Optimal Policyholder Behavior in Personal Savings Products and its Impact on Valuation

Thorsten Moenig

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The author of this dissertation is:

Thorsten Moenig
35 Broad Street NW, 11th Floor, Atlanta, GA 30303

The director of this dissertation is:

Daniel Bauer
Department of Risk Management and Insurance
35 Broad Street NW, 11th Floor, Atlanta, GA 30303
Optimal Policyholder Behavior in Personal Savings Products and its Impact on Valuation

BY

Thorsten Moenig

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Of

Doctor of Philosophy

In the Robinson College of Business

Of

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GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY

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ACCEPTANCE

This dissertation was prepared under the direction of Thorsten Moenig’s Dissertation Committee. It has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctoral of Philosophy in Business Administration in the J. Mack Robinson College of Business of Georgia State University.

H. Fenwick Huss, Dean

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

Daniel Bauer
Glenn Harrison
Ajay Subramanian
Eric Ulm
Yongsheng Xu
ABSTRACT

Optimal Policyholder Behavior in Personal Savings Products and its Impact on Valuation

BY

Thorsten Moenig

May 7, 2012

Committee Chair: Daniel Bauer
Major Academic Unit: Department of Risk Management and Insurance
In recent years, complex exercise-dependent option features have become increasingly popular within personal savings products. Life insurers in particular have chartered unknown territory by offering a variety of new products that expand their risk profiles far beyond their traditional exposures. In addition to the ubiquitous surrender options within traditional product lines, especially so-called Guaranteed Minimum Benefits within Variable Annuities are extremely popular and provide a host of choices for policyholders that considerably affect their final payoff. Arguably the most behavior-dependent option among them are so-called Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefits (GMWBs), which provide the right but not the obligation to withdraw a certain amount every year free of charge and independent of the investment performance.

My dissertation studies optimal policyholder behavior in personal savings products and the resulting financial risks for the issuer by analyzing in detail these guarantees. In particular, I provide novel insights on the following two important research questions: What drives optimal policyholder behavior in life insurance? And what are the implications of optimal exercise behavior for product design?

While previous research has shown that policyholders’ exercise strategies considerably affect the valuation of such products (cf. Kling et al. (2011)), the drivers of policyholder exercise behavior are still little understood. In particular, insurers’ attempts to estimate and correctly anticipate policyholder withdrawal behavior vary tremendously and are typically driven by intuition and past behavior rather than economic insights. This is problematic due to the scarcity of data for these relatively new products, and the inability to extrapolate the observed behavior to different market conditions. In contrast, the actuarial literature has approached the problem from an arbitrage pricing perspective (see e.g. Milevsky and Salisbury (2006) and Dai et al. (2008) for GMWBs),
where policyholders are assumed to exercise their options in a way that maximizes the risk-neutral market-consistent value of the resulting cash flows. The implied policyholder behavior, however, does not square well with observed prices and empirical exercise patterns.

I address this discrepancy in my first essay, *Revisiting the Risk-Neutral Approach to Optimal Policyholder Behavior: A Study of Withdrawal Guarantees in Variable Annuities*. More specifically, since the market for personal savings products exhibits frictions – typically, investors cannot sell their policies, or parts thereof, at their risk-neutral value – and is incomplete, key assumptions underlying standard arbitrage pricing are violated. Therefore, (optimal) exercise behavior might be affected by the policyholders’ preferences.

To analyze this in more detail, I develop a life-cycle model for a Variable Annuity with a withdrawal guarantee as well as outside investment opportunities. I find that while the valuation results are rather insensitive to preference characteristics, they are strongly affected by the consideration of appropriate tax treatments: The tax-deferred growth property of Variable Annuities (in the U.S.) not only makes them a popular long-term investment vehicle, but also shapes the investors’ optimal withdrawal behavior.

Based on these insights, I then develop a risk-neutral valuation approach that incorporates the proper tax treatments, and – as expected given my earlier findings – valuation results closely resemble those from the life-cycle model. I also find that they are substantially different from the case analyzed in the literature, that is without considering taxation. In particular, my analysis of an empirical Variable Annuity product suggests that the GMWB fees are sufficient to cover the costs of the guarantee, contrary to findings from the literature. Hence, one key result from this essay is that the consideration of taxes alone appears sufficient to explain policyholder exercise behavior.
within Variable Annuities including a GMWB.

My second essay, On Negative Option Values in Personal Savings Products, concerns the design of personal savings products. In particular, I demonstrate that it is possible for financial options to have negative marginal value for the issuer. The key insight is that when the financial market exhibits frictions and is incomplete, market participants deviate from traditional arbitrage pricing and their value functions no longer are direct opposites. If subjective valuation is affected by individual preferences, the idea of risk-sharing comes to mind. However, negative option values can arise even when policyholder and insurer both are value maximizers: The consideration of taxes introduces a third (inactive) party – the government – to the transaction.

For instance, in the context of Variable Annuities, adding a standard guarantee may incentivize the policyholder to reduce her withdrawals and the likelihood of surrender, and thus also her tax obligations (as tax payments are deferred). Since the government collects fewer taxes, there is more money to be distributed between the two main parties. If, in addition, the policyholder holds other (implicit or explicit) options from the same issuer, and the presence of the additional option makes exercising them less optimal, it is conceivable that both investor and issuer gain from the addition of the option – at the expense of the third party.

In Sections 2 and 3 of Essay 2, I demonstrate with a two-period model and by implementing an empirical product, respectively, that a death benefit guarantee (GMDB) written on a Variable Annuity with a GMWB may result in exactly such an effect: The death benefit guarantee has a negative value to its issuer, so that both insurer and policyholder benefit from the product (at the expense of the government). It may thus come as no surprise that death benefit guarantees have become a standard feature in Variable Annuity policies, and most withdrawal guarantees (including
the one that I use as an empirical example) now also promise to return the remaining benefits base in case of the policyholder’s death.

Overall, while more research is needed until insurers can feel comfortable about their exposure to policyholder behavior, the findings in my dissertation rectify and explain some of the insurers’ strategies: The fees charged for GMWBs appear to be sufficient for covering the resulting liabilities, contrary to what the actuarial literature has suggested; my results endorse simple dynamic exercise rules based on the “moneyness” of the guarantee, which are slowly being adopted by some life insurance companies (cf. Society of Actuaries (2009)); and their recent tendency to bundle certain guarantees might be explained by the observation that options in private savings products (such as a death benefit guarantee) can have a negative marginal value due to specific tax considerations, so that offering the guarantee is mutually beneficial.
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To those who sparked my interest in actuarial science, risk and economics, and inspired me to pursue an academic career – I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude. In particular, I’d like to thank Jim Bridgeman, Adam Speight, Jay Vadiveloo and George Zanjani. Thank you for all that you have been doing for me and many others.

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Despite the study-aholic lifestyle, my time in Atlanta has been enhanced on a personal level as well. To Menna, Swathy, Omer and – of course – Maria: Thank you for being so wonderful!
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Chapter 1


1.1 Introduction

Policyholder behavior is an important risk factor for life insurance companies offering contracts that include exercise-dependent features, but so far it is little understood. Specifically, analyses of optimal policyholder behavior uncovered in the actuarial literature – building on the theory for evaluating American and Bermudan options – commonly yield exercise patterns and prices that
are far from observations in practice.\footnote{See, among others, Bauer et al. (2008), Grosen and Jørgensen (2000), Milevsky and Posner (2001), Milevsky and Salisbury (2006), Ulm (2006), or Zaglauer and Bauer (2008).} A recent strand of literature believes to have identified the problem in the incompleteness of the insurance market.\footnote{See e.g. Gao and Ulm (2011), Knoller et al. (2011), and Steinorth and Mitchell (2011).} More precisely, the argument is that in contrast to financial derivatives, policyholders may not have the possibility to sell (or repurchase) their contract at its risk-neutral continuation value so that exercising may be advisable – and rational – even if risk-neutral valuation theory does not suggest so. As a solution, these papers suggest to analyze exercise behavior in life-cycle utility optimization models where the decision to exercise is embedded in the overall portfolio problem of an individual or a household, although the associated complexity naturally necessitates profound simplifications.

In this paper, we follow this strand of literature in that we also develop a life-cycle utility model for a poster child of exercise-dependent options in life insurance, namely a variable annuity (VA) contract including a Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefit (GMWB) rider. However, compared to earlier work, we explicitly account for outside savings and allocation options. While of course this addition increases the complexity of the optimization problem, it affects the results considerably. We find that most risk allocations occur outside of the VA and that changes in the policyholder’s wealth level, preferences, or other behavioral aspects have little effect on the optimal withdrawal behavior. In contrast, the exercise behavior appears to be primarily motivated by value maximization, however with the important wrinkle that taxation rules considerably affect this value.

To further analyze this assertion and as an important methodological contribution of the paper, we develop a valuation mechanism in the presence of different investment opportunities with
differing tax treatments. The key idea is that if the pre-tax investment market for underlying investments such as stocks and bonds is complete, it is possible to replicate any given post-tax cash flow with a pre-tax cash flow of these underlying investments – irrespective of the tax treatment for the securities leading to the former cash flow.

We show that when taking taxation into account via the proposed mechanism, a value-maximizing approach yields withdrawal patterns and pricing results that are close to the results from the life cycle model and that square well with empirical observations. Hence, our results can be interpreted as a vindication of the risk-neutral valuation approach – associated with all its benefits such as independence of preferences, wealth, or consumption decisions – although it is to be taken out from the perspective of the policyholder rather than the insurance company so that personal tax considerations matter.

As already indicated, we focus our attention on policyholder exercise behavior for VA contracts with GMWBs. Here, a VA essentially is a unit-linked, tax-deferred savings plan potentially entailing guaranteed payment levels, for instance upon death (Guaranteed Minimum Death Benefit, GMDB) or survival until expiration (Guaranteed Minimum Living Benefits, GMLB). A GMWB, on the other hand, provides the policyholder with the right but not the obligation to withdraw the initial investment over a certain period of time, irrespective of investment performance, as long as annual withdrawals do not exceed a pre-specified amount. To finance these guarantees, most commonly insurers deduct an option fee at a constant rate from the policyholder’s account value.

In 2010, U.S. individual VA sales totaled over $140 billion, increasing the combined net assets of VAs to a record $1.5 trillion, whereby most of them are enhanced by one or even multiple guaranteed benefits. These figures indicate the importance for insurers to understand how policy-
holders may utilize these embedded options, especially because changes in economic or regulatory conditions have on occasion caused dramatic shifts in policyholder behavior that have caught the industry off-guard.\(^3\) However, to date most liability models fail to capture this risk factor in an adequate fashion. In particular, companies usually rely on historic exercise probabilities or static exercise rules, although some insurers indicate they use simple dynamic assumptions in their C3 Phase II calculations (cf. Society of Actuaries (2009)).

The prevalent assumption for evaluating GMWBs in the actuarial literature is that policyholders may exercise optimally with respect to the value of the contract consistent with arbitrage pricing theory (see, among others, Milevsky and Salisbury (2006), Bauer et al. (2008), Chen and Forsyth (2008), or Dai et al. (2008)).\(^4\) Specifically, the value is characterized by an optimal control problem identifying the supremum of the risk-neutral contract value over all admissible withdrawal strategies. While such an approach may be justified in that it – in principle – identifies the unique supervaluation and superhedging strategy robust to any policyholder behavior (cf. Bauer et al. (2010)), the resulting “fair” guarantee fees considerably exceed the levels encountered in practice. For example, Milevsky and Salisbury (2006) calculate the no-arbitrage hedging cost of a GMWB to range from 73 to 160 basis points, depending on parameter assumptions, although typically insurers charge only about 30 to 45 bps. While from the authors’ perspective these observed differences

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\(^3\)For instance, rising interest rates in the 1970s led to the so-called disintermediation process, which caused substantial increases in surrenders and policy loans in the whole life market (cf. Black and Skipper (2000), p. 111). Similarly, in 2000, the UK-based mutual life insurer Equitable Life – the world’s oldest life insurance company – was closed to new business due to problems arising from a misjudgment of policyholder behavior with respect to exercising guaranteed annuity options within individual pension policies (cf. Boyle and Hardy (2003)). More recently, the U.S. insurer The Hartford had to accept TARP money, after losing “$2.75 billion in 2008, hurt by investment losses and the cost of guarantees it provided to holders of variable annuities.”

\(^4\)A few alternatives have also been put forward. For instance, Stanton (1995) proposes a rational expectations model with heterogeneous transaction costs in the case of prepayment options within mortgages, and De Giovanni (2010) develops a model for surrender options in life insurance contracts, which also allows for irrational in addition to rational exercises.
between theory and practice are a result of “suboptimal” policyholder behavior, these deviations can also be attributed to the policyholder foregoing certain privileges and protection when making a withdrawal, even in the case of rational decision making. Most notably, tax benefits of VAs are a major reason for their popularity, so that it is proximate to assume that taxation also factors into the policyholder’s decision-making process. Furthermore, in contrast to financial derivatives, policyholders generally are not able to sell their policy at its risk-neutral value, which may also affect withdrawal behavior.

To analyze whether or not there are rational reasons for the observed behavior – akin to related recent literature (cf. Gao and Ulm (2011) or Steinorth and Mitchell (2011)) – we introduce a structural model that explicitly considers the problem of decision making under uncertainty faced by the holder of a VA policy. More specifically, the policyholder’s state-contingent decision process is modeled using a lifetime utility model of consumption and bequests, where we allow for stochasticity in both the financial market and individual lifetime. However, in contrast to previous contributions, we explicitly allow for an outside investment option and we include appropriate investment tax treatments. We parametrize the model based on reasonable assumptions about policyholder characteristics, the financial market, etc., and solve the decision making problem numerically using a recursive dynamic programming approach.

Based on the model, we are able to identify a variety of aspects that factor into the policyholder’s decision process. First and foremost, withdrawals are infrequent and are optimal mainly upon poor market performance or – to be more precise – when the VA account has fallen below the tax base. For instance, in our benchmark case the policyholder will make one or more withdrawals prior to maturity less than one fourth of the time, and the probability that he will withdraw the
full initial investment is less than 5%. These findings are in stark contrast to the results based on arbitrage pricing theory, which find that withdrawing at least the guaranteed amount is optimal in most circumstances (cf. Milevsky and Salisbury (2006)). In particular, our results indicate that the assumed guarantee fee of 50 basis points appears to sufficiently provide for the considered return-of-investment GMWB. Moreover, our results prove fairly insensitive to changes in individual and behavioral parameters such as wealth, income and the level of risk aversion. The differences are small but systematic in a way that is consistent with the market incompleteness resulting from an absence of life-contingent securities – other than the VA – within our model. Therefore, our results suggest that policyholder behavior is primarily driven by value maximization when taking the preferred tax treatment of VAs into account. In particular, taxation not only seems to be a major reason why people purchase VAs, but appears to also incentivize them not to withdraw prematurely.

To further elaborate on this observation, we devise a risk-neutral valuation mechanism in the presence of different investment opportunities with differing tax treatments. Relying on this mechanism, we implement an alternative approach to uncover the optimal withdrawal behavior with regards to maximizing the value of all payoffs akin to standard arbitrage pricing methods. As predicted, the numerical results of the value-maximizing strategy turn out to be similar to those of the – considerably more complex – utility-based model.\(^5\) Furthermore, the computational tractability of this risk-neutral approach allows the consideration and analysis of more complex VA products as they are offered in practice, which typically entail step-up features and other optional features. As an empirical example, we implement Prudential’s *Advanced Series Lifevest II* (ASL II) policy

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\(^5\)This result shows some resemblance to the findings of Carpenter (1998) in the context of employee stock options. In particular, her investigations suggest that a value-maximizing strategy (plus a fixed-probability exogenous exercise state) explains exercise behavior just as well as a complex utility-based model.
within our framework and analyze the optimal withdrawal behavior as well as the corresponding option fees. We find that the 35 basis points charged for the GMWB roughly accord with the marginal cost of the guarantee, although results are rather sensitive to capital market parameters.

On a practical note, our results endorse the use of simple dynamic exercise rules based on the “moneyness” of the guarantee, which are slowly adopted by some life insurance companies (cf. Society of Actuaries (2009)). While this result is in line with the empirical findings from Knoller et al. (2011), we note that the coherence of this rule in our setting is not primarily due to the “moneyness” factoring into the policyholder’s decision process, but it is a consequence of the similarities between tax and benefits base.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In the subsequent section, we introduce a lifetime utility model for VAs. Section 3 is dedicated to the implementation of the model in a Black-Scholes framework and to discussing computational details. Section 4 details the numerical results of the life-cycle model. In Section 5, we develop a risk-neutral valuation approach with taxation and apply it to our valuation problem. This is followed by a discussion of implications for insurance practice in Section 6. Section 7 is devoted to the implementation and analysis of Prudential’s ASL II Variable Annuity policy, and a discussion of its pricing. And finally, Section 8 concludes and briefly discusses possible extensions.

