Regime Completeness and Conflict: A Closer Look at Anocratic Political Systems

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Mixed regimes are often viewed as inherently less stable and more war prone than fully democratic or autocratic systems due to their low levels of institutionalization. I ask, are certain mixed regimes more or less war prone than other mixed regimes, based on the strength and orientation (more democratic or autocratic) of their political institutions? At ends with previous research, my findings suggest that institutionalization levels play little, if any role in the onset of interstate war.

INDEX WORDS: Anocracy, COW, Institutionalization, Mixed regime, Regime completeness, Stability, War
REGIME COMPLETENESS AND CONFLICT: A CLOSER LOOK AT
ANOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS

by

MATTHEW J. SCHIPANI

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
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In the College of Arts of Sciences
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DEDICATION

In dedication to my loving family for their constant encouragement and support.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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1. INTRODUCTION

The dyadic democratic peace provides compelling evidence that
democratic states are more pacific in their interstate relations, at least towards
similar systems. That no two democracies have engaged in war with one another
has many, especially in the West, advocating for the proliferation of democratic
institutions and norms as a means of securing world peace (Doyle, 1983; Owen,
1997). While a world full of democracies is likely to be less conflictual, the short-
term impacts of such a transition would likely lead to sharp increases in interstate
conflict due to the bellicose nature of mixed regimes (Mansfield and Snyder,

When discussing conflict proneness, much of the debate focuses on the
democracy/autocracy dichotomy, while mixed regimes, or anocracies, are often
an afterthought. This is unfortunate, given their prevalence, and more conflictual
nature (relative to complete autocracies and democracies). Between 1817 and
1997, there have been a total of 9,863 country years. Of these 9,863
observations, there have been 4,134 monadic country years where states have
been considered mixed (42 percent). Over this same time period, there have
been 398 monadic country years where an external war has occurred. Of these
398 observations, mixed regimes were involved in 148 monadic country years of
war (37 percent) (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002, 2009; Sarkees, 2000).

Obviously, anocratic political systems are fairly widespread and war
prone. Unfortunately, we know very little about them since they are usually
discussed in relation to full democracies and/or full autocracies. To better understand the behavior of anocratic systems, I examine them in relation to each other. Are certain types of anocratic regimes more or less conflict prone than other types of anocratic regimes? Is the strength of political institutions an important factor? The rest of this paper will be spent attempting to answer these questions.

2. The Literature

That anocracies are more conflict prone than either complete democracies or complete autocracies is a pretty common, widely accepted supposition (Gurr, 1974; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2007; Rose and Shin, 2001; Hegre, 2001; Marshall and Gurr, 2003; Gates et. al., 2004). The source of this behavior is slightly more contested.

Anocratic political systems posses a mix of both democratic and autocratic attributes. Going off of Mansfield and Snyder’s criteria, in mixed regimes leaders are accountable to factions and/or groups outside of the ruling elite. Who can participate in the political process, and how they are able to participate is restricted. Typically, there are elections of some kind, but they fall to meet the high standards of competitiveness and fairness found in democratic systems (Mansfield and Snyder, 2007). In other words, institutions that regulate political processes in anocratic systems are relatively weak.
System instability is the most prevalent explanation of conflict proneness within mixed regimes, and is often attributed to weak institutions (Huntington, 1968; Rose and Shin, 2001). Without consolidated institutions to regulate political participation and elections, elites may employ nationalist sentiments to gain public support, which may than lead to conflict due to the bellicose nature of their rhetoric (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002, 2002, 2007). Another institutional explanation posits that democratic and autocratic states are more stable because of the presence of self-enforcing equilibria. In these systems, elites have an incentive to perpetuate the status quo (they are, after all, the ones holding a majority of the power), and the easiest way to do this is by maintaining their political institutions. This type of self-enforcing equilibria is not present in anocratic systems, which means there is no incentive for elites to maintain institutions, which in turn makes them less stable and more prone to conflict (Gates et. al., 2004).

