Strategic Positioning: UNESCO's Use of Argumentation to Encourage a U.S. Return to Membership

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doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1397545

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STRATEGIC POSITIONING: UNESCO’S USE OF ARGUMENTATION TO ENCOURAGE A US RETURN TO MEMBERSHIP

by

JARED LEE JOHNSON

Under the Direction of David Cheshier

ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an argumentation analysis of UNESCO’s use of argumentation theory to encourage a U.S. return to membership in 2003. The U.S. left UNESCO in 1985 under complaint that it had become politicized and was fraught with budgetary mismanagement. It is an attempt to bridge international communication scholarship and international relations scholarship on an organization that is positioned to have great influence in the international community.

INDEX WORDS: UNESCO, United States, international relations, communications, argumentation, unilateralism, multilateralism, rhetoric
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A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In the College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University

2010
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Electronic Version Approved: May 12, 2010

Office of Graduate Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
August 2010
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Never in our lifetime has there been a more desperate need for constructive dialogue, among individuals, among communities, among cultures, among and between nations. The threats are terrifying, but the responses are at hand (United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 2008).

The above quote from the United Nations Secretary General outlines a growing philosophy about how important dialogue is across cultures and people of varying backgrounds. This is not simply a question of bickering between nations, although that certainly is a problem. It is the question of how can disputes between nations be solved when clashes between cultures lie at the very heart of the problems nations face. The philosophy proposes that the ability to talk constructively with those from different walks of life would diminish disputes between nations and people – or at least help to resolve disputes rationally.

The United Nations has an organization, formed immediately after World War II, whose specific purpose is to facilitate this type of dialogue. The United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was formed as an international organization designed to be freed from the restraints of politics in which nations could talk constructively to change the “minds of men” about war. It was not designed to be a policy-making organization, but rather a “big picture” organization to coordinate educational and scientific ventures, but most importantly, to facilitate cultural dialogue.

Yet almost from the outset, the organization was fraught with difficulty. The
member nations could not agree upon what UNESCO’s role was, exactly. Hence, individual nations treated UNESCO differently. This discord bubbled over with the announcement of the United States’ declaration that it would leave UNESCO membership, taking with it nearly 30% of the operational budget. Nearly 20 years later, the U.S. returned to UNESCO membership in 2003 and that return has opened questions about how UNESCO has changed and what might its value be in the future. Such a question is even more timely, when one considers that UNESCO has changed its outlook and focus to match the ideology of its director general – sometimes dramatically. Last year (2009) UNESCO held new elections for the position of director general and although the old issues have not surfaced publicly, internally there are rumblings.

Yet to date, no research has been done on UNESCO’s actions to facilitate a U.S. return to membership. This dissertation seeks to explain how UNESCO reacted to the departure of the United States specifically (but also the United Kingdom and Singapore) in 1984 and what the organization did to bring about a U.S. return in 2003. It analyzes the use of argumentation by UNESCO to persuade the U.S. that reforms had been made and the changes had occurred which would make it in the interest of the U.S. to return to full membership.

Such a discussion relating to UNESCO is infinitely relevant to the field of international communication for many reasons. First, the use of language in communication within organizations and between organizations has always been of interest to the communication scholar. Second, as an international organization, issues that affect the field of international relations become increasingly relevant to international communication and vice versa. This is a topic that would be of interest to both fields.
Third, communication scholars have long-since been interested in issues of culture. The proposed dissertation will engage with ongoing discussions about culture, particularly where related to issues of intellectual property, cross-cultural communication, cultural diversity and international media. Finally, there is a relative lack of current research on issues surrounding UNESCO as a whole. While it is true that recent research exists about various UNESCO programs, there is a glaring void in research about the organization as a whole. This is particularly true relating to UNESCO’s role in international communication, as laid out in its foundational mandate. As the world perceptually draws closer together through globalization, true engagement among different peoples with conflicting issues of culture is truly needed. This is something UNESCO can and does provide.

One of the main reasons for the establishment of UNESCO was to help monitor international communication. Tracing UNESCO’s course and ideology from a communication standpoint would yield valuable information for communication scholars in general and would be helpful to international relations scholars as well. Additionally, although there was much intellectual work relating to UNESCO during its role at the forefront of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), which led to the withdrawal of three nations from UNESCO, including the U.S., this debate has faded into the background of intellectual evaluation. It is extremely timely with the relatively recent return of the U.S. and Singapore to take a new look at where UNESCO stands in its long-established mission. Issues of intellectual property, freedom of the press, technology diffusion and cross-cultural communication all are affected by UNESCO’s success, or lack thereof. It is essential to renew a discussion of these topics.
Discovering how UNESCO altered its rhetoric and stance in order to convince the United States to return to membership will provide great insight into how it attempts to move forward with the resolution of core issues tied to its mandate that caused such divisiveness during the years in which the U.S. felt the necessity to leave.

This chapter will establish the importance of research about UNESCO, especially given the relative ambivalence to the organization, which seems to exist mostly in the U.S. It will show that the importance of UNESCO is enhanced, given discussions about globalization and culture – issues which UNESCO finds itself in the center of attention. It will also trace the ideological foundation of UNESCO through the events leading up to the U.S. withdrawal.

The Importance of UNESCO

A great tragedy is that in the 18 years that the U.S. has been absent from UNESCO the world has made little progress in what has been the great intellectual problematique of the post-Second World War epoch: the crisis of universality. The most startling evidence of that were the attacks of September 11, 2001 – an act of ideological defiance as much as it was of terrorism. The key question is whether in the coming years the United States will engage with ideas that it finds abhorrent by staying in UNESCO, or will repeat the actions of the past by leaving when the going gets tough (Alleyne, 2002).

Ideological foundation of UNESCO

The foundation of UNESCO is an excellent place to start when looking at the seeds of discord that ultimately led up to the withdrawal of the U.S. Yet it is also a good place to start in evaluating where UNESCO stands today and why it is so important as a topic of study.

UNESCO was born under the efforts of reconstructing Europe following World
War II. It was during this post-war time period that leaders of nations realized that preventing war would be more useful than traditional peace-keeping. The world had seen the effect of the rise of nationalist movements in sparking the two world wars. Thus, when the United Nations was created, several programs were established that were designed to go farther than the failed League of Nations. These programs were designed to reduce, as much as possible, all the factors leading up to the war (UNAC.org). Leaders came to the conclusion that for this international organization to succeed in preventing war, it needed to not only address the prevention of conflict, but also economic and social development, human rights and the elimination of world hunger. It is during this time period that the new concept of “human rights” was discussed, along with the first attempts to codify them in international law, beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This declaration was passed in the General Assembly of the UN on December 10, 1948. All of these issues were seen to be causes of conflict around the world and thus, needs that had to be addressed by any successful world organization (ibid).

It is under the backdrop of this discussion that the United Nations was formed. Under the UN system, a functional dichotomy exists. This dichotomy exists along the technical and political levels. The political/strategic side has come to be known as “high politics” and refers to the United Nations, principally, as the body which handles the relations between states and the policy that comes from those relations. High politics are strategic in nature. Studies of development and culture have come to be known as “low politics” and Specialized Agencies underneath the U.N., whose goals are the overseeing of the technical matters such as communication, science, education and other human
rights operate in this arena.

Under the functionalist approach, it was intended that the technical side be freed from the constraints of the political side. Of utmost importance was that decisions on the technical issues not be determined by the national interests of various nation-states. In this sense functionalism is comparable to the U.S. idea of separation of church and state, where religious matters were kept apart from policy matters to avoid the endless contention that would stop anything from being accomplished. “Functionalism also suggests a set of reasons for international conflict and prescribes for conflict resolution, particularly through what might be described as functional conflict prevention, the preempting of violent conflict through the construction of cooperative relations based on common interests in specific functional areas” (Ashworth & Long 1999).

It is under these assumptions that the U.N. and its Specialized Agencies were set up. Using a functionalist approach, a multitude of organizations were formed under the U.N. to control the technical issues that arise. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was set up to help struggling economies get back on track. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was set up to facilitate the exchange of ideas and to promote human rights. The International Telecommunication Union, one of the oldest international organizations, was co-opted into the UN system to facilitate and regulate the growing use of wireless communication (radio, TV, satellite) among nations. The purpose of these agencies was to address the problems that led to World War II and were to be free from the constraints of politicization.

According to the preamble of UNESCO, which said that, "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed."
As also stated in the preamble, "the great and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races" (UNESCO web site). World War II was too recent of an event when UNESCO was created for its founders to forget that fact. UNESCO's purpose as a member of the UN family of organizations began intending "to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations” (Ibid).

This beginning was a fine place to start, but even at the outset, it was unclear how UNESCO planned to accomplish such lofty goals. International relations and communication were being conducted under a structuralist paradigm, which focuses on the system and relations of power between states, whereas the goals put forth in the preamble were more focused on education, science and culture, looking to alleviate tensions that lead to war “in the minds of men.” This kernel of conflict that had been planted within UNESCO can be seen as early as 1948, when Richard McKeon stated that UNESCO’s claim, “That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.” (UNESCO preamble) However, at the first General Conference, “The delegates came
back again and again to the problem of a philosophy for UNESCO, and the record of
their discussion may be read as an expression of general agreement that the philosophic
problem of UNESCO consists, not in the discovery of a single true philosophy in which
all men must agree, but rather in the discovery of common courses of action and common
solutions of problems on which men might agree for different reasons” (McKeon, 1948).

The problem was that the world was very new to the concept of universal rights,
particularly as they related to culture and education. Most of the debate was precisely
about action and direction and other structural elements. The United States and other
western powers saw UNESCO as a vehicle for promoting democratic values and
combating tyranny. They provided the lion’s share of the budget and had ultimate
control, via numerous political means such as veto power and a stranglehold on
leadership positions, over the action taken by UNESCO.

The result was very little progress in defining the philosophical ground and taking
action towards those ends. The concepts of “promoting collaboration among the nations
through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for
the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed
for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion,” could
not be defined because different nations could not agree upon what “fundamental
freedoms” or “human rights” meant. As time would go on, and the Cold War ramped up,
developing nations seeking their own identities and solutions to their own problems
would inevitably come to use these statements to their advantage (Wells, 1987). This
would lead up to the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) years
and the eventual departure of the U.S., Great Britain and Singapore from UNESCO.
UNESCO was at the crosshairs of the attack. By this time, the U.N. had admitted so many nations from all parts of the world that there began to be a “new Third World majority.” During this time of the Cold War, developing nations were part of the battlefield being waged ideologically. The complaints made by Western countries against UNESCO, particularly, the U.S. claimed that the organization had lost its sense of purpose by succumbing to a “tyranny of the majority” (Senarclens, 1985).

Many examples of the complaints against UNESCO came from the debate over the MacBride Commission report: Many Voices, One World. This was a source of contention with western countries and became a long-standing feud between the U.S. and UNESCO (Schiller, 1989). The major powers of the time had found ways to maintain their stranglehold over the governing process at the political level by first overseeing the process of membership. Secondly, they instituted a system of weighted representation, which gave the major players veto power. Finally, they had control (from the developing nation’s viewpoint) in that the headquarters were all located within the borders of major powers and the staff and leadership within was all from the developed world.

It was during these years that there began to be a rising wave of countries desiring to return to the ideological base upon which UNESCO was founded. The desire was to provide access to communication and knowledge for all humans worldwide. UNESCO was seen by many as the ideal vehicle to promote this universality in communication and information. This movement began the highly debated NWICO, proposed in many venues, but stemming from the New International Economic Order, proposed in UN resolution 3201 of May, 1974. At the heart of this movement were some of the tenets spelled out in the UNESCO General Conference in Belgrade, 1980. Some of these were:
a. this new world information and communication order could be based, among
other considerations, on:

1. elimination of the imbalances and inequalities which characterize the
   present situation;
2. elimination of the negative effects of certain monopolies, public or private,
   and excessive concentrations;
3. removal of the internal and external obstacles to a free flow and wider and
   better balanced dissemination of information and ideas;
4. plurality of sources and channels of information;
5. freedom of the press and information;
6. the freedom of journalists and all professionals in the communication
   media, a freedom inseparable from responsibility;
7. the capacity of developing countries to achieve improvement of their own
   situations, notably by providing their own equipment, by training their
   personnel, by improving their infrastructures and by making their
   information and communication media suitable to their needs and
   aspirations;
8. the sincere will of developed countries to help them attain these objectives;
9. respect for each people's cultural identity and for the right of each nation to
   inform the world public about its interests, its aspirations and its social and
   cultural values;
10. respect for the right of all peoples to participate in international exchanges
of information on the basis of equality, justice and mutual benefit;

11. respect for the right of the public, of ethnic and social groups and of individuals to have access to information sources and to participate actively in the communication process:

b. this new world information and communication order should be based on the fundamental principles of international law, as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations;

c. diverse solutions to information and communication problems are required because social, political, cultural and economic problems differ from one country to another and, within a given country, from one group to another (UNESCO 1980).

This growing conflict between ideologies, (Consoli, 1987; Lent, 1977; Alisky, 1988; Masmoudi, 1979) centered around UNESCO and the NWICO debate, culminated in the series of events that led to the withdrawal of the U.S., the U.K. and Singapore in 1984 and 1985 respectively. The predominant paradigm in U.S. politics regarding UNESCO was the hope that UNESCO could be the vehicle upon which to fight the Cold War and Communist ideology. The U.S. mindset of the time was to fight the spreading communist message in the Third World – the very proponents of the NWICO movement who were fighting for equal access to means of communication and information (Coate, 1989, Imber, 1990).

The points of contention the U.S. and others had with UNESCO can be summed up in the letter sent to UNESCO by Secretary of State George Schultz notifying the organization of the U.S. intent to withdraw. “We have been concerned that trends in
policy, ideological emphasis, budget and management of UNESCO were detracting from the organization’s effectiveness. We believe these trends have led UNESCO away from the original principles of its constitution” (Schiller, 1989).

The departures of the U.S., Great Britain and Singapore, along with their reasons for departure are evidence of the change in paradigm regarding international relations and communication. International relations was undergoing a “cultural turn” with its greater focus on cultural impact on relations between states. At the same time, other scholars point to an “argumentative turn” in policy analysis and planning (Fischer & Forrester, 1993). Former Director General of UNESCO, Federico Mayor, has stated that it was during this period, that UNESCO was forced to re-define itself and discover its place in international society (Mayor, 2007). Former director of UNESCO’s Division of Human Rights and Peace, Pierre de Senarclens, withdrew from his appointment at UNESCO on principle, in part because of politicization, but also because he felt that the culture of the organization at the time of his departure had stifled true intellectual dialogue and was symptomatic of its problems (Senarclens, 1985).

**U.S. views about UNESCO’s relevance**

It is no secret that the UN and its various organizations have been viewed skeptically by many in the United States. The prevailing attitude in the US towards international agencies has been that as long as the organization serves the needs of the U.S., it is useful. There has been little tolerance for oppositional ideas. As was stated before, UNESCO was founded on the principle that knowledge and universality were the keys to peace. For many years, the U.S. viewed these organizations as the prime means of fighting the Cold War. With UNESCO this is particularly true, and it is proof of this
viewpoint that when the “new majority” of countries began flexing its combined muscles – some of it with the encouragement of Moscow – Washington began to see less and less value in the organization as a whole. As Mark Alleyne said it, “the world political scene and the USA’s position in that dynamic process were very different. Through the prism of Cold War politics Washington saw UNESCO as nothing more than an ideological accomplice of the Eastern Bloc and what were seen as its Third World lackeys” (Allyne 2002).

One of the prevailing attitudes in Washington (and, indeed among many U.S. citizens) is that because the U.S. pays so much of the budget of UN organizations, it should benefit the U.S. most of all. In fact, this attitude leads many Americans to believe that international organizations do not accomplish anything at all and that membership is a waste of money (Shawn 2006, Schaefer 2001).

Issues of rampant budgetary inefficiency, poor spending practices, nepotism and corruption within UN organizations, including UNESCO, have not made the U.S. views about UNESCO any brighter. Fox News reporter Eric Shawn did a thorough job of explaining what many American have felt toward the UN and its organizations in his book “The U.N. Exposed: How the United Nations Sabotages America’s Security and Fails the World” (Shawn 2006). While the book contains numerous examples chosen to prove corruption within the organization, its very existence (and the fact that it was a New York Times Best Seller) illustrates the self-centered approach many American have about international organizations.

While there are many proponents of international organization, and UNESCO in particular (Americans For the Universality of UNESCO, for example), it appears that the
opposition is much more vocal – and the cases of corruption which surface from time to
time do not help. One of the leading voices against UNESCO over the course of the last
25 years has been the Heritage Foundation. In fact, in an article published in the
foundation’s newsletter, Brett Schaefer (2001) said that the U.S. should not rejoin
UNESCO. In fact the language used in support of his thesis, exposes the self-centered
viewpoint held by many Americans about how an organization needs to benefit the U.S.
most of all if it is a worthwhile expense of our tax dollars. “President Bush should not
yield to pressure to rejoin UNESCO, even if it appears to be an attractive low-cost way to
deflect international charges of isolationism or to deflate pressure to pay U.S. arrears to
the United Nations without assurances of reform. The President should instead take time
to evaluate UNESCO’s current priorities and progress toward reform.” Finally, this
statement sums up how many view participation in UNESCO. “President Bush must
recognize that even if UNESCO were a paragon of management and efficiency, it is
unclear how America would benefit from membership in the organization” (Schaefer
2001).

Nevertheless, despite the antagonistic approach to UNESCO seen by many
Americans, there are a few who still see use in this forum organization whose goals are to
provide a place for an open exchange of ideas, scientific exchange, and cultural
understanding and preservation. Even the Reagan Administration, when it took the U.S.
out of UNESCO felt compelled to make a plan for compensation in the areas that
UNESCO provided so much value. In a report issued from the international affairs office
of the National Research Council, the president of the National Academy of Sciences
stated that “the governing board of the National Research Council and the Council of the
National Academy of Sciences are deeply concerned about the potential impacts on science of a withdrawal by the United States from UNESCO” (NRC 1984). The report went on to say that U.S. participation in UNESCO science projects was “invaluable” and that a withdrawal from the organization would have wide-reaching results in the scientific community alone (ibid). The report went on to suggest a few points that the U.S. government must consider should it decide to withdraw.

First, the NRC stated that there was “no viable overall alternative” to accomplish what UNESCO does for science. In fact, the report said that withdrawal would be likely to result in a “multiplicity of channels for coordinating scientific research” that may or may not be more or less effective. It also said that U.S. withdrawal would jeopardize the chances of U.S. scientists to occupy lead roles in ongoing projects.

Second, the NRC pointed out that the withdrawal would likely result in the danger of fragmentation of research. Along with this is the rise of the cost of scientific administration that “cannot be overestimated. However, the fact that UNESCO’s activities include both development assistance programs and programs aimed at the advancement of scientific research makes the search for a single alternative extremely difficult, if not impossible” (ibid).

Finally, the report went on to list a series of alternative arrangements needed to maintain scientific cooperation in the absence of membership in UNESCO. It is noteworthy to point out that the costs of these interim arrangements by far outweigh the costs of membership in UNESCO – a fact which virtually eliminates the argument of expense as a reason for withdrawing from UNESCO (ibid).

In summary, Paul Kennedy, a well-known scholar on international organizations,
wrote in his book entitled *The Parliament of Man: Past Present, and Future of the United Nations* that “it is difficult to imagine how much more riven and ruinous our world of six billion would be if there had been no UN social, environmental, and cultural agendas – and no institutions to attempt to put them into practice on the ground” (Kennedy 2006). Kennedy repeatedly throughout the book discusses the value of being involved in dialogue with nations and peoples of differing ideas and cultures – a principle value of UNESCO as a whole.

**The world’s view of UNESCO’s importance**

Despite the fact that the bulk of discussion about UNESCO in the U.S. appears to have followed the same pattern of criticism about corruption and mismanagement that the U.N. in general has faced, UNESCO seems to have a much higher standing in the eyes of those outside the U.S. and U.K. Those within the U.S. who have remained in favor of participation in UNESCO have echoed what has been said worldwide – that the principal value of UNESCO is in its ability to provide a safe forum for peoples of differing cultures and ethnicities to come together and have dialogue. In general, praise for UNESCO – and claims about its importance – has centered around the three areas of its original mandate – education, science and culture. While much has been made of UNESCO literacy efforts and scientific coordination (and the U.S. continued to participate in many of these from the outside even during its absence), the communication scholar should be particularly in the praise UNESCO receives in its efforts relating to culture.

