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Sublime Subjects and Ticklish Objects in Early Modern English Utopias

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SUBLIME SUBJECTS AND TICKLISH OBJECTS IN
EARLY MODERN ENGLISH UTOPIAS

by

STEPHEN DANIEL MILLS

Under the Direction of Dr. Calvin Thomas and Dr. Paul J. Voss

ABSTRACT

Critical theory has historically situated the beginning of the “modern” era of subjectivity near the end of the seventeenth century. Michel Foucault himself once said in an interview that modernity began with the writings of the late seventeenth-century philosopher Benedict Spinoza. But an examination of early modern English utopian literature demonstrates that a modern notion of subjectivity can be found in texts that pre-date Spinoza. In this dissertation, I examine four utopian texts—Thomas More’s Utopia, Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis, Margaret Cavendish’s Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World, and Henry Neville’s Isle of Pines—through the paradigm of Jacques Lacan’s tripartite model of subjectivity—the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real. To mediate between Lacan’s psychoanalytic model and the historical aspects of these texts, such as their relationship with print culture and their engagement with po-
itical developments in seventeenth-century England, I employ the theories of the Marxist-
Lacanian philosopher, Slavoj Žižek, to show that “early modern” subjectivity is in fact no dif-
ferent from critical theory’s “modern” subject, despite pre-dating the supposed inception of such
subjectivity. In addition, I engage with other prominent theorists, including Fredric Jameson,
Jacques Derrida, and Donna Haraway, to come to an understanding about the ways in which crit-
ical theory can be useful to understand not only early modern literature, but also the contempo-
rary, “real” world and the subjectivity we all seek to attain.

INDEX WORDS: Utopia, Thomas More, New Atlantis, Francis Bacon, Blazing World, Margaret
Cavendish, Isle of Pines, Henry Neville, Slavoj Žižek, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Fredric Jameson
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DEDICATION

Dedicated to Zora Edna Mills, my reason for being.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING UTOPIA

It is true that this isolated “being”—foreign to what is not it—is the form in which existence and truth at first appeared to you. It is to this irreducible difference—which you are—that you must relate the sense of each object. Yet the unity which you are flees from you and escapes: this unity would only be a dreamless slumber if chance disposed of it according to your most anxious will.

*Georges Bataille - Inner Experience*

Utopia is a state of mind. It is not a socially-constructed psychological state or an ideology, but merely an attitude, a specific state of consciousness. Achieving utopia may not happen, but if an individual’s utopia appears, it arrives at the very moment of individuation.\(^1\) To illustrate this definition I will examine Thomas More’s (1478-1535) seminal *Utopia* (1516) and three seventeenth-century utopian texts by employing the tripartite model of subjectivity developed by French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901-1981): the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real. Thomas More’s *Utopia* demonstrates all three of Lacan’s orders; Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) *New Atlantis* (1624) demonstrates the Symbolic order; Margaret Cavendish’s (1623-1673) *The Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World* (1666) demonstrates the Imaginary order; and Henry Neville’s (1620-1694) *The Isle of Pines* (1668) demonstrates the Lacanian Real. Literary critic Malcolm Bowie (1943-2007) has called this three-part model the “unholy trinity”: “The would be truth-seeker will find that the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real are an unholy trinity whose members could as easily be called Fraud, Absence, and Impossibility” (112). To

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\(^1\) This differs from Fatima Viera’s assertion that utopia “is to be seen as a matter of attitude, as a kind of reaction to an undesirable present and an aspiration to overcome all difficulties by the imagination of possible alternatives” (7).
mediate between the historical and psychoanalytical implications of these utopian texts, I will employ the Marxist-Lacanian model of Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek (b.1949).

Although Lacan began his career as a psychoanalyst, his lasting contributions to twentieth century intellectual history stand alongside the practitioners of continental philosophy and Critical Theory. He published very little during his lifetime and much of the development of his thought has become available only in the posthumous publications of transcriptions of his Seminars. Lacan has, however, remained important to psychoanalysis and talk therapy among a small number of practicing Lacanian psychoanalysts. Bruce Fink, for example, has published widely on Lacan from both the perspective of clinical psychology as well as that of Lacan’s place in intellectual history. According to Bruce Fink, Lacan “finds the concept of subjectivity indispensable and explores what it means to be a subject, how one comes to be a subject, the conditions responsible for the failure to become a subject (leading to psychosis), and the tools [. . .] to induce a ‘precipitation of subjectivity’” (The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance xi). Through Lacan’s understanding of subjectivity, I will demonstrate the entirely psychological state of utopianism in the four literary texts listed above.

**THE SYMBOLIC ORDER: FRANCIS BACON’S NEW ATLANTIS**

Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis* exemplifies Lacan’s notion of the Symbolic order. For Lacan, the Symbolic order resides in the strict law of language. By implication, Lacan’s notion of the Symbolic order corresponds most closely to the Old Testament, the part of Christianity that provided the *Pentateuch*, the Law of Moses, and demonstrated its applications and transgressions through the subsequent individual books of the Hebrew Bible. In addition, the Symbolic resides alongside the notion of a Father, or in Lacanian terms, the Name-of-the-father. God
the father gave Moses, the primary patriarch of the Old Testament, the law and commanded he spread it to the subsequent patriarchs that served as subjects for the rest of the Old Testament.

Lacan’s Symbolic order is very unforgiving. He argues that the Symbolic realm, which constitutes that of language, ushers in subjectivity: “The subject sets itself up as operating, as human, as I, from the moment the symbolic system appears” (Seminar II 52). But Lacan recognizes that initiation into the Symbolic order does not necessitate the literal act of speech on the part of the subject: “Development only takes place in so far as the subject integrates himself into the symbolic system, acts within it, asserts himself in it through the use of genuine speech. It isn't even essential, you should note, that this speech be his own” (Seminar I 86). In other words, the Symbolic order descends upon the soon-to-be Lacanian “subject” without his or her having any way of questioning it or stopping it. It simply becomes part of the reality for this subject, who becomes a subject immediately upon its introduction. Lacan argues that subjectivity via the Symbolic order comes about through conscious and unconscious submission to mutual and all-encompassing difference within the system of “law”: the subject “enters into the symbolic relation of I and you, in a relation of cultural recognition and transcendence, into the order of a law which is already quite ready to encompass the history of each individual” (Seminar I 177). Lacan’s subject, in other words, receives the Symbolic order through culture and this serves the subjects’ differentiation from the Other.

The Symbolic order for Lacan constitutes and is constituted by law, i.e., the Law, the Name-of-the-Father. Dylan Evans describes the Name-of-the-father in very political and legal terms by assigning it “the legislative and prohibitive function of the symbolic father” (119). Lacan’s Symbolic order precisely describes the orderly society Bensalem. The very patriarchal Bensalem and its seat of government, the House of Solomon, constitute an extremely disciplined
society and most closely demonstrate Lacan’s notion of the Symbolic order through strict codes of conduct for the inhabitants and visitors to the island society. The Feast of the Family, a very patriarchal ceremony and holiday in Bensalem, calls to mind Lacan’s notion of the Name-of-the-father. In addition, women play virtually no role in both the society of Bensalem as well as the narrative Bacon presents in *The New Atlantis*. Žižek writes that the “symbolic space acts like a yardstick against which I can measure myself [. . .] the ‘God’ who watches over me from beyond, and over all real individuals” (*How to Read Lacan* 9). This closely describes the House of Solomon in Bensalem, the seat of government that keeps a watchful eye of the entire island society.

**THE IMAGINARY ORDER: MARGARET CAVENDISH’S *A DESCRIPTION OF A NEW WORLD, CALLED THE BLAZING WORLD***

The Symbolic order does not hold complete control over the “subject,” and the subject can with relative ease move in and out of the Imaginary order. Lacan distinguishes the Symbolic from the Imaginary thus:

[I]t's the symbolic relation which defines the position of the subject as seeing. It is speech, the symbolic relation, which determines the greater or lesser degree of perfection, of completeness, of approximation, of the imaginary. This representation allows us to draw the distinction between [. . .] the ideal ego and the ego-ideal. The ego-ideal governs the interplay of relations on which all relations with others depend. And on this relation to others depends the more or less satisfying character of the imaginary structuration. (*Seminar I* 141)

“Ego-ideal” refers to the “signifier operating as ideal, an internalized plan of the law, the guide governing the subject’s position in the symbolic order, and hence identification” (Evans 52).
This ego-ideal “signifier” operates paradoxically as the “ideal,” or rather the Saussurean notion of the “sign” or “signified,” which in many ways resembles Plato’s notion of the ideal. The “ideal-ego” refers to that which “always accompanies the ego, as an ever-present attempt to regain the omnipotence of the preoedipal dual relation” (Evans 52). The Imaginary in other words rests in a realm that relies upon elements of metaphor, symbolization, allegory, etc. In this order, the Other becomes an important concept, as it takes the place of the Symbolic gaze that the House of Solomon represents. According to Žižek, the “Ego-Ideal is the agency whose gaze I try to impress with my ego image, the big Other who watches over me and impels me to give my best, the ideal I try to follow and actualize” (How to Read Lacan 80). In essence the subject governs himself unconsciously because of indoctrination into the Symbolic order.

In Margaret Cavendish’s Blazing World, the Empress acts without any oversight, however, and thus corresponds with Lacan’s Imaginary order. The protagonist of The Blazing World, the Empress, immediately demonstrates challenges to the law and to the status quo immediately after the native inhabitants of the Blazing World make her Emperor. Despite her attacks on science, the native inhabitants of the Blazing World frequently speak of the Empress as a messiah. And finally, the Empress demonstrates her fraudulent ascension, firstly, by bringing the text’s author, Cavendish herself, into the Blazing World, and secondly, by choosing to retreat into her own mind, narcissistically turning her back on the responsibilities she assumed by accepting the position of Empress. Žižek argues that the ego becomes split in the Imaginary order into the “ideal ego” and the “ego ideal”: the “ideal ego is imaginary, what Lacan calls the ‘small other,’ the idealized mirror-image of my ego”; in other words, the ideal ego represents “the way I would like to be, the way I would like others to see me” (How to Read Lacan 80). This precisely de-
scribes the way in which the Duchess in Cavendish’s *Blazing World* attempts to assimilate both within and above the society that has put her in charge.

Lacan’s notion of the Imaginary order corresponds most closely with that of New Testament, the dialectical marriage of man and deity through the unseeable Holy Ghost. It thus also aligns with notions of the savior or son and the alienation that comes with challenging the law, or Symbolic order. Lacan locates the Imaginary order near the differentiation the subject has with the literal and Symbolic father: “the narcissistic or imaginary relation to the father is distinct from the symbolic relation, and also from the relation that we really do have to call real -which is residual with respect to the edifice which commands our attention in analysis (Seminar I 66).

Lacan argues that the Imaginary resides within the challenge to the status quo and allows the ego-driven subject to challenge the law of the Symbolic order: “the subject, having projected his sadism, sees it coming back from these objects, and, by this very fact, finds himself jammed up by an anxious fear, don't you have the feeling that we are in the domain of the imaginary?” (Seminar I 74). For Lacan, the Imaginary represents an adversarial challenge to the Symbolic. Lacan also argues that the ego itself resides within the Imaginary order:

In its most essential aspect, the ego is an imaginary function. That is a discovery yielded by experience, and not a category which I might almost qualify as a priori, like that of the symbolic. On account of this point, I would almost say on account of this point alone, we find in human experience a door opened out on to an element of typicality. (Seminar II 36)

Lacan again locates the ego in the Imaginary:

The ego is inscribed in the imaginary. Everything pertaining to the ego is inscribed in imaginary tensions, like all the other libidinal tensions. Libido and the
ego are on the same side. Narcissism is libidinal. The ego isn't a superior power, nor a pure spirit, nor an autonomous agency, nor a conflict-free sphere - as some dare to write - in which we could find some support. ([Seminar II 326].)

The Empress in *The Blazing World* does closely follow this model; she does not represent a “superior power,” but merely a challenge to tradition and the status quo. Nevertheless, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 3, the native inhabitants of the Blazing World treat the Empress as a savior.

Dylan Evans argues that the Imaginary “has connotations of illusion, fascination and seduction, and relates specifically to the dual relation between the Ego and the specular Image” (82). Evans defines the dual relation as that which “is characterized by illusions of similarity, symmetry, and reciprocity” (49) and he define Lacan’s notion of “specular image” as “referring to the reflection of one’s own body in the mirror, the image of oneself which is simultaneously oneself and Other” (190). He continues: “The imaginary is thus the order of surface appearances which are deceptive, observable phenomena which hide underlying structure” (82), or, in Bowie’s words, fraud. Although he does not refer to Lacan, Jean Baudrillard places alienation within the Imaginary: “‘Alienation’ is still the imaginary of the subject, even of the subject of history. The subject does not have to become a total man again, the subject does not have to rediscover himself” (176). The Empress in *The Blazing World* consistently makes errors in judgment yet receives no advice or corrective action from the populace who has put her into power; she thus overtly personifies fraud. The Empress represents a significantly subversive element to the Blazing World. Baudrillard in kind sees as part of utopia a subversive element: “Utopia seeks speech against power and against the reality principle, which is the only phantasm of the system and of its indefinite reproduction. It only wants speech, and only to lose itself in it” (177). Indeed, the
Empress’s lengthy question and answer session with the scientists of the Blazing World amounts to no new understandings on the part of the Empress, and ultimately represents only a series of word games and unnecessary speech into which the Empress gets lost.

**THE REAL: HENRY NEVILLE’S *THE ISLE OF PINES***

Lacan’s notion of the Real corresponds with the child, the pre-Oedipal, the post-law, impossibility, revelation, and apocalypse. According to Bruce Fink, the real corresponds with an infant’s body before it comes under the sway of the Symbolic order, before it is subjected to toilet training and instructed in the ways of the world. In the course of socialization, the body is progressively written or overwritten with signifiers; pleasure is localized in certain zones, while other zones are neutralized by the word and coaxed into compliance with social, behavioral norms. (*Lacanian Subject*, 24)

Fink qualifies the Real by writing that it “does not exist, since it precedes language” (*Lacanian Subject*, Fink’s emphasis, 25). The real represents “that which has not been symbolized, remains to be symbolized, or even resists symbolization; and it may perfectly well exist ‘alongside’ and in spite of a speaker’s considerable linguistic capabilities” (Fink, his emphasis, *Lacanian Subject* 25). Žižek argues that the “figuration of the Real” consists of:

- first, the real of the lamella, of the terrifying formless Thing; then the scientific Real, the real of a formula that expresses nature’s automatic and senseless functioning [. . .]. The difference hinges on the different starting point: if we start with the Imaginary [. . .] we get the Real in its imaginary dimension, the horrifying primordial image that cancels the imagery itself; if we start with the Symbolic [. . .]
we get language deprived of the wealth of its human sense, transformed into the real of a meaningless formula. (How To Read Lacan 66)

Žižek also claims that “for Lacan the Real, at its most radical, has to be totally desubstantialized. It is not an external thing, but the fissure within the symbolic network itself. The Real as the monstrous Thing behind the veil of appearances is the ultimate lure that lends itself easily to New Age appropriation” (How to Read Lacan 72). The arrangements on the Isle of Pines certainly appear “New Age” in their reliance on the disintegration of marital law and custom. As Dylan Evans argues, “the real is the impossible [. . .] because it is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into the symbolic order, and impossible to attain in any way. It is this character of impossibility and of resistance to symbolization which lends the real its essentially traumatic quality” (160). Indeed, the traumatic shipwreck serves as a tame precursor to the “impossible” polygamy and the traumatic civil war that eventually erupts on the island.

The four survivors of the shipwreck in Henry Neville’s The Isle of Pines immediately begin to procreate and over the course of four generations of their offspring humanity itself regresses, with the inhabitants ultimately wearing no clothes and falling into tribal warfare. The society on the Isle of Pines indeed seems “impossible” in its depiction of sexual anarchy and wanton procreation (the society eventually numbers 10,000). It also approximates the pre-linguistic aspects of the Lacanian Real, as it depicts humanity in as far of a regression as possible in a post-linguistic, Symbolic world. As Lacan’s Real also exists in the realm of post-Symbolic law, the Isle of Pines also represents horrific lawlessness in the civil war that eventually destroys the society. The destruction creates on a microcosmic scale a literal apocalypse. Indeed, as Frank Manuel argues, “the greatest distinction between the sixteenth- and eighteenth century utopias lies in the redreaming of ideal sexual and marital happiness” ("Toward a Psychological
History of Utopias" 78). Žižek argues that “the Real is the impossible hard core which we cannot confront directly, but only through the lenses of a multitude of symbolic fictions, virtual formations [and] this very hard core is purely virtually, actually non-existent” (The Parallax View 26). In The Isle of Pines, Neville creates a society that through his own authorial choices he does not allow the reader to see directly. The narrative of The Isle of Pines uses multiple narratives frames to further remove the reader and audience from the “reality” of the entirely “unreal” or “impossible” societal arrangements on the island.

In the following I provide a survey of utopian studies scholarship by categorizing individual studies into the appropriate domain of Lacan’s tripartite model.

UTOPIAN STUDIES THAT ILLUSTRATE LACAN’S SYMBOLIC ORDER

Formal (which might suggest “Symbolic”) studies of utopia have appeared. In “Varieties of Literary Utopias,” (1966), literary critic Northrop Frye (1912-1991) argues that “utopia is a speculative myth” and that “The utopian writer looks at his own society first and tries to see what, for his purposes, its significant elements are. The utopia itself shows what society would be like if those elements were fully developed” (25, 26). The notion of “fully developed” suggests some level of perfection, a kind of completion with a monolithic stability similar to Law. He also writes that utopia relies upon “a corresponding increase in the amount of ritual habit necessary to life, and a new ritual habit must be conscious, and so constraining, before it becomes automatic or unconscious” (28). In Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis, the “Symbolic” utopia of this present study, the society’s inhabitants engage in many ritualistic and repetitive activities simply because of tradition. In the very formalist but highly influential Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian writing, 1516-1700 (1981), J.C. Davis argues that utopia has three characteristics: “It is fictional, it describes a particular state or community, and its theme is
the political structure of that fictional state or community” (16). Davis goes on to argue that utopia must deal with “the totality of change envisaged, its closed-society nature, and the order of stability of the new establishment” (19). Bensalem in Bacon’s *New Atlantis* certainly qualifies as a “closed-society.”

Utopian studies have also frequently focused on the authoritarian nature of societies depicted in utopian texts, readings of utopian thought, and utopian studies in general. In *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (first published in German in 1929 and in English in 1936), Hungarian sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) argues that an understanding of “the functions of the press, or the popularization of knowledge and of propaganda contribute[s] to a more precise conception of the role of ideas in political and social movements and of the value of knowledge as an instrument in controlling social reality” (xxix). Mannheim here interestingly links early printing to control of the populace. Mannheim also claims that “Utopias too transcend the social situation, for they too orient conduct towards elements which the situation, in so far as it is realized at the time, does not contain. But they are not ideologies, i.e. they are not ideologies in the measure and in so far as they succeed through counteractivity in transforming the existing historical reality into one more in accord with their own conception” (195-6); Mannheim in other words argues for an unconscious self-justifying subjectivity formed by external, state-driven pressure. Mannheim also argues that creativity can exist in utopia: “The belief that the significance of individual creative power is to be denied is the most widespread misunderstanding of the findings of sociology” (206). He also argues that true utopias represent becoming and not being (224). In ”Utopia, the City and the Machine” (1966), Lewis Mumford argues that there exists an “authoritarian nature of […] many utopias” (3). He goes on to argue that authoritarianism has remained a part of utopia: “the utopian ideal of total control from
above, absolute obedience below, never entirely passed out of existence” (19). Mannheim and Mumford both acknowledge the importance of strictly controlling the utopian state.

Much of Marxist critical theorist Fredric Jameson’s (b. 1934) work has come near to utopian studies as well. In *Marxism and Form* (1971), Jameson claims that “in the older society [. . .] Utopian thought represented a diversion of revolutionary energy into idle wish-fulfillment and imaginary satisfactions,” whereas more recent Utopian thought “has undergone a dialectical reversal. Now it is practical thinking which everywhere represents a capitulation to the system itself, and stands as a testimony to the power of that system to transform even its adversaries into its own mirror image” (110-1). Jameson’s dichotomy of “older” utopian thought and “newer” utopian thought illustrates very clearly the typical prejudice leveled by critical theorists against pre- or even early modern intellectual history, as Jameson seems to imply that on the very day of Immanuel Kant’s birth the modern age instantly began.

In *The Political Unconscious* (1981), Jameson argues that “In its contemporary form, the critique of such identity theory argues not merely that the concept of ‘totality’ is here a code word for Absolute Spirit, but that a whole vision of history is herein perpetuated, in which Utopia (read: communism) is understood as achieving its ultimate identity by the obliteration of difference through sheer force” (51). Although not alone in doing so, Jameson here conflates utopia with communism in a very dangerous and counterproductive essentialist statement. This gesture calls to mind the cliché notion that “one man’s utopia is another man’s dystopia.” Jameson also refers to and seeks to undermine Ernst Bloch’s “Utopia fantasies of plenty” (86) and concludes that “it is the proposition that all class consciousness—or in other words, all ideology in the strongest sense, including the most exclusive forms of ruling class consciousness just as
much as that of oppositional or oppressed classes—is in its very nature Utopia” (289). Jameson’s figuration of utopia here sounds very totalitarian as well as essentialist.

In Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions (2005), Jameson expands on this notion of utopia by arguing that in Utopia

the effacement of the private property of the self and the emergence of some new decentered and collective practice of social and individual relations, it would in the best of cases scarcely correspond to an abolition of subjectivity but rather merely to a new form of the latter, in which bourgeois individualism—another name for the old humanist ‘centered subject’ under attack by contemporary theory—has been replaced by the ‘multiple subject positions’ of postmodernity and late capitalism. Once again the notion of the replication of the system becomes the final form of conspiracy theory, and the concept of a Utopian transformation becomes an additional resource in the warehouse of late capitalism’s ruses and lures. (168)

He goes on to say “in Utopia, the ruse of representation whereby the Utopian impulse colonizes purely private fantasy spaces is by definition undone and socialized by their very realization” (230). In other words, the utopian “colonizer” (Symbolic order) wins the battle with the Imaginary order, the “purely private fantasy spaces.”

UTOPIAN STUDIES THAT ILLUSTRATE LACAN’S IMAGINARY ORDER

In the early yet highly influential The Story of Utopias (first published in 1922), utopian studies literary critic Lewis Mumford (1895-1990) distinguishes between two types of utopia: escapist and reconstructive. The escapist utopia eliminates the mundane elements of life and, as Mumford states, transports society to an idyllic environment such as an island in the South Seas.
Such utopian works offer an escape from the trials of everyday life and offer nothing “to sharpen your teeth upon” (13). Utopias of reconstruction establish entirely new types of human relationships, habits, values, and institutions. Reconstructing, cultivating, and controlling the environment prove integral in reconstructive utopias; Mumford writes, "The utopia of reconstruction is what its name implies: a vision of a reconstituted environment which is better adapted to the nature and aims of the human beings who dwell within than the actual one" (13). Mumford also relates three ways in which man may react to some kind of hostile or unsatisfactory condition of existence: running away, trying to hold his own, and attacking. The reaction of flight tends to inspire utopias of escape, while holding one's own and attacking tend to align themselves with utopias of reconstruction. While it has legal and sociological implications, transgression must first originate from an unconscious psychological deficit or from a conscious decision to commit a transgression. Such deficits rest in the ego, and utopian studies have long incorporated ideas of psychology into definitions and paradigms. Mumford defends the proliferation of utopias by saying "It is hard to conceive a social order so complete and satisfactory that it would rob us of the necessity of having recourse, from time to time, to an imaginary world in which our sufferings could be purged or our delights heightened" (13). Here Mumford uses the very word “imaginary,” suggesting a challenge to what he sees as the “sufferings” humanity wants to purge.

To justify the source for this creation of an idealized world, Mumford first distinguishes between the two worlds in which man exists: the world within and the world without. The world without represents the physical, mundane, day-to-day realities of human existence: interacting with the environment, interacting with others, and satisfying the physical requirements of eating and sleeping. The inner world, to Mumford, represents the springing board for utopias. He calls the inner world the "idolum," a term he uses to designate the subjective and spiritual world and
intends it to include "all the philosophies, fantasies, rationalizations, projections, images, and opinions" that influence the pattern of human behavior. This all inclusive "idolum" inspires the mind of man to have the very desire to imagine for himself a better reality in which he has more direct control over environmental and societal realities. Again, this notion of utopia resides within an individual’s imagination, or rather, that which escapes the mundane, quotidian realities of the “real” world.

The Frankfurt School provided a significant body of theoretical scholarship, which we now call “Critical Theory,” that attempted to unite the political and economic implications of the writings of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and the psychoanalytic practices of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). One such Frankfurt School luminary, German philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885-1977), wrote extensively on utopia. In *Philosophy of the Future* (1963), Bloch argues that

Nevertheless a distinction has to be made between the utopistic and the Utopian; the one approaches circumstances only immediately and abstractly, in order to improve them in a purely cerebral fashion, whereas the other has always brought along the constructional equipment of externality. Of course only utopism, as it reaches out abstractly above reality, need not fight shy of a mere empiricism that undertakes only another form of abstract apprehension below reality. (89)

In other words, utopia must not hide from “mere empiricism,” which we can take to mean Law, or by association, the Symbolic: that is to say, the laws of science, which will repeatedly produce the same results. For Bloch, utopia transcends reality and in essence resides in the Imaginary order. In *The Spirit of Utopia* (1964), Bloch argues that

To shape a path from the lonely waking inner-dream of the inner self-encounter to the dream that goes out to shape the external world at least to alleviate it, at least
as locus minoris resistantiae or even as the instrumentation for the goal. And just this, the explication of ‘glossolalia’ as ‘prophecy,’ of the metaphysical system, distinguishes the passage to the ‘world’ of the soul, which is neither of this world nor of that, but is nonetheless not simply acosmic and closed to the cosmos, but turned toward the new, all-pervading power of the subject-object space. (237)

Again, Bloch here places utopian in a realm outside of the literal, the waking world, or practical reality. For Bloch utopia rests in the Imaginary order.

In “The Three Faces of Utopianism” (1967), political science professor and utopia studies luminary Lyman Tower Sargent lists three manifestations of utopia: utopian thought, the utopian novel, and communitarian experiments. Sargent in this essay establishes a great deal of the foundation to what has become “utopia studies” in the Western academic world. Sargent’s three manifestations suggests that utopian thought can exist independent of both literary and real world utopian thought experiments. Sargent in this designation places a great power on the notion of “utopian thought” by not mandating its attachment to something more tangible. In his “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited” (1994), Sargent argues that “utopias, written in different times and places, need to be understood both in their historical and linguistic context and for what they communicate to a contemporary reader” (3). Indeed, linguistic implications of utopia figure prominently in my chapter on Thomas More’s Utopia, to which More added an artificial language and examples of Utopian verse in this language. He goes on to say that “utopianism is the result of the human propensity to dream while both asleep and awake” and that “this dual propensity [. . .] is basic to the conflict over the political nature of utopianism, particularly for the twentieth argument that utopianism necessarily leads to totalitarianism and violence” (4). Again, Sargent places utopia outside of the literal signifying chain or network. Although he concedes
that “Utopia is primarily a type of prose fiction” (7), he recognizes the prevalence of “utopian”
thought across cultures, and by implication, across crude literary definitions and genres:

[T]hose who limit utopias to the West are demonstrably wrong” by asserting that
“1. Utopianism (social dreaming) is a common human phenomenon; 2. Every cul-
ture has produced body utopias; 3. There are city utopias and even independent
utopian traditions outside the Christian West; [and] 4. Thomas More invented a
particular literary form that spread rapidly. More’s invention was of immense
importance; it gave a form of utopianism that has been adopted universally. This
form sprung from traditions and precursors and has now produced many off-
shoots. (19)

He also argues that “there is a basic ambiguity in utopianism” (26), which, as I will demonstrate
in Chapter 2, precisely describes More’s Utopia.

The title of More’s text and the literary genre it started also has fallen into ambiguous
complications with regards to conveniences such as definition and meaning. Sargent argues in
“Utopia: The Problem of Definition” (1975) that perfection has never characterized utopian fic-
tion, but the misuse of the word perfect continues. In this same article Sargent argues that “un-
less the purely formal characteristics of the genre are stressed, most contemporary Utopias are
lost” (145). In “A Note on the Other Side of Human Nature in the Utopian Novel” (1975), Sar-
gent argues that utopia relies on the following assumption: “people are essentially good, but the
system, economic, social, and/or political, is either fundamentally wrong or somewhat out of
balance; and if the system is corrected people will behave well” (89). Sargent here suggests that
the established order, the status quo, needs rethinking in a break from tradition, i.e., the Law or
the Symbolic. In “Authority & Utopia: Utopianism in Political Thought” (1982), Sargent ar-
Sargent argues that utopia can represent danger: “utopianism is somewhat dangerous, [and] the danger inheres in the process of transforming visions into political movements, not in utopia itself” (566). Sargent sees utopia as only a possibility, and a rather unlikely one at that: “Utopia is a possibility rather than a certainty [. . .] it is designed to break through the barriers of the present and encourage people to want, and work for, change [. . .] Far from being the road to totalitarianism, it is the road away from totalitarianism” (“Authority & Utopia: Utopianism in Political Thought” 574). Indeed, true “utopianism” however defined would want to break from the totalitarian, the Law, and the Symbolic order.

In *Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction* (2010), Sargent argues that utopias tell stories about good (and later bad) places, representing them as if they were real. Thus they show people going about their everyday lives and depict marriage and the family, education, meals work, and the like, as well as the political and economic systems. It is this showing of everyday life transformed that characterizes a utopia, and utopianism is about just that transformation of the everyday. (4) The everyday here suggests a quotidian or thoughtless existence under the thumb of the signifying network. Sargent lists six purposes of literary utopia: “a fantasy, [. . .] a description of a desirable or an undesirable society, an extrapolation, a warning, an alternative to the present, or a model to be achieved. And the intentional community as utopia adds a seventh purpose, to demonstrate that living a better life is possible in the here and now” (*Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction* 8). In his introduction to Paul Ricouer’s (1913-2005) *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* (1986), George Taylor similarly sees the pragmatic possibilities of utopia: “Utopia is the view from ‘nowhere’—the literal meaning of the word—that ensures that we no longer take for granted our present reality” (xxix). Taylor also sees the unattainability of utopia, and suggests
utopia conceptually exists primarily to evoke appreciation and mindfulness about our “present reality.”

The natural human urge to escape “present reality,” goes beyond producing utopian texts or experiments, and has contributed to the growth of science fiction. Cavendish’s *Blazing World* has many elements of science fiction it, as do several other early modern utopia texts. Yugoslav-born science fiction literary critic Darko Suvin (b. 1930) argues in “Defining the Literary Genre of Utopia: Some Historical Semantics, Some Genology (sic), a Proposal and a Plea” (1973) that “Utopia operates by example and demonstration dialectically” (121). Suvin also sees utopia as residing in an ostensible “imaginary” space which reality cannot obtain or reach: “Utopia is an Other World immanent in the world of human endeavor, dominion, and hypothetic possibility—and not transcendental in a religious sense. It is a non-existent country on the map of this globe, a ‘this-worldly other world’” (126). In *Perversion and Utopia: Studies in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory* (1995), psychoanalyst Joel Whitebook pits Freud against Herbert Marcuse in an attempt to bring into Critical Theory an untouched opposition by arguing that “the ego, far from being an agency of truth and emancipation, is in fact the defensive structure, a submissive slave, sycophant, opportunist and liar—a symptom, as Lacan puts it—that narcissistically seeks to protect the individual from otherness and, in so doing, ultimately violates the otherness of the Other” (122). This sounds very similar to Malcolm Bowie’s equation of the Imaginary with Fraud, and, by association, the Empress in *The Blazing World*.

In *The Concept of Utopia* (1990), sociologist Ruth Levitas argues that “Utopia is the expression of the desire for a better way of living” (8), interestingly using Lacanian language to locate utopianism. Miriam Eliav-Feldon in *Realistic Utopias: The Ideal Imaginary Societies of the Renaissance, 1516-1630* (1982) argues that “utopia is an invitation to perceive the distance
between things as they are and things as they should be. It is a presentation of a positive and possible alternative to the social reality, intended as a model to be emulated or aspired to” (1).

Here again a utopian studies critic uses the word “imaginary” to describe utopia, in this case the very title of Eliav-Feldon’s book. In *Visions of Utopia* (2004) architectural critic Herbert Muschamp (1947-2007) writes, “The conventional utopia—the imaginary ideal city or world—seems to me a transitional state between belief in an almighty dignity, a supreme being capable of bending the laws of nature, and the acceptance of personal responsibility in whatever sphere life happens to place us” (29). Again, utopianism’s challenge to the established order plays prominently in definitions of utopia.

**UTOPIAN STUDIES THAT ILLUSTRATE LACAN’S REAL**

Whether utopia relies upon including or excluding oppression or implementing or stopping authoritarianism, it always includes some kind of law and order that invites transgression. In his *Utopics: The Semiological Play of Textual Spaces* (first published in English in 1984), French philosopher Louis Marin (1931-1992) argues that “utopics are spatial play” (26) and that “Utopia [is] the experience of a neutralized world, that of the same and yet Other World” (48). He argues that “Utopia established transgressions as norm. Subversion becomes figurative representation of the law. In other words, in utopia transgression is not related to law; it has becomes the law” (79). In Henry Neville’s *Isle of Pines*, the very fabric of the society, the polygamous marital relations and generally regressive humanity on the island, constitutes a transgression impossible anywhere else than on the island itself.

After transgression apocalypse might follow, and thus utopian studies frequently address apocalyptic aspects of idealized societies. For example, literary critic David Ketterer in “Utopian Fantasy as Millennial Motive and Science-Fictional Motif” (1973) argues that “in reality, an
established utopia is an illusion, albeit an illusion of major motivational importance” (81). Ketterer also sees an eschatological aspect of millenarian utopia and argues that “The coming millennium, although technically outside human control, might, in a limited sense, be achieved. The sense implied here, of a temporally-bounded utopia, preceded by the loosing of Satan and existing unchanged until the end of the world, may have some analogy in the common literary conception of utopia as a spatially-bounded area” (85). He also traces this millennial aspect of utopia to Genesis, arguing that “Pastoral or Arcadian models of utopia derive their conviction largely from belief in the Garden of Eden” (89). He argues that utopia cannot contain a plot (90). Indeed, the society created in Neville’s largely plotless *Isle of Pines* at first appears as an Edenic fantasy but ultimately turns into destruction and death. Ketterer succinctly articulates the way in which utopia operates in Neville’s text: “The verbal fabric of a utopian fiction is in a constant incipient state of conflict or insurrection which is nullified when presented as a fantasy or transcended in visionary apocalyptic writing but encouraged in the apocalyptic mode of science fiction” (95). Suvin also sees Edenic paradise as utopian (140) and such a formal approach to the study utopia could correlate with a “Symbolic” approach in the Lacanian sense, as formal studies and definitions seek to set laws, rules, and consistency in the study of utopian thought.

Bruce Fink points to what he calls “kinks in the Symbolic order” as “something anomalous always shows up in language, something unaccountable, unexplainable, an aporia” (*Lacanian Subject* 30). In Fink’s sense, these “kinks” might appear as transgressions of the Law, the place where the systematic order of the Symbolic order does not hold sway. Marina Leslie in *Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History* (1998) argues that in the early modern period, historical crisis serves not simply as the backdrop or context of utopian fiction but as a mode of representation. The historical crisis that the literary utopia repre-
sents is, in short, a crisis of representation. To put it another way, utopia, to be effective either as a narrative or model, must show how history is made up—in the double sense of ‘constituted’ and ‘fictionalized’—in order to show how it can be made over. (8)

Leslie’s notion of a “crisis” in essence suggests a break in the Symbolic order. Lucy Sargisson in *Utopian Bodies and the Politics of Transgression* (2000) also sees transgression as important to the utopian impulse: “utopian thought works thus: it issues from political dissatisfaction and offers political critique; it articulates estrangement and offers an alternative perspective, from an alien (or new) space; it is creative and imaginative and often fictional; it has subversive and transformative potential” (3). Transgression goes further than the Imaginary in its challenge to the Symbolic order, and this brings it into the realm of the Real.

In *Living in the End Times* (2010), Žižek argues that “‘ideology’ represents precisely such a reduction to the simplified "essence" that conveniently forgets the "background noise" which provides the density of its actual meaning. Such an erasure of the ‘background noise’ is the very core of utopian dreaming” (5-6). By “essence,” Žižek means, I think, that the unstructured, lawless of the Real. He also says,

This is the true utopia, the idea that a legal order can make recompense for its founding crimes, thereby retroactively cleansing itself of its guilt and regaining its innocence. What lies at the end of this road is the ecological utopia of humanity in its entirety repaying debt to Nature for all its past exploitation [. . .] The underlying utopian notion is the same: the system which emerged through violence should repay its debt in order to regain an ethico-ecological balance. (35)
Neville’s *Isle of Pines* begins with natural violence in the storm that creates the shipwreck and ultimately moves into man-made violence in the civil war that destroys the island’s large population.

In the chapters that follow, I will use the writings of Žižek to connect historical considerations with the Lacanian model of subjectivity; at times I will also engage the writings of Michel Foucault, Fredric Jameson, and other prominent twentieth-century theorists. While Žižek overtly advertises himself as a “Marxist-Lacanian,” I plan to use the four early modern utopian texts to illustrate the way in which the literary utopian does NOT need Marxist, socialist, or communist aspects to create an “ideal” society. I plan to challenge Žižek’s reliance on this mandatory Marxism to illustrate the ways in which Marxism can itself assist in merely political analysis of literary texts. This rests on my belief in the difference between “believing” in Marxism (and the logical follow through of revolution) and merely “knowing” Marxism (knowing what he wrote), and I wish these early modern utopian texts to illustrate this differences among their depiction of the tripartite model of Lacan.
CHAPTER 2: “IF ONLY THIS WERE SOME DAY POSSIBLE”: THE EXCECRATION, CONSECRATION, AND CATECHIZATION OF HUMANIST OPTIMISM IN THOMAS MORE'S *UTOPIA*

Communism doesn't work because people like to own stuff.

*Frank Zappa*

Communism is like one big phone company.

