Title
The Failure of Desire: A Critique of Kantian Cognitive Autonomy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
Date of Award
Spring 1-9-2013
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Sebastian Rand
Abstract
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant offers a revolutionary approach to cognition, wherein cognition can be understood as an action carried out by a cognitive agent. But giving the subject such an active role raises questions about Kant’s ability to account for objective cognition. In this paper, I will argue that the cognitive autonomy thesis central to Kant’s model renders it unable to account for the normativity required for objective cognition, and that G.W.F. Hegel makes just this criticism in the Desire section of his Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel proposes an alternative: some basic intersubjective structure must be built into cognition on a fundamental level. For Hegel, the possibility of disagreement is an a priori requirement for objective cognition in general.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/3575803
Recommended Citation
Harrison, Rebecca D., "The Failure of Desire: A Critique of Kantian Cognitive Autonomy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2013.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/3575803