Empire of the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and Pan-Islam under British Surveillance, 1865-1926

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EMPIRE OF THE HAJJ: PILGRIMS, PLAGUES, AND PAN-ISLAM UNDER BRITISH SURVEILLANCE, 1865-1926

by

MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER LOW

Under the Direction of Stephen H. Rapp

ABSTRACT

From roughly 1865 to 1926, the forces of European imperialism brought the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca under the scrutiny of non-Muslim interests. The driving force behind this dramatic change was the expansion of the British Empire’s maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean basin. With the development of steamship travel and the opening of the Suez Canal, colonial authorities became increasingly involved in the surveillance of seaborne pilgrims. During this period, the hajj came to be recognized as both the primary conduit for the spread of epidemic diseases, such as cholera and plague, and a critical outlet for the growth of Pan-Islamic networks being forged between Indian dissidents, pilgrims, and the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the British and Ottoman empires engaged in a struggle for control of the hajj, which would ultimately reshape both the hajj and the political landscapes of the Middle East and South Asia.

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MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER LOW

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EMPIRE OF THE HAJJ: PILGRIMS, PLAGUES, AND PAN-ISLAM

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Georgia State University
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To the barefooted believer who, 
trapped in the toils of existence, 
remains thirsty for Zamzam

To the awakened soul who, 
having seen the vision of an umma 
rising from the plain of Arafat, 
remains locked out of the Haram

To the son of Abraham who, 
having declared the liberation from idols 
of the East and West, 
is forced to silent obedience 
before the gatekeepers of the Ka'ba

To the daughter of Hagar who 
Cannot find her footprints

To the sister of Khadija who 
Searches her threshold in vain

To the forgotten brother of Bilal who 
Longs for his voice

To the cast-down gaze that seeks the path of the Prophets

And to the expectant hands that rise in supplication.

-‘Alī Sharī’atī, Hajj: Reflections on its Rituals
Over the years I have accrued quite a long list of intellectual debts, for which mere words are undoubtedly an inadequate method of repayment. My intellectual curiosity was first kindled during my undergraduate years at the University of West Georgia under the tutelage of Ron Love. Through Ron’s efforts I became familiar with the fundaments of the historian’s craft and the history of European exploration and expansion, and became fascinated by the history of British imperialism in India and the Indian Ocean basin. As a result of his patient and fatherly encouragement, my eyes were also opened to the possibility of pursuing these interests at the graduate level.

My interests were further nurtured and substantially altered by the three years that I spent as a secondary school educator in the DeKalb County School System, during which time I taught a course on the history and geography of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. During these years I benefited greatly from summers spent traveling throughout Britain, Europe, Turkey, India, and West Africa. Perhaps more important, however, was the influence of my students, a high percentage of whom were immigrants and refugees hailing from Bosnia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Burma, and almost every corner of the globe. Many of these students were Muslims, bravely struggling to find their way in the Islamophobic atmosphere that prevailed in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As I sought to combat the constant barrage of negative depictions of Islam in the media, I became something of an unofficial
mentor for the school’s Muslim community. This valuable experience has irrevocably turned my intellectual interests toward the history and culture of Islamic civilization.

Despite my naïve enthusiasm, when I entered the Master’s program at Georgia State University in 2003-2004, I would have never imagined taking on a project as ambitious as this thesis. I had originally intended to focus my attention primarily on Britain and imperialism, hoping that it would allow me to at least dabble in the history of India and the Islamic world later in my career. Fortunately, however, the first seminar that I attended at Georgia State was taught by Donald M. Reid, under whom I received first-rate training in both historiography and modern Middle Eastern history. Equally important was his willingness to nurture my interest in both the Middle East and India. He allowed me to construct a directed readings course, which largely revolved around a comparison between Britain’s colonial influence in Egypt and India. It was during this course that I stumbled upon the reference that ultimately led me to embark upon my current project. His long experience dealing with Thomas Cook’s operations in Egypt had made him aware of their role in the colonial-era pilgrimage trade. Don was immediately interested and supportive of my proposed line of research, and I also credit him for inspiring what has been the most life-altering decision of my academic career. As a result of his wise counsel and encouragement, I mustered the courage to begin studying Persian. After successfully surviving one year of Persian, I felt confident enough to begin my training in Arabic. Simply put, this decision has opened doors to research topics, fellowships, and travel opportunities that would have been unthinkable before.
Similarly, my research would not have been possible without the constant intellectual companionship and friendship provided by Stephen H. Rapp, the director of our department’s program in World History and Cultures, whose dedication to thinking outside of conventional national and regional frameworks has been indispensable. Through him I have been initiated into the wider community of world historians interested in large-scale themes, such as cross-cultural exchanges, environmental and epidemiological histories, and seascapes. Our numerous conversations about the advantages and limitations of the area-studies system have also exerted an incredible amount of creative influence over this project’s purposeful transgression of the metageographical boundaries between the Middle East and South Asia. In addition to his position as an intellectual role model and trusted advisor, Steve has been my greatest advocate, constantly providing valuable introductions, writing countless letters of recommendation, nominating my work for awards, and assisting me in securing funding for overseas research. It is my sincerest hope that one day I can continue the *silsilā* after the example that you have set for me.

In addition to my two primary readers, I have benefited greatly from a large supporting cast of Georgia State faculty members, who have commented on this project at various stages of its development. In particular, John Iskander of the Religious Studies department has exerted significant influence over my research. Large sections of this work were written under his direction. Moreover, in many ways he has been my *murshid* to the subject of pilgrimage. His course on “Pilgrimage Across Religious Traditions,” which introduced me to the works of Victor Turner, lay at the heart of my theoretical conceptualization of the *hajj*. And in much the same way as Professor Rapp, John has
become both a friend and mentor, always eager to help with recommendations, a sympathetic ear for my struggles with Arabic and Persian, long-term career advice, or a much-appreciated word of praise. Ian C. Fletcher and the members of the Trans-Empire Research Cluster have also provided valuable comments and sense of intellectual community. Christine Skwiot provided much-needed criticisms of the fellowship proposals that ultimately allowed me to conduct research in Yemen.

A word of thanks is also due to my language professors. My Arabic instructors at Georgia State, Khalil Abdur Rashid and Teirab Ash-Shareef have given me a strong foundation in Arabic, which will undoubtedly allow me to expand this project during my doctoral studies. However, the greatest credit for my linguistic training goes to Emory University’s Hossein Samei, whose countless hours of patient and compassionate tutoring have been the decisive factor in my maturation as a student of Persian. For many months I half-heartedly joked that the difficulty of his class, in which I was the only non-heritage speaker, made him my greatest zālim (oppressor). In reality, however, my affection and admiration for him are tremendous. His assistance in locating pilgrimage-related verses from among the masters of classical Persian poetry as well as his guidance in the translation of the plague-related portions of Safarnāmīh-i Mīrzā ‘Alī Khān Amīn al-Dawlah have been particularly vital to this project.

Along the way, I have also been fortunate enough to have received critical comments and support from a variety of leading world historians and specialists of Middle Eastern studies from other universities across the country. During my first presentation of the research that would ultimately become Chapter 3 at Columbia University’s graduate student conference, “Crossing Boundaries, Spanning Regions:
Movements of People, Goods, and Ideas,” I received valuable comments and encouragement from Adam McKeown and Mark Mazower as well as from the University of Konstanz’s Valeska Huber. My association with the American Institute for Yemeni Studies (AIYS) has provided valuable contacts with Steve Caton and Engseng Ho. In part as a result of Professor Caton’s interest in my project, I was awarded an Arabic training fellowship from AIYS. From Engseng Ho, I received a great deal of encouragement to publish a portion of my research. I was also extremely flattered by Professor Ho’s use of my article in his undergraduate seminar on “Imperialism and Islamism” at Harvard University. I also benefited from several important corrections made by Virginia Tech’s William Ochsenwald following my presentation at the 2006 Middle East Studies Association conference in Boston.

While teachers, friends, and colleagues are always the most important influences on any of our labors as historians, institutions have important parts to play in any successful project. I would like to thank both the American Institute for Yemeni Studies and the David L. Boren National Security Education Program for their generous fellowships. At the American Institute for Yemeni Studies, I owe special thanks to Christopher Edens and Maria deJ. Ellis for their respective roles in facilitating my language training and research in Sana‘ā’. I was also extremely pleased with the training and support that I received from Sabri Saleem and the entire staff at the Yemen Language Center (soon to be the Yemen College of Middle Eastern Studies). Finally, the difficult work of archival research was greatly aided by the efforts of numerous staff members at the National Archives in Britain (formerly the Public Record Office), Dār al-Makhtūtāt at Bayt al-Thaqāfa in San‘ā’, and the Yemeni Presidency’s National Center for Archives.
Along the way, I have also been lucky enough to make what I hope will be life-
long friendships with fellow my students, several of whom deserve special recognition
for the many hours in which they have indulged my boring stories about “Pilgrims,
Plagues, and Pan-Islam.” To Jennifer “Stella” Cotton, Professor Jason Edwards at
Bridgewater State College, Kevin Keller, Walter Lorenz, Lindsey Stephenson, and Rod
Suleimani, “Let us together in the manner of the Sufis of old fill many more cups of
wine.”

However, my greatest debt of thanks is owed to my best friend and wife, Cari,
who has and always will be my *hamrāh dar safar-i zindīgī*. Without her loving concern
for my happiness and unyielding faith in my abilities, I would have most certainly not
had the courage to pursue my far-flung intellectual passions. Not only has she
couraged my work, but she has patiently endured the self-inflicted solitude that
naturally accompanies the writing process as well as the even longer absences
necessitated by language training and research abroad. Thus, it is to her that this thesis is
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

Transliteration and Grammar

Because this project includes names, sources, and technical terms in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu, a few guidelines regarding transliteration methods are necessary. Although there are several well accepted methods of transliterating Arabic characters into the Roman script, I have primarily used the modified Encyclopedia of Islam system employed by the International Journal of Middle East Studies. However, I have only used this system as guide rather than a rigid set of rules. Where I have strayed from this system, I have done so in order to make my research more accessible across disciplinary lines.

For a non-Arabist or Persian specialist, it is not very helpful to be able to distinguish between the two types of ḥ (ح) and ḍ (د) or s (س) and s (ص) or t (ت) and ṭ (ط) found in the Arabic alphabet, and readers who are familiar with the languages will already be aware of these subtleties. The Arabic character qāf (ق) is transliterated as q not k. The letter jīm (ج) is equivalent to j not dj. The letter dhāl (ذ) appears as dh as in the month of Dhū al-Hijja. And the Arabic character khāʾ (خ) is rendered as kh. While I have avoided cluttering the text by omitting diacritical marks for consonants, I have indicated differences in vowel length in most cases. Simply put, ā is pronounced as a long aa, ī as an ee, and ā as an oo sound. I have also made certain to mark the Arabic letter ayn (ع) as ‘ and the hamza (ء) as ’.
Generally speaking, I have not assimilated the l of al- according to the following consonant, regardless of its Arabic grammatical status as a “sun” or “moon” letter. While many Persian or Urdu speakers tend to render names like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani as ad-Din, od-Din, or ud-Din, I have purposely retained the al- regardless of the language being used. The exception to this rule comes in the case of Indians, either serving as colonial officials or corresponding in English, such as Dr. Abdur Razzack. In these cases, I have maintained the spellings in which they themselves have used to render their names into the Roman script. Similarly, in cases, where names have common or accepted English spellings, I have opted for the most common spelling, as in the case of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. This also becomes a major issue in Chapter 5. Because of the ubiquity of hybridized Indo-Persian Indian names in that chapter, many of which have been anglicized in a variety ways both by colonial officials and subsequent historians, I have largely omitted diacriticals throughout that chapter.

The Arabic ta marbuta (ۤ) is rendered a not ah. As a result, colonial-era spellings, such as Jeddah, have been changed to Jidda, except when they appear in quotations. However, in Persian, the equivalent of the ta marbuta, the letter heh (۫), has been rendered as ih in words such as safarnamih. The adjectival –ya followed tā’ marbūta is rendered –iyya in Arabic and iyyih in Persian. The nisba is also rendered –iyya. And the Persian equivalent of the Arabic idāfa (al-), the izāfat, is rendered as –i as in Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka’ba, as opposed it the Encyclopedia Iranica’s –e.
Names and Places

For my non-specialist audience, I have tried to eliminate the use of complicated diacritical in commonly-used names, places, and terms. For example, I have avoided the use of diacriticals in familiar names like Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani or Sultan Abdul Hamid II, while for less well-known figures, such as Mīrzā ‘Alī Khān Amīn al-Dawlah or Mīrzā Muhammad Husayn Farāhānī, I have included the diacriticals. Similarly, for place names I have typically used common English spellings. However, in the case of more obscure locations like Kamarān Island or the Yemeni coastal region of Tihāma, I have provided the diacriticals. As for terminology, all Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu words have been italicized. For common terms like dar al-Islam, jihad, mujahidin, shaykh, khilafa, and hajj, I have not included diacriticals. However, for more technical terms, such as tawwāf (circumambulation of the Ka‘ba), tā‘ūn (plague), and wabā’ (epidemic or cholera), I have opted to include diacriticals. Similarly, all books from Arabic or Persian have been cited with full diacriticals.

Dates

Unless otherwise noted all dates are from the common era (C.E.). However, when quoting directly from diary-style-safarnamih sources, I have indicated the date as quoted (hijra, A.H.) with its common-era equivalent in parentheses.


**INTRODUCTION**

The first House established for the people was that at Bakka [Mecca], a place holy, and a guidance to all beings. Therein are clear signs—the station of Abraham, and whosoever enters it is in security. It is the duty of all men towards God to come to the House a pilgrim, if he is able to make his way there.

- *Qur’an*, 3:96-97

And proclaim to humanity the Pilgrimage, and they shall come unto thee on foot and upon every lean camel. They shall come from every remote place that they may witness things profitable to them.


### The Tale of the “Twin Infection”

For nearly fourteen centuries, each year during the month of *Dhu al-Hijjah*, throngs of Muslims from all of over the world have descended upon the Holy City of Mecca and its environs. As one of the Five Pillars of the Islamic faith, all Muslims are obliged to perform the *hajj* or pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in life, so long as they are physically and financially able. They come to walk in the footsteps of their spiritual forbearers from Abraham to Muhammad. They feast their eyes upon the Ka‘ba, the very same shrine to which the prayers of all Muslims are directed five times a day. There at the center of the *Masjid al-Haram* (the Great Mosque) they perform seven circumambulations around the Ka‘ba in imitation of the Prophet Muhammad and the

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Figure 1. The Ka'ba and the *Masjid al-Haram*, Mecca, 1885, by Snouck Hurgronje.

angels encircling Allah’s throne in heaven. Given the spiritual sensitivity of the sites and rituals involved in the *hajj*, however, non-Muslims are strictly forbidden from entering the *haramayn* (sacred areas) of Mecca and its nearby sister city, Medina. Yet, from the mid-nineteenth to the early-twentieth centuries, the forces unleashed by the age of European imperialism and its rapid encroachment on the *dar al-Islam* (the Islamic world) increasingly brought the *hajj* under the scrutiny and regulation of non-Muslim interests.

The principal driving force behind these changes was the expansion of the British Empire. In particular, as Britain’s power in the Indian subcontinent grew, so too did its maritime supremacy throughout the Indian Ocean basin.² Concurrently, Britain and its European rivals increasingly exploited the declining military and financial fortunes of the

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Ottoman Empire and its weakening control over Egypt, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Peninsula. As Britain looked to secure its access to India, ward off its European competitors, and expand its commercial interests in southwestern Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, its role in the region was intensified by the transit opportunities that emerged with the development of regular steamship routes between the Mediterranean and India from the 1830s to the 1860s and the eventual opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. With the exponential growth of maritime traffic that accompanied these technological advances came a similarly dramatic rise in the ocean-going pilgrim traffic from and through British India. Freed from the rhythms of sailing in accordance with the monsoon cycle, the costs of transport and the length of passage for Indian pilgrims were reduced drastically. While previous generations of pilgrims were confined mainly to elite officials, wealthy merchants, and the ‘ulama’ (religious elites and scholars), after the introduction of the steamship the “modern” hajj also became accessible to ordinary Muslims of modest means. However, the relative affordability of the steamship-era hajj also made the journey possible for a group identified by both

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3 Prior to the opening of the Suez Canal and the inauguration of a direct route to India, communications between India and England via the Red Sea involved multiple stages. For instance, a letter sent from England required a train journey across France, a steamship journey to Alexandria and onward to Cairo, where it would be transferred by camel to Suez before a further steamship leg to Bombay or Calcutta. This process could take up to forty-five days, while a letter sent in reply could take up to three months to make its way back to England. Daniel Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 130.

Figure 2. Major Pilgrimage Routes in the Nineteenth Century.\(^5\)

Muslim and non-Muslim authorities as a “dangerous class” of “pauper pilgrims.”\(^6\) As the numbers of destitute Indian pilgrims rose, so did the incidence of death and disease in the Hijaz. Much to the dismay of Turkish and Egyptian officials, and to the embarrassment of the British who vehemently denied that British India and its pilgrims were the source of epidemic cholera for fear of restrictions that might be placed on the flow of trade between India and Europe, by the 1860s the connection between the influx of India’s destitute pilgrim masses and the globalization of epidemic disease was becoming all too

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clear. The breaking point came in 1865, when a particularly virulent epidemic of cholera broke out in the Hijaz, killing an estimated 15,000 pilgrims. To make matters worse, when ships carrying returning pilgrims arrived at Suez in May of the same year, they falsely reported that no instances of the disease had been detected, despite the fact

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that over a hundred corpses had been tossed overboard since leaving the port of Jidda. By June, cholera had attacked Alexandria, killing some 60,000 Egyptians and setting off a chain reaction that subsequently spread to, and ravaged, the port of Marseilles and all of Europe. Finally, by November 1865, cholera was recorded as far away as New York City. By the epidemic’s end, over 200,000 lives had been lost in major cities alone.\

Given the severity of the 1865 epidemic, international attention focused immediately on the role of the hajj in the dissemination of cholera. Writing shortly after the outbreak, Dr. Achille Proust, a Professor of Hygiene at the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Paris, wrote of the terror felt throughout the Mediterranean region, commenting that “Europe realized that it could not remain like this, every year, at the mercy of the pilgrimage to Mecca.”\(^9\) Echoing Dr. Proust’s anxiety and contempt for Indian pilgrims, W.W. Hunter, the Director General of Statistics to the Government of India and a leading authority on Indian ethnography and history, noted with haughty contempt that while India’s pilgrim masses might “care little for life or death,” their “carelessness imperils lives far more valuable than their own.”\(^11\) As a result, for the remainder of the nineteenth century, European Powers, acting upon the conclusions of the International Sanitary Conference of 1866 held in Constantinople (Istanbul),\(^12\) embarked upon an ambitious and highly contentious program of sanitary reform and surveillance.\(^13\)

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\(^12\) While Istanbul would ordinarily be the preferred name for the Ottoman capital, I have used Constantinople throughout this project. I have chosen to do so primarily because of the importance of the International Sanitary Conference of 1866. The correspondence regarding the Constantinople conference,
As F.E. Peters observes in *The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places* (1994), “the threat of devastating cholera epidemics invading Europe” resulted in a “concerted politique sanitaire whose objective was the regulation of the life of Western Arabia and, no less, of the most sacred ritual of Islam, the hajj.”14 For British officialdom, however, these dramatic changes were further complicated by the looming anxieties of Muslim-inspired political subversion that haunted British officialdom in the wake of the Sepoy Mutiny (Great Rebellion) of 1857-1858.15 As William Roff succinctly states in his pioneering article, “Sanitation and Security: The Imperial Powers and the Nineteenth-Century Hajj” (1982), the hajj came to represent a source of “twin infection.”16 On the one hand, despite British claims to the contrary, India’s Ganges valley was established as the source of cholera. On at least forty occasions between 1831 and 1912 cholera spread from either Bombay or Calcutta to the Hijaz, and then was dispersed far and wide by returning hajjis, ensuring that outbreaks of cholera were a

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15 While the term Sepoy Mutiny has become unfashionable among specialists of South Asian history, owing to its Eurocentric connotations, other terms, such as the Great Rebellion, the Indian Revolt, or the First War of Indian Independence, are not as universally recognizable among non-specialists. As a result, I have, despite its obvious drawbacks, opted to use the colonial terminology. I would also argue that the psychological impact of the original phrase upon the “official mind” of colonial authorities cannot be adequately conveyed by these newer terms. For examples of how these terms are currently being deployed among specialists of South Asian history, see for example, Robin Jeffrey et al., eds., *India Rebellion to Republic: Selected Writings, 1857-1990* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1990); Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 91; Nicholas Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 43.

perennial threat to Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, Europe and even the Americas.  

On the other hand, contact with Arabia was widely considered by British officials to be the primary source of religio-political fanaticism among Indian Muslims. First referred to as “Wahhabism” and then later as Pan-Islam, Arabian influences were blamed for spreading unrest and rebellion in India, the Straits Settlements and the Dutch East Indies.

Though the British certainly understood the risk of political subversion that the hajj entailed, they were also fearful that direct interference with this fundamental Islamic practice would surely inspire a religio-political backlash in India. During the height of the cholera era, from 1860s to the 1890s, these political considerations placed Britain in direct confrontation with the reform-minded politique sanitaire being imposed by the rest of Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Britain’s concerns were three-fold. First and foremost, Britain feared that restricting its pilgrims’ access to the hajj would agitate its Muslim population in India. Second, Britain feared that international sanitary restrictions and quarantines would threaten the free flow of trade between India and Europe. And third, Britain was hesitant to submit to any international agreements that would have enhanced the Ottoman Empire’s ability to govern the hajj effectively, enforce its sovereignty in Arabia, or exert more Pan-Islamic influence over Britain’s Muslim colonial subjects. As a result of these concerns, British officialdom obstinately denied a mounting body of scientific evidence and international consensus that cholera was a contagious disease. For over three decades Britain obstructed international efforts to impose quarantine restrictions and limit the number of indigent and infected pilgrims going on pilgrimage.

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Fighting for administrative control of the sanitary functions surrounding the *hajj* would only serve to increase the intensity of Anglo-Ottoman contestation regarding pilgrimage traffic as a whole. Though the initial impetus for increased British involvement in the Red Sea and the administrative details of the *hajj* was largely the result of international sanitary and trade concerns generated by the spread of cholera via the *hajj* and the resultant call for quarantine measures in the region, such interests cannot be separated from more directly political considerations. In the decades that followed the Sepoy Mutiny and the international sanitary conference of 1866, British officials became increasingly concerned with monitoring the international networks of anti-colonial radicalism, both real and imagined, being forged between diasporic networks of Indian dissidents, pilgrims, and the Ottoman Empire. However elusive these connections may have been during the 1850s and 1860s, it had become clear to British officials that by the 1870s and 1880s these linkages had given way to a more clearly-defined Pan-Islamic ideology, sponsored in part by the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1908). Thus, as a result of the “twin infection” of both sanitary and security concerns, both the British and Ottoman empires became engaged in a contestation of sacred space in which the stakes ranged from suzerainty in the Hijaz and the administration of the *hajj* to even larger questions of hegemony over the Red Sea region and even the entire *dar al-Islam*.

*Things to Come…*

Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the existing literature concerning the *hajj*, beginning with a discussion of Victor Turner’s anthropological model of pilgrimage. Despite my initial skepticism regarding his universalizing tendencies, I have come to
recognize the elegance and flexibility of Turner’s model. By adapting his dualistic theory of “communitas” and “structure” to the specificities of the colonial-era hajj, I have discovered a high degree of commonality between Turner’s model and the musings of the famous Dutch Orientalist Christian Snouck Hurgronje, many of whose ideas played a crucial role in shaping Dutch (and to a lesser extent British) policies toward the political and medical administration of the colonial-era hajj. By comparing Turner and Hurgronje, I transition from the world of academic theory to the practical questions of colonial administration, many of which lay at the heart of the early historiography of the hajj. In my review of the historiography of the pilgrimage, I begin with the nineteenth-century classics produced by European adventurers, many of whom entered Mecca and Medina disguised as pilgrims. Although these accounts would undoubtedly provide excellent fodder for a Saidian analysis of Orientalist thought, I have opted to leave this task to others.¹⁸ Instead, I am more concerned with the way in which the area-studies system has suppressed and fragmented the study of trans-regional connections embodied by the Indian Ocean’s bustling pilgrimage traffic. I am convinced that by separating the Middle East and Islamic South Asia into discrete regional units, the existing literature has unnecessarily obscured the enduring unity of the dar al-Islam. In order to transcend the conventional regional boundaries of the Middle East and South Asia, I will discuss how the emerging historiography of the Indian Ocean offers a way to reframe both the hajj and the boundaries of British India.

Chapter 2 examines the period between the great cholera outbreak of 1865 and the outbreak of plague in Bombay in 1896. It will first be necessary to briefly trace the roots of epidemic cholera back to India. Here, particular attention will be paid to the combination of factors that allowed cholera to repeatedly leap beyond India’s borders during the nineteenth century and eventually led international opinion to place the blame for this disaster squarely upon British India and its legions of infected pilgrims. However, the process by which cholera was transmitted from human to human would not be fully understood until Robert Koch’s discovery of the bacillus vibrio cholera in 1884. Thus, while international opinion during the period between 1866 and the 1890s called for the imposition of quarantine measures in order to protect Europe from cholera, Britain repeatedly denied that cholera was caused by human-to-human contact and therefore remained vehemently opposed to the implementation of such measures. Here, I will explore the diplomatic and scientific rift between Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the rest of Europe caused by the quarantine controversy. I will also compare the more stringent recommendations made at the subsequent sanitary conferences held during the 1870s and 1880s with the parallel program of reforms being pursued by British India, which while meant to avoid economically undesirable quarantines were nonetheless aimed at curbing the number of indigent pilgrims as well as improving both the scandalously unsanitary conditions aboard pilgrimage vessels and the abusive business practices associated with the pilgrimage trade.

In Chapter 3, the focus shifts from infections of epidemic disease to infections of a political nature. This chapter will trace how the advent of the steamship era brought British India into much closer contact with the Red Sea region and the Muslim Holy
Land. Increased European presence in this sensitive region often provoked violent responses among local populations. Particularly in the decades that followed the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857-1858, British officials became increasingly concerned with monitoring diasporic networks of anti-colonial radicalism being forged between Indian dissidents, pilgrims, and the inhabitants Red Sea region. Especially in the case of the 1858 massacre of Jidda’s Christian population, I will demonstrate how anti-colonial tremors originating in India spread to the Hijaz. As episodic as such outbursts may have been during the 1850s and 1860s, by the 1870s and 1880s, these informal networks had given way to a more clearly-defined Pan-Islamic ideology, sponsored in part by the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II. As a result, during Abdul Hamid’s reign the Holy Places became an important outlet for Pan-Islamic propaganda directed toward Indian Muslims. Here, particular attention will be paid to how Pan-Islam’s strategic relationship with the hajj and the Holy Places spurred British officials to implement daring schemes of espionage, which would ultimately blur the lines between medical and political surveillance of the hajj and turn doctors into spies.

Chapter 4 will explore the radically transformative period between 1896 and 1926. By the close of the nineteenth century, significant progress in containing cholera had been made. International Sanitary Conventions had been ratified in Venice in 1892 and again in Paris in 1894 and with the outbreak of plague in Bombay even Britain’s long-held policy of obstructing international sanitary regulations finally became untenable. Thus, by the 1890s, but especially after World War I, the hajj had been colonized. British and international commitments in Arabia and the Red Sea had become an institutionalized part of the pilgrimage experience.
The final chapter will explore the flurry of Pan-Islamic activities in India immediately before and after World War I, many of which involved organizations, most notably Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba (Society of the Servants of the Ka‘ba), ostensibly created to protect the Holy Places from defilement or destruction at the hands of European powers. Similarly, as in the case of the Silk Letter Conspiracy, Mecca and Medina served as the key point of communication between the Ottoman Empire and India’s pro-Ottoman radicals coordinating a frontier jihad from Afghanistan during World War I. Many of the central players in these Pan-Islamic networks would eventually become instrumental figures in the Khilafat Movement (1918-1924) and Indian Muslims’ rejection of the British-backed Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali’s claims upon the Caliphate and control of the Holy Places. While the Khilafat Movement was ultimately unsuccessful in its efforts to save the Ottoman Caliphate, its importance as the first mass nationalist movement to span all of India and garner support among both Muslims and Hindus underscores the Pan-Islam’s impact on the later development of Indian and Pakistani nationalisms.

Finally, I will conclude with a brief consideration of the Wahhabi take-over of the hajj in 1925. In many ways, the changes to the hajj wrought by the House of Sa‘ūd and the Wahhabis have been more profound and long-lasting than the European interventions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Sugata Bose points out, “The removal of the authority of the Ottoman sultan-khalifa over the Holy Cities, the Hashemite interregnum, and the establishment of Saudi dominance widened fissures not just between Muslims and non-Muslims but also within the universal community of Islam.” With their puritanical sensibilities and penchant for iconoclasm, the traditional
practices of South Asian pilgrims, ranging from Sufi to Shia, their Persian-influenced namaz, their salutations at the Prophet’s grave, and their pious veneration of shrines and tombs, all came under intense scrutiny. Thus, while British colonial regulation of the hajj had been “galling enough,” South Asian pilgrims suffered new forms of tyranny at the hands of the their Muslim brothers.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\) Quoted from Bose, A Hundred Horizons, 226-232; see also Peters, The Hajj, 362.
CHAPTER 1

PILGRIMAGE: THEORY AND PRACTICE

… and how few have looked upon the celebrated shrine! I may truly say that, of all the worshippers who clung weeping to the curtain, or who pressed their beating hearts to the stone, none felt for the moment a deeper emotion than did the Haji from the far-north. It was as if the poetical legends of the Arab spoke truth, and that the waving wings of angels, not the breeze of morning, were agitating and swelling the black covering of the shrine. But to confess humbling truth, theirs was the high feeling of religious enthusiasm, mine was the ecstasy of gratified pride.

-Sir Richard F. Burton

One must guard against the too-common tendency to generalize. This art is known to our “experts” on conditions in the East Indies, as well as to anybody. One hears from one Resident who has often come into unpleasant contact with the Hajjis that the Hajjis are the plague of native society; they encourage the natives to resistance, sow fanaticism and hatred of Europeans, etc. Another, whom chance has brought into contact with docile Hajjis, and whom they have served as very useful “boys”, replies that all this is the invention of clumsy colleagues, for anyone who knows how to deal with Hajjis (like the speaker) learns to know them as sober, orderly people. All start from the fallacious hypothesis that the Hajjis have, as such, a special character.

-Christian Snouck Hurgronje

Rethinking Victor Turner:
Pan-Islamic Communitas, Anti-Colonial Liminality, and the Structure of Colonial Surveillance

To a considerable degree, the theoretical discussion of pilgrimage and its impact on society has been dominated by one man, British anthropologist Victor Turner, an authority on ritual and a trail-blazing scholar in the fields of comparative religion and

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pilgrimage studies. Turner is best known for his binary model of “communitas” and “structure” in the pilgrimage experience. For Turner, pilgrimage offers an opportunity to create communitas, which involves movement away from one’s institutionalized social status, family, town, political party, job, etc. Traveling away from one’s home on pilgrimage offers an opportunity to shed these conventional roles. As the pilgrim distances himself from the structure of normal, everyday life, he will ostensibly move away from established hierarchies into a “liminal” status, freed from the normal bonds of structure. Above all else, communitas generated by the pilgrimage experience represents a kind of strained reach toward lofty concepts like equality, global unity, and brotherhood. As Turner points out, the hajj and its well-known penchant for equalizing rituals is an outstanding example of a communitas-generating pilgrimage.

Structure is a system of rank and status underlying mundane functions such as labor and government. Obviously, structure is dominant and pervasive in the world. Structure remains dominant by creating safe spaces and times where communitas can be expressed without fear of major disruption. Thus, communitas has been relegated to the world of myths and symbols. However, rituals, including pilgrimage, create liminal spaces where the norms of structure can be safely challenged and bent, if not broken. Despite this relegation, Turner was committed to the resilience of pilgrimage and communitas. Moreover, he argued that pilgrimage served a special, almost irrepressible function in society. Pilgrimages, even if for only a fleeting moment, can slip the bonds of structure, criticizing it instead of reproducing it. While this rough sketch of communitas and structure cannot do justice to Turner’s thought, it does provide a sense of Turner’s
basic vocabulary and the formula around which much of the previous scholarship on pilgrimage has been constructed.

Despite the importance of Turner’s model, for historians it has proved more controversial than influential. Most have taken issue with the ahistorical nature of Turner’s work or its claims of universal applicability across widely varying religious traditions. Many have also doubted whether or not pilgrims embarking on the *hajj* can ever really achieve the lofty goal of communitas as described by Turner, noting that even in Mecca divisions of class, ethnicity, language, and nationality are plainly evident. Moreover, the supposed liminality of *hajj* experience has often been called into question, particularly when one considers the degree to which the entire pilgrimage experience is subject to rigid textual guidelines, the instructions of professional pilgrimage guides, and the dictates of religious and governmental authorities determined to maintain certain standards of religious orthodoxy.³

Although these criticisms are well-founded, Turner’s model remains a useful starting point for thinking about the colonial-era *hajj* and its relationship to Pan-Islam, anti-colonial radicalism, and the growth of sanitary surveillance spawned by repeated outbreaks of cholera. While the origins, authenticity, sincerity, and plausibility of the grandiose schemes hatched by both the Pan-Islamic movement’s most famous activists and its official Ottoman sponsors have already been scrutinized and dissected by other scholars, it may be more useful to rethink Pan-Islam and its relationship to the *hajj* using

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a simplified version of Turner’s theoretical vocabulary.⁴ At its most basic level, Pan-Islam was an anti-colonial movement that stressed the unity of the Islamic umma (community). Not surprisingly, Pan-Islamic thinkers gravitated to universal symbols like the Caliphate, Mecca, the Ka’ba, and the hajj. In each case, the underlying value of these symbols was derived from their ability to convey notions of communitas.

One of the main elements of communitas is, of course, its tendency to criticize structure rather than reproduce it. Applying this definition to Pan-Islam, we can see that it was a vehicle for criticizing British, French, Dutch, and Russian imperialisms. Pan-Islam, like other expressions of communitas, was closely monitored and discouraged within the colonial structure of not only India, but also the British Empire as a whole, and throughout the Islamic world. Thus, Pan-Islam needed symbols, rituals, and liminal spaces in order to express itself. I would argue that sites where British authority was weak, non-existent, or contested were the very places where Pan-Islamic communitas was most likely to form. Mecca and the Hijaz were the most obvious examples of territories where the British had little authority. Mecca also had the added advantage of an already high capacity for the creation of communitas as a result of the hajj. More generally speaking, the entire Ottoman Empire, although challenged by British and European interference, was still an independent Muslim power, headed by the self-

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professed leader of the Islamic world, the Sultan-Caliph. One might also argue that a
certain kind of loosely-associated communitas existed in the arc of radical Indian
diasporic communities scattered throughout the Indian Ocean basin, the Red Sea, and
Middle East.

