Social Transformation in Divided Societies: Willingness to Integrate Post-Power Sharing Agreement: The Northern Ireland Case

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This thesis examines the factors which impact societal willingness to integrate in a post conflict, post power sharing agreement environment. Utilizing the Northern Ireland case, this study analyzes variance in willingness to integrate between Protestant and Catholic groups. Analysis of the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey data illustrates the shifting relationship between political trust and ingroup/outgroup frustrations on levels of willingness to integrate since the Good Friday Agreement. Statistical analyses indicate confirmation of ingroup attachment and elite political trust hypotheses, and reduced impact of outgroup benefit perceptions on willingness to integrate since the Good Friday Agreement.

INDEX WORDS: Northern Ireland, Integration, Political trust, Power sharing, Social dominance theory, Contact theory, Social transformation, Intergroup behavior.
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES:
WILLINGNESS TO INTEGRATE POST-POWER SHARING AGREEMENT
THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE

by

ELIZABETH A. O’CALLAGHAN

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
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WILLINGNESS TO INTEGRATE POST-POWER SHARING AGREEMENT

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DEDICATION

To my Parents and Grandparents.
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INTRODUCTION

How do trust in political elites and perceptions of ingroup and outgroup benefits impact willingness to integrate in the post-conflict context? In post-conflict societies, social transformation and integration are important for creating sustainable peace. While there are a variety of ways in which peace and power sharing agreements are initiated, if agreements are to produce the desired effect of sustainable peace, integration and tolerance must proliferate throughout politics and society. This thesis aims to measure and explain the existence of such change in the latter area, society.

Social cleavages can be rooted in language, ethnicity, regionalism, culture or race, and in all cases they tend to constitute obstacles to inter-group reconciliation.¹ Societal differences become politicized for a variety of reasons including mobilization for attainment of power or resources, political or otherwise. They deepen and become ingrained over time through socialization, group separation, and the maintenance of an “us versus them” mentality which constitute barriers to post-conflict consolidation of peace agreements and peace sustainability.²

At issue in this research project is the role of political trust and perceived group benefit as facilitators of individual willingness to interact and integrate with persons of another, previously antagonistic, group. Scholars have discussed group insecurities and low levels of trust in elite power sharing agreements as causes of group unwillingness to integrate (Hughes & Donnelly 2001; Hughes 1998; O’Neill 2000; Reik et al. 2008). It is the goal of this thesis to test hypotheses about alternative variables that may impact willingness to integrate in post-conflict societies. Identifying social transformations has significant implications for successful peace processes, these implications are discussed in greater detail below. Additionally it should be noted here that

¹ See Donald Horowitz’s discussion of ascriptive group identity (1985 also Varshney 2001).
² Anna K. Jarstad refers to this lingering polarization and insecurity as “the legacies of war” (2008, 19).
while there are many factors that can spoil peace agreements this thesis concentrates on measuring social change and the factors that contribute to reduced social space between historically divided social groups. The societal aspects of peace sustainability are important for long term sustainability of peace, therefore, identification of specific causal factors for increasing societal cohesion (factors include elite trust, perceptions of outgroup benefit, and ingroup attachment) over time in post conflict societies is relevant and imperative for understanding the full post-conflict picture.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Peace processes in societies that have endured protracted internal conflict are particularly complex and fragile. Goodhand and Hulme discuss five key premises that underlie the concept of peace-building:

(1) There is an assumption that peace requires social transformation and must be built over time.
(2) Peace encompasses economic, social, cultural, political and humanitarian issues; it is something more than the absence of violence, and includes ideas about sustainable development and social justice.
(3) Peace building is not an event with a precise beginning and end, rather it refers to processes which occur before, during and after violent conflict.
(4) Peace building is not a specific activity but a consequence of an activity (defined by its outcome or process).
(5) It is based on the premise that societies affected by violent conflict still contain individuals, groups, attitudes and processes that promote peace. Conflicts also generate a 'moral' economy, not just a 'predatory' one. There are instances of civil groups or 'constituencies for peace', as for example in Somaliland, who have helped support and develop a peace process.” As the term implies, peace is built upon by supporting and nurturing such constituencies within civil society.”

(emphasis added in all of the above; 1999, 16).
These five premises and are largely built on the assumption of reconciliation within societies as a primary goal and emphasize the temporal nature of peace building. Social transformation is a requirement of peace and “must be built over time” throughout a peace process (Goodhand & Hulme 1999, 16; emphasis added).

Rothchild and Roeder identify and discuss two institutional phases of the transition to peace: the “initiation phase” and the “consolidation phase”. The initiation phase is essentially the institutional foundation for elections, while the consolidation phase is the institutionalization of free and fair elections (2005, 12). Rothchild and Roeder go on to state that there is a gap between the initiation phase and the consolidation phase, or the inability of the institutional groundwork to hold during implementation. Reliance on purely institutional aspects of a peace process can ignore the importance of social transformation, which is a parallel and subsequent phase of a successful transformation processes. The social transformation aspect or phase is an absolute necessity of any peace process according to Goodhand and Hulme, and can potentially fill the “gap” between the initiation phase and the consolidation phase.

