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Judicial Recusal: On the Brink of Constitutional Change

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JUDICIAL RECUSAL: ON THE BRINK OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

By

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Under the Direction of Dr. Amy M. McKay

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Recusal, or judicial disqualification, occurs when a judge abstains from a particular legal proceeding because of a personal conflict of interest. All levels of the judicial system and some administrative agencies in the United States apply the concept of recusal, but this study focuses on the United States Supreme Court. Title 28 of the United States Code provides standards (not obligatory by legal means) on when Supreme Court Justices should recuse themselves. But Supreme Court Justices are themselves the arbiters of their own recusal and often these substantive standards are not met. The method of study applied is theoretical, using both quantitative and qualitative data from past Supreme Court cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Rumors of partiality quickly turned into allegations of bias February when publicized documents showed just how strong the financial ties were between the lobbying groups working against the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the wife of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. Just how much did Ginny Thomas earn as a lobbyist against President Obama’s healthcare bill? The Washington Post obtained a copy of the letter signed by seventy-four House Democrats to Justice Thomas which says Ginny Thomas received $686,589 over a four year span from The Heritage Foundation, a prominent opponent of healthcare reform. Representative Anthony Weiner (D- NY) writes in the letter:

The appearance of a conflict of interest merits recusal under federal law. From what we have already seen, the line between your impartiality and you and your wife's financial stake in the overturn of healthcare reform is blurred. Your spouse is advertising herself as a lobbyist who has "experience and connections" and appeals to clients who want a particular decision - they want to overturn health care reform.¹

Recusal, or judicial disqualification, occurs when a judge abstains from a particular legal proceeding because of a personal conflict of interest. Is $686,589 paid by a lobbying group to the wife of a Supreme Court Justice enough of a financial stake to warrant a conflict of interest and ensuing judicial recusal? The answer depends on point of view and interpretation of the judicial recusal statute. According to today’s Supreme Court standard, the decision on whether to recuse oneself from a case is left exclusively in the

hand of the Justice in question. And since a justice is never up for reelection or reappointment and there is no veto on a Supreme Court vote, what check on the recusal power of the Supreme Court do the American people have? The answer is next to nothing outside of impeachment, which has happened only once since our country’s birth, there are no repercussions at all.\(^2\) Under the United States Constitution a Supreme Court Justice is awarded a lifetime commission, one free of recusal mandates and ensuing political consequences. They are themselves solely responsible for judging their ability to be impartial. By examining parties to past cases and the history of past and current Justices, we will determine that impartiality is not adequately questioned and that there are clear and consistent flaws in the recusal system of the U.S. Supreme Court.

All levels of the judicial system and some administrative agencies in the United States apply the concept of recusal, but this paper will focus solely on the Supreme Court and particularly on recusal patterns of modern day Supreme Court justices. Throughout this paper, while unraveling the complexities of recusal, I will continue to reference the Justice Thomas case study mentioned in the first paragraph. I will also cite other controversial recusal affairs in order to prove that a consistent flaw exists. Though it will obviously be impossible for me to study every instance of Supreme Court judicial recusal, it is necessary to note that of all the cases that have been brought before the high court, only a miniscule fraction are surrounded by recusal controversy. As I continue in this paper,

\(^2\) The first and only instance where a Supreme Court justice was subject to impeachment proceedings was in 1804. The U.S. House of Representatives voted to impeach Samuel Chase, one of the signatories of the Declaration of Independence, on the grounds that his federalist background was influencing his Supreme Court opinions. The Senate acquitted him of all charges. This helped establish the precedent of judicial independence and judicial review. (Dilliard, Irving. "Samuel Chase," In *The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 1789–1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions*, ed. Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel (New York: Chelsea House, 1969).)
keep in mind that I am making a study of only a slice of that miniscule fraction in contention.

There is some confusion on the procedure of Supreme Court judicial recusal: what is law and what is precedent? First, there are two laws that govern judicial recusal. Title 28 of the United States Code provides the two standards, Section 144 and Section 455 (not obligatory by legal means) on when Supreme Court Justices should recuse themselves.\(^3\) Section 144 titled “Bias or Prejudice of Judge” is extremely similar to Section 455 but applies exclusively to federal district court judges accordingly we will pay less attention to it for the purposes of this paper.\(^4\) Section 455 entitled “Disqualification of Justice, Judge, or Magistrate Judge” covers “actual bias,” “conflicts of interest” and “the appearance of bias” concerning “any justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United States.”\(^5\) It states that a judge should recuse himself/herself of his/her own accord when: his/her impartiality, personal bias, or prejudice is questioned concerning the case presented.\(^6\) Section 455 (a) deals with the appearance of impartiality: “any justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United States \textit{shall} disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his partiality might reasonably be questioned.”\(^7\) The word “shall” bears all the weight in this statute, because no matter how strongly the grounds for recusal may be, disqualification is the prerogative of each individual justice and the decision of application is not up for review.\(^8\) Even if the eight other Justices, seventy-four house democrats, or anyone else of political significance directly petition Clarence Thomas to disqualify himself in \textit{Florida v. US} when it reaches

\(^4\) Ibid., 56.
\(^5\) Ibid., 56.
\(^6\) Ibid., 56.
\(^7\) Ibid., 59.
\(^8\) Ibid., 63.
the Supreme Court, which it undoubtedly will, the decision to recuse remains arbitrarily his.  

Title 28 Section 455 (b) deals with conflicts of interest: (1) where he/she has personal knowledge of the evidence concerning the proceedings or has previously expressed an opinion on the case’s outcome (personal bias or prejudice); (2) where he/she has previously served as a lawyer or witness concerning the same case; (3) where he/she has come into contact with the matter while in government employment; (4) where he/she, spouse or child has a financial stake in the outcome of the case; and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree. In the letter to Clarence Thomas, House Democrats use Section 455 (b) (4) as the rationale for his recusal.

Proponents of the Justice’s decision to sit use the more specific particularities of Section 455 (b) (4) to defend their point of view:

Section 455 means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other participant in the affairs of a party. The prohibition applies ‘only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest,’ but the proviso extends only to a mutual insurance company or a similar proprietary interest.