UNESCO, as a forum organization, is at the forefront when varying cultures come together. It becomes a microcosm of cultures coming together throughout the world. Because its policies are non-binding, their principal value becomes rhetorical. They
provide a unifying rhetoric and help establish sets of principles and values. They provide discourse for local policy makers to draw upon that is internationally shared and goes a long way to establishing global norms. Unlike its efforts in coordinating scientific research or educational programs, the bulk of its value in culture is in providing a global dialogue and rhetoric in the establishment of shared global values and norms. Member nations are not bound to adhere to its cultural declarations, yet the rhetoric contained therein contains substantial weight upon bodies that do make policy.

Richard Hoggart, a British scholar, said that the hardest, but most valuable of UNESCO’s work lies in its “inching towards norms on issues which cannot avoid bringing ideologies into play.” He states that UNESCO is a “privileged place in that it brings together in an international context governments – those who make decisions – and people who are at the forefront of the study of contemporary problems. In this way UNESCO is important as a centre for international dialogue among experts of all kinds and also intellectuals” (Hoggart, 1978). Sagarika Dutt succinctly described UNESCO as a “world resource centre that collects facts from all over the world, in all its areas of competence, which it then standardizes so that they are uniformly and internationally available” (Dutt, 1999).

It cannot be denied that occasionally the polarization of ideologies can have a dramatic effect on UNESCO as a forum organization. The NWICO debates resulting in the withdrawal of the U.S. is but one stark example, albeit extreme. The mere fact that the U.S. decided to depart from UNESCO is evidence of the value the weight the organization carries. Australian scholar Joost Smiers wrote that, “UNESCO shapes, structures and stabilizes the language, priorities and instruments (including statistical
instruments) of government. It provides ready narratives which connect up diverse policy
domains into compelling and connected programs for action. In providing a meta-level
framework through its declarations, statements of principle and plans of action, UNESCO
provides ways of thinking about issues and problems, ordering priorities and legitimizing
governmental attention to certain matters” (Smiers, 2004).

Examples of this power include UNESCO initiatives like the recent Universal
Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
(2000), and the Global Alliance for Cultural Diversity. Many of these documents,
produced with considerable debate, and having no binding policy power, have been cited
in many policy-making governmental and non-governmental bodies around the world and
are likely to have an impact for years to come on policies and priorities of these bodies
(Smiers, 2004).

To illustrate the importance of research on the rhetoric of UNESCO, just after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, a number of states, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan
and Algeria asked UNESCO for rhetorical assistance to break the imaginary link between
Islam and terrorism (Smiers, 2004). Other such requests have been fielded by UNESCO
from states and non-governmental agencies who have come to realize and appreciate the
power UNESCO can wield to create international norms through the rhetorical power of
its documents and speeches. Even press bodies have asked for help in campaigns to stop
the murder and threats against journalists (ibid).

Many of the same authors have suggested that UNESCO is best positioned to take
on the much-needed academic debate on issues like intellectual property, copyright
protection and enforcement, and most especially, cultural diversity. While many
agencies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual Properties Organization (WIPO) have been tasked with the policy end of this debate, they are not equipped to tackle the diversity of ideologies that have existed on the subject since long before the NWICO debates on the floor of UNESCO. What has suffered was the discussion on cultural diversity that has led many nations from the south to complain that all viewpoints are not being considered.

Even the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has attempted to provide this open forum bringing together policy makers and those from the information society and the communication society in the form of the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), which has held two summits in recent years. Oddly enough, UNESCO was not invited to participate in or help organize such a forum, despite wide recognition that it was interested and qualified to do so (Siochuru, 2004). UNESCO, itself has recognized the need to have such a forum, and has proceeded with its initiatives on cultural diversity. UNESCO’s Executive board has published that one of its goals was to “… focus on development issues to which communication and information can make a meaningful contribution and would provide a forum for all who wish to contribute to the search for international consensus in these matters” (UNESCO, 1996). The Executive Board also said that it “views favorably the proposal to organize a UNESCO conference on information and communication for development, following the consultations and reflections seen in the current biennium and as a joint undertaking with other competent and interested institutions of the United Nations system, provided that sufficient resources can be mobilized within the Organization and with external partners” (ibid).

Such a conference has yet to take place, and some scholars have pointed out that
one reason other international organizations have failed to provide a forum for dialogue is that the U.S. presence, power, and ideological position against action or dialogue to protect cultural diversity have been strong. On the other hand, UNESCO has proposed such conferences and laid out a clear need and many outside the U.S. say it is uniquely qualified to pull off such a conference. UNESCO’s rhetoric may be reflective of the fact that it is the one UN organization in which the U.S. influence has significantly waned and is still recovering from its long absence (Siochuru, 2004).

The difference between how the U.S. views UNESCO and what it stands for, versus much of the rest of the world can be seen in the intense debate leading up to the defeat of the U.S. position on UNESCO’s 2005 Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions. Many communication scholars have described the presence of two basic positions in this debate – the liberalist position, which argues for a free market economy, and the culturalist position, which argues for the protection of local culture against invading cultural content (Moghadam, 2008).

The culturalist side of this debate was led by France and Canada, each of which have strong protection in place for local culture and language. The liberalist side was led by the U.S., with Australia and Japan taking strong stands as well. Interestingly, some of the culturalist nations actually accused the U.S. of being culturalist because only 2% of the programming aired in the U.S. was imported. However, the U.S. refuted this vehemently by saying that this was more of a reflection of market choice than protectionism. Ultimately, the convention was adopted with the only negative votes being the U.S. and Israel. Australia abstained, citing previous treaty requirements, as did a number of developing nations (including Liberia, Nicaragua and Honduras) because of
intense pressure coming from the United States.

**UNESCO, globalization and culture**

This prospectus has argued that UNESCO has value in establishing rhetoric that can be drawn upon for discourse by media, governments and people worldwide. It has also argued that many nations worldwide (and even many scholars and politicians in the U.S.) see UNESCO as a valuable organization for its unique qualifications in being able to bring peoples of various backgrounds together to discuss complex issues. It is important now to draw attention to the areas of current academic and political debate within which UNESCO finds itself at the forefront.

For scholars of international communication and some from the discipline of international relations, those areas are globalization and culture. These two areas contain intense debates on issues such as the flow of news, media and culture between countries, the protection of local media and culture, intellectual property rights, and access to communication technology – especially in developing nations. All of these issues have been present on the floor of UNESCO and the language adopted by the various documents produced has been used in many different venues.

During the 1980s, the concept of globalization began receive attention within a wide range of disciplines. This intellectual focus on globalization and its implications was brought about in part by a desire to understand the nature of the socio-economic and cultural changes, which seemed to be enveloping the developed world. This gave rise to a growing field of research, which sought to analyze the ways in which daily existence, right down to the cultural level, within most countries was becoming increasingly enmeshed with people of different backgrounds. Within this context, the mass media was
capable of bringing to an audience’s immediate attention distant events, thus creating a sense of a globally shared community.

While the term ‘globalization’ is widely used in many fields of literature, the use and meaning of the term remain contested. One less-contended definition says that, globalization refers to the rapidly developing process of complex interconnections between societies, markets, cultures, institutions, and individuals world-wide (Harvey, 1989). Globalization is a process that involves a compression of time and space, shrinking distances through a dramatic reduction in the time taken to cross them (either literally, as in air travel, or perceptually, as in electronic communication), which in turn makes the world seem smaller, bringing humans into closer contact with each other than ever before possible. Most scholars appear to agree that with the phenomenon of globalization, no community or culture can be completely isolated. The previously described NWICO debates on the floor of UNESCO represent one of the first real clashes stemming from the globalization process. None of the nations involved was truly prepared to engage in dialogue with opposing sides, especially related to the exploding field of electronic media and information (Smiers, 2004).

Indeed, globalization and culture are oftentimes discussed in the same breath. With the bringing together of the world through electronic communication, much discussion has taken place in academic circles about the global flow of culture. One researcher, Arjun Appadurai, identified five dimensions of global cultural flow: 1) ethnoscapes (the movement of tourists, immigrants, refugees and guest workers); 2) mediascapes (the worldwide distribution of information through newspapers, magazines, TV programs and films through the various electronic methods of distribution); 3)
technoscapes (the distribution of technologies); 4) finanscapes (global capital flows); and 5) ideoscapes (the distribution of political ideas and values and ideologies) (Appadurai, 1990, 1996). Of these dimensions, UNESCO is central to three: mediascapes, technoscapes, and ideoscapes.

Many have attempted to define culture, a complex construct seen as multi-layered (Sinclair 1999). Raymond Williams (1962) viewed culture as a communally-shared lifestyle forged by such things as “values, traditions, beliefs, material objects, and territory” (Lull 1995). Similarly, many regard culture as a relatively stable phenomenon, stemming from both environmental and biological factors—religion, ethnicity, class, language, and family—that largely influence daily patterns of life (Lull 1995). This definition of culture has led some to argue that individuals do not drift very far from “blood and belief, faith and family” (Huntington 1996). This link between groups and culture is most clearly put forth in Benedict Anderson’s (1991) famous term “imagined community,” though given the numerous aspects of culture (Castells 1997), Anderson’s concept might more appropriately be called “imagined communities.”

However, scholars also recognize the fluid nature of culture as it adapts and is transformed (Lull 1995). Taking a more communication-centric view of culture, Clifford Geertz, defined it as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (Geertz 1973, 89). Thus Geertz rejected deterministic notions of culture, instead arguing that “culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be casually attributed; it is a context” (Geertz 1983, 14). It
would seem, then, that if Geertz is correct and culture is fundamentally contextual and communicative in nature, altering context and communication content or patterns would have the effect of likewise altering culture. Possibly because of this nexus between culture, context, and communication, it has been argued that “there is no natural distinction between media and culture,” and that “to discuss culture in the absence of media is impossible” (Dorfman 2004, 7-8).

It is therefore not surprising that initial studies investigating the impact of media on culture resulted in the prognosis that media was becoming a vehicle of cultural hegemony wherein “stronger” cultures attempted to remake “weaker” ones after their own image, a form of modern imperialism (Mattelart 1980). Such theoretical contentions are also largely influenced by dependency theory from the field of political economy, which posits that “poorer” nations become dependent on “richer” nations, whether that be in material or cultural goods (Bolana, Matrini, and Sierra 2004). Dependency theorists see the relationship between advanced nations and less developed countries as one of center-periphery, with power—both political and economic—disproportionately located in the center, benefiting advanced nations as the expense of peripheral nations (Tansey and Hyman 1994). Thus “poorer” regions are held back by their dependency on foreign media programming and foreign culture (Sinclair 1999). This perceived one-way flow of information was also at the heart of the NWICO debates on the floor of UNESCO with hopes of combating cultural media imperialism (Sinclair 1999) given that dependency theory portended a homogenized internationalization of elites and upper middle classes around the world (Salinas and Paldan 1979).

Cultural media imperialism theory is largely based on the work of Schiller (1969)
and Mattelart (1980), with Mattelart positing that

ideology and culture [are] power practices, and in this sense ‘cultural imperialism’ can be considered a model of organization of power. This power seeks a homogenization, a demobilization and disorganization, a consensus. A people deprived of its culture, its customs, its own style of life, is just as defenseless as if it had been robbed of its raw materials (69).

Hence Western culture, led by American media, seeks to globalize (or Americanize) world cultures, subjugating them much like imperial colonizers in history (Kivikuru 1995). While Schiller (1974) viewed cultural media imperialism as largely a byproduct of the “age of electronic communications” (110), Tunstall (1977) contended that cultural imperialism predates television and its origins can be found 19th century American and British international news agencies.

Other theorists added to the growing din of cultural media imperialism scholarship. Elihu Katz (1977) was unoptimistic that “authentic cultures” could survive the onslaught of new, foreign media. Glen Fisher (1987) saw international culture imported via media as a significant threat to the cultures of traditional societies. Richard Peet posited that “in the interaction between centre culture, regional culture and traditional cultures,…the tendency is towards the production of one world mind, one world culture and the consequent disappearance of regional consciousness flowing from the local specificities of the human past” (1986, 195). Building on the notion of media and cultural imperialism, Duane Varan (1998) likened the influence of media to cultural erosion, with foreign media engaging in abrasion (erosion by friction), deflation (removal of loose material), deposition (addition of foreign materials), and saltation (the scattering of local materials). And media scholars have imported the notion of acculturation from intercultural contact research, wherein the meeting of disparate cultures leads to cultural
change (Clement, Baker, Josephson, and Noels 2005).

On the other hand, and also discussed in various circles on the floor of UNESCO, the cultural flow model is based on the notion that the understanding of Western power as cultural imperialism is too simplistic. Maybe globalization is both more ambiguous and less ominous than what is described in the cultural imperialism model. Cultural influences do not necessarily follow the linear paths that the cultural imperialism model would predict.

In the cultural flow model, the process of cultural globalization is a de-centralized one, a process that produces often-changing patterns of advantage and disadvantage throughout the international system. An important feature of globalization today is its de-Westernization, with the emergence of some non-Western nations - like Japan - as key actors. Information technology, as the driving force of economic globalization, has become a useful instrument for propagating cultural flows emanating from what has traditionally been considered the periphery. Proponents of this model do not intend to say that traditional forms of creation and dissemination of media and culture are not under threat, rather that the origin of the threat is not as centralized as thought. Globalized cultural industries, whether originating in the core or the periphery, have impacted local culture. In many instances, a local culture’s role as an integral part of people's lives is eroded and it ceases to serve as the means of constructing societal values, reproducing group identity and building social cohesion. If allowed to continue on unchecked, the end result could be global integration at the expense of local disintegration.

Thus, many governments have reacted to today’s cultural globalization by following one of two equally extreme strategies: either an exaggerated attachment to an
often reinvented past in the name of tradition and culture; or attempts at a wholesale adoption of anything and everything foreign in an attempt to aspire to full membership in international society.

In short, globalization and culture are being discussed with increasing frequency on a global scale. In academia, this has been the case for many years. However, on the level of international organizations and governance, this has not been the case. As pointed out earlier, UNESCO was set up to provide just that type of forum for shaping “the minds of men.” But the U.S. and other powers used UNESCO under a functionalist mentality to spread their ideology. This mentality was used to squelch open discussion about media and culture and when it was unable to do so (in the case of NWICO), the U.S. decided to withdraw, rather than engage in discussion it found distasteful.

This chapter has traced the foundation of UNESCO and established its importance to some in the United States, but especially to those around the world. It has brought in the discussion about globalization and culture and linked this discussion to UNESCO. Most importantly, it has shown how research about UNESCO is relevant and important, given that the debates that have raged in UNESCO for decades are still present. Many of these tensions have spilled over into unfortunate events of violence across the world. More than ever, the forum that UNESCO provides for dialogue among cultures is needed if headway is to be made towards a reduction of violence and terrorism.
CHAPTER 2

Review of Literature

Many scholars have done research about international organizations. Many of these come from the discipline of international relations. Still others have done research on international organizations. Communication scholars have done extensive research in the field of international communication and culture. The study of globalization has also been an area of fertile research for communication scholars. Still others have done research on the use of rhetoric and argumentation in national and international organizations. However, the study of UNESCO offers the opportunity to bring many fields together in the study of communication and culture. This chapter attempts to review work done in a few of these fields that has a bearing on UNESCO. Its goal is to highlight great analysis and research being done, yet draw attention to blind spots specifically related to UNESCO.

Although there were many short-sighted reasons for the U.S. departure from UNESCO, there were also some very good outcomes of the departure. The departure forced UNESCO to deal with several legitimate internal problems that the U.S. cited as “official” reasons for departure. While the actual extent of reforms within UNESCO can be debated, what can be seen is what many scholars are calling “turns” both in international relations research and in policy analysis within international organizations. These “turns,” known as the “cultural turn” in international relations, and the “argumentative turn” in policy analysis were taking place as the beginning of the discussion about globalization. The U.S. departure from UNESCO took place right as these changes were beginning to take place. These turns both brought focus more on
culture and the important role of communication.

**The “cultural turn” in international relations**

During the 1990’s, the field was in the middle of what is known as the cultural turn. Indeed, IR researchers are still debating the concept of culture and cultural diversity in the field (eg. Brown, 2001; Mulhern, 2000).

For the past two decades, and perhaps even further, a central locus of discussion in international relations theory has centered on the debate between two perspectives – liberalism and realism. The debate and research in both fields has been intense, but extremely beneficial as it has served to sharpen the philosophies of both through trial and error. However, a new way of conceptualizing International Relations, called constructivism, began to emerge in the early 1990’s when Alexander Wendt, largely credited with bringing constructivism to international relations, questioned some of the basic elements of both liberalism and realism (Wendt 1992). Perhaps the most questioned element of both is the adherence to the materialistic view of politics – the idea that an actor (state) will operate in its own best interest and that said interest is principally based on a materialist conception of reality. A good part of the debate between realists and liberals has centered around the extent to which relative or absolute gains-seeking behavior occurs in international politics.

Constructivists have no qualms with most of what the other traditions say or do, but rather, they attempt to point out what the others ignore. Constructivists say that what gets ignored commonly is the content and *sources* of state interest and the very real social fabric that influences world politics. In doing so, constructivists reach out to other disciplines, most notably sociology and anthropology, to establish firm ground. Since this
area of international relations is so new, standing on the foundation built by other
disciplines makes sense. Why reinvent the wheel? Also, borrowing from other disciplines
has become commonplace as our world grows perceptually smaller. In this manner,
constructivists have expanded the theoretical discourse within international relations.

Constructivism has stretched the boundaries of international relations theory by
bringing out two assumptions (Wendt 1995). First, it assumes that the environment in
which actors (states, politicians, world governing bodies, etc.) take action is social as well
as material. The assumption is that material structures are given meaning only by the
social context in which they operate, or are interpreted. The best example is the
environment about nuclear weapons. As constructivists point out, most politicians and
individuals in North America and Europe show little concern over the fact that Britain
has a tremendous stash of nuclear weapons. But the mere thought that North Korea would
be testing or in possession of even one nuclear weapon generates extreme tension in the
international community. The reason for this is socially constructed.

The second assumption put forward by constructivists is that the mere realization
of the impact of social constructs can provide actors or states with the means to construct
their own interests. It becomes a form of empowerment that liberates states from the arms
of materialism. It also is shown in how constructivists emphasize the interaction between
agent and structure. For liberalists and realists, the agent establishes the structure, making
the structure subservient to the agent. Ontologically, both agent and structure are equal,
leaving open the discussion of identity formation and that state interests emerge from
interaction with structures (Wendt 1995). Neoliberalists and realists haven’t found the
way to deal with this problem, as can be seen in Robert Powell’s “Anarchy in
International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal debate,” (Powell 1994) and other such literature in international relations journals. From both the neoliberal and neorealist point of view, everything is agent-centered (the state). This individualistic viewpoint reduces everything to a discussion of the individual state and its goals and plans without focusing on how the social environment can shape those goals and plans.

In short, for constructivists, much research concerns the logic of appropriateness. The discussion is not a means-end discussion. Rather, constructivist stake the claim that actors ask “What kind of situation is this?” and “How should I react now?” when situations arise. Social norms help supply the answers to those questions. In that manner, norms help the actor/state arrive at an understanding of what interests are. Wendt and other constructivists borrowed the concept of logic of appropriateness from other disciplines in developing this position (March & Olsen 1989). In contrast, the neoliberalists and neorealists in international relations theory can be categorized as rational choice scholars in which the actor makes a rational decision based on interests. This means-end process assumes much about what those interests are. Often they are materially-oriented. To these scholars, norms are little more than constraints to actors operating in self-interest, operating under a logic of consequence that stresses utility maximization (Weingast, 1995).

What this represents is an ontological difference between constructivists on one hand and neoliberalists and neorealists (very different themselves) on the other. Epistemologically, constructivists have little or no quarrel with either theory. This puts them on solid ontological ground with postmodernists, who also focus on issues of interest and identity and norms. Where constructivists differ from postmodernists is in
substantive matters, such as what the role of identity or discourse actually is. In other words, constructivists share ontological ground with postmodernists, but are different epistemologically. In comparison to neoliberalists and neorealists, constructivists share epistemological ground, but differ ontologically. This would suggest the possibility to bridge the differences between rational choice scholars and postmodernists – a very valuable possibility.

