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Oil and U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Africa

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OIL AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

by

DANIEL FIKREYESUS

Under the Direction of Carrie Manning

ABSTRACT

Does the presence of oil influence U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African oil states? This study attempts to answer this question through a study of U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African oil and non-oil states since the early 1960s. Although presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush have indicated that the United States has a moral obligation to promote democracy, democracy promotion became a central element of U.S. foreign policy after 1990. Scholars as well as policy makers, however, have suggested that the United States has frequently sacrificed the promotion of democracy and human rights in favor of other goals. In recent years, although promoting democracy and good governance have been described as leading U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa, they may have been overshadowed by two other goals: the global war on terror and energy security. Gulf of Guinea countries have attracted U.S. attention as it tries achieving energy security. The United States in 2008 imported about sixteen percent of its oil from the Gulf of Guinea, and this figure is likely to increase to 25 percent by 2015. As U.S. oil interests in the region increase, some fear that the United States is likely to forgo its support for democracy in favor of energy security. This dissertation evaluates whether or
not U.S. concerns about energy security or commercial interests have overshadowed its policy of promoting democracy in oil-exporting African countries. The dissertation finds that, in fact, there is no direct correlation between presence of oil and U.S. democracy promotion. When dealing with African oil states, the United States has not compromised its democratic and human rights principles, particularly since 1990.

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by

DANIEL FIKREYESUS

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
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in the College of Arts and Sciences
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2012
OIL AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

by

DANIEL FIkreYESUS

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Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Studies
College of Arts and Science
Georgia State University
May 2012
DEDICATION

In Memory of

Fikreyesus Seyoum
1941-2010

and

Dr. Atef Ghobrial
1950 - 2005
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All glory belongs to God for helping go through my studies and finish it. I like to thank my wife TG, Addis and now Keya for their support. I am very grateful for chair of my committee Dr. Carrie Manning and members of the committee Dr. John Duffield and Dr. Herb. I would also like to appreciate my friends Dr. Josephine Dawuni and Dr. Bala Erramilli for their non-stop support and encouragement and also Wondowossen Sentayehu in Ethiopia. I am grateful for SREB (Southern Educational Research Board) for their financial assistance.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSS</td>
<td>Africa Center for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Commander of the U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPE</td>
<td>Center for International Private Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEPS</td>
<td>Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>The Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEBC</td>
<td>Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>Energy Information Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean People’s Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of Angola/ Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Liberation Movement of Angola/ Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Mouvement National Congolais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Fronts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBM</td>
<td>Office of Budget and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPIC</td>
<td>Overseas Private Investment Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEPFAR</td>
<td>President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Angola/ Partido Democrático de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIDE</td>
<td>Polícia Internacional de Defesa de Estado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola/ União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPA</td>
<td>Union of Angolan Peoples/ União das Populações de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTR</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Trade Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION

According to 2011 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) data, Africa (including Sub-Saharan and North Africa) accounted for almost 12 percent of U.S. oil imports. In October 2007, U.S. oil imports from Africa for the first time surpassed those from the Middle East. U.S. interest in Africa, particularly in West African oil, has increased considerably in the last decade (Cohen and Rafal 2007; Ghazvinian 2007; McCullum 2006; National Intelligence Council 2004). Proximity to the United States, high quality, and low sulfur content make African oil an attractive source of energy to the United States, and it should be even more so in the future. Even though overall U.S. oil imports have been declining, imports from Africa have been increasing and expect to increase in the near future (National Intelligence Council 2004).

The rising U.S. interest in African oil has come with a concern for some scholars, policy makers, and human rights advocates, who have argued that oil is reshaping the relationship between the United States and African oil states (Gary and Karl 2003; Kansteiner III, Walter and Morrison, 2004; Yetiv, 2004, United States Cong. Senate 2007). This concern has come

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from previous U.S. engagements in Middle Eastern oil states. As seen in the Middle East, when the United States has economic and security interests in a country or region, it has frequently compromised the democracy and human rights agenda for its other priorities. This has been true of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East and Caspian Sea regions from the end of World War II until 2001.

During the past six decades, U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East has been shaped by three significant issues: the security of Israel, the fight against terrorism, and the stability of oil suppliers. Until 2001, the United States sidelined proactive democracy promotion in the Middle East where the United States has had a significant interest in the region’s oil (Carothers 2007, 6; Duffield 2008, 100; Karl and Gary 2003, 77). The Middle East had been a core supplier of oil to the United States for decades. The region holds two-thirds of the world’s oil reserves, and this concentration makes political, economic, and security developments in the region vital to global energy stability. U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East has been influenced by the desire to create a stable Middle East. In order to create a stable Middle East, the United States has worked with authoritarian and repressive regimes in the region. Close U.S. alignments with friendly authoritarian regimes, particularly monarchies, such as the Shah of Iran and the Saudi ruling family are examples.

The United States has a tendency to work with friendly authoritarian regimes to secure its energy needs. With the growing interest in African oil, will U.S. foreign policy towards
African oil states be influenced by oil? Is the fear that the U.S. will abandon its democracy promotion in the region for its energy needs a legitimate concern? The United States has been importing oil from Africa, particularly Nigeria and Angola, since the early 1970s. However, the instability in the Middle East, the rising cost of oil, and nationalist movements in Latin America have driven the United States to seek additional sources of oil and increase its oil imports from African oil suppliers. This dissertation examined whether oil has influenced U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states.

U.S. engagements with countries such as Equatorial Guinea and Gabon suggest that the United States might be more likely to work with authoritarian regimes to secure its energy interests. The reopening of its embassy in the authoritarian state of Equatorial Guinea in 2002 after it was closed for eight years reflects a shift in U.S. foreign policy priorities. This policy was made based on oil interests. The reopening of the embassy conceded with the rise in oil production as well as an increase on investment from U.S. companies. On the other hand, substantial U.S. financial assistances for democracy programs in the continent’s largest oil producers, Nigeria and Angola, suggests that the United States has not consistently compromised its democracy agenda for oil. This study examined the puzzle of whether and to what degree Sub-Saharan Africa’s oil has influenced U.S. policy towards the region. The central question of this study is:
Does the presence of oil influence U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African oil states? In particular, did the U.S. prioritize its energy needs over other priorities such as containment of Soviet expansion during the Cold War and support for democracy and human rights after the Cold War ended?

This dissertation looked at U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African oil states over time in comparison with U.S. policy towards non-oil African states. The study is conducted using qualitative comparison of sixteen oil and non-oil African states as well as paired case studies of oil and non-oil states.

The major finding of the study is that U.S. foreign policy towards Africa was not influenced by oil but other geopolitical interest. During the Cold War, containment of Soviet expansion shaped U.S. foreign policy and in the post-Cold War period, the United States was more interested in spreading democracy and human rights. In the post 2001 period, the global war on terror, humanitarians support and regional stability dominated U.S. – African relationships. Furthermore, the United States did not compromise its democracy agenda but actively promoted it in some oil states such as Nigeria. Another major finding of the study is that U.S. foreign policy towards Africa was dominated by few states throughout time and some of these states such as Ethiopia and Congo are not oil states. Thus, the United States did not give any special attention or consideration to oil states when it interacted with African states.
United States’ relationship with Africa did not attract a significant attention from policy makers and academicians for many years. Despite the enormous natural resources it has, Africa remained at a receiving end of the relationship rather than a supplier to the United States. And for many years Africa has been considered as a continent which has little to offer to the United States. The lack of strategic interest had created a gap in scholarly work on U.S. - African relations as well (Copson 2007; Gordon, et al 1998). This dissertation will help to fill the gap by examining U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African and the role of oil in determining U.S. foreign policy towards Africa.

**Organization of the study**

The study will use a combination of small-N comparison and case study methods. The small-N part of the study will use the most similar systems method and focuses on the eight Sub-Saharan African oil states and nine non-oil African states that have similar characteristics. It is most similar systems because the cases have many similar independent variables and one different independent variable, which is the presence of oil. The study will start out by conducting a study using small-N method which will help identify countries that merit further study. It will then follow with two paired case studies: Angola and Congo and Ethiopia and Sudan.
The remainder of this introduction will provide background information about oil in Africa and the significance of African oil to the United States and the world market. Chapter Two will provide a literature review on U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East and the role of oil in shaping U.S. foreign policy. This review will present insight into what we should expect from U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states. Chapter Three will lay out the research design and methods used to operationalize the study and quantify and measure the dependent and independent variables. Chapter Four will provide a cross-sectional analysis of U.S foreign policy towards both oil and non-oil states. Chapters five and six will be dedicated to case studies, and chapter seven will offer the conclusion.

**Understanding African Oil in the World Market**

The continent of Africa has rich deposits of minerals, and its trade relationship with the rest of the world has been dominated by extractive industries. Though Africa has enormous natural resources, oil became a major export commodity only in the last four decades. Oil currently accounts for 50 percent of Africa’s exports and 65 percent of its foreign direct investment (Gary & Karl 2003, 5). African oil production grew by 100 percent between 1981 and 2008 (Table 1.1 Calculation based US EIA data). Although African oil production has been more modest since the late 1990s, the continent remained the fourth largest oil producing region after the Middle East, North America, and Eurasia. Africa’s oil production is comparable to that of Eurasia. Total African oil production in 2008 was about 10.8
million barrels per day while Eurasia’s was 12.5 million (Table 1.1). Middle East and North America have a production of 25.8 and 15 million barrels per day respectively.

![Figure 1.1: Total World Oil Supply by Region.](image)

(Africa region includes Northern African and Sub-Saharan Africa)

Data reconstructed from US EIA data.

**African Oil States**

Oil production in Africa is dominated by a few large states. The top four oil producers are Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, and Libya. These countries combined produced 60 percent of Africa’s total output in 2008. In addition to Algeria and Libya, North African oil producers include Egypt, Tunisia, and Mauritania. However, these states are not considered major oil states, as their production has been small. There are currently eight sub-Saharan oil producing countries. The two largest oil producers, Nigeria and Angola, have a long history of production going back to the early 1970s. Some of the smaller Gulf of Guinea countries
and Sudan became major oil producers in the last ten years (Gabon and Cameroon had been producing small amounts since the early 1970’s). Angola, which is currently the largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, has shown the highest increase in production in the last few years and had a 150% increase between 2001 and 2008 (see Table 1.2). Sudan, the third largest producer in Sub-Saharan Africa, also had an impressive growth in oil output since 2000. In 1998, Sudan produced just 9 thousand barrels per day, but production reached 480 thousand barrels per day ten years later.

Though Sub-Saharan African oil is not as significant as that of the Middle East and North America, it is of geopolitical importance to the United States. African oil producers are not members of OPEC (with the exception of Nigeria and Angola). OPEC membership limits oil production and members are at times entangled in international oil politics. Non-membership in OPEC provides suppliers opportunity for unlimited production. It also gives freedom to consumers from arbitrary restrictions usually set by OPEC. Thus, producers such as Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Gabon are free to produce and sell as much as they want, which is beneficial to the United States (Goldwyn and Morrison 2003).

Africa currently accounts for only about 8% of world oil reserves, and this figure is small compared to that for the Middle East. However, what the Africa oil producers lack in size, “they more than make up for it in vigor: Because many of Africa’s oil and gas fields are
only now being developed, they hold the promise of greater output in the future, when many deposits in other parts of the world are sure to be in decline” (Klare 2008, 148).

Many of the new oil discoveries in Africa are located offshore. Though offshore oil is more expensive to develop, it is also less susceptible to the political upheaval and instability that often affects onshore production in the region. Offshore exploration and production also requires high technical capabilities. This technical requirement is attractive to U.S. companies, as investment becomes restricted to a few technically advanced and well financed corporations. U.S. companies thus dominate off shore oil exploration and production in Africa.

Figure 1.2: Sub-Saharan African States Oil Production.
Data reconstructed from US EIA data

Historical Perspective of U.S. Interests in African Oil
Until World War II, Africa’s oil sector was dominated by Europeans. After World War II, the United States with its rise as a superpower also started to be interested in Africa’s oil. However, European colonial powers’ control over African states limited U.S. multinationals from activity seeking oil exploration and drilling in the continent. This was very apparent in one of the largest oil producers, Nigeria. Oil exploration in Nigeria was first done by a German company, Bitumen Corporation, between 1907 and 1914. World War I forced Bitumen to abandon its work. After the war ended, British colonial leaders did not allow the company to return but chose British oil companies to conduct oil exploration (Frynas 2000, 9). British colonial leaders passed the Mineral Oil Ordinance No. 17 of 1914, which gave permission only to British oil companies to do business in the Nigerian oil sector (Frynas 2000, 12). A joint venture between Shell and BP was granted oil exploration rights and in 1953 oil was discovered in the Akata -1 well and in 1956 additional oil was found in Oloibiri. BP and Shell remained the dominant oil producers until the early 1960s. Socony-Vacuum, which later became Mobil, was the first non-British company to enter the Nigerian market, in 1955. Independence of Nigeria from British colonization paved the way for non-British companies to enter the country. Tennessee (known as Tenneco), Gulf (which later became Chevron), and American Overseas (known as Amoseas) all entered the Nigerian market between 1960 and 1961.

In other African oil states, American multinationals did not face many challenges. The absence of multinational oil corporations capable of exploring and producing oil in Portugal
allowed American companies easily to break into Angola’s oil sector. Even though oil exploration in Angola started around 1910, commercial production did not start until 1955/56. Oil production started after discovery in the Kwanza basin. There was also discovery and development in the Cabinda region and production in the area started in 1968. The Petroleum Company of Angola (Companhia de Petróleos de Angola—Petrangol), which partnered with an American oil company—Texaco—was the first company to start production in the Kwanza River Basin. Petroleum Company of Angola later discovered oil in the Congo River Basin. At about the same time a subsidiary of the American-based Gulf Oil, the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (Cagboc), began exploration in the Cabinda area in 1954 and started production in 1968. By the beginning of 1977, production from these U.S. firms accounted for 80 percent of Angola’s export earnings, mostly from tax and royalty fees. In 1984, SONANGOL (Angolan national oil company) created a joint venture with Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, which was a subsidiary of Chevron. Petrofina and Texaco were also two of the largest producers in the Kwanza and Congo basins (Hodges 2001; International Energy Agency 2006). In the late 1980s, the major foreign oil companies operating in Angola were American. Chevron, which had taken over Gulf, owned 49 percent of the shares in the offshore Cabinda blocks, Angola's largest production area (Price 1978).

Since the 1990s, the U.S. government has been actively encouraging U.S. companies to invest in the African oil sector. The African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) is one initiative that was set up to facilitate business between the United States and Africa. Even
though AGOA was not specifically intended for oil and gas and was targeted towards all sectors, oil and petroleum products dominated U.S. imports from African through AGOA. In 2007, 92.3 percent of total AGOA imports were petroleum products. Since 2000, U.S. imports from the oil producing countries have grown in every case, with imports from Nigeria growing by 16.2 percent, from Angola by 51.2 percent, from the Republic of Congo by 65.2 percent, from Equatorial Guinea by 89.5 percent, from Chad by 55.4 percent, and from Gabon by 4.4 percent (Diamond 2009). In addition, four of the top five AGOA beneficiaries (Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, Chad, and the Republic of Congo) were oil states.

AGOA not only increased U.S. imports of oil but also facilitated U.S. multinational oil companies’ investment in the region. According to PFC Energy, a global energy consulting firm, U.S. companies invested 1.8 billion dollars in Nigeria and Angola alone in 2003. In 2008, Exxon Mobil produced more oil in Angola than it did in the U.S., largely due to its increased investment in Angola’s oil sector (Ariweriokuma 2009, 2). In addition, a large majority of these investments were offshore (Goldwyn and Morrison 2008). It is expected that West Africa will have large offshore drillings in the near future. Due to their technical and financial capabilities, U.S. multinationals are in a much better position than their European and Asian competitors in offshore drilling and are expected to dominate the market for the foreseeable future. According the Managing Director of Mobil Producing Nigeria, Mark Ward, “deep water offshore oil fields in West Africa rose sharply from US$1.5 billion
in 2000 to US$15.6 billion in 2010.”


Since the turn of the century, large U.S. multinational oil companies have been aggressively seeking new oil fields in Africa. While Exxon Mobil and Chevron Texaco have led investment, smaller independent companies such as Amerada Hess, Vanco, Ocean and Marathon have also been investing in Africa. In 2002, Chevron Texaco announced that it had invested $5 billion in the past five years in African oil and was planning on investing an additional $20 billion in the next five years. In addition, Exxon Mobil was planning on spending $15 billion in Angola between 2002 and 2006, and an additional $25 billion across Africa during the between 2002 and 2012 (Gary and Karl 2003, 12). In 2002, both Exxon Mobil and Chevron Texaco made their intention clear to invest billions of dollars in Nigeria, the fifth largest exporter of oil to the United States.

Chevron Texaco has also been involved in developing the oil and gas fields in Equatorial Guinea, while Exxon Mobil had worked on the Sao Tome and Principe oil and gas fields (Obi 2007). Other major U.S. sponsored oil projects in Africa include the 1,070 Kilometer

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2 This remark was made on several news papers in Africa including Afrique Avenir. “Expert puts investments in deepwater offshore fields in West Africa at US$15.6 billion.” Accessed November 16, 2010.

Chad-Cameroon Oil pipelines, which start out in the Doba oilfields in Chad, for export through the Cameroon port of Kribi. The project is believed to be the “largest single U.S. private investment in Africa by Exxon Mobil valued at $3.7 billion” (Valle, 2004, 53). The West African Gas Pipeline Project (WAGP), which is a joint venture by Chevron Texaco (largest single share), Shell, the national oil corporations of Nigeria (NNPC) and Ghana National Oil (GNPC&VRA), is also another major oil project that has significant involvement from U.S. multinationals. The investment, valued at $500 million, is expected to transport an estimated 120 Mmcf/d (Million standard cubic feet per day - a unit of measurement for liquids and gases) of gas to Ghana, Benin and Togo from Nigeria’s Niger Delta, and it covers a distance of 1,033 Kilometers.³

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³Information from the World Bank Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (Initial) for “West Africa Gas Pipeline” Project. Report No: AC508. Section 1 - Basic Information. Date ISDS Prepared/Updated: 12/17/2003. Additional information is also available from the project website at http://www.wagpco.com/
In 2008, Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 14 percent of U.S. oil imports, just behind imports from Persian Gulf countries, which was 18 percent (Figure 1.3). This figure has decreased to about 12% in 2011 since it pick in 2008. Imports from the Sub-Saharan region have been dominated by the two largest producers - Nigeria and Angola. The two countries together accounted for 75 percent of U.S. oil import from Sub-Saharan Africa countries in 2008 and this figure has remained the same for the past three years. Current trends indicate exports from Nigeria have been declining while those from Angola are on the rise. The third largest producer in the region, Sudan, does not export to the U.S. due to U.S. sanctions.

Gabon has also been exporting oil to the U.S. since the late 1980s, but the amount has
remained under 200 thousand barrels per day. Imports from Chad have increased slightly since 2000, but remained under 100 thousand barrels per day (Figure 1.4).

![Figure 1.4: U.S. Oil Import from Sub-Saharan African Countries. Data reconstructed from US EIA data](image)

**Conclusion**

The United States consumes 25 percent of the world’s petroleum, and it imports 11.7 million barrels per day. According to US Energy Information Administration, the United States imported almost half of the crude oil and refined petroleum it used in 2010. Since the early 1980s, the Central and Latin American regions have been the top oil exporters to the United States followed by Canada, the Persian Gulf region and Sub-Saharan Africa. The Persian Gulf was the largest source of U.S. imports until the 1970s oil crises. U.S. imports from the region started to decline after 1976 while imports from Central and Latin America started to increase. Though Sub-Saharan Africa is currently the fourth largest exporter to
the United States, U.S. imports from the region have been increasing noticeably and the region was exporting 1.2 million barrels per day in 2009.

The 1973 oil crisis forced the U.S. to reevaluate its relationships with Middle Eastern suppliers. After the first oil shock, the United States looked for other oil suppliers and shifted its focus to oil producers in Central and Latin America. Nigeria, which was then the largest oil producer in African, also generated U.S. interest. This was the first time the United States began to focus on oil countries outside the Middle East. The high cost of oil associated with increasing world-wide demand and continuous unrest in the Middle East made the United States formulate a new national security strategy which also focused on energy policy. African oil suppliers have started to attract policy makers attention in energy security and “in 2004 an advisory panel of Africa experts authorized by Congress to propose new policy initiatives identified five factors that have shaped increased U.S. interest in Africa in the past decade: oil, global trade, armed conflicts, terror, and HIV/AIDS” (Ploch 2009, 13. Though Africa has been exporting oil to the U.S. since the1960s, it was only in the 20th century that the United States started to look at oil as one of the priority issues it considers in formulating U.S. foreign policy towards the continent.

The increase in U.S. business relationships with African oil producers and interests in African oil is likely to influence U.S. foreign policy as well. When we look at U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East, we see that the presence of oil has had an influence. The
presence of oil, in addition to other priorities such as the global war on terror and concern for Israel, has made the United States prioritize keeping pro-Western regimes in power over other issues such as democracy and human rights in the Middle East. In order to maintain a stable, pro-Western regime in power, the United States has worked with friendly authoritarian and repressive regimes in the region. United States’ oil interest in Africa has been growing; thus, will we see the United States work with authoritarian regimes in the region, or will it also advocate democracy and transparency as a means of achieving stability and energy security?

Activists such as Fredriksson (2007) of Amnesty International and foreign policy scholars (Baer 2003, Bahgat 2003, Gary a& Karl 2003, Goldwyn & Morrison 2005, and Kalicki & Goldwyn 2005) have indicated that the United States supports authoritarian regimes in its quest for energy security or that it prioritizes regime stability over other priorities. However, in two oil states in Africa, Nigeria and Angola, the United States is also actively engaged in promoting democracy. U.S. foreign policy towards Sudan also confirms that it does not necessarily compromise democracy and human rights for its energy interest. Sudan has been one of the major oil producers in Sub-Saharan since 2002, and it is currently the third largest producer in the region. Despite the surge in oil production, the United States has placed strict economic sanctions on the country due to its human rights violations in Darfur. These sanctions prohibit U.S. imports of oil from Sudan. Looking at the U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest oil producers, Nigeria, Angola and Sudan, it is possible
to say that the United States treats African oil states differently than Middle Eastern oil
states. However, its cozy relationship with authoritarian regimes in Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon and Chad also shows that United States is willing to work with authoritarian regimes.
This dissertation will evaluate whether the United States systematically treats oil and non-oil
African states differently and whether it prioritizes regime stability over its other priorities
such as democracy and human rights in only non-African oil states.
CHAPTER II:
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS

This dissertation explores the intersection of oil and U.S. foreign policy, with a focus on African oil states since the 1960s. This section will first look at the role of oil and energy security in U.S. foreign policy and why we should expect oil to influence U.S. foreign policy. It will then provide an overview of U.S. foreign policy over three different time periods and they are the Cold War, 1990 to 2001 and 2001 to present. The literature review will start by looking at oil in U.S. foreign policy followed by each period. Embedded in each section is an overview of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East and role oil played in influencing U.S. foreign policy towards the region. While U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East is pointed out here to reflect the role oil plays in influencing U.S. foreign policy, it is important to remember that other geopolitical interests also have an influence in U.S. foreign policy. While the hypotheses generated and tested in this study are not exclusively based on U.S. foreign policy towards from the Middle East, it is included in this study to use as a comparison with U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states and to show how it is different. Oil and U.S. Foreign Policy
What kind of U.S. foreign policy should we expect when interest in oil influences U.S. foreign policy? Energy security has been one of the priorities of U.S. foreign policy, and as former Congressman Lee Hamilton indicated that next to national defense, energy security is a central element to the economic well-being of United States. U.S. energy security is based on promoting a stable supply of oil, at affordable prices, from as diverse a set of suppliers as possible” (Goldwyn and Morrison 2005, 16). Concern for energy security has risen in the last decade due to the high cost of oil associated with the increasing world-wide demand and continuous unrest in the Middle East (Cohen and Alasa 2007; McCullum 2006). In countries and regions where the United States has significant interest in energy, it frequently has abandoned its democracy and human right concerns. Such has been U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East. The United States has a history of working with friendly authoritarian regimes in the Middle East for security and stability reasons. Though the United States in 2010 imported only about 16 percent of its oil from the region, it has been anxious about stability in the area, as the region holds two-thirds of the world’s oil reserves. Any instability in the region can affect the global oil price (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 330; Duffield 2008, 116; Yeomans 2004, 119-120). Thus, the United States has been concerned “about the stability and friendliness of the regimes that preside over the oil-rich sands of the Middle East” (Herb 1999:5). To avoid any destabilization of the sources of oil in the region, the United States has worked with authoritarian regimes and has used military force as well (Fandy 1997; Miglietta 2002, 232; Yetiv 2004, 64). The U.S. military has intervened and at
times supported repressive regimes, disregarding human rights and democratic norms for economic and security reasons (Gary and Karl 2003, 2).

The United States has seven major allies in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Kuwait, Israel and Morocco. Some of these countries have received significant military assistance from the United States; Egypt has been the second largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world for many years. Even though some of the oil rich Middle Eastern countries did not need and receive military aid, the United States has sold large quantities of military supply to them. In FY 2010 the United States proposed the sale of “84 new F-15SA fighter aircraft and the upgrade of the existing Saudi fleet of 70 F-15S fighters to the F-15SA configuration. The total value of this equipment was more than $29.4 billion and was the largest U.S. arms sale to any single country” (Blanchard 2011, 9). The U.S. alliance with these states is currently shaped by three main priorities: the security of Israel, the fight against terrorism (or containing the rise of Islamist extremists), and oil. Concern over Soviet expansion also influenced U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War (Garfinkle 2009). The United States has focused on building positive relationships with pro-Western regimes that would satisfy one or all of the interests. The problem with U.S. foreign policy arises when there is an interest in achieving political stability and at the same time push for democratic reform. Nevertheless, the convergence of energy interest and political stability has led the United States to support authoritarian regimes abandon its democracy and human rights promotion.
Since the 1979 oil crisis, the U.S. interests and commitments to protecting its Middle Eastern oil suppliers has also increased. U.S. military involvements in the Middle East after the Iranian revolution of 1979 reflects U.S. interests in securing energy suppliers by any means necessary. After the Iranian revolution, the United States started full military engagement to stabilize the region, and it was “forced, for the first time, to develop substantial military capability and regional support to protect its own interests in the Gulf” (Yetiv 2004, 64). During the same period, the Carter administration created the Rapid Deployment Force that would respond to regional crises at once. The time was the beginning of a long U.S. military involvement with repressive regimes in the region (Yetiv 2004).

The competing U.S. interests of political stability and democracy have made the United States forego full commitment to democracy promotion “and when faced with a choice between preserving the stability of a nondemocratic ally and fostering democratic change, the United States has sided with the incumbent regime” (Bensahel and Byman 2004, 9). The United States has been unwilling to push for democratic reforms for fear of destabilizing and antagonizing friendly regimes. U.S. policy makers also assume that promoting democracy and human rights can be risky, as there is a fear that business operations and oil reserves can fall into the hands of non-allies and opposition groups. Therefore, The U.S. government has been at times reluctant to denounce dictatorial regimes that have oil (Gary
and Karl 2003). Indeed the United States “has put little public pressure on the monarchies to liberalize. This stance arises out of a calculation that it is best not to try to fix things that are not broken: if the status quo is stable and serves Western interests” (Herb 1999, 5). By supporting corrupt and dictatorial regimes for immediate economic and strategic advantage, the United States has prevented necessary changes for democratization in the Middle East.

Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, referring to U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East in 2005, said that “for 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy…and we achieved neither.”

The most pressing challenge for foreign policy makers had been balancing the “two conflicting imperatives for U.S. foreign policy: preserving the short-term stability of Arab regimes that have been friendly—or at least not explicitly and intractably hostile—to the United States and promoting a deeper, more organic stability in the region through democratic reform” (Diamond 2005).

By supporting corrupt and dictatorial regimes for short term economic and strategic advantage, the United States has prevented necessary change in some Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, the notion of providing unequivocal support to pro-Western authoritarian regimes has been challenged by many. As Noreng (2006) stated, “The wisdom of giving unquestioning support to corrupt and authoritarian regimes because they export oil

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is not obvious. The error has been to equate secure oil supplies with regimes that were more dependent on Western backing than on a popular mandate. Such a policy can backfire, as it did for the United States in Iran.” The rise of extremists who are unhappy with U.S. foreign policy also confirms that the policy has not necessary stabilized the region.

This dissertation looks at U.S. foreign policy in three different time frames: 1960 to 1990, or the Cold War period; 1990 – 2001 or the post-Cold War period and the rise of the global norm of democracy and human rights; and 2001 to the present or the time of rising concern for energy. The next sections will provide a literature review of U.S. foreign policy during these periods and what we should expect in U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states during these periods.

**U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War**

U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was dominated by containment, and the United States became directly or indirectly involved in several developing nations to counter Soviet expansion (Gaddis 2005). From direct military intervention in Vietnam to a CIA-backed military coup in Guatemala to oust the left-wing President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, the United States tried to remove anti-Western leaders and install pro-U.S. regimes. When John F. Kennedy came to power, he clearly indicated his main foreign policy goal towards the developing nations was “containment of Soviet Union and cultivation of third world
nationalists” (Schraeder 1994, 59). Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy towards Mobutu’s Zaire or Ethiopia was not different. Though he was influenced by human right norms, Carter kept pro-Western leaders such as Mobutu an ally to the United States while he shunned Communist leaders such as Mengistu of Ethiopia (Rothchild & Keller 2006; Yohannes 1997).

Even though the United States viewed Africa as having little to offer the United States, it still tried to counter communist expansion in the continent (Copson 2007). However, U.S. direct and active involvement in Africa was limited to a few countries: Congo, the Angolan civil war (1975-1991), and the Ethiopian – Somalia war (1977 – 78) dominated U.S.’s attention during the Cold War period. Rothchild and Keller (2006) called this U.S. policy one of “selective engagement” toward Africa during the Cold War period (Rothchild and Keller 2006, 4). Kissinger, explaining the U.S. administration’s involvement in Angola, stated that “America’s modest direct strategic and economic interests in Angola are not the central issue. The question is whether America still maintains the resolve to act responsibly as a great power” (Clough 1992, 9-10). Kissinger emphasized that the United States needed to counter Soviet involvement in the region since U.S. inability to counter Soviet expansion would encourage the Soviets to expand in other areas of Africa. Kissinger viewed U.S. policy towards Angola under the wider Cold War policy as his policy and mind set was shaped by the Cold War (Schraeder 1994). Though the United States had
minor involvement in Africa compared to its involvement in other parts of the world, its foreign policy was still largely influenced by the Cold War.

