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THOU SHALL NOT KILL: ANALYZING DEMOCRACY'S MODERATING EFFECT
ON VIOLENT RELIGIOUS SUPREMACY IN ISLAM

by

ARIEL E. MORGENSTERN

Under the Direction of Dr. Sean Richey

ABSTRACT

This research examines the commonly explicated theory that democracy is a moderating force on the public's support for terrorism. Specifically, I test the hypothesis that living in a democracy will decrease support for terror in Muslim populations. I analyze survey data on support for terrorism from the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which has data from 10 nations. I use an ordered logistic regression model to test what determines support for terrorism. The results show that democracy negatively correlates with support for terror. Additionally, I find that opinions toward US policy in the region, including the 'Global War on Terror' and US support for Israel, do not correlate with support for terrorism. The results inform our understanding of why certain members of Muslim society that do not engage in acts of violence against civilians in defense of Islam support terror none-the-less.

INDEX WORDS: Democracy, Terror, Islam

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by

ARIEL E. MORGENSTERN

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2009

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2009

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1 INTRODUCTION

The majority of Muslims around the world do not support terrorism. However, there are many that do, and the consequences of that support have touched the lives of individuals around the globe. The number of Muslims who support terror is not miniscule or simply a ‘fringe’ group; in fact according to a 2006 study conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Pew Global Attitudes Project* 12.8 percent of total Muslim respondents[†] living in countries defined by the 2006 Economist Democracy Index to be “full” or at least “flawed democracies” indicated that they sometimes or often support an act of terror in defense of Islam.¹ Additionally, more than double that number, 26.8 percent, of respondents in nations defined by the Economist’s index as “hybrid” or “authoritarian” regimes stated that they sometimes or often support terror in defense of Islam.² None-the-less, Western leaders around the globe mistakenly downplay the level of support for terror in the Islamic world.³ The reality is that Islamic extremism –more properly described as radical and violent fundamentalist Islam- is an ideology with many millions of followers, not the avoidable, manageable or containable beliefs of a few committed individuals.⁴

Table 1.1 Countries in Study

1. Egypt	6. Nigeria
2. France	7. Pakistan
3. Germany	8. Spain
4. Indonesia	9. Turkey
5. Jordan	10. United Kingdom

*Requested Disclaimer: The Pew Global Attitudes “Project bears no responsibility for the interpretations presented or conclusions reached based on analysis of [their] data.”

[†] This includes all respondents from countries in the survey, not just those ultimately included in the model as some respondents were dropped by the statistical program used during the regression as they declined to answer certain questions.

A great deal of research has been conducted in an attempt to understand the political psychology of the fundamentalist Muslim suicide bomber. The literature on the subject has essentially rejected the widely held assertion that there is a causal connection between poverty and low education, and engaging in acts of terror.⁵ Further, the West can not pass off fundamentalist Muslim suicide bombers as simply crazed radicals.⁶

For a variety of reasons, the primary focus of Western research in this field has been on the bomber him or herself. However, fundamentalist Muslim terrorism is not an individual aberration. This strain of terror would not exist in such numbers and would not have such sophisticated capabilities⁷ if there did not exist populations from which terror organizations could operate.⁸

Authoritarian states that do not possess the power or the inclination to oppose terrorism are prime headquarters for terrorists.⁹ The very nature of these authoritarian regimes causes the governments in question to be viewed by their people as corrupt and stifles the free-thinking discourse that would be associated with the moderation of violent religious doctrine. Religion is often a philosophical rallying point for perceived governmental injustice. This fact, combined with a religious doctrine that has not had the room to modernize (also stemming from the authoritarian nature of the government in question) causes great swathes of the societies in question to support terrorism – in particular in the Middle East. Thus, there is a great value in conducting research beyond the motivations and the psychology of the individual terrorist, and examining what causes non-terrorist members of Muslim society to support acts of terror in defense of Islam.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

An act of terror can be broadly defined as an act of ideologically motivated violence against a target intended to both inflict physical damage on person and/or property and inflict a psychological trauma upon the wider target society. More narrowly, within this paper the terrorism in question is limited to an act of such violence against civilians in defense of Islam.

There are essentially two broad schools of thought regarding the motivation for support for terrorism: Western Middle Eastern policy –in particular long-standing support for Israel and/or the Bush Administration’s War on Terror- is responsible for street level support for Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, or this support can be attributed to indigenous factors.

The foremost purveyors of the hypothesis that Western policy is at least in part responsible for Muslim support for terror in the name of Islam are Dr.’s Stephen Walt and John Mearshimer who assert “unconditional U.S. support for Israel makes it easier for extremists like bin Laden to rally popular support and to attract recruits.”¹⁰

Though he makes clear that his theories do not hold for all terrorism, but rather only acts of suicide terrorism, the extension of Robert Pape’s 2005¹¹ argument would also essentially argue that U.S. policy in the Middle East is largely responsible for support for Islamic terrorism. Unfortunately Pape’s discussion suffers from a fundamental logical misstep that calls into question the validity of his central theoretical conclusion. As a foundation for his argument Pape categorizes terrorism as “demonstrative,” “destructive” and “suicide” terrorism.¹² This delineation is inconsistent as the first two categories define terror based on tangible goals whereas the third defines terror based upon tactic

(and falls into the definition of destructive terrorism). Empirical evidence extrapolated using this inconsistent delineation serves as the foundation for Pape's ultimate assertion that terror organizations that use suicide bombers are motivated by the desire to free land of foreign occupation, and specifically in the case of Middle Eastern terror organizations, are offended by the presence of foreign troops in historically Muslim lands.

While I concur with Pape's assertion that the leaders of Islamic terror organizations certainly want to rid the Middle East of any foreign troop (and I would add liberal democratic or secular political) presence, I argue that the terrorists in question and their autocratic backers (as well as a portion of their individual supporters) have a wider more imperialist agenda.¹³ The consequence of the illogical way in which Pape classifies terror, coupled with his not giving proper weight to the stated *ideological* motivations of the subjects he studies, leads to a fundamentally flawed and oversimplified understanding of Islamic terrorism, thus raising serious doubts about Pape's "New Strategy for Victory."

