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The Impact of Electoral Engineering on Nationalist Party Behavior in Post-War States

Cynthia M. Frank

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THE IMPACT OF ELECTORAL ENGINEERING ON NATIONALIST PARTY BEHAVIOR IN POST-WAR STATES

by

CYNTHIA M. FRANK

Under the Direction of William M. Downs

ABSTRACT

To what extent can electoral engineering mitigate deadly intra-state conflict? This paper investigates the impact of electoral engineering on nationalist party behavior in highly-fragmented states. As nationalist parties have been instrumental in escalating inter-group tensions to large-scale hostilities, frameworks for conflict resolution frequently incorporate institutional mechanisms as a means of altering the incentives for conflict exploitation or for inter-group cooperation. Specifically, the paper investigates proportional representation (PR) and preferential systems. To test the impact of these systems, the study observes party engagement in cooperative or conflictual behavior during legislative campaigns in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, and Croatia over several election cycles. Data from the Bosnian cases largely support expectations that PR presents incentives for nationalist parties to “play the ethnic card” and exacerbate communal conflict. In contrast, the Croatian case provides a degree of support for the prediction that preferential voting structures encourage cooperation and thus conflict dampening.

INDEX WORDS: Intra-state conflict, Electoral engineering, Nationalist parties, Conflict resolution
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CYNTHIA M. FRANK

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by

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INTRODUCTION

To what extent can electoral engineering minimize nationalist party aggravation of inter-communal conflict in post-war societies? Whether civil wars have arisen as consequences of greed, grievance, regime transition/collapse, systemic change, or some combination thereof, contemporary intrastate wars have been largely characterized by the rise of extremist, identity-based politics. By exploiting inter-communal divisions, endorsing ethno-chauvinist platforms, and inciting violence, ultra-nationalist parties encourage supporters and target groups toward large-scale hostilities, thereby helping to escalate the domestic security dilemma to precarious levels that persist beyond the implementation of cease-fires and resolution packages. The increased tendency for negotiated settlements of intrastate wars to break-down into renewed violence (Licklider, 1995) illustrates the degree to which nationalist party provocation of conflict can become deeply entrenched in post-war states. Despite growing consensus that institutional engineering can prompt conflict de-escalation in severe cases (Hartzell, 1999; Horowitz, 1985; Rothchild, 1997), debate continues over which institutional frameworks can most successfully foster durable peace in highly segmented societies (Lijphart, 1991 and 1996; Lustick, 1979; Manning and Antic, 2003; Reilly and Reynolds, 2001). Given a continued lack of consensus as to which engineered designs most effectively defuse intractable group conflict, this research compares the impact of two electoral frameworks on nationalist party behavior, and thus the degree to which institutional variation, in the form of consociational-based PR or preferential designs, can facilitate or frustrate inter-communal conflict resolution in deeply-divided, post-war societies. Specifically, the analysis focuses on party engagement in cooperative, accommodative behaviors that dampen inter-communal tensions or in conflict exploitation that contributes to the breakdown of peace settlements and conflict intractability. Using post-war elections in the two Bosnian entities as exploratory cases, the study finds that engineered PR systems fail to motivate conflict dampening by nationalist parties, while actually encouraging conflict exploitation. Additionally, elections in Croatia provide evidence that preferential
electoral schemes can prompt parties toward cooperation and accommodation, thus reinforcing conflict de-escalation.

Deep division in segmented societies becomes especially malignant, escalating from latent hostilities to full-scale civil war, in environments where group identity, especially ethnic identity, “becomes a politically salient cleavage around which interests are organized for political purposes,” (Reilly, 2001, 4) thus providing the center around which ultra-nationalist parties and voters gravitate and exacerbating the intensity of inter-communal tensions (Horowitz, 1985). Identity-based politics effectively elicit mass support by “exploiting old inter-ethnic animosities and historical grievances” and can therefore intensify inter-communal violence by invoking emotional sentiments of collective frustration and threat that are then filtered into persecution and violent attack of target groups (Reilly, 2001,4). Politically organized ethnic groups, striving to attain socio-political goods come into competition with other variously aligned groups or use politicized identity conflicts as a proxy for other issues, instigating a “politics of communalism,” (Price in Reilly and Reynolds, 2001, 11) thus fueling the deepening of conflict (Rothchild, 1997). Politicization of group identity in these societies tends to occur in tandem with zero-sum, winner-take-all political competition that fosters group hostility by creating “losing” factions that can easily project frustration onto a target group of “winners” via victimization rhetoric and sentiments of being cheated by the political system (Reilly, 2001).

In amassing popular support on the basis of inter-communal conflict, ambitious political entrepreneurs and nationalist parties emphasize and manipulate communal identities by employing extremist, sectarian rhetoric, demonizing group mythologies, ethnic stereotyping, moralistic chauvinism, exaggerated grievances over resource distribution, and fears of group extinction to mobilize popular support (Van Evera, 1994, Ganguly in Brown, et al., 2001; Horowitz, 1985). These strategies fuel group animosities and work to politically mobilize violence as emotive fears of being threatened, either physically, economically, or culturally, combine with sentiments of individual dissatisfaction and frustration to push individuals and
groups to increasingly extreme forms of violence. For example, economic collapse in the Former Yugoslavia and group competition over a shrinking pie of federal resources could be projected in Serbian politics onto target groups such as Croats or Kosovar Albanians. The competitive nature of office-seeking encouraged Serbian nationalists to adopt group validation and self-glorifying measures in order to out-bid their political opponents and garner power.

Additionally, in flanking situations, competition manifests within a group or existing political party and inter-group conflict and violence are provoked from a base of politicized identity with the aim of wresting communal group support from the dominant nationalist and moderate, multi-ethnic parties. Hislope defines the flanking process as, “an attempt of an insurgent party, representing one ethnic group, to challenge the dominant party of the same ethnic group by staking out a more extreme position” (Hislope, 1997, 473). Flanking parties contribute to centrifugal politics, forcing competition for votes to the extremes of the political continuum instead of at the center (Reilly, 2001). Using hyper-nationalist rhetoric to reinforce group solidarity and consciousness, flanking parties depict themselves as the ‘true’ voice of the group, contrasted with the group’s dominant parties, which are portrayed as abandoning crucial group interests and needs. As extremist flanking tactics come to take increasing votes from moderate parties of the same group, those mainstream parties will respond by adopting hard-line, ethno-chauvinist positions to counter flanking party claims of being the genuine representation for the group. Often, large-scale violence and persecution result from either intra-group violence between nationalist parties and their followers or from violence that is propagated by nationalist parties against out-groups to bolster solidarity.

The crux of belligerent nationalism in democracies, particularly new democracies, is that political platforms based on group identity frequently appeal to competitive, power-seeking parties because they are often linked to deep symbolic emotions that can be easily used to mobilize popular support (Reilly, 2001). In many cases, political leaders may find it easier to “play the ethnic card” and maintain strategies of ethnic chauvinism rather than those based on
ideological issues or moderate policy positions (Reilly, 2001). As political discourse becomes dominated by hegemonic group rhetoric, calls for group homogeneity, and out-group subordination, recurrent patterns of antagonism, violence, and reprisal unfold while moderate, accommodatory voices are stifled by the roar of extremism (Reilly, 2001). Regardless of the motivational sources, nationalist co-optation of violence raises the bar of hostile conflict because party promotion and engagement in armed disputes will likely lead to counter-measures by targeted out-groups. Hence, a sort of political security dilemma emerges as communities and parties increasingly engage in tit-for-tat conflict escalation.

The persistence of extremist, nationalist politics in post-war societies has made these environments particularly resistant to the establishment of democratic institutions aimed at managing continued group dispute. Political mobilization of group identity and violence on the back of group identity cleavages become embedded within a society, creating a rigid “culture of violence” that remains in tact despite formal peace treaty and is particularly pernicious where ethnic conflict provocation, as based on perceived threats of extinction or domination, becomes extremely difficult to reverse even after large-scale hostilities have ended (du Toit, 2001). Moreover, formal peace settlements all too often hinge on items of third-party peace enforcement, force demobilization, territorial integrity and land repatriation, surrender of weapons, and general calls for “free and fair” elections that do not specifically address the incentives, penalties, and environment in which political competition will be carried out in the post-conflict state. Thus, deficient post-conflict initiatives may fail to reduce the incentives for nationalist party manipulation of identity cleavages and violence in domestic politics. In fact, the likelihood of post-settlement violence may increase in post-war periods as nationalist parties can more readily call upon fresh memories of war-time atrocities and victimization while depicting losses, exclusion, or bias in settlement negotiations to reinforce group consciousness, solidarity, and the desire for retribution.
Extensive research supports the fundamental role played by domestic institutions in mitigating nationalist party politicization and escalation of inter-communal conflict as democratic systems incorporate effective mechanisms for the articulation, processing, and resolution of communal disputes (Rothchild, 1997; Hartzell, 1999; Przeworski, 1986; Snyder and Ballentine, 1996). In particular, advocates of institutional engineering argue that democratic regimes may provide the most fertile environment for the transformation of inter-communal conflict and extremist political trends because democracies effectively establish rule of law and political discourse, frame political behavior in stable, predictable, and recurrent patterns, and manage/process group conflict (Diamond, et al., 1990; Przeworski, 1986; Ostrow, 2000). These institutions can affect inter-group hostilities by (1) setting the tone for political discourse, (2) allowing for the representation of certain interests/behaviors, while curtailing others, and (3) incentivizing political actors toward accommodative, moderate behavior and strategies while penalizing other, conflict-inducing activities (Boix, 1999; Manning and Antic, 2003; Reilly and Reynolds, 2001). Democratic frameworks can create an environment that engenders cooperation instead of confrontation as “institutional design determines whether the combination of incentives and constraints compels members to pursue conflict-management strategies or leaves them unconstrained to pursue strategies of conflict and confrontation” (Ostrow, 2000, 5). Consequently, communal relations can be stabilized by institutional mechanisms that penalize conflict exploitative political strategies while rewarding communication, accommodation, and cooperation. In discussing the strategic choices and consequences presented by democratic institutions to political actors, Przeworski contends that, “the experience of democracies demonstrates that institutional guarantees are quite effective in preventing some interests from coming to the fore and preventing certain interests from being politically articulated at all” (Przeworski, 1986, 60). In particular, the electoral system can encourage inter-party bargaining and the forging of mutually beneficial relationships, requiring communication, moderation on divisive issues, and accommodation, thus reducing the extent to which nationalist parties are
motivated to exacerbate inter-group disputes to the level of full-scale war. Hence, institutional devices can not only regulate political behavior, but also limit the extent that destabilizing interests are advanced in the arena of domestic politics and mobilized through violent behavior.

Despite broad agreement on the critical nature of institutions in long-term resolution initiatives, researchers, practitioners, and policy-planners remain divided on expectations of how specific electoral institutions will impact inter-communal relations in various contexts and levels of conflict, and thus which electoral systems will result in durable peace. Proponents of consociationally-based proportional representation (PR) systems stress that major communal groups must have the ability to participate in government, relative to group size in the population, for the management of communal grievances and to dampen the root cause of conflict. In contrast, advocates of preferential systems argue that electoral structures allowing voters to rank order candidate/party preferences will motivate groups and parties toward cooperation in order to exchange the second-order votes that can secure office. Therefore, preferential structures are predicted to increase party incentives for cross-group accommodation and cooperation while deterring strategies of conflict exploitation. Although PR-based systems have been overwhelming favorites among practitioners and policy planners, these designs have largely failed to produce expected accommodative and cooperative inter-group relations.

In contributing to the debate on electoral institutions as implements of conflict management and resolution, this investigation examines the implications of variation in institutional design on nationalist party belligerence in post-settlement environments. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the extent to which the consociational frameworks of proportional representation and preferential systems facilitate the type of party behavior that leads to group cooperation, accommodation, and the de-escalation of violent conflict in fragmented, post-war societies. The thesis is divided into four sections, with the first providing a review of previous literature on electoral systems, party behavior, and conflict resolution in deeply-divided societies. Following a review of existing literature, the second segment of the
paper outlines the methods of inquiry to be employed in evaluating the dependent variable (nationalist party behavior) and the independent variable (electoral system design). Using the methodological tools set forth in the second section, the subsequent segment uses comparative case studies to examine how previous attempts at electoral engineering impacted nationalist party behavior. Finally, the study concludes by discussing the implications of the findings in these three cases to conflict studies and further research.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Building from an institutionalist foundation, previous research in conflict resolution has attempted to uncover the ways in which constitutional and electoral engineering can set the rules of the game, the strategies and behavior of political actors (i.e., leadership, elites, parties, and the electorate), and consequently the extent to which domestic political competition can exacerbate or alleviate violent intra-state conflict. Electoral systems, in particular, can exert substantial force upon the behavior of nationalist parties, “because elections help shape broader norms of political behavior…electoral systems can play a powerful role in promoting both democracy and conflict management” (Reilly, 2002, 155). Of primary relevance to this investigation of nationalist party behavior, the consociationalist and preferential schools advance compelling arguments as to which electoral arrangements are most likely to encourage nationalist parties to facilitate the de-escalation of violent civil conflict.

Consociational Theory and Proportional Representation

Largely attributed to work by Lijphart in the late 1960’s, consociationalist theory has substantially influenced both researchers and practitioners working with conflict in highly segmented societies. Elements of inclusiveness and proportionality, as manifest in frameworks of group power sharing by leadership and elites, may dampen inter-group conflict by accommodating significant social segments in deeply diverse states. In conjunction, elite cooperation and accommodation can counter centrifugal tendencies, where political competition
moves further toward ethno-nationalist extremes on the political spectrum, and promote the moderation of inflammatory ethno-politics (Lustick, 1979). Proponents often cite Switzerland as the paramount example of successful consociational design, with the Netherlands (1917-1967), Malaysia (1955-1969, 1971 on), Belgium (since 1970), and the interim South African constitution of 1994 as imperfect but supporting cases (Lijphart, 1996). Overall, the four pillars of consociationalist theory incorporate power sharing into central mechanisms of: 1) executive grand coalitions or other forms of high-level power sharing, 2) cultural autonomy for major social groups, as evidenced through educational and individual rights, 3) proportionality in legislative seats and civil service appointments, and 4) minority veto on all issues deemed as vital to the minority community (Reilly and Reynolds, 2001, Lijphart, 1996 and 1969).

