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THE DIFFERING EFFECTS OF SATISFACTION, TRUST, AND COMMITMENT ON BUYER'S BEHAVIORAL LOYALTY: A STUDY INTO THE BUYER-SALESPERSON AND BUYER-SELLING FIRM RELATIONSHIP IN A BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS CONTEXT

By:

Brian Nicholas Rutherford

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Robinson College of Business
of
Georgia State University

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY ROBINSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 2007

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ACCEPTANCE

This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the candidate's Dissertation Committee. It has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy in Business Administration in the Robinson College of Business of Georgia State University.

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ABSTRACT

THE DIFFERING EFFECTS OF SATISFACTION, TRUST, AND COMMITMENT ON BUYER'S BEHAVIORAL LOYALTY: A STUDY INTO THE BUYER-SALESPERSON AND BUYER-SELLING FIRM RELATIONSHIP IN A BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS CONTEXT

By:

Brian Nicholas Rutherford April 27, 2007

Committee Chair: Dr. James Boles and Dr. Wesley Johnston

Major Department: Marketing

This study is one of the first studies to fully address the relationship that business-to-business buyers have with both the selling firm and salesperson within an integrated model. Finding from this survey research support 14 of the 26 original hypotheses and the 2 additional linkages using structural equation modeling. This study finds that the relationship customers have with the selling firm is a stronger predictor of continuance than the relationship that the buyer has with the salesperson. While this relationship is stronger between the buyer and the selling firm, findings suggest that the salesperson can have a direct negative impact on the relationship if conflict is present. Overall, this study provides a framework for future research on the topic of business-to-business buyer-selling firm and buyer-salesperson relationships.

Key Words: Selling firm, salesperson, business-to-business, continuance, satisfaction, trust, commitment, conflict, perceived commitment, and dependence

Chapter One

Introduction

Customer retention is viewed as a major issue within marketing and sales (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Hellier et al 2001; Moncrief and Marshall 2005). With an improved understanding of customer retention and the effects of customer retention, selling firms can substantially increase profits (Jacobs et al 2001; Reinartz et al 2005). For example, longevity of customer relationships has been explored in relation to a firm's profitability (Zeithaml et al 1996). Reichheld's (1993) research claims that by understanding the economic effects of retention on revenues and costs, companies with loyal customers can retain high-quality customers. Further, research indicates that customer retention can boost profits by almost 100% by retaining only 5% more of their customers (Reichheld and Sasser 1990). Other effects of customer longevity have been explored. For example, Zeithaml et al. (1996) claims that long-term customers are more likely than short-term customers to buy additional services, spread favorable word-of-mouth, and the selling firm may be able to charge higher prices than other companies because the buyer receives added value in maintaining the relationship.

It appears that with increased customer retention or decreased customer defection, profitability for the firm can be increased substantially. While customer retention has been shown to increase profits, the antecedents of customer retention need to be further addressed. Specifically, customer retention needs to be addressed in a business-to-business sales context.

Many studies have addressed the issue of antecedents to customer retention. To explore the antecedents of customer retention, researchers have devoted attention to the development and testing of models linking satisfaction with customer retention (Swan

and Trawick 1981, Taylor and Baker 1994; and Cronin and Taylor 1992; Johnson et al 2001; Anderson and Sullivan 1993). Other research has explored the relationship between trust and customer retention (Doney and Cannon 1997; Anderson and Weitz 1989; Ganesan 1994). Commitment has also been tested as an antecedent to customer retention (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Gounaris 2005; Johnson 2001). While the relationship the customer has with the salesperson is important, the relationship the customer has with other members of the firm is also of interest. A deeper understanding may be obtained by splitting the relationship the buyer has with the firm into different facets.

Different facets of the buyer-seller relationship have been researched with regards to satisfaction, trust, and commitment. For example, trust has been broken into two facets. The first facet is trust in the salesperson, and the second facet is selling firm trust (Doney and Cannon 1997). Commitment has been broken into two different facets by Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) and into three facets by Allen and Meyer (1990). Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) break commitment into personal and organizational commitment.

Satisfaction has been broken into different facets (Crosby and Stephens 1987;
Ruekert and Churchill 1984; Oliver and Swan 1989b). Crosby and Stephen (1987)
looked at four facets of satisfaction. They looked at satisfaction with contact person,
satisfaction with core service, satisfaction with institution, and overall satisfaction.
Ruekert and Churchill (1984) looked at five facets of satisfaction. The facets were
satisfaction with social interaction, satisfaction with product, financial satisfaction,
satisfaction with cooperative advertising support, and satisfaction with other assistances.
Oliver and Swan (1989) looked at salesperson satisfaction, dealer satisfaction, and
product satisfaction. While various facets of each of these constructs are important,
looking at the relationship the buying firm has with the salesperson and the selling firm is
of interest for this study.

Motivation for the Study

During the earlier stages of my research career, I have been exposed to topics pertaining to buyer-seller relationships in a business-to-business setting. Specifically, I have read extensive literature pertaining to satisfaction, trust, and commitment in relation to buyer continuance. While reading this literature, I was able to identify missing linkages or linkages that have only been partially addressed.

Wanting to learn more about these linkages, I was able to acquire several data sets that had the needed constructs. With access to several data sets, I started researching several of the missing linkages in the buyer-seller relationship. While addressing these missing linkages, I was able to answer some of the questions that I had formed in my mind. In answering some of the questions, several research projects were started. With starting several research projects and forming more complex linkages in the future research sections of these papers, there was additional research needed to expand to current body of knowledge in the business-to-business buyer-seller relationship.

While the current data sets I have obtained have the ability to expand the body of knowledge, there are several limitations to these data sets. For example, the data sets lack the ability to fully integrate several of the constructs I have identified as being critical to an integrated model. This is partly due to having smaller sample sizes in the data sets or in the larger data sets not having the needed constructs. With both of these limitations, providing an integrated model can not be accomplished. Longing to address these limitations has been the primary motivation to conduct this research project.

Purpose of the Study

It is the purpose of this study to attempt to fill certain gaps in the extant literature related to business-to-business relationships by addressing multiple facets of the buyer-seller relationship. Specifically, the buyer-seller relationship is researched as containing two distinct facets. The first is the relationship the buyer has with the salesperson. The second is the relationship the buyer has with the selling firm. Using social exchange theory as the theoretical foundation, linkages amongst perceived commitment, actual commitment, trust, satisfaction, conflict, dependence, and the buyer's continuance are examined using structural equation modeling.

Organization of this Study

The study is organized in the following way. In chapter two, a theoretical framework is presented on the buyer-seller relationship. Within the theoretical framework, a detailed discussion of social exchange theory is presented. First, social exchange theory is defined to give the reader a background of the theory. Second, a discussion of what constructs have been linked to the theory and several of the major articles using the theory will be discussed. The literature review will continue and address the constructs buyer's continuance in the relationship, satisfaction, trust, commitment, and perceived commitment. Following the introduction of the constructs, dependence and conflict will be introduced, as well as the literature pertaining to these constructs. Finally, the literature pertaining to the linkages between the constructs will be presented.

Chapter three presents the overall model for the research and the hypotheses pertaining to the model. First, the linkages pertaining to the buyer's relationship with the salesperson are presented. Second, the linkages pertaining to the buyer' relationship with the selling firm are presented. Next, the models and hypotheses pertaining to the buyer's perceptions of the selling firm and salesperson are presented. After the perception models are presented, the model and hypotheses that link the salesperson and selling firm together are presented. The chapter ends with a presentation of the overall model.

Chapter four details the methodology, data collection procedures, and the statistical analytical procedures used in this study. The chapter starts with sample and data collection procedures. The study continues and presents items to measure each of the constructs and discusses studies that have previously used the items. The chapter ends with a detail discussion of the data analysis procedure.

Chapter five discusses the findings of the study. A detailed looked at each of the 26 hypotheses is provided. A summary table of the 26 hypotheses is also provided. The chapter closes with the presentation and findings of the modified structural model.

Chapter six is devoted to providing implications of the study. A detailed looked at the relevance of the study and implications of the study which are relevant to management and academics are provided. Chapter seven is the final chapter and it provides discussions pertaining to limitations and future directions for studying this topic. A summary is also provided in chapter seven.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

Social Exchange Theory

Social exchange theory (SET) is commonly used in business-to-business relational exchanges (Lambe et al 2001). Lambe et al (2001) define the foundational premise of social exchange theory as:

"SET postulates that exchange interactions involve economic and/or social outcomes. Over time, each party in the exchange relationship compares the social and economic outcomes from these interactions to those that are available from exchange alternatives which determines their dependence on the exchange relationship. Positive economic and social outcomes over time increase the partners' trust of each other and commitment to maintaining the exchange relationship. Positive exchange interactions over time also produce relational exchange norms that govern the exchange partners' interactions (p. 6)."

When viewing the exchange, social and economic rewards are important. Social rewards can be, but not limited to, emotional satisfaction, spiritual values, pursuit of personal advantage, and sharing humanitarian ideals (Lambe et al 2001). Economic rewards can be rewards such as money (Lambe et al 2001). The theory suggests that if both social and economic rewards are satisfactory, parties involved in the transactions will remain (Homans 1958; Blau 1968; Lambe et al 2001).

The theory also discusses the issue of alternatives to the present agreement in regard to levels of satisfaction. If both parties involved in the transaction are not receiving a high enough level of both economic and social outcomes compared to alternatives, dissatisfaction will be experienced (Thilbaut and Kelley 1959). If the overall benefit from an alternative exchange partner is greater than the current benefit from the

present exchange partner, the party that can receive more benefit from the alternative exchange partner will switch to the alternative (Thibaut and Kelley 1959).

Trust is a key component in social exchange theory. Blau (1968) allows that trust is important because the exchange, to a large extent, is governed by "obligations" rather than by contracts. With increased levels of trust, increased levels of commitment will also occur (Lambe et al 2001). The inverse of increased trust leading to increased commitment is summed in a statement by McDonald (1981). McDonald states, "mistrust breeds mistrust and as such would serve to decrease commitment in the relationship and shift the transaction to one of more direct short-term exchanges (p. 834)."

With increased levels of trust and commitment in an exchange, the potential for a long-term relationship to occur as opposed to a discrete transaction is present. A closer look at discrete transactions follows. After looking at discrete transactions, relationship marketing will be discussed.

Based on the premise of social exchange theory, a closer look at factors affecting the buyer-seller relationship needs to be addressed. First the outcome variable, buyer's continuance in the relationship, will be discussed. Second, satisfaction, trust, commitment, and perceived commitment will be discussed.

Buyer's Continuance in the Relationship

Several major outcomes of buyers/sellers relationships occur as a result of exchanges between the two parties. For example, the buyer can decided to stay in the relationship, leave the relationship, reduce the degree of the relationship, voice concerns about the relationship, or act in an opportunistic manner in the relationship. Research conducted by Ping (1993) looks at buyer's exiting the relationship, voicing concerns. loyalty, opportunism, and relationship neglect. Morgan and Hunt (1994), for example, looked at acquiescence, propensity to leave, and cooperation as an outcome of relational commitment. They also looked at relationship commitment, cooperation, functional conflict, and a reduction in uncertainty as outcomes of trust. Reichheld and Sasser (1990) discuss differences in buyers that maintain a long-term relationship versus buyers that maintain only a short-term relationship. They suggest long-term buyers are more likely to spread favorable word-of-mouth communication, buy additional services, and pay a higher price because of added value. While all these outcomes are affected by the buyer/seller relationship, fully understanding these outcome variables are beyond the scope of this study. The present study will focus on an outcome variable pertaining to maintaining the buyer-seller relationship. From this point forward, this construct will be labeled "buyer relationship continuance."

Our understanding of buyer relationship continuance has been greatly expanded since the early 1990's (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Anderson and Sullivan 1993; Ping 1993; Johnson et al 2001; Rutherford et al 2006). Within the literature, two dominant perspectives appear with regard to buyer relationship continuance. The first is negative and framed as defection intentions (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Ping 1993). The second is positive in nature, and has been researched as repurchase intentions (Anderson and Sullivan 1993), anticipation of future interaction (Crosby et al 1990; Doney and Cannon 1997), and/or propensity to stay (Rutherford et al 2006). Johnson et al. (2001) states,

"After the initial purchase, buyers often continue to repurchase from the same salesperson to avoid spending the time and expense required to assess new suppliers. A buyer's perception of his/her relationship with the salesperson can play an integral role in the buyer's decision to continue or terminate the relationship (p. 124)."

First, the negative aspects of continuance will be addressed. Propensity to leave has been defined by Morgan and Hunt (1994). Morgan and Hunt (1994) state, "propensity to leave is the perceived likelihood that a partner will terminate the relationship in the (reasonably) near future (p. 26)." Ping (1993) looked at retail buyers leaving the relationship. He researched this type of "relationship termination" as an exit. He defines exit as, "the member ceasing to buy the firm's product(s), or leaving the organization (p. 323)." In addition to researching exit intentions in a retail setting, Ping (1994) has researched the construct within marketing channels.

The second is positive in nature and looks at the relationship continuing.

Anderson and Sullivan (1993) look at repurchase intentions in a consumer setting.

Rutherford et al (2006) looked at propensity to stay using a three item scale. Within this construct, the respondents were asked about the likelihood of them staying in the relationship for at least a period of one year. The respondents were also asked if they were interested in what other suppliers had to offer. Crosby et al (1990) and Doney and Cannon (1997) looked at anticipation of future interactions.

Satisfaction

According to the current literature in marketing, one of the antecedents of buyer relationship continuance is satisfaction (Oliver 1980; Hellier et al 2001; and Selnes 1998). For example, Ganesan (1994) in an investigation of long-term buyer-seller orientations found that a retailer's satisfaction with past outcomes is significantly related to the retailer's long-term orientation. In a retail sales setting, Swan and Trawick (1981) found that satisfaction determines a customer's anticipation of future behavior to patronize a retail store.

Ping (1993) looked at hardware retailers and the findings of his research suggest that satisfaction is negatively associated with exiting. Satisfaction has been shown to be positively associated with re-purchase intentions in a service setting. The relationship between satisfaction and re-purchase intentions has been shown to have a positive relationship in a consulting firm context (Patterson and Spreng, 1997; Patterson et al 1997), in four different service industries (Cronin and Taylor, 1992), and in a long distance communication setting (Taylor and Baker, 1994).

While results from previous studies indicate that satisfaction is positively related to propensity to stay or negatively related to defection intentions, several studies have addressed the satisfaction constructs as contained multiple facets. For example, the results of Crosby and Stephens (1987) in an insurance setting, Ruekert and Churchill (1984) in a channel setting, and Oliver and Swan (1989b) in a retail sales setting suggest a deeper understanding can be obtained regarding the effects of the different facets of satisfaction on buyer relationship continuance. To explore the relationship between satisfaction and buyer relationship continuance beyond the overall satisfaction construct, the two facets of satisfaction used by Oliver and Swan (1989b) will be examined (satisfaction with the salesperson and satisfaction with the firm). In addition to breaking satisfaction into two facets within the selling firm, research suggests that both the impact

of economic satisfaction and non-economic satisfaction will affect the buyer/seller relationship differently (Geyskens et al 1999).

Satisfaction with the Salesperson

Customer's satisfaction with the salesperson has received considerable attention within the literature (Westbrook 1981; Oliver and Swan 1989a; Oliver and Swan 1989b; and Reynolds and Beatty 1999a). In a business-to-consumer context, Oliver and Swan (1989a) found that future intention to deal with the same salesperson when purchasing their next car was a function of satisfaction with the salesperson. Reynolds and Beatty (1999a) found that satisfaction with the salesperson was associated with word of mouth, increased share of purchase, satisfaction with the company, and increased loyalty to the salesperson.

While several articles have been published dealing with customer satisfaction with the salesperson leading to future intentions in a retail setting (Oliver and Swan 1989a; Beatty et al 1996; and Reynolds and Beatty 1999a), the effect of a customer's satisfaction with the salesperson on buyer relationship continuance has received less attention in business-to-business settings (Johnson et al 2001; Rutherford et al 2006). Within a business-to-business service context, Johnson et al (2001) states, "If a buyer is not satisfied or committed to the salesperson, then he/she may begin the process of searching for a new supplier (p. 126)." Rutherford et al (2006) found a significant relationship between satisfaction with the salesperson and the buyer's propensity to stay in the relationship.

Satisfaction with the Selling Firm

When looking at satisfaction with the firm, a relationship between satisfaction and other variables has received research attention. For example, Oliver and Swan (1989b)

found that satisfaction with the dealer was associated with increased product satisfaction. Reynolds and Beatty (1999a) found that satisfaction with the company lead to a higher share of purchase, increased loyalty to the company, and positive company word-of-mouth. Goff et al (1997) found that satisfaction with the dealer predicted satisfaction with the product (a vehicle) and the manufacturer. Within a business-to-business context, Rutherford et al (2006) found a significant relationship between satisfaction with the firm and buyer's propensity to stay in the relationship.

Economic and Non-Economic Satisfaction

A meta-analysis conducted by Geyskens et al (1999) in a channel setting will be the framework for the economic and non-economic split. Geyskens defines economic satisfaction as "a channel member's positive affective response to the economic rewards that flow from the relationship with its partner, such as sales volume and margins (p. 224)." They define non-economic satisfaction as "a channel member's positive affective response to the non-economic, psychosocial aspects of its relationship, in that interactions with the exchange partner are fulfilling, gratifying, and easy (p. 224)."

Overall, four satisfaction constructs are important for this study. The first set of satisfaction constructs address the buyer's satisfaction with the salesperson: they are 1) buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson and 2) buyer's economic satisfaction with the salesperson. The second set of satisfaction constructs address the buyer's satisfaction with the selling firm, they are: 1) buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm and 2) buyer's economic satisfaction with the selling firm.

Trust

Current research in marketing defines trust in the buyer/seller relationship using several different definitions. First, Anderson and Weitz (1989) define trust as "one party's belief that its needs will be fulfilled in the future by actions undertaken by the other party (p.312)." Moorman et al (1992) define trust as "a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence (p. 315)." Morgan and Hunt conceptualize trust "as existing when one party has confidence in an exchange partner's reliability and integrity (1994 p. 23)." Doney and Cannon define trust as the "perceived credibility and benevolence of a target of trust (1997 p. 36)."

Within Doney and Cannon's (1997) research on trust, they look at several dimensions of the construct. Their first dimension of trust focuses on the objective credibility of the partner and that the partner's word and written statements can be relied on. The second dimension of trust focuses on the extent to which one partner is genuinely interested in the other's welfare and motivated to seek joint gain.

Ganesan (1994) looks at two dimensions of trust proposed by Moorman et al (1992) in a retail setting. The first is credibility and the second is benevolence. Within Ganesan's (1994) research, credibility is "based on the extent to which the retailer believes that the vendor has the required expertise to perform the job effectively and reliably (p. 3)." Ganesan (1994) states that benevolence "is based on the extent to which the retailer believes that the vendor has intentions and motives beneficial to the retailer when new conditions arise, conditions for which a commitment was not made (p. 3)."

With different facets of trust (credibility and benevolence) being present in the literature, several researchers have divided the selling organization into different parts. Doney and Cannon state, "the trust literature suggests that in an industrial buying context, customers can trust the supplier firm, its salesperson, or both (1997 p. 36)." Further,

Ganesan and Hess (1997) study the effects of both credibility and benevolence on buyer's interpersonal trust (trust in the salesperson) and organizational trust (trust in the selling firm). Overall, present literature suggests that both interpersonal trust and organization trust affect the buyer/seller relationship in different ways. Considering these findings, both buyer's trust in the salesperson and buyer's trust in the selling firm will be explored.

