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“IGNORANT AND CONFUSED?”

KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS AS DETERMINANTS OF EUROSKEPTICISM

by

ANDREA STEPHANIE ALDRICH

Under the Direction of Dr. William Downs

ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to explain Euroskeptic attitudes by examining the relationship between information and Euroskepticism and the role of Euroskepticism in the post-enlargement integration debate. Drawing upon data from the Eurobarometer survey series and the European Election Studies, this thesis tests the relationship between information and attitudes towards membership, the direction of integration, and voting. This analysis concludes the roles of knowledge and awareness have divergent influences on hard and soft Euroskepticism. While increased knowledge increases support for membership in the EU, increased awareness decreases support for the direction of integration. This conclusion suggests that knowledge initially informs individuals of the benefits of being a member in the EU but greater awareness increases the likelihood they will be a harsher critic of the way in which it is developing, necessitating further examination of the role of the Euroskeptic movement in public opinion.

INDEX WORDS: Euroskepticism, Knowledge, Awareness, European Integration

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ANDREA STEPHANIE ALDRICH

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2009

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## **Introduction**

Does greater knowledge of the European Union influence individual preferences and attitudes about the EU, its institutions, actors, and policies? More specifically, are those “Euroskeptic” individuals who oppose the EU measurably more or less informed about that which they profess to oppose? Are Euroskeptic individuals even actively aware of European-level politics, or are they expressing negative preferences on the basis of some other set of (presumably national) cues? While the literature on European integration and voting in European Parliament elections has focused on a wide range of factors explaining support for (and trust in) the EU, research on Euroskeptic attitudes and preferences for avowedly Euroskeptic political parties remains divided. It has, moreover, largely failed to fully explore the impact of information on individual opinions. By exploring the relationship between knowledge, political awareness, and Euroskepticism, this thesis tests two hypotheses: (1) as the level of knowledge and awareness about EU institutions and politics increases, Euroskeptic attitudes toward membership and the direction of the EU decrease and (2) as the level of EU awareness increases, the likelihood of voting for Euroskeptic parties decreases.

Examining the independent effects of knowledge and awareness on attitudes toward the direction of integration and membership and the impact of information on voting is important for several reasons. First, breaking public opinion of the EU into two separate attitudes brings attention to a new debate taking place in Europe post-enlargement. This thesis argues the debate over membership (i.e. whether or not to join or remain members) has become less salient post-enlargement in favor of a more specific debate on the prospects for further enlargement and integration. The inclusion of a measurement for attitudes toward the direction of the EU is necessary in order to distinguish between hard and soft Euroskeptics and observe the effects of

information on both attitudes. Second, extending the analysis of Euroskepticism to test the link between awareness and voting allows for an analysis of the impact of political parties and campaigns. This thesis argues that while knowledge influences public opinion, the level of information received prior to an election has a larger effect on how an individual will vote and the issues they will view as important. The effects of knowledge and awareness may diverge because of the different nature of the source of information. Knowledge of how the EU functions and formulates policy is objective and is less likely to be manipulated by framing and cueing from political elites. This knowledge increases the level of familiarity an individual has with the EU and how it works. On the other hand, awareness measures the amount of information that an individual receives and shares with others. This information comes from media sources and peer groups and is much more likely to be subject to framing and bias. Information from the media and political parties can highlight controversies and debates an individual was previously not aware of, such as the consequences of enlargement for economic competition or national identity.

This thesis seeks to fill a gap in our understanding of Euroskeptic attitudes by examining the relationships between information and Euroskepticism in three ways. Drawing upon data from the Eurobarometer survey series and the European Election Studies, this thesis will test the relationship between attitudes towards membership, attitudes toward the direction of integration, and the relationship between awareness and voting. Most empirical testing of Euroskepticism and information to date has explored the relationship between information and sentiments towards membership only (McLaren 2007; Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998) and virtually no research has been conducted on the role of individual characteristics in European elections. This analysis contributes to our understanding of these relationships by concluding the roles of

knowledge and awareness have divergent influences on hard and soft Euroskepticism. While increased knowledge increases support for membership in the EU, increased awareness decreases support for the direction of integration. This conclusion suggests that knowledge initially informs individuals of the benefits of being a member in the EU but awareness increases the likelihood they will be a harsher critic of the way in which it is developing.


### **Euroskepticism in Context**

Euroskepticism and its impact on integration have also been the subjects of scholarly debate for several decades. Both the appearance of different types of Euroskepticism and its role in public opinion are discussed in several works (Gabel 1998; Taggart 1998; Janssen 1991; McLaren 2007). “Euroskepticism” as employed in this thesis is defined as qualified or unqualified opposition to the process of integration. Different forms of Euroskepticism exist that range from complete opposition to the idea of the EU to opposition to only a few parts or processes of the EU (Taggart 1998). This difference between types of Euroskepticism is often interpreted through the distinction of “hard” and “soft” Euroskeptics. Hard Euroskeptics hold hard-line positions on all forms of European integration. They reject any idea of political or economic integration in Europe. On the other hand, soft Euroskepticism often takes the shape of opposition to specific policies or the deepening of integration (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). Single issue parties centered around direct opposition are considered hard Euroskeptics, whereas even pro-EU parties can have some soft Euroskeptic views (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). This thesis seeks to explore Euroskepticism by incorporating measures for both types. Using data that analyze the manifestos of the parties running in European Elections, Euroskepticism is quantified through the coding of hostile statements to both the entire idea of Europe and to the deepening of a range of policy areas in Europe (Euromanifestos 1979-2004). Euroskepticism in individuals is

quantified through survey data that investigates attitudes toward both the value of membership in the EU and the direction of integration.


Euroskepticism is a persistent issue in EU politics. Czech MEP Jan Zahradil estimates that about 15-20% of the 785 MEPs in the Parliament are Euroskeptic, and this number is expected to rise in the forthcoming 2009 election (CTK 2008). Two major party families in the European Parliament are considered Euroskeptic, the Independence and Democracy group and the Union for Europe of the Nations, along with several members from the European United left, some Greens, and nearly all of the non-aligned members (see Figure 1 for distribution among party families in the EP). Hostility to the EU in public opinion also measured around 15% in the latest 2008 Eurobarometer survey, which indicated public discontent is again growing after a slight decline in negative attitudes in 2006 and 2007 (Eurobarometer 70: see Figure 2), and recent challenges facing the EU like the current financial crisis and the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty have further tarnished the image of the EU in the eyes of some.

Understanding the relationship between Euroskepticism and knowledge may help in determining the main causes of Euroskepticism and help evaluate alternative strategies for ameliorating it as well. A lack of knowledge was blamed as a key reason for the failed acceptance of the Lisbon Treaty by the people of Ireland. Following this rejection, a European Commission report stated that over half of the respondents rejected the Lisbon Treaty due to a “lack of understanding,” “ignorance, and confusion” (Buchanan 2008). In order to educate potential voters in the 2009 European Parliament elections, the EU is preparing to spend 17 million Euros on activities to publicize the elections across Europe. It hopes to use major media outlets to promote the election and educate the European public on European issues and give political parties a platform on which to campaign (Smyth 2009).



Source: BBC Guide to the European Parliament <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7824671.stm>

**Figure 1: Party Families in the European Parliament**



Source: Eurobarometer 70: First Results [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70\\_first\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_first_en.pdf) pg 36

**Figure 2: Opinion of Membership in the EU**

## **Euroskepticism and Integration**

Euroskepticism in public opinion also has urgent implications for integration as the EU seeks to move forward. The implications of anti-EU sentiment are explored through research on the quality of democracy in the EU (Rohrschneider 2002; Karp et al. 2003), the nature of Europeanization (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Checkel 2007), and the role of political contestation in the integration process (Marks and Steenbergen 2004; van der Brug et al. 2007b). Qualifying a lack of knowledge as the main reason for the failure of the latest national EU referendum signifies a refusal by the European elite to consider the real power of public opinion. Implying that lack of knowledge is the only reason the citizens of Ireland would reject the Lisbon Treaty disregards other plausible reasons for the referendum's failure. A large majority of the Irish people may have been well informed, but remain unhappy about the direction integration would proceed if the treaty was approved.

The role of public opinion and its impact on European politics has changed considerably over the past few decades. From its inception, the EU has been a largely elite-driven process. While public opinion has been measured since the early 1970s, it has not played a distinctive role in political contestations (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Previous European elections were not an accountability mechanism for politicians and policy making at the European level (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2004). Most of the empirical analysis conducted following the 1994 and 1999 European elections determined these elections were second-order national elections, where individuals often punished national politicians regardless of their stance on European issues. These elections were neither a good indicator of public sentiment toward Europe, nor were they used as a vehicle for parties and political groups to campaign on European issues (van der Brug et al. 2007b). EU orientations contributed very little to the party choice in



European elections because parties did not clearly differentiate their positions (van der Brug et al. 2007a). Additionally, the European preferences of voters showed no discernable patterns across parties or ideology, making it even more difficult to determine a Euroskeptic constituency (Scheuer and van der Brug 2007). Analyses of these relationships following the 2004 election have not been forthcoming, suggesting scholars are looking to alternative points of entry for public opinion in the debate over Europe.

Scholars analyzing the impact of integration on national political contests also came up empty handed (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Political parties have traditionally not used European issues to gain support in domestic elections. There has been no clear choice between different “visions” for Europe among parties. Mainstream parties do not see it as advantageous to debate European issues and instead these issues are left to the extremes, where smaller parties attempt to capitalize on the new issues (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). In 1999, issues of integration had not yet become urgent enough to bridge this gap, but a prominent theme throughout these studies was the immense potential for their contestation. Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) coined the term “sleeping giant” to represent the role of EU orientations in national politics. They argued under certain conditions these orientations could push voters towards new patterns of political behavior that could change the bases of mobilization in party systems across Europe. The conditions predicting the polarization of EU orientations included the mobilization of party elites around these new issues and the occurrence of external events that would place the EU on national agendas. On the eve of the 2009 European Parliament elections these conditions may very well be present, highlighting an imperative need to understand how preferences for Europe are formed and voiced.