The concept of “norms” has gained much play in literature over the past couple of decades. To use this concept as an example, for neorealists norms lack causal authority. Consideration of norms as a means of determining interest, therefore, does not make sense. For neoliberalists, norms can play an influential role in certain areas, but even still, norms are a structure built on a material base. Their function is to help actors maximize their material gains or utility. For liberals, agents create norms, not the other way around. In contrast, for constructivists, norms are “collective understandings that make behavioral claims on actors. Their effects reach deeper. They constitute actor identities and interests. They do not simply regulate behavior. As explanatory variables, their status moves from intervening to independent” (Wendt, 1995). In other words, norms are not merely a superstructure built on a materialist base, as liberals would claim. Rather, the actors/states and the structures, or global norms, interact with each other and are mutually constituted.

To give a specific example of these differences, Martha Finnemore wrote a book (Finnemore 1996) that specifically questions on ontological grounds the current direction of scholarly work based on the means-end, rational choice theory and the definition of state interest calculations as the dominant model of determining state behavior and
specifically the role of international organizations. Finnemore’s stated goal is to move away from the actor-centered approach to center more on the actor-structure interaction. She argues that a logic of appropriateness approach is just as plausible in determining state behavior as is logic of consequences. She postulates that systemic norms propagated from international organizations help determine and define state interests and can be useful in predicting behavior. They provide direction in determining interests and guidance in setting goals.

Finnemore uses this framework to carry out three case studies, which deal with how international organizations played a key role in shaping and changing state interests. She argued her case by using a two-pronged analytical method. First, she evaluated a correlation between the emergence of new norms and the subsequent change in state interest and policy. Then she looked at the discourse to see if the changes were consistent with systemic norms.

Another good example of a constructivist viewpoint is the case study done by Michael Barnett (who, coincidentally teamed up with Finnemore recently to publish a new book on international relations). In the case study, Barnett cites the example of Rwanda, where UN peacekeepers pulled out right at the moment they were most needed. Most agree that this was done because the member nations were unwilling to commit resources to an operation that fell outside their interests. He says that international organizations fall prey to indifference (and thus inaction) for a few reasons. He cites Michael Herzfeld’s *The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy* (1993) in listing five reasons indifference in international organizations occurs. First, bureaucracies, such as the UN differentiate members from.
nonmembers, which makes the plight of nonmembers less compelling that those of members. Second, Herzfeld says that “indifference is a rejection of those who are different.” Third, bureaucracies apply rights differently even among members of the community and that this cannot be reduced to politics or economics exclusively, but also based upon identity criteria such as race, religion and gender. Fourth, bureaucrats can become indifferent because they not only identify with their community, but also with their bureaucracy. Bureaucrats will often identify with their bureaucracy before they will with the community they represent.

Finally, Herzfeld says that bureaucrats pursue not only a bureaucratic agenda, but also a personal one, striving to accomplish personal goals and achievements. This is a purely constructivist approach to looking at international organization. It is one that looks at both the individual and the system/structure equally to determine behavior. This is where there is great possibility to link discussions of the public in communication to discussions of politics in international relations.

This cultural turn can be seen on a larger scale as well. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama wrote a very controversial article entitled “The End of History,” followed by a 1993 book entitled “The End of History and the Last Man.” In this book he argues that the ideological battle has concluded with the Cold War and that from this point forward, Western liberal democracy will be the final form of human government. “But if, over time, more and more societies with diverse cultures and histories exhibit similar long-term patterns of development; if there is a continuing convergence in the types of institutions governing most advanced societies; and if the homogenization of mankind continues as a result of economic development, then the idea of relativism may seem
much stranger than it does now. For the apparent differences between peoples’
‘languages of good and evil’ will appear to be an artifact of their particular stage of
historical development” (Fukuyama, 1993).

This book brought the debate about the cultural turn to light in the Western
academic establishment. Many theorists attacked Fukuyama’s claims in many different
ways. Jacques Derrida critiqued the arguments using a Marxist framework. However, in
1993, Samuel Huntington sparked the debate even further by attacking Fukuyama’s basic
premise with his article in *Foreign Affairs*, entitled “The Clash of Civilizations?”

In this article, Huntington acknowledges that the Cold War changed the global
political environment and that, while nations will continue to be the principal focus of
relations (structure), culture and ideology will become the center points of conflict. In
other words, the clash is not over. As he puts it best in the introductory paragraph of his
article, “World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to
proliferate visions of what it will be—the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries
between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of
tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the
emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global
politics is likely to be in the coming years. It is my hypothesis that the fundamental
source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily
economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict
will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but
the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of
different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault
lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (Huntington, 1993).

Another example of this cultural turn came in the writings of Joseph Nye. In 1990, Nye wrote an article, published in Foreign Policy, called “Soft Power.” Nye argues that there is a difference between hard power – that of military and economic power – and soft power, which is defined as the ability to get other nations to do what you want, because they want the same thing. Nye says that there are three ways to achieve results: first with a big stick (threats), second with carrots (rewards), and finally is to “attract them or co-opt them, so that they want what you want. If you can get others to be attracted to want what you want, it costs you much less in carrots and sticks” (Nye, 2004). So, instead of the realist view of power, Nye proposes a much more constructivist view of power as being that which will convince others that the goal is the same and to work together for that goal. Cultural capital becomes much more important, as does working toward universal goals.

This new way of looking at international relations and communication is much more in line with UNESCO’s origins than ever before. Where before it was very difficult to define universality, this new environment is becoming much more friendly to UN initiatives that make universal claims, as seen by the Millenial Declaration of Human Rights at the turn of the century. Nearly gone is the ideological struggle between communism and democracy, replaced by ways to come to a common understanding, which will help achieve peace. UNESCO is at the heart of this intellectual and practical exercise.

Another practical example of culture coming to prominence in international relations can be seen in former Director General of UNESCO, Federico Mayor’s
Foundation for a Culture of Peace (Cultura de Paz), based in Madrid.

According to the Cultura de Paz, a culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes and behavior which reflect a respect for life, for human beings and for human dignity. At the forefront of a culture of peace lie human rights, the rejection of all violence and adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, solidarity and tolerance, as well as promoting mutual understanding among all nations, groups and peoples. Abolishing violence, according to Mayor, “requires much more than governmental action. Achieving this objective requires the participation of everyone by implementing human rights in our daily lives. Only then can we achieve a profound change in attitudes in our families, in our communities, our regions and our countries” (Mayor, 2005).

In order to accomplish this goal, which equates to the attempt to bring together various individuals with similar beliefs, Cultura de Paz proposes five things that must be accomplished: 1) Promote education in peace, human rights and democracy, tolerance and mutual understanding at both national and international levels; 2) Fight all forms of discrimination; 3) Promote democratic principles and practices in all areas of society; 4) Combat poverty and achieve sustainable participatory development which benefits all people and provides each individual with the means for living life in dignity; 5) “Mobilize society with a view to instilling in young people the fervent desire to seek forms of coexistence based on conciliation, generosity and tolerance, as well as rejecting all forms of oppression and violence and seeking a just distribution of resources and the free-flow and sharing of information and knowledge” (Mayor, 2005).

Mayor also said that of late his foundation has been adding to its agenda by attempting to promote the free circulation of information and knowledge and to fight
terrorism (a rhetorical ploy that might appeal to some in the U.S.). This foundation thus far is only present in Spain, but has been quite active in visiting other such organizations globally. Interestingly, Mayor said some of his toughest battles for achieving a culture of peace are being fought in his own country, where discrimination is proving difficult to fight.

In this researcher’s interview with Mayor, it was perceived that Mayor had been fed up with the bureaucracy of international governing bodies that never seem to accomplish what needs to be done and are always subject to the whims of the member states. Upon retiring from the bureaucratic life, Mayor resolved to do something more tangible, and in his opinion, useful. He certainly has his work cut out for him. He finds his organization underfunded and understaffed. He is virtually dependent on the funding coming from city governments (notably the Madrid city council) to sustain operations. But that contact with the governments is exactly the connection that can help bring about his goals – if it lasts.

Such initiatives are gaining momentum on the international scene, of which UNESCO is a part. In January of 2008, the government of Spain, led by President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, teamed up with the secretary-general of the U.N. to host a conference of the Alliance of Civilizations. Mayor, and his Cultura de Paz were a part of this conference and Mayor holds a spot on the “high level group” directing the actions. This conference and initiative demonstrate the growing wave of post-structuralist thought that believes that a new way to peace can be accomplished.

These examples of the cultural turn in international relations show much more focus on the individual members of international organizations and governments, as
opposed to the heavily resource and interest-based focus that has always been traditional
of international relations analysis and study. The turn towards a more important role for
culture and communication provides a natural bridge for cross-pollination with
communication scholars. It also provides a new way of looking at international
organizations that has not had much play in recent years, but that, given the importance
of what UNESCO does, could help us move much closer to true dialogue on important
cultural issues.

Specifically, the work done by constructivists in the field of international
relations, makes the concept of “norms” and their impact on international organizations
all the more important.

The “argumentative turn” in policy analysis

At the same time as the cultural turn was getting started in international relations,
many authors have pointed to an argumentative turn in the way organizations have
looked at their policy. In particular, organizations will strive to use rhetoric in framing
their policy that will convince others of the strength of their position. Ultimately, the goal
is to get the concepts described in rhetoric to be converted into norms or values that will
have an effect on actions (Crawford, 2002, Fischer, 1993, Payne, 2004).

Policy planning had previously been an exercise in power and resources, much
like the focus on international relations theory. However, numerous scholars have
described a change in this direction in a number of cases. Fischer (1993) describes a
change during the Great Society in which the policy-making power was concentrated into
the hands of the technocratic few. This has been described as an example of Technocratic
Theory, a variation of elite theory, in which the democratic deliberation has been taken
out of the hands of the common people and placed into the hands of the technically trained elite. This coincided with the decline of the political party in the U.S.

The conservative response to this was to obtain its own elite and politicize through rhetoric, essentially divide, the technocratic elite and claim a piece of the pie (Fischer, 1993). In this process is seen one example of the argumentative turn, which pitted elite against elite for the prize of electoral clout. Fischer attributes the rise in political fortunes of the conservative party in the 1908’s in part to this rhetorical strategy.

Another case to be used as an example of the argumentative turn can be found in the same book by Fischer. In this example, Maaten Hajer further fleshes out the concept of a discourse coalition, and uses the example of the struggle in Great Britain to “clean up” polluting factory emissions. He points out that the rhetoric of the dominant coalition placed a normative value cost versus benefit. In that light, until the rest of Europe, clamoring for decrease in British emissions to slow down acid rain, could prove that the available methods could prove: 1) causal harm to the environment; 2) that this harm stemmed from emissions from British factories; and 3) that existing (and expensive) methods for cleaning up emissions would make a substantial difference; the benefit did not justify the cost (Hajer, 1993).

This type of rhetoric from a particular discourse coalition, made up mostly of industrial owners, formed the dominant norm in that country. Going against that normative belief by an opposed coalition took years of effort and research to overcome. Although the desired policies were eventually adopted in Britain, remnants of the previously dominant rhetoric are still present and hindering factors for the opposite coalition (Hajer, 1993).
Another example of research showing this argumentative turn can be found in work being done by Céline Germond-Duret stemming from a paper as yet unpublished, but peer-reviewed and presented at the International Studies Association Conference (2009). Her work is based on the institutionalization of development discourse. She argues that despite changes in development policy (particularly at the World Bank), key elements of early rhetoric and argument persist to this day. The key elements that persist despite policy changes are: 1) All societies tend to development on a linear way (linearity); 2) Tradition conflicts with development (anti-tradition); 3) Development is achievable through market economy and growth; and 4) Development is essentially defined in economic terms (“economism”).

Germond-Duret argues that despite change in the policy at the World Bank, these elements of rhetoric, formed in the 70’s and 80’s have been “naturalized in the development discourse and practice,” to the point they have become norms and taken as fact. The existence of these norms has created significant harm to the new direction being taken by the World Bank.

This researcher would argue that the argumentative turn can also be seen in the change in rhetoric and policy emanating from UNESCO after the departure of the U.S. It also suggests that key elements of the change in rhetorical direction not only played a role in the U.S. return (perhaps by making the return less threatening to the U.S., even if some of the issues at the core of the U.S. withdrawal had not totally gone away), but are becoming useful in furthering the goals of UNESCO’s foundational mandate of changing the “minds of men.” This change presents great possibilities in the arena of cultural diversity, mitigating certain types of conflict arising from the globalization process, and
ultimately in improving communication between peoples of varying backgrounds.

**Argumentation, norms and “the public” – linking communication and international relations**

If, as many believe, UNESCO’s rhetoric holds a great deal of power in the construction of international norms, then it would be of great importance to establish the identity of a public to which both sides (the U.S. and UNESCO) may be accountable. Chapter 3 will propose that this public does indeed exist and Chapter 4 will analyze how UNESCO’s argumentation tapped in to this public as a means of rhetorical coercion to bring the U.S. back into membership.

A very fertile field for communication scholars for many centuries has been the pursuit of the public sphere. Theorists have constantly grappled with the issue of what a “public” is. This discussion has increased as technology and society have made changes. Many theories exist on what a public is and how it is constituted. Since the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas introduced the notion of the “public sphere” during the 1960’s in an attempt to describe the symbolic arena of politics and political conversations that began with cultural institutions of the early eighteenth century, the “public sphere” has become one of the most debated concepts in communication studies. The debate has crossed the boundaries into rhetoric, politics, technology and many other fields of study. The debate about the public sphere is diverse. It ranges from what elements should be contained in the definition of the public, to whether or not the public must be active or passive, to how it must be called into being.

For Habermas, the tension between the administrative power of the state, along with its understanding of sovereignty, and the emerging organizations of the bourgeoisie,
such as coffee houses, newspapers and literary culture, was seen as being mediated by the public sphere as a symbolic site of deliberation and reasoning by the public. However, the changes in society since the eighteenth century have called into question just how valid Habermas’ framework really is. The growing tension between the interests of the state and the international community, for one, has begun to change the framework on which the modern state rests, as evidenced, for example, in the inclusion of non-state members of certain international governing bodies (Microsoft and AT&T’s inclusion in the International Telecommunications Union is a prime example). Many scholars, given the complexity of the intellectual and politics environment that has shaped our world over the last two centuries, have suggested that it is necessary to define the public sphere along the lines of interaction between politics, technology, science, norms, culture and other concepts. I would suggest that this is true and that these concepts are further complicated by issues of cultural and historical identity.

Habermas has been joined by many other scholars in this philosophical debate about the public. John Dewey, Hannah Arendt and many others have added much to the discussion. Perhaps the single biggest area where debates about the public sphere can influence and shape the field of international relations, in the opinion of this author, occurs in the discussion of the creation of a cosmopolitan public sphere. History has been replete with wars and cries for peace. Theorists have chimed in on the debate about how to achieve peace for as long as history is recorded. In some way, international relations is influenced by all these discussions. During the last century, these discussions have included the effectiveness of international bodies, such as the United Nations and its associated organizations, in accomplishing their mandates. Currently, there is enormous
academic and political debate centered around the concepts of knowledge and information flow. At the heart of this debate lies policy on intellectual property and cultural diversity. UNESCO is at the heart of this debate – a fact that makes study of its direction regarding member states even more relevant.

James Bohman (1997) is one author who poses the idea of a cosmopolitan public sphere. He uses Kant’s theoretical framework of a “negative substitute” for a world republic dedicated to upholding the common good. Kant said that it is up to individual political actors to stand up and uphold or create favorable conditions for peace. He said that this was a more achievable result than the ideal of a benevolent world republic. As a result, Kant claims that a federation of states must emerge – each driven by its population consisting of actors standing up for common good. This public opinion would have to influence actions of the federation. Bohman argues that this power of the cosmopolitan public sphere can “shape and ultimately reorganize existing republican institutions and political identities."

While Bohman’s ultimate goal is in determining a public is to promote democratic deliberation, he rightly points out that International civil society is not enough to achieve this goal because it is “too punctual and too divided spatially and temporally to effect decisions.” Bohman says a cosmopolitan public sphere could influence deliberation in existing institutions and that these institutions could organize public opinion internationally. The resulting discourse can only help international organizations to in a quest promote peace. This perspective is considered a constructivist approach by those in the field of international relations, but the study of the public is a path well-known by communication scholars.
This discussion is intended as background and a review of the field, as the work of this dissertation is intended to bring to the table the best of both communication scholarship and international relations scholarship. While much of the literature cited has shed light on, and guided the research in this dissertation, I have chosen a specific methodological framework, which I believe brings together both fields in a manner that has only recently appeared in the literature – and much of that has had little to do with international organizations (and none to do with UNESCO specifically). I believe that combining these fields in this way opens up new areas of useful research that may bear fruit for years to come. I also believe it essential to examine the ideological power international organizations can have on the political makeup of the world (for good and, perhaps, for bad). The following chapters will address issues of methodology and analysis related to this dissertation.
CHAPTER 3

Methodology

The previous chapters have traced the literature related to the study of international relations, international communication, and specifically, UNESCO. While all of these topics are related at some level, it is at the methodological level that research lines can truly intersect. It is also at this level that the biggest void in research can be found, making an argumentation analysis of UNESCO’s rhetoric a valuable addition to the body of scholarly work. The dissertation will use an informal argumentation analysis to look at how the rhetoric changed at UNESCO following the departure of the U.S. in 1984. By informal I simply mean to distinguish what follows from the formal categories of logical analysis characteristic of certain philosophical practice, and to follow the lead of scholars like Toulmin and Perelman in their effort to track argument in everyday and semi-formal usage.

Immediately after the U.S. departure from UNESCO, one can see three distinct categories of rhetorical argumentation emerging from the agency. First was a phase of denial, in which UNESCO claimed it was continuing on with its foundational mandate with or without the U.S. presence. This position denounced the U.S. as a bully who takes his toys and runs home when he can no longer have his way. This hard line gave way rather quickly to an abrupt change in rhetoric in 1987 with the change of directors general.

This second phase of rhetorical argumentation can be characterized by expressions of sadness and regret that such a powerful nation would not be involved at the table of the forum of ideas that is UNESCO. During this period, every effort was
made to portray an environment of change in management practices, and most importantly in ideological direction. Focus drifted from politicized issues to ones more directly centered around the foundational mandate of UNESCO. For the most part, education and science initiatives at UNESCO remained unchanged. The real change came in an increased vigor in pursuing cultural goals such as the Convention on Cultural Diversity and collaboration with the UN on the Millennial Declaration of Human Rights, among many others. During this time, UNESCO collaborated with other international organizations, such as the ITU and WTO to organize initiatives.

The final category of rhetorical argumentation is less pronounced, but came during a period of time starting roughly in the year 2000. Spurred by the next change in directors general at UNESCO, this era can be categorized as one focused on demonstrating improvement in management practices within UNESCO. The focus of this period was to convince the U.S. that budgetary improprieties had diminished and that the organization was under better management. Although the rhetoric of this period was influential in the ultimate decision of the U.S. to return to membership, I argue that the lasting rhetoric from the previous period (which continues even to this day) was even more influential.

**Perelman and the Typologies of Informal Argumentation**

In order to evaluate the argumentation methods used by UNESCO, I utilize an informal analysis that follows the lead established in Chaim Perelman’s typology of argumentation schemes.

Chaim Perelman, the polish-born philosopher of law, is most known for teaming up with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in authoring the book *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on*
Argumentation. This work is largely considered one of the most important works in rhetorical theory of the twentieth century.

Perelman began his career intrigued by the concept of justice. Likely influenced by historical events taking place in Europe in the 1920’s and 1930’s, as well as his intellectual formation, which included an earned doctorate in law, he began to see that applications of the law always involved value judgments. This presented a concern for him since values cannot be placed under the microscope of logical reason. While one might conclude from this that that justice must be arbitrary, Perelman rejected this reasoning and continued his research on the interplay between justice, values and reason.

When Perelman met Olbrechts-Tyteca, they teamed up to conduct an extensive study of the ways authors in various fields of study used argumentation to come to terms with values. They examined statements from judges that explained the reasons for their decisions as well as other fields that involved deliberations about matters of value. The result was a new scheme based on the Aristotelian concept of analytics, which dealt with dialectical reasoning as opposed to demonstrative reasoning.