Positioned at the fringes of colonial structure (beyond or at the margins of British
power and/or surveillance), each of these sites show characteristics of what might be
dubbed anti-colonial liminality. Where anti-colonial liminality existed, the potential for
Pan-Islamic communitas as well anti-colonial protest and violence was greatly increased.
While anti-colonial liminality might seem to contradict the universalizing purpose of
communitas, as Turner points out in “Pilgrimage and Communitas” (1974), though
pilgrimages strain, as it were, in the direction of universal communitas, they are still
ultimately bounded by the structure of the religious systems within which they are
generated and persist.” As a function of this inherent exclusivity, Turner also recognized
that the hajj carries with it the potential for generating “fanaticism” and reactivating
“Muslim belief in the spiritual necessity of Jihad or Holy War.”

Though it is doubtful that colonial administrators would have seen themselves as
policing anti-colonial liminality and Pan-Islamic communitas, they nevertheless
recognized the potential that Mecca, the Ottoman Empire, and the Red Sea region had to
generate feelings of exclusivity, fanaticism, and political subversion. How then was this
problem of colonial “disorder” approached by British officialdom? Ironically, the
answer, as the renowned Dutch Orientalist Christian Snouck Hurgronje pointed out, was
that the hajj was inherently manageable. In other words, structure was inherent in the
hajj. Throughout his career he reassured nervous elites in both the Dutch and British

\[5\] Turner, “Pilgrimage and Communitas,” 315.
empires that the supposedly unruly hajj could be policed and disciplined, suggesting that it might even offer an avenue to further subjugate the Islamic world to the colonial order.

Having spent nearly a year in Jidda and Mecca in 1884-1885, Hurgronje became convinced that “Europeans greatly exaggerated the city’s role as a breeding ground for anti-colonial agitation in the Islamic world.”\(^6\) To prove his point, he emphasized the inherently conservative nature of hajj and the mundane business of the pilgrimage industry, arguing that “the vast majority of hajjis returned home exactly as they departed—not as rebels but as ‘sheep.’”\(^7\) Hurgronje also painted native Meccans as more concerned with “fleecing their pilgrim prey” than fomenting rebellion. In sharp contrast to the “herd of gullible hajjis,” Hurgronje acknowledged the presence of a small minority of “conspirators who turned their piety into fanaticism and rebellion.”\(^8\) He argued that the true danger of the hajj lay in the “networks of exiles and students [muqīm] who took refuge in Mecca’s many expatriate communities, exploiting the freedom of the hajj to propagandize visitors from their homelands.”\(^9\)

Hurgronje’s solution to this paradox was simple. He argued that instead of restricting access to Mecca, a strategy which he reasoned was needlessly provocative, colonial governments should increase their diplomatic, intelligence, and sanitary presence in the Hijaz. Following his recommendation, the Dutch created a full-service hajj agency in Jidda, ostensibly to protect their subjects from fleecing and epidemic disease. He argued that by supporting the hajj, colonial regimes could simultaneously endear

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\(^6\) Bianchi, *Guests of God*, 43.

\(^7\) Christian Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century*, 290-291.

\(^8\) Bianchi, *Guests of God*, 43.

themselves to the majority of their subjects, while keeping a watchful eye on any subversive elements. His strategy was to bring the *hajj* within the framework of colonial governance and surveillance. Following Hurgronje’s model, both the Dutch East Indies and British India moved to pry as many of functions of the *hajj* as possible from Ottoman control. By engaging in this strategy of inter-imperial contestation, the British and their European colonial counterparts slowly decreased the *liminal* space for anti-colonial activities previously afforded by the *hajj* and extended the tentacles of colonial authority to include pilgrimage institutions spanning the entire Indian Ocean basin. In this way, colonial structure became pervasive even in Mecca, successfully making Pan-Islam and the *hajj* manageable dangers.

**A Historiography in Fragments**

Bernard Lewis, commenting on the dearth of scholarly research related to the *hajj*, once commented that the “effect of the pilgrimage on communications and commerce, on ideas and institutions, has not been adequately explored.” Moreover, Lewis lamented that “it may never be, since much of it will, in the nature of things, have gone unrecorded.” While the first part of Lewis’ complaint remains surprisingly accurate, the latter half of his analysis is slightly exaggerated, at least in the case of the colonial-era. In reality, the British, Dutch, French, and Ottoman empires have all left voluminous archival collections detailing almost every conceivable issue related to pilgrimage administration during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In addition to these archival sources, numerous pilgrimage accounts from medieval times up to the

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present are available in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Urdu, and a variety of other languages. Moreover, there are a number of pilgrimage accounts, particularly from South Asians, written or translated into English. In addition to descriptions of Mecca and the pilgrimage written by actual hajjis, there is also an important genre of nineteenth-century travel and exploration literature written by Westerners. However, as Lewis and others have pointed out, despite the existence of these primary sources, which are of course the necessary raw materials with which a richer analysis of the hajj could be

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11 Although, from a strictly temporal perspective, many of the available accounts in Arabic and Persian fall well beyond the scope of this study, becoming familiar with the traditions of Arabic and Persian pilgrimage literature has been immensely valuable to my understanding of not only the rituals of the hajj, but also with the rigors of pilgrimage experience as a whole and the relative degree to which hajj exhibits both elements of change and continuity. Of the various examples from the Arabic riḥla and Persian safarnāmīḥ genres (travelbooks usually centered around a journey to Mecca), by far the most important example is that of Ibn Battūta. See Ross Dunn, The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the 14th Century, 2nd ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004); Ibn Battuta, The Travels of Ibn Battuta A.D. 1325-1354, vols. 1-2, translated with revisions and notes by H.A.R. Gibb, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. Similarly, Ibn Jubayr’s account from 1183-1184 offers an excellent account of the threat posed to pilgrims by the European Crusaders until Salah al-Dīn’s conquest of Jerusalem in 1187, an era which could be seen as a useful point of comparison with the nineteenth-century European sanitary interventions. For Jubayr’s account, see Ibn Jubair, Voyages, translated and annotated by Maurice Gaudefroy-Dembyenes, 2 vols. (Paris: Paul Guethner, 1949-1951). A portion of Ibn Jubayr’s account is also reproduced in Michael Wolfe, ed., One Thousand Roads to Mecca: Ten Centuries of Travelers Writing about the Muslim Pilgrimage (New York: Grove Press, 1997), 33-50. In addition to Ibn Jubayr’s account, Wolfe’s collection also features translated excerpts from Persian works, such as Nāṣīr-i Khusraw’s Sa‘farnāmīḥ (1150) and Jalāl-i ʿAlī Ahmad’s Khāṣṣī dar mīqāt (1664). However, for the purposes of this study, the most useful Persian narrative has been that of Mīrzā Muhammad Husayn Farāhānī’s A Shi‘ī Pilgrimage to Mecca, 1885-1886: The Safarnāmeh of Mirza Mohammad Hosayn Farahānī, edited, translated, and annotated by Hafez Farmayan and Elton L. Daniel (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990). I am also in the process of translating portions of Mīrzā ‘Alī Khān Amīn al-Dawlah, Safarnāmīḥ-i Mīrzā ‘Alī Khān Amīn al-Dawlah, edited by ‘Alī Amīnī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Tūs, 1975), whose account includes a great deal of previously unused material, providing an Iranian pilgrim’s perspective on the plague outbreaks of 1896-1897. Another source of insight has come from numerous references to the hajj scattered throughout the works of the Persian master poets: Hāfīz Rūmī, and Sa‘dī. See Hāfīz, Dīvān-i Khwājah Shams al-Dīn Muhammad Hāfīz Shīrāzī, edited by Muhammad Qazvīnī and Qāsim Ghanī (Tehran: Kitābkhānā-i Zavvār, 1970); Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Dīvān-i Kāmil-i Shams-i Tabrīzī, edited by Bādí‘ al-Zamān Furūzānfar and ‘Alī Dāshī (Tehran: Sāzmān-i Intishārāt-i Jāvidān, 1980); Sa‘dī, Kulliyāt-i Sa‘dī, edited by Muhammad ‘Alī Furūghī (Tehran: Paymān, 1999).

constructed, the historiography of the *hajj* remains embarrassingly slender, indeed almost non-existent. In response to this historiographical lacuna, three central questions spring to mind. First, what secondary analyses of the *hajj* are currently available? Second, which academic disciplines are producing these accounts, and what are the temporal periods, geographical areas, and themes with which these scholars have primarily been concerned? And third, what are the disciplinary, linguistic, and theoretical obstacles facing scholars who might wish to address these issues?

In terms of the scholarly literature, while an obvious starting point for any discussion of pilgrimage is of course Victor Turner’s work, its impact on the historiography related to the *hajj* has been muted as a result of the criticisms already mentioned. While Turner’s work may be applied in order to achieve a deeper understanding of how the *hajj* might be considered as an important influence on political power and societal change in the Islamic world and beyond, his body of research is not specifically about the *hajj*. Rather, Turner’s *oeuvre* was a work of anthropology and comparative religion, which compared pilgrimage rituals as varied as those of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam. Moreover, its deeply ahistorical comparisons paid little attention to the most important aspect of historical research, change over time.

Similarly, because of its far-flung geographical and temporal comparisons, its claims of universality across religious traditions, and its lack of attention to primary sources written in Middle Eastern languages, scholars of Near Eastern and Middle East Studies the vast majority of whom are deeply convinced of the cultural, linguistic, and religious

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13 For excellent introduction to the problems of this subject’s historiography, see Pearson, *Pilgrimage to Mecca*, 3-19.
distinctiveness of their geographical area of specialization are equally suspicious of Turner’s work.

Thus, the historiography of the colonial-era *hajj* begins not with Turner but with the work of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Orientalists and explorers, who either converted to Islam or at least feigned their conversion and successfully disguised themselves as Muslims in order to enter the Holy Cities. The two most important and comprehensive accounts from this genre are those of Sir Richard F. Burton and Christaan Snouck Hurgronje. While Burton’s account of his 1853 pilgrimage-in-disguise is undisputedly the most famous, Hurgronje’s account of his sojourn in Mecca from 1884-1885 is by far the more politically important of the two and speaks most directly to the fears aroused by the “twin infection” of sanitary and security concerns that haunted colonial regimes of the late nineteenth century. Though the works of Burton and Hurgronje have garnered the lion’s share of scholarly interest, similar narratives left by John Lewis Burckhardt, Charles Doughty, John F. Keane, Eldon Rutter, and A.J.B. Wavell have also been used extensively.¹⁴

The majority of these Western narratives of pilgrimage-in-disguise were written in English, Hurgronje’s account in Dutch being the notable exception. Yet, the earliest

efforts of twentieth-century professional historians and Orientalists were undertaken by Dutch, French, and German scholars. The contributions of the Dutch scholar A.J. Wensinck, particularly his articles on the Hadjdj, the Ka’ba, and the Masjid al-Haram in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, have been foundational sources upon which others have relied greatly.\(^{15}\) Maurice Gaufroy-Demombynes’ *Le pèlerinage à la Mekke: Étude d’histoire religieuse* (1923) and Firmin Duguet’s *Le pèlerinage de le Mecque au point de vue religieuse, social et sanitaire* (1932) were the first academic, monograph-length studies solely dedicated to the *hajj*. While Gaufroy-Demombynes’ work is more useful for understanding the religious and ritual aspects of the *hajj*, Duguet was the first to examine the *hajj* from a medical perspective. Thus, Duguet’s study is of seminal importance, particularly for scholars interested in tracing the impact of cholera and quarantine measures related to the *hajj*.\(^{16}\)

In the post-World War II era, the current area-studies system began to develop, one might expect a proliferation of studies on the *hajj* given its centrality to the practice of Islam and to the Middle East as a region. However, that has not been the case. As we shall see, “the general narrowing of scholarly focus within the framework of area-studies” and the tendency of many scholars to concentrate their efforts on a particular nation-state seems to have discouraged scholars from tackling topics which would require them to examine broader trans-regional connections between the Middle East and the rest of the Islamic world.\(^{17}\) Strangely, from the 1950s until the late 1970s, very little Western

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\(^{17}\) Bose, *One Hundred Horizons*, 7.
scholarship concerning the *hajj* was produced. With the exception of a lone chapter from G.E. Von Grunebaum’s dated but still useful classic, *Muhammadan Festivals* (1951), which also deals only with the religious rituals of the *hajj*, the great pilgrimage was virtually ignored by historians and area-studies specialists.

This trend was finally reversed in 1978 when the first volume of *Hajj Studies* was published by the Hajj Research Center in Jidda. Though it contained a number of interesting articles, all dealing with modern topics and mostly of a social-science orientation, no subsequent volumes appeared.\(^\text{18}\) Then, in 1979, David E. Long’s *The Hajj Today: A Survey of the Contemporary Makkah Pilgrimage* was published. Long’s thorough and sympathetic study, the most comprehensive since those of Gaudefroy-Demombyne and Dugeut, details the economic, medical, political, religious, and social implications of the *hajj*. Of particular value is Long’s chapter, “Health Aspects of the Hajj,” which concisely describes both the international sanitary reforms of the nineteenth century and the subsequent development of Saudi health institutions relating to the pilgrimage.\(^\text{19}\) Despite its usefulness, however, Long’s book is more of a study of Saudi Arabia’s contemporary administration of the *hajj* than a comprehensive history of the *hajj* itself.

At present, the most chronologically comprehensive histories of the *hajj* have been written by F.E. Peters, a professor of Near Eastern and Islamic studies at New York University. In fact, Peters’ scholarly output has been prodigious. In 1994 alone he published two massive tomes, *The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places* and *Mecca: A Literary History of the Muslim Holy Land*. Both volumes span

\(^{18}\) Ziauddin Sardar and M.A. Zaki Badawi, eds., *Hajj Studies*, vol. 1 (Jidda: The Hajj Research Center, 1978-)

from the pre-Islamic period up to 1926 and the foundation of the Saudi state. Both tomes weave together Arabic, Persian, and Turkish sources, religious texts, pilgrimage narratives, and European archival materials, all handsomely embellished by copious maps, illustrations, and early photographs of the Holy Places. In particular, his chapter, “Steamships and Cholera: The Hajj in Modern Times,” in *The Hajj*, has been an important point of reference for this project. However, I have come to view these volumes as more of an encyclopedic guide, a textbook, or something of a mine from which one might extract quotations, references, or the answer to an obscure question. Though it feels strange to admonish any author for using too many primary sources, in the case of these two books, such a criticism may be appropriate. Because Peters relies so heavily on lengthy quotations, allowing the primary sources to speak for themselves, he provides very little in the way of analysis. As a result, both volumes careen from topic to topic, bereft of transitions, explanations, or any kind of theoretical or historiographical compass. 

In terms of theoretical sophistication, the most important general study of the *hajj* is undoubtedly Robert Bianchi’s recent masterpiece, *Guests of God: Pilgrimage and Politics in the Islamic World* (2005), which won the Middle East Studies Association’s Albert Hourani Book Prize. Particularly for those concerned with not only the rituals of the *hajj* and their administration in Saudi Arabia, but rather with the *hajj*’s social and political impact on Muslim societies scattered across the Islamic world, Bianchi’s research, unlike any other study before it, deals with both the national and trans-national dimensions of the great pilgrimage. Bianchi, an international lawyer and professor of

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political science, also a Muslim and himself a hajji, examines the international politics of the contemporary hajj through a series of case-studies on Pakistan, Malaysia, Turkey, Indonesia, and Nigeria. From a historical perspective, however, Bianchi only briefly deals with the colonial roots of the present-day pilgrimage system. Despite its brevity, Bianchi’s discussion of Hurgronje’s views on the administration of the pilgrimage from Dutch-ruled Indonesia and his insightful comparison between Hurgronje’s ideas and Turner’s theoretical model of pilgrimage have proved extremely useful.21

In many ways, Bianchi’s geographical de-centering of the hajj offers important clues about the direction in which the historiography of this topic is heading. While one might expect the vanguard of hajj research to have emerged from Near Eastern or Middle Eastern studies programs, from specialists of the Arabian Peninsula, or from among those whose primary research language is Arabic, this has not been the case. Rather, it has been specialists of the Ottoman Empire, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and a coterie of historians interested in questions of imperialism in the Indian Ocean world that have begun to lead the way. While their collective efforts currently account for little more than a handful of book chapters, articles, and a few full-length studies, by patiently piecing together the historiographical fragments that have been produced across these disparate fields, a fuller appreciation of the pilgrimage’s trans-regional, even global, dimensions can be exposed.

By far the most valuable investigation produced by this collection of scholars has been William Roff’s seminal article, “Sanitation and Security: The Imperial Powers and the Nineteenth Century Hajji” (1982). Roff, a specialist of Southeast Asia, was the first scholar to explore the confluence of medical and political concerns shared by colonial

administrators in India, Malaysia, and the Dutch East Indies.\textsuperscript{22} He was also the first to make use of the copious colonial archives amassed by the British. Although this study borrows much from Roff’s research, the two differ in several important respects. First, Roff’s study is now twenty-five years old and is therefore in need of an update to reflect more recent research. Second, despite its claim to cover both “sanitation and security,” the vast majority of the essay is dedicated to issues of sanitary surveillance, while specific threats posed by Pan-Islam and other forms anti-colonial radicalism are only briefly addressed in the articles concluding pages. Moreover, the narrative is told exclusively from a European perspective. As a result, I have striven to give more attention to the actions and voices of Muslims themselves, whether they be indigent Indian pilgrims, the Ottoman Sultan, Pan-Islamic activists, or participants in anti-colonial violence in the ports of the Red Sea and Mecca itself. Thus, this study has been deliberately designed so as to read less as a study of British colonial policy and more as a narrative of inter-imperial contestation between the Ottoman Empire, Britain’s Indian Ocean empire, and a collection of polyphonic Muslim voices spanning from Jidda to Bombay.\textsuperscript{23} And finally, despite some areas of overlap, I have tried wherever possible to

\textsuperscript{22} William R. Roff, “Sanitation and Security: The Imperial Powers and the Nineteenth Century Hajj” in Arabian Studies VI (London: Scorpion Comm. and the Middle East Centre, University of Cambridge, 1982). Though still unpublished, Eric Tagliacozzo, another specialist in Southeast Asian history, is currently preparing a manuscript, which will be the first to present the a comprehensive history of hajjis, from pre-modern times to the present, traveling from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phillipines, Singapore, and Thailand. For a summary of his forthcoming research, see Angilee Shah, “Hajj Stories from Southeast Asia,” UCLA International Institute, available from www.international.ucla.edu; Internet; accessed 19 May 2007. I would also like to extend thanks to Professor Tagliacozzo, whom I had the privilege of meeting at the American Institute for Yemeni Studies in 2006, for passing along several helpful articles. \textsuperscript{23} Although my thesis relies much more heavily on the colonial archive than upon the use of Arabic rihlas and Persian safarnāmihs, I plan to reverse this balance and devote much more attention to these matters during the course of my dissertation research. Similarly, there is much more work to be done with the Ottoman-era records housed in the Yemeni Presidency’s National Center for Archives in Sana’ā’, where I began to work while on a fellowship from the American Institute for Yemeni Studies in the summer of 2006. During the summer of 2007, I will be resuming my research both at the National Center
expand upon Roff’s use of British archival sources, particularly those from the Foreign Office, related to the *hajj*.\(^\text{24}\)

Though Roff’s research has exerted the greatest influence upon this study, another noteworthy contribution has come from the work of Mark Harrison, a specialist in the history of medicine in colonial India. His article, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade: India 1866-1900” (1992), deals extensively with British sanitary policies related to the containment of both cholera and plague as well as with British objections to international quarantine procedures.\(^\text{25}\) Harrison’s article includes copious documentation from India Office records as well as newspaper coverage taken from the *Bombay Gazette*. While the outbreak of cholera and plague in colonial India have been well documented by Harrison, David Arnold, I.J. Catanach, Ira Klein, and Sheldon Watts, Harrison’s article is still the only study to specifically address the relationship between cholera and plague in India, the quarantine of pilgrims en route to Mecca, and the quarantine controversy’s effect on Britain’s maritime trade.\(^\text{26}\)

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While Roff and Harrison have shown us glimpses of the richness of Britain’s colonial archive, there still remains much to be discovered in the Ottoman archives. Suraiya Faroqhi’s *Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans, 1517-1683* (1994) and Naimur Rahman Farooqi’s “Moguls, Ottomans, and Pilgrims: Protecting the Routes to Mecca in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” (1988) have both contributed much to our understanding of the political and organizational aspects of the early-modern *hajj*. However, William Ochsenwald’s investigations of the nineteenth-century Hijaz *vilayet* and Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s famous Hijaz Railway project stand as the only works based on Ottoman sources dealing with the time period under consideration in this study. In particular, Oschenwald’s *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz Under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908* (1984) contains valuable accounts of the Ottoman response to cholera as well local resistance to European sanitary interventions in Jidda and Mecca. 


Metageography (1997), the “various area studies complexes at American universities” have also encouraged “a certain insularity in scholarship, making it unnecessarily difficult for scholars to investigate processes that transcend conventional world regional boundaries.” In many ways, their analysis of the area-studies system as a whole is reflected in the historiographic fragmentation of hajj-related scholarship in particular. As a result, there is as of yet no cohesive historiography of the hajj.

**Beyond Area-studies: The Hajj as Indian Ocean History**

As Kären Wigen explains in “Oceans of History,” while maritime regions have typically been slighted by stubbornly continental and area-studies-driven conceptions of geography, “across the discipline, the sea is swinging into view.” Indeed, “no longer outside time, the sea is being given a history, even as the history of the world is being retold from the perspective of the sea.” Reflecting upon these exciting advances, particularly in the growth of Atlantic history, Bernard Bailyn remarked that: “There comes a moment when historians… blink their eyes and suddenly see within a mass of scattered information a new configuration that has a general meaning never grasped before, an emergent pattern that has some kind of enhanced explanatory power.”

Nowhere has this process been more evident than in the field of South Asia history. Drawing upon the now classic seascape template provided by Fernand Braudel’s investigations of Mediterranean basin, pioneering scholars such as K.N. Chaudhuri,

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Sugata Bose, Ashin Dasgupta, Kenneth McPherson, and M.N. Pearson have reframed the Indian subcontinent as part of vast chain of political, economic, and cultural interaction, stretching from East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula in the West to China and Southeast Asia in the East.\(^{32}\)

In his recent study, *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire* (2006), Sugata Bose defines the Indian Ocean basin as an “interregional arena.” Bose situates this concept “somewhere between the generalities of a ‘world system’ and the specificities of particular regions.” Bose contends that stubborn colonial boundaries have tended to “obstruct the study of comparisons and links across regions.” Moreover, this legacy has also played an important role in the construction of “regional entities known today as the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, which underpin the rubric of area studies in the Western academy. As a result these divisions tend to “arbitrarily project certain legacies of colonial power onto the domain of knowledge in the post-colonial era.”\(^{33}\)

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\(^{33}\) Bose, *One Hundred Horizons*, 5-7.
By transcending the artificial metageographical boundaries between the Middle East and South Asia, Bose exposes both Islamic and imperial connections that the traditional historiographies of area-studies regions have left inchoate. As Bose, Chaudhuri, and almost every other scholar of the Indian Ocean basin have repeatedly stressed, the Indian Ocean’s complex cultural and trade networks, which emerged in the pre- and early-modern periods, owe much of their existence to the spread of Islam. Of course, one of the primary vehicles that bound together the disparate peoples of this vast oceanic space was the *hajj*. In fact, as M.N. Pearson explains in his study of the Mughal-era *hajj*, *Pilgrimage to Mecca: The Indian Experience, 1500-1800* (1996), while most scholars have long focused on trade as the most important unifying element of the Indian...
Ocean, what has been neglected is the immense influence of passenger traffic associated with the pilgrimage trade.\textsuperscript{35} These sustained opportunities for person-to-person cross-cultural exchanges between groups as diverse as Arabs and Malays, Egyptians and Indians, or Hadramis and Indonesians breathed a cosmopolitan ethos and shared sense of cultural norms into this “interregional arena.”\textsuperscript{36}

By firmly insisting upon the existence and importance of these interregional Islamic contacts, the geographical space constructed by Indian Ocean scholars, perhaps more so than any other regional scheme, allows us to shake off Western scholarship’s pernicious tendency to conflate Islam with the Arab Middle East and South Asia with Hinduism. While this idea may seem ridiculously simple, precious few studies since Marshall Hodgson’s three volume \textit{tour de force}, \textit{The Venture of Islam} (1974), have been able to adequately articulate Islam’s capacity to integrate far-flung civilizations from the Mediterranean basin to China.\textsuperscript{37} Addressing almost identical concerns, Chatterjee notes in \textit{The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories} (1993) that because the history of the Indian nation-state, which dominates South Asian studies, has become synonymous with the “normalizing project” of Hindu nationalism, the trans-


\textsuperscript{36} Bose, \textit{One Hundred Horizons}, 37.

national “fragments” of Indian history, especially those of Indian Muslims and their interactions with the *dar al-Islam*, are often occluded, if not wholly “suppressed.”

Similarly, Bose complains that “The British raj has been typically regarded as having its basis in the territorial landmass of the Indian subcontinent and its extraterritorial relations have been studied following the longitudinal axis that linked metropolitan Britain and colonial India.” However, in reality, British India’s territories and political influence extended well beyond the national boundaries that constitute present-day India; its western frontiers stretched into the Persian Gulf, Arabia, the Red Sea and the coasts of East Africa. Thus, my thesis is concerned with the “latitudinal” linkages between India and its various dependencies and interests in the Red Sea, Arabia, and the Suez Canal zone. Likewise, the primary threats to British India’s security considered here also involve “latitudinal” contacts between the Ottoman Empire, Pan-Islamic activists, ex-Indian mutineers, and pilgrims. Despite tremendous efforts to monitor and control these contacts, “Muslim colonial subjects who undertook the pilgrimage could never be wholly subjected to state discipline.” In this regard, Islam’s universalist aspirations linking nineteenth-century Indian Muslims with their coreligionists across the Indian Ocean and the *dar al-Islam* may be viewed as an understudied, extraterritorial relative of the anti-colonialism trends that would later spawn the nationalist movements of the twentieth century.

Just as state boundaries and networks of surveillance could not contain the anti-colonial currents of Pan-Islam, studies confined by conventional area-studies regions have been utterly incapable of expressing the global reach of disease flows. Thus, on the

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one hand, the respective historiographies concerning cholera outbreaks in Britain, Europe, and India are rich, because few scholars have dared to address this topic from a trans-regional or global perspective. On the other hand, the complicated process by which cholera spread across the globe and ignited both international controversy and cooperation concerning how best to halt its advance has been repeatedly reduced to little more than a footnote. However, by addressing these issues from an Indian Ocean perspective, this study aims to articulate a critical plane of analysis that is flexible enough to shift between previously disconnected national, regional, and global frames.

\(^{40}\) For a survey of the historiography related to the spread of cholera in nineteenth-century Britain and Europe and the scientific debates concerning the etiology of cholera and germ theory, see Chapter 2.
CHAPTER 2

THE CRISIS OF CHOLERA

The policy which has been consistently maintained by the Government of India is that, as the exportation by sea of cholera from India to the Red Sea and Europe has never been known, elaborate precautionary measures, framed on the supposition that cholera, has been so exported, are useless restrictions upon trade and upon the great Mohammedan population of India.

-Lord Elgin, Viceroy of India

Ships loaded with emigrants or pilgrims, or which may be judged of especial danger to the public health, may be subject of special precautions to be determined by the sanitary authority of the port of arrival.

-William Maycock, Foreign Office

This quarantine in no way causes any loss or expense for the Ottoman Empire. Whatever they expend on it, they get back double from the pilgrims. Exorbitant sums go to the employees of the quarantine. When officials are posted to the quarantine, it is as if [they had been appointed] officials in charge of fleecing and plundering the pilgrims.

-Mîrzâ Muḥammad Ḥusayn Farāhānī, Iranian Pilgrim

“A Woeful Crescendo of Death”

From 1865 until at least World War I, India experienced what Ira Klein describes as “a woeful crescendo of death.” A staggering death rate of 41.3 per 1,000 in the 1880s, already high by contemporary European standards, rose to 48.6 per 1,000 between 1911 and 1921. As David Arnold explains, “the causes of this savage upsurge in

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3 Farāhānī, A Shi‘ite Pilgrimage to Mecca, 1885-1886, 291.
mortality have been much debated.” While Arnold, Klein, and a host of others have focused their attention on the balance of advancements and limitations in the way that Western medicine and sanitation were being applied to nineteenth-century Britain and India, William McNeill’s *Plagues and Peoples* (1976), stresses the role of British military campaigns in creating new patterns of disease transmission across the subcontinent. Other studies, most notably Mike Davis’ scathing Marxist exposé *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño and the Making of the Third World* (2001), have pointed to the expansion of capitalism and modern systems of trade and food distribution, which resulted from industrialization and the rise of new transportation options, particularly the introduction of rail and steamship connections. Moreover, Davis recasts India’s exorbitant levels of mortality primarily as a function of the large-scale famines that resulted from the deteriorating economic, social, and environmental conditions created by Britain’s exploitation of the subcontinent’s land and resources. Davis also underscores that while natural factors, such as the failure of the monsoons, contributed to droughts and famines, nineteenth-century India’s catastrophic mortality rates and the synergistic

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5 Arnold, *Colonizing the Body*, 200.
8 Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño and the Making of the Third World* (London and New York: Verso, 2001), 10, 26-27. As Davis explains, “newly constructed railroads, lauded as institutional safeguards against famine, were instead used by merchants to ship grain inventories from outlying drought-stricken districts to central depots for hoarding (as well as protection from rioters).” Moreover, “The taxes that financed the railroads had also crushed the ryots.” Worse still, the “commodification of agriculture eliminate[d] village-level reciprocities that traditionally provided welfare to the poor during crises.” Yet, the government of India vehemently opposed any attempt to regulate grain prices during times of famine, arguing that such actions would unnecessarily interfere with market forces and the principles of free-trade. Thus, despite the existence of adequate supplies of rice and wheat production in parts of India unaffected by famine, “much of India’s food surplus was exported to England.” In effect, “Londoners… were eating India’s bread.” For more on the technological side of this deadly equation, particularly the expansion of railroads and steamships, see Headrick, “Part Three: The Communications Revolution,” in *The Tools of Empire*, 129-149, 180-181; Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress*, 18-96.
9 Ibid., see especially Davis’ preface and “Victoria’s Ghosts,” 1-59.
relationship forged between drought, famine, and cholera were in fact *man-made* crises, born of colonial India’s unjust economic and political systems.\(^{10}\) However, Dadabhai Naoroji’s classic study of underdevelopment, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India* (1901), puts it best: “how strange it is that the British rulers do not see that after all they themselves are the main cause of the destruction that ensues from droughts; that it is the drain of India’s wealth by them that lays at their own door the dreadful results of misery, starvation, and deaths of millions… Why blame poor Nature when the fault lies at your own door?”\(^{11}\)

Regardless of whether one places more emphasis on economic, political, technological, or pathogenic factors beyond human control, the death tolls are undeniable. Between 1896 and 1921, outbreaks of plague accounted for about 10 million deaths. Malaria deaths during the same period accounted for probably twice that number. There was also the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919, which wiped out another 12 to 15 million.\(^{12}\) However, even these sobering epidemiological statistics pale in comparison with colonial India’s first and most prolific killer, cholera. Between 1817 and 1865, rough estimates suggest that some 15 million cholera deaths occurred. After 1865, more systematic and reliable mortality statistics began to be collected. From 1865 until 1947, a further 23 million deaths were recorded.\(^{13}\) Although, as we shall see, it is highly likely

\(^{10}\) See also Watts, *Epidemics and History*, 202. Watts also points out that: “Since the mid-1980s Oxfam and other disaster relief organizations have accepted that malnutrition (which contributes to a person’s predisposition to cholera) and famine (leading to death from starvation) are *man-made* disasters rather than the result of natural phenomena.”


\(^{12}\) Arnold, *Colonizing the Body*, 200.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 161.
that many more deaths went unrecorded for purely political reasons.\textsuperscript{14} Worse still, the millions lost to cholera were only part of a much larger colonial-era demographic catastrophe.

Extended periods of drought, followed by intense famines, ravaged the Indian countryside from 1876-1879 and again from 1896-1902. Though statistics vary widely, it is estimated that these two famines produced between 12.2 and 29.3 million victims.\textsuperscript{15} As a result of these waves of drought and famine, India became fertile ground for the incubation of cholera and other epidemic diseases. Though hot, dry conditions are generally a hindrance to the proliferation of the cholera bacillus, years of failed monsoons pushed villagers to seek water from contaminated sources. Chronic malnutrition combined with changes in diet and behavior worked to weaken immune systems and raise the risks of infection. Starvation led to desperate searches for sustenance, leading people to consume roots, leaves, and other marginal food sources, which resulted in diarrhea and other complications.\textsuperscript{16} Whether the victims of famine or disease, many attempted to flee to other villages, towns or cities, while others were concentrated in relief camps. As a result of both the mobility and concentration of victims, normal family and community standards of care-taking and hygiene collapsed into poverty and chaos, while British efforts at medical relief were more often than aimed at protecting

\textsuperscript{14} As Arnold explains, many cases of cholera were either down-played to avoid the threat of quarantine or they were falsely recorded as “famine diarrhea.” For conflicting reports regarding both the underestimation of cholera deaths and the inadequacy of the food being provided for famine victims, see \textit{Review of the Madras Famine, 1876-1878} (Madras: Government Press, 1881), 125; “Madras Sanitary Commissioner’s Annual Report,” 1880, p. 12; W.R. Cornish in “Madras Sanitary Commissioner’s Annual Report,” 1877, p. xxv; Charles Blair, \textit{Indian Famines: Containing Remarks on their Management} (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1874), 182-185.

\textsuperscript{15} Davis, \textit{Late Victorian Holocausets}, 7.

