6-9-2006

Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems, and Power Sharing in Divided Societies

Sara Ann Miller

ETHNIC CONFLICT, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, AND POWER SHARING IN DIVIDED

SOCIETIES

by

SARA ANN MILLER

Under the Direction of Jennifer L. McCoy

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the relationship between ethnic conflict, electoral systems, and power sharing in ethnically divided societies. The cases of Guyana, Fiji, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Mauritius, and Trinidad and Tobago are considered. Electoral systems are denoted based on presidential versus parliamentary system, and on proportional representation versus majoritarian/plurality. The paper concludes that, while electoral systems are important, other factors like the power distribution between ethnic groups, and ensuring a non-zero-sum game may be as important.

INDEX WORDS: Ethnic conflict, Electoral systems, Power sharing, Divided societies, Guyana, Fiji, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, Presidential system, Parliamentary system, Proportional representation, Majoritarian/Plurality, Zero-sum

ETHNIC CONFLICT, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, AND POWER SHARING IN DIVIDED

SOCIETIES

by

SARA ANN MILLER

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2006

ETHNIC CONFLICT, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, AND POWER SHARING IN DIVIDED

SOCIETIES

by

SARA ANN MILLER

Major Professor:	Dr. Jennifer McCoy
Committee:	Dr. Michael Herb
	Dr. Carrie Manning

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Students
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
May 2006

DEDICATION

I dedicate the thesis to all my friends and family who have encouraged and pestered me throughout the years. Special thanks to Lipika Joshi, Sharad Aggarwal, Foluyinka Folowosele, Anitha Manohar, Stela Anguelova, Susan Hyde, Yariv Nornberg, and Shyam Sriram.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AV   Alternative Vote

DLP   Democratic Labor Party

FPTP   First Past The Post

GAP   Guyana Action Party

GECOM   Guyana Elections Commission

MAR   Minorities At Risk

MP   Member of Parliament

NAR   National Alliance for Reconstruction

PCD   Patriotic Coalition for Democracy

PNC   People's National Congress

PNM   People's National Movement

PPP   People's Progressive Party

PR   Proportional Representation

STV   Single Transferable Vote

WPA   Working People's Alliance

Introduction

One important way to mitigate problems in divided societies is to create an electoral system befitting of the situation. In many divided societies, the state has inherited the electoral system of their colonizer. This paper will examine the impact of various electoral systems on ethnic conflict in a divided society. To this end, I will examine the case of Guyana, and compare it with a broader set of other divided societies who are in the same type of situation. While the frequency of ethnic conflict has decreased, it is still a major fear in many parts of the world.

Guyana has had three electoral systems since the 1940s, with variation in the level of ethnic conflict. In such a situation, it is important to assess the current political system with the intent of answering: how do electoral systems exacerbate or mitigate ethnic conflict? Specifically does Guyana's electoral system mitigate or exacerbate ethnic conflict, does Guyana need a new electoral system, and what are appropriate alternatives?

In seeking to explain the impact of an electoral system on ethnic conflict, this project will add to knowledge on the subject in four important ways. First, case studies in this area have generally not focused on the Caribbean. The region provides an important test. The ethnic divisions in the Caribbean tend to be along racial lines, whereas most work focuses on uni-racial ethnic divisions, where ethnicities may be more malleable. Another important factor in the Caribbean is that because there are few indigenous people left, the conflict tends to be between recent arrivals from Africa, Asia, and Europe. The legacy of slavery and indentured servitude further complicates efforts to solve conflicts in the area.

Second, Guyana is a state where the largest racial group is a majority. This lends to an even more intransigent ethnic conflict. There is little to no incentive for the majority group to seek or allow power sharing, since it will hurt their relative position.

Third, in Guyana, the minority Afro-Guyanese Forbes Burnham captured the presidency in 1968 and held the position through rigged elections until his death in 1985. His successor Desmond Hoyte allowed free elections in 1992, when the majority Indo-Guyanese gained power. During the rule of Burnham (1968-1985), the military and police forces acted repressively first against Indo-Guyanese, and

later the Afro-Guyanese as well, forcing almost a third of the population to emigrate. As a result, an air of fear and insecurity surrounds politics. The Afro-Guyanese fear revenge, the Indo-Guyanese fear a return of the previous system. Understanding the intricacies of the case will provide useful information on power sharing potentials and options for improvement in similar cases.

Finally, this project will look at low intensity ethnic conflict. Much of the work done on ethnic conflict focuses on civil wars and similar high intensity ethnic conflict. However, high intensity conflicts build from low-level ones. By focusing on the low intensity conflicts, I will broaden the academic discussion, and help bring attention to mitigating low-level conflict before it gets out of hand. While difficult, mitigating low-level conflict is easier than ending a civil war and subsequently building a new government.

I argue that the type of electoral system, gauged in terms of presidential versus parliamentary system, and in terms of proportional representation (PR) and plurality/majority, makes great strides towards explaining the issue of ethnic conflict in divided societies. PR in a divided society when one group makes up more than half of the population will not promote ethnic harmony. Finally, a power-sharing arrangement will help prevent ethnic conflict.

I find that the shift to proportional representation (PR) in 1964 was the most dangerous time in Guyana in terms of property destruction and personal violence. The FPTP system, in place until 1963, was the second most dangerous period. The current system, mixed PR, is the system that has caused the least amount of violence and destruction. To conclude, I offer recommendations to Guyana on how best to prevent future conflict.

Literature Review

Democracy

Dahl's polyarchy model is the basis of most current definitions of democracy. Elections are the key to this procedural view. Dahl calls for the ability to contest the government, and the ability to participate in the election of officials (1971). Diamond, Linz, and Lipset expanded this definition to meet

three criteria. First, there has to be competition for office. Second, the people must be able to participate in the government through elections. Third, there must be necessary civil and political liberties to ensure the integrity of the competition and participation (1995). Integral to liberal democracy is that the government must be able to change hands, in order to prevent the tyranny of the majority. In divided societies with one clearly identifiable ethnic group in the majority, the government is unlikely to change hands, and a "liberal democracy…produces aliberal results" (Byman 2002, 127).

Mill did not think that democracy could persist in multiethnic states. He believed that institutions would not be able to function properly, since there would be so many countervailing opinions (1948). Acton disagreed with Mill and said that the countervailing opinions of various groups would force the state to keep from absolutist actions. Acton envisaged semi-autonomous groups working together in the central government (1962).

Divided societies

Divided societies are those in which there is an ethnic difference among the people in a state. Additionally, these ethnic differences must determine politics and political parties. There are two main types of inter-ethnic divisions: ranked and unranked. In ranked systems, the ethnic groups are geographically intermixed, ethnicity determines economic status, and one group dominates the other. In unranked systems, the ethnic groups live in enclaves, race does not determine jobs, and the groups are parallel, not hierarchical (Mason 2003). In unranked systems, the groups are so separated from each other that Horowitz describes their relationship as more similar to international relations than intra-state relations (1971).

Ethnic conflict in ranked systems is rare, since the dominant group tends to have so much power relative to the weaker groups that if conflict arose, the dominant group would be able to suppress the revolt with few problems. Additionally, it is very difficult for the subordinate group to become a feasible opposition, since their lower position means that they have less access to funds and have increased problems in mobilization. In unranked systems, groups tend to have conflict over government control.

The major fear of groups in unranked systems is that one group will control the government and use that power to favor their own people in a zero sum game. These groups are more able to fund and support a conflict. This tends to occur in a cycle, as one group wins office, and the other group retaliates. This overwhelming fear of the unranked society turning into a ranked society is the most likely cause of conflict in an unranked society (Mason 2003).

Many current divided societies were once colonies. Upon independence, a majority of these new states adopted the parliamentary system of their colonial master. For British colonies, this meant the adoption of the Westminster, plurality-based electoral system. One major tactic of colonial masters was to use the divide-and-rule tactic to turn ethnic groups against one another for easier rule, either exacerbating an already ranked society, or more sinisterly turning an unranked society into a ranked one (Mason 2003). While ranked societies have less large scale conflict, once a dominant group gains power, it attempts to "institutionalize its advantages by enacting policies that reinforce the existing stratification system, preserving for its members a monopoly on high status roles and confining the subordinate group to low status roles" (Mason 2003, 85). This allows the dominant group to take important state resources for themselves and the subordinate group is less likely to gain social, political, and economic liberties. Faced with the aftermath of the divide-and-rule-system and combined with an inappropriate electoral system, the new states were under a great deal of stress from the outset.

Divided societies have a greater chance of ethnic conflict than just multiethnic states. A necessary step before conflict is the mobilization of the populace along ethnic lines. Hechter and Levi (1979) propose that successful ethnic mobilization occurs if (1) the federal government allows political and cultural opposition groups (2) an ethnically based civil society already exists and (3) the opposition group is able to organize. Elites are able to overcome the collective action problem in ethnic conflict since they are able to identify their constituency easily, and elites can easily determine if a member of their group is not participating in the conflict (Hechter et al 1982). Generally, if there is a response from the state or the opposing group, the response will be against all the members of the ethnic group regardless of their prior actions (Mason 2003).

Sources of ethnic conflict

There are several theories of the cause of ethnic conflict described in Byman (2002): the ethnic security dilemma, status concerns, hegemonic ambitions, and elite aspirations. The ethnic security dilemma arises in states where the central government is weak, if it exists at all. In this state, ethnic groups are likely to defend themselves and their territories with militias and other armed groups. However, the arms accumulation of one group will lead to the arms accumulation of another group, and the resulting situation will be worse than before.

A second theory is conflict based on status concerns. Status concerns deal both with what people think their group deserves from the state and with the relative status and protection of their ethnic group from domination (Byman 2002). A third theory is hegemonic ambitions. According to this theory, the dominant group will attempt to make the state conform to their ethnic group identity. For example, the dominant group will make their language the official language, and force their religion and culture on the other groups and the state facilities. This is one of the most common explanations of ethnic conflict, whether or not hegemonic ambitions actually existed. Some scholars claim this theory as the reason for the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the issue is a continued source of conflict throughout much of Africa, as well as in India and Turkey (Byman 2002).

Finally, there is the theory of elite competition. While the previous theories have all been at the group level, elite competition focuses on the leaders of the groups. Elites, for example Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia, exacerbate ethnic differences by basing their political parties on ethnicity and making campaign promises of ethnic promotion and protection (Byman 2002). These ethnic entrepreneurs tend to force politics from a centrist focus to ethnically based extremism.

Political parties in divided societies may just mirror the ethnic division initially, but eventually, they tend to deepen and widen the differences in the groups (Horowitz 1985). When societies split along ethnic lines, it is much easier for a potential politician to base his/her campaign on issues of ethnicity rather than on substantial issues. Indeed, when major parties begin to centralize their campaigns or seek understanding with another group, the chances of inter-ethnic dissension increase and new politicians are

likely to arise to take up the ethnic banner. Mason (2003) shows this occurring in the new post-independence Sri Lankan parliament between the Tamil and Sinhalese parties.

The type of ethnic conflict is an important factor in determining the likelihood of successful win-win resolutions. First, if the basis of the conflict is to gain political rights for the minority group, it is likely to succeed. Powerful groups have relatively less to lose by allowing small groups to vote than if they were to violently suppress the movement. Second, ethnic conflict based on minorities attempting to gain separate statehood has been peacefully resolved by offering regional autonomy and governance. Third, demands for cultural recognition and rights to ancestral lands have been relatively easy to grant. In all of these conflicts, the majority groups are likely to allow the demands, rather than spending a great deal of time, energy, and expense to suppress the groups (Gurr 2000). However, ethnic conflicts based in the ethnic security dilemma, status concerns, or elite competition are more difficult to resolve. The first two deal with the physical security of both groups and the weaker groups are unlikely to feel secure. Elite competition deals with ambitions of individual people; inflammatory rhetoric is difficult to squelch.

In many Western democracies, there is a core of support for particular parties, but there are always undecided voters, thus increasing parties' desires to move to the center to accommodate the voters. With ethnically based political parties, there are few undecided voters. Basing political parties on ethnicity removes the median voters, and the most important factor in an election becomes voter turnout (Mitchell 1995). In fact, in ethnically based political systems, such as historically in Northern Ireland, center-based parties receive few votes, since the vast majority of the people mobilize along ethnic lines (Mitchell 1995).

