Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: Model, processes and outcomes

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Acceptance and Commitment Therapy:  
Model, Processes and Outcomes  

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Abstract

The present article presents and reviews the model of psychopathology and treatment underlying Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). ACT is unusual in that it is linked to a comprehensive active basic program on the nature of human language and cognition (Relational Frame Theory), echoing back to an earlier era of behavior therapy in which clinical treatments were consciously based on basic behavioral principles. The evidence from correlational, component, process of change, and outcome comparisons relevant to the model are broadly supportive, but the literature is not mature and many questions have not yet been examined. What evidence is available suggests that ACT works through different processes than active treatment comparisons, including traditional CBT. There are not enough well-controlled studies to conclude that ACT is generally more effective than other active treatments across the range of problems examined, but so far the data seem promising.
The behavior therapy movement began with two key commitments: 1. empirical validation of well-specified interventions for well-specified problems, and 2. an analysis of problems and treatment in terms of basic psychological processes. Franks and Wilson’s well-known early definition of behavior therapy shows that dual commitment clearly, asserting that behavior therapy was based on "operationally defined learning theory and conformity to well-established experimental paradigms" (1974, p. 7). Over the 40 years of development of behavior therapy, however, only the first of these two commitments has been firmly kept.

Behavior therapy can be divided into three generations: traditional behavior therapy, cognitive behavior therapy, and the more recent “third wave” of relatively contextualistic approaches (Hayes, 2004). In the first generation of behavior therapy it was possible to keep both commitments because traditional behavior therapists drew on a large set of basic principles drawn from the basic behavioral laboratories. Even in the earliest days, however, authors of behavioral principles texts realized that this base needed to expand beyond operant and classical principles to include those focused on human cognitive processes (Bandura, 1969). Clinicians realized that as well, and this realization was at the core of the second generation of traditional cognitive therapy and cognitive behavior therapy (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Mahoney, 1974).

Unfortunately, none of the basic cognitive models available at the time were as easy to link to clinical interventions as were learning theory principles. The reasons for this are complex, but they go beyond merely the stage of development of basic analyses at the time. The dominant cognitive models were (and remain) mechanistic information processing approaches and organismic cognitive developmental perspectives. For philosophical reasons, both are more focused on the nature and evolution of cognitive acts and their impact on other forms of action than they are on the specific contextual events that regulate psychological events and relate them one to the other. This feature tends to limit the direct applied relevance of the concepts that result (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). Let us explain.

A principle like reinforcement is focused on the interface between action and its manipulable context, in effect, unifying both dependent and independent variables into a single unit. When the clinician applies such a concept to change behavior, the independent variables specified by the term can be manipulated and the effect noted. This is not, in the main, true of the cognitive concepts generated by information processing and developmental cognitive perspectives. A concept like cognitive schemas (Piaget, 1964) is focused on the organization of a specific kind of dependent variable but it does not itself specify the contextual variables that alter these variables and their impact on other forms of activity. Neither explanations of behavior (here meaning private and public behavior) that locate causality in the material of the brain, nor those that explain behavior as the unfolding of developmental patterns, lead directly or efficiently to the practical causes emphasized by the needs by clinicians. After all, clinicians always reside in the context surrounding clients and thus can only have an impact on client behavior by manipulating its context.

Unable to rely fully on basic cognitive accounts, clinicians created their own cognitive models and interventions as CBT was born. For example, specific patterns of irrational cognitions characteristic of specific forms of psychopathology were defined and measured (e.g., Beck, Brown, Steer, & Weissman, 1991). The terms used to describe these patterns sometimes were loosely linked to basic cognitive psychology (e.g., schemas), but often they were not (e.g.,
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Ellis, 1962) and in either case the actual content of these cognitive processes (e.g., over-
generalization; black and white thinking; emotional reasoning; and so on) were of little
importance to basic cognitive science. These concepts were “cognitive” in the sense that they
were about thinking as understood in common sense terms – that is, they focused on “thoughts.”
In the area of treatment, the relationship to basic processes was even more tenuous: cognitive
disputation, empirical tests, collaborative empiricism, and so on were not methods of
fundamental importance to the basic cognitive science laboratory – they were common-sense
practical procedures generated clinically.

The second generation of behavior therapy is now thirty years old, and the result of this
approach can be examined. The results are decidedly mixed. CBT techniques are fairly well
validated, but the link between cognitive therapy and cognitive science continues to be weak.
Looking at the array of techniques developed in cognitive-behavior therapy, none are known to
have emerged directly from the basic cognitive science laboratories. The underlying model has
also received mixed support. Component analysis studies have generally failed to find support
for the importance of direct cognitive change strategies (Gortner, Gollan, Dobson, & Jacobson,
1998; Jacobson, Dobson, Truax, Addis, Koerner, Gollan, Gortner, & Prince, 1996; Zettle &
Hayes, 1987). Well-known cognitive therapists have been forced to conclude that in some
important areas “there was no additive benefit to providing cognitive interventions in cognitive
therapy” (Dobson & Khatri, 2000, p. 913). The response to traditional cognitive therapy often
occurs before cognitive change techniques have been implemented (Ilardi & Craighead, 1994), a
finding that has still not been adequately explained. Support for the hypothesized mediators of
change in CBT is weak (e.g., Burns & Spangler, 2001; Morgenstern & Longabaugh, 2000),
particularly in areas that are causal and explanatory rather than descriptive (Beck & Perkins,
2001; Bieling & Kuyken, 2003).

This overall picture presents an anomaly. One the one hand, most modern psychologists
agree that traditional behavior therapy was not adequate and that better methods of dealing with
thoughts and feelings were needed. On the other, the core conception of traditional cognitive and
cognitive behavior therapy – that direct cognitive change is necessary for clinical improvement –
is still not well supported.

There is some indication that the new “third wave” interventions in CBT may have found
a way around this conundrum. These third generation approaches have been defined as follows
(Hayes, 2004):

Grounded in an empirical, principle-focused approach, the third wave of behavioral and
cognitive therapy is particularly sensitive to the context and functions of psychological
phenomena, not just their form, and thus tends to emphasize contextual and experiential
change strategies in addition to more direct and didactic ones. These treatments tend to
seek the construction of broad, flexible and effective repertoires over an eliminative
approach to narrowly defined problems, and to emphasize the relevance of the issues they
examine for clinicians as well as clients. (p. 658).

Examples of third wave CBT interventions include Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (ACT, said as a single word, not as initials; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999),
Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy
(MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2001), and meta-cognitive approaches (Wells, 2000).
Rather than focusing on changing psychological events directly through first-order change
strategies, these interventions seek to change the function of those events and the individual’s
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relationship to them through second-order change strategies such as mindfulness, acceptance, or cognitive defusion (Teasdale, 2003). We will describe these procedures later in the paper.

Taking Another Road: ACT, RFT, and Contextual Behavior Analysis

Third generation approaches are emerging both within more behavioral and more cognitive wings of CBT, which is part of what justifies thinking of these changes in generational terms. In the present article, however, it is our purpose to characterize ACT and its underlying theory, to summarize the data available, and to begin to contrast ACT with traditional CBT. While ACT is part of current developments it is also distinct in the particular development path it has followed. As the above definition emphasizes, third generation CBT in general is more principles focused. ACT is unique in its attempt to develop the basic laboratory itself so as to generate more adequate basic behavioral principles.