They argue that (1) The Heritage Foundation and Ginny Thomas’s previous employment is not a party in Florida v. U.S., (2) the outcome of the case would not substantially affect them, and (3) The Heritage Foundation is not a proprietary interest. However, delving deeper into the context of Section 455 (b) (4) the democrats are wise to mention in their

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9 There are rare instances in U.S. Supreme Court history where Justices have collectively manipulated their votes in order to diminish the voting power of another. In the 1970s Justice William Douglas suffered a stroke and the other eight Justices met in secret to agree that they would not pass down a 5 – 4 judgment where Douglas was in the majority. (Ross E. Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables of Supreme Judicial Disqualification,” Green Bag 2d, Vol. 10, no. 1 (Autumn 2006), 88.)

10 Third degree relationships are present between individuals with 1/8 (12.5%) of a genetic link. Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59.

11 Ibid., 59-60.
letter the significance that Thomas did not, perhaps purposefully, disclose his wife’s earnings.\(^\text{12}\)

Supreme Court recusal precedent is just as ambiguous in relation to a Justice’s recusal decision as its legal counterparts. First, there are nine justices on the Supreme Court and all nine perceive the text of Section 455 differently, as have the justices before them since the first federal judicial disqualification statute passed in 1792.\(^\text{13}\) Problems caused by the different interpretations of judicial recusal law are just the tip of the iceberg; recusal precedent is also extremely sensitive to the historical developments (formal and informal, i.e. official Supreme Court opinion) of the law. Because of this, examining the most influential changes to Supreme Court recusal procedure will help us understand the context in which the precedent has developed. The most crucial reshaping of recusal policy occurred in 1911, 1948, and 1974 and additionally interpreted by Supreme Court justices throughout the Court’s history, most recently in 1993.

In 1911 Congress enacted Section 144 of Title 28 U.S.C. enabling litigants to request a judicial disqualification motion, also known as an affidavit, based on a Justice’s personal bias or prejudice.\(^\text{14}\) Though Section 144 applies only to federal district court judges it is important to mention it when studying Supreme Court recusal policy because Section 144 was and can still be interpreted by the Supreme Court – conveying how the Supreme Court views recusal arbitration in relation to lower courts. In 1921, \textit{Berger v. US}, a World War I espionage case, reached the Supreme Court. In this case, the German American petitioners who were accused of espionage filed a motion for the trial judge’s recusal based on statements the judge had allegedly said – for example, “one must have a


\(^{13}\) Hammond, \textit{Judicial Recusal}, 14.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 56.
very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against the German Americans in this country. Their hearts are reeking with disloyalty.”¹⁵ When the constitutional question of whether the judge should have recused himself (because he did not) reached the Supreme Court, the Justices decided that the affidavit, which Congress intended to have a peremptory effect, would actually have little influence on judicial disqualification. The Court determined that a judge had the power to choose if the application for disqualification and accompanying affidavit were legally “sufficient,” meaning they had to have enough support and evidence that would give substance to the judge-in-question’s prejudice – that is to say “sufficient” in the opinion of the judge-in-question.¹⁶

Congress pushed through further developments in 1948, mostly affecting Section 455. A first modification eliminated the requirement that a party initiate the motion for recusal. A second development was the addition of the word “substantial” in Section 455 (b)(4), “only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest.”¹⁷ These two changes worked against the peremptory-style changes made in 1911, widening the capacity for judicial discretion pertaining to recusal.

In 1993 the policy for recusals was altered in a less controversial way; the sitting Supreme Court Justices presented their individualized criteria for their own recusals.¹⁸ The impetus for such formal action on this subject started in 1974 when the text of U.S.C. Section 455 (a) was changed from “in the opinion of the judge” to “might reasonably be questioned.”¹⁹ In the same year, the “duty to sit” criteria was eliminated by Congressional

¹⁵ Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
¹⁷ Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 58.
¹⁹ Ibid., 89.
amendments which was aimed at widening the scope for judicial disqualification. The real driving force behind the 1993 recusal statements was the Court’s ruling in *Liljeberg v Health Services Acquisition Corp* (1988) which revolved around whether a judgment ought to be reversed if it is found out that a judge who decided the case was also unknowingly closely-connected financially to the outcome of the case. The Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 vote that U.S.C. Title 455 (a)’s language – “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his partiality might reasonably be questioned” – refers to when a “reasonable person” would expect a judge to be aware of the questionable partiality, regardless of whether or not the judge himself knew circumstances were questionable.

Even after *Liljeberg*, recusal issues continued to cause problems in lower courts and when combined with the perpetual question of why the Supreme Court was not held to the same standards as its subordinates, the 1993 “Statement of Recusal Policy” was inevitable. Seven Supreme Court Justices signed on to the Statement, issuing independent recusal standards they, as individuals, intended to uphold. This is one statement signed by only seven of the Justices. Though it’s written in a collaborative effort the Justices are independently aiming to uphold the policy within. “Statement of Recusal Policy” was signed by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg. In

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20 Ibid., 91.
21 This case revolved around a federal judge in Louisiana, but is noted in this paper specifically because the opinion, written by Justice Stephens, institutes a new judicial recusal norm in regards to U.S.C. Title 28. *Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.*, 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
25 David Souter and Harry Blackmun did not sign the agreement. (“Statement of Recusal Policy,” Supreme Court of the United States (Nov. 1, 1993) (on file with Hofstra Law Review), signed by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Ginsburg.)
2005 Chief Justice Roberts adopted the policy as well.\textsuperscript{26} Of particular importance in the statement is the declaration that Title 28 Section 455 (b)(2) concerning his/her or relative’s legal association with the case:

Current participation as lawyer, and not merely past involvement in earlier stages of the litigation, is required [for a Supreme Court Justice’s recusal]. A relative’s partnership status, or participation in earlier stages of the litigation, is relevant, therefore, only under one of two less specific provisions of Section 455, which require recusal when the judge knows that the relative has “an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding,” Section 455 (b), or when for any reason the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” Section 455 (a).\textsuperscript{27}

The terms of this statement formally, but not legally,\textsuperscript{28} bind each Justice to the policy that lawyer-partner relationships to a lawsuit only mandate recusal if financial interests are substantially affected, there is an appearance of partiality, or if the relation is personally participating in the representation of the firm, not just a member or partner to the representing firm.\textsuperscript{29} Though the change seems small, the precision of the statement nevertheless, substantially contributes to diminishing the vague nature of Supreme Court recusal policy.

