The Interaction between Ethnic Relations and State Power: A Structural Impediment to the Industrialization of China, 1850-1911

Wei Li

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THE INTERACTION BETWEEN ETHNIC RELATIONS AND STATE POWER: A STRUCTURAL 
IMPEDIMENT TO THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF CHINA, 1850-1911

by

WEI LI

Under the Direction of Toshi Kii

ABSTRACT

The case of late Qing China is of great importance to theories of economic development. This study examines the question of why China’s industrialization was slow between 1865 and 1895 as compared to contemporary Japan’s. Industrialization is measured on four dimensions: sea transport, railway, communications, and the cotton textile industry. I trace the difference between China’s and Japan’s industrialization to government leadership, which includes three aspects: direct governmental investment, government policies at the macro-level, and specific measures and actions to assist selected companies and industries. Compared to the Meiji government, the Chinese government’s role in all of the three aspects was insufficient.

Furthermore, I explore why the Chinese government did not lead China’s economic development efficiently. The Manchu question—Manchu rule of Qing China and Manchu supremacy over other ethnic groups—triggered ethnic rebellions between the early 1850s and the early 1870s, which severely undermined the government in economic, political, and military terms. Ethnic rebellions in turn were caused by the government’s unequal ethnic policies that had established an ethnic hierarchy in the empire. Moreover, the government spent a disproportionate amount of funds on the Manchu stipend to financially support the group compared to the government’s investment in modern industries. The Manchu question surfaced after 1895 in the sense that pro-dynastic reforms attempted to deal with it. The 1911 Revolution eventually brought the Manchu question to an end.

INDEX WORDS: Qing government, Ethnic relations, Industrialization, Eight Banner system, Ethnic Inequality
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CHAPTER I: AN INTRODUCTION

Late Qing China’s economic transformation is of great importance to modern Chinese history and the geopolitics of modern East Asia. China began to industrialize during the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-95). The main thrust of this movement was military modernization and industrialization (1865-95). The movement lasted roughly three decades. In 1895 it ended abruptly with China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War.

In retrospect, the movement signified the first stage of China’s industrialization. During this period China began to change from a traditional agrarian society to a modern industrial society. As of 1895, a number of large-scale modern factories and facilities had been constructed in China. These projects were built by imitating Western technology and production and were new and foreign to the Chinese at the time. With the establishment of modern factories, capitalist relations of production appeared in China. Hence in socioeconomic terms the aforementioned three decades mark a period of significant changes in Chinese history.

The aforementioned changes notwithstanding, industrialization was slow in speed, limited in scope, and moderate in outcome when compared to that of contemporary Japan. The difference between the two countries had calamitous impact for China. Lacking a solid modern economic base to sustain its military campaign, China lost the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Consequently, China suffered significant financial and territorial losses. China had suffered qualitatively similar losses inflicted by Western powers, but nothing was comparable in scale. For instance, China paid 14.7 million tael1 of silver to Britain after the Opium War as compensation (Zhou 2000: 81). After the Sino-French War (1883-1884), China paid nothing to France. However, the Treaty of Maguan (Japanese: Shimonoseki) signed after the war stipulated that China pay 230 million tael of silver to Japan in three years and cede Taiwan to Japan (ibid: 318). Worse, the war ushered in a wave of territorial, financial, and political demands by imperial powers. China’s international relations deteriorated. Internally the war had a major impact on China’s

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1 A tael is approximately 37 grams. As an indicator of the relative value of a tael of silver, here I cite the amount of banner soldiers’ monthly stipend. The monthly stipend of banner soldiers stationed in the capital varied between 2-4 tael depending on rank (Ding 2003: 220). The stipend was supposed to support the soldier and his family members.
sociopolitical structure. The Qing government began to lose its ability to control and administer the society. A decade or so later, the Qing dynasty was subverted, which marked the end of dynastic empires that had existed in China for more than 2,000 years.

Prior to the late nineteenth century, China had been the cultural, economic, and political center of East Asia for close to two millenniums. China established its own “world-system,” which was maintained through rituals\(^2\) and economic ties\(^3\). In addition Chinese culture diffused to other parts of East Asia, including Japan. After 1895, however, the direction of cultural diffusion turned inward. Japan became the cultural center of East Asia, and China began to adopt cultural and technological elements from Japan.

Moreover, the Sino-Japanese War changed the geopolitics of East Asia and soon afterwards the world, whose implications are still felt today. After the war Japan acquired its first colony, Taiwan, from China, and began to expand its influence to the Korean peninsula, which was under Chinese suzerainty at the time. With the financial compensation that it extracted from China after the war, which amounted to the Japanese government’s four years revenue, Japan’s economic development accelerated. Backed by its economic strength, Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, which took place in China’s northeast region. Afterwards Japan expelled Russian influence from Korea and officially annexed the country in 1911. Japan became a full-fledged imperial power, and in the following decades it invaded many countries in Asia, including much of China, in attempt (together with Germany and Italy) to subvert the world socioeconomic structure established by Western European powers. Today Japan is the second economic power in the world in terms of GNP and industrial technology and China is still “catching up” rapidly. To understand the Chinese government’s push toward modernization and industrialization in contemporary China, one may have to step back to the three decades before the Sino-Japanese War (1865-1895), which mark the beginning of China’s industrialization. Building upon existing literature, this study intends to explore the factors that influenced China’s economic developments in the early stage of China’s industrialization. Particular attention will be given to the interaction between state policies and

\(^2\) The Chinese emperor conferred titles on rulers of its vassal states.
\(^3\) The vassal states submitted tributary goods to the Chinese emperor, and received gifts from the latter.
ethnic relations at the time and the impact of the interaction on the government’s capacity to lead China’s industrialization during the Self-Strengthening Movement in the last three decades of the 19th century.

EXISTING EXPLANATIONS

What accounted for China’s problematic industrialization between the 1860s and the 1890s? Why did Japan’s industrialization fare well during the same period? These two questions are intimately related. Five theories on economic development offer explanations to varying degrees. These theories are: A) the Marxian paradigm, B) the Weberian paradigm, C) the World-system theories, D) the development theory, and E) the late development theory. Below I introduce these theories as the theoretical background of the proposed study. Among the five theories, the Marxian and Weberian paradigms include both Marx’s and Weber’s classical works on state and economy and studies on China and Japan by later researchers using Marx’s and Weber’s basic approaches. The following review focuses on later studies as they are directly related to China and Japan.

A) The Marxian Paradigm

Marx (1859/1978: 3-5) argues that society includes economic infrastructure and legal and political superstructure. The economic infrastructure—including the relations of production and productive forces—determines the political superstructure. Marx argues that history evolved from Asiatic, ancient, and feudal societies to the capitalist mode of production. Regarding the reason for the existence of the Asiatic mode of production, Marx (1853/1978: 655) resorts to ecological factors such as climate and territorial conditions. The dry climate and large tracts of desert in Asia necessitated common use of water and artificial irrigation for agriculture. In Asia civilization was too low and the territory was too vast to facilitate voluntary association; instead despotic governments came into being. As revealed above, Marx also regards history as a progressive process. The feudal mode of production was critical to the rise of capitalism in Europe.

Recent Marxian researchers have dropped the notion that Asia was behind Europe prior to the Industrial Revolution in England. They recognize that Europe’s economic transformation benefited from the useful knowledge and technology borrowed from Asian civilizations. Nevertheless, they have
inherited the basic analytic tools from Marx, namely human ecology and feudalism. For instance, E. L. Jones (1981: 227) traces Europe’s flourishing economy from about 1400 to 1800 back to Europe’s “considerable geological, climatic, and topographical variety” that supposedly “endowed it with a dispersed portfolio of resources.” Furthermore, he contends that Europe possessed a number of advantages in location. Distance from the Central Asian horse nomads (Turkish and Mongol peoples) protected Europe from the worst ravages, yet at the same time the proximity of Islam culture to Europe was a positive external factor in Europe’s development. In addition to Europe’s natural endowments, a feudal system worked to its advantage in economic terms in that the relatively small European states—compared to Asian states—sought to attract and retain the most and best-paying subjects by supplying order and adjudication. By contrast, “despotic Asian institutions suppressed creativity or diverted it into producing voluptuous luxuries” (ibid: 231).

Similarly, Sanderson (1999) argues that environmental features and feudalism accounted for the economic development in Tokugawa Japan and the underdevelopment in Qing China. He claims that only Europe and Japan had the true feudal regimes in world history, and the feudal systems of Europe and Japan arose at about the same time and persisted for a similar length of time. European and Japanese feudal systems gave substantial freedom to their merchant classes to operate economically. In contrast, he argues that China did not possess the environmental characteristics and feudalism common to Europe and Japan.

In general, Marxian theorists focus on pre-1800 economic development in different parts of the world. Few Marxian theories have provided explanations of China’s slow economic development in the late nineteenth century. This study adds to the literature by examining the role of government in economic transformation.

B) The Weberian Paradigm

Weberian theorists tend to focus on the relationship between economic development and culture. Weber (1904/1993) claims that religion played a central role in the rise of capitalism in Western Europe. In contrast, Confucianism (Weber 1918/1951) had no concept of salvation and emphasized the adjustment
to the world. Confucians worked to gain wealth and then spent the money instead of saving and
reinvesting in future business as Protestants did. Hence capitalism did not rise in China.

In a similar vein, Robert N. Bellah (1957) contends that Chinese values lacked the elements found in
Japanese religions that paved the way for Japan’s industrialization in the nineteenth century. The central
value system in Tokugawa Japan—the Samurai ethic—combined Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian ideas
and mainly consisted of loyalty to one’s lord and asceticism. The ethic of the warrior class sufficiently
descended to the populace so that it became the ethic of the Japanese people. The religiously based ethic
played a central role in the industrialization of Meiji Japan: the Samurai class led a political movement
(the Meiji Restoration) of fundamental social changes to revere the emperor and expel the barbarians.
Then the newly created government in turn encouraged the development of a modern economy by
transforming the old warrior class into a great number of capable entrepreneurs who took leadership in
Japan’s industrialization. In addition to the vigorous industrialists, an obedient, hard-working, and frugal
labor force was found in abundance among the general population. The Chinese belief system had similar
and different elements. It was the differences that brought about China’s failure at industrialization. For
instance, while the Japanese emphasized loyalty, the Chinese emphasized filial piety. Whereas the
Japanese value system was political or goal-orientated, China was characterized by integrative values that
maintained the status quo (ibid: 188-189). Consequently, industrialization did not take place in China.

China’s current economic growth has prompted new interpretations of Chinese belief systems.
Harrell (1985) argues that the Chinese are a hard-working people and that the Chinese economic ethic
stems from the Chinese value or family orientation. In his view, the Chinese economic ethic is the ethic of
entrepreneurship, which is “the investment of one’s resources in a long-term quest to improve the material
well-being and security” of one’s family (ibid: 216). Similarly, Landes (2000: 2) attributes China’s
current economic growth to Chinese culture; he claims that “culture makes almost all the difference” in
economic development across the world.
Unlike the Weberian approach that emphasizes the relationship between the rise of capitalism and culture, this study seeks to examine the relationship between China’s industrialization and the role of the government. Further, I explore the influence of ethnic relations on the government’s role.

C. The World-System Theory

Wallerstein (1974, 1979) argues that the modern world system came into being in Europe between 1450 and 1640. The system consolidated by 1815, expanded to a global entity by 1917, and lastly consolidated up until now. The system consists of three interdependent areas: core, periphery, and semiperiphery. The core areas are the location of a complex variety of economic activities in the hands of indigenous bourgeoisie, with strong state systems. These societies have the greatest economic power within the world system by conducting the most advanced productive activities using advanced technology. The peripheral areas are those regions that are the least powerful and most severely exploited by the core. They produce high surplus value to the core mainly by exporting raw agricultural and mineral products. The semiperipheral zone falls in between the core and periphery in terms of the levels of economic development and political power. It buffers the political tensions between the other two zones and meanwhile facilitates the economic intercourse between them. All three zones add up to a world-economy in the sense that the various areas have come to be dependent upon each other for their specialized roles.

The dependency theory generated by A. G. Frank and a group of Latin American scholars offers a scheme similar to the world-system theory. In addressing the underdevelopment of Latin America, Frank (1972) contends that it stems not from the indigenous feudalism but from the metropolis-satellite structure in which Latin America has been dependent on and exploited by Europe and later the U.S. for centuries. Consequently both the developed and backward sectors of Latin America’s economy are results of its dependency on the metropolis-satellite structure. Regarding Japan’s economic development in the late nineteenth century, Frank argues that Meiji Japan was relatively independent.

Applying Wallerstein’s theory to late nineteenth century East Asia, Frances Moulder (1977) emphasizes the significance of Western impact on China and Japan in relations to the two countries’
development. In her view, the different outcomes of China and Japan’s economic transformation were due to the two countries’ different positions in the world-system. China’s incorporation into the world economic system was much greater than Japan’s. Consequently, China was exploited by the West and its development was thwarted. Moulder looks at four variables in her comparison of the incorporation of China and Japan into the world system: trade, investment, political incorporation, and missionary penetration. She argues that Western powers were more interested in China than in Japan and consequently “Japan remained relatively autonomous within the world system whereas China was incorporated as a dependent satellite” (Moulder 1977: 199).

It is debatable whether the world-system theory is applicable to East Asia. Sugiyama (1988: 26) points out that the dependency and world-system theories are inapplicable to East Asia since Western influence was limited in the region prior to 1900. More specifically, Sugiyama charges that Moulder has misunderstood some basic facts about China’s and Japan’s economic ties with the West. He argues that China’s incorporation into the world system was less pronounced than Japan’s. This proposed study does not intend to judge the validity of Moulder’s and Sugiyama’s arguments. Rather, it seeks to take a closer look at China’s industrialization at a time when China was facing challenges from the West. My primary research interest is to examine factors that inhibited China’s industrialization processes.

D. The Development Theory

In explaining economic development, Rostow (1971) seeks to build a theory of production through examining distribution of income between consumption, saving, and investment as well as the composition of investment and development within particular sectors of the economy. Rostow argues that a highly developed economy goes through five stages: traditional, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and, lastly, high mass-consumption. Of the five stages, the take-off state corresponds to industrialization. Rostow’s (ibid: 24-29) observation of the preconditions for take-off (or industrialization) boils down to two main points. Politically a country needs a leading group—motivated by “reactive nationalism” appearing under the threat of control by the more advanced nations—that is determined to push the economy upward. This group in most countries is the government. Economically the government
must raise overall social capital through taxation on agriculture and extractive industries and use the capital to build infrastructure.

Rostow observes that take-off (industrialization) happened in China in the 1950s, whereas in Japan industrialization took place in the 1870s and 1880s. However, Rostow has not clearly stated the reason for China’s belated industrialization. Why did industrialization not take place in China in the late nineteenth century like it did in Japan? One might infer from his theory that Qing China’s government was weak and did not invest sufficient capital in modern infrastructure. If this is true, then the next question arises: Why did the Qing government not invest sufficient capital in the economy? Put in a different way, why did the Qing government not provide sufficient leadership in China’s economic development? This study intends to explore these questions by examining the interplay between the government and ethnic relations in Qing China.

E. The Late Development Theory

First of all, lateness is relative. For some scholars the reference point is the English Industrial Revolution. Thus Alexander Gerschenkron (1965) speaks of German industrialization after the 1850s as a case of late development. Others (Amsden 1989) lump Germany with Britain in relation to industrialization of countries in Asia and Latin America, and label the latter as late developers. Albert Hirschman (1968) has applied Gerschkron’s ideas to Latin American countries, speaking of their “late, late” industrialization after the WWII. In any case, researchers of the late development model unanimously agree that government intervention is crucial to late industrialization. During the processes of the industrialization of early developers, such as Western European countries, states provided the suitable economic environment for development by making laws and regulations. In contrast, states of late developers must preside over industrialization and actively intervene in economic activities.

Gerschenkron (1965: 17-19) is one of the pioneers to explore the frontier of the role of the state in late industrialization. In Russia, one of his primary cases of late development in Europe, Gerschenkron argues that the government assumed the role of the primary agent propelling the industrialization of the country in the 1880s and 1890s.
The level of economic development in Russia was incomparably lower than that of Western European countries prior to the industrialization of Russia. The state realized the necessity to develop the economy through military conflicts with Western Europe. In 1861 the government abolished serfdom to remove the obstacle to industrialization. Similarly, the judicial and administrative reforms in the following years created a suitable framework for industrial development. Further, in the middle of the 1880s, the state began to build railways and to promote industrialization policies through various devices such as preferential orders to domestic producers of railway materials, price control, credits, and subsidies. The government also reformed the taxation system to finance modern projects. Finally, the government established a modern financial system to channel capital to industry, for the scarcity of capital was such that no private banking system could succeed in attracting sufficient funds. The ruble was stabilized and the gold standard was established to attract foreign participation in the development of Russian industry.

Hirschman (1958) looks at the role of the state from a different perspective. Hirschman focuses on the “late late developers” in Latin America and argues that the principal problem with Latin American countries is not capital accumulation, but the dearth of entrepreneurship, defined as “the perception of investment opportunities and their transformation into actual investments” (ibid: 35). Hence those with resources to invest are unwilling to make the decisions to turn their wealth into actual productive activities. He sees the state as a potential source of providing incentives for the wealthy and thereby inducing them to become entrepreneurs.

In terms of their views on the key factors promoting economic development, the theories reviewed above may be classified into two camps: theories that emphasize the role of the state and theories that highlight other factors. The former includes Rostow’s theory, and the latter includes Marxian, Weberian, Wallersteinian theories. I echo Rostow’s insight that government plays a determining role in economic transformation. Recent literature on state and economy further indicates that state intervention was the major reason for the success of the newly industrialized economies in postwar East Asia.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE STUDY

This study utilizes the insights from two major theoretical frameworks: the state and economy theory and the social construction of ethnicity theory. Following the state and economy theory, I attempt to examine the role of the state in China’s early stage of industrialization process in the era of 1865-1895. The theoretical insights of social construction of ethnicity guide my study of the relationship between the state and ethnic relations.

A. State and Economy: The East Asian Development Model

Inspired by Gerschenkron and Hirschman’s works, some researchers have studied East Asian success after WWII from the perspective of late development. The basic theme of the East Asian development model is that state intervention is necessary for late development. The degrees of state involvement in economic transformation vary depending on the timing of industrialization. Generally the later industrialization of a nation, the greater the state involvement has to be because the country needs not only to industrialize but also to catch up with the earlier developers. During the First Industrial Revolution, the British government intervened to maintain law and order, and to minimize the outflow of technology to foreign countries. In the Second Industrial Revolution in Germany and the US, states intervened to protect infant industries (Amsden 1989: 12-13). To industrialize in the twentieth century greater government support is required. States not only have to protect infant industries, but also to provide entrepreneurs with incentives, including tariff protection and subsidies.

Amsden (1989) argues that the South Korean state intervened by mediating market forces. The state set up multiple prices in order to create profitable investment opportunities for private investors. More importantly, the state exercised discipline over private firms. Discipline comprised two dimensions: penalizing poor performers and rewarding good ones. Penalty took two forms: The first was rationalization, and the second was the government’s refusal to bail out badly managed, bankrupt firms. Good firms were rewarded licenses to expand, to enter more lucrative sectors. Hence state discipline facilitated the development of large-scale diversified business groups.
At the stage of economic development where latecomers already have basic industry but without high-tech industry, government intervention is greater and more systematic in promoting high-tech industry and modern services than in promoting labor-intensive and mid-tech industry. A key component of the upgrading of the economy is to expand the scale of firms. Taiwan is a good example. Electronic assembly (particularly computers) was a leading sector in upgrading the economy. Taiwan initially depended on import of parts and components from US and Japanese vendors due to lack of cutting-edge technologies. The government played the leading role in promoting local substitution of high-tech foreign components. It created a government-owned research institute and benefited many businesses (Amsden and Chu 2003: 15).

Wade’s (1990) governed market (GM) theory emphasizes government intervention in markets. Whereas neoclassical economic theories emphasize sufficient resource allocation through freely functioning markets as the principle force for economic growth, the GM theory stresses capital accumulation generated by government adjustment of market mechanisms as the force of growth. The GM theory explains the superior performance of East Asian economies as the result of investment different in both degree and composition from other less developed economies. In addition, governments intervened to adjust certain prices so as to change the signals to which market agents responded, and used non-price means to alter the behavior of the agents (ibid: 29).

In a broad sense Amsden (2001) generalizes that the rise of “the rest” is attributable to government intervention in economy. “The rest” refers to China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand in Asia; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico in Latin America, and Turkey in the Middle East (ibid: 1). After World War II they became world-class competitors in mid-technology industries by devising a new economic model, or an original control mechanism different from the market-driven control mechanism of the earlier developers such as Britain, Germany, and the US. The new mechanism revolved around the principle of reciprocal subsidies to make manufacturing profitable enough to attract entrepreneurs. Governments set performance standards for private entrepreneurs. Those who met the standards were rewarded subsidies and were further induced to be results-oriented (ibid: 8, 125).
“The rest” failed to industrialize and were lagged far behind the West between 1850 and 1950 for lack of proprietary technology and skills needed for industrial production. To catch up, “the rest” needed to make the “three-pronged investment.” First, “the rest” needed to enlarge their firms by investing more in up-to-date machinery. Second, “the rest” needed modern management. Third, the “rest” needed to establish and expand distribution networks, which were decisive for competitiveness in consumer goods industries (ibid: 70-85).

Industrial transformation of latecomers depends on state structures and roles. Most states combine several roles in assisting one sector, and patterns of government involvement can be identified depending on how roles are combined. The patterns in turn depend on the internal organization of states. The ideal type of the structure is what Evans calls “embedded autonomy,” whose meaning is twofold. First, selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards create among the officials a sense of corporate coherence, which gives state apparatus a kind of autonomy. Second, autonomy is embedded in a set of social ties that binds the state to society. Embedded autonomy provides the structural basis for successful state intervention in industrial development (Evans 1995: 12).

The intrinsic nexus between the state and economy is determined by the nature of the state. States have always intervened to spur economic development in modern world history. In general, states perform four roles. Making war and ensuring internal order are the basic tasks. Following them are the tasks to foster economic transformation and guarantee minimal levels of welfare (Evans 1995: 5).

If it is true that fostering economic development is one of the basic tasks of all states, then one wonders about the role played by the state in China’s industrialization in the late nineteenth century. Drawing on the late development theory and the case studies of postwar East Asian countries, and more importantly, political economic theory of the relations between the state and economy, I inquire into the role of or the lack thereof the state in the early phase of China’s industrialization. Furthermore, I explore various social, cultural, and historical factors related to the state’s role in China’s economic development in the historical context of the late 19th century.

B. Social Construction of Ethnicity
This study further examines the interplay between ethnic relations and ethnic policies. When studying ethnic issues in Qing China, I utilize the social constructionist perspective. The social constructionist perspective emphasizes the socially constructed aspects of race and ethnicity. It stresses the “fluid, situational, volitional, and dynamic character of ethnic identification, organization, and action” (Nagel 1994: 152). Nagel argues individuals and groups construct ethnicity using two basic building blocks: identity and culture. Individuals and groups create and recreate their collective histories and the content and meaning of their culture, and negotiate the membership boundaries of their group.

Ethnic identity is closely associated with the issue of ethnic boundaries. Barth (1969) conceives ethnicity as a system of group boundaries that includes members and excludes others through interaction between the groups. According to the constructionist model, ethnic identities and boundaries are the results of internal and external opinions and labeling processes. Individuals may select their ethnic identities from a set of ethnic categories depending on the social settings where interaction occurs, but those categories are socially and poetically defined by society at large with varying degrees of stigma and advantages attached to them. Official ethnic categories are generally political (Nagel 1994).

Nagel (1995) further argues that ethnic groups compete for scarce economic and political resources. She points out a set of historical and societal factors promoting ethnic competition. Among the historical factors are the split labor market and the “cultural division of labor,” which refers to “segregated ethnic communities characterized by great inequalities of wealth, power, and status” (ibid: 446). A third historical factor is ethnic entrepreneurs, that is, “ethnic small business owners who sell to a different ethnic clientele” (ibid: 447). Contemporary factors include immigration, access to political office, and control over political polities. Ethnic competition may increase ethnic identification and group formation, prejudice and racism, inter-group conflict, and ethnic mobilization. In short, competition stimulates group formation.

Regarding ethnic relations in Qing China, this study will focus on the influence of the state on ethnic boundaries and inequalities. Using historical documents, I attempt to examine the role of the state in shaping ethnic relations in the empire. I would argue that ethnic identity was socially constructed by the
state in certain historical context. Ethnic boundaries were maintained and re-defined based on the
dynamics of the relationship between the state and different ethnic groups.

This chapter has raised the question of what caused the problematic industrialization of China
between 1865 and 1895 and has introduced major existing theoretical explanations. It also has suggested
that the basic approach of this study is to link economic development with the state’s role and ethnic
relations. The next chapter gives an overview of ethnic issues in the Qing. Furthermore, to explore
China’s industrialization in the late nineteenth century, one needs to look at the economic foundations for
industrialization. The next chapter addresses this issue as well.
CHAPTER II: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Recent Chinese and English scholarship reveals that Qing economic development reached an unprecedented level in Chinese history (Gao 1999, Pomeranz 2000, Smith 2003). The new perspective is quite different from the popular wisdom that China after the Song dynasty (960-1279) declined into stagnant status in nearly all aspects of life. In the 1980s, Western historians of China began to build on the research of Chinese and Japanese historians to envision a second socioeconomic transformation in Chinese history, one that extended from roughly the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, spanning the Ming and the Qing. They (Lee 1999, Smith 2003) highlighted a number of key elements in the Ming-Qing transformation: the influx of silver from the New World and Japan, the economic upsurge of the sixteenth century with concomitant commercialization of agriculture, expansion of production in both rural and urban areas (proto-industrialization), inter-regional trade in bulk staples, the maturation of urban centers in many regions, the growth of educational and cultural activates, and the consequent socioeconomic stratification of the Chinese.

Chinese scholars have pointed out similar developments in the Qing economy. According to Gao (1999), the size of reclaimed land doubled in the Qing compared to the preceding Ming, and crop production increased considerably due to the induction of corn, potato, sweet potato, and other crops from Americas. Meanwhile population in the Qing reached approximately 400 million, nearly three times as many as that of the Ming dynasty. Furthermore, commercialization of agricultural products, largely cotton and staple foods, reached a higher level, and cross-regional commercial networks came into place in the Qing.

Recent English scholarship on pre-1800 China portrays a society characterized by dynamic social and economic changes comparable to contemporary Europe. Research by American historians has identified a number of key factors in China’s society and economy that allegedly were unique to Europe. For instance, North and Thomas (1973) assert that the development of property right regimes accounted for the rise of capitalism in Western Europe. They trace the development of property rights to increasing economic scarcity, which was caused in turn by population growth in Western Europe. Mann (1986: 504-
maintains that the development of capitalism resulted from long-term changes in European agriculture from as early as the twelfth century. The drainage and utilization of wet soils increased agricultural yields and created a sustainable surplus for trade. Meanwhile, long-distance trade, especially the “North-South Corridors” across Europe, linking the northern shores of the Mediterranean and North-western Europe, stimulated the European economic dynamic.

Wong (1997: 52-58) argues that China shared a set of critical features with Europe such as demographic dynamics, agricultural commercialization, and protoindustrialization, by which Wong means the expansion of the production of handcrafts to rural areas. Pomeranz (2000) systematically demonstrates that Europe’s “unique characteristics” that allegedly put the region on the path to capitalism by 1800—such as demographic and ecological factors, accumulation of capital, markets, credit, etc.—were largely shared by China. What later set Europe apart from China, he argues, were Europe’s economic ties with the new world, which eased Europe’s land and energy constraints and thus gave Europe an edge over China.

Frank (1998) argues that a world economy had existed before the rise of European capitalism. Europe’s position in the China-dominated world system was marginal, but Europe benefited from its backwardness. It was Europe’s backwardness that “permitted its ascendance after 1800” (ibid: 37). His argument echoes that of Hodgson (1993), who emphasizes the importance of the Afro-Eurasian commercial network to the development of Europe, or “the great Western transmutation.” In Hodgson’s view, Europe was the beneficiary of the cross-continental network reinforced by Muslim merchants: it borrowed useful elements from other civilizations such as gun powder, the compass, printing, and a civil service examination system from China. In a similar vein, Blaut (1993) highlights the effect of external sources on Europe’s transformation: the massive flow of wealth and labor power from American colonies was the basic factor that explains Europe’s rapid development after 1492. From a purely technological point of view, Blaut continues, Chinese sailors were able to travel to the new world. Yet the Chinese had a geographical disadvantage: the Americas were further away from Asia than from Europe.
Contrary to some sociologists’ assertion that Qing China was behind Tokugawa Japan in economic terms (Collins 1997, Sanderson 1999), historians of China argue that China’s level of economic development was similar to that of Tokugawa Japan. For instance, John Lee (1999) argues that both China and Japan had highly commercialized agriculture, expanding handicraft production, substantial growth in monetization and urbanization, and rational ways to manage resources.

It may be concluded from the works cited above that Europe, China, and Japan were all at the stage of protocapitalism prior to 1800. Here it is meaningful to differentiate between modern capitalism and protocapitalism. Capitalism in the Marxian tradition is a particular mode of production, a combination of relations of production and productive forces. Marx (1867/1967) distinguishes between two forms of capitalism. In his analysis, capitalism first began in the sixteenth century in Western Europe in the form of merchant capitalism. After the English Industrial Revolution the “true” form of capitalism, i.e. industrial capitalism, began. Marx argues that industrial capitalism depends on three factors. First is private ownership of the means of production by the bourgeoisie. The second is free wage labor provided by the proletariat. The third factor is the purpose of production, namely to generate surplus value for the bourgeoisie.

Weber argues that capitalism in various forms existed in human history. Modern capitalism has six basic characteristics absent in former forms of capitalism (Sanderson 1999: 140):

1. appropriation of the means of production as the property of autonomous private industrial enterprises;
2. the absence of irrational constraints on market exchange;
3. rational development of technology in the form of mechanization;
4. calculable law;
5. free labor; and
6. the general commercialization of economic life.

Both Marx and Weber emphasize that capitalism is a specific type of relations of production. The bourgeoisie owns the means of production and the proletariat sells their labor freely on the market. Both agree on the importance of technology and production to capitalism. Weber stresses the technological aspect of capitalism, and Marx argues that the Industrial Revolution marked the beginning of modern capitalism.
The meaning of protocapitalism is rarely clearly defined by researchers. For example, in his study on
the rise of capitalism in the world, the sociologist Stephen Sanderson (1999) argues that it is critical to
make distinctions between modern capitalism and protocapitalism. Sanderson adopts a Wallersteinian
view of capitalism, defining it as “an economic system in which commodities are produced for sale in a
market and in which the economic objective is to realize a profit and to accumulate capital of over time”
(ibid: 140). He vaguely defines protocapitalism as “early forms of capitalism” (ibid: 141). Blaut (1993)
views protocapitalism as the progress toward industrialization and capitalism.

From the works of a number of researchers who have written on the subject, it may be inferred
that protocapitalism in general included the following features: division of labor and specialization
in handicrafts industries, and protoindustrialization, by which Wong (1997: 52-58) means the
expansion of the production of handicrafts to rural areas; commercialization of agriculture and inter-
regional trade in bulk staples (Mann 1986: 504-509, Smith 2003: 2-5); urbanization (Collins 1997);
accumulation of capital and growth of markets (Pomeranz 2000). Based on these similarities it may
be concluded that China, Japan, and Western Europe were at the stage of proto-capitalism as of the

If it is true that pre-1800 China, Europe, and Japan were at similar levels of economic
development, and given the fact that industrialization took place in Europe after 1800 and several
decades later in Japan, then it may be inferred that China’s economic environment was largely
suitable for industrialization when it started in the 1860s. This study intends to explore why China’s
industrialization did not yield significant outcomes. It will examine the government’s socioeconomic
policies during the 1860s and 1890s. Further, it will study what affected the government’s capacity
to lead the country’s economic transformation. Since the Qing was a multiethnic empire and ethnic
relations were a major element in Qing sociopolitical life, I will link ethnic issues with the
government’s ethnic policies to examine how the state incorporated the various ethnic territories into
the empire and how ethnic relations affected state power. The next section gives an overview of the
basic pattern of ethnic issues in the multiethnic empire.
THE MANCHU QUESTION

The Qing was a multiethnic empire comprised of six major ethnic territories: the Manchus living in the northeast (Manchuria), the Mongols in Mongolia, the Chinese in China proper, the Tibetans in Tibet, the Miao in the southwest, and the Uyghurs in the northwest or modern Xinjiang. Manchu rulers established the empire by conquering and incorporating the above ethnic groups into the Qing between the late sixteenth century and the mid-eighteenth century. Like the three empires that partially coexisted with it, the Qing was a multiethnic empire ruled by a numerically small ethnic group who comprised 1-2% of the total population of the empire. In the Habsburg empire (1382-1918), the ruling ethnic group had long been the Germans who as of 1910 constituted 23.8% of the entire population (Sugar 1997: 8-9). The ruling group of the Ottoman empire (1299-1918) was a Turkish-speaking Muslim people, yet the subjects living in the lands under Ottoman rule included a large number of Arabs and Slavs. The case most similar to the Qing as an “alien” dynasty was the Mughal empire (1526-1857) established by a Turkish-speaking Muslim people who originated in modern Afghan and invaded the Indian subcontinent. While the ruler of Mughal empire was a numerical minority from the Muslim culture, the majority of the subjects were Hindus. A minority ethnic group’s rule of a large empire was universal, and presumably this is the very nature of empires (Esherick et al. 2006: 5).

The basic mechanism of minority rule was “divide and rule.” Hence empires ruled various ethnic groups according to different rules and prohibited the subordinate groups from interacting with each other (ibid). In the Qing, Manchu emperors enacted specific laws about ethnic-territory as well. The result was the state’s unequal treatments of the various ethnic groups. Of great importance were ethnic boundaries and inequalities between the Manchus as the dominant group and the Chinese, the most populous group in the empire. Manchu rule of Qing China and Manchu supremacy over other ethnic groups were distinctive characteristics of Qing sociopolitical structure. Manchu rule and Manchu supremacy were intimately related. I synthesize the two issues and term the combined entity as “the Manchu question.” In other words, the Manchu question had two aspects: Manchu rule and Manchu supremacy.
MANCHU RULE OF QING CHINA

Three factors rendered Manchu rule a complex issue. First, the Manchus were a numerical minority group whose population was disproportionately less than that of the Chinese. The Manchus constituted less than 2% of the entire population of the empire, whereas the Chinese constituted over 90% of the population and lived in the largest territory. The small population of the Manchus probably gave Manchu emperors a sense of insecurity. They set up a set of political and administrative measures to ensure Manchu political domination. These measures favored the Manchus at the expense of the Chinese. For instance, in the political field, about half of the top positions of the central bureaucracy were reserved for Manchu candidates while the other half were reserved for Chinese. The system was called “Manchu-Chinese diarchy” (Man-Han canban). The Manchu share of the positions was disproportionate to their numbers and was therefore unequal. Furthermore, the Manchu-Chinese diarchy existed only in some departments in the capital. Chinese were excluded from certain state organizations such as the Court of Colonial Affairs dealing with foreign affairs and non-Chinese affairs within the empire. At the provincial level Manchus constituted the majority of the govern-generals\(^4\) and roughly half of the governors throughout the dynasty (Rhoads 2000: 14).

Manchu-Chinese diarchy in a sense resembled the administrative structure of India under British control between 1858 and 1914. During this period India was ruled by a viceroy of the British throne and Indian affairs were in the charge of a secretary of state of India. The upper echelons of the colonial bureaucracy were exclusively British officials recruited through civil service examinations held in London. Indians in practice were excluded from the examinations and they staffed only the lower levels of the administration (Bose and Jalal 1998: 99).

Military was an important force to buttress political rule. Manchu rulers kept an army they trusted and gave the soldiers better training and higher stipends. The banner troops were created by Manchu rulers before the conquest of China in 1644. Indeed they were the main force that conquered China. After the conquest Manchu emperors preserved the banner troops alongside the Chinese Green Standard with

\(^4\) Governor-generals in principle were in charge of two provinces whereas governors were in charge of one province.
the ratio roughly at 1:3 and further kept the Chinese army under the surveillance of the banner troops
(Rhoads 2000, Zhou 2000, Ding 2003). Qing military structure resembled the British military in India.
Before 1857, British rule was backed by a mercenary army whose soldiers recruited from the upper-caste
peasants in northern India and Bihar in eastern India, belonging to the English East India Company. In
1805, the company’s armed forces totaled 155,000 (Bose and Jalal 1998: 68). In the wake of the 1857
Mutiny, Britain reorganized the army around the principle that European-Indian ratio would never fall
below 1:2. The purpose was to ensure British control of the army and, by extension, India (ibid: 98).
Finally, like European soldiers in India, Manchu soldiers enjoyed higher status and were paid better than
their Chinese counterparts.

The second problem was Manchu culture. Cultural differences and similarities might affect the ways
that two peoples perceive each other, giving each group a sense of distance or closeness between them.
The Manchus were an ethnic group whose culture differed greatly from that of the Chinese. The Manchu
language belonged to the agglutinative, atonal, and multi-syllabic Altaic family, whereas the Chinese
language belonged to the Chinese-Tibetan family characterized by analytic sentence structure, single
syllable, and tones. Linguistic differences suggest limited interaction in the formative stages of the two
peoples.

In addition, certain visible elements of Manchu culture—such as clothing and hairstyle—were
noticeably different from those of the Chinese. In terms of economic activities the Chinese were a
sedentary people whose dominate mode of production was agriculture, whereas the Manchus were a
semi-nomadic people engaging in fishing, gathering, and hunting. In general the Manchu way of life was
quite different from that of the Chinese.

Moreover, the Manchu and Chinese cultures were incomparable in terms of length of time. For
instance, the writing system was an important component of the culture of a people. At the point of the
conquest the Manchu writing system had existed for only about 40 years, and the refined form of the
system had been in existence for only 20 years, whereas the Chinese characters had been a mature writing
system for about 2,000 years. Over the course of time the Chinese had accumulated rich literature, arts,
and ideology that inspired the Manchus to learn even before they entered China proper. After they conquered China proper the Manchus gradually gave up much of their original culture and adopted that of the Chinese: the Chinese language, the writing system, and ideology. Manchu emperors forced the Chinese to accept certain Manchu ethnic markers such as the male hairstyle and dress. Forced assimilation triggered resistance and had a long-lasting impact on the Chinese.

The third problem was the legitimacy of Manchu rule. The Manchus at the point of the conquest were a new ethnic group created by the state Later Jin. The Manchus, whose main body was the Jurchens, were created out of the various ethnic groups in Northeast Asia by Later Jin. The Later Jin was established by Nurgachi in 1616 and was renamed as the Qing in 1635 during the reign of Hong Taiji. The Manchus had never ruled China proper previously, but the preceding Chinese dynasty, the Ming, had ruled the Manchus, albeit indirectly. Thus how to justify Manchu rule of China was a critical question for Manchu rulers. They resorted to the Confucian ideology of the relations between the ruler and the ruled, stressing the latter’s obligation of absolute loyalty to the former (Wang 2001, 2002). The strategy had mixed effects. It partially succeeded in the sense that Manchu rulers managed to maintain their rule for nearly three centuries. However, the strategy failed as well, since Chinese subjects never fully accepted Manchu rule as legitimate, as evidenced in the Chinese rebellions throughout the dynasty. From a Chinese perspective, Manchu rule was alien and unfair since state policies favored the Manchus at the expense of the Chinese, as outlined in the next section.

**MANCHU SUPREMACY OVER OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS**

The second aspect of the Manchu question was economic, social, and political inequalities between the Manchus and other ethnic groups created and reinforced by the state. In the economic field, while the Manchus were exempt from state taxation, the Chinese were subject to pay land tax and the canal transportation tax. In addition, the Manchus received state financial assistance in the forms of stipends and rations of rice on a monthly basis. I term the stipend as the Manchu stipend. Politically the Manchus received preferential treatment in entering the bureaucracy and obtaining appointment and tenure. Legally
the Manchus were subject to a different system that stipulated lenient treatment of Manchu suspects and convicts.

Manchu rule and Manchu supremacy constituted and reinforced each other. Manchu-Chinese inequality did not exist before the Manchus entered China proper in 1644. After the conquest the Manchus were immersed in the vast majority of the Chinese. To ensure Manchu rule hence became a challenging task for Manchu rulers. They gave preferential treatment to the Manchus to win their support for the dynasty. Indeed all the ethnic boundaries and inequalities including residential segregation, the ban on intermarriage, and unequal treatments of the two groups, or in the words of the court, the separate governance of the Manchus and the Chinese (Man-Han fenzhi), were created and sanctioned by the state. After the downfall of the Qing state in 1911, Manchu supremacy disappeared.

The essence of the Manchu question is minority rule on the basis of ethnic inequality. What complicated the Manchu question was the incorporation of other ethnic groups into the Qing and their relative sociopolitical positions in the empire. Materials presented in chapter V suggest that an ethnic hierarchy existed in the Qing. The Manchus and the Mongols occupied the top notch, followed by the Chinese in the middle, and on the bottom were the Miao, the Uyghurs, and the Tibetans. As the hierarchy was unequal in nature, it generated serious sociopolitical problems. These problems led to ethnic rebellions which in turn impeded China’s industrialization in the nineteenth century.

CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION

This study seeks to shed some light on the question of why the economic development of China was slow during the Self-Strengthening Movement (1865-95). Economic development here is defined as industrialization. According to Jary and Jary (1991: 232), the commonly used indicators of industrialization are: “(a) the percentage of the labor force employed in the industrial and service sectors compared with primary production and (b) manufacturing output as a proportion of gross national product.” If we use these indicators to study China’s industrialization, we would need statistics on Qing China’s labor force composition and GNP. At present these data are unavailable. In this study I will therefore look at the development of modern industries.
Based on Rostow’s (1971) argument about the importance of infrastructure to industrialization, I examine the development of modern transport and communication networks in Qing China. Transport system under the nineteenth century circumstance was comprised of steamship and railway, and communication networks consisted of telegraph and the postal service system. Further, I will look at the cotton textile industry, one of the few fast-growing modern industries in China that contributed to the industrialization of the country. The cotton textile industry in fact was an important industry to industrialization in world history. It was a labor-intensive industry with a large number of workers. In addition, cotton products were relatively cheaper than, for instance, silk products, and therefore had a relatively large customer base. Demand in turn might spur production. Because of these factors the cotton textile industry played the leading role in the industrialization of many societies including Britain and Japan (Takamura 1994).

The proposed study will compare China’s industrialization to Japan’s since the two countries’ economic transformation was closely related. First of all the Self-Strengthening Movement and the Meiji Restoration started at roughly the same time. Both China and Japan began to modernize in the 1860s. The first modern factory in China, Jiangnan Manufacturing Bureau, was established in 1865, which signaled the beginning of China’s industrialization. In Japan systematic effort at industrialization began after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Thus by 1895 China’s industrialization was under way for a similar length of time as Japan’s. More importantly, the Self-Strengthening Movement was brought to an end by the Sino-Japanese War. China was ultimately defeated by Japan because it lacked a strong foundation to sustain its first modern war. China’s industrialization suffered a major setback due to the influence of the defeat on Chinese politics and war indemnity paid to Japan. In fact, after the war, the conditions for China’s development deteriorated and construction of large modern projects by the state stopped. The Self-Strengthening Movement came to an abrupt end (Yu 1994). In sum, China’s first stage of industrialization was ruined by Japan’s invasion, which was backed up by its superior industrial strength. In a sense, China’s industrialization between 1865 and 1895 was aborted by Japan’s rapid and successful industrialization during the same period.
This project seeks to study China’s industrialization by looking at the interaction between state power and ethnic relations. First, I ask the following questions: What was the status of China’s industrialization between 1865 and 1895? What was the differences between China’s and Japan’s industrialization in major sectors? To answer the questions, I will look at the growth of major industries and compare China’s economic development with Japan’s.

Next, I will consider whether China’s problematic economic development between 1865 and 1895 was caused by insufficient government leadership. I will look at the Qing government’s economic policies in three respects: direct government investment, macro-level policies aimed at promoting industrialization, and specific actions that the government took to assist selected industries and companies. I will compare the Qing government’s economic policies with those of the Japanese government to understand the differing roles played by the different states. Drawing on the theories of government intervention in economic development, I will examine China’s economic policies in relation to ethnic conflicts at the time. I will argue that China’s tardy economic development, compared to Japan’s, was probably due to disruption of the state caused by a series of large-scale ethnic rebellions. These ethnic rebellions in turn were caused by the government’s unequal ethnic policies. The interaction between ethnic relations and state power ultimately affected China’s industrialization between 1865 and 1895.

To comprehend the significance of ethnic relations in Qing politics and how ethnic relations adversely affected state power in the mid- to late nineteenth century, one needs to go back at least to 1851, when the anti-Manchu Taiping Rebellion broke out, and examine the economic, social, and political implications of the rebellion. The Taiping rebellion, together with other ethnic rebellions between the early 1850s and the early 1870s, impacted the government drastically and severely undermined the government’s ability to lead China’s economic development in the subsequent years. Moreover, to fully address the issue of ethnic relations, one must look at the last decade of the Qing when ethnic discord surfaced and eventually led to the end of the empire.
CHAPTER III: DESIGN OF THE PROJECT

This chapter gives an overall depiction of the proposed project by addressing the following questions. The first is my theoretical approach to China’s industrialization. I look at the question from the perspective of state-society relations. Secondly I explain why I bring in Japan when studying China. Next I give a brief account of the process by which I formulated my hypothesis. Fourth I explain how I collected the data used in this study. Fifth, I briefly describe how I analyzed the data. Sixth, I define the important terms used this study. Finally, I outline the case chapters.

A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO CHINA’S INDUSTRIALIZATION

This study adopts a multidisciplinary approach to late Qing China’s industrialization. It combines political economic and sociological perspectives and historical research methods to explore the issue. First, I take a political economic approach to economic development, which regards fostering economic development as a basic function of the state. More specifically two theories using this approach serve as the theoretical foundations of the proposed study. The late development theory derived from the experiences of late nineteenth century Eastern Europe and postwar Latin America has demonstrated the significance of the state’s role in industrialization. The East Asian development model based on postwar East Asian economic success enumerates the specific measures taken by Eastern Asian states to foster industrialization. The essence of the model stresses the role of government intervention in late industrialization compared to limited government involvement in economic affairs of the early developers such as Britain and the US.

Meiji Japan is generally considered as a successful late developer. In my view late Qing China was a late developer as well in terms of the timing of the beginning of its industrialization, and its problem supports the basic theme of the East Asian Development model from a different angle. Qing China’s failure lay in insufficient government leadership, whereas the successful industrialization of the other economies after WWII can be attributed to strong and effective government intervention in the economy. The case of Qing China and postwar Asian economies share the same underlying theme: successful economic transformation depends on effective government intervention.
Second, in addition to studying the relationship between the state and economy, this study adopts the sociological perspective to examine how society affects the state’s ability to make policies to promote industrialization. More precisely it explores how the state and society interact with each other, how the interplay affects the power of the state, and how the state in particular social circumstance makes economic policies. I intend to examine the issues in two steps. First I compare the roles of the governments of Qing China and Meiji Japan to see whether any differences existed between them. If any significant differences are found, then I examine whether the differences contributed to the disparity in the outcomes of economic transformation between the two countries. Second, after having completed the above task, I intend to do some theoretical analysis, examining the relations between the state and society and the effect of state-society relations on economic development.

When studying society, my analytical units are large social groups instead of individuals. Social groups include class, ethnic groups, parties, entrepreneurial groups, etc. My analytical units are the ethnic groups in Qing China. I attempt to explore the interaction between the ethnic groups and the state: how the state’s ethnic policies affected the welfare of the ethnic groups, and how the reaction of the ethnic groups in turn affected the power of the state.

Third, this study is a historical one since it studies events of the past. As such, it adopts the historical research method, by which I mean historians’ emphasis on historical evidence, especially first-hand materials when studying historical events. A considerable proportion of this project is based on archival and primary data that I collected from my fieldwork in China. Archives are original Qing governmental documents now kept in the First Historical Archives of China located in Beijing, and primary data are published Qing official records, including the Veritable Records (shilu) of Qing emperors and books written by Qing officials and intellectuals. Archival data reveal some important issues in Qing society that have been overlooked by researchers. An example is the measures the state took to reify the ethnic line between the Manchus and the Chinese. I utilize documents submitted to the Department of Eight Banner Governance by banner officials at various levels dealing with Manchu affairs to establish the existence of
the mechanisms, and argue that these mechanisms were aimed to reinforce the inequalities between the
two ethnic groups created by the state.

Throughout the study I strive to provide empirical evidence to support my arguments. Empirical
evidence here refers to factual information on historical events and social actors. Empirical data have
been collected from two sources. The first source is archives and primary data on Qing ethnic relations.
The second category of data is scholarly studies on various issues published in Chinese, Japanese, and
English, which I refer to as secondary data. For example, my comparison of the economic development of
China and Japan between 1865 and 1895 is based on Chinese and Japanese studies on important sectors
of the economy such as sea transport, railway, and communications.

Empirical data are crucial to this study for two reasons. First, historians have placed some of the
issues that this study looks at on the margins. A glaring example is Manchu-Chinese relations. In China,
Japan, and as well as the US, only a small number of researchers have carried out research on it. As a
result of limited scholarly effort, many aspects of this important issue remain unclear. Therefore I make
an effort to present some of the materials I have collected in the hoping of clarifying the questions.

Second, sociological theories on China and Japan in general lack detailed and reliable information on
the issues studied: Many statements about China and Japan seem to be either inaccurate or cursory. An
example is the notion that Japan had become a modern capitalist society prior to the Meiji Restoration.
Another example is the idea that Qing China was far behind Tokugawa Japan in terms of level of
economic development (Chapter II). These views of China and Japan are on shaky ground from the
perspective of historians of China and Japan. Thus in this study I endeavor to reliable evidence, including
archives, primary sources, ancient books, and secondary Chinese, English, and Japanese studies.

**WHY DO I INCLUDE JAPAN IN THIS STUDY?**

Nineteenth century Japan is important to this study in three ways. First is the theoretical significance
of the case of Japan. Sociologists view Japan as an “exception” that proves the rule, the rule being their
theory about capitalism in Eurasia. Marxian and Weberian theorists like E. L. Jones, Stephen Sanderson,
and Randall Collins argue that Japan was the only non-Western society that shared with Europe the
critical features needed for the rise of capitalism, and Wallersteinian theorists such as Francis Moulder assert that Japan, unlike China, escaped falling into the peripheral zone of the world system. I disagree with sociological theories on China and Japan, and I use the two countries as two cases to support my overall argument that government involvement is important to economic transformation.

Second, the strategy of my argument requires the inclusion of Japan. I intend to highlight the significance of the state in economic transformation. Since the Chinese government was too weak to preside over the economic transformation of China, and invested little in China’s modern industries, I use Japan as a polarizing example to illustrate the point that strong and effective government policies could facilitate economic transformation.

Third, China and Japan as of the 1860s were comparable in terms of level of economic development. As recent economic histories have revealed, China and Japan prior to the 1860s were at the same level of economic development, namely proto-capitalism. Hence China and Japan were comparable prior to the time when industrialization was initiated in both countries. If the economic foundations of Japan and China were the same or at least similar, and if their structural relations with Western powers as defined by treaties with the West were similar as will be discussed in Chapter VII, then the difference in the outcomes of industrialization in the 1890s should be attributed to factors other than international relations (cf. dependency/world-system theories), preexisting ecological, cultural, and economic conditions (cf. Marxian and Weberian notions). Existing political economic literature points to the role of the state as a promising research clue. This study intends to further investigate it.

**FORMULATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS**

My hypothesis that ethnic relations adversely affected late Qing China’s industrialization formed and crystallized in three steps. The first is the idea that government leadership was critical to China’s industrialization. Second, ethnic conflicts in China undermined the power of the government. Third, ethnic conflicts stemmed from the government’s unequal treatment of the various ethnic groups. Here I present the most important works that shaped the formation of the ideas.
Building on Tominaga’s (1990) argument that the Meiji government not only presided over the industrialization of Japan but had a significant role in it, I hypothesized that Qing China’s tardy industrialization resulted from inefficient government involvement in economic development (although the government did initiate economic transformation as evident in the Self-Strengthening Movement). Then the question arose: What made the Chinese government inept in promoting economic development? From a sociological perspective, I speculate that the reason lay in factors deeply embedded in Chinese society. The central question was: What factor(s) within the Chinese society prevented the Chinese government from actively fostering economic transformation?

I formed the tentative idea that ethnic relations might be a major factor in Qing politics by reading secondary studies. Evidence suggests ethnic conflict was a significant issue in Qing China. After all the Qing was a multiethnic empire ruled by a numerically small ethnic group, the Manchus. They invaded China proper and ruled the majority group, the Chinese, on the basis on ethnic inequality. Manchu rule was alien and unfair from the Chinese perspective. The Chinese did not fully accept Manchu rule as legitimate, and evidence indicates that they resisted Manchu rule throughout the duration of the dynasty. Ethnic rebellions undercut the power of the government, causing it to be unable to lead China’s economic transformation effectively in later years.

Studies on Qing ethnic relations indicate that Qing ethnic policies caused ethnic rebellions. Edward Rhoads (2000) makes the point that the Manchus and the Chinese remained two “separate and unequal” peoples in terms of social, political, and legal statues as of mid- to late nineteenth century. Zhou Wu (2003) points out that the Taiping Rebellion had profound socioeconomic impact on Qing society as a whole. To validate the hypothesis, it was essential to collect evidence to establish the connection between rebellions such as the Taiping Rebellion and ethnic inequality.

Materials left by contemporary Western and Japanese observers of Chinese secret societies testified that anti-Manchuism was a common goal of the organizations. Gustave Schlegel (1866/1973) provided valuable first-hand information on The Heaven and Earth Association. The main body of this book was a collection of the legends, rules, rites, symbols, and flags of the association compiled on the basis of the
documents confiscated by the Dutch colonial government in Java and Sumatra in the 1850s. Schlegel not only translated them into English instead of his native language, Dutch, but also presented the Chinese texts in juxtaposition with the English translation in the hope that his book would reach a larger audience and the errors in his translation would be corrected later. The information contained in this book confirms the notion that the association aimed to overthrow Manchu rule of China out of the view that Manchu rule was alien and cruel. Moreover, in his book on another well-known anti-Manchu secret society, the Association of Brothers (Gelaohui), and the revolutionaries’ affiliation with it, the Japanese observer Hirayama Shu (1911) demonstrates that anti-Manchu revolts by Chinese were common in the Qing, and the revolutionaries who were active in the 1900s were motivated by anti-Manchuism.

Additional secondary literature indicates intrinsic connections between the Taipings and members of the secret anti-Manchu associations. Hence I came to the conclusion that the Taiping Rebellion was driven by anti-Manchu motives. A theme began to emerge in my mind: The Chinese were treated unequally by the Manchu government; therefore they rose up against the Manchu state. After all, Rhoads (2000) hints that the Taiping Rebellion was somehow connected to ethnic discord. At this point my task was to find out if there was really a connection between the Taiping Rebellion and Qing ethnic relations. Thus I intended to collect materials during my fieldwork in China.

Finally, secondary Chinese studies on the ethnic groups in the Qing broadened the scope of this study. In a ground-breaking book in the field of Qing ethnic laws, Liu Guang’an (1993) elaborates on Qing legal documents governing the military, political, economic, and social aspects of the Mongol, Uyghur, Tibetan, and Miao territories. This book reveals that the Qing was an empire legally divided along ethnic lines and the ethnic groups’ positions in the empire were unequal. Therefore it would be inappropriate to deal with Manchu-Chinese inequalities without paying due attention to the overall ethnic relations of the Qing. Because of this I set out to look for secondary studies on the other ethnic groups. These works eventually helped me to paint the broad picture of Qing ethnic relations, which became the framework in which I placed Manchu-Chinese relations.
Thus before I went to the field I had formulated the following questions that needed to be verified by field research:

1. Existing literature on Manchu-Chinese inequalities needed to be confirmed by preferably Qing official documents and accounts written by contemporary intellectuals. Furthermore, archival and primary data needed to be collected to obtain additional information on ethnic inequalities.

2. How closely was the Taiping Rebellion related to state-sanctioned ethnic inequalities? Were there any other ethnic rebellions by the subordinate groups triggered by ethnic inequalities?

3. If the answers to the above questions were affirmative, then what were their socioeconomic implications? How did the implications affect the government and its policies on China’s industrialization?

I went to the field with these questions in mind. My main task, therefore, was to find materials, ideally archives and primary sources, on Qing ethnic relations. I collected archival data—Qing governmental documents on ethnic relations—from The First Historical Archives of China located in Beijing. In addition I obtained primary sources, namely Qing official records such as the Veritable Records of the emperors and the Donghua Record of the Guangxu Emperor. Moreover, I found unpublished books and genealogies written by Qing intellectuals on various aspects of ethnic relations in the Qing. Archival and primary materials show that state-sanctioned ethnic inequalities were a major issue in Qing politics. Next I articulate what data I collected. Before elaborating on them, however, I give a concise depiction of Qing political structure to shed light on the archival and primary sources.

**QING POLITICAL STRUCTURE**

In the following paragraphs I will first address the power of the emperor, and then I will look at the various departments of the central government to emphasize that archives and primary sources used in this study are valid. Archives used in this study originally were documents submitted by Qing officials at various levels to the ministries and departments of the central government, and primary data were Qing official records of the daily activities of the emperors, including the Veritable Records of Qing emperors.
Information contained in this section is largely based on Meng and Wang’s (2003) depiction of Qing state bureaucracy.

EMPORSHIP

The emperor was the supreme ruler of the empire except for the decades at the end of the dynasty when empress dowager Cixi ruled the country de facto in the name of the Tongzhi and Guangxu emperors. Judging from the above fact, a more precise statement would be that emperorship as an institution characterized by dictatorship transcending individual emperors was at the highest level of Qing political structure. Yet like any institutions emperorship had to be embodied by particular individuals. The emperor, when he existed as a person, was naturally concerned that others would challenge his occupation of the throne. Out of their sense of insecurity, early Qing emperors created a set of political organizations to fortify emperorship.

The fortification of emperorship was particularly important to the Qing as a Manchu state due to relics of early Manchu political structure and Manchu rule of the various ethnic groups in the empire. First of all, Manchu princes and aristocrats possessed considerable power, which was determined by early Qing political structure. In 1622 Nurmagchi set up a collegiate political system comprised of his sons and nephews. Under the system eight princes (Manchu: bele) were authorized to hold meetings where they were supposed to discuss important political issues and collectively make decisions. The eight princes were masters of the eight banners at the same time. Thus they not only possessed military leadership but also political power. In the next year Nurmagchi appointed eight officials to assist the princes. The essence of the system, called “Eight Prince Meeting” (Chinese: bada beile huiyi), was oligarchy, which undercut the power of the Khan. Nurmagchi stipulated that the eight princes would jointly convene meetings to discuss political affairs and that they would jointly pay tribute to the khan as well. Further Nurmagchi authorized the Eight Prince Meeting to elect and depose khans after his death. Nurmagchi aimed to create an oligarchy in his remaining years to ensure political stability in the state Later Jin after his death.

The Eight Prince Meeting limited the power of the khan and later the emperor. After he came to the throne Hong Taiji reformed the system to promote the positions of the eight officials in order to offset the
influence of the princes. The officials were appointed as “officials discussing politics” (yizheng dachen), and the reformed political system was renamed Meeting of Princes and Officials Discussing Politics (yizhengwang dachen huiyi) in 1637. It lasted until 1792 when the Qianlong emperor finally abolished the system.

