Normative Dualism and the Definition of Art

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by

ISABELA QUEVEDO

Under the direction of Jessica Berry

ABSTRACT

Defining art has been one of philosophy of art’s biggest projects. However, no definition offered has achieved to account for all objects we consider art. In this paper, I argue that normative dualism, an unjustifiable Western prejudice for the mental, plays a big part in this failure. The division between fine art and utilitarian and “low” art has been perpetuated because the former is associated with the mental processes involved in its appreciation and, thus, considered more valuable. Theories of art also tend to exclude production (a physical process), concentrating mostly on the appreciation of art (a mental process). Ridding theory of the bias of normative dualism, by abolishing the division that sets fine art apart as more valuable and writing theory that takes art production into consideration, is the only way art theory will succeed in accurately describing art objects.

INDEX WORDS: Philosophy, Aesthetics, Definition of Art, Normative Dualism, Art, Craft, Cluster Account of Art, Gaut, Markowitz, Zangwill
NORMATIVE DUALISM AND THE DEFINITION OF ART

by

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NORMATIVE DUALISM AND THE DEFINITION OF ART

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I. Introduction

Twentieth century aesthetics was full of failed definitions of art. For some theorists, this failure has been a sign that the right definition has not been proposed. Some have criticized the types of definitions used, proposing complex or disjunctive definitions instead. Others have given up on describing art altogether. Others reject trying to find a definition, but they believe finding an account is possible. In the 1950s, Morris Weitz applied Wittgenstein's criticism of definitions—Wittgenstein says concepts like art, which he calls open, are based on family resemblance, not on necessary and sufficient conditions—to definitions of art, saying the concept of art cannot be defined, only described. This observation is insightful, as the objects we consider to be art have become so diverse, no one trait can cover them all. Yet, Wittgensteinian accounts have also been problematic, relying on paradigm art objects that end up begging the question. In this paper, I will argue that the problems inherent to definitions are not the only reason aesthetics has not succeeded in finding a satisfying description of art. A bias against the physical in favor of the mental has perpetuated the myth that there is a real difference between “high” art and the utilitarian arts,¹ and has led philosophers to exclude considerations about how art is produced from their theories about what art is, and to concentrate solely on its appreciation. This, I believe, has been the biggest obstacle in finding a convincing account of art.

Art “with a capital 'A’,” high art, the art of genius, the art for which we pay millions, has never existed outside of theory. It is not a proper category of real objects. The idea that it is a proper category is based on a prejudice that is as old as Western civilization—the idea that the

¹ Although my aim is to show that not only craft, but other utilitarian arts, such as illustration and industrial design, are also art, throughout this paper, I will concentrate primarily on arguments that attack the art and craft distinction. This is not a paper about the philosophy of language. The terms 'craft', 'design' and 'utilitarian art' are just as contentious as the term 'art' itself. For this reason, I will not worry about these distinctions too much. Yet, I would like to stress that this paper argues for the inclusion of craft, design and some “low” art into the idea of art. I believe that the arguments contained in this paper are sufficient to cover most of these points.
immaterial, the mental, the spiritual, the emotional, are more valuable than the material. The division between art and “non-art” relies on our associating art with the mental processes involved in its appreciation and “non-art” with things that seem to be incompatible with the value of these mental activities. Craft is associated with the physical processes involved in its utilization. “Low” art is associated with a general public audience, which in turn, is also associated with the physical, as the working classes are associated with the physical labor they tend to engage in. Design suffers from both of these associations, as design objects are both utilized and mass produced/mass consumed. In an effort to exclude these other categories and include only high art, early functionalist definitions of art were overly narrow, and later accounts of art have become overly complex, overly contextual and counterintuitive.

Art theorist Arthur Danto goes so far as to admit that art is a theoretical category, saying that “[i]t is the theory that takes [an artwork] up into the world of art, and keeps it from collapsing into the real object which it is” (Danto 1964, 11).² Yet, no account explains why it is that the cognitive processes associated with art make it more valuable than “non-art” or why it is important to keep artworks from collapsing into the real objects they are. What is more, no account explains why we should still see the cognitive and the physical as different categories that cannot overlap, given that we no longer recognize the metaphysical division of substances into material and immaterial.

Similarly, the bias for the mental has led aestheticians to exclude art production from their accounts of art. The relation between art and the processes of its appreciation is seen, in some cases, as more important to art than the physical processes of its production, and in others, as the only process relevant to the conception of art. Most functionalist definitions completely

ignore the artist and her intentions, while contextual definitions are audience theories, which focus on the effect art has on the audience and take only the artist into consideration when explaining her intentions to affect an audience. Accounts of art that try to include utilitarian non-Western art focus on how an audience recognizes art across cultures, and not on the similarities that exist among the processes of production of all of these objects. No justification is given for concentrating on the appreciation of art, or for why no one has asked the artist what art means. Art objects are artifacts, and as such, the intentions and processes involved in their production should be as relevant as their appreciation.

I will begin my analysis by looking at a paper by Sally Markowitz, who examines the influence the normative nature of dualism has had on the art and craft distinction. After this examination, I will look at how this prejudice has permeated contemporary art theories, making them inadequate. I will then examine Berys Gaut's cluster account, which has few detractors, arguing that it fits craft and other utilitarian arts quite well, while being flexible enough to include considerations about art production. I will follow by looking at an art theory by Nick Zangwill, which concentrates on art production. This theory has many flaws, but it points out a lot of important gaps in aesthetics and includes the artist, her intentions and her methods prominently. I will close my paper by looking at some consequences of my account, such as the possibility for good art and bad art and the place value has in art theory.

**Normative Dualism**

The claim that the distinction between art and craft is arbitrary is not new. Many have argued that the distinction is elitist. Some criticize the divide because the work traditionally done by women disproportionately falls under the heading ‘craft’. Others protest because the label
tends to be applied to the work of people of color. Yet another group claims that it is the products of the working classes that usually get relegated into this “second tier” category. The truth is that work done by upper- and middle-class white men is disproportionately labeled 'art'. It is also true that art is viewed as more valuable than craft. Yet, the mere fact that the divide has favored white males does not mean it exists for this purpose.

In “The Distinction Between Art and Craft,” Sally Markowitz addresses the misconception that the art and craft divide is explained by elitism. Markowitz points out that although elitism is a real problem, accusations of elitism that accept the distinction do not explain it, while the ones that reject the distinction oversimplify the issue. The distinction between art and craft, as well as its elitism, rest on the idea of normative dualism. Dualism, a theory of mind proposed by Descartes, is inherently normative. When separating the metaphysical categories of the material and the immaterial, dualism ascribes more value to the immaterial. Similarly, and not by coincidence, the distinction between art and craft is not equal; more value is ascribed to art.

