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doi: <https://doi.org/10.57709/1059854>

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EXPLAINING THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE: THE LEADERSHIP OF THE HEGEMON

by

BETSY MONTGOMERY

Under the Direction of Dr. John Duffield

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the role of the hegemon in the international response to genocide. The study looks specifically at the role of the United States and the post Cold War cases of genocide to determine how the United States encouraged or discouraged a response to genocide. By using the plausibility probe method, this study finds that the role of the hegemon is an important one that should be studied further to understand the impact of the hegemon on the international response to genocide.

INDEX WORDS: Hegemon, Genocide, Rwanda, Bosnia, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Genocide Convention

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of

Master's of Arts

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2007

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Betsy Lynn Montgomery
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December 2007

Table of Contents

List of Tables	v
Subheadings	
Introduction	1
The Genocide Convention: Background and Ratification	2
Defining Evil: The Meaning of Genocide	3
Literature Review	5
Factors Affecting the Response to Genocide	7
Focusing on the Leadership of the Hegemon	12
The Role of the United States: An Overview	13
Case Selection and Methodology	14
Evaluating the Response: Rwanda	17
Pre-Genocide Rwanda and the International Community	18
The Response of the United States and How it Affected the International Community	20
Finally a Response: Operation Turquoise	22
The Importance of the United States: Reluctant Hegemon	22
Evaluating the Response: Bosnia and Herzegovina	26
Bosnia I: Non-Intervention Policies	28
A Response and a Result: The United States Takes the Helm	32
Why Intervention? A Review of the Response to Bosnia	33
Never Again? Final Thoughts on the Genocide Convention	35
Bibliography	37

List of Tables

Table One: Genocide and the International Response	5
Table Two: Preventive Action with Presence of Hegemon	14

After the world witnessed the horrors of the Holocaust the international community cried out “never again” and resolved to find ways to discourage the repression of citizens by their governments and to prevent the atrocities like those that resulted from the Holocaust. The violence of the Holocaust seemed so different from anything the world had seen before that the actions seemed to merit a new term: genocide. Even though destructions of this kind have been perpetrated throughout history, the Holocaust was an important turning point when states responded collectively to declare that acts of such monstrosity were unacceptable and against international moral standards. Leaders from around the world created the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (from here on referred to as the Genocide Convention or simply the Convention) and declared it in force as of January 12, 1951. Not only is genocide declared a “crime under international law,” but it is also considered so grievously against the international norms that the agreement requires signing states to do all within their power to prevent genocide from occurring.

Although the Genocide Convention requires states to prevent and punish genocide, there have been multiple cases when the international community failed to respond. Many explanations have been given for this failure, but there has not yet been a theorization of the causes behind the inability of the Genocide Convention and its signatories to prevent and punish genocide when it occurs. The recurring cases of genocide and the current situation in Darfur, Sudan raises the question, why has the international community failed to prevent genocide?

In order to examine the failure of the international community to prevent genocide, I will focus specifically on the leadership role of the hegemon and its actions to encourage or discourage the rest of the international community to respond to genocide. The leadership potential of the hegemon and other major powers in the international community and

international crises is vast. Major powers provide humanitarian aid, generate economic policies that affect worldwide trade, have the ability to take military action and set the example for the reaction of the international community towards crises. The importance of a willing hegemon and major powers to be involved in the international community, regardless of the size of the country affected, is not only important, but often is essential. This thesis argues that the decision of the hegemon to respond to genocide will encourage the rest of the international community to respond and is therefore required to stop the genocide. In order to examine this further, this thesis will focus specifically on the role of the United States in the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda and will look at the impact of the hegemon on the cessation of genocide.

The thesis is organized as follows. The first section explains the definition of genocide, the Genocide Convention, and the extent of the problem of states failing to enforce the Convention. The second section explores the literature on hegemony, collective security, and the Genocide Convention and draws the theoretical basis for the project from the literatures. The use of multiple literatures provides the best foundation to develop possible reasons or hypotheses for the failure of the Genocide Convention. Finally, I will discuss the role of the hegemon in responding to genocide and demonstrate the connection between the leadership of the hegemon and the presence or absence of a response towards genocide.

The Genocide Convention: Background and Ratification

Although the word “genocide” is known by the majority of people in the world, the word itself is in fact a new concept. Until the Holocaust, the mass killing of a group of people based on their intrinsic characteristics was labeled barbarity, not genocide (Power 2002). A Polish jurist named Raphael Lemkin, who had studied the repeated occurrences of genocide throughout

history, coined the word “genocide” to truly reflect the “unique horror of the crime”. Lemkin also understood the need to draft a document that mandated political leaders to act on the “moral imperative” of stopping genocide (Power 2002). Lemkin pressured international leaders to create a document that not only reflected the horrors of genocide but that bound political leaders to act when genocide was occurring (Power 2002). The United Nations finally reached an agreement and the result was the creation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of The Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations in 1951 and considered in force in 1951.

Although the Convention was considered in force in 1951, it was not ratified by the United States until 1988. Politicians in the United States had a problem with the vague terminology and the implications of signing a document that accepted the violation of sovereignty to prevent genocide (Kampmark 2005; Rusk 1950). One of the major problems for the United States was the idea that by signing an international document, it would be forfeiting its rights to determine when and where action would be undertaken by the United States. Even though the United States expressed its reservations to the Genocide Convention, once it signed the Convention, as a major power and signatory, the United States has an obligation to respond to genocide in a way that ensures the rapid end to the violence.

Defining Evil: The Meaning of Genocide

Article Two of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing Members of the Group
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part

- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The definition of genocide distinguishes genocide from other atrocious but less brutal acts, such as mass murder and crimes against humanity. Genocide has not been uncommon since the end of World War Two. It has occurred in nine countries, including Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia, Guatemala, Nigeria, Iraq, Burundi, East Pakistan and is currently occurring in Darfur, Sudan. The death toll has reached easily into the millions and with countless more people displaced from their homelands as a result of the violence (Prevent Genocide International). It is clear that the Genocide Convention has not achieved the goals of preventing genocide for which it was originally created. Furthermore, the Convention is also weak in its ability to punish perpetrators, although it has made some headway through the trials for Rwanda and Bosnia within international courts.

The table below categorizes the different occurrences of genocide since the creation of the Genocide Convention in 1951. As demonstrated below, the international community has rarely used preventive measures to stop genocide and the use of the Convention to punish perpetrators has been irregular. The only case that had some sort of preventive measures associated with the Convention is Bosnia, and the case of Bosnia can actually be separated into two distinct periods involving different types of responses (labeled as Bosnia I to signify a lack of response and Bosnia II to signify the period when the United States became heavily involved). As demonstrated below, the record of prevention of genocide, even in the existence of the Genocide Convention, is poor.