Early Qing emperors took another step to fortify emperorship concerning selecting the crown prince. After a process of trial and error, they found a safe way to select their successors by secretly selecting the crown prince. The Yongzheng emperor learned from his predecessors that not designating a crown prince might trigger a fierce scramble for the throne among the princes after the emperor died, and that openly designating the crown prince would cause trouble as well: it would give rise to factionalism among the princes, and officials would cling to the would-be emperor. This was a serious threat to the power of the emperor especially when he became old and feeble physically. Yongzheng’s solution was to secretly pick the crown prince. He wrote down the name of his successor, made two duplicate copies, and carried one with him constantly and put the other in a small box to be placed behind the sign above the entrance of the Qianqing Palace within the Forbidden City. Upon his decease officials would open the two duplicate copies and the prince whose name appeared on them would succeed the throne.

Moreover Qing rulers established a bureaucratic system to assist the emperor in handling politics. The bureaucracy recruited men of talent, and worked on the basis of regulations and rules. The bureaucracy was divided into two parts: the central government and local governments. The central government consisted of the institutions and ministries dealing with affairs concerning the empire as a whole, and local governments were comprised of three levels: province, prefecture, and county. I will concentrate on the central government in the following paragraphs.

**THE THREE GRAND INSTITUTIONS**

The hub of the central government was comprised of three organizations: the Grand Secretariat (neige), the Grand Council (junjichu), and the Office of Conferences and Political Affairs (huiyi zhengwuchu). The Grand Secretariat was set up in the early seventeenth century as an imitation of the six ministries of the Ming dynasty, and the Grand Council was created in the early eighteenth century to
offset the growing influence of the Grand Secretariat and to ensure the emperor’s control of politics. Both institutions existed until the end of the Qing. The Office of Conferences and Political Affairs was founded in 1901 as an important step of the New Politics reform, and the office was the leading organ of the government in dealing with new issues that occurred during the last decade of the dynasty. In addition to the three institutions, a set of ministries and departments were established to handle affairs in various realms of Qing politics.

The Grand Secretariat was founded in 1658. Its predecessor was the three Interior Courts (nei sanyuan) founded in 1636 by Hong Taiji to take charge of education, recording history, and official paperwork of the Later Jin. The basic task of the Grand Secretariat was to process memorials submitted by officials in the empire. The secretariat was divided into a set of departments and offices dealing with specific duties. Among the subdivisions were the Manchu Hall (Manbentang) in charge of documents written in Manchu, the Chinese Office (Hanbenfang) handling documents in Chinese, and Mongolian Office (Menggufang) dealing with paperwork submitted by officials in Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang (Meng and Wang 2003: 431-432). The Chinese Office was the most important among the three ethnicity-based subdivisions in terms of the sheer volume of work.

The general working procedure of the Grand Secretariat was: the secretariat read the memorial and gave a tentative opinion, then submitted them to the emperor. The emperor would write his instructions on the memorial and return it to the secretariat, which in turn would forward the memorial with the emperor’s instructions to the appropriate ministries and departments within the central government, for instance, the six ministries (Zhongliang). In practice, however, the memorial had to go through multiple offices within the Grand Secretariat before it reached the final appropriate ministry.

To free himself from dealing with the enormous amount of routine tasks and to ensure his direct control of important affairs and the officials, the Kangxi emperor created the South Study to handle important issues in a confidential manner. The emperor selected a small number of officials by himself, gave orders to them directly, and established a secret channel to receive personal reports from officials in the provinces. After the Yongzheng emperor came to the throne, he first created the secret Office of
Military Supplies (*junxufang*) in 1726; then, in 1729, he reorganized the office into the Bureau of Military Affairs (*junjichu*), which is often translated as the Grand Council since it dealt not only military issues, but politics in general.

The council had a chief minister and several ministers, who were appointed by the emperor himself and reported directly to the emperor. The council functioned on the basis of secret memorials submitted by officials in the central government and in the provinces. Unlike documents submitted to the Grand Secretariat that had to go through multiple layers of the bureaucracy before they were finally processed, memorials submitted to the Grand Council went directly to the emperor. In addition, unlike the documents submitted to the Grand Secretariat, which were open to officials at various levels of the bureaucracy, documents submitted to the Grand Council were kept highly confidential and only the ministers had access to them. Finally, unlike the Grand Secretariat, which employed a large number of clerks dealing with documentation, the Grand Council hired no clerks in order to further ensure efficiency and confidentiality (Meng and Wang 2003: 436). After the establishment of the Grand Council, the Grand Secretariat became an organ specialized in dealing with everyday tasks. The Grand Council, or secret politics in a more general sense, was unique to the Qing. It was the product of dictatorial emperorship when it reached its summit in the Qing.

In the wake of the Boxers Uprising, Cixi issued an edict in the name of the Guangxu emperor on January 29, 1901, proclaiming that the court was ready to conduct sweeping reforms and urging officials to submit proposals. The edict heralded the beginning of the New Politics. On April 21 Guangxu announced the establishment of the Office of Supervision and Administration of Political Affairs (*duban zhengwuchu*). Prince Qing and powerful officials such as Li Hongzhang were appointed as members of the new office. On November 9, 1906, the office was renamed the Office of Conferences and Political Affairs (*huiyi zhengwuchu*), and was placed under the jurisdiction of the Grand Secretariat (Meng and Wang 2003: 442-443). Although officially the office was designated as a subordinate unit of the Grand Secretariat, in practice the office was parallel to the Grand Secretariat and the Grand Council in terms of
political influence, for the office was staffed with members of the two other institutions and ministers of
the six ministries.

THE SIX MINISTRIES AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS

In addition to the three leading institutions, a number of ministries and departments existed in the
central government responsible for imperial affairs. They were: the six ministries, the Court of Colonial
Affairs, and the Department of Eight Banner Governance. The six ministries were founded in 1631, and
each was in charge of a specific area of imperial affairs and in some cases issues pertaining to the Chinese.
The Ministry of Civil Officials (libu) handled the appointments, evaluations, and removals of civil
Chinese and Miao officials, and determined the posts in the capital and the Chinese provinces. The
Ministry of Households (hubu) was responsible for farmland and household registration, taxation,
stipends of officials, and imperial finance. It had 14 field offices in the Chinese provinces. The Ministry
of Rites (libu) was responsible for imperial ceremonies, education, civil examinations, and entertaining of
foreign envoys. The Ministry of Works (gongbu) was in charge of construction of river control facilities,
manufacture of porcelain objects, weapons and military supplies, and mines. The Ministry of War (bingbu)
was in charge of the Chinese army, namely the Green Standard. It was renamed as the Ministry of Army
(lujunbu) in 1906. Finally, the Ministry of Punishment (xingbu) was responsible for crimes, legal affairs,
and the making of criminal laws (Meng and Wang 2003).

The Court of Colonial Affairs was created in 1637 and was put in charge of Mongol affairs initially,
but later it took over issues related to the Tibetans, Uyghurs, and the vassal states of the Qing such as
Korea and Vietnam (Liu 1993). The Department of Eight Banner Governance was created in 1723 to take
charge of Manchu affairs and existed until the end of the Qing. Some of the ministries and the Court of
Colonial Affairs were renamed or reformed in 1906 during the New Politics reform. Overall, however, the
agencies demonstrated remarkable consistency in their internal structure.

ARCHIVAL AND PRIMARY DATA

This section explains three categories of data: primary sources, archives, and private histories. All of
these data were materials left by Qing contemporaries.
**PRIMARY SOURCES**

During the Qing dynasty (except for a short period of the Kangxi reign) recording officials were permitted to be present at imperial audiences and other activities in order to compile the Diaries of Rest and Repose (*Da-Qing qijuzhu*). These accounts were bound together on a monthly and later yearly basis. After an emperor died, his successor would commission a group of scholar-officials to scrutinize the diaries and other relevant documents to compile the Veritable Records of the deceased emperor. The purpose of the project was to provide useful guidelines and references for the new emperor to rule. Therefore the records were taken seriously by Qing emperors. Only two duplicate copies were made, one kept in the Forbidden City in Beijing, and the other in the Forbidden City in Mukden (modern Shenyang). These records now have been reprinted for researchers to use.

Primary sources on ethnic relations are extracted from the Veritable Records of several emperors, including the Kangxi emperor’s expression of his attitudes toward the Manchus, the Mongols, and the Chinese (listed in bibliography as SZSL); the Qianlong emperor’s instruction on reforming the banner system, particularly the “fostered soldiers” (listed in bibliography as GZSL); and the Jiaqing emperor’s statement of his feelings about a Chinese revolt that occurred in the Forbidden City in 1813 (listed in bibliography as RZSL).

In addition to the Veritable Records, I use the Donghua Records of the Guangxu Reign (*guangxuchao donghualu*) regarding historical events of the Guangxu reign (1875-1908). This private history was compiled by the Qing official Zhu Shoupeng, who had access to Qing official documents.

**ARCHIVAL DATA**

Archival materials on Manchu-Chinese boundaries as of the late Qing were documents submitted to the Office of Conferences and Political Affairs. In the wake of the assassination of Enming, the Manchu governor of Anhui province in July 1907, Cixi issued an edict requesting officials and common subjects to submit suggestions on eliminating Manchu-Chinese inequalities. I found 16 memorials presented to the court in two months of the assassination by Manchu and Chinese officials, intellectuals, and merchants.
These documents testified that as late as a few years before the end of the Qing dynasty institutional ethnic inequality persisted as a result of early state policies.

Archives on the measures that the Qing took to reinforce Manchu-Chinese ethnic line originally were documents submitted by banner officials to the Department of Eight Banner Governance during the mid-to late Qing. These documents demonstrate that the state created a set of measures to keep the Manchus separate from the Chinese both physically and socially. In doing so the state made certain that Chinese could not pretend to be Manchus in order to receive sociopolitical privileges granted to the Manchus.

Archival data on armed revolts organized by Chinese revolutionaries in the 1900s were documents submitted to the Ministry of Army and the Grand Council by officials dealing with the cases, including the revolts led by Xu Xilin, Xiong Chengji, and Qiu Jin in Anhui and Zhejiang provinces. These first-hand documents contained “confessions” and other materials written by the aforementioned persons and showed that the revolutionaries were motivated by anti-Manchu ideologies as a consequence of the persistence of ethnic inequalities.

**PRIVATE RECORDS AND GENEALOGY**

In addition, I went to the Ancient Books Branch of the National Library of China located in central Beijing to collect materials on ethnic relations left by Qing intellectuals. I found a few books on the banner system, Manchu-Chinese relations, and anti-Manchu rebellions, including the Taiping rebellion. Xie Jiehe and Zhou Runan’s accounts on the Taipings’ treatment of Manchus living in Nanjing after the Taipings took over the city, and the Taiping government’s policy on male hairstyle indicated that the Taipings were motivated by anti-Manchuism. Private accounts on ethnic rebellions complement official records on state-sanctioned ethnic inequalities.

The genealogy of the Manchu Yi family preserved in the library reveals that average Manchus were obligated to report marriages and births to their superiors. The actual reports contained in the genealogy were complementary to official documents under the category of the Department of Eight Banner Governance kept in the First Historical Archives of China. Together with the official documents, the private materials suggest that a tight-knit reporting system existed, under which ordinary Manchus had to
report major changes in their families to their superiors, who in turn would report to higher officials, and so on. Eventually the matters would reach the Department of Eight Banner Governance and were kept on file permanently. The system was aimed to protect Chinese from passing off as Manchus in order to receive privileges given to the Manchus by the state.

**CONVERSION OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE CALENDAR**

Archives and primary sources used the traditional Chinese calendar. Usually a 30 to 40 day difference existed between the Chinese and the Gregorian calendars, the Chinese system predating the latter. I convert dates in the traditional Chinese calendar to the Gregorian calendar following the conversion tables contained in the book by Fang Shiming and Fang Xiaofen (1987).

**DATA USED IN THE CASE CHAPTERS**

Broadly speaking, I use archival and primary sources as well as secondary Chinese, English, and Japanese studies in this study. More specifically, my views about the relationship between state power and the establishment of the Qing empire (Chapter IV) is based on primarily secondary Chinese sources. Materials on ethnic legislation and ethnic policy are drawn from the works of Wang Zhonghan, Liu Guang’an, Zhao Yuntian, Ding Yizhuang, and Mark Elliott, just to name a few. Regarding Manchu-Chinese relations (Chapter V), I cite Edward Rhoads (2000) intensively in the section *Manchu-Chinese Inequalities* not only because his study provides valuable information on the issue, but because I share his view that the Manchus and the Chinese remained two “separate and unequal” peoples as of the second half of the nineteenth century. In the section *Picketing the Ethnic Line* I use predominantly archival data to show the administrative and legal measures the state took to maintain and reinforce the ethnic line between the Manchus and the Chinese.

On ethnic rebellions (Chapter VI), I use primary and secondary sources on the Taiping Rebellion and other ethnic rebellions. In addition, I use books written by Qing intellectuals, now kept in the Branch of Ancient Books, the National Library of China, located in Beijing. Finally, for official documents issued by the Taiping regime, I draw from the three-volume work of Franz Michael (1971). I also make use of
other useful materials left by the rebels contained in the works by Chinese historians and professional associations.

In Chapter VII I first compare China’s economic development with Japan’s between 1865 and 1895. Materials are drawn from secondary studies by Chinese and Japanese researchers, of whom Zhou Yumin (2000) is most helpful. The section on the question of what the Qing could have done on the Japanese samurai model is based on both archival and secondary Chinese and Japanese sources.

Materials in Chapter VIII on the revolutionaries’ propaganda against the Manchus are drawn from the five-volume work by Zhang Dan and Wang Renzhi (1960), who have compiled articles published in magazines and newspapers in the 1900s. In addition, archival data are used on the armed revolts organized by revolutionaries. I have translated Chinese archival and primary materials into English used in this project, and I am responsible for any errors.

**CLARIFICATION OF TERMINOLOGY**

In this section I articulate how I conceptualize key terms used in this study. The first set of words is government, state, and state power; the second is nation, ethnic group, and culture; the third is Han, Chinese, and China.

**GOVERNMENT, STATE, AND STATE POWER**

Weber suggests that states are “compulsory associations claiming control over territories and the people within them” (Evans 1995: 5). At least five types of states existed in history: empires, feudalism, the polity of estates, absolutist states, and modern nation-states (Held: 1992).

I use “government” and “state” interchangeably in this study. “Government” often refers to the executive branch and “state” refers to the wider structure of governance institutions, but in practice the two words are often used interchangeably (Wade 1990: 8). The Qing was an empire, in which there was no clear boundary between the executive branch and the general structure of governance as in modern states. Thus using the two words interchangeably does not cause serious confusion.

Empire is a difficult polity to define. Nevertheless, we still can outline several key features of empire. Empire in general is a large, composite, multiethnic polity formed by conquest of subordinate
parts by a strong center. It is characterized by hierarchical systems of rule. At the top are the emperor and the court, beneath whom are ranks of officials and nobles with stipulated powers and often hereditary privileges. Usually an ethnic/geographic core and a subordinated periphery exist, with the latter ruled by the former indirectly (Esherick et. al 2006: 5-7). Indirect rule leads to tolerance of ethnic differences at least to some degree. On the other hand, as an empire comprises of peoples typically living in different territories, holding these parts together entails a substantial exercise of coercion from the center (ibid: 7).

State power is the power of the state. In this study it refers to the power of the Qing empire. The meaning of state power is twofold. The first dimension is the strength of the state, which is conceptualized in four aspects: military, economic, political, and ideological. Military strength was the basis of state power. The military was important because it could force people to obey the will of the state (discussed below). Where resistance arose military forces could destroy it physically. The military played the determining role in the establishment of the Qing empire. Military forces also reinforced the order established after the conquests and intimidated resistance. An example was the strategic deployment of banner troops in China proper.

Economy constituted the material foundation of the empire. The state needed funds to finance its rule. It obtained funds through taxation. Dynamic economic activities in China proper provided an abundant source of revenue for the state. In general a positive relationship existed between economic strength and military strength. For example, Xinjiang was the last ethnic-territory incorporated into the Qing. The annexation of this region in the eyes of the Qianlong emperor signified that the empire reached its zenith. The military campaign began in 1757 and ended in 1759. It coincided with the period from the early 1750s to the late 1760s characterized by unprecedented high state revenue (Gao 1991: 9).

The third aspect of Qing state power was the political, administrative, and legal fields. Administration refers to the concrete measures taken by the state to manage the routine businesses. An example was the selection and appointment of lower-level officials to run local affairs. Politics were the fundamental ways to rule the empire involving critical decision-making at the highest level, i.e. the court and high-ranking officials. An example was the well-known New Politics in the last decade of the Qing.
Another example was the secret politics governing China proper. The classification of the two categories is arbitrary. In practice they might well overlap with each other. For instance, administrative divisions may be regarded as both administrative and political. Provinces, when considered as units to govern the people within them, were parts of the administrative mechanism. But the way the provinces were divided might influence the relations between the locals and the court, and provincial officials in some circumstances might grow as powerful as to challenge the authority of the central government. Thus in this sense provinces became political.

In addition to political and administrative tools, laws were made by the state to systemize and reify the will of the state. Many administrative procedures and political decisions were reinforced in the form of law. For example, Qing ethnic policies often took the form of law to ensure Qing imperial rule. On the other hand, activities deemed harmful to society and the state were regulated and punished by law. An example was the Criminal Law of the Great Qing. As the political, administrative, and legal aspects of state power were interrelated, I use the word *political power* to refer to them collectively.

The fourth aspect of state power was ideology. If military, political, administrative, and legal mechanisms were the “hard” state apparatus, then the ideology sanctioned by the state was a soft but influential tool to control the subjects. By instilling state ideology into the minds of people, the state could cultivate docile subjects with the mindset the state expected them to have. If the hard state apparatus was institutions that existed outside people but exerted influence on their behavior, then state ideology entered the minds of people and prescribed their behavior from inside. If hard state apparatus intimidated people into obeying the norms set up by the state, then state ideology could prevent them from having the idea to disobey. An example was the Kangxi emperor’s encouragement of the Neo-Confucianism in China proper shortly after the Manchu conquest. Neo-Confucianism emphasized the subjects’ obligation of absolute loyalty to rulers (Wang 2001).

The second dimension of state power was the state’s authority and ability to fulfill its will, such as controlling the subjects and achieving its military, economic, and political goals. The will of the state is metaphorical shorthand. The will of the state in practice was the will of the rulers, but this does not mean
that the will of the state was merely a reflection of their personal interests and whimsical thoughts. The state should be treated as an independent entity like an enterprise in a sense. The Qing emperors often viewed the empire as an enterprise to be preserved and expanded. Their strategy included a carefully designed process of decision-making involving intensive and secret communication between the emperor and officials, in some circumstances even lower-level officials directly dealing with local issues. The popular image that the emperor was somewhat isolated from the real world is not accurate. In fact the emperor had multiple sources of information and often deliberately encouraged officials to submit conflicting opinions. He weighed the opinions against each other, and hence the decision of the emperor was usually the result of internal political crystallization, representing the most balanced opinion and the best possible compromise of the ruling body.

The state’s ability to fulfill its will largely depended on the military, political, and economic strength it already had, and its ability to control the subject ideologically. In general a positive relationship existed between the first and the second dimensions of state power. That is, when its strengths on the aforementioned four aspects increased, the state’s ability to fulfill its will increased correspondingly. As the strength of the state might change, the overall power of the state might change accordingly.

In broad outlines the state power of the Qing empire continued to increase from the early seventeenth century and reached its peak in the middle of the eighteenth century, that is, the Qianlong reign, and began to decline afterwards. The Qing underwent noticeable decline by the middle of the nineteenth century, namely the Jiaqing and Daoguang reign periods. One index was the silver reserve of the state. During the majority of the Qianlong reign period state silver reserve continued to increase annually. In 1781 it amounted to more than 70 million taels. Afterwards state silver reserve began to decrease. In 1789 the amount was over 60 million taels. In 1814, however, the amount slumped to approximately 12.4 million taels (Zhou 2000: 64-65). In 1850, that is, at the dawn of the Taiping Rebellion, the amount further dropped to 1.87 million taels (ibid: 144). The major historical events discussed in this study occurred in a declining Qing.
No universally accepted definitions of the terms have been established. In their recent book entitled *Empire to Nation*, Esherick et al. (2006) acknowledge that it is devilishly difficult to define the term nation. They give only a loose and elusive statement about the term: “nations are socially and discursively constructed polities” (ibid: 5). They cite Benedict Anderson’s book title and suggest that nations are “imagined communities.” Furthermore, they emphasize that the nation is politically constructed. It is the state that makes the nation and not vice versa.

By contrast, Connor (1994: 36) emphasizes that the essence of nation is a *group feeling*, namely the “psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious of its members, from all other people in a most vital way.” In a narrow sense nation is a self-defined grouping that gives people a sense of sameness, of oneness, or of belonging on the basis of the belief of shared blood. In a broad sense nation refers to the citizenry of a state, and what further complicates the connotation of nation is the propensity to use the term as a substitute for the state. Consequently nationalism is often equated with loyalty to the state and not to the nation.

Ethnic group is considered to be a group of people with common descent, cultural tradition, and a shared sense of identity (Connor 1994: 43). Smith (1985: 22-30) maintains that ethnicity involves a common name, a sense of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory, and a sense of identity and solidarity. The meanings of nation and ethnic group overlap when nation is restricted to the narrow sense of the word. They both include a sense of belonging among the members of a nation/ethnic group. Yet ethnicity involves not only identity, but also culture. In this project I use ethnic groups to refer to the Chinese, Manchus, Mongols and other peoples living in the Qing empire.

The various ethnic groups in the Qing formed through long-term political, social, and cultural processes. Strictly speaking, ethnicity was constantly in fluidity; in this sense I recognize that it might be anachronistic to apply the term “ethnic groups” to the various peoples of the Qing. On the other hand, however, the state created laws and regulations governing each major ethnic group in the empire;
arguably, the sociopolitical boundaries between the groups, especially those between the Manchus and the Chinese, were clear and fixed as long as the laws remained in place. Moreover, the ethnic groups believed that they were different from each other. For instance, the Taipings in the 1850s and 1860s and the revolutionaries in the 1900s articulated that the Chinese were different from the Manchus in terms of ancestry, culture, and so forth. These facts speak for the notion of “attitudinal boundary,” that is, the perceptions of the members of an ethnic group that exclude them from other groups (Armstrong 1994: 141).

The state in traditional societies plays a partial role in that state policies favor some ethnic groups and are a threat to others (Brass 1985: 26). The notion is applicable to the Qing regarding its ethnic policies. In fact complex relations existed between the ethnic groups in terms of the treatments they received from the state. I will demonstrate that some groups received favorable treatments at the expense of others, and in this sense an ethnic hierarchy was created and maintained by the Manchu rulers.

I use the term “culture” frequently in this study. Culture, broadly speaking, is the way of life of an ethnic group, including food, language, and customs. In some cases it may encompass highly abstract matters such as ways of thinking and political structures. In the Qing context the male hairstyle and dress were significant for the Chinese. The Manchu rulers imposed Manchu male hairstyle and dress on Chinese men as they believed annihilation of Chinese ethnic marks would suppress Chinese self-consciousness, which in turn would be beneficial to Manchu rule. On the other hand, the Manchus, after they had lived in China proper for a century or so, began to adopt the Chinese language. Thus in a sense cultural assimilation took place in two ways, the result being that the Manchus and the Chinese were largely identical in physical appearance as far as men were concerned. But this is not to say that the Manchus assimilated to the Chinese or vice versa. On the contrary, the two peoples remained two distinctive ethnic groups. Ethnicity, in addition to “culture,” also includes the history and tradition of a group of people, and the belief that they share something in common in their blood. In the context of Qing China, the Manchus were largely “sinicized” culturally in the sense that they gradually adopted the Chinese language and ideology, but they remained a different people from the Chinese in terms of
ethnicity. The Chinese and the Manchus believed that they were two different peoples; they had different ancestors; they remained biologically “pure” after the Manchus had lived in China proper for over two centuries because of the ban on intermarriage and other institutions reinforcing the ethnic line.

**HAN, CHINESE, AND CHINA**

In this project I equate the “Chinese” with the Han. The equation has certain terminological and conceptual advantages. For instance, the *Chinese* language is the language of the Han, and *Chinese* characters are the system to write the language of the Han. Therefore, using the word Han to refer to the Chinese might cause unnecessary confusion among readers. Moreover, the Han in the Qing often called themselves Chinese (*Zhongguoren*, or *Huaren*), emphasizing that they were the legitimate residents of China (see below). The Taipings in the 1850s and 1860s and later the revolutionaries in the 1900s called themselves Chinese more often than Han. I follow this tradition for convenience since I will cite their statements extensively.

Chinese ethnic self-consciousness resulted from Manchu diminishing of China proper and the Chinese language, the annihilation of Chinese customs, and Manchu supremacy sanctioned by the state. The state title of the Qing was the “Great Qing” (*Da Qingguo*), which had nothing to do with China (*Zhongguo*). Manchu emperors and officials equated the word *Qing* with Manchu. For instance, they referred to the Manchu language as the “Qing language” (*Qingyu*), or blatantly the “national language” (*guoyu*), and the Manchu alphabet as “Qing characters” (*Qingzi*) even after Manchu became a dead language by the middle of the eighteenth century in China proper and by the middle of the nineteenth century in the Northeast (Manchuria).

The connotation of the word “China” (*Zhongguo*) differed from its modern use, which includes the territory under Chinese sovereignty. As stated above “Qing” was the state title of the empire and it was commonly used in governmental documents and published materials. From the government’s perspective the term referred to all the territory under Qing control. Some Chinese—evidently Chinese rebels throughout Qing history—preferred the word “China.” For instance, the Taipings in the mid-nineteenth century and the revolutionaries at the turn of the twentieth century restricted the meaning of China to the
18 Chinese provinces⁵, which were the largest among the six ethnic-territories of the Qing and the economic, cultural, and political core of the empire. In this project I refer to these provinces as “China proper.” The territory of the Qing included not only the 18 provinces but also other ethnic territories. I refer to the entire Qing territory as the Qing. Depending on the context I use other words as well. For example I use Qing China as opposed to modern China or China when compared to foreign countries such as Japan.

OUTLINES OF THE CASE CHAPTERS

I articulate the basic theme of this study in the following three propositions:

1. China’s problematic industrialization between 1865 and 1895 was due to insufficient government leadership in the forms of making industrialization policies and creating specific mechanisms to assist in the emergence of important modern industries.

2. The government had been crippled by ethnic rebellions between the early 1850s and the early 1870s.

3. Ethnic rebellions were caused by the government’s unequal ethnic policies.

To illustrate the points I need to reverse the order of the above argument in the main body of this study so that my depictions of historical events will follow chronological order. In order to understand the Qing government’s ethnic policies, I must first delineate how the Qing empire was established between the sixteenth century and the late eighteenth century and what policies the government made to rule the various ethnic groups incorporated into the empire. Then I will make the argument that unequal ethnic policies caused ethnic conflict. I focus on the ethnic rebellions in the mid-nineteenth century (proposition 3). Finally I examine in what ways the ethnic rebellions impacted the government (proposition 2) and how the weakened government failed to successfully lead China’s industrialization (proposition 1).

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⁵ Their usage of “China” was ethnocentric since it was based on the notion that the 18 provinces were ruled by the Chinese Ming dynasty and Chinese residents had long lived in these provinces. The historical fact is: the southwestern provinces, i.e. Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, were home to other ethnic groups such as the Miao. Minority groups had long lived in some other provinces as well.
Chapter IV outlines the process of the establishment of the multi-ethnic Qing empire. It emphasizes the determining effect of the state’s military power in the process of the conquest of each of the six major ethnic territories and the significance of the state’s political and legal measures to maintain control after the conquest. The state’s ethnic policies varied from case to case. In some regions, it sought to preserve native cultures, social and political structures, whereas in other ethnic lands the state endeavored to change them. The underlying theme was the same: how to perpetuate Manchu rule. Thus ethnic policy for the Qing was essentially political.

The ruling ethnic group, the Manchus, was created primarily between the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries by the state Later Jin out of the various peoples in Northeast Asia, the core being the Jurchens. The state invented the civil-military organization Eight Banners, conquered and brought members of different ethnic groups to the Later Jin, and incorporated them into the banners. It also invented a writhing system, a set of religious beliefs sanctioned by the state, a code of ethics for the new ethnic groups, and named it “Manchus.” The Later Jin changed its state title to the Qing after it had conquered the southern Mongols living in Inner Mongolia. In the following century or so the Qing conquered the Khalkha and Oirat Mongols with military forces. It reorganized Mongol tribes into roughly 200 jasagh banners to ensure efficient administration. The jasagh was an official selected by the Court of Colonial Affairs from Mongol noblemen to take charge of Mongol affairs. The Qing conquered China proper between the 1640s and the 1680s, and it preserved the Chinese bureaucracy to some degree, but it introduced military (planned deployment of banner troops), political (secret politics), and administrative (the separate governance of the Manchus and the Chinese) mechanisms to rule the Chinese.

Furthermore, Manchus living in China proper were subject to a separate system of governance. After it conquered the Miao territory in the southwest in the 1720s, the Qing fully incorporated the region into the Chinese political structure. In the 1750s the Qing conquered modern Xinjiang, and soon the state wove the Uyghur beg system into the imperial political structure. The beg was a native official in charge.

6 The Manchus living in the Northeast (Manchuria), the Chinese in China proper, Mongols in Mongolia, Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the Miao in the Southwest, and the Tibetans in Tibet.
of a village, town, or a larger district. Finally, between the 1720s and 1790s, the Qing settled the case of Tibet through military invasions, and subsequently reorganized the native religious/political system.

Chapter V gives a full treatment of Manchu-Chinese relations, the most important ethnic relations in the empire. Drawing on archival data as well as secondary studies, I demonstrate that the state treated Manchus preferably at the expense of the Chinese in political, administrative, and legal aspects. Moreover, the state created a set of measures to maintain the ethnic line between the two groups. I locate Manchu-Chinese inequalities in a big context. I argue that in a broad sense an ethnic hierarchy existed in the empire in terms of intermarriage, access to natural, social, and political resources, and social prestige. Each major ethnic group occupied a particular notch: the Manchus and the Mongols were at the top of the hierarchy, the Chinese in the middle, and other groups on the bottom.

Consequently, ethnic conflict arose. Chapter VI focuses on ethnic rebellions between the 1850s and the 1870s. I demonstrate that they were motivated by the competition among different ethnic groups for political, economic, and social resources. For instance, the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion, the largest among all the rebellions, aimed to restore traditional Chinese ethnic traces and political power to rule China proper. The civil wars left the government destitute, decentralized the power of the government, and simultaneously gave rise to regional strongmen.

Chapter VII demonstrates the significance of government’s role in economic development between 1865 and 1895. As the Qing government failed to modernize the country, I use Japan as an example to show what the Chinese government could have done to facilitate the modern transition. First I present statistics to demonstrate that as of 1895 China lagged behind Japan in every comparable field of economic development, ranging from marine transport, railways, to communications and textile industry. Next I argue that the Japanese government played an active role in the country’s economic miracle: it established a modern financial regime and invested intensively in modern infrastructure and industries; it protected Japanese companies against more advanced Western competitors; it fostered the development of private enterprises; and it conducted overall social reforms to extract capital for modern industries. None of these did the Chinese government attempt to do. Moreover, the section on the Manchus and the samurai
illustrates how the Chinese government’s failure to reform the Manchu question negatively affected the government’s finances and investment in modern projects, and impeded China’s industrialization.

The Manchu question surfaced in the last decade or so of the Qing dynasty. Pro-dynastic intellectuals in the One Hundred Days Reform first brought up the issue and intended to carry out radical reforms. Cixi aborted the Reform, but only a few years later she had to face the Manchu question seriously. In the early 1900s the government under her leadership abolished some aspects of Manchu-Chinese inequality, but kept the banner system and Manchu stipend intact. The remainder of the Manchu question constituted the basis of anti-Manchuiism promulgated by the revolutionaries, who further organized armed revolts against Manchu rule, which eventually brought the Manchu question to an end.
CHAPTER IV: STATE POWER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE MULTI-ETHNIC EMPIRE QING

This chapter addresses the origins of the Manchu question, which is associated with the
establishment of the Qing. I argue state power played a significant role in the making of the empire.
Scholarship on Manchu rule of China has attempted to answer the question of why the tiny minority,
about 1-2% of China’s population\(^7\), could conquer and maintain their rule over the Chinese for over 260
years from a cultural perspective. The traditional wisdom claims that the Manchus were sinicized after
they entered China proper, and that the Qing dynasty was essentially based on the Chinese way of
governance. Recent studies challenge this view, but they still look at the question from the cultural
perspective, only from different angles. Evelyn Rawski (1998) argues that the Qing emperors sought to
present themselves as representatives of different cultures within the multiethnic empire. Therefore they
were accepted by the various ethnic groups psychologically and politically. Mark Elliott (2001) maintains
that the Manchus as a whole strove to maintain their cultural identity on the one hand, but on the other
hand the Manchu rulers manipulated Chinese culture to buttress their “alien” rule of China.

I highlight state power as an important factor in the establishment and maintenance of the empire.
This chapter first outlines the process of the establishment of the Qing by delineating the rise of the
Manchu state, namely the Later Jin (later the Qing) in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries;
and Qing incorporation of the various ethnic territories between the early seventeenth and the mid-
eighteenth centuries. The state’s military power was the determining factor in the making of the empire
between the 1580s and the 1760s, during which period the state brought into its control the following
ethnic territories one by one: the Manchus originally living in the Northeast, the Mongols in Mongolia
and surrounding regions, the Chinese in China proper, the Miao other ethnic groups in the Southwest, the
Uyghurs in modern Xinjiang, and the Tibetans in Tibet. State power included two main parts: military
power and political power. The military power of the state played a determining role in the making of the

\(^7\) Ethnic composition of the empire’s population is based on estimation since the Qing did not conduct census.
Researchers generally accept the following estimates: Manchus: 1-2%, Chinese: 90-95%. The rest of the population
was comprised of the Tibetans, the Mongols, the Uyghurs, the Miao, and other ethnic groups.
Manchu state, the Later Jin (1616-1634), and the Manchus as a people; and in incorporating each of the other ethnic territories into the Qing empire (1635-1911).

After conquest the state exerted administrative and legal power to reinforce its control and maintain its hegemony over each ethnic territory. Political institutions and laws were modified and reinforced over time, and remained in effect until the middle of the nineteenth century or even later. Therefore to grasp ethnic relations in the late Qing one requires a brief review of the process of the establishment of the empire in earlier times.


Mainstream scholarship on Qing history regards the Qing as not different from a typical Chinese dynasty: It began in 1644, when the Manchu state Qing entered China proper and began the long process of conquests of other ethnic territories. This Sino-centric view was problematic on two counts. First, the popular wisdom cuts off the Qing from its Manchu tradition. The state title of Qing was decided in 1635 by Hung Taiji within his reign period (1627-1643). The original title of the state was “Jin” (historians referred to it as “Later Jin” to differentiate it from the Jurchen state Jin: 1115-1234, which the Later Jin claimed to be its ancestral state). To say the Qing dynasty began in 1644, therefore, diminishes the existence of the Qing before 1644. Secondly, and more importantly, the Sino-centric popular wisdom ignores the continuity of Qing sociopolitical institutions before and after 1644, many of which were non-Chinese such as the Eight Banner system handling Manchu affairs, the Lifanyuan (Court of Colonial Affairs) dealing with non-Chinese issues both inside and outside the empire; and separate administrative systems for different ethnic groups even if they were living within the same jurisdiction area. None of these institutions had a Chinese dynastic government invented, but all of them were created by the Manchu state prior to its conquest of China, and were preserved after the conquest through the end of the dynasty, though with moderate modifications. These non-Chinese systems were not only unique in Chinese history, but also important for the “successful” Manchu rule of the Chinese territory and the entire empire. Hence to fully comprehend the complexity of the issue of ethnic relations in the late Qing,
one must go all the way back at least to the late sixteenth century when the Manchus as a people and the Later Jin as a state were forming.

The word “Manchu” (Chinese *Manzhou*) came from the Manchu word *Manju*, the term Hung Taiji (the second ruler of the Later Jin) in 1635 officially adopted to call the mass of people brought together under his rule by force whose ancestors were the Jurchens inhabiting the Northeast, known to the west as Manchuria (Huang 1990). The Manchus, in deed, were a community created by Nurgachi (the first ruler of the Later Jin) and his successor Hung Taiji. The state conquered various Jurchen tribes, brought them to the region under Later Jin control, made rules and laws for the people to obey, invented a writing system for the people to communicate with each other, and determined the dress and behavioral codes for the people regarding wedding, funeral, religious and ritual conducts. Symbolic of the significance of the state in the formation of the people was the fact that the name of the people as an ethnic group on par with other groups in East Asia was given by the state.

The Jurchen tribes inhabited the mountains and forests in the vast land of the Northeast. In the late sixteenth century, the Jurchens divided into three major tribal clusters, the Jianzhou, the Haixi, and the Donghai (another name was Yeren). The Jianzhou Jurchens lived on the eastern edge of the Laiohe River basin, bordering Korea to the Southeast and China to the Southwest. The Jianzhou Jurchens borrowed many things from China and Korea and was the most “developed” among the Jurchens. To the North of the Jianzhou Jurchens were the Haixi Jurchens, living around the middle reaches of the Sungari and Mudan Rivers. The four of the Haixi tribes were: the Yehe, Ula, Hoifa, and Hada. The Haixi tribes were the most strongest in terms of military strength due to their horse-riding archery. The third large group was the Donghai, inhabiting the region to the East and the North of the Haixi, straddling the Heilongjiang (Amur) and Ussuri Rivers, including the Warka, the Hurha, and the Weji tribes (Elliott 2001, Wang 2002: 118-119). The Donghai Jurchens were the least “civilized” in the eyes of the Chinese as the Chinese name *yeren* suggested: the savages.

The Jurchens at the time were under the indirect control of the Chinese Ming dynasty. About 200 garrisons were set up by Ming, and native Jurchen chieftains were appointed as military leaders. Jurchen
tribal leaders enrolled in the Chinese tributary system led missions to China, paying tribute to the Chinese emperor, and were authorized by the Ming court to trade with Chinese merchants in markets on the border for tea, silk, and chinaware. Politically Jurchen tribal leaders sought to use Chinese influence to compete against other tribes in their competition for hegemony (Yu 2003, Jiang 1995).

Nurgachi (r. 1616-1626), founder of the Later Jin, was a member of the Odoli branch of the Jianzhou Jurchens. At a point between the years 1412 and 1417, the Ming created the Left Jianzhou Guard at the settlement of the Odoli branch in today’s Hoeryong, near the Tumen River in Korea. The chieftain, Mengke Temur, was appointed commander of the Guard and was confirmed by the Ming emperor as head of the Odoli subdivision. Nurgachi was a sixth generation scion of Mengke Temur. In 1442, the Ming set up the Right Jianzhou Guard out of the Left Jianzhou Guard, led by Fanca, Mengke Temur’s half-brother. The relations between the three branches were congenial initially, but gradually the Jianzhou Guard faded from prominence, and a rift grew between the Left and Right branches. In 1574 and 1583, Giocangga, head of the Left Jianzhou branch, conspired with Ming local military officials to get rid of the leader of the Right. Giocangga and his son, Taksi, succeeded in their second attempt, but were killed by Ming troops by mistake or by design, thus leaving both branches of the Jianzhou Jurchens in disarray (Huang 1990: 259-262, Elliot: 2001: 53-56)).

Combined with the turmoil was the declination of the Hada tribe, the strongest of the four Haixi Jurchens and Jianzhou’s ally, caused by the death of its leader, Wan, in 1582. Out of the power vacuum emerged Nurgachi, a 25-year-old young man and the oldest son of Taksi. In the name of revenge, in 1583 Nurgachi led about 100 men to attack the Turun castle where his grandfather and father were killed. In the following several years, he launched a series of battles against other Jianzhou tribes, conquered and annexed them one by one. By 1588, Nurgachi brought the Hunhe, Donge, Zhechen, Wanggiya, and Suksuhu tribes of the Jianzhou Jurchens under his control. In the next decade, Nurgachi annexed a number of tribes of the Haixi and the Donghai Jurchens through military campaigns, which culminated in Jianzhou’s annexation of the Hada tribe of the Haixi confederation in 1600, when more than 10,000 households were forced to migrate to Jianzhou. Jianzhou Jurchens’ military strength grew increasingly
afterwards. In the subsequent one decade or so, Jianzhou subjugated the Hoifa and the Ula tribes. By then three of the four Haixi tribes had been brought into Jianzhou rule. Finally the Yehe tribe was vanquished in 1619. Meanwhile, Nurgachi subdued the Warka and the Hurha tribes of the Donghai Jurchens (Zhang 2002: 248-250).

In the conquering process, Nurgachi created a military organization called niru (Chinese: Niulu), which was derived from the Jurchen way of hunting. Jurchen men, when going out for hunting, were grouped into small parties, each consisting of 10 men. A leader was elected, and the other nine men each gave an arrow to the leader and followed his orders. The hunting group was called niru (arrow), and the head of the group was called niru ejen. The exact date of the creation of the military niru was unknown, but evidence suggests that 17 niru were founded by 1588 (Zhang 2002: 250). In 1601, a year after the annexation of the Hada tribe, Nurgachi officially adopted the niru as a military unit, which now in principle consisted of 300 adult males. While the hunting niru was ad hoc and temporary, disbanded when the hunt was over, the military niru was permanent and well organized. In addition, the military niru was all-encompassing in that not only the man, but his entire household, including family members and servants, were enrolled as members of the organization (Zhang 2002, Bai 2002, Elliott 2001).

Further in 1615 Nurgachi created the Eight Banner system to accommodate the increasing Jurchen population. Eight banners were created at the time. The banners were aimed to encompass military, economic, and social functions. Each banner (Manchu: gusa; Chinese: gushan, later qi) was identified by the color of its flag (yellow, white, red, or blue), which was either solid or bordered with a red or white fringe. Each banner consisted of five jalan (regiments), which in turn consisted of five niru (company) led by a niru ejen (Chinese: niulu ezhen. Later it was translated zuoling). Each company was further divided into four subdivisions, led by a Janggin (Chinese: zhangjin) and a gasan bosoku (Chinese: boshiku, transliteration of Manchu; later it was rendered canling) (Zhang 2002, Bai 2002, Rhoads 2001).

The Jianzhou, Haixi, and Donghai confederations were reorganized into the eight banners in different ways. The majority of the Jianzhou tribes, as they helped or surrendered to Nurgachi voluntarily, were kept intact and were reorganized as independent niru, and their chieftains were allowed to continue
to be the heads of the niru. A small number of Jianzhou tribes and the majority of the Haixi tribes, however, were dismembered and incorporated into mixed niru because the Haixi used to be the strongest confederation before the 1580s. By dividing the Haixi and integrating them into the mixed niru, Nurgachi could utilize their manpower for his cause and yet at the same time ensure that they would no longer pose a threat to his power. The Donghai Jurchens were incorporated into the banners through the use of force too, but their tribes were largely kept intact as separate niru were set up for them on the basis of their original tribes. The major reason for this preferential treatment was that the Donghai Jurchens were at a lower stage of socio-economic development, and therefore posed no threat to the Later Jin. In sum the Later Jin adopted two approaches to the different Jurchen tribes in accordance to whether or not they posed a threat to the state (Liu 2001: 171-177).

Whereas the hunt niru was based on blood and geographic closeness, the military niru broke down the boundaries and thereby facilitated interaction between people who originally belonged to different villages and tribes. The new niru was indeed multi-functional in that it combined military, production, and administration in one body. Virtually all the Jurchens now were incorporated into the eight banners, hence later the Manchus, who derived primarily from the Jurchens, identified themselves as “banner people.”

The eight banners thus possessed the basic functions of a state. In the next year, Nurgachi proclaimed the establishment of the state Jin (1616-1635), which historians refer to as Later Jin to distinguish it from the Jurchen state Jin (1115-1234). The niru-banner system was preserved in Later Jin as its basic sociopolitical unit. The Jurchens now were subject to the rule of the state government, as opposed to tribal leadership before.

In addition to the Jurchens, various Tungus peoples were recruited and incorporated into the banner system. They were called “new Manchus” (Manchu: ice Manju) (Zhang 1994). Moreover, some Mongols, Koreans, and Chinese voluntarily or involuntarily joined Later Jin’s course. Koreans (and some Mongols and Chinese) were incorporated into the Manchu eight banners. In 1635 and 1642, the Mongol Eight Banners and the Chinese Eight Banners were created respectively.
A new name appealing to all ethnic components was required, and the name Jurchen was undesirable. Between the 1570s and the 1620s, Jurchen society underwent significant economic development and social stratification, and many ordinary Jurchens went bankrupt and fell into the status of slaves. Over the course the word Jurchen (Manchu: Jusen) became a synonym for slaves of Jurchen descendants as opposed to the word “aha” referring to slaves of Chinese and Korean origins. In 1635 Hung Taiji officially adopted the term Manju for the new group of people brought together and woven together by power (Huang 1990).

THE INFLUENCE OF STATE POWER ON MANCHU CULTURE

Power transformed the Manchu way of life. First of all the establishment of the niru as a military unit in 1601 broke down the original tribes to which the Jurchens had physically and spiritually belonged. As the tribes now were destroyed, petitioned, and reorganized into multiple niru, the men were forced to move to new locations and turned into members of the new civil-military organization. They were no longer members of the tribes that their families belonged to for generations. In addition, in the niru men lost their personal freedom they had enjoyed in their tribes, where they had full control of their behavior and production, whereas in the niru they as ordinary members had to obey the rules and regulations set from above, and contributed their labor and production to the niru. They had to provide civil and military services to the niru, and eventually to the state. After all, they could not leave the unit at will once they were incorporated into the organization (Zhang 2002). Moreover, the establishment of the state Later Jin in the 1610s, which accompanied the formation of the Manchus as an ethnic group, transformed Jurchen tribes into components of a state governed by a set of new political, administrative, and legal systems (Liu 2001).

Further, the men were severed from the spiritual life of their initial tribes. Prior to their integration into the niru, the Haixi and Donghai Jurchens, like the Jianzhou Jurchens, believed in tribal shamanism and they believed that they lived under the protection of gods and goddesses. When they were conquered, their deity altars called “tangse” (Chinese: tangzi) were destroyed, and the sculptures of their ancestors and other sacred religious objects were ravaged. What replaced their original tribal shamanism were the
standardized shamanistic beliefs sanctioned by the state. More importantly, Nurgachi and Hong taiji created new norms, made laws governing civil and criminal matters, and rules regarding dressing, wedding, funeral, and lifestyle (Zhang 2002). These new norms and regulations later became the core of the Manchu culture, distinctive from the Chinese.

Meanwhile, the Manchu writing system was invented. The Jurchens had no written language and used Mongolian to communicate. The educated Jurchens had to learn Mongolian in order to read and write. In 1599, Nurgachi committed Erdeni and Gegai to invent a Manchu script on the basis of the Mongolian alphabet. The writing system created at this time had considerable defects as it could not differentiate homophones. In 1623, Hung Taiji requested Dahai to improve the existing writing system. Dahai added dots and circles to the alphabet and effectively resolved the problem (Zhang 2002). The appearance of the Jurchen script finally gave the people a distinctive ethnic marker.

In the economic field, the state transformed the Jurchens from a semi-nomadic hunting-gathering people to a sedentary people engaging in agriculture. The Jianzhou Jurchens came into shape between the late fourteenth century and the mid-fifteenth century. They inhabited the mountains and forests, and fishing, hunting, and gathering were their main economic activities. Agriculture began to appear in this period. However, they were incapable of making high quality iron tools and had to depend on the importation from the Chinese Ming dynasty. The Jurchens were unskilled in raising domestic animals used in framing and thereby they bought or plundered cattle from the Ming (Li 2002; Jiang 1995). In addition, the jurchens did not have the knowledge and skills needed in agricultural production. They abducted and enslaved Chinese and Koreans to farm for them. The Jianzhou Jurchens under Nurgachi’s leadership underwent tremendous technological progress between the 1580s and 1620s. In 1599 they began to refine iron ores and produce iron tools and weapons on a large scale. In 1621, five years after its establishment, Jin waged a large war against the Ming, who occupied the land west of the Liao River. Thereby the Jurchens entered an agrarian region. Nurgachi proclaimed a policy to encourage agriculture among the Jurchens. Between 1621 and 1625 the state allocated farming land to the Jurchens at least three times. As a result the Jurchens were becoming an increasingly agricultural people, abandoning their
traditional mode of production. Further the Jurchen society evolved from slavery into serfdom in the 1620s (Wang 2002: 148) with landlord-peasant relations of production among the Chinese population under the rule of the Later Jin (Liu 2001: 224).

The five decades between the 1580s and the 1630s witnessed dramatic changes in the traditional Jurchen way of life brought about by Nurgachi’s military power and the state Jin. Hung Taiji was fully aware of the transformation of the Jurchens. In 1634 he issued an edict stating the name “Jurchen” was no longer appropriated for the new community, and requesting his subjects to stop using it. In 1635 he renamed the new community Manju, from which derived the Chinese word Manzhou for the Manchus (Huang 1990: 280-282). Hong Taiji’s renaming the group was symbolic of the significant role of the state Jin in the formation of the Manchus.

THE QING CONQUEST OF THE MONGOLS

The belligerent nomadic Mongols were brought under Manchu control as a result of the chronic declination of the Mongol Khanate and the simultaneous rise of the Manchu state. The first bloc, the Southern Mongols, was absorbed into the Later Jin by 1635. About a half century later the Qing incorporated the Khalkha Mongols living in modern Mongolia into the Manchu empire in 1691. Finally about six decades later the Qing brought the Oirat Mongols in modern Xinjiang under its direct rule. The Manchu rulers established a Manchu-Mongol alliance, particularly with the southern Mongols (Man-Meng yiti, meaning Manchu and Mongols are one body), therefore the northern part of the Qing empire remained stable for nearly 280 years, which was crucial for the maintenance of the entire Qing empire (Wang 1997).

The Mongol empire established by Kublai Khan collapsed in the late fourteenth century. At the turn of the fifteenth century the Mongols split into two major subdivisions: the Tartar Mongols living on the Mongolia Plateau and the Oirat Mongols west of the plateau. In 1410 the Chinese Ming dynasty waged a war against the Tartars. The Tartar leader Benyashili (transliteration from Chinese) fled to the Oirat to take refuge, but was killed there. Soon the Tartars surrendered to the Ming. Afterwards the Tartars launched a series of attacks on the Ming to resume autonomy, yet they failed to achieve their goal and
their power was subsequently undercut. In 1434 the Tartars fell into control of the Oirat Mongols. In 1479 Dayan Khan (transliteration from Chinese) of the Tartar Mongols defeated the Oirat and unified Mongol tribes. However, his decease in 1517 brought about the collapse of the fragile unification of the Mongols. The Tartar Mongols themselves broke into two groups: the Khalkha to the north (modern Mongolia) and Mongol tribes living to the south (modern Inner Mongolia) (Zhao 1993).

Traditionally the Chahar tribe of the southern Mongols was the location where the Mongol khan resided. In 1604 Ligdan ascended to the throne but in name only. He attempted to unify the Mongol tribes, yet his ambition encountered resistance from his own tribal bloc, the southern Mongols, who consisted of two clusters of tribes. The Left Wing lived to the east on the southeastern edge of the Mongol Plateau, including the Chahar, Aokhan, Naiman, Bairin, Ongnirod, Jarod, and Khorchin tribes. To the west was the Right Wing, including the Tumet, Maomingan (transliteration from Chinese), Urat, and Ordos tribes. While some tribes supported Ligdan khan’s attempt to establish hegemony over all Mongol tribes, others opposed his ambition. Battles broke out frequently and culminated in the war of 1627 when a coalition formed by the Kharachin, Tumet, Ordos, and other tribes attacked the Chahar. The war killed about 43,000 soldiers commanded by Kigdan khan and caused heavy casualties on the opposite side too (Zhao 1993: 334).

In the mean time Chahar pressure pushed a number of the Left Wing Mongols to migrate to the neighboring Later Jin. Nurgachi welcomed them as he was striving to build a new state and was in need of valiant Mongol cavalrymen. The geopolitics of Northeast Asia at the turn of the seventeenth century prompted the Later Jin to approach the eastern Mongol tribes. From the Manchu perspective, the Chinese Ming dynasty was the strongest enemy, but it had Korea on its side. In addition, Ligdan khan accepted Ming nominal leadership in return for support. Against such a political backdrop, the Later Jin held out an olive branch to the adjacent eastern Mongol tribes first by intermarriage.

The Khorchin tribe had the largest number of intermarriages among all Mongol tribes with the Manchu royal family. It was the Mongol tribe closest to the Manchu territory, and had close relations with the Haixi Jurchens. In fact the Khorchin was the only Mongol tribe that joined the Haixi in the war on
Jianzhou Jurchens in 1593. It might have anticipated that it would be Nurgachi’s next target after he had settled the Haixi. From the Manchu perspective, it needed to secure its backyard when fighting the Chinese. Out of the mutual need, 36 marriages were arranged between the Later Jin royal lineage and the Khorchin tribe between 1612 and 1644. Likewise, 14 marriages were arranged between the Khalkha tribe and the Later Jin, and several cases of intermarriage with the Aokan, Naiman, Bairin, and Kharachin tribes (Liu 1995: 5-6).

Simultaneously with the arrangement of the marriages, the Later Jin managed to bring some of the eastern Mongol tribes on its side. The Naiman and Aokhan tribes belonged to the eight-tribe Chahar. Due to discord with Ligdan khan, however, the two tribes in 1627 signed a three-party agreement with Later Jin to collectively confront the Chahar.

When Hung Taiji ascended to the throne in 1627, he set the goal to conquer the southern Mongols, which brought the Later Jin into conflict with Ligdan khan, who, as stated above, was determined to unify the southern Mongols. Ligdan khan’s aim invited discontent from the ambitious Inner Khalkha tribes, who had about 10,000 families as the Chahar. Ligdan khan attacked the Bairin and Jarod tribes of the Inner Khalkha. The two tribes accepted Later Jin leadership in return for protection. As the Bairin tribe was the head of the five of the Inner Khalkha tribes, its siding with the Later Jin had considerable influence on other Inner Khalkha tribes. In addition, the Later Jin conquered the Khalachin tribe, whose location was strategically crucial as it bordered the Ming, the Later Jin, and Inner Mongolia (Liu 1995).

By then Later Jin had brought a number of southern Mongol tribes under its control. In 1628 Hongtaiji himself led troops to attack the Chahar. Afterwards the Ongnirod, Urat, and Aro-Khorchin tribes surrendered to the Later Jin. In 1632 Hongtaiji for the second time attacked the Chahar, with about 100,000 Mongol troops under his command. The war lasted for two years. In 1634 the Ligdan Khan died from disease. His son, prince Eje, surrendered to Later Jin with the state stamp. Thus the Mongol state ceased to exist (Liu 1995; Zhang 1998).

Some researchers argue that cultural similarities facilitated Manchu-Mongol alliance in the early seventeenth century. These similarities ranged from food, language, and customs, to mode of production,
political structure, and psychological intimacy (Qi 1992). Although it is an insightful view, I maintain that political and military power was more important than culture in Mongol incorporation into the Manchu empire. After all, the Later Jin conquered only the southern Mongols in the 1630s. Cultural closeness did not bring the two other Mongol confederations (The Khalkha and the Oirat) under Manchu rule. It was military force that played the determining role a century later.

In April 1636 the Later Jin changed its state title to the Qing after it had conquered the southern Mongols. In December of that year about 100,000 Qing banner troops commanded by Hung Taiji invaded Korea and forced the country to sever its political ties with the Ming, and honor the Qing as the authentic suzerain (Jin 2001). A few years later dramatic political changes in China drew the Qing southward. Manchu emperors turned northward to the Khalkha Mongols after they had settled resistance in China proper in the early 1680s.

The Khalkha Mongols accepted Chahar leadership before the Later Jin defeated Ligdan khan. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Khalkha split into three khanates: The Setsen to the east, the Jasaghtu to the west, and the Tushiyetu in the middle. After the Qing conquered the Chahar, the Khalkha khanates presented tribute to the Qing and thus accepted Qing nominal rule. Nevertheless, Khalkha allegiance was volatile and they oscillated between docile and rebellious through the 1640s and the 1650s. A major development in Qing-Khalkha relations occurred in 1655, when the new khans of the Tushiyetu and Setsen, to obtain Qing support of their leadership, sent envoys to the court together with the Jasaghtu khanate. The court granted them gifts and set up eight Jasagh banners in their territories in return. This was the first step toward full incorporation of the Khakha into the Qing empire.

In addition to strained relationship with the Qing from time to time, internal conflict curtailed Khalkha power and Qing emperors soon capitalized on it. In 1662 a succession struggle broke out within the Jasaghtu khanate, leading a large number of tribesmen to migrate to the neighboring Tushiyetu khanate. The Kangxi emperor intervened and conferred the title of khan on chenggun (transliteration of Chinese). Later Chenggun repeatedly requested that the Tushiyetu khanate repatriate Jasaghtu refugees, but was denied each time by the latter. Animosity between the two khanates grew rapidly as time passed
by. The Kangxi emperor mediated between them, and in 1686 he ordered the two khanates to meet at Urga (modern Ulan Bator) to settle the dispute. During the duration of the meeting, the Qing managed to set up six more Jasagh banners in Khalkha territory, appointing Khalkha taiji as the heads. Nevertheless Qing leadership remained on the superficial level. One example was that the Tushiyetu khanate returned only half of the people to Jasaghtu, not all of them as requested by the Kangxi emperor (Zhao 1993).

A major turning point in Qing influence over Khalkha Mongols came in the late 1680s with the rise of Galdan khan, the powerful leader of the Zunghar tribe of the Oirat Mongols living in northern Xinjiang. In the 1670s Galdan unified the Oirat Mongols and began to assault the Khalkha to the east in the hope of becoming the khan of all Mongols. In 1687 Galdan helped the Jasaghtu khanate to attack the Tushiyetu Khanate. When the attempt failed, in the spring of 1688 Galdan himself led 30,000 troops to attack the Tushiyetu. The war prompted many tribes of the three Khalkha khanates to move southward to Inner Mongolia. As the war continued, in 1691 the Kangxi emperor summoned all Khalkha and southern Mongol noblemen to Dolon Nor in Inner Mongolia for a political conference. There the Khalkha noblemen were forced to give up their original noble titles and accept the same titles given to the southern Mongols by the Qing court. In addition Jasagh banners were set up among the Khalkha Mongols parallel to those in Inner Mongolia. The only privilege Khalkha Mongols retained was the empty title of khan (Zhao 1993, Rawski 1998).

Afterwards the Kangxi emperor took to the battlefield several times and defeated Galdan finally in 1696 at Jao Modo. In 1725 the Sain Noyon Khanate was created out of the Tushiyetu Khanate to cut the power of the latter. In 1767 the court built a walled town at Uliasutai within the Sain Noyon khanate and stationed the Uliasutai General there in charge of Khalkha political, military, and economic affairs. Moreover, in 1767 the court created a post in Kobdo to oversee regional affairs (Zhao 1993). Thus the Khalkha Mongols were placed under full control.

The last Mongol tribal bloc, the Oirat, was incorporated into the Qing empire through military campaigns in the mid-eighteenth century. The Oirat lived in the land north of the Tianshan Mountains in modern Xinjiang, composed of four major tribes: The Khosot, Zunghar, Dorbot, and Torgut. In the early
seventeenth century the Khosots were the strongest among the Oirat Mongols, and Khosot chieftains headed the loose Oirat confederation successively. To resolve inter-tribal conflict resulting from struggle for pasture lands, in 1637 the Khosot leader, Gusi khan, led Oirat confederation troops to Kokonor (modern Qinghai). They defeated Khalkha tribes living there, and later Gusi khan moved the Khosot tribe to the region. Gusi khan further attacked the secular government in Tibet and occupied the region in 1642.