Salesperson Trust

As the primary means of contact, the salesperson is an important source of trust for a buying firm through personal interactions (Doney and Cannon 1997). "The salesperson, as the primary contact with the buying firm, provides valuable information and consultation to members of the buyer center. To make current purchase decisions and long-term relational commitments, buyers must determine the extent to which they can trust suppliers and their salespeople (Doney and Cannon 1997 p. 36)." Doney and Cannon (1997) found that buying firm's trust of the salesperson is positively related to buying firm's trust of the supplier firm and purchase choice (1997).

Firm Trust

The supplier firm provides sources of trust through its policies, actions, and personnel (Doney and Cannon 1997). Doney and Cannon (1997) suggest a positive relationship between the buying firm's trust in the supplier firm and the buying firm's trust of the salesperson, purchase choice, and anticipated future interaction (1997). Further, Ganesan and Hess (1997) found that organizational benevolence was a significant predictor in a buyer's commitment to the vendor organization.

Commitment

Research pertaining to commitment in the buyer-seller relationship is prevalent in marketing (Dwyer et al 1987; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Tellefsen and Thomas 2005).

Several definitions of commitment appear within the literature (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Morgan and Hunt 1994). For example, Morgan and Hunt (1994) define relationship commitment as "an exchange partner believing that an ongoing relationship with another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it; that is, the committed party believes the relationship is worth working on to ensure that it endures indefinitely (1994 p. 23)." Anderson and Weitz (1992) state, "commitment to a relationship entails a desire to develop a stable relationship, a willingness to make short-term sacrifices to maintain the relationship, and a confidence in the stability of the relationship (p. 19)."

While there are several definitions of commitment within the literature, several researchers have started to assess commitment as being multi-faceted. For example, Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) address personal commitment and organizational commitment in their study. The current study will also address the two facets of commitment examined by Tellefsen and Thomas (2005).

Personal Commitment

Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) allow that as personal commitment increased, the amount of relational exchanges between a buying firm and selling firm increased. While personal commitment was found to be a predictor of relational exchanges, the coefficient was stronger (.58) for organizational commitment than personal commitment (.15). Further, Johnson et al (2001) found that the level of commitment the buyer had with the salesperson in a business-to-business context, affected multiple aspects of their relationship (defection intentions and benefits necessary to switch suppliers).

Organization Commitment

Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) look at the relationship between the decision maker's commitment and a trading partner. Within this research, they call this type of commitment "organizational commitment" and define it as the "degree to which a decision maker in one firm (such as a dealership, distributor, or wholesaler) felt committed to a particular manufacturer (p. 24)." Their findings suggest that as organizational commitment increased, the amount of relational exchanges between a buying firm and selling firm increased.

Overall, the results of Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) have several important implications. The results of this research suggest that buyers form different levels of commitment with the salesperson and the selling firm. They state the following implication about their findings,

"The fact that personal commitment was shown to be distinct from organizational commitment and to have a significant effect on relational exchange has several implications for researchers. First, it suggests that business service buyers consider both organizational and personal factors when managing their firm's exchange relationships. It also suggests that researchers might benefit by expanding their analysis to include personal constructs such as personal commitment, trust, and dependence to develop a more complete understanding of interorganizational relationships (p. 33)."

Perceived Commitment

While commitment has been shown to be an important construct in relation to buyer's continuance, the effects of buyer's perception of the seller's commitment has been addressed in relation to buyer's continuance to a limited degree (Rutherford et al 2007). In looking at a manufacturer-distributor relationship, Anderson and Weitz (1992) suggest a relationship between commitment of one party leading to the other party's perception of that commitment. In other words, they suggest that a manufacturer's commitment to the relationship will have a positive effect on the distributor's perception of the manufacturer's commitment to the relationship and that a distributor's commitment to the relationship will have a positive effect on the manufacturer's perception of the distributor's commitment to the relationship. Second, Anderson and Weitz (1992) suggest a relationship between perception of commitment and actual commitment to the relationship. In other words, as manufacturer's/distributor's perception of the other party's commitment increases then the manufacture's/distributor's commitment to the relationship will increase.

In addition to the linkage between perception of commitment and actual commitment, research has partially addressed other outcomes of perception of commitment (Jap and Ganesan 2000; Gao et al 2005) and perceptions of asymmetry in levels of commitment (Ross et al 1997). Jap and Ganesan (2000) suggest a relationship between a retailer's perception of a supplier's commitment and: (1) a positive evaluation of that supplier's performance, (2) a negative effect on conflict level, and (3) a positive effect on relationship satisfaction by the retailer. Gao et al (2005) hypothesized but failed to find support that buyer's perception of the supplier's commitment had a negative effect on buyer decision-making uncertainty. Ross et al (1997) suggests: (1) a negative relationship between perceiver's estimate of asymmetry in commitment to the relationship and levels of profit derived from the relationship and (2) a positive

relationship between perceiver's estimate of asymmetry in commitment to the relationship and perceiver's own perception of the current level of conflict in the relationship.

Dependence

According to social exchange theory, dependence of both the buyer and selling will have a significant affect on each party's continuance in the relationship. Dependence can be defined as "the firm's need to maintain a relationship with the partner to achieve its goals (Kumar et al 1995 p. 349; Beier and Stern 1969; Frazier 1983)." Ganesan (1994) found a positive relationship between the dependence of a retailer and the retailer's long-term orientation with the supplying firm. He also found a negative relationship with the retailer's perception of the vendor's dependence and retailer's long-term orientation. Lusch and Brown (1996) found that as a wholesaler became more dependent on the supplier, the long-term orientation of that wholesaler increased. Overall research suggests that as buyer's level of dependence increased, the buyer's long-term orientation to the relationship also increased.

Conflict

According to Geysken et al's (1999) meta analysis, conflict impacts the buyer/seller relationship. Stern and El-Ansary (1988) define channel conflict as, "a situation in which one channel member perceived another channel member to be engaged in behavior that is preventing or impeding him from achieving his goals (p. 284)." Conflict is often linked with reductions in performance, satisfaction, and trust. For example, Frazier et al (1989) found in a developing country setting that as conflict increased, satisfaction decreased. Geyskens et al (1999), suggests that conflict reduces economic satisfaction, non-economic satisfaction, and trust in the relationship. Duarte and Davies (2003) found partial support that conflict had a negative linear relation to performance.

Satisfaction and Trust

Considering that the both satisfaction and trust have been linked with buyer's continuance in the relationship, it is important to assess the path that each of these constructs take and how each of these constructs related to each other when assess there affect the continuance construct. For example, Ganesan (1994) linked a retailer's satisfaction with past exchange outcomes with two different facets of trust. The results of the study suggest that a retailer's satisfaction with past outcomes was not related to benevolence or credibility. Geyskens et al (1999) conducted a meta-analysis to test these linkages in a channel setting. First, the relationship between economic satisfaction and trust are suggested to be only indirectly related to each other. Specifically, economic satisfaction was suggested to be fully mediated by the level of conflict in the linkage to trust. In this relationship, economic satisfaction had a negative effect on level conflict in the relationship. The level of conflict in the relationship had a negative effect on trust. The relationship between non-economic satisfaction and trust was suggested to be direct and unmediated by conflict. The results of this study suggest that non-economic satisfaction has a positive effect on trust. Overall, the relationship between satisfaction and trust is suggested not to be significant when looking at a retailer in relation to a supplier. While this relationship is suggested not to be significant, the more current meta-analysis which breaks satisfaction into two facets yields support that non-economic satisfaction is positively related to trust and that economic satisfaction is indirectly related to trust.

Satisfaction and Commitment

The satisfaction constructs has also been linked with the commitment construct. For example, in a 2005 study, Abdul-Muhmin found a relationship between satisfaction and commitment in a business-to-business context. Within a sales setting, Johnson et al (2001) found that satisfaction with the salesperson increased the buyer's commitment to the relationship. In an auto repair setting, Bansal et al (2004) did not find a relationship between satisfaction and their three components of commitment. Specifically, they hypothesized a relationship between satisfaction and affective commitment and did not hypothesize a relationship between satisfaction and normative commitment or continuance commitment. While literature fails to find a relationship between satisfaction and commitment (Bansal et al 2004), other research has found a relationship (Abdul-Muhmin 2005; Johnson et al 2001). Based on Abdul-Muhmin (2005) and Johnson et al (2001) a relationship between satisfaction and commitment is suggested.

Trust and Commitment

Within the literature, the trust construct has been linked to the commitment construct. For example, Morgan and Hunt (1994) researched trust as a determinant of relationship commitment. Within their research, they used commitment as a mediator between trust and propensity to leave and did not test a direct linkage between trust and propensity to leave. Moorman et al (1992) allows that because trust increases the extent that partners will engage in risky exchanges, trust is expected to increase the likelihood that the user will become committed to the relationship. Within a meta-analysis conducted by Geyskens et al (1999), a positive relationship between trust and commitment was found.

Research by Gounaris (2005) has examined the relationship between trust and different facets of commitment. The findings suggest that the more trust a client has in a service provider, the more affectively commitment and calculatively committed the buyer will be to the service provider. When testing the proposed model (trust \rightarrow commitment \rightarrow behavioral intentions) against the rival model (direct paths between service quality, bonding, trust, and commitment leading to behavioral intentions), the proposed model fit better. Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) found that organizational trust has a positive relationship with organization commitment and that personal trust has a positive relationship with personal commitment. The relationship between trust and commitment was stronger for organizational (.42) than personal (.29). A positive relationship between trust and commitment has been found using clients of advertising agencies (Venetis and Ghauri 2004) and in an auto repair setting (Bansal et al 2004). Overall, findings suggested that as a buyer's trust increases the buyer's level of commitment to the relationship will also increase.

Path of Satisfaction to Continuance

The satisfaction construct has been shown to have direct and indirect linkage to continuance in the relationship. For example, Abdul-Muhmin (2005) found a significant negative relationship between satisfaction and propensity to terminate the relationship. In this research, the satisfaction to propensity to terminate the relationship remained significant when including a linkage between commitment and propensity to terminate. In addition to the commitment/propensity to terminate linkage, a mediated path linking satisfaction and propensity to terminate through commitment was included. Overall, the results of this study suggest that satisfaction has a strong negative relationship with propensity to terminate the relationship even after the effects of commitment are taken into account. Johnson et al (2001) did not find a significant direct path between satisfaction with the salesperson and defection intentions, while they did find an indirect path when commitment with the salesperson was used as a mediating variable.

Rutherford et al (2006) found a significant relationship between satisfaction with the firm and propensity to stay in the relationship. They also found a relationship between satisfaction with the salesperson and propensity to stay in the relationship.

When viewing their results, satisfaction with the firm played a stronger role in the buyer's propensity to stay in the relationship than satisfaction with the salesperson.

Path of Trust to Continuance

Trust has been shown to have a direct and indirect linkage to continuance. For example, Anderson and Weitz (1989) found a significant relationship between trust and continuation when looking at independent sales agents and manufacturer's representatives. Ganesan (1994) states, "a retailer's trust in a vendor affects the long-term orientation of a retailer in three ways: (1) it reduces the perception of risk associated with opportunistic behaviors by the vendor, (2) it increases the confidence of the retailer that short-term inequities will be resolved over a long period, and (3) it reduces the transaction cost in an exchange relationships (p. 3)." Overall, Ganesan (1994) found that vendor credibility affects long-term orientation, but failed to find a relationship between vendor benevolence and long-term orientation.

Doney and Cannon (1997) hypothesized a relationship between buying firm's trust in a supplier firm and buying firm's anticipation of future interaction with the supplier. While they did hypothesize a relationship with buyer's trust in a supplier firm, they did not hypothesize a relationship between a buyer's trust in a salesperson and future interaction. They state,

"We do not hypothesize a direct relationship between trust of the salesperson and anticipated future interaction with the supplier firm. Because salespeople frequently change employers and territories, long-term intentions are driven primarily by expectations about the supplier firm. This is not to suggest that the salesperson is not important in the buyer's future intentions but rather that the effects of salesperson trust operate indirectly through supplier firm trust (p. 42)."

Path of Commitment to Continuance

Buyer's commitment to the relationship and intentions to stay in the relationship or leave the relationship has received considerable attention. For example, Morgan and Hunt (1994) found that relationship commitment was negatively associated with propensity to leave. Abdul-Muhmin (2005) found a significant negative relationship between commitment and propensity to terminate the relationship even when including a linkage between satisfaction and propensity to terminate the relationship.

Breaking apart commitment into two different facets, Gounaris (2005) found a relationship between commitment and buyer's intentions to remain in the relationship. Specifically, Gounaris (2005) found that affective commitment was associated with the customer's intentions to remain in the relationship. Gounaris (2005) also found that customer's intentions to invest in the relationship and calculative commitment were negatively associated with the customer's intentions to remain in the relationship.

When looking at the relationship that the buyer has with the salesperson, Johnson et al (2001) found a significant negative relationship between buyer's commitment with the salesperson and defection intentions. Specifically, they found support for a direct path between commitment and defection intentions. They also found an indirect path with commitment being mediated by benefits necessary to switch suppliers and perception of available suppliers leading to defection intentions.

Path of Perceived Commitment to Continuance

The relationship between perceived commitment and behavioral intentions has been looked at by Rutherford et al (2007). Specifically, Rutherford et al (2007) looks at the direct relationship between perceived commitment and buyer's propensity to stay in the relationship. Rutherford et al (2007) looked at both buyer's perception of selling firm's commitment and buyer's perception of salesperson's commitment in relation to buyer's propensity to stay in the relationship. Their results suggest that buyer's perception of selling firm's commitment is related to the buyer's propensity to stay in the relationship. Their results also suggest that buyer's perception of the salesperson's commitment is related to the buyer's propensity to stay in the relationship.

In addition to looking at the indirect path of perceived commitment leading to commitment, researchers have looked at possible mediating variables. When looking at the relationship between perceived commitment and buyer trust in the supplier, Gao et al (2005) found a relationship between the two constructs. More specifically, the research found buyer trust in the supplier had a negative effect on buyer decision-making uncertainty and buyer perceived supplier commitment had only an indirect (direct was not significant) path through buyer trust in supplier with regards to buyer decision-making uncertainty. Jap and Ganesan (2000) state, "When retailers perceive the supplier as committed to the relationship, they know that the supplier will strive to make the relationship work. Working together with a supplier in pursuit of mutual benefits increases perceptions of compatibility (p. 233)." Specifically, Jap and Ganesan (2000) found a relationship between a retailer's perception of supplier commitment and the retailer's satisfaction with the relationship.

Chapter Three

The Model and Hypotheses

Based on the findings of pervious studies, one integrated model will be proposed. While this integrated model will be proposed, first the study will look at various parts of the model. For example, the impact of buyer's satisfaction, trust, conflict, and commitment to the salesperson will be assessed with regard to buyer's continuance in the relationship. Second, the impact of the buyer's satisfaction, trust, conflict, and commitment to the selling firm will be assess with regard to buyer's continuance in the relationship. The third part of the model will assess the impact of the buyer's perceptions of the salesperson's commitment to the relationship with regard to satisfaction, trust, and commitment. The fourth part of the model will assess the impact of the buyer's perceptions of the selling firm's commitment to the relationship with regard to satisfaction, trust, and commitment. The fifth part of the model will assess the impact of the salesperson's impact on the selling firm. The final part of the model will assess the impact of dependence on the continuance construct. Once the dependence constructs has been proposed in relation to the continuance construct, the entire model will be presented.

The Salesperson (Figure One)

Based on previous finding, the following section will build linkages using existing literature with regard to the salesperson and buyer's continuance in the relationship. First, the satisfaction the buyer has with the salesperson is split into the two facets of salesperson satisfaction. The first facet is buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson. The second facet is buyer's economic satisfaction with the salesperson.

Based on the meta-analysis by Geyskens et al (1999), a relationship between buyer's non-economic satisfaction and trust is suggested. In addition, a relationship between buyer's economic satisfaction and trust is suggested when accounting for the mediating variable conflict. Next, the level of conflict the buyer has with the salesperson has to be taken into account. Based on the above literature, the following hypotheses are formed:

H1: Buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson has a direct positive effect on buyer's trust in the salesperson.

H2: Buyer's economic satisfaction with the salesperson has a direct negatively effect on the level of conflict between the buyer and the salesperson.

H3: Buyer's level of conflict with the salesperson has a direct negative effect on the buyer's trust in the salesperson.

Johnson et al (2001) suggest a relationship between satisfaction with the salesperson and commitment to the salesperson. Their research does not suggest a direct relationship between satisfaction with the salesperson and buyer's propensity to leave the relationship. Based on their research, the following hypothesis is formed:

H4: Buyer's level of satisfaction with the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of commitment to the salesperson.


Morgan and Hunt (1994) suggest a relationship between trust and commitment. Moorman et al (1992) allows that as trust increases the likelihood that a buyer will become committed to the relationship increases. Further, Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) suggest that personal trust has a positive relationship with personal commitment. The following hypothesis is formed:

H5: Buyer's level of trust with the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of commitment to the salesperson.

The last hypothesis for model one forms the linkage between the buyer's satisfaction, trust, conflict, and commitment in the relationship to his/her view of continuance in the relationship. The relationship between commitment and propensity to leave (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Abdul-Muhmin 2005; Johnson et al 2001) or propensity to stay (Gounaris 2005) is well established in the literature. Specifically, Johnson et al (2001) found a negative relationship between buyer's commitment to the salesperson and buyer's propensity to leave. Based on the above research, the following hypothesis is formed:

H6: Buyer's level of commitment to the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship.

Figure One: The Buyer's Relationship with the Salesperson



The Selling Firm (Figure Two)

Based on previous finding, the following section will build linkages using existing literature with regard to the selling firm and buyer's continuance in the relationship. Satisfaction with the selling firm is split into two groups. The groups are buyer's economic satisfaction and non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm. Second, the level of conflict the buyer has with the selling firm has to be taken into account. Based on the research by Geyskens et al (1999), a relationship between buyer's non-economic satisfaction and trust is suggested. Based on the research by Geyskens et al (1999), a relationship between buyer's economic satisfaction and trust is suggested when accounting for the mediating variable conflict. Two conflicts exist in the literature pertaining to satisfaction, trust, and commitment. Abdul-Muhmin (2005) links satisfaction to commitment and propensity to terminate the relationship, while Geyskens et al (1999) suggests that the relationship between satisfaction and commitment is mediated through trust. In addition, Bansal et al (2005) founds a relationship between trust and affective commitment, but fails to find a relationship between satisfaction and affective commitment. While Bansal et al (2005) fails to find a relationship between satisfaction and affective commitment, they fail to link satisfaction to trust, normative commitment, and continuance commitment. Based on the above literature, the following hypotheses are formed:

H7: Buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's trust in the selling firm.

H8: Buyer's economic satisfaction with the selling firm has a direct negatively effect on the level of conflict between the buyer and the selling firm.

H9: Buyer's level of conflict with the selling firm has a direct negative effect on the buyer's trust in the selling firm.

H10: Buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's commitment in the selling firm.

Morgan and Hunt (1994) suggest a relationship between trust and commitment. Moorman et al (1992) allows that as trust increases the likelihood that a buyer will become committed to the relationship increases. Further, Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) suggest that organizational trust has a positive relationship with organizational commitment. Based on the above research, the following hypothesis is formed:

H11: Buyer's level of trust with the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of commitment to the selling firm.

While the relationship between commitment and buyer's continuance (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Abdul-Muhmin 2005; Gounaris 2005) is well established in the literature, the majority of research does not break the relationship apart between salesperson and selling firm. This research will form the second hypothesis between the commitment constructs and buyer's continuance. Based on the above research, the following hypothesis is formed:


H12: Buyer's level of commitment to the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship.