**The Post-Cold War Period**

The end of the Cold War allowed the United States to freely promote democracy and human rights throughout the world. Since the early 1990s, the United States has made democracy promotion a center piece of its foreign policy. In order to be actively engaged in democracy promotion, the U.S. Department of State established the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in 1998 with the purpose of promoting democracy as a means to achieve security, stability, and prosperity for the entire world. The United States started to promote democracy because not only did democracy become a globally accepted norm, but it also believed that democracy serves U.S.’s economic interests. According to President Clinton’s *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*: “Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners, and are far less likely to wage war on one another” (The White House 1995). Democracies that have respect for the rule of law will have a more stable society and they are also more likely to honor treaties. Democratic countries are also viewed as good trading partner and outside investors are more likely to invest in a democratic country. The United States also wanted to promote democracy as it believed that authoritarian regimes are not only threats to a stable economy but can also lead to ongoing conflict and destabilization.
Based on U.S. foreign policy towards Middle Eastern oil states, it is possible to assume that the United States would abandon its democracy and human rights agenda work with authoritarian regimes in African oil states by providing military, financial and other technical support to stabilize and create pro-Western regimes. However, preliminary research clearly indicates that the United States has not done so. During the post-Cold War period, the United States pushed for democratic reforms in oil producing countries such as Angola and Nigeria. For example, in 2007 the United States invested over $12 million for democracy, civil society and transparency projects in Nigeria and an additional $6 million in Angola. These countries are two of the largest oil producers in the continent. U.S. lawmakers have indicated that “the U.S. should not be partnering with unpopular, undemocratic regimes. On the contrary, proper foreign policy would bolster American values with our allies and encourage democratic development. One way to achieve this is to engage with energy-producing countries in a way that fosters and encourages the development of a middle class, rather than allowing petro-dollars to flow into the hands of a small number of corrupt leaders and their associates” (Schultz and Wihbey 2002). U.S. democracy assistance to Nigeria and Angola seems to indicate that the United States is willing to be engaged in pushing for democratic reforms in oil states in Africa.

On the other hand, it is argued that democracy does not necessarily achieve stability and this line of reasoning has been supported by the works of scholars such as Geddes and
Diamond. Geddes (1999, 2003) has indicated that monarchies are the most stable regime type, followed by one-party states and military regimes. Geddes further indicated that multiparty systems are the least stable. ⁵ Diamond (1988) pointed out that dictatorships are more stable, as they have been successful at economic management and thus are less threatened by instability pushed by public dissatisfaction over performance failure. Monarchies or authoritarian regimes are considered stable as they do not have frequent changes of government. A 2005 study by Geddes also pointed out that semi-authoritarian regimes or incomplete democratic transitions — those that get stalled before reaching the stage of full democracy - have a higher chance of involving in a civil and interstate conflict. These countries have weak governmental institutions and one susceptible to instability. The study further showed that incomplete democratic transition can create regional instability as cross-border attacks increases due to weak military institutions.

This argument can be further supported when we see the outcome of U.S. democracy promotions. The value of U.S. democracy promotion has been debated as it has resulted in several conflicting outcomes. A recent USAID-commissioned study (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, Seligson and Tate 2008) indicated that U.S. democracy and governance assistance has not necessarily yielded a positive outcome on democracy growth worldwide as gains were modest. It is also argued that democracy promotion can be very expensive and may not

⁵ Geddes define stability as (i) whether or not shifts of government have taken place, and (ii) whether or not the governing party takes the largest share (more than two-thirds) of the vote in elections.
guarantee that real changes will be made on the long term. Epstein et al (2007) in their report to Congress have clearly indicated that “promoting democracy can be a destabilizing factor in a country, as well as its region, and have documented a backlash to democracy promotion, including restrictions on freedom in some countries where democracy promotion has taken place” (Epstein et al 2007, 7). In addition, U.S. democracy promotion is sometimes viewed as inappropriate interference in the domestic politics of foreign countries which can produce a backlash. U.S. involvement in democracy programs in Russia and Eastern Europe was followed by a backlash and anti-American sentiment. Democracy promotion can also have an unintended impact by allowing anti-American elements to rise to power, as seen by the election of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories.

U.S. Foreign Policy Since 2000

After George W. Bush came to the White House in January 2001, he altered U.S. foreign policy and involvement by making significant changes such as U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. However the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington dramatically changed U.S. foreign policy and reshaped Bush’s foreign policy during his two terms. After the 9/11 attacks, U.S. foreign policy became dominated by security concerns and the National Security Strategy of 2002 indicated that “deterrence and containment were no longer sufficient to safeguard America’s
security in the face of terrorist threats with global reach and so-called ‘rogue states’ such as Iraq and North Korea. Instead, what was required was an offensive approach that included preventive military operations” (Wenger 2008, 2). The United States’ involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq are directly related to U.S. anti-terrorism operations. However, U.S. anti-terrorism operations were not limited to these two states but also included several other Middle Eastern and Africa states. The United States has provided military and security assistance to several African countries to counter Muslim extremists.

President George W. Bush also indicated that one of reasons for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was to bring democracy to that country. In December 2006, Bush stated that “[We] are committed to a strategic goal of a free Iraq that is democratic, that can govern itself, defend itself and sustain itself” (Epstein, Serafino and Miko 2007, 2)\(^6\). The Bush Administration looked at democracy promotion as an instrument for combating terrorism. On the contrary, it is argued that U.S. involvement in Iraq has greatly discredited U.S. democracy promotion and that “the actual extent of the Bush commitment to democracy promotion is much less than the president’s sweeping rhetoric would suggest” (Carothers 2007, v). Nevertheless, U.S. democracy promotion became a widely accepted foreign policy goal since 2000.

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\(^6\) This remark was made by President Bush and first reported by the White House on Dec. 12, 2006. Titled: President Bush meets with Senior U.S. Defense Officials on Iraq, December 13, 2006. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061213-5.html]
Energy security also became one of U.S. foreign policy goals since 2000. One of the reasons that have led to this concern has been instability in the Middle East and in order to lessen this anxiety, the United States has planned to reduce its dependency on Middle Eastern oil supply. In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush made this clear when he stated that the United States need to “move beyond a petroleum-based economy and make our dependence on Middle Eastern oil a thing of the past.” He further stated that his administration’s goal is “to replace more than 75 percent of our oil imports from the Middle East by 2025.”

Policy makers have indicated that President Bush appeared to have African oil supplies in mind when making this remark and indicated the United States interests “to build a security alliance with Africa in order to achieve this goal” (Hess 2007). As African oil export to the United States has grown from about 15 percent in 2004 to 22 percent by 2006 and as the National Intelligence Council (2004) has indicated that U.S. imports from Africa might grow to about 25% by 2015, the United States might achieve its goal through further involvement in Africa. As the U.S. interests in Africa is growing, scholars and policy makers have recommended that the U.S. implement foreign policy that incorporates good governance/transparency, economic development, human capacity development as well as security to create a stable source of energy from Sub Saharan African oil producers. This recommendation is in stark contrast with the policy U.S. followed with some of the Middle East oil states. The U.S. interests in promoting democracy, good

governance and transparency is based on the assumptions that doing so will create a stable system and also lead to an economic development which will in the long run benefit the United States

**U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa**

When U.S. economic and political interests in Africa are compared with U.S. interests in the Middle East, they are minimal (Rothchild & Keller 2006, 3). During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy towards Africa was driven by ideology and containment of Soviet expansion, and U.S. policy makers seldom showed interest in African countries (Clough 1992, 2). After the end of Cold War and during the 1990s, U.S. interests in Africa declined and the region was seen as an experimental battle ground for democracy (Gordon et al. 1998, 17).

Though the United States had minimal economic interest in Africa during the Cold War period and its polices were largely shaped by its wider Cold War politics, its foreign policy towards African oil states could still have been shaped by the need for energy security. The 1970s oil crisis made energy security a priority in U.S. foreign policy, and its policies towards the Middle East were largely shaped by that. In order to stabilize oil states, the United States worked with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. In Africa, did the United States work with authoritarian regimes to stabilize energy sources as it did in the Middle East, or did the United States pursue wider political agendas, such as containment of Soviet expansion during the Cold War and promotion of democracy after the Cold War?
This question will be answered in the study. The increase in oil production in some African states and the discovery of new oil fields have made U.S. policy-makers recognize the importance of Africa, and particularly West African oil, to the growing needs of the United States.  

U.S. growing interest in African oil is reflected in its increased military assistance to some African oil producers. Lynn Frederickson of Amnesty International, in a testimony to congress in 2007, indicated that Equatorial Guinea which is the fourth largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa was the fourth largest beneficiary of U.S. foreign direct investment (mainly in oil and gas) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the known human rights abuses and corruption that is in the country, she pointed that that the U.S. Government chosen to provide military assistance to Equatorial Guinea and the President’s request for FY08 foreign operations appropriations include $45,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding (Fredriksson 2007). Frederickson’s concern was echoed by other human rights and environmental advocates, such as Oxfam and Catholic Relief. Scholars have indicated that the rise in U.S. military involvement in Africa is partially attributed to oil. The creation of AFRICOM by many is seen as a tool that the United States can use to secure it interests in West Africa (Lubeck etal 2007). The U.S. Army War

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College annual war game, or also called “Unified Quest,” for the first time in 2008 included scenarios in Africa. One of the scenarios was a test of how AFRICOM would respond to a crisis in Nigeria if the Nigerian government collapsed, and rival factions and rebels fought for control of the oil fields in the Niger Delta.

The increase in U.S.-Africa business relations has also been a concern for the prospect of democracy and human rights in the region, as it is believed that when the United States has economic interests, it relinquishes democracy promotion. Many African oil states are considered authoritarian regimes, and Freedom House ranked six of the eight oil states as Not Free.9 The prospect of these countries moving towards democracy becomes deem with a strong political and military support from the United States. And U.S. behavior of courting suppressive Africa oil regimes has been seen as a policy driven by oil (Duffield 2008, 151; Gary & Karl 2003, 53-54).

This section has provided an overview of U.S. foreign policy in three different time frames. Based on these analyses, the next section in this chapter will run through the hypotheses that will be evaluated in the study. These hypotheses are build upon general assumptions held about U.S. foreign policy and not necessarily limited to U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East.

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9 Only Gabon and Nigeria were ranked Partially Free. Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 has complete information.
Hypothesis

Given that energy security is one of the key priorities of U.S. foreign policy, how does the United States seek to pursue this interest in relation to other priorities in African oil states? Has this policy changed over time as well? The study seeks to answer these questions by comparing U.S. foreign policy towards oil and non-oil African states. The main line of argument that this study presents is that U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states will be significantly different from its policy toward non-oil African states. From this statement three hypotheses on how it is different will be developed and tested in the study. The three hypotheses are

a. With respect to oil producers, the U.S. will prioritize regime stability above other goals.

b. The U.S. will not prioritize democracy and human rights promotions in African oil states.

c. U.S. political engagement, military cooperation and foreign aid will be higher in oil states than in non-oil states

U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War and post - Cold War period has been dominated by several priorities, which also have changed throughout time. During the Cold War, the United States prioritized containment of Soviet expansion over other issues such as the spread of democracy or human rights. During the same period, particularly after the
1970s oil crisis, the United States put energy security at the forefront of its foreign policy as well. In the post-Cold War period, democracy and human rights promotion also became a priority. In the post 9/11 years, the Global War on Terror and energy security became priorities.

The United States not only prioritizes issues but also countries. The United States prioritizes countries based on several factors including geopolitical significance, natural resources such as oil, prior engagement, and regime type. The United States has been providing support for regimes in the countries where it has an interest and which it considers friendly. The support has come in the form of military aid, foreign aid and diplomatic support. In addition, the United States has not openly advocated for democratic changes in countries that it considers friendly, regardless of the nature of the regime. Based on these assumptions, if the United States prioritizes energy security, we are more likely to see it treat oil states differently than non-oil African states. There are three hypotheses that are generated and studied based on the difference in U.S. treatment of oil and non-oil states and they are:

a. *With respect to oil producers, the U.S. will prioritize regime stability above other goals.*

Ensuring stability in countries that provide energy security has been one of the main goals of U.S. foreign policy. “U.S. foreign policy means and ends are intended and designed to promote positive relations and maintain stability in those nations with whom the United
States seeks to foster amicable and cooperative relationships” (Meernik 2008). Regime stability means the “ability to deter, mitigate, and contain threats to the supply of oil including political, economic, and strategic developments such as wars, revolutions, coups d’etats, transnational and local terrorisms and labor strikes” (Kalicki & Goldwyn 2005, 9). If the United States prioritizes regime stability, it is more likely to accept authoritarian regimes and provide military and foreign aid, give diplomatic legitimacy, and avoid openly advocating democratic reforms. This hypothesis will test whether the U.S. prioritized regime stability over energy security.

b. The U.S. will not prioritize democracy and human rights promotions in African oil states.

In the post-Cold War period, U.S. interests in promoting democracy and human rights increased. However, the United States might have been selective in its democracy promotion and not aggressively pursued such policies in friendly authoritarian regimes; some might provide energy to the United States. If the United States was selective in its democracy promotion, non-oil states in Africa would be targeted more than African oil states. Thus, we can argue that the United States treats oil and non-oil states differently. This hypotheses tests if the United States prioritizes democracy and human rights in non-oil states more than in oil states.
c. U.S. political engagement, military cooperation and foreign aid will be higher in oil states than in non-oil states.

If the United States treats African oil states differently from non-oil states, its engagement will also be different. The United States will give more military and foreign aid to oil states. In addition, its diplomatic engagement, such as visits by high level government delegations will be higher than in non-oil states and also more visible. This will be done to give legitimacy to regimes and show political support. This hypothesis tests whether U.S. diplomatic engagement and cooperation will be higher in African oil states than non-oil states.

The next chapter of this study will cover the research design, which will outline the methods used to test these hypotheses. The study will be done by dividing the time frame into three periods: 1960-1990, 1990-2000/2001 and 2001 to present. The reasoning behind the time frames will also be covered in the research design section.
CHAPTER III:
RESEARCH DESIGN

U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East and its current interests in Africa lead to the puzzle that this study will answer. The United States has recognized the importance of West African oil in addressing its energy security (Gary and Karl 2003, Kansteiner III, Walter H. and Morrison. 2004; Servant 2003). Thus, when dealing with African oil states, did the United States prioritize its oil interests over other political priorities during the Cold War? In the post-Cold War period, did its policy towards African oil states also change and has it focused on satisfying its economic interests and disregarded democracy and human rights norms? The study will answer these questions by looking at changes in U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African oil states through three different time periods and in comparison with other non-oil African states.

In order to analyze whether oil has influenced U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African oil states, this study will evaluate U.S. policy in three time periods. The different time periods also reflect eras when U.S. interests might have changed, along with the development of new norms in international relations and changes in international politics. While these factors indicate the breakdown in the time period, there will also be a subsection
or division in the time periods to reflect changes in U.S. energy policy driven largely by
changed in the international relations of energy market. For example when looking at U.S.
foreign policy during the Cold War, the study will look at U.S. foreign policy in the pre and
post 1973 period to see if U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states changed due to the
oil crisis. In addition, the study will control for presidential attitudes and policies that might
have influenced U.S. foreign policy toward these states. An example of such issues includes
Carter’s human rights agenda and Bush’s influence by a coalition of Christian conservatives
and evangelicals on U.S. policy toward Sudan.

**Time Periods**

**1960 to 1990: The Cold War and Birth of New Nations in Africa**

The first time period the study will look at will be between 1960 and 1990. Many of the
African oil states became oil producers during this period. Table 3.1 below indicates the
year oil became a major export commodity in African oil states or the year when production
escalated. Angola and Nigeria are not only two of the largest oil producers but two of the
earliest as well.

U.S. foreign policy towards Africa and other parts of the world during the Cold War was
driven by ideology and containment of Soviet expansion (Schraeder 1994, Dobson & Marsh
2006). During that period, democracy promotion was not considered a major component of U.S. foreign policy. Thus, the United States was unlikely to be engaged in democracy promotion and more likely to work with authoritarian regimes to secure its economic and political interests. In the pre-1990 period, the United States also provided significant military assistance through donation and sales to oil as well as non-oil states. This policy was driven by the wider foreign policy of containment rather than interest in oil. Some of the largest military aid was given to non-oil countries such as Ethiopia and Congo, and military aid was given to a rebel group in the oil producing country of Angola. We expect to find that in this period oil did not play any significant role in shaping U.S. foreign policy to African states.

The dissertation will also look at the impact of the 1973 oil shock in U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states. In October 1973, Middle Eastern oil producers put an embargo that lasted for five months on the United States and other European nations for their support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War. In addition to the embargo, Arab member countries of OPEC decided to cut oil production by twenty percent. The embargo and decline in oil output created a shortage of oil in the United States and increased the price of oil. To reduce its dependence on foreign oil, the United States increased domestic production and also diversified its oil sources. According to BP, Middle Eastern oil states produced about 36
percent of total world oil production in 1973\textsuperscript{10} and the embargo and decline in oil production had a significant impact on the United States. The United States was forced for the first time to devise an energy policy. Since 1973 represented a shift in U.S. energy policy, the study will also look at whether U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states changed in 1973.

\textit{Table 3.1: Major Oil Producers in Sub-Saharan Africa and the year they became a major exporter globally}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1989/1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{1990-2000: Rise of Democracy and Human Rights Promotion}

The second time period the study will look at will be between 1990 and 2000. The fall of Communism in 1990 opened the door for the United States to be engaged in democracy promotion programs throughout the world and the United States became more free “to promote democratic reform in Africa and to abandon authoritarian regimes that it had formerly supported to help combat communism” (Dobson & Marsh 2006: 165). In addition, democracy and human rights grew into globally accepted norms (Fukuyama 1992). After

\textsuperscript{10} Total world production was 58,456 thousand of barrels per day and the Middle East produces about 21,197 thousand of barrels per day.
1990, the United States made promotion of democracy an important element of its foreign policy. When foreign aid became part of U.S. foreign policy in the 1960’s, democracy was not considered a priority. Since the 1990’s, U.S. foreign aid dedicated to democracy promotion had increased dramatically and it also became a crucial part of its foreign aid program. For example, in 2007 the United States spent about $1 billion on democracy assistance in 50 countries excluding Iraq and Afghanistan (Mitchell & Phillips 2008, 18). It has been argued that democracy promotion and interest in oil are conflicting priorities. Thus, if oil influences U.S. foreign policy, we are less likely to see the United States promote democracy throughout African oil states, even though democracy promotion became a priority for the United States in this period.

2001 – Present: Global Rise in Energy Demands and War on Terror

The third time frame the study will look at will be 2001 to present. Two major issues have influenced U.S. foreign policy since then: rising energy demand (energy security) and the global war on terror. The United States was a victim of terrorist attacks in Africa long before the 9/11 attack with the bombing of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. United States anti-terrorism operations in Africa before 9/11 focused on the East African nations of Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Sudan. However, the 9/11 attack escalated the U.S. interests in anti-terror operations in the entire continent. The new phenomenon made other countries in Northern Africa and Sahel region more important
in the fight against terror. Countries such as Chad and Mali also became partners in the
global war on terror.

Energy security also became a priority in U.S. foreign policy and the Gulf of Guinea and
other African oil producers started to attract U.S. interest. Energy experts (Ploch 2009) have
indicated that as Africa’s exports of crude oil to the United States were almost equal to
those of the Middle East in 2007, the continent has become a strategic importance to the
United States.\(^\text{11}\) Walter Kansteiner, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, during a visit
to Nigeria in July 2002 also indicated that “African oil is of strategic national interest to us’,
…and it will increase and become more important as we go forward.”\(^\text{12}\) The statements
indicated that the Gulf of Guinea region possesses a strategic position for the United States in
achieving energy security by creating an alternative source of oil.

A preliminary study I conducted has indicated that U.S. energy interests and the global war
on terror in African oil states have no strong linkage. U.S. foreign policy towards oil
producing countries such as Nigeria was not significantly impacted by the global war on
terror. Even though there had been religious conflicts and tension in the country, policy
makers believed that Islamic radicalism was not associated with terrorism in Nigeria. As

\(^{11}\) Ploch is an Analyst in African Affairs at Congressional Research Service. This is taken from her 2009 report

\(^{12}\) Quote taken from Mike Crawley, ‘With Mideast uncertainty, US turns to Africa for oil’, Christian Science
Monitor, 23 May 2003.
Dagne (2002), a Specialist in International Relations Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division stated, “available accounts do not indicate that outside radical Islamic organizations are inciting sectarian violence within Nigeria” (Dagne 2002, 12). The absence of “global war on terror” as variable in African oil state will help in giving a clear argument about whether U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states is influenced exclusively by the presence of oil. In addition, it will be possible to see if the United States treats African oil and non-oil states differently mainly due to the presence of oil.

**Measurement Variables**

The independent variable for this study is the presence of oil in a particular state and the extent to which the United States perceives that oil could be vital to its energy security. Significance of oil in any country can be looked at in three different forms: known oil reserve, oil production, and oil export. For this study, the two factors that will be given weight are oil production and known oil reserves. Oil production and known oil reserves directly impact world oil supply and price and ultimately influence energy supply and price in the United States. A country is considered to be oil producer if it has a minimum production of 100,000 barrels/ day and when its primary export commodity is oil. The top oil producers in Sub-Saharan Africa also have the largest known oil reserves. Thus, there is no distinguishing between oil production and known oil reserve in identifying a country as an oil state.
As indicated above, oil has been one of the determinant factors influencing U.S. policy towards Middle East. For this study, oil is also expected to be a determinant factor that shapes U.S. foreign policy towards the Sub-Saharan African oil states. The United States does not necessarily look at all oil producers equally. Differences in current production, known reserves and export levels may influence U.S. policy. These factors will also be considered in assessing the importance of African oil to the world market and the United States.

Nigeria and Angola are the two largest oil producers in Sub-Saharan Africa, each producing over two million barrels per day. Sudan is third with 500 thousand barrels per day and Equatorial Guinea produces over 350 thousand barrels per day each. The rest of oil producers in Africa produce less than 200 thousand barrels per day. Nigeria has 37.2 billion barrels of proven oil and exports 40 percent of its oil to the U.S. In 2009, Angola produced more oil than Nigeria for the first time, but it has significantly less known oil reserve than Nigeria - about 9.5 billion barrels. Angola also exports about 35 percent of its production to the United States. Sudan has about 5 billion barrels reserve but does not export any oil to the United States. Equatorial Guinea has about 1.1 billion barrel reserve, and exports about 30 percent of its oil to the United States. Nigeria and Angola not only have large oil

production and known reserves, but they also export significant amounts of their oil to the United States. Though Gulf of Guinea countries produce trivial amounts of oil compared to the Middle East, they are attractive to United States due to the quality of oil, proximity to the United States, and off shore capabilities. Thus, we should expect United States to look at major oil producing countries such as Nigeria, Angola and Sudan in the same category while at the same time consider some of the smaller African countries strategically significant.

**Control Variables: Other Factors Influencing U.S. Foreign Policy**

In addition to oil, other factors may also influence U.S. foreign policy towards Africa. These other issues will be pointed out here as an indication that there are other potential factors that may have shaped U.S. foreign policy. Throughout the study, these factors will be considered to evaluate the extent to which they have influenced U.S. foreign policy. For example, when we looks at U.S. military assistance to Chad, which is considered an oil state, the study will evaluate if the military assistance was given to assist anti-terrorism operations or protect oil investments. However, as the study was set out to look at the influence of oil in U.S. foreign policy, the main independent variable that will be looked at will be presence of oil.

**U.S. Anti-terrorism Operations**
Since 2001, one of the main U.S. foreign policy goals has been combating Muslim extreme throughout the world, including Africa. U.S. anti-terrorism operations have impacted both U.S. diplomatic engagements and military assistance. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 1206, which came out in 2006, “mandates the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide assistance to foreign security forces to build and strengthen the capacity of these forces in counterterrorism operations” (Serafino 2012, 9). Even before this provision was passed, the Department of Defense was allowed to get fully involved in counter terrorism operations and the United States had anti-terrorism support in Africa prior to 2006. In 2002, the United States launched the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) to assist the Sahel countries in Africa in counter terrorism efforts. The Pan Sahel Initiative included Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania, and these countries received military aid targeted for counter terrorism operations. Other East African countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya also had received military assistance for anti-terrorism operation. This study will look at military aid as a component of foreign policy targeted for terrorism operations. The U.S. annual budget that is used in this study to evaluate military assistance clearly states when aid is targeted for counter terrorism efforts. For example, the US FY 05 budget clearly indicated that “U.S. interests in Chad are counter-terrorism, economic prosperity and security, environmental protection and mutual understanding,
promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights.”

15 The total U.S. budget for IMET training was $564,000 and it was meant to build important military-to-military contacts that help combat anti-U.S. influences in the country.

**U.S. Military Assistance for Regional Peace Keeping Operations**

Military training and equipment donation for peace keeping operations have been an integral part of U.S. foreign policy in the last two decades. In 1996, the United States started the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to providing military support in a form of training to develop regional military capabilities for peacekeeping. The program has trained 17,000 troops from nine African nations. The Bush Administration also started the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) as a multilateral, five-year program to train and equip 75,000 African soldiers for peacekeeping operations. The United States contributed $660 million from FY2005 to FY2009 for the GPOI initiative. As regional peace keeping programs influenced U.S. foreign policy and particularly military assistance, the study will at looked at these assistances to oil states. For example, in 2000, the U.S. provided $3.1 million military finance assistance to Nigeria and additional $8.4 million in 2002. Nigeria is an oil producing state; however, the military assistance the United States

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15 Budget of the United Stated Government FY 2005. Department of State Request by Region. P 266
given to the country was not due to its oil supply but support and strengthening the Nigerian army so that it is better equipped to respond to regional peacekeeping efforts.

**Domestic Factors within the U.S.**

The role of domestic actors in influencing U.S. foreign policy has been growing since the end of the Cold War. International and local non-profit agencies, human rights advocates and other transnational actors have been lobbying and shaping some aspects of U.S. foreign policy. The Christian Coalition representing the large majority of Evangelicals that voted for President George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 has been lobbying the Bush Administration on several issues ranging from Sudan to HIV/AIDS programs. The group help limit U.S. contribution to United Nation's Population Fund because of its work with groups that implement China's one-child-only policy and emphasis abstinence on U.S. AIDS program. One of the most noticeable activities of the group was its influence in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Sudan during the Bush Administration. Christian coalition leaders such as Franklin Graham and Senator Sam Brownback successfully lobbied George W. Bush so that the United States would take a tougher stand against the Bashir Administration for his prosecution of Christians in South Sudan. This study will consider whether factors like this have shaped U.S. foreign policy.
Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is U.S. foreign policy. Foreign policy constitutes several components. The study will focus on four of them. They are total foreign aid (including food aid and other development assistance), democracy assistance, diplomatic support and military assistance. The United States has used military as well as non-military support to prop up Middle Eastern authoritarian oil states to secure its economic and national security interests. Providing military assistance to an authoritarian regime has direct implications on democratization. Weak authoritarian regimes that receive foreign military assistance are more likely to increase suppression and plummet in democratization. On the other hand, through military aid, states can create some level of stability by increasing a state’s repressive capacity. Thus, the study will look at both military support and democracy assistance to analyze whether the United States uses military assistance in African oil states to strengthen non-democratic regimes or push for democratization. However, an essential element of the analysis of military aid will be looking at whether the assistance is directly tied to oil or if it could be explained by other internal or external factors such as strengthening of regional peace keeping forces or anti-terrorism efforts. In addition, the study will also look at non-military and non-democracy assistance such as diplomatic gestures to analyze if the United States adjusted its policy after a country became an oil exporter.
The dependent variables that the study will look at will also focus on the nature of U.S. foreign policy. While it is possible to look at the nature of the policy in some circumstances, it is also valuable to look at the extent. For example, when looking at training of military personnel, an accurate picture can only be revealed by looking at the magnitude and extent of the program. Training a small number of military personnel from Gabon might be significant due to its small size while it might be insignificant for large state such as Nigeria.

**U.S. Foreign Aid (Non Military Assistance)**

Foreign aid is considered an important instrument of U.S. foreign policy. It reflects priorities in U.S. foreign policy as well as weight the U.S. gives to a particular country. U.S. foreign aid programs can be broadly categorized into three areas - economic aid, humanitarian assistance, and multilateral assistance. Economic aid provides support for long term development and includes programs such as education and agriculture. Humanitarian support is mainly emergency assistance. Multilateral assistance supports activities in international organizations and work that the United States does with other nations. The data used in this study is also divided into these categories and looks at economic aid, humanitarian and military assistance separately.

Foreign aid has been used to demonstrate U.S. support to countries that are of strategic interest of the United States. As U.S. interests changed so has its foreign aid. Carothers

This study will also look at total foreign aid as well as specific foreign aid assistance such as U.S. Ex-Im Bank and Trade Capacity Building assistance. These forms of assistance indicate whether the United States has become interested in building its business relationship after oil becomes a major commodity in the country. If the study demonstrates an increase in U.S. non-military and non-democracy assistance after a country becomes an oil producer, then it will be possible to conclude that the United States has changed its policy and it intends to improve the relationship due to oil.

**Diplomatic Ties**

Direct and indirect diplomatic gestures also reflect U.S. foreign policy. Presidential or high level visits are considered indicators of U.S. commitment to specific countries. Dobson and
Marsh (2006) used Carter’s visit to Nigeria in 1977 (Dobson & Marsh 2006: 112) and Rothchild and Keller (2006) used Clinton’s Commerce Secretary Ron Brown’s visit to Senegal to show each administration’s commitment to African states. When Colin Powell visited Angola in 2002, he indicated the renewed interest of the Bush administration in Angola. President Bush’s visit to Nigeria the following year also indicated U.S. interests in strengthening the relationship between the two countries.

In order to look at diplomatic engagement, this study will examine events such as visits by high level U.S. dignitaries to each country, visits to Washington by African states’ diplomats and opening or closure of U.S. embassies or consulates. By looking at these indicators, the study will analyze if the U.S. interests in the country have changed over time due to an increase in oil production. If the study finds that high level U.S. delegations made increased visits to a country after a country becomes an oil producer, then it will be possible to conclude that the United States has changed its policy toward the country due to oil. An example of such events includes the re-opening U.S. Embassy in Equatorial Guinea in 2002 with a pressure from American oil companies which have large investments in the country. The move was done despite objection from human rights organizations on the basis of the country’s poor human rights record. The action reflected Washington’s interests in rebuilding its relations with Equatorial Guinea for its oil interests and a foreign policy that is purely based on energy concerns rather than human rights or democratic norms.
Sanctions have been used as an important foreign policy tool. The U.S. has deployed sanctions frequently to assert its leadership in world affairs. Examples of such actions are U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya. U.S.’s refusal to impose sanctions against South Africa during the apartheid era and the Byrd Amendment of 1971 that partially lifted UN mandated on American economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia reflected U.S. priority of economic interests over human rights (Schraeder 1994). In addition, U.S. relationship with South Africa during the apartheid period was based on economic interests. The fall of Siad Bare regime in 1991 and U.S. evacuation of its embassy personnel from Somalia (Dobson & Marsh 2006, 166; Rothchild and Keller 2006, 5) as well as passage of the National Security Revitalization Act by Congress illustrates the declining U.S. interests toward Africa (Also in Gordon, etal 1998).