As was previously noted, Pape would likely reject the application of his theory to general support for terror in the name of Islam, but none-the-less, the logical extension of his argument should be addressed and ultimately falls within the theory that modern Western Middle East policy is largely responsible for the alarmingly high level of support for fundamentalist Islamic terrorism.

The other school of thought is the theory that low education and poverty drive participation in terrorist activity. As was previously cited the literature has largely rejected this assertion. However, beyond education and poverty, there are certainly other

indigenous factors that could contribute to support for terror in the name of Islam, namely democracy, or a lack thereof.

3 THEORY

Even the most cursory review of history shows that religious supremacy and conversion at the point of the sword are not uniquely Islamic phenomena. An honest review of the sacred texts of the Abrahamic faiths should lead one to conclude that within the Torah, the Christian Bible and the Koran one could certainly find statements that could be interpreted as advocating violent archaic law or religious imperialism. However the Koran has several overt statements inciting followers to engage in violent acts in the name of religious supremacy.¹⁴ That Bin Laden and his philosophical kin can find a Koranic basis for the violence they perpetrate cannot be disputed, but the Koran is not alone in containing passages that some might find violent or disturbing.

It is not the doctrines of faith that are responsible for such great support for terrorism in the Islamic world – though such doctrines certainly play a role- but rather the nature of the governments in which the individuals of said faith live. To be sure, the Koran does contain violent doctrine, but I posit that where democracy is present the interpretation and implementation of this theology is much more likely to be subjected to a modern ethical filter.

I argue that certain interpretations of the violent imperial religious doctrines in Islam cause some individuals to feel compelled to support conflict, despite a natural ethical¹⁵ and justifiably self-interested¹⁶ aversion to violence. Support for religiously motivated violence against civilians (in this case Islamic terrorism) would be minimized largely through the moderation of the interpretation of the violent religious doctrines

associated with the motivating theology. Democracy enables that moderation through deliberation, because deliberation promotes tolerance.

Thus tolerance is the primary causal mechanism through which deliberation moderates the theological philosophy that serves as the basis of support for terror.¹⁷ There exists in the political science literature a fairly well accepted linkage between deliberation and tolerance. Most succinctly Delli Carpini et al. (2002) note that “[public] exchanges are a central way of clarifying and negotiating deep divisions over material interests and moral values.”¹⁸ Citing Warren (1996)¹⁹ as well as Guttman and Thompson (1996)²⁰, Burkhalter et al. (2002) explain the linkage: “because deliberation leads citizens to consider the arguments of other citizens it should produce increased understanding and tolerance of the variety of perspectives on the common good.”²¹ In addition, Gastil (2002) concurs with Mendleberg (2002)²² when the former notes that deliberation increases tolerance and causes individuals to “examine a problem and arrive at a well reasoned solution after a period of inclusive, respectful consideration of diverse points of view.”²³

The connection between deliberation and tolerance is neither novel nor terribly controversial. Though many of the above cited works examine deliberation as a tool for improving democracy (largely concentrating on Western populations), one should expect that the power of deliberation to increase tolerance would extend directly to arguments contrasting the views of individuals in democratic states with those living under authoritarian regimes, because it is assumed that there are much greater levels of deliberation in democratic states than in authoritarian nations. This should not be confused with an argument asserting that there exists a nation that has achieved a pure

deliberative democracy; however if Page is correct and “[p]ublic deliberation is essential to democracy,”²⁴ than it stands to reason that long standing democracies do in fact have high levels of public deliberation. While we must accept that deliberative democracy will not be complete,²⁵ the logical extension of this argument is that one could reasonably assume that the more democratic a state (in its totality), the greater the level and quality of deliberation.

In sum, the theory explicated here is that democracy moderates those violent imperialist interpretations of Islamic doctrine that serve as the philosophical foundation for Islamic terrorism. That moderation occurs because in democracies there exist much higher levels of deliberation, and the primary consequence of deliberation is the spread of tolerance.

4 HYPOTHESIS

I will test this theory through the following hypothesis:

H1: There will be a negative correlation between support for Islamic terrorism and the level of democracy in the country in which the respondent lives.

If democracy does have a moderating effect on violent religious supremacy (specifically in this case Islamic supremacy) we should see a negative correlation between support for terror and the level of democracy in the country in which the respondent resides.

5 DATA

I use data from the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes survey “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other.”²⁶ The model consists of responses from

5,335 Muslim individuals in ten countries across Europe, Asia and Africa (including of course the Middle East).

The dependent variable is “Support for Terror.” This variable is operationalized by coding responses to a question in the Pew survey, which asked if respondents felt that “suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets... [are] often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?” In the primary model, responses are coded in ascending order of frequency of justification. In order to address Mondak and Sanders 2003 assertion that degrees of tolerance are not as starkly different from one another as simply whether or not one possesses any intolerant positions, in the second model, the dependent variable is dichotomously coded, with terror rarely and never justified set against terror sometimes and often justified.²⁷

The independent variable of primary interest, “Democracy,” is operationalized by using the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index scores from the year of the survey (2006).²⁸ The decision to use the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index and not another more traditional academic rating of democracy or freedom is rooted in the theoretical underpinnings of this paper. The Economist’s researchers quite conclusively explain that the traditional measures of democracy are quite “thin.”²⁹ I concur with the Economist’s assertion that the more traditional indices “do not encompass sufficiently or at all some features that determine how substantive democracy is or its quality.”³⁰ None-the-less Freedom House scores are also used as a measure of freedom in order to test the robustness of the theory (in so far as democracy and freedom are so closely related). The results of this test (discussed below) are found to be very similar and lend further support to the theory.

The two other independent variables of secondary interest are “Support for the US War on Terror” and “Sympathy for the Palestinians” (or Israelis), as they directly relate to the aforementioned competing theories on the subject of what correlates with support for terror. The former variable is operationalized through a four point ordinal scale (0-3) at which the higher number indicates greater support for the “US led War on Terror” and the lower number indicates opposition. “Sympathy for the Palestinians,” as opposed to the Israelis, is operationalized through a three point ordinal variable with sympathy for Israel receiving a one, sympathy for Palestinians receiving a three, and sympathy for neither or both receiving a two.

Several control variables are included in order to account for demographic and socioeconomic factors. Education is indexed on an eight point scale in an attempt to create a general education index for all individuals around the world.