With the Khosots migrating out of northern Xinjiang, Galdan of the Zunghar tribe gradually seized Oirat confederation power. In 1678, after having unified the Oirat Mongols north of the Tianshan Mountains, Galdan conquered the Uyghurs south of the mountains. Shortly afterwards he demanded the Khosot Mongols in control of Tibet to submit to his rule. In 1688 Galdan further attacked the Khalkha Mongols, a move that ironically helped the Qing to bring the Khalkha under control (see above). After Galdan’s death in 1697, his nephew Tsereng Araptan became the leader of the Oirat. At first he was submissive to the Qing court, but gradually he chose to rebel as his power grew over time. In 1715 he sent 2,000 troops to attack the Uyghurs in Hami, eastern Xinjiang, who had submitted to Qing rule (Zhao 1993). Next in 1717 Tsereng Araptan sent 6,000 troops to Tibet, killed the Khosot leader Lajang khan ruling Tibet, and eventually ended 75-year-long Khosot rule of Tibet (Zhang 1999). Zunghar Mongols occupied Tibet for three years until Qing troops expelled them. In 1727 Galdan Tsereng succeeded Oirat leadership after Tsereng Araptan’s death. The new leader too oscillated between submissive and rebellious. The Yongzheng emperor up to several times sent troops to fight against the Zunghar, but failed to bring them under control. With Galdan Tsereng’s death in 1745, however, a drawn-out succession struggle broke out among the Zunghar. In the following decade some Oirat chieftains led their people to migrate to Qing territory. The disruption of Oirat power prompted the Qianlong emperor to make the decisive move to take Xinjiang. In the spring of 1755 the court entrusted the Mongol general Amursana with the task. Amursana defeated the Oirat, but soon he rebelled too as his expectation to be appointed as the Oirat leader was not satisfied by the emperor. Soon the Uyghur leaders, the Khoja brothers, followed suite. The Qing first concentrated military forces on Amursana. In the autumn of 1757 Amursana was defeated and escaped to Russia. At the beginning of the next year the Qing began to deal with the Khoja
brothers. In the summer of 1759 the Qing quelled down the Muslim rebellion, and brought both the Oirat Mongols and the Uyghurs in Xinjiang under control (Zhao 1993).

A final note is needed about the Khosot Mongols. The Khosot Mongols who migrated to Kokonor remained autonomous through the early eighteenth century although they accepted Qing nominal suzerainty. As stated above, the Khosot khanate ruled Kokonor and Tibet from 1642 onward. After the decease of the fifth Dalai Lama in 1682, three reincarnations were selected by the Tibetan Sde Srid (assistant to the Dalai Lama), Lajang khan (the Khosot Mongol leader ruling Tibet), and Khosot Mongols in Kokonor respectively. The controversy became more complicated in the 1710s, involving the following five parties: the Qing, Lajang khan, Tsereng Araptan (the Zunghar Mongol leader ruling the Oirat Mongols in northern Xinjiang), Tibetan clergy, and Lobjang Danjin (Khosot Mongol leader in Kokonor).

In 1717 Tsereng Araptan’s troops invaded Tibet, killed Lajang khan, and deposed the sixth Dalai Lama selected by Lajang khan. In 1720 Qing and Kokonor Khosot allies entered Tibet and expelled Zunghar troops. The Qing took advantage of the campaign and set up a new political structure in Tibet, ending Khosot dominance over Tibet, and further leaving the Khosot completely out Tibetan affairs. Three years later, Lobjang Danjin rebelled (Zhang 1999, Rawski 1998). The Yongzheng emperor appointed Sichuan-Shaanxi governor-general Nian Gengyao as the commander-in-chief to fight the Khosot. The next year the Qing quelled down the rebellion. Shortly afterwards the Qing renamed the region Qinghai and reorganized the region into an administrative area under full control (Liu 1993, Rawski 1998). By now all the Mongol tribes were subject to Qing rule.

MECHANISMS FOR RULING THE MONGOLS

Manchu rulers adopted multiple approaches to the Mongols. Mongol princes were rewarded with noble titles, gifts, and Aisin Gioro wives. In addition, Mongol tribal leaders were granted political privileges. Manchu rulers recognized largely Mongol leaders’ rule over their tribes though sometimes divided and reorganized Mongol tribes in such a way that the strong tribes would not impose serious threat to the Manchu throne. The nomadic, horse-riding Mongols, in the eyes of early Manchu rulers,
were potential troublemakers. To curb the Mongols, Manchu rulers conceived of the basic mechanism of “divide and rule,” or in their own language, to prop up numerous leaders in order to divide their strength.

The department in the central government dealing with Mongol affairs was named the Mongol Department\(^8\). It was founded in 1636. In 1638 the Chinese title of the minister was changed to “Court of Colonial Affairs” (*lifanyuan*), but the Manchu and Mongol titles remained unchanged. The Court was a high level department parallel to the six ministries in the central bureaucracy dealing with Chinese issues. Unlike the six ministries, however, officials of the Court were selected only from Manchus and Mongols, and staff members were selected from Mongols, Manchus, and Chinese banner men, or more precisely Manchus of Chinese descent (Wang 1997: 169). Ordinary Chinese were excluded.

At the administrative level, the Manchu rulers reduced the autonomy of the Mongol tribes by reorganizing them into “banners” and by dividing large tribes into small banners. The project was started with Eastern Mongol tribes in 1636, later was expanded to outer and western Mongols. By the Qianlong reign (1736-1785) the Mongols were divided into 199 banners (ibid: 171).

Administrative control of the banners was taken out of the hands of original tribal leaders. A new post, the Jasagh, was created to take charge of each banner. The Jasagh was selected from the nobility, who were loyal to or had contributed to the Manchu court, regardless of their original ranks in the Mongol tribes. Those who were from the high ranks but were useless or untrustworthy were conferred titles, but not real power. On the contrary, low-ranking noblemen who had offered remarkable contributions were granted Jasagh in charge of the entire banner’s affairs, including military, administrative, legal, and corvee services.

The Jasagh banners were further organized into leagues, each consisting of a number of banners. The league head had only nominal authority over the jasagh in that he could only convene league conference every three years, but no authority to intervene into the internal affairs of the individual banners, which

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\(^8\) The Chinese title of the department was *Menggu yamen*, and the Manchu title was *Monggo yamun*, where *yamun* was a loanword from Chinese. Later the Manchu title was rendered *Monggo i jargan* to purify the Manchu language. See Crossley 2006: 81)
were under the direct administrative control of the Court of Colonial Affairs, which in turn was supervised by the emperor.

The Manchu rulers sought to contain the migrant and uncontrollable Mongols by limiting them within the boundaries of their own banner. When a banner was created, its geographic boundaries were demarcated. Consequently all the Mongols, including the princes and the herdsmen, were forbidden to cross the borders; otherwise they would be punished. Furthermore, the Manchu court prohibited intermarriage and trading between the inner Mongol tribes and the Khalkha and Oirat tribes.

Moreover, the court restricted interactions between the Mongols and the Chinese after 1644. Chinese merchants, before entering Mongolia, had to apply for travel authorization called *yinpiao* (printed stamps). Chinese merchants doing business without the stamp were deemed illegal, and were expatriated once they were found with half of the goods confiscated. Chinese farmers going to Mongolia to reclaim land had to apply for stamps as well (Sun 1998).

Natural disasters and population growth pushed Chinese farmers to enter Mongolia, where land suitable for farming seemed to be unlimited. Over time many Chinese immigrants entered Mongolia illegally. The court unwillingly acknowledged their existence, but ordered them to live in villages separate from Mongol dwellings, and to exchange land with Mongols so that they would not mingle together (Sun 1998). In 1810 the court set up a dual administrative system in Mongolia. In the Chinese regions, counties and districts were founded like those in China proper; whereas in the Mongol territories, the banners were preserved. The system lasted until the end of the dynasty (Zhang 1998).

Culturally Mongols were forbidden to learn Chinese characters, to adopt Chinese names, and to marry Chinese, except for the short period between 1788 and 1800. The court issued edicts to ban intermarriage between Chinese men and Mongol women repeatedly. For instance, in 1801, the Jiaqing emperor issued an edict, which prescribed that those who broke the law were subject to three months in jail and 100 whippings, and that the husband and wife should divorce with the Mongol woman sent back to her parents’ family (Sun 1998: 47).
Traveling between Mongolia and China proper was restricted. Mongols had to use the six designated passes on the long border: Shanhaiguan, Xifengkou, Gubeikou, Dushikou, Zhangjiakou, and Shahukou. In addition, restrictive laws were made to limit Mongol traveling and trading with outsiders other than Chinese. The 10 Korchin banners had to follow certain regulations when sending merchants to purchase minks from Tungus peoples in the Heilongjiang valley, otherwise they would be punished. If the organizer was a Mongol prince or jasagh, he would be fined, and the head of the merchants would be beheaded with the goods confiscated (Wang 1997: 174).

The Manchu court made a set of laws for the Mongols called the Mongol Laws (Menggu Lüli). Regarding the application of the laws, the laws initially prescribed that the laws applied to all Mongols regardless of the location where the crime was committed. Later it switched the principle of territoriality. In either case, the Mongols and the Chinese in general were subject to two parallel administrative and legal systems (ibid: 176). Segregation, from the Manchu perspective, prevented trouble between the Mongols and the Chinese, which was conducive to a peaceful Manchu rule, as the court repeatedly acknowledged. What the court was reluctant to openly articulate, but was perhaps more important, was that by protecting Mongols from Chinese cultural and economic invasion, and by granting Mongol nobility certain privileges, the Manchu court won Mongol support, which was crucial for Manchu rule of China.

In addition to legal control, Manchu rulers had a soft approach. To control the mindset of the Mongols, Manchu emperors sponsored Tibetan Buddhism among the Mongols. A byproduct of the policy was a slump in Mongol population as Mongol men were encouraged to renounce family and become monks. In addition, sexually transmitted diseases spread among Mongols as Monks were forbidden to marry (ibid: 173). The problems with the Mongol population made the Manchu task of controlling the Mongols more doable.

THE QING CONQUEST OF THE CHINESE

The Qing conquest of China occurred at a time when the Ming dynasty had been subverted by peasant rebellions, and thus the Chinese had lost the capacity to mobilize military and political resources
to fight against Qing attacks. The Manchu conquest, unlike western invasions in the mid-nineteenth century, did not bring in technological, cultural, or political elements that inspired the Chinese to learn willingly. On the contrary, the Manchus had little to nothing to offer to the Chinese, except for few Manchu ethnic marks such as the male hairstyle, dress, and sociopolitical discriminations imposed on the Chinese, which caused long-term Chinese animosities, as we shall see in Chapter IV. This section intends to give a concise description of the Manchu conquest of China in the 1640s to illustrate the point that Manchu military conquest and ethnic policies on the Chinese, who deemed themselves a civilized people as opposed to the “barbarian” Manchus, sowed the seeds of hatred among the Chinese, which smoldered throughout the dynasty and surfaced in the last decade of the Qing dynasty, prompted political unrest, and eventually led to the downfall of the government.

The Ming began to suffer a chronic internal disorder in 1627 when peasants in the northwestern Shaanxi province revolted against local government due to heavy taxation at a time of natural disasters. Soon peasant uprisings swept across the country. In the following decade of so, rebels struck many provinces, slashed local governments, and gradually but steadily destroyed Ming political and economic structures. On May 6, 1644, one of the peasant armies, the Dashun, led by Li Zicheng, captured Beijing. The Chongzhen emperor committed suicide before the troops entered the Forbidden City. Ming rule of China came to an end.

The Qing state, after Nurgachi’s issuance of his “Seven Great Grieves” against the Ming in 1618, officially took on the Ming as its enemy country, and sought to contend hegemony in East Asia after having subdued the Mongol state in 1635 and vanquished Korea in 1636. The Qing capitalized on Ming’s internal conflicts. In 1638 Qing besieged the city of Jinzhou, the one closest to the Qing among the eight Ming fortresses along the Liaoxi corridor linking Manchuria to China proper. Fully aware of the Qing’s attempt, the Ming emperor hastily transferred the notable general Hong Chengchou to Jinzhou from the battlefront with the peasant troops next year. A war broke out between the Qing and the Ming in Jinzhou and the surrounding areas, and lasted until spring 1642, ending with the Ming defeated. At the time the Ming was still strong enough to assemble troops from the provinces and move them to the Northeast to
confront the Qing. Against such a political backdrop, the Qing tried to pacify the rebel armies in the hope of winning them over. On November 6, 1642, Hung Taiji sent envoys to the Ming to observe the situation. The Manchu officials were instructed to negotiate with the Chinese rebels, telling them that the motive for the Qing attack on the Ming coincided with that of the Chinese rebels in that they were both fighting against a government engaging in inhumane policies, but the mission ended in vain (Li 1999).

By the time he took Beijing, the rebel leader Li Zicheng had established the regime the Shun, and attempted to bring China under his control. After the fall of the capital, Li sent a letter to Wu Sangui, the general stationed at the Shanhaiguan Pass at the east end of the Great Wall, urging him to surrender. Wu refused to reply. Before Li Zicheng’s army took Beijing on April 25, the Chongzhen emperor instructed Wu to bring his troops southward to protect the capital from the rebel. Wu did follow the instruction, but the capital fell in Li’s hand before Wu reached there. On April 28, knowing the possibility to take over the capital was slim; Wu retreated to Shanhaiguan Pass, a strategic point overseeing the entrance to China from Manchuria.

Sandwiched between the Qing to the Northeast and the rebel regime Shun to the Southwest, Wu’s troops, mounting to 30,000 to 40,000 men, were unable to confront either side. Wu had to choose between surrendering to the Qing or the Shun. Wu first opted for the Chinese side. He gave over the Shanhaiguan Pass to Tang Tong, representative of Li, then led his troops down to Beijing to join Li’s course. On May 10 on his way to the capital, however, Wu encountered his family members who fled the city, from whom Wu learned that the Shun mistreated Ming officials who had voluntarily surrendered to the Shun, forcing them to contribute large sums of wealth to the regime by torturing the officials, including his father, Wu Xiang. Wu realized that he could meet the same fate as his father. Wu then ordered his troops to turn around to march back to Shanhaiguan. On May 13 Wu recaptured the pass. Foreseeing Li’s attack, Wu recruited new soldiers, bringing his troops to over 60,000 men. Meanwhile Wu sent envoys to the Qing to request help. On May 20 Dorgon met with Wu’s representatives and received a letter written by Wu himself, in which Wu implored Dorgon to “lend” troops to help him to

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9 The following account is based on Liu 1994.
restore the Ming, and promised to cede Chinese territory in return. In the letter Wu designated two routes for Qing troops to enter China: one was the Xifengkou-Longjingguan line, the other was the Qiangziling-Miyun, both being the routes the Qing had used before to assault the Ming, thus having no strategic value. Dorgon was cautious about Wu’s intention. In his reply on May 21, Dorgon requested Wu to surrender and promised noble title in return.

Meanwhile on May 16, Li sent representatives to Wu demanding his surrender. Two days later Li himself commanded 100,000 troops to swoop on Shanhaiguan. On the morning of May 26, Li’s troops arrived at the destination and a battle began between the two armies. Dorgon’s troops arrived on the outskirts of Shanhaiguan in the evening through rapid march. A day before Dorgon received a second letter from Wu, requesting him to bring troops immediately to Shanhaiguan to resist the Shun. By the time Dorgon’s troops arrived at the scene, Wu had fought with Li for a whole day, and was in the inferior position. Li’s troops broke through Wu’s first defense line, and gained the upper hand in the battles at supporting castles around the Shanhaiguan fortress. At the time Dorgon’s troops were still outside Shanhaihuan, while the main forces of Li’s troops were engaging in combat with Wu. Dorgon defeated a detachment of Li’s soldiers at Yipianshi, thus cleared the way to Shanhaiguan. On the morning of May 27, Dorgon led his troops to Shanhaiguan, but ordered his men to stop outside the fortress, not joining the battle as Wu expected. Li’s troops started to attack again, up to three times Wu implored Dorgon to help. Dorgon was still skeptical of Wu’s intention and wanted to ensure that Wu would definitely submit to him. Before he sent soldiers to join the battle, Dorgon detached scouts to obtain details about the combat between Wu and Li up to eight times. Under the fierce assaults by Li’s troops, Wu was unable to hold his own. Protected by 200 bodyguards, Wu broke out of Li’s encirclement, and galloped to Dorgon’s camp, where the two men completed a negotiation that would influence China for the many years to come.

In a nutshell, Dorgon agreed to dispatch soldiers to help Wu. In return Wu promised to divide up Chinese territory and cede the land north of the Yellow River to the Qing. As a sign of submission, Wu agreed that he and his soldiers would adopt the Manchu male hairstyle immediately, like Chinese who had been brought under Manchu rule before.
After the negotiation, Wu opened the Shanhaiguan gate and Qing troops entered the fortress secretly. Dorgon then ordered Wu to fight with Li first. For the rest of the day, the two armies fought fiercely against each other as Wu knew he could not lose. The battle lasted until the evening, and Li gradually gained the upper hand. At the juncture, Dorgon sent 20,000 cavalrmen to join the combat, and defeated Li. Li retreated to Beijing. On June 15 he left the capital for Xi’an, capital of his home province Shaanxi. Two days later Dorgon entered Beijing and soon settled the capital and surrounding areas. Then he sent troops to Henan and Shanxi provinces surrounding Shaanxi to contain Li. With his subordinates losing several battles in other areas in the province, Li believed he could not defend Xi’an; thus he abandoned the city and moved southward. On his way he lost one battle after another. Finally he was killed in Jiangxi province the next year and the Shun regime came to an end (Li 1999).

After Qing troops took Beijing, Ming loyalists continued to resist in the south. Four former Ming princes established southern Ming governments successively in different locations. The last one lasted until early 1662.

Another force fighting against the Qing was Zheng Chenggong’s army. Zheng set the two islands Jinmen and Xiamen (Amoy) in the southeastern province of Fujian as his bases, and further expanded his influence to some areas in Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang provinces, where he collected supplies for his military campaigns. Parallel to his effort on the mainland, Zheng also actively engaged in maritime trading between China, Japan, and Southeast Asian nations to raise funds. Moreover Zheng and his family sought to enlist foreign help from counties as far afield as Liuqiu (Ryukyu), Luzon, and the Roman pope. Most noteworthy was that up to 10-20 times Zheng and his family appealed to Japan to send troops to help with their cause. Unfortunately the Bakufu denied their requests. Nevertheless, Zheng was determined to carry out his ambitious plan to reestablish the Ming. In June 1658 Zheng launched a campaign to attack the mainland now under Qing control. From Fujian he led troops northward, taking towns and cities in Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces, and finally reached Nanjing in the summer of 1559. Zheng’s troops besieged the city. Capturing Nanjing was the first important step in his plan. In a poem he wrote at the time, Zheng said he was standing on the bank of the Yangtze River wearing white mourning
apparel for his lost country, and was determined to exterminate the barbarians. In the last line Zheng expressed his firm belief that he would be able to reestablish the Ming state: “Look, if I throw my whip into the natural moat [the Yangtze River] and across it, then I believe that I will make the Middle Plain [China] have the surname of Zhu [the surname of the Ming emperors]” (Ishihara 1967: 59). However, secret enemy agents within Zheng’s ranks rendered his defeat at Nanjing, and he had to retreat to Fujian. In 1661 Zheng captured Taiwan and from then on the island served as the base for his cause. The Qing approached Zheng’s army in two ways: military campaign on the one hand and on the other hand the Qing’s declared amnesty for those who would surrender, further promising rewards to them. In 1662 Zheng died in Taiwan and his son Zheng Jing succeeded him as the leader. In 1667 twice the court sent envoys to Taiwan to negotiate with Zheng Jing, who eventually refused the Qing conditions that he had to shave his head and move to the mainland. In 1683 the court ordered the general Shi Lang to attack Taiwan. Shi took the Penghu islands between the mainland and Taiwan. Under military pressure, Zheng Keshuang, the son of Zheng Jing, surrendered, bringing the last organized resistance force to an end (Qin 2001). Evidence suggests that Zheng Chenggong’s subordinates formed the Heaven and Earth Association (Luo 1997), whose purpose was to subvert the Qing and reestablish the Ming. The association was an important social force throughout the Qing dynasty, organizing a large number of rebellions in the south against the government. Many of its members participated in the Taiping rebellion and the 1911 Revolution.

MECHANISMS FOR RULING THE CHINESE

The Qing in general preserved the political structure in China proper after the conquest. However, three military, administrative, and political mechanisms were unique to the Qing as opposed to Chinese dynasties such as the Ming. First, the Qing stationed banner troops in strategic points across China after it entered China proper to deter and control the Chinese population (Elliot 2001: 129). Roughly 150,000 troops were stationed in the capital, called jinlü, or Imperial Guards, whereas troops stationed in the provinces were called zhufang, literally station and defense (Ding 2003). 25 garrisons were set up in the capital region, while 14 major garrisons in the provinces (Rhoads 2000). The garrisons were carefully
arranged in terms of location and ethnic composition so that the state could keep the Chinese under control with limited numbers of banner troops.

First, Manchu rulers protected the capital with three defense lines. The first line was the Imperial Guards stationed within the city; the second circle consisted of garrisons built in eight counties surrounding the capital; and the third defense line included garrisons in eight cities further away in Shanxi, Hebei, and Shandong provinces neighboring the capital region (Ding 2003). In the provinces the three major garrisons at Jiangning (modern Nanjing), Xi’an, and Jingzhou in the Southeast, Northwest, and Midsouth, respectively, had the largest numbers of banner troops. Moreover, only the trustworthy Manchu and Mongol banner troops were stationed in Jiangning and Jingzhou, whereas in the outskirts of the huge triangle (the three garrisons mentioned above) both Manchu and Chinese banner troops were stationed. Further, in the peripheral provinces such as Fujian and Guangdong, banner troops that originally belonged to the three feudatories\(^\text{10}\) were stationed. In sum, by the end of the seventeenth century the Manchu emperors managed to keep China under control by laying out multiple layers of defense in which Manchu/Mongol banner troops oversaw Chinese banner troops, who in turn oversaw the Chinese Green Standard Army stationed across the country (Ding 2003: 35-36).

Administratively the Qing created an ethnic quota system and applied to top positions in the metropolitan administration, in which Manchus were appointed with Chinese in roughly equal numbers. Indeed the Manchu quotas were further divided into five categories: the imperial lineage, Manchu banner men, Mongol banner men, Chinese banner men, bondservants of the Imperial Household Department; in most instances half of the top posts were reserved for them and the other half were allocated to the Chinese. However, the majority of the subordinate positions were reserved for Manchus, with the Chinese quota making only about 30% of the positions (Du 1995: 11, Rhoads: 2000).

The principle of diarchy applied to only a limited number of positions. Even so the Qing invented mechanisms to cap Chinese influence in the metropolitan administration. For instance, the post of board

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\(^{10}\) The Qing rewarded the three Chinese generals who had helped the Qing in the process of conquest with prince titles and land. Among them Wu Sangui was the most preeminent.
supervision that outranked a board’s two presidents and oversaw the operation of the board was almost always a Manchu. Moreover, the numerous positions at the middle and lower echelons of the Qing nine-rank administrative system were staffed disproportionately by Manchus. For instance, at the Grand Secretariat, 20 of the 24 mid-level positions were reserved for Manchus (Rhoads 2001: 45). Thus it can be inferred that the structure was conceived in such a way that the few token Chinese officials were controlled by Manchu supervisors from the top and the power of the Chinese to some degree were undercut by the numerous Manchu officials from the bottom.

In the provinces roughly an equal number of Manchus were appointed as governors or governors-general with Chinese. Throughout the entire Qing dynasty Manchus constituted 57% of all governors-general and 48.4% of all governors. A remark is needed here. The percentages of Manchu governors-general and governors declined after the anti-Manchu Taiping Rebellion. Manchus constituted 34.6% of all governors-general and 22.2% of governors between 1851 and 1912 (Rhoads 2001: 48). Hence it can be inferred that Manchus outnumbered Chinese as provincial leaders for the majority of the duration of the Qing. Moreover, the above statistics show that more Manchus served as governors-general than Chinese indicating that in the provinces too Manchus overpowered Chinese for the entire Qing period.

Politically the Qing court gradually changed to secret politics from open politics. In a broad stroke, the open political system worked in the following way: the Titangguan (an official who represented a province but resided in the capital) submitted documents from the province to the official called tongzhengshisi, whose responsibility was to review and seal the documents and then submit them to the Grand Secretariat (neige), which was supposed to draft an opinion on each document, then submit it to the emperor. The emperor read the original document, the cabinet’s opinion, and made remarks, then passed it down to the Imperial Office of Conference (neizoushichu), which in turn passed it to the pibenchu within the cabinet, which wrote the emperor’s remarks on the title page of the original document under the supervision of the official hanlinzhongshu (Zhongliang). In short, the procedure was open to officials in the departments involved in the complex process. In addition, Ming emperors held open “court conferences” (tingyi) routinely. Shortly after the conquest, however, the Manchu rulers changed the
procedure. In 1677 the Kangxi emperor created the agency “South Study” (nanshufang), staffed by officials he selected directly. The organization collected documents directly from provincial officials, and drafted opinions for the emperor (Meng and Wang 2003). The Yongzheng emperor went a step further. In 1726 he secretly set up the Office of Military Supplies (junxufang) within the Ministry of Household to deal with military campaigns in the Northwest (Meng and Wang 2003: 435, Guo 1998). In 1729 the Office of Military Supplies was changed to junjichu (literally the Bureau of Military Secrets, or the Grand Council), which consisted of normally five officials appointed directly by the emperor and a number of secretaries (zhangjing) through whom the emperor communicated directly with individual offices in the provinces without the intervention of the Grand Secretariat, which now dealt with only routines. The Grand Council was secret politics in nature (Guo 1998). Officials could report local issues and their colleagues’ activities directly and secretly to the emperor, thus through the Grand Council the emperor kept a strong hold of the country, the population, and the officialdom. The three mechanisms that the Manchu rulers utilized in China, namely military deployment in important areas, the Manchu dominated bureaucracy, and secret politics, contributed to the long-lasting Manchu rule of China.

THE QING CONQUEST OF THE MIAO

The southwest was home to various ethnic groups such as the Miao, the Yi, and the Zhuang. Qing government and contemporaries referred to this region as the “Miao territory” (Miaojiang). The Qing invaded the territory in the 1720s, about four decades after the state secured the Chinese land. The Miao society had been isolated from the Chinese since the end of the Ming as the Ming government built a wall in the western part of the Hunan province, separating the Miao to the west from the Chinese to the east. The wall was called “Frontier Wall” (Bianqiang). It was approximately 120 miles in length, five feet in width, and eight feet in height (Wu 1985: 20). Due to separation Miao sociopolitical structures were largely preserved.

The Miao possessed no state government or formal legal system. The society was bound by two basic social organizations. At the lower level was the drum society (gushe), a clan-like organization whose members shared blood ties. Its purpose was to strengthen psychological closeness between the
members by worshipping common ancestors on a periodical basis. On such an occasion, a master of ceremonies was elected, normally a respected elderly man of the clan. The society reviewed the rules on the rituals, assessed whether the clan had fulfilled its goals and obligations to all members, and might revise the rules of the society consequently. Afterwards some people beat drums and others began to dance in the tones.

At a higher level was the organization called “kuan,” a tribal confederation created by organizing people of multiple villages through a set of rituals involving drinking blood and vowing to heaven to help each other. Regulations were made through popular discussion, and a leader of the kuan was elected, who, together with village leaders, were bound by the regulations. This larger organization was created for the purpose of maintaining social order in a larger area. When a member village was bullied by an outsider, all other villages of the whole kuan were supposed to help the former to revenge. If a person was killed or wounded in such a fighting against outsiders, then the kuan would allocate funds for the person to receive medical treatment or for the family to arrange funeral. In addition, their family members would be taken care of by the kuan. At the time, the kuan possessed no permanent organizations, not to mention standing army, prison, or court. Civil disputes were arbitrated by the kuan leader, village head, or clan head, depending on the degree of severity of the matters. The kuan also possessed communal property and facilities, and provided public services to all members (ibid: 3-5).

Prior to the Qing invasion, the Miao territory was under the rule of native chieftains. The Ming and Qing governments had only nominal control by conferring official titles on them—but nothing more than that, and subsequently the people paid no tax or services to the government.

Having settled Chinese resistance in China proper, the Qing began to turn to the southwest. The state aimed to bring the region into its direct rule. The project was completed with military campaign. On March 4, 1726, the Yongzheng emperor entrusted the Manchu official Ortai with incorporating the native peoples fully into the empire. The task lasted for five years (1726-1731), mobilized more than 100,000 troops and cost the government 4.6 million taels of silver (Wang 1997: 223-225). The troops included Manchu soldiers transferred from the capital, the Chinese Green Standard stationed in the provinces of
Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guangxi, and soldiers recruited from native men, whose number amounted to roughly half of the total number of troops mobilized. During the conquest process cases of genocide were common. In some cases the people of entire villages were exterminated, including women and children, even if they showed no signs of resistance (Wang 1997: 222).

MECHANISMS FOR RULING THE MIAO

In the wake of the conquest, the state imposed coercive cultural assimilation on the aboriginal peoples. Like what it did to the Chinese, the Manchu court dictated that native chieftains adopt Manchu male hairstyle, and wear Manchu official dress. Later the order of hairstyle was extended to the “ripened Miao” (shu Miao, or civilized Miao, referring to those who were accustomed to Chinese culture) to differentiate them from the “Raw Miao” (sheng Miao), who lived in remote areas and had little contact with the Chinese.

The state transformed native political structure after the conquest. If other minority territories in the empire retained their autonomy to varying degrees, then the Miao territory was fully incorporated into the Qing empire politically. The territory was reorganized into counties and prefectures on the Chinese model. The state also shuffled personnel in charge of local affairs. A large number of Manchu and Chinese officials were sent to the Miao territory. Some native chieftains considered to be loyal to the court, were appointed as officials at various levels as well, but they were not allowed to work in their hometown as before.

The state did not make independent laws for the Miao. Unlike other ethnic groups who were subject to the administration of the Court of Colonial Affairs, Miao affairs were handled by the Chinese bureaucracy. For instance, Miao officials were administered by the Ministry of Personnel (Libu). Regulations on native affairs were included in the Criminal Law of the Great Qing (Da-Qing lüli), which originally applied to the Chinese only. The 1740 version of the statute contained 24 clauses on administration of native officials, Chinese-Miao relations, and legal issues in the territory. Moreover, 12 clauses were added after 1740. The Miao were forbidden to carry hunting weapons. Chinese were forbidden to enter Miao territory and vice versa. In practice, however, this ban was not strictly observed.
as the state encouraged Chinese-Miao intermarriage as a method to assimilate the Miao. Serious offences were tried in accordance to Qing criminal law, but disputes between native parties were allowed to be arbitrated in accordance with native customs (Liu 1993: 112-113).

Simultaneously the state transformed native social structures. The government banned the kuan, and imposed the Chinese bao-jia system on the Miao with slight variation. Whereas in China proper every 10 households made up a jia, in the Miao territory every three households did so, resulting in more intensive neighborhood surveillance. Culturally the government pushed for sinicization by forcing native peoples to adopt Chinese names. The state founded schools in Miao territory to teach natives the Chinese language and culture in general (Wang 1997).

The government took another measure to reinforce its control of the Miao territory by encouraging Chinese immigration to the region in the hope that these Chinese would serve as the government’s watchdogs on the Miao. These “guest residents” (kemin), as the government called them, were allocated farmland taken away from native people by the state. The guest residents, many of whom were relatives or associates of local Chinese officials, obtained tremendous social power due to their closeness to the local government, and gradually became a distinctive powerful interest group. They served as the social foundation for Qing rule of the Miao territory. Due to their unjustifiable economic and political status, however, these guest residents frequently came into conflict with the natives, who were often treated unfairly by local Chinese officials when disputes occurred involving Chinese and Miao (Wu 1985).

As a result, ethnic animosity arose among the Miao, and in some cases grew into rebellions, which were common between the early eighteenth and the late nineteenth centuries. One of the largest broke out on February 4, 1795 in the area bordering Hunan and Guizhou provinces. In the following two years the government mobilized 180,000 troops from seven provinces, and finally quelled down the rebellion in January 1797. Afterwards the state took over arable land from the Miao and labeled it “official land” (guantian) to support troops stationed there. Many Miao lost their land and had to rent land from the Chinese. Militarily the state recruited 8,000 Chinese men living in Miao territory in attempt to check future Miao resistance (ibid: 150). In addition the state built new walls, over 110 miles in total length to
contain the Miao, and constructed more than 1,200 castles and fortresses in the region, placing the Miao under heavy surveillance (ibid: 148).

Culturally the state sought to eliminate Miao ethnic traits both by banning Miao cultural activities and by imposing Chinese and Manchu practices on the Miao. First, the state forced the Miao, both the “ripened” and the “raw,” to adopt the Manchu male hairstyle. Second, the state ordered that the Miao turn in their spears, swords, and guns, and further banned making new ones. Some Miao relied on hunting to make a living. For these people, carrying weapons was a customary practice. The state’s order thus posed a threat to their livelihood. Third, the state, in the name of abolishing obsolete customs, prohibited Miao religious practices such as drum dancing and killing animals as sacrifice in worshiping ancestors. Fourth, to strip off Miao culture and reinforce assimilation, the state set up cultural institutes to instill Chinese language and culture. In Hunan province alone, six colleges and 120 schools were set up and Miao children were sent there to study free of charge. These “charity schools” (yixue), as called by the state, were intended to teach natives Chinese customs and ideology, so that gradually they would become controllable. The state executed these measures by force. A large number of Miao who had resisted were decimated. Government records indicated that no less than 300 villages were burned down to the ground in the process (ibid: 151).

As a consequence, Miao animosity flamed again. Participants of the former rebellion rose up once again. Miao revolts spread over a large area along the Hunan-Guizhou border. The rebels had learned a lesson from government massacre of the previous rebellion, which engaged in large battles with the government army; this time the rebels launched guerrilla warfare against the enemy. The rebellion lasted for nine years and was finally put down in spring 1806.

The 1796-1806 Miao rebellion was important on two counts. First, the Miao rebellion triggered a larger Chinese rebellion, the White Lotus Rebellion. As the Miao drew a large number of Qing troops to the southwest, Chinese White Lotus believers in central China capitalized on the opportunity and rose up against the state in the hope of reestablishing a Chinese state. Together with the Miao rebellion, the Chinese rebellion (1796-1805) struck the state severely and marked the end of the so-called “Kang-Qian
prosperous period” (Kang-Qian shengshi)\(^{11}\) signaling a significant decline of Qing state power. Secondly, Qing suppression of the rebellion did not resolve the ethnic problem. About six decades later rebellions broke out once again in this region, as we shall see in Chapter VI.

THE QING CONQUEST OF THE UYGHURS

About three decades after it had brought the southwest under its direct rule, the Qing turned its attention to the Northwest. In 1759 the state achieved its goal to take control of the region through a series of military campaigns. The Xinjiang case is another example of state power oppressing peoples.

In the early Qing the territory called Xinjinaq today consisted of two parts in terms of ethnic composition. North of the mountains was home to the Oirat Mongols. To the south the Uyghurs and other Turco-Iranian peoples lived. In the mid-seventeenth century the Afaqiyia (White Mountain) branch of the Makhdumzada lineage began to replace the Ishaqiyya branch as Altishahr’s (modern southern Xinjiang) religious as well as secular leader. In 1679 Khoja Afaq obtained the help of the Zunghar Mongol leader Galdan in northern Xinjiang, and thereafter ruled Altishahr as a Zunghar client state. In the late 1720s or early 1730s a rebellion broke out in Altishahr. The Zunghar leader Galdan Tesreng captured Khoja Jihan and Burhan ad-Din and held them prisoner in Yili. In 1755 the Qing conquered the Zunghar and released the Khoja brothers, with the expectation that they would rule the region as a Qing tributary. But when the Mongol general Amursana rebelled in the north, the Khoja brothers soon followed suit. In early 1758 the Qing began to deal with the Khoja brothers after having quelled the Amursana rebellion. In the autumn of that year, however, Khoja Jihan trapped the main Qing force commanded by the Manchu general Zhaohui at Qara Usu; meanwhile Burhan ad-Din led troops there to strengthen the siege. At the critical juncture, a force led by Khoja Erke Husein and his nephew Turdi, who belonged to the Kiramet (Khoja Afaq’s brother) line of the Makhdunzada clan and resented Afaqi dominance, attacked Kashghar, the base of Burhan ad-Din, forcing him to withdraw from Qara Usu, and thus relieving the pressure on Zhaohui. In August 1759 the Khoja brothers were killed. Uyghur internal conflict speeded Qing conquest of Altishahr (Millward 1994: 431-434, Zhao 1993).

\(^{11}\) Referring to the Kangxi and Qianlong reign periods, c. the eighteenth century.
MECHANISMS FOR RULING THE UYGHURS

To ensure long-term control of the region, the state founded the office of the “Yili General” (*Yili jiangjun*) in 1762 to run daily administration of Xinjiang. A state apparatus was put in place to buttress the Office. First and foremost was Qing military presence. In May 1760 the Qianlong emperor directed that Manchu banner troops, instead of the Chinese army, should be stationed in Yili and other cities, in that Xinjiang was far away from and different from China proper; therefore Chinese troops were unable to perform well the duties desired (Zhao 1993: 313). Banner troops were sent to strategic points in the Xinjiang. In Yili alone 15,000 troops were stationed (Ding 2003: 99).

Secondly, the state created a bureaucratic system unique to the Uyghur territory. Manchu and Chinese officials were put in major cities in charge of administrative, legal, and financial affairs, whereas the vast countryside and towns were left to native local leaders. The traditional official title of “beg” was woven into the state bureaucracy. The *beg* were determined ranks within the state government, and official dress and stamps were created for the *beg* at each level. Thirdly, checkpoints were set up along major transit routes to ensure state control of the flow of people and materials; in addition castles were constructed at strategic points or near sources of natural resources like coal and timber to ensure state economic control of local society. Fourth, a legal system was established, which was different from the Chinese system in some cases. For instance, to ensure social stability, it dictated immediate execution of criminals who committed homicides involving both Chinese and Uyghurs to intimidate potential murderers, especially Uyghurs. Fifth, in attempt to control regional finances, the state minted coins for local circulation. Chinese inscriptions were molded on one side with Manchu and Uyghur on the other side. The coin was round with a square hole in the middle like coins used in China proper. Sixth, strict social regulations were put in place. In the easternmost cities of Hami and Turfan, the bao-jia neighbor watch system was applied. In all other parts of the Uyghur territory, the Hakim *beg* were ordered to select and appoint village heads in charge of local affairs. Furthermore, high-ranking *beg* were requested to visit the capital on a regular basis and in a manner stipulated by law to pay tribute to the emperor (Zhao 1993: 313-316).
Overall the Yili General was in charge of the above issues. Branches were founded in four major cities: Yili, Urumqi, Tashibahatai, and Kashghar. Thus three administrative systems coexisted in the jurisdiction of the General. Jasagh banners (see the section on Mongols) were created for Oirat Mongols to the north of the Tianshan Mountains. The beg system was established for Uyghurs to the south of Tianshan. The person put in charge of a large administrative area was conferred the title of Hakim beg, and his assistants, Ishikagha beg. Under them were other beg, whose kinds exceeded 30. In the Chinese areas of Xinjing, districts, counties, and prefectures were founded as in China proper. The complicated triple administrative system generated interesting outcomes. For instance, Chinese local officials, whose jurisdiction was located within Xinjiang, were subjected to the administration of the neighboring Gansu province. In contrast, the Mongol and Uyghur officials were under the direct supervision of the Lifanyuan (Zhao 1993: 317-318). To sum up, the region of Xinjiang illustrated the Qing’s strategy of separate rule of different ethnic groups.

The Qing conquest of Xinjiang, like other regions, met native resistance. In as early as 1765, Uyghurs in Ush rebelled against Manchu officials and soldiers raping Uyghur women (Miao 1995). To curtail Uyghur power, the Qing took several measures. First, it gradually stripped the beg off the right to inherit, and turned them into officials selected and appointed by the state. In 1814 the state made it the law to stop beg inheritance. The beg now were selected from noblemen who were loyal to the court. Their term was determined three years but renewable. Secondly, the high-ranking beg (the third to the fifth grades), according to the law, should not be appointed in their hometown so as to prevent them from making connections with local strongmen. The third measure was the separation of religion and politics. Islam spread quickly in the region after the fifteenth century, and spiritual leaders gradually came into control of secular government. The Khoja brothers were religious leaders. To avoid the precedent, in 1760 the Qianlong emperor dictated that the ahung (imam) should never intervene in secular affairs, which should be handled exclusively by the hakim beg (Miao 1995: 41). Fourth, to promote Uyghur loyalty, in 1759 the court prescribed that Uyghur leaders should go to the capital and present themselves to the emperor on a regular basis. They paid tribute to the court and in return received gifts and titles (ibid: 43).
Despite all the measures Uyghur loyalty to the state remained fragile due to distinctive cultural and religious elements. A large rebellion broke out in 1826 led by Jungar. It took the state more than a decade to put down the rebellion. Uyghur rebellion resurfaced in the 1860s as we shall see in Chapter VI.

THE QING CONQUEST OF THE TIBETANS

Tibet’s incorporation into the Qing empire took place in 1720 after Qing troops entered Tibet and expelled Zunghar Mongols in control of the region. Tibet came under Mongol control in 1642. In that year the Khosot Mongol leader Gusi khan defeated the Tibetan secular ruler Zangba khan (transliteration from Chinese) and took over Tibet. Gusi khan later accepted Qing suzerainty. Meanwhile, the Qing made an effort to approach the Tibetan religious leader, the Dalai Lama. In 1652 the fifth Dalai Lama was invited to Beijing, where he received a holy title, and a gold stamp and a gold certificate, which indicated that the Qing acknowledged his spiritual leadership (Zhao 1993: 355-356). During this period, the Qing attempted to strike a power balance between the Mongols and the Tibetans, and maintain the status quo as the Manchu court was busy dealing with Chinese resistance in China proper.

In 1682 the fifth Dalai Lama died. His death triggered a scramble for power between the Mongol secular rulers and the Tibetan spiritual leaders. Before his nirvana the Dalai Lama appointed Sangjiejiacuo (transliteration of Chinese) as the Sde Srid (head of the secular government), who withheld the news of the Dalai Lama’s death and secretly designated Tshang dbyangs rgya tsho as the sixth Dalai Lama in attempt to undercut Mongol influence in the long-run (Zhao 1993, Zhang 1999). In 1696 the Kangxi emperor became aware of the truth. He sent the Sde Srid a letter, in which the emperor scolded the Tibet leader. The next year, intimidated by the power of the Qing, which had already annexed China proper, the Sde Srid sent envoys to Beijing to explain. The emperor apparently forgave him but in fact became mistrustful of him. In 1703 the Mongol Lajang Khan succeeded as ruler of Tibet, and soon Tibet-Mongol discord came out into the open. In 1705 Lajang Khan assassinated the Sde Srid, and deposed the sixth Dalai Lama. The Kangxi emperor buttressed the Mongol Khan. Furthermore, the emperor ordered Tshang dbyangs rgya mtsho to come to Beijing under intensive Qing escort. In 1706, however, the young man mysteriously died in Qinghai on his way to the capital (Zhao 1993: 357).
The power struggle between the Mongols, Tibetans, and the Qing court did not stop. In 1707 Lajang Khan designated another youth to be the sixth Dalai Lama, and somehow he managed to get his choice approved by the Qing, but Tibetan lamas and Khosot Mongol noblemen in Kokonor refused to recognize Lajang khan’s choice. Moreover, in 1710 they designated a third youth as the reincarnation of deceased Tshang dbyangs rgya mtsho (Zhao 1993, Zhang 1999).

Mongol-Tibetan conflict provided the Manchu court an opportunity to intervene, and play the commonplace game in politics, to divide and rule. On the one hand, the Qing sent an official to Tibet to “collaborate” with Lajang Khan. Furthermore, the Qing sought to bring the Panchen Lama, who had great influence in southern Tibet, to its side by conferring the title “Panchen Erdeni” on the fifth Panchen Lama. Later in 1716 the Qing transferred the sixth Dalai Lama designated by Tibetan clergy and Khosot Mongols to Kokonor (Zhao 1993).

The controversy over the sixth Dalai Lama gave pretext for the Zunghar invasion of Tibet in 1717. Lajang khan was killed, and the sixth Dalai Lama of his choice was deposed. In 1718 and 1720 twice the court sent troops to Tibet to expel the Zunghar and succeeded the second time. The Qing conferred the title of the sixth Dalai Lama on the youth chosen by Tibetan clergy and Khosot Mongols to Kokonor, and sent troops to escort him back to Lhasa.

**MECHANISMS FOR RULING THE TIBETANS**

In the wake of its military success in Tibet, the state reinforced its control of Tibet by setting up a new political structure. In 1721 the Qing abolished the native government post of sde srid, and created the position of “galun” (transliteration of Chinese) instead to handle native politics. The Qing appointed three galun and conferred noble titles on all of them. Appointing multiple leaders in non-Manchu regions was typical in Qing politics, as the Manchu rulers believed it would disperse native power. To back up the new structure, the state stationed 3,000 troops in Lhasa.

In early 1723 the Yongzheng emperor withdrew the troops as military supplies were costly. Meanwhile he added two more galun, bringing the total number to five. In 1727 the rift between the native leaders grew into a military conflict. The five galun originally came from two cliques. Two of them
were from southern Tibet, and they were supported by the Qing. The rest three of them were from northern Tibet, and were backed up by the Dalai Lama. On August 6, 1727, a military coup took place. The northern clique assassinated Kangjinai (transliteration of Chinese), a member of the southern Tibet clique in the Dalai Lama’s bedroom, and launched military attacks against Puoluonai (transliteration of Chinese), the other member of the southern Tibet clique. Puoluonai allied himself with Kangjinai’s brother, and led southern Tibet troops to fight back. Soon the coup escalated into an all-Tibetan civil war. The Qing expected Puoluonai to defeat the northern clique; therefore it delayed sending troops to Tibet as requested by Puoluonai until June the next year when the southern clique troops entered Lhasa. The three galun of the northern Tibet clique escaped to the Potala to seek the Dalai Lama’s protection. Under the pressure from Puoluonai, however, the Dalai Lama agreed to surrender the three galun to him, but requested that they should be pardoned death. The two parties reached an agreement to wait for the emperor’s decision, and thus brought the civil war to an end. In September, Qing troops arrived in Lhasa, and killed the three galun and others on their side (Zhang 2000: 35).

The Qing took advantage of the opportunity and furthered its interests in Tibet. First the court created the two posts of “Tibet-based Ministers” in charge of Tibetan affairs to set off the Dalai Lama’s influence. Second, the court moved the Dalai Lama out of Lhasa and put him up in a temple in southeastern Tibet. His residence was “protected” by 2,000 Qing troops and his contact with Tibet was under intensive surveillance. He was moved back to Lhasa seven years later, and afterwards his role was restricted to religious affairs. Third, the Qing established the bka-sag system where four galun were appointed under Puoluonai. Fourth, the state re-stationed 2,000 troops in Tibet (ibid: 36).

In short, these measures lay the foundation of the political structure in Tibet until 1751. Three centers of power coexisted. The Tibet-based ministers were in charge of defense and policing, whereas the bka-sag system headed by Puoluonai handled secular issues, and the Dalai Lama’s influence was in the religious realm. Finally diplomatic relations with neighboring countries were jointly handled by the three parties (ibid).
In 1747 Puoluonai died, and his son Zhuermote (transliteration from Chinese) succeeded his position. In attempt to assume more political power, he soon rebelled, and killed Qing officials and troops. In 1750 the Tibet-based ministers conspired and succeeded in assassinating Zuermote, but shortly afterwards they themselves were killed by Zhuermote’s followers. Qing quelled down the rebellion swiftly, and reinforced its administrative control with three measures. First, the Qing overrode the interim government appointed by the Dalai Lama. Second, the state demarcated the responsibilities of the Dalai Lama and the Tibet-based ministers. Third, the Qing reinforced its military presence by stationing troops in important locations (ibid).

Further, the court made 13 rules governing Tibet, namely the document “Tentative Regulations Dealing with the Aftermath in Tibet” (Zhuoding Xizang shanhou zhangcheng). The regulations abolished de facto Tibetan monarchy (as seen in the case of Puoluonai) and subsequently curtailed Tibet secular power significantly. The Qing court decentralized regional power by setting up the galun conference, a political system in which four galun were appointed to deal with general administration. To prevent factionalism and nepotism, the document ordered them to go to work at the bka-sag office instead of at home, which was customary, and stipulated that they should not employ friends and members of their families as their subordinates. Further, the document prescribed that important issues were to be handled jointly by the Dalai lama and the Tibet-based ministers (ibid: 39).

Regarding the creation of government posts and the appointment and punishment of local officials, the document stipulated the separation of the three pillars of power: military, administrative, and religious. Five high-ranking military posts (daiben, transliteration from Chinese) were created to take charge of the Tibetan military, now divided into two districts, namely southern Tibet and northern Tibet. Troops could be mustered only when approved by both the Dalai Lama and the minister with written documents. The officials were appointed by the court. Local government officials were nominated by the four galun, but were appointed jointly by the Dalai Lama and the Tibet-based ministers; transference, and punishment of Tibetan local officials should be approved by both the Dalai Lama and the Tibet-stationed ministers. In the religious realm, the abbots of temples were appointed by the Dalai Lama (ibid). Finally, the state put
the eight Mongol Jasagh banners and Northern Tibet previously controlled by Zuermote under the direct administration of the ministers.

The document stipulated the Dalai Lama’s position in Tibetan society: he had control of all the Tibetan people, finance, and taxation including free labor service. However, his power was curbed by the Tibet-based ministers, who were authorized to nominate the four galun and five daiben together with the Dalai Lama (ibid). To sum up, the Qing gained control of Tibetan political and military affairs at the top level, whereas general administration and religious issues were left in native hands.

The state finally settled the Tibet case in 1793 as a result of Gurkha (modern Nepal) invasion of southern Tibet. In 1788 and 1791 twice Gurkha invaded Tibet, which exposed the weakness of Qing indirect control. In 1792 the state expelled Gurkha, and further invaded its capital. With its overwhelming military power, the Qing took advantage of the unprecedented opportunity to expand its control of the region. In 1793, the Qianlong emperor issued the well-known “Imperially Approved Regulations on Tibet” (*Qinding Xizang zhangcheng*).

The Regulations clearly demarcated the responsibilities of the Tibet-based ministers and the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, and substantially raised the status of the Tibet-stationed ministers. The regulations made it clear that the ministers were supposed to supervise Tibetan affairs. Nominally they were in equal position to the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, and were supposed to work in collaboration with the Lamas. However, the document simultaneously authorized the ministers’ leadership in diplomatic relations, border control, defense, administration, financial auditing, legal affairs, and so forth. All other Tibetan secular officials and religious clergy, even the living Buddhas, were subject to the ministers’ leadership. The Dalai and Panchen Lamas had control of low-ranking local officials and abbots of small temples only (Zhang 2000: 59). The document further stipulated the supremacy of the ministers. Reports of the income and expenditure of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas should be submitted to the ministers twice a year, in spring and fall respectively. The ministers were responsible for auditing the financial reports (Zhao 1993: 361). In doing so the state kept an eye on the activities of the Lamas.
The state reformed Tibetan religious affairs as well. Four highest religious leaders coexisted in Tibetan Buddhism, which was popular among both the Tibetans and the Mongols. Over time the state made the law that all of the four leaders needed to be confirmed by the state. The fifth Dalai Lama was confirmed in 1652. From then on the Dalai Lama’s influence was restricted primarily to northern Tibet. The fifth Panchen Lama was confirmed in 1713, and his influence was mainly in southern Tibet. Meanwhile, the state confirmed the Yellow Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism popular among the Mongols. In 1693 the Kangxi emperor conferred the title “the Great Lama” (Da lama) on Jebtsundamba, and put him in charge of religious affairs in Outer Mongolia. In 1711 the emperor conferred “the Great National Mentor” (Da guoshi) on Jangya Khutukhtu, and put him in charge of religious issues in Inner Mongolia. The state deliberately made the four Lamas mutually independent in terms of their status and territory (Cheng 2000).

Moreover, the state created a new way to select the incarnations of the Lamas. Before the new code was made, the reincarnations of the Lamas were determined by regional noblemen, resulting in hereditary reincarnation. The combination of secular and religious power was a threat to state control of Tibet. The new law prescribed a new method to choose the reincarnation in order to curtail Tibetan (and to some degree Mongol) power. When the Dalai, Panchen, and Khutukhtu Lamas died and their reincarnation boys needed to be determined, the Tibet-based ministers were authorized to summon religious leaders to the Dazhao Temple located in Lahsa. In the presence of the ministers, ivory tablets, on which the names and birth dates of little boys selected to be candidates were written, were put in a gold bottle. Then one tablet was randomly taken out of the bottle. The boy whose name was on the tablet would be confirmed the reincarnation of the deceased Lama. When only one candidate was found, the law then dictated that a blank tablet needed to be placed into the bottle together with the tablet on which the candidate’s name was written. If the blank tablet was drawn at the ceremony, then a new candidate had to be found. In doing so the state could prevent the future Lamas from coming from a single clique. Moreover, the law stated that when the boy came to age, the inauguration of the would-be Lama was to be held under the ministers’ supervision (Liu: 1993: 52-53).
In 1844 the Daoguang emperor added 28 clauses to the Regulations. The reincarnations of lower level living Buddhas were determined jointly by the Dalai Lama, the ministers, and Jinong Khutukhtu (see below). Then the three parties were to issue certificates to the new living Buddhas. When Mongols living in the neighboring Qinghai province intended to invite Tibetan living Buddhas to Qinghai, the former had to submit application to the Qinghai Minister at Xi’ning, capital of Qinghai, who in turn would communicate with the Tibet-based Minister, for the issuance of passport (Zhao 1993: 362).

To limit the Dalai Lama’s power, the state created the office “Jinong Khutukhtu,” namely assistant to the Dalai Lama. The incumbent was appointed by the emperor (Liu 1993: 47). The state undermined the Dalai Lama’s power by restricting him to religious issues, and by holding the Jinong Khutukhtu accountable for secular affairs. The new law prescribed that monks under the Dalai Lama’s jurisdiction, and the villages and households under the Khutukhtu’s control were to be registered. A copy of register was submitted to the ministers and the Dalai Lama respectively.

Finally, the Tibet-based ministers were in charge of a wide range of issues including financial, military, and legal affairs. As Tibet was adjacent to South Asia the ministers were also responsible for the supervision of across-border trading and other foreign affairs. By expanding the Tibet-based ministers’ responsibilities and curtailing Tibetan secular and religious power, the Qing state strengthened its rule of the region (ibid: 52).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has highlighted that state power was an important factor in the establishment and the perpetuation of the Qing empire. Military forces in the first place played a determining role in the creation of the empire spanning the two centuries between the 1580s and the 1790s and involving the six major ethnic-territories. After the incorporation of each ethnic-territory the Qing took cultural, economic, administrative, legal, and military measures to ensure effective rule over the region. Of particular importance were the administrative, legal, and political mechanisms.

The roles of the various ethnic groups varied in the process of the establishment of the empire. The Manchus were the first major ethnic group ruled by the state Later Jin and later the Qing, and through
whom the Qing expanded its rule over the southern Mongols and the Chinese, who in turn contributed to Qing conquests of the other ethnic-territories. State power was significant in the formation of the Manchus. The state first concentrated various Jurchen tribes scattered in the vast Northeast in the area under Nurgachi’s control and then in the Jianzhou region through forced migration; thus it created a tight-knit community making intensive interactions possible among the people. On the basis of geographical closeness, the state created the Eight Banners, an economic, social, political, and military organization, which facilitated the Manchu transition from tribes to a state, and later served as the basic social organization of the Manchus and the political structure of the state Later Jin. The state further invented the Manchu writing system, standardized the Manchu code of behavior, and modified the religion. In short, the state crystallized the Manchu way of life.

The unification of the Jurchens and the creation of the Manchus were accompanied by the declination and internal struggle among the Southern Mongols, who eventually fell victims to the rising Manchu state in the 1630s. The Manchu rulers established the Manchu-Mongol alliance with particularly the Southern Mongols to further their interests, and the alliance helped Manchu rulers to conquer other ethnic-territories. Through war and alliance the Qing brought other Mongol blocs under control one by one by the 1750s.

The Qing capitalized on the internal disorder of Ming China in the 1640s, invaded China proper and conquered the Chinese by the 1680s. With the economic and human resources of China proper the Qing launched a series of military campaigns and took the Miao territory, Tibet, and Xinjiang successively and secured the cases between the 1720s and the 1790s. After the conquest of each ethnic-territory the Qing took a set of cultural, administrative, legal, and military measures in order to ensure its military triumph and perpetuate its rule. The incorporation of the ethnic territories brought ethnic problems to the empire. In the next chapter I will address ethnic relations in the Qing with the focus on Manchu-Chinese inequalities.
CHAPTER V: MANCHU-CHINESE INEQUALITIES IN THE QING

Manchu-Chinese relations were undoubtedly the most important ethnic relations in the Qing empire, as the Chinese were the most populous group and the Manchus were the ruling group. This chapter highlights an important aspect of Manchu-Chinese relations: the various forms of sociopolitical inequality between the two groups created and reinforced by the state. The inequalities caused the Chinese to resist, which will be addressed in the next chapter. This chapter focuses on the institutional inequalities between the Manchus and the Chinese as of the middle of the nineteenth century for two reasons. The first is that certain aspects of the banner system, and the sociopolitical position of the Manchus, underwent change over time. In other words, the Manchu question as of the second half of the nineteenth century did not come into existence overnight; rather, it was created and modified by the state continuously over time. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, this chapter focuses on the late Qing, with reference to earlier periods when needed.

Secondly, the purpose of this chapter is to set up the stage for the next chapter, in which I will argue that ethnic inequalities prompted ethnic conflicts across the empire. Ethnic rebellions that occurred between the early 1850s and the 1870s in particular had tremendous damaging effects on the state and subsequently on China’s industrialization in later years. I need to present evidence of ethnic inequality that directly led to the rebellions in the mid-nineteenth century. Hence I will focus on ethnic inequalities in the middle of the nineteenth century.

MANCHU-CHINESE INEQUALITIES

Manchu-Chinese relations were undoubtedly the most important ethnic relations in the Qing empire as the Chinese were the most populous group and culturally influential and the Manchus were the ruling group. As of the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Manchus and the Chinese were segregated and treated unequally by the state in administrative, political, and legal aspects. First and foremost, virtually all the Manchus were classified by the state as banner people, namely military personnel, even women
and children who were not actually enlisted. In contrast, the Chinese were classified as civilians (minren). The classifications were permanent and hereditary, except for few rare cases where some people were recruited into or disbanded from the system. These cases required strict procedures, often initiated by the emperor’s instructions (Wang 2002: 122). Different classification intrinsically meant inequality.

The Manchus in the first place were a military caste. As such they were forbidden to engage in agriculture, trade, or handicraft industry as the Chinese were. Instead, the state provided a stipend and a certain amount of rice to the soldiers in accordance with their ranks. Three ranks existed: the first rank was the corporal (lingcui) and the vanguard (qianfeng), the second rank was the cavalryman, and the third rank was the foot soldier. In the Qianlong reign period (1736-1795), soldiers of the first rank stationed in the capital received a monthly stipend in the amount of four taels of silver, the second rank three taels, and the third rank two taels; whereas soldiers in the provinces at each comparable rank received a tael less successively. A banner soldier stationed in the capital received four dou (a dou was roughly equal to a deciliter) of rice per month, and a banner solider in the provinces received about 2.5 dou (Ding 2003: 220). Evidence suggests that stipends and rice increased as time passed by. The favor was extended even to boys 10 years of age and older, who were not actually enlisted. These children were termed “fostered soldiers” (yangyu bing). The institution was established in the early Qing, but later the favor was given to younger boys who lost their parents or whose families were poor: in December 1738, the Qianlong emperor issued an edict to expand the policy to boys under nine years of age (GZSL: 1288). The state intended to support the poor Manchus so that they could get by without working. The stipend was exempt from state tax. In contrast, the Chinese had to work to make a living, and they were subject to state taxation and services.