The consequences of enlargement in 2004 may be the single event that has produced the conditions where public support becomes paramount to the success of integration. Following the preconditions for polarization set by van der Eijk and Franklin (2004), Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that political tensions are activating across Europe because these conditions have been met. First, they argue the scope and depth of integration reduced national barriers, allowing mass immigration and increased economic competition which placed the consequences of enlargement on national political agendas. Second, these issues have become mobilized by political parties and political entrepreneurs. It is this mobilization that can influence public opinion most. The public does not induce the effect of enlargement from personal experience, but rather it needs to be constructed. This construction is most influential in those people who do not have strong prior attitudes or opinions or have little exposure to the EU. Hooghe and Marks argue that political entrepreneurs are able to mobilize mass publics by providing this information and constructing mass opinion. Priming, framing, and cueing become the primary methods of construction for opinions about enlargement and the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Because the center right and center left parties have largely ignored European issues, the majority of debate on integration is taking place outside of the center parties and being framed by parties in opposition to Europe and the possibility of referenda increases the politicization of European issues even more (Hooghe and Marks 2009).

The current constitutional treaty raises issues of integration that have yet to be subjected to a public vote, with the exception of Ireland. Concerns stemming from enlargement and integration are now more focused on how the future scope and direction of the EU will be defined. Public opinion is becoming increasingly more important. Hooghe and Marks conceptualize the entry of public opinion into the decision making arena as a brake on

integration, arguing that integration has slowed not because the public has changed its mind about Europe, but because ordinary citizens now have a voice. Nationalist parties have been able to capture the minds of the public by bringing questions of integration out of the economic sphere and placing them into a debate on national sovereignty and identity (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The process of integration is being stalled even further by the reluctance of elites to start, and subsequently lose, this debate over integration. The elite maneuvering to sell the Lisbon Treaty as a smaller and less consequential step in integration has highlighted its desire to keep the treaty out of referenda. By requiring a referendum, the public becomes the decision making body that can make or break the Lisbon Treaty, or at the least slow the process of integration considerably. National governments in Europe are now fearful of referenda defeat and the consequences of their European policies. They are now far more aware of the opportunities for European issues to enter political contests than they were at the turn of the century (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Instead of gauging public opinion on membership in the EU, it is now more important to determine what influences opinion on way the EU is evolving and functioning.

Exploring the nature of European public opinion on issues of integration is no longer a hypothetical study of the potential for public contestation, but a step towards understanding how the future of Europe will be determined. Because Euroskeptic parties are facilitating the politicization of European issues, understanding the potential influence they have on individuals is essential. Hooghe and Marks (2009) highlight the opportunity these parties have to influence public opinion by framing, cueing, and priming the information received by those with little knowledge or little exposure to the EU. They argue several issues stemming from integration have become contentious in national debates and many of these are also the explanatory factors of much of the Euroskeptic literature. These include national identity, cognitive mobilization,

and economic and utility evaluations. While there is much consensus on the impact of identity and economics, the impact of knowledge and awareness is less clear. Several studies have included knowledge as a factor in determining Euroskepticism, but have not yet addressed the potential impact it has on different types of Euroskepticism (Gabel 1998; McLaren 2007, 2004, 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Rohrschneider 2002; Anderson 1998; Inglehart 1970; Janssen 1991). A gap exists in the systematic testing of cognitive mobilization as a factor in both hard and soft Euroskepticism and empirical tests of the influence of information post-enlargement are scarce. While identity remains a large component of Euroskeptic examination, analysis of the ability to influence public opinion through information is due. Drawing on literature exploring the relationship between awareness and public opinion (Anderson 1998; Inglehart 1970; Janssen 1991; Zaller 1991) and the nature of Euroskeptic parties (Taggart 1998; McLaren 2007; Hix and Lord 1997; van der Brug et al. 2007a), this thesis contributes to the understanding of Euroskepticism by systematically testing the relationship of both knowledge and awareness for both hard and soft Euroskepticism and extending the analysis of awareness to voting behavior in European Parliament elections. In doing so, it provides insight into the role of information as a resource for political mobilization for or against integration.


### **Knowledge, Awareness, and Public Opinion in the Integration Debate**

The ability of an individual to translate his or her understanding of the political process of integration and absorb information about the EU from political parties is the main interest of this thesis. Cognitive mobilization refers to the ability of individuals to use their cognitive skills and level of issue familiarity to develop opinions about complex political matters. Knowledge of EU institutions is defined by the level of understanding individuals have with the institutions of the EU, their structure, and functions. Political awareness is defined as the level of interest or

exposure an individual has to information. Each factor plays a separate role, not only in the formation of preferences, but also in an individual's ability to process and be influenced by information. It is necessary to test these relationships separately in order to account for the difference between objective and subjective knowledge. Knowledge improves the level of factual understanding an individual has about the EU. Knowledge can increase an individual's ability to evaluate the functioning of the EU properly and produce more substantiated opinions on issues like democracy and economic competition. Awareness includes a measurement for the level of information an individual receives and shares with others. This measurement does not account for the actual level of factual understanding an individual has, but rather measures how much information an individual receives from the media and peers. If information about the effects of enlargement is being promoted mainly through Euroskeptic movements, awareness may be expected to increase the level of familiarity an individual has or acquires on controversial issues. Both knowledge and awareness contribute to formation of attitudes and opinions, but in different ways.

Cognitive mobilization theory addresses the relationship between awareness and public support for integration and incorporates level of knowledge into the structure of preference formation. Cognitive mobilization, as conceptualized by Inglehart (1970), encompasses the broad process of familiarization, acceptance, and processing of information related to a political community. Applying his theory to public support for integration, Inglehart argues that forming attitudes toward integration and support for a political community is a two-level process (Inglehart 1970). On the first level, mobilization must occur for individuals to develop an understanding of European integration. On the second level, the ability of an individual to receive and understand information influences the direction of support for integration. Inglehart

(1970) argues that a higher level of education and political skill will allow for an individual to more accurately link information to support for integration. Therefore if the information received supports integration, individuals should support integration or if this information is negative, an individual should become more opposed. Inglehart continues to argue that because the majority of information cast upon the public has been favorable, any type of information consumption should produce favorable orientations to the integration (Inglehart 1970). Gabel (1998) also argues that any information is positive because it increases familiarity with the EU. Breaking the theory of cognitive mobilization into these two parts (Figure 3) clearly shows how both knowledge and awareness might have independent effects on the level of support for integration.




**Figure 3: Causal Path of Cognitive Mobilization and Integration Attitudes**

Extending the analysis of awareness and public opinion beyond the scope of European integration, scholars have determined that awareness is a driving force in the formation of public opinion (Zaller 1991; Converse 1962; Mackuen 1984; Zaller 1987). Political awareness plays a direct role in the formation of public opinion by influencing the way individuals receive and process information. Like Inglehart, Zaller (1991) determined the reception of information and its acceptance is a two-stage process. First, a person is exposed to information in the mass media

and then they determine if they will accept or resist the information. He argues that political awareness directly affects both levels of information processing and the amount of influence this information will have. People with high levels of political awareness are likely to be constrained by pre-formed preferences and values when exposed to new information and are able to defend their prior beliefs. People with low levels of awareness are highly unlikely to receive much new information and remain isolated from attempts to change their opinion. Those in the middle remain the most susceptible to new information and influence because they are aware of new information but do not have sophisticated attitudes allowing them to resist new influences (Converse 1962).

If this is true, awareness could play an important part in the public's perception of Europe. The argument that voters in Ireland were ignorant and confused may be solely the fault of mixed messages in the media and the public debates over the Lisbon Treaty or they may be indicative of the broad scale effect of a Euroskeptic movement on the public. The argument set forth by Hooghe and Marks (2009) places the stalling of integration on the shoulders of a large Euroskeptic movement that has been able to influence the public by politicizing the consequences of enlargement. This argument draws strength from the fact that information is most influential when knowledge and exposure are low. In fact, the majority of respondents in the European Election Study of 2004 fell in the middle or low range (see Figure 4) suggesting that there are very few individuals with enough awareness to resist messages about the EU and integration. This highlights an enormous opportunity to disperse influential information to a middle and low range population.



**Figure 4: Level of Awareness of European Voters**

Contradictions exist in the analysis of knowledge in preference formation. The level of skill an individual has in interpreting information is directly related to their ability to abstract and understand complex issues like European integration. The conception of integration and its implications may be too challenging for an average citizen to attempt to comprehend and develop carefully scrutinized preferences (Janssen 1991). Anderson (1998) assumes that not many people are well informed about the integration process and will fill gaps in their knowledge by using proxies, like opinions about their national governments or parties, when answering questions about the European integration process. He faults research on public opinion and integration for assuming citizens have meaningful preferences for integration, that they are economically rational, reasonably well informed, and able to perform complex evaluations of the integration process. In reality, he argues, most public opinion data show that people have very little knowledge about the EU and questions how individuals can be both ignorant of European issues and rational in their evaluations of the personal benefits from integration.



Janssen (1991) empirically tested the link between changes in public opinion and the level of knowledge of individuals. Janssen theorizes individuals who have a higher understanding of “what the EC is about” will have well thought out attitudes about integration and answer questions about integration and their attitudes toward the EU consistently. His research supports this conclusion and also finds that people with a higher level of understanding to be more likely to view integration positively, thus supporting Inglehart’s theory. This suggests that increased knowledge does drive support for integration but all scholars agree. Karp, Banducci, and Bowler (2003) test the influence of knowledge on evaluations of democracy in the EU. They argue that citizens who are more familiar with the EU will also be more likely to form negative opinions because they are better prepared to evaluate how it functions. First they use the democratic deficit hypothesis to argue that people who are more politically aware will know that the EU parliament, and its relatively low level of control over policy, is not the democratic equivalent to their own national parliament. They then argue that citizens who are more politically aware will show greater concern over the lack of accountability and responsiveness in the EU institutions. They find the evaluation of democracy declines as the level of knowledge increases and the most knowledgeable people tend to be the most skeptical about democracy in the EU (Karp et al. 2003).

Identifying the causal direction of the relationships between support and awareness and knowledge provides the theoretical foundation for testing these relationships empirically. The literature above suggests that some initial level of awareness is necessary for an individual to form an opinion about the EU. Cognitive mobilization can be broken into these two relationships, where awareness influences the receipt of information and its processing and knowledge influences the way this information is evaluated and translated into attitudes.

Because relatively little empirical consensus exists on the role of awareness and knowledge in the formation of Euroskeptic attitudes, the first hypothesis of this thesis will test the roles of knowledge and awareness in Euroskepticism to help further consensus. It will also seek to differentiate the roles of information in hard Euroskeptic attitudes, and in the increasingly salient soft Euroskeptic attitudes. Following from this literature, the first hypothesis argues that increased knowledge will decrease the chances of Euroskeptic attitudes and will be tested using the following:

H<sub>1</sub>: As the level of knowledge and awareness about EU institutions increases, the likelihood of Euroskeptic attitudes towards membership decreases.