Due to a wide variance in costs of living across the countries examined, absolute income is not an accurate assessment of a respondent’s status. Additionally, because the number and scope of income brackets varies a great deal across countries in the data, a relative income scale is created, wherein a respondent’s income bracket is recoded on a scale of zero to one, relative to the income breakdown of the other respondent’s in the country in question. This allows for uniformity across borders and more accurately describes the wealth of the individual relative to his/her nation’s cost of living.

Age and gender are both included as they may impact attitudes towards terrorism. A six point ordinal scale measuring the frequency of mosque attendance is included in order to account for religiosity.

Finally in order to control for social desirability factors, specifically to in part measure the impact living in a non-majority Muslim country may have upon the respondents, I include a variable measuring the percentage of Muslims of the population³¹ of the country in which the respondent lives.[‡]

Mondak and Sanders³² offer a more standard measure of social desirability when examining such contentious topics. Largely relying on their model, figure one shows that response rates relating to support for terror are higher than other questions on the survey. In total 95% of individuals answered the question relating to support for terror. The lowest level of response for any question was a 90% response rate to the question regarding income (often seen in survey research). Further, more individuals in non-authoritarian states (97%) responded to the support for terror question, where as 94% of individuals responded to the support for terror question in authoritarian states. Finally, as will be reported in more detail in following sections, the variable measuring the percent of the population that is Muslim -while significant- is in small measure negatively correlated with support for terror.

Given the above information, if any conclusion regarding social desirability is to be drawn, it is that true to theory of the paper, those living in democracies feel freer to answer contentious questions. Because regimes like Egypt and Jordan are opposed to organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood a respondent might feel that responding honestly to such a question (if they do in fact support terror) is perilous. At worst,


[‡] The 2006 State Department Report on International Religious Freedom is used for religious demography. However, in Nigeria the 2008 CIA World Fact Book is used as the most recent Nigerian census numbers had been disputed. Further Spain does not allow state census efforts to gather figures on faith, as such an estimate from the aforementioned State Department Report is used. Finally, as the State Department Report's information on France gives a range, the mean of that range is used.

tyranny-induced social desirability depresses articulated support for terror in totalitarian states. The summary statistics are reported in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Support for Terror	0.7160545	0.9397379	0	3
Religiosity	4.040021	1.90878	1	6
Relative Income	0.3015999	0.1938773	0	1
Age	35.82806	12.94825	18	89
Gender	1.471406	0.4992283	1	2
Education	2.748142	1.867616	0	7
Support US WoT	0.2138333	0.4100488	0	1
Palestinian Sympathy	2.817829	0.473868	1	3
Country Perc. Muslim	88.18335	16.57428	2	99
Support for Terror Dichotomous	0.2351805	0.4241512	0	1
Freedom	3.872216	1.249997	2.5	7

Table 5.2 Response Rates



6 METHODS

The primary model uses an ordered logistic regression with the ordinal dependent variable support for terror, and all other variables operationalized as discussed above. The

secondary model similarly uses an ordered logistic regression, but measures support for terror, through a dichotomous dummy variable.

In addition to these two primary models, a multinomial probit regression is run to test the robustness of the conclusions, measuring the impact of democracy on each level of support for terror (and their relationship to one another) with the response “never” serving as the base outcome. Finally, an ordered logistic regression, in which the ordinal variable democracy is transformed into a categorical variable as per the levels of democracy delineated by the Economist Democracy Index, is run to test the whether or not democracy’s moderating effect has a threshold over which the effect can be shown. Here the omitted category is Authoritarian Regime.

In all models, variables are clustered around country, and sample weights are included.^{§33}

7 FINDINGS

The findings support the theory. The hypothesis holds in both models as there is a strong negative and statistically significant correlation (at the $>.0001$ level) between the level of democracy in the respondent’s home country and support for terror against civilians in defense of Islam. Neither of the secondary independent variables of interest (Opposition to the US War on Terror or Sympathy for the Palestinians^{**}) showed

[§] Weights do not drastically impact results. The primary variable of interest retains highly similar levels of significance across tests when tests are run without weights. This said, in the ordinal test using Freedom House scores rather than Democracy Index scores as a measure of freedom/democracy, Mosque Attendance (.05) and Age (.10) were found to be significant, the Percentage of the Population that was Muslim was found to be in significant and the impact of democracy was found to be slightly less significant. Overall, regardless of weighting, the results would lead largely to the same conclusions. Non-weighted results are available upon request.

^{**} For those that may be concerned that a lack of variance in these variables led to an outcome indicating that these two variables do not have any explanatory effect, please refer to the summary in figure two which shows – through the means and standard deviations – that there is a reasonable amount of variance in both variables.

statistical significance, thus calling into question those theories that assert that the US led War on Terror or US support for Israel has a measurable and significant impact on support for terror in defense of Islam.

In both the ordinal model and in the model in which the dependent variable was coded dichotomously, the Chi-Squared is reported at 0.0000, lending support to the models' fit.

As was previously noted, the percent of the country that is Muslim is significantly and negatively correlated with support for terror (at the $>.0001$ level). However, as noted below, using the program *Clarify*, I find that the results indicate that the level of democracy is a considerably more important factor when examining support for terror, than the country's percentage of Muslim population. This said, this variable does remain an important element of our above discussion concerning social desirability.

The multinomial probit regression largely mimics the results of the primary models, with both independent variables of significance increasing in significance as the level of democracy in which the respondent lives decreases. Further, the ordered logistic regression in which the ordinal variable democracy is transformed into a categorical variable also sees similar levels of significance across the variables relating to democracy and Muslim percentage of the population of the country in which the respondent lives. Notably, democracy becomes insignificant once the country in question becomes a hybrid regime (the omitted category is Authoritarian Regimes), thus one can conclude that at a certain point a regime becomes so repressive that variance in democracy no longer has a moderating impact on violent religious doctrine. In both secondary models the secondary

independent variables of interest remain insignificant. The full results of these secondary models are available upon request.