One important exception to this is India. There, linguistic lines generally were the demarcation of the federal states. In order to gain office at the federal level, the political parties have been successful in centering their politics to obtain voters from all regions (Lijphart 1996). Politicians are not required to garner votes from all the states, as in Nigeria, but appealing to only one ethnic/linguistic group would create many small parties with minimal percentages in Parliament. The personalities of Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru (and their family members' popularity) also heavily influenced Indian

politics. These men (and their families) were heavily supported in post-partition India, since they helped bring about independence from Britain. This may be changing in India since recently a Hindu nationalist party gained office by appealing to religion. They lost power after one term as leaders of the Parliamentary coalition, but still wield substantial power in many areas.

Electoral systems and power sharing alternatives

One way to address ethnic conflict may be the constitutional engineering of the electoral systems. However, electoral systems may also play a role in exacerbating ethnic conflict. When looking at the electoral system, there are two dimensions to consider. The first is how members of the legislature gain office—either through plurality/majority vote or through proportional representation. The other dimension is whether the executive branch is parliamentary or presidential. We can place states in one cell of this two-by-two matrix based on these dimensions.

Legislative electoral systems. Legislative electoral systems fall into three major families, based on how votes translate into parliamentary seats. The first family is the plurality/majority model. In the plurality model, the party that gains the most votes in a district wins that seat. This plurality system does not require that any party receive more than fifty percent of the vote. The majoritarian electoral model demands that one party win more than fifty percent of the vote.

As early as the 1950s and 1960s, scholars argued that the plurality model was destined to fail in West Africa. Lewis was one of the first to promote proportional representation (PR) to ensure that the government hears the voices of the minorities (1965). Proportional representation is widely seen as the most common way to ensure that the government represents the interests of the minority as well as of the majority. In a PR system, the percentage of votes a party receives in the constituency is the percentage of seats the party receives in the legislature.

Electoral systems may also be semi-proportional. Semi-proportional systems incorporate some elements of PR and some of plurality/majority into the electoral system. For instance, there may be a national PR list vote, but also regional plurality votes.

These three types of systems have inherent positive and negative attributes. Divided societies, especially those with ethnically based political parties, complicate these attributes. Scholars have proposed several political systems in order to address the issue of democracy in a divided society.

Power-sharing. There are various definitions of power-sharing. Sisk defines power-sharing political systems as "those that foster governing coalitions inclusive of most, if not all, major mobilized ethnic groups in society" (Sisk 1996, 4). More specifically, power sharing can be defined as "a set of principles that, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide every significant identity group or segment in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to a group" (Sisk 1996, 5). Lijphart's version of power sharing is consociational, while Horowitz and others favor integrative (pluralist) approaches. While not the first to describe a power-sharing government, Lijphart (1969) proffers consociational politics for divided societies. The model grows out of an in-depth analysis of several continental European states with ethnic divisions, such as Belgium and the Netherlands.

There are four fundamental requirements for consociational politics. First, the elites must have the power to accommodate their people. Second, the elites from one group must be willing to work with elites from other groups. Third, the elites must be committed to the cause of democracy and willing to work to ensure its survival. Finally, the elites must accept and understand the problems that will arise in the case of fragmentation (Lijphart 1969). Clearly, elites are more important in this model than the populace is. One type of consociational arrangement used in Venezuela and Colombia (neither divided societies) resulted in two major political parties alternating the presidency. Switzerland has a seven-person executive made up of members from the ethnic groups. The Netherlands and post-WWII Austria had a small decision-making committee, which, though lacking many formal powers, wielded a great deal

of influence. In Belgium, Catholic and Liberal party leaders learned from the mistakes of their predecessors and formed an opposition union in order to prevent a repeat of the civil conflict that had allowed foreign forces to dominate Belgium. A 1943 Lebanese pact dictated that the President of the Council and the President of the Republic be of different ethnicities (Lijphart 1969).

Important factors of a consociational electoral system are the provisions for power sharing and the autonomy of cultural groups (Lijphart 2004). An easy way to ensure these two aspects electorally is to have a PR system. A PR system tends to create a wide range of parties, usually necessitating a grand coalition (Reilly 2001, Lijphart 1990). However, there should also be provisions for a minority veto (Lijphart 2002).

In the three dominant electoral systems described, there are few incentives for politicians to reach out to others in a divided society to ensure consociational politics. In fact, politicians could lose votes from their own people if the people believe the politicians are weak. In a plurality model, if a politician were to actively seek out support from another community, the politician would be rejected by his/her own people, since in a divided society, support for another group would be perceived as hurting one's own group. In a proportional representation model, the same would be true. The politician would be rejected by his/her own group and simultaneously unaccepted by the other community. Consociational models are based on the existence of the different groups; an attempt to overcome the differences would weaken the position of all the parties. Without incentives in place to encourage reaching out, politicians are much more likely to incite their own people and become ethnic entrepreneurs. Ethnic entrepreneurs tend to ignite a more intense ethnic conflict and push the political spectrum outward from the center to extremism and to what have been called centrifugal politics (Reilly 2001). In such circumstances, electoral reform to force the formation of more centrist groups becomes important; this is known as centripetal politics (Horowitz 1992).

One overwhelming problem with consociationalism is that it encourages further divisions between the groups in a state. In order for consociationalism to work, the groups must always exist (van den Berghe 1981). Centripetal politics, also known as integrative or pluralist politics, is an alternative to

consociational politics. Rather than simply replicating the existing ethnic differences in the legislature, a centripetal system is designed to "encourage moderate, centrist forms of political competition, rather than the polarising extremes and centrifugal patterns that characterise so many divided societies" (Reilly 2001, 7). Thus, the goal shifts from replicating the differences to reducing the salience of the differences. The central aspect of this is to create incentives for politicians to cooperate and accommodate other groups in a divided society. The easiest way to do this is to build functions into the electoral system to force politicians in elections to reach out across the division and draw other groups into their electoral base. This type of arrangement is also expected to draw elites together and help foster communication between the politicians, as well as encouraging vote-sharing or trading deals (Reilly 2001).

Three areas need to be addressed in order to move to a centripetal system. First, there must be electoral incentives for candidates to reach across the divide to other groups for support. Second, there must be arenas of bargaining, when candidates from different groups are expected to come together to vote pool. Third, parties are expected to move towards the center to attract a broader range of voters (Reilly 2001).

In practice, Horowitz (1990) and Reilly (1997) both agree that the alternative vote (AV) or the single transferable vote (STV) is the most effective way for a centripetal system to function. Pre-independence Papua New Guinea showed the most convincing argument for the AV, although Australia, Fiji, Estonia, Ireland, and Northern Ireland all have had preferential voting systems (Reilly 1997).

In the majoritarian AV system, voters rank their preferences for the position in question for a single member district. If there is no majority when the first preferences are counted, the last place candidate is eliminated and the second preferences from these ballots are distributed to the other candidates, and so on until there is a majority vote for one candidate. The purpose of the system is to encourage candidates to actively seek out second or third preference votes of people in other ethnic groups (Reilly 1997).

In the PR STV system, voters rank their preferences for the position in question for a multimember district. The first step is to determine a "winning quota." For example, if there were 10,000

votes cast and 10 seats to fill, the "winning quota" is [10,000 / (10+1)] + 1, or 910 votes. Any candidate who gains this number of votes wins a seat. If no candidate gains the quota, the last place candidate is eliminated and the second preferences from these ballots are distributed to the other candidates, and so on until there is a quota-meeting vote for a candidate. Concurrently, "the "surplus" votes of elected candidates (that is, their votes above the quota) are redistributed at a reduced value according to the lower preferences on the ballots, until all seats for the constituency are filled" (Reilly 2002, 158).

AV worked extremely well in Papua New Guinea's pre-independence parliamentary elections, where micro-sized clans and ethnic groups are the norm. No candidate could campaign only in his ethnic group and win a majority of the national vote. Thus, candidates from different ethnic groups campaigned together. The goal was to have candidates be the first preference of their own ethnic group, and the second preference of the other candidates' ethnic group. These small coalitions forced candidates to appeal to other ethnic groups and campaign as a "second-best" candidate. Upon independence, in 1975, Papua New Guinea changed their system to FPTP, citing the unnecessary complications of the AV system and the desire to rid themselves of their colonial vestiges. In stark contrast to the pre-independence elections, in the 1987 parliamentary plurality elections in Papua New Guinea, one candidate won a seat with 7.9% of the vote. Additionally, "in 1987 and 1992, candidates in many Highlands areas were virtually restricted to campaigning only in their home base areas due to the very real possibility of violence if they ventured beyond their own clan or tribal region" (Reilly 1997, 6).

The moderating effect of preferential voting systems was clear in a recent Australian election. While it does not qualify as a divided society, Australia has always employed a system of preferential voting (AV for the lower house and STV for the Senate). In the past, politicians used the system to ensure that their coalition would win with an overwhelming majority. This was not the case in 1998 when Pauline Hanson and her One Nation party came onto the scene. Hanson's platform was anti-immigration, anti-benefits for the Aborigines, and she wanted to end all foreign aid and withdraw from the United Nations. The other political parties rallied against her. In some regions, the party specifically told voters to place Hanson as the last preference (ending decades of having voters place the major

opposition as the final preference). In the first round of preferences, Hanson won a plurality – 36%. Had the system been plurality based, this extremist candidate would have taken the position. However, since the system was preferential, the candidate who came in third in the first round won the seat and Hanson's party only gained one seat in the election (Reilly 2002).

MacIver (1999) proposes federalism in multi-ethnic states as a way to mitigate conflict, but this would only be useful if the ethnic groups were geographically isolated. With federalism, political power devolves to the local level, allowing groups to have more autonomy. This tends to work well in India, where states are linguistically/ethnically based, but is likely to work less well in states with ethnic integration (Lijphart 1996).

Executive electoral systems. Executive electoral systems may be presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary. Verney (1979) described eleven major differences between the presidential system and the parliamentary system. However, scholars now focus on only three main distinctions between the types of executive systems. The first is whom the head of the government is responsible to (the people vs. the parliament). The second is how the head of the government is selected (by the people or by the parliament). The third is how many executives there are (one vs. multiple cabinet members).

The advantages or disadvantages of particular systems are as important as classifying them. There are three main advantages of a presidential system. First is the fixed term of office, this ensures that there are not confidence votes, which lead to instability. Constant confidence votes led to the failure of many governments in the Weimar Republic, France in the Third and Fourth Republics, Sri Lanka, and present-day Italy. Second is the fact that presidentialism may mean greater democracy, since the people are voting directly for their president. In divided or multiethnic states, this gives a heterogeneous ethnic constituency. However, in parliamentary systems with only a few parties, voting for a party shows tacit approval of their leader. This is more complicated in multi-party systems, where the prime minister may be chosen because of intra-coalition bargaining. The third advantage is that presidentialism has an inherently more limited government because of separation of powers; each branch has different

responsibilities (Lijphart 1992). Montesquieu (1989) was opposed to this concentration of power, fearing that it would produce tyranny if one person or group both created and enforced laws.

There are three advantages of a parliamentary system. The first is that there is a lack of executive-legislative deadlock. Since the rejection of a major bill is a vote of no confidence, the cabinet does not have the option to veto. The cabinet remains in office until they lose a confidence vote or have to call elections. If no party is more than half of the parliament, this ensures that there is a greater chance of cooperation and bargaining in the presentation of laws (Lijphart 1992). Second is the fact that there is no rigid term for parliaments. The constant affirmation of government ensures that the cabinet is always current and focusing on important tasks. Many Latin American states do not allow reelection of presidents; as soon as the president enters office, s/he is a lame duck and has little power. This also avoids presidential succession issues, with the possibility that a potentially unqualified vice president succeeds the president. Third, parliamentary systems tend to produce a more inclusive government (if there are more than a few parties). While the office of president is inherently winner-take-all, the presence of a congress mitigates the ability of the president to completely control the government (Lijphart 1992). Nigeria's Second Republic system attempts to counteract this by demanding that the president receive both a plurality of national votes, and at least 25 percent of the votes in two-thirds of the 19 states, thus ensuring support from other ethnic groups (Horowitz 1990).

Some see semi-presidentialism as a more favorable option. They argue that semi-presidentialism gives the best of presidential and parliamentary systems. However, semi-presidentialism does not mean that the president and the prime minister are equivalent at the same time. Instead, the president is more powerful when his/her party is the majority in the legislature and the prime minister is more powerful when the president's opposition party is the majority in the legislature (Lijphart 1992).