The banner troops were only a part of the state’s armed forces. In addition to the Manchu army, the Chinese Green Standard (Lüying) was founded shortly after the Qing conquest, and was stationed across the Chinese territory in the empire. To the Manchu court the banner troops without doubt were more trustworthy than the Chinese army (Ding 2003: 30). About half of the banner troops were stationed in the

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12 For a concise and informative description on the structure of the banner system, see Rhoads 2000: 24-34.
capital, and the rest in the Chinese provinces, Manchuria, and Xinjiang (See Chapter IV). In contrast, the Chinese Green Standard was stationed in China proper only except for a few rare cases.

The Manchu and Chinese armies differed not only in geographical distribution, but in duties as well. The Chinese army, in addition to combat, was put in charge of keeping public order in peacetime, such as arresting criminals, investigating secret religious groups and secret societies, arresting gamblers, and safeguarding important government buildings. In contrast, the Manchu army was freed from the daily task of policing so that they could concentrate on military training in peacetime. The state made the division of labor between the two armies in order to ensure that the Manchu army would maintain its combat capacity in wartime on the one hand, and keep the Chinese army under Manchu surveillance in peacetime on the other (Ding 2003: 130-133).

The banner troops, however, lost their raison d’être over time as they gradually became fond of pleasant city life, neglected military discipline and training, and eventually lost their capacity to fight. The state stationed the banner troops in the capital and other metropolitan areas in order to intimidate Chinese resistance. This ironically brought about an unexpected outcome as the troops became accustomed to city dwelling. The last major battles they took part in were at the turn of the nineteenth century, when the White Lotus Rebellion broke out in central-west China (see Chapter VII). The pampered Manchu soldiers from the capital were not used to the harsh conditions in the wild. Further, they often disobeyed orders given by their superiors. Frontline officers wrote to the emperor to send the soldiers back to the capital (Zhao 2002: 87). Although the troops ceased to be a valiant force and virtually became a big financial burden for the state, the court kept the army until the very last day of the dynasty, revealing the Manchu rulers’ mistrust of the Chinese army.

The Manchus, like the civilian Chinese, could enter the civil bureaucracy. Indeed, Manchus had an advantage over the Chinese, for many positions were reserved for Manchus exclusively. Rhoads (2000: 43-47) points out that Manchus received preferential treatment in recruitment, appointment, and tenure. For example, the state set four methods for the Manchus to enter the bureaucracy much more easily than the Chinese. First, the state assigned separate and more generous quotas for the Manchus than for the
Chinese in the regular examination (keju). Secondly, the state allowed Manchus to take a set of examinations less demanding than the regular ones, but nevertheless awarded the same titles as the regular ones did, except for a prefix to the title. Thirdly, the state permitted Manchus to take an easy translation test 13 that led them to low-ranking metropolitan officials known as Manchu language scribes (bitieshi). Fourth, Manchus could enter government service by taking advantage of their fathers’ hereditary privilege.

In appointments, too, Manchus had an advantage over Chinese, for many posts were reserved for them. The superficially impartial principle of diarchy, that is, appointing equal numbers of Manchu and Chinese officials on positions at the same level (Man-Han canban), applied only to a few posts at the top of the government, particularly in the capital. Moreover, the principle did not extend to certain government agencies at all. In any case, the principle of diarchy was essentially discriminative as the Manchus occupied only 1-2% of the country’s entire population. Once they were appointed, Manchus on average held longer tenures than Chinese.

The third dimension of Manchu-Chinese inequality was the legal sphere. The state treated the Manchus preferentially at the expense the Chinese. The Manchus, even though they were living in China proper, were subject to a separate set of laws and were tried by a different system of courts (Chi 2001). As a result, local Chinese officials exerted no legal power on a Manchu person if he or she committed a crime at a location within the jurisdiction of the Chinese law-enforcement personnel; rather, the case was handled by the company and the banner the suspect belonged to, which caused ineffective processing of legal suits. The system lasted until the end of the dynasty, as stated by the prominent Manchu official Duanfang in his memorial presented to the court on August 24, 1907 (ZWC: 29).

When convicted, Manchus received much lighter actual punishment than Chinese who were sentenced to the same degree of punishment. The disparity remained unchanged until the end of the dynasty. For instance, Shen Jiaben, vice minister of the Ministry of Law, and one of the officials charged

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13 Examinees translated essays from Manchu into Chinese, which became the native language of Manchus living in China proper after the mid-eighteenth century.
with revising existing laws, presented to the court a memorial on September 9, 1907, in which he reviewed the laws governing the Manchus. If a Manchu was sentenced to one year in prison, he was actually punished by wearing the cangue for 20 days. For each additional year he was sentenced to, five days were added. If a Manchu was sentenced to exile of 2,000 li (approximately 600 miles), the actual punishment was wearing the cangue for 50 days. For each additional grade of punishment, five days were added (ZWC: File No. 43). In any case, the maximum number of days of wearing the cangue, or the maximum punishment for Manchus, did not exceed 90 days. In prison, Manchus were put in cells different from Chinese inmates, as stated by the intellectual Li Hongcai in his memorial presented to the court on August 14, 1907 (HYZWC: 22). In sum, the institution of “separate governance of the Manchus and the Chinese” (Man-Han fenzhi) was essentially unequal, and resembled extraterritoriality that Western powers imposed on the Qing after the Opium War.

**MANCHU-CHINESE SEGREGATION**

To maintain ethnic separation, the state took two measures: the first was residential segregation. Manchus were living in Manchu cities (Mancheng) built by the state as garrisons and dwellings. Broadly speaking Manchu cities had two types. One type was walled Manchu quarters within Chinese cities, and the other type was towns built outside, but adjacent to, Chinese cities (Elliott 2001: 103-114). Manchu cities generally covered a large area, including farmland and facilities to meet the basic needs of Manchu soldiers and their families. Manchu residents were forbidden to leave the city without permit, and Chinese were forbidden to enter without permit. Chinese merchants who were authorized to enter the Manchu city to do business had to enter the city every morning after the gates were opened and leave before the gates were closed every evening. They were not allowed to stay in the city overnight (Chen and Yan: 201: 33-35).

The second way for the state to maintain the ethnic line was to ban Manchu-Chinese intermarriage. The policy was made shortly after the Qing conquered China. Over time the government became somewhat lenient about Manchu men marrying Chinese women, for married women were regarded as members of their husbands’ families, and children’s descent was traced through the paternal line. In 1822
the Daoguang emperor permitted marriages between Manchu men and Chinese women (Ding et al. 2004: 272), yet the state remained stubborn on marriages between Manchu women and Chinese men. It was not until February 1, 1902, that the de facto ruler Cixi issued an edict permitting intermarriage across the board (Chi 2001), but it had little immediate effect, as reflected in more than a dozen memorials presented to Cixi in 1907, when the court proclaimed that it was ready to “eliminate the boundary between the Manchus and the Chinese” (huachu Man-Han zhenyu). Intermarriage was one of the several measures the officials proposed as to how to tear down the “Manchu-Chinese fence” (Man-Han fanli) (HYZWC. 22, 23).

The empire underwent further decline after the 1895 Sino-Japanese War. In 1900 the Boxers rose up and western powers invaded Beijing. In the wake of the crisis the court proclaimed its intention to reform. One of the fields it dealt with was Manchu-Chinese relations. Some scholars argue that the ethnic line was eliminated by the state gradually in the last decade of the dynasty because the government abolished some unequal treatments; however, the banner system per se remained intact, and Manchu stipends and Manchu cities existed until the very last day of the dynasty (Chi 2001).

A question arises: if by the second half of the nineteenth century (even the end of the dynasty), the Manchus and the Chinese remained two “separate and unequal” peoples (Rhoads 2000: 11), then how did the state succeed in maintaining the ethnic line after the Manchus had lived in China proper for over 200 years? This is an important question. If Chinese could sneak into the banner system easily, then the Manchu-Chinese inequalities sanctioned by the state would become meaningless. Scholarship on this question is limited. Therefore based on archival materials I collected from the First Historical Archives of China located in Beijing, I will focus on the issue and address the concrete measures the government took to perpetuate the Manchu-Chinese boundary.

**THE STATE’S MEASURES TO MAINTAIN ETHNIC BONDARIES**

The Manchus, even those who lived in China proper, were governed by the Eight Banners. Moreover, the Manchus, as banner people, were subject to the “Imperially Approved Regulations on Eight Banners” (Qinding Baqi zeli), indicating that the state ruled the Manchus with a system different
from the Chinese one. The differences illustrated the government’s policy of Manchu-Chinese “separate
governance.”

Virtually all Manchus, including women and children, were incorporated into the Eight Banner
system. At the highest level was the banner, which was divided into five battalions (Chinese: Jiala, from
Manchu: Jalan), each subdivided into five companies (zuoling), each in principle consisting of 300 male
adults and their families. The company was the basic socioeconomic and administrative unit for Manchus.

While each banner looked after its own daily businesses, an overarching government agency existed
to oversee overall Manchu issues: the Department of Eight Banner Governance (Baqi dutong yamen). The
department, although it did not bear the title of ministry (bu), was nevertheless at the highest
administrative level and parallel to the six ministries in charge of Chinese issues. First, the department
reported directly to the emperor, like the six ministries did. The numerous documents submitted to and
issued by the department prove this. The department presented the documents directly to the emperor, not
via any of the six ministries. Second, when it sent a document to one or more of the six ministries, the
department used the word “inform” (zi) at the end of the document, instead of “report to” (bao), as a
subordinate organ did with its superior organ.

In addition to the structural differences, the state created specific measures to ensure that the
Manchus would not escape from the banner system and the Chinese would not sneak into it. First, at the
beginning of the dynasty, the state made a law that every three years each banner was suppose to conduct
a census and submit a copy of register of male adults (16-60 years of age) to the department. Archives
suggest that the rule was observed throughout the dynasty. The register contained the men’s names,
positions in the company, and their fathers’ and grandfathers’ names. For instance, in 1897, Changrui,
captain of a company in the First Battalion of the Bordered White Chinese Banner, submitted a register;
then he did once again in 1900. In the 1900 register, he first reported that in that year 98 male adults were
registered with him, as opposed to 99 in the previous register, because six men died from disease, and

14 The responsibility of the six ministries included handling issues of other ethnic groups under the Chinese
administrative system, such as the Miao. See Chapter I.

15 Approximately 35,000 files are held at the First Historical Archives of China located in Beijing.
another five men were added in the past three years. He then continued to list information about the veterans. For example, the man Yushou was a cavalryman (*majia*), his father was Qingkui, and his grandfather was Zheng Yonggui. Another example is the man named Tingxin. He was a corporal (*lingcui*), his father was Wengui, who was still alive, and his grandfather was Changshou. After having listed the veterans, the captain listed the five new recruitments separately at the end of the register (BQDTYM: 14).

In addition to the census of the male population, the government from time to time sent officials to the banners to investigate cases where Manchus allegedly adopted Chinese children. Since the banners were well-organized and the rules were strict, the only loophole for Chinese to sneak into the system seemed to be through adoption. However, the state was persistent in keeping Chinese out of the institution and always kept a watchful eye. Whenever it received reports about Manchus adopting Chinese children, the government reacted quickly and thoroughly. For example, in 1756 the Qianlong emperor instructed that Chinese who entered the banners through adoption should be recorded on separate sheets in the register, and that their children could not inherit their status as banner people. In 1821 the Daoguang emperor once again took sweeping measures against adoptions across the ethnic line. He instructed the lieutenant-general (*dutong*) of each banner to investigate their banner carefully and thoroughly. The emperor gave a three-month grace period, during which Manchus who had adopted Chinese children would report to authorities by themselves, otherwise detected they would be severely punished with no exceptions. In dealing with those adopted children, the emperor stated that the government would follow the precedent of the 1756 Qianlong rule. Following the edict, the banners acted swiftly. For instance, the lieutenant-general of the Bordered Red Chinese Banner investigated his banner, and reported back to the Department of Eight Banner Governance on November 12, stating that 8,024 people were registered with the 29 companies in his banner at the time. He further broke the total number into five categories (battalions) with number of registered people for each battalion (BQDTYM: 2).
A third similar case occurred in 1894. On July 22 the Guangxu emperor issued an edict in response to Ruixun, an educational official (siye)\textsuperscript{16} of the Imperial Academy (Guozijian), who submitted a memorial to the emperor, in which he claimed that Chinese imposters had sneaked into the banner system in hopes of receiving stipends and rice and raising their social position. The emperor instructed (ibid):

> Chinese are prohibited from sneaking into the banner system. If it is like this proctor reported that many Chinese purchased official titles and took examinations under the names of Manchus, and that the colonels and captains never exposed these cases, then it is really shameful. I order that the lieutenant-generals of the banners and the minister of the Imperial Household Department [Neiwufu] should investigate thoroughly in accordance with the original memorial, set up cases upon careful consideration, and report back to me. Obey this.

Following the instruction, the Eight Banner Conference (Baqi huiyi) read the original memorial by Ruixun, reviewed the procedures by which the banners made registers and recommended young Manchu men for military recruitment and civil examinations, and pledged to uphold the emperor’s instruction. In its report submitted to the emperor, the Conference wrote (ibid, translation mine):

> …We have examined the procedures by which the banners make and review registers of male adults. It has been a long tradition that the banners compile a register every three years. Each time they compare the new register with the previous one, point out the disbanded and the new recruitments, and make two duplicate copies. The captain [zuoling], the lieutenant [xiaoxiao], the corporal [lingcui], and the lineage head [zuzhang] cosigned and fingerprinted on each copy. Afterwards they put a copy in an official envelope stamped with the lieutenant-general’s seal, and send it to the Department of Eight Banner Governance; and keep the other copy within the banner for future reference. These are the procedures for compiling and reviewing the register. We have strictly followed them and never dared to neglect. Furthermore, when the time comes to recruit, the captain selects the candidates, and has them pledge authenticity for one another. If a person is a [Chinese] imposter, then his cohorts all have the sense that the person would get it by cheating, why should they cover up the truth for his sake? This is the reason why it is difficult to sneak into the banner system to appropriate money and rice. In addition we have read the claim that Chinese imposters purchased official titles, took civil examinations, and inherited noble titles. We believe that these are connected to prestige; therefore we have taken these issues more seriously. Suppose someone tries to pass off as a Manchu or have fabricated documents, then he would be reported by other examinees from the same banner, or disputed by people within the same lineage who should inherit the title. Officials in charge of the companies have close ties with insiders and can investigate easily. Hence imposters would be detected with no difficulty. How dare the officials harbor the imposters, and issue false documentation for them, knowing they themselves would be prosecuted?

After having asserted reliability, the Conference took a step backwards, admitting that some loopholes might exist because it had been long since the procedures were established. Then it continued to pledge that it would reinforce the emperor’s instruction (ibid, translation mine):

> …We will give strict instructions to the captains to investigate carefully and thoroughly. If a Manchu who had military merit adopted a Chinese child, then we will allow him to confess, and we will handle the case in accordance with established rules. If he does not turn himself in and if he is detected by others,
then we will not only dismiss him from the banner system and destroy his file, but also will punish the colonel, the captain, and the lineage head…

Thirdly, the officials inspected Manchu residence on a regular basis. As stated above, the Manchus were forced to live in their designated residence, i.e. the Manchu cities. The captain was obligated to report the locations of his soldiers’ residencies to his superiors, who in turn reported to the Annual Duty Office (Zhinianchu) within the Department of Eight Banner Governance. So was the case with the “fostered soldiers,” namely little boys treated as soldiers by the state. The captain needed to report the locations of their homes as well. Thirty-one reports were found dated from 1835 to 1906 in BQDTYM File No. 22 alone.

A standard report listed the name of the captain, the rank, and the name of the person reported, location of the person’s residence, and the date of the report prepared. Finally the report was signed, fingerprinted, and stamped with the seal of the banner to guarantee validity. In addition to individual reports by the captain, each year the banner also submitted an overall report to the Annual Duty Office as to whether Manchu persons in the very banner had moved out of their residencies during that year.

Fourth, as Manchus were not allowed to leave the Manchu city, therefore they had to obtain written travel authorization before traveling. From the state’s perspective, travel authorization enabled the state to keep track of people leaving and returning to the Manchu city. As they were not allowed to travel beyond a certain distance from the Manchu city, normally 20 li (about six miles), Manchus had to apply for authorization before traveling, carry the document with them on the trip, and report to appropriate government agencies at the destination upon arrival.

For instance, Jitai was the candidate for a position in Jinan Prefecture in Shandong province. He died on January 31, 1888, and his family needed to transport his coffin back to Beijing. If they were Chinese, they could leave immediately. However, Jitai and his family belonged to the company under Captain Jin Guoshan, of the Bordered Red Chinese Banner. Therefore, Jitai’s oldest son, Rongxun, had to apply for travel authorization on behalf of the whole family. In his application, Rongxun stated the reason and time to travel, the names and ages of family members traveling with him, and the names of his household
servants traveling with them. He submitted the application along with his household register to the county (xian) where his family resided. The county officials then forwarded the application to the provincial governor and the minister of Warfare. The two high-ranking officials jointly wrote a letter to the Department of Eight Banner Governance, appealing for travel authorization on behalf of Rongxun and his family. The department received the letter on May 19, 1888, about four months after Jitai’s death (BQDTYM: 3). Whether Rongxun’s application was approved or not was not important for my discussion, the point is: by making it hard for Manchus to get travel authorization, the state could intimidate people from traveling and thereby keep people in place.

Another case occurred in 1844 revealing a different pattern. Jinglian, the oldest son of a Manchu military officer stationed in Xinghua county, Fujian province, needed to go back home in Beijing. Jinglian was 19 years old, and an “idle man” (xiansan)\(^\text{17}\) belonging to the company under captain Minggui’s command, the Bordered Red Manchu Banner. At the beginning of the year Jinglian requested a six months leave from the banner to escort his family from Beijing to his father’s office in Fujian. The banner reported to the Minister of Warfare, which issued a pass for Jinglian. The young man left Beijing on March 3, 1843, and arrived at Xinghua on May 8. Upon Jinglian’s arrival, Jinglian’s father retained him in Xinhua so that the young man could help his father to deal with family issues. As Jinglian was on leave and was supposed to go back to his banner in Beijing, Jinglian’s father then submitted an application to his superior, who in turn informed the banner in Beijing to write down the change in Jinglian’s records. Shortly afterwards Jinglian purchased the official title of Manchu language scribe (bitieshi, see the above section), and needed to go back to his banner in Beijing to study and to wait there for his turn to come to fill the position. Jinglian’s father therefore submitted an application on behalf of Jinglian for travel authorization. At the end of the letter, Jinglian’s father made a list of people traveling with Jinglian: Jinglian’s wife, Guaerjia, who was 19 years old; their son, Songheng, four years old; and four household servants. The letter was submitted to the lieutenant-general of the banner and the

\(^{17}\) A man who was not enlisted in any of the five service branches in the banner system.
provincial military commander (*tidu*), who in turn forwarded it to the Department of Eight Banner Governance and the appropriate minister for verification (BQDTYM: 3).

Fifth, Manchus were obligated to report to their superiors any major changes in their families, such as marriage, the birth of a child, and death. In the case of marriage, they had to state the names of the bride and the groom, the companies and banners that they belonged to, and their families’ residences respectively. For instance, on August 24, 1872, Zaizu’s daughter was arranged to marry the man Zengyuan. Zaizu wrote to his superior (MZYSJP, translation mine):

> Zaizu’s daughter, on the twenty-first day of the seventh month, married Zengyuan, who passed the metropolitan civil examination, of the company under Captain Longshun, of the Plain Red Manchu Banner.
> I report this to you, education commissioner.
> The man is living on Enyuansi Street, which is in the turf of the Fourth Battalion of the Bordered Yellow Manchu Banner.
> The seventh month of the eleventh year of the Tongzhi reign.

The superior commented on the report: “did not say whose son the man is, and what his surname is. Must ask.” The report was returned to Zaizu. Zaizu then added to his original report: “Zengyuan is a son of Wentao, a staff member [*zhushi*, a sixth-rank official] of the Ministry of Public Work. His surname is Guaerjia” (ibid).

When they received reports of changes in their subordinates’ families, lower-ranking officials then reported to their superiors, and eventually Manchu marriages and births of children were reported to the Department of Eight Banner Governance. For instance, Haiquan was a member of the Yuanmingyuan Guards, belonging to the company commanded by captain Changxu, of the First Manchu Battalion of the Yuanmingyuan Bordered Red Banner. On March 27, 1905, Haiquan married a 20-year-old woman whose father was named Wang Da, living in Wanping County near Beijing. Haiquan reported his marriage to colonel Ronglin and lieutenant Wenlin. The colonel then reported to the banner commander (*yingzong*) Jikui, who finally reported to the Department of Eight Banner Governance (BQDTYM: 26).

Sixth, in addition to regulations governing ordinary Manchus, the state set up rules to administer low-ranking officials at the company level. As stated above, the company was the basic military, administrative, and social unit of the banner system, and the captain and other officials interacted with
regular members of the company on a daily basis. Hence, from the viewpoint of the state, to control these personnel was a key step to managing the general Manchu population. Unlike the Manchu multitude, the number of the lower ranking officials was limited, making them easier to handle.

The state created two measures to get hold of the officials. The first was registration. Every three years the captain registered corporals and lineage heads in his company and eventually reported to the Department of Eight Banner Governance. For instance, in a report dated the eleventh month of the tenth year of the Jiaqing reign (c. December 1805), the captain Tong Xiang of the Bordered Red Chinese Banner listed the five corporals who assisted him. Tong then stated that these five officials were all jointly appointed as lineage heads, therefore there was no need to report them repeatedly as lineage heads (BQDTYM: 156).

Another report serves as a good example of official registration. Captain Li Zhen in the First Battalion of the Bordered Red Chinese Banner wrote in his report to the department (ibid, translation mine):

Lineage head, Wang Tingzhen, who had purchased the intellectual title of Jiansheng, but had never entered the bureaucracy, was appointed lineage head on the tenth day of the seventh month of the fifty-fifth year of the Qianlong reign [August 14, 1785];
From the first month of the fifty-sixth year of the Qianlong reign to the twelfth month of the fifty-eighth year of the Qianlong reign, three years. He made no mistakes, and registered with Captain Li Zhen, who then reported to the department;
Again, from the first month of the fifty-ninth year of the Qianlong reign to the twelfth month of the first year of the Jiaqing reign, three years, he made no mistakes, and registered with Captain Li Zhen, who then reported to the department;
[The format repeats five times. Each time the beginning and ending years going down three years respectively]
Again, from the first month of the eighth year of the Jiaqing reign to the twelfth month of the tenth year of the Jiaqing reign, three full years. Lineage members under his charge and himself have breached no laws. He has completed five [eight] full terms, therefore, I hereby request on his behalf to register.
Colonel Enqiwei and Captain Li Zhen [signature]
Corporal Gao Xihui [signature]
[Stamp of the First Battalion of the Bordered Red Chinese Banner]

The report confirms that registration was conducted on a regular basis (once every three years), and that registration was a serious matter. The captain and the corporal needed to cosign on the report so that

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18 The exact date of this document cannot be identified. Judging from the content, however, it can be inferred that this report was probably submitted around the first month of the eleventh year of the Jiaqing reign, c. February 1806)
they would assume joint responsibility. The report had probably been reviewed by the banner, judging from the fact that it bore the stamp of banner seal, before it was submitted to the department.

The second measure was to evaluate the officials. The evaluation was standardized by the government, containing the following categories: integrity, ability, cavalry, age, archery, and comment. Each category had four degrees: excellent (you), good (liang), average (zhong), and bad (cha). The evaluation also contained the last overall remark: “retain or disband.” That is, to keep the official on the position and remove him from the position. 194 evaluations were found in BQDTYM: 194 alone.

Seventh, each banner submitted a copy of register of all high-ranking officers, namely lieutenant (xiaogixiao) and above, to the department of Eight Banner Governance. The typical register first listed the position and the total number of officers appointed to the position. Then it gave the name and position of each individual, and when he was appointed to the position. Thirty-one registers were found in BQDTYM: 203 alone.

To sum up, the banner system was a well-organized sociopolitical institution. It consisted of three tiers: regular banner people, low-ranking officers, and high-ranking officers. Each group was subject to specific regulations created and reinforced by the state with identifiable regulations, agencies, and procedures. As a result, the banner system remained in good shape even after the Manchus had lived in China for over 200 years. In other words, the ethnic boundaries between the Manchus and the Chinese were clear as of the last decades of the dynasty. The fact reveals the significance of state power in ethnic relations.

**STATE-SANCTIONED ETHNIC HIERARCHY IN THE QING**

Manchu-Chinese inequality was an important aspect of overall ethnic relations in the Qing. In order to better understand Manchu-Chinese relations, one must locate it in a context. I argue that an ethnic hierarchy existed in the Qing in the sense that the state treated the major ethnic groups unequally in sociopolitical terms. Of the six major ethnic groups, the Manchus were at the top of the hierarchy, under whom were the Mongols. The Chinese were in the middle notch, followed by the Uyghurs and the Miao
were on the bottom of the structure. The Tibetans were somewhat detached in the sense that the forbidden terrain of Tibet prevented state penetration. I simplify the construct as follows: the Manchus and the Mongols were at the top of the three-layer hierarchy, followed by the Chinese in the middle, then further downward were the Miao, the Uyghurs, and the Tibetans.

I further my argument in two steps. First, I point out that the state sought to keep the various groups separate both physically and in terms of social interaction by law and regulation. This was the case with the Manchus, the Mongols, the Chinese, the Tibetans, and the Uyghurs. As of the Miao, the state imposed both forced assimilation and separation. Secondly, I articulate that the state treated the groups unequally.

**LEGAL SEGREGATION OF THE ETHNIC GROUPS**

Ethnic separation first was reflected in the fact that the state made separate laws for each ethnic group regarding administrative, legal, financial, and social issues. These ethnic-group-specific laws were mutually independent, resulting in the fact that each ethnic territory was ruled in a way as if it were an independent state to other ethnic territories. The Qing empire in a sense was unified only politically by state power.

The Mongol Law (*Menggu Lüli*) was the typical case. It was the first ethnic-territory-specific-statute made by the Qing, and a comprehensive legal document dealing with Mongol issues of a broad range. The first full-fledged version of the Mongol Law was made in 1789 under the Qianlong emperor’s order. In 1815 the law was revised and renamed “The Regulations of the Court of Colonial Affairs) (*Lifanyuan zeli*). The Qing’s attempt at compiling Mongol-related regulations went all the way back to 1696, when the Court of Colonial Affairs, under the Kangxi emperor’s instruction, issued “The Regulations” (*zeli*), a collection of the 125 rules and clauses made since the Hong Taiji reign (1627-1643) regarding the Mongols (Liu 1993: 7).

The Regulations of the Court of Colonial Affairs first decided the administrative districts in the Mongol territory. It demarcated 49 jasagh banners in Inner Mongolia, and 150 jasagh banners in Outer Mongolia, northern Xinjiang, and Qinghai (ibid: 18). To prevent the Mongols from getting united, the regulations stipulated that the nomadic Mongols could not cross the borders to herd. Traveling across the
banners borders was restricted as the state dictated that travelers had to obtain permits. The horse-riding
mobile Mongol tribes thus became fettered within their individual banners.

To control the jasagh and noblemen, the Regulations of the Court of Colonial Affairs determined the
ranks and inheritance of noble titles, and the selection, appointment, promotion, and punishment of
officials. For instance, the “Section of Ranks” in the Regulations stipulated official dress, including the
number of buttons on the official’s hat, color and pattern of the dress, and even the cushion for the official
to sit on; the number of subordinates and the order of seats were determined in accordance with rank (Liu
1993: 19). The “Section of Inheritance” provided that the rank of an heir was determined by the rank of
the person from whom the former inherited title or position. For example, a prince’s (qinwang) son would
inherit the title of first grade taiji and the son of a prince of a lower degree (junwang) would inherit the
second grade taiji. This section also stipulated the eligibility and the procedures of succession. The
Regulations also articulated the noblemen and officials’ salaries, travel allowances, etc.

More importantly, the section of “Ceremonial Audience with the Emperor” (chaojin) stipulated the
frequency of the event, i.e. from once a year to every three years in accordance with title and position, and
the number of divisions of officials traveling to the capital (i.e. a tribe’s leaders might be divided into a
number of subgroups, each group traveling to the capital when its turn came. A tribe’s leaders might be
divided into as many as nine subdivisions). The Regulations provided that all high-ranking Mongol
noblemen and officials were obligated to pay tribute, and they would be punished should they fail to do so.
Only those who were 65 years of age and above could exempt from the duty. In addition, the Regulations
stipulated the kind and amount of tribute articles for each tribe to carry to the capital, the standard of
banquet for officials, imperial rewards, and the rituals of such occasions in accordance to ranks (ibid: 23).

Secondly, the Regulations dealt with social issues. The “Section of Population” stipulated that
census would be conducted on a regular basis; it also stipulated punitive measures against illegal trading
of people, and so on. The “Section of Land” prohibited Chinese from migrating to Mongolia to reclaim
land and stipulated the corresponding punishment. Simultaneously it stipulated the procedures for
Chinese peasants to enter Mongolia to rent land from Mongols, and Mongols pawning land to the Chinese,
and the like. The “Section of Barn and Storage” dealt with storage and allocation of government of grain. The Regulations also provided government relief in case of natural disasters (ibid: 26-30).

The regulations had clauses on issues related to Mongol women. First, the emperor would confer honors on chaste women by ordering monuments erected for them. Second, the state encouraged Mongol women to reproduce boys by rewarding mothers who gave birth to boys. Third, the Regulations had clauses on marriage and divorce, and the payment and refund of dowry. More importantly, the Regulations forbid Mongol women from marrying Chinese men (ibid: 26).

Thirdly, the Regulations addressed military issues. Specific codes were set to deal with military discipline, the assessment of military merits, pension for dead soldiers’ families, procedures for the league head (mengzhang) to review troops on parade, examination of weapons and equipment, and the jasagh banners purchasing weapons and military supplies. For example, the rules for combat stipulated battlefield discipline, the rewards for valiant soldiers and punishment for the defeated, and so on. The clauses on purchasing military supplies stipulated strict procedures of auditing and authorization. When military purchase became necessary, the jasagh first had to submit application to the Court of Colonial Affairs, specifying the kind, and the amount or number of weapons and supplies. The Court in turn would communicate with the Ministry of Warfare, which would review and issue the “ticket of approval.” It was not until he had gone through all the procedures that the jasagh could place the order (ibid: 27).

Fourth, the Regulations included criminal law and judicial procedures. Punishment for serious offences, such as murder, robbery, and larceny were laid out. Domestic animals were an important part of property in the Mongol territory; therefore, the Regulations set detailed clauses on stealing stock. Raping, illegal trading of human beings, and digging tombs were included in the legal document as well. In the legal field, the Regulations also contained punitive measures against officials who failed to fulfill their duties (ibid: 31-32).

In addition the Regulations determined legal procedures in Mongol territory, such as how to start a legal suit, who was eligible to take a lawsuit, and the like. Furthermore, specific clauses were made to
govern trial, redemption of one’s punishment by paying a ransom, imprisonment, transportation of criminals, etc (ibid: 31-33).

Similarly the empire made laws and regulations for the Uyghurs as well. In the Uyghur territory, the first legal document systematically dealing with the Uyghurs was the six-article memorial presented by the general Zhaohui in charge of military conquest of Xinjiang, in August 1759, in the middle of the military campaign. The Qianlong emperor approved all the suggestions, thus turning the articles into law. The main contents outlined the methods to select and appoint native officials at the local level, collect tax ad provisions, mint new currency, and station troops in the city of Kashghar, one of the two major cities controlled by rebels (ibid: 76-77). In November 1765, shortly after quelling down the revolt at Ush, the emperor approved a memorial by Mingrui, which contained eight articles giving specific suggestions as to how to select and appoint the Hakim Beg, the etiquette regarding how native officials and Qing officials would address and interact with each other (ibid: 78-80).

The legal document had an article on ethnic relations. The seventh article prescribed residential segregation of Chinese and Uyghurs. It anticipated that Chinese immigration into Xinjiang would soar in the future. If Chinese lived close to government compounds, then officials would be able to handle the Chinese immigrants. If the state did not restrict Chinese residence, then they would mingle with Uyghurs and inevitably causing troubles. The article forced Chinese to live and trade in places adjacent to the military camps. It finally prescribed that Chinese who defied the rule would be punished (ibid: 79).

Later the comprehensive legal document The Regulations on the Uyghur Territory (Huijiang zeli) was first compiled in March 1814, revised in 1837, completed in 1842, and finally issued by the Daoguang emperor in 1843. Like the Regulations of the Colonial affairs concerning mainly about the Mongols, the Regulations on the Uyghur Territory stipulated bureaucracy in the region, including the official ranking system, selection and appointment of Uyghur officials, inheritance of titles and positions, their duties, native taxation and coercive labor, and Uyghur officials paying tribute to the emperor, many of which copied the Lifanyuan Regulations (81-87).
Two items were unique to the region. First was regional currency. The Regulations reiterated the government’s decision to keep the regional currency different from that of China proper, and further determined the exchange rate between the two currencies (ibid: 88). Secondly, the Regulations had multiple clauses governing behaviors of Manchu troops stationed in the region. The Clauses prohibited Manchu soldiers from entering Uyghur towns and villages, and Uyghur women from entering Manchu cities without permit. In addition, a clause prohibited Manchu soldiers from taking up Uyghur farmland and orchards (ibid: 92).

The state made five legal documents regarding Tibet by 1850. Among them the 1751 thirteen-clause Tentative Regulations Dealing with the Aftermath in Tibet, and the 1793 Imperially Approved Regulations were significant. The former laid the foundation for imperial legislation on Tibet, and the latter was systematic in terms of content and significant in terms of influence on future laws.

**ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION BY THE STATE**

The state treated the major ethnic groups unequally on a wide range of issues. I will point out ethnic discrimination by the state on five dimensions. In general the Manchus and the Mongols received the best treatment, followed by the Chinese, then other groups including the Miao, the Uyghurs, and the Tibetans.

First, the court made discriminatory policies on the different ethnic territories. The state treated Manchuria and Mongolia as the Manchu and Mongol homelands and reserved the two regions for the Manchus and Mongols respectively in order to prevent the two regions from falling into Chinese hands and to preserve native cultures, but encouraged Chinese to move to Xinjiang and the Miao territory. The Manchu rulers considered Manchuria as the Manchu homeland and prohibited Chinese migration to the region. The Qing built the famous Willow Palisade to block Chinese immigrants. The palisade was “an earthen levee about a yard high planted with a row of willow trees with a parallel trench about three yards deep” (Rhoads 2000: 40) in southern Manchuria with 19 gates along it (Elliot 2001: 49, Ding 2003: 91). The palisade was composed of three sections extending outward from the city of Kaiyuan. To the west was Mongolia; to the south was Shengjing (modern Shenyang), the capital of Latter Jin, or the homeland of the Jianzhou Jurchens; to the east and northeast was Jilin and Heilongjiang, whence the Haixi and
Donghai Jurchens had come. The palisade, the guarded checkpoints, and punishment prevented large numbers of Chinese emigrants from entering Jilin and Heilongjiang, though some sneaked in illegally for fertile land in times of natural disaster and famine.

Furthermore, in 1736, the court ended the practice of exiling Chinese to the region while continuing to send Manchu convicts there. In 1740 the state tightened up Chinese emigration to Manchuria by issuing an edict forbidding Chinese emigration beyond Shanhaiguan; thereby the entire region was closed (fengjin) to Chinese immigrants. The ban remained in effect until a few years before the collapse of the Qing empire in the early twentieth century. Finally in 1751 an edict came that all officials serving in Manchuria were to be Manchus thereafter (Elliott 2000).

Likewise Manchu rulers treated Mongolia as the Mongol homeland and closed off the region to Chinese emigration. Chinese merchants and peasants who needed to travel to the region were subject to a restrictive procedure, and they were not permitted to stay there permanently. It was not until 1910 that the ban on Chinese emigration was lifted (Liu 1993).

While the Qing prohibited Chinese from moving to Manchuria and Mongolia, it encouraged Chinese to migrate to Xinjiang and the Miao territory. Shortly after it had conquered Xinjiang in the middle of the eighteenth century, the Qing moved Chinese Green Standard soldiers, Manchu banner troops, exiles, and Chinese peasants to northern Xinjiang. The state set the neighboring Gansu province as the main source of emigrants, and ordered local officials to persuade Chinese peasants to move westwards. In addition, the state offered substantive assistance to them such as funds, food, travel allowance, clothing, and utensils. On average a household received 90 taels of silver in government support. At the destination, officials allocated farmland to the immigrants, built houses for them, and further lent them seeds, farming implements, and so on (Hua 1992: 34). Large-scale immigration organized by the state stopped in 1780, by which time more than 72,000 Chinese had settled in northern Xinjiang. Afterwards state policy shifted from direct sponsorship to self-supporting migration. The state simplified the procedure for Chinese peasants to enter Xinjiang and encouraged immigrants to settle down in the region. The policy lasted until
the end of the Qing. In 1831 the court issued an edict encouraging Chinese to emigrate to southern Xinjiang. In 1844 the court further allocated farmland to Chinese peasants (ibid: 34-36).

The state’s policy on the Miao territory was more discriminative. On the one hand it eroded the size of the Miao territory by military actions, and on the other hand the government brought in Chinese in two ways. First, the state stationed Chinese troops in some areas and introduced a military-civil system to the region. They received military discipline in peacetime so that they would be ready to act in times of unexpected incident. In addition, each soldier and his family were registered as a household with the officer, and they were allocated a certain amount of farmland around the garrison that the state confiscated from native people. The soldiers engaged in agricultural production alongside military training, and were obligated to pay land tax in the form of grain like regular peasants. In the Guzhou area of Guizhou province alone about 9,000 military families settled (Guo and Sang 1991: 8-9).

Unlike its policy on Chinese emigration to Manchuria and Mongolia, the state in practice did not ban Chinese emigration to the Miao territory. As a result Chinese were allowed to move freely to the southwest. In some areas Chinese population grew rapidly due to the influx of Chinese immigrants. For instance, between 1713 and 1820 registered Chinese residents in Yunnan and Guangxi provinces increased from roughly 900,000 and 1,000,000 to approximately 4,490,000 and 7,420,000 respectively (Pan 1992: 46).

Second, the state took differential attitudes toward intermarriage between different ethnic groups. I classify intermarriages into two categories: those between upper-class people and those between average people. If marrying a member of the imperial lineage was a great honor, then the prestige was given to Mongols only (Rawski: 1998, Cheng, 1998). In regard to intermarriages between ordinary people of different ethnic groups, the Manchu rulers were hypersensitive about marriages between Chinese and Manchus or Mongols. More specifically, laws were made to prohibit intermarriage between Chinese men and Manchu/Mongol women presumably because married women were regarded as members of their husbands’ families, and because children’s descent was traced through their fathers. Thus by forbidding Chinese men to “take” Manchu or Mongol women, the court aimed to protect Manchu and Mongol
womanhood and their descendents. In contrast, the court encouraged intermarriages between Chinese and Miao in order to assimilate the latter.

Third, chances for members of different ethnic groups to enter the state bureaucracy varied greatly. Manchus, and only Manchus had full access to posts in the central government (which governed essentially the Chinese provinces), the court of Colonial Affairs, Manchuria, and the position of general in Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet-based Ministers. Mongols could enter the Court of Colonial Affairs. Chinese were allocated posts in the central government, including the Miao territory. Due to the Qing official system, in principle, members of other ethnic groups were restricted to their own ethnic territories.

In short, Manchus were given the best chance to enter the bureaucracy, followed by Mongols and Chinese; whereas other ethnic groups were highly restricted to their own territory.

Fourth, Manchu rulers displayed varying attitudes towards different ethnic cultures. Manchu emperors without doubt favored Manchu culture, and endeavored to preserve the Manchu language, archery, and cavalry after the Manchus entered China proper. The Manchu language was declared to be the national language (guoyu) of the Qing empire. Sometimes the language was referred to as the Qing language (Qingyu), and Manchu characters were called Qing characters by the state. The honor given to the language continued to the end of the dynasty although the Manchu language became virtually a dead language in China proper by the mid-eighteenth century and by the late nineteenth century in the Northeast (Zhang 1995). Likewise Manchu rulers attempted to preserve Mongol culture against Chinese erosion by forbidding Mongols to learn Chinese and adopt Chinese names (Chapter IV).

In contrast, Manchu rulers forced Chinese and the Miao to adopt Manchu male hairstyle and clothing. Further the state forced the Miao and the Uyghurs to learn Chinese culture. I have addressed forced Miao assimilation in Chapter IV; therefore here I focus on the Uyghurs. Qing policy on the Uyghurs at first was ethnic segregation, including residential segregation between the Uyghurs and the Chinese, the ban on intermarriage between the aforementioned two groups, and interestingly the prohibition against Uyghurs wearing the queue (Cheng 1998: 19). In the late 1870s the Qing began to reverse its policy that had lasted for a century. Administratively Xinjiang was reorganized into a province and the beg system was
abolished. Culturally the state set up schools to teach Uyghurs Chinese culture free of charge like it had done in the Miao territory. In sum, the Qing honored and attempted to preserve Manchu and Mongol cultures, mutilated Chinese culture, and intended to annihilate Miao and Uyghur cultures.

Fifth, the Qing was overtly contemptuous of the Tibetans, Uyghurs, and the Miao. In its official documents, the government used derogatory terms to refer to them. For instance, the clauses on the Miao contained in The Criminal Law of the Great Qing, frequently called the Miao “Miaoyi” or “Miaoman,” where the characters yi and man had the connotations of “barbarian” and “uncivilized.” Similarly, the Regulations on the Uyghur Territory addressed the Uyghurs as “huizi,” a contemptuous term for Muslims. Finally Manchu rulers’ contempt for the Tibetans manifested itself in the term they used to call the ethnic group, “fanzi,” which had the connotation of alien or barbarian (Liu 1993).

No evidence has been found that suggests that Manchu rulers used derogatory terms to call the Chinese. Nevertheless, Manchu emperors uttered their mistrust and dislike of the Chinese as well. The Kangxi emperor in the winter of 1716 said: “The Chinese are disloyal, unlike the Manchus and Mongols, the hundreds of thousands of whom have one heart. I have ruled for many years, and I always feel that the Chinese are hard to manage because they are disloyal” (SZSL VI: 3598). The Yongzheng emperor wrote in the book Records of Conscience and Confusion about the Great Cause (Dayi juemilu): “All of the Manchus consider it to be a shame to associate with the Chinese. The Zunghar [Mongols] called the Manchus manzi [southern barbarians, referring to the Chinese]. When Manchus heard of it none of them was not indignant” (cited in Wang 2001: 208)

Manchu rulers not only distanced themselves from the Chinese, but demonstrated their sense of Manchu superiority. In the autumn of 1759 the Qianlong emperor cited his father, the Yongzheng emperor as saying: “We Manchu people are simple and honest. We are loyal to our rulers and respectful of our parents, our behavior is of great integrity. Isn’t it superior to Chinese literature and arts and Mongol canons?” (cited in Guo 2000: 31). No evidence has been found about later Manchu rulers uttering negative attitudes toward the Chinese. However it is hard to say they regarded the Chinese as equal to the
Manchus, judging from the fact that they sanctioned systematic discrimination against the Chinese. To sum up, Manchu rulers displayed differential attitudes toward the various ethnic groups.

Because of inequality in the five aspects I argue that an ethnic hierarchy existed in the Qing. The Manchus and the Mongols were at the top, the Chinese occupied the middle notch, and the Miao and the Uyghurs were on the bottom. The Tibetans were somehow detached as the forbidding terrain of Tibet prevented state penetration deeply enough to change native social structure, although the state exerted considerable political influence on the region. Ethnic inequality was created and maintained by the state. Therefore I term ethnic inequality in the Qing as “state-sanctioned” inequality. A clear pattern existed in the relative positions of the various ethnic groups. Their notches in the hierarchy were determined largely by the time when they were brought under the state’s rule. The Manchus were the group on whom the Latter Jin was based. The southern Mongols were the first external group that the Qing conquered; therefore, they were treated by the Manchu rulers as the most trustworthy and dependable external group. Southern Mongols in specific and the Mongols in general received more favorable treatment than other ethnic groups such as the Chinese. After the Qing conquered China proper the state utilized the economic and human resources of China proper to subjugate the Miao, the Tibetans, and the Uyghurs who in turn were placed in notches below the Chinese. In sum the ethnic groups’ positions were determined by the state in accordance with their contribution to the establishment of the empire. From the state’s perspective the arrangement was rational and reasonable, yet for the various peoples it was unfair. As such it prompted resistance from the oppressed groups as discussed in the next chapter.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has dealt with three major issues. The first is the administrative, political, and legal inequalities between the Chinese and the Manchus as of the nineteenth century. Manchu-Chinese inequalities were created and reinforced by the state through regulation and law. Since ethnic inequalities were sanctioned by the state, they were relatively fixed and their effects were long-lasting.

The second issue is the measures taken by the state to separate the Manchus living in China proper from the Chinese physically and socially. The purpose was to maintain the banner system by ensuring that
Chinese would not sneak into the banner system and Manchus would not escape from the system as such actions would render the state-sanctioned inequalities between the two ethnic groups meaningless.

The measures included residential segregation, intermarriage ban, and administrative procedures. The interrelated measures were effective and constituted an invisible social boundary between the two ethnic groups. Loopholes existed, but when reported the state was quick to react to close them. Therefore in general the sociopolitical boundaries between the Manchus and the Chinese remained intact as of the middle of the nineteenth century.

Third, Manchu-Chinese relations were the most important component of Qing ethnic relations in terms of sociopolitical influence. However, the Manchus and the Chinese were but two groups of the ethnic hierarchy in the multiethnic empire. The hierarchy and Manchu-Chinese relations reinforced one another, and this was one of the primary reasons why the empire could last for nearly three centuries. Furthermore, the three tiers of the ethnic hierarchy constituted a holistic system. They were interdependent and each performed some functions for the maintenance and perpetuation of the hierarchical system.

More specifically the Manchu rulers treated the Mongols as their allies by giving the Mongols favorable status in the hierarchy. Having the Mongols on their side, the Manchus could concentrate on the Chinese, the largest and culturally most influential ethnic groups in the empire. The Chinese were the middleman in the empire, linking the upper-tier with the bottom-tier in economic, social, and political terms. The Chinese as a whole were a disadvantaged group compared to the two groups in the upper-tier, yet to some degree they could compensate for their disadvantages in terms of sociopolitical status by taking resources from the groups on the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy. For instance, under the system of “Manchu-Chinese diarchy” the Chinese were subject to virtually unequal treatment in appointment and tenure in the bureaucracy in the capital and at the provincial level. Yet the diarchy substantially excluded members of other ethnic groups from entering the central bureaucracy. Thus in the sense that the diarchy stipulated Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese quotas, it gave the Chinese an advantage over the Tibetans, the Miao, and the Uyghurs.
Moreover, the incorporation of the Miao territory, Tibet, and Xinjiang into the empire created new opportunities for Chinese to be appointed as officials or to be stationed in those regions as soldiers, receiving stipends and other benefits from the state. Economically in the seventeenth century the state took away farmland from Chinese landowners and peasants living in the areas around the capital and redistributed among Manchus, but in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the state assisted Chinese in the southwestern and northwestern provinces in migrating to the Miao territory and Xinjiang. These Chinese immigrants occupied native farmland in those regions. The groups on the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy served as a buffer against Chinese disaffection against the Manchu state; therefore, functionally, the Miao, the Uyghurs, and the Tibetans sustained the ethnic hierarchy.

These mechanisms bore similarities with those invented in other parts of the world. Based on examples of race and ethnic relations in Europe, the Americas, and Australia, Simpson and Yinger (1996) articulate that majority groups take six measures in dealing with minority groups. The first is assimilation including forced assimilation and peaceful assimilation. Whereas forced assimilation refers to “an extreme ethnocentrism” adopted by dominant groups that “refused minorities to practice their own religion, speak their own language, follow their own customs” (ibid: 20), peaceful assimilation “permits minorities to absorb the dominant patterns in their own way and at their own speed, and it envisages reciprocal assimilation” (ibid: 21). In the Qing case the Manchu rulers executed both forced assimilation and peaceful assimilation. On the one hand the empire forced the Chinese to adopt visible Manchu ethnic traits such as the male hairstyle and dress in order to strip off Chinese ethnic marks for the purpose of diminishing Chinese ethnic identity. Chinese men were given two choices: to adopt the Manchu hairstyle or they would be killed. This was a glaring example of forced assimilation.

On the other hand the state allowed the Manchus to assimilate Chinese cultural elements, such as language and ideology, peacefully and gradually. This was an example of peaceful assimilation. Judging

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19 Simpson and Yinger define majority-minority situation as distribution of power instead of the numbers of population. Their usage of majority and minority groups corresponds to dominant and subordinate groups used in this study.
from the above facts it is safe to say that in general “forced assimilation” was applicable to the Chinese and “peaceful assimilation” was applicable to the Manchus.

In practice, however, Qing policies were more complicated than the above dichotomous classification of assimilation. As a result, virtually no clear-cut classifications can be made concerning any of the six major ethnic groups. For instance, the state set up hundreds of schools in the Miao territory to teach Miao people Chinese language and culture, and encouraged native chieftains and later “civilized Miao” to adopt the Manchu male hairstyle. These measures could hardly fit neatly in either the forced or peaceful assimilation category since they were neither completely forced nor voluntary. On the one hand Miao people were not forced to go to school to learn Chinese or adopt the Manchu hairstyle. At least their lives were not threatened as in the Chinese case. On the other hand cultural acculturation was not entirely voluntary in the sense that Miao people did not make the policies by themselves nor did they request the state to make the policies. Rather, they were merely passive recipients of the policies made by the state. They were seduced to go to school because they were not charged for schooling and because of the prospect that they would enter the bureaucracy if they did well in school. The Manchu male hairstyle in the Miao case was presented to natives by the state as a sign of prestige. Hence cultural assimilation in a sense was rewarded by financial gains and social mobility.

What complicated ethnic assimilation was the fact that imperial policies varied from group to group. While it forced the Chinese to adopt the Manchu hairstyle and seduced the Miao to learn Chinese and adopt the Manchu hairstyle, the state forbade the Mongols to learn Chinese and the Uyghurs to adopt the Manchu hairstyle. Furthermore, the state made no explicit policies regarding Tibetans. The empire displayed much flexibility or tactics when making ethnic policies.

The second mechanism in Simpson and Yinger’s analysis is pluralism, which was seen in the Qing empire to some degree. Each ethnic group was allowed to preserve some of its ethnic traits insofar as they were not perceived by the state as threatening to Manchu rule. For instance, while the state forced Chinese men to adopt the Manchu male style and dress, it did not force Chinese women to adopt Manchu women’s coiffure or dress. Furthermore Chinese women were allowed to practice foot binding, which
became a distinctive ethnic mark during the Qing dynasty. During the 1911 Revolution thousands of Manchu women and their family members were slaughtered by Chinese revolutionaries and mobs. Although many tried to pass off as Chinese, Manchu women’s natural-sized feet betrayed their ethnicity.

Legal protection of minorities, namely subordinate groups, is the third item in Simpson and Yinger’s analysis. On this count the Qing case was quite different. Overall the empire did not make laws and regulation to promote the welfare of subordinate groups. On the contrary, the empire protected the dominant group, the Manchus, by legal means. In the economic sphere while the Chinese were subject to state tax, Manchus were exempt from the obligation. Moreover, they received financial aid from the state on a monthly basis. Politically the state invented multiple channels for Manchus to enter the bureaucracy, receive promotion, and obtain tenure more easily than their Chinese counterparts. The legal system of the Qing gave Manchu criminals more favorable treatment than Chinese inmates.

Simpson and Yinger argue that dominant groups have sometimes transferred subordinate group members out of an area in attempt to reduce ethnic problems (ibid: 24). Population transfer concerning subordinate groups did not occur in the Qing on a considerable scale. A similar but different phenomenon was Chinese emigration to other ethnic territories. Regarding this issue, imperial policies varied from case to case. Manchu emperors banned Chinese immigration to Manchuria and restricted Chinese immigration to Mongolia, yet they encouraged Chinese to move to the Miao territory and Xinjiang. These policies reflected Manchu rulers’ differential attitudes toward the ethnic groups. Manchu emperors attempted to keep Chinese immigrants out of Manchu and Mongol “homelands” and to usher them in Uyghur and Miao territories.

Moreover, Simpson and Yinger have pointed out that dominant groups have sometimes physically destroyed minority groups. Extermination of minority groups took place in the Qing mainly in the conquest of ethnic territories. For example, during the conquest of the Miao territory thousands of Miao were slaughtered by Qing troops. Finally, “continued subjugation” (Simpson and Yinger 1996: 25) of subordinate groups was an essential part of imperial policy. After the conquest the Chinese were kept in a subservient situation by Manchu rulers. In addition to Manchu-Chinese inequalities, Manchu rulers
treated other ethnic groups unfairly. In doing so the empire created an ethnic hierarchy on which rested the empire.

The ethnic hierarchy was unfair to the subordinate groups in the middle and bottom notches. Hence they rose up against the groups above them, namely the Chinese against the Manchus, and the Miao and Uyghurs against the Chinese, as discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VI: ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND CONSEQUENCES

In the preceding chapter I have located Manchu-Chinese inequalities within the framework of Qing ethnic relations, arguing that an ethnic hierarchy existed in the Qing. This chapter demonstrates that ethnic inequalities prompted ethnic conflicts across the empire over time. I examine predominantly ethnic rebellions that occurred in the 1850s and 1870s in order to set up the stage for the next chapter, where I argue that the aforementioned ethnic rebellions severely disrupted the Qing state and consequently undermined the state’s ability to lead China’s industrialization later.

In this chapter, while I look at other influential ethnic rebellions, I focus on the largest rebellion in Chinese history, the Taiping Rebellion. I make the following points: first, the rebellion was anti-Manchu in nature. The second point is the domino effect caused by the Taiping Rebellion. A series of ethnic rebellions broke out in the Southwest and Northwest, organized by subordinate ethnic groups. Third I point out that ethnic rebellions, particularly the Taiping Rebellion, had significant impact on the state in economic, military, and political terms.

ANTI-MANCHU REBELLIONS BEFORE THE TAIPING REBELLION

It is a formidable task to establish the argument that the Taiping Rebellion was anti-Manchu in nature because the task involves challenging the popular wisdom that the rebellion was an example of class struggle between landlords and peasants. I adopt the following strategy in making my points. First, in this section I outline the long tradition of Chinese resistance against Manchu rule. I sketch out major Chinese rebellions aimed to subvert Manchu rule, and suggest that the Taiping Rebellion was on the long trajectory of Chinese resistance. Second, in the next section I elaborate on the Taiping Rebellion and further demonstrate that it was anti-Manchu by examining the motive of the leader, the Taiping religious doctrine, and Taiping actions against the Manchu question.

Manchu rule of China incurred Chinese resistance throughout the duration of the dynasty. Popular wisdom argues that Chinese resisted in the early Qing, but later they became accustomed to Manchu unfair rule of their country, thus ethnic inequality did not cause much conflict until the last decade of the dynasty when state power declined dramatically (Chi 2001). Contrary to the traditional wisdom, I
maintain that Chinese rebellion broke out from time to time throughout the dynasty, and formed a clear pattern, which was the attempt to subvert the perverse rule of a “barbarian” people as viewed by contemporary Chinese. I will exemplify my view by sketching out two major Chinese rebellions against Manchu rule in the mid-Qing.

Qing official records filtered out the ethnic color of the rebellions, which were prompted by Qing policies that affected the Chinese populace substantively and psychologically. In addition to Manchu-Chinese inequality in the administrative, political, and legal spheres, which I have discussed in the preceding chapter, some economic, social, and cultural policies initiated in the early Qing had detrimental long-lasting effects on the Chinese. First, soon after the conquest, the Manchu court up to three times issued edicts to forcibly take over arable land around Beijing from Chinese owners, and distributed the land among Manchu noblemen and average people. In total the Manchu government seized 166,838 qing (approximately 1,112,253 hectares) farmland from Chinese owners (Wang 2002: 165).

In the social domain there was the noxious policy of touchong (meaning “throw in and supplement”), by which millions of Chinese were forced into the banners as slaves and bondservants during the roughly 200 years between 1644 and the middle of the nineteenth century. Chinese were enslaved in three ways. First, in the early Qing millions of Chinese from all socioeconomic backgrounds were turned into slaves after being captured by banner troops. Second, about two decades or so after 1644, slave markets came into being in Beijing and other Manchu cities, where slaves were sold and purchased through legal and illegal contracts. Many poor Chinese sold themselves to Manchu families for food and clothing. Third, exiled criminals, the majority of whom were participants of rebellions and their innocent family members, were given to Manchu soldiers. Slaves worked in the field, and bondservants managed the house, ran errands, etc. Their work was crucial to the Manchu economy and to the Manchu family. Some of them ran away from their masters due to cruel treatment. The state made the Law on the Escapees (Taoren fa) to punish them and deter others (Elliott 2001: 227-229, Wang 2002, Zhao 1999).

A more notorious policy was the “hair-shaving edict” (tifa ling), issued in 1645, the next year after the Manchus entered China proper. The edict forced Chinese men to adopt the Manchu male hairstyle, to
shave deeply the forehead and form the rest of the hair into a quere in the back of the head. This policy affected all Chinese men. Resistance rose, but the Manchu rulers were determined, stating their policy was “hair or head” (liufa bu liutou). Grassroots revolts spread over many parts of the country, many of which were organized by secret religious groups (Cao et al. 2002). More than 100 secret sects existed in the Qing, and they were called generically “White Lotus.” These groups expressed their common goal, to subvert the Qing and revive the Ming, in three ways. First, they incorporated their goal into their doctrines. Second, they named their sects with characters referring to the Ming or the surname of the Ming emperors. Third, some leaders claimed to be descendents of the Ming royal family (Liu 2002).

Some scholars argue that the goal resulted from the catastrophic changes during the Ming-Qing transition in the eyes of the Chinese. Ordinary Chinese bore the brunt of ethnic oppression. Explicit subversive phrases and prophecies against the government appeared in secret religions only after the Manchu conquest, which marked a sharp contrast with Ming secret religions. The collective memory was passed down from generation to generation through religion (Yu 1987). Now I briefly describe two cases in the mid-Qing.

The first case was the White Lotus rebellion that struck five provinces at the turn of the nineteenth century. In the summer of 1794, the government detected that some secret religious leaders spread anti-Manchu doctrines in the region bordering Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Hubei provinces. The court arrested and executed scores of them, and further ordered local governments to investigate and arrest followers. Thousands of White Lotus believers were arrested, tortured, and killed. Secret religious groups then planned for a large-scale rebellion. In early 1796 rebellions broke out in several counties in Hubei, and soon spread over to neighboring provinces. Rebels put out anti-Manchu slogans. For instance, in a bulletin dated the fifth month and the third day of the Dingsi year (May 28, 1797), Zhang Hanchao, the leader of the rebels in Xiangyang, Hubei, declared that his goal was to bring about the rise of the Chinese and the extermination of the Manchus (xing-Han mie-Man). In the text he claimed that the country belonged to the Chinese and urged people to cooperate (Renda and Yidang 1983: 1). In addition, French priests working in Sichuan province testified in their correspondences to Paris that the rebellion was
aimed to expel the “Tartars” and have a Chinese ascend to the throne (ibid: 336-339). The Qing strategy was to “control the Chinese by using Chinese” (yi-Han zhi-Han), that is, in addition to the regular army, the state used local Chinese militias to quell the rebellion (Xi 2000). The rebellion was put down in 1804.

