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Casebook of Management for Nonprofit Organizations

Entrepreneurship and Organizational Change in the Human Services
About the Author

Dennis R. Young is Professor at the W. Averell Harriman College for Policy Analysis and Public Management at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, and is a member of the Visiting Faculty of the Program on Non-Profit Organizations, at the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University.
Case book of Management for Nonprofit Organizations: Entrepreneurship and Organizational Change in the Human Services is a monographic supplement to the journal Administration in Social Work, Volume 8 (1984). It is not supplied as part of the subscription to the journal, but is available from the Publisher at an additional charge.

Administration in Social Work is a quarterly journal devoted to the theory and practice of management and administration in social work and related human service fields.

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The Haworth Press, Inc., 10 Alice Street, Binghamton, NY 13904-1580, USA

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Young, Dennis R., 1943-
Casebook of management for nonprofit organizations.

HAWORTH SERIES IN SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION, VOLUME #2

"A monographic supplement to Administration in social work, volume 8, 1984."
Includes bibliographical references.
II. Title
HV91.Y68 1984 361.3'068 84-9040
ISBN 0-86656-352-0 (pbk.)
In memory of my beloved father, Dr. Nathan Young, an accomplished educator whose dedication, high standards, and keen wit will ever remain an inspiration.
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Foreword

The use of original case studies for teaching and learning has a long history. Some institutions base a substantial part of their curricula on the case method. In the social services too, case analysis has occupied a key position in preparing practitioners to assume professional responsibilities in social agencies. Paradoxically, the professional literature is largely barren of useful cases. Student recording of organizational experiences, on the other hand, is almost universally required.

In this volume, a serious and informed observer has undertaken the task of preparing detailed and pointed but concise case studies. A sophisticated social scientist, he conducted a series of interviews and observations with leading management actors in a variety of human service organizations, and distilled the most relevant behaviors in order to cast light on the inner workings of organizational leadership. Dr. Young has here moved successfully between the shoals of too great brevity and too elaborate detail, with a view to making each case situation available for ready discussion and analysis.

While stressing entrepreneurship, these studies deal with a variety of aspects of organizational life and touch upon a number of social policy issues. They provide vivid material on innovation, change and organizational growth, detailing constraints and opportunities grasped by creative and skilled executives. The settings of the studies differ in a number of ways. Those who have an interest in understanding the problems of serving children will find a rich lode of professional insight. Others will recognize problems and dilemmas faced by their organizations. Students will find rich material for reflection and study, for here are live, "real" people, many known widely in the field.

The individual studies concentrate on a special aspect of executive leadership—the entrepreneurial spirit, exploring and seizing opportunities for establishing and extending human services. In this sense they deal with particular ways of engineering organizational change.

Teachers will welcome these recorded experiences for use in the human service classroom. Administrators will find an abundance of illustration of principles of management practice.

This volume is an important contribution to the social organizational
literature. One hopes it will stimulate others to pursue the example here provided.

Simon Slavin
Editor, Administration in Social Work
Professor of Social Administration
and Founding Dean Emeritus
Temple University
Preface

Case studies have long been a mainstay of education for management of organizations in the commercial sector of the economy. Theory and methods courses are essential too, but the idea behind case studies is that the overall complexity and richness of management problems and life in organizations can best be appreciated and understood by experiencing them—if not directly then at least through the eyes of others as related through case material.

In the area of human services, case material has not, to this point in time, been commonly available or commonly used. One reason for this is that education for human services has put much less emphasis on management and administration than has education for business, or education for government for that matter. The human services, largely concentrated in the nonprofit sector of the economy, are administered by specialized professionals, highly trained in the treatment or technical methodologies of their disciplines—social work, health care, education, the arts—with normally just a smattering of management training added in.

This is changing. Human service organizations in the current economy of scarce resources and efficiency-minded funding sources have come to realize the importance of good management. And education programs for the human services are beginning to put greater emphasis on rigorous managerial training. Indeed, health administration, arts administration, and other areas of human services administration have begun to develop into important and self-contained specialties in their own right.

Which brings us back to case studies. Those who are now being educated for administration in the human services require case materials drawn from these service areas, as existing materials from the business or government sectors can be stretched only so far in order to portray the kinds of experiences human services administrators will face. The collection of cases presented in this volume is intended to address the present lacuna.

These cases are addressed to particular aspects of human services management—the processes of new program development and the management of organizational change. There is particular emphasis here on entrepreneurial activity, that is, enterprising behavior by administrators and other leaders of human service organizations. Thus, just as in the commercial sector, entrepreneurs or enterprising individuals are seen as linchpins or catalytic agents that help set important organizational changes and
program developments in motion, and are largely responsible for their successful implementation. This too, is a view that has been neglected in the education of human service administrators, heretofore, and which needs to become a part of such curricula in the future.

The cases here are not widely spread over all areas of human services. Indeed they are concentrated largely on developments in child welfare, though this is broadly construed to encompass not only foster care but also management information systems, mental health care, education, preventive and community-based services, management consulting, diagnostic service programs, programs for runaway youth, and general youth programming. Generically, however, the cases deal with a wide array of types of organizational change, ranging from development of new programs to the birth of new organizations, the merger of organizations, and the expansion and diversification of the service offerings of various agencies. Moreover, the cases touch on many other intrinsic aspects of organizational administration including management of professionals and other staff, working with trustees, financing of programs through government and private sources, coping with governmental regulatory processes, and managing relationships with organizational clients and constituent groups. The cases also cut across sector lines; while most of the cases are based in the nonprofit sector, three cases are drawn from the governmental sector, as well. Thus, the cases are believed to have a very wide band of application for human service administrators not only in social services, but in other professional services areas as well.

The cases were originally developed as part of a research project on entrepreneurship in nonprofit organizations, under sponsorship of the Program on Non-Profit Organizations in the Institution for Social and Policy Studies of Yale University. The cases contributed to a theory of nonprofit organizational behavior and have since been refined as teaching material, successfully tested in courses in nonprofit organizational management at the State University of New York at Stony Brook and at Yale University. As they are written in nontechnical, easy-to-read language, students enjoy them and digest them quickly. They seem to be most effectively used as the basis of open seminar-style discussions of particular issues or lessons the instructor may wish to draw from a given case. As the introductory chapter indicates, the possible choices for such topics are manifold, and thus the cases quite flexibly inserted into the menus of management courses in a variety of ways. However, there is also great value in allowing the cases to speak for themselves. Having read the cases, students often come up with their own interpretations and ideas on what might have happened or what should have been done in the

circumstances described. As a teacher, I have often found that the most interesting way to use the cases is to keep my own preconceived notions in check, and to allow the interchange among intelligent graduate students to take its own course.