Explanations

In this paper, I will examine the ways that electoral systems exacerbate or mitigate ethnic conflict. Electoral systems are the way in which citizens elect political leaders of a state to office. We

can examine the ways in which the executive (president/prime minister) and legislative (congress/parliament) branches gain office. Usually, the judicial branch of government is appointed, not elected.

If certain types of electoral systems can feasibly mitigate ethnic conflict better than others can, then these should be the types of systems promulgated for these states. While electoral systems cannot absolutely guarantee better democracy, the fact that the institutions are in place for ethnic cooperation is paramount to future peace.

Hypotheses

H_1: In a divided society with ethnically based political parties, the type of government system and electoral system will affect the potential for conflict. In particular, a plurality or majority based electoral system in a parliamentary system is expected to generate the highest level of ethnic conflict and insecurity. Presidential systems with proportional representation electoral systems are expected to generate the lowest level of ethnic conflict and insecurity.

This is because in a parliamentary system or coalition, whichever party wins the most seats controls the government—both the legislative and executive branches, producing a zero sum game. Ethnically based political parties will thus encourage people to vote along ethnic lines, and by employing inflammatory comments and platforms, the potential for conflict and insecurity increases. This demands full participation of voters, and those who vote against their ethnic party or do not vote may be targeted for recrimination. This is less likely in a presidential system, since there is a balance of power (assuming that the legislative branch has the power to balance the president). Chart I shows expected outcomes of electoral systems in ethnically divided societies.

Chart I: Expected Outcomes of Electoral Systems in Ethnically Divided Societies

Type of executive/ How legislature is elected	Presidential	Parliamentary
PR	Conflict not likely	Conflict likely
Plurality/Majoritarian	Conflict somewhat likely	Conflict most likely

H_2: In a divided society with ethnically based political parties where one ethnicity is more than 50% of the population, a proportional representation system will not prevent ethnic conflict and insecurity.

Since the proportional representation system is based on the percentage of votes that a party receives, if an ethnic group is more than 50% of the population, they will win control of the legislature. They will not have to consult with other political parties or ethnic groups in order to rule. They may become entrenched as the ruling party, to the detriment of the other ethnic groups.

H_3: Power-sharing will help prevent ethnic conflict and improve security.

A power sharing government will allow representation of minorities in the government. Minority representation assures that the government hears the voices of the people, and that issues will be brought to attention before conflict erupts.

Operationalization

Dependent Variable

This paper seeks to explain ethnic conflict in divided societies. In many states, the population's ethnicity is malleable and may have no historical basis. Byman defines ethnic groups as "people bound together by a belief in a common kinship and group distinctiveness, often reinforced by religion, language and history" (2002, 5). In other words, ethnicity is what you make of it. Self-identification is paramount to this definition. Many cases exist of ethnic entrepreneurs fanning the flames of ethnic divides in hopes of gaining power. In places where there are many ethnicities in the same race of people, this is an obvious problem. People may shift their ethnicities, and mobilize along these lines.

In states with an immigrant majority, ethnicities are more readily distinguishable and ethnic divides tend to follow racial divides. In the Caribbean, there is an ethnic divide between those descended from European colonizers (primarily British), those descended from African slaves, and those brought as indentured servants from Asia and Europe (primarily Portugal). In these places, ethnicity is clearly distinguishable, based not only on skin color, but also on language, religion, culture, and even names. In other parts of the world, these ethnic differences are not as distinguishable. However, in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the Americas, ethnicity is distinguishable by many factors.

The second feature of this variable is conflict. Conflict incorporates a broad spectrum of activity. Some types of ethnic violence listed by Horowitz (2001) include riots, violent protests, pogroms, feuds, lynchings, genocides, terrorist attacks, gang assaults, and ethnic fights. We can also include strikes (when industries are ethnically based), arson, forced migration, and sexual assaults.

There are two major types of ethnic conflict: group versus group or group versus government. Byman calls an ethnic conflict over when there have been fewer than 100 deaths per year for at least 20 years. The use of deaths is justifiable in that, while there are many types of conflict, it is difficult to measure riots, sexual assaults, and other forms of violence, and so he uses deaths as a proxy of conflict (Byman 2002). However, in states with small populations, this measurement is not as useful, since if we use this to measure the magnitude of violence it would be proportionally much higher than in states with high populations.

For this study, I will use the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. The MAR dataset includes data on inter-communal conflict from the 1940s through 2000, both the type and level of violence. MAR measures political discrimination, extent of political restrictions, economic disadvantages, cultural discrimination, inter-communal violence, group protest activity, anti-regime rebellion, and government repression. It also includes type of government from 1945 through 2000 (MAR 1986).

As this paper focuses on lower intensity conflict, I will define ethnic violence in terms of riots, violent protests, physical assault, property destruction, ethnically motivated strikes, and forced migration.

Explanatory Variable

Electoral systems are distinguishable based on the type of voting system, type of legislature, and/or manner of presidential election. Electoral systems generally fit into one of the three electoral families (majority/plurality, PR, or semi-PR) described above, and should fit into one of the four cells categorizations As control variables, I will consider economic conditions in the cases such as level of unemployment, GDP per capita, economic differences between the groups, and other economic factors.

Methodology

This research project is a qualitatively and quantitatively based case study of Guyana in comparative perspective. I will examine the implications of each political system concerning majority/minority interactions and the chances of majority tyranny. Furthermore, I will examine examples of power sharing as they occur in the case studies. I will make recommendations based on the ethnic composition of the divided society as to which power sharing arrangements are likely to improve the chances of decreased ethnic conflict.

The first section of the project is an in-depth case study of Guyana. Guyana has a parliamentary system in which the president is the leader of the party controlling the parliament. S/he then selects a prime minister. In Guyana, the Indo-Guyanese make up half of the population, Afro-Guyanese make up just over a third of the population. Thus, they violate Lijphart's first condition for power sharing to work. In fact, Guyana has had three electoral systems since the 1940s. They had a plurality-based parliamentary system for several elections in the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1960s, there was one election based on proportional representation before an Afro-Guyanese leader seized power. Since 1992, there have been three national level elections, with another election due by winter of 2006. The current system, in place in its current configuration since 2001, is a mixed one, with a single statewide list-based PR system electing forty members of parliament, and regional constituencies electing the remaining twenty-five via PR. I look at the change in the level of conflict in Guyana over time to see if the change in electoral

systems affected it. Additionally, I examine the level of conflict before and after the party schism that divided the People's Progressive Party (PPP) into ethnic parties.

Other divided societies, for example Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius, Fiji, and Lebanon will be examined less rigorously using the MAR dataset to see if there is a correlation between type of electoral system and level of conflict. I analyze this group of divided societies to see if there is support for the above hypotheses. The differing percentages of ethnic groups, as well as their electoral experiences and economic conditions, should shed some light on the impact of the electoral system on ethnic conflict.

My data sources include secondary and historical analyses, election reports, and interviews with people who have worked with Guyana in various capacities. These people have worked as election monitors, democracy experts, and conflict resolution experts.

Guyana Case Study

Historical Review

Pre-independence. Guyana suffered through colonization of the Dutch, the French, and, finally, the British. They gained independence from the British in 1966. When Europeans first arrived in the New World, Amerindian tribes, primarily the Carib and the Arawak, populated Guyana. Initially, the Dutch traded near the coast with the Amerindians, but eventually they moved inland and began plantations. The Dutch used Guyana primarily for sugar production, but they also grew coffee, indigo, and tobacco. Sugar is now the second largest agricultural product. As a primary product producer Guyana's economy is contingent upon world prices and economic circumstances around the world.

After it became clear that they could not enslave the Amerindians, the Dutch and later the British turned to Africa. From the beginning of plantations until the abolition of slavery in 1833, they brought thousands of slaves, although the exact number is unknown. After the British banned slavery in 1833, the freed Afro-Guyanese slaves refused to work for their former masters regardless of the wages, and moved into the urban regions where they became civil servants. To attract workers, the British began an indentured servant project. Initially, they brought indentured servants from the Madeira Islands of

Portugal and from China, but these workers could not work in the tropics and soon these ethnic groups moved into the merchant sectors. The next source for the British was India, where they were already firmly entrenched. Indentured servants from India came in huge numbers until 1917, when the practice was officially ended. The Indians were accustomed to the type of climate found in Guyana, and were able to work on the plantations. The current population of Guyana is 50% Indian, 36% African, 7% Amerindian, and 7% other groups (CIA World Factbook). In general, the Afro-Guyanese have lived in the urban areas and dominated the bureaucracy and security forces. The Portuguese and Chinese have excelled in the merchant sector. The Indo-Guyanese have dominated the rural areas and agricultural sectors. Some Afro-Guyanese remained in the rural areas, but they were a minority. There was also mixed race mining of bauxite, but the Afro-Guyanese tended to dominate the sector.

The relationships between the ethnic groups have been trying since the beginning. The Dutch and British utilized Amerindians to find, to capture, and to return escaped African slaves. The Afro-Guyanese resented the Amerindians for this. The Afro-Guyanese also resented the Indo-Guyanese, whom the Afro-Guyanese felt were responsible for their diminished bargaining position on the plantations.

Ethnic groups in Guyana have always been separated. The voluntary associations and the labor unions were the beginning of the independence movement. During the 1930s, the two major labor unions instigated strikes and other public dissension in Guyana in order to attract British attention. They demanded universal adult suffrage. The British refused, but did begin to lower the voting requirements, which made little difference initially, but eventually suffrage increased throughout the 1940s. Suffrage extended from 11,000 people in 1944 to 59,000 people in 1947 (Premdas 1996). Ethnically based associations began the collaboration of peoples necessary for the overthrow of a colonial master. The Indian and African groups, making up the largest segment of the population, "recognized that economic conditions were inextricably bound up with the colonial political order" (Premdas 1996, 29). They began demanding wider suffrage and abolition of voting restrictions.

During the 1947 elections, when Guyanese were voting for their colonial legislature (which was dominated by the British and afforded them no real power), Cheddi Jagan (an Indo-Guyanese who would

later become the first president) had realized the people were unequivocally voting along racial lines. In order to ensure victory for his new political party, the PPP, Jagan sought out an Afro-Guyanese running mate, Forbes Burnham, to capture both the Indian and African votes. The PPP continued to strive for a Socialist state; they won 18 of 24 seats in the 1953 election. This power arrangement created a time of unparalleled ethnic harmony in Guyana (Premdas 1996). However, when the British realized that the PPP were socialists, they suspended to constitution to block Jagan's policies and sent warships to remove the government, likely at the behest of the United States government and business interests in Guyana (Griffith 1997).

The British jailed Jagan and Burnham separately. During their forced separation, differences in style and leadership goals became apparent, and the PPP split into two parties in 1955. The parties were known for a while as PPP Jagan and PPP Burnham, but eventually Burnham renamed his party the People National Congress (PNC) (Carroll and Pastor 1993). Most unfortunately, the ethnic solidarity disappeared.

After the party split in 1955, each subsequent election ratcheted up the violence in the state. According to Premdas, in Guyana, "each succeeding election campaign raise[d] the level of intergroup distrust and fear to a new high point until, after several elections, inter-community differences become so intolerable that continued mutual coexistence among the sub-groups in the society [was] close to impossible" (1996, 59).

Table I: Election Outcomes
Source: Ishmael 2005

Year	Party	Seats	Percentage of popular vote won	Voter Turnout
1957	PPP	9	47.50%	55.8%
	PNC	3	25.48%	
	Others	2	N/A	
1961	PPP	20	42.6%	89.4%
	PNC	11	41%	
	UF	4	16.1%	
1964	PPP	24	42.6%	97%
	PNC	22	41%	
	UF	7	12.4%	

Table I shows the election outcomes from 1957, 1961, and 1964. In the 1957 election, the PPP won nine out of 13 seats with voter turnout at 55.8% of registered voters. In 1961, the PPP won 20 of 35 seats, while the PNC won 11 seats with voter turnout at 89.4%. In 1964, the PPP won 24 seats, while the PNC won 22 seats with voter turnout at 97% (Ishmael 2005).

Premdas interviewed several people who were registered to vote, but did not, in the 1957 election. These people stated that in 1957 "they had been psychologically unable to bring themselves to vote for either Dr. Jagan or Mr. Burnham, since this would necessarily entail disrupting the relatively peaceful inter-ethnic harmony that existed between African and Indian communities at that time" (Premdas 1996, 62).