Markowitz begins by applying to craft objects two types of criteria, aesthetic and semantic, commonly used to justify the classification of some objects as art. Claims of elitism and the idea of normative dualism would not hold if these criteria turned out accurately to describe only art objects. By applying them successfully to craft objects, Markowitz aims to show that the criteria work only under an unjustified prejudice for the mental.

The aesthetic criterion is described as follows: what makes an object an art object is that it has a certain type of aesthetic character. What counts as aesthetic character is not entirely clear, but it is generally taken to mean beauty, evocativeness and form. Sometimes the idea goes

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beyond formal characteristics and includes the response people have to objects; sometimes the intention to make something with aesthetic character is also taken into consideration. Markowitz says that although the term 'aesthetic' has been disputed by some, we can agree it is widely applied, and thus she takes it for granted. In trying to dispute the art/craft distinction, she wants to avoid challenging or addressing any of the other controversies that exist in art theory.

Because craft is utilitarian, how far the aesthetic criterion applies to it depends on the version of the criterion being employed. When aesthetic character is meant to pertain only to formal qualities, then it can easily apply to craft. Craft has formal qualities, and even if strict formalism is applied, one can argue that the formal elements of an object are inextricably linked to its function. Whether it is the pouring ability of a pitcher or the ability a painting has to represent, the function of an object explains its form. However, a challenge arises when we consider the response aspect of the aesthetic criterion. Aesthetic response is taken to be a cognitive process involving disinterested contemplation, and some see contemplation as incompatible with physical actions. Markowitz says that the solution hinges on the rejection of this last claim. Although forfeiting the idea of the aesthetic response or saying it has nothing to do with contemplation are also possible solutions, both of these options seriously affect our conception of art appreciation. Saying that physical engagement with an object is compatible with contemplation solves the problem and has no such implications. We can contemplate the aesthetic features of a pot, we can think about its colors or how beautiful its handle is, while pouring tea out of a pot. Therefore, craft objects can meet the aesthetic criterion.

Markowitz uses Arthur Danto's definition of the semantic criterion. The semantic criterion states that the semantic character, the possibility for interpretation, of an art object is what stops it from being a run-of-the-mill object. Markowitz acknowledges that Danto might be
offering a normative account of art, but even if Danto is only giving a picture of what he wishes art were, this idea is so commonly applied that it merits scrutiny.

Craft is usually not interpreted. It can be beautiful, but pure beauty does not lend itself to interpretation. Markowitz says that because craft is useful, we think it does not have to be interpreted. Conversely, she says that we might have a need to interpret artworks because “we don't know what else to do with them” (Markowitz 1994, 61). Yet, it is very easy to imagine a world in which people routinely ascribe meaning to and interpret craft. Utility need not exclude interpretation. A knife with allegorical animal carvings on its handle could be interpreted and also used.

Markowitz says this view does not solve the problem, however. This possibility does not prove that there is no division between art and craft, it only proves the contingency of the division. Thus, Markowitz turns to another example that challenges the semantic criterion: embroidery. Because embroidery is representational, traditionally depicting symbols of female gender norms, it demands interpretation. This must mean semantic character is not all there is to the semantic criterion. Art is associated with originality and individuality and the traditional roles embroidery usually represents are seen as incompatible with personal expression and innovation. The semantic criterion, were it not skewed to conform to prejudiced views, such as the ones that relegate work done by females to craft, could pertain to craft.

The differences between art and craft do not depend only on what craft lacks, as Markowitz points out. There are many practices in craft that art does not conform to. Craftspeople have a preoccupation with material and craftsmanship: they respect them. Being true to a material, exalting its qualities, never trying to make the material look like something else, are all seen as signs of the sincerity and honesty of craft. For many craftspeople, craft
preserves values art has neglected and, because of this, craft is held in high ethical regard. Workmanship is appreciated for the same reason. Craftspeople feel objects, whether craft or art, should be well made.

Self-expression is thought to overshadow function and interfere with the values craft tries so hard to promote, making many craftspeople and craft collectors reject it. Yet, not all craftspeople hold these values dear. Many are now trying to produce craft objects with deeper, sometimes personal, meaning. Carl Borgeson makes ceramic pots with lids that cannot be detached. By completely renouncing the utilitarian, Borgeson hopes to make a statement. An artist's choice of title may also challenge the traditions of craft. “Apartheid Chair,” by Paul Ludic, is a functional chair painted in different colors and with a chain-link fence as a back. The chair's materials, in connection to its title, demand interpretation. The different colors represent different ethnicities, while the chain link back evokes the true usage of chain-link fences, making it a political statement. Interpretation makes these objects transcend their classification as mere objects, and as this trend to make craft objects with semantic character continues, the division between art and craft will become even harder to sustain.

The analysis demonstrates that the criteria only support the art/craft division when processes that are purely cognitive are taken into account, and even then, it is suspect that the craft objects the criteria apply to are still labeled as “mere” craft. Because the separation does not depend on the objects alone, there must be a set of values and assumptions influencing the criteria we use and how we apply it. Markowitz addresses three different arguments for the idea that the division between art and craft exists due to elitism, aiming to show that none of the arguments is completely successful. The first argument Markowitz looks at denies the existence of the art/craft distinction by saying that art is the label for what the wealthy make and craft is
the label given to the work of the poor. Yet, there are problems with this assumption. Pointing out
an error in classification does not mean that the classification is wrong. Elitism can reside in the
type of distinction made, not the fact that the distinction is made. This is the premise of the
second argument Markowitz addresses. Some theorists say the divide itself and the criteria used
to distinguish art and craft are correct, but that objects have been misclassified due to sexism and
racism. Elitism has led the divide to be drawn so that only the work of white males is included in
the category ‘art’. Accepting this argument might motivate a relabeling of objects, but it would
not explain why we value art over craft. The third and last argument has a similar problem. This
argument also acknowledges the divide and the criteria, but it does not ask for reclassification; it
takes a separate-but-equal approach. Art and craft are separate, but both should be equally
valuable. Yet, this does not answer why we have valued art more until now. It also does not ask
why the distinction exists in the first place.