Table 7.1 Determinants of Support for Terror

	<u>Ordinal</u>	<u>Dichotomous</u>
Democracy	-.39*** (.10)	-.43*** (.09)
Religiosity	.02 (.03)	-.002 (.04)
Income	-.18 (.45)	-.6 (.48)
Age	-.003 (.004)	.008* (.004)
Gender	-.013 (.16)	-.07 (.2)
Education	.012 (.04)	.02 (.04)
Sup. US WOT	-.09 (.14)	-.04 (.19)
Pal. Symp.	-.01 (.13)	-.17 (.15)
Country Perc. Mus.	-.01*** (.003)	-.015*** (.003)

Ordered logistic regression reporting robust standard errors, clustered on country. *** Indicates significance at the >.0001 level. * Indicates significance at the >.05 level. For both models: N= 5,335 and Chi-Squared = .0000

As noted above, in order to test the robustness of the findings, the primary and secondary models are run using Freedom House scores,^{††} rather than Economist Democracy Index scores as the primary independent variable of interest. In the ordinal test, the independent variable of interest Freedom reports a P-Value of .051 with a coefficient of -.28. The percentage of the population that is Muslim reports significance of .01 and reports a coefficient of -.018.^{‡‡} In the dichotomous test, Freedom reports a P-

^{††} Freedom scores were determined by taking the mean of the 2006 Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores.

^{‡‡} Though outcomes using Polity IV scores do similarly correlate directionally with Democracy Index and Freedom House scores (i.e. Democracy is negatively correlated with support for terror) the results are not statistically significant at .05 level: P-Value of .13 for ordinal regression, .085 for dichotomous. The only

Value of .02 with a coefficient of -.31 while the population that is Muslim retains its .009 P-Value with a coefficient of -.02. Thus as previously indicated, the substitution of Freedom House^{§§} scores for Economist Democracy Index scores does not drastically impact the theoretical conclusions of the paper. Further, I would argue that the (all-be-it minimal) relative change in the explanatory power of democracy/freedom, is an indication that the Economist scores are simply a better measure of the intangible democracy that I seek to measure in this paper. Freedom House makes no claim to measure democracy, but rather, seeks to measure “political rights and civil liberties,” which while vital to the existence of democracy, do not in-and-of-themselves constitute the full measure of democracy.

It should also be noted that in both regressions in which the variable measuring support for terror is dichotomous, age is found to be moderately significant and positively correlated with support for terror.^{***}

In order to further test the robustness of the conclusions, two factor analyses were run and the scores they deliver are tested in new models. First, I run a principle component analyses on the five differing scores^{†††} that make up the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index scores from the year of the survey (2006).³⁴ The resulting primary component reports an Eigen value of 3.77. The principal component’s Eigen Vectors show that the primary component loads about equally on all five elements

variable significant at the .05 level is the percentage of the population that is Muslim, which is negatively correlated with support for terror at similar levels exhibited by the Economist and Freedom House scores in both ordinal and dichotomous models. The P Values for this variable was .041 in both models.

^{§§} Results of Freedom House tests are available in Appendix A.

^{***} The regression using Polity IV scores with the dichotomous measure of support for terror as the dependent variable reports age to also be positively correlated with terror, with a P-Value of .066.

^{†††} The five elements defined by the Economist Democracy Index are 1 electoral participation, 2 the functioning of government, 3 political participation, 4 political culture, and 5 civil liberties.

of the Democracy index score;^{†††} the highest being .5 associated with civil liberties and the lowest being .36 associated with political culture. All others load in the .4 to .5 range. This component is used to predict the first new measure of democracy which captures the essence of the democratic concept.

Using this essence of democracy in place of the Economist's original number, the new model confirms the conclusions of the first: When support for terror is measured ordinally, democracy's essence reports a coefficient of -.38 and with a P Value of >.0001. The percentage of the population that is Muslim reports significance of >.0001 and reports a coefficient of -.014.^{§§§} All other variables are insignificant. When I use the dichotomous measure of support for terror democracy's essence reports a coefficient of -.4 and with a P Value of >.0001. The percentage of the population that is Muslim reports significance of >.0001 and retains a coefficient of just -.014.^{****} As with the other dichotomous models, age is again significant and positively correlated with support for terror, reporting a P-value of .036 and a coefficient of .008. All other variables are insignificant.

The second factor analysis is run using the scores from each of the three measures of democracy (from 2006) noted in this paper: Economist Democracy Index, Freedom House, Polity IV Project. The resulting primary component reports an Eigen value of 2.85. The principal component's Eigen Vectors report that the primary component loads about equally on all three scores the highest being .59 associated with Freedom House and the lowest being .57 associated with the Economist.

^{†††} The full results of the factor analysis including the principal components (Eigen Vectors) are available in Appendix B.

^{§§§} Full Results available in Appendix C

^{****} Full Results available in Appendix C

Using this combined measure of democracy in place of the Economist's original number, the new model confirms the conclusions of the first: When I use the ordinal measure of support for terror the combined measure of democracy reports a coefficient of -.32 and with a P Value of .03. The percentage of the population that is Muslim reports significance of .004 and reports a coefficient of -.017.^{†††} All other variables are insignificant. When I use the dichotomous measure of support for terror, the combined measure of democracy reports a coefficient of -.34 and with a P Value of .013. The percentage of the population that is Muslim reports significance of .006 and retains a coefficient of just -.019.^{††††} As with the other dichotomous models, age is again significant and positively correlated with support for terror, reporting a P-value of .049 and a coefficient of .007. All other variables are insignificant.

In order to gauge the substantive impact of the democracy variable (in the dichotomous model)^{§§§§}, I use the software *Clarify* to show the predicted probability of support for terror in populations that are one standard deviation above and below the mean in the democracy score, while holding the other independent variables constant at their mean. The findings indicate that there is a higher probability of support for terror in a country with a democracy score one standard deviation below the mean at approximately 36 percent; where as in a country with a democracy score one standard deviation above the mean the probability of support for terror is 11 percent, while holding all else constant. These results are significant with a 95% confidence interval. These

^{†††} Full Results available in Appendix C

^{††††} Full Results available in Appendix C

^{§§§§} Though substantively it had no impact, it should be noted that weights were not used to determine the coefficients in the model tested, as STATA does not properly execute the *Clarify* command when weights are included.

results show a large substantive impact in democracy's moderating effect on support for terror.