*Dennis R. Young*
Acknowledgments

I owe a very special thanks to John G. Simon for his guidance and unwavering support throughout this project. I would also like to thank Richard R. Nelson and Harry Weiner for their particular suggestions and general encouragement. Joseph B. Gavrin, who has since passed away, gave me unique assistance and insights for which I am especially grateful. Barbara Blum and Susan Della Sala provided valued help, as well.

Many other people, too numerous to mention, at Yale and Stony Brook, and within the child care and nonprofit areas at large also gave generously of their time. I am especially grateful to those entrepreneurs and officials documented in the cases of this book, and in other cases that did not make it into this volume, who freely opened themselves to my inquiries. I hope the contents presented here are faithful to their trust.

I also want to give special thanks to Si Slavin and Bill Cohen for their confidence in me, their suggestions for the style and format of the book, and for their editorial guidance.

Writing books like this is especially difficult without competent secretarial support. In this instance, the work involved transcription of tapes as well as typing of voluminous manuscripts. Thus I would like to acknowledge Ella Selmquist, Andrea Compton, Marilyn Mandell, and Patricia Schlee, and give a very special thank you to Sandy Nuhn whose talents, dedication, and organizational skills kept my head above water during the initial period of transcription and writing.

This work has been supported by the Program on Non-Profit Organizations, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University.

Dennis R. Young
September, 1983
Introduction

Since 'tis Nature's law to change,
Constancy alone is strange

—John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester (17th Century)

An important strand of the theory and literature on organizations and bureaucracy centers on the notion that formal organizations permit society to carry out its ongoing functions more efficiently by structuring work into programmed tasks and sequences. By extension, the management of such organizations can be viewed as a routine control and support function—pushing the right buttons, making the right corrections, providing regular supervision and administrative services, and so on, so that organizations continue to operate smoothly and reliably in a steady state. No doubt, mastery of the routine aspects of administration are essential to successful organizational management. But routine administration is by no means the most interesting nor even the most important part of effective organizational management, in the human services or elsewhere in the economy.

It is perhaps trite to indicate that human service agencies, like organizations in other industries, are dynamic entities. They must adapt to changes in their social and economic environments and they must respond to the advance of professional knowledge and scientific technology. To stand still in a changing world is to invite organizational disaster. Thus a key to successful management, especially in the long run, is the understanding of how and why organizations undertake change and how changes in programs and organizational structure can be effectively developed and administered. Indeed, the appropriate image of a successful manager may be less that of controller and facilitator of routine services, than that of leader and entrepreneur—a person who can chart a clear and confidence-inspiring course for his organization and pull together the various elements needed to implement such plans successfully. In the human services particularly, the entrepreneurial role has not been well understood. Narrowly interpreted, the term “entrepreneur” conjures up images of profit making and wheeling and dealing for purposes of self-interest. But as the cases in this volume graphically illustrate, there is much more to it than this. Entrepreneuring in the human services involves a wide variety of motivations—selfish and unselfish—and it is a function that is essential to the ability of human service organizations to carry out their acknowledged, legitimate societal missions.
It is worth a note of clarification to mention that while entrepreneurship is central to managing an organization’s successful adaptation to change, entrepreneurship is not precisely congruent with the responsibilities of executive leadership. Entrepreneurship entails identifying a new concept or idea, e.g., a new service to be offered or a new way of providing an existing service, garnering resources and support, planning and advocating, and overseeing implementation of a venture—in short, doing whatever is necessary to move a project from concept to reality. Executive leadership, in contrast, entails a much more general set of responsibilities, for organizational change, as well as for organizational maintenance and stability.

To expand on this point, various routine or day-to-day aspects of organizational life must be tended to by executives—much of this routine activity legitimately characterized as leadership. For instance, a top executive must serve as a good role model for his subordinates, personifying enthusiasm, proper work habits, and style so as to maintain employees’ morale through exhortation and example, and to convey the organization’s values and ideology (what recent writers on corporate management have called superordinate goals).

To the contrary, entrepreneurship, a nonroutine function, while it clearly involves leadership behavior, can to an extent be delegated by executives to other staff members by granting them sufficient autonomy and resources. Board members or trustees may also involve themselves in enterprising activity on behalf of the organization. Some staff may even specialize in entrepreneurial projects rather than routine administrative responsibilities, just as some executives may farm out as much routine administration as possible so as to concentrate on enterprising. (See the GLIE and Sanctuary cases for contrasting examples.)

In short, entrepreneurship and executive leadership are not full coincident: Entrepreneurs in an organization may not be executives, though they are leaders in a general sense, and executives may not be entrepreneurs. However, as an empirical matter, the correlation between the two roles is strong. And one thing seems certain—successful executive management of human service organizations in a dynamic world requires that the entrepreneurial function be adequately provided for, one way or another. Such provision may entail direct and intensive executive involvement in enterprising activity, as in the cases of Greer and GLIE presented here, or it may involve, as in the Huntington Sanctuary case, establishing an effective organizational regime within which the executive can encourage, nurture, control, and otherwise facilitate new ventures undertaken by staff.

How then can the management of entrepreneurship and organizational change be learned? Probably not very well through textbooks or even case studies. Experience is always the best teacher. However, as an initial exposure, case studies do have the distinct advantage of relating the actual
Introduction

experiences of real administrators and managers and other leaders who have been responsible for carrying out important projects that have altered the faces of organizations, brought new organizations into existence, and have had significant effects and implications for the industries in which they have taken place. Learning the lessons embedded in these cases should help aspiring managers and even those with some managerial experience to embark on their own ventures with some confidence and awareness of the principles they should apply, the factors they should be aware of, and the pitfalls and opportunities that may lie ahead. Perhaps such study will reduce some of the “trial” in the unavoidably trial-and-error process of mastering this subject, and will help to minimize the prospects of failure, either failure by commission of strategic errors, or failure to recognize or exploit circumstances where enterprising activity is appropriate or opportune.

Before fleshing out some of the perspectives and management lessons on which instructors may wish to have their students focus their attentions and discussions, a few words on the selection and structure of the cases themselves is in order. Since the human services are delivered primarily through public and private nonprofit organizations, and because the objective of this volume is to provide educational material illuminating the management of change in primarily professional rather than commercial contexts, the cases here are confined to public and nonprofit enterprise. Moreover, the balance of cases take place in the private, nonprofit sector where the dearth of managerial case studies has been particularly acute. It should be noted, however, that all but one of the private, nonprofit cases involve considerable interaction with government, and that virtually all of the cases reflect the importance of the government–voluntary sector relationships that pervade delivery of human services in the U.S.—relationships that human service managers must deal with, no matter what the sector to which their organizations formally belong.