1.2 A Lifetime Utility Model for Variable Annuities with GMWBs

There exists a large variety of VA products available in the U.S. The policies differ by how the premiums are collected; policyholder investment opportunities, including whether the policyholder
can reallocate funds after underwriting; and guarantee specifics, for instance what type of guarantees are included, how the guarantees are designed and how they are paid for, etc. For a detailed description of VAs and the guarantees available in the market, we refer to Bauer et al. (2008).

This section develops a lifetime utility model of VAs including (at least) a simple return-of-investment GMWB option, with stochasticity in policyholder lifetime and asset returns. The policyholder’s state-contingent decision process entails annual choices over withdrawals from the VA account, consumption, and asset allocation in an outside portfolio.

In contrast to mutual funds, VAs grow tax deferred, which presents the primary reason for their popularity among individuals who exceed the limits of their qualified retirement plans. For instance, Milevsky and Panyagometh (2001) argue that variable annuities outperform mutual funds for investments longer than ten years, even when the option to harvest losses is taken into account for the mutual fund. Since the preferred tax treatment may also affect policyholder exercise behavior, we briefly describe current U.S. taxation policies on variable annuities and the way these are captured in our model in Section 1.2.4.

### 1.2.1 Description of the Variable Annuity Policy

We consider an $x$-year old individual who has just (time $t = 0$) purchased a VA with finite integer maturity $T$ against a single up-front premium $P_0$. We assume that all cash flows as well as all relevant decisions come into effect at policy anniversary dates, $t = 1, \ldots, T$. In particular, the insurer will return the policyholder’s concurrent account value – or some guaranteed amount, if eligible – at the end of the policyholder’s year of death or at maturity, whichever comes first. In addition, the contract contains a GMWB option, which grants the policyholder the right but not the obligation
to withdraw the initial investment $P_0$ free of charge and independent of investment performance, as long as annual withdrawals do not exceed the guaranteed annual amount $g_t^W$. Withdrawals in excess of either $g_t^W$ or the remaining aggregate withdrawal guarantee – denoted by $G_t^W$ – carry a (partial) surrender charge of $s_t \geq 0$ as a percentage of the excess withdrawal amount. We model a “generic” contract that may also contain a GMDB or other GMLB options. In that case, we denote by $G_t^D$, $G_t^I$, and $G_t^A$ the guaranteed minimum death, income, and accumulation benefit, respectively.\footnote{A Guaranteed Minimum Accumulation Benefit (GMAB) guarantees a minimal (lump-sum) payout at maturity of the contract, provided that the policyholder is still alive. Under the same conditions, a Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefit (GMIB) guarantees a minimal annuity payout.} For simplicity of exposition and without much loss of generality, we assume that all included guarantees are return-of-investment options. Thus all involved guarantee accounts have an identical benefits base

$$G_t \equiv G_t^W = G_t^D = G_t^A = G_t^I.$$  

If an option is not included, we simply set the corresponding guaranteed benefit to zero. Hence this model allows us to include a variety of guarantees, without having to increase the state space, which makes the problem computationally feasible.\footnote{In particular, we can also analyze contracts that do not contain a GMWB option at all.} However, other contract designs could be easily incorporated at the cost of a larger state space. We refer to Bauer et al. (2008) for details.

While for return-of-investment guarantees, the initial benefits base is $G_0 = P_0$, this equality will no longer be satisfied after funds have been withdrawn from the account. More precisely, following Bauer et al. (2008), we model the adjustments of the benefits base in case of a withdrawal prior to maturity based on the following assumptions: If the withdrawal does not exceed the guaranteed annual amount $g_t^W$, the benefits base will simply be reduced by the withdrawal amount. Otherwise,
the benefits base will be the lesser of that amount and a so-called pro rata adjustment. Hence,

\[ G_{t+1} = \begin{cases} (G_t - w)^+ & : w \leq g_t^W \\ \left( \min \{ G_t - w, G_t, \frac{X_{t+1}^-}{X_t} \} \right)^+ & : w > g_t^W \end{cases} \quad (1.1) \]

where \( w \) is the withdrawal amount, \( X_t^-/+ \) denote the VA account values immediately before and after the withdrawal is made, respectively, and \((a)^+ \equiv \max\{a, 0\}\). To finance the guarantees, the insurer continuously deducts an option fee at constant rate \( \phi \geq 0 \) from the policyholder’s account value.

With regards to the investment strategy for the VA, we assume the policyholder chooses an allocation at inception of the contract, and that it remains fixed subsequently. This is not unusual in the presence of a GMWB option since otherwise the policyholder may have an incentive to shift to the most risky investment strategy in order to maximize the value of the guarantee.

### 1.2.2 Policyholder Preferences

The policyholder gains utility from consumption, while alive, and from bequesting his savings upon his death (if death occurs prior to retirement). We assume time-separable preferences with an individual discount factor \( \beta \), and utility functions \( u_C(\cdot) \) and \( u_B(\cdot) \) for consumption and bequests, respectively.

The policyholder is endowed with an initial wealth \( W_0 \), of which he invests \( R_0 \) in the VA. The remainder is placed in an “outside account”. We suppose there exist \( d \) identical investment opportunities inside and outside the VA, the main difference being that adjustments to the investment allocations in the outside portfolio can be made every year at the policy anniversary. We denote the
time-$t$ value of the VA account by $X_t$ and the time-$t$ value of the outside account by $A_t$, where the corresponding investment allocations are specified by the $d$-dimensional vectors $v^X_t$ and $v_t$ for the VA and outside account, respectively. In either case, short sales are not allowed, so that we require

$$v_t, v^X_t \geq 0, \text{ and } \sum_i v_t(i) = \sum_i v^X_t(i) = 1. \quad (1.2)$$

For the values at policy anniversaries $t \in \{0, 1, \ldots, T\}$, we add superscript $-$ to denote the level of an account (state variable) at the beginning of a period, just prior to the policyholder’s decision, and superscript $+$ to indicate its value immediately afterwards. Note that guarantee accounts do not change between periods, i.e. between $(t)^+$ and $(t + 1)^-$, $t = 0, 1, \ldots, T - 1$, but only through withdrawals at policy anniversary dates, so that no superscripts are necessary here. The policyholder receives annual (exogenous) net income $I_t$, which for the purpose of this paper is deterministic and paid in a single installment at each policy anniversary. Upon observing his current level of wealth, i.e. his outside account value $A_t^-$, the state of his VA account $X_t^-$, the level of his guarantees $G_i$, and his VA tax basis $H_t$ (see below), the policyholder chooses how much to withdraw from the VA account, how much to consume, and how to allocate his outside investments in the upcoming policy year.

Appendix A describes the assumed timeline of events leading up to and following the policyholder’s decision each period.
1.2.3 Mortality

Relying on standard actuarial notation, we denote by $t q_x$ the probability that ($x$) dies within $t$ years, and by $t p_x \equiv 1 - q_x$ the corresponding probability of survival. In particular, we express the one-year death and survival probabilities by $q_x$ and $p_x$, respectively. Consequently, the probability that ($x$) dies in the interval $(t, t + 1]$ is given by $t p_x \cdot q_{x+t}$.

Upon the policyholder’s death, we assume that his bequest amount is converted to a risk-free perpetuity (reflecting that upon the beneficiary’s death, remaining funds will be passed on to his own beneficiaries, and so on) at the risk-free rate, which for simplicity is assumed to be constant and denoted by $r$. Note that all previous earnings on the VA will be taxed as ordinary income at that point. We assume the beneficiaries have the same preferences as the policyholder, and that his bequest motive is $B$. That is, if he leaves bequest amount $x$ (net of taxes), the bequest utility is given by:

$$\frac{1}{1-\beta} \cdot B \cdot u_C([1-e^{-r}] \cdot x).$$

1.2.4 Tax Treatment of Variable Annuities

We model taxation of income and investment returns based on concurrent U.S. regulation, albeit with a few necessary simplifications. More precisely, we assume that all investments into the VA are post-tax and non-qualified. As such, taxes will only be due on future investment gains, not the initial investment (principal) itself.

Investments inside a VA grow tax deferred. In other words, the policyholder will not be taxed on any earnings until he starts to make withdrawals from his account. However, all earnings from a VA will eventually be taxed as ordinary income. More precisely, withdrawals are taxed on a
last-in first-out basis, meaning that earnings are withdrawn before the principal. Specifically, early withdrawals after an investment gain are subject to income taxes. Only if the account value lies below the tax base will withdrawals be tax free. In addition, withdrawals prior to the age of $59\frac{1}{2}$ are subject to an early withdrawal tax of $s^g$ (typically 10%). At maturity, denoting the concurrent VA account value by $X_T$ and the tax base by $H_T$, if the policyholder chooses the account value to be paid out as a lump-sum, he is required to pay taxes on the (remaining) VA earnings

$$\max\{X_T - H_T, 0\}$$

immediately (if applicable, we substitute $G^A_T$ for $X_T$). However, if the policyholder chooses to annuitize his account value – e.g. in level annual installments, as we assume in this paper – his annual tax-free amount is his current tax base $H_T$ divided by his life expectancy $e_{x+T}$, as computed from the appropriate actuarial table. In other words, the policyholder will need to declare any annuity payments from this VA in excess of $H_T/e_{x+T}$ per year as ordinary income (see IRS (2003)).

For the initial tax base, we obviously have $H_1 = P_0$. The subsequent evolution of the tax base depends on both the evolution of the account value and withdrawals, where $H_t$ essentially denotes the part of the account value that is left from the original principal. More precisely, the tax base remains unaffected by withdrawals smaller or equal to $X_t^- - H_t$, i.e. those withdrawals that are fully taxed (because they come from earnings), whereas tax-free withdrawals reduce the tax base dollar for dollar. Hence, formally we have

$$H_{t+1} = H_t - \left(w_t - (X_t^- - H_t)^+\right)^+.$$  \hfill (1.3)
In contrast, returns from a mutual fund are not tax deferrable. While in practice parts of these returns are ordinary dividends and thus taxed as income, others are long term capital gains and subject to the (lower) capital gains tax rate. We simplify taxation of mutual fund earnings to be at a constant annual rate, denoted by $\kappa$, which for future reference we call the capital gains tax, although it may be chosen a little higher than the actual tax on capital gains to reflect income from dividends or coupon payments, which are taxable at a higher rate. The income tax rate is also assumed to be constant over taxable money and time, at rate $\tau$.

### 1.2.5 Policyholder Optimization During the Lifetime of the Contract

The setup, as described in this section, requires four state variables: $A_t^-$, the value of the outside account just before the $t$-th policy anniversary date; $X_t^-$, the value of the VA account just before the $t$-th policy anniversary date; $G_t$, the value of the benefits base (and thus all guarantee accounts) in period $t$; and $H_t$, the tax base in period $t$. At the $t$-th policy anniversary, given withdrawal of $w_t$, we define next-period benefits base and tax base by equations (1.1) and (1.3), respectively.

**Transition from $(t)^-$ to $(t)^+$**

Upon withdrawal of $w_t$, consumption $C_t$, and new outside portfolio allocation level $\nu_t$, we update our state variables as follows:

\[
X_t^+ = (X_t^- - w_t)^+, \text{ and } \quad A_t^+ = A_t^- + I_t + w_t - C_t - \text{fee}_I - \text{fee}_G - \text{taxes},
\]

---

*We believe this to be a reasonable simplification as holders of variable annuities are typically relatively wealthy, so that brackets over which the applicable marginal income tax rate is constant are fairly large. Moreover, we want to avoid withdrawal behavior being affected unpredictably by “fragile” tax advantages.*
where

\[ \text{fee}_I = s \cdot \max \{ w_t - \min(s_t^W, G_t^W), 0 \} \]

denotes the excess withdrawal fees the policyholder pays to the insurer,

\[ \text{fee}_G = s^g \cdot (w_t - \text{fee}_I) \cdot 1_{\{x+t<59.5\}} \]

are the early withdrawal penalty fees the government collects on withdrawals prior to age 59.5, and

\[ \text{taxes} = \tau \cdot \min\{w_t - \text{fee}_I - \text{fee}_G, (X_t^- - H_t^+)\} \]

are the (income) taxes the policyholder pays upon withdrawing \( w_t \).

In our basic model, we update the guaranteed withdrawal account by (1.1). If the contract specifies guarantees to evolve differently (e.g. step-up or ratchet-type guarantees), the updating function must be modified accordingly. In that case we may also need to carry along an additional (binary) state variable to keep track of whether the policyholder has previously made a withdrawal. We refer to Bauer et al. (2008) for details.

**Transition from** \((t)^+\) **to** \((t+1)^-\)**

In our model, the only state variables changing stochastically between \((t)^+\) and \((t+1)^-\) are the account values inside and outside of the VA, both driven by the evolution of the financial assets, which are described by the vector-valued stochastic process, \( (S_t)_{t \geq 0} \).\(^9\) Similarly, the (row) vector

\(^9\)As usual in this context, underlying our consideration is a complete filtered probability space \( (\Omega, F, \mathbb{P}, F = (F_t)_{t \geq 0}) \), where \( F \) satisfies the usual conditions and \( \mathbb{P} \) denotes the “physical” probability measure.
\( v_t \) captures the fraction of outside wealth \( A_t^+ \) the policyholder wants to invest in each asset. Taking into account the tax treatments as described in section 1.2.4 we can update the account values as follows:

\[
A_{t+1}^- = A_t^+ \cdot \left[ v_t \cdot \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} - \kappa \cdot \left( v_t \cdot \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} - 1 \right) \right], \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
X_{t+1}^- = X_t^+ \cdot e^{-\phi} \cdot \left[ \nu X \cdot \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \right],
\]

where \( \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \) denotes the component-wise quotient.

**Bellman Equation**

Denoting the policyholder’s time-\( t \) value function by \( V_t^- : \mathbb{R}^4 \to \mathbb{R}, y_t \equiv (A_t^-, X_t^-, G_t, H_t) \mapsto V_t^-(y_t), \) where we call \( y_t \) the vector of state variables, we can describe his optimization problem at each policy anniversary date recursively by

\[
V_t^-(y_t) = \max_{C_t, w_t, \nu_t} u_C(C_t) + e^{-\beta} \cdot \mathbb{E}_t \left[ q_{x+t} \cdot u_B(b_{t+1} | S_{t+1}) + p_{x+t} \cdot V_{t+1}^-(y_{t+1} | S_{t+1}) \right],
\]

subject to (1.1), (1.2), (1.3), (1.4), (1.5), the bequest amount

\[
b_{t+1} = A_{t+1}^- + b_X - \tau \cdot (b_X - H_t, 0),
\]

where \( b_X = \max \{ X_{t+1}^-, G_{t+1}^D \} \), and the choice variable constraints

\[
0 \leq C_t \leq A_t^- + I_t + w_t - \text{fee}_I - \text{fee}_G - \text{taxes}, \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
0 \leq w_t \leq \max \{ X_t^-, \min \{ g_t^W, G_t \} \}.
\]
1.2.6 Policyholder Behavior upon Maturity of the Variable Annuity

If the policyholder is alive when the Variable Annuity matures at time $T$, we assume that he retires immediately and no longer receives any outside income. He will live off his concurrent savings, which consist of the time-$T$ value of his outside portfolio, plus the maximum of his VA account value and any remaining GMLB benefits. More precisely, we assume he uses these savings to purchase a single-premium whole life annuity, and that he no longer has a bequest motive; his consumption preferences, on the other hand, are the same as before.

We model the taxation of annuities following our discussion in Section 1.2.4. The outside account value $A_T^-$ is already net of taxes, thus only future earnings (i.e. interest) need to be taxed. Therefore, $A_T^-$ acts as the tax base for the whole life annuity. The outside account can thus be converted into net annuity payments of

$$c_A \equiv \frac{A_T^-}{e_{x+T}} + (1 - \tau) \cdot \left( \frac{A_T^-}{\ddot{a}_{x+T}} - \frac{A_T^-}{e_{x+T}} \right) = \tau \cdot \frac{A_T^-}{e_{x+T}} + (1 - \tau) \cdot \frac{A_T^-}{\ddot{a}_{x+T}} \quad (1.7)$$

at the beginning of every year as long as the policyholder is alive. Here, $\ddot{a}_{x+T}$ denotes the actuarial present value of an annuity due paying 1 at the beginning of each year while $(x + T)$ is alive, and $e_{x+T}$ denotes the policyholder’s complete life expectancy at maturity of the VA as used to determine tax treatment upon annuitization of the VA payout.