Table One: Genocide and the International Response

	Prevent	Punish
East Pakistan (1971)	--	--
Burundi (1972)	--	--
Cambodia (1975-1979)	--	--
Nigeria (1967-1970)	--	--
Guatemala (1981-1983)	--	--
Iraq (1987-1989)	--	+/--
Bosnia I (1992-1994)	+/--	+
Bosnia II (1994-1995)	+	+
Rwanda (1994)	--	+
Sudan (2003-2007*)	--	*

+ Signifies the Genocide was stopped with the use of force

-- Signifies the Convention has been ignored or ineffectively used

+/- Signifies the response has been mixed;

*Signifies the genocide is still occurring

Although it is clear that the Genocide Convention fails on both parts of the prevent and punish clause, it is more important to note how it fails as a way to prevent genocide. Preventing genocide before it becomes catastrophic is preferable to punishing perpetrators after the fact, especially in light of the fact that early prevention can help save countless lives and stem the amount of destruction. As a result, this paper will focus specifically on the failure of the Genocide Convention to get signing states to prevent genocide.

Literature Review

The literature covering the Genocide Convention fails to adequately explain why signatories have been reluctant to fulfill their obligations to prevent genocide (Power 2002; Miraglia 2005; Rosen 1999; Totten & Bartrop 2004). The literature has instead focused on topics

such as the ratification of the treaty and the application of the punishment clause of the Convention. Although there is a large gap in the literature on the Genocide Convention, the literatures on collective security and hegemony fill the gap to explain the failure of the Genocide convention. The combination of the literature on collective security and hegemony creates a strong theoretical basis for the explanation of the recurrence of genocide in the post World War Two period and will be further explored in the first sections of the literature review. Then the focus will be turned to the various factors that affect the response to genocide, such as the lack of a preponderance of power, a lack of shared vision, a lack of interest in responding to genocide in areas that are not strategically important, problems associated with free-riding, and the lack of a willing hegemon.

In order to understand how the Genocide Convention has failed, it is useful to first categorize it as a form of collective security. Both collective security and the Genocide Convention have the common goal of preventing hostile behavior (war or genocide, respectively) by creating a system in which an aggressor state sees more costs than benefits in creating instability. It is helpful to understand the Genocide Convention as a form of collective security because of the requirement to prevent and punish genocide and the implications of this requirement for the international community. This section of the literature review will focus on situating the Genocide Convention within the collective security literature. Then the section will examine various explanations for the failure of the Genocide Convention derived from collective security and other literatures.

In the most basic terms, collective security is a system where a group of nations agree that an attack on one state in the system is the equivalent of an attack on all (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991). As a result, if there is an attack on one state in the system, the other members of

the international community are expected to retaliate against the aggressor as if they themselves had been attacked (Mearsheimer 1995; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991). However, the purpose of collective security is to use regimes and institutions to respond to a system of instability (Mearsheimer 1995; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991; Claude 1962). Inis Claude calls collective security a “scheme designed to accomplish the effective management of power relations among states” and it is through this scheme that the management of power allows for a more stable, peaceful system to emerge (Claude 1962).

Like collective security systems, the Genocide Convention is a security regime because its focus is on the management of genocide by requiring the signatories to respond to the perpetrators by stopping the genocide. The purpose of the Genocide Convention is to discourage genocide by warning perpetrators of the consequences before they act, or at least to make the perpetrators expect a response to the genocide to make it end quickly. The preventive capabilities of a security regime, particularly the Genocide Convention, should ideally create an atmosphere where genocide does not occur because of the potential magnitude of the consequences. The Genocide Convention, although established as a security regime, has failed to prevent genocide because of a variety of factors. I will now turn my attention to the factors affecting the response to genocide and theorize which factor promotes the most significant hypothesis to test.

Factors Affecting the Response to Genocide

A collective security arrangement is meant to create the “principles, norms, and rules that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate” (Jervis 2001). In order to create the principles, rules and norms to respond to aggressive nations, a collective security arrangement, such as the Genocide Convention, needs to be created to account

for the various factors that may affect its effectiveness. The first factor that may affect the response of the members to an aggressor is the lack of a preponderance of power from the states forming the arrangement. If one of the goals of collective security is to “prevent war by providing a deterrent to aggression”, there cannot be any power greater than the coalition that would not be deterred by its size, force, and power (Thompson 1953). This “preponderance of power” is absolutely necessary for a collective security system to work; otherwise there would be no effective deterrence towards states that are taking actions that would violate international norms (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991; Thompson 1953; Betts 1992). Although preponderance of power is an important factor, it is important to distinguish between the existence of preponderance of power and the willingness to use it.

Although a preponderance of power might exist in the international community, meaning there might be more powerful nations or a more powerful combination of nations who have the ability to stop genocide in a country, there also has to be the *threat* of the use of the power. If there is no threat that the international community will respond with enough force to stop the genocide, there is no real threat of preponderance of power. The use of the preponderance of power will rest on the willingness of the states to use it. If there is a preponderance of power available, but the states maintaining the preponderance of power are unwilling to commit the resources to provide it, there is still a lack of preponderance of power. At what point do countries find the political will to use the power available to respond to genocide?

Another factor that will affect the effectiveness of a collective security arrangement is the lack of interest for a country to respond to genocide. Although a country may want to prevent genocide and may even have the ability to do so, other factors may shape their immediate interest and stop them from undertaking the necessary actions to prevent genocide. For example,

if a country is already involved in military actions at the time of the genocide, they will be less likely to expend resources to prevent genocide. This would mean that although the resources are available to respond to both the genocide and remain involved in the military actions in other places, there is a lack of political will to involve the country in multiple military conflicts. A country may have the ability to respond to genocide, but the interest of the country may be based on the political will of the leaders, the domestic support of the country, or the strategic interest/importance of the country for the international system.

In terms of institutional factors that may affect the response of the international community to genocide, there are two major impediments to consider. The first is the institutional structure of the United Nations Security Council and the ability of the members to veto proposed legislation and therefore prevent any action from taking place. The veto power can create a big impediment to collective action, particularly when the major powers do not support a reaction to genocide when it is occurring and do not see the benefits in bearing the costs. The veto power can also demonstrate to the international community, and in particular, the perpetrators of genocide, that the major powers are not interested in the plight of the victims and the genocide can continue. The veto power gives major powers the ability to withhold resources and prevent action, thereby keeping the major powers safely removed from the conflict. The members of the Security Council can determine what course of action will be pursued in the United Nations and withhold or grant the use of UN resources to prevent genocide, a factor that could change the course of genocide.