While a large amount of post-conflict engineering incorporates only some of Lijphart’s original pillars, all post-conflict electoral designs embrace proportional representation systems to effect power sharing and minority protection in segmented societies. Theoretically, PR systems allow minority groups to access representation in government more readily than other systems of majoritarian or semi-proportional design. Majoritarian and pluralist models like the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, according to Lijphart, have a higher propensity toward electoral outcomes that over-represent majorities and large parties while discriminating against smaller minority parties (Lijphart, 1996). PR systems effectively avoid the potential escalation of conflict by aggrieved, under-represented minorities by allowing these groups to achieve legislative representation relative to group proportions within the total population. Observers further posit that majoritarian systems may be particularly inappropriate to divided societies as winner-take-all outcomes are likely to provoke further inter-group animosity and hostility when losing groups contest election outcomes and government legitimacy, thus lending to further destabilization in an already precariously-balanced situation (Rokkan in Boix, 1999). Additionally, systems of PR evidence power sharing between communal groups and parties more readily than other systems (Reilly and Reynolds, 2001), which may have a trickle-down effect to promote inter-
group cooperative relations between group members. Specifically, consociationalist theory endorses list PR designs where parties present candidate lists to the electorate prior to elections. Voters select parties on the ballot and each party is accorded seats based on the percentage of votes it can capture in the election. Individual members are then assigned to parliamentary seats dependent upon their rank order within the party. List PR models effect power sharing and minority inclusion by allowing, “all significant ethnic groups, including minorities, to ‘define themselves’ into ethnically based parties and thereby gain representation in the parliament in proportion to their numbers in the community as a whole” (Reilly, 2002, 157).

Criticisms leveled against consociational theory range from contention with the assumptions underlying the approach to questions on the practical implications of consociational and semi-consociational systems operating in extremely divided societies that have experienced large-scale inter-communal violence. The underlying assumption that ethnic leaders will opt for moderation on the key sectarian issues of their supporters does not address the incentives in communally fractured democracies for leaders and parties to emphasize ethnocentric politics or the limited bargaining space available in which leaders can make concessions and compromises. Frequently, leaders that are perceived as too conciliatory and not faithfully representing the interests of their group are challenged by flanking parties or are replaced by more vehement leaders. Political leaders in extremely fractionalized societies face serious obstacles in balancing the demands for maintaining support from outside and within their groups and pressures from below to concentrate and centralize power rather than share it (Lijphart, 1996). Furthermore, PR structures can make it easy for ethnic leaders to gain office and are cited to further “aggravate rather than rehabilitate” inter-communal conflict in practice (Lustick, 1979, 329). In legislative elections, the degree to which ethno-nationalist parties and candidates are able to gain office on the basis of support from their own ethnic group may result in a transferal of social divisions to the legislature (Reilly and Reynolds, 2001). Critics question the ability of PR models to stabilize inter-group relations in larger states, arguing that when
ethnic groups are geographically concentrated into specific regions, PR designs may not guarantee minority participation in government as successfully as federalist systems or strict separation of powers mechanisms (Boix, 1999). The most controversial contention is that PR schemes do not diminish the political salience of identity cleavages, thought by many to be a crucial driving force in civil wars, but actually reinforce and encourage the prominence of group divisions. Electoral systems based on PR may encourage parties to represent narrowly defined communal issues where, “the very institutions designed to alleviate tensions may merely entrench the perception that all politics must be ethnic politics” (Reilly and Reynolds, 2001, 31). When ‘playing the ethnic card’ has been found effective to seize seats guaranteed in a PR structure, there is often little incentive for parties and candidates not to politicize ethnic issues, especially if they can get elected solely from votes in their own ethnic group (Reilly and Reynolds, 2001).

**Preferential Systems**

Focused on inter-group and party cooperation, accommodation, and moderation, centripetally-based preferential systems patterns are advanced by Horowitz, Reilly, and Reynolds as the most appropriate institutional framework for managing conflict in deeply divided societies (1985, 2001, 2002). These frameworks characterize democracy as an ecosystem in which highly contentious issues of group division are continually resolved through processes of communication, negotiation, and reciprocal dependence (Reilly, 2001). Electoral mechanisms are seen to present incentives to domestic political competitors for integrative behavior, bargaining, and moderate policy positions which work in conjunction against extremist ethno-politics and conflictual competition (Reilly and Reynolds, 2001). Reilly argues that, “by changing the incentives and payoffs available to political actors in their search for electoral victory, astutely crafted electoral rules can make some types of behavior more politically rewarding than others” (Reilly, 2002, 155). For proponents of preferential designs, the key to defusing the most
common form of civil conflict, ethnically based dispute, issues of ascriptive identity must decline in political salience, replaced by issues of traditional policy and political ideology. Depoliticization of identity can occur through offering incentives for the creation of multi-ethnic parties or coalitions thereof and through the shifting of the space for political competition from ethno-sectarian extremes toward the moderate center. According to Reilly, preferential electoral structures encourage three fundamental phenomena: (1) the presence of electoral incentives for parties and candidates to attract votes from groups other than their own, (2) the existence of an arena of bargaining where political actors are incentivized toward cooperation and reciprocal support, and (3) advancement of centrist, aggregative, and multi-ethnic parties or coalitions that can make cross-ethnic appeals to members of other groups (Reilly, 2001 and 2002). In theory, the resulting centripetal spin on political competition in highly-segmented societies should reduce the salience of ethnic cleavages, discourage the formation of ethnic parties, and prevent the replication of ethnic division in the legislature, thus defusing inter-communal hostilities (Reilly and Reynolds, 2001; Reilly 2002).

Preferential electoral theory endorses frameworks that generate inter-party bargaining, vote-pooling, and accommodation across group lines to temper the potentially explosive pressures of inter-communal hostility (Horowitz, 1985). This approach most commonly advocates preferential electoral designs, in which voters rank preferences for candidates, parties, or coalitions, to achieve group accommodation and moderation. Preferential systems are all founded on the concept of allowing voters to indicate alternative preferences in the event that their most favored competitor is defeated. Ideally, preferential systems encourage parties to moderate positions and accommodate other groups/parties that may deliver critical second-preference votes in situations where no candidate or party is guaranteed an outright majority in first-preference votes and electoral success is contingent upon attracting second-preference votes from groups other than one’s own or by capturing the support of moderate, “floating” voters. In order to attract the second preferences from other groups and successfully vote-pool,
political competitors must make cross-ethnic appeals that focus on traditional or broader policy objectives and demonstrate a capacity to represent other groups in the event of electoral victory (Reilly, 2001; Horowitz, 1985). Moderation and accommodation can also result from the formation of inter-party alliances, where parties agree to encourage their constituencies to give second preferences to partner or affiliate parties, and through party coalitions (Reilly, 2001 and 2002). With alliances and coalitions, potential partners must often moderate campaign rhetoric and policy positions and establish cooperative relationships through increasing iterations of inter-party communication, negotiation, and mutual dependence on votes from each party’s constituency (Horowitz, 1985). Thus, with alternative vote (AV) or single transferable vote (STV), parties that can more successfully vote-pool first and second preference support have better chances of gaining a majority and being rewarded with electoral success (Reilly, 2002). Alternatively, those parties that appeal to only one communal or social segment, using ethno-chauvinist, extremist and identity-based positions to champion themselves as the sole voice of a particular group, fail to garner enough voter support to gain office and are consequently penalized with electoral defeat.

Of the criticisms advanced against preferential structures, the absence of sufficient empirical evidence on the models in practice has been most significant (Lijphart, 1991; Reilly and Reynolds, 2001; Reilly, 2002). The scarcity of cases and the relative transience of these systems have posed serious obstacles to theory testing and observation of the long-term viability of the models. Moreover, the tendency for theorists to propose majoritarian electoral designs has made the school vulnerable to the aforementioned arguments that elections tend to result in disproportionate outcomes and minority party exclusion (Lijphart, 1991). In conjunction with disproportionate results, the majoritarian models of AV and preferentially-amended FPTP have been attacked for operating more like winner-take-all models and thus failing to actually provide incentives for accommodation and moderation (Reilly and Reynolds, 2001). Not only can certain ethno-nationalist parties secure an outright majority from their constituencies, but
these parties may also co-opt other, smaller extremist parties in close proximity on the political spectrum in order to garner sufficient electoral support. The possibility that moderate nationalist parties will align with proximate extremist parties and result in further centrifugal pressure undermines the main centrist goal of the preferential approach. The demographic distribution of ethnic groups may also undermine the ability of preferential electoral designs to encourage integrative behavior as ethnic parties and candidates in homogenous districts can garner enough support to win an outright majority of the votes in their district (Reilly and Reynolds, 2001). Hence, parties that have already secured majority support are not presented with incentives toward moderation, coalition/alliance building and accommodation, or cross-group campaigning because second-preference votes are not necessary to win the seat. Single-member districts that are ethnically homogenous, then, do not pressure parties toward the vote-pooling behavior advocated by preferential system theorists. Finally, systems such as AV require a high degree of popular literacy in order to function effectively (Reilly and Reynolds, 2001). Sufficient levels of public literacy are difficult to attain in under-developed and developing states, which have frequently experienced large-scale civil conflict; the achievement of such levels may be especially challenging in post-war environments where violence and instability have disrupted the conventional means of popular education such as schools, newspapers, radio, and television.

Accounting for the aforementioned points, debate on both theoretical and substantive levels continues over which types of electoral engineering will result in the cooperative, moderate behavior associated with conflict de-escalation and resolution. While proponents of consociational PR and preferential systems both aim for inter-communal cooperation and accommodation, PR is thought to effect these behaviors after elections, once parties are participating in government. Preferential systems, alternatively, are believed to stimulate party moderation and cooperation during the electoral process, initiating patterns that extend to the electorate and elected representatives once in government. However, questions persist as to
whether these electoral frameworks will generate the intended results and, if cooperation is achieved, which form and corresponding stage of cooperation will lead to prolonged conflict, short-term conciliation, or durable peace. As noted above, little empirical research exists to substantiate the claims of preferential advocates, while PR structures, though widely implemented, have met with mixed success in dampening group hostility, particularly in extreme cases of conflict. In short, this research lends further comparative analysis of these institutional designs in highly-fragmented situations so that we may develop a more thorough understanding of how electoral design impacts both nationalist party behavior and durable peace.

Hence, the research presented here tests two hypotheses on electoral engineering and party behavior in highly-fractured societies emerging from identity-based civil war. Hypothesis 1 states that consociationally-based PR systems are correlated with centrifugal nationalist party provocation of ethno-political conflict, thus reinforcing inter-communal antagonism (see boxes I and II in Fig. 1). According to hypothesis 2 (boxes III and IV in Fig. 1), preferential electoral frameworks promote moderate and accommodative cooperation by nationalist parties that facilitates the dampening of inter-group conflict. Therefore, preferential electoral models are expected to foster a reduction in violent, inter-communal conflict, via nationalist party behavior, more successfully than are consociational PR models. A framework for these hypotheses is offered below in Figure 1. Contrary to theories advanced by Lijphart and others, consociationally-based PR systems are expected to frustrate group relations as ethnic politics are reinforced and encouraged by the electoral design. Preferential systems are expected to initiate centripetal patterns that prompt inter-group conciliation and accommodation more successfully, whereas consociational PR frameworks are expected to foster centrifugal trends. The import of such findings cannot be over-emphasized given the prevalence of consociational theory and dominance of PR systems in post-war environments and the lack of long-term stability or conflict transformation in these cases. These points suggest that the low incidence of durable peace is linked to the prominence of inappropriate consociational PR as a
**Figure 1: Party Behavior by Electoral System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTORAL SYSTEM</th>
<th>Conflict Exploitation</th>
<th>Accommodative Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consociational</strong> (PR, List PR)</td>
<td><strong>I. Combustible Communal Relations</strong></td>
<td><strong>II. Precarious Peace</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Centrifugal</td>
<td>- Centrifugal</td>
<td>- Centrifugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ethnicity is highly politicized</td>
<td>- Ethnicity is moderately politicized</td>
<td>- Ethnicity is moderately politicized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Platforms based on ethno-political scare tactics</td>
<td>- Platforms based on ethnicity/resource distribution</td>
<td>- Platforms based on ethnicity/resource distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Large number of ultra-nationalist, sectarian parties and few to no multi-ethnic, moderate parties</td>
<td>- Multi-ethnic, moderate parties unlikely</td>
<td>- Multi-ethnic, moderate parties unlikely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Coalitions likely to be only intra-group</td>
<td>- Coalitions unlikely during election campaign, but possible in government-building</td>
<td>- Coalitions unlikely during election campaign, but possible in government-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frequent and extreme levels of inter-group, inter-party violence</td>
<td>- Frequent but low level inter-group hostility and violence</td>
<td>- Frequent but low level inter-group hostility and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Ex. Republika Srpska</td>
<td>*Ex. South Africa</td>
<td>*Ex. South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferential</strong> (AV, STV)</td>
<td><strong>III. Low Potential for Violent Conflict</strong></td>
<td><strong>IV. Potential Durable Peace</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Centrifugal</td>
<td>- Centripetal</td>
<td>- Centripetal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ethnicity is highly politicized</td>
<td>- De-politicized ethnicity</td>
<td>- De-politicized ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Platforms are ethnically centered, but may include traditional policy and political ideology issues</td>
<td>- Platforms are likely to be primarily based on traditional policy, political ideology, include cross-cutting cleavage positions</td>
<td>- Platforms are likely to be primarily based on traditional policy, political ideology, include cross-cutting cleavage positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Multi-ethnic, moderate parties highly unlikely</td>
<td>- Multi-ethnic, moderate parties highly likely</td>
<td>- Multi-ethnic, moderate parties highly likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Alliances highly likely, moderate coalition formation</td>
<td>- High likelihood for inter-group alliances/coalitions</td>
<td>- High likelihood for inter-group alliances/coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frequent and moderate levels of inter-group, inter-party hostility and violence</td>
<td>- Low potential for inter-group and inter-party violence</td>
<td>- Low potential for inter-group and inter-party violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Ex. Sri Lanka</td>
<td>*Ex. Australia</td>
<td>*Ex. Australia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mechanism in resolving highly intractable civil wars.