The American Bar Association’s \textit{Code of Judicial Conduct} and \textit{Model Code of Judicial Conduct} is accredited little to none in regard to recusal policy. Its significance is

\textsuperscript{26} Hammond, \textit{Judicial Recusal}, 66.

\textsuperscript{27} “Statement of Recusal Policy,” Supreme Court of the United States.

\textsuperscript{28} Supreme Court Justices as well as any federal judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages, \textit{Stump v Sparkman}, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), therefore impeachment is the only way to hold a Justice officially accountable for not adhering to recusal policy.

more implied than it is officially recognized. Outside of the Supreme Court, 49 of 50 U.S. states espouse moral regulations similar to those in the *Model Code of Judicial Conduct*, which includes that every judge should aim to avoid impropriety, the appearance of impropriety and any instance where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Additionally in 1973 the Judicial Conference of the United States, the principal policy making administration for the U.S. judiciary, adopted the *Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges*, now known as the *Code of Conduct for United States Judges*. The *Code of Conduct* is the federal equivalent of the ABA’s *Model Code* and it calls for compliance from all judges – delving deeper into particular instances of the appearance of a conflict of interest.

Though it has provisions similar to Section 144 and Section 455 of U.S.C 28, it states clearly that “not every violation of the code should lead to disciplinary action” and so lends a hand to the ambiguity of Supreme Court recusal policy.

Arguably the most incomprehensible problem with Supreme Court recusal policy is the Justice’s opinion of his/her eight counterparts. After all, the power of a Justice rests in their power to vote and recusal is the only lawful way to remove an important vote from an evenly matched case. Thus it seems obvious that an opinion on a Justice’s recusal would depend largely on the politics within the Court, i.e. how evenly split the vote is going to be and how each Justice predicts his/her counterparts will vote. Because the Supreme Court makes its decisions in private, the only way to study these recusal politics

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32 Ibid., 3.
33 Ibid., 3.
34 Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 86.
of the Supreme Court is to piece together information from memoirs and papers written by past Justices. One such paper was written October 20, 1975 by then Associate Justice Byron White (in office 1962 – 1993). It was delivered to seven of the eight other Justices – those seven having been present at a private meeting which excluded the eighth, William Douglas. The year before Douglas had suffered a serious stroke and the eight other Justices were afraid he was no longer competent, at least in the interim, to serve as a judge. In the letter White indicated the participants met on October 17 and discussed and came to the decision that (1) “the Court [would] not assign the writing of any opinions to Mr. Justice Douglas,” and (2) “they would not hand down any judgment arrived at by a 5-4 vote where Mr. Justice Douglas is in the majority.” Conceptually, the Justices were plainly and without regard for the legality of such measures, commandeering Congress’s authority to impeach and remove judges. The other Justices felt Douglas should recuse himself and made the decision for him.

The fact that instances like the one from the White letter have happened before signifies that real inconsistencies exist in Supreme Court recusal policy. If a Justice is incapacitated, clearly there should be a more convenient route outside of Congressional impeachment that would remove him/her from office. If judges of a lower court are forced to adhere to a particularized procedure, recusal or otherwise, the Supreme Court should as well, as they say, lead by example. If a Justice is explicitly breaking recusal policy, as stated in the text of the Congressional amendments, there should be repercussions or at

35 Justice deliberations are private because (1) it protects the Justices from public influence and sentiment and (2) deliberations do not necessarily reflect the final decision and opinion, which may not be written for weeks or months. (Epstein, Lee and Thomas G. Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Institutional Powers and Constraints, 7th Ed., Washington, DC: CQ Press (2011), 22.
36 Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 88.)
38 Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 89.
least protocol for those actions. When a Justice or multiple Justices determine a recusal is appropriate, there should be procedures in order to maintain the constitutional purpose and effectiveness of the Supreme Court. In Section II of this paper I’ll outline more specific problems/inconsistencies with U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455, and in Section III I’ll examine the possibilities of change, if Congress decided to proceed with adjustments to the statute.
II. ANALYSIS

This section is split into two parts. In part one I go in depth into specific case studies on Supreme Court judicial recusal examining specific circumstances, the justice’s past, the Supreme Court makeup at the time, recusal standards (formal and informal) at the time, and any other particulars I think necessary to mention. I organize the analysis into categories based on established Congressional grounds for recusal and then arrange contentious cases under the appropriate recusal category. In most cases, because of the distinctiveness of each recusal issue, it so happens that recusal precedent is almost always affected – and so I examine those effects as well.

In part two I use data from The Supreme Court Database to help me examine how often a Supreme Court recusal is surrounded in controversy. The Supreme Court Database has a comprehensive set of 200 facts about each case the Supreme Court has judged from 1953 to 2009 and a less comprehensive set of similar facts about cases dating back to 1946. Because of technicalities with the data I will be only running a statistical analysis on cases where less than nine judges participated in the vote. When we arrive at part two I will explain my intentions with the data set more clearly.

Part One: Case Studies

i. U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (a)

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39 The Supreme Court database is available online at http://scdb.wustl.edu. The lasted version, which I am using, was released February 11, 2011.
Section 455 (a) deals with the appearance of impartiality: “any justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his partiality might reasonably be questioned.”\textsuperscript{40} The language in this section is clearly not the most comprehensive and so ample room exists for a Supreme Court Justice’s interpretation. According to the text any type of past and/or current associations with parties or indirect participants in a Supreme Court docketed lawsuit may cause a recusal issue. It is for this reason that past and current associations with parties to a docketed case are, in large part, found to be the most controversial recusal cases. Associations in this sense could mean a friendship with a litigant, professional history with a party, prior work on the case, previously stated bias, or a unique combination of them all.