*Lenny Bruce*

In *Minima Moralia*, Theodor Adorno writes, “In the inner recesses of humanism, as its very soul, there rages a frantic prisoner who, as a Fascist, turns the world into a prison” (89). Humanism, which emphasizes the power of the individual to control his own existence, played a significant role in the European Renaissance at its inception in the fourteenth century and in the English Renaissance when it began in the early sixteenth century. The literary period in England that Thomas More’s *Utopia* inaugurates, once called "the Renaissance," has now become the "early modern" period, as literary critics have documented the "modern" aspects of culture and society gleaned from the literature of the period. In *Utopia*, however, Thomas More in fact undermines humanism, optimism, and "utopian" ideals through his depiction of a very proto-modern notion of individual subjectivity with a cynicism that eerily foreshadows twentieth-century post-war and post-holocaust nihilism in a complete abandonment of humanistic ideals.³

₂ Jacob Burckhardt too sees the misery inherent in a career as a humanist: “The career of the humanists was, as a rule, of such a kind that only the strongest could pass through unscathed [. . .] But worst of all was, that the position of the humanist was almost incompatible with a fixed home, since it either made frequent changes of dwelling necessary for a livelihood, or so affected the mind of the individual that he could never be happy for long in one place” (186-7).

³ J.H. Hexter points out that in *Utopia*, “his [More’s] own alienation—he calls it a prison—would end” (“The Loom of Language and the Fabric of Imperatives: The Cases of Il Principe and Utopia 966). I take particular issue with Lee Khanna’s claim that “The ability to experiment, learn, and change is more important to Utopia than any particular new institutions or customs presented” (*Utopia: The case for Open-minedness in the Commonwealth*” (91). Timothy Kenyon more accurately claims that “the conception of citizenship in More’s Uto-
When analyzed through the perspectives of Marxist-Lacanian theorist Slavoj Žižek, More’s *Utopia* becomes a depiction of a prison that neither embraces nor rejects what previous critics have claimed; on the contrary, More consciously praises and indict both sides of his intentionally ambiguous utopian political spectrum. More’s Utopians find themselves in a lose-lose conflict between the two extremes presented in More’s text, pre-capitalism and communism.

Thomas More was born the son of lawyer Sir John More in London in 1478. He began his university studies at Oxford in 1492 but left to pursue legal training and joined the bar in 1492. He had four children by his first wife, Jane Colt, and none by his second wife, Alice Middleton. His political career began with his election to Parliament in 1504, and he soon performed diplomatic duties and received his knighthood in 1521. He eventually acted as a go-between for King Henry VIII and the Lord Chancellor, Thomas Wolsey, whom he succeeded in 1529. When Henry VIII broke from the Catholic Church to enable him to divorce Catherine of Aragon and marry Anne Boleyn, Thomas More found himself at odds with the King’s 1534 Act of Supremacy, which required all Englishmen to denounce the Roman Catholic Church in favor of the new Church of England. After spending time imprisoned in the Tower of London for his insubordination, King Henry VIII had the piously Catholic More executed in 1535.

More counted among his friends the Dutch humanist Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536), with whom More would correspond throughout much of his life. The Greek title of Erasmus’s most famous text, *The Praise of Folly* (first printed 1511), refers to Erasmus’s friend More, as the text’s Greek title, *Morius Enkomion*, also translates as the “Praise of More.” More’s other important texts include his *History of King Richard III* (first printed 1518) and *A Dialogue Con-

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4 For a more detailed discussion of More’s friendship with Erasmus, see Wootton and Huizinga, esp. pp. 29-38, 55-61, and 79-86.
cerning Heresies (first printed 1529). In 1504 Thomas More translated Giovanni Francesco Pico della Mirandola’s (1470-1533) The Life of John Picus (first printed in 1510), which gives an account of his uncle and Italian Renaissance humanist, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494). Pico della Mirandola’s “Oration on the Dignity of Man” (1486) represented one of the more concise yet thorough explanations of the notion of a “Renaissance Man and the humanist belief in the autonomy and power of the individual.”

R. W. Chambers outlines four “distinct stages in More’s life: youth, early maturity, later maturity, and a final period in which he seems to have his feet planted on paths which lead elsewhere.” Utopia belongs to the “adolescent” period of More’s life (51, 52).

MORE’S UTOPIA: THE TEXT AND ITS CRITICAL HERITAGE

More likely began working on Utopia in 1515. Publisher Thierry Martin printed the first edition in 1516 in Louvain, entirely in Latin, with the title, De optimo reipublicae statu deque noua Insula Utopia. A year later in 1517, Gilles de Gourmont in Paris published a second edition with revisions by More. The first printed English version would not appear until the printing of the 1551 translation by Ralph Robinson. All early editions of More’s Utopia appeared in print with what critics now call parerga, essentially paratexts that vary with each edition. The parerga include a map of Utopia, an illustration of the Utopian alphabet, an example of Utopian poetry, and epistolary correspondence between and among Thomas More and Erasmus, John

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5 More too exemplified the epitome of Renaissance humanist, which meant, according to John Olin, “he was trained in an educational tradition centered in a revived classical rhetoric” (13). According to Johan Huizinga, nobody in the humanist circle of More and Erasmus, nobody’s “spirit was ever softer, sweeter or happier than that of Thomas More” (34).

6 R. J. Schoeck similarly argues that More’s Utopia presents a “strong sense of Angst” in More (281, Schoeck’s emphasis).

7 Interestingly, as Henry Donner points out, More’s “did not choose to adopt Utopia among his English works […] and it must claim its rank as a work of literature before an international court among the foremost productions of its age” (7).

8 The term “paratexts” comes from Gérard Genette’s Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, 1. Paratexts might include front matter, back matter, dedicatory verses or letters, illustrations, or anything provided by editors or publishers extraneous to the primary text.
Froben, William Bude, Peter Giles, Thomas Lupset, and Jerome de Busleyden of France. More includes the map and alphabet largely to make his text resemble a travel narrative, and these “parerga” have become increasingly important in understanding the narrative proper of Utopia.

Although his Utopia named the genre influenced by it, More followed the precedents of literary idealized societies depicted in Plato’s Republic (4th century BC), Saint Augustine’s City of God (5th century AD), and Lucian of Samosata’s True History (2nd century AD). More in fact translated some of Lucian’s works from Greek into Latin, including the Cynicus, Philopseudes, Tyrannicida, and, perhaps most importantly, Menippus. Third century author Menippus has given name to the term Menippean satire, a prose satire focusing on psychological concepts or deficiencies, and critics have long accepted More’s influence from Menippean satire. More also likely had familiarity with the early fourteenth-century poem, Land of Cokaygne, one of the Kildare Poems, which depicts lecherous monks living a luxurious life in the fictitious Cokaygne. In addition, travel writing by such authors as Marco Polo (1254-1324), and the author of The Travels of Sir John Mandeville (fourteenth century) had circulated

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9 For an exhaustive study of the paratexts of various editions of More’s Utopia, see Terence Cave’s Thomas More’s “Utopia” in Early Modern Europe: Paratexts and Contexts (Manchester UP, 2008) and J.H. Hexter, “Introduction,” clxxxiii-cxciv.

10 J. Duncan M. Derrett argues that More felt as though Utopia “should have the usual accompaniment to a semi-fabulous adventure-story, namely, a script, or alphabet, and specimens of the language” (“The Utopian Alphabet” 62). Similarly, Marina Leslie argues that “the Utopian language announces the absurdity of such an esoteric project of translation, even as it teases the reader to make the attempt” (64). Peter Allen notes that “these letters and verses were of very great importance to Utopia, not just in ensuring its success but in determining the degree of seriousness with which it would be taken and the kind of interpretation it would be given” (99).

11 According to R. W. Chambers, “More’s place [is] a link in the continuity of thought [that points] back to Plato” (34). For more on More’s influence from Plato’s Republic, see White.

12 For a detailed account of More’s Utopia as satire, see Heiserman, esp. n. 3, and Elliott, pp. 29-49.

13 The fourteenth-century Kildare Poems included 16 poems in an Irish dialect of Middle English. For an account of the Land of Cokaygne and its relationship to the development of utopian literature, see Morton, pp. 15-45.
in the early modern world around the time More wrote his work, and More likely wished his work to play on some of the tropes established in these works.  

More invented the very word “utopia,” which comes from combining the Greek words for “good” and “place,” to form outopia, but this combination of Greek words can also mean “no-place.” In his influential study of English utopias, *Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian Writing, 1516-1700*, J. C. Davis argues that More creates “a world of stability, rationality, and moral meaning with a secular history (of historical myth) of that meaning; a world which was neither apocalyptic nor classical republican. In doing so he created a mode of ideal society and gave it a name, utopia” (43). In essence, by creating what Davis labels as a place “neither apocalyptic nor classical,” More means for the word “utopia” to not only refer to the fictional island “Utopia” but also to a “good place” and a “no-place,” a place both unlike anything else in a good (or bad) sense and also a “no-place,” as in a place unattainable in its very ontology as unlike anything else. The double meaning of the very title of More’s text illustrates the binary and non-committal nature of the narrative it describes.

Many early critics simply argued that *Utopia* depicts a positive alternative to More’s contemporary society in England. C.S. Lewis, however, argues that “the Utopians represent the natural virtues working at their ideal best in isolation from the theological; it will be remembered

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14 But, Nina Chordas notes, More “most likely saw himself as producing [a] parody of the travel writing that was widely known in his time” (39). Chordas offers a rather extensive account of More’s engagement with travel writing, esp. pp. 35-64.

15 Richard S. Sylvester argues that to reading the word “utopia” to “mean an ideally perfect society [contradicts] the avowed etymology of the word as it was first invented and employed and that [contradicts] the unavowed intention of its author” (“Si Hythlodaeo Credimus: Vision and Revision in Thomas More’s Utopia” 290).

16 Robert P. Adams, for instance, argues that *Utopia* “suggest[s] the grand social optimism of men of good will everywhere on the continent” (“Designs by More and Erasmus for a New Social Order” 134). Russell Ames similarly argues that Utopia has “value” because “More’s special qualities and experiences enabled him to give a rich, clear-headed, and humane description of social progress” (6). Henry Donner by contrast argues that Utopia contains an “implied criticism of society in the description of a commonwealth whose institutions appear ideal by means of the contrast it presents to the conditions actually prevailing” (5). Joshua Phillips argues that “the attitude expressed in Utopia by Hythloday and the Utopians accords well with the attitudes of More’s closest friends and intellectual peers” who considered Utopia a “mirror to commonwealths” (52).
that they hold their Natural Religion only provisionally” (168). In response to Lewis, literary critic Richard Halpern claims that “Lewis damns the imagined Utopia as a totalitarian dungeon” (140). Halpern’s study seeks to find in Utopia positive aspects of the cooperative and communal society the text depicts. Halpern argues that the unpleasantness of Utopia “has been exaggerated by a conservative tradition of Utopia criticism which thrives on ideological delusion, cold-war hysteria, and sheer intellectual dishonesty” (141). Halpern also asserts that “More’s Utopia takes this model of (utopian) kernel and (ideological) shell and, in Marx’s suggestively mixed metaphor, turns it on its head. For whereas Utopia’s finished form depicts a utopian-socialist society, this surface conceals an ‘interior’ realm whose primal fantasy and pleasurable substance turn out to be—the logic of capital itself” (141). Despite Utopia’s ostensible “utopian-socialist” characteristics, according to Halpern, More’s text reveals More’s own personal commitment and belief in the “logic of capital,” and, therefore, Utopia merely reasserts the dominant ideology coming with the rise of the merchant class.

Halpern’s reading of more’s Utopia falls in line with much Marxist criticism of early modern literature. Marxist readings of early modern English literature frequently mandate a “death of the author” in order to “always historicize.”17 But nonetheless, analysis of More’s text must acknowledge More’s contemporary humanist ideals and reconcile them with his socialistic society.18 Marxist theorist Jameson argues that More’s humanist beliefs cannot coexist within

17 The phrase “death of the author” comes from the 1967 essay of the same name by Roland Barthes. The phrase “always historicize” comes from Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious (1). Christopher Kendrick, for instance, admittedly “marginalize[s] biography” to argue that “Utopia may best be understood by reference to a historical conjecture, which I would like to try to conceive of here as operating, as ‘authoring,’ the text through ‘More’ [. . .] More transcends himself; in this genre, it is not the biographical but the historical More whose meaning counts” (234-5).
18 Christopher Kendrick argues that “early humanism will gradually appear as an ideology, representative of a peculiarly over determined or unevenly developed social class: the class of small property holders; I would like to suggest that this ‘petty’ humanism distinguishes itself from its twentieth-century descendants mainly by locating ‘humanity’ not so much in some common ethical substance as in the function of labor, in independent work” (234).
the society his *Utopia* presents: “paradoxically, although *Utopia* can in one sense be read as a kind of manifesto for just such humanist intellectuals, the society it represents does not contain any, for its realization is meant to spell the end of all such (Utopian) political projects” ("Morus: The Generic Window" 434).19 *Utopia* indeed presents a socialist alternative to early sixteenth-century society;¹⁹ Jameson asserts that “*Utopia* is a transparent synonym for socialism itself, and the enemies of Utopia sooner or later turn out to be the enemies of socialism,” (3) and that the fundamental social contradictions on which Book Two must perform its work or transformation [. . .] is a critique of nascent capitalism, and determines a perspective whose distance from the first can most dramatically be measured at the end of Book two, when Hythloday identifies the vices or transgressions that threaten the Utopian system as such. ("Of Islands and Trenches: Naturalization and the Production of Utopian Discourse” 15)

The “vices” and “transgressions” about which Jameson writes refer to the utopian embrace of humility and personal temperance, and thus place such transgressions within the realm of individuation. Likewise, some Marxist criticism of *Utopia* has also addressed the role of subjectivity and individuation in Utopia.²¹ More’s communism does, however, exist within a narrative frame

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¹ David Baker argues that “radical humanism in England was often a matter of reception, timing, and topicality rather than a tradition with an inherent politics” including More’s *Utopia* (2).

¹⁹ George Logan agrees: “Rejecting the idea that Utopia is a disguised rehash of humanist prescriptions, we are forced to confront afresh the fundamental interpretive question about the book: if it is political theory [. . .] what kind of political theory is it?” ([The Meaning of More’s “Utopia”] 26).

²⁰ Saad El-Gabalawy similarly argues that Book Two of *Utopia* “concludes [. . .] with the proposition that private property is the root of all social evil and the suggestion that all social good flows from the equality preserved by common possession” (231) and that “in *Utopia superbia* has been eradicated through equal and just distribution of things, through the abolition of private property and money. By banishing inequality the Utopians have banished pride” (232). Timothy Kenyon claims that More “regarded communism as necessary medium for the dissipation of the distressed values of the property regime” ("The Problem of Freedom and Moral Behavior in Thomas More’s Utopia" 366).

²¹ Christopher Kendrick, for instance, argues that “the utopia visible erects its social image within the space hollowed out by history at the heart of the feigning subject, cancelling and preserving that subject in one and the same descriptive movement” (237). Richard Halpern argues that “the Renaissance conception of subjectivity defines the individual in its relation to politico-juridical coercion of the kind that predominates its precapitalist formations.
in a work of pure fiction.\(^{22}\) Marxist interpretation of More’s *Utopia* thus reduces the text to an “essentialist” critical reading in the same way as does E.M.W. Tillyard’s *Elizabethan World Picture*, a common and popular target of harsh critique by the New Historicists.\(^{23}\) Jameson’s dismissal of More’s agency as a conscious author of *Utopia* completely ignores the dialogic structure and conversational nature of the way in which More presents his idealized society. A staunch Marxist theorist, Jameson merely seeks to validate a depiction of pre-Marxist socialism appearing at the very beginnings of capitalism’s rise to prominence in the Western world. Friedrich Engels himself refers to utopian “theoretical enunciations, corresponding with these revolutionary uprisings of a class not yet developed; in the 16th and 17th centuries [appeared] Utopian pictures of ideal social conditions” \(^{32}\). Engels unsurprisingly locates the inception of utopia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as this not only saw the printing of More’s *Utopia* but also the rise of the capitalist system that plays the convenient whipping boy of Engels amalgamation of Karl Marx’s theoretical explorations of political economy.

Not all critics read *Utopia* as a definitive commentary on the subjects it addresses. A lengthy critical tradition holds that More’s *Utopia* simply obscures meaning altogether.\(^{24}\) Even New Historicism founder Stephen Greenblatt claims that “the political world [. . .] for More [. . .] Freedom is conceived of as difference from or transgression of the law. This mode of power by no means disappears under capitalism, but it is supplemented by other modes for which the differential subject is not an impediment but a conduit” \(^{43}\).

\(^{22}\) Edward Surtz argues that “Utopia exists only in More’s brain; so, too, the communistic Christian commonwealth exists only as an ideal in his mind and heart” (Thomas More and Communism” 558).

\(^{23}\) For example, here is a typical claim made by Tillyard: “The Elizabethans were interested in the nature of man with a fierceness rarely paralleled in other ages; and that fierceness delighted in exposing all the contrarieties in man’s composition. In particular by picturing man’s position between beast and angel with all possible emphasis they gave a new intensity to the old conflict” (76).

\(^{24}\) James Romm, for instance, asserts that the unidentifiable names found in *Utopia* “undermine the assumption that language can convey consistent or unambiguous meanings” (173). John Perlette refers to a “radical indeterminacy” in the rhetorical style used by More (250) and William McClung states that “exacting analyses of More’s language [. . .] minimize the possibility of stabilizing or fixing his meaning” (9). For Andrew McLean, More “confronts the reader with a variety of kinds of dialogues” to maintain ambiguity (91). Elizabeth McCutcheon argues that More in Utopia “praises and dispraises, often almost simultaneously, since to deny something about Utopia is to affirm it, indirectly, of the word as we know it” (274). Henry Donner refers to More’s “rambling inconsistencies” in *Utopia* (33).
is opaque” (15). More scholar Alastair Fox argues that “Utopia escapes from all attempts to contain its meaning within reductive rational formulas” (Thomas More: History and Providence 50) and elsewhere claims that Utopia “is riddled with ambiguities” (Utopia: An Allusive Vision 12). Indeed, More’s prose, even in modern English translation, makes for difficult reading.25 Such critics as Harry Berger and Andrew McLean argue that More intentionally and consciously aims to confuse the reader as part of his project.26 Utopia also displays contradictions with More’s own personal life, but, according to Paul Oskar Kristellar, “neither the Utopia nor More’s other writings nor the record of his political activities suggest that he ever thought it possible or desirable to bring about a Utopia in the real world of his time, whether by legislation or force, by reform or revolution” (11).27 But for A.L. Morton, More’s life and biography inform the reading of Utopia:

[What is remarkable about More is not his limitations but the extent to which they were transcended, not the fact that his tolerance had limits but that the principle of toleration was so plainly set forth, not the occasional reactionary features of his Utopia but its broadly communist economy, not his fear of popular action

25 Harry Berger states that More’s Utopia “undertakes misanthropy, and depict[s] the structures this condition erects to protect itself from life” (“Utopian Folly: Erasmus and More on the Perils of Misanthropy” 271). More’s misanthropy is political (271). J.H. Hexter argues, however, that the “Robinson rendering alone is readily accessible to present-day readers” (More’s “Utopia”: The Biography of an Idea 5).

26 Harry Berger argues that “More has so shaped Hythloday’s account as first to draw us into Utopia, then to push us away from it [. . .] The relations which determine the overall structure of Utopia are after all are primarily verbal, intelligible, and temporal” (Second World and Green World: Studies in Renaissance Fiction-Making 34). Jeffrey Knapp argues that “More’s invented island does more than register his ability to transcend distraction: it translates the nowhere that distracts into the very expression of More’s transcendence. Powers wasted in the ostensible inanity of England not only prove that distraction a source of sublimity, but recreate inanity as itself sublime” (50). Keith Thomas writes that More had a “sophisticated awareness of author reader relations and was able to exploit them teasingly” (16).

27 Robert P. Adams argues that “Many are the seeming ‘inconsistencies between Utopian practices and More’s personal life which have lacked any unified explanation’ (“The Philosophic Unity of More’s Utopia” 49). J. H. Hexter, however, argues that “the circumstances of the author when he wrote utopia confirm the view that of his intent derived from reading the book, and that the events of More’s life do not reveal any discrepancy between the intent ascribed to Utopia and the career of its author” (More’s “Utopia”: The Biography of an Idea 14).
but his understanding of the causes of poverty and his real desire to remove them.

(75)

The parerga also contain inconsistencies, and it becomes difficult to reconcile the essentialist Marxist readings with the long tradition of readings of *Utopia* that stress the ambiguity of the text.  

Genre considerations also appear in analyses that argue for a non-committal stance on the part of More, and interestingly some of them come from the same critics who argue More’s society praises socialism. Jameson, for instance, labels *Utopia* a satire in which “if we posit the priority of book 1, we will want to foreground satire and its generic structure; if book 2 (and insofar as Utopia as a genre does not yet exist), it will be the travel narrative that sets the generic agenda” ("Morus: The Generic Window" 432).  

Indeed, as Dominic Baker-Smith reminds us, with *Utopia* More “was engaged in a work of fiction, not in a philosophical treatise” (157). Aside from creating the utopian genre itself, critics have demonstrated how More’s text has attained the status of “myth” in the literary canon. The most useful analyses to my argument have seen not

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28 Warren Wooden points out that readers of *Utopia* learn of “map which learn, half-way through the text, is manifestly and grossly incorrect, a direct contradiction of the geographical description furnished by Hythloday” (“A Reconsideration of the Parerga of Thomas More’s Utopia” 157). Brian O’Brien argues that in *Utopia* More aims through the parerga to “sketch an ideal society through a process of increasing ambiguity and indirection to the final state of Utopia in the Basel edition of March 1518” (20).

29 Elsewhere, Jameson argues that “the very foundational text of the Utopian genre as such, Thomas More’s eponymous work, proves to contain, alongside its Utopian ingredients, all the makings of an anti-Utopia and a parody or satire of itself. This is an argument which solves a number of problems in the history of the reception of More’s little book; it is also at least implicitly an enlargement of Bakhtin’s dialogism to include dissent and disagreement not merely among the official discussants (More and Hythloday) but within the very structure of the text itself” (*Archaeologies of the Future* 177).

30 John Freeman argues that “the enclosed structure of the text, considered in the order of its composition, works in a contrary fashion to reorient the mythic island to historical contingencies. This form of enclosing is integrally related to the structure of the text itself” (“Discourse in More’s Utopia: Alibi/Pretext/Postscript” 299). Fred Standley argues that More’s utopia is a myth that has guided creations of utopias and dystopias (135).
only the primacy of critiquing everything depicted politically and societally, but also they have taken into consideration More’s outlook on human nature.  

**THE SYMBOLIC ORDER IN **_**UTOPIA**: PATRIARCHALISM, FAMILY, AND THE NAME OF THE FATHER

Utopia’s family unit plays a significant role in keeping the populace obedient in much the same way as in Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis* (published in Latin in 1624 and then in English in 1627), as the society employs a very strict set of guidelines which govern how many children live at home, for how long, and under what circumstances children may move away from home.  

Furthermore, much of the oppression in the society rests at the familial level. J.H. Hexter points out that “Utopian society is rooted in patriarchal familism” (“Introduction” xliii). Hythloday also speaks of a gendered work ethic when he says that those “weakened by idleness or softened by almost womanish occupations, should become unmanned if trained to earn their

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31 Aleksander Pavkovic argues that “the incompatibility of the societal goals and the missing link between labor and reward [...] are hidden behind the picture of static and uniform needs, productivity and reward (spare time)” (33). Damian Grace states that “whether More approved of Utopian institutions is not the central question. It is his underlying conception of the plasticity of human nature, its corrigibility through improved social institutions that is remarkable” (“Utopia” 182). Russell Jacoby claims that “The announcement of ‘utopia’ by Thomas More corresponds to its denunciation by Thomas More. Utopianism and modern anti-utopianism converge in More. The vast secondary literature on More covers all aspects of his life, yet most of it focuses on Utopia and, to a lesser extent, on his execution in 1535 after his refusal to countenance the succession of Anne Boleyn as queen of England” (43).

32 Elliott Simon argues that “More believed that a regenerated man could achieve [moral] perfectibility using reason governed by a Christian love as represented by the Utopian family” (22). Timothy Kenyon points out that “Although More was often quite radical in his view of patriarchalism, he nevertheless regarded the family as an inviolable institution” (*Utopian Communism and Political Thought in Early Modern England* 89).

33 Harry Berger, for instance, argues that in More’s Utopia “the patriarchal family as a functioning unit is for the most part in Utopia in name only; that it is, if anything, an arm of the civil government; and that its peculiar arrangements have a specific aim: to redirect from family and household to larger, more public units, and ultimately to the political tribe as a whole [...] What bothers the government, in my view, is the privacy and intimacy, the loyalty, solidarity, and mutuality of interests, encouraged by sustained family life” ("Utopian Folly: Erasmus and More on the Perils of Misanthropy" 282). Berger argues that “Utopian monogamy is, among other things, a defense against the social orders rooted in promiscuity” ("Utopian Folly: Erasmus and More on the Perils of Misanthropy" 284). Berger claims that families in Utopia “must spend their married lives continually proving that the underlying suspicion formalized in the betrothal procedure is untrue” ("Utopian Folly: Erasmus and More on the Perils of Misanthropy" 285). Timothy Kenyon argues that “More remained convinced of what he saw as the inherent inferiority of the female sex” (*Utopian Communism and Political Thought in Early Modern England* 66)
living in honest trades and exercised in virile labors” (65). More responds to Hythloday’s accusations by referring to the alternative work force as “sheep” (65). Hythloday also discusses a state-sponsored feast similar to the Feast of the Family in Bacon’s *New Atlantis*: before the Final Feasts, [. . .] wives fall down at the feet of their husbands, children at the feet of their parents. They confess that they have erred, either by committing some fault or by performing some duty carelessly, and beg pardon for their offense [. . .] for it is sacrilegious to attend with troubled conscience [. . .] If they are aware of hatred or anger against anyone they do not assist at the sacrifices until they have been reconciled and have cleansed their hearts, for fear of swift and great punishment. (233)

In Utopia the very kernel of societal stability lies in the strict adherence to tradition and patriarchal hierarchies and to the populace at large following along willingly.

In Lacan’s paradigm, the Symbolic order represents law, specifically the law associated with the Name-of-the-father: “It is in the name of the Father that we must recognize the basis of the symbolic function which, since the dawn of historical time, has identified his person with the figure of the law” (“The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” 230). The Name-of-the-father departs from Freud’s Oedipal complex in associating subjectivity with the realm of language instead of simply incest and castration anxiety. In *Seminar III*, Lacan writes,

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34 Here and throughout I have used the Yale edition of Thomas More’s *Utopia*.

35 Warren Wooden notes that “Utopian humanity as displayed in Book II is so denatured, disinfected, and clinical that it bears roughly the same relation to real men and women that the erudite and mellifluous shepherds of the pastoral tradition bore the English serfs who tended their master’s sheep” (“Utopia and Arcadia: An Approach to More’s *Utopia*” 35).

36 Eric Nelson argues that in Utopia “Implicit [is] that individuals should reject the contemplative life and embrace the active life of civic engagement, [. . .] performing their officia to their friends and family, promoting the glory of their patria, and securing honor and fame for themselves” (1032).
In order for the human being to be able to establish the most natural of relations, that between male and female, a third party has to intervene, one that is the image of something successful, the model of some harmony. This does not go far enough—there has to be a law, a chain, a symbolic order, the intervention of the order of speech, that is, of the father. Not the natural father, but what is called the father. The order that prevents the collision and explosion of the situation as a whole is founded on the existence of this name of the father. (96)

For Lacan, language itself acts as the overseer of societal and interpersonal interactions that prevent not only incest but also “lawlessness,” as it provides a symbolic system through which society can find agreement and accord. More’s overt patriarchalism favors the father and tradition and this models the way in which the society of Utopia keeps its populace in line.

THE SYMBOLIC ORDER IN UTOPIA: Authoritarianism and the Law

The society depicted in Utopia indeed overtly displays an intrusive governmental presence in the workings of day-to-day life. Stephen Greenblatt argues that More favors “power, whose quintessential sign is the ability to impose one’s fictions upon the world: the more outrageous the fiction, the more outrageous the manifestation of power” (13). Despite his dismissal of the New Critics’ reading of Utopia as oppressive, Richard Halpern concedes that “Utopia’s obsession with surveillance and control seems also to be a recoding operation conducted with the

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37 Timothy Kenyon argues that in Utopia, “More envisaged that after the Fall, communism could obtain only in relation to the context of a strict and even authoritarian range of civil institutions” (Utopian Communism and Political Thought in Early Modern England 72). Christopher Kendrick argues that in Utopia occurs a “reification which begins by constituting the individual subject as a self, an individual endowed with independent means of control and action. The political centralization that accompanies economic fragmentation will appear, with the consolidation [operating through] internal and external control” (242).

38 Berger argues that “Hythloday’s radical idealism is that of a closed inner world: it is pure and monologic, not open to time, correction, compromise, or the interplay of perspectives made possible by dialogue” (Second World and Green World: Studies in Renaissance Fiction-Making 27).
vagrant masses silently in mind” (155). We also learn that consistency and organization guide the architectural design of Utopia:

The island contains fifty four city-states, all spacious and magnificent, identical in language, traditions, customs, and laws. They are similar in layout and everywhere, as far as the nature of the ground permits, similar even in appearance. None of them is separated by less than twenty four miles from the nearest, but none is so isolated that a person cannot go from it to another in a day’s journey on foot. From each city three old and experienced citizens meet to discuss the affairs of common interest to the island once a year at Amaurotom, for this city, being in the very center of the country, is situated most conveniently for the representative of all sections. It is considered the chief as well as the capital city. (113)

This language sounds very panoptic. The cities themselves have no individuality, and as a result neither do the citizens who live in them. We later learn Amaurotom, the capital city of Utopia, “is surrounded by a high and broad wall with towers and battlements at frequent intervals. A moat, dry but deep and wide made impassable by thorn hedges, surrounds the fortifications on three sides; on the fourth the river itself takes the place of the moat” (119). This description depicts Amaurotom as a medieval castle, impenetrable from all directions, and, more importantly, impossible to easily exit.

The citizens’ lives come under similar scrutiny through the expectations of the society at large. Hythloday tells us, “Of the other crafts, one is learned by each person, and not the men

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39 J.H. Hexter argues that “Hythlodaeus’ description [. . .] of the organization of penal servitude among the Polylereites is perhaps the first of those attempts to conceive a wholly rational penology of which the Panopticon of that radical of radicals, Jeremy Bentham, was to be the most notorious, though not the last” (“Introduction” cxviii).

40 John Freeman argues that in Utopia, “the state [. . .] can regulate and limit a person’s right to own certain ideas and opinions even to the point of violating the most private preserves, the home and the individual’s very person” (“More’s Place in ‘No Place’: The Self-fashioning Transaction in Utopia” (212)

41 Albert Duhamel sees Utopia as “representative of More’s lingering medieval dogmatism” (99). Russell Ames reminds us that “City organization in More’s time [. . .] was medieval in form” (97).
only, but the women too. The latter as the weaker sex have the lighter occupations and generally work wool and flax [. . .] For the most part, each [male child] is brought up in his father’s craft, for which most have a natural inclination. But if anyone is attracted to another occupation, he is transferred by adoption to a family pursuing that craft for which he has a liking” (127). Utopian tradition assumes that male children have the same vocational proclivities as their father, as the desire to pursue another occupation results in separation from the biological family.

Utopia also relies on turning the populace against itself. At the end of the meticulous description of the dining halls and eating arrangements, Hythloday declares that “the grave and reverend behavior of the old may restrain the younger people from mischievous freedom I word and gesture, since nothing can be done or said at table which escapes the notice of the old present on every side” (143). Hythloday continues by describing outright surveillance as a daily occurrence; Hythloday explains that “the trays of food are not served in order from the first place and so on, but all the old men, who are seated in conspicuous places, are served first with the best food, and then equal portions are given to the rest” and that “the notice of the old [is] present on every side” (143). The Utopians even distribute food meticulously to maintain equality.

Utopia also keeps watch over the foreign travels of its citizens: “They thus take care that every gesture of everyone abroad is observed by those whose authority and discipline govern them at home” (235). But such foreign travel must not take place often, as Utopian society also restricts the movement of its citizens: “If any person gives himself leave to stray out of his territorial limits and is caught without the governor’s certificate, he is treated with contempt, brought back as a runaway, and severely punished. A rash repetition of the offense entails the sentence of slavery” (147). The traveling of Utopians necessitates strict governmental control, and those
wishing to travel must get permission. Even while traveling the Utopians must work in their allo-
lotted trade in order to receive food and shelter on the road:

Now you can see how nowhere is there any license to waste time, nowhere any
pretext to evade work—no wine shop, no alehouse, no brothel anywhere, no op-
portunity for corruption, no lurking hole, no secret meeting place. On the contra-
ry, being under the eyes if all, people are bound either to be performing the usual
labor or to be enjoying their leisure in a fashion not without decency. This uni-
versal behavior must of necessity lead to an abundance of all commodities. (147,
emphasis added)

Critics have frequently noted that this passage has panoptic resonance and suggests that it privi-
leges ignorance over ethical choice for the good, but nevertheless Utopia society requires this
ignorance of privacy and secret meetings.\(^{42}\) This conceptual space resembles Žižek’s reading of
Franz Kafka’s *The Trial* in which Žižek argues that “the fact that reality is there for the subject
only must be inscribed in reality itself in the guise of anamorphic stain—this stain stands for the
gaze of the Other, for the gaze qua subject” (*Ticklish Subject* 88, emphasis added). In practice
within a dystopian space such as that in *The Trial* (or *Utopia* for that matter) the Other becomes
in essence a big (Br)Other, an anamorphic gaze that has no presence, center, or tangible ontolo-
gy. The big (Br)Other’s gaze always already subjects Utopian “subjects” to itself, the gaze, and

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\(^{42}\) J.H. Hexter asserts “Indeed Hythlodeaus’ description of the organization of penal servitude among the Polylerites
is perhaps the first of those attempts to conceive a wholly rational penology of which the panopticon of that radical
of radicals, Jeremy Bentham” (“Introduction” cxviii). Peter Marks argues that “Utopian equality requires the co-
operative activity of all citizens in its surveillance regime” (182). Harry Berger claims that “Only fear of eternal
punishment keeps the citizen from treating as worthless the laws and customs of the commonwealth” (“Utopian Foll-
ly: Erasmus and More on the Perils of Misanthropy” 287). Harry Berger argues that “Demographic control is a
symptom of apprehensiveness, and as a public policy it is an excuse to keep people from getting attached to each
other—as they are, for example, in More’s household” (“Utopian Folly: Erasmus and More on the Perils of Misan-
thropy” 281).
in doing so, in Žižek’s model, this constitutes the seminal moment of subjectivity. Lacan writes, “One can be satisfied with being Other like everyone else, after a lifetime spent being it in spite of the Law” (The Other is Missing” 133). As Jean Baudrillard notes, the difference between the “liberal prison and public housing” lies in “Forced presence [because] [e]ven if the walls are signs, every moment of life has its iron curtain” (Utopia Deferred 220).

Hythloday focuses much attention to the ways some of the societies he has visited employ surveillance to keep watch, and by implication control, over the populace. For instance, Hythloday’s description of the Persian Polylerites’ society sounds very panoptic: “they are far from the sea, almost ringed round by mountains, and altogether satisfied with the products of their own land. In consequence they rarely pay visits to other countries or receive them. In accordance with their long-standing national policy, they do not try to enlarge their territory and easily protect what they have from all aggression by the mountains and by the tribute paid to their overlord” (75). Hythloday also points out that the Polylerites all dress “in clothes of the same color” (77). And finally, Hythloday tells his audience that sometimes slaves “are granted their liberty which they have merited by their submissive behavior” (79). Submission to authority brings reward to the submissive slave.

In Seminar I, Lacan writes, “the child serves his apprenticeship in the symbolic order and accedes to its foundation, which is the law” (179). In other words, the child enters into his humanity, his subjectivity, individuation, etc., via indoctrination into language, the symbolic system. Without indoctrination into this system, the child remains a child unable to communicate in any other way than visceral and non-verbal vocal noises. In Seminar II, Lacan writes, “It is the

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43 J.C. Davis sees a similar commitment to authority: “There is thus no privacy in Utopia [and the Utopians] have accepted a discipline which is totalitarian in its scope and denial of human individuality” (54).
44 R. W. Chambers notes that “King Utopus punished any violent religious propaganda by bondage—and bondage in Utopia meant death, if the bondsman continued to be violent” (39).
discourse of my father for instance, in so far as my father made mistakes which I am absolutely condemned to reproduce - that's what we call the super-ego. I am condemned to reproduce them because I am obliged to pick up again the discourse he bequeathed to me, not simply because I am his son, but because one can't stop the chain of discourse, and it is precisely my duty to transmit it in its aberrant form to someone else” (89). The super-ego, that which governs the impulses of the id and which critiques the drives of the ego, comes attached to it a hierarchal tradition, both in the familial sense as well as in the linguistic sense. The atmosphere in Utopia greatly resembles a super-ego, an ever-present, yet always invisible watchful eye that keeps the populace of Utopia in check.

**THE SYMBOLIC ORDER IN UTOPIA: OBLIGATORY TEMPERANCE AND THE FORECLOSURE OF DESIRE**

Utopia relies heavily upon its citizens’ morality based on individual and civic virtue. Early in Book I, More immediately sets up Peter Giles as a man of virtue by meticulously describing his character in the style of a sonnet’s blazon, describing Giles as an honorable man of high position in his home town yet worthy of the very highest position, being a young man distinguished equally by learning and character; for his is most virtuous and most cultured, to all most courteous, but to his friends so open-hearted, affectionate, loyal and sincere that you can hardly find one or two anywhere to compare with him as the perfect friend on every score. (49)

But More describes Hythloday through his physical appearance: “a stranger, a man of advanced years, with sunburnt countenance and long beard and cloak hanging carelessly from his shoulder,

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45 J.C. Davis points out that “With his friends More was committed to a revival not only of Christian spirituality, but also of Christian morality and its effectiveness in ordinary lives and society in general” (45).
while his appearance and dress appeared to me to be those of a ship’s captain” (49). More makes a value judgment of Hythloday from his appearance alone.

After the dialogue has begun, Hythloday first criticizes the free market when he criticizes the lechery and gluttony resulting from wealth: “not only the servants of noblemen but the craftsmen and almost the clodhoppers themselves, in fact all classes alike, are given to much ostentatious sumptuousness of dress and so excessive indulgence at table” (69). Wealth begets waste and over-indulgence, according to Hythloday. Hythloday also explains that Utopians do not have needs, desires, or wants in Utopia because of the abundance of materials and goods and the understanding that no citizen would take more than he needs: “avarice and greed are aroused in every kind of living creature by the fear of want, but only in man are they motivated by pride alone—pride which counts is a personal glory to excel others by superfluous display of possessions” (139). But the reader never finds out exactly how Utopian society kept this desire of men to pursue accumulation from happening. And finally, Hythloday argues that

Pride is too deeply fixed in men to be easily plucked out. For this reason, the fact that this form of a commonwealth—which I should gladly desire for all—has been the good fortune of the Utopians at least, fills me with joy. They have adopted such institutions of life as have laid the foundations of the commonwealth not only most happily, but also to last forever, as far as human prescience can forecast. At home they have extirpated the roots of ambition and factionalism along with all the other vices. Hence there is no danger of trouble from domestic discord, which has been the only cause of ruin to the well-established prosperity of many cities. As long as harmony is preserved at home and its institutions are in a healthy state, not all the envy of neighboring rulers, though it has rather often
attempted it and always been repelled, can avail, to shatter or to shake that ambi-
tion. (245)

The most egregious of the Seven Deadly Sins, Pride represents the single greatest threat to Uto-
opian ideals based on “universal” equality and equal distribution of resources.