Social Cohesion

Social capital literature discusses the importance of social interactions and distinguishes between intra-group interaction (bonding) and inter-group interaction (bridging) (Putnam 1993; Colletta & Cullen 2000). Social cohesion defined by Berkman and Kawachi (2000) as two societal features: "the absence of latent conflict" and "the presence of strong social bonds-measured by levels of trust and norms of reciprocity". Strong social cohesion is discussed as an important aspect for maintaining peace while weak social cohesion has the alternative affect.

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3 “Social capital forms a subset of the notion of social cohesion. Social cohesion refers to two broader intertwined features of society: (1) the absence of latent conflict whether in the form of income/wealth inequality, racial/ethnic tensions, disparities in political participation, or other forms of polarization and (2) the presence of strong social
Weak social cohesion increases the risk of social disorganization, fragmentation, and exclusion and the potential for violent conflict. Building community or social capacity is a key development task for strengthening overall social cohesion and the ability to manage and prevent conflict (see Sen 1999).

(Colletta & Cullen 2000, 13)

Social cohesion is therefore important for preventing violent conflict in the first place, but also in reducing the likelihood of societies reverting to violent conflict after peace initiatives have established a ceasefire or institutionalized peace.

**Elite Peace Initiation**

The type of power sharing agreement and government formed after violent conflict is debated as greatly impacting the level of social integration over time with in post conflict societies, and therefore the ability of peace to sustain long-term. Consociational agreements and majoritarian agreements are championed by various scholars and strands of literature as producing the optimal outcome in post violent conflict societies.

Consociationalism is an elite initiated power sharing mechanism, one that should produce institutions that will effectively manage elite interaction based on institutional constraints. Consociationalism has been championed as the legitimate way to achieve “conflict regulation” (McGarry & O’Leary 1995 via Dixon 1997, 4; Lijphart 1977; McGarry & O’Leary 2004). Consociationalism which is discussed at length by Lijphart (1969; 1977), Dixon (1997), and O’Leary and McGarry (2004) is a structured power-sharing system put in place by political groups which are identified and divided by some characteristic (i.e. ethnic or religious identity) to ensure equal representation of each group. While there are many forms of power-sharing,
consociationalism is identifiable by four power-sharing characteristics: an inclusive executive, proportional representation, a level of group autonomy, and minority vetoes in legislature (McGarry & O’Leary 2004, 154). Power-sharing structures in consociationalism are elite driven processes usually accomplished through cooperation and constitutional inclusions. These power sharing institutions are put in place to create a political structure that increases political participation and provides more equal representation than majoritarian structures.

Majoritarian institutions limit representation and inclusion due to the winner-take-all setup. Producing difficulty for minorities to voice at the electoral and legislative level and often leading to “tyranny of the majority”. Many political systems have been engineered to account for this low level of representation including federalism, partition, and power sharing.

Consociationalism, a top-down method of power sharing, has however been criticized for unintended long term consequences. Consociationalism has the potential to promote continued divisions due to the necessity of identifying political parties along ethnic, linguistic or religious stratifications. Identification along these lines is necessary to ensure adequate levels of power sharing and representation between groups where at least one of which has previously been excluded from the political process. Horowitz (1985), a proponent of majoritarian structures, argues that identification along these stratified lines only further ingrains the division rather than building cross-societal interactions which, he believes, would lead to more sustainable elite and social interaction. Roeder and Rothchild also state that power sharing institutions which “provide an attractive basis to end a conflict in an ethnically divided country are likely to hinder the consolidation of peace and democracy over the long run” (2005, 6).

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4 See McGarry and O’Leary (2004) or Lijphart (1969; 1977) for full discussion of these four characteristics.
5 See Roeder and Rothchild (2005) for full discussion.
In sum, Horowitz and Dixon among others deny the probability that elite constructed institutions, which maintain identification of the “other” rather than promoting solidarity, can lead to a sustained peace, a cooperative political system, or a coherent and interactive civil society. Elite action therefore might be necessary and sufficient for initial peace agreements and short term conflict management, but it is unclear and unlikely that elite cooperation is sufficient for the prolonged sustainment of peace.

**Delivery of the Masses?**

Lijphart discusses the importance of elites being able to deliver followers for consociational institutions to be successful (Lijphart 1969; McGarry & O’Leary 2004, 154). This indicates again the tie between full social cohesion (discussed above) and elite initiatives in the form of power sharing institutions or otherwise. This vertical link between elites and society is imperative to understand and must be accounted for within a post conflict society. Reik et al. state that:

If citizens are aware that their leaders are interacting with leaders of an opposing nation in a friendly way, similar benefits can be expected. This is an important point as it represents one means of altering the attitudes of the general population who in democratic societies have the ultimate power in determining the fate of reconciliation efforts. Such extended contact effects may ever begin to transform the public's representation of "us" and "them" into a more inclusive "we."

(2008, 268)

While establishment of these vertical links is important, “contact theory”, is also referred to frequently within bottom-up literature as a positive force within divided societies (e.g. Hewstone et al. 2005; Allport 1954; Hayes et al. 2007; Brewer 1996; Riek et al. 2008). Contact theory

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6 Timothy D. Sisk and Christoph Stefes (2005) also discuss the obstacles for long term social integration under consociationalism.