(1) Current Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia declined to recuse himself in the 2004 \textit{Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia} case in which his good friend, then Vice President Cheney, was a party. After the Supreme Court had accepted and docketed the case, Justice Scalia accepted an invitation to fly with Cheney on a government plane to go on a hunting trip. The party seeking Justice Scalia’s recusal referenced §455 (a) – saying the justice’s impartiality in this case “might reasonably be questioned.”\textsuperscript{41} Justice Scalia responded to the assertion in an issued Memorandum that his friendship with Cheney did not jeopardize his impartiality, that Supreme Court Justices can not be bribed by plane rides and hunting trips, and finished up by declaring the reality that many Justices make it onto the Supreme Court exactly because of friends in high places.\textsuperscript{42}

In addition to Scalia’s Memorandum, then Chief Justice William Rehnquist also issued an

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[40] Grant Hammond, \textit{Judicial Recusal}, 59.
\item[41] Ibid., 4.
\item[42] Ibid., 5.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
opinion on the matter after he received a letter from two Senators voicing concerns about an appearance of impartiality with Scalia. Rehnquist replied saying each Justice decides for himself whether to recuse in a case; the way in which they come to that decision varies but that each Justice “strives to abide by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 455, the law enacted by Congress dealing with the subject.” This recusal case is important because we see that an irrefutable friendship with a party to a case, no matter how current or strong, is not an irrefutable “appearance of bias.” Because if it were, according to then Chief Justice Rehnquist, Scalia would have recused himself based on “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 28 Section 455.”

(2) A similar recusal issue was present in the very politicized Supreme Court case related to the Watergate scandal of 1972. United States v Nixon reached the Supreme Court in 1974 to decide whether executive privilege could keep Nixon from handing over the incriminating audiotapes to the Special Prosecutor. Of the nine justices on the Court, Richard Nixon appointed four. Of the four Nixon appointments, then Associate Justice William Rehnquist was the only one to recuse himself, citing his past association with the Nixon administration. This may be related to the fact that upon Nixon’s election and prior to serving on the Supreme Court, Rehnquist served as Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel. If Rehnquist’s past association with the Nixon administration had enough of an impact that his impartiality might be questioned, one has to wonder if the

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46 "Rehnquist recused himself in the case, citing his past association with the Nixon Administration.” Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, 508.
other three Nixon appointees had strong associations with Nixon as well.\textsuperscript{47} Then Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, who was at one point on Nixon’s list for possible Vice Presidential candidates, was the only other Justice with a questionable recusal because of his friendship with the President. The alleged fact that Burger was originally supposed to vote in favor of Nixon, fuels fire to the recusal issue, but because he steered his vote to the majority makes any recusal problem revolving around \textit{U.S. v Nixon} moderate.\textsuperscript{48} The reality is that, for the most part, Supreme Court Justices interpret judicial recusal statute differently and this compounds the difficulties surrounding the development of a reliable Supreme Court judicial recusal precedent. And on many occasions individual Justices alter their interpretations with time, making the recusal procedure seem even more ambiguous.

Examining \textit{Laird v Tatum} will be an example of just that complication.

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{U.S.} Title 28 Section 455 (b) (1)
\item Section 455 (b) (1) where he/she has personal knowledge of the evidence concerning the proceedings or has previously expressed an opinion on the case’s outcome (personal bias or prejudice); and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.\textsuperscript{49} Developments in regard to this area of Section 455 are few and far between, however controversy is rampant. The issues revolve around the very fine line between opinion and prejudice. According to the text any type of past and/or current viewpoint could or could
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{47} The other three Nixon appointments besides Rehnquist were Warren E. Burger, Harry Blackmun, and Lewis F. Powell. Prior to being appointed, Burger was on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Blackmun was on an 8th Circuit Judge and Powell was in private practice.


\textsuperscript{49} Third degree relationships are present between individuals with 1/8 (12.5\%) of a genetic link. (Hammond, \textit{Judicial Recusal}, 59.)
not be considered bias depending on the examiners point of view. We will examine some of the comments past and current Justices have made concerning cases that have been argued in the Supreme Court.

(1) Rehnquist’s “past association” recusal in *U.S. v Nixon* is attributed to his previous involvement as Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Assistant for President Nixon.\(^50\) Similarly, *Laird v Tatum* (1972) was a case in which Rehnquist had prior associations because of his time as Assistant Attorney General. The Office of Legal Counsel is in charge of providing legal advice to the Executive Branch agencies and the President through written opinions and oral advice. By official assignment, the Assistant Attorney General is in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel and authorizing legal advice that is provided.\(^51\) While in this position Rehnquist gave testimony in front of Congress on whether or not he thought a Department of Defense surveillance scheme on “dissident” civilians critical of the Nixon administration and mostly the Vietnam War presented a constitutional issue.\(^52\) He also allegedly was a custodian of some of the digital evidence.\(^53\) Obviously his participation in the Supreme Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the program was seen as controversial. In a rare instance where a Justice publicly defends their decision to sit, Rehnquist said that his Congressional testimony expressed the position of

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\(^{50}\) Kutler, *The Wars of Watergate*, 508.


his client, the government, and not his own. However if we compare this recusal issue area to the *U.S. v Nixon* case, certainly Rehnquist’s professional capacity and involvement was similar in both because he held the same professional relationship to both; why then does he only recuse from one of the cases instead of both?

iii. U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (b) (2)

Section 455 (b) (2) where he/she has previously served as a lawyer or witness concerning the same case; and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.

The language in this section is actually one of the more defined in all of Section 455. As I stated in the introduction, there has been Supreme Court interpretations into recusal when a Supreme Court Justice’s relative is affiliated with a case, but the actual Justice’s previous legal relationship to a case and recusal in relation to it, is still open to interpretation.

Because several Justices were previously employed either in private legal practice or by the government, it is not uncommon that a case they worked on or participated in might reach the Supreme Court. And because of the arbitrary recusal policy of the Supreme Court, some Justices may choose to participate in the vote while other Justices in a similar situation might not.

(1) Before joining the Supreme Court in 1967 Thurgood Marshall was Solicitor General for President Lyndon B. Johnson. Because of this prior involvement in the executive

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branch, Marshall recused himself from about 40 percent of the cases in his first term.\textsuperscript{56}

Despite this rational for recusal, his most referenced and critically revered recusals were those related the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Marshall’s involvement with the NAACP began in 1934 and he won his first of 29 Supreme Court cases in 1940, the same year he was nominated to NAACP Chief Counsel.\textsuperscript{57} His extensive involvement as Chief Counsel with the association’s legal team, up until his appointment to United States Court of Appeals for the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Circuit in 1961, was the basis for his routine recusal in cases concerning the NAACP.\textsuperscript{58} After his retirement in 1991 and passing in 1993, his Supreme Court records were opened to the public at the Library of Congress revealing a letter of memorandum he sent to the other Justices describing and asking for advisement on his past and current recusal policy in relation to the NAACP.\textsuperscript{59}