At maturity, the policyholder can withdraw the remainder of the account value (or some guaranteed level, if applicable) from the VA. That is:

$$w_T = \max \left\{ X_T^-, \max \left[ G_T^A, \min \left( G_T^W, g_T^W \right) \right] \right\} . \quad (1.8)$$
This results in life-long annual payments of

\[
c_X \equiv \min \left\{ \frac{w_T}{\bar{a}_{x+T}}, \tau \cdot \frac{H_T}{e_{x+T}} + (1 - \tau) \cdot \frac{w_T}{\bar{a}_{x+T}} \right\}
\]

\[
= \frac{w_T}{\bar{a}_{x+T}} - \tau \cdot \max \left\{ \frac{w_T}{\bar{a}_{x+T}} - \frac{H_T}{e_{x+T}}, 0 \right\}.
\]

(1.9)

If a GMIB is included in the contract, the policyholder can also choose to annuitize the guaranteed amount \( G^I_T \) at a guaranteed annuity factor \( \bar{a}^\text{guar}_{x+T} \), and thus receive annual payouts

\[
c_I \equiv \frac{G^I_T}{\bar{a}^\text{guar}_{x+T}} - \tau \cdot \max \left\{ \frac{G^I_T}{\bar{a}^\text{guar}_{x+T}} - \frac{H_T}{e_{x+T}}, 0 \right\}
\]

(1.10)

Overall, the policyholder can therefore consume \( c_A + \max\{c_X, c_I\} \) every year during his retirement.

The time-\( T \) expected lifetime utility for the policyholder is thus

\[
V_T^{-} (A_T, X_T, G_T, H_T) = \sum_{t=0}^{\omega-x-T} \exp(-\beta t) \cdot t \cdot \mu \cdot u_c(c_A + \max\{c_X, c_I\}),
\]

subject to equations (1.7) to (1.10).

### 1.3 Implementation in a Black-Scholes Framework

For our implementation, we consider two investment possibilities only, namely a risky asset \( (S_t)_{t \geq 0} \) and a risk-free asset \( (B_t)_{t \geq 0} \). More specifically, akin to the well-known Black-Scholes-Merton model, we assume that the risky asset evolves according to the Stochastic Differential Equation (SDE)

\[
\frac{dS_t}{S_t} = \mu dt + \sigma dZ_t, \quad S_0 > 0,
\]
where $\mu, \sigma > 0$, and $(Z_t)_{t>0}$ is a standard Brownian motion, while the risk-free asset (savings account) follows

$$
\frac{dB_t}{B_t} = r \, dt, \quad B_0 = 1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad B_t = \exp(rt).
$$

In this setting, optimization problem (1.6) takes the form

$$
V_{t-}^-(y_t) = \max_{C_t, w_t, \nu_t} u_C(C_t) + e^{-\beta} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \psi(\gamma) \left[ q_{x+t} \cdot u_B(b_{t+1}|S'(\gamma)) + p_{x+t} \cdot V_{t+1}^-(y_{t+1}|S'(\gamma)) \right] d\gamma, \quad (1.12)
$$

where $\psi(\gamma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp(-\frac{\gamma^2}{2})$ is the standard normal probability density function, and $S'(\gamma) = S_t \cdot e^{\sigma \gamma + \mu - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2}$ is the annual gross return of the risky asset, subject to various constraints (see Appendix A for a detailed list). For the proof of equation (1.12), we refer the reader to Appendix B.

In the remainder of this section, we present a recursive dynamic programming approach for the solution. In particular, we address practical implementation problems arising from the complexity associated with the high dimensionality of the state space.

### 1.3.1 Estimation Algorithm

The key idea underlying our algorithm is a discretization of the state space at policy anniversaries. More specifically, our approach to derive the optimal consumption, allocation, and – particularly – withdrawal policies consists of the following steps.

**Algorithm 1.**

1. Discretize the four-dimensional state space consisting of the values for $A, X, G$, and $H$ ap-
appropriately to create a grid.

(II) For \( t = T \): for all grid points \( (A, X, G, H) \), compute \( V_T^{-}(A, X, G, H) \) via Equation (1.11).

(III) For \( t = T-1, T-2, \ldots, 1 \):

1. Given \( V_{t+1}^{-} \), calculate \( V_t^{-} (A, X, G, H) \) recursively for each \( (A, X, G, H) \) on the grid via the (approximated) solution to Equation (1.12).

2. Store the optimal state-contingent withdrawal, consumption, and allocation choices for further analyses.

(IV) For \( t = 0 \): For the given starting values \( A_0 = W_0 - P_0 \), \( X_0 = P_0 \), \( G_0 = G_1 = P_0 \) and \( H_0 = H_1 = P_0 \), compute \( V_0^{-}(W_0 - P_0, P_0, P_0, P_0) \) recursively from equation (1.12).

Storing the optimal choices in step (III.2) not only allows us to analyze to what extent a representative policyholder makes use of the withdrawal guarantee, which is the primary focus of our paper, but we may also determine the time zero value of all collected fees and payouts to the policyholder or his beneficiaries via their expected present values under the risk-neutral measure \( Q \).

10 In particular, by comparing these values we can make an inference whether or not the contracted fee percentage within our representable contract sufficiently provides for the offered guarantees in the absence of other costs. However, before discussing our results in Section 1.4, the remainder of this section provides the necessary details about the implementation of the steps in Algorithm 1 as well as the choice of the underlying parameters.

---

10By the fundamental theorem of asset pricing the existence of the risk-neutral measure is essentially equivalent with the absence of arbitrage in the market. As is common in this context, here we choose the product measure of the (unique) risk-neutral measure for the (complete) financial market and the physical measure for life-contingent events.
1.3.2 Evaluation of the Integral Equation (1.12)

Since within step (III) of Algorithm 1 the (nominal) value function at time $t+1$ is only given on a discrete grid, it is clearly not possible to directly evaluate the integral in Equation (1.12). We consider two different approaches for its approximation by discretizing the underlying return space.

Since the integral entails the standard normal density function, one prevalent approach is to rely on a Gauss-Hermite Quadrature. However, to ascertain the accuracy of our approximation, we additionally consider a second approach. Note that our integral equation is of the form

$$K \equiv \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi(u) F(\lambda(u)) \, du,$$

where $\phi(u) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(\frac{1}{2}u^2\right)$ is the standard normal density function, $\lambda(u) = \exp(\sigma u + \mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2)$ corresponds to the annual stock return $S_{t+1}/S_t$, and

$$F(x) \equiv q_{x+t} \cdot u_b \left( b_{t+1} \left| \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} = x \right. \right) + p_{x+t} \cdot V_{t+1}^- \left( y_{t+1} \left| \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} = x \right. \right).$$

Dividing the return space $(-\infty, \infty)$ into $M > 0$ subintervals $[u_k, u_{k+1})$, for $k = 0, 1, \ldots, M - 1$, where we set $-\infty = u_0 < u_1 < \ldots < u_{M-1} < u_M = \infty$, a consistent approximation of the integral (1.13) is given by

$$K \approx \sum_{k=0}^{M-1} \Phi(u_{k+1}) \cdot [a_k - a_{k+1}] + \exp(\mu) \cdot \Phi(u_{k+1} - \sigma) \cdot [b_k - b_{k+1}].$$

Here, $\Phi(.)$ is the standard normal cdf, $a_k \equiv \frac{x_{k+1} \cdot \psi_k - x_k \cdot \psi_{k+1}}{x_{k+1} - x_k}, b_k \equiv \frac{\psi_{k+1} - \psi_k}{x_{k+1} - x_k}$ for $k = 0, \ldots, M - 1$, $a_M = b_M \equiv 0$, $x_k = \lambda(u_k)$ represent the gross returns, and $\psi_k \equiv F(x_k)$ are the function values.
evaluated at returns $x_k$ (see Appendix B for a derivation of (1.14)). With this approach, we have the discretion to choose the number $(M - 1)$ and location $(x_k)$ of all nodes, providing more flexibility than the Gauss-Hermite Quadrature method. It is important to note, however, that the values $\psi_k$ cannot be calculated directly, but need to be derived from the value function grid at time $t + 1$, where we rely on multilinear interpolation when necessary. We find very similar results for both approaches and therefore only present estimation results based on the approximation via Equation (1.13).

1.3.3 Monte-Carlo Simulations to Quantify Optimal Behavior

Using Algorithm 1, we can determine the policyholder’s optimal decision variables for all time/state combinations. To aggregate and better compare results, and to analyze pricing implications, we perform Monte Carlo simulations. More precisely, we simulate 5 million paths over stock movements and individual mortality. Thus, based on optimal choices of withdrawal, consumption and investment, we can compute the evolution of state variables as well as a variety of withdrawal measures for each path. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 in the Results section 1.4 show the corresponding statistics for different parameter assumptions. Note that the first section of each table is based on paths generated under the risk-neutral measure $\mathbb{Q}$ (see Footnote 10). While we later argue that $\mathbb{Q}$ is not appropriate to value contingent claims from the policyholder’s perspective due to tax considerations (see Section 1.5), an insurer replicating its liabilities does not pay taxes on the respective earnings, so that a direct valuation under $\mathbb{Q}$ is appropriate.
### Parameter Assumptions

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Age at inception</td>
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<td>VA principal</td>
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<td>Capital gains tax rate</td>
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</table>

*In 2007, the median net worth of a U.S. household where the head is age 55 to 64 was roughly 250,000. Median annual (gross) income is around 57,000 for the same category. Our assumptions are based on anecdotal evidence that holders of VA policies are generally wealthier than average. In addition, our results indicate that the choices of wealth, income, etc. do not have a considerable effect on withdrawal behavior.*

Table 1.1: Parameter Choices for Benchmark Case
1.3.4 Parameter Assumptions

For our numerical analysis, we consider a male policyholder who purchases a 15-year VA with a return-of-investment GMWB at age 55. Fee and guarantee structures are typical for contracts offered in practice. We further assume that the policyholder maximizes his expected lifetime utility over consumption and bequests, and that he exhibits CRRA preferences, that is

\[ u_C(x) = \frac{x^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}. \]

Assumptions about contract specifications and policyholder characteristics in the benchmark case are displayed in Table 1.1.

1.3.5 State Variable Grids

As discussed above, the choice-dependent state variables in our life-cycle model are \( A_t^- \), \( X_t^- \), \( G_t \), and \( H_t \). The guarantee account \( G_t \) and the tax base \( H_t \) are bounded from above by their starting value \( G_0 = P_0 \) and \( H_0 = P_0 \), respectively. For both accounts, we divide the interval \([0, P_0]\) into 16 grid points, including the boundaries. Now note that the tax base can never fall below the benefits base: Both start off at the same level, namely the principal, and both are only affected by withdrawals. The benefits base, however, is reduced by \textit{at least} the withdrawal amount (and possibly more if the withdrawal amount exceeds the annual guaranteed amount); the tax base, on the other hand, is reduced \textit{at most} by the withdrawal amount (namely if withdrawals come from the principal, not earnings). Therefore, we only need to consider state vectors for which \( H_t \geq G_t \).

\(^{11}\)We assume that his mortality follows the 2007 Period Life Table for the Social Security Area Population for the United States (http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html).
### Account Value Grids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>95%-ile</th>
<th>99%-ile</th>
<th>99.9%-ile</th>
<th>99.99%-ile</th>
<th>max. grid points</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X^-_T$</td>
<td>361,000</td>
<td>933,000</td>
<td>1,477,000</td>
<td>2,579,000</td>
<td>3,970,000</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A^-_T$</td>
<td>709,000</td>
<td>1,111,000</td>
<td>1,339,000</td>
<td>1,637,000</td>
<td>1,981,000</td>
<td>7,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A^-_T + X^-_T$</td>
<td>1,070,000</td>
<td>2,025,000</td>
<td>2,791,000</td>
<td>4,103,000</td>
<td>5,758,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2: Distribution of Terminal VA and Outside Account Values (based on MC simulation, cf. 1.3.3, and choice of maximum grid point.)

Since policyholder preferences are assumed to exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (cf. Section 1.3.4), and in the interest of keeping grid sizes manageable and the implementation computationally feasible, we choose grids for VA and outside account that are increasing in distance between grid points. More specifically, for the VA account $X^-_T$, we divide the interval from 0 to 6 million into 64 grid points, whereas for the outside account $A^-_T$ we use 49 grid points and a range from 0 to 7.8 million. As displayed in Table 1.2, these values are well above the 99.99th percentile of account values as determined by simulation (see Section 1.3.3).\(^\text{12}\)

### 1.4 Results I: Withdrawal behavior in the Life-Cycle Model

One of the primary objectives of this paper is to determine whether it is optimal for policyholders to withdraw prematurely from their VA. We commence by analyzing withdrawal patterns and incentives for the benchmark case parameters (cf. Table 1.1). Subsequently, we discuss how differences

\(^{12}\)We choose the grid for the outside account based on the percentiles of the combined terminal account values, $A^-_T + X^-_T$, in order to be able to accurately value the policyholder’s lifetime utility even if he chooses to fully surrender his VA account.
in underlying parameters affect the optimal withdrawal behavior.

1.4.1 Optimal Withdrawal Behavior in the Benchmark Case

Our key observation is that in the presence of taxation early withdrawals are an exception rather than the norm. More specifically, for the benchmark case parameters roughly 76% of all possible scenarios entail no withdrawals until maturity. And in only about 5% of all cases will our representative policyholder withdraw his entire guaranteed amount (cf. Table 1.3, Column [1]).

Figure 1.1 depicts optimal withdrawals, $w_t$, for our utility-based model as a function of the VA account value $X_t^{-}$, in the presence and in the absence of tax considerations, whereby we also include the maximal possible withdrawal amount as a reference. We find that withdrawal patterns are very similar for account values below the benefits base $G_t$ – which coincides with the tax base $H_t$. Here, the policyholder withdraws the majority of his account since withdrawals are neither taxed nor subject to fees. However, the optimal strategies in the two cases differ fundamentally when the account is above the benefits and tax base: While we observe no out-of-the-money withdrawals with taxes, in the absence of tax considerations the policyholder surrenders his contract if the VA account exceeds approximately 150,000.\(^{13}\) The intuition for this observation is that the benefit of deferred taxation outweighs the guarantee fees, whereas – when withdrawals are not taxed – the benefits of downside protection does not compensate for the incurred fees. For account values close to but above the benefits base, however, the latter comparison is inverted, leading to

\(^{13}\)It is worth noting that we would also observe positive withdrawals when the VA makes up the vast majority of the policyholder’s total wealth, due to an overexposure to equity risk. More precisely, since he cannot change the allocation inside the VA, he withdraws from the VA to place the funds (after possible fee and tax payments) in the risk-free outside account. For even larger values of the VA account, the policyholder may also want to consume beyond the limits of his outside wealth, leading to withdrawals for the purpose of consumption smoothing. However, such scenarios are extremely unlikely (we observed no such case in 5 million simulations of the benchmark case) and do not have a sizable impact on the value of the guarantee. Hence, we will not delve into this issue any further.
no withdrawals even in the case without taxation.

The findings in the absence of taxation are consistent with results from the existing literature that analyzes optimal withdrawal behavior based on arbitrage pricing theory (see e.g. Chen et al. (2008)). These studies also derive fair guarantee fees that are significantly above concurrent market rates. In contrast, our analysis – if we include taxation – suggests that an annual guarantee fee of $\phi = 50$ bps seems sufficient to cover the expected costs of the guarantee. More specifically, we find that the risk-neutral actuarial present value at time 0 of the collected guarantee fees is $5,971$ (plus an additional 30 in excess withdrawal charges), which far exceeds the risk-neutral value of payments attributable to the GMWB of $1,480$.

Figure 1.2 displays the optimal withdrawal behavior as a function of the VA account value $X_t^-$ at different points in time and for differing but fixed levels of the benefits base $G_t$ and the tax base $H_t$. The outside account $A_t^-$ is identical over all panels, but sensitivities are analyzed in Section
Figure 1.2: Withdrawal Behavior in the Benchmark Case
(As a function of the VA account $X_t^{-}$.)
1.4.2 below.

During the first four contract years, the policyholder has not reached age 59.5, and therefore all withdrawals are subject to a 10% early withdrawal tax. Withdrawals are still profitable for low account values as the policyholder may not be able to withdraw the guaranteed amount otherwise. However, this becomes less likely as the account value increases. For instance, as demonstrated by Figure 1.2(a) for the case of \( t = 4 \), there are no withdrawals beyond an account value of about 60,000. Moreover, we do not observe excess withdrawals in this case, which we attribute to the 15% charge (10% + 5% excess withdrawal fee) on all excess withdrawals.