The second generation broke away from the first because operant and classical learning principles were not adequate to account for human cognition. ACT is the applied extension of a twenty year long attempt to create a modern form of behavior analysis more adequate to the challenge of human language and cognition – one that will allow behavioral and cognitive therapy to return more fully to its original vision. ACT is based on the development of a philosophy of science, and theory human language and cognition specifically designed with a functional unity of applied and basic psychology in mind.

ACT Description and Background

ACT Philosophical Roots

ACT is rooted in the pragmatic philosophy of functional contextualism (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Hayes, 1993; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986; Hayes, Hayes, & Reese, 1988), a specific variety of contextualism that has as its goal the prediction and influence of events, with precision, scope and depth (Hayes, 1993). Contextualism views psychological events as ongoing actions of the whole organism interacting in and with historically and situationally defined contexts. These actions are whole events that can only be broken up for pragmatic purposes, not ontologically. Because goals specify how to apply the pragmatic truth criterion of contextualism (Hayes, Hayes, Reese, & Sarbin, 1993), functional contextualism differs from other varieties that have other goals.

ACT reflects these philosophical connections in several ways. It emphasizes workability as a truth criterion, and chosen values as the necessary precursor to the assessment of workability because values specify the criteria for the application of workability. Its causal analyses are limited to events that are directly manipulable, and thus it has a consciously contextualistic focus. From such a perspective, thoughts and feelings do not cause other actions, except as regulated by context (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). Therefore, it is possible to go beyond attempting to change thoughts or feelings so as to change overt behavior, to changing the context that causally links these psychological domains.

ACT Theoretical Roots

Nearly a decade and a half passed between the earliest randomized trials on Comprehensive Distancing (the early form of ACT, Zettle & Hayes, 1986) and those in the modern era (e.g., Bond & Bunce, 2000). In that interval, the basic theory of human language and cognition underlying ACT, Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) was developed into a comprehensive basic experimental research program used to guide the development of ACT itself. RFT has become the most actively researched basic behavior analytic theory of human behavior, with over 70 empirical studies focused on it tenets. According to RFT, the core of human language and cognition is the learned ability to arbitrarily
relate events, mutually and in combination, and to change the functions of events based on these
relations. For example, very young children will know that a nickel is larger than a dime by
physical size, but not until later will the child understand that a nickel is smaller than a dime by
social attribution. RFT researchers have shown that such relations as knowing that one event is
“larger” than another arbitrarily a) can be trained as an operant (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes,
Smeets, Strand, & Friman, 2004, 2004; Berens, 2005), and b) will alter the impact of other
behavioral processes (e.g., Dymond & Barnes, 1995).

RFT has proven itself successful so far in modeling the nature, acquisition, and impact of
higher cognition at the behavioral, emotional, and neurobiological level. For example, RFT
researchers have successfully modeled analogy and metaphor (Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, &
Roche, 2004), trained perspective taking (xx), ad RFT tasks can successfully model the natural
language tasks studied in basic cognitive science, such as semantic priming (Bissett & Hayes,
1999; Barnes-Holmes. Xxx 2003) or xxx. Neurobiological measures tell the same story. For
example, RFT tasks generate pre-frontal activation (xx) as would be expected based on cognitive
research on problem solving xxx

The details of RFT go beyond the scope of this paper, but virtually every component of
ACT is connected conceptually to RFT, and several of these connections have been studied
empirically. Among other applied implications of RFT, its primary implications in the area of
psychopathology and psychotherapy can be summarized as follows (Hayes et al., 2001): 1.
normal cognitive processes necessary for verbal problem solving and reasoning underlie
psychopathology, thus these processes cannot be eliminated; 2. the content and impact of
cognitive networks are controlled by distinct contextual features; 3. cognitive networks are
historical and thus are elaborated over time. Much as extinction inhibits but does not eliminate
learned responding (xxx citation), the logical idea that cognitive networks can be logically
restricted or even eliminated is generally not psychologically sound; and, 4. direct change
attempts focused on key nodes in cognitive networks, tend to elaborate the network in that area
and increase its functional importance.

ACT / RFT Theory of Psychopathology: Psychological Inflexibility

From an ACT / RFT point of view, while psychological problems can emerge from the
general absence of relational abilities (e.g., in the case of mental retardation), the primary source
of psychopathology is the way that language and cognition interacts with direct contingencies to
produce an inability to persist or change in the service of long term valued ends. This kind of
psychological inflexibility is argued in ACT and RFT to emerge from weak or unhelpful
contextual control over language processes themselves.

The literature on an ACT / RFT model of psychopathology is large and growing, so only
a thumbnail account can be given here. The overall model is shown in Figure 1. Cognitive fusion
refers to excessive or improper regulation of behavior by verbal processes, such as rules and
derived relational networks (see Hayes et al., 1999 for further details). In contexts that foster
such fusion, people’s behavior is guided more by their inflexible verbal networks than by the
contingencies of reinforcement in their environment. As a result, they are less able to act in a
way that is consistent with what the environment affords for behavior that would foster the
persons values and goals. Thus, from an ACT / RFT point of view, it is not the form, or content,
of cognition that is most troublesome, but the contexts that lead this cognitive content to
inappropriately, or excessively, regulate human action.

The functional contexts that tend to have such deleterious effects include: contexts of
literality [treating symbols (e.g., the thought, “life is hopeless”) as one would their referents (i.e.,
a truly hopeless life), reason-giving (i.e., basing action or inaction excessively on the constructed “causes” of own behavior, especially when these processes point to non-manipulable “causes” such as conditioned private vents) (Addis & Jacobson, 1996), and emotional control (i.e., focusing on proper manipulation of emotional states as a primary goal and metric of successful living).

Cognitive fusion supports experiential avoidance, which is the attempt to alter the form, frequency, or situational sensitivity of private events even when doing so causes behavioral harm (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Due to the temporal and comparative relations present in human language so-called “negative” emotions are verbally predicted, evaluated, and avoided. Experiential avoidance is thus due to the natural effects of human language – a pattern that is then amplified by the culture into a general focus on “feeling good” and avoiding pain. Unfortunately, attempts to avoid uncomfortable private events tend to increase their functional importance – both because they become more salient and because these control efforts are themselves verbal linked to conceptualized negative outcomes – and thus tend to narrow the range of behaviors that are possible since many behaviors might evoke these feared private events.

The social demand for reason giving and the practical utility of human symbolic behavior draws the person into attempts to understand and explain psychological events even when this is unnecessary or even unhelpful (Hayes, 2002). Contact with the present moment decreases as the person begins to live “in their head.” The conceptualized past and future, and the conceptualized self, gain more regulatory power over behavior, further contributing to inflexibility. For example, it can become more important to be right about who is responsible for personal pain, than it is to live more effectively with the history one has; it can be more important to defend a verbal view of oneself (e.g., being a victim; never being angry; being broken; etc) than to engage in more workable forms of behavior that do not fit that that verbalization. Furthermore, since emotions and thoughts are commonly used as reasons for other actions, reason-giving tends to draw the person into even more focus on the world within as the proper source of behavioral regulation, further exacerbating avoidance patterns. Again psychological inflexibility is the result.