7 This quotation is referencing a study by Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp which discusses "extended contact hypothesis ... proposes that knowledge that an in-group member has a close relationship with an out-group member can lead to more positive intergroup attitudes" (1997, 73).
discusses the impact of interaction between groups, within a society that have traditionally been in opposition to one another, for building the positive and cross societal interaction Horowitz states is important to reconciliation. It is important to note that some top-down theories, that propagate elite initiated peace through formal power sharing institutions, have indicated that contact between groups can have a reinforcing effect. Contact can further ingrain preconceived negative notions about the “other”, and further stratify or increase tensions between groups (O’Leary & McGarry 1995).

**Social Dominance Theory and Intergroup Relationships**

"Legacies of war" discussed by Jarstad (2008) are the societal norms of behavior and interaction that exists long after the end of violent conflict. These social legacies can produce hurdles for maintaining a stable and sustainable peace. Intergroup relations and perceptions of group benefit become embedded during long, enduring identity conflicts. The violent manifestations of this conflict are not the beginning or the end of such interactions and weak trust between opposing groups.

Levin and Sidanius (1999) discuss the implications of hierarchical societies and how ingroup and outgroup behavior is dependent upon the strength of the hierarchical system and if one’s own group (the ingroup) is the lower or higher status. Levin and Sidanius find, using cases of the US and Israel, that groups with a lower status have greater behavioral variation between cases. This variation is dependent on the relationship the lower status ingroup has with the dominant outgroup. Higher status groups alternatively exhibit more consistent behavior across cases. Dominant groups within a society will participate in “elevation of the ingroup…when

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8 Jewish and Arab groups in Israel and White and Latino groups in the US were investigated. Behavior of these minority groups was more reliant on the relationship between minority and majority groups while majority group behavior is alternatively are more a consequence of their dominant status alone.
social identity needs are salient, and devaluation of the outgroup…when social dominance needs are salient among high-status group members” (120). The above behaviors are efforts to safeguard the dominant group’s status and maintain the hierarchical system. Crighton and MacIver (1991) discuss group dominance in protracted internal conflict. They discuss Lebanon and Northern Ireland and find that groups in hierarchically ranked societies will have “fears of extinction” and are more likely to “produce protracted conflicts” (139). Crighton and MacIver also find that the “fear of extinction” is greatest among “dominant groups who are regional minorities”, and the existence of dominant group insecurity increases the likelihood of institutional exclusion, minority mobilization, and protracted conflict (139-140).

In addition to group threat ingroup attachment contributes to intergroup relations literature. Hinkle and Brown (1990) found that two factors were important in relation to outgroup perceptions. The first contributing factor, also discussed above, is how the ingroup perceives they are doing relative to how the outgroup is doing. The second factor is connectedness to the ingroup, captured in social identity theory, which argues that mere identification with a group will increase prejudices to the outgroup (Levin & Sidanius 1999; Abrams 1984; Kelly 1988; Hinkle & Brown 1990).

**Socioeconomic Factors**

In addition to the above factors that impact levels of social cohesion, previous studies have shown at the aggregate level that per capita income and school enrolment as well as other socioeconomic factors are important for post conflict reconciliation and sustainable peace (see

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9 Additionally, Crighton and Maclver find that the stronger “irredentism of regional majorities,” the greater the “political mobilization of ethnic subordinates,” the more insecure the dominant group will be. Lastly, “the more insecure the dominant group, the more it opposes the political demands of ethnic subordinates and the greater the likelihood of protracted conflict” (139). See article for additional findings regarding the implications for institutional exclusion, and protracted conflict.
Quinn, Mason, & Gurses 2007; also e.g. Fearon & Latin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 1998; 2004; Sambanis 2004). Leighly and Vedlitz (1999) find that increases in socioeconomic levels, operationalized as income and education level, produced positive political participation across four groups.\footnote{Leighly and Vedlitz (1999) examine political participation across four ethnic groups: Anglos, African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Mexican-Americans. They find that education as a positive predictor for all four and income for the first two listed above.}

**THEORY AND EXPECTATIONS**

The primary literature on social cohesion looks at the issue at the aggregate level where each post conflict society or a group within that society is examined as the unit of analysis. Social transformation, at the aggregate level, can be operationalized as a shift in willingness to integrate with an outgroup over time. The implications of the individual level causal mechanisms for willingness to integrate are, however, often left unaddressed in post conflict literature. Identification of willingness to integrate at the individual level in societies that have experienced aggregate level shifts or social transformation can be utilized to determine important individual-level causal mechanisms for inciting such change. This study aims to contribute a greater understanding of what impacts willingness to integrate within a divided society at the individual level. The dependent variable examined is therefore the individual’s willingness to integrate with the outgroup. Primary independent variables include: perceived outgroup benefit of an instituted power sharing agreement, individual trust in political elites, social contact with the outgroup, and a variety of control variables.
**Intergroup Behavior and Perceptions**

Intergroup relationships within a single society and perceptions of ingroup and outgroup status, discussed in *social dominance theories* and *social identity theory*, sheds light on how intergroup perceptions and interactions can impact social transformations post conflict. Changes in intergroup behavior overtime are important factors for determining social transformations and willingness to integrate at the individual level.