Using Alison Jaggar’s idea of normative dualism, Markowitz explains the root of the art
and craft distinction. Although Descartes’ metaphysical separation of the spiritual and the
physical is no longer taken seriously, its effects can still be felt. We readily classify things into
mental and physical categories, and what is more, we take the superiority of the mental for
granted. Somatophobia, the aversion to the physical, has had a huge influence and meaningful
consequences in many arenas of Western thought. For example, the fear of the physical has lead
groups with power to reduced the oppressed to their physical characteristics so that they can
deny their rationality and classify them as less than human. Markowitz correctly observes that,
similarly, somatophobia is responsible for the elitism that favors white men in art. Moreover,
somatophobia is the reason art is valued over craft. Art is associated with the mental, the
immaterial, while craft, being utilitarian, is physical. The aesthetic and semantic criteria both
suffer from this bias. The aesthetic response is thought to lay only in contemplation, and contemplation is seen as incompatible with the physical. The semantic criterion concentrates only on the interpretation of an object, a mental process, so that utilitarian objects can be excluded.

Markowitz’s aim is to make us question why we value art over craft without questioning the quality or workmanship put into the objects. She wants us to question why we value mental processes over physical processes and the social implications this evaluation has. She feels that understanding normative dualism is necessary for understanding why the art/craft distinction exists and does not want to denounce it as illusory; instead, she says that “elitist or not, a distinction is real enough if we make it, especially when it informs our social practices” (Markowitz 1994, 69). But this is where Markowitz goes wrong. I agree with her analysis, and I agree with her goals, but simply explaining something does not justify it. No distinction, even if elitist, arbitrary or wrong, should be dismissed without analyzing its effects. We can denounce something as illusory while still understanding its cause and its effects. When fighting racism and sexism, defenders of the rights of women and blacks understood the social implications of a divide that, based in normative dualism, classified women and people with dark skin as less than human. Activists understood the elitism behind this divide while denouncing it as illusory. And we can analyze the causes behind the art/craft division, examine its consequences and still say it is illusory, as we should. If this division has relevant social consequences, the fact that it is unjustifiable should make denouncing it as illusory a top priority.

The problem lies in the fact that showing that categorization is based on an unjustified assumption does not necessarily make it a mistake. One can identify something correctly even if one's reasons are completely wrong. Yet, there are two very significant reasons supporting the
idea that the art and craft distinction is not only unjustified but unjustifiable. The first is that, so far, definitions of art have failed to create conceptions of art that account for all art objects. I will address this point in the next section. The second is that the bias of normative dualism is present not only in the art and craft distinction, but in whole of the field of aesthetics. The idea of art in Western culture, its value and its practices, all stem from a prejudice for the mental that can be traced back to the origins of Western thought.

Descartes’ normative dualism is based on the Greek and Christian divisions of the material and immaterial. Christians separate the body from the soul, associating the body with sin. The Greeks separated mental from physical work, preferring the first. This influenced what little art theory they had: poetry theory. Greek poetry theory, in turn, was the basis for art theory in the eighteenth century. This means our conception of art, which we assume is an accurate description of the objects and their value, is based on a millenary, unjustified bias. Justifying the preference for the mental would vindicate the art and craft divide and our assumptions about the value of art. However, considering that most of us no longer accept the separation of the material and the immaterial, it seems unreasonable to try to justify a meaningful preference for the latter. Restructuring theory to get rid of the bias, then, is the rational option.

Evaluating Definitions of Art

The art/craft division is not the only way in which normative dualism has affected art theory. The bias, as we have seen, is also tied to sexism, racism and classism, which has led to the exclusion of certain objects and performances from the category ‘art’. I will address how this

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4 In his study of the history of the fine arts as a group from the Ancient Greeks to the eighteenth century, Paul Kristeller discusses the way the Greeks viewed visual art. He quotes certain instances in which philosophers would follow praise for painters or sculptors by saying they would still rather be thinkers than get mixed with manual labor. See Kristeller, Paul Oskar, “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics (I),” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Oct., 1951): 500-3.
has affected the classification of certain films, music, and even paintings later on in my paper. Another way in which normative dualism has affected theory is the exclusion of art production from accounts of art. Theorists have not bothered asking the artist what art is. They rarely consider the intentions or processes involved in art production when describing art objects, and the few philosophers who do take this into account do so by stressing the importance the experience of the audience has for the artist. I will look at the analyses Morris Weitz, Robert Stecker and Stephen Davies have made of the three types of art definitions: functional, institutional and historical (these last two are contextual). I will use these analyses to illustrate how these definitions are supposed to work, why theorists think that they have failed, and how normative dualism has affected them.

Morris Weitz's article, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” is one of the most important works in aesthetics, as it challenged definitions by pointing out their weaknesses.\(^5\) Written in 1956, this article shifted the focus of aesthetics away from the essentialist definitions of the early twentieth century and contemporary definitions that no longer seek necessary and sufficient conditions (Stecker, 45).\(^6\) Highly influenced by Wittgenstein, Weitz argues that art is an open concept, that is, a concept lacking necessary and sufficient conditions. Weitz stresses that all definitions formulated until then claimed to have picked the one and only essential trait of art, also saying the all other definitions were wrong. Formalism picked formal properties as the essence of art. Emotionalism said that art's sole aim was to convey emotion. Intuitionism viewed art as a spiritual activity. There are several more essentialist definitions, but it is not necessary to examine them as they all suffer from the same problem; they are all too narrow. All of these traits

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are part of art, and picking any single one as essential gives an incomplete account of what art is.

According to Weitz, aesthetics should attempt to describe the concept of art, not create a theory of art. Wittgenstein's family resemblance, a theory that states we classify objects by finding similarities between objects, not by finding necessary and sufficient conditions, is Weitz's proposed method. Open concepts, such as art, and the objects that fall under them, only have a group of related similarities that binds them together. Not all objects have all the similarities, but each has enough to be seen as part of the group. Trying to find essential traits and necessary and sufficient conditions is futile for open concepts is futile, as only closed concepts, like mathematics and logic, have them.

Robert Stecker has a similar complaint about essentialist definitions. Stecker refers to these definitions as functionalist definitions because they all stress a function served by art that is thought to be valuable. Stecker considers that Weitz's critique of essentialism is important, as it has promoted an account of art that is open to modification. Being disjunctive, that is, being made up of several features which are not independently necessary, is what is required of a good definition of art. Stecker claims all good contemporary definitions are disjunctive, which is tantamount to saying early twentieth-century functionalist definitions were bad definitions because they were too narrow and failed to take certain important features of art into account.