The relationship between satisfaction and propensity to terminate the relationship has been researched when including both satisfaction and commitment (Abdul-Muhmin 2005). Results of this research suggest that the relationship between satisfaction and continuance is only partially mediated by commitment. With only partial mediation of these constructs on the organizational side, hypotheses will be form linking the constructs to buyer's continuance. Based on the above research, the following hypotheses are formed:

H13: Buyer's level of non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship.

H14: Buyer's level of economic satisfaction with the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship.

Figure Two: The Buyer's Relationship with the Selling Firm



Buyer's Perception of the Salesperson (Figure Three)

The third section will form the hypotheses with regard to the buyer's perceptions of the salesperson's commitment to the relationship and the buyer's level of satisfaction, trust, and commitment to the salesperson. First, Anderson and Weitz (1992) suggest a relationship between one party's perception of the other party's commitment and that party's actual commitment. In addition to the relation between perceived commitment and actual commitment, other researchers have looked at outcomes of perceived commitment (Jap and Ganesan 2000; Gao et al 2005). Jap and Ganesan (2000) suggest that a retailer's perception of a supplier's commitment influences the retailer's satisfaction. Gao et al (2005) suggests that a relationship between perceived commitment and trust exists. While these research does not directly explore the differences in the buyer's perceptions of the salesperson and selling firm, linkages will be formed pertaining to the salesperson.


H15: Buyer's perception of the salesperson's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson.

H16: Buyer's perception of the salesperson's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's economic satisfaction with the salesperson.

H17: Buyer's perception of the salesperson's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's trust in the salesperson.

H18: Buyer's perception of the salesperson's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's commitment to the salesperson.

Figure Three: Buyer's Perception of the Salesperson



Buyer's Perception of the Selling Firm (Figure Four)

The fourth section will form the hypotheses with regard to the buyer's perceptions of the selling firm's commitment to the relationship and the buyer's level of satisfaction, trust, and commitment to the selling firm. Using the same literature to build the linkages in model four as model three, the following hypotheses are formed:


H19: Buyer's perception of the selling firm's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm.

H20: Buyer's perception of the selling firm's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's economic satisfaction with the selling firm.

H21: Buyer's perception of the selling firm's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's trust in the selling firm.

H22: Buyer's perception of the selling firm's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's commitment to the selling firm.

Figure Four: Buyer's Perception of the Selling Firm



The Linkage between Salesperson and Selling Firm (Figure Five)

The fifth model forms the linkages between the salesperson and the selling firm. Referencing back the research conducted by Reynolds and Beatty (1999), Doney and Cannon (1997), Goff et al. (1997) and Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) a direct association between the salesperson and selling firm is formed. Specifically, Reynolds and Beatty (1999a) test only the linkage between satisfaction with the salesperson leading to satisfaction with the selling firm. Further, Goff et al. (1997) test only a linkage between satisfaction with the salesperson leading to satisfaction with the dealer. Considering this research, the current study will view the relationship that the customer has with the salesperson as flowing through the selling firm. This study will not assess the relationship that the customer has with the selling firm as flowing through the salesperson. Based on the above research, the following hypothesis is formed:

H23: Buyer's level of non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm.

Like Reynolds and Beatty's (1999a) research on satisfaction, the relationship between trust in the salesperson affecting the level of trust that the buyer has with the selling firm was researched by Doney and Cannon (1997). Remaining consistent with Reynolds and Beatty (1999) and Goff et al. (1997) only a linkage between trust with the salesperson leading to trust in the selling firm will be tested.


H24: Buyer's level of trust in the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of trust in the selling firm.

The relationship between salesperson commitment and selling firm commitment has not be addressed to the same degree as salesperson trust/selling firm trust and salesperson satisfaction/selling firm satisfaction. While the relationship has not been established, Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) show a significant correlation between

personal commitment and organizational commitment. Incorporating the research by Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) and the direction of satisfaction proposed by Reynolds and Beatty (1999a) and Goff et al. (1997), the following hypothesis will be formed:

H25: Buyer's level of commitment in the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of commitment in the selling firm.


Figure Five: The Linkage between Salesperson and Selling Firm



Overall Model (Figure Six)

Dependence in relation to continuance forms the final linkage in the overall model. Ganesan (1994) and Lusch and Brown (1996) both suggest that as the buyer's dependence in the supplier increases, the buyer's long-term orientation increases. With research suggesting that dependence effects long-term orientations, the impact of dependence needs to be controlled. To control for this issue and considering research has tested direct linkages between dependence and long-term orientations, a hypothesis will be formed to account for dependence. Specifically, the research suggests that as dependence increases the buyer's continuance in the relationship will also increase.

H26: Buyer's level of dependence has a direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship.



Chapter Four

Methodology and Data Collection

This chapter describes the development of the questionnaire, the sampling frame, and the data collection procedures. Within the questionnaire development procedures, sources and selected items will be provided. Sample selection for the study is discussed. The chapter ends with a discussion of data collection procedures.

Questionnaire Development

The questionnaire for this study was developed by using existing scales when possible. When established scales were available that were appropriate for this study, they were used verbatim. When existing scales were available but not in the appropriate format, these scales were modified. Two of the constructs had established scales, but these scales failed to address the constructs to the degree needed in this study. In these cases, items were created for this study.

Buyer's Continuance in the Relationship (Table One)

Buyer's continuance in the relationship has been measured through an anticipated future interaction scale. Doney and Cannon (1997) use a two item version of this scale and report an alpha of .95. The two items measure purchase intent of 1 year out and 3 years out. For the purpose of this research, a longer version of the scale that measures purchase intent at 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years will be used to measure the construct.

Table One: Buyer's Continuance

How likely is it that your firm will	make a purchase fro	m th	ie se	lling	firm	dur	ring the next:
	Very little Chance of Purchase						Definitely Will Purchase
3 months	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6 months	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1 year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2 years	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3 years	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Satisfaction with the Firm and Satisfaction with the Sales Representative (Non-Economic) (Table Two and Table Three)

Satisfaction with the firm and satisfaction with the sales representative are based on Dwyer and Oh (1987). Five items scored on a seven point Likert scales will be used to measure each of these constructs. Previous studies have found the scales reliable in a business-to-business service setting (Rutherford et al 2006). Rutherford et al (2006) found the measure reliabilities were .90 for satisfaction with the firm and .96 for satisfaction with the salesperson.

Table Two: Non-economic Satisfaction with the Selling Firm

Please estimate your firm's level of satisfaction with	the sel	ling	firm	1:			
	Strongl Disagre					Strong Agre	, ,
In general, I am very satisfied with my firm's relationship with the selling firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Overall, the selling firm is a good company to do business with	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am dissatisfied with the service my firm gets from the selling firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
All in all, the selling firm is very fair with my firm				4			
Overall, the selling firm's polices benefit my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Table Three: Non-economic Satisfaction with the Salesperson

Please report on your firm's level of satisfacti	on wit	h yo	ur s	alesp	pers	on:	
	Strong Disagr						Strongly Agree
In general, I am very satisfied with my firm's relationship with my salesperson	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Overall, my salesperson is a good person to do business with	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My salesperson provides my firm with a satisfactory level of service	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Overall, my salesperson is an asset to my company	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
All in all, my salesperson deals fairly with my company	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Satisfaction with the Firm and Satisfaction with the Sales Representative (Economic) (Table Four and Table Five)

Geyskens et al (1999) conducted a meta-analysis that split non-economic and economic satisfaction apart. In their 2000 study, they created a scale to measure both constructs. The original scale contained five items of which the measures yielded problems in the current setting. For this study, six items for both economic satisfaction with the selling firm and salesperson were created.

Table Four: Economic Satisfaction with the Selling Firm

Please estimate your firm's level of eco	onomic	sati	sfac	tion	with	the	e selling firm:
	Strongl Disagre						Strongly Agree
My firm's relationship with the selling firm has provided good value	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm's relationship with the selling firm is very attractive with respect to cost savings	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm's relationship with the selling firm is very attractive with respect to productivity increases	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm is economically satisfied with the selling firm as a supplier	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The selling firm provides my firm with fair pricing	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Relative to other firms, the selling firm provides my firm with good economic value	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Table Five: Economic Satisfaction with the Salesperson

Please estimate your firm's level of economic	satisfa	ctio	n wi	th yo	our s	sale	sperson:
	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree
My firm's relationship with my salesperson has provided good value	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm's relationship with my salesperson is very attractive with respect to cost savings	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm's relationship with my salesperson is very attractive with respect to productivity increases	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm is economically satisfied with my salesperson	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My salesperson provides my firm with fair pricing	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Relative to other salespeople, my salesperson provides my firm with good economic value	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Trust in the Salesperson and Trust in the Selling Firm (Table Six and Table Seven)

Two major studies have broken apart the relationship the buyer has with the salesperson and the relationship the buyer has with the selling firm (Doney and Cannon 1997; Ganesan and Hess 1997). In the study conducted by Doney and Cannon (1997), they used an eight item scale to measure trust in the supplier firm. The scale provides a strong reliability of .94. They also used a seven item scale to measure trust in salesperson. The scale provides a strong reliability of .90.

Table Six: Trust in the Selling Firm

Please report on your firm's level of trust in the selling firm:									
		ongly agree				Strongly Agree			
The selling firm keeps promises it makes to my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
The selling firm is not always honest with my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
My firm believes the information that the selling firm provides us	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
The selling firm is genuinely concerned that my firm succeeds	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
When making important decisions, the selling firm considers my firm's welfare as well as its own	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
I trust the selling firm keeps my firm's best interests in mind	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
The selling firm is trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
My firm finds it necessary to be cautious with the selling firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		

Table Seven: Trust in your Salesperson

Please estimate your firm's level of trust in your salesperson: Strongly Disagree									
My salesperson has been frank in dealing with my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
My salesperson does not make false claims	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
I do not think this salesperson is completely open in dealing with my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
My salesperson is only concerned about himself/herself	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
My salesperson does not seem to be concerned with my firm's needs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
The people at my firm do not trust my salesperson	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
My salesperson is not trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		

Commitment to the Salesperson and Commitment to the Firm (Table Eight and Table Nine)

The 10 item scale used by Anderson and Weitz (1992) will be modified and used in this study. In their 1992 study, Anderson and Weitz report a Cronbach alpha of .83 for distributor's commitment. Further, Johnson et al (2001) used a modified 3 item version of the scale when measuring commitment to the salesperson. They report a reliability of .70. For this study, nine items used in the Anderson and Weitz (1992) scale will be modified to create the scales for both the firm's level of commitment to the selling firm and the salesperson.

Table Eight: Commitment to the Selling Firm

Please report on your firm's level of commitment to the selling firm:						
Strongly Disagree						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
m 1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Strongly Disagree 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Strongly Disagree 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2	Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3	Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4	Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5	Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6

Table Nine: Commitment to your Salesperson

Please report on your firm's level of commit	Strong Disagro	ly		- ~	. ~	·	Strongly Agree
My firm defends this salesperson when others criticize him/her	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm has a strong sense of loyalty to this salesperson	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm is continually on the lookout to add to or replace this salesperson	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm expects to be using this salesperson's products for some time	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If another company offered my firm a better product line, my firm would most certainly take them on, even if it meant dropping this salesperson	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm is not very committed to this salesperson	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm is quite willing to make long-term investments in the relationship with this salesperson	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm's relationship with this salesperson is a long-term alliance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm is patient with this salesperson when he/she makes mistakes that cause us trouble	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Perceived Commitment of the Selling Firm and Perceived Commitment of the Salesperson (Table Ten and Table Eleven)

Perceived commitment of the selling firm and perceived commitment of the sales representative are based on Anderson and Weitz (1992). Six item seven point Likert scales will be used to measure each of the constructs. The constructs have been tested by Rutherford et al (2007). Within their study, the constructs had strong reliabilities (.90 for perceived commitment of the selling firm and .91 for perceived commitment of the sales representative).

Table Ten: Perceptions of the Selling Firm's Commitment to your Firm

Please indicate your perceptions of the selling firm's commitment to your firm:							
	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree
The selling firm is not very committed to my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The selling firm is quite willing to make a long-term investment in helping my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The selling firm sees the relationship with my firm as a long-term alliance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The selling firm is willing to dedicate whatever people and resources it takes to help my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The selling firm is patient with my firm when we make mistakes that cause them trouble	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The selling firm has a strong sense of loyalty to my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Table Eleven: Perceptions of your Salesperson's Commitment to you Firm

Please indicate your perceptions of your salesperson's commitment to your firm:							
	Stron Disagn	0.			Strongly Agree		
My salesperson is not very committed to my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My salesperson is willing to make a long-term investment in helping my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My salesperson sees my firm's relationship as a long-term alliance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My salesperson is willing to do whatever it takes to help my firm's sales grow	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My salesperson is not patient with my firm when we make mistakes that cause him/her trouble	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My salesperson has a strong sense of loyalty to my firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Dependence (Table Twelve)

Dependence and perceptions of dependence has been researched by Ganesan (1994). Within the dependence construct, Ganesan (1994) used eight items to measure the construct which provided a reliability of .94. This scale will be used for the current study.

Table Twelve: Dependence on the Selling Firm

Please report on your firm's level of dependence on the selling firm:						
Strongly Disagree						
y 1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Strong isagroup 1 1 1 1 1	Strongly isagree y 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2	Strongly isagree y 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3	Strongly isagree y 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4	Strongly isagree y 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5	Strongly isagree S y 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6

Conflict (Table Thirteen and Table Fourteen)

A conflict scale has been developed by Kumar et al (1992). It contained three items and yielded reliabilities of .85 and .82. The scale has been used recently by Jap and Ganesan (2000). The scale provided a reliability of .83. This research will use a modified version of the scale. The modification to the scale is needed to assess levels of conflict with both the selling firm and the salesperson (the original scale uses an overall measure).

Table Thirteen: Conflict with the Selling Firm

Please estimate your firm's level of conflict with the selling firm:								
	Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree		
The relationship between the selling firm and my firm can be best described as tense	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
My firm has significant disagreements in our working relationship with the selling firm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
My firm frequently clashes with the selling firm on issues relating to how we should conduct business	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

Table Fourteen: Conflict with your Salesperson

t with your salesperso Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
	Strong Disagr 1	Strongly Disagree 1 2 1 2	Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 1 2 3	Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4	Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5	Strongly S		

The Sample

For this study, respondents that had purchasing authority in a business-to-business context were used. Considering that some people with purchasing authority may purchase online or never have a salesperson that calls on them, two requirements were used to ensure that respondents were eligible to complete the study. First, the respondents firm had to procure products or services from a selling firm. Second, the respondents had to have a salesperson make sales calls to them.

Data Collection Procedures

To collect the needed sample for this study, an online panel was used. To obtain the completed surveys, a group of 1688 respondents in the panel were invited to participate if they were involved in purchasing for their firm. Four days after the initial email a follow-up email was sent to the panel members reminding them about the study. One day after the follow-up email a second group of potential respondents were invited to complete the survey. Three days after the second group of 380 respondents was invited, a follow-up email was sent to both groups of respondents. Overall, the online panel contacted all of their 2,068 business panelists that purchased from selling firms. Eleven days after the initial invitation a total of 394 completed surveys were obtain and the survey was no longer available for respondents to complete.

Chapter Five

Data Analyses and Results

Sample Size and Completion Rates

A total of 2,068 potential respondents were emailed and asked to participate in the study. Of the 2,068 potential respondents a total of 635 visited the link where the survey was posted. Of the 635 respondents which visited the site, 58 percent were eligible to take the survey. Of the 368 eligible respondents, 105 of them failed to complete the entire survey. A total of 229 respondents answered the entire survey.

Of the 229 respondents which answered the entire survey, 25 were removed. Respondents were removed based on three criteria. First, if respondents failed to answer questions 2 and 3 (see Appendix A) they were removed. Second respondents were removed for excess missing data within the questionnaire. Last, respondents were removed for inaccurate answering of the questionnaire. To do this, pairs of opposite items were checked. For example, "My firm is not very committed to the selling firm" was compared against, "My firm is very committed to the selling firm." If the respondent answered both the former and latter questions as 6 opposed to 6 and 2, the respondent would be marked as a possible problem. A total of four pairs of items were checked and respondents that had a variation of more than 10 out of 24 were removed from the analysis.

After deletion of the respondents that were not usable, a total of 199 respondents remained. The overall response rate of every invitation sent to purchasing agents and

eligible respondents agreeing to take the survey and completing the survey in usable format in the data analysis was 9.6 percent. Considering that all purchasers do not qualify to complete the survey, only 1,199 (58 percent) of the total 2,068 contacted are estimated to be qualified to complete the survey. The overall response rate of qualified respondents sent the invitation and respondents completing the survey in usable format in the data analysis were 16.6 percent. The effective usable response rate of eligible respondents agreeing to take the survey and completing the survey in usable format in the data analysis was 54.1 percent.

Respondent Profiles

The average respondent was 49 years of age with a range of 23 to 80. 59.4 percent of the respondents were female, while 40.6 percent of the respondents were male.

Average compensation of the respondents was 57,351 dollars per year. The average respondent worked in purchasing for their current employer for just less than 8.5 years with a range of 1 month to 35 years. The average respondent had 12 years of formal education. The mode for years of formal education was 16 and 40 percent of the respondents had 16 or more years of formal education.

6.8 percent of the respondents completed the questionnaire with regard to service providers, while 93.2 percent of the respondents completed the questionnaire with regard to product providers. 41.5 percent of the respondents indicated that 100 percent of their purchases in this category were from the referenced selling firm. 58.5 percent of the respondents indicated that less than 100 percent of their purchases in this category were from the referenced selling firm.

Annual sales for the buying firms varied substantially. 6.3 percent of the firms had annual sales less than 100,000 dollars. 6.9 percent of the firms had sales between 100,000 dollars and 999,999 dollars. 28.4 percent of the firms had sales between 1,000,000 dollars and 9,999,999 dollars. 36.2 percent of the firms had sales between 10,000,000 dollars and 99,999,999 dollars. 22.4 percent of the firms had sales in excess of 99,999,999 dollars. 6.1 percent of the buying firms employed less than 10 workers. 10.7 percent of the buying firms employed between 10 and 49 workers. 7.6 percent of the buying firms employed between 50 and 99 workers. 43.6 percent of the buying firms employed 100 and 999 workers. 32 percent of the firms employed 1,000 or more workers.

Table Fifteen: Respondent Profiles

Individual Profiles	Questionnaire Profiles	Firm Profiles
Age	Answered Survey with	Annual Sales
Mean 49 years old	regard to:	Less than \$100,000
Range 23-80 years old	Service was 6.8% Product was 93.2%	6.3%
Income		\$100,000 to \$999,999
Mean \$57,351		6.9%
90.9% earned less than		
\$100,000		\$1,000,000 to
		\$9,999,999
Gender		28.4%
Female 59.4%		
Male 40.6%		\$10,000,000 to
		\$99,000,000
Years working in		36.2%
Purchasing for current		
firm		Greater than \$99,000,000
Mean 8.39 years		22.4%
Range 1 month to 35		
years		Employees
		Less than 10
Education		6.1%
Mean 12 years		
Mode 16 years		10 to 49
40% had 16 years or		10.7%
more		
		50 to 99
		7.6%
		100 to 999
		43.6%
		1,000 or more
		32%

Measurement Model Results

A total of 199 respondents were used to test the model which contained 14 constructs and a total of 85 items. Results from the Lisrel's outputs suggested measurement modifications were needed. Using the modification indices from the Lisrel outputs, items were identified with high cross loadings. Once these items were identified, construct reliabilities were checked to assess the impact of removing the selected item. If modification indices and reliabilities both suggested that item should be removed from the model, the item was then removed. After removing each item, the measurement model was run again to assess the actual impact of removing the item. After assessing numerous Lisrel outputs and construct reliabilities, a total of 42 items were used to measure the 14 constructs. According to Hu and Bentler (1999) and Hair et al. (2006), results for the final measurement model suggested good model fit (DOF=728; Chi-Square=1334; RMSEA=.058; NFI=.97; CFI=.99; and SRMR=.042). Table fifteen provides a summary of the construct items along with their reliabilities. The appendix contains detailed analysis with regard to the construct reliabilities, measurement model syntax, reduction of items in the measurement model, and Lisrel measurement model output.