Sanctions are also used as important tools to show disapproval of a regime. The current U.S. sanctions against Sudan over the Darfur genocide indicate that the United States is willing to consider human rights concerns over oil. The United States has not imported any oil from Sudan since production resumed in the late 1990’s. If the study finds that the U.S. imposes sanctions on a country that has oil, then it will be possible to conclude that U.S foreign policy toward that country is not necessarily influenced by oil. Examples of such analysis will include U.S.’s current foreign policy toward Sudan. In 2007, President Bush first imposed sanctions on Sudan due to north-south conflict and then the escalation of the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Despite the rise in Sudan’s oil production, the United States has forgone Sudan’s oil over human rights in the country.

**U.S. Democracy Assistance**

Direct financial support for democracy assistance reflects the level of U.S. commitment to promotion of democracy in a specific country. This study will evaluate U.S. foreign aid given for democracy programs. It will also look at democracy assistance proportional to total foreign aid within each country. If we see an increase in U.S. financial commitment for democracy programs after a country becomes an oil producer (in comparison with non-oil producer), the study will conclude that the United States is interested in promoting democracy in the country and such policy is not necessarily determined by oil. One example of such action would be U.S. democracy assistance to Angola which increased from zero in 1990 to about $2.8 million in 2004, reaching a peak of $5.4 million 1998. The United States increased its democracy assistance to Angola during the 1990’s when democracy and human rights norms were predominant. This was also a time period when Angola’s oil production increased. Thus, the U.S. commitment to democracy assistance to Angola confirms that U.S. policy makers do not think promoting democracy is inconsistent with energy security in Angola.
Examples of U.S. democracy assistance to non-oil countries include U.S. democracy programs to Mali which increased from zero in 1990 and to a high of $3.6 million in 1998 before declining to $1.6 million in 2004. On the other hand, the United States did not provide any financial assistance for democracy projects in Chad. Chad in the 1990’s did not have oil and as the U.S. did not have any energy interest, we should have seen the U.S. engaged in democracy promotion in Chad. However, the U.S. in 1994 actually closed its USAID office in Chad, impeding democracy and other assistances. The comparison between Chad and Mali confirms that U.S. did not necessarily discriminate against any state on democracy assistance based on its economic interests.

U.S. democracy assistance to Africa has increased dramatically since 1990 as well. In the early 1990’s the State Department established a major election aid fund for Africa in 1992. The African Regional Electoral Assistance Fund supported several elections in Africa. More than forty African countries in the 1990’s had received U.S. democracy aid; while, South Africa got the largest share, other recipient included Mozambique, Ethiopia, Zambia, Ghana, Mali, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, and Malawi (Carothers 2006, 41). Many of these countries were not oil producers as well. In the late 1990’s, U.S. democracy assistance shifted to assisting civil societies and freedom of media.
U.S. Military Assistance

The current U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and its maintenance of military bases overseas are some actions that have been used to indicate the level of U.S. military involvement and evaluate its foreign policy. U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain and now Iraq are used to show U.S. military involvement in Middle East (Randall, 2005; Learsy, 2005). U.S. military assistance to Israel is used to examine its foreign policy towards Israel as well (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). Caspar Weinberger in 1983 argued that the U.S. should maintain and expand military bases in friendly African states. Weinberger wanted to reinforce the argument that the United States should use its military to advance its foreign policy in Africa (Dobson & Marsh 2006, 112). The training of military personnel has been used to indicate U.S. favorable policy toward some African countries (Dobson & Marsh 2006, 168). U.S. direct military assistance during Reagan’s administration to support Chadian leader Habre with military advisers and $25 million of military aid is an example of military assistance that reflects particular foreign policy (Dobson & Marsh 2006, 115). U.S. establishment of Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) mission in Addis Ababa is another example that reflects U.S. foreign policy (Schraeder 1994, 119). These examples indicate how the United States has used direct military assistance to support regimes and countries in which it has economic or other geopolitical interests regardless of the country’s human rights records.
In addition to military support, this study will use withholding of support to evaluate U.S. foreign policy. An example of such policy would be Bush administration’s policy of threatening to withhold military aid from 35 countries that refused to sign and agree with the exemption of Americans from potential prosecution by the ICC (Rothchild and Keller, 2006).

Building on the literature, this study will evaluate U.S. foreign policy toward African oil states using four kinds of military support: military financing, military technical assistance, presence or extensive use of military bases and covert operations.

1. Military financing or donation of military equipment. The U.S. frequently uses military support to strengthen local governments and their ability to respond to domestic as well as regional threats. Using U.S. government’s annual military aid such as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program which is a mechanism through which U.S. government provides financing for sales of U.S. military equipment, this study will analyze U.S. foreign policy towards African oil and non-state. The level of U.S. military financial assistance also depends on other factors such as size of the country, strength of military force, level of economic development and extent of internal as well as external threat. Thus, when analyzing level of U.S. military assistance, the study will take into account these factors that can influence the level of U.S. military assistance. If there is an increase in military financing after a country becomes an oil exporter, then the study will conclude that the U.S.
has an increased interest in the country due to oil and there has been a change in policy. If there is a decrease or no change in military financing after a country becomes an oil exporter, then it is possible to conclude that U.S. foreign policy is not necessarily influenced by oil.

Examples of analysis the study will conduct and the conclusion that will be drawn are as follows. The U.S. in 1998 provided $1.5 million military assistance to Chad and the amount declined to an average of $400,000 for several years and increased to $1.8 million in 2006. The U.S. military assistance to Chad started before Chad became a major oil producer. The United States did not have any military financial assistance to Chad between 2003 and 2005 when Chad’s oil production increased. The high amount of military financial assistance before the country became an oil producer, declined when oil production increased shows that there is no direct relationship between U.S. military assistance and oil production in Chad. Thus, it is possible to conclude that U.S. foreign policy towards Chad was not necessarily determined by oil. However, it is important to note that U.S. military assistance to Chad might have been associated with other factors such as anti-terrorism programs in the region.

The U.S. provided $3.1 million military finance assistance to Nigeria in 2000. The amount increased to about $8.4 million in 2002 and then declined to $2.3 in 2005 and $724,000 in 2007. These changes in U.S. military financing assistance came long after Nigeria became
an oil producer. The changes in the military financing program shows that military aid and oil production might have no direct correlation in Nigeria. On the other hand, U.S. military assistance to Nigeria was tied to strengthening the Nigerian army so that it is better equipped to support regional peace keeping efforts.

2. Military technical assistance including training. In addition to financial commitment for military aid, the study will look into non-financial military support such as training of military personnel, military technical assistance as well as supply of military advisors or increase in military attachés in U.S. embassies. If there is an increase in U.S. military technical assistance after a country becomes an oil producer, then there is a change in U.S. foreign policy due to oil.

The U.S. military training is an integral part of the wider military aid program as instruction in the operation and maintenance of equipment is part of all weapons sales or grants. U.S. foreign military trainings programs are defined as “formal or informal instruction of foreign soldiers by officers or employees of the U.S. government or by private contractors authorized by the U.S. government. Training includes theory (book learning) as well as operational field instruction.”\(^\text{16}\) Informal trainings include visits of small mobile training teams, joint combined exercises of U.S. and foreign troops, deployments specially intended

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for training, and military unit exchanges. It is important to note that some of the informal training are difficult to quantify and may not necessarily be reported. For this study, the data used only records formal training. In recent years U.S. forces have been training approximately 100,000 foreign soldiers annually. These trainings took place in at least 150 institutions within the U.S. The trainings also took place overseas (Berrigan 2000).

Training programs have also been carried out under different initiatives to meet various military and policy goals. After the end of the Cold War, trainings in Africa and Latin America were given for peacekeeping and counter narcotics efforts. New initiatives such as African Crisis Response Initiative and Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) were created in response to specific regional threats. Other programs included “U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare School in Ft. Bragg, NC, the Asia-Pacific and the African Centers for Strategic Studies” (Lumpe 2002, 3).

Since 2001, antiterrorism operations have also been used as a justification for military trainings. After 9/11, Congress established a new regional counterterrorism fellowship program to fund training of foreign officers at U.S. military institutions. Such initiatives also provided a loophole as it allowed individuals from undemocratic regimes to get training. For example, through this program “Indonesian officers— banned by a separate act of Congress from receiving other forms of military training due to the Indonesian Army’s egregious
human rights record” (Lumpe 2002, i) were allowed to receive training from the U.S. military.

In order to conduct the analysis, the study will also look at initiatives such as Professional Training of African Military Officers program through which the United States provides military training to senior officials from Africa. Through this program, the United States did not train any individual from Equatorial Guinea in 2005; however, in 2006 it trained 38 individuals and in 2007, it trained 42. The rise in number of trainees from Equatorial Guinea indicates growing U.S. interest in the country after U.S. oil imports from the country increased. Another example is U.S.’s naval activity in Gulf of Guinea. In 2005, the U.S. Navy conducted a two-month Gulf of Guinea Deployment program in Douala, Cameroon; Port Gentil, Gabon; and Sekondi, Ghana. This action reflects an increased importance of Cameroon and Gabon to the U.S. and development of positive working relationship between the U.S. and these countries.

3. Presence of U.S. military base: Another strong indicator of U.S. foreign policy towards a country is presence of U.S. military base. The U.S. opens a military base in a particular country after it has strategic geopolitical or economic interests. If the U.S. establishes its own military base, make an extensive use of local military base or show strong interest in creating military base after a country becomes a major oil exporter, then it is possible to conclude that the U.S. policy has changed due to oil.
4. Use of indirect or covert operation to support or remove regimes. The United States had been involved in direct as well as indirect covert operations to install regimes it wanted or remove regimes that it disliked. Such operations are tied to U.S. interests. If we see the United States get involved in a direct or indirect covert operation in a country which has significant oil, then it is possible to conclude that the U.S. foreign policy is influenced by oil.

Case Selection

King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) indicated that qualitative research that measures differences in variables and looks at a small number of cases can be categorized as small N methodology. Small N method is conducted by selecting cases based on independent variables. Selection of cases is “done in an intentional fashion, consistent with research objectives and strategy” (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p.139). This study uses most similar systems method which selects cases that take on similar values of confounding variables, but different values of a key independent variable - in this case, the presence or absence of oil. Lijphart (1971) argued that the small N method can be enhanced by reducing the number of variables and increasing the number of cases. Thus, the study will limit the number of variables but use selected number of cases.
There are currently eleven major oil producing countries in Africa of which eight are in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Sub-Saharan African oil producing countries are Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and Sudan. Northern African oil producers include Libya, Algeria and Egypt. This study focuses only on Sub-Saharan African countries. Sub-Saharan Africa is considered different than other regions of the developing world. Its history, demography, geopolitical significance and economic development are different from developing regions, including those that are oil producing such as Middle East or Asia. Furthermore, North African oil producing countries have some difference from Sub-Saharan African countries and thus are not included in the study. The main reasons that North African countries are not included in the study are:

1. Traditionally, U.S. foreign policy towards Middle East has included North African countries and particularly Egypt. U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt has been shaped by several factors including the Israeli and the Palestinian issue. As the U.S. policy towards Egypt is heavily influenced by factors other than oil or economic interests, to include Egypt in the study would make it difficult to isolate the variable that is shaping U.S. foreign policy.

2. Another major factor that has influenced U.S. foreign policy towards North African countries has been terrorism. However, it is important to note that U.S. policy towards these countries particularly Algeria and Libya on the issues of terrorism was devised long before 9/11. Though Libya is currently the largest oil producer in Africa, including it and Algeria in
this study will not only demand that this work be broadened but requires a different theoretical basis.

Sudan is sometimes categorized as a non-Sub-Saharan African Country. However, it has been selected to be included in this study for two reasons. The U.S. State Department has Sudan as part of Sub-Saharan African. In addition, the current U.S. policy toward the country is unique as the United States has been aggressively pushing for respect of human rights and democratic reforms, including it in the study would strengthen the argument presented in the study.

Case Selection

This study will be done through a comparison of oil states and non-oil states. All of oil states in Sub-Saharan Africa will be included in the study as well as eight non-oil states. The eight non-oil Sub-Saharan African states have comparable political, social and economic features as the oil states. In order to compare the political environment of these countries, the study uses Freedom House ratings. The political and civil liberties index will be used to identify states that have similar political environment. As most of the Sub-Saharan African oil states are rated Not Free, the study has picked non-oil states that are rated as Not Free or Partly Free. In order to identify countries with similar economic
features, GDP/Capita and other human development index will be used. However, as many African oil states have relatively higher GDP/Capita compared to non-oil states, it would not be possible to find countries that have comparable GDP. On the other hand, human development index and GDP growth can substitute the skewed comparison created by GDP/Capita. Almost all of the oil and non-oil states have comparable infant mortality rate and life expectancy. For example, Angola, an oil producing state, despite having a higher GDP/capita than all of the nonoil states, has the lowest life expectancy and highest infant mortality rate. Thus, it will be possible to identify countries that have similar feature. One other factor that is looked at in this study is religion. Mali and Niger have a large Muslim population and including them in the study can strengthen the argument by taking non-economic factors into consideration. The U.S. Pan-Sahel antiterrorism initiative also includes Mali, Niger and Chad. By conducting a comparative analysis of U.S. policy including these states, the study will be able to see if oil has influenced U.S policy toward African oil states of if it was influenced by other factors such as fear of Islamist terrorist groups.
Table 3.2: Political, Economic and HDI indicators of case countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Indicators/ Freedom House*</th>
<th>Economic Indicators</th>
<th>Human Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Right (0-40)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Civil Liberties (0-60)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Combined Average Indicator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Dem. Rep.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Rep.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote D'Ivoire</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
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<td>Gambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Data from Freedom House indicators
** Date from World Bank Development Indicators
*** Data from the CIA fact book
CHAPTER IV:
OVERVIEW OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICAN OIL AND NON-OIL STATES

Introduction

This chapter provides a broad overview of U.S. foreign policy towards sixteen African countries. U.S. foreign policy will be evaluated by looking at foreign aid, democracy assistance, diplomatic engagement and military assistance. The analysis will be done through quantitative analysis of financial contribution the United States has made to each country. Diplomatic gestures will be evaluated by looking at visits of key political figures from the United States and vice versa. The chapter will then conclude by providing an overall assessment of U.S. foreign policy and identifying countries that merit further study.

A. U.S. Foreign Aid (Non-Military, Non-Democracy Assistance)

A.1 U.S. Foreign Aid to Africa (non-trade assistance)

The United States has been providing aid to Africa since the independence of many African states in the 1960s. U.S aid to Africa has grown substantially since then. The United States in 1970 gave a total of $200 million for Sub-Saharan African countries; by 2008 U.S.
foreign aid reached $7.5 billion.\textsuperscript{17} U.S. aid did not show a constant growth but has fluctuated throughout time. In the mid-1990s, aid declined to $1.5 billion from about $2.3 billion in 1992. This shift was attributed to changes in U.S. foreign policy priority to Eastern Europe and Latin America countries as well as the declining significance of Africa to the United States. Foreign aid to Africa then showed a dramatic increase under the Bush Administration and reached over 7 billion dollars annually by 2008.

U.S. foreign aid has also changed in structure and sector as well. In the 1960s and 70s foreign aid focused on providing technical and development assistance in agriculture and education. In the 1980s, the bulk of U.S. foreign aid went to food aid and other emergency assistance. In the 1990s, aid again shifted with a change in the international norm and it focused on governance, democracy assistance and post conflict reconstruction. Since the turn of the century, emergency assistances and food aid have again dominated aid. With 9/11, the global war on terror and other antiterrorism efforts were also added to foreign aid programs in Africa. However, anti-terrorism programs remained marginal compared to total foreign aid. Military assistance (including antiterrorism programs) in 2007 was less than 5% of total U.S foreign aid to Africa.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{17} Data reconstructed from U.S. Foreign Aid - Green Book. Both figures represent historic data. In constant 2007 data the 1970 figure is 885 Million.
\textsuperscript{18} Total foreign aid (including military assistance) was 7.5 billion while total military assistance was 396 million
Data from the selected sixteen case countries reflects trends characteristic of overall U.S. foreign aid to Africa. After sudden increase in the early 1960s, U.S. aid declined in the 1970s and then showed a dramatic increase in the early 1980s. The spike was due to food aid given to Ethiopia and Sudan for the 1984-85 famine. U.S. aid again declined in mid 1990s with an overall U.S. government budget cut and then showed a sharp increase after 2000 when the Bush Administration increased humanitarian assistance. Since the early 1960s, Sudan has been one of the largest total non-military foreign aid recipients in Africa. The other top recipients from both oil and non-oil states in the last ten years have been Ethiopia, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Mozambique.

Figure 4.1: Total U.S. Economic Assistance for selected Sub-Saharan African countries 1960-2008
Total aid in thousands, constant 2007 SUS
These countries that have received the most significant foreign aid also have several key characteristics in common. They have large geographical size as well as population. While Sudan is the largest country in Africa; Congo and Nigeria are also ranked in the top eight in their geographical size. Besides their size, Nigeria with 150 million and Ethiopia with 80 million people are the two most populated countries in the continent. Ethiopia and Nigeria are also considered regional powers because of their military strength and ability to influence regional politics. Nigeria had been active in West African peace keeping operations while Ethiopia has contributed military force to UN and African Union operations in Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan (Darfur) and Somalia. Both countries have been close partners of the United States in its global war on terror. Congo is also significant due to its geopolitical influence in central Africa as it neighbors eleven countries. Instability in Congo has been directly linked to destabilization in neighboring countries such as Uganda and Rwanda. Nigeria and Angola are also considered significant due to their oil resources.

Sudan has been one of the largest U.S. foreign aid recipients. In 2008 alone, it received over 900 million dollars. U.S. aid to Sudan was dominated by two main operations: humanitarian aid and multilateral assistance which was also used to cover international peace programs. U.S. contribution to U.N. operations, food aid and disaster assistance combined account for 75% of the total aid since 2004. Economic support funds which were not part of the overall humanitarian assistance accounted only for 10% of total foreign aid in 2007. Sudan, on the other hand, did not receive any military assistance since the early 1970s.
When U.S. foreign aid is compared against GDP of the recipient country, Mali emerges as the largest U.S. foreign aid recipient per GDP. For example, U.S. aid to Mali equaled 22% of the country’s GDP in 2007. The second largest recipient per GDP was Mozambique with 6.4% followed by Democratic Republic of Congo with 3.4% and Ethiopia with 2.4%. All four of the highest aid recipients in terms of aid/GDP are non-oil producers.

A.2 U.S. Trade Assistance

The U.S. Export Import (Ex-Im) Bank provides loans to risky developing countries that are considered financially and politically unstable. Ex-Im Bank’s involvement in Africa was limited until the early 1970s. Only a few countries, namely Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia, received assistance in the 1960s. In the 1970s, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon and Sudan started to receive assistance. Democratic Republic of Congo received over $400 million in 1974 which was the largest amount by then. Democratic Republic of Congo has not received loan since 1980. Sudan had not received any assistance since 1974 and Ethiopia since 1979 due to changes of governments in both countries.

Starting in the mid-1970s Ex-Im Bank started to provide loan to oil producing countries such as Gabon, Cameroon and Angola. Gabon got 28 million dollars in 1995, Cameroon $154 million in 1974, and Angola got $191 million in 1980. However, Ex-Im Bank loan
has been dominated by Nigeria which has received one third of the total loan amount from the sixteen countries between 1960 and 2007. In those years, the Ex-Im Bank provided a total assistance of 2.9 billion dollars and Nigeria received over 1 billion dollars. Angola was second largest recipient with $508 million dollars. U.S. Ex-Im Bank assistance to Africa has been declining since the 1980s. It decline from a high of $848 million in 1981 to zero in 1994. Between 1994 and 2007, the Ex-Im Bank provided a total of 80 million dollars to the sixteen case countries.

A.3 U.S. Trade Capacity Building Assistance

In 1990, the United States initiated a new program to provide technical assistance in international trade. The goal of this program is to provide assistance to developing countries so that these countries can better integrate with the world make and expand their economy and thus create jobs and reduce poverty. From the selected case countries, eight countries including all the oil producers have received assistance for five or more years since 1999. The largest recipient to date has been Mozambique, followed by Mali and Ethiopia. Nigeria and Angola, both oil producers, has also received noticeable amount. Nigeria has received over $32 million and Angola over $8 million total between 1999 and 2007, but both figures are trivial when compared to what Mali and Mozambique has received. Three of the top five trade assistance recipients were non-oil producers.
Table 4.1: United States Trade Capacity Building Assistance by Country ($US in thousands)\(^{19}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>1,338</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>4,150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>104</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>21,745</td>
<td>11,920</td>
<td>7,409</td>
<td>6,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>272</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4,721</td>
<td>6,915</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td>3,932</td>
<td>14,518</td>
<td>7,095</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>137,579</td>
<td>1,115</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>8,352</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>9,171</td>
<td>2,024</td>
<td>13,201</td>
<td>11,536</td>
<td>6,449</td>
<td>6,608</td>
<td>224,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,143</td>
<td>6,956</td>
<td>6,891</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>9,734</td>
<td>5,822</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>1,965</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>1,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sudan, which has been placed under economic sanctions by the U.S, has also received assistance through the Trade Capacity Building Assistance program. U.S. assistance to Sudan poses a particular puzzle about U.S. foreign policy towards the country. Though the goal of the U.S. trade capacity building program is to assist developing countries become

\(^{19}\) Source: The USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services (EADS)
more integrated into the international business environment, it is also intended to help U.S. companies do business in Africa. The U.S., while placing sanctions on Sudan and prohibiting U.S. companies from doing business or investing in Sudan, has in return provided trade assistance. This is an eccentric act that requires further study and will be investigated later on in this study.

A.4 Analysis of U.S. foreign Aid to Africa

The United States uses foreign aid to achieve its economic and political interests. A brief examination of U.S. foreign aid to African oil and non-oil states indicates that the United States does not necessarily provide any significant attention to oil states when it designates foreign aid. During the Cold War, the United States provided significant foreign aid to countries it considered strategic to its political objectives. Countries such as Ethiopia and Congo received sizeable foreign aid for their close collaboration with the United States. Strong favoritism to these countries was given based on political consideration rather than economic interest. During the same period of time, countries such as Angola, which supplied oil to the United States, received no foreign aid. Nigeria also received significantly less aid than non-oil states such as Ethiopia. Though the United States did not give direct foreign aid to countries that would potentially provide economic benefit, it provided large amounts of loan guarantees the through Ex-Im Bank. Nigeria was the largest Ex-Im Bank beneficiary, and other oil states such as Gabon and Cameroon also received loan guarantees.
The brief analysis of U.S. foreign aid to Africa between 1960 and 2008 indicates that several key countries consistently benefited more than other countries. These countries were Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Mali. Aid given to each country also fluctuated over time. The changes in foreign aid had occurred mainly due to changes in the domestic regime in each country. A significant conclusion that can be made from this observation is that countries that provide energy security or oil to the United States did not necessarily attract special attention.

B. Democracy Assistance

B.1 U.S. democracy Assistance to Africa

As expected, total U.S. democracy assistance to the sixteen case study countries shows an increase in funding since the early 1990s. However, assistance has been dominated by a few countries. In the early 1990s, Angola was the highest recipient and it received over 4 million dollars in 1992 alone. Aid to Mozambique then became higher than Angola. Mozambique in 1994 received over 10 million dollars. Ethiopia during the same year also received over 5 million dollars. Since 1998, democracy assistance given to Nigeria was the largest and it increased from less than $2 million in 1997 to the high of $16 million in 2003. Democratic
Republic of Congo also received over $8 million in 1999. Democracy assistance to Sudan also increased from zero in 2001 to about $9 million in 2003.

**Figure 4.2: US Democracy and Governance Assistance**

*Source: Cross-National Research on USAID’s Democracy and Governance Programs Finkel, Green, Pérez-Liñán, Seligson, and Tate.*

Two important observations can be made from the trend in U.S. democracy assistance. First, three of the largest oil producers had received significant democracy assistance from the United States. Between 1998 and 2003, Nigeria was the largest democracy assistance recipient and it received a total of 50 million dollars. Angola received over 4 million dollars each in 1992 and 1993 and an additional 30 million dollars between 1996 and 2004. Sudan, which did not receive any assistance until 2001, received over 9 million dollars in 2002 and 2003. In 2004, Sudan became the largest recipient with over 6 million dollars. Democracy assistance to Sudan largely went to north-south peace negotiations. From non-oil countries,
the largest aid recipients were Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique. Between 1993 and 1996, Mozambique was the largest recipient and in 1994 it received over 10 million dollars.

The second observation is that democracy assistance seems to follow domestic politics in the recipient country as well. When all the countries (oil and non-oil) received democracy assistance, they were going through major political changes. Angola in the early 1990s was coming out of civil war. Ethiopia also had a change of leadership and the new government was writing constitution and conducting local and national elections. Congo had ousted Sese Seko and replaced him with Kabila. Nigeria was also conducting a major election after years of military leadership. Sudan was going through peace negotiation to end the North – South conflict. Therefore, what we see in these cases is that the United States increases assistance for transitions to democracy. Even though these were not the only African countries going through democratic and post conflict transition, they were countries that received significant U.S. assistances.

**B.2 Analysis of U.S. Democracy to Africa**

U.S. democracy assistance to Africa should be looked at in light of its broader foreign policy objectives since 1990. As democracy promotion was not an essential element of its foreign policy during the Cold War, the United States did not give democracy any precedence
during that time. Similar to its foreign aid programs, a few nations also emerge as countries
that have received substantial aid in democracy assistance from the United States. These
countries are Nigeria, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan and Angola. Between 1990 and
2004, Nigeria and Congo received over three hundred million dollars each. During the same
period, Angola received over 250 million dollars, and Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan
over 100 million dollars each. As these countries are both oil and non-oil states, it is possible
to conclude that U.S. did not make any special distinction in democracy assistance based on
presence of oil.

It has been argued that when the United States has economic and security interests, it
frequently forgoes democracy and human rights agenda for its other priorities. Based on this
assumption, we should not have seen large democracy assistance in African oil states.
However, in three of the largest oil producers in Sub-Saharan Africa, the United States has
been active in democracy promotion programs. U.S. democracy assistance to Sudan also
indicates that the United States does not necessarily compromise its principles for energy
concern, as the U.S. democracy assistance to Sudan increased during the same time the
country started to produce oil.

Changes in U.S. foreign policy to push democracy and human rights begun in the early
1990s after these ideas became globally accepted norms. Did the United States start to push
these reforms following the global trend or did U.S. policy makers start to believe that
democracy is the best way to maintain security, peace and stability in oil states? The
changes in U.S. foreign policy can be attributed to both.

C. Diplomatic Engagement

Looking at United States diplomatic relationships with other countries illuminates the
political or economic priorities the United States has for that particular country. In addition
to establishing embassies or consulates, countries build their diplomatic relationships
through official visits of high level delegates, including presidents or secretaries of state. In
this section, the study will evaluate U.S. diplomatic engagement with the selected case
studies by looking at visits by U.S. presidents as well as secretaries of state to African states
and African presidents’ visits to the United States.

C.1 Presidential visits

U.S. presidents choose what African countries to visit based on several factors. President
Obama indicated that he chose Ghana as his first African country to visit “to ‘highlight’ its
adherence to democratic principles and institutions, ensuring the kind of stability that
brings prosperity.”20 George W. Bush in 2003 indicated that his trip to Africa was “to
demonstrate that U.S. is not neglecting the welfare of the world's poor while waging the

Clinton emphasized countries that have shown democratic and economic development when choosing which countries to visit.

From the selected case countries, Nigeria was the most visited state by any U.S. president in Sub-Saharan Africa. Carter was the first president to visit Nigeria in 1978 and Clinton and George W. Bush both visited the country since then. Though all three presidents had indicated the importance of Nigeria to the United States and to regional stability during their visits, energy interest was not mentioned as a priority for their trip. Bill Clinton left out Nigeria during his first trip in 1998 due to the repressive nature of the Sani Abacha regime, and only visited it in 2000 after elections and transition to civilian rule. Though his visit had economic implications with the inclusion of several business executives in his trip, he also indicated that his trip was “to highlight and support Nigeria's democratic experiment, which resulted in the 1999 election of civilian President Olusegun Obasanjo after 15 years of military rule.” Clinton also stated that "If democracy takes root in Nigeria it will lift up an entire region," During a meeting with Nigerian and American business leaders, Clinton also “warned that debt relief will only come once the country has demonstrated that it will not continue to fritter away oil revenues and will invest the

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23 Ibid
savings from debt relief wisely.”24 Such statements reflect that Clinton was also interested in promoting democracy, transparency and good governance in Nigeria. No other oil producing country besides Nigeria had been visited by a U.S. president while in office.

The majority of the countries visited by U.S presidents were chosen for their exemplary progress in democracy or economic and human development rather than economic benefit to the United States. Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama all chose countries such as Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda and Botswana to show and highlight the significant progress these countries have made in democracy as well as human development and the contribution U.S. foreign aid has made in these developments.

Table 4.2: U.S. Presidential Visits to Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>June 12-14, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4-Jan-78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria and Liberia</td>
<td>March 31-April 4, 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>March 7-10, 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria and Liberia</td>
<td>March 31-April 4, 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>November 22-23, 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2-Jan-93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana and Senegal</td>
<td>Mar-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria, Tanzania, Egypt</td>
<td>August 26-28, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>Senegal, South Africa, Botswana, Uganda and Nigeria</td>
<td>9-Jul-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt, Benin, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana and Liberia</td>
<td>Feb. 15-12, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>16-May-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>09-June-09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Constructed from White House Archives

C.2 Visits by Secretaries of State

Several U.S. Secretaries of State have visited Africa since William Roger made his first trip in 1970. Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo are the two most visited countries with five visits to each country by different Secretaries of State. However, Henry Kissinger visited Congo twice in 1976 to discuss the new found collaboration between the two countries and discuss issues ranging from Angola to Zimbabwe. Other countries with high
rate of visits were Angola, Ethiopia and Mali, each country was visited by three different Secretaries of State.

While presidents make a diplomatic statement during their visits, Secretaries of States are usually left to do the hard political arm twisting and difficult negotiations. When former Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Africa in May 2001, he openly criticized repressive regimes and “shocked the continent with his calls for the ‘big men’ who cling to power at all costs to step aside.” 25 He also called for “African heads of state to come out and openly declare AIDS a crisis caused by sex that requires self-control, condoms, abstinence and monogamy to be defeated.” 26

C.3 African Head of States Visits to the U.S.

