Aristotelian Liberal Virtues

Joseph W. Slade, IV

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ARISTOTELIAN LIBERAL VIRTUES

by

Joseph W. Slade, IV

Under the Direction of Dr. Peter Lindsay

ABSTRACT

I analyze the potentially self-destructive tension inherent in liberalism between conceptions of negative liberty and positive liberty. In doing so, I utilize Aristotle’s theory of virtue to show that virtue is the best method of resolving this tension. In addition, I demonstrate that liberal virtues are best construed as virtues of intellect to be exercised in the public sphere. In particular, I show the importance of not construing liberal virtues as virtues of character (often referred to as moral virtues), because advocating such virtues is, in fact, contrary to the central tenets of liberalism. That is, I argue that it is illiberal to ask liberal citizens to develop a certain moral character, and that it is, instead, essential for said citizens to develop intellectual virtues as a method of resolving this tension within liberalism between the virtues needed to sustain liberalism and liberalism’s resistance towards promoting those virtues.

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2008
ARISTOTELIAN LIBERAL VIRTUES

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Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
May 2008
DEDICATION

For Alison, who knows far more about this than she ever bargained for, and to whom I am sincerely grateful.
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INTRODUCTION

Despite the success of liberalism in contemporary society, there are a number of tensions within liberal political thought. The one we will be concerned with in this essay is a dichotomy between two notions of freedom. The first of these is the familiar idea that one cannot be free unless one is unfettered; that is, one is free when there are no constraints on oneself. The second conceptualizes freedom as consisting in “man’s ability to determine himself” (Ruggiero, 35).

These two notions of freedom exist in tension within one another because the second conception opens up the possibility that we may not be sufficiently in control of our lives. This, in turn, can lead to the view that individuals need to be taught certain skills or values to be free in a specific way. In teaching such skills, restraints are placed on free action—in this case, the ability to reject this idea of freedom. Thus, there are two conceptions of freedom that can be used in our discussion of liberalism: the freedom from external constraints and the freedom of self-determination.

In the following section, I shall first give background information on the tension between these two conceptions of freedom and showcase this difficulty more explicitly. In doing so, I shall develop the general tension between these two types of freedom into a particular instantiation of this problem within liberal theory. I shall then outline a methodology for resolving this particular tension in liberal theory throughout the remainder of this essay. In resolving this tension, I shall demonstrate the applicability of certain aspects of Aristotle’s theory of political virtue to modern liberal theory. First, however, we must examine the tension between negative and positive liberty in greater detail.

This tension between positive and negative liberty has a long-running history in liberalism, both with regards to liberal political theory and in discussions of practical policy. On
the one hand, liberalism espouses a commitment to negative freedom, to the idea that people should be free to decide for themselves how to live their lives. On the other hand, many liberal states are committed to ideas of positive freedom, through, for example, the democratic process. On this conception of freedom, individuals who participate in the democratic process are free because they have helped determine the course of the state. Moreover, one of the values that liberal societies rest on is the idea that people should be free to decide how to live their own lives. This means that toleration and civility are values that liberal citizens need to have in order to live next door to people who espouse very different viewpoints on the meaning of the good life.

If liberal citizens lack such tolerance, liberal society will swiftly degenerate into anarchy. We need only look as far as the religious tensions in the world today to understand that if people living in diverse societies are not taught that diversity, toleration, and religious freedom are necessary, then one radical group may swiftly go to war with another. Some positive concepts regarding how to live one’s life—in this case, the importance of the concepts listed just above—are necessary to the maintenance of liberal political society. In order for liberal society to continue, liberal citizens need to be taught to value the virtues that hold liberal society together.

Many individuals understandably side with the idea that freedom consists in being unencumbered by others—other individuals, groups of people, and especially the government. Such a concept of freedom is intuitively appealing. What else would it mean to be free? Surely nothing more than to be able to do what one wants, when one wants it, and to decide the ‘how’ for oneself as well. Moreover, freedom of this sort is important to have: if one cannot do at least some of the things one desires, how can one be said to be free? Proponents of this concept, such
as John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith, advocate for this type of freedom both in theory and in practice.

However, some theorists (e.g., Marx and Rousseau) have suggested that there is more to freedom than the absence of obstacles. Charles Taylor refers to this concept as the view that “one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one’s life” (Taylor, 388). On this reading, in order to be free, an individual must be able to exercise control over her life, and to act on what she believes is “significant for human life;” merely being unencumbered is insufficient (Taylor, 391). She must be able to make decisions based on what she wants, and be able to act on those decisions to get what she wants. If, for whatever reason, this individual is not able to control her own life, then she is not free.

For example, Susan Brison, writing about issues of personal identity, states that “[the autonomous self is] that which freely makes choices and wills actions,” (Brison, 27). However, following a violent attack on Brison’s person, uncontrollable flashbacks undermine and “reconfigure the survivor’s will, rendering involuntary many responses that were once under voluntary control” (Brison, 27). Such involuntary actions violate an agent’s autonomy. Moreover, what Brison wanted to do, post-trauma, was also changed, since instead of wanting to go for a walk at dusk, she wished to remain at home—something she claims was a radical departure from her previous self (Brison, 27).

Additionally, one has only to consider a fairly standard case of self-deception to see a way in which an individual could render himself unable to carry out his true wishes. If, for example, I am choosing between two jobs, one in Seattle, and one in Boston, I may pass over the job in Boston which would make me happier than the one in Seattle, just because I have friends in Seattle. So one could be free in the sense that one is unencumbered, but such an individual
could be unable to live his life in the way he really wants due to some inner difficulty. Such a case cuts to the heart of this tension between the two conceptions of freedom. Why, we must ask, do we want to be free in the first sense?

The reason we want to be free from external influence is so we can give free reign to our own desires. We do not want other people telling us how to live our lives; we want to decide for ourselves how to live our lives. In essence, we want the negative freedom in order to be able to exercise our positive freedom—control over our lives. When stated in such a manner, it seems quite simple to embrace negative freedom. However, a tension between negative and positive freedom remains.

We must figure out how to live the life we want, and, more importantly, decide on what it is that we do, in fact, want in life. This is accomplished not by simply allowing everyone to go and do whatever they want, but by ensuring that individuals have the resources and ability to decide what they want out of life and to pursue those desires. (Although a policy of trial and error might allow individuals to figure out what kind of life they desire, such a policy would result in anarchy.) The tension between positive and negative liberty arises because many people feel that their way of life is best, or most free. Moreover, many of these people also believe that everyone should lead the type of life that they lead. This raises the question of whether or not individuals should be helped to gain these putative resources and abilities in order to become free.

Such a question raises additional considerations along the lines of the idea that freedom consists in the absence of obstacles. The example of the totalitarian state makes many people rightly wary of the idea that anyone should aid us in deciding what we want in life. One of the reasons people fear help in deciding how to live their lives is that they fear being told how to live
their lives. However, eschewing any such aid would leave individuals unable to even speak to one another—communication, and even more so, education, is itself a primary form of such assistance. Nevertheless, people particularly fear the reduction of their negative liberty by the state, because the state has the most power to do so. This is especially true when it comes to promoting conceptions of positive liberty—people fear that they will be told how to live their lives in ways that are drastically different from the ways in which they have adopted conceptions of freedom from their smaller, familial communities.

This illustrates the tension between negative and positive conceptions of freedom within liberal thought. Liberal citizens want to be free in the negative sense to pursue their own conceptions of the good life. However, the only way that everyone can be assured of such freedom is for everyone to be taught the importance of certain positive values—values which rule out some activities or conceptions of the good life (such as the violent promotion of the existence of a single way of life), and that people be restricted from engaging in some behavior. The desire for freedom from interference by others is in tension with the desire for people to embrace an idea of the good which encompasses many different ways of life so that individuals will respect the negative liberty of others. We can fail to be free because of external impediments to our desires, such as living in a society which does not respect the way in which we wish to live our lives, and we can fail to be free to realize our own desires because of internal impediments. Those internal impediments can be something like Brison describes, a version of post-traumatic stress disorder, or self-deception, or inculcation in a belief system which teaches that an aspect of human nature is wrong (such a system could result in the diminishing of one’s ability to actualize one’s desires).
Despite the possibility that we may need to be taught to be free, many individuals still fear that someone will direct their lives for them. We can accept that “[self-realization] can fail for internal reasons, but [we believe] that no valid guidance can be provided in principle by social authority” because “the attempt to impose such guidance will destroy other necessary conditions of freedom,” namely, that of negative liberty (Taylor, 390). Taylor’s argument is that we fear that someone will second-guess our motivations, and tell us that we are thinking or acting improperly. We fear having our character shaped for us by outside influences, such that we become unable to act in the way we wanted to act before we were externally influenced. We fear being told how to live our lives—that we will be deprived of our negative liberty by being forced to embrace a conception of positive liberty that we do not agree with.

I do not wish to argue that this fear is unfounded; instead, I want to point the way towards a possible resolution of the tension between negative and positive liberty. The tension between negative liberty and positive liberty is instantiated within liberal theory in a complex manner. As should be clear by now, we have negative liberty on one side, with the corresponding desire that people should live in the manner they see fit. On the other side, we have positive liberty, which notes that liberal citizens need to possess certain virtues for liberalism to continue existing. Both positive and negative conceptions of liberty are important to liberal thought, and both are necessary. Without a commitment to (for example), toleration, diversity, and the free discussion of political, religious, and intellectual viewpoints, liberalism cannot long remain extant.

In this essay, I will argue that a partial resolution of the tension described above can be achieved through the judicious application of certain aspects of Aristotle’s ethical and political theory. That is, we can develop the outline of a theory of positive liberty while preserving the negative liberty that people are afraid to lose. Unlike modern theories, Aristotle’s methodology
is driven forward by the concept of virtue. To ancient theorists such as Aristotle, virtues were considered types of excellences. These excellences were good because they helped achieve a specific function—and everything, even human beings, was thought to have a function. The virtue of a knife, for instance, is its sharpness, which enables it to achieve its function—cutting.

Aristotle argues that human beings have a function, and that there are virtues which enable individuals to carry out that function. (The specific human function is not important to our discussion.) We will explore Aristotle’s ethical and political theory at length in the next section, but I would like to touch here on two conceptual distinctions that will inform the rest of this essay. The first distinction is one which separates the idea of intellectual virtues, or excellences, from virtues of character (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103a5). For our purposes, virtue is best understood as a kind of positive liberty. As noted above, one of the reasons that people in liberal societies fear positive liberty is because they are afraid that they will in fact have their characters shaped in such a way that they no longer express what is truly important to them as individuals. That is, we fear that positive liberty—virtue, in this case—will threaten our negative liberty.

This distinction between intellectual virtues and virtues of character (also known as moral virtues) will allow us to conceptualize the idea of positive liberty in a way which separates the two conceptions of virtue. As shall become clear throughout the course of this essay, I shall argue that only moral virtues appear to threaten negative liberty. This is not to say that moral virtues cannot possibly play a role in conceptions of positive liberty; just that moral virtues appear to infringe upon negative liberty. As liberals concerned with avoiding such encroachment, we should avoid the inculcation of moral virtues.
By doing so, we will restrict this liberal conception of positive liberty—of virtue—to the sphere of intellectual virtues. Thus, any conception of positive liberty which emerges from this discussion will avoid forcing people to live their lives in a specific manner. I shall argue that if one attempts to inculcate moral virtues into a liberal populace, an individual’s ability to choose how to live his life is restricted; that is, attempts to inculcate moral virtues into a liberal populace would infringe upon the negative liberty of those citizens. In addition, I shall argue that intellectual virtues do not have the same necessary effect on an individual’s life. Broadly speaking, the difference is that moral virtues are best described as habitual ways to live one’s life—dispositions regarding how one acts and behaves. By contrast, intellectual virtues are cognitive capacities such as the ability to reason effectively.

The distinction between moral and intellectual virtues, then, is primarily a conceptual distinction. However, it should help make the tension between negative liberty and positive liberty seem less challenging to liberalism, mostly by making the conception of positive liberty I shall endorse seem less threatening to negative liberty. However, this may not be enough; a conception of intellectual virtue may still seem to encroach upon the negative liberty of liberal individuals by changing how they think. The challenge here is to find a way to further restrict the influence any conception of virtue can have.