After his 60th birthday, the policyholder can withdraw 7,000 annually free of charge, and he will do so whenever the VA is below the tax base, as evidenced by Figure 1.2(b) for \( t = 7 \). In addition, we observe excess withdrawals, despite a 2% excess withdrawal fee. The intuition is that this is the policyholder’s best chance to access as much of the aggregate guarantee as possible: He withdraws the amount that reduces his benefits base to a level that leaves roughly the guaranteed amount of 7,000 for each of the remaining withdrawal dates. In other words, he withdraws as much as possible without jeopardizing the future payouts from his GMWB rider. As the VA account increases, the optimal withdrawal amount increases as well and so do the associated excess withdrawal costs. Yet, beyond a certain amount, the benefit of the maximal guarantee will no longer compensate for the excessive withdrawal fee, so that the policyholder will prefer to withdraw the guaranteed amount only. When the excess withdrawal fee vanishes, however, excess withdrawals are optimal up to the full benefits base as evidenced by Figure 1.2(c) (time \( t = 10 \)). Moreover, the optimal withdrawal curve becomes steeper as time progresses since there are fewer periods – and hence a smaller aggregate guaranteed amount – remaining.
This pattern of excess withdrawals continues as we approach the end of the contract term. However, during the final years before maturity, we observe zero withdrawals for low, but not too low, account values relative to the tax and benefits base (cf. Figure 1.2(d)). This can be once again explained by tax benefits: Since these account values are considerably below the tax base, any (likely) return over the remaining contract years will be tax free – unlike investments in the outside account; hence, even if the guarantee is worthless and cannot be brought in the money unless incurring considerable withdrawal penalties, paying the fee inside the tax-sheltered VA account is optimal. Keeping these effects in mind, it is then also not surprising that this “gap” widens as we get closer to maturity.

This is also the motivation that withdrawals vanish beyond a certain point when the tax base exceeds the benefits base, as shown in Figure 1.2(e). The ability to save sheltered of taxes yields no withdrawals beyond about 45,000, whereas below that amount bringing the guarantee into the money pays off. However, if we also decrease the tax base so that it is again on par with the benefits base (Figure 1.2(f)), we uncover a similar pattern as before (Figure 1.2(c)). In particular, the relative size of the outside account value \( A_t^- \) appears to have little effect on optimal withdrawal patterns.

### 1.4.2 Sensitivities to Key Unobservables

A primary concern when implementing a utility-based model in practice is the choice of parameter assumptions, particularly those the insurer has little or no information about. In our case, these key unobservables include the level of initial wealth \( W_0 \), the policyholder’s annual labor income \( I_t \),
### Sensitivities to Key Unobservables

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<tr>
<td>BM</td>
<td>$W_0 = 250K$</td>
<td>$W_0 = 1M$</td>
<td>Inc = $70K$</td>
<td>$W_0 = 1M$, Inc = $70K$</td>
<td>$\gamma = 2.88$</td>
<td>$B = 0.2$</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$E^Q[\text{Fees}]^a$</th>
<th>$E^Q[\text{Excess-Fee}]$</th>
<th>$E^Q[\text{GMWB}]$</th>
<th>$E[\text{agg. w/d}]^b$</th>
<th>$E[\text{excess w/d}]$</th>
<th>$E[\text{w/d, } t \leq 4]$</th>
<th>$E[\text{w/d, } 5 \leq t \leq 8]$</th>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,534</td>
<td>1,421</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$E[\text{agg. w/d}]^b$</td>
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<td>14,144</td>
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<td></td>
<td>$E[\text{excess w/d}]$</td>
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<td>8,636</td>
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<td>9,058</td>
<td>8,915</td>
<td>9,692</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$E[\text{w/d, } t \leq 4]$</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>264</td>
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<td></td>
<td>$E[\text{w/d, } 5 \leq t \leq 8]$</td>
<td>5,263</td>
<td>5,476</td>
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<td>5,502</td>
<td>5,727</td>
<td>3,770</td>
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<td>$E[\text{w/d, } t \geq 9]$</td>
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<td>7,903</td>
<td>7,982</td>
<td>8,193</td>
<td>8,132</td>
<td>8,366</td>
<td>7,659</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$E[\text{G_T}]^c$</td>
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<td>85,943</td>
<td>85,892</td>
<td>85,763</td>
<td>85,645</td>
<td>85,369</td>
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<td>$P(G_T = = 0)$</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
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<td>5.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$P(G_T &lt; P_0)$</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
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<td>$E[H_T]$</td>
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<td>86,775</td>
<td>86,686</td>
<td>86,523</td>
<td>86,298</td>
<td>88,525</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Table 1.3:** Withdrawal Statistics in the Benchmark Case, and for Policyholders with Different (Unobservable) Characteristics

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$a$ All under the risk-neutral measure $Q$: Actuarial present value (APV) of fees collected by the insurer; APV of excessive withdrawal fees charged to policyholder; APV of payouts made to policyholder only due to GMWB (i.e. when $X^- = 0$).

$b$ Mean aggregate withdrawal amount (pre-maturity); excess withdrawal amount; withdrawals subject to early w/d tax; withdrawals subject to excess w/d fees but no early w/d tax; “free” withdrawals. (Note: values are added up under the physical measure $P$ and without accounting for the time value of money.)

$c$ Average level of benefits base at maturity; probability that the policyholder uses full guarantee; probability that at least one withdrawal is made; Average tax base at maturity.
his level of risk aversion $\gamma$, and his bequest motive $B$.\footnote{More generally, one might question the fundamental assumption of our expected utility framework. While a detailed analysis with respect to preferences or other assumptions is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that – say – more complex utility structures reflecting non time-separable preferences (see e.g. Epstein and Zin (1989)) and similar features can be easily implemented in our model. Furthermore, we highlight in the conclusions that we see evidence that such modifications will have little effect on our results.} In that regard, our findings provide some encouraging evidence: As Table 1.3 shows, variations in these characteristics have relatively little effect on aggregate withdrawal statistics. Nonetheless, the effects of these deviations from the benchmark case are quite systematic and in some cases counterintuitive at first sight: For instance, while withdrawals appear to increase with the level of initial wealth, we observe the opposite effect when increasing annual income. Furthermore, it may appear that a more risk averse policyholder will make greater use of his guarantees.\footnote{Consider e.g. a simplified version of the scenario in Figure 1.2(a): The policyholder faces the decision whether to withdraw the guaranteed amount of 7,000. Withdrawing the money results in a certain payout of 6,300 (i.e. 7,000 minus 10% early withdrawal tax); otherwise he faces a lottery with a random payout of either 7,000 or 0, depending on whether the portfolio will increase above the guarantee by maturity of the policy. This argument may suggest that a more risk averse policyholder would be drawn towards the certain payout, that is towards making the withdrawal.} Again, this is not what we observe.

Instead, our findings reflect the insight that in addition to taxation, in-the-moneyness, and fee structure, none of which change when varying the preference parameters, withdrawals are also affected by the policyholder’s bequest motive. Here, it is important to realize that while the outside account “pays” irrespective of the policyholder’s life status, the guarantee is only material while he is alive. Conversely, the annual income stream essentially is a life annuity, so that income and guarantee can be viewed as substitute goods. Moreover, a risk averse policyholder with a positive bequest motive will optimally allocate a certain proportion of his current wealth in annuities while the remainder should also serve as bequest protection. And under decreasing absolute risk aversion, the optimal amount of annuities is increasing in the wealth level.

Hence, if the policyholder starts off with a higher degree of wealth (Columns [2] vs. [1], [3]...
vs. [1] and [5] vs. [4]), he will ideally allocate a larger absolute amount to annuities. Since income remains fixed, his demand for the guarantee increases, and the policyholder has a greater incentive to move the guarantee (further) into the money, thus withdrawing more frequently and making more use of his guarantee.

As income increases (Columns [4] vs. [1] and [5] vs. [3]), on the other hand, ceteris paribus the demand for the guarantee goes down since the two are substitutes. The policyholder thus is willing to give up parts of his guarantee in exchange for non-life contingent funds, and he can do so by not withdrawing and thereby letting the guarantee move out of the money. Therefore, the value of the GMWB decreases.

Similarly, a more risk averse policyholder (Column [6] vs. [1]) with a positive bequest motive is also more averse to mortality risk, and thus has an increased preference for a safe asset – in the form of the outside account – over a risky asset in the form of the annuity. Thus, ceteris paribus, the demand for the guarantee declines, and so will the incentives to withdraw and hence the value of the GMWB. Finally, a lower bequest motive (Column [7] vs. [1]) reduces the demand for payments in death states, thus raising the relative demand for the guarantee, and resulting in increased withdrawals.

Figure 1.3 further affirms this intuition by depicting withdrawals as a function of the VA account value $X_t$ at time $t = 4$ (cf. Figure 1.2(a)). As discussed above, the withdrawal decision here is based on a trade-off between increasing the value of the guarantee and the cost of withdrawing. In line with the portrayed intuition, we observe slight changes in response to changes in the demand 

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16The parameter value $\gamma = 2.88$ was chosen in order to attain a Merton Ratio (see Merton (1969)) of 60%, consistent with the “rule of thumb” that investors should optimally hold 60% of their assets in stocks and 40% in bonds (cf. Gerber and Shiu (2000)).
preference parameters. More precisely, the “safe asset” characteristic of the outside account yields increases in the withdrawal area for larger values of the outside account (Figure 1.3(b)) and for a lower bequest motive (Figure 1.3(e)). Conversely, the range of withdrawing at the guaranteed level shrinks for policyholders with a larger income (Figure 1.3(c)) or a higher level of risk aversion (Figure 1.3(d)).

Hence, these deviations can be ultimately attributed to a lack of market completeness regarding bequest protection. In particular, the sensitivities might be less pronounced – or not even existent – if the policyholder had access to life insurance. This indicates that the sensitivity may be even less significant in practice, where agents have access to a large menu of life- and morbidity-contingent securities.

All in all, the insignificance of the sensitivity of optimal withdrawal behavior – and, thus, of resulting financial statistics – points towards value-maximization as being the key driver. In particular, it does not seem to be the market incompleteness that is responsible for the divergence of actual observations and results from the actuarial literature, which rely on value-maximization approaches. Rather, it appears to be a matter of perspective: While there, the calculations were carried out from the company’s position, the focus should be on the policyholder’s point of view. In particular, it appears imperative to take investment taxation rules into consideration. This idea is developed in the following section.
Figure 1.3: Withdrawal Behavior at \( t = 4 \) when Key Unobservables Change
1.5 Risk Neutral Valuation from the Policyholder’s Perspective

One of the primary results from the previous section is that optimal policyholder behavior in the life cycle model seems to be mainly driven by value maximization. This raises the interesting possibility that we can after all meaningfully analyze optimal policyholder behavior by a risk-neutral valuation approach – associated with all its benefits such as independence of preferences, wealth, and, in particular, outside allocation and consumption decisions. Specifically, the reason for the meager performance of risk-neutral valuation approaches in explaining observed prices and exercise patterns so far seems to be the disregard of important factors affecting the policyholder’s decision, especially tax considerations, rather than a fundamental methodological flaw.

To cope with tax considerations, in this section we develop a general methodology for valuing cash flows when tax rates differ over investment opportunities. Subsequently, in order to vindicate – or rather rectify – the risk-neutral valuation approach to optimal policyholder behavior, we describe how to implement the method in the context of this paper. Finally, we present numerical results and contrast them with those from the life-cycle model.

1.5.1 Valuation of Cash Flows under Different Taxation Schemes

Arbitrage pricing in the presence of taxation is an intricate issue. For instance, as demonstrated by Ross (1987), no universal pricing measure exists when tax rates vary for different agents. In fact, an agent’s valuation of a given cash flow depends on his individual endowment. Our primary idea is that we can nevertheless identify a unique – though individual – valuation methodology if the
pre-tax financial market for “ordinary” investments such as stocks and bonds is complete.\(^ {17}\) Then, consistent with standard arbitrage pricing arguments, we define the time-zero value of a post-tax cash flow \(X\) as the amount necessary to set up a pre-tax portfolio that – after taxes – replicates \(X\). This valuation rule is individual in the sense that it depends on the investor’s current position. For instance, if the investor has additional investments that may offset tax responsibilities for the replicating portfolio, the relative value of the replicating portfolio will increase.

More formally, we consider an individual with endowment \(A\) and access to underlying securities such as stocks and bonds subject to capital gains taxation as described in Section 1.2.4. We assume that the pre-tax market is complete. Hence, there exists a unique equivalent martingale measure, denoted by \(Q\), such that the cost for a replicating portfolio for any pre-tax cash flow is given by its expected discounted value under \(Q\) with respect to the numeraire \((B_t)_{t \geq 0}\) (savings account). Furthermore, for simplicity and without much loss of generality, we assume that all cash flows are realized at the end of years only.

We first focus on a single year \((t, t+1]\) and consider the (post-tax) cash flow \(X_{t+1} \equiv X\) at time \(t+1\) potentially originating from a separate investment opportunity subject to different tax rules. We are interested in its value at time \(t\). Denote by \(A_{t+1}\) the investor’s (state-specific, post-tax) endowment at time \(t+1\), with known value \(A_t\) at time \(t\). Then, if an amount \(V_t\) is necessary to replicate the post-tax cash flow \(Y \equiv X_{t+1} + A_{t+1}\), then the (marginal) value of \(X_{t+1}\) is given by \(X_t \equiv V_t - A_t\). Hence, the valuation problem reduces to determining the (pre-tax) replicating portfolio, and thereby \(V_t\).

\(^{17}\)Note that even in the absence of taxes, arbitrage pricing theory does not give a unique pricing rule if the market is incomplete.
Define $Z$ as the corresponding *pre-tax* cash flow required to attain $Y$ after tax payments, i.e.

$$Y = Z - \kappa \cdot [Z - V_t]^+. \quad (1.15)$$

Inverting the function on the right-hand side, Equation (1.15) may be restated as

$$Z = Y + \frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa} \cdot [Y - V_t]^+. \quad (1.16)$$

On the other hand, since $V_t$ is the cost of setting up the pre-tax cash flow $Z$ and the pre-tax market is complete, we have:

$$V_t = E_t Q_t \left[ \frac{B_t}{B_{t+1}} \cdot Z \right].$$

Thus, with Equation (1.16), we obtain

$$V_t = E_t Q_t \left[ \frac{B_t}{B_{t+1}} \cdot Y \right] + \frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa} \cdot E_t Q_t \left[ \frac{B_t}{B_{t+1}} \cdot (Y - V_t)^+ \right], \quad (1.17)$$

with the unknown $V_t$, depending on the state of the world at time $t$. Hence, Equation (1.17) presents a (non-linear) valuation rule for $Y$ and, thus, $X_{t+1}$, which gives a unique value $V_t$ as shown by the following result.\(^\ddagger\)

**Proposition 1.** Any time $t+1$ post-tax cash flow $X_{t+1}$ can be valued uniquely by the investor at time $t$, and its time-$t$ value is given by $V_t - A_t$, where $V_t$ is the unique solution to Equation (1.17).

\(^\ddagger\)The proof is provided in Appendix B.
$X_{t+1} \equiv X$ at time $t+1$. As we have argued, its time $t$ value is given by $X_t = V_t - A_t$, which again can be interpreted as a post-tax cash flow. Hence, its value at time $t-1$ is given by $X_{t-1} \equiv V_{t-1} - A_{t-1}$, where $V_{t-1}$ is the setup cost for a replicating portfolio for the post-tax cash flow $X_t + A_t = V_t$ as above.\footnote{Note that for simplicity of exposition we disregard consumption and income that would alter $A_t$. Generalizations are straightforward.} Hence, the time $t-2$ value – and similarly the values at times $t-3, t-4, \ldots$, and eventually the time-zero value – can be determined recursively by serially solving the corresponding Equation (1.17).

This procedure allows us to evaluate every combination of post-tax cash flows – for any given outside investment and consumption strategy – uniquely as the marginal increase required in today’s outside portfolio in order to replicate the aggregate cash flow. In particular, it can be applied to analyze the cash flows from the VA contract introduced in the previous sections.

### 1.5.2 The Policyholder’s Optimization Problem under Risk-Neutral Valuation

Following the previous analysis, we implement a risk-neutral valuation approach for our representative VA policyholder assuming he maximizes the value of all benefits. Akin to the life-cycle model, the problem will be set up recursively, period by period.

However, since the valuation introduced in the previous subsection applies only locally, i.e. given investment and consumption decisions, a “proper” risk-neutral valuation methodology formally still requires us to consider the policyholder’s entire portfolio. This implies that the value-maximization approach loses one of its key benefits: the ability to focus solely on the cash flows
associated with the VA, and to ignore all other factors. In particular, this means that the model essentially possesses roughly the same level of complexity as the utility-based framework and the numerical implementation of this approach will be equally cumbersome.