His past practice had been, he said, to “routinely disqualify myself from all cases in which the NAACP has participated as a party or as an intervener.” Enough time had passed, however, since he had left the NAACP, “that continued adherence to this self-imposed blanket disqualification rule is no longer necessary.” And so he planned “in the future not to recuse myself in cases in which the NAACP is a party or an intervener, unless the circumstances of an individual case persuade me, as with all cases, to do otherwise.”\textsuperscript{60}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{60} Justice Thurgood Marshall quoted in Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 81.
\end{footnotes}
Not only did the eight other Justices condone the changes he proposed in his memorandum, Justice John Paul Stevens was “delighted.”\textsuperscript{61} This proves how judicious Justices can be when preparing to recuse, but of course it depends on the Justice. Would Justice Marshall still have recused himself in so many cases if it was his wife who had worked for the NAACP instead of him, like the Thomas case study mentioned previously?

iv. U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (b) (3)

Section 455 (b) (3) where he/she has come into contact with the matter while in government employment; and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.\textsuperscript{62} This subsection of text refers almost exclusively to a Justice’s previous government employment and recusing when government associated material is brought before the Supreme Court. Depending on a Justice’s interpretation, this could mean government employment immediately preceding their Supreme Court nomination or it could mean government employment years, if not decades, before service. This type of recusal would apply to many Justices dating back to the beginning of the Supreme Court. Justices are especially likely to encounter such a case in their first couple years on the Supreme Court. Some examples would include Associate Justice William Rehnquist (previously Assistant Attorney General), Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall (previously Solicitor General), Chief Justice John Marshall (previously Secretary of State), Chief Justice Roger Taney

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 82.
\textsuperscript{62} Hammond, \textit{Judicial Recusal}, 59.
(previously Secretary of the Treasury), Associate Justice John McKinley (previously U.S. Senator), Chief Justice Charles Hughes (previously Secretary of State) and many more.\footnote{A brief biography is provided for each Justice on the Federal Judicial Center website. Federal Judicial Center, “History of the Federal Judiciary,” http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/hGetCourt?cid=0\&order=c\&ctype=sc\&instate=na (accessed March 8, 2011).}

(1) Current Associate Justice Elena Kagan is also a good example of when a Justice practices routine recusals in relation to prior legal association. As the 112\textsuperscript{th} Supreme Court Justice, Kagan came to the Court directly from her position as Solicitor General under the Obama administration, appointed by him in January 2009.\footnote{Paul Kane and Robert Barnes, “Senate confirms Elena Kagan’s nomination to Supreme Court,” The Washington Post, August 6, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/05/AR2010080505247.html (accessed March 8, 2011).} The Solicitor General is in charge of representing the United States government’s case in those suits that reach the Supreme Court docket.\footnote{U.S. Department of Justice, “About the Office.”} The Solicitor General advises the executive branch and supervises litigation (including \textit{amicus} filing and oral arguments) in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. They also indirectly assist the Justices in selecting the docket by submitting opinions of the U.S. government to cases where, of course, the U.S. government is not a party.\footnote{The Solicitor General would submit a petition for the Supreme Court to hear whichever case and the Court accepts about 70 percent to 80 percent of the cases the federal government petitions for. (Epstein, Lee and Walker, \textit{Constitutional Law for a Changing America}, 19.)} Though Kagan’s time as Solicitor General was short, she still played a vital role in many cases that will be argued in the 2010–2011 term. That pre-judicial role fueled speculation into how she would choose to practice recusal, especially in comparison to the last Solicitor General appointed to the Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall, who I examined earlier in this analysis. For the 2010–2011 term, Kagan is recusing herself from 25 out of 51 cases because she either assisted writing a brief or she was actively participating in a case while it was litigated in lower courts, according to the \textit{Washington A brief biography is provided for each Justice on the Federal Judicial Center website. Federal Judicial Center, “History of the Federal Judiciary,” http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/hGetCourt?cid=0\&order=c\&ctype=sc\&instate=na (accessed March 8, 2011).}
The reputable SCOTUSblog.com also attributes the recusals to her filing a brief at the invitation of the Court of the U.S. government’s opinion, signing certiorari grants (memos she signed saying the U.S. government would not be involved), and recusing in cases where the United States is the petitioner. Because of the substantial amount of recusals in her first term some attorneys are going as far as holding out on applying for certiorari, so that they can be sure Kagan will sit the case. As prudent, or should I say logical and democratic, as Justice Kagan’s stance on Supreme Court recusal policy may be, her recusals are still largely unpredictable because of the arbitrary nature of the policy.

Section 455 (b) (4) where he/she, spouse or child has a financial stake in the outcome of the case; and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree. By now, the recusal issue most familiar with Section 455 (b) (4) is Clarence Thomas’s financial tie, and possible bias, related to Florida v. U.S. Similarly, another Section 455 (b) (4) recusal controversy revolves around Justice Scalia and the gender bias class action lawsuit against Wal-Mart. The recusal issue is whether or not Justice Scalia will participate in the case when his son’s law firm is representing Wal-Mart. However, in

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70 Hammond, Judicial Recusal,” 59.
many cases the financial stake is clear and ensuing Supreme Court recusals are not controversial.

(1) For example, current Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. used to own stock in Pfizer Inc., a New York-based drug maker. Even though his stock was worth no more than $15,000, practically pennies compared to Ginny Thomas’s earnings from The Heritage Foundation, he routinely recused himself from lawsuits involving the company. Where it gets tricky is when we examine the financial stakes Justices previously had with a party to a case. In this example, everything was running smoothly with Justice Roberts’ recusal regimen until it was announced that he sold his Pfizer stock holdings on August 31, 2010. Now he is set to sit on two Pfizer Inc. cases this term, according to a docket entry from September 2011.\(^\text{72}\) Can the appearance of bias be so easily shed in as little as a couple of months? The period between Justice Roberts selling his company stock and then judging the Supreme Court case which includes Pfizer as the party is not a substantial period of time to disassociate the two. In the same way that Justices like Elena Kagan and Thurgood Marshall recuse from cases they have associations with, recusal policy related to financial investments should be heavily exhibited as well, even six months or perhaps years after the fact – enough to remove the appearance that Justice Roberts may be bias.