Table Sixteen: Constructs and Items

Constructs and Items in Final Measurement Model Perceived Commitment Firm The selling firm is quite willing to make a long-term investment in helping my firm The selling firm is willing to dedicate whatever people and resources it takes to help my firm The selling firm has a strong sense of loyalty to my firm Satisfaction with Firm Overall, the selling firm is a good company to do business with All in all, the selling firm is very fair with my firm Trust with Firm Overall, the selling firm is very fair with my firm The selling firm keeps promises it makes to my firm My firm believes the information that the selling firm provides us The selling firm is trustworthy Commitment to Firm My firm is not very committed to the selling firm My firm's relationship with the selling firm is a long-term alliance Economic Satisfaction with Firm My firm is economically satisfied with the selling firm as a supplier The selling firm provides my firm with fair pricing Relative to other firms, the selling firm provides my firm economic value	Table Sixteen: Constructs and Items	
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Relative to other firms, the selling firm provides my firm	The selling firm provides my firm with fair pricing	
, , ,	The sening min provides my min with the privile	
, , ,	Relative to other firms the calling firm provides my firm	
economic value	, 5	
	economic value	

Conflict with Firm	.95
The relationship between the selling firm and my firm can be best described as tense	
My firm has significant disagreements in our working relationship with the selling firm	
My firm frequently clashes with the selling firm on issues relating to how we should conduct business	
Perceived Commitment Salesperson	.91
My salesperson is willing to make a long-term investment in helping my firm	
My salesperson is willing to do whatever it takes to help my firm's sales grow	
My salesperson has a strong sense of loyalty to my firm	
Satisfaction with Salesperson	.94
My salesperson provides my firm with a satisfactory level of service	
Overall, my salesperson is an asset to my company	
All in all, my salesperson deals fairly with my company	
Trust with Salesperson	.93
My salesperson does not seem to be concerned with my firm's needs	
The people at my firm do not trust my salesperson	
My salesperson is not trustworthy	
Commitment to Salesperson	.87
My firm has a strong sense of loyalty to this salesperson	
My firm is quite willing to make long-term investments in the relationship with this salesperson	
My firm is patient with this salesperson when he/she makes mistakes that cause us trouble	
Economic Satisfaction with Salesperson	.95
My firm is economically satisfied with my salesperson	
My salesperson provides my firm with fair pricing	
Relative to other salespeople, my salesperson provides my good economic value	

Conflict with Salesperson	.96
My firm's relationship with my salesperson can best be described as tense	
My salesperson and my firm have significant disagreements in our working relationship	
My salesperson and my firm frequently clash	
Dependence	.90
If my firm's relationship was discontinued with the selling my firm would have difficulty	
It would be difficult for my firm to replace the selling firm	
My firm is dependent on the selling firm	
Anticipated Future Interaction	.90
How likely is it that your firm will make a purchase from the selling firm during the next:	
6 months	
1 year	
2 years	

Structural Model Overall Fit

A total of 199 respondents were used to test the model which contained 14 constructs and a total of 42 items. According to Hair et al (2006) and Hu and Bentler (1999) the structure model provided adequate fit on several of the indicators, while other indicators suggests modification are needed (DOF=790; Chi-Square=1766; RMSEA=.077; NFI=.96; CFI=.98; and SRMR=.110). The CFI, NFI, and RMSEA are all at an acceptable level. The SRMR is above the .08 cutoff suggested by Hair et al. (2006) and Hu and Bentler (1999) and the RMSEA is above the .06 suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999). Further, a chi-square difference test suggests that the measurement model provides better fit. Overall, the structural model fails to provide great fit, but still provides an acceptable level of fit to assess the results for each of the hypothesis. The next fifteen pages contain detailed results for each of the hypothesis. The appendix contains detailed analysis with regard to structural model syntax and Lisrel structural model output.

Results for Model One (Figure Seven)

Results for **H1**, buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson has a direct positive effect on buyer's trust in the salesperson, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.25 and a z-value of 2.46. Results provide support for H1.

Results for **H2**, buyer's economic satisfaction with the salesperson has a direct negatively effect on the level of conflict between the buyer and the salesperson, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of -.69 and a z-value of -8.82. Results provide support for H2.


Results for **H3**, buyer's level of conflict with the salesperson has a direct negative effect on the buyer's trust in the salesperson, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of -.58 and a z-value of -10.30. Overall, results support H3.

Results for **H4**, buyer's level of satisfaction with the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of commitment to the salesperson, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of -0.19 and a z-value of -1.48. Results fail to support H4.

Results for **H5**, buyer's level of trust with the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of commitment to the salesperson, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.06 and a z-value of 0.79. Results fail to support H5.

Results for **H6**, buyer's level of commitment to the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.01 and a z-value of 0.17. Results fail to support H6.

Figure Seven: Summary of Model One Results



Results for Model Two (Figure Eight)

Results for H7, buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's trust in the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.43 and a z-value of 8.77. Results provide support for H7.

Results for **H8**, Buyer's economic satisfaction with the selling firm has a direct negatively effect on the level of conflict between the buyer and the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of -.88 and a z-value of -13.01. Results provide support for H8.

Results for **H9**, buyer's level of conflict with the selling firm has a direct negative effect on the buyer's trust in the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of -0.26 and a z-value of -6.64. Results provide support for H9.

Results for **H10**, buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's commitment in the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of -.12 and a z-value of -1.02. Results fail to provide support for H10.


Results for **H11**, buyer's level of trust with the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of commitment to the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of .10 and a z-value of .59. Results fail to provide support for H11.

Results for **H12**, buyer's level of commitment to the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of .20 and a z-value of 2.41. Results provide support for H12.

Results for **H13**, buyer's level of non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.13 and a z-value of 1.96. Results provide support for H13.

Results for **H14**, buyer's level of economic satisfaction with the selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.25 and a z-value of 3.56. Results provide support for H14.

Figure Eight: Summary of Model Two Results



Results for Model Three (Figure Nine)

Results for **H15**, buyer's perception of the salesperson's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.89 and a z-value of 13.97. Results provide support for H15.


Results for **H16**, buyer's perception of the salesperson's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's economic satisfaction with the salesperson, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.79 and a z-value of 12.08. Results provide support for H16.

Results for **H17**, buyer's perception of the salesperson's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's trust in the salesperson, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.13 and a z-value of 1.19. Results fail to provide support for H17.

Results for **H18**, buyer's perception of the salesperson's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's commitment to the salesperson, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 1.14 and a z-value of 7.34. Results provide support for H18.

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Figure Nine: Summary of Model Three Results



Results for Model Four (Figure Ten)

Results for **H19**, buyer's perception of the selling firm's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.33 and a z-value of 4.60. Results provide support for H19.


Results for **H20**, buyer's perception of the selling firm's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's economic satisfaction with the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.66 and a z-value of 12.74. Results provide support for H20.

Results for **H21**, buyer's perception of the selling firm's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's trust in the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.25 and a z-value of 4.93. Results provide support for H21.

Results for **H22**, buyer's perception of the selling firm's commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect on the buyer's commitment to the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.23 and a z-value of 1.87. Results fail to provide support for H22.

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Figure Ten: Summary of Model Four Results




Results for Model Five (Figure Eleven)

Results for **H23**, buyer's level of non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.41 and a z-value of 5.43. Results provide support for H23.

Results for **H24**, buyer's level of trust in the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of trust in the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of -0.03 and a z-value of -0.78. Results fail to provide support for H24.

Results for **H25**, Buyer's level of commitment in the salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of commitment in the selling firm, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.51 and a z-value of 5.39. Results provide support for H25.

Figure Eleven: Summary of Model Five Results



Results for Overall Model (Figure Twelve and Table Sixteen)

Results for **H26**, buyer's level of dependence has a direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of -0.06 and a z-value of -1.71. Results fail to provide support for H26.

Figure Twelve: Summary Results for Overall Supported Model




Table Seventeen: Summary Table of Hypotheses Results

Hypothesis	z- value	Supported/N
V F		ot Supported
H1: Buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the	2.46	Support
salesperson has a direct positive effect on buyer's trust in		11
the salesperson.		
H2: Buyer's economic satisfaction with the salesperson	-8.82	Support
has a direct negatively effect on the level of conflict		11
between the buyer and the salesperson.		
H3: Buyer's level of conflict with the salesperson has a	-10.30	Support
direct negative effect on the buyer's trust in the		
salesperson.		
H4: Buyer's level of satisfaction with the salesperson has	-1.48	Not Supported
a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of		
commitment to the salesperson.		
H5: Buyer's level of trust with the salesperson has a	0.79	Not Supported
direct positive effect on the buyer's level of commitment		
to the salesperson.		
H6: Buyer's level of commitment to the salesperson has a	.017	Not Supported
direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the		
relationship.		
H7: Buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the selling	8.77	Supported
firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's trust in the		
selling firm.		
H8: Buyer's economic satisfaction with the selling firm	-13.01	Supported
has a direct negatively effect on the level of conflict		
between the buyer and the selling firm.		
H9: Buyer's level of conflict with the selling firm has a	-6.64	Supported
direct negative effect on the buyer's trust in the selling		
firm.		
H10: Buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the selling	-1.02	Not Supported
firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's		
commitment in the selling firm.		
H11: Buyer's level of trust with the selling firm has a	.59	Not Supported
direct positive effect on the buyer's level of commitment		
to the selling firm.		
H12: Buyer's level of commitment to the selling firm has	2.41	Supported
a direct positive effect on the buyer's continuance in the		
relationship.		
H13: Buyer's level of non-economic satisfaction with the	1.96	Supported
selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's		
continuance in the relationship.		
H14: Buyer's level of economic satisfaction with the		
selling firm has a direct positive effect on the buyer's	3.56	Supported
continuance in the relationship.		
H15: Buyer's perception of the salesperson's	13.97	Supported
commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect		
on the buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the		
salesperson.		
	i e	

H16: Buyer's perception of the salesperson's	12.08	Supported
commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect		
on the buyer's economic satisfaction with the salesperson.		
H17: Buyer's perception of the salesperson's	1.19	Not Supported
commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect		
on the buyer's trust in the salesperson.		
H18: Buyer's perception of the salesperson's	7.34	Supported
commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect		
on the buyer's commitment to the salesperson.		
H19: Buyer's perception of the selling firm's	4.60	Supported
commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect		
on the buyer's non-economic satisfaction with the selling		
firm.		
H20: Buyer's perception of the selling firm's	12.74	Supported
commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect		
on the buyer's economic satisfaction with the selling		
firm.		
H21: Buyer's perception of the selling firm's	4.93	Supported
commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect		
on the buyer's trust in the selling firm.		
H22: Buyer's perception of the selling firm's	1.87	Not Supported
commitment to the relationship has a direct positive effect		
on the buyer's commitment to the selling firm.		
H23: Buyer's level of non-economic satisfaction with the	5.43	Supported
salesperson has a direct positive effect on the buyer's		
level of non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm.		
H24: Buyer's level of trust in the salesperson has a direct	-0.78	Not Supported
positive effect on the buyer's level of trust in the selling		
firm.		
H25: Buyer's level of commitment in the salesperson has	5.39	Supported
a direct positive effect on the buyer's level of		
commitment in the selling firm.		
H26: Buyer's level of dependence has a direct positive	-1.71	Not Supported
effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship.		

Squared Multiple Correlations for Structural Model (Table Seventeen)

The results from the structural models paths yielded strong squared multiple correlations for each of the predicted constructs. For the predicted variables with regard to the salesperson: satisfaction with the salesperson had an R^2 of .75, trust in the salesperson had an R^2 of .73, commitment to the salesperson had an R^2 of .78, economic satisfaction with the salesperson had an R^2 of .74, and conflict with the salesperson had an R^2 of .36. For the predicted variables with regard to the selling firm: satisfaction with the selling firm had an R^2 of .54, trust with the selling firm had an R^2 of .86, commitment of the selling firm had an R^2 of .62, economic satisfaction with the selling firm had an R^2 of .57. The overall dependent variable continuance had an R^2 of .33.

<u>Table Eighteen: Summary of Squared Multiple Correlations for Structural Model</u>

Constructs	R^2
Satisfaction with Salesperson	.75
Trust with Salesperson	.73
Commitment to Salesperson	.78
Economic Satisfaction with Salesperson	.74
Conflict with Salesperson	.36
Satisfaction with Firm	.54
Trust with Firm	.86
Commitment to Firm	.56
Economic Satisfaction with Firm	.62
Conflict with Firm	.57
Anticipated Future Interaction	.33

Modified Structural Model

After reviewing the overall structural model fit and modification indices, a modified structural model was tested. To test this model, the error terms for conflict with the salesperson and conflict with the selling firm were correlated to reduce error in the model. In addition, two additional linkages were developed post hoc. The first looks at a link between economic satisfaction with the salesperson and economic satisfaction with the selling firm. In the original model, paths were hypothesized between non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson and non-economic satisfaction with the firm. Building off of this linkage, a path will be tested linking economic satisfaction with the salesperson to economic satisfaction with the selling firm.

L27: As buyer's level of economic satisfaction with the salesperson increases, the level of economic satisfaction with the overall selling firm increases.

The second of the linkages looks at the negative impact of the salesperson on buyer's continuance in the relationship. In this case, conflict with the salesperson is predicted to decrease the buyer's continuance in the relationship. In other words, if the buyer has a high degree of conflict with the salesperson the buyer is more likely not to continue the relationship.

L28: Buyer's level of conflict with the salesperson will be negatively associated with the buyer's continuance in the relationship.

Modified Structural Model Overall Fit

The modified structure model provided stronger fit than the original proposed structural model. The modified structural models overall fit was adequate with regard to RMSEA, CFI, and NFI (Hair et al. 2006; Hu and Bentler 1999) (DOF=787; Chi-Square=1661; RMSEA=.072; NFI=.96; CFI=.98; and SRMR=.089). Overall, DOF dropped by 3, Chi Square dropped by 105, RMSEA dropped by .005, NFI remained unchanged, CFI remained unchanged, and SRMR dropped by .021. Further, a chi-square difference test suggests that the modified model fits significantly better than the original model. Overall, results suggest that the modified model provides better fit then the original model.

Results for Modified Model (Figure Thirteen)

Results for **L27**, as buyer's level of economic satisfaction with the salesperson increases, the level of economic satisfaction with the overall selling firm increases, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.51 and a z-value of 7.19. Results provide support for L27.

Results for **L28**, buyer's level of conflict with the salesperson will be negatively associated with the buyer's continuance in the relationship, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of -0.28 and a z-value of -5.54. Results provide support for L28

Significant Changes in Structural Paths

Results for **H13**, buyer's level of non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm will be positively associated with the buyer's continuance in the relationship, yielded an unstandardized regression coefficient of 0.08 and a z-value of 1.28. Results fail to provide support for H13.

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Buyer's Perception of Buyer's Perception of Salesperson' Selling Firm's Commitment Commitment Buyer's Buyer's Buyer's Buyer's Buyer's Buyer's Trust in Economic Economic Supplier to Supplier Salesperson Satisfaction Satisfaction Salesperson with Supplier Salesperson Buyer's Conflict with Buyer's Buyer's Buyer's Satisfaction Conflict with Economic Supplier Salesperson Satisfaction with Supplier Salesperson Buyer's Dependence Continuance in the Relationship

Figure Thirteen: Summary Results for Modified Overall Supported Model

Solid line means significant linkage from original model
Dashed Line means hypothesis was added in the modified model
Dashed line with different size dashes means hypothesis was supported in the original model but not supported in modified model

Squared Multiple Correlations for Modified Structural Model

The results from the structural models paths yielded strong squared multiple correlations for each of the predicted constructs. For the predicted variables with regard to the salesperson: satisfaction with the salesperson had an R^2 of .76, trust in the salesperson had an R^2 of .73, commitment to the salesperson had an R^2 of .79, economic satisfaction with the salesperson had an R^2 of .74, and conflict with the salesperson had an R^2 of .34. For the predicted variables with regard to the selling firm: satisfaction with the selling firm had an R^2 of .54, trust with the selling firm had an R^2 of .85, commitment of the selling firm had an R^2 of .56, economic satisfaction with the selling firm had an R^2 of .54. The overall dependent variable, anticipated future interaction, had an R^2 of .41.

Overall, squared multiple correlations increased for 4 of the constructs, decreased for 3 of the constructs and remained unchanged for 4 of the constructs. Specifically, the squared multiple correlations for the salesperson side were as follows: satisfaction increased by .01, trust remained unchanged, commitment increased by .01, economic satisfaction remained unchanged, and conflict decreased by .02. For the firm side: satisfaction remained unchanged, trust decreased by .01, commitment remained unchanged, economic satisfaction increased by .06, and conflict decreased by .03. The overall dependent variable, anticipated future interaction, increased by .08.

Chapter Six

Discussions and Implications

Implications

Perceived Commitment with the salesperson

The construct perceived commitment of the salesperson has a strong impact on the model. First, the construct predicts economic satisfaction with the salesperson, non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson, and commitment to the salesperson.

Considering that both non-economic satisfaction and commitment to the salesperson have an indirect impact on continuance, increasing variance explained in this constructs is important. Further, both economic satisfaction and commitment to the salesperson have an indirect impact on continuance in the modified model.

One overall implication pertaining to perceived commitment of the salesperson is the construct does impact buyer continuance in an indirect fashion. Further, researchers testing commitment, economic satisfaction, and non-economic satisfaction with regard to the salesperson should test this construct because of its ability to predict variance. From managerial prospective, sales managers should understand that buyer's perception of their salesperson's commitment does impact the relationship. In other words, salespeople should at minimum convey to buyer's that they are committed to building a strong relationship with the buyer.

Non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson

The construct non-economic satisfaction with the salesperson was a predictor of trust in the salesperson and non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm. Results give support that if the buyer is non-economic satisfied with the salesperson the buyer will

also be more non-economically satisfied with the selling firm. From a managerial prospective, a firm should ensure that buyer's are non-economically satisfied with the salesperson if they are looking to increase non-economic satisfaction with the firm.

Economic satisfaction with the salesperson

The construct economic satisfaction with the salesperson was a negative predictor of conflict with the salesperson in both the model and modified model. For managers, they need to assess the impact of buyer's not be economically satisfied with their salespeople because if buyer's are not economically satisfied, conflict will increase. One technique for salespeople to increase economic satisfaction with the buyer is to increase the perceived value provided by the product over decreasing the price.

In the modified model, economic satisfaction with the salesperson was a significant predictor of economic satisfaction with the selling firm. In other words, if buyers feel that the salesperson is giving them a good deal and are economically satisfied with them, they are also more economically satisfied with the selling firm. From a firm's prospective, increasing buyer's economic satisfaction with the salesperson will have a positive impact on the buyer's economic satisfaction with the firm.

Conflict with the salesperson

Conflict with the salesperson played a minor role in the model. Conflict with the salesperson was significantly related to trust in the salesperson. While this relationship was significant, the impact of conflict did not get mediated through the model.