As previously noted I also used *Clarify* to show the predicted probability of support for terror in populations that are one standard deviation above and below the mean in the percentage of the population that is Muslim. The findings show that there is a lower probability of support for terror in a country with a higher percentage of the population that is Muslim. The predicted probability of support for terror in a country with a 100 percent Muslim population was approximately 14 percent; while the predicted probability of support for terror in a country with one standard deviation below the mean was approximately 20 percent. This said, as is shown in Figure 4, there is substantial overlap in predicted probabilities within the 95 percent confidence interval, thus one should not read too much into the substantive impact of these findings. In spite of the fact that Islamic community homogeneity decreases the probability of support for terror, top line support for terror remains exponentially higher in majority Muslim countries because of the authoritarianism found there. In other words, democracy (or a lack there of) is of much greater consequence than Islamic community homogeneity when attempting to predict support for terror.

Figure 7.2 The Impact of Living in a Democracy on Support for Terror





Figure 7.3 The Impact of Islamic Population Homogeneity on Support for Terror



8 DISCUSSION

Democracy has been shown to have a moderating effect on violent Islamic religious supremacy. Neither support or sympathy for the Palestinians nor opposition to the US led War on Terror is correlated with support for Islamic terrorism in any model, thus when the scientific method is applied through individual level quantitative analysis, those assertions linking these two Western policies to support for terrorism in the Middle East are shown to be lacking validity.

The policy implications for the West are clear. The Western foreign policy of avoiding democratic elections where Islamists are likely to win³⁵ or propping up tyrannical regimes when expedient is partially to blame for these regimes remaining in power. And this lack of democracy stifles religious moderation.*****

Western policy makers and pundits have long feared that Islamic democracy would lead to democratically elected “Islamist governments unwilling to cooperate with [the US].”³⁶ However, this policy ignores the evidence presented in this paper, incorrectly assumes majority support for Islamic terror across the Middle East, and ignores the fact that regardless of whether or not the country in question has a majority Muslim population, tangible government support for terror is highly depressed in truly democratic states (relative to authoritarian regimes). Given that democracy moderates support for violent religious doctrine and given that in Iraq we have not seen that government support

***** I would note that a limitation of this research is that it is unknown if the theory of this paper would extend directly to the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Though we certainly see much less support for terror amongst Arabs living in Israel proper than those living in Palestinian Authority or Hamas controlled territories, a great deal of specific and additional research would need to be conducted in order to understand the impact of this specific conflict and the associated institutional/religiously oriented Palestinian incitement of violence.^{22a}

terror as its predecessor did^{††††} one should conclude that over the long-term the Western policy that must be corrected is support for tyranny in the Middle East.

To be clear, the data here does not draw conclusions as to the methods for bringing democracy to the Middle East. Though arguments could be made that this research indicates that because democracy does moderate violent religious extremism, democracy through external violent intervention -i.e. the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan- is a prudent policy, such an argument is an oversimplification of the issue. The host of literature discussing the best policies for bringing democracy to tyrannical regimes is beyond the scope of this paper.

Ultimately, foreign policy realists and pacifists have long preferred détente over aggressive diplomatic (or military) confrontation even though this has been shown to be a strategic error. The West should not ignore the moral hazard of promoting tyranny in the name of stability, but nor should we act as if promoting democracy is strictly a moral endeavor. Encouraging democratic proliferation has a long-term strategic benefit too often ignored by policy elites.

In the final analysis there exists some truth to both schools of thought on this subject. An indigenous factor does impact support for terror in the Middle East, but the factor is democracy, not education or poverty. Further, Western policies in the Middle East also impact support for terror in the region, but it is not US support for Israel or the US led War on Terror, but rather the policy of pursuing détente with autocratic regimes and failing to demand they implement democratic reforms that is flawed.

^{††††} This is a reference to the Hussein regime's support for Palestinian terrorists. ^{22b}

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10 APPENDICES

Appendix A: Freedom's Impact on Support for Terror

Table 10.1 Determinants of Support for Terror

	<u>Ordinal</u>	<u>Dichotomous</u>
Freedom	-.28* (.15)	-.32** (.14)
Religiosity	.02 (.03)	.003 (.04)
Income	-.24 (.62)	-.73 (.62)
Age	-.002 (.003)	.006* (.003)
Gender	-.02 (.15)	-.06 (.19)
Education	-.0005 (.05)	.014 (.049)
Sup. US WOT	-.14 (.16)	-.1 (.2)
Pal. Symp.	-.02 (.13)	-.02 (.15)
Country Perc. Mus.	-.018** (.006)	-.02** (.007)

Ordered logistic regression reporting robust standard errors, clustered on country. *Indicates significance at the >.10 level. ** Indicates significance at the >.05 level. For both models: N= 5,335 and Chi-Squared = .0000

Appendix B: Principle Component Analyses

Table 10.2 Principle Component Analysis of Economist Democracy Score

Principal components/correlation				Number of obs	=	7146
				Number of comp.	=	5
				Trace	=	5
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)				Rho	=	1.0000
Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative		
Comp1	3.77812	3.05584	0.7556	0.7556		
Comp2	.722282	.296838	0.1445	0.9001		
Comp3	.425444	.368956	0.0851	0.9852		
Comp4	.0564884	.0388273	0.0113	0.9965		
Comp5	.0176611	.	0.0035	1.0000		
Principal components (eigenvectors)						
Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Comp5	Unexplained
electoralp~s	0.4860	-0.3487	-0.1370	-0.1578	0.7737	0
govtfuncti~g	0.4635	-0.4388	0.2298	0.6649	-0.3126	0
polpartici~n	0.4061	0.3902	-0.7891	0.1594	-0.1864	0
politicalc~e	0.3649	0.7237	0.5232	0.1455	0.2193	0
civilliberty	0.5009	-0.0993	0.1788	-0.6975	-0.4699	0

Table 10.3 Principle Component Analysis of Combined Measures of Democracy

Principal components/correlation				Number of obs	=	7146
				Number of comp.	=	3
				Trace	=	3
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)				Rho	=	1.0000
Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative		
Comp1	2.85806	2.73321	0.9527	0.9527		
Comp2	.124855	.107771	0.0416	0.9943		
Comp3	.0170843		0.0057	1.0000		
Principal components (eigenvectors)						
Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Unexplained		
democracy	0.5715	0.7149	0.4029	0		
freedom	0.5882	-0.0145	-0.8086	0		
polity2006	0.5722	-0.6991	0.4288	0		