After the FPTP 1957 election, the political parties began a campaign to support the idea of *apanjaat* (vote for your own kind) politics. Because of the pervasive *apanjaat* policies, the people were forced to vote for their own ethnicity, or face violent reprisals. According to Premdas, if a person was identified as having voted for the "wrong" party, "activists applied various forms of pressure, including open attacks on the persons or homes of the uncommitted, as a means of persuading them to behave according to the tenets of *Apanjaat*" (1996, 52). Voter turnout rose tremendously from 1957 to 1964 because of this pressure (Carter Center 1993).

From 1957 to 1963, under FPTP, only constituencies with a relatively equal distribution of the major ethnic groups suffered the consequences of *apanjaat*. The effect of turning from FPTP to PR for the 1964 election was that the *apanjaat* system immediately spread throughout the entire country. Grassroots canvassers spread this system by visiting many homes within six months of the elections, and urged the people to vote for their own kind. During this time, political parties continued to co-opt voluntary associations to ensure that the constituents were in line with *apanjaat*. Political parties accomplished this co-option by putting voluntary association leaders in high-ranking positions in the party, and by having high-ranking members of the political parties installed as leaders of the voluntary associations (Premdas 1996).

Analysis: Politically inspired ethnic conflict

Soon after the PPP gained office in 1961, the United Front (UF) (a party mainly consisting of the well-off European, Chinese, and mixed Guyanese), which had gained four seats, began a destabilization campaign in order to show that the PPP was unable to govern. The Afro-Guyanese dominant civil service and other Afro-Guyanese associations joined the campaign by striking and protesting against the PPP. This strike turned for the worst on February 16, 1962 with arson and violence in Georgetown. The toll of this violence was "five men killed, eighty injured, and over \$11.5 million dollars (British West Indies currency) worth of property destroyed in the business center of Georgetown" (Premdas 1996, 100). The PPP government was unable to reign in the violence during this time, likely because the Afro-Guyanese dominated military and police were unwilling to respond. The British were called in to help reprieve the violence (Horowitz 1985).

The following year, the PNC called on the Afro-Guyanese unions to strike against the government to weaken the PPP's position. Since the Afro-Guyanese dominated the civil service and armed service sectors, this was devastating. The goal of the strike was to remove Jagan from office, since the Afro-Guyanese refused to accept him as the President. Secretly funded by the CIA, the AFL-CIO of the United States funneled money to the African unions in an attempt to remove the Socialist government

from office. Eventually, the sugar companies, oil importers, food transporters, and even the police/military refused to do their jobs (Premdas 1996). Communal violence broke out, the British were pressured to intervene and sent troops in to quell the violence (Carter Center 1993).

Given the debilitating effect the strike had on the PPP, the PNC and UF were encouraged that more striking would further weaken the government. The goal was the replacement of the PPP in government by the PNC/UF. Premdas (1996) notes that strikes were easy to launch against the PPP in Georgetown because the vast majority of Indo-Guyanese lived in rural areas. The Afro-Guyanese dominated civil service, police, and military forces were based in Georgetown, as well as the generally well-off supporters of the UF. A strike of the civil service shut down the government, and the police were unwilling to attempt to force them back to work.

For 80 days in 1963, ethnic violence reached a peak, law and order was destroyed, and the state was essentially in civil war. The impetus was the introduction of a labor relations bill into parliament. Essentially, the same bill had been proposed in parliament in 1953, but in 1963 the political climate had changed and the opposition parties opposed the bill because it centralized power in the Ministry of Labor and because the opposition had not been consulted. However according to Burnham, the opposition to the labor relations bill was not the *causa belli,* but the *casus belli,* of the strike; that is, not the cause of war, but the opportunity for it (Chase 1964).

According to Premdas, the cause of the 1963 strike was the same as the 1962 strike: to demonstrate "the inability of the Jagan regime to govern Guyana, and to postpone independence, change the electoral system, call new elections, and ultimately remove the PPP government from power. In sum, the PNC and UF's distrust of a PPP regime in independent Guyana precipitated violence and sabotage against the Jagan government" (1996, 105). In general, Afro-Guyanese workers and not the Indo-Guyanese workers participated in the strike. Because of the ethnic composition of the strikers, it is clear that ethnicity was at the forefront of the strike.

After the strikes, the UF and the PNC, as well as the US, pressured the British to allow PR elections in 1964. In response to these pressures, the UK changed the Guyanese electoral system, making it the only colony in the Commonwealth that did not have a FPTP system (Horowitz 1985).

During the 1963 strike, the Jagan government was unable to get assistance from any international states other than Communist Cuba and Soviet regimes. When Cuban and Soviet shipments arrived carrying food and oil, rumors flew of a communist takeover, which led to increased ethnic violence, with Indo-Guyanese being attacked and killed in Georgetown, while the same occurred in rural areas to Afro-Guyanese. Other forms of violence, including bombings, became common. Essentially, this was civil war (Premdas 1996).

The violence was ended after eighty days when the British government was able to mediate the dispute. The labor relations bill was thrown out of parliament, but for three weeks after this the violence continued, which is further evidence that the strike was not a result of the bill but instead intended to destabilize the government (Premdas 1996).

During the mediation of this dispute, the British government essentially gave the opposition all that they demanded while denying Jagan any of his requests. The British conceded on four points: new elections would be held; independence would be postponed; PR would be used; and the voting age would not be decreased and would remain at 21. The concession of these four points essentially guaranteed that the opposition (a PNC/UF coalition) would win the new election. While these concessions were able to end the violence of 1963, they set the stage for the following year's problems. The United States encouraged the British government's refusal to grant any of the PPP concessions (Premdas 1996).

In response, in January 1964, the PPP organized a reaction against the decisions of the mediation. Jagan called a strike of the sugar industry and mobilized a march to the capital. The strikes did not end until July 24, 1964. Ethnic violence was again at civil war standards. Estimated destruction was "total deaths range from 150 to 200, injuries from 900 to 2,000, homes destroyed from 1,400 to 2,000, displaced persons from 10,000 to 20,000, and physical property damage from G$5 million to G$20 million" (Premdas 109, 1996). In May, a state of emergency was declared (which lasted through independence in

1966), British troops were brought in, and security was placed in the hands of the British governor. With the sugar workers striking, violent confrontation spread throughout the countryside. The deaths, violence, displacement, and property damage solidified the split between the groups, with calls for secession on both sides (Premdas 1996).

Elections under PR were held in December 1964. The PPP won 24 seats of 53, the PNC won 22 seats, and the UF won seven seats. The PNC and the UF joined a coalition, and with 29 of 53 seats in the legislature, were able to run the government from 1964 to 1968. Independence was granted on May 26, 1966 while the state of emergency was still in place. Because of the strength of the police/military forces and the presence of British troops during the continued state of emergency, the PPP was unable to strike or cause any disruptions during this time.

Post-independence. In 1968, the PNC began rigging elections and a 28-year period of PNC authoritarian rule ensued. Violence against Indo-Guyanese and eventually Afro-Guyanese spread throughout Guyana. The state violence maintained the power of the PNC; it also gave a veil of impunity to the police to plunder the populace for their own gains (Premdas 1996). A third of the population fled, mainly to North America. Political space disappeared. During Burnham's rule, groups were not granted any political space and any movements against the government were met with force, since the PNC controlled the military sector.

Burnham died in 1985. During his years as president, the political and economic situations deteriorated significantly. He changed electoral rules to the mixed PR system to ensure his continued electoral success and changed the constitution. He improved relations with the USSR, China, and Cuba, nationalized and consolidated control of major businesses in Guyana, and probably ordered the assassination of the popular political opposition leader Walter Rodney of the Working People's Alliance in 1980. The economy also took a turn for the worst during Burnham's rule, with the oil crisis of the 1970s increasing prices and the terms of trade deteriorating significantly. Given their strong socialist

leanings, the country also had a poor relationship with bilateral and multilateral donors (Carter Center 1993).

Burnham died in August 1985 and was succeeded by Desmond Hoyte, who was the first vice president and prime minister. Elections were due later that year; coupled with domestic pressures for reforms, Hoyte realized that some concessions were necessary. He eliminated postal voting and put restrictions on overseas voting. Burnham had fraudulently used both of these voting methods to capture elections (Carter Center 1993). After the 1985 elections, the PPP and four other main opposition parties formed the Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD) in order to push for reforms. Specifically, they wanted "the creation of a totally independent Elections Commission with authority over all aspects of the electoral process, the counting of ballots at polling places, restricting the military to barracks on election day, and the presence of international observers" (Carroll and Pastor 1993, 165).

Guyana since 1992. In the early 1990s, Hoyte faced pressures from international and domestic actors to democratically reform the country. Because of this, he invited the Commonwealth Secretariat to monitor the election. Jagan was not certain of the impartiality of the Commonwealth and invited the Carter Center to also observe the elections. Jagan was able to convince the Hoyte government to agree (Carter Center 1993).

After the Cold War, it was no longer necessary for the United States to support the PNC government in Guyana. According to Premdas (1996), the Carter Center was one of the main forces in persuading the government to hold transparent elections, which finally occurred on October 5, 1992. In late 1990, with the PCD pressuring Hoyte, he began some minimal reforms of the electoral system, but many problems remained, most notably the flawed voters list and the structure of the Elections Commission (Carter Center 1993).

Given the problems, however, election-monitoring groups agreed that the actual 1992 election was clean by their standards and the PNC withdrew from power in favor of the PPP. During this election, 53 of 65 seats were directly elected in PR (party list), while the other 12 were elected by regional

councils. Since it was the first competitive election under this system, I consider this the first instance of the mixed PR system.

While for the most part the voting was calm and peaceful, in Georgetown, Linden, and New Amsterdam, "violence, intimidation, and attempts to manipulate the process did occur" (Carter Center 1993, 40). A siege of the Elections Commission headquarters in Guyana nearly led to the collapse of the election. The siege was by "a violent and angry crowd claiming disenfranchisement" (Carter Center 1993, 40). Most of these were members or supporters of the PNC. Violence spread into the business sector of Georgetown, resulting in two deaths and substantial damage. In early afternoon, more than 1,500 protestors were at the election headquarters. The Guyanese and UNDP technicians in the building were forced to flee in the midst of the stoning of the building and attempts to storm the building (Carroll and Pastor 1993). The Chairman of the Elections Commission agreed to allow these protestors to vote at the headquarters. Their votes were not counted, but officials determined that less than a quarter of them were registered voters. Later in the day, armed officers arrived, and the protestors dispersed (Carter Center 1993).

In Linden, violence also broke out. Crowds claiming to have registered but unable to find their names on the voters list attacked six polling stations and the regional office of the Elections Commissions. "Several of these polling stations were stoned and elections officials were intimidated and assaulted, furniture overturned and destroyed and, in some cases, ballot boxes removed" (Carter Center 1993, 41).

In New Amsterdam, a crowd overwhelmed a polling place, but the potential violence was squelched when officials allowed them to vote and placed their votes in a "special container" (Carter Center 1993). Later in the same day, this group stormed Jagan's office, and widespread looting occurred in Georgetown for several days (IFES 2002).

Tallying was done at the polling stations, and a "Quick Count" was utilized by observers to ensure a proper count. As a result, Jagan was declared the winner rather quickly. Opposition parties and international observers accepted the results, although the PNC continued to insist that all the prior

elections during their rule were free and fair. While the election did end the system of non-democratic ethnic rule, the PPP did not need to include other parties in their rule, since they got a majority in Parliament. The situation switched from non-democratic Afro-Guyanese domination to democratic Indo-Guyanese domination. Given the violence of the dictatorship, and the complete distrust of both sides, Jagan was in no political position to form a grand coalition. The parliamentary seats were dispersed as such: PPP/Civic 36, PNC 26, WPA 2, and UF 1, with Jagan inaugurated on October 9, and the new parliament convening on December 17, 1992 (Carter Center 1993).

Jagan died in March 1997 and was succeeded by Prime Minister Samuel Hinds, who invited the Commonwealth to observe the 1997 election. There were 10 parties contesting the 1997 election, and there was some discontent from the smaller parties (Commonwealth 1998). The Disciplined Forces, the police, defense force, prison service, and the national service voted peacefully on December 10 (Commonwealth 1998).

The actual voting on December 15 was not problematic; however, the tallying process was. The tallying process continued until early in the morning on December 19. In the meantime, both the PPP and the PNC had declared victory. Elections officials decided to meet with the heads of the parties on the evening of December 16. However, "shortly before these meetings a street demonstration resulted in tear gas and shots being fired. It was reported that 11 people had been wounded, some of whom were hospitalized" (Commonwealth 1998, 27).