Both Morris and Stecker give compelling evidence that there is something inherently wrong with definitions that seek necessary and sufficient conditions. But, aside from the problems definitions have, normative dualism is clearly at work here. Formalism relates to Markowitz's idea of contemplative admiration of aesthetic properties. Intuitionism directly states that art is about the spiritual, the immaterial. Expressionism is about art as a medium for the

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7 Stecker, 45-53.
expression of emotion, a mental process. These traits are also clearly geared towards the mental processes of the viewer, concentrating more on the appreciation of art more than its production. Any talk of the artist's intention views it as geared towards an audience, which is not surprising, as these definitions were written from the point of view of viewers of art. The philosophers behind these theories did not take the artist into consideration when picking an essence for art, and Weitz's concern that these are normative definitions is not unfounded. It is likely that these candidates for the essence of art were based on what these philosophers thought the traits of art should be, not what traits art objects actually possess.

Contemporary definitions, as pointed out above, have ceased to look for necessary and sufficient conditions. Most current definitions belong to functionalism (although in a new form that looks only for conditions that are sufficient but not required), contextual theories (such as institutionalist and historical theories), or hybrids of the three. Institutional definitions depend on the institution of art or the artworld to explain the art status of objects. Historical theories link the way present art objects are treated by the artworld to the way other objects that are considered art have been treated in the past. The major objection against these definitions, an objection that has been made by Berys Gaut, Robert Stecker, Stephen Davies and Peg Zeglin Brand, among others, is that they fail to take into account the art that exists outside of the context of the Western artworld. I will now look at two shapes this objection can take.

In “Non-Western Art and Art's Definition,” Stephen Davies explains why he thinks non-Western cultures have art, posing arguments against theories that say they do not, and then explaining how this affects existing theories of art. Addressing this last point, Davies demonstrates that contextual theories have a hard time accommodating non-Western art. George

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8 Stecker, 45-8.
Dickie’s institutional theory says that an object is art if and only if it is an artifact presented as a candidate for aesthetic appreciation to an audience in the institutional artworld, which is the complex set of social relations in which art occurs. Some cultures outside of the West, such as Japan and China, have institutionalized professional art, but for the most part, art outside of the West occurs in informal settings. The institutional theory, therefore, cannot properly account for non-Western art. Jerrold Levinson’s historical theory states that for an object to be artwork, it must be regarded in the same way part artwork have been regarded. Because it allows for historical narratives within different cultures, it seems to account for Non-Western art, but it does not explain how we can recognize different historical traditions of art cross-culturally. Davies’ main argument in favor of seeing certain objects in other cultures as art, and not dismissing this concept as a Western phenomenon, is the fact that we can recognize art cross-culturally, even without being acquainted with the customs and mores of these cultures. If art were art only in virtue of its placement within a culture’s historical tradition, we would have no way of recognizing these objects as art unless we were familiar with the culture. Thus, historical definitions, too, fail successfully to account for non-Western art.

Gaut and Stecker have a slightly different form of this criticism. In his essay, “Is It Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?,” Stecker argues that although current definitions of art are said to share no common ground, all of the ones that work are, in fact, disjunctive definitions. To show this is true, Stecker analyzes how well functionalist, institutionalist and historical theories fare, both as simple and as disjunctive definitions. Stecker says that both contextual definitions cannot account for “first art.” The first artwork created within a culture cannot be account for by these theories, as there was no artworld for it to be embedded in and no previous

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art to which it could be related. Gaut's problem is similar, although it also relates to Davies's objection. These theories have no way of accounting for art that exists outside of the proposed context, for example, in the case of alien artifacts that look like artworks found on a different planet.

The inclusion of non-Western art is important to the project of removing the bias of normative dualism from art theory, as much of it is utilitarian. One of the biggest problems theorists have with non-Western art is its utility. A bias against craft made in the West has led some theorists to ignore the utility of these objects when classifying them as art, creating a double-standard according to which craft is not art because of its utility, and non-Western art is art despite of it. As noted by Davies, many anthropologists want to deny that non-Western cultures have art namely because of its utility and a lack of differentiation between art and craft. I agree with Davies’ criticism, but I would also like to stress that the difference between the Western and non-Western conceptions of art only stands when the bias of normative dualism is at work. If the West were to consider craft, design and “low” art, then our concept of art would be similar to that which exists outside of the West. Thus, considering non-Western art, utility and all, as art, opens the door for Western forms of utilitarian art to be considered art as well. Conversely, if we are to remove the bias of normative dualism from the Western tradition of art, we would no longer have to engage in the debate of whether people outside the West have art.

Aside from their problem with accounting for art outside of the Western tradition, contextual definitions are also clearly biased towards the mental. These definitions are completely dependent on the conceptual nature of art. Art-hood does not lie in the object or its production, it lies in a decision or on a conceptual precedent, and especially, on its audience.

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Creating a piece of art, on this view, has to do solely with the intent of artists to create a specific appreciation experience or on authoritative members of the audience, such as critics and art historians, picking out objects as art based on their experiences of them. Art is so far removed from the physical on the contextualist account that it seems to exist only in the minds of those who already understand art objects as art.\textsuperscript{12}

Adapting these definitions to include utilitarian or mass produced objects is possible if their art-hood is conferred by the institution or they are properly connected to existing art objects. Yet, this seems highly unlikely, especially because Weitz's concern about the normative nature of definitions is also at play here. Contemporary definitions might be descriptive, as they give a very good explanation of how the institution of art functions. In practice, critics, historians, theories, artists and collectors all follow the practices described by contextual theories. However, these definitions are not describing art objects accurately; they are not accounts of what art really is. The descriptions given by these definitions are all normative because they are placing value on objects that are considered “art” while stripping other, non-art objects of this value. They are all still accounts of what theorists think art should be, not what it is. This means that as long as theorists see utilitarian objects as less valuable, they will be reluctant to include them in their theories. And even if these theories included utilitarian objects, contextual definitions would fail to account for art production. Again, it seems like restructuring theory is the only option.