METHODS

The Dependent Variable: Nationalist Party Behavior

Before assessing the impact of electoral system design on nationalist party behavior, it is necessary to further describe how the dependent variable is observed and measured. For the purposes of this analysis, party behavior is seen to run along a spectrum with extreme conflict exploitation at one end and integrative cooperation at the other end of the continuum. A summary of these behavior categories is provided in Figure 2. Party positioning on the spectrum is dependent on the extent and frequency of engagement in several types of conflict exploitation or cooperation. This analysis uses a method of measurement based on six indicators of behavior that are broadly divided into confrontational, competitive and cooperative, integrative activities. Within these two categories, party activity is assessed in six subcategories of behavior: conflict exploitative campaigning, incitement of violence, engagement in violence, proximate policy positioning, party alliances, and party coalitions. Party activity during the campaign leading up to legislative activities is monitored and rated for each subcategory of behavior. Subcategory scores are then combined to attain an aggregate score of behavior that determines a party’s overall position on the behavior spectrum.

Confrontational Conflict Exploitation

As a first indicator of conflict exploitation, party use of exploitative campaigns that are based solely or primarily on communal divisions, as opposed to campaigns launched from platforms of traditional policy, such as corruption, employment, foreign policy, and political ideology, or cross-cutting cleavages, demonstrates the degree to which parties seek office via conflict maintenance or exploitation instead of through conflict dampening. Conflict exploitative campaigns are organized predominantly around ethno-chauvinist or sectarian platforms and are characterized by confrontational rhetoric unleashed against a specific target group.
### Figure 2: The Spectrum of Party Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONFLICT EXPLOITATION</th>
<th>INTEGRATIVE COOPERATION</th>
</tr>
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</table>

**Items:**
1. Political Environment  
2. Party Platform  
3. Strategies  
4. Inter-party relations  
5. Frequency of Violence  
6. Intensity of Violence  
7. Examples of Violent Activity
Confrontational rhetoric, as described previously, involves not only myths of subjugation, claims of group vulnerability to extinction, and group superiority over the target group, but also public attack, derogation, and denouncement of target group members and their representative parties. Conflict exploitation is scored from $-2$, for extreme and frequent exploitation, to $0$, where exploitative campaigning is absent from party behavior.

Another indicator of exploitative behavior, *incitement of violence*, relates to direct party calls for supporters to engage in acts against the target group, including physical violence such as beatings, torture, bombings, arson, kidnapping, and assassination, as well as the use of intimidation and threat of these acts. Such behavior represents a more extreme form of conflict exploitation and is therefore rated from $-3$ to $0$, with parties receiving a score of $-3$ for frequent and extreme engagement and $0$ for refrain from such activities altogether.

Finally, at the most extreme, *party engagement in violent activity* against target group members or parties represents the most intense form of party provocation of inter-communal conflict. This indicator differs from the incitement indicator in that party leaders actually engage in belligerent activities instead of just encouraging members toward such activity. Behavior in this category includes the aforementioned acts of physical attack, destruction of property, and intimidation listed in the previous category, but propagated by party leadership and members from mid to high levels in the party hierarchy. These activities are scored from $-4$ to $0$, with $-4$ for the most intense involvement in such behavior and $0$ for no engagement.

**Integrative Cooperation**

Given the potential loss of credibility and voter support that can result when parties are perceived as too cooperative with other parties by consorting, cutting deals, and establishing amiable relationships with the enemy, the high political stakes provide parties with strong incentives to conceal the extent and substance of cooperation with other parties. However, evidence of party cooperation can be observed indirectly. For example, the first indicator of party cooperation, *proximate policy positioning*, reveals a degree of party cooperation and
accommodation. Proximate policy positioning relates to the extent to which parties endorse similar, complementary, or joint positions on substantive issues such as the economy, unemployment, foreign policy, or other cross-cutting issues. With the nature of competition between parties in democratic structures, it would be expected that parties are encouraged to take up policy positions opposite to those of their competitors in order to carve out a distinct political niche and attract voter support (Hislope, 1997). Yet, when parties endorse similar stances on policy issues, these parties have set aside competitive motives in lieu of some mutual goal revolving around either policy or office-seeking intent. This behavior can work to ease conflictual patterns and foster cooperation by (1) bringing parties together in cooperative relationships, (2) emphasizing traditional policy rhetoric over ethno-nationalist politics (both for parties and the electorate) and thus de-politicizing ethnic cleavages while highlighting policy-based campaign strategies, and (3) demonstrating inter-party and inter-group cooperation on issues of common interest to the electorate. Evidence of proximate policy positioning can be found in party platforms, fliers, pamphlets, speeches, and public statements and is scored from 2 to 0. A score of 2 is assessed when a party addresses and proposes solutions to an issue in parallel with another party, while a score of 0 is given to parties that focus on wholly different issues or offer opposite solutions to the same issue addressed by other parties.

As an additional measure of party cooperation, joint campaigning illustrates the extent to which cooperative behaviors and party perspectives produce party alliances and partnerships. Joint-campaigning, involving public party support of other parties and calls for constituents to choose members of other parties during municipal or presidential elections, demonstrates the existence of a cooperative relationship that has resulted from positive-sum bargaining where parties opt to forgo certain differing interests and competitive strategies toward mutual or complementary goals. Like proximate policy positioning, joint-campaigning has the potential to encourage further party cooperation, de-emphasize identity politics, and evidence inter-group accommodation, thereby defusing group conflict. Such integrative relations are further
cemented by continued iterations of party interaction, mutual dependence on constituent votes, and reciprocal vote exchange. Joint-campaigning can be observed in a similar fashion to proximate policy positioning through media coverage, joint party statements of alliances, joint rallies, party support of partners, and calls for voters to support other parties. This subcategory is rated from 0 to 3, with 0 assessed for a complete absence of joint-campaigning and 3 for parties that frequently campaign with other parties or endorse a number of candidates from another party.

The final indicator of party cooperation, *party coalitions*, signifies an extensive degree of inter-party coordination and accommodation. Party formation of coalitions reflects not only party cooperation and amiable relationships, but also party willingness to commit to long-term relationships with other parties. It should be noted that party coalitions differ from joint-campaigning in that the latter involves public party support of another and the possibility of reciprocal vote exchange, the former relates to parties that campaign together on the same ticket, share votes as a coalition, and offer a set of common representatives for legislative seats won or possibly plan to share control of government. Hence, coalition behavior may be observed as the highest form of party cooperation. Coalitions are identified in party registration as a coalition, joint party statements of campaign cooperation, and party members running under a common coalition banner. This indicator is scored as 4 for membership in a multi-ethnic coalition, 3 for coalition with a political party representing another communal sector, 2 for coalition with a moderate party from the same communal group, 1 for coalition with a more extreme or ethno-chauvinist party from the same social segment, and 0 for no coalition activity.

**Case Selection and Control Variables**

During the period from 1946-2001, 163 of a total 225 conflicts worldwide were internal in nature (Gleditsch, et al., 2002). While several studies present data on the number of conflicts ended via military victory or negotiated settlement, previous datasets do not include comprehensive information on whether electoral engineering characterizes the political
environments after hostilities have been concluded. The propensity for a winning faction to seek long-term conflict resolution with opponents is low given the likelihood that the victor, having usually destroyed the organizational capacity of the opposition, will perceive conflict to be fully resolved (Licklider, 1995). Moreover, the crushing of the opposition after military victory typically renders the defeated incapable of sustaining further conflict (Licklider, 1995) and thus renders useless long-term resolution mechanisms such as electoral engineering. Given these points, the number of cases involving electoral engineering as a resolution strategy can be estimated from the number of negotiated settlements. While some findings indicate that as many as 42% of qualified civil wars have ended through negotiated settlement (Walter, 1997), more conservative research assesses the frequency of negotiated settlement to be 20%, or 14 of 57 cases from 1945 to 1993 (Licklider, 1995). A list of negotiated settlements from 1945-1997 is provided in Table 1. This list of cases provides a rough illustration of where electoral engineering has already taken place or may potentially be used to further stabilize recent settlements and encourage of inter-group conciliation.

Nationalist party behavior in post-war environments occurs in a situation of intense inter-communal conflict that is a highly intricate phenomenon based upon a set of numerous, intertwined factors. In order to isolate the relationship between party behavior and electoral system design, several explanatory variables have been controlled for through case selection. These variables include intense social division, degree of identity politicization during hostilities, intensity of hostilities, international monitoring, and international involvement in the case and exert a degree of force upon inter-party relations, willingness/ability to cooperate, and conflict de-escalation. The analysis conforms to a most similar systems design (MSSD), where the three cases are similarly matched on the aforementioned variables (see Tables 2 and Figure 3) so that variation in the independent variable, type of engineered system, can be more clearly linked with dependent variable outcomes. As the cases are similarly situated with respect to
Table 1: Negotiated Settlements to Civil Wars: 1945-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1992-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1970-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1989-1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>1994-1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>1948-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1995-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1963-1964, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1965-1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1979-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (S. Ossetia)</td>
<td>1989-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (Abkhazia)</td>
<td>1992-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1968-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1946-1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1961-1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1950-1953</td>
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<td>Laos</td>
<td>1959-1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1958-1958</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1989-1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1948-1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1992-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1975-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1981-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1981-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1972-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1991-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1983-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1963-1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1992-1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1962-1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1972-1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hartzell, 1999.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Federation (FBiH)</th>
<th>Republika Srpska (RS)</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Cleavage</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties to Conflict</td>
<td>Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks</td>
<td>Serbs, Bosniaks</td>
<td>Serbs, Croats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Politization During Hostilities</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of War-time Hostilities</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Monitoring</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High (very high from 1991-1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Involvement</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Moderate (very high from 1991-1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineered System</td>
<td>List PR, semi-consociational</td>
<td>PR, semi-consociational</td>
<td>PR/Preferential (General/Serb Minority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-War Nationalist Party Behavior</td>
<td>Moderate to high conflict exploitation, low level hostilities and violence</td>
<td>High conflict exploitation, moderate to high level hostilities and violence</td>
<td>Moderation/cooperation, low to absent levels of hostilities and violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3: Ethnic Population Distribution

**BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA**

- Serb 37.1%
- Bosniak 48%
- Croat 14.3%
- Other .6%

**CROATIA**

- Croat 89.6%
- Serb 4.5%
- Other 5.9%

*The Bosniak component of the Croatian population is included in the “Other” category.

**Source: CIA World Factbook. Statistics for Croatia compiled 2001, while those for Bosnia-Herzegovina are taken from 2000.*
these control variables, variation in nationalist party behavior can be more directly correlated with variation in electoral system, allowing for isolation of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Further detail on how these cases fit this most similar systems design can be found in Table 2.

The choice of research design is not without compromise. While a larger case pool might yield increasingly generalizable results, the exploratory nature of the research question does not lend itself to a larger quantitative study at this time. Comparative investigation of a small number of cases allows for a more thorough analysis of the variables, relationships, and causal linkages that can facilitate the development of precise variable observation and hypothesis testing with a larger case pool in future research. Additionally, it should be noted that the MSSD framework shows correlation between variables without necessarily providing causation. While the impact of matched variables can be controlled for, the potential influence of other variables on the dependent variable can be mistakenly attributed to the independent variable under investigation. Despite this relative vulnerability, the MSSD scheme provides the most effective means for controlling these additional variables and isolating the causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables in the study currently.

The Federation (FBiH), Republika Srpska (RS), and Croatia present fruitful avenues for investigation as these cases have experienced some of the most intensive and complicated attempts at electoral engineering as a means of conflict resolution. Nationalist party behavior during the Bosnian legislative elections in 1996, 2000, and 2002 is examined in both the FBiH and RS. These findings are combined with those for the Croatian elections in 2000 and 2003 to compare the effect of electoral engineering on party behavior. Each of the six behavior indicators will be assessed through the course of these campaign cycles in each country to distinguish the development of patterns over time as related to electoral design.

Data on party behavior from a diverse set of sources is used to develop a comprehensive base for investigation. As a primary source, the campaign and election reports
produced by the OSCE missions to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo provide detailed assessments of party behavior, including party rhetoric, the substance of platforms and proposed policies, party cooperation and alliances, strategies of either confrontation or accommodation, politically motivated violence, and party involvement in violent activity. Incorporated with analysis on the OSCE publications, additional attention is directed to the press/media releases and country reports put forth by the International Crisis Group (ICG), a leading NGO with extensive exposure and on-the-ground coverage in all three cases. Finally, BBC coverage of campaign activity and events serve as a third source from which party behavior is monitored. The utilization of these three sources will allow for fact/data verification and the balancing of any bias present in the reports, thus furthering thorough and objective analysis.

**CASE ANALYSIS**

**Bosnia-Herzegovina**

Accounting for the discussion and hypotheses outlined previously, we expect confrontational behavior along ethnic lines to be high in state and entity election campaigns, thus supporting hypothesis 1. Although theory on PR structures predicts inter-party cooperation in government, such behavior is not expected during the election campaign. Furthermore, the linkage between PR systems and competitive office seeking as based on ethnic affiliation generates the expectation that the Bosnian electoral structure will encourage parties toward conflict exploitation. Consequently, scoring on individual cooperation indicators is expected to be low, while scores for conflict exploitation are expected to be very high in both the Federation and RS, thus supporting hypothesis 1, that *consociationally-based PR systems encourage nationalist parties toward centrifugal, ethno-political conflict provocation*.