More had likely read Aristotle’s Politics, in which Aristotle offers his famous reply to the
communist ideal:

If the state cannot be entirely composed of good men, and yet each citizen is ex-
pected to do his own business well, and must therefore have virtue, still inasmuch
as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of the good man
cannot coincide. All must have the virtue of the good citizen- thus, and thus only,
can the state be perfect; but they will not have the virtue of a good man, unless we
assume that in the good state all the citizens must be good. (1180)

Although typical of Aristotelian circular reasoning, Aristotle here suggests that a state cannot
create “good” or “virtuous” men. According to Quentin Skinner, Utopia represents “one of the
earliest and most original attempts to introduce a classical understanding of civic virtue and self-
government into English political thought” (Visions of Politics 8). Skinner’s reading of Utopia
as political theory, however, relies on an explicit positionality on the part of More, a positionality
that More does not present. As the physical movements of the Utopians falls under the close

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46 As A. D. Cousins notes, “the Utopians understand that the human desire for false pleasure is ultimately linked to
pride” (Pleasure and Gender in the Writings of Thomas More 5).
47 George Logan agrees, labeling Utopia as a “serious work of political philosophy” (The Meaning of More’s “Uto-
pia” i). Phillip Wegner argues that “it is precisely through its estranging deterritorialization of late feudal culture
[that Utopia] opens up the ‘traumatic wound’ in which emerges the reterritorialization that is only later understood
to be the form of the modern nation state” (25-6). Timothy Kenyon somewhat departs from Skinner and Logan in
his claim that “More remained deeply skeptical of the facility of human rationality to promote the effort of will nec-
essary for the institution of the good society. Utopia is, therefore, an exercise in speculative rationalism and theo-
logical pessimism” (Utopian Communism and Political Thought in Early Modern England 47).
scrutiny of the state, so does the mental activity through this notion of mandatory temperance and rejection of all things material, personal, and privately owned.

**THE IMAGINARY ORDER IN UTOPIA: RELIGION AND THE FELLING OF TRADITION**

In its opening pages, *Utopia* depicts the characters Thomas More, Peter Giles, and Jerome de Busleyden, and their encounter with Raphael Hythloday (whose name means “peddler of nonsense”) who tells them about an island nation he has visited named Utopia. The narrative begins when Peter Giles introduces More to Hythloday, a world traveler with a strange and weathered appearance. Book I depicts a Socratic dialogue among More, Giles, Hythloday, and de Busleyden about politics and governance. Book II presents Hythloday’s meticulous first-person description of Utopia’s founding, geography, customs, and politics. More-the-character does not appear in Book II until the very end, as Hythloday alone speaks in Book II in his description of Utopia. Unlike the dialogic narrative in Book I among the four men, Hythloday’s words in Book II do not appear in quotation marks.

More’s *Utopia* first appeared in print the year before Martin Luther would post his *Ninety-Five Theses on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences* on the door of All Saint’s Church in Wittenberg, Germany in 1517. Of course the staunchly Catholic More opposed the Reformation vehemently, and polemically engaged with Protestant reformer William Tyndale (1492-49). According to Russell Jacoby, “With the emergence of Luther and the upheavals of the Reformation, the Catholic More turned against the movement he believed he had helped initiate. The utopian More becomes the anti-utopian More, the bane of so-called heretics” (xiii). Kendrick argues that More’s “fetishism” “is the transformation most significantly symbolized and acted out by Reformation Protestantism that hollows out an ethical-psychological space within the body of late feudal society, a would-be private space [. . .] in which what might be called ethical fetishism is freed to operate as a kind of discrete symptom, where it produces [. . .] the silent saint, the saint-in-himself” which constitutes the Utopian “subject” (235-6). Alan Nagel argues that *Utopia* depicts a “basic irony about imaginative, fictional language and the problem of imitation” (170) and that “More establishes equally both the resemblance and difference between England and Utopia” (175).

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48 Hans-Werner Ludwig states that More's absence from the bulk of the narrative during which Hythloday describes Utopia leads the reader "to forget More is the primary narrator" in favor of Hythloday who may or may not be speaking for More (245).
49 According to Russell Jacoby, “With the emergence of Luther and the upheavals of the Reformation, the Catholic More turned against the movement he believed he had helped initiate. The utopian More becomes the anti-utopian More, the bane of so-called heretics” (xiii). Kendrick argues that More’s “fetishism” “is the transformation most significantly symbolized and acted out by Reformation Protestantism that hollows out an ethical-psychological space within the body of late feudal society, a would-be private space [. . .] in which what might be called ethical fetishism is freed to operate as a kind of discrete symptom, where it produces [. . .] the silent saint, the saint-in-himself” which constitutes the Utopian “subject” (235-6). Alan Nagel argues that *Utopia* depicts a “basic irony about imaginative, fictional language and the problem of imitation” (170) and that “More establishes equally both the resemblance and difference between England and Utopia” (175).
1536) in an ongoing dialogue about early sixteenth-century English translations of the Bible. But More’s treatment of religion presents a difficult conundrum, as Utopia has no obligatory religious dogma. And despite More’s staunch adherence to Catholicism (he frequently wore a hair shirt well into middle age), More’s text curiously dabbles in magic, however, which overtly places More’s vision in opposition to tradition and the status quo.

More’s treatment of religion illustrates Lacan’s notion of the Imaginary, which evades, undermines, or escapes the Symbolic order. Lacan locates God within the Imaginary realm: “We can’t fail to note the link between the imaginary relation and the divine rays” (Seminar III).

Lacan writes of how the ego seeks to separate itself from the Symbolic, the Law, and the divine:

Just to start raising the question as to what the ego is requires one to detach oneself from what we might call the religious conception of consciousness. Implicitly, modern man thinks that everything which has happened in the universe since its origin came about so as to converge on this thing which thinks creation of life. Unique, precious being, pinnacle of creation, which is himself, with this privileged vantage-point called consciousness. (Seminar II 48)

More succinctly, in Seminar II, Lacan writes, “In its most essential aspect, the ego is an imaginary function” (36). The ego, the organized and rational realm of the reality principle, falls un-

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50 Paula Blank notes that “Against Thomas More, Tyndale defended his use of English on the grounds that the gospel was, after all, originally preached in the apostles’ mother tongues. The effort to suppress English Bibles, he claimed, was an attempt by the old religious hegemony to ‘kepe the world still in darkenesse’” (150).
51 According to Guido Giglioni, “Although the practice looks like any other ritual of wonder-working, in More’s opinion, Utopians’ faith in miracle is not magic, but a pious practice meant to obtain divine favors through prayers” (97). For a discussion of More and alchemy, see Bloch, p. 528.
52 But, as Henry Donner points out, the ‘religious toleration of the Utopians [. . .] is not unlimited. Those who think that the world is governed by chance without any divine providence and so deny the existence of God [. . .] are refused the right of citizenship” (50). Although not using the term in the Lacanian sense, Nina Chordas writes that “Thomas More’s Utopia articulated an imaginary ideal society” (2).
53 Alan Nagel argues that Utopia is a “pure fantasy, an ethical-political idyll” (180).
der the domain of the governing super-ego, which houses morality and ethical reasoning. The ego thus resides in the Imaginary order, as it exists to challenge the Symbolic signifying chain. *Utopia* deals in part with the abolition of the ruling social order and a reinvention of social values, habits, and customs, and many of the values, customs, and habits More interrogates logically and rationally deserve reinvention. More's England saw a great amount of social upheaval resulting from the Reformation, and in his rewriting of Plato's *Republic* More exhibits signs of either trying to hold his own within his existing societal conditions, or of vehemently attacking some of the tightly held cultural tenets of societal behavior in Early Modern England. More loved his church and state and in writing *Utopia*, despite some of the ironic elements of the work, he displays his belief that England represented a good example of modern society that could merely benefit from some fine-tuning.

The very founding of Utopia evokes Biblical events that focus on the destruction of an established society. Through Hythloday we learn that the founding of Utopia came when King Utopus conquered the people of Abraxa and “brought the rude and rustic people to such a perfection of culture and humanity as makes them now superior to almost all other mortals, [and] gained a victory” (113). This echoes the way in which the Israelites, with the apparent support of God, conquered the Canaanites to take possession of their homeland, “the land of milk and honey” described in Joshua, Judges, 1st & 2nd Samuel, 1st & 2nd Kings. In Judges 4:23, God himself conquers the Canaanites: “So God subdued on that day Iabin the king of Canaan, before the children of Israel.” Even after the conquest of Abraxa by Utopus there still existed pain and torment; Hythloday tells the reader that Utopus enslaved the Abraxans to sever the newly named

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54 Damian Grace argues that “the resolution of the riddles of Utopia is an exercise in the practical reasonableness that More commends to Dorp—philosophia in contrast to the dialectical sophisms that the scholastics regard as sophia” (14).

55 J.H. Hexter, for instance, argues that “The Utopian Discourse then is based on a diagnosis of the ills of sixteenth century Christendom” (*More’s “Utopia”: The Biography of an Idea* 76).
society Utopia from the mainland, effectively cutting off any physical means of escape: “He set to the task not only the natives, but to prevent them from thinking the labor a disgrace, his own soldiers also. With the work divided among so many hands, the enterprise was finished with incredible speed and struck the neighboring peoples as vain, with wonder and terror at its success” (113). Hythloday describes the genesis of Utopia by pointing out that its founder Utopus “who as conqueror gave the island its name (up to that point it had been called Abraxa) and who brought the rude and rustic people to such a perfection of culture and humanity as makes them now superior to almost all other mortals” (113). Hythloday seems to gloss over the fact that Utopia began with the invasion, the seminal event, of a sovereign nation and the subsequent conquering and reprogramming of its inhabitants. This conflicts with Hythloday’s ostensible pacifism, and precisely demonstrates Žižek assertion that utopia must come about from some kind of forceful violence:

This is the true utopia, the idea that a legal order can make recompense for its founding crimes, thereby retroactively cleansing itself of its guilt and regaining its innocence. What lies at the end of this road is the ecological utopia of humanity in its entirety repaying debt to Nature for all its past exploitation [. . .] The underlying utopian notion is the same: the system which emerged through violence should repay its debt in order to regain an ethico-ecological balance. (Living in the End Times 35)

Utopia does detail the eventual assimilation of the Abraxans after the conquest by Utopus, but this comes with a problematic lack of equality among the Utopians and the Abraxans. Nevertheless, as Elisabeth Hansot notes, “Utopia’s inhabitants find their lives to be perfectly in accord
with Scripture when it later becomes known to them” (48). In other words, the Utopians retrofitted Scripture, the Law, in order to understand their own behavior.

THE IMAGINARY ORDER IN UTOPIA: ALIENATION

More depicts a remedy for the alienation common in his contemporary England. The result creates a Utopian populace who largely do not resemble people in the real world. Žižek’s Marxist-Lacanian model relies upon internalization of external ideological pressure: “the external negativity of the revolutionary Terror is internalized into the power of moral Law, into the pure Knowledge and Will qua Universality, which is not something externally opposed to the subject but something which constitutes the very axis of his self-certainty” (23-4). Such a model of ideological construction of individuality complements the common critical assertion that More’s society in Utopia resembles that of monastic asceticism and isolation. But for Žižek, the internalization of ideological influence, which Žižek calls Terror, shares similarities to the Protestant ethic, as he writes of “the Protestant gesture of dislocating actual social freedom into inner moral freedom, which leaves untouched all the distortions of actual social life” (Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology 24). This underscores Lacan’s importance to Žižek’s thesis about the Hegelian Lacan and the Lacanian Hegel, as “the pressure

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56 J.H. Hexter argues that “More presented an alternative [. . .] in which the means of alienation in his own society—money, private property, inequality [---] would not exist” (“The Loom of Language and the Fabric of Imperatives: The Cases of Il Principe and Utopia, 966). Ernest B. Gilman similarly argues that the Utopia island itself has an “Its alien status, revealed to us by the alienated Hythloday, writes the alien into the narrative of the early modern” (361).

57 Warren Wooden argues that “Utopian humanity as displayed in Book II is so denatured, disinfected, and clinical, that it bears roughly the same relation to real men and women that the erudite and mellifluous shepherds of the pastoral tradition bore to the English serfs who tended their masters’ sheep” (“Utopia and Arcadia: An Approach to More’s Utopia” (35). Similarly, C. S. Lewis calls the Utopians “paper citizens” (168).

58 See, for instance, Duhamel, 119-120. According to Alistair Fox, More in Utopia “[oscillates] between two opposed extreme impulses: to withdraw from the world on one hand, and to become thrall to the phantasmal possibility of the temporal perfecting of the world on the other” (Thomas More: History and Providence 52). Edward Surtz argues that “among the most genuine Christian communities, namely the enclosure of monks and friars [. . .] there is more than a tinge of regret that what Christ had instituted for all should be practiced by only a few” (“Thomas More and Communism” 553). Russell Ames points out that More “decided against becoming as monk, according to Cresacre More, because monastic life had grown impure” (137). But J.H. Hexter disagrees: “Utopia is not a society which men enter voluntarily because of a special vocation, it is a society into which they are born; it is in short and despite all analogues a commonwealth, not a convent” (More’s “Utopia”: The Biography of an Idea 90)
exerted on the subject, which first seemed to come from the outside, is now experienced as something which defines—or rather, subverts—the very kernel of his self-identity” (Tarrying with the Negative 25). Žižek uses Lacan to understand this antinomy by arguing that Lacanian understanding of the split between the Individual and the Universal, the reconciliation constituted by this split, must come about alongside the understanding of the notion of sign and signifier as Society and Individual, respectively. The split, in both Lacan and Žižek, results in alienation.

Žižek also uses his notion of “Terror” as a construct to represent the violence of language exacted onto the subject, and this shares some corollaries with the foundation of Utopia. Utopus did, after all, found Utopia following the violent overthrow of the indigenous population on the island. But in Žižek, all of these concerns have psychological implications: “Lacan’s last word would be radical alienation of the subject. His content, ‘what he is,’ would be determined by an exterior signifying network [i.e., language] offering him the points of symbolic identification, conferring on him certain symbolic mandates” (The Sublime Object of Ideology 46). These “symbolic mandates” also contribute to alienation.

Some have argued that More’s society dulls individuality. Timothy Kenyon justifies More’s choice in doing this by arguing that “first, it is an important factor within the process of

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59 Julian Yates argues that “The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries thus mark a period of transition from the pre-subject of a vaguely defined Middle Ages to the bourgeois subject of the cogito: they are a time of complex and divided selves” (4).

60 Harry Berger argues that “the very self-enclosed spatiality of Hythloday’s green world is a criticism; it is a womb-like retreat protected from the outside world. Since it is a triumph of human art, an ideal system, it is totally, unified and homogenous, purged of that variety—more difficult to control—which springs from accidents of history and differences of individual perspective” (Second World and Green World: Studies in Renaissance Fiction-Making 30). Joshua Phillips argues that in Utopia, the “lack of concern for issues of ownership or provenance, coupled with More’s notion of relatively subjective value, starts to delineate More’s affective and participatory theory of belonging [. . .] Utopia achieves a collective subjectivity only in evacuating the particular subjectivity of its members” (43). Carlo Ginzburg demands that “chilling side of More’s Utopia is absolutely crucial” to understanding it (2). Utopia is “an island where sheep devoured human beings” (23). Berger argues that in Utopia “the naïveté about the psychological appeal of such vices as dicing, hunting, and love of jewels suggests how little experience they have of the mortal weakness from which they are remote” (Second World and Green World: Studies in Renaissance Fiction-
stifling human sinfulness; and second, uniformity and the consequent eschewance of conspicuous consumption reduce the demand for goods and hence the labour required for the production of commodities” (Utopian Communism and Political Thought in Early Modern England 91). In *Tarrying with the Negative*, Žižek argues that the post-modern subject attains an isolated subjectivity at the cost of freedom and pleasure, arguing that “in exchange for this isolation, substance itself accomplishes a first step toward its ‘subjectivization,’ i.e., it changes from the unattainable State, abstractly opposed to us, into wealth qua substantial content which already is at our disposal,” i.e., money (23). Žižek further develops this notion of submission to authority in favor of the chance to engage in monetary exchange by claiming that the State itself must submit to the same paradigm. He argues that the State “is not only subordinated to the subjectivity of self-consciousness via its transformation into wealth: in exchange for this subordination, it acquires itself the form of subjectivity—the impersonal State is replaced by the absolute Monarchy; it becomes identified with the person of the Monarch” (23). “Monarch” here does not refer to a literal sovereign with only inherited political power, but rather as an invisible, unseen yet centralized governmental presence. Once the subject has gone past the point of no return in his acceptance of the alienation, the “alienation becomes an abstract negation which offers no positive, determinate content in exchange” because of the inherent lack of Substance of the literal entity of monetary exchange (*Tarrying with the Negative* 23). Žižek refers to this submission to aliena-

_Making_ 32). Berger argues that in Utopia “the means of order must be alienated from their separate wills and securely vested in the mechanisms of a coercive or cooperative social system. Since ethical reform is beyond attainment, institutional reform is the only alternative. But this is not self-fulfilling: it creates the condition it condemns” (“Utopian Folly: Erasmus and More on the Perils of Misanthropy” 279). John Olin notes “a deadening sameness about Utopian life” (27). George Logan refers to “drab uniformity of Utopia life” (*The Meaning of More’s “Utopia”* 221).
tion as “negative self-relating,” a self-relating that seemingly results from unconscious acceptance of that which negates the self and subjectivity.\(^6\)

In *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance*, Bruce Fink offers an anecdote that somewhat illustrates this notion of “negative self-relating.” Fink writes of the situation in which parents point to a photograph of their child and say, “That’s you!” (36). But this operates much differently in light of the response my friend’s four-year-old son gave when his parents pointed to a picture of their toddler and asked “Who is that?” My friend’s son responded, “That’s you!” Dylan Evans explains this phenomenon: “For Lacan, alienation is not an accident that befalls the subject and which can be transcended, but an essential constitutive feature of the subject. The subject is fundamentally SPLIT, alienated from himself, and there is no escape from this division, no possibility of ‘wholeness’ or synthesis” (9).

**THE IMAGINARY ORDER IN UTOPIA: SCIENCE**

Despite the pseudo-scientific social engineering in Utopia, Thomas More did not have a sense of scientific development of humanity.\(^6\) Much of the actual description of the society focuses on the physical, tangible, and geographic aspects of the island. *Utopia* describes with exhausting detail every aspect of the island of Utopia, from housing layouts to dining hall architecture. William McClung, however, labels More’s overly descriptive account of Utopia as "unsystematically set forth" (10). Indeed, the very narrative structure of the text poses problems for the careful reader. For instance, the narrative of *Utopia* unfolds initially through a first person account of the encounter with Hythloday from More’s perspective. When Hythloday begins de-

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\(^6\) Elliott Simon argues that “The Utopian’s free will fashions an ideal identity for the individual through his support of the common welfare of the state” (26).

\(^6\) According to Joyce Oramel Hertzler, Utopians “regarded the pursuit of science rather as a part of their religion that as in any way antagonistic to it” (144). On the other hand, Robert P. Adams argues that “the idea that applied natural sciences can be made responsible for remarkable social progress was advanced by Sir Thomas More” in *Utopia* (The Social Responsibilities of Science in *Utopia, New Atlantis* and After” 375).
scribing Utopia, the narrative switches to a first person account from the point of view of Hythloday. This lack of definitive narrative foundation additionally adds to the sense of lack of conviction towards the portrayed societies established in each work. According to Ernest Bloch, Utopia makes “medicine easier, less painful, more of a short cut, an art of newly constructed life, or if life cannot be preserved, of effortless death. Instead of gloomy medieval infirmaries, More portrays friendly, roomy hospitals for all” (457). More’s depiction of Utopian hospitals challenges this medieval stereotype. Chloe Houston argues that although the Utopians discover printing, they, like More, cannot benefit from it: “The Utopians have gained a technology; but they are severely limited in what they can do with it” (1400). In other words, the Utopians have challenged the existing laws of nature through a hesitant embrace of technology, but do not follow through with the logical submission to the new “rules” gleaned through technology. The Utopians challenge the Symbolic order, but refuse to submit to another such “Law” that comes from advanced scientific inquiry and discovery.

THE IMAGINARY ORDER IN UTOPIA: PRIVILEGED SUBJECTS

Despite the supposedly “classless” society in Utopia, some of its citizens possessed special privileges.63 The syphogrants, for instance, “legally exempted from work, yet take no advantage of this privilege so that by their example they may the more readily attract the others to work” (131). There do exist opportunities for upward mobility through dedication to learning when “a craftsman so industriously employs his spare hours on learning and makes such progress by his diligence that he is relieved of his manual labor and advanced into the class of men of learning. It is out of this company of scholars that they choose ambassadors, priests, tranibors, and finally the governor himself, whom they call in their ancient tongue Barzanes but in their

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63 A.L. Morton argues that “More’s Utopia was an approximation to a classless society and was necessarily communist” (55).
more modern language Ademus” (133). So while Utopia has eliminated private property of objects to stave off jealousy and material want, there clearly exists in the society a non-tangible commodity through the attainment of membership in a higher “class.” Classes still exist, even though Utopians have the benefit of a six hour workday (129). Such possible upward mobility itself undermines the authority of the very state of Utopia, as the apparently unspoken spoken rules for changing profession trump the spoken rules of following your inherited trade. This also conflicts with More’s England, a society very much ingrained in late medieval social structures and still under the thumb of the Catholic Church.

**THE IMAGINARY ORDER IN *UTOPIA*: MONEY AND PRIVATE PROPERTY**

In addition to a six-hour workday, the Utopians live their lives without any private ownership of material goods or commodities; Hythloday says: “‘wherever you have private property, and all men measure all things by cash values, there it is scarcely possible for a commonwealth to have justice or prosperity—unless you think justice exists where all the best things flow into the hands of the worst citizens or prosperity prevails where all is divided among very few’” (103). Hythloday also endorses redistribution of goods: “‘I become more partial to Plato and less surprised at his refusal to make laws for those who rejected that legislation which gave to all an equal share in all goods’” (105). More disagrees with Hythloday: “‘Life cannot be satisfactory where all things are common. How can there be a sufficient supply of goods when each withdraws himself from the labor of production? For the individual does not have the motive of personal gain and he is rendered slothful by trusting to the industry of others. Moreover, when people are goaded by want and yet the individual cannot legally keep as his own what he has gained, must there not be trouble from continual bloodshed and riot?’” (107). With the removal of money, Hythloday argues that
[W]hat a mass of troubles was then cut away? What a crop of crimes was then pulled up by the roots? Who does not know that fraud, theft, rapine, quarrels, disorders, brawls seditions, murders, treasons, poisonings, which are avenged rather than restrained by daily executions, die out with the destruction of money? Who does not know that fear, anxiety, worries, toils, and sleepless nights will also perish at the same time as money? What is more, poverty, which money alone seemed to make poor, forthwith would itself dwindle and disappear if money were entirely done away with everywhere. (243)

This suggests that both sociological ills as well as psychological issues would disappear with the disappearance of money. But he does say money must disappear “everywhere,” and this leaves the reader wondering whether he means that removal of money from a closed system would result in the benefits he claims. He also does not differentiate from results of an a priori lack of money from a society’s inception versus the removal of it from a society by force or legislation. Monetary transactions come with considerable suspicion: “In all transactions on credit, however, they never trust private citizens but the municipal government” (149). In other words, the state serves as the source of faith and trust, not the individual. A moneyless society seriously challenges the universal use of real world money, a very firm and rigid symbolic system in and of itself.

THE IMAGINARY ORDER IN UTOPIA: MACHIAVELLI

Hythloday early in his discussion of Utopia displays a cynicism familiar to readers of Machiavelli: “among royal counclors everyone is actually so wise as to have no need of profiting by another’s counsel, or everyone seems so wise in his own eyes as not to condescend to profit by it, save that they agree with the most absurd saying of, and play the parasite to, the chief
royal favorites whose friendliness they strive to win by flattery” (57). Such an observation about the rat race nature of court life foreshadows Hythloday’s indictment of private property. Early in Book I, More tells Hythloday, “it is plain that you, my dear Hythloday, are desirous neither of riches nor of power. Assuredly, I reverence and look up to a man of your mind no whit less than to any of those who are most high and mighty” (57). More immediately draws out a dichotomy between those who want power and those who do not want power. Hythloday’s comments about the outlying lands through which he had to travel also suggest a Machiavellian mistrust of the unknown. He initially describes the parts of the world he has visited with somewhat of a xenophobic tenor: “there lie waste deserts scorched with continual heat. A gloomy and dismal region looms in all directions without cultivation or attractiveness, inhabited by wild beasts and snakes or, indeed, men no less savage and harmful than are the beasts” (53). But nevertheless Hythloday assures his audience that he eventually found “peoples, cities, and towns” (53). Hythloday declares that he does not expect to find favor for his positions on these issues: “if I tried to obtrude these and like ideas on men strongly inclined to the opposite way of thinking, to what deaf ears should I tell the tale!” (97). He continues with a cynical condemnation of the lack of any idealism among men in power: “In the private conversations of close friends this academic philosophy is not without its charm, but in the councils of kings, where great matters are debated with great authority, there is no room for these notions” (99). This suggests that Hythloday’s beliefs tend towards absolutism, as he argues in favor of practical applications of dogmatic idealistic positions.

64 Alastair Fox argues that in Utopia, More demands “political Machiavellianism” (Thomas More: History and Providence 179). Henry Donner, however, disagrees (incorrectly): “Utopia appears as a protest against the new capitalist system of economics, the new Machiavellian methods in politics, and the spirit of disbelief in religious matters that was rapidly spreading over Europe” (59).

65 Richard Helgerson argues that Utopia “owes much” to a “tough-minded acceptance of natural limitation” (103). Timothy Kenyon similarly sees More’s sense of limitations, arguing that “More’s social theory was characterized by a tempered optimism” (“The Problem of Freedom and Moral Behavior in Thomas More’s Utopia” 355).
Hythloday argues that one of the ways a sovereign can maintain stability comes from keeping the populace fat dumb and happy: “Who is more eager for revolution than he who is discontented with his present state of life? Who is more reckless in the endeavor to upset everything, in the hope of getting profit from some source or other, than he who has nothing to lose?” (95). He continues by giving an example of Fabricius (likely Gaius Fabricius Luscinus Monocularis, a Roman politician first elected consul in 282 BC), who stated that “he would rather be a ruler of rich people than be rich himself” (95). In other words, the power to rule trumps the power associated with money. But Machiavelli’s system relies heavily upon deceit and subterfuge, and in this respect Utopia’s inclusion of Machiavellian politics brings Utopian polity closer to Malcolm Bowie’s notion of the Imaginary as Fraud (112).

THE IMAGINARY ORDER IN UTOPIA: MADE-UP WAR

Although he speaks against war, Hythloday posits a very post-modern notion of a “made-up” war as a means to control the populace: a councilor “suggests a make-believe war under pretext of which he would raise money and then, when he saw fit, make peace with solemn ceremonies to throw dust in his simple people’s eyes because their loving monarch in compassion would fain avoid human bloodshed” (92-3).66 This chilling ruse described by Hythloday resonates with Jean Baudrillard’s series of essays, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, which claim that the 1992 Gulf War did not take place; Baudrillard writes that the “Gulf War functioned like the flow of capital: Just as wealth is no longer measured by the ostentation of wealth but by the secret circulation of speculative capital, so war is not measured by being waged but by its speculative unfolding in an abstract, electronic and informational space, the same space in which capital moves” (8). Baudrillard connects the “artificiality” of the Iraq war with “speculative capital” in much the same way as does Hythloday describes a non-existent war as a means by which to raise

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66 As Henry Donner points out, “Utopian warfare is in itself an argument against war” (48).
money, which almost suggests a fascist tendency of the Utopian government. “Speculative” capital also describes *Utopia’s* lack of any concrete monetary system at all, as the only “currency” in Utopia comes through behavior, hard work, and virtuous, yet obligatory, temperance.

But for Žižek, “‘Fascism,’ in its ideology and practice, is nothing but a certain formal principle of distortion of social antagonism, a certain logic of its displacement by a combination and condensation of inconsistent attitudes” (*Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* 219). For Žižek, true, pure “fascism” only exists as a “phantom of ‘pure’ Fascism” as “Fascism tout court” (*The Ticklish Subject* 219). In other words, Fascism requires the presence of even the minutest presence of seditious or secret or secretive element to necessitate its own (Fascism’s) existence. This of course shares some commonalities with the New Historical subversion and containment model; in other words, the Utopian government would create the subversive element (albeit in the form of an outside threat) and then tax the populace under the guise of containing this nonexistent subversive element.

**THE IMAGINARY ORDER IN UTOPIA: A PRIORI LANGUAGE**

More also initiates the subversive element of an artificial alphabet, and this fundamentally undermines the very foundation of the Symbolic order. In the Symbolic order, the “signifying network” rests with language in the Lacanian sense of the Saussurean relationship between sign and signifier. For Žižek, this marries externally-originated individuation to Lacan’s Symbolic realm, that of language. But More created a “Utopian Alphabet” to accompany his “utopian” treatise.
The notion of a Utopian alphabet has two connotations: an alphabet from the country of Utopia, and an idealized “good place”/“no-place” alphabet, presumably preferable to pre-existing alphabets. The inclusion of an *a priori* language and alphabet, called a “philosophical language” in the early modern period, serves as another frame through which readers must negotiate More’s text. The pages of the early editions of *Utopia* only translate the utopian verse into Latin.

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67 Creators of philosophical languages in early modern England appeared primarily in the seventeenth century, and include Francis Lodwick (1619-1694), Sir Thomas Urquhart of Cromarty (1611 - 1660), George Dalgarno (1616–
which those with little Latin must then translate into English. In Seminar I, Lacan states, “I have taught you to identify the symbolic with language” (74). The implications of this relationship for More’s creation of an a priori alphabet and language lie in his reinventing language for the purpose of controlling language and by association the populace. If Utopians learn a language different from every other known language, they cannot think beyond that language and thus he who controls the language (More or Utopus) controls the populace (the Utopians).


More’s decision to place himself as a character in his Utopia finds more sophisticated development in Margaret Cavendish’s entrance into her own utopia, The Blazing World. But in the case of More, More-the-character appears at the very beginning of the narrative and even in several of the parerga while Cavendish herself only appears at the end of her utopian narrative. This curious “split” subjectivity of More—More-the-character and More-the-author—complicates understanding of both halves of this “split.” These two halves jointly exist in an impossible realm resembling Lacan’s notion of the Real. Bruce Fink gives the most succinct definition of Lacan’s notion of the Real: “The real is perhaps best understood as that which has not yet been symbolized, remains to be symbolized, or even exists ‘alongside’ and in spite of a speaker’s considerable linguistic capabilities” (25). More-the-author “remains to be symbolized” in the same way as More-the-character “exists ‘alongside’ and in spite of” the beliefs held by More-the-author as extrapolated from his other writings and biographical details. More’s conscious, or perhaps unconscious, vacillation between the crude dialectic of capitalism and communism plac-

1687), and John Wilkins (1614 – 1672). German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 – 1716) also wrote about a priori languages. Incidentally, Lodwick began his publishing career with publications outlining philosophical languages and at his death left only in manuscript his A County Not Named (composed 1675), an agrarian and communist utopian treatise.
es him in the Real, and, for Lacan, this places him in a somewhat “psychotic” space. Even at the end of the narrative, he has not yet symbolized himself, i.e., resolved the conflict of this problematic dialectic, and thus remains at odds with himself in the same way that Utopia remains at odds with itself even five hundred years after it first appeared in print.

One of the most debated topics about Utopia lies in its at times contradictory messages about equality and freedom. Although emancipation of servitude could not have happened in More’s world, More-the-author presents an implicit approval of egalitarian attitudes among men (and women). After all, women get to see their future husbands naked before they marry just as men get to see them (as in Bacon’s New Atlantis). In addition, the acceptance of slavery in More’s work demonstrates his conflicting attitude towards indicting the society into which he was born, in which he grew up, and in which he became a very successful man. This makes More the true protagonist in the work, either More-the-narrator or More-the-author. Louis Marin argues that More steps upon the stage only as subject of events in the text he writes, only to relinquish this position in discovering that the events that affected him are not weighty, factual events but discursive events that are weightless because they are the narrative of events that have happened to another. Thus the exactness More sought (and he says as much to Peter Giles) is not the referential exactness of a full signified; it is, rather, fidelity to another narrative, to the narrative of an other: utopia.

But both More-the-character and More-the-author become the captive audience of Book II’s description of what some see as almost a fascist society. In reading Utopia next to the tradition of

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68 According to John Olin, “More is denying not that absolute equality is right, but that it is prudent. The commonwealth cannot be stable, prosperous, and happy without inequality” (19, Olin’s emphasis).
humanism, Jameson claims that More himself serves as a character in his own narrative, a character that unknowingly has rejected his own fundamental beliefs about society and human nature:

Utopian figure would in this case be the sign of More’s dawning awareness of the inefficacy of those fundamental humanist instruments and categories which are rhetoric and persuasion. *Utopia* would then be generated, not by an overestimation of the powers of reason, as rather by an unformulated consciousness of its failure, and by Hythloday’s experience (in Book One) of the impotence of discursive argument and disputation in the making or at least the transformation of history. (“Of Islands and Trenches: Naturalization and the Production of Utopian Discourse” 19)

Jameson here suggests that More betrays a wavering commitment to his humanist ideals to unconsciously favor a “transformation of history,” or, in other (Marxist) terms, a revolution of some kind, whether social, political, or economic.

If More-the-character serves as the protagonist of the work, he undergoes a change in state of mind, almost as in a bildungsroman. In the closing paragraphs of the work, he writes, “I first said, nevertheless, that there would be another chance to think about these matters more deeply and to talk them over with him more fully. If only this were some day possible!” (245). When the narrative shifts from Hythloday’s description of Utopia to More’s final assessment of it in a shift in focalization, the reader sees that More’s words no longer appear in quotation marks. This suggests a closing of the gap between More in Book 1 who disagreed with Hythloday vehemently to More in the concluding paragraphs who has become more willing to
interrogate the things that constitute the only reality he has ever known. As critics have frequently noted, More composed Book 2 proper of Utopia before he composed Book 1. Almost immediately in Book II the reader notices that the point of view of the narrative has shifted and that Hythloday now speaks in the first person without quotations marks. Accepting More-the-character as the protagonist of the work underlines a change the thinking of More-the-character: “Meanwhile, though in other respects he is a man of the most undoubted learning as well as of the greatest knowledge of human affairs, I cannot agree with all that he said. But I readily admit that there are many features in the Utopian commonwealth which it is easier for me to wish for in our countries than to have any hope of seeing realized” (246-7).

THE AFTERLIFE OF MORE’S UTOPIA: SIXTEENTH CENTURY AND BEYOND

More’s text has of course had far reaching impact extending beyond early modern England. In their utopian texts of the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon and Margaret Cavendish cannot reconcile the implicit complications in creating a perfect society: Bacon left his New Atlantis unfinished and Cavendish’s Blazing World moves into the realm of the “fantastickal” (as she calls) when she retreats into her own mind and makes multiple “Blazing Worlds” in her imagination.

Aside from the obvious references and influences found in major utopian texts such as Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis and Margaret Cavendish’s The Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World, references to More and Utopia appear frequently in writings from other major early modern authors. For example, in his Defence of Poesy (written in 1579, first printed 1595), Sir Philip Sidney (1554-1586) writes,

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69 The term “focalization” comes from Gérard Genette’s Narrative Discourse, p. 10.
70 George Logan demands that the reader read “the sections of Utopia—that is, in the order in which More meant them to be read—is the best critical procedure” (The Meaning of More’s “Utopia” 18).
But even in the most excellent determination of goodness, what philosopher’s
counsel can so readily direct a prince, as the feigned Cyrus in Xenophon; or a vir-
tuous man in all fortunes, as Aeneas in Virgil; or a whole commonwealth, as the
way of sir Thomas More’s Utopia? I say the way, because where Thomas More
erred, it was the fault of the man and not of the poet, for that way of patterning a
commonwealth was most absolute, though he perchance hath not so absolutely
performed it. (222)

John Foxe (1516-1587), author of the 1516 Acts and Monuments (aka, Foxe’s Book of Martyrs)
mentions More’s Utopia in his A Sermon of Christ Crucified (1570), which largely praises Prot-
estantism and denounces Catholicism. Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) essay “Of Usury” from
his collection, Essays: Religious Meditations. Places of Perswasion and Disswasion. Seene and
Allowed (1597) mentions Utopia in the context of its inability to end usury: “Therefore to speak
of the abolishing of usury is idle. All states have ever had it, in one kind or rate, or other. So as
that opinion must be sent to Utopia” (422). John Milton (1608-1674) mentions More in a little
known 1642 pamphlet entitled “An apology against a Pamphlet Call’d A Modest Confutation,”
and politician William Prynne (1600-1669), poet F. Quarles (1592-1644), politician John Coke
(1563-1644), and True Levelers-founder Gerard Winstanley (1609-1676) all mention More.

But references to More and his Utopia appear in more obscure texts as well, with refer-
ences to both appearing in seventeenth century texts by poet Thomas Overbury (1581-1613),
translator Thomas Holland (1539-1612), and poet Thomas Bancroft (1596-1658). Two minor
utopian texts also mention More prominently: Samuel Hartlib (1660-1662) mentions More’s

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71 Warren Wooden first noted this in a 1978 note in Moreana (“An Unnoticed Sixteenth Century Reference to
More’s Utopia”)
72 For more on these references, see Tamura.
73 For more on these references, see Rude.
Utopia in his own utopian A Description of the Famous Kingdome of Macaria (1641); and bishop Joseph Hall (1574-1656) mentions More in the anonymously published dystopian text, Mundus alter et idem sive Terra Australis antehac semper incognita; Longis itineribus peregrini Academici nuperrime illustrata (1607).74

The critical and scholarly attention afforded More’s Utopia has evolved with the evolution in “fashionable” trends of literary scholarship, and discussion of Utopia frequently finds its way in non-literary scholarship as well. This present study engages in a search for elements of subjectivity, which has characterized much recent scholarship about not only early modern literature but also literature before and since the early modern period. But using Lacan to understand More’s depiction of Utopia, with whatever we take that word to mean, places Utopia outside of the trends of historical scholarship and thus transforms More’s work into a more timeless and archetypal depiction of a supposedly “ideal” society. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate Francis Bacon’s conscious and obvious engagement with More’s Utopia through Bacon’s embrace of strict control of its populace in the Lacanian Symbolic order.