H<sub>2</sub>: As the level of knowledge and awareness about EU institutions increases, the likelihood of Euroskeptic attitudes toward integration decreases.

In the literature above, Euroskeptic attitudes have been tested using cognitive mobilization but include only a measure for membership. By including the measure of integration, this analysis draws conclusions that can be extended beyond the first assessment of membership and begin to shed light on newer forms of political contestation. An analysis incorporating new forms of contestation is incomplete without also examining the role parties play in politicizing European issues. If issues of integration are becoming more salient in public debate, the level of awareness a European voter has towards the political debate between parties should influence the decisions they make in voting. It is important to examine the structure and positions of parties in European elections in order to determine how awareness impacts voting.

## **Euroskepticism in European Party Systems**

Political parties on the fringes have recently been given credit for stirring Euroskeptic sentiment among the public (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Issue ownership of many contributing factors to Euroskepticism like threats to national identity, economic competition, and increased immigration has mainly resided in parties far from the center right or center left. The unwillingness of mainstream parties to address problems stemming from an enlarged Europe has largely marginalized the centrist view in public debate. Mainstream parties rarely find it advantageous to debate integration issues. These parties are constrained by historical and ideological roots which force them to incorporate new issues into their existing structures. This often leads to discord among party members, which can confuse potential voters. Mainstream parties are also much less likely to differ on issues of integration, so highlighting their position also highlights the stance of other centrist parties (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe 2007). This leaves very little room for centrist parties to campaign for or against European issues and leaves the battlefield of European issues to parties on the fringe or traditional protest parties.

Parties on the far right or far left will use integration as an issue to gain public support for three reasons. First, it is the consequences of integration that these parties are able to make competitive issues with other parties and increase their popularity. Second, they are also able to woo new voters without having to stray far from their ideological platform. They have more credibility to actually make changes in national European policy because they are not held to the same behavioral commitments mainstream parties have already made. Third, these parties can bring these issues to debate without having to worry about the issues being politically divisive. While traditional parties are grappling with enlargement issues as they come to the fore, longtime Euroskeptic parties have had an established, party-wide anti-Europe stance for much

longer (Hooghe and Marks 2009). After enlargement, we expect the increased saliency of these issues to benefit the Euroskeptical parties at the polls because more voters are aware of not only the issues but also the positions of these parties.

The distribution of Euroskeptical parties among the EU member states demonstrates the variance in Euroskeptical positions and the difficulty of placing Euroskeptical parties into traditional cleavage structures. In Western Europe, the mainstream parties are unlikely to publicly appear Euroskeptical. With the exception of a few Christian Democrat and Conservative parties in Euroskeptical parties are mostly far-right nationalist parties or far left communist parties on the periphery or single issue parties. Table 1 describes the Euroskeptical parties that were able to gain parliament seats in 2004 by party family and scale score for anti-EU positions.<sup>1</sup> As this table shows, it is not possible to distinguish Euroskepticism as a left-right ideological phenomenon because opposition exists on both sides. Therefore it is difficult to remove the relationship between Euroskepticism and vote choice from traditional determinants of vote choice such as partisanship, ideology, government evaluation (protest voting) (Taggart 1998). However, these are the parties that are likely stirring controversy over integration post enlargement and their effect on public opinion is important. In particular, many far right parties have been able to capitalize on these issues in recent elections. The far right in Austria won nearly 30% of the vote in September 2008 and credit was given to the strong stance they hold on immigration and the protection of national identity (Iggulden 2008). Other far right parties in Europe that have been able to increase success by campaigning on nationalist platforms include the Northern League in Italy, the National Front in France, and the Flemish Block in Belgium (Ignazi 2006).

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<sup>1</sup> The scale score is taken from the coding of Anti or Pro EU positions in the Euromanifesto Data. Please see variable coding in Appendix A for more information. This scale rates pro-EU parties as a 1 and Anti-EU parties as 10. All parties scoring above the median are included in this table. Also, Appendix A contains scale scores for all parties each countries ballot in the 2004 European election and expands the list of Euroskeptical parties beyond those elected to the Parliament.

**Table 1: Euroskeptical Parties in the European Parliament (2004)**

Country	Party Name	Party Family	Scale Score
Austria	Freedom Party	Liberal	10
	Social Democratic Party of Austria	Social Democrats	7
Belgium	Flemish Block	Regional	8
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Monrovia	(Post)Communist	6
	Political Movement Independents	Special Interest	9
Denmark	Civic Democrat Party	Liberal	9
	Danish People's Party	Nationalist	9
	People's Movement Against the EU	Special Interest	9
	June Movement Against the Union	Special Interest	9
Estonia	Estonian People's Union	Conservative	7
Finland	Christian League of Finland	Christian Democrats	7
France	National Front	Nationalist	10
	Movement for France	Conservative	9
	Rally for the Republic	Special Interest	8
Germany	Christian Social Union in Bavaria	Christian Democrats	9
	Communist Party of Greece	(Post)Communist	10
	Popular Orthodox Alarm	Nationalist	9
Ireland	The Greens	Green Party	7
	Sinn Fein	Special Interest	8
Italy	National Alliance	Nationalist	7
	Northern League	Nationalist	7
	Communist Refoundation Party	(Post)Communist	9
Luxembourg	Christian Social People's Party	Christian Democrats	6
Netherlands	Political Reform Party	(Post)Communist	6
	Socialist Party	(Post)Communist	7
	Democratic Unionist Party	Regional	9
Northern Ireland	Sinn Fein	Special Interest	8
	Ulster Unionist Party	Regional	7
Poland	League of Polish Families	Nationalist	9
	Self-Defense of the Polish Republic	Conservative	9
Portugal	Unitarian Democratic Coalition	(Post)Communist	9
Slovakia	Christian Democratic Movement	Christian Democrats	8
Sweden	Greens	Green Party	9
	Junlistan	Special Interest	7
	Left Party	(Post)Communist	9
United Kingdom	Conservative Party	Conservative	8
	Green Party	Green Party	7
	Independence Party	Special Interest	10

Euroskepticism manifests itself more publicly in the party systems of Central and Eastern Europe and differences in the voting strategy of individuals between Western and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) may exist. In CEE countries, several mainstream parties publicly voice soft Euroskepticism. Hard Euroskeptical parties again remain on the periphery in the communist or

far-right parties but are more abundant than in Western Europe. Euroskepticism in CEE is the result of the increased salience of integration during the accession process (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). Unlike Western Europe, it is expected integration will be a larger issue in CEE, debated publicly in the party systems during the before and after the accession process. This will affect the way individuals cast their votes and how this can be linked to Euroskepticism. In Western Europe, it is more difficult to draw conclusions about Euroskepticism from voting behavior than it is in CEE. In CEE, the expectation is that voting for Euroskeptic parties is politically viable since Euroskepticism is distributed among many more parties. This leads to an increased likelihood that citizens of CEE countries will cast votes for parties higher on the integration scale utilized to classify parties in this thesis. In Western Europe it is less likely even Euroskeptic individuals will cast a vote for a Euroskeptic party if the electoral consequences are insignificant (i.e. it is less likely parties on the periphery will be elected to office) and the number of parties is smaller. Considering this, the measurement for vote choice is constructed to capture movement away from pro-EU parties as our independent variables vary to estimate the effect of awareness on vote choice in the 2004 European Parliament election<sup>2</sup>. Even though it may be difficult to disentangle the influence of Euroskepticism on party vote choice, it is still important to examine the role they have in public opinion.<sup>3</sup>

The power political parties and political entrepreneurs have to influence voters is most important when examining voter behavior. If Euroskeptic political parties are doing the majority of campaigning during European elections, it can be expected the information available to

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<sup>2</sup> The dependent variable is constructed to measure movement up the scale for party classification instead of simply accounting for votes cast only for parties determined to be Euroskeptic. See Appendix B for more information.

<sup>3</sup> For further discussion on the distribution among party families and for a larger classification of Euroskeptic parties that includes parties not elected to the European parliament in 2004, see Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004 and Taggart 2008.

individuals is framed for a specific purpose. Euroskeptic parties will attempt to raise issues like immigration, trade policy, economic competition, and democratic representation in order to elevate their position above the centrist parties. It can be assumed that the majority of information being received from television, newspaper, websites, and possibly even peer groups revolve around the current European debates, whether positive or negative. In the months leading up to an election, it may be less likely that this information increases their factual knowledge of the EU. It is much more likely they will receive information on controversial issues only.

Awareness then becomes the best measure for exposure to the EU, and its relationship to voting holds more explanatory power for Euroskepticism. The relationship between awareness and vote choice can be tested using survey data. In order to determine whether or not the relationship between the salience of enlargement and integration issues and Euroskepticism exists, the following hypothesis will be tested:

H<sub>3</sub>: As the level of EU awareness increases, the likelihood of voting for an anti-EU party decreases.

Conceptualizing Euroskepticism on the individual level for voting and attitudes has produced several explanations for an individual's feelings about the EU that cannot be ignored. Factors such as national identity, economic status, left-right ideology, and trust in government, have been theorized as possible components of Euroskeptic attitudes in addition to the role of information (Gabel 1998; McLaren 2007; Inglehart 1970; Hooghe 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Janssen 1991; Rohrschneider 2002). Various combinations of these factors make up very different kinds of Euroskeptics. Determining the roles that awareness and knowledge play on the formation of attitudes cannot be accomplished without controlling for the independent effects of values, ideology, and economic factors on the interpretation of information.

## **Alternative Explanations for Euroskepticism**

Several arguments also exist that claim individuals may have other characteristics and values that pre-determine and solidify their attitudes toward integration. Gabel (1998) tested five theories of Euroskepticism that included national identity, utilitarianism, cognitive ability and political values, class partisanship, and political trust (Gabel 1998; McLaren 2007, 2004; Anderson 1998; Rohrschneider 2002; Hooghe 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2004). In order to distinguish the independent effects of awareness and knowledge, these factors must also be addressed and controlled in the analysis.

### ***Utilitarianism***

European integration has long been examined as an economic endeavor and attitudes towards Europe have largely been conceptualized as cost-benefit analysis of the economic utility of membership. Utilitarian conceptualizations of Euroskepticism rest on the belief that different socioeconomic levels will assess the value of integration differently. The effect of market liberalization, the free movement of labor and goods, and the liberalization of capital markets varies across occupations and education levels (Gabel 1998). Utility theories will predict a positive relationship between the level of education and occupational skill level, along with income, and proximity to border regions. Hooghe and Marks (2004) highlight the effect of scarcity as a reason for Euroskepticism. Because the opening of markets will favor individuals who own factors that are abundant in the economy, it will hurt those in possession of factors that are relatively scarce (Stopler –Samuelson theorem). In wealthy states the abundant factor is capital. Those individuals in management or professional occupations will benefit, while the working class will see it as a threat to their well-being. It is expected unskilled workers or



laborers will be more Euroskeptic and a negative relationship to exist between low occupational skill level and support for integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004).