Nigeria tops the list with the most frequent presidential visits to the United States. Different Nigerian presidents have made a total of thirteen visits to the United States since 1977 and eight of the visits came from President Obasanjo. General Sani Abacha who had ruled Nigeria from 1993 to 1998 and was well known for his human rights violations was not

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26 Ibid
welcomed to the United States and he did not make any official visit. Following Nigeria, two different presidents from the Democratic Republic of Congo had a total of nine visits. Mobutu Sese Seko who was also known for corruption and human rights abuse had a warm relationship with the United States, particularly the Reagan administration. He made four different trips during the Reagan and George H. Bush administration. Mobutu’s relationship with Clinton was lukewarm and he did not make any visit to the U.S. during Clinton’s presidency. President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique also made five different trips to the United States and President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola made three trips to the White House (see Annex II for complete list).

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia who had a close relationship with the United States made five visits and the communist leader Mengistu did not visit the United State at all. Meles Zenawi who replaced Mengistu made three different visits. When different U.S. administrations are compared, the number of African leaders who visited the White House during the Clinton years was small. From the selected case study countries, five presidents visited the White House between 1992 and 2000 and they were dos Santos (Angola), Patasse (Central Africa Republic), Zenawi (Ethiopia), Konare (Mali) and Obasanjo (Nigeria). Dictators such as President Bongo of Gabon were absent from the White House between 1987 and 2004. The pattern of African head of state visits to the United States reflects U.S. political interests. During the Cold War, the U.S. welcomed leaders such as
Mobutu Sese Seko which it considered an ally and in the post-Cold War period, the U.S. avoided open interaction with known human rights violators.

C.5 Analysis of U.S. diplomatic engagement with African States

U.S. diplomatic engagement with African leaders reflects its wider international policy goals. During the Cold War, the United States constructed a close relationship with pro-Western regimes and distanced itself from countries that looked pro-Soviet or antagonistic towards the United States. Frequent visits by leaders such as Mobutu Sese Seko and Haile Selassie confirm this hypothesis. In the post-Cold War period, U.S. diplomatic engagements in Africa were influenced more by democratic principles and international politics than energy interests. After the end of the Cold War, known human rights violators were clearly not welcomed to the White House. Mobutu and Sani Abacha of Nigeria were absent from the White House during the Clinton presidency. On the other hand, countries with no strategic significance but that have made progress in moving towards democracy were rewarded. President Alpha Oumar Konare of Mali is one example, and he was welcomed to the White House. U.S. presidential visits to Africa have also been determined based on the country’s political as well as economic progress. In the post 1990 period, U.S. presidents avoided senior level diplomatic engagement with countries that have appalling human right records despite their economic significance (Clinton avoiding Nigeria in 1998 visit to
Africa). U.S. presidents clearly indicated that their criteria for choosing a country were political and economic progress.

U.S. diplomatic engagement has been again dominated by the few countries that have also dominated U.S. foreign aid and democracy assistance. Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and Mali dominated U.S. engagement over time. The only country that had received significant aid but not diplomatic attention was Mozambique.

D. Military Assistance

D.1 Military Equipment Financing

U.S. military financial assistance programs include assistance through Military Assistance Program (MAP) Grants, International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing Program, Foreign Military Financing and Direct Loan Program Account. Since the early 1960s, U.S. military assistance to Africa has been dominated by a few large countries such as Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia. While Congo and Ethiopia each have received over 200 million dollars in the last forty years, Sudan had received over 900 million dollars (including assistance given to UN peace keeping operations).
Until 1977, Ethiopia was the largest military assistant recipient followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo. During the same period the United States was building its relationship with Mobutu Sese Seko in Congo, providing considerable military assistance to help Mobutu strengthen his power. In the early 1980s U.S. assistance to Sudan also escalated and it reached over 194 million in 1983. U.S. military assistance to Sudan then was dominated by direct military financing. From 1990 to 2004, Sudan did not receive any assistance from the U.S. In 2004, U.S. military aid to Sudan escalated to the highest level to any African country. However, the entire military assistance to Sudan went to UN peace keeping operations since 2001.
D.2 Military Training

Similar to overall military aid, military training assistance was also dominated by a few large countries – Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. Starting in the early 1960s, Ethiopia received the largest portion of military training and in 1967 alone it received close to 10 million dollars for military training. Military training aid to Ethiopia went to nil in 1978 after the country fell under communism. Starting from 1970, military training aid to Democratic Republic of Congo also increased and Congo was the largest recipient after assistance to Ethiopia stopped. Congo in 1979 received over 7 million dollars. Between 1982 and 1985, Sudan was the largest recipient for military training and it received over 2 million dollars annually. Military training aid to Sudan then ceased in 1990. Starting from 1992, military training assistance to Africa declined and total aid given to the sixteen case countries was no more than a million dollars annually.
D.3 Analysis of U.S. Military Assistance to Africa

U.S. military financing and training assistance to Africa since the 1960s has been dominated by a few states. These few states are Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia. The oil states such as Nigeria and Angola, which dominated U.S. foreign aid, democracy assistance and diplomatic engagement, did not receive significant military assistance compared to the three non-oil states. On the other hand, countries that received large foreign aid or diplomatic attention, such as Mozambique, and Mali did not receive major military aid. Brief evaluation of U.S. military assistance to Africa indicates that military assistance was influenced by international politics and domestic politics within the African states. Similar to its diplomatic engagement and foreign aid, U.S. military assistance during the Cold War favored pro-Western regimes regardless of the nature of the government and
economic significance to the United States. Congo, which was ruled by the ruthless regime of Mobutu, received significant assistance. Ethiopia, when it had pro-Western regime, also received large assistance. Sudan during the time it had Western friendly leader also received large military aid. When these countries, particularly Sudan and Ethiopia, were taken over by anti-Western leaders, military aid ended.

In the post-Cold War period, U.S. overall military assistance to all African countries declined. As the United States moved to democracy promotion and helping countries move towards peaceful transition, it limited its military assistance. In addition, as the Cold War ended, it gave little weight for active military support. U.S. military support to African countries in the 1990s was dominated by a will to create a regional military force that would be capable of responding to crisis in Africa. In line with this policy, the United States had provided military support to countries such as Nigeria and Ethiopia to build regional response units.

U.S. military assistance to oil and non-oil state reveals that oil states did not receive any preference over non-oil states. Large oil states such as Nigeria and Angola did not receive significant military assistance compared to non-oil states such as Ethiopia and Congo. On the other hand, Sudan was the only oil state that received substantial aid. However, it did not provide any direct benefit to the United States as the U.S. has sanctions against Sudan.
A comparison between oil and non-oil states also does not show any pattern. While oil states such as Angola received modest support, non-oil states such as Niger and Guinea received large amounts of assistance compared to Angola. Military assistance given to Nigeria, the largest oil producer, was not proportional to its size, economic, and other geopolitical significance. Another oil state, Cameroon, had received aid which was almost equal to Nigeria. Chad, another oil producer, was the second largest recipient in 2005. Significant military training assistance to Chad and Niger between 2004 and 2007 was attributed to support anti-terrorism efforts rather than secure U.S. energy interests.

E. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter provided an overall assessment of U.S. foreign policy towards selected African states starting the 1960s. The evaluation was done using U.S. foreign aid, democracy assistance, diplomatic engagement and military assistance. The study also included a comparison of foreign policies between oil and non-oil states. The study revealed some important characteristics of U.S. foreign policy toward the sixteen case countries. Some of these findings are:

- Foreign aid, democracy assistance and military assistance have been dominated by a few large states including both oil and non-oil states. These states were Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Ethiopia and Mozambique. In addition Mali also stands out in terms of diplomatic engagement.

- The common factors seen in these states are
  - They are all large in size and population and have geopolitical significance to the United States.
- Aid to these states also fluctuated with changes in international politics and domestic politics within each state.
  - When a country has pro-U.S. government, aid increase and when the country has anti-U.S. government, aid decrease or cease. (with the exception of Sudan)

Looking at the findings from these analyses, the preliminary conclusions that can be made from the study are that:

- **There is no clear indication that United States foreign policy is different towards oil vs. non-oil states or that the presence of oil has consistently influenced U.S. foreign policy.**
- **The United States does not necessarily abandon its democratic principles when dealing with African oil states.**
- **The presence of oil does not cause United States to stop support for democracy.**
- **The United States does not increase military and foreign aid to an oil producing country.**
In order to further analyze these findings, a qualitative study of the countries that consistently emerge as countries that have attracted U.S. foreign policy will be studied. By paring oil and non-oil states and further going in-depth into U.S. foreign policies to these countries, the study will be able to further evaluate the findings. The countries that will be paired for further study are Angola with Congo and Sudan with Ethiopia. These countries are paired because of their similarities in political, economic and human development, with the exception of the presence of oil in Angola and Sudan. In addition, as the paired countries are neighbors, their politics are influenced by each other. U.S. foreign policy towards each of the countries is also influenced by the regional politics as well as each other. For example, the United States wanted to establish a closer relationship with Sudan in the mid-1970s once Ethiopia became a communist country and the U.S. needed an ally in the Horn of Africa. The United States also used its close relationship with Congo to aid Angola rebel groups in the 1980s. The interconnection of these regional politics and U.S. geopolitical interest in the different part of the regions allow strengthen the logical argument for the paired case studies.

**Foreign Policy during the Cold War**

U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was based on its geopolitical interests and the friendliness of a given African regime towards the United States. The United States established close relationships with countries such as Congo and Ethiopia based on
geopolitical interest. It also had a positive relationship with Sudan when the country had a pro-Western regime. During the same period of time, it had a lukewarm relationship with Nigeria and no diplomatic relationship with Angola. However, it had an ongoing economic relationship with both countries and allowed U.S. companies to invest in the oil sector in the countries as well as import oil from the countries. United States relationship with Nigeria and Angola reflects the fact that it left out any political interference in its business dealings. If United States was concerned about energy security, we should have seen it prioritize building positive relationship with Nigeria and Angola. In addition, we should have seen the United States recognize the MPLA leadership in Angola and work with it. However, what we had seen in U.S. foreign policy towards African prior to 1990 was a policy based on a Cold War mentality and other geopolitical interest rather than energy security or oil.

**Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period**

This study is based on the theoretical assumption that the United States would not advocate democratic reform in oil states. However, what we have seen since 1990 is that the United States became committed to democracy promotion and human rights in oil states as well non-oil states. Since 1990, the United States has been engaged in democracy promotion and human rights in three of the largest oil states – Nigeria, Angola and Sudan. In addition, it had limited diplomatic engagement with Nigeria and Sudan when they were under dictatorships. The United States distanced itself when Nigeria was ruled by the dictatorial
regime of Sani Abacha, and the White House became diplomatically engaged in Nigeria after it had democratic elections and transited to civilian administration. In Sudan, the United States refused to work with the repressive regime of Bashir and put economic sanctions on the country. Though the United States has been giving economic and other assistance to Sudan, it has sought to assure that no assistance benefit the Bashir administration.

The largest U.S. foreign aid (non-humanitarian) and military assistance since 1990 has been going to non-oil states such as Ethiopia, Mozambique and Democratic Republic of Congo. Mali has also been one of the countries that have received the most diplomatic recognition. If U.S. foreign policy is made based on energy interests, the fact that Congo, Mozambique and Mali that received significant attention from the United States contradicts the argument. Indeed, countries such as Nigeria and Angola might have significant place in U.S. energy security. Ethiopia and Sudan might play a major role in the global war on terror. However, Congo, Mali and Mozambique provide no direct strategic benefit to the United States, particularly since 1990. During the Cold War, the United States might have provided aid to these countries to contain Soviet expansion. But, in the post 1990 period, assistance was given to Congo and Mozambique based on regional politics within Africa rather than any direct benefits these countries would have provided to the United States.
In order to confirm the hypotheses that will be tested in this study, the research will continue with in-depth paired case studies of oil and non-oil states. The two paired studies will be Sudan - Ethiopia and Angola - Democratic Republic of Congo. Sudan, which is a rising oil state, is a unique case study with its strange relationship with the United States. The United States has put sanctions on Sudan, while at the same time providing significant foreign assistance and reestablishing diplomatic engagement under the George W. Bush administration. These practices are contradictory to each other. Thus, Sudan provides an excellent opportunity to investigate whether U.S. foreign policy is dominated by energy security or democratic principles. Ethiopia, its neighbor to the east, received substantial U.S. assistance when it was under different pro-western regimes. By looking at these paired countries through different time periods, the study will be able to confirm if indeed oil influenced U.S. policy towards oil producing states.

Angola was the second largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa until 2009 when it surpassed Nigeria as the largest oil producer in the region. Angola also poses a unique case study, as it is in a transition period coming out of long civil unrest. The United States had been supporting rebel groups in the 1970s and 1980s and now it has shifted its support to democratic reforms in the country. In addition, the United States had been importing oil from Angola starting in the 1980s while it did not recognize the government of Angola. Looking at the U.S. relationships with Angola through different time periods as well as in
comparison with the Democratic Republic of Congo, which did not have oil, the study can further shed light on whether and how oil indeed influenced U.S. relationship with Angola.

*Table 4.3: Comparative Indicator*

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<th>Foreign policy program</th>
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<th>Non-oil state</th>
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<td>Trade capacity building</td>
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<td>Democracy assistance</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique</td>
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<td><strong>MILITARY ASSISTANCE</strong></td>
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CHAPTER V:
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
ANGOLA AND DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

This dissertation seeks to answer the question does the presence of oil influence U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African oil states? In particular, does it cause the United States to reduce its support for democracy and human rights and increase its level of military involvement in a given country when its energy interests increase? Angola has been an oil producing country since the early 1970s and the United States has been importing oil from the country since then. U.S. companies have also been investing in Angola’s oil sector since the 1960s. As this chapter further illustrates, U.S. foreign policy towards Angola was not necessarily influenced by oil. During the Cold War, the U.S. followed the policy of containment towards Angola without having any interference in its ability to import oil or be involved in Angola’s oil sector. In the post-Cold War period, it pushed for democracy promotion and peace building, again with no interference in its ability to benefit from Angola’s oil. When the U.S. followed both sets of polices, its ability to import oil was not jeopardized. This chapter will confirm this finding by looking at details of U.S. foreign policy towards Angola.

In addition to looking at U.S. foreign policy towards Angola, the chapter will also provide analysis of U.S. foreign policy towards a non-oil state or Congo. U.S. foreign policy towards
Congo during the Cold War was also made in the shadow of the wider U.S. foreign policy of containment. After the Cold War ended, democracy promotion, human rights and peace building surpassed all other policies. Analysis of U.S. foreign policy towards a non-oil state is provided to show that U.S. policy towards both oil and non-oil states are made based on similar objective. Thus, it is possible to argue that presence of oil did not influence U.S. policy towards Angola.

A. Angola

A.1 Background

Angola’s contemporary politics and its relations to the United States are closely tied to its 20th century history and independence movement. Thus, the study will start by providing a recent historical background of the country.

During the independence movement, there were three main rebel groups that fought against the Portuguese. These were the FNLA -- National Front for the Liberation of Angola/ Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola; MPLA -- Popular Liberation Movement of Angola/ Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola); UNITA -- National Union for the Total Independence of Angola/ União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola). The MPLA was supported by Portuguese Communist Party or Partido Comunista Português (PCP). FNLA was formed when Union of Peoples of Angola or UPA merged
with the Democratic Party of Angola or Partido Democrático de Angola (PDA) in 1962. UNITA was established by Jonas Savimbi in 1966 after separating from FNLA. Savimbi established UNITA to avoid Holden Roberto’s domination of FNLA. The three different groups had frequent infighting and the internal conflict between FNLA, UNITA and MPLA and disagreement between their leaders delayed Angola’s independence and also kept the organizations weak. Angola won independence in 1975 after Portugal suffered major military setbacks in other African countries namely Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

The disagreement that erupted among the different groups led to a chaotic independence when Portugal refused to recognize any faction and did not have a single group to hand over the government. The MPLA, however, claimed leadership and called the territory under its control the People's Republic of Angola. FNLA and UNITA also announced a separate government with a head office in the southern city of Huambo and called their territory the Democratic People's Republic of Angola; however, they did not get any international recognition except from South Africa. A long and chaotic civil war between MPLA on one side and UNITA and FNLA on the other side started soon after independence. Historians have argued that since foreign forces and intervention remained vibrant after independence, Angola never truly experienced independence (Hodges 2001, 7-8).
This section will provide a broad overview of U.S. foreign policy towards Angola between 1960 and 1990. The section will start by pointing out national, regional and international historical episodes that shaped U.S. policy towards Angola in the pre-independence period. It will then follow with U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. The section will also look at oil production in Angola and role of oil in influencing U.S. policy during that period. Even though the United States did not formally recognize the government of Angola, it was able to import oil from Angola and U.S. multinationals were allowed invest in Angola. This suggests that interest in oil did not interfere with U.S. political policies towards Angola.

United States involvement in Angola started during the independence movement in the late 1960s when it began aiding FNLA and UNITA. The goal of U.S. military assistance in the 1970s was to stop MPLA from establishing a stronghold and central government in the capital Luanda. Soon after independence, Angola was invaded by South Africa. In order to assist the MPLA government resist South African invasion, the Soviet Union sent arms and Cuba sent twelve thousand troops. In order to counter the Soviet and Cuban support to MPLA government, the United States provided military support to UNITA. The Ford administration started with $300,000 worth of military aid in January of 1975 and increased it to $30 million six months later. In the mid-1970s the United States had a well-coordinated
support to MPLA between the CIA, NSC and at times U.S. Presidents to support any anti-
MPLA group (Sylvan & Majeski 2009, 21).

United States military support to UNITA was made in the shadow of its wider Cold War foreign policy. The United States was interested in countering Soviet expansion in the region and former Secretary of State Kissinger emphasized that the U.S.’s inability to counter Soviet expansion would encourage the Soviets to expand in other areas in Africa. Kissinger argued that the presence of Soviet troops and large military aid in Angola and Mozambique demonstrated Soviet desire to expand their sphere of influence in Africa and urged President Ford to intervene (Schraeder 1994, 29). Kissinger viewed Angola’s communist leaning government as “cancer that actively and ideologically undermined neighboring states” (Dobson & Marsh, 2006, 112). Other diplomats, such as former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young, on the other hand, argued that Cuban presence in Angola was a positive factor as it could be “a force for stability there” (Price 1978, 1). U.S. policy of supporting anti-Soviet groups in Africa became stronger under the Carter as Cuban involvement in other part of Africa such as Ethiopia created more concern for Carter. U.S. policy towards African then became dominated by the danger of Cuban/Soviet involvement in the region.

U.S. military assistance to UNITA was given through covert operations and financial supports were not openly recognized in the U.S. foreign aid records. The U.S. official foreign assistance data, also known as the Green Book, does not reflect the amount of assistance the
United States gave UNITA as the aid was not considered bilateral assistance and UNITA was considered a rebel group. Official U.S. foreign aid data indicate that between 1968 and 1995, the United States gave zero direct military assistance to the government of Angola. The United States conducted its diplomatic engagement with UNITA through its office in Kinshasa, Zaire. UNITA also had an office in Kinshasa and Savimbi’s good relationship with Mobutu allowed him and other senior UNITA officials to freely move in and out of Zaire (Cohen 2007, 96-97).

Congress and the State Department, particularly the Africa Bureau, opposed United States’ unequivocal support of UNITA and argued against assisting any guerrilla group as it contributed to the destabilization of the country and ongoing conflict in the region. In the mid-1970s, Congressional inquiries into the U.S. role in Angola led it to put an end to
Pentagon and CIA’s interference in Angola. The Senate in December of 1976 voted to cut off all aid to guerrilla groups including UNITA and later added the Clark Amendment to the 1976 Foreign Assistance Act. The Clark Amendment excluded aid to groups engaged in military conflict and it was explicitly written to stop any military aid to UNITA. The Tunney Amendment was also added to the 1976 Defense Appropriations Bill to cut off all covert aid to Angola (Schaeder 1995, 47).

During the Cold War, one of the key advocates of human rights was President Carter. Even though President Carter came to power with strong commitment to promote human rights, he was constrained from making any effort in Angola due to the previous path the United States had taken in its policy towards Angola. During Carter’s Presidency, the United States had no leverage in promoting democracy or human rights as it did not recognize the MPLA government. The U.S.’s close collaboration with UNITA also severely limited it from making any legitimate quest for human rights in Angola. In addition, the administration also faced some resistance from the CIA and Department of Defense against making any radical changes in its policy towards Angola. Thus, the United States did not have any democracy or human rights program in Angola between 1960 and 1990.

When Reagan came to power, the U.S. – Angola relationship also changed as the U.S. resumed its support to UNITA. In 1985 the Clark Amendment was repealed and aid to UNITA resumed with an initial supply of $15 million dollars of military aid in 1986.
Reagan resumed military support to the rebel groups but he also altered his approach. While President Nixon used proxies and more militaristic approach to fight communist expansion, Reagan preferred an active but limited involvement. With low risk and relatively little expense, assistance to UNITA appeared to be the perfect candidate for Reagan Doctrine (Copson 2007, 6-7; Dobson & Marsh, 2006, 114). The Reagan Doctrine emphasized aiding of anticommunist guerrillas. President George H.W. Bush continued this support for a short period of time once he became a president in 1988.

In the early 1980s, after Angola’s president dos Santos indicated his readiness to work with the United State and the U.S. made its first attempt to mend its relationship with the MPLA (Bender, Coleman & Sklar 1985, 121). The State Department initiated talks several times, and between 1982 and 1985, and eighteen different talks was held between senior U.S. State Department officials and MPLA leaders in Luanda, New York and Cape Verde. These discussions were held in spite of official U.S. policy of non-recognition of the state of Angola and MPLA government. Nevertheless, none of the talks succeeded in changing the U.S. - Angolan relationship.

In order to advocate for ongoing military assistance from the United States, UNITA had a registered lobbying organization called Free Angola Information Services in Washington DC and a paid lobbying firm called Black, Manafort and Stone. The Angolan government was also represented by Perito and Dubuc law firm to push for an end of Washington’s support to
UNITA and get diplomatic recognition from the United States (Cohen 2007, 104). The leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, also had a close positive relationship with some U.S. leaders such as Reagan and Bush and had received endorsement and legitimacy from them. Savimbi met with Reagan in 1986 and again in June 1988 at the White House. During both of these visits to the United States, Savimbi also met with Vice President Bush who later provided strong backing when he became president. President George H.W. Bush in January 1988 wrote to Jonas Savimbi offering "all appropriate and effective assistance" during his administration.27 Bush’s support to Savimbi and UNITA later ceased as the Cold War ended and the U.S. did not see any feasible reason in continue supporting UNITA.

During the Cold War, the United States provided limited humanitarian assistance to Angola to address the food crisis. After independence, declines in agricultural production led to food shortages in Angola in the late 1970s. To address the shortage of food, the World Food Program (WFP) started providing assistance to Angola in 1977. The United States also provided food aid starting in the late 1970s. The first U.S. food aid was given in 1977 which was worth half a million dollars. The largest food aid came in 1980 which was about 14 million dollars. U.S. foreign aid to Angola was restricted to food aid until 1992.

Despite the absence of diplomatic relationship between Angola and the United States, U.S. multinational corporations had business relationships and investments in Angola’s oil sector. The following section provides an overview of U.S. multinational investments in Angola. U.S. multinational oil companies started to get involved in Angola’s oil sector in the 1950s. Texaco was the first company to partner with Petroleum Company of Angola in oil exploration and production in the Congo River Basin. Gulf Oil, the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (Cabgoc) also began explorations in the Cabinda area in 1954 and started production in 1968. After independence, MPLA made a law making the Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis (SONANGOL) the sole owner of the country’s oil but it allowed U.S. companies to continue production. By the late 1970s, production from these U.S. firms continued to increase.
accounted for 80% of Angola’s export earnings, mostly from tax and royalty fee. In 1984, SONANGOL created a joint venture with Cabinda Gulf Oil Company which was a subsidiary of Chevron. Petrofina and Texaco were also two of the largest producers in the Kwanza and Congo basins (Hodges 2001, 125).

In the late 1980s, the major foreign oil companies operating in Angola were American. Chevron, which had taken over Gulf, owned 49 percent of the shares in the offshore Cabinda blocks, Angola's largest production area. Sixty expatriate staff operated the facility and they were protected by Cuban troops from insurgents (Price 1978, 25). This was ironic as the U.S. was supporting UNITA to fight Cuban influence in the country. In 1986, the Reagan administration pressured American oil companies and equipment suppliers to withdraw their interest in the Angolan oil industry to protest the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Chevron, therefore, withdrew 20 percent of its interests from Cabgoc and sold its shares to the Italian firm Agip. Conoco, however, rebuffed this pressure and became the third American oil company to have operations in Angola. Texaco, another major operator in Angola, operated offshore near Soyo, where it held a 40 percent interest in a production-sharing consortium. It also had a 16 percent interest in some of the onshore fields in the Congo River Basin. Most of these operations happened as the MPLA encouraged joint oil exploration and production with international oil firms, especially U.S. based firms (Chabal, Engel & Gentili 2005, 24).
Political and diplomatic differences between the U.S. and Angola were generally left out when the U.S. handled its economic interests in Angola. American oil companies operating in Cabinda provided a substantial portion of Angola's export earnings and foreign exchange, and this relationship continued despite political pressures on these companies to reduce their holdings in Cabinda in the mid-1980s. Oil revenue had also been associated with the prolonging of the conflict as it had been used to finance large military expenditure and sustain government operation instead of providing any social or public services (Hodges 2001, 123). The MPLA government invested 60% of its oil revenues into arms and much of the remainder went into private gain for the MPLA (Sharifa and Feffer 2009). The United States had both benefited from Angola’s oil and contributed to the prolonging of the war by purchasing Angola’s oil while at the same time supplying arms to UNITA. The MPLA provided the U.S. with cheap oil via U.S. multinationals like Gulf, which supplied 65% of Angola's export earnings during the Reagan years. The divergence of private economic interests from the U.S. diplomatic policy was complicated by differences of opinions among American policymakers. From 1975 to 1985, through the Clark Amendment, the United States Congress prohibited aid to UNITA and slowed covert operations. After the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985, however, trade between Angola and the United States started and continued to rise. At the same time, Cuban and Angolan troops attempted to prevent sabotage against U.S. interests by UNITA and South African commandos.
The previous section provided an overview of U.S. foreign policy towards Angola between 1960 and 1990. U.S. foreign policy towards Angola was dominated by Cold War politics and the United States was interested in containing Soviet expansion during that time. The United States aligned itself with the UNITA rebel group as the ruling group (MPLA) sided with the Soviets. It also did not recognize the government of Angola and it did not give any direct military assistance to the government of Angola. However, it gave foreign aid in a form of food and other humanitarian assistance. The following section provides an overview of U.S. foreign policy towards Angola between 1990 and 2001. U.S. foreign policy towards Angola went through a radical shift in 1992/93 with the recognition of the MPLA leadership and state of Angola by the U.S. government. This shift occurred mainly due to change in international and regional politics.

In 1988, South Africa withdrew its troops from Angola and Namibia became independent, cutting off one of the supply lines for UNITA. UNITA leaders feared that U.S. interests in Angola would decline. The United States initially assured UNITA that its support would continue. Senator Paul Simon of Illinois, Chair of African Subcommittee, Representative Charles Rangel and Donald Payne of Congressional Black Caucus had a trip to Angola in 1988 to confirm U.S. support to UNITA and to urge the MPLA government to open negotiations with UNITA (Cohen 2007, 88). When the Cold War ended, President Bush and
Secretary Baker also placed high priority on ending the conflict in Angola and collaborating with the Soviets to conclude the civil war (Cohen 2000, 87). President Bush and Secretary of State Baker wanted to end their military support to UNITA and made their policy known early on. This was the beginning of a radical change in U.S. foreign policy towards Angola.

In 1990, Secretary Baker got involved in peace negotiations and he went to Windhoek, Namibia to meet with Angola’s president dos Santos. This was one of the first high level meetings between the United States and MPLA leaders. After three days in Namibia, on his way back to Washington, Baker stopped in Kinshasa and met with Savimbi as well. The United States wanted to end its support to UNITA and Baker made this clear to Savimbi (Cohen 2007, 100-101). Undersecretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen visited Angola six times during the twelve month period between 1 November 1991 and October 1992 (Cohen 2007, 112). Cohen was on a diplomatic shuttle to salvage a peace deal between UNITA and MPLA as well start official diplomatic relations with Angola.

Despite the absence of an official relationship between the two nations, diplomatic interaction between the two governments went on through regular visits to Kinshasa and the British embassy in Luanda. The Joint Political Military Commission whose members included Angola, South Africa, Cuba, U.S. and Soviet Union also played an important role in facilitating talks. The United States also used its embassies in Republic of Congo, Gabon, Zambia and Zaire to push MPLA to negotiation with UNITA (Cohen 2007, 90).
Angola’s major breakthrough in transition came from the U.S. and Portuguese brokered peace agreement also known as The Bicesse Accord. The agreement laid out framework for elections and also withdrawal of foreign troops. Angola made its first attempt to transition to democracy under the supervision of the UN. In 1992, Angola held its first election. UNITA leaders after losing the election refused to accept the result and chose to continue civil war. The United States refused to accept UNITA’s decision and in 1993, the United States for the first time also recognized the MPLA government. One of the preconditions put forward by MPLA was that the U.S. end its military aid to UNITA. The United States agreed and since 1992 it had not provided any military assistance to UNITA. Despite absence of military support from the United States and South Africa, UNITA nevertheless had one of its most successful attacks against the MPLA in 1994. UNITA replaced its foreign military aid with revenue from diamond sales. In addition, due to the demobilization of MPLA soldiers during the 1991-92 peace negotiation, MPLA was weak and vulnerable (Hodges 2001, 15).

Additional factors that forced change of U.S. policy toward UNITA were domestic factors inside Angola and within UNITA. In the early 1990s UNITA campaign became ethnic and racist. UNITA used spiteful languages against foreigners and human rights abuses were reported in its head office in Jamba. These incidents made UNITA’s relationship with the U.S. sour (Tvedten 1999). Tito Chingunjai, UNITA representative in Washington, his wife and children were executed by UNITA leaders after being recalled to Jamba. Chingunjai was
well liked in the U.S. and Savimbi’s action made Secretary of State James Baker furious. Baker openly criticized Savimbi and this was the first time the United States did not back UNITA. After UNITA refused to accept the 1992 election results and resumed war, the United States completely ended its support to UNITA. It had not reestablished relationship with Savimbi or UNITA since then.