74 For Hartlib’s use of More, see Tamura. For Hall’s use of More, see Wands.
CHAPTER 3: POWER IS KNOWLEDGE: FRANCIS BACON’S *NEW ATLANTIS* AND SYMBOLIC SUBJECTIVITY

I don’t want to belong to any club that will accept people like me as a member.

**Groucho Marx**

Upon discovering Bensalem, Francis Bacon's fictive society in the *New Atlantis*, the Portuguese sailors encounter the island society’s authority, which relies upon an unseen, yet continually invasive, seat of government known as The House of Salomon. The House of Salomon also serves as the focal point of scientific innovation as well as the means to control the knowledge of scientific innovation along with the day-to-day activities of the Bensalemites. From the sailors’ initial encounter with them, the Bensalemites exhibit a muted hospitality with an undercurrent of mistrust; after telling the sailors to wait offshore for an extended period of time, the Bensalemites tell the sailors explore Bensalem freely while remaining within specific spatial limits. Through the control of knowledge, science, and physical movement, Bacon’s ostensibly utopian *New Atlantis* illustrates the early modern notion of how sociological forces in a society affect the psychology of the members of that society. But Bensalem uses means other than the House of Salomon to impose governmental control on its population; Bensalem's strict patriarchal structure perpetuated by the nationalized "Feast of the Family" celebration presents Bacon’s version of a society employing what Foucault would call a Machiavellian "art" of government, or "Governmentality." The society depicted in the *New Atlantis* thus constitutes a Foucauldian, panoptic dystopia that employs a gender-based authority and maintains its power and authority through a system of rewards, punishments and ever-present surveillance through

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75 Bronwen Price asserts that a “troubled relationship between part and whole, outside and inside, is a key feature of the text” (“Introduction” 5)

76 According to Kate Aughterson, in the *New Atlantis* "Both sexual difference and gender are prominent literal and allegorical signifiers within the tale, and are therefore central to any interpretation of the text" (157).
both technology and biopower. In Bacon’s Bensalem, the psychological site of utopian individuation manifests inside the authoritative and orderly nature of the society. Bacon’s New Atlantis thus reflects Lacan’s Symbolic Order of individuation in its depiction of this strictly patriarchal and highly disciplined society, the center of which shares a name with a prominent Old Testament patriarch.

**Patriarchy in Bacon’s New Atlantis**

Bacon’s *New Atlantis* relates the story of a Spanish merchant ship lost at sea off the coast of Peru that accidentally finds the island, Bensalem. The first Bensalemites the Spaniards encounter initially keep the newcomers at a distance but ultimately allow them to come onshore. Once on the island, the shipwrecked sailors learn that the island nation is a self-contained and isolated society virtually cut off from the rest of the world. Through a series of guided tours, the sailors learn about this society through a series of ever-present and watchful guides. The sailors’ first guide controls the House of Strangers, where the sailors stay at the beginning of the visit. Their second guide, a Jew named Joabin, introduces the sailors to the familial and marital customs and traditions; Joabin also instructs them on the patriarchal structure of the society and the state-sponsored ritual called “the Feast of the Family,” in which the “father” of the family, or “Tirsan,” both asserts and passes on his authority. Over the course of the tours, the sailors re-

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77 Critical opinion about the genre to which Bacon’s *New Atlantis* belongs is not a consensus. Bacon’s editor and secretary, William Rawley, refers to the text as a “fable” in the prefatory note to the reader (127). Max Deutscher argues that the *New Atlantis* presents a utopia that “is not an allegory of what occurs, but a dream of a possible world” (290), while Marina Leslie labels the *New Atlantis* a “parable” (10). Paul Salzman states that the *New Atlantis* is “allusive at the level of genre, gathering together, as it does, a range of reference to a wide variety of narrative possibilities” (28). Salzman goes on to astutely demonstrate “The intersection between travel narrative, dystopia and imaginary voyage” in the *New Atlantis*, which he labels a “particularly hybrid example of a particularly hybrid genre” (35, 45). Perez Zagorin argues that the *New Atlantis* “belongs to the genre of utopian or ideal commonwealths, whose authors depict, either seriously or playfully, the world as they think it ought to be” (123). Nieves Mathews labels the *New Atlantis* a “religious fable” (412). J.C. Davis argues that the *New Atlantis* is “extremely ambivalent” and therefore does not easily fit into a generic category (106). Patricia Demers argues that the text demonstrates “dramatic artistry” (138).

78 According to Guido Giglioni, “in *New Atlantis*, the shipwreck (better, the mysterious, forced landing) is in all likelihood engineered by the technologically savvy Fathers of Solomon’s House” (93).
ceive considerably detailed information about the formal institutions of Bensalem as well as the scientific activities that take place at the House of Salomon.\textsuperscript{79} They initially think that Bensalem lacks direction and authority, but eventually, however, they become acquainted with Bensalem’s laws and customs and quickly learn that the society lives under the watchful eye of the House of Salomon. The sailors’ final guide, the Father of Salomon’s House, instructs them about where they can and cannot go during their stay. Bacon’s text “ends” abruptly, noting, “The rest was not perfected.” Bacon’s secretary and seventeenth century editor, William Rawley, famously declared the work unfinished, although many critics argue the \textit{New Atlantis} is complete in the form in which Bacon left it.\textsuperscript{80}

Bacon’s text appeared in Latin in 1624 and in English in 1627 during a complicated time for England.\textsuperscript{81} The Latin version appeared one year before James I died and the English version appeared two years after Charles I took the throne. But the seventeenth century saw significant political changes on the continent as well. For example, in his 1978 lecture entitled “Governmentality,” Foucault asserts that during the seventeenth century occurred a shift in the dynamics of the way European governments operated to exercise power. Foucault specifically calls attention to the influence of Machiavelli’s writings of the early fifteenth century on this burgeoning “art” of government. Foucault discusses three different modes of government: “the art of self-government, connected with morality; the art of properly governing a family, which belongs to economy; and finally the science of ruling the state; which concerns politics” (90).

This relationship between the rule of the father (patriarchy/family) and the rule of the family

\textsuperscript{79} For a detailed outline and description of these institutions, see Wheeler, 297-8; for an explanation of these activities, see Wheeler 299-301.

\textsuperscript{80} See, for instance, Hutton, 49. F. H. Anderson argues that because “There is an earlier draft [.] it may be concluded that [Bacon at the later period] is attempting to put the original piece into shape for publication” (43). Robert Adams claims “it seems intended for publication as it stands” (“Social Responsibilities of Science” 385). Jerry Weinberger argues that the New Atlantis is not finished because it “lacks a political teaching” (“Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the New Atlantis” 865).

\textsuperscript{81} For an explanation of the printed presentation of the \textit{New Atlantis}, see Salzman, 42-3.
(politics/economy) reflects patriarchal attitudes prevalent when sovereigns such as England’s James I claimed divine right of rule despite a complicated genealogical path to the throne. Foucault ultimately argues that a government must use surveillance: “To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and goods” (92). Bacon’s New Atlantis exhibits all three components in Foucault’s model of governmentality: Bensalem represents a self-sufficient and isolated society and thus exists as a “self-governed” society; Bensalem also comingles political matters with familial matters with the state-sponsored “Feast of the Family”; and finally, Bensalem represents a society strongly scientific in nature, both in the realm of politics as well as in the day-to-day lives of its inhabitants. Queen Elizabeth perpetuated her persona of the “mother” of England throughout her reign, and repeatedly appealed to this ethos as chosen mother of her country. Francis Bacon came of age during Elizabeth’s reign, but never successfully found a place at court among Elizabeth’s advisors, and only rose to political prominence when James became king. In establishing a clearly patriarchal authority in the New Atlantis, Bacon comments upon the familial nature of rule in the England that provided him success in his career.82

Although Foucault has held a much favored position in Renaissance studies in the last three decades, some critics have attempted to undermine his legacy. In her study of Foucault’s displacement of Lacan in the academy, Joan Copjec argues that “the panoptic argument is ultimately resistant to resistance, unable to conceive of a discourse that would refuse rather than refuel power” (10). Copjec suggests here that the phenomenon of the prisoners holding power in

82 W.A. Sessions argues that the New Atlantis reflects Bacon’s autobiography (“‘Child of Time’: Bacon’s Uses of Self-representation” 97).
the panopticon does not translate into any tangible or useful power. Copjec also argues that subjectivity in Foucault’s model becomes impossible because of the necessity of self-denial: "the internal dialectic that makes the being of the subject dependent on the negation of its desire turns desire into a self-hindering process" (25). In other words, the subject “desiring” to attain individuation in essence sabotages himself through the very process of engaging in this desire because it requires a kind of self-regulation. In their study of the intersections of the theories of Foucault and Žižek, Fabio Vighi and Heiko Feldner argue that this self-regulation results in an outward manifestation:

This bipolar conception of biopower – ‘anatomic and biological, individualizing and specifying, directed towards the performances of the body, with attention to the processes of life’ (ibid.) – thus integrated the microphysics of disciplinary power, which Foucault had elaborated in Discipline and Punish, into a complex model of power which now extended to the level of macro-sociology. (81)

Vighi and Feldner argue here that biopower engages in an “individualizing and specifying” process that, according to Vighi and Feldner, transcends the specificity of the individual and changes from the “micro,” or personal individuation, into the “macro,” or societal individuation, or rather the assimilation of individuals into the collective conscious of the “whole” of society. The Bensalemites in the New Atlantis have few proper names and Bacon largely identifies them through their profession or their role in the society. The Bensalemites individually thus constitute “biopower” in both Foucault’s sense and Vighi and Feldner’s sense. According to Jacques Lacan, subjectivity comes about through the individual’s connection to society with regards to profession and status: “the totality of the symbolic world of the subject, which can be extraordinarily complex, even antinomic, and to his own personal position, […] is a function of his place
in society, of his future, of his projects, in the existential sense of the term, of the education and tradition which is his” (Seminar I 198). Lacan’s notion of biopower aligns closely to that of Foucault and Foucault’s interlocutors, and all of these models of subjectivity leave the individual seeking subjectivity powerless and with society’s boot to his neck.

In the New Atlantis, Bacon does not depict very many authority figures. In place of interaction with high-ranking official Bensalemites, the explorers hear accounts of many of the practices of the society from their series of guides. The Jewish guide, Joabin, gives the sailors an account of the custom known as the “Feast of the Family,” which contains many of the corollaries between governmental authority and familial or patriarchal authority.\(^83\) Any Bensalemite man who sees at least thirty of his own descendants alive together at three years or older may enjoy such a feast, which comes at the cost of the state.\(^84\) The Bensalemites call the “Father of the Family” the “Tirsan,” which comes from Hebrew for “timid” or “fearful”; this suggests that despite the state-sponsored “Feast,” the patriarch celebrant must still submit to the state. Before the feast begins the father attempts to make amends to unresolved family matters and receives “such reverence and obedience they give to the order of nature” (147). The order of nature here connects with the order of the government: “The governor assisteth, to the end to put in execution by his public authority the decrees and orders of the Tirsan, if they should be disobeyed” (148). Patriarchal authority reigns here at this feast, as Bacon aligns the natural order of patriarchal rule with the political order of the governing body of the state. In Seminar III, Lacan claims that the Symbolic order exists to withstand the Oedipal attraction, and he uses legislative language in his

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\(^{83}\) John Guillroy argues that in the New Atlantis Bacon has created “The bachelor state, [which] as we shall see, is the social condition for the cultivation” of the Feast of the Family (52). In Joabin, Bacon likely wishes to refer to the Joab of the Old Testament, the nephew of King David, whom Solomon succeeded in 1 Kings, Chapter 1.

\(^{84}\) Kate Aughterson connects the patriarchal structure in Bensalem with the governance of Bensalem at large: “The discourse surrounding the father in the New Atlantis echoes contemporary patriarchal theory, but Bacon alters the political balance between individual and state” (165).
description of its necessity: “there has to be a law, a chain, a symbolic order, the intervention of the order of speech, that is, the father” (96). Dylan Evans in his Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis uses similar legalistic language to describe the Name of the Father, arguing that Lacan “emphasizes the legislative and prohibitive function of the symbolic father” (119). Bensalem in fact employs a “name of the father” in the title of “Tirsan,” a name that replaces or supplants the father’s given name for the purposes of the Feast of the Family, which perpetuates patriarchies and in essence negates any notion of the Oedipal complex.

The nobility of Bensalem provides some iconography for the Feast of the Family in the form of The King’s Charter, which contains “gift of revenew, and many privileges, exemptions, and points of honor, granted to the Father of the Family” (148). The guide tells the explorers, “For they say the king is debtor to no man,” they say, “but for propagation of his subjects” (149); Bacon brings the law of nature close here to inherited rule. Seemingly the most important part of the feast comes with the blessing that the Tirsan gives: “Son of Bensalem, (or Daughter of Bensalem) thy father saith it; the man by whom thou has breath and life speaketh the word; The blessing of the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace, and the Holy Dove be upon thee, and make the days of thy pilgrimage good and many” (149); the ritual firmly establishes the power of existing patriarchal authority through marriage and procreation, while at the same time it remains

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85 The Symbolic domain for Lacan houses language (Seminar I 74). Benjamin Farrington points out that in Bacon’s works at large, Bacon demonstrates that “the very nature of language involved each new generation in the errors of the old by the process of learning to speak” (The Philosophy of Francis Bacon: An Essay on Its Development from 1603 to 1609 44).

86 Susan Bruce notes the patriarchal nature of the Feast by arguing that it “might better be named the ‘Feast of the Father’” because the patriarch of the family receives all the honor and attention (595). Jerry Weinberger sees the ritual in a more positive light, arguing that it “shows the goodness of Bensalem to consist in the mere generation of human bodies: the elaborate count of rank and merit are subordinated to the virtue of mere fecundity” (Science, Faith Politics: Francis Bacon and the Utopian roots of the Modern Age 153). Weinberger seems to ignore the way that Bacon ignores the Bensalemites who carry and give birth to the children.

87 Denise Albanese asserts that Bacon’s text “produces difference from within [. . . ] by inserting itself into the flow of power between monarch and representation” (New Science, New World 93). The superiority of masculine sovereignty had been undermined with Elizabeth’s successful reign and James’s contested ascension to the throne and the representation of such order in Bacon’s text attempts to restore the damaged image it had attained.
married to patriotic duty ("Son of Bensalem").\footnote{Robert Faulkner argues that Bacon’s “channeling toward marriage is not for reasons of morality but for reason of state: thus the king obtains the growth in population and the family discipline that is highlighted” in the Feast of the Family (241). Julie Robin Solomon argues that “the celebration is a ritual enactment of masculine social power and organization” (Objectivity in the Making: Francis Bacon and the Politics of Inquiry 99).} Dylan Evans explains that for Lacan, “the social world is structured by certain laws which regulate kinship relations and the exchange of gifts” (202). Lacan writes,

> The closer we get, not to the origin, but to the element, the more the structuration, the amplitude, the intricacy of the specifically symbolic structure of nomenclature imposes itself. The nomenclature of kinship and alliance is more comprehensive in the elementary forms than in the so-called complex forms, that is to say those forms elaborated in cultural cycles of far greater extension. (Seminari II 30)

Lacan’s notion of “kinship and alliance” has resonance with Bensalem, a society that bases its authority on keeping the populace in line through “kinship” and patriarchal authority. As in More’s *Utopia*, Bacon’s *New Atlantis* demonstrates the patriarchal ideology at work in the creation of a utopian society. The Bensalemites’ utopian individuation comes through this submission to patriarchal rituals, which lie closest to Lacan’s notion of the Symbolic order. The very perpetuation of Bensalem rests firmly within the “cultural cycle” of the Feast of the Family, which serves both as a celebration of procreation but also as celebration of the state.

Some parts of the Feast of the Family ritual demonstrate the control the society has over its inhabitants. The sailors learn that all present at the ritual chant, “*Happy are the people of Bensalem*” and “*Son of Bensalem (or Daughter of Bensalem) thy father saith it; the man by whom thou has breath and life speaketh the word; The blessing of the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace, and the Holy Dove be upon thee, and make the days of thy pilgrimage good and...*”
many (149, 150, Bacon’s italics). Through this memorized language the Bensalemites allow and become complicit in their own hegemonic domination by the ruling order of Bensalem. The Feast of the Family serves an important role for the Bensalemites, as it perpetuates a familial structure that keeps every man, woman, and child aware of their predetermined role in the society. Attempting to perpetuate what seems like a “status quo” seems unnecessary for a society with little contact with the outside world, as strict adherence to Bensalem’s laws about leaving the society or meeting with visitors would eliminate the possibility of the populace knowing any other way to live. Nevertheless it demonstrates the extent to which the Bensalemites blindly submit to the law of the land.

In his essay “Of Custom and Education,” Bacon asserts that “custom is the principal magistrate of man’s life” and that “the great multiplication of virtues upon human nature resteth upon societies well ordained and disciplined” (419-20). Bacon’s Bensalem consists of a highly disciplined society. For instance, Bacon’s narrator concludes of the Feast of the Family: “The objective of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen, and protect the principality, but with this last understood to mean not the objective ensemble of its subjects and the territory, but rather the prince’s relation with what he owns, with the territory he has inherited or acquired, and with his subjects” (90). For Bacon here the relationship the sovereign has with his followers de-

89 Adwin Wigfall Green accuses Bacon of being “in love with the enameled beauty of his own rhetoric” in his descriptions of the Feast of the Family (175-6). For Charles Whitney, Bacon’s “utopia governed by reason is like a family of many generations gathered lovingly to share their abundance and do honour to their progenitors in a ritual celebration” (Francis Bacon and Modernity 199).
90 As Robert Appelbaum notes, “In the New Atlantis one of the highest marks of success for a man is the number of his progeny” (98).
91 This blind submission leads Anthony Funari to argue that the New Atlantis displays Bacon’s “near naïve optimism” (25). Joyce Oramel Hertzler similarly reads Bacon’s text as wishful thinking, arguing that it depicts “romantic enthusiasm” about the possibilities of scientific innovation (147). Robert Appelbaum argues that “There is plenty of wishful thinking in the construction of New Atlantis, but by Bacon’s own standards there is no magic in it (94).
92 Charles Whitney argues that the narrative structure of the New Atlantis reflects the discipline and structure to which the Bensalemites are subject to: “The New Atlantis is much less a narration of events than it is a narration of procedures, culminating in that of Salomon’s House’s scientific procedures” (Francis Bacon and Modernity 199). Claire Jowitt argues that the men in Bensalem “need to be ‘disciplined’ by marriage” (149).
terminates his success in governing the principality. Bacon departs from Machiavelli’s model of a leader who must keep his principality in fear to retain power, but nevertheless a leader’s success comes about from his dealings with his followers for both Bacon and Machiavelli. The ruling order of Bensalem at the macro level, or the Father of the Family at the micro level, constitute a “body politic,” representing the physical, corporeal manifestation of the realm under his control, and as such also represents the “greater good” of the collective populace over which he ruled but also to which he belonged. Lacan bluntly states that the Symbolic order relies on “organized” authority: “the symbolic world [is] organized” (Seminar II90). Indeed, Bensalem represents a highly-ordered and disciplined society, and as such the Bensalemites’ status as citizens of a “utopia” relies upon their own individual submission to this ordered and disciplined society.

**RELIGION IN BACON’S *NEW ATLANTIS***

The Bensalemites named their House of Salomon after their founder, King Solamona, but Bacon clearly got the name from the prominent Old Testament patriarch Solomon, known in the Book of Kings and Chronicles as Solomon “the wise” and the builder of the first Temple. Bensalem’s House of Salomon serves as the society’s center of technology, knowledge, and population control. The Bensalemites built Salomon’s House “for the finding out of the true nature of things” (146), a likely reference to Lucretius’s epic poem, *On the Nature of Things*, a late Roman treatise about, among other things, the absence of divinity and the afterlife. Bacon’s Bensalem

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93 Vincent Luciani has successfully demonstrated Bacon’s engagement with Machiavelli in texts other than the *New Atlantis*, but his assertion that Bacon “remains in a sense ethically inferior to” (27) to Machiavelli does not take into consideration the importance of the Feast of the Family to keeping the populace happy, albeit happy in a state of ignorant happiness. Howard White sees the complete opposite of Weinberger, arguing that in the *New Atlantis* Bacon shows that “political philosophy, or the knowledge of the best regime, is the most important knowledge on earth” (*Peace Among the Willows* 15).

94 Jerry Weinberger sees a close connection between the Biblical naming of the House of Salomon and the role of technology in the *New Atlantis*: “That science and technology should arise and flourish depends importantly on the genuine truth of the Biblical revelation” (“On the Miracles in Bacon’s *New Atlantis*” 111). On the other hand, Elizabeth McCutcheon points out that Solomon was “often seen in the Renaissance as a symbol of the vanity of knowledge” (345).
as such unsurprisingly seems at odds with religious belief, despite the obvious religious implications of naming the seat of government after the Biblical patriarch Solomon. While Bacon leads the reader to think that Bensalem has actually achieved a classless society, the very center of the society takes its name from one of the most prominent patriarchal figures in the Bible.

Solomon had numerous wives and countless children, and this suggests that Bacon means to suggest that the “subjects” of Bensalem are merely wives, married to an unseen yet all-seeing symbol of patriarchal authority. Lacan’s reading of Freud’s *Moses and Monotheism* makes for a nebulous presence of the father: “There is, he tells us, genuine progress in spirituality in affirming the function of the father, namely, of him of whom one is never sure” (*Seminar VII* 143).

While Bacon does favor science over religion in the *New Atlantis*, he does attach the name of a prominent Biblical figure to the very center of the society, both architecturally and historically.

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95 This is also true of Bacon’s name for his text and its society, the *New Atlantis*, an obvious reference to the mythical island society mentioned by the pre-Christian pagan Plato in his *Critias* and *Timaeus*, not the mention Bacon’s certain familiarity with Plato’s *Laws* and *Republic*.

96 Critics have long found Bacon’s work to be steeped in religious belief. For example, Peter Zetterberg argues that “The method that Bacon outlined for science was patterned on the example of the divine creation” (186). Jerry Weinberger argues that “the Christianity described in the *New Atlantis* is as pious as it is secular” (*Science, Faith, and Politics: Francis Bacon and the Utopian Roots of the Modern Age: A Commentary on Bacon's Advancement of Learning* 27). Howard White refers to Bacon’s use of a “Christian, or a pseudo-Christian twist” on a pagan embrace of nature (474). Harvey Wiener argues that in the *New Atlantis*, “providence is a means at least equal in status to science in Bacon’s utopian universe wherein the comprehension of all things is man’s goal” (85). Lawrence Lampert argues that in the *New Atlantis* “science has its proper place and authority in a Christian society” (33). Harvey Wiener argues that “a strongly religious atmosphere appears early and remains in the *New Atlantis*. Where scientific advances come late in the work and in concentrated doses, Christianity and references to God and the Book are everywhere” (85-92). Similarly, José García argues that the choice to name the seat of government Solomon’s House initiates “the protagonist’s pattern of conversion is deployed as a movement away from his own disabling habits of thought [. . .] which in turn allows him to embrace a stronger identity as both a Christian and a natural philosopher” (180). In railing against the new historicism, Catherine Gimelli Martin argues that “Bacon’s foundational assumptions are grounded in Christian humanism, or pragmatism or both” (“The Ahistoricism of the New Historicism: Knowledge as Power Versus Power as Knowledge in Bacon's *New Atlantis*” 34). More recently, Stephen McKnight argues that “Bacon’s program of utopian reform presented in the *New Atlantis* is grounded in genuinely and deeply felt religious convictions and contends that it serves as the foundation of for his program of political and social prosperity to be achieved through the advancement of learning” (11).

97 David Innes claims that, like God, “Bensalem [. . .] is an unknown knower and as such strikes fear in the heart” (13).

98 Jerry Weinberger argues that “Bacon broke from the tradition of Christian philosophy that maintained the compatibility of faith and reason [. . .] Bacon was a non-believer, even if he pretended to be otherwise [and] on rational grounds ("Francis Bacon and the Unity of Knowledge: Reason and Revelation” 111). Lawrence Lampert also argues that Bacon favors science and rejects religion: “In Bensalem, Christianity is clearly subdued by science” (64)
The House of Salomon thus perpetuates the inception of the society by King Solamona by virtue of its literal name, and in essence King Solamona has become a myth well before the narrative of the *New Atlantis* has started. For Lacan, “the sole function of the father is to be a myth, to be always only the Name-of-the-Father, or in other words nothing more than the dead father, as Freud explains in *Totem and Taboo*” (*Seminar VII* 309); the father must, in other words, always already have existed as a myth in both name and symbolic function. In *Seminar II* Lacan argues that the inception of the subjectivity in the symbolic order comes from the symbolic order’s presence at the beginning of human life: “the symbolic agencies function in the society from the start, from the moment it takes on a human appearance” (30); indeed, the very center of Ben-salem holds the name of the literal founder of the society, in essence inscribing on the society the “Law” from its originator and creator.

In *The Sane Society*, Erich Fromm writes of man’s modern retreat to primitive behavior:

> While science and technique created the conditions for such development, the Western world fell back into new forms of clan idolatry, that very orientation which the prophets of the Old Testament and early Christianity tried to uproot. Nationalism, originally a progressive movement, replaced the bonds of feudalism and absolutism. The average man today obtains his sense of identity from his belonging to a nation, rather than from being a ‘son of man.’ His existence, that is, his reason, is warped by this fixation [. . .] Love of one's country which is not part of one's love for humanity is not love, but idolatrous worship. (58-59)

and refers to Bacon’s “new religion of technology” (66). Susan Bruce also argues that Bacon privileges science and knowledge over religion (128). In contrast, Frances Yates argues that Bacon’s *New Atlantis* presents a conflation of Jewish mysticism and Christianity and as such is an “important text for the study of the Christian Cabalist movement in relation to the growth of science” in light of the presence of the Jewish character, Joabin (204). Robert Adams argues that the New Atlantis offers an “expression of almost unbounded faith in human rationality, human goodness, and in the beneficence of science power over nature” (“Social Responsibilities of Science” 390).
Nationalism for Fromm comes at the cost of individuation, subjectivity, etc., as it divorces “man” from his natural, biological inclusion among “men” and replaces it with belonging to a group based on an ostensibly geographic and convenient sense of physical proximity. Fromm goes on to define the psychological function of the Catholic Church, which he argues, perpetuated the prophetic attitude that encouraged the questioning and criticizing of secular power's violation of the principles of love and justice receded in importance. The new attitude called for indiscriminating support of the Church's [power as an institution]. Such psychological satisfaction was given to the masses, that they accepted their dependency and poverty with resignation, making little effort to improve their social condition. (54)

Here lies the fundamentally necessary element of blind nationalism: self-sacrifice and unwavering commitment to the larger good despite immediate and very real (and probable) unmet physical and biological needs. Such an ascetic submission to authority only comes about through growing up in a society that encourages its populace to accept and even embrace this kind of sacrifice. Bensalem thus demonstrates more adherence to Old Testament clan mentality than it does to the New Testament and Christianity.99

But Bacon grew up in the wake of the Reformation, and while early Protestantism advertised itself as an alternative and more direct path between man and God, it nevertheless had psychological implications. Fromm argues that the conundrum of Protestantism lies in its "extreme degree of egotism and by the pursuit of self-interest" (Escape from Freedom 113). Co-founders of Protestantism Martin Luther and John Calvin, according to Fromm, were essentially "powerless" in the same way as in the Catholic system (Escape from Freedom 69). To Fromm, Martin

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99 In Founding Fictions: Utopias in Early Modern England, Amy Boesky argues that all the utopian texts she examines, including the New Atlantis, "founding fictions, narratives that delineate the origins and charters of emergent nationalism" (179).
Luther represents a quintessential individual in the Renaissance/post-Reformation sense of the word (251). In *The Parallax View*, Žižek goes further than Fromm and points out that Luther conceived of man as “divine shit [who] fell out of God’s anus.” (*Parallax View* 187). Bacon’s view of man needing constant oversight conflicts with Protestant doctrine that allows direct access to God without the mediation of the clergy. For Bacon, man can be neither Christian nor Christlike because in his utopian society, the utopian mindset relies upon mindlessly following patriarchal tradition and the disciplined expectations of daily life.

**THE HOUSE OF SALOMON**

The House of Salomon keeps watch over the Bensalemites and acts as the repository for scientific knowledge in Bensalem.\(^{100}\) While holding such power, it does not necessarily have the resources to react to any kind of opposition to that power.\(^ {101}\) The Bensalemites who control the House of Salomon number very few, and those employed in the House of Salomon cannot escape the authoritarian nature of the society at large as they too serve as labor in Bensalem.\(^ {102}\) This greatly resembles the authoritative nature of More’s *Utopia* as discussed in Chapter 2. But intellectual labor implies some kind of product or output, an ostensibly social object of dis-

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\(^{100}\) According to Lawrence Lampert, Solamona’s “two great innovations [are] the laws of secrecy and the founding of Salomon’s House” (39). Perez Zagorin reads the House as not only the center of scientific innovation but also “beneficent and philanthropic ends” (173).

\(^{101}\) According to Christopher Kendrick, “if Bacon’s House amounts in a sense to a peculiar late version of a Renaissance rearistocratization plan, it represents the tiniest of aristocracies -- not really a social class, indeed, but only the court that might epitomize it, the barest state to discharge its interests” (*Utopia, Carnival, and Commonwealth in Renaissance England* 310).

\(^{102}\) Kendrick argues that the control exhibited by the House of Salomon equates to “Bacon's refashioning of intellectual labor, both as process and as function” (*Utopia, Carnival, and Commonwealth in Renaissance England* 291). Antoinette Paterson argues that the Baconian scientific model requires that “The physical objects or processes that are to be studied must be put under regulated observation by the proper adjustment of the researcher’s powers of sense” (20, Paterson’s emphasis). The implications here for the House of Salomon are obvious—the researchers, secretive in their studies and research, are also subjected to surveillance, oversight, and regulation. David Dickson goes so far as to equate Bacon’s project to a blueprint for early capitalism, arguing that “Bacon’s proposals for his scientific method reveal many of the formal characteristics if the capitalist labour process” (19). Antonio Pérez-Ramos argues that Bacon’s oeuvre demonstrates Bacon’s “regulative ideal of maker’s knowledge,” that is, the intersection of knowing and creating (41).
course. The Bensalemites have staffed this center of learning with scientific experts who exist only to conduct scientific research.

The gaze of surveillance performed by the House of Salomon affects the populace of Bensalem, as the text specifically refers to Salomon’s House as functioning as “the very eye of this kingdom” (132). Bacon perhaps intentionally means the word “eye” to also refer to “I,” which would suggest Bensalem’s subjectivity as a society relies upon the ever-watchful House of Salomon. Lacan argues that “The eye is [. . .] symbolic of the subject” (Seminar I 80), which sheds light on Foucault’s reading of Bentham: “Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap” (Discipline and Punish 200). The Bensalemites individually constitute a collective eye that maintains a collective gaze aimed at themselves and other individual Bensalemites. But with the literal definition of “eye” Bacon clearly means to depict the city’s central point of authority as engaging in a constant gaze or watchful “eye” over the populace. Similarly, Lacan defines the Symbolic as always already present: “The symbolic function is not new as a function, it has its beginnings elsewhere than in the human order, but they are only beginnings. The human order is characterised by the fact that the symbolic function intervenes at every moment and at every stage of its existence” (Seminar II 29). In this sense, Lacan’s Symbolic order itself performs surveillance over human subjectivi-

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103 Julian Martin argues that the House of Salomon is “a vast establishment of buildings and employees, and even the elite brethren were to be subject to strict hierarchy of command and a careful division of labour” (163).
104 Elisabeth Hansot refers to the scientists in the House of Salomon as a “society of savants” (99). Benjamin Farrington points out that the nature of Salomon’s House demonstrates Bacon’s belief that “scientific work calls for various lower grades of intelligence” including “collectors of information, who, if they would only stick to the plan, needed no exceptional intelligence to do useful work” (Francis Bacon: Philosopher of Industrial Science 118). Julie Robin Solomon notes that “Bacon conceives important aspects of scientific practice in terms of merchant journeying” as demonstrated by naming them the “Bensalemites,” or “Merchants of Light” (“To Know, to Fly, to Conjure: Situating Baconian Science at the Juncture of Early Modern Modes or Reading” 520). William Sessions refers to Bacon’s “bee-like communes of science” in the New Atlantis (“Francis Bacon and the Classics: The Discovery of Discovery” 238).
105 Or, as Travis DeCook claims, "Solomon's Temple preserves the essence of a people's identity" (111).
106 Timothy Reiss argues that the New Atlantis depicts a “movement towards the outside, whether it be as voyage [. . .], or as gaze” (89). Reiss also claims that “Bacon’s seeker is an individual ‘I’ in search of knowledge” but does not address the eye/I homophone (92).
ty. For Lacan, the Symbolic register constitutes humanity itself: “If one has to define the mo-
ment at which man becomes human, we can say that it is the moment when, however little it be,
he enters into the symbolic relation” (Seminar I 155). By “relation” Lacan means “relations,”
humans becoming human through their own relation(ships) with and among other humans: “It
enters into the symbolic relation of I and you, in a relation of mutual recognition and transcend-
ence, into the order of a law which is already quite ready to encompass the history of each indi-
vidual” (Seminar I 177). The Symbolic order precedes the very ontology of an individual subject
and acts as a gatekeeper who must allow the subject to enter into humanity. For Lacan, psycho-
sis comes about from a psychic malfunction of individuation within the model of the Symbolic
order (Seminar III).

During one of the guided tours, the Spanish narrator refers to how a “traveler into a for-
eign country doth commonly know more by the eye” (36). Joan Copjec claims that "When you
encounter the gaze of the Other, you meet not a seeing eye but a blind one” (10). While the visit-
ing sailors in the New Atlantis readily notice the surveillance, the native inhabitants of Bensalem
have likely ceased to be consciously affected by the ever-watchful House of Salomon and hence
have become “blind” to the constant surveillance. But for Žižek, the rulers and the ruled depend
upon each other, as both depend on “the secret longings of the dominated majority, and the spe-
cific content expressing the interests of the forces of domination” (The Ticklish Subject 217).
For Žižek, the populace “secretly” wishes to be dominated, to be subjected to a dominating force.
Copjec further develops this notion of the governmental gaze as constantly present yet never tan-
gible, apparent, or even visible: "It is not the long arm of the law that determines the shape and
reach of every subject, but rather something that escapes the law and its determination, some-
thing we can't manage to put our finger on" (56). By allowing the sailors to come ashore as well
as teaching them about the society the Bensalemites illustrate this antinomy: Bensalem welcomes and then controls the sailors, informs and then keeps secrets from them. The Bensalemites explicitly state that they do not allow outsiders to enter their society all the while providing a guided tour to the outsiders; the guide tells the sailors of the “law against the admission of strangers” in Bensalem (144), but nevertheless this narrative comes about from the very transgression of this law. Bensalem’s power to engage in surveillance comes attached to patriarchal authority.\textsuperscript{107}

But the guides never show the sailors (and the reader) any evidence of technological innovation; the sailors only hear stories about such innovation.\textsuperscript{108} While allowed to stay at the Stranger’s House, the sailors remain outsiders to everything in the society other than what the guide can directly tell them. Žižek argues that “Foreigners may look and act like us, but there is some unfathomable je ne sais quoi, something ‘in them more than themselves,’ that makes them ‘not quite human’ (‘aliens’ in the precise sense of the term)” (\textit{Interrogating the Real} 267). Through Žižek’s notion of foreigners, the sailors constitute “aliens” who only share an uncanny and distant similarity with the Bensalemites, primarily outward appearance as members of the same species. Otherwise, in the Deleuzian sense, the Bensalemites are merely “bodies without organs.”\textsuperscript{109}

The gaze of Bensalem directed at the Spanish sailors defamiliarizes the sailors from

\textsuperscript{107} According to Rein de Wilde, “the evolution of the eye of power has a longer history than Foucault asserts. Although Bentham perfected this new technique of surveillance, its first prototype was developed by the people of New Atlantis [...] the invention of the eye of power, i.e., an eye whose gaze cannot be returned, creates the prospect of a significant redistribution of power. The Father who possesses the skill of watching without being seen himself cannot only “torture” nature without feeling the effects of its moral power, he also will make the patriarchal family even more patriarchal. (139)

\textsuperscript{108} Dana Jalobeanu also sees the reader alongside the sailors in the journey: “The reader, as the sailors of New Atlantis, is lead into further inquiry and exploration. Moreover, as the story unfolds, we are witnessing the unfolding of a sort of quest” (217).

\textsuperscript{109} In the literal sense, Deleuze and Guattari see “bodies,” as constitutive of parental “parts,” in essence “organs”: “pieces from the bodies of the mother and the father are taken up in the connections, parental appellations crop up in the disjunctions of the chain, the parents are there as ordinary stimuli of an indifferent nature that trigger the becoming of adventures, of races, and of continents” (\textit{Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Vol. 1} 114). They also extend this notion of metonymic individuation to linguistic incest: “Incest has become possible in the wedding of the kinship bodies and family appellations, in the union of the signifier with its signifieds” (\textit{Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Vol. 1} 209).
humanity and thus the gaze represents the Bensalemites’ bid for subjectivity simply by virtue of the fact that they are not foreign or alien as are the Spanish sailors. In other words, Bensalemites are “not not-foreign” upon seeing the sailors.

**TECHNOLOGY IN BACON’S NEW ATLANTIS**

Aside from the ever-present guides who lead the sailors through a tour of the island nation, Bensalem also uses technology to control the populace and maintain authority. In Aphorism 2 of his *Novum Organum*, Bacon asserts that “It is by instrument and other aids that the work gets done, and these are needed as much by the understanding as by the hand” (43). Bacon here makes technology subordinate to man by referring to it as merely an “instrument” or “aid,” but simultaneously he marries it to skill, as suggested by “hand.” Bacon wrote the *New Atlantis* as a largely scientific text, but the science ultimately comes under the control of men. Other critics, however, see Bacon’s society as one that embraces technology. The inherently intrusive entity of Salomon’s House naturally invites critical readings likening of this seat of government to a panopticon.

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110 According to Chloë Houston, “The primary utopian focus of *New Atlantis* is not after all Bensalem itself but the research institution that it supports” (“An Idea for a Principality? Encountering the East in Bacon’s *New Atlantis*” 23).

111 As Amy Boesky points out, “It was Bacon who was to contribute to modernity the conviction that a nation’s strength depended on scientific and technological superiority” (141).

112 Todd Borlik notes Bacon’s employment of “the camera obscura illustrates how technology, in particular the technology of surveillance, contributes for the formation of a discourse of objectivity in Bacon’s writings” (233). He goes on to claim that “technology shapes Bacon’s epistemology” (233). Likewise, Amy Boesky sees in the *New Atlantis*, “Surveillance, inspection, and scrutiny mirror and double back on each other as the explorers are quarantined and kept for observation in Bensalem’s Stranger’s House” (146).