### ***Political Trust***

Political trust is often a factor in support for all governments. When it comes to integration, it is expected that those individuals who do not trust their national governments will be less likely to trust the institutions of the EU. Dissatisfaction with national government is likely to be projected onto the EU (McLaren 2007). Instead of evaluating the idea of European integration from a rational, cost-benefit point of view, individuals simply vote on their preferences for domestic government (Anderson 1998). Because the functioning of the institutions of the EU may be even harder to comprehend than national governments, individuals may tend to be increasingly skeptical (McLaren 2007).

### ***Identity***

Integration can also be seen as a threat to national identity. Identity has been theorized to be a mixture of different territorial identities that can either be exclusive or inclusive (Hooghe and Marks 2004). Inclusive identities can be those where several different levels of identity are mixed and a national and European identity are interwoven (Risse 2004). European identity can also be an integral part of national identity, where national identity means in part to be European (Kersbergen 2000). Exclusive identities are those in which European identity exists in conflict with national identities. These identities are threatened by integration and it is expected individuals who view their identity as solely national will be more Euroskeptic (Hooghe and Marks 2004).

All of the factors described above may play a connected role in determining an individual's preferences for European integration. If the levels of information and knowledge influence the way information is received and accepted, then the personal values and characteristics an individual holds may influence the type of information they receive. While Inglehart (1970) argued that any exposure to European integration can be positive, the variation in opinion of political parties and political elites must also contribute to the type of information and the positive or negative effect it has on public opinion. Public opinion research has often argued that voters develop their positions on policy by taking cues from their chosen political party (Gabel and Scheve 2007).

### **Testing Knowledge and Awareness in Euroskepticism**

Conflicting theories of Euroskepticism in individuals and in the party systems of Europe make it hard to determine what makes an individual Euroskeptic. Are individuals really voting for Euroskeptic parties because they hold Euroskeptic preferences? Are individuals aware of their preferences for integration? Are these preferences represented in European elections? All of these questions beg for a better understanding of the European voting behavior. This thesis will first draw on data from Eurobarometer 68.1 (Papacotas 2007) to measure the actual level of knowledge held by individuals who display Euroskeptic attitudes. It will also use data from the 2004 European Election survey (EES 2004) to identify the distribution among parties and utilize the elections survey to determine the level of awareness of each voter.

If the results of the hypotheses tests for  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  find in favor of these hypotheses, it will support the literature on cognitive mobilization and political skill that favors the formation of positive opinions towards the EU. If the results do not support  $H_1$  and  $H_2$ , it could signify

several more issues for investigation. If people are knowledgeable about the EU and still opposed to integration, it could signify that EU information campaigns may not be the answer to Euroskepticism and that the literature on the politicization of enlargement as a negative is more powerful. It would suggest that knowledge may heighten the level of evaluation individuals have for EU policy and that their evaluations are becoming increasingly negative post-enlargement. If the results of the hypothesis test for  $H_3$  find evidence in favor of  $H_3$ , it will support the literature that claims all forms of information increase familiarity with the EU and in turn will be positive influences. If the evidence is unable to conclude in favor of  $H_3$ , then a conclusion that awareness can hinder the integration process will be in order. If this is true, the claims of ignorance on behalf of Euroskeptic voters will no longer be valid and the examination of the information available to voters will be necessary. The role of Euroskeptic parties in the mobilization of these issues will be increased. This conclusion will highlight the need to take a look at the role of Euroskeptic parties in campaigns and elections.

### ***Dependent Variables***

The dependent variables used to test  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  incorporate measures of support for integration and the desired direction of integration, with the standard Eurobarometer questions, “Generally speaking, do you think membership in the European Union is a: good thing, bad thing, neither good nor bad and “at the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction, wrong direction, or neither in the European Union.” The literature that has previously tested the individual components of Euroskepticism has represented a variety of measures for Euroskeptic attitudes. The question for attitude towards membership has been the most prominent standalone measure for support for integration (Anderson 1998). Euroskepticism has also been constructed using an index of attitudes toward the membership and

direction (McLaren 2002) and combined with a question on the speed of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004). It is no longer valid to combine these measures as a test for Euroskepticism in light of the recent push for further supranational integration. As the literature described above has stated, the main issue facing the EU today is the direction of the EU's future. Combining these measures may lose some of the distinction between hard and soft Euroskepticism. By keeping them separate, this thesis will be able to distinguish the effects of knowledge and awareness on Euroskeptics that are wholly opposed to membership and those that are merely opposed to the direction it is going. The ambiguity of the question utilized to measure this attitude leaves the meaning of the "right" and "wrong" direction to the respondent. In doing so, the measurement here makes no attempt to distinguish between different ideas of wrong. This measurement is assumed to pick up on negative attitudes for all facets of opinion including those who view the direction negatively because integration is going too far and those who have the same opinion because it is not going far enough. In using this question, it is hoped all forms of soft Euroskepticism are accounted for.

In order to test H<sub>3</sub>, the dependent variable will be constructed as an ordinal variable from the European Election Study of 2004. The value for each vote will correspond to the placement of that party on a scale measuring pro and anti integration positions. This categorization of Euroskeptic allows for all parties to be placed on a spectrum of pro-EU to Anti-EU with a middle score of neutral (5). Instead of only identifying votes for those parties with a high enough score to be considered Euroskeptic, this measure hopes to show the relationship between awareness and the movement along this pro-anti EU scale. Electoral rules and different party systems may influence the way in which voters cast their votes in elections. Using the scale as a measurement is meant to account for those individuals who may strategically vote for a

center party when Euroskeptic parties are not a viable alternative. It is assumed that even if a hard-line Euroskeptic will not vote for a Euroskeptic party that has no viable chance for success, he/she will also not vote for an intensely pro-EU party. This scale hopes to catch those votes in the center and the movement between the likelihood of voting at each level when awareness changes.

### ***Independent Variables***

#### ***Knowledge***

The main independent variable to be tested for  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  is knowledge of the EU. This variable will be constructed using several questions about the EU and parliament. The first sets of questions are true or false:

The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the EU?  
 The European Parliament was created 50 years ago?  
 Any enlargement of the EU is subject to prior approval of the European Parliament?  
 The EU's budget is determined jointly by the European Parliament and Member states?  
 The EU currently consists of 15 member states?  
 Every six months the presidency is given to a different member state?  
 The Euro area currently consists of 12 member states?

The next questions pertain to the date of the next European Parliament election (June 2009, 2007 for Romania): "In your opinion, when will the next European elections be held, here in our country? Year?" This combined measure is meant to replace a more commonly used measure of self reported knowledge of the EU. While this measure is available in the survey, the option of actually testing individual knowledge is uniquely available as well. These measures appear to be similar with 35% of respondents scoring above the mean on the knowledge test and 40% claiming to have an understanding of how the EU works.

### *Awareness*

Awareness will also be tested in  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  using the standard questions:

“When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never. The main independent variable to be tested for  $H_3$  is also the level of awareness of the European Election. This measure will be constructed using this five part question addressing interest in the European election, “how often did you do any of the following during the three or four weeks before the European election?”

...watch a program about the election on the television?  
 ...read about the election in a newspaper?  
 ...talk to friends or family about the election?  
 ...attend a public meeting or rally about the election?  
 ...look at a website concerned with the election?

### *Controlling for Alternative Explanations*

According to the theoretical literature, controls will be added for national identity, political trust, partisanship, and utilitarianism along with demographic controls.

### *Model for Voting*

Controls will be added to the model for trust, national identity, partisanship, and utility.

The measure of trust will be constructed using an index of responses to the following question:

“Please tell me on a score of one through ten how much you personally trust each of these institutions.”

Country parliament?  
 The European Parliament?  
 The (Country) Government?  
 The European Commission?  
 The Council of Ministers?

In order to measure national identity, the following question will be used to code those respondents with exclusive national identity: “Do you ever think of yourself not as a (country)

citizen but also as a citizen of the European Union?” The measure for partisanship will come from a self reported measure for left/right political ideology using the following question: “in political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. What is your position? Please indicate your views using any number on a 10-point-scale. On this scale, where 1 means “left” and 10 means “right,” which number best describes your position?” In order to account for the role of extreme ideologies, this variable will be recoded to distinguish voters on the fringes. Several different measures of utility have been used to the relationship between economic utility and support for integration. Egocentric utilitarianism measures economic utility using occupation, income, and education along with questions regarding the perceived benefits from integration (McLaren 2007, 2004; Gabel 1998). This thesis uses the question, “over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in this country will be?” The responses are on a scale of one to five, five being get a lot worse and one being get a lot better. Other measures included as controls will be a dichotomous measure for membership in a trade union (occupation) and in the agricultural sector, last year of education completed, and the self reported social class of each respondent.

### ***Model for Preferences***

The measure for trust will be constructed using the same format as the voting model. The Eurobarometer supplies the same questions pertaining to trust. National identity will be constructed with the same logic as identity in the voting model in order to account for exclusive identities. It will combine a measure for attachment to one’s country and the EU to produce a score that will be coded for exclusion or inclusion. The measure for partisanship will be constructed the same as in the model for voting. The same question exists in the Eurobarometer with the same scale. Those respondents who answered “don’t know” or “no answer” will be

coded as missing. The Eurobarometer survey uses the same question about expectations as the measure of utilitarianism in the voting model. This question will be used here along with the demographic indicators of employment in a manual trade and level of education.

### ***Methods***

In order to test  $H_1$  and  $H_2$ , an ordered logit model is constructed to determine the independent effect of knowledge and awareness on preferences for membership and integration. In order to test  $H_3$ , ordered logit regression analysis was used to test for the independent effect or awareness on vote choice. The expectation is as the level of awareness increases, the likelihood of casting a vote for a party higher on the pro and anti-EU scale will decrease. Ordered logit will be used over OLS since these dependent variables are bounded, non-continuous variables. In each model, the control variables will be included in order to control for alternative explanations. By using these models, it is possible to misinterpret the effect of the variables due to fixed country effects. Because the country of each respondent does have some effect on the values, education, and information individuals will received (i.e. some countries by nature are more Euroskeptic than others), this effect is controlled by using country dummy variables.