The second institutional factor to consider is the lack of enforcement mechanisms for failing to honor the commitment to the Genocide Convention also stands as an institutional problem with the Genocide Convention that fails to encourage member states to prevent

genocide even when action is not in their immediate interest. Without an enforcement clause attached to the Genocide Convention, there is no punishment for states that fail to uphold the obligations outlined in the Convention. Without the enforcement clause, there is no way to ensure compliance with the Convention and no repercussions for inaction. The institutional problems with the Genocide Convention and the impact on the response to genocide are necessary factors to consider when considering the failure of the Genocide Convention.

A hegemon is defined as the single dominant power of the international system, such as the United States after the Cold War. The role of the hegemon in the international system is often to promote cooperation and, as part of a unipolar system, is often expected to be the “stabilizer” (Kindleberger 1973). It is also well known that the role of the hegemon in international regimes is often to provide what are considered “public goods” (Snidal 1985; Moravcsik 2000). However, for the hegemon to have a desire to provide the public goods on behalf of the international community, it has to be “willing to bear the full costs of its provision” (Snidal 1985). The role of the hegemon may have a large impact on whether or not genocide can and will be stopped. If the hegemon is unwilling to bear the costs of the response, then action will be unlikely. The potential for a hegemon to assume the leadership position in the response to genocide could have the most impact on the response of the rest of the international community. Without the resources of the hegemon, the rest of the countries may want to act but not have the resources and power necessary to be successful. When the hegemon acts, the rest of the international community sees it is willing to bear the majority of the costs, and other states can get involved to provide support that would have been insufficient without the hegemon. Although all of these factors are important in their capacity to affect the response to genocide as

set out in the Genocide Convention, the role of the hegemon is in many ways one of the most interesting.

The role of the hegemon in the international system is often to stabilize international politics and to promote cooperation. With regards to human rights regimes however, the role of the hegemon is debated. Roger K. Smith argues that when viewing the role of the hegemon through the lens of regime theory, the typical view that the hegemon is an exploiter of the international system is turned into the view that the hegemon is able to promote and sustain regimes (Smith 1987). Other theorists view the role of the hegemon as a potentially important, especially with the idea that human rights regimes have a moral underpinning. If the hegemon decides to wield its power on the basis of a moral obligation to human rights, it can be “unusually effective” (Donnelly 1986). With regards to the Genocide Convention, the role of the hegemon can fulfill either path. The hegemon could ignore and discourage the fulfillment of the Genocide Convention, or it could be its greatest champion, encouraging cooperation from the rest of the signatories and fulfilling a moral responsibility. The involvement of the hegemon might be important because of its unique capability to promote action, bear the brunt of action, and coordinate the action and lend its resources.

There is also the impediment of countries that free ride when action is necessary and “produce a weaker opposing coalition by contributing to the underproduction of military capability” (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995, 56). Free riding occurs when countries take more than their share of the benefits of action, while contributing less than the other countries. Essentially, free riding countries get the benefits without contributing to the costs. Countries wait to see the reaction of the rest of the international community, particularly the major powers, before they commit to intervention. As a result, the major powers do not wish to bear the costs of the

intervention and the smaller powers wait to respond to the genocide, thereby allowing the genocide to occur and action to be stalled. There is also the problem of other major powers free riding on the power, commitment, and expenses of the hegemon while contributing little of their own resources. The presence of a hegemon can alleviate many of these fears by providing a single state that has “sufficient interest in the [public] good to be willing to bear the costs of its provision” (Snidal 1985). The hegemon can help to alleviate the free riding problem by using its power and resources to bear the costs of the intervention and allow the smaller powers to contribute the resources they do have and encouraging the participation of the rest of the international community.

Focusing on the Leadership of the Hegemon

Although each factor affecting the response of nations involved in a collective security regime represents a possible determinant to the success of the Genocide Convention, there is one major factor that stands out above the rest. The hegemon has an important role to play in the implementation and effectiveness of regimes (Moravcsik 2000; Kindleberger 1973; Keohane 1980). Although the United States did not play a major role in the creation of the Genocide Convention after World War Two, the ratification of the Genocide Convention by the hegemon at the end of the Cold War meant the United States was now also subject to the rules of the Convention. However, the United States and the major powers have not always sustained the Genocide Convention and have instead often let genocide occur without taking or promoting any preventive action. The importance of the United States in promoting preventive action towards genocide is an avenue that needs to be explored further. This thesis will focus specifically on the role of the hegemon and the impact of a willing hegemon to prevent genocide.

Hypothesis:

I hypothesize that the Genocide Convention is likely to be ineffective in the absence of a willing hegemon that encourages the rest of international community to stop genocide where it is occurring. My independent variable is the willingness and ability of the hegemon to respond to genocide. My dependent variable is the cessation of genocide based on the intervention of the hegemon and the international community as a whole.

The Role of the United States: An Overview

Does the presence of a willing hegemon make a difference in the reaction to genocide? Based on the genocides that have occurred since the end of World War Two, it is clear that a successful response to genocide has not occurred without the presence of a willing hegemon. It is important to note that it is not solely the presence of a hegemon in the international system that would be sufficient for response to genocide, but rather that the key is the willingness of the hegemon to be involved in a response. It is easiest to summarize this idea in a matrix demonstrating that the presence of a hegemon was not the deciding factor in preventing genocide, but that the presence of a willing hegemon is necessary for any response to genocide to occur. Based on the table below, it is clear that without a hegemon present there has been no case of preventive action. The presence of the hegemon indicates that there was one country recognized as the hegemon of the international system and a party to the Genocide Convention, a factor not present until the end of the Cold War, with the United States assuming hegemony. Therefore, hegemon in the table refers specifically to the United States. Preventive action

indicates that there was enough force to stop the genocide at any stage of the process, even if the genocide had been occurring for years.