The PNC did not accept the initial declaration of tallying process, and demanded a recount, especially in Region 4, which they announced the morning of December 19. A few hours later, the Elections Commission announced that based on the votes counted, the PPP had won, and the votes left to be counted could not surmount the divide. As a result, the Chairman of the Elections Commission declared the PPP to be the winner. Some of the "opposition groups had already gone to the High Court of Guyana to ask for an injunction to prevent the continuation of the tally of the votes and to ask that the ballots from all over the country be recounted" (Commonwealth 1998, 28). This injunction was not

granted in time, and later that afternoon Janet Jagan was inaugurated as president with only 90% of vote counting completed.

There was an outbreak of riots in response to this perceived theft of office; PNC supporters essentially took over Georgetown to show the country that the PPP could never have won the elections. The same type of rioting and looting which occurred after the 1992 election occurred again (IFES 2002). Violence against Indo-Guyanese occurred; and since they controlled the civil service, the military forces, and essentially Georgetown, the PNC was able to force the government into negotiations, mediated by Caricom, and called the Herdmanston Accord (Premdas 2002). The PNC refused to accept the result of the election, and boycotted Parliament during the violent demonstrations (Carter Center 2002). The PNC could not fathom that the number of Indo-Guyanese in the rural areas could counter the number of Afro-Guyanese in the urban areas.

Janet Jagan resigned in 1999 due to poor health, and after Samuel Hinds temporarily resigned from his position as Prime Minister to remove himself from the line of succession, Bharrat Jagdeo became the President. As a result of the Hermanston Accord, and new legislative elections were scheduled for 2001 (a year early). Significant reforms were planned to the constitution and the Elections Commission. The most significant change in the Elections Commission was that it was made a permanent secretariat, renamed the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM). GECOM had a very tight schedule in order to meet the elections deadline of the Herdmanston Accord, which was further hampered by the Parliament's failure to pass key reforms until November 2000 (Carter Center 2002).

The key reform dealing with the electoral system was that all members of the Parliament would be directly elected, ridding the system of the Regional Councils. The system was finalized in February 2001, when it was decided that there would be 65 members of Parliament—40 elected in the national PR list and 25 elected in the regional PR lists. GECOM was forced to move the election date from January until March 19, 2001. They also had to revise and verify the voters list and produce and distribute the national ID cards (Carter Center 2002).

In January 2001, the High Court finally resolved the cases arising from the 1997 elections. The High Court ruled "the 1997 elections 'vitiated,' because the statutory requirements of using voter registration cards violated the Constitution" (Carter Center 2002, 17). In practice, this meant the GECOM's actions to print and distribute voter ID cards for the 2001 elections was also unconstitutional, and the entire practice had to be ended and revamped. This was remedied by allowing the identification cards to be only one form of acceptable identification, instead of as in the 1997 elections when it was the only acceptable identification. The Court also decided that in order to ensure law and order, the PPP government was to remain legally in office until the March 31, 2001, giving GECOM a firm deadline. The PPP government's mandate expired on January 17. During the interim period, the government was restrained from any political and legislative actions beyond day-to-day operations (Carter Center 2002).

On Election Day 2001, only a few major irregularities occurred, and these were not enough to doubt the integrity of the election. However, there were many problems with the voter ID card. In some cases, people without cards were allowed to vote, and in others they were not. As the day progressed, the streets of Georgetown were becoming tense, and there were many PNC supporters who believed they were deliberately being disenfranchised (Carter Center 2002).

One of the medium-term observers of the elections was David Pottie (2005). He was stationed in a town on the Surinamese border. He noted no major problems in the election, which drew a high turnout. However, after the election, he was unable to return to Georgetown because of the roadblocks. He instead went to New Amsterdam and met up with other observers. After careful deliberation (since the police forces are dominated by Afro-Guyanese), they presented themselves to the police and returned to Georgetown with a police escort.

The tallying process of the 2001 election was not nearly as problematic that of the 1997 election, and the observers saw few problems, and none that were significant enough to doubt the integrity of the election. The smaller parties, who were not allowed to be present at the tabulation of the votes, disputed the counting methods. On March 23, 2001, GECOM issued the results of the elections. There was a problem in Region 4, and when the results were retabulated (with no major complaints), the results were

Guyana Action Party/Working People's Alliance (GAP/WPA) 2, PNC/R 27 (41.9%), PPP/C 34 (52.9%), ROAR 1, and UF 1 (Carter Center 2002).

The PNC continued to refute the results, and members began demonstrating, claiming that they had been disenfranchised. One of the PNC/R Election Commissioners was attacked for agreeing with the official results. Buxton also experienced unrest, and some businesses and schools stayed closed in Georgetown because of it. Within hours of the release of the official results, a PNC/R candidate petitioned for an injunction to prevent Jagdeo from being inaugurated. During the hearings, protestors gathered outside. On March 31, the judge dismissed the injunction, clearing the way for Jagdeo's confirmation (Carter Center 2002).

For several weeks, the country remained tense. There were multiple protests, which occasionally turned violent, as well as roadblocks in Georgetown and other areas of the country. Hoyte declared his intention to escalate the protests and a PNC/R rally led to an outbreak of violence. A talk show host's comments led to arson in Georgetown (destroying eight buildings). Additionally, a woman was murdered near the PPP/C headquarters. Beginning April 24, Hoyte met with Jagdeo to reach agreements on several topics, and this series of meetings seems to have ended the violence (Carter Center 2002). In ending the violence, Jagdeo negotiated with the PNC leader and agreed to constitutional reform and to adding minority rights and unofficial power sharing (Premdas 2001). These reforms have yet to occur, with elections scheduled for 2006.

The 2001 election again resulted in PPP dominance in the legislature and Jagdeo was reaffirmed as President "triggering, almost as an uncanny repetition, a series of riots, shootings, and murders which assumed an ethno-racial character" (Premdas 2001, 25). Additionally, after the election, a prolonged court battle waged between the PPP and the PNC over technical details of the elections (IFES 2002).

After significant debate about changing the number of MPs elected in the geographic PR elections, in June 2005, the PPP tabled a bill that would freeze the number of seats allocated to the geographical PR election process at 25. The opposition was infuriated, but could not stop its adoption, since the PPP has an absolute majority in Parliament.

On July 7, 2005, the government tabled a bill (passed July 14, 2005) that would make voter registration continuous, instead of just every seven years. This was intended to help clean up the 2001 voter registration list, which the government so far intends to use as the basis of the 2006 voter registration list. Although the opposition claims that they support the idea of continuous registration, they are upset that so many of their ideas have not been implemented. The opposition wants to start a new voter registration list, since they claim that there were so many problems with the 2001 list. They also want to implement biometric measures, i.e. fingerprints, as a part of the voter registry to avoid improper and multiple voting. The opposition also claims that the PPP is circumventing and undermining GECOM.

In the past few years, as drug eradication efforts have worked in Colombia, Venezuela, and elsewhere in South America, Guyana has become a major shipment point for illicit drugs to the United States. With trafficking come traffickers, their money, and their guns. Given the historical contentiousness that occurs in the lead up and aftermath of an election in Guyana, and the current opposition grievances against the government, it is reasonable to expect that the 2006 Guyanese elections will also have violence. The number and force of weapons available to the people has increased dramatically in the last few years, and this could make any problems associated with the 2006 elections even more dangerous.

Analysis and summary of the case study

There have been three electoral systems in Guyana's recent history. The first electoral system was the pre-independence first-past-the-post elections. The elections that took place under this system occurred in 1957 and 1961. Table II shows the amount of damage caused during outbreaks of ethnic conflict in Guyana. The strikes of 1962 and 1963 took place while Jagan was president, elected via FPTP.

Table II: Level of violence in Guyana at electoral moments
Sources: Premdas 1996, Carter Center 1993, 2001

	Strikes	Arson/property damage	Injuries/deaths	Government repression
FPTP	1962: PNC/UF 1963: PNC/UF	1962: $11.5 million	1962: 80 injured, 5 deaths 1963: urban beatings, rural massacres	None reported
PR	1964: PPP	Homes destroyed: 1,400 – 2,000; displaced persons 10,000-20,000; property damage: $5-$20 million	Injuries: 900-2,000 Deaths: 150-200	Government repression of PPP
Mixed PR	1992: PNC	Rioting and looting in Georgetown; Jagan's office stormed	Election officials assaulted	No major repression noted
Mixed PR	1997: PNC	Rioting and looting in Georgetown	11 wounded, violence against Indo-Guyanese	Some use of force and arrests
Mixed PR	2001: PNC	8 buildings destroyed	1 high ranking election official assaulted, other election officials assaulted, 2 deaths	None apparent

The second type of system was PR; the elections under this type of system occurred in 1964; this election chose the party which would lead the country into independence in 1966. The strikes in 1964 were led by Jagan while he was still President in response to the decision to change the system to PR. While both the FPTP strikes of 1962 and 1963, as well as the PR strikes of 1964 were highly destructive, in terms of personal violence, the 1964 PR strikes were the worst. After the PNC/UF coalition took power in 1964, they began to repress the PPP and their members. This is the only major instance of such repression.

Since Burnham's death in 1985 and the return to democracy in 1992, there has been a mixed PR system, with members of Parliament (MPs) elected from a national list, as well as from a regional list. The current parliament in Guyana has 65 members. Forty are elected through nationwide closed PR lists. The remaining 25 are elected through constituency-based closed PR lists. One major flaw with closed list PR in large constituencies is that there is limited accountability to the people. The populace does not

have a legislator responsible to their needs—the people do not know whom they can contact from the nationwide list. However, since there are multiple constituency legislators, the people also are not aware of whom to contact from the regional list. The urban constituencies are underrepresented in terms of population. Alternatively, the rural constituencies are so physically large that they also have representation problems.

The strikes since the return to democracy in 1992 have not been nearly as violent as those of the 1960s. However, it is important to note that the violence still has existed. Property damage through arson and/or riots/looting has occurred in all three elections since 1992. The level of personal violence, although there have only been two deaths, seems to be escalating since 1992. In terms of destruction and personal violence, the PR related strikes of 1964 were by far the worst, followed by the FPTP strikes of 1962 and 1963, then the mixed PR strikes of the 1990s and 2001.

According to the MAR data in Table III, in Guyana from 1990 to 2000, there was little violent intercommunal conflict. The MAR data measures acts of harassment, political agitation, sporadic violent attacks, anti-group demonstrations, communal rioting, and communal warfare. Only acts of harassment were noted for the ten-year period—in 1992, and in 1997-2000. These periods coincide with the elections, with the 1997 election creating a longer period of discontent. Full data on all three measures of violence listed in Table III are not available before 1985. However, MAR also shows that, for all the years with data since 1970, there has been intercommunal conflict. Therefore, even if the conflict did not turn violent, it still existed (MAR 2003).

Table III: MAR data in Guyana: 1985-2000
Source: MAR 2003
Data for Guyana is incomplete before 1985, and MAR does not extend past 2000

Year	Intercommunal Conflict	Protest Activity	Government Repression
1985	N/A	Verbal opposition	N/A
1986	N/A	Verbal opposition	N/A
1987	N/A	Verbal opposition	N/A
1988	N/A	Verbal opposition	N/A
1989	N/A	Verbal opposition	N/A
1990	None evident	Verbal opposition	N/A
1991	None evident	Verbal opposition	N/A
1992	Acts of harassment	Scattered acts symbolic resistance	N/A
1993	None evident	Scattered acts symbolic resistance	N/A
1994	None evident	Verbal opposition	N/A
1995	None evident	Verbal opposition	N/A
1996	None evident	Verbal opposition	Property confiscation or destruction/force against protestors
1997	Acts of harassment	Small demonstrations	Arrested a few members of groups/Saturation of police or military/force against protestors
1998	Acts of harassment	Small demonstrations	Arrested a few members of groups/Saturation of police or military/force against protestors
1999	Acts of harassment	Verbal opposition	Arrested a few members of groups/Saturation of police or military/force against protestors
2000	Acts of harassment	Verbal opposition	None evident

The MAR also measures protest activity since 1985. Protest categories are verbal opposition, symbolic resistance, small demonstrations, medium demonstrations, and large demonstrations. Each year has had some protest activity. In 1997-1998, coincident with the elections, protest activities were at the level of small demonstrations, defined as "demonstrations, riotes, strikes, and/or riots, total participation of less than 10,000" (MAR 2003, 89). In 1992-1993, coincident with the elections, protest activity was at the level of scattered acts of symbolic resistance, defined as "sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage,

symbolic destruction of property or political organizing activity on a substantial scale"(MAR 2003, 88-89). In all the other years, protest activity was at the level of verbal opposition (MAR 2003).