**Group Threat**

The combination of assertions in social domination literature, and the expectation that these embedded values and norms will have lingering effects are coupled here under the condition that elites have engaged in some form of power sharing agreement. After a peace agreement “fears” of minority and majority groups that exist before and during protracted conflicts are likely to remain salient for some individuals long after full blown violent conflict has subsided (Horowitz 1985). Perception that the outgroup is benefiting more from a particular agreement indicates higher levels of “fear of extinction.” According to theory discussed above “fears” of a shifting social hierarchy should be primarily experienced by the dominant group. The following expectations regarding the relationship between perceived outgroup benefit of a peace agreement and variation in levels of willingness to integrate with that outgroup can be asserted:

*Hypothesis 1(a):* Individuals who perceive that an outgroup has benefited more from a power sharing agreement are less likely to be willing to integrate with that outgroup.

*Hypothesis 1(b):* Dominant groups will be less willing to integrate with outgroup(s) than minority groups.
Ingroup Attachment

In addition to outgroup benefit playing an important role in determining level of willingness to integrate, strength of ingroup attachment as discussed by Hinkle and Brown (1990) is also expected to be significant. Group attachment within a post conflict society is expected to have a similar outcome; with increased attachment to one’s ingroup the individual will be less likely to desire interaction with the outgroup.

Hypothesis 2: Strength of identification with one’s ingroup will negatively and significantly impact willingness to integrate with the outgroup.

Individual Trust in Domestic Political Elites

Theories of intergroup contact as a factor in perceptions of the outgroup help inform expectations of willingness to integrate between groups. Vertical links (cues taken from domestic elite members) and horizontal (society level cross community) links are important social interactions that contribute to trust and social cohesion. Each of these intergroup relational links can manifest positively (positive interactions that build positive/new perceptions of an outgroup) or negatively (negative interactions that reconfirm/strengthen prior stereotypes of an outgroup). However, they both have potential to impact interactions and willingness to interact or integrate with the outgroup.

Vertical Links and Political Trust

To achieve “delivery of the masses”, as discussed above, one would expect a need for high levels of individual trust in the political elites who are initially creating power sharing agreements and consistently participating in the constructed institutions. In context of the
persistent ingroup attachments and outgroup perceptions that linger after the end of a violent conflict, rallying the public to trust the power sharing agreements that have been instituted can prove difficult. Much of the political behavior literature regarding political and social trust has found that while national level indicators of social and political trust are strongly related, little individual level analysis provides fully convincing evidence of a significant and robust relationship between political trust and social indicators (Newton 2007, 352). However, group identification within divided societies provides a different context for analyzing political trust that can be more predictive of individual’s behavior, and for this study, the individual’s willingness to integrate.

While past literature is relatively inconclusive, this study looks at individual level trust in political elites within the specific reference to group identity of elites in relation to that of the individual within the context of a stratified society. The expectation is that there will be a significant and positive relationship between individual level trust in domestic political elites who have engaged in power sharing agreements and an individual’s willingness to integrate. It is the connection of political trust with an ingroup or outgroup that will increase the viability of measuring political trust at the individual level. Cross-community elite trust (i.e. trust in outgroup political elites) should lead to greater levels of willingness to integrate with that outgroup. While intra-community elite trust (i.e. higher levels of trust in the ingroup elites) will produce reduced levels of willingness to integrate with the outgroup. Following assumptions derived from social identity theory and social dominance theory in combination with previous literature on elite trust the following relationship is expected:
**Hypothesis 3:** Individual trust in domestic political elites\(^{11}\) (groups or parties) will impact the level of willingness to integrate. Trust in outgroup political elite will be positively and significantly related to willingness to integrate, while higher levels of trust in ingroup elite will be negatively and significantly related to willingness to integrate.

**Horizontal Links and Social Contact**

Interactions with members of the outgroup are also expected to impact perceptions and willingness to integrate with that outgroup. Scholars debate if outgroup contact has a positive or negative impact on perceptions of the outgroup. There is, however, agreement that contact does have an influence of some kind on perceptions and interactions between groups. Therefore while a prediction of the direction of the relationship cannot be made, it is expected that contact will be a significant predictor of willingness to integrate with the outgroup.

**Additional Factors**

Socioeconomic indicators, frequently used in political behavior literature as well as post conflict literature\(^{12}\) as important predictors, should positively influence willingness to integrate. It is expected that higher economic status and education will lead to higher levels of willingness to integrate. Due to variation in socioeconomic indicators across a social population the above hypotheses will be investigated while controlling for a variety of socioeconomic indicators such as, perception of household income over time, personal income, level of education, age and sex.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{11}\) Domestic political elites refers to those political elites who identify as one of the conflicting sides within an internal conflict and have participated in creation of power sharing agreements or one or more institutions created by the power sharing agreement.

\(^{12}\) e.g. Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis (2000), Collier and Hoeffler (2004). Socioeconomic indicators, including GDP per capita and education levels predict peace sustainability and democratization.