After the establishment of official diplomatic relationship between the United States and Angola in 1993, the two countries started a bilateral military program in 1996. In 1996, United States for the first time gave 2.5 million dollars of military aid under the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) to Angola. Between 1997 and 2002, it did not give any assistance under the Foreign Military Financing Program. Since 2002, it has been giving military aid under FMFP worth around $200,000 annually. United States’ largest military assistance to Angola since 1997 has been given under the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Program (NADR). Under this program, the U.S. gave a total of 43.4 million dollars in ten years between 1997 and 2007. During the civil war, Angola was flooded with land mines. Thus, anti-mining assistance has been one of the core U.S. programs in Angola to reverse the damaged done during the conflict.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two nations, four Secretaries of States have visited the country. Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN in the 1990s, also visited Angola in 1994. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos also visited
the U.S. three times in December 1995, February 2002 and May 2004. In his last two visits, dos Santos met with President George W. Bush and President Bush reaffirmed his commitment to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries. President George W. Bush’s interaction with the MPLA leadership was a stark contrast with President George Bush Sr. and other Republican presidents who had refused to recognize MPLA.

Since 1992, the United States has increased its foreign aid, particularly food aid, to Angola as well. Between 1990 and 2001, it gave food aid worth 535 million dollars and additional 20 million dollars for development and economic assistance. Conflicts and land mines reduced agricultural output in the 1980s and 1990s and the country was in food shortage. Despite a decrease in conflict in the 1990s, Angola was going through a major food shortage due to poor economic performance. To address these challenges, the United States provided food aid and other development assistance.
The U.S. government, particularly the State Department, has played an instrumental role in democracy promotion and peace building in Angola since 1992. The U.S. State Department, led by Herman Cohen, worked for the success of the 1992 election and pushed UNITA to disarm and seek peaceful and democratic means of gaining political power. When President Clinton came to power, he wanted to continue full engagement in peace negotiations as well. USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) provided post conflict peace building and democracy promotion assistance. Its main goal of OTI support was to assist Angola in making a successful transition through a peaceful process. From 1994-1998, OTI managed a $28 million program in Angola. OTI operations increased after the death of Savimbi in 2002 and the prospect for peace emerged again.
The U.S. enthusiasm for building democracy in Angola was backed by its financial commitment. In 1993 and 94, the United States gave a total of 26 million dollars in non food aid and 20 percent of the aid was dedicated for democracy programs. U.S. foreign policy priorities in Angola since 1995 largely focused on strengthening democracy and governance as well as promoting peace and security. However, funding priorities within these broad goals has changed. In 1992 and 1993, 80% of the democracy funding went for election and political process as Angola was holding it first multi-party election. The U.S. government did not give any democracy assistance to Angola in 1994 and 1995 but resumed its democracy program in 1996 with a focus on governance and civil society. U.S. democracy assistance between 1996 and 2000 was dominated by these two programs that took over 95% of the
total democracy aid to Angola. Largest U.S. democracy assistance was given in 1998 which was 5.2 million dollars and $2.6 million of that went to civil society and $1.8 million to governance. Rule of law was another program the U.S. government ran under democracy but it remained small compared to other democracy activities.

A.4 U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Angola: 2001 – Present

U.S. foreign policy towards Angola in the 1990s became cordial with changes in international politics as well as domestic politics in Angola. The United States abandoned its support to the UNITA rebel group, recognized MPLA and started to push for a peaceful end to the civil war. These policies were completely different from its previous course of actions during the Cold War when it refused to recognize MPLA and provided unequivocal support to UNITA. The United States in the 1990s also started to provide significant development and democracy assistance to Angola. United States foreign policies since 2000 also followed its previous year’s strategies with minor changes.

In this period, U.S. foreign aid to Angola followed the same trend as the previous years and largely focused on food aid. The largest food aid in a single year came in 2003 and it was 123 million dollars. International disaster assistance also showed some increase compared to previous years and between 2002 and 2005, the United States gave a total of 45 million dollars. Angola also became a beneficiary of President Bush’s health initiatives and since
2001 it has received over 80 million dollars in child health and survival. Angola was not part of the fifteen countries that benefited from President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). However, it has received minor assistance for HIV/AID since 2004.

Since 9/11 U.S. global military assistance has focused on anti-terrorism efforts. Along this wider foreign policy goal, its assistance to Angola under the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, and Demining & Related program increased by 90% between 2002 and 2005. It went from $3.7 million in 2002 to $6.3 million by 2004 and has remained above $5 million annually since then. Though Angola is not one of the key countries in the U.S. fight against terrorism, it is one of the ten countries in the U.S. Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative program whose goal is to assist local governments to improve their maritime security off the western coast of Africa (Feickert 2005). The other U.S. military assistance that has shown substantial increase was commercial military exports which reached 14 million dollars in 2006. 1997 was the first year the United States provided military aid through the program which was merely $133,000. The amount, however, has decreased since its peak in 2007. The United States has provided a total of $25 million in military assistance through the commercial military export program since 1997. It can be argued that the U.S. Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative is directly tied to U.S. oil interests in the region. However, no official statement from the U.S. government acknowledges this fact.
Since 2002, USAID shifted its democracy assistance from concentrating on elections to strengthening democratic instructions and governance. The U.S. government provided some assistance to prepare Angola for the 2008 Parliamentary elections but it also started to focus on human capital development so that Angola could make a better transition to a democratic country. Programs run by USAID included strengthening the quality of dialogue between the government and civil society as well as decentralization and modernization of the judiciary system. The U.S. government continued to provide assistance in governance and civil society but reduced rule of law funding substantially while increasing funding for elections briefly in 2002. The increase in funding for election and political process was for a preparation for anticipated elections in 2004 which was delayed until 2008.

A.5 Analysis of U.S. foreign policy towards Angola

U.S. foreign policy towards Angola should be looked at in two time periods, pre 1990 and post 1990. In the pre-1990 period, U.S. policy towards Angola was dominated by Cold War politics. The United States aligned itself with UNITA and supported the rebel group for more than twenty years to contain Communist expansion in the region. United States’ initial relationship with UNITA was shaped by path dependency rather than deliberate policy decision. As Angola was gaining its independence, several groups were fighting each other to gain supremacy. The Soviets, Cubans and South Africans were running for influence as well. The United States chose to aid UNITA despite having no ideological or political
association with it as other groups sided with the Soviets. In addition to the Cold War and Soviet expansion in Africa, regional politics within Africa also shaped U.S. policy.

Despite a hostile relationship that existed between MPLA and the United States, the two countries had a positive economic relationship. Angola exported oil to the United States in the 1970s and 80s with little political inference (Clough 1992, 16). U.S. involvement in Angola’s oil sector started before its independence. U.S. companies started exploration in the 1960s and by late 1960s production began when American-based Gulf Oil started production in the Cabinda area (International Energy Agency 2006). The MPLA leadership, despite their pseudo-Marxist rhetoric, always welcomed investment by the transnational companies and never broke from the economic domination of the West. While continuing to rely on Soviet and Cuban military technical and economic assistance, the Angolan government had emphatically pursued a policy of economic nonalignment. Regardless of the political polarity that existed between MPLA and the U.S. government, U.S. companies were actively courted and protected by MPLA. In the late 1980s, the major foreign oil companies operating in Angola were American. Except for the brief period of time in the mid-1980s when the Reagan administration pressured American oil companies and equipment suppliers to withdraw their interest in the Angolan oil industry to protest the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, U.S. companies were freely operating in Angola without much political interference (Frynas and Wood 2001). Some powerful multinationals such as Texaco, nevertheless, snubbed U.S. pressure and continued to operate in Angola.
Political and diplomatic differences between the two countries were generally left out when the U.S. handled its economic interests in Angola. Despite having no official diplomatic connection with Angola in the 1970s and 80s, the United States had a strong economic relationship with Angola. The irony of the economic relationship that existed between the two countries was that American oil companies operating in Cabinda provided a substantial portion of Angola's export earnings and foreign exchange, and this relationship prolonged the conflict as it had been used to finance large military expenditure and sustain government operation instead of providing any social or public services (Hodges 2001, 123). The MPLA government invested 60 percent of its oil revenues into arms and much of the remainder went into private gain (Sharife and Feffer 2009). The United States had both benefited from Angola’s oil and contributed to the prolonging of the war by purchasing Angola’s oil while at the same time supplying arms to UNITA. The MPLA provided the U.S. with cheap oil via U.S. multinationals like Gulf, which supplied 65 percent of Angola's export earnings during the Reagan years. The divergence of private economic interests from the U.S. diplomatic policy was complicated by differences of opinion among American policymakers. From 1975 to 1985, through the Clark Amendment, the United States Congress prohibited aid to UNITA and slowed covert operations. After the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985, however, trade between Angola and the United States started and continued to rise. At the same time, Cuban and Angolan troops attempted to prevent sabotage against U.S. interests by UNITA and South African commandos.
In addition to importing oil, U.S. government trade agencies had programs in Angola as well. U.S. Export Import Bank provided its first loan in 1975 which was valued at 5.2 million dollars. Between 1975 and 1984, it had provided a total of 435 million dollars in loans. The largest loan guarantee was in 1980 for estimated at $191 million. The U.S. EX-IM Bank loans reflected the U.S. economic interest in the pre-1990 period and that these economic engagements were not necessary parallel with its political or diplomatic actions.

The second time period that showed a dramatic change in U.S. foreign policy was the post 1990 period. End of the Cold War and rise in global norm of democracy paved the way for the U.S. to abandon its support to UNITA. After the Cold War the United States has no more threat coming from the Soviets and saw no need to continue supporting UNITA. In addition as MPLA was willing to work with the United States in building peace while at the
same time supply oil, the United Stated shifted alliance and it recognized MPLA. It also abandoned its support to UNITA. The change in U.S. alliance and shift in policy was caused by the transformation in international politics rather than economic interest in Angola. The U.S.’s newfound relationship with MPLA was backed by large foreign aid and democracy assistance as well as diplomatic recognition. Absence of oil in influencing U.S. foreign policy towards Angola is evident as we did not see any dramatic change in U.S. investment in Angola or increase in import of oil from Angola. U.S. import of oil from Angola remained under 300 thousands barrel per day until 1999 and it peaked to 500 thousands barrel per day in 1999. However, it declined to less than 300 thousands barrel per day by 2002.

In the post 2002 period the United States started to look at Angola’s oil as strategically important. The 2002 National Security Strategy clearly identified Angola as a potentially major oil supplier to the United States. Since then Angola’s oil supply to the United States has also been increasing. Since 2005, Angola has been supplying over 500 thousand barrels per day annually consistently. Angola’s oil production has also been increasing dramatically from less than 1000 thousand barrels per day in 2003 to over 2000 thousand barrels per day by 2008. U.S. interest in Angola’s oil in the post 2002 period is also reflected by increased U.S. investment in offshore drilling as well as U.S. government’s commitment to trade capacity building programs in Angola. In order to strengthen Angola’s international trade capacity, it has been giving large amounts of aid under Trade Capacity Building Assistance
program. In 2005, the largest aid came for Human Resources and Labor Standards program and it was about 4 million dollars. The United States has given a total of approximately $9 million for trade capacity since 1999. In the last eight years, U.S. trade capacity assistance to Angola was one of the largest in Africa. The increase in U.S. trade assistance to Angola can be tied to the growing U.S. interest in Angola’s oil.

U.S. foreign policy towards Angola was made based on its wider foreign policy goal, regional politics in Southern African and domestic politics within Angola. During the Cold War, policies were made in light of its wider objective, in the 1990s democracy and human rights prevailed and in the post 2002 period oil was given some weight. While the United States pursued its political objectives in Angola it also imported oil from the country without jeopardizing its policy and without interference from the Angola’s government. This reflects that politics and oil had no intersection in U.S. foreign policy towards Angola. The United States ability to practice its political objectives without risking the ability to import oil from Angola can make one question if the United States overemphasized its need to collaborate with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.

Since the 1960s the United States has been recognizing and working with authoritarian regimes of the Middle East to secure its energy interest. It did so as it feared that any opposition to the regimes would risk its ability to import oil from the countries. Unlike its policy towards the Middle East, the United States did not fear losing any oil from Angola for
its refusal of recognition of the government of MPLA in the 1970’s and 80s. Angola’s oil might have been minor compared to Middle East; however, it still had the potential to be an alternative source to the U.S. during the 1970s oil shock. The United States did not make any change in its policy towards Angola then as it saw that the country would continue to provide oil to the U.S. regardless of its political or diplomatic policy.

B. Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the third-largest country in Africa, bordering nine different countries. Its size, ethnic composition and geographical location make it an important country for regional stability in central Africa. Congo’s contemporary politics and its relations with the United States are also very rooted in its past domestic and regional politics. This section will first provide a brief historical background and then analyze U.S. foreign policy towards the country.

B.1 U.S. Policy towards Zaire between 1960 and 1990

In the late 1950s due to domestic and regional pressure, the Belgian colonial authorities started working on granting local authorities more autonomy in Zaire. However, the January 1959 riot in Léopoldville expedited Zaire’s independence. The chaotic election run by the Belgians and held in December 1959 was invalidated by Congolese and the Congolese
declared their independence six months later in 1960. Early signs of violence appeared when several leaders emerged during the transition period. Joseph Kasavubu of Alliance des Ba-Kongo (ABAKO) and Lumumba's MNC were in a fight for the top position. As a compromise Kasavubu became president and head of state while Lumumba became prime minister. Moïse Tshombe, another prominent leader, became govern of one of the largest region, Katanga. Katanga located in the South is an important region for Zaire as it has the largest copper and cobalt deposit.

During the transition period the top leaders in Congo, Kasavubu, Lumumba and Tshombe, had frequent infighting. In addition to their conflict, the hasty change in military structure introduced by Lumumba created chaos and thousands of Belgians were forced to flee Congo. The chaos created an opportunity for Tshombe to declared Katanga’s independence from Congo. When the Belgians sided with Tshombe, Lumumba asked the Soviets for assistance in reclaiming Katanga.

The United States initially wanted to have a positive relationship with Lumumba and invited him to Washington in 1959. Lumumba, however, showed his socialist and nationalist ideology and left an uneasy feeling in Washington. After his visit to Washington the U.S. administration believed he was “an individual whom it was impossible to deal with” (Schraeder 1994, 54). CIA Director Allen Dulles indicated that Lumumba’s behavior made Zaire a target for communist expansion (de Witte 2001, 78). The arrival of one hundred
Soviet military advisors in the same year confirmed U.S. suspicions that Lumumba was leaning toward communism. U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, William Burden, in July 1960 recommended that the U.S. should attempt to remove Lumumba from power (Schraeder 1994, 56; Bender, Coleman & Sklar 1985, 212). The CIA started covert operations to remove Lumumba and the action was supported by President Eisenhower as he firmly believed “that radical third world leader who looked to the Soviet block for military aid and support threatened U.S. interests in an increasing turbulent Third World” (Schraeder 1994, 55). In August 19, 1960 CIA Deputy Director authorized CIA operation to overthrow Lumumba. CIA’s plan, however, was disturbed by the arrival of new UN envoy Rajeshwar Dayal who refused U.S. intervention (Schraeder 1994, 57).

As the conflict between Kasavubu and Lumumba escalated, Mobutu used the chaos to stage a coup and take over leadership. In October 1965, Mobutu dismissed Kasavubu and took over power. It was believed that “Mobutu would not have come to power had it not been for the privileged relationship he had developed with the mid-level CIA officials who exercised considerable influence over U.S. policy toward the Congo in the early 1960” (Clough, 1992, 80). Mobutu changed Congo’s name to Zaire and its official name remained Zaire until 1997.28

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28 As Congo was named Zaire starting 1965 to 1997, the name Zaire will be used in this dissertation when refereeing to that period of time.
United States’ involvement in Zaire started during its independence movement. Since the Eisenhower administration started large scale covert operations to maintain territorial integrity and pro-Western government in Zaire in the early 1960s, the relationship between the two countries continued for more than three decades and through nine U.S. administrations. United States’ initial intervention in Zaire was created from fear “that the Soviets might rush into the vacuum created by chaos in the Congo” (Clough 1992, 80). First President Eisenhower and then President Kennedy had approved several “covert and overt actions to ensure that a pro-Western moderate held on to power in Kinshasa” (Clough 1992, 80). President Kennedy’s decision to establish a bilateral military agreement with Mobutu marked the beginning of what would be a long standing American military commitment to Zaire (Dobson & Marsh 2006, 116). President Kennedy in a televised speech in 1961 also confirmed U.S. assurance to UN presence in Zaire and also made his position in Zaire clear. He indicated that he would object any strong Soviet involvement in the country.

After the UN withdrew from Zaire, U.S. military involvement escalated with President Kennedy’s approval of a program known as the ‘green plan’ to train the Zairian army (Schraeder 1994, 66). The United States openly started to aid Mobutu after he held a private meeting with Kennedy on May 31, 1963 in Washington. Kennedy indicated that Mobutu’s crucial behind the scene role in the Cold War struggle against communism in Zaire was significant and openly acclaimed Mobutu by stating “generally, if it hadn’t been for you, the
whole thing would have collapsed and the communists would have taken over” (Schraeder 1994, 69).

![Figure 5.6: US Military Assistance to Congo 1960-2007](source: US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook])

U.S. direct military involvement did not come until increased guerrilla attack threatened the Kisangani region. As insurgency increased and Mobutu’s inability to subdue the guerrillas became clear, President Johnson directed the CIA and Defense Department to coordinate the use of the paramilitary operations in 1964. In August 1964, the “Defense Department shipped a variety of arms, jeeps, light tanks, and five B26 bombers which were flown by CIA commissioned Cuban exiles, C130 transport planes guarded by an elite unit of fifty- six paratroopers from Fort Bragg, NC” (Schraeder 1994, 71). The Defense Department also allowed Zaire to purchase six C-130s between 1970 and 73. Zaire also had stationed two military attachés (Army and Air Force) in Kinshasa which was unusual compared to other African nations (Schraeder 1994, 80). The U.S. only had one military attaché stationed in
most other African countries. The CIA considered Mobutu an important channel for U.S.
support to UNITA and FNLA in Angola. The CIA used Kinshasa as a base to maintain link
with UNITA (Bender, Coleman & Sklar 1985, 116; Schraeder 1994, 76).

Through bilateral agreement the United Stated provided several forms of military assistance
including Transfer of Excess Military Equipment (TEME) and International Military
Education and Training (IMET). One of the largest military equipment assistance efforts was
in 1964 and totaled over 19 million dollars. Between 1964 and 1970, the United States gave
a total of 27 million dollars military equipment. However, no military aid for equipment has
been given since 1970. One of the longest running U.S. military assistance programs had
been the IMET which started in 1964. The United States had given aid totaling $18 million
from 1953 to 1991 under IMET (figure 5.6). There was no military aid set aside to IMET

The White House, CIA and Pentagon’s policy of military support, however, was not fully
supported by the State Department and Congress. Members of Congress such as Senator
John Stennis (D Mississippi) openly questioned if Zaire was becoming another Vietnam for
the United States (Schraeder 1994, 72). The State Department African Bureau was a strong
opponent of U.S. policy towards Zaire due to Mobutu’s economic and human rights policies
(Bender, Coleman & Sklar 1985, 217-218). The State Department’s negative assessment of
Mobutu’s handing of Zairian economy led to tension between the U.S. and Zaire in 1974-75.
However, the “tension was in direct contrast to his growing cooperation with the CIA” (Schraeder 1994, 84-83).

Once the U.S. established a strong foothold in Zaire, senior U.S. government officials at several different occasions had given Mobutu endorsement and had shown U.S. commitment to him. Secretary of State Kissinger in 1976 confirmed the U.S.’s dedication to Mobutu when he stated “the respect and affection that lie at the heart of the relationship between the United States and Zaire; and he assured the Mobutu regime that “the United State will stand by its friends” (Clough 1992, 81). Kissinger’s commitment to Mobutu was seen by his visit to Zaire and frequent meeting with Mobutu. Kissinger made two visits to Zaire during his tenure and they both came in 1976. William Rogers was the first Secretary of State to visit Zaire in 1970 and after a long period of absence James Baker visited Zaire in 1990.

U.S. foreign aid to Zaire had also mirrored its other commitment. Washington engagement in Zaire in early 1960s was followed by substantial foreign aid. Between 1960 and 1990, U.S.’s largest foreign aid came in a form of USAID grant which peaked in 1963 with 355 million dollars. Other major foreign aid programs in the 1960s and 1970s came as food aid. USAID loans were also significant in late 1960s and 1970s. With the passing of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act of 1986, U.S. foreign aid to Africa was reduced (Schraeder 1994, 102). However, foreign aid to Zaire did not show any substantial decline from
previous years in the 1980s. Total foreign aid to Zaire remained around $50 annually million from 1984 to 1990.

Mobutu was one of the few African leaders who made frequent trips to the U.S. during the Cold War. His first official visit to the U.S. came in 1970 when he met with Nixon. Mobutu then visited the Washington in 1981 when he also met with Reagan. Mobutu was absent from the White House during the Carter administration, which partially reflected Carter’s desire to avoid public interaction with a known human rights violator. During the Republican administrations of Reagan and Bush, Mobutu visited the Washington for a total of four times which was the most by any African president at that time. Mobutu was the first African head of state to be invited by President George H. Bush to the White House as well. During Mobutu’s visit, President George H. Bush also underscored the “excellent” nature of US-Zairian bilateral relationship and praised Zaire as one of Washington’s “oldest” and “most valued” friends on the African continent.29 Mobutu frequently used his visit to the U.S. and statements from senior U.S. officials as “symbolic gesture of support to sustain the perception that U.S. condones his conduct and will stand by his government” (Clough 1992, 81).

U.S. Presidents such as Carter, who was a champion of human rights at times, have also provided affirmation for Mobutu despite the clear evidence of the human rights abuse in Zaire. When Carter was asked about his administration’s relationship with Mobutu and the poor human rights record, he replied by stating “Our friendship and aid for Zaire has not been predicated on their perfection in dealing with human rights” (Clough 1992, 82). The long and complicated U.S. involvement in Zaire was problematic for Carter’s intent to promote democracy and human rights. Despite the poor human rights record and weak economic performance, the U.S. was unwilling to exert change or walk away from Mobutu. Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard Moose testifying in congress in 1979 stated, “there is no way for us to walk away from the problems of Zaire, our interest will not permit it. Moose believed that the U.S. cannot restrict its vision to economic self-interest alone (Clough 1992, 82).

When Reagan came to power, one of his main foreign policy goals was to support pro-Western, moderate foreign policy and Mobutu was a perfect candidate for Reagan doctrine. (Schraeder 1994, 96). Pressure to strengthen U.S.-Zairian ties also emerged again during the 1980s from Pentagon officers who demonstrated a growing interest in Africa. The Pentagon in 1985 began focusing on Kamina airbase which one military official described as an “irresistible attraction” (Schraeder 1994, 100). Pentagon’s other interest in Zaire includes use of the country as a gateway for growing military involvement in Chad and Sudan as well as training space for EUCOM exercises. In return for use of space by the Pentagon, Mobutu
wanted more military and economic assistance. However, after a long debate inside the
Pentagon, senior level Defense Department and Joint Chief of Staff voted against it as they
considered the operation unnecessary and overly risky. In order to satisfy Mobutu’s interest,
Pentagon devised limited joint exercises in Kamina with a budget of 2 million dollars
(Schraeder 1994, 101). The decision to let go of large military program in Kamina in 1986
was the beginning of a declining U.S. military involvement in Zaire.

In the late 1980s, Zaire’s strategic importance to the U.S. declined with the end of the Cold
War. However, the U.S. State Department did not believe that radical change or push
towards democracy should be pressed in Zaire aggressively. They argued that Mobutu
should be removed and democracy should be introduced through incremental changes
(Schraeder 1994, 106-107). “Mobuto or Chaos” argument was widely used in shaping U.S.
policy or intervention in the early 1990s (Schraeder 1994, 107). The U.S. State Department
believed that an abrupt removal of Mobutu would lead to chaos and that gradual removal of
the regime was essential in maintaining peace and order in the country.

B. 3 U.S. Policy Towards Zaire between 1990 – 2001

U.S. foreign policy towards Zaire between 1960 and 1990 was made in the shadow of its
wider Cold War policy. Washington was actively supporting the Mobutu regime through
military and foreign aid to block any possibility of Soviet expansion in the region. The
United States not only provided diplomatic legitimacy to Mobutu but also overlooked his human rights abuse for the sake of maintaining pro-Western regime in the country.

With the end of the Cold War and a rise in human rights norms, many inside the U.S. administration particularly the State Department started to raise alarm about the human rights abuses in Zaire. Outside of the State Department, Congress also started to raise concerns and House Foreign Relation Committee labeled the Mobutu regime as a gross violator of human rights. Representative Dellums sponsored several anti Mobutu bills requesting restriction on military aid though none of the legislation passed. In addition, Congress also requested full termination of President Bush’s $56 million aid including $4 million in military aid. Mobutu during his June 1989 visit to Washington was made aware that concerns for human rights violations and corruption in Zaire were increasingly becoming an issue in Congress (Schraeder 1994, 102). In November 1990, Congress cut military and economic aid (except for some humanitarian aid) to Zaire due to the ongoing human rights violations in Zaire. Washington also lost its interest in maintaining large military and other operations in Zaire and it closed its aid mission while at the same time reducing its diplomatic presence (Gambino 2008, 11). The U.S. government also closed the USAID office in 1993/94 because it considered the Mobutu administration a “poor development partner.”

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The end of the Cold War, changes in regional politics particularly in Angola, and ongoing conflict in central Africa made the United States push changes in Zaire as it did not see that Mobutu was ready to embrace adjustment in Zaire. To push the U.S. agenda, Secretary of State James Baker visited Zaire in March of 1990 and made it clear to Mobutu that the U.S. would not continue to provide military or other forms of assistance to Zaire. Baker also told Mobutu that the Washington did not expect him to keep the status quo. Mobutu’s 1989 visit to the White House was his last and though he remained in power for several more years; he did not visit the White House. During Clinton’s administration it was clear that he was not welcome at the White House. Clinton, however, through his UN Ambassador Bill Richardson tried to negotiate a peace deal between Mobutu and Kabila during the last days of Mobutu.

After aid from the United States disappeared, Mobutu’s military strength also declined. The resistance movement led by Laurent Kabila gained momentum in its fight against Mobutu and by 1997, it was clear that Mobutu could not stop Kabila militarily. In order to avoid bloodshed and chaos, Washington began to push Mobutu to go into exile and surrender power to a transitional government. After rebels were closing in on Kinshasa, Mobutu left Zaire. Mobutu after being rejected for asylum in France and Togo settled in Morocco where he was treated for prostate cancer and later died. Laurent Kabila took over power in May 1997.
Once Mobutu left in 1997, the Washington started to work with Kabila. Between 1992 and 1995 the U.S. government did not provide any foreign aid to Congo. In 1995, the U.S. resumed food aid but assistance remained insignificant or under $1 million annually. However, in 1999, the U.S. resumed development assistance and other programs once. Disaster and famine assistance also started during same year. In 1997, Washington resumed democracy programs with a focus on aid to elections and political reform. Since 1997, it has provided democracy assistance to Congo but remained a small fraction of total U.S. aid. Clinton early on made it clear that the U.S. “wants to see a transition to a genuine democracy.”31 To show U.S. commitment in promoting democracy and regional stability, Secretary of State Albright as well as UN Ambassador Bill Richardson visited Congo in October 1997 and December 1997.

The Clinton administrations’ position towards the Kabila government was to provide limited military training to build professionalism in the Congolese army. In 1997, it provided limited military assistance in a form of equipment sales worth approximately half a million dollars. In comparison with the amount of military assistance the U.S. gave during the Cold War, this was a trivial amount. As Kabila was a former rebel leader with some controversial background including association with Che Guevara in the 1960s, the Clinton administration wanted to keep Kabila at a distance. Thus, Clinton did not want to provide large military assistance to Congo.

Kabila’s incompetency in leadership emerged soon after he came to power when another war started in 1998 involving Congo and several other nations including Angola, Chad and
Zimbabwe. U.S. engagement in Congo and the region then focused on helping broker a ceasefire arrangement (Gambino 2008, 12). A peace agreement negotiated by the U.S. was signed in Lusaka, Zambia in 1999 and the UN operation MONUC was created during the same year. The U.S. also remained actively engaged in funding UN operations since then. U.S. State Department’s involvement in Congo was very much influenced by the Rwanda genocide in 1994.

B.4 U.S. Policy towards Congo between 2001 and Present

U.S. foreign policy towards Congo changed after the end of the Cold War in 1990. It abandoned its military support to Congo and limited its foreign aid. United States total assistance was at its peak in 1965 with total aid of 350 million dollars but had declined since then to zero between 1994 and 1997. Mobutu was also shunned away from the White House for his poor human rights records. Washington’s disengagement with Mobutu and interruption of military support eventually led to his downfall in 1997 and the U.S. resumed limited support to the new administration of Kabala.

Laurent Kabila in 1998 appointed his eldest son Joseph Kabila to be commander in chief of the army and in 2001 when his father was killed, Joseph Kabila took over power. George W. Bush administration, who believed that Congo’s size and location made it vital to the stability of Central Africa, wanted to work with Kabila and help him stabilize his
government as well as create peace in Central Africa. President George W. Bush established a positive relationship with Joseph Kabila to promote his agenda. President Kabila visited the White House three times during the Bush administration which is an evidence of a growing relationship between the two countries. Washington’s commitment to Congo during Joseph Kabila’s administration was backed by large financial assistance which amounted to 150 million dollars in 2006 and additional $300 million in 2007 to pay for UN operations. Though the United States wanted to get engaged in Congo and promote regional stability, it was criticized for not having comprehensive strategy to create peace in the region (Gamino 2008, 5).

The Bush administration also resumed military assistance to Congo in 2004 with funding for International Military Education and Training. In 2004, with a funding of about three hundred thousand dollars, it trained thirty three individuals. The following year it recommenced assistance through Foreign Military Financing program. In 2006, it also resumed Foreign Military Sales program with initial support of 1.2 million dollars and addition 1.4 million dollars in 2007. Compared to the 1990 – 2001 period, the U.S. military assistance to Congo by 2007 was significant. However, when the aid is compared to the amount of the military assistance United States had given to Mobutu, it was marginal.

President George W. Bush also revived U.S. foreign aid to Congo. In 2001, U.S. foreign aid increased to over 60 million dollars annually. The largest portion of the assistance was in
food aid. New programs such as child survival and health were also introduced. There have also been fifteen directives from the executive branch to implement various foreign aid programs in Congo under Bush administration as well (Gamino 2008, 26). The United States has also been providing several trade assistance programs to Congo since 1999. However, U.S. overall trade assistance was minor compared to other forms of foreign aid it had given to Congo. When the U.S. started its Trade Capacity Building Assistant program in 1999, it provided a total of eighty five thousand dollars. The aid increased to about 1.2 million dollars by 2007. In 1997, Washington also resumed democracy assistance but it remained small fraction of total U.S. aid. From the total democracy assistance, large portion of the aid has been going to civil society and election process programs and a small portion to governance.