The bellicose nature of anocratic systems has also been explained as a function of their lack of “persistence” and “adaptability,” where persistence refers to the amount of time a system has gone without an abrupt change in its authority patterns, and adaptability refers to “minor and gradual major changes in authority characteristics” (Gurr, 1974, pg. 1492). Democratic states are more persistent and adaptable because they are more responsive to public opinion, and autocratic systems are more persistent and adaptable because they effectively allocate resources and coercive forces against discontented citizens. Anocratic
systems lack both attributes because they are unable to perform either of these functions effectively, making them less stable and more conflict prone (Gurr, 1974)

The previous scholarship on anocratic regimes has been myopic at best. The weak institutions argument does not take the variation in anocratic systems into account because it treats anocracy as a dichotomous variable. While this relationship may be robust in the aggregate, it is likely that the effects of stability across anocratic regimes will differ depending on the orientation and strength of certain institutions. In other words, anocratic systems are not differentiated from other anocratic systems; either you’re a mixed regime, or you aren’t. Just as no two democratic or autocratic systems are exactly the same, no two anocratic systems are identical. To truly grasp the extent of this variation, anocratic systems must be disaggregated and then examined in relation to one another on the basis of institutional strength.

3. The Theory

I contend that while anocratic political systems may tend to be more war prone than democratic or authoritarian regimes, certain types of anocracies will be less war prone than others, depending on the strength of the system’s institutions. The primary purpose of any government is to maintain central authority, control policy (both domestic and foreign), and provide governance (Marshall and Gurr, 2003). While the majority of anocratic systems are unlikely to
perform any of these functions as effectively and/or efficiently as complete political systems, some will perform them better than others.

Much of the discussion dealing with the democracy/autocracy debate focuses on the substantive variation between the two. For example, the monadic democratic peace theory contends that democratic states are less likely to engage in any wars (Danilovic and Clare, 2007), suggesting that democracies tend to be more pacific in their relations with all states. While this variation is of obvious importance, democratic and autocratic states are in many ways functionally similar, since the variation between these systems often leads to the same end result: states with strong institutions, and subsequently, greater stability. In the current context, states that possess these characteristics (higher levels of institutionalization and stability) are considered complete regimes (e.g. democracies and autocracies are complete systems), while states that do not are considered to be less complete or incomplete. In other words, mixed regimes tend to be less complete or incomplete systems, since they generally possess lower levels of institutionalization and stability.

To focus solely on completeness as a function of strong institutions and stability would be shortsighted. The substantive variation between regime types does matter. Drawing on the previous example of the monadic democratic peace, if democratic states tend to be more pacific in all of their interstate relations, then we can expect that less complete anocratic states that fall more towards the democratic side of the political spectrum will be less war prone than anocratic
states that are more autocratic. In other words, the degree of regime completeness and the orientation (e.g. towards democracy or autocracy) of a mixed regime should impact the state’s propensity for war.

This argument assumes that mixed regimes are less complete or incomplete systems, relative to democratic and autocratic states. Unfortunately, this is not true of all anocratic systems. Some states have remained mixed for extended periods of time, and have consolidated their political institutions. In other words, some mixed regimes are complete, or at least near complete systems (this is discussed in more detail below). Here, I concede that not all anocratic states are necessarily less complete or incomplete, but for the purposes of my theory, I assume that they are.

Recent scholarship on anocratic systems can help illustrate this point. For instance, Levitsky and Way (2002) argue that in competitive authoritative regimes, autocratic governments and democratic political institutions can coexist indefinitely, as long as the ruling elite “avoid[s] egregious (and well-publicized) rights abuses and do not cancel or openly steal elections” ¹ (pg. 51-52). In other words, the inherent contradictions between autocratic governance and democratic institutions are mitigated, so long as the ruling elite avoids grandiose violations of democratic norms. By employing various “legal” forms of persecution

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¹. Competitive authoritarian states are those systems where the minimum criteria for democracy exist (e.g. open and free elections of the legislature and executive, a majority of adults can vote, political rights and civil liberties are protected, and elected officials posses the authority needed to govern), but are violated to the point where an unequal playing field between incumbents and the opposition is created.
(e.g. bribery and co-optation), incumbents are able to stymie the opposition while avoiding public dissent and international scrutiny (Levitsky and Way, 2002).

In her 2008 book, *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*, Gandhi makes a similar argument. In authoritarian states, dictators face two barriers to governance: the need to gain cooperation from at least some segments of society, and the need to subvert any potential opposition. To address both barriers, authoritarian leaders can use nominally democratic institutions, which allow leaders to effectively share power and make policy concessions. By providing a forum, these institutions act as an outlet for oppositions to effect change, even if that effect is minimal, and allow ruling elites to contain demands. In effect, Gandhi argues that incorporating democratic institutions into an authoritative system allows dictators to consolidate their power and increase stability by offering an outlet to discontented groups, even if that outlet is ineffective (Gandhi, 2008).