\textsuperscript{16} Arnold, \textit{Colonizing the Body}, 168.
white colonists and balancing budgets instead of ameliorating the plight of those who were actually suffering.\textsuperscript{17}

Working in tandem, the vicious cycles of famine and cholera in India set into motion a sanitation crisis which would eventually assume global proportions. Though cholera had long been endemic in Bengal, over the course of the nineteenth century it rapidly transgressed its previous boundaries. The disease first came to the attention of Britain and Europe in 1817, when there was an outbreak in the environs of Calcutta. Unlike the outbreaks of pre-colonial times, new patterns of British trade and military movement allowed the disease to grow beyond its previous limits, infecting new territories, where human resistance and coping mechanisms were nonexistent. Pre-colonial patterns of cholera transmission seem to have revolved around Hindu pilgrimage and festival circuits. Large crowds of celebrants would contract the disease and carry the infection back home, where it would run its deadly but still endemic course. From 1817 onward, however, cholera transmission dramatically expanded its reach. British troops brought the disease overland to Nepal and Afghanistan by 1818, while British ships spread it from East Africa to China during the 1820s. By the 1830s British trade had ensured the global diffusion of cholera. However, the arrival of cholera in Mecca in 1831

\textsuperscript{17} British famine relief camps took much of their inspiration for Chadwick’s poorhouse philosophy of “lesseligibility,” discussed on pp. 39-40 of this chapter. Thus, to qualify for food handouts each person, reardless of their current state of malnutrition, was forced to endure severe physical labor. If they failed to pass the “work test,” they were removed from the rolls of those eligible for aid. Moreover, the caloric value of the food rations allotted by the Government of India’s famine czar, Sir Richard Temple, has shockingly been proven to be less than the rations given to Holocaust victims at Nazi concentration camps during World War II. For more on the appalling conditions of the relief camps, see Arnold, \textit{Colonizing the Body}, 168; Davis, \textit{Late Victorian Holocausts}, 33-47; David Washbrook, “The Commercialization of Agriculture in Colonial India: Production, Subsistence and Reproduction in the ‘Dry South,’ c. 1870-1930,” \textit{Modern South Asian Studies} 28, no. 1 (1994), 151; Watts, \textit{Epidemics and History}, 201-202.
made that diffusion an annual event. Like India’s Hindu pilgrimage circuit before it, the *hajj* became a prime vehicle for the expansion and globalization of cholera transmission.\(^\text{18}\)

In 1831-1832, cholera made its first appearance in Britain. Yet, this first outbreak was not framed by contemporary observers as a colonial crisis, nor was it immediately connected to India or the *hajj*. Rather, as Sheldon Watts points out in *Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism* (1997), at this point, cholera was more closely associated with elite attitudes toward working-class people. It was argued that cholera was a non-contagious “variant of an English fever which could be expected to target those who were predisposed to it by their immoral living, their poverty, their neglect of family values, their holding of opinions about political matters, and their heavy drinking.” As in the case of the “Irish disease,” mostly likely typhus, which had swept across Britain from 1817 to 1819, cholera was viewed as a “disease of filth.” By connecting “‘superstitious’ Catholicism, poverty and death through disease, then contrasting it with ‘enlightened’ Protestantism, wealth and good health,” cholera became associated with “predisposing causes.”\(^\text{19}\) As we shall see, the rhetoric of “predisposing causes” became deeply engrained in British responses to cholera in both Britain and India.

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\(^\text{19}\) Quoted from Watts, *Epidemics and History*, 192-193. See also Christopher Hamlin, “Predisposing Causes and Public Health in Early Nineteenth Century Medical Thought,” *Social History of Medicine* 5, no. 1 (Apr., 1992), 59-60.
Edwin Chadwick and the Foundations of British Attitudes Toward Cholera

The driving force behind this ideology of “predisposing causes” was the acid-tongued lawyer, Edwin Chadwick. It was Chadwick, the one-time secretary to Jeremy Bentham, who was at the center of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 and its subsequent administration. As Watts reports, Chadwick “took up the task of creating a new system of poor relief which would at one and the same maintain the fiction that England was a Christian country and cater to the ideological needs of the propertied classes.” The result was a war on the supposedly “idle” poor. Though a national network of poorhouses was constructed in accordance with the Poor Law Amendment Act, conditions were so miserable that no able-bodied person would willingly subject themselves to these facilities. The guiding principle behind the construction and administration of these poorhouses was Chadwick’s notion of “less eligibility,” which subjected those who were desperate enough to find themselves in the poorhouse to prison conditions. These individuals were given minimal nutrition, alcohol and tobacco were forbidden, all reading materials except the Bible were forbidden, and inmates were segregated by sex and torn from family members. All of these moralizing restrictions were meant to keep the costs of poor relief down, while supposedly “forcing the willfully idle to work for their bread.” As a result of these measures, ordinary men and women of the working classes came to regard poorhouses as degrading “bastilles,” which were to be avoided at all costs. Even starvation or suicide became preferable options to the poorhouse.  

It is important to note how Chadwick’s Poor Law ideology spilled over into sanitary concerns in both Britain and India. Using his position as Poor Law chief as a

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20 Watts, Epidemics and History, 196-197.
stepping-stone, Chadwick was later given the responsibility of creating a Royal Commission to study the health of English towns. In his 1842 report, *Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain*, Chadwick also sought to defend his Poor Law strategies.\(^\text{21}\) Despite the fact that those living in Chadwick’s poorhouses were two to three times more likely to die of cholera than the general population, Chadwick sought to prove that not only had poverty been alleviated under his watch but that he also had a strategy for combating cholera. Combining a heavy dose of moralization with the mid-nineteenth century’s muddled Galenic understanding of disease transmission and newer ideas about sanitary engineering, Chadwick hypothesized that the way to combat cholera and move public health forward was to update sewage systems and water supplies. Chadwick’s rationale was that diseases were caused by “miasmas,” which rose from festering waste materials. According to Chadwick’s logic, removing the waste materials that caused these dangerous “miasmas” from working class neighborhoods would in turn eliminate disease and the principal causes of working class poverty, moral decay, and alcoholism. Ironically, while Chadwick correctly pointed to the water-borne nature of cholera by advocating the modernization of sewage systems, his ideologically motivated ideas concerning “miasmas” and “predisposing causes” would ultimately prove to be among the greatest obstacles to the scientific understanding of cholera in the nineteenth century. Over time Chadwick’s line of thought became institutionalized as the underpinning of Britain’s official response to cholera. In 1848-1849, when cholera returned to Britain, Chadwick was the head of the General Board of Health. He would continue to hold that position until 1854 and would continue to lecture.

until 1877. Under Chadwick’s tutelage scores of doctors and sanitary experts working in both Britain and India came to view cholera through the theoretical framework he had elaborated.22

Britain’s General Board of Health also began to apply Chadwick’s attitudes toward cholera on an international scale. Since Chadwick and the General Board of Health were convinced that outbreaks of cholera arose from local conditions found among certain classes or neighborhoods or through certain environmental factors, such as the quality of the air or water, the official British position was that cholera was not a contagious disease. This set of ideas came to be known as the “localist” position. By contrast, other European nations, particularly Mediterranean states, such as France and Italy, maintained that cholera was definitely a contagious disease. They reasoned that it was communicable from person to person. Thus, it was possible to transport the disease from its endemic homeland in India to Europe. According to this school of thought, otherwise known as “contagionist theory,” stringent quarantines and sanitary cordons were necessary to stem the transmission of the disease.23

As early as 1848, Britain’s General Board of Health had a clearly defined policy in opposition to “contagionist theory” and quarantine regulations. Foreign Office

22 Margaret Pelling, Cholera, Fever and English Medicine, 1825-1865 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 1-80. Pelling’s first two chapters explore both Chadwick’s role in the formation of Britain’s public health system and his role as the head of the General Board of Health. Pelling also illuminates the relationship between Chadwick and his medical advisor, Thomas Southwood Smith, who was instrumental in formulating Britain’s miasma-based sanitary ideal. See also Watts, Epidemics and History, 171, 195-198.

documents, particularly the “Letter from the General Board of Health respecting the spread of Cholera in this Country, and the inutility of Quarantine Regulations for preventing its introduction” (1848), indicate that British authorities were hostile to both the “notion of contagion” and preventative quarantines and cordons even before the international cholera crises of the 1860s to the 1890s. Citing the Metropolitan Sanitary Commission, the Royal College of Physicians of London, and the “special knowledge” of “medical men” observing the disease in India, the General Board of Health argued that “Asiatic cholera” has “rarely been communicated by personal intercourse, and that all attempts to stay its progress by cordons or quarantine have failed.” Therefore, “preventative measures, founded on the theory of contagion, namely internal quarantine regulations, sanitary cordons, and the isolation of the sick, on which formerly the strongest reliance was placed, have been abandoned in all countries where cholera has appeared, from the general experience of their inefficiency.” Moreover, it was also argued that quarantines and sanitary cordons were a “useless waste of public money,” which would “prejudice affairs and trade.”²⁴

At face value, the Board of Health’s opposition to “contagionist theory” and quarantines might appear as nothing more than an expression of scientific and professional opinion. Like Chadwick’s earlier work as Poor Law chief, however, such opinions seem to have been linked closely with the interests and prejudices of the propertied classes. Because the horrors of cholera were rhetorically linked with working

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²⁴ F.O. 881/299, Henry Austen to Viscount Palmerston, “Letter from the General Board of Health respecting the spread of Cholera in this Country, and the inutility of Quarantine Regulations for preventing its introduction,” Dec. 1848, p. 5-6. Official documentation of British skepticism and outright hostility toward “contagionist” theory can even be seen as late as the 1880s and 1890s. For example, see F.O. 881/5011, W. Maycock, “Memorandum respecting the Quarantine Restrictions adopted by Foreign Countries in consequence of the Outbreak of Cholera in Europe,” 30 Sept. 1884.
class people and their impoverished neighborhoods, Britain’s elites felt more threatened by the financial effects of quarantines than by cholera itself. As Watts reminds us, “every Briton knew since, since the era of the Continental Blockade imposed by Napoleon, Britain’s prosperity had depended on its mercantile fleet and world-wide freedom of trade.”

Owing to these intermingling historical and ideological perspectives on the relationship between poverty, cholera, and free trade, as British policies toward cholera developed over the course of the nineteenth century, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal, Britain was decidedly less concerned with controlling cholera’s transmission from India to Europe than with the protection of her Indian trade route against quarantine restrictions and sanitary cordons. It was even feared that France and other maritime powers might be able employ lengthy quarantine delays to erode the profits of British vessels traveling from Bombay via the Suez Canal.

This paranoia was most bluntly expressed in an 1883 edition of the British medical journal, *Lancet*, released just after the opening of the Kamaran Island quarantine station at the southern end of the Red Sea: “those who love quarantine, hate England.”

Ultimately, these attitudes would set the British Empire on collision-course with both international political opinion and scientific consensus.

*Science versus the Science of Denial*

Though the precise cause of cholera remained hotly contested among legitimate scientists until at least the mid-1880s, as Sheldon Watts points out, a working hypothesis concerning the transmission of cholera had already been worked out and publicly stated

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27 *The Lancet* 15 (Sept. 1883), 482.
as early as 1849 by John Snow. Snow, an anesthetist by training, who had worked with cholera victims in the coal mines near Newcastle-upon-Tyne during Britain’s first cholera epidemic in 1831-1832, became famous for exposing the link between cholera and contaminated water from the infamous Broad Street Pump in London in 1854.²⁸ Snow’s groundbreaking research identified the causal agent of cholera, a “poison,” reputed to reproduce itself within the body of the victim. He also identified its principal modes of transmission, through the victim’s “dejecta” (vomit and feces) and through the movement of people (human intercourse). Snow even explained how the provision of clean, uncontaminated drinking water could block the spread of the disease.²⁹

Though Snow’s conclusions demonstrated the role of water in the local epidemiology of the disease, his findings would also play an important role in the consensus reached by mainstream European scientists participating in the 1866 sanitary conference, concerning how best to halt cholera’s advance at the global level. Moreover, Snow’s research would eventually be reconfirmed by the findings of the German bacteriologist, Robert Koch. Through his investigations of cholera in both Egypt and India, Koch was able to discover the causal agent of cholera, the comma bacillus, in a Calcutta water tank in 1884. With Koch’s discovery of the role played by the human intestinal tract in the life-cycle of the bacterium, *Vibrio Cholerae*, and his confirmation of

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²⁸ Watts, Epidemics and History, 169; Watts, “From Rapid Change to Stasis,” 326.
cholera’s waterborne transmission through infected human waste products, the scientific debate surrounding how best to contain cholera should have come to a screeching halt.

However, the Government of India’s Sanitary Commissioner, Dr. J.M. Cunningham, serving from 1868 to 1884, had built his career around the denial of contagion theory and the obstruction of international quarantine efforts. Cunningham, a disciple of Edwin Chadwick’s localist school of thought, insisted that cholera was caused solely by local sanitary imperfections. Cunningham remained convinced that some “mysterious influence” in the state of the atmosphere, a particular “season” or the “fermentative products of the soil” were responsible for cholera outbreaks. He held that such imperfections in India’s environment were caused by “unwholesome surroundings” or the “filthy habits” of Indians, not by any “specific communicable germ.” Thus, he repeatedly argued that quarantine measures based on “contagionist theory” were “no more logical or effectual than it would be to post a line of sentries to stop the monsoon.” Rather, Cunningham espoused that the only truly appropriate response to cholera was a strict Chadwickian regimen of “pure air, pure water, pure soil, good and sufficient food, proper clothing, and suitable healthy employment for both mind and body.”

During his tenure as Sanitary Commissioner, Cunningham ruled the Anglo-Indian medical establishment with an iron fist. In fact, one of his first acts in office was to write

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34 Ibid., 130.
a damning commentary on the annual report of 1869, which had been prepared by his subordinate Surgeon-Major A.C.C. DeRenzy, the Sanitary Commissioner for the Punjab. While they had cooperated successfully during their campaign to halt the advance of the Hardwar cholera epidemic of 1867, just two years later Cunningham and DeRenzy had become bitter enemies. DeRenzy stubbornly insisted on following the cutting-edge recommendations of John Snow. However, in political terms, this was career suicide. Under Cunningham’s anti-contagionist regime, DeRenzy’s appeal to scientific consensus, would ultimately lead to his removal from office in 1876.35

Similarly, Cunningham made certain that subsequent investigations undertaken in India conformed to his official position. In 1878, T.R. Lewis of the Army Medical Department and D.D. Cunningham of the Indian Medical Service were appointed by the Indian Medical Service to examine the etiology of cholera using the latest methods of laboratory science and microscopy. Under the watchful eye of J.M. Cunningham, Lewis and D.D. Cunningham were indoctrinated into the localist school of thought. They concluded that “human agency alone could not explain the peculiar spread and periodicity of the disease and held the opinion that ‘cholera has as good a chance as malarial diseases to a telluric [soil-based] origin.”36

Although Cunningham’s localist approach to the etiology of cholera had been popular among medical authorities in India since the early nineteenth century, this doctrine was reinforced from the 1860s onward by the work of the German miasma-specialist Max von Pettenkofer.37 Pettenkofer, Koch’s long-time nemesis, put forth a

35 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, 192; Watts, “From Rapid Change to Stasis,” 354.
36 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, 194.
37 Max von Pettenkofer, Cholera: How to Prevent and Resist It, trans. Thomas W. Hime (London: Ballière, Tindall, and Cox, 1875). See also Watts, Epidemics and History, 204; Watts, “From Rapid
soil-based theory, which stated that the presence of a specific germ and a susceptible victim could not alone produce cholera symptoms. Rather, cholera required the presence of specific soil conditions. Only then would the germ acquire its pathogenic qualities and produce an epidemic. As an anti-contagionist, Pettenkofer was naturally opposed to the European consensus, which called for quarantines and *cordons sanitaires* in response to cholera outbreaks. As a result, his theories, despite their unpopularity among the scientific community in continental Europe, proved a valuable tool in British India’s battle against quarantine regulations. Pettenkofer’s denial of contagion theory culminated in his shocking *experimentum crucis* of 1892, in which, “having first neutralized his stomach, he swallowed a culture of cholera vibrios without apparent effect.”

Following Koch’s discovery of the cholera bacillus in 1884, his research was predictably attacked by his archrival Pettenkofer. While Koch was able to thoroughly refute Pettenkofer’s localist position at the Second Cholera Conference, held in Berlin in May 1885, Britain’s deeply institutionalized opposition to contagion theory would survive for nearly another decade. In his last days as the Government of India’s Sanitary Commissioner, Cunningham expressed both “patriotic pique as well as professional chagrin that an outsider like Koch should presume to unravel the mystery which had baffled India’s own medical service for more than sixty years.”

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41 Arnold, *Colonizing the Body*, 194.
Sir Joseph Frayer, Surgeon-General at the India Office Council in London, put it: “I am also very anxious to avert the evil consequences that may accrue from the effects of this so-called discovery on our sea traffic and international communication.” Moreover, Fayrer was determined that Britain would not take Koch’s discovery lying down, commenting that: “Happily we have pathologists and microscopists who are as competent as any in Germany or elsewhere to carry out such an investigation, and, in view of the important issues concerned, I would most strongly urge the Secretary of State in Council to assent to such an inquiry.”

As a result of Frayer’s request, Drs. Edward Emanuel Klein and Heneage Gibbes were dispatched to conduct their own “independent investigation.” To the great relief of the Government of India and the India Office, in 1885 Klein and Heneage reported that Koch’s bacillus was actually innocuous and could not be the sole cause of cholera.

Armed with the Klein-Gibbes report, “An Enquiry into the Etiology of Asiatic Cholera,” Frayer, with the support of the Italian delegate, managed to almost single-handedly derail the 1885 International Sanitary Conference in Rome. Frayer and his Italian colleague managed to prevent Koch from defending this research at the conference. In fact, it was even agreed that matters surrounding Koch’s theory should not be discussed at all. By casting doubts on Koch’s hypothesis, Frayer pushed for a

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43 Ibid.

relaxation of quarantine restrictions at both Kamaran Island and Suez, hoping for the return to a less stringent system of medical inspections.  

As a result of Britain’s continuing denial of the overwhelming scientific evidence, “the rapport between Britain and the continental states [especially France and Germany] became more and more strained.” However, the other European powers were unsuccessful in counterbalancing British domination through “the weak apparatus of internationalism.” As a result, the Rome conference was adjourned without being reconvened. No binding international agreement was reached. Thus, “more decisive than the question of who had the power to voice their interests at these conferences was therefore that of who had the power simply to refuse to co-operate.”

In many ways, British obstructionism at the Rome conference is a useful metaphor for understanding the entire series of sanitary conferences from 1851 onward.

**International Sanitary Conferences and the Quarantine Controversy**

International efforts to stem the spread of cholera from India began in earnest in 1838 when Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) established the Constantinople Superior Board of Health (*Le Conseil Supérieur de Santé de Constantinople*). Though originally composed only of members appointed by the Porte, it quickly became clear that quarantine measures proposed by the Board in 1839 could not be enforced against foreigners. Thus, regulations and taxes were referred for approval by foreign consulates, who were ultimately invited to appoint their own delegates to the board in 1840. Despite this gesture, as David Long explains, “the Board was constantly hamstrung by political

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45 Ibid., 701. See also Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 131.
intrigue by its European members as well as by Ottoman lethargy and obstructionism to what it felt was infringement by the European powers on its sovereignty. In large part, this body would become the primary instrument through which subsequent international action (or more often than not inaction) against cholera would be taken. At its height, the Board maintained a large sanitary service at all the principal ports of the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Red Sea, staffed by a corps of Levantine medical officers and amply funded by high quarantine dues. The Board even maintained services along the Ottoman Empire’s Persian frontier in order to monitor the Shia pilgrimage traffic destined for Najaf and Karbala. Similarly, the Egyptian Quarantine Board (L’Intendance Générale Sanitaire d’Égypte) was established in 1831. As in the case of the Constantinople Board, it was also dominated by foreign consuls. In 1881, a Khedival decree separated the Egyptian Quarantine Board into an internal or native-run branch, based in Cairo, and an external or international branch, Le Conseil Sanitaire Maritime et Quaranteaire d’Alexandrie, based in Alexandria. Often referred to as the International Quarantine Board, this body also played a major role in the sanitary control of the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the hajj. However, like its Ottoman counterpart in Constantinople, Egyptian efforts to halt the advance of cholera would also have to contend with British hostility toward quarantine regulations.

47 Long, The Hajj Today, 70.
49 F.O. 881/5155X, H. Hill to India Office, “History of Quarantine and Cholera in Europe from 1878,” Apr. 1885, pp. 1-3, 39. With the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) set about reorganizing the Alexandria Board in order to subjugate it to British demands that the Suez Canal remain open. See also Naval Intelligence Division, Western Arabia and the Red Sea, 465; Goodman, International Health Organizations, 235-237; Long, The Hajj Today, 70.
The first evidence of an impending diplomatic crisis over cholera prevention methods came in 1852, when the first international sanitary conference was convened in Paris in an attempt to settle the disputed question of quarantine. This conference marked the battle lines of international opinion on cholera prevention, which, would last until at least 1896. Mediterranean doctors and governments, inheriting centuries-old methods that been developed to combat the Black Death, continued to believe in contagion and the necessity of quarantine, while Britain and other northern European states scoffed at such “antiquated ideas,” preferring explanations involving “localist” theories, which viewed miasmas and sewage as the primary causes of cholera. As a result of these irreconcilable differences, cholera prevention was no longer being imagined as merely a matter of public health in Britain, India and Europe. Rather, it had become a matter of foreign policy and free trade.50

Although another international conference was convened in Paris in 1859, like its predecessor in 1852, consensus still proved unattainable. In 1865, however, a new sense of urgency developed when Europe experienced its fourth and most severe cholera outbreak. As has already been noted, a third sanitary conference gathered at Constantinople in 1866 to address the problem. During the seventh months that the conference met, a new era of sanitary interventionism emerged. The conferees took a strongly “contagionist” stance, concluding “that cholera is communicable from the diseased to the healthy.” Moreover, they “affirmed Asiatic cholera to be endemic in India, and in no other country.”51 As for the mode of transmission, the delegates pointed to the squalid conditions of Hindu pilgrimage centers within India, as well as of the “hajj

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50 McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 281-282.
to Mecca, seen as the second stage by which cholera was relayed from India to Europe.”  

From these conclusions, the delegates prescribed rigorous measures of quarantine, which eventually entailed the establishment of Red Sea and Caspian Sea quarantine stations (lazarettos) in order to inspect the health of those pilgrims infected with disease arriving in the Hijaz and, if necessary, to restrict the movement of infected pilgrims and the vessels carrying them. Finally, it was also recommended that the number of pilgrims traveling to Mecca be reduced and their “quality” improved through the administration of a “means test.”

Again in 1874, another international sanitary conference was held in Vienna to discuss the “best means of checking the spread of Epidemic Diseases, such as Asiatic Cholera.” The conference took as its highest priority the adoption of a “uniform system of preventative measures,” to be instituted in all of the participating nations and their colonial possessions. However, little had changed since the previous sanitary conference in 1866. Despite the protests of British delegates, cholera was still considered to be contagious by the majority of conference delegates and India was still blamed as its primary source. And though it was recommended that the controversial quarantine measures be adopted by all the participating nations, in the end it was recognized that individual states could opt for a less robust system of medical inspection instead of the more rigorous quarantines. Thus, the implementation of sanitary measures, whether

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through a system of quarantines or the medical inspection of ships, would be “left to the discretion of individual states.”

Under the proposed quarantine system, arrivals from an infected port were to be observed from one to seven days depending on the severity of the outbreak. In the ports of the eastern Mediterranean or under exceptional circumstances the period of observation might be extended to ten days. If cases or suspected cases occurred while at sea, the period of observation for uninfected persons was set at seven days from the time of their isolation. The sick, however, were to be landed separately for medical care, while the vessel and infected items onboard were subject to a rigorous disinfection process. Even arrivals from a port that was merely considered suspect, despite having no reported cases of infection or having been given free passage at another port of call, were subject to an observation period of five days. The boldest regulation of all, however, was concerned with “vessels considered particularly dangerous,” which specifically targeted ships carrying pilgrims and emigrants. Any vessel carrying passengers labeled as such would be subject to “special precautions,” which essentially meant that they could be held in quarantine for longer periods than other vessels. In order to implement this system it was decided that a chain of quarantine stations governed by an international commission would be constructed throughout the Red Sea at Suez, al-Tūr (El Tor), al-Wajh, Kamarān Island, and the Straits of Bāb al-Mandab.

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By contrast, the system of medical inspection, largely unchanged since the Constantinople conference, called for greater intelligence sharing as opposed to the enforcement of quarantines. Under this system, each port was to employ an officer who would be responsible for gathering information regarding the health of the port under his care. These officers would communicate the relative status of their ports and statistics relating to mortality, and provide bills of health for departing vessels. According to this more permissive proposal, even a vessel from an infected port would be allowed passage through the Red Sea, if it had not reported any infections during its voyage or if it had called at another uninfected port during its voyage. If these conditions were not meant, only then would the vessel be delayed for medical inspection. Vessels under suspicion would be boarded and inspected for signs of sickness or deaths having resulted from cholera. If no cases were observed, the ship would be free to continue. If evidence of cholera was found, however, the vessel, its crew and passengers would be subject to disinfection, but merchandise would be allowed to pass immediately.56

Having left sanitary measures largely to the discretion of individual states, it was proposed that the conclusions reached in Vienna should be formalized as an International Convention. In the years following the Constantinople and Vienna conferences, however, both the representatives of Britain and British India repeatedly showed a preference for more flexible systems of medical inspection and intelligence sharing.57 British India also sought to implement its own package of sanitary and pilgrimage-related reforms rather than assenting to any permanent agreements or surrendering any sovereignty to an international commission. Therefore, it was no great surprise when in

56 Ibid.
In 1876 the Government of India formally “declined to be fettered in their in their legislation by any such Convention.”

Despite the Government of India’s rejection of the proposed International Convention in 1876, British officials were ultimately unable to avoid the implementation of the quarantine facilities first envisaged in 1866. Although Ottoman authorities had long delayed building quarantine stations because of the considerable expenses involved, a new station was opened at Kamarān Island, a barren strip of land just off the coast of Yemen at the southern end of the Red Sea, just in time for the 1882 pilgrimage season. Prior to its opening, Indian pilgrims had undergone occasional quarantines in makeshift camps in Jidda. Without British support for quarantine measures, the expenses for the establishment of the Kamarān Island station fell upon the Ottoman government. As a result, provisions at the camp were less than comfortable for the pilgrims forced to embark upon its shores. Moreover, an exorbitant head tax was levied to recover the funds need to establish the station.

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60 F.O. 881/4942X, Egypt, “Unfinished Report by the late Consul Moncrieff on the Quarantine Treatment of Indian Pilgrims at Camaran,” 1883, p. 3; Baldry, “The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamarān Island,” 30; Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 124.
Figure 5. An Early Sketch Map of the Kamaran Island Quarantine Station, 1892.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{61} Reproduced from F.O. 195/1767, Vice Consul Sayyid Tameez ad-Deen, Hudayda to Acting Consul Dr. Abdur Razzack, Jidda, 30 Sept. 1892, in \textit{Records of the Hajj}, vol. 9, 229-230.
Almost immediately after the first Indian pilgrims set foot on the island, the British consulate in Jidda received a deluge of complaints. Pilgrims complained that the quarantine fees were excessive, foodstuffs and cooking fuel were prohibitively expensive, and that water was both scarce and brackish. The lack of water was further compounded by the island’s insufficient accommodations. Seventy pilgrims were herded into each Tihāma-style thatched hut, provided by the Ottoman provincial authorities in Hudayda. The station’s supervising physician calculated that this would have provided approximately 11.3 square feet per pilgrim. Given the sizzling temperatures for which Kamarān is infamous, this amount of space would have proven positively suffocating for healthy pilgrims, let alone sickly or elderly ones.\(^62\) As one physician who accompanied pilgrims to Kamarān noted, “the shelter which is meant for their short imprisonment is totally unfit for such a place as Camaran, where sometimes the heat (sultry) is even greater than Muscat, and the poor pilgrims have to keep themselves half scorched under their cow-sheds until relieved.”\(^63\) Worse still, there were also troubling accusations of intimidation and beatings at the hands of Ottoman guards and women being forcibly unveiled for medical inspections.

As Harrison points out, in light of the conditions on Kamarān Island, “the Turkish Sultan had provided the anti-quarantine lobby in India with just the evidence it needed to make a powerful case against such restrictions. Seizing its chance, the Indian government launched an immediate inquiry into conditions at Kamarān.”\(^64\) The report


\(^{63}\) F.O. 195/1730, in “Correspondence printed in the Times of India,” 26 July 1891,” in Records of the Hajj, vol. 9, 217.

\(^{64}\) Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 131.
stated that “pilgrims were subjected to oppression and extortion amounting to positive cruelty.” Moreover, the whole arrangement seemed to be designed solely for the pecuniary benefit of the Turkish authorities.” Owing to the difficult living conditions on Kamarān Island, the Indian government even began to suggest that the quarantine station itself might become an epicenter for cholera transmission. As the editor of the *Bombay Gazette* put it in 1883: “more sickness occurs on the island of Kamarān than during the voyage. On board ship pilgrims are tolerably well cared for. At Kamarān they [the pilgrims] are turned onto a desert island without an adequate supply of water or shelter from the sun.” Despite years of complaints, even as late as 1891, petitions from

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65 Ibid., 125, quoted from India Office Records (I.O.R.) P/2261, Govt. of India (Sanitary) to Govt. of India (Home Dept.) to Sec. of State, 24 Apr. 1883.

66 Ibid., quoted from *Bombay Gazette* (7 Aug. 1883), 18.
aggrieved pilgrims, such as those of the ill-fated S.S. Sculptor, published in *The Times of India*, reflected similar experiences:

The [S.S.] Sculptor was not sent back, but the pilgrims petitioned the captain to take them back to Bombay as they were seriously alarmed by their treatment in Camaran. It should be remembered that up to the time the pilgrims landed on that quarantine station, there was not a single case of cholera on board, and their sufferings commenced when they had set foot on the island and drunk of the brackish and unwholesome water which the authorities there had kept in store for them. The so-called sanitary arrangements for the accommodation of pilgrims were highly incomplete and such as would scarcely reflect credit on any civilized or humane Government.⁶⁷

Though, as has already been discussed, the 1885 conference in Rome was doomed from the outset by British intransigence regarding the etiology of cholera, important discussions regarding the quarantine stations at Kamarān Island, Suez, and al-Tūr did take place. However, owing to Britain’s occupation of Egypt in 1882, relations between the British and Ottoman empires had seriously deteriorated. Thus, when Britain renewed its demand for the withdrawal of quarantine restrictions at Kamarān and Suez, the Sultan took exception to these demands, announcing that vessels traveling from India to Ottoman territories would thereafter be subject to ten as opposed to five days in quarantine. Similarly, British and Indian proposals that ships agreeing not to dock before reaching England should be exempted from the Suez quarantine were soundly defeated. As a result of Britain’s new-found influence in Egypt, many nations, particularly France, were also extremely concerned that Britain would manipulate the Alexandrian Quarantine Board in order to relax quarantine measures, which were rightfully regarded as Europe’s last line of defense against the onslaught of cholera.⁶⁸

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⁶⁷ F.O. 195/1730, in “Correspondence printed in the *Times of India*,” 26 July 1891,” in *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 9, 216. The preamble to the petition was written by A.H.A.Z.A. Shirazi, Agent, Bombay and Persia S.N.Co., Ltd. However, the petition itself was author by Oomer Jamal, et al.

⁶⁸ Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 127, 131.
The Thomas Cook Hajj:  
Reforming the “Sanitary Pariah of the East”

With the failure of the Rome conference, it might seem that the Indian government was completely incapable of reconsidering its own sanitary policies. Despite the continuance of its unilateralist approach to international sanitary reforms and quarantine restrictions, however, by the mid-1880s external pressures from Europe and the Ottoman Empire as well as the growing acceptance of Koch’s discovery of the cholera bacillus began to mount. These external factors coupled with internal pressures, particularly complaints about the plight of indigent pilgrims from the Indian Muslim community and the reporting of pilgrimage-related scandals in the Anglo-Indian press, forced Britain to intensify its own efforts to reform the sanitary conditions of the ocean-going pilgrimage trade.