Table Two: Preventive Action with Presence of Hegemon

Hegemon Present?	Yes (Post Cold War)	No (Cold War)	
PREVENTIVE ACTION TAKEN?	Yes	BOSNIA II	No case of preventive action without presence of hegemon
	No	SUDAN BOSNIA I IRAQ RWANDA	CAMBODIA NIGERIA GUATEMALA EAST PAKISTAN BURUNDI

Case Selection and Methodology

In order to test the theory that a willing hegemon can change the course of a genocide, I will focus the rest of this thesis on the post Cold War cases of genocide, specifically Rwanda and Bosnia. These two cases represent the most fruitful cases of post Cold War response for several reasons. Primarily, they represent the best cases to fulfill the condition of the presence of a hegemon, especially since they represent a time period where the Soviet Union was clearly no longer a threat to the United States and as a result the United States was the hegemon. Although the United States continuously gained more power throughout the end of the Cold War period, the post Cold War period represents a time when the United States filled the role of hegemon without the threat of another powerful country to its hegemonic position. Both cases occurred within the same time period (early 1990s) and the basic characteristics of the international system did not change drastically within the year between the two occurrences of genocide. Therefore, I will be able to use these cases while controlling for other variables, such as different

leaders, time periods, or international events. These two cases also allow me to examine two different responses to genocide. Although the response to genocide in Bosnia was late, it was drastically stronger than the non-response to the genocide in Rwanda. Compared to all of the other cases of genocide, these two post Cold War cases are the best way to test the theory with the ability to see the two different responses to genocide (whereas almost every other case of genocide, both pre and post Cold War, was met with a strong lack of response).

Although the cases of Sudan and Iraq also occurred after the Cold War, the genocide in Sudan is still occurring and until the cessation of hostilities in Sudan, it would not represent a strong case study for the purposes of this thesis. Therefore, the genocide in Sudan will not be considered as a case study, but should be looked into for further studies on genocide once the genocide in Sudan has stopped. The genocide in Iraq would also be an interesting case to study; However, the similar times period, history, and political background of the Rwanda and Bosnia cases makes them the best choices to study. Rwanda and Bosnia represent the two most similar cases to examine and will provide the most fruitful plausibility probe inquiry into a deeper study of genocide and the role of the hegemon. Finally the comparison of Rwanda and Bosnia I with Bosnia II represent two very different responses and the ability to demonstrate that with the involvement of the United States in Bosnia II, the course of the genocide was drastically changed and the result was an end to genocide. The final case to address is that of Cambodia and the role of Vietnam. Although an argument can be made that Vietnam intervened in Cambodia and the result was the end of genocide, I am not considering Cambodia as a case to study. The military action Vietnam undertook towards Cambodia overthrew the political system in the country and then set up a puppet government in the country, and as a result the genocide was stopped. The intervention in Bosnia II was not to overthrow the government with the intent of installing a

puppet government, but instead was to stop the genocide. This is an important distinction to make, especially since the genocide in Cambodia represents a case during a bipolar system of power.

In order to sufficiently test the hypothesis, this study will use Eckstein's methodology of a plausibility probe to determine whether or not a more rigorous, comparative study of the genocides will be fruitful. A plausibility probe is a method used to examine whether the theory will be strong enough to be tested with even broader, more in-depth inquiries (Eckstein 1975). The method to study a plausibility probe is to use case studies that are "rooted in data and reasoning to warrant their statement in more precise form and their thorough testing" (Eckstein 1975). The purpose is to "establish the validity of the central propositions" for further inquiry (Eckstein 1975). In examining the response of the hegemon to genocide by using a plausibility probe, I hope to determine whether a stronger, more in-depth approach to the research question would be beneficial for the field of political science.

I plan to examine the case studies using secondary sources, with particular attention to summaries and comments on the resolutions and documents passed by both the United Nations and the United States. I will also use quotes and summaries of major politicians from personal biographies of the politicians as well as secondary sources that have summarized the quotes and speeches of the politicians. In addition to the use of quotes and speeches of politicians, I will also use the secondary sources for the most accurate summaries of the response of the international community and the United States to genocide. I plan to use secondary sources primarily because the wealth of information on both Rwanda and Bosnia represents a beneficial area to examine the role of the United States with regards to genocide in these two countries.

Evaluating the Response: Rwanda

The genocide in Rwanda represents one of the most horrific massacres in a very short period of time. In the span of one hundred days, the militias promoted by the Hutu-dominated government massacred almost 800,000 Tutsi and Hutu moderates. As the genocide in Rwanda continued on, the United States and the rest of the Western world refused to become involved and the perpetrators continued to slaughter without fear of repercussions. In evaluating the response to Rwanda, we see that the United States followed a certain pattern in its response: (1) it attempted to avoid using the term genocide to avoid obligations to respond; (2) the United States urged the Western world, through mediums such as the United Nations, to withdraw its support. The rest of this section will give a brief summary of the genocide in Rwanda, discuss the patterns of the response of the international community and the United States, and throughout the section will examine the role of the United States in not responding to the genocide.

The genocide that occurred in Rwanda is relatively well known, however, a brief summary will help to give a basic background to the case study. Rwanda consists of two main ethnic groups, the Hutus, making up about 85% of the population and the Tutsis, which are about 15% of the population (CIA World Factbook). Historically, the ethnic tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda were deeply ingrained and society was divided along these lines. During the colonial rule by the Belgians, the Tutsis held the power within the system of government (Paris 2004). The tensions between the Tutsis and Hutus were already in existence but, “Belgian rule appears to have exacerbated differences and destroyed the cushions that had made the prevailing hierarchy tolerable” (Marchak 2003). In the mid-1950s, the Hutus were gradually given more power and subsequent violence began to occur against the Tutsis. As a result, waves of Tutsis fled into exile and tensions continued to flare, especially as the exiled

Tutsis began to build a revolutionary military force to attempt to win back power. When independence from Belgium was granted in 1962, the Hutus solidified their place as the ruling class in Rwanda. From 1962 to the early 1990s, the Hutus used their positions to marginalize the Tutsis and the Tutsis in exile continued to build their military force. The culmination of these events was a civil war that began in 1990, tearing the country apart and enflaming already existing conflicts. A cease-fire was reached in 1993, with the help of the United Nations, and negotiations were underway (Power 2002). However, the negotiations were facing many obstacles and the success of the peace process was mixed. When the plane of Rwandan President Habyarimana was shot down in 1994, any hope for the success of a peace process disintegrated and the genocide began to unfold. The genocide resulted in the death of 500,000 to one million Rwandan Tutsis and Hutu moderates (Stanton 2004). Where was the international community during the Rwandan genocide and why did the international actors not follow through with their obligations as set out in the Genocide Convention?

Pre-Genocide Rwanda and the International Community

Several major powers were involved in Rwanda throughout the civil war and were instrumental in the peace process and the Arusha peace agreement, which served as a temporary hold on hostilities still fermenting (Prunier 1995). The international community had been instrumental in pressuring Rwandan President Habyarimana to accept the Arusha peace agreement and the world hoped the cease-fire agreement would be enough to end the hostilities (Destexhe 1995). The United Nations was also heavily involved at this point, and had agreed to supply a “neutral military monitoring force” to sustain the Arusha agreement. The deployment of this new monitoring force created the new United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda

(UNAMIR). Although the idea behind the monitoring force was to reinforce the peace process and to assist the country in rebuilding, it lacked the support from the United Nations necessary to make it a functioning entity in the face of mounting violence (Jones 1996). UNAMIR became the model of initial reluctance that shaped the response of the international community for the rest of the conflict (Jones 1996).