**B.5 Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy towards Congo**

U.S. foreign policy towards Congo should be looked at in the shadow of the domestic politics within Congo, international politics as well as regional politics. U.S. foreign policy towards Congo during the Cold War was driven by its wider policy of containment and its main goal in the country as well as the region was to control Soviet expansion. Washington indisputably supported Mobutu despite his well-known human rights abuses and corruption is a reflection of this attitude. The United States prolonged the rule of Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Soko by providing significant military support and domestic and international legitimacy through various diplomatic gestures. Mobutu used his U.S. supplied arsenal to
repress his own people and plunder his nation’s economy for three decades until his brutal regime was overthrown by Laurent Kabila’s forces in 1997.

As the world changed in 1990 and Washington saw no significant threat coming from the Soviets, it abandoned its support to Mobutu. The U.S. desertion of Mobutu eventually led to his downfall. In the 1990s the United States was no longer interested in sheltering Mobutu and wanted to see democratic and human rights reforms in Congo. Washington wanted to follow such policy as it became a global norm and it also viewed Mobutu’s resistance to change as forces of instability in the region. As the same time, it also feared that radical changes would bring about instability to the country. Mobutu’s inability to control the country eventually led to his downfall in 1997 and he was replaced by Kabila. After Kabila came to power, Clinton was eager to help the country move towards democracy and also be a force for regional stabilization. Clinton’s approach of dealing with Kabila was similar to that of the newly installed regimes in other African countries. Clinton saw the Kabila administration as part of the wave of newly emerging leaders in Africa who would bring democracy and development to the continent. In the post 2000 period, the Bush administration followed Clinton’s policy and continued to provide support and legitimacy to the Kabila administration. The Bush administration also escalated its humanitarian support and other assistance to UN operations in Congo. The administration did so as it emphasized the significance of the country to regional stability.
C. Comparative Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Congo and Angola

A close examination of U.S. foreign policy towards Angola and Congo reveal two different observations. These observations are:

- Changes in U.S. foreign policy happen due to changes in international and regional politics.

These two findings will be discussed in detail below.

C.1 Changes in U.S. Foreign Policy Over Time

Looking at U.S engagements with both countries over the three periods (1960-1990, 1990-2001, 2001-Present), U.S. foreign policy seems to change through time and its policies are largely influenced by international and regional politics rather than concern for energy security. This phenomenon is observed in both countries regardless of the presence of oil. During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was designed along its wider policy of containment and with strong consideration of the Soviet’s position in the region. Washington supported the Mobutu regime in Congo and UNITA in Angola in order to counter Soviet support to the MPLA and to prevent further expansion in Congo. U.S. foreign policy towards Angola and Congo during the Cold War was not distinctly different. While Angola provided economic benefit to the United States, Congo did not provide any economic benefit. But the
United States considered Congo geopolitically a strategic country. Washington’s parallel policy and approach to both countries tells us that oil or energy security did not necessarily shaped U.S. foreign policy towards Angola during that time. As the United States was allowed to import oil from Angola without much political interference from the government of Angola, it did not see the need to adjusts its political policy to fit it energy needs. Contrary to traditional believes that host country’s government would defy multinational corporations due to political interference, U.S. companies were confronted from U.S. government rather than the host nation. Nevertheless, many of these companies were able to outweigh the challenges from U.S. government and continue to do business in Angola.

In the 1990s, changes in regional politics as well as the rise of democracy norms opened the door for the United States to change its policy to both Congo and Angola. While it abandoned its full support to Mobutu Sese Seko and UNITA rebels in Angola, it recognized the MPLA leadership and the state of Angola. Mobutu was well known for his human rights abuses and economic conditions were worsening while conflict escalatated. As Washington could not continue to support Mobutu under those circumstances, it abandoned its support and let go of Mobutu. U.S. policy makers also realized that U.S. policy was contributing to prolonging the conflict in Angola. As the Cold War ended, the Soviets were no longer interested in supporting the MPLA and the U.S. saw no logical reason to continue assisting UNITA. This radical shift in U.S. policy was also attributed to U.S. commitment in building peace in the region as well as democracy in both countries. The changes in U.S foreign
policy towards both countries also confirm that the United States was not willing to compromise its democratic promotion agenda for energy security or oil. If the United States feared that pushing democratic reforms would jeopardize its oil interests, we would not have seen it advocate for reform in Angola.

Since the end of Cold War, the United States has been actively engaged in democracy programs in both countries as well. Between 1990 and 2004, it gave over 41 million dollars for democracy programs in Angola while it spent 32 million dollars in Congo. Most of the democracy programs in both countries focused on peace initiatives as both countries were coming out of long civil wars. In addition, U.S. democracy assistance in Angola also focused on elections and capacity building in civil society. U.S. democracy assistance to Congo also came after the end of the Mobutu regime. In addition to the democracy assistance the United States gave to both countries, we have seen it alienate known human rights violators and those who obstructed democratic process in both countries. In 1990, the United States ended relations with Mobutu and few years later with UNITA once it refused to accept the election results in Angola.

When U.S. democracy programs and diplomatic gestures in Angola and Congo are compared, Angola overshadows Congo in both areas. This is an indication that the United States has taken a much greater interest in Angola in the 1990s, particularly in building democracy and peace in the country. The U.S. willingness to take risks in advocating
democracy in the oil state of Angola touches the core assumption that the U.S. is not willing to advocate democracy in oil states as we had seen in its dealings with the Middle Eastern oil states.

The 1990s also saw a shift in U.S. foreign aid. In the previous three decades, Congo received significant foreign aid. In 1990, the United States ceased aid programs to Congo under Mobutu but started new programs in Angola. The United States only resumed aid programs to Congo after Mobutu left.

![Figure 5.8: Comparative Overview of U.S. foreign aid to Angola and Congo](image)

Foreign aid has the potential to explain the wider U.S. foreign policy. A comparative evaluation of U.S. foreign aid programs between Angola and Congo indicate that during the period it had increased interests in Congo, the United States gave large amounts of aid and when its interests declined in the 1990s, so did its foreign aid. When U.S. interests in Angola
increased in the 1990s, its foreign aid also increased. Since 2001, U.S. foreign aid programs to Congo and Angola had been equivalent until 2006 when aid to Congo dramatically increased.

C.2 Absence of Oil in U.S. Foreign Policy

From its independence in 1975 to 1992, the United States did not recognize the MPLA leadership in Angola and did not provide any military or foreign aid to the country. However, the United States had energy interests in Angola and it was not only importing oil from the country but also allowed U.S. companies to invest in the country. Based on the traditional assumption that when the United States had economic interests, it would forgo other priorities and work with the ruling regime, we should have seen the U.S. government recognize and work with the MPLA. However, the United States not only refused to recognize and work with the regime but vigorously supported opposing rebel groups. If Washington believed that such policies would have jeopardized its energy and business interests, it would have abandoned its support to UNITA and worked with MPLA. However, we did not see that happen.

The Cold War was the time period the United States worked with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East to secure its oil interests. The 1970s oil crisis also forced the United States to reevaluate its approach and dealing with Middle Eastern oil states. The United States, after
the crisis, devised two policies that would allow it become better prepared for future shock. While it looked for other sources of oil, it also came up with the Rapid Response Unit which would provide quick U.S. military response to crisis areas. If the United States followed these two policies in Angola, the policies and actions we had seen would have been different. The United States should have assumed that its oil interests in Angola would be jeopardized because of its aligning with a group (UNITA) that did not have control over oil resources. In addition, it should have assumed that MPLA can at any time cut off oil exports to the United States or force out U.S. companies from the country. U.S. policy makers did not assume this or give these positions serious consideration as they did not change their foreign policy after the oil crisis.

U.S. policy makers might not have changed their policy toward Angola for two reasons. First, U.S. policy makers might not have given Angola’s oil a significant place. Angola’s oil production and known reserves were not significant in the late 1970s compared to Middle East or North America. Thus, U.S. policy makers might not have given a strong weight to Angola’s oil when devising its energy policy after the oil shock. U.S. policy makers did not give strong priority to Africa’s or Angola’s oil until the turn of century, thus this is one presumption for absence of change in U.S. foreign policy towards Angola.

The second possibility is that U.S. multinational oil corporations have significant technological, financial and market advantage over other MNCs in Angola. Policy makers
might have assumed that Angola would have much to lose by meddling in oil investments in the country. The oil sector has been left out of political dealings by both MPLA and the U.S. government. The MPLA administration had actually tried to protect U.S. companies in the country and actively tried to attract them. U.S. multinational corporations have dominated the oil sector over their European counterparts in Angola. These complex business relationships gave Washington the upper hand and U.S. policy makers did not fear that the MPLA government would take the radical action of expelling U.S. multinationals or nationalize their investment. Thus, the United States was free to pursue any policies or political decisions.

U.S. foreign policy towards both Angola and Congo in the post 1990 period was also different in that democracy and human rights outweigh U.S. oil interests. Looking at U.S. democracy programs and diplomatic engagement with both Angola and Congo since the 1990s, it is evident that the United States has not necessarily compromised democracy and human rights for its oil interests in Angola. Based on the assumption that the U.S. forgoes its democratic principles in place of oil, the U.S. should have had none or minor democracy program in Angola as an aggressive push for democracy might antagonize Angola’s government. In addition, there was no radical difference between U.S. foreign policy in democracy assistance and diplomatic engagement between oil producing country- Angola- and non-oil producer –Congo-. Thus, it is possible to conclude that oil did not play any significant role in shaping U.S. foreign policy, particularly democracy promotion. Based on
evidence collected on U.S. foreign policy practices towards Angola and Congo over the past fifty years, it is possible to conclude that oil production of a country and U.S. foreign policy of advocating democracy or building diplomatic relationships with authoritarian regime have no correlation in African oil state of Angola.

History of U.S. foreign policy towards Angola and Congo over fifty years since the 1960s raises an interesting question. When looking at U.S. energy policy and its foreign policy towards other oil states in the Middle East, it was evident that oil played a major role. The United States abandoned its democracy and human rights agenda when it interacted with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. If the United States was able to pursue its political agenda or a policy of containment (during the Cold War) when dealing with African oil states without jeopardizing its energy interests, why was it unable to do so when dealing with Middle Eastern oil states? In addition, have U.S. policy makers overstated the significance of the risk of pushing for reforms in the Middle East over its energy security? Finally, have U.S. policy makers learned from their experience in the Middle East about the consequences of authoritarian rule and instability in oil states and pushed for reforms in Angola since the early 1990s? These questions highlight some of the important contributions this study can bring to our understanding of U.S. foreign policy and energy security as well as changes the U.S. policy makers have incorporated in there dealing with African oil states over the last two decade. After conducting another paired study of an oil and non-state state in the next chapter, the dissertation will answer these questions.
CHAPTER VI:
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SUDAN AND ETHIOPIA

This chapter will provide an evaluation of U.S. foreign policy towards the Sudan and Ethiopia starting in the early 1960’s. Each sections starts by providing a historical and political overview of the country and then continues with a detailed examination of U.S. policy towards each country. The analysis will be done using U.S. foreign aid, diplomatic engagement, military aid and democracy promotion. As neighbors and two large states with strong geopolitical interest to the United States, Sudan and Ethiopia provide an excellent comparative analysis of domestic and international factors that has influenced U.S. foreign policy. One major variable that distinguishes Sudan from Ethiopia is the presence of oil in Sudan.

A. Sudan

A.1 Background

Sudan is currently the third largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sudan’s oil production is small compared to the two largest producers in the region. However, Sudan’s oil production has increased dramatically since 1999. In addition, oil plays a major role in the domestic economy as it accounts for about 73 percent of Sudan's total export revenues. Sudan’s oil resources were first developed in the 1950’s and then again in the late 1970’s.
However due to instability in the government and domestic unrest, it was never fully developed and exported. In 1975, Chevron signed a production-sharing agreement with the Sudanese government to explore oil and gas. After carrying out extensive geological and geophysical work, Chevron started drilling operations. In 1979, it struck oil in Abu Gabra, in southern Kordofan. Due to the war in the South, Chevron abandoned its activities in 1986.\textsuperscript{32} Since the late 1990’s, many European and Asian based have returned back to Sudan to participate in exploration and production of oil. However, no U.S. based company has been allowed to conduct any oil related operations due to economic embargo placed on the country by the United States.

A.2 U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Sudan between 1960-1990

Sudan has gone through periods of several civilian and military rulers since its independence in 1956. El-Ferik Ibrahim Abboud took over the government two years after its independence by overthrowing the civilian rule Abd Allah Khalil. Abboud strengthened his relations with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt which the United States viewed as Socialist. Abboud also had a policy of “Islamization” and in 1964 he expelled 300 foreign missionaries and continued to carry on the war in the south. These actions constrained relations between the United States and Sudan. In the 1960’s, U.S. diplomatic relations with Sudan were limited due the nature of Sudan’s leaders. The final diplomatic gash between the two countries came in 1967 when Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the United States.
States, siding with other Arab nations in the Arab-Israeli War. Despite the diplomatic constraints, the United States gave military aid to Sudan.

During Abboud and other anti-Western regimes in Sudan, U.S. military and other forms of assistance were very limited. U.S. main military aid came largely in a form of International Military Education and Training. U.S. IMET support was under $500,000 annually. Despite having a hostile relationship, the United States also gave Sudan additional military assistance in the form of a loan. In 1967, one of the largest United States military assistance was given to Sudan in a form of direct loan for military finance valued at 7 million dollars. This was the only major military aid given to Sudan until 1979.

After Abboud was overthrown in 1964, Al-Khatim Khalifa and Mohamed Ahmad Mahgoub briefly ruled Sudan before Gaafar Numiery came to power in 1969. Numiery came to power with the help of Sudanese Communist Party which had pan-Arabism ideology. Numiery initially strengthened his relationship with the Soviets and received substantial military aid from Soviet Union. He also embraced socialism and established a close relationship with Nasser of Egypt (Clough 92, 83). When Numiery came to power, Washington decreased its foreign aid, including food aid, and loans and grants also came to a halt. Between 1969 and 1972, it gave a total of three hundred thousand dollars in food aid and no other aid was given to Sudan.
Figure 6.2 US Military Assistance to Sudan 1965-2007
Source: US Green Book

Numiery’s relations with Soviets went sour after he became suspicious that the Soviets were behind the 1971 attempted coup. Numiery broke off all association with the Soviets immediately and in 1972 resumed relations with the United States. Even so, U.S.-Sudan relations did not show much improvement until Numiery visited Washington in 1976 (Clough 92, 83). Changes in political environment in Ethiopia in 1974 also made Sudan more important to the United States. After the overthrow of Haile Sellassie who had been a close ally to the U.S. in Ethiopia and the communist revolution, Ethiopia became a partner with the Soviets. The Ford administration then assumed Sudan “to be of strategic importance to U.S. national interest with the advent of a pro-Soviet military regime in Ethiopia” (Peterson 2003, 13). The United States then became eager to foster its ties with Khartoum. Numiery also allowed the Pentagon to use Port Sudan to help patrol the Indian Ocean (Dobson & Marsh 2006, 112). Sudan by 1982 also became the largest U.S. foreign aid recipient in Sub-Saharan Africa, getting over $160 million in economic assistance and
$100 million in military aid annually. In the 1970’s Sudan went through some political change with partial end to the civil war and the country appeared to be heading in the right direction in the eye of U.S. officials, particularly in the State Department. The initial close relationship between the U.S. – Sudan became apparent when Assistant Secretary of State Crocker in April 1983 declared that the United States was “Sudan’s closest Western friend” (Clough 92, 88).

After dramatically reducing military assistance between 1969 and 1979, Washington started a series of large scale military assistance to Sudan. The first substantial aid was direct military loans estimated at 12 million dollars and the aid increased to 56 million dollars in 1980 and to $62 million in 1981. It reached a peak of $96 million in 1982. Between 1979 and 1982, the United States gave a total 229 million dollars in direct military financing loans. U.S. direct loans for military financing ended in 1982 but Military Assistance Program (MAP) grant program started the same year. In 1982, it gave $79 million and the amount increased to $80 million the following year. Between 1983 and 1987, it gave a total of $270 million dollars in MAP grants.

In 1973, Washington also increased food aid to 4.3 million dollars from less than one hundred thousand dollars the previous year. Between 1973 and 1990, food aid to Sudan was on a continuous rise except for a few years. During the 1984/85 East African famine, Sudan also benefited from large food assistance. The total amount of food aid Sudan received in
1985 was estimated to be over 264 million dollars. In 1984, the U.S. also resumed economic assistance in a form of grants and loans and it gave Sudan 42 million dollars as a loan during the same year. U.S. grant assistance recommenced in a larger scale in 1979 and continued to increase until 1985 when it reached a peak of 256 million dollars. Sudan, in the four years between 1981 and 85 alone, received over 1.2 billion dollars.

![Figure 6.3 U.S. Food Aid to Sudan 1960-1990](image)

*Source: US Green Book*

Numiery made one of his visits to Washington in November of 1983 to obtain aid, but his trip turned rocky when he openly denounced Israel. Despite his open hostility toward Israel, Washington continued to support him. Even though economic conditions were worsening in Sudan, the senior U.S. government officials in Pentagon disregarded the domestic economic
conditions and continued to work with Numiery as well. The U.S. continued to support and work with Numiery to counter Soviet’s presence in Ethiopia as well as instability in Egypt. In the early 1980’s, Sudan’s close relations with its neighbors, Egypt and Libya created alarm in Washington. Washington’s close friendship with Numiery also unraveled after he became born again Muslim, erratic and a dictator (Clough 92, 83).

Despite the large amount of aid Sudan received, the country did not show any economic progress. Former President George H Bush made a visit to Sudan in April of 1985 to assess U.S – Sudan’s relations. Washington, in order to push economic reform in Sudan, halted its foreign aid and forced Numiery to implement economic reform. Numiery, rather than instigating reform made a trip to Washington to request continuation of U.S. foreign assistance. After meeting with President Reagan on April 1, 1985, Numiery got some aid released but significantly less than Sudan used to get (Clough 92, 89).

Even though Washington officially broke diplomatic relations with the Numeiry administration in 1985, it continued to give him military assistance. However, military aid declined by 300% from 1986 to 1987 and MAP grants program was discontinued in 1988. The U.S. has not given any direct military assistance to Sudan since 1988. Even though Numiery was gone, the U.S. remained an important partner to Sudan under Sadiq al Mahdi as it continued to be a significant foreign aid donor. U.S. aid reached its peak in 1985 and then declined until 1990 when it completely ceased.
During the Cold War period, the U.S. did not have any interest in promoting democracy or human rights in Sudan. U.S.’s main interest was bringing about an end to the north-south conflict. After Numiery successfully reached a peace deal between the north and south, Sudan’s relation with the U.S. improved. However, after Numiery abandoned the peace agreement and installed Sharia law in 1983, revolt started in the south. The Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) was also formed and the civil war restarted. The U.S. in 1984/85 pushed Numiery to resort to peace and blocked economic assistance briefly to show its discontent with Numiery. Once Sadiq Al-Mahdi came to power through election in 1986, the U.S. showed some interest in working with him to resolve the north – south conflict. Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen met with Sadiq in 1989 to discuss peace negotiation (Cohen 2000, 65). However, Sadiq was overthrown few days after his meeting with Cohen.

A.3 U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Sudan Between 1990 – 2001

U.S. foreign policy toward Sudan between 1960 and 1990 can be characterized as unstable and impulsive. U.S. foreign policy to Sudan was dominated by the Cold War and heavily influenced by the nature of the regime in power in Sudan. Sudan went through several leaders and when it had a leader that exhibited pro-Western attitude, Washington worked with him. On the other hand, when the leader reflected anti-Western or Islamism attitude,
the U.S. shunned the leader. The frequent change of leaders and U.S. frequent modification of policy characterized U.S - Sudan relations between 1960 and 1990. Nevertheless, Sudan was one of the larger recipients of U.S. foreign aid and military assistance. The size and magnitude of U.S. assistance reflected U.S. interests in the country. During the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, Sudan was the largest U.S. foreign aid recipient in Sub-Saharan Africa, getting over $160 million in economic assistance and $100 million in military aid in 1982 alone.

Al-Bashir came to power by overthrowing Sadiq Al Mahdi in 1989. The George H. Bush administration initially opted for dialogue with Bashir in hopes of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. Though the U.S. continued providing humanitarian assistance, it later terminated all economic assistance “because U.S. law obliges a suspension of economic and military aid to any country if its democratically elected government is forcibly deposed” (Petterson 2003, 13). The Bashir administration looked at U.S. cancelation of economic assistance and continuation of other humanitarian assistance particularly to the South as interference in domestic affairs of Sudan (Brynn 1995). Sudan also accused the U.S. and the UN that food and medicine destined for Southern Sudan was ended up in rebel hands. United States’ main focus in the early 1990’s on Sudan was to facilitate foreign aid as well as bring about peaceful end to the north – south war. Former Undersecretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen led American initiated talk in May 1990 with Southern
People Liberation Army (SPLA) and Bashir (Cohen 2000, 61). This was the last diplomatic involvement by the George H. Bush administration in Sudan.

U.S. – Sudan relations under the Clinton administration started to unravel after several incidents harmed U.S. interests. In 1992 in the southern city of Juba, two Sudanese employees of USAID were executed by the regime allegedly for assisting the SPLA. Two more Sudanese USAID employees were also taken and are believed to be killed. The Khartoum government argued that the employees were using USAID radio to pass information to SPLA. When U.S. Ambassador Petterson wrote a letter to Bashir asking for information about the execution of a local USAID employee, Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed sent a diplomatic note which indicated that the letter “constituted interference in Sudan’s internal affairs and contained undiplomatic language” (Petterson 2003, 30). The security threat led to reduction of embassy staff and evacuation of dependents in 1993. U.S. Embassy Khartoum's staff remained small for several years and travel to Khartoum by U.S. visitors became subjected to both Embassy and State Department review and approval. By 1996, the United States withdrew all USAID staff and diplomats from the country.

The absence of full time diplomats in Khartoum created a gap and a weak information flow. It also weakened Washington’s influence as there was no direct engagement with Khartoum. U.S. diplomatic communication in the late 1990’s was made by occasional visits by former Under Secretary Pickering and Special Envoy Johnston who made two trips to Khartoum for
high-level consultations. In 1993, Under Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, also visited the country to seek UN Security Council resolution for Somalia. However, Cohen’s discussion with Al Bashir turned into talks about bilateral relations and Bashir clearly asked Cohen why the United States was picking on Sudan? (Petterson 2003, 56). The Clinton administration was keen not to publicize any senior State Department officials visit to Khartoum as it believed that visits by senior officials can be interpreted by the Sudanese as a sign that relations were restored to normal.

The Clinton administration policy towards Sudan was that of isolationism and containment. These policies were developed directly in response to Sudan’s open door policy towards international terrorist networks. Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher in 1993 put Sudan on terrorist list and in October 1993 interview with AFP stated: “relations between Sudan and the U.S. would remain bad unless the Sudanese government began to show respect for human rights, renewed a democratic process and stopped supporting terrorism” (Petterson 2003, 101).

While isolating the Khartoum government, the Clinton administration also tried to put political pressure by creating a friendly relationship with leaders of SPLA. Clinton tried to achieve these through “high-level official meetings with opposition groups in East Africa, travel into Southern Sudan, and bilateral and multilateral sanctions” (Deng & Morrison 2001, 3). Some leaders of Southern Sudan established a close relationship with members of
Congress and State Department. In 1993, Congressmen Frank Wolf of VA and Harry Johnson of FL flew to Southern Sudan but not through Khartoum and the Bashir government denounced their visit (Petterson 2003, 81). The most senior level diplomatic support to Southerners came in October 1999 when Secretary of State Albright met with John Garang of SPLA in Kenya and she praised him and condemned the Sudanese government (Petterson 2003, 237). These actions did not bring significant political change in Sudan.

Sudan was accused of hosting individuals responsible for the 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian president Mubarak in Addis Ababa. When Sudan refused to hand over the individuals, the UN Security Council passed a resolution placing sanctions on Sudan. Washington was a strong supporter of the resolution. However, the resolution was never fully implemented, particularly the ban on international flights by Sudan Airways. Failure of the UN resolution led Clinton to impose stricter sanctions which limited all trade activities between the two countries in 1997. The sanctions put full restrictions on trade with Sudan and a freeze on assets of Government of Sudan. Sanctions which limited U.S. corporate investments and transfer of technology for the development of Sudan’s energy sector hampered Sudan energy sector and kept the country isolated but did not achieve any of its political objectives.
U.S. - Sudanese relationship reached bottom after the terrorist attack of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and presumed relationship between the attackers and Osama bin Laden who was residing in the Sudan at that time. In response to the attack, the U.S. bombed El Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Sudan on August 1998. Washington’s action strengthened Sudan’s position in Middle East as many considered it as an assault by the United States (Deng & Morrison 2001, 6). In response to attack, the Khartoum regime worked hard to portray U.S. policy toward Sudan as reflecting an anti-Sudanese and anti-Islamic bias.

After Al Bashir requested Osama bin Laden to leave Sudan, the U.S. felt that the Bashir government was at last moving in the right direction on the terrorism issue and interaction between Khartoum and Washington got better. The U.S. embargo was eased in 2000 and bilateral talks resumed in March 2000 and one of the main topics of discussion was terrorism. Though Washington wanted to improve its relationship with Sudan, it did not want the Bashir government to get full international recognition until it improved its domestic records on human rights and end the conflict with the South. In June 2000, U.S. State Department expressed opposition to lifting the UN sanctions against Sudan imposed in 1996. During the same year, the U.S. State Department also successfully opposed Sudan’s candidacy for a UN Security Council seat (Petterson 2003, 237). Sudan, on the other hand, wanted to mend and reestablish its relationship with the U.S. as it believed that having a positive relationship with the United States is important in building international standing and legitimacy even for its energy sector. Sudan linked U.S. and UN Security Council
sanctions as an obstacle to getting international assistance from the World Bank and IMF to develop its oil industry (Deng & Morrison 2001, 7).

In the 1990’s, U.S. democracy assistance to Sudan was limited to human rights and peace building. Through its embassy in Khartoum, it tried to monitor human rights violations in Sudan but it was constrained due to shortage of staff and security concerns. Washington mainly worked with U.N. Human Rights Commission in bringing about international condemnation of human rights violations by Sudanese government. The United States, while openly criticizing human rights abuse going on in Sudan, remained limited in its action due to previous sanctions it had placed on the country. Between 1990 and 2001, it gave zero direct assistance for democracy, human rights or peace initiatives to Sudan.

Changes in international politics in 1990 and the end of Cold War reduced U.S. interests in Sudan. As “the Cold War was over, Sudan has no strategic interest in the United States (except in the negative sense that it was a nesting ground for Islamic terrorist organizations), and the upper reaches of the Bush and Clinton administration were focused on other international problems” (Peterson 2003, 83). In the 1990’s, the Bashir government also hosted Osama bin Laden and was welcoming to other Muslim extremists. In addition, the well documented human rights abuse and north-south conflict made the Bashir government appear to be a hostile regime to the international community. These political events pushed Washington to have limited engagement with Sudan. As human rights and democracy
became globally acceptable norms, the United States did not want to abandon these norms and provide military support to a well-known human rights violator. Thus, it has not given any direct military assistance to Sudan since 1988.

Over all, post-Cold War politics in Sudan was shaped by a rise in Islamic fundamentalism and Sudan’s support to extremists until today (Rothchild & Keller 2006, 106-107). U.S. interests in Sudan in the 1990’s include “detrerring Sudanese support for terrorism and regional extremism, supporting an end to the civil war, encouraging the restoration of political/human rights, and ending the humanitarian crisis” (Brynn 1995). However, Clinton’s policy did little to either end the north-south war or the humanitarian crisis. The Clinton administration was never clear on the ultimate goal of its policy toward Sudan and was ambiguous. The administration was never clear if it wanted regime change or push for reform. Such ambiguity worked for a benefit of Khartoum which accused Washington of covert operation against it (Deng & Morrison 2001, 3). U.S. policy was also weakened as some African, European and Asian states which normalized their relationship with Sudan and continued their trade relations. The U.S. policy was left ineffectiveness with no other partner.

U.S. foreign policy “did not significantly weaken Khartoum, strengthen southern and northern opposition, moderate the conduct of Sudan’s war, enhance humanitarian access and deliveries, or promote a process of genuine peace negotiations” (Deng & Morrison 2001, 5).
A.4 U.S. Foreign Policy towards Sudan between 2001 and Present

U.S. foreign policy towards Sudan between 1990 and 2001 can be characterized as isolationism and antagonistic. Due to the Bashir’s support to terrorist groups, the Clinton administration tried to isolate Sudan. Sudan’s significance in U.S. diplomatic circle also dropped and Washington became disengaged with the regime by closing its aid mission and reducing its Embassy staff. In addition, U.S. bombing of pharmaceutical plants in Khartoum elevated the hostility between the two countries. U.S. foreign policy toward Sudan under the George W Bush administration was very different than the Clinton years.

When George W. Bush came to office, he already had heard about the horror of Southern Sudan from Senators Bill Frist, Sam Brownback and Congressman Frank Wolf, all of whom had been to the region. The Rev. Franklin Graham, son of Billy Graham, has also been a staunch advocate of Southern Sudan and he had lobbied President Bush on their behalf (Petterson 2003, 238). The advocacy work of the religious right created a policy shift towards Sudan under the Bush administration. To head his peace and other initiatives, Bush appointed former Senator John Danforth on Sept. 6, 2001 as special envoy to Sudan. The appointment reflected his commitment to the country (Copson 2000, 89). One of the new administration’s main goals was to end the north-south conflict.
Secretary of State Colin Powell also put high priority on Sudan and believed that the best course would be for the United States to become directly involved in an international effort to end the Sudan war (Petterson 2003, 239). In January 2002, in talks in Switzerland mediated by American and Swiss, Bashir’s administration and SPLM signed six months cease-fire to allow for immediate dispatch of food aid. Though President Bush signed Sudanese Peace Act which would place more punitive steps against the Bashir regime, the measure was put on hold after the initial signs of cooperation from Sudan. Sudan also lifted a ban on U.S. diplomats in 2002 and some U.S. diplomats were back in Sudan shortly after that. The U.S. also indicated that it would not oppose lifting UN ban on Sudan.