\textsuperscript{12} This seems to suggest that contextual theories beg the question. Noel Carroll makes this claim against George Dickie's institutional theory, however, Dickie is not phased by it. Dickie says that he acknowledges the circularity of contextual notions of art and that he believes that the concepts associated with art, as well as the recognition of art objects, can be interdependent. Dickie believes that the necessary and sufficient conditions for art that are delineated by the institutional theory are acquired at childhood, at the same time one is introduced into the institution of art. His argument is not very convincing, but I feel it does illustrate how accusations of circularity will not be seen as an inconvenient by theorists who defend contextual definitions of art. Dickie, George, “The Institutional Theory of Art,” in \textit{Theories of Art Today}, ed. Noel Carroll, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 103.
Art Production

The argument presented by Markowitz makes a good case for utilitarian art, but it is working only from the perspective of art consumption. It could turn out to be that, for reasons separate from normative dualism, only art appreciation should be considered when creating a successful account of art. If definitions of art are defective not only because they exclude physical utilization from theory, but also because they exclude art production from theory, then a separate argument must be made in order to defend the claim that we must consider art production in addition to consumption. I will now give now give three separate reasons in favor of a theory of art that includes production.

It could be argued that art theory must be written from the perspective of art appreciation because this process is universal, while art production is experienced only by artists. Therefore, art production is not fully understood by most people and theory must be written from the universal perspective. However, this criticism could apply only if the ideas of genius and creative impulse as “divine inspiration” were true. Only if the creative process is an indescribable mystery would this be true. The idea, attributed to Kant, that art is the product of genius is an influential one in philosophy of art. Many believe that genius is necessary for art production, and that, as such, only those born with this innate artistic talent can produce art.

The problem is that the idea that art requires genius it is a controversial one (and, I believe, an implausible one, too). Bradley Murray says that Kant is being misread by philosophers and that he never said genius was necessary for art production, only that we needed to pretend nature, working through genius, was the true author for art in order to achieve

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disinterested contemplation of the aesthetic properties of art. Moreover, the idea of genius did not arise until the eighteenth century. As I mentioned earlier, the Greeks associated poetry only with cognitive processes, while the visual arts were seen as physical labor. During the Renaissance, and even later, most artists worked in workshops where apprentices trained under an artist, learning the process of making artworks and even doing a lot of the work for their master. Academies of art have existed since the late Renaissance, and even today, most art schools teach the techniques of art production. Having been an art student for years myself, I know that it is practice and hard work that make for truly exceptional art, regardless of the level of innate talent.

Many theorists have used genius as an explanation for the technical skilled displayed in certain artworks; as an explanation for the existence of certain artworks. However, the idea of genius is not an explanation of art production; genius is actually incompatible with the explanation of production processes. The concept of ‘genius’ is usually taken to imply that there is some inexplicable natural process that is responsible for art. The idea of genius in art implies that creativity is a mystery, an impulse the artist cannot help or control. But to say that art is something that just happens, a drive the artist cannot control, is to take the artist out of the equation. Besides, the idea of genius has not always and is not always associated with art production.

It is true that individuals with truly exceptional talent exist. However, this is true of most areas of human endeavor. Physical theories sometimes come from exceptional individuals like Einstein, but we do not think it is necessary to be a genius to be a physicist or to make an important discovery in this area. Similarly, we should not expect every artist to be a genius. As

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Stephen Davies and Dennis Dutton point out, art is a universal practice, it exists in all cultures. In many cultures, those who create art are seen as skilled artisans who have acquired their competence through practice, not by nature. As children, we all create art. When 'art' is taken a value-neutral term, the idea that we all have the ability to produce art, albeit to different degrees, is a possibility. If art production is a universal endeavor, and it seems to be, then art production could not be an unintelligible process.

A second reason why it is crucial for theorists to take production into consideration is that artists might provide a valuable source of information about the nature of art. It could be that the only thing all art objects had in common was the process behind their creation. It must be granted that some artists have been indoctrinated by art theory, they define their work and the value of their work based on what the institution finds valuable. Yet, even in cases where the artists’ conceptions of art are no different from the conceptions of other members of the artworld, they can provide descriptions of their processes of production. Both the cognitive and physical processes involved in art production could be sources of similarities, or perhaps further differences that prove me wrong, between art and non-art objects. Artists could also eventually be the subjects of neurological research. Studying the brain and creativity might be key to understanding art, its production and its appreciation.

The last reason for favoring the inclusion of art production in art theory is that we should explain the rationality of art activities, a very good point made by Nick Zangwill in his book *Aesthetic Creation*. In this book, Zangwill argues for a production-based theory of art. As will me demonstrated in the discussion below, Zangwill's arguments in favor of his theory are hardly convincing, and his characterization of his theory as novel and revolutionary are far from

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accurate. Yet, there are still some important lessons to be learned from his theory of aesthetic creation. For example, Zangwill believes that a good theory of art should not explain only what the concept of art means, but that it should make art activities intelligible. If we engage in art production, art consumption and art preservation, there must be a reason for it. Unless these activities are valuable, it would be irrational for people to spend so much time, effort and money creating art and engaging in them.

Many philosophers feel that any talk of value should be left out of art theory. Both Markowitz and Weitz worry about the normative nature of some definitions. George Dickie says that 'art' should be a neutral term so that we can allow for good and bad art.\(^\text{16}\) Zangwill says that separating the description and the value of art is impossible, as part of describing art is explaining why people engage in art activities. What is more, Zangwill says that Dickie is wrong in thinking that all theories that explain the value of art would not allow for the possibility of bad art.

Zangwill's theory of aesthetic creation successfully proves this point. Because it is centered on the production of art, the intentions of the artist are taken into consideration before any talk of appreciation comes into play. Zangwill believes that art must be created with the intention of producing an object that has aesthetic properties, and that because of this, there is room for failure and bad art. Something may be art without its producer having intended it to be so, and intentions can be realized with varying degrees of success.

I agree with Zangwill's description of art production and appreciation, as well as with most of the extension of his account. He explains that the artist has certain intentions she wants to achieve, but that these intentions can be adjusted during the process of creating an artwork. He

allows for different levels of success and for accidental properties to be part of the finished work. He stresses that, as artifacts, there must be a function to art. He allows for the appropriation of natural objects and other artifacts as art. He says artists do not always create with an audience in mind and stresses that the act of artistic creation is pleasurable in and of itself. He rejects purely sociological, that is, contextual, definitions of art and says that the properties of the objects matter as much as the context they are created in. He allows utilitarian art and even everyday activities, such as doodling, to fit the theory.

Yet, Zangwill thinks aesthetic properties are essential to art. He explains the pleasure of art production in terms of the pleasure derived from creating aesthetic properties, because these properties are valuable. He says that an artist's intentions must be to create aesthetic properties in an object. He says that the appreciation of art is also due to the pleasure aesthetic properties induce. Although he says his theory is a new way of looking at art, beyond putting production into the equation, his theory is no different than old-fashioned aesthetic theories. As the discussion about functionalist definitions above demonstrates, essentialist definitions are too narrow; in Zangwill’s case, most avant garde art is excluded prima facie.