In the world of overt behavior, this means that long term desired qualities of life (i.e., values) take a backseat to more immediate goals of being right, looking good, feeling good, defending a conceptualized self, and so on. People lose contact with what they want in life, beyond relief from psychological pain. Patterns of action emerge that are detached from long term desired qualities and gradually dominate in the person’s repertoire. Behavioral repertoires narrow and become less sensitive to the current context as it affords valued actions. Persistence and change in the service of effectiveness is less likely.

Six Core Processes of ACT

ACT targets each of these core problems with the general goal of increasing psychological flexibility – the ability to contact the present moment more fully as a conscious human being, and to change or persist in behavior when doing so serves valued ends. Psychological flexibility is established through six core ACT processes as is show in Figure 2.

Acceptance. Acceptance is taught as an alternative to experiential avoidance. Acceptance involves the active and aware embrace of those private events occasioned by one’s history without unnecessary attempts to change their frequency or form, especially when doing so would cause psychological harm. For example, anxiety patients are taught to feel anxiety, as a feeling, fully and without defense; pain patients are given methods that encourage them to let go of a
struggle with pain, and so on. Acceptance (and defusion) in ACT is not an end in itself. Rather acceptance is fostered as a method of increasing values-based action.

**Cognitive Defusion.** Cognitive defusion techniques attempt to alter the undesirable functions of thoughts and other private events, rather than trying to alter their form, frequency or situational sensitivity. Said another way, ACT attempts to change the way one interacts with or relates to thoughts by creating contexts in which their unhelpful functions are diminished. There are scores of such techniques that have been developed for a wide variety of clinical presentations (Hayes & Strosahl, 2005). For example, the thought could be watched dispassionately, repeated several times out loud until only its sound remains, or treated as an external observation by giving it a shape, size, color, speed, or form. A person could thank their mind for such an interesting thought, label the process of thinking (“I am having the thought that I am no good”), or examine the historical thoughts, feelings, and memories that occur while they experience that thought. Such procedures attempt to reduce the literal quality of the thought, weakening the tendency to treat the thought as what it refers to (“I am no good”) rather than what it is directly experienced to be (e.g., the thought “I am no good”). The result of defusion is usually a decrease in believability of, or attachment to, private events rather than an immediate change in their frequency.

**Being Present.** ACT promotes ongoing non-judgmental contact with psychological events and events in the environment as they occur. The goal is to have clients experience the world more directly so that their behavior is more flexible and thus their actions more consistent with the values that they hold. This is accomplished by allowing contact with what works to exert more control over behavior; and by using language as a tool to note and describe events, not simply to predict and judge them. A sense of self called “self as process” is actively encouraged: the defused, non-judgmental ongoing description of thoughts, feelings, and other private events.

**Self as Context.** As a result of deictic frames such as I-You, Now-Then, and Here-There human language leads to a sense of self as a locus or perspective, and provides a transcendent, spiritual side to normal verbal humans. This idea was one of the seeds from which both ACT and RFT grew (Hayes, 1984), and there is now growing evidence of its importance to language functions such as empathy, theory of mind, sense of self, and the like (e.g., see xxx). In brief the idea is that “I” emerges over large sets of exemplars of deictic relations, but since this sense of self is a context for verbal knowing, not the content of that knowing, it’s limits cannot be consciously known. Self as context is important in part because from this standpoint, one can be aware of ones own flow of experiences without attachment to them or an investment in what experiences occur: thus defusion and acceptance is fostered. Self as context is fostered in ACT by mindfulness exercises, metaphors, and experiential processes.

**Values.** Values are chosen qualities of purposive action that can never be obtained as an object but can be instantiated moment by moment. ACT uses a variety of exercises to help a client choose life directions in various domains (e.g. family, career, spirituality) while undermining verbal processes that might lead to choices based on avoidance, social compliance, or fusion (e.g. “I should value X” or “A good person would value Y” or “My mother wants me to values x”). In ACT, acceptance, defusion, being present, and so on are not ends in themselves; rather they clear the path for a more vital, values consistent life.

**Committed Action.** Finally, ACT encourages the development of larger and larger patterns of effective action linked to chosen values. In this regard, ACT looks very much like traditional behavior therapy, and almost any behaviorally coherent behavior change method can be fitted into an ACT protocol, including exposure, skills acquisition, shaping methods, goal
setting, and the like. Unlike values, which are constantly instantiated but never achieved as an object, concrete goals that are values consistent can be achieved and ACT protocols almost always involve therapy work and homework linked to short, medium, and long-term behavior change goals that in turn occasion identifying and working through psychological barriers that show up along the way through other ACT processes (acceptance, defusion, and so on).

The core ACT processes are both overlapping and interrelated. Taken as a whole, each supports the other and all target psychological flexibility: the process of contacting the present moment fully as a conscious human being and persisting or changing behavior in the service of chosen values. The six processes can be chunked into two groupings. Mindfulness and acceptance processes involve acceptance, defusion, contact with the present moment, and self as context. Indeed, these four processes provide a workable behavioral definition of mindfulness (Fletcher & Hayes, in press). Commitment and behavior change processes involve contact with the present moment, self as context, values, and committed action. Contact with the present moment and self as context occur in both groupings because all psychological activity of conscious human beings involves the now as known.

ACT is an approach to psychological intervention defined in terms of certain theoretical processes, not a specific technology. In theoretical and process terms we can define ACT as a psychological intervention based on modern behavioral psychology, including Relational Frame Theory, that applies mindfulness and acceptance processes, and commitment and behavior change processes, to the creation of psychological flexibility.

Research on ACT

In this review we will focus primarily on the underlying ACT / RFT model, considering correlational studies, studies of the impact of ACT components, and processes of change studies. Finally we will briefly summarize the strength of ACT outcomes, particularly as compared to alternative approaches, but this will be fairly brief since a fairly recent review is available (Hayes, Masuda, Bissett, Luoma, & Guerrero, 2004). We believe this review likely references all the existent literature as of Spring 2005 that directly examines ACT or ACT components in correlational studies, studies of the impact of ACT components, and processes of change studies. Studies which might have relevance to ACT processes of change (e.g., mindfulness studies outside of ACT per se) but which did not directly attempt to examine ACT or ACT derived components were deliberately excluded from this review.

Studies of the ACT Model: Correlational Studies

The correlational studies of the ACT model to date have generally not focused on single ACT processes. The largest body of evidence has used various forms of the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes, Strosahl et al., 2004). The AAQ was constructed by having ACT therapists generate an item pool of the kinds of clinical processes targeted by ACT. The resulting instrument measures the degree to which an individual fuses with thoughts, avoids feelings, and is unable to act in the presence of difficult private events. Thus the AAQ, although it is often referred to generically as a measure of experiential avoidance, is actually a more general measure of several ACT processes designed for use in population-based studies.