Aristotle also gives us a second conceptual distinction which should help accomplish the goal of restricting the influence of virtue. If the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues helps make positive liberty less threatening, then this second distinction should make it clear that liberal positive liberty will not attempt to shape our private lives. Aristotle distinguishes between things that are virtues for man qua man, and what is good for the citizen of a particular regime (Politics, 1277a10). That is, some virtues are virtues for all human beings
simply in light of the fact that they are human; the ability to reason well might be one of these virtues. The other side of this dichotomy are virtues for citizens. Aristotle distinguishes the virtue of the citizen from that of the human being; he also distinguishes the virtue of one type of citizen from another. Thus, the virtues of the liberal citizen will be different from the virtues of the citizen of communist Russia, the virtues of the citizen of theocratic Iran, and the virtues of the citizen of monarchist Thailand. The benefit of this dichotomy is that in using it, we will be able to distinguish liberal virtues from the virtues that may be necessary in other walks of life. Furthermore, in utilizing this distinction, we can differentiate between the virtues that people need to be good liberal citizens and the virtues they might want for their private lives, which can then be left alone. In doing so, we restrict the scope of positive liberty to a smaller sphere, further lessening the impact on negative liberty. The goals of this essay do not include enumerating the virtues of the liberal citizen; that is a project for a later date, though I shall attempt to point in the general directions future research might pursue.

However, in order to get a better sense of where to direct future research, and also to spell out where previous theories have gone wrong, the bulk of this project will be devoted to analyzing the work of four contemporary theorists. Each of them—Peter Berkowitz, John Rawls, Stephen Macedo, and Joseph Raz—is, in his own way, responding to the tension between negative and positive liberty noted above by incorporating theories of virtue into liberal political theory. In the sections to follow, we shall analyze each thinker to understand where they go wrong so that we may outline the structure of a liberal theory of virtue.

Berkowitz identifies quite clearly with the tension between positive and negative liberty described above. He thinks that liberalism depends on the existence of moral and intellectual virtues within the liberal populace. The tension comes in because although liberalism depends
on these virtues, liberalism simultaneously eschews the methods of producing of such virtues. For Berkowitz, then, the tension exists between the desire for citizens of liberal states to have complete negative freedom, and the necessity of those citizens possessing certain virtues in order to foster the ongoing existence of that liberal state. Berkowitz’s work displays the tension between the necessity for negative conceptions of liberty as well as the need for liberal states to work to inculcate virtue. We can take from Berkowitz the idea that state-sponsored virtues of some kind are important to liberalism.

John Rawls’ theory is tied extremely closely to his theory of the good life. Though this theory of the good is very broad, he seems only to consider moral, rather than intellectual, virtues. My critique of Rawls’ theory will primarily rest on this consideration; though Berkowitz and Macedo are also heavily indebted to the idea of moral virtues, I shall use Rawls’ account as a foil for a robust account of my rejection of moral virtue. Rawls does, however, draw a useful dividing line between virtues that people want for themselves and virtues which people want their fellow citizens to have. Though this does not completely coincide with the distinction Aristotle draws between the good man and the good citizen, it gives us an indication that we may be on the right track.

Macedo, in contrast to Berkowitz and Rawls, aims primarily at an account of intellectual virtues—just as I intend to. Macedo goes wrong only in his failure to separate the civic arena and its virtues from the private sphere; that is, he does not draw the distinction between the good man and the good citizen. I shall argue that Macedo’s conception of positive liberty infringes upon the negative liberty of citizens because his idea of positive liberty is not restricted to the public sphere. My claim is that liberal virtues should be described as civic virtues, as intended for the public good of the state, rather than the private benefit of individuals. Nevertheless,
Macedo’s work points us in some useful directions for further research on the specific intellectual virtues of liberal citizens.

In sharp contrast to Berkowitz, Rawls, and Macedo, Joseph Raz’s theory radically exceeds the traditional boundaries of negative liberty in liberalism. In developing his theory of virtue, Raz fully embraces the notion of positive liberty and becomes a neo-Aristotelian. Raz advocates not only the creation of moral virtues amongst a population, he also promotes the idea of collective control over the lives of individuals. In other words, Raz’s theory is one that is heavily influenced by positive liberty. He gives short shrift to considerations of negative liberty, noting that people can be wrong about what they want, or about what is truly good for them. When such individuals go wrong, it is the duty of the state to set them right at all costs. Raz’s account is an excellent example of why Aristotle’s theory is not liberal, and why, as liberals, we should not be too eager to adopt Aristotle’s entire account of virtue. Aristotle’s theory also serves as an example of why positive liberty seems threatening to negative liberty: it may strip people of choices.

As noted above, I intend to use Aristotle as a lens for this project. By this I mean that we should view the role of virtue in liberal theory through certain focal points within of Aristotle’s theory. Aristotle’s thoughts on ethics and politics are important because they are very different from those of modern liberals. Aristotle considers virtue not as an add-on to his political theory (as we shall), but a matter at the very heart of that theory. Nevertheless, I want to make it clear that I mean only to utilize the two distinctions Aristotle draws. The fact that Aristotle embraces the concept of positive freedom in a manner contrary to that of liberal theory is reason enough to avoid incorporating more of Aristotle’s theory. Moreover, Aristotle would most likely reject the
idea of a theory of positive freedom which eschews moral virtues (see *Nichomachean Ethics* 
Book IX).

In this essay, I shall not attempt to argue that moral virtue *cannot* play a role in 
conceptions of positive liberty. Rather, I shall assert the importance of negative liberty to liberal 
political theory and attempt to show that the inculcation of moral virtues by the liberal state 
would result in potentially unacceptable losses of negative liberty. In order to produce virtues 
that do not violate conceptions of negative liberty, liberal virtues must be construed as public, 
intellectual virtues. Liberal theorists have always feared the slippery slope of positive freedom— 
that the state will tell people how to live. It is partially on this basis that we shall reject Raz’s 
account of virtue in liberal theory.

I shall close with some additional thoughts regarding the two Aristotelian distinctions we 
intend to utilize. In particular, I shall demonstrate how we can use these two distinctions to 
resolve a number of the difficulties raised in the theories of Berkowitz, Rawls, and Macedo. In 
addition, I shall raise several other challenges to the incorporation of virtue within liberal theory: 
first, the idea that intellectual virtues may infringe upon negative liberty; finally, that this 
conception of virtue in particular forces people to change their lives by limiting their conceptions 
of the good life. I shall attempt to deal with those criticisms before offering directions for future 
research in this area.
ARISTOTLE

Aristotle’s conception of virtue is extremely robust and complicated. Due to this fact, this section will have two main areas of discussion. First, we shall examine Aristotle’s basic conception of virtue, then turn to investigating the complex relationship the concept of virtue plays in Aristotle’s theories of ethics and politics. In doing so, we shall rely primarily on two texts: The *Nicomachean Ethics*\(^1\) (abbreviated *NE* from here) and the *Politics*.\(^2\) Moreover, we shall pay a great deal of attention to the two distinctions cited in the previous section: the distinction between intellectual and moral virtues, and the distinction between the virtue of the good man and that of the good citizen.

To begin discussing Aristotle’s concept of virtue, we must start with a definition of virtue. Virtue is most simply (and most often) described as a kind of excellence (*NE*, 1098a10). The paradigm example of a virtue involves a knife. The primary virtue of a knife is sharpness. This is because a knife’s purpose is to cut things. Sharpness is very important to the purpose of cutting, since a dull blade cannot cut well. As this example demonstrates, everything that has a purpose has a virtue or group of virtues.

Aristotle’s focus on virtue deals with humans rather than knives. The virtue of a human being is that which leads to performing well the function of a human being. Aristotle defines the function of a human being as “activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason” (*NE*, 1098a8). The virtues of a human being are differentiated into two distinct groups: “virtues of thought,” or intellect, and “virtues of character,” or moral virtues (*NE*, 1103a5). Intellectual virtues consist of traits like “wisdom, comprehension, and prudence,” whereas moral virtues are

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characteristics such as “generosity and temperance” (NE, 1103a5). Thus, human virtues will consist of these two general kinds of excellence which enable us to act in accord with our rational nature. Virtues of character are described by Aristotle as mean states, which divide two extremes. This mean is “defined by reference to reason” (NE, 1107a5). That is, being virtuous requires the use of reason to find the appropriate action to take in a situation, where there are multiple inappropriate responses to the situation.

This conception of virtue forms the backbone of the Aristotelian conception of ethics. For Aristotle, everything that human beings do is aimed at achieving something, some end (of which there are many) (NE, 1094a5). Nearly all of these ends are sought for the purpose of accomplishing “some end that we wish for because of itself,” a single, ultimate end (NE, 1094a20). This ultimate end is happiness—the only thing, according to Aristotle, that we seek only for its own sake. All of our other goals are meant, in the long run, to bring us happiness. However, there can be some confusion about what defines happiness.

Happiness is not doing whatever one wants, or doing nothing, but is found “in the activities in accord with virtue” (NE, 1177a10). Aristotle argues that happiness is not a life of gratification, but rather a life in which the human function—activity in accord with reason—is fulfilled (NE, Book I.5). That function is to live a rational life in keeping with man’s essentially rational nature. Such a life, Aristotle believes, would be a life devoted to study. This is because “understanding is the supreme element” in human beings, and actively pursuing understanding “is the most pleasant of the activities in accord with virtue” (NE, 1177a 20-25). Virtue is thus a necessary condition for happiness (NE, 1099b15). However, virtue alone is not a sufficient condition for happiness, because some external goods (such as enough money to live in relative comfort) are also necessary (NE, 1099b15). Moreover, simply possessing the virtues does not
guarantee one’s ability to exercise them appropriately; certain situations and other external elements come into play here as well.

As noted above, there are two types of virtue relevant to the human condition which can help fulfill our rational function and make us happy. Humans are not born virtuous; this is why it is easy to acquire bad habits and do things poorly or lazily. It is important, therefore, that the acquisition of virtues of character begins in childhood with the development of good habits (NE, 1103b20). One of the most important habits to acquire is that of doing the correct action in a given situation for the right reason (NE, 1103b30). Aristotle’s explicit analysis of motivation is that people act to gain pleasure and avoid pain—though pleasure is not our ultimate aim (NE, Book II.3). The key to performing the correct action and being morally virtuous is to find the right things pleasurable and the wrong things painful. “It is proper to virtue to feel both pleasure and pain in the right things and in the right way,” Aristotle says (NE, 1121a5). This is all part of Aristotle’s theory: part of being virtuous is having the proper emotional attachments to what is right and what is wrong in a given situation. Thus, feeling the right way is a key component of virtue. Though Aristotle did not conceive of the division between positive and negative liberty in the way later theorists did, it should be clear by now that his theory is based on positive liberty.

Aristotle notes that there are three important qualities of morally virtuous actions. First, the agent must know what action he is taking—he should not be confused or deceived. Second, that agent must choose to take the action “for its own sake;” that is, because it is the right thing to do (NE, 1105a30). Finally, he must perform that action “from a fixed and permanent disposition” (NE, 1105a30-1105b). This final condition is what makes an individual virtuous:
that he consistently chooses the good action because he has become habituated to taking pleasure in acting rightly.

As with moral virtues, Aristotle devotes a book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to the subject of the intellectual virtues (*NE*, Book VI). Of these virtues, the one which we shall be concerned with is prudence—the ability to “calculate well to promote some excellent end” (*NE*, 1140a30). Prudence is thus necessary to carrying out moral virtue, since it is concerns one’s ability to achieve good ends. Prudence is also defined as “a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being” (*NE*, 1140b5). Aristotle’s concept of prudence thus has a moral component, since it is concerned with excellent ends. Moreover, there are multiple types of prudence, including “legislative science,” which deals with the deliberations and decisions of the politically active (*NE*, 1141b25). Aristotle distinguishes this type of prudence from prudence of the individual, concerned with what is good for oneself. In doing so, Aristotle sets the stage for a conception of liberal virtue that is concerned with the public sphere.

Unfortunately, Aristotle does not devote nearly as much time to discussing the acquisition of the virtues of thought as he does the moral virtues. There are several divisions within the intellectual virtues. There exist virtues of thought which involve contemplating science and the world, as well as wisdom and “prudence.” The most he says is that prudence is greatest in those who are “experienced and older,” and that the young are not prudent because while they can grasp concepts, they have yet to gain experience with particular situations (*NE*, 1143b15). Nevertheless, prudence is a sort of rational capacity needed for morally virtuous action, insofar as one needs to be able to decide on a course of action. More importantly,
prudence, as we have seen, can be separated into types, particularly a type which is concerned with political action.

The reason that Aristotle is so concerned with ethically virtuous behavior is because of the impact his theory of virtue has on his political ideas. As we shall see, the virtues of character in particular play a large role in Aristotle’s conception of the role of the state. This conception will support the idea that the distinction between intellectual virtues and moral virtues is crucial. We shall discuss the impact of this distinction at greater length in the section on John Rawls. In this section, we shall be primarily concerned with the role that Aristotle’s conception of virtue, human purpose, and happiness play on the political stage.