British India’s first steps toward reforming the pilgrim trade had already been made in 1858. Act XXI of 1858, a precursor to what eventually came to be known as the Native Passenger Ships Act of 1876, was primarily designed to restrict the number of passengers per vessel in the hopes that by alleviating instances of over-crowding the risk of cholera outbreaks would also be mitigated.69 Yet, as British officials in Jidda and Egypt acknowledged, these regulations were easily evaded. Ship masters embarking with far too many passengers than British regulations allowed would simply land at a neighboring port under Turkish or Egyptian administration. As the “men on the spot” complained, they did not have the resources to inspect every ship arriving and departing

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69 For the Native Passenger Ships Act of 1876 and a parallel discussion of Turkish pilgrimage regulations, see F.O. 881/3079, “Correspondence respecting Turkish Regulations for Pilgrim Traffic, 1875-1877,” inclosure 3 in no. 13, Extract from the Bombay Government Gazette, 20 Apr. 1876. For its amending act of 1883, see Manual for the Guidance of Officers and Others Concerned in the Red Sea Pilgrimage Traffic (Shimla: Government Central Branch Press, 1884) in F.O. 78/4093, Pilgrimage Traffic, 1884-1884. For British efforts to force the Ottoman Empire to agree to coordinate its regulations with those of the Native Passenger Ships Act, see also F.O. 79/4094, “Turkey, Pilgrimage Traffic, 1886-1887.”
from Jidda much less those which actively sought to evade the law. Moreover, these officials also wondered whether or not they had any jurisdiction in the Ottoman Empire or over vessels which were no longer on British Indian soil.\(^{70}\) Despite the fact that no piece of British Indian legislation could be truly effective without Ottoman and Egyptian cooperation in the Red Sea, British officials repeatedly scoffed at such cooperation, alternatively citing the incompetence and corruption of both administrations.\(^{71}\)

In the absence of any effective international regulations, however, the 1880s would emerge as a decade of pilgrimage-related scandals. Undoubtedly the best known incident occurred in August 1880. The steamship *Jeddah*, sailing under a British flag, embarked from Penang with nearly a thousand Malay and Indonesian pilgrims on board. After enduring some difficult storms, the ship began taking on water, and sprung a heavy leak just off Cape Guardafui, at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden. With the water rising rapidly, the captain and the ship’s European officers panicked and abandoned the passengers to their fate, an apparently certain death. Escaping with one of the ship’s few emergency crafts, the Europeans were picked up by another vessel and were taken to Aden. Astonishingly, however, given that the *Jeddah* and its passengers had been left for dead, the *Jeddah* herself arrived in Aden some twenty-four hours later, having been towed by a French vessel. In many ways, this was a great moral role reversal for the “natives” and their supposedly superior colonial overlords. The Malay pilgrims had courageously worked the pumps and kept their vessel afloat until help arrived, while the


white men onboard had shown themselves to be cowards, violated their own codes of
seafaring behavior, and abandoned their charges to die.\textsuperscript{72}

The official inquiries that followed sparked an international scandal, which
effectively shamed British authorities from Aden to Singapore. In 1898, this great
“scandal of the Eastern seas,” would eventually provide the basis for Joseph Conrad’s
famous novel, \textit{Lord Jim}.\textsuperscript{73} Conrad’s fictional pilgrimage vessel, the \textit{Patna}, was
essentially a literary recreation of the conditions onboard the \textit{Jeddah}. Like most pilgrim
ships of the time, the \textit{Patna} was small, inhumanely overcrowded, and completely lacking
emergency equipment, proper sanitation facilities, and access to medical attention. Even
the space demanded by law was a mere nine superficial feet per adult. Perhaps no other
description of the period captures the ominous sense of foreboding that must have
accompanied pilgrims as they set out for Mecca:

\begin{quote}
They streamed aboard over three gangways, they streamed in urged by faith and the
hope of paradise, they streamed in with a continuous tramp and shuffle of bare feet,
without a murmur, or a look back; and when clear of confining rails spread on all sides
over the deck, flowed fore and aft, overflowed down the yawning hatchways, filled the
inner recesses of the ship—like water filling a cistern, like water flowing into crevices
and crannies, like water rising silently even with the rim.\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

While the \textit{Jeddah} incident ultimately did not move British officials to take action,
some five years later the issue of overcrowding returned to the public eye with a
vengeance. On 31 October 1885, \textit{The Times of India} ran a scandalous story, “The
Pilgrimage Trade.” This exposé shed light on the most gruesome details of the trials to
which India’s “pauper pilgrims” were subject during their voyages to Mecca and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[74] Conrad, \textit{Lord Jim}, 7; Roff, “Sanitation and Security,” 151.
\end{footnotes}
ultimately pressed the government to take drastic new steps to reform the pilgrimage business.\textsuperscript{75} Having virtually ruled out cooperation with the Ottoman Empire, however, Britain turned to an unlikely savior. In 1885, Thomas Cook’s son John Mason Cook was approached in Constantinople by Sir Henry Drummond Wolff with a request from the Governor General of India, Lord Dufferin, to assist the colonial administration in rationalizing, reforming, and monitoring the entire pilgrimage transportation network between India and Mecca. Thus, from 1886 to 1893, the famous travel agency Thomas Cook and Son was appointed as the official travel agent of the \textit{hajj}. As Harrison explains, the government “hoped that Cook’s high reputation would reassure Muslim leaders and the International Boards that Bombay was no longer the ‘Sanitary Pariah of the East’.”\textsuperscript{76}

On 4 January 1886, a three-year agreement was struck. The terms of that agreement were as follows: Cook’s was to be the sole travel agent of the \textit{hajj}. As agents of the government, Cook’s representatives were to receive assistance from government officials throughout India. One of the firm’s tickets was to be issued to each pilgrim by a government officer along with a passport. The office of the Protector of the Pilgrims, a centralized administrative office opened in Bombay in 1882, was to be placed under Cook’s control. Thomas Cook and Son were to arrange with the railway administrations and steamship proprietors for the conveyance of the pilgrims, quoting fares from all chief


\textsuperscript{76} Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 132.
stations from India to Jidda and back. The government agreed to indemnify Thomas Cook against any financial losses that it might incur in the course of its work.⁷⁷

Recognizing the enormity of the task before him, John Mason Cook is said to have commented: “I know this business is surrounded with more difficulties and prejudices than anything I have hitherto undertaken.”⁷⁸ In hindsight, it would appear that Mason Cook’s words were prophetic. The situation facing Cook’s was grim. Muslim pilgrims, many of them so poor that they could not even afford to pay for transportation to Bombay, India’s largest point of embarkation for the hajj, often walked from hundreds and even thousands of miles away. Indeed, many of them died before their sea-journey had even begun, while those who did survive the overland trip to Bombay were often in poor condition. Even these hardships were only the beginning. Unfortunately, the piety of the pilgrim was matched if not exceeded by the thievery and exploitation of Bombay’s pilgrimage brokers, whom John Mason Cook, once referred to as Bombay’s version of the “Liverpool Crimp.” Often pilgrims were kept waiting for weeks, while their funds were depleted by inflated prices for accommodations, food, and scams of every description. For those who were able to successfully secure a steamship ticket from Bombay to Jidda, a new struggle began once they boarded. The competition for space was intense. The weak were elbowed aside and trampled upon and in some cases crushed to death, while those who did manage to stake claim to a space “were crowded together below decks in conditions hardly better than those on slave ships.” As one can imagine,

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⁷⁸ Rae, The Business of Travel, 211-212.
the combination of rough seas and cramped quarters created appallingly unsanitary and often deadly conditions.\textsuperscript{79}

Despite the increased sanitary restrictions imposed by subsequent legislative actions, namely the Pilgrim Brokers Act of 1886 and the updated Native Passenger Ships Act of 1887, even the vaunted Cook’s could not tame the \textit{hajj}.\textsuperscript{80} In 1889 a retired Muslim Inspector of Hospitals, Muhammad Yakub Ali Khan, accused Cook’s of having sold more tickets for the return journey from Jidda than there had actually been accommodation available for onboard the steamship \textit{Tanjore}, highlighting the overcrowding and sufferings endured by the pilgrims involved. Again in 1891, Cook’s pilgrimage operations were implicated in a major outbreak of cholera aboard the S.S. \textit{Decan}, owing to the overcrowded conditions below its decks.\textsuperscript{81}

Ultimately, this novel experiment in colonial governance proved unsatisfactory for both Cook’s and the British officials charged with overseeing the reform of pilgrimage transport. In 1889, Cook’s announced losses, stating that the firm’s pilgrimage operations were unlikely to ever turn a profit. Cook’s claimed that it had not received the support it had expected from India’s Muslim community, and would only agree to continue its operations if the government would agree to reimburse the firm for any future losses.\textsuperscript{82} The relationship was finally terminated in 1893. Despite Cook’s obvious failures, on the occasion of the banquet commemorating Cook’s fiftieth anniversary, the company’s efforts were hailed not only as an absolute success and

\textsuperscript{79} Swinglehurst, \textit{The Romantic Journey}, 133-136.
\textsuperscript{80} Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade;,” 133.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
solution to the pilgrimage question, but were lauded as selfless acts of humanitarianism, social justice, and most importantly a great service to Britain’s prestige in “the East.”

**Pauper Pilgrims, the Suez Canal, and the Civilizational Boundaries of Travel**

A recurring theme that runs across the Foreign Office correspondence with Cook’s regarding the hajj, *The Times of India*’s reporting on the subject, Turkish and Egyptian complaints to the British government, the observations of elite Indian Muslims, and the reports of European observers traveling in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea points to the fact that “pauper pilgrims” were widely considered the root cause of the sanitary crisis that surrounded the pilgrimage for most of the latter half of the nineteenth century. This collective sentiment is well summarized by the almost hopeless description offered by W.H. Wilson, the Acting Commissioner of Police for Bombay (1886):

The Acting Commissioner has the honour to report that a large number of the Indian Pilgrims are no doubt very poor, and go to the Hedjaz not so much with the intention of maintaining themselves by begging…but on account of the sanctity of the place and with a feeling that if they die there they will go straight to Paradise. Some stay on waiting till death overtakes them, and others having no funds to return to India are forced to beg; but beyond warning them; it seems impossible to prevent them from going there. Any interference in this matter on the part of the British Government would be certainly taken as an interference in their religion.

In contrast to the Commissioner’s comments, other observers were much less charitable. In a description of her journey through the Suez Canal, Mary French Sheldon described a

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83 “Banquet to Commemorate the Fiftieth Year of the Business of Thomas Cook and Son,” held at the Hôtel Métropole, London, 22 July 1891, which is attached as addendum inside Rae’s, *The Business of Travel*, 8.

caravan of pilgrims as “unclean, utterly miserable, degraded human beings, knowing only a migratory life, in common with their camels and their vermin.”

While one might suspect that Indian Muslim observers would have taken exception to such comments, this was not always true. As in the case of the Egyptian and Ottoman complaints to British authorities, many Muslim notables’ opinions reflected a strong bias against their lower class Muslim brothers and sisters. In fact, in response to government inquiries regarding what should be done to reform the pilgrimage, the Central National Muhammadan Association responded by noting:

…there appears to be considerable truth in the complaint of the Turkish Government. A large majority of the destitute Indian Muhammadans who go to Mecca are more actuated by the worldly motive of making a livelihood from the charity of the richer pilgrims; and in many cases they prove themselves a nuisance to their well-to-do fellow compatriots. Under the Muhammadan law no person is entitled to make the hujj unless he has the means of paying for the journey to and fro, and maintaining himself at the same time.

Moreover, the advice of the Muhammadan Association was that a means test or security deposit be instituted to separate out those pilgrims who could not actually afford to undertake the hajj.

British authorities, however, remained reluctant to take such a step. As Harrison explains, “the majority of pilgrims, most of whom struggled to meet the cost of the pilgrimage, appear to have resented increased fares more than overcrowding or the lack of sanitary facilities.” Moreover, “Sanitation on board pilgrim vessels was primarily the

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concern of well-to-do Muslims, willing to meet the cost of increased fares and to pay the sanitary levies introduced in some Indian ports.\textsuperscript{87} Similarly, British authorities repeatedly resisted measures to increase the amount of square footage allotted for each pilgrim. To increase space requirements would have reduced the number of pilgrims that could be carried by each ship, raising fares, and damaging the competitiveness of British steamship operators. As one member of Bombay’s European community, writing under the pen name “Oliver Twist,” put it in a letter addressed to the Bombay Gazette:

\begin{quote}
the effect of increasing the space [for each pilgrim on board ships] would be simply that the Hadj would become more expensive a thing than it already is, and philanthropically disposed as Government may be, it has no more right to legislate in that direction that is has to make it law that no-one shall go home except in a first-class P. & O. Steamer.\textsuperscript{88}
\end{quote}

While the administrative reforms put in place by Thomas Cook and Son may have alleviated these tensions to a certain extent, the ultimate solution to this lingering problem came only when a degree of international consensus regarding the \textit{hajj} was finally reached at the sanitary conferences of 1892 and 1894 in Venice and Paris. In 1892, delegates at the Venice conference proposed different sanitary regulations for pilgrims as opposed to other travelers and commercial traffic. In 1894, the Paris conference prescribed strict disinfection and control measures for pilgrims while generally advocating that quarantining all travelers was unnecessary. While this compromise assuaged British concerns, the decision to differentiate between pilgrims and other

\textsuperscript{87} Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 134. 
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 132, quoted from the \textit{Bombay Gazette} (31 Aug. 1886), 14.
travelers aided in the construction of an imaginary boundary between different forms of mobility.\textsuperscript{89}

As Valeska Huber explains, “while some types of mobility—connected with European expansion and trade became a marker of modernity, other types came to be seen as a symbol of the Orient and its lack of civilization.” Thus, as opposed to the European tourist, trader, or soldier, pilgrims, immigrants, the poor, and non-Europeans were generally considered dangerous and their movements necessitated surveillance and regulation. In other words, “this categorization of border-crossers” styled “some cross-border enterprises as choler-free linked with trade but also with the movement of troops.” At the same time, however, “the singling out of the pilgrims as the main vector of cholera justified the lowering of restraints on other groups of travelers.” As a result, the Suez Canal became a kind of border, “permeable to European colonial and commercial enterprises, but impermeable to others.”\textsuperscript{90}

In many ways such distinctions reinforced and made concrete the perception that, following the opening of the Suez Canal, the Red Sea had become a vulnerable border zone between Europe and Asia. Just as it was common practice for travelers of the period to fashion their passage through the Red Sea and the Canal as a turning point in their journey, marking their transition to and from “civilization,” travelers themselves were labeled in much the same way.\textsuperscript{91} At least in the minds of European travelers, the Suez Canal was both the “gate of the East…with all its mysteries, its glamour, it history,

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{89} Huber, “Contact Zone,” 4-6; Huber, “The Unification of the Globe by Disease?,” 468-476. For Huber’s conception of “Boundaries between Mobilities,” see John Urry, Sociology beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century (London and New York, 2000).
\textsuperscript{90} Huber, “The Unification of the Globe by Disease?,” 474.
\textsuperscript{91} Huber, “Contact Zone,” 2.
\end{footnotesize}
its wonders,” but also a vulnerable connection to its “dangers and depravities.” As a result of this perception, “the Suez Canal was in many ways Mecca’s counterpart at the conferences.” While “the first represented the triumph of technology and Western modernity, the latter was connected with ‘Oriental’ backwardness and disease.”

The implications behind this civilizational demarcation were certainly not lost on the delegations from Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia. For them, “the Suez Canal issue highlighted the unequal relationship between Western Europe and the Orient, ambiguously shifting between co-operation and exploitation.” Ironically, “while treating the countries of the Middle East condescendingly,” Europe “still relied on their assistance.” In effect, the Orient had become the semi-civilized, but still expendable, buffer zone between the Indian disease pool and the civilized nations of Western Europe.

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93 Huber, “The Unification of the Globe by Disease?,” 475.
94 Ibid., 468, quoted from *Venice 1892*, Protocol no. 14, 27 Jan. 1892, p.262. As the Egyptian delegate to the Venice conference of 1892, Boutros Pasha, put it: “You make Egypt a sentry to safeguard Europe and then you tell her ‘Pay for it!’”
CHAPTER 3

POLICING PAN-ISLAM

Obedience to the Sultan is mandatory;
This is enjoined by the Koran and oral tradition.
Any Muslim who contradicts this
Is, surely, a wicked hypocrite!

-Sayyid Muhammad ‘Ārif ibn al-Sayyid Ahmad Al-Munīr al-Husaynī’l-Dimashqī¹

… as along as the union of Islam continues, England, France, Russia, and Holland
can be counted on my finger tips, because in the Muslim lands now under their
domination even one word of the Caliph would be enough for starting a *jihad*
against them which would be a catastrophe for the Christians.

-Sultan Abdul Hamid II²

The Rise of British Surveillance in the Red Sea and the Muslim Holy Land

British India extended well beyond the national boundaries that constitute present-
day India. It included the territories of present-day Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma and
its western frontiers stretched into the Persian Gulf, Arabia, the Red Sea and the coasts of
East Africa. Far from being confined to a contiguous land mass, British India was
actually an Indian Ocean Empire, which safeguarded British India’s regional interests
through an archipelago of scattered dependencies, consulates, and agencies. These
agencies, writes Robert Blyth, “met India’s strategic needs, served commercial interests,
dealt with the consequences of the Indian diaspora, facilitated pilgrimage to Arabia and

¹ Sayyid Muhammad ‘Ārif ibn al-Sayyid Ahmad Al-Munīr al-Husaynī’l-Dimashqī, *The Book of the
Increasing and Eternal Happiness—The Hijaz Railway*, introduction, text, and translation by Jacob Landau,
under the title *The Hijaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of Ottoman Political Propoganda*

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acted as listening posts across much of the Islamic world.”\(^3\) These outposts originally developed around the commercial needs of the East India Company and India’s native merchant diaspora. During the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, the Company was already active in the Red Sea, particularly in Jidda and Mocha. It seems probable that Company residents, particularly Muslims, became involved in preexisting pilgrimage networks of shipping, lodging, and financial transactions. As a result of this mixture of trade and pilgrimage, large communities of Indian Muslims could be found in Mecca, Jidda, Mocha, and Aden.\(^4\)

After the Mutiny and Parliament’s transfer of East India Company possessions to the Crown in 1858, new security needs led the imperial state to project its power throughout the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. However, even before 1858, a more aggressively imperial mode of operations was already emerging. Though the British were forbidden from physically entering the Holy Places, they were allowed in Jidda. From Jidda and their footholds in the other ports of the Red Sea, they began to build greater intelligence capabilities and press for more direct influence in the Red Sea. The intensification of British interests in the region began in earnest with the voyage of the steamship *Hugh Lindsay* on 20 March 1830. Aggressively backed by the Bombay Presidency, even when plans for the ship and its proposed Red Sea route had been discarded by the East India Company’s Court of Directors, the *Hugh Lindsay* quickly proved its worth, reducing the journey from Bombay to Suez to a mere twenty-one days.


\(^4\) Roff, “Sanitation and Security,” 144.
Seeing the potential benefits of this new steam technology, the Bombay Presidency and the Government of India both looked to the Red Sea with renewed interest.\(^5\)

The opening of the Red Sea to regular steamship services, however, still depended on the military support of British India to ensure its success. In order to provide coaling station for its ships the Bombay Presidency forcibly seized the Island of Socotra, off the Horn of Africa, in 1835. Four years later in 1839, when the port of Aden was found to offer a better harbor and climate than that of Socotra, Aden’s ruler, like Socotra’s, was intimidated, bribed, and ultimately overpowered.\(^6\) Not surprisingly, this aggressive stance in the Gulf of Aden rapidly intensified the activities of British agents in the region. By the 1830s British agents were given greater political responsibilities and upgraded titles. Another sign of change came in 1837 when the East India Company began to appoint “English” (i.e., non-Muslim and non-Indian) agents to Red Sea posts, such as Jidda, Mocha, Suez, and Qusayr. By August 1838 these very same agents were recognized by the British Foreign Office as Vice-Consuls. As Alexander Ogilvie, the first British Vice-Consul at Jidda, reported to his new post, his French counterpart, Fulgence Fresnel, described the scene: “Jeddah, that old concierge of the Holy City, received within its walls, stupefied, a European consul arrayed in the European fashion and the cannon of the Muslim fortress saluted with 21 guns the English flag as it was hoisted over the consular residence.”\(^7\) To underscore the significance of this shift in Red Sea’s balance of power, only sixty years earlier the Ottoman Sultan had considered “the sea of Suez” and the “noble pilgrimage to Meccah” to be wholly Muslim affairs. In fact,

\(^5\) Headrick, *The Tools of Empire*, 129-156


the Sultan had warned his Viceroy in Egypt that “to suffer Frankish [non-Muslim, European] ships to navigate therein, or to neglect opposing it, is betraying your Sovereign, your religion, and every Mahometan…”\(^8\)

Despite such resentment, no Muslim power, not even the Ottoman Sultan himself, was in a position to halt Britain’s expansion into the Red Sea during the first forty years of the nineteenth century. The following two decades, however, revealed that Britain’s steam-powered imperialism had spawned a number of unintended consequences. Chief among them were growing numbers of Indian pilgrims traveling to Mecca, including rising populations of indigent pilgrims and Indian Muslims living and working throughout the region, which arguably culminated in the development of a nascent Pan-Islamic bond between Mecca and Muslim resistors to British imperialism in India.

Around the mid-nineteenth century the annual flow of ocean-going pilgrims from the subcontinent is estimated to have hovered between 5,000 and 7,000 participants.\(^9\) By the 1880s, however, average numbers rose to around 10,000.\(^10\) Doubling again during the pilgrimage season of 1893, the number of Indian pilgrims was reported to have exceeded 20,000.\(^11\) While Indians normally accounted for the largest proportion of pilgrims arriving by sea each year, the growth of the steamship-era *hajj* was not confined to this one group. The total number of pilgrims rose from an estimated 112,000 participants in 1831 to some 300,000 in 1910.\(^12\)

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By the 1850s British observers began to take note of the potential dangers and embarrassments presented by the rising tide of Indian pilgrims in the Hijaz. Not surprisingly, their principal concern was with the high proportion of destitute pilgrims. As early as 1814 the explorer John Lewis Burckhardt had commented on the wretched state of Indian pilgrims, but it appears that little urgency was attached to these observations before the Mutiny and the international cholera crisis of 1865-1866.\footnote{Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, 16, 191, 259.} Prior to these events, British officialdom had not yet considered the potential link between the *hajj* and its capacity to spread disease and political subversion. Consequently, no passports or travel documents were required of pilgrims from British territories, despite Turkish proposals from as early as the late 1840s.\footnote{Roff, “Sanitation and Security,” 146. Although the Ottomans called for passport regulations and the purchase of return tickets to avoid pauper pilgrims being stranded in the Hijaz and both the French and the Dutch colonial regimes required that their subjects purchase passports or sanitary certificates, the British repeatedly opposed these measures, complaining that such restrictions would be misunderstood as an infringement upon religious freedom. E.g., see F.O. 881/3079, “Correspondence respecting Turkish Regulations for Pilgrim Traffic, 1875-1877,” Consul Beyts, Jidda to Secretary to the Government of Bombay, inclosure no. 9 in no. 10, 30 Apr. 1875; F.O. 881/3079, Governor-General of India in Council to the Marquis of Salisbury, Fort William (Calcutta), inclosure in no. 11, 7 Jan. 1876; F.O. 412/58, “Correspondence respecting the Paris Cholera Conference and the Question of Sanitary Reform in the East,” Jan. 1895. In the 1890s the British even began to defer such questions to the “Sultan of Turkey” or “the Head of the Mussulman religion” in order to shift any blame for decisions to restrict access to the *hajj* onto the Sultan’s shoulders. E.g., see F.O. 412/58, The British Delegates to the Paris Cholera Conference to the Earl of Rosebury, no. 48, Paris, 21 Feb. 1894.} Likewise, no real effort was made to document the numbers of pilgrims traveling. Nor was there much that British officials thought they could do to protect the pilgrims themselves. As the Vice-Consul in Jidda commented in 1853, “I am directed to afford relief to all destitute British subjects and to enable them to return to their own country.” However, he lamented that little could be done to curb the proliferation of indigent pilgrims because the Government felt strongly
that it had “no right to prevent any person who desires to do so, from proceeding on
pilgrimage.”¹⁵

In sharp contrast to this laissez-faire attitude, Sir Richard F. Burton’s experiences
during his famous pilgrimage-in-disguise in 1853 convinced him that the problem of
indigent pilgrims would eventually have much wider political implications. In his
famous pilgrimage narrative, Burton related the tale of a Punjabi, who, “finding life
unendurable at home,” sold his possessions, gathered his family, and set out for Mecca.
As with many poor pilgrims of the period, it was very likely that this family would either
fall victim to physical privations or settle in the Hijaz, never to return to India again.
Using this example, Burton described a dangerous pattern of Muslim emigration and
radicalization in the Muslim Holy Land. He warned:

To an ‘Empire of Opinion’ this emigration is fraught with evils. It sends forth a horde
of malcontents that ripen into bigots; it teaches foreign nations to despise our rule; and
it unveils the present nakedness of once wealthy India. And we have both prevention
and cure in our own hands.¹⁶

Burton’s “cure” prescribed that pilgrims should be made to prove their solvency
before being permitted to embark from Indian ports. He further recommended that
pilgrims be made to register with the Vice-Consul upon their arrival in Jidda. Burton also
pointed to the need for a stronger British presence in the region. In short, Burton forecast
that the hajj would become an outlet for Muslim radicalism and anti-British sentiment.
Moreover, he understood how easily negative opinions about British rule could be spread
to other parts of the dar al-Islam via the hajj and the diaspora of Indian exiles who were

¹⁵ Vice-Consul, Jidda to Chief Sec. to Govt. of Bombay, 7 Dec. 1853, and Sec. to Govt. of India to Chief
Sec. to Govt. of Bombay, 5 May 1854, For. Dept. Proc., Pol., for 1854, no. 16-18, cited in Roff, “Sanitation
in Security,” 146.
beginning to circulate around it. In retrospect, the aggressive steps recommended by Burton were at least ten or twenty years ahead of their time.

Only two years after the publication of Burton’s hajj account, the Sepoy Mutiny shook British India to its very core. For the most part British officials tended to label the Mutiny as an example of Muslim fanaticism. Despite the oversimplified assumptions behind such views, much of the symbolism of the rebellion was undeniably Islamic. Upon capturing the Mughal capital of Delhi and collecting their would-be emperor, the mutineers fashioned the elderly Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah, as the leader of the revolt. Uprisings followed in predominantly-Muslim areas, such as the Northwest Frontier and the recently annexed province of Awadh. Therefore, it is not surprising that contemporary British observers tended to conflate the Mutiny with previous frontier jihads in India. Such responses are best exemplified by the life and work of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (1786-1831). Like many Indian ‘ulama’, dislocated by the rapid changes in India’s legal and educational systems, he took refuge in Mecca. During the 1820s, he twice performed the hajj and resided in Mecca from 1821 to 1824, where he came under the influence of the militant Arabian reform movement of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-1792). In his semi-official history, The Indian Musalmans (1871), W.W. Hunter explicitly blamed Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi’s Wahhabi-inspired religio-political activism in North India as the inspiration behind the Sepoy Mutiny. Though laced with stereotypes and exaggerations, Hunter vividly described “Wahhabi” influence as a “chronic conspiracy” and a “standing rebel camp,” which threatened both India’s frontiers and its internal security. Consequently, Hunter’s readership was left to assume
that external influences, rather than heavy-handed British policies, were the primary source for Muslim radicalism in India.\textsuperscript{17}

If, as Hunter suggested, Muslim anti-colonialism in India was subject to external influences from Arabia and the rest of the \textit{dar al-Islam}, is it not also reasonable to assume that events in India might also have had a similar impact on public opinion in Arabia and other parts of the \textit{dar al-Islam}? Just as Burton had predicted, intersecting networks of pilgrims, merchants, and exiles could easily send tremors of anti-British sentiment throughout the Islamic world. The first real evidence confirming this theory seems to have been the outbreak of anti-Christian violence in Jidda on 15 June 1858. On that evening the British and French Consulates were ransacked and their respective flags pulled down. Among the victims was the British Vice-Consul, who was reported to have been cut into pieces and thrown from a window of his residence. The French Consul and his wife were also murdered. In all, more than twenty Europeans, mostly Greeks, were slain, while another twenty-six were later rescued by the steam frigate, \textit{The Cyclops}.\textsuperscript{18}

Though the exact causes for this violent outburst remain obscure, it seems that a variety of commercial, political, and religious variables collided in Jidda. Ottoman authorities argued that the massacre arose from a dispute over a vessel confiscated by British authorities. This explanation did not, however, satisfy European observers, who rightly argued that such a matter could not have precipitated a general slaughter of Jidda’s European population. Although Foreign Office correspondence acknowledged

\textsuperscript{17} W.W. Hunter, \textit{The Indian Musalmans} (London, 1871), 1, 11, 36; W.W. Hunter, \textit{A Brief History of the Indian Peoples} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895), 222-229.

\textsuperscript{18} F.O. 424/18, “Papers relating to the Outbreak in Jeddah,” Acting Consul-General Green to the Earl of Malmesbury, no. 1, Alexandria, 6 Jul. 1858; Précis of Captain Pullen’s Letter, Jidda to the Secretary of the Admiralty, inclosure no. 2 in no. 11, 25 Jun. 1858; Ochsenwald, \textit{Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia}, 137-151.
that the most probable cause for the violence was Muslim bitterness over the increasing presence of Christians in the Islamic Holy Land, noting that such an uprising had long been expected, British officials also feared that the violence was related to the ongoing Mutiny in India. Despite reports suggesting that a shaykh from Delhi and sixty of his followers in Mecca may have incited the violence, however, more consistent evidence suggests that the violence originated with the Hadrami mercantile community, whose grievances extended beyond the problem of Christians in the Muslim Holy Land.\(^\text{19}\) There is also evidence to suggest that the violence in Jidda was precipitated, at least in part, by Hadrami resistance to European and Ottoman efforts to abolish the slave trade. More generally speaking, however, the Hadramis resented the damage being done to their share of the shipping and pilgrimage trades as a result of British and European steam-power in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.\(^\text{20}\) More importantly, these same Hadrami merchants and boatmen also had close cultural and commercial contacts with India, which would have facilitated their interactions with radical Indian exiles, ex-mutineers, and pilgrims traveling through the Red Sea region.\(^\text{21}\) In fact, corroborating reports suggest that Hadrami sailors enthusiastically spread news of the Jidda outbreak in an attempt to foment a similar rebellion among the inhabitants of the port of Suez.\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{19}\) F.O. 424/18, Précis of Captain Pullen’s Letter, Jidda to the Secretary of the Admiralty, inclosure no. 2 in no. 11, 25 Jun. 1858.


\(^{22}\) F.O. 424/18, Précis of Captain Pullen’s Letter, Jidda to the Secretary of the Admiralty, inclosure no. 2 in no. 11, 25 Jun. 1858; FO 424/18, Vice-Consul G. West, Suez to Acting Consul-General, J. Green, Alexandria, inclosure no. 1 in no. 12, 5 Jul. 1858.
Fearing that similar attacks might be in store for Europeans stationed in Cairo and Suez, Alfred Walne, the British Consul at Cairo, remarked that “from the breaking out of the revolt in India, in which Moslems have taken such a prominent part, there has been here reason to suppose that Indian and Persian partisans have done their best to increase, if not to excite, that sympathy.” Viewed in isolation Walne’s analysis might be dismissed as the expression of a panicky insinuation. However, seemingly unrelated anti-European or anti-Christian disturbances in one corner of the dar al-Islam often formed the background events for subsequent outbreaks of violence elsewhere. Unfortunately, the processes of resistance to imperialism have often been handled by historians as part of discrete colonial, national, or regional histories, thereby occluding the inter-regional connections between various locales within the dar al-Islam. By contrast, Juan Cole has described a period of generalized Muslim resistance to European, especially British, expansion from the Sepoy Mutiny (1857-1858) to the ‘Urabi Revolt in Egypt (1881-1882). He connects episodes of urban violence, such as those in Lucknow and Delhi (1857-1858), Jidda (1858), Damascus (1860), and Alexandria (1882), as well as wider events like the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), to reveal a larger pattern of conflict.

Taking this model into account, it would appear that the polarizing effect of India’s many frontier jihads, particularly the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1839, and then the Mutiny of 1857-58, were relayed through international networks of Muslim activists, merchants and radicalized members of the ‘ulama’, many of whom had been displaced by the advance of European interests in India, had gone on pilgrimage to Mecca, and had subsequently settled in Aden, the Hijaz, Egypt, Syria, and Istanbul. Population statistics

23 Ibid., inclosure no. 3 in no. 12, 5 Jul. 1858.
also support this claim. By the 1860s the British Consul in Jidda estimated that there were at least 10,000 Indians living in the Arabian Peninsula, up significantly from Richard Burton’s estimates during the previous decade. Among these immigrants to Arabia were growing numbers of Afghans and Indians with bitter experiences forged by years of fighting against the British. Intermingling with the Hadrami trading communities of the Red Sea ports, these immigrants provided a volatile anti-imperialist and anti-Christian element that contributed to the massacres in Jidda and later episodes in Damascus and Alexandria. Even beyond the Red Sea ports, Egypt and the rest of the Middle East experienced a similar increase in South Asian Muslim sojourners and exiles. Although fewer than a thousand British subjects registered with the authorities in Egypt, one British Consul suggested that their actual numbers were probably closer to 10,000. Though the bulk of Egypt’s Indian community lived in Cairo, even in the more remote towns of Upper Egypt there were reports as late as 1865 of fugitive holy men-cum-revolutionaries provoking peasant rebellions.25 Noting these disturbing developments in 1873, British officials in India began to sense the far-reaching dimensions of the Indian Muslim diaspora in Mecca and Red Sea region and its potential as conduit for the kind of radicalism that would eventually fall under the term Pan-Islam. As Sir Bartle Frere, a former Governor of the Bombay Presidency, observed, “the Hedja[z] is the natural asylum for fanatical Moslem exiles from India.” He added that even though many of these exiles “pass their lives in a congenial atmosphere of fanaticism” their strong influence “cannot be safely disregarded either in Aden or in India.”26

Perhaps even more worrisome for British authorities was the elite group of Indian exiles who took up residence in Istanbul alongside Pan-Islamic activists like Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838/9-1897) and began to lobby for an Ottoman-supported *jihad* against European imperialism.\(^{27}\) Thus, in the decades that followed the Mutiny and the Jidda massacre, British officialdom became increasingly sensitive to the trans-imperial networks being forged between Indian dissidents and the Porte. However diffuse these connections may have been during the 1850s and 1860s, by the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II such sentiments had matured into a more robust Pan-Islamic movement.

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**Sultan Abdul Hamid II:**  
*Caliph, Protector of the Holy Places, and Master of Pan-Islamic Propaganda*

Following the psychological watershed of the Mutiny, Indian Muslims were forced to come to terms with the loss of a Muslim state and the consequences of foreign domination. Even after the Great Rebellion, there were still those Muslim leaders who called for either *jihad* or *hijra*, citing Shāh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz’s famous *fatwa* of 1803, which declared British-controlled India to be *dar al-harb*. However, British repression in the wake of the Mutiny made it clear to most that *jihad* was at best futile and at worst suicidal. Defeated and deprived of Mughal power and prestige, Indian Muslims turned increasingly toward the Ottoman Caliphate “in search for an alternative psychological and spiritual center.”\(^{28}\) The Ottoman Sultan was the only remaining independent Sunni power and he was also the Protector of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina. He embodied not only the survival and supremacy of Islamic law, but also a living link to the

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\(^{27}\) Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn “al-Afghānī,* 60; Özcan, *Pan-Islamism,* 90-94.  
\(^{28}\) Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics,* 17, 176-177.
temporal power and glory of the Islamic past. This acknowledgment of the Ottoman Caliphate was a major change. During their prime, from roughly 1526 to 1707, the Mughals had regarded themselves as “caliphs of India,” citing Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī’s fatwa legitimizing the simultaneous presence of multiple caliphs. However, the destruction of Mughal power forced Indian Muslims to engage in “the invention of tradition,” a process of legitimizing change through references to the past, which usually occurs “when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which ‘old’ traditions had been designed.”

However, Indian Muslims were not the only Islamic society to engage in this kind of “invention of tradition.” The social and political fabric of the entire dar al-Islam came under increasing pressure from the imperial powers of Europe, especially Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Russia. In response to these encroachments, disparate groups of Muslims from Central Asia to Indonesia rallied around the Ottoman Caliphate. The Ottomans were inundated with pleas for military, political, and spiritual support from conquered territories throughout the dar al-Islam. Out of these diffuse efforts to protect the Islamic world against Western domination, a broad-based religio-political movement, otherwise known as Pan-Islam (Ittihād-i Islam), eventually coalesced under the auspices of loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph. However, the Pan-Islamic response to imperialism did not become a conscious, focused movement until the mid-1870s. It was during this period that the Ottomans began aggressively to assert the Sultan’s ecumenical claim of jurisdiction over Muslims living under the rule of non-Ottoman governments. However, these claims rested on extremely tenuous foundations. According to the

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29 Ibid., 14.
Figure 7. Sultan Abdul Hamid II, c. 1890.\textsuperscript{31}

official myth, title of Caliph had devolved from the last Abbasid Caliph, al-Mutawakkil, to the Ottoman blood line as a result of the conquest of Egypt by Selim I in 1517.\textsuperscript{32}

From the late eighteenth century onward, but especially during the reign of Abdul Hamid II, the role of Caliph gained new importance. After the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), the Ottoman Empire lost a huge portion of its territory and the majority of its non-Muslim population in the Balkans. This allowed the Sultan to place more stress on the Islamic foundations of the Ottoman state. However, due to the shaky grounds

\textsuperscript{31} Reproduced from the George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress.

upon which the Sultan’s caliphal claims were based, a secondary “basis for the Sultan’s legitimating ideology was his position as defender of the Holy Places, the *Haram al-Haramayn*, in Mecca and Medina.” By accentuating these roles, Abdul Hamid hoped to bolster the international position of the Ottoman Empire, which had been reduced to a “tributary state” by Western powers through war and the economic and political coercion of the Capitulations.