There are two general validated versions of the AAQ. One 16-item version consists of two factors: one that measures acceptance and mindfulness (hereafter referred to as just acceptance) and the other that assesses values-based action, both of which load onto a second-order factor, which might be called psychological flexibility (Bond & Bunce, 2003). The second 9-item version measures only this general factor (Hayes, Bissett et al., 2004). Both versions have adequate criterion-related, predictive, and convergent validities (Bond & Bunce, 2003; Hayes,
Bissett et al., 2004). A specific pain-related version of the AAQ has also been widely used that is based on rewriting of the AAQ items to focus on pain content: the Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire (CPAQ; Geiser, 1992; McCracken, 1999; McCracken et al., 2004). Several other specific versions are becoming available, some of which will be mentioned later in this review.

The individual studies reviewed here are listed in Table 1. In order to determine the extent to which the AAQ and psychological outcomes are related, these studies were integrated into a meta-analysis in which correlations established with a greater number of people were given more weight in calculating the average effect size using the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient ($r$) as the metric (Durlak, 1995; Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001).

Twenty-one studies, involving 4,721 participants, investigated the relationship between the AAQ and various quality of life outcomes, including psychopathology (e.g., depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress, trichotillomania), stress, pain, job performance, and negative affectivity. Several separate meta-analyses were performed, examining the overall data set and sub-sets, defined by specific problems or common measures.

The overall dataset produced 52 correlations between these two sets of variables. The effect size of these relations was $0.030$ (95% confidence interval: $0.29 – 0.32$) showing that this measure of ACT processes had a moderate relationship with psychological outcomes generally. Three studies (Bond & Bunce, 2000; 2003; Donaldson & Bond, 2004) showed that higher levels of psychological flexibility (i.e., acceptance and values-based action processes) were associated with a lower probability of having a psychiatric disorder, as measured by the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ; Goldberg, 1978). The relationship between the AAQ and GHQ was of a medium size: $-0.40$ (95% confidence interval: $0.34 – 0.45$). Similarly, one two-wave, full-panel study by Bond and Bunce (2003) showed that higher levels of flexibility predicted better mental health (i.e., lower GHQ scores), also to a medium extent. Moreover, the AAQ demonstrated these predictive effects, after controlling the longitudinal impacts of negative affectivity, locus of control, and the amount of control people have over how they do their job. Finally, results indicated that the GHQ did not predict AAQ scores, one year later. Taken together, these longitudinal findings suggest that levels of psychological flexibility are impacting subsequent mental health, and not the reverse.

Six studies (Bond & Bunce, 2001; Dykstra & Follette, 1998; Gold et al., submitted; Pistorello, 1998; Polusny, 1998; Strosahl, Hayes, Bergan & Romano, 1998) compared the AAQ with either edition one or two of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Edition I: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961; Edition II: Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), and when we aggregated these correlations in a meta-analysis, we obtained an effect size of $-0.50$ (95% confidence interval: $0.45 – 0.54$). Similarly, three studies (Cook, 2004; Polusny, 1998; Toarmino, Pistorello & Hayes, 1997) investigated the association between the AAQ and the Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994), which assesses various indicators of mental ill-health. The aggregated correlations between these variables also produced a large effect: $-0.53$ (95% confidence interval: $0.47 – 0.58$). Our final meta-analysis, based upon data from four studies (Karekla, Forsyth, & Kelly, in press; Stewart, Zvolensky & Eifert, 2002; Strosahl et al., 1998; Toarmino et al., 1997), showed that the AAQ was, overall, significantly related to three well-known measures of anxiety, to a fairly large extent: $-0.49$ (95% confidence interval: $0.44 – 0.54$). (These three measures were: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983; Beck Anxiety Inventory, Beck & Steer, 1993; and the Anxiety Sensitivity Index, Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986.) Cohen (1977) notes that finding large effect sizes is unusual in the behavioral sciences.
The AAQ is not just correlated with important measures of psychopathology, however. Research indicates that it is also associated with behavioral effectiveness, in the form of job performance and chronic pain management. Specifically, Bond and Bunce (2003) found that psychological flexibility predicted, to a medium extent, the number of computer input errors that call centre workers made over the following year. This measure of job performance did not predict AAQ scores one year later, thus suggesting that it is the AAQ that is determining job performance and not the reverse.

McCracken (1998) found that higher levels of psychological flexibility as measured by a pain-specific variant of the AAQ predicted, to a medium extent, less disability, better work status, and more daily ‘up-time’, among people experiencing chronic pain and did so to a greater degree than actual pain ratings. McCracken, Vowles, and Eccleston (2004) also found that higher levels of this measure amongst chronic pain patients were related, to a medium extent, to fewer pain-related health care visits and fewer classes of prescribed analgesic medications.

Overall, the correlational evidence is fairly supportive of the ACT model as assessed by self-report instruments specifically designed by ACT therapists to measure the range of processes targeted by ACT. It is particularly strong using more traditional measures of psychopathology, but also applies to a wide range of measures, from work performance to pain behaviors. The range of measures of ACT processes is still limited, however. A wide range of concepts and measures seem to overlap with the ACT model, and researchers are beginning to explore connections with such concepts as distress tolerance (Brown xxx), learned industriousness (Eisenberger, 1992), thought suppression (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000), delay discounting (Myerson & Green, 1995), strivings (Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, & Kasser, 2004), mindfulness (Baer xxx), metacognition (Wells, 2000), decentering (Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000), and the like. As the ACT / RFT research program expands a wider variety of theoretically coherent measures, including some outside of self-report, seem likely to be available to refine the tests of an ACT model.

Experimental Psychopathology and ACT Component Studies

Many current empirically-supported treatment protocols are large packages composed of diverse elements. Unless each element is linked to a basic principle and integrated into a larger theory, it is difficult to know how to dismantle these packages because the natural lines of fracture are drawn more from common sense than theory. Small scale dismantling studies tend to be ignored, but large scale studies are expensive and are only conducted with the most widely adopted treatments, and then only many years after scores of clinicians have been trained in and have adopted the model. By that time, dismantling studies may have little immediate impact if they show that favored components are unhelpful, and their results may just be explained away. Cognitive therapy for depression may provide an example. Small scale early dismantling studies (e.g., Zettle & Hayes, 1987), and subsequent larger scale studies (Gortner, Gollan, Dobson, & Jacobson, 1998; Jacobson, Dobson, Truax, Addis, Koerner, Gollan, Gortner, & Prince, 1996) have apparently not lead so far to notable changes in the protocols or their underlying model.

ACT researchers are following a different course that is afforded by an inductive, technique-building, principles-focused treatment development approach: conduct micro-studies on each of the key ACT processes (e.g., acceptance, defusion, values, self as context, contact with the moment, values, and commitment) to see if each is psychologically active and works in a fashion that accords with the theory. In the handful of years since publication of the ACT book, several such micro-studies have appeared. The early published studies have focused largely on acceptance, defusion, and values, but targeted studies are underway or completed on all of the
other elements. These studies are important for the overall model and we will examine them in some detail.

The impact of a cognitive defusion technique on negative self-referential thoughts has been examined (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004) using the Milk-Milk Exercise (Hayes et al., 1999, p. 154-155) in which a thought is rapidly repeated aloud until it loses all meaning. In this study the impact of word repetition on the discomfort and believability of self-relevant negative thoughts was investigated as compared to a distraction task (reading about Japan) or to a thought control task involving abdominal breathing training and instructions to shift attention to more pleasant thoughts. In a series of alternating treatments designs (N=8) the cognitive defusion technique was found to reduce both discomfort and believability more so than the comparison approaches. Group control studies suggested that the effect was not due to demand characteristics.