In addition to the United Nations, France played an important role in the genocide. The French had been involved in Rwanda long before the hostilities had flared to the point of genocide. Beginning with the dictatorship of President Habyarimana in 1975, the French supplied military and financial aid, slowly edging out the role of Belgium as the former colonial ruler (Melvern 2000). When the Rwandan Patriotic Front returned to Rwanda from Uganda and started the civil war, France sent in troops to stand by the Rwandan government forces to fight (Melvern 2000). Even though officially the French troops were not to use force, the French government was running the counter-insurgency campaign for the Rwandan government (Melvern 2000). Although the French had the resources to stop the genocide, they did not. Instead, the French supported the Hutu government and allowed the genocide to continue. The role of the United States in this situation should have been to encourage the French to stop the genocide and remove its support for the Hutu government. The French were not weak in their ability to stop the genocide, but they lacked the political will to stop the genocide (whereas the will existed to help secure the investment France had made in the Hutu government). The role of the United States is not always to provide solely the power and resources, but also to provide the encouragement to and direction of the missions.

The Response of the United States and How it Affected the International Community

The international community knew the situation in Rwanda was genocide, but were reluctant to use the term “genocide,” in order to avoid the obligation to try and stop it (LeBor 2006). In fact, the Secretary of State for the United States, Warren Christopher, acknowledged the fact that “acts of genocide” had occurred based on the definition given in the Genocide Convention, but he would not directly state that genocide had occurred. Other officials, such as the State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelley, stated “genocide has a very precise legal meaning...I’m not able to look at all of those criteria at this moment and say yes, no” (Cohen 2007). This statement came after multiple nongovernmental organizations had already identified what was occurring as genocide, including the Red Cross, Oxfam, Time and Human Rights Watch (Cohen 2007). By avoiding the use of the term “genocide” the United States was able to shy away from the obligations to prevent any further devastation (Ferroggiaro 2001; Donaghue 1994; Christopher 1994). By avoiding the use of the word “genocide,” the United States could also avoid any obligations to encourage the rest of the international community to become involved in an intervention.

The initial response to the genocide from the international community was discouraging to the victims, with the international community relinquishing responsibility for responding to the genocide. The first UN response to the genocide was to pass Resolution 912, reducing the UNAMIR force from 2,500 to 270 (Destexhe 1994). This response was primarily encouraged by the United States (Ferroggiaro 2001; Power 2002). General Romeo Dallaire, the former UN Commander in Kigali, has been quoted as saying “The day all that started, the US said not only are we not getting involved, we are not going to support anyone else getting involved”

(Amanpour 2004). As a result, the hegemon discouraged action by the international community and shaped the response to the genocide. The final intervention proposal presented to the Security Council on April 13th failed to receive any support, mostly because of the intense lobbying of the United States government to remove it from consideration (Cohen 2007). In addition to politicking at the United Nations, the United States also immediately stated its lack of interest in wars that were based on ethnic divisions to which it had little knowledge of or interest in (LeBor 2006). As the genocide continued to occur and the international media continued to publish stories about the atrocities, the United States began to pass legislation that stated its position on peacekeeping operations and intent to “be more selective and effective in which peacekeeping operations it undertook” (Cohen 2007). These statements indicated that the United States did not consider the situation in Rwanda to be a peacekeeping operation worth considering. Even when the United States was willing to commit resources to the proposed missions, the bureaucracy of the American government hampered the response. For example, the United States was asked for armored cars to help support the limited UN mission in Rwanda. The United States would only let the UN use armored cars from storage and it took three weeks for the US State Department to begrudgingly turn over the cars to the UN Department of Legal Affairs (Prunier 1995). The slow response from the United States failed to encourage the international community to work on a response to the genocide. The lack of response from the international community signified a response to the perpetrators of the genocide that the violence could continue without fear of reprimand or intervention. The non-response was actually a very strong response from the international community that allowed the genocide to continue.

Finally a Response: Operation Turquoise

A response finally occurred when, on May 17th, the Security Council passed a resolution calling for an arms embargo and deploying forces into the war zone. The resolution was drafted with the initial opposition of the United States, even though it had recently established the Rwanda Task Force as part of a Pentagon initiative (Cohen 2007). The French offered a humanitarian operation known as Operation Turquoise (Melvern 2000; Cohen 2007). The previous involvement of the French in the country was as a supporter of the Habyarimana government and thus made this mission a controversial one. The RPF were hostile towards the French mission, but the United Nations mandated the peacekeeping operation and gave them the authority to use force if necessary (Melvern 2000). As part of the peacekeeping operation, the French established safe zones for the Rwandans, regardless of their ethnic identity. As a result, the killings continued with the safe zones and the safe zones protected both perpetrators and victims of the genocide (Melvern 2000; Cohen 2007). The French Operation Turquoise failed to stop the genocide and in fact gave shelter to the perpetrators while inflaming tensions with the RPF because of the historical role of the French in the country (Cohen 2007; Melvern 2000; Cohen 2007). The peacekeeping operation undertaken by the French and approved by the Security Council months after the genocide had begun failed and the genocide continued unabated.

The Importance of the United States: Reluctant Hegemon

Due to the encouragement of the United States to avoid an intervention in Rwanda, there was no force strong enough to prevent the genocide and as a result the loss of life was catastrophic. Without the pressure of the hegemon on the international community to respond to

the genocide, the international community did not commit itself to a response. General Dallaire had asked for “reinforcements and later said that with 5000 troops he could have saved 500,000 people,” but without the support of the United States the devastation was in fact much worse (Destxhe 1995). Clearly, if the United States had committed troops and support to the United Nations military force instead of removing troops and paralyzing the United Nations, the response to genocide in Rwanda would have been different within the international community. The impact of the lack of U.S. involvement and the Clinton administration’s refusal to contribute anything to the missions attempting to prevent and stop the genocide in Rwanda made it that much more difficult for the international community to have an impact in stopping the genocide crisis in Rwanda