Part Two: Data Analysis

As stated previously, part two of this section utilizes data from The Supreme Court Database, which organizes hundreds of facts about tens of thousands of cases dating all the way back to 1946. The latest version of the Database was released February 11, 2011 and this is the version I will be using for my statistical analysis. I was unsure of what to focus on when I first encountered the vast range of Supreme Court data that was available. I decided that I would only be looking at cases where a Justice did not participate in order to first, concentrate on less-controversial recusals and second, determine the more common grounds for recusal. Doing this automatically eliminated tens of thousands of cases from my analysis, allowing me to focus on only the cases which include five, six, seven, or eight Supreme Court Justices. At that point I still had over 2,000 cases in my data set and so to narrow down my analysis further I decided to make a random sample of forty cases. I chose forty cases instead of a higher or lower amount because of (1) brevity, being this paper has limits of its own, and (2) because I know that much of the case data, found in the Database and through other research methods, on these forty cases may lack information pertaining to the specific grounds for non-participation. Thereafter I will sum up how often controversy surrounds Supreme Court recusals and why Supreme Court cases do not always have all nine Justices.

The following table supplies the primary information regarding the forty randomly selected Supreme Court cases in which there were less than nine votes. The table identifies a case number (which I assigned), lexis citation, date of decision, name, number of votes, 

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73 The Supreme Court database is available online at http://scdb.wustl.edu.
74 Supreme Court Database, random sample of 40 cases where the number of votes is less than nine. More detail on certain cases is provided in this paper’s endnotes.
recusant and reason for nonparticipation, if obtainable. All the information in the table is self-explanatory except for the “reason” column. The explanations in the “reasons” column state either one of the five subsections of United States Code Title 28 Section 455, “per curiam,” or “no info,” all clarified below for convenience.

Reference List:

§455 (a) – Justice disqualified himself in a proceeding where his partiality was reasonably questioned

§455 (b)(1) – Justice had personal knowledge of the evidence concerning the proceedings or previously expressed an opinion on the case’s outcome

§455 (b)(2) – Justice had previously served as a lawyer or witness concerning the same case

§455 (b)(3) – Justice had come into contact with the matter while in government employment

§455 (b)(4) – Justice, spouse or child had a financial stake in the outcome of the case

per curiam – means that the court released an opinion on the case as a single entity with the participating and nonparticipating Justices acting anonymously.

T/R – meaning “technical recusal;” that the nonparticipating Justice was not present for oral arguments, therefore decided not to participate in the decision

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75 For brevity’s sake I used the shortened case names for the table. The lexis citation is the U.S. Reporter Citation (usCite). The date of decision is defined as the day, month and year that the Supreme Court released its decision. The recusant(s) is the Justice that did not participate (I researched this independent of the Supreme Court Database).

76 The reasons for nonparticipation were obtained by me through research and my analysis thereof.

77 Section 455 (a) and (b) include prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.
N/A – meaning “not applicable.” This means that all the Justices were voting, none recusing, therefore there were only eight Justices on the Supreme Court when the case was being decided.

J/D – meaning “jurisdictional dissent;” when the Justice disagrees with the Court’s assertion or denial of jurisdiction. In The Supreme Court Database these are counted as nonparticipations.\(^78\)\(^79\)

no info – meaning “no information.” I was unable to find information related to a reason why the Justice did not participate – either I found nothing or I found that they recused for unspecific reasons.\(^80\)

\(^79\) The phrase jurisdictional dissent comes from the idea of justiciable, meaning the Supreme Court’s power is limited to “cases” and “controversies.” Characteristics that make a case nonjusticiable are advisory opinions, collusive suits, mootness, ripeness, and political questions. A Justice would write a jurisdictional dissent if he/she thought one of these characteristics applied to a Supreme Court docketed case. (Epstein, Lee and Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America, 93-6.)

\(^80\) The reason why The Supreme Court Database does not have information on explanations for nonparticipation is because Supreme Court Justices are not required to disclose that information. Instead, at the end of the opinion it will simply say, for example in U.S. v Nixon (1974), “Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.” If this is the only information I can find on the recusal, then I will use “no info” under the “reason” column.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Lexis Citation</th>
<th>Case Name</th>
<th>Date of Decision</th>
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<td>17</td>
<td>1986 U.S. LEXIS 88</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>1989 U.S. LEXIS 1738</td>
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<td>1991 U.S. LEXIS 7262</td>
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<td>LEXIS 3779</td>
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<td>MORGAN STANLEY v. PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSUR.</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>LEXIS 4002</td>
<td>1998 U.S. LEXIS 4002</td>
<td>AT&amp;T v. CENTRAL OFF. TELEPHONE</td>
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<td>LEXIS 4200</td>
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<td>LEXIS 8965</td>
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<td>2010 U.S. LEXIS 4971</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>LEXIS 5540</td>
<td>2010 U.S. LEXIS 5540</td>
<td>DEMARCUS ALI SEARS v. UPTON</td>
<td>2010-Jun-29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After examining Table 2.1 I simply compiled the recusal data that serves this paper’s main purpose – the reasons for nonparticipation – into Figure 2.1.\footnote{The occurrences in Figure 2.1 add up to 44 instead of 40 because in Case Numbers 23, 28, 34, and 35 there are two recusants, causing the number of reasons in the data set to be 44.}

Right away, we see that the most common occurrence is “no information;” this is due to the difficulty encountered when trying to find the exact reason for recusal. The next common occurrences are “technical recusals,” probably due to the high number of cases the Court hears relative to the amount of time the Court spends in transition between Justices. The next most common occurrence is Section 455 (b) (3), but at a substantially less common occurring rate. Immediately this tells us that nonparticipation in the Supreme Court takes place less often because of recusal statute and more often because of technicalities with the Court system.
Technical recusals, along with no information, not applicable, jurisdictional dissent, and per curiam, are not the focus of this paper but studying the rate at which they occur explains a lot about how The Supreme Court Database calculates its data on number of votes. Just because 2,000 or so case decisions over the past half a century were made with less than nine votes, doesn’t mean every nonparticipation was because of a conflict of interest. However, as previously established throughout this paper, Supreme Court recusal policy is not obligatory, so the Database also does not take into account cases that perhaps should but did not have less than nine votes because a conflict of interest or appearance of bias.
III. DISCUSSION

Up until now, this paper has discussed the historic changes to Supreme Court recusal policy as developed through Congressional statutes and the judicial review subjected to them. After careful analysis of specific recusal cases, inconsistencies between procedure and execution of United States Code 28 Section 455 are evident. While the policy’s text is clearly written and the Justices swear themselves to it, their interpretations of the text are of real consequence. As former Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist declared during the *Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia* recusal controversy about Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, “there is no formal procedure for Court review of the decision of a Justice in an individual case. This is because it has long been settled that each Justice must decide such a question for himself.”