113 In comparing *Utopia* to Bacon’s text, Christopher Kendrick labels More’s *Utopia* as “nontechnological” (*Utopia, Carnival, and Commonwealth in Renaissance England* 249) and in like manner Todd Borlik argues that “Bacon’s later works display a marked ambivalence toward technology” (243).

114 According to Jürgen Klein, Bacon “aligned human thought towards the construction of machines as tools by the help of which man can compensate the negative consequences of the Fall” (46).

115 My likening of Bensalem to a panopticon is not unique. As Brian Vickers points out, Jeremy Bentham, the author of *Panopticon* (1787) prominently mentions Bacon from his 1776 work *Fragment on Government* and through the remainder of his works (248). Benjamin Farrington argues that “the technological, political, social and religious history of the race, entangled scientific advance with every aspect of human life” (*Philosopher of Industrial Science* 44).
In Seminar II, Lacan writes, “The symbolic world is the world of the machine” (47), in essence claiming that the orderliness of the symbolic order manifests as a controlling force. Despite the lack of direct knowledge of technology afforded the sailors in Bensalem, the interplay of nature and technology runs throughout the New Atlantis, although Bacon does not depict technology as a universal good. When Erich Fromm argues that man only “emerges from nature by mastering it” (Sane Society 178), he allows for the possibility that man can master nature and thus have access to technology, the means by which man can manipulate and have more influence in the creation of his reality. The impact of Bensalem’s authoritarian government mirrors the society’s attempts to control nature. Although a state cannot ultimately control nature, creating the appearance of such ability can only strengthen the state’s power over the populace. In their discussion of Bacon in The Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno argue that men learn from nature how to dominate nature and other men (27). The new empirical scientific method Bacon helped create sought to facilitate more meaning out of natural phenomena. The Bensalemites similarly make a concerted attempt to control nature. Near the end of the New Atlantis, we learn that the Bensalemites “have likewise violent streams and cataracts, which serve for many motions: and likewise engines for multiplying and enforcing of winds, to set also on going divers motions” (73). Whether the Bensalemites can control the weather is irrelevant here; the fact that they have attempted to illustrates that either they: 1. can do so; 2. arrogantly think they can do so; or 3. want their populace and the visiting sailors to

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116 Jerry Weinberger claims that “The New Atlantis suggests the problem, as much as the promise, of technology and the story raises questions about the ways and means of the scientific project, the ends and limits of the conquest of nature, and the implications of science and technology for human life and values” (“Francis Bacon and the Unity of Knowledge: Reason and Revelation” 110). Paul Oskar Kristellar similarly notes that “The notion that man rules the elements and all of nature [. . .] has something in common with Francis Bacon’s concept of man’s dominion over nature that contains, as it were, the entire program of modern science and technology” (180)

117 Rein de Wilde sees the problem of individuation of Bensalemites in the New Atlantis as inherent in Bensalem’s attempts to control nature (132-3).
think that they can do so.\footnote{Denise Albanese convincingly argues that the \textit{New Atlantis} presents Bacon's construct of a truth "derived from commanding the natural world" (\textit{New Science, New World} 95).} In the very first lines of the text the shipwrecked explorers immediately demonstrate a lack of authority (or agency) over nature; in describing the wanderings of the ship, Bacon writes, “But then the wind came about, and settled in the west for many days, so as we could make little or no way, and were sometimes in purpose to turn back” (129). Nature, a self-sufficiently perpetual force, does not represent the only controlling force for the narrator and his companions as the rationally motivated actions of the Bensalemites become apparent. Žižek argues that

for Hegel the drive technologically to exploit nature is still a mark of man's finitude; within such a perspective, nature is perceived as a threatening external object, an opposing force to be dominated, while a philosopher, from his standpoint of Absolute Knowledge, does not experience nature as a threatening foreign field to be controlled, but as something to be left to follow its inherent path. (\textit{Interrogating the Real} 352)

For Žižek, the attempt to control nature goes against the intellectual well-being of society, as only through acceptance of nature’s autonomy and power can man begin to overcome his own mortality.\footnote{This contrasts with Chloë Houston’s assertion that “the imagination of technology to improve society in \textit{New Atlantis} is part of a serious endeavor to improve society in accordance with the model offered in the text” ("‘Knowledge Shall be Increased’: Natural Philosophy and Religion in the Early Modern Utopia” 1402).} But Bacon’s Bensalemites do not hold this wisdom; their society is encompassed and constituted by technology, and thus the Bensalemites cannot cheat death as very few characters in the \textit{New Atlantis} have proper names and are identified only by their official title and/or their role in the society at large.

Martin Heidegger understands technology as something that enslaves men: "the machines and apparatus are no more cases and kinds of enframing than are the man at the switchboard and
the engineer in the drafting room," asserting such machines lead to “man as cog in machine” (35). Heidegger argues that technology “is a mode of revealing” (13), and that "unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing" (16). Heidegger in essence argues the same point as Fromm about mastering nature, as Heidegger attributes to technology such non-natural abilities such as “unlocking, transforming,” etc. He continues: "technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., truth" (12). Heidegger makes an important distinction here, as he argues that technology does not itself “reveal” truth, but that it constitutes “truth” itself via the “realm of revealing.” As such, Heidegger argues that "“technology is a contrivance” (5) and should not be trusted or taken at face value:

Thus we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of the technology so long as we merely conceive and push forward the technological, put up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral. (4)

Heidegger’s use of the word “unfree” has obvious political implications as technology binds man to itself and thus undermines man’s autonomy. Erich Fromm sees technology as integral to the capitalist system, arguing that in capitalism, man becomes "merely a cog in the vast machine of distribution" (Escape from Freedom 125). This suggests that the notions of technology and machinery predate much “modern” technology and machinery. Fromm also argues that in capitalism, man becomes part of a "vast economic machine [with a] highly specialized task" (Escape from Freedom 125). This comes close to explaining the significance of Heidegger’s aphoristic
statement that "technology is not the essence of technology" (4); while modern sensibilities consider it a means (the shoe factory) to an end (a shoe), technology is actually the end itself.

Lacan’s comments on conceptual machinery can shed light on Heidegger’s statement: “The machine embodies the most radical symbolic activity of man, and it was necessary so that questions could be raised - you may not notice it in the middle of all this - at the level at which we are raising them” (Seminar II 74). Men literally become machines in Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s reading of the Sirens passage in The Odyssey in which Odysseus forces his men to row faster and faster, as it illustrates how repetitive work dulls thinking and individuality (49).

In the New Atlantis, Bacon uses technology through the House of Salomon to perpetuate the obligatory conformist fate of Bensalem’s populace and also to control and keep watch over the visiting sailors. To accomplish this, the House of Salomon uses suspicion, isolation and fear, which the guide bequeaths to the visiting sailors during their tour of the island; Bacon thus anticipates the power technology will have on the formation of subjectivity. Tirsan, the term for the “Father of the Family” for whom the state provides an extravagant celebration, translates as “fearful.” Erich Fromm argues that the modern subject must train himself to live in a constant state of insecurity and fear: "the psychic task which a person can and must set for himself, is not to feel secure, but to be able to tolerate insecurity, without panic and undue fear [. . .] Free man is by necessity insecure; thinking man by necessity uncertain" (Sane Society 196). Fromm also argues that unseen governmental control achieves its power through dulling individuation: "the mechanism through which the anonymous authority operates is conformity" (Sane Society 153):

Fromm also conflates “independence and freedom” with “isolation and fear” (Sane Society 256).

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120 Paul Olson argues that the New Atlantis demonstrates how “no major technological change can occur without altering how human beings govern themselves or are governed” (48).

121 According to Charles Whitney, in the New Atlantis Bacon demonstrates how “Isolation breeds contempt: as Bensalemites gain scientific knowledge, they demonize those whom they themselves exclude from this knowledge” (“Merchants of Light: Science as Colonization in the New Atlantis” 259).
For Joan Copjec, this fear can actually serve as a liberating mechanism, as she argues that “suspicion of dissimulation offers the subject a kind of reprieve from the dictates of law” (28). Like many other critical theorists, Erich Fromm sees isolation as inherent in the formation of early modern subjectivity: for Fromm, in the Renaissance, "the individual was left alone; everything depended on his own effort, not on the security of his traditional status,” or rather, his caste-based, place in the established social hierarchy (Escape from Freedom 59). Fromm goes on to argue that "freedom [...] has made him isolated, and, thereby, anxious and powerless" (Escape from Freedom x). Quoting Kant’s "What is Enlightenment?" Žižek makes the most elegantly simple summary of the nature of societies that are only ostensibly free: Kant says, "think freely, but obey!” (In Defense of Lost Causes 62). In the essay Kant himself claims that “Everywhere there is restriction on freedom [and that] [t]he touchstone of everything that can be concluded as a law for a people lies in the question whether the people could have imposed such a law on itself” (“What is Enlightenment?” 5, 7). Žižek’s reading of Kantian ethics resonates here: “we are compelled to engage in a kind of ‘leap of faith,’ and commit ourselves to a fundamental trust in the friendly structure of reality” (Parallax View 48). While personal ethics, according to Žižek’s reading of Kant, exists as an interiorized entity, it nevertheless must negotiate its relationship in the social realm, in the space of how we interact with others.122 In One Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse argues that technology in the post-Industrial Revolution notion of modernity has resulted in a process that has hindered the psychological freedom of thought in the post-modern subject: "the 'inner' dimension of the mind in which the opposition to the status quo can take

122 It should be noted that in the prefatory remarks of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant quotes the Great Instauration, referring to Bacon as “Baco de Verulamio” (Bii).
root is whittled down (10). Bacon's scientific society in the *New Atlantis* demonstrates Bacon's astute observation about how science and technology dulls individuation.

The reader of the *New Atlantis* finds little in the way of individuality or even fictive characterization of the characters in the narrative, with the possible exception of the sailor narrator. Despite this lack of psychological depth in its characters, some critics argue that Bacon well understood the importance of psychology. In his reading of Žižek’s system of ontology, Adrian Johnston argues that “the body participates in giving birth to the subject, after which the subject interminably struggles to sever this umbilical cord tethering it, however tenuously, to the material foundation of its embodied origin” (57). Johnston argues that modernity “is an age in which the scientific view of human nature seemingly threatens to collapse the subject into the body, to transform human beings into just such overdetermined mechanisms of the material world, gesticulating at the sole behest of a genetic-evolutionary puppeteer” (64). Modern man, for John-

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123 Robert Faulkner states of the founders of modernity that “the father of these founders is Bacon” (5).  
124 Anthony Quinton’s paraphrase of Karl Popper is relevant here: “scientific discovery cannot be mechanized, turned into a straightforward methodical routine to be carried on by any trained scientific craftsman, because important scientific advances are made by the creation of novel theories, not the mere summarizing of observations” (68). Quinton does not, however, distinguish between the notion of those creating technology and those merely using it as in Marcuse. I take issue with Harvey Wheeler’s assertion that Bacon’s model in the *New Atlantis* “explains concretely how it [empiricism] would work in actual practice”; there are too many inconsistencies to attribute to Bacon credit for what Wheeler calls “Postmodern Science” (308).  
125 Jerry Weinberger argues that "Bacon was keenly aware of human psychology as crucial to science" ("On the Miracles in Bacon's *New Atlantis*" 109). Pointing out that skin in early modern biology and physiology was both inside and outside the literal body, Stephanie Shirilian reads the notion of skin in the early modern period as representing "bodily encounter and intercorporeal influence" to "discover what role, if any, the body's surface played in negotiating the relationship between bodies" (60). Benjamin Farrington argues that throughout his works Bacon "switches his attack from individuals and concerns himself with the psycho-social conditions hindering the emergence of a genuine natural philosophy" (*The Philosophy of Francis Bacon: An Essay on Its Development from 1603 to 1609* 45).  
126 Jerry Weinberger sees the Feast of the Family as a governmental reward for “the mere generation of human bodies” that demonstrates Bacon’s “political whole as a collection of homogeneous, commensurable parts” (*Science, Faith, and Politics: Francis Bacon and the Utopian Roots of the Modern Age: A Commentary on Bacon’s Advancement of Learning* 153).
ston, has become merely a “clockwork orange” in which the “orange’s” destiny comes about only through entirely pre-determined genetic fate.\textsuperscript{127}

\section*{AUTHORITARIANISM IN BACON’S \textit{NEW ATLANTIS}}

Many critics have astutely demonstrated the intrusiveness of the House of Salomon as a governing body.\textsuperscript{128} The sailors also trustingly take the Bensalemites as friendly when the Bensalemites receive them “without any show of distrust at all” (130).\textsuperscript{129} When they attempt to give gifts to the Bensalemites, “the servant took them not, nor would he scarce look upon them” (131). Later the sailors learn the reason for the refusal of the gifts, as the guide can “not be twice paid” for doing his job (32).\textsuperscript{130} This inverted master/servant dynamic places the Bensalemites in

\begin{itemize}
\item As Antoinette Paterson points out, in Bacon “The body now has been transformed into a useful force for human society” by knowledge (29).
\item Simon Wortham, for instance, detects an intrusive governmental presence, arguing that the \textit{New Atlantis} "unavoidably raises questions concerning the relationship between censorship and knowledge, insofar as this relationship actually comes to structure and define the possibilities for any advancement" (181). Jerry Weinberger bluntly states that Bensalem “is not egalitarian or free” (27). Other critics, including Christopher Kendrick ("The Imperial Laboratory: Discovering Forms in the \textit{New Atlantis}” 1021-2), John Michael Archer (118), José María Rodríguez García (180), and Antoinette Paterson (95-96) similarly see Bensalem as under the thumb of authoritarian rule. John Farrell claims that Bacon subjugates natural philosophy to an agenda to create an “absolutist state” (106). Harvey Wheeler argues that Bacon in essence created an environment of ideology and that “the vested and professional interests of the scientific classes” become “a social program for the benefit of the entire society” (291). Catherine Gimelli Martin argues that when taking into consideration the way Bensalem has none of the bureaucracy and hierarchy that ended Bacon’s career, the \textit{New Atlantis} “must be read as a contemporary rebuttal to the ideologically regimented society that Thomas More imagined would produce the ‘socialist paradise’ of his \textit{Utopia}” ("The Ahistoricism of the New Historicism: Knowledge as Power Versus Power as Knowledge in Bacon’s \textit{New Atlantis}” 36). Denise Albanese argues that “through the warrant of its colonized utopianism, the \textit{New Atlantis} also reproduces the culture of Jacobean England, transformed to fit the ideological contours of the scientific” ("The \textit{New Atlantis} and the Uses of Utopia” 507), in effect arguing that science has begun to encroach upon ideology and, in essence, the formation of subjectivity. Robert Appelbaum argues that the progress in the “\textit{New Atlantis} [is not] really possible without the assumption of an absolute authority after the manner of James I” (52).
\item Jerry Weinberger argues that Bensalem’s focus of its power lies in its dominance of nature and not man: “Human force applied to nature, rather than to man, serves a universal empire of enervated, money-loving sheep without succumbing to the cycle of natural decay” (\textit{Science, Faith, and Politics: Francis Bacon and the Utopian Roots of the Modern Age: A Commentary on Bacon's Advancement of Learning} 139). Steven Mathews similarly reads the text as utopian, arguing that “Guided by Christian charity, the right religion, and the proper reading of the book of nature, the Bensalemites live in a society of peace where the inhabitants lack no good thing” (114).
\item The use of this phrase complicates Robert Adams’s assertion that in the \textit{New Atlantis} “we find therefore a notable early appearance of man considered, not [. . .] as most noble in reason and godlike apprehension, but as a ‘consumer’—as a sort of belly capable of almost infinite distension” (387). John Briggs argues that “Insofar as the reader comes to believe he knows what is happening in the House of Solomon, he is given a vision of nature’s power, and the power of nature’s maker. The tale also trains its sympathetic listeners to imitate the enlightened utopians’ secrecy, not just in order to hide their achievements from envy or theft, but to protect their piety from their own unreliable dispositions. The rigorous ceremony of New Bensalem is in part a device to persuade the narrator that the more he
\end{itemize}
a position of power, and continues when they describe conditions for coming on land: the Bensalemites tell the sailors, “If ye will swear (all of you) by the merits of the Saviour that ye are no pirates, nor have shed blood lawfully nor unlawfully within forty days past, you may have licence to come on land” (131). Aside from meaning positive qualities, “merits” here can also refer to merits of law, further emphasizing the “lawfully nor unlawfully” conditions of their recent past (“Merit”). The Bensalemites’ speaker ultimately makes the explorers subservient when later in the same passage we read the sailors “were his humble servants” as the newcomers come on land (132). This seeming contradiction of simultaneously holding positions of Master and Slave for Žižek comes from the ruler (in this case the House of Salomon) attaining power because the populace treats him as the ruler: “I’m your Master because you treat me as Master; it is you, with your activity, who make me your Master!” (Sublime Object 164). This is compounded by the complete lack of any “masters” or “Masters” in the narrative of the New Atlantis; the real ruling class remains largely unseen by not only the sailor visitors but also to the guide who perpetuates the sense of being ruled merely by referring to this unseen entity.

For Lacan, “A law is imposed upon the slave, that he should satisfy the desire and the pleasure [Jouissance] of the other. It is not sufficient for him to plea for mercy, he has to go to work. And when you go to work, there are rules, hours - we enter into the domain of the symbol-

\[\text{\textsuperscript{131}}\text{131 Catherine Gimelli Martin argues that in the New Atlantis, “Bacon’s fundamental interest in ending, not mending, the mutual subjugation of master and slave, king and counselor, husband and wife also explains the paradoxical ‘masculinism’” in Bensalem (“The Feminine Birth of the Mind: Regendering the Empirical Subject in Bacon and His Followers” 75).}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{132}}\text{132 As Harvey Wheeler notes, “Bensalem has social classes but with a difference. At the top is a powerful learned and scientific aristocracy of lamp, laboratory, and robe—knowledge, science, and theology. Next is a middling gentry-burgher class [and] there is a lower class; a ‘meaner sort’ furnishes the sailors” (296). Robert Faulkner similarly points out that the “New Atlantis portrays a cosmopolitan nation with a king who is never seen and whose authority [. . .] is shadowy, regulated by laws, and equated with the state” and that this king “seems subordinate to law and custom and only appears in his name and seal” (191, 211). Julie Robin Solomon argues that “the Bensalemites maintain their intellectual sovereignty by seeing without being seen. We can never take the true measure of their openness, because of its invisibility” (Objectivity in the Making: Francis Bacon and the Politics of Inquiry 158).}\]
ic (Seminar I 223). Bensalem represents this kind of “work” with “rules, hours” that govern every aspect of the society. One of the Bensalemite guides eventually takes the sailors to the “Strangers House,” an odd name and designation for a building in a society, the sailors soon learn, that does not allow strangers to enter. The Spanish sailors enter into a realm in which their identity comes from the outside, the building in which they must stay. They are strangers first and individuals second, and they remain at the mercy of Bensalem throughout the entire visit. Žižek claims that “there is no intersubjectivity (no symmetrical, shared relationship between humans) without the impersonal symbolic Order” (Did Someone Say Totalitarianism? 165); this precisely describes the initial “welcome” given the Spanish sailors upon their arrival.

The Bensalemites’ authority makes a decided turn when an officer tells the sailors “He was but our servant and our guide” (132); at this point the explorers formally become guests of Bensalem and it appears as if they have freedom to do as they wish after being told they had a “servant and guide.” Later, however, the guide tells them, “you are to keep within doors for three days,” but he also contradictorily tells them “do not think yourselves restrained, but rather left to your rest and ease” (133). These conflicting instructions represent the first time the...

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133 But, as Ian Box notes, “Everything worth wishing for, including that most elusive goal of longevity, has been achieved in Bensalem” (133).

134 Naming it the “Stranger’s House” in essence works as propaganda directed at the foreign and uninitiated. Christopher Kendrick argues that in the New Atlantis “Bacon’s practice of the utopian genre results in an unwonted thickening of his propagandistic message [. . .] and that it thus winds up interrogating the social significance of his scientific obsession” (“The Imperial Laboratory: Discovering Forms in the New Atlantis” 1012). Guido Giglioni similarly sees this as negative: “New Atlantis conveys the feeling of disorientation that derives from traveling to foreign, unknown lands and that is the distinctive trait of travel literature” (94). In contrast, Antoine Hatzemberger reads Bensalem’s reception of the sailors positively as “an incentive to think about the status of asylum seekers, who are at the same time stateless and virtually citizens of the world” (126). Charles Whitney also sees a power-hungry Bensalem, arguing that “The implication of the New Atlantis is that European colonialism in the form of explicitly racist exploitation abroad and disciplinary technologies at home is a reality that finds an ideological counterpart in Bacon’s far-sighted and influential vision of scientific freedom and power” (“Merchants of Light: Science as Colonization in the New Atlantis” 257).

135 Lawrence Lampert reads this exchange as indicative of how “Bensalemite superiority will be confirmed for the Bensalemites by the humane way in which they think they treat the exceptions, those accidental travelers from inferior societies who, they think, are freely given the choice between enjoying the benefits of Bensalem or returning home” (40).
Bensalemites exercise authority over the sailors. The sailors receive conflicting instructions about what they can and cannot do in Bensalem, as the Bensalemites lead them to believe they have certain freedoms that they may not actually have; they learn of the rule to remain indoors as one they “have by commandment (though in form of courtesy)” (134). In addition to the Biblical implications of “commandment,” the tenor of “courtesy” can suggest courtliness or hospitality afforded to visitors.

Despite this promise of possible “courtesy,” the sailors quickly recognize that Bensalem has them under surveillance: “For these men that they have given us for attendance may withal have an eye upon us” (134). The Bensalemites also tell them that “‘none of you must go above a karan’ (that is with them a mile and a half) ‘‘from the walls of the city, without especial leave,’” and they decide to obey this “commandment” (135). The sailors also learn of the “laws of secrecy” the Bensalemites have enacted for dealing with travelers (136). Few courtly interactions occur in the New Atlantis, as the explorers never meet any of the truly high-ranking officials of Bensalem. In fact, the Bensalemites immediately alienate the sailors who appear out of place on the shore.

CONCLUSION

While Bacon labeled the New Atlantis as unfinished, in the rest of his corpus Bacon remains concerned with the progress of governmental rule, particularly in light of Foucault’s no-

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136 Elisabeth Hansot writes of the “physical distance and lack of communication between the college and the city” that results in the “isolation and autonomy of Bacon’s scientists” (100). This stands in stark contrast to the ever-present watch over the sailors who never find themselves alone.

137 Although Sharon Achinstein makes the claim that, “Bacon’s method, furthermore, was authoritative with [. . .] activity to be guided at every step” (250), her assertion that the New Atlantis represents an attempt at the betterment of the state dedicated to King James does not acknowledge the negative aspects of day-to-day life in Bensalem. Marina Leslie also sees the secrecy in Bensalem as problematic for the utopian impulse, arguing that the utopian impulse rests in “metaphors of secrecy and apocalypse” (83).

138 Travis DeCook characterizes the sailors at the beginning of the narrative as a “lost and frightened crew arriving in the harbor of a strange land, both thankful for their apparent safety but also deeply uncertain about their fate, and the reader follows the mariners’ experience of having this strange new society gradually unfold before them” (106). David Renaker characterizes the crew as a mob, arguing that at the beginning of the narrative they sit “in the dark across sixty yards of water from the object of their astonished attention” (190).
tions of how such rule necessitates intrusive measures that enable absolute psychological control.

In a letter addressed to King James appearing at the beginning of the *Novum Organum*, Bacon praises James “who can compare with Salomon in so many things, in the gravity of your judgments, in the peace of your reign, in largeness of heart, in the noble variety of the books you have composed” (6). Such a partially veiled connection between James and the House of Salomon suggests not only a subversive, or even transgressive, aim for his *New Atlantis*. Either he intends the reader to take his letter to James at face value or he wishes to undercut James with sarcasm. Later in the *Novum Organum*, Bacon writes about how he “sailed by the ancient arts” and that “the subtlety of experiments is far greater than that of the sense itself” (19, 22). This metaphor of sailing as epistemological experience suggests Bacon’s *New Atlantis* merely constitutes a thought “experiment” in the “sense” that he really has no truly “utopian” impulse or desire. But in *The Advancement of Learning*, Bacon points out that Solomon “gives a censure, ‘That there is no end of making books, and that much reading is weariness of the flesh’” and that “he that increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety” (6). Bacon may have intended the *New Atlantis* to serve as a satirical jab at James, a Salomon proxy who wishes to control knowledge and, by association, power. Although cryptic and spread across three texts, Bacon’s satirical comments suggest that the *New Atlantis* seeks to criticize the royal court within which he made his career.
CHAPTER 4: MARGARET CAVENDISH AND THE CREATION, PUBLISHING, AND EMPOWERING OF SUBJECTIVITY IN *THE BLAZING WORLD*

Species reek of race and sex: and where and when species meet, their heritage must be untied and better knots of companion species attempted within and across differences.

**Donna Haraway, *When Species Meet***

Like Thomas More and Francis Bacon before her, Margaret Cavendish created her utopian vision of a fictitious society without leaving any definitive "meaning" or commentary on whether or not the "utopia" she depicted really constituted a "perfect," idealized society. Unlike More's and Bacon's utopian texts, however, Cavendish's *Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World* has not received significant attention from critics seeking to label the text as "utopian" or "dystopian." Perhaps because critics have only recently begun to usher Cavendish into the canon of early modern English literature, the scholarship on *The Blazing World* has not yet adequately addressed this important generic issue. In this chapter I will demonstrate that Cavendish's *The Blazing World* constitutes a dystopia in which the subjectivities attained by the Empress and the native inhabitants reflect the negative psychological impact of oppressive social

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139 Mary Baine Campbell refers to *The Blazing World* as a "feminist quasi-utopia" (17). James Sutherland refers to *The Blazing World* as "a fantastic example of science fiction" (*Wonder & Science: Imagining Worlds in Early Modern Europe* 218). Paul Salzman claims that "*The Blazing World* may irritate students of serious utopias" (*English Prose Fiction, 1558-1700: A Critical History* 295). Marina Leslie directly addresses generic considerations, arguing that "Cavendish’s manipulations of genre in *The Blazing World* speak directly to the vicissitudes in the history of her reception and the assumptions of her legibility or illegibility" (*Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History* 120). Leslie also refers to *The Blazing World's* “mixed genre [that blends] imaginative romance, fiction, natural history, and philosophy” (*Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History* 123). Leslie also calls *The Blazing World* a “more orthodox a utopia than in her revisions of others’ utopian models” (*Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History* 124). Elizabeth Spiller reads *The Blazing World* as a "utopian romance—a genre whose central concern is that which could be true but is not true" ("Reading through Galileo’s Telescope: Margaret Cavendish and the Experience of Reading” 196). Christopher Hair argues that to "celebrate* The Blazing World* “as something approaching a feminist utopia [overlooks] the failure of the protagonist’s societal failures” (56). Line Cotegnies argues that “Cavendish’s utopia thus eventually turns into a disenchanted dystopia” (90). Mary Baine Campbell refers to *The Blazing World* as “proto-novel, a feminist utopia” (“Literature” 770). Elizabeth Spiller claims that “In *The Blazing World*, Cavendish creates what she understands as an “artless” fiction — a text that is utopian not so much in being itself a fiction but in countering the fictions that, for Cavendish, comprise early modern science: (*Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature: The Art of Making Knowledge, 1580-1670* 23). Erica Lang Bonin argues that "By rejecting the island utopia so prevalent in seventeenth-century culture, Cavendish implicitly criticizes the form’s nearly invisible foundation: women's political inferiority (340).
forces inherent in the society. The subjectivities of both the Empress and the native inhabitants of the Blazing World reflect the psychological and social issues Cavendish had to overcome as a woman attempting to enter the male-dominated practice of publishing literary and philosophical texts. By analyzing The Blazing World through Lacan’s Imaginary order and twenty-first century theories of subjectivity, this essay will demonstrate Cavendish’s aim to depict a dystopian society that both critiques and undermines authoritarian rule while it also indicts the notion of a “classless” society in a system of obligatory equality.

BIOGRAPHY OF CAVENDISH

Like her most obvious literary predecessor, Mary Sidney, Countess of Pembroke, Margaret Cavendish was born into a favorable situation for a woman with literary and philosophical ambitions. Born in 1623 to an aristocratic family sympathetic to the throne, Cavendish married William Cavendish, the First Duke of Newcastle, in 1645 and lived the early years of her marriage in Paris and Antwerp in exile during the first half of the Interregnum. Although Cavendish was known for being shy and introverted, she became the Maid of Honour to Queen Henrietta Maria and travelled with her to France. Once the English Civil War began, Cavendish had to leave England and live in exile because of her royalist beliefs. Her marriage enabled her to spend a great amount of time reading and writing, and thus allowed her to produce a very

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140 Paul Salzman argues that Cavendish “was notorious as an authoress—a rare phenomenon in the seventeenth century, although it is worth remembering that a number of women did turn to prose fiction” in the seventeenth century (English Prose Fiction, 1558-1700: A Critical History 293). By contrast, Hilda Smith notes that “the Renaissance concept of woman left little opportunity for individual attainment by a member of the female sex and excluded women from the greatest educational and professional advances embedded within humanism and the ‘new learning’ that emerged from it” (27).

141 Samuel Pepys did not think favorably of the Cavendish couple, writing of "reading the ridiculous History of my Lord Newcastle, Lord Newcastle, wrote by his wife, which shows her to be a mad, conceited, ridiculous woman, and he an ass to suffer her to write what she writes to him, and of him" (630).

142 Robert Appelbaum argues that throughout Cavendish’s works, “is the voice of exile. It is an exile doubly inflected, since Cavendish understands herself to have experienced her life in alienation not only from the political culture of England, but also from the world of letters and science, a world all but entirely of men, by men, and for men” (202). This exile was, however, uneventful. According to Ann Hughes and Julie Sanders, Cavendish eventually had to come to terms with the “more humdrum reality of exile and political marginalization” (52).
large output of printed texts, ranging from natural philosophy to poetry and literary prose. Unlike many other sixteenth and seventeenth century English women writers, however, Cavendish wrote specifically for the purposes of publication, and analysis of any of her single publications must come within the context of her other publications.\textsuperscript{143} She lived a relatively secluded life but published a significant number of books, very uncommon for a woman in seventeenth-century England.\textsuperscript{144} She died December 15, 1673.

**BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF CAVENDISH’S WORKS**

Cavendish's first publication appeared in 1653 as her *Poems and Fancies* (Wing N869), which appeared with numerous paratexts, including dedicatory epistles, prologues, and prefaces. Also in 1653 appeared her *Philosophical Fancies*. Attributed only to the “Right Honourable, The Lady Newcastle,” the anonymous *Poems and Fancies* would set the tone of her future publications, all of which demonstrated a considerably astute understanding of the extremely lively English printing and publishing industry in the seventeenth century. A second edition of this text appeared in 1664 (Wing N870), but this one listed its authorial attribution as “Thrice Noble, Illustrious, and Excellent, Princess, The Duchess of Newcastle.”\textsuperscript{145}

The authorial attributions on the title pages of Cavendish’s works reveal a great deal about Cavendish’s societal status and authorial identity, as the attributions change over the

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\textsuperscript{143} According to Jonathan Goldberg, “like the violation of the border between subject and object, self and other, in *Blazing World*, describes the vagaries of Cavendish’s writing practice even at the level of the letter (442).

\textsuperscript{144} Virginia Woolf refers to Cavendish as “crazy”: “When the rumour spread that the crazy Duchess was coming up from Welbeck to pay her respects at Court, people crowded the streets to look at her, and the curiosity of Mr. Pepys twice brought him to wait in the Park to see her pass. But the pressure of the crowd about her coach was too great” (*The Common Reader* 34-5). Paul Salzman also sees a troubled psyche of Cavendish, arguing that “Cavendish [...] tended to veer between self-deprecation and self-assertion in a manner calculated to undermine any sweeping generalization one might make about her own sense of her image as a female author” (*Reading Early Modern Women’s Writing* 135).

\textsuperscript{145} There is no inherent meaning behind the epithet “Thrice Noble,” but Cavendish used this phrase on the title pages of several of her publications.
course of her publishing career depending on her place among English nobility. Another of Cavendish’s early publications came in 1655 as *The Worlds Olio: Written by the Most Excellent Lady the Lady Marchioness of Newcastle* (Wing N873). A second edition of this text appeared in 1671 (Wing N874), but like the second edition of *Poems and Fancies*, this edition’s title page attributes the text to “The Thrice Noble, Illustrious, and Most Excellent Princess, the Duchess of Newcastle. This change in authorial attribution constitutes the only major difference between the two editions of the text, and it also characterizes the rest of her published texts that appeared in more than one edition. Also in 1655 appeared *Philosophical and Physical Opinions, written by her Excellency, the Lady Marchioness of Newcastle* (Wing N863). A second edition of this text appeared in 1663 (Wing N864) with the once again newly promoted status of Cavendish reflected on the title page. Such self-aggrandizing titles were rare in the first two centuries of printed books and Cavendish’s use of such titles highlights her desire for both self-promotion and admittance to the world of published authors.

Cavendish’s vast oeuvre goes beyond poetry and natural philosophy and includes drama, biography, and autobiography; bibliographic aspects of these texts further illustrate her conscious authorial project. Cavendish, in fact, became one of the first women to write an autobiography that appeared in print when in 1656 she published *A True Relation of my Birth, Breeding, and Life*, which appeared attached to the *Natures Pictures Drawn by Fancies Pencil to the Life*. A second edition of this text appeared in 1671 (Wing N856). Cavendish also had published in 1667 a biography of her husband, entitled *The Life of the Thrice Noble, High, and Puissant Prince William Cavendishe* (1667). A second edition of this text appeared in Margaret Cavendish’s own English-to-Latin translation in 1668 (Wing N848). A third edition in English ap-

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146 D.F. McKenzie argues that “Cavendish’s books are interesting for their surface—they’re sumptuous, lavishly spaced, highly decorated folios printed in Great Primer or Double Pica on good paper” (122).
peared in 1675 (Wing N854). The various editions of the life writings of her husband and namesake not only fueled Cavendish’s name because of her prominent self-promotion on the title pages, but they also furthered her upward mobility though the promotion of her husband’s position in the nobility. Cavendish also published two collections of plays: *Playes written by the thrice noble, illustrious and excellent princess, the Lady Marchioness of Newcastle* (Wing N868), printed in 1662, and *Plays, never before printed. Written by the thrice noble, illustrious, and excellent princesse, the Duchess of Newcastle* (Wing N 867), printed in 1668. The very title of her second collection of plays demonstrates Cavendish’s conscious attempt to advertise this particular publication to potential book buyers who had already seen her first collection of drama. Indeed, Cavendish tested tradition and went against many expectations as an author. Such a gesture would have invited a potential reader and buyer to look twice at the book and even purchase another edition of it.

Her most well know publication appeared in 1666 with the folio printing of *Observations upon experimental philosophy. To which is added, the description of a new blazing world. Written by the thrice noble, illustrious, and excellent princesse, the Duchess of Newcastle* (Wing N847 and N859). This text appeared in a second edition in 1668 with one difference: in the first edition of *Observations*, each new section begins with its own first page, while in the 1668 edition (Wing N858), only *The Blazing World* begins with its own first page. In both editions, *The Blazing World* appears after the *Observations* section of the text. Cavendish very consciously attached *The Blazing World*, a fictive prose utopian text some critics have labeled as the first science fiction text, to a volume of natural philosophy. In 1626, Francis Bacon's (1561-1626) Latin version of his prose utopia, *The New Atlantis*, appeared in print attached to his text on natural

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147 According to Marea Mitchell and Dianne Osland, “Cavendish was a political conservative, aligned with the royalists, but in her literary ambition apparently bound by no known laws of tradition or kind, publishing (prolifically) on philosophical and scientific topics as well as prose fiction and memoir” (99-100).
philosophy, *Sylva Silvarum, or a Natural Historie* (STC 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172). Bacon had intended to compose an expansive multi-part treatise on natural philosophy called the *Great Instauration*, part of which included his Latin text *Novum Organum*, first printed in 1620 (STC 1162 and 1163). But Bacon left this project unfinished, and Cavendish similarly left a vast yet splintered catalogue of texts, both literary and philosophical.

**THE BLAZING WORLD IN DIGEST**

*The Blazing World* begins with a seaman’s love for and abduction of a woman from a higher social class:

A Merchant travelling into a foreign Country, fell extreamly in Love with a young Lady; but being a stranger in that Nation, and beneath her, both in Birth and Wealth, he could have but little hopes of obtaining his desire; however his Love growing more and more vehement upon him, even to the slighting of all difficulties, he resolved at last to Steal her away. (154)

After the abduction, the mariner sets sail but meets with a violent storm at the pole of “another world,” killing all onboard except the unnamed lady, who “by the light of her Beauty, the heat of her Youth, and Protection of the Gods, remain[ed] alive” (154). This noble lady is rescued by “Bear-like Creatures” who take her to an “Island, where the Emperor of the Blazing-world (for so it was call’d) kept his residence” (157). The reader learns that the origin of the name “Blazing World” is from its bright stars. Once on the island, the man-beast creatures take the lady to “Paradise,” the “Imperial city” on the island. Some of the islands human inhabitants include “Priests and Governors were Princes of the Imperial Blood, who [are] Eunuches” and others of “several Complexions; not white, black, tawny, olive or ash-coloured; but some appear’d of an Azure, some of a deep Purple, some of a Grass-green, some of a Scarlet, some of an Orange-
colour” (163). The rest of the inhabitants of the island consist of half-man, half-beast creatures who inherit their profession upon birth. The narrative offers no gender identification of the man-beast inhabitants of the society.

The reader learns that “there was but one way to enter” into the society, and that this entrance was “like a labyrinth, so winding and turning among the rocks, that no other Vessels but small Boats could pass” (160). The society is walled and well-guarded: “within the Arch stood the Emperors guard, which consisted of several sorts of men; at every half mile was a Gate to enter” (161). The narrator also describes the Sun-stone as “fixt and firm like a center” (166). This depiction of a centralized government with a vast reach of watchfulness over the populace coupled with the presence of a strong female presence in *The Blazing World*—with the Empress and Cavendish herself—suggests that Cavendish allows for female subjectivity despite the initial commitment to a patriarchal social order demonstrated in having the Emperor make the Empress his bride.  