Open hostilities erupted in Bosnia when the republic, fearing Milosevic’s monopolization of power in the federation, proclaimed independence in 1992. As Yugoslav National Army (JNA) forces were sent in to reclaim the region, Bosnian Serb military elements, encouraged
and propped up by Milosevic, embarked upon a strategy of capturing as much territory as possible to be incorporated into “Greater Serbia.” Armed conflict intensified as self-proclaimed “Chetnik” gangs, supported by the JNA and various criminal elements, began using terror tactics against Bosnian Muslims. Nationalist furor manifested itself in ethnic cleansing campaigns by both Serb and Croatian forces, aimed at driving Muslims from their villages and carving up the remains into “Greater Croatia” and “Greater Serbia.” By spring of 1993, the ethnic cleansing activities of Croats attempting to establish an all-Croat homeland left many to speculate on a Serb-Croatian alliance seeking to divvy up the spoils of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tactics of systematized rape and the detention of Muslim men and boys in concentration camps characterize the virulence of ethnic cleansing activities during this period. However, the Serbian partnership fractured as Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic started to pursue objectives at variance from those of Milosevic, whose commitment to the war began to waver under the pressure of increasing inflation, compounded by an economic blockade by the international community. After several failed partition proposals, Croats and Muslims agreed upon plans for a federated Bosnia in March 1994 and were able to make joint gains on Serb-controlled areas while UN-commissioned air-strikes helped to weaken the Serb position. The summer of 1995 witnessed the climax of the Bosnian conflict and the ultimate dissolution of UN authority over the situation when armed Serb elements overran UN-declared safe-areas in Srebrenica and Zepa, instigating some of the most egregious incidents of ethnic cleansing during the entire war. Serb setbacks in Krajina and parts of western Bosnia-Herzegovina to Muslim-Croat forces and a wave of air-strikes unleashed by NATO upon the Serbian infrastructure worked in conjunction with Milosevic’s failure to intervene to leave Bosnian Serbs without the external patronage on which they depended and prepared the way for the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in November 1995, galvanized by the enforcement of 60,000 NATO troops. Although a tenuous peace has been maintained by international security forces latent inter-group animosity and hostility have continued to
characterize relations between Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs and have been at the disposal of ultra-nationalist parties from all three communities.

1996 General Elections

Following the finalization of the DPA, Bosnian voters turned out for elections on September 14, 1996 to decide the mandates for the President, Vice President, and National Assembly (NA) of the RS, the FBiH House of Representatives (HoR) and various cantons in the Federation. Under a PR system, the seats of the RS NA and FBiH HoR were awarded in proportion to the number of votes cast for contesting entities. Parties, coalitions, and individual candidates contended for seats in the RS NA with a minimum threshold of 1.2% of the vote needed in order to gain each seat. Individual candidates attaining the threshold acquired one seat personally while parties and coalitions won seats based on their respective vote-shares. Seats for coalitions and parties were distributed according to published coalition or party lists, with seats going to candidates from down the list until the number of seats allotted to the coalition or party had been filled.

Although the Coordinator for International Monitoring officially certified the 1996 elections, significant problems relating to registration, absentee polling stations, freedom of movement, and the election campaign, were cited as serious concerns by the Coordinator (OSCE/ODIHR, 1996a and b). Campaign conduct, in particular, raised doubts among observers, including ICG, that the politically neutral environment, as mandated by Dayton in order for elections to proceed, had actually been established. Overall, the dominant nationalist parties, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Croat Democratic Party (HDZ), and the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), used intimidation, propaganda, and violence to effectively impair campaigning by moderate, multi-ethnic, or non-nationalist parties and coalitions throughout both the RS and Federation entities. In addition to disrupting the rallies and meetings of other parties, the SDS and HDZ also used convicted war criminals to boost their campaigns and defied the DPA by voicing secessionist opinions. A persistent trend throughout the campaign in
both entities was party use of local authorities to harass members of opposition parties and 
stymie their efforts to organize and campaign.

Inter-party cooperation in the Federation and RS was virtually non-existent during the 1996 campaign. Proximate policy positioning was largely absent as the main nationalist parties focused their platforms and rhetoric on their community’s victimization and losses during the war, repatriation for their own refugees, and commitment to the defense of their group’s interests. Despite the international community’s maintenance of security and order, the SDS, SDA, and HDZ “went to great lengths to propagate fear and insecurity among voters” (ICG, 1996, 20; ICG, 1999) and capitalized on portraying themselves as the sole defenders of their respective community’s physical safety during and after the war. These calls for ethnic protection and defense carried over to the maintenance of sectarian or ethno-chauvinist positions that often facilitated conflict exploitation and left little room for party cooperation on policy or campaigning initiatives. Furthermore, although moderate, multi-ethnic parties coalesced into alliances and coalitions, the dominant nationalist parties failed to embrace such cooperation. Nationalist parties did not align or cooperate with moderate and other nationalist parties, including those from the same communal group.

In the RS, the campaign tactics and rhetoric of the SDS further demonstrate the resistance of the party to efforts by the international community to foster moderate politics in Bosnia. SDS leaders widely clung to beliefs that the RS would eventually be united with Serbia and Montenegro in a rump Yugoslavian state.¹ Statements made by SDS leaders and officials during the campaign clearly challenged the territorial integrity of the BiH state and promised that SDS re-election would mean RS independence and unification with Serbia (ICG, 1996). In the view of one ICG report, the aim of the SDS campaign was, “to confirm with the ballot what they had won during the war, working toward the unification of all Serbs in one state” (ICG, 1996, 39). Yet another sign of the continuing extremism in the SDS was the persistent influence of war criminal at large, Radovan Karadzic, on the party. SDS posters during the campaign
flaunted pictures of Karadzic while party leaders frequently made public reference to their affiliation with the former president of the RS. The Election Appeals Sub-Committee (EASC), responsible for disciplining any violations of the rules set forth by the Provisional Election Commission (PEC), attempted on September 6th to threaten the party with penalties for such rhetoric and strategies but was largely ineffectual as demonstrated by the SDS’s unwillingness to alter it public stance. On September 10th, the EASC exacted a penalty of US $50,000 on the SDS and demanded that the party halt the use of inflammatory rhetoric to avoid having its candidates removed from the party list (OSCE/ODIHR, 1996 a and b). When SDS officials and candidates continued to make provocative statements, the EASC ordered SDS leader Biljana Plavsic to issue a formal, televised apology, warning that three SDS candidates would be stricken from the party list if the apology were to be distorted in any way. Although the EASC called for the Karadzic posters to be taken down or covered up, the SDS avoided compliance by stating that the posters had been put up by private citizens who were not under EASC jurisdiction (OSCE/ODIHR, 1996b).

A prevalent trend during the campaign in the RS, the assault on opposition parties by the main nationalist parties, testifies to the high level of inducement to and involvement in violence by nationalist parties. The level of intimidation and violence exacted by the dominant parties was directly related to the strength of the opposition party under attack. The SDS harassed the main opposition coalitions, the Union for Peace and Progress (SMP) and the Democratic Patriotic Bloc (DPB) by threatening or carrying out job dismissal, launching direct violence at opposition rallies and the homes of party leaders, and prompting local officials to deny permits and leases to buildings slated for used by the opposition parties (OSCE/ODIHR, 1996b, ICG, 1996). In particular, the Socialist Party of Republika Srpska (SPRS), working in the SMP coalition, was the target of especially vicious attacks by the SDS; one SPRS member received threats that his daughter would be raped unless he left the party (ICG, 1996).
The behavior of the main nationalist parties in FBiH illustrates resistance by the HDZ and SDA to efforts at political moderation. In Croat-controlled territory, the HDZ responded to the multi-national opposition party started by Jole Musa by ensuring that Musa was evicted from office and by intimidating four party candidates to the point that they dropped out of the party (ICG, 1996). The far-right opposition parties, the Croat Party of the Right (HSP) and the Croat Pure Party of the Right (HCSP) also faced HDZ intimidation and disruption tactics. A number of shootings, beatings, bombs, arson attempts, and forced evictions were perpetrated by the HDZ to silence the opposition. Similarly, opposition parties in Bosniak controlled territory faced even more severe scare tactics by the SDA, as indicated by SDA leader Edhem Bicakcic’s threat to “show no mercy to opposition parties” (ICG, 1996, 25). Opposition supporters in the Federation faced the same type of employment intimidation and coercion that the opposition in the RS had suffered. SDA violence during the pre-election campaign was epitomized by the brutal physical assault on Haris Silajdzic, leader of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) by SDA supporters at an SBiH rally during the summer. ² Political disruption and violence were widespread in Bosniak-majority areas as SDA supporters planted bombs at the headquarters of opposition parties, threw grenades into rallies and homes of key party members, and beat supporters/leaders of the SBiH, the Union for Bosnian and Herzegovinian Social Democrats (UBSD), and the multi-ethnic Social Democratic Party (SDP) (OSCE/ODIHR , 1996 a and b, ICG, 1996). In the same vein as the SDS in the RS, the SDA utilized local authorities to help undermine opposition campaigns. In Bihac, local police removed posters and leaflets of the coalition United List (ZL) because the materials advertised opposition to the ruling SDA. HDZ strategies mirrored those of the SDS, displaying images of crimes against humanity suspect, Dario Kordic. However, while the actions of the HDZ and SDA were under the close scrutiny of the EASC and other international monitors, these parties were not penalized for their activities to the extent that the SDS was because they less vehemently challenged the integrity of the BiH state and the spirit of Dayton.
The tactics of the main nationalist parties paid-off on election day when the SDS was able to capture both the presidency and an absolute majority in the RS NA. Given that the primary nationalist parties that started the war and maintained a vice grip on control of the region were able to flout the democratic process with fear and intimidation, propagate extremist politics, and remain in power, we must conclude that the post-war electoral institutions were ineffective in curbing extremist politics in the immediate term. As one ICG report observes, the electoral system in 1996 did not present incentives for voter support of moderate parties, in effect failing to deter parties from relying on the “fear vote” (ICG, 1999, ii). Furthermore, parties in both entities sought to propagate and capitalize on a “strong sense of the ‘hostile other”’ (ICG, 1999, 2). As expected, cooperation indicators in both FBiH and RS were low, as indicated in the 0 scores for all cooperative behaviors (see Table 3). In relation, party conflict measures reached the high scores predicted, resulting in an aggregate behavior score of −9 for both cases that falls on the far left, extreme conflict side of the behavior spectrum in Figure 2. Yet, the data suggests that the EASC played a more direct role, through interventions, warnings, and penalties, in affecting party and candidate behavior. This point, however, should not be overemphasized since critical observers have pointed out how the delay of EASC decisions and failure of the body to stringently handle violations contributed to a zero-sum political arena where parties were drawn to exploit ethnic, nationalist rhetoric (ICG, 1996; ICG 1999).

2000 General Elections

Prior to General Elections in 2000, the PEC initiated several electoral system modifications meant to persuade politicians and parties away from hard-line, nationalist stances toward accommodatory, cross-ethnic strategies. At the House of Peoples (HoP) level of the FBiH parliament, deputies would be popularly elected by cantonal assemblies instead of being appointed by the major Bosniak and Croat parties in those assemblies. This change was meant to persuade HoP candidates to choose more moderate political tones in order to gain the
support from other ethnic groups necessary to gaining a mandate in the HoP. The ICG noted that the political environment engendered by the PEC modifications might usher in an opportunity, “ripe for an election result that would confirm Bosnia’s Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats could move away from ethnic politics…” (ICG, 2000, 2). However, these hopes were deflated during the campaign period where nationalist propaganda, built upon fear, hate, and growing distrust of the international community, was increasingly peddled by candidates and parties in both the RS and the Federation. Violations of PEC regulations against hate speech and rhetoric that could incite violence led to the EASC’s decision to penalize offenses by striking several candidates from party lists. Although the party dynamics in Bosniak politics experienced a relative shift toward centrism, the HDZ in FBiH and parties in the RS continued to rely on ultra-nationalist, sectarian strategies for voter support.

The lack of substantive nationalist party cooperation during the 1996 elections largely carried over to the 2000 campaign. However, by 2000, all parties aligned around recognition of international community authority within Bosnian territory. Additionally, a movement toward reforms and reconstruction that would facilitate Bosnian self-sufficiency in matters of governance began to surface in both moderate and nationalist party rhetoric. In parallel, some nationalists, the SDA and HDZ in particular, rallied around continued or increased international aid and the hopes of EU membership at some point in the future. Yet, policy alignment around substantive issues, such as refugee return, repatriation of land, and corruption, failed to materialize amongst nationalist parties.

By far, party maneuvering in Croat-controlled parts of the FBiH was the most provocative during the pre-election period in 2000. Having lost a significant portion of support due to decreasing voter turnout and the strengthening of the flanking party, the Croat Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZBiH), the HDZ campaign was hard-pressed to not only reclaim some of its power, but to secure the party's survival in Bosnian politics. The hard-line position of HDZBiH leaders supported goals for consolidation of the Croat community mainly
through the reunion of western Herzegovina with Croatia and posed a verifiable threat to HDZ claims to represent the interests of the Croat people. The formation of the New Croat Initiative (NHI), resulting from a split within the ranks of the HDZBiH, meant that no party with the strength to unseat the HDZ existed in Bosnian Croat politics. Using the electoral amendments preceding the elections as a chance to build up sentiments for Croat unity, the HDZ launched a campaign centered on the image of a Croatian community threatened by larger groups and the international community. Party posters with messages such as “determination… or extermination” complimented the HDZ attack on HoP election reform, which the party argued was aimed at debilitating Croat influence in a Bosniak-dominated government. The HDZ continued its opposition to the reforms by sponsoring the “All Croat Congress” in which it and other Croat parties announced support for a referendum on the establishment of a third, independent entity, Herceg-Bosna, for the Croatian people. Although the HDZ cooperated with other parties in order to challenge the international community, the party largely sought to overpower its opponents by advertising itself as the only party capable of protecting the interests of the Croat community (ICG, 2000d). HDZ domination in Croat regions of the FBiH was easily re-instated due to the absence, since the split of HDZBiH, of any party or coalition that could seriously challenge its dominance. The HDZ’s inflammatory campaign openly flouted Dayton provisions, opposing requirements for minority return and challenging the territorial integrity of BiH with its separatist agenda, and eventually provoked disciplinary action from the EASC (ICG, 2000d). Citing the potential of HDZ ads and statements to provoke violence and hatred, the EASC threatened and carried out the removal of several candidates from HDZ party lists in addition to demanding that the party take down or cover up all posters in violation of PEC regulations. The EASC actions only proved to further the HDZ cause as the party used the events as evidence of Croat persecution by the international community. After the election, the EASC delivered a more severe blow to the HDZ when it found the referendum by the All Croat Congress to be a breach of the statute of campaign silence on election day and penalized the
HDZ by eliminating those candidates of the party that achieved the strongest voter support from several Cantonal Assemblies. As the seats were not to be refilled, this act resulted in a minor loss of HDZ power in electing representatives to the HoP on both entity and state levels. Yet, the deliverance of these decisions did little to curb HDZ behavior and tactics during the campaign since the penalties were exacted well after election day.