Another study examined the impact of a 90-minute ACT protocol focused on acceptance and defusion on pain tolerance utilizing a cold pressor task (Hayes, Bissett, Korn, Zettle, Rosenfarb, Cooper, & Grundt, 1999) as compared to a traditional CBT pain-management condition (training in applying the gate theory of pain) and to an attention placebo condition consisting of discussion of a behavioral approach to pain. The acceptance and defusion protocol addressed the paradoxical effects of emotional control, an attempt to undermine feelings and thoughts as reasons for actions, the workability of emotional control, and defusion of thoughts and feelings from the self. Thirty-two college students were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. No differences were found in the intensity of pain at post intervention, but participants in the acceptance and defusion condition were able to keep their hand in the cold water significantly longer than the other conditions at post-test. Participants in the acceptance condition also showed lower levels of belief in pain-oriented reasons for action than the other groups.

This cold pressor study was extended by a subsequent study that attempted to determine whether the acceptance and defusion exercises were important or whether it was the rationale itself that made a difference even if more traditional CBT exercises were used (Takahashi, Muto, Tada, & Sugiyama, 2002). An acceptance and defusion rationale was used in each of two active treatment conditions, but one also used the Leaves on the Stream mindfulness exercise (Hayes et al., 1999, p. 158-161) and the Physicalizing defusion exercise (Hayes et al., 1999; p. 170-171), both of which are designed to undermine the literal impact of difficult private events. The other condition used exercises designed to control pain. Participants (N=28) were randomly assigned to these conditions or to an attention-placebo control. Participants in the acceptance-based condition that included acceptance and defusion exercises but not those in the other two conditions showed positive changes in pain tolerance suggesting that acceptance and defusion exercises were necessary to produce the effect.

Another pain tolerance study (Gutierrez, Luciano, & Fink, 2004) examined the impact of a 20-minute long ACT acceptance, defusion and values intervention using the Card Exercise (Hayes et al., 1999, p. 162) and Swamp Metaphor (Hayes et al., 1999, p. 247-248) as compared to a cognitive and emotional change intervention. Pain levels were systematically raised throughout the study, and the randomly assigned participants (N=40) were paid to persist as long as they could in each condition. ACT participants showed significantly higher tolerance of pain, and significantly greater willingness to persist even after they said the pain levels had reached very high levels.
The effects of ACT acceptance techniques on tolerance of exposure to carbon dioxide (CO2)-enriched air (Felder, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003) was examined with 48 college students who scored high or low on the AAQ. Participants were randomly assigned either to a computerized acceptance-based condition that taught participants to observe and let go of a struggle with feelings during the exposure to CO2-enriched air or a similar condition that instructed participants to suppress their feelings during the CO2 inhalation. In the suppression condition but not the acceptance condition, individuals with high experiential avoidance reported greater levels of anxiety relative to those with low experiential avoidance. Participants with high experiential avoidance in comparison to those with low experiential avoidance reported greater levels of anxiety and affective distress, but not physiological arousal, in the exposure to the CO2.

In a similar study 60 highly anxious females were randomly assigned to a 10-minute acceptance condition (i.e., accepting and mindfully observing feelings; use of a physical version of the Chinese Finger Trap metaphor; Hayes et al., 1999, p. 104-105), a emotional-control condition (controlling psychological experiences by abdominal breathing), or a no-instruction condition (Eifert & Heffner, 2003). Compared to the control and non-instruction participants, those in the acceptance condition were less avoidant behaviorally and also reported less intense fear and cognitive symptoms. Participants in the acceptance group also reported greater willingness to return to the CO2-inhalation study than those in comparison groups.

The impact of a brief acceptance method on the exposure to CO2-enriched air has also been examined using individuals with panic disorder (Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004). Sixty patients were randomly assigned one of three 10-minute audiotaped interventions: acceptance, suppression and distraction. The acceptance-based condition drawn directly from the ACT manual (Hayes et al., 1999) and focused on the futile and paradoxical nature of experiential control, and the importance of focusing on behavior change in alignment with own values. The acceptance group showed significantly greater levels of willingness to participate in the biological challenge again and lower level of anxiety than those is comparison groups.

Processes of Change

A second method for studying processes of change is to attempt to measure their fluctuation during treatment outcome studies and to examine their relation to treatment condition and outcome. This section reviews several ACT intervention studies that have examined processes of change in ACT, generally focusing either on the AAQ, similar instruments that target a specific domain of experience (e.g., the CPAQ targets pain; Geiser, 1992; McCracken, 1999; McCracken et al., 2004), or on brief rating scales targeting acceptance or defusion. We will consider first those study that conducted formal mediational analyses followed by those that have reported processes of change data in less stringent fashion.

Mediational studies. One worksite stress reduction study randomly assigned 90 participants to received 9 hours of ACT, 9 hours of a behavioral program designed to teach workers to remove stressors in the workplace, or to be waitlisted (Bond & Bunce, 2000). At a 3 month follow-up, ACT was significantly better than the other groups on the GHQ, while both active treatment groups were improved in worksite stress reduction innovations. Using the steps as specified by Baron and Kenny (1986), the AAQ mediated GHQ outcomes but not workplace innovation at follow-up.

Type II diabetes requires emotionally challenging and consistent patterns of self-management, which is traditionally encouraged by detailed diabetes education. ACT plus diabetes education was compared to diabetes education alone in a trial that randomized 81 newly diagnosed poor and primarily minority diabetics to a one-day workshop for either approach
(Gregg, 2004). At three-month follow-up, ACT outperformed the control condition on changes in self-management behaviors and blood glucose (HbA1c) among those participants with a high HbA1c value. A version of the AAQ that targeted diabetes-related content, the Acceptance and Action Diabetes Questionnaire (AADQ; Gregg, 2004) was used as the mediator. Mediational analyses were conducted using the MacArthur model as specified by MacKinnon (2003) and showed that diabetes-related acceptance and action was a mediator of self-management behaviors but not change in HbA1c scores. Self-management changes also did not mediate blood glucose.

A study comparing ACT to Nicotine Replacement Therapy (NRT) for smoking cessation (Gifford et al., 2004) randomized 67 smokers either to NRT or seven individual and seven group sessions of ACT. ACT had significantly better outcomes at one-year follow-up (35% vs. 15%). The Avoidance and Inflexibility Scale (AIS), developed for this study, examined smokers endorsement of the need to avoid smoking related thoughts and feelings in order to maintain abstinence. Mediational analyses showed that the AIS passed all of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) steps for mediation.

A study compared ACT, multicultural training (MT), and education about the biology of addiction in terms of their effectiveness in reducing stigma toward clients and burnout among substance abuse counselors (Hayes et al., 2004). 93 counselors were randomized to a day-long, six-hour workshop in each condition. At follow-up, ACT, but not MT, was superior to the education condition on the frequency of stigmatizing attitudes; ACT was also significantly better than MT on burnout. The Stigmatizing Attitudes Believability Scale (SAB) was designed to measure defusion from stigmatizing thoughts towards substance abusing clients, as distinct from their form, frequency, or situational sensitivity. Mediational analyses were conducted using the MacArthur model as specified by MacKinnon (2003) and found that the SAB mediated both counselor burnout and stigmatizing attitudes in the ACT group but not the MT group as compared to education.