Appendix C: Additional Tests

Table 10.4 Determinants of Support for Terror

	<u>Ordinal</u>	<u>Dichotomous</u>
Essence of Dem.	-.38*** (.09)	-.4*** (.07)
Religiosity	.02 (.03)	.002 (.04)
Income	-.17 (.44)	-.59 (.47)
Age	-.003 (.004)	.008 (.003)
Gender	-.01 (.15)	-.07 (.19)
Education	.01 (.03)	.02 (.04)
Sup. US WOT	-.08 (.14)	-.04 (.19)
Pal. Symp.	-.01 (.13)	-.02 (.16)
Country Perc. Mus.	-.014*** (.003)	-.015*** (.003)

Ordered logistic regression reporting robust standard errors, clustered on country. *** Indicates significance at the >.0001 level. For both models: N= 5,335 and Chi-Squared = .0000

Table 10.5 Determinants of Support for Terror

	<u>Ordinal</u>	<u>Dichotomous</u>
Combined Dem.	-.3** (.14)	-.34** (.14)
Religiosity	.02 (.03)	.003 (.05)
Income	-.27 (.62)	-.73 (.59)
Age	-.003 (.003)	.007 (.0037)
Gender	-.01 (.15)	-.05 (.2)
Education	-.007 (.05)	.02 (.05)
Sup. US WOT	-.14 (.15)	-.1 (.2)
Pal. Symp.	-.03 (.12)	-.03 (.14)
Country Perc. Mus.	-.017*** (.006)	-.019*** (.007)

Ordered logistic regression reporting robust standard errors, clustered on country. **Indicates significance at the >.05 level. *** Indicates significance at the >.005 level. For both models: N= 5,335 and Chi-Squared = .0000

Appendix D: Summary Statistics by Country

Table 10.6 Egypt

-> CountryName = Egypt					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
country	936	3	0	3	3
supterror	910	.9076923	.9940672	0	3
realmosque-t	930	3.506452	1.858985	1	6
democracy	936	3.9	0	3.9	3.9
relincome	936	.4557692	.2340274	.2	1
age	936	36.58654	12.19954	18	62
sex	936	1.503205	.500257	1	2
educationi-d	936	2.519231	2.145423	0	7
supuswot	864	.1018519	.3026286	0	1
wei ght	936	1	0	1	1
ordpal symp	935	2.954011	.2757556	1	3
rarley	910	.2549451	.43607	0	1
sometimes	910	.2010989	.4010422	0	1
often	910	.0835165	.2768134	0	1
countrydem-d	936	4	0	4	4
DemOnes	936	0	0	0	0
DemTwos	936	0	0	0	0
DemThrees	936	0	0	0	0
DemFours	936	4	0	4	4
supterror-d-y	910	.2846154	.4514792	0	1
religion2006	936	90	0	90	90
freedom	936	2.5	0	2.5	2.5
polity2006	936	-3	0	-3	-3
electoral p-s	936	2.67	0	2.67	2.67
govtfunction-g	936	3.64	0	3.64	3.64
polpartici-n	936	2.78	0	2.78	2.78
politi cal c-e	936	6.88	0	6.88	6.88
ci vil liberty	936	3.53	0	3.53	3.53
fhci vil lib	936	5	0	5	5
internet	907	.1444322	.3517214	0	1
demessence	936	-1.651893	0	-1.651893	-1.651893
democracy-d	936	-1.746585	0	-1.746585	-1.746585

Table 10.7 France

-> CountryName = France					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
country	400	4	0	4	4
supterror	396	.5883838	.91942	0	3
realmosque-t	398	2.497487	1.697158	1	6
democracy	400	8.07	0	8.07	8.07
relincome	388	.4293078	.2033301	.1428571	1
age	400	32.97	12.00623	18	80
sex	400	1.5125	.5004697	1	2
educati oni -d	400	4.4475	1.312078	0	6
supuswot	397	.2141058	.4107182	0	1
wei ght	400	.0775129	.0220896	.032944	.217332
ordpal symp	393	2.722646	.5731413	1	3
rarley	396	.1843434	.3882545	0	1
someti mes	396	.1035354	.3050422	0	1
often	396	.0656566	.2479941	0	1
countrydem-d	400	1	0	1	1
DemOnes	400	1	0	1	1
DemTwos	400	0	0	0	0
DemThrees	400	0	0	0	0
DemFours	400	0	0	0	0
supterrord-y	396	.1691919	.3753956	0	1
rel i gion2006	400	9	0	9	9
freedom	400	7	0	7	7
pol i ty2006	400	9	0	9	9
el ectoral p-s	400	9.58	0	9.58	9.58
govtfuncti -g	400	7.5	0	7.5	7.5
pol parti ci -n	400	6.67	0	6.67	6.67
pol i ti cal c-e	400	7.5	0	7.5	7.5
ci vi l l i berty	400	9.12	0	9.12	9.12
fhci vi l l i b	400	1	0	1	1
i nternet	400	.73	.4445154	0	1
demessence	400	2.772264	0	2.772264	2.772264
democracya-d	400	2.261921	0	2.261921	2.261921

Table 10.8 Germany

-> countryname = Germany					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
country	413	5	0	5	5
supterror	401	.2219451	.6108332	0	3
real mosque-t	405	3.05679	1.73754	1	6
democracy	413	8.82	0	8.82	8.82
rel income	357	.4326175	.2129752	.1111111	1
age	413	37.0799	12.89788	18	97
sex	413	1.457627	.4988056	1	2
educati onl -d	381	3.577428	.9275972	3	6
supuswot	386	.3264249	.4695133	0	1
wei ght	413	.0764407	.0551164	.010718	.303655
ordpal symp	371	2.371968	.7509786	1	3
rarley	401	.0523691	.2230485	0	1
sometimes	401	.0698254	.255171	0	1
often	401	.0099751	.0995	0	1
countrydem-d	413	1	0	1	1
DemOnes	413	1	0	1	1
DemTwos	413	0	0	0	0
DemThrees	413	0	0	0	0
DemFours	413	0	0	0	0
supterror-d-y	401	.0798005	.2713226	0	1
rel i gl on2006	413	4	0	4	4
freedom	413	7	0	7	7
pol i ty2006	413	10	0	10	10
el ectoral p-s	413	9.58	0	9.58	9.58
govtfuncti -g	413	8.57	0	8.57	8.57
pol parti ci -n	413	7.78	0	7.78	7.78
pol i ti cal c-e	413	8.75	0	8.75	8.75
ci vi l i l i berty	413	9.41	0	9.41	9.41
fhcl vi l i l i b	413	1	0	1	1
I nternet	409	.6405868	.4804161	0	1
demessence	413	3.593344	0	3.593344	3.593344
democracya-d	413	2.593892	0	2.593892	2.593892
countryname	0				