Both Levitsky and Way, and Gandhi make cogent arguments, but neither of them really challenges the association between mixed regimes and low levels of institutionalization. Levitsky and Way even concede that “the coexistence of democratic rules and autocratic methods aimed at keeping incumbents in power creates an inherent source of instability” ((Levitsky and Way, 2002; pg. 59). Also, both arguments deal with very specific types of mixed regimes, not anocratic systems in the aggregate, which have been shown by many to have weaker political institutions (Gurr, 1974; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2007; Gates et. al., 2004).
Levitsky and Way’s conception of competitive authoritative regimes, and Gandhi’s democratic dictatorships represent the exceptions to the rule. I contend that mixed regimes in general tend to possess lower levels of institutionalization. Looking at authority patterns in democratic and autocratic states will help to justify this relationship. Authority in democratic states is generally spread across several political institutions (e.g., the legislature, executive, and courts), which limits the potential gains of subversion (e.g., incumbents trying to maintain office after being voted out). Conversely, in autocratic states authority tends to be concentrated in the executive (ideally), which prevents the opposition from gaining “access to channels of political power” (Gates et. al., 2006; pg. 895). Both lead to higher degrees of stability in their respective systems. In anocratic states, authority is not diffuse enough to prevent the democratic process from being subverted, and not concentrated enough to restrict potential opposition (Gates et. al., 2006). In other words, political institutions in mixed regimes tend to be weak and ineffective.

The degree of institutionalization matters insofar as it influences system stability (Huntington, 1968; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002, 2002, 2007). Political institutions regulate and legitimize the political process. As a state democratizes, both social and economic changes occur, that “extend political consciousness, multiply political demands, and broaden political participation” (Huntington, 1968, pg. 5). This is problematic because in transitioning states traditional sources of political authority are weak, and new sources lack
legitimacy and are ineffective. This can be attributed to public demands for inclusion outpacing the development of the political organizations that were designed to regulate it. As the gap between public demands and effective regulation widens, political instability will occur (Huntington, 1968; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002, 2002, 2007).

The recent (and ongoing) global recession can help illustrate this point. The United States is, by all accounts, a complete democratic system. Political institutionalization and organization is high. Going off of Huntington’s criteria, American institutions are adaptable (older institutions that are functionally adaptable to change), complex, autonomous, and coherent (unified), and these types of institutionalized political organizations regulate economic and political processes with great efficacy (at least in relation to states with lesser degrees of institutionalization). In the context of the global recession, American institutions absorbed at least some of the shock, and insulated the American public, at least to an extent, through programs such as TARP. I am not arguing in favor or against such programs, but rather, am acknowledging that a significant, potentially destabilizing crisis occurred, and the reaction to this crisis (i.e., government programs) provided at least some mitigation. The question is, could a state with moderately institutionalized political organizations, such as those found in an anocratic system, provide this same level of mitigation, thereby maintaining stability? The ongoing political and economic turmoil in Thailand suggests that the answer to this question is most likely no.
Thailand has been in crisis since the 2006 ousting of then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Protests and riots have been a common occurrence over the last few years, with the rural poor supporting the deposed Shinawatra (the Reds), and practically everyone else in favor of his ousting (the Yellows). Violent demonstrations across the country led to the institution of emergency rule in May of 2010. Economically, Thailand has suffered its worst downturn in history, contracting by as much as 6 percent quarterly. The tourist industry, one of the state’s key revenue sources, declined significantly due to all the protesting (“BBC,” 2009; Head, 2009).

The ongoing political and civil unrest, along with the severity of the economic downturn, are largely a function of Thailand’s weak political institutions. In states with highly institutionalized political organizations, leaders generally are not deposed by military coups. In the case of Thailand, the ensuing political turmoil hindered government responses to the economic downturn, which increased the severity of the crisis. While the recession had deep and lasting effects on the United States, the strength of American institutions and the subsequent system stability made it easier for the government to effectively respond.

The next (and final) link in our causal chain bridges the gap between stability and war. Previous scholarship has shown that there is a strong correlation between low levels of system stability and high levels of war proneness (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2007; Rose and Shin,
Most of the theories dealing with this correlation were discussed earlier in this paper. I contend that, when taken together, these explanations provide compelling evidence of this relationship. In other words, anocratic systems are more war prone due to the bellicose nature of elite rhetoric, the lack of self-enforcing equilibria, their unresponsiveness towards public opinion, and their ineffective use of resources against discontented subjects (Gurr, 1974; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2007; Gates et. al., 2004).