Another White Lotus sect was Wenxiang, later changed to Qingcha. The founder of the cult was the Wang family in Luanzhou, Hebei province. Its holy book was titled “The Omnibus Book of the Three Doctrines on Preparations for Calamities” (Sanjiao Yingjie Zongguan Quanshu). The book was full of subversive words and phrases in the view of the state. In his edict issued on January 14, 1816, to the Manchu official Nayancheng who was put in charge of the investigation of the cult, the Jiaqing emperor cited some of the prophecies: “The Qing dynasty is coming to an end, and the Sizhengwen Buddha\(^20\) is falling in the House of Wang. The fate of the Northern Barbarians \(huren\) is doomed, then who will come to the throne? The sun and the moon will return and restore the Great Ming. Niu Ba\(^21\) is originally the Saturn\(^22\)” (Gugong 1979: 49).

The branch was popular in Shanxi, Shandong, Hebei, and Henan provinces. Influenced by the Wenxiang, a religious group by the name of “Heaven’s Principle Society” (Tianlihui) rebelled in Huaxian County, Henan province on September 29, 1813. Soon it spilled over into neighboring counties in Hebei and Shandong provinces. The rebels, headed by Li Wencheng, attempted to restore the Ming dynasty. Li styled himself as “The Heaven-abiding True Ruler of the Great Ming” (Da-Ming Tainshun Lizhenzhu). As a sign of their defiance, they removed the hair in the back of the head beneath the queue. The state mobilized 5,000-6,000 Manchu troops from other provinces, some as far as Heilongjiang and Jilin to put down the rebellion. In two months the state succeeded in its military campaign by killing about 20,000 participants (QDPDJFJL: 1-12).

Meanwhile a subdivision headed by Lin Qing planned to break into the Forbidden City in order to seize power while the Jiaqing emperor was out of town on a hunt. On October 8, 1813, more than 70 followers successfully broke into the imperial compound. Imperial guards killed and captured 31 men.

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\(^20\) Sizhengwenfuo, i.e. Maitreya

\(^21\) Niu Ba referred to the surname of the Ming emperors.

\(^22\) Tuxing. The word might refer to the Wang family.
Although the state settled the incident swiftly the psychological impact of the coup on the Jiaqing emperor was profound and long-lasting. He was baffled and frustrated as he told his ministers (JQSL: 4053, translation mine):

Although I was unable to conduct real politics that treated my subjects with love, I did not do any cruel thing that harmed them. Therefore I really do not understand why the incident occurred. It might be because my virtue was tenuous and evil accumulated. All I can do is to criticize myself. Although the incident arose all of sudden, nevertheless it resulted from evils that had accumulated for long. The greatest problem at present lies in the fact that ministers neglect their duties and just follow the motion. This is true with both China and foreign lands. Although I had warned them so many times that my lips became dry and my tongue became numb, the ministers did not comprehend and handled politics perfunctorily so that such an incident came about, which had never taken place in the Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties. Compared to the palace incident at the end of the Ming, how many times is this incident more severe! Thinking of this, I cannot say anything more. All I can do is to reflect on myself to correct my mistakes and right my heart.

The emperor rightly pointed out that the 1813 incident was unprecedented in Chinese history, yet he failed to link it with Manchu rule of China, nor could he foresee that the largest rebellion in Chinese history was about to come in less than four decades.

THE TAIPING REBELLION

The Taiping rebellion without doubt was anti-Manchu. I explain my view in the following steps. First I point out that Hong Xiuquan, the leader of the rebellion, was motivated by a desire to subvert the “alien” Manchu rule of China, which in his view was comprised of the 18 Chinese provinces. Second, anti-Manchu thoughts transcended the leader at the individual level. Indeed anti-Manchuism became an organic component of the Taiping religious doctrine, which motivated tens of thousands of Chinese to join the Taiping cause to overthrow Manchu rule. Third the Taipings practiced their religion, including actions against the Manchu question in areas under their control. In the following sections I elaborate on the three points.

THE ANTI-MANCHE MOTIVE OF THE LEADER

Hong Xiuquan had harbored anti-Manchu thoughts long before he launched the rebellion. In as early as 1842, or about nine years before the rebellion broke out, Hong uttered his anti-Manchu ideas to his close friends (Luo 1951: 1, translation mine):

China, as large as having 18 provinces, is controlled by tiny Manchuria; the Chinese, having as many as 500 million people, are being controlled by several million Manchus. This is really the ultimate
shame and humiliation! Besides, they [Manchus] spend tens of millions of taels of silver of China to purchase opium, and collect millions of taels of fat and grease [wealth] from Chinese to make pollen. They have been doing so for years and years. It has been like this for two hundred years. How cannot the rich people of China become poor, and the poor break the law? If they become unlawful, how can they avoid being exiled to Yili, Helongjiang, and Jilin and enslaved?

In Hong’s view, China and Manchuria were two different countries. China was the Chinese territory, i.e. the 18 provinces, excluding Manchuria and other ethnic territories. In addition to political suppression, Hong also made reference to economic exploitation and social inequality that the Manchus inflicted on the Chinese. Hong was apparently compassionate about his country and people suffering from, in his eyes, unfair alien rule. His passion later turned into the notion to expel the Manchus and reestablish a Chinese state. Around 1845, he revealed his thoughts to Hong Rengan, one of his major assistants later in his course. According to the then Hong Kong-based Swedish pastor Hamburger, who socialized with Hong Rengan and published a book on the rebellion in 1854 (Hamburger 1854/1935 English Version: 29-30. italics added), Hong Xiuquan made the following statement:

Siu-tshuen [Xiuquan] disclosed to him [Hong Rengan] the secret thoughts of his heart, and his hatred against the Manchoo [Manchu] people, saying, ‘God has divided the kingdoms of the world, and made the ocean to be a boundary for them, just as a father divides his estates among his sons; everyone of whom ought to reverence the will of his father, and quietly manage his own property. Why should now these Manchoos forcibly enter China, and rob their brothers of their estates?’

ANTI-MANCHUISM AND TAIPING RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE

In this section I first cite documents issued by Taiping leaders to illustrate that their political goal was to subvert Manchu rule, which in their eyes was both alien and perverse to the Chinese. Next I argue that anti-Manchu thoughts, such as equating the Manchus with demons, were woven into the Taiping religious doctrine, and motivated a large number of Chinese to join the cause of the Taipings.

By 1850 Hong Xiuquan had created the religious organization “The Congregation of Worshipers of God” (Baishangdihui), formed his plans, and mobilized thousands of people in Guangxi province, many of whom were members of the Triad society (another name for the Heaven and Earth Society. See Chapter I), and was waiting for the right moment to make a decisive move. In October of that year the court sent Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu to Guangxi to quell the rebels. In November Lin issued a
summons demanding their surrender. Hong replied with the following manifesto, claiming his right to the
throne by asserting the “alien” Manchus had no right to rule China (Michael 1971: 78-79):

The Manchoos [Manchus] who, for two centuries, have been in hereditary possession of the throne of
China, are descended from an insignificant nation of foreigners. By means of an army of veteran
soldiers well trained to warfare, they seized on our treasures, our lands, and the government of our
country… What! Is it possible that the Manchoos [Manchus], who are foreigners, have a right to
receive the taxes of the captured provinces, and to name officers who oppress the people, while we
Chinese [italics added] are prohibited from taking a trifling amount at the public cost? Universal
sovereignty does not belong to any one particular individual, to the exclusion of all the rest…

In 1852 when the Taiping troops were marching through Hunan province on their way to Wuchang,
Hong Xiuquan issued a document entitled “Proclamation on the Cause for the Campaign,” denouncing
the oppressive rule of the Manchus and asserting that they had no right to the throne because they were
“barbarians.” The proclamation started with the statement: “It is known that, situated in the central
position and with high aspirations, we have for countless ages held a strict division between the
barbarians and the Chinese [italics added]” (ibid: 168). The document then condemned the Manchus as
“barbarian” adventurers like Liu Yuan—leader of the Xiongnu tribe who was the first of the five
“barbarian” peoples that invaded China and established 16 regimes in northern China during the late third
and early fifth centuries—and Shile, leader of the Jie tribe who invaded China and established the state of
Houzhao, the strongest of the 16 states; it also charged that the Manchus had annihilated Chinese culture,
and advocated punishing the Manchus (ibid: 169-170).

Around the end of February, 1853, about a month before he entered Nanjing, the Eastern King Yang
Xiuqing in Anqing, capital of Anhui province, issued a proclamation to the scholars and people of
Jiangnan, the lower Yangtze valley, announcing Taiping policy. It declared that the troops would not
harm the people, and promised to arrange for civil service examinations as soon as the Taiping army took
Nanjing. At the very beginning of the document Yang officially introduced himself as “specially
appointed commander in chief of the Grand Army, engaged in sweeping away the Manchus and
establishing the new dynasty” [italics added] (ibid: 184-185). Yang denounced the Manchus as robbers
and meanwhile promoted Chinese ethnic pride (ibid: 185):

I would like to ask those of you who have given of your money and aided with your provisions [the
Manchu government--original translator’s annotation] in order to purchase titles and official dignities,
what is the glory of such distinctions? And even those literary honors which the Manchu robbers have
conferred at the literary examinations, of what use are they? I and my followers are all subjects of the
great Chinese Empire, and students of the books handed down by the great sages of antiquity; how then
could we stoop to receive rank and emolument from these Manchu barbarians.

In 1854 the Taipings published a collection of essays denouncing the region where the Manchus
lived as “the demons’ den.” The publication consisted of an edict by the Heavenly King Hong Xiuquan
denouncing the Manchu government’s capital as “demons’ den” and the metropolitan province Zhili
(today’s Hebei province) as a criminal region, and 32 essays written by Taiping officials and scholars
upholding the denouncement. The edict read (ibid: 277):

We have now denounced the area of Pei-Yen [Beiyan, an ancient name of the region
including Beijing], and designated it “the demons’ den,” because the demons have defiled that region.
The demons have committed crimes, and the ground they tread is involved in their crimes; we have
therefore degraded Chihli [correctly-attached—original translator] province, and how denominated it
Tsui-li [criminally-attached—original translator] province.

Taiping documents vehemently attacking Manchus continued through the end of the rebellion.
Immediately after his assuming office in the spring of 1859, the Gan King Hong Rengan issued a
proclamation, in which he first declared that he had taken over authority as chief of staff, then derogated
the Manchus as animals who had altered Chinese customs. Note that antagonism against the Manchus and
Taiping religious doctrines were woven together in this document: Recovering the Chinese land—the
divine land favored by God—from the Manchus was portrayed as a holy cause commissioned by God
(see Appendix A).

Further I cite two proclamations written by Hong Rengan on the death of the Xianfeng emperor;
both entitled “Proclamation on the Extermination of Demons,” but were aimed at different audiences. The
first was addressed to the average Chinese. Hong first claimed that Heaven had punished the emperor
(ibid: 860):

Heaven is resolved to exterminate the [Manchu—original translator] slaves, for it has killed Hsien-feng, who is
now buried under the yellow earth. With the people’s hearts turning to the Sovereign, it is only appropriate that
heroes and men of action should uphold the blue heaven.

Next, Hong charged that the Manchus exploited Chinese wealth, imposed perverse customs on them,
and treated them unfairly (Appendix B). The second document targeted Chinese officials and soldiers on
the Qing side. Hong asserted that China belonged to the Chinese, not to the Manchus. Yet the Manchus
invaded China and stole the throne at the end of the Ming dynasty, thereafter used Chinese officials and soldiers to their advantage. Chinese soldiers, however, were badly treated, receiving fewer rations and rewards than Manchu soldiers, being sent to the front as “death shields.” Finally the document urged Chinese soldiers to join the Taipings to “destroy all the ugly barbarians.” (Appendix C)

Mu Yibin (1994) points out that anti-Manchuism was an essential component of Taiping religious doctrines, a mix of Christianity, Confucianism, and Chinese folk religions, the core being worshipping God and getting rid of idols. Mu argues that Taiping doctrines may be divided into two phases. The early doctrines consisted of the following contents: worship God, the Heavenly Father, and expel the demons. Those who believed in God would be taken care of by God when they were alive; after death their souls would enter Heaven and enjoy forever happiness; or otherwise they would be caught by demons and suffer in hell. After the uprising broke out Hong Xiuquan incorporated political elements into the Taiping doctrines (later doctrines). The conflict between the Heavenly Kingdom, which was favored by God, and the Qing, controlled by demons, was interpreted as the conflict between God and demons. Hong claimed to be the second son of God, the younger brother of Jesus, and was entrusted with the mission to restore China. Taiping doctrines preached that those who believed in God would be glorified in this world, and would enjoy eternal happiness in the afterlife. Mu further points out that Taiping political ambitions included a strong ethnic consciousness. Hong and other leaders asserted that Manchus were demons, and Chinese were the people favored by God because China was God’s land. The “Manchu demons” had stolen “God’s land,” therefore God commissioned the Taipings to restore China.

The documents I cited above, such as the proclamation by Hong Xiuquan, denouncing Beijing, the city that had the largest Manchu population in the country, as demons’ den, and the proclamation by Hong Renguan, advocating for the extermination of the demons, buttress Mu’s theory. I maintain that anti-Manchusim was woven into Taiping religious doctrines for the purpose of taking over political power. I cite three documents issued by Yang Xiuqing and Xiao Chaogui in April 1852. In the first document, Yang and Xiao first identified themselves, asserting that they had received Heaven’s mandate to destroy the demons. Then they introduced biblical episodes and claimed that “God had sent an angel to
bring the T’ien Wang up [Hong Xiuquan] to heaven, where he was commended to destroy the demons [Manchus]; afterwards He sent the T’ien Wang into the world to rule and save the people” (Michael 1971: 143. see Appendix D). The second proclamation by Yang and Xiao claimed that China belonged to the Chinese, yet the “barbarian” Manchus, whose “first ancestor was a crossbreed of a white fox and a red dog, from whom sprang this race of demons” (ibid: 147), had stolen the Chinese empire, and thereafter had “forced us Chinese to become demons” (ibid: 145) by imposing the Manchu male hairstyle and dress on the Chinese. Therefore, the Taipings raised their “righteous army” to avenge (Appendix E). In the third proclamation, Yang and Xiao asserted that it was appropriate for the Chinese to rule the Manchus, but not vice versa (Appendix F).

**ANTI-MANCHU ACTIONS BY THE TAIPINGS**

The Taipings not only uttered their anti-Manchu attitude, but also acted out their thoughts. They practiced anti-Manchuism in two ways. First, in cities under their control, the Taipings decimated a large number of Manchus regardless of age and gender. Second, the Taipings purged Chinese culture of Manchu influence. A symbolic move was that the Taipings abolished the Manchu male hairstyle, and restored the traditional Chinese hairstyle. As stated before, the state imposed the Manchu hairstyle on Chinese men. The state regarded wearing the queue as a symbol of obedience. Hence in the eyes of the Taipings cutting the queue was symbolic of Chinese ethnic pride and defiance.

On March 8, 1853, about 80,000 Taiping troops commanded by Hong Xiuquan and Yang Xiuqing arrived at Nanjing. They took the outer city and soon besieged the Manchu City at the center of Nanjing. The Manchu soldiers and Taiping troops fought fiercely there. Manchu women and children also got on the walls surrounding the Manchu City to help with the battle. After a day’s combat, the Manchu City fell into Taiping hands. Only about 400 Manchu soldiers somehow managed to escape before the fall of the city. Manchu officers and soldiers captured were all killed by Taiping soldiers. Thousands of women and children were driven out of the Nanjing city through the Chaoyang Gate to a nearby river. There they were either burned to death or were driven into the river. Two Qing sources confirmed this (Xie 1857: 3, Zhang 1890: 11).
The Taipings carried out a campaign of genocide against Manchus in cities under Taiping control. For example, more than 30,000 Manchus lost their lives in the massacre at Nanjing. Manchus absorbed tremendous casualties in other garrisons as well. At Hangzhou, knowing they would be killed by the Taipings, a majority of the Manchus in the city, numbering 8,000 to 10,000, killed themselves when the city fell into Taiping hands. Manchus in the nearby Zhapu garrison were decimated as well (Rhoads 2000: 59).

In addition the Taipings expressed their anti-Manchu attitude by expunging Manchu influence on Chinese ethnicity. After all, what triggered the Taiping Rebellion was Manchu rule of China proper and Manchu alteration of Chinese culture. As stated above, Manchu rulers forced Chinese men to wear the queue as a sign of submission. The policy had invited Chinese resistance both overt and covert. The Taiping leaders viewed wearing the queue as a humiliation on Chinese men; therefore they banned wearing the queue in areas under their control. They requested people to undo the queue, not to shave the forehead and let the hair grow freely. For this reason the Qing officials frequently referred to the Taiping rebels as “hair rebels” (fani). The hair rebels were consistent in their attitude toward the hairstyle. After they took over Nanjing and set it as the capital of the Taiping kingdom, the rebels banned the Manchu hairstyle in the city as they did in other places. Nanjing residents who cut their hair were punished; some even received the capital punishment.

Soon after they conquered the city, the rebels summoned all of the residents of the city, and checked their hair. Those who cut their hair were locked into a compound called Gongyuan. Meanwhile, the Taiping government issued an order requesting that Men’s Houses send those who cut their hair to Gongyuan. If they failed to do so, then the men would be killed immediately if detected. More than 2,000 men were sent to Gongyuan. Then the government ordered to search the Women’s Houses. Many Nanjing women cut their hair in the front and on the back of the head, which was a local custom. Not knowing this, the rebels arrested more than 2,000 women too, and several hundred children. Fortunately shortly

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23 The Taipings requested the separation of men and women. Men lived in Men’s Houses [nanguan], and women in Women’s Houses [nüguan].
afterwards Taiping leaders realized that many of the people had cut their hair for medical reasons as well. Then they released the majority of the imprisoned people on bail, and killed over 100 people. A few days later some of the released people tried to escape from the city, but unluckily were captured by Taiping soldiers. Once again Taiping leaders issued another order requesting the bails send the released back to Gongyuan, where they were tortured. Several hundred people were killed or committed suicide (Xie 1857/1938: 8-9).

On April 3, 1855 the Taiping Imperil Commissioner Lai (personal name unknown) issued an order requesting people to give up the Manchu male hairstyle and restore the traditional Chinese hairstyle (photograph in Luo 1991: 14, translation mine):

This Commissioner has received order from the Heavenly King to command valiant troops to exterminate the barbarian slaves, and restore the Chinese way. By now I have exterminated the demons hiding in your area. I have heard that some of you, villagers and townspeople, have served as demons’ soldiers. In principle these people should be executed. However … I decide to be exceptionally lenient and pardon your crimes. I allow you to repent of your wrongs and have a fresh start…From the time this order is issued and onwards, you people do not have to panic, but should remain in peace… I hope that you people from now on will turn your hearts to the right, grow your hair and facial hair so that you will return to the original Chinese way, and will not follow the demons’ customs.

THE TAIPING DOMINO EFFECT

This section looks at the major ethnic rebellions trigged by the Taiping Rebellions between the 1850s and the 1870s. After the Taiping Rebellion broke out in the south, ethnic groups in other parts of the Qing empire soon followed suit. They were: the Nian Rebellion in north China, Muslim rebellions in the Northwest, and ethnic rebellions in the Southwest.

THE NIAN REBELLION

The Taiping Rebellion triggered a set of ethnic rebellions across the empire. Participants in these rebellions openly stated that their action was directed against other ethnic groups for political or economic reasons. The first of such rebellions was the Nian, which broke out in 1853 in north Anhui and later spread over to neighboring Jiangsu, Henan, and Shandong provinces. The Nian were originally men and women who bound together based on kinship, marriage, or geographical closeness to rob the rich and divide up booty equally among the members. Some people joined Nian groups to protect themselves
against bandits. They had long been in existence before the Taiping rebellion broke out. However, the
Taiping northern campaign (1853-1855) prompted the Nian groups to take political action against the
state. In February 1853 the leaders of 18 Nian groups met at the town Zheheji in north Anhui where they
declared rebellion (Mao 2001). They elected Zhang Lexing as head of the league, and in 1855 divided
members into five large groups, each identified by the color (red, yellow, blue, white, and black) of its
flag, which suggested White Lotus influence (Perry 1976).

Between 1857 and 1864 the Taipings and the Nian formed an alliance against the Qing. The Nian
accepted titles conferred on its leaders by the Taiping regime. When Nanjing fell in July 1864, the
remnants of the Taipings and the Nian combined and formed the new Nian Army, led by Lai Wenguang,
a former Taiping general. The new Nian army continued to fight against the Qing for four years (Guo and
Liu 1996).

The Nian carried the banner of anti-Manchuism. In his proclamation issued after the meeting at
Zhiheji, Zhang styled himself as “the head of the Great Chinese League” (*Da-Han mengzhu*), and stated
that the goal of his cause was to expel the Manchus (JDSZL 1963: 24-25, translation mine):

…Since we founded the league and started our cause at Zhihe, brothers have vowed to live and die
together. They have elected me as the head of the league, and we have united our hearts to exterminate
the Tartar demons…Our strong troops moved southward, and took the Sanheji-Zhengyangguan-
Luanzhou area. Thereby our army became more powerful, and the demons fled away upon hearing the
news…

Like the Taipings, the Nian wore long hair as well, and the male hairstyle was a serious issue for
them. In another proclamation addressed to the people in east Henan province, dated the twelfth year of
the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (1862), Zhang and other Nian leaders declared that the Nian Army had
taken the county Xincai, and was besieging Yingzhou. They were awaiting the arrival of the troops
commanded by the Ying King (Chen Yucheng, a Taiping leader) to attack Yanjing (e.g. Beijing) via
Bianliang (e.g. Kaifeng, the capital of Henan province). Finally they urged the people to grow their hair
and join their cause (ibid: 26).
**MUSLIM REBELLIONS IN THE NORTHWEST**

The Taiping and the Nian rebellions triggered a set of Muslim rebellions in the Northwest as the former rebellions spread to other parts of the empire and disrupted local sociopolitical order. As two Qing contemporaries observed, in March 1862 the joint forces of the Taiping and the Nian entered Shaanxí province. In May troops commanded by the Manchu governor Yingjie fought with the Taiping and the Nian, but were defeated by the rebels. The rebels took the counties of Weinan and Huazhou. As the political order of the province broke down, the Hui, an ethnic group believing in Islam, rose up. Soon afterwards Hui people in neighboring Gansu province followed suit. The Hui rebellion in the two Northwestern provinces resulted from long-term Hui-Chinese antagonism (Yang 1887, Zeng 1893).

Soon Muslims in Xinjiang, including Uyghurs and other ethnic groups responded by making the same move. The rebellion led by Tuoming (transliteration from Chinese) lasted for three years in Urumqi and other areas in north Xinjiang; the rebellion led by Anjiyan lasted for four years in the region south of the Tianshan Mountains (Zeng 1893). In 1867 Yacob Beg established an independent regime in Xinjiang backed up by Russia. In 1870 Russia invaded and occupied Yili. The Muslim rebellions in the Northwest were finally brought to an end in 1873 by Zuo Zongtang (Zhou 2000).

**ETHNIC REBELLIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST**

In the southwest various ethnic groups rose up too. In 1853 the Yi in Yunnan province, led by Li Wenxue, rebelled. The rebellion lasted until 1876 (Liu 1963). In 1855 the Hui under the leadership of Du Wenxiu followed suit. The Hui rebellion was quelled in 1873.

Evidence suggests that the Yi and the Hui rebellions were organized along ethnic lines. Participants in the Yi rebellion styled themselves the “Yi Army” (Yijun). They were predominantly Yi peasants. In contrast, participants of the Hui rebellion were overwhelmingly Hui peasants and landlords (Liu 1963).

The Hui rebellion resulted from Hui-Chinese antagonism. In Baoshan County, Yunnan province, Chinese and Hui held long-term animosity toward each other as a consequence of frequent group violence against each other triggered by, according to one Chinese source (Li 1931), Hui disrespectful remarks and behavior towards Chinese religious practices and customs. At the time eight Chinese gangs existed in
Baoshan. In 1843 fierce ethnic fights broke out and subsequently ethnic hatred flamed. The gangsters thereby decided to exterminate the Hui. In 1845 a Chinese man named Shen Ying was elected by the gangsters as the head of the eight gangs for the purpose of killing the Hui. Shen signed an agreement with county and prefecture civil and military officials, which first stated that all of the Chinese residents of Yongchang (the prefecture where Baoshan County was located) had petitioned Shen to command the local semi-official militia to exterminate the Hui living in Yongchang, and further stipulated that the local officials would take full responsibility afterwards if higher authorities investigated the case. Shen then selected 3,000 men from the militia. On the night of October 2, 1845, Shen and his men climbed over the walls of the town of Baoshan. Chinese residents had ignited incense sticks and hung them on their doors beforehand in the name of worshipping the Door God. The militiamen broke into houses whose doors had no burning incense sticks and killed people in the houses regardless of sex and age. In total more than 8,000 Hui were slaughtered that night (Li 1931).

A second wave of genocide took place in 1847, and more Hui people were killed than in the first massacre. A civil service examination at the county level was held in that year. Hui students who traveled to the county town to take the examination were all killed. After the first massacre in 1845, Du Wenxiu and other Hui leaders traveled to Beijing to lodge complaints to the state. Afterwards the Yunnan-Guizhou governor-general Lin Zexu was sent to the locality to settle the case. When Lin was on his way the second wave of genocide broke out. Lin executed more than 200 Chinese men, and exiled another 200 to 300 men. In addition Lin ordered that Hui people who fortunately survived the genocide to sell their properties at prices much lower than their fair values to Chinese residents, then move to a far away and less developed mountainous area. Because of the obvious discriminative rule against the Hui, Chinese in other areas of Yunnan followed the example of Baoshan, and killed thousands of Hui people in the province, and more Hui people became homeless. Against such a backdrop Du Wenxiu stood up for the Hui (ibid). Another source (Zhou 1917), although addressing the incident from the anti-Hui Chinese perspective, confirmed the basic theme of the story: long-term Hui-Chinese animosity since the Jiaqing reign (1796-1821) trigged the Hui rebellion led by Du Wenxiu.
The province of Yunnan was in a sense a miniature of the Qing empire. When different ethnic groups lived together they competed for political and economic resources. To say ethnic conflict took place on political and economic dimensions is not to diminish the significance of ethnicity. The belief held by a group of people that they shared common descent and culture bound them together in their competence for social and natural resources with other groups. The Hui people regardless of their economic status joined the Hui Army, which was against the Chinese. The Yi people joined the Yi rebellion. The Chinese in Yunnan, being a minority, took the Yi’s side. In fact, the Hui rebellion resorted to assistance from Muslims outside the region. Evidence suggests that they communicated with Hui in the Northwest, and more interestingly Du Wenxiu’s son even went to Turkey to seek help (Hsu 2000).

To sum up, between the 1850s and 1870s, various ethnic groups rose up against those who were above them in the ethnic hierarchy. Chinese stood up against the Manchus, while the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Hui in the Southwest opposed the Chinese.

**SOCIOECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNIC REBELLIONS**

The drawn-out civil wars between the 1850s and 1870s devastated the Qing empire. Millions of lives were lost in war, famine, and epidemic brought about by war. War also destroyed cities and towns in Jiangnan, the Lower Yangtze. Direct economic loss was huge, and indirect loss resulting from suspension of economic activities caused by war was beyond estimation. The wars that lasted for more than two decades not only severely damaged the Qing economy and society, but drained the state of its finances, ruined the political and military power of the state, and caused serious problems for the government later when it needed to finance China’s industrialization, which will be discussed in the next chapter. This section focuses on the Taiping rebellion for two reasons. First it was the most important among the ethnic rebellion between the 1850s and 1870s. The second reason was the paucity of information on other rebellions, but I will touch on them if possible.

**SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE TAIPING REBELLION**

The most important social consequence of the Taiping rebellion was unquestionably the loss of lives. Based on official registers of households and census, some researchers estimate that 100-160 million
people died in the prolonged civil war, equal to 25-40% of the entire population in the empire (Zhou 2003). These figures included the lives the war claimed directly, and those who died from starvation caused by famine and epidemics caused by the war. Take the example of epidemics, in war-stricken Jiangnan, the lower Yangtze valley region, including south Anhui, south Jiangsu, and north Zhejiang provinces, destruction of property and people, pollution of the environment, and the flow of troops and refugees caused and spread various diseases, including cholera, malaria, and smallpox. The epidemic broke out in 1860, reached its peak in 1862, and subsided in 1864 with the end of the war, after having claimed several million lives (Yu 2002).

**ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE TAIPING REBELLION**

In the economic realm the war devastated Jiangnan, the economic center of China. Farmland was left to waste as owners died or fled away. Handicraft industry and commerce suffered unprecedented damage. Direct economic loss was huge. Moreover, Qing finance deteriorated due to war expenditure. Government spending on the Taiping rebellion and other rebellions was astronomical.

**Table 6.1 Qing Military Expenses on Quelling Down Ethnic Rebellions:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebellion</th>
<th>Amount (in taels)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Taiping Rebellion</td>
<td>291,690,000</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nian Rebellion</td>
<td>115,250,000</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Rebellions in the Northwest</td>
<td>118,887,653</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Rebellions in the Southwest</td>
<td>78,736,500</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Rebellions on the South</td>
<td>22,336,935</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>626,901,088</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The total of the war expenses was equal to 8-10 years government revenue during the 1870s and 1880s after the state recovered from civil wars. As the Taiping Rebellion disrupted Jiangnan sociopolitical system, the state could not collect taxes effectively between the early 1850s and the middle of the 1860s. State revenue continued to decline and military spending kept soaring year by year, resulting in low silver reserve. In November 1850, the eve of the war, state silver reserve reached the lowest point since the Opium War at 1.87 million taels (Zhou 2000: 144). Between 1853 (two years after the war broke
out) and 1864 (the year when the war ended), state silver reserve oscillated between 50,000 and 130,000 taels, remaining steady between 50,000 and 70,000 in the last five years (1860-1864) of the stated period:

Table 6.2 Qing Silver Reserve during the Period of the Taiping Rebellion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount in Taels</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount in Taels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>118,709</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>74,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>126,406</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>69,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>114,238</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>68,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>91,951</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>52,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>105,230</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>56,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>50,432</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>66,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ibid: 147

That is to say, state finance was on the verge of collapse. To break through the financial constraints, the government levied a new tax on trading in 1853, the so-called lijin, equal to 1% of the value of goods. In addition the government requested the rich to donate money. Moreover, beginning in 1853 the government minted the so-called “big coins” (daqian) whose values were determined to be equal to 10, 50, 100, 500, or 1,000 standard copper coins. Issuing these “big coins” was a reckless measure to deal with the financial crisis. The “big coin” had much more face value than its actual minting cost. For example, in 1852, the government stipulated that the standard coin was to be made from alloy of copper and lead, weighing one qian (three grams). When the “big coins” were minted the very next year, a “big coin” equal to 10 standard coins weighed only 4.4 qian, that is, 4.4 standard coins; a big coin equal to 100 standard coins weighed only about 14 qian, or 14 standard coins; and a big coin equal to 1,000 standard coins weighed only about 20 qian, or 20 standard coins (Zhou 2000: 177). In short, the greater the face value of the big coin, the more the state saved. In a similar vein, the government made coins from cheaper metals such as iron and tin.

Poor quality coins brought about serious socioeconomic outcomes. First, the big coins drove the original standard coins out of the market at first, but later people began to reject the big coins. The government had to stop minting the big coins soon. Second, the big coins caused a chaos in silver-coin exchange rates, with the value of coins depreciating dramatically against silver in the 1850s and early
1860s. Third, poor quality currency in general caused high inflation, decrease in the standard of living, and declination of commerce (ibid: 185-188).

The war had a profound impact on other financial matters. In 1857 the Xianfeng emperor acquiesced to the proposal to levy tax on opium, thus making opium trading legal. The war threw the salt issue (yanzheng)\(^{24}\) and the Grand Canal transit system in disorder. Perhaps the worst change in the financial field was that the central government had to delegate authority over financial issues to provincial officials. As financial leadership was an important aspect of state power, I discuss this question in the next section along with military leadership and political leadership.

**IMPACT OF ETHNIC REBELLIONS ON THE STATE**

Ethnic rebellions significantly undermined Qing state power, which included three important aspects: authority over financial matters, military leadership, and the government’s capacity to select and appoint officials. This section focuses on the Taiping Rebellion to illustrate how ethnic rebellions dealt a heavy blow on each of the three aspects. First the rebellion drained the state of its finances and altered its financial system in such a way that to a large extent the state lost its control over financial issues of the empire. Simultaneously provincial leaders gained much power in dealing with financial matters not only directly related to their regions of jurisdiction but affecting the empire as a whole. The loss of financial leadership undercut the authority of the state on other issues.

Second, the Taiping Rebellion destroyed the military forces of the empire, forcing the state to allow Chinese officials to organize their personal armed forces to fight the rebels. As the state was unable to finance the armies, the officials had to manage to collect funds to pay the soldiers through personal channels, which, together with personal channels of recruitment, led to the privatization of the armies founded in the wake of the Taiping Rebellion and the Nian Rebellion. Yet the loss of financial and

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\(^{24}\) The salt issue was important both economically and politically. Salt was an important consumer good in imperial China. In a sense it was like gasoline in modern times. The refinement and distribution of salt were controlled by the state. The purpose of state control was twofold: to ensure the quality of salt and to levy tax. Salt tax was a substantial source of state revenue, second only to land tax. Hence the salt issue was viewed as an important political issue, as evident in the way the government called it: “salt politics,” or yanzheng.
military leadership undercut the political capacity of the state to select and appoint officials at the provincial level, causing serious problems in the long run.

**IMPACT ON QING FINANCIAL SYSTEM**

Drastic changes occurred in Qing financial system after the Taiping Rebellion. The essential part of Qing financial system was cash flow, which included money that the provinces submitted to the central government, and money flowing between the provinces. In both cases, the flow of money was directed by the central government before the Taiping Rebellion. To ensure its control over finance, the state prescribed that local governments should submit reports of accounts of revenue and expenditure at the end of every fiscal year (the traditional Chinese year). Counties and prefectures first reported to the province their finances classified into four categories: funds left over from the last fiscal year, income of the current year, expenses of the current year, and, finally, existing funds. Provincial financial officials (buzhengshisi) then submitted the reports, after auditing, to the Ministry of Household, which was in charge of state finance. Reports from the provinces were subject to the Ministry’s auditing and approval (Zhou 2000: 26-27).

Ethnic rebellions undermined Qing financial power as the state had to transfer financial leadership to provincial governors due to the lack of money. The shift of financial power included four aspects. First, provincial governors could raise funds in their jurisdiction by levying new taxes and increasing existing taxes beyond the control of the Ministry of Household in the name of supplementing military expenses. The state lost its grasp on money raised this way as the court could not set the amount of fund for provincial governors to raise, nor could the court audit how the money was used. Second, provincial governors could appropriate money and grain that should have been submitted to the state. Governors frequently siphoned off funds that were transported through their jurisdiction again in the name of military needs. Third, military commanders could collect money and grains in localities where their troops were stationed, which breached the rule of the separation of military power and financial power, giving rise to powerful regional leaders. Fourth, the reporting-approval system between provinces and the Ministry of Household as stated above, which was strictly observed before, was loosened. In sum, the
Tiping rebellion changed Qing financial operating system dramatically and forever (Zhou 2000: 222-228).

**IMPACT ON QING MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES**

The Taiping Rebellion changed the relations between the military and the state. Before the rebellion the military were under the control of the state. Yet the Hunan Army organized by Zeng Guofan to fight against the rebellion, and later armed forces modeled on it were privatized as the property of the military commanders. Therefore they were out of the control of the state. The privatization of armed forces and the loss of financial leadership, which has been address in the above section, eventually led to the loss of political leadership to a large extent. The changes in financial, military, and political domains after the Taiping Rebellion severely undercut the power of the state, making the state unable to lead China’s industrialization in the decades to come.

Military leadership was an important aspect of state power both on its own terms and in light of its influence on political power. Therefore my discussion will concentrate on the changes in the structures of the armed forces and military-state relations after the rebellion. Two armed forces existed before the rebellion: Eight Banner Troops and the Chinese Green Standard. Both were owned and controlled by the state. I discuss the banner troops first. The banner troops were under the direct control of the state. The Upper Three Banners (shangsanqi), namely Bordered Yellow, Plain Yellow, and Plain White, were under the direct control of the emperor from an early date. The rest of the Lower Five Banners were originally commanded by Manchu princes, but came under the emperors’ direct command in the Yongzheng reign (1722-1735) (Rhoads 2000: 19).

As for the Green Standard, the state kept in check the armed forces stationed in the provinces through civil officials. First, the soldiers were selected from households that were registered as “military” with the state. The registers were kept by the Ministry of Warfare. Those who were conscripted into the army were registered with the Ministry as well. Further, military officials were selected by the Ministry too. In the provinces the top military ranks of *tidu* and *zongbing* were put in charge of military affairs, but military orders were issued by civil officials, e.g. the governor or governor-general (Luo 1984).
The Hunan Army created in 1853, two years after the Taiping rebellion broke out, adopted a totally new structure. Soldiers and officers were recruited by individuals through personal network, not by the state. In the Army officers at each level personally recruited subordinates at the next lower level, with the marshal recruiting generals and the lowest officers called shizhang (lieutenants) each recruiting 10 soldiers. In the recruiting process, officers used their personal networks, e.g. fellow villagers and townspeople, school friends, and relatives, to get new members. Consequently, the vast majority of the Army’s officers and virtually all soldiers were from Hunan province, Zeng’s home province, resulting in tight interpersonal relations and loyalty to one’s direct superior. This was the major reason why the Hunan Army was deemed the property of Zeng (Luo 1984: 212).

The second reason for the privatization of the Hunan Army was the fact that the soldiers’ pay depended on funds raised by the marshal Zeng through personal channels, for the state had no funds for the Army. The marshal allocated money to the generals, who each in turn allocated his portion to his subordinates, and so on. Here, to make a contrast, it is necessary to describe how the Green Standard paid soldiers. When the Green Standard applied for soldier’s pay, the biao and the ying (military units) submitted payrolls to the provincial financial official (buzhengshisi) on the one hand, and informed the governor or governor-general on the other hand. Finally the money was to be granted by the Ministry of Household. At the time to give out soldiers’ pay, both civil and military officials had to be at the scene, with military officials handling the money and civil officials making record. Due to the difference in the two systems, in the eyes of soldiers in the Hunan Army, their pay came from their superiors, not from the emperor via the Ministry of Household, as the saying “eating the emperor’s rice” said it all. From the officer’s perspective, his subordinates were his men as he recruited and fed them (ibid: 212).

The Hunan Army was disbanded in 1864 shortly after the fall of the Taiping capital Nanjing, but the organizational style of the Hunan Army had profound influence on the Qing military. It replaced the Green Standard as the dominant military structure in the empire. Moreover, the Huai Army set up jointly by Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang in early 1862 was modeled on the Hunan Army. The Huai Army, led by Li, a former subordinate of Zeng, copied the rules and structure of the Hunan Army. As the Huai Army
remained dominant in the armed forces of the empire up until the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, in a sense the influence of the Hunan Army lasted until that time, or even later (ibid).

As the Green Standard proved to be useless in the Taiping rebellion, many provinces began to create their own armed forces, called “the Defenders” (fangjun), again modeled on the Hunan Army. The Huai Army was indeed the most well known one among them. In addition to the Defenders, some provinces set up yet another type of army, called “the trained” (lianjun). The first army of its kind was created by Liu Changyou, governor-general of Zhili (today’s Hebei) province, and a former subordinate of Zeng Guofan in the Hunan Army. In 1869 Zeng was appointed as governor-general of Zhili province. He further reformed the “trained” in Zhili in accordance with the structure of the Hunan army. Afterwards other provinces set up their “trained” on the Zhili model.

A difference existed between the “defenders” and the “trained.” The former was recruited from civilians, whereas the latter was selected from the existing Green Standard25, but otherwise both the “defenders” and the “trained” were modeled on the Hunan Army in terms of structure, rules, and channels to raise funds for soldiers’ pay (Luo 1984: 206-207). After Li Hongzhang’s death, Yuan Shikai created the North Coastal Army (Beiyangjun) from the remnants of the Haui Army. The Huai Army, the Defenders, the Trained, and the North Coastal Army all inherited not only the structure of the Hunan Army, but also the legacy of the privatization of troops (ibid: 216).

As the generals of the Hunan Army ascended to governors and governor-generals, they assumed both military and civil power. They further monopolized provincial administrative power by delegating the administrative officials in the provinces, buzhenghisi, who were responsible to the Ministry of Personnel and the Ministry of Household, and anchashisi, who were responsible to the Ministry of Legal Affairs, both previously independent from the governor and governor-general, to their subordinates (ibid: 219).

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25 After its strong men were picked out, no new members were added to the Green Standard; thus the army was gradually reduced to an army in name only.
To sum up, the Taiping rebellion disrupted Qing financial, military, and personnel systems, reduced the authority of the central government to a much lower level, and subsequently gave rise to the powerful regional leaders. Unfortunately the decentralization of state power occurred at a critical time when China needed to transfer itself into a modern state.

CONCLUSION

The Manchu question triggered Chinese resistance from the beginning of the Qing onwards. Between the 1850s and 1870s a series of large-scale ethnic rebellions broke out. Among them the most influential one was the Taiping Rebellion organized by Hong Xiuquan against Manchu rule of China proper. The rebellions not only severely damaged the economy and society, but also badly hit the government in military, financial, and political terms. To a large extent the state lost its authority to raise funds from and distribute financial resources among the provinces, to command the armed forces organized after the rebellions, and to select and appoint officials at the provincial level. Political power was taken over by the provincial strongmen, e.g. the governors-general. Therefore it is safe to say that state power of the Qing declined significantly after the middle of the 1860s. The decline of state power in turn undercut the state’s ability to lead Qing China’s economic transformation in the years to come as discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter VII: THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF CHINA BETWEEN 1865 AND 1895:
COMPARISON WITH CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

The previous chapter argues that ethnic rebellions between the 1850s and 1870s significantly weakened Qing state power. This chapter then demonstrates that the state was unable to efficiently lead China’s industrialization in the three decades between 1865 and 1895, resulting in two problems. One was limited governmental investment in modern projects and the other was insufficient governmental leadership. Moreover, Qing spending on the Manchu stipend constituted a large proportion of Qing finances between 1865 and 1895. As a result, the government was left with limited financial resources to invest in modern industry.

The three decades between 1865 and 1895 were the golden period for China’s modernization. The Self-Strengthening Movement started in 1865 in the economic field when the first large modern factory, Jiangnan Manufacturing Bureau, was established, and continued until 1895 when China was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War. The War caused a serious setback to the modernization of China. A direct effect of the war was that the Self-Strengthening Movement came to an abrupt end. The unexpected end of the Self-Strengthening Movement weakened the material foundation on which China could further develop. Construction of large modern projects had to be stopped due to serious financial constraints after the war (Yu Dahua 1994).

Military, political, and economic factors caused China’s defeat. From a military perspective Zhang Yiwen (1994) has identified six specific reasons for the defeat, the two major ones being the government’s mistakes in its strategy for developing national defense, and the old-fashioned structure of the Qing defense system. Strategic mistakes involved the government’s problematic decisions regarding the development of the navy, and the problem of Qing military structure manifested in five aspects. Among them were the lack of a full-fledged central commanding organization, the absence of a standing army, and the lack of military operating logistics. Zhang further concludes that the problems in the Qing military suggested that the ultimate reason for the defeat was political. The Self-Strengthening Movement did not touch on the Qing political system; hence the old-fashioned military structure was left intact.
Furthermore, the defeat indicated the disparity in the economic development of Japan and China. The Qing lacked a strong economic base to sustain the combating capacity of its navy and army. Despite the facts that the Qing navy might be comparable to the Japanese navy in terms of total tonnage of warships and number of cannons and that the Qing army outnumbered the Japanese army, the Qing was unable to transport soldiers to the battlefields in an efficient way due to lack of a modern transit system on the basis of railway and steamboat, which the Japanese enjoyed. Consequently Japanese troops outnumbered Qing troops in the several major battlefields (Yu Mingxia 1994, Zhang 1994).

If it is true that the result of the Sino-Japanese War to some extent reflected the economic disparity between China and Japan as of 1895, then the next question is to explore what caused China’s tardy economic development. My explanation is that state policies to a large extent determined the outcomes of China’s and Japan’s economic development. Here I focus on the two governments’ policies and actions to facilitate modernization rather than their attitudes toward modernization. In the late 1860s the governments of China and Japan intended to defend their countries against Western invasion by building a strong economy and army. While in China the goal was called *ziqiang* (self-strengthening), in Japan it was called *fukoku kyohei* (enrich the country and strengthen its military). Although the words were different, the goals in essence were very similar (Yoda 1996: 5). In this sense the Chinese government’s attitude toward modernization was similar to that of the Japanese government. Attitude is a feeling or opinion about something or someone. In the current discussion it means that both the Chinese and Japanese governments wanted to modernize their countries. However their actions were different. Action here refers to what the governments actually did. For example, they could make specific policies and take concrete actions to assist modern industries and enterprises. The Chinese government’s actions were quite different from that of the Japanese government. First of all, the range of the Chinese government’s action was rather limited. It was confined to the economic and technological fields, whereas the Japanese government introduced legal and political institutions from the West in addition to science and technology (ibid). Moreover, as we will see in this chapter, the Chinese government’s actions were insufficient even
within the economic field as compared to those of the Japanese government. The difference between the two governments’ actions resulted in the different outcomes of the modernization of the two countries.

To establish the point, I first discuss two popular explanations. The first is that China’s foundations of modernization were different from Japan’s: Qing China was behind Tokugawa Japan in terms of the level of economic development (Collins 1997, Sanderson 1999). Contrary to the popular wisdom I demonstrate that China and Japan were at similar levels of economic development prior to the 1860s. In addition, I take issue with another conventional explanation that China’s tardy development and Japan’s rapid development in the late nineteenth century were due to the two countries’ different positions in the world system (Moulder 1977). I argue that domestic factors were more important than external influence for China’s development.

After having evaluated the two popular explanations, I present statistics on the economic development of China and Japan and exemplify that Japanese government’s policies were much more conducive to economic development than those of the Chinese government. Lastly I argue that the Manchu question ultimately affected China’s modernization. The Chinese government’s failure to reform the Manchu question impeded China’s modernization, whereas the Japanese government’s abolition of the samurai class fostered Japan’s modernization. The Chinese government did not attempt to reform the Manchu question because it was a tricky problem: the two basic aspects of the question, Manchu supremacy and Manchu rule, were inextricably intertwined, thus whichever aspect the government touched on would affect the state itself.

FOUNDATIONS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

It is still a debatable question whether China was behind Japan prior to the 1860s when modernization began. I side with researchers who argue that China and Japan were at the same level of economic development. Moulder (1977: 25-44) has pointed out four points of similarity between Qing China and Tokugawa Japan. Above all both China and Japan were fundamentally agrarian. He points out that 80 to 85 percent of the population in both countries were peasants working directly in agriculture production. Secondly, in terms of mode of production, peasants in both countries produced largely the
same things and by largely the same methods. Agricultural products included grain, lesser food crops, and a variety of crops for handicraft industry, such as silkworm eggs and cocoons, cotton, and tea. In both countries agricultural technology was pre-industrial, relying on draft animals and human beings to provide the energy for planting, harvesting, and transporting crops. More specifically, similar kinds of techniques prevailed in both countries, such as intensive rice cultivation based on the construction of irrigation, drainage, and flood-control works; multiple cropping, seed selection, and the use of commercial fertilizers. Also, farm implements were similar, such as hoes, water pumps, and plows.

Thirdly, handicraft industries were similar in China and Japan. In both countries the textile industry, i.e. cotton and silk, was the most important industry. Other industries included tea processing, oil pressing, grain milling, pottery, rice wine production, paper, and ink, all relying on human power, instead of mechanical implements powered by fuel.

Fourthly, commercialization developed to similar extents with growing agricultural productivity, increasing population, and improvements in transportation. The areas participating in commerce increased, but the degree of commercialization within each of these areas remained low. In other words, in both countries a relatively large number of areas began to produce and exchange goods with other areas, but most people in each area remained self-sufficient in the production of the vast majority of necessary articles of livelihood. A national market, an institution that determined the prices of goods through the interaction of supply and demand on a nationwide scale, did not exist in either country.

Moreover, John Lee (1999) supports Moulder’s view on the level of economic development of Qing China and Tokugawa Japan. Lee argues that China and Japan witnessed parallel development in the economic field. As a result, the two countries were comparable on key factors such as commercialized agriculture, proto-industrialization, urban development, and rationalization of production and resources. Lee (1999: 18-19) writes:

Both had highly commercialized agriculture and expanding handicraft production; both had accumulated substantial growth in monetization and urbanism; both relied, in farming as well as in manufacturing, primarily upon human labor; and both had developed, within the confines of their own conditions, rational and sensible ways to manage resources.
According to Lee the most noticeable difference between the two countries was that the Qing economy was a nearly free economy whereas the Tokugawa economy was greatly influenced by what he calls “big players,” namely the bakufu, the domains, and the great merchant houses. If Moulder and Lee are correct, it may be concluded that both China and Japan were at the stage of proto-capitalism, which was important to the rise of capitalism. If any difference existed between the two countries, then it might be negligible in the analysis of the relationship between the rise of modern capitalism and preexisting economic foundations, given the significant structural difference between proto-capitalism and capitalism.

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: RELATIONS WITH THE WEST BY 1895

China’s relations with the West were a complicated issue involving multifarious factors. The essence of the question in the context of China’s modernization is whether external influence was more important than domestic factors for China’s modernization in the second half of the nineteenth century. World-system theorists like Frances Moulder (1977) emphasize the significance of Western impact on China. According to her, the different outcomes of China and Japan’s modernization were due to the two countries’ different positions in the world-system. Moulder looks at four variables in her comparison of the incorporation of China and Japan into the world system: trade, investment, political incorporation, and missionary penetration. She argues that Western powers were more interested in China than in Japan and consequently “Japan remained relatively autonomous within the world system whereas China was incorporated as a dependent satellite” (ibid: 199).

On the other side of the debate are researchers who emphasize the importance of domestic factors in economic development such as government policies. For example, Sugiyama (1988: 26) charges that Moulder has misunderstood some basic facts about China’s and Japan’s economic ties with the West in the late nineteenth century. Contrary to Moulder’s claim that Japan’s economic incorporation into the world system was less than China’s since trade between Japan and Western nations “was smaller and was not of a staple nature, and there were fewer foreign investments” (Moulder 1977: 200), Sugiyama demonstrates that the volume of trade between Japan and Western countries exceeded that between China
and the West. Sugiyama further argues that Japan’s export trade and overseas competition assisted by the government accounted for Japan’s rapid economic development during the aforementioned period.

In this debate I side with researchers who stress the significance of domestic factors. Furthermore I intend to add new thoughts to their views. I argue China’s international environment was similar to Japan’s during the mid- to late nineteenth century. International environment here is defined as the basic pattern of relations between China (or Japan) and the West, which was established by treaties between the governments of China (or Japan) and Western nations. The legal documents were aimed at establishing permanent, stable, albeit unequal, relations between China (or Japan) and Western powers.

In the early 1840s China signed a series of unequal treaties with Britain, US, and France following the Opium War. The major components included (Hsu 2000: 190-193):

1. The opening of ports to trade on China’s east coast. The cession of Hong Kong to Britain.
2. A fixed tariff: 5% of value on most commodities.
3. Extraterritoriality/consular jurisdiction: citizens of the above countries who were suspected of having committed crimes in China should be tried by the representatives of their governments.
4. Unilateral most-favored-nation status granted to the powers. The above countries would automatically gain any and all privileges that China would give other nations.

The 1858 Tianjin Treaties with Britain, France, Russia, and US permitted diplomats from these countries to resident in China permanently. In addition, 10 port cities were opened to foreigners, and foreigners were allowed to travel in China. The opening of Japan came a decade after the Opium War (1840-1842) and the treaties between Japan and Western powers were signed on the Chinese model. In May 1853, Commodore Matthew Perry summoned four warships in Shanghai and led the fleet to Japan, turning up off the shore at Edo in July demanding the bakufu to open Japan. In February 1854, Perry’s naval force again appeared off the coast and intimidated the bakufu into signing the Treaty of Kanagawa, which stipulated the opening of the two ports Shimoda and Hakodate, providing fuel, water, and food for American vessel, and also the most-favored-nation status and the diplomatic residence. At the time Britain also saw a good opportunity to take advantage of Japan. In October 1854 the Anglo-Japanese
Agreement was imposed on Japan that stipulated the opening of Nagasaki and Hakodate. In February 1855 Russia came along and forced the Russo-Japanese Treaty on Japan that determined the ocean border between the two countries, and the opening of Hakodate, Shimoda, and Nagasaki. Following these precedents the Dutch forced Japan to sign the Dutch-Japanese Treaty in January 1856.

After having secured the initial treaty, the US expanded its privileges in Japan. In January 1858 Townsend Harris, the American Counsel-general at Shimoda, presented a treaty draft to the bakufu, which requested free trade, diplomatic residence, opening of ports for trade, consular jurisdiction, and a 5% tariff on Japan’s exports (but varying rates on America’s exports to Japan). Japanese authorities were reluctant to sign the treaty. At the time a report came in that the Anglo-Franco warship fleet would be sent to Japan to impose treaties on the country after they had defeated China. Harris convinced the bakufu that it would be in Japan’s interests to sign the treaty immediately before the British and Frenchmen appeared in Japan. On July 20, 1858, the bakufu signed the treaty under pressure. Meanwhile Lord Elgin, who had been sent to China by British government to secure the Treaty of Tianjin, arrived in Japan after he had succeeded in China. On August 26, the Britain-Japanese Trade Treaty was signed (Nakamura 1967). In a nutshell, China’s and Japan’s treaties with Western powers contained similar contents: a fixed 5% tax on both countries’ exports to the west, bilateral most-favored-nation status, and extraterritoriality.

The major difference between China and Japan was that China underwent three wars with Western powers whereas Japan eluded large-scale conflicts with Western imperialism. The wars were: the Opium War (1840-1842), the Arrow War (1857-1858), and the Sino-French War (1883-1885). These military conflicts worsened Qing political and financial situation to some degree. In this sense Japan had an advantage over China, yet it is problematic to attribute China’s tardy industrialization as compared to Japan’s solely to Western impact.

The impact of the wars with Western powers was rather limited in comparison with civil wars between the 1850s and the 1870s in terms of duration of war, areas affected by war, and the Chinese

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26 Two conflicts occurred between Japan and Western powers. In August 1863 British warships bombarded Kagoshima in the domain of Satsuma. In September 1864 British, French, US, and Dutch warships bombarded Shimonoseki in the domain of Choshu.
government’s war expenditure. First of all the aforementioned wars with Western powers were fairly short-lived. None of them lasted for more than three years. In contrast both the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) and the Nian Rebellion (1853-1868) continued for more than a decade. Next the civil wars affected more areas than the external wars. The Opium War took place at several ports on the south coast, the Arrow War involved only few skirmishes in the cities of Guangzhou and Dagu (Hsu 2000: 205-219), and the Sino-French War broke out in Vietnam. None of them directly affected the vast inland areas and the majority of ordinary Chinese. The Taiping and Nian Rebellions affected almost all of the provinces and mobilized millions of ordinary people.

Lastly the Chinese government spent much more on the civil wars than on the external wars. War expenditure may be viewed as a numerical indicator of the ferocity of a war and the damaging effect of the war on society. The government spent 14.7 million taels of silver on the Opium War and eight million on the Arrow War respectively (Zhou 2000: 79, 244). The Sino-French War cost the government approximately 30-35 million taels (ibid: 275). Together the three external wars cost the government 50-60 million taels. In contrast the civil wars cost the government more than 600 million taels (ibid: 153). In other words, the government’s expenditure on the three wars with Western powers was less than 10% of the expenditure on civil wars. Hence it may be inferred that civil wars had much more negative influence on China than external wars.

MODERN DEVELOPMENT: 1865-1895

China’s industrialization was slow between the 1860s and the 1890s compared to Japan’s. To illustrate the point I describe the development of key industries in both countries. The selection of industries here is inevitably subject to some subjective criteria. In order to be selected, an industry first must be representative of the technological progress of the nineteenth century, since my basic concern here is “development.” Second an industry must be critical to the economic development of both countries. Stated in another way, this industry must have exerted considerable influence on the development of other modern industries. Finally an industry must have existed in both China and Japan for the sake of comparison. Based on these three criteria I have selected the following industries: marine
transport, communications, railway, and the cotton textile industry. In general they were high-tech industries under nineteenth-century circumstances. Moreover, transportation (marine transport and railway) and communications systems were key components of a country’s infrastructure, and were important for industrial development (Rostow 1971). Finally the cotton textile industry was the most important sector in a number of countries in the nineteenth century in terms of its contribution to industrialization. In both Britain and Japan the cotton textile industry served as the engine of their industrialization (Takamura 1994). In China the cotton textile industry was one of the few industries that employed modern technology and facilities to produce. It employed a relatively large number of workers and affected the livelihood of ordinary Chinese.

As of 1895, China was behind Japan in all of the four areas. First Japan’s sea transportation industry was far ahead of China’s in terms of the scale of the industry. Japan had more steamships than China and probably Japan’s steamboats in general were more advanced than China’s since Japanese companies provided long-distance services to ports in China, Korea, and Russia, whereas the only sea transport company in China restricted its services to inland waterways and coastal ports. Furthermore, judging from the fact that Japanese companies opened international lines whereas the Chinese company limited its services to the domestic market, it is safe to say that overall Japan’s maritime transportation was ahead of China’s in terms of technology, facilities, and management. Thus it is not surprising that the Japanese were able to transport military personnel and supplies to Korea and China efficiently in the Sino-Japanese War, where the Chinese were defeated at home.

Second, as of railway construction China was behind Japan as well. By 1895 a total length of more than 2,000 miles was built in Japan. In contrast, the total length of railways in China was approximately 200 miles. Third, modern communications systems developed in Japan much faster than in China by 1895. Modern communications consisted of two parts, telegraph and post services. In both areas China was behind Japan. Japan established a nationwide post system in the early 1880s, whereas in China the post service was absent until 1895. As of telegraph Japan was ahead of China as well. By the middle of the 1880s a national network was built in Japan whereas in China telegraph lines were built in a piecemeal
fashion. Fourth, Japan’s cotton textile industry was more advanced than China’s in terms of the number of factories, the number of spindles, and the quantity of production.

**SEA TRANSPORT**

Modern sea transportation industry was important because it linked military industries with civil industries and could promote the development of the latter. In China the first maritime transportation company was Shanghai Steamboat Company (*Lunchuan zhaoshangju*) established by Li Hongzhang in 1872. The company absorbed 1.928 million taels of silver from governmental funding, and 0.73 million taels from private investors. It possessed 30 steamships and became the largest civil enterprise (Liang 1992). Another source says that the company initially had four steamboats with the total tonnage of 2319 tons, and 0.599 million taels in total capital. However, it developed quickly. In 1883 its total number of ships reached 26, its total tonnage reached 33,370 tons, and its capital increased to 5.33 million taels (Hu & Zhou 1993). According to Zhou (2000: 79) a silver dollar was equal to 0.7 tael, thus 5.33 million taels were approximately 7.61 million silver dollars.

In Japan a government-private jointly owned company named Transportation Company was established in 1870, providing services between Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, and Osaka. The company was dissolved shortly afterwards due to bad management. The steamships and other facilities were passed down to two other new companies established to take over the former. The two companies, however, were soon disbanded. In 1875, the 18 steamships owned by them were passed on to Mitsubishi Corporation. The Meiji government selected Mitsubishi as the company to receive intensive state support. Between 1875 and 1883 Mitsubishi received eight million yen27 in government subsidies and grew into a gigantic maritime transportation company, owing 56 out of the some 70 ships eligible for insurance at the time. To checkmate Mitsubishi monopoly, a group of investors established Tokyo Sailboat Company. The company further merged with two other companies, and formed Common Transportation Company, owned jointly by the government and private investors. Fierce competition soon began between the new

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27 According to Liang (1992: 333), one yen was equal to 1.15 silver dollars, thus eight million yen was equal to 9.2 million silver dollars.
company and Mitsubishi, and both suffered great losses. In 1885, the government ordered the two companies to stop competition and merge into one. Thus Japanese Ocean Liner Company was established, and the government further promised that the company would retain 80% of the profit it would generate for up to 15 years (Kajinishi 1967: 102).