The complexity greatly reduces when we rely on an exogenous assumption about (outside) investment and allocation decisions. While formally imposing such assumptions appears problematic, it is important to note that their effect in regards to the VA solely comes into play when there is a possibility to offset gains and losses. In all other case, the outside account is immaterial.\footnote{Obviously, this is quite different from the life-cycle model, where the outside account and consumption decisions directly enter the value function. In contrast, here we have only an indirect effect through potential tax offsets.} Hence, supposing that the effects are minor, we consider the simplest possible case when no offsets are possible at all, which can be represented by simply setting the outside account to zero.

Under the same specifications as in Section 1.2, at each policy anniversary date, the policyholder’s decision is then based solely on observing the concurrent state variables \(X_t^-, G_t\) and \(H_t\), and only entails choosing the withdrawal amount \(w_t\). Again, we implement the model numerically in a Black-Scholes framework using recursive dynamic programming. In doing so, we compute the value of the payoff at maturity, and then recursively proceed similar to Algorithm 1. More specifically, for each \(t = T - 1, \ldots, 1\), the policyholder chooses the withdrawal amount that maximizes the continuation value, i.e.

\[
V_t(X_t^-, G_t, H_t) = \max_{w_t} (w_t - \text{fee}_t - \text{fee}_G - \text{taxes}) + \tilde{V}_t, \tag{1.18}
\]
where $\tilde{V}_t$ is given implicitly by (cf. Equation (1.17))

$$e^r \cdot \tilde{V}_t - \mathbb{E}^Q_t[q_{x+t}b_{t+1} + p_{x+t}V_{t+1}(\cdot)] - \frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa} \mathbb{E}^Q_t[(q_{x+t}b_{t+1} + p_{x+t}V_{t+1}(\cdot) - \tilde{V}_t)^+] = 0.$$ 

Clearly, this optimization problem is subject to a variety of constraints regarding account evolution and updating, which are similar to the implementation of the life-cycle framework. For more details, see Appendix 1.9.3.

1.5.3 Results II: Withdrawal behavior under the Risk-Neutral Framework

Table 1.4 shows the resulting values and aggregate withdrawal statistics for the risk-neutral valuation approach (RNV) in comparison to the life-cycle (LC) benchmark model in the case with (Column [1]) and without (Column [2]) taxes. In addition, we present the respective results for contracts that differ from the benchmark case, by assuming there are no fees on excess withdrawals (Column [3]), by reducing the equity exposure within the VA account (Column [4]), and by varying the income tax rate (Column [5]). While we observe considerable differences between the latter results and the benchmark case – which are discussed in detail in Section 1.6 below – we find that within each specification the differences between the results from the two approaches are quite small.

Therefore, overall our presumption that the results for the two approaches will be similar proves true. The same conclusion can be drawn from Figure 1.4, where the optimal withdrawal behavior at times $t = 10$ and $t = 4$ is displayed for both approaches in the case with and without taxes. In particular, we do not have any withdrawals in the presence of taxes if the account value significantly
Sensitivities to Contract Specifications and Tax Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BM</td>
<td>BM w/o taxes</td>
<td>s = 0</td>
<td>νX = 90%</td>
<td>τ = 30%</td>
<td>ITM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LC</td>
<td>RNV</td>
<td>LC</td>
<td>RNV</td>
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<td>$E^Q[\text{Fees}]$</td>
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<td>$E^Q[\text{Excess-Fee}]$</td>
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<td>162</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>$E^Q[\text{GMWB}]$</td>
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<td>3,163</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>1,974</td>
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<tr>
<td>$E[\text{agg. w/d}]$</td>
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<td>190,340</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$E[\text{w/d , } t \leq 4]$</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>27,400</td>
<td>27,400</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1,025</td>
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<tr>
<td>$E[\text{w/d , } 5 \leq t \leq 8]$</td>
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<td>7,639</td>
<td>27,110</td>
<td>25,980</td>
<td>18,406</td>
<td>14,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>$E[\text{w/d , } t \geq 9]$</td>
<td>8,035</td>
<td>10,507</td>
<td>135,830</td>
<td>137,940</td>
<td>3,851</td>
<td>8,395</td>
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<tr>
<td>$E[G_T]$</td>
<td>85,961</td>
<td>80,974</td>
<td>6,687</td>
<td>6,794</td>
<td>76,891</td>
<td>76,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P(G_T = = 0)$</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>84.0%</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P(G_T &lt; R_0)$</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
<td>88.7%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E[H_T]$</td>
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<td>81,809</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>78,076</td>
<td>76,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_0$</td>
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<td>100,064</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.4: Withdrawal Statistics in the Life-Cycle Model and under Risk-Neutral Valuation
(For the benchmark case with (Column [1]) and without ([2]) taxation, for different contracts ([3], [4]) and tax rates ([5]). Column [6] displays results when the policyholder withdraws the guaranteed amount if and only if the guarantee is in the money.)

$^a, ^b, ^c$ See Table 1.3.

$^d$ Time zero expected discounted lifetime-utility / value.
Figure 1.4: Withdrawal Behavior under Risk-Neutral Valuation
exceeds the tax base (Figures 1.4(a) and 1.4(b)). In contrast, in the absence of taxes, it is optimal
to withdraw when the guarantee is out-of-the-money under both optimality criteria, indicating their
alignment (Figures 1.4(e) and 1.4(f)).

The rather slight deviations between the two approaches are in line with the – rather slight – sensitivities of the results from the life-cycle model to wealth and preferences, as analyzed in
Section 1.4.2. There we demonstrate that the response in withdrawal behavior to changes in wealth,
income, or risk aversion are motivated by the allocation to death and life states. The risk-neutral
approach can now be interpreted as the limiting case of a policyholder with infinite wealth or zero
risk aversion. For instance, in Section 1.4.2 we explain that early in the contract \( t = 4 \), an increase
in wealth yields a wider withdrawal range (Figure 1.3(b) vs. 1.3(a)). Accordingly, the risk-neutral
approach results in an even wider range (Figure 1.4(d) vs. Figures 1.3(b) and 1.4(c)). A similar
relationship holds when varying risk aversion: High risk aversion leads to a smaller withdrawal
range than lower risk aversion (Figure 1.3(d) vs. 1.3(a)), which in turn leads to a smaller withdrawal
range than the risk-neutral approach (Figure 1.4(d) vs. 1.4(c)).

These deviations then also lead to a slight increase in the value of the GMWB rider. In particu-
lar, the difference in the values of collected fees and benefits associated with the GMWB – which
may be interpreted as the value from the insurer’s perspective – decreases from 4,521 to 3,776.
It is important to note, however, that this value in the benchmark case relies on our specific as-
sumptions on preferences, income and wealth — and therefore may be even smaller for alternative
choices. Also, it may change in the presence of alternative investment options. For instance, if the
policyholder has access to other life-contingent contracts, withdrawals may be even less affected
by the policyholder’s allocation motive and, thus, his preferences. In the absence of taxes, the
difference in values is even less pronounced (215 in the benchmark case and 146 for risk-neutral valuation), and the big gap between the two tax regimes again resonates the deficiencies of risk-neutral valuation approaches in the previous literature on policyholder exercise behavior within VAs.

1.6 Results III: Implications for Life Insurance Practice

The results from the previous sections have important – and encouraging – implications for life insurers offering GMWBs. On the one hand, this paper provides theoretical insights into optimal withdrawal patterns that appear to be in line with actual observations. On the other hand, we demonstrate that optimal withdrawal behavior can be analyzed based on the – relative to a life cycle model – simple risk-neutral valuation approach.

However, of course questions arise regarding the generality of the detected patterns, for instance with respect to changes in VA design or the underlying tax rates as different policyholders may fall into different tax brackets. Furthermore, eventual quantitative results depend on specifics of considered contracts, yet a practical implementation of the risk-neutral approach to determine optimal policyholder behavior – despite its relative simplicity – may still be too ambitious for most insurers. In fact, current industry practice is to rely on historic exercise probabilities or static exercise rules, although some insurers indicate they started to use simple dynamic assumptions (cf. Society of Actuaries (2009)).

Therefore, in this section we first analyze the robustness of the uncovered exercise patterns with respect to the underlying contract specification and parameters. Subsequently, to appraise the
advancement of imposing dynamic exercise rules in the context of our model, we compare our results to the usage of a simple rule based on the “moneyness” of the guarantee.

### 1.6.1 Robustness of the Results

Columns [3] and [4] of Table 1.4 show the effects when modifying the contract’s specifications vis-à-vis the benchmark case. As may be anticipated, removing the excess withdrawal fees (Column [3]) induces more frequent withdrawals early in the contract period. This reduces collected fees and, at the same time, increases the “usage” and therefore the value of the guarantee. These findings suggest that the “actual value” of the excess withdrawal fee to the insurer is larger than the rather moderate amount that is directly attributed to excessive withdrawals in the benchmark case (30) due to changes in policyholder behavior.

In practice, insurers sometimes limit equity exposure in the VA in order to contain the risks. Column [4] of Table 1.4 provides some evidence to that effect: When reducing equity exposure to 90%, the value of the guarantee diminishes, while collected fees remain relatively unaffected. This of course is a direct consequence of a reduced likelihood of adverse scenarios under the more conservative allocation strategy, since withdrawals are optimal only when the guarantee is “in the money”. In other words, the downside protection is more valuable for a more risky investment strategy, so that is is also no surprise that the policyholder, ceteris paribus, will prefer a 100% equity exposure inside the VA (under both models), as shown in the bottom line of Table 1.4.

Nevertheless, in both cases, when modifying the surrender fee structure or when adjusting the equity exposure, the general withdrawal patterns prevail. In particular, withdrawals still are the exception rather than the norm and mostly occur in adverse scenarios for the underlying index.
The driver behind these observations of course is the deferred taxation of investments inside the VA.

Results change dramatically in the absence of taxation (cf. Table 1.4, Column [2]). More precisely, investment in the VA loses its comparative advantage, withdrawals increase substantially, and – as a result – so does the guarantee value. A similar argument applies if the tax advantage becomes less important, e.g. due to an increase in the income tax rate: The VA becomes less attractive, and the policyholder has a greater incentive to withdraw and invest it outside of the VA. Accordingly, Column [5] of Table 1.4 shows that an increase from 25% to 30% leads to an increase in withdrawals. However, we find that even under a tax rate of 30% on withdrawals, the deferred taxation feature is valuable enough to sustain an absence of withdrawals in most scenarios. Therefore, we again have a positive answer to the question of generality of our results: Even for relatively high tax brackets, the observed patterns prevail.

1.6.2 Simple Reduced-Form Exercise Strategies

As indicated above, insurers have started to rely on simple dynamic exercise rules in their calculations, where approaches based on the “moneyness” of the guarantee appear particularly popular. More formally, these rules assume the policyholder withdraws the guaranteed annual amount whenever the guarantee is “in the money” (that is: the account value lies below the benefits base), and zero otherwise, regardless of tax and fee considerations:

\[ w_t \equiv \min\{g_t^W, G_t^W\} \cdot 1_{\{X_t \leq G_t^W\}}. \]
The results in the context of our model are provided in Column [6] of Table 1.4, and we find that overall the withdrawal statistics are very close to the benchmark case. Given the described withdrawal patterns for the benchmark case, the relatively good performance of the “moneyness” assumption should come as no surprise. Still, the suitability of this assumption – particularly in view of the valuation results – bears good news for the insurance industry. In particular, our models endorse the use of the simple “in-the-money” rule.

This result is also consistent with empirical findings from Knoller et al. (2011), who determine in the case of Japanese VA products that “moneyness (…) has the largest explanatory power for the rate at which policyholders surrender their policies”. It is worth noting, however, that in our setting the validity of “moneyness” as a proxy for optimal policyholder behavior is mainly a consequence of the similarities between tax and benefits base.

1.7 Analysis of an Empirical Variable Annuity Product

We apply our valuation framework from Section 1.5 to a current empirical Variable Annuity product in the U.S. market. More specifically, we implement the Advanced Series Lifevest II SM (ASL II) Variable Annuity by Prudential Annuities Life Assurance Corporation. The product differs from the standard example contract considered in the previous sections in a variety of features. We commence by describing these features and their implementation and present the numerical results thereafter.
1.7.1 Implementation of ASL II

ASL II is a flexible premium deferred annuity that allows investments in a variety of underlying mutual fund portfolios, and offers numerous add-on guarantees for purchase. As a Variable Annuity product, it is subject to the standard U.S. rules and regulations, such as deferred taxation and early withdrawal penalties.

We consider a male policyholder age 55 who initially invests $100,000 but makes no further premium payments. The VA carries an annual Mortality & Expense Risk Charge of 1.50% and an Administration Charge of 0.15%, both as a percentage of the daily net assets of the investor’s sub-accounts. We implement them as continuously deducted charges from the policyholder’s account value, at an annual rate of 1.65%.\(^\text{21}\)

The policyholder purchases the product in combination with an optional Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefit (GMWB), with an annual charge of (currently) 0.35%, also as a fraction of the policyholder’s concurrent account value. Under the GMWB, the insurer guarantees to return the initial investment over the course of the policy, provided that the policyholder does not withdraw more than the guaranteed annual withdrawal amount of $7,000 in any given year. The GMWB comes with a variety of special features: (1) The policyholder can elect to step up the guarantee level prior to his first withdrawal, and then again every 5 years; In this case, the benefits base is stepped-up to the concurrent account value, and the annual guaranteed withdrawal amount is set to the larger of the previous guaranteed annual amount and 7% of the new benefits base. (2) If the policyholder makes no withdrawals during the first seven years, the GMWB fee will be

\(^{21}\)We refrain from including the Annual Maintenance Fee of the lesser of $35 and 2% of the account value, which is waived if the account value is above $100,000. Even if the waiver does not apply, we consider the relatively small amount of $35 negligible.
waived for the remainder of the contract (or until he steps up his guarantee) – even if he makes withdrawals thereafter. (3) Withdrawals can be made at all times. However, for computational purposes, and due to the *annual* withdrawal “limit” on the GMWB, we simplify the policyholder’s decision making process by restricting withdrawals to policy anniversary dates only. (4) There are no withdrawal obligations. In particular, the policyholder can withdraw zero, the guaranteed annual amount, up to the level of his account value, or any amount in between. Both VA account and benefits base are reduced by the withdrawal amount. If the policyholder withdraws excessively in a given year, the benefits base is reduced linearly by the guaranteed amount, and then proportionally to the account value by the excessive withdrawal amount. In this case, the annual guaranteed amount is also reduced by the same factor.

We assume that the policyholder annuitizes his VA after 20 years, if still alive. He then can choose whether to receive his account value in the form of a life annuity, or his remaining benefits in the form of annual payments at the level of his annually guaranteed withdrawal amount. Note that only the first option accumulates interest during the annuitization period. If the policyholder chooses the benefits base option and the (accumulating) account value is not sufficient to cover the payouts, the insurer will make up the difference.

If the policyholder dies before annuitizing, his beneficiary can choose between three payout options: A one-time payout of the concurrent account value; receiving the benefits base in annual installments, at the level of the annually guaranteed withdrawal amount; or receiving the benefits base as an immediate lump-sum payment. 22

22While the second option is part of the GMWB feature, the latter option resembles the “basic death benefit” included in the VA. The basic death benefit guarantee allows the beneficiary to withdraw the greater of the concurrent account value and the initial investment, adjusted proportionally for previous withdrawals. Since benefits base and death benefit amount are likely to be close, we substitute one for the other, once again to keep the state space manage-
Regarding the overall investment strategy, the policyholder can choose between a variety of mutual fund portfolios. In addition, the policyholder is entitled to 20 transactions per year, at no additional cost. However, due to the downside protection of the guarantee, it appears optimal for a value-maximizing policyholder to choose the most risky investment strategy.\(^{23}\) Therefore, we assume the policyholder allocates his entire investment in the *ProFund VP Bull* investment portfolio. The fund is issued by ProFund Advisors LLC and aims for returns similar to the *S&P 500* index. We implement the evolution of the fund with a Black-Scholes model, assuming again a historical volatility of 17%. We further assume a risk-free rate of 5%, net of mutual fund fees (which for the *ProFund VP Bull* are 1.68% per year). Our parameter assumption for the benchmark case are summarized in Table 1.5.

We implement the policy with the recursive dynamic programming techniques described above. At each policy anniversary date, the policyholder can choose his withdrawal amount, and if applicable whether he wants to step up his guarantee. In our implementation, we exploit that it is not necessary to fix the *absolute* account for the optimal decision process but merely the *ratio* of benefits base and tax base to the account value. The remaining state variables are the annual guaranteed amount (as a percentage of the benefits base), the number of years that passed since the last step-up (from 1 to 5), and whether or not the fee waiver is applicable.