Our interest in Aristotle’s Politics picks up very much where the Nicomachean Ethics left off, with a discussion of the purpose of the state and the role of virtue in politics and political communities. The role of ethics, Aristotle says, is not merely to understand what virtue, good, and happiness are, but to aid us in becoming virtuous, good, happy people (NE, 1179b5). The role of politics is to further the goal of ethics: helping people become virtuous individuals. Because man is a naturally political being, humans naturally tend towards being social (Politics, 1253a5). This natural tendency begins when people combine to form small households of a single man and woman. When several households come together, they are able to create a village “for the sake of satisfying needs other than everyday” needs, such as food, water, shelter, and defense (Politics, 1252b15). A state, broadly defined, is a community “established for the sake of some good” (Politics, 1252a5). In fact, every community is established for the purpose of achieving some end.

Nevertheless, rather than of a group of human beings coming together to form a state, Aristotle believes that the state is prior to the individual in the same way that I exist with relation
to my arm: the whole exists before the part; the part cannot exist without the whole (Politics, 1253a19). The state thus exists naturally; since man is a political animal, his political associations are natural (Politics, 1253a24). Moreover, Aristotle believes that a man who is not politically inclined is either sub- or super-human (Politics, 1253a5). That is, such an individual does not need the benefits of association, either because he is unable to take advantage of them, or because he does not need to.

Thus, the state “comes to be for the sake of living, but remains in existence for the sake of living well” (Politics, 1252b25). The purpose of the state is therefore to help individuals live well by causing them to become virtuous. However, as we have discussed, there are many different types of virtues—at least one virtue for everything that has a purpose. In this case, both rulers and subjects must be virtuous in order to carry out their tasks well; rulers and subjects have different purposes (Politics, 1258b35-40). There are different virtues pertinent to both rulers and subjects.

In fact, because there are many different kinds of regimes (dictatorships, monarchies, democracies, etc.), there are multiple virtues of both rulers and subjects. From this, Aristotle infers that there is no single virtue for a citizen. Each regime has its own group of virtues for its citizens (Politics, 1276b25). In this way, the virtue possessed by the citizen can be remarkably different from the potentially complete virtue of a good man (Politics, 1276b30). The purpose and excellences required by the good man do not change, no matter what regime he lives in. However, the purposes and excellences of the good citizen differ from state to state, based on the type of regime and other local conditions. Thus, we are forced to conclude that the virtue of the good citizen most often does not equal the virtue of the good man (though it is possible that in the perfect regime, the two would be the same)—that “the virtue of a man and of a citizen cannot
be unqualifiedly the same” (*Politics*, 1277a10). We shall discuss the importance of this distinction throughout the rest of this essay, though most notably in the section featuring Stephen Macedo. Ultimately, this distinction is relevant because it allows us to restrict the sphere of influence of positive liberty on liberal life.

The process of becoming virtuous is particularly important to our discussion, since it has implications for both the positive and negative liberty of the citizens of a state. According to Aristotle, there are three necessary conditions for becoming virtuous. These are “nature, habit, and reason” (*Politics*, 1232a40). One must be human, and have a certain rational capacity. Moreover, one must attain good habits—habits that promote virtue and eschew vice. Finally, we must be guided by reason, and attempt to harmonize our reason with our habits and nature. In order to attain virtue, then, we must be human beings who are educated in a certain manner. This education, Aristotle tells us, falls to the state. Moreover, since Aristotle is aiming at the good for man, and not the good of a particular type of citizen, the sphere of positive liberty encompasses the entire life of the individual.

As the most “authoritative” community, the one with the most power, influence, and decision-making authority, it is appropriate that the state is charged with aiming at the most authoritative good—happiness (*Politics*, 1252a5). Moreover, the purpose of the state is not to help an individual or group of individuals achieve happiness, but to make the whole state happy (insofar as that is possible). This is because it is good to achieve the highest good for an individual, but better to do so for a state (*NE*, 1094b10). It is better to achieve happiness for the entire state, rather than a single man, because the best states look to benefit everyone (*Politics*, 1279a15). Because the goal of political science is happiness for a state, it is necessary for the state to strive to inculcate virtue in the community, since virtue is the path towards happiness.
Aristotle believes that the state is established for a positive good: to make the citizens of that state “good people who do fine actions” (NE, 1099b34). Thus, the state must pay close attention to the character of the citizens in order to help them become good people (NE, 1099b30). This is obviously contrary to at least one of the explicit and implicit aims of liberal government since Hobbes, which is to prevent “mutual wrongdoing” (Politics, 1280b30).

Aristotle’s belief in the positive good of the state evolves from his conception of man as naturally political, an early theme of both our texts (NE, 1097b12, Politics, 1253a1-5). Since man is naturally political, the role of the state is to help him achieve success within the state; this is accomplished through virtue. Aristotle dwells first and most on moral virtues. He believes that character is developed through “[the repetition of] similar activities” (NE, 1103b25). Because of this, he places great emphasis on developing good habits in childhood, noting that the state “should be particularly concerned with the education of the young” to help promote the laws and mores of the state (Politics, 1337a10).

Such character development is unnatural, in the sense that it does not spontaneously occur (NE, 1103a19). Instead, the development of a virtuous character is brought about via habituation prompted by the legislator, the person or group of people who make the laws of the state. Habituation refers to the method of encouraging and/or forcing individuals to perform specific actions over a period of time. In this case, to behave virtuously—to do good things and become good people. Over time, if one does enough good deeds, it becomes habit to do so. In doing so, an individual develops a habitually virtuous character.

This work of habituation is the primary task of the state, so much so that “correct habituation distinguishes a good political system from a bad one” (NE, 1103b6). Such habit formation starts at a very young age; in fact, one of the primary concerns of habituating
individuals in a state is to lay down guidelines which “prescribe” the “upbringing and practices” of the youth in a state (NE, 1179b35). Aristotle’s legislator lays down laws concerning the education of the youth in the state. It is not enough to want to do good; an Aristotelian citizen must come to love and hate the right things (NE, 1172a22). One must be habituated correctly to have virtue of character. So the state has the task of making sure individuals come to be good citizens by teaching them to hate what the state says is bad and love what the state says is good. The legislator pushes people towards virtue (NE, 1180a7).

This pushing is done through the primary means available to a state—laws (NE, 1180a35). Aristotle stresses the importance of such efforts when he notes that “a human being is the best of animals when perfected,” but the worst of animals when without laws (Politics, 1253a32-35). The only way we can achieve the end of human life—happiness—is when we are taught to be properly human. The purpose of the state is to achieve this end by elevating the citizens of the state through laws. The end result of good laws should be properly habituated citizens, who will be human, not animal, and able to seek out their proper end of happiness.

Aristotle’s ruler naturally tries to achieve political good, which Aristotle takes to be justice, or the common benefit (Politics, 1282b15). A political constitution is best when it tries to achieve the common benefit. The state is a community of free people who have come together for mutual benefit (Politics, 1279a16). It would be contrary to the purposes of the state to prioritize an individual or group over the whole (Politics, 1324a5). Thus, the state must be just so that the citizens who make it up will be virtuous. Though some citizens would be virtuous regardless, the majority would not. The relationship works in the opposite direction as well: the state will be great only if the individuals who compose it are excellent (Politics, 1332a33). This excellence is due to the confluence of nature, habit, and reason, which explains why Aristotle
puts such an emphasis on education (Politics, 1332a39). Not much can be done to change someone’s nature, but their faculties of reasoning can be developed, and they can be habituated, as we have seen, to virtuous actions. This is why the legislator is so concerned with educating the young (Politics, 1337a11).

Such an attempt to have all citizens be virtuous also explains why Aristotle wants education to be of a communal variety (Politics, 1337a21-27). Everyone should receive the same education and habituation so that the influence of nature is lessened as much as possible, so that all may grow up to become virtuous citizens. In the end, we see that Aristotle views the individual through the lens of the state, as a product of the state rather than the material which makes up the state—a fact which greatly influences his views about virtue and freedom (Politics, 1253a20). This is why Aristotle’s theory is so different from liberal theory: for Aristotle, positive freedom is the key element, rather than negative.

The distinctions between intellectual and moral virtues, and between the good for man and the good for the citizen, can help us in our attempts to develop a truly liberal account of virtue. The first distinction allows us to conceptually separate two very different types of virtue—one of which, moral virtue, is potentially threatening to negative liberty (as we shall discuss in great detail later). Both distinctions show us that we can talk about liberty as an issue purely dealing with the public, political sphere, because Aristotle conceptualizes one part of prudence as dealing with political reasoning, and because we shall concern ourselves with virtues designed for the liberal citizen, rather than the liberal person. Both of these will help us contain the influence of positive liberty so that it does not greatly affect the negative liberty of individuals, thus avoiding the main reasons to avoid conceptions of positive liberty in liberalism.
In the next section, we will discuss the work of Peter Berkowitz. Berkowitz, as we shall see, identifies quite closely with the tension between negative and positive liberty described in the previous section. Berkowitz analyzes the work of several “forefathers” of modern liberalism. In doing so, he argues convincingly that each felt that virtue was important to their political theory, thus demonstrating the relevance of virtue to modern liberal theory.
In this section, I shall discuss Peter Berkowitz’s revisionist accounts of three influential thinkers—Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill. I shall lay out Berkowitz’s discussion of each of these three theorists. In doing so, I shall be less concerned with Berkowitz’s attempts to revise our understanding of these thinkers than I am to compile his reasoning regarding the necessity for virtue in liberalism. Berkowitz does not present his own views on virtue in a standard manner; instead, each thinker Berkowitz examines illuminates one or two aspects of Berkowitz’s own thoughts on liberal virtues. While Berkowitz and I are in agreement about the need for a liberal theory which encompasses an idea of virtue, Berkowitz merely hints at the outline of such a theory. Though parts of his work are flawed (most notably his apparent insistence on a robust account of government-sponsored virtue), he makes several contributions to our project, including his rejection of an ultimate end for human life and his emphasis on the intellectual virtues.

Berkowitz identifies both an enthusiasm for virtue and a distrust of the same within the liberal tradition (Berkowitz, xi). This tension should be familiar to us as an instantiation of the tension between positive and negative liberty identified earlier. On the one hand, liberalism embraces positive liberty and self-realization (here represented by an enthusiasm for virtue). On the other hand, we distrust the concept of virtue because we fear the promotion of virtue will infringe upon our negative liberty. This instantiation of this tension is generated because Berkowitz believes liberalism logically entails a need for citizens to possess basic virtues, yet liberalism also struggles with how citizens are to obtain such virtues (Berkowitz, xiii). His goal is modest: to show that the forefathers of modern liberalism also struggled with this fact, yet
Hobbes, Locke, and Mill all thought that virtue was important enough to liberalism to retain as part of their theories.

Berkowitz begins the primary thrust of his argument by discussing Hobbes. There are obvious reasons both to call and deny Hobbes the title of “liberal,” but one cannot debate the importance of *Leviathan* to the intellectual history of liberalism. Hobbes’ primary concern was, undeniably, the “attainment of peace” for the subjects under the sovereign (Berkowitz, 39). This was to be accomplished through following the laws of nature, which Berkowitz believes can be viewed as moral virtues (Berkowitz, 38).

In discussing Hobbesian virtues, it is important to note that Hobbes is not speaking about achieving an ultimate good life for man; his goal is for citizens to live in peace (Berkowitz, 57). This is somewhat like Aristotle’s second distinction between the virtues for man and citizen. Thus, the virtues that Hobbes is concerned with are not those that might lead to human perfection; rather, the virtues that Hobbes thinks citizens should possess lead towards the attainment and maintenance of a peaceful society. Hobbes’ virtues are concepts like “*justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy*” (quoted in Berkowitz, 57). These virtues, after all, are what all regimes want for citizens, and are a far cry from an attempt to remake a populace in a certain image.

Since such a peace is the primary goal of Hobbes’ leviathan, it is important that citizens should all possess such virtues. The question then becomes, as with all accounts of virtue, how individuals should acquire such virtue. According to Berkowitz, Hobbes thinks that virtue must first be acquired by the sovereign, who should then instill virtue into his subjects (Berkowitz, 64-5). This should be done through “political education” (Berkowitz, 72). Hobbes felt that there should be government supervision of churches and universities, since most opinions are formed
in such institutions. While Berkowitz, as we shall see, is in favor of government promotion of virtue, most likely through mandated state-sponsored education, this is the part of Hobbes’ argument that Berkowitz finds most illiberal.