The Bush administration initially continued Clinton’s foreign aid programs. In July 2001, when a high-level delegation, headed by former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios, visited Khartoum and areas controlled by SPLA in the South, the U.S. pledged additional humanitarian assistance to both north and south Sudan. In 2001, the Bush administration while keeping several economic sanctions against Sudan, lifted foreign aid restriction and started additional programs. Development assistance, economic support, health programs including CDC run programs all started back again in 2001/2002. Bush administration’s major programs, however, focused on the Southern Sudan. Two of the signature programs were Southern Sudan Agricultural Revitalization Project which provides $22.5 million for a five year and the Sudan Basic Education Program which was also budgeted around $20 million over five years. Both programs were exclusively implemented in the South.
The Bush administration was faced with several conflicting dilemmas when dealing with Sudan. While it wanted to continue to work with the Bashir regime to bring about a peaceful end in the north-south conflict, it also did not want to have a close relationship with Bashir so as not to create an impression of acceptance of the regime and its actions.

9/11 terrorist attack also brought back Sudan’s interest to the Washington. As bin Laden previously resided in Sudan, the Bush administration wanted to work closely with the Bashir administration to extract all known information about bin Laden. Any collaboration between the CIA and Pentagon with the Bashir administration has been denied by the Bush administration. However, there were assumptions that the Bush administration changed its policy to gain victory against the war on terror (McLaughlin 2004).

In order to deal with Sudan, the U.S. initially took a carrot and stick approach. The U.S. wanted to put pressure on Sudan on all possible avenues and the U.S.-Sudan Peace Act of 2002 included a commitment on the part of the U.S. government to “take all necessary and appropriate steps to deny Sudan government access to oil revenues in order to ensure that funds are not used for military purposes” (Shankleman 2006, 125). While putting a pressure on the Bashir government, the Bush administration also continued to provide diplomatic support to Southerners and was openly working with SPLM. Dr. John Garang, leader of SPLM, came to the U.S. in March of 2002 for a talk with Bush Administration officials and met with Secretary of State Colin Powell, senior White House officials and members of
Congress (Dagne 200). The carrot and stick approach worked and the United States along with the UN were successful in ending the north-south conflict.

The North–South conflict ended in 2004 and in the same year the Darfur crisis started. In the eye of many international observers, the Bashir government played a key role in helping the Janjaweed arm themselves and forcefully evicts black Sudanese from Darfur region, an act which was labeled genocide by former Secretary of State Powell. In 2004, Colin Powell also became the first Secretary of State to visit Sudan since 1978 when Cyrus Vance plane stopped over for refueling. The main goal of Powell’s visit was to discuss ways to halt “the suffering and violence in Sudan's western region of Darfur, home to the world's worst humanitarian crisis” (McLaughlin 2004). In opposition to the role of Sudan’s government in the Darfur crisis the UN passed two different resolutions the first on March 2005 and then in April 2006. In response to the resolution, on April 27, 2006, President Bush issued Executive Order 13400, expanding the national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 13067 to block the property and interests in property of certain persons connected with the conflict in Darfur. President Bush’s harsh measures against Sudan did not stop there. In October of the same year, Bush signed an executive order placing countrywide sanction against Sudan but excluded regional government of Southern Sudan and other areas such as

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33 This is part of US Department of Treasury. Title 31 Part 538 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations and Executive Order -- Blocking Property of Persons in Connection with the Conflict in Sudan's Darfur Region -- An overview of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations.
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, Abyei, Darfur. These actions were taken to marginalize the Khartoum government.

The UN also started to get involved in Sudan to end the Darfur crisis in 2004. U.S. military assistance to Sudan since 2004 has been coming in the form of multilateral assistance to fund peace keeping operations in Darfur. In 2004, it contributed 5.5 million dollars but that amount escalated to 167 million dollars the following year. In 2006, it contributed 154 million dollars and in 2007 it peaked to 254 million dollars. The United States has remained the largest contributor to UN/African Union operations in Darfur. In four years between 2004 and 2008, it contributed a total of 580 million dollars. Though all of these assistances went under military operation funding category for Sudan, none went to Sudan government directly.

The Darfur crisis dominated U.S. – Sudan relations during the second term of President Bush’s administration. To implement his policy, President Bush appointed Andrew Natsios as special envoy to Sudan to deal with Darfur. Senior State Department officials made several visits to Sudan to pressure the Bashir administration to take more aggressive approach to end the Darfur crisis and also accept UN resolution to deploy additional UN led peace keeping forces. In April 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick and Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer traveled to Sudan to discuss the Darfur
crisis as well as check on the status of North-South peace agreement. Zoellick, during his visit, also traveled to Darfur and demanded a quick end to the violence.

In addition to the White House, Congress has also been actively involved in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Sudan since the escalation of Darfur conflict. Since 2004, several members of Congress introduced a total of 104 legislations all dealing with Sudan and passed 52 bills. In the 110th Congress session, 11 bills addressing several issues on Sudan ranging from funding to condemnation of China’s position passed. 34 In order to counter Washington’s pressure and negative news coming out of Sudan, the Sudan government in July 2005 hired a lobbying firm, C/L International, to provide public relations services. To bypass U.S. government restriction on U.S. companies doing business with Bashir’s government, C/L International was given exemption by the Department of State. The State Department authorized this exemption to show some diplomatic gesture that it was willing to work with Bashir. This was the first such measure taken since the imposition of sanctions in 1997. Later in 2005, the State Department moved Sudan “from Tier III country, worst offenders of Trafficking in Persons (TIP), to Tier II. According to the Presidential Determination Memorandum, the Secretary of State has determined that Sudan “is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance” (Dagne 2006). This was due to successful lobbying of C/L International.

34 Information collected from SaveDarfur Collation (http://www.savedarfur.org/) Accessed on Jan. 22, 2010
Since 2001, U.S. foreign aid to Sudan has been increasing but it largely remained under food aid. Total U.S. food aid between 2001 and 2007 was over 1.7 billion dollars. The United States also gave additional humanitarian assistance valued at 880 million dollars under International Disaster and Famine Assistance. The United States also started to provide support to Sudan through Trade Capacity Building Assistance program. The Trade Capacity Building Assistance program provided capacity building assistance to developing nations in trade and international business. U.S. assistance to Sudan through this program started in 2002 and reached $4 million by 2005. U.S. trade assistance to Sudan was given during the same time it has placed strict economic sanction in the country. These two polices are contradictory to each other. Nevertheless, the Bush administration has given more support to Sudan than any other previous administrations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1 United States Trade Capacity Building Assistance by Category - Sudan ($US in thousands)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade Facilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Customs Operation and Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Export Promotion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business Services and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial Sector Development and Good Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade-Related Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governance/Transparency and Inter-Agency Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL TCB</td>
</tr>
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SOURCE: The USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services (EADS)
In 2001, the U.S., for the first time gave financial assistance for democracy and peace activities. U.S. democracy assistance to Sudan was small compared to overall development assistance. In 2002 and 2003, the Bush administration gave over 8 million dollars annually. The largest portion of the money was spent in governance and all of U.S. democracy assistance was spent in Southern Sudan and Darfur. Other U.S. democracy programs in Sudan included peace building initiatives and the main goal of the program was to support the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the north and south. The U.S. government has been active in helping Southern Sudan establish a government and has provided technical assistance in “formation of core government institutions and systems” (Hess 2007).

President Bush was the most active president to tackle Sudan’s domestic conflict and humanitarian crisis than any other previous administrations (Copson 2007, 95). Bush’s meeting with human rights advocates, Darfur and Southern Sudan leaders also reflects his commitment to human rights. President George W. Bush in 2007 met with Salva Kiir, First Vice President of the Government of National Unity of the Republic of the Sudan and President of the Government of Southern Sudan. In December 2008 when celebrating Human Rights Day, President George W. Bush also met with Dr. Halima Bashir, a Darfur Human Rights Activist. Bush was the first President to give presidential diplomatic recognition to Southern Sudan and Darfur leaders. Despite the interest and high level talks, the U.S. was represented by Chargé d’Affaires rather than an ambassador for several years.
Alberto M. Fernandez was the Chargé d’Affaires stationed in Khartoum until July 2009. It is also important to note that Sudan’s importance to the U.S. was not only based on U.S. domestic interest or the war on terror but regional instability. Instability in Sudan had a potential to affect other neighboring states particularly Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya (Deng & Morrison 2001, 3).

The Obama administration policy toward Sudan seems also to follow that of Bush’s and does not reflect any radical change. Obama’s administration policy is not based on energy interest but humanitarian causes. The administration outlined the significance of Sudan and U.S. obligation due to its “role as witness to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and as the first country that unequivocally identified events in Darfur as genocide” (White House 3009). One major change Obama outlined is that his administration wants to help lead comprehensive international efforts rather that follow actions such as sanction. The Obama administration has indicated that U.S. strategy in Sudan will focus on ending the suffering in Darfur, and building a lasting peace.

A.5 Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy towards Sudan

Former U.S. ambassador to Sudan Don Petterson once stated that U.S. foreign policy towards Sudan can be characterized by inconsistency and incoherency. During the Cold War, it was interested in establishing a strong foothold in the region and control Communist
expansion. In the 1960’s and 70’s, the United States was also concerned about increased Socialist movement in Egypt and then Ethiopia. In addition, it was anxious about Islamists taking root in the region. However, two domestic and regional factors limited the United States from being fully engaged in Sudan. Sudan had frequent changes of government and some of the leaders showed outright hostility towards Washington. When leaders that exhibited pro-Western attitude came to power, the United States worked with them. It provided foreign and military aid to the leaders. When anti-Western leaders came to power, it cut off military assistance and strong diplomatic relationships. U.S. foreign policy failure in Sudan is exhibited during the Numiery administration when it had changed alliances. In addition, despite the assistance and legitimacy it has given to Numiery, U.S. foreign policy toward Sudan had been viewed as a flaw for failing to accomplish its main objection of creating a stable pro-Western government.

After the end of the Cold War, the driving forces that have shaped U.S. foreign policy towards Sudan have been the fight against terrorism, domestic human rights abuse as well as humanitarian crisis within Sudan. In the 1990’s, long before 9/11 and the war on terror became an important element of U.S. foreign policy, Sudan attracted Washington’s attention as it hosted bin Laden. Clinton bombed Khartoum to retaliate Al-Qaeda’s attack of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and escalated the hostility between the two countries. The Clinton administration used a policy of isolationism to bring about changes in Bashir government. The failure of U.S.’s policy towards Sudan during Clinton years was attributed
to lack of clear direction and thought-out policy from the Washington. U.S. diplomats indicated that though the administration wanted to isolate Bashir, it was not clear if it wanted change of regime or policy change with in Sudan. The United States also pulled out its senior diplomats, closed USAID office and run its diplomatic operation using lower level personnel. Such changes while sending a clear message that the administration was disengaging from Sudan also made the United States lose any leverage in pushing reform in Sudan.

Washington’s isolation of Sudan might have put a dent on Sudan’s ability to explore and produce oil in the 1990’s. Though oil was discovered in the 1970’s, there was no production until the late 1990’s. Multinational corporations did not invest in Sudan and Sudan was limited in its market as well as it could not export to the United States. On the other hand, it is argued that rather than U.S. policy, the internal conflict and instability might have made oil companies become reserved in being fully engaged in oil sector in Sudan.

When the Bush administration came to power, U.S. foreign policy changed from disengagement to limited engagement for a goal of achieving political change in Sudan. Rather than isolating Sudan, the Bush administration wanted to be engaged to bring about an end to the humanitarians crisis and human rights violations. U.S. foreign aid, democracy assistance as well as diplomatic engagement dramatically increased, but largely went to Southern Sudan. U.S. military assistance also increased but it did not go to the government
of Sudan. U.S. foreign policy towards Sudan under Bush was very different than that of Clinton’s. Nevertheless, both presidents were concerned about human rights abuses, humanitarian crisis, domestic conflict as well as Sudan’s association with terrorists but they had a different approach in dealing with Sudan.

In the post-Cold War period, U.S. policy towards Sudan has been driven very much by humanitarian crisis and concern for terrorism than oil. Under both Clinton and Bush administrations, oil played no role in influencing policy makers. Contrary, both administrations wanted to limit U.S. companies’ involvement in Sudan’s oil sector. The U.S. government has put several economic sanctions on Sudan and limited U.S. companies from doing any business in Sudan due to the ongoing human rights violations by the Bashir government. U.S. sanctions against Sudan were purely based on political goals rather than energy benefits to the United States. U.S. government sanctions came about because of ongoing lobbying effort within the United States from the Christian right and other groups concerned over Basir’s poor human rights records. These sanctions were placed against the interest of business and oil companies who have the potential to benefit from investments in Sudan. Despite oppositions and pressures from multinationals, the U.S. government ability to keep the sanctions against Sudan reflects that a human rights concern outweighs oil interests. U.S. sanctions’ against Sudan were also based on the assumption that oil can prolong the internal crisis in Sudan. Oil revenues have the potential to strengthening the Bashir’s government military and economic capabilities. Stronger government in Khartoum means
that the Bashir government has the capacity to suppress people in the South and Darfur. Many within the U.S. government did not want to see U.S. companies indirectly support the Bashir government and thus be an instrument for domestic conflict in Sudan. These assumptions prevailed over U.S. interests in oil and thus the U.S. government put sanctions on Sudan.

Looking at U.S. engagement with Sudan and Angola since 1960 and U.S. foreign policy towards Angola during the Cold War, one assumption that becomes clear is that in both cases the U.S. government did not let oil interfere in its political decisions. During the Cold War, containment of Soviets expansion preceded oil interests in Angola. Washington did it can to support UNITA and counter Soviet’s assistance to MPLA. At the same time, it allowed U.S. multinationals conduct business in Angola. In the post 1990 period, the United States did not let its concern for human rights violations overshadowed by oil in Sudan and did not allow U.S. Companies do business in Sudan and indirectly provide benefit to Khartoum. What we can see from these both policies is that the United Stated does not necessarily prioritize energy interests over other political issues in dealing with African oil states.

The next section of this chapter will provide a historical overview of U.S. foreign policy towards Ethiopia and the conclusion of the chapter will compare U.S. policy towards the two countries.
B. Ethiopia

B.1 U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia between 1960 - 1990

Ethiopia and the United States started diplomatic relationship in 1903 when most other African countries were under European control. The United States early on wanted to form “diplomatic relations with an independent African country that has long attracted the attentions of European countries and increasingly gained international importance” (Metaferia 2009, 3). However, the relationship did not become strong until the end of World War II. After the war ended, the United States recognized the geopolitical significance of Ethiopia to its interests. U.S. interests in Ethiopia had been closely associated with its wider military and other security interests in the region. U.S. – Ethiopian relations has also been shaped by domestic politics within Ethiopia. This section analyzes the relationship between the two countries and factors that shaped U.S. foreign policy towards Ethiopia in different time periods.

U.S. diplomatic relations with Ethiopia became strong after the Italians left Ethiopia in 1943. From 1944 to 1974, Washington enjoyed a strong diplomatic relationship with Ethiopia. United States’ main interest in Ethiopia was to strengthen its relationship with Haile Selassie as it deemed Ethiopia to be a strategic location militarily and wanted its cooperation in a global telecommunications surveillance network targeted at the USSR
Ethiopia signed the Lend Lease agreement in 1943 and that was a beginning of U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia that lasted thirty years. In 1953, two additional diplomatic agreements were signed to strengthen relations between the two countries. The two agreements were The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the Agreement for the Utilization of Defense Installations within Ethiopia (Rothchild & Keller 2006, 100).

Though Pentagon initially rejected the significance of Ethiopia and indicated that Ethiopia or Eritrea had no strategic importance to the United States, it became interested in Ethiopia after Gamal Abdul Nassar of Egypt took power and established a strong tie with the Soviets (Schraeder 1994, 120). The CIA underscored growing importance of Kagnew military base located in northern Ethiopia or current day Eritrea. Congressman Frances P. Bolton (R Ohio) labeled Kagnew as the “most important radio facility in the entire world” (Schrader 1994, 130). In order to have full access to Kagnew and expand the base, the U.S. provided military aid including training of fourth division of Ethiopian army, close to 40,000 soldiers (Schraeder 1994, 123). Between 1957 and 1960, The United States spent twenty million dollars to fund the equipping and training of 28,000 Ethiopian soldiers. In 1959, the United States also agreed to provide Ethiopian air force with F86 fighter jets (Schraeder 1994, 118-119). Ethiopia then became one of the few developing countries to receive supersonic fighter jet and the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa (Lefebvre 1998).
U.S. military support to Ethiopia increased in the mid 1960’s from $8.5 million in 1964 to $18.2 million in 1967. It also provided twelve F-5 Freedom Fighter aircraft which signified U.S. commitment Ethiopia (Schrader 1994, 129). During the Emprior Haile Selassie’s period, Ethiopia was the highest recipient of U.S. assistance in Africa and between 1953 and 77, 80 percent of U.S. military assistance to Africa and 55 percent of international education and training aid to Africa went to Ethiopia. In addition one fifth of total economic aid to Africa went to Ethiopia (Yohannes 1997, 39).

Haile Selassie visited the White House more than any other African presidents. He first came to Washington in 1954 by the invitation of Eisenhower when he also made a speech at a joint

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**Figure 6.4 U.S. Military Assistance to Ethiopia by sector 1960-1990**  
*Source: USAID Green Book*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign Military Financing, Direct Loan Program Account</th>
<th>Transfer from Excess Stock</th>
<th>Foreign Military Financing Program</th>
<th>International Military Education and Training</th>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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Congress session. Haile Selassie then visited United States almost ten years later by the invitation of President Kennedy in 1963. During Haile Selassie regime, the most senior visit came from the United States was by Vice President Hubert Humphrey who visited Ethiopia in 1968. Secretary of State William Roger also visited Ethiopia in 1970 and no other Secretary of State visited the country for another twenty five years. Vice President Spiro Agnew visited Ethiopia in 1971 but he did not bring good news to the Emperor. Agnew’s visit was to inform him of the changing dynamics in U.S. Ethiopian relations and to indicate to him that Washington cannot continue providing large military aid to Ethiopia (Skinner 2003, 42).

U.S. foreign aid to Ethiopia between 1960 and 1974 reflected its wider foreign policy to the country. During the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie, it provided substantial economic assistance. The U.S. started providing large scale foreign aid to Ethiopia after Ethiopia was included in President Truman’s Four Points Program. Under the Four Points Program, Ethiopia received foreign aid and technical assistance to improve agricultural production (Metaferia 2009, 42). Between 1960 and 1974, U.S. foreign aid came mainly in a form of USAID development grants. A small portion or less than 5% went to food aid. Ethiopia until the late 1960’s had good agricultural production and did not face large scale famine until early 1970’s.

Even though Haile Selassie enjoyed a positive relationship with Washington, the United States first challenged him to reform and improve political space and modernize the country after the 1960 coup attempt. Assistance Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mennen Williams, visited Ethiopia in 1961 and made U.S. position clear to the Emperor (Skinner 2003, 38). The United States wanted Haile Selassie to remain in power for regional stability and keep Ethiopia free from communism (Rothchild & Keller 2006, 100).

By the early 1970’s, Ethiopia’s significance to Washington had declined. The shift in U.S. interests in Ethiopia started in 1966 after the Pentagon constructed a base in Indian Ocean of Diego Garcia to replace U.S. operations in Kagnew base. In 1973 the U.S. decided to withdraw from Kagnew and by 1975, the number of staff stationed there were reduced to 35. Despite these changes, Haile Selassie failed to see the declining U.S. interests in Ethiopia. In 1973, he came to Washington to seek $450 million in modern weapon, tanks and jets (Yohannes 1999, 69). Though Nixon refused military aid, he promised $200 million foreign aid to be given over several years. Despite the change in U.S. interests in Ethiopia, the largest military assistance to Ethiopia was given in 1974 in a form of a loan.

Haile Selassie was overthrown by Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1974. United States initially continued to have relationship with the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Mengistu’s rare meeting with Congressman Howard Wolpe in 1975 is a reflection of that.
The United States became uneasy about Mengistu once he became a Socialist and implemented massive land reform and nationalized private business.

U.S. foreign policy fully changed when Carter came to power and brought the issue of human rights into foreign policy agenda (Rothchild & Keller 2006, 101). Carter’s main political agenda was promotion of human rights and he elected Ethiopia as a good candidate to test his diplomacy. Unlike Mobutu of Zaire who also had a bad human rights record and enjoyed a positive relationship with the U.S., Mengistu did not have a positive relation with the Washington, thus he fell victim to Carter’s human rights agenda. President Carter terminated 100 million dollars’ worth of military credit sales and abstained from voting on World Bank loan of 75 million dollars to Ethiopia when Ethiopia signed a military contract worth $400 million dollars with the Soviet (Yohannes 1997, 85; Cohen 2000, 74). Carter overestimated his leverage against Mengistu as Mengistu retaliated by “terminating all military contracts with the U.S., ordered closure of U.S. military communication center in Asmara, Naval Medical Research Unit, USIS and diplomatic establishments in Eritrea as well as expulsion of 46 military personnel” (Yohannes 1997, 84). Ethiopia also requested that U.S. Ambassador Chapin be recalled.
The souring relations between the two countries also led a decline in foreign aid. By 1978, United States was giving Ethiopia only food aid worth less than a million dollars. All other forms of aid were suspended. During the 1984-85 famine, food aid programs escalated. In 1985 and 86, the United States gave 140 million dollars’ worth of food aid annually. The Reagan administration wanted to benefit for being the largest donor during the famine by reestablishing visibility in Ethiopia. The administration also initiated a secrete dialogue with Mengistu using the new opening (Yohannes 1997, 91). Mengistu also wanted to improve his relationship with the Reagan administration. However, Mengistu’s anti-American rhetoric did not help. Mengistu also expelled four members of U.S. Embassy staff in 1984 and Washington responded by sending two Ethiopian embassy staff back to Ethiopia (Skinner 2003, 57). Despite a large amount of food aid, U.S. diplomatic relationship remained unproductive as the two countries had little diplomatic exchange (Cohen 2000, 17). The...
large humanitarian assistance the U.S. had given to Ethiopia did not have any real leverage
with the Mengistu regime.

In the late 1980’s, once the internal crisis loomed within Ethiopia and the Mengistu regime
was under pressure from rebel groups and the Soviets decreased their assistance, the
Communist regime wanted to reestablish a relationship with the U.S. to gain access to arms
assistance. The Soviets also advised Mengistu to look to the U.S. for assistance to end the
ongoing civil war (Cohen 2000, 20). The regime then invited senior level U.S. diplomats in
1989 and Under Secretary of State for African Affairs Cohen visited Ethiopia between
August 4 and 6 of 1989. Ethiopia’s interest in rebuilding its relationship with Washington
was also evident by the fact that soon after Congressman Mickey Leland airplane crashed on
a visit in Ethiopia, U.S. Air force were granted permission for search and rescue mission
(Cohen 200, 25).

B.3 U.S. Policy Towards Ethiopia between 1990-2001

Between 1960 and 1990, Ethiopia was the largest foreign aid and military aid recipient in
Africa when it was ruled by Haile Selassie. Washington was keen to provide large support
to Ethiopia and maintain its influence in the country to contain Communist expansion in the
region. In addition, the United States was uncomfortable with Egypt socialist leader and
frequent changes of governments in Sudan. Ethiopia also had a geopolitical significance for
the U.S. as it hosted the Kagniew military based and it bordered the Red Sea. Ethiopia’s significance eventually declined and once it became a Communist nation in 1974, U.S. military assistance ceased while non-humanitarian aid significantly declined. However, Ethiopia received large humanitarian aid during the 1980’s. U.S. foreign policy towards Ethiopia during this period was made in the shadow of wider U.S. Cold War policy.

When rebel groups fighting against Mengistu made an advance in 1991 and it became evident that Mengistu’s days were numbered, the “U.S. intensified its involvement in negotiation between the Ethiopian government and the guerrilla opposition by sending high level delegates” (Schraeder 1993, 8). U.S. negotiators included Under Secretary of State for African Affairs, Harmon Cohen, his deputy Irving Hicks, Robert Frasure (member of the National Security Council) and former Senator Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minnesota). Boschwitz functioned as special envoy for former President George H. Bush (Smith 1991). The U.S. State Department was keen in getting involved in Ethiopia to avoid another chaos the world just noticed in Somalia and Liberia (Cohen 1991).

Once Mengistu left and Meles Zenawi came to power, Clinton quickly embraced him as ally of Washington in dealing with regional and continental issues. The United States also introduced three U.S. government priorities in Ethiopia and they were democratization, liberalization of market and stability. Since his initial trip to Washington in 1994, Meles Zenawi had enjoyed a close relationship with two U.S. presidents, Clinton and Bush. He had
visited the White House twice under Clinton and once under Bush. Ethiopia also greatly
benefited with a new set of foreign aid programs. Food aid increased from $78 million in
1992 to over $200 million dollars by 1994. Economic support fund and grants were brought
back after thirty years. U.S. total foreign aid in the mid 1990’s tripled from the 1980’s but
the large portion aid continued to be dominated by food aid.

United States has also made democracy promotion one element of its foreign aid. Though,
U.S. democracy assistance has remained less than 10 percent of total U.S. foreign aid
(excluding food aid), it had provided significant support in building necessary institutions for
democracy in Ethiopia. U.S. democracy assistance to Ethiopian in the 1990’s focused on rule
of law, elections and political processes. U.S. financial and technical assistance was used to
write new constitution, establish a national election commission and conduct the 1995 and
2000 national and local elections.

The U.S. military support to Ethiopia also started after 1992 with International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program in 1993. The following year U.S. military
assistance increased by tenfold and also expanded to other sectors. Foreign Military
Financing Program and Transfer of Excess Stock were included in 1995. Between 1994 and
1996, Ethiopia received 9 million dollars’ worth of military equipment. From 1997 to 1999,
U.S. military assistance shifted to Foreign Military Financing Program and Ethiopia
received a total of 7 million dollars in those years. U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia came
to a halt in 2000 due to the escalation of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1999. The United States reduced and eventually ceased any military assistance to Ethiopia between 1999 and 2002 as it did not want to contribute to the war between the two countries. The United States, through Under Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, and former National Security Adviser Anthony Lake whom Clinton appointed as a special envoy played a major role in the Algiers Accord which ended the war between the two countries.

B.4 U.S. Policy Towards Ethiopia: 2001 to Present

Similar to the regime changes many African countries went through in the 1990’s, Ethiopia also made a transition from Communism to a transitional democracy with a new group in power. With a new regime in power, U.S. foreign policy towards Ethiopia also changed in 1992. The Clinton administration established a new diplomatic relationship with Meles Zenawi administration and foreign aid as well as military assistance resumed. Democracy assistance also started and Ethiopia eventually regained its status as one of the largest recipient of U.S. assistance to Africa.

The election of President Bush and the global war on terror paved the way for renewal of U.S.-Ethiopian diplomatic relationship. Soon after 9/11, Ethiopia signed up with Washington to support U.S.’s fight on the global war on terror. However, U.S. interests in Ethiopia to fight terrorism started before 9/11. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Susan
E. Rice, in 1999 stated that “the United States has important national security interests in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s neighbor, Sudan, has long supported international terrorism, fostered the spread of Islamic extremism beyond its borders” (Rice 1999). After 9/11, the U.S. government also identified East and Horn of Africa to be at great risk to terrorist organizations determined to strike U.S. allies and interests. The U.S. identified Somalia as a safe haven for terrorist and it identified Ethiopia as a perfect partner to fight terrorist in the country. The 2005 Congressional Budget indicated that United States’ primary interests in Ethiopia include ensuring counter-terrorism support. U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia increased from zero assistance in 2001 to about 8 million dollars in 2005 to reflect these changes.

In 2005, Ethiopia received the largest military assistance through FMFP which was about $8 million dollars and in 2006 Ethiopian troops entered Somalia to fight terrorist residing the country and help the transitional government of Somalia. It is believed that the “United States quietly helped Zenawi’s forces invade neighboring Somalia after a U.S.-financed coalition of warlords lost the capital of Mogadishu to an Islamist alliance known as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)” (McClur 2008). The U.S. has rebuffed any military support to Ethiopia and has denied that it had encouraged Ethiopia to invade Somalia. U.S. officials insisted that Ethiopia was intervening in Somalia for its own security interest. However, in May of 2007, Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander of the U.S. Central Command

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(CENTCOM), visited Addis Ababa and met with Zenawi. His visit was intended to
strengthen Pentagon’s support to Ethiopia and discuss security issues in the region including
Somalia. Nevertheless, Ethiopia had been a key ally to the U.S. in the global war on terror
and had received one of the largest U.S. military assistance in Sub Saharan Africa for that
purpose since 2001.

The U.S. Department of Defense in 1999 created the Africa Center for Strategic Studies
(ACSS) as one of its five regional centers for strategic studies. The Center provides several
joint civil military academic activities for African officials in the U.S. and throughout Africa.
ACSS is based in Washington DC. In 2006, however, it opened its first office in African
continent in Addis Ababa inside U.S. embassy in Ethiopia. This is a reflection of growing
military interest in Ethiopia and the significance of the country to U.S. interest in the region.

U.S. foreign aid to Ethiopia also saw its largest increase under the George W. Bush
administration. Though food aid still dominated foreign aid, Ethiopia also received
significant aid in development assistant, health and child survival. Ethiopia was one of the
fifteen recipients of foreign aid through President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief

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Admiral William J. Fallon of the U.S. Central Command Visits Addis Ababa.

(PEPFAR) program and between 2004 and 2007 it received over three hundred million dollars. One hundred sixty million dollars came in 2007 alone. In 2006, President Bush also included Ethiopia in a special initiative to fight Malaria.

The United States also continued to provide financial assistance for democracy programs in Ethiopia. Between 2001 and 2004, it gave over 7 million dollars to governance and additional 4 million dollars for civil society programs. In 2005, Ethiopian democracy was tested when it held its third national election since 1992. The election did not end peacefully and over 200 protestors were killed and opposition party leaders were sent to jail. In the aftermath of the election, the U.S. State Department indicated that human rights violations were occurring widely in Ethiopia. In light of these human rights violations, several key members of the Congress introduced a bill that would limit U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia and force the U.S. to attach additional aid with democracy and human rights. After intense lobbying by the White House and a lobbying firm the Ethiopian government hired, DLA Piper, the bill failed to make it to the floor of Congress (Zacharia 2007). The Bush administration defended the Melse regime in the post 2005 election violence when Meles’ regime came under attack from Congress. Since the 2005 post-election violence, political space in Ethiopia has been closing. Nevertheless, the U.S has continued to provide limited democracy assistance to Ethiopia and has abstained from making strong push for democratic reforms in the country due to its other priorities or the global war on terror.
B.5 Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Ethiopia

U.S. foreign policy towards Ethiopia should be looked at in three time periods. The Cold War period should be divided into pre 1974 and post 1974. 1974 is a pivotal time in Ethiopian history as it was the year that the country had a revolution and removed the Emperor to follow Communism. U.S. foreign policy towards Ethiopia, which was also made under the influence of Cold War politics, changed during the same period as well. The last time period used in analyzing U.S. foreign policy is post 1992 which was the year that the Communist government was removed and replaced by pro-Western regime.