The inhabitants of this “Blazing World” become so enamored with the narrator that they immediately crown her as Emperor of their society. The newly crowned Empress engages the native inhabitants of this world, all half-man, half-beast creatures, in a series of question and answer dialogues in which the Empress stubbornly refuses to accept any of the scientists’ discoveries, knowledge, or experiences. Despite becoming Empress, the protagonist remains secluded in many ways throughout *The Blazing World* and attempts without success to assimilate intellectually with the society that has put her in a leadership position simply because of her grace and

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148 According to Anna Battigelli, *The Blazing World* “serves to highlight the unpredictable and often willful nature of the self. By highlighting the problem of subjectivity, the briefer Blazing World serves as a useful introduction to her fuller, though no more systematic, critique of empiricism” in *Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy* (“Between the Glass and the Hand: The Eye in Margaret Cavendish’s Blazing World” 29). Su Fang Ng argues that “the self in *The Blazing World* is one that forms partnerships in ties of love and family, whether with spouses or with platonic lovers” (186)
beauty. Despite her apparent authority position, however, the Empress becomes marginalized, particularly during her question and answer session with the half-man, half-beast scientists. Late in the narrative Margaret Cavendish herself enters the text to act as an advisor to the Empress, ultimately advising the Empress to retreat into her own mind and create numerous blazing worlds inside her own imagination.149

The Empress’s voyage, which immediately becomes “fantastic” (as the Empress ultimately describes it), resides in a realm between Lacan’s Symbolic order and Lacan’s Real. The entire narrative overtly breaks from anything resembling an orderly or “realistic” domain in which the Symbolic order can reign, as the Symbolic requires a certain presence of “law,” or rather, “law-of-the-father.” But once she becomes Empress, the protagonist of the narrative creates a “law-of-the-mother” or perhaps a “law-of-the-not-father”; Lacan argues that feminine identification becomes the impetus for initiation into the Imaginary order: “The question arises whether we have before us a properly psychotic mechanism, one that would be imaginary and that would extend from the first hint of identification with and capture by the feminine image, to the blossoming of a world system in which the subject is completely absorbed in his imagination by a feminine identification” (Seminar III 63). Lacan’s notion of the “blossoming of a world system” precisely describes the Empress’s indoctrination into the populace of the Blazing World. The inhabitants of the Blazing World already have an Emperor, and by crowning an Empress and assigning her the power they ultimately assign her, the Emperor himself appears to have been “completely absorbed in his imagination” upon the inception of the narrative of The Blazing World.

GENDER

149 Todd Borlick argues that “Utopian fiction offers Cavendish the chance to found her own private textual empire from which to wage campaigns against men like Bacon, Boyle, and Pepys and grant herself the intellectual authority her culture denied her” (241).
Cavendish’s creation of the Empress as *The Blazing World*’s protagonist reflects her own search for authorial subjectivity, both in the context of *The Blazing World* itself and of the other texts she wrote for publication.\(^{150}\) In addition, Cavendish’s body of work demonstrates Cavendish’s belief in the connection between gender and writing.\(^{151}\) *The Blazing World* also reflects Cavendish’s desire to establish her own authority within the seventeenth century intellectual community.\(^{152}\) Unsurprisingly, gender-based subjectivity in *The Blazing World* figures prominently in much of the criticism on the text as well.\(^{153}\) While Cavendish’s self-presentation may

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\(^{150}\) Carol Neely argues that Cavendish’s creation of the Empress empowers herself (63), and in like manner Anne Thell argues that the Empress aims to “break through Cavendish’s contemporary reality” by reciprocally providing authority to her own voice as creator of the Blazing World (442). Hero Chalmers sees Cavendish’s self-presentation as emblematic of “of the cultural and historical conditions of Interregnum royalism” (17). She argues that, “the retreat into imaginary kingdoms in *The Blazing World* thus posits a model in which women’s aspirations towards absolute power may be satiated without vouchsafing any actual female political agency over the public world of Restoration England” (*Royalist Women Writers, 1650-1689*, 118). Earla Wilputte places Cavendish’s self-claimed subjectivity in how she “[fantasizes] about power and realize[s] [it through her] own imagined spaces” (111). John Shanahan argues that Cavendish’s forensic spaces serve to create “pure wonder and self-affirmation” (372).

\(^{151}\) According to Bronwen Price, “Cavendish’s work provides an exploration and redefinition of positions from which to speak through its intervention with existing discourses, as well as demonstrating a self-consciousness about the relationship between gender and the process of writing” (“Feminine Modes of Knowing and Scientific Enquiry: Margaret Cavendish’s Poetry as Case Study” 118).

\(^{152}\) Hande Seber argues that Cavendish in *The Blazing World* “becomes the authoress/creatoress of her own self and of an imaginary realm, praising herself and freely expressing her ideas, the ones on monarchy, science and natural philosophy in particular” (85).

\(^{153}\) Geraldine Wagner argues that the tension between “prescribed, subjected female body and a female subjectivity that emerges through the body […] is finally brought to the fore, confronted, explored and ultimately resolved by her two protagonists and their author who are by turns distinct from and merged with each other” (para. 1). Rosemary Kegl demonstrates how Cavendish’s metaphor in *The Blazing World* of “two Worlds at the ends of their Poles” that “figures women’s intellectual equality with men also helps to shape an English experience of merchant’s capital, of female desire” (123). (69). David Michael Robinson reads lesbian elements in *The Blazing World*, while Lee Khanna argues that “In *The Blazing World* figurations of female power and creativity are multiple and include depictions of shared power and the generative potential of a relational self” (18). Oddvar Holmesland argues that on the one hand *The Blazing World* represents a “tale of virtue rewarded within the parameters of a providential aristocratic ideology,” but on the other hand, “the narrative may also be read as a feminine subversion of romance conquest figuring a progressive woman who makes a masculine utopia her own” (457-9). Marina Leslie sees Cavendish’s achievement in terms of how she deals with travel discourses; while she discusses “how she uses the very ambiguities and ambivalences of gendered travel discourses to turn the topos of ‘the world turned upside down’ on its head with her own polar fantasy of female emancipation and rule” (“Antipodal Anxieties: Joseph Hall, Richard Brome, Margaret Cavendish and the Cartographies of Gender” 54), the female emancipation symbolizes more than mere fantasy as more and more women were finding it possible to participate in the patronage game in the courts of England in the seventeenth century. On the other hand, Rachel Trubowitz sees *The Blazing World* as “neither self-indulgent ‘retreat into fantasy’ nor ‘ponderous tome’ but rather a canny revision of the utopian social paradigm, driven by competing demands of the Duchess’s radical feminism” (230). Angus Fletcher argues that *The Blazing World* “demonstrates that Cavendish’s emphasis upon irregularity did more than offer an alternative to the views of nature circulated by her male contemporaries. It also revealed how a woman might impose her authority by exploiting the anxieties […] about unregulated motion” of a powerful woman (125).
have resulted from the complicated political environment in which Cavendish lived as an exiled royalist, I wish to posit more of a linguistic impetus for the formation of Cavendish’s subjectivity. In *Gender Trouble*, Judith Butler argues that subjective representation in the realm of gender comes from *a priori* subjectivity:

The domains of political and linguistic ‘representation’ set out in advance the criterion by which subjects themselves are formed, with the result that representation is extended only to what can be acknowledged as a subject. In other words, the qualifications for being a subject must first be met before representation can be extended. (2)

Butler argues that political subjectivity in the realm of gender often relies on demonizing an Other: “The political construction of the subject proceeds with certain legitimating and exclusionary aims, and these political operations are effectively concealed and naturalized by a political analysis that takes juridical structures as their foundation” (3). Butler’s legislative language in this passage suggests an “unspoken” law of patriarchal authority or superiority that perpetuates its own existence through marginalization of the Other; the Empress does in fact engage in the “exclusionary aims” Butler notes in her lengthy assault on the man-beast scientists. In one instance, the Empress asks an impossible-to-answer question that has no real consequence even if it were answerable, asking for “an exact account thereof, by reason the circulation of blood was an interior motion” (176); the Empress in essence asks why blood circulates inside the body, pre-

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154 Hero Chalmers argues that Cavendish’s “usually forthright presentation of herself as a female author is not the product of psychological factors but of the cultural and historical conditions of Interregnum royalism” (17). She argues that, “the retreat into imaginary kingdoms in the *Blazing World* thus posits a model in which women’s aspirations towards absolute power may be satiated without vouchsafing any actual female political agency over the public world of Restoration England” (*Royalist Women Writers*, 1650-1689:129).

155 According to Robert Letellier, The Empress’s rise to power is authorized by men, but her transfiguration or blazoning by the female narrator, identified as Cavendish herself and called “Margaret the First,” is a description and demonstration of the Empress’s total control over her male subjects. What occurs is a prophetic rapture, an empowering by disguise or assumption, allowing a woman to excel in a masculine role (emperor, vice-regent, general, legal advocate, heir, “son”) (24).
sumably as opposed to outside of it. Representative of many of the Empress’s questions, the Empress’s pointless question about the nature of blood circulation in effect undermines her authority as Empress of a highly scientific society. The Empress’s hostility towards the scientists also undermines any possibility of an “idealized” society based on seventeenth-century London intellectual attempting to create such a society in Cavendish’s real world life. The fact that Cavendish dared to create her own utopia speaks to her “proto-feminist” (as Catherine Gallagher terms it) leanings, and suggests she was aiming at something more than “Fantastickal.”

In Tarrying with the Negative, Žižek argues that “the subject—self-consciousness—receives honor (the honor of serving the common Good embodied in the State) [in which] a process of exchange/mediation takes place: the ‘noble consciousness’ alienates its pure For-itself (its silent honorable serving of the State) in language qua medium of the universality of thought (flattery to the Monarch, the head of the State)” (22-3). Strong actions by the female characters move their subjectivity closer to that of the men of letters such as More and Bacon who have similarly created their own perfect societies. The discussion of the society does not come without its law and order, however, as we read of the “power absolute” of the Grand Signor (218). This need for authority necessitates the portrayal of “power absolute” in a positive light to further empower the authors and creators of the new societies. This empowerment acts to

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156 Su Fang Ng connects Cavendish’s royalist sympathies with her gendered position, arguing that “Figuring Cavalier marginality in gendered terms, Cavendish could at once envision a more important role for women to play in governance and still support Cavalier ideals. She does so by extending greater political roles only to aristocratic women. In her imaginative writings [Cavaliers are] feminized because marginalized, come to share greater equality with their wives” (174).

157 Kathleen Ahearn calls Cavendish a “proto-ecofeminist” (216). Debora Boyle, on the other hand, writes, “In Blazing World, Cavendish does display an awareness of the ways in which power can be used to limit knowledge, but her attitude toward such uses of power is one that contemporary feminists would abhor (‘Margaret Cavendish’s Nonfeminist Natural Philosophy” 227).

158 Deborah Boyle, on the other hand, argues that For Cavendish’s characters, imitating the masculine does not produce the same effects for women as those masculine acts and virtues achieve for men. Thus I take it that although Cavendish had no objection to hermaphroditical things per se, she did not think women should be educated into the masculine virtues. (“Margaret Cavendish on Gender, Nature, and Freedom” 7).
strengthen the female subjectivity at work not only in the writing of Cavendish’s work, but also in the actions of the female characters in *The Blazing World*.

**ISOLATION AND ALIENATION**

Despite the kind reception she receives at her first encounter with the inhabitants of the Blazing World (in which she becomes the Empress), the Empress becomes secluded both as a woman with power and as someone ignorant of science who attempts without success to assimilate intellectually with the society that has put her in a leadership position. Through her interrogation of the scientists, the Empress demonstrates a strong undercurrent of distrust in scientific knowledge. For example, after the Lice-men, one of the many man-beast hybrids in the society, tell her they cannot measure everything within a “hair’s breadth,” the Empress “began to be displeased, and told them there was neither Truth nor Justice in their Profession, and so dissolved their society” (188). When the Empress engages the man-beast scientists in these lengthy dialogues, she does not understand the scientific advances presented to her, and this further separates and isolates her from her new home. She also orders scientific instruments destroyed, suggesting an attempt to suppress the spread of knowledge.

Emma Rees and Anna Battigelli have extensively explored the isolation experienced by female writers in the seventeenth century despite the literary circles to which they belonged.\(^ {159}\) Indeed, isolation rested firmly in the minds of the English people during and after a Civil War that chased not only royalist supporters but also the sovereign himself into exile.\(^ {160}\) The isolation felt by Cavendish and other lesser-studied women writers contemporary to her manifests in *The Blazing World* with a depiction of an all-powerful and clearly capable female sovereign who

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\(^ {159}\) Rees writes of Cavendish’s “singularity” in engaging with “archetypically masculine literary modes” (188). Battigelli, *Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind*, p. 82.

\(^ {160}\) Virginia Woolf writes, “What a vision of loneliness and riot the thought of Margaret Cavendish brings to mind!” (*A Room of One’s Own*, 74).
nevertheless finds herself adrift in a world of male-dominated scientific thought and revolution.\textsuperscript{161} \textit{The Blazing World} demonstrates Cavendish’s acute awareness of this movement that went on literally around her and her circle and shows how she, despite attaining a powerful position for a woman in the seventeenth century, sought to depict scientific thought as foreign to the female sphere.\textsuperscript{162}

As a female protagonist drives forward the narrative of \textit{The Blazing World}, reading the Empress as a reflection of Cavendish’s own self-reflection naturally follows. Margaret Cavendish’s psychological state has rightly received scholarly attention, as has the way in which it manifests in her writings.\textsuperscript{163} But as Cavendish sought her own personal subjectivity and empowerment through the process of writing and publishing, the authoritarian nature of the Empress likely comes from the frustration Cavendish felt as a woman attempting to become part of the male world of literary authorship.\textsuperscript{164} Critics have naturally commented on the Empress’s authoritarian nature in \textit{The Blazing World}, but the society Cavendish depicts does not necessarily denote her opposition to such authoritarian rule.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{161} Robert Ignatius Letellier argues that “Cavendish’s own reaction to her effective exclusion from political power and citizenship helped to form the basis of her feminine critique” (21). Megan Heffernan, however, argues that in \textit{The Blazing World}, Cavendish creates a subjectivity that is markedly more social than individual” (71).

\textsuperscript{162} Robert Appelbaum writes that “In Margaret Cavendish’s mind the two forms of alienation, on the one hand from her country and on the other hand from the world of letters and fame, are inevitably coupled” (202).

\textsuperscript{163} See, for instance, Anna Battigelli, \textit{Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind}, p. 82, and Emma Rees, p. 177.

\textsuperscript{164} According to Keith Thomas, “For an exceptional woman like Margaret Cavendish, who unashamedly invaded the masculine domain by seeking fame as a writer and thinker, and incurring much mockery in the process, it was a matter of great distress that most of her sex were content to die unremembered” (255).

\textsuperscript{165} Catherine Gallagher claims that the Empress’s authoritarian rule grants subjectivity to Cavendish: “it was, paradoxically, in the ideology of absolute monarchy that Cavendish found a model of the absolute, sovereign private self” (133). Gallagher similarly sees a “commitment to absolute monarchy” (138) that excludes female subjectivity. Although Bronwen Price asserts that, Cavendish commits a “liberating act” with the creation of the Empress, this act “still demands authoritarian devotion to her as the head of state and to God through her as head of church” ("Journeys Beyond Frontiers: Knowledge, Subjectivity and Outer Space in Margaret Cavendish’s the \textit{Blazing World} (1666)” 138), John Rogers contends that \textit{The Blazing World} presents an “anti-authoritarian perspective . . . in the decentralized government of \textit{Blazing World}” (197). Carrie Hintz argues that \textit{The Blazing World} “resolves the question of the place of dissent in a stable society by concluding (perhaps a bit wistfully) that the pleasures of diversity must give way to the exigencies of unity. In order to maintain a society worth living in, the vagaries of individual dissent and lively public debate must be sacrificed” ("'But One Opinion': Fear of Dissent in Cavendish’s New \textit{Blazing World}"
Through the Empress, Cavendish consciously depicts the alienation she experienced because of her mental state and ambitions as a woman seeking authorial success and respect. Cavendish’s choice to present her most obvious fictional alter ego in a “fantastic” narrative suggests her unconscious realization that her ambitions resided outside of normal expectations in the seventeenth-century world of publishing. Lacan argues quite simply that “Alienation is constitutive of the imaginary order” (Seminar III 146). The Imaginary, as distinguished from the Symbolic, the Law, the law-of-the-father, inherently departs from the structural order of the Symbolic and the result, according to Lacan, is alienation and even paranoia: “it is the imaginary ego which gives it its centre and its group, and it is clearly identifiable with a form of alienation, akin to paranoia. That the subject ends up believing in the ego is in itself madness” (Seminar II 247). In a well-known biography of Cavendish entitled Mad Madge: The Extraordinary Life of Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle, the First Woman to Live by Her Pen, Katie Whitaker explores precisely this undercurrent of “madness” in Cavendish’s life and writings. Cavendish thus found herself in a realm in which she confronted the patriarchal world of publishing and sought to depict a woman’s revenge on this male-dominated world, albeit through heavy-handed tactics and an ostensible Luddite attitude towards scientific advances.

Žižek argues that alienation in essence constitutes “getting lost” and thus ultimately has ethical implications:

25). Line Cottegnies takes this argument further by arguing that in The Blazing World Cavendish “reveals the true nature of her newfound ‘paradise’; an authoritarian (if paradoxically benevolent) regime based on secrecy and surveillance” (my emphasis 73). William Poole specifically locates the authoritarian nature of the Empress’s reign in her treatment of the half-man, half-beast scientists, arguing that the Empress “in using ‘science’ to quell political enemies and keep one’s subjects in awe, she merely invites renewed skepticism considering the inherent justification of politics and religion. Might’s helping hand ends up replacing right” (16). According Jay Stevenson, “the Empress's discourse and staged self-display subjects the inhabitants of the Blazing world to her rule” (153).

165 Žižek points out that in psychoanalysis, “the first analysands were female hysterics; that is to say, psychoanalysis was originally an interpretation of female hysteria” (Tarrying with the Negative 165).

166 Žižek likens submission to authority as what “became a favorite Soviet tactic against dissidents: anyone whose political views differed from theirs was insane” (The Parallax View 302).
It is not that we are dealing here with the simple ‘Hegelian’ movement into alienation (getting lost) and recuperation of oneself (finding a firm position): the point is a more precise one: *it is the very movement of ‘getting lost’ (of losing ethical substance) that opens up the space for the ethical work of mediation which alone can generate the solution*. The loss is this not recuperative but fully asserted as liberating, as a positive opening. (*The Parallax View*, Žižek’s emphasis 127)

Similarly to many other utopian narrative protagonists, the Empress in *The Blazing World* literally becomes “lost” at the inception of the narrative, and in essence this constitutes “losing ethical substance” which she pursues through her immediate promotion to Empress upon entering the Blazing World. But, as in Lacan’s notion of the Imaginary, the Empress succumbs to the narcissistic pull of the Imaginary, and thus fails to resituate herself within an acceptable ethical framework.

**FOUCAULT’S ART OF GOVERNMENT**

*The Blazing World’s* political environment demonstrates a continuing development of what Foucault calls an “art” of government in his 1978 lecture entitled “Governmentality.” Foucault claims that during the seventeenth century occurred a dynamic shift of the way governments operated to exercise power, most explicitly calling attention to the influence of Machiavelli’s writings of the previous century on this burgeoning “art” of government. He points to three different types of government: “the art of self-government, connected with morality; the art of properly governing a family, which belongs to economy; and finally the science of ruling the state; which concerns politics” (91). This relationship between the rule of the father and the rule of the family (economy) speaks to the patriarchal ideology obviously prevalent during the seventeenth century, and comes at a time when sovereigns such as England’s James I claimed the di-
vined right of rule. Foucault argues that proper governing requires significant oversight on the part of an unseen governing body: “To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and goods” (92). Less than a century earlier Queen Elizabeth had portrayed herself as the mother of England during her reign, and strove to build her own ethos as chosen mother of her country.

In *The Blazing World* Cavendish appears to aim to create an idealized society based on new scientific thought processes and social control. Despite the divine intervention of Margaret Cavendish herself entering the narrative, scientific progress in natural philosophy holds more authority in the text than does mere fancy, and with more advances in scientific thought come advances in the art of government, according to Foucault. Foucault’s argument that governmentality progressed throughout the seventeenth century explains the intrusive presence of authoritarianism in Cavendish’s work; “For Heaven frowning at his theft,” says *The Blazing World*’s narrator, pointing to God as a kind of spy over the actions of the ship; the ship proceeds “as if it had been guided by some Experienced Pilot, and skillful Mariner” (154); here the fate of the soon-to-be-crowned Emperor falls under the control of an unseen yet all-powerful force. Cavendish takes the concept of controlling natural forces further than Bacon by bringing in divine intervention to instigate the storyline, thus paving the way for the part of her work she oddly labels “Fantastickal”; the very beginning of the narrative depicts a ship sailing into an undiscovered world, itself a “fantastic” occurrence.168

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168 According to James Grantham Turner, the “absolutist Empress awes her subjects into adoring submission with spectacular displays of luminous stones that her scientists have discovered and mined” (812).
Foucault claims that this new art of government results in a Machiavellian system of rule: “The objective of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen, and protect the principality, but with this last understood to mean not the objective ensemble of its subjects and the territory, but rather the prince’s relation with what he owns, with the territory he has inherited or acquired, and with his subjects” (90). For Foucault the relationship between the sovereign and his or her subjects dictates the success of the governing of the principality. Throughout The Blazing World the authorities seem to have a fairly good working relationship with their subjects.

Nevertheless, a commitment to patriarchy and absolute monarchy manifests in this society, as the society has only one Emperor, “to whom they all submitted with the greatest duty and obedience, which made them live in a continued peace and happiness, not acquainted with other foreign wars, or home-bred insurrections” (160). Keeping the population ignorant of outside affairs betrays a controlling influence on the part of the government, an influence that privileges the royalty over the general population. When asked why they prefer the monarchial system, the populace of the Blazing World answers, “That as it was natural for one body to have but one head, so it was also natural for a Politick body to have but one Governor […] to whom we all submit with one obedience” (164). The royalty sees much greater freedom than the general populace, including the man-beast scientists, in the Blazing World: “None was all owed to use of wear Gold but those of the Imperial Race, which were the onely nobles of the State; nor durst any one wear Jewels but the Emperor, the Empress, and their Eldest Son” (162). This attitude towards jewelry differs slightly from that described in More’s Utopia, in which Utopians consider jewelry merely the playthings of children.169

Cavendish’s invocation of defunct sumptuary laws does more than merely situate her utopia next to More’s. Such stringent control over the appearance of the subjects of the Blazing

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169 According to Sara Hutton, the “Blazing World has no precedent in More’s fiction” (170).
World empowers the Empress and the governing body, but does so regarding a relatively minor and insignificant aspect of daily life. But by controlling the outer appearance of the Blazing World’s subjects, the Empress in effect inscribes onto the subjects an immediately visible litmus test of their subservience to her as their ruler. Žižek often quotes the line from Immanuel Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?”: “Think Freely, but Obey!” Žižek qualifies his use of this term in *First as Tragedy, Then as Farce* by pointing out that the phrase “poses a series of problems of its own, since it also relies on the distinction between the ‘performativ[e]’ level of social authority and the level of free thinking where performativity is suspended” (105). Cavendish’s Empress has made the simple act of wearing certain clothes or jewels a “performativ[e]” act that immediately demonstrates adherence to the Empress’s will. Cavendish does not give the vast majority of the characters in *The Blazing World* proper names; Žižek’s reading of Kant does not apply to these nameless, faceless man-beasts whom Cavendish only includes in the narrative only to “perform” strictly within the confines of their inherited profession and act as the target of the Empress’s wrath, in essence providing the Empress with subjectivity through the process of denying their own.

**AUTHORITARIANISM**

By establishing such a strong central governmental presence, Cavendish claims a strong authorial authority early on in her description of her idealized society.\(^{170}\) This strong authority sees complications, however, in some of the later descriptions that seem inconsistent with her

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\(^{170}\) For Marina Leslie, this authority comes from Cavendish’s willingness to “play a supporting, scribal role, although she will be intent on calling attention to—and redefining the importance of—her role as author” (*Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of History* 121). Robert Appelbaum argues that in *The Blazing World*, Cavendish demonstrates “the self in writing, the self as that which produces a world of its own, for its own sake, becomes in Cavendish’s case the ultimate authority of social value, the ultimate producer and consumer of social power” (209).
early descriptions.\textsuperscript{171} When talking of ways of motivating citizens, the narrator tells us, “Fear, though it makes people obey, yet does it not last so long, nor is it so sure a means to keep them to their duties, as Love” (193). When the Empress has been tasked with making an imaginary world of her own, she “made some alterations in the Blazing-world, she lived in, which yet she could hardly do, by reason it was so well ordered that it could not be mended, for it was governed without secret and deceiving Policy; neither was there any ambition, factions, malicious detractions, civil dissensions” (216).\textsuperscript{172} Another source of inconsistency lies in the fact that \textit{The Blazing World} has few laws: “they answered, That many laws made many Divisions, which most commonly did breed factions, and at last brake out into open wars” (164). At times \textit{The Blazing World} seems to have a tight grip around its citizens, and at other times it seems to let its people live freely. On the other hand, when the Spirits, the “Immaterial Spirits” the Empress addresses in order to understand “the World she came from” do wrong, “for their punishment they were condemned to the lowest and darkest Vehicles” (206). “Vehicles” here may refer to a “substance, esp. a liquid, serving as a means for the readier application or use of another substance mixed with it or dissolved in it” (\textit{OED}, sb., I.1.a); such distilling of the “Spirits” suggests a rather strong reaction to a mistake on the part of the Spirits, and also a likely overreaction. The word also has medical implications. Regardless, the atmosphere oscillates between the authoritarian and the egalitarian.

In their influential 1954 social science study \textit{The Authoritarian Personality}, Theodor Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, and D.J. Levinson seek to make sense of fascist regimes, with a

\textsuperscript{171} Anna Battigelli argues that ”In \textit{Blazing World} Cavendish illustrates the idea that, while making the sovereign the political arbiter of truth looked efficient in theory, it was hardly likely to work in practice (“Political Thought/Political Action: Margaret Cavendish's Hobbesian Dilemma” 54).

\textsuperscript{172} These inconsistencies have not gone unnoticed by critics. Although Oddvar Holmesland argues that Cavendish’s work contains contradictions, and that “her raw materials were largely traditional discourses encountering a new world” (458), it would seem that Cavendish intentionally included these contradictions. Holmesland’s statement that these contradictions “reflect her unstable conception of nature as a mark of the categorical instability of her age” (458) seems shortsighted.
particular focus on Nazi Germany. This work outlines common traits among people with an authoritarian or "fascist" personality; anti-intellectualism and cynicism are the most relevant traits with regards to the Empress. The Empress's arguably racist anti-intellectualism directed towards the man-beasts calls to mind the conditions that served as the impetus for the composition of *The Authoritarian Personality*: Nazi domination and ultimate elimination of much of the Jewish population of Europe. The Empress also exhibits significant cynicism towards science, which she interrogates as vehemently as she does the scientists who study it. In one instance, the Empress (sarcastically?) asks the Spirits “whether all Matter be soulified” (203); again the Empress asks a question that firstly, has no answer, and secondly, has no relevance to the topic under discussion. *The Blazing World* appeared in the midst of the beginnings of the Royal Society and new scientific advances in both practice and theory, and the Empress’s attack on the man-beast scientists inherently turns the ruler of the society away from any kind of technological or scientific advances that could potentially lead to a real “utopia.”

Hannah Arendt has provided a useful model of the effects of oppressive rule, although she opts for the term “totalitarian” instead of “authoritarian.” In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt argues that totalitarian rule depends on submission by the ruled: “the seemingly firm establishment of totalitarian governments [rests] on mass support” (xxiv). Indeed, the Empress experiences a rapid ascendancy upon her arrival in the Blazing World, as the Emperor immediately upon meeting her “conceived her to be some Goddess, and offered to worship her” (162). More importantly, however, Arendt argues that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes dull and even negate individuality: “Totalitarian bureaucracy, with a more complete understanding of the meaning of absolute power, intruded upon the private individual and his inner life with equal brutality. The result of this radical efficiency has been that the inner spontaneity of people under
its rule was killed along with their social and political activities” (245). Arendt here, most importantly, argues that the subject or citizen under the thumb of “absolute power” becomes affected psychologically, and, at times even physically in the event of a death sentence. Arendt also locates isolation within the very movement that puts into power the oppressive regime: “totalitarian movements are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals” (323). With the despot, “the assumption of infallibility, moreover, is based not so much on superior intelligence as on the correct interpretation of the essentially reliable forces in history or nature, forces which neither defeat nor ruin can prove wrong because they are bound to assert themselves in the long run” (349). Such “reliable forces” in the context of the Empress’s luddite-like attempt to eliminate scientific enquiry might constitute “traditional” wisdom, outdated scientific beliefs, and other such dogma. And the Empress indeed becomes Empress for apparently no other reason than her physical appearance. Arendt goes on to argue that the authoritarian ruler must engage in “the killing of man’s individuality” (454). Cavendish does not populate her utopia with any men per se (save the Emperor and the “man” half of all the male man-beasts), and in *The Blazing World*, the narrator identifies all native inhabitants (with the exception of the Emperor and the Empress) by their species and profession. Arendt sees this act of destroying the individual as an act of non-corporeal violence: “After murder of the moral person and annihilation of the juridical person, the destruction of the individuality is almost always successful” (454-5). The result of totalitarian rule always has the same result for Arendt: “isolation and impotence” (474). Despite belonging to their inherited profession based on their hybrid species, the man-beast scientists become isolated with their various in-kind groups, and thus the Empress in essence renders them impotent.
Žižek addresses authoritarianism in the context of the fall of communism in *Did Someone Say Totalitarianism?* Žižek writes that totalitarianism can serve as a political “opiate of the masses,” turning on its head Marx’s take on religion serving as such an opiate: “instead of enabling us to think the historical reality they designate, they relieve us of the duty to think—or even actively prevent us from thinking” (138). Like Arendt, Žižek sees the importance of a “chosen one” serving as not only the despot but also as the savior of the society, likening this savior to a messiah: “the Messianic promise remains forever a promise, can never be translated into a set of determinate economico-political measures. [. . .] our debt towards the Other can never be repaid; our response to the Other’s call is never fully adequate” (155). The Empress does appear as a messiah to the inhabitants of the Blazing World, who “could hardly be persuaded to believe her mortal, [and] tender’d her all the veneration and worship due to a Deity” (162). Žižek’s notion of a “messianic promise” suggests a linguistic aspect of totalitarian control that extends to every subject under the boot of the regime. Despite her “promising” initiation into the Blazing World, whose inhabitants make her Emperor almost immediately upon meeting her, as sovereign in the Blazing World, the Empress not only attempts to undermine scientific discourse, but she also retreats into her own utopia of one, the blazing worlds in her own mind, thus breaking the implicit promise of accepting the role governing the corporeal, “real” utopia of the Blazing World.¹⁷³

Nevertheless, the Blazing World’s inhabitants have (apparently) freely placed the Empress in charge, and the Empress’s behavior as the despot still serves a purpose for the native inhabitants. Žižek argues that “the very form of ideological universality bears witness to the struggle between (at least) two particular contents; the ‘popular’ content expressing the secret longings of the dominated majority, and the specific content expressing the interests of the forces of

¹⁷³ William White argues that “The Blazing World was a world that Cavendish created with her own imagination, and, as a utopian fiction, the world was perfectly ordered because she controlled the philosophy of her people” (49).
domination” (The Ticklish Subject 217). The Empress clearly draws “popularity” in her immediate ascent to the top of the Blazing World’s hierarchy and paradoxically represents both the “longings” of those who put her in power and the “interests of the forces of domination.” Cavendish’s longings for acceptance as an author always wait in the wings for the Empress, a proxy for these “forces of domination.” In other words, Cavendish in essence presents and perpetuates an ideology that empowers the Empress that undermines itself through its own dependence on the “forces of domination.”

Cavendish consciously places the Empress in this impossible situation to reflect her own situation, one in which she has her visceral drive (Freud’s “id”) of attaining acceptance from the publishing community that must be governed by the “reality principle” of her “real” world situation as a woman in a patriarchal society (Freud’s ego). Lacan bluntly places the ego in the Imaginary: “the ego is an imaginary function” (Seminar II 36). By placing the ego, Freud’s construct of the psychic component that tempers the drives associated with the id, within the Imaginary, Lacan in essence removes the pragmatic or realistic possibility of ego-driven subjectivity from the very realm of possibility, which would, in Lacan’s understanding, reside in the Symbolic. Just as Arendt argues that the despot enjoys and exploits an unsubstantiated “assumption of infallibility,” Lacan argues that in the Imaginary, “the narcissistic or imaginary relation to the father is distinct from the symbolic relation” (Seminar I 66). Arendt’s despot relies upon a messianic, or rather, narcissistic, personality that exists outside of logic, outside of anything rational, and therefore in opposition to the law and order of the Symbolic. Lacan similarly differentiates “the narcissistic or imaginary relation” with the father (Law, law-of-the-father, Symbolic order) different from the Symbolic relation with the father.

INTERROGATION OF SCIENTISTS
The centerpiece of *The Blazing World* depicts the man-beast scientists responding to various questions and requests presented to them by the rather aggressive Empress. Lacan argues that aggression resides in the Imaginary domain: “People believe that aggressivity is aggression. It has got absolutely nothing to do with it. At the limit, virtually, aggressivity turns into aggression. But aggression has got nothing to do with the vital reality, it is an existential act linked to an imaginary relation” (*Seminar I* 177). Cavendish demonstrates this kind of “imaginary” aggressivity through the Empress, who, despite her apparent authority position, experiences some self-initiated marginalization during her question and answer session with the man-beast scientists. Cavendish’s treatment of the scientists implicitly and explicitly demonstrates not only a negative attitude towards science but also an undercurrent of racism. The Empress does not merely illustrate a conception of an early modern tyrant; through the Empress, Cavendish also seeks to undermine the male dominated world of seventeenth century empirical science through the Empress’s stubborn interrogation with the scientists. Hannah Arendt locates part of totalitarian power at the site of quashing intellectual achievement, arguing that, “totalitarianism in power invariably replaces all first-rate talents, regardless of their sympathies, with those crackpots and fools whose lack of intelligence and creativity is still the best guarantee of their loyalty” (339). Incidentally, Arendt also argues that that Nazism, the ultimate manifestation of fascist, racist, and despotic rule, attempted “to change man into beast.” While the Empress never replaces the scientists she attempts to undermine, she nevertheless demonstrates hostility to what Ar-
endt calls “everything they cannot understand,” i.e., everything the Empress cannot understand, which amounts to virtually all of the scientific advances and innovations presented to her by the man-beast scientists.

Lacan perfectly describes the nature of the question and answer session between the Empress and the man-beast scientists: entrance into the Imaginary “results from [a] misrecognition that what in the subject calls for recognition on the appropriate level of authentic symbolic exchange--which is not so easy to attain since it's always interfered with--is replaced by a recognition of the imaginary, of fantasy” (Seminar III 15). The Empress’s interrogation of the scientists indeed challenges a Symbolic relation, as she meets the presumably rational scientists with irrational and “imaginary” knowledge, or rather a lack of knowledge that constitutes a “fantasy.” The Empress’s stubborn dismissal of scientific advances and knowledge resides in a realm completely outside of Lacan’s notion of the Symbolic, which follows certain rules and “laws” because it houses language and by association subjectivity. The Empress never enters into the Symbolic order in The Blazing World, and firmly situates herself in the Imaginary through her refusal to follow the “laws” of science, and by association, the Symbolic order and language.

SUBJECTIVITY THROUGH BADIOU

Despite this hostility towards science, the Empress might merely aim to find scientific Truth, and thus attain her own subjectivity within that Truth. Alain Badiou argues that “a subject is a militant of truth” and that “to be a Subject (and not a simple individual animal) is to be a local active dimension of such a procedure” (xiii). Badiou’s notion of a “procedural” path to becoming a “militant of truth” veers closely to ethics and moral philosophy, but his juxtaposition of the “aggressive” descriptor of “militant” suggests that Badiou also believes in a certain element of “mindless” submission to following certain rules. Badiou tries to resolve here, I think, the an-
tinomy of ethics via free will and ethics via social training, fear of divine punishment, etc. Badiou answers the question of “how is pure mathematics possible?” in the search for true subjectivity by positing the possibility of a transcendental subject: “pure mathematics being the science of being, how is a subject possible?” (6). Badiou ponders here whether, firstly, his project to unite symbolic/analytical philosophy with continental phenomenology can leave room for an individuated subject, and, secondly, whether his system merely creates a “clockwork orange” subject that has no true individuation in the phenomenological sense. He goes on to extend this notion to the realm of artistic creation:

What happens in art, in science, in true (rare) politics, and in love (if it exists) is the coming to light of an indiscernible of the times, which, as such, is neither a known or recognized multiple, nor an ineffable singularity, but that which detains in its multiple-being all the common traits of the collective in question: in this sense, it is the truth of the collective’s being. The mystery of these procedures has generally been referred either to their representable conditions (the knowledge of the technical, of the social, of the sexual) or to the transcendent beyond of their One (revolutionary hope, the lovers’ fusion, poetic ex-stasis) [. . .] because in occupying the gaps of available encyclopedias, they manifest the common-being, the multiple essence, of the place in which they proceed. (17)

For Badiou, “there is no subject save the artistic, amorous, scientific, or the political” (17). The Blazing World offers representatives of all four of these sites for what Badiou would call “evental” subjectivity, a kind of phenomenological awakening or beginning of awareness: the inhabitants of the Blazing World fall in love with the Empress and make her their sovereign; the Empress becomes a political subject, subjected to her own new identity as political ruler; the scien-
entific man-beast characters have their profession as their only source of identity; and Cavendish enters the narrative herself as the sole representative of an “artistic” impulse.

In addition to his notion of evental subjectivity, Badiou offers a useful model of set theory that describes what Cavendish accomplishes with her man-beast scientists. The man-beast scientists constitute one set, made up of smaller sets distinguished by their species and profession. For Badiou, this kind of belonging results in a transcendence of the set itself:

The immanent resources of a presented multiple—if this concept is extended to its subjects—thus surpass the capacity of the count whose result-one is itself. To number the resource another power of counting, one different from itself, will be necessary. The existence of this other count, this one-multiple—to which this time the multiples included in the first multiple will tolerate belonging—is precisely what is stated in the power-set axiom. (85)

The tension Badiou describes here results from the possibility of a “power-set” that “tolerates” multiple belonging. Lacan claims that the Imaginary “places the perception-consciousness system where it belongs, namely at the heart of the reception of the ego in the other, for all imaginary references of the human being are centred on the image of the fellow being” (Seminar II 120). Lacan in other words requires a similar notion of Badiou’s “set,” that is, a category into which everyone falls and that results in the majority of individuation. But Lacan relies upon the recognition that occurs in the mirror-stage and thus requires another Other that paradoxically serves as the means by which the subject finds an identity and subjectivity.