The problems do not stop there. Although he considers aesthetic properties to be essential to all art, Zangwill says that other properties, social, economic and semantic, can be essential to individual artworks. As I will demonstrate in the next section, if there is a description of art that can account for all of these properties without excluding any artworks, and without resorting to obsolete talk of essences, that will be the more desirable theory.\(^\text{17}\) Zangwill also never includes a

\(^{17}\) In his discussion of non-Western art, Davies says that we recognize art from other cultures in virtue of the fact that they have aesthetic properties. Davies also says that these are essential to art. Yet, he also says that there are some properties these artworks have that we could only come to understand once we become acquainted with their culture of origin. It seems that both of these points would still apply even if aesthetic properties were not essential to art. Perhaps we recognize that cultures have art in virtue of the aesthetic properties some art objects have, however, we cannot recognize all art or all properties of any one art object until we have become
convincing argument in his book explaining what aesthetic properties are, why artworks have them and why they are valuable. He briefly mentions the link between aesthetic properties and value in the last few paragraphs of the book, but by then, it does little to support his theory. Zangwill also claims that aesthetic properties are dependent and supervenient on the non-aesthetic properties of works, but never explains why, and he does not defend these relations either, although he admits that they are problematic. He also makes broad, uncharitable generalizations about sociological theories of art, accusing all of their proponents of the some/all fallacy and assuming that because not all artworks can be explained in terms of aesthetic properties, then none can be.

In short, although it is a position that includes and even privileges art production, while still explaining art appreciation, Zangwill’s artistic creation is not a good candidate for a theory of art. But this does not mean it is not without value. This theory asks the right questions. What is art? Why do we create art? Why do we appreciate it? This theory concentrates on all aspects of the art process. This theory allows for the physical and mental appreciation of art. It includes “high” art, craft, design, “low” art and everyday activities. Yet, although the support for this theory is not compelling enough, even if it does not suffer from the bias of normative dualism. This is not the correct way to restructure theory.

**The Cluster Account**

Restructuring theory might sound like a daunting task. We might worry that abolishing the art/craft distinction or the bias of normative dualism might undermine other aesthetic theories. Yet, this task is not nearly as monumental as it seems, nor do we have to give up all acquainted with their context. The cluster account in the next section seems to accommodate this idea.
areas of art theory to purge the prejudice. Although some theories concentrate solely on the
cognitive processes involved in the production and appreciation of art, this does not mean these
theories need to be scrapped. Many theories already correctly explain the characteristics of
certain objects; others point to what the institution of art values. Even while they rest on the bias,
some theories simply need to reassess the value they ascribe to art objects; others need to
acknowledge that they are not describing the objects themselves, but how we treat them. More
importantly, the efforts to create a successful account of art have inadvertently been working
towards discarding the bias of normative dualism already. Though I disagree with many aspects
of Zangwill’s theory, it is proof that existing theories are compatible with the inclusion of “non-
art” and art production. Yet, I think the rejection of essentialist definitions and a shift towards
cluster accounts of art has proven more beneficial to aesthetics. This approach rids theory of the
need to demonstrate the value of one criterion over another, allowing for many different criteria
to be considered as important to art. I will now discuss the benefits of cluster accounts.

Cluster accounts provide a successful classification system for art objects by employing
not a fixed definition but, instead, a list of characteristics that all objects that fall under a
category should have. Yet, unlike Weitz’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches, cluster accounts reject
the idea of having a paradigm object that determines resemblance. Berys Gaut’s account of art is
the paradigm example of the cluster account: not only does it carefully delineate the form a
cluster account should take, but it has been so successful as to have few challengers.  
Gaut’s list of characteristics for art has three important features. First, the characteristics on the list are

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modifications, but these are outside the scope of my paper. See: Longworth, Francis, and Scarantino, Andrea,
jointly sufficient to make an object art; that is, the conjunction of a group of them is sufficient safely for us to say an object is art. Second, there is no single characteristic on the list that is necessary; that is, no one characteristic must be present in an object for it to be considered art. Third, these characteristics are disjunctively necessary. That is to say, possessing only one of the characteristics does not make an object art; an art object must display two or more of the characteristics on the list.

It is important to note that Gaut's account depends on its form and not on the content of his list. Because the list is open to the expansion and replacement of its criteria, the content of cluster accounts is not fixed. Yet, Gaut does suggest a ten-point list of characteristics for art objects: Objects that (1) have aesthetic properties such as beauty and grace, (2) express emotion, (3) challenge the status quo and the intellect, (4) have formal coherence and complexity, (5) convey meaning beyond the obvious, (6) are the product of an individual point of view, (7) display originality, imagination and creativity, (8) require high degree of skill to produce, (9) are an example of an accepted art form or (10) have been produced with the intention of making art, are art objects (Gaut 2000, 28). Gaut acknowledges that these ten specific characteristics could be incomplete or open to revision, but his successful application of them to several accepted art objects seems to indicate that they are a good starting point.

Gaut's account is promising because of how successful it has been at describing art objects. For instance, he explains how the cluster account can successfully capture Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, Egyptian art, Buñuel and Dali's Un Chien Andalou, folk art and an ugly nineteenth-century painting. Gaut's list of characteristics is also promising because it includes both cognitive and physical considerations and is open to revision. I will now argue for the claim that any successful account of art will inevitably describe craft and other utilitarian arts as well.
by applying Gaut's list of characteristics to some objects.

I will begin by using one of Markowitz's examples of an object that straddles the boundary between art and craft: one of Borgeson's non-functional pots. Following Markowitz's description, the pot meets six out of ten of the criteria mentioned above. Its pleasant color scheme and form meet characteristics one and four (aesthetic properties and formal coherence). The idea of the non-functioning lid meets points three (challenge to the status quo), six (an individual point of view), and seven (display of originality). Because the object displays mastery of pottery technique, it meets point eight. Borgeson's pot fits Gaut's cluster account.

Yet, the case of a craft object that fits Gaut's account may succeed in showing only that that particular object was art, and not craft, all along. If the account is to include the whole of craft, the account must apply successfully to an object that is not a borderline case, an object that most theorists would reject as art, such as a blown glass vase. Blown glass vases are generally considered beautiful, so they meet point one. Some of them have very complex forms, which display both formal complexity (point four), and mastery of technique (point eight). Making a particularly complex form that requires the development of new techniques to work the glass is a display of originality and creativity, so a glass vase can also satisfy point seven.