In contrast to politics in the RS and Croat areas in FBiH, the Bosniak political environment experienced a significant shift away from extremist politics toward a more moderate base. After sustaining major losses in the preceding municipal elections, and losing much of its media access and financial support, the SDA lost its grip on power and paved the way for Haris Silajdžić, leader of the SBiH, to assume the role of potential “king-maker” in the FBiH. The international community placed heavy emphasis on an SBiH coalition with the SDP since the liberal, moderate parties had finally amassed enough strength to build a coalition government that excluded the SDA. No other extremist party with potential strength to replace the SDA made progress toward overcoming the SDA or its primary opposition.

The formation of the liberal SLOGA coalition and rising success of the centrist Party for Democratic Peace (PDP) and the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) in the RS rang in the potential for moderate opposition forces to alter the imbalance of SDS power and play a meaningful role in government. However, the OSCE ban of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) consequently galvanized the position of the SDS as the party could then pick up most of the SRS vote made available after the ban. Having made additional gains when SLOGA dissolved in the months preceding elections, the SDS sought to boost its popularity through a campaign program that accentuated a Serb sense of vulnerability by fueling voter fears of a unified Bosnian army and education system, which would endanger Serbian children. Still heavily under the influence of Karadžić and openly working to undermine the spirit of Dayton, the SDS capitalized on HDZ calls for an independent third entity by supporting a referendum for RS independence. Hence, initial gains made by centrist opposition elements were ultimately
reversed by the SDS appeals for ethnic unity in the face of threats by other groups and the international community and by the actions of external actors.

Together, these observations support the expectations of hypothesis 1. Regarding behavior indicators, the parties in both FBiH and RS continued to achieve the low cooperation and high conflict exploitation scores anticipated from hypothesis 1 (see Table 3). On balance, the behavior of the HDZ and other nationalist parties in the Federation yield an aggregate rating of –4, while RS party behavior reached –7, placing both cases on the left end of the behavior spectrum (See Table 3 and Figure 2).

2002 General Elections

The Bosnian elections of 2002 signal a landmark in the post-Dayton period in several respects. First, the elections were celebrated as the first races to be administered and organized largely by local authorities rather than the OSCE. Although the OSCE did have to provide more guidance and support than originally expected, the PEC was replaced with a permanent BiH body, the Election Commission (EC). Second, the elections were the first to occur under the aegis of a newly adopted Election Law, which introduced formal provisions for the representation of “constituent peoples”, Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. Finally, the new High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, and other elements from the international community were highly involved in a political campaign consisting of seven electoral races on state, entity, and canton levels. Ashdown extended the full force of his Bonn powers by requiring a constitutional amendment that requires a minimum of four members from BiH’s constituent peoples to be elected to the Federation HoR and the RS NA, by re-allocation of compensatory seats if necessary. Additionally, constitutional laws were added to ban party certification if persons banned by the PEC held top party positions, resulting in major leadership restructuring by the SRS and HDZ. Ashdown also enforced a provision for an additional vice presidential seat in the RS, requiring that a Serb, Bosniak, and Croat hold either a presidential or a vice presidential
seat in the entity. Multi-member districts accorded voters open lists by which to mark preference among candidates, while closed lists were used for compensatory mandates.

Having been patched together by the international community in order to block the nationalist parties from controlling government, the moderate Alliance for Change coalition governed at the state and Federation levels, bringing together a large number of diverse parties from across the ideological spectrum. Plagued by paralysis, particularly respecting socio-economic issues, the Alliance’s 18-month unsatisfactory performance worked in conjunction with indignation at being barred from government to embolden the dominant nationalist parties in their 2002 bid for office. An inability to cooperate or instigate meaningful economic progress aided the nationalists in their offensive attack of the moderate, Alliance parties. Capitalizing on popular dissatisfaction with the lack of progress over the past two years (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a), the fervent nationalist drive to attack leading moderate parties and to exploit contentious issues, such as the further melding of the Federation and RS into one state and the sensitive issue of refugee return, fueled the continually conflict-charged campaign environment in Bosnia.

Overall assessments of the campaign present highly varied observations of party and candidate behavior. Where the OSCE reports a generally peaceful political environment and a low incidence of seriously egregious incidents in connection with the campaign, internal and outside observers also commented that the campaign was the dirtiest race to be fought in the post-Dayton period (OSCE/ODIHR, 2002 and 2003a; ICG, 2003). Although the OSCE counted few incidents of hate speech or incitement to violence, several international bodies and NGOs urged contesting parties to moderate nationalist political rhetoric (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a). The prevalence of negative, highly personalized campaigning and the resurgence of nationalist propaganda fulfilled ICG predictions that, “barring a whole series of miracles, the campaign will be entirely negative with the accent on threats to ‘our’ nation and accusations of betrayal of ‘our’ national interests” and “alternating with more or less veiled imprecations against the others and attempt to derive maximum benefit from every passing revelation of sin” (ICG, 2002, 22).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Behavior Indices</th>
<th>Proximate Policy Positioning</th>
<th>Joint Campaigning</th>
<th>Party Coalitions</th>
<th>Conflict Exploitative Campaigns</th>
<th>Incitement of Violence</th>
<th>Engagement in Violence</th>
<th>Aggregate Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>-2</td>
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<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>-1</td>
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In general, the level of inter-party cooperation was largely muted. A degree of proximate policy positioning is evident in nationalist and moderate party support for EU membership and commitment to the idea of reform. Party calls for “reform” failed to crystallize on concrete issues such as banking, employment, trade, or structural adjustment, leaving few specific points around which parties could build common fronts. Although the number of cross-entity campaigns rose, with 27 Federation-based parties and the HDZ contesting posts in the RS and 12 RS parties vying for mandates in the Federation, this pattern did not result in extensive cross-ethnic campaigning strategies as most cross-entity campaigns were directed at ethnic votes from returnees of the party’s own communal group (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a). The level of cooperative policy-positioning in these campaigns was largely relegated only to rhetoric and media gestures instead of rallies or actual contact with the electorate (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a). While the SNSD and PDP made joint public appearances, these rallies were mainly directed at “their” returnees and held in Serb-dominated areas of the Federation. However, cross-entity campaigns reported no obstruction or intimidation by other parties (OSCE/ODIHR, 2002 and 2003a). In conjunction with cross-entity campaigns, inter-party cooperation extended to suspected negotiations between the SDA and HDZ to form a coalition government once elected that did not result in a campaign coalition or bloc. Additionally, the ties between the SDS and Alliance parties, built through de facto cohabitation in government, proved to confuse voters and forestall any further campaign cooperation between the SDS and any moderate parties from the Alliance (ICG, 2003). Yet, the HDZ did enter into the Koalicija coalition with the Christian Democrats in the state races and at the Federation level with the inclusion of the People’s Democratic Union (HNZ) party.

Observation of nationalism throughout the 2002 campaign highlights a complex dynamic of entrenched ethno-politics, resultant party behavior, and voter perceptions. Nationalist rhetoric largely followed two seemingly opposite strategies to strain communal relations. On one hand, nationalist leaders, particularly Bosnian Serbs, were firmly opposed to the prospect of
further integrating the Federation and RS into a unitary state, promising to undertake preventative measures once in office to act as stalwarts to unification initiatives (ICG, 2003). SDS candidate Mirko Sarovick promised to protect RS autonomy from all encroachments by the state, including the establishment of a single economy, government, and army, by obstructing the function of the state government (ICG, 2003). On the other hand, officials from the SDA commented that the RS would be defunct by the next elections, in effect escalating Bosnian Serb feelings of vulnerability and provoking fresh resentment and animosity (ICG, 2003).

Although the primary nationalist parties sought to re-brand themselves as moderate, cooperative, and pragmatic, party attempts to attest that nationalist strategies were no longer appealing are contradicted by the extent to which ethno-political tactics continued to play an underlying and pervasive role in campaign activity (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a). Despite OSCE analysis that nationalism had been on the wane in campaign maneuvering, others claim that the entrenchment of ethnic politics, particularly in the RS and at the local levels, meant that parties were less compelled to present explicitly nationalist agendas and rhetoric as the ethnic nature of their positions could largely be assumed by the electorate and other contesting parties (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a; ICG, 2003). Moreover, observers note a continuing trend throughout Bosnia for material interests to be intertwined with national ones (ICG, 2003). The embedded quality of nationalist, ethno-politics served the reified nationalists well in their bid to recapture office from the moderate Alliance because nationalist parties continue to maintain the confidence of the largest part of a “still divided electorate whose separate nations still resonate to assertions either that they were the war’s main victims or that they are the most at threat from others – the nationalists could be placed to reassure their constituents that the reforms underway will not endanger their respective national interests” (ICG, 2003,1). For example, in highlighting the nationalist quality of Milorad Dodik’s (SNSD) campaign, ICG notes that “since all political discourse in the RS takes place within nationalistic terms of reference, he has no alternative but to speak the phrases his electorate wants and expects to hear” (ICG, 2003, 26).
Despite observations that nationalism played a clandestine and insidious role, overt examples illustrate the stubborn persistence of ethno-politics in the campaign strategies employed by the main nationalist contestants and smaller parties. While the SDS campaign included urges to “Vote Serb,” the HDZ championed its image as the defender of Croat patrimonial interests and faith (OSCE/ODIHR, 2002; ICG, 2003). The SDA took advantage of popular dissatisfaction with the Alliance government by attacking the Alliance parties for failing to protect Bosniak interests, belittling Bosniak heroism during the war, and deficient patriotism (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a; ICG, 2003). The Croatian Rights Bloc and the PDP further escalated the climate of ethnic confrontation, with the former using inflammatory posters portraying WWII Ustashe images and slogans bellowing “Ready for the Fatherland”, while the latter touted slogans such as, “to become European, but to stay Serbian” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a; ICG, 2003). These trends spread to more moderate parties as well, with these parties ridiculing nationalist strategies while taking any available opportunity to demonstrate their commitment and dedication to national, communal values (ICG, 2003). Ethnic politics were further reinforced by nationalist party manipulation of fear to maintain strong support bases. Fear resonated in non-physical concerns as well; as one report observes, “people who would like to vote for a non-nationalist worry that their vote won’t count if everyone else divides along nationalist lines.” While reliance on scare tactics trumping up the threat of communal extinction were less prominent than in previous campaigns, continued reliance on the manipulation of fear marks the persistence of ethnic voting in Bosnia.

Belligerent behavior, while less extreme than in previous elections, continued to characterize campaign politics in the Federation. Exploitative behavior included the distribution of offensive leaflets and removal of another party’s posters leading the ECAC to remove candidates from the election in three cases (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a). In one particular case, party materials were found to clearly incite violence (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a). While serious incidents of violence were virtually non-existent, poster vandalism and destruction were widespread with
evidence that the behavior had been organized activities (ICG, 2003). Nationalist parties targeted moderate parties and other nationalist parties, as evident in the exchange of poster vandalism between the HDZ and Radom za Boljitak (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a; ICG, 2003). Vandalism also extended to physical destruction of property, such as broken windows at the People’s Democratic Union (HDZ) headquarters (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a). Belligerent behavior extended to police blocking of HSS candidate Ante Colak from holding a press conference in front of the Ministry of the Interior building to Colak’s physical assault by an HDZ party official (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a).

If inter-party cooperation was largely muted in the Federation, it was almost silent in the RS. While nationalist parties engaged in a degree of proximate policy positioning by speaking out against corruption, inter and intra-party divisions over issues such as cooperation with the ICTY on the surrender and capture of war criminals, refugee repatriation, and further unification with the Federation prevailed. Although individual leaders and officials from the SDS and SRS may have aligned around similar positions on the aforementioned issues, no RS-based nationalist party cooperated with moderate, multi-ethnic, or other ethnic parties in either the RS or from the Federation. The proximate policy positioning that did occur among individual party members failed to materialize into concrete party alliances or coalitions. In fact, the SDS, threatened by the flanking maneuvers of the SRS, waged a vicious battle for the hearts of Serb voters, showcasing its eminence as the defender of the Serb community’s survival and core national interests.

In the RS, the SDS maintained a double faceted role by pandering to international authorities, espousing democratic, accomodatory principles and claiming to have given up an ethno-chauvinist and sectarian agenda, while abandoning such attitudes in practice and exploiting communal tensions, as apparent after ethically-motivated riots in 2001. Regardless of SDS involvement, the rioting in Banja Luka and Trebinje produced a long-term advantage to the SDS by working to “unite Serbs against their common Muslim and international enemies and
allowed the SDS to exploit the fears of displaced Serbs in the RS who occupy the homes of Bosniaks or Croats threatening to return" (ICG, 2001, 21). Under international pressure, threats of aid embargos, and disciplinary action that would ban the party from the upcoming elections, SDS leadership moved to make nominal gestures of ethnic conciliation by publicly apologizing to Bosniak returnees and attempting convince the international community that it denounced ethnically motivated violence (ICG, 2001). Yet, the continued use of conflict inductive rhetoric by the SDS throughout the 2002 campaign illustrates flimsy party commitment in reality to ethnic reconciliation and integration. Suspicions of continued affiliation with Mladic, Karadzic, and other war criminals combined with SDS propaganda that perpetually stressed Serb victimization, the essential position of the party as the only real defense against a fundamentalist Islamic state, and the value of the party in building the nationalist solidarity necessary for Serb survival in an antagonistic environment (ICG, 2001). As ICG notes, the party bases its popular strength from its position as “the wartime party that built RS" and that “this means its leaders must regularly invoke the past, stoke up fears of those ‘alien’ elements whose return would put their achievement at risk, and maintain a measure of nationalist paranoia among the population – all in order to remind the masses of the party’s sterling services in war and indispensability in peace” (ICG, 2001, 21). Consequently, the SDS could not afford others redefining its war in order to market its importance in serving the Serb community and to distract attention away from the floundering state of the RS economy (ICG, 2001). These signals expose the degree of actual sincerity in SDS attempts to portray itself as a reforming, pragmatic party to the international community and RS voters.