The new Pan-Islamic orientation of Abdul Hamid’s reign was also designed to capitalize on the Sultan-Caliph’s increasing status in the eyes of non-Ottoman Muslims. Not surprisingly, the Porte was intrigued by the rise in Indian enthusiasm for the Sultan-Caliph that had developed during the Russo-Turkish War. While the rapid growth in Pan-Islamic sentiment in India and beyond has often been attributed to Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, under whose influence the development of a mass movement advocating the political, social, and intellectual rejuvenation of Islam world began to take shape, an even more crucial factor in this process seems to have been the growth of India’s vernacular press, particularly in Urdu. While in 1835 there had only been only 6 vernacular newspapers in India, by 1850 the number was up to 28, and by 1878 northern India alone had as many as 97 vernacular papers with a total circulation of some 150,000. By 1880, the number of vernacular journals had risen to 330. The explosion of publications around the time of the Russo-Turkish War provided Indian Muslims with greater access to news from around the Islamic world, much of which was translated from Turkish and Arabic newspapers, such as *al-Jawaib*, *Tercuman-i Rum*, *Akbar dar al-Khalifat* and *Tercuman-i Mashriq*. However, the most influential publication of all

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was *Paik-i Islam*, an Istanbul-based journal, written in Turkish and Urdu and edited by an Indian Muslim. Designed as an official organ of the Porte, it raised Sultan-Caliph’s profile and promoted closer ties between Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Empire.\(^{34}\)

As a result of the proliferation of pro-Ottoman newspapers and journals, numerous voluntary organizations sprang to life, decrying the Turkish plight and urging Indian Muslims to give financial aid to the Ottomans in their time of need. According to Ottoman registers, Indian efforts to support the Ottoman war effort were an overwhelming success. Over 124,840 Ottoman liras, equal to over 10 lakhs (million) of Indian rupees, were collected. More importantly, organizations like the Anjuman-i Islam, the Anjuman-i Teyyid-i Turkiye, and the Meclis-i Mueyyid-i Islamiyye drew this financial support from diverse quarters of the Indian community. As a result, normally divergent Indian Muslim groups like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Aligarhi loyalists, Deobandis, Shias, and even Hindus joined in this overwhelming financial response.\(^{35}\)

As a result of this almost unanimous wave of support, the Ottomans envisaged an elaborate system of consulates, missions, and emissaries in India. Based in Bombay and Calcutta, these officials were charged with stimulating interest in the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire. They encouraged Indians to invoke the Sultan-Caliph’s name during the Friday *khutba* (sermon). They often bestowed honorific titles or imperial decorations upon elite Indian benefactors. They even urged average Indians to write to the Sultan. These letters varied from expressions of moral support to demands for the opening of more Ottoman consulates in India to protect Muslim rights. Many of these letters were also used as propaganda in the Turkish press to emphasize the Sultan-Caliph’s

\(^{34}\) Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics*, 30-31, 42.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., 29; Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 69-70.
ecumenical authority at home and abroad. Similarly, Ottoman press agencies circulated news and appeals for financial support in India’s vernacular press. Turkish press extracts, republished in India, included glowing accounts of the Sultan-Caliph’s good deeds and the need for strengthening the bonds of religion. Clearly, these journalistic efforts served as an important medium for the transmission of Pan-Islamic thought to distant Muslim communities. However, British officials from Calcutta to London became increasingly suspicious. Ottoman representatives were kept under close surveillance, their access to the vernacular press circumscribed, and their requests for opening new consulates were rejected. Although intelligence inquiries into Indo-Turkish activities often failed to yield any firm conclusions as to whether the Porte’s activities were part of a systematic political plot, the British remained perpetually concerned about Ottoman activities in Bombay, the Northwest Frontier and Afghanistan. The British particularly feared the possibility that Abdul Hamid was engaging in the kind of wild Turco-Indo-Afghan *jihad*-ist schemes advocated by al-Afghani.36

However, much of Abdul Hamid’s propaganda effort was not undertaken on Indian soil. The un-colonized space provided by Mecca represented a perfect opportunity to solidify the bond between non-Ottoman Muslims and their Caliph. Not surprisingly, this “sacred” bond also involved the profane business of propaganda distribution. Indeed, great care was taken to draft propaganda materials that would appeal to each language and nationality. Thus, some pamphlets called for Central Asian Muslims to rise against their Russian masters, while others called upon Indians for financial support. These materials urged Indian Muslims to send their *zakat* to the Ottomans. Such pamphlets even declared that by doing so: “God would reward them, otherwise they would be

36 Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 60, 111-126.
punished and disgraced both now and in the hereafter.” As if God’s wrath were not enough, such tracts even included disclaimers for loyalist Indian Muslims, reminding them that Anglo-Ottoman relations were friendly and that “the British Government would not object to support given by the Indian Muslims.”

Aside from Abdul Hamid’s propaganda and financial appeals, the Holy Places themselves became a major part of the Sultan-Caliph’s public image. Embarrassed by complaints from European officials regarding the mistreatment or cheating of their colonial subjects in Jidda, Mecca, and the quarantine stations of the Red Sea, the Sultan-Caliph went to great lengths to demonstrate his not only his spiritual importance, but also his temporal power and competence as Protector of the Holy Places. By raising the visibility of his good works in the Hijaz, increasing the official Ottoman presence at the Holy Places and the caravan routes, imposing passport fees and regulations, and policing hajj-related territories and commerce, he endeavored to make a better showing in this critical area of Ottoman foreign policy.

While such reforms were meant to underscore the Sultan-Caliph’s competence and beneficence as Protector of the Holy Places, the most compelling example of this public image campaign was the monumental Hijaz Railway project. On 2 May 1900, Abdul Hamid announced the construction of a railway linking the Syrian coast with the Hijaz. As William Ochsenwald explains, “this railroad was to be the single physical embodiment of the Pan-Islamic movement. If the Empire could handle the project using

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37 Ibid., 75; F.O. 195/1653, in “Commercial exploitation of the Hajj involving forcible booking of tickets to India and the sale of Qur’ans, 1888-1889,” in Records of the Hajj, vol. 4, 27-110. Particularly during the 1890s and again during World War I, British officials charged Ottoman authorities with extortion, claiming that pilgrims were forced to contribute to Ottoman war coffers against their will. They also charged that pilgrims were pressured to buy official Ottoman-printed Qur’ans and book their return tickets at exorbitant prices.

38 Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire,” 26.
only Ottoman sources of supply and personnel it would indicate to Europeans and Ottomans alike that technical and economic independence was possible.”  

This project would also make extensive use of the modern propaganda and fundraising methods that had developed from the Russo-Turkish War onward in order to signal to Muslims and non-Muslims alike that the Sultan-Caliph was capable of properly organizing the hajj, maintaining the Holy Places of Islam, and protecting Arabia from foreign attack. Thus, while construction started without any accumulated capital, it was hoped that Muslims could rally together to raise the necessary funds. The Sultan himself made the first donation, setting an example for other Muslims. In India, the Central Committee for the Hijaz Railway was soon founded in Hyderabad. Following the Sultan’s lead, Indian organizers persuaded donors to give liberally by stressing how the plight of suffering pilgrims had spurred the Sultan-Caliph to act for the sake of religion. As a result of this Indo-Turkish press blitz, fifty percent of the total bill was raised through subscriptions. In 1908, just before the end of Abdul Hamid’s reign, the line finally reached Medina. For Indian Muslims, the railway’s completion was the physical embodiment of Pan-Islam. The success of the project signaled that the dar al-Islam was still capable of protecting itself. More importantly, the Hijaz Railway project and others like it provided an alternative symbolic structure of financial and political links between India, the Caliphate, and the Holy Places, which provided a model for the later development of Muslim anti-colonialism, particularly during the Khilafat movement of 1918-1924.  

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40 Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 108-111.
Despite many warning signs, British policy-makers did not immediately recognize Pan-Islamic sentiment as a major threat to British India. In fact, from the Crimean War (1853-1856) until the Russo-Turkish war, the British were more concerned with Russian expansion in Central Asia. During these decades, Anglo-Ottoman relations were strongly aligned against Russia. On multiple occasions pro-Ottoman sympathies were actually encouraged in order to either bolster their own legitimacy or to check Russian advances in Central Asia. However, by the 1870s, Austen Henry Layard, the British ambassador at Constantinople, and Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, began to worry that pro-Ottoman feelings could be directed against the British in the event of a future deterioration of relations with the Ottomans. As Lytton pointed out, “If either by pressure of public opinion at home, or political difficulty abroad, Your Majesty’s Government should be forced into a policy of prominent aggression upon Turkey, I am inclined to think that a Muhammedan rising in India is among the contingencies we may have to face.” Lytton’s worst fears came true, during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, when William Gladstone spearheaded a public denunciation of the “Bulgarian horrors” perpetrated by the Ottomans against their non-Muslim subjects in the Balkans. Gladstone’s rhetoric sparked an anti-Turkish crusade in the press, effectively ending Britain’s pro-Ottoman policy. Thus, when Russia invaded Turkey in 1877, Britain did nothing. As a result, Britain was no longer able to tout itself to Indian Muslims as the Sultan’s ally and protector. As a result of this the anti-Ottoman turn in British foreign policy, even previously loyal Muslims became disillusioned and began to question why British support for the Ottoman Empire, considered sacrosanct in the 1850s, had abruptly ended during 1870s.
Undoubtedly, this sense of disillusionment led a great number of Indian Muslims back into the political arena, particularly into the embrace of Pan-Islam.\(^{41}\)

Just as Lytton predicted, the deterioration in Anglo-Ottoman relations did in fact raise the threat of Indo-Ottoman intrigues. Moreover, anxious reports from Layard pointed to Mecca as the main point of contact for anti-British activities. He warned that “ex-mutineer Indians at Mecca were in communication with the Porte and that through them the Ottomans could make an attempt to bring about a rising in India.”\(^{42}\) In a similar reaction to the spike in Pan-Islamic sentiments during and following the Russo-Turkish War, the English pilgrim-adventurer John F. Keane reported the following ominous details about his 1877-1878 pilgrimage:

…the community of Meccah is composed of the most bigoted Mohammedans, the fanatical scum of the whole Modhammedan world. Now the precarious position of an unbeliever in any wholly Mohammedan town is well known; but let a Jew, Christian, or idolater approach to defile ground so holy and held in such veneration as is Meccah in the eyes of Mohammedans—ground of which many declare that should any but a True Believer stand on, it would open and swallow him—to say that he would be stoned to death, torn in pieces, burnt and his ashes sent out of the country, would only be repeating what I have heard Mohammedans declare. I am confident the life of a solitary white man refusing to make “profession of that faith” would not be worth an hours purchase—two hours outside the walls of Jeddah—even to this day…

He goes on to warn of violent Pan-Islamic schemes being hatched in Mecca and Jidda:

Who can know what alarming projects or conspiracies may not at this moment be on foot in Mecca, that center and hotbed of Mohammedan intrigue? For my part, I regard the Christians in Jeddah as sitting on the safety valve of the Hijaz, and sooner or later an explosion is inevitable.\(^{43}\)

Keane’s sentiments are almost identical to those expressed by the newly appointed British Consul in Jidda, J.N.E. Zohrab, who wrote the following in 1879:

\(^{41}\) Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics*, 20, 25-29.
\(^{42}\) Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 90-93.
The province of the Hedjaz is the centre to which the ideas, opinions, sentiments and aspirations of the Mussulman world are brought for discussion. The annual meeting at a fixed time ostensibly for the purposes of the Pilgrimage of Representatives from every Mussulman Community affords a means without creating suspicion to exchange opinions, to discuss plans, to criticize the actions of the European Governments and form combinations to resist the supremacy of the Christian Powers.\footnote{F.O. 685/1, “Report on the Establishment required to carry on the duty of Her Majesty’s Consulate at Jeddah,” in J.N.E. Zohrab’s Letter Book, Sept. 1879, p. 442, cited in Peters, \textit{Mecca}, 340-342. See also F.O. 373/5/6, “The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate and the Pan-Islamic Movement,” Jan. 1919, p. 60. When compared with this 1919 handbook on “The Pan-Islamic Movement,” it would appear that Zohrab’s almost identical assessment some four decades earlier foreshadowed Britain’s long-term position on the matter.}

As these comments clearly illustrate, to the official mind of the British Empire the \textit{hajj} would need greater political surveillance if the threat of anti-colonial subversion was to be contained. However, those same officials were constrained by Queen Victoria’s famous 1858 proclamation of religious tolerance and non-interference, which sought to allay both Hindu and Muslim fears that post-Mutiny India would be subject to aggressive Christian missionary activities.\footnote{Queen Victoria, “Post-Mutiny declaration of religious non-interference,” in C.H. Phillips et al., eds., \textit{The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1857-1947: Select Documents} (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 10-11.} It was against these guarantees that British authorities would have to weigh the need for greater political surveillance in both India and the Muslim Holy Land. Any governmental intrusions that could be perceived as an affront to the sanctity of the \textit{hajj} or the religious freedoms of Indian Muslims carried the possibility of a violent backlash.

Despite the political and epidemiological threats, officials deemed it too risky to discourage Muslims from undertaking the \textit{hajj}. As a result, Britain repeatedly resisted international sanitary conventions, which would have called for the imposition of a means test or passport fees, thereby limiting the number of “dangerous” and “pauper” pilgrims. Instead, Britain opted for a strategy of increased surveillance activities, in terms of both public health and politico-religious machinations. Following this logic,
Zohrab recommended in 1879 that “in order to thoroughly sift the questions of aid and protection to pilgrims” the entire pilgrimage experience must be understood. Furthermore, “to do this effectively it is in my opinion necessary that a Confidential Agent of the consulate be sent to watch and follow this year’s pilgrimage.” The British ambassador at Constantinople proposed in June of 1880 that the Indian Government employ Muslim secret agents to infiltrate the Holy Cities. While Layard’s plan was rebuffed at the time, British agents at Aden, Constantinople, and Jidda were charged with monitoring any Ottoman propaganda efforts. In the meantime, British intelligence continued to receive reports of Ottoman intrigues from French and Dutch sources as well as its own. At this point, all of the colonial powers were becoming increasingly suspicious of Muslim radicalism transmitted via the *hajj*. As a result of this common interest, in December 1880, the Dutch Foreign Minister proposed to Layard a joint program of intelligence sharing and political surveillance related to pilgrims traveling from India and Southeast Asia to Mecca.  

In September 1881, Lord Dufferin revived Layard’s suggestions, arguing for the appointment of a “secret paid agent residing in Mecca.” Ironically, the ideal man for Dufferin’s proposed “secret agent” was already at work in the region. Back in 1878, the Government of British India had attached Assistant Surgeon Abdur Razzack of the Bengal Medical Service to accompany that year’s pilgrimage from India. Dr. Razzack’s appointment was made in the context of growing administrative and diplomatic questions associated with the repeated outbreaks of cholera in the Hijaz, the general welfare of pilgrims, overcrowding on vessels carrying pilgrims, and the rising numbers of indigent

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47 Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 93-95.
pilgrims. Razzack was to report only on the sanitary conditions of the *hajj*, a task which he performed successfully in March 1879.\(^{48}\)

In light of the political concerns raised by Zohrab, Layard, and then Dufferin, however, Razzack was pressed to perform a more overtly political role. In 1882, Razzack was chosen as the best candidate for Britain’s political surveillance activities in Mecca and the Hijaz. Razzack was said to be “an excellent man” and “altogether separated from the Delhi and Wahhabi schools…clever and ambitious.” Although Razzack’s primary duties were to assist Her Majesty’s Muslim subjects, promote the health and comfort of the pilgrims, and protect them in their dealings with Ottoman officialdom, he was also instructed that the Consul in Jidda “may wish to avail himself of your assistance in obtaining trustworthy information regarding the course of affairs, and of public opinion, in Mecca and neighboring places.” As Razzack pointed out in reply, “he would have to visit Mecca frequently in order to obtain such information, and that in order to avoid arousing suspicions it would be necessary for him to take a house there, and to have an allowance that would permit him ‘to give some small presents to some of the religious heads.’” Although Razzack’s requests were approved, it is unclear whether or not Razzack really provided any kind of covert intelligence in his reports.\(^{49}\)

While the degree to which Razzack actually served as a spy is debatable, his influence over pilgrimage affairs is unquestionable. From 1878 to 1895, he was the British point-man for pilgrimage affairs. Razzack’s presence in the Hijaz and later at the Kamarān Island quarantine station, which became operational during the 1881-1882 pilgrimage season, signaled the institution of more accurate documentation of the number


\(^{49}\) Ibid., 148, 156.
of pilgrims undertaking the *hajj*. The suggestions made in Razzack’s detailed annual reports also seem to have formed the practical basis for the Government of India’s efforts to reform and institutionalize the pilgrimage experience.⁵⁰ Razzack’s reports were instrumental in changes made to the major piece of British legislation regarding pilgrimage traffic. Based on an earlier but far less comprehensive piece of legislation from 1858, the Native Passenger Ships Act of 1876 was amended in 1883 and 1887 to reflect changes suggested by Razzack and in light of the highly contentious diplomatic effort to integrate Ottoman and British Indian pilgrimage regulations.⁵¹

These legislative reforms sought to ensure that pilgrims were treated humanely and given access to medical attention during both their steamship journey and their stay in the Ottoman Hijaz. Razzack also recognized that new institutions and infrastructure would be needed to ensure that such regulations would ultimately be followed. Thus, in 1881 he suggested the establishment of a separate “pilgrimage agency” to administer the *hajj*. While Razzack envisioned this agency as a Muslim-funded charitable effort, his proposal, at least as he had imagined it, never came to fruition. However, a version of his idea was taken up by the Government of Bombay, which created a post called the Protector of the Pilgrims in 1882.⁵²

Shortly thereafter, in 1885, efforts were made by the Government of India to streamline the entire pilgrimage process by hiring a single agency to handle all rail transportation to the ports of embarkation, shipping, passports, and the issuing of return

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tickets covering all the necessary fees for a successful roundtrip from Bombay to Jidda. Thus, from 1886 until 1893, Thomas Cook and Son, were charged with the near impossible task of taming the pilgrimage industry and the unscrupulous pilgrimage brokers of Bombay. Though reforming the hajj ultimately turned out to be more than Cook’s could handle, this adventure seems to have presaged the commercial travel industry’s eventual conquest of the modern hajj.  

Just as the Thomas Cook scheme had challenged the status quo, Razzack also took on powerful vested interests in Jidda and Mecca. In 1882, he reported the following:

The common opinion among the sensible and knowing classes of Arabs and the Meccans themselves is that the cause of sickness which generally prevails among the pilgrims after their descent from Arafat to Moona and continues for some time in Mecca also, is the unsanitary condition of Moona and the abominable stench that pervades the town after the first day, and increases day by day, as well as the impure water which the majority of the pilgrims drink.

…and there are few believers in those who tax India with originating Hedjaz cholera instead of recognizing and combating the two obvious causes which alas exist in these “holy places,” on seeing which it is impossible not to feel indignation as a Mussulman, as well as disapproval as a medical man.

Undoubtedly, Razzack’s scathing comments, which shifted blame away from India and located the causes of disease in the Hijaz itself, did little for his popularity.

Perhaps even more daring than his criticism of the sanitary conditions in the Hijaz was his attempt to take on what might be considered the most entrenched of pilgrimage institutions, the mutawwif or shaykh system. These hereditary guilds of pilgrimage guides, despite their corruption and abuses, provided pilgrims with guidance in carrying out the complex rituals of the hajj. Each guide had different linguistic and cultural

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55 The term mutawwif is derived from the Arabic word tawwâf, the act of circumambulating the Ka’ba.
specialties to suit their clients’ respective country of origin. Not only were they a necessary part of the pilgrimage experience, but they also stood at the heart of Mecca’s government and economy. The British, however, regarded the *mutawwif* system as an exploitative monopoly, and in many cases it was just that. Moreover, the British resented the closed nature of the system. They wanted to appoint their own guides in order to both monitor events in Mecca as well as to gain greater control over the recruitment activities those guides working outside the Hijaz. It was feared that these guides were distributing Pan-Islamic propaganda as they traveled to recruit would-be pilgrims in their country of specialization. Thus, in 1881, when Razzack was first appointed Muslim Vice-Consul in Jidda, it was naively hoped that he would work with the Sharif of Mecca to appoint the Indian pilgrimage guides. Though Razzack was never allowed this privilege, he repeatedly worked to expose their abuses as well as those of the Ottoman administration.\(^56\)

Though it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Razzack served as a spy, it would seem that either his critical role as part of the growing sanitary regime or his suggested role as a secret agent ultimately led to his death. On 31 May 1895, a band of “‘supposed Bedouins’ attacked members of the foreign community in Jeddah walking outside the walls of the town, killing Razzack and wounding the British, French, and Russian consuls.”\(^57\) These Bedouin assailants reportedly blamed the sanitary authorities themselves for bringing cholera to the Hijaz. On that same day, Mecca’s disinfecting

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machine was destroyed and the building housing was completely ransacked.\textsuperscript{58} Two days later, Mecca’s hospital was attacked, forcing its physicians to disguise themselves and flee for their lives. Likewise, the disinfection machine in Jidda was demolished by Bukharan pilgrims, forcing medical inspectors to seek shelter aboard vessels in the harbor.\textsuperscript{59}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\caption{Early Twentieth-Century Pilgrims at Jidda's Harbor.\textsuperscript{60}}
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\textsuperscript{58} While descriptions of disinfection machines and procedures vary widely, such machines were usually stoves or steam machines used to disinfect clothing and other goods. However, other accounts give the impression that entire rooms where used to subject pilgrims to a fumigation process. There are also some descriptions of mobile disinfection machines. Some sources also discuss the use of chemical or carbolic acid treatments used to disinfect the pilgrimage ships. For examples, see John Baldry, “The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamarān Island, 1882-1914,” 47, 63, 83; C.O. 885/8/19, “Papers relating to the Clayton process of sulphurous disinfection,” Jun. 1903-Feb. 1904. The Clayton process was used for the destruction of rats and vermin and for disinfection in the case of plague, cholera, malaria and other diseases.\textsuperscript{59}


\textsuperscript{60} Reproduced from (British) Naval Intelligence Division, \textit{Western Arabia and the Red Sea}, 470-471.
Though it might be impossible to prove, there was a significant feeling on the part of the British that perhaps there was more to Abdur Razzack’s murder and the accompanying spate of violence against medical personnel than a mere Bedouin raid, perhaps a plot coordinated by either the Ottoman or Sharifan authorities. Such feelings were only exacerbated by Ottoman reluctance to carry out harsh reprisals against the Harb Beduoins whom they had accused of Razzack’s murder. Nor did Razzack’s murder bring an end to local resistance to sanitary intervention. In subsequent years Bedouin camel-drivers attacked the Yanbu military hospital’s disinfecting machine, claiming that the disinfectants were designed to kill rather than protect pilgrims. Nine died in the rioted that ensued. And yet again, three years later, quarantine and disinfection policies directed against the plague sparked riots in Jidda.\textsuperscript{61}

Despite the loss of their most-trusted operative in the Hijaz, Britain continued to pursue its medico-political surveillance efforts. Thus, just two years after Razzack’s murder, the Foreign Office once again urged a new initiative to organize Muslim spies, calling for the creation of “an Indian Muhammadan Detective Agency at Constantinople, Mecca, Jeddah, and Baghdad.” However, the proposal was eventually rejected by the Government of India, which doubted that “any respectable Muhammadan would consent to work as a secret agent in Mecca, Jeddah, or Baghdad.” Furthermore, they reasoned that such work could be more effectively carried out from Jidda, as it had been under Dr. Abdur Razzack.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{62} Roff, “Sanitation and Security,” 156.
CHAPTER 4

TOWARD A NEW ERA OF SANITARY INTERVENTIONISM

The city of Jidda became a vast cemetery, and the most urgent and useful sanitary precautions consisted in burying the dead bodies that filled the caravansaries, mosques, cafés, houses and public places…

We saw many cases of lightning-swift death, and this is another still vivid memory—each evening we said farewell to each other, my colleague and I, before retiring, out of fear that we would never see the morrow. On disembarking from one of the ships in Jidda harbor, I passed on the water Mr. O., and English maritime agent who was embarking on that same ship. We greeted each other in friendly fashion on passing, but once on board the poor wretch was leveled by a sudden attack and left the ship a corpse…

- Dr. Oslchanitzki, Ottoman Sanitary Service, Jidda, 1893

Allah’s Apostle said, ‘There are angels guarding the entrances [or roads] of Medina, neither plague nor al-Dajjāl [the Antichrist] will be able to enter it.’

-Sahīh al-Bukhārī

Every tā‘ūn [plague] is a wabā’ [epidemic], but not every wabā’ is a tā‘ūn.

-Muhyī al-Dīn al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Muslim

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1 Dr. Oslchanitzki’s unpublished memoir, quoted in Peters, The Hajj, 303.
2 Sahīh al-Bukhārī, vol. 3, book 30, no. 104 (see also no. 105), English translation by M. Muhsin Khan, University of Southern California Muslim Student Association Compendium of Muslim Texts, available from www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/sbintro.html; accessed 6 May 2007. Muhammad ibn Ismā‘īl ibn Ibrāhīm ibn al-Mughīra al-Bukhārī (d. 870) was the author of one of two most authoritative hadīth (report of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad and other early Muslims) collections. Within Bukhārī’s ahādīth (plural of hadīth) there are numerous references to plague (tā‘ūn in Arabic and Persian). As opposed to other kinds of epidemics (wabā’ or pl. awbā’), such as fevers or cholera, plague holds a special place in prophetic traditions because Muhammad is said to have promised that the haramayn in Mecca and Medina would forever be immune to its ravages. For more on early Islamic understandings (both scientific and religious) of plague and cholera and their relationship to Islam’s Holy Places, see B. Shosan, “Wabā’” in the Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 11, fascicules 179-180 (Leiden:Brill, 2000), 2-4; Michael Dols, The Black Death in the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Lawrence Conrad, “Tā‘ūn and Wabā’: Conceptions of Plague and Pestilence in Early Islam,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 25, no. 3 (1982), 268-307.

3 Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Muslim (d. 1277), (Cairo, 1929-1930), XIV 204-207, Salām no. 92, quoted in Conrad, “Tā‘ūn and Wabā’: Conceptions of Plague and Pestilence in Early Islam,” 297. Though al-Nawawī writes about the and frequent scientific confusion among physicians concerning plague and other epidemics, Conrad also points out that because of the prophetic traditions concerning the immunity of Mecca and Medina from plague, it seems highly probable that Islamic authors denied the existence of plague in the Hijaz in deference to the sanctity of the haramayn by simply substituting the more general term, wabā’, for the more problematic term, tā‘ūn. While it is unclear the extent that such traditions would
**Cholera’s Grande Finale**

As a result of the previously unprecedented level of compromise reached under the Venice Convention of 1892, British concerns over the economic impact of sanitary precautions and maritime quarantine measures were greatly reduced. As has already been discussed in Chapter 2, under the Venice Convention, European passenger ships and commercial traffic were differentiated from pilgrimage vessels, which were singled out as the most-likely carriers of epidemic disease. Under this new system, vessels were categorized, distinguishing between “infected,” “suspect,” and “healthy” ships.\(^4\) Another crucial change was the reorganization of the *Conseil Sanitaire Maritime et Quaranteaire d’Égypte* in order to allow for a greater preponderance of European as opposed to Egyptian members, a move which further assuaged British concerns.\(^5\) The following year at the Dresden Conference of 1893 sanitary restrictions on traffic flowing through the Suez Canal were further relaxed. While just a year earlier in Venice, delegates were unable to agree upon cholera’s mode of transmission, in Dresden a majority of the delegates agreed that Koch’s theories concerning the waterborne cholera bacillus were indeed correct. The likely reason for this *volte face* was the confirmation of Koch’s findings in the wake of the Hamburg epidemic of 1892. As a result of the Hamburg outbreak, however, contagion and quarantine were no longer an inseparable combination. The Hamburg epidemic had shown that quarantine measures failed to prevent the spread of cholera to Europe. While countries with “no rigid system of quarantine like Britain,” which “relied on selective medical inspection,” witnessed “declining mortality from

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\(^4\) Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 134, 138.

cholera, ostensibly as a consequence of general sanitary reforms,” other states with strict quarantine measures were devastated by severe outbreaks.\(^6\) As a result of this shift in perception regarding the efficacy of strict quarantine measures and its impact on the relaxation of regulations concerning traffic through the Suez Canal, at least for European and commercial traffic, the Dresden Convention was ultimately ratified by eleven states, including Great Britain, in 1897. As in the case of the Paris Conference of 1894, the Dresden Conference, stressed targeted restrictions and greater utilization of disinfection techniques, “even if this meant treating the pilgrims harshly, for example forcing women to undress publicly.”\(^7\) However, while the 1892 and 1893 conferences largely avoided directly addressing the contentious question of pilgrimage surveillance, in 1894 that subject would once again return to the forefront with renewed urgency.\(^8\)

Although the early 1890s saw major breakthroughs in the multi-decade struggle between the British Empire and the rest of the international community over issues of sanitary prevention, the etiology of cholera, the efficacy of quarantine, and the free flow of commercial vessels through the Suez Canal, these diplomatic successes, unfortunately, did not bring an end to crisis of cholera. As F.E. Peters points out, “if the object of these measures was to shield Egypt and Europe from infection carried by returning pilgrims,

\(^6\) Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 135.

\(^7\) Huber, “The Unification of the Globe by Disease?,” 469. Though Huber is correct to note the increased strictness with which disinfection procedures were applied, particularly toward women, her reading of the Foreign Office correspondence is a bit misleading. What she fails to mention is that there is no malicious intent on the part of British or Ottoman authorities. In reality, Vice Consul J.N. Ahmed notes the need for more private changing facilities for female pilgrims, most of whom are accustomed to being “purdanasheen” (an Indo-Persian phrase meaning “veiled woman”), while waiting on their clothes to be disinfected. Ahmed also argues that the employment of female guardians who speak “Hindustani” as opposed to Arabic would make the female pilgrims feel much more comfortable. See also F.O. 412/58, “Correspondence respecting the Paris Cholera Conference and the Question of Sanitary Reform in the East,” Vice Consul, J.N. Ahmed, no. 1, “Report on the Quarantine Station at Camaran for the Pilgrim Season of 1893,” p.4.

\(^8\) Ibid., 468-469.
they were apparently a success.” However, in the East, cholera continued unabated on its path of destruction. Proof of cholera’s staying power came in 1893. During that pilgrimage season, over 30,000 out of a total of approximately 200,000 pilgrims are thought to have perished in Jidda, Mecca, and Medina. This appalling death toll, the worst ever in the Hijaz, was observed in graphic detail by Dr. Oslchanitzki, an Ottoman-employed physician, working at the Kamarān Island quarantine:

I was sent from Qamaran to Jidda with a colleague to supervise the return of pilgrims. All was quiet in the city, but we knew that at Mecca there was a veritable hecatomb of pilgrims; more than a thousand were being reported dead daily. An initial convoy of 5,000 camels brought 15,000 pilgrims to Jidda. The ill had to be kept outside the city and only the healthy were admitted. I went with my colleague to the place and we began our medical inspection, which lasted from 4 A.M. till noon. The sight was terrible: everywhere were the dead and the suffering, the cries of men, women and children mixed with the roaring of the camels, in short, a terrifying scene which will never be blotted out of my memory.

This carnage would once again catapult cholera onto the global political stage. Thus, at the Paris Conference of 1894, the pilgrimage question reemerged as a source of conflict. However, by this point, the diplomatic battle-lines had been redrawn. It would be the Ottoman Empire, not British India, which would receive the lion’s share of criticism for the catastrophic mortality witnessed during the 1893 pilgrimage season. It became clear that the Ottomans were not properly enforcing the international sanitary regulations in their own territories. As a result, Britain, France, and the Netherlands took bold new steps to control the maritime pilgrimage, insisting “that they had a right to intervene directly in sanitary questions at Jidda.” In particular, British officials were

quick to justify their new interventionist stance by pointing out that pilgrimage matters concerned more British subjects than Ottoman ones, “lay[ing] stress on the fact that India contains within her borders more Moslems [roughly 60 million at the time] than any other country in the world.”\textsuperscript{13} And although the Ottoman delegate indignantly complained about how the colonial powers “pretended to legislate on internal matters in Turkey,”\textsuperscript{14} he was sharply rebuffed and reminded that the issue at hand was “a question not of national sovereignty but of basic human rights.”\textsuperscript{15}

Discussions at the 1894 meeting revolved around three main areas of concern: sanitary surveillance of pilgrims moving through the Red Sea, the surveillance of shipping traffic in the Persian Gulf, and sanitary arrangements to be taken at ports of departure. Britain acquiesced to virtually all terms regarding the Red Sea and ports of departure. However, it fought against further restrictions in the Persian Gulf. The British delegation also refused to agree to terms, which would have required pilgrims to be given a minimum space of 21 square feet per passenger below decks, the reintroduction of a passport system, and the imposition of a means test. Despite Britain’s continued refusal to assent to these measures, particularly out of deference to official opinion in India, the conference exposed a widening rift between London and Calcutta. Calcutta, which was no longer permitted to send a separate delegation, was outraged by London’s acceptance of the Convention’s recommendations. Authorities in India were especially shocked by Britain’s agreement to compulsory daily inspections onboard pilgrimage vessels deemed

\textsuperscript{13} F.O. 412/58, “Correspondence respecting the Paris Cholera Conference and the Question of Sanitary Reform in the East,” A. Godley, India Office to Foreign Office, inclosure in no. 27, “Memorandum of the Views of the Secretary of State for India regarding the Attitude to be taken in behalf of India at the Paris Conference of February 1894,” 29 Jan. 1894, p. 22-23.