\(^{13}\) Each of these control variables is discussed more thoroughly in the Data and Measurements section.
**Temporal Nature of Social Transformation**

The societal change necessary to embed or reinvigorate\(^\text{14}\) a norm of social tolerance and functional integrated society will take time. The necessity of time indicates that even after the predominant violence has ended and power sharing agreements are initiated social integration and continued cooperation on the elite and societal levels are paramount to ensuring sustainable peace. While peace agreements and formal power sharing institutions are important aspects of peace building, they are in many cases the early stages of a full and successful peace process. Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis note that “after ten years of peace the risks of conflict are about half of those after five years of peace at the mean of the characteristics of post-conflict countries” (2000, 333). Given Goodhand and Hulme’s premises and the additional literature above it can be assumed that if social transformation, or the reduction of embedded social hierarchies, takes place, it will not necessarily be immediately following the institution of a power sharing agreement. Social transformation of societies into fully cohesive entities will potentially take decades, not years. While it is not a novel idea that change, in the form of social transformation, takes time, empirical studies that examine cases of post conflict reconciliation often focus on short term analysis of only a few years after peace is initiated (e.g. the two year threshold used by Doyle & Sambanis 2000). Limiting years of analysis is understandable for practical reasons, but limits full understanding of changes that might be taking place in societies that exhibit successful peace maintenance. Virginia P. Fortuna (2004) comments that “many studies of the stability of peace use an arbitrary time period (five years, say) to determine whether peace is stable. But peace often falters more than five years out” (271). Fortuna finds 14 years to be the

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\(^{14}\) Reinvigorate is used here due to Goodhand and Hulme’s fifth premise (above) which assumes societies continue to have the capacity for peace through violent conflict. While these behavioral tendencies are suppressed during violence, and a new set of norms are established during conflict, the potential for peaceful and reconciliatory behavior (in some cases) remain under the surface.
mean duration of peace (2004, 277). Due to the temporal nature of peace processes, examination of individual level factors that lead to increases in social and political tolerance necessitates longitudinal analysis of specific cases. Evidence from several years after a power sharing agreement is, therefore, necessary to allow for assessment of variation over time.

THE CASE

Selection of a case is somewhat limited by the relatively small number of cases that have successfully reached the consolidation phase of the peace process, many fewer indicate some form of social transformation. This study, as discussed above, will primarily examine the relationship between elite political trust and group benefit and the impact these factors have on social transformation.

To test the hypotheses above, examination of an appropriate case must be determined. Necessary characteristics of a test case include: a fragmented society, history of protracted conflict, and institutionalization of an elite initiated power sharing agreement. While there are a few societies that fit this description the society must also show indication of societal transformation over time, since initiation of power sharing agreements. According to Mukherjee, out of 61 political power sharing agreements for conflicts meeting the requirements of the Correlates of War index only 17 lasted more than 7.6 years (2006, 483).

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15 Fortuna goes on to discuss the preferred method is a continuous measure of peace duration.
16 Roeder and Rothchild (2005, 21) discuss the limitations on generalizability more fully. However, these limitations do not reduce the salience of understanding the relationship between groups under power sharing agreements in post conflict environments.
Northern Ireland provides an excellent case for initial investigation of the hypotheses stated above. There are two primary groups in Northern Ireland that comprise the historical cleavages, Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist and Catholic/Nationalist/Republican. In the hierarchical structure of Northern Irish society Protestants make up the higher group and Catholics the lower. This is apparent in population size, as well as political and social status throughout Northern Irish history in which Catholics have been the numerical, political, and social minority. According to the 1991 Northern Ireland Census, Catholics comprised 38 percent of the 18 and older population, while over 50 percent were Protestants. By the 2001 Census the Protestant population was reduced to approximately 48 percent while Catholics remained static at 38 percent. Additionally Protestants were over-represented while Catholics underrepresented.

17 The friction between groups in Northern Ireland has deep historical roots going back centuries well beyond the 17th century. In modern history conflict peaked beginning in the late 1960s due to continued political and social repression of the Nationalist minority. In 1969 the Battle of Boggside marked the beginning of heightened violence between Nationalists and Unionists and expansion of British military presence. This event was followed by the 1972 Bloody Sunday cemented the beginning ‘the Troubles’, the three decades conflict that plagued Northern Ireland. Many efforts throughout ‘the Troubles’ were made to quell violence and create cooperation between Nationalist and Unionist groups. Some of these efforts resulted in agreements such as the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 and the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. These agreements were not able to hold within Northern Ireland for a plethora of reasons such as elite blockages and inability to decommission civil military groups. In 1998, with efforts by Nationalists and Unionist elites, the UK, the Republic of Ireland and the US, the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was signed and ratified with an overwhelming support from the public in Northern Ireland and the Republic, instituting consociationalism within Northern Ireland and its National Assembly, and ensuring inclusion of the Nationalist minority (71 percent (82 percent of Catholics and 62 percent of Protestants) of those who voted in Northern Ireland voted for the Good Friday Agreement (McGarry and O’Leary 2004; 338, & Evans and O’Leary 2000 table: 14).