4. Hypotheses

In my causal chain, low levels of institutionalization result in lower levels of system stability, which lead to higher levels of war proneness. The degree of institutionalization is largely a function of regime completeness. Fully democratic and autocratic states are complete systems, and therefore possess the strongest political organizations, while anocratic states are less complete. To help illustrate this point, imagine an eleven-point scale where zero represents the lowest possible level of institutionalization and ten represents the highest. As a state moves along this scale, its institutions grow stronger as it approaches ten, where ten represents perfect democracy or perfect autocracy and zero represents perfect anocracy.

As a state becomes more complete (moves towards ten on our scale), we expect system stability to increase with institutionalization. We should therefore
see a smaller propensity towards war in relatively more complete anocratic systems. Conversely, anocratic states that are less complete should have a relatively higher propensity towards war. This leads to my first hypothesis.

**H1**: More complete anocracies (those possessing higher degrees of institutionalization and stability) are less war prone than less complete anocratic systems.

The degree of regime completeness is not the only factor that must be considered, however. The substantive variation between regime types has been shown to influence state behavior. The monadic democratic peace theory suggests that democratic systems are more pacific in their relations with all states because of democratic norms and institutions (Danilovic and Clare, 2007). Since some anocratic systems are likely to be more democratic than others, the monadic democratic peace has implications here. This leads to my second hypotheses.

**H2**: Anocratic states that fall more towards the democratic side of the political spectrum will be less war prone than anocratic states that fall towards the autocratic side.
5. The Design

I contend that mixed regimes tend to have relatively weaker political institutions, weak institutions lead to lower levels of system stability, and less stable states are more likely to engage in wars. Since both levels of institutionalization and stability are in the causal chain, including both in the same model would be problematic. I therefore test only the first (institutionalization) and last link (war) in my theory, assuming that my model captures the impacts of stability. To test my hypotheses, I employ Mansfield and Snyder’s data from their 2002 article, Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War. The unit of analysis is monadic country year. Using this data, I estimate the following model:\(^2\)

\[
War_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Institutionalization}_{i(t-1)} + \beta_2 \text{Institutionalization}^2_{i(t-1)} + \beta_3 \text{Majpower}_{it} + \\
\beta_4 \text{Civwar}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Initiator}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}
\]

My dependent variable is war (coded WAR). I use Mansfield and Snyder’s data, which measures war as the log odds that state \(i\) engages in external war at time \(t\), where a one indicates war and a zero indicates otherwise. For the operationalization, data from the Correlates of War is utilized. The COW data considers two types of external war, which is defined as conflict between state \(i\) and a foreign enemy. International war is the first type, which is classified as a

---

\(^2\) It should be noted that Mansfield and Snyder use a variable that measures the concentration of a state’s capabilities, which I chose not to include in my model.
conflict between two members of the international system that results in a minimum of one thousand battlefield fatalities. Those states that endure at least one hundred battlefield deaths, or commit a minimum of one thousand troops to combat are considered participants. Extra-systemic war is the second type, and is defined as imperial actions where a member of the international system and a non-state actor engage in conflict. The threshold for extra-systemic wars is also set at one thousand battlefield deaths. To be considered a participant, a state must sustain one thousand battlefield deaths every year over the duration of the conflict. Over the course of the period examined (1816-1992), and based on the aforementioned criteria, eighty-eight different states have engaged 79 international wars and 108 extra-systemic wars, for a total of 398 monadic country years in which an external war occurred (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a, 2005; Sarkees, 2000).

In regards to institutionalization levels, I use measurements of regime type as a proxy. Since the strength of a system’s political organizations is a function of regime completeness, and the degree of completeness is measured by regime scores, I expect these scores to capture variation in institutionalization levels. I employ the Polity IV project’s revised combined polity scores, coded Polity2, since they offer a comprehensive measure of regime characteristics.