\textsuperscript{14} Ministry of Health (M.H.) 19/238, “Paris Sanitary Convention,” British delegate Phipps to Foreign Office, 28 Mar. 1894.

\textsuperscript{15} Duguet, \textit{Le pélerinage de la Mecque}, 171-173, quoted in Peters, \textit{The Hajj}, 304.
to be sailing from infected ports, forcefully remonstrating that such measures “would almost certainly be misconstrued by lower-class Muslims as a provocation on the part of the British authorities.”

Although this matter was ultimately an argument between India and the imperial metropole, in an attempt to escape the resentment that further sanitary measures would likely engender among Indian Muslims, Calcutta sought to hold the Ottoman Empire responsible by cleverly appropriating the Sultan-Caliph’s Pan-Islamic prestige for its own purposes:

If in conformity with the view of European Powers, it should be decided that further restrictive measures ought to be taken in India as regards Indian pilgrims to the Hedjaz, then it would be desirable that such restrictions should be supported by distinct and explicit concurrence of His Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, who is recognized by Moslems in India as the protector of Islam and the Viceregent of the founder of their religion.

As has been previously mentioned, the Indian Government was by no means the only quarter from which the Ottoman Empire came under pressure. Rather, as John Baldry explains, “the Conference developed into the trial of the Ottoman Sanitary Administration.” The Italian delegate, Count Tornielli, bluntly summarized the mood of the conference by boldly plotting a European takeover of Constantinople Board of Health. In his correspondence with the Foreign Office, he wrote:

The Supreme Sanitary Council in Constantinople, invested with fresh power and instructions by the Conferences of Venice and Dresden, will take a position of greater importance in the Conference about to take place as to the measures to be taken in regard to the Mecca pilgrims, and the precautions to be adopted in the Persian Gulf. The question may arise whether it should be allowed to remain as it is now.

The Conference of Venice modified the Sanitary, Maritime, and Quarantine Council of Alexandria. There should be no obstacle, and it would only be logical that

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16 Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 135.
17 F.O. 412/58, “Correspondence respecting the Paris Cholera Conference and the Question of Sanitary Reform in the East,” A. Godley, India Office to Foreign Office, inclosure in no. 27, “Memorandum of the Views of the Secretary of State for India regarding the Attitude to be taken in behalf of India at the Paris Conference of February 1894,” 29 Jan. 1894, p. 23.
18 Baldry, “The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamaran Island,” 60.
the Conference of Paris should on similar lines modify the Supreme Council of Constantinople. The former revised the Regulations of the Council of Alexandria; the latter might revise those of the Council of Constantinople.

The expediency of modifying the Supreme Council of Constantinople is obvious.

Tornielli goes on to explain that “whilst [the Council] spends it resources in grants to its officials, it leaves the hospitals without water, unprovided with sufficient means of disinfection, and in such a state that they became rather hotbeds of infection.” In response to these grievances, Tornielli strongly advocated “that the [European] Powers [should] always be able to maintain in the face of the Porte, their rights derived from the Capitulations against the decisions of the Council.”

In addition to Tornielli’s appeal to Europe’s superior economic and diplomatic position with regard to the Capitulations, yet another withering round of attacks was launched against the conditions on Kamarân Island and the Ottoman Empire’s other lazarettos. As the Révue d’Hygiène put it, the flag-ship station of the entire quarantine system was a virtual “emporium of cholera,” a “scandal and disgrace to every European Government represented on the Ottoman Board of Health.” Similarly, a British journal, The Practitioner, warned: “We know… that mere condemnation [by the delegates at the

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19 F.O. 412/58, “Correspondence respecting the Paris Cholera Conference and the Question of Sanitary Reform in the East,” no. 50, translation of “Memorandum communicated by Count Tornielli,” 26 Feb. 1894, p. 36-39. While the Capitulations had begun as a unilateral act of diplomatic favor, first granted to France in the sixteenth century, over time this Ottoman diplomatic practice would be badly abused by European states. As a result, from the eighteenth century onward European states demanded increasing exemptions from Ottoman law when traveling and conducting business in Ottoman territories. With regard to the issue of pilgrimage and the sovereignty of the Constantinople Board of Health, European states, particularly Britain, questioned whether the Ottoman Empire could claim any right to set sanitary restrictions that would affect its colonial subjects. For more on the Capitulations, see Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 78-79.

20 Révue d’Hygiène (Sept., 1899), quoted in Baldry, “The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamaran Island,” 60.
Paris Sanitary Conference] if only followed by promises of amendment on the part of the Sultan and the Turkish Government, will lead to no real improvement.”

To counter this onslaught of criticism, the Ottoman delegation announced that a series of improvements and new constructions would be carried out both at Kamarān and at the other quarantine stations scattered throughout the Empire. As Baldry’s analysis of the Kamarān quarantine station explains, the Paris Conference of 1894 and the two pilgrimage seasons following it “mark[ed] the end of an epoch.” In 1895, the Constantinople Board of Health decided to completely reorganize the entire lazaretto. As Hamza ‘Ali Luqmān’s reports in Tārīkh al-Juzur al-Yamaniyya, a fresh-water-filtration system for desalinating sea water was installed in 1895. Prior to its construction, well water had been the only source of drinking water available to the pilgrims. According to Baldry, the instillation of this machine had far reaching consequences. After the instillation of this apparatus the average mortality rate among pilgrims quarantined on the island plummeted from 3.37 to 1.04 per 1,000. Subsequent research would eventually establish that water from the wells on the island contained microbes conducive to the spread and virulence of the cholera vibrio. It was also thought the water treatment facilities would probably bring outbreaks of cholera at Kamarān to an end. With the exception of one outbreak in December 1907, this conclusion was essentially correct.

Ottoman improvements on Kamarān Island were only the beginning. In the Hijaz itself, the Ottomans had announced the reorganization of their quarantine facilities at

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21 The Practitioner 52 (1894), quoted in Baldry, “The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamaran Island,” 60.
22 Baldry, “The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamaran Island,” 62.
24 Baldry, “The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamaran Island,” 62.
Jidda, the construction of new shelters for indigent pilgrims, the establishment of new hospitals in Mecca, and the improvement of existing hospitals and clinics in Mecca and Jidda. And finally, in April 1895, an imperial firmana “made provision for additional doctors during the pilgrimage, a pharmacy, and a corps of sanitary police.” While these reforms were likely responsible for the marked decline in cholera deaths, which dropped to only 306 in 1895, it is also probable that the intensification of sanitary activities, particularly on the part of Europeans, were at least partially responsible for fomenting the atmosphere of violence which ultimately led to Dr. Abdur Razzack’s murder (previously discussed in Chapter 3) that same year.25

The violence of 1895 notwithstanding, the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire’s sanitary facilities yielded long-lasting results. No subsequent outbreaks of cholera were ever as devastating as that of 1893 and after 1912 epidemic cholera no longer threatened the Hijaz. Cholera’s deadly reign had, however, brought the Hijaz under non-Muslim surveillance for the first time ever, ensuring the direct involvement of Europe’s colonial powers in the sanitary administration of the hajj and the Muslim Holy Places until well into the second half of the twentieth century.

The Bombay Plague of 1896: The Defeat of British Sanitary Obstructionism

Sadly, even the defeat of cholera did not signal an end to the threat of epidemic disease in the Hijaz. Just as the Ottoman sanitary service was being overhauled, once again British India spawned another epidemiological nightmare. In September 1896, the plague broke out in Bombay. It appears to have been imported by stowaway rats from

Hong Kong, where an epidemic had ravaged that city since 1894. As Mike Davis explains, “At the time, some scientists theorized that drought, as previously in southern China, was a critical factor in driving plague-carrying rats into more intimate commensality with human victims.” In any case, like Hong Kong, Bombay “offered an ideal ecology for a pandemic: fetid, overcrowded slums (perhaps the densest in Asia) infested with a huge population of black rats.” While health officials, most notably Florence Nightingale, repeatedly warned administrators that by refusing to acknowledge the city’s virtual “phantasmagoria” of disease conditions and provide adequate sanitation, the entire city would eventually be plunged into an “epidemic apocalypse.” While Bombay had experienced an economic boom in the 1880s and 1890s, as both Davis and Ira Klein indicate, this expansion was in many ways “subsidized by falling living and health standards of its vast majority.” In fact, “the wages of unskilled laborers increased only five percent in 35 years while grain costs rose 50 percent and land values and rents tripled.” Thus, “the progressive immiseration” of Bombay’s working poor may be seen as “the single most important factor” in Bombay’s explosion of mortality around the turn of the century. Despite a number of “panic-stricken exoduses” during the period, famine and cholera in the countryside surrounding Bombay left its urban poor trapped in the filth of the slums. Worse still, the city and its suburbs were repeatedly inundated by refugees fleeing the carnage of drought and cholera playing out in the Deccan.

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26 The principal mode of transmission for plague (Yersina Pestis) is via rats and their fleas (Xenopsylla Cheopis). For more on the spread of plague from China to India as well as the vectors involved in its transmission from rats to fleas to humans, see I.J. Catanach, “The ‘Globalization’ of Disease? India and the Plague,” 133-143. For a contemporary discussion of plague’s etiology and preventative measures, see “Plague in India,” in The Lancet (25 Apr. 1908).

27 Davis, Late Victorian Holocauts, 149.

At first glance, it would appear that authorities in India had learned nothing from their long experience with cholera. In the first weeks of the plague outbreak, officials in Bombay tried to reassure both Bombay’s urban populace and international observers that the epidemic was not truly plague, but rather a “bubonic fever” or “plague of a mild type.” Moreover, reports to the contrary were denounced as “scaremongering.” Given the state’s prior reluctance to acknowledge the full extent of cholera outbreaks, its fear of provoking public opposition, particularly among Muslims, and its unwillingness to spend more than the absolute minimum amount of money on public health for India’s native population, such denials might lead us to believe that British India’s response to plague would be less than impressive. However, once the plague had been announced in October 1896, the Government of the Bombay Presidency and municipal authorities in the city acted with a speed and aggressiveness never before witnessed during previous epidemics.  

Within a few days of the official admission of the outbreak quarantine measures had been imposed against Indian vessels at Suez and at numerous ports the world over. It is important to note, however, that under the more lenient rules of Venice Convention of 1892 the quarantine at Suez was no longer an obstacle to most commercial ships. French and other Mediterranean ports would prove to be much less flexible. In Marseilles, passengers arriving on steamers from Bombay were not permitted to land, while other ports opted to tighten the regulations agreed upon at the Venice and Dresden conferences. France, Germany, and Italy all imposed restrictions or total bans on the importation of Indian raw hides and other suspect items like raw cotton, which had been deemed likely

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29 Bombay Gazette (26 Sept. 1896), p. 2, quoted in Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade.” 137. See also Arnold, Colonizing the Body, 203.

30 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, 203.
to harbor plague by an emergency sanitary conference held in Venice in 1897. Some nations even banned tea imported from Bombay. Others, opting for a slightly less stringent response, decided to disinfect suspect products only to those ships sailing from ports known to be infected. The accumulated economic impact of these restrictions was swift and severe. Although Bombay was the primary target of these restrictions, Calcutta also suffered great losses, despite the fact that it was practically untouched by plague. Bombay, however, suffered more from restrictions placed upon its commerce with other Indian ports. Combined with the interruption of its export trade and the flight of some 100,000 people, the city’s commercial operations were decimated.\(^{31}\)

Fearing that the plague, like cholera before it, might escape India’s borders and find its way to Europe, the international community threatened a total embargo on trade with not only Bombay but all of India unless colonial administrators decided to take decisive action to contain the outbreak.\(^{32}\) In order to satisfy these demands, in an unprecedented step the government imposed a full quarantine, rather the customary system of medical inspections, at Madras, Karachi, Calcutta, and Rangoon against all vessels sailing out of Bombay.\(^{33}\) Internally, the municipal authorities took even more drastic steps. Under the Municipal Act of 1888, the powers vested in local authorities allowed “the enforced segregation and hospitalization of suspected cases and municipal health officers’ right of entry into infected buildings.” At the same time, officials launched a massive campaign of “urban cleansing.” They “flush[ed] out drains and sewers with oceans of seawater and carbolic, scouring out scores of shops and grain warehouses (in the vicinity of which many of the first cases had occurred, sprinkling

\(^{31}\) Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 138-139.
\(^{32}\) Arnold, Colonizing the Body, 205.
\(^{33}\) Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 139.
disinfectant powder in alleyways and tenements. Even more tragically, this brutal campaign also destroyed “several hundred slum dwellings in the hope of extirpating the disease before it could fully establish itself.”

Despite this energetic, if brutal, response, the plague continue to spread throughout the city. Faced with the gruesome prospect of combating plague across the entire subcontinent, on 4 February 1897, Lord Elgin, the Viceroy at the time, approved “An Act to Provide for Better Prevention of the Spread of Dangerous Epidemic Disease.” This piece of legislation was hurried through Elgin’s council and approved with little debate. The act applied to all of India and took effect immediately upon its passage. It was a drastic departure from previous sanitary measures and its powers were applied in a ruthless, almost reckless fashion. Under its provisions official were now allowed to inspect any ship or suspect passenger; to detain and segregate those suspected of infection; to destroy infected property; to disinfect or simply destroy any dwelling suspected of harboring plague; to prohibit large gathers, such as fair and pilgrimages; and to examine and detain rail passengers. In short, India’s medical personnel were unleashed upon populace with few restrictions.

Men, women, and children were dragged from their homes, their belongings burnt and their shrines and places of worship desecrated. Victims of the disease were kidnapped, their families only finding out about their whereabouts after they had died in quarantine. With some four out of five victims dying in the government-run plague camps and very few ever returning home alive, rumors ran wild. Some even suspected

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34 Arnold, *Colonizing the Body*, 203-204.
35 Ibid., 204.
that victims were being murdered by the authorities “to extract a vital oil to be employed as a magic ointment by Europeans.”

While for decades officials in Britain and India and their delegates at the numerous sanitary conferences of the period had claimed that bold sanitary restrictions would inflame the religious passions of their Indian subjects, during the plague outbreak of 1896, Indian opinion was simply brushed aside as mere “superstition.” What then was catalyst for this dramatic change? The colonial government’s new interventionist stance was likely the product of both internal and external pressures as well as by both medical and political factors. The most important factor, however, was that the international pressure to control the plague swiftly and effectively was tremendous.

The foundations for British India’s transition to a more robust policy of sanitary interventionism had been some three to four decades in the making. The international sanitary conferences had consistently pushed Britain to take action against its public heath crises, whether related to cholera or plague. Finally, the tenth sanitary conference, which met in Venice in February and March 1897 specifically to address the plague emergency, pressed the Government of India to take extreme measures to ensure that the advance of plague be stopped at India’s shores. The conference was essentially a final ultimatum: act now, undertake the international community’s suggestions, or India’s ports will be indefinitely closed to all foreign commerce.

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36 Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts*, 150.
37 Arnold, *Colonizing the Body*, 204.
Once the Indian Government had formally acknowledged the plague outbreak in October 1896, Ottoman and European officials demanded that the *hajj* be suspended. In January and February of 1897, the duration of quarantine and disinfection periods at Kamarān and other Red Sea ports was raised from 10 to 15 and then eventually to 20 days. As a result, further departures of Indian pilgrims during the 1896-1897 season were forbidden. And for the first time ever, on 20 February 1897, the Government of India followed France and Russia in announcing that the *hajj* would be formally suspended as long plague prevailed. Unfortunately, however, some pilgrimage vessels had already left India before the ban. The steamship *Pekin* arrived at Kamarān Island carrying two plague victims. And despite having been officially discouraged from making the pilgrimage, in June 1897, Foreign Office reports estimated around 2,500 Indian pilgrims present in Jidda, some 5,000 in Mecca, and around 4,000 still at Yanbū’. Not surprisingly, at the end of the pilgrimage season plague broke out in Jidda. Despite rather dubious claims from British officials in the Red Sea that this outbreak originated from Yemen’s Tihāma coast or from among “the poorer Arabs from Hadramout,” who appeared “to have been the first and chief sufferers,” the international community remained nonplussed. India was once again to blame for bringing epidemic disease to the Hijaz.

With the plague having made its way to the Hijaz during the 1896-1897 pilgrimage season, it was the expressed “wish of the Constantinople Sanitary Board that

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40 Baldry, “The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamara Island,” 65.
41 F.O. 78/4981, “Pilgrimage Traffic, 1898”; Baldry, “The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamara Island,” 65.
42 Baldry, “The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamara Island,” 65.
the prohibition against Moslem pilgrimage from India should be maintained.\textsuperscript{44}

Although the Secretary of State for India ultimately opted not to impose a total ban on the 
\textit{hajj} during the 1898 season, authorities remained convinced that half-hearted sanitary 
controls would no longer be tolerated by the international community. As a result, 
pilgrims were publicly discouraged from making the journey during the 1898 season.\textsuperscript{45}

Instead, pilgrims were encouraged to save their money for upcoming seasons.

Authorities announced the imposition of lengthier and more stringent quarantines in the 
Red Sea. Even more important were the internal restrictions placed on would-be pilgrims 
within the subcontinent itself. No pilgrims were allowed from the Bombay Presidency, 
nor were pilgrims allowed to begin their journey from Bombay. Thus, pilgrims were 
ererouted to other ports via specially isolated trains, provincial and central observation 
camps were set up along these new routes, and pilgrims were segregated and placed 
under medical supervision at their port of embarkation. Perhaps the most effective 
restriction was placed on pilgrimage brokers and shipping agents, who were prohibited 
from selling \textit{hajj}-related tickets except with in the purpose-built observation camps. As a 
result of these more aggressive steps, only 893 Indian pilgrims arrived at Kamarān Island 
during the 1898 season. Even still, the disease struck Jidda yet again in March 1898.\textsuperscript{46}

After successive seasons of plague in Jidda, the Constantinople Board of Health 
drew up new regulations, based on recommendations of the Venice Convention of 1897, 
in the hope that plague outbreaks would not become an annual occurrence in the Hijaz.

Under these new rules, all ships carrying pilgrims would be diverted to Aden for a

\textsuperscript{44} F.O. 78/4981, “Pilgrimage Traffic, 1898,” A. Godley, India Office to Under Secretary of State, 
Foreign Office, 19 Jan. 1898.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., extract of telegram from Lord Elgin, Viceroy of India to Foreign Office, 6 Nov. 1897.

\textsuperscript{46} Baldry, “The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamaran Island,” 66.
shipboard medical inspection before being allowed to continue onward to Kamarān and Jidda. In addition to this extra precaution, strict quarantine measures were imposed on all persons, whether pilgrims or not, leaving Jidda by land or sea. In an even more drastic step the entire town was cordoned off. Pilgrims were forced to land outside the town and routed directly to Mecca. As a result, Jidda’s merchants were completely cut off from their principal source of income. The devastating economic impact of these restrictions, the intensification of European involvement in the local affairs of the port, and the carnage wrought by repeated bouts of plague set the stage for confrontation. That same year some 1,500 Jiddawis rioted against the quarantine and looted the quarantine facilities outside the city’s Mecca gate.47

It was precisely this climate of chaos and fear that Mīrzā ‘Alī Khān Amīn al-Dawlah (1844-1904), the former Grand Vizier of Iran, and his companions faced on their 1899 journey to Mecca. While these men were neither poor pilgrims nor Indians, even these wealthy, powerful aristocrats would have to stare down their own mortality along their route to the Hijaz. Even before they had set out from Iran, they were strongly discouraged from traveling by both an Ottoman sanitary official (sent specifically to monitor Iranian precautions against the Indian plague) and the Russian embassy. As they traveled they obsessively inquired about the “rumors of plague in Jidda.”48 And as the reports of the disease continued in each new port along the way, their conversations

47 Ibid., 67.
frequently oscillated between expressions of bravery in the face of adversity, fear, uncertainty, regret, and resignation to God’s will. As Amīn al-Dawlah explains:

The frequency of the news of plague in Jidda confused everyone, and they sometimes blamed my stubbornness in undertaking travel to the Hijaz, because to throw oneself into a fire and to put oneself in a situation in which you will certainly die; it is against reason and religion. I wished health and safety, not for myself, but for my companions. I wished that, God willing, we would return to our homeland in good condition, and that I would not be responsible [for bringing harm to them].

At other times along the journey, however, Amīn al-Dawlah displays the kind of suicidal resignation to his destiny and inclination toward martyrdom that British officials repeatedly complained about when referencing the poorer pilgrims of India, many of whom believed that perishing en route to Mecca or in Mecca would send them straight to Paradise.

If plague in Jidda is verified, it is against reason and logic to proceed toward death by one’s own footsteps… [However,] we need not be afraid of the plague that is in the way of God’s house. If we are destined to die this year, it is better that our reward is given to us by God according to the divine promise.

His companions were more realistic, however, and warned him that they would not allow him to behave so rashly. They replied:

With plague it is not an opportunity to show your mystical bravery. And if it is proven that there is disease their [in Jidda]. We will not allow you to move. We will have to choose another route. After entering Istanbul we may decide…

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49 Amīn al-Dawlah, Safarnāmih-i Mīrzā ‘Ali Khān Amīn al-Dawlah, 2 Dhu al-Hijja 1316 A.H. (13 Apr. 1899), 151. Purposely bringing harm to oneself or engaging in any activity that is certain suicide is prohibited in Islam. Continuing toward a town that is known to be stricken with plague is also prohibited according prophetic traditions recorded in Sahīh al-Bukhārī, vol. 7, book 71, no. 625.

50 Amīn al-Dawlah, Safarnāmih-i Mīrzā ‘Ali Khān Amīn al-Dawlah, 10 Dhu al-Qa’da 1316 A.H. (22 Mar. 1899), 75. Here, Amīn al-Dawlah seems torn between Islamic prohibitions against suicidal behavior and the promise of martyrdom for those striving in the way of God and accepting of the destiny decided by God (qisma). This tension is also seen in traditions related to plague. As al-Bukhārī reports in Sahīh al-Bukhārī, vol. 4, book 56, no. 680, “if one in the time of an epidemic stays in his country patiently hoping for Allah’s reward and believing that nothing will befall him except what Allah has written for him, he will get the reward of a martyr.” See also, British reports of elderly and sick pilgrims attempting to die en route to or in Mecca in F.O. 78/4094, Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Wilson, Acting Commissioner of Police, Bombay, no. 1366, Bombay, 3 Apr. 1886, in “British efforts to improve travel conditions for pilgrims; appointment of travel agent; problem of indigent pilgrims,” Oct. 1884-Feb. 1887, Records of the Hajj, vol. 3, 615.
Though first-hand accounts of pilgrims traveling directly toward a known epidemic or plague-stricken city are understandably few and far between, it is reasonable to believe that the feelings expressed by Amīn al-Dawlah and his companions give at least some indication of the conflicting fears and motivations that animated the countless masses of hajjis who braved the numerous cholera and plague outbreaks of the period in question. The final cholera outbreaks of 1907-1908 and 1911-1912 not withstanding, the successive plague outbreaks in Jidda and the Hijaz just before the turn of the century represent something of a climax in the international and inter-imperial struggles over sanitary control of the hajj.\textsuperscript{52} Both the British and Ottoman empires took previously unthinkable steps in order to avoid allowing plague to become endemic to the Hijaz.

While it is tempting to focus our attention solely on the global political and diplomatic implications of cholera and plague, it is crucial that we not overlook the very real sufferings and deaths of the countless pilgrims who died in an attempt to reach the pinnacle of their spiritual lives as Muslims.

From 1890 to 1919, cholera deaths in India averaged around 4 million per decade, while plague is estimated to have swept away some 10 million souls during roughly the same period (1896-1921).\textsuperscript{53} While cholera and plague continued to haunt India and the Hijaz during the first two decades of the twentieth century, in the wake of Bombay plague outbreak of 1896, Britain’s longstanding policy of opposition to the implementation of sanitary restrictions was no longer politically viable. As a result of having finally acknowledged international concerns regarding quarantine and pilgrimage


\footnotesize{52} Peters, 	extit{The Hajj}, 306-307; 	extit{Records of the Hajj}, vol. 9, 377-412.

\footnotesize{53} Arnold, 	extit{Colonizing the Body}, 164, 200.
procedures during the sanitary conferences of the 1890s, at least one aspect of Britain’s
dilemma regarding its pilgrimage policy was settled. However, the problem of Pan-Islam
and anti-colonial radicalism still remained.
CHAPTER 5

ALL THE CALIPH’S CONSPIRATORS: INDIA, THE HAJJ, AND PAN-ISLAM DURING WORLD WAR I

The rule of the Turk is regarded as drawing to a close by people of position in Mecca, fanatical or liberal. Our policy now should be guided by our intentions, or at least our wishes, when that rule ceases. If we have no views, it would be well to form them. We ought to be ready, and making up our mind in time…

-G.P. Devey, British Consul, Jidda, 1897¹

The Muhammadans in Asia, Europe and Africa adorned themselves with all sorts of arms and rushed to join the jehad in the path of God. Thanks to Almighty God that the Turkish Army and the Mujahidin have overcome the enemies of Islam… Oh Muslims, therefore attack the tyrannical Christian government under whose bondage you are… Hasten to put all your efforts, with strong resolution, to strangle the enemy to death and show your hatred and enmity for them.

-Ghalib Pasha, Ottoman Governor of the Hijaz, 1915²

We have had a lot of disquieting reports about the propaganda of the Pan-Islamists in and out of India and there can be little doubt but that there has been a good deal of contact and sympathy between them, the Wahabis [colonial shorthand for Pan-Islamic radicals] and the Maulvi ['ulama'] class. But up to the present the Muhammadan ill-feeling against us has manifested itself only in a number of unpleasant incidents which outwardly at least are connected into one big movement. Pan-Islamist journalists have written very objectionable articles, Maulvis have praised the Sultan of Turkey and jehad, religious teachers have shaken the dust of India from their feet as a sign that they considered it an unholy country [dar al-harb], schoolboys have been instigated to join our fanatical enemies across the frontier…

-Criminal Intelligence Office, Shimla/Delhi, 1916³

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¹ F.O. 881/6924, G.P. Devey, British Consul, Jidda to Sir Phillip Currie, Constantinople, inclosure no. 2 in no. 1, 8 May 1897.
² Translation of an extract of the Ghalibnama, quoted in P.C. Bamford, Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1925), 125.
In many ways, the Pan-Islamic connections between India and the Ottoman Empire, first forged during the Russo-Turkish War and throughout the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, had matured by the dawn of the twentieth century. The methods of symbolic mobilization, journalism, political organization, and fundraising devised and honed during Abdul Hamid II’s reign had proven that Pan-Islam could be both an effective method of anti-imperial resistance and a way to foster varying degrees of nationalistic solidarity among disparate groups of Indian Muslims. Pan-Islam also provided Indian Muslim activists a measure of protection against British objections. Given Queen Victoria’s post-Mutiny guarantees of religious freedom, Indian Muslims were able to argue that their organizational and financial efforts to support the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph and the protection of the Holy Places were wholly legitimate expressions of religion, rather than seditious acts of jihad or nationalism. Thus, by expressing political discontent in terms of the defense of religion, Pan-Islamic symbolism allowed groups that had not previously dared to voice their opinions publicly to reenter the political arena.4

Since the divergent cultural and educational reform movements that came in response to the events of 1857-1858, however, Muslim elites had been divided into polarized factions. After the carnage of the Great Rebellion, it had become clear to most Indian Muslims that waging jihad against British hegemony was at best futile and at worst suicidal. In light of this conclusion, both Muslim political leaders and the ‘ulama’

came to the consensus that their best interests lay in the cultivation of educational, religious, and cultural affairs, and in strengthening the Muslim community from within.\(^5\)

This process of adaptation to the newly-imposed British regime generated two main responses. For the ‘ulama’, Muslim reform could only be achieved through the purification and standardization of Islamic practices and a staunch refusal to collaborate with British rule. The most prominent example of this strand of ‘ulama’-led revival was the Deoband movement. Because this movement was founded in 1867, at a time when the British had stripped away the umma’s expectations of protection under an Islamic state, it was envisioned as a state-less community of revitalized religious practice under the leadership of the ‘ulama’. Thus, instead of relying on political organization as their method of communal solidarity, its members used local madrasas as their avenue to preserve and reform the personal religious practices of Muslims. Deoband’s reform college, the Dār al-‘Ulūm, instituted a curriculum that stressed the study of the revealed sciences and Islamic law over the study of modern science. In fact, the Deoband curriculum was explicitly designed to train students for a public mission: to instruct the community in the “orthodox” practice of Islam. By reforming or opposing syncretistic festivals, the veneration of saints, and other parochial rituals, the Deobandis strove to integrate Muslims of varied geographical backgrounds and particular cults into a more homogenous version of Islam. Acting as professional spiritual guides in this process of standardization, the Deobandis instructed their communities not only in the madrasas, but also through Urdu vernacular publications. The result was a wide-spread middle- and

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lower-middle class base of support, paving the way for the opening of more than forty branch schools within thirty years of its founding.⁶

While there were significant differences between the two, the Deobandis also shared a great deal in common with older scholarly centers of the subcontinent like Farangi Mahal, a maze of residences and courtyards in the Lucknow Chauk. Founded during the reign of Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707), Farangi Mahal remained among the most influential centers of Islamic scholarship in the subcontinent thanks to Mulla Nizamuddin’s *dars-i nizami*, the basic Islamic curriculum taught in Indian *madrasas* from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. Although this curriculum emphasized “rational studies,” such as Arabic grammar, logic, philosophy, and jurisprudence, rather than solely focusing on Qur’an and *hadith* as in the case of the Deobandis, its reform-minded and regularized institutional structure mirrored the efforts being undertaken by its Deobandi counterparts.⁷

In many ways, the worldview of ‘*ulama*’ groups like the Deobandis and Farangi Mahal was built upon the earlier Delhi-based intellectual traditions of Shâh Walîullâh (d. 1762) and his son Shâh ‘Abd al-‘Azîz (d. 1824). However, they also drew upon the grassroots revivalist model of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi and its Arabian influences. The most significant difference between the Barelwis and the post-Mutiny ‘*ulama*’, however, were their respective positions on political involvement and *jihad*. In the wake of the Mutiny, the ‘*ulama*’ opted to avoid methods of direct confrontation and political mobilization lest they meet the same fate as Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi or that of the Sepoy

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mutineers. Thus, while the ‘ulama’ maintained a stoic silence on political issues, they still harbored deep anti-British and Pan-Islamic sentiments.⁸

Conversely, the former Mughal political elites focused their attention on educational reforms designed to facilitate the absorption of Western science and the creation of a modernist Muslim political identity. The most famous example of this trend is undoubtedly Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), scion of a family that served first under the Mughals and then under the British, who argued that Muslims were not only dependant on British favor but that British rule was in fact lawful. According to Ahmad Khan, British rule and its post-Mutiny pledge of non-interference in religious affairs allowed Muslims to live in peace and under the shari’a. As a result, Ahmad Khan consistently opposed Pan-Islamic agitation and Indian nationalist sentiments, while remaining loyal to the British, Western educational reforms, and his dream of a future British-Muslim power-sharing arrangement.⁹

In Ahmad Khan’s mind, Western educational and technological superiority offered proof that the umma was in desperate need of reform. If Muslims were the recipients of God’s final revelation, why were they no longer prospering, innovating, and ruling? It seemed to him that if Muslims were being surpassed by British innovations that the umma’s understanding of Islam had wandered astray. This convinced him that Indian Muslims would have to learn from the British and their advances in modern society.

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technology before they could resume any position of power. Nowhere was Ahmad Khan’s secular-liberal style more evident than in his approach to educational reform. In 1875, he founded the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, which was designed to be India’s Muslim version of Eaton. The school encouraged political conservativism, rooted in an understanding of British governmental institutions and the gentlemanly skills of British culture. Aligarh also exposed its students to a hybrid curriculum of Islamic studies, English, and Western science. Its goal was to forge an Islamic brand of modernism that could reconcile Western science, secularism, and political theory with the fundamental teachings of the Qur’an. However, while Aligarh began as a loyalist institution, by the first two decades of the twentieth century it eventually became the training ground of the Indian subcontinent’s twentieth-century Muslim nationalist leaders and hotbed of anti-imperialism. Aligarh’s students were instrumental in forging a nationalist Indian Muslim identity, which ultimately spawned the All-India Muslim League, its successor the Muslim League, and eventually the creation of the Muslim-majority Pakistani state in 1947.10

While Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s college at Aligarh was successful in its creation of reform-minded, nationalist political elites, it did not, however, capture the imagination of the ‘ulama’ or a hegemonic hold on the loyalty of the masses. The ‘ulama’ of north India and their millions of followers did not share Ahmad Khan’s enthusiasm for British rule and innovation. Instead, they saw their primary role as the protectors of faith and religious heritage during a time of non-Muslim rule. For the ‘ulama’, Ahmad Khan’s attempt to westernize the Muslim upper classes through secular, English-language

schooling was simply an anathema. This split helped to create separate educational and reform philosophies, one designed with primarily local political objectives and one with more universal religious objectives. The “institutional dualism” created by the rift between the ‘ulama’ and the modernist political elites conditioned a remarkably durable pattern of tension and competition between Islamic revivalism and secular nationalism, which in turn conditioned different orientations toward British rule, Pan-Islam, and eventually to the nationalist politics that led to Indian independence and partition in 1947.\(^\text{11}\)

While the Western-educated elites graduating from Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s loyalist school, the Aligarh Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, might have seemed unlikely to join forces with the religiously-educated ‘ulama’ of the Deobandi or Farangi Mahal schools and vice versa, at the beginning of the twentieth century the Indian Muslim political environment was undergoing a radical transformation. From 1885 to 1911, the loyalty of Western-educated Muslim elites to the British was severely eroded as events in the Middle East and India began to reinforce Muslim anxieties of British and Hindu domination. At the local level, the Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, had already begun to gain momentum toward Indian national independence. It expressed Indian resentment of British arrogance and racial superiority, called for increased Indian participation in civil service, demanded increased political representation, and opposed British economic policies that threatened Indian interests. However, Congress was dominated by Hindu lawyers, who seemed to outmaneuver their Muslim counterparts at

every turn. In both the 1880s and 1890s British efforts to reform municipal self-
government in India resulted in electoral systems that heavily favored Hindu interests. In
light of governmental policies that deliberately favored Hindu civil servants and political
appointees over Muslim candidates, the first episodes of Hindu-Muslim communal riots,
and the Hindu crusade against the dominant place of Urdu in governmental affairs, even
loyal Muslims and Western-educated elites began to question whether their long-standing
policy of collaboration with British interests was still appropriate. However, no single
event shifted Muslim opinion more than the partition of Bengal. In 1905, the British had
created a Muslim-majority province in Eastern Bengal and Assam, but under Hindu
pressure had reversed their decision in 1911. In the minds of many Muslims, even the
loyalists of Aligarh, this reversal was viewed as a sign that collaboration and loyalty were
utterly discredited. However, the final straw among the Aligarh community was when
the government halted plans for the opening of an Aligarh Muslim University in 1912.
Thereafter, a new generation of Western-educated Muslim officials, lawyers, and
journalists that had graduated from Aligarh began to distance themselves from the earlier
loyalties of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Indeed, the younger generation became more radical
and thus more amenable to both the goals of Pan-Islam and Indian nationalism.12

To make matters worse, events in the Ottoman Empire and the greater Middle
East seemed to prove that the Muslim world was tottering on the brink of disaster. In
1897 came the Greco-Turkish war, followed by the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 to
create spheres of influence in Iran, the deposition of the Sultan Abdul Hamid II by the

12 Bamford, Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements, 110; Lapidus, The History of
Islamic Societies, 631; “Civil society, colonial constraints, 1885-1919,” in Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise
History of India, 123-164; Minault, The Khilafat Movement, 8-10; Francis Robinson, Separatism among
Young Turks in 1908, from 1911 to 1913 a rapid succession of Muslim defeats in the Turco-Italian and Balkan conflicts, and the French imposition of a protectorate over Morocco. Taken as a whole, these events were interpreted by the Muslim press as a plot by the Christian powers of Europe to crush the Ottoman Empire, the Caliph, even religion of Islam itself. Part of this conspiracy theory was based on the belief that European agents were covertly attempting to sow the seeds of revolt among the Ottoman Empire’s Arab population. During this same period, there was also a spate of rumors and conspiracy theories claiming Italy and Britain had entered into an anti-Islamic alliance and were threatening “to bomb the Ka‘ba in Mecca and the tomb of the Prophet in Medina in order to pressure Turkey into suing for peace.”