   Berkowitz nevertheless holds that “it is the task of government to promote such virtues” because liberal governments need virtue for their continued existence (Berkowitz, 71). He finds fault with Hobbes’ theory because Hobbes’ account produces “only a modest kind of virtue, the virtue necessary to the maintenance of the institutions that underwrite peace and cooperation for mutual advantage” (Berkowitz, 72). Though this sounds precisely like the kind of virtue that liberalism could embrace, Berkowitz believes it is insufficient. In addition, Berkowitz believes the educational instruments Hobbes sets in place to teach such virtue (namely, the ultimate power of the sovereign) are extremely anti-liberal, and as such, should be avoided.

   Berkowitz next turns to John Locke, for whom virtues are principles of reason and qualities of character (including, most famously, toleration) (Berkowitz, 94-5). Using Locke, Berkowitz expands upon the idea that virtue should be promulgated by the liberal state. Such governments are dependent “on the character of citizens and officeholders” (Berkowitz, 75). For liberal government to be successful, individuals must possess enough virtue to act with appropriate restraint. Such restraint is needed in order to make them see past their ordinary human passions (such as greed, jealousy, and narrow-mindedness) to the public good: the “natural freedom and equality of all human beings” (Berkowitz, 84).

   However, Berkowitz sets up an interesting dichotomy in making these claims. Despite the apparent reliance on private virtue for public benefit, Locke (in keeping with liberal tradition today) was very much against the idea of government-sponsored education for virtue. He felt that there could be no substitute for the nuclear family unit as the locus for an education in virtue
(Berkowitz, 104-5). This is because Locke placed a greater importance on the avoidance of state interference to protect negative liberty. However, Berkowitz questions the reliance on the two-parent nuclear family. If virtue is of such importance to the survival of liberalism, then contemporary society must also find a way to promote virtue. Locke’s ideal of the family as the nucleus for generating this virtue seems misplaced in an age when the presence of such households have declined. Berkowitz suggests that new methods of instilling virtue in the young must be developed. He claims that institutions such as the family and voluntary civil associations are less viable sources of virtue today. This is in part due to the atomistic individualism that modern liberalism has encouraged (Berkowitz, 173-4). Nevertheless, the virtue that appears necessary to the preservation of such modern liberalism can be encouraged, Berkowitz believes, through state action. This brings us to the last thinker that Berkowitz touches on: John Stuart Mill.

Mill has long been thought of as a staunch defender of the non-involvement of government in the lives of individuals. In *On Liberty*, Mill offers one of the best defenses of the liberal conception of government non-involvement in the lives of the populace. However, Berkowitz believes that Mill’s theory not only requires virtue, but that Mill was in favor of state-sponsored education in order to achieve such virtue. Berkowitz makes a compelling argument for the former claim, and though the latter is unsubstantiated by the text of *On Liberty*, it is important to note because Berkowitz clearly feels that virtue should be inculcated through state-sponsored education.

Mill “encounters difficulties in his treatment of virtue that are characteristic of liberal efforts to harmonize the political need for virtue with the political commitments to limited self-government, the protection of individual freedom, and the respect for human equality”
(Berkowitz, 137-8). This does not, however, prevent Berkowitz from arguing that Mill feels his theory needs virtue. In *On Liberty*, Mill presents a series of arguments for allowing people the freedom of speech and expression. One of these arguments is based around Mill’s theory that diversity of opinion is crucial to the liberty of individuals.

Berkowitz thinks that Mill makes the following argument: Mill starts from the supposition that all individuals are seeking to have true beliefs—that they want their beliefs to reflect the way the world actually is. However, there are many beliefs whose truth-value is uncertain. Thus, it is in everyone’s best interest to avoid suppressing opinions, because one (or more) of these opinions may be true, or lead to truth. Moreover, even established truths need to be tested with other opinions so that people can come to learn why the beliefs they already hold are true. Berkowitz believes that Mill’s argument for intellectual freedom serves not only that purpose, but also makes it clear that a liberal, free-thinking society needs to possess certain intellectual virtues.

Berkowitz thinks these virtues are necessary for two reasons. First, liberalism requires intellectual virtues in order to find truth—the truth cannot be found without diverse opinions, yet diverse opinions can be problematic. Diversity of opinions can frequently lead to strife among a population (as the history of civilization shows). Without some semblance of Mill’s intellectual virtue, the diversity of thought, opinion, and the nature of the good life that theorists cherish in liberal society would swiftly lead to arguments, perhaps even anarchy. Nevertheless, such diversity is necessary—it is what helps ensure that the truth is somewhere “out there” (Berkowitz, 149-51). “Liberty, as a way of life, is an achievement,” one which “demands of individuals specific virtues or, to speak less formally, certain qualities of mind and character,” qualities which “require education and cultivation” (Berkowitz, xi).
In this sense, if no others, education is necessary for liberty in the positive sense. The intellectual virtues are critical to Mill’s thought. Mill shows us that people must be able to think critically in able to perceive truth in the world. Berkowitz’s investigation of Mill shows us that “citizens and officeholders must possess a range of basic virtues in order to sustain a [liberal] regime” (Berkowitz, xiii). On Berkowitz’s reading, Mill’s virtues are primarily intellectual virtues—types of excellences which enable people to better understand the world around them.

In discussing virtue’s place in the theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Mill, Berkowitz draws a number of interesting conclusions. With Hobbes, Berkowitz characterizes virtue as involving “appropriate qualities of mind and character” (Berkowitz, 170). Again siding with Hobbes, Berkowitz embraces the ability to reject the idea of an ultimate end or *telos* for human life without rejecting the concept of virtue. This is because virtue can “serve a variety of ends,” not all of them related to human perfection (Berkowitz, 172). Berkowitz himself rejects Hobbes’ minimalist account of virtue, however, as well as Locke’s account of the acquisition of virtue.

There are two conclusions that Berkowitz draws that are of particular interest to us. First, he points out the importance of certain intellectual virtues such as an open mind and the ability to think critically. Second, Berkowitz raises the issue of how virtue should be inculcated. The first conclusion regarding the importance of intellectual virtue stems in part from the recognition—with Aristotle—that virtues are not all the same. At the very least, they appear conceptually divisible from outside Aristotle’s theory of virtues into a minimum of two categories—moral and intellectual virtues. Of the thinkers Berkowitz analyzes, Mill’s virtues are the most intellectual. Moreover, Berkowitz’s account of virtue in Mill shows us that intellectual virtues such as critical thinking are one of the keys to the survival of liberalism. Without the intellectual virtues, Mill would have been unable to argue so effectively for the negative liberty so prized by liberalism.
Moreover, the ability to reason clearly about the world around us—and about our inner life—can help us achieve the sort of positive freedom from self-deception (and outward deception) that we discussed at the beginning of this essay. Just as importantly, though Mill’s intellectual virtues increase positive liberty in the ways just described, their presence does not infringe upon negative liberty (though it may be possible that the inculcation of intellectual virtues does so infringe).

This second conclusion regarding the inculcation of virtue is a possibility about which many people are wary. It is easy to see how state-sponsored attempts to help people be more free—to inculcate positive liberty in the form of virtue—could be perceived as a means to reduce negative liberty. In Berkowitz’s case, the temptation to wariness is particularly powerful, given his rejection of Hobbes’ account of civic virtue (the attainment and maintenance of peace). Why would a minimal conception of civic virtue be bad, particularly when people are worried about the state infringing on their negative liberty? If Berkowitz wants more than the modest account of virtue embraced by Hobbes, there exists the possibility that a state operating under his theory would infringe upon the negative liberty of its citizens. However, Berkowitz does not discuss exactly what he thinks the ideal state should accomplish, and so we cannot determine whether a state operating under Berkowitz’s conception of virtue would encroach upon negative liberty.

These, then, are the important points to recall. We have seen, contra Aristotle, that we can speak meaningfully about virtue while still rejecting the idea of an ultimate end for human life. Moreover, a number of points regarding both positive and negative liberty have been raised as possible issues. We have already seen the importance of distinguishing, as Aristotle does, between intellectual and moral virtues from a conceptual stance. As we discuss John Rawls’
work in the next section, we will begin to understand why the inculcation of moral virtues may actually infringe upon people’s negative liberty.
JOHN RAWLS

John Rawls is probably the most influential and widely read liberal political philosopher of the twentieth century. Yet one of the facts that is rarely mentioned about *A Theory of Justice* is its reliance on the concept of virtue. Rawls, like Aristotle, believes that well-ordered societies should want their members to be virtuous (Rawls, 383). Though Rawls does not directly address the issues of positive and negative liberty, in examining what an account of liberal virtue could look like we must discuss Rawls’ seminal liberal theory. In doing so, we shall first examine Rawls’ theory of the good. Following this examination, we shall discuss the relationship of virtue with the theory of the good. This will enable us to understand the role of the state with regard to virtue. At the end of this section, we shall discuss why Rawls’ theory, though distinctively liberal, is not the best method of incorporating virtue into liberal theory.³

One of the aspects of Rawls’ work that is frequently overlooked is that *A Theory of Justice* “does, indeed, presuppose a theory of the good” (Rawls, 230). This theory of the good is, admittedly, quite broad. That is, such a theory tries to avoid unduly narrowing the options available to individuals. Rawls calls this theory of the good a “thin” theory of the good. In doing so, Rawls calls attention to the fact that this theory of the good is neither detailed nor intended to be influential. It is therefore “broad,” and inclusive of other theories of the good. In describing the theory as “thin,” Rawls avoids placing too many conditions on what the good is. This is a distinctly liberal argument in that Rawls tries hard to avoid having his theory prejudge other theories of the good. It is a theory which is concerned not to remove too many options from people’s lives—a theory which is concerned with the preservation of negative liberty.

³ Though the phrase “political liberalism” has a very definite meaning when discussing Rawls’ work, I will use the phrase more broadly throughout this essay. Moreover, though Rawls’ conception of political liberalism changed with the publication of *Political Liberalism*, I shall here be concerned only with *A Theory of Justice*. 
One of the things Rawls is concerned to avoid, however, is a theory of the good which is unjust. In fact, “desires for things that are inherently unjust” are among the very few things that are excluded by his thin theory of the good (Rawls, 230). The thin theory, then—though largely concerned with avoiding infringement upon negative liberty—also considers justice an important aspect of positive liberty. An ideal liberal state, according to Rawls, must be just. Rawls believes that virtue and a theory of the good are so important that one cannot have justice without a theory of the good because it is impossible to know what is fair and just without having a theory of what is good (Rawls, 348). Justice is transitively defined by what the good is considered to be, beginning with the original position (and the thin theory), which yields a fair procedure; when combined with primary goods, this yields fair, just principles which assume the thin theory of the good. Justice, therefore, is a relative concept, based on how one defines the good. (Though this could be a problematic way of defining justice for Rawls’ theory, it is beyond the scope of this essay.)

However, even in restricting available goods by ruling out those which are unjust, we are left with “a class of goods that are normally wanted as parts of rational plans of life which may include the most varied sorts of ends” (Rawls, 230). Rawls’ theory of the good thus allows for people to embrace widely divergent conceptions of the good, so long as their theories of the good do not involve doing injustice to others by violating their negative liberty. An unjust theory of the good would most likely involve violating someone else’s theory of the good (or the principles of justice), perhaps by arguing for a single, rigid theory of the good life, one which prescribed a life plan for all individuals. By ruling out the inherently unjust, yet leaving the theory of the good otherwise wide open, Rawls stays true to his ideal of a thin theory of the good—one which does not offer a detailed prescription regarding how the good life is to be
lived, merely that any good life cannot be unjust. This allows Rawls to note (like Berkowitz) that we can have “an ideal of the person without invoking a prior standard of human excellence,” allowing individuals to express their excellences in their own ways (Rawls, 287).

In moving from Rawls’ theory of the good to his theory of virtues, it is important to note that Rawls, unlike Aristotle, does not believe virtues are a type of excellence. Nevertheless, virtues are key to Rawls’ theory. Once the thin theory of the good is defined, we are able to know what justice is. Once “the principles of right and justice are on hand,” we can use them to define what virtues are (Rawls, 167). Thus, virtues are, transitively, defined by the good.