Perelman believed that argumentation is distinct from formal logic or reasoning in that it is the study of discursive techniques that “induce or increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1968), whereas logic, or demonstration, is simply a calculation based on rules that have been previously established. Through this scheme, values and judgment can be understood as operating in harmony and then be explained. Logic is impersonal, whereas argumentation is people-centered and affected by hierarchies of values. Thus, for persuasion to take place there must be a meeting of the minds.
This worldview offers a compelling parallel to the points of contention that separate traditional IR scholars (who value the material, logical as explanatory elements), from constructivists (who don’t dispute the value of the material power, yet see a high value in the social, or people-centered variables as explanatory elements).

At the center of Perelman’s concept of argumentation is the audience, which he breaks into a *universal* audience and a *particular* audience. He argues that for argumentation to occur there must be some sort of “meeting of the minds.” In this intellectual engagement, a common frame of reference must be shared. Perelman defines the audience “for the purpose of rhetoric, as the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1968). Thus, the audience is the speaker’s conception of the audience, a kind of mental projection, as opposed to a physical, concrete and tangible public. This concept is of importance in the case of UNESCO, because much of the rhetoric used is not directed at specific audiences, as opposed to a more general imagined audience defined by the organization.

For Perelman, the *universal audience* is very generic, a thought experiment composed of all reasonable people. The *particular audience* is a more specific group of people – who may or may not be reasonable or inclined to believe the speaker. In one possible scenario, the speaker may be trying to persuade a specific audience (such as the government of the U.S.) by selecting appeals that appeal to both the universal audience (the international community) and the specific audience.

This concept of a universal audience has been discussed from both sides in the forum of academic scholarship, but I find it very useful in constructing a scheme that would help explain the U.S. return to UNESCO from a different perspective than those
traditional IR scholars who explain the U.S. return as nothing more than a reflection of perceived national interest. Such an explanation is short-sighted in that it belittles the potential value of UNESCO and the U.S. membership in this international forum and downplays the likely role suasive argument may have played in the calculation of costs and benefits.

Aside from the audience, Perelman categorizes the rhetorical means by which speakers can persuade their audiences. He starts by explaining that fact and truth can only be defined as something to which the universal audience agrees with. Hence, the starting point for his scheme begins with values (and a hierarchy of homogeneous and heterogeneous values) and loci, or topics. The speaker then selects these elements on which to focus, creating what Perelman calls a “presence,” or even an absence of presence (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1968). Ultimately, the goal of the speaker is to establish “communion” with the audience.

At this point, Perelman elaborates the techniques of argumentation. He argues that there are two main techniques – those of association and those of dissociation. With arguments of association, the speaker seeks to create a bond between the starting point of the argument and the point being argued (what he wishes to make persuasive). With arguments of dissociation, he seeks to distance himself from the starting point. The speaker may try to split an idea in two in order to shed association to undesirable elements of that idea.

For this dissertation, I argue that UNESCO used a combination of quasi-logical arguments (which Perelman says is an element of *argumentation by association*) to associate itself with elements of its foundational mandate, with *argumentation by*
dissociation then undertaken to distance itself from the charged themes of NWICO and from accusations of mismanagement. Most importantly, in the process, UNESCO was attempting to attach itself to norms it began to establish when it was created and use the rhetorical power it had to move these norms closer to universality. With the charged atmosphere of the Cold War faded into history, many of the foundational mandates had gotten serious traction in the international community.

**Argumentation and the Logical Schemes of international relations**

Perelman's schematic approach to the analysis of argumentative formations is well aligned with the method of analysis used by Neta Crawford. In *Argument and Change in World Politics* (2002), Crawford evaluated the mechanisms of evidence and warrant used to establish intersubjectively validated norms in the process of decolonization and humanitarian intervention. Crawford maps out a process she claims is commonly used by those presenting arguments to change the ethical norms associated with decolonization.

Crawford’s book, targeted to scholars of international relations, is an attempt to bring the strengths of communication scholarship into the realm of world politics. As previously noted, constructivists in IR have begun to push the scholarship of their field, recognizing what rhetorical scholars have known for some time – that what is political can be constituted by how we communicate. How communicate helps to shape norms. Norms then help shape politics and can be very explanatory when it comes to political policy and decisions. This is the very thing realists and liberals in IR have rejected because of the long-held belief that norms, culture and discourse hold no real power – they only reflect material power.
Crawford does an admirable job of tracing the history of slavery and colonization and establishing credible evidence that changing norms played a much greater role in their demise than IR scholars have previously given credit. She lays out a history in which transnational advocates mobilized to start norm revolutions that eventually tore down the regimes that supported slavery and colonialism. Advocate groups used their audience’s own ethical norms against them to make it unacceptable to continue to support the practices of slavery and forced labor.

Crawford breaks down the discourse used to support the regimes of slavery and colonialism and shows how advocate groups began to use argumentation found in long established norms to delegitimize the undesirable, yet prevalent practices. Although it took many years of work, the argument against slavery and forced labor began to gain traction (after shifting from the American Indian to Africans). Her work represents one of the best recent attempts to show cross-pollination of scholarly fields. The work of this dissertation is one more step in that direction – this time using UNESCO as a case study.

But Crawford is not the only one who has used Perelman’s schemes of argumentation. It appears to be the most closely related to the topic of this dissertation, but others have used the techniques in studies of similar international importance. Frank Myers (2000) used a similar analysis to examine the famous “Winds of Change” speech by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1960. That speech marked a distinct change in policy for the British government. For more than 100 years, Britain had pursued a policy of white, European domination over the politics of its colonies in Africa. This speech signaled a change in direction from that policy and distinctly went against the policy of the British Conservative Party.
The focus of Myers’ research is to show how the chosen speech was able to balance between three audiences: 1) the group of people who supported the policy that is being changed (as well as the leadership which previously carried out the old policy) and will likely feel betrayed at the changed; 2) those who were not supporters of the old policy but will probably support the new one; and 3) those who have supported the leader in the past and also support the changes. The political challenge in the change of policy is to rally the enthusiastic support of the third group, minimize the feelings of betrayal from the first group, and assuage any suspicions from the second group about the motives for the change (Myers, 2000).

Although Myers’ study was particularly useful in evaluating the use of various argumentative techniques on disparate audiences, as well as showing the background of how audience beliefs came in the construction of the speech, other studies have placed focus on other relevant aspects of Perelman’s *New Rhetoric*. Ira Strauber (1985) focused the bulk of his work on the interplay between reasonable and rational. He derives a significant portion of his analysis from Perelman’s concept of lies, versus truth. Although he departs somewhat from Perelman in that he argues that reasonable ought to be the controlling factor over the rational (whereas Perelman argues that the reasonable should control, but only as a step toward a more solid rational), the article does make a significant step into showing why rhetoric and argumentation should play a greater role in explaining political policy (Strauber, 1986).

**Perelman, Crawford, and the Unfolding UNESCO Situation**

In her book, Crawford maps three phases in which argumentation runs its course in the changing of global norms. In the first phase identified by Crawford, argumentation
deconstructs and delegitimizes or denormalizes dominant beliefs and practices. In this phase, as applied to the UNESCO history under analysis here, UNESCO can be described as using argumentation to deconstruct its previous association with NWICO, particularly some of its more controversial practical applications, such as the licensure of journalists.

In the second phase persuasive arguments are posited that reconstruct argumentation based on an alternative that meets normative criteria. In this phase, the organization begins to rhetorically embrace an alternate course of action and policy begins to take shape. I argue that this corresponds to the phase in which UNESCO used quasi-logical argumentation to establish itself as the best forum for discussing ideological issues of culture and diversity and for bringing people together from various backgrounds to form a common goal.

The third phase suggested by Crawford occurs when actors begin to take action upon the new argued norm. She says that if arguments are persuasive enough, then the balance of capabilities between the previously dominant norm and the newly suggested normative belief will begin to change. In this phase, I suggest that UNESCO undertook an agenda to aggressively bring people and nations together to act upon its foundational mandate. I also argue that this is the phase in which UNESCO currently finds itself. The argumentation tactics used by UNESCO during this time gained enough of a following that the U.S. found it necessary to re-evaluate its position as a non-member.

However, in using these forms of analysis, we run in to some of the same problems outlined earlier in the field of international relations. Communications scholars and constructivists in the field of international relations will all recognize the value of argumentation and rhetoric in research in their respective fields. However, many
international relations scholars from the liberalist or realist tradition continue to treat rhetoric and argumentation as if they held little explanatory value to their field. This is problematic, since we are studying an international organization that holds value in the eyes of the world in many different arenas, and an unsatisfying disregard especially given cases (such as presented by the work of international organizations) where the main institutional power is suasive (as opposed to that implemented by armies or control over the economic levers of state power). Realists and liberalists would both argue that material power, not rhetorical positioning and argumentation, played the biggest role in the United States’ return to membership in UNESCO. They would say that the U.S. returned because it was in their national interest to return – that they had something to gain from returning.

My problem with this reasoning is that it completely fails to take into account the social power the rest of the world has upon the nations who deviate from norms established by the international community. Can it be proven that the U.S. had something to gain from returning? Certainly. But can it be established that what it stood to gain was the causal reason behind the decision to return? I argue that trying to establish that link is complicated at best and that communication scholars with long-established research in the power of discourse have much to add to an explanatory discussion on the U.S. return. Crawford pointed out in her own case study that some have argued slavery was abolished for economic reasons. Yet her case adds a refreshing new light in the field and is a compelling argument for the power of discourse.

Had any previous studies on UNESCO’s rhetoric been performed, constructivists might already have noted that the argumentation used by UNESCO was successful in
convincing the U.S. that a return to membership was in its best national interest and that the world’s interest would also be served. But this view is also too simple. It is virtually impossible to prove that American decision-makers were finally persuaded by UNESCO’s rhetoric that the right changes had been made and that all problem areas had been resolved. Indeed, even right up to the date of return, and even afterwards, many political analysts – especially Republicans – were still saying that the time was not right for return – and that the true issues which caused the U.S. to withdraw had not been resolved satisfactorily. “President Bush should not yield to pressure to rejoin UNESCO, even if it appears to be an attractive low-cost way to deflect international charges of isolationism or to deflate pressure to pay U.S. arrears to the United Nations without assurances of reform. The President should instead take time to evaluate UNESCO’s current priorities and progress toward reform” (Schaefer, 2001).

A new thread of scholarship has recently emerged that aims to bridge the gap between those who foreground rhetoric (constructivists and communications scholars) as opposed to those who put a premium on material power (liberalists and realists). As with any model, some elements are acceptable and others less so, but the work of Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson (2007) does suggest a potentially promising path forward. They have recently proposed a model for looking at the power of argumentation and political rhetoric and, although they apply this model only to smaller scale politics, it is based on Perelman’s theory and the stages proposed by Crawford. They call this a model of *rhetorical coercion*.

Krebs and Jackson rightly point out that it is impossible to establish that persuasion occurs as a causal effect of argumentation, even in light of policy changes
suggesting persuasion has been successful. How can we be sure that change was motivated by one side becoming convinced of the validity of the argumentation framed by the opposition? Even organizations that have changed their stance may not have done so because the true convictions of those involved have been modified (their motives may be cynical or self-serving in other ways). In the case of UNESCO, although the Republican administration of George Bush returned the U.S. to membership in 2003, saying in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, “This organization has been reformed, and America will participate fully in its mission to advance human rights, tolerance, and learning” (Bush, 2003), his own party seemed yet unpersuaded and many other national conservative leaders would more likely have endorsed the exactly opposed view.

The model of rhetorical coercion accounts for this deficiency by dismissing entirely the question of whether or not persuasion actually happened. This question may be relevant, but is not necessary when it comes to explaining change in policy. In the Krebs and Jackson model, three parties are involved: a claimant making a claim through argumentation, an opposition to the claimant, and a public to whom both parties are somehow accountable. All three of these parties must be involved for the model to function (Krebs, 2007). “Coercion” is a term found much more palatable to mainstream IR scholars because it implies real leverage – something realists and liberalists can truly understand and accept.

In the model of rhetorical coercion, Krebs uses the example of the Druze Arabs in Israel and their use of rhetoric to coerce the Israeli government into granting them rights not held by other Arabs. In terms of material power, the Druze held very little, and the
government was not naturally inclined to grant them the rights they sought. Their position was thus to deny these rights to all Arabs. The various Christian, Muslim and other groups of Arabs employed a range of tactics as they fought for the extension of rights. Other Arab groups had more resources than the Druze. Yet only the Druze have been successful in persuading Israel to guarantee them rights. In this case, the claimants were the Druze. The opposition was the Israeli government. The public that held some sort of power was the citizens of the Israeli state.

Culture and norms play a part in this model in that the public holds given values and positions likely to be accepted or at least understood based on culture. In this case, the Druze appealed to a highly shared cultural belief that if one wanted rights as a citizen, he or she must be willing to serve in the military to fight for them. The Druze were the only Arab group to embrace mandatory military service even as they lacked full rights as citizens. Later, this was rhetorically constructed to appeal to the values held by Israeli citizens. As far as this key public was concerned, the Druze had met their obligation and deserved the right to be represented as citizens. The opposition had little choice but to grant the Druze their demands (ibid). Krebs points out that the government likely had little desire to do so, but was left with the choice of attempting to frame the argument differently (and under conditions where alternative frames would have been decisively unflattering to the national government), or redefine the implications involved. Even traditional IR scholars would see that there was real power in this tactic.

For this model to be effective, one key component is the presence of a public able to exert influence over its opposition. The authors point out that this fact often limits the range of achievable action (and by extension, the reach of the model). But despite this
potential limitation, other studies have also shown the usefulness of this model on the international stage. Some of the contexts in which this model can be successfully applied include the eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO (Firke and Wiener, 1999; Schimmelfenig, 2004), the analysis of Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and his proposals for nuclear disarmament (Evangelista, 2001), Cold War crisis negotiation (Mattern, 2004), and even dynamics in play between Arab groups (Barnett, 1998).

This model suggests an effective method for explaining the U.S. return to UNESCO, despite many claims that the organization had insufficiently changed its practices during the time of the American absence. In applying this model, the claimant would be UNESCO itself seeking to coerce the U.S. into returning. The opposition would be the U.S. government. But who was the public for this persuasive exchange? I suggest that given the absence of Cold War polarization dynamics (changes which took place after the U.S. departure), a significant turn in direction – at least rhetorically – had been accomplished with respect to the international ways in which universal human rights and intercultural dialog were conducted. This evolution has softened the tendency to view UNESCO as a battleground for the Cold War and has invigorated the push towards UNESCO’s original mission as a forum organization. The result is a significant international community, a transnational public, as it were, that sees value in UNESCO's work in the world (at least as it was originally articulated). Hence, the public to which the U.S. (as opposition in this model) feels pressure is the international community itself.

It must be pointed out that this public is not ever-present, or always salient when international disagreement arises. Nor do all international organizational controversies interpellate the same transnational public; rather, it is the specific foundational mandate
of UNESCO – and the recent push towards these goals in the absence of the Cold War – that has resulted in the formation of this public.

In what follows, then, I utilize this model because of its potential viability to constructivists and communication scholars given the way in which it more adequately weights the value of norms and rhetorical leverage. It is tolerable to traditional IR scholars because it stops short of claiming persuasion and speaks in terms of real leverage and power – albeit rhetorical. In short, this model accounts for the material power of rhetoric without claiming persuasion as a causal force in determining policy. Applied in this case, the model is able to help explain the return of the U.S. to UNESCO in terms that both sides should be able to find palatable.

This dissertation thus seeks to contribute to the field by showing how the rhetorical positioning accomplished by UNESCO anticipated responses by other member states, although not necessarily with a view to proving a causal relationship between UNESCO's public arguments and state interactions (although implying such a relation may not finally be seen as unreasonable given the public ways the fate of American involvement in UNESCO were litigated).

In line with this perspective, UNESCO documents have been analyzed to locate with greater precision the strategies of argumentation. Specifically, the dissertation establishes UNESCO as the claimant seeking to coerce the U.S. to return to membership, the United States as the opposition, and establishes the international community as the public. The next chapter examines those normative beliefs UNESCO sought to strengthen or downplay from the time period beginning when the Americans withdrew support. The findings reported derive from a combination of depth interviews with current and
previous UNESCO officials, including former UNESCO Director General, Federico Mayor, and archival research at UNESCO archives in Paris, France. Documents reviewed include: Executive Board meeting minutes, official declarations ratified by UNESCO, communication between the UNESCO directors general and some foreign government officials, speeches (particularly prominent ones) given by UNESCO directors general, and UNESCO publications. The time period analyzed has been intentionally held flexible to account for each of the three periods suggested earlier, but mainly focuses on the period immediately following the U.S. withdrawal and the tenure of Mayor as director general. Appropriate attention will be placed on the period preceding the U.S. return, however it is expected that the most descriptive results will come during the time of its absence, especially immediately following U.S. withdrawal.

In order to guide my analysis of the UNESCO documents and the interviews, and in accordance with the model suggested by previous scholars, the following questions were used as roadmaps. 1) Are the arguments used in the document making use of concrete supporting material, or are they mostly assertive? 2) What kinds of argumentative evidence does the document/speaker use and are they consistent? 3) Which arguments are given plenty of support and which ones are left short, and why? 4) Does the document refer directly to the U.S. absence, or does it just present the arguments, leaving it up to the audience to connect the dots? 5) What evidence in the document points to arguments directly associated with the U.S. departure? 6) To which audience(s) does this document appear to be directed based on the evidence included?

For the purpose of categorizing arguments and clarification devices found in the documents, I have used a standard classification of rhetorical evidence and reasoning,
including serial examples, extended examples, quantification, isolated comparisons, extended comparisons, testimony, definition and contrast (Hart, 1997).

The bulk of this dissertation is based upon evaluation of speeches and the minutes from Executive Board meetings held at UNESCO Headquarters. These documents were obtained during a visit to UNESCO archives in Paris during July and August of 2009. Previous contact I made with Mayor was able to get me in touch with the Chief Archivist at UNESCO headquarters, Jens Boel. Through Boel, I was able to secure entrance into the archives. While in the archives, I had nearly unrestricted access to materials contained therein. One restriction was a firm rule that certain sensitive documents were off-limits to anyone for a period of 20 years. Executive Board minutes are considered sensitive documents, but since the minutes I was looking for took place in 1985-1989, the 20-year time frame had elapsed on all of the documents. Therefore, it was a simple matter of formally requesting the documents and I was able to gain access – usually in the same day.

While at UNESCO archives, I was given use of photocopy machines to duplicate any documents I retrieved. So the process was quite simple. I would tell the archivist the documents and dates I wanted. He would bring the documents, which I read over and photocopied, then returned. The access granted while there was really quite amazing, aside from the 20-year rule. I was able to recover the transcripts from the speeches I needed. I also recovered minutes from Executive Board meetings held in September and October of 1986 and 1987. Also in the archives I was able to find reports given to UNESCO from both the U.S. and U.K. about evaluations both countries had performed on UNESCO. Related to these reports, I was able to copy letters and correspondence
between the Director General and foreign government officials. All documents were photocopied and brought back with me for analysis. I maintained contact with the archivist there in case any documents were missed. They expressed a willingness to scan and email any documents I might have need of in the future. All documents were available in English, French and Spanish.

Perhaps given my training as a journalist, I value the depth interview as a means of providing color to this research. In fact, the selection of this topic was in no small part due to an interview I conducted with Mayor in 2005. I interviewed him in August, 2005 for a project that would later evolve into this dissertation. I made an appointment and traveled to Madrid, Spain to do this interview at Mayor’s Foundation for a Culture of Peace headquarters. I tape recorded the interview and transcribed it for analysis. The interviews with Mayor were conducted in Spanish (I have tested at a level near native speaker in written and spoken Spanish) and I translated the interview into English.

As this project evolved, I followed up this interview with a telephone interview in November of 2007. Again the interview was in Spanish and recorded, transcribed and translated. Finally, in August of 2009, I again traveled to Madrid following my research in the archives to conduct one final interview. The same procedures were followed in this interview.

The other depth interviews were conducted in Paris. At UNESCO headquarters on July 31, 2009, I was able to interview one archivist, Alexandre Coutelle, who had been present through the tenures of both Mayor and Matsuura. I also conducted two other interviews with UNESCO officials which were not used in this dissertation, but were nonetheless quite interesting and enlightening. I conducted all in-depth interviews, and
this meant that most interviews with UNESCO officials were conducted in English – since my French proficiency is minimal. This presented minimal communication challenge as all of the people interviewed were quite proficient in English. The interviews were taped and transcribed.