The cases are grouped into four categories and subcategories according to the type of venture, and the particular sector of the economy within which a case takes place. Most of the cases (11 in all) take place in the private, nonprofit sector and within this collection cases involve three different types of activity: the founding of new organizations from scratch; the founding of new organizations under the wing of existing or parent agencies; and the development of major new programs or expansion of activities by existing organizations.

Three cases of human service ventures in the government sector are also presented. These provide some perspective on differences in incentives, constraints, motivations, problems, and opportunities, between government and the private, nonprofit sector. One of the public sector cases concerns the establishment of a new organization (youth bureau); the other two focus on the development of new programs within the context of existing organizations. As indicated in the Preface, all the cases
cluster in the general field of child welfare but range very widely in terms of particular services and programs within this field. Moreover, as elaborated below, the cases concentrate on generic management problems and aspects of organizational change that apply to a very wide spectrum of organizations dealing with professional or human services.

A comment on the methodology of construction of the cases is in order at this point. As noted in the Preface, the cases originally contributed to a theoretical study of behavior of nonprofit organizations. In that context, a variety of different types of ventures, along the lines noted above, were sought. Through various types of (formal and informal) inquiry, organizations which had exhibited each variety of venture (establishing a new organization, developing a new program, etc.) within recent memory were identified. The rationale was that cases that had transpired recently would offer better access to the principal actors involved, greater accuracy of memory of these actors, and greater availability of written documentation.

Ultimately twenty-one cases were identified in organizations whose decision-makers agreed to cooperate. (All of these cases were written up. Three took place in the proprietary sector. Fourteen of the remaining eighteen cases were selected for this volume.) In each case, as many of the principal actors as possible were interviewed extensively by the author. Interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed. Available written materials such as annual reports, minutes, proposals and other documents were studied as well, and, where possible, outside observers were also consulted. The cases were each written up in draft form and circulated to those interviewed to check accuracy, and subsequently revised and edited. As presented here, the cases provide the available facts, the views of the principal actors, and the author’s suggested interpretation and explanation of events.

In order to facilitate comparative discussion and analysis of the cases, they are all structured into a uniform format. Each case is divided into nine sections, each of which describes a particular dimension to the case, as follows:

Précis. This is a short overview summarizing what the venture is, when and where it took place, and a brief glimpse of its character.

The Entrepreneur(s). This section briefly introduces the key participants and indicates some of the history, skills, philosophy, and motivations of these individuals.

The Organization(s). Here an overview is given of the organizational context in which the venture takes place. This includes characterization of the parent organization(s)—if the venture is a new internal program,

spin-off, or a merger—and if applicable, a description of the new organization.

**Chronology of Events.** This is simply a list in chronological order of the key events leading to and culminating in the implementation of the venture at issue. This section is intended to serve as a convenient reference for the reader, to guide him in tracking the sequence of events.

**Context.** This section discusses the social context in which the venture takes place. This includes demographic, economic, and social trends, as well as developments in the professional disciplines that served as stimulative and long-run determining factors influencing the case.

**Choices.** This section describes the strategic choices facing the managers and entrepreneurs in the case, the alternatives they considered, and the reasons they selected particular courses of action.

**Risks and Constraints.** Here the professional, personal, organizational, and financial risks facing decision-makers are described and assessed, and the financial, regulatory, bureaucratic, political, and other constraining factors that inhibited the venture’s implementation or affected its form, are identified and discussed.

**Outcomes.** This section tells what ultimately came of the venture, as of a given cutoff date (approximately mid-1979) when documentation was completed. Some sense of the ultimate success or failure of the venture can be gleaned from this presentation.

**Analysis.** This is a brief discussion that brings together various aspects of the case and suggests a way to crystallize and summarize why the venture took place in its particular form and circumstances. A sense of the overall “chemistry” required to carry off the venture is indicated here.

**LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES**

What is the student of management and administration in the human services to learn from these cases? To answer this question, let us begin with the premise previously stated that successfully managing a human service organization requires the ability to guide and inspire programmatic and organizational change, not only the ability to ride out storms and trends in the organizational environment but perhaps more importantly to anticipate requirements for change and to lead an organization through constructive adaptations in advance of debilitating crises. This ability in turn requires that the manager have: (1) a good understanding of how and why major changes in organizations take place and what factors shape the outcomes of efforts to change, and (2) a mastery of strategies and techniques and a knowledge of the prerequisites for successfully implementing and managing change. In the following few pages, an overview of the perspectives and lessons that can be drawn from the cases will be presented. The intent here is to identify some of the important points
instructors may wish to emphasize and have discussed by their students. There is no claim of comprehensiveness here, however. Each case is sufficiently rich in detail that instructors or students are likely to draw many other perspectives, interpretations, and management lessons of general value on the subject of change or on other managerial questions such as management styles, organizational relationships, and so on. Indeed this flexibility represents much of the educational value of case studies per se. The cases are meant to be provocative and to challenge the reader, but neither the following discussion nor even the analyses presented in each of the cases constitute the last word. Rather, this material is meant to be suggestive, and perhaps a good jumping off point from which further discussion can take place.

**General Perspectives on How and Why Change Takes Place**

At least four different lessons may be drawn from the cases here on the subject of why and when major changes take place in human service organizations. These lessons repeat themselves throughout the cases, but here we shall highlight only a few important instances.

The first important perspective is that changes often occur as part of a process of solving an important internal organizational problem. The second perspective is that changes are driven by entrepreneurs who are in the right place at the right time and devote great amounts of energy to the project, for a variety of strong personal motives. The third perspective is that changes at the organization level usually reflect trends and long-term developments in the social, economic, and technological environment of the organization. Fourth, change often reflects the crystallization of some important, new idea.