The Polity IV revised combined polity scores are taken in two parts based on the democratic and autocratic characteristics of a regime, and scores are then

3. States are only coded one for the initial year of hostilities. For instance, the United States is coded 1 in 1941, when the U.S. entered WWII, but is coded 0 in 1942.
added together. The democratic score is based on the presence of political institutions that allow citizens to express preferences, institutional constraints on the executive, and civil liberties. The autocratic score is based on the level of competitive political participation, executive selection, and the level of institutional constraints on the executive. The polity scores are on a scale from -10 to 10. The closer a state is to -10, the more autocratic it is, and the closer a state is to 10, the more democratic it is. As a state approaches zero, it becomes more mixed and less complete (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002).

I expect the association between institutionalization levels and war to be non-linear, based on my previous theoretical justifications. At the highest levels of institutionalization (-10 and 10), war should be least likely, and as a state becomes less complete (approaches 0), I expect the likelihood of war to increase. This should result in an inverted “U” shaped relationship, where the base of the two legs indicates the highest levels of institutionalization and the lowest propensity towards war, and is represented by complete democracies and autocracies, while the peak indicates the lowest levels of institutionalization and the highest propensity towards war, and is represented by incomplete anocracy. Since I expect anocratic systems that fall more towards the democratic side of the political spectrum to be less war prone, this U shaped relationship will not be perfectly symmetrical. To model this relationship, I include the composite polity scores and the composite polity scores squared.

In addition to institutionalization levels, I also include three control
variables in my model: major powers, civil war, and initiator. Each will be discussed in turn.

First, I include Mansfield and Snyder’s control variable for the presence of a major power in the international system (coded Majpower). It has been shown that major powers are more likely to engage in wars, relative to weaker states. Using this control allows me to differentiate between the likelihood of states that engage in war due to their greater relative strength, and the likelihood that states engage in war due to their level of institutionalization. The major power variable is dichotomous, and it is coded one if a state is a major power and a zero otherwise (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a, 2005; Sarkees, 2000).

I also include Mansfield and Snyder’s control variable for the presence of civil war (coded CivWar). It is important to account for civil war since previous research has shown that intrastate conflicts can affect the outbreak of interstate wars (see Snyder 2000). Civil war is defined as a conflict that occurs within a state between a government and non-government forces. To meet classification requirements, the government must be actively involved in hostilities, both sides must effectively resist the other, and there must be a minimum of one thousand battlefield deaths. Civil war is dichotomous, and is coded one for the presence of civil war, and a zero otherwise. There are a total of 591 country years in which a civil war occurred (Sarkees, 2000).

The final control variable I employ focuses on war initiation (coded INITIATOR). The relative weakness and instability of anocracies when compared
to complete systems is not disputed here. This position makes anocratic systems an easy target for more powerful, complete regimes. By controlling for initiator, we can determine whether the conflict proneness of anocracies is actually a function of the regime type, or if anocratic systems simply make easy targets that are not necessarily more prone to conflict, but are attacked more often by complete systems. To control for initiator, I use the COW data. Here, initiator is classified as the state whose battalions made the first attack in force on the enemy’s army or territory, rather than a measure of which state provoked the war. Since provocation is not necessarily captured by initiation, this measure is bound to miss some of the variation that I am interested in. However, excluding initiator could lead to omitted variable bias, and an issue with endogeneity, so I include it in the model, but concede that it is an imperfect measure. Initiation is dichotomous, and is coded 0 if state i at time t is not the originator of war, and 1 if it is (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a, 2005; Sarkees, 2000).

6. THE RESULTS

I use cross section time series data to test my hypotheses. Since my dependent variable is dichotomous, random effects logistic regression is employed in all testing. To deal with any potential simultaneity bias (e.g. the onset of war leading a state to behave more autocratically), I lag my measures of institutionalization by one year. To address problems with autocorrelation, I include in my model, Mansfield and Snyder’s natural spline function (with three
knots) of the number of years since state i last engaged in hostilities (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a). In addition, there were several mixed regimes during World War I and World War II. Many of these mixed regimes became involved in hostilities, but in reality were only nominal participants. To ensure that these observations are not driving my results, I run an alternative model with them excluded as a robustness check (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002). To accomplish this exclusion process, all observations between 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 are dropped. In my base model, I have an n of 9,772 monadic country years, where war was observed in 398 country years. In my hypotheses test where the observations for major wars are excluded, I have an n of 9,193 monadic country years, and war was observed in 341 country years.

Based on the results, reported below, it appears that neither of my hypotheses is supported, since my measure of institutionalization is not statistically significant. In regards to my controls, the variable for major powers has a positive significant coefficient regardless of whether the observations for major wars are excluded, which suggests that major powers are more likely to engage in war than lesser powers. My results also indicate that the presence of intrastate war has little effect on the outbreak on interstate hostilities. Finally, whether or not a state is the initiator of war appears to be unrelated to the outbreak of external war.