One principal reason this research is so timely is that UNESCO is now facing a moment of transition where a new Director General might be elected. If, as hypothesized, the particular flair and rhetoric of each director general has such a profound effect on the direction of the organization, an analysis of how entrenched towards institutionalization the current argumentation has evolved into norms will be very valuable should someone with a different ideological orientation take the reins of UNESCO – a distinct possibility. In addition, it will become interesting to see how the arguments used to coerce the U.S. into a return will play out in actual policy and discussion over the coming years.

Most importantly, this research could help to invigorate the cross-pollination between communication scholars and IR scholars and give added importance to the value of rhetoric in the arena of international politics.
CHAPTER 4

Analysis

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, which changed the entire world and set free the minds of millions of men and women. I strongly hope that this spirit will guide our efforts here, at UNESCO, towards the creation of more just and prosperous societies based on knowledge, tolerance and equal opportunities for all through education, science, culture and access to information. My understanding of a NEW HUMANISM for the 21st century will guide all my activity (Bokova, 2009).

This quotation, taken from the mission statement of newly-elected Director General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, represents a stark change from the rhetorically-charged days of the NWICO conflict. It is but a small sample of the monumental change in rhetorical direction the organization while the United States was still refusing to participate as a member. It is also a sign that this new rhetorical direction has become entrenched in the community surrounding UNESCO – that those associated with the organization have bought in to the new direction. The policies and programs UNESCO has been pursuing in recent years provide confirmatory arguments in support of this statement (consider, for example, the Millennium Development Goals, among other policies). UNESCO has not always followed this path – in fact, far from it. And so the question arises: how did UNESCO public discourse reach this juncture? In what follows, I use the UNESCO history to lay out the contours of a paradigm case for how argumentation can change policy and influence the decisions of even the largest of states – in this case, the United States.

This chapter will examine the process by which the United States returned to membership in UNESCO, imagining its logical unfolding as the elaboration of an
ongoing public argument. UNESCO used techniques associated with argumentation to “coerce” the U.S. back into membership. I use the word coerce, because, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the arguments used by UNESCO discursively positioned both itself and the U.S., leaving the United States few acceptable public options apart from returning to membership.

There is a corollary communication theory, which is widely used, called “framing.” This theory says that framing is used to encourage an audience to see the world in a different way. By inducing audiences to see a phenomenon through a particular perspective, a frame leads readers to focus on some attributes of a circumstance and overlook others, thus strongly shaping their subsequent responses (Entman, 1993). The theory is quite complex, but simply used in this example, says that UNESCO framed the discussion about itself in such a way that put NWICO and the budgetary concerns into the background and the common values upon which it was founded into the foreground.

In the example used by Krebs in the previous chapter, the Druze Arabs in Israel used the norms established by the Israeli government itself to frame their argument. The Israeli government had long attached the rights to full citizenship to service in the armed forces. The Druze served in the military, and so they framed their argument upon this norm – demanding full rights of citizenship. Although the Israeli government was not keen to give these rights, they had few acceptable options but to give in to the Druze demands. Framing and argumentation established the position necessary to accomplish such an outcome.

With UNESCO – like the Druze example – the U.S. had established that
UNESCO had departed from the values and direction upon which it was founded, becoming too politicized in the process. It also complained about the budgetary decisions made (nothing new to U.N. organizations). UNESCO framed the discussion to eliminate the controversial elements and embrace its foundational values, leaving the U.S. with few acceptable reasons to remain on the outside. The presence of an apparently unified international community behind UNESCO’s goals, added real weight to the pressure on the U.S. to return.

With such a framework to the analysis, the return can be explained in terms that should be found acceptable to traditional scholars of international relations who see the world through a materialist lens, but that may also strike a chord with communication scholars and constructivist scholars in the IR field more inclined to privilege explanations of social change residing in the social and rhetorical.

In what follows, then, I examine the development of UNESCO’s argumentation through the three phases suggested by Crawford. Particular emphasis must be placed in the first phase, as this is where the argumentation first begins to dissociate UNESCO from previous policy and reattach itself (or, to use the Perelman vernacular, associate) with its foundational mandate. However, in order to completely paint the picture of just how drastically UNESCO changed direction following the U.S. departure, I begin with an evaluation of the state in which UNESCO found itself in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal, building on the very high quality account given by Clare Wells (Wells, 1987).

UNESCO after U.S. Withdrawal

As mentioned in Chapter 1, NWICO was the outcome of an ideological battle that
started shortly after the end of World War II, when UNESCO was formed. At that time, many of it’s founders envisioned UNESCO as a forum organization designed to get nations from varying backgrounds to come together and discuss matters that could impact “the minds of men.” They were excited about education and culture being included for the first time on an international basis (Huxley, 1947). In part because of this foundational interest, considerable work was spent defining and articulating the UNESCO ideology. Yet even from the beginning, it was clear that the nations of the world did not agreeably share the same vision of what UNESCO was to accomplish (Wells, 1987).

For the U.S. and many of its allies, the organization was seen and used as a functional tool to combat the ideologies it found distasteful, or that it felt could lead to a recurrence of the previous global wars. Thus, it was seen and used as a weapon against communism from the very beginnings of the Cold War (Sewell, 1975). This vision as it emerged in the 1950's and 1960's was so distinct from the original mission the organization's founders had in mind, that a handful of UNESCO officials acted on their accumulating sense of disillusionment and stepped down over the years (Senarclens, 1985).

As the Cold War faded into the annals of history, what remained was a world lacking the institutionalized dichotomy of superpowers who fought, bribed, and cajoled to secure the loyalty of the developing nations. Those nations now formed a new majority in UNESCO and began to flex their collective muscles, in part by forming NWICO. But the departure of the U.S. from UNESCO (the United States was joined by the U.K. and Singapore) did not change the larger dynamics still at work in the world. Many
developing nations felt they could best advance their interests by pursuing every avenue they could find to achieve a more even footing with developed nations. The UNESCO Director General at the time the U.S. left, Amadou M’Bow, was from Senegal and had been a champion of NWICO from the very beginning. With the U.S. and the U.K. gone, a time of uncertainty was upon UNESCO and the membership was waiting to see what course would be taken (Mayor, Former Director General of UNESCO, 2007).

The course taken was to march forward in the same manner as before. To M’Bow, the loss of the U.S. would certainly mean budgetary shortfalls, which would impact the programs at UNESCO, but this would “not be enough to stop the progress of this great organization.” (M’Bow, 1985) In his speech to the annual general conference of UNESCO, M’Bow acknowledged that cuts would have to be made, but gave detailed accounts of how the programs UNESCO had previously supported would continue with or without the support of the U.S.

It goes without saying that some of these difficulties (budgetary shortfalls explained previously in some detail) are directly connected with the situation created by the withdrawal of the United States of America from the Organization. The budgetary difficulties experienced by the Organization in 1985 have been a factor in delaying the application of various measures or in masking the real effectiveness of what has been done. The serious budgetary cutbacks to which the programme and the staff will be subjected in 1986-1987 will make it necessary to introduce further stringent measures. But this will not stop the mission UNESCO has set out to achieve. This Organization will continue to champion the causes beneficial to all member nations regardless of their size (M’Bow, 1985).

Numerous documents affirm the continuation of direction UNESCO and its Director General had been pursuing. In fact, at this point in history, faced with the U.S. withdrawal, UNESCO really had few available directions to pursue. It could try to paint itself as an organization willing to make any changes necessary to stop the U.S. from
withdrawing. It could continue unabashed with its current policy and engage in a spitting match (so to speak) with the U.S., defending itself at all costs against the perceived bully. Or, finally, it might pursue something of a middle ground: express regret at the departure of the U.S., distance the organization from charged topics, admit improvements needed to be made and promise to deliver more defensible programmatic outcomes.

Although the third option was finally pursued, I note that the argumentative change in UNESCO strategy only occurred after a change of Director General (consistent with the logic I elaborated in mapping UNESCO history onto Crawford first phase). In reality, this option may (arguably) have been the only one able to save UNESCO from elimination as a United Nations agency. But in the immediate wake of the U.S. departure, M’Bow rather chose to adopt the second option.

Privately, behind closed doors in the executive board meetings of UNESCO, M’Bow lambasted the U.S. decision and vigorously defended himself and the organization he directed. Publicly, before the general assembly of UNESCO, M’Bow, representing the decisions made by the executive board, drew upon every resource to defend UNESCO and cast U.S. officials in a harsh light. Some of the language used in these documents shows clearly UNESCO’s intention to hold persist in its course – despite charges of politicization and budgetary mismanagement.

In the executive board meeting minutes, which only recently were opened for academic and public inspection (following UNESCO’s mandatory policy of a 20-year period of closed files), M’Bow offered a detailed accounting of the details surrounding the U.S. decision to withdraw. He assured all members of the board that he had done everything possible to convince the U.S. to remain and continue paying its share of the
UNESCO budget (which represented one-fourth of the whole budget). It is noteworthy that much discussion revolved around the money lost by a U.S. withdrawal (UNESCO Executive Board, 1984). Although the U.S. gave proper notice of its intention to withdraw effective December 31, 1984, the question was whether the U.S. (whose withdrawal came at the end of the first half of the 1984-1985 biennium) did or did not owe the second half of its contribution for that biennium. The board concluded that the U.S. did indeed owe UNESCO $43 million. A decision was made to pursue this amount. The U.S. refused to pay, and discussion was later held in the 121st session of the Executive Board regarding bringing the matter of the money owed to the attention of the International Court of Justice (UNESCO Executive Board, 1985). Nothing ever came of this and UNESCO never collected this money.

Also part of the discussion in the Executive Board was a plan brought up by M’Bow himself, and endorsed by the board, that would have member nations voluntarily forgo surpluses under Part VII of the budget for 1981-1983 that were due them as a result of the rise in value of the dollar (UNESCO Executive Board, 1985). Discussion centered on whether such a plan would allow UNESCO to stand tall and credibly claim that its goals would not be thwarted when even several large nations decided not to participate. M’Bow proudly reported to the General Assembly in 1985 that the amount collected up to that time exceeded $9 million. He also made a point of expressing “my heartfelt gratitude to the Member States, most of which are developing countries, that have made a considerable financial contribution to the Organization. Such contributions will enable us to continue successfully in our fight for universality with all countries having a voice.” (M’Bow, 1985)
Easily recognizable in these statements is the reinforcement of the idea that UNESCO would continue on unabashed even without the United States. Especially important is the recognition of the developing countries’ contributions to “the cause” because this reinforces the idea that the majority of nations support the rationales for which UNESCO (and its Director General) had been recently laboring. What was not as well known is that the majority of the countries contributing voluntarily were also part of the coalition banding together in 1987, strategizing to re-elect M’Bow to another term in office. All this produced a vicious battle within the Executive Board – a battle fraught with political maneuvering and tactics between those who were adamant upon maintaining course under M’Bow and those who were equally adamant that a new direction would better serve UNESCO.

A third issue arising within Executive Board meetings concerned how to deal with the nearly 1,000 U.S. citizens still working in positions at UNESCO. Part of the reason for this was to make sure that quotas of employees from each member state would be redistributed fairly. But M’Bow recognized that there were two groups of minds about how to handle current employees. One group felt they should be treated like any other employee – that their contracts should be renewed dependent on their evaluations of their performance. Another group – one to which M’Bow belonged – felt that it would be unfair to member states to keep these employees with UNESCO beyond the frame of their current contracts. He also raised the issue that most of these U.S. employees were having their U.S. income taxes reimbursed by UNESCO for their service. UNESCO had an agreement with the U.S. government to recoup these costs. However the U.S. had ceased this agreement two years prior to its withdrawal and that created for UNESCO
another budgetary dilemma tallying close to $500,000. In the end, it was decided to keep employees only through the completion of their contracts, although some employees of the Secretariat finally were allowed to continue for longer (UNESCO Executive Board, 1985). But the fact that there were two distinct sides within the Executive Board on nearly all of these issues was a sign of conflicts likely to soon boil over.

Many examples from both the public and private meetings and speeches illustrate M’Bow’s determination to “stay the course” with UNESCO – with or without the United States. Many of these instances also demonstrate an aggressive tone towards the U.S. government. But none are better than the speech previously mentioned, given by M’Bow to the 23rd session of the General Conference of UNESCO. This was the first address given to the entire organization after the departure of the United States. Thus, it was the first opportunity to provide official reaction – and direction – to the body of the organization.

M’Bow's 1985 speech began with expressions of gratitude for the support of the Executive board – a ploy doubtlessly used to convey unity of purpose in the UNESCO leadership. M’Bow then pointed to the agreement on the Medium-Range Plan adopted at the General Conference two years prior, one of the very documents pointed to by the U.S. upon its decision to withdraw. M’Bow painted this agreement as one in which the nations of the worlds were in agreement and he stressed that nations continued to work toward Medium-Range goals in common purpose. In referring to the biennial program adopted the previous year by UNESCO, “also by consensus,” M’Bow said that, “the representatives of the various regional groups all, without exception, made a point of stressing their favourable assessment of the results of the Conference, which was indeed
marked by a spirit of active co-operation and by a political will for conciliation which could be seen as a hopeful sign for the future” (M'Bow, 1985).

Against the backdrop of an asserted “world consensus” for a plan that was actually rather controversial, M’Bow proceeded to explain the tasks he derived from the 1984 conference, painting those tasks as weighty, but important. He argued that much had been done to accomplish those tasks and once again expressed his gratitude to the Executive Board. Then, after tallying successes, M' Bow immediately reiterates a list of “impediments” that he notes prevent the attainment of goals supported elsewhere in the world wanted – and foregrounds the withdrawal of the U.S. from membership. “But from the outset, these efforts were set against the background of the submission of notice of withdrawal…” referring to the U.S., Britain and Singapore individually (M'Bow, 1985). He sought to show how these nations were resisting international majorities, noting that the fact that their withdrawals were “accompanied by a series of observations and criticisms on various aspects of the functioning of the Organization and on sovereign decisions adopted by the General Conference” (M'Bow, 1985).

M’Bow makes the withdrawal into a personal issue, stating that “the Organization – and at times even its Director-General – were subjected to a vigorous press campaign conducted by some of the media, in which a concern for objectivity all too often gave way to systematic denigration and even slander; the issues at stake therein, which are now beginning to emerge more clearly, will no doubt have to be clarified one day. Meanwhile, voices were raised on all sides to reaffirm the attachment to UNESCO of the very great majority of Member States” (M'Bow, 1985).

It is clear that UNESCO, under M’Bow and following the withdrawal of the U.S.,
intended to maintain course rhetorically and in policy by adhering to those principles the U.S. government found most distasteful when it decided to leave. It is also clear, given the documents from the secretly held Executive Board meetings, that the picture of unanimous support was less rosy in reality. Finally, it is clear that M’Bow intended his remarks to bolster the enthusiasm for UNESCO among those already inclined to support him, motivate and persuade those still sitting on the fence, and paint into a corner those opposed to his articulated direction.

M’Bow was in for a fight he surely knew was coming. Just a year later, in preparation for elections coming up in 1987, the Executive Board met to adopt a procedure for the nomination of candidates for Director General. In this meeting, it was discussed how the coming elections were likely to be contentious between those supporting M’Bow and the considerable group actively working against him (UNESCO Executive Board, 1986). The Board concluded that a strict procedure was required to allow for nominations to progress to candidacy. In accordance with this new procedure, on October 10, 1986, the chairman of the Executive Board addressed a circular letter to member states inviting them to suggest to him, confidentially, if possible before April 2, 1987, the names of persons who might be considered for the post of Director General. On May 27, 1987, the chairman sent a letter to member states containing the list of candidates proposed to that date together with the names of member states who supported them. Updated lists were sent to member states weekly during September 1987, all this activity leading up to the elections in October (UNESCO Executive Board, 1987). The period of contentious transition was about to begin and it is clear those affiliated with UNESCO knew the storm was coming.
A detailed account of the procedural maneuvering that took place in the fight between supporters of M’Bow and those seeking change is not necessary to confirm that UNESCO originally intended to continue its course with or without the U.S., as well as to contrast their previous position with the position adopted after the change of directors general – which sets up the first phase of how UNESCO’s history maps to Crawford’s framework. Suffice it to say that the list of candidates was narrowed down several times in October, 1987 meetings of the Executive Board. At one time, M’Bow removed his name from consideration, only to have his supporters work hard using procedural technicalities to have his name put back on the list when the supposed leading opposition candidate was eliminated. It is also important to note that U.S. membership (or lack thereof) was a theme that was mentioned only indirectly throughout the elections, even though the direct interviews I conducted with some UNESCO officials confirmed that the organization’s position on U.S. membership (and specifically the Director General’s views of this topic) was clearly an under-the-table theme that persistently lurked in the discussions held among delegates from member states (UNESCO Executive Board, 1987).

The result of the election was the elevation of Federico Mayor, from Spain, to the post of Director General. His election signaled an end of overt public hostilities between UNESCO leadership and the U.S. government, but it did not immediately result in a return to membership for the U.S. I argue that UNESCO was still required to use all the tools at its disposal to discursively box in the U.S., thereby leaving it no other option but to return. Interviews with UNESCO officials confirm this position.
Phase One: Dissociating UNESCO from NWICO

I would characterize M’Bow’s time as Director-General as one of pursuing a political agenda for small and developing nations regardless of the costs. Mayor brought ideology and purpose to UNESCO as a whole. Everyone rallied around the principles Mayor brought. (Koichiro) Matsuura (the next Director-General elected in 1999) brought business and management direction with no change of philosophy. Each one brings a different look and lately, it has been exactly what the organization needed at just the right time (Coutelle, 2009).

The previous discussion aimed to establish the clear direction in which UNESCO was headed – centered chiefly on the shoulders of whoever served in the position of Director General at a given time. It also sought to evidence the seeds of discord within UNESCO's governing body regarding that direction. In Chapter 1 information was offered to demonstrate that seeds of discord about the foundational mandate were present even from the beginning. Here I seek to document the clear-cut change in direction for UNESCO signified by the election of Spain's Federico Mayor to the seat of the Director General. As before, archival records from UNESCO headquarters and relevant to the topic at hand will be used. In addition, I draw extensively upon speeches given by Mayor and by two depth interviews I recently conducted with Mayor at his Foundation for a Culture of Peace Headquarters in Madrid (one in 2007, the other in August of 2009).

However, of the hundreds of speeches given by Mayor during his time in office, most relevant to this section is his inaugural speech to the UNESCO General Assembly on November 16, 1987, and a speech given to the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on May 9, 1988. These speeches are important for two reasons. First, the inaugural address provided Mayor with his first chance to establish the tone of his leadership. All UNESCO, as well as the UN and the international community, was aware of at least some level of conflict within UNESCO relating to NWICO and the U.S.
departure. They were aware of the tension between M'Bow and the U.S. government. With this recent conflict still in mind, the inaugural address enabled a first opportunity to define what was to be. Mayor's inaugural address is thus an ideal moment in which his anticipated changes in direction can be specified, and this within the logics of Perelman's strategic emphasis on rhetorics of dissociation, which also roughly map onto the first phase of Crawford’s model.

The speech given in New York was Mayor’s first official address delivered to an audience associated with the U.S. government – or at least to American opinion leaders UNESCO was seeking to persuade of the merits of membership. As with the inaugural address, the New York speech provides an ideal location from which to analyze elements of dissociation from NWICO, as well as the associative logics implied by the case for a return to the foundational principles of UNESCO’s origin.

From the outset, it was apparent that Mayor had become the champion of the group within UNESCO fighting for the participation of all nations – not just the large or just the small, or developing nations. In the Executive Board meeting documents from the meetings to elect a new director general, a huge debate was waged between opposing sides within UNESCO. On the one hand, nations such as Pakistan expressed public concern that UNESCO’s current direction should be maintained because it would greatly benefit the developing nations. Pakistan offered its own candidate, who was widely endorsed by many nations, stating that is was the nation’s desire, “to ensure that this important post should be occupied by a personality from the developing countries, for whom international cooperation in the fields of science, education and culture is most vital. Since Africa and Latin America have had the privilege of leading this organization,
Pakistan responded to a broadly held view that Asia would now be offered the opportunity of serving in this important office” (UNESCO Executive Board, 1987). The Pakistani delegation went on to cite the importance of equal flow of information – an issue at the heart of the NWICO debate. Responding to this, a Finnish representative expressed an opposing view, stating that in order to truly accomplish the organizational mission, a candidate who supported efforts to have all nations represented (both those departed and those not in membership) would best serve the long-term interests of UNESCO.