### 1.7.2 Valuation Results for ASL II

Table 1.6 displays the numerical results for our implementation of ASL II. We find that overall the collected fees considerably exceed the benefits of the Variable Annuity, although substantial

\(^{23}\)Most permissible investment portfolios have limitations to equity exposure.
### Parameter Assumptions

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<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age at inception</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to maturity (years)</td>
<td>$T$</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA principal</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VA charge</td>
<td>165 bps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee fee (GMWB)</td>
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<td>ASL II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual guaranteed amount</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income tax rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital gains tax rate</td>
<td>$\kappa$</td>
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<td>Early withdrawal tax</td>
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<td>Based on U.S. tax policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk-free rate</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>17%</td>
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</table>

Table 1.5: Parameter Choices (Benchmark Case) for Implementation of ASL II

Parts might be required to cover administrative costs and other expenses. The difference amounts to approximately 7 to 10% of the initial investment, depending on the parameter assumptions.

To determine the marginal cost relative to the charged fee of the GMWB rider, we compare the difference of fees and benefits with and without incorporating the withdrawal guarantee. Note that all valuation results are quoted in net present value terms under the risk-neutral measure, and based on an initial investment of $100,000. We find that in the benchmark case, the difference in absence of the guarantee exceeds the difference in the presence of the guarantee: The insurer’s expected profit decreases by $800 when adding on the withdrawal guarantee. However, an increase in the volatility of the underlying investment from 17% to 20% would result in a positive difference of
approximately $2,000 when adding on the GMWB. Given fluctuations in the historical volatility of the S&P 500 index, our results indicate that a premium of 35 bps for the GMWB is roughly consistent with the marginal cost to the insurer.

We further observe that in the benchmark case, it is optimal for the policyholder to surrender his VA prior to maturity in approximately 75% of all scenarios. In the absence of a GMWB, surrender occurs in over 88% of all scenarios. We attribute this high propensity of surrenders to the 165 bps charge for the basic VA. In the absence of tax considerations (see Column 8), it even becomes optimal to surrender almost immediately after purchasing the VA. This suggests that the tax-deferred growth property of the VA investment is deterring policyholders from early withdrawals (as we argued in previous sections), but appears not to be worth 1.65% of the investment value every year if the guarantee is out of the money.

Further evidence presented in Table 1.6 supports this theory: An increase in the tax rate on investments outside of the VA, $\kappa$, renders the VA a relatively more attractive investment vehicle, and we consequently observe a substantial reduction in surrenders to around 21%. Conversely, a larger income tax rate $\tau$ makes the VA less attractive, which mildly increases surrender rates. Not surprisingly, the results in the table also show a reduction in surrender rates for all considered parameter values if the withdrawal guarantee is present. In particular, we observe a tremendous reduction in surrender rates when increasing the volatility from 17% to 20%: The intuition here is that – ceteris paribus – the withdrawal guarantee (like a put option) is more valuable in a more volatile environment.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.6 indicate that the difference in fees and benefits from the GMWB decreases with the market interest rate, i.e. benefits considerably exceed the collected fees in a
low interest environment. This could serve as a potential explanation why in recent years many insurers have either modified the offered withdrawal guarantees (e.g. by increasing the fees), have regulated the risk exposure of potential investments – particularly when guarantees are elected – or have stopped offering such guarantees altogether.

Moreover, we find that the difference is rather insensitive to changes in the time period (see Column 5). Increasing the tax rate on VA earnings from 25% to 35% (Column 6) also has little effect on the insurer’s profit calculations. Since withdrawals are treated as income (for tax purposes), our results appear to be consistent across income groups. On the other hand, a larger tax rate on earnings from the replicating portfolio (see Column 7) would substantially increase the marginal value of the GMWB.

Finally, Column 8 shows that without taxation, the policyholder would surrender almost immediately after purchasing the VA – and therefore probably not purchase the product at all. Clearly, without accounting for the benefits of tax-deferred investment growth, the VA provides little advantage for the policyholder and does not justify the corresponding annual fee. This, once again, demonstrates the fundamental difference in optimal policyholder behavior if the valuation is taken out from his perspective.

1.8 Conclusions and Future Research

The present paper concerns the optimal policyholder exercise behavior within embedded options in life insurance contracts. More specifically, our focus is on withdrawal behavior for the holder

\footnote{For instance, for the ASL II, it is not possible to invest in the ProFund VP UltraBull, which “seeks daily investment returns, before fees and expenses, that correspond to twice (200%) the daily performance of the S&P 500”, if the policyholder elects a GMWB rider.}
## Valuation results for ASL II

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<td>$r = 3%$</td>
<td>$r = 3%, \sigma = 20%$</td>
<td>$T = 30$</td>
<td>$\tau = 35%$</td>
<td>$\kappa = 20%$</td>
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### Including GMWB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$E^Q[\text{Guarantee}]$</th>
<th>$E^Q[\text{Fees}]$</th>
<th>$E^Q[\text{Net Profit}]$</th>
<th>Surrender Rate</th>
<th>Step-up Rate</th>
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<td></td>
<td>4,161</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6,979</td>
<td>9,700</td>
<td>5,614</td>
<td>1,748</td>
<td>7,192</td>
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<td></td>
<td>75.2%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91.3%</td>
<td>130.5%</td>
<td>117.5%</td>
<td>114.0%</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
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### Without GMWB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$E^Q[\text{Guarantee}]$</th>
<th>$E^Q[\text{Fees}]$</th>
<th>$E^Q[\text{Net Profit}]$</th>
<th>Surrender Rate</th>
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<td>799</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>1,870</td>
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<td>8,579</td>
<td>8,858</td>
<td>9,485</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7,780</td>
<td>7,657</td>
<td>7,615</td>
<td>7,167</td>
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<td></td>
<td>88.2%</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
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### Net Value of GMWB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</table>

Table 1.6: Withdrawal Statistics and Valuation of ASL II for Different Parameter Values
of a VA contract including a GMWB rider, even though our insights are not limited to this popular but rather specific product.

Our main conclusion is that the key driver for exercise behavior in the pre-retirement period is value maximization. More precisely, we contrast two approaches to optimal policyholder behavior, namely a lifetime utility model that explicitly allows for outside investment and a risk-neutral value-maximization approach. We find that despite their conceptual differences, both approaches yield very similar withdrawal patterns and aggregate withdrawal statistics. In particular, the possibility to defer investment taxation within the VA seems to be the dominating factor, inducing policyholders to only withdraw when the guarantee is in the money, i.e. in adverse market conditions. As a consequence, under our parameter assumptions, a guarantee fee of 50 bps, which is close to levels encountered in practice, more than sufficiently provides for a return-of-investment GMWB. Moreover, our analyses of an empirical VA contract containing a relatively complex withdrawal guarantee indicate that the charged option fee is roughly in line with the marginal cost to the insurer.

These results are in stark contrast to findings in the actuarial literature based on value-maximizing approaches, which suggest much higher guarantee fees. In fact, it is exactly this disparity that has led researchers to gravitate towards (more complex) life-cycle models, supposing that the disparity has to be attributed to the incompleteness of the individual insurance market. In line with this hypothesis, in our utility-based framework, policyholders respond to changes in parameters by balancing payouts in the case of death and survival – which of course is the source of the incompleteness of the market. However, these effects are far less pronounced relative to the motive to maximize the value of the embedded option. In contrast, we show that the primary reason for
the alluded disparity is the negligence of tax effects: A value-maximizing approach that correctly accounts for tax benefits will produce very similar outcomes as the considerably more complex life cycle model. Furthermore, the difference between the two approaches might be even smaller if we additionally included a market for life contingencies such as term life insurance in our lifetime utility framework. Thus, our findings suggest that the supplemental insights provided by a utility-based framework do not justify the additional complexity relative to the risk-neutral approach – if the latter is taken out properly, that is from the policyholder’s perspective.

Beyond taxation rules, this distinction of perspective can also be important for the underlying assumptions of the approach. For instance, in the present paper we assume a given set of mortality rates that are identical both from the individual and the company’s perspective. In future work, it may be worthwhile to study the effects of an asymmetry in the mortality assumptions on withdrawal behavior. Here, the asymmetry may originate from informational asymmetries between the policyholder and the company during the contract phase due to individual mortality risk, or may be simply caused by the policyholder’s poor understanding of his own mortality risk as suggested in the behavioral economics literature (cf. Harrison and Rutström (2006)). The latter may be particularly interesting since, to our knowledge, so far there are no attempts to quantify the financial impact of such “behavioral anomalies” on exercise-dependent retirement savings products.

Another obvious direction of future research is the generalization of our results to a more general model frameworks and a more general set of life insurance products. Specifically, while the life-cycle model considered here is rather simple, we see evidence that modifying the preference assumptions or adding additional risk factors will not affect withdrawal behavior – provided that these risks are separately insurable. However, non-insurable exogenous expenditure or liquidity
shocks may well yield a difference in patterns. This is akin to Carpenter (1998), who in the context of employee stock options proposes a risk-neutral valuation model with an exogenous withdrawal state. Similarly, including additional guaranteed benefits and extending the contract period may provide further insights. For instance, it is conceivable that for other guarantees the pooling with a savings product could provide payoff profiles that impair the performance of the risk-neutral approach relative to the utility maximization framework, especially later in life.

Finally, it is important to further elaborate on the practical significance of our results. While we already highlighted that our results endorse simple reduced-form exercise rules based on the “moneyness” of the guarantee, the question arises if there are better performing reduced-form rules – both in the context of our model and in view of empirical exercise patterns.

1.9 Appendix A: Model Details

1.9.1 Timeline

Starting at the end of policy year $t \in \{1, \ldots, T - 1\}$, just prior to the $t$-th policy anniversary date, the timeline of events is as follows:

1. The policyholder observes the annual asset returns $S_t / S_{t-1}$, and thus the level of his current state variables, $A_t^-$ and $X_t^-$. 
2. The policyholder dies with probability $q_{x+t-1}$. 
3. In case of death, he leaves bequest $b_t = A_t^- + \max\{X_t^-, G_t^D\}$, and no further actions are taken. If he survives:
4. The policyholder receives income $I_t$ for the new period.
5. Based on this information, he chooses how much to withdraw from the VA account, $w_t$, consume, $C_t$, and how to allocate his outside portfolio, $\nu_t$. 
6. The policyholder consumes $C_t$. Account values $(A_t^+, X_t^+)$, the benefit base $(G_{t+1}^t)$ and the tax base $(H_{t+1})$ are updated accordingly. 
7. Between $t$ and $t + 1$, the account values evolve in line with the asset(s).
8. (1.) The policyholder observes $S_{t+1}/S_t$, etc.

### 1.9.2 Bellman Equation in the Black-Scholes Framework

In a Black-Scholes environment, as described in Section 1.3, optimization problem (1.6) takes the form

$$V_t^-(y_t) = \max_{C_t, u_t, \nu_t} uC_t + e^{-\beta} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \psi(\gamma) \left[ q_{x+t} \cdot u_B(b_{t+1}|S'(\gamma)) + p_{x+t} \cdot V_{t+1}^-(y_{t+1}|S'(\gamma)) \right] d\gamma,$$

where $\psi(\gamma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp(-\gamma^2/2)$ is the standard normal probability density function, and $S'(\gamma) = S_t \cdot e^{\gamma y_t + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2}$ is the annual gross return of the risky asset, subject to

$$y_t = \{A_t^-, X_t^-, G_t, H_t\},$$
$$X_t^+ = (X_t^- - w_t)^+,$$
$$A_t^+ = A_t^- + I_t + w_t - fee_t - fee_G - taxes - C_t,$$
$$fee_t = s \cdot \max\{w_t - \min\{g_t^W, G_t^W\}\},$$
$$fee_G = s^g \cdot (w_t - fee_t) \cdot 1_{\{x_t < 59.5\}},$$
$$taxes = \tau \cdot \min\{w_t - fee_t - fee_G, (X_t^- - H_t)^+\},$$
$$G_{t+1}^+ = \begin{cases} (G_t - w)^+ : w \leq g_t^W, \\ (\min\{G_t - w, G_t \cdot X_t^- / X_t^+\})^+ : w > g_t^W, \end{cases}$$
$$H_{t+1}^- = H_t - (w_t - (X_t^- - H_t)^+)^+,$$
$$A_{t+1}^- = A_t^+ \left[ v_t \cdot e^{\gamma y_t + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2} + (1 - v_t) \cdot e^r - \kappa \cdot (v_t \cdot e^{\gamma y_t + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2} + (1 - v_t) \cdot e^r - 1)^+ \right],$$
$$X_{t+1}^- = X_t^+ \cdot e^{-\phi} \cdot \left[ v^X \cdot e^{\gamma y_t + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2} + (1 - v^X) \cdot e^r \right],$$
$$b_X = \max\{X_{t+1}^-, G_{t+1}^X\},$$
$$b_{t+1} = A_{t+1}^- + b_X - \tau \cdot (b_X - H_t, 0),$$
$$0 \leq C_t \leq A_t^- + I_t + w_t - fee_t - fee_G - taxes,$$
$$0 \leq w_t \leq \min\{g_t^W, G_t^W\},$$
$$0 \leq v_t \leq 1.$$

### 1.9.3 Bellman Equation in the Black-Scholes Framework under Risk-Neutral Valuation

In a Black-Scholes environment, the risk-neutral valuation problem takes the form

$$V_t(X_t^-, G_t, H_t) = \max_{w_t} (w_t - fee_t - fee_G - taxes) + X_0,$$
where \( X_0 = V \) is given implicitly by
\[
e^r \cdot V - \mathbb{E}^Q[Y] - \frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa} \mathbb{E}^Q[Y - V]^+ = 0,
\]
and subject to
\[
\begin{align*}
Y &= q_{x+t} b_{t+1} + p_{x+t} V_{t+1} (X_{t+1}^-, G_{t+1}^+, H_{t+1}), \\
X_{t+1}^* &= (X_t^- - w_t)^+, \\
fee_t &= s \cdot \max \left\{ w_t - \min (g_t^W, G_t^W) \right\}, \\
taxes &= \tau \cdot \min \left\{ w_t - fee_t - fee_G, (X_t^- - H_t)^+ \right\}, \\
G_{t+1} &= \left\{ \left( \min \left( G_t - w, G_t \cdot \frac{X_t^+}{X_t^-} \right) \right)^+ : w \leq g_t^W \right\}, \\
H_{t+1} &= H_t - \left( w_t - (X_t^- - H_t)^+ \right)^+, \\
X_{t+1}^- &= S_t \cdot e^{-\phi} \cdot \left[ \nu S_t \cdot e^{\sigma \tau + r - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2} + (1 - \nu S_t) \cdot e^r \right], \\
b_X &= \max \left\{ X_{t+1}^+, O_{t+1} \right\}, \\
b_{t+1} &= b_X - \tau \cdot (b_X - H_t, 0), \quad \text{and} \\
0 &\leq w_t \leq \max \left\{ X_t^-, \min \left\{ g_t^W, G_t^W \right\} \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]
where \( \gamma \) follows a standard normal distribution.

### 1.10 Appendix B: Derivations and Proofs

#### 1.10.1 Proof of Integral Equation (1.12)

We follow Bauer et al. (2008) to derive a quasi-analytic expression to our lifetime optimization problem (1.6) in a Black-Scholes-type environment.

As discussed, the evolution of the stock process can be described by a geometric Brownian Motion:
\[
dS_t = S_t \cdot \mu \cdot d\tau + S_t \cdot \sigma dZ_t.
\]

Let \( t \in \mathbb{N}, \ t < T \), and assume that we know the policyholder’s value function
\[
V_{t+1}^{-1} (A_{t+1}^-, X_{t+1}^-, G_{t+1}^+, H_{t+1}^-)
\]
as a function of the current level of state variables at the end of the period, after observing \( S_{t+1} \) and whether or not the policyholder has survived the period, but before consumption, withdrawal and reallocation decisions for the next period are made.