Additionally, the MAR lists various government repression from 1996 onwards. Guyana only scores on a few measures in these years. In 1997-1999, the government arrested a few members of group members who were engaged in collective action. In 1996, the government engaged in property confiscation or destruction of "group members in both kinds of circumstances engaged and not engaged in collective action, or in ambiguous situations, for example when it is not clear from source materials whether repressive action was provoked or not" (MAR 2003, 94). This was the only year that the Guyanese government scored on this account. From 1997 to 1999, the government engaged in saturation of police or military against groups engaged in collective action. From 1996 to 1999, the government used some force against protestors.

Unfortunately, the information in MAR for Guyana does not go back to the 1960s. However, given the level of violence reported in the 1960s, it seems clear that the level of physical violence since 1985 does not compare (MAR 2003). Therefore, it seems that in general the level of physical violence in Guyana has decreased recently. This may be due to changes in the electoral system. There is not enough evidence to make a causal link between the electoral system and violence, although correlation is clear. There is now a more equitable distribution of seats as compared to votes. However, the seat distribution only shows representation, not political power and ability to change anything. Both political parties think that the political situation in Guyana is a zero-sum game. Violence was associated with the electoral system because it would determine who would be in power. The violence was not directly related to the type of electoral system, but who would be in power as a result. Given the legitimacy of the government and the internationally accepted elections, the PPP does not have to resort to violence to maintain control of the state. The PNC is now more likely to turn to the court system for resolution, rather than violence, because acting out against an internationally accepted regime is a dangerous prospect both politically and physically. Although the reality of intercommunal violence continues, it is at a lower level of violence

than during the 1960s and during the authoritarian period because of the electoral system and the legitimacy it bestows on the government.

There is speculation that a full-blown ethnic conflict is always possible in Guyana. The distrust and underlying fears of the people may give way at any time to a bitter war. The PPP uses the violence that occurred during Burnham's rule as a campaign issue. They constantly evoke the terror of their constituencies as a way to ensure their continued success. Given the fears of both sides (of violence and/or retribution), it is unlikely that any multi-ethnic government would succeed in the very near future (Calder 2005).

It is clear that the ethnic groups still do not trust one another, and this distrust is likely to continue indefinitely. With the pressure of national and international groups, the democracy can survive. However, there has been an increase in crime and weapons in the country and the 2006 elections are therefore a watershed event. Election preparations and the elections themselves must be acceptable to all parties and be violence free. The potential for violence is currently very high, and steps are being taken by GECOM and other government officials to help diminish the possibility.

Jagdeo has yet to implement the reforms he agreed to in 2001. This lack of reform, coupled with the PPP dominating Parliament and ensuring that only their laws are passed, are only a few examples of the continuing political problems in Guyana. In Parliament, the PNC and other opposition parties are impotent, and unable to do anything without the PPP's approval. Since the PPP has total domination in the Parliament, they do not consult with the opposition. They do not need any bipartisan approval to act, and they do not seek it. Even with free and fair elections, it is obvious that the inability of the government to change hands is fundamentally impacting ethnic conflict in Guyana.

While problems continue in Parliament and with the electoral system, it is important to note other issues in Guyana that may be affecting the violence. First is that there have been no major attempts at conflict resolution in Guyana. Regardless of the type of elections and electoral system, it is obvious that the democracy is not going to be accepted and respected by all without conflict resolution and democratic consolidation, although Carroll (2005) believes that the electoral system will have to be changed in order

to accomplish these. Carroll (2005) and Mapendere (2005) both believe that ensuring free and fair elections has not and will not improve the situation in Guyana without changes to the electoral system, and that broad and deep conflict resolution must occur before the country can move forward.

Another extenuating circumstance involves the economic position of the ethnic groups in Guyana. Pottie (2005) believes that the Indo-Guyanese have a, at least perceived, superior economic position. In addition, many Guyanese expatriates are heavily involved in Guyanese politics. Pottie (2005) believes that they are helping to fuel the conflict, by action and by moving funds into and out of the country.

A final concern is with the Guyanese political culture. Pottie (2005) noted a tabloid flare to politics. Both the television and print media support this tabloid flare, and he felt that these forms of media were just extensions of personal and political agendas. Indeed, the media are not all independent. There is only one major independent newspaper in Guyana. The others tend to support either the PPP or the PNC.

Other divided societies

This section will explore five other cases in order to test the above hypotheses. Table IV shows the five states, as well as their ethnic makeup, their electoral system, and extenuating circumstances that may affect the state. This section will also include available MAR data for the states and a description of their situations.

Table IV: Ethnic makeup, electoral system, and extenuating circumstances in divided societies

Country	Ethnic Makeup (CIA)	Electoral System	Extenuating Circumstances
Guyana	Indians 50% Africans 36% Mixed 7% Other 7%	PR (mixed level)	
Mauritius	Hindu 48% Creole 27% Muslim 16% Sino-Mauritian 3% Franco-Mauritian 2%	FPTP & PR (Multi-member with best loser seats)	Democratic culture
Trinidad and Tobago	Indian 40% Creole 37.5% Mixed 20.5% Other 2%	FPTP	Democratic culture; oil and gas economy
Fiji	Indigenous Fijian 51% Indian 44% Other 5%	AV	Only state mentioned with indigenous population with any power
Sri Lanka	Sinhalese 73.8% Sri Lankan Moors 7.2% Indian Tamil 4.6% Sri Lankan Tamil 3.9% Other 0.5% Unspecified 10%	PR	Continuing and violent internal struggle between the Tamils and the Sinhalese who are geographically distributed
Lebanon	Arab 95% Armenian 4% Other 1% Muslim 59.7% (Shi'a, Sunni, Druze, others) Christian 39% Other 1.3%	PR	Religion, not ethnicity, is the deciding factor, civil war ended in 1991, heavily influenced by neighboring countries, especially Syria

In 1997, Fiji changed from a FPTP system to a majoritarian alternative vote (AV) system in order to grant more power to the Indo-Fijians, who had historically been disproportionately underrepresented in office. Initially this system drew together the communal groups as expected with the AV system (a majoritarian electoral system), but the fact that the prime minister elected in 1999 was Indo-Fijian caused discontent among the indigenous Fijians. A year later, there was a coup, which resulted in an increased level of communal conflict (Reilly 2001). As Table VI shows, while intercommunal conflict existed in all years, the level of violence intensified after the electoral change in 1997. The level of protest activity

remained constant. There was no government repression noted under the FPTP system in 1996 (the earliest year data is available). After the change in 1997, there was quite a lot of government repression reported, primarily under the indigenous Fijian government and after the coup (MAR 2003).

Table V: Divided societies with changed electoral systems: Guyana
Source: MAR 2003

Type of System	Mixed PR 1992-
Intercommunal Violence	Acts of harassment
Intercommunal conflict	Exists all years
Protest activity	Resistance Small demonstrations
Government Repression	Arrests Property confiscation/destruction Police/military at marches Force against protestors

Table VI: Divided societies with changed electoral systems: Fiji
Source: MAR 2003

Type of System	FPTP 1970-1996	Single Member Alternative Vote 1997-
Intercommunal Violence	1990-1994, 1995: political agitation 1996: acts of harassment	1999: anti-group demonstrations 2000: communal rioting
Intercommunal conflict	Exists all years	Exists all years
Protest activity	Verbal opposition 1987 Symbolic resistance 1988-9 Small demonstrations 1990-91 Symbolic resistance 1992-95 Small demonstrations 1996	Small demonstrations 1997-2000
Government Repression	None reported	Many group members arrested during collective action 2000 Leaders arrested, disappeared or detained during collective action 2000 State of emergency against groups in collective action 1998 State of emergency against group members not involved in collective action 2000 Saturation of police/military against group members engaged in collective action 1998, not engaged in collective action 2000 Use of force against protestors engaged in collective action 1998 Military campaign against group members in collective action 2000

Although Sri Lanka changed from a FPTP system to a mixed system, there is little to indicate that the switch influenced the ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict began in the 1950s when the Sinhalese passed a law making Sinhala the official language of the island. This immediately provoked the anger of the Tamil speaking population. Like the Afro-Guyanese, in Sri Lanka the Tamils are outnumbered greatly and could not, on their own, gain a majority of seats; they have been fighting against the Sinhalese for years. In the 2000 election, the electoral related violence was not between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, but between two (biologically) related Sinhalese politicians. More than one political party represents each ethnic group, and if either of the Sinhalese parties did not receive an absolute majority, the other

Sinhalese party would join in a coalition in order to prevent the Tamils from gaining substantial power

(Horowitz 2001). Table VII shows there has been intercommunal conflict in all years. Since the MAR

data began recording events in Sri Lanka, there has been substantial intercommunal violence and

government repression.

Table VII: Divided societies with changed electoral systems: Sri Lanka
Source: MAR 2003

Type of System	Mixed PR
Intercommunal Violence	1990, 1997, 1999-2000: communal rioting 1994, 1996: anti-group demonstrations 1991-1995: acts of harassment
Intercommunal conflict	Exists all years reported
Protest activity	Symbolic resistance 1985-1989, 1991, 1994-5 Small demonstrations 1996-1997 Large demonstrations 1990, 1992-1993, 1998, 2000
Government Repression	Government repression Limited use of force against protestors engaged in collective action 1998, 2000 Military campaigns against armed rebels engaged in collective action 1996-2000 Military targets and destroys rebel areas 1996-2000 Military massacre of group members not engaged in collective action 2000

In Lebanon, multi-ethnic, multi-member constituencies elected representativess from an inter-

ethnic list. The top roles (President, Prime Minister, Speaker of the House, and Vice-Speaker of the

House) were constitutionally mandated to specific ethnic groups. The candidates could not mobilize

ethnic votes to elect them into another position. Thus, cross-ethnic ties were common, as someone

running for President would team with someone running for Prime Minister in order to increase the

number of votes s/he received. There was intra-ethnic conflict to get the position, which stymied the

creation of political parties, as individual candidates were the focus of the elections. For 30 years, from

1943 until the beginning of the civil war in 1975/6, Lebanon had an unparalleled level of ethnic

cooperation. It has been seen as the emblem of consociationalism and power-sharing. According to

Horowitz (1985), the civil war generally had nothing to do with the electoral system, except in two

regards. First, since there were no political parties and politics rallied around individuals, the practice of having private militias grew. Second, since the posts were so rigid, there was no recourse for change except through violence. The civil war ended in 1991 and the current system, technically in place in since the Ta'if Accord in 1989, but in practice in effect since 1992, gives a more equitable, but still sectarian division in the government. This power-sharing government seems to be able to keep the ethnic conflict in check, and mitigate against the potential of conflict. The influence of Syria is also a problem in Lebanon, although at least their military presence, along with that of Israel, has been removed. Table VIII shows that there has been communal violence in all years reported with varying levels of intercommunal violence and government repression. Since the change in the electoral system, Lebanon has had its share of conflict in the country. Given the military presence of two external armies, it is difficult to relate these problems to the electoral system. However, now that the other militaries are gone, Lebanon can be examined to see the role of the electoral system on the level of conflict. One extenuating factor is the continued influence of Syria on Lebanon, and the political violence manifest in this. One other note is that the groups in Lebanon are not divided along ethnic lines, but along confessional lines. While Table IV reflects the ethnic and religious lines, the more important distinctions (Shi'a, Sunni, Maronite, etc.) are not known. Lebanon has not had an official census since the first part of the 20th century. Experts agree, however, that no groups has a majority in the state.