The definition of the dependent variable in the voting model, the identification of each party on a pro-anti integration scale, could be problematic. Using a qualitative assessment of party manifestos to transfer party position into a quantitative data set may lead to variation in the coding of parties and statements. The coding of these statements is already done in the Euromanifestos and precautions were taken to ensure standard coding across coders and countries. In order to ensure that the scale scored used to categorize parties is the best measure of party standing toward the EU, analysis of policy statements will be used to double check the



validity of a categorization (see Appendix). However, the score currently used is a scale placement by the coder of the manifestos. Since the coders of the manifestos are political science professionals in the country for which they are coding, they perhaps are able to offer the best view of integration attitudes. As with any survey data, the effects of the question wording and order effects and social desirability effects can contribute to inaccuracies in answers from the respondents. It is likely that some respondents will not respond with their true opinions when being interviewed by a member of the Eurobarometer or EES team. However, the large number of observations should be able to mitigate this effect where it may occur. Another problematic element of the construction of these tests is the potential endogeneity of the relationship. While the literature suggests that knowledge and awareness affects opinions about the EU, it is hard to protect against falsely identifying this relationship when it is really support for the EU that is driving the accumulation of knowledge. Testing for causality is done by utilizing a modified Granger test for casualty. This will be used in the model of preferences.

## **Results**

Initial tests of the models of membership attitudes and direction show different effects for knowledge and awareness. In the model testing the attitude toward membership, both knowledge and awareness support the hypothesis and decrease the likelihood that respondents will view membership negatively (Table 2). The control variables behave as expected with higher levels of education and a positive economic outlook supporting a decrease in Euroskeptic attitudes toward membership. More extreme identification for partisanship, as well as exclusive national identity and identification with manual labor increase the likelihood that Euroskeptic attitudes toward

membership are present. Trust was not significant in this model (at the  $\alpha = .05$  level), suggesting that trust in government is a weaker factor in determining attitudes toward membership.<sup>4</sup>

**Table 2: Results of Membership Model<sup>5</sup>**

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	
Knowledge	-0.147	0.009	0.863	0.008	**
Awareness	-0.140	0.025	0.869	0.022	**
Trust	0.014	0.008	1.015	0.008	
Identity	0.737	0.037	2.090	0.077	**
Partisanship	0.065	0.032	1.067	0.034	*
EconOutlook	-0.568	0.022	0.567	0.013	**
Manual	0.162	0.037	1.176	0.044	**
Education	-0.309	0.020	0.734	0.014	**

\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.05$  level \*\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.01$  level

Upon further analysis, knowledge appears to have the largest effect in decreasing Euroskeptic attitudes when awareness is held constant at the highest level (18).<sup>6</sup> Here the probability a respondent will view membership as a good thing is increased from 69% to 80% as knowledge goes from 0 to 4 correct answers at the highest level of awareness. The percentage does increase between the middle and highest levels but it is not as dramatic as the switch from low to high levels (80% predicted probability to 88% when knowledge goes from 4 to 8 at the highest level of awareness). Awareness has the largest effect when it is increase from mid-to high levels and knowledge is held constant.<sup>7</sup> We can conclude in favor of H<sub>1</sub> and find in support

<sup>4</sup> Trust is significant at the  $\alpha = .10$  level.

<sup>5</sup> National fixed effects were controlled for in this model but not reported here. See Appendix C for full models. Each model uses Netherlands as the base country and excludes it from the model. It found most countries significantly different from the Netherlands. Including these fixed effects attempts to control for specific country effects that may affect the view an individual has toward membership. The effects of the explanatory variables remain significant with this inclusion.

<sup>6</sup>The clarify function was used to test the strength of the effect of knowledge and awareness on membership varying each level of awareness for each level of knowledge and allowing each control to remain at its central tendency (Trust = mean of 10.8, Identity at mode of 1, Partisanship at mode of 0, Economic Outlook at mode of 3, Manual Labor at mode of 0, and Education at mode of 2).

<sup>7</sup> In order to account for potential interactive effects of knowledge and awareness on this dependent variable, a model was constructed including an interactive term and reported the insignificance of term ( $\alpha=.853$ ).

of the theoretical literature that argues knowledge and awareness have a positive effect on attitudes toward the EU.

In the model testing attitudes toward direction, knowledge and awareness have divergent effects. Knowledge is a significant negative factor in this model, signifying as knowledge increases the likelihood of being skeptical of the direction of the EU decrease. Awareness is found to be a significant and positive factor (Table 3). This implies as people become more aware of the EU, they are more likely to see it going in the wrong direction.<sup>8</sup> The control variables also perform as expected in this model. Higher levels of trust and education as well as a positive economic outlook decrease Euroskeptic attitudes and exclusive national identity and manual labor identification increase these attitudes. Further analysis also supports this divergent relationship.<sup>9</sup> The probability of thinking the EU is going in the wrong direction increases at every level of knowledge when it is held constant and awareness is changed. For example, when knowledge is held constant at 4 the percent probability for a negative attitude increased one percent at each level of awareness (11%, 12%, and 13%).<sup>10</sup> The percent probability that a respondent will have a positive view toward direction is high, but it is decreased as awareness moves higher (71%, 69%, and 67%), showing that awareness does have a decreasing effect on seeing the EU in the right direction. In this case,  $H_2$  is supported only for the relationship between direction and knowledge.

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<sup>8</sup> The survey question utilized to construction the direction variable offers the choices: the EU is going in the right direction the wrong direction, or neither. Please see variable description for more info.

<sup>9</sup> The clarify function was also used to test the strength of the effect of knowledge and awareness on membership varying each level of awareness for each level of knowledge and allowing each control to remain at its central tendency (Trust = mean of 10.8, Identity at mode of 1, Partisanship at mode of 0, Economic Outlook at mode of 3, Manual Labor at mode of 0, and Education at mode of 2).

<sup>10</sup> The interaction between knowledge and awareness was also tested in an additional model. In this case the combined effect was significant and positive, showing further support for the conclusion above.

**Table 3: Results of Direction Model<sup>11</sup>**

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	
Knowledge	-0.120	0.009	0.887	0.008	**
Awareness	0.049	0.025	1.050	0.026	*
Trust	-0.040	0.008	0.961	0.008	**
Identity	0.526	0.035	1.692	0.059	**
Partisanship	0.058	0.032	1.060	0.034	
EconOutlook	-0.712	0.022	0.491	0.011	**
Manual	0.019	0.038	1.019	0.038	
Education	-0.220	0.019	0.803	0.015	**

\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.05$  level \*\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.01$  level

The results for the voting model support the same relationship for awareness as the model of direction. This model finds that awareness is significant and positively related to voting for a party higher on the anti-EU scale (Table 4). This suggests that as awareness increases, votes for parties that are Euro-neutral or Euroskeptic increase. Further analysis reveals that the behavior of this variable is closely linked to trust.<sup>12</sup> Analyzing predicted probabilities shows that when awareness is increased, the probability of voting for parties that rank 1, 2, or 3 decreases and parties ranking 4 or higher increase at low and mid levels of trust. For example, as awareness increases from 7 to 10, the predicted probability of voting for a party ranked 3 decreases by 4% while a party ranked 7 increases by 1%. The largest increase in predicted probabilities occurs in parties between 4 and 6 which signify that Euro neutral parties also gain significantly from increased awareness. The smallest increase in predicted probabilities occurs at high levels of trust. The probability for voting for parties ranked 3 or greater is increased at high levels of trust

<sup>11</sup> National fixed effects are included but not reported in this table. See footnote 3 and Appendix C.

<sup>12</sup> The clarify function was also used to test the strength of awareness on party vote varying each level of awareness for each level of trust and allowing each control to remain at its central tendency (Identity at mode of 0, Partisanship at mode of 0, Economic Outlook at mode of 3, Union at mode of 0, Agriculture at mode of 0, Education at mean of 19.48, and Class at mode of 3). The control variables were also tested at varied levels and found to have a small effect in change the predicted probabilities but not changing the overall pattern or increasing and decreasing probabilities for party vote over changes in awareness and trust.

and the expected probabilities change only slightly across all parties.<sup>13</sup> In this model, H<sub>2</sub> is rejected in favor of an increasing relationship between awareness and the scale score of the party an individual votes for.

**Table 4: Results of Voting Model<sup>14</sup>**

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	
Awareness	0.057	0.014	1.059	0.015	**
Trust	-0.028	0.003	0.972	0.003	**
Identity	0.160	0.057	1.174	0.066	**
Partisanship	0.156	0.051	1.168	0.060	**
EconOutlook	0.088	0.029	1.092	0.031	**
Union	-0.010	0.054	0.990	0.054	
Agriculture	-0.191	0.116	0.826	0.096	
Education	-0.012	0.005	0.988	0.005	*
Class	-0.142	0.027	0.868	0.024	**

\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.05$  level \*\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.01$  level

The relationships in the attitudinal models required testing for endogeneity. While this thesis explores the effect knowledge has on membership attitudes and attitudes toward the direction of integration, it is also plausible that positive or negative sentiments for both membership and direction may motivate an individual to seek higher levels of knowledge and awareness. In order to test the casual relationship between these variables, a simulated Granger test was conducted but reversing the dependent and independent effects for the attitude models. A model with knowledge as the dependent variable and membership and awareness as the main explanatory variables shows that sentiments toward membership are significant and positive in determining levels of knowledge. This relationship was similar when awareness was a dependent

<sup>13</sup> The interaction between trust and awareness was tested in an additional model and was insignificant ( $\alpha= .164$ ).

<sup>14</sup> National fixed effects were controlled for in this model. Please see Appendix C for the full report. This model reported the significance for most countries, which is expected given different electoral and party systems and cultures. With these effects included, awareness remains significant. The strongest effects came from countries where the majority of votes were placed for parties ranking above 5. Similar to the other models, this model uses the Netherlands as the base country and excludes it from the model.

variable and knowledge independent but the direction was negative. For the direction model, direction was significant but negative when knowledge was a dependent variable. This suggests that preference for the direction of integration actually reduced the level of knowledge that people have. With awareness, direction was a significant and positive factor only a 95% confidence level but not at a 99%. This suggests that higher animosity toward the direction of the EU increases awareness. Simulating the Granger test show that the causal direction of these models is bilateral and perhaps there is some sort of feedback taking place between the variables.