**POST-HUMANISM: “IN ANIMALS, KNOWLEDGE IS A COAPTATION, AN IMAGINARY COAPTATION”**

176 Eve Keller argues that “The Blazing World manifests [the autonomous self] by multiplying the selves who people its multiple worlds” (463).
The beings with which Cavendish has populated the Blazing World seriously complicate Badiou’s notion of set belonging. While Badiou seeks to allow for both belonging and individuality, Cavendish’s man-beasts always already only belong to their hybrid and to their profession. Lacan writes in *Seminar III* that animal psychology shares an affinity with the Imaginary: “there is no doubt either that the imaginary relation is linked to ethology, to animal psychology” (177). In other words, Lacan’s “animal psychology” belongs to the Imaginary because it does not and cannot enter into the Symbolic domain, the domain of language and the associated law-of-the-father. This suggests that the man-beast scientists themselves can truly enter into the Symbolic domain. While they clearly have “intelligence” in the sense that they can communicate and understand the corner of scientific research they have inherited to master, they never have a true “choice” in terms of what their area of mastery becomes because they inherit it upon birth. Cavendish almost seems to associate animal instinct with the scientific impulse in seventeenth-century England that resulted in the Royal Society. As the Royal Society based its study on the scientific method as introduced largely by Francis Bacon, Cavendish clearly aims to equate the members of the Royal Society with the man-beast scientists, who exist with only partial “human” individuation, subjectivity, or free will.

As quoted above, Badiou distinguishes “man” and “human” from “animal”; this seemingly tautological notion also complicates any understanding of the hybrid scientists Cavendish has created. In his text on the “post-human” condition, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, Jacques Derrida argues that human individuation relies on not only the presence of the animal instinct, but also the recognition and subversion of it: “the subject is confirmed in the eminence of its power by subverting it and bringing it back to its defect, namely that animality is on the side of the conscious ego, whereas the humanity of the human subject is on the side of the unconscious, the law
of the signifier, Speech, the feigned feint, etc” (132). But such a post-modern notion (and a progressive post-modern notion at that) of man’s animality stands in stark contrast to much of what historians and literary scholars have determined about early modern attitudes towards animals and specifically how animals existed (ontologically speaking) merely to serve man in any way man sees fit. Much of the formulation of animal symbolism and imagery in early modern England came from widely available editions of William Caxton’s printings of *Aesop’s Fables*, first printed in English in 1484. Wilhelm Leibniz expresses a common seventeenth-century attitude towards animals in his *Theodicy* (published posthumously in 1710):

> For animals, since they do not reflect, are susceptible neither to the grief that accompanies pain, nor to the joy that accompanies pleasure. Men are sometimes in a state approaching that of the beasts, when they act almost on instinct alone and simply on the impressions made by the experience of the senses: and, in this state, their pleasures and their pains are very slight. (281)

Leibniz here suggests men too can act merely on “instinct,” although humans still retain the ability to “reflect”; in other words, men can instinctually act in a way that does not involve reflection and then can possibly reflect on these instinctual actions. In light of this attitude towards animals, Cavendish’s decision to create man-animal hybrids demonstrates an almost iconoclastic gesture towards the scientific community to which she desperately wanted to belong.\(^{177}\) Cavendish literally and symbolically reduces the man-beast scientists to their animal “half” and, by subjecting them to the Empress’s interrogation, denies any subjectivity they may have as “humans” or “men.”

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\(^{177}\) Lisa Sarasohn argues that "Cavendish's fascination with hybrid creatures in the *New Blazing World* demonstrates the power animal imagery had in her thought" (53). Sara Hutton notes that “the miscellany of animal-like inhabitants with which the Blazing world is peopled has no parallel among either the citizens of Utopia or Bensalem” (170).
Derrida also sees man as a being that engages in an art, but he describes this art as a failed attempt at the true art, that of God as conceived by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan*:

Nature is the art of God when he creates and governs the world [and] the art of man that is the most excellent replica of the art of God, the art of this living being, man, imitates the art of God but, being unable to create, fabricates and, being unable to engender a natural animal, fabricates an artificial animal (the frontispiece of the book represents this gigantic and monstrous man who dominates the city, and Hobbes cites in Latin, in this frontispiece, a passage of Job (41:33), ‘Upon earth there is not his like,’ words followed in the text by “He beholdeth all high things: he is a king over all the children of pride. (49)

For Derrida, man creates a false “animal,” a political graven image that only approximates man and/or beast but does not constitute either. Hobbes’s *Leviathan* in Derrida’s reading reduces absolute sovereignty to a kind of animality that man must accept, as God created the inferior sentient being of “man,” and man can only create a further inferior being, a beast. Cavendish’s man-beast hybrids have neither the wisdom of man nor the majesty of beasts and as such they reflect the impossibility for the Blazing World as a society to allow for any true subjectivity.

Lacan too engages with the differentiation of man from animal, and argues that in the animal world, the entire cycle of sexual behaviour is dominated by the imaginary. On the other hand, it is in sexual behaviour that we find the greatest possibilities of displacement occurring, even in animals. We already make use of it for experimental purposes when we present the animal with a lure, a false image, a male partner which is only a shadow bearing the dominant characteristics of the said animal. At the time of the manifestations of the phenotype that, in many spe-
cies, occur at this biological moment which calls for sexual behaviour, the offering of this lure is sufficient to release the sexual behaviour. The possibility of displacement, the illusory, imaginary dimension, is essential to everything pertaining to the order of sexual behavior. (Seminar I 138)

Cavendish eventually invokes Hobbes to create one world, and brings up the most pessimistic view of the formation of state power. When the Duchess dissolves the first world she creates and makes another in the image of Hobbes’s society, she creates something horrific: “they seemed like a company of Wolves that worry Sheep, or like so many Dogs that hunt after Hares” (215).

Horrified when she sees what has happened, she experiences pain in her head, and thus decides to “make a World of her own invention,” a world “composed of sensitive and rational self-moving Matter; indeed it was composed only of the rational” (215). The Empress creates an ideal world, one which,

was so well ordered that it could not be mended; for it was governed without secret and deceiving policy; neither was there any ambition, factions, malicious detractions, civil dissensions, or home-bred quarrels, divisions in Religion, foreign wars [. . .] but all the people lived in a peaceful society united Tranquility, and Religious Conformity. (216)

The Empress here has resolved the problems in the society that originally served as the setting for The Blazing World, and in doing so has possibly created a true utopia. Lacan sees the possibility of damage done to the subject in the Imaginary domain: “In other words, she finds there more or less of an attempt at symbolic repair of the imaginary lesions that have occurred to the fundamental image of the maternal body” (Seminar VII 106). The Empress’s horrific creations
seem like “lesions” indeed, as well as “evental” trauma, in Badiou’s sense of phenomenological “event.”

The Empress then turns her attention to religious reform and constructs holy places for multiple faiths and denominations. Some of the religious/spiritual beliefs of the society also suggest a wavering commitment to progress. When asked about religion, the subjects answer the Empress that, “there was no more but one Religion in all that World, nor no diversity of opinions in that same Religion” (164). When pushed for more details about Jews, Turks, and Christians, they respond, “We do not know [ . . . ] what Religion those are; but we do all unanimously acknowledge, worship and adore the Onely, Omnipotent, and Eternal God, with all reverence, submission, and duty” (164, my emphasis). Such ignorance of other religions likely means that the controlling forces of the society have successfully censored or suppressed other religious practices in an attempt to make all its citizens conform. Otherwise, the society in The Blazing World seems rather worldly in terms of knowledge of other societies.

As she seeks spiritual enlightenment and self-exploration, some of the Empress’s spiritual advisors suggest bringing in the Duchess of Newcastle as a more useful ally and advisor. As the Duchess, Margaret Cavendish consciously inserts herself into her own narrative. After advising the Empress, the Duchess speaks of the possibility of retreating to the inner “blazing worlds” created inside one’s own mind. Cavendish’s insertion of herself into her own fiction precisely depicts a post-subjectivity mirror-stage revelation as described by Lacan: “That is what I insist upon in my theory of the mirror-stage - the sight alone of the whole form of the human body gives the subject an imaginary mastery over his body, one which is premature in relation to a real mastery” (Seminar I 79). Likely a very deliberate and conscious decision, Cavendish’s place-

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178 According to Deborah Boyle, “for Cavendish, some pursuits of knowledge are potentially dangerous, and ought to be controlled” (“Margaret Cavendish's Nonfeminist Natural Philosophy” 222).
ment of herself in the text betrays her desire to have more control over herself as a woman and her career as a publishing writer. Such a desire on the part of Cavendish-the-author can only find satisfaction in the Duchess-the-character. Lacan writes, “the exchange that takes place between the subject's image and the image of the other in so far as it is libidinalised, narcissised, in the imaginary situation” (Seminar I 153). The Duchess constitutes Cavendish’s Other in the same manner as Lacan’s famous phrase, “Desire is the desire of the other.” Lacan also likens Freudian narcissism as the intersection of the human and animal world: “the Freudian notion of narcissism gives us a category which enables us to understand to what extent there is nonetheless a relation between the structuration of the animal world and that of the human world” (Seminar II 166).

CONCLUSION

Cavendish's The Blazing World resembles the most prominent utopian predecessors of More's Utopia and Bacon's New Atlantis in several ways. As in More's Utopia and Bacon's New Atlantis, Cavendish's society exists relatively self-sufficiently cut off from the rest of the world. Like More's Utopia, The Blazing World's native inhabitants essentially inherit their profession, and by implication, their role in the society. As do the European sailors who discover the utopian society in Bacon's New Atlantis, the Empress, the protagonist of The Blazing World, discovers the utopian society by accident. The details of the Empress's discovery, however, do not get any significant attention in Cavendish’s narrative. Also like More and Bacon, Cavendish divided her prose utopia into two clearly separated sections. And finally, Cavendish consciously follows the leads of More and Bacon by not definitively depicting her society as either a utopia or a dystopia.

179 Bronwen Price draws these same corollaries between Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis and The Blazing World by pointing out that they both appeared in print attached to a volume concerning natural philosophy, they both start with a sea voyage thrown off course by a storm, and they both rely on divine intervention to save the sailors” (“Journeys Beyond Frontiers: Knowledge, Subjectivity and Outer Space in Margaret Cavendish's the Blazing World (1666)” (131).
Cavendish ends *The Blazing World* concisely by stating, “my ambition is not onely to be Empress, but Authoress of a whole World” (250). Cavendish here must make a claim to her authority to authorize the society to hold the characteristics it does. Cavendish does seem concerned with the progress of governmental rule, particularly in light of Foucault’s notions of how such rule necessitates intrusive measures that enable absolute control. Cavendish paints a more positive picture of the possibilities of an ever-progressing societal model, but she does go through revisions to attain her perfect world. To Cavendish the ideal society appears in the distant horizon, to take place after much turmoil and strife. In a way Cavendish’s work acts as the conclusion of Francis Bacon’s unfinished *New Atlantis*, in that it addresses concerns that Bacon left untouched.
CHAPTER 5: HENRY NEVILLE'S *ISLE OF PINES* AND THE FOUR WIVES OF THE (REAL) APOCALYPSE

The pornography of violence of course far exceeds, in volume and general acceptance, sexual pornography, in this Puritan land of ours. Exploiting the apocalypse, selling the holocaust, is a pornography.

**Ursula K. Le Guin**

Henry Neville's 1668 text, the *Isle of Pines*, arguably the first truly dystopian English literary text, relates the story of five shipwreck survivors living on an uninhabited island who create a thriving society that ultimately implodes and falls into self-destruction. Although published in 1668, nearly twenty years after the bloody English Civil War (1642-1651), Neville's text represents a microcosm of Civil War England that paints a bleak picture of an island nation that begins as a paradise but eventually becomes a hell on Earth. The *Isle of Pines* presents a snapshot of England's return to the kind of widespread violence not seen in England since the middle ages. The *Isle of Pines* thus reflects the late seventeenth-century eschatological anxieties coming about from two political and cultural revolutions: the move to an English republic and beheading of Charles I, and the subsequent restoration of the monarchy with Charles II's ascension. Neville’s apocalyptic vision manifests through all aspects of the texts, from the complicated physical dissemination and bibliographical history to its allegorical and archetypal symbolism.

This chapter will contribute to the recent resurgence of critical attention afforded Neville’s *Isle of Pines* by employing the theories of Jacques Lacan, Foucault, Jameson, and Žižek and their interlocutors and respondents to, first, analyze the eschatological nature of all aspects of the text, and, second, to test these critical theories using Neville’s text to determine to what ex-
tent the *Isle of Pines* constitutes a truly “early modern” text. Through the motifs of miscegenation and isolation, Neville’s *Isle of Pines* shifts abruptly from sexual freedom into another impossible and unimaginable space of total destruction best understood in terms of Jacques Lacan’s notion of the Real.

Born the son of prominent Jacobean court politician Sir Henry Neville (d. 1629) and grandson of the prominent Elizabethan politician Sir Henry Neville I (1562-1615) in 1620, Henry Neville studied at Oxford but never graduated. Henry Neville’s primary profession lay not in politics, as he was a gentleman and an author first, but Neville’s political pedigree and biography naturally provide aid in close reading of the *Isle of Pines*; during the Interregnum, Neville published some (arguably) misogynist satires, including *The Parliament of Ladies*, and *The Ladies, a Second Time*, both in 1647. In 1649, during the English Civil War, Neville was elected to Parliament, and also served on the Council of State from 1650-1651 and in 1659. Upon his initial election to Parliament he almost immediately found himself at odds with Oliver Cromwell. Neville’s staunch republican views positioned him in opposition to monarchy, which he believed was akin to Cromwell’s authority despite Cromwell’s ostensible “republicanism.” Despite his support of republican interests against the Stuart monarch, Neville spent a short time imprisoned for treason after the Civil Wars. Neville spent the final years of his life writing and translating and died in 1694.

Neville appears prominently in J.G.A. Pocock’s *The Machiavellian Moment*, an influential political analysis of seventeenth-century England and Neville’s colleague and fellow republican utopia author, James Harrington. While political readings of the *Isle of Pines* exemplify

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180 James Turner writes of the “lewd ‘Parliament of Ladies’ (a favourite theme of the republican Henry Neville)” (800). As I mention below, some critics have labeled the *Isle of Pines* as misogynist.

181 Pocock refers to Neville as “Harrington’s friend and literary heir apparent” (420). Later in the *Machiavellian Moment*, Pocock even argues that “we have seen that Harrington’s thought [. . .] required the republic to locate it-
some of the newfound interest in Neville’s text, generic readings continue to attempt to situate the *Isle of Pines* into the familiar “utopia versus dystopia” conversation common in the criticism of many early modern prose texts depicting idealized societies. By reflecting anxieties of post-Civil War England and the coming fin de siècle, Neville’s *Isle of Pines* becomes the first truly dystopian text by depicting an apocalypse on a microcosmic scale that additionally points to a larger sense of English isolation and hopelessness. Neville published the *Isle of Pines* after returning from exile, and although it appears a brief and frivolous utopian text, the dystopic *Isle of Pines* acts as Neville's final comment on both the failure of the regicide and English republican cause as well the failure of the employment of print to disseminate and strengthen the ultimately failed attempt to transform England into a Republic.

**NEVILLE’S ISLE OF PINES: TEXTS, PARATEXTS, AND PRESENTATION**

The *Isle of Pines* came to readers through a complicated series of pamphlets. Through a framed narrative, the first pamphlet tells of the 1569 shipwreck of Englishman George Pine and four women, including the African slave Philipa, who establish a small thriving society on a pre-

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182 Critics have yet to come to a consensus as to the *Isle’s* genre. Peter Stillman, for instance, argues that the *Isle of Pines* represents at once a utopia, an arcadia, and a dystopia ("Monarchy, Disorder, and Politics in the *Isle of Pines.*" 147). Daniel Carey labels Neville’s text as emblematic of generic implications for travel literature, arguing that the *Isle of Pines* demonstrates “one of the major incentives for the composition of imaginary voyages, namely to venture into the terrain of fantasy, beyond the more constricting conventions of ‘authentic’ narrations of individual experience.” Daniel Carey also sees more than one genre present in Neville’s text, but sees the society as moving from a utopia to a dystopia: the “confused history of the island [. . .] veers [. . .] sharply and unexpectedly from a utopian condition to one of dystopian conflict” ("Travel and Sexual Fantasy in the Early Modern Period" 152, 206). Gaby Mahlberg writes of “Neville’s bogus travel narrative *The Isle of Pines*, which literary scholars have studied as a pre-cursor of the modern novel predating Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe*” (Henry Neville and English Republican Culture in the Seventeenth Century: Dreaming of Another Game 2). William Poole convincingly argues that Neville makes “an in-genre reference to the location of the skirmish” between the English and Spanish on a real Isle of Pines near Cuba. He also notes that Francis Godwin published his utopian *The Man in the Moone* in 1596, the year the skirmish took place (12-14). Felicity Nussbaum labels Neville’s text as a “popular erotic novella” (“The Other Woman: Polygamy, *Pamela*, and the Prerogative of Empire” 146).

viously uninhabited island. The pamphlet presents itself as a "true relation" told by George Pine himself and handed down to his son and then grandson and ultimately making its way into the hands of Dutch sailor Henry Cornelius Van Sloetten well into the seventeenth century when the population of the island numbers around 10,000. The Dutch sailor Van Sloetten finds the island and reports it in a letter to a friend (Abraham Keek) in London on July 22, 1668. Two short letters from Keek appear at the beginning of the “completed” edition of the text, one dated June 19, 1668, and the second dated July 6, 1668. The bulk of the actual narrative takes place in the letter written by van Sloetten. The final edition includes the four-part illustration. This fractured bibliographic history of the text should serve as a staple for any critical analysis of the Isle of Pines; it also makes the Isle of Pines, in essence, a “miscegenated” text that reflects the miscegenation between the African slave character, Philipa, and the white men on the island. Because the text appeared piecemeal before appearing as an entire text with an epistolary frame, Neville demonstrates his conscious imitation of Thomas More’s Utopia, a text with an epistolary frame, and for which the author wrote the second half before writing the first.

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184 Presenting the Isle of Pines as factual harkened back to sixteenth century prose fiction; according to C.S. Lewis, "the truth is that Elizabethan fiction points only rarely and uncertainly towards the novel properly so called. It appealed to rather different tastes and the eighteenth-century novelists had to make a new start [. . .] Often it contains matter that might well have been served as fiction: presumably the taste for confessed fiction was then (as it still is) rarer than the taste for sensational reading which claims to be 'news.' The lowest sort of reader wants to be assured [. . .] that what he reads is true” (394). John Scheckter also claims that travel literature encountered the same expectations: “Throughout the period, travel writing remains a necessarily fluid and unstable genre, making claims upon evidence that is impossible to verify away from the site” (78).

185 Daniel Carey argues that the physical dissemination of the text illustrates “the struggle that developed between the text’s author, its audience, and finally its subsequent editors and translators, demonstrates that genre represents a principle of order and control invoked in the case of ambiguous narratives, with forgery as a challenge to that principle of order” (“Henry Neville’s The Isle of Pines (1668): Travel, Forgery and the Problem of Genre” 23).

186 Kevin Sharpe and Steven Zwicker argue that “Any full history of the material book, of the marketplace and of the interpretive community in early modern England must address genre theory and history as the site of subtle and shifting negotiations between readers and authors” (10).
Critics have largely overlooked one of the more important bibliographic aspects of the text: the frontispiece illustration.\footnote{Nat Hardy is a notable exception. Hardy argues that the frontispiece for *The Isle of Pines* “ultimately expurgates the licentiousness of Pines and his coterie, not to mention the utopian island setting [and] prove subtle in interpretation and expurgatory in intention.” He goes on to say that the illustrations “remain unequivocally revisionist because they distort the story’s features. By eliminating nudity, sex, violence and utopian plenitude [. . .] Neville’s engraver sanitizes the tale, offering a sexually repressed and, consequently, more polite version reinterpreted through the title page’s four bowdlerized images. The title page of the 1668 edition of *The Isle of Pines* offers a misleadingly euphemistic rendering of what is, at its profane core, a violent and vulgar polygamous tale” (106). Nat Hardy makes astute assertions but fails to fully assess the various implications of the contents of the illustrations in his pursuit to label the text itself “vulgar.” Kevin Sharpe and Steven Zwicker claim that “All the paratextual matter of the early modern book was part of its design, in every sense of that word” (6).} The illustration itself [Figure 1] for the *Isle of Pines* suggests an apocalyptic environment on the island:

![Figure 5.1: Isle of Pines Frontispiece](image-url)
Figure 5.2: Isle of Pines Frontispiece

Top Left Detail

The illustration in the top left, entitled "How they were cast away" [Figure 2], depicts a rear view of George Pine’s ship as they find the island on which the survivors establish their society.

Figure 5.3: Isle of Pines Frontispiece

Top Right Detail

The illustration in the top right, entitled "gathering their shipwreck" [Figure 3], depicts the aftermath of the shipwreck as the survivors salvage anything they can from the ocean. Although they are still salvaging items from the ship, a tent appears in the top of the image. Both the top left and top right images depict a chronology that moves forward from the bottom of the image.
to the top of the image. This resembles the style of continuous narrative painting popular in the religious art of the Middle Ages, in which a single painting would depict an entire narrative from start to finish, and this creates the effect of the passing of time (nearly 100 years) that occurs in the narrative. The top images move from depicting the shipwreck to depicting a barren island, both rather dour circumstances.

![Figure 5.4: Isle of Pines Frontispiece](image)

*Bottom Left Detail*

The bottom two images do not use continuous narrative and focus merely on events in the second chronological half of the narrative. The bottom left image, entitled "Pine: Numbering his People" [Figure 4], depicts Pine bringing together all of his descendants before his death and dividing them into four tribes. On the right-hand side of the image stands an immense crowd constituting the now decades-old society. In the forefront of the image on the left stand George Pine and the four women survivors. The image depicts the African slave character as having no discernible facial features. The immense crowd of Pine’s offspring implies that such a massive population can coexist peacefully, both with regards to natural resources as well as the inevitable interpersonal conflict among the masses.
The image in the bottom right [Figure 5] depicts the Dutch sailor Van Sloetten landing on the island and meeting the grandson of George Pine. At this point the non-island inhabitants of the island outnumber the inhabitants, leaving George Pine’s grandson as the only inhabitant left on the island in the image. The apocalypse has thus come to fruition.

Possibly as a result of the relatively recent “Y2K” and 2012 apocalyptic anxieties, critical interest in the Isle of Pines has increased and suggests a progression towards greater literary respect for the text. Much of this criticism has focused on the sexuality depicted in the text, as much of the story narrates how the sole male survivor, George Pine, populates the island with the four women survivors. An early critic labeled the text as “pornography,” and, more recently, critics have addressed whether Neville truly represents a “misogynist.”189 Because the island society gets its very name from George Pine, critics have correctly established the presence of a

189 Owen Aldridge, 464. Amy Boesky actually refers to Neville as a “misogynist Republican” (5). Felicity Nussbaum sees a similar misogyny in the text, arguing that “race and class, subordinate to fulfilling the fantasy of male sexual desire and voyeurism, are erased as the sexually available women become interchangeable in the hero’s mind. These and other discourses of polygamy locate the libidinal energy needed to colonize the Other in the body of the woman” (81). Mihoko Suzuki, on the other hand, claims that arguments pointing out “Neville’s expression of flagrant misogyny” in his texts are incorrect and that these texts “acknowledge the reality of women’s political activity as well as include a counterdiscourse that gives voice to women’s own perspective” (154-5).
patriarchal power structure in the *Isle of Pines*. In addition to reflecting the problems with patriarchy and monarchy, the *Isle of Pines* reflects legal implications of building a society, leading some critics to read the text’s political implications from a legal perspective. But perhaps most importantly, the *Isle of Pines* demonstrates Neville’s deep commitment to republican ideals. The conflicting critical assessments of Neville’s text suggest that the *Isle of Pines* deserves its newly-found literary respect.

**Patriarchy and Race in the Isle of Pines**

The island discovered by Pine and the four women immediately foreshadows the destruction caused by the African slave woman from the “dark” continent. Once the framed narrative of Van Sloetten’s encounter with the inhabitants of the island ends, the narrative proper begins as Neville presents George Pine’s written history of the society that constitutes the remainder of the narrative. Pine’s history refers to the shipwrecked survivors as “uncertain in the night, not having the least benefit of the light, which we feared most, always wishing for day” (17), suggesting

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190 Seth Denbo argues that “in utilizing a setting which evoked the growing trade with Asia, Neville exploited interest in colonialism and exploration and provided a setting in which contemporary anxieties about patriarchy, kinship and sexuality could all be played out in an experimental setting” (149). Harold Weber similarly sees gendered implications in the *Isle of Pines*, arguing that the *Isle of Pines* is indicative of the public revelation concerning Charles II’s sexual dalliances and that it aims to create male sexual fantasies that provide a patriarchy that will keep women subordinate to men who “attempt to imagine and construct fantasies that secure their power over women” (195). Christine Rees argues that Neville’s text “fictionalizes an immensely influential principle in seventeenth-century political theory, the principle of patriarchy as the basis of society and government” (57). Gaby Mahlberg refers to the Isle as an “attack on political patriarchalism” (Henry Neville and English Republican Culture 109).

191 Stephanie Jones, for instance, reads the text legally, and points to “ethical and legal concerns embedded in the representation of a constitutional law” in the *Isle of Pines* (213). Similarly, Susan Wiseman argues that “Neville’s fictional patriarchal colony [takes] the reader from the family to the state in a demonstration that the authority of the father is not enough to rule alone, without law (149). Miguel Angel Ramiro Avilés also argues that Neville’s text demonstrates the need for extra-patriarchal power as it “describes the progress from an anomic ideal society (Naturalia) to a nomic ideal society (Utopia)” (232). Robert Appelbaum argues that the *Isle of Pines* demonstrates the “violent romance about the invention and inevitable breakdown of law and order” (197).

192 Amy Boesky argues that “The Isle must be read as a republican criticism of political patriarchalism in the face of England’s fiscal-military weakness and declining significance abroad, displayed in the recent Anglo-Dutch war, its weakness of government at home, displayed in repressive measures against political and religious dissent, and its growing dependence on France” (110). Gaby Mahlberg accurately situates Neville’s text within the context of the failed English Civil War: “it is necessary to re-emphasize the importance of republicanism and anti-patriarchalism and to establish *The Isle* firmly in this discursive context” (“Historical and Political Contexts of the *Isle of Pines*.” 113).

193 Adam Beach, for example, has discounted previous critical consensus that characterizes the *Isle of Pines* as frivolous pornography by labeling the work as a “profound vision of English weakness” (21).
an inherent fear of the darkness, literally within nature and symbolically of people. On a practical level, the five survivors of the shipwreck need daylight. When Pine first reveals the presence of a black survivor, he refers to the five survivors as “in all four persons, beside the negro” (18). The “negro” character, Philipa, serves as the site for much of the historical and symbolic meaning behind Neville’s text. In addition to appearing in the wake of the English Civil War, the Isle of Pines also appeared well into the violent Dutch-English competition for naval supremacy in exploration and colonization. The Isle of Pines presents a view of England through the eyes of the Dutch character Van Sloetten; the Dutch took advantage of the English Civil War to improve their position in the naval struggle for power and the slave trade, which began in the early sixteenth century and would not end until well into the eighteenth century.

Although the conflict over the slave trade reached its peak in the seventeenth century, many Englishmen and Europeans would have encountered dark-skinned people much earlier. Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus (first performed 1594) and Othello (first performed 1604) both contain characters of African descent, and these depictions engaged with popular sentiments about black people. The figuration of black people in English literature often merely reflected attitudes towards and stereotypes of black slaves, and, alternatively, fear and anxiety over aliens. Despite the prominence of negative stereotypes of Africans and associated hostility to-

194 Here and throughout I cite John Scheckter’s critical edition of the Isle of Pines in his Isle of Pines, 1668: Henry Neville’s Uncertain Utopia.
195 According to Gaby Mahlberg, “While the English had descended into political and economic insignificance, the Dutch had risen to become the new international sea and trading power in Europe. Neville blamed the inertia of the Restoration regime” (“An Island with Potential: Henry Neville’s The Isle of Pines” 63).
196 Pawel Rutkowski argues that through the framed narrative the story comes to English readers through the eyes of Dutch explorers who stumble upon George Pines’ society and see it as barbaric and technologically primitive (22).
197 John Rawley, 88.
198 According to James Walvin, “in talking about the Negro, the English began to look a little more critically at themselves” (The Black Presence: A Documentary History of the Negro in England, 1555-1860 34). David Dabydeen, points out that in English literature “black characters are seen from the outside and have no human complexity” (2). This is complicated by the publication of Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko, or The Royal Slave in 1688, as it depicts the titular character and his love, Imoinda, with very sophisticated human subjectivity. Shakespeare’s moorish characters in Titus Andronicus and Othello have of course received considerable scholarly attention, but, accord-
wards them, black people became common sights and at times even became status symbols during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\footnote{199}{James Walvin points out that black people “became everyday sights on the streets of London” during the Restoration (\textit{Black and White: The Negro and English Society, 1555-1945} 10). Amassing African slaves also became symbolic of naval superiority; James Rawley points out that black people in the early English slave trade “became a prize in international competition” (4). Peter Fryer similarly points out that “having a black slave or two in one’s household became a craze for all who could afford it” (14).} Notwithstanding this familiarity, the English would have still likely associated black people with the violent conflict with the Dutch.

Although Philipa serves as a convenient and obvious Other, Neville empowers Philipa by having her tribe instigate the insurrection on the island.\footnote{200}{Incidentally, the name “Philipa” had significance in British history, as Philipa of Lancaster was Queen consort of Portugal in a marriage that finalized a Portuguese-English alliance in the fifteenth century.} Unlike the other women survivors, however, Philipa does not have a surname, and essentially, as Gayarti Spivak would claim, Philipa has no voice: “If, in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow” (83).\footnote{201}{While Philipa is technically not “colonized” in the traditional sense as she is already a slave, Spivak is still relevant here in light of Philipa’s lack of history and demonization as the instigator of the society’s downfall.} Her offspring who form the tribe that destroys the society becomes known as Phills. But Philipa carries with her centuries of stereotypes of black sexuality.\footnote{202}{Amy Boesky argues that “Neville illuminates the classifications in \textit{The Isle of Pines} that most matter to him and to his culture, defining the English as masters and antagonists of a race they themselves have created” (144).} Cornell West argues that on the one hand, black sexuality among blacks simply does not include whites, nor does it make them a central point of existence. It proceeds as if whites do not exist, as if whites are invisible and simply don’t matter. This form of black sexuality puts black agency center stage with no white presence at all. This can be uncomfortable for white people accustomed to being the custodians of power. (125)

According to Gretchen Gerzina, representation of blacks merely served under the larger umbrella of a fear of aliens in early modern British society and culture: “this apparent xenophobia often had its origins in economic jealousy [of the British for Dutch control of the slave trade], but whatever its basis, the perception of strangers as different and of their presence as deleterious echoed through centuries of English history” (9). Daryl Palmer also subordinates race to a larger paradigm of differentiation, arguing that to discuss race in early modern England “is to talk not of skin color, but of intercultural contact and contacts, the cultivation of and exploitation of ethnic difference” (37).
West also points out that historically “black people [played] the role of the “other”—closer to nature (removed from intelligence and control) and more prone to be guided by base pleasures and biological impulses” (127). Indeed, seventeenth-century attitudes reinforce this; Robert Burton, for instance, claims that there is a “lust and jealousy [of Africans]” (264).

The English specifically harbored suspicion towards and negative attitudes about black women and their sexuality that predated the English slave trade by over one hundred years. Sexual power over the supposed site of authority, according to anthropologist Ann Stoler, reflected that “the assertion of European supremacy in terms of patriotic manhood and racial virility was not only an expression of imperial domination, but a defining feature of it” (16). Stoler also notes the role of concubinage and how the resulting mixed race offspring became threatening to any authority held by the father (51). Literary critic Kim Hall illustrates an intersection of gender, race, and authority, arguing that representations of black women in early modern visual art created “expectations that women are only valuable and visible as domesticated in the service of the state” (“Object into Object? Some Thoughts on the Presence of Black Women in Early Modern Culture” 366). The frontispiece of the *Isle of Pines* does depict Philipa without facial features, suggesting a subordinate role to the white people on the island who do have such features. Hall defines the threat of blackness as “signs of disorder [that prepare] Europe’s ordering and later exploitation of Africa’s human and natural resources” and that “blackness begins to represent the destructive potential of strangeness, disorder, and variety, particularly when intertwined with the familiar, and familiarly threatening, unruliness of gender” (*Things of Darkness:*

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203 According to David Bindman, “It is a fantasy not only of black character but also of blackness itself that gives a distinctively English literary flavor to their representations” (240)

204 James Walvin argues that during the early days of the slave trade, the British “embarked on long, convoluted, conscience-stricken, justifications for the treatment meted out to the slaves” and that “once the African was divested of his humanity, his role within the imperial economic framework seemed clear and comprehensible” (*The Black Presence: A Documentary History of the Negro in England, 1555-1860* 11-2).
Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England 28). The Isle of Pines reflects this notion of familiar and threatening. Hall also argues that the relationship between political “competition and erotic danger is similar to that found in the travel narrative in which black women may represent the possibility of conquest and enrichment as well as the threat of potential destruction” (Darkness 65). Black women thus found themselves portrayed as merely the trophies of imperialist venture in addition to being depicted as less than human. 205 According to Franz Fanon, in colonialism, “Individualism is the first to disappear. The native intellectual had learnt from his masters that the individual ought to express himself fully. The colonialist bourgeoisie had hammered into the native's mind the idea of a society of individuals where each person shuts himself up in his own subjectivity, and whose only wealth is individual thought” (47). In the Isle of Pines Philipa serves as not only the site of Pine’s literal sexual conquest, but also as the threat of potential destruction. Neville’s depiction of the African Philipa indeed reflects the fear of destruction caused by an Other.

In the “dark” skinned character Philipa, Neville provides a perfectly tangible “Other” to serve as the site both for defining the white characters as well for Neville’s warning about the dangers of pursuing domination of the slave trade over the Dutch. An “Other,” of course, frequently allows a group to form a community around merely being different from this “Other,” and such formation of community pervaded the early modern period. 206 According to Žižek, “The reference to the established set of norms is thus simultaneously the condition of possibility

205 Sue Niebrzydowski argues that “the bodies and behaviors of black women were the site for a definition of gender and racial otherness” over a century before the slave trade began (187). Joyce MacDonald points out a particular prejudice towards black women, arguing that “black women have been relentlessly marginalized and exoticized by the discourses of dominant racial and sexual cultures, their bodies employed as ideological and representational tokens, anatomized, dismembered, repressed” (14).

206 Jonathan Dollimore argues that the “combined emphasis on universal interests, society as a 'reflection' of the 'natural' order of things, history as a 'lawful' development leading up to and justifying the present, the demonizing of dissent and otherness, was central to the age of Shakespeare” (7). Dollimore here argues that an essentialist and collective mentality existed in the early modern period simply because of a readily available “Other,” that acted as the impetus for the formation of the collective identity.
and the condition of impossibility of ethical engagement; [and] this normative dimension [. . .] always already somehow betrays the Otherness from which every ethical call/injunction emanates” (Parallax 87). In an inversion of his Lacanian Hegelianism, Žižek here argues that “the Other is the desire of the desire” in the sense that collective white, identity relies on having this “Other” while it wishes simultaneously not to have the various threats associated with the Other; in the case of the Isle of Pines, the English differ in appearance from this Other, whether of African descent, European descent, or simply non-English descent. Lacan also necessitates the Other for individuation: “And in so far as we are the subject who thinks, we are implicated in a quite different way, in as much as we depend on the field of the Other, which was there long before we came into the world, and whose circulating structures determine us as subjects” (The Four Fundamentals of Psycho-Analysis 246). In the Isle of Pines, the five survivors shed their previous subjectivity from civilization (the Symbolic order) and find a new subjectivity in the Real.

In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault argues that “an identical nature is the condition for an individual to know what he is” (69); on the Isle of Pines, Philipa will never know this kind of reflective subjectivity as the island has no other African survivors. Even Philipa’s children can only be at most half black and half white, and subsequent generations will depict an even further dissolution of Philipa’s African heritage. African historian Chancellor Williams argues that there has been “a scheme of weakening the Blacks by turning their half-white brothers against them” and that in the ancient world “white Asians were generally very proud of their sons by black women. But these black mothers remained slaves, while their mulatto sons and daughters were born free and, moreover, classified as ‘white’” (61). Through his introduction of

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207 According to Patrick Wolfe, “Black people’s enslavement produced an inclusive taxonomy that automatically enslaved the offspring of a slave and any other parent. In the wake of slavery, this taxonomy became fully racialized in the ‘one-drop rule’ whereby any amount of African ancestry, no matter how remote, and regardless of phenotypical appearance makes a person Black” (387-8).
miscegenation into the *Isle of Pines*, Neville in effect forces an otherwise impossible sexual pairing of a white man and a black woman, the offspring of which cause the downfall of the society. Lacan argues that the infant’s initial encounter with his mirror image “reveals both a libidinal dynamism that has hitherto remained problematic and an ontological structure of the human world that fits in with my reflections on paranoiac knowledge.” Lacan also argues that this crucial moment of unconscious individuation “symbolizes the I’s mental permanence, at the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination” (“The Mirror State as formative of the *I* Function” 77). For Lacan, even seeing an image of oneself still leads to alienation. Philipa will never see such a reflection among her peers, and as such, arrives at this site of alienation much sooner than had another African been on the island. According to Fanon, “The native’s muscular tension finds outlet regularly in bloodthirsty explosions—in tribal warfare, in feuds between sects, and in quarrels between individuals” (54). The tribal structure George Pine creates becomes the site for this kind of “quarrel” in Fanon’s sense.

In the early modern period skin color served as one of the means by which early moderns viewed their own status and the status of others. The association of the concept of “darkness” with “badness” had a long tradition in the early modern period, and in his 1651 utopian political treatise *Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, for instance, Thomas Hobbes warns of the dangers coming about from the misuse of religion in a section entitled “Kingdome of Darkness.” In this final section, Hobbes points out the dangers of misuse of scripture and the comingling of idolatry with “pure” Christianity. This “darkness” thus results in a distilled and bastardized version of Christianity, or in the context of the *Isle of Pines*, a miscegenation of Christianity. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes equates darkness with

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208 Anu Korhonen succinctly summarizes the early modern attitude about skin color by stating that “skin colour could act to define the borders of civility and barbarism” (95).
abject evil and blasphemy: “The Darkest part of the Kingdom of Satan, is that which is without the Church of God; that is to say, amongst them that believe not in Jesus Christ” (628). Later in this section, itself entitled simply, “Of Darknesse,” Hobbes uses “darkness” to describe the central thesis of *Leviathan*, arguing that, “power Regal under Christ, being challenged, universally by the Pope, and in particular under the Common-wealths by Assemblies of the Pastors [. . .] comes to be so passionately disputed, that it putteth out the Light of Nature, and causeth so great a Darknesse in men’s understanding, that they see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience” (630). As such, “darkness” had already taken on a negative connotation in the context of politics in the most famous political treatise of seventeenth-century England.