These results indicate that there is likely no relationship between institutionalization levels and a state’s propensity towards war, or a relationship
Table 1: Logit Estimates of the Effects of Institutionalization on War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>No Major Wars</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization Levels</td>
<td>-0.0123 (0.0093)</td>
<td>-0.0076 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization Levels Squared</td>
<td>-0.0019 (0.0019)</td>
<td>-0.0026 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>1.497** (.229)</td>
<td>1.456** (.246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>0.3646 (.255)</td>
<td>0.4671 (.257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>0.1429 (.479)</td>
<td>0.3009 (.483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.557** (.174)</td>
<td>-3.558** (.186)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed tests are conducted for all estimates)
* p ≤ .05 (two-tailed tests are conducted for all estimates)

between democratization levels and war. Obviously, the implications of null results in this context raises serious questions about the validity of much of the theories that helped to inform my own, specifically those dealing with the bellicose nature of mixed regimes as a function of weak political institutions, and those supporting the monadic democratic peace.

It would be hasty, however, to write off an entire literature based on my single hypotheses test, especially since there is a chance that my model was
poorly specified. In other words, I still believe that my theory (and those used to help justify it) is sound, but I have failed to capture the variation in institutionalization levels that I am interested in.

I start by specifying a second model. First, to measure institutionalization, I use the concentration of domestic authority (coded DOMAUTHORITY), an index created by Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore, and employed by Mansfield and Snyder in their research on mixed regimes. The domestic concentration of authority index is measured on an eleven-point scale, and measures the degree to which domestic authority is concentrated in the central government of state i. Domestic concentration increases as “political participation is regulated or restricted in accordance with institutionalized procedures, executive recruitment is regulated, the chief executive is either designated in accordance with institutionalized procedures or chosen through competitive elections, the chief executive faces few constraints on his or her authority, this executive does not depend on some group (like a junta or cabinet) for his or her authority, and authority is concentrated in the central government, and local and regional governments have little independent authority” (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a, pg. 315; Gurr et. al., 1989; pg. 39-40). As state i approaches 10 on this scale, it becomes more complete and has higher levels of institutionalization.

I could simply run a model using this measure as my independent variable, and assume that states with a low domestic authority score are less complete or incomplete anocracies, and states with higher scores are complete
democracies and autocracies. This was, after all, the approach I employed earlier in my first test. However, after some consideration, I now believe that differentiating between regime types is necessary. Since, theoretically, I am interested in how war proneness varies across different regime types (e.g. between less complete and incomplete anocracy) it makes good methodological sense to distinguish between them. Obviously, by doing this I am “delinking” my previous imperfect association between regime type and institutionalization (the assumption that as institutionalization levels increase or decrease, so does a states “completeness”). I believe that this “delinking” will allow me to more accurately capture the variation in institutionalization that I am interested in, which will make for a stronger hypotheses test.

In order to differentiate between regime types I use the composite regime scores, which are disaggregated into a series of dummy variables. To capture variation across the full range of regime completeness and orientation, a total of six regime type measures are employed: democracy (DEMO), less complete democratic anocracy (LCDANOC), incomplete democratic anocracy (coded IDANOC), autocracy (AUTO), less complete autocratic anocracy (LCAANOC), and incomplete autocratic anocracy (IAANOC). Democracy is coded 1 for states with polity scores between 7 and 10, less complete democratic anocracy is coded 1 for states with polity scores between 4 and 6, autocracy is coded 1 for states

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4. It is important to note that these regime measures are simply a means to distinguish between regime types, and are in no way considered to be a measure of institutionalization.
with polity scores between -7 and -10, and less complete autocratic anocracy is coded 1 for states with polity scores between -4 and -6.