Meanwhile, in west Japan, merchants began transportation service using small steamboats as well, connecting ports in Shikoku and Kyushu. In 1884, 48 ship owners established Osaka Commercial Shipping Company. The government again fostered the development of the company. Starting in 1888, the government gave a subsidy in the amount of 50,000 yen per year for up to eight years. Thus the two largest sea transportation companies, Japanese Ocean Liner and Osaka Commercial Shipping, were established under government guidance. Under government order, they provided services on a regular basis connecting port cities around Japan. They later opened routes to China, Korea, and Russia (ibid).

In sum China’s sea transportation industry lagged behind Japan’s in terms of the scale of the industry. First only one large company was established in China versus two in Japan. Second the Chinese company, Shanghai Steamship Company, had fewer ships than the two Japanese companies. As stated above, the Chinese company possessed 30 ships at the culmination of its business, yet Mitsubishi alone possessed 56 ships even before it merged with other companies forming Japanese Ocean Liner Company. Third, the Chinese company’s service routes were limited to the Yangtze River Valley and China’s southeast coast, whereas Japanese companies not only provided services that formed a nationwide sea transportation network, but also opened overseas services. Based on these facts, it can be inferred that Japan’s sea transportation industry reached a higher level of development than China’s.

**RAILWAY**

Railway was an important development in land transportation in the nineteenth century. China began to build its first railway in 1880. A short railroad was constructed in Kaiping Colliery connecting the coal yard with a nearby transportation hub. In 1886 the railroad was extended. In 1887 it was further extended to Tianjin at one end and to Guye at the other. This was the first railroad in the genuine sense of the word in China (Liang 1992). In 1893 a railroad was built in Taiwan connecting Jilong, Taipei, and Xinzhu by
Liu Mingchuan, governor of Taiwan and a former general of the Huai Army. In the spring of 1894 the railroad connecting Shanhaiguan and Linxi was completed. This project was constructed in preparation of Japanese invasion, which was looming large on the horizon. It is estimated that 300 to 400 kilometers (185 to 247 miles) of railway was completed in China by 1894 (Yu 1994).

Meanwhile, railroad was built in Japan at a much faster speed. In 1872 Japan’s first railroad was completed, connecting Tokyo and Yokohama. In 1874 the railway connecting Kobe and Osaka was completed. In 1879 Kyoto was connected to Osaka by railroad. In 1889 the railroad connecting Kyoto and Tokyo was completed. Moreover, private investment was encouraged by the government to enter railway construction. In 1881 Nihon Railroad Corporation was established by private investors. In 1891 the Corporation completed the railroad connecting Aomori with Tokyo. Following Nihon Railroad Corporation, a number of private railroad companies were established in many parts of the country. By 1891, 1165 miles of railroad was constructed by private investors, in comparison with 551 miles built by the government. In total 1716 miles of railway was constructed in Japan, forming a nationwide network (Kajinishi 1967: 97). As of 1895 more than 2,000 miles of railway was built in Japan (Kokaze 1994: 93). In contrast, the total length of railway in China was merely 200 or so miles.

**COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS**

The modern post system was a blank area in China. In Japan the system was first established in Osaka in 1871, and soon spread over the country. In 1873, a nationwide flat rate was put in effect by the government. Afterwards the post system grew faster. Total length of post lines increased from 4,020 ri28 in 1872 to 19,680 ri in 1881, and covered all major towns in the country (ibid: 102).

Another field of communications was telegraph. In the late 1870s Li Hongzhang suggested to the court building a telegraph line between Tianjin and Shanghai, but it took years for the plan to materialize. In 1881 a short line was built between Zhenjiang and Nanjing. In 1882 the Telegraph Bureau was established for the purpose of constructing telegraph lines using private investment. The bureau planned to build a telegraph line between Shanghai and Guangzhou along the southeast coast and other lines.

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28 A ri was approximately 2.44 miles.
connecting major cities across the country. In addition, some provinces constructed their own telegraph lines (Liang 1992). Despite the planning and actual construction of telegraph lines, in general the new method of communication was implemented in piecemeal fashion. In contrast, the telegraph developed systematically in Japan because of central coordination by the government. In as early as 1869, the telegraph was opened between Tokyo and Yokohama. In 1870 the line between Osaka and Kobe was completed. In 1873, a nationwide main line was completed, connecting Nagasaki to the south with Aomori to the north via Tokyo. In the same year a telegraph line connecting Hakodate with Sapporo in Hokkaido was opened. Moreover, between 1874 and 1876, major cities and towns in Kyushu were connected by telegraph, and so were the cities in Shikoku few years later (1876-79). Between 1876 and 1883, cities and towns on the coast of the Japan Sea were connected to the national network. Finally, in 1885, the government revised the Telegraph Regulations erected in 1874, and set a nationwide flat rate (Kajinishi 1967: 102).

**THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY**

Finally I examine the development of the cotton textile industry, the most important light industry for civil use in both countries. In Japan the cotton textile industry developed rapidly in the 1880s and soon became the engine of Japan’s Industrialization in the late 1890s, much like what the cotton textile industry did for Britain’s Industrialization in the late eighteenth century. In this period China’s textile industry developed slowly and failed to push the country to an industrialized society.

In the 1870s China planned to establish mechanical cotton mills. The first planned cotton mill was Shanghai Cloth Weaving Shop. Preparation work started in 1880, but it was not until 1889 that the factory went into production. In 1888, Li Hongzhang and Gong Zhaoyuan established New China Textile Bureau in Shanghai. In 1893 Zhang Zhidong established Official Hubei Textile Bureau. By 1894 four textile factories were established in China (Liang 1992). In this year Cloth Weaving Shop was burned down by a fire hazard, but it was rebuilt under the name of Huasheng General Textile Factory (Huasheng fangzhi zongchang). In addition, in 1894 and 1895 three private factories, Yuyuan, Yujin, and Dachun, were
established as “branches” of Huasheng. Thus by 1895, seven factories existed with about 1800 machines and 170,000 spindles in operation (Takamura 1982: 33-34).

In Japan three small textile mills had been built prior to the Meiji Restoration: Kagashima Textile Mill and Sakai Textile Mill in Satsuma, and Kaginogawa Textile Mill in Edo. The three mills were poorly equipped. The total number of spindles was merely about 6,000 (Kajinishi 1967: 102), yet the Meiji government endeavored to develop the industry. In 1878 the government purchased two textile machines each with 2,000 spindles from Britain, and set up two factories in Hiroshima and Aichi respectively. The next year the government purchased another 10 machines of the same kind, and sold them to 10 private entrepreneurs on terms favorable to the entrepreneurs: the entrepreneurs would pay back the prices of the machines in 10 years with zero interest rate. Thus 10 new textile mills were established in different parts of the country. In addition, the government fostered the establishment of three other textile mills by paying in advance for the needed machinery. Moreover, three more textile mills were established by a prefecture government, former domain leaders, and private investors. Thus between 1882 and 1885 at least 16 textile mills were established in Japan. In general these factories used the so-called “2,000-spindle-textile-machines” powered by waterwheel, whose productivity was limited.

On the other hand, a new type of factories appeared using private capital raised through issuing stocks. In 1882, Osaka Textile Company was established in this way. The company collected 250,000 yen and went into production the next year, using large machines powered by steam with the productivity of 10,500 spindles (Chen 2000: 66). Operation was arranged in two shifts, generating much profit. Its success encouraged other private investors. Between 1886 and 1890 six other large textile factories were established. Overall Japan’s textile industry flourished. The total number of spindles increased from 43,000 in 1883 to 277,000 in 1890 (Kajinishi 1967).

Consequently Japan’s production of cotton yarns increased dramatically: the amount in 1880 was 3,246 bundles\(^{29}\), whereas in 1890 the amount reached 104,839. In other words, production of cotton yarn in Japan increased by 31 times within 10 years (Chen 2000: 66). In 1890 Japan exported to China 31

\(^{29}\) A bundle was equal to 150 kilograms.
bundles of cotton yarns. In 1891, the amount increased to 108 bundles. Japan began to export cotton cloth to China as well. In 1894, 384,000 yen worth of cotton cloth was exported to China (ibid). Japan’s textile industry undoubtedly got ahead of China’s by the time of the Sino-Japanese War.

To sum up, China lagged behind Japan in economic transition by the time of the Sino-Japanese War, including marine transportation, railway, communications, and the textile industry. In the next section I argue that the differences between the Chinese and Japanese governments’ policies accounted for the different outcomes of the two countries’ industrialization.

THE STATE’S ROLE

Before I elaborate on the differences between China and Japan, I first point out the similarities between the two countries to paint the broad picture. First, both countries chose to modernize their military and develop their modern military industries first. In the mid-1860s China constructed several large military factories to imitate western style weapons. For instance, Jiangnan Manufacturing Bureau, the first military factory established by the Self-Strengthening Movement in 1865, produced 65,300 guns, 742 cannons, 6,670,000 pounds of gunpowder, 1,600,000 artillery shells, 8,690,000 bullets, and 1,500 land mines and submarine mines between 1867 and 1895. In the field of the navy, Fuzhou Shipbuilding Bureau produced a cruiser (xunyangjian), 12 cannon ships (paojian), and 14 warships (bingjian) between 1875 and 1874. Between 1885 and 1895, the Bureau made 2 ironclad ships (tiejiapian), 7 cruisers, 6 guard ships (shoujian), 3 drill ships (lianchuan), and 1 transport ship (Wang Yongjin 2005: 258).

Similarly, the Meiji government first directed attention to military industries. Shortly after the Meiji Restoration, the government took over military factories left by the bakufu and domains and enlarged them. For instance, the new government turned Sekiguchi Manufacturing Institute into Tokyo Cannon Factory; the government used the machinery of the Nagasaki Manufacturing Institute and established Osaka Cannon Factory. Likewise, Ishikawajima Shipyard was reorganized as the Navy’s Munitions Factory; Yokosuka Steelworks was separated into two facilities: Yokosuka Shipyard and Yokosuka Navy’s Factory (Kajinishi 1967).
Secondly, in both countries the government took the initiative to modernize. After this initial stage, which lasted for about a decade in both countries, private investment was allowed in the modern projects covering a wide range. In China the government permitted merchants to participate in the construction of factories, railroads, transportation companies and so on in the mid-1870s. Similarly Japanese government privatized the majority of the country’s modern enterprises starting in 1880.

**MACRO-LEVEL POLICIES**

Despite the similarities, considerable differences existed between the two countries. Compared to the Chinese government, the Meiji government’s industrialization policies in the 1870s and 1880s benefited Japan’s modern industry as a whole. At least five measures can be identified. First the Meiji government made sizable and intensive investments in modern projects. The Japanese government’s direct investments between 1868 and 1885 amounted to three times the Chinese government’s investments between 1865 and 1895 (Liang 1992: 332-333). Direct governmental investment was important to China and Japan because both countries needed to catch up with Western powers as soon as possible and yet capital was scarce in both countries.

Second, industrialization became the guiding principle of the Meiji government, while the Chinese government made no long-term, specific policies aimed at promoting industrialization. The state’s attitude toward economic transformation was important: macro-level policies and concrete actions to assist economic development were guided by the government’s fundamental attitude. For instance, the Meiji government’s intensive investments resulted from its guiding principle. Moreover, because of the guiding principle, the Meiji government took concrete measures to facilitate industrial development. In the 1860s and 1870s the Japanese in general had no knowledge of modern industrial technology, administration, and management. The government then set up “model factories” to demonstrate the operation of modern factories. In contrast, the Chinese government did nothing comparable to what the Meiji government did.

Third, in the 1870s the Meiji government encouraged the development of private enterprises. The government created several agencies to perform the task. Moreover, in the 1880s the government
transferred state-enterprises to private entrepreneurs at prices much lower than the fair values of the properties.

Fourth, the Meiji government carried out a series of socioeconomic reforms to extract capital from the peasants and samurai, and channeled capital to modern projects. In contrast, the Chinese government did nothing in the social sphere to foster capital accumulation. Finally, the Meiji government established a modern financial regime and used it to facilitate economic development, whereas the Chinese government did nothing in the financial realm.

The following paragraphs elaborate on the above points. The first was direct governmental investment. Chinese governmental investment was insufficient to transform the large society, whereas Japanese governmental investment was large and intensive. The Chinese government’s investment between the mid-1860s and 1890s was estimated to be 50 million taels of silver (Liang 1992: 333), whereas the Meiji government spent 210 million yen on state-run modern projects by 1885 (Liang 1992). It is estimated that 50 million taels of silver were equal to 80 million silver dollars, whereas 210 million yen was equal to 245 million silver dollars (Liang 1992: 332-333). Thus the Meiji government investment’s during the 17 years between 1868 and 1885 was roughly three times that of the Chinese government during the 30 years between 1865 and 1895. It would be meaningful to compare the ratio of government mental investment to total governmental spending of the two countries, but unfortunately I have not found statistics on this.

The second point was the Meiji government’s policy aimed at the industrialization of the country. The government promoted industrialism by making the policy of “Increasing Assets and Prospering Industries” (shokusan kogyo). In 1870 the Meiji government created the Department of Industry, and put it in charge of developing modern industries. The Japanese, like the Chinese at the 1860s were largely ignorant of modern science and technology, and financial and corporate systems. To introduce industrialism and foster its development in Japan, the government established the so-called “model factories” (Tominaga 1990), such as Tomioka Silk Factory, Shinmachikuzuito Textile Factory, Aichi

30 Another study estimates 65 million taels of silver (Zhou 2000: 307).
Textile Factory, and Hiroshima Textile Factory. By the early 1880s the government had built at least 3 shipyards, 51 merchant vessels, 5 munitions plants, 10 mines, and 52 factories (Lockwood 1954: 15).

I take the first model factory, Tomioka Silk Factory, as an example to illustrate the government’s leading role in industrialization. Since the Ansei Trade Treaties signed in 1858, raw silk had been one of Japan’s main exports, but manufacturing technology remained rudimentary and product was of poor quality. In 1870 the Department of Civil Affairs (Minbusho) and the Department of Treasury discussed the matter of improving the method to make raw silk, and the two departments finally reached the agreement to hire foreign experts to help with the task. Two officials from the Treasury, namely Ito Hirofumi (later Japan’s prime minister) and Shibuzawa Eiichi, were appointed to handle the job. After having consulted two Frenchmen living in Japan, the two officials decided to hire a Frenchman by the name of Buryuna (transliteration of Japanese) as the main engineer. The two parties signed a tentative agreement in July. In August Japanese officials and Buryuna conducted fieldwork and determined the location of the factory at the town of Tomioka near Tokyo. On November 27, 1870, the Department of Civil Affairs signed an official contract with the Frenchman. In the meantime five Japanese officials from the Departments of Civil Affairs and Treasury were appointed as Directors of Construction Affairs (Kajinishi 1965).

In the spring of 1871, construction work started. Government officials encountered much difficulty at the scene. Above all, people of Tomioka were far from cooperative. One of the aforementioned five construction directors wrote in his diary that the local population was deeply suspicious of the new government and its intention to demonstrate new methods to make silk. They doubted that the government knew better than them about silk reeling and ridiculed the officials’ effort. Subsequently nobody took the project seriously. Moreover, when they saw Westerners in their hometown for the first time since they had been born, they believed firmly that these foreigners would bring perils to them. When officials informed the locals that they would cut trees in a nearby mountain for construction timber, trouble arose. The locals believed that the heavenly dog inhabiting in the forest would be angered because Japanese officials were about to cut the trees of his dwelling to build houses and factory for foreigners.
When the heavenly dog became angry, the locals would bear the brunt. Out of the fear, some locals implored the officials not to build the factory, and some even attempted to block the construction. The officials had to convince them by saying that the heavenly dog would be delighted by the construction as the factory would bring prosperity to the townspeople (ibid).

Government officials resolved substantive issues as well. They arranged construction materials such as bricks and cement, and researched on market price of cocoons. By November 1872 when the factory went into operation, government investment reached 198,572 yen and 856,016 silver dollars, excluding the officials’ salary and travel allowance (ibid: 115).

In contrast, the Chinese government did not make any macro-level policies to boost industrialization, nor did it create new agencies like the Ministry of Industry in Japan to foster modern development in China. Some Chinese officials did organize and participate in the establishment and administration of factories and businesses, but their efforts seemed to be in a piecemeal fashion due to the lack of coordination by the central government. What was worse is that many of the enterprises were regarded by the officials as their personal belongings. A glaring example was Hubei Textile Factory established by Zhang Zhidong. At first Zhang planned to construct the factory in Guangdong province, which was under his jurisdiction as he was the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces. When he was transferred to the post of governor-general of Hunan and Hubei provinces, however, Zhang relocated the planned factory to Hubei (Takamura 1982: 34).

Third, in addition to establishing state enterprises, the Japanese government encouraged the development of private enterprises as well. Three government agencies were created to perform the duty. First in 1871 the Department of Promoting Industry (kankoryo) was set up within the Ministry of Industry to foster the development of private enterprises. The department enjoyed a high position in the hierarchy of the ministry: It was placed second in the 11 departments of the ministry. The regulations of the department stipulated the responsibilities of the department, such as “to make rules governing patents on inventions to foster the development of new industries… give entrepreneurs funds less than 100 ryo to

More specifically, two technology sections, chemistry and engineering, were created within the department. The two sections built factories and organized seminars to demonstrate and teach industrial techniques. In addition, Japanese students were sent abroad to learn cotton spinning, dyeing, mining, chemistry, and the like. In 1873 the Meiji government decided to send a delegation to attend the Austria Exposition, and seized the opportunity to promote industry by building industrial museums in various cities across the country, and by training workers to manufacture the exhibits (ibid). The department was dismissed November 1873. In January 1874 the Department of Promoting Industry (kangyoro) was created within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (naimusho) to replace the former. The responsibilities of the two departments largely overlapped with each other except that the latter placed greater emphasis on exportation and cutting importation. A third government agency in charge of promoting industries was the Bureau of Industrial Affairs created within the Ministry of Agricultural and Commercial Affairs in 1881 (ibid).

With government encouragement, private initiative and experience grew rapidly. Meanwhile government undertakings proved to be a big financial burden on the government; therefore, the government transferred the majority of its industrial properties to private entrepreneurs in the middle of the 1880s in the latter’s favor: prices were as low as 1/3 to even 1/5 of the fair values, and the entrepreneurs were allowed to pay off loans in 25 to 55 years without interest (Kamiyama 1994: 60). The measure stimulated development of private enterprises. Japan’s industrialization began shortly afterwards.

In China the lack of central leadership hurt the development of the country’s private enterprises. As private entrepreneurs received little support from the government, the dominant organizational style of factories was the so-called guandu shangban, which determined that the factories would be run by merchants under the officials’ supervision. Because of their authority, however, officials controlled the administration of the modern undertakings. In addition, because they had a vested interest in the factories, the officials often acted to maximize the profit of their own factory, not the interest of the entire industry,
not to mention the whole nation. For instance, Shanghai Cloth Weaving Factory was established by Li Hongzhang. Li managed to get the privilege of tax exemption on behalf of the factory by negotiating with the court. Moreover, Li obtained monopoly granted by the state: Chinese merchants were not allowed to establish their own textile factories within 10 years after the establishment of the factory. They had to purchase the factory’s stocks if they wished to invest in the textile industry (Jiang 1992). The aforementioned Hubei Textile Factory initially absorbed private investment, but as private influence grew, Zhang Zhidong forced private investment out of the enterprise (Hsu 2000: 286).

Fourth, the Meiji government raised capital from peasants and samurai by establishing a monetary land tax on the one hand and by stopping the samurai stipend on the other, and channeled capital into industry. In 1873, the government publicized the Regulations on Land Tax Reform, which stipulated three principles. First, land tax was set at 3% of the value of the land. In 1877 the tax rate was reduced to 2.5%. Second, land tax would be paid by cash. Third, owners of land were obligated to pay the tax, not the tenants as required in the Tokugawa period (Kajinishi 1967).

To further ease its financial constraint, the government abolished the four-status strata of samurai, peasants, artisans, and merchants of the Tokugawa period. In 1869, following its order of the return of land and population registers, the government issued another order that domain masters should be classified as Kazoku, samurai as Shizoku, and all others, including former peasants, artisans, and merchants, as Heimin (common people). Although they were placed under different categories in registration, the three groups were granted equal legal rights by the government. All of them were allowed to engage in occupations of their choice, to move to wherever they pleased, and more importantly, to marry people of other categories. Afterwards the government incorporated the “untouchable” of the Tokugawa period into the category of common people. By 1872 the government had created suitable human relations for a modern society (Okubo 1967).
With the abolition of the samurai class, the government reduced their stipend correspondingly. In 1872 government spending on samurai stipends decreased to about 4.9 million koku of rice\textsuperscript{31}, less than 40\% of the amount at the end of the Tokugawa period, but it still remained a heavy burden for the government. Therefore the government decided to dispose of the stipend completely. As early as 1870, the government had already dismissed those who desired to engage in agriculture and commerce by offering them five years’ worth of stipends at a time. In 1873 the government enacted the Conscription Law, and thereby some samurai were absorbed into the army. Thus by 1876 the government had disposed of about 100,000 samurai and 1.5 million koku of rice. Nevertheless, the samurai stipend still constituted more than 30\% of the government’s annual revenue. The government resolved to take further action. In August 1876, it enacted the Stipend Bonds Issuance Regulations, which prescribed that all former samurai should give up their stipends. In return, the government offered bonds to them. About 313,000 people received bonds totaling 173 million yen. On average, however, a samurai was granted merely 548 yen (Kajinishi 1967: 95). With the limited amount of money, the samurai could not live a comfortable life for long. In fact, an 1884 survey revealed that nearly 80\% of the bonds were sold to merchants and usurers, and thus many samurai had become wage-earners working in modern industries. Moreover, former domain masters who had been granted huge amount of bonds invested in the construction of railway and the establishment of modern textile and banking industries (ibid). Hence the Meiji government’s abolition of the samurai stipends served two functions. It not only got rid of a heavy financial burden but also facilitated modern change in the country.

Fifth, the government established a modern financial regime and used it to foster the development of the economy. The new system consisted of three interrelated components: paper notes, the silver standard, and a modern banking system governed by the central bank. The government first issued unconvertible paper currency in 1868 soon after it took over power. By the early 1870s about 100 million yen was issued. In 1871 the government led by Inoue Kaoru intended to establish the gold standard, but the attempt eventually failed due to shortage of gold reserve. In the middle of the 1880s the silver standard

\textsuperscript{31} A koku was equal to 180 liters.
was established as a result of the decrease in silver-paper currency exchange rate and the depreciation of silver in the international market. The central bank, Bank of Japan, was established in 1882. In 1885 it began to issue convertible paper money (Kamiyama 1994: 50-59).

After the formation of the new financial structure, the government could develop the economy by financial and fiscal means, such as providing bank loans to important industries instead of direct government investment as typical in the early years, and adjusting the amount of paper currency in circulation to affect the overall economy. For instance, in the second half of the 1870s when Okuma Shigenobu was in charge of financial issues, his policy was to increase the issuance of currency to stimulate economic activities and promote the construction of infrastructure. Later the policy caused inflation and the depreciation of paper notes. In 1881 when Matsukata Masayoshi took over the administration of finance, he adopted the opposite approach, reducing the amount of currency in circulation by retiring the paper notes and cutting government spending (ibid).

**SPECIFIC ACTIONS**

This section focuses on the ways the Qing and the Meiji governments aided particular industries or companies. In general the Chinese government provided only limited subsidies to assist Chinese companies, whereas the Meiji government helped Japanese companies in a more systematic way.

The first was subsidies including both capital and assets to selected companies. As stated above, Mitsubishi alone received eight million yen and a number of ships from the government free of charge. Likewise the two large Japanese companies established later were given financial support and operational privilege. In contrast, the Chinese company, Shanghai Steamboat Company, received little governmental support. If one yen was equal to 1.15 silver dollars (Liang 1992: 333), then eight million yen amounted to 9.2 million silver dollars, whereas the Chinese government’s subsidy in the form of loan to Shanghai Steamship Company was 1.928 million taels of silver. If a silver dollar was equal to 0.7 tael of silver (Zhou 2000: 79), then 1.928 million taels were equal to 2.76 million silver dollars, far less than what Mitsubishi received from the Japanese government.
The only privilege the Chinese company received from the government was exclusive operational rights on the Grand Canal at the time of its establishment, which proved to be of little value as canal transportation shifted to coastal transportation soon afterwards. Once it was established, the company was left to its own devices. When it needed more capital to expand its business, it had to borrow money from private investors. From 1882 to 1883, the company issued two million taels worth of stocks. In 1883, however, a financial crisis broke out in Shanghai and the surrounding areas. To pay back the money it had borrowed from private lenders, the company had to borrow 748,000 taels of silver from two foreign banks by mortgaging its real estate. In 1885 the debt was due to return. Then the company had to borrow another 300,000 pounds, or 1,217,140 taels of silver from a British bank to pay back the first loan (Zhu 1992: 300). In a sense the company had to rob Peter to pay Paul due to capital shortage, which in turn was caused by insufficient governmental support.

Second, the Meiji government stopped unhealthy competition among Japanese companies in some sectors, ordered the merger of the competing companies, and thus fostered the development of the industry as a whole. For instance, in the early 1880s the Common Transportation Company competed with Mitsubishi on the sea transportation market; consequently both suffered losses. The sea transportation industry at the time was still an infant sector in Japan, hence the losses of the companies were not beneficial to the development of the industry. Therefore in 1885 the Meiji government ordered the merger of the two companies, and provided further assistance to the new company (Kajinishi 1967: 102). In contrast, the Qing government did nothing comparable to the Meiji government on this count.

Third, governmental support protected Japanese companies against more advanced western companies, whereas the Chinese company had to negotiate and compromise with stronger foreign competitors. I discuss the Chinese company first. When the company was just established, the two Western companies by the names of Yihe and Taigu lowered their transport fees on lines on which the Chinese company operated in order to constrain the newcomer. In 1877 Li Hongzhang entrusted the merchant Tang Tingshu with negotiating with the Western companies. Tang signed a “price agreement” with the two foreign companies, stipulating the wage of daily laborers on the piers, the way the three
companies would divide up the customer base, and a commonly accepted standard of fees. As the joint portions of the two Western companies were superior to the Chinese company, the latter suffered loss in the long-run. Between 1877 and 1893 the total tonnage of Yihe increased by two times, and Taigu increased by nearly four times, whereas Shanghai Steamship Company’s total tonnage decreased.

In contrast, in their competition with Western companies Japanese companies received great protection from their government. Mitsubishi faced challenge from the American company the Pacific Mailer, which lowered transport fees in the hope of driving Mitsubishi out of the Japanese market. Backed by the Meiji government, Mitsubishi lowered its fees correspondingly. Thus the American company felt hard to win the price competition. At the juncture the government further lent 810,000 yen to Mitsubishi to help it to purchase the Shanghai line of the American company, including ships and land facilities. The actual cost of the purchase was 780,000 yen. The purchase agreement further stipulated that the American company would not engage in the Shanghai line; thus the Japanese company virtually drove the American company out of Japanese domestic market. Later Mitsubishi successfully forced the British company by the name of P. O to evacuate from Japan unconditionally (Jiang 1992).

Fourth, the Meiji government assisted in the emergence of the so-called “private railways companies.” Five major railway enterprises were established by private investors in the 1880s: Nihon, Hokkaido Coal Mine (both in eastern Japan), Kansai, Kyushu, and Sanyo (all in western Japan). The largest one, Nihon Railway Company, was established by 16 people of the kazoku class headed by Iwakura Tomomi, himself a member of the kazoku and a high-ranking official in the Meiji government. The kazoku was a new social class created by the Meiji government in 1872, whose members were originally noblemen and high-ranking officials of the court at Kyoto, and the daimyo prior to the Meiji Restoration. In early 1872 the Meiji government abolished the Tokugawa four strata including samurai, peasants, handicraftsmen, and merchants, and created three classes instead: kazoku, shizoku (former low-ranking samurai), and heimin (common people). The kazoku were deprived of their noble titles but were offered by the government a huge amount of money as compensation. Later they invested in banks, industries, and railways.
Nihon Railway Company was a good example. Its investment came primarily from members of the kazoku. After the establishment of the company, the Railway Department of the Meiji government took full charge of the company’s businesses, from construction and maintenance of railways to operation of trains. Furthermore, government officials were appointed as the first two presidents of the company, and the government sent managers and engineers to the company to run its businesses. Therefore contemporary Japanese viewed the company as not different from state enterprises. This was true with Hokkaido Coal Mine Railway Company as well. The three companies in Western Japan were relatively independent from the Meiji government as it was busied with helping the two companies in eastern Japan, but nevertheless all of the three companies were initiated and organized by prefectural governments. Moreover, the two companies Kyushu and Kansai appointed officials as their presidents (Kokaze 1994: 93-96).

I have argued that two major reasons accounted for the disparity in modern development between China and Japan: direct governmental investment, and more generally governmental leadership. In the previous chapter, I have pointed out that ethnic rebellions had damaged Qing state power severely, and that to a large extent the government was deprived of the ability to lead China’s economic transformation. In the next section, I revisit the first question and examine it from a different angle: Was it possible for the government to invest more in modern projects?

THE MANCHU STIPEND AND QING FINANCES

Given the situation that the government’s revenue was limited, was it possible for the government to allocate more money for the country’s industrialization? I make two hypotheses. The first is that the Manchu stipend and ration of rice constituted a significant proportion of Qing finances and thus they reduced the funds available to the government to invest in modern industries. The second is that the government should have cut the Manchu stipend and used the money saved to fund modern projects because the stipend performed no socially justifiable functions.

Overall my findings support my hypotheses. First, my research shows that government expenditure on the Manchu stipend was 15.5 million taels of silver per year. Overall the Manchu stipend constituted
approximately 20% of government spending between 1865 and 1895. In other words during this period the total Manchu stipend cost the government 463.5 million taels, which was more than seven times governmental investment in modern projects. Second, my research indicates that the government should have cut the Manchu stipend because the stipend was not justifiable in terms of its social functions. This in turn was because the Manchus performed no justifiable functions.

In my research I have omitted the ration of rice. It is hard to estimate the total sum of money that the government spent on the ration of rice for two reasons. First of all, although rice was their staple food, banner troops received other grains as a supplement. The kinds of grains they received varied from region to region, depending on the cereals grown in the region. Multiple kinds of grains were allocated to banner soldiers, such as millet and beans. Because of this it is complicated to calculate the total cost of the grains. Second, prices of grains fluctuated considerably from time to time. Hence it is hard to assess exactly how much the government spent on them. Yet it is safe to say that the Manchu ration of rice, or more precisely, foods, added a considerable amount to government spending on the Manchu stipend. Therefore the total sum of money that the government spent on the Manchus was greater than the Manchu stipend.

**THE MANCHU STIPEND: HOW DID I OBTAIN THE AMOUNT?**

In the following paragraphs I explain my findings in detail. To answer the question I have raised at the beginning of this section, ideally a list of Qing expenditures during the 30 years of the Self-Strengthening Movement period would be helpful. Unfortunately, such a list is not available in the present. Therefore I have to resort to secondary sources to estimate the figure.

Banner troops consisted of two subdivisions: those who were stationed in the capital and those in the provinces. Hence government spending on the Manchu stipend consisted of two parts: money for the capital banner troops and money for the provincial troops. The 1812 version of *The Collected Statutes of the Great Qing* reveals that the total stipends of provincial banner troops amounted to 5,155,888 taels of silver (cited in Zhou 2000: 36). Yet no direct governmental source is available on the total amount of capital banner troops’ stipends because it was deemed as a secret by the government. The information I
have now is: the total amount of the stipends of provincial banner troops. In addition to this, I have found
the stipend rate chart containing both the capital and provincial troops as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1 Provincial Banner Soldiers’ Monthly Pay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cavalrymen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 T., 0.3 D.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.2 Capital Soldiers’ Monthly Pay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corporals* (lingcui)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalrymen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporals in the Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fostered Soldiers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
1. * applied to corporals in the four branches: The Escorts (qinjun), Vanguard (qianfeng), Guards (hujun), and Light Cavalry (xiaoqi).
2. In peacetime soldiers were rewarded as on defense.
3. Stipend is measured in Taels, and ration of rice in Dou.

Source: Mao, Haijian. 1995: 64.

At this point what I need to make the estimate for overall Qing spending on banner troops is: the
number of capital troops, and the number of provincial troops. First, I present information on the number
of capital banner troops. Thomas Wade reported in 1851 the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.3 Number of Capital Banner Soldiers in 1851</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another source, The Draft History of the Qing, gave a slightly different count:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.4 Number of Capital Banner Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ibid. 28.
Now it can be inferred that the total number of capital banner troops was roughly 150,000 men. Next I present the total number of provincial banner troops:

**Table 7.5 Number of Provincial Banner Troops**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>107,819</td>
<td>110,934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ibid: 31.

The total number of provincial banner troops was roughly 110,000 men. Thus the ratio of capital banner troops to provincial troops was 15:11. Moreover, since capital banner soldiers were paid better than provincial soldiers, as stated in the beginning of this section, then it can be inferred at this point that the total stipends of capital banner soldiers exceeded the total stipends of provincial troops. To give a more accurate estimation, I need the pay rates of both capital and provincial troops. In addition to the chart I have presented at the beginning of this section, Ding Yizhuang gives a simplified version, simple but meets the need of this study.

**Table 7.6 Simplified Version of Capital Banner Troops’ Stipend**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Amount (in taels)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First class</td>
<td>Corporals and Vanguards</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second class</td>
<td>Cavalrymen</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third class</td>
<td>Infantry soldiers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ding, Yizhuang. 2003: 220.

Ding (ibid) also points out that stipend for provincial banner troops decreased successively. If the percentage of a particular class of the provincial banner troops did not vary greatly from the percentage of the corresponding class of the capital banner troops, then the ratio of the total amount of the stipend for provincial banner troops to that of the capital troops would be 6:9, or 2:3. Since the ratio of the number of provincial troops to capital troops was 11:15, now it can be inferred that the ratio of the total amount of stipend for provincial banner troops to the total stipend for capital troops was: 2×11/3×15=22:45, or roughly 1:2. Further, since the total amount of stipend for provincial troops was approximately 5.15

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32 That is to say, the first class received 3 tales, the second class 2 taels, and so on.
33 That is, suppose x% of the provincial troops were the first class, and y% of the capital troops were the first class, whereas x is close to y.
34 That is, 1+2+3=6, whereas 2+3+4=9.
million taels of silver per year, therefore, the total amount of stipend for capital banner troops would be
5.15×2, or 10.3 million taels of silver annually. Then the total amount of stipend for banner troops should
be 5.15+10.3, equal to 15.45 million.

The figure is not conclusive, but should be highly reliable. A Qing official’s memorial buttressed the
validity of my estimate. After the Boxers Uprising in 1900, the state reduced the Manchu stipend by 30%
(Im 1993: 122); that is, government spending on Manchu stipend decreased to only 70% of the original
amount. On September 16, 1907, the official Xiong Xiling from Sichuan province stated in his memorial
addressing Manchu livelihoods that stipends for both capital and provincial banner troops totaled
approximately 10 million taels of silver (HYZWC: 48). Based on the above information, the following
calculation can be made regarding the total amount of Manchu stipend before the pay cut: if the product
of my estimate (15.45 million) and 70% is close to 10 million, then my estimate should be considered
valid. As 15.45 multiplied by 0.7 is 10.815, or, in the context of my discussion, 10.815 million taels of
silver, which is close to what Xiong said, therefore my estimate is supported by the document.

How significant was the Manchu stipend in Qing finance? Qing total expenditure during the 30 years
of the Self-Strengthening Movement between 1865 and 1894 was 2.25 billion taels (Zhou 2000: 307), or
75 million taels per year. Thus the Manchu stipend constituted 20.6% of Qing annual expenditure
(15.45/75=0.206). In other words, every year the state spent 1/5 of its money to support the Manchu
ethnic group.

Did the Manchu stipend affect governmental investment in modern industries? The answer is
affirmative. Governmental investment during the Self-Strengthening Movement was 65 million taels.
Compared to this, the Manchu stipend during the same period was strikingly greater: it should have
amounted to 15.45×30=463.5 million taels, or more than seven times governmental investment in modern
industries.

A final note needs to be made here. In practice, the total expenditure on Manchu stipend might vary
slightly from the above calculation. In 1853 the Xianfeng emperor reduced banner soldiers’ pay by 20%
due to the financial crisis caused by the Taiping Rebellion (Im 1993: 122), and the pay cut continued until
1884. In 1885 the state restored the original pay scale for banner soldiers and further set up a special fund for capital banner soldiers pay (Zhou 2000: 242-244). In sum, the decrease in the total amount of Manchu stipends might be set off by the raise determined in 1885. In other words, Qing actual spending on the Manchu stipends during the three decades of the Self-Strengthening Movement should be consistent with my estimate.

**THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE MANCHU STIPEND**

I have hypothesized that the government should have cut the Manchu stipend and used the money saved to fund China’s modern projects between 1865 and 1895. My research has shown that government expenditure on the Manchu stipends reached a huge amount: it was seven times governmental investment in modern projects. Moreover, one of the factors that accounted for the difference in the outcomes of China’s and Japan’s industrialization was direct governmental investment. The Meiji government’s investment in Japan’s industrialization was three times that of the Chinese government. Therefore it can be inferred that had the Chinese government saved the money on the Manchu stipends to invest in China’s modern projects, then it could have made a big difference to China’s industrialization.

The Manchu stipend not only was huge in amount, but also it was unjustifiable in terms of social functions. The essence of the Manchu stipend was that the entire ethnic group was supported by the state financially as they were prohibited from working outside the military. The soldiers, including the so-called “fostered soldiers,” were granted a certain amount of stipend and rice. From the perspective that the Manchus were classified by the government as hereditary military personnel, the policy was reasonable at least to some degree. However, over time the Manchus lost their capacity to combat. The last major war they participated in was the White Lotus Rebellion at the turn of the nineteenth century. The Taiping Rebellion, which took place in the middle of the nineteenth century, was quelled down by Chinese armed forces. Thus the Manchus as a military caste lost their raison d’être. Therefore the state should have reformed the Manchu question during the Self-Strengthening Movement.

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35 Manchu boys under the age of 10.
36 The military significance of the banner troops was limited by the fact that the Chinese Green Standard coexisted with the former.
In addition, after the Taiping Rebellion, the state let the Chinese Green Standard perish. Eventually it was replaced by the Defenders and the Trained. Hence from a purely military viewpoint there was no reason for the state to keep the banner troops and continue supporting the Manchus financially. However, the Manchus were the ethnic group on whom the state relied. Therefore the state was reluctant to reform the Manchu question.

The Manchu stipend was probably the largest single government spending category. At least it was far more than two socially necessary spending categories: defense and disaster relief. Defense was necessary because it offered national security; disaster relief was necessary because it helped people affected by floods, famines, earthquakes, etc. to go through the hardships. Hence it was important to social security. By contrast, the Manchu stipend only assisted a specific group of people who even did not perform what they were originally supposed to do. Hence the stipend was socially unacceptable and should have been cut at least partially.

Now I turn to the government’s spending on disaster relief and defense to illustrate that the Manchu stipend far exceeded these two necessary categories of government spending. First, the government spent more than 100 million taels of silver on disaster relief. Between 1861 and 1895 natural disasters (flooding, draught, etc.) occurred frequently in China. In the 18 Chinese provinces and the Northeast, excluding Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet, natural disasters occurred 17,278 times in total, or 493 times per year on average. Every year about 1/3 of China’s counties and prefectures suffered from natural disasters (Xia 1998: 72).

Disasters entailed government spending on relief in the forms of funds and supplies. When a major disaster struck, the government always had to allocate money for relief work. For example, in the late 1870s and early 1880s, a major famine occurred in North China, affecting the four provinces of Zhili (modern Hebei), Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Henan. The government allocated at least 19,396,807 taels of silver and 2,687,851 dan\(^{37}\) of grain for the victims. Between 1871 and 1873, and again between 1879 and 1889, twice floods struck Zhili province, and the government spent 4,719,284 taels of silver to help the people.

\(^{37}\) One dan was roughly equal to one hectoliter.
affected, the amount excluding food and clothes. Between 1890 and 1895 floods and tsunami struck the province once again, and cost the government more than seven million taels of silver. In 1887 the Yellow River breached the dyke at Zhengzhou, Henan province, and the government had to spend 2.5 million taels on relief. Between 1885 and 1899 the Yellow River burst the dyke several times in Shandong province, costing the government more than seven million taels. Between 1889 and 1998, floods struck Jiangsu province frequently, and cost the government more than five million taels. Because of reoccurring floods, often associating with rivers breaching the dykes, the central government had to repair broken dykes, and build irrigation facilities to prevent disasters in the future. Between 1871 and 1895, the government spent 45.01 million taels of silver on the Yellow River projects alone. Overall it is estimated that government spent more than 100 million, probably 120-140 million taels of silver, between the 1870s and 1890s on disaster relief and flood-control works (Xia 1999: 65-70).

Military expenditure was another large category of government spending. The Qing launched two major military campaigns and started a major marine project between the 1870s and 1890s. In 1867, Yacob Beg, a warlord from Kokand, a vassal state of the Qing, capitalized on the Muslim rebellions in the Northwest, invaded Xinjiang, and established the so-called Zhedeshaer (transliteration from Chinese) Khanate in the northern part of the region. In 1870 Russia occupied the westernmost Yili area of Xinjiang. In 1873 Zuo Zongtang quelled down the Muslim rebellions in the northwest, but part of Xinjinag was still under foreign occupation. In 1875 the state entrusted Zuo with retrieving the lost land. In 1878 Qing troops finally defeated Yacob Beg. In 1881 Russia returned Yili to the Qing. In 1884 the Qing reorganized Xinjiang into a province like in China proper. In sum, during the decade between 1875 and 1884, the Qing spent 70-80 million taels of silver on the Xinjiang campaign, which was equal to the government’s one year revenue (Zhou 2000: 264-266).

In addition, the Sino-French War in the 1880s cost the Qing a large amount of military expense. Between December 1883, when the war broke out, and June 1885, when the war ended, the Qing spent 30-35 million taels of silver on defense (ibid: 275). Moreover, preparation of costal defense cost the government a large sum of money. In 1874 Japan invaded Taiwan. The next year the Qing decided to
build a modern navy to check for Japan’s territorial ambitions. By the time the Sino-Japanese War broke out, the Qing spent 30 million taels of silver in total (ibid: 272). In sum, the above three military bills amounted to 130-140 million taels of silver.

Thus military campaigns and disaster relief together cost the government approximately 250-270 million taels of silver. The two spending categories, though large, were necessary because military campaigns were crucial to Qing territorial integrity and disaster relief was essential to maintaining the existing sociopolitical order. Moreover, the two categories of spending added together amounted to 370-410 million taels of silver, less than government spending on the Manchu stipend. Hence in retrospective the government should have abolished the Manchu stipend or at least cut it partially so that the government could use the money saved to fund modern projects.

**MANCHUS VIS-À-VIS SAMURAI**

A key factor that brought about China’s tardy industrialization compared to Japan’s was that the Qing government invested much less than the Meiji government did in modern industries. Moreover, Qing spending on the Manchu stipend constrained government finances and hence limited direct governmental investment in modern projects. Two questions arise. First, how did the Meiji government manage to raise funds for modern industries? The new government had limited funds in the early 1870s when it had to invest intensively to initiate industrialization. In the following paragraphs I first examine the Meiji government’s financial policies to ease its financial restraints and to increase revenue, then I suggest that the Meiji government’s abolition of the samurai stipend reduced governmental spending and to some degree it helped the government mitigate its financial problem. The government might have invested part of the money saved this way in modern industries, hence the abolition of the samurai stipend ultimately helped with Japan’s industrialization.

Secondly and more importantly, I explore the question of whether it was possible for the Qing government to abolish the Manchu stipend on the Japanese samurai model. I will look at the similarity and difference between the samurai class and the Manchus as an ethnic group, and examine officials’
proposals to abolish the Manchu stipend and Manchu privileges on the samurai model. Finally I discuss why the Qing government eventually failed to reform the Manchu question on the Japanese model.

**THE MEIJI ABOLITION OF THE SAMURAI CLASS AND THE ACCUMULATION OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL IN JAPAN**

The fragile and impoverished Meiji government was determined to fortify its financial basis immediately after its establishment under difficult political circumstances. The government was formed mainly by low-ranking samurai from the two domains of Satsuma and Choshu, lacking a broad base of support. Indeed Bakufu and pro-Bakufu domains waged a series of battles against the new government starting in early 1868 in various parts of the country, from Kyoto and Edo, to the Northeast and Hokkaido. It took the government about a year-and-a-half to quell anti-government forces and centralize power. The civil war was termed the Boshin War in Japan as the year 1868 was the Boshin (wuchen in Chinese) year in the Chinese year designating system. Soon afterwards the government ordered the domains to submit their land and population registers to the Meiji emperor in 1869, and only two years later the Meiji government abolished the 200-plus domains and reorganized them into some 50 prefectures.

Financially, however, the government remained in dire straits. The problem appeared even earlier. During the civil war the Meiji government had to borrow money from rich merchants across the country to finance its war effort (Mura 1967). Japan’s financial problem resulted partly from trade deficit. In the mean time, the government was faced with fostering modern economic growth in the overall backward country. To fortify its financial base, the government took several measures. First of all, the government issued paper bills starting in 1869. The purpose of issuing the paper bill was to accumulate silver and gold coins by charging foreign traders metal money and by paying Japanese providers paper bills. Western diplomats protested and the Meiji government had to stop the method (Kamiyama 1994).

Next the government enacted the New Currency Regulations, which stipulated that one yen was equal to one ryo of gold and one US dollar. Thus the rule of gold standard was determined. Immediately following the law, the government began to mint new gold coins. Furthermore, the government permitted private investors to establish the so-called “national banks” across the country. To establish the gold
standard in practice, the government needed to issue paper bills that could be exchanged for gold coins. Therefore the government set up the “preparation fund” (jumbikin) to buy up gold. Yet gold coins were in shortage at the time, and exchange was difficult. Facing the situation the government in 1872 enacted the Regulations on National Banks, which allowed private investors to establish banks and issue exchangeable bank bills so that they would retrieve former paper bills and accumulate gold coins (ibid). Finally the government established monetary land tax on the one hand and stopped the samurai stipend on the other. I have argued in a nutshell that the Meiji government’s abolition of the samurai class and the samurai stipend removed a financial burden on the government and eventually facilitated modern changes in the country. I further suggest that to some degree it gave a practical example of what the Qing could have done with the Manchus to foster China’s industrialization.

The Manchus had several intrinsic similarities to the samurai. First, both the Manchus and samurai were in nature a military caste. As such, they were forbidden to work in agriculture, handicraft industries, or trading, but were awarded a stipend for their livelihoods. Second, membership in both cases was hereditary and hence permanent. Third, the Manchu stipend became a heavy burden on the government in China in the critical period of modern transition as samurai stipend for Japan. I have shown that the Manchu stipend alone, excluding ration of rice, constituted approximately 20% of Qing annual spending. Likewise, the samurai stipend, even after reduced in the early 1870s, occupied more than 30% of the Meiji government’s annual revenue in 1876. Fourth, although being a privileged group, a considerable proportion of the Manchus became increasingly destitute as fixed governmental aid did not meet the need of increasing population, and this was the case with samurai. In fact, some Manchus and samurai had to borrow money to get by. Therefore intra-group poverty required reform. Fifth, over time, however, both Manchus and samurai lost their capacity to combat and hence their raison d’être. In sum, the Qing should have abolished Manchu privileges like the Meiji government did with the samurai.

**REFORMING THE MANCHU QUESTION ON THE JAPANESE SAMURAI MODEL**

My argument about the similarities between the Manchus and samurai and the feasibility of reforming the Manchu stipend on the samurai model is further buttressed by Qing officials. In 1907, Cixi
proclaimed to address the Manchu question and requested officials to submit their proposals. Several high-ranking officials suggested that the government follow what the Meiji government did with samurai. For instance, the prominent Manchu official Duanfang wrote in a memorial submitted to the court on October 1, 1907 (HYZWC: 29, translation mine):

Years ago after the Reform [i.e. the Meiji Restoration] had just begun in Japan the government abolished domains and set up prefectures, and dismissed the samurai. Regarding the stipends that samurai had received for generations, the government offered bonds to them as state debt in accordance with their original stipends so that samurai would get interest every year. The government would pay back the principle in installments…before this samurai could not work in occupations [other than military service], but their meager stipends did not render them self-sufficient, which was exactly the same as our banner people [italic added]. When their stipends were stopped and they began to receive governmental bonds, samurai all threw themselves into industry and commerce and hence no longer lived idle lives. If your Majesty imitate it but replace bonds with silver, then your Majesty will be more magnanimous…

Some officials opposed the idea from a technical perspective: The Qing government had lost its financial credibility. For instance, Xiong Xiling wrote in his memorial submitted on September 16, 1907 (HYZWC: 48, translation mine):

Some officials have proposed offering bonds, imitating the method by which Japan disposed of former domain debts and samurai stipend. They suggest that since it is hard to raise a huge amount of money, therefore your Majesty should issue bonds…Yet in China the government has lost credibility for long since the Zhaoxin Stocks. Now if your Majesty replace the hard stipend with empty document, then it is hard to promulgate the plan among people so that they accept willingly. In addition, banner men have run up huge debts, and have promised the creditors to pay back with stipend they will receive. They are living in a circumstance where they await rice to cook. How can a piece of paper help with their urgent situation?

Xiong in fact suggested dealing with the problem by imitating Japan on a larger scale. First, he argued, the government should establish a large number of factories and technical schools so that young Manchu men could master a job skill and make a living. This would take a long time, but it was the fundamental way to resolve the problem. Second, Xiong proposed raising a fund to establish modern banks, and issuing shares to Manchus so that they could get interest annually. This, Xiong, argued, would encourage Manchus to save money and help them to make a living. Xiong further buttressed his proposal by stating that decades ago Okuma Shigenobu in Japan established national banks to plan for the livelihoods of the kazoku. Third, Xiong recommended that the state construct railways in Manchuria and Mongolia (Man-Meng gebu) and offer railway stocks to banner men so that they would get interest every year.
Xiong’s proposals resembled Meiji policies. After all, the essence of dealing with the Manchu question was: How to turn this stipended group of people into independent and self-sufficient members of society so that they would no longer depend on the government? Xiong, and as a matter of fact, some other Chinese officials, seemed to have developed their ideas from the Japanese model. First, as part of Japan’s industrialization, the Meiji government established modern factories and hired former samurai and their family members so that they would make a living by working at those facilities. For instance, the government established Tomioka Textile Factory, the first model factory, in July 1872. The factory went into production in October. The vast majority of the factory’s female employees were from former samurai families. They were scheduled to work from sunrise to one-half hour before sunset, and the top class women workers were paid 1.75 yen monthly or 21 yen a year (Kajinishi 1967: 101).

In a similar vein, Qing officials suggested establishing factories and recruit Manchus to help with their livelihoods. Their idea materialized to some degree as small factories were set up in the Northeast. For example, in March 1909 Fengtian Eight Banner Factory (Baqi gongyichang) was established in Fengtian (modern Shenyang) by Fengtian Banner Affairs Bureau (Qiwuchu). The factory hired 500 Manchu men working in 10 sections, including carpentry, iron making, waving, and paper making. Meanwhile, the factory opened a branch in the city Jinzhou. Because of the factory’s success, Xiliang, the Manchu governor-general of the Northeast, recommended to the court that a factory for Manchu women should be established. Thus in October 1909, Fengtian Eight Banner Women Workers’ Seminar (fengtian Baqi nügong chuanxisuo) was established, which included two parts: classroom and workshop. About 2,000 taels of silver was invested initially, and 80 women were hired in 1909, and another 80 in the next year, working in tailoring, weaving, and embroidering sections (Zhang 1996). Despite all the progress made, the factories were organized by local authorities, and consequently were small in scale.

Qing officials also suggested moving Manchus to the Northeast following the Japanese example. In 1869 the Meiji government renamed the region hitherto known as “the Ezo land” as Hokkaido, set up the agency of Development Commissioner (Kaitakushi) in Sapporo, and began to develop the frontier. The government encouraged former samurai to form groups and migrate to Hokkaido to help the government
to turn the land into Japan’s granary. The plan proved to be successful. In 1882, the government closed the Development Commissioner’s office after having set up three prefectures in Hokkaido (Okubo 1967). Xiong Xiling mentioned in his memorial that some officials suggested imitating Japan’s migration plan. Duanfang further explored the idea in his memorial (HYZWC: 29, translation mine):

I suggest that [your Majesty] move the capital banners to the northeastern provinces…according to geological surveys by foreigners, the land of Manchuria [Manzhou] is flat and vast, suitable for agriculture. By now no more than one fifth of its land has been cultivated, yet no provinces in the North and the South do not drink liquor made from its sorghum and use oil form its soy bean. At present, the most important factor for agriculture in Manchuria lies in cultivation, and the most important factor in cultivation is migration. If [your Majesty] move all of the banner men in the capital to the northeastern provinces, and let them reclaim land, then it will not only release the tension on the economy, but also will get rid of foreign territorial ambition toward the region, and abort their plan to occupy and colonize. I suggest surveying the reclaimable land first, grasping the size, then allocating [to Manchus]. The government should arrange vehicles and ships for them, offer funds and food to them and help them to move to their destinations. The government should also set up army and police to protect their security, and establish schools for men and women to educate them. Other issues, such as agronomy, irrigation works, banks, and industries, need to be established gradually as well…

Despite the discussion, the idea never materialized, because relocating Manchus living in the capital was not only an economic issue, but a sensitive political issue as well. Nevertheless, Qing officials’ discussion on dealing with the Manchus on the samurai model buttresses my point that the two groups shared a number of similarities, and that the Qing could have disposed of the Manchus as the Meiji government did the samurai.

**THE CRUX OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S PROBLEM**

The influence of the Manchu question on China’s economic development was beyond the financial realm. The fact that the tiny minority was in control of state power delayed and diverted the course of the society at large as Manchu leaders had a vested interest in giving priority to looking after the Manchus. The prominent Chinese officials during the Self-Strengthening Movement were excluded from the center of power. They handled practical issues in their jurisdiction, but had no overarching power that would allow them to make policies to determine the general direction the country was headed in. The ultimate power lay in the court dominated by the imperial lineage members, who happened to be Manchus. Their goal was to perpetuate Manchu rule and protect Manchu privileges.
This was particularly obvious in the case of Yihuan. Between 1861 and 1884 the central government was dominated by Yixin (prince Gong, the Xianfeng emperor’s brother). In April 1884 Cixi reshuffled the Grand Council (junjichu) headed by Yixin. All the members were removed from their posts, and Yihuan (prince Chun, the brother of Yixin) was replaced as the de facto leader of the new Grand Council. After he assumed leadership in the central government, Yihuan sought to look after the interests of the Manchus. His overall political doctrines were reflected in his saying, to have “weak branches, a strong truck, and firm roots.” In his view the roots included three components: the capital, the Northeast, and Eight Banners.

The capital was the center of Manchu rule. When he was in command of the Capital Field Force (shenjiying), a new banner unit added to the capital banners during the Self-Strengthening Movement, Yihuan insisted on first arming the capital eight banners with Western style weapons.

In addition Yihuan made an effort to raise banner soldiers’ pay to benefit Manchus in general. When he joined the discussion on coastal defense, Yihuan advocated fortifying the Northeast as it was the place where the ancestors of Manchus originated (Yang 1992). Existing literature suggests that Manchu rulers’ excessive concerns about Manchu interests in the late-nineteenth century were harmful to the entire empire, especially to its economic transition.

The 10 years between 1885 and 1895 provided the best opportunity for China’s industrialization as internally civil wars subdued and externally foreign invasion was in an interim. Subsequently Qing financial status became better. Had the Qing government seized the opportunity to modernize the country, the outcome of the Sino-Japanese war would presumably have been different. However, existing studies indicate that government strategy was wrong and money was spent in the wrong place because of Manchu rule and the government’s policy to preserve Manchu supremacy. Manchu rulers’ attitude toward the Manchu question during the period of the Self-Strengthening Movement (1865-1895) was an important issue. Further examination of the question will help us understand better why China’s industrialization was slow in this critical period.
CONCLUSION

The Manchu question adversely affected China’s industrialization between 1865 and 1895. The aforementioned three decades were the golden period for China’s economic transformation. China’s industrialization began in 1865, yet 30 years later China was behind Japan in all of the important areas of modern development. China’s tardy industrialization was due to the lack of strong and efficient state leadership. The Manchu question weakened the power of the state, drained the state of its financial resources, and prevented strong and efficient state involvement in economic development.

Broadly speaking, effective state intervention took two forms as demonstrated by the Meiji government: direct governmental investment and policy assistance. The former refers to money invested in modern industries directly by the government. The latter consisted of general industrialization-oriented policies and concrete actions and measures to assist selected industries and enterprises. In general the Japanese government outperformed the Chinese government in all areas. First, the Meiji government’s investments in modern projects amounted to three times the Chinese government’s. In addition, compared with the Chinese government, the Meiji government’s policies at the macro-level covered a wider range of economic, financial, and social issues. Finally the Meiji government took some effective measures to assist Japanese companies, which the Chinese government failed to perform at a comparable level.

Ethnic rebellions in China between the 1850s and 1870s in general, and the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) in specific, severely undermined the power of the state in economic, military, and political terms. Consequently the weakened government was unable to lead China’s industrialization efficiently. Ethnic rebellions, however, resulted from ethnic inequalities created and reinforced by the state. Ultimately, therefore, the state was responsible for ethnic conflicts.

Moreover, the Manchu stipend drained the state of its already-tight finances after the Taiping Rebellion, resulting in insufficient governmental investment in modern industries. The Manchu stipend alone constituted approximately 20% of Qing expenditures between 1865 and 1895. The total sum of money the government spent on the Manchu stipend was seven times governmental investment in modern
projects. Hence it is safe to say that the government gave precedence to the welfare of the Manchu ethnic group over the economic development of China.

The fact that Manchu welfare took priority over China’s industrialization was firmly rooted in the Manchu question. Broadly speaking the Manchu question had two basic dimensions: politically Manchu rule of Qing China and Manchu supremacy in sociopolitical terms. Manchu rule and Manchu supremacy reinforced each other. Manchu rule created and reinforced Manchu supremacy, and Manchu supremacy motivated Manchus to support Manchu rule. The mutually supporting relations between the two resulted from the fact that the Qing empire was based on Manchu minority rule. To perpetuate Manchu rule of the empire, Manchu rulers needed to enlist wholehearted support from the Manchus. To preserve the ethnic identity of the Manchus immersed in the vast Chinese population, Manchu rulers needed to separate the Manchus from the Chinese physically and socially. Manchu rulers established the ethnic hierarchy in the empire, and placed the Manchus at the top.

The Manchus enjoyed sociopolitical privileges given to them by the state. Therefore the Manchus collectively had a vested interest in seeing the perpetuation of the empire. Presumably they offered support to the state wholeheartedly. Throughout the duration of the Qing dynasty, no Manchus rebelled against the state, while rebellions by other ethnic groups were common in the empire. Given the symbiotic relationship between the state and the Manchus, it is not surprising that the state not only allocated much more funds for Manchu livelihoods than for China’s industrialization, but sought to continue and reinforce Manchu dominance in sociopolitical domains. The Qing government’s failure to act on the Manchu question prior to 1895 in the way the Japanese government abolished the samurai was due to the fundamental difference between the two social groups: whereas the samurai were a class, the Manchus were an ethnic group which the Qing state most favored. And the Qing state’s failure to reform the Manchu question had a harmful consequence for China’s modernization.

The political developments after 1895, however, rendered the Manchu question obsolete. Pro-dynastic intellectuals and officials suggested reforming it, while revolutionaries advocated subverting the

38 Except for the Mongols, the other ethnic group at the top of the ethnic hierarchy.
state. Under increasing social pressure even the government had to face the Manchu question in the 1900s.