As Muslim frustrations and fears mounted, the Western-educated and religiously-educated factions of Muslim India finally began to combine forces. This new sense of unity and anti-British feeling brought forward a new circle of leaders: Aligarh men, such as the brothers Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali and their classmate Zafar Ali Khan, Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari, Maulana Abul-Kalam Azad, Maulana Mahmud Hasan of Deoband, and Maulana Abdul Bari and Shaykh Mushir Husain Qidwai of Farangi Mahal. This new generation of Muslim leaders collaborated to found a variety of new journals and charitable organizations, ostensibly designed to raise money and medical aid for their Muslim brothers in the Ottoman Empire, to protect and defend the Holy Places, and to

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13 Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, 23-24; Bamford, *Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements*, 110-113. Indian fears concerning the safety of the Ka‘ba may been sparked, at least in part, by reports of the Russian bombardment of the Iran’s holiest shrine, the tomb of the eighth Imam ‘Alî Rizâ in Mashhad, see Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics*, 56.
aid Muslims making the *hajj*, but which eventually transformed into more outwardly anti-British and nationalistic activities.\(^{14}\)

The Balkan conflicts quickly sparked new currents of Muslim militancy in the Urdu press. In 1912, a young ‘*alim*-turned-journalist, Abul-Kalam Azad founded *al-Hilal* (the Crescent). *Al-Hilal* blended Middle East news, religious reforms, and satirical Urdu poetry with a healthy dose of gory battlefield photographs and stories from the Turkish frontlines. Moreover, *al-Hilal* preached that Muslims were a single people bound by religion and their Caliph. Thus, Azad argued that the time for *jihad* had arrived and that it was the duty of Muslims to push for Indian home rule and to actively support the Ottoman Caliphate.\(^{15}\) In many ways, *al-Hilal*’s Pan-Islamic message was mirrored by Muhammad Ali’s *Comrade* and Zafar Ali Khan’s *Zamindar*. As Gail Minault argues, the overarching goal of these three major journals was “to speak for Muslims in general” in an attempt “to create a consensus of Muslim opinion they could then represent.”\(^{16}\)

As a result of the Urdu press’s increasingly grim reports from the Ottoman Empire and across the Islamic world, literate Indian Muslims were profoundly disturbed. Through the efforts of the aforementioned journals and a number of similar papers and organizations, Indian Muslims demonstrated their heart-felt support for their Ottoman coreligionists by establishing and contributing large sums of money to Turkish relief funds. In 1913, *al-Hilal* also launched a successful boycott of European goods similar to that of the Hindu *Swadeshi* campaign, which was supported by *fatwas* (Islamic legal

\(^{14}\) Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, 12-64.

\(^{15}\) Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics*, 58, quoted from *Zamindar* (5 Nov. 1912).

opinions) from a number of leading ‘ulama’. Shaukat Ali issued an appeal to organize a volunteer corps to fight on behalf of the Ottomans in the Balkans. Similarly, his younger brother Muhammad Ali advocated that funds collected for the stalled Aligarh University project should be handed over to the Ottomans as a loan. The call for war-time financial support even prompted the Deobandi ‘ulama’ to issue a fatwa, which made it obligatory upon Muslims to donate funds to the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, even declaring it permissible to divert zakat (required almsgiving) funds if necessary. As a result of both the intense media coverage and fatwas concerning the Turkish relief effort, by May 1913, Indian Muslims had donated more than half of the total amount of relief funds that reached the Ottoman Red Crescent Society from all over the Islamic world.

While India’s financial support of the Ottoman war effort was substantial and cut across previous factional divisions between Aligarhis and the various ‘ulama’ groups, the most notable organizational successes of the period were those of the Indian Red Crescent Mission to Turkey and the Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba (Society of the Servants of the Ka‘ba). Through these activities, leaders from the Indian Muslim community were able to travel to the Hijaz, Egypt, Istanbul, and the Ottoman frontlines, bringing them into direct contact with Ottoman dignitaries and anti-colonial activists from across the Islamic world. It is also through these earlier Pan-Islamic schemes that we begin to see the emergence of the organizational framework around which the Khilafat Movement, India’s first mass nationalist movement, would ultimately form.

The idea of sending a medical mission to the Ottoman Empire was first expressed by Shaukat Ali in the Comrade on 12 October 1912. Just one week later it was

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17 Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 149; Bamford, Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements, 112.
18 Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, 56.
19 Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 149-150.
announced that Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari, a former resident at the Charing Cross Hospital in London, had been asked to organize the mission. Ansari’s preparations proceeded quickly and within less than a month the mission was deemed ready for departure. The mission consisted of 5 doctors and 19 female nurses, representing all parts of India. On 15 December 1912, the mission departed for Turkey with the blessings of the Viceroy, who received the entire delegation in Bombay. Each member wore a distinctive Turkish cap, a khaki quasi-military uniform handsomely adorned with red and silver crescents, and a coat embroidered with the Arabic inscription: *al-wafd al-tibbiyya min bilād al-Hind* (the Medical Delegation from India). Upon their arrival in Istanbul, they stayed for several weeks before continuing to the front, during which time, they met with high-ranking officials, including Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha, as well as other Young Turks, and Egyptian nationalists, most notably Abdul Aziz Shawish. Armed with warm expressions of Turkish gratitude and their own glowing impressions from their experience in Istanbul, they crafted a series of pro-Ottoman articles, which were published in the Indian Muslim press.\(^{20}\) While the importance of the Indian Red Crescent Mission has often been overlooked or downplayed as merely a humanitarian gesture, the political contacts made by Ansari and the Red Crescent Mission were in fact substantial. As Ansari himself emphasized, the mission was responsible for “the formation of a bond of union between the Turkish nation and the Indians.”\(^{21}\) Subsequently, Ansari, Shawish, the Ali brothers, and Zafar Ali Khan would collaborate with Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha in an attempt to raise the funds needed to establish a refugee colony for Muslims dislocated by the Balkan conflict. Ansari and the Ali brothers would also attempt to


\(^{21}\) Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 153.
promote the sale of Turkish bonds in India. Although these schemes ultimately failed to gain any real traction, the relationships formed between all the parties involved provide important clues about subsequent Pan-Islamic activities, particularly the formation of the *Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba*, which is widely considered to be the most important forerunner of the *Khilafat* Movement.

The idea for the *Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba* originated with Abdul Bari, the leading figure of Farangi Mahal at the time. Abdul Bari’s enthusiastic support of the Sultan-Caliph can be traced back to the Greco-Turkish war in 1897. Upon Turkey’s victory, Lucknow Muslims celebrated the occasion and forwarded a congratulatory message to the Sultan-Caliph. When Abdul Bari performed the *hajj* in 1910-1911, he took the opportunity to visit Istanbul, at which time he became fascinated by the Ottoman capital, which he considered to be “last vestige of Islamic greatness.”

During the Balkan wars, Abdul Bari and his students traveled across north India collecting funds for Turkish relief and for the Red Crescent Medical Mission. As a result of these fundraising efforts, he came into contact with the Dr. Ansari, the Ali brothers, and other Aligarh men who were engaged in the same campaign. Abdul Bari was first introduced to the Ali brothers in December 1912 by Shaykh Mushir Husain Qidwai, one of his former students. Upon their meeting, Abdul Bari suggested that they form a society dedicated to protecting the Holy Places of Islam from harm at the hands of the European colonial powers, suggesting that the Ottoman Empire could no longer do the job alone. He proposed that they call it the *Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba* (Society of the Servants of the Ka‘ba), and suggested that they should open its membership to all Indian Muslims.

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23 Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, 34.
Through the organization, he argued that they could raise funds to ensure the safety of Mecca and Medina and offer aid to indigent pilgrims.\textsuperscript{24}

For their part, the Ali brothers were impressed by Abdul Bari’s ideas. For some time they had hoped to use their considerable political and journalistic influence in order to nurture an issue that could unite all Indian Muslims behind a single cause. While their previous Turkish relief efforts had been successful, those projects lacked both the religious rationale and symbolic value of the association suggested by Abdul Bari. Equally important, this would also mark the first major collaboration between the secular Aligarhis and the ‘ulama’. The depth of this collaboration is further demonstrated by the fact that in subsequent years Abdul Bari took the Ali brothers as his religious disciples. Under his tutelage, they read the Qur’an in Urdu and corresponded with him about questions of spiritual import.\textsuperscript{25}

Shortly after their first meeting, the \emph{Anjuman} was formed and on 31 March 1913, the Ali brothers made the idea public in a speech given in Amritsar. Abdul Bari became the president (\textit{Khādim al-Khuddām} or servant of the servants), while Mushir Husain Qidwai and Shaukat Ali served as general secretaries. According to its promoters, the \emph{Anjuman}’s chief aims were to maintain the honor and sanctity of the Ka’ba and the other Holy Places of Islam and to defend them against non-Muslim aggression, purposes which they claimed were “strictly religious, having nothing to do with politics.”\textsuperscript{26} In order to

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\textsuperscript{24} Minault, \textit{The Khilafat Movement}, 34-35; Özcan, \textit{Pan-Islamism}, 155; Qureshi, \textit{Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics}, 77.
\textsuperscript{25} Minault, \textit{The Khilafat Movement}, 35.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 35.
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Figure 9. Dastūr al-ʿAmal (Rules of the Society), Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Kaʾba, 1913.27

accomplish these rather amorphous goals, the founding members sought to solicit a one rupee membership fee each year from every Muslim in India. The money collected from membership dues was to be divided into three parts: one third was to be given to any independent Muslim state that was in charge of the Holy Places (i.e. the Ottoman Empire); one third was devoted to orphanages, schools, and other Islamic missionary activities; and the remainder was reserved for the future defense of the Ka‘ba and for aiding pilgrims.²⁸

It was also hoped that the Anjuman’s membership rolls would be expanded by establishing branch offices throughout the subcontinent. Each new member was required to take an oath of loyalty to the Anjuman, promising to maintain the dignity of the Ka‘ba and to sacrifice life and property if necessary.²⁹ In addition to the oath of allegiance, each member was expected to prominently display a yellow and black crescent logo, bearing the name Khādim-i Ka‘ba (servant of the Ka‘ba) on their clothing.³⁰

While the goals stated in the organization’s Dastūr al-‘Amal (Rules of the Society), were by no means political in nature, from the outset the lofty ambitions of the society’s founders betrayed the true character of the Anjuman. It was hoped that the first year’s dues would amount to around a crore (ten million rupees).³¹ It was proposed that this far-fetched sum could be used build a Muslim fleet to protect the Holy Places or failing that to buy at least one dreadnought for the Turkish navy. If not a Muslim navy, it

²⁸ Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 157.
²⁹ F.O. 371/1966, “Note on the Panislamic Movement and its effect on political agitation in India,” with the Urdu text of the Anjuman’s Dastūr al-‘Amal, Cairo, 19 Mar. 1914, in Islamic Movements in the Arab World, 1913-1966, vol. 1, 86, 92. British intelligence reports suggest that colonial officials had acquired information from an Indian student at al-Azhar, leading them to interpret article 6 of the Dastūr al-‘Amal as a pledge by each new pledge or devotee (fidāyī or “shidaiyan”) to do anything asked of him, including the commission of political crimes against the colonial government.
³⁰ Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 156.
³¹ Ibid., 158.
was thought that the *Anjuman* might purchase airplanes for presentation to the Ottomans. Another scheme called for funds to be earmarked for sending Indians abroad for military training. More realistic goals included the formation of a Turco-Indian Steamship Company to carry pilgrims from Bombay to Jidda in an attempt to break the British monopoly over the pilgrimage traffic. Eventually, however, the *Anjuman* concentrated on the more manageable task of aiding indigent pilgrims. Thus, Shaukat Ali went to Bombay and secured a license as a pilgrimage broker. He promised all pilgrims that their tickets, passports, and safety concerns would be well provided for and that all proceeds from the sale of tickets would be dedicated to the *Anjuman’s* fund for indigent pilgrims.\(^{32}\)

Although the *Anjuman’s* cause was extremely popular, the immediate effects of its projects were limited. Some prospective members refused to agree to the rather weighty terms of the society’s oath of allegiance. Nor did the *Anjuman* raise the kind of funds it had hoped for. While membership topped 20,000 within a year, including some 2,000 female members, even these impressive numbers could not come close to raising a million rupees. Further setbacks came in the wake of a bookkeeping scandal at the *Anjuman’s* head office in Delhi. More importantly, with the outbreak of World War I, the *Anjuman’s* activities were abruptly cut short and the Delhi office was forced to close. Given the mounting tensions between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, the *Anjuman* had been forbidden to send aid to Istanbul without the permission of the government. As Azmi Özcan points out, “the *Anjuman* was now in a difficult position because, under its rules, up to half of the amount of its funds were to be paid to the protector of the Holy Places, viz. the Ottoman Sultan, with whom Britain was soon to be at war.”\(^{33}\)


\(^{33}\) Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 158-161.
critical than its fiscal quandaries, however, was the fact that with the outbreak of World War I, the hajj route was closed, rendering even the Anjuman’s most practical aims a moot point. In a further preemptive strike against the Anjuman, the Viceroy pledged “that the present status of the Holy Places would not change and they were to be immune from attacks.”  

Thus, for all intensive purposes the Anjuman’s raison d’être had ceased to exist.

As Minault explains, however, the formation of the Anjuman was “nevertheless, a significant step toward cooperation between the ‘ulama’ and the Western-educated Muslims, and it provided a pattern for future operations.” Through the exploitation of religious symbols, such as the Ka’ba, the Caliphate, and the Crescent, public opinion had been aroused. Thus, for the first time since the Great Rebellion of 1857 the Muslim community had united for a common cause. The Indian ‘ulama’ had returned to the political arena and had sown the seeds that would ultimately form the roots of the dramatic Pan-Islamic conspiracies of World War I and the subsequent mass agitation campaigns that came in its wake.

Despite their repeated claims concerning the society’s strictly apolitical character, British intelligence officials from Cairo to Calcutta remained unconvinced. Instead, they read the activities of the Indian Red Crescent Mission and the Anjuman merely as fronts for a vast Pan-Islamic conspiracy, connecting Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and India. As this report, a “Note on the Pan-Islamic Movement and Its Effect on Political Agitation in India,” created by the Cairo police (19 March 1914), indicates:

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34 Ibid., 162.
35 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, 37.
The promoters of the movement took advantage of the pro-Turkish feeling aroused by the Balkan Wars and the constant arrival of Indians at Constantinople either as representatives of the Red Crescent Society or as journalists… It may be said that almost every Indian who visited Constantinople went back to his country fully prepared to serve the Turks by helping to spread the principles of Pan-Islamism.

Some of those same Indians passed through Egypt where they met leaders of the Nationalist Party with whom they conferred and to whom they confided that it was the intention of Indian Moslems to form secret societies under cover of religion for the purpose of sowing the seeds of PanIslamism as desired by the Turks and that they would endeavor to come to an understanding with their Hindoo brethren and stir up the spirit of rebellion and independence throughout the whole country.

One of the most important if not the most important of these societies is the society called the ‘The servants of Al-Kaaba’ (Khuddam el Kaaba)…(emphasis mine)³⁶

**World War I and the Call for Jihad: Pan-Islamic Plots Revealed**

On 1 November 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of Austria and Germany against the British Empire and the Allies. However, when the news of the proclamation of *jihad* by Sultan Mehmed V (r. 1909-1918) and the publication of five *fatwas* signed by the Shaykh al-Islam (the chief religious official or *mufti* of the Ottoman state) reached India early in December, the news failed to move Indian Muslims toward rebellion. In the months preceding the Ottoman declaration of *jihad*, British intelligence officials reported an increased intensity in the correspondence between members of the *Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba*, the Ottoman Vice-Consul in Bombay, and the presence of “several suspicious visitors” from the Turkish Red Crescent Society and the Committee for Union and Progress. Intercepted letters between these persons of interest and the leading Pan-Islamists of India had indicated the Ottoman Empire’s intent to enter the war and their continued need for India financial contributions.³⁷


same period, India’s triumvirate of Pan-Islamic journalists, Muhammad Ali, Zafar Ali Khan, and Abul-Kalam Azad, had also launched a series of “objectionable” articles, “sneering at any loyal effusion” and expressing their admiration for both the Ottomans and their German allies.38 In response, “the government brought out its long arm and set the Press Act [of 1910] in motion to gag some of the Muslim papers and ban those imported from Turkey.”39 Despite the fact that colonial officials remained uneasy about the possibility of an Ottoman-inspired Muslim rebellion being concocted in the Muslim press, however, it was widely believed that “the Muslim community would remain passively hostile” so long as the government could assure Muslims that the Holy Places of the Hijaz as well as those in Iraq (Najaf and Karbala) would remain immune from Allied attacks.40

For the most part, the government’s assumption was correct. The bulk of Muslim opinion remained loyal. With the notable exceptions of Mahmud Hasan of Deoband and Abdul Bari of Farangi Mahal and Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba fame, the government was able to secure support for a loyalist fatwa from most quarters of the ‘ulama’. The fatwa stated that the Sultan’s declaration of jihad was invalid because the war between Britain and the Ottoman Empire was politically rather than religiously motivated.41 Although it is important to point out that such expressions of loyalty were often

38 Ibid., 118.
39 Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, 72; Bamford, Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements, 118, 121. The most famous example of pro-Ottoman writing from the period immediately proceeding the war was Muhammad Ali’s article, “The Choice of the Turks,” published in the Comrade (26 Sept. 1914). Zafar Ali Khan was also interned in his native village as a result of inflammatory articles in the Zamindar. The government would later intern the Ali brothers in May 1915, forbidding them from traveling outside the Delhi province and from attending public meetings. At roughly the same time, the government also shut down Abul-Kalam Azad’s al-Hilal.
40 Ibid., 73. See also the Times of India (3 Nov. 1914).
41 Bamford, Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements, 120. However, it was later claimed that the fatwa had been issued under government coercion.
pragmatic political maneuvers aimed at the Indian Muslim community’s own self-preservation, throughout the war’s duration, the vast majority of Indian Muslims remained loyal and contributed greatly to the defeat of their Caliph. Indeed, some 240,000 Indian Muslim soldiers, despite some desertions, fought and died for the British Crown.\footnote{42 M.E. Yapp, “‘That Great Mass of Unmixed Mahomedanism’,” 12; Qureshi, \textit{Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics}, 85. For a an excellent discussion of the dilemmas of divided loyalties facing Indian soldiers during World Wars I and II, see also “Waging War for King and Country,” in Bose, \textit{A Hundred Horizons}, 122-147.} This fact was certainly not lost on Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who later admitted that without their assistance, “we should not have conquered Turkey at all.”\footnote{43 \textit{Hansard Parliamentary Debates}, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 125 (1920), col. 1964.}

While India remained relatively secure, the \textit{hajj}, however, still remained a politically sensitive subject as well as the most important conduit through which the currents of Pan-Islamic anti-colonial radicalism continued to flow. With the outbreak of hostilities between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, the \textit{hajj} once again became an Ottoman propaganda outlet. In November 1914, leaflets were distributed to India pilgrims, proclaiming the \textit{jihad} and stating that “the Allies were the enemies of Islam and that anyone who helped them was an infidel.”\footnote{44 Bamford, \textit{Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements}, 119.} For the most part, however, Ottoman propaganda efforts were overshadowed by the more immediate need to evacuate Indian pilgrims from the Hijaz. As Foreign Office reports indicate, upon hearing the news of fighting between the Ottomans and Russia, “the pilgrims were panic stricken and there was a great scare among them, and soon after return from Arafat to Mecca everybody hurried to reach Jeddah so as to catch the first steamer.”\footnote{45 India Office Records (I.OR.), L/P & S/10/523, “The Haj Report for the Year 1914-1915,” in \textit{Records of the Hajj}, vol. 4, 782.} Unfortunately, only 3,000 of the nearly 12,000 Indian pilgrims present in the Hijaz were able to secure return tickets,
leaving the remainder “with heavy hearts, resigned… to the prospect of being stranded at Jeddah until the war was over.” The panic among the pilgrims sparked a dramatic spike in both the availability and price of food and transportation, instantly reducing many stranded pilgrims to a state of destitution. Problems of price gouging were further compounded by the increased risk of pilgrimage vessels being confiscated either at Jidda or by hostile Ottoman warships at sea. As a result, the Government of India became concerned that news of stranded, starving pilgrims might ignite a massive scandal with the potential to foment further civil unrest in India. In response, the Viceroy felt initiated a program to arrange for food aid and rescue ships, indemnifying shipping companies involved in the pilgrimage trade against any possible losses incurred in rescuing the stranded *hajjis*. Furthermore, it was deemed necessary that the Red Sea pilgrimage route should be constantly patrolled by British warships.

Despite having averted this initial humanitarian crisis, by January 1915, it had become clear from the reports of returning *hajjis* that Ottoman propaganda activities in the Hjiaz and India had begun to bear fruit. It was reported that 700 pilgrims had remained in the Hijaz in order to fight on behalf of the Caliph. These *hajjis*-turned-*mujahidin* had come under the influence of Atta Muhammad and Abdul Wahid Aba, both of whom were members of the *Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba*. This discovery would only reconfirm previous British suspicions concerning the *Anjuman* and its leadership’s true intentions. However, even this rather significant act of subversion was little more than

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46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 784-785.
48 Bamford, *Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements*, 120. While the *Anjuman* never went so far as to openly call for *jihad*, intelligence reports indicate that the actions of Atta Muhammad and Abdul Wahid Aba may have encouraged private meetings among the society’s leading figures in Delhi in order to discuss whether or not *jihad* was incumbent upon Indian Muslims. The meetings in Delhi took place at the offices of Muhammad Ali’s newest paper, *Hamdard*. Shaukat Ali is also said to have been
a prelude to an even larger web of Pan-Islamic and anti-colonial conspiracies, which once again followed the pilgrimage route.

In August 1916, the plot known as the “Silk Letter Conspiracy” was uncovered. Spearheaded by the Deobandi ‘alim, Maulana Mahmud Hasan, the plot was an ambitious bid to raise a frontier jihad in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier in order to overthrow British rule in India. Up to a decade in the making, Mahmud Hasan had dispatched his former student Ubaidullah Sindhi to Kabul, where he would establish contacts with a group of students from Lahore and the Northwest Frontier, who had crossed into Afghanistan as a result of Mahmud Hasan’s 1915 fatwa, which had called for Indian Muslims to perform the hijra (migration of Muslims to escape a territory deemed to be dar al-harb). In Kabul, Sindhi would also make contact with the Turco-German Mission operating in Afghanistan and the German-supported Indian revolutionaries, Raja Mahindra Pratap and the Ghadr-party member Professor present and to have declared India to be dar al-harb (territory of war, as opposed to dar al-Islam). Whether these meetings precipitated any concerted action on the part of the Anjuman is perhaps irrelevant. However, the fact that British intelligence reports connected these events may partially explain the subsequent internment of the Ali brothers in May 1915. Later in 1916, increased government suspicions were further intensified by the discovery of links between a number of the conspirators involved in the Silk Letter Conspiracy and the leading members of the Anjuman.

F.O. 686/149, “First Note on the Silk Letters,” Criminal Intelligence Office, Shimla/Delhi, 22 Sept. 1916, p. 3; Bamford, Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements, 122; Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, 79. Sindhi was a former Sikh, who had converted to Islam and subsequently became quite radicalized during his time as a Deobandi student. He had started his own school in Delhi, Jami’a Nazaratu’l-Ma’arif Qur’aniyya, and had released several books, impressing upon Muslims the necessity of jihad. As a result, even before his involvement in the “Silk Letter” affair, he had been placed on the Shimla/Delhi Criminal Intelligence Office’s curiously titled, “Who’s Who of the Wahabi Movement, 1915.”

F.O. 686/149, “Third Note on the Silk Letters,” Criminal Intelligence Office, Shimla/Delhi, 22 Sept. 1916, p. 3; Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, 78. The issue of hijra would later become even more critical in 1920, during the Khalifat Movement. As Minault explains in The Khilafat Movement, 106, Sindhi piras, who had either been associated with Ubaidallah Sindhi and Mahmud Hasan’s plot or the Anjuman-i Khuddám-I Ka’ba called upon Muslims to migrate to Afghanistan in protest to British policies toward the Caliphate. This plan would ultimately result in the migration of some 30,000 muhajirin. Tragically, however, these ordinary people became the victim’s of their leaders’ overly ambitious plans, resulting in robbery and looting at the hands of frontier tribesman, their being turned away by the Amir of Afghanistan, and many deaths along the infamous Khyber Pass.
Muhammad Barakatullah, who were building a shadow government, the “Provisional Government of India.”\(^{51}\) While Sindhi was in Afghanistan, Mahmud Hasan was to proceed to the Hijaz, ostensibly as a pilgrim, before making his way to Istanbul, and eventually to the Indo-Afghan frontier. Before making his way to the Hijaz, however, Mahmud Hasan stopped in Bombay, where he stayed at the Bombay offices of the \textit{Anjuman-i Khuddāam-i Ka'ba} and was reportedly inducted into the society, cementing the marriage of the Deobandi ‘ulama’ to the \textit{Anjuman}’s Pan-Islamic coterie.\(^{52}\) While in the Hijaz, Mahmud Hasan established contact with Enver Pasha and Ghalib Pasha, the Ottoman governor of the Hijaz, from whom he obtained a declaration of \textit{jihad}. This document, known as the \textit{Ghalibnama}, was then smuggled to India by a Deobandi associate, copied and distributed in order to raise recruits for the proposed frontier \textit{jihad}.

These recruits were to form the nucleus of a proposed \textit{Jund-Allah} (Army of God). This

\(^{51}\) As Joan Jensen describes in \textit{Passage from India: Asian Indian Immigrants in North America} (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988), there was much talk around this time of a “Hindu-Bolshevist clique” and “German-Hindu Conspiracy,” plotting an uprising against India from Afghanistan and Central Asia. Thus, while Pan-Islam was certainly one of the most important elements of the revolutionary scene in Kabul, it should also be noted that the German-assisted, San-Francisco-based \textit{Ghadr} party also played a major role in this truly global cluster of conspiracies. \textit{Ghadr} members were responsible for inciting several significant war-time mutinies among soldiers in India, Europe, and Singapore. Muhammad Barakatullah was even involved in Pan-Islamic activities in Japan. See Parliamentary Papers, \textit{Report of Committee Appointed to Investigate Revolutionary Conspiracies in India}, vol. 61, Cmd. 9190 (1918); F.O. 686/149, “First Note on the Silk Letters: An appreciation of the events and scheme described in the silk letters and in Abdul Haq’ statement,” Criminal Intelligence Office, Shimla/Delhi, 22 Sept. 1916, 11; Peter Hopkirk, \textit{Hidden Like Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire} (New York: Kodansha Globe, 1994); Harold Gould, \textit{Sikhs, Swamis, Students, and Spies: The Indian Lobby in the United States, 1900-1946} (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006); Harish K. Puri, \textit{The Ghadar Movement: Ideology, Organisation, and Strategy}, 2nd ed. (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1993); Selçuk Esenbel, “Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945,” \textit{American Historical Review} 109, no. 4 (Oct., 2004), 1140-1170.

\(^{52}\) F.O. 686/149, “Note by D.C.I. on Mission of Deoband and Saharanpur Maulvis to Arabia, 1915-1916,” Criminal Intelligence Office, Shimla/Delhi, 22 Sept. 1916, p. 1-3. While on his way to the Hijaz, Mahmud Hasan’s intentions had already begun to worry the Bombay Commissioner of Police, who wrote: “I cannot help feeling a suspicion that the departure of these Maulvies to Meccas due to something more than the mere desire to perform the haj.” There was even an attempt to apprehend him in Aden. However, the message was received to late to intercept the steamship on which he was traveling. Less than a month later on 14 October 1916, the \textit{Zamindar} published “an article on the attitude of Indian ulemas toward the \textit{Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba} in which the writer laid stress on the fact that Mahmud Hasan had become a member of the \textit{Anjuman} on the eve of his departure for Mecca as showing that the objects of the \textit{Anjuman} were fully approved of by the Deoband maulvis.”
army was to be the centerpiece of Islamic alliance between the Ottoman Sultan, the Shah of Iran, and the Amir of Afghanistan. Its headquarters were to be at Medina, under the command of Mahmud Hasan, while secondary centers were to be established in Istanbul, Tehran, and Kabul, which was to be under Sindhi’s generalship.\textsuperscript{53}

The entire plot was stumbled upon and subsequently unraveled by British authorities in the Punjab as a result of their discovery and capture of the infamous “Silk Letters.” The letters consisted of three pieces of yellow silk, finely inscribed with messages in Urdu. The messages contained reports of Sindhi’s progress in India and Afghanistan, which were to be forwarded to Mahmud Hasan in Medina by intermediaries in the Punjab.\textsuperscript{54} Naturally, when the letters were discovered, plans for the \textit{Jund-Allah} fizzled. Although the \textit{mujahidin} and frontier tribesmen amassed by Sindhi continued to skirmish with British forces, the entire plot was eventually crushed and numerous arrests were carried out in India. And finally, Mahmud Hasan and four of his associates were apprehended in the Hijaz by Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali (Amir and Sharif of Mecca under Ottoman suzerainty from 1908-1916, King of the Hijaz from 1916-1925) and handed over to the British.\textsuperscript{55} As a result of these arrests and subsequent investigations, it was definitively established that there had been substantial correspondence and cooperation between Mahmud Hasan and his Deobandi associates, Abul-Kalam Azad, Dr. Ansari, the Ali brothers, and other leading members of the \textit{Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba}.\textsuperscript{56}

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} Bamford, \textit{Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements}, 122-125.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Qureshi, \textit{Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics}, 80-81.
\end{itemize}
The landscape of Indian Muslim politics had truly undergone a sea change. The ‘ulama’ and their Western-educated counterparts had not only come together, they had even begun to contemplate the merits of jihad and costs and benefits of open rebellion. Thus, decades of British fears had been realized. While it has traditionally been held that it was Indian concern for the Ottoman Caliphate that provided the inspiration for such cooperation, given the prominence played by the hajj in these Pan-Islamic plots, one could argue with almost equal force that the hajj served a similarly critical role both as unifying symbol and a vehicle for spread of Pan-Islamic sentiments.