Because *A Theory of Justice* relies on virtue to achieve the goods that Rawls specifies (similar to Aristotle), virtue must be something we can have control over (Rawls, 348-9). Thus, virtues are “sentiments . . . related families of dispositions and propensities regulated by a higher-order desire . . . to act from the corresponding moral principles” (Rawls, 167). In the sense that they are defined as sentiments, Rawls’ virtues are not dissimilar from Aristotle’s, since Aristotle believed that virtuous individuals reacted to pleasure and pain in a specified, correct manner. Moreover, they are propensities and dispositions—presumably, though Rawls does not specify, propensities and dispositions to act, behave, or exist in a regular fashion. This, again, is similar to Aristotle’s conception of how moral virtues work.

However, Rawls’ account also diverges from Aristotle’s. The higher-order desire described by Rawls above is a desire to have a specific virtue so that one acts in a specific way, as dictated by what the individual believes the good to be. For example, if politeness is a virtue which I possess, I will “want” (broadly speaking) to be polite. My second-order desire, in this instance, is a desire to want to be polite. By cultivating both my primary and second-order desires, over time I would develop a disposition towards being polite.
There are two other interesting points to be made about this particular piece of text. The first is that Rawls very much believes that we have a conscious control over whether or not we behave in a virtuous manner. As I have shown elsewhere, Aristotle does not rule this out, but Aristotle thinks it is much more difficult than Rawls believes to become virtuous—hence the energy Aristotle devotes to describing how one becomes virtuous. The second is that Aristotle’s theory of the good clearly delineates the virtues an individual ought to cultivate. Because of Rawls’ thin theory of the good, the virtues that an individual should want will depend heavily on the theory of the good that the individual subscribes to. Nevertheless, there are some virtues that Rawls takes to be more important than others.

Rawls describes the “fundamental” virtues as being “among the broadly based properties that it is rational for members of a well-ordered society to want in one another” (Rawls, 383). Thus, in a well-ordered society, there will be certain key virtues, such as justice and benevolence. Moreover, we can pick these out by thinking about what (in a well-ordered society) people would want their cohort to possess. However, it seems that Rawls has set up a dichotomy of virtues. On the one hand, there are the virtues that individuals, broadly speaking, want for themselves—based on the theory of the good that they subscribe to. On the other hand, there are the fundamental virtues, which individuals want everyone to have in order to continue living in a well-ordered society. This is exactly like Aristotle’s distinction between the good for man as a human being and the good for man as a citizen (depending on his state). Just as Aristotle separates the virtue of man and the virtue of the citizen, Rawls separates the fundamental virtues from the virtues that an individual will want to acquire based on his specific theory of the good.
Since, Rawls sets up his theory to “define a class of goods that are normally wanted as parts of rational plans of life which may include the most varied sorts of ends,” known as the primary goods, he avoids tying his theory of the good to “a particular arrangement of institutions” (Rawls, 230). Rawls does this because he has a theory regarding the gradual acquisition of moral virtues. This process begins with the family (Rawls, 405). Moreover, it continues through role-modeling and association with other individuals, so that virtue develops over time and in accordance with authority. Though Rawls’ account is somewhat lacking in detail, Rawls notes that “institutions” should encourage the virtue of justice (Rawls, 231). One could easily imagine, for example, government institutions as a viable way to encourage other virtues, so long as these institutional virtues do “not prejudge the choice of the sort of persons that men want to be” (Rawls, 230).

The inculcation of virtue by a regime thus promotes Rawls’ idea of the ideal human being. This is done much more subtly than, for example, Joseph Raz, who is open about his belief that the state should remove the non-virtuous options from those options that citizens are able to consider. Rawls, by contrast, advocates an extremely broad theory of the good, one which rules out only “things that are inherently unjust, or that cannot be satisfied except by the violation of just arrangements” (Rawls, 230). Rawls rejects things that are unjust because to allow such actions or arrangements would violate the negative liberty of others. Raz, as we shall see, rejects the presence of things he thinks are bad because they do not actively contribute to the positive liberty of the individual. Rawls allows people greater negative freedom, so long as their choices are not unjust.

This points us in the direction of a similarity between Rawls and Aristotle. Both are willing to rule out certain choices available to citizens. Aristotle’s claim is that one is not fully
actualized as a human being until one cannot help but make the right choice. Individuals should, through law and the inculcation of habitual virtues at a young age, be steered away from the wrong choices. Aristotle, as should be clear by now, embraces the concept of positive liberty. Rawls, by contrast, allows more negative freedom—but not the freedom to act unjustly. Moreover, Rawls is quite emphatic about the fact that one can “define an ideal of the person without invoking a prior standard of human excellence,” unlike Aristotle, who defines the ideal human being by invoking just such a standard (Rawls, 287).

Despite these differences with Aristotle, Rawls’ theory is not ideal for our purposes. There are 2 main difficulties. Both stem from the fact that Rawls’ theory of virtue is quite vague. The first is a difficulty regarding moral virtues; the second is about how people should obtain the virtues. We shall address these concerns in order.

As we have seen, Rawls calls virtues sentiments, propensities, and dispositions. Moreover, the virtues are regulated by a second-order desire to act according to an unspecified moral principle. It is not entirely clear from Rawls’ account how the virtues are supposed to function. As noted above, if virtues are construed as sentiments, then Rawls’ account of the virtues functions in a way very similar to Aristotle’s: in response to someone feeling pleasure or pain. However, if the virtues are propensities or dispositions for acting in a certain way, then one will consistently respond to the same sort of stimulus in a similar way. Perhaps Rawls’ virtues are meant to be a consistent response to a feeling.

However, specific virtues are still fairly vague. Rawls provides a makeshift list which includes such virtues as justice, “the excellences of free persons,” and properties that it is rational for members of a society to want each other to have (Rawls, 455). This vagueness is presumably because Rawls thinks his virtues are “virtues of form,” rather than of content (Rawls, 456). We
can, however, narrow the virtues down somewhat: Rawls seems to be concerned exclusively with moral virtues, “leading us to act on certain principles of right” (Rawls, 383). The combination of moral virtues and the idea of virtues as a consistent response to a feeling has the potential to be a dangerous one.

To return to Aristotle, we note that he says that “our virtues are expressions of our choice, or at any rate imply choice” (NE, 1106a5). Given the way in which the language of Rawls’ virtues are couched as consistent dispositions, this should cause us to pause. Virtue certainly does express choice in some way, but it seems that the choice to act in accord with virtue was made at some point in the past. To a certain extent, a virtuous individual is almost unable to act in a way which is not in accord with virtue. Because Rawls defines virtue is defined as a propensity to act in a certain way, the virtuous individual lacks, to a certain extent, the freedom to make a non-virtuous choice. For some proponents of positive freedom, this is not an issue; it is, as Taylor might say, a method of short-circuiting the impulse to act in a way different from how one truly wants to behave.

However, Rawls’ conception of virtue is defined in such a way as to appear to allow him to avoid this criticism. He says that the virtues are regulated by a second-order desire, rather than by habit, as with Aristotle’s virtues. If this is so, then Rawls’ virtuous individual has to want to be virtuous in the first place, rather than merely being inculcated to be virtuous. Despite this fact, however, Rawls’ theory of virtue does not escape criticism. The second-order desire is one which causes the individual to act, as we have seen, according to a moral principle. It is not, however, clear that the moral principle is one that the individual has chosen for himself. If so, then Rawls might be free of this charge—but if the moral principle has been inculcated, then
difficulty of defining virtues as propensities remains in place: such individuals will respond to similar stimuli in a consistent manner.

The problem with defining virtues as dispositions or propensities is that someone—a person not virtuous in the Rawlsian sense—might struggle (perhaps mightily) with a decision. In the end, that decision is fully his—he deliberated, engaged in reasoning and reflection. There is a sense in which this non-virtuous individual is more free (in a negative sense) than the virtuous individual. Because the virtuous individual has propensities which predispose her towards a certain type of action (the virtuous type), she is less free because of her virtue. The virtuous person is not unable to act in a non-virtuous fashion, but doing so is extremely difficult, because she has to work against her habituated virtue.

This is particularly true if her virtue is, as Aristotle advises, inculcated from youth, when she was not competent to make her own choices. If this is the case, then the choice to become virtuous was not really hers in the first place; thus, her actions—though in accord with virtue—might be construed as being less free, since her negative liberty was infringed upon to establish her virtuous habits. This is an important distinction; if she established her own virtuous habits and dispositions, then her negative liberty was never infringed upon. If, however, such habits were inculcated in her as a child, then certain options were removed via that process of habituation. Even if this is for good reasons of positive liberty, her negative liberty has been infringed upon.

Rawls, however, does not make it clear how individuals are supposed to gain virtue. He mentions the family and that (presumably state-sponsored) institutions should inculcate the virtue of justice, but that is the only mention that the acquisition of virtue seems to receive. On the one hand, this may make Rawls’ account less susceptible to the charge developed above
regarding the freedom of the virtuous individual: if he develops virtue of his own accord, then the virtue is of his own making, and was not forced on him during his childhood. However, if Rawls is leaving the acquisition of virtue up to each individual, Berkowitz’s instantiation of the tension between positive and negative liberty receives new life: virtue is necessary to Rawls’ liberal theory, but he does not develop a method for citizens to acquire virtue.

Nevertheless, Rawls’ theory is not useless to us. Because Rawls’ theory of the good is so broad and inclusive of many ways of life, it does not rule out too many options. That is, one can lead a non-virtuous life, so long as one does not violate the principles of justice. Rawls’ theory avoids prejudging many types of life-plans. Thus, from a liberal standpoint, his theory does not greatly infringe on people’s negative liberty, and may also benefit individuals from the standpoint of positive liberty. Moreover, Rawls’ use of Aristotle’s distinction between the good for man and the good for the citizen (in separating the fundamental virtues from the virtues needed by individual theories of the good) helps us see that we are on the right track with this distinction. With these points in mind, we can move on to our next liberal thinker, Stephen Macedo.
In this section, we shall examine the work of Stephen Macedo. Though his work is, at first glance, very similar to that of Berkowitz and Rawls, Macedo distinguishes himself through the obvious influence of Aristotle on his work and his account of the importance of the intellectual virtues. In this section, I shall discuss Macedo’s project of liberal virtues. In doing so, we shall see that Macedo’s project contains some serious difficulties concerning the separation of virtues concerning the liberal human and the liberal citizen. Nevertheless, as with Berkowitz and Rawls, we can utilize some of Macedo’s work in our own attempts to construct a liberal theory of virtue.

Macedo’s project and interest in virtue is similar to Berkowitz’s. Macedo notes that “liberal institutions such as law and rights require the willing support of liberal citizens. For that support to be forthcoming and for a liberal state to flourish liberal values must be internalized by citizens” (Macedo, 55). This passage identifies a familiar issue—the idea that liberal citizens need to espouse liberal values for the success of a liberal state. Implicit in this statement is the belief that people will not embrace liberal commitments without being educated to do so. The best way to accomplish this goal of internalizing liberal values, Macedo believes, is through the promotion of liberal virtues (Macedo, 4). However, the ways in which Macedo believes that liberal states should inculcate virtue is quite different from the other liberal thinkers we have examined; instead, his ideas are reminiscent of Aristotle.

Macedo immediately shows that Aristotle has influenced him by noting that liberal virtues are “those forms of excellence appropriate to citizens of liberal regimes and conducive to flourishing in the kind of society liberalism creates” (Macedo, 4). This is the message that Aristotle’s second distinction (between the good for man and the good for a citizen) conveys.
Thus, Macedo defines liberal virtues as being relative to the goals of liberal society as he sees them—a kind of liberal political excellence. The idea of virtue as excellence, as we know from our examination of Aristotle, presupposes some end towards which the virtue helps the possessor move. For Aristotle, that telos was happiness. Macedo’s virtues are not designed to achieve a universal human end, like Aristotle’s. What counts as a virtue, then, depends on what Macedo’s liberal regime is expected to accomplish. Ultimately, such a regime is supposed to achieve the ultimate in positive liberty: Macedo’s liberal state aims for its citizens to become autonomous individuals who can “explore various ways of realizing the good life” and “exercise self-critical, self-transforming reflective capacities” (Macedo, 204).

Macedo quite consciously views autonomy as the end for the liberal state (Macedo, 213). In thinking about and discussing autonomy, Macedo lights upon the importance of critical thinking capacities for liberal citizens (Macedo, 216). Liberal citizens need the “active power of persons to shape who they are, to understand, control, and shape their desires” (Macedo, 225). That is, we need the ability not only to control what goes on around us, but to control what we actually want—to have the ability to control our second-order desires. If we can do this—if we can find a way to control not just what we want, but to want to want specific things—then, Macedo believes, an individual will be truly autonomous and therefore free.