The debate was rather heated, and when M’Bow’s candidacy was announced and a situation of divided support presented itself, Pakistan withdrew its candidate to more fully consolidate the votes favoring M’Bow. After a whirlwind of debate, the field of candidates was narrowed to M’Bow and Mayor. Because a majority supported Mayor, the procedure required that Mayor’s name be presented to the delegates for approval or rejection. The final vote, taken by secret ballot, was 30 votes in favor and 20 votes against (UNESCO Executive Board, 1987). Thus began the era of Federico Mayor as director general. The election also signaled that the majority of UNESCO’s member states favored a change in policy – enough to unseat an incumbent candidate.

Executive Board documents generated in the immediate aftermath of Mayor’s ascension to the leadership position detail the first occasions available to the Mayor team to “huddle” and plan for the future. While verbatim accounts of what was said in this meeting were not available, summaries of what was said in the meeting have been analyzed.

The Executive Board voted in agreement of the need to convince the three
departed members to return. It also expressed a firm commitment to return to the foundational mandate of UNESCO and to step aside from the charged topics of the NWICO years. Mayor delivered an impassioned plea to step outside the prevailing logics of state sovereignty, in favor of an approach that looked instead to individuals as the establishing agents of norms and values that would promote peace from the grassroots. He argued that UNESCO was the only international body positioned and able to succeed in this goal. Specific directions were given that UNESCO was to avoid language alienating to U.N. member states – an emphasis for Mayor given the importance of a united direction for the future. Discussion also raised the issue of the need for a U.S. return for budgetary reasons, but it was also the prevailing view that the financial issue was not to be the focus of UNESCO’s efforts (UNESCO Executive Board, 1987). The best place to see this new program enacted is in the subsequently delivered public speeches.

Despite the absence of academic attention to Mayor’s first speech, the one given on the occasion of his installation as Director General, we find a classical example of argumentation theory. It is a speech drafted with a very particular audience in mind. While there are references to particular audiences (such as supporters of the previous direction, supporters of the change in direction, and fence-sitters), under the framework of Perelman’s scheme, the analyst can easily see that it evokes a “universal audience” consisting of all the imagined members of the international community. While the universal audience for Perelman is not a definable entity (made up only in the mind of the orator), the universal audience Mayor first attempts to bring into play is more concrete (though still somewhat difficult to define) and encompasses an assemblage of smaller,
more particular audiences.

Mayor starts with a direct appeal to the foundational mandates of the organization, followed by a direct reference to the need to have the U.S. (and others) return to membership – linking this need to the importance of the mandate. His opening words are a quote from one of the early Directors general of UNESCO – Jaime Torres Bodet, of Mexico, about the importance of the security of the future generations. The resonances with the UNESCO charter are unmistakable when he says, “it is our commitment that determines the future. We are committed to illuminating the paths of tomorrow’s world by promoting education, science and culture. These enduring and unalterable goals and principles must also guide our present decisions, faithfully reflecting maturity, serenity and the spirit of understanding and agreement” (Mayor, Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987).

There are several devices at work in this opening. First, the passage directly accesses the rhetoric of the UNESCO constitution, instantiating its principles as enduring and unalterable, and in so doing directly aligns the organization's historical mission with contemporary guiding lights for present decisions – at root this is, then, an associative logic that collapses the historical interlude by seeking to return UNESCO's work to its moment of origination. In this, Mayor expresses a theme wholly acceptable to his imagined universal audience, since that audience can be readily thought to have accepted the goals and purposes of UNESCO – even if those goals had been far from the center of discussion in previous decades. Second, his use of the words of an early Mexican director general (in fact the only director general to that point, excepting the controversial M’Bow, who was not originally a citizen of a major world power) speak directly to the
audience of supporters still stinging from the defeat of M’Bow – a ploy that recurs in this speech.

The next portion of his speech wastes no time in addressing the most sensitive point of contention for the organization – the departure of three member nations. In another reference to the foundation, Mayor emphasized, “that unity, common vision, and unavoidable striving after the construction of peace in the minds of men,” provided a clear goal for the organization. That goal and, “clear common purpose, both implicitly and explicitly, require the prompt return of the countries that have withdrawn and the inclusion among us of those that have not yet become Members. For if we are united – and only if we are all united – we shall be able to prepare the ground to ensure that the coming millennium can really begin with ‘springs flowing freely and plentiful corn’” (Mayor, Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987). The last phrase uses Bodet’s own language referring to the future generations.

The direct reference to the departures of the U.S., U.K. and Singapore – in only the second paragraph of the speech – coupled with the concept of a required return in order to accomplish the foundational mandate, is a direct association to Perelman’s typology, because the text links the idea of the accomplishment of a mandate everyone accepts, to the return of the departed countries – inferring such a goal could not be accomplished without return. As such, in two paragraphs, Mayor has appealed to a common goal, and then stipulated that the goal is unattainable without everyone’s cooperation.

This argument appealed to those who opposed M’Bow’s controversial (and anti-U.S.) stance. It served to bring in an audience of fence-sitters by galvanizing them behind
a goal that was thought universally acceptable. Finally, it appealed to those who opposed his candidacy for DG by calling for the inclusion of all people and by quoting a previous DG’s statements regarding the need to secure the future of generations to come. The fact that this former DG was from what was then a clearly identified developing nation, appealed to this audience greatly. The fact that it was not the controversial M’Bow made this link acceptable to other audiences.

The issue of audience is again evoked by Mayor’s next topic: that of his controversial election to the DG position. It was a simple transition to carry over the rhetoric of “unity” and “common goals” from a discussion of overall organizational direction to a discussion about his rise to leadership. He refers directly to the “genuinely democratic” nature of the elections that resulted in his taking office (a reference to the norm widely held by the target audience valuing democratic election of leadership) and tells the audience that, “I stand before you today not as the Director-General of one group or another but as the Director-General of all, without exception; the Director-General of all Member States, without distinction, all on a footing of complete equality and with equal regard for all their cultural diversities; everyone’s Director-General, with the independence derived from the absolute figures of vote” (Mayor, Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987). Once again, this is a device used to dissociate from the contention previously at work in UNESCO.

In Perelman’s framework, a speaker will use logical pairs of concepts to dissociate ideas. One of his more commonly used pairs of concepts is the appearance/reality pair. Perelman relates appearance to the top of the logical pairing – what he calls “term I,” or what is apparent, actual, immediate or known directly. The
bottom concept in the pair is usually an opposite to the top. In this case, *reality* is the bottom of the pair, which Perelman calls “term II,” which he says can only be understood by comparison with term I. He says it “results from a dissociation effected within term I with the purpose of getting rid of the incompatibilities that may appear between different aspects of term I” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1968).

With regard to the case at hand, to that point in time, by Mayor’s point of view, the *appearance*, which Perelman would call term I, was that UNESCO was headed in a direction supported by the former Director General (which was the reason the U.S. gave for its departure). Yet, to the audience Mayor was speaking, there had been enough evidence to support that this direction was *reality*, or term II. Even the election of Mayor to his post would not be enough to dissociate what was viewed as reality to the target audience. In order to establish a new direction, Mayor had to reverse the order of the pair by dissociating from the previous direction. He does this by first stating that his election was the consequence of the expression of a majority opinion, promising that because the majority opinion elected him, he would represent everyone. The implication is that the course he would set would be a reflection of the will of the whole, not just “one group or another,” as Mayor puts it.

This is further evidence of Mayor’s attempts at dissociation. What Mayor has done here is an intentional ploy to build a new unity behind the new reality he intends UNESCO to pursue (reversing the appearance/reality pair). By invoking two norms generally accepted by his audience he is both beginning the process of dissociation from NWICO and building the base that would form his universal audience in years to come. The first of these two norms is the value placed on the legitimacy of democratic
processes as speaking for the majority. Also related to this norm is the weight and emphasis placed on every member state being on a “footing of complete equality” – a concept very closely tied to the concept of democracy. Also note the usage of the words “absolute figures of vote.” Clearly, Mayor is associating these principles to his election and using the resulting strength to validate the courses his tenure would pursue.

The second norm invoked is the norm that establishes the importance of UNESCO as an organization and the need for unity in pursuit of common goals. This is a value instilled in those working with UNESCO from the beginning and Mayor uses the concept of unity as a connecting link to the courses he will pursue. The continuing passages of this speech are intended specifically to accomplish this link. As Perelman puts it, “it is the compromise solution to incompatibilities which calls for the greatest effort and is most difficult to justify because it requires a new structuration of reality. On the other hand, once it is established, once the concepts have been dissociated and restructured, compromise tends to appear as the inescapable solution and to react on the aggregate of concepts into which it is inserted” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1968).

The incompatibilities in this case exist between the nations supporting the NWICO movement and the nations who would oppose many concepts of that movement. The situation indeed called for a restructuration of reality, and that meant redefining UNESCO and its direction.

Mayor goes on to offer up the fact that many “outstanding intellectuals throughout the world,” the Secretariat, and many others had encouraged him to “take on this task,” thereby adding to the list of evidence that this course is endorsed by the majority – a majority devoid of U.S. input. Rather than associating with particular factions, Mayor
prefers to cling to the foundational mandate (again, appealing to a sense of organizationally unity), offering up hope that the organization could overcome obstacles in its path, including the “premature disenchantment” of some nations. This tie to the foundation of UNESCO only increases in the next portion of his speech.

After spending time referring to member states, Mayor then addresses the issue direction by distinctly attaching himself (and thus the organization) to the foundational charter by pointing out that “behind the term ‘State,’ which refers to a country’s political and administrative structure, are the people and civic society which are its real historical embodiment. My appeal, my call for a joint effort today concerns them most particularly” (Mayor, Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987). After following up by saying how the individuals that made up the various organizational groups within UNESCO had to work together – regardless of national affiliation – to achieve their goals. The following could not demonstrate any more clearly the point:

In this differing but combined effort, we can all refer to one sure guide, the Constitution of UNESCO, the true Magna Carta of our Organization, whose principles are today as valid, or more so, than when they were established. These principles which the passage of time has confirmed and strengthened are thus for us inviolable and will be, for me, the compass which will determine and guide our action at all times (Mayor, Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987).

Clearly, Mayor intends to use the foundational mandate to dissociate the organization from the charged themes of the previous two decades.

Mayor's argumentative strategy of association/dissociation continues in the next portion of his speech, wherein he uses metaphor to show how his training is exactly what is needed at such a difficult time. Mayor recounts a series of great and unfortunate trends and occurrences that have occurred over the previous thirty years. Many of these
occurrences are scientific in nature – such as species loss, environmental damage, and biological engineering. He lists a great number of trends and events easily recognizable to those present. With that backdrop, he brings in the metaphor:

"My training is that of a scientist, and a scientist is, by definition, a man accustomed to teamwork, in whom boundless hope – of possible discovery or innovation – coexists with the implacable realism of daily experimental practice. The scientist advances only gradually, in a process of accumulating contrasted certainties. But, in his view, far from being the goal at the end of an operation, verification is a new starting point that starts the climb upward once more. This modesty of pace, this need to check the validity and utility of objectives that one sets oneself, will obviously be mine. There can be no others. Modesty and ambition then, as two indissociable dimensions of the one and only aim: to be useful" (Mayor, Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987).

Mayor then compares the qualities of a scientist to the qualities needed in a DG at this particular period in time. The metaphor is designed to paint the perfect picture of a DG as the person trained as a scientist. He goes on to mention that a scientist is also perfectly suited to direct an organization tasked to oversee scientific advances.

The speech does a number of other important things, including the outlining of several obstacles that will need to be overcome in the near future. But the speech's most significant accomplishment is that it interpellates a universal audience to which Mayor will continue to appeal for the rest of his term in office – and indeed the rest of his career to this date. Drawing broadly, again, from the language of the UNESCO charter, Mayor spoke of coming together in a fight worth fighting.

"This symbol of solidarity – of North, South, East and West joining hands – might bring a glimmer of light to the horizon. In this context I call upon all States – and particularly the most developed – to work together in conjunction with numerous associate experts, and to encourage their young people to contribute to one of the boldest transformations for which the world is still calling: the struggle – the only struggle in which we should be called to enlist – against illiteracy, the struggle against ignorance, and the struggle for individual and collective independence"
In order to evoke his universal audience, Mayor first needed to acknowledge the contributions (real or perceived) of his predecessor to appeal to those who have been supporters of the opposition within UNESCO. Healing the divisions within UNESCO was crucial to establishing a unified audience needed to call upon the U.S. to rejoin the fight for which UNESCO was formed. Mayor did this in a personal way, by thanking his predecessor for his tireless service heading up the organization, and by linking himself to M’Bow, noting how much he had learned during his three years as M’Bow’s Deputy Director-General. The combination of this personal linkage, in which Mayor referred to M’Bow as “an African of universal stature,” with the language of change and return to the goals of the creation of UNESCO, Mayor was able to appeal to opposition (especially African) without attaching himself to the charged policies the opposition had pursued.

Indeed, Mayor finishes his speech with one final tribute to the opposition as a gesture of unity and healing, and his gesture spells out clearly how he sees the pieces coming together for the future.

I hope the he (M’Bow) may continue for many years to highlight the most urgent development needs of the peoples. In order that multilateral cooperation may be concentrated on the essential aspects of progress and eliminate those which are harmful. In order that important long-term activities may not constantly be set aside for the most urgent. May he continue for many years to help in making into reality these goals (Mayor, Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987).

Mayor leaves little doubt that he considers worthwhile the pursuits of the opposition, yet more urgent the need to return to “the minds of men.”

In direct interviews with Mayor, perhaps misunderstanding the intent of the questions, Mayor took exception to the inference that the organization changed its rhetoric and used argumentation to begin the process needed to lure the U.S. back in to
It’s not like we bowed down to the demands of the U.S. government. We believed at that time, as I believe now, that having everyone at the table working together – no matter how distasteful one finds the views of those across the table – is the only way to achieve peace. Sure, we backed away from confrontational positions. But we did so to pursue what I still believe is a more important course – teaching people to want peace. Only in that way will States be inclined to pursue peaceful policies. If I didn’t truly believe in the direction we argued in favor of, why would I continue to pursue those goals even outside the auspices of UNESCO?” (Mayor, Former Director-General of UNESCO, 2009).

Mayor then went on to point out that the rhetoric used in his Foundation for a Culture of Peace was nearly identical to much of the rhetoric used during his tenure as DG of UNESCO – a fact that is, indeed, true. He began the foundation in March of 2000, immediately following his departure from UNESCO and used the same language about a culture of peace that was found in UNESCO documents during the time of his term in office.

It must be pointed out – and Mayor himself willingly admits – that much of the ideology behind a “culture of peace” which was the centerpiece of the new direction UNESCO had taken, came from a collaboration between Dr. David Adams, a psychologist from Connecticut who later developed and became director of UNESCO’s Culture of Peace Program, and Father Felipe MacGregor, a Jesuit scholar from Peru. Mayor saw this as the embodiment of the direction he wanted to take UNESCO and brought Adams on board to oversee many programs organized by UNESCO worldwide. Thus, his disagreement with the inference that argumentation was used only with the end of luring the U.S. back into membership.

Mayor punctuated his disagreement with such an assertion by also pointing out that despite his upbringing as a biologist and the many endeavors he could have pursued
in that field, he chose to continue on the path that he felt would make the most difference in the world, drawing the final point that doing so for all these years after his tenure had nothing to do with getting any State to join any organization. Mayor claims to be a “converted disciple” of the ideology “culture of peace” and encouraged me several times to let him get me in touch with Adams to see why he so fully believed in his cause.

But Mayor’s points of disagreement actually serve only to prove my larger claim, and this is revealed in his statement that “while this path was seen as the best route to get the U.S. to agree to return, it also happened to be the right path” (Mayor, Former Director-General of UNESCO, 2009). If the language of this first speech isn’t enough to draw such conclusions, the interview with Mayor certainly confirms that UNESCO was attempting to deconstruct itself from the charged themes that surrounded NWICO. It also confirms that Mayor saw the need to portray a unified front in this effort, and had concluded that a unified front was necessary to add weight to those calling for a U.S. return (and to construct a universal audience, I would argue), all contained within the larger context of his insistence that this unified front was not simply a ploy to get the U.S. to return, but also something necessary to accomplish UNESCO’s goals.

These themes are more fully foregrounded in Mayor's first address given to a strictly U.S. audience, and on U.S. soil. If the model I have sought to elaborate is to hold, Mayor’s speech should clearly be attempting to distance himself from charged themes, recommit to the core values for which UNESCO was formed, call upon a universal audience, and promise great change and a bright future for UNESCO. In fact, his speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on May 9, 1988 does just that.

In the CFR speech, the language of dissociation from the NWICO years is not
subtle, but blatant and present even from the start. Following the obligatory acknowledgement of the superb efforts of the Council of Foreign Relations over the years, he states that the world is in as great a need of the “innovative solutions” the council has been involved with in the past. He then pledges UNESCO’s presence in helping to solve those world issues. “Whatever the situation and however grave the problems, UNESCO would make its contribution to the search for solutions though its fields of competence. I repeat, through its fields of competence: education, science, culture and communication” (Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 1988). This statement establishes from the start that UNESCO intended to be only that for which it was formed without overstepping its bounds – a key issue of concern during the NWICO years.

The next segment of this speech gets right to the point of the whole speech – that UNESCO has returned to the ideals it once was supposed to uphold. He does this by tapping the well-known verbiage of the UNESCO Constitution “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defense of peace must be constructed,” and “that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.” Mayor argues that “this message is still valid today,” and cites recent peaceful developments between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as examples.

Nearly missed at this part of the speech is a direct reference to the audience to which Mayor will seek approval for the duration of his tenure – and would rely on to
provide the weight needed to secure a U.S. return. He attempts to establish a direct link between the mission of UNESCO and this audience when he says, “this peace process will need the support of the international community whose thoughts and actions carry considerable weight and must be directed towards the bringing about the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind” (Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 1988). Note specifically the emphasis on the need for the international community to remain involved and his nod to this community as holding the final relevant power. The discursive choices enact the sort of leverage Krebs speaks of in his model of rhetorical coercion, and Mayor is in this speech (as well as in many others) bolstering the weight of argument as he seeks to frame the issues for his potential audience.

At this point Mayor begins to utilize more direct argumentation techniques to add weight to his case that the U.S. should rejoin. He does this first by restating the fact that he intends to hold UNESCO to the scope of its original mandate. In doing so, he directly references the absence of three important nations:

I am sharing these thoughts with you because, on taking up the duties of Director-General, in a period which has been characterized as one of a crisis of multilateralism, I felt it essential to concentrate on the simple core of mandates, goals and ethics that define UNESCO’s functions. I have taken up my duties at a time when three member states – including the United States of America – have withdrawn from the organization, I none the less do so in a spirit of optimism (Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 1988).

He then mentions again (though for the first time in this venue) his training as a scientist, noting that his training has taught him that no state of affairs, however disturbing, need be permanent – and here Mayor evokes long-held U.S. cultural values, linking those to his own. “I believe that resignation and pessimism are mistaken attitudes and that dreaming and thinking – with a considerable dose of pragmatism – can generally lead to
solutions” (Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 1988). The similarities between these statements, and values embedded in American culture of hard work without giving up can bring about the American Dream are a direct attempt to link with common values of his audience.

Mayor then outlines a string of arguments linking the current mission of UNESCO to goals of common interest in the U.S. He talks about how both would agree on certain multilateral initiatives, such as literacy and education, scientific exploration, and even global, natural and cultural heritage, “for which there is such a great concern both at UNESCO and in the United States,” and says he believes it to be in the best interest of both to continue working together. He next argues that UNESCO has *changed* to assure these goals are at the forefront, stating that, “reform is the order of the day at UNESCO. This has taken concrete shape in the preparation of the organization’s next Medium-Term Plan for the period 1990-1995.” He describes this plan as anchored in a set of unifying concepts based on the notion that UNESCO is acting as a catalyst among the many international actors.

