Author

Yu LiuFollow

Date of Award

Spring 4-11-2016

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Real Estate

First Advisor

Jonathan A. Wiley

Second Advisor

Alan J. Ziobrowski

Third Advisor

Karen M. Gibler

Fourth Advisor

Paul Gallimore

Abstract

This dissertation consists of two essays on investor differentiation in industrial real estate markets. The first essay examines the following questions: (1) Do corporates buy or sell at different prices when transacting in the industrial market (as assessed from a comparison between the transactions of corporates and non-institutional investors)? (2) If such a difference does exist, what are the factors that determine its magnitude? Unlike in prior studies on the office market, corporate investors only buy high but do not sell low when transacting in industrial real properties. The pattern of buying high by corporates is consistent during market cycles and across general- and special-purpose property types. The results reflect a higher cost of real capital (acquisition cost) to corporates, and generally imply that the price a corporate is willing to pay is determined primarily from an overall business value perspective, rather than property market value.

In the second essay, I examine the performance of government investors in the industrial market. The analysis reveals that, in general, governments buy high and sell low in comparison to similar property transactions by individuals. On average, governments overpay by an estimated 9.8% and sell at a discount of 17.3%. The results may help governments identify a potential vulnerable point on their real estate management, and reduce their loss if they can mitigate this inefficiency.

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