For \( \tau \in [t, t+1) \), we define the policyholder’s valuation of his total investments as the discounted expected valuation of his valuation at the next policy anniversary date:
\[
V_{t} (A_{\tau}, X_{\tau}, G_{t+1}, H_{t+1}) = e^{-\beta \cdot (t+1-\tau)} \cdot \mathbb{E}^\mathbb{P} [V_{t+1}^{-1} (A_{t+1}^-, X_{t+1}^-, G_{t+1}^+, H_{t+1}^-) | \mathbb{F}_{\tau}] \equiv f(\tau, S_{\tau}).
\]

We can write down the second identity of (1.20) because the only things changing within the period are time and stock value. These two drive the evolution of state variables \( A_{\tau} \) and \( X_{\tau} \), while all other state variables remain at their time \( t^+ \) level, hence subscript \( t+1 \) on the left hand side.
Our goal is to first determine a partial differential equation describing the evolution of \( f \), and then turn that into an integral equation that eventually allows a direct expression of \( f(t,.) \) in terms of \( f(t + 1,.) \). In that spirit, define

\[
\tilde{u}(\tau, S_\tau) \equiv e^{-\beta(\tau-t)} \cdot f(\tau, S_\tau) = E^\mathbb{P}[e^{-\beta \cdot V_{t+1}^- (A_{t+1}^-, X_{t+1}^-, G_{t+1}, H_{t+1})} | \mathbb{F}_\tau].
\]

Observe first that \( \tilde{u}(\tau, S_\tau) \) is a martingale, and as such must have zero drift. Applying Ito’s Lemma (together with (1.19)):

\[
d\tilde{u} = e^{-\beta(\tau-t)} \cdot \left[ -\beta \cdot f + f_\tau + f_S \cdot \mu \cdot S_\tau + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \cdot S^2_\tau \cdot f_{SS} \right] d\tau + e^{-\beta(\tau-t)} \cdot f_S \cdot S_\tau \cdot \sigma \cdot dZ_\tau,
\]

we can thus conclude that

\[
-\beta \cdot f + f_\tau + f_S \cdot \mu \cdot S_\tau + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \cdot S^2_\tau \cdot f_{SS} = 0.
\]

This is a slightly modified version of the classic Black-Scholes PDE, and subject to the terminal condition

\[
f(t + 1, S_{t+1}) = q_{x+1} \cdot u_B(B_{t+1}|S_{t+1}) + p_{x+1} \cdot V_{t+1}^- (A_{t+1}^-, X_{t+1}^-, G_t, H_t|S_{t+1}).
\]

We now try to transform the PDE (1.21) to an integral equation: For that matter, define

\[
\begin{align*}
\eta & \equiv \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2} \\
\rho & \equiv \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2} \cdot \eta^2 + \beta \\
X_\tau & \equiv \frac{\log S_\tau}{\sigma^2} \\
g(\tau, X) & \equiv \exp(\sigma \cdot \eta \cdot X - \rho \cdot \tau) \cdot f(\tau, S)
\end{align*}
\]

In particular, this implies \( S = \exp(\sigma \cdot X) \), \( \frac{dX}{dS} = \frac{1}{\sigma S} \), and \( f(\tau, S) = \exp(\rho \tau - \sigma \eta X) \cdot g(\tau, X) \). And hence:

\[
\begin{align*}
f_\tau & = \exp(\rho \tau - \sigma \eta X) \cdot [\rho \cdot g + g_\tau], \\
f_S & = \exp(\rho \tau - \sigma \eta X) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma S} \cdot [g_X - \sigma \eta g], \text{ and} \\
f_{SS} & = \exp(\rho \tau - \sigma \eta X) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma^2 S^2} \cdot \left[ \sigma^2 (\eta^2 + \eta) g - \sigma (2\eta + 1) g_X + g_{XX} \right].
\end{align*}
\]

After plugging these derivatives into (1.21) and some simplification, we obtain

\[
g_\tau + \frac{1}{2} g_{XX} = 0.
\]

This PDE is commonly known as a one-dimensional heat equation, and it is subject to its terminal condition

\[
g(t + 1, X) \equiv \exp(\sigma \cdot \eta \cdot X - \rho \cdot (t + 1)) \cdot f(t + 1, S).
\]

To solve this, observe first that a solution to (1.24) is given by the pdf of a \( N(\alpha, t + 1 - \tau) \) distributed...
random variable, for any $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$h^\alpha(\tau, z) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi(\tau + 1 - \tau)}} \exp\left(-\frac{(z - \alpha)^2}{2\tau(\tau + 1 - \tau)}\right).$$

Due to the linearity of the differential operator, any linear combination (and under certain regularity conditions that includes integration) of such pdfs also satisfies the PDE (1.24). The challenge is then to find the one that also satisfies the terminal condition (1.25). As can be easily verified, the following function does the job:

$$g(\tau, X) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi(\tau + 1 - \tau)}} \exp\left(-\frac{(X - \alpha)^2}{2\tau(\tau + 1 - \tau)}\right) \cdot g(t + 1, \alpha) d\alpha. \quad (1.26)$$

Using the transformation $\gamma \equiv \alpha - \eta \sigma - X$, and applying (1.23) to (1.26), we find

$$f(\tau, S) = e^{-\rho(\tau + 1 - \tau)} \cdot \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi(\tau + 1 - \tau)}} \exp\left(\sigma^2\eta^2 + \sigma \eta \gamma \cdot (1 - \frac{1}{\tau + 1 - \tau}) \right. \left. - \frac{\gamma^2 + \eta^2 \sigma^2}{2(\tau + 1 - \tau)}\right) \cdot f(t + 1, S \cdot e^{\gamma \eta \sigma}) d\gamma,$$

and therefore

$$f(t^+, S_t) = e^{-\beta} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \psi(\gamma) \cdot f(t + 1, S_t \cdot e^{\sigma \gamma + \eta \sigma^2}) d\gamma,$$

$$= e^{-\beta} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \psi(\gamma) \left[q_{x+t} \cdot u_B(B_{t+1}|S'(\gamma)) + p_{x+t} \cdot V_{t+1}^- (A_{t+1}^- X_{t+1}^- | y_t | S'(\gamma))\right] d\gamma$$

where $S'(\gamma) = S_t e^{\sigma \gamma + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2}$, $\psi(.)$ is the standard normal density function $\psi(\gamma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{\gamma^2}{2}\right)$, and the final identity follows from (1.22).

### 1.10.2 Derivation of Approximation (1.14)

For given $M$ and $u_k, k = 0, \ldots, M$, we can compute $x_k = \lambda(u_k) = \exp(\sigma \cdot u_k + r - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2)$ and $\psi_k = F(x_k)$, if necessary by interpolating and/or extrapolating $F(.)$ over the state space grid. Note that the domain of gross return variable $x$ by definition is $(0, \infty)$.

Then, for arbitrary $0 < x < \infty$, we can approximate the corresponding function value linearly by

$$F(x) \approx \sum_{k=0}^{M-1} \left( \psi_k + \frac{x - s_k}{s_{k+1} - s_k} \cdot (\psi_{k+1} - \psi_k) \right) \cdot 1_{[s_k, s_{k+1})}(x)$$

$$= \sum_{k=0}^{M-1} (a_k + b_k \cdot x) \cdot 1_{[s_k, s_{k+1})}(x),$$
where for $k = 0, \ldots, M - 1$

\[ a_k \equiv \frac{x_{k+1} \cdot \Psi_k - x_k \cdot \Psi_{k+1}}{x_{k+1} - x_k}, \quad \text{and} \quad b_k \equiv \frac{\Psi_{k+1} - \Psi_k}{x_{k+1} - x_k}. \]

In addition, we define $a_M = b_M \equiv 0$.

Plugging this into Equation (1.13), we obtain

\[
K = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi(u)F(\lambda(u)) \, du \approx \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi(u) \cdot \sum_{k=0}^{M-1} (a_k + b_k \cdot x) \cdot 1_{[x_k, x_{k+1})}(x) \, du
\]

\[
= \sum_{k=0}^{M-1} \int_{u_k}^{u_{k+1}} \phi(u) \cdot (a_k + b_k \cdot \lambda(u)) \, du = \sum_{k=0}^{M-1} a_k \cdot \int_{u_k}^{u_{k+1}} \phi(u) \, du + b_k \cdot \int_{u_k}^{u_{k+1}} \phi(u) \cdot \lambda(u) \, du,
\]

and since

\[
\phi(u) \cdot \lambda(u) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \cdot \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}u^2\right) \cdot \exp\left(\sigma u + \mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2\right) = e^{\mu} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}(u - \sigma)^2\right) = e^{\mu} \phi(u - \sigma),
\]

we obtain

\[
K \approx \sum_{k=0}^{M-1} a_k \cdot [\Phi(u_{k+1}) - \Phi(u_k)] + \exp(\mu) \cdot b_k \cdot [\Phi(u_{k+1} - \sigma) - \Phi(u_k - \sigma)].
\]

Finally, reordering of the summation terms yields Equation (1.14).

\[\square\]

### 1.10.3 Proof of Proposition 1

All that is left to show is the existence and uniqueness of the solution to Equation (1.17), which can be written as

\[
V_t - \mathbb{E}_t^Q \left[ \frac{B_t}{B_{t+1}} \cdot Y \right] - \frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa} \int \frac{B_t}{B_{t+1}} \cdot (Y - V_t) \cdot 1_{[y > V_t]} \, dF^Q = 0,
\]

whereby $0 \leq \kappa \leq 1$, and $0 \leq B_t \leq B_{t+1}$. Denote the left hand side by $f(V_t)$. To complete the proof, we only need to demonstrate that the equation $f(V) = 0$ has exactly one solution.

Let us first demonstrate existence: Since $f(\cdot)$ is continuous, $f(-\infty) = -\infty$ and $f(\infty) = \infty$, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there needs to exist $-\infty < V < \infty$ such that $f(V) = 0$.

To show uniqueness, it suffices to show that $f(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing. For that matter, consider $V^2 > V^1$. Then:

\[
f(V^2) - f(V^1) = V^2 - V^1 - \frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa} \left[ \int \frac{B_t}{B_{t+1}} (Y - V^2) 1_{[y > V^2]} \, dF^Q - \int \frac{B_t}{B_{t+1}} (Y - V^1) 1_{[y > V^1]} \, dF^Q \right]
\]

\[
= V^2 - V^1 + \frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa} \left[ \left( (Y - V^1) 1_{[V^1, V^2]} + (V^2 - V^1) 1_{[V^1, V^2]} \right) dF^Q \right]
\]

\[> 0.\]

\[\square\]
Chapter 2

On Negative Option Values in Personal Savings Products

2.1 Introduction

Option values are generally considered to be strictly positive as they provide the holder with the right – but not the obligation – to execute a transaction (see for example Merton (1973)). This is certainly true from the holder’s perspective since she can always choose to ignore the option. And since in general the payoff to the issuing counter party is simply the opposite of the investor’s profit function, it will be optimal for the issuer to charge a positive option price.

This argument, however, is based on the important assumption that the two parties possess identical value functions. We show that this assumption breaks down in the case of personal savings products, where frictions such as preferential tax treatments may cause the value functions to differ. In fact, in these cases an agent may increase his expected payout by issuing a marginal
This insight may not come as a surprise in the presence of unequal market access. For instance, if it is impossible for a risk-averse holder of the option to sell it at its risk-neutral value, as it is frequently the case for personal savings products, the investor’s decision making will be shaped by her preferences. We show that negative option values can also arise when all market participants are value maximizers but tax treatments differ. More specifically, in this case, in addition to the holder and the issuer of the option, a third party (the government) has a stake in the transaction. The key contributions of this paper are the illustration of the mechanics of negative option values, and to provide examples where this situation may arise in practice.

Intuitively, the addition of an option to an investor’s position can change his optimal exercise and/or investment strategy. This is true even for a value-maximizing investor, if the new option is affecting the value profiles of other positions she possesses. However, under standard arbitrage pricing, any dollar the investor gains from an option would have to come out of the issuer’s pocket. This balance equation is no longer true when a third (and inactive) party gets involved, as now the revised optimal strategy could entail a reduction of payments to the third party. For instance, by issuing an option which induces an optimal exercise behavior that e.g. defers the investor’s tax payments, the counter party can affect the positions of the investor and issuer dissimilarly, at the expense of the government. Moreover, it is even possible that the issuer stands to gain directly from the investor’s change in strategy, e.g. because he has issued other options to the investor whose exercise is affected by the new option. Thus, it is conceivable that this option will actually reduce the issuers aggregate liabilities, i.e. the option will have a negative marginal value. Thus both, the issuer and the investor, may benefit from this additional option, and their compensation
will come out of the government’s balance through a reduction in (or deferment of) the investor’s tax liabilities. Therefore, negative (marginal) option values can arise whenever investments grow tax-deferred or tax free.

In the United States, this is the case for many retirement savings vehicles. A prominent example are Variable Annuities (VA). In essence, VAs are investment vehicles offered by insurance companies that invest in mutual funds or fixed income securities. Their popularity stems primarily from the fact that they grow tax-deferred.¹ These products are frequently enhanced by long term investment guarantees – so-called guaranteed minimum benefits – which in their payoff structure resemble standard option contracts.

One such guarantee, known as a Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefit (GMWB), grants the policyholder the right – but not the obligation – to withdraw her initial investment over the course of the policy (typically around 20 years), provided that annual withdrawals do not exceed a given amount (typically 7% of the initial investment). In my first essay, I demonstrate that withdrawing early is not always optimal, since the policyholder might forego future tax benefits on the amount withdrawn. Since the insurer is liable for the remaining withdrawal payments once the investment account depletes, he benefits when the policyholder chooses not to withdraw. The insurer further profits from a non-withdrawal by collecting more premiums, which are typically quoted as a fixed percentage of the concurrent account value every year. On the other hand, the investor herself can also benefit from foregoing a withdrawal, since her investment would keep growing tax-deferred. This strategy would lead to a reduction in tax payments, and therefore there is an opportunity to make both policyholder and insurer better off. Note that this does not imply

¹Earnings are not taxed until they are withdrawn, which provides for a considerable advantage over mutual funds, particularly for long-term investments.
that there must always exist an *enforceable* contract that leads to a mutually preferable allocation, but merely that – in contrast to standard arbitrage pricing – it is now theoretically *possible* for such a contract to exist. We demonstrate this in the following sections.

In Section 2 we illustrate with a two-period model how negative marginal option values may arise as a result of deferring tax treatments of different investments. In Section 3 we present and implement a Variable Annuity from the U.S. insurance market that reflects this very situation: The presence of a death benefit guarantee (formally known as a Guaranteed Minimum Death Benefit, GMDB),\(^2\) makes withdrawing suboptimal in certain situations, and thereby *increases* the insurer’s expected net profit. Section 4 concludes the chapter.

### 2.2 Negative Option Values in a Two-Period Model

The following two-period model describes a personalized, tax-preferred investment between an issuer and an investor, and illustrates how adding an option (at no cost) can make both parties strictly better off. We want to stress that it is merely the presence of differing tax policies (with respect to a potential replicating portfolio) that cause the option to have a negative marginal value, even if the investor acts rationally.

Consider an agent who, at time 0, invests 100 with an issuer for a period of two years. The money is invested in an asset whose evolution can be described by a binomial tree with annual periods: each year, investments increase by 25% or decrease by 30%, before taxes (see Figure 2.1). The (pre-tax) financial market is completed by a second asset that earns the risk-free rate of

\(^2\)A GMDB promises to return the greater of the account value and the initial investment in the case of the policy-holder’s death.
7.2% (also pre-tax).

Figure 2.1: Annual Evolution of the Risky Asset (Pre-Tax)

The issuer also grants the investor the right (but not the obligation) to withdraw 50 at the end of each of the two years, regardless of her investment performance. However, this guarantee is tied to the investor herself and does not apply to her beneficiaries. Withdrawals are taken out of the investment account, if possible, and are covered by the issuer, if not. In addition to the initial investment of 100, the issuer also deducts 5% of the investment value at the beginning of each year, to cover the costs of providing this downside protection.

Therefore, at time 1, upon observing the first-year investment performance, the investor decides whether to exercise the first half of her option, and withdraw 50 from her account. At time 2, the investment matures and it is obvious that the second part of the guarantee will be claimed – and thus be costly for the issuer – if and only if the terminal account value is below 50.

We assume that the investment grows tax-deferred, that only earnings will be taxed upon their withdrawal or when the investment matures, and that earnings are taken out first.\footnote{The reader may notice that the here described product resembles a Variable Annuity (with a withdrawal guarantee), and that the tax policies we implement here are fairly consistent with current U.S. tax policies on Variable Annuities (see IRS, Publication 939).} In contrast, for all other investments – including the potential replicating portfolio – earnings are taxed on an
annual basis. We assume a tax rate of 40% applicable to all investments. Furthermore, mortality rates are 0 and 0.27 for the first and second year, respectively.

We first analyze the investor’s optimal exercise behavior in this basic model, and calculate the resulting net profit for the issuer. Thereafter, in Section 2.2, we consider the impact of a death benefit guarantee for the agent’s investment. We will see that this option alters the optimal time-1 exercise strategy, to the effect that the issuer is being made better off as well. Our numerical analysis quantifies the resulting marginal value of the death benefit option for the issuing party as −32 basis points.