In terms of Perelman’s scheme of dissociation, once again Mayor is attempting to move from appearance (Term I) – or the UNESCO that vigorously pursued NWICO for better than a decade – to a newly constructed reality – or a UNESCO that has changed and he draws upon the action/intention logical pair when he talks about reforms taking “concrete shape” in the form of the organization’s plans. He follows this by addressing another concern of the U.S. – that of management and budgetary difficulties at UNESCO. Yet, while he talks of these issues, he makes it clear that these issues alone would not be enough to make UNESCO useful. To do that, it must “hold fast to its central ethical
All this leads into a discussion of the main point of contention the U.S. had with UNESCO – the free flow on information. Mayor tells his audience that without question UNESCO stands for a free flow of information and the freedom of the individual. To drive this point home, he quotes from the 19th Article of the Declaration of Human Rights, which says: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” If this wasn’t enough to completely dissociate UNESCO from the parts of NWICO the U.S. found so distasteful, he the UNESCO Constitution yet again, which asserts: “The States Parties to this Constitution believing in... the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purpose of mutual understanding and more perfect knowledge of each other’s lives.”

These quotes from the Constitution served two purposes. First, they make it very clear that UNESCO was departing (or dissociating) from its previous course. Second, they served to bind UNESCO to its foundational mandate. One quote came from outside UNESCO, one from UNESCO itself (the Constitution). His clarification addresses the NWICO controversy head-on: “Of course, imbalances in the capacity to communicate exist in the world. Often we see developing countries rich in resources remain poor because they lack the infrastructure to communicate for development. My aim is not to place restrictions on those who have developed powerful systems of communication. It is
to increase the practical communication capabilities of those who need them most
desperately” (Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 1988). This is in stark
counter to the rhetoric and position embraced by the previous DG, who made no excuses
about working to curtail the influence of nations with highly developed media in order to
level the playing field with respect to emerging nations.

Mayor also argues for the importance of collaboration (back-handedly referring to
U.S. membership) in education and science. He suggests that while the U.S. could
participate as an observer in many of UNESCO’s projects, it would only have significant
input if it were collaborating as a member state. Together, he argued, and “emphasizing
action based on mutual interest among all parties, and by focusing on the things that unite
us that we avoid the waste and misunderstandings caused by divisiveness” (Mayor,

The last argument Mayor makes in his speech, refers to the reforms his
organization had undertaken – policies implemented in direct reaction to U.S. criticisms
of mismanagement and budgetary indiscretions. He spends some time pointing out the
managerial changes put in place to correct issues the U.S. has raised during M’Bow’s
tenure. No specifics are addressed in this section – a tactic purposefully used, I believe.
The points of argumentation remain purposely vague. Mayor was unlikely to be criticized
for this vagueness, since he had only recently taken office, and he was likely to receive
credit for addressing the matter at all given the contentious history. The tactic is
rhetorically clever, and while I do not suggest it as a rationalization, it should be noted
that in pointing out general plans for accountability, Mayor must have been aware that his
recent ascension to office provided him some latitude in the minds of his audience. The
point was to argue that changes were underway – another hint to his “reform is the order of the day at UNESCO” rhetoric.

Mayor concludes his speech with an impassioned plea to members of the council to use the power and influence it holds to change the ideas Americans held about UNESCO. He once again links U.S. and UNESCO interests and hints that only with U.S. help will the reforms and goals he has sketched truly occur. His final thoughts encapsulate the public intentions of his speech.

The Council on Foreign Relations has always been promoting a constant process of thinking and rethinking about America’s relationships in the world. It is in this spirit of dialogue and analysis that I hope the Council will help keep minds in the United States open, dispassionate and objective on UNESCO. I maintain that UNESCO sells not bread, but yeast. I sincerely hope that your country will one day soon play its part again in ensuring that our yeast makes the best bread, for everyone’s consumption. In an intellectualized UNESCO, I am convinced your country and other ‘absent parties’ will find renewed interest in what we stand for (Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 1988).

What these two speeches and other documents help establish is that the highest leadership of UNESCO, including the DG himself, recognized that a change in tone, if not direction, was needed. They establish that decisions were made to back away from contention and attempt to bring all nations together in pursuit of UNESCO’s original mandate. Finally they establish firmly the presence of a universal audience in the mind of Mayor, at the very least (along with his comments in interviews), and quite likely, in the minds of the Executive Board.

Many further speeches during the years 1988 to 1990 made similar arguments attempting to delegitimize UNESCO’s association to NWICO – though none were quite as passionate as the first speeches given during Mayor’s tenure in office. But, as Crawford points out in her model, these changes in attitudes and norms do not gain
immediate traction. Time had to pass with continued distance from the unwanted association. Also, the association to a new direction has to be constructed and built to the point where policy begins to take shape.

**Phase Two: Embracing the foundation**

Mayor’s first two years in office (phase one) were dedicated to his articulated recognition that organizational changes were required, including the ascension of Mayor to the DG seat, and the creation of a new rhetorical tone. That tone distanced UNESCO from the NWICO themes and an association or reattachment to foundational values. But, as Crawford points out, such a change in direction takes time to gain momentum. Indeed, in UNESCO’s case, it was necessary to maintain this new rhetorical direction for some time before even the majority of its own members bought in to the change.

Jumping forward to 1990, three years after Mayor’s takeover, UNESCO continued to dissociate itself from the NWICO years. In fact, none of the speeches given by Mayor between 1990 and the time he left UNESCO in 1999 contained the slightest mention of support for themes tied to NWICO. Nearly all, however, included varying degrees of the verbiage analyzed previously, where the variance at any given time depended on the audience being addressed.

One example is a speech given in 1995 to UNESCO delegates at the opening of the first UNESCO Philosophy forum – an event started by Mayor that has endured to this date. If references (or even hints) to previously charged themes of NWICO were to occur, it would be in this speech. The forum wherein it was given was intended to debate philosophy with hopes of coming up with new ways to pursue UNESCO’s philosophical goals. In this speech, Mayor spoke of knowledge on a philosophical level. Once again,
there was no reference to NWICO, or any of its more controversial themes. Rather, the whole speech was dedicated to the very philosophical pairs of argumentation upon which Mayor had been dissociating from the past. Among the best examples of this is his use of the knowledge/thinking pair.

What characterizes human intelligence? Awareness of ends, of ultimate purpose. Hence I dislike the usefulness of the word ‘artificial intelligence’. However sophisticated it may be, advanced technology is of no interest to me if I do not know how it is going to enable people to live better – ‘perfection without purpose’. The importance of knowledge depends on what is done with it. Accumulating knowledge constitutes, when you come to think of it, a dangerous activity: if knowledge can prevent one from deciding or acting, it may also prevent one from thinking (Mayor, Speech to UNESCO Philosophy Forum, 1995).

This is drastically different to the language used during NWICO, though the theme – knowledge and information – was also a driving force of NWICO. But Mayor does draw liberally on his language of unity and common purpose that he established when he first took office. He connects these logical pairs to the reality of the new focus on UNESCO’s long-held foundation.

The consistency of our branches of knowledge can no longer have the characteristic that was guaranteed by the Aristotelian cosmos; it cannot determine a priori and definitively the limits between the thinkable and the unthinkable. Both science and technology are constantly shifting such limits and engendering possibilities that disrupt the order of thinking and the social order alike. We are irreversibly caught up in an open-ended history in which what individuals and society can do is being put to the test (Mayor, Speech to UNESCO Philosophy Forum, 1995).

And with these words, he calls upon UNESCO to perform the function it was created to do – to become a forum for the discussion of these matters as knowledge becomes wisdom. The fact that he applies this logic in areas of UNESCO’s competence – namely science, culture and communication provides a strong link to the reality he had worked so hard to establish beginning eight years before this speech.
Another example of the continued use of argumentation throughout the second phase of this transition comes in a speech given by Mayor to the International Conference on Culture of Peace and Governance in Mozambique in 1997. Along with the standard language referring to education in the “minds of men” being necessary to thwart war, this speech provides an excellent example of Mayor’s continued call to return to the basics for which UNESCO was founded.

As the century ends, we must now fully honor the promise made in 1945. All parliaments of the world, all people and parties should say: violence has failed. We are ending the century with advanced technology but also with very advanced forms of rapid destruction. It has been a century of war, of suffering, of violation of human rights and it is still so today. The coming generations must be allowed to enjoy life in a culture of peace and dialogue. We have to be convinced the mission of UNESCO is feasible. Only by fulfilling that mission, by building peace in the minds of men and women, will we prevent future generations from knowing the horror of war (Mayor, Speech to International Conference on Culture of Peace and Governance, 1997).

In this speech, Mayor is referring to clearly established concepts that knowledge and peace are inseparably linked. More importantly, he continues to preach the doctrine of the promises made in 1945, when UNESCO was founded. The premise is that the founders got it right, but that UNESCO and the nations of the world had failed to see the value (especially during the NWICO years). This is another reference to the appearance/reality pair and more strongly reinforces the links to the new reality. Clearly, Mayor is continuing, and strengthening the ideology he established in the early years of his tenure – continuing to invoke the universal audience he called into being years before.

Likewise, Executive Board meetings continually evaluated UNESCO’s progress during this second phase of returning to its mandate. Logically, those meetings also
evaluated progress towards convincing the departed member states to return. But all documents appear to indicate that the chief architect in this new vision was Mayor, himself.

Mayor succeeded in 1990 in getting both the U.S. and the U.K. to perform an evaluation of UNESCO for the purpose of gauging how close these states might be to returning. While the results were not what Mayor was hoping for, they do indicate clearly that phase two in Crawford’s model is in full swing. The evidence makes clear that the organization's direction has noticeably changed, but also that not all member states have accepted the new direction. This concern and some others prompted both countries to resist, for the time being at least, renewed membership in UNESCO. The UNESCO archives contain copies of correspondence between Mayor and the U.S. Observer Mission at UNESCO that confirm this fact. When Mayor was informed of this decision, he was also sent a copy of a report drafted by U.S. officials who had undertaken an independent evaluation of UNESCO. This report is also found in the archives and contains independent confirmation, from outside the organization, that a second argumentative phase is underway.

In the report, the U.S. explains the reasons it withdrew in the first place and describes the perceived success this withdrawal has had so far on UNESCO policy. It concludes that returning to membership so soon after leaving would invalidate its previous stance and likely result in reversal of the positive changes so recently enacted: “While United States non-membership has spurred some reform activity at UNESCO, there is much more that needs to be accomplished in order for UNESCO to be considered as the organization intended by its founders” (Miller, 1990). The report also refers to the
recent U.K. decision not to seek reentry as confirming evidence that the U.S. position is appropriate.

The report also specifically recognizes that UNESCO has begun a process of change – beginning with the DG. “The Director General has made known his desire to see UNESCO reformed. We are confident that he is sincere in his expressions of desire to see the United States rejoin the organization. UNESCO has not succeeded, however, in translating his assurances into concrete measures of reform” (Miller, 1990). The report then mentions a number of issues illustrative of U.S. concern with respect to activities at UNESCO, mostly concerning budgetary and management issues, which one might add have subsequently proved inconsequential to the larger issues at hand (and, in fact, these concerns remain even to this day).

Two of these issues, however, are of vital relevance as they provide evidence of phase two in Crawford’s model as applied to UNESCO. The first of these issues (and least important, though related indirectly to NWICO) concerns the U.S. perception that UNESCO is anti-Israel and supportive of the PLO. The document claims that UNESCO resolutions have been heavily biased against Israel and, “often based on false accusations,” have continued to be adopted even after the organization itself has tried to distance itself from the NWICO years – continued evidence (according to the U.S.) that the U.S. voice will be drowned out by a persistent majority of developing nations speaking from ideologically charged positions. The report cites this as evidence that the organization has not fully succeeded in its change in direction. In fact, later on, the document goes so far as to say that, “The leverage we retain as a sought-after non-member in some instances is greater than we would wield simply by being one vote
among 161 others” (Miller, 1990). The report also cites the appointment of a high-level “Coordinator for Cooperation with Palestine” as an example of UNESCO giving special status to Palestine – which wasn’t even a recognized state - exceeding that of any member state (Miller, 1990).

The second issue the report offers as an example is the issue of communication – the critical matter raised by NWICO. The report states that the U.S. is “deeply concerned” about palpable similarities which is says exists between the current text on communications and the documents which proceeded it over a fifteen year span. It states that additional references have been inserted regarding freedom and independence of the press, but says that it is “undeniable that critical elements to which the United States most strongly objected in the past are still present,” and that the UNESCO program on communications remains one in which freedom of the press and of expression are balanced against the desires of governments to control the flow of information to and from their citizens. Recall that this was a crucial goal for the U.S. in combating communist ideology – still a sore spot in 1990.

The following quote from the document has the most relevance to this discussion:

Moreover, the so-called New World Information and Communication Order is still perceived by the Third World UNESCO delegates as an ‘article of faith’ with them and as ‘a continuing and evolving process’ (Miller, 1990).

This quote shows that while UNESCO had begun to deconstruct its association with NWICO, the message had not, as yet, fully reached critical mass with all of its membership. Perhaps this is due to the continued presence of the Cold War, but more likely it is evidence that the phases defined by Crawford are valid and that this one had not quite surpassed phase two and that policy changes were still in their infancy related to
this new direction.

The report concludes with bulleted points adopted by Congress as official policy with regard to UNESCO. While nearly all these points have been reviewed earlier in this chapter, one bullet point confirms that the Soviet Union – through Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze – had taken responsibility for much of the “exaggerated ideological approach” that undermined tolerance intrinsic to UNESCO, and expressed the U.S. hope that Soviet policy would improve in this regard as a result. I take this point as offering confirming evidence that Cold War ideological pressure itself was not the sole cause of the U.S. withdrawal – and that by the same token the promise of improved Soviet policy also was not enough to prompt a U.S. return.

Executive Board documents from 1990-1992 show that discussion took place within the UNESCO leadership about the organization's direction. It is quickly apparent to any reader that much less contention then existed within the leadership, and this after less than five years change in the DG. The progress toward convincing the U.S. to return to membership is still a frequent topic, but mostly the discussion centers on other policy matters – and, importantly, how these efforts fit the overall goals of the organization.

At the same time, public speeches given by Mayor continued to utilize the same language as before – that is putting emphasis on themes that were much more universally acceptable – and all completely avoiding charged themes. The language used in every speech is laced with tones of cooperation and mutual benefit – always referring back to the UNESCO Constitution, the founders of UNESCO, or similar language used by prominent people for the audience to whom he is speaking.

Nearly as important as the words used in the speeches is the frequency of
speaking engagements taken on by Mayor – and the diversity of audiences to whom he spoke. During this time, Mayor accepted nearly twice as many speaking invitations as he had in the previous two years. Many of these engagements were in the U.S. or U.K. – reflective of his continuing great effort to reach as many in the most relevant countries to his agenda as he could. Mayor spoke to associations of scientists and appealed to their desire to collaborate scientifically with the rest of the world. He spoke to press associations and appealed to their desire for greater freedom of the press and protection from censorship by telling them about the many initiatives UNESCO had accomplished (or planned to tackle). He spoke to advocacy groups about their areas of interest. He spoke to at the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage and praised the Americans who helped start the projects on world heritage, while also speaking of how much UNESCO had planned to continue this important project. Always he used language tied to UNESCO’s foundation and associated that language with current or planned efforts. However, now, nearly missing from every speech were references to the departure of the U.S. It appears that Mayor made his big push immediately after taking office and let the arguments about UNESCO’s progress speak for themselves.

In speeches to the UNESCO General Conference, Mayor consistently spoke of all nations coming to the table to work for a common goal. Gone were the references to budgetary fallout from the U.S. departure. Resource shortage was still mentioned, but this was seldom connected to the U.S. absence. This is a technique used to distance UNESCO from any self-served interest in bringing back the U.S. into membership. That they needed U.S. monetary contributions and had to do more with less was a foregone conclusion and pointing to that fact only associated the new direction to attempts to bring the U.S. back.
In 1992 the U.S. had a change in the presidency with the Republicans, who opposed UNESCO, being replaced by Democrats in the White House under Bill Clinton. It was also during this time that the end of the Cold War began to be much more of a reality than a dream. All this attachment to UNESCO’s foundation – without attachment to the U.S. return – was necessary to drive home the point to the universal audience (particularly the developing nations who once supported NWICO) that this course of action would be more productive and that NWICO was no longer a topic of discussion.

In interviews with Mayor, he often referred to this period as the first sign that a U.S. return might be a real possibility. Mayor cultivated a close association with Clinton and worked hard to provide whatever the new American president needed regarding UNESCO. It was during this period that major programs that were directly tied to the foundation of UNESCO were started. Multiple initiatives for human rights were conceived during this time period – most of which finally came to fruition around the year 2000 in connection with the Millennial Declaration of Human Rights. Such a working relationship led to what Mayor said was an “agreement from President Clinton that the U.S. would return to membership in UNESCO as soon as logistically possible” (Mayor, Former Director General of UNESCO, 2007). Mayor referred to a letter he received from Clinton in which Clinton recognizes the progress UNESCO has made and, more importantly, the ideals it stands for. He said that in the letter, Clinton promised a return to UNESCO, but hinted that return might not be possible under the Republican-controlled Congress who would have to approve the return since a return meant budgetary expenditures. By Mayor’s accounting, all the proof of ideological change in UNESCO had been accomplished in the eyes of his administration by the year 1998, but
the major hurdle would be proof of better management to justify investing American money in the organization once again – and that proof was mostly demanded by Republicans in Congress.

What we can see through the documents is that between 1990, when the U.S. refused to return, and 1999 at the end of Mayor’s time as DG of UNESCO, the rhetoric of universality and getting back to the foundational principles had fully set in and become embraced. This is not only the case with the specific particular audience of the U.S. government, but also the case with the general membership inside UNESCO.

While it cannot be proven that all member companies gave up on their desires of NWICO and accepted wholly the new direction dictated by the UNESCO Constitution a few things lead us to that logical conclusion. First, there is a distinct absence of contention in the Executive Board – something that hadn’t been the case almost since the organization was founded – meanwhile the board spoke often and openly about the new direction and the progress in recovering former member states. Second, the language of dissociation from UNESCO virtually disappeared during this time. No longer was UNESCO openly trying to distance itself from NWICO so much as it was trying to establish its new course. It spent less time overtly defending the legitimacy of its change – through techniques like constantly speaking of only working in its area of competence – and more time promoting what it actually was doing. It spent less time defending budgetary practices – and what it could not do – and more time speaking about what it actually could do. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, all the voting on medium and long-term plans for the organization passed rather easily through the general membership with only regional quarrels rather than large scale ideological ones.
And so we come to the point in time, where I argue that this argumentation process shifts from Crawford’s second phase to that of the third phase – the phase in which more concrete policy begins to take shape. This is the phase in which the balance of capabilities between the previously dominant norm (those associated with NWICO) began to change in favor of the newly suggested norm (or in this case, re-suggested, because it was suggested, though never truly acted upon, after World War II). A major point in this argument is the fact that the U.K. made the decision to return to membership in 1997, saying that UNESCO had truly reformed and that the world was embracing that reform. But the key point in favor of this argument is the changing of Directors General at UNESCO in 1999.

**Phase Three: Vision Turns to Action**

In 1999, the UNESCO Executive Board elected Koichiro Matsuura, from Japan, as the new Director General of UNESCO. Although Executive Board documents for this won’t be accessible for another nine years and thus we can only access individual accounts of the event, all indications were that this was a move not to change the ideology of UNESCO, but to provide more efficient management of the organization. One person working at UNESCO, and present for this transition, spoke of the change. “Ideaology of UNESCO didn’t change when Matsuura took over, in fact it hasn’t changed to this day. But the leadership was looking for someone who could provide credibility in management without giving up our principles. Many felt Mayor had sufficient time to make change and had done so in ideology, but wasn’t doing so in management.”

(Coutelle, 2009) Given the U.S. concerns about management of resources (and accusations of cronyism), and the need to improve in this area to eliminate it as a reason
for the U.S. to remain apart, the change to Matsuura was a logical step.

If the UNESCO case is to continue to map on to Crawford’s three phases of change, this third phase must be characterized not only by a continuance of the new ideology, but also by the beginning of policy changes and more concrete action supporting the newly accepted ideology. The installation of Matsuura as DG, along with his subsequent public acceptance of the organization’s ideological direction evidences the beginning of this third phase. Coutelle’s comments indicated a growing sense that not enough was being done tangibly to pursue this accepted ideology. And so, UNESCO brings on what it deemed the embodiment of efficient policy management – Matsuura. To map UNESCO to Crawford’s model – third phase – we also need to show some action being taken.