Macedo rarely considers the problems and challenges of negative liberty, except to reflect occasionally on the importance of liberal values such as freedom, tolerance, and respect (Macedo, 258). However, though Macedo sets up the achievement of an autonomous life as the end goal of liberalism, he notes that those who choose not to strive for true autonomy must be respected (Macedo, 229). Of course, some may ask why Macedo would want to allow such a choice. Some theorists (such as Joseph Raz) want to rule out choices that are less liberal, less
autonomous. While Macedo would presumably rule out some human ends (like Rawls, ones which violate the rights or ends of others), he is willing to allow people to make choices which do not strictly accord with his idea of the good. Because Macedo, despite his emphasis on positive liberty, also respects negative liberty, the idea of forcing individuals to make particular choices, or endorse particular ends, is anathema to him. Therefore, no single “good life” can be agreed upon—though Macedo’s ideal is clearly that of the autonomous individual (Macedo, 200). The virtues Macedo espouses, such as reflective ability and autonomous self-development, are, like Aristotle’s basic virtues, very broad, general types of excellence. This leaves open the possibility of having more than one end for liberal citizens to choose from.

In order for the citizens of a liberal state to become autonomous individuals, Macedo believes that a number of things need to occur. Autonomy is developed through the acquisition of such virtues as “self-critical reflectiveness, a willingness to experiment, to try and to accept new things, self-control and autonomous self-development,” to name but a few (Macedo, 272). Liberal virtues are themselves promoted through liberal law, since “liberal law, properly understood, promotes a community of interpreters; a citizenry of self-critical reason-givers” (Macedo, 78). This is because Macedo believes that liberal law should be subject to a process of public justification. In order for people to be good citizens, and for the state to fulfill its obligations to those citizens, laws need to be “publicly stated, openly debated,” and supported by “widely accessible arguments” (Macedo, 12). Thus, virtues like the ones listed above will help society achieve the goals of the project of public justification.

The idea that virtue should be promoted via law is itself an Aristotelian idea. Aristotle believes that virtue should be inculcated in individuals in two ways: first, through state-sponsored education during one’s youth; second, through laws designed to encourage virtue by
making it easy to do the virtuous action and difficult to do the vicious action. Despite the fact that “liberals reject the intrusive tutelary apparatus and rigid controls necessary to inculcate virtue,” Macedo seems to have set up something quite similar: he has developed a conception of virtue and law that requires that laws be designed to promote virtue (Macedo, 98). In referring to the “tutelary apparatus,” we can only assume that Macedo is referring to the system of education that Aristotle believes is necessary for the inculcation of virtue in the young; Aristotle, like Macedo, believes that laws should encourage virtue in adults. So despite his apparent rejection of Aristotle, Macedo’s views remain quite derivative of Aristotle’s theory.

However, like John Rawls, Macedo is aware that liberalism, though admitting of a broad plurality of ends, is not value-neutral (Macedo, 251). Unlike many contemporary liberals, Macedo does not believe that liberalism and a “robust conception of responsible citizenship” are mutually exclusive (Macedo, 105). Like Berkowitz, Macedo believes this is because “there are attitudes and capacities that liberals ought to have and develop, and that when people do have and develop them a liberal regime will flourish” (Macedo, 3). There are certain ends and theories of the good which are not compatible with liberalism, such as the end of making an entire state believe something by any means necessary. Instead, as we saw during Berkowitz’s discussion of Mill, liberalism holds up an ideal of the autonomous individual, someone who is able to make her own choices about such matters. A liberal theory of the good, such as the one Rawls designs, cannot cut off too many options.

Thus, though Macedo does narrow the field of available options somewhat, it is not reduced to a choice of one. One could still argue that Macedo imposes his own set of goals on individuals, but given that the context of our discussion is political liberalism, not anarchism, any political theory will inevitably shape a populace. Thus, we can say that Macedo assumes a
pluralist view of the good life, one which holds that “reasonable people disagree not only about preferences and interests, but widely and deeply about moral, philosophical, religious, and other views” (Macedo, 47). This is a typically liberal position to hold about the nature of the good. To this end, the virtues Macedo espouses are able to help people accomplish a wide variety of ends related to their individually chosen goods. Self-control, for example, is an excellent ability to have if one wishes (having reflected upon the matter) to stop an unhealthy habit.

According to Macedo, virtue is the best path to internalizing liberal values because liberal virtues and values are derivative of each other. Laws and rights, as we have seen, lead to the flourishing of the liberal state. Similarly, Macedo claims that virtues should be “conducive to peace, prosperity, and ordered liberty” (Macedo, 139). Thus, on Macedo’s view, the state has a justified self-interest in promoting liberal virtues such as the ones he describes. The question of exactly how these virtues are to be promoted is unfortunately beyond the scope of this essay. It is enough, for our purposes, to know that Macedo is in favor of state-promoted virtues through the use of the law.

Nevertheless, Macedo believes that liberal institutions which instill virtue need to be based on liberal theories which are committed to being publicly justified—that they need to be supported by reasoned arguments (Macedo, 4, 12). In a manner reminiscent of Rawls, this is because “liberal justice and rights . . . structure and partly determine the ends, goals, and visions of the good life that liberal citizens pursue” (Macedo, 5). In addition, as we have already discussed, some of these ends and visions of the good life—such as the destruction of another particular way of life—are not live options for liberal citizens because the goals that they would pursue infringe upon the liberty of others.
However, within the broad sphere of choices that liberal citizens do have, Macedo believes that the government should largely avoid interference. That is, having put in place a system of laws emphasizing positive liberty, when operating outside the realm of law, Macedo wishes to emphasize negative liberty in the interactions of citizens. Once liberal citizens become autonomous, they will be able to define what is important to them and determine whether or not the decisions made by the regime they live in are reasonable. Through this process of self-discovery and invention, Macedo expects people to adopt his set of liberal virtues: a commitment to tolerance and communication, to persuasion rather than coercion, to live the way one wants and allow others to do the same (Macedo, 261, 265). In doing so, Macedo shows that his account truly allows for both individuality and pluralism. Not only does the ideal liberal society avoid promoting a single ideal of the good, but such a state would be “tolerant, open, and dynamic and its members would be prone to experiment with different lifestyles and commitments” (Macedo, 278).

Though Macedo makes some excellent points (to which we shall return shortly), his argument is not without problems. There are two main points to which I wish to call attention. First, Macedo’s conception of liberal virtues may be too broad. Second, morality and the shaping of character is built into his system. I shall address each of these apparent difficulties in order.

Macedo, as we have seen, sets up a dichotomy between liberal virtues and non-liberal virtues. He does this by defining virtues as the excellences needed by specifically liberal citizens. However, the lists of virtues that he provides (some of which we have discussed) are extremely broad. That is, it appears that virtues such as autonomous self-development and the ability for introspection and self-discovery are not specific to liberalism. Such virtues would be
virtues for almost any human being, living under almost any political system. Even an individual living under a totalitarian regime would want to have the positive freedom to autonomously develop himself. A specifically totalitarian virtue might be the ability to conceal one’s true intentions from the government.

Moreover, though presented as exclusively liberal virtues, Macedo’s virtues seem so broad as to go beyond the liberal sphere. That is, his virtues, though aimed at the liberal citizen, would promote a positive conception of freedom—autonomy—in any individual. The only aspect of them that is, perhaps, liberal, is that a citizen in a totalitarian regime might not be successful operating with liberal virtues. In addition, Macedo also notes that these virtues will be both civic virtues and personal ones—that is, they will benefit both the liberal state, and also the liberal citizen directly (not just through the impact the state has on the individual) (Macedo, 272). This idea of virtues being beneficial to both the public and private realms is similar to how Aristotle believes virtue would function in the “perfect” polity, where the good for an individual and the good for a citizen would perfectly overlap (Politics, 1277a10).

So while it first seemed that Macedo was following Aristotle’s second distinction—the distinction between the good for humans and the good for citizens of specific regimes—he may, in listing his virtues, actually have provided a list of goods for mankind. Moreover, Macedo views virtue as a method for accomplishing the goals of the state, but also as a method of improving the individuals who make up the population of his liberal state. That is, “the liberal virtues are both civic and personal virtues” (Macedo, 272). It is true that all citizen virtues are also human virtues; and while Macedo no doubt means only to advance the idea that the liberal virtues can contribute both to the betterment of the social order as well as an individual’s private life, it is this essentially forced bettering of one’s private self, rather than the social order, which
causes people to fear the idea of positive liberty. In advancing a conception of liberal virtues as both civic and personal virtues, Macedo enables the concept of positive liberty to get deep into the lives of the liberal citizens, effectively erasing the distinction between the virtues necessary to be an effective citizen and the virtues necessary to be a good person. In doing so, Macedo potentially issues an enormous amount of power to the liberal state, power motivated by concepts of positive freedom, with which the state can greatly effect change in the private lives of their citizens.

This brings us to our second criticism of Macedo’s theory. One of the points of emphasis in our project is that liberal virtues should not be construed as what Aristotle calls “moral virtues,” or “virtues of character.” However, it seems that morality is heavily built into Macedo’s framework. “Moral principles underlie and help justify the law,” Macedo claims (84). Without getting into whether or not moral principles should, in fact, underlie and justify the law (a topic beyond the scope of this essay), we can argue that law can be justified without resorting to moral principles. Laws can be thought of—and have been thought of—as rules, rather than moral precepts. Moreover, the idea that laws should be moral might result in the further removal of options for the varieties of the liberal good life in that such laws might infringe on the negative liberty of liberal citizens.

Most disturbing is the idea that moral laws are intended to shape character. That is, the laws Macedo describes setting up are there to put people in the habit of acting in a certain way—just as Aristotle intended. Aristotle’s conception of moral virtue is not illiberal simply because it advocates the pursuit of a virtuous character, but because the means that he and Macedo use to pursue virtuous character fly in the face of many of the virtues Macedo professes to endorse. Moral virtues are virtues of habit, and the means that Aristotle uses to develop those habits begin
in one’s youth. An individual should become used to performing the virtuous action, to the point that such a type of action becomes habitual. Virtue certainly does express choice in some way, but it seems that the choice to act in accord with virtue was made at some point in the past. To a certain extent, a virtuous individual is almost unable to act in a way which is not in accord with virtue (this objection to moral virtues is discussed at greater length in the previous section on John Rawls).

Macedo talks several times about the pursuit of shared political ends, character, and the shared identity of the liberal personality (Macedo, 15, 213, 203). However, the specific virtues that he cites, such as “self-critical reflectiveness, a willingness to experiment, to try and to accept new things, self-control and autonomous self-development,” are virtues that are obviously undermined by habituation, because such virtues are things which require intentionality (Macedo, 225). One cannot habitually accept new things; to do so requires conscious effort. Thus, in subtly endorsing a virtue of habit, Macedo actually makes it more difficult to carry out the practice of the virtues he espouses. It may be possible to reflexively be self-critical, but it is hard to imagine how one could habitually experiment and try new things.

Though I hope to have shown that we should not fully endorse Macedo’s conception of liberal virtue, his theory is not without merit. There are three conclusions we should take away from this investigation. First, that “there is nothing incompatible between liberalism and a robust conception of responsible citizenship” (Macedo, 105). We can agree to this without adopting his methodology of arriving at a robust conception of liberal citizenship. Second, and more importantly, Macedo and Rawls both show us that liberal theory necessarily forecloses some options that people might consider goods, or parts of the good life.
However, the third point we can take from Macedo is the importance of not closing off options that do not have to be closed off. For example, though Macedo places the achievement of autonomy as the highest good that a liberal state can promote, he also notes that we cannot infringe on the negative liberty of the individual whose idea of the good life is one of apathy and unfocused activity. Though this individual may, in fact, be lacking in autonomy and knowledge of what is truly good, to force such an individual to become fully free through inculcation in the virtues and positive liberty would violate his negative liberty.

Some proponents of positive liberty will advocate just that—forcing the couch potatoes to their feet. Here we must remember that liberalism is a balancing act between the different types of freedom. In pushing someone to become more autonomous, we are actually restricting their negative freedom. We cannot make him get off the couch because after being educated in the virtues, he would be unable to return to the couch; he would understand that there are better things in life. In making this assertion, one directly opposes many theorists who advocate for conceptions of positive liberty. We shall touch on this more when we examine the work of Joseph Raz.