Considering the lack of mediation of conflict in the model, the modified model tested a direct link between conflict with the salesperson and continuance. This linkage was significant and had a strong negative impact on continuance. With conflict with the salesperson being the only added link to continuance in the modified model, the variance explained in continuance in the modified model increase by .08. In other words, conflict with the salesperson has a strong negative impact on buyer continuance. From a

managerial prospective, if the buyer has a high level of conflict with the salesperson in the relationship, even if the firm is doing a good job, the buyer is much more likely to leave the relationship.

Trust with the salesperson

Trust with the salesperson was not a predictor of commitment to the salesperson. In addition, trust with the salesperson failed to significantly predict trust with the selling firm. Overall, in both the original model and modified model, trust with the salesperson failed to predict other constructs.

Commitment to the salesperson

Commitment to the salesperson had an impact on the model. First, commitment to the salesperson was a significant predictor of commitment to the selling firm. Second, commitment to the salesperson was not a significant predictor of continuance. Within the modified model the significance of the paths remained the same. In other words, buyer's commitment to the salesperson does not have a direct impact on the buyer's continuance in the relationship. The impact of the buyer's commitment to the salesperson is mediated through commitment to the selling firm. From a managerial aspect, buyers do not directly consider their commitment to the salespersons when deciding to continue in the relationship.

Dependence

Dependence was not a significant predictor of continuance in the original model. Further, dependence was not a significant predictor of continuance in the modified model. Overall, the impact of dependence in the relationship should be reexamined to provide more insight into the construct.

Perceived commitment of the selling firm

The construct perceived commitment of the selling firm has a strong impact on the model. First, the construct predicts economic satisfaction with the selling firm, non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm, and trust in the selling firm. Considering that both non-economic satisfaction and economic satisfaction with the selling firm have a direct impact on continuance in the model, increasing variance explained in these constructs are important.

One overall implication pertaining to perceived commitment of the selling firm is the construct does impact buyer continuance in an indirect fashion. Further, researchers testing trust, economic satisfaction, and non-economic satisfaction with regard to the selling firm should test this construct because of its ability to predict variance. From a firm prospective, communications which stress the firm is committed to the relationship are important to keeping the buyer in the relationship.

Non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm

The construct non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm was a predictor of trust in the selling firm and continuance in the relationship. In the modified model only trust in the selling firm was predicted by non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm. This research gives partial support that non-economic satisfaction with the selling firm had a direct impact on continuance. Given this finding, selling firms should ensure that customers are non-economically satisfied with them.

Economic satisfaction with the selling firm

The construct economic satisfaction with the selling firm was a negative predictor of conflict with the selling firm and a significant predictor of continuance in both the model and modified model. For managers, they need to assess the impact of buyer's not be economically satisfied with the selling firm because if buyer's are not economically satisfied conflict will increase. In addition, if the buyer is not economically satisfied, the

buyer is less likely to continue in the relationship. Overall, if the firm wants to reduce conflict in the relationship and increase the buyer's chances of continuance in the relationship, the firm should focus on making sure the buyer is economically satisfied in the relationship.

Conflict with the selling firm

Conflict with the selling firm played a minor role in the model. Conflict with the selling firm was significantly related to trust in the selling. While this relationship was significant, the impact of conflict did not get mediated through the model.

Trust with the selling firm

Trust with the selling firm was not a predictor of commitment to the selling firm in the original model. Further, the relationship remained non-significant in the modified model. Overall, in both the original model and modified model, trust with the selling firm failed to predict other constructs.

Commitment to the selling firm

Commitment to the selling firm had an impact on the model. Commitment to the selling firm was a significant predictor of continuance. Within the modified model the path remained supported. In other words, commitment to the selling firm has a direct impact on the buyer's willingness to continue to purchasing from the firm.

Summary of the impact of the salesperson

Overall, the results find support that the buyer's relationship with the salesperson has a strong impact on the buyer's relationship with the selling firm. This finding is not surprising because of the salesperson's status as the boundary spanner. What is surprising is the lack of direct impact the buyer's relationship with the salesperson has on buyer's continuance. Findings suggest that a strong positive relationship between the buyer and the salesperson has no direct effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship. Findings also suggest that a negative relationship with high levels of conflict between the

buyer and the salesperson does have a negative direct effect on the buyer's continuance in the relationship. In other words, the salesperson can directly cause the buyer not to continue in the relationship if the salesperson creates high levels of conflict with the buying firm. In addition, the salesperson alone can not keep the buyer in the relationship when a strong positive relationship exists.

Summary of the impact of the selling firm

Overall, the results find support that the buyer's relationship with the selling firm has a strong direct impact on the buyer's continuance. Three of the constructs, non-economic satisfaction, economic satisfaction, and commitment were significant predictors of continuance. Findings suggest that the selling firm has a great deal of influence on the buyer's continuance in the relationship. Considering this, the selling firm needs to assess ways to monitor levels of buyer's satisfaction both in an economic and non-economic sense. If buyers are not satisfied with the selling firm, there is a direct impact in the buyer's continuance in the relationship.

Overall

Overall, the results from this study propose several interesting findings. First the salesperson only has an indirect positive effect on buyer's continuance in the relationship. This finding suggests that the relationship is held by the selling firm and the buyer is only able to positively influence it in an indirect fashion. Second, while the salesperson has an indirect positive effect on buyer's continuance, the buyer does have a direct negative effect on buyer's continuance. In other words, the salesperson is able to create an environment in which the buyer leaves the relationship based on negative feelings, but can not keep the buyer directly in the relationship based on positive aspects.

On the other side, the selling firm can have a direct positive influence on the relationship. In this case, if the buyer is committed to the selling firm, the buyer is more likely to stay in the relationship. The findings here suggest the relationship is controlled

by the selling firm and positive aspects of interactions between the selling firm and the buyer have a direct positive influence on the relationship. In summary, the findings suggest that the selling firm controls the relationship and the buyer views that relationship primarily being with the selling firm, but if the selling firm allows a boundary spanner to harm the relationship the buyer may terminate the relationship.

Chapter Seven

Limitations, Future Research, and Conclusions

Limitations

This research like all research has several limitations. First, this study used a long questionnaire which may have reduced the response rate. For example, a little over 20% of the respondents which started the survey failed to finish the survey. If the questionnaire would have been reduced by 30 percent, the response rate might have increased. Second, the study focuses on buyer's purchases of business-to-business products and services and does not control for differences in these. If one selling firm's customers were surveyed versus using this panel, respondents could have reported findings based on one type of product or service. Third, the study fails to assess if differences exist between different types of industries. The respondents in this study were from a wide range of industries and purchased a wide variety of products and services. If a sampling frame based on industry classification codes could have been obtained and a large enough respondent base from each of the select codes could have been obtain, a comparison between industries could have been reported. A fourth limitation of this study is the lack of longitudinal data. If the study was setup to assess responses over several times, the actual interactions of buyers in the relationship could be assessed.

Future Research

In the future, this research could be tested in a variety of industries, just service industries, just a product setting, and/or even within a retailing context. If tested within a variety of industries, differences and similarities between and within industries would be discovered. Next if one of the studies looked at this topic in a product setting and another looked at the topic in a service setting, buyer's views of differences in products and services would be discovered. Third if this topic is transposed into a retail setting, research could determine differences in business-to-business buyers and business-to-consumer buyers.

Further, research could take the continuance construct into a new direction. For example, research could address the negative side of the continuance construct. If propensity to leave was tested within the same context, differences in a positively framed continuance construct and a negatively frame construct would be discovered.

As hinted at earlier, three streams of research surrounding this topic will be engaged in. First, this research will address the topic of differences in industries. To do this, data will be collected from customers of a single selling firm and compared against this data set where multiple selling firms and multiple buyers were used. Once complete with this study, comparisons will be made between the two data sets.

The second research stream will emerge comparing differences in the last dependent variable. First, differences will be compared against the positive and negative versions of the continuance construct. Once complete with this, word-of-mouth and share-of-wallet will be addressed. Once complete with this topic, there will be a clearer understanding of: 1) what keeps customers in a relationship, 2) what make customers want to leave a relationship, 3) what makes customer purchase more or less from a

supplier when given the choice between several suppliers, and 4) what increases customers willingness to recommend a supplier to others.

The last stream will emerge within a retail context. To do this, three sets of relationships will be addressed. First, the relationship between the buyer and selling firm will be addressed. Second, the relationship between the buyer and salesperson will be addressed. The last relationship that will be addressed will be the buyer's relationship with the product brand. Once complete with this research stream, two major topics will have further clarification. First, difference in business-to-business and business-to-customer sales can be addressed. Second, differences in the buyer's relationship with the selling firm, salesperson, and brand within a business-to-consumer context will be further clarified.

Conclusions

This study is one of the first studies to fully address the relationship that business-to-business buyers have with both the selling firm and salesperson within an integrated model. This study hypothesized 26 linkages in the original model and 28 in the revised model. Finding from this study support 14 of the 26 original hypotheses and the 2 additional linkages. The overall dependent variable, continuance, had 33 percent of its variance explained in the original model and 41 percent explained in the modified model.

Further, this study finds that the relationship customers have with the selling firm is a stronger predictor of continuance than the relationship that the buyer has with the salesperson. While this relationship is stronger between the buyer and the selling firm, findings suggest that the salesperson can have a direct negative impact on the relationship if conflict is present. In this case, conflict with the salesperson explained about one-fourth of the variance explained in the continuance construct. Second, like previous studies have suggested, this research finds that the flow in the buyer-salesperson relationship flows through the buyer-selling firm relationship. Considering this, the salesperson has a strong indirect effect on the buyer's decision to continue in the relationship.

Third, the study finds that commitment with the selling firm, economic satisfaction with the selling firm, satisfaction selling firm, and conflict with the salesperson all play a direct role with regard to continuance. This finding stresses the importance of further research with regard to these constructs and relationship continuance. One interesting finding of this study is the impact of trust. Trust was not found to have an impact on commitment from both the selling firm and salesperson side. When taking into account the non-significant relationships, trust fails to even provide an indirect impact on continuance. Overall, this study provides a framework for future research on the topic of business-to-business buyer-selling firm and buyer-salesperson relationships.

Appendix

Appendix A: The Survey

Customer Relationship Survey

Georgia State University
Department of Marketing
Informed Consent
Title: Customer Relationship Survey

Principal Investigator: James S. Boles, Ph.D. Brian N. Rutherford, Doctoral Candidate

You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to investigate the relationships between customers, their salespeople, and the selling firm. You are invited to participate because of your procurement position in a B2B company. A total of 300 participants will be recruited for this study. Participation will require 20 to 25 minutes of your time. If you decide to participate, you will complete the following online questionnaire. Once you have completed the guestionnaire, please allow 7-10 business days for your Zoomerang rewards to appear in your account. In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. Participation in this study may or may not benefit you personally. However, it will allow us to gain important information about the product decisions that business managers make. Participation in research is voluntary. You have the right not to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time. Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. We will code all information. Your name will never be reported on study records. Only Zoomerang personnel will have access to the information you provide us. Additionally, Zoomerang personnel will protect your information you provide. Your name and other facts that might point to you will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be identified personally. Call James S. Boles, Ph.D. at (404) 651-2740 or Brian N. Rutherford, Doctoral Candidate at (404) 403-8352 if you have guestions about this study. If you have guestions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research study, you may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at 404-463-0674 or svogtner1@gsu.edu.

If you are willing to volunteer for this research, please start the survey now by clicking on the Submit button below



1

Do you and your firm meet the following two requirments: 1)Your firm procures products or services from selling firms, and 2) A salesperson makes sales calls to you





Survey Page 2

2	Please select and list the name of one firm which meets the following two requirements: 1) Your firm procures products or services from this firm, and 2) A salesperson from this firm makes sales calls to you
	▼
	
3	What type/types of products or services does this selling firm primary provide to your firm?
	SUBMIT

Please answer the following questions with regard to your firm's relationship with the selected selling firm:

4	Please est	imate your	· firm's leve	el of satisfa	action with	the selling	, firm with
	"1" being s	strongly dis	agree and	"7" being	strongly a	gree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	In general, firm	I am very	satisfied v	vith my firn	n's relation	ship with t	he selling
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Overall, th	_ e selling fir	m is a goo	od compan	y to do bu	siness with	1
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	I am dissa	tisfied with	the service	e my firm	gets from t	he selling	firm
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	All in all, th	e selling fi	rm is very	fair with m	ny firm		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Overall, th	_ e selling fir	m's police	s benefit n	ny firm		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please report on your firm's level of trust in the selling firm with "1" being strongly disagree and "7" being strongly agree										
1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
The selling firm keeps promises it makes to my firm										
1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
The selling	g firm is no	t always ho	onest with	my firm						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
My firm be	elieves the	informatior	n that the s	selling firm	provides ι	ıs				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
The selling	g firm is ge	nuinely co	ncerned th	at my firm	succeeds					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
	king import well as its		ons, the se	lling firm c	onsiders m	ny firm's				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
I trust the	_ selling firm	keeps my	firm's bes	t interests	in mind					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
The selling	_ g firm is tru	stworthy								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
My firm fir	_ ids it neces	sary to be	cautious	with the se	lling firm					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7				

5

SUBMIT

Survey Page 4

3	Please ind your firm w						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	The selling	g firm is no	t very com	mitted to r	ny firm		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	The selling helping my		ite willing t	o make a	long-term i	nvestment	: in
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	The selling alliance	firm sees	the relatio	nship with	my firm as	s a long-te	rm
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	The selling takes to he			icate what	ever peop	le and reso	ources it
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	The selling cause ther		tient with n	ny firm wh	en we mak	ke mistake:	s that
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	The selling	firm has a	a strong se	ense of loy	alty to my f	firm	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

7							
	Please est being stror	•		, ,		•	ith "1"
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm is	very loyal t	o the sellir	ng firm			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm is	very comm	nitted to the	e selling fir	m		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm do	es not con	sider itself	a loyal se	lling firm c	ustomer	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm do	es not plar	n to purcha	ase at the s	selling firm	in the futu	re
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

SUBMIT

Survey Page 5

Please report on your firm's level of commitment to the selling firm with "1" being strongly disagree and "7" being strongly agree My firm defends the selling firm when others criticize the company My firm has a strong sense of loyalty to the selling firm My firm is continually on the lookout for another company to replace the selling firm My firm expects to be using the selling firm's products and services for some time If another company offered my firm a better product, my firm would most certainly take them on, even if it meant dropping the selling firm My firm is not very committed to the selling firm My firm is quite willing to make long-term investments in the relationship with the selling firm My firm's relationship with the selling firm is a long-term alliance My firm is patient with the selling firm when they make mistakes that cause us trouble

Please estimate your firm's level of economic satisfaction with the selling firm with "1" being strongly disagree and "7" being strongly agree											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
My firm's r	My firm's relationship with the selling firm has provided good value										
1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
My firm's r to cost sav	elationship vings	with the s	elling firm	is very att	ractive with	n respect					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
	elationship		elling firm	is very att	ractive with	n respect					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
My firm is	economica	ılly satisfie	d with the	selling firm	ı as a supp	olier					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
The selling	g firm provi	des my firr	n with fair	pricing							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
Relative to economic	other firm	s, the selli	ng firm pro	ovides my f	firm with go	bod					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7					

SUBMIT

Survey Page 6

9

10							
		oort on you strongly dis		•		-	g firm with
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
		s relationsh e difficulty	nip was dis	scontinued	with the se	elling firm,	my firm
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	The selling	g firm is cru	ucial to my	firm's futu	ire perform	ance	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	It would be	e difficult fo	or my firm t	to replace	the selling	firm	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm is	_ dependent	t on the se	lling firm			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm do	_ oes not hav	ve a good a	alternative	to the selli	ng firm	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	The selling	g firm is im	portant to	my firm's t	ousiness		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	The selling	_ g firm's pro	duct lines	are essen	tial to my fi	rm	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	If my firm's the selling	_ s relationsh firm	nip was dis	continued	, it would b	e difficult r	replacing
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

11							
	Please esti	•		•			lling firm
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Competitor more than		-	•	es that wou	uld benefit	my firm
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm wo						ı
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Competitor the selling		lling firm v	vould be b	etter to do	business	with than
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

SUBMIT

Survey Page 7

12	Please es	-			ct with the songly agree	-	ı with "1"
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	The relation		veen the s	elling firm	and my firr	n can be b	est
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm ha		nt disagree	ements in o	our working	g relations	hip with
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
		equently cla conduct b		the selling	g firm on is:	sues relati	ng to how
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
any type c	ical four-wee ommunication ding contact	n in which	the selling	firm initiat			
Actual nur	nber of times						
4.4							
frequency	ical four-wee of any type c th you (exclud	ommunica	tion in whi	ch the selli	ng firm init		
ldeal numl	per of times						
			SUB	міт			
							Survey Page

Please answer the following questions with regard to your salesperson at the selling firm:

15	Please rep	•				•	sperson
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	In general, salesperso	-	satisfied v	vith my firn	n's relation	ship with r	ny
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Overall, my	y salesper	son is a go	ood person	to do bus	iness with	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My salespe	erson prov	ides my fir	m with a s	atisfactory	level of se	rvice
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Overall, my	y salesper	son is an a	asset to my	/ company		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	All in all, m	y salespei	rson deals	fairly with	my compa	iny	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

16	Please esti	-			•	•	ith "1"
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My salespe	erson has	been frank	in dealing	with my fi	rm	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My salespe	erson does	s not make	false clair	ns		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	I do not thin	nk this sale	esperson is	s complete	ely open in	dealing wi	th my
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My salespe	erson is on	lly concern	ed about h	nimself/her	self	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My salespe	erson does	not seem	to be con	cerned witl	h my firm's	needs
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	The people	at my firn	n do not tru	ust my sale	esperson		

My salesperson is not trustworthy

SUBMIT

Survey Page 9

7	Please ind										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
	My salespe	erson is no	ot very com	ımitted to ı	my firm						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
	My salespe	_ erson is wi	lling to ma	ke a long-	term inves	tment in he	elping my				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
	My salesperson sees my firm's relationship as a long-term alliance										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
	My salespo	erson is wi	lling to do	whatever i	it takes to I	nelp my fir	m's sales				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
	My salesperson is not patient with my firm when we make mistakes that cause him/her trouble										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7				
	My salespe	erson has	a strong se	ense of loy	alty to my	firm					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7				

18							
	Please est being stror	•				•	with "1"
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm is	_ very loyal t	o my sales	sperson			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm do	_ es not plar	n to purcha	ase from m	ıy salesper	son in the	future
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm is	very comm	nitted to my	/ salespers	son		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm do	es not con	sider itself	very loyal	to my sale	esperson	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

SUBMIT

Survey Page 10

Please rep	•				•	person
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm de	fends this	salesperso	on when of	thers critic	ze him/hei	ſ
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm ha	s a strong	sense of l	oyalty to th	is salespe	rson	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm is o	_	on the loc	kout to ad	d to or rep	lace this	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm ex	pects to be	e using this	salespers	son's prod	ucts for so	me time
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
					line, my fii ng this sale	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm is	not very co	ommitted to	this sales	sperson		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm is owith this sa			long-term	investmen	ts in the re	elationshi
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm's r	_ elationship	with this	salesperso	n is a long	ı-term allia	nce
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My firm is perfection that cause			sperson wl	hen he/she	e makes m	istakes
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

20	Please esti salesperso agree						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm's re	elationship	with my s	alespersoi	n has provi	ded good	value
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm's re		with my s	alespersoı	n is very at	tractive wi	th respect
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm's re			alespersoi	n is very at	tractive wi	th respect
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm is e	conomica	lly satisfied	d with my	salesperso	n	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My salespe	rson provi	des my firi	m with fair	pricing		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Relative to good econo			ny salespe	erson provi	des my firi	n with
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