The move came too late, however, as discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII: THE DECLINE OF STATE POWER AND THE CHINESE SHOWDOWN ON THE MANCHU QUESTION: 1895-1911

This chapter deals with the process through which the Manchu question came to an end in the last decade or so of the Qing dynasty. The end of the Manchu question had much to do with the decline of state power. After China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, state power declined significantly. With the decline of state power, Chinese disaffection with the Manchu question grew increasingly. The Manchu question soon surfaced. The state reformed certain aspects of the Manchu question in the 1900s, namely Manchu-Chinese inequalities in the political and legal spheres. Yet the basic elements of the Manchu question remained unchanged. Under such a circumstance the revolutionaries launched anti-Manchu propaganda through newspapers and magazines published in Japan and Shanghai. Furthermore, revolutionaries organized armed revolts against the government, which culminated in the 1911 Revolution. The revolution brought the Manchu question to an end.

THE SURFACING OF THE MANCHU QUESTION

Qing state power declined significantly after the Sino-Japanese War. Soon afterwards Chinese disaffection with the Manchu question surfaced in the sense that pro-dynastic intellectuals and the government began to face the question. This section looks at two events: the One Hundred Days Reform and the New Politics (xinzheng), and examines how the two reforms dealt with the Manchu question respectively. The fact that the two reforms touched on the Manchu question illustrated the importance of the question in late Qing politics.

THE DECLINE OF STATE POWER

Qing financial status, which recovered in the middle of the 1880s from the destruction caused by ethnic rebellions between the 1850s and the 1870s, deteriorated once again due to war expenditure and indemnity to Japan, which amounted to 300 million taels, equal to three-and-a-half years’ revenue of the Qing government (Zhou 2000: 318). Moreover, the Boxer Indemnity following the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and the military engagement between China and the eight foreign powers dealt a heavier blow on the Qing government. The indemnity was 450 million taels and the Qing was obligated to pay it off in 39
The Qing took a number of measures to deal with the financial crisis. First, the central government apportioned the debt among the provinces. Second, the government cut spending on official salary and military. Third, the government levied new taxes or raised existing taxes on a wide range of commodities including grains, salt, and liquor. Fourth, the government allowed people to purchase official titles. Fifth, the government borrowed huge amounts of money from foreign banks. These measures added extra financial burdens to the provinces and the common people, and thereby the credibility of the government declined and the discord between the central government and the provinces grew increasingly (ibid: 389-405).

Politically the decline of the authority of the central government accelerated as reflected in the following two events. On June 21, 1900, the court issued an edict ordering provincial governors to help the Boxers to fight against the foreign powers invading Beijing. Governors and governors-general of several southeastern provinces, however, openly disobeyed the edict. On June 26 their representatives negotiated with foreign diplomats in Shanghai and signed two agreements, which stipulated that the foreign quarters in Shanghai were to be protected by the foreign powers. Meanwhile the Yangtze River, the two cites of Suzhou and Hangzhou, and other inland areas were to be protected by the provincial governors. The agreements stipulated that the foreign powers and the provincial governors should not “trouble” each other, but should protect the lives and properties of Chinese and foreigners. Later the court did not punish the governors but approved the agreements (Lü 2003: 74-76). The incident indicated that the central government’s control of the provincial officials was waning.

Another case involving the gentry in Jiangsu province took place in 1904 and further indicated the decline of the central government. In that year the court issued an edict abolishing the post of “governor-general of canal transportation” (caoyun zongdu). The order simultaneously divided Jiangsu into two provinces. However, officials and the gentry in the province opposed the separation because they believed that it would jeopardize the economic interests of the province. Under popular pressure the court had to revoke the original decision a few months later (Li 2003).
THE ONE HUNDRED DAY REFORM AND THE MANCHU QUESTION

The Manchu question surfaced against such a sociopolitical background. Chinese intellectuals, officials, and soon the government began to face the question. If the Taiping view on the Manchu question several decades ago was radical but superficial and unsystematic, then the proposals made by pro-dynastic groupings to reform the Manchu question provided insiders’ views on the Manchu question, revealing the seriousness of the issue.

The One Hundred Days Reform of 1898, which intended to carry out sweeping reforms in China’s political, economic, and social realms, touched on some aspects of the Manchu question for the first time since the Taiping Rebellion. Kang Youwei, the leading figure of the reform, submitted proposals to the Guangxu emperor to demobilize the banner troops, to eliminate the institutional disparity between the Manchus and the Chinese, and to cut the queue and change the Manchu address.

In a memorial submitted to the emperor in late June or early July 1898, Kang (1898a/2003: 230) suggested disbanding the banner troops. He pointed out that the Manchus as a whole were in poverty because they were not allowed to engage in industry or commerce, although they received stipend from the state. He recommended that the court allow banner men in the provinces to take on occupations of their choice, give them three years’ ration of rice, and allow them to register with local governments as civilians. Those who had military talents and wished to serve the country would be incorporated into the New Army, where they would receive the same stipend and training as Chinese soldiers. Moreover, Kang recommended preferential treatment of Manchus living in the capital. They should be granted farmland.

Kang pointed out that the Manchu stipend constrained the government’s finances. He suggested stopping giving the stipend and using the money saved in this way to create and train a new army organized on foreign models. He recommended that the government adopt German or Japanese military structure. Furthermore, he suggested founding military schools, making western-style weapons and supplies.

About a month later Kang (1898b/2003: 237) submitted another memorial, suggesting abolishing the separate governance of the Manchus and the Chinese. He argued that the key to the success of the
powerful nations in the world was not their political or military strength, but that the ruler and the subjects and the different ethnic groups (minzu) were united like one person. Hence the emperor should abolish the aforementioned institution to foster ethnic equality and harmony. In late August or early September, roughly a month before the coup by Cixi on September 20, Kang submitted a third memorial suggesting to the emperor that he issue an edict to cut the queue and change the Manchu official dress (1898c/2003: 265).

Kang’s proposals touched the baseline of Manchu rule. His first memorial to disband banner troops, if implemented, would eliminate the foundation of the existence of the Manchus qua banner people. His second memorial to abolish the separation of Manchus and Chinese went against an important state policy, namely the separate governance of the Manchus and Chinese. His third proposal to cut the queue and change Manchu dress was undoable from the Manchu perspective, as wearing the queue was symbolic of Manchu rule of China. Kang was hardly naïve, however, to recommend dealing with the Manchu question. It was an important issue at the time. Three years later empress dowager Cixi, the de facto ruler of the empire, began to deal with the issue, as seen in the next section.

The One Hundred Days Reform invited resistance from Cixi and Manchu officials. A few days after the coup Kang had an interview with B. Brenan in Shanghai, where Kang took refuge. The British pro-consul general to Shanghai reported the meeting to British Foreign Ministry in a document dated September 26, 1898. According to Brenan, Kang told him that the main reason for the coup was that the emperor issued an edict to change the Manchu dress. Cixi and all high-ranking Manchu officials opposed the reform. Kang gave Brenan a list of names: Ronglu, Gangyi, Prince Qing, Prince Duan, Huaitabu, and Lishan. In contrast those who supported the reform were all low-ranking Chinese officials (Brenan 1898/2003: 526-527).

Three months later Liang Qichao, Kang’s student and a major participant of the reform, founded the newspaper Political Criticism by Scholars (qingyibao) in Japan. His lead commentary in the inaugural issue was an article attacking the Manchus. He charged that the Manchus “look upon the Han [Chinese], without reason, as an alien race who mean them ill; all the while they are oblivious that the harm that the
truly alien race [westerners] will inflict will be a hundred million times greater” (cited in Rhoads 2000: 4). Further he called for the abolition of institutional Manchu-Chinese inequalities, or in his words, “to tear down the boundaries between the Manchus and the Chinese” (ping Man-Han zhi jie). Part of this article read (ibid: 4-5):

If their oppressive policies continue much longer, they will engender a great upheaval, in which resolute scholars all over the country will either declare independence, as in America, or start a revolution, as in France and Spain. By then, of course, it will be too late for the Manchus to regret. Or if it does not happen like this, then after a few more years of today’s reactionary government, there will be partition. As partition takes place, the secret societies will rise and run amok. Since the government’s authority cannot penetrate to the local level, the people will have free rein to take their revenge. Whatever else might happen, the Manchus in the provincial garrisons will surely be annihilated.

Liang’s prediction of Chinese declaring independence, secret societies’ role in an upheaval, and genocide of Manchus in the garrisons to a large extent came true in the 1911 revolution as discussed later. Further, Liang’s article was the first reasoned condemnation of the Manchus since the Taiping Rebellion. It signaled an anti-Manchu propaganda as discussed later. I summarize Kang’s and Liang’s remarks by saying that their remarks testified from different angles that the Manchu question was an important issue in China’s political realm. Three years later even conservative officials began to face it.

**THE NEW POLITICS AND THE MANCHU QUESTION**

On January 29, 1901, in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion and foreign occupation of the capital, Cixi issued an edict in the name of the Guangxu emperor, proclaiming that the court was ready to conduct sweeping reforms concerning a broad range of issues. Cixi called on officials to submit proposals within two months, and admonished them to take responsibilities when the empire was in crisis by giving up empty talk and going through the motions or they would be punished without exceptions (GXCDHL: 4601-4602). The edict heralded the beginning of the New Politics (xinzheng). In July 1901 Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi, the two most powerful provincial governors at the time, jointly submitted three memorials suggesting the methods to train and select men of abilities, reform China’s institutions, and adopt Western institutions. Among the twelve reforms of Chinese institutions39, the ninth item was to

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39 The twelve reforms were to 1. encourage frugality, 2. abolish obsolete rules, 3. stop the practice of selling official titles, 4. establish modern schools, 5. dismiss office clerks, 6. dismiss governmental bailiffs, 7. reform prison, 8. reform the procedure for selecting officials, 9. plan for the livelihood of banner people, 10. reduce the staff of canal
“plan for the livelihood” of banner people. Being the actual writer of the memorial, Zhang Zhidong (1901/1998: 1417-1423) suggested that the court lift the ban on banner people’s occupation, that is, to allow them to take on jobs of their choice, not limited to military service. Unlike Kang Youwei, who suggested cutting the Manchu stipend and ration of rice, Zhang and Liu suggested continuing payment of the stipend and rice. But they did recommend opening the door to further reform: if Manchus in the provinces were willing to leave the garrisons and live in Chinese quarters, then they should be allowed to do so, but still registered as “banner people in temporary residency” (jiju qiren). If they wished to be registered as civilians like the Chinese, then they should be allowed to do so as well. In either case, they should be treated equally to civilians (Chinese) by local governments. In addition, the court should reduce the number of banner troops. The money and rice saved in this way would be used to found schools to train Manchus in academia, agriculture, industry, commerce, and military so that they would be able to support themselves in the future. If they did not master job skills and fail to support themselves economically, then the state would continue to pay them stipend and rice.

Zhang’s and Liu’s suggestions were only limited reforms to the Manchu question. With the progress of the New Politics, the court gradually loosened the policy of separate governance of the Manchus and Chinese. On February 1, 1902, Cixi issued an edict allowing Manchu-Chinese intermarriage. In 1906 the court reformed the procedure for selecting and appointing officials. The new system abolished the Manchu-Chinese diarchy and Chinese officials began to be placed in positions reserved for Manchus before. In 1908 legal discrimination was abolished. The reforms notwithstanding, the basic elements of the Manchu question remained intact: the banner system *per se* was preserved, and so were the Manchu stipend and ration of rice, which were exempt from tax. In contrast, the Chinese received no financial aid from the state on a monthly basis and their income was subject to state tax. Furthermore, Manchu dominance of the central government remained in place. After the abolition of the Manchu-Chinese
diarchy more Manchus were appointed in the top ranks of the metropolitan bureaucracy than before (Chi 2001).

ANTI-MANCHEU PROPAGANDA BY THE REVOLUTIONARIES

As the power of the state was declining and ethnic inequalities remained in place, Chinese revolutionaries began to promulgate anti-Manchuism openly in their publications in 1901. Anti-Manchuism in the 1900s was a complex ideological system and reflected an unusual era in Chinese history. Wang Chunxia (2005) links anti-Manchuism to revolutionaries’ effort to reconstruct Chinese history centering on the Han in the hope of establishing a Han nation-state. In her view, the reconstruction of Chinese history had four aspects. The first was to regard the Yellow King as the first male ancestor of all the Han in order to unify the Han as a people different from the Manchus. The second aspect was to glorify Han heroes who fought against “alien” invasions. Particularly Ming loyalists who resisted the Qing conquest were highlighted. The third element was the condemnation of “Han traitors” (hanjian) who collaborated with “alien” dynasties in Chinese history. The fourth aspect was to advocate preserving essential elements of Han culture. Wang maintains that revolutionaries were narrow-minded and ethnocentric in their interpretation of Chinese history.

I agree with Wang that anti-Manchuism was connected with revolutionaries’ political agenda. Unlike Wang, who overlooks ethnic inequality in her analysis of anti-Manchuism, I view the ideology as rooted in Manchu-Chinese inequality at the time. In my view ethnic inequality was an important factor that motivated the Chinese revolutionaries to endeavor to establish a Chinese nation-state. The Chinese were treated unfairly in four aspects. First the Chinese were obligated to pay state tax, while the Manchus were exempt from it. Moreover, the state supported the Manchus financially in the form of stipend. Because of this it is safe to say that Manchu livelihood was ultimately sustained by Chinese tax payers. Second, although the intermarriage ban was lifted in 1902, it produced no significant direct effect. The government had long permitted intermarriage between Manchu men and Chinese women due to women’s

Wang’s usage of Han corresponds to my usage of Chinese. She uses Chinese to refer to all ethnic groups that once lived in what is called China today.
lower social status at the time. Married women were considered as members of their husbands’ families, and children were considered to be descendents of their fathers. Precisely speaking the ban was aimed at forbidding intermarriage between Chinese men and Manchu women. After the ban was lifted cases of intermarriage between Chinese men and Manchu women remained rare (Rhoads 2000). In practice the opposite cases were more common. As intermarriage did not take place in two ways it remained a social problem. Third, the abolition of the Manchu-Chinese diarchy in 1906 fell short of Chinese expectations. Contrary to the popular expectation that Chinese would dominate the bureaucracy as they constituted more than 90% of the entire population, in fact more Manchus were appointed at the top ranks of the important departments of the government (Chi 2001). Finally, although the state in 1908 abolished the Manchu legal system and the Manchus and the Chinese were subject to the same legal system, the change came too late. The government made the move only after the anti-Manchu propaganda reached its peak.

Materials left by the revolutionaries indicated that Anti-Manchuism in the 1900s differed from traditional versions of Chinese ethnic sentiment against the Manchus—for instance, the Taiping version—for two counts. First the new version was based on pseudo-scientific classifications of the peoples in the world, which revolutionaries borrowed from the West through Japan. The word “race” itself was ambiguous. In some cases it referred to a group of people with certain physical characteristics, and in some cases it had the connotation of ethnic group understood as common ancestry and culture.

Second the revolutionaries were influenced by social Darwinism, which was popular at the time. They accepted the idea of the survival of the fittest, and viewed imperialism and colonialism as competition among races. Furthermore, the revolutionaries had an ethnocentric view on the ethnic groups in the Qing and regarded the Chinese race (hanzhong) as superior to the Manchus. They asserted that the Chinese would survive the competition between the yellow race (huangzhong) and the white race, but that the Manchus would perish. To win the race competition the Chinese should establish their own nation-state because the Chinese race was different from the Manchu race, who oppressed the Chinese in their own country.
The anti-Manchu propaganda began in 1901 and came to an end around 1908. The foreign quarters in Shanghai under foreign sovereignty (zujie) and Japan were the two bases of the revolutionaries. They printed newspapers and magazines in Shanghai and Japan, and held rallies in cities such as Yokohama and Tokyo in Japan (Zhang and Wang 1960). Subversive discourses and demonstrations were not allowed by the Qing government. As a result no anti-Manchu discourse was published in Chinese territory under the government’s control. In fact the majority of the authors were Chinese students and scholars in Japan. Their publications were circulated among Chinese students in Japan and were smuggled back into China. Students also spread anti-Manchuiism in China when they came back to China. No evidence was found indicating that members of other ethnic groups published discourses on ethnic relations.

The authors adopted two strategies in their discourse against the Manchus and the government. First they resorted to history to attack the Manchus. For example, they frequently charged that the Manchus massacred civilian Chinese during the conquest in the seventeenth century and imposed the Manchu male hairstyle on the Chinese. The second strategy was: they pointed to ethnic inequality, arguing that the Manchu government treated the Manchus and the Chinese unequally in economic, political, and social terms.

The propaganda culminated in the debate between the revolutionaries and constitutionalists between 1905 and 1907. In 1905 the court proclaimed that it was prepared to establish a constitutional system. Supporters believed that this would save China. Revolutionaries charged that it was merely a trick to deceive the Chinese. In this year revolutionaries from various political groups founded the organization the Alliance (Tongmenghui) in Tokyo, Japan. Revolutionaries and constitutionalists launched a debate starting this year and ending in 1907. The debate centered on two questions: Were the Manchus an alien people ruling the Chinese unfairly? Was a revolution necessary to save China?

Revolutionaries argued that the answers to both questions were affirmative. They published articles in their organ People’s Journal (Minbao) to explain why and called on people to rise up against the Manchu government. Constitutionals published articles mainly in New People’s Journal (Xinmin congbao) sponsored by Liang Qichao. They admitted that the Manchus were an alien people, but they
were opposed to revolution because in their view any radical change would cause serious turmoil in the country.

The following section will focus on revolutionaries’ propaganda. Zou Rong and Chen Tianhua were two well-known revolutionaries writing monographs on anti-Manchuism, and rich literature exists on them. For instance, Zou’s *Revolutionary Army* has been translated into English and printed in the US. In this section I will introduce less than well-known revolutionaries and their thoughts to suggest that a large number of Chinese upheld anti-Manchuism at the time.

**CASES OF ANTI-MANCHU DISCOURSE**

Zhang Binglin (1901/1960) published “Correcting the Notion that We Hate the Manchus” in Citizens’ Journal (*Guominbao*) on August 10, 1901. He refuted the charge made by Liao Qichao that revolutionaries hated the Manchus as a people. Zhang argued that the Manchus sought to control and annihilate the Chinese, and everything the Manchus did was harmful enough to make China lost to foreigners. Zhang charged that Manchu officials were corrupted and murderous. He decried that the five million Manchus successfully ruled the 400 million Chinese by keeping them in ignorance and fettering them with obsolete laws. In addition, Zhang asserted that both the Manchus and the Westerners were alien peoples to the Chinese. Manchus had stolen and taken possession of China for over 200 years and Westerners were trying to colonize China.

Zhang argued that to expel the Manchus was not equal to killing them. He stated that the Manchus could go back to the Northeast and establish their autonomous regime and that the Chinese did not intend to revenge the massacres that the Manchus conducted when they entered China proper but only attempted to expatriate the Manchus back to their homeland. At the end of the article, Zhang claimed that he had a feeling of intimacy with the Japanese but not with the Manchus because the Chinese and the Japanese shared certain customs, written language, and in general way of life.

In 1903 Yu Yi (1903/1960) published the article *On Nationalism* in the February and March issues of Zhejiang Tides (*Zhejiangchao*). The tone of his language was moderate; nevertheless his thoughts might be more subversive as he formulated a reasoned argument against the Manchus. He first asserted
that the world had entered the age of nationalism. If nationalism was not advocated in China, then the Chinese would eventually lose their country. The author then continued to elaborate on the origins of the state and nationalism, and the importance of the nation-state (minzude guojia).

Yu asserted that the state originated from competition among peoples. A state represented the interest of the people that established the state. Therefore if two peoples were forced to live in one country by the government, then the state would eventually collapse because the two peoples could hardly identify with each other due to their different cultures and, more importantly, psyches. When the government was powerful, then the peoples would view the country as the government’s possession, and consequently they would not identify with the government. Furthermore when an absolutist government was in control of the country, it would carry out policies to obscurantism and consequently people would become ignorant and selfish. The government and the people would not care about each other; hence the country would decline eventually. When the power of the government declined, then people would rise up against the government.

If the above article was an implicit criticism of the empire, not touching on the Manchus and the Chinese, then the following article was an explicit condemnation of the government. On May 2, 1903, Children’s World (Tongzi Shijie) published the article No Difference between Being Slaves of Foreigners and Being Slaves of the Manchu Government (author unknown 1903/1960). The article attributed China’s weakness to the “savage” Manchu government, which treated the Chinese as slaves. The author further alerted that the Chinese would soon be enslaved by the “civilized” British. In either case the Chinese were slaves of an alien people.

In addition to a broad alienation and condemnation of the Manchus, revolutionaries also pointed to specific issues to conduct their propaganda against the Manchus. The revolutionaries viewed wearing the queue as a sign of compliance to Manchu rule. They called on Chinese to cut the queue and support the revolution looming on the horizon. In 1903 the magazine The Soul of the Yellow King (Huangdihun) published an article entitled The Origin of the Queue. The author (name unknown 1903/1960) began with

41 Legend has it that the Yellow King was the first male ancestor of the Chinese.
the statement that he was delighted to hear that in Guangxi province alone as many as 18,000 people had cut their queues, and that overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia under Dutch rule had followed suit. He mourned over the fact that those who were still wearing the queue were humiliated or even killed when they traveled to foreign countries. In the author’s view the queue looked like a rope, a chain, or an animal’s tail. Even Chinese themselves felt that it was ugly, not to mention foreigners. Nevertheless these people refused to cut the queue, saying either the court ordered to wear the hairstyle or their ancestors passed down the custom on them. The author charged that these people were ignorant, then he went on to explain where the queue came from.

He proudly claimed that China was the country where civilization arose. Chinese clothing was well known in the world for its artistic quality. According to the author barbarians who had invaded China willingly complied with Chinese dress. Even the Mongols of the Yuan dynasty did so. As a consequence Chinese dress and hairstyle remained unchanged for up to 4,000 years. After reviewing Chinese history, the authors began to attack the Manchus. According to him, the Manchus, who originated from the Tartar tribes (Dada zhi buluo), invaded and occupied the country with assistance from immoral Chinese. The Manchus ordered everybody to shave their heads, or they would be killed. In every city they took the Manchus carried out massacres. Those who survived were forced to shave their heads. The author passionately argued that Chinese suffered physically from cutting their hair and wearing the queue. Finally he encouraged Chinese to cut the queue and adopt the western hairstyle since it was the trend of the world.

In September 1905, Song Jiaoren published the article *Discussing the Qing Empress Dowager’s Constitutional Politics* in the magazine *The Awaken Lion (Xingshi)*. Song maintained that the Manchu government would not establish a constitutional system wholeheartedly because a genuine constitutional system would benefit the Chinese more than the Manchus. Even if Cixi was so benevolent that she was
willing to abolish Manchu privileges, “not all of the two million Tungus\textsuperscript{42} are willing to give up their interests” (ibid: 71).

Song further pointed out three issues on which the Manchus would not compromise. The first was the state tax. While the Chinese were subject to land tax and canal transportation tax, the Manchus were exempt from them. Furthermore, they received stipends and rice from the state. The second matter was that Manchus enjoyed a disproportional large share of officials in the bureaucracy and Chinese were excluded from certain departments such as the Imperial Household Department and the Court of Colonial Affairs. The third issue was governmental finances. Song argued that the government was sustained financially by Chinese tax payers, hence their representatives in the future parliament should have the right to monitor the government’s finances. Yet the government was unlikely to allow parliament to make budget. Song concluded that the Manchu government would not abolish the unequal institutions and that it would not conduct authentic constitutionalism. He finally declared that “we Chinese should never be conceived by what woman Nala\textsuperscript{43} said” (ibid: 71).

In October 1905 Zhe Shen published the article \textit{Manchus Unable to Establish Constitutional System Even If They Wish} in People’s Journal. Zhe (1905: 116) first pointed out that debaters had focused on the question of whether or not Manchus were willing to establish a constitutional system. Zhe asserted that it was a wrong question; rather, the essential point was whether or not Manchus could carry out what they promised. In his view Manchus were unable to conduct the task even if they had the intention to do so because China lacked ethnic cohesion needed for the impletion of a constitutional system. Constitutionalism was based on constitution, which was made by self-governed people. Autonomy in turn came from people collaborating with one another. Ultimately people were the foundation of constitutionalism.

Zhe claimed that in China the Manchus and the Chinese did not get along well with each other. Manchus had stolen China from the Chinese, and that the Chinese for up to more than 200 years never

\textsuperscript{42}A prevailing estimate of the Manchu population at the time was four to five million. Song might have deliberately decreased the number in order to diminish the significance of the Manchus in the country.

\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Nalashi}. Nala was Cixi’s personal name. This was a disrespectful way to address her.
forgot the “national injustice” (guochou) and made continuous efforts at revenge. In his view the collaboration of the two peoples was unthinkable due to the long history of Manchus and Chinese killing each other. Furthermore, Zhe asserted that the government was concerned about the Manchus only since it gave the Manchus political privileges and financial assistance. Due to ethnic inequality, a sense of national injustice went deeper and deeper in Chinese hearts as time passed by. As a result, the Chinese were unwilling to live side by side with the Manchus under one emperor. The author asserted that a revolution would happen in the near future. According to him, the revolution first was aimed at ethnic revenge. To subvert the despotic government was only a secondary goal. Zhe refuted the belief that Manchu-Chinese boundaries would disappear automatically once a constitutional system was established.

As time passed by revolutionaries began to talk about military revolt openly. In April 1906 Pu Man⁴⁴ published *Launching a Revolution* in *Citizens’ Journal*. The author sought to offer the best strategy for the revolutionary army (gemingjun) to subvert the government. He started with the presumption that three major ways existed for people to rebel. The first was to occupy the capital, establish a government, and then put the whole country under control. The second method was to establish a military base, and the third way was to rise up in multiple places simultaneously. After having surveyed European and Chinese history the author asserted that European revolutionary armies adopted the first method as in France and England, whereas Chinese revolutionary armies tended to use the second and third methods. According to the author, the revolutionary army at the time could hardly defeat the government by taking the second way because the government would exhaust all its military sources to fight against the new, inexperienced, and vulnerable revolutionary army. Hence the revolutionaries needed to take the third method.

He further articulated the strength and weakness of the method. He argued the method had two merits. First, when a large number of people rose up the government lost its supporting base. Secondly, when people rebelled in multiple places the government would have to divide up its military forces. Thus each subdivision became weak. In addition, when people rose up in everywhere the government would

⁴⁴ It was probably a pen-name. It literally meant “exterminate the Manchus.”
lose its sources of military supplies. However, according to the author, the method had two shortcomings that revolutionaries needed to be aware of. First, the vast majority of people in the revolutionary army had no concept of people’s rights (*mingquan*) due to the long tradition of autocracy in the country. What they envisioned after overthrowing the present government was only another autocratic government ruled by the revolutionaries themselves. Secondly, when people rose in numerous places communications between them would inevitably be scarce and insufficient. As a result conflict would arise easily. Regarding this matter the author offered two suggestions. First, revolutionaries needed to propagate nationalism and rule by people (*guominzhuyi*). Second, revolutionaries needed to form a united group to organize people.

In mid-1905 the court proclaimed that it was prepared to establish a constitutional government. Later that year it sent five high-ranking officials to Europe, US, and Japan to study their political systems. On October 24 when the five constitutional commissioners were leaving Beijing, Wu Yue, a member of the Society for Glorious Restoration, attempted to assassinate them at the Qianmen train station. He managed to board the train. However the train lurched untimely causing the bomb hidden on his body to detonate prematurely. Wu was killed instantly, and two of the five commissioners were injured (Rhoads 2000: 97; Hirayama Shu 1911/1980: 100)

Wu (1906) was motivated by anti-Manchuism as expressed in his posthumous farewell letter entitled “My Opinion” published in April 1906 in *People’s Journal*. He believed that constitutionalism would not benefit China. Wu listed five reasons for his action. First, he was a believer of the notion of nation-state. He asserted that the Chinese could not tolerate the Manchus and vice versa. Second, in his view, to support the Manchu government would not save China because Manchus were determined to exclude Chinese. In the eyes of the Manchu government China was an unexpected windfall. Thereby it ceded Chinese territories and sacrificed Chinese sovereignty generously. The Chinese in turn did not identify with the Manchu government. Hence “the Manchu government is really the greatest obstacle for China to become rich and strong” (ibid: 392).

Thirdly, Wu asserted that Manchus were unable to establish constitutionalism because they were ignorant, selfish, and vicious. Fourthly, the Manchu government’s policies on the Chinese were cruel and
unfair. Fifthly, constitutionalism would not benefit the Chinese because the government was concerned with the Manchus only. Under future constitutional system “the Manchus and the Chinese definitely will not have equal rights” (ibid: 392).

Anti-Manchuism reached its culmination in 1907. In April an article entitled Proclamation of a War of Revenge on the Manchus (Junzhengfu: 1907) appeared in Heaven’s Punishment (Tiantao), a supplementary issue to People’s Journal. The article was published in the name of “the military government” of Chinese citizens (Zhonghua guomin). The document was written by Zhang Binglin. Zhang listed 14 major crimes the Manchus committed against the Chinese since they entered China, and pledged, in the name of the military government, to expel the Manchus on behalf of the Chinese. Next, Zhang announced the government’s policy on the various ethnic groups in China: the government would unify all the ethnic groups in order to form an alliance against the Manchus.

The proclamation then called on all the Chinese to join the revolutionaries’ course. Further it declared the revolutionaries’ attitude toward the Manchus. If Manchus realized that they were wrong and wished to go back to their homeland, then they would be allowed to do so. If they wished to stay in China, then they would be allowed to engage in all professions and would be treated equally by the revolutionary government. Finally the proclamation warned the Manchus that the revolutionary government was determined to carry out a campaign of genocide against the Manchus (ibid: 714).

In addition to Zhang’s call for a revenge war and threatening remarks, the Heaven’s Punishment published Wu Yue’s (1907) another posthumous article, The Age of Assassination. Wu indicted that the Manchus had subjugated the Chinese as slaves ever since they conquered China. The Manchu government proclaimed that it was ready to establish a constitutional system, yet its real intention was to

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45 According to Zhang (ibid: 710-712) the crimes were: 1. The Manchus ruled the Chinese in a way as if they were slaves; 2. The Manchus transferred Chinese wealth to their homeland; 3. The Manchus levied heavy taxes on the Chinese; 4. The Manchus massacred civilian Chinese during the conquest; 5. With the connivance of Manchu emperors the Dutch killed thousands of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia; 6. The Manchus exterminated the imperial lineage of the Chinese Ming dynasty; 7. Manchu emperors killed a large number of disaffected Chinese scholars; 8. Manchu emperors destroyed more than 8000 kinds of Chinese books to ensure ideological control; 9. The Manchus made the legal system where Chinese criminals were enslaved and given to banner troops as presents; 10. The Manchus made strict laws to control the Chinese; 11. The Manchus recently created the police, who harassed law-abiding Chinese citizens; 12. The Manchus destroyed good Chinese customs; 13. Under Manchu rule officials became corrupted; 14. The Manchus imposed the queue on Chinese males.
ruin the Chinese so that they would never become independent and thereby the Manchus could perpetuate their rule. The constitutionalists, in Wu’s view, were slaves of, and made by, the Manchus. Hence to resolve the problem completely he had made up his mind to expel the Manchus.

He pointed out two ways to achieve the goal. The first way was to assassinate Manchu officials. He claimed that two groups of Manchus needed to be killed: those who had already enslaved the Chinese, and those who would ruin the Chinese. The head of the first group was “slut Nala” (Nala yinfu, referring to Cixi), and the head of the second group was Tieliang. Wu stated that the second way to expel the Manchus would be a revolution aimed at subverting Manchu rule because the Manchus were an alien people who had stolen China from the Chinese, and enslaved the Chinese on their own land. In the section entitled “To my respectable fellow countrymen” Wu revealed his passion for the Chinese and his determination to die for them (ibid: 729).

In July 1907 Zhang Binglin published Explaining the Republic of China in People’s Journal. It was the first treatise on the popular notion that China belonged to the Chinese. Furthermore, it elaborated on the complex issue of ethnic relations in the future republic. Zhang mainly discussed the ethnic groups’ political status. Meanwhile he touched on the economic development of the ethnic territories. It was an influential discourse at the time. The post-Qing Chinese government adopted the state title “Zhonghua Minguo” (The Republic of China) suggested in this article. Hence this article deserves a careful treatment here.

The article can be divided into three sections. The first section elaborated on the origins and meanings of the terms referring to the Chinese. Zhang articulated that the three terms Hua, Xia, and Han referred to both the Chinese people and the Chinese land. The remote ancestors of the Chinese, Bixi, Shennong, Huangdi, Gaoyang, Gaoxin, Yu, and Shun were born or rose in either Yongzhou or Liangzhou, two regions adjacent to the Hua Mountain. Thus ancient Chinese named their state “Hua.” Over time the term came into reference to the people. As of the official name of the Chinese as a people, Zhang argued that “Xia” was suitable. The name came from the Xia River, another name being Han River, running in Yongzhou and Liangzhou. Later the word Xia was used to address the Chinese.
According to Zhang, the Chinese established their first state, the Han dynasty, beginning in the Hanzhong area in the extensive Yongzhou-Liang region. Thus, the three terms Hua, Xia, and Han were a trinity, referring to both the Chinese people and the Chinese territory. Zhang concluded the first section by arguing that at present the term Han was appropriate for the name of the people as it also contained the connotation of the state; and that the term Hua was suitable for the state title as it included the connotation of the people.

The second section refuted the notion that the term “Zhonghua” (Chinese) referred to a culture instead of a state or a people. Some people at the time asserted that the word “Hua” (Chinese) referred to all civilized peoples in a broad sense. Zhang argued that the theme was wrong on three counts. First, the word hua originally referred to the Hua Mountain. Over time it came to refer to the Chinese as a people. With the passage of time many other meanings derived from it such as splendid and civilized, yet not all civilized peoples were Chinese.

Secondly, Zhang charged that those people cited the classic Spring and Autumn incorrectly and misinterpreted Chinese history. They claimed, Zhang continued, that there was no distinctive line between the Chinese and the barbarians in the Spring and Autumn period because some Chinese states and barbarian states frequently joined hands in wars against other Chinese states. Zhang decried that the theory originated from those Chinese who served the Manchu “barbarians” and distorted history. Zhang argued that prior to the Han dynasty the Chinese regarded barbarians as less than human beings. The book Spring and Autumn recorded that once the Chinese states of the Xing and the Qi connived with the Di barbarians to attack the Chinese state of the Wei. The book called the Di “people.” Zhang argued that Spring and Autumn as a whole condemned those Chinese who conspired with barbarians to kill other Chinese. Hence it could be inferred that the book intended to humiliate the Xing and the Qi by lumping them together with the Barbarian Di. To support his argument Zhang gave another example in Spring and Autumn where the semi-barbarian state Chu annexed the Chinese states the Chen and the Cai. When other Chinese states appealed to it to help the Chen and the Cai, the powerful Chinese state Jin refused their request. Spring and Autumn called the Jin “barbarian.” Zhang concluded that although in some cases
Spring and Autumn degraded Chinese states as barbarians, it never upgraded the barbarians to the same level as the Chinese. A clear line existed between the Chinese and the barbarians. He asked rhetorically: “Is it reasonable to upgrade the Manchus?” (ibid: 737)

Thirdly, Zhang charged that the aforementioned notion did not take into account veritable historical records. In his view it was wrong to say that the Chinese were the product of hundreds of different peoples who amalgamated together over time. Zhang acknowledged that the biological make-up of a people could not be measured precisely with a device. Nevertheless, he maintained that the majority of an ethnic group shared blood ties because cultural homogeneity originated from common blood ties. In his view the Chinese were a group of people who shared blood relations. In addition to the Chinese, other ethnic groups existed in Chinese history and they were subject to Chinese rule. As a result they gradually absorbed the Chinese way of life. Since the Wei and the Jin states (ca. the third century) a number of minority groups had assimilated into the Chinese.

Clearly Zhang was promulgating the notion of a Chinese nation-state. In the third section of his article Zhang put forth his suggestions for state-building. First he demarcated the territory of the future state, which would be the land under Chinese rule in history. He advocated that the new “Chinese republic” should take the Ming provinces as its main body if it could not restore the territory of the Han dynasty. In addition the state should include Korea, Vietnam, and Burma under its sovereignty. The “Chinese Republic” should first take back the two prefectures [jun] of Korea and Vietnam because they were under the rule of Chinese dynasties for hundreds of years. Afterwards the republic should direct its attention to Burma because it was ruled by the Ming as a minority district (si). Zhang then took a step backward, acknowledging that difficulty varied from case to case. The three “uncivilized lands” (fuhuang), namely Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, were easier for the republic to take in possession because they were not under the control of foreign powers.

Zhang then focused on ethnic relations in the republic. In regard to cultural assimilation he asserted that the Uyghurs were intelligent and they would learn the Chinese language and characters faster than the “benighted” (zhuanyu) Mongols. The Mongols were gradually picking up the Chinese language as well
because of Chinese merchants in Mongolia. In contrast the Tibetans would require much more Chinese effort because Tibetans had their own civilization and was under little Chinese cultural influence.

Next Zhang turned to the economic field. He argued that Mongolia was the most challenging region because its land was not suitable for agriculture. In the political and legal realm, Zhang continued, Xinjiang was more difficult than Tibet and Mongolia for the Chinese to administer. The Manchu government had sent Manchu officials to Tibet to assistant Tibetan religious leaders. Chinese officials had long been in some areas in Mongolia. Hence it would not be difficult for the republic to appoint Chinese officials to administer these two regions. Unlike the Mongols, who were trusted by the Manchus, or the Tibetans, whose religion was honored by the Manchus, the Uyghurs were mistreated by the Manchus. Consequently the Uyghurs harbored a strong animosity against the Manchus. They might direct their anger to the Chinese in the future. Hence administration of the Uyghurs was a thorny issue demanding much Chinese effort.

Due to the differences Zhang argued that the republic would need to set a twenty-year-period for the Mongols, Tibetans, and Uyghurs to participate in state affairs. During the preparation period the republic would establish effective administrative and educational institutions in each of the three regions, and would encourage native peoples to engage in agriculture and industry. Afterwards they would be given the rights to vote and to be elected. Zhang refuted the notion that the only prerequisite for the three ethnic groups to participate in state politics was their proficiency in Chinese. Zhang asserted that having the language did not mean that these minorities would understand Chinese social structure (shehui xingtai). If the state had to give them access to politics, then the government would allow the minorities to elect their representatives in future parliament. They would be allowed to offer their opinions on issues related to their communities, excluding issues of national importance.

Having discussed the Tibetans, Mongols, and Uyghurs, Zhang turned his attention to the Manchus. In his view the Manchus did not reach the level of the three “uncivilized peoples” in terms of the work ethic, even though the Manchus had adopted the Chinese language. While the Uyghurs and the Tibetans engaged in agriculture and the Mongols raised livestock, the Manchus were unaccustomed to any of these
occupations. This was the reason why they were called “lazy people” (*duomin*). Hence the Manchus did not qualify to participate in state politics because they knew little to nothing about the society. In his conclusion Zhang reiterated that the goal of the republic was to ensure sovereignty over the three “uncivilized lands” and restore sovereignty over Korea, Vietnam, and Burma.

Contrary to revolutionaries, constitutionalists argued that gradual reforms would work for China better than an abrupt revolution. Regarding the Manchu question they argued that they did not like the Manchus. Nevertheless they opposed the idea to expel the Manchus because they believed that that would bring about internal disorder, which in turn would doom China. The standard-bearer Liang Qichao summarized the constitutionalists’ stand on the issue in a nutshell. In an article published in *New People’s Journal* in March 1906, Liang (1906: 237) wrote:

> The reason why I say this [opposing revolution], really is not because I hold love for the Manchus. In terms of emotion, although I am not like you [revolutionaries], I am a man of flesh and blood too. Every time I read *Ten Days in Yangzhou* and *A Brief Account on the Massacres in Jiading*, they make my blood boil. Therefore a few years ago I put forth anti-Manchuism. Although everyday my mentor and my friends criticized me, I never gave it any thought to changing my theory. Even now thoughts of that kind still reside in my mind. Every time I drink and get slightly drunk, I cannot help uttering the theory intermittently. If it is the right way to save our country and avenge the feud, then why should I not admire it even if I am not a sensible person? These two matters by no means are compatible. Revenge has to come from a violent revolution, which will definitely be followed by an unguenuine republic, which in turn will lead our country to destruction. Hence weighing the two against each other, I would like to bear the shame and humiliation than becoming a sinner making our country perish.

Revolutionaries eventually gained the upper hand at the end of the debate. In 1907 Yu Zhi (1907), himself a constitutionalist, published the article *On China’s Political Parties at the Present and Politics in the Future* in *New People’s Journal*. The author admitted that revolutionary thoughts had penetrated the minds of everyday people and that constitutionalists had lost their influence and had become the underdog in the debate.

Revolutionary thoughts influenced thousands of Chinese students in Japan. When they returned to China, they spread the ideas among young people and members of secret societies in that country. Anti-Manchuism became the zeitgeist of China in the 1900s. It penetrated the minds of people from all walks of life. It made significant inroads into the New Army, which the Qing created in the hope of
strengthening its rule. Yet ironically the New Army became the gravedigger of the empire as shown in the following section.

**ANTI-MANCHU ARMED REVOLTS**

In the 1900s, the Alliance led by Sun Yat-sen organized more than ten armed revolts in southern China, including the famous Huanghuagang Revolt that took place in the spring of 1900 in Guangzhou. In addition to the Alliance, other revolutionaries launched armed revolts as well. This section focuses on three such revolts and explores the motivations of the leaders. The first two were led by Xiong Chengji and Qiu Jin. Both were quelled by the government. The third was the Wuchang Revolt that fired the first shot in the 1911 Revolution. I use archival and primary sources to exemplify that these revolts were directed against the Manchus because of the continuing existence of the Manchu question.

**THE REVOLT IN ANQING**

On November 19, 1908 Xiong Chengji commanded more than 1,000 soldiers of the Anhui New Army to rebel in Anqi, the provincial capital of Anhui. Xiong was 22 years old that year. He was born in a low-ranking official family. His grandfather once was the magistrate of Fanchang County, Anhui province; and his father was a candidate for a position at the county level (*tongpan*). Xiong graduated from Nanyang Cannon School. Afterwards he was appointed as cannon *paizhang* (in charge of 42 soldiers) of the Ninth Corp (*zhen*, the highest subdivision of the army) of the New Army. Later he was transferred to Anhui Cavalry and was promoted to *Duiguan* in charge of 126 soldiers. From the cavalry he was transferred to cannon *duiguan*. At such a young age Xiong was on track to a promising military career, which was made possible by the government’s effort to establish a new army based on German and Japanese models.

However, Xiong was a revolutionary whose ultimate goal was to overthrow the government. For that purpose Xiong treated his subordinates well and formed a secret group among his colleagues. At the time of the revolt the Hubei and Nanyang Armies were in Anhui for exercise. The Guangxu emperor and Cixi

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46 The account is based on Xiong’s “confession” contained in LJB: 40.
47 This description of the military units of the late Qing is based on Li (2003b: 245-247).
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had died recently and as a consequence the country was in a state of disturbance. Xiong saw it as an opportunity. On November 19 he had a secret meeting with several of his comrades, where they unanimously agreed to Xiong’s plan for the action: They would easily take Anqi as only several thousand troops were stationed in the province; after having taken the provincial capital, they would march directly to the location of the exercise, where they would subjugate the troops without difficulty as most of them were wearing empty guns without bullets; then they would incorporate the Hubei and Nanyang troops into the revolutionary troops. Following this the revolutionaries would take over the provinces whence the Hubei and Nanyang Armies came. Then the revolutionaries should have occupied a large military base. Afterwards they would march northwards to attack the capital.

The overall plan proved to be too optimistic later, nevertheless the revolutionaries carried out at least part of their broad goal. At four o’clock in the afternoon, the leaders announced their intention among the soldiers, issued an order containing 13 items. They assigned duties to each battalion (biao) and company (ying). They planned to take the arsenal located within the city; afterwards they would attack the governor’s office and the telegraph office. They also allocated two groups of soldiers to patrol the streets to maintain order, to protect churches and foreigners. At ten o’clock the cannon company led by Xiong first started the action. They left their camp, holding torches as a signal to other collaborators. They arrived at the Army School to seize guns and later the armory to get bullets. Afterwards Xiong led the troops to attack the provincial capital. However, those revolutionaries stationed within the city headed by Xue Zhe failed to perform their duty to open the gate. At the time, the cavalry was following the cannon. Yet the infantry was not under the control of the revolutionaries. Therefore the cavalry had to intimidate the infantrymen into joining them by threatening them with guns. Some infantrymen ran away, but some followed the revolutionaries. The joined troops then went back to the armory to obtain shells. Afterwards they marched to the Linjiangsi highland, and from there they bombed the governor’s office within the city, but they met fierce resistance. The revolutionaries failed to take the city as they expected.

After the aborted coup, Xiong escaped to the neighboring Henan province, then to the port city of Yantai in Shandong province. From there he fled to Dalian in Liaoning province by sea. Dalian at the
time was a Japanese colony. In January 1909 Xiong traveled to Japan. He first arrived at Kobe, then
Tokyo, where he lived in Qinxueshe, which was the headquarters of Xiong’s revolutionary party. About a
month later, he went back to China and was active in the Shenyang-Changchun region in Northeast. He
was arrested and executed in Jilin shortly afterwards.

In his confession, Xiong wrote about his motivation (LJB: 40):

My goal was to subvert the savage autocratic government and establish a new government so that my
fellow countrymen [tongbao] would enjoy the happiness of a republic, which would wash away the
ultimate shame in my motherland’s history. The reason was that the Manchus treated us Chinese in an extremely vicious way since they seized our
land. After they entered China, Manchus killed us Chinese. At the time the dead bodies piled up and
formed a gigantic hump, and all the blood covering the Central Plain [Zhongyuan, i.e. China]
accumulated into a red sea, flowing in China proper [Zhina zhi benbu]. Contemporaries called them
White Bone Mountain [baigushan] and Red Wetland [Hongzeguo], I believe they were not untrue.
However, the most miserable incident occurred in our Yangzhou. Manchu soldiers entered the city and
killed continuously for ten days, and not a single person was left alive. We can infer from Yangzhou
about how it was like in other places. Since then [Manchus] treated us Chinese viciously in many
aspects. Let me enumerate the worst ones.

Xiong stated four aspects that the government treated the Chinese unfairly. First, the government did
not entrust the Army and Navy commandship to Chinese. Therefore for more than 200 hundred years
military leadership was in Manchu hands. Second, the Manchu court did not give political power to the
Chinese. Third, the Manchu court did not care about the welfare of the Chinese. Fourth, the Manchu court
sought to keep the Chinese in ignorance (see appendix G).

THE QIU JIN CASE

The second case was the revolt led by Qiu Jin, a member of the Society for Glorious Restoration
(guangfuhui). She was born in 1875. She went to Japan to study in 1904, and returned to China in 1906.
In summer 1907, Qiu and her fellow members of the Society conceived a coordinated revolt
simultaneously in multiple areas in Anhui and Zhejiang provinces. In Anqing, Anhui, Xu Xinlin,
superintendent of the provincial police academy, headed the part of the plan in Anhui (Rhoads 2000: 104-
105). On July 6, 1907, Xu started the revolt by first assassinating Enming, the Manchu governor of Anhui.
According to the memorial Enming submitted to the court after the assassination48, the incident took place
shortly before the graduation of the First Class of the Police Academy. In the morning Enming led his

48 Enming’s son wrote the memorial under his dictation because he was seriously wounded. JJCLF: 8672-33.
subordinates to the Academy to inspect the students. When the students were lining up, all of sudden Xu
and several outsiders stormed in the scene, all with pistols in both hands. They opened fire simultaneously
at Enming in a distance less than five chi (yards), shouting the revolution army was in action. Enming
received seven to eight shots, and several of his subordinates were killed or wounded. Xu and his
comrades then tried to take the armory, but the revolt was soon quelled down.

Enming telegraphed the court instantly. According to him Xu was a daoyuan on probation, an
official of the fourth rank. The incident impacted the court greatly. Two days later Cixi issued an edict
openly, in which she not only acknowledged the existence of the Manchu-Chinese boundary first-ever,
but called on her subjects to submit proposals to eliminate the boundary49.

In Zhejiang, Qiu Jin and her comrades Zhu Shaokang, Wang Jinfa, and Lü Fengqiao headed the
subdivision of the large revolt50. Qiu Jin and her comrades mobilized more than 10,000 people, many of
whom were members of the local secret societies Jiulonghui and Shuanglonghui, living in Jinhua, Wuyi,
Yongkang, and Sheng counties. They were divided into eight subdivisions, each named with a character.
The eight characters in combination read: “Gloriously Restore the Chinese and Greatly Rejuvenate
National Sovereignty” (guangfu Hanzu, dazhen guoquan. Qiu 1991: 23). They purchased western style
guns and other needed materials to revolt in Shaoxing, Zhejiang on July 19. Later from Datong School,
where Qiu Jin worked as a physical education instructor, local officials confiscated 48 guns, including 46
Mausers, more than 6,200 bullets, five horses, and a mule. A few days before the revolt, however,
participants in Wuyi were detected by the county officials and they confessed to the plan. The officials
reported to the provincial governor immediately, who detached the First Battalion of the First Regiment
of the Zhejiang New Army to Shaoxing. The troops arrived at Shaoxing on the afternoon of July 13. Qiu
was arrested, but she refused to confess. In her interrogation, she readily admitted that the pistol, the diary,
and the speech drafts found with her at her arrest were hers. When asked the whereabouts of other revolt
leaders, she answered “do not know.” When officials asked how many people were there in her

49 I found 16 memorials by officials, students, and merchants kept at the First Historical Archives of China.
50 The following account is based on the dossier of the Qiu Jin case submitted to the Ministry of the Army by local
officials dealing with the case (LJB: 56) unless otherwise noted.
revolutionary party, she “firmly refused to confess,” adding “don’t ask anymore about the revolutionary party.” On the early morning of July 15, she was beheaded in Shaoxing.

Materials found with Qiu Jin at the scene of her arrest indicated that Qiu was anti-Manchu. In one of her speech drafts, Qiu wrote a story about her experiences in Japan, including an informal meeting she had with several other people at her dwelling. The story used the heuristic method to introduce anti-Manchu thoughts to encourage the audience to join the Society for Glorious Restoration to overthrow the Manchu rule (see Appendix H).

Lu and Shi then introduced the Glorious Restoration Society, giving information on the history of this society, the names of its leaders, and the number of membership. Lu and Shi then identified themselves that they were members of the society, and that their job was to recruit new members, urging everybody at the spot to join the society.

Two other documents that were supposed to address the public revealed that the action was directly aimed at subverting Manchu rule. The first document started with the statement that China was at a critical moment. Western threat was soaring, yet the Manchus cared little about the country. While they pretended to establish a constitutional system, in fact their real intention was to ruin the Chinese and devastate China. Given the situation the revolutionaries were determined to rise up against the Manchus for the sake of the Chinese (Qiu 1991: 20. see appendix I). The second document was written in a similar vein (ibid: 21):

It has been more than two hundred years since the fall of the Chinese. [Now the Chinese] have a maid’s knees and a slave’s face [being servile], and lower their shoulders to get under the roof of the house of others [sacrificing Chinese dignity]. [The Chinese] have their land but do not know to protect, have wealth but do not know to utilize. [The Chinese] venerate the ugly barbarians [chouyi] as their masters, and treat themselves as slaves. For them [the Manchus] this country was an expected windfall, therefore why should they care about us? What makes us feel unbearable is the future of our elders and brethren.

The article then went on to denounce the government’s attempt at establishing constitutional monarchy, claiming it would cut the power of the Chinese, and give advantage to the Manchus so that they would be “presumptuous” (ibid: 22). It asserted that the present situation allowed no wishy-washy
solutions, therefore “we are determined to exact a huge revenge first to wash off the humiliation for us Chinese being slaves for over two hundred years, then to lay the foundation of our new empire” (ibid: 22).

**THE REVOLT IN WUCHANG**

The aforementioned coups contributed much to the 1911 Revolution. As the revolts drew the Qing government’s attention to the lower Yangtze valley revolutionaries in the middle reaches of the river could capitalize on the opportunity to organize their activities. Two groups in Hubei province, the Literature Society (*wenxueshe*) and the Association for Common Progress (*gongjinhui*) enjoyed quick development among the New Army stationed in Wuchang, capital of Hubei. On October 10, 1911, the New Army fired the first shot in the 1911 Revolution. Soon other Chinese provinces followed suit one by one, declaring independence (*duli*) from the Manchu Qing. Thus the Qing empire was subverted without a large-scale civil war.

I maintain that the Wuchang Revolt was anti-Manchu. The following account is based on the memoirs of Li Baizhen (1961) and Li Liuru (1961), two participants of the revolt. The Association for Common Progress was founded in the spring of 1907 in Tokyo by some radical members of the Alliance. It published two manifestoes at the time of its establishment, one in plain Chinese, one in classical Chinese, both declaring the association’s anti-Manchu principle. For instance, the first paragraph of the plain Chinese version read (cited in Li Baizhen 1961: 499):

> Since the time of Pangu [the creator of the universe] we Chinese have lived in China, our country…at the time of the Chongzhen emperor of the Ming dynasty, the barbarian Manchu race in the east became strong all of sudden. They took advantage of the incident in our country, and invaded China [here the manifesto charged that the Manchus decimated a large number of Chinese and enslaved the rest, and stated the goal of the association]…if everybody follows the great course of this association to expel the Manchus, then the world will call us revolutionary heroes.

The Association designed its flag, which contained 18 yellow stars, one at each end of nine black acute angles radiating from the center of the flag in red background, signifying that the people of the 18 Chinese provinces would fight against the Manchu government with iron will (the black color) and with the determination to shed blood (the red color) (ibid: 502).
In the winter of 1908 some members of the association returned to China to mobilize people in their home provinces. In Wuchang, capital city of Hubei, Sun Wu and others established the Hubei branch. The branch absorbed members of secret societies and organized several abortive small armed revolts. Then the branch changed its strategy and began to take in soldiers of the Hubei New Army. In late July 1911 the branch merged with the Literature Society, whose members were almost soldiers of the New Army.

At the time the entire country was in a state of sociopolitical turmoil. Popular uprisings were common in cities and the countryside alike. The leaders of the aforementioned two groups founded a commanding body and planned to take action. Meanwhile, the Qing government decided to nationalize the country’s railroads, which affected private investors in several provinces, particularly Sichuan. In the summer of 1911 popular uprisings broke out in a number of cities of the province. The government moved troops to the province to crush down the uprisings. Some troops of the Hubei New Army were ordered to enter Sichuan. At the juncture the commanding body decided to revolt immediately.

On October 9, 1911, the commander in chief issued an order to revolt. The order consisted of ten items. The first item expressed the intention and the goal of the revolutionaries: “This army will revolt at twelve o’clock tonight to revive the Chinese and expel the Manchus.” And the second item read: “This army must obey the rules on defense and on the offensive. Under no conditions should we harm our fellow countrymen [the Chinese] or foreigners” (Li Liuru 1961: 310). The rest of the ten items prescribed the deployment of soldiers. The order did not say to protect the Manchu population living in the city. As a result, anti-Manchu violence occurred there as was the case later in other cities. Within the three days following the revolt as many as 400-500 innocent Manchus were killed in Wuchang on the streets. Some even feared that the dead bodies would cause pestilence if not disposed of quickly. It was a serious problem, so serious that diplomats of 11 countries jointly petitioned to the military government not to kill Manchus indiscriminately (Wang 2005231; Rhoads 2000).

The 1911 Revolution brought the Manchu question to an end. Not only that grassroots-level violence against Manchus and Manchu resistance took place in many cities across the country, but the interim governments in various cities and provinces officially declared anti-Manchuiism as their political goal.
the provinces where Chinese were the majority group revolutionaries were widely welcomed by Chinese from various social backgrounds. Many voluntarily participated in revolutionaries’ attacks on Manchu garrisons (Wang 2005).

Other ethnic groups displayed different attitude toward the revolution. The Mongols opposed the revolution strongly. In November 1911 Outer Mongolia declared independence from the Chinese provinces. Then several banners and leagues in Inner Mongolia followed suit. In some Mongol areas Mongol-Chinese conflict occurred and Mongols expelled Chinese residents. In the northwest, where the majority of the population was Muslim, revolutionaries received little support from native ethnic groups and encountered much difficulty in their military campaigns against Manchu garrisons. For example, lacking strong local support revolutionaries’ attacks on the Manchu garrisons in Ningxia and Urumuqi were defeated by Manchu troops. In Yili, Xinjiang province revolutionaries did not win support from Uyghurs and other ethnic groups during their attack on the Manchu garrison. In the end they had to compromise with Manchu and Mongol troops by signing a peace agreement. In Tibet Chinese residents were killed or driven out of the region (Wang 2005). In the southwest native resistance did not appear as Chinese had come into firm control of provincial and local governments.

**SUMMARY**

The Manchu question surfaced in the last decade or so of the Qing dynasty. Before 1895 although Chinese rebels had explicitly denounced Manchu rule of China proper, pro-dynastic intellectuals and officials never overtly discussed the Manchu question. After 1895, however, they could no longer ignore the question. The One Hundred Days Reform and particularly the New Politics acknowledged Manchu-Chinese inequalities and further reformed certain aspects of the Manchu-Chinese inequality.

The Manchu question was an important issue in Qing politics in the last decade of the dynasty. First evidence suggests that the One Hundred Days Reform was aborted by Cixi because the reform touched on the sensitive Manchu question. Kang Youwei made three radical proposals: demobilizing banner troops, stopping giving the Manchu stipends, and cutting the queue. The banner troops and the Manchu stipend were interconnected, both sustaining Manchu rule of China proper. The queue was symbolic of Manchu
rule of the Chinese. The three proposals, if executed, would mean the end of Manchu rule of China proper from the Manchu perspective. In fact, the state preserved the Manchu stipend and banner troops until the very end of the dynasty, and the queue was viewed as a sign of loyalty to Manchu rule later by the government and the revolutionaries as well. Moreover, Kang’s conversation with the British diplomat B. Brenan indicated that Manchu opposition to the reform was the cause of the coup launched by Cixi51.

Second, Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi in 1901 suggested reforming the banner system and the state later abolished certain Manchu privileges as part of the New Politics. These facts indicated that the Manchu question was a serious matter in the Qing. Furthermore, the fact that until the very end of the dynasty the state refused to do what Kang suggested doing indicated that Kang’s suggestions were unacceptable to the state, which might lead to the abortion of the One Hundred Days Reform.

After the revolutionaries started the propaganda against the Manchu question, the court adopted the strategy to preserve Manchu political dominance by giving up certain Manchu privileges. The move was too late. The state eventually was subverted by revolutionaries and Chinese supporters. The 1911 Revolution brought the Manchu question to an end.

51 The reason for the coup has long intrigued Chinese scholars. Mao Haijian (2005) has reviewed 21 influential studies published between the 1930s and 2005 in mainland China and Taiwan. According to Mao’s summary of the studies, none of them touches on the Manchu question and Kang’s proposals. In his 600-page book Mao seeks to answer the aforementioned question as well. He has not touched on the Manchu question and Kang’s proposals. Zhang’s conclusion is that he has not identified the reason for the coup, although he has found out some details about the reform and the coup.
CHAPTER IX: SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

My primary concern in this study is: what caused China’s tardy economic development between 1865 and 1895 as compared to Japan’s? I have compared China’s economic development with Japan’s in four important aspects: railway, marine transport, communication networks, and the cotton textile industry. In all of these areas, China was behind Japan as of 1895. I have suggested that the direct reason was insufficient governmental leadership measured in three respects: direct governmental investment, macro-level policies aimed at industrialization, and specific action to assist selected industries and companies. On all of the three counts the Chinese government was outperformed by the Japanese government.