Table VIII: Divided societies with changed electoral systems: Lebanon
Source: MAR 2003

Type of System	PR
Intercommunal Violence	1990-1998: communal rioting 1999: sporadic violent attacks 2000: none manifest
Intercommunal conflict	Exists all years reported
Protest activity	Verbal opposition 1985-1992 Medium demonstrations 1993 Small demonstrations 1994-2000
Government Repression	Saturation of police/military against group members engaged or not in collective action 1996-1998 Limited force used against group members engaged in collective action 1996-1998 Domestic spying used 1998 State of emergency 1998 Unrestrained force used against group members engaged in collective action 1998 Leaders arrested, disappeared or detained during collective action 1999 Torture used against members who were engaged in collective action 1999 Military campaigns used against members who were engaged in collective action 1999

In Mauritius, the British attempted to change the system to a PR system before independence. However, the political elites held out and the current system is a mixture of FPTP and PR. There are 70 members in the parliament; 62 of whom are elected in constituencies and eight of them are nominated as the 'best losers'. The island of Mauritius is made up of 20 constituencies; each voter gets to vote for three people. The top three vote getters in each constituency win seats in the parliament. The nearby island of Rodrigues gets two representatives and voters there get two votes. The 'best loser' system is intended to make up for demographic discrepancies in parliament. The Electoral Supervisory Commission, in order to ensure proportional representation of all the ethnic groups, selects eight losing candidates for parliament. Regardless of the outcome of the election, Chinese and Muslim representatives are guaranteed a seat in the parliament. The idea is to ensure that each of the four ethnic communities is proportionally represented in parliament, to ensure both representation and harmony.

In the 1960s before independence, the island had a referendum, and 44% of the people voted that they did not want independence. The Hindu population of Mauritius was more than half of the population, and the other ethnic groups (Creoles, Muslims, Sino-Mauritians, and Franco-Mauritians)

feared ethnic domination. In fact, the Muslims wanted different ethnic voting lists for each group. The current mixed system was a compromise to the Muslim groups. Although the political parties were mainly ethnically based, the first Prime Minister invited all the opposition to join the government as a sign of national unity (Miles 1999).

Because of the extreme difficulty of winning an election alone, since the Hindu population is split into two parties, and so no party has the support of more than half of the population, since 1968, all of the governments have been coalitions, and the four main parties have all allied with each other in elections. Because of a personality clash between leaders, two major Hindu parties arose to vie for government, choosing coalition partners from two other major parties (one essentially representing the Creoles and other a multi-ethnic party) and a menagerie of smaller parties, although the two Hindu parties can and have joined in a coalition in the past. Mauritians are very proud of their democratic culture and would defy any attempts to corrupt it. There was occasional violence in the 1960s and in the late 1990s, but for the most part, the island is a rare ethnically heterogeneous democracy. There have been five successful, and peaceful, transfers of power because of elections (Miles 1999, Srebrnik 2002).

As Table IV shows, Mauritius actually has an Indian descended population that is a majority of the population, like Guyana. The Mauritian Muslims make up 16%. In Guyana, the Indo-Guyanese are not fractured along religious lines. In Mauritius, the British were much less involved and when they attempted to change the system to PR, the political elites refused, and instead created the current electoral system.

Additionally, there are differences in the political parties in the two states. While both states have ethnically based political parties, the *apanjaat* system in Guyana has made the two major parties much more stringent in their ethnic makeup, regardless of the nominal numbers of the other ethnic group. There have been only a few new parties emerge in Guyana since independence, and none have been able to significantly effect the power balance. Additionally, Guyana had a 28-year authoritarian period, and does not share the democratic culture found in Mauritius.

The number and purpose of the political parties is also starkly different. First and foremost is that in Mauritius there are two political parties representing the Hindus community. While the Hindus make up more than half of the population, their ethnic vote is split. Except for the 1983 coalition, these two Hindu parties generally do not work together, but are always in different coalitions. With a Hindu party as their base, the government must also include one of the other major parties, either the multi-ethnic party or the Creole majority party.

Besides the precedent set by S. Ramgoolam, the nation's first Prime Minister, of coalition building, the necessity of coalition building, and thus, power sharing, is also built into the electoral system. Of the 70 seats, eight (more than 10%) are reserved and dispersed to the 'best losers' by the election commission. This fact nearly destroys the possibility of winning a majority alone. Additionally, the island of Rodrigues generally does not vote for members of the four larger parties, but instead have two unique parties. Historically, two of the elected seats and two of the 'best loser' seats come from Rodrigues, even further diminishing the chances of any party winning alone. Because the government changes often, the opposition is an integral part of the parliament, and does not walk out of parliamentary proceedings. Doing so would diminish the people's faith in the party and decrease their chance of winning the next election.

There have only been three major outbursts of serious ethnic violence in Mauritius since the 1960s. The first two outbursts in the pre-independence era (1964-65 and 1968) were related to fears of Hindu domination. More than thirty years passed before the 1999 riots, related to the suspicious death of a Creole singer while in police custody. Elections in Mauritius do not get violent, there is no problem with the election rules, or how elections work. Everyone agrees on the "rules of the game" and the people would not accept any attempts to interfere with or infringe upon their rights to democracy.

Trinidad and Tobago have the same ethnicities as Guyana, but as Table IV indicates, there is a smaller gap in size between the two major groups. Since the two major groups are similar in size, and parties are ethnically based, there is a potential for government to change hands. Like Guyana, the Creoles (those of African descent) tend to dominate urban areas, while the rural areas are more Indian.

In the 1956 elections in Trinidad, the People's National Movement (PNM), which had support from the urban Creoles, won 13 of 24 seats with 38.7% of the total vote in a FPTP system. A Hindu dominated party, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), emerged from the opposition to win the 1958 elections for the Federation Parliament, six seats to the PNM's four seats. Because of the FPTP system, even though the parties got about half of the total votes each, since the Hindus were more spread out in the rural areas, the DLP won more constituencies, while the PNM received three of their four in and around the capital. The next year, the results were similar in the vote for country council, with the DLP receiving one more seat than the PNM. The DLP was facing problems since the population was so similarly split. In order to ensure victory, they realized they had to make overtures and give government positions to the Creoles in their party (1/3 of their votes came from the rural Creoles). However, the DLP feared the Indians would stop supporting them if they did this, and the Creoles of the party left (Horowitz 1985).

A new political party did not emerge for the rural Creoles, and they felt obligated to vote for the PNM, essentially solidifying two ethnic parties. The DLP began losing votes to the PNM. In the 1960s, 90% or more of the people were voting on an ethnic basis. In 1971, the DLP boycotted elections, since their loss was expected. A new Indian party captured 27% of the 1976 vote. However, despite changes in party name, there remained an Indian and a Creole party. As in Guyana, there are token members of the other ethnic group in each party, but their influence is small and they run only in the regions where the dominant ethnic group of the party is the minority (Horowitz 1985).

In 1986, the PNM lost power. There had been many complaints of discrimination during their rule. As evidence, the Indo-Trinidadians pointed to the lack of representation in the cabinets and the overwhelming number of Creoles in the civil service. In 1986, a steep recession caused a number of angry Indians and Creoles to create a party to oppose the PNM. Surprisingly, they won. This multi-ethnic National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) lasted only a year, the victim of inter-ethnic bickering. In 1991, the PNM was able to able to retake the government, with the Indian based United National Congress (UNC) in opposition. In 1995, the PNM lost power to an Indian alliance of the UNC and the

NAR. The UNC was able to regain office in the 2000 elections, but lost it again in 2002 to the PNM (Premdas 2001).

There have been consistent free and fair elections in Trinidad since 1946, although the island did not gain its independence until 1962. There is thus a culture of democracy, and even when the Indians did not think they could win, they still voted, except in 1971. Generally, there have not been human rights abuses against the people, and election turnover has been peaceful. Trinidad also benefits from oil and gas based economy, which gives it one of the highest rates of average national income in the less developed world. Trinidad has a bicameral legislature. The Senate is appointed by various actors in the country (ruling party, president, and opposition party) while the House of Representatives is elected via FPTP (Premdas 2001).

Although they have inherited the same ethnic groups as Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago have not had the high level of violence seen in Guyana. While under Creole rule from the 1960s to 1985, there was not widespread violence against the Indians. There was ethnic discrimination, but currently, Trinidad does not suffer from the same type of distrust and fear that Guyana does. Trinidad's two major ethnic parties are so similar in size that no party dominates. This is clearly their starkest difference in comparison to Guyana.

Conclusions

H$_1$ predicted that in a divided society with ethnically based political parties, the type of government system and electoral system would affect the potential for conflict. Chart I repeats the expected outcomes. Chart II summarizes the countries examined here. Those which fit the hypothesis are marked with a *. Guyana and Sri Lanka both have parliamentary-PR systems, and both act as expected by the hypothesis. In Guyana, which has parliamentary mixed PR system, that is, two levels of proportional representation, on a national party list level, and on a regional geographic level, conflict exists as predicted. In Sri Lanka conflict also exists as predicted.

Fiji, Mauritius, and Trinidad and Tobago have parliamentary plurality/majoritarian systems. In Fiji, with a parliamentary majoritarian system, conflict exists as predicted. In Mauritius, which has a mixed parliamentary plurality/PR system, that is, multi-member districts with FPTP, and the best loser proportional representation system (since this is predominantly FPTP, I categorize it as such), conflict surprisingly does not occur with any frequency. In Trinidad and Tobago, which has a parliamentary plurality system, conflict surprisingly does not occur with any frequency.

In Lebanon, with a presidential PR system, conflict occurred, but not generally because of the electoral system. There were no cases of presidential plurality/majoritarian cases considered.

Four of the six cases acted in the expected direction predicted by the hypothesis. Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago did not. These are the only two states with uninterrupted elections since independence. They also have the best functioning economic systems of the cases. Economic stability and democratic culture may be extenuating circumstances here that alter the outcome of this hypothesis. Additionally, the ethnic groups in Trinidad and Tobago are of similar size, while the Hindu group in Mauritius, while a majority, is not a unified group. The additional hypotheses may help explain these two cases.

Chart I: Expected Outcomes of Electoral Systems in Ethnically Divided Societies

Type of executive/ How legislature is elected	Presidential	Parliamentary
PR	Conflict not likely	Conflict likely
Plurality/Majoritarian	Conflict somewhat likely	Conflict most likely

Chart II: Outcomes of Electoral Systems in Ethnically Divided Societies

Type of executive/ How legislature is elected	Presidential	Parliamentary
PR	Lebanon*	Guyana* Sri Lanka*
Plurality/Majoritarian	Conflict somewhat likely	Mauritius Trinidad and Tobago Fiji*

H$_2$ predicted that in a divided society with ethnically based political parties where one ethnicity is more than 50% of the population, a proportional representation system would not prevent ethnic conflict and insecurity. As shown in Chart III, the cases of the parliamentary Guyana, Sri Lanka, and Fiji support this hypothesis. Trinidad and Tobago and Lebanon do not have one dominant ethnicity. The relative size of the ethnic groups in Trinidad and Tobago best explains their avoidance of conflict. One ethnically based political party does not have a majority, and there is a mixed-race party to help balance the Creole and Indian parties. The government can and does alternate. Unlike Guyana, each political party has a chance of attaining government in elections. Hindus in Mauritius make up about half of the population, but conflict does not frequently occur there, since the Hindu vote splits between parties.

Chart III: Outcomes of Electoral Systems in Ethnically Divided Societies with majority ethnic groups

Type of executive/ How legislature is elected	Presidential	Parliamentary
PR	Conflict not likely	Guyana* Sri Lanka*
Plurality/Majoritarian	Conflict somewhat likely	Mauritius Fiji*

H$_3$ predicted that power-sharing would help prevent ethnic conflict and improve security. A power sharing government will allow representation of minorities in the government. Minority representation assures that the government hears the voices of the people, and that issues will be brought to attention before conflict erupts. Mauritius and Lebanon are the best cases of power-sharing in the set. The 'best loser' system in Mauritius helps prevent ethnic conflict there. All of the ethnic groups are represented in the parliament, and all of the voices are heard. In Lebanon, the consociational system rigidly prescribes the positions of ethnic groups in government; there are perpetual winners and perpetual losers, although this was not the main cause of conflict in the country. While this encourages inter-group cooperation, it discourages intra-group cooperation. While the conflict generally was not the result of the

electoral system, the rigid prescription of positions may have fomented the potential for conflict. Mauritius has been able to overcome its predicted violence, but Lebanon has not. Besides the obvious effects of external actors, in Mauritius, the ethnic groups naturally formed coalitions, and there were no rigid positions prescribed constitutionally. Only the 'best loser' seats are directly related to ethnicity, there are no other serious ethnic constraints on the system.

The potential for alternation in power in Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago have similar effects as formal power-sharing. The potential for alternation reduces the stakes of winning control of the government, which reduces ethnic tension.

Evidence from Guyana's experience 1964 shows that demonstrations related to changing the electoral system to the PR system were the most violent. More people died, more destruction was caused, and more government repression occurred because of the shift to the PR system than the FPTP system (used 1957-1961). From 1964 through 1966, Guyana was in a state of emergency. There was heightened security and more civic restrictions during this time than previously.