**Problem Solving**

A pessimist could survey the cases in this book and observe that organizational crises are the seedbed of change and that unfortunately organizational managers and trustees tend not to see far enough ahead to head off such crises with reforms earlier on. An optimist on the other hand, would note that severe crises often allow organizations to change in ways that make them much stronger and healthier in the end. Both perspectives seem to have strong elements of truth. Financial crises and related difficulties with the quality and workload of organizational services are prominent among the cases and seem often to be at the root of impending change. For example, Seabury Barn, a residential program for runaway youth sponsored by the Smith Haven Ministries (SHM), was a compromise component of a package proposal to a state funding agency designed to shore up the Ministries financial condition and allow it to honor its serious debt obligations.
Sometimes financial problems are tied closely to workload problems. Characteristic of many charitable organizations, Smith Haven Ministries and the Group Child Care Consultant Services (GCCCS) were overextended in terms of the services they wanted to provide their needy clientele, compared to the resources that were available to provide these services. A new program and a reorganization followed from these circumstances, respectively. The Harlem-Dowling program sponsored by the Spence-Chapin organization was also inspired in part by an economic overburden the agency faced with its foster care program, and a desire to avoid having its foster care program overwhelm the main agenda of adoption and research and demonstration programs that Spence-Chapin considered its principal mission.

Quality problems sometimes couple with financial difficulties to inspire change. The two spectacular examples of the Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund and Greer-Woodycrest Children’s Services illustrate how the greatest successes in organizational growth, development, modernization, and efficiency, can follow from the depths of physical plant and service deterioration and management stagnation. Greer and Florida Sheriffs are classic “turnaround” situations.

Finally, serious “image” problems that impair and threaten an organization’s relationships with its supporters and constituents may be seen to inspire change. In the case of Greer, the perception of low quality by state regulators was a serious blow and impetus to reform. In the case of Florida Sheriffs, it was the poor public image of the sheriffs as law-enforcement officials that prompted their organization to get into the business of helping troubled youth. And in the case of the Pleasantville Diagnostic Center of the Jewish Child Care Association (JCCA), the perceptions of New York City officials and others in the child care community, that JCCA, especially its Pleasantville campus, was an institution only for well-behaved, white Jewish children, stung at a time when the social priorities required service to troubled minority children. In all these instances, the image problem contributed to an impetus to do something to reverse those outside perceptions, perceptions which represented a serious long run threat to the viability of the organizations involved.

**Entrepreneurs**

It is impossible to read the cases here without realizing that the energies, drives, and skills of entrepreneuring managers or other leaders are crucial to the formulation, launching, implementation, and nurturing of new programs and organizations. It is clear in many of the cases that the particular organizational changes might never have occurred without the right entrepreneurial characters in place at the particular time. For example, the Group Live-In Experience (GLIE) in the South Bronx, the Sagamore outpatient program, and the Melville House on Long Island, are
special and unusual programs that are uniquely associated with particular social entrepreneurs and seem unlikely to have come into existence without them. There seems to be no inevitability surrounding such innovations, and without their entrepreneurial roots there seems to be no reason to believe that something like them would have sprung up in a proximate time and place.

In other cases, where alternate ventures might have filled in the vacant market niches, the entrepreneurs clearly put their individual stamps on the character of the programs they inspired, and at the least could be credited with ventures their organizations would not otherwise have undertaken or succeeded in. Greer, for example, or Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund, might not have survived at all, much less develop into the organizational pathbreakers they eventually became, were it not for the fortuitous employment of Harry Weaver and Ian Morrison, respectively, at crucial times in the histories of these organizations. While in cases such as the Child Welfare Information Service, the Sanctuary Program of the Huntington Youth Bureau, and the Brookhaven Youth Bureau, it seems clear that some programs like these would eventually have come along (with other leaders at the helm), the expediency with which they did develop, and the particular form they took, derived much of their substance from the ideas and energies of the entrepreneurial characters, Joe Gavrin, Andy Casazza, and Tom Williams, respectively.

Finally, it is of interest to note that the opportunity to make money or to gain other material rewards is not necessarily the essential or even most common motivation underlying enterprising behavior in the human services. Contrary to the stereotypical concept of the entrepreneur, financial return is not the sole engine of venture even in the profit-making sector, and certainly not in the not-for-profit parts of the economy. A perusal of the cases here reveals that motivations vary widely. They include: artistic-like urges to build and create; the seeking of status or inner satisfaction from professional achievement and accomplishment; a psychological need to test oneself and prove that one is capable of carrying off a major project or program; pursuit of innate desires to help, teach, or serve the less fortunate members of society; intellectual satisfaction from shaping and implementing new ideas; the achievement of personal recognition, power, and social status; the urge to control people and events; the fulfillment of strong social or religious beliefs or causes; a desire for autonomy and independence (to be one's own boss); maternal-like satisfactions of parenting an enterprise and seeing it grow; and material security and gain. Thus the entrepreneurs encountered in the cases here are quite a diverse group, ranging from the grandiose builders like Bert Beck, Jay Goldsmith, and Ian Morrison to the outspoken and unencumbered firebrand Lorraine Reilly, to the soft-spoken, behind-the-scenes facilitators like Joe Gavrin and Peter Ryan, to the persistent idealists like Tom Williams and
Ken Goldman, to the highly professional achievers Jane Edwards, Andy Casazza, and Mary Hagamen, to the very businesslike Harry Weaver, to the almost reluctant enterpriser and devoted educator in the person of Alan Keith-Lucas. But this diversity of motives and styles belies certain strong common traits that bind these entrepreneurial characters together—the intense energies and commitments they have exhibited in pursuing their objectives in clear, single-minded, and opportune fashion.

The Environment

While each venture is impressive and somewhat unique in its own right, each case may also been seen as a current or eddy in a stream of social, economic, and technological change. No organization changes in a vacuum, and most organizational changes signal larger changes taking place in the environment. Thus, while individual ventures and program developments may not be inevitable manifestations of environmental trends, at the very least these ventures tend to blossom when developments in that environment signal that “their time has come.”

Technological change, for example, is reflected in the case of the Child Welfare Information Service (CWIS) where the advent of the computer makes inevitable improved information processing for management of child care agencies in the New York City system, and prompts the agencies to take initiative in this direction. Or, in the case of the Sagamore Outpatient Clinic, new professional knowledge of mental retardation and autism in children influenced the development of new, noninstitutional services.

Changes in the economic environment also have a strong influence in prompting enterprising behavior. In the instance of Harlem-Dowling, for example, the New York City fiscal crisis severely depressed the per diem rates which the City could pay for child care, at first delaying the possibility of launching this new agency, but eventually creating such strains on the parent agency (Spence-Chapin) that cutting the new agency loose became imperative.

Demographic trends may be seen to underlie much of the economic pressure that influences the development of new ventures in the human services. In the case of the Jewish Board of Family and Children’s Services (JBFCS), a merger of two Jewish agencies in New York City reflected the need for services consolidation in a region where the Jewish population was declining. By contrast, the case of Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund illustrates how a venture can ride a demographic trend to prosperity, in this instance, the growing elderly population in Florida which generated a strong element of voluntary contributions through estate planning.