Strained relations between returnees and Serbs in RS following the riots and the persistence of ethnically charged rhetoric highlight the political atmosphere in which elections occurred. As previously noted, the entrenchment of ethno-politics worked to constantly entwine political positions with the identity and interests of each communal group. At best, one could observe the low level of violence following the riots until elections and the denouncement of
violence during the riots by nationalist politicians as evidence that inter-communal relations had improved. However, OSCE observations that few incidents of direct intimidation are contradicted by several reports that a climate subtle and indirect intimidation pervaded the entire campaign period (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a). Due to heightened security after the 2001 riots, all nationalist party incitement to violence or direct involvement in violence during the campaign was highly restrained. Although the return of Bosnian refugees to the RS correlated with a proportional rise in attacks on returnees (ICG, 2001), the level of violence that culminated in the riots did not re-emerge during the pre-election campaign. Nationalist programs may not have spurred incidents that would be labeled “serious” violations, however, several significant examples highlight the conflict-prone political environment preceding elections. Parties reported intimidation that ranged from Radom za Boljitak reporting that it was prevented from organizing rallies to enterprise workers in Tulza and eastern RS stating that they had been terminated or threatened with termination due to political affiliation (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a). These incidents occurred against a backdrop of widespread antagonism and hostilities, including vandalism, property destruction, and harassment.

Although the main nationalist parties, the HDZ, SDA, and SDS sought to re-vamp their respective images as “pragmatic modernizers who could put their past antagonisms aside while continuing to defend their respective national interests,” their nationalist undertones failed to sufficiently convince either the electorate or international observers of their actual transformation (ICG, 2003,1). Despite higher cooperation scores than in previous elections, nationalist parties in the Federation continued to achieve moderately high conflict exploitation scores, as listed on Table 1. Conversely, the decline in conflict provocation by RS parties, due in large part to intervention by the international community, was not accompanied by increased levels of party cooperation, as evident in low cooperation ratings (see Table 3). Together, the behavior indices place FBiH parties at the middle section in the behavior spectrum, with an aggregate score of 0,
while parties in the RS, attaining a total score of –1.5, continue to fall in the left portion of the continuum (See Figure 1 and Table 3).

Yet, low turnout, down 10% from 2000, and increased voter apathy worked to benefit the nationalist parties that receive most of their support from an actively committed constituency (OSCE/ODIHR, 2002; ICG, 2003). At all levels, election results mirrored previous contests and “did not reflect major changes in voting patterns from previous elections and showed a continuing fragmentation among political parties” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a, 20).

Analysis

Engineering of electoral institutions in BiH after Dayton arose from intentions to alter political system dynamics, which supported extremist ethno-nationalism and obstructed the development of mechanisms that could peaceably manage inter-group conflict. During the campaign period preceding the 1996 elections, hard-line SDS, HDZ, and SDA forces in the RS and Federation were only minimally deterred from ethnic conflict provocation by electoral engineering. For its part, the EASC more effectively influenced party behavior by penalizing violations of PEC regulations. However, dominant nationalist parties in both entities were able to respond to emergent multi-ethnic or moderate opposition with tactics of intimidation, violence, and propaganda based on ethnic insecurities. The emergence of moderate, centrist parties and candidates that were able to develop bases of support and reputations eventually impacted the political imbalance of extreme nationalist party power. Yet, the erosion of nationalist party power bases did not substantially motivate parties toward moderation, aggregative politics, or cooperation. Without incentive for moderation and accommodation, these parties continued to play the ethnic card that had served them well before and during the war. In certain instances, the absence of such incentives worked in conjunction with penalties, meant as a disincentive, to boost the appeal of ethno-political office-seeking strategies, as evident in the HDZ’s use of scare tactics during the campaign.
Given the marginal success of engineering attempts to prompt nationalist moderation in the 1996 elections, the PEC established electoral reforms preceding the 2000 elections, aimed at encouraging the softening of hard-liner rhetoric and the need for cross-ethnic campaigning. These changes worked to reinforce the group victimization imagery used by the SDS and HDZ and provided fuel to calls for hardened ethnic unity. Bosniak politics experienced a relative shift in favor of centrist, non-nationalist, or multi-ethnic parties, as Bosniak politicians sought to appease the international community, earning the approval needed to re-establish a degree of autonomy and the potential for EU and NATO membership. It should be noted, however, that the remaining component of the SDA and the other nationalist parties were not persuaded, once again, of the gains to be had from moderate, cooperative behavior. While the decline in large-scale violence directed by these parties is largely attributable to the security presence of international authorities, the persistence of conflict exploitative rhetoric and platforms illustrate how little the PR structure and new electoral provisions impacted nationalist strategies.

The 2002 campaign exhibits a continuing pattern of declining ethno-nationalist violence, due in large part to increased hopes of European integration. The HDZ’s coalition behavior primarily resulted from weakened ties and support from its counterpart in Croatia, leaving the party with few options other than inter-party cooperation to provide for its political survival. Yet, the assault by an HDZ official of another party member also illustrates the limits of these coalitional strategies and the HDZ’s amenability to conflict exploitative strategies. Further, potential hostilities in the RS were curbed by the extended international scrutiny, security presence, and threats resulting from the 2001 riots. The very ignition, success, and spread of rioting and demonstration violence illustrate the continued combustibility of ethnic relations and, consequently, the gains to be reaped from nationalist conflict exploitation. This is particularly true given SDS involvement in the riots. Potential belligerent parties in the Federation benefited from the lessons learned by the SDS and were thus deterred in pursuing similar tactics that might provoke disciplinary actions or threats of aid sanctions. As in other campaigns, the
prevalence of extremist rhetoric and calls for nationalist unity reflect the degree to which ethnic politics are entrenched and continue to offer powerful incentives to political actors.

With respect to the hypotheses, the dependent variable in the Bosnian cases largely conforms to the combustible, conflict exploitation described in box I of Figure 1 for the 1996 elections, with corresponding scores on the behavior indicators and aggregate behavior spectrum (Figure 2). Although nationalist tactics and activities in subsequent elections exhibit a lower degree of violence, moving from combustible relations to precarious peace (box II, Figure 1), continued party reliance on and proclivity toward ethno-political conflict provocation demonstrates the failure of PR to solely encourage cooperation, accommodation, and moderation. Moreover, the decline in belligerent behavior and violence is attributed mainly to the presence of international security forces and pressures/incentives, such as “sticks” in the form of aid sanctions, party bans, and monetary penalties, and “carrots” in the form of EU membership. Given the prevalence of conflictual rhetoric and victimization/threatened security tactics, in addition to the continued necessity of international involvement, it becomes evident that PR engineering alone, in the absence of intervention by the international community, not only fails to engender cooperative party moderation, but can also sustain or escalate party exploitation of conflict.

Croatia

Changes to the Croatian electoral framework from a predominantly PR structure to a mixed PR/preferential framework allow both hypotheses to be tested. Before electoral restructuring to incorporate preferential mechanisms, hypothesis 1, that PR structures will be associated with nationalist party conflict exploitation, is expected of all nationalist party behavior, yielding the low cooperation and high level of conflict exploitation outlined in box I of Figure 1. Following the institution of preferential provisions, Serb nationalist parties are predicted to follow the behavior patterns in box IV of Figure 1, resulting in high scores on the cooperative behavior
indicators and low ratings on conflict behavior measures. Such patterns conform to the expectations of hypothesis 2, that preferential frameworks prompt moderate and accommodative cooperation by nationalist parties. As preferential mechanisms do not apply to non-Serb voters, other Croatian nationalist parties are expected to conform to hypothesis 1, box I of Figure 1, with low levels of campaign cooperation and high to moderately high scores on conflict exploitation indicators.

Inter-group conflict between ethnic Croats and Serbs may date back for several centuries, however, a brief review of the past few decades will serve as an adequate basis for understanding the recent and current situation in Croatia. Croat-Serb animosity did not intensify until WWII when the extremist Ustashe movement carried out a brutal program of ethnic cleansing against Jews, Romani, and Serbs, culminating in Ustashe claims of creating Croatia as the first “ethnically pure” area in Europe during Nazi dominance. Despite these events, Serb and Croatian communities continued to interact and intermingle throughout the creation of the Yugoslavian state and Tito’s program of Yugoslavian nationalism. However, Croatian nationalism became a potent factor amongst intellectual circles for several decades before Tito’s death, which served to signal an end to state repression of Croat nationalism and an opening through which that nationalism might be realized. Croatian nationalist elements exploited a sense of “Serbian supremacy” after WWI and collective memories of “enforced humiliation the (Croats) felt in living together without rights or property” (Lendevai and Parcell, 1991, 254) during WWII to fuel the fires in the drive for a “Greater Croatia.” Meanwhile, distrust by Milosevic and other Serb factions of Croatian nationalism extended beyond interest in retaining the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state to residual memories of attempted genocide by the Ustashe. After Tito’s demise, Milosevic’s attempts to remain in the presidential post beyond his term and subsequent obstruction of Croatia’s turn at the rotating presidency combined with tensions over federal spending, the direction of the economy, and Milosevic’s attempt to reform the government into a more centralized structure under his control to result in
to the Croatian declaration of independence in 1991, which clashed with armed resistance from both the JNA and Serb paramilitary elements in Croatia. Serb propaganda at the time magnified popular Serbian social angst, Tito’s patronage of Croats, and recent persecution of Croatian Serbs after Tito’s death, including job dismissal, forced loyalty oaths, and denial of the right to use Cyrillic or set up their own schools, only exacerbated the clash of a “Greater Croatia” and a “Greater Serbia” on the battlefield of socio-economic rivalry. While large-scale hostilities between the JNA, Serb paramilitary groups, and Croatian forces ended officially in 1991, issues over the return of Serb refugees, minority representation, and residual distrust have continued to harden inter-ethnic animosity between Croats and Serbs since Croatian independence in 1992.

**General Elections 2000**

The issue became particularly salient during and right after the Balkan wars of the 1990s as the Croatian state became obsessed with territorial integrity, in light of Croatian Serb desires to breakaway and join Serbia proper. In response, one of the amendments to the Croatian electoral framework during 1995 reduced the number of mandates reserved for ethnic Serbs from thirteen to three. Mandates would later be appropriated according to a List PR system using the D’Hondt method and a 5% eligibility threshold. An additional special constituency, number 12, allocated according to FPTP, refers to national minorities and allowed Hungarians, Italians, and Serbs to elect one member to the Sabor while Czechs and Slovaks get one representative and Austrians, Germans, Ruthenians, Jews, and Ukrainians together elect one representative. The electoral provision of the National Minorities Law stipulates that voters from a national minority can choose between general and ethnic votes, resulting in the creation of separate minority and general voter lists. The National Minority provision has sparked criticism by observers on the contention that special minority seats in the House of Representatives have been used to “justify the creation of ethnic voter registers, with the ethnicity of individuals
identified that raise a risk of intimidation and discrimination” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2000a, 1-3).
Furthermore, observers speculated that the national minority provision potentially encourages the “ethnic vote” (OSCE, 2000b, 3).

The right-wing, nationalist HDZ has dominated the arena of Croatian politics for more than fifteen years, with party founder, the late Franjo Tudjman, serving as an icon of Croatian nationalism, self-determination, and unity. Beginning with his perceived martyr-like quest to embolden a sense of Croatian nationalism during the Tito regime, Tudjman and the HDZ’s image as the supreme defender of Croatian security and interests are further galvanized by the party’s leading role during the war for independence, the hostilities in Bosnia, and stewardship of the Croatian government since 1990. Despite its primacy as a paragon of Croatian independence, bolstered by the powerful, iconic image of its leader and head of state, the HDZ faced staunch opposition, primarily from the center-left Social Democrats (SDP). Beyond the SDP, the HDZ faces competition from other Croatian nationalist parties, including the moderate Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) and the radical Croatian Pure Party of Rights (HSP). Various Serbian parties, including the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), or Independent Serb Democratic Party (SDSS), and the Serb People’s Party (SNS) also vied for legislative seats.

Leading up to the 2000 elections, the HDZ found its position severely weakened and controversialized by a number of events, including financial scandal, intra-party division between moderate and hard-line factions, and Tudjman’s failing health. With the rocky conditions facing its main adversary, the SDP sought to strengthen its position by capitalizing on the ill fortunes of and growing popular discontent with the HDZ, while strategically aligning itself with other prominent opposition parties, such as the HSLS and to a lesser extent the so-called “Porec Group” consisting of the Croat Peasant Party (HSS), the Liberal Party (LS), the Istrian Democratic Party (IDS), and the Croatian People’s Party (HNS). These two blocs came to be commonly referred to as the “opposition six” and would branch out to enlist support from other
moderate and Serb parties, such as the SPO, into the fold of a broad-ranging opposition alliance. Additionally, several parties and coalitions from the political right and the Serbian minority came into play to contest the 2000 elections.