### **Implications**

Several conclusions with important implications can be derived from these findings. The implication and conclusions will first be addressed in relation to the theoretical literature on knowledge and Euroskepticism, then its implications for the integration debate will be incorporated, followed by a recommendation for further exploration. The hypotheses of this thesis have mixed results.  $H_1$  is supported in its entirety. Increases in knowledge and awareness appear to decrease the tendency to hold negative attitudes toward membership in the EU.  $H_2$  must be split into two separate parts. First, the test of knowledge and direction confirms the hypothesis. An increase in the level of knowledge does decrease the likelihood of holding a negative attitude toward the direction the EU is going. Second, the test of awareness and direction does not support the hypothesis. As awareness increases, the tendency to view the direction of integration negatively increases.  $H_3$  is not supported. The relationship between awareness and vote choice appears to be positive and increases the chances of voting for a party ranked higher on the integration scale. These findings imply knowledge and awareness function differently, even though they may not be mutually exclusive. Overlap exists when conceptualizing awareness and knowledge. Higher awareness can certainly lead to increased

objective knowledge, but there is no guarantee. Concurrent with these findings, it is expected to play a distinctly different role when information is constructed for a specific purpose. Linking these findings to the theoretical literature further explains this relationship.

Interpreting these results in light of the literature offers several important conclusions. The literature on cognitive mobilization and political acceptance is supported by these findings (Zaller 1990, Inglehart 1970, Anderson 1998). Increasing knowledge increases familiarity with the EU and makes individuals more open to new ideas. This is also supported in the evaluation of knowledge and direction of the EU. The higher level of understanding individuals have on the way the EU works, the more approving they tend to be. This differs slightly from Karp, Banducci, and Bowler (2007) who find that an increase in knowledge leads individuals to evaluate the functioning EU with greater skepticism, but these studies are not immediately comparable. Evaluations of democracy do not correspond necessarily to evaluation of the benefits of membership or integration. This type of evaluation is highly sophisticated and the authors admit these types of evaluations only occur with high levels of knowledge. In order to contradict Karp et. al., further analysis of these relationships at only high levels of knowledge is necessary.

The role of awareness in this study diverges from the literature. While in the case of membership attitudes, awareness follows the classic theoretical pattern of increasing positive attitudes (Inglehart 1970, Anderson 1998), but this can no longer be said for attitudes toward direction. It appears from these models that awareness and knowledge play two separate roles. When individuals evaluate the benefits of membership in the EU, their knowledge and level of awareness predict they will evaluate membership positively with higher levels of cognitive mobilization. This is somewhat expected, but the large debate over membership has been

replaced with a more complex debate on how and if the EU should continue to expand. In the post-enlargement EU, the most important issues for debate revolve around how to handle the consequences of enlargement like increased immigration and economic competition. These issues are more susceptible to deliberate and purposive interpretation by groups seeking to promote political goals. Assessment of attitudes toward enlargement and further integration are best measured using questions about the direction of the EU and this is where the most divergence with the literature is found.

Awareness appears to increase the probability individuals will evaluate integration in the EU more skeptically. In both the model of direction attitudes and the voting model, awareness has a significant and positive relationship. Although cognitive mobilization is more likely to increase positive attitudes toward membership, increased awareness is just as likely to decrease positive assessments of the direction of integration. This conclusion supports the theoretical position of Hooghe and Marks (2009). They argue the largest debates are being cued, primed, and framed by Euroskeptic parties and movements, raising awareness of the new challenges of integration for the public. Public opinion is becoming more apprehensive in its support for the constitutional measures and furthering integration. By framing the Lisbon Treaty in terms of decreasing national sovereignty and attacking a national identity, anti-EU movements have been able to influence the attitudes held by the public. What the findings in this thesis support is a reevaluation of the link between information and preference formation. Instead of blaming referenda failure on the ignorance and confusion of the public, it may be more important to look at who is steering public debate and what information is being given to individuals when they read a newspaper, watch television, listen to the radio, or talk among their peer groups. In order to combat the negative effect of increased awareness, pro-EU groups must become more



mobilized and enter the debate over integration to match the skeptic movements. In addition to increasing the factual information available to the public about the EU, groups must mobilize in favor of the EU initiatives. The domination of debate thus far by skeptic groups have produced and controlled the relationship between integration attitudes and awareness shown here. The benefits of enlargement need to be championed by pro-EU group and socialized into public opinion in order to mobilize individuals around positive outcomes.

The performance of the control variables also impacts the strength of the conclusions made here. Nearly all of the control variables were found to be significant and behave in the theoretically expected way. Preferences for integration are obviously determined through a bundle of many different influences. Economic influence, identity, and trust all contribute to the formation of preferences along with information. This suggests that given the right conditions, mass Euroskeptic movements can effectively and strategically pinpoint the most pressing and controversial issues in public debate. By highlighting the consequences of enlargement as threats to identity and the economy, Euroskeptic movements are able to raise awareness of the contentious issues in the public that are very much a part of how they will determine their preferences for the future of the EU.

### **Ignorant and Confused in Ireland?**

A preliminary examination of the Irish citizens voting for the Lisbon referendum highlights an opportunity to apply these findings. After the referendum failed, several political leaders and the European commission scrambled to explain the public rejection of the new treaty. The European Commission concluded that over half of the respondents rejected the Lisbon Treaty due to a “lack of understanding,” “ignorance, and confusion” (Buchanan 20). The

Eurobarometer Post-Referendum survey offers insight into these statements and the relationship between knowledge, awareness, and voting and Irish citizens (Flash Eurobarometer 245). While the data for the survey are not yet available to the public, the preliminary results reports can be interpreted and compared to the results found here.

Lack of knowledge appears to play an important role in the decision to participate in the vote and in the voting decision, but it deserves a closer look. From the reports, it is evident that 78% of respondents could provide a legitimate reason for voting against the referendum. In fact, knowledge appears to play its most important role in the decision to vote. The top three reasons for abstaining from the vote were a lack of understanding of the treaty, a lack of information on the issues, and a lack of information on the content of the treaty. Of those that did vote, reasons for voting no include protecting the Irish identity, protesting against a united Europe or the EU decision making process, to protect Irish military neutrality, and protect the tax system, as well as a self reported lack of information (22%). Lack of information was the modal category for respondents that voted no, but further questions reveal that lack of information does not translate directly to ignorance and confusion. In addition to these reasons for voting no, the survey also explores the knowledge voters have of the possible consequences of the rejection of the treaty. When asked series of questions related to the outcome, only 17% of no voters claimed to be unaware of the implications of the treaty's rejection. 14% of yes voters made the same claim.

The majority of voters appeared able to make judgments about the future of Ireland and the EU following the referendum. 76% of those voting no thought it would enable Ireland to negotiate exceptions in the treaty compared to 38% of those voting yes. These results suggest that those voting no were aware, at least marginally, of the way the EU works and what the treaty

could mean for the Irish people. As far as membership goes, nearly all voters did not see this referendum as a signal that Ireland is on its way out of the EU, which supports the conclusion of this thesis, that knowledge influences positive attitudes towards membership. 89% of all voters (98% yes and 80% no) still supported membership in the EU (European Commission 2008). These results show that while the voters may have had a lack of information about the treaty, they were neither confused nor ignorant of what it meant for Ireland. This signals that the public did consume some information about the treaty, but it may not have been the information the commission considers vital to the treaty's understanding. Likewise, the benefits of the treaty may not have been clear in the messaging coming from Lisbon supporters. It is clear that the Irish people had legitimate reasons for rejecting the treaty and have established opinions about its role in Irish society and government. This suggests that even though the treaty itself may not have been understood, citizens did possess information on its implications. Examining the role of the campaigns for and against the treaty provides preliminary insight into how information may influence vote choice.

**Table 5: Survey of Irish Voters**

Flash Eurobarometer 245 Important Issues in Survey (N=2000)	Vote Choice	
	No	Yes
Unaware of implications	17%	14%
Vote will enable treaty exceptions	76%	38%
Ireland leaving EU (not believing)	80%	98%
“No” campaign more effective	81%	57%
Changed mind in campaign	72%	64%
Decision in last week	57%	52%

Analysis of the level of information and the effectiveness of the campaigns provides insight into the role of campaigns and awareness in determining vote choice. The single most important determinant of voting preference for the referendum appears to be the effectiveness of the campaigns for or against it. This supports the conclusion that awareness has the potential to affect voter preferences and shape public opinion. The respondents to the post-referendum survey overwhelmingly concluded that the no campaign was the most effective. 68% of all voters claimed the no campaign was most effective, with only 15% of all voters giving the same distinction to the yes campaign. This means that even 57% of those who voted yes to the referendum still thought the no campaign was more convincing for voters. Another interesting aspect of these campaigns is that they appear to be most effective in the final days before the referendum. The majority of all voters made their decisions in the final week of campaigning (55%), compared to only 19% that had made a decision at the start of the campaigns. Furthermore, 72% of those surveyed and voting no changed their minds in during the campaigns (European Commission 2008). While the information is not available to measure how many changed their minds from yes to no, this data adds more support to the conclusion that awareness of the debate was a crucial factor in constructing the rejection of the treaty. This supports the idea that the information received by voters during the campaign was influential and more powerful when it was coming from Euroskeptics. While the measures of awareness used to model this relationship are unavailable at this time, it appears that Irish voters have demonstrated the relationships and conclusions set forth in this thesis.

It cannot be concluded that Irish voters were “ignorant and confused” when voting for the referendum in 2008. A preliminary look at the post referendum survey highlights the ability of the Irish to justify their votes using valid reasons and understand the meaning and implications of

their votes; those who where “ignorant and confused” appear to be mainly those who abstained from voting entirely. The campaigns launched against the referendum appear most effective, supporting the idea that Euroskeptic groups and parties are more effective at raising awareness of the issues (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Further analysis of the Irish case once data become available will allow this relationship to be explored further.

## **Conclusion**

In the future, the impact of awareness and knowledge on public opinion of the EU cannot be ignored. As Europeans prepare to go to the polls for the European Parliament one more time in 2009 and the Lisbon Treaty gears up for a second chance in Ireland, the level of information the public receives is important. Information plays an important role in the formation of attitudes and preferences for integration. Knowledge of the European Union and its functions and structure increase the level of familiarity and decrease negative attitudes toward the EU and its direction. On the other hand, awareness decreases these attitudes, suggesting the power of information to shape public opinion. The contradictory influences of these two explanatory variables highlights the distinction between information that increases factual knowledge and information that expresses an opinion or highlights a controversy. Information can be framed and constructed to inform public opinion for a specific purpose.