Demographic change may be observed to have a much more pervasive
influence on enterprise in human services than just what is felt through direct economic effects. The increase in the youth population in Brookhaven Town, for example, was a major justification for the establishment of the Youth Bureau in that location while that same trend in nearby Huntington Town and surrounding Suffolk County underlay the developments of the Sanctuary program in Huntington and Smith Haven Ministries’ Seabury Barn, respectively. Similarly the turnover of youth and family populations in New York City, featuring a large influx of racial minorities, played a large part in stimulating the program developments of Greer-Woodycrest Children’s Services, Pleasantville Diagnostic Center, Harlem-Dowling, and other cases in this volume.

Other kinds of social changes also influence organizational enterprise in important ways. The growing phenomenon of runaway youth in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, was a direct antecedent of the programs presented in the GLIE, Sanctuary, and Seabury Barn case studies. And the deterioration of urban centers such as the South Bronx or the Lower East Side of New York helped inspire the GLIE and Lower East Side Family Union (LESFU) projects. Finally, important shifts in the role and character of government social services policies overtime underlie a number of the changes described in the case studies. Demands for greater accountability in the public sector, for example, directly influenced the development of projects like CWIS which would provide better information to monitor child care agencies under contract to government, while the deinstitutionalization movements in mental health and retardation, social services, and criminal justice, which deemphasized residential care in favor of services delivered in the community, underwrote elements of the GLIE, Sagamore, and LESFU cases.

In short, it is almost always necessary to ask where an individual venture fits into the “big picture” of social, economic, and technical change, in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of why a given enterprise developed in the particular time, place, and form that it did. Even where particular ventures seem to buck the trends, such as the Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund case, which grew solely on private, philanthropic funding at a time when dependence of social service agencies on government funds was generally dramatically increasing, they can be understood by studying the local context, in this case, the growing elderly population and the political conservatism of Florida.

Ideas

It is striking how often the strength of simple but profound new ideas or concepts serve to inspire and crystallize program developments. Such ideas may capture the essential purpose or character of ventures, hence their articulation gives the participating parties the vision they need to push the enterprise forward and rally its supporters. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this phenomenon. In the Child Welfare Information
Service case, the idea that "information is power" played an important motivating role, and the desire for shared control over such information underlay much of the energy for the child care agencies to develop a management information system of their own before the government developed one in which they would have little part. In the Huntington Sanctuary, Brookhaven Youth Bureau, LESFU, and JBFCS cases, the "model" of a comprehensive mental health or social service delivery system that coordinates various kinds of services from different sources or divisions provided the essential design principle by which these enterprises were developed. In the case of LESFU and Harlem-Dowling, the concept of social service agencies having to be firmly rooted into the local communities and populations they service also played a central inspirational role.

Professional concepts, reflecting current disciplinary thinking in social work, mental health, and related fields provide the intellectual cores around which various other programmatic developments grow. For example, the idea of comprehensive problem diagnosis prior to foster care placement formed the conceptual foundation for the Pleasantville venture, while the concepts of deinstitutionalization and preventive services clearly influenced the Sagamore and LESFU developments.

Reform strategies also may constitute the central idea. In the case of Sagamore Children’s Center, Mary Hagamen devised the "inside/out" notion to convert the center from inpatient to outpatient emphasis over time, while in the Pleasantville case, Jake Trobe saw the diagnostic center as a "foot in the door" that would eventually turn the program emphasis of the whole agency around. In both these cases, the entrepreneurs worked with an explicit concept of incremental or evolutionary reform, envisioning how their initial projects would set in motion a long-term sequence of constructive change.

In short, the context of organizational problems, the presence of entrepreneurial energies, skills, and motivation; trends in the social, economic, and technological environment; and the conception and articulation of key ideas seem to constitute much of the basic chemistry leading to important organizational changes and program developments. For the human services manager it is well to be able to recognize these circumstances and prerequisites if one is to be capable of fostering change by planting the seeds of reform into fertile soil. But what of the nurturing of these seeds and resultant seedlings? What lessons can we draw from the cases, for the successful management of change? We turn to this question next.

**Principles of Managing Change**

There are of course no cookbook solutions to successfully carrying off the development of a major programmatic or organizational enterprise. Every venture is different and of necessity a large degree of adaptation and "learning while doing" must take place, even for seasoned managers
and leaders in longstanding organizations. But a perusal of the cases here reveals a surprising number of common principles and lessons that seem to underlie success, and these seem worth fleshing out for consideration:

(1) Styles of administration must be adapted to fit the circumstances. Most managers and leaders have their own personal styles of administration. Some prefer tight centralized control and others put more emphasis on delegation of responsibilities and decentralized control. Some prefer expansion and development of large organizations, and others lean to spinning off new programs as autonomous units, and so on. Similarly, organizations develop their own cultures, policies, and styles of administration over time, which may reflect their size, diversity, age, sources of support, and programmatic objectives. Certainly a wide variety of organizational structures and administrative styles is reflected in the fourteen cases presented here.

It is interesting, however, that the form in which new program developments are administered is not always consistent either with the intrinsic preferences of the guiding entrepreneur nor with the historical style of the organization in which the developments take place. Rather, the styles and strategies for new developments often seem to follow an internal logic dictated by the intrinsic concepts and environmental circumstances in which they are built.

There are several noteworthy examples of this in the cases here. Harlem-Dowling was an embryonic program in the Spence-Chapin agency whose executive style was tight central control. Yet the logic of the program, its ability to function as an indigenous agency to the Harlem community, required a loosening of such control and eventually a letting go entirely. It took discipline on the part of the guiding executive, Jane Edwards, to allow this to happen. A similar case in point is LESFU, a program also built on the concept of indigenous local operation and on the principle of coordinating packages of social services from a number of different local social service organizations. Yet LESFU started out as a program within the Henry Street Settlement under direction of Bert Beck whose intrinsic preferences were to maintain and expand the repertoire of programs under his direct jurisdiction. However, the logic of the program and the cooperation of other local agencies dictated otherwise. Again, Beck had the insight and discipline to let go.