Gaudiano and Herbert (in press a; in press b) replicated Bach and Hayes (2002) with a better controlled but smaller study focused on coping with hallucinations or delusions among inpatients hospitalized with a primary psychotic disorder or mood disorder with psychotic features (N=29). In this study, enhanced treatment as usual (ETAU – enhanced so as to control for therapist contact) was compared to three sessions (on average) of ACT plus TAU. At discharge from the hospital, participants in the ACT condition showed significantly greater improvement in affective symptoms, overall improvement, social impairment, and distress associated with hallucinations. 50% of the ACT group showed a two standard deviation improvement on the BPRS as compared to 7% in the ETAU group. Although four month rehospitalization rates were 38% lower in the ACT group, this difference did not reach statistical significance. A rating of the believability of delusions or hallucinations was used as the process measure in this study. Only the ACT condition was found to result in lower believability ratings at post-intervention. Mediational analyses conducted as specified by Baron and Kenny (1986) found that believability of hallucinations mediated the relationship between frequency of hallucinations and associated distress at post-intervention.

A study of the distress produced by end-stage cancer (Branstetter, Wilson, Hildebrant, & Mutch, 2004) randomly assigned 120 cancer patients either to 12 sessions of ACT or traditional CBT focused on relaxation and cognitive restructuring. Treatment was delivered during chemotherapy or other medical visits. Patients were dying at too high a rate for meaningful follow-up but by session 12 ACT produced significantly greater reductions in distress, anxiety,
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy

and depression than traditional CBT. A mediation analysis using Sobel’s method (19xx) found that the Mental Disengagement subscale of the COPE (Carver, Scheier, & Wientraub, 1989), which includes items like “I go to movies or watch TV, to think about it less,” mediated the reduction in distress. Only the ACT condition reduced mental disengagement: this measure actually increased in the CBT condition.

Blackledge (2004) reports on the results of a within-subject analysis of a two-day ACT workshop delivered to parents/guardians of children diagnosed with autism (n=20). Significant improvements on measures of mental health (BDI, GHQ, GSI) were seen from pre treatment to a three month follow up. The AAQ and ATQ-B were both used as process measures in this study. From pre to post-workshop, ATQ-B scores improved, while both the AAQ and the ATQ-B improved at the three month follow-up. When ATQ-B post scores were used as a covariate, none of the pre to follow-up improvements remained significant, approximating the core of a mediational analysis using a within-subject design.

Zettle and Hayes (1986) compared ACT to two variants of cognitive therapy for depressed clients (N=18) delivered in a 12 week individual protocol. Since the two variants were virtually identical in outcomes, the two groups were combined for the main comparison. The same Beck-trained cognitive therapist delivered both ACT and CT. ACT was superior to CT at post on the BDI and at a two-month follow up on the Hamilton. ACT and CT differed significantly on the ATQ-B but not the ATQ at post. The groups also differed on reason-giving (see Addis and Jacobson, 1996 for a later version of this measure).

This small study is important for present purposes because it is one of a handful of studies so far that have directly compared ACT and CT. A formal mediational analysis was not reported in the original study, but the data were reanalyzed for the present article. The results will be reported in more detail here that the studies above since this analysis is original.

At the mid-point of treatment (week six), ACT and CT did not differ significantly in their BDI scores ($F(1, 16) = 2.81, p = .12$, ACT M = 12.05, SD = 7.15, CT M = 22.86, SD = 13.48, $d = 1.00$), but did differ significantly in their ATQ-B scores ($F(1, 16) = 2.81, p = .12$, ACT M = 49.0, SD = 10.95, CT M = 92.25, SD = 34.77, $d = 1.68$). The mid-point ATQ-B scores were then assessed for their role as a mediator of outcomes on the post-score BDI, which did reveal a significant difference in outcome ($F(1, 16) = 4.61, p < .05$, ACT M = 4.83, SD = 5.19, CT M = 19.42, SD = 16.01, $d = 1.23$). All four steps of the model suggested by MacKinnon (2003) were satisfied: 1) a Spearman above .2 between treatment condition and outcome (actual result = .50, $p = .033$); 2) a significant Spearman between treatment condition and the mediator (actual result = .60, $p = .008$), 3) a significant Spearman between the mediator and the outcome (actual result = .87, $p < .001$), and 4) a significant regression between the mediator and the outcome after condition is included in the model (Beta = .97, $t = 7.35, p < .001$). A similar analysis was then conducted on the follow-up Hamilton scores (HRS-D F-up) since this was the other variable showing significant outcome differences. The results were similar. Treatment condition correlated significantly with HRS-D F-up (.57, $p = .013$), and week 6 ATQ-B (reported above), which in turn correlated with HRS-D F-up (.88, $p < .001$). The regression between the week six ATQ-B and HRS-F F-up scores was significant after condition was included in the model (Beta = .87, $t = 5.35, p < .001$). Thus greater changes in the belieavability of depressogenic thoughts mediated the superior outcomes achieved by ACT.

**Other studies.** Several others studies have reported changes in process variables. Zettle (2003) compared ACT and systematic desensitization for math anxiety (N=24) and found equivalent reductions in math-related anxiety, but greater change in trait anxiety with systematic desensitization. Significantly greater reductions in math anxiety were found for ACT participants
who had higher initial levels of experiential avoidance as measured by the AAQ, but this was not true with desensitization.

Bach and Hayes (2003) compared four 45-minute sessions of ACT to treatment as usual (TAU) in a randomized trial helping inpatients cope with positive psychotic symptoms (n=80). Patients in the ACT condition had half the rate of rehospitalization over a four month follow-up period. ACT was found to result in significantly lower believability ratings of psychotic symptoms (e.g., rating whether the delusions/hallucinations were literally true) at the four month follow up. Overall symptom reduction was less in the ACT group than the TAU group. An interesting pattern was found only in the ACT group, where rehospitalization rates were much lower (about 25% of the rate) for patients who admitted psychotic symptoms than for those who did not. This pattern was interpreted as an indication that ACT undermined denial and thus symptom admission was an indication of greater acceptance in the ACT group. In line with that view, no one in the ACT condition was rehospitalized who both admitted symptoms and viewed them as less believable.

McCracken, Vowles, & Eccleston (in press) reported the effects of a three to four week residential/inpatient treatment for chronic pain conditions based on ACT (n=108). Significant improvements in emotional, social, and physical functioning as well as lower health care utilization was found following treatment. The CPAQ improved significantly with acceptance-based treatment, and changes in this measure were significantly associated with change in five of nine outcome variables examined, including depression, pain-related anxiety, physical and psychosocial disability, and the ability to stand and sit rapidly in a timed test.

ACT plus habit reversal was compared to a wait list control for the treatment of trichotillomania in a small (N = 25) randomized trial reported by Woods, Wetterneck, and Flessner, (in press). Wait list subjects then received the combination treatment. Self reported and objectively verified hair pulling decreased significantly with treatment, was maintained at a three month follow up and correlated .57 with changes in the AAQ.