### 2.2.1 Withdrawal Behavior and Net Profit in Basic Model

Since the exercise decision at maturity is an obvious one, the sole choice variable for the investor is whether to exercise her time-1 option by taking 50 out of the investment. That choice is based on the time-1 investment value, which can take on two values, depending on the movement of the underlying asset. Figure 2.2 depicts the evolution of the investment account in the case where the investor chooses to exercise in both scenarios. The investment tree for different exercise strategies can be constructed analogously. Starting with the initial investment of 100, the issuer first deducts 5% for the guarantee fee at the beginning of the first year. The remainder is invested in the asset for one year, and thus moves to either 118.75 or 66.50. In either case, the investor exercises the first part of her guarantee, which reduces the account value by 50. The issuer once more deducts his guarantee fee, and invests the remainder of the investment account in the asset for another year. If the investor is alive at maturity and his investment has fallen below 50, the issuer makes up the difference. We observe that only if the asset moves up both times, the guarantee is worthless and
the investor receives her investment account value at maturity.

The optimal time-1 decision is the one that maximizes the investor’s expected net present value, after taxes. We illustrate the calculation at the example of time-1 exercise when the investment is worth 118.75. The amount withdrawn is subject to taxation: Since the initial investment of 100 can be taken out tax-free, of the 50 that are withdrawn at time 1, 18.75 are earnings, and 31.25 are tax-free principal. The net payout to the investor is thus $31.25 + (1 - 0.4) \times 18.75 = 42.50$, valued at time 1. Her second-year payout, however, will depend on the movement of the asset and the investor’s death or survival. In particular, since she has already withdrawn 31.25 from her initial investment at time 1, only $100 - 31.25 = 68.75$ can be taken out tax-free at time 2. Hence, if her investment appreciates to 81.64, she receives $68.75 + (1 - 0.4) \times (81.64 - 68.75) = 76.48$ net of taxes. On the other hand, if her investment account decreases, her terminal payout will be tax-free: either 45.72 if she dies, or 50 due to the guarantee in case of survival.

We define the time-1 value of this uncertain time-2 post-tax cash flow as the amount needed to set up a replicating portfolio for these payouts. Since earnings of this replicating portfolio are taxed on an annual basis, we apply the corresponding valuation formula developed in my first essay. In particular, the time-1 value of these payouts, $V_{u}^{50}$, is given implicitly by

$$(1 + r) \cdot V_{u}^{50} = \mathbb{E}[Y_2] + \frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa} \cdot \mathbb{E}[\max(Y_2 - V_{u}^{50}, 0)], \quad (2.1)$$

where $Y_2$ is the random variable reflecting the post-tax payout, $\kappa = 40\%$ is the applicable tax rate on earnings, and $r = 7.2\%$ is the risk-free (pre-tax) interest rate. The expectation is taken under the risk-neutral measure of the financial market, combined with the physical measure of biometric
Figure 2.2: Evolution of Investment Account if Investor Exercises at Time 1

(a) Investor Survives to Maturity.

(b) Investor Dies in Period 2.
risk. More specifically, since the risk-neutral probability that the asset increases in a given year is given by

$$p^* = \frac{1.072 - 0.7}{1.25 - 0.7} = \frac{186}{275},$$

we can compute

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_2] = \frac{186}{275} \cdot 76.48 + \left(1 - \frac{186}{275}\right) \left((0.27 \cdot 45.72 + (1 - 0.27) \cdot 50) = 67.54.\right.$$

From Equation (2.1) we thus find $V^{50}_u = 66.99$ as the time-1 value of the terminal payout if the investor exercises her first-year guarantee. Combined with her net payout at time 1, the investor receives the equivalent of $42.50 + 66.99 = 109.49$ at time 1.

In contrast, if the agent does not exercise her first-year option after the asset appreciates, we find (in similar fashion) a time-1 value of $V^{0}_u = 109.02$. The resulting investment evolution is depicted in Figure 2.3. Therefore, it is optimal for the investor to exercise the guarantee at time 1 if the investment is at $118.75$. Moreover, it can be shown that exercising is also optimal if the investment account decreases in the first year. Figure 2.2 thus reflects the evolution of the investment account based on optimal exercise behavior by the investor.

Since the issuer needs to make up any difference between account value and guaranteed amount (see Figure 2.2), his time-0 risk-neutral expected present value of guarantee payments is given by

$$PV_{B0} = \frac{1}{1.072^2} \cdot 0.73 \cdot \left[ \frac{186}{275} \cdot \frac{89}{275} \cdot (4.28 + 30.41) + \left(\frac{89}{275}\right)^2 \cdot 39.03 \right] \approx 7.42.$$
Figure 2.3: Evolution of Investment Account if Investor Does not Exercise at 118.75.

(a) Investor Survives to Maturity.

(b) Investor Dies in Period 2.
At the same time, the fees he collects accumulate to a net present value of

\[ PV_P_0 = 0.05 \cdot 100 + \frac{1}{1.072} \cdot \left[ \frac{186}{275} \cdot 0.05 \cdot 68.75 + \frac{89}{275} \cdot 0.05 \cdot 16.5 \right] \approx 7.42. \]

We conclude that with a guarantee premium of 5% p.a., the issuer roughly breaks even in this model.

Suppose now that the investor does not exercise if the investment account is at 118.75. In that case, as Figure 2.3 shows, the guarantee will not be valuable at maturity, and the issuer also collects more premiums at time 1. In particular, the expected net present value of collected premiums is now

\[ PV_P'_0 = 0.05 \cdot 100 + \frac{1}{1.072} \cdot \left[ \frac{186}{275} \cdot 0.05 \cdot 118.75 + \frac{89}{275} \cdot 0.05 \cdot 16.5 \right] \approx 9.00, \]

while the issuer’s expected payout (in present value terms) decreases to

\[ PV_B'_0 = \frac{1}{1.072^2} \cdot 0.73 \cdot \left[ \frac{186}{275} \cdot \frac{89}{275} \cdot (0 + 30.41) + \left( \frac{89}{275} \right)^2 \cdot 39.03 \right] \approx 6.825. \]

Hence, the issuer would make a net profit of approximately 9.00 – 6.83 = 2.17, if the investor were to forgo her first-period guarantee when the asset moves up.

If he could issue an option with a net present value of less than 2.17 that would induce the investor to refrain from exercising at an investment account value of 118.75, it would therefore be optimal to do so. We will see in Section 2.2 that a death benefit guarantee will do the trick. It is also clear that in a classical arbitrage pricing environment such a situation could not arise.\(^4\)

\(^4\)In that case, the respective value functions of issuer and investor would be diametrical opposites, and the investor would lose 2.17 in net present value terms from foregoing first-period exercise. Therefore, any option that the issuer would consider offering (at no extra charge) would not make up for the investor’s loss and would not induce her to
(a) If Investor Exercises when Account at 118.75. (b) If Investor does not Exercise when Account is at 118.75.

Figure 2.4: Tax Payments Made by Investor at Times 1 and 2.

The sole difference in this model, however, is the financial involvement of a third party, the government, through tax payments. To more closely examine how this situation can allow for such an option to exist, notice that in the case analyzed above, namely when the asset increases in the first period, the investor pays more taxes on aggregate when exercising at time 1.\textsuperscript{5} These results demonstrate that, while the investor must somehow be compensated (to make up for the reduction from 109.49 to 109.02, see above) in order to refrain from exercising if the investment increases to 118.75, it is generally possible to achieve that: The resulting reduction of tax payments from 10.75 to 10.35 leaves 0.40 more to be distributed between issuer and investor, with the opportunity change her exercise behavior.

\textsuperscript{5}Figure 2.4 displays the tax liabilities in the cases with and without exercise of the first-year guarantee. As described above, when exercising at time 1, the investor pays $50 - 42.50 = 7.50$ in taxes immediately, while her tax liabilities at maturity are $81.64 - 76.48 = 5.16$ or 0, depending on the second-year asset movement. Therefore, the time-1 value of the investor’s risk-neutral expected aggregate tax payments is

$$7.50 + \frac{1}{1.072} \left[ 186 \cdot \frac{1}{275} + 5.16 + \left( 1 - \frac{186}{275} \right) 0 \right] = 10.75.$$  

Conversely, if the guarantee is not exercised at time 1, the investor owes taxes at the amount of either $141.02 - 124.61 = 16.41$ or 0, again depending on her investment performance in year 2. This corresponds to a time-1 risk-neutral expected value of

$$\frac{1}{1.072} \left[ \frac{186}{275} + 16.41 + \left( 1 - \frac{186}{275} \right) 0 \right] = 10.35.$$
to make both parties better (and the government worse) off.

### 2.2.2 Withdrawal Behavior and Net Profit with a Death Benefit Guarantee

Suppose now that the issuer bestows an additional option on the investor. The option promises to return the original investment of 100 (minus proportional withdrawals) in case the investor dies.

We find that it is still optimal to exercise the first part of the guarantee if the investment account decreases to 66.5. However, if the account appreciates in the first period, the investor is now better off not exercising, as we demonstrate in Appendix A. In particular, the death benefit option has a net present value of 1.69, roughly 0.48 less than the issuer stands to gain if the agent does not exercise in the “up” state.

This shows that the death benefit option thus carries a negative marginal value to its issuer, and it makes both issuer and investor strictly better off. In fact, with the option included, the issuer breaks even at an annual premium of 4.68%.\footnote{At this rate, the issuer would lose 0.34 (out of 100) each year without the option.} Since without the death benefit guarantee, the issuer was breaking even at an annual premium of 5%, the marginal value of the death benefit guarantee in this model is −0.32% or −32 basis points.

### 2.3 Negative Option Values in Practice

To test the occurrence of negative option values in practice, we implement a Variable Annuity (VA) contract that closely resembles a product that has been offered in the United States until recently: the Advanced Series Lifevest II\textsuperscript{SM} (ASL II) policy, by Prudential Annuities Life Assurance Corporation. We briefly describe the implemented policy features, and present our numerical results. For
a more detailed description of the VA and its implementation, we refer to Section 1.8.

We consider a male policyholder age 55 who initially invests $100,000 but makes no further premium payments. The insurer deducts fees at an annual rate of 1.65% of the concurrent account value (as *Mortality & Expense Risk Charge* and *Administration Charge*). This charge of 1.65% includes a *basic death benefit guarantee* (GMDB) which promises to return the initial investment (minus proportional withdrawals) upon the policyholder’s death, if that exceeds the value of his investment account at the time. We want to quantify the marginal value of this guarantee to the insurer.

For that matter, note that under the ASL II, the policyholder can withdraw from his investment account – and even surrender his VA policy – at no cost, although earnings are taxed upon withdrawal. In addition, the policyholder may purchase an optional *Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefit* rider (GMWB), at a cost of 0.35% per year, again as a percentage of his investment account value. The rider guarantees that the policyholder can withdraw the initial investment over the course of the policy, at annual installments of $7,000. While it is possible to withdraw more than that in a given year, the guarantee is only for $7,000 p.a. Lastly, note that the policyholder is not obligated to withdraw.\(^7\)

Upon the policyholder’s death, his concurrent investment account value will be transferred to his beneficiary. Due to the GMDB, the insurer makes up the difference between that amount and the benefits base, if necessary. Conversely, if the policyholder survives 20 years, his remaining

\(^7\)The GMWB comes with a variety of special features: The policyholder can elect to step up the guarantee level prior to his first withdrawal, and then again every 5 years. If that happens, the benefits base is stepped-up to the concurrent account value, and the annual guaranteed withdrawal amount is set to the larger of the previous guaranteed annual amount and 7% of the new benefits base. Moreover, if the policyholder makes no withdrawals during the first seven years, his GMWB fee will be waived for the remainder of the contract (or until he steps up his guarantee), even if he makes withdrawals thereafter.
The investment account will be converted to a whole life annuity. The money is invested in the *ProFund VP Bull* investment portfolio, which evolves similarly to the *S&P 500* index. We model the index in a Black-Scholes environment with a volatility of 17% (based on data from 1982 to 2010). We further assume a risk-free rate of 5%, based on interest rate data over the same time span. See Section 1.8 for more details.

Lastly, we assume tax rates of 25% on income (which includes earnings withdrawn from a VA), and 15% on earnings in any investment outside of the VA. Our implementation is consistent with the current tax treatment of Variable Annuities in the United States, as outlined in IRS Publication 939. Mortality follows the U.S. actuarial life table for a 55-year old male. We implement the policy with the recursive dynamic programming techniques described in Section 1.3.

To determine the marginal value of the death benefit guarantee in this context, we compare the consequences of the policyholder’s optimal withdrawal and step-up strategy with and without the the GMDB. As we outlined in Section 2, the presence of a death benefit guarantee gives the policyholder incentives not to withdraw from or surrender his VA, in addition to the prolonged tax benefits he receives from deferring his withdrawals. This allows the insurer to collect more premiums for a longer time, and it is therefore conceivable that the insurer will be made overall better off, at the expense of the government which now collects fewer taxes.

Table 2.1 displays the discounted net present values (under the standard risk-neutral measure $\mathbb{Q}$) of the benefit payments the insurer makes and the fees he collects. We observe that by adding a GMDB free of charge, the insurer *increases* his expected net profit by 250, that is 3.5%. Since technically the death benefit guarantee is already included in the VA, it might be more appropriate to state our result as follows: Removing the GMDB from the VA would not only make the poli-
cyholder but also the insurer overall worse off. This might partially explain why more and more Variable Annuity products now include (basic) death benefit guarantees as standard features.

\section*{2.4 Conclusions}

This paper demonstrates that options that are attached to personal savings products can have negative marginal values, even if the holder of the option acts rationally and seeks to maximize her discounted expected payout. This result is in stark contrast to implications from standard arbitrage pricing, and it is driven solely by the consideration of appropriate tax treatments of different investments.

We illustrate the mechanics of negative option values with a simple two-period model: As the option induces an overall reduction in tax payments, both its issuer and the investor are being made strictly better off, at the expense of the government. Negative option values can arise, for instance, when an investment receives preferred tax treatments. This is the case with many retirement savings vehicles. In that spirit, we implement a Variable Annuity offered in the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>With GMDB</th>
<th>Without GMDB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\mathbb{E}^Q[\text{Guarantee}]$</td>
<td>3,610</td>
<td>3,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathbb{E}^Q[\text{Aggregate Fees}]$</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>10,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathbb{E}^Q[\text{Net Profit}]$</td>
<td>7,390</td>
<td>7,140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: ASL II: Net Present Value of Benefit and Premium Payments.
life insurance market, and identify the (very common) death benefit guarantee as having a negative marginal value to the insurer. This might perhaps explain why death benefit guarantees are nowadays standard in most Variable Annuity policies.

2.5 Appendix A: Two-Period Model — Derivation of Optimal Exercise Strategy and Behavior with Death Benefit Option

The death benefit option guarantees a payout of 100 in case the investor dies, and if she did not exercise at time 1. If she did exercise, the payout would be reduced by the same ratio as the withdrawal of 50 reduced the account value at the time. That is, if the investment account is at 118.75, the death benefit payout would be

\[
100 \cdot \frac{118.75 - 50}{118.75} \approx 57.89.
\]

Similarly, exercising at an account value of 66.5 would reduce the death benefit payment to

\[
100 \cdot \frac{66.5 - 50}{66.5} \approx 24.81.
\]

Naturally, payouts in the survival state remain unaffected. This yields the investment account trees with and without time-1 exercise in the “up” state, as displayed in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, respectively.

To determine the investor’s optimal exercise strategy when the asset appreciates in year one, we once again compute and compare her expected net present values using Equation (2.1). In the case of no exercise, we find \( V_u^0 = 110.23 \). Moreover, \( V_u^{50} = 67.69 \), which – together with the net
Figure 2.5: Evolution of Investment Account with Death Benefit Guarantee and Exercise at 118.75.
Figure 2.6: Evolution of Investment Account with Death Benefit Guarantee and no Exercise at $118.75$. 

(a) If Investor Survives to Maturity.

(b) If Investor Dies in Period 2.
withdrawal amount of 42.5 – adds up to 110.19, if she exercises. Therefore, the investor is better off not exercising at time 1 if her investment has increased to 118.75.

For the issuer, this implies that he gains 2.17 (in net present value terms) due to the less frequent use of the withdrawal guarantee. His additional payouts from the death benefit guarantee amount to

\[ PV_{DBG} = \frac{1}{1.072^2} \cdot 0.27 \cdot \left[ \frac{186}{275} \cdot \frac{89}{275} \cdot (21.03 + 5.22) + \left( \frac{89}{275} \right)^2 \cdot 13.84 \right] \approx 1.69 < 2.17, \]

which allows him to capture a profit of 0.48. This implies that the death benefit guarantee has a negative marginal value.
Bibliography