Information sources and the level of mobilization against integration require a closer look. Euroskeptic campaigns were able to persuade Irish voter to reject the Lisbon Treaty. The opportunity for Euroskeptic parties to gain control of the public debate over integration will only grow if centrist parties do not begin to take public opinion serious. Euroskeptics are not confused or ignorant; they are becoming more aware of the consequences of enlargement and further

integration. This leads to another very important question that must be analyzed empirically: what kind of information is being received and who is it coming from? Measuring the amount of information an individual receives and shares with others is an important first step in examining this relationship, but further analysis into the source of information will provide even more insight into the link between information and Euroskepticism. If the EU seeks to combat the skepticism coming from the far right and far left movements in Europe, it must incorporate the debate over integration into its agenda and mobilization public opinion in its favor. If mainstream parties continue to ignore the debate on integration they will undoubtedly drive voters to parties that offer alternatives to the full-speed forward integration policies of the past decade. Further research into the level of information and its source is necessary in order to determine the potential awareness has to influence public opinion. In order to steer public opinion away from Euroskepticism, pro-integration movements must be able to match this movement in strength and distribution.

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## APPENDIX A: EUROPEAN PARTY CLASSIFICATION

PARTY	EU	PARTY	EU	PARTY	EU	PARTY	EU	PARTY	EU
AUT: FPO Fre	10	FIN: KD (for	7	IRE: Fianna	3	NET: CDA Chr	2	SPA: AP,PP C	3
AUT: GA Gree	2	FIN: KK Nati	3	IRE: Fine Ga	5	NET: CU/SGP:	6	SPA: CC Cana	3
AUT: HPM, Li	1	FIN: RKP SFP	2	IRE: Greens	7	NET: D 66 Li	2	SPA: CiU Con	3
AUT: LINKE	10	FIN: SK Finn	2	IRE: LP Labo	4	NET: EuroTra	3	SPA: Coalici	3
AUT: OVP Chr	2	FIN: SSDP So	2	IRE: Sinn Fe	8	NET: GL Gree	2	SPA: Coalici	3
AUT: SPO Soc	7	FIN: VL Gree	3	ITA: AN Nati	7	NET: Lijst P	9	SPA: EA Basq	3
BEL: CD&V: f	2	FIN: VL Left	3	ITA: DS/SDI/	1	NET: PvdA La	3	SPA: EH Eusk	3
BEL: CDH	2	FRA: CPNT Hu	8	ITA: Fed.V:	2	NET: SP Soci	7	SPA: ERC Cat	3
BEL: Ecolo F	2	FRA: Diversi	3	ITA: FI Forz	2	NET: VVD Lib	2	SPA:GALEUSC	3
BEL: FN Nati	5	FRA: EDE Eur	3	ITA: Lista p	2	N-IRE: DUP D	9	SPA: IU: for	3
BEL: Groen!	2	FRA: FN Nati	10	ITA: LN Nort	7	N-IRE: SDLP	2	SPA: Los Ver	3
BEL: MR Mouv	5	FRA: Greens	2	ITA: Patto S	4	N-IRE: SF Si	8	SPA: PNV EAJ	3
BEL: NVA: fo	4	FRA: HZ	5	ITA: PdCI Co	4	N-IRE: UUP	7	SPA: PSOE So	1
BEL: PS Fran	2	FRA: L'ouest	3	ITA: PR Radi	1	POL: LPR lea	9	SWE: Center	7
BEL: SP Flem	3	FRA: La terr		ITA: RC New	9	POL: PiS Law	5	SWE: FP Libe	2
BEL: Spirit	3	FRA: LO Work		ITA: SVP Sou	1	POL: PO Citi	2	SWE: Greens	9
BEL: VB Flem	8	FRA: MPF Mou	9	ITA: UD.EUR	3	POL: PSL Pol	4	SWE: Junilis	7
BEL: VLD: fo	3	FRA: Nouvell	2	ITA: UDC		POL: SdPI Po	3	SWE: KdS Chr	4
CYP: AKEL	4	FRA: Parti d	10	ITA: Ulivo	1	POL: SLD-UP	2	SWE: MSPCon	3
CYP: DIKO	3	FRA: Parti d	4	ITA:S.C.D.P.	3	POL: SO Self	9	SWE: SdaP So	5
CYP: DISY	2	FRA: PCF Com	3	LAT: :PP Lat	4	POL: UW Free	1	SWE: pComm	9
CYP: KISOS	3	FRA: PS Soci	2	LAT: JL New	3	POR: B.E. BI	5	UK: Conserva	8
CYP: KOP	4	FRA: RPF Ral	8	LAT: LC Latv	3	POR: CDU: Co	9	UK: Greens	7
CZR: CSSD Cz	1	FRA: RPR/DL	2	LAT: PCTVL F	4	POR: PSD-PP:	4	UK: Labour	4
CZR: KDU-CSL	3	FRA: UDF	2	LAT: TB/LNNK	4	POR: PSP Soc	2	UK: LDP Libe	4
CZR: KSCM Co	6	FRA: UFCN	3	LAT: TP Peop	3	SK: ANO New	5	UK: PC Plaid	3
CZR: NEZ Pol	9	GER: Allianc	3	LAT: ZZS Gre	5	SK: HZDSMov	3	UK: Respect	4
CZR: ODO Civ	9	GER: CDU Chr	5	LIT: DP Darb	5	SK: KDH Chri	8	UK: SNP Scot	4
CZR: SN-ED A	3	GER: CSU Chr	9	LIT: KKSS	5	SK: KSS Slov	8	UK: UK Indep	10
CZR: US/LRS/	3	GER: FDP Fre	4	LIT: LCS Lib	2	SK: SDKU Slo	4		
DEN: DF Dani	9	GER: PDS Par	2	LIT: LDP Lib	2	SK: SDL Part	2		
DEN: FB Peop	9	GER: REP The	10	LIT: LKD Lit	3	SK: SF: Free	5		
DEN: JB June	9	GER: SPD Soc	3	LIT: LLRA/LR	4	SK: Smer Par	3		
DEN: KF Cons	2	GRE: DPE Dem	2	LIT: LSDP Li	4	SK: SMK Part	3		
DEN: RV Radi	3	GRE: KKE Com	10	LIT: NS New	2	SL: LDS Libe	1		
DEN: SD Soci	2	GRE: LAOS: L	9	LIT: VNDPS V	3	SL: NSi New	1		
DEN: SF Soci	3	GRE: ND New	1	LIT:TS-LK Ho	3	SL: SLD+SKD	3		
DEN: V Liber	2	GRE: PASOK S	1	LUX: ADR Pen	1	SL: ZLSD Uni	1		
Doppelt, fäl	2	GRE: SYN Coa	4	LUX: Dei Gre	3	SL:SDS Slove	1		
EST: ResP Re	3	HUN: FIDESZ	1	LUX: PCS CSV	6				
EST: ER Esto	5	HUN: MDF Dem	1	LUX: PD DP D	2				
EST: K Centr	4	HUN: MSZP Hu	1	LUX: POSL LS	3				
EST: Rahvali	7	HUN: SZDSZ A	2	MAL: MLP Par	3				
EST:IL Party	5			MAL: PN Part	2				
EST:SDE Peop	2								

Party coding: each party is given a score on a scale of 1-10. A score of 1 represents a pro-EU designation for the party. A score of 10 represents an anti-EU designation for the party. The scale is taking from the Euromanifestos 2004 data and is determined by the designated coding specialist for each country after the party manifestos have been coded.

## APPENDIX B: VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION

### Dependent Variables

The dependent variable used to test  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  are constructed using standard Eurobarometer questions.

Membership: “Generally speaking, do you think membership in the European Union is a: good thing, bad thing, neither good nor bad, don’t know.”

Direction: “at the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction, wrong direction, or neither in the European Union.”

The literature that has previously tested the individual components of Euroskepticism has represented a variety of measures for Euroskeptic attitudes. The question for attitude towards membership has been used as a standalone measure for support for integration (Anderson 1998). Euroskepticism has also been constructed using an index of attitudes toward the membership and direction (McLaren 2002) and combined with a question on the speed of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004). Due to the structure of this particular Eurobarometer, the speed of integration will be excluded from this measure. The values of good, bad, or neither, and right, wrong, or neither were coded as one, two, three respectively. Values for the “do not know” answer (4) are coded as missing values without losing a significant portion of observations. The values for “neither” are changed to a value of 1.5. It is assumed that individuals that believe membership is neither a good nor a bad thing, or the direction of the EU is neither good nor bad, do not have an opinion either way. It is reasonable to assume they are somewhere between bad and good; therefore, these values were re-coded to fall between bad and good. For each question a value of 2 signifies Euroskeptic attitudes and 1 is more Europositive.

### Independent Variables

#### *Awareness*

Awareness in the attitude models is also be tested using the standard questions:

“When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?”

Response will be coded 1 for never, 2 for occasionally, and 3 for frequently. Those responses of don’t know or no answer will be coded as missing.

Awareness in the voting model constructed using this five part question addressing interest in the European election, “how often did you do any of the following during the three or four weeks before the European election?”

- ...watch a program about the election on the television?
- ...read about the election in a newspaper?
- ...talk to friends or family about the election?
- ...attend a public meeting or rally about the election?
- ...look at a website concerned with the election?

The responses were coded one for often, two for sometimes, and three for never, but were coded again so that never =1, sometimes =2 and often =3 in order to construct the measure to be positively increasing. Values of “don’t know” or “no answer” are coded as missing. The responses to all questions are added to create an awareness score ranging from five to fifteen, five being least aware and fifteen being most aware with a mean of 7.65.

## *Knowledge*

This variable is constructed using several questions about the EU and parliament. The first sets of questions are true or false:

The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the EU?  
 The European Parliament was created 50 years ago?  
 Any enlargement of the EU is subject to prior approval of the European Parliament?  
 The EU's budget is determined jointly by the European Parliament and Member states?  
 The EU currently consists of 15 member states?  
 Every six months the presidency is given to a different member state?  
 The Euro area currently consists of 12 member states?

The next questions pertain to the date of the next European Parliament election (June 2009, 2007 for Romania):

“In your opinion, when will the next European elections be held, here in our country?”

Year?