Returning to Macedo: we have come to a better understanding of the importance of Aristotle’s second distinction, the distinction between what is good for man qua man, and what is good for man as a liberal citizen. We can see that the liberal virtues must be something distinct from what is good for mankind—unless we want to claim that what is good for man as a liberal citizen really is what is good for mankind. We can also see that Macedo appeared to be on the right track when discussing some of his virtues—particularly the intellectual virtues of self-reflection, among others.
JOSEPH RAZ

Though Joseph Raz uses the language of virtue so familiar to us by now, we will not turn to Raz for ideas on how to incorporate virtue into liberalism. Rather, we are examining Raz’s work as an example of how liberal theory can easily become too oriented towards positive liberty, thus depriving liberal citizens of necessary negative freedoms. In this section, we shall try to accomplish two goals. First, as with the other thinkers we have examined, I shall lay out Raz’s virtue-oriented political theory. Second, I shall show why Raz’s theory strips citizens of negative liberty, making it a poor theory to emulate in advocating for liberal virtues.

Most interesting for our purpose is that Raz argues for a “liberal morality on non-individualistic grounds” (Raz, 18). These grounds are based heavily on virtue and the idea that a liberal state should inculcate virtue. Like Macedo, Raz believes that the primary virtue that such a state should be concerned with is autonomy. However, Raz takes a different approach towards the inculcation of autonomy, an approach which I shall argue violates the negative liberty liberalism requires. Before doing so, we shall discuss why autonomy is a virtue for Raz, and why he thinks that the state should assist individuals in acquiring autonomy.

According to Raz, he is concerned with “the ideal of individual freedom and its role in politics” (Raz, 2). By this he means that his work is a discussion of what the ideal of individual freedom is and the place that political philosophy should accord to that ideal of individual freedom. In addition, Raz situates himself within the liberal tradition of discussing what role the state should play in said freedom. Raz “affirms the intrinsic value of liberty,” and holds that liberty is valuable for its own sake (as well as for the other goods that someone who is free may procure) and that a liberal government should work to promote positive liberty (Raz, 7). That is, government should create “conditions which enable their subjects to enjoy greater liberty than
they otherwise would” (Raz, 18). Here, Raz very clearly situates himself in the camp of positive liberty.

Because Raz is pursuing a liberal morality based on non-individualistic grounds, he eschews the idea of limited government. Raz believes that governments can present a threat to liberty, but can also be regarded as “a possible source of liberty,” by creating conditions in which citizens are more free than they might otherwise have been (Raz, 18). Raz’s argument has two parts, interspersed throughout his text. The first part of his discussion lays out what freedom means for Raz. The second part of his argument concerns the methods by which this freedom is to be attained in a liberal society. The two halves are inextricably linked, however, because of Raz’s understanding of freedom.

For Raz, freedom is “constituted by the ideals of personal autonomy and value-pluralism” (Raz, 265). He wants people to “develop freely to find for themselves the form of the good which they wish to pursue” (Raz, 133). In order to do so, Raz believes that individuals need to be mature adults. Moreover, they need to be able to decide for themselves what they want out of life. To achieve this maturity, individuals need to be taught, even from youth, to be autonomous in order to be able to decide, as mature adults, what they want from life—so that they may, in effect, be free in the positive sense (Raz’s resemblance to Aristotle will develop throughout this section).

In order for this autonomy to be meaningful, there must be “a choice of goods,” perhaps even incommensurable goods, for individuals to choose between—hence the need for value-pluralism (Raz, 379). So far, as we have seen, there has been little mention of negative freedom—only discussion of the enabling of individuals to decide for themselves and to act on those decisions. We can see that Raz’s conception of freedom, then, is markedly different from
the other theorists we have examined, in which both positive and negative conceptions of freedom are weighed heavily. Raz mentions concepts dealing with negative liberty, but does not dwell on them—nor does he consider how his theories of positive liberty may, in fact, reduce the freedom of individuals.

Even more remarkable in the context of political liberalism is that Raz takes “a perfectionist view of freedom,” because he “regards personal political freedom as an aspect of the good life” (Raz, 265). Perfectionism is the view that there is a human good which is intrinsically, rather than instrumentally, good. In making this claim, Raz further allies himself with Aristotle, who also holds the view that there is an intrinsic human good—a human telos. For Raz, this good is autonomy, and autonomy constitutes the largest part of Raz’s conception of positive freedom. Moreover, anti-perfectionists claim that “ideals of the good life . . . are not a legitimate matter for governmental action” (Raz, 110). Raz clearly feels differently, since he couches himself as a perfectionist. Raz regards freedom as being intrinsically valuable because it is part and parcel with individuals making autonomous choices from a pluralistic group of options. Even though he is a perfectionist, Raz maintains that “perfectionism is . . . compatible with moral pluralism;” that is, he believes that one can endorse governmental involvement in ideals of the good life and still have a plurality of options for living the good life (Raz, 161). Thus, not only does Raz believe in the promotion of positive freedom, he also embraces government sponsorship of that freedom.

Virtue makes its entrance in Raz’s denial of the importance of rights-based theories of morality. He argues that any rights-based theory overlooks the downsides of rights. For example, “a person may be denied the chance to have an autonomous life . . . without any of his rights being overridden or violated” (Raz, 247). This sentiment should be familiar from the
introduction to this essay, where we discussed the possibility that one might fail to be free even if one’s negative liberty is not being infringed upon. Raz believes that one of the ways this could happen is through a shortage of “live” options presented to an individual. If someone has three options, two of which involve doing things he finds painful, morally repugnant, or simply distasteful, then he has only one “live” option (Raz, 379). Raz believes that such a choice is a choice only in name, not in fact. If his choice is no choice at all, Raz thinks, he cannot truly be said to be autonomous. Thus, any rights-based theory can fail to secure autonomy for individuals because they do not “allow personal characteristics which are virtuous or morally praiseworthy to be judged intrinsically desirable and cultivated for their own sake” (Raz, 197). Virtue theories, however, can say that the personal characteristic of autonomy is intrinsically valuable and should be cultivated. Raz therefore adopts a theory of virtue for his project.

Autonomy plays a key role in attaining the positive freedom that Raz desires for individuals. Raz, like Macedo, believes that a liberal government should promote autonomy (Raz, 415). Such a government should, in effect, instill positive freedom in its populace by providing the citizenry with a plurality of good choices. Part of doing this would involve removing actions and choices that Raz believes are non-autonomous. This is because “while autonomy is consistent with the presence of bad options, they contribute nothing to its value” (Raz, 412). Like Rawls and Macedo, Raz does not think that governments need to be neutral concerning ideals of the good. For example, Rawls’ famous “veil of ignorance” is only justified “from the point of view of a certain conception of the good,” namely secular humanism (Raz, 118).

Raz moves swiftly from conceptions of neutrality concerning government involvement in theories of the good to pluralism. One of the main worries of liberals who eschew a perfectionist
account of the good is that if the government were to become involved, a conception of the good could be forced on those who do not subscribe to it. Raz, following the liberal tradition of negative liberty, notes that coercion, even for the good of the coerced, is anti-liberal (Raz, 157). Coercion should therefore be limited in a liberal state.

Nevertheless, he feels justified in empowering the government to promote autonomy because “an autonomous person’s well-being consists in the successful pursuits of self-chosen goals and relationships” (Raz, 370). Raz does not think that what he is advocating is coercive, nor that it removes live options. Instead, he believes that “while autonomy is consistent with the presence of bad options, they contribute nothing to its value” (Raz, 412). Thus, though Raz states repeatedly that he believes in a plurality of good lives, he allows for the use of coercion to diminish non-autonomous actions (Raz, 416). Raz believes that it is acceptable to restrict the options open to people to those which fit a broadly liberal conception of the good.

In couching his argument as restricting the open options to ones which are broadly liberal, Raz tries to frame himself alongside Rawls and Macedo. Rawls, we recall, espouses a thinly liberal theory of the good which he believes rules out certain conceptions of the good life—namely, those conceptions which violate his principle of justice as fairness. In doing so, he notes (as do Rawls and Macedo) that liberal theory is not value-neutral in its assessment of what is good. Raz’s theory, however, does not fit into the framework that Rawls and Macedo have set up because Raz’s theory diminishes the negative freedom available to individuals.

Raz’s theory, unlike Rawls’, is a thick theory of the good which contains three main components. First, Raz believes in the intrinsic value of autonomy. Second, he wants to disallow theories of the good which do not promote autonomy, such as unenlightened hedonism; and third, he also wants to remove “bad” choices from the options available to liberal citizens, so
that, for example, it is not possible for someone to spend their life watching television. Raz has a number of arguments as to why each of these is a good idea. We have touched on some of them, but now is the time to explore the possible objections to Raz’s arguments. To do so, I want to present objections to the three components of Raz’s thick theory listed above.

Raz’s desire to promote autonomy, as we have seen, stems from his belief that autonomy is intrinsically good. This belief, of course, causes Raz to reject all theories of the good which do not include autonomy. However, one can agree with Raz on the importance of autonomy, as Macedo does, and still reject the idea that autonomy is intrinsically good. Aristotle, after all, claims that happiness is the highest good, because it is the only thing we want for itself, and not for anything else. Aristotle would likely have a similar response to Raz’s claim—we want to be autonomous because we believe being autonomous makes us better able to achieve happiness. Macedo’s view is more moderate: like Raz, Macedo believes that the liberal state will cut off some theories of the good. However, Macedo and Rawls believe that those theories should be disallowed because they directly conflict with a liberal ideal like justice, freedom, or toleration. Even so, Rawls and Macedo do not argue that these ideals are intrinsic goods—they are merely instrumental goods, designed to keep individuals from interfering with other individuals, or to keep the state from interfering with citizens. Intrinsic goods are defined for individuals according to the theories of the good to which individuals subscribe. The belief in a single intrinsic good, such as autonomy, may help to increase the positive freedom of a populace. However, Raz’s plan for achieving a state full of autonomous citizens would result in a decrease of negative freedom. Such a decrease would occur because rather than specifying a thin theory of the good which rules out only a few options, Raz’s thick theory would rule out many more
options—not all of which would necessarily be illiberal, just non-autonomous. Raz believes that such a sacrifice would be worth the goal.

However, even if we grant the intrinsically valuable nature of autonomy, Raz’s argument is still difficult to accept. If one accepts that autonomy is intrinsically valuable, then it is an obvious step (leaving aside practical concerns) to ban theories of the good which do not consider autonomy a good (such as the life of the couch potato). It is less obvious, however, that accepting the intrinsic value of autonomy means that it is good to focus on reducing and removing “bad” options. I shall argue that removing bad options from the available live options is actually counter-productive to Raz’s stated goal of promoting autonomy.

Raz wants to remove bad options because he does not believe that the presence of such options contributes to the value of autonomy. Moreover, he believes that the use of coercion is allowable in order to remove such options: it might, for example, be acceptable to outlaw the viewing of television, on the grounds that television does not contribute to autonomy. Raz also believes, as we have seen, that a lack of available options from which to choose means that a choice may not be a meaningful choice. Moreover, he notes that “autonomy requires a choice of goods” (Raz, 379). However, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which someone has three choices: one of which is good, the others bad (according to Raz’s designation). If the person decides to follow through on one of the bad choices, then Raz will claim he is not acting autonomously. If he should choose the good choice, he is acting autonomously.

However, if we remove the bad choices (for the sake of argument, through non-coercive means), then the individual has only a single choice. According to Raz, this is not actually a choice, and the individual is not acting autonomously, because he does not have more than one live option. If an individual can only choose the good, how is that choice autonomous?
Moreover, to refer back to Aristotle, how is that individual displaying the virtue of practical wisdom in choosing between right and wrong? While Raz argues that the existence of bad choices does not contribute to autonomy, we can see that such an argument is not necessarily true. If you cannot, in Raz’s terms, make a real choice, then you are not acting autonomously. Without the availability of bad choices, one cannot truly be said to be acting virtuously.

I have suggested that Raz’s arguments are flawed on two levels. First, because there are internal difficulties, such as the tension suggested above between allowing non-autonomous options and denying the utility of such options. Second, and more important, is the fact that Raz’s work strips a great deal of negative freedom from the liberal citizen. Though it is not necessarily without warrant (as Raz notes, coercion can be motivated by good intentions) since the negative freedom is replaced with positive freedom, it is hard to believe that Raz’s insistence on removing bad options would leave people with a great deal of choice on which to exercise their newfound autonomy (Raz, 157). However, Raz’s theory, though deeply flawed due to its neo-Aristotelianism, is not without merit. Raz’s work can be seen as a lengthy way of justifying the inclusion of virtue within liberalism. If, as Raz suggests, autonomy is seen as a virtue that everyone needs to have in order to be free (freedom being a traditional component of liberalism), then it may be within the purview of the state to (gently) advocate for such autonomy.

