Date of Award
8-7-2007
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Eddy Nahmias - Chair
Second Advisor
Tim O'Keefe
Third Advisor
Andrew Altman
Abstract
In this paper I consider a recent objection to compatibilism—the manipulation argument. This argument relies on two plausible principles: a manipulation principle that holds that manipulation precludes free will and moral responsibility, and a ‘no difference principle’ that holds that manipulation is relevantly similar to determinism. To respond to this argument, the compatibilist must reject either the manipulation principle or the ‘no difference principle.’ I argue that rejecting the manipulation principle offers the compatibilist the most compelling response to the manipulation argument. Incompatibilists claim that this strategy is implausible because it requires that some victims of manipulation are free and responsible. I aim to show that this consequence is not as implausible as it might initially appear.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.57709/1059762
Recommended Citation
Coates, Daniel Justin, "Manipulation and Hard Compatibilism." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2007.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1059762