Table 10.9 Indonesia

-> CountryName = Indonesia					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
country	909	7	0	7	7
supterror	899	.4004449	.718697	0	3
realmosque-t	903	4.843854	1.510856	1	6
democracy	909	6.41	0	6.41	6.41
relincome	907	.2546858	.1165474	.0833333	1
age	909	36.38064	11.81336	18	89
sex	909	1.49835	.5002725	1	2
educati oni -d	909	3.342134	1.185725	0	6
supuswt	875	.3908571	.4882215	0	1
wei ght	909	1.000089	.3498293	.2857	1.6803
ordpal symp	859	2.812573	.4356281	1	3
rarley	899	.1779755	.3827051	0	1
sometimes	899	.0845384	.2783484	0	1
often	899	.0177976	.1322886	0	1
countrydem-d	909	2	0	2	2
DemOnes	909	0	0	0	0
DemTwos	909	2	0	2	2
DemThrees	909	0	0	0	0
DemFours	909	0	0	0	0
supterrord-y	899	.1023359	.3032583	0	1
religi on2006	909	88.2	0	88.2	88.2
freedom	909	5.5	0	5.5	5.5
poli ty2006	909	8	0	8	8
electoral p-s	909	6.92	0	6.92	6.92
govtfunction-g	909	7.14	0	7.14	7.14
pol partici -n	909	5	0	5	5
poli ti cal c-e	909	6.25	0	6.25	6.25
civi lliberty	909	6.76	0	6.76	6.76
fhci vi llib	909	3	0	3	3
internet	892	.073991	.2619031	0	1
demessence	909	1.029474	0	1.029474	1.029474
democracya-d	909	1.130877	0	1.130877	1.130877

Table 10.10 Jordan

-> CountryName = Jordan					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
country	972	9	0	9	9
supterror	967	.901758	.9233945	0	3
realmosque-t	962	3.75052	1.83733	1	6
democracy	972	3.92	0	3.92	3.92
relincome	952	.3257538	.1585696	.0588235	.8823529
age	972	35.30453	13.18176	18	77
sex	972	1.48251	.4999513	1	2
educati oni -d	971	2.416066	1.945629	0	6
supuswot	870	.1689655	.374937	0	1
wei ght	972	1	0	1	1
ordpal symp	970	2.963918	.2265575	1	3
rarley	967	.2781799	.4483344	0	1
someti mes	967	.2419855	.4285072	0	1
often	967	.0465357	.2107511	0	1
countrydem-d	972	4	0	4	4
DemOnes	972	0	0	0	0
DemTwos	972	0	0	0	0
DemThrees	972	0	0	0	0
DemFours	972	4	0	4	4
supterrord-y	967	.2885212	.4533092	0	1
religi on2006	972	95	0	95	95
freedom	972	3.5	0	3.5	3.5
poli ty2006	972	-2	0	-2	-2
el ectoral p-s	972	3.08	0	3.08	3.08
govtfuncti -g	972	3.79	0	3.79	3.79
pol parti ci -n	972	3.89	0	3.89	3.89
pol i ti cal c-e	972	5	0	5	5
ci vi l l i berty	972	3.82	0	3.82	3.82
fhci vi l l i b	972	4	0	4	4
i nternet	956	.2039749	.4031615	0	1
demessence	972	-1.656	0	-1.656	-1.656
democracya-d	972	-1.301352	0	-1.301352	-1.301352
CountryName	0				

Table 10.11 Nigeria

-> CountryName = Nigeria					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
country	468	10	0	10	10
supterror	452	1.265487	.9674773	0	3
realmosque-t	467	4.753747	1.6145	1	6
democracy	468	3.52	0	3.52	3.52
relincome	400	.1908929	.1691706	0	.9285714
age	468	33.0641	11.86614	18	76
sex	468	1.508547	.5004619	1	2
educati oni -d	468	2.805556	2.068063	0	6
supuswot	452	.199115	.3997772	0	1
wei ght	468	1	0	1	1
ordpal symp	429	2.554779	.6800953	1	3
rarley	452	.2345133	.4241637	0	1
someti mes	452	.3960177	.4896101	0	1
often	452	.079646	.2710444	0	1
countrydem-d	468	4	0	4	4
DemOnes	468	0	0	0	0
DemTwos	468	0	0	0	0
DemThrees	468	0	0	0	0
DemFours	468	4	0	4	4
supterror-d-y	452	.4756637	.4999608	0	1
religi on2006	468	50	0	50	50
freedom	468	4	0	4	4
poli ty2006	468	4	0	4	4
electoral p-s	468	3.08	0	3.08	3.08
govtfuncti -g	468	1.86	0	1.86	1.86
pol parti ci -n	468	4.44	0	4.44	4.44
poli ti cal c-e	468	4.38	0	4.38	4.38
ci vi lli berty	468	3.82	0	3.82	3.82
fhci vi lli b	468	4	0	4	4
i nternet	468	.1837607	.3877033	0	1
demessence	468	-2.133955	0	-2.133955	-2.133955
democracya-d	468	-.6759991	0	-.6759991	-.6759991