Only year is used for this measure due to the variability of the actual date of elections across countries. Each correct answer has been coded as one and each incorrect answer will be zero. Answer coded don't know have been coded again as zero. This is reasonable to assume that respondents who answered “don't know” do not have the correct answer and did not choose to respond with a specific choice. All scores are added to create a total score ranging from zero for no correct answers to 8 for all correct answers and a mean score of 3.69. This measure is meant to replace a more commonly used measure of self reported knowledge of the EU. While this measure is available in the survey, the option of actually testing ones knowledge is uniquely available as well. These measures appear to be similar with 9,557 respondents scoring near the mean (3 or 4) on the knowledge test and 10,798 (26, 768 total) claiming to have an

understanding of how the EU works. This measure was also tested for reliability with a score of  $\alpha = .6212$  which was considerable higher than the reliability of combining the measures.

### Control Variables in Model for Attitudes

#### *Trust*

The following Eurobarometer questions are used for this variable: The measure of trust is constructed using an index of responses to the following question: “Please tell me on a score of one through ten how much you personally trust each of these institutions.”

The (Country) Government?  
 Country Parliament?  
 The European Union?  
 The European Parliament?  
 The European Commission?  
 The Council of Ministers?

Respondents are given the options of tend to trust (1), tend not to trust (2), and don’t know (3). The coding of these responses is reversed so that trusting is coded three and not trusting is coded 1. Answers of don’t know are coded as neutral (2) in order to keep substantial numbers of observations in the data set. All responses are indexed to form the variable trust with possible values from six for not trusting any institutions to eighteen for fully trusting.

#### *National Identity*

This variable uses the following question, “People may feel different levels of attachment to their village, town or city, to their country or to the European Union. Please tell me how attached you feel to...

Your country?  
 The European Union?

The responses vary from “very attached” to “not at all attached.” Not at all is coded one and very attached is coded four. The responses for European Union attachment are subtracted from national attachment, which produces negative scores for those that have inclusive national identities and positive scores for those who have exclusive national identities and zero for neutral. These scores are then coded dichotomously so exclusive identities are one and neutral or inclusive are zero.

### *Partisanship*

The measure for partisanship comes from a self reported measure for left/right political ideology using the following question: “in political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. What is your position? Please indicate your views using any number on a 10-point-scale. On this scale, where 1 means “left” and 10 means “right,” which number best describes your position?” Once again respondents answering I don’t know or those who did not provide an answer are coded as missing. In order to account for the role of extreme ideologies, this variable will be recoded to distinguish voters on the fringes. Values of 1, 2, and 3 represent voters on the far left, while 8, 9, and 10 represent voters on the far right. Each of these values are coded as 1 and the remaining values as 0. Those respondents who answered “don’t know” or “no answer” are coded as missing values.

### *Utilitarianism*

Economic Outlook: “over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in this country will be?” The responses are coded 1 for worse, 2 for the same, and 3 for better

Manual: dichotomous coding for identification in a manual labor occupation (1) or not (0)

Education: age when left school in sections:

No full time education =0

15 and under =1

16-19 =2

20+ =3

Still studying =4

### *Controls in Model for Voting*

#### *Trust*

The measure of trust is constructed using an index of responses to the following question:

“Please tell me on a score of one through ten how much you personally trust each of these institutions. A response of one indicates that the respondent does not trust an institution at all, and a response of ten indicates that they have complete trust.”

Country parliament?

The European Parliament?

The (Country) Government?

The European Commission?

The Council of Ministers?

The total score has a value between five for no trust at all and fifty for very trusting. Answers that are coded as “do not know” will be coded as missing values. This measure is the standard used in previous studies seeking to gauge political trust (McLaren 2007).

#### *National Identity*

In order to measure national identity, the following question is used to code those respondents with exclusive national identity: “Do you ever think of yourself not as a (country) citizen but also



as a citizen of the European Union?” Responses include often, sometimes, and never. Those respondents that replied never are considered to have an exclusive identity and are coded 1, the rest are zero.

### *Partisanship*

The measure for partisanship is a self reported measure for left/right political ideology using the following question: “in political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". What is your position? Please indicate your views using any number on a 10-point-scale. On this scale, where 1 means "left" and 10 means "right," which number best describes your position?” Once again respondents answering I don’t know or those who did not provide an answer are coded as missing. In order to account for the role of extreme ideologies, this variable is recoded to distinguish voters on the fringes. Values of 1, 2, and three represent voters on the far left, while 8, 9, and 10 represent voters on the far right. Each of these values will be coded as 1 and the remaining values as 0.

### *Utilitarianism*

Economic Outlook: “over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in this country will be?” The responses are on a scale of one to five, five being get a lot worse and one being get a lot better.

Union: dichotomous coding for membership in a union (1) or not (0)

Agriculture: dichotomous coding for work in the agricultural sector (1) or not (0)

Education: age when left school, continuous variable with min 0 and max 74

Class: ordinal variable with the following values

Working class=1

Lower middle class=2

Middle class=3

Upper middle class=4

Upper class=5

## APPENDIX C: MODELS WITH COUNTRY EFFECTS

**Membership Model**

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	
Knowledge	-0.147	0.009	0.863	0.008	**
Awareness	-0.140	0.025	0.869	0.022	**
Trust	0.014	0.008	1.015	0.008	
Identity	0.737	0.037	2.090	0.077	**
Partisanship	0.065	0.032	1.067	0.034	*
EconOutlook	-0.568	0.022	0.567	0.013	**
Manual	0.162	0.037	1.176	0.044	**
Education	-0.309	0.020	0.734	0.014	**
Belgium	0.414	0.115	1.512	0.174	**
Denmark	0.685	0.112	1.984	0.223	**
Greece	0.634	0.112	1.885	0.211	**
Germany	0.596	0.103	1.814	0.187	**
Spain	0.086	0.127	1.090	0.139	
Finland	1.563	0.105	4.775	0.503	**
France	0.948	0.109	2.580	0.282	**
Ireland	-0.257	0.127	0.774	0.098	*
Italy	1.039	0.116	2.827	0.328	**
Luxembourg	-0.309	0.176	0.734	0.130	
Austria	1.909	0.108	6.748	0.729	**
Portugal	0.535	0.119	1.708	0.204	**
Sweden	1.281	0.108	3.599	0.388	**
UK	1.709	0.104	5.522	0.575	**
CyprusRepublic	1.029	0.137	2.798	0.385	**
CzechRepublic	1.333	0.106	3.793	0.401	**
Estonia	0.510	0.117	1.666	0.195	**
Hungary	1.418	0.109	4.128	0.449	**
Latvia	1.466	0.110	4.332	0.476	**
Lithuania	0.351	0.132	1.420	0.187	**
Malta	1.090	0.157	2.975	0.467	**
Poland	0.375	0.129	1.455	0.187	**
Slovakia	0.851	0.108	2.342	0.253	**
Slovenia	0.859	0.116	2.360	0.274	**
Bulgaria	0.606	0.126	1.834	0.230	**
Romania	0.298	0.135	1.347	0.182	*

\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.05$  level \*\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.01$  level

The Netherlands is used as base country for national fixed effects.

**Direction Model**

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Odds Ratio	St. Err	
Knowledge	-0.120	0.009	0.887	0.008	**
Awareness	0.049	0.025	1.050	0.026	*
Trust	-0.040	0.008	0.961	0.008	**
Identity	0.526	0.035	1.692	0.059	**
Partisanship	0.058	0.032	1.060	0.034	
EconOutlook	-0.712	0.022	0.491	0.011	*
Manual	0.019	0.038	1.019	0.038	
Education	-0.220	0.019	0.803	0.015	**
Belgium	-0.052	0.092	0.949	0.087	
Denmark	-0.318	0.097	0.728	0.070	**
Greece	-0.336	0.095	0.715	0.068	**
Germany	0.126	0.083	1.134	0.094	
Spain	-0.519	0.105	0.595	0.063	**
Finland	0.318	0.092	1.374	0.126	**
France	0.002	0.097	1.002	0.097	
Ireland	-0.879	0.107	0.415	0.044	**
Italy	0.125	0.100	1.134	0.113	
Luxembourg	0.348	0.124	1.417	0.175	**
Austria	0.400	0.093	1.492	0.139	**
Portugal	-0.347	0.104	0.707	0.073	**
Sweden	-0.089	0.095	0.915	0.087	
UK	0.359	0.094	1.433	0.135	**
CyprusRepublic	-0.585	0.143	0.557	0.079	**
CzechRepublic	-0.484	0.092	0.616	0.057	**
Estonia	-1.393	0.114	0.248	0.028	**
Hungary	-0.500	0.096	0.607	0.059	**
Latvia	-0.849	0.106	0.428	0.045	**
Lithuania	-1.223	0.125	0.294	0.037	**
Malta	-0.772	0.164	0.462	0.076	**
Poland	-1.350	0.125	0.259	0.032	**
Slovakia	-0.599	0.093	0.549	0.051	**
Slovenia	-0.703	0.105	0.495	0.052	**
Bulgaria	-1.617	0.142	0.198	0.028	**
Romania	-1.236	0.125	0.291	0.036	**

\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.05$  level \*\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.01$  level

The Netherlands is used as base country for national fixed effects.

### **Voting Model**

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	
Awareness	0.057	0.014	1.059	0.015	**
Trust	-0.028	0.003	0.972	0.003	**
Identity	0.160	0.057	1.174	0.066	**
Partisanship	0.156	0.051	1.168	0.060	**
EconOutlook	0.088	0.029	1.092	0.031	**
Union	-0.010	0.054	0.990	0.054	
Agriculture	-0.191	0.116	0.826	0.096	
Education	-0.012	0.005	0.988	0.005	**
Class	-0.142	0.027	0.868	0.024	**
Austria	-0.383	0.143	0.682	0.098	**
Cyprus	0.147	0.227	1.158	0.262	
Finland	0.214	0.139	1.238	0.172	
Greece	-4.515	0.294	0.011	0.003	**
Portugal	1.841	0.212	6.303	1.334	**
Germany	1.790	0.161	5.991	0.966	**
Latvia	0.802	0.138	2.231	0.309	**
Poland	-5.281	0.260	0.005	0.001	**
Slovakia	0.723	0.159	2.061	0.328	**
Czech	2.338	0.193	10.356	1.999	**
Estonia	0.730	0.142	2.076	0.295	**
UK	0.378	0.102	1.459	0.149	**
Belgium	-0.463	0.135	0.630	0.085	**
Luxembourg	1.753	0.109	5.774	0.630	**
Ireland	0.124	0.129	1.132	0.146	
France	-1.137	0.133	0.321	0.043	**
Slovenia	-6.344	0.470	0.002	0.001	**
Spain	-3.191	0.164	0.041	0.007	**

\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.05$  level \*\*signifies significant at the  $\alpha=0.01$  level  
The Netherlands is used as base country for national fixed effects.