SUBMIT

21	Please rep	ort on you	r firm's lev	el of confli	ict with you	ır salesper	son with
	"1" being s	trongly dis	agree and	l "7" being	strongly a	gree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm's r	_ elationship	with my s	salesperso	n can best	be describ	ed as
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My salespoworking re		my firm ha	ave signific	ant disagr	eements in	our
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My salespo	erson and	my firm fre	equently cl	ash		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22	Over a typ any type c you:						
	Actual nun	nber of tim	es				
23	Over a typ frequency initiates co	of any type	e commun		stimate yo which your		
	Ideal numb	per of time	s				
			sı	JBMIT			

relationship:

Please answer the following questions about your firm's expectations of association with the selling firm with "1" being strongly disagree and "7" being strongly agree My firm thinks about ending the business relationship with the selling firm My firm is not likely to continue the business relationship with the selling firm My firm will probably stop doing business with the selling firm in the near future Occasionally my firm suggests changes to the selling firm if there is a problem If there are problems with the selling firm my firm works jointly with them to help improve the situation My firm works with the selling firm to correct any mutual problems There is virtually no chance that my firm will leave the selling firm during the coming year 1) My firm is not interested in investigating what competitors of the selling firm could offer

Please answer the following questions with regard to your firm's overall

How likely is it that your firm will make a purchase from the selling firm during the following time periods with "1" being very little chance of purchase and "7" being definitely will purchase

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3 months

6 months

3

2

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4

5

6

7

1 year

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2 years

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3 years

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

SUBMIT

26	About how often do you tell others about your relationship with your salesperson? With "1" being not very often and "7" being very often
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27	About how often do you recommend the selling firm? With "1" being not very often and "7" being very often
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28	What is the percent likelihood that during the next year your firm will continue to use the selling firm?
	Percent chance we will continue
	SUBMIT

29	Please ans ended emp firm that co disagree a	oloyment w ompetes di	vith the sel rectly with	ling firm an	nd started	employme	nt with a
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm wo selling firm				iness relati	ionship wit	h the
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm is r			the busine	ess relatior	nship with t	he selling
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	My firm wo				ess with the	e selling fir	m in the
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
			su	BMIT			

Please answer the following classification questions about your relationship:			
Please respond to the following questions with regard to length of contact:			
About how long has your company had contact with the selling firm? months			
About how long have you had contact with the selling firm? months			
About how long has your current this salesperson called on your company? months			

33	About how long has this salesperson called on you? months
34	What is the gender of your salesperson? Female Male

SUBMIT

Please estimate your firm's average total yearly purchases of products and services in this product category In dollars Please estimate your firm's average yearly purchases from the selling firm? In dollars Currently, about how many suppliers does your firm use for this product category? Number of suppliers How many comparable providers exist for this product category? Number of suppliers	Please a	answer the following questions with regard to your purchases:	_
Please estimate your firm's average yearly purchases from the selling firm? In dollars Currently, about how many suppliers does your firm use for this product category? Number of suppliers How many comparable providers exist for this product category? Number of suppliers	35	and services in this product category	ducts
Currently, about how many suppliers does your firm use for this product category? Number of suppliers How many comparable providers exist for this product category? Number of suppliers	36	firm?	elling
How many comparable providers exist for this product category? Number of suppliers	37	category?	roduct
Survey Pag	38	Number of suppliers SUBMIT	urvey Pa

Please reply to the following questions about your firm:				
39	Estimate the number of people employed in your firm			
	Number of people			
40	Estimate the number of people in your firm involved in purchasing from the selling firm			
	Number of people			
41	Estimate the total annual sales of your firm			
	In dollars			

Please a	answer the following classification questions about yourself:
42	How long have you worked in your present position? In months
43	How long have you worked for this company? In months
44	How long have you worked in purchasing for any firm (Including this firm)? In months

45		Have you ever worked in sales? yes No
	46	If yes, how long?
		In months
	47	What is your gender?
		Female
		Male
	48	How many years of formal education have you received?
		now many years or formal education have you received:
	49	How old were you on your last birthday?

In years

50	What is your marital status?	
51	Approximately how much total compensation did you receive over the last 12 months from your company? In dollars	
52	What is your ethnicity?	
Thank	you for your time and cooperation!!!	
		Survey Page 18



Proposal

Z05732

Date: February 7, 2007

Dear Brian,

We are pleased to present this quote for your upcoming project. Please review this quote carefully. Your signature below will signify an acceptance of the project, agreement with the terms below, and confirmation of authorization to execute the project.

Name:	Brian Rutherford
Company:	J. Mack Robinson College of Business
	Georgia State University
Address:	P.O. Box 3991 • Atlanta, GA 30302-3991
Phone:	404 403-8352
Email:	brianruther@yahoo.com; mktbnrx@langate.gsu.edu
Project Name:	Customer Relationship Survey

Sample Details:

Desired Responses:	
Demographics/Attributes:	
Incentive:	
Incidence*:	

^{*}Note: If you have not provided the incidence rate, we will assume 100%. If responses indicate that the survey incidence rate is below 100%, we will adjust pricing accordingly if additional sample needs to be provided to meet the desired responses.

Sample Team Deliverables:

Incentive:	Provide incentive as detailed above for this survey.
Email Invite:	Create the email invitation using the standard Zoomerang Sample email invitation.
Number of Mailings:	Host the survey and deploy via email the survey to sample identified above. There will be a single mailing of the survey invitation.
Reporting:	Real-time reporting and data export available via Zoomerang account.

Customer Responsibilities:

Survey Content:	Create and complete survey in its final form within Zoomerang and ensure that survey is complete and accurate.
Testing:	Test the survey prior to project launch.
Demographics:	Within the body of the survey, ask any specific
	demographic/behavioral data that is required for results analysis.
	(A separate demographic report will not be provided).
Email Invitation (Optional):	Create a custom email message (if desired; otherwise standard
	email invitation will be created by Sample team).
Billing:	Provide PO (if necessary) and billing contact and billing
	instructions if invoice is to be received by anyone other than the
	signer of this quote.

Project Timeline:

Deployment:	The survey will be deployed within 24 hours (excluding Saturday,			
	Sunday and U.S. holidays) upon receipt of this signed agreement			
	and final verification that the survey is complete and ready to			
	deploy.			

Zoomerang Account Information

	Zoomerang zPro Account:	brianruther@yahoo.com
--	-------------------------	-----------------------

TOTAL PROJECT PRICE:

Expedite Fee	
Sample Price	
TOTAL:	

Please note this request for proposal is valid until midnight on 2-21-2007.

Payment terms:

Payment for Zoomerang Programming and Sample are expected upon deployment. All customers: Please provide a valid credit card. This card will be automatically charged if payment is not received within 60 days of order execution. You will be notified prior to the card charging.

First time customers: Payment is required up front by valid credit card or check.

Other terms:

Client agrees and warrants that the contents of email invitations and surveys, and use of the Zoomerang service, will be in compliance with all laws, including those concerning spam, privacy (including children's online privacy rights), defamation and communications decency.

Client is responsible for ensuring that survey invitations and surveys do not violate or infringe upon the trademark, trade name, copyright, trade secret or other intellectual property rights or other rights of any person or entity.

MarketTools retains exclusive ownership of all sample provided for Client's project. Panelists' email address and other personally identifiable information are the property of MarketTools and will not be disclosed to client or any other person. The client and any additional research partners may not capture any personally identifiable information of our panelists within the survey. No survey invitations or surveys will advertise or promote a product or service.

This document supplements your Zoomerang subscription agreement. Together they contain the complete and entire understanding between you and MarketTools concerning the subject matter hereof. Your signature below will signify your acceptance of the project quotation and terms, and will confirm authorization to execute the project. Please fax signed quotation to: **+1.415.634.2589** or respond to this email with your confirmation of acceptance. Please note, orders cannot be deployed until this quote is accepted in writing.

Signature:	 Date:	
•		

Client Billing Information: (If different than contact information above)

Billing Contact:	
Company:	
Billing Address:	
Phone:	
Email:	
P.O. # (if applicable)	

MarketTools Contact Information:

Name:	Philip Beary
Company:	MarketTools, Inc.
Address:	150 Spear Street, Suite 600
	San Francisco, CA 94105-1535
Phone:	1-800-310-6838 (toll-free US and Canada)
	1-801-316-0476 (Outside U.S. and Canada)
Email:	philip.beary@markettools.com
Tax ID:	77-0445536

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Appendix C: Measurement Model Syntax

```
Measurement Model for Dissertation
DA NI=95 NO=199 MA=CM
LA
Satfm1 Satfm2 Satfm3 Satfm4 Satfm5
Trustfm1 Trustfm2r Trustfm3 Trustfm4 Trustfm5 Trustfm6 Trustfm7 Trustfm8r
PCFM1r PCFM2 PCFM3 PCFM4 PCFM5 PCFM6
Comfm1 Comfm2 Comfm3r Comfm4 Comfm5r Comfm6r Comfm7 Comfm8 Comfm9
Esatfm1 Esatfm2 Esatfm3 Esatfm4 Esatfm5 Esatfm6
Dep1 dep2 dep3 dep4 dep5 dep6 dep7 dep8
Confm1 confm2 confm3
Satsp1 satsp2 satsp3 satsp4 satsp5
Trsp1 trsp2 trsp3r trsp4r trsp5r trsp6r trsp7r
Pcsp1r pcsp2 pcsp3 pcsp4 pcsp5r pcsp6
Comsp1 comsp2 comsp3r comsp4 comsp5r comsp6r comsp7 comsp8 comsp9
Esatsp1 esatsp2 esatsp3 esatsp4 esatsp5 esatsp6
Consp1 consp2 consp3
Exit1 exit2 exit3
Pts1 pts2
Afi1 afi2 afi3 afi4 afi5
Pts3
Exit1r exit2r exit3r
SE
Satfm1 Satfm2 Satfm4
Trustfm1 Trustfm3 Trustfm7
PCFM2 PCFM4 PCFM6
Comfm6r Comfm7 Comfm8
Esatfm4 Esatfm5 Esatfm6
Dep1 dep3 dep4
Confm1 confm2 confm3
satsp3 satsp4 satsp5
trsp5r trsp6r trsp7r
pcsp2 pcsp4 pcsp6
comsp2 comsp7 comsp9
Esatsp1 esatsp3 esatsp4
Consp1 consp2 consp3
afi3 afi2 afi4 /
CM
MO NX=42 NK=14 PH=SY TD=SY LX=FU
PA LX
3(1000000000000000)
3(0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0)
3(001000000000000)
3(0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0)
3(000010000000000)
3(000001000000000)
3(0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0)
3(00000001000000)
3(00000000100000)
3(00000000010000)
3(00000000001000)
3(000000000000100)
3(0000000000000001)
FI LX(1.1) LX(4.2) LX(7.3) LX(10.4) LX(13.5) LX(16.6) LX(19.7) LX(22.8) LX(25.9) LX(28.10)
LX(31,11) LX(34,12) LX(37,13) LX(40,14)
VA 1.0 LX(1,1) LX(4,2) LX(7,3) LX(10,4) LX(13,5) LX(16,6) LX(19,7) LX(22,8) LX(25,9)
LX(28,10) LX(31,11) LX(34,12) LX(37,13) LX(40,14)
OU SI TV MI
```

Appendix D: Measurement Model Output

DATE: 2/28/2007 TIME: 13:26

LISREL 8.72

BY

Karl G. Jöreskog & Dag Sörbom

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Measurement Model for Dissertation

Number of Input Variables 95 Number of Y - Variables 0 Number of X - Variables 42 Number of ETA - Variables 0 Number of KSI - Variables 14 Number of Observations 199

Parameter Specifications

LAMBDA-X

:	KSI 1	KSI 2	KSI 3	KS	SI 4	KSI 5	KSI 6
Satfm1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Satfm2	1	0	0	0	0	0	
Satfm4	2	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm3		3	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm7		4	0	0	0	0	
PCFM2		0	0	0	0	0	
PCFM ²		0	5	0	0	0	
PCFM		0	6	0	0	0	
Comfm6		0	0	0	0	0	
Comfm		0	0	7	0	0	
Comfm		0	0	8	0	0	
Esatfm4	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatfm5	0	0	0	0	9	0	
Esatfm6	0	0	0	0	10	0	
Dep1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
dep3	0	0	0	0	0	11	
dep4	0	0	0	0	0	12	
Confm1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
confm2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
confm3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp4	0	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp5	0	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp5r	0	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp6r	0	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp7r	0	0	0	0	0	0	
pcsp2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
pcsp4	0	0	0	0	0	0	
pcsp6	0	0	0	0	0	0	
comsp2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
comsp7		0	0	0	0	0	
comsp9		0	0	0	0	0	
Esatsp1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
esatsp3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
esatsp4	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Consp1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
consp2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
consp3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi4	0	0	0	0	0	0	
					1.40		

LAMBDA-X

	KSI 7	KSI 8	KSI 9	KSI	10 K	SI 11	KSI 12
Satfm1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Satfm2	0	0	0	0	Ö	0	
Satfm4	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm1	-	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm3		0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm		0	0	0	0	0	
PCFM		0	0	0	0	0	
PCFM		0	0	0	0	0	
PCFM		0	0	0	0	0	
Comfm		0	0	0	0	0	
Comfm		0	0	0	0	0	
Comfm	8 0	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatfm4		0	0	0	0	0	
Esatfm5	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatfm6	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Dep1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
dep3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
dep4	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Confm	1 0	0	0	0	0	0	
confm2	13	0	0	0	0	0	
confm3	14	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp4	0	15	0	0	0	0	
satsp5	0	16	0	0	0	0	
trsp5r	0	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp6r	0	0	17	0	0	0	
trsp7r	0	0	18	0	0	0	
pcsp2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
pcsp4	0	0	0	19	0	0	
pcsp6	0	0	0	20	0	0	
comsp2		0	0	0	0	0	
comsp7		0	0	0	21	0	
comsp9		0	0	0	22	0	
Esatsp1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
esatsp3	0	0	0	0	0	23	
esatsp4	0	0	0	0	0	24	
Consp1		0	0	0	0	0	
consp2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
consp3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi4	0	0	0	0	0	0	

LAMBDA-X

	KSI 13	KSI 14
Satfm1		0
Satim?		0
Satfm ²		0
Trustfm		
Trustfm		
Trustfm		
PCFM		0
PCFM) 0
PCFM) 0
Comfm		0 0
Comfn		0 0
Comfn		0 0
Esatfm		0
Esatfm		ő
Esatfm		0
Dep1	0	0
dep3	0	0
dep4	0	0
Confm	1 0	0
confm	2 0	0
confm.	3 0	0
satsp3	0	0
satsp4	0	0
satsp5	0	0
trsp5r	0	0
trsp6r	0	0
trsp7r	0	0
pcsp2	0	0
pcsp4	0	0
pcsp6	0	0
comsp		0
comsp		0
comsp		0
Esatsp1		0
esatsp3		0
esatsp4		0
Consp		0
consp2		0
consp3		0
afi3	$0 \\ 0$	0 27
afi2 afi4	0	27 28
a114	U	48

PHI

	KSI 1	KSI 2	KSI 3	KSI 4	KSI 5	KSI 6
KSI 1	29					
KSI 2	30	31				
KSI 3	32	33	34			
KSI 4	35	36	37	38		
KSI 5	39	40	41	42	43	
KSI 6	44	45	46	47	48	49
KSI 7	50	51	52	53	54	55
KSI 8	57	58	59	60	61	62
KSI 9	65	66	67	68	69	70
KSI 10	74	75	76	77	78	79
KSI 11	84	85	86	87	88	89
KSI 12	2 95	96	97	98	99	100
KSI 13	3 107	108	109	110	111	112
KSI 14	120	121	122	123	124	125

PHI

	KSI 7	KSI 8	KSI 9	KSI 10	KSI II	KSI 12
KSI 7	 56					-
KSI 8	63	64				
KSI 9	71	72	73			
KSI 10	80	81	82	83		
KSI 11	90	91	92	93	94	
KSI 12	2 101	102	103	104	105	106
KSI 13	113	114	115	116	117	118
KSI 14	126	127	128	129	130	131

PHI

KSI 13 KSI 14 KSI 13 119 KSI 14 132 133

THETA-DELTA

Satfm1	l Satfr	n2 Sat	tfm4 Tru	ustfm1	Trustfm3	Trustfm7
134	135	136	137	138	139	

THETA-DELTA

PCFM2	PCF	M4 P	CFM6	Comfm6r	Comfm7	Comfm8
140	141	142	143	144	145	

THETA-DELTA

Esatfm4	Esatfm5	Esat	fm6	Dep1	dep3	dep4
146	147	148	149	150	151	

THETA-DELTA

satsp5	satsp4	satsp3	onfm3	fm2 co	l con	Confm
	157	156	155	154	153	152

THETA-DELTA

trsp5r	trsp6r	trsp7r	pcsp2	pcsp	o4 pcsp6	ĵ
158	159	160	161	162	163	

THETA-DELTA

esatsp4	esatsp3	Esatsp1	omsp9	sp7 co	2 com	comsp
	169	168	167	166	165	164

THETA-DELTA

Consp	1 cc	onsp2	consp	3 afi3	afi2	afi4
170	17	71	172	173	174	175

Measurement Model for Dissertation

Number of Iterations = 15

Goodness of Fit Statistics

Degrees of Freedom = 728
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 1334.42 (P = 0.0)
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 1218.72 (P = 0.0)
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 490.72
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (398.45; 590.87)

Minimum Fit Function Value = 6.74
Population Discrepancy Function Value (F0) = 2.48
90 Percent Confidence Interval for F0 = (2.01; 2.98)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.058
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.053; 0.064)
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.0093

Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 7.92 90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (7.46; 8.43) ECVI for Saturated Model = 9.12 ECVI for Independence Model = 219.71

Chi-Square for Independence Model with 861 Degrees of Freedom = 43418.13
Independence AIC = 43502.13
Model AIC = 1568.72
Saturated AIC = 1806.00
Independence CAIC = 43682.45
Model CAIC = 2320.05
Saturated CAIC = 5682.85

Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.97 Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.98 Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.82 Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.99 Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.99 Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.96

Critical N (CN) = 122.63

Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.076 Standardized RMR = 0.042 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.77 Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.72 Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.62

Appendix E: Measurement Model Modifications

Items	Estimates	RMSEA	NFI	CFI	RMR	X^2	Item to Remove
89	269	.085	.94	.97	.18	8936	AFI5
88	267	.084	.96			8583	AFI1
87	265	.083	.94		.19	8258	TRFM5
86	263	.082				8043	ComSP1
85	261	.081	.95		.18	7780	ComSP5R
84	259					7567	TrSP4R
83	257					7357	SatFM5
82	255	.080				7134	ComFM1
81	253					6929	PCFM3
80	251	.079				6679	TRFM2R
79	249	.078				6480	DEP6
78	247				.17	6271	PCFM5
77	245					6086	COMSP3R
76	243	.076				5897	ECSATFM3
75	241	.075				5685	COMFM5R
74	239					5529	COMFM9
73	237					5366	PCSP1R
72	235	.074				5190	TRFM6
71	233	.073				5032	TRSP1
70	231	.071				4825	TRSP2
69	229	.070				4608	SATFM3R
68	227	.071		.98		4453	COMSP8
67	225	.070 .96				4245	PTS1