The fact that the vase meets only four of the criteria on the list is a cause for concern. For example, Gaut suggests that a philosophy paper would meet points three, four, five and seven, and thus would provide an example of something that meets the requirements on the list but is not art. But as Gaut admits, a problem with this account is that there is no way of knowing how many or which characteristics from the list are required to show an object is art. It seems we have to appeal to our intuitions to apply the account. For example, the similarities between an unremarkable student painting that meets only requirements one, four, nine and ten and a blown
glass vase intuitively seem to be greater than those between the painting and the philosophy paper. Yet, even if our intuition is correct, intuition does not justify anything.

Therefore, a better approach would be to find a way to verbalize and incorporate this intuition into the account. I would like to propose a new feature for cluster accounts (I would like to stress that I do not mean a new characteristic for the list) that could be added to Gaut's three that would not only give more weight to the idea that craft fits the account, but would explain why the painting does and the philosophy paper does not. All four characteristics met by the philosophy paper belong to the ideas in it, not to the object itself. The paper and the characters printed on the paper have nothing to do with the philosophy paper’s originality, the challenges it poses to the intellect or even the complexity and coherence of its form. On the other hand, both the student painting and the blown glass vase have characteristics that pertain to both the ideas they represent as well as the objects themselves. Even in cases of conceptual art, the physical object or performance is required to convey the message; it is a necessary part of the statement being made. Unlike Berys Gaut's “‘Art' as a Cluster Concept,” which would be the same thing whether it was read in print or on the pixels of a screen, Marcel Duchamp's *Fountain* would be a completely different piece, with a different impact, had a sink been used instead of a urinal.

Thus, in addition to the cluster account’s requirement that its proposed characteristics be jointly sufficient and disjunctively necessary for “arthood,” it must also require that these joint characteristics pertain to the object itself and to the cognitive and physical processes involved in its production and appreciation.

Adding this feature is important not only because it appeases some worries that may arise by its inclusiveness, but also because it stresses the rejection of normative dualism. The idea that art exists only because of the relationship these objects have to theory, to ideas, to cognitive
processes is unjustifiable. The physicality of art objects is as important to their being art objects as the cognitive processes involved in their production and appreciation. The same goes for craft, and therefore, we should not divide these objects into separate categories. The flexibility of this account also allows for requirements pertaining to art production, beyond the artist's intentions, which are already part of the list, to be added in the future.

**Bad Art, Good Art and the Place of Value in Art Theory**

Removing the bias of normative dualism and the art/craft distinction from aesthetics has a couple of consequences that might seem undesirable to a few philosophers. Some might worry that such an inclusive account would end up including any man-made object. However, as I will demonstrate below, this worry is unfounded and only a problem for those with elitist views—whether these views stem from normative dualism or another bias. A second concern the account might raise is that its inclusiveness allows for good art and bad art, which some theorists might not want. Going back to Zangwill's discussion of art and its value, I will explain why not only is it desirable to explain the rationality of engaging in art activities, but necessary under a theory that is free of the bias of normative dualism.

I will begin with the first worry: my account is so inclusive that all artifacts end up being art. Prima facie, it seems like this would be true, as under the cluster account, a pencil that meets the requirements could be art. Plumbing that meets the requirements could be art, whether it is Duchamp's *Fountain* or a particularly aesthetically appealing faucet. A plastic bag could be art. However, I would like to stress that this is only if the object meets the requirements of the cluster account. This means that an object of any type, whether it is a mural or a utility box, can be art. However, this does not mean that any one type of object will always be art. An appropriated
yellow No. 2 pencil, sitting on a pedestal in a gallery, could be art. A giant pencil could be art. But the type ‘pencil’ is not art, although tokens of the type may be. A chewed up pencil, sitting in the corner of a second grade classroom is not art. Picasso’s *Guernica* is art. A self-portrait by Rembrandt is art. The painting of a rabbit I made when I was five is art. But a canvas used to clean paintbrushes and covered in paintmarks is not art.

This can be troubling to some. Accepting craft as art is relatively easy: these objects are unique and handmade by craftspeople who adhere to good technique and have a personal relationship with the product. Yet, most people—theorists, members the artworld and the general public—tend to reject mass produced objects as art. But I do not see a way to justify this. For one thing, being an accepted art form has never been seriously considered as a necessary condition for being art. More importantly, excluding mass produced objects from art usually hinges on the biased idea that art is inherently valuable, and that, therefore, non-unique, mass produced objects can not be art. Mass production is associated with mass consumption of a product, and this is seen as incompatible with the value art has. Anyone can have one, at any time, making the object less valuable.

This prejudice is also used against the entertainment industry and “low” art. It is rare that popular music and movies are considered art. But just as it is unjustified to think an

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19 A related point is made by sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. In his book *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, Bourdieu argues that the division between art and non-art resides in a class bias that associates art, art appreciation and the value of art with the life of leisure of the bourgeoisie. Non-art objects are associated with the concerns the working classes have with utilitarian matters. The bourgeoisie appreciates disinterested contemplation of aesthetic properties and the semantic quality of art, the “uselessness” of *avant garde* twentieth century art, because this shows they do not have to associate themselves with manual labor. The working classes appreciate representation in art, narratives that mimic life; art serving a purpose, even if it is just to imitate life. Although I think these observations hold true, Markowitz’s discussion has shown that accusations of elitism are not very illuminating, and in the end, can be traced back to normative dualism. This theory also suffers from the prejudice against art production that I relate to the bias of normative dualism. Yet, I think this is an important observation, especially when it comes to the entertainment industry. Many times, it seems that the only justification people have for excluding Hollywood movies and Top-40 pop music from the artworld lies in their mass consumption. Bourdieu, Pierre, “Introduction,” in *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press): 1984.
established art form is required for art status, it is unjustified to think a genre within an art form is required for art status. I see no good reason to say all auteur films are art, while all action or horror films are not. The reason Ingmar Bergman's films seem to be art and Jean Claude Van Damme's filmography does not lies in how well they fit a good account of art, such as the cluster account. Yet, if we were to find out that the director of a Jean Claude Van Damme film intended for it to be art, then we would have to consider it art. After all, it is part of an accepted art form and it has aesthetic properties, and these points of the cluster account pertain to both the object and the processes involved in its appreciation and its production. This idea might be opposed by many, but only if they think that there is no such thing as bad art.