Ethiopia had enjoyed a close relationship with Washington during the Cold War until Haile Selassie was removed from power. During the Cold War, U.S.’s main interests in Ethiopia...
and Horn of Africa were maintaining western oriented regime, evading communist influence in Ethiopia and commitment to the principles of collective security (Yohannes 1997, 39). To secure its interests, it had provided large military and economic aid to Ethiopia during Haile Selassie and then cut off all military and non-humanitarian assistance when the Communist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power. During the Cold War, Ethiopia received 80 percent of all U.S. military assistance to Africa and 1/5 of economic assistance (Skinner 2003, 43).

After the Cold War ended and the government in Ethiopia changed, Washington started to rebuild its relationship with the country and resumed large scale foreign aid including military assistance. Washington’s main interest towards Ethiopia in the post-Cold War period has been stability, economic progress, democracy and good governance as well as fight against terrorism. Long before 9/11, the United States had identified Ethiopia as a key ally to fight terrorism in the region including Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and possibility Kenya. After 9/11, Ethiopia became one of the closest partners of the Pentagon in the global war on terror and was instrumental in fighting terrorism in Somalia. Though the Meles government has been accused of human rights violations and tampering with democracy in Ethiopia, the White House under Bush and the Pentagon have ignored the accusation and supported Meles for his unequivocal collaboration with them on the global war on terror. Ethiopia does not have oil or any other natural resources that would benefit the United States and the United States was very much interested in Ethiopia for its geopolitical significant.
Despite the democracy and human rights assistance it has given to Ethiopia, the country had shown little progress in democracy and U.S. government has largely failed to demand more radical changes. As U.S. government played an important role in “legitimating the current EPRDF leadership, the U.S. Government, until 2000, depicted the current regime in the most favorable light possible” (Vestal 2006). Moreover, the U.S. State Department in its annual human rights country report “conveyed the impression that the Ethiopian Government was committed to improving human rights and the democratization process” (Vestal 2006). On the contrary, according to other reports by organizations such as Human Rights Watch, wide spread political oppression, harassment, arrest and killing were going on in Ethiopia (Human Rights Watch 1997). The U.S. Department of State human rights report on Ethiopia started to be more candid after 1999. Washington was confronted to be more transparent and truthful about the situation in Ethiopia with the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea took global spotlight. In its 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights, the State Department further highlighted the human rights situation in Ethiopia. Despite these records, the U.S. continued to be a close ally of the current Ethiopian regime. The U.S. unambiguous support to Ethiopia despite the well recorded human right abuse is in a stark difference with U.S. foreign policy towards Sudan. Sudan despite having oil was shunned away by the United States, while Ethiopia has a positive relationship. Characteristics and diplomatic skills of the leaders probably best explain these differences. While Bashir exhibited anti-Western rhetoric, Meles frequently showed pro-Western attitude.
C. Comparative analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Sudan and Ethiopia

Unlike the top two oil states in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria and Angola, the significance of Sudan’s oil to United States was limited during the Cold War. Sudan became a major oil producer after 1999 and its production has also been increasing dramatically since then. Even though this period is also a time when the U.S. identified oil or energy security as a priority, the United States has not benefited from Sudan’s oil due to the sanction it has imposed on the country.

As two of the largest countries in East Africa, Ethiopia and Sudan have substantial influence in regional politics. In addition to their influence in Africa, the two countries also have the potential to impact activities in the Red Sea and parts of Middle East. U.S. foreign policy towards each state during the Cold War was influenced by the domestic politics and regional politics. During the first part of the Cold War, Washington supported Ethiopia as it needed an ally in the region. Sudan was unstable and had leaders with Islamist views, thus the United States avoided close relations with Sudan and worked with Ethiopia. Once it lost its influence in Ethiopia, it started to rebuild its relationship with Sudan but the relationship lasted for a short period of time as Sudan went through several coups and some of the leaders intentionally avoided the United States. U.S. foreign aid to both countries reflect that changing of U.S. alliance. Until 1969, the U.S. gave foreign aid to both Ethiopia and Sudan and from 1969 to 1975 foreign aid to Sudan ceased. Starting the early 1980’s aid given to
Sudan was significantly larger than aid that went to Ethiopia. Foreign aid to both countries declined in the 1990’s compared to the previous decade; however, aid to Ethiopia increased while it decreased significantly to Sudan. Since 2000, aid to both Ethiopia and Sudan has dramatically increased. The largest portion of aid to both countries remained food aid and other humanitarian assistances.

Figure 6.7: Comparative Overview of U.S. Foreign Aid to Ethiopia and Sudan

After the Cold War, two different issues dominated U.S. foreign policy towards both countries: terrorism and democracy or human rights. As Sudan hosted bin Laden and was friendly to other extremists, the United States tried to isolate Sudan while it signed up Ethiopia as a close partner. Washington believed that Ethiopia can play a major role in fighting terrorism in the region. The U.S. was also keen in promoting democracy and human rights in Ethiopia as well as in Sudan.
When the Bush administration came to office its policy towards Sudan changed. Rather than isolating the country, the Bush administration believed that selective engagement would bring about peace and end to the humanitarian crisis in the country. Since 2003, Sudan has been the largest foreign aid recipient in Sub-Saharan Africa including food aid. However, large portion of the aid has been going to Southern Sudan which is where most of Sudan’s oil is located. Bush’s administration policy towards Sudan has also been influenced by the fight against terrorism as some members of the Bashir’s administration had deeper knowledge of bin Laden. U.S. policy toward Ethiopia under Bush was also dominated by the global war on terror as it wanted to use Ethiopia in a proxy war in Somalia. Bush administration also wanted to professionalize Ethiopian army so that it can get involved in regional peace keeping operation under African Union. Since 2006, part of the African Union peace keeping forces stationed in Darfur came from Ethiopia.

An analysis of U.S. foreign policy towards Sudan shows that U.S. policy towards the country under the Bush administration might have been influenced by energy interests as relations with Southern Sudan increased. Even though senior administration official have indicated that U.S. priorities in the country are humanitarian assistance. This was a sharp change from Clinton administration policy and dramatic increase in foreign aid might be targeted for long term benefit. In addition, as a large portion of the aid has been going to Southern Sudan where Sudan’s oil is located and Washington has kept good diplomatic relationship with leaders of Southern Sudan, it might be implementing its policy with long term objective that
once Southern Sudan becomes independent, the new administration would be friendly to the United States. Despite this assumption, as the U.S. is not currently importing any oil from Sudan, there is no direct relationship with oil and U.S. foreign policy. In addition, as the United States also increased assistance and engagement with Ethiopia, it is evident that there is no special priority given to Sudan.

Looking at U.S. foreign policy towards Ethiopia and Sudan since 2001, we see that the U.S. does not discriminate or have favorable policy towards Sudan over Ethiopia to secure its energy interests. The United States has not given up its democracy agenda or overlooked human rights abuses in Sudan. Contrarily, it has been one of the prime advocates of human rights abuse in Sudan compared to European and Asian countries. Keeping its broad objective of promoting democracy and human rights, the United States has been working on democracy promotion programs in both Ethiopia and Sudan. The success of these programs can be debated; however, it is still possible to argue that the United States has not completely abandoned its democracy agenda in place of other interests or oil. In addition, Washington’s commitment to promoting democracy in both countries suggests that it does not discriminate where it intends to advance democracy based on other interests. The United States has also not provided any direct military assistance to Sudan. Based on the evident presented, it is possible to argue that there is no strong direct relationship between oil and U.S. foreign policy of providing military support or abandoning democracy and human rights.
CHAPTER VII:
CONCLUSION

This dissertation was conducted to see if the presence of oil influences U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African oil states. In particular, it looked at to see if the United States prioritized its energy needs over other priorities. These priorities were containment of Soviet expansion during the Cold War and support for democracy and human rights after the end of Cold War. The dissertation answered this question by looking at sixteen oil and non-oil states in Sub-Saharan Africa over three different time frames. The sixteen oil states that the study looked at are: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan. The dissertation also went into substantive in-depth analysis of case studies and looked at U.S. foreign policy toward four African states, two oil and two non-oil states. The paired countries were Angola with Zaire and Sudan with Ethiopia. U.S. foreign policy was analyzed using four different variables: military aid, foreign aid, democracy promotion, and diplomatic gestures.

Expectations

U.S. foreign policy towards oil producing states, particularly those in the Middle East and Caspian Region, had been influenced by oil. The United States has been concerned about stability in the Middle East, as any chaos there would drive up the price of oil. In order to
create stability in the region, the United States has worked with friendly authoritarian regimes in countries such as Saudi Arabia. Did the United States follow a similar policy towards African oil states? This dissertation tackled this question and analyzed if the presence of oil also influenced U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African oil states and, in particular, if the United States prioritized its energy needs over other goals. The hypotheses it tested derived from the assumption that U.S. foreign policy towards oil and non-oil African states will be significantly different. The particular hypotheses the study tested were:

- With respect to oil producers, the United States will prioritize regime stability above other goals.

- The United States will not prioritize democracy and human rights in African oil states.

- U.S. political engagement, military cooperation and foreign aid will be higher in oil states that in non-oil states.

Based on U.S. foreign policy towards Middle East, its policy towards African oil states should have been influenced by oil. Particularly, we should expect to see the United States work with authoritarian regimes and not be concerned about promoting democracy and human rights in African oil states. However, as this study found out, oil did not play any significant role in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states. The conclusion of
this study will first point out the main findings of the study and then general conclusion. It will finally point out the contribution it has made to the field.

Findings

**U.S. Foreign Policy Between 1960 and 1990**

Between 1960 and 1990, only a few countries in Africa received significant military, foreign aid and diplomatic attention from the United States. These countries were Zaire (currently Congo), Ethiopia and Sudan. While Ethiopia and Sudan received significant military and foreign aid, Zaire and Ethiopia also received the most diplomatic attention, with several visits by leaders from those countries to Washington. The largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, received insignificant military assistance compared to the non-oil states. The United States did not provide any military or foreign assistance to Angola, but it provided military assistance to a rebel group in Angola.

The overall trend of U.S. foreign policy towards Africa reflects that between 1960 and 1990 U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the wider Cold War policy. The United States provided military and foreign assistance to counter Soviet expansion in Africa. Its foreign policy towards Angola and Zaire clearly reflects this policy. In Angola, the United States assisted rebel groups that were fighting pro-Soviet regimes. In Zaire, the United States
provided diplomatic backing to dictators and authoritarian regimes that were pro-Western. Its alliance with Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire is an example of such policy.

Another notable trend in U.S. foreign policy was that its military assistance to and diplomatic relations with these countries changed as regimes in each country changed. When there was a pro-Western regime in the country, the United States provided large military and foreign assistance, and it discontinued military assistance when relationships soured. It also reduced foreign aid but continued to provide humanitarian aid to some of the countries regardless of its alliances with the regime in power. This was reflected in U.S. foreign policy towards Sudan and Ethiopia. The United States continued to provide humanitarian assistance, as it wanted to transfer its humanitarian influence into political influence in communist countries such as Ethiopia.

Based on U.S. military assistance, foreign aid, and diplomatic gestures towards African oil and non-oil states, the conclusion this study makes is that U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was not influenced primarily by oil. Rather, U.S. policies were made based on geopolitical interest rather than oil. U.S. foreign policy towards Angola perfectly reflects this assumption as the United States did not prioritize oil interests in dealing with the country. The MPLA regime in Angola followed Socialist ideology and had a close relationship with Soviet Union during the Cold War. To counter the Soviet presence in Angola, the United States backed the rebel group UNITA which was fighting against the
MPLA regime. At the same time, the United States imported oil from Angola and also
allowed U.S. companies to invest in the country. If the United States was concerned about
its energy supply from Angola, it would not have openly support the UNITA rebel group.
On the other hand, it would work with the MPLA regime to secure its interests.

When we compare U.S. military and foreign assistance towards African oil and non-oil
states, we observe that African oil states did not receive any special attention from the
United States. The largest foreign aid and military assistance recipients in Sub-Saharan
Africa between 1960 and 1990 were Zaire (Congo), Ethiopia and Sudan. All three countries
were non-oil states then; Sudan only became an oil state in the 1990s. On the other hand, a
major oil state such as Nigeria did not receive significant aid compare to the non-oil African
states. If the United States had prioritized its oil interest in Africa, we should have expected
larger military and foreign aid going to Nigeria. As Nigeria was equivalent in its population,
size, and other human development index with Zaire, Ethiopia and Sudan, the amount of
foreign and military assistance going to Nigeria should have been equivalent or larger than
the non-oil states.

The 1973 oil shock for the first time forced the United States to develop an energy policy
that included diversification of oil sources. In 1970, the United States imported more oil
from Nigeria than Saudi Arabia. It imported 17 million barrels of oil annually from Nigeria
while it imported 15 million barrels annually from Saudi Arabia. After that, the amount of
oil the U.S imported from both countries dramatically increased. By 1980, it imported 450 million barrels annually Saudi Arabia and 390 million barrels annually from Nigeria. U.S.
oil imports from Nigeria reflect that African oil suppliers have the potential to partially substitute for Middle Eastern oil suppliers when there is disruption in oil the supply. Thus, the 1973 oil shock should have changed U.S. foreign policy towards Nigeria and other African oil states; however, we did not seen U.S. foreign policy towards Nigeria change at all. This is evident that oil interests did not influence U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states such as Nigeria. As we have seen in U.S. foreign policy towards Nigeria and Angola during between 1960 and 1990, even though the United States imported oil from both countries and had energy interests, its foreign policy was not shaped by oil but by Cold War geopolitical interests.

**U.S Foreign Policy between 1990 and 2001**

In the post-Cold War period, U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states was not influenced by oil but by other political interest as well, mainly the promotion of democracy, humanitarian assistance and peace building in post conflict areas. Looking at U.S. foreign assistance, diplomatic engagement and military assistance in both oil and non-oil states confirms this. Countries that attracted significant U.S. attentions were non-oil countries, and oil countries such as Nigeria did not draw United States’ attention for its oil. Though there
was a positive change in the U.S. – Angolan relationship; it was not due to oil but to changes in international politics.

The end of the Cold War allowed the United States to freely promote democracy and human rights throughout the world. Unlike the Cold War period, democracy promotion took center stage in U.S. foreign policy. The United States government started to have a separate budget for democracy programs, good governance, and accountability. These programs also started to be tied to other foreign aid assistance, and these were also reflected in U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African states. In the 1990s, U.S. democracy assistance to both oil and non-oil states increased. Countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique received significant democracy assistance during this period. All of these countries were emerging from long years of civil war and were holding elections for the first time. U.S. democracy assistance targeted building democracy in many of the post conflict or post-communist countries. The United States also started to show its discontent towards known human rights violators. Previous U.S. allies such as Mobuto Sese Seko were no longer welcome to Washington.

Countries that attracted large foreign and democracy assistance, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique, also dominated U.S. diplomatic engagement. Similar to its foreign policy during the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s was dominated by a few states, and these states were Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mozambique, Sudan and Angola. From
these states, Ethiopia and Sudan were the two countries that attracted significant interest during the Cold War, and they continue to do so during the post-Cold War period as well. Zaire, which was one of the largest U.S. military and foreign aid recipient during the Cold War and one of United States’ strongest allies in the region, no longer received significant attention in the 1990s. While the former authoritarian leader Mobutu Sese Seko remained in power until 1997, the United Stated discontinued its military and foreign assistance due to the repressive nature of the regime.

The new countries that started to attract U.S. foreign aid and diplomatic gesture were Angola and Mozambique. Between 1990 and 2000, Mozambique received an average 127 million dollars and Angola an average of 72 million dollars annually in foreign aid. Though the top two foreign aid recipients were non-oil states, Angola, which was an oil state, also received significant assistance compared to other states. U.S. foreign aid to Angola was tied to the end of the civil war and United States recognition of the MPLA administration and the state of Angola. Much of U.S. assistance to Angola went to food aid, demining, and peace programs, which were aimed at helping post conflict Angola. U.S. assistance to Sudan went largely to humanitarian assistance and other programs in South Sudan.

While overall military assistance to Africa declined, it increased to some countries, namely Nigeria, Ethiopia, Niger and Chad. Some of the assistance given to these countries was to professionalize and strengthen their armies. However, overall U.S. military assistance to
Africa in the 1990s had wider regional objectives. In order to avoid another humanitarian crisis, such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the United States started to work with other multilateral organizations to develop regional peace keeping forces. Thus, U.S. military assistance in the 1990s was targeted to help African regional forces be better prepared for peace keeping deployments. Since 1996, the United States has been actively supporting the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which began as the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). Ethiopia and Nigeria had two of the largest armies in the region and contributed large number of troops to African and UN peace keepers in places such as Rwanda. Though Nigeria is an oil state, U.S. military assistance to the country was not due to its oil but other factors stated above.

Based on U.S. foreign aid, military assistances, and diplomatic engagement, it is possible to confirm that U.S. foreign policy towards African oil and non-oil states in the 1990s was largely shaped by two factors, international politics and domestic politics with in each country. Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique had just emerged from long years of civil war, and the United States was keen to assist the countries’ transition to democracy and peace. With the end of the Cold War, democracy and human rights became globally accepted norms. Thus, democracy promotion became a key component in U.S. foreign policy, and countries regardless of being oil producers or not received large amount of assistance for democracy promotion. U.S. foreign policy towards some of the countries was also
influenced by terrorism. The United States became a victim of terrorist attacks in the Horn of Africa, and its policy particularly towards Sudan was dominated by the country’s support of Islamic extremists. Countries such as Chad and Niger also received some assistance to counter terrorist expansion in the region.

As reflected from its foreign and military aid as well as diplomatic relationships, U.S. foreign policy towards both oil and non-oil African states were the same. African oil states such as Nigeria and Angola did not get special consideration due to their oil. Rather than oil or energy interests, U.S. foreign policy towards all African states was shaped by international issues and domestic politics within the African states. Thus, it is possible to conclude that U.S. foreign policy was not influenced by oil but by other geopolitical interests.

**U.S. Foreign Policy Since 2001**

The 9/11 terrorist attacks notably shaped U.S. foreign policy towards many states, including African countries. Besides the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States also focused its global war on terror on some African countries that provided safe harbor for Islamic extremists. Countries such as Chad and Mali that have large Muslim populations received some counterterrorism and military assistance. To counter Islamic extremist expansion in Somalia, the United States also assisted Ethiopia in invading and rooting out
the Al-Shabaab group. Even though U.S. counterterrorism operations in Africa increased after 9/11, the United States was involved in anti-terrorism programs before then. The United States was a victim of terrorism on African soil in 1998 with the bombing of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by Osama bin Laden. In response to these attacks, the United States bombed Sudan where bin Laden used to reside, put sanctions on Sudan, and later worked with Sudanese officials to gather intelligence about bin Laden. In the post 9/11 period, U.S. foreign policy was influenced by the global war on terror; however, when we look at U.S. foreign policy towards African oil and non-oil states, it is only on few occasions that we see terrorism strongly influencing the policy.

In the post - 2001 period, the other two issues that dominated U.S. foreign policy towards Africa were humanitarian crisis and energy security. The United States continued to provide large amount of humanitarian assistance to several African countries that were emerging from civil war. The countries that dominated U.S. humanitarian assistance were Sudan, Ethiopia, and later Congo. U.S. humanitarian assistance towards Sudan was dominated by crisis in two areas of the country, South Sudan and Darfur. U.S. humanitarian assistances to Sudan also included support to UN and African peace keeping operations. Even though the overall U.S. foreign aid to Africa dramatically increased during the Bush presidency, it largely went to support humanitarian crisis.
U.S. military assistance to Africa increased slightly in the 2001-2007 period over the previous six years. However, it remained very low compared to the Cold War period. Military assistance was also given to multiple countries including both oil and non-oil states. Sudan was the largest military aid recipient, and it received over 500 million dollars in six years between 2001 and 2007. However, it is important to note that 100 percent of the military aid to Sudan went to fund peace keeping operations or the United Nations. U.S. government budget documents put the UN military assistance through budget set aside for Sudan rather than direct fee of payment to the UN, thus it is referred to as military aid to Sudan. Unlike Clinton, President Bush had strong diplomatic engagement with Sudan due to his interest in ending the Darfur Crisis. Bush’s engagement in Sudan was largely pushed by the Christian based organizations that wanted to end the conflict in Darfur as well as South Sudan.

U.S. democracy assistance to Africa also increased after 2001. The largest democracy assistance recipients were Nigeria and Congo. U.S. overall diplomatic engagement also increased during the Bush administration. The key countries that dominated the relationship were Nigeria, Congo, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Angola. These countries had attracted significant U.S. interest for the past fifty years. At the same time, these same countries, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique, dominated U.S. diplomatic engagement. Presidents from each of the three countries visited the United States at least once, and a high level delegation led by either the President of the United States or the Secretary of State visited each of country.
Since 2001, the United States has increased foreign aid, democracy assistance, military assistance and diplomatic engagement in Africa. The increase in aid was to achieve several objectives, including stability, strengthening antiterrorism operations, and regional peace operations. The changes happened to both oil and non-oil states. In addition, despite providing a significant amount of aid to Sudan, the United States did not benefit from Sudan’s oil due to economic sanctions. Thus, the increase in military and foreign aid assistance was not necessarily tied to oil.

One of the U.S. foreign policy priorities towards Africa in the post 2001 period has been energy security. Traditional theoretical assumption and the hypothesis tested in this study were that when the United States has energy interests, it abandons its democracy assistance. However, the United States has not only increased its democracy assistance in two of the largest oil producers, Nigeria and Angola, but also started a democracy program in Sudan. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that oil production of a country and U.S. foreign policy of abandoning democracy promotion and increasing military involvement do not have a direct correlation in African context.

**Summary of Hypothesis and Conclusion**
This study analyzed if the presence of oil influenced U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan African oil states and, in particular, if the United States prioritized its energy needs over other goals. The study particularly looked to see if the United States prioritized regime stability above other goals, if the United States would abandon democracy and human rights promotion in African oil states and if U.S. political engagement, military cooperation and foreign aid were higher in oil states that in non-oil states. The in-depth analysis of U.S. foreign policy done in this study has revealed that U.S. foreign policy towards African states was not influenced by oil. The conclusion made above briefly indicated the outcome of the hypotheses. After looking at U.S. foreign policy towards sixteen oil and non-oil Sub-Saharan Africa states, and addition in-depth analysis of paid case studies, the outcome of the hypotheses and conclusions are as follows.

H1. With respect to oil producers, the U.S. will prioritize regime stability above other goals.
Hypothesis is null

If the United States prioritized regime stability, it would work with leaders in power in each country regardless of its nature. However, as seen in this study, the United Stated did not necessarily work with those in power in African oil states. This was evident in Angola, Nigeria and Sudan. In Angola, the United States did not recognize the MPLA leadership until 1992 and during much of the Cold War; it vigorously supported UNITA, the opposing rebel group. United States support of UNITA prolonged the civil war in Angola,
and the country remained unstable until the turn of the century. During the post-Cold War period, the United States rejected the Abacha regime in Nigeria due to its human rights violations and undemocratic nature. Since 2001, rather than working with the Bashir regime in Sudan, the United States has tried to impose an embargo and sanctions for its actions against Darfur and South Sudan. In all three of these oil states in Sub-Saharan Africa, the United States did not necessarily focus on regime stability but rather on other geopolitical interests.

H2. The U.S. will not prioritize democracy and human rights in oil-producing states.

Hypothesis is null

In the post-Cold War period, the United States identified democracy promotion as one of its foreign policy goals, and it did not spare oil states from its democracy promotion agenda. Democracy promotion was central element of U.S. foreign policy agenda across the board for all African states regardless of whether they were oil producer or not. U.S. financial assistances for democracy programs went to both oil and non-oil states. Furthermore, the diplomatic gestures seen from the United States against Nigeria, which was led by the repressive regime of Abacha in the 1990s, reflect that the United States was serious about democratic reforms even in oil states.
H3. U.S. political engagement, military cooperation and foreign aid will be higher in oil states that in non-oil states.

Hypothesis is null

This study has shown that few countries dominated U.S. foreign policy towards Africa for the past six decades. Countries such as Ethiopia and Congo that have received significant aid are not oil states. During the Cold War, African oil states did not receive any special consideration on military and foreign aid as well as significant diplomatic attention due to their oil. A comparative evaluation of U.S. foreign policy since the 1960s indicates that countries that attracted significant U.S. interest did not have oil (Table 7.1). Thus, U.S. political engagements as well as assistance were not necessarily higher in oil states than non-oil states.

| Table 7.1 Comparative evaluation of African states that dominate U.S. foreign policy |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|


Foreign aid

|                          | Zaire, Ethiopia & Sudan | Ethiopia & Mozambique & Angola & Sudan |

Ex-Im Bank

|                          | Zaire, Cameroon, Nigeria, Angola | Nigeria & Angola |

Trade capacity building assistance

|                          | Zaire, Ethiopia (until 1974) & Sudan (after 1976) | Ethiopia & Nigeria |

Military Assistance

|                          | Zaire, Ethiopia (until 1974) & Nigeria | Angola, Ethiopia and Mali |

Diplomatic gesture

|                          | Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola | Nigeria, Congo, Mozambique, Sudan and Angola |

Democracy Assistance

Conclusion and Contribution to the field

Rising oil prices associated with instability in the Middle East have been a concern for U.S. policy makers. Starting from the 1973 oil shock, U.S. policy makers have tried to respond to a rise in the oil price by proposing new domestic and international policies. Scholars and policy makers have associated high oil prices with instability in the Middle East, and large numbers of studies have been conducted to see how the United States has responded to these crisis. We know what foreign policy the United States has followed towards Middle Eastern oil states. But the literature remained absent in studying U.S.
relationship with African oil states. This study tried to fill the gap by looking at how the United States treated African oil states starting from the early 1960s.

This study looked at whether U.S. foreign policy towards early oil producers such as Angola and Nigeria was similar to Middle Eastern oil states, and analyzed if U.S. foreign policies towards African oil states changed over time. If U.S. foreign policy was different and if it has changed, the study also looked at why it changed. Was it because overall U.S. foreign policies changed or have U.S. policy makers learned from previous mistakes? United States’ unequivocal support to Middle Eastern oil states was for security and stability; were these concerns over security and working with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East overstated? An evaluation of U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states has answered these questions. Indeed, the United States was able to import oil while at the same time follow its political agenda in African oil states. Thus the push for democratic reforms in African oil states did not jeopardize its ability to import oil from African oil states. This finding is one of the major contributions of the study.

On September 11, 1990, five weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait, former Vice-President and Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the United States has strategic interests in the Persian Gulf region due to the energy that is at stake in the area (Cheney 1990). One goal of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East had been protecting U.S. energy interests in the region by any means necessary, including
working with authoritarian regimes and providing military support. Eleven years later, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States showed the strong anti-U.S. sentiment that has been built in the region due to its foreign policy, particularly its policy of supporting authoritarian regimes and a large U.S. military presence in the region. As this study has found that the United States was able to preserve and follow its other political objectives in African oil states during the Cold War and post-Cold War period without jeopardizing its oil or energy interests in Africa, it is possible to pose the question of whether the United States should reevaluate its foreign policy towards Middle East as well.

In the spring of 2011, some North African and Middle Eastern states experienced dramatic political change with mass protests and violent uprisings. Close U.S. associates such as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt were removed from power. The United States for almost thirty years supported the Mubarak regime with the expectation that the regime would provide stability against extremists in the regions and security for Israel. Even though the Mubarak regime was known for its authoritarian nature, the United States continued to support it without an aggressive push for reform. This support contradicted the democracy rhetoric provided from the United States. At the end, the United States’ support neither provided stability nor was it instrumental in establishing democracy in Egypt. To the contrary, the support the United States had given to Mubarak has made it lose leverage and confidence with the Egyptian public in shaping current and future democratic transition. As the United States was able to push democracy in African oil states without jeopardizing its
energy needs or oil imports, would it have been able to do the same in Egypt? In retrospect, there may be a lesson the United Stated could learn from its engagements with African countries such as Nigeria and Angola. Despite the large amount of oil it imports from Nigeria, the Unites States was able to keep its commitment to democracy in the 1990’s. This was evidently reflected during the Clinton Administration, when it made this policy clear to Abacha’s regime in Nigeria.

The United States has been pushing democracy, human rights, transparency and good governance reforms in Africa. These reforms are supposed to pave the way for positive economic and political growth in the region. The U.S. interest in promoting democracy, good governance and transparency is based on the assumption that they will contribute to better governance and economic development, which in the long run will benefit the United States. Even though a large amount of democracy assistance has been given to Nigeria and Angola, there has still been a short fall in democratic transition in both countries. Election manipulation, post-election violence, and corruption are still common occurrences in Nigeria, and Angola has had the same president for the past thirty years. Instability and violence continue to destabilize Nigeria, one of the largest oil suppliers in the region.

A significant finding from this research and a contribution to the foreign policy and energy security literature it makes is that the United States has not compromised its democracy agenda when dealing with African states. Foreign policy scholars have argued that the U.S.
has abandoned its support for democracy and has opted to work with authoritarian regimes for its energy interests. This study has confirmed that the traditional assumption held about U.S. foreign policy, energy security, and democracy promotions towards Middle East does not necessarily apply to African oil states. The United States’ interest in promoting democracy in African oil states is rather opposite to its policy towards Middle Eastern monarchies which are also oil states. Several assumptions can be made regarding why the United States followed different policies towards oil states in different parts of the world. One possibility is that the U.S. policy makers believe democracy, respect for human rights and good governance are the best way to achieve stability in African oil states.

A major contribution this study makes is to confirm that the theoretical assumption held by U.S. policy makers about the relationship between democracy and stability is followed by actions. Many of the African oil states have gone through or currently have internal conflict. Democracies are believed to be the best mechanism to reduce conflicts and corruption in the African oil states and create responsible governments. Democratic institutions create a system of checks and balances that will produce a mechanism to control governmental power. Furthermore, it is argued that democracies are better able to protect private property, which is essential in promoting investment and thus ultimately generating economic development. President Clinton in the *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* document stated that “Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners, and are far less likely to wage war on
one another.”39 This belief is apparent in the U.S. foreign policy towards African oil states.

The United States believed that by promoting democracy in Nigeria it would be able to create good governance and reduce corruption. A democratic Nigeria would respect its citizens and the environment. Oil wealth would be evenly distributed and local communities would be able to benefit from their natural resources. Nigeria under this scenario would have less violence and thus oil production might increase. This outcome would have a positive impact on U.S. energy security as well.


http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200810.garfinkle.redefiningusinterestsmiddleeast.html


http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_battle_for_angolas_oil