In regards to the incomplete measures, disaggregating the data is a bit more complicated since zero falls between the two incomplete dummies (composite scores are measured on a scale from -10 to 10). To overcome this I use the Polity iV datasets measure of the openness of executive recruitment to divide the composite scores of 0 between my two dummy variables for incomplete systems. I chose executive recruitment for two reasons. First, it is considered by Mansfield and Snyder to be one of the three most important measures of institutionalization when examining the relationship between weak political institutions and war, and second, because this measure clearly distinguishes more autocratic states from more democratic states (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a; 2002b; 2005). Executive recruitment is measured on a four point scale where a 1 indicates that chief executives are either selected through hereditary secession or seize power (autocracy), 2 indicates hereditary secession and the selection of a chief minister by either the executive or the courts (autocratic anocracy), 3 indicates hereditary secession and a elected chief minister (democratic anocracy), and 4 indicates that executives are selected by competitive elections, elite designation, or transitional arrangements (democracy) (Gurr et.al.,1989). Incomplete democratic anocracies are therefore coded 1 for states with polity scores between 0 and 3, when states coded 0 have an
executive recruitment score of 3 or 4. Incomplete autocratic anocracies are coded 1 for states with polity scores between 0 and -3, when states coded 0 have an executive recruitment score of 1 or 2.  

Thus far, I have introduced a new measure of institutionalization, and developed six measures of regime type. In my theoretical justification, I argue that state i will be more war prone when state i posses relatively weaker political institutions, and more complete systems will tend to have higher levels of institutionalization. Since a state will be more likely to engage in hostilities when it posses weak political institutions, I interact my regime measures with the concentration of domestic authority.

Based on my new measures of institutionalization, I estimate the following model:

\[
War_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 DEMO_{i(t-1)} + \beta_2 LCDANOC_{i(t-1)} + \beta_3 IDANOC_{i(t-1)} + \\
\beta_4 LCAANOC_{i(t-1)} + \beta_5 IAANOC_{i(t-1)} + \beta_6 DOMAUTHORITY_{i(t-1)} + \\
\beta_7 DEMO* DOMAUTHORITY_{i(t-1)} + \beta_8 LCDANOC* DOMAUTHORITY_{i(t-1)} + \\
\beta_9 IDANOC* DOMAUTHORITY_{i(t-1)} + \beta_{10} LCAANOC* DOMAUTHORITY_{i(t-1)} + \\
\beta_{11} IAANOC* DOMAUTHORITY_{i(t-1)} + \beta_{12} Majpower_{it} + \beta_{13} Civwar_{it} + \beta_{14} Initiator_{it} + \epsilon_{it}
\]

---

5. Since I am interested not only in the conflict proneness of mixed regimes in relation to each other, but whether or not these regimes will be less conflict prone if they fall more towards the democratic side of the political spectrum (the monadic democratic peace), I chose my dummy for autocracy as the reference variable.
Based on the results of my new models, reported below, it appears that there is still no relationship between the level of institutionalization in a state, and its propensity towards war. In addition, the relationship between democratization levels and war is also challenged (the monadic democratic peace). Before moving on with this discussion, first a little more about the results.

In both my base model and in my robustness test where major wars are excluded, the coefficients for democracy and less complete autocratic anocracy are both negative and non-significant, while the coefficients for the rest of my regime measures are positive and non-significant. Both models also indicate that my measure of institutionalization (concentration of domestic authority), and all of the interactions between this measure and my regime type dummy variables are not significant. Once again, my variable for major powers is positive and significant regardless of whether observations for major wars are dropped. Finally, both civil war and war initiation still appear to be unrelated to a state's propensity towards war.