The violence associated with FPTP and PR systems in Guyana were not necessarily about the type of electoral system, and since the PPP and the PNC were both of the same ideological type, this does not seem to have been the reason for violence (although the United States and the United Kingdom perceived a difference when they favored the PNC over the PPP). Instead, they were in response to the fact that one party was out of power. The 1962 and 1963 PNC/UF strikes were an attempt to destabilize the PPP government and prove Jagan an ineffective leader, unfit to bring Guyana into independence. The 1964 PPP strike was a response to the change of electoral system that would bring the PNC/UF into office. Thus, the strikes were less about the actual system and more about the loss of power that would occur because of the proposed changes in the electoral system in a perceived zero-sum game.

However, the immediate effect of the change to a PR system in Guyana was that the *apanjaat* system immediately spread throughout the country. The violence associated with elections was no longer restricted to mixed race areas where the election could go either way, but spread to areas where one race

was clearly in high proportion. The effect of changing to a PR system was that the potential for electoral violence was more geographically widespread.

Currently, because of the system, the PPP is essentially destined to win each election, since they are the slim majority ethnic group. The PNC is not willing to become the loyal opposition, and will likely continue to not support the government. The conflict in Guyana is deeply rooted and will be difficult to overcome.

Even with a PR system, since the Indo-Guyanese make up more than half of the population, they are unlikely to be unseated. However, there are several small parties in Guyana. If these were to team with the PNC, the election results would be much closer, and if the small parties were able to garnish enough Indo-Guyanese voters, a PNC coalition might be formed. However, this would just continue the domination of one ethnic group over the other. I would recommend that any important small party not align themselves with either group. By remaining independent, a small party could force debate and dialogue in both the Parliament, and in the wider country.

The 2006 elections should prove to be an important watershed event in Guyana's history, and deserve future research. Another future source of research will be a more thorough review of the ranked versus unranked relationships in Guyana, and the usefulness of the ethnic mobilization literature in describing this case.

When considering ethnic violence, the type of electoral system is not the only factor to consider. The distribution of power in a state is the larger framework within which to work. States must avoid the zero-sum game, and all parties must have reason to play by the rules of the game. States must implement designs that help minimize the zero-sum game. States can accomplish this through official power-sharing arrangements, the potential for government turnover, or other options like the party incentive structure. Party incentive structures, and how they can change the dynamics in a state, are one important avenue for future research.

Policy Recommendations

My first recommendation for Guyana is to open the party lists. A shift to an open PR system will provide the populace with a better understanding of whom their candidates are and increase satisfaction with the system. In order to increase accountability, regional constituencies should assign MPs to specific areas. To create actual accountability, regional MPs should be elected on a basis similar to Nigerian presidential elections. MPs should receive a percentage of the full regional vote, as well as a threshold of votes in a subset of the region. On the national list, voters should be able to choose which candidate they support.

A second recommendation is that the government should increase involvement with the PNC. This can be accomplished by having members of the opposition in key committees and in cabinet positions. Initially, this could be expected only in military/civil service types of representation, since the Afro-Guyanese dominate these industries. However, eventually this could be expected to evolve into greater representation in other fields.

A third recommendation is to allow a limited opposition veto (Lijphart 1977). This could not be widespread in all fields, since the opposition is likely to use it to stymie the government. However, in police/military fields, in civil service areas, electoral reform, and in urban renewal, it might be appropriate for the opposition to have a veto on policy. In these areas, the Afro-Guyanese tend to be better represented. If the opposition were given a veto on policy, they would be expected to wield it only to address poor legislation in these areas. One simple way to implement would be to require 2/3 votes to pass legislation in these areas. Many countries already have this in place for certain functioned areas, such as the United States and constitutional reform.

A fourth recommendation is to decrease the power of the president (who is the head of the government in their parliamentary system). To reiterate, the president is the head of the largest party in the legislation and s/he appoints the Prime Minister. Although the president is the chief of state, and the Prime Minister is technically the head of government, in effect, the president is the head of both. Given the current structure of the political system, the president wields ultimate authority. With the PPP in

power in the legislature and in the presidency, they have little reason to converse with opposition parties. A decrease in presidential power would increase the power of parliament. This is expected to produce more debate and dialogue between the parties. If the legislature felt more empowered and distant from the president, they may be able to broach less ethnically charged legislation and work together with the opposition. Obviously, this could not take place without the implementation of the first recommendation. Otherwise, legislators would feel completely beholden to their party, and could be punished with a low ranking on the next party list. One way to implement this would be through a shift to a presidential system, and to have the president elected directly by the people; this would add another voting item on each voter's ballot. While this might produce the same results, as the Indo-Guyanese have a majority in the country, as stated elsewhere their slim majority is feasibly surmountable. Given the fact that there is general discontent among many people, especially given the current crime wave, allowing the people a direct say in the President might have interesting and unpredictable results.

A final recommendation is to increase the level of civic education. By teaching children to think of themselves as Guyanese first, and their ethnic groups secondly, the country may be able to increase the likelihood of continued peace into the future.

Guyana has not had severe ethnic conflict for many years. Some see the country as constantly on the brink of conflict. However, there is also a shared history and experience. The people see themselves as Guyanese—maybe not as Guyanese first, but they do have a sense of patriotism. This can be used advantageously to decrease the chances of ethnic conflict. Full blown ethnic conflict is not preordained, it can be avoided if there is a concerted effort to mitigate it, as long as changes to the political system support this goal.

One way to help remedy this problem is to create a system where the people are able to know which representative represents them. One version of this would mean a single member district, and the FPTP system would need to be used. However, in keeping with the PR system, another way to resolve this issue is to assign representatives to constituencies after their election. There would be no way to hold

these representatives accountable to the constituency they are assigned to, as they could rely on the votes of another region at the next election, but this may help create a culture of accountability.

In a closed list PR system, the order of the candidates elected is chosen by the party with no opinion of the voters taken into account. In the open list system, voters can indicate their preferred party as well as their preferred candidates of the party. A third type of system is a free system in which people vote for candidates and the seats are apportioned to parties based on the votes of the individual candidates. Guyana currently has a closed list PR system. In fact, the voters do not receive the list of candidates ahead of time, they just vote for the party they prefer on Election Day.

One easy way to increase voter satisfaction would be to reveal the list ahead of time. That way the voters know for whom they are voting. An even better option would be to convert the system to an open list or free list system. This would require that the candidates campaigned throughout the country to garner votes, and although the candidates would be loyal to the party, they would be able to put a face on the party and speak for themselves, thereby increasing accountability. If the system would be unattractive for the nationwide PR vote, it would at least be advisable for the regional constituency votes. A free list system would logistically be more difficult to implement, since it entails a radical departure from the norm and the way that the votes are counted and dispersed is quite tricky. These changes would improve accountability and the representation of the people.

Whether or not the PPP is removed from office in the 2006 election, they have to make some changes to the system. The current system gives the opposition parties no power. The PPP is able to control all the branches of government and unilaterally pass any laws they desire. In order to improve the chances for no violence in the future, the government should follow the recommendations set out above.

List of Works Cited

Acton, Lord. 1962. *Essays on Freedom and Power*. New York: Meridian Books.

Byman, Daniel. 2002. *Keeping the peace : lasting solutions to ethnic conflicts*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Calder, Jason. 2005. Interview with Author. Atlanta. March 11, 2005

Carroll, David J. and Robert A. Pastor. 1993. "Moderating Ethnic Tensions by Electoral Mediation: The Case of Guyana." Security Dialogue 24 (2): 163-173.

Carter Center, The. 1993. "The Council of the Freely Elected Heads of Government: Observing Guyana's Electoral Process", 1990-1992. Atlanta, GA

Carter Center, The. 2001. "Observing the 2001 Guyana Elections". Atlanta, GA

Chase, A. 1964. *A History of Trade Unionism in Guyana, 1900-1961*. Georgetown: New Guyana Co.

CIA. 2005. *The World Factbook 2005*.

Commonwealth Secretariat. 1998. "The General and Regional Elections in Guyana: 15 December 1997: A Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group." London.

Dahl, Robert Alan. 1971. *Polyarchy; participation and opposition*. New Haven,: Yale University Press.

Diamond, Larry Jay, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1995. *Politics in developing countries : comparing experiences with democracy*. 2nd ed. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers.

Griffith, Ivelaw. 1997. " Political change, democracy, and human rights in Guyana." *Third World Quarterly 18 (2):* 267-185.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 2000. Nonviolence in Ethnopolitics: Strategies for the Attainment of Group Rights and Autonomy. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 33 (2):155-160.

Hechter, Michael, D. Friedman, and M. Appelbaum. 1982. A Theory of Ethnic Collective Action. *International Migration Review* 16:412-34.

Hechter, Michael, and Margaret Levi. 1979. The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2:2060-74.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1971. Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics. *World Politics* 23:232.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1990. Comparing Democratic Systems. In *Parliamentary Versus Presidential Systems*, edited by A. Lijphart. New York: Oxford University Press.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1992 *A democratic South Africa? constitutional engineering in a divided society*. University of California Press, 1992.

Horowitz, Donald L. 2001. *The deadly ethnic riot*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

IFES. 2002. "Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention". IFES White Paper, by Jeff Fischer.

Ishmael, Odeen. 2005. "The Guyana Story (From Earliest Times to Independence)" http://www.guyana.org/features/guyanastory/guyana_story.html First accessed September 26, 2005.

Lewis, W. A. 1965. *Politics in West Africa*. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Lijphart, Arend. 1969. Consociational Democracy. *World Politics* 21 (2):207-225.

Lijphart, Arend. 1990. Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Conflict Management in South Africa. In *Critical Choices for South Africa: An Agenda for the 1990s*, edited by R. A. Schreirer. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1992. *Parliamentary versus presidential government*, *Oxford readings in politics and government*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1996. The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation. *American Political Science Review* 90 (2):258-268.

Lijphart, Arend. 2002. Negotiation democracy versus consensus democracy: Parallel conclusions and recommendations. *European Journal of Political Research* 41:107-113.

Lijphart, Arend. 2004. Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (2):96-109.

MacIver, D. N. 1999. Introduction: States and Ethnic Pluralism. In *The politics of multinational states*, edited by D. N. MacIver. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Mason, T. David. 2003. Structures of Ethnic Conflict: Revolution Versus Secession in Rwanda and Sri Lanka. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15 (4): 83-113.

Miles, William F.S. 1999. "The Mauritius Enigma." *Journal of Democracy* 10.2, 91-104.

Mill, John Stuart. 1948. *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Goverment*. London: J.M. Dent and Sons.

Minorities at Risk (MAR). 2003. University of Maryland. Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM).

Mitchell, Paul. 1995. Party competition in an ethnic dual party system. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18 (4): 773-796.

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold Stone. 1989. The Spirit of the Laws. In *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*, edited by A. Lijphart. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pottie, David. 2005. Interview with Author. Atlanta. August 12, 2005

Premdas, Ralph. 1996. *Ethnic Conflict and Development: The Case of Guyana.* Research in Ethnic
        Relations Series. Brookfield, Avebury.

Premdas, Ralph. 2002. "Ethno-Racial Divisions and Governance: The Problem of Institutional Reform
        and Adaptation." Conference Paper, Racism and Public Policy, United Nations Research Institute
        for Social Development. Durban, South Africa.

Reilly, Ben. 1997. The Alternative Vote and Ethnic Accomodation: New Evidence from Papua New
        Guinea. *Electoral Studies* 16 (1):1-11.

Reilly, Ben. 2001. *Democracy in divided societies : electoral engineering for conflict management*,
        Theories of institutional design. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Reilly, Ben. 2002. Electoral Systems for Divided Societies. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2):156-169.

Sisk, Timothy D.   1996. *Power sharing and international mediation in ethnic conflicts.* United States
        Institute of Peace Press. Washington, DC.

Srebrnik, Henry. 2002. "'Full of Sound and Fury': Three Decades of Parliamentary Politics in
        Mauritius." *Journal of Southern African Studies*: 28 (2) 277-289.

Van den Berghe, Pierre L. 1981. *The ethnic phenomenon*. New York Westport, Ct.: Elsevier ;
        Greenwood Press.

Verney, Douglas V. 1979. Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government. In *Parliamentary
        Versus Presidential Systems*, edited by A. Lijphart. New York: Oxford University Press.