Without the desire of the hegemon to bear the majority of the costs of the intervention in Rwanda, the rest of the international community failed to act as well. They did so because the United States “is the only country that has the political, economic, and military strength to lead an effective intervention in crises of such scale” (Destexhe 1994). The United States as the hegemon had the ability to lead the intervention in Rwanda and to stop the genocide, but it failed to fulfill that role. Not only did the international community fail to prevent genocide militarily, but they also failed to find alternate ways of dealing with the atrocities and instead stuck to “diplomatic niceties and neutrality, and shipping humanitarian aid” (Destexhe 1995). As the hegemon, the United States often had to face the consequences from whatever course of action it chose to take. With regards to Rwanda, the United States would either respond to the genocide and commit its resources or ignore the genocide and refuse any commitment. Therefore, the United States had to face two potential outcomes if it decided to become involved: “the authorization of a new UN force and a new mandate without the means to implement either; and

worse, the very real possibility of the U.S. having to bail out a failed UN mission” (Ferroggiaro 2004). In the end, the truth of the matter is that the United States had every ability to understand and respond to the genocide in Rwanda, but as Samantha Power notes: “any failure to fully appreciate the genocide stemmed from political, moral, and imaginative weaknesses, not informational ones” (Power 2002). The United States was told during a meeting between UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Ambassador Madeline Albright that “forces for Rwanda would be available if the U.S. could make a ‘substantial contribution’ to a special peacekeeping fund for Rwanda” (Ferroggiaro 2004). The United States, as a hegemonic power in the international system, was expected to not only honor its commitment to the Genocide Convention, but also to lead the rest of the international community to respond to the crisis in Rwanda.

Why did the United States spend so much energy refusing to get involved in the genocide in Rwanda? The biggest reason explored in the literature and recognized by policy leaders was the fiasco in Somalia, where American soldiers were ambushed and dragged through the streets, all the while being broadcast on international news networks (Prunier 1995). The result was the lack of both domestic support and interest from the United States to get involved in Rwanda, if only to prevent another Somalia from occurring. In addition, a fact that Madeline Albright has pointed out, the United States was already involved in crises elsewhere, including Haiti and Bosnia (LeBor 2006; Albright 2004). The United States also knew that if it were to commit itself to a response to the genocide, it would end up bearing the costs of the intervention and the United States did not see the benefits to such action (LeBor 2006). The political will from the United States was clearly lacking, determined by factors such as the recent crisis in Somalia and

the lack of desire to organize the rest of the international community (LeBor 2006; Albright 2004).

The role of the United States as the hegemon during the genocide in Rwanda is clear. Without the assistance and support of the United States, the United Nations was unable to respond to the genocide because it was lacking the power and capability from the major power and, as a result, was also lacking the resources from the rest of the international community. The United States “as the lone superpower today, cannot escape the accompanying moral and political obligation to deal with a genocide” (Destexhe 1994). As the United States continuously blocked UN resolutions and dragged its feet on a response to the genocide, the rest of the international community followed its lead (Prunier 1995; Destexhe 1994). The combination of a lack of interest from the United States as well as the general lack of interest in the international community meant the potential for a response to genocide in Rwanda was minimal. Even though the United States, France, Britain and China had plenty of power to easily deploy military troops or use air strikes early in the conflicts/genocide to stop the perpetrators before the genocides reached the extent they did, they failed to do so (Prunier 1995). Genocide in Rwanda continued as the world stood by.

The conflict finally resolved itself when the Rwandan Patriotic Front consolidated power in Rwanda and was able to stop the genocide. After 100 days of fighting, the end result of the genocide was over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus dead. The international community had failed to respond to one of the worst genocides since World War Two. In a United Nations report published in 1999, the United States and other major world powers are condemned for “ignoring evidence of the genocide and removing UN staff when the victims needed help the most” (UN Report 1999).

Evaluating the Response: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Whereas the genocide in Rwanda was met with a complete lack of action, the genocide in Bosnia was met with a wide range of responses compared to all other cases of genocide. The case of Bosnia shows that when the United States was reluctant to become involved in genocide, the pattern followed was similar to that of Rwanda. First, there was a debate on whether or not the actions constituted genocide and reluctance to use the word and then there was an abandonment of the region by the United Nations and the rest of the international community. However, once the United States became involved in the response to the genocide, the response was drastically different. The genocide stopped and the warring parties were able to come to an agreement to end the civil war. This case study will be constructed somewhat differently than that of Rwanda because of the two phases of the response. The first section will discuss the history of the genocide. The second section will look at Bosnia before the intervention of the United States, from the years of 1992-1994, also known as Bosnia I. The third section will look at the course of the genocide after the United States followed intervention policies and will discuss the reasons for the changing response of the United States, from 1994-1995, labeled as Bosnia II.

Similar to the genocide in Rwanda, the genocide in Bosnia was the end result of years of civil war. The breakup of Yugoslavia exposed many issues, especially as political crises began to give rise to extremist and secessionist groups. In addition to the problems within Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was civil war and ethnic conflict in the surrounding regions, including Croatia. The United Nations had established a peacekeeping force in Croatia to deal with the ethnic conflicts that were already present in the region but that continued to spill over and become more extreme as the peace process dragged on. The United States was working within

Croatia during the conflict, transferring weapons through Muslim countries to the Croatian army (LeBor 2006). The case of Croatia shows that the United Nations and the United States were already involved in the region when the Bosnia conflict began to escalate, and were well aware of the impending genocide.

The ethnic breakdown of Bosnia is divided into three groups: Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims). The civil war in Bosnia was a response to the breakup of the Soviet Union and the power struggle among the ethnic divisions. Elections within the region threatened the Bosnian Serbs, since the Serbs felt the elections failed to represent their interest in a “Greater Serbia” championed by Slobodan Milosevic (LeBor 2006). The main conflicts began to arise as the Serbs began to boycott the referendums, fearing that the vote would give power to the other two ethnic groups and cause the Serbs to be constantly outvoted by ethnic lines as opposed to political lines (Economides and Taylor 1996). Although the “ethnic cleansing” of the Bosniaks occurred throughout the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, the most well known episodes of genocide in Bosnia were largely carried out in the Muslim enclaves (and UN protected “safe areas”), the most famous known as Srebrenica. Even though the United Nations and the rest of the international community had been involved with the peace accords up to this point, there was little to no response at the outset of the genocide. Again, the international community attempted to help with the peace process during the civil wars, but claimed their ability to help was limited because these were “ethnic wars” that the Western world could know and do little about (LeBor 2006; Henriksen 1996). It was best to just let these factions settle the problems amongst themselves and the international community was limited to stop them.