If that wasn’t explicit enough for recusal critics, Rehnquist’s involvement in *Laird v. Tatum* is – giving testimony before Congress on the constitutionality of an executive program and then eventually reviewing the same program’s constitutionality before the Supreme Court. Controversies like these surrounding Supreme Court recusal policy are certainly not a new trend.

Many Supreme Court recusal disputes are politically charged, especially in a polarized climate like today. However, proponents on both sides of the political spectrum will still take notice to impropriety when evaluating nominees. The 1969 Senate rejection of Associate Justice Abe Fortas to the Chief Justice seat is evidence that the legislature is trying to keep a check on the Supreme Court’s power – deciding to reject the Fortas’

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nomination for many different reasons. First, it was public knowledge that Fortas had consulted President Johnson on executive affairs numerous times during Fortas’ time as Associate Justice. Second, Fortas had received $15,000 for speaking at American University on different occasions – money raised for the university by corporations that might presumably argue in front of the Supreme Court one day. Third, it was also discovered in 1969 that Fortas signed a contract with a wealthy investor, agreeing to trade legal advice in exchange for lifetime yearly payments of $20,000. After he failed to gain the Chief Justice seat it became clear that Fortas would probably face impeachment and consequently he resigned from the Supreme Court. Similarly in 1969, President Nixon attempted to nominate Clement Haynsworth to the Supreme Court who also ended up being rejected by the Senate, conceivably for previously judging cases where he held a financial interest. Instances like these are ways in which the legislature reminds the Supreme Court that bad judicial behavior has its consequences; but are Justices only held accountable in politically charged circumstances? Impeachment might be more likely for Justice Thomas’s recusal case if the media paid as much attention to it as it did for Fortas – $686,589 is significantly more than $15,000.

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84 Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: a biography (Binghamton, New York: Yale University Press, 1990), 352.
85 Kalman, Abe Fortas, 362.
86 Ibid., 374.
87 Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 65.
88 Historians claim that Nixon’s nomination of Clement Haynsworth was rejected by Democrats as payback for Conservatives rejecting Fortas. Historians also claim that Johnson’s nomination of Fortas was rejected because Conservatives did not like the left turn the Court was taking. (David Kaplan, “The Reagan Court – Child of Lyndon Johnson,” The New York Times, September 4, 1989, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950D1DE1733F937A3575AC0A96F948260 (accessed March 20, 2011).)
In *Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia* we concluded that the “appearance” of bias is a very loosely defined and heavily interpreted term. Associate Justice Scalia traveling and socializing with Dick Cheney, who was a party to a Supreme Court docketed case, does not signify an appearance of bias. According to Scalia, friendships with parties to a case do not mean indicate possible nepotism or the “appearance” thereof. Then Chief Justice Rehnquist also responded to the controversy, which fueled the fire, saying that every Justice strives to adhere to U.S.C. 28 and though the process may be different for each Justice, the recusal goals are the same. However, Supreme Court recusal policy is extremely influenced by a Justice’s interpretation, so what seems a recusal goal for one is likely to be different for another. Former Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall recused himself, more often than not, from NAACP cases between the time when he was nominated to the Supreme Court in 1967 until 1984, twenty-three years after leaving his post as NAACP Chief Counsel. Looking back in time and being able to reference the 1984 memorandum, even Marshall’s decision to end his “self-imposed blanket disqualification rule” that year was occasionally renounced where “the circumstances of an individual case persuade me, as with all cases, to do otherwise.”

This helps us understand how dependent recusals are on a Justice’s reasoning and it acts as an excellent example of how quickly recusal precedent changes, even according to Justices themselves.

Although the text of Congressionally mandated judicial recusal policy seems descriptive it’s clear that much of it depends on (1) Supreme Court interpretation, (2)

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89 Marshall’s reference to his so-called “blanket disqualification” since 1984 is made in error because he actually did participate in NAACP Supreme Court cases between 1967 and 1984. He actively participated in *Milliken v. Bradley* (1974) and *Meek v. Pitenger* (1975), both involving the NAACP as the plaintiff. (Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 84-5.)

90 Ibid., 81.
individual Justices’ interpretations (in the instance that their recusal is the one in question), (3) the political climate and (4) the particular “place” a Justice might be in their judicial mindset and constitutionally interpretive development.

In regards to the first dependent variable, Supreme Court interpretation, the Court’s ruling in *Liljeberg v Health Services Acquisition Corp* (1988) is a good example. The Supreme Court’s ruling that a judgment ought to be reversed if it is found out that the sitting judge who decided the case was also unknowingly closely connected financially to the outcome of the case. In the ruling the Supreme Court interpreted Section 455 (a)’s language – “might reasonably be questioned” to mean when a “reasonable person” would expect a recusal. This ambiguous “reasonable person” test could be seen as an expansive or contractive adjustment to recusal policy. It is all up to interpretation, in the same way Section 455 (b)(4), “only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest,” is all up for interpretation. Is Ginny Thomas’s $686,589 from a business indirectly affiliated to the healthcare bill a substantial interest or not?

In regards to the second dependent variable, individual Supreme Court Justice interpretations, Associate Justice Elena Kagan provides a good example compared to her counterparts. She is more disciplined in her recusal policy than other Justices, making the task of overturning lower court decisions more difficult especially on those where a split vote is predicted. The difference is how she interprets the policy compared to another,

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91 This case revolved around a federal judge in Louisiana, but is noted in this paper specifically because the opinion, written by Justice Stephens, institutes a new judicial recusal norm in regards to U.S.C. Title 28. *Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.*, 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
plus before she was appointed she indicated her recusal from at least eleven cases – those in which she represented the U.S. government in her previous job as Solicitor General.\textsuperscript{96}

In regards to the third dependent variable, political climate, Associate Justice Kagan’s recusal habits are also of interest. The relevance is intensified when combined with Associate Justice Thomas’s recusal habits. As mentioned numerous times in this paper, many people are calling for Thomas to recuse himself when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act inevitably reached the Supreme Court judicature. The same is being said about Kagan. The state lawsuits against the healthcare bill began while Kagan was still Solicitor General, Kagan gave insight into the constitutionality of the bill during her Senate hearings and Kagan practically said how she would vote if she was to participate.\textsuperscript{97} Much of the reasoning behind Thomas and Kagan’s refusal to recuse is prompted by the political climate clouding the case itself. Universal healthcare in the United States finally came to fruition in 2010 and after decades of Presidents in pursuance thereof, it is ever more important than to the American government and citizens that the Supreme Court have every constitutional authority reviewing the legalities of the bill.