Table 10.12 Pakistan

-> countryname = Paki stan					
Varl able	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
country	1233	11	0	11	11
supterror	1148	.4634146	.9146027	0	3
real mosque-t	1215	3.869136	2.252985	1	6
democracy	1233	3.92	0	3.92	3.92
rel income	968	.2693698	.1669401	.125	1
age	1187	34.18029	13.72917	18	85
sex	1233	1.505272	.5001751	1	2
educati onl -d	1232	2.131494	2.081347	0	7
supuswt	1020	.3519608	.4778161	0	1
wei ght	1233	1.000942	.4443233	.5984424	1.491037
ordpal symp	979	2.722165	.5830154	1	3
rari ey	1148	.0905923	.2871536	0	1
sometl mes	1148	.0792683	.2702748	0	1
often	1148	.0714286	.2576516	0	1
countrydem-d	1233	4	0	4	4
DemOnes	1233	0	0	0	0
DemTwos	1233	0	0	0	0
DemThrees	1233	0	0	0	0
DemFours	1233	1	0	1	1
supterror-d-y	1148	.1506969	.3579091	0	1
rel i gl on2006	1233	96	0	96	96
freedom	1233	2.5	0	2.5	2.5
pol i ty2006	1233	-5	0	-5	-5
el ectoral p-s	1233	4.33	0	4.33	4.33
govtfuncti -g	1233	5.36	0	5.36	5.36
pol parti ci -n	1233	.56	0	.56	.56
pol i ti cal c-e	1233	4.38	0	4.38	4.38
cl vi l l i berty	1233	5	0	5	5
fhci vi l l i b	1233	5	0	5	5
Internet	1134	.0837743	.2771712	0	1
demessence	1233	-1.594906	0	-1.594906	-1.594906
democracy-d	1233	-1.933544	0	-1.933544	-1.933544
countryname	0				

Table 10.13 Spain

-> CountryName = Spain					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
country	402	13	0	13	13
supterror	381	.5328084	.9414992	0	3
realmosque-t	385	3.911688	1.967839	1	6
democracy	402	8.34	0	8.34	8.34
relincome	306	.3211951	.133693	.1428571	1
age	402	32.93035	8.794701	18	68
sex	402	1.233831	.4237933	1	2
educati on-i-d	400	3.1875	1.793149	0	6
supuswt	379	.1319261	.3388578	0	1
wei ght	402	.0094827	.0040355	.0014179	.0196297
ordpal symp	386	2.764249	.4768583	1	3
rarley	381	.1102362	.3135958	0	1
sometimes	381	.1049869	.3069396	0	1
often	381	.0708661	.2569385	0	1
countrydem-d	402	1	0	1	1
DemOnes	402	1	0	1	1
DemTwos	402	0	0	0	0
DemThrees	402	0	0	0	0
DemFours	402	0	0	0	0
supterror-d-y	381	.175853	.3811957	0	1
rel i gion2006	402	2	0	2	2
freedom	402	7	0	7	7
pol i ty2006	402	10	0	10	10
el ectoral p-s	402	9.58	0	9.58	9.58
govt functi -g	402	7.86	0	7.86	7.86
pol parti ci -n	402	6.11	0	6.11	6.11
pol i ti cal c-e	402	8.75	0	8.75	8.75
ci vi l l i berty	402	9.41	0	9.41	9.41
fhci vi l l i b	402	1	0	1	1
i nternet	393	.5496183	.4981661	0	1
demessence	402	3.084134	0	3.084134	3.084134
democracya-d	402	2.443266	0	2.443266	2.443266

Table 10.14 Turkey

-> CountryName = Turkey					
Vari able	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
country	1001	14	0	14	14
supterror	863	.5144844	.8720784	0	3
realmosque-t	961	3.416233	1.906542	1	6
democracy	1001	5.7	0	5.7	5.7
rel income	913	.2124179	.1588447	.0625	1
age	1001	38.64236	14.70857	18	80
sex	1001	1.493506	.5002077	1	2
educati on-i-d	1000	2.679	1.431086	0	6
supuswt	912	.1502193	.3574823	0	1
wei ght	1001	1	0	1	1
ordpal symp	858	2.677156	.5792727	1	3
rarley	863	.1019699	.3027842	0	1
someti mes	863	.1575898	.3645672	0	1
often	863	.032445	.1772814	0	1
countrydem-d	1001	3	0	3	3
DemOnes	1001	0	0	0	0
DemTwos	1001	0	0	0	0
DemThrees	1001	3	0	3	3
DemFours	1001	0	0	0	0
supterrord-y	863	.1900348	.3925559	0	1
rel i gi on2006	1001	99	0	99	99
freedom	1001	5	0	5	5
pol i ty2006	1001	7	0	7	7
el ectoral p-s	1001	7.92	0	7.92	7.92
govtfuncti -g	1001	6.79	0	6.79	6.79
pol parti ci -n	1001	4.44	0	4.44	4.44
pol i ti cal c-e	1001	3.75	0	3.75	3.75
ci vi l l i berty	1001	5.59	0	5.59	5.59
fhci vi l l i b	1001	3	0	3	3
i nternet	992	.2066532	.4051088	0	1
demessence	1001	.1902715	0	.1902715	.1902715
democracy-a-d	1001	.6402881	0	.6402881	.6402881

Table 10.15 United Kingdom

-> countryname = UK					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
country	412	1	0	1	1
supterror	387	.4832041	.8557045	0	3
realmosque-t	406	3.921182	1.986049	1	6
democracy	412	8.08	0	8.08	8.08
relincome	356	.4241573	.2396987	.1666667	1
age	411	32.83698	11.99167	18	81
sex	412	1.475728	.5000177	1	2
educati onl -d	373	4.780161	1.293047	3	7
supuswt	372	.1424731	.3500055	0	1
wei ght	412	.0656796	.0116162	.039662	.104772
ordpal symp	372	2.782258	.506994	1	3
rari ey	387	.1033592	.3048215	0	1
sometl mes	387	.1395349	.3469524	0	1
often	387	.0335917	.1804091	0	1
countrydem-d	412	1	0	1	1
DemOnes	412	1	0	1	1
DemTwos	412	0	0	0	0
DemThrees	412	0	0	0	0
DemFours	412	0	0	0	0
supterror-d-y	387	.1731266	.3788465	0	1
rel i gl on2006	412	2.7	0	2.7	2.7
freedom	412	7	0	7	7
pol i ty2006	412	10	0	10	10
el ectoral p-s	412	9.58	0	9.58	9.58
govtfuncti -g	412	8.57	0	8.57	8.57
pol parti cl -n	412	5	0	5	5
pol i ti cal c-e	412	8.13	0	8.13	8.13
cl vi l i l i berty	412	9.12	0	9.12	9.12
fhcl vi l i l i b	412	1	0	1	1
I nternet	410	.6658537	.4722675	0	1
demessence	412	2.820344	0	2.820344	2.820344
democracya-d	412	2.361676	0	2.361676	2.361676