Bosnia I: Non-Intervention Policies

The response to the genocide in Bosnia was drastically different between when the United States was noncommittal in responding to genocide and when it finally agreed to intervention and to take the lead in the response. The beginning of the response of the United States started during the term of President George H.W. Bush, who had followed a policy of non-intervention to deal with the conflict. During his presidential campaign, President Clinton had made it clear that he wanted to make Bosnia a part of his foreign policy agenda and criticized the policies of President Bush (Henriksen 1996; Clinton 2004). Up until this point and during the first few months of President Clinton's administration, the United States fulfilled humanitarian roles, such as airdropping relief supplies (Henriksen 1996; House Document Communication 3732, 1994). However, because of the involvement of the United States in the Gulf crisis, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council decided to let the rest of Europe take a firm lead in responding to the crisis (Economides and Taylor 1996). From the beginning, the Western world was disinterested in the conflict in Bosnia and the perpetrators recognized that the Western world had little desire to get involved.

At the outset of the genocide in Bosnia, the United States followed many of the same patterns found in the case of Rwanda. Political leaders in the United States were hesitant to use the word genocide, and instead used words such as "ethnic cleansing" (LeBor 2006). They characterized the war as one of "ancient hatreds" and as a result stood idly by as the atrocities occurred. The result was the escalation of the conflict into genocide as the international community debated on what should be the best course of action. In addition to not labeling what was occurring as genocide, the United Nations and the international community tried to paint the conflict as one in which both sides of the conflict shared responsibility for the atrocities and that

genocide was occurring from both sides, not just one (LeBor 2006; Cushman and Mestrovic 1996). The United States responded to the atrocities by claiming, “no party is blameless for the current situation,” a quote made by the Department of State spokeswoman Margaret D. Tutwiler (Cushman and Mestrovic 1996). As a result of the noncommittal response of the United States to identify the situation in Bosnia as genocide, the international community could also refuse to acknowledge the truth of what was occurring and instead commit the minimal amount of troops or aid necessary to appear to be interested.

The United States was once again expected to be the leader in responding to the genocide occurring in Bosnia. From the beginning, the United States decided that the response of the international community in Bosnia would be noncommittal and the Serbs in Bosnia recognized this. Early responses to the genocide included sanctions, small troop deployments, and humanitarian efforts. The United Nations and the United States had established arms embargos and economic sanctions, which in fact hurt the Bosnian Muslims more than the Serbs (Daalder 2000; Henriksen 1996). The French and British deployed troops to calm the fighting, but the troops were there to avoid war with the Serbs and act as an “alibi for not taking more robust action against the Serbs” (LeBor 2006). By sending troops but not authorizing them to use force, the international community could say it was involved without providing the actual support to discourage the genocide. The humanitarian efforts did not have enough support on the ground to get the supplies to the necessary locations, regardless of Resolutions 770 and 771, which were passed at the United Nations and designed to ensure the humanitarian aid (LeBor 2006). The initial reactions to the crisis in Bosnia and the limited commitment to deployments and the use of force sent a clear message to the perpetrators that the international community would not get involved.

In order to avoid military involvement with the genocide, in Bosnia, the United States pursued non-military action. By pursuing non-military action, the United States could avoid fulfilling its obligation to respond to the genocide effectively and instead find policies that kept the United States above criticism of inaction. During the initial phase of the genocide and the war, the United States attempted to commit itself to non-military agendas, including embargos and sanctions (Daalder 2000). Additionally, the United States offered policies that conflicted with the policies offered by the European Community and therefore it was difficult to find a compromise (Daalder 2000; LeBor 2006). The United States supported a “lift and strike” approach to the crisis, where the embargo would be lifted so Bosnia could defend itself and NATO would sponsor air strikes against the Serbs (LeBor 2006). Although the United States tried to negotiate a “lift and strike” plan with its NATO allies, they could not come to an agreement. Germany was “sympathetic” while Britain and France did not agree with the air strikes because it could put their ground troops at risk (Sharp 1998; LeBor 2006). The United States continued to offer policies that differed from the rest of Europe and more often than not, “relinquished another opportunity to assume a leadership role” by allowing the Europeans to “prevail in preserving their cautious, go-slow approach while innocents died” (Henriksen 1996).

As the conflicts continued on in the region, the United States began to waver in its own policies, including the initial idea of “lift and strike.” President Clinton read a novel, *Balkan Ghosts*, which served to convince him that the “conflict in the Balkans was inevitable” and therefore not worth pursuing (Sharp 1998). The policy of the United States shifted from limited involvement to attempts to contain the conflict and eventually to adopting the UN safe areas, or enclaves (Sharp 1998; Daalder 2000). However, the safe area plan limited the ability of the international community to respond to the genocide and in fact allowed for the Bosnian Muslims

to be in contained areas with little protection from the United Nations (Sharp 1998). The shift in policy from limited engagement to containment meant the Bosnia Serbs were given even more freedom to attack the Bosnian Muslims and a clear pass to continue with their aggressive actions.

Without pressure from the United States and the United Nations, the international community did not feel any pressure to get involved, and thus lacked the willingness to respond. Bosnian Serbs knew that the UN would “return to traditional peacekeeping principles and would not interfere with their efforts” geared towards ethnic cleansing (Daalder 2000). Unlike in Rwanda, the United States had the ability to rely on NATO as a force of support and resources in its attempts to stop the genocide in Bosnia. However, because NATO allies and the United Nations were unable to come to agreement over “when and to what extent to use force,” the credibility of both NATO and UN was diminished (LeBor 2006). The United States had supported small NATO air strikes against the Serbs, but “without serious U.S. backing, these assaults had been meaningless” (Sharp 1998). The lack of commitment from the United States in the beginning of the genocide allowed the genocide to continue while the international community debated the solution and offered policies that kept the world on the sidelines of the conflict.

The failure of the United States and the international community stemmed partly from the idea that the United Nations was meant to be a neutral party to the war and to only act in “self-defense” (LeBor 2006). The United Nations had taken a stance to “remain neutral” and work only as “impartial and objective” observers to limit its involvement in the intervention (LeBor 2006). With the wavering policies of the United States and the lack of a true military force from the United Nations, “the Serbs always knew the United States was not committed” and the international community did not have the pressure to involve itself in a way that would be

sufficient enough to stop genocide (LeBor 2006). As the UN protected safe areas were filled with Bosnian Muslims, the UN soldiers had little ability or authorization to resist attacks from Bosnian Serbs (Sharp 1998; LeBor 2006; Daalder 2000). The breaking point for the United States and the international community came when the Bosnian Serbs attacked the Muslim enclaves with little impunity, while the UN troops could do little but watch the massacres unfold.