65	223	.069		.15	4060	TRFM4
64	219	.070			3818	ESSP2
63	217	.069	.96		3660	COMSP4
62	215	.067			3472	COMSP6R
61	213	.065			3278	PCSP3
60	211	.062			3094	PTS2
59	209			.13	2982	DEP7
58	207	.063		.12	2904	DEP2
57	205	.062		.11	2789	COMFM3R
56	203			.10	2681	PCFM1R
55	201			.097	2574	ECSATSP5
54	199	.060		.098	2432	COMFM2
53	197	.059		.097	2301	SATSP2
52	195	.058			2177	DEP5
51	193	.059	.97	.093	2117	DEP8
50	191	.060		.089	2059	ECSATFM1
49	189	.059		.09	1952	COMFM4
48	187			.087	1861	TRFM8R
47	185	.060		.081	1779	ECSATFM2
46	183	.059			1688	SATSP1
45					1578	TRSP3R
44		.060		.078	1535	ECSATSP6
43		.059		.076	1425	PTS3
42		.058			1334	

Appendix F: Reliablity for Satisfaction with Selling Firm

Overall

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****

_

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	SATFM3R	5.9950	1.6538	201.0
2.	SATFM1	5.9602	1.1825	201.0
3.	SATFM2	6.0746	1.0952	201.0
4.	SATFM4	5.9453	1.0872	201.0
5.	SATFM5	5.8358	1.1216	201.0

Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 29.8109 26.2741 5.1258 5

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 201.0 N of Items = 5

Alpha = .8802

Reduced

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****

_

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	SATFM1	5.9412	1.1938	204.0
2.	SATFM2	6.0539	1.1106	204.0
3.	SATFM4	5.9265	1.0916	204.0

Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 17.9216 10.3485 3.2169 3

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 204.0 N of Items = 3

Appendix G: Reliablity for Trust in Selling Firm

Overall

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****

_

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS -	SCALE	(A L P H A)
------------------------	-------	-------------

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1. 2.	TRFRM1 TRFM3	5.9802 6.0347	1.1927 1.0527	202.0
3.	TRFM4	5.7376	1.2950	202.0
4.	TRFM5	5.3861	1.3492	202.0
5.	TRFM6	5.5396	1.3162	202.0
6.	TRFM7	5.9752	1.1349	202.0
7.	TRFM2R	5.9554	1.6339	202.0
8.	TRFM8R	5.6634	1.6945	202.0

Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 46.2723 74.1096 8.6087 8

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 202.0 N of Items = 8

Alpha = .9179

Reduced

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****

_

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	TRFRM1	5.9853	1.1889	204.0
2.	TRFM3	6.0343	1.0522	204.0
3.	TRFM7	5.9755	1.1336	204.0

Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 17.9951 9.8571 3.1396 3

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 204.0 N of Items = 3

Appendix H: Reliablity for Perceived Commentment of Selling Firm

Overall

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	PCFM2	5.5821	1.4746	201.0
2.	PCFM3	6.0050	1.2708	201.0
3.	PCFM4	5.4826	1.4869	201.0
4.	PCFM5	5.4776	1.3859	201.0
5.	PCFM6	5.4726	1.4493	201.0
6.	PCFM1R	5.8607	1.5331	201.0

Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 33.8806 52.8657 7.2709 6

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 201.0 N of Items = 6

Alpha = .9192

Reduced

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****

_

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	PCFM2	5.5842	1.4712	202.0
2.	PCFM4	5.4851	1.4837	202.0
3.	PCFM6	5.4752	1.4462	202.0

Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 16.5446 16.9259 4.1141 3

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 202.0 N of Items = 3

Appendix I: Reliablity for Commentment to Selling Firm

Overall

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1. 2.	COMFM1 COMFM2	5.0914 5.3147	1.3672 1.3448	197.0 197.0
3.	COMFM4	5.9949	1.1888	197.0
4.	COMFM7	5.2640	1.4782	197.0
5.	COMFM8	5.6447	1.3115	197.0
6.	COMFM9	5.1066	1.4047	197.0
7.	COMFM3R	5.4010	1.5107	197.0
8.	COMFM5R	4.1472	1.6884	197.0
9.	COMFM6R	5.4670	1.5957	197.0

Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 47.4315 89.5017 9.4605 9

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 197.0 N of Items = 9

Alpha = .8906

Reduced

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1. 2. 3.	COMFM7 COMFM8 COMFM6R	5.2576 5.6364 5.4444	1.4772 1.3134 1.6229	198.0 198.0

Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 16.3384 14.7529 3.8410 3

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 198.0 N of Items = 3

Appendix J: Reliablity for Economic Satisfaction with the Selling Firm

Overall

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis ****** -

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	ESATFM1	5.8657	1.0986	201.0
2.	ESATFM2	5.5970	1.3007	201.0
3.	ESATFM3	5.3184	1.2442	201.0
4.	ESATFM4	5.6866	1.1385	201.0
5.	ESATFM5	5.7264	1.1488	201.0
6.	ESATFM6	5.7065	1.1526	201.0

Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 33.9005 41.2800 6.4250 6

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 201.0

N of Items = 6

Alpha = .9561

R educed

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	ESATFM4	5.7010	1.1377	204.0
2.	ESATFM5	5.7353	1.1484	204.0
3.	ESATFM6	5.7157	1.1522	204.0

Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 17.1520 10.9866 3.3146 3

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 204.0 N of Items = 3

Appendix K: Reliablity for Dependence Overall

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA) Mean Std Dev Cases 1. DEP1
2. DEP2
3. DEP3
4. DEP4
5. DEP5
6. DEP6
7. DEP7
8. DEP8

 3.8060
 1.8567
 201.0

 4.0945
 1.7681
 201.0

 3.7264
 1.9026
 201.0

 3.7015
 1.8084
 201.0

 3.1841
 1.7581
 201.0

 5.0697
 1.5281
 201.0

 4.9851
 1.7334
 201.0

 3.4975
 1.9471
 201.0

 N of Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 32.0647 134.1708 11.5832 8 Reliability Coefficients N of Cases = 201.0N of Items = 8Alpha = .9241Reduced ***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis ***** RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA) Mean Std Dev Cases

 3.7980
 1.8598
 203.0

 3.7094
 1.9034
 203.0

 3.6749
 1.8192
 203.0

 1. DEP1
2. DEP3
3. DEP4 N of Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 11.1823 25.8231 5.0816 3 Reliability Coefficients N of Cases = 203.0 $N ext{ of Items} = 3$ Alpha = .8964

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****

Appendix L: Reliablity for Conflict with the Selling Firm

Overall

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	CONFM1	1.8200	1.3664	200.0
2.	CONFM2	1.8300	1.3228	200.0
3.	CONFM3	1.7350	1.2092	200.0

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 200.0 N of Items = 3

Alpha = .9545

Reduced

***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
-

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)

		Mean	Std Dev	Cases
1.	CONFM1	1.8200	1.3664	200.0
2.	CONFM2	1.8300	1.3228	200.0
3.	CONFM3	1.7350	1.2092	200.0

Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 5.3850 13.9666 3.7372 3

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 200.0 N of Items = 3

Appendix M: Reliablity for Satisfaction with Salesperson

Overall

```
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                         Mean Std Dev Cases
 1. SATSP1
2. SATSP2
3. SATSP3
4. SATSP4
5. SATSP5
                       5.9353
                                    1.2493 201.0
                       6.0199
                                     1.2648
                                                 201.0
                       6.0149
5.7463
6.0299
                                                201.0
                                     1.2226
1.3529
1.1955
                                                 201.0
                                                 201.0
                                             N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 29.7463 35.3003 5.9414 5
Reliability Coefficients
                               N of Items = 5
N of Cases = 201.0
Alpha = .9697
Reduced
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                         Mean Std Dev Cases
 1. SATSP3
2. SATSP4
3. SATSP5
                       6.02461.2204203.05.75861.3519203.0
                                     1.1934
                       6.0394
                                                203.0
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 17.8227 12.7209 3.5666 3
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 203.0
                            N of Items = 3
Alpha = .9409
```

Appendix N: Reliablity for Trust in Salesperson

Overall

```
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
  RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                           Mean Std Dev Cases
 1. TRSP1
2. TRSP2
3. TRSP3R
4. TRSP4R
5. TRSP5R
6. TRSP6R
7. TRSP7R
                                       1.2996 199.0
                          5.9447
                          5.8995
                                         1.3333
                                                      199.0
                         5.6080
5.9648
6.0603
6.2462
6.3869
                                         1.8741
                                                      199.0
                                        1.4647
1.3804
1.2246
1.1353
                                                      199.0
                                                      199.0
                                                      199.0
                                                      199.0
                                                  N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 42.1106 63.6948 7.9809 7
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 199.0
                                       N of Items = 7
Alpha = .9136
Reduced
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                           Mean Std Dev Cases
                         6.06441.3753202.06.24261.2199202.06.38611.1327202.0
 1. TRSP5R
2. TRSP6R
3. TRSP7R
                                                  N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 18.6931 12.1740 3.4891 3
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 202.0
                                       N of Items = 3
Alpha = .9255
```

Appendix O: Reliablity for Peceived Commentment of Salesperson

Overall

```
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
  RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                                    Mean Std Dev Cases

      1.
      PCSP2
      5.6816
      1.3668
      201.0

      2.
      PCSP3
      5.9751
      1.1766
      201.0

      3.
      PCSP4
      5.6269
      1.3510
      201.0

      4.
      PCSP6
      5.5075
      1.4495
      201.0

      5.
      PCSP1R
      5.8806
      1.5924
      201.0

      6.
      PCSP5R
      5.9303
      1.5216
      201.0

                                                                  N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 34.6020 42.9208 6.5514 6
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 201.0
                                         N of Items = 6
Alpha = .8637
Reduced
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                                    Mean Std Dev Cases
  1. PCSP2
2. PCSP4
3. PCSP6
                                 5.68321.3636202.05.62871.3478202.05.50501.4464202.0
                                                                  N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 16.8168 14.7076 3.8350 3
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 202.0 N of Items = 3
Alpha = .9117
```

Appendix P: Reliablity for Commentment to Salesperson

```
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
   RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                                              Mean Std Dev Cases

      1.
      COMSP1
      4.8646
      1.5761
      192.0

      2.
      COMSP2
      5.1146
      1.5134
      192.0

      3.
      COMSP4
      5.9323
      1.2110
      192.0

      4.
      COMSP7
      5.1875
      1.5268
      192.0

      5.
      COMSP8
      5.5521
      1.3871
      192.0

      6.
      COMSP9
      5.0677
      1.4181
      192.0

      7.
      COMSP3R
      5.9167
      1.4411
      192.0

      8.
      COMSP5R
      4.4375
      1.7535
      192.0

      9.
      COMSP6R
      5.5990
      1.5351
      192.0

                                                                                   N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 47.6719 101.7609 10.0877 9
Reliability Coefficients
                                                                  N of Items = 9
N of Cases = 192.0
Alpha = .9037
Reduced
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
   RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                                              Mean Std Dev Cases
   1. COMSP2
2. COMSP7
3. COMSP9
                                           5.13791.5093203.05.21181.5187203.05.05911.4442203.0
                                                                                    N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 15.4089 15.8171 3.9771 3
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 203.0
                                                                  N of Items = 3
Alpha = .8675
```

Appendix Q: Reliablity for Economic Satisfaction with Salesperson

```
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
  RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                                       Mean Std Dev Cases
  1. ESATSP1
2. ESATSP2
3. ESATSP3
4. ESATSP4
5. ESATSP5
6. ESATSP6

      5.7879
      1.1988
      198.0

      5.5505
      1.3943
      198.0

      5.3535
      1.4021
      198.0

      5.5960
      1.2897
      198.0

      5.7222
      1.2539
      198.0

      5.6919
      1.2709
      198.0

                                                                        N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 33.7020 51.4184 7.1707 6
Reliability Coefficients
                                                 N of Items = 6
N of Cases = 198.0
Alpha = .9620
Reduced
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
  RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                                        Mean Std Dev Cases

      1.
      ESATSP4
      5.6030
      1.2903
      199.0

      2.
      ESATSP5
      5.7286
      1.2540
      199.0

      3.
      ESATSP6
      5.6985
      1.2711
      199.0

                                                                        N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 17.0302 13.2617 3.6417 3
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 199.0 N of Items = 3
Alpha = .9511
```

Appendix R: Reliablity for Conflict with Salesperson

```
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                             Mean Std Dev Cases
                           1.6667 1.2814 204.0
1.7990 1.4190 204.0
1.7108 1.2826 204.0
 1. CONSP1
2. CONSP2
3. CONSP3
                                                      N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 5.1765 14.6387 3.8260 3
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 204.0 N of Items = 3
Alpha = .9569
Reduced
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
  RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                              Mean Std Dev Cases

      1.
      CONSP1
      1.6667
      1.2814
      204.0

      2.
      CONSP2
      1.7990
      1.4190
      204.0

      3.
      CONSP3
      1.7108
      1.2826
      204.0

                                                      N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 5.1765 14.6387 3.8260 3
Reliability Coefficients
                                 N of Items = 3
N of Cases = 204.0
Alpha = .9569
```

Appendix S: Reliablity for Anticipated Future Interaction

```
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
  RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                                          Mean Std Dev Cases

      1.
      PTS3CC
      6.6956
      .8015
      194.0

      2.
      PTS1
      5.4485
      1.6127
      194.0

      3.
      PTS2
      3.7113
      1.8768
      194.0

      4.
      AFI1
      6.6186
      1.0123
      194.0

      5.
      AF12
      6.6392
      .9350
      194.0

      6.
      AF13
      6.5722
      .9371
      194.0

      7.
      AF14
      6.2423
      1.1281
      194.0

      8.
      AFI5
      6.0722
      1.2775
      194.0

                                                                            N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 47.9997 40.5289 6.3662 8
Reliability Coefficients
                                                      N of Items = 8
N of Cases = 194.0
Alpha = .7918
Reduced
***** Method 1 (space saver) will be used for this analysis *****
  RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
                                          Mean Std Dev Cases
                                       6.6355.9361203.06.5665.9383203.06.22661.1466203.0
  1. AF12
2. AF13
3. AF14
                                                                             N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables SCALE 19.4286 7.4936 2.7375 3
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 203.0
                                                             N of Items = 3
Alpha = .8852
```

Appendix T: Structural Model Syntax

Structural Model for Dissertation

DA NI=95 NO=199 MA=CM

LA

Satfm1 Satfm2 Satfm3 Satfm4 Satfm5

Trustfm1 Trustfm2r Trustfm3 Trustfm4 Trustfm5 Trustfm6 Trustfm7 Trustfm8r

PCFM1r PCFM2 PCFM3 PCFM4 PCFM5 PCFM6

Comfm1 Comfm2 Comfm3r Comfm4 Comfm5r Comfm6r Comfm7 Comfm8 Comfm9

Esatfm1 Esatfm2 Esatfm3 Esatfm4 Esatfm5 Esatfm6

Dep1 dep2 dep3 dep4 dep5 dep6 dep7 dep8

Confm1 confm2 confm3

Satsp1 satsp2 satsp3 satsp4 satsp5

Trsp1 trsp2 trsp3r trsp4r trsp5r trsp6r trsp7r

Pcsp1r pcsp2 pcsp3 pcsp4 pcsp5r pcsp6

Comsp1 comsp2 comsp3r comsp4 comsp5r comsp6r comsp7 comsp8 comsp9

Esatsp1 esatsp2 esatsp3 esatsp4 esatsp5 esatsp6

Consp1 consp2 consp3

Exit1 exit2 exit3

Pts1 pts2

Afi1 afi2 afi3 afi4 afi5

Pts3

Exit1r exit2r exit3r

SE

satsp3 satsp4 satsp5

trsp5r trsp6r trsp7r

comsp2 comsp7 comsp9

Esatsp1 esatsp3 esatsp4

Consp1 consp2 consp3

Satfm1 Satfm2 Satfm4

Trustfm1 Trustfm3 Trustfm7

Comfm6r Comfm7 Comfm8

Esatfm4 Esatfm5 Esatfm6

Confm1 confm2 confm3

afi3 afi2 afi4

pcsp2 pcsp4 pcsp6

PCFM2 PCFM4 PCFM6

Dep1 dep3 dep4 /

CM

<Insert Matrix Here>

MO NX=9 NY=33 NK=3 NE=11 LX=FU LY=FU TD=SY TE=SY BE=FU Ga=FU

PS=SY PH=SY

LK

PCSP PCFM DEP

LE

SSP TSP COMSP ESSP CONSP SFM TFM COMFM ESFM CONFM PTS

```
PA LX
100
100
100
0 1 0
010
0 1 0
001
001
001
PA LY
100000000000
100000000000
0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
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00000010000
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0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0
00000000001
00000000001
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001
0001
00001
000001
000001
0000001
00000001
PA TE
1
0.1
001
0001
00001
000001
000001
0000001
00000001
000000001
00000000001
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PA PH 1 1

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PA GA
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100
100
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0 1 0
0 1 0
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000
001
PA BE
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0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0
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1
0 1
001
0001
00001
000001
000001
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
00000001
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
FI LX(1,1) LX(4,2) LX(7,3), LY(1,1) LY(4,2) LY(7,3) LY(10,4) LY(13,5) LY(16,6)
LY(19,7) LY(22,8) LY(25,9) LY(28,10) LY(31,11)
VA 1.0 LX(1,1) LX(4,2) LX(7,3) LY(1,1) LY(4,2) LY(7,3) LY(10,4) LY(13,5)
LY(16,6) LY(19,7) LY(22,8) LY(25,9) LY(28,10) LY(31,11)
PD
OU SC RS MI SI TV AD=OFF
```

1 1 1

Appendix U: Structural Model Output

DATE: 2/28/2007 TIME: 13:37

LISREL 8.72

BY

Karl G. Jöreskog & Dag Sörbom

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Structural Model for Dissertation

Number of Input Variables 95 Number of Y - Variables 33 Number of X - Variables 9 Number of ETA - Variables 11 Number of KSI - Variables 3 Number of Observations 199

Parameter Specifications

LAMBDA-Y

	SSP	TSP	COMS	SP	ESSP	CONSP	SFM
satsp3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp4	1	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp5	2	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp5r	0	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp6r	0	3	0	0	0	0	
trsp7r	0	4	0	0	0	0	
comsp2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
comsp7	0	0	5	0	0	0	
comsp9	0	0	6	0	0	0	
Esatsp1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
esatsp3	0	0	0	7	0	0	
esatsp4	0	0	0	8	0	0	
Consp1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
consp2	0	0	0	0	9	0	
consp3	0	0	0	0	10	0	
Satfm1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Satfm2	0	0	0	0	0	11	
Satfm4	0	0	0	0	0	12	
Trustfm1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm7	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Comfm6		0	0	0		0	
Comfm7		0	0	0		0	
Comfm8		0	0	0		0	
Esatfm4	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatfm5	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatfm6	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Confm1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
confm2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
confm3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi4	0	0	0	0	0	0	

LAMBDA-Y

	TFM	COMF	M .	ESFM	CONFM	PTS
satsp3	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp4	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp5	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp5r	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp6r	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp7r	0	0	0	0	0	
comsp2	0	0	0	0	0	
comsp7	0	0	0	0	0	
comsp9	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatsp1	0	0	0	0	0	
esatsp3	0	0	0	0	0	
esatsp4	0	0	0	0	0	
Consp1	0	0	0	0	0	
consp2	0	0	0	0	0	
consp3	0	0	0	0	0	
Satfm1	0	0	0	0	0	
Satfm2	0	0	0	0	0	
Satfm4	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm1	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm3	13	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm7	14	0	0	0	0	
Comfm61		0	0		0	
Comfm7		15	(
Comfm8		16	(
Esatfm4	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatfm5	0	0	17	0	0	
Esatfm6	0	0	18	0	0	
Confm1	0	0	0	0	0	
confm2	0	0	0	19	0	
confm3	0	0	0	20	0	
afi3	0	0	0	0	0	
afi2	0	0	0	0	21	
afi4	0	0	0	0	22	