In various other cases, there is more harmony between the logic and requirements of the fledgling program and the intrinsic preferences of the entrepreneur or the style of the parent agency. Joe Gavrin, for example, was perfectly happy to move the CWIS program outside of his Council on Voluntary Child Care Agencies (COVCCA) both as a logical step in its development and as a way of keeping COVCCA in the small and informal style he preferred. And Jay Goldsmith was content, even enthusiastic, to decentralize the JBFCS in order to make management of this very large
new agency more viable. So too, the expansive style of Ian Morrison fit
the strategy of expansion through merger on which his agency was em-
barked. In still other cases, however, the reluctance of the entrepreneur to
adapt his or her management style to what the program change appeared
to require seemed to cause problems. Alan Keith-Lucas's reluctance to
get too heavily involved in administration may have held back the needed
formalization of GCCCS, for example, when that agency was growing
quickly and running into substantial financial and other management dif-
ficulties. And, while the fierce, antibureaucratic rebellious style of Mary
Hagamen served her well when her program was in vogue and outside
funding was available, it may have come back to haunt her when the cir-
cumstances changed and the bureaucrats were back in the driver's seat.

A relevant aside here is that the complex and multifaceted require-
ments for management and entrepreneurial leadership may sometimes be
divided into subspecialities, allowing the skills and styles of alternative
officers to better match the requirements of the job to be done. In several
cases here, this takes the form of having a "Mr. Outside" and a "Mr. In-
side." For example, in the Pleasantville case, Jake Trobe is the dominant
figure in dealing with the outside world and with his agency's overall
governance and administration, but Paul Steinfeld is given the respon-
sibility for implementing the project itself and running it on a day-to-day
basis. Similarly, in the Harlem-Dowling case, Jane Edwards is the head
honcho but Joe Smith is given responsibility for laying the groundwork in
the Harlem community, and initially implementing and running the pro-
gram. In these cases and others, the chief executives were able to organ-
ize themselves in a manner which met the projects' requirements with-
out cramping their personal administrative styles. In the case of LESFU,
on the other hand, finding an adequate Mr. Inside proved to be a problem.

In short, entrepreneurs may be able to pick and choose their ventures,
and organize their agencies, in a manner consistent with their administra-
tive and leadership styles, but sometimes the intrinsic concepts behind the
innovation being implemented, or particular stages in the development of
those projects, require adaptation and rethinking of administrative strate-
gies to ensure continued success.

(2) Managing change requires sensitivity to staff, trustees, and consti-
tuents.

Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to
better.

—Richard Hooker, in the "English Dictionary"
(16th Century)

Change is, by definition, disruptive. In human service organizations it
affects the welfare of a number of important groups of participants—
staff, trustees, clients, and the like. Given that successful implementation of change usually requires (at least the passive) cooperation of these participants, an important tenet in the management of change is to deal sensitively with them—bringing them along in partnership, or at least making them aware of why certain painful adjustments or compromises need to be made; giving credit for their support and sacrifice; distributing benefits and costs in a manner that is perceived as fair and reasonable; and respecting existing loyalties, sentimentalities, and personal principles where possible.

Certain of the cases present examples of such sensitive behavior in clear terms. The JBFCS case involved the merger of two agencies with long traditions, loyal staff and boards members, and ties to their client communities. Most of the energy in carrying out the merger was spent on working out arrangements that would minimize the dislocations and relieve the anxieties of those involved, while still accomplishing the consolidation objectives. Meetings, discussions, training sessions, protocols for allocating positions on the board and staff, "massaging personalities," and paying meticulous attention to the language employed to describe what was being done—for example emphasizing the concept of a "marriage of equals"—dominated the proceedings. Even so, the proposed merger almost failed because of sensitive feelings on both sides of the aisle.

The case of the Brookhaven Youth Bureau provides another good example of sensitive management. Here, because the program was to be implemented in the local public sector, the entrepreneur Tom Williams was meticulous in his efforts to build bipartisan support in order to minimize the risks facing the council members he had gotten behind the effort. He was careful to give credit for the successes, however, and to propose service patterns that benefitted alternative local jurisdictions in a balanced way. The Pleasantville case provides another such example, where an explicit incremental change strategy was adopted in part to bring anxious staff members along slowly, rather than to try to impose a sudden radical shift in clientele upon them.

The Harlem-Dowling case is even more intriguing in this respect. Anxieties of staff members understandably nervous about breaking away from the parent agency were here balanced against the growing impatience of would-be board members of the new agency whose autonomy had been delayed. Here management had to stroke two different groups whose interests were at odds with one another.

In other cases, an inadequate degree of sensitivity may have accounted for problems in implementing or maintaining the venture at issue. In the LESFU case, tensions between research- and demonstration-oriented management and service-oriented staff members were not very well ameliorated. And in the Sagamore case, inattention to the sagging morale of
the staff of the contracting inpatient department may have contributed to conditions that eventually became unstable.

Clearly, sensitivity to affected groups cannot dominate the scenarios of change, else too often nothing would be done. Too many have vested interests in the status quo. Hard decisions need to be made, such as in the Greer case where longstanding staff members had to be let go. But the realization that changes will be painful and that successful change can depend on ameliorating that discomfort seems to be a key element in the successful management of major change.

(3) Being creative. Just as problem solving often forms the basis of enterprising behavior, creative solutions to problems frequently seem to spell the difference between the successful implementation of a venture and its stagnation or failure. In a number of the cases, stubborn operational difficulties threatened the viability of whole initiatives and efforts to develop and implement new programs. At the same time, creative thinking—formulating new alternatives or new ways of approaching the problem—saved the day. These creative solutions, though modest in concept, had the common characteristic of being out of the ordinary, demonstrating the need for enterprisers to avoid the mental rut of always going by the book, but rather thinking things out afresh when conventional ways of doing things do not work.

A few examples from the cases will suffice to illustrate the point. In the instance of GLIE, the ordinary procedures for certifying the new agency had led to stalemate. Someone (Barbara Blum of the State Board of Social Welfare) came up with the bright idea of putting the new program under the wing of an existing agency. The solution was obvious, but only in retrospect. Similarly, in the Florida Sheriffs experience, a restrictive trust stood in the way of plans to diversify and expand beyond programs for boys. Harry Weaver conceived the bright idea of setting up multiple corporations at least as a way of circumventing the restrictions in the short run, and as a way of demonstrating to the courts later on that the restrictions had to be lifted. It was not a conventional solution, but it worked. In the Jewish Board of Family and Children’s Services case, there was a problem of who would become the board president of the newly merged agency. A Solomon-like arrangement was developed whereby the board presidency would go to the current board president of one of the merging agencies, but then shift to his counterpart in the other agency for a longer term after a given period of time. Unusual, but it was accepted.