A Response and a Result: The United States Takes the Helm

As the emboldened Serbs took advantage of the Muslim “safe areas,” the United States realized that if it failed to step in at this point, the slaughter would become worse and its policy of containment was no longer working. The Serbs had overrun safe areas and had entered UN depots with the intent of repossessing the weapons seized by UN troops and to also take UN peacekeepers hostage as bargaining tools (Talentino 2005). As Serbs overran the UN safe areas and took advantage of the weakly guarded UN depots (where confiscated Serb weapons were being held), the United States finally decided it was time to commit its full force to the cessation of the hostilities (Talentino 2005).

The United States was the “crucial ingredient in ending the war” and finally the United States agreed to take the leadership role (Sharp 1998; Daalder 2000). Intense NATO air strikes coupled with offensive operations on the ground supported by French and British troops proved to be a formidable force against the Serbian armies. President Clinton’s agreement to allow NATO to bomb Bosnian Serb targets forced the “acceleration of the on-going Geneva talks between the non-combatants” (Henriksen 1996). NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force, a plan to use both air strikes and bombing campaigns to move the Serbs from the occupied territories. Operation Deliberate Force was a success in that it reduced the amount of territory the

Bosnian Serbs held and encouraged them to return to the bargaining table. With the renewed interest of the United States in the atrocities, the Bosnian Serbs no longer had the freedom to commit genocide and the international community had the leadership it needed to respond to further atrocities.

The United States took control of the majority of the NATO air strikes, with American pilots flying more than 80% of the planes (Henriksen 1996). Operation Deliberate Force became the effective preponderance of power necessary to end the genocide. The United States spearheaded the peace process, with representatives of Muslim, Croatian and Serbian factions convening outside of Dayton, Ohio (Daalder 2000). The genocide in Bosnia ended with the leadership of the United States and its Dayton Agreement negotiator Richard Holbrooke. It is clear that once the United States agreed to become fully engaged in the conflict in Bosnia, the course of the conflict took a different route. The second phase of the Bosnian genocide demonstrates the crucial factor of the need of a willing hegemon to respond to genocide in a way that both convinces the rest of the international community to get involved as well as convinces the perpetrators that the rest of the world is ready to respond.

Why Intervention? A Review of the Response to Bosnia

Why did the United States finally decide to assume the leadership role to end the conflict in Bosnia? What made the initial policies of non-intervention change to strong, clear attacks against the Serbs to stop the genocide? There are a variety of possible explanations for this change in reaction, including the proximity of Bosnia to Europe, the need of the United States to ensure the continuation of democracy in the unstable, former Communist region, and the ability to use NATO and the European allies for support. While these factors existed from the beginning

of the response, the increase in the threat from the genocide and the realization that the United States would lose these important factors if the genocide continued made for a change in response.

The geographical proximity of Bosnia to the rest of Europe, particularly the NATO countries, meant the refugee flows and instability of the region could potentially spillover into the NATO countries and cause even more instability (Talentino 2005). As a result, the European allies were more willing to compromise on different tasks to attempt to end the war. In addition, the importance of Bosnia to the larger desires to democratize the former Communist areas and the need to ensure stability in the region as the young democracies were growing proved to be a very important point for the United States. As the recent victor of the Cold War and the triumph of Democracy, the United States wanted to prove the stability of democracy. Therefore, the United States had a vested interest in the outcome of the civil war, and this interest only grew as the crisis slipped from chaos to sheer pandemonium.

As the war waged on and the media reports about genocide continued to filter out of Bosnia, President Clinton decided to take full advantage of the resources at his disposal, particularly NATO. The genocide had finally reached a point where the United States felt that the resources it would have to expend to stop the genocide were less important than the potential loss of the region to even more instability and the continuation of genocide. In contrast to Rwanda, the United States had the ability to draw resources from the NATO alliance to reinforce any military objectives it undertook. The use of NATO most certainly played a deciding factor not only in adding to the preponderance of power of the United States and allies, but it also afforded the allies an alternative to deploying the ground troops that would have been necessary without the NATO air strikes. The ability to draw off of NATO resources had a large impact on

the end of the Bosnian genocide and once the political will existed to use these resources, the genocide reached an ending point.

Thankfully, the United States intervened when it did, otherwise the genocide in Bosnia may have lasted much longer than it did. Although the loss of life during the first three years of the genocide represents a disastrous time in the foreign policy of the Western world, the final response to the genocide in Bosnia demonstrates the power the Western world, and in particular the United States, can have in stopping genocide. The United States became the champion of the end of the Bosnian genocide and has proven its ability to stop genocide if necessary.

Never Again? Final thoughts on the Genocide Convention

The United States had a responsibility and the resources to respond to the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia. With the conclusion that the United States had the most important role in responding to the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, it is likely that a further inquiry into the role of the United States in the prevention of genocide will be fruitful. Without the support of the United States, the international community did little to respond to the genocides. It was not until the United States became involved fully in the responses that the results were drastically different. When the United States committed its policies and power to the response to Bosnia, the genocide ended quickly. Without the support of the United States to end the genocide at that point, the genocide would have most likely continued indefinitely. On the other hand, it is highly likely that the genocide would have been stopped earlier had the United States resolved to dedicate its power to the problem at the outset.

Although the hegemon has the responsibility to take the leadership role in responding to genocide, the rest of the international community has responsibilities and obligations as well.

The major powers can use their position to encourage the hegemon to assume the leadership position. The smaller powers can contribute more resources to the intervention efforts without the expectation to free ride on the resources of the major powers. Preventing genocide must be a collective effort, but the collective effort is made much more successful with the assistance of the hegemon. It is not solely the responsibility of the United States or the hegemon to respond to genocide, but the involvement of the hegemon will often change the course of the genocide. The United States and the other signatories to the Genocide Convention have a responsibility and an obligation to do all within their power to prevent genocide when it begins or to stop it as soon as possible.

With the current situation in Darfur, Sudan and the atrocities we see there in the daily media, it is clear that genocide is occurring. Politicians in the United States have called the situation genocide, including President Bush (September 9, 2004 Press Release). The response from the United States has been different since the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, but it still has not learned from its mistakes. The United States has still failed to take a truthful, powerful lead to the response to the genocide. Although there has been the promise of aid, UN peacekeepers, and military force from the African Union and others, it has not been enough to stop the genocide. The result is the continuation of genocide and the deterioration of the credibility of the United States as a moral leader in the world political system. The United States should commit its support early and wholeheartedly in the beginning of conflicts where genocide is a clear result of current animosities/conflict. Only with the support of the United States and its fulfillment of its leadership capabilities will the world begin to see the end of genocide.

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