That my model indicates a null relationship between institutionalization levels across regime type and a state's propensity towards war carries with it serious implications. First, my theory was derived in large part from previous scholarship on mixed regimes (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder, Gates, and Rose and Shin just to name a few). Methodologically, I used Mansfield and Snyder's data, and my hypotheses test was, in part, based on their model. However, despite the similarities in theory and methods, Mansfield and Snyder are interested in the
Table 2: Logit Estimates of War Proneness Across Regime Type using Domestic Authority to Measure Institutionalization Levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>No Major Wars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-2.047</td>
<td>-2.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.44)</td>
<td>(2.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less complete democratic anocracy</td>
<td>-1.311</td>
<td>-1.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.67)</td>
<td>(2.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete democratic anocracy</td>
<td>-.7686</td>
<td>-1.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.52)</td>
<td>(2.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less complete autocratic anocracy</td>
<td>-2.06</td>
<td>-2.394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.49)</td>
<td>(2.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete autocratic anocracy</td>
<td>-1.50</td>
<td>-1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.49)</td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy*Domestic authority</td>
<td>.2786</td>
<td>.3864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.434)</td>
<td>(.481)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less complete democratic anocracy* Domestic authority</td>
<td>.1316</td>
<td>.2155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.468)</td>
<td>(.511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete democratic anocracy* Domestic authority</td>
<td>.0666</td>
<td>.1662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.454)</td>
<td>(.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less complete autocratic anocracy* Domestic authority</td>
<td>.2926</td>
<td>.390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.443)</td>
<td>(.489)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete autocratic anocracy* Domestic authority</td>
<td>.2111</td>
<td>.2711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.443)</td>
<td>(.491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration of domestic authority</td>
<td>-.1979</td>
<td>-.2746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.431)</td>
<td>(.479)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major power</td>
<td>1.53**</td>
<td>1.471**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.232)</td>
<td>(.248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>.3366</td>
<td>.4083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.283)</td>
<td>(.286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>.2731</td>
<td>.4165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.481)</td>
<td>(.486)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.134</td>
<td>-1.862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.43)</td>
<td>(2.64)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
** p ≤.01 (two-tailed tests are conducted for all estimates)  
* p ≤.05 (two-tailed tests are conducted for all estimates)
effects that regime transitions have on the outbreak of war (a dynamic concept),
while I am testing the relationship between institutionalization and war (a static
concept). Also, in my theory I differentiate between mixed regimes and focus on
the variation among them, and the aforementioned theories focus on anocratic
systems in the aggregate and their bellicose nature in relation to complete
democratic and autocratic states. Although my results conflict with the previous
mainstream findings, we cannot necessarily say that they are discredited,
because of these differences. That said, my results do raise some questions over
the validity of these works, since they view mixed regimes as typically more
bellicose due to their lack of institutionalization. On this basis, it appears that the
impacts of the strength of political institutions has likely been overstated. Before
we can dismiss this association outright, additional testing is needed.

In regards to my second hypothesis, the results suggest that a state’s
orientation towards democracy or autocracy has little bearing on war proneness
for two reasons. First, none of my measures of regime type are significant. If
democratic states were truly more pacific in their interstate relations (the monadic
democratic peace) than we would, at the very least, expect an inverse significant
relationship between my measure of democracy and war. Second, my results
also indicate that institutionalization levels are not directly related to war. Since
democratic institutions are often used to explain the more pacific nature of
democratic states, and I find that political institutions have little effect on a state’s
war proneness, the validity of the monadic peace is challenged. However, due to disparities in testing, and since the monadic democratic peace is also explained as a function of democratic culture and norms, additional testing is needed before we draw any conclusions.

7. Conclusions

In this article I have attempted to link a state’s propensity towards war to the strength of its political institutions and resulting system stability. While previous research suggests that this association explains much of the variation in war likelihood, my results indicate that the level of institutionalization in a state has little, if any, impact. Obviously, this has significant implications for past research, raising questions about the validity of theories dealing with this relationship.

While I believe that I have successfully captured the variation in institutionalization that I am interested in, certain data limitations cannot be overlooked. For starters, war is a relatively rare phenomenon, which makes statistical testing difficult, since there is little in the dependent variable. In

6. These results also suggest that the dyadic democratic peace may not be as robust as previous scholarship suggest. However, since I use monads as my unit of analysis, the implications of my results on the dyadic democratic peace should not be taken as evidence against the relationship. Additional testing employing dyadic data is needed prior to forming any conclusions.

7. While only two separate hypotheses tests are included in this article, others were performed as a robustness check. To verify my results, I have also run models using only my regime measures, and only my measure of domestic authority. I have also run models with and without the lags and three-knot natural spline function. In every test that I have run, the results have remain unchanged.
addition, many variables are imperfectly and in many cases, arbitrarily measured. For example, the measure of war initiation employed in this article classifies initiator as the state whose battalions made the first attack in force on the opposing sides army or territory. Obviously, a measure of initiation that focused on which side actually provoked the war would be more substantively meaningful, and methodologically useful in this context.

While current data may be limited, it is clear that my hypotheses tests indicate that the strength of political institutions appears less important than previous research suggests. While both of my models suggest that institutions may not matter in this context, my second model also indicates that war proneness does not vary by regime type, which raises questions about the validity of the monadic democratic peace. Taken together, these results lead me to ask, which factors do contribute to a state’s propensity towards war? Since the relationship between stability and war was not directly tested here, should we consider regime durability as a potential explanation? Obviously, additional testing of this relationship, and of the theories linking war likelihood to political institutions, and those dealing with the monadic democratic peace, is needed.
Work Cited