Cooperation amongst the opposition nationalist and moderate parties followed roughly consistent patterns throughout the 2000 campaign, while the strategies pursued by the HDZ vacillated between cooperation, with the intent to co-opt the competition, to direct confrontation and reversion to ethno-political tactics (ICG, 1998b). Reeling from scandal, internal discord, and weakened popular support, the HDZ at first attempted to undermine the opposition six by trying to seduce party leaders away from the alliance (ICG, 1998b). Hard-line elements of the HDZ, obsessing over territorial sovereignty, reclamation of the Croat portion of Herzegovina, and resolute opposition to cooperation with the ICTY on suspected war criminals, became embroiled in an intense clash with the party's moderate wing, which wanted to shift party focus from nationalist issues to moderate, reforming positions. Although this internal battle would end with the success of the radical, right wing, other inter-party divisions also flared up, primarily between factions supporting the deputy speaker in the outgoing parliament, Vladimir Seks, and those following presidential adviser Ivic Pasalic, illustrating a regional dimension to clashes amongst differing brands of hard-line nationalism (ICG, 1998b). These events pushed the HDZ to a further extremist position, despite earlier attempts to demonstrate its intent to reform, leaving one ICG report to make stinging observations that “the triumph of the HDZ right has dispelled any illusions about the nature of the party, as despite efforts by Tudjman to revive the impression of balance within the HDZ... the party of Tudjman has been revealed, under the direction of Pasalic, in its true colours, as a party of the nationalist, xenophobic right” (ICG, 1998b, ii) and that “with most of its liberal senior members now departed, it remains a party of the right, authoritarian, determined to hold on to power and prepared to subvert and undermine democratic institutions, the media and the intelligence services in order to do so” (ICG, 1998b, 21). While these divisions threatened to fracture the party into dissolution, popular confidence
continued to plummet, leaving Tudjman to seek out survival strategies that included cooperation with adversaries in the opposition. ICG suggests that Tudjman, “perhaps fearing that further radicalization of the HDZ’s position was bringing yet more discredit to the ruling party, began to put feelers out…” (ICG 1998b, 18) and attempted to lure opposition leaders into the HDZ fold. Before the election campaign, the HDZ offered cooperation in the House of Counties to both the HSLS and the HSS. In particular, the HSS was counted by the HDZ as the weakest link in the opposition grouping for its previous attacks on the SDP in the 1997 campaign and became a primary target for HDZ advances (ICG, 1998b).

In terms of cooperation indicators for the other nationalist parties, proximate policy positioning, as in the Bosnian case, occurred around the topic of further European integration and EU membership – a position that all parties rallied to support. Further, parties largely aligned around the need to effectively combat government corruption and meet refugee return objectives required for the progression of EU accession talks. Mutual inter-party support and alliances were also frequent between both nationalist and moderate, multi-ethnic contestants. The SDP and HSLS had strategically planned to exchange each party’s strengths for mutual gain. Ivica Racan, leader of the SDP, specifically set out to avoid taking on the HDZ on national issues that were vital during the war and chose to focus on matters of social discontent, while gambling that the HSLS would “supply the nationalist credibility that the SDP still lacks” (ICG, 1998b, 15). For its part, the HSLS relied on the SDP to dilute its image as an extreme nationalist party, while re-branding itself as a moderate party of the new Croatia. Additionally, parties worked together in public demonstrations and rallies. For example, the Serb SPO agreed to partake in anti-government protests and other activities led by the opposition six and its alliance partners.11 The two primary opposition blocs (the SDP/HSLS and the Porec Group) formalized a broad alliance known as the Alliance for Change. Several additional coalitions and blocs running on the same ticket were formalized, including the far-right HSP and Croatian Democratic Union (HKDU) bloc.
Despite the observations that the 2000 pre-election campaign occurred in a “calm” environment that was “noticeably subdued” and that political parties were not inhibited by bureaucratic obstacles or interference from state bodies (OSCE/ODIHR, 2000b, 12, 18), the HDZ perpetrated a number of directly conflictual and clandestine efforts to undermine its competition. Some speculate that Tudjman would have attempted to curb the electoral chances or sabotage the opposition were his health not substantially deteriorating shortly before his death late in 1999. Having failed in its attempt to co-opt the HSS by offering up the ministry of agriculture, the HDZ consequently resorted to confrontational tactics by attacking the credibility of HSS leader Zlatko Tomcic in the media (ICG, 1998b). The HDZ took on a seemingly accommodative approach by suggesting inter-party dialogue with the opposition six and several smaller radical parties that worked to ignite severe divisions within the opposition bloc over issues related to the investigation of a recent SIS scandal, diaspora representatives in the HoR, the inclusion of the right-wing parties, and the level of compromise/cooperation that should be pursued with the HDZ. Despite these aggravated relations, conflictual behavior was relatively restrained during the campaign. Racan and HSLS leader Drazen Budisa took up the position that the talks should occur, that dialogue was desirable, and that the opposition could not afford to pursue positions “based on indignant refusal of the HDZ” (ICG, 1998b, 19). Moreover, the SDP/HSLS proposition that victory at the polls would depend on reaching the broadest possible audience hinged on the appearance of tolerance and dialogue. Such an environment would help the alliance avoid further radicalization between two clashing blocs which might work to further galvanize the HDZ and destabilize the government environment in the event of an alliance takeover (ICG, 1998b). Conversely, leaders from the Porec Group, such as the LS’s Vlado Gotovac, doubted Tudjman’s sincerity and willingness to constructively reach an agreement (ICG, 1998b). Elements in the Porec Group also questioned the need for HDZ cooperation in light of the growing success enjoyed by the opposition six and the imminent decline of the HDZ (ICG, 1998b). These divisions, in conjunction with disagreements over
decision-making in the alliance, \(^\text{13}\) worked to unravel the hard-earned unity achieved amongst opposition partners since 1998. Hence, the HDZ discovered an effective means of eroding the cohesive base of its main opposition and used “what might have been seen as a sign of HDZ acknowledgement of opposition strength, in that it showed readiness to discuss matters upon which it had previously refused discussion, had in fact exposed the first weaknesses in the opposition grouping” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2000b, 20). The rifts surfacing from proposed talks with the HDZ resulted in the two blocs running on separate tickets in the election; however, the former opposition six parties continued to cooperation in the Alliance for Change.

Party rhetoric and platforms centered less on calls for a Greater Croatia and more on issues based on economic status, EU membership, and relations with neighboring countries in the Balkans. However, the HDZ did use the Croatian Radio and Television (HRT) services to broadcast an ad shortly before elections that depicted images of the late Tudjman followed with the text “do not betray him” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2000b). Although several incidents of violence and voter intimidation occurred (OSCE/ODIHR, 2000a), these events were largely perpetrated by individuals not part of the dominant nationalist parties and no substantial evidence points to violence and intimidation as directed by nationalist parties against other parties. Furthermore, no evidence credibly demonstrates nationalist party provocation or engagement in inter-ethnic violence. Observers speculate that the relative calm occurred due to the extremely shortened campaign period in which parties had little time to escalate their competitive strategies (OSCE/ODIHR, 2000b).

Regarding behavior indices, the Croatian parties reached moderate levels of cooperation in 2000, while conflict provocation ratings are very low, with a \(-1\) for exploitative campaigning. The party scores for the other conflict behavior categories were found at 0. These indicators point to a total score of 3, placing Croatian parties on the right side of the behavior spectrum.
Several changes occurred in the Croatian political landscape prior to the 2003 Sabor elections. Considered a luxury (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003b), the upper House of Counties met its demise in 2001 as the Sabor became a unicameral body, consisting solely of a House of Representatives (HoR). In attempting to meet Council of Venice recommendations for EU accession, Sabor parliamentarians made a series of vacillating changes to the voting rights of minorities which culminated in a Constitutional Law on National Minorities that expanded minority representation in the Sabor from 5 to 8 seats. Of these seats, those reserved for the Serb community increased from one to three. Moreover, the SEC moved to allow Serb voters a preferential voting scheme whereby voters could specify preferences for multiple candidates up to three contestants. An unexpected consequence of the minority voting rights law was that for the most part, minority voters, with the exception of Serbs, chose to vote on general ballots instead of the special minority ballots afforded by constitutional law. With these amendments in force and the cohesion of the SDP-led coalition government deteriorating, elections were called and the campaign set to begin on November 6th.

The dissolution of the SDP-led government resulted in an election period, like that in 2000, that was relatively short, affecting party participation and contributing to observations that, “overall, the tenor of the campaign was muted” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003b, 11). Generally, the EOM noted the campaign and voting period environs as “calm” and “orderly” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003a and b). In this atmosphere, a high degree of proximate policy positioning occurred with consensus among contestants on the priority of socio-economic issues (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003b). Furthermore, contesting actors from various positions on the political spectrum stressed the necessity of meeting international requirements in order for Croatia to formally join the EU and NATO (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003b). In terms of alliances and coalitions, the 2003 campaign evidenced a high degree of coalition formation that was largely patterned into national and regional party alliances. The Istrian Democratic Party (IDS) joined the SDP-led coalition with
the Liberal and LS while the HNS, PGS, and SBHS consolidated power into an official coalition. Having broken ranks with its former coalition partner, the nationalist HSLS formed new coalition ties with the moderate Democratic Center (DC). While the HDZ and the HSS were the only main nationalist parties to not form coalition with smaller parties, the HDZ did negotiate cooperative agreements for the support of the HSS and the SDSS, marking a significant step in the party’s movement toward moderation and inter-ethnic accommodation/cooperation.

A prominent force in the overall tone of the campaign was the self-styled transformation of the HDZ from an ultra-nationalist party of Tudjman to a responsible, moderate party of Croatia. Party leader Ivo Sanander claimed that, "the party has been transformed under my leadership..." and sought to reinforce the assertion that the HDZ had abandoned its former extremist nationalist policies by encouraging the return of Serb refugees. In addition to supporting refugee return, Sanander further demonstrated party transformation by emphasizing ethnic reconciliation, higher living standards, better relations with neighboring states and regional cooperation, and EU membership instead of the ultra-nationalist policies of the previous HDZ (OSCE/ODIHR, 2004). The moderate tone of Sanander’s statements and much of the HDZ campaign came as a surprise given the continued strength of hard-line conservative elements in the party that had refused to work with the SDP government on issues of refugee return and cooperation with the ICTY on surrendering suspected war criminals from Croatia. The aforementioned cooperation with both moderate and Serb parties further evidence authenticity of HDZ claims to have converted into a new party of Croatia.

Regarding conflictual behavior, the OSCE reported that campaign-related incidents were rare and that no parties claimed to have been intimidated or hindered from campaigning through intimidation (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003b). Notably, Serb parties were able to organize and carry out campaign rallies free from harassment. However, several minor events of inter-party confrontation marked the campaign period. The previously noted moderate campaign tone was largely unencumbered by ultra-nationalist rhetoric or policies, with the exception of several
smaller, mostly non-parliamentary parties that did espouse nationalist rhetoric at campaign rallies (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003b). Furthermore, members of the outgoing government coalition received letters with death threats leading up to elections, including HNS president Vesna Pusic, HSS president Tomcic, the SDP’s Sime Lucin, and SDP leader Ivica Racan (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003b). While the persons responsible for of these letters cannot be determined with certainty, party provocation is clearly evident in an event where a member of the extremist HCSP threw eggs at government vice president, Slavko Linic and the SDP’s Marin Jurjevic at an SDP rally on November 9th in Imotski (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003b). Yet, the SDP blamed the HDZ for the incident, charging that Sanander’s “inflammatory” speeches had provoked the nationalist resentment leading to the event (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003b). The conflict between HDZ and SDP continued as Sanander condemned the event and rejected the SDP’s claims of HDZ responsibility (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003b). This form of low-scale abuse was also directed at other parties, such as the HNS, whose president was also accosted with egg hurling at a campaign rally on November 16th. Despite these isolated, and perhaps publicity motivated, incidents, the overall tone of campaign violence was quite low, particularly compared with levels in election campaigns prior to 2000.

These observations yield moderately high scores on the cooperative behavior indices and very low indications on conflict exploitative behaviors. While conflict provocation remained low, at the same levels as in the 2000 elections, a strong increase was witnessed in party cooperation, resulting in an aggregate behavior score of 5 (see Table 3). Hence, the Croatian parties fall firmly on the right-hand side of the party behavior spectrum. At the polls, these behavior patterns resulted in positive gains for the nationalists, as evident in the HDZ’s successful campaign of transformation into a moderate, ethnically-accomodative party that reaped tremendous rewards in the 2003 races, garnering 62 seats from constituencies N01-10, thus reclaiming a degree of its former dominance. Yet, moderation strategies did not benefit the HSLS to the same extent as the party’s coalition with the DC only resulted in 3 mandates.
While flanking patterns did not push the HDZ to a more extreme position, the far-right HSP performed well at the polls, winning 8 seats in parliament.

Analysis

Leading up to the 2000 and 2003 elections, Croatian political parties sought several means of cooperation, with vary degrees of success, and continued to find themselves embroiled in conflict as well. Recent election cycles demonstrate a decline in ultra-nationalist rhetoric and campaign-related violence combined with movement from extreme ethno-politics toward inter-party cooperation and ethnic accommodation in the Croatian political landscape. Racan’s strategy of capitalizing on the perceived priority change in the electorate from nationalist war-time concerns to normal peace-time issues, such as living standards served as an illustrative lesson to a number of nationalist parties (ICG, 1998). Cooperation between Serb nationalist parties, in particular the SPO, with moderate or Croat national parties is a compelling example of the strategic appeal of cooperation given centuries of inter-communal antagonism. As the most dramatic example of cooperative strategies, the HDZ’s movement to embrace inter-party cooperation with moderate and Serb parties demonstrates party transformation, despite its ultra-nationalist roots and radical component. As a further testament to the HDZ’s commitment to reforming and to its image of the party of Croatia, the flanking behavior of the HSP failed to provide incentives for HDZ radicalization. Although several minor nationalist parties continued to employ ethnically-based positions, the overall trend for both Croat and Serb nationalist parties was toward ethnic reconciliation and accommodation.