The managerial lesson in all of this is straightforward enough, if not so easy to carry out in practice: explore all the angles and don’t be confined by the conventional ways of doing things. A simple solution to a knotty operational problem may mean the difference between success and failure.
(4) **Enterprise requires risk-taking.** Classically, commercial entrepreneurship is commonly associated with risk-taking of a financial nature. There is some of this kind of risk-taking in the public and nonprofit human services as well. In cases such as Melville House or the Brookhaven Youth Bureau, the entrepreneurs faced personal financial sacrifice, at least in the short run, and put their future incomes at risk.

Still, if the cases here are at all typical, financial risk-taking does not seem to be the primary gamble for those who guide new ventures and undertake major programmatic change in the human services. Rather such individuals appear to go out on a limb in other ways, perhaps more courageous ways than simply financial peril. Specifically, these leaders often put their professional and managerial reputations on the line, and risk the security of their jobs, by undertaking bold initiatives whose consequences cannot be fully anticipated. Moreover, the process of organizational change and the success of major new ventures seems to depend importantly on the willingness of entrepreneurs to assume such risks.

In several of the cases, the ventures involved controversial new programs, which if they failed would invite the disdain of professional peers. In the Harlem-Dowling case, for example, there were more than enough naysayers who thought it was foolish to try to establish a new human services agency in the rocky social soil of Harlem. As a fledgling executive director, Mrs. Edwards faced potential ridicule from fellow social workers and loss of effectiveness as an administrator if the venture had backfired. Similarly, Jake Trobe and Paul Steinfeld perceived themselves as playing with fire in their effort to establish a diagnostic center for potentially violent and disruptive children on their campus at Pleasantville. One serious incident might have jeopardized the project and the long-term reform strategy it spearheaded, and would have put the future personal effectiveness of these administrators in doubt as well. The case of the Huntington Sanctuary program is similar. One serious incident associated with the overnight placement of a runaway youth might have undermined the program and had serious implications for the youth bureau itself.

In other cases, the new ventures threatened to mar the reputations and effectiveness of the organizations and increase the managerial burdens of executives, because they introduced complexity into existing administrative arrangements. In the case of Seabury Barn, an additional program in an area where the organization had no experience (residential care) was being grafted onto an organization (SHM) which already was straining to hold itself together. Yet this new program promised financial salvation and necessitated the risk. In the Florida Sheriffs case, Harry Weaver set up multiple corporations for his different campus programs, gambling that the courts would strike down the restrictive trust on his Boys Ranch and allow him ultimately to consolidate the organization's operations into a manageable administrative structure. Had he lost this gamble, he would
have been saddled with a highly cumbersome and unwieldy managerial arrangement. But had he not tried, he would have been unable to undertake the subsequent expansion and growth of the Youth Fund enterprise.

Finally, in the case of the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services, two agencies of manageable size and individually respected reputations were merged into a new, very large agency whose future shape and prospects were theorized but largely unknown. Moreover, these agencies were coaxed along into consolidation by the executive directors of each, one of whom, Jay Goldsmith, would have to administer the new arrangement. Not only could Goldsmith be blamed for whatever failure or loss of reputation the new agency might incur, but he faced a potentially overwhelming managerial burden had he not been able to reorganize in a manner that would ease the responsibilities of the top man.

Finally, entrepreneurs in these human services case studies sometimes exhibited an explicit willingness to stick their necks out by taking actions that were unauthorized but which seemed necessary to keep their ventures on track. Most often this brand of risk-taking involved refusal to wait for official government approvals prior to opening new facilities for business. In the cases of GLIE and Seabury Barn such actions were taken both for economic reasons and to prod the bureaucracy into faster action, but they were gambles nonetheless.

Any consideration of risk-taking must of course take into account both sides of the coin—i.e., what were the risks of doing something versus not doing it. In several cases, especially those where the venture represented a solution to an important and pressing organizational problem, the risks of not undertaking the proposed project or program were clearly high as well. This applies, for example, to the Seabury Barn case and the early stages of the Greer and Florida Sheriffs experiences, where not undertaking the initiatives might have meant the financial failures of the agencies involved. In other instances, however, the dangers of inaction were not necessarily imminent and the risks were taken by those who could foresee potential long-term benefits from their short term gambles and sacrifices.

(5) Successful enterprise requires persistence. While the entrepreneurial characters encountered in the cases here are a very dynamic and sometimes fervent, hot-blooded group of personalities, they all exhibit unusual degrees of patience and what is called in the slang "stick-to-itiveness." Constraints and complications pepper these cases as they would all significant ventures involving major change, yet the entrepreneurs refused to be defeated by these roadblocks and indeed took them on as personal challenges. This behavior comes out most clearly where these enterprising individuals had to deal with government to obtain certifications, approvals or funding, and where they had to overcome skepticism, political reservations, and bureaucratic inertia and inconsistency.

This is nowhere better illustrated than in the case of Melville House,
where obtaining certification from the state bureaucracy to open the facility dragged on interminably and threatened to sink the venture at various points, but where the resolve of the entrepreneurs eventually won out. Similarly, in the GLIE case a charter for the new agency had to be fought for, and interim governance arrangements accepted, before the city's regulatory machinery allowed the program to officially open. And in the case of Sagamore Children's Center, the persistence of the entrepreneur is illustrated by her incredible energy and effort in coping with the state civil service system in order to hire suitable staff for her outpatient program.

Persistence and patience is required not only with the bureaucracy but with the overriding political system as well. Thus, in the Seabury Barn case, Peter Ryan spent endless hours in negotiation with county legislators as well as state officials over funding and governance arrangements acceptable to these interests. Andy Casazza and his staff repeatedly resubmitted their grant proposals for Sanctuary until it was funded. And Tom Williams waited patiently through changes in the town's administration until a receptive town supervisor and councilmen were in place; then he persisted in his efforts to document needs, garner support, and ultimately gain appointment as the Brookhaven Youth Bureau director.

Of course many other facets of enterprise require similar persistence, including pursuit of internal agency matters. Thus, Jane Edwards had to keep up the pressure over a long period of time in order to avoid any tendency of staff members comfortable with present arrangements to slow the emancipation of the Harlem-Dowling project. And Jay Goldsmith had to anticipate months of meetings and negotiations not only to prepare personnel for the JBFCS consolidation, but to deal with setbacks, and to ease the implementation and smooth the transition once the merger had officially taken place.

Overall, the lesson seems to be that the guiding entrepreneurs and managers must be clear-minded about what is to be accomplished, but must also expect that accomplishment to take a long time and to encounter many problems along the way. Ventures can thus fail either because the leaders can lose their senses of direction in the midst of the numerous barriers to implementation, or because they may lack the fortitude to keep plugging in the face of resistance, distraction, and delay.