Furthermore, I have argued that ethnic issues affected the government’s intervention in economic transformation. Ethnic issues were twofold. First, ethnic rebellions that took place between the early 1850s and the early 1870s weakened the government in economic, military, and political terms. Ethnic rebellions included the Taiping Rebellion in the south, the Nian Rebellion in the north, and ethnic uprisings in the southwest and northwest. They devastated many regions in China including the Jiangnan area, the economic center of the country. They drained the government of its finances. The rebellions also changed the financial and political structure of the government and weakened its military strength. In sum, the rebellions damaged the government’s ability to administer the country. Moreover, the combined implications of ethnic rebellions negatively affected the government’s ability to lead the economic transition in the subsequent years. Consequently, governmental investments were insufficient and policies and actions were inefficient between 1865 and 1895. Second, between 1865 and 1895 the Qing government spent a considerable proportion of its finances to support the Manchus. The government’s expenditure on the Manchu stipend was seven times as much as governmental investments in modern industries.

Ethnic rebellions and the Manchu stipend together pointed to the significance of what I call “the Manchu question.” The Manchu question had two aspects: Manchu rule and Manchu supremacy. Manchu
rule was a political issue referring to the fact that the Manchus as a numerical minority conquered China proper and other ethnic territories and ruled the Chinese and other ethnic groups. Manchu supremacy refers to the privileges the state granted to the Manchus. Manchu rulers established an ethnic hierarchy and assigned a notch to each of the major ethnic groups. In general, the Manchus and the Mongols were at the top of the hierarchy, followed by the Chinese in the middle and the Miao, the Uyghurs, and the Tibetans on the bottom.

This study has focused on Manchu-Chinese relations. The state favored the Manchus at the expense of the Chinese. In the economic field, while the Chinese were subject to state taxes, the Manchus were exempt from them. Moreover, the Manchus were given financial assistance in the forms of stipends and rations of rice on a monthly basis. In the legal field, the Manchus were subject to a different legal system and procedure. As a result, they received lenient treatment systematically. Politically the government created special channels for Manchus to enter the bureaucracy easily and gave them favorable treatment in promotion and tenure.

Furthermore, the state took seven specific legal and administrative measures to ensure that the Chinese would not falsely enter the banner system in order to pretend to be Manchus. First, a census was conducted on Manchu males once every three years. Second, the state forbade Manchus to adopt Chinese children. Third, Manchus were obligated to report important changes in their families to their superiors. These changes included marriage, birth, and death. Fourth, Manchus were not allowed to move freely, and officials inspected Manchu residency on an annually basis. Fifth, Manchus were not permitted to travel more than 20 li (about six miles) away from their dwellings. They had to apply for travel authorization in case they had to travel further. Sixth, lower level officials who dealt with Manchu affairs at the community level were subject to evaluation yearly. Thus the state could control the general Manchu population by controlling the officials. Seventh, high-ranking banner officials were subject to evaluation as well.

These measures were aimed to reinforce the ethnic boundaries in order to socially demarcate the Manchus as a distinctive group. The maintenance of ethnic boundaries in turn was intended to prevent the
Chinese from claiming privileges granted to the Manchus exclusively. In fact Manchu supremacy and Manchu rule reinforced each other. The Qing empire was established on the basis of Manchu minority rule. To prevent the Manchus from assimilating into the Chinese completely, Manchu rulers made a set of cultural, economic, and social policies. They forced Chinese males to adopt the Manchu male hairstyle and dress. Through forced assimilation Manchu rulers were able to preserve Manchu ethnic identity and culture. In addition, residential segregation and the ban on intermarriage helped Manchu rulers keep the Manchus and the Chinese as two “separate and unequal” peoples (Rhoads 2000: 11) until the end of the Qing.

After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 the power of the state underwent further decline, and simultaneously the Manchu question surfaced. Leaders of the One Hundred Days Reform of 1898 proposed to reform the Manchu question, and the New Politics actually reformed certain aspects. Yet these reforms did not meet the revolutionaries’ demand. They organized armed revolts against the government, which eventually led to the 1911 Revolution and brought the Manchu question to an end.

**CHINA AND JAPAN IN THEORIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

The economic development in Qing China and Meiji Japan had a unique position in world history. China and Japan began to industrialize in the late nineteenth century; their industrialization processes were several decades later than Western early developers and roughly a century earlier than the Newly Industrialized Economies in East Asia. Comparing the East with the West, scholars have argued that the role played by the state was limited in the industrialization of Western societies and was more extensive in postwar East Asia (Jones 1981; Brenner 1985a, 1985b; Amsden 1989, 2001). In this study, I have argued that the role of the state was more critical in China and Japan in the nineteenth century. The states needed to make not only economic policies but also social policies to foster industrialization.

Regarding Western European societies, some researchers emphasize Europe’s internal factors. Brenner (1985a) points to class struggle between the landlords and peasants in England before the Industrial Revolution to explain why industrialization first occurred in England instead of France. Jones (1981) traces Europe’s flourishing economy between 1400 and 1800 to Europe’s environmental features
and political structure. Scholars also have debated about the problematic development of Latin American and African nations after WWII. Weberian researchers argue that culture or attitude explains their underdevelopment. David Landes (2000: 2) claims that “culture makes almost all the difference” in economic development in different societies across the world. Thus to bring economic prosperity to developing countries, Lawrence (2000) suggests “promoting progressive cultural change” and Michael (2000) proposes that “changing the mind of a nation” will achieve the goal.

Others suggest using market factors to foster economic transformation in Africa and Latin America. The neo-utilitarian theory suggests that corrupted African and Latin American states made policies that extracted resources from society and gave economic advantages to their supporters. Neo-utilitarianism advocates abandoning the state and placing full reliance on the market (Evans 1995). In contrast, researchers of the East Asian development model stress the importance of government intervention in the economic transformation of some East Asian economies (Amsden 1989, Amsden and Chu 2003, Wade 1990).

China’s and Japan’s governments in the 1860s had more tasks to perform than the post-war governments in Taiwan and South Korea. Post-war Taiwan and South Korea had considerable manufacturing experiences under Japanese colonial rule (Amsden 2001). Basic industries had been established, and tight economic ties existed between native entrepreneurs and Japanese entrepreneurs, which were beneficial to export-orientated industries. These resources were conducive to industrialization.

In contrast, the Chinese and Japanese in the 1860s knew little about the operation and administration of modern factories or the technologies used in industrialization. Furthermore, both China and Japan lacked modern transportation networks. In the nineteenth century modern transportation included railway and steamboat, both of which were lacking in China and Japan. Modern financial regimes were nonexistent in China and Japan as well. A modern financial regime in the nineteenth century included paper bills issued by the state, the gold standard, banks, and exchange rates with foreign currencies. A national market—defined as a mechanism that controls prices through demand and supply—existed in
neither China nor Japan due to the lack of modern transportation networks. In sum, the Chinese and Japanese governments had to create modern industries and markets in the first place.

Moreover, cultural exchange between East Asia and Europe was limited as of the 1860s. The Chinese and the Japanese at the time had only limited knowledge of Western civilization and Westerners. Many Chinese and Japanese had qualms about building modern factories and facilities. They feared that their traditional ways of life would be destroyed by modern factories. The lack of information about the West and Western industrialization at the time of 1860s led to the fear for change among some people in both China and Japan.

Because of these factors the Chinese and Japanese governments had a critical role to play in initiating industrialization. In China the government first built modern military and civil factories. The Japanese established “model factories” to demonstrate the operation and administration of modern factories. In general the Chinese government did not perform as well as its Japanese counterpart. As a result of ineffective government leadership, the development of modern transportation networks in China lagged behind Japan. As of 1895, China’s total length of railway was roughly 10-20% of Japan’s. China’s modern sea transportation on the basis of the steamboat was behind Japan’s measured by the number of steamships and opening international lines. The postal service system was absent in China prior to 1895, whereas in Japan a nationwide postal service system was established in the 1880s. In China, telegraph lines were built in some cities for official use before 1895. In Japan a nationwide system for commercial use was in place in the 1880s. Finally, as of 1895 China’s textile industry lagged far behind Japan’s in terms of number of factories and number of spindles.

In addition to economic tasks, the Chinese and Japanese governments had to deal with social issues as well. They needed to reform obsolete elements in societies that impeded industrialization. In China the ethnic hierarchy created and sanctioned by the state was an obstacle to China’s economic transformation. The Manchu stipend was a big burden on state finances, and Manchu privileges caused serious social problems. In Japan the four strata caste-like classification of subjects posed a serious obstacle to Japan’s industrialization, for occupation was hereditary. While the Meiji government in 1872 abolished the
system and all Japanese were allowed to engage in occupations of their choice, the Qing government failed to reform the Manchu ethnic hierarchy.

**STATE, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMY**

Existing literature suggests that the relations between the state and social groupings may affect economic transformation. Evans (1995: 23-41) argues that the ideal type of state-society relations is “embedded autonomy.” On the one hand the state apparatus must remain insulated from society as insulation is a necessary precondition for the bureaucracy to function properly. Unless the state maintains a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis society, officials are likely to distribute resources to supporters in inappropriate ways or to use their rule-making authority to generate rents for favored groups as in Africa and Latin America. On the other hand, however, states must be embedded in various forms of social relations in order to be effective in facilitating economic transformation. For instance, in East Asia, states and industrial groups cooperated in joint projects.

Migdal (2001) suggests the “state-in-society approach” to economic development. A central question he raises is: “When and how have states been able to establish the economic agenda for their societies—to appropriate resources and to shape patterns of investment, production, distribution, and consumption?” (ibid: 97). The state-in-society model posits that the society is laden with conflicts between multiple groupings competing for domination. The state must contend with opposing groups to carry out its agenda. Hence the outcomes of state agenda depend on the interaction between the state and societal groups (ibid: 11-15).

Both Evans and Migdal emphasize the influence of state-society relations on economic transformation, yet they look at state-society relations from different angles. Evans stresses that the state should cooperate with the society to succeed in carrying out state-private joint development projects, whereas Migdal highlights the tension between the state and society in explaining the failure of economic transformation. Despite the difference, they converge on the underlying theme that the state apparatus works within the framework of society. The outcomes of state policies depend on whether or not the state can enlist sufficient support from societal groups. In their analyses society seems to overshadow the state.
Like Evans and Migdal, I maintain that the state and society mutually reinforce or undermine each other depending on the outcomes of the interaction between the two, and state-society relations eventually have profound effects on economic transformation. Yet there is a difference between my approach to state-society relations and theirs. In my view the state and society are two independent variables in the study of economic transformation. By society, I mean primarily ethnic groups instead of social classes. In my argument the state and society are of equal analytical importance, and the interaction between the two determines the outcomes of economic transformation.

The state and society in my analysis are equally important. State polices on economic transformation do not affect ethnic welfare directly as long as state agenda does not specify discriminative treatment of different ethnic groups. Thus during a period of economic transformation the ethnic groups may not necessarily oppose state economic policies. Rather, the state and society may remain quite detached. For instance, between 1865 and 1895 when the Chinese state was undertaking economic development, it encountered little resistance from the ethnic groups as regards to the state’s policies on industrialization. Meanwhile the ethnic groups did not offer much support either. In short, China’s industrialization in the late 19th century was largely a project at the state level having little to do with the society.

The second difference between my perspective on state-society relations and that of Evens and Migdal is that I adopt a long-term approach to the above issue. I look at state-society interaction over centuries instead of decades. In the long run, intensive interaction may occur between the state and society. The interplay between the two may strengthen or weaken one another. Here I agree with Migdal that the state is constantly competing with opposing groups for domination, some of which are quite subversive.

In my opinion, there are four types of dynamics in the state-society struggle. The first is that the state wins but suffers considerable losses and damages. For instance, the ethnic rebellions in the 1850s and 1860s, notably the Taiping Rebellion and the Nian Rebellion, severely disrupted the Qing state. Consequently, the state lost its ability to lead the country’s economic transformation in the years to come.
The second is that the state wins and subsequently it centralizes its power. Then the state is able to carry out its political and economic agenda. An example is what happened in the early Qing. The state conquered the Mongols, the Chinese, and other ethnic groups successively. After having incorporated each of the six ethnic-territories into the empire, the state made specific laws and regulations to rule the region. Among the many sociopolitical institutions established by the state, an important one was the separate governance of the Manchus and the Chinese, which stipulated unequal treatments of the two peoples in sociopolitical terms. The state successfully maintained the policy for nearly three centuries.

The third type of the state-society struggle is that the state ties with society. The society or more precisely a social group then may establish an independent state. As a result two independent states may coexist in the territory previously governed by one state. For instance, the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace established by the Taipings controlled part of China for more than a decade.

The fourth dynamics of the state-society battle is that a group within the society wins out in the end and establishes a new state. This is what happened at the turn of the twentieth century. The Chinese revolutionaries launched propaganda against Manchu rule of China and organized armed revolts against the state. After a decade of struggle, their effort resulted in the 1911 Revolution and eventually the establishment of a new state, the Republic of China. In sum the fluidity of the outcomes of state-society struggle stems from the dynamic power struggle of the state and society.

What happened during the roughly three centuries of Qing China testifies that the state and society may exert significant influence on each other over the course of time. At particular historical junctures, however, the state or society might exert more influence on the other. When such a historical period coincides with the economic transformation of the country, then the action of the state or societal groupings may exert tremendous influence on economic transformation. During the three decades between 1865 and 1895 the Chinese state was more directly involved in China’s industrialization than society. The state led industrial projects whereas the society contributed little to China’s industrialization. In this sense I have argued that in the late nineteenth century declining state power brought about China’s tardy industrialization.
STATE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

The social constructionist view on ethnic relations argues that ethnicity is socially and politically constructed. Regarding the notion of political construction of ethnicity, Nagel (1994) points out three ways through which political policies and institutions in the modern world produce and define ethnic boundaries, identities, and cultures. First, governments’ immigration policies create new ethnic groups within their territories by bringing in immigrants. Second, ethnically-linked economic policies provide incentives for groups to reconstruct and reinforce ethnic boundaries and identities. The result is the formation of new ethnic groups. Third, the organization of political access along ethnic lines may promote ethnic identification and group formation as well. Overall Nagel emphasizes identity and culture as two important building blocs of ethnicity, and her study indicates that government policies have an indirect role in the formation of ethnic groups. While immigration policies bring in new immigrants, the formation of new group identities is contingent on how the groups define themselves in their interaction with the larger society. Competition for economic and political resources may promote and redefine group identities and cultures, and may eventually result in the formation of new ethnic groups, while the government in the processes seems to be a somewhat detached actor except for making policies, which serve as incentives for ethnic formation. This study suggests that in some cases the state may be a direct force in shaping ethnic relations.

CREATING ETHNIC GROUPS

The state in some circumstances may play the role of creating ethnic groups. The state usually controls a tremendous volume of economic resources and possesses supreme political and military power. Backed up by its overwhelming power, the state has much more powerful means than individuals and groups to define and redefine ethnic boundaries. Unlike governments of modern democracies whose power is often limited by the separation of administrative, legislative, and judicial powers, the government of Qing China was a totalitarian one and it seemingly had unlimited power compared to social groupings. Power hence enabled the government to become a powerful actor in shaping ethnicity. The government could bring people together and concentrate them on a particular area even though these
people originally were from different geographic locations and ethnic backgrounds. In addition, the government could also invent important cultural elements and make a code of conduct for the new group, and thus giving them distinctive ethnic markers. When the state was strong in relation to members of the society, then the state could execute its ethnic policies effectively despite resistance from some ethnic groups. The whole process of creating a new ethnic group might be completed in a relatively short period of time.

The making of the Manchus as an ethnic group illustrated the power of the state in the formation of ethnicity. The Manchus were created by the Later Jin primarily between the 1580s and 1630s. Through forced migration the state concentrated various Jurchen tribes scattered in the vast northeast on Jianzhou, an area in modern Liaoning province under the direct control of the state. Geographical closeness facilitated social interaction between the tribesmen. Furthermore, the state reorganized the tribesmen into niru, a new civil and military system. On the basis of niru the state created the Eight Banners, a distinctive social, military, and economic system of the Manchus. The state later incorporated members of the various ethnic groups in northeast Asia into the banner system. In addition, the state modified Jurchen religious practices, made shamanism the national religion, created the Manchu code of conduct, and invented the Manchu writing system in 1599, thus giving the group a distinctive ethnic identity. Finally the state in 1635 named the new ethnic group—which was created out of the Jurchens, Tungus peoples, Mongols, Koreans, and Chinese—as the Manchus. At this point, the state blurred ethnic boundaries in order to win support from the various groups by giving them a new collective identity.

**DEFINING ETHNIC BOUNDARIES**

Nagel (1994) argues individuals and groups are dynamic actors in negotiating and redefining ethnicity in various social settings. In addition to individuals and groups, this study suggests that in some cases the state can be a powerful force in creating and maintaining ethnic boundaries. The state can create multiple layers of boundaries and perpetuate the boundaries by using its legal and administrative resources. Furthermore, the state can assign social meanings to ethnicity by giving sociopolitical
privileges to some groups but not to others. Thus the groups favored by the state may enjoy a higher social status than the other groups.

In the Qing situation, Manchu-Chinese boundaries determined who was Manchu and who was Chinese. The state officially classified the Manchus as banner people or a military caste and classified the Chinese as civilians. The state further banned intermarriage and stipulated residential segregation. The Manchu quarters were demarcated and separated from the Chinese quarters by walls, and Chinese were not allowed in the Manchu district without permit. As a result of the boundaries, there was only limited interaction between the two groups on a daily basis even if they lived within the same city. Even Chinese merchants were forbidden to stay in the Manchu quarter overnight. Considerable social distance existed between the two groups.

To further reinforce ethnic boundaries, the government made a set of administrative measures to insulate the Manchus from the Chinese. In other words, the measures were also aimed to prevent Chinese from pretending to be Manchus. The government successfully maintained the ethnic line by utilizing administrative means. Behind the walls surrounding Manchu cities, a distinctive Manchu identity was preserved even after the Manchus had lived in China proper for over two centuries, and certain Manchu cultural elements remained intact, such as funeral and wedding rituals.

The state distributed economic and political resources unequally among the Chinese and the Manchus. In the political sphere, Manchus could enter the bureaucracy and obtain tenure more easily than Chinese. In the economic field, the state supported the Manchus by taxing the Chinese. Moreover, unequal treatments of the Manchus and the Chinese in the legal field gave the Manchus a higher social status. The Manchus as a whole thus had easy access to resources. Being a Manchu in Qing China thus meant better life chances and appreciable social prestige. The flip side of the issue was limited opportunities for the Chinese as a whole. It was for this reason that some Chinese wanted their children to be adopted by Manchu families to obtain Manchu ethnic identity and privileges even though this practice was prohibited by the state.
As a result of the long-standing ethnic boundaries and inequalities, attitudinal boundaries existed between the two groups. As of the late nineteenth century, the Chinese and the Manchus could hardly identify with each other. Indeed, ethnic animosity burst into large-scale, long-term rebellions between the 1850s and the 1870s that had devastating effects on China’s economy, society, and government for the subsequent years. Territorial and financial losses after the Sino-Japanese War prompted pro-dynastic Chinese intellectuals to propose to redefine ethnic boundaries and redistribute resources. Kang Youwei, a well-known reformist in late Qing China, suggested that the banner system be abolished and the Manchu stipend be terminated. Kang’s proposals encountered resistance from powerful Manchu officials, and the reform ended in vain.

After the Boxers Uprising in 1900, Qing financial status deteriorated due to war indemnities that the Qing was obligated to pay to the foreign powers. To resolve its financial problem, the government on the one hand reduced the Manchu stipend and raised taxes on the other. The increased taxation eventually came from Chinese taxpayers. Chinese livelihoods deteriorated. In many cities and rural areas uprisings broke out. Chinese revolutionaries began to attack the government both verbally and in terms of military action. Under these circumstances the government sought to blur the ethnic boundaries by abolishing certain restrictions on ethnic relations and some aspects of ethnic inequalities. The reforms did not satisfy the revolutionaries who were Chinese. They launched the 1911 Revolution to subvert what they called the “Manchu government.” In a sense the 1911 Revolution itself may be viewed as an example of ethnic competition.

The disappearance of Manchu-Chinese boundaries came with the downfall of the state. The 1911 Revolution subverted Manchu rule and brought state-sanctioned ethnic boundaries to an end. After the revolution the Manchus lost their social, political, and economic advantages. Since the Manchus were designated by the state as a military caste and were forbidden to engage in agriculture, industry, and commerce, they virtually possessed no practical occupational skills to support their livelihoods. This once privileged group hence underwent considerable downward social mobility (Ding 1999).
In sum, the construction and reconstruction of Manchu-Chinese boundaries were closely associated with the fluctuation of state power. The nexus between state power and ethnic boundaries and inequalities came from Manchu minority rule of the numerical majority group, the Chinese. The creation of the Manchus as an ethnic group and a military caste by the state and the construction of a collective ethnic identity helped the state to rise to hegemony in East Asia, conquer other ethnic territories, and finally establish the multi-ethnic Qing empire. The state in turn rewarded the Manchus with sociopolitical advantages over other ethnic groups. In the second half of the 19th century, ethnic boundaries and inequalities prompted resistance from other groups. Chinese rebels rose up in order to overthrow Manchu rule and redefine Manchu-Chinese ethnic boundaries. The anti-Manchu 1911 Revolution finally subverted Manchu rule.

ETHNIC RELATIONS AND CHINESE NATIONALISM

I have suggested that ethnic relations were a significant issue in late Qing history (1840-1911). China began to face increasing threats from the West after the Opium War. The Qing government needed to respond to external threats in order to protect the empire’s territorial integrity and ensure the socioeconomic welfare of all ethnic groups. Failure to resist foreign threats resulted in war indemnities, first to Britain, then to Japan. These war indemnities became tax burdens eventually allocated to the Chinese taxpayers.

To resist foreign threats, the Qing government faced the challenge of sweeping social and economic reforms to strengthen its military and economy. It further needed to build a modern political structure to administer its subjects from different ethnic backgrounds. In addition to state-building, the various ethnic groups needed to form a supra-ethnic collective identity when they were faced with foreign threat. Nationalism transcending ethnic identity was needed to unify members of various ethnic groups in the face of foreign invasion and financial extraction. However, ethnic issues affected the processes of both state-building and nation-building in late Qing China. It was at this historical juncture that Chinese nationalism emerged.
Many researchers seem to view Western imperialism as the cause of Chinese nationalism. For example, Hunt (1993) maintains that a dominant feature of Chinese nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a Chinese “obsession” with a strong centralized state. Patriotic officials and intellectuals saw a weak China repeatedly defeated by foreign powers in wars. Each new humiliation prompted them to search for new strategies to save the state. Hence Hunt argues that China patriotism can substitute for nationalism. Similarly, Karl (2002) argues that Chinese nationalism appeared at the turn of the twentieth century and originated from Han literati’s perception of a colonized China in the heyday of imperialism. Both authors regard Chinese nationalism as a reaction to Western imperialism.

This study suggests that the core of Chinese nationalism was aboriginal and appeared long before Western imperialism reached China. The core of Chinese nationalism here refers to Han nationalism, the essence of which was anti-Manchuism. The Han constituted more than 90% of the entire population of the late Qing, Han nationalism, I argue, was the root of Chinese nationalism.

To clarify, the word “Chinese” (Zhongguoren) in the context of nationalism refers to all the ethnic groups in Qing China. In the body of this project, I have used Chinese to refer to the Han—the largest group in the Qing empire—because inter-ethnic conflicts between the Han and the Manchus were the core of my inquiry into the question of state and economy. In the rhetoric of the Chinese rebels and revolutionaries at the end of the Qing empire, China was only the 18 provinces where the Han were the majority, excluding the northeast (Manchuria), Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. However, faced with foreign threats after 1840, a new, supra-ethnic identity was needed to include the Han, the Manchus, and all other ethnic groups in the Qing. The Chinese identity in this context was not only self defined by the groups but also an identity imposed by the foreigners to include all groups who lived in China. This identity might foster a sense of belonging, as all ethnic groups shared similar experiences of war, turbulence, and indignation.

However, ethnic boundaries and inequalities thwarted the formation of the identity. The Han Chinese, particularly the Taipings in the 1850s and 1860s and the revolutionaries in the 1900s, articulated that China (zhongguo) was the 18 provinces where the Han had long lived. They articulated that these
provinces were ruled by the Han dynasties for centuries. In their view, consequently, the “Chinese” were the Han exclusively. They frequently used words such as huaren and zhongguoren to name themselves. Both words today mean the “Chinese,” that is, all the ethnic groups living in China. Thus the connotation of Chinese has been expanded during the last 150 years.

Han revolutionaries in the 1900s harbored a strong animosity against the Manchus due to ethnic inequality by the government, which they dubbed the “Manchu government.” They repeatedly advocated the construction of a Han nation-state. They constructed Chinese history centering on the Han. In their anti-Manchu discourses the revolutionaries frequently resorted to Taiping anti-Manchu thoughts and actions, and glorified the Taipings as their forerunners. As of the Taipings, they incorporated anti-Manchuism into their religious doctrines. The Manchus were demons, whereas the Chinese were the people selected by God and were entrusted by God to exterminate the demons. Those who believed in God should kill the demons and only in this way would they enter heaven after they died (Mu 1994). They also articulated that their goal was to establish a Han dynasty based on Han territory and tradition. Thus systematically documented Han nationalism can be traced back to the 1850s.

Furthermore, Han nationalism as upheld by the Taipings did not appear in a vacuum. Rather, it was a continuity of nationalistic sentiment of earlier Chinese rebels such as the White Lotus followers who launched a large-scale anti-Manchu uprising in the 1790s and 1800s. White Lotus rebels articulated that their goal was to overthrow Manchu rule and to establish a Han dynasty. Viewed in this way Han nationalism dates back at least to the 1790s as a reaction to Manchu rule of the Han.

The brief overview of the history of Han nationalism suggests that Chinese nationalism, understood as a collective, supra-ethnic identity, probably did not come into existence until the 1911 Revolution. What existed previously in the minds of the Han, the majority of the Chinese, was Han nationalism, the essence of which was anti-Manchu. It was only after the Han came into power—the establishment of the Republic of China—that Han leaders such as Sun Yat-sen began to advocate for a “Chinese” identity, which now included all the ethnic groups living in the newly established republic. Their purpose was to enhance the “harmony of the five groups” (wuzu gonghe) including the Han, the Manchus, the Mongols,
the Muslims, and the Tibetans. In doing so they abandoned the notion that the Chinese were the Han exclusively, an ideology that they endeavored to promulgate prior to 1911. The redefinition of Chinese was inherited by the government of the People’s Republic of China after 1949. The post-1949 state has been promulgating the redefinition of the concept for the purpose of promoting “ethnic harmony” (minzu tuanjie). Thus the changes in the meaning of the word “Chinese” reflected the needs of political parties in different circumstances, and the development of Chinese nationalism reflected the needs of the states at different times.

LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Chinese scholarship has placed Manchu-Chinese relations in the Qing dynasty on the margins of Qing history due to the concern of “nationalities unity” (Crossley 1990: 218). In fact, not only issues regarding the Manchus but also ethnic relations in general still remain a politically sensitive topic in China’s academia today. As a result, only limited Chinese literature exists on issues related to the Manchus and other ethnic groups. This project has used some first-hand materials as well as published studies to suggest that ethnic relations were an important aspect of Qing history. Ethnic issues affected Qing China’s politics, economy, and society. Needless to say, effort is needed to collect more data and to analyze them in order to support the proposed argument.

Regarding the central theme of this project—the relationship between the Manchu question and China’s economic transformation—more attention is needed as well. Recent studies challenge the popular wisdom that the Manchus had assimilated into the Chinese culture by the end of the eighteenth century and “Manchuness” was irrelevant to China’s economic development in the late nineteenth century. Mark Elliott (2001) in his study on Manchu identity and Manchu rule between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries has raised the interesting question: Did the “Manchuness of Qing rule” affect China’s response to Western threats after the Opium War?

Elliott looks at the question from the perspective of Manchu rulers’ attitude. In his view, Manchu solidarity and conservatism hampered China’s response to the West. The Manchu elite were excessively
concerned about themselves and strived to protect their proprietary interests. In addition, as they were an alien minority, they were insecure about their position, thus they tended to “close ranks and defend the status quo when threatened” (ibid: 356). However, the circumstances after the Opium War “demanded creative responses, of which the Manchu leadership had few” (ibid: 357). Findings in this study have suggested that Manchu rule adversely affected China’s economic transformation. From economic and political perspectives, I have demonstrated that the Manchu stipend drained the state’s already tight finances and the Manchus as a privileged group in society incurred Han Chinese antagonism and rebellions. These ethnic rebellions disrupted the Qing sociopolitical structure. The disrupted government was unable to lead China’s economic transformation in the subsequent years, let alone to unite the different ethnic groups against external threat. Thus I have suggested a new direction for future research. More effort is needed to verify if it is valid.

This study has also suggested that ethnic conflict contributed to the downfall of the Qing government. Fairbank (1986: 63) argues that one of the factors leading to the downfall of the government was “its failure in the early nineteenth century to keep up with the growth of population and commerce by a commensurate growth of government structure and personnel.” This study has provided documents that suggest that ethnic rebellions between the 1850s and the 1870s severely undermined the government’s military, political, and financial systems at the time; and they had long-term devastating effects on the government. Furthermore, armed revolts organized by revolutionaries in the 1900s culminated in the 1911 Revolution, which subverted the government. More effort is needed to allow a comprehensive understanding of the downfall of the Qing government and the rise of the nationalist revolution.

At the present Tibet independence and Xinjiang independence are attracting much attention in the world. The recent social turmoil involving Tibetans in some areas in China, the attempted bombing of a flight by Uyghurs, and demonstrations in some European cities by supporters of Tibet independence against the Beijing Olympics indicate that ethnic relations remains a touchy question in contemporary China. Current ethnic issues are the legacies of ethnic relations in the Qing. This study provides background information on questions such as the Qing empire’s annexation of the various ethnic
territories and the state’s comprehensive measures to perpetuate its rule of the territories. Although it is far-fetched to claim that ethnic issues in contemporary China can be directly traced back to the Qing, readers may find this study informative in that it has provided the historical context in which they ought to place current ethnic issues in order to formulate a comprehensive conception of the issues. Finally, readers from different social and cultural backgrounds may interpret this study in different ways. Two major issues dealt in this study—state power and ethnic relations—are issues with significant political implications, and we need to adopt an objective attitude when we discuss them.
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BQDTYM: Baqi dutong yamen (The Yamen of Eight Banner Governance)

HYZWC: Huiyi zhengwuchu (The Office of Conferences and Political Affairs)

LJB: Lujunbu (The Ministry of Army)

JJCLF: Junjichu lufu zouzhe (Memorials Submitted to the Grand Council)

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Appendix A: A document by Hong Rengan

I, the chief of staff, with the great display of Heaven’s blessings by the Heavenly Father and Heavenly brother, and with the great display of sacred mercy by the true sacred Sovereign, have been charged with heavy responsibilities and have never been able to settle down peacefully for fear of failing to fulfill the sacred will...I have, in compliance with the imperial order, made copies of this proclamation, which are being published to the world so that everyone will hear and know.

From the beginning, China has been called Hua-Hsia because God’s fame here. It has also been known as the Heavenly Dynasty, because the capital of the divine kingdom is here. So dignified is China that since ancient days it has subjugated the Hun barbarians, and so majestic is this divine land that it must not now tolerate the Manchu dogs. But when the Tartar demons appeared, the dresses and hats of the civil and the military became different from those of ancient times, and the hair given us by our parents was destroyed against our will. We mouth their language and pronounce the devilish title *baturu*; we live together with their members, and our people suffer from the vileness of the Manchu dogs.

So it is time that we rejuvenate China and resist the northern barbarians, in order to wipe out the humiliations of two hundred years. We should return to God and uphold our T’ien Wang [Hong Xiuquan], so as to restore the old territory of the eighteen provinces. How can a person abandon the Heavenly Father’s great virtue without knowing shame? How can he forget that he is Chinese without feeling strange? How foolish it is! How deplorable it is! I, the chief of staff, before I achieved prominence, often discussed this matter with our true sacred Sovereign and always deplored China’s lack of manhood, which had resulted in our subjugation under the Tartar demons. Now the heavenly ways have returned to normalcy, and the people’s hearts have turned to what is right. Favoring the new and abandoning the old, at the end of misfortune there comes happiness.

Therefore, the Heavenly Father, God, commissioned our true sacred Sovereign in the year of *t’ien-yu* [1837], and Christ, our Heavenly Elder Brother, on the day of the righteous uprising took charge of conducting a war against the demons. Since the command was thus undertaken, no demon shrines or demon followers escaped destruction...Could they [the demons] have been wiped out by human strength?

Appendix B: *Proclamation on the Extermination of Demons*

It happens that Hsien-feng, the head of the demons, died on the sixteenth day of the seventh month, and his successor, the demon suckling, is not yet five years old. It shall soon be evident that powerful traitors [Chinese officials] will have their way and that disasters and calamities will emerge; although the embers remain, it shall not be long before they are extinguished. As a virtuous man would not oppress a widow or an orphan, how could I, the chief of staff, take pleasure in the calamity of others? However, as death in middle age is itself an omen of the termination of Heaven’s mandate, to take advantage of the time, men of intelligence must act at a moment when disorder prevails and perdition is imminent. Moreover, (the Manchus) have shaved off your parents’ hair and destroyed our traditional hat and gown. Military power belongs exclusively to the Manchus, and great authority is vested solely in the demon chieftains. Taxes on fishing have been used for cosmetics, an annual sum of eight million taels. Likewise, more than eight million taels are collected annually from the Ch’ang-pai-shan region in the barbarians’ native land. In addition to stealing treasures from our country, they have also poisoned the body and soul of our nation. Each year fifty million taels’ worth of opium is consumed, and men throughout the eighteen provinces are taught to worship the demon Buddha. In every matter they have violated our moral principles, and each rule is designed to dominate our people. This is why Wen T’ien-hsiang and Hsieh Fang-te52 vowed not to serve the (Manchu) barbarians.

If we do not avail ourselves of this opportunity—now that the demon is dead and the young one barely established, and [the Manchus are—original translator] abandoned by Heaven and forsaken by men—to wash off the humiliation which China has suffered for hundreds of years and to avenge our forefathers of the enmity which has lasted for hundreds of years, then the disaster that will befall China in its failure to throw off its subjugation will be unexplainable to posterity. You who are descendants of Chinese are all members of the Chinese race; all being sons and daughters of Heaven, none is not a brother of the same kinship. Why then exert our efforts for the demon Manchus and the demon suckling; why do you not offer our cities to your own country and your own province? The willingness of the dignified Chinese of the Heavenly Kingdom to die and sacrifice themselves for a five-year-old demon child and to bend their knees and bow their heads, none of them considering the shame of the domination of eighteen provinces by three Manchu provinces or the humiliation of the subjugation of five hundred million people by about three million Manchu demons, has indeed made China detestable, pitiable, lamentable, and tragic, and unworthy of God above as well as undeserving of its leading role among nations. Moreover, previous evidence shows that a barbarian rule never exceeds one hundred years, but (the Manchus) have lasted more than twice as long. Investigating the insults which the Manchus have heaped upon China, one could hardly count them on the fingers. The servile demons are the offspring of the barbarians. Beginning from Shun-chih [the first Qing emperor to rule China], they have brought confusion to our land and are indeed archcriminals. Throughout the eighteen

52 Both were officials at the end of the Southern Song dynasty who refused to serve the Mongol Yuan dynasty. Wen was killed, and Hsieh starved himself to death] preferred death to serving the Yuan, and Ch’ü Shih-ssu and Shih K’o-fa [both were officials at the end of the Ming dynasty. Ch’ü defended Guangdong and Guangxi against the Manchus, and died at Guilin in the fall of the city. Shih defended Yangzhou, was caught but died without surrendering.
provinces the loyal and good have been massacred; for eighteen years, Fukien [Fujian] and Kwangtung [Guangdong] have preferred death to capitulation\(^{53}\). [Hong then decried the corrupted Qing rulers and officials. Afterwards he continued.] The Manchus received the fat and the Chinese remained lean; the Manchus were honored and the Chinese suffered indignities. (The Manchus claim that) they do not take Chinese women, but within the premises of the Yuan-ming-yuan (imperial garden), where filth is hidden and perversion prevails, all the women are Chinese. Our county had accumulated foodstuffs and increased deposits of silver, but these have all been lavishly wasted by the Manchu dogs in the various provinces. Their various crimes repel Heaven above and are so numerous as to be beyond count…

I know that the wise are unable to use their talent and the brave are unable to exert their strength. Why do we Chinese of the Middle Land not avail ourselves of the opportunity to air our anger and stop being held back by the deceits of the demons? This is precisely the time for us to seize the opportunity to uphold Heaven and render ourselves not unworthy in our role as heroes of the world…

What I hope is that you will recognize Heaven and know our Sovereign, and abandon darkness and embrace brightness. Help exterminate the remaining demons, and together contribute to the construction of the Heavenly Dynasty.


\(^{53}\) The Southern Ming court in Fujian and later in Guangdong continued resistance against the Qing for 18 years.
Appendix C: A Document by Hong Rengan

This country belongs to the Chinese, not to the Manchus. The throne belongs to the Chinese, not to the Manchus. The people, the jade, and the silk belong also to the Chinese, not to the Manchus. It is to be lamented that when the Ming dynasty declined, the Manchus seized the opportunity, became aggressive, and invaded China and stole the throne.

Two hundred years have passed, during which the Manchus have created confusion and brought disorder to China. They have held the (Chinese soldiers) and people firmly in hand. They have used punishments and created laws to the utmost extent. All the men of ability have been kept in obedience and made personally willing to be used by the Manchus. Alas! It indeed makes people bitter at heart to speak of this, and their hatred goes into their bones.

Formerly, you, the officials and the soldiers, were used by the Manchus because they imposed force upon you. Therefore it is unreasonable to blame you greatly. Moreover, you had not, before now, witnessed the appearance of the true sacred Sovereign, and therefore you could not know which road to follow. Neither could you start righteous understandings together, and you could not leave the demons and go elsewhere...

The Tartar demons’ winning over of the Chinese was chiefly due to their gifts of official positions. However, if you consider this you will see that the most important and best offers were filled by the Manchu demons, while laborious and difficult positions were given to the Chinese, which meant that Chinese would be responsible for deficits and mistakes and that Chinese would be in positions where they would make mistakes...

When the question of promotions and transfers arose, the Manchu demons had the necessary recommendations, and they occupied high positions. As to the Chinese, they were either rejected by the demon chief, or had their recommendations delayed or pigeonholed by the demon boards. Even when they had distinguished and meritorious service records, they were not able to get promotions except through bribes.

As regards the treatment of soldiers, Manchu soldiers were paid double shares of rations while the Chinese were paid single shares, but on the battlefield the Chinese were sent to the front and the Manchus to the rear. Therefore, whenever the heavenly soldiers arrived and attacked them, they were crushed into dust, and those whose livers and brains were smeared over the ground and whose corpses were piled like mountains were mostly Chinese. As for the Manchus in the rear, when they learned of the defeats of the front, they fled like rats. Thus, in encounters with weapons or when braving death against archers and slingiers, the Chinese were used as shields. Therefore, the ‘village braves’ were commonly called ‘death shields,’ and the Chinese soldiers were called ‘substitutes in death.’ When it comes to rewards, they all go to the Manchus, while the Chinese soldiers get nothing. You have left your parents and your native villages, enduring the hardships of the weather and risking your lives. Have you not done all this for merit and honor? But the Tartar demons have no provisions for making awards with respect to merit and honor in the military camps. No matter whether it is the red, blue or white buttons [for hats—original translator] that are given, they are false rewards without real meaning. Therefore, these buttons for military merits are sometimes called ‘pacification buttons’ [moral awards—original translator], because they are awarded in emergencies [to keep the spirits up—original translator], and are taken away after an emergency is over. Why should you risk your life in a hundred battles in exchange for such false rewards? In addition to that, you are conscripted and sent a thousand miles away on short notice. You cross a thousand mountains and ten thousand rivers and
become fatigued on marches. You sleep in the dew and eat the wind, and work hard and industriously. But before you can establish merits and honors you die at the point of a sword. What a pity! Some of you who serve as soldiers and ‘braves’ have once, through negligence, committed wrongs, and have joined the ranks to avoid death. Do you not know that the people of our native village hate you as if you were snakes or lizards? Since the Manchus have been strict in enforcing their laws by all sorts of measures in order to strengthen their power, upon your return to your native village you will be killed by the villagers, either buried alive or drowned in deep water. I, the chief of staff, witnessed this when I was in Kwangtung and eight other provinces. Thus you will not be able to receive the honors, and even though you should make some slight promotion, in the end you will not be able to return honorably to your places of origin. An old proverb says that if you cannot return to your place of origin, regardless of your riches or power, you are like people who are will addressed but walk in the dark. Thus for you to be in the army means death not life, and to return home while alive also means death. There is no place for you to live; there is only death for you. At midnight think of this and suffer its sadness. All this came about because you have been used by the demons. For what profit and for what prospect do you willingly tolerate it? This applies only to those of you who served as soldiers and ‘braves’ and is a general statement.

As regards (the crimes of the Manchus) in oppressing the masses and harming the people, such crimes could not be described even if all the bamboo of the Southern Mountain were used to write upon; and the poison flowing from such crimes could not be washed away even if all the waves of the Eastern Sea were to be let in. This is the extent to which the Tartar demons have poisoned China. All of us, the people of China, have accumulated hatred against the Tartar demons. Together we must exert our righteous hatred, and destroy all the ugly barbarians. We must recover our former territory and spare none of the barbarians. This is quite in agreement with the principles of Heaven, and in accordance with the principles of good and evil.

Appendix D: The First Proclamation by Yang and Xiao

According to the sacred text of the Old Testament, the Heavenly Father, the Great God, in six days created heaven and earth, mountains and seas, men and things. The Great God is the spiritual father, the father of the soul, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent; all nations under heaven have records of the Great God’s power. Since the Great God’s creation of heaven and earth, the Great God has frequently displayed his great anger; are you people of the world still unaware of this! The Great God, on the first occasion of his great anger, sent down without interruption for forty days and forty nights a great rain, the flood waters flowing everywhere. On the second occasion of his great anger, the Great God descended into the world and rescued the Israelites out of the land of Egypt. On the third occasion of his great anger, the Great God sent the Savior, the Lord Jesus, to be born in Judea to redeem the sins of mankind and to suffer bitterness. Now, once again greatly angered, in the \textit{ting-yu} year (1837) the Great God sent an angel to bring the T’ien Wang [Heavenly King] up to heaven, where he was commanded to destroy the demons; afterwards He sent the T’ien Wang into the world to rule and save the people. In the \textit{wu-shen} year (1848), the Great God felt compassion for the fallen people who had been deluded by the demons; in the third month the Supreme Lord, the Great God, descended into the world, and in the ninth month the Saviour, the Lord Jesus, descended into the world; manifesting their innumerable powers, they exterminated great numbers of demons in pitched battle, for how could the demons seek to rival Heaven? And what, we would ask, was the cause of the Great God’s anger? He was angry with mankind for worshipping corrupt spirits and performing corrupt acts, and with those who grievously transgress the Heavenly Commandments. You people of the world, have you not yet awakened? Living in the present days, you are permitted to witness the glory of the Great God; how fortunate are you men of this world! Living in these times, you are permitted to witness the heavenly days of the T’ai-p’ing; how fortunate are you men of this world! Awake! Awake! Those who follow Heaven shall be preserved; those who rebel against Heaven shall perish. Now, the Manchu demon, Hsien-feng, being in origin a barbarian, is the mortal enemy of us Chinese; moreover, he has induced mankind to assume demon shape, to worship evil spirits, to disobey the true spirit and to greatly disobey the Great God; Heaven cannot tolerate him and therefore he must be destroyed.

Appendix E: The Second Proclamation by Yang and Xiao

We, Yang, Assistant on the Left, the Chief of Staff, the Tung Wang [Eastern King], and Hsiao, Assistant on the Right, the Second Chief of Staff, the Hsi Wang [Western King], of the true Heavenly-mandated T’ai-p’ing T’ien-kuo [The Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace], upholding Heaven’s will to destroy the Manchus, declare to the four directions, proclaiming:

O you masses, listen to our words. It is our belief that the empire is China’s empire, not the Manchu barbarians’ empire; food and clothing are China’s food and clothing, not the Manchu barbarians’ food and clothing; sons, daughters, and citizens are China’s sons, daughters, and citizens, not the Manchu barbarians’ sons, daughters, and citizens. Alas! Since the Ming’s misrule, the Manchus availed themselves of the opportunity to throw China into confusion; they stole China’s empire, appropriated China’s food and clothing, and ravished China’s sons, daughters, and citizens. Yet China, with the vastness of its six combines and the multitudes of its nine divisions, permitted the Manchus to act barbarously without considering it improper. Can the Chinese still deem themselves men? Ever since the Manchus spread their poisonous influence throughout China, the flames of oppression jave risen up to heaven, the vapors of corruption have defiled the celestial throne, the filthy odors have spread over the four seas, and their devilishness exceeds that of the Five Barbarians. Yet the Chinese with bowed heads and dejected spirits willingly became their servants. Alas! There are no men in China. China is the head and Tartary the feet; China is the land of spirits and Tartary the land of demons. Why is China called the land of spirits? Because the Heavenly Father, the Great God, is the true Spirit; heaven and earth, mountains and seas are his creations, therefore from of old China has been named the land of spirits. Why are the barbarians considered demons? Because the devilish serpent, the demon of Hades, is a perverse demon; the Tartar demons worship only him, therefore we should now consider the barbarians as demons. But alas! The feet have assumed the place of the head; the demons have usurped the land of spirits and have forced us Chinese to become demons…

The Chinese have Chinese characteristics; but now the Manchus have ordered us to shave the hair around the head, leaving a long tail behind, thus making the Chinese appear to be brute animals. The Chinese have Chinese dress; but now the Manchus have adopted buttons on the hat, introduced barbarian clothes and monkey caps, and discarded the robes and headdresses of former dynasties, in order to make the Chinese to forget their origins. The Chinese have Chinese family relationships; but the former false demons, K’ang-hsi, secretly ordered the Tartars each to control ten families and defile the Chinese women, hoping thereby that the Chinese would all become barbarians. The Chinese have Chinese spouses; but now the Manchu demons have taken all of China’s beautiful girls to be their slaves and concubines. Thus three thousand beautiful women have been ravished by the barbarian dogs, one million pretty girls have slept with the odorous foxes; to speak of it distresses the heat, to talk of it pollutes the tongue. Thus Chinese womanhood has been humiliated. The Chinese have Chinese institution; but now the Manchus have created devilish regulations and laws so that we Chinese cannot escape their nets, nor can we move our hands and feet. Thus all the men of China are in their bondage. The Chinese have the Chinese language; but now the Manchus have introduced slang of the capital and changed the Chinese tones, desiring to delude China with barbarian speech and barbarian expressions.
Whenever floods and droughts occur, there is not the slightest compassion; they sit idly by and watch the starving wander about until the bleached bones grow like wild weeds, for they desire to reduce China’s population. Moreover, the Manchus have let loose covetous officials and corrupt lesser officials throughout the empire to strip the people of their fat until men and women weep by the road sides, for they desire to impoverish us Chinese. Offices are to be obtained by bribes, and punishments to be bought off with money; the rich hold authority and heroes despair, for they seek to drive our Chinese heroes to a despairing death. Should any seek to launch a righteous uprising and revive China, the Manchus would as a rule charge him with plotting a rebellion and execute his nine relations, for they desire to put an end to the plans of China’s heroes. The Manchus in deluding China and abusing China have not ailed to employ every extreme. What schemers they are! Formerly, Yao I-chung, of barbarian origin, advised his son Hsiang to swear allegiance to China. Fu Yung, also of barbarian origin, repeatedly advised his elder brother Chien against attacking China. Now the Manchus, having forgotten the meanness and baseness of their origin, have taken advantage of Wu San-kuo’s invitation, occupied China by force, and carried their villainy and viciousness to the extreme. We have carefully investigated the Manchu Tartars’ origins and have found that their first ancestor was a crossbreed of a white fox and a red dog, from whom sprang this race of demons. They daily multiplied and contracted marriages among themselves, there being no proper human relationships nor civilization. Availing themselves of China’s lack of heroes, they seized China. They established their own throne and the wild fox ascended to occupy it; in the court the monkeys are bathed and dressed. We Chinese could not plow up their caves or dig up their dens; instead we fell into their treacherous plots, bore their insults, and obeyed their commands. Moreover, our civil and military officials, coveting their emoluments, bowed and knelt in the midst of these herds of foxes and dogs. Now, a child but three feet tall is extremely ignorant, but point out a pig or a dog for him to bow down to and he would redden with anger. The Manchu barbarians are no more than dogs and swine. Some of you, sirs, have read books and know your history; yet you do not know the slightest shame…

Now fortunately Providence is retributive and China will have every reason to revive; as men’s minds are bent on order, there is evidence that the Manchu barbarians shall soon be destroyed…The Manchus’ crimes having reached their full, August Heaven thunders with anger and commands our T’ien Wang sternly to display Heaven’s majesty, to erect the standard of righteousness, to sweep away the barbarians, to pacify China, and respectfully carry out Heaven’s punishments. He says to all, whether far or near, that there is none without the willingness to support Him; whether official or citizen, all have the determination to hurry to unfurl the standard. Our arms and armor amidst righteous shouts are full of color, husbands and wives, men and women, prompted by public indignation, press to the fore, determined to slaughter the eight banners in order to pacify the nine provinces [China].

We hereby call upon the brace and noble of the four directions immediately to submit to God, in order to comply with God’s will. Let us again capture a Shou Hsü [a Mongol Khan] at Ts’ai-chou and seize a T’o Huan [the last emperor of the Mongol Yuan dynasty] at Ying-ch’ang; let us recover the long-lost territory and raise up God’s principles. Any person who captures the Tartar god, Hsien-feng, and bring him before us, anyone who can cut off his head and present it to us, or anyone who can seize or behead any of the Manchu barbarian chieflains shall be invested with high office; this promise shall not be broken.
Our Chinese empire has now received the great favor of the Great God who has ordered our Sovereign, the T’ien Wang, to rule; how can the occupation and prolonged misrule of the Manchu barbarians be permitted to continue? You gentlemen have for generations resided in China; who among you is not a child of God? If you can uphold Heaven in destroying the demons, seize the standard and be the first to mount battlements and warn yourself of Fang Feng’s late arrival [Yu of the Xia dynasty summoned a meeting of the nobles; Fang Feng arrived late and was killed], you shall be a hero without compare in the mortal world, an in heaven you shall receive glory without bounds. If instead you cling to your delusions, protect the false and reject the true, in life you will be a barbarian and in death a barbarian demon. Between obedience and disobedience there is a great principle; Chinese and barbarians are clearly distinguished. Let each obey Heaven and free himself from the demons that he may be a man. You gentlemen have suffered under the Manchu oppression long enough; if you still do not know how to change our attitude and with united hearts and concerted efforts to sweep clean the barbarian dust, how are you to answer God in high heaven? We have raised our righteous army; for God above we shall avenge those who have deceived Heaven, and for China below we shall free the common people from their miseries. We are determined to sweep away every vestige of barbarian influence and to enjoy in union the happiness of T’ai-p’ing. Those who obey Heaven shall be richly rewarded; those who disobey Heaven shall be publicly executed. Publicize this throughout the empire; let all hear and know it.

Appendix F: The Third Proclamation by Yang and Xiao

… we also proclaim our desire to save all born of Heaven and nourished by Heaven, all the children of the Heavenly Father, the Supreme Lord and Great God; we also proclaim our desire to save all the Chinese people who formerly did not understand the great principle, and mistakenly aided the demon Manchus and harmed China…

…we chiefs of staff are also truly desirous of saving you. You are all Chinese people, and since you are Chinese people, how can you be so stupid as to cut your hair and follow the demons, wear Manchu dress and Manchu apparel and willingly become slave dogs of the Manchu demons. The feet have assumed the place of the head, superior and inferior relations are reversed; do you know this? For China to rule the Manchu demons is like the master ruling the slave, which is proper; but for the Manchu demons to rule China is like the slave oppressing the master, which is improper.

Appendix G: Confession by Xiong Chengji

Occasionally shameless Chinese killed their fellow countrymen [tongbao] in order to suck up to them [the Manchus] like Zeng [the personal name was left blank], but they [Manchus] still sent Manchu officials [blank] to constrain them [Chinese]. As of the Army and Navy created recently, how important are they! If they [Manchus] really have the intention to improve the military, they could easily find people of ability. But the people they [Manchus] put in charge, like [blank], do not have an ounce of knowledge about military! What evil intentions they [Manchus] harbor by using these people!

Secondly, they do not give political leadership to us Chinese. Before [the recent reform] one or two Manchus were always appointed in each province as governor or jiansi to watch secretly. As of the provincial capitals and strategic points, none of them was not under the surveillance of their [Manchu] generals [jiangjun], lieutenant-general [dutong], or vice lieutenant-general [jiodutong]. In these a few years they [Manchus] use centralizationism [zhongyang jiquanzhuyi] to pretend to assimilate Manchus and Chinese, and cut generals and lieutenant-generals. Let us take a look. After the reform of the official system, the Grand Council [junji] is the hub of politics, and [name left blank] is in charge. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the organ of communications, and [blank] takes control of it. Finance Ministry is mother of businesses, and [blank] heads it. Political Council [zizheng] is the foundation of Parliament, and [blank] is on the top of it. Besides, [blank] is in charge of Civil Affairs [mingzheng], [blank] is in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce, [blank] is in charge of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, [blank] is in charge of the Ministry of Laws, [blank] is in charge of Daliyuan [the supreme court], [blank] is in charge of the Ministry of Education. None of them is not Manchu. Only the three unimportant Ministries of Personnel, Rituals, and Post and Transit are put in Chinese hands. Is it really that their ability and knowledge do not reach Manchus? I do not think so.

Thirdly, they do not care about our Chinese livelihood. We Chinese work hard all the year round, but how much do we get! All Chinese people’s grease and fat [zhigao, referring to wealth] exhausted are not enough for the imperial household to squander. But when it comes to the ignorant and untouchable banner men [qiding], the government allocates them rice every month. Now they have come to the realization that monthly stipend is not sustainable, and then they have begun to plan for the livelihood of the Manchus. Yet how is our Chinese livelihood like? Worse, in years of natural disaster and poor harvest, [the court] gives only several thousand of taels of silver, and brags that its kindness is deep and its gratuity is great. Do they not know that the money comes from our Chinese people’s grease and fat?

Fourth, they do not enrich us Chinese intellectually. Although now new schools are being set up gradually, their principle is incorrect as the government does not have the intention to set the purpose of education as cultivating good citizens. What it makes is either interest seekers or mediocre men. Rarely exist men of outstanding ability or high ambition, and the government always seeks to press these people so that they fail to achieve their ambitions. Moreover, the government is unwilling to develop agriculture, industry, and commerce, even schools, which are most important to people’s livelihood. Alas! Can we imagine the future of us Chinese? Westerners always say: The four hundred million Chinese have been under the oppression of the four million brutal Manchus for over
two hundred years, and have not recovered yet; therefore it can be inferred that the Chinese are more servile than other peoples. If we divide up China, they must not dare to resist. In addition, I have heard that westerners believe that once a people are ruled by a different people, then they can not wash off the historical shame and humiliation even with the water of sea. How can we Chinese wash off the over two hundred years long shame and humiliation in our history?

Due to the above reasons, I am determined to start a racial revolution [zhongzu geming]. Now we are in an age of competition. Everybody knows that the strong survive, and the weak die. Our China’s land size is large and our people are numerous. Cannot we be in the superior status!

Source: LJB: 40.
Appendix H: A Speech Draft by Qiu Jin

Qiu wrote that on a Sunday in October, she was having a little gathering with a few friends at the house she rented. At the time:

Suddenly my maid came in with visiting cards in hand, saying two guests were outside. I looked at the cards. One was by the name Lu Muxiu, one Shi Jingou [literally competing with Europe]. I told my maid to usher them in immediately. There came in two imposing young men. They joined us sitting on the floor drinking tea. We began to talk about school and politics. All of sudden Lu gave out a long sigh, uttering: ‘Our country has been annihilated by the Northern Barbarians [hu]. Further, judging from the present situation, I am afraid that we will be slaves of the white race. But our fellow countrymen in our home country and men of high ambition across this country are still like drunken and dreaming. What should we do?’ Jiang Zhenhua [literally prospering China] asked: ‘What do you mean by saying our country has been annihilated by the Northern Barbarians?’ Shi Jingou answered promptly: ‘Do you think the emperors at the court are Chinese like us? They are the nomadic Manchu race [Manzhu zhi zu]. They plotted to take advantage of our country’s internal disorder and seized illegally the throne. The third prince escaped to Burma, but finally was killed by them, the eldest prince, and the second prince, needless to say, both already had been killed by them. Only the youngest prince managed to flee, but nobody knows his whereabouts. In addition, there is this whole bunch of shameless slaves, who search and kill their co ethnics to gain favor from the different race.’ Huang and Liang then said angrily, pounding on the floor: ‘We did not know the throne was stolen by the Northern Barbarians. Aren’t they ancient enemies of us Chinese? We venerate them as our emperors. How regretful are we! Notwithstanding we are not men of great ability, we nevertheless vow to expel the ugly caitiffs [choulu]. We only regret that there is no organizing body because the task cannot be completed by a few people. What can we do?’ Then they sighed continuously, became quiet, sweeping tears. Lu and Shi were delighted at heart. Before they went on to say something, Aiqun [literally love people] asked: ‘How are the hearts like of people in China and the men of ambition across this country?’ Lu said: ‘People in China cannot distinguish races. All they do is to suck up to the Northern Barbarians, and call themselves patriots loyal to the emperor, such as the Emperor Protection Pary [baohuangdang]. They venerate their enemies as their fathers and kill their fellow countrymen. The men of ambition belong to two parties: The Emperor Protection Party and the Revolutionary party.

Source: LJB: 56.
Appendix I: Proclamation by Qiu Jin:

Alas, our elders and brethren! Do you know how the present situation is like? Do you know that the present situation does not allow non-revolutionary solutions? The wind from Europe and the rain from America are surging and cutting our bodies. Manchu bandits [Manzei] and Chinese traitors [Hanjian] collaborate. Our fellow countrymen are between a wall and hard rock, but they still are not aware of where they are. This is why we have to remind you sincerely for the sake of the great course. Our fellow countrymen are in a situation not different from a fish swimming in a cooking pot, or a swallow in a burning nestle, whose lives may come to an end at any moment, but not knowing that they are in danger. Financially [the Manchus] are avaricious and extort [money from us] endlessly. Although we all bear the obligation to pay tax, we are not granted the right to participate in politics. As of people’s livelihood, they [have become destitute] wander about homelessly; whereas they [the Manchus] are singing and dancing happily [living in luxury]. They [Manchus] talk beautifully about establishing constitutionalism, but in fact they intend to conduct autocracy. Ostensibly they claim political centralization, but the fact is the Chinese are being exploited. Military leadership is gripped in the hands of the Manchu lackeys [Mannu, a derogatory term referring to the Manchus]. In addition, they intend to monopolize national wealth. The so-called military improvement and tax increase are just two examples of the ways they exploit us. In a nutshell, they want to drive us Chinese to death.

Even in the days of isolation, the evil of ethnic preference could not be tolerated, not to mention now when we are besieged by [western powers] in all directions. They [Manchus] still use caution against their household thefts [the Chinese], and toady to foreigners. They will eventually doom our beautiful motherland. Alas! Our elders and brethren, why do not you reflect on the difficulty with which our ancestors founded this country, and on the fact that our grandchildren will have no place to put their feet [their future is doomed], and further ponder over the policies of the Manchus?

We are deeply concerned with the future of our motherland. We have observed the situation in our country, and we believe that we must set an example to everyone by launching a revolution to expand our influence and exterminate them ugly lackeys [chounu, referring to the Manchus]. When the flag of our great course points to the area where you are, and if you are a member of our Chinese people, then you should express your sympathy.