Block (2002) conducted a small randomized trial (N=39) comparing ACT, cognitive-behavioral group therapy (CBGT), and a waitlist control. Both active groups were superior to the wait list on most measures. Participants in the ACT condition stayed longer in an arranged public speaking situation than those in the other groups post-treatment, and showed larger reductions in distress during the speech (Cohen’s d within-condition effect-sizes for distress of 1.37 for ACT, versus .67 for CBGT and -.02 for the wait list). Willingness to experience anxiety also increased more pre to post for ACT (Cohen’s d within-condition effect-sizes for willingness of 1.03, .38, and -.42 for the ACT, CBGT, and wait list conditions respectively). The pre-differences among groups approached significance, however (ACT participants were generally more severe) so regression to the mean is a possible explanation for these results. Examining only the post-scores on the primary outcome variable (length of time in a public speaking situation), however, the effect sizes were d= .49 and .52 for ACT as compared to CBGT and the control, respectively, which is particularly supportive given the trends at pre-assessment.

Another study examined the treatment of polysubstance abusing individuals being maintained on methadone (Bissett, 2001; Hayes et al., 2004). Participants (N=124) were randomly assigned to either ACT, Intensive Twelve-Step Facilitation, or to methadone maintenance only. In the two active treatments, participants received 32 individual and 16 group sessions. At the six-month follow-up participants in the ACT condition demonstrated a greater decrease in objectively measured (through monitored urinalysis) total drug use than did methadone maintenance alone; and greater decreases in self-reported total drug use than both of
the other conditions. ITSF includes a significant acceptance component and there were few process differences between ACT and ITSF, but there were a number of process differences between ACT and the control condition. For example, the ratio of ATQ and ATQ-B (or a similar ratio focused on reasons for using drugs) differed between the ACT and control conditions. There are problems in this study at the level of processes of change, however. For example, the AAQ did not change in any condition. A large number of processes measures were used and the reader is referred to Bissett (2001) for more details.

In a small (N = 22) randomized trial on self-harm and emotional dysregulation among Borderline Personality Disordered patients, Gratz and Gunderson (in press) compared treatment as usual to a short group consisting of ACT and DBT. About two-thirds of the sessions appeared to have been drawn from ACT. Large between group effects were found at post on measure of self harm (d = .98) and emotional dysregulation (d = 1.84). Unusually larger effects were found on the AAQ (d = 3.08).

**Summary of mediational and processes of change results.** Several weaknesses can be noted in these studies. Many of the measures used in these studies lack published data regarding their psychometric properties. The mediational analyses have often (but not always) used processes measures taken after outcomes began to improve significantly. These results rely almost exclusively on self-reported processes measures, often with measures of high face validity. Behavioral and observer measures of hypothesized process variables would considerably improve the strength of claims of mediation. The AAQ, a general measure designed primarily for population based studies tends not to be as reactive as measures more focused on ACT relevant processes in specific targeted problems areas, but these are generally less well established. The measures used also target a small number of putative processes, leaving other parts of the overall model untested.

Despite these weaknesses, in broad terms these results seem to be supportive and relatively consistent. This is particularly encouraging in light of the relatively low power of some of these trials, and in light of the known difficulties in CBT or psychological interventions generally in obtaining consistent mediational results across several studies. So far, the ACT model seems to be holding up relatively well in these early tests, although a great deal more work remains to be done.

**ACT Clinical Outcome Studies**

The within condition and between condition effect sizes for the ACT outcome literature (including studies with a direct applied purpose and excluding analogue studies) are shown in Table 2. In most of these studies, ACT was compared to an active treatment condition that was expected, or had previously been shown, to affect the targeted problem. In a few cases wait list or placebo controls were used or used in addition. Summarizing across the entire literature on the primary outcome variable targeted (see Table 2 for our judgments in that regard), and weighting average effect sizes by the number of cases that produced the effect, ACT has produced within-condition effect sizes (using Cohen’s d) of 1.11 at post (N=253) and 1.26 at follow-up (N = 210). Between condition effect sizes for comparisons between ACT and manualized active treatments were .49 at post (N = 322) and .69 at follow-up (N = 218); for comparisons with wait list, educational, treatment as usual, or placebo treatments the effect sizes were .97 at post (N = 280) and 1.58 at follow-up (N = 286: the increase in N at follow-up being due to some studies that only collected follow-up data). Across the dataset, follow-ups, when they occurred, ranged from 8 to 52 weeks with a weighted average of 27.2 weeks.
As these results apply to the ACT model it seems worth noting that when ACT and ACT components are compared to traditional CBT or its elements, differences in both outcome and process of change are usually obtained. Considering only the studies that have directly compared ACT and traditional CT or CBT (Block, 2002; Branstetter et al., 2004; Zettle & Hayes, 1986; Zettle & Rains, 1987) between condition effect sizes were .73 at post (range: .49 to 1.23) and .83 (range: .79 to .92) at follow-up in favor of the ACT approach on primary outcome measures. The total number of participants in these four studies is still very small however (N = 96 and 39 at post and follow-up, respectively). On primary processes of change measures specified from an ACT model, the between condition effect sizes were 3.32 at post (N = 96) and .74 at follow-up (N = 39). These data provide an initial indication that ACT and CT or CBT impact change processes differently, although far more work needs to be done to be certain of that conclusion. As was noted earlier some of these trials have been conducted by Beck trained clinicians (Zettle & Hayes, 1986; Zettle & Rains, 1987), so some competence in CT or CBT can be assumed, but these studies are also being conducted by researchers interested in ACT, so bias is possible. Larger scale studies and broader effectiveness trials that those current conducted (Strosahl et al., 1998) will be needed to tease out these issues. Some of these studies are in fact underway and preliminary data have been reported (e.g., Herbert xxx 2004), thus more evidence seems likely soon.

Discussion

ACT is part of a larger movement in the behavioral and cognitive therapies toward the use of mindfulness and acceptance (Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2004). The long delay between the earliest studies on ACT (Zettle & Hayes, 1986) and its publication as a book length model and manual (Hayes et al., 1999) allowed time for the development of a theoretical account for these processes based on a comprehensive experimental program in human language and cognition (Hayes et al., 2001). The present article is the first to consider whether that investment has lead to a progressive model of psychopathology and its treatment.

Reviewing the entire body of evidence suggests that the ACT model seems so far to be working across a relatively broad range of problems, and across a range of severity from psychosis to interventions for ordinary people (e.g., worksite stress interventions). It appears that the processes targeted by ACT are not targeted, or are not targeted as efficiently, by the other empirically supported treatments examined so far, including traditional cognitive and cognitive-behavioral therapy. It also appears that the processes being targeted seem to work in broadly similar ways across a wide range of settings and populations.

It is worth noting that many of these ACT interventions are quite short. That is probably due more to the stage of the research program than to the preferences of clinical researchers. Extensive treatment protocols are difficult and expensive to mount, and it is natural in the early stages of a research program to conduct constrained and typically unfunded studies (e.g., in the form of theses and dissertations), The relatively inductive approach being followed also leads toward small and relatively short studies. The data so far seem supportive despite these limitations, but as the literature matures it will be import to learn how to build these methods out into more comprehensive programs targeting the range of clinical needs being addressed.