A degree of moderation in rhetoric, decline in violent confrontation, and accommodation of national minority rights may be attributed to the desire for EU membership and truncated campaign periods. However, these variables do not account for the level of cooperation, alliance, and coalition observed between both moderate and nationalist parties. Office-seeking motivations and the SDP’s success raised the appeal of cooperative strategies and moderation,
particularly given shifts in electorate priories away from war-time concerns for security and territorial integrity to economic policy. Serb parties, contending for the small number of seats allocated by the national minorities law were enticed under preferential voting schemes to establish cross-party alliances. Instead of competing with a number of other Serb parties for perhaps one or two seats, cooperative parties could hope to gain a larger share of the legislative pie by running with a Croat or moderate party in general elections. Furthermore, these parties could carve out a niche for themselves as parties representing Croatia instead of only the Serb community, thus increasing their second-preference appeal on the Serb ballot.

With respect to the hypotheses, nationalist party campaign behavior during the 2000 elections largely conforms to hypothesis 1, with high levels of conflict rhetoric and exploitation. However, inter-party and group violence was remarkably low given the level of armed hostilities during the 1991 warm setting nationalist party behavior in box II of Figure 1. Following the implementation of preferential devices, Serb nationalist behavior during the 2003 campaign exhibited a marked increase in inter-party cooperation with moderate and Croat nationalist parties, confirming hypothesis 2 and the predicted scores on behavior indices. An unexpected pattern during the 2003 campaign, Croat party, specifically the HDZ, moderation and cooperation with other parties and communal groups further evidences an overall centripetal trend in Croatian politics. However, the data does not overwhelmingly demonstrate a causal link between Croat party moderation and the electoral system. Rather, these parties, learning from successful SDP strategies, responded to changing priorities in the electorate by modifying their platforms and positions. Hence, the Croatian case offers a degree of support for hypothesis 2 and preferential systems, while also highlighting the strong potential for changes in electorate interests to work in conjunction with the electoral structure to bolster the appeal of moderation and cooperation strategies.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

As guided by literature on the topic of electoral engineering, this investigation set out to test two hypotheses on electoral structure and nationalist party behavior. Hypothesis 1 states that consociationally-based PR systems will be associated with nationalist party provocation of ethno-political conflict, while hypothesis 2 asserts that preferential structures will promote moderation and cooperative accommodation by parties, resulting in conflict de-escalation. These hypotheses were tested using cooperative and conflictual behavior indices in three similar cases with different forms of electoral engineering over several election cycles. Generally, the data confirm both hypotheses, although not as strongly as expected.

For the three election cycles observed, nationalist party behavior in the Bosnian entities broadly supports hypothesis 1. While the level of inter-ethnic hostilities and violence declined from 1996 to 2003, the pattern arose primarily as a consequence of intervention by the international community rather than the PR structure. As expected, the PR system not only failed to discourage Bosniak, Croat, and Serb parties from playing the ethnic card, employing scare tactics, and pursuing conflict exploitation to garner votes, but the structure also encourages these behaviors by offering government office as based on representation of a single ethnic group. The moderation of party platforms/positions offered by non-nationalist parties and the flowering of multi-ethnic, moderate parties were not accompanied by a concomitant rise in the level of inter-party cooperation and inter-ethnic accommodation by nationalist parties. Furthermore, the degree of progress made in mitigating large-scale violence in the Federation failed to take root in the RS, as evident in the continued appeal and utility of provoking latent inter-communal tensions into large-scale violence and rioting for the SDS in 2001. Although PR offered communal groups the opportunity to attain legislative representation relative to their share of the population, this provision failed to meet the expectations of Lijphart and others that essential group grievances would be addressed and conflict defused. Instead, the Bosnian cases affirm arguments made by Reilly and Reynolds that PR mechanisms provide
institutional incentives for political actors, namely nationalist parties, to aggravate and harden ethnic divisions (2001, 2002). Moreover, the Bosnian findings suggest that proportional representation alone cannot resolve the complex array of factors fueling inter-sectarian conflict. Bosnian nationalist parties largely fulfilled Reilly and Reynolds’ expectations that PR systems encourage the politicization of communal identity and thus offer incentives for parties to exacerbate group conflict in order to win office based on marketing themselves as the sole defenders of their group’s interests and security. Hence, the data demonstrate that electoral engineering founded solely on PR provisions fail to both deter nationalist conflict provocation and to present adequate incentives toward the cooperation and moderation necessary to effect intended conflict dampening. This further illustrates the import of arguments made by Horowitz and others that one of the most central aspects of conflict resolution in identity-based civil wars may not be proportional representation as based on communal identity, but the depoliticization of that identity (Horowitz, 1985; Reilly, 2001, 2002; Reilly and Reynolds, 2002). However, it should be noted that these cases do not speak to fully consociational systems. Given the relative scarcity of fully consociational systems in extreme conflict, it remains unclear whether the implementation of all pillars advocated by Lijphart (1969, 1996) will substantially curb ultra-nationalist proclivities toward identity-based conflict exploitation, flanking behavior, and centrifugal patterns. Finally, the pattern of declining nationalist party exploitation of conflict and violent hostilities as a consequence of international pressure, threats, disciplinary action by election authorities, and the desire for EU and NATO membership begs questions of how inter-communal relations will unfold as the international community withdraws from Bosnia and of how much stability can be expected in cases with a lower degree of international involvement.

In comparison, Croatian politics witnessed a marked decline in inter-communal violence and extreme nationalist manipulation of inter-ethnic tensions that roughly conforms to the expectations of hypothesis 2. The hypothesis is further supported by the more extensive engagement of Croatian parties in cooperative strategies with moderate and other ethnic parties
for mutual gains at the ballot box as predicted by the hypothesis. Of the patterns observed, the co-mingling of Serb and Croat parties and the stark transformation of the HDZ’s stated positions and pursuit of inter-party collaboration are most compelling. Unlike Bosnia, international community involvement in Croatian politics and party behavior has been limited since 1995, lending to the conclusion that these results can be linked to the electoral system more clearly than in the Bosnian cases. Furthermore, while the promise of further European integration affects the desire of the central government to accommodate national minorities, the willingness of national parties to abandon ultra-nationalist strategies, and the eagerness of the larger Croatian population to fulfill requirements for EU membership, this factor only explains party restraint from xenophobic, conflict exploitation. EU accession does not fully account for the degree of cooperation and partnership pursued by parties. Rather, office-seeking motivations provided the main impetus for cooperation and accommodation, as noted in the calculations made by the SDP’s Ivica Racan and the adoption of successful SDP strategies by both moderate and nationalist contestants, particularly the HDZ and SPO. The inclusion of the preferential option for Serb voters worked as an incentive for Serb parties to coordinate and align with Croat nationalist and moderate parties that could deliver supplementary support needed to gain further additional legislative seats beyond those guaranteed by the National Minorities Law. Contesting general constituencies with a larger coalition/ alliance partner could more readily supply mandates than competition with other Serb parties for the support of a very limited voter base that would only render one to two seats. This pattern mirrors arguments made by Reilly and Reynolds that parties are motivated toward moderation and cooperation, with the resultant centripetal spin on politics, when preferential systems provide incentives for accommodation (office attainment) and penalties for ethno-politics and conflict exploitation (electoral defeat) (Reilly 2001, 2002, Reilly and Reynolds, 2001). Hence, the data provide strong support for arguments made by Horowitz, Reilly, and Reynolds that in order for conflict de-escalation to progress, political actors must be presented with incentives for depoliticizing
ethnic identity, moderating policy positions, and cooperation with other parties and ethnic
groups (Horowitz, 1985; Reilly, 2001, 2002; Reilly and Reynolds, 2001). The preferential
system in Croatia further illustrates how institutional mechanisms set the rules of political
competition, frame political discourse, and deter the articulation of certain interests/agendas,
specifically ethno-chauvinist, sectarian positions, as argued by Ostrow and Przeworski (2000, 1986). With regard to other Croat parties, the overwhelming victory attained by the SDP due to its cooperation with the opposition six and other parties made a lasting impression on contenders in the 2003 races. The appeal of office-seeking, and office recapture in the HDZ’s case, overpowered flanking pressure by radical parties such as the HSP. It should be noted however, that preferential voting provisions have not been extended to the entire Croatian electorate. While it would be imprudent to affirm that expanding preferential voting would definitively result in increased inter-party cooperation, the behavior of Serb parties suggests that such an amendment is unlikely to provoke either growing ultra-nationalist strategies or the explosion of violent communal hostilities.

Given these observations, several limitations in the research should be acknowledged. First, as previously mentioned, the period for study in these cases has been limited by necessity, using data from only two to three election cycles. However, these findings give insight into the short to mid-term effects of electoral engineering that may better inform policy planners and peace-building initiatives. Second, these cases are intimately linked in a regional context of enduring conflict and one may be hesitant to generalize these findings to a larger pool of cases. Yet, the practice of comparative conflict mapping matches conflict cases on the basis of shared characteristics such as intensity and duration of conflict, type (as based on ascriptive or politico-economic identity), types of conflict adversaries (i.e. government, sub-government, military, paramilitary/guerilla, and other factions) and conflict fault lines (issues of exclusion from socio-political resources or dispute over economic/natural resources). The Bosnian and Croatian cases are not unique to the point that they cannot be comparatively mapped with other
cases, especially those in other regions of Eastern Europe such as Kosovo and former Soviet bloc countries. Moreover, cases with similar conflict characteristics may benefit from this line of investigation, including cases in Sub-Saharan Africa. Third, the international community exerts a prominent, albeit varying, influence in both cases. It remains difficult to fully isolate the impact of electoral engineering on party behavior from other variables such as the presence of security forces, threat of disciplinary action and sanctions, or the promise of external incentives. While this problem continues to plague purely scientific analysis, the findings presented here carries valuable suggestions for the international community, not only that carrots may be more effective tools in conflict intervention/resolution, but also that, in an environment where the multiple costs of long-term military involvement continue to climb, alternative means may provide a more cost-effective and durable policy option in certain cases.

Taken together, the preceding points highlight several insights into electoral engineering, conflict resolution, and further research in the field. The most compelling finding of this study is that electoral engineering in post-conflict states must be comprehensively designed to address a wide range of conflict sources, including both grievance and greed factors. Frameworks built solely upon proportional representation, without the inclusion of all the consociational elements, not only fail to resolve the complex layers of inter-communal conflict, but are also inappropriate in cases where greed, whether for natural resources or political office/power, serves as the main impetus for conflict escalation. In cases of office/power-seeking, the electoral incentives and disincentives offered by preferential structures direct nationalist party behavior toward moderation, accommodation, and cooperation more effectively than PR systems. However, additional research can uncover the long-term impact of preferential systems on party conflict provocation and the degree to which preferential systems function with and without international involvement in a wider range of cases. Additionally, this study highlights the need for further investigation into the influence of other domestic mechanisms, in particular penalties in the form of monetary fines, candidate removal from party lists, and party bans. Furthermore, such
research can more directly target how these mechanisms interact with both PR and preferential structures. Finally, the design and findings presented here provide a foundation for additional analysis into the larger set of cases in Eastern Europe or other regional conflict studies. Growing regional studies and cross-regional comparisons of these relations will lead to increasingly generalizable findings that benefit electoral engineering, conflict studies and the wider arena of intervention policy and durable conflict resolution in intractable civil conflicts.
END NOTES

1 Civil wars in the referenced works are “qualified” by several sets of parameters, such as the number of military deaths per year and the organizational capacity of the adversaries. Hence, the case pool used in these investigations is dramatically reduced from the overall number of conflicts classified as internal in nature by Gleditsch, et al.

2 For example, the SDS ardently promoted RS secession and joined with other parties in asserting that, “they would not permit the drowning of Republika Srpska in a Muslim state” (ICG, 1996, 39).

3 The assault on Siladjdzic occurred in a campaign environment wrought with violent activity, including reports on the beatings of other SBiH and UBSD members, shootings into the homes of UBSD representatives, and assault of opposition supporters by police elements affiliated with the nationalists. See OSCE/ODIHR, 1996 a and b.

4 For example, the EU’s Javier Solana made public statements urging Bosnian voters to refrain from supporting nationalist parties. Ashdown also worked rigorously to remind parties and the electorate of his presence and involvement by making frequent television and media statements and by visiting public venues and the homes of returnees. This degree of involvement by the international community had a significant impact not only on the electoral framework but also on potential candidates. See ICG, 2001 and 2003.

5 Meanwhile, SBiH, SDP, and SDA efforts at campaigning in regions of the RS with high numbers of Bosniak returnees, such as Banja Luka, Prijedor, and Doboj, were unsuccessful as rallies went largely unattended. See ICG, 2003.


8 ICG reports that interview with several internal sources indicate SDS involvement in the production of these materials. See ICG, 2003.

9 Other incidents include claims by the NHI that the HDZ attempted to prevent the party from establishing an office, the DNZ reporting broken windows at its headquarters in Sarajevo that were politically motivated, HDZ and Radom z Boljitak claiming that it was not allowed to organize rallies in Mostar and Siroki Brijeg.

10 Attacks on, intimidation of, and discrimination against non-Serb refugees in the RS culminated in riots during May 2001, following the laying of foundation stones for the rebuilding of two historic mosques that had been destroyed during the war. While these events did not occur during the election campaign, the spread of violence to Trebijne and Banja Luka and the extent of physical assault, including attacks with firearms, explosives, and property destruction, evidence the persistence of inter-ethnic conflict and extent to which animosity toward Bosniaks, particularly returnees, persisted as late as 2001. Furthermore, ICG reports cite interviews with international and internal intelligence sources that implicate the SDS in working to instigate and coordinate the violence through groups of war invalids, informal underground military unions, and by having supporters close local schools so that students could participate in the riots. The level of SDS involvement during the riots is also evident in public calls by Big Radio, under the stewardship of an SDS supporter, for listeners to demonstrate “against the invasion of the Muslim hordes.” See ICG, 2001.

11 Kroeger, Nationalists Prosper.


14 While leaders from the smaller Porec Group parties endorsed reaching decisions by consensus, Racan used the existing discord to argue that consensus-style decision-making was undesirable and that consideration must be given to relative party strengths. See ICG, 1998,19.


16 Ibid.

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