To show how Matsuura’s election as DG signals the beginning of the third phase (along with his embracing the established ideology), I will examine his inaugural speech at the UNESCO General Conference in 1999. Matsuura’s speech at his installation as DG demonstrated two things: a commitment to continue the ideological direction established by his predecessor, and an absolute determination to slim down and make more effective the programs overseen by UNESCO – both of which are critical to map this case to Crawford’s model.

As to the ideological direction, Matsuura, made it clear he was going to pursue the exact same course as Mayor – with his own particular flair. His speech spoke of his childhood witnessing the horrors of war in Japan – and how this made him determined to seek a life of public service and commitment to avoid such travesties. He spoke directly to multiple cultures as he told of his appreciation for all cultures. He quoted texts from
different religious backgrounds. Then he spoke of the current needs of the world with which UNESCO had competency, specifically mentioning literacy, education, poverty, overpopulation, science and communication. He links these with the vision of the founders of UNESCO. “Of course our world picture should not be painted so dark. Since 1946, much headway has been made. The prophetic creators of UNESCO foresaw the foundations of our world body becoming ever more democratic: that is, enshrining ‘the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect’ of all human beings, as stated in the founding document” (Matsuura, Speech to UNESCO General Conference, 1999).

Matsuura goes on to speak about how much potential UNESCO has to aid the progress of globalization by being a source of answers to the challenges globalization presents. He speaks as well of an international community as being an important part of the answers the world needs. This is parallel to the audience Mayor worked so hard to convince during his tenure.

Then Matsuura goes into the area of his special focus – that of management. “But criticisms, not all of them unfair, have been leveled against this great instrument: and failings, where verified, must be made good. The purpose of sound management is, again, no end in itself, but a duty: to ensure that our institution fully discharges its great task as a true world service, responsible and accountable to the world – and to the world’s taxpayers” (Matsuura, Speech to UNESCO General Conference, 1999).

Plainly, the new DG was ready to follow the establish course of his predecessor – though he intended to do so in a more efficient manner. Although the election of Matsuura was relatively without controversy, his immediate actions upon taking office
were not. Mayor was a popular leader among UNESCO personnel and interviews with those present at that time confirmed simply that his ideology had become effective and accepted nearly universally. Thus, when Matsuura dismissed 20 senior advisers and suspended more than 120 promotions and appointments that his predecessor put in place before he left, it caused a great deal of tension inside UNESCO headquarters. The moves provoked staff protests and even a short hunger strike. But Matsuura knew these moves would be contentious – and his speech directly to the Secretariat office reflected his awareness of the strain his moves would cause. But the speech also reflects the depth of the acceptance Mayor’s ideology had gained.

This speech to the Secretariat – over which the DG presides – was intended to unite the organization behind the values it already believed in, while at the same time make them aware of some drastic administrative decisions that had to be made. In an air of unprecedented openness, Matsuura introduced himself to the staff and spoke of his dedication to the ideals that UNESCO stands for. He also connected with many of them by calling France his “second home” where his two sons were born. He then called upon the collective values of the staff. “Let us think about what our collective strength represents – the strength of collective intelligence, our know-how and, above all, our conviction. I know that you are all still totally devoted to the ideals of UNESCO, even if lately some of you have questioned them in light of fear of cutbacks. Let us try to think together what our potential, without these fears, could achieve if it were all concentrated in the same direction” (Matsuura, Speech to UNESCO Secretariat, 1999). He then proceeds to tell them that the member states – their acknowledged bosses – have demanded some order be put into “the House.” He refers to the challenges the staff has
faced with cutbacks, lack of resources, and – brazenly admits – from “a lack of authority, to use the word in its true sense.”

At no time does he deny the direction Mayor has taken the organization – in fact he professes to believe in it and encourages others not to stray from it. He unites both the ideological ground and the need for better management practices by saying that, “and yet – and here is the whole mystery of this Organization and its mission so well articulated by my predecessor – you still believe in it. I must tell you that I also believe in it. There is something here, in UNESCO, that is unique, outstanding and magical, which can spur people in unprecedented efforts. To achieve our goal, however, we must trust first in common sense, justice, order, balance and responsibility. I hope to add these principles to the ones that have united us for the past decade” (Matsuura, Speech to UNESCO Secretariat, 1999). Clearly there is evidence of the work previous principles of argumentation have accomplished in bringing UNESCO into a place where it was much more likely to accomplish the return of the U.S. to membership. We see in the previous words evidence that phase two has been achieved and that the organization is ready for organized policy to result out of the new beliefs.

The rest of Matsuura’s speech details changes that are to come – requesting the support of the Secretariat in some of the painful changes that will be to come. But he closes with his reference to the audience that is critical in the goal to convince the U.S. to return to membership. “I wish to reaffirm my commitment, taken before the Member States in General Conference, in this very hall, to serve the international community to the utmost of my ability, in accordance with the Constitution of UNESCO” (Matsuura, Speech to UNESCO Secretariat, 1999).
These speeches are used purely as examples to map this time period, beginning with the installation of Matsuura, to the third phase in Crawford’s model. There is no longer much evidence of the more elaborate argumentation campaign directed at the United States specifically during these speeches. As I have argued earlier, the success of that campaign left little doubt in the minds of most of the international community that a U.S. return to UNESCO was inevitable. As such, most of Matsuura’s speeches continued accepting the same ideology as Mayor, but focused much more on practical policy issues designed to be the final argument in the case for a U.S. return.

Which leaves us with only the task of showing the policy moves related to the foundational language of UNESCO – essential to Crawford’s third phase. It would be a lengthy task indeed to outline all policies and documents UNESCO produced during a single year – let alone during the tenure of a single DG. Nevertheless, there are a few very noteworthy policies that came out of UNESCO during the latter part of Mayor’s tenure, but more specifically, during Matsuura’s tenure, which separate this period from previous ones. If Mayor’s tenure could be described as one of many public speeches attempting to define the organization, Matsuura’s tenure could just as easily be defined as one of many official declarations and policy implementation.

One policy directly related to this new ideology is the “Declaration and Program of Action for a Culture of Peace” mentioned earlier. This is based on the document Mayor tasked Adams to complete in the early part of his tenure. The fruits of these labors began to appear just as Mayor was leaving office. In October, 1999 UNESCO came out with the official document accepted by the General Conference. That same month, it was presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations and ratified. This document
officially recognized UN resolutions UNESCO had worked hard to pass – specifically the proclamation that the year 2000 would be the “International Year for the Culture of Peace” and that the decade 2000-2010 would be the “International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World.” This UNESCO document – ratified by the U.N. – defined a culture of peace and gave policy recommendations for member nations to enact in order to foster a culture of peace. This was a comprehensive document. It gave suggestions in the following areas: fostering a culture of peace through education, promote sustainable economic development and social development, promote respect for human rights, ensure equality between women and men, foster democratic participation, advance understanding, tolerance and solidarity, support participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge, and to promote international peace and security. The document took each of these areas and gave specific examples of how states could implement the concepts. To the eye of the informed observer, this document represents the center of the argumentative campaign to convince the U.S. to return – at least insofar as ideology is concerned.

Another policy move taken at roughly this same time period (1999-2000) is the formation of the UNESCO “Department of Education for a Culture of Peace.” This UNESCO group was tasked with overseeing all activities related to the International Decade proclamation mentioned earlier. Adams was appointed to lead this group.

In 2002, UNESCO implemented a strategy for an international program on democracy. The overall theme of the democracy program is “democracy, culture and peace.” It contains three main areas of action: fostering comparative analytical research on democracy and its relationship to culture; organizing international dialogues and
prospective analysis on the future of democracy; and supporting democracy in post-conflict societies.

Many other programs were formed in the years immediately following Matsuura’s installation as DG. In 2000, UNESCO formed the Human Rights Program, including a program for gender equality and another for the advancement of human rights. In 2004, UNESCO sponsored the first world forum on the Advancement of human rights. Also during this time period, UNESCO added to the Philosophy forum Mayor had started by hosting a “philosophy day.” The first was held at UNESCO headquarters in 2002. Shortly thereafter, UNESCO started the Network of Women Philosophers. Other specific resolutions or programs enacted during this time period include programs on poverty eradication, HIV prevention, the fight against discrimination, and the education of children in need.

The list of programs implemented directly attached to UNESCO’s foundational mandate during this period is substantial and represents the fruits of the philosophical labors started by Mayor. Clearly, 1999 to the present shows significant progress needed to map a third stage in Crawford’s model. The trend continues even today. The formation of an “Alliance of Civilizations,” multiple projects on world heritage, and initiatives UNESCO is involved with such as the World Summit for the Information Society, all show action and movement on UNESCO’s goals that were missing during (and immediately following) the NWICO years.

All of this leads up to the period in which sufficient momentum in the argumentation campaign to convince the U.S. to return to membership had been achieved.
CHAPTER 5
Implications and Conclusion

After a long struggle, UNESCO accomplished its goal of convincing the U.S. to return to membership in 2003 under President George W. Bush. The decision was welcomed by the international community and, though expected, the timing was a bit surprising to many journalists and members of the international community who had seen the U.S. pursue unilateralist policies ever since its departure in 1985. In fact, the pursuit of unilateral foreign policy had only increased in the years leading up to the U.S. return – and would continue with the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

The international community greeted the U.S. announcement that it would return to UNESCO as a positive indicator of American interest in international endeavors. Announcing the move, Bush utilized language derived directly from the UNESCO foundation as he spoke to the UN. “America will participate fully in its mission to advance human rights, tolerance and learning” (Bush, 2002). Bush acknowledged that UNESCO had reformed its finances, bureaucracy and political focus to be a leaner, more efficient organization – and gave credit for the changes to Matsuura, although the ideological direction UNESCO had taken clearly had commenced under the tenure of Mayor.

UNESCO organized a targeted argumentative campaign to induce the United States to return to membership. It made a concerted effort to dissociate itself from the contentious ideology of the NWICO years and associate itself with more widely accepted ideology of its charter. All the documents analyzed from the years during which the United States absence was most heavily argued indicate that Neta Crawford's model
applies in the case of UNESCO. From the position of a communication scholar and a constructivist in international relations, there is already an abundance of evidence that the argumentation used by UNESCO was successful in its ultimate goal.

The problem, seen from the perspective of traditional international relations scholarship, is that it is finally impossible to prove that UNESCO’s change in ideology and argumentation convinced the U.S. government that a return was in its best interest. The counter-claim would be that the U.S. found some tactical advantage in returning – that it stood to gain substantially by a return. In fact, some IR scholars might argue that the U.S. returned in order to offset the outcry its unilateral actions against Iraq would soon provoke. But this is where Krebs’ model is so insightful – and where the documents examined in this dissertation help to reveal rhetorical elements that might not have been noticed otherwise by traditional scholars of international relations.

Krebs points to three parties involved in his model – a claimant (UNESCO), an opposition (the U.S. government), and an audience to whom both parties must appeal. I have argued that the audience, as applied to Krebs’ model in this case, was the wider international community. UNESCO's leadership, especially its Director General (Mayor) went to great lengths to invoke this audience – along the lines of Chaim Perelman’s concept of a “universal audience.” I have also argued that Matsuura took great care to maintain the existence of this audience – both by calling upon it in his inaugural speech, and by acknowledging it in his communication to his Secretariat. In fact, Matsuura counted upon the existence and cohesiveness of this audience to combat the opposition he would face upon implementation of staff cutbacks. His attempts were intended to build on this ideology – already existent and long agreed to by many in the international
community – by adding to it a sense of competent management, which was the only remaining item of contention expressed by the U.S. government.

Perhaps the best argument in favor of the existence of such a universal audience – and that UNESCO has succeeded in changing the normative beliefs of this audience – is the return of the U.K. to membership in 1997. In interviews with Mayor, he frequently expressed regret that he was unable to achieve the U.S. return during his tenure. But he said the course he commenced eventually resulted in a U.S. return, and he proudly spoke of the return of the U.K. as convincing evidence that there was hope for the universal ideals he clearly holds. “Maybe the United States didn’t officially come back to membership while I was Director General. But I have letters signed by many U.S. government leaders saying that they would return as soon as it were possible to pass the action through the Congress. This, to me, is nearly as good as a return – even if it happened after I left. It was just politics stopping a return. But England came back much earlier, so we must have gotten something right. They, perhaps, just didn’t have as strong a conservative resistance” (Mayor, 2009).

In fact, while outside the scope of this dissertation, a study of the return of the U.K. to UNESCO might be nearly as valuable as the current work. In documents at UNESCO headquarters, correspondence between Mayor and U.K. government officials clearly point to the existence of a wider international normative consensus to which the U.K. felt it had to respond. “It is evident in the decade since we left UNESCO, that substantial progress has taken place in eliminating politicization in UNESCO policy. Its leadership clearly supports the free flow of information, but more impressively seems to have the international community galvanized behind initiatives in its area of competence.
Since we have always believed in these goals, we feel compelled to participate fully in UNESCO’s future” (Howell, 1997). Although the letter also insisted that budgetary and management principles still required resolution, it said that the U.K. was willing to help with reform from within rather than as an outsider. In fact, the letter said that the work UNESCO was beginning to accomplish was “too important” to allow it to continue without British input as a member.

If, then, this audience had been called into action, and a major nation like the U.K. used its existence as a reason for returning, it stands to reason that the same might also be true of the United States. Why, then, would the U.S. wait five more years to return? The answer to this question is quite complex. First, one must recognize the substantial opposition to anything associated with the U.N. (e.g., Shawn, 2006) exists to this day in the United States. Much of this opposition is focused on the dubious management and budgets of UN organizations – and in many cases is well justified. This alone can help explain the delay in rejoining until a Director General was elected who appeared to set things in order. As late as only one year prior to the United States' return to UNESCO, it was still reporting lack of progress in this regard (Schaefer, 2001), but even this fact may only provide further evidence of the power of argumentation.

The U.S. returned even despite concerns over how its money would be spent. It recognized the position UNESCO had placed it in by reforming its ideology. The mere fact that a Director General perceived as competent in this area was overseeing the reform proved finally enough for the U.S. government. This move eliminated the last leg the U.S. had to stand upon if it wanted to continue to remain apart from UNESCO. It is important to recall that this was part of the strategy of the Executive Board when it
elected Matsuura. This pressure of budgetary concerns in U.N. affiliated organizations was not nearly so prevalent in the U.K., which tends to be less unilateral in policy than the U.S.

Second, the U.S. likely waited longer than the U.K. to return because it saw a need to time a return to gain maximum advantage. Previously cited documents have pointed to a U.S. desire to gain the most it could out of a return – even though the decision was widely recognized as inevitable. “The United States had been edging back toward the Paris-based organization since the Clinton administration, but the Bush team chose its moment to focus maximum international attention on the formal reconciliation” (Fitchett, 2002). This is also evidentiary of the U.S. recognizing the presence and power of the international community. It wanted to focus as much attention as possible from the international community upon this move, a fact confirmed by the chosen announcement date, on the one-year anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks.

What we have, then, is a U.S. government “coerced,” or at least nudged, by international pressure into a decision to return. This decision was essentially taken during the Clinton administration, as Mayor has stated in interviews, but acted upon at a time most beneficial to the U.S. image. The return was heralded by the international community as a sign of hope that the U.S. could sit at the same table and dialogue with people whose views it found distasteful – all of which signifying that UNESCO’s efforts to change the direction of international dialogue were successful. It is also a case in which Krebs’ model for coercion appears to apply on a larger scale than even he intended. Perhaps this is an isolated example of his model on a worldwide stage – or perhaps there may be other examples to be found.
All this raises an important final question: If UNESCO (or other international organizations) has the power to shape the global agenda through their argumentation, to set that agenda in motion, to rally the international community (which we have seen to hold a measure of influence) behind its agenda, and in the process bring on board nations who have reason to object, what more might it be able to accomplish within its areas of competence? Could it achieve true international cooperation in environmental concerns by using the same principles of argumentation – trackable through the stages of Crawford’s model? What about scientific endeavors? Many documents in UNESCO archives hint that catastrophes like tsunamis could be mitigated if all nations were able to coordinate and share data properly. What about the challenges of cultural diversity? Could UNESCO employ the same methods to bring everyone together on the contentious issue of intellectual property? The possibilities for international consensus are considerable.

This research is but a beginning in what promises to be a fertile field of investigation. It offers contribution to many fields of study. One significant contribution is offered to both scholars of argumentation and scholars of international relations. This contribution is seen in the discussion of the universal audience. To scholars of argumentation, the application of the universal audience in this research is something that warrants further exploration. For Perelman, the universal audience is constituted only in the mind of the speaker. However, this research has shown that UNESCO, beginning with Mayor, invoked a universal audience made up of members of the international community and associated with UNESCO. In fact, the language of UNESCO’s Charter invokes this audience and was used effectively by Mayor (and later by Matsuura) to great
effect. This audience is referred to numerous times in the speeches of both directors
general. The idea that a universal audience could be constituted more concretely than in
the mind of the speaker is worth exploration.

To international relations scholars, the universal audience is a noteworthy
contribution to the work of scholars like Krebs. Recall that Krebs says his model is valid
mostly on smaller scale cases (regional, or perhaps smaller nations) as opposed to the
complexities of international organizations. The presence of a universal audience could
increase the scale to which Krebs’ model may be applied. This research also adds to the
growing body of work by constructivists struggling to gain increased credibility in a field
dominated by realists and liberalists. It gives added weight to social and rhetorical
elements usually rejected by these traditions. It fits well into the research done by Barnett
staking a claim for the power of social and rhetorical elements in international
organizations.

Also, this study is a valid contribution to scholars of both international relations
and argumentation because it is an example of an organization that changed the rules.
Specifically, Mayor succeeded in changing the standards by which UNESCO was to be
judged. His use of argumentation ingeniously, and subtly changes the rules. Before,
UNESCO was judged by the standards of the time – sustainable development. This was
how the organization was judged by the majority. States looked at UNESCO as
successful in terms of how it could help member states develop – and states came to the
table at UNESCO expecting as much. UNESCO’s pursuit of the policies associated with
NWICO (and most of the MacBride Report) are evidence of this. Mayor succeeded in
changing how UNESCO was to be judged. Cleverly, he got the organization and the
international community to shift its focus away from member states (at least beyond mere membership) and on the individuals that made up those member states. He had the language of the UNESCO Constitution to back him in this endeavor. This language, which says, “that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.” Cleverly removes the focus from politicized elements associated with governments of states and places it squarely upon individual people. He spoke many times of how states are really just made up of many individuals and that “to change states, we need to change individuals.” In this manner, Mayor changed the rules on how UNESCO would be judged. Doing so astutely removed from UNESCO all possibility of being politicized. Doing so also took issues of budget and spending out of focus. This is significant for both argumentation and international relations scholars.

To the field of international communication, this research offers a more fitting conclusion to the NWICO years, which simply faded out of the picture. It could serve as a starting point for any research looking to track where those issues stand today. In addition, this research could open up new applications for the use of framing theory. The framing of arguments to the point where a superpower can be swayed is an intriguing possibility.

Areas for future research

There are many avenues for future research based on the work in this dissertation. Perhaps the next step would be to do an analysis of mass media accounts of the
withdrawal and return of the U.S. The intent of this research would be to see if the formation of the universal audience, as well as the strategies of dissociation were picked up by the main-stream media. Was the rhetoric picked up in the same way as in communication coming from UNESCO? Along the same lines would be to study communication within the U.S. Congress to track how this rhetoric was picked up and used. Were there any references made to the universal audience?

Also, though this is not an exhaustive list of possibilities for future research, it would be a valuable quest to examine the U.K. return to membership in the same way – and to compare with findings about the U.S. return. The same holds true for the departure and return of Singapore. The argumentation used at UNESCO held that the participation of all countries is important to the organization’s mission. It would be fascinating to look at strategies (if any) used to convince Singapore to return (which happened only recently, in 2008).

Finally, it seems of value to examine other international organizations struggling for acceptance – or embroiled in controversy – to see how they are positioning themselves with respect to a potential universal audience. A couple of organizations that come to immediate attention to communication scholars would include the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). WIPO, in particular, would be of interest to communication scholars tracking issues of intellectual property and culture.

In my opinion, this type of research is particularly suited to UNESCO as an organization because rhetorical and argumentation analyses are the best tools to evaluate a forum organization. Dialogue between nations is at the heart of UNESCO, and what
better tools to track dialogue than those communications scholars bring to the table? In a world facing tough challenges, of which many are within UNESCO’s areas of competency, continued evaluation of dialogue may provide even further insight into how international organizations can play an increased role in shaping the world.
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