One of the questions of this essay has been the appropriate level of state involvement in inculcating positive freedom. Having examined the works of four theorists working in the liberal tradition, we are now in a position to do just that. In the next, final section, I shall attempt to tie together the different arguments and theories that we have been discussing. In doing so, I hope to give us reason to believe that the best method for incorporating virtue into liberal theory lies with one of the progenitors of virtue—Aristotle.
CONCLUSION

At this point in our discussion, we have seen the importance of virtue to liberal theory, and we are finally in a position to understand why part of Aristotle’s theory of political virtue will be more useful to the cause of liberal virtue than the theories of Berkowitz, Rawls, Macedo, and Raz. This conclusion has three parts: First, I shall discuss the benefits of Aristotle’s first distinction, separating intellectual and moral virtues. Second, I shall do the same with Aristotle’s second distinction, which separates the virtues of man as a human being from those of man as a liberal citizen. In completing these tasks, I hope to demonstrate the superiority of a conception of Aristotelian public, intellectual liberal virtues over the other conceptions of virtue we have discussed. Finally, I shall suggest some possible avenues for further study. Though developing an account of what Aristotelian liberal virtues might be is beyond the scope of this essay, we can point future researchers in some specific directions.

Aristotle’s first distinction drew a clear, if conceptual, line bisecting the virtues into moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Throughout this essay, I have argued strenuously against the use of conceptions of moral virtues within liberal theory because the inculcation of moral virtues infringes upon the negative liberty of liberal citizens. There are two reasons to think that moral virtues are destructive of negative liberty. First, as we have seen, liberal virtues are likely to be inculcated by the liberal state. Because of this fact, moral virtues, which Aristotle describes as a disposition to feel and act (motivated by pleasure and pain), will cause a reduction in negative liberty. Moral virtues that are inculcated by the state will have this effect because people are being taught that certain things are good, and others are bad, rather than figuring that out for themselves; more importantly, they are being taught to respond to that perception of goodness or badness in their actions. Such instruction and education would be less threatening to
negative liberty if carried out by a family or small community. However, because of the power that states possess a state can use its power to remove the available options to individuals in ways that families and communities cannot. Moreover, as Mill argued for so strenuously in *On Liberty*, doing so not only reduces the negative liberty available to people, but because states would be inculcating conceptions of right and wrong, such a state would diminish the ability of it’s populace to seek true opinions. Moral virtues teach you *what* to think, rather than *how* to think.

Second, as discussed in the chapters on Rawls and Macedo, I argued that the habitual nature of intentionally inculcated moral virtues also reduces negative freedom. This reduction in negative freedom occurs for a similar reason as described above. The fact that virtues are construed, in Aristotle and Rawls (though not necessarily Macedo), as propensities or dispositions means that virtuous individuals are less likely to be able to act in a non-virtuous manner. They have, in effect, an internal impediment to acting non-virtuously. This is particularly restrictive if, as we are assuming, virtue needs to be inculcated by the state, or during one’s youth. Either way, one is being forced to accept a conception of positive liberty when one is unable to effectively reject such a conception. This also impedes negative liberty.

I do not wish to give the impression that I believe moral virtues to be inherently bad. However, I do think that in circumstances such as these, moral virtues have an impact on negative liberty. This is because throughout the works of Berkowitz, Macedo, Raz, and even Rawls (to a lesser extent), the moral virtues are to be promulgated by the state. This is a difficulty because such promulgation will (if the legislators take their cue from Aristotle) occur during youth, when people are not competent to decide for themselves the sort of person they want to be. If someone acquires moral virtue without anyone else making an attempt to
promulgate that virtue, then the arguments I have made above about moral virtue reducing negative liberty would be false. In such a case, actions chosen through the moral virtues would, in fact, be expressions of that person’s own choices. This would also be true (to a lesser extent) regarding the virtues that individuals absorb through their family and community, since such virtues are less likely than government-sponsored virtues to have been promulgated in a manner that brooks little argument. Instead, I have tried to suggest that this is not necessarily the case when one considers moral virtues that have been absorbed by a populace via the state.

However, by separating moral virtue from intellectual virtue, we can, as good liberals, have a conception of positive freedom which does not violate the negative freedom of individuals. We have, to this point, been concerned primarily with the reasons why moral virtue infringes upon negative liberty. However, as we discussed in the section on Aristotle, intellectual virtues are primarily concerned with abilities to reason, to understand the truth about the world, and, in Aristotle’s case, to deliberate and make political decisions. Thus, though the intellectual virtues are clearly a form of positive liberty, they do not infringe upon the negative liberty of individuals in the way that the moral virtues do.

Moreover, our discussion of Mill’s (through Berkowitz) and Macedo’s intellectual virtues give us excellent additional intellectual virtues. Mill’s arguments for intellectual freedom are themselves some of the most compelling arguments possible for intellectual virtues; when combined with Aristotle, it is difficult to see how one could not want to become intellectually virtuous. These intellectual virtues open up the possibility for clear, critical reasoning about the liberal political arena and the search for political truth, showing that Macedo is correct: there is nothing inherently illiberal about the idea of robust citizenship. Macedo’s conception of liberal citizens depends on their having intellectual virtues so that they can analyze, reason about, and
debate the justification of law. In addition, such virtuous individuals will be able to meaningfully discuss the deep divides in liberal society regarding moral, religious, philosophical, and political views.

Furthermore, intellectual virtues distinguish themselves from moral virtues in one other way. Moral virtues, as I have suggested repeatedly above, are habitual. I have argued that over time, such habits can become rote, or be less expressive of an individual’s own choice when those virtues are forced on an individual from childhood. I do not believe this is the case with regard to intellectual virtues. Instead, excellences concerned with critical thinking and reasoning, become more and more insightful over time, with experience, as Aristotle notes. Intellectual virtues are unlike moral virtues in that they cannot become rote over time; one may learn to habitually apply the intellectual virtues, but true critical thinking, for example, will yield different results from different cases.

Despite the apparently wondrous nature of intellectual virtues, there are two objections that I wish to raise against the idea of intellectual virtues. The first deals with an objection I have hinted at throughout this essay: the couch potato. The second, closely tied, objection has to do with the possibility that intellectual virtues may actually infringe upon negative liberty. In responding to the first objection, I hope to also answer the second objection. The “couch potato objection” follows this line of reasoning: There is an individual, living in a liberal state which embraces intellectual virtues, whose conception of the good life is sitting on his couch, watching TV. For the sake of argument, he is wealthy enough to do this for the rest of his life, and pursues this conception of the good life with vigor.

Many proponents of positive liberty, even some who embrace the conception of intellectual virtues I have offered above, are going to argue that the couch potato should be
forced off the couch. However, I take this to be a clear violation of his negative liberty, and an important one (proponents of positive liberty will disagree that this violation of the couch potato’s negative liberty is important). There are two reasons that this violation is important. First and foremost, to force him off the couch does, in fact, violate his negative liberty. Second, and the more important of the two, if we inculcate the couch potato with intellectual virtues, it seems unlikely that he will be able to resume his previous life. That is, in forcing him off the couch, we will be violating his negative liberty not only in the sense of providing an external impediment to his desires, but we will force him to become cognizant of roles and responsibilities that he was previously (perhaps self-deceivingly, but certainly blissfully) unaware. We will, in short, be making it impossible for him to pursue this conception of the good life.

As I have said, many proponents of positive liberty think that this is an acceptable loss. Sitting in front of the TV for the rest of his life was not, they will argue, what this couch potato “really” wanted. And there may (or may not) be some truth to that. However, my argument is that this is such a clear violation of this individual’s negative liberty that we cannot justify overriding this consideration of negative liberty for other considerations of positive liberty. This is because the couch potato is no longer free in “the meaningful sense of ‘free’, that for which we value it, in the sense of being able to act on one’s important purposes” (Taylor, 396). In this case, that important purpose is sitting on the couch, watching TV.

Therefore, though it seems clear that under certain circumstances intellectual virtues can infringe upon negative liberty, I hope to have shown that when there are overriding concerns regarding the ability to act on one’s important purposes, those purposes take priority over conceptions of positive liberty. More importantly, the intellectual virtues only rarely conflict
with the negative liberty of liberal individuals. In addition, I have shown that intellectual virtues are vastly superior in this arena to moral virtues, which can potentially conflict with negative freedom on a regular basis. This is the first step towards establishing a set of intellectual virtues for liberal citizens.

This brings us to our discussion of Aristotle’s second distinction concerning the differences between what is a virtue for man *qua* man, and the virtues of the liberal citizen. I hope to have shown above that Aristotle’s conception of intellectual virtues are, in this case, construed as public intellectual virtues—that he has an idea of prudence which restricts it to the political arena. It is my further hope that this second distinction can advance the cause of liberal virtues in a sense which also does not infringe upon negative liberty. Each regime has its own specific virtue that it tries to instill in its citizens so that they will be good citizens of that regime.

As we discussed in the section concerning Rawls, this distinction allows us to separate the virtues that liberal citizens need—or, as Rawls suggests, the virtues that liberal citizens want other liberal citizens to have—from the virtues that each individual citizen wants for himself. This distinction is important because in embracing it, we discover that one can be a good citizen without being a good person. As we noted when discussing Berkowitz, we want to talk about virtue without worrying about the human telos. Here, Aristotle shows us an appropriate theoretical framework for doing so. We can reject the ideal good person, and we are left solely with the idea of the ideal good (in our case, liberal) citizen. Thus, we already have in place a framework for talking exclusively about what we would want the virtues of a liberal citizen to be.

We want to be able to discuss the virtue of the citizen without worrying about the virtues of human beings because we are concerned with preserving the balance between positive and
negative liberty. Without this distinction, we would only be able to talk about helping people become better people, rather than talking about them becoming better citizens. As we discussed in the section on Macedo, inculcating individuals with a conception of positive freedom that took the individual as human, rather than as citizen, as the starting point, would seriously reduce the negative liberty available to those individuals. However, in discussing the virtues that liberal citizens need, we are able to restrict the virtues to the public domain, enabling people to become robust liberal citizens without infringing upon the negative liberty of their private, non-public lives.

By definitively separating the virtues of the public citizen from the virtues of the private individual, we not only avoid infringing on the negative liberty of the liberal citizen, we promote diversity. By combining the features of Rawls’ broad, thin theory of the good with some of the qualities of Macedo’s ideal liberal state (“tolerant, open, and dynamic and its members would be prone to experiment with different lifestyles and commitments”), we can embrace the diverse possibilities of the liberal state (Macedo, 278). In doing so, such a state would embody Mill’s ideal of a community engaged in open discussion in a search for the truth. Thus, the distinction between the good man and the good citizen allows us to enable liberal citizens through a conception of positive freedom without tampering with their negative freedom.

Thus, we have a framework for positive liberty within liberalism that is not in tension with negative liberty to the extent displayed in the introduction. In developing the conception of Aristotelian liberal virtues found here, I believe that we have an ideal of public, intellectual liberal virtues that liberal states and citizens alike can embrace, one which allows for the focus to be placed squarely on the virtues of the liberal citizen.
This brings us to our final task: avenues for further research. The first, clear priority is to discover whether or not a conception of virtue which embraces the moral virtues could play a role in an account of liberal positive liberty, one which still does not infringe upon the negative liberty of liberal citizens. Though given the above analysis to the contrary, it may be possible, particularly if a non-governmental method for the inculcation of virtue can be established. The second priority will be to analyze what liberal states need from citizens to establish what virtues are required to function well as a liberal citizen. In doing so, we can avoid confusion about what virtues should be promoted, such as the confusion between Rawls’ fundamental virtues and those inspired by theories of the good. The only virtue with which liberal states need concern themselves will be the virtues that are fundamental to liberal life. These virtues will be targeted exclusively at the public life.

A few more specific suggestions are also in order. Rawls’ thin theory of the good would be an excellent starting point for determining what virtues are needed from liberal citizens. Furthermore, additional attention should be paid to Macedo’s specific liberal virtues, particularly his suggestions regarding autonomy. Though it was not within the scope of this essay to discuss whether or not autonomy was an intellectual virtue, it has intriguing possibilities. In addition, Mill’s theory regarding seeking truth through public, intellectual discourse should receive further attention.

We began this project with an analysis of the tension between two competing conceptions of liberal freedom. Through the use of Aristotle’s distinction between moral and intellectual virtues, as well as his distinction between the virtues of human beings and the virtues of political citizens, we worked to develop a conception of public, intellectual liberal virtues. Moreover, we came to an understanding of the failure of other liberal theorists who attempted to develop
distinctively liberal theories involving virtue. Though this problem is far from finished, I hope to have shown that we can embrace an idea of positive freedom within liberalism without infringing upon the negative freedom of individual liberal citizens.
WORKS CITED