18 According to Rabushka and Shepsle’s 1972 typology Northern Ireland is a balanced multi ethnic society meaning that there are less than four identifiable groups. Rabushka and Shepsle’s typology includes four multiethnic society classifications; fragmented, balanced, dominant minority and dominant majority. See Sisk 1996 or Rabushka and Shepsle 1972 for explanations of these four classifications (1972: Sisk 1996, 15-16).
The first year Sinn Féin ran in a Westminster election, 1983, 15 seats went to two unionist parties, while two seats went to the two primary Nationalist parties for their 28.3 percent of the popular vote. In the 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly elections, the first after the power sharing agreement took effect, representation of Nationalist voters increased with 42 Nationalist seats (24 SDLP and 18 SF) out of the 108 total Assembly seats.\textsuperscript{19}

In the wake of the Good Friday Agreement (1998), the power sharing agreement between Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland, aggregate level survey data indicate that there is an overall increase in levels of willingness to integrate (see Figure 1). Additionally, Hughes and Donnelly (2001) discuss that variance in willingness to integrate is potentially a consequence of levels of trust, or confidence in the process of mixing.\textsuperscript{20} They comment that Catholics have increasing trust that their “rights and cultural traditions will be protected” while Protestants are less enthusiastic and sentiments are “tempered by a growing sense of mistrust and unease” which emerged after 1996 (3). This assertion follows with other cases discussed by Crighton and Mac Iver, and Levin and Sidanius. More recent data indicate that there has in fact been a reduction the variance between Protestant and Catholic groups with regard to each groups’ willingness to integrate.

This reduced variation between groups is apparent in Table 1 and 2. Variation in preference for mixing in neighborhoods has decreased almost 5 percent from 1998 to 2008 (although increasing in 2003). A parallel reduction in variation between groups in combination with an overall increase in willingness to integrate is present in preference for mixing in the workplace. In addition to this substantial ingroup-outgroup variation over time within these two areas, there is also variation across all four willingness to integrate questions over a twenty year

\textsuperscript{19} CAIN Web service - “Key Issues –Elections in Northern Ireland” http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/
\textsuperscript{20} Willingness to integrate is a measure of social transformation, discussed fully in the data and measurements section.
period from 1989 to 2008. This time frame puts the power sharing agreement right in the middle of this time period and illustrates well perceptual shifts over time with a steady increase in willingness to integrate from 2000 on.

The Northern Ireland case is therefore an optimal case for several reasons: the Good Friday Agreement (engagement in a political power sharing/consociational agreement), a sufficient amount of time has passed (13 years have passed since the signing of the GFA, thus significantly reducing the likelihood of reversion to violence), and the case indicates aggregate level increases in willingness to integrate as well as variation between groups, over time, and at the individual level.
Table 1: Percent Preference for Mixing in Neighborhoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1998</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer own religion only</td>
<td>18.07</td>
<td>25.03</td>
<td>21.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer mixed religion</td>
<td>72.42</td>
<td>66.42</td>
<td>70.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dk</td>
<td>9.51</td>
<td>8.55</td>
<td>8.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2003</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer own religion only</td>
<td>15.90</td>
<td>26.80</td>
<td>21.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer mixed religion</td>
<td>76.61</td>
<td>66.40</td>
<td>71.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other/dk/don’t care</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>6.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer own religion only</td>
<td>15.05</td>
<td>22.27</td>
<td>14.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer mixed religion</td>
<td>79.86</td>
<td>78.62</td>
<td>80.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other/dk/don’t care</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>4.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2: Percent Preference for Mixing in the Workplace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1998</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer own religion only</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td>14.68</td>
<td>11.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer mixed religion</td>
<td>84.63</td>
<td>77.30</td>
<td>81.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dk</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>8.03</td>
<td>7.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2003</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer own religion only</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>17.06</td>
<td>11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer mixed religion</td>
<td>87.61</td>
<td>77.66</td>
<td>82.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dk</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>5.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer own religion only</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer mixed religion</td>
<td>92.59</td>
<td>91.25</td>
<td>91.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dk</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The aggregate level data indicates that there is a societal level shift or a social transformation taking place in Northern Ireland. Given this, the remainder of this thesis will investigate, through use of the individual level Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey data, the causes of potential attitudinal shifts through testing of the hypotheses discussed above.

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21 Exact wording for these questions (and those found in Table 2) are consistent across waves and can be found in the data and methods section of this thesis.
DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

The data for this research are drawn from two waves of the Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) Survey. Cross-sectional, individual level data from the 1998 and 2008 waves are utilized to account for any changes that might have occurred over time, addressing in part the temporal nature of the peace process as discussed by Goodhand and Hulme and above. Survey questions from all variables and waves are laid out below (for specific coding rules see Appendix).

Dependent Variables

Respondent’s willingness to integrate in four areas serves as the dependent variable in this study. There are four questions that measure each area of personal willingness to integrate. The questions are the same in both waves used and they are as follows:22

1) Neighborhood integration: “If you had a choice, would you prefer to live in a neighbourhood with people of only your own religion, or in a mixed-religion neighbourhood?” Possible responses included “Own religion only” “Mixed religion neighbourhood” and “Don’t know”. (1998, 30)

2) Workplace integration: “And if you were working and had to change your job, would you prefer a work place with people of only your own religion, or a mixed religion workplace?” Possible responses include, “own religion”, “mixed religion workplace”, and “Don’t know”.