**RELIGION IN THE ISLE OF PINES**

Neville’s fictive society begins utopian and ends apocalyptic with destruction that does not eradicate all life and does not completely end the society but merely changes it for the worse.209 Jameson argues that utopia conceptually contains a similar contradiction: “in Utopia the ruse of representation whereby the Utopian impulse colonizes purely private fantasy spaces is by definition undone and socialized by their very realization” (230). Neville’s utopia does precisely this: the situation allows for the colonization of private fantasies and the resulting destruction results from the realization of these private fantasies. The juxtaposition of both an idealized society and mass destruction resembles the antinomy of the second coming of Christ; his appearance comes with much anticipation and preparation by devout Christians, but it also brings with it total destruction.

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209 Daniel Carey has taken up this change from utopia to apocalypse in "Henry Neville's the *Isle of Pines*: From Sexual Utopia to Political Dystopia." Utopia also has inherent traits that suggest apocalypse; as Amy Boesky argues that the *Isle of Pines* demonstrates "utopias reliance on spectacle of violence that foretells its own dystopic conclusion. The more rigidly the Pines struggle to master their island, the further from utopia it recedes." (161).
As in many other early modern texts, references to God and the Bible appear frequently in the *Isle of Pines*. Early in the narrative, Pine tells us that “Departing from thence we were encountred with a violent storm, and the winds holding contrary, for the space of a fortnight, brought us back almost as far as the Isle Del Principe; during which time many of our men fell sick, and some dyed, but at the end of that time it pleased God the wind favoured us again” (14). Pine thinks the shipwreck is divine providence: “we then set our faces for the Cape of Good Hope, where by Gods blessing after some sickness, whereof some of our company died, though none of our family; and hitherto we had met with none but calm weather, yet so it pleased God” (17). Despite this catastrophic event, Pine never loses faith in God: “but God was pleased to spare our lives, as it were by miracle” (17). Even after the shipwreck, Pine still has faith: “we had greatest reason to fear, was to be starved to death for want of Food, but God had otherwise provided for us, as you shall know hereafter” (18). Pine also holds onto the possibility for rescue with God, saying that rescue would come “if it pleased God to send any Ship that way” (19).

When the procreation begins, Pine once again gives “blessing [to] God for his Providence and goodness” (21) after “thus praying God to multiply them” (21). Pine also mentions that he has a Bible that survived the shipwreck and that early strife on the island before the full insurrection came about from the “neglect of hearing the Bible read” (22). When the island creates a “constitution,” the Bible plays a prominent role: “who should be absent from the monethly assembly to hear the Bible read, without sufficient cause shown to the contrary, should for the first default be kept without any victuals or drink, for the space of four days, and if he offend therein again, then to suffer death” (23). This stands in stark contrast to the apparent sexual anarchy that characterizes the day-to-day activities of the inhabitants of the island. In addition, the inhabitants of the island may never adhere to the constitution, or never had any intention of adhering to it in the
first place. In Lacan’s order of the Real, the law and structure associated with the Symbolic order collapse, and for Lacan, religion and spiritual space appear in the Real: “the gods belong to the field of the real” (*The Four Fundamentals of Psycho-Analysis* 45).

Giving George Pine four wives to populate the island overtly calls to mind the four matriarchs of Judaism (Sarah, Rebecca, Leah, and Rachel); before his death Pine divides the offspring into four distinct tribes named after the original matriarch: the English, the Sparks, the Trevors and the Phi1s. The bottom left panel of the frontispiece illustration depicts this scene:

![Figure 5.6: Isle of Pines Frontispiece](image)

**Figure 5.6: Isle of Pines Frontispiece**

**Bottom Left Detail**

A much more ominous implication of the title of the lower left pane of the frontispiece lies in its almost certain allusion to the Biblical parable of King David “numbering” his people in a great census in 1 Chronicles 21:1: “And Satan stoode vp against Israel, and prouoked Dauid to number Israel.” In the 1611 King James Bible, this represents the first appearance of the name of “Satan.” The Second Book of Samuel also relates the story of King David ordering Joab to perform the census: “For the king said to Ioab the captaine of the hoste, which was with him, Goe now through all the tribes of Israel, from Dan euen to Beer-sheba, and number ye the people, that I may know the number of the people” (2 Samuel 24:2). But Joab did not want to complete the census as “numbering the people” constituted a sin against God in its pursuit of greatness.
through knowledge of something only God would know (the total count of the population). Joab here also calls to mind the Jewish character in Bacon’s *New Atlantis*, Joabin, who relates to the Spanish sailors the marital and domestic practices in Bensalem. Although Bensalem’s strictly monogamous family customs stand in stark contrast to what happens on the Isle of Pines, Bensalem does allow engaged couples to see each other naked before the wedding in “Adam and Eve’s pools” to make sure they want to go through with the marriage. Neville likely intends this intertextuality to situate his *Isle of Pines* in the tradition of English utopian literature. But the choice to illustrate this specific scene, which takes place soon before the island’s civil war, places Neville’s Biblical reference here closer to apocalyptic chaos.

Pine’s four wives also suggest an allusion to the four horsemen of the apocalypse that appear in Revelations. The Book of Revelations describes the appearance of a red, a white, a black, and a pale horse. Death sits on the pale horse, not on the black horse:

2. And I saw, and behold, a white horse, and hee that sate on him had a bowe, and a crowne was giuen unto him, and hee went foorth conquering, and to conquere.
3. And when hee had opened the second seale, I heard the second beast say, Come and see. 4. And there went out another horse that was red: and power was giuen to him that sate thereon to take peace from the earth, and that they should kill one another: and there was giuen unto him a great sword. 5. And when hee had opened the third seale, I heard the third beast say, Come and see. And I beheld, and loe, a black horse: and he that sate on him had a paire of balances in his hand. 6. And I heard a voice in the midst of the foure beasts say, A measure of wheate for a penie, and three measures of barley for a penie, and see thou hurt not the oyle and the wine. 7. And when hee had opened the fourth seale, I heard the
voice of the fourth beast say, Come and see. 8. And I looked, and behold a pale horse, & his name that sate on him was Death, and Hell followed with him; and power was giuen vnto them, ouer the fourth part of the earth, to kill with sword, & with hunger, and with death, and with the beastes of the earth. (6: 2-8)

Pale and white horses announce the apocalypse along with a black horse, and killing with hunger suggests a slow death for humanity. In Revelations, the black and white horses work together to instigate the end of the world in the same way as the tribe of Pine’s biracial offspring lead to the destruction of the society.

Neville makes a Biblical allusion through an English-speaking Dutch character named Jeremiah Hanzen who marvels that English-speakers simultaneously run around naked.²¹⁰ Ironically, the Biblical Jeremiah replies to God when called upon to warn Jerusalem, “Ah, Lord God! behold, I cannot speak: for I am a child” (Jeremiah 1:6). Jeremiah, the Biblical prophet who warned his contemporaries of apocalyptic destruction in of the Books Jeremiah and Lamentations, states that, “Then the LORD said unto me, Out of the north an evil shall break forth upon all the inhabitants of the land. For, lo, I will call all the families of the kingdoms of the north, saith the LORD; and they shall come, and they shall set every one his throne at the entering of the gates of Jerusalem, and against all the walls thereof round about, and against all the cities of Judah” (Jeremiah 1:14-15). The Biblical Jeremiah lends his name to the literary genre of “Jeremiad,” a harsh critique of society and prediction of the society’s downfall.²¹¹ Neville’s inclusion of this

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²¹⁰ John Scheckter finds cultural exchange implications in the Neville’s text: “In problematizing language, for example, the text emphasizes the questions of dissemination and reception,–perhaps, unresolvable—that already influence European transactions. In Neville’s estimation, the persistent difficulty of translation serves as a better model of social communication than the celebrated cohesion of a group through shared language” (137).

²¹¹ For a detailed analysis of the development of the Jeremiad, see Bercovitch, 31-61.
name, one of the few proper names provided in the *Isle of Pines*, serves as Neville’s warning to English society and politics.\(^{212}\)

Although it deals significantly less with society and politics, the *Isle of Pines* acts as a second bookend to Francis Bacon’s utopia, the *New Atlantis*, and Neville certainly would have had familiarity with Bacon’s text. The fictive society depicted in the *New Atlantis*, Bensalem, located its seat of governmental and scientific control in the House of Salomon. Named after the Biblical character often labeled as “wise,” the House of Salomon serves as the center of the society that both keeps close watch on the Bensalemites and keeps control over the extensive scientific research activities on the island. The Biblical Solomon became famous for having numerous wives and concubines, including the Queen of Sheba, likely a dark-skinned African. Neville likely meant for the polygamous marital situation that begins the society on the Isle of Pines to refer, among other things, to the dangers of breaking the rules of the family unit. Particularly because the African slave woman’s offspring initiates the civil war that destroys the society, Neville portrays the dangers of miscegenation.

**TECHNOLOGY IN THE ISLE OF PINES**

The survivors of the shipwreck would have needed to learn how to use nature for agriculture to survive.\(^{213}\) Although agricultural tools long served as the initial sites for technological innovation, by the early modern period, weapons increasingly became a site for technological advances as well; as Hannah Arendt argues, “the revolution of technology, a revolution in tool-making, was especially marked in warfare” (4). Martin Heidegger sees technology as an enslav-

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\(^{212}\) Republican ideals had a strong basis in Christianity. According to Christopher D’Addario, “Milton, Henry Neville and Algernon Sidney derived their faith in a republican form of government from their conviction that the English people, schooled in civic virtue, could develop the ideal form of government” (98).

\(^{213}\) But, as J.C. Davis notes of Neville’s text within the larger context of utopia as a genre, “When nature’s bounty is insufficient or when men abandon moderation, arcadia is unattainable and those in search of social perfection must seek other means” (26).
er, arguing in his “The Question Concerning Technology,” that man’s relationship with technology must include a Master/Slave dynamic. Otherwise, he argues,

we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we merely conceive and push forward the technological, put up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral. (4)\textsuperscript{214}

Northrop Frye argues that “the demonic divine world largely personifies the vast, menacing stupid powers of nature as they appear to a technologically undeveloped society” (147). The survivors on the Isle of Pines build a society with seventeenth-century experience but also without any seventeenth-century technology. But Frye’s notion of the “demonic divine” on the Isle of Pines resides with the African slave woman Philipa and her offspring who instigate the civil war. Philipa, along with the other four surviving women, become literal “baby machines” who mechanistically and repetitively produce new island inhabitants, one fourth of whom lead the insurrection that destroys the society.

Upon discovering the Isle of Pines, Van Sloetten gives the inhabitants of the island weapons in the form of “some few knives (of which we thought they had great need), [and] an axe or hatchet to fell wood (which was very acceptable unto him)” (16). While Van Sloetten thinks these implements necessary, it becomes apparent that this encounter with an outsider aids in bringing about the downfall of the society. This foreign visitor cannot understand how a society could subsist without tools to use for hunting and killing wild animals in light of the presence of indigenous animals on the island, and the text never establishes how the island’s inhabitants

\textsuperscript{214} Christopher Kendrick takes this argument further within the context of technology in utopia, arguing that the true utopia is inherently “nontechnological” (289), and, by definition, implies that technological advances lead societies towards dystopia.
feed themselves. Through Van Sloetten’s account, Neville leads the reader to perceive the island society as a truly prelapsarian utopia, a place without technology, and by association, without weapons and violence. Chronologically, after receiving the tools and weapons from Van Sloetten, the society devolves into anarchy.

**ISOLATION IN THE ISLE OF PINES**

The island that the survivors discover contains no inhabitants, making for much more of an immediate sense of seclusion for the characters in the narrative, from George Pine’s isolation as the only man on the island, to Philipa as the only slave woman and survivor of African descent. Such a sense of isolation became integral to the Renaissance, or “early modern” period. According to Erich Fromm, in the Renaissance, “the individual was left alone; everything depended on his own effort, not on the security of his traditional status,” or his profession (Escape from Freedom 250). Similarly to Fromm, Jacob Burckhardt argues that the early modern republics of Venice and Florence relied upon a healthy amount of isolationism: “The keynote of the Venetian character was, consequently, a spirit of proud and contemptuous isolation, which, joined to the hatred felt for the city by the other States of Italy, gave rise to a strong sense of solidarity within.” Burckhardt also argues that community brings weakness: “The inhabitants meanwhile were united by the most powerful ties of interest in dealing both with the colonies and with the possessions on the mainland, forcing the population of the latter, that is, of all the towns up to Bergamo, to buy and sell in Venice alone” (49). The *Isle of Pines* thus puts to rest the humanist optimism in “Renaissance man’s” ability to progress through study and contemplation, as the prelapsarian environment George Pine and his companions discover fails to result in

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215 John Scheckter locates the isolation in the *Isle of Pines* within the context of the English Civil War: Neville “wrote *The Isle of Pines*, a displaced tale of individuals who survive the collapse of their society, who in isolation and with only the tools at hand must build anew whatever will be the rest of their lives” (xvii)
anything resembling a new Eden as the narrative merely reinforces the destructiveness of humanity.

The framed narrative in Neville’s text foreshadows this destruction by presenting Cornelius Van Sloetten’s encounter with the inhabitants of the island long after they have established the society and while it still flourishes. George Pine first finds the Isle of Pines after more than one storm: “sixteen days together did this storm continue, though not with such violence as the first” (14). Neville foreshadows the text’s revelation of sexual freedom when Van Sloetten sees “several persons promiscuously running around about the shore”; while this does not necessarily suggest sexual promiscuity, it foreshadows the indiscriminate procreation that eventually populates the island. Van Sloetten also relates Jeremiah’s confusion about how English-speakers could “go naked” (15).

Jacques Lacan argues that indoctrination into the Symbolic system of language in essence denaturalizes the human subject. According to Adrian Johnston, Lacan repeatedly emphasizes that the big Other, as a non-natural symbolic order, precedes the birth of the individual, preparing in advance a place for him or her in a system obeying rules other than the laws of nature. Thanks to these representational mediators and their central role in the processes of subjectification, the Lacanian subject exists as a (non-)being alienated from its corporeal-material substratum. (34)

At this point in the narrative, Pine and his descendants’ regression from “civilized” standards should leave the reader dumbstruck. Also during this part of the narrative the reader learns that on the island “prince and peasant here far[el] alike,” suggesting universal equality serves as the foundation of the society. According to Foucault, “man is to population what the subject of right

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216 Jina Politi argues that the *Isle of Pines* can be seen as a “shipwrecked” narrative that “miraculously cross[es] the divide into parody, there to discover [the] terra-incognita of ‘natural’ man” (115).
was to the sovereign” (Security, Territory, and Population 79). George Pine left Elizabethan England with a Virgin Queen and significant literary output that contributed to the Elizabeth’s image as mother of her country. On the Isle of Pines, mankind is truly subject(ed) to the limits and dangers of a multi-faction system of tribes.

In his encyclopedic treatise The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), Robert Burton rightly sees paranoia as a sign of psychological illness: “fear sadness, suspicion” are all symptomatic of melancholic illness. George Pine’s initial encounter with the environment of the island suggests this type of melancholic experience. Pine expresses the fear the survivors had of impending doom from the wild animals they assumed inhabited the island: “I looked out a convenient place to dwell in, that we might build us a hut to shelter us from the weather, and from any other danger of annoyance from wild beasts, if any should find us out” (196). While the need for shelter does not necessarily denote paranoia or suspicion, Pine’s fear that “wild beasts [. . .] should find us out” suggests an unrealistic attribution to wildlife as doing anything than normal hunting and surviving. Pine in a way feels as if nature and the environment perform surveillance on the five survivors who stand in the complete mercy of the island. According to Lacan, “the delusion of persecution is quite different and manifests itself through interpretive intuitions in the real” (Seminar III 46). This stands in stark contrast to Bensalem, Francis Bacon’s fictive society in the New Atlantis. Bensalem seeks to control nature and the environment through science and seeks to keep a close eye on the activities of the island’s inhabitants through its centralized scientific and political seat of power, the House of Salomon. But in Neville’s utopia, nature still dominates man in the sense of Frankfurt School psychologist Erich Fromm’s claim that modern man is "a part of nature, and yet to transcend it" (32). The society on the Isle of Pines ultimately re-
gresses and behaves like a pre-historic, “uncivilized” tribal community, and the regression proceeds completely into the tribal warfare that destroys the society.

Burton also describes the relationship between the body and mind of the individual with that of the state in the same way as would the frontispiece for Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan* a few decades later; Burton writes, “the state was like a sick body which had lately taken physic, whose humours are not yet well settled, and weakened so much by purging, that nothing was left by melancholy” (81). The psychologically unhealthy state begets psychologically unhealthy men and vice versa; melancholy such as this can lead to the downfall of the state, presumably through violence or revolution. Žižek argues that the individual’s psychological “admiration for the Revolution in its utopian enthusiastic aspect goes hand in hand with the conservative melancholic insight that enthusiasm inevitably turns into its opposite, into the worst terror, the moment we endeavor to transpose it into the positive structuring principle of social reality” (*Ticklish Subject* 153). Žižek draws a distinctive line between revolution as a progressive impulse within the minds of those wanting the revolution and the “social reality” of what happens once the violence and carnage begins.

Like Hobbes, Burton describes a metaphorical relationship between sovereign body and the popular body of the governed. The body politic of monarchs in the early modern period frequently took the on the characteristics of the state over which they governed. Following Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics*, Burton labels intemperance as the ill “that pulls so many several incurable disease upon our heads, that hastens old age, perverts our temperature, and brings upon us sudden death” (136). Burton goes on to argue that lack of temperance leads to “headstrong passions, violent perturbations of the mind; and many times vicious habits, customs, feral diseases; because we give so much to your appetite, and follow our inclination, like so many beasts”
(169). For Burton, then, only temperance prevents men from becoming beasts; Burton also argues that destructive melancholy comes about from covetousness when a person “complains of want, a second of servitude [. . .] unfortunate marriage, single life, too many children, no children” (279). The social arrangements on the island inherently make for inevitable strife and turmoil resulting from polygamous sexual arrangements. Lacan says of the Real: “It is to describe that which is lacking in the symbolic order, the ineliminable residue of all articulation, the foreclosed element, which may be approached, but never grasped: the umbilical cord of the symbolic” (*The Four Fundamentals of Psycho-Analysis* 280). Robert Burton argues that the family unit represents the microcosmic symbol for the state: “From commonwealths and cities I will descend to families, which have as many corrosives and molestations, as frequent discontents as the rest. Great affinity there is betwixt a political and economical body; they differ only in magnitude and proportion of business” (107). By economical body, Burton here refers to temperance as a virtue that leads to political stability. But the Isle of Pines demonstrates anything but temperance in its rampant procreation and inevitable incestual births, both of which contribute to the downfall of the society.

Cicero also conceives of temperance as essential for the health of a society, writing in his *Republic*, “As for the souls who devote themselves to bodily pleasures and become, so to speak, their willing slaves, and are impelled by the lusts that serve pleasure to violate the laws of gods and men—those souls, on escaping from their bodies, swirl around, close to the earth itself, and they do not return to this place until they have been buffeted about for many ages” (94). Neville would have also likely had familiarity with English diplomat Thomas Smith’s *De Republica Anglorum; the Manner of Government or Policie of the Realme of England* (first published in 1583). In this text, Smith claims that the formation of a commonwealth depends upon turning
one supporter into a few and then the few into many: “Whereupon necessarily it came to passé that the common wealth must turne and alter as before from one to a few, so now from a few to many and the most part, ech of these yet willing to save the politicke bodie” (27); Pine himself does precisely this through literal procreation of eventual subjects on his island society. Smith also sees temperance as necessary to the health of a commonwealth: “there is the greatest modestie and temperance” among the leaders of the society he describes (55). The Isle of Pines reflects anything but temperance, both sexually, and, ultimately, socially. The anti-Stuart republican Neville would certainly have had familiarity with Burton’s, Cicero’s and Smith’s texts, all of which were widely read in the seventeenth century. In Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy, Cicero’s Republic, and Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum, temperance plays a primary role in establishing and maintaining order in society. The society in the Isle of Pines in no way demonstrates temperance, and this lack of temperance leads to the downfall of the society of Pines.

Completely separated from any notion of “civilization,” George Pine’s society appears as a paradise before Van Sloetten arrives. Pine’s account of the early stages of the development of his society relates that “as to food we wanted nothing. And thus, and by such like helps, we continued six months, without any disturbance or want” (19). The inhabitants at this point do not need food or shelter, and enjoy freedom to engage in significant sexual activity. In her interrogation of Foucault’s displacement of Jacques Lacan as the preeminent French psychoanalytic critic, Joan Copjec argues that "loss does not construct a subject who simply and unequivocally has a desire, but one who rejects its desire, wants not to desire it. The subject is thus conceived as split from its desire, and desire itself is conceived as something--precisely--unrealized; it does not actualize what the law makes possible" (25). Reading Copjec’s argument next to Neville’s text, law here contrasts with nature and the natural order. The survivors do not have any base needs,
and thus do not have “desire” in the physiological sense that they literally do not know what constitutes physiological want or desire. In Lacan, desire represents neither sexual nor physiological want or lack, but something much more complicated; for Lacan, desire “is the desire of the Other,” i.e., it does not constitute a true end in itself, in the sense that desire seeks that which the subject really does not want (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis 115). Lacan goes on to define desire as “situated in dependence on demand—which, by being articulated in signifiers, leaves a metonymic remainder that runs under it, an element that is not indeterminate, which is a condition both, absolute, and unapprehensible, an element necessarily lacking, unsatisfied, impossible, misconstrued [. . .] an element that is called desire” (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis 154). Copjec expands on this notion of desire’s impossibility, arguing, "The subject is the effect of the impossibility of seeing what is lacking in the representation, what the subject, therefore, wants to see" (35). True subjectivity for Copjec comes with a rationalization of optimistic (perhaps hopeful) thinking, an acceptance of reality and the limits of a given situation. The survivors on the island have accepted the limits of their situation and thus have accepted the impossibility of rescue, the greatest want of a shipwrecked survivor on a desert island. Thus, the rejection of the desire for rescue becomes the very mechanism by which the survivors meet the desires for food, shelter and, ultimately, sex and procreation. As in Lacan’s assertion that “desire is the desire of the Other,” the survivors and their offspring literally “desire” rescue, which would end the (presumably) enjoyable sexual anarchy on the island. They do not really desire rescue in the same way they really do not want to remain stranded on the island. These literal, visceral desires become inscribed on the sexuated bodies of the procreating islanders in the form of this double bind of conflicting desires of the Other. When Copjec later argues that, "Between the subject and the real, civilization--the social order-is interposed" (40),
she gets to the heart of what happens in every desert island utopia and dystopia: the subject finds
his own subjectivity through the very acceptance of a fantastical or impossible situation that can-
cels the social order he previously knew and unconsciously recreates a collective social order
that elsewhere is simply impossible. The survivors on the Isle of Pines break from their “civi-
lized” ideology only from necessity and because of their physical and psychological separation
and isolation from their former lives. In his essay, “Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heteroto-
pias,” Foucault claims that, “in so-called primitive societies, there is a certain kind of heterotopia
which I would describe as that of crisis; it comprises privileged or sacred or forbidden places that
are reserved for the individual who finds himself in a state of crisis with respect to the society or
the environment in which he lives; adolescents, women during their menstrual period or in labor,
the old, etc.” (26). For Foucault, then, community and collective consciousness can come about
from the group’s immersion into a traumatic crisis, and thus introduction into the impossible,
and, in Lacanian terms, the Real: “the impossible is not necessarily the contrary of the possible,
or, since the opposite of the possible is certainly the real, we would be lead to define the real as
the impossible” (The Four Fundamentals of Psycho-Analysis 167).

Elsewhere, Lacan argues for a stronger pull of desire in the subject: “Only the presence of
the desiring and the sexually desiring, subject, brings us that dimension of natural metaphor from
which the supposed identity of perception is decided” (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psy-
cho-Analysis 154). Through this perspective, we see that the survivors on the Isle of Pines have
experienced a trauma by being thrust into an environment that immediately undermines and can-
cels all social norms and expectations before any of the procreation or destruction has occurred
in the narrative. For Lacan this “trauma” is constituted by the Real: “The function [of] the real
as encounter—the encounter in so far as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the missed
encounter—first presented itself in the history of psycho-analysis in a form that was in itself already enough to arouse our attention, that of the trauma” (The Four Fundamentals of Psycho-Analysis 55). But Lacan also locates fantasy within the Real:

The place of the real, which stretches from the trauma to the phantasy—in so far as the phantasy is never anything more than the screen that conceals something quite primary, something determinant in the function of repetition—this is what we must now examine. This, indeed, is what, for us, explains both the ambiguity of the function of awakening and of the function of the real in this awakening. (The Four Fundamentals of Psycho-Analysis 6)

The five survivors of the shipwreck have not encountered a “traumatic” experience inside the Real; they soon encounter a true “fantasy” completely unimaginable in their former lives in the “civilized” world. By association, Lacan’s notion of fantasy equates with the impossible: “This method would bring us here to the question of the possible, and the impossible is not necessarily the contrary of the possible, or, since the opposite of the possible is certainly the real, we would be lead to define the real as the impossible” (The Four Fundamentals of Psycho-Analysis 167).

While surviving a shipwreck is not impossible, the founding of a thriving society from the offspring of only five people seems unlikely at best. And the sexual anarchy that results in the creation of this society is certainly impossible, at least in the survivors’ former lives in the “civilized” world.

In the civilized world from which the survivors become separated, social norms serve as a psychological prison that plays a key role in establishing subjectivity. In their examination of Žižek’s model of ideology and its relationship to the body, Fabio Vighi and Heiko Feldner read Foucault’s notion of biopower thus:
The ‘disciplines of the body’ on the one hand, and the ‘regulation of the population’ on the other, combined to form the ‘two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed’ (ibid.). This bipolar conception of biopower – ‘anatomic and biological, individualizing and specifying, directed towards the performances of the body, with attention to the processes of life’ (ibid.) – thus integrated the microphysics of disciplinary power, which Foucault had elaborated in *Discipline and Punish*, into a complex model of power which now extended to the level of macro-sociology. (81)

In other words, individual psychological control originating from the outside works in tandem with the “regulation of population” that comes from the inner psychology of individuals subjected to “disciplines of the body”; this partnership creates the site for the state to impose and inscribe literal and symbolic markings of power. Either way the subject is himself subjected to this source of power, either from a literal oppressor or from an internal sense of ethics or morality; subjectivity thus comes from the outside no matter what. Žižek argues that in the Hegelian subject “external circumstances are not an impediment to realizing potentials, but on the contrary the very arena in which the true nature of these inner potentials is to be tested” (*Tarrying with the Negative* 142). Adrian Johnston similarly sees subjectivity under the thumb of external influence and oppression, arguing that, “Now more than ever, this is an age in which the scientific view of human nature seemingly threatens to collapse the subject into the body, to transform human beings into just such over determined mechanisms of the material world, gesticulating at the sole behest of a genetic-evolutionary puppeteer” (64). Freud makes an important distinction about this process:
We obtain our concept of the unconscious from the theory of repression. The repressed is the prototype of the unconscious for us. We see, however, that we have two kinds of unconscious—the one which is latent but capable of becoming unconscious, and the one which is repressed and which is not, in itself and without more ado, capable of becoming conscious [. . .] The latent, which is unconscious only descriptively, not in the dynamic sense, we call preconscious. (5)

By unconsciously breaking with what Freud calls “repression,” the unconscious becomes the conscious with the shedding of sexual morality in favor of sexual liberation, which challenges Foucault’s opposition to Freud’s “repression hypothesis” in The History of Sexuality.217 Employing a similar argument, Copjec argues, that “the principle of a regime’s institution always in some way negates the regime it institutes” (10). The single greatest institution affecting all citizens in Western society in the seventeenth century was life-long monogamous marriage; the polygamous society on the Isle of Pines realizes this break from the only institution that governed every strata of society. Although this polygamous environment breaks with the institution of monogamous marriage, the alternative fares no better in enabling the islanders’ subjectivity, as the desire, at least from the male perspective, of unregulated sexual freedom also originates from the very societal taboo that makes it unacceptable. Copjec argues that such a narcissistic subjectivity nevertheless fails to escape the big Other: ”The construction of the subject depends, then, on the subject's taking social representations as images of its own ideal being, on the subject's deriving a 'narcissistic pleasure' from these representations” (41-2). What Copjec means here, I think, is that these “representations,” (to be read as “law,” “social order,” “language,” or the like) beget pleasure from the subject who has realized that they do not necessarily need to govern real-

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217 For a fuller exploration of the problems with Foucault’s rejection of the repression hypothesis, see Vighi and Feldner, pp. 80-6.
life behavior, regardless of whether breaking these social rules occurs in public or in private. But such self-pleasure paradoxically undermines such a reach for subjectivity as constituted by external and societal influence on the subject’s object of desire. In Erich Fromm’s terms, the Isle of Pines represents a society transforming from "freedom from to freedom to" (*Escape from Freedom* 150). The survivors have broken the fetters of a very ingrained aspect of the social order in their previous homes and replaced it with a hedonistic form of sexual anarchy; they have broken out of sexual repression which, according to Althusser, they did not even know they were subject(ed) to. According to Lacan, psychoanalytic breakthrough comes with an encounter with the impossible in the Real: “Here we have what appears to him at a high point in his existence, and not at all at a moment of deficit, in the form of an irruption in the real of something that he has never known, a sudden emergence of a total strangeness that will progressively bring on a radical submersion of all his categories to the point of forcing him into a veritable reshaping of his world” (*Seminar III* 86). The *Isle of Pines* presents a definitively “total strangeness” and “radical submersion” in the survivors and their offspring’s “shaping” a new world and society.

Critics have noted that the name “Pines” is an anagram for “penis,” but have not addressed the implications of a sexually prolific man with both the physical prowess of the anatomical phallus, the male sex organ, as well as the symbolic “phallus” in the psychoanalytic sense. Following Freud, Lacan suggests the possibility that “castration is the punishment for incest” (“The Signification of the Phallus” 576); this seems particularly apropos to the procreative situation on the Isle of Pines, as incest would become inevitable as the offspring of Pine’s offspring

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218 Louis Althusser might label the sexual rules of Pine’s previous society as something similar to an Ideological State Apparatus as opposed to a Repressive State Apparatus, as “Ideological State Apparatuses function secondarily by repression, even if [. . .] this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic” (1490).

219 Incidentally, Worthington Chauncey Ford notes that the name Cornelius van Sloetten calls to mind the English word “slut” but concedes that this is “of doubtful origin, although forms having some resemblance in sound and sense occur in the Scandinavian languages” (47). Incidentally, Neville likely knew personally Cornelius Holland, an anti-Stuart Republican who played a key role in the beheading of Charles I.
must eventually procreate with and among themselves. While incest does not result in castration on the island, the reader learns that those on the island “fell to whoredoms, incests, and adulteries,” which lead George Pine “to redress those enormities, my father assembled all the Company near unto him, to whom he declared the wickedness of those their brethren” (22). A few lines later the reader learns of the six laws instituted on the island. While not a literal castration, the imposition of the law here constitutes a kind of symbolic castration in the Lacanian sense. Lacan claims that the “phallus is the signifier”; the “Pines” in the name of the society, “Isle of Pines,” anagrammatically spells “penis.” Thus constitutes the signifier for the ultimately symbolic presence of the various traditions he represents, from patriarchy to the English empire building impulse. Lacan continues with this notion of the phallus by arguing,

If, indeed, man is able to satisfy his demand for love in his relationship with a woman, inasmuch as the phallic signifier clearly constitutes her as giving in love what she does not have, conversely, his own desire for the phallus will make its signifier emerge in its residual divergence toward ‘another woman’ who may signify this phallus in various ways, either as a virgin or as a prostitute. (“The Signification of the Phallus” 583)

Although the practical situation in which Pine finds himself undercuts this notion of a wandering gaze of a man chasing the unobtainable phallus, Pine does nevertheless procreate prolifically and as such, this polygamy, as in the case of any polygamous “marital” relations, evokes a sense of chasing the uncatchable. In his “Instance of the Letter of the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud,” Lacan illustrates the “arbitrariness of the sign” by using an illustration of a tree under a line above which is the word “tree.” Lacan rearranges anagrammatically the French word for tree, *arbre*, to *barre*, the French word for the “bar,” which serves in the illustration as a literal bar
that separates signifier from signified. But more importantly he does this in the sense of using a conceptual “bar” as prohibition for any inherent, definitive relationship between the Saussurean sign and signifier (416-19). Žižek reads Lacan’s notion of subjectivity in the context of this essay as indicative a “radical dimension of Lacanian theory [that] lies [. . .] in realizing that the big Other, the symbolic order itself, is also barre, crossed-out, by a fundamental impossibility, structured around an impossible/traumatic kernel, around a central lack. Without this lack in the Other, the Other would be a closed structure and the only possibility open to the subject would be his radical alienation in the Other” (Sublime Object 137). Žižek suggests that the Symbolic order itself has a lack, due in part to its perpetual reliance on the notion of difference that distinguishes one signifier/signified relationship from another. There exists no inherent, transcendental subjectivity in a system, the Symbolic order, which relies on its comparison to another subject. In the Isle of Pines, the impossible and unthinkable situation in which the five initial survivors find themselves transforms George Pine and the four women from subjects subjected to the Symbolic order into the Real, the place where the Symbolic order has broken, the place with the Lacanian lack, and the place of anarchic signifier/signified fluidity.

CONCLUSION

Neville's readable and engaging text became an immediate success and many early modern readers were convinced it was non-fiction. The Isle of Pines even became very successful on the continent as well. Jameson argues that apocalypse can serve to bring people together in a community: “the Apocalypse [. . .] is probably to be grasped by as metaphysical or religious, in which case its secret Utopian vocation consists in assembling a new community of readers and believers around the world” (199). The entire of the Isle of Pines narrative begins in 1569 and

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220 James Sutherland refers to Neville’s “level narrative style” of writing (218).
221 For an exhaustive account of translations and editions of the Isle of Pines, see Scheckter, 45-76.
ends presumably with the publication of the first of the pamphlets in 1668. Neville's bitterness towards the failed revolution likely found a kind ear in Restoration England and this is likely what lead many English readers of the *Isle of Pines* to believe, or want to believe, the tale was true. It is easy to see how his readers would have felt the same kind of desperation after a bloody conflict that George Pine’s descendants experienced.

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222 Pamphlets had long become more than merely disposable printings; according to Joad Raymond, by the late sixteenth century there emerged the “concept of a pamphlet as a small book, and as something as over and above that” (5).
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face—for ever.

George Orwell, 1984

1.

In Ideology and Utopia, Karl Mannheim argues that individual identity largely comes from group and community dynamics. Mannheim argues that signification within the individual’s psychology depends on the group understanding: “We belong to a group not only because we are born into it, but […] because we see certain things in the world the way it does” (22). Although Mannheim’s thesis about the sociological source of individuation can help explain large scale acceptance of the stripping of the individual’s subjectivity, his sociology of knowledge does not address psychological effects of this submission by the collective interest.

Although critics have used psychoanalytical criticism to study Renaissance literature, New Historicism and Cultural Materialism have dominated theoretical approaches for Renaissance studies in the last three decades. As Jonathan Dollimore asserts, the scholarship produced under the auspices of these two culturally-oriented theories has lead to a critical consensus: "[U]niversal interests, society as a 'reflection' of the 'natural' order of things, history as a 'lawful' development leading up to and justifying the present, the demonizing of dissent and otherness" are "central to the age of Shakespeare" (7). This "centrality," according to Dollimore, suggests that political and sociological forces constitute the primary factor that influenced literary writings of the time. Stephen Greenblatt holds a similar view of Renaissance English literature, basing his notion of "cultural poetics" primarily within a political or sociological framework. Since the publication of Greenblatt’s oft-cited essay, "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Literature," psycho-
analysis has been pushed to the margins of criticism on English literature of the period, as Greenblatt dismisses the pertinence of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytical criticism.

Many critics have produced scholarship on English Renaissance utopian literature that has primarily focused on sociological and political issues. Amy Boesky, for instance, argues that English Renaissance utopias represent "founding fictions, narratives that delineate the origins and charters of emergent nationalism" (179). Richard Appelbaum similarly contends that utopian literature of the seventeenth-century serves a nation-building purpose: "between 1603 and 1670 there is a traceable, narratable history of the ideal politics and utopian mastery, a history which registers significant changes in political subjectivity" (2). The creation of "nationalism" and "political subjectivity" as demonstrated by Boesky and Appelbaum highlights the larger trend of Renaissance literary scholarship that has focused more on how fictional characters interact with and relate to each other as opposed to the ways in which characters attain interior subjectivity.

Although there have appeared no attempts to assess the extent to which sociological factors affect psychological states in utopian literature, some critics have begun to lay the foundation for doing so. Lucy Sarginson, for instance, argues that the "binary oppositional thought that erects hierarchies [. . .] affect the way that we think about and relate to the world" (3). Sarginson's focus, however, does not address psychological implications of characters in utopian texts as she focuses more on Self/Other subjectivity, which concerns individuation as it relates to other people. Sarginson builds on Michael C. Schoenfeldt's study of what he calls "materialist psychology" that shows "how humoral psychology makes available not only the deliberately superficial characterizations that mark Jonsonian comedy but also the convoluted depths of Shakespeare's Sonnets" (2). I have attempted to demonstrate that the insularity of both political and
psychological criticism of seventeenth-century English utopian literature has resulted in a largely, and incorrectly, essentialist body of scholarship that has misread many themes and motifs in these texts.

2.

What did you dream? That’s alright, we told you what to dream.

Pink Floyd, “Welcome to the Machine”

In the 2010 film Tron Legacy (directed by Joseph Kosinski), the sequel to the 1982 Disney movie Tron, we see that the Jeff Bridges character, Flynn, has now been trapped inside the impossible to understand computer world he calls the grid. Through the same mechanism Flynn used to transport himself inside this computer game world his son finds himself in the grid as well and is reunited with his father. Flynn tells his son the events of the last 20 years since he disappeared, and at one point he says “I created the grid, a free and open society for everyone: a utopia.” We then learn that Flynn created a clone of himself inside the grid and assigns this clone the job of building infrastructure, managing the society, and keeping law and order. But this clone turns the grid into a police state, where there are armed sentries at every corner and tanks on every street. All the sentries and tanks are red.

Keep in mind that this is still a Disney movie. Is it a veiled referendum on Marxism in theory versus Marxism in practice? I offer this anecdote because in the larger project from which this paper comes is not just using 20th century critical theorists to illuminate literature; I wish for the literature to illuminate the theory. While many theorists attempt to undermine such binary thinking I think they are guilty or doing it at the same time in the same manner as in Tron Legacy, and unfortunately that gives the wrong people the wrong ammunition to attack what they call “progressive” agendas.
Fictive utopian societies inherently beg comparison to real world societies. But utopian writing does not necessarily make all or nothing, black or white declarations or recommendations. All too often utopian literature has attracted criticism putting the horse of critical approach before the cart of legitimate textual evidence. From each anonymous citizen in these utopian worlds to the ruler or ruling body of these worlds, sociological and psychological forces engage in a sophisticated interplay that complicates Žižek’s Marxist-Lacanian black and white model and begs further exploration of the utopian literary genre.
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