LAMBDA-X

-	PCSP	PCFM	DEF
pcsp2	0	0	0
pcsp4	23	0	0
pcsp6	24	0	0
PCFM2	0	0	0
PCFM4	0	25	0
PCFM6	0	26	0
Dep1	0	0	0

dep3 0 0 27 dep4 0 0 28

BETA

	SSP	TSP	COMSF	ES	SSP (CONSP	SFM
SSP	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TSP	29	0	0	0	30	0	
COMS	P 31	32	0	0	0	0	
ESSP	0	0	0	0	0	0	
CONSI	0	0	0	33	0	0	
SFM	34	0	0	0	0	0	
TFM	0	35	0	0	0	36	
COMF	M (0	38	0	0	39	
ESFM	0	0	0	0	0	0	
CONF	M 0	0	0	0	0	0	
PTS	0	0	42	0	0	43	

BETA

	TFM	COMFN	A ES	SFM	CONFM	PTS
SSP	0	0	0	0	0	
TSP	0	0	0	0	0	
COMSI	9 0	0	0	0	0	
ESSP	0	0	0	0	0	
CONSP	0	0	0	0	0	
SFM	0	0	0	0	0	
TFM	0	0	0	37	0	
COMFN	M 4	0 0	0	0	0	
ESFM	0	0	0	0	0	
CONFN	1 0	0	41	0	0	
PTS	0	44	45	0	0	

GAMMA

Pe	CSP	PCFM	DEP	
SSP	46	0	0	
TSP	47	0	0	
COMSP	48	0	0	
ESSP	49	0	0	
CONSP	0	0	0	
SFM	0	50	0	
TFM	0	51	0	
COMFM	0	52	0	
ESFM	0	53	0	
CONFM	0	0	0	
PTS	0	0	54	

PHI

PO	CSP	PCFM	DEP	
PCSP	 55			
PCFM	56	57		
DEP	58	59	60	

PSI

SSP	TSF	CON	MSP	ESSP	CONSP	SFM
61	62	63	64	65	66	

PSI

TFM	COI	MFM	ESFM	CONFM	PTS
67	68	69	70	71	

THETA-EPS

satsp3	satsp4	satsp	5 trsp	5r trs	p6r	trsp7r
72	73	74	75	76	77	

THETA-EPS

esatsp4	esatsp3	Esatsp1	omsp9	sp7 c	com	comsp2	
	83	82	81	80	79	78	

THETA-EPS

Consp	1 cons	sp2 co	nsp3	Satfm1	Satfm2	Satfm4
84	85	86	87	88	89	

THETA-EPS

Trustfm1	Trust	fm3 Tr	rustfm7	Comfm	ı6r	Comfm7	Comfm8
90	91	92	93	94	95	I	

THETA-EPS

Esatfm4	Esatfm5	5 Es	satfm6	Confm1	confm2	confm3
96	 97	98	99	100	101	
				178		

THETA-EPS

THETA-DELTA

pcsp2	pcsp4	pcsp6	PCFM2	2 P(CFM4	PCFM6
105	106	107	108	109	110	

THETA-DELTA

Mod Structural Model for Dissertation

Number of Iterations = 15

LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood)

BETA

	SSP	TSP	COMSP	ESSP	CONSP	SFM
SSP						
	0.25 (0.10) 2.46		(-0.58 (0.06) 10.30		
(SP -0.1 (0.13) -1.48	19 0.0 (0.07) 0.79	06			
ESSP						
CONS	Р		0. (0.08) -8.82	69		
	0.41 (0.08) 5.43					
TFM	(0.	-0.03 .04) 0.78		(0.0 8.	05)	
COMF	FM -	(0.10	0.51 9	(0. -1.	11)	
ESFM	I					
CONF	M -					
PTS		(0.08	*	(0.0 1.5	0.13 07) 96	

BETA

	TFM	COMFM	ESFM	CONFM	PTS
SSP					
TSP					
COMS	Р				
ESSP					
CONSI	P				
SFM					
TFM		(-0.26 0.04) -6.64		
	M 0. 0.17) 0.59	10			
ESFM					
CONFI	M -	(0.07) -13.01	0.88 -		
PTS	(0.	0.20 0. 08) (0.07) .41 3.56			

GAMMA

PHI

PCSP PCFM DEP

PCSP 1.29
(0.18)
6.98

PCFM 1.17 1.59
(0.15) (0.21)
7.55 7.48

DEP 0.29 0.39 2.57
(0.14) (0.16) (0.35)
2.07 2.46 7.26

Squared Multiple Correlations for Structural Equations

SSP	TSP	CON	MSP :	ESSP	CONSP	SFM
0.75	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.36	0.54	

Squared Multiple Correlations for Structural Equations

TFM	I CON	MFM	ESFM	CONFM	PTS
0.86	0.56	0.62	0.57	0.33	

Squared Multiple Correlations for Reduced Form

SSP	TSP	COM	ISP I	ESSP	CONSP	SFM
0.75	0.44	0.78	0.74	0.26	0.50	

Squared Multiple Correlations for Reduced Form

PTS	CONFM	ESFM	MFM	1 CON	TFM
	0.26	0.35	0.62	0.49	0.67

Goodness of Fit Statistics

Degrees of Freedom = 790
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 1766.48 (P = 0.0)
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 1722.40 (P = 0.0)
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 932.40
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (816.36; 1056.14)

Minimum Fit Function Value = 8.92
Population Discrepancy Function Value (F0) = 4.71
90 Percent Confidence Interval for F0 = (4.12; 5.33)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.077
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.072; 0.082)
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.00

Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 9.84 90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (9.25; 10.47) ECVI for Saturated Model = 9.12 ECVI for Independence Model = 219.71

Chi-Square for Independence Model with 861 Degrees of Freedom = 43418.13
Independence AIC = 43502.13
Model AIC = 1948.40
Saturated AIC = 1806.00
Independence CAIC = 43682.45
Model CAIC = 2433.54
Saturated CAIC = 5682.85

Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.96 Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.97 Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.88 Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.98 Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.98 Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.96

Critical N (CN) = 100.24

Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.18 Standardized RMR = 0.11 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.71 Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.67 Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.62

Appendix V: Modified Structural Model Syntax

Mod Structural Model for Dissertation

DA NI=95 NO=199 MA=CM

LA

Satfm1 Satfm2 Satfm3 Satfm4 Satfm5

Trustfm1 Trustfm2r Trustfm3 Trustfm4 Trustfm5 Trustfm6 Trustfm7 Trustfm8r

PCFM1r PCFM2 PCFM3 PCFM4 PCFM5 PCFM6

Comfm1 Comfm2 Comfm3r Comfm4 Comfm5r Comfm6r Comfm7 Comfm8 Comfm9

Esatfm1 Esatfm2 Esatfm3 Esatfm4 Esatfm5 Esatfm6

Dep1 dep2 dep3 dep4 dep5 dep6 dep7 dep8

Confm1 confm2 confm3

Satsp1 satsp2 satsp3 satsp4 satsp5

Trsp1 trsp2 trsp3r trsp4r trsp5r trsp6r trsp7r

Pcsp1r pcsp2 pcsp3 pcsp4 pcsp5r pcsp6

Comsp1 comsp2 comsp3r comsp4 comsp5r comsp6r comsp7 comsp8 comsp9

Esatsp1 esatsp2 esatsp3 esatsp4 esatsp5 esatsp6

Consp1 consp2 consp3

Exit1 exit2 exit3

Pts1 pts2

Afi1 afi2 afi3 afi4 afi5

Pts3

Exit1r exit2r exit3r

SE

satsp3 satsp4 satsp5

trsp5r trsp6r trsp7r

comsp2 comsp7 comsp9

Esatsp1 esatsp3 esatsp4

Consp1 consp2 consp3

Satfm1 Satfm2 Satfm4

Trustfm1 Trustfm3 Trustfm7

Comfm6r Comfm7 Comfm8

Esatfm4 Esatfm5 Esatfm6

Confm1 confm2 confm3

afi3 afi2 afi4

pcsp2 pcsp4 pcsp6

PCFM2 PCFM4 PCFM6

Dep1 dep3 dep4 /

CM

MO NX=9 NY=33 NK=3 NE=11 LX=FU LY=FU TD=SY TE=SY BE=FU Ga=FU

PS=SY PH=SY

LK

PCSP PCFM DEP

ΙF

SSP TSP COMSP ESSP CONSP SFM TFM COMFM ESFM CONFM PTS

PA LX

100

100

```
100
010
0 1 0
010
001
001
001
PA LY
100000000000
100000000000
1\; 0\; 0\; 0\; 0\; 0\; 0\; 0\; 0\; 0\; 0
0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
00001000000
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
00000100000
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
00000001000
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0
0000000100
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0
00000000010
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0
000000000001
00000000001
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
PA TD
1
0.1
001
0001
00001
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
000001
0000001
00000001
```

```
PA TE
1
0 1
0.01
0001
00001
000001
000001
0000001
00000001
000000001
000000000001
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
00000000000001
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
PA PH
1
1 1
1 1 1
PA GA
100
100
100
100
000
010
0 1 0
010
010
0.00
001
PA BE
```

```
1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0 \; 1 \; 0 \; 0 \; 0 \; 1 \; 0 \; 0 \; 0 \; 1 \; 0 \\
0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 0
0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 1\ 1\ 0\ 1\ 1\ 0\ 0
PA PS
1
0 1
001
0001
00001
000001
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
0000001
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
0000100001
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1
FI LX(1,1) LX(4,2) LX(7,3), LY(1,1) LY(4,2) LY(7,3) LY(10,4) LY(13,5) LY(16,6)
LY(19,7) LY(22,8) LY(25,9) LY(28,10) LY(31,11)
VA 1.0 LX(1,1) LX(4,2) LX(7,3) LY(1,1) LY(4,2) LY(7,3) LY(10,4) LY(13,5) LY(16,6)
LY(19,7) LY(22,8) LY(25,9) LY(28,10) LY(31,11)
PD
OU SC RS MI SI TV AD=OFF
```

Appendix Y: Modified Structural Model Output

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LISREL 8.72

BY

Karl G. Jöreskog & Dag Sörbom

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Mod Structural Model for Dissertation

Number of Input Variables 95 Number of Y - Variables 33 Number of X - Variables 9 Number of ETA - Variables 11 Number of KSI - Variables 3 Number of Observations 199

Mod Structural Model for Dissertation

Parameter Specifications

LAMBDA-Y

	SSP	TSP	COMS	SP	ESSP	CONSP	SFM
satsp3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp4	1	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp5	2	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp5r	0	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp6r	0	3	0	0	0	0	
trsp7r	0	4	0	0	0	0	
comsp2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
comsp7	0	0	5	0	0	0	
comsp9	0	0	6	0	0	0	
Esatsp1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
esatsp3	0	0	0	7	0	0	
esatsp4	0	0	0	8	0	0	
Consp1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
consp2	0	0	0	0	9	0	
consp3	0	0	0	0	10	0	
Satfm1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Satfm2	0	0	0	0	0	11	
Satfm4	0	0	0	0	0	12	
Trustfm1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm7	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Comfm6		0	0	0		0	
Comfm7		0	0	0		0	
Comfm8	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatfm4	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatfm5	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatfm6	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Confm1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
confm2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
confm3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
afi4	0	0	0	0	0	0	

	TFM	COMF	M]	ESFM	CONFM	PTS
satsp3	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp4	0	0	0	0	0	
satsp5	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp5r	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp6r	0	0	0	0	0	
trsp7r	0	0	0	0	0	
comsp2	0	0	0	0	0	
comsp7	0	0	0	0	0	
comsp9	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatsp1	0	0	0	0	0	
esatsp3	0	0	0	0	0	
esatsp4	0	0	0	0	0	
Consp1	0	0	0	0	0	
consp2	0	0	0	0	0	
consp3	0	0	0	0	0	
Satfm1	0	0	0	0	0	
Satfm2	0	0	0	0	0	
Satfm4	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm1	0	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm3	13	0	0	0	0	
Trustfm7	14	0	0	0	0	
Comfm6		0	0		0	
Comfm7		15	(0	
Comfm8		16	(0	
Esatfm4	0	0	0	0	0	
Esatfm5	0	0	17	0	0	
Esatfm6	0	0	18	0	0	
Confm1	0	0	0	0	0	
confm2	0	0	0	19	0	
confm3	0	0	0	20	0	
afi3	0	0	0	0	0	
afi2	0	0	0	0	21	
afi4	0	0	0	0	22	

LAMBDA-X

]	PCSP	PCFM	DEF	
pcsp2	0	0	0	
pcsp4	23	0	0	
pcsp6	24	0	0	
PCFM2	0	0	0	
PCFM4	0	25	0	
PCFM6	0	26	0	
Dep1	0	0	0	
dep3	0	0	27	
dep4	0	0	28	

BETA

	SSP	TSP	COMSF	ES	SSP (CONSP	SFM
SSP	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TSP	29	0	0	0	30	0	
COMSI	31	32	0	0	0	0	
ESSP	0	0	0	0	0	0	
CONSP	0	0	0	33	0	0	
SFM	34	0	0	0	0	0	
TFM	0	35	0	0	0	36	
COMF	$\mathbf{M} = 0$	0	38	0	0	39	
ESFM	0	0	0	41	0	0	
CONFN	1 0	0	0	0	0	0	
PTS	0	0	43	0	44	45	

BETA

	TFM	COMFN	A ES	SFM	CONFM	PTS
SSP		0	0	·	0	
TSP	0	0	0	0	0	
COMSE	•	0	0	0	0	
ESSP	0	0	0	0	0	
CONSP	0	0	0	0	0	
SFM	0	0	0	0	0	
TFM	0	0	0	37	0	
COMFN	Λ 40	0	0	0	0	
ESFM	0	0	0	0	0	
CONFN	_	0	42	0	0	
PTS	0	46	47	U	U	

GAMMA

PC	CSP	PCFM	DEP	
SSP	48	0	0	
TSP	49	0	0	
COMSP	50	0	0	
ESSP	51	0	0	
CONSP	0	0	0	
SFM	0	52	0	
TFM	0	53	0	
COMFM	0	54	0	
ESFM	0	55	0	
CONFM	0	0	0	
PTS	0	0	56	

	PCSP	PCFM	DEP
PCSP PCFM DEP	57 1 58 60	59 61	62

PSI

	SSP	TSP	COMS	P ES	SSP	CONSP	SFM
SSP	63						
TSP	0	64					
COMSE	0	0	65				
ESSP	0	0	0	66			
CONSP	0	0	0	0	67		
SFM	0	0	0	0	0	68	
TFM	0	0	0	0	0	0	
COMFN	$\mathbf{M} = 0$	0	0	0	0	0	
ESFM	0	0	0	0	0	0	
CONFM	1 0	0	0	0	72	0	
PTS	0	0	0	0	0	0	

PSI

	TFM	COMI	FM	ESFM	I CO	NFM	PTS
TFM	69						
COMF	M (0 7	0				
ESFM	0	0	71				
CONFN	Λ) ()	0	73		
PTS	0	0	0	0	74		

THETA-EPS

satsp3	satsp4	satsp5	5 trsp	5r trs	sp6r	trsp7r
75	76	77	78	79	80)

THETA-EPS

esatsp4	esatsp3	Esatsp1	omsp9	isp7 c	2 com	comsp
	86	85	84	83	82	81

THETA-EPS

Consp1	consp2	2 co	nsp3	Satfm1	Satfm2	Satfm4
87	88	89	90	91	92	
				194		

THETA-EPS

Trustfm1	Trust	tfm3 Tr	rustfm7	Comfm	6r	Comfm7	Comfm8
93	94	95	96	97	9	8	

THETA-EPS

Esatfm4	Esatfm5	5 Es	atfm6	Confm1	confm2	confm3
99	100	101	102	103	104	

THETA-EPS

THETA-DELTA

pcsp2	pcsp4	pcsp6	PCFM2	2 PC	CFM4	PCFM6
108	109	110	111	112	113	

THETA-DELTA

Mod Structural Model for Dissertation

Number of Iterations = 15

LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood)

BETA

	SSP	TSP	COMSP	ESSP	CONSP	SFM
SSP						
	0.24 (0.10) (2.36)			-0.58 (0.06) -10.23		
(P -0.2 (0.13) (-1.61	0.07)	5			
ESSP						
CONS	Р		0. (0.08) -8.81	66		
	0.44 (0.07) 5.93					
TFM	0.0)			0.0)	0.44 05) 04	
COMF	M		0.52	(0.1	12)	
ESFM	[0.5 (0.07) 7.19	51		
CONF	M					
PTS		(0.08	3)	-0.28 (0.05) (-5.54		

BETA

	TFM	COMFM	ESFM	CONFM	PTS
SSP					
TSP					
COMSI	Р				
ESSP					
CONSE					
SFM					
TFM		(0.26 0.04) -6.32		
((M 0. 0.17) 0.67	12			
ESFM					
CONF	М	(0.07) -12.72	-0.84 -		
PTS	(0.	0.24 0. 08) (0.07) .17 2.09			

GAMMA

	PCSP	PCFM	DEP
(0.89 (0.06) 13.97		
	0.14 (0.11) 1.27		
	P 1.16 (0.16) 7.41		
	0.80 (0.07) 12.10		
CONS	Р		
SFM	(0.0 4.3	0.30 97) 34	
TFM	(0.0 5.1		
COMF	(0.1 1.8		
ESFM	(0.0 5.7		
CONF	M		
PTS		0 (0.03) -1.24	

PHI

PCSP PCFM DEP

PCSP 1.28
(0.18)
6.97

PCFM 1.13 1.58
(0.15) (0.21)
7.43 7.43

DEP 0.29 0.39 2.57
(0.14) (0.16) (0.35)
2.07 2.47 7.27

PSI

PTS

	SSP	TSP	COMS	P E	SSP	CONSP	SFM
	0.33 (0.05) 6.59						
TSP	(0.0 6.						
COMS	SP	(0.08 4.5					
ESSP			(0.05) 5.81)			
CONS	Р			(0.11) 8.56	0.94		
SFM					(0.07) 8.16	0.58	
TFM							
COMI	FM						
ESFM	1						
CONF	°M			(0.07) 5.45	0.38		

PSI

Squared Multiple Correlations for Structural Equations

SSP	TSP	CON	MSP 1	ESSP	CONSP	SFM
0.76	0.73	0.79	0.74	0.34	0.54	

Squared Multiple Correlations for Structural Equations

TFM	I CON	MFM	ESFM	CONFM	PTS
0.85	0.56	0.68	0.54	0.41	

Squared Multiple Correlations for Reduced Form

SFM	CONSP	ESSP	ASP I	CON	TSP	SSP
	0.49	0.25	0.74	0.78	0.43	0.76

Squared Multiple Correlations for Reduced Form

FM PTS	ESFM CONFM		MFM	I COI	TFM
	0.23	0.33	0.62	0.48	0.66

Goodness of Fit Statistics

Degrees of Freedom = 787
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 1661.59 (P = 0.0)
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 1594.18 (P = 0.0)
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 807.18
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (697.03; 925.08)

Minimum Fit Function Value = 8.39
Population Discrepancy Function Value (F0) = 4.08
90 Percent Confidence Interval for F0 = (3.52; 4.67)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.072
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.067; 0.077)
P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.00

Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 9.22 90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (8.67; 9.82) ECVI for Saturated Model = 9.12 ECVI for Independence Model = 219.71

Chi-Square for Independence Model with 861 Degrees of Freedom = 43418.13
Independence AIC = 43502.13
Model AIC = 1826.18
Saturated AIC = 1806.00
Independence CAIC = 43682.45
Model CAIC = 2324.21
Saturated CAIC = 5682.85

Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.96 Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.98 Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.88 Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.98 Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.98 Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.96

Critical N (CN) = 106.13

Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.14 Standardized RMR = 0.089 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.72 Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.68 Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.63

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