In a discussion about art and censorship, Donald W. Crawford points out that the “art for art's sake” idea of art and touting the value of art, whether it lies in promoting the value of aesthetic properties or creativity, has led people to think art is above moral judgment. Similarly, under normative dualism, equating art with the mental processes involved in its appreciation has led some theorists to think that art is inherently good, that the idea of bad art is a contradiction. In this sense, Dickie did have a point when he said 'art' should be a neutral term.

As I said above, I agree with Nick Zangwill that art theory must explain why art is worthwhile, why it is reasonable for us to engage in art production and art appreciation. This is not incompatible with there being good art and bad art, and explaining the rationality of art activity does not make art a normative. Yet, I do not agree with his explanation for the value of art. It is narrow and leaves out many considerations.

As pointed out by Zangwill, the production of art is pleasurable to the artist. Zangwill thinks this pleasure stems from creating aesthetic properties, which he thinks are valuable.

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However, I do not see why the activity of artistic creation cannot be pleasurable without relying on aesthetic properties. We can get pleasure from creating aesthetic properties, but we can also get pleasure from endowing an object with special meaning, from creating a piece that challenges the status quo, a piece that spreads an important social message, or even in creating an artwork because it will help us pay the bills. Artistic creation might even be pleasurable for its own sake, regardless of what the final product contains or expresses. The reason why artistic creation is pleasurable is irrelevant. What matters is that artistic creation is pleasurable to most artists, and, therefore, it is valuable to them.

Zangwill uses the pleasure found in creating and appreciating the aesthetic properties of art as a bridge between the value of art production, the value of art consumption and the value of art preservation. However, there is no important reason why the values of art production, consumption and preservation should be the same. The fact that both of these activities center on the same objects does not mean that our reasons for engaging in them must be the same. Moreover, there is no reason why art should be valuable for only one reason. Take the Mona Lisa. It was rational for Leonardo Da Vinci to paint this work for several reasons. He was getting paid for it. He probably enjoyed the process of art production (regardless of the reason). He could have been teaching an apprentice how to paint a portrait successfully. And a viewer’s appreciation of the Mona Lisa is rational, but for other reasons. The viewer can appreciate the subtle beauty of its brush strokes, or she can be impressed with Da Vinci’s mastery of atmospheric perspective. While these same reasons could explain why it is rational to want to conserve the work, they need not; and there may be other reasons that do that work. For example, it is important to conserve the Mona Lisa because of its popularity and the historical

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21 The difference between artistic production and appreciation is also discussed by Bradley Murray in his paper about Kant’s conception of genius.
value it has gained. It would be absurd to think that this was among the reasons Da Vinci created the painting, and most people's appreciation of it are independent of this.

Art activities can be rationally explained independently of each other. For this reason, we can explain the value of art as whole, as a branch of human endeavor, without explaining the value of independent artworks. We can discuss why people think art activities are rational without making 'art' a normative term. Philosophers seem to ignore the fact that simply because art as an activity is worthwhile, this does not mean that all artworks should be. Theories that concentrate wholly or primarily on art appreciation suffer from this myopia.

Seeing that not all artworks are worthwhile, although art as a whole is, is easy if we consider all art activities when creating an account of art. If it is true that art production is pleasurable to the artist, this would make art production rational and worthwhile. Therefore, art, as an endeavor, is valuable because its creation is valuable. Art objects do not always meet the artist's intentions, however, as Zangwill points out. So, even if an artist intended to make a beautiful painting in order to educate his community about the evils of American interventionism overseas, this does not mean that the painting will be beautiful or that it will successfully depict American interventionism in a negative light (and even if it did, this does not mean his message is true or worthwhile). Moreover, the artist could have no intention of producing anything of either visual or theoretical value. Yet, it is the fact that an art object has visually or theoretically valuable properties that makes it worthwhile to appreciate. Art consumption is justified by the beauty of a piece, or by its intellectual or even monetary value, regardless of what the artist’s intentions were. The value of independent artworks, then, is completely separate from the value of art as whole. There can be bad art, although, art, as a whole, is an important and worthwhile branch of human endeavor.
Therefore, the value of art has a place in art theory without making the term 'art' normative. An inclusive account of art, such as mine, avoids two mistakes normative dualism has led theorists to make, the unjustified exclusion of objects based on a prejudice for their class or genre and the rejection of the idea of bad art. Bad art is a necessary part of a theory that explains the rationality behind art activities, the actual properties objects have and that correctly classifies objects as art. A last clarification I would like to make is that satisfying more or fewer of Gaut's cluster account criteria cannot be used to determine whether art is good or not. Simply because a work meets all points on the list, this does not mean it does it exceptionally well or that it is valuable. Whether it is of your liking or not, Duchamp's *Fountain* has been an incredibly influential, and thus valuable, piece of art. It is good art not because it meets all of the requirements on Gaut's list, but because it meets some of them, challenging the intellect and the status quo, and expressing originality, incredibly well.

**Conclusion**

The bias of normative dualism has led to the separation of “high” art from craft, design and “low” art, a division that is unjustifiable. It has led to the exclusion of art production from art theory, which has given us an incomplete picture of what art really is. It has made many theorists think that bad art is an oxymoron, and thus, to the misclassification of many objects. This bias is so entrenched in Western thought that it has affected all of art theory. The quest of twentieth-century aesthetics failed to describe art time and time again. Part of this failure can be attributed to the fact that art objects, being so diverse, have no necessary and sufficient conditions that apply to all of them. Yet, this problem, which arises when definitions are applied to open concepts that lack independently necessary and sufficient conditions, is not the only reason
behind this failure. Even accounts rejecting essential features have not managed to include all of the objects we want to consider art. The attempts to maintain the division between art and “non-art” are also part of the reason accounts of art have failed.

As I have tried to show by applying Berys Gaut's cluster account, which is successful in describing art objects, to craft, a good description of art will also describe utilitarian art and “low” art. Art and so called “non-art” share not only aesthetic characteristics, but also production and appreciation traits. Unlike other artifacts, it is both the cognitive processes involved in their production and appreciation and the physical characteristics of the objects themselves that make them what they are. Therefore, ridding theory of the bias of normative dualism and the arbitrary art/craft division is the first step to creating an account of art that actually works.

Including production is the next step to creating a theory that is free of the prejudice for the mental and that accurately denotes art objects. Art production can explain further similarities between art objects, and looking into the rationality of engaging artistic production explains the value of art as a branch on human endeavor. Theories of artistic production also allow and explain the existence of bad art, which is a necessary part of a theory that does not equate art with “high” art and its unjustifiable normativity. Ridding art theory of the bias of normative dualism is, then, what we need to finally reach a successful description of art.