3) School integration: “And if you were deciding where to send your children to school, would you prefer a school with children of only your own religion, or a mixed-religion school?” Possible Responses include, “own religion only,” “mixed religion school,” and “Don’t know.” (30)

22 All survey questions are quoted from the 1998 version of the NILT survey unless otherwise indicated.
4) **Integration in Marriage:** “And you personally, would you mind or not mind?” … “if one of their close relatives were to marry someone of a different religion?” Possible responses: “Would mind a lot,” “would mind a little,” “would not mind,” and “Don’t know.” (29)

The responses of these four questions are aggregated creating an ordinal variable, 0 = responded with preference for no mixing/only “own religion” to all areas of integration and 4 = responded with preference for mixing/“mixed religion” in all four areas (both “mind a lot” and “mind a little” responses coded as preference for no mixing). 24

**Political Trust**

The political trust variable utilizes one question from each wave analyzed in this study. The four primary political groups are measured as follows: the 1998 survey asks respondents about specific political leaders, while the 2008 survey ask about political parties. Both years’ questions adequately measure trust levels in the more extreme and more moderate nationalist and unionist groups. 25

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23 The question wording for these is identical in most years and has identical wording in the 1998 and 2008 which are statistically analyzed and used for descriptive statistics, and 2003 that is used for descriptive statistics in this thesis. The only difference is that in the 2008 wave there is an additional note to the interviewer for these questions: “If necessary, remind respondent that these questions refer to relations between Protestants and Catholics.” (repeated in each question). The question on personal preference follows a question to impression of general Northern Ireland preference: “And do you think most people in Northern Ireland would mind or not mind if one of their close relatives were to marry someone of a different religion?” (emphasis added to the section that is included above to illustrate meaning of the marital integration question but only read with the first question regarding general community preference.)

24 Because there is no overt “prefer mixed marriage” or “prefer marriage to your own group” answer for the marriage category the three options given must be assigned values that best represent these preferences. So while there are degrees of preference in the two responses “mind a lot” and “mind a little” both responses do indicate a preference against mixed marriage. Due to this, both are coded as 0 for preferring no integration in marriage rather than a 1 which is assigned to respondents who stated they “would not mind”. A response of “would not mind”, or the absence of objection, is considered here equivalent to preference for integration.

25 Models using 2003 and 2008 data were also run with an aggregate measure of trust in politics, specifically trust in the Northern Ireland Assembly. *Survey question:* “Still using the card, how much do you trust a Northern Ireland Assembly to work in Northern Ireland’s best interests?” Responses include “Just about always”, “Most of the time” “Only some of the time,” “almost never,” and “Don’t know” (Q23 from 2003 NILT Survey Questionnaire, 23). Using this more general measure of political trust, previous findings are confirmed with the lack of significance of the political trust variable. The other primary independent variables behave the same as in the models discussed in the findings section of this thesis, except for 2003 Catholic outgroup benefit which is negative and significant at the
1) 1998 survey: Elite Specific question asks; “Here is a list of some of the main politicians in Northern Ireland. Which of them, if any, would you generally trust to act in the best interests of all the people in Northern Ireland?” Respondents could answer yes or no to the following politicians: Gerry Adams, John Alderdice, David Ervine, John Hume, Robert McCartney, Gary McMichael, Monica McWilliams, Seamus Mallon, Ian Paisley, and David Trimble.26

2) 2008 Survey: Party specific question asks; “Thinking about the ministers in the Northern Ireland Executive, how much would you trust a minister from each of these parties to act in the best interests of all the people in Northern Ireland? First, a minister from the Democratic Unionist Party or DUP?” the survey then asks about “A minister from Sinn Féin”, “A minister from the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)” and “A minister from the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)”. Responses for all are as follows: “Probably trust,” “Neither trust nor distrust,” “Probably distrust,” “definitely distrust” or “Don’t know”27.

Two ordinal variables (0 to 2) are constructed to adequately analyze the relationship between individuals and elites or parties of the ingroup or outgroup; trust in nationalist elites and trust in unionist elites. The 2008 data represents the four primary nationalist and unionist parties, therefore the four elites which align with these parties are utilized from the 1998 data.

**InGroup Attachment**

Religious identification and level of religious participation, measured by frequency of attendance to church, as well as political group attachment quantifies ingroup attachment.28 First, two models were run for each of the specified time periods (one for the Catholic population, and one for the Protestant population) to clearly identify any variation between significant causal factors for the two groups. Second, measurement of the respondent’s frequency of attendance to church services will gauge strength of attachment (an ordinal variable) to the religious group and

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26 1998 NILT Survey (17)
27 Section 5 Q10 NILT Survey Questionnaire (31).
28 The choice to use this measure of religious attendance is driven by the societal stratification within Northern Ireland. In other divided societies the equivalent measures will be dependent on the social cleavage particular to that society.
identification as Protestant or Catholic. Third, the attachment variable measures identification of the individual as Unionist or Nationalist, this identifies political group attachment which indicates a strong attachment to either group decreasing the likelihood of willingness to integrate.