(6) Beware the dilemmas of funding. One of the trickiest problems the entrepreneurs in these cases seem to encounter is balancing the programmatic and organizational implications of accepting various sources of funds against the benefits of that support. Often, the implications are subtle and even deceiving. In other instances, the implications are fully understood and anticipated, and either funds are rejected or accepted with awareness of the consequences.

In various cases, concessions are made as a necessity of essential fund-
ing. In the GLIE case, an onerous oversight arrangement is accepted as a way of qualifying for foster case funding. Even more dramatically, GLIE is forced to separate from its advocacy activities as a condition of funding for its services. The Seabury Barn case also exhibits an example where undesired oversight arrangements are accepted in exchange for funding eligibility. For GCCCS, concessions in autonomy were also the price extracted for overhead support from the university in which the organization is housed.

Alternatively, agencies are sometimes forced to make service program concessions in exchange for funding. Thus, Seabury Barn was itself a project taken on by the Smith Haven Ministries in exchange for funding support of SHM’s other programs. And in the LESFU case, spinning-off the project from the Henry Street Settlement was a partial consequence of securing a grant from the state.

In other instances, funding sources were specifically rejected because of the programmatic implications they contained. Thus GLIE rejected various juvenile justice and drug program monies in order to avoid the labelling of its clients that this would entail. And more spectacularly, the Florida Sheriffs organization scrupulously avoided government money of any sort in order to preserve its autonomy and avoid any entanglements that might interfere with its program objectives.

In various cases, the leaders and managers devised strategies to free themselves somewhat from the oppressive consequences of receiving funds from particular sources. Diversification is one strategy, employed by GLIE for example in its later stages of development, and sought by the designers of the JBFCS merger that combined agencies with primary dependence on different public and private funding sources. The federal grant for the Sagamore outpatient project was another instance where diversification permitted escaping the requirements of the state’s regular (inpatient-oriented) funding system.

Another strategy is deliberate ambiguity in proposal writing for grant funds. This was an idea used in the LESFU case as a way of maximizing the chances of funding from different sources as well as allowing flexibility in implementation. A third strategy, for the private agencies at least, was to build up endowment or reserve funds that could ultimately generate income in the form of returns on investment, free of external conditions and restraints. This was the objective of Harry Weaver in the Florida Sheriffs case.

But these strategies, even if they worked, were not without problems and unanticipated consequences. For LESFU, ambiguity in the proposal stage translated into uncertainties and tensions when it came to detailed program design and implementation. And in the case of Florida Sheriffs, the strategy of building up reserves meant putting great emphasis on fund-raising activity and particularly the solicitation of donations from
conservative elderly contributors, which in turn seemed to dull the aggressiveness and shunt the planning for the agency’s primary objective—services to predelinquent youth.

Other dilemmas are also raised by decisions on funding. What was to be the future of the outpatient program at Sagamore when the special grant ran out, given that the state’s regular funding programs were designed for inpatient care? Was permanence ever possible in this regime? And what about the dangers of false security once comfortable endowment funds are put into place, as they were in the instance of the Greer agency prior to its deterioration? No easy answers appear to exist. The lesson for management then is to be aware enough to look gift horses in the mouth and to anticipate and be prepared for it when they buck.

The Chemistry of Success

A final perspective that seems worth imparting to the student of management in the human services is that purposeful organizational and program change cannot be taken for granted. Rather it requires explicit management attention, adherence to strategies and principles of the kind indicated in the previous section, and an appreciation of the conditions conducive to change and the elements prerequisite to it. More than this, it is useful to recognize that change is fragile and that successful change requires that unstable elements be brought together at the same time and place in order for the necessary interactions to take place, i.e., the chemistry of change to be effected. The case studies are, by and large, studies of ventures that were successful, at least for a period of time. Instances where ventures were nipped in the bud, or were foregone for lack of the proper combination of factors, would of course be much harder to find and to document. But the number of these would no doubt overwhelm the number of successes that can be identified.

Even the case studies of success, however, contain with them substantial evidence of how fragile, even serendipitous, successful implementation of change can be. Case after case belies the unique combinations of factors, or the critical timing, or the fortuitous catalytic element responsible for action and progress where there might have been none. For example, it is hard to imagine development of the GLIE program without the unique personality of Lorraine Reilly. Indeed, in many cases, GLIE, LESFU and GCCCS among them, leadership was a critical commodity, and where it floundered, so did the enterprise. The GLIE experience also illustrates how a fortuitous suggestion that a parent agency be found to overcome the barriers to having GLIE enter the child care system can make the difference between action and stagnation. The Pleasantville case too demonstrates the role of fortuitous circumstances—the fact that a building fund drive just happened to be going on that could supply reno-
vation funds for a new program facility, and the unanticipated bright idea that Medicaid rates could be adjusted to cover the operating costs. These elements allowed the project to ignite and takeoff when it might otherwise have gone by the boards. Well-timed, sometimes unexpected grant opportunities, such as those that arose in the cases of Sagamore, Sanctuary, and Seabury Barn, also attest to the fortunate confluence of events that often seems to underlie the successful launching of important ventures. And usually the window of opportunity is quite narrow once the necessary elements appear to be in place. The JBFCS merger, for example, had to exploit the retirement of Shep Sherman and be effected before his agency would begin to look for a replacement for him. Moreover, the timing between the agreement to merge and effecting of the agreement itself seemed quite critical. A long enough period was needed to explore the implications, but too long a time period would allow people to have second thoughts and opponents to gather strength. Similarly in the case of Harlem-Dowling, the timing of emancipation of the program from the parent agency Spence-Chapin was critical—too early and the new agency would fall on its face, too late and internal resistance would grow and the motivations to effect the separation would be diffused. And in the instance of Melville House, much further delays in certification by the state would surely have led to an aborted enterprise.

All this is not to suggest that a programmatic organizational change is simply a happenstance affair. A good bit of luck does seem to be involved. But the real managerial lesson here is that circumstances favorable to the successful launching and growth of an enterprising activity do not last forever, and must be recognized and exploited when they do occur. The successful manager of change in the human services field is not unlike a tightrope walker, who needs to master the skills, assess the climactic conditions, map a strategy, make the necessary adjustments in his machinery, resolve to carry on and to assume the risks, understand the potential consequences, and finally when conditions are favorable, make the narrow passage over dangerous territory to hopefully stable ground on the other side.