*Arabia in the Balance: The Caliph Deposed and the Hijaz Colonized*

With the Ottoman declaration of jihad against the British Empire, colonial officials in London, Cairo, and Delhi began to cast about for a Muslim dignitary who might be persuaded to align himself with Britain and her allies in an attempt to counterbalance the prestige of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph. Ultimately, they would find their man in the person of Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali, the Amir of Mecca. Appointed to office by Abdul Hamid II in 1908, his position as the Amir of Mecca was the most prestigious Arab-Islamic title in the Ottoman Empire. The holder of this office was recognized as the guardian of the haramayn in Mecca and Medina. Though the Ottoman-appointed governor of the Hijaz was placed in control of administrative and military affairs in the region, the Amir of Mecca retained a certain degree of autonomy as a result of his responsibilities for maintaining the sanctity of the Holy Places and the safe and orderly conduct of the hajj. Given the spiritual important of these duties, the Amir of Mecca was selected only from among those families claiming direct descent from the
Prophet Muhammad, the Hashimite clan, and the Quraysh tribe, thereby entitling him to the honorific title of *Sharīf*. A highly ambitious man, Sharif Husayn had greatly distrusted the leadership of the Young Turks on both political and religious grounds. As a result, he had devoted himself to obtaining a greater degree of autonomy from Istanbul during the years preceding World War I. Through the careful construction of tribal alliances, Sharif Husayn had hoped to secure sufficient political capital to make his office hereditary within his own family. With the outbreak of World War I, however, Sharif Husayn’s bid for regional autonomy was instantly launched onto the stage of global political intrigue.\(^{57}\)

On 9 June 1916, Sharif Husayn’s tribal forces cut the Hijaz railway near Medina, and on the following day the Arab Revolt began with an attack on the Ottoman garrison at Mecca. By September of that same year most of the Hijaz had been wrested from Ottoman control, with the exception of Medina, which would remain under siege for the remainder of the war. The Hijaz was but the first step in a process that would completely reorder the political landscape of the modern Middle East. With the assistance of a small cadre of British military advisors, among them the famous Captain T.E. Lawrence, and a group of Iraqi ex-Ottoman officers, Husayn’s tribal forces would eventually capture Damascus in 1918. As a result, centuries of shared history between the ethnically Turkish leadership of the Ottoman Empire and their Arab subjects was irrevocably severed. While it is tempting to romantically interpret these events as a popular Arab uprising against Ottoman domination, this was not the case. Rather, it was more of a

marriage of convenience between Husayn’s personal ambitions and the strategic concerns of his British patrons.58

In October 1914, the then Minister of War, Lord Kitchener, had promised that if Husayn and the “Arab Nation” were to support Britain’s war effort, the British would recognize Arab independence and guarantee the Arabian Peninsula against foreign aggression. However, Kitchener did not stop there. He made a promise that would generate a firestorm of controversy for years to come, stating that it might be possible for “an Arab of the true race” to “assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina.” Kitchener’s cavalier language prompted a sharp rebuke from the India Office. Both India Office personnel in London as well as officials in Delhi were well aware that any British attempts to interfere with the Caliphate would likely incite a violent backlash among Indian Muslims.59

However, the dye had already been cast. In the months following Kitchener’s initial suggestion, a clique of British officials serving in Egypt and the Sudan became fervent advocates of an Arab Caliphate. Reginald Wingate, the then Governor-General of the Sudan, Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, and his Oriental Secretary, Ronald Storrs, would all come to support this position.60 Thus, when in July of 1915, Husayn sent a letter to McMahon proposing the conditions under which he might be persuaded to enter into an alliance with Britain, McMahon and his colleagues in Cairo responded eagerly. This was the beginning of the infamous Husayn-McMahon correspondence (July 1915-March 1916), an exchange of ten letters, which

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58 Cleveland, *A Modern History of the Middle East*, 157-161; Paris, Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 22-44.
59 Paris, Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 23.
60 Ibid., 321.
would spark bitter post-war disputes and permanently reconfigure the entire map of the Middle East. In addition to British promises of Arab independence after the war, McMahon would reaffirm Kitchener’s promise of an Arab Caliphate.\textsuperscript{61} Thus, as it turned out, the India Office had virtually lost all control over Britain’s Middle East policy. As World War I progressed, it became increasingly clear that the Foreign Office’s newly created Arab Bureau, based in Cairo, would be the final arbiter of British strategy in the region.\textsuperscript{62}

While the Foreign Office had initially supported Kitchener and McMahon’s course of action, the India Office insisted that “an attitude of absolute… neutrality was the only acceptable course.” Eventually, the Foreign Office would come to see the wisdom of their colleagues in India and would later enjoin MacMahon to lower Husayn’s expectations. Thus, it was officially decided that the “question of the Khaliphate is one which must be decided by Moslems without interference from non-Moslem Powers.” However, “Should Moslems decide for and Arab Khaliphate that would… be respected… but the decision is one for the Moslems to make.”\textsuperscript{63} Despite these explicit instructions, in his correspondence with Sharif Husayn, MacMahon failed to make these qualifications clear. Instead, he continued to encourage Husayn, noting that Britain “would welcome the resumption of the Khaliphate by an Arab of true race” from “the branches of the blessed tree of the prophet” (\textit{min furū’ tilka al-dawha al-nabawiyya al-mubāraka}).\textsuperscript{64}

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\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 29; Cleveland, \textit{A Modern History of the Middle East}, 157-161.
\textsuperscript{62} For an excellent discussion of the bureaucratic struggle between Delhi and Cairo over Britain’s Middle East policy, see Blyth, \textit{Empire of the Raj}, 147-155.
\textsuperscript{63} I.O.R., L/P&S/10/523, Foreign Office to MacMahon, Cairo, 14 Apr. 1915, quoted in Paris, \textit{Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule}, 322.
\textsuperscript{64} Sulaymān Musa, \textit{al-Murāsalat al-Tārīkhīyya}, vol. 1 (Amman, 1973), 33.
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While historians have often succumbed to overly romanticized visions of Kitchener, McMahon, Lawrence, and the devil-may-care, desert-dwelling diplomacy of the Arab Bureau, the plot to wrest the Caliphate away from the Ottoman Sultan actually had much deeper historical roots. As Kemal Karpat explains, by the 1880s, the British had concluded that the Hijaz was destined to become a “major power base” from which the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph would “incite the Muslims of India to revolt.” To counter this threat it was reasoned that the British could undermine Caliphal influence by questioning the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate, since the Ottoman Caliphs were not descendants of the Prophet’s bloodline, the Arab Quraysh tribe. As a result of this ethno-nationalist view, the first plans to manipulate the Caliphate emerged in 1877. While Wilfred S. Blunt, an eccentric English aristocrat, traveler, and Arab enthusiast, has traditionally been credited for popularizing the idea of an Arab Caliphate, it was actually J.N.E. Zohrab, the British Consul in Jidda from 1878 to 1881, who had first promoted the idea. Zohrab argued that Britain should establish a protectorate over the Hijaz and bring the Sharif of Mecca under British control in order to allow Britain “to guide the whole Mussulman world.”

From this perspective, Kitchener and McMahon’s dealings with Sharif Husayn are merely the obvious conclusion to an almost comically ambitious, multi-decade project, aimed at nothing less than the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate and the establishment of British control over the Muslim Holy Places. At the conclusion of World War I, the Ottoman Empire lay in ruins. The Islamic world’s most powerful empire had been thoroughly defeated. Its territorial girth would be fragmented into

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67 Ibid., 245-248. See also *The Jedda Diaries, 1919-1940*, vol. 1, 8-9.
nation-states, not unlike the building blocks of the secular West. In January 1919, representatives from twenty-seven nations gathered in Paris to negotiate a peace settlement. However, for most delegates European issues took precedence. The formulation of a post-war settlement for the Middle East would drag on until August 1920. The terms of the Ottoman settlement were agreed upon in April at the San Remo Conference and subsequently incorporated into the Treaty of Sèvres. The treaty dealt harshly with the Ottoman Empire, reducing its territories to their original Anatolian core. The Arab provinces were divided into a group of regional states (Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan) to be administered by Britain and France under the authority of the newly-created League of Nations. From the Arab perspective, although the Hijaz would theoretically retain its independence, Britain’s pledges to Sharif Husayn and his sons, Faysal and Abdullah, had been sacrificed at the altar of Britain and France’s imperial ambitions.\(^{68}\) In the wake of the Ottoman defeat, the Turkish national assembly, under the exacting secularist, Mustafa Kemal, passed a resolution to abolish the Ottoman Sultanate and turn the Caliphate into a purely religious office with no political authority. Mehmet VI Vahideddin, the thirty-sixth and final Ottoman Sultan was forced to leave Istanbul under British protection. The title of Caliph was then transferred to his cousin, Abdul Mejid II. Two years later, in March 1924, however, the Turkish Republic abolished the Caliphate.\(^{69}\)

Only days after the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, the Hashimites announced that Sharif Husayn had accepted the Caliphate in response to “numerous telegrams of

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\(^{68}\) Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 163-169.
\(^{69}\) Ibid., 175-179.
However, Husayn’s claims rung hollow and were met with little enthusiasm in India or elsewhere. From the first moment that news of the Arab Revolt had reached India in June 1916, Muslim public opinion had been strongly opposed to Husayn’s betrayal of the Ottoman Caliph. On learning of these events Husayn was condemned by the Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba, the Muslim League, and Deobandi ‘ulama’. Abdul Bari sent a venomous telegraph to the Viceroy, expressing the “consternation and painful anxiety” felt by Indian Muslims, who fear that the Husayn’s actions would “convert their most sacred places into fields of slaughter and carnage.” Moreover, he added that “the impudent besieger of the tomb of the Holy Prophet and his sympathisers will stand forever condemned in the eyes of the Muslim world as enemies of Islam.” At the same time, at the Muslim League’s meeting in Lucknow, a formal resolution was adopted:

The Council of the All-India Muslim League places on record its abhorrence of the action of the Arab rebels headed by the Sharif of Mecca, whose outrageous conduct may place in jeopardy the safety and sanctity of the Holy Places of Islam in the Hedjaz and Mesopotamia and condemns them and their sympathisers as enemies of Islam.72

As one Deobandi ‘alim succinctly put it, “The Mahomedans have it firmly fixed in their minds that The Sharif of Mecca is merely a puppet of the English and… consequently the Holy cities are practically under [British] control.”73

This was precisely the response that the India Office had feared. As World War I drew to a close, the agitation among Indian Muslims grew to a fevered pitch. At the

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70 Paris, Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 346.
71 Extracts from Abdul Bari’s telegraph, 25/26 Jun. 1916, quoted in Bamford, Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements, 127.
72 Ibid.
73 Paris, Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 326.
December 1918 meeting of the Muslim League, Dr. Ansari gave a violently incendiary speech denouncing Sharif Husayn. As he saw it:

…actuated by personal ambitions and selfish interests, Sharif Husain raised the standard of revolt against the unquestioned Khalifa of Islam, whom he himself had recognised as such. By doing so he not only disregarded a rule of political morality, but, according to Muslim belief and religious teaching, broke an explicit and clear commandment of God and the Prophet.

Ansari went on to explain that the Ottoman Sultans had discharged their duties as Caliphs and guardians of the Holy Places to the “entire satisfaction of the Muslim world and that the present Sultan was the only Muhammadan who could possibly be capable of successfully combating the intrigues and secret machinations of non-Muslim governments.” Moreover, he “proceeded to define the limits of the Holy Places and quoted passages from the sacred traditions of Islam to prove that the whole of Arabia, Palestine, and Mesopotamia [including Syria] was included in the Jazirat-ul-Arab from which all non-Muslim influence must be removed.” Finally, he made what could only be interpreted as a call for Husayn’s murder. Quoting from the Qur’an, Ansari warned that “if anyone attempts to divide the unity of my people, kill him with the sword, whosoever it may be.” Ansari’s speech was seconded by Abdul Bari’s keynote address, in which he quoted the Prophet: “Remove the Jew, the Christian, and the idolator from the Holy Places at all cost.” Thus, the position of Indian Muslims was unequivocal. Sharif Husayn was viewed as a usurper and a selfish collaborator, who had aided the British Empire in simultaneously undermining the Caliphate, destroying the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and bringing the Holy Places of Islam under non-Muslim control.

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74 Extracts from Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari’s speech at the 11th annual session of the All-India Muslim League, Delhi, 30-31 Dec. 1918, quoted in Bamford, Histories of the Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movements, 132-133.
75 Ibid.
As Ansari and Abdul Bari’s fiery rhetoric suggests, the Muslim League’s annual meeting in 1918 was a watershed moment. The meeting was well attended by both the Western-educated and ‘ulama’-based factions. Not surprisingly, the resolutions passed at this session emphasized religio-political issues. As Ansari put it:

The Indian Musalmans take a deep interest in the fate of their co-religionists outside India… [T]he collapse of the Muslim powers of the world is bound to have an adverse influence on the political importance of the Musalmans in this country, and the annihilation of the military powers of Islam cannot but have a far-reaching effect on the minds of even the loyal Musalmans of India…

In many ways, this was the preamble of the Khilafat Movement. Within the Muslim League, religious activists and Bombay barristers had a meeting of the minds. It was felt that Muslims needed to mobilize and give voice to their anti-British sentiments. As a result, the influence of the British loyalists was eroded and the leadership of the Muslim League was ousted. Their position in the Muslim community had been overtaken by the Ali brothers, Ansari, and Abdul Bari, essentially the Pan-Islamic nucleus of the Anjuman-i Khuddâm-i Ka’ba.

While previous Muslim leaders had avoided coordination with the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress, Abdul Bari and the Ali brothers found common grounds for an alliance. With the passage of the Rowlatt Sedition Bills in 1919, the government sought to extend into peacetime the emergency wartime powers granted under the Defense of India Act. The widespread opposition to this act of governmental heavy-handedness merged with Muslim grievances related to Turkey’s treatment in the post-war peace process and the Caliphate issue. With the Ali brothers locked away in

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77 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, 62-64.
prison for their refusal to abide by the terms of their internment, Abdul Bari and Mohandas K. Gandhi (also known as the “Mahatma,” (1868-1948) had turned to one another. Gandhi sought out Abdul Bari’s help in quelling recent outbursts of Hindu-Muslim communal tension. In turn, Abdul Bari sought Gandhi’s assistance in the campaign to secure the release of the Ali brothers from internment. They met at Dr. Ansari’s home in Delhi in March 1918. From this meeting the seeds of Hindu-Muslim rapprochement had been planted. Gandhi convinced Abdul Bari and the Ali brothers to join his campaign of non-violent resistance (satyagraha). Though this alliance was often fraught with misunderstandings, Gandhi patiently spelled out his plan:

By helping the Muhammadans of India at a critical moment in their history, I want to buy their friendship… It is expedient to suffer for my Muhammadan brother to the utmost in a just cause and I should therefore travel with him along the whole round so long as the means employed by him are as honourable as his end.79

Having enlisted his Muslim comrades, Gandhi was able to forge a Hindu-Muslim alliance at the joint meeting of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and the All-India Khilafat Committee in September 1920. This alliance paved the way for Gandhi’s first all-India non-cooperation movement.80

Although the Hindu-Muslim accord would only last until 1922, their combined efforts represented the greatest challenge to British rule in India since the Great Rebellion of 1857. And despite the fact that the Khilafat Movement’s animating issue had been rendered a moot point by finalization of the post-war peace settlements and the Turkish Republic’s subsequent abolition of the Caliphate, its symbols and emotional charge had been carried over into the realm of anti-colonial agitation and nationalist politics, making

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78 Ibid., 65-110.
79 M.H. Abbas, All about the Khilafat (Calcutta: Ray and Roychaudhury, 1923), 345-351, cited in Minault, The Khilafat Movement, 100.
80 Bose, A Hundred Horizons, 64.
it clear that the political consciousness of the Indian Muslim community had become an undeniable factor in Indian politics.

However, in the process, the movement had also helped define the emerging identity of Indian Muslims as a separate community. Indeed, while the “Congress-Khilafat alliance has often been evoked by nationalist Indians, in the years since 1947, in a kind of nostalgic reverie, as an era of amity that anticipated a road not taken,” the historical reality is quite different. Instead, the period of Hindu-Muslim cooperation witnessed during the Khilafat Movement was actually an anomaly. Thus, despite having moved in tandem for a time, the political distinctions between Hindu and Muslim were never broken down. In the final analysis, Pam-Islam and its offspring, the Khilafat Movement, had “unwittingly bequeathed a pattern of politics with which the Muslims of India have been familiar ever since.” Its most important feature has been “the massive scale on which religion was imported into politics.” Pan-Islam proved both the utility and potency of religious symbols as a mobilizing force. In the years leading up to the India’s independence and tragic partition, this basic pattern of political organization ultimately lent itself to the creation of a separate brand of Muslim nationalism and, thus, a separate, Muslim-majority Pakistani state. However, unlike Turkey, which was able to more fully absorb the concept of territorial nationalism under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, even today, Pakistan remains janus-faced, torn between Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s (Pakistan first Governor-General, 1876-1948) vision secular nation-state and its deeply embedded Pan-Islamic roots.

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81 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of India, 179.
82 Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, 423-424.
EPILOGUE

LEGACIES OF THE COLONIAL HAJJ

A pilgrim in the Hedjaz lands is just as grass
and a nice piece of meat; every one likes to take a piece of it.
-Mohammed Abou-Elewa, Chief Egyptian Dragoman
for Thomas Cook & Son, 1886

Our brethren are quite aware that we came to the Holy Land only to remove
from the house of God oppression and misbelief and their supporters, and to
extend assistance to the Moslem visitors… You are aware that the previous rulers
of the Hejaz used to treat pilgrims badly and despotically; but, by the grace of
God, we shall try as far as possible to put an end to everything based on bad
treatment.
-‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sa‘ūd,
First King of Saudi Arabia, 1925

The Hashimite Interregnum

As result of World War I, from 1916 to 1918, the pilgrim ships did not sail from
India.3 By 1919, however, a new pilgrimage administration emerged from the ashes of
World War I and centuries of Ottoman hegemony over the Hijaz had been overturned. In
its place the regime of Sharif Husayn took shape. Because it was clearly in their own
interests, the British had granted Husayn his independence. In the wake of the armistice,
British officials in both London and Cairo were fully committed to the advancement of an

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1 F.O. 78/4094, “Translation from the Arabic Journal of Mohammed Abou-Elewa’s Pilgrimage, Cairo to
2 F.O. 371/102813, “Address of Welcome to the Pilgrims” given by ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman
3 While pilgrimage traffic, particularly in terms of ocean-going pilgrims, lay mostly dormant during
World War I, the British, the French, and the Italian all managed to send small delegations of Muslim
soldiers during 1917 and 1918. In 1917, Britain sent 8,000 Indian soldiers in groups of 2,000. However,
this stroke of political genius involved only a select few, hand-picked for their exemplary behavior or their
degree of religious observance. See Peters, The Hajj, 326-329; Bose, One Hundred Horizons, 209.
Anglo-Hashimite strategic alliance throughout much of the Middle East (the Hijaz, Transjordan, and Iraq). However, Husayn and his sons were bitterly disappointed by the post-war machinations of Britain and France. As a result, Husayn rejected both the Treaties of Versailles and Sèvres because they entailed his approval of the Mandate system. Husayn stubbornly maintained that his negotiations with McMahon in 1915 had provided for Arab independence, not only the Hijaz, but also in those areas placed under the Mandatory control. Not surprisingly, as British negotiations with the Hashimites stalled in 1920 and 1921, British support for Husayn cooled considerably. While Britain was reasonably well prepared to suffer Husayn’s intransigence regarding the Mandate system, at base all Anglo-Hijazi relations were predicated on the maintenance of the safe and sanitary administration of the *hajj*. As the post-war negotiations between Britain and Husayn soured, however, the administration of the *hajj* once again became a point of contention.⁴

With the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the Constantinople Board of Health was dissolved. In 1915, British forces had seized the Kamarān Island quarantine station, and after the war the Government of India assumed control over the *lazaretto*.⁵ Similarly, administration of the Jidda quarantine was also taken over by the British in 1919.⁶ Thus, with control over the Ottoman Empire’s Red Sea quarantine system and a British-installed ruler in Mecca, it was becoming increasingly clear that the administration of the *hajj* had fallen almost completely into British hands. The *hajj* had been colonized.

As a result of more than a half century of sanitary regulation, particularly after the defeat of British obstructionism in the wake of the 1896 plague outbreak in Bombay, the

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⁴ Paris, *Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule*, 299, 311, 355-357.
⁶ Paris, *Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule*, 300.
commitments of Britain and other European imperial powers in Arabia and the Red Sea had become an institutionalized part of the pilgrimage experience. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly apparent that these sanitary precautions were finally paying dividends. By 1922, only eleven patients were treated at Kamarān Island’s hospital. Moreover, there had been no reported cases of cholera since 1920, and only 44 cases had been documented since 1911. The situation at the al-Tūr, the principal quarantine station for the Red Sea’s southbound pilgrimage traffic, was almost identical.\footnote{Ibid.}

While Husayn had initially acknowledged Britain’s suzerainty over the sanitary administration of the post-war \textit{hajj}, agreeing to the continuation of their control over the Jidda quarantine in April 1920, in late May, “perhaps embittered by the recently published San Remo decisions assigning the Mandates to France and Britain and by the failure to renew his subsidy,” he abruptly reversed his decision.\footnote{Ibid.} Although the risk of epidemics had been dramatically reduced by the 1920s, and the modified International Sanitary Convention of 1923 called for only a cursory medical inspection at Jidda, Husayn continued to insist that all pilgrims spend 24 hours on the Hijazi island of Abū Sa’d. As a result, pilgrims were forced to endure a “double quarantine” at either al- Tūr or Kamarān and then again in Jidda. Thus, while Husayn insisted that British interference with the Jidda quarantine was an affront to his country’s sovereignty, the imposition of redundant quarantine measures led both British officials and pilgrims alike to believe that the extra quarantine was simply a ploy to generate additional tax revenues.
This feeling was only intensified by the dramatic spike in quarantine fees from 7.5 Turkish piastres in 1921 to 40 in 1923.\(^9\)

Quarantine fees were not the only taxes, dues, charges, and fees that would confront the hajji traveling under Husayn’s watch. Pilgrims were taxed for health certificates, camels, baggage, empty containers, and even the clothes on their backs. It is estimated that the minimum expenses for the hajj in 1922 amounted to around 17 British pounds, from which Husayn received roughly 4.5 pounds. While it is difficult to ascertain precisely the level of exploitation suffered by pilgrims of the pre-war period as opposed to the post-war period, as one British official put it, the increased cost of the hajj under Husayn’s rule was “entirely out of proportion with the cost of living.”\(^10\)

Husayn’s rapacious pursuit of increased revenues also led him to exact an increased share of camel fares, taking up to 50 percent of the fares charged by camelmen and guides. As a result, the cost of transport services skyrocketed. This situation was further exacerbated by his tribal policies. During the pre-war era, the Ottomans had paid as much as 70,000 pounds in subsidies to the tribes surrounding the pilgrimage routes. Husayn had also paid large sums to the tribes during the war. However, when the subsidies paid by his British patrons were stopped in 1920, Husayn’s payments dried up and his relations with the tribes deteriorated rapidly. As a result, Husayn began to lose control of the Mecca-Medina road. By 1923, the caravan routes to Medina came under

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\(^10\) Paris, *Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule*, 300-301.
repeated raids and collapsed into complete chaos. Robbery, kidnapping, and murder reigned supreme.\textsuperscript{11}

The growing British dissatisfaction with Husayn’s administration of the \textit{hajj} was summed up nicely by Captain Mian Nasir-ud-Din Ahmad, the Indian Officer stationed at Mecca to protect British interests. “The pilgrims have a hundred and one grievances for which the [Hashimite] officials are primarily responsible. The King is one of the most dreaded persons, but single handed his unable to control the machinery of Government, his ministers being mere figure heads.”\textsuperscript{12} Unfortunately, for Husayn, however, the problems facing his rule were much larger than mere incompetence. His mismanagement of the \textit{hajj} was further compounded by his repeated refusals to come to terms with the Mandate system, his rejection of numerous British treaty offers, and his unwillingness to resolve lingering border disputes with Britain’s other Arabian client from the Najd, the House of Saʻūd. In December 1916, Ibn Saʻūd (1881-1953) had concluded a treaty with Britain acknowledging his status as the independent sovereign Najd, al-Hasa, Qatif, and Jubayl, raising questions as to whether Britain would continue to protect Husayn’s sovereignty in opposition to the designs of the Najdis. The conflict between Husayn and the Najdis was further exacerbated by his refusal to permit Wahhabi pilgrims from the Najd to make the \textit{hajj}. Equally important, however, was the vitriolic opposition being voiced against Husayn by the leaders of the \textit{Khilafat} Movement in India. In many ways, British policy toward the Hijaz and the larger Arabian Peninsula was handcuffed by the


Khilafat agitation. Fearful of further agitating Indian Muslims, Delhi vociferously advocated a policy of complete non-interference in the Hijaz.\textsuperscript{13}

**The Wahhabi Conquest of the Hajj**

Thus, when Husayn made his ill-fated bid to seize the Caliphate in 1924, he found himself almost completely isolated, at once denounced by Muslims everywhere and discarded as a liability by his British allies. On 4 September 1924, Ibn Sa‘ūd’s Wahhabi warriors (*al-Ikhwān*), descended on Ta’if, the Hashimite summer residence, some 70 miles from Mecca. However, Husayn’s pleas for assistance were met with deafening silence from London. Instead of risking becoming entangled in an armed struggle for the Holy Places, which would have undoubtedly been met with violent opposition in India, Britain decided to leave Husayn to his own devices. As a result, the Najdis seized Mecca and Medina, and then laid siege to Jidda. Britain limited its assistance to escorting Husayn out of harms way. While they well aware of the dangers involved in the Wahhabi conquest of the Hijaz, British patience for Husayn had finally run out.\textsuperscript{14} As T.E. Lawrence explained, there was nothing more that could be done. “The old man was a tragic figure in his way: brave, obstinate, hopelessly out-of-date: exasperating.”\textsuperscript{15}

This was the unintended, yet far-reaching, consequence of Britain’s adventure in the Hijaz. By reordering the entire region, a power vacuum had been created, launching a hitherto insignificant tribal chieftan onto the international stage. With the dawn of the


\textsuperscript{14} Paris, *Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule*, 348-357.

Saudi state, the ultra-conservative, reformist theological positions first espoused by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, became the official state religion of Arabia. With their radical conception of *tawhīd* (the oneness of God), Wahhabis (or *al-muwahhidūn* as they refer to themselves) brought an uncompromisingly ultra-orthodox attitude toward Shia Islam, Sufism, and saint veneration, branding all such practices as blasphemous examples of polytheism (*shirk*), deserving of death. This fundamentalist orientation is further evidenced by the Wahhabi insistence that the *Qur’an* and the *hadith* were the only reliable sources through which God’s will could be ascertained. While the merging of ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s reformist message with the House of Sa‘ūd’s tribal warriors had succeeded in capturing Mecca once before in 1803, Wahhabi forces were ultimately crushed when, at the bequest of the Ottoman Sultan, Muhammad ‘Ali’s Egyptian troops recaptured Mecca and Medina in 1812.  

A century later, however, the second coming of the Saudis proved much more durable. Responding to the rapidly changing realities of Arabian politics, Britain would conclude the Treaty of Jidda with Ibn Sa‘ūd in May 1927. The treaty recognized “the complete and absolute independence of the dominions of his Majesty the King of the Hajaz and of Najd and its Dependencies,” in exchange for Ibn Sa‘ūd’s guarantee “that the performance of the pilgrimage will be facilitated to British subjects and British protected persons of the Moslem faith.” The treaty further reiterated that Ibn Sa‘ūd should respect Britain’s special relationships with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. Having received this formal recognition, in 1932, the state’s...
name was official changed to *al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘ūdiyya* (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia).  

As early as June 1924, Ibn Sa‘ūd had cleverly sought to court Indian opinion, writing to Shaukat Ali, suggesting that the Caliphate question should be decided with “care and consideration” by an assembly of the representatives from across the Islamic world. He had even written a letter to *Bombay Chronicle*, condemning Husayn’s “greedy haste” in assuming the Caliphate, pointing out his unfitness for the office.  

In the midst of his conquest of the Hijaz, Ibn Sa‘ūd once again looked to curry favor among Indian Muslims. In his call for a World Muslim Conference, he specifically praised the Indians for their opposition to Husayn’s bid for the Caliphate:  

I have to thank the nations that adopted towards us the position of supporters of right and I have to thank particularly the Indians for their attitude towards the Arabs and their cause at the time when the Arabs themselves were busy with their quarrels and forgot their duties towards religion and country. I have to thank the Indians because they were the first to answer the call—may God give them the best reward for us and for I Islam.

Ibn Sa‘ūd also sought to allay Indian and Persian fears that the Wahhabi conquest would result in the violation of the *haram* in Medina and the destruction of the Prophet’s tomb.  

Indian and Persians, particularly Shias, remained horrified by the prospect of Saudi rule. Recalling the Wahhabi sacking of Karbala in 1801, during which the shrines of Imām Husayn his half-brother, ‘Abbās, “were stripped of their gold and precious ornaments,” Shias protested loudly against the prospect of a similar fate befalling Medina.

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19 Paris, *Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule*, 348.  
21 Ibid.  
In actuality, Ibn Saʿūd’s promises were little more than cynical ploy. The advent of Wahhabi domination was signaled by the destruction of numerous domes and cupolas of tombs held sacred by Indian pilgrims, most notably, those of Sayyidnā Hamza, members of the Prophet’s family in Medina, and Khadija, the Prophet’s wife and first convert to Islam, in Mecca. British reports on the 1926 pilgrimage listed at least seven new religious restrictions imposed upon pilgrims. Among the most offensive of these regulations was the posting of Najdi guards to guard cemeteries and shrines. Those who refused to abide by the Wahhabi sensibilities of these guardians of orthodoxy were “denounced as mushriks (idolators) and kafirs (infidels) and beaten.” This forced many pilgrims to surreptitiously steal moments at the tombs of their saints in the middle of the night or through bribery.\(^{23}\) As Abul Majid Daryabadi (1892-1977) described the situation:

> Around the Prophet’s grave there are Saudi sipahis [soldiers]. Some of them are very harsh. They push the pilgrims and sometimes they flog them with their willow and club. They do not hesitate to even drag women. Thus they seek to impose the “Nejdi Shariah.” But some of the sipahis are very mild and they neglect or overlook the violation of the rules and regulations by the pilgrims. Some of them even take rupees to let the pilgrims do what they want.\(^{24}\)

As colonial officials understood, this kind of treatment was deeply hurtful to “the Persians who appear[ed] to be inveterate tomb worshippers and the Indians who were also inclined in that direction.” Other issues included Wahhabi refusals to allow clerics of other sects to lead prayers at Masjid al-Haram and the prohibition of festivities celebrating Mīlād al-Nabī (the Prophet’s birthday). Perhaps most offensive of all,

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\(^{23}\) Bose, *One Hundred Horizons*, 212.

however, was the Wahhabi ban on the chanting of the *dorūd* (*Yā Rasūl Allah!*), the traditional salutation directed to the Prophet at the His grave in Medina.\(^{25}\)

Thus, as the Muslim World Conference of 1926 convened, the stage was set for a confrontation between and very same Indian Khalifatists who had been previously been his greatest supporters. The most vocal of Ibn Saʿūd’s critics were the Ali brothers. On one occasion Muhammad Ali “pointed out to Bin Saud that he could never have conquered the Hejaz had it not been for the help he received from India.” To which, Ibn Saʿūd scowled, “I won the Hejaz by the sword.” Muhammad Ali then replied, “Yes, but with money we shall take it from you.” At which point the King angrily left the room. As a result of this exchange, the Indian delegation openly stated that “co-operation between India and the Wahhabi was not possible under the present circumstances on religious as well as many other grounds as no Indian could accept either their doctrines or what amount to their ignorance.”\(^{26}\)

In many ways, the heated exchange between Muhammad Ali and Ibn Saʿūd marked the end of an era. With the death of the Ottoman Caliphate and a growing realization among Indian Muslims of the depth of Wahhabi intolerance, the *hajj*’s value as an anti-colonial, Pan-Islamic symbol was substantially altered. Now, the *hajj* would take “on overtones of resistance to both Saudi orthodoxy and European imperialism.” In many ways these two forces, imperialism and religious orthodoxy, were not so different. Both the sanitary regulations and spy networks of British India’s pilgrimage administration and the puritanical restrictions of the Saudi state sought to “exercise strict


surveillance over the performance of the Muslim pilgrimage." However, the faithful bravely trudged onward in fulfillment of their duties to God. They stubbornly endured colonial repression, extortion, famine, cholera, plague, treacherous seas, wars, and repeated humiliations at the hands of Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Thus, after decades of colonial rule, the hajj had proven itself almost impervious to state boundaries, regulation, and the designs of those who sought to manipulate the sanctity of the Holy Places to suit their own political goals.

By the time the Saudi state emerged in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the role of Britain and the other European colonial powers in the sanitary administration of the hajj was substantial. Between the 1880s and World War I, both Jidda and Kamarān Island had become important listening posts for colonial officials. With their sponsorship of Sharif Husyan’s Hashimite regime and the elimination of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate, Britain had virtually colonized every function of the hajj and had gained unprecedented access to and influence over the Hijaz. While this influence was greatly diminished by Saudi conquest of the Hijaz in 1925-1926, their influence over sanitary matters remained for another three decades. In 1926, a new International Sanitary Convention was drafted in Paris. Thereafter, an office was established in Paris to coordinate sanitary control over Mecca with the Egyptian Quarantine Board. This system remained in place until the creation of the World Health Organization in 1948. Indeed, despite repeated complaints that this system represented an infringement upon Saudi

27 Bose, A Hundred Horizons, 195.
28 Ibid., 215.
sovereignty, the international, essentially colonial, control of the hajj would linger on until 1957.²⁹

Since 1957, however, the Saudi regime has retained full control of the hajj. For the most part this has been a period of remarkable security. The threat of epidemic disease has all but receded. Unlike Husayn’s anarchic rule, Saudi “justice” has been unswerving. Even the infamously extortionary practices of the pilgrimage guides have been curbed. With the discovery of the world’s largest oil reserve and the commencement of commercial production in 1938, the House of Sa‘ūd became extremely wealthy.³⁰ As a result of this newfound wealth, countless dollars have been poured into the refurbishment of the Holy Places and the construction of modern facilities for the pilgrims. Meanwhile, air travel eclipsed the steamship as the primary mode of transport in the late 1960s and early 1970s, marking a new phase in the modernization of the hajj. As a result of the switch from steamship to air travel, the hajj has grown from 77,000 participants in 1926 to its present annual total of roughly two million participants each year.³¹

Despite these improvements, however, the hajj has also become a major vehicle for the spread of Saudi Arabia’s puritanical standards of behavior and the Wahhabi doctrine to other parts of the Islamic world. The House of Sa‘ūd has also proven adept in its use of the haramayn as both tools in the manipulation of the Muslim faithful and as shields against the aggressions of non-Muslim governments. Through a combination of the prestige derived from its role as the Custodian of the Holy Places and its incredible oil

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³⁰ al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 93.
wealth, Saudi Arabia has cultivated an internationally-recognizable Islamic identity rather than a national identity. Their support of innumerable schools and colleges, publications and conferences, mosques and charities, and Muslim insurgencies across the world has helped to maintain this carefully crafted image. Indeed, whether their message is directed at a Pakistani madrasa student, Muslim families living in the West, or an Indonesian pilgrim, the common factor in all of these activities is the propagation of their own militant version of Islam, which, despite its highly exclusivist attitudes, has ironically helped foster a growing homogenization of Islamic practices and identity.\textsuperscript{32}

With the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, the \textit{haramayn} have become the last truly global Islamic symbols. As such, the Holy Places have once again returned to forefront of international affairs. Just as Pan-Islamists of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, like the members of the \textit{Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka’ba} and the \textit{Khilafat} Movement, strove to both protect these most valuable of all Islamic positions against non-Muslim aggression and Western influence and to deploy these potent symbols in order to mobilize political support for their agenda, so too do the Islamists of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Thus, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and King Fahd required the Saudi ‘ulama’ to endorse the arrival of American and other foreign troops on Saudi soil, Osama bin Laden framed his criticism of the Saudi royal family in the following terms:

The aggression has reached such a catastrophic and disastrous point as to have brought about a calamity unprecedented in the history of our \textit{umma}, namely the invasion by the American and western Crusader forces of the Arabian peninsula and Saudi Arabia, the home of the Noble Ka’ba, the Sacred House of God, the Muslim’s direction of prayer, the Noble Sanctuary of the Prophet, and the city of God’s Messenger, where the Prophetic revelation was received.

\textsuperscript{32} Lapidus, \textit{A History of Islamic Societies}, 572-575.
This momentous event is unprecedented both in pagan and Islamic history. For the first time, the Crusaders have managed to achieve their historic ambition and dreams against our Islamic umma, gaining control over the Islamic holy places and the Holy Sanctuaries, and hegemony over the wealth and riches of our umma, turning the Arabian peninsula into the biggest air, land, and sea base in the region. While it would be unfair and irresponsible to equate Osama bin Laden’s extremely violent brand of jihadist Islamism to the actions of anti-colonial activists in the Ottoman Empire or colonial India, it is important to note that the points of reference remain the same. The deeply-held religious sentiments conveyed by invoking the Holy Places continue to be an important measure of the delicate relationship between the West and the Islamic world.

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