In regards to the last dependent variable as to why judicial recusal policy is so unclear, two cases studied in Section II are the perfect example – Justice Rehnquist (who was less restrained in his recusals than Justice Kagan) in \textit{Laird v. Tatum} (1972) and \textit{U.S. v Nixon} (1974). The reason Rehnquist divulged for not recusing himself in \textit{Laird v. Tatum} was because his prior involvement as Assistant Attorney General on the government’s

behalf was purely professional and not of personal opinion. In *U.S. v Nixon*, we don’t have the fortune of looking back at Rehnquist’s explicative reason for recusing himself other than the little rational he offered – “past association.” However, advising the Nixon administration as Assistant Attorney General is in the government’s surveillance program is clearly a “past association” as well.

Finding a solution that tries to tackle every single inconsistency (not just those mentioned in this paper, but inconsistencies I may have failed to uncover) in Supreme Court recusal policy is a daunting task. If the policy is tightened to the effect of prompting more judicial recusals, it’s more than possible that parties to a case would take advantage of it. If Justices recuse themselves more often, the constitutional significance of having nine versus six voting on monumental cases, such as President Obama’s healthcare bill, would greatly diminish, in which case the Founding Fathers’ purpose of the United States Supreme Court would be nonexistent. In the following recusal policy suggestions presented I examine that type of problem, as well as other weaknesses and strengths the suggestions may have if ever they were actually implemented into law.

One suggestion that is by no means unheard of in the policy circles of federal government is the idea that there is a “Justice in waiting.” This Justice would most likely be a retired Justice or a Justice confirmed and awaiting a seat on the Court. Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have a similar structure in place for its high courts in order for a full court hears each case. However this would cause bureaucratic problems with staff and possibly open up the floodgates for continuous and uncontrollable recusals.

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A less drastic change than the “Justice in waiting” system is to adopt American Bar Association Codes specific to Section 455. For example, Section 455 (b) (2) could define the disqualification of a Justice being:

When the judge knows that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm in which a relative of the judge is a partner or has an ownership interest in the law firm.

This describes the instances and appearances for recusal more narrowly than the current Title 28 text, and calls for recusal regardless of how strong the affiliation and/or ownership. A procedure like this would undoubtedly call for recusals in cases such as the Scalia – Wal-Mart recusal controversy.

A far simpler adjustment could be something as little as a personal statement written by the Justice in question on his decision to sit the case. The statement would address the rational of those who submitted the motion to recuse and it would help develop a recusal precedent for the future. Currently this suggest is the most realistic which is why Representatives Chris Murphy and Anthony Weiner are working on a bill based on it.

But of course, any new policy that encourages or ends up bringing about more frequent Supreme Court recusals challenges the constitutionality of the court, meaning the “consistency and balance of our judicial system,” according to two Harvard law professors. If the Constitution is as they say, a living document, then it is expected that changes will occur, just as slavery was abolished and amendments were passed. Former

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99 Abramson, “The Judge’s Relative is Affiliated With Counsel of Record,” 1200.
Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall agreed, saying that the Constitution was clearly not “forever ‘fixed’ at the Philadelphia Convention,” in light of how the Framers originally wanted life to be for minorities and women.\(^{102}\) Therefore it is just as likely and if not very reasonably expected that major changes to the Supreme Court will occur, just as the original number of Justices was established at six and eventually became today’s number of nine.\(^{103}\)

Former Chief Justice Rehnquist gave the best response regarding a Justice’s decision to sit on a case where there’s questionable partiality; that before a Justice is appointed to the Supreme Court they are likely to have voiced statements, comments, or opinions on any matter of subjects and when one day those subjects come before the Court, to appear ignorant on the matter “would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.”\(^{104}\) No matter how controversial the statements, comments, or opinions on any matter may be, in the end, it would still be up to the Justice himself on whether to recuse himself/herself or not. There are many cases where the line between conflict of interest and impartiality of Supreme Court Justices is blurred. Justices are themselves solely responsible for judging their ability to be impartial but if Congress is moved to change the policy, their power of the Court’s jurisdiction and number of Justices can influence a great deal.\(^{105}\) However, policy implementation in Congress is an entirely different beast.

\(^{103}\) The Judiciary Act of 1789 established one Chief Justice and five Associate Justices. The Supreme Court has been fixed at nine since 1869. (Epstein, Lee and Walker, *Constitutional Law for a Changing America*, 62.)
Work Cited


ENDNOTES:


2 City of Norfolk were making improvements to schools, streets and parks, and Justice Powell’s past employment with the Richmond School Board presented a conflict of interest.

iii Justice Marshall was the lawyer who won the infamous Brown v. Board of Education, therefore his bias was already apparent when Board of Education v. Vail was placed on the Supreme Court docket.

iv Before joining the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall was a lawyer to a case fighting for equality in publicly-financed housing projects; Sweatt v Painter 339 U.S. 629 (1950).

v Case revolved around funds from Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which presented a conflict of interest because of Justice Powell’s history with Richmond School Board.

vi Ibid.

vii National School Boards Association submitted amicus curiae, which presented a conflict of interest because of Justice Powell’s history with Richmond School Board.


ix The period between Justice Lewis’s retirement and Justice Kennedy’s nomination lasted from June 1987 to Feb 1988, therefore the Court only had eight Justices sitting at that time.

x Ibid.

John O’Connor, husband of Justice O’Connor, worked for Fennemore Craig law firm, which represents AT&T. Also O’Connor used attorneys from this firm to help her prepare for confirmation hearings. “Fennemore Craig Celebrates 125 Years of Legal Service,” Fennemore Craig Attorneys, http://www.fclaw.com/about/history.cfm (accessed April 11, 2011).


Stevens retired on June 29, 2010.