This research program is still very young, despite its nominal chronological age, since so much time has been devoted to developing the basic foundation of the approach. As a result, many aspects of the model have received little attention as yet. While beyond the scope of this article, RFT is also developing rapidly and is beginning to model applied processes from the bottom up. In the ideal world these two research programs will merge. For example, if the
overall theory is valid it should be possible to create cognitive fusion and then use a variety of
techniques to dismantle it – all in the experimental laboratory. These procedures would then be
able to be applied and tested directly in the clinic.

In the earliest days of behavior therapy translational research of that kind was both
possible and common, but it is rarely seen today. The ACT / RFT program is focused on
producing a new form of behavior psychology more adequate to the challenge of the human
condition that is coherent from the most basic study to the most applied. Whether that “back to
the future” vision will come to pass only tomorrow will tell. This article shows, however, that
there is emerging support for the ACT model and the processes and components it specifies.
References


Figure 1. An ACT / RFT model of psychopathology.
Figure 2. A model of psychological processes ACT seeks to strengthen.
Table 1.
Studies included in the meta-analysis that examines the average relationship between the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ) and measures of psychopathology and quality of life

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<td>Anxiety about pain*</td>
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<tr>
<td>McCracken &amp; Eccleston (2003)</td>
<td>Daily functioning hampered by pain*</td>
<td>-.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>McCracken et al. (2004)</td>
<td>Medication taken for pain*</td>
<td>-.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pistorello (1998)</td>
<td>Symptom Checklist-90-R</td>
<td>-.53</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BDI</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polusny (1998)</td>
<td>IES intrusion experiences</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDS re-experiencing</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDS arousal</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sexual experiences survey: extent of adolescent sexual victimisation</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict tactics scale-2: physical assault subscale</td>
<td>-.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stewart et al. (2002)</td>
<td>Anxiety sensitivity index</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beck Anxiety Inventory</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toarmino et al. (1997)</td>
<td>Symptom Checklist-90-R</td>
<td>-.49</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Beck Anxiety Inventory</td>
<td>-.35</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fear of intimacy</td>
<td>-.33</td>
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</table>

Note. r = Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient representing the relationship between the AAQ and the listed measure. Negative correlations indicate that lower levels of psychological flexibility are related to worse levels of psychopathology and quality of life. * Acceptance measured with the Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire (CPAQ)
Table 2: ACT Outcome Literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Problem focus</th>
<th>Primary Measure</th>
<th>Comparison condition</th>
<th>d (N)</th>
<th>d (N) Post</th>
<th>F-up</th>
<th>Weeks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bach &amp; Hayes, 2002</td>
<td>Psychosis</td>
<td>Rehospitalization</td>
<td>Treatment as Usual</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.45 (70)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Block, 2002</td>
<td>Social phobia</td>
<td>Speaking time</td>
<td>Group CBT</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.49 (26)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Block, 2002</td>
<td>Social phobia</td>
<td>Speaking time</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.52 (26)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bond &amp; Bunce, 2000</td>
<td>Work Stress</td>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>Wait list control</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.72 (60)</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bond &amp; Bunce, 2000</td>
<td>Work Stress</td>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>Workplace Innovation</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8 (60)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Branstetter et al, 2004</td>
<td>End stage Cancer</td>
<td>Distress</td>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9 (31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dahl et al., 2004</td>
<td>Chronic pain</td>
<td>Sick leave (days)</td>
<td>Treatment as Usual</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.17 (19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gaudiano &amp; Herbert, in press</td>
<td>Psychosis</td>
<td>Clinically large BPRS</td>
<td>Enhanced TAU</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.11 (29)</td>
<td>**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gifford et al., 2004</td>
<td>Smoking</td>
<td>Not smoking</td>
<td>Nicotine patch</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06 (62)</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gratz &amp; Gunderson, in press</td>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>Self harm</td>
<td>Treatment as Usual</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.98 (22)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gregg, 2004</td>
<td>Type II Diabetes Stigma and Burnout Stigma and Burnout Polysubstance abuse</td>
<td>Self management of diabetes</td>
<td>Diabetes education</td>
<td>3.63*</td>
<td>3.63* (78)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hayes, Bissett, et al, 2004</td>
<td>Maslach Burnout Inventory</td>
<td>Biological Education</td>
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<td>.61</td>
<td>0.61 (59)</td>
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<td>Hayes, Bissett, et al, 2004</td>
<td>Maslach Burnout Inventory</td>
<td>Multicultural Training</td>
<td>0.26 (64)</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.57 (59)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hayes, Wilson et al, 2004</td>
<td>Objective UA of drug use</td>
<td>Methadone Maintenance</td>
<td>0.41 (51)</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95 (43)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hayes, Wilson et al, 2004</td>
<td>Objective UA of drug use</td>
<td>12-step plus Methadone</td>
<td>.04 (45)</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23 (44)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Levitt et al., 2004</td>
<td>Agoraphobia</td>
<td>Willingness to do exposure</td>
<td>Distraction</td>
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<td>0.81 (40)</td>
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<td>Levitt et al., 2004</td>
<td>Agoraphobia</td>
<td>Willingness to do exposure</td>
<td>Supression</td>
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<td>0.67 (40)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woods et al., in press</td>
<td>Trichotilomania</td>
<td>MGH-HS (Hair pulling)</td>
<td>Wait list</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.72 (25)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zettle &amp; Hayes, 1986</td>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>BDI</td>
<td>Cognitive Therapy</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.23 (18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zettle &amp; Rains, 1989</td>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>BDI</td>
<td>Cognitive Therapy</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.53 (21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zettle, 2003</td>
<td>Math anxiety</td>
<td>MARS (Matho anxiety)</td>
<td>Systematic desensitization</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.55 (24)</td>
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**Within Group Effects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Disorder</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Effect Size</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Time (w)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Block, 2002</td>
<td>Social phobia</td>
<td>Speaking time</td>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>0.68</td>
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<td>GHQ</td>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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<td>Gaudiano &amp; Herbert, in press</td>
<td>Psychosis</td>
<td>BPRS</td>
<td>Enhanced TAU</td>
<td>2.02</td>
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<td>Gratz &amp; Gunderson, in press</td>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>Self harm</td>
<td>ACT/DBT within</td>
<td>0.76</td>
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<td>Gregg, 2004</td>
<td>Type II Diabetes</td>
<td>Self management of diabetes</td>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>Haynes, Bissett et al, 2004</td>
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<td>Maslach Burnout Inventory</td>
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<td>Haynes, Wilson et al, 2004</td>
<td>Polysubstance</td>
<td>Objective UA of drug use</td>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>1.94</td>
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<td>McCracken et al., in press</td>
<td>Chronic pain</td>
<td>Psychosocial disability</td>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>108</td>
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<td>Twohig et al., in press</td>
<td>OCD</td>
<td>OCI-D</td>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>3.08</td>
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<td>MGH-HS</td>
<td>ACT/HR within</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MGH-HS</td>
<td>ACT/HR within (crossover)</td>
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<td>ACT</td>
<td>2.64</td>
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* based on difference scores since pre-scores were different between groups
** the effect size on the raw BPRS scores was .52