**Outgroup Benefit**

Perceived ingroup and outgroup benefit in terms of satisfaction with the power sharing agreement are derived from two questions. The first question determines if the respondent identifies as Catholic or Protestant. This variable is combined with questions that gauge if Unionists/Protestants or Nationalists/Catholics benefited more, less, or equally from the Good Friday Agreement. While the 2008 question asks specifically about Protestants and Catholics, and the earlier waves ask in terms of Unionist and Nationalist identification, the manner in which identity in Northern Ireland is constructed allows for these two terms of identity to be collapsed into comparable categories.

1) *The 1998 and 2003 surveys ask:* “Thinking back to the Good Friday Agreement now, would you say that it has benefited unionists more than nationalists, nationalists more than unionists, or that unionists and nationalists have benefited equally?” Responses include: “Unionists benefited a lot more than nationalists,” “Unionists benefited a little more than nationalists,” “Nationalists benefited a lot more than unionists,” “Nationalists benefited a little more than unionists,” “Unionists and nationalists benefited equally,” and “Don't know”.

---

29 There are obviously additional religions represented in the Northern Irish population, however, these are not pertinent to this particular study and are dropped out of the model.

30 Note that ‘political group’ is used instead of political party. I am using identification with either Nationalist or Unionist political identities, the two identities which are accounted for in the GFA broadly, rather than specific political parties which may or may not identify with one of these broader political identifications. The three waves in this study have different response categories which have been standardized for comparison across years.

31 Q21 NILT Survey Questionnaire (21).
2) *The 2008 survey asks:* “And thinking about all the political changes that have taken place in Northern Ireland since 1998, would you say that they have benefited Catholics more than Protestants, Protestants more than Catholics or have Protestants and Catholics benefited equally?” Responses included; “Protestants benefited a lot more than Catholics,” “Protestants benefited a little more than Catholics,” “Catholics benefited a lot more than Protestants,” “Catholics benefited a little more than Protestants,” “Protestants and Catholics benefited equally,” “Other,” “Neither Side benefited,” or “Don’t know” 32

**Previous Interaction**

Contact theories are measured by identifying if the respondent attended a mixed school or not. Approximately 5% of schools in Northern Ireland are mixed between Protestants and Catholics as of 2003. 33 While there are other ways that interaction may occur, the following question is consistent across all waves. “Did you ever attend a mixed or integrated school in Northern Ireland, that is, a school with fairly large numbers of both Catholic and Protestant children?” Responses include, “Yes,” “No,” or “don’t know” 34. Approximately 88 percent of both Catholics and Protestants respondents in 2008 and Catholic respondents in 1998 attended non-integrated school. Protestant respondents in 1998 however reported higher levels of mixed education at 14 percent (see Table 3).

| Table 3: Measuring Contact – Percent Respondents who Attended Mixed Schools |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                            | 1998                        | 2008                        |
|                            | *Catholic*                  | *Protestant*                | *Catholic*                  | *Protestant*                |
| Mixed                      | 11.62                       | 14.10                       | 11.34                       | 11.30                       |
| Not Mixed                  | 88.38                       | 85.90                       | 88.66                       | 88.70                       |
| N =                        | 628                         | 943                         | 432                         | 593                         |


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32 Section 5 Q11 NILT Survey Questionnaire (31). Variable BENCHNG.

33 CAIN: http://cain.ust.ac.uk/ni/educ.htm

34 Q26 from 1998 NILT Survey Questionnaire (58).
Socio Economic Variables

In addition to the variables discussed above variation that may be explained by socio-economic factors is controlled for. Previous literature, both generally and in the sub-areas of conflict and post-conflict reconciliation, has indicated that education level, income, and social status impact behavior (e.g. Sullivan et al. 1981; Stoufer 1955; Nunn et al. 1978; Blanton, Crocker, & Miller 2000; Blanton 2001).  

Economic Status in this study is measured through a self-identified household income level. “Looking back over the last year or so, would you say that your household's income has... fallen behind prices, kept up with prices, or, gone up by more than prices?” or “(Don’t know)”36. This question primarily measures perceived economic status which allows for understanding of how secure, financially and otherwise the individual feels. Education level is measured as an ordinal level variable ranging from no formal education (0) to degree level or higher (5). The respondent was asked for their highest level of education and shown a list of responses.  

Income is measured with a categorical ordinal variable ranging from under £3000 (1) to over £40,000 (10). It is important to clarify here the difference between the income variable and the economic status variable. While income is the actual reported household income, economic status is gauging the respondent’s perception of economic wellbeing and security.

---

35 Previous literature indicates a positive relationship between education, income and social status, and tolerance. Studies that use the state as the unit of analysis usually use GDP or GDP per capita to gauge state economic productivity (e.g. Quinn, Mason and Gurses (2007) who find that higher GDP reduces the likelihood of conflict recurrence).

36 Q6 from 1998 NILT Survey Questionnaire (3).

37 Section 7 Q4 from 1998 NILT Survey Questionnaire (51). Possible responses between 1998 and 2008 were different in original data, and have been re-coded for consistency across all three waves.
Furthermore correlation statistics show that each of these variables is gauging a different concept (.26 in 1998 and .16 in 2008).\textsuperscript{38} The age variable is the self reported age of the respondent. Sex is represented with a dichotomous variable where 0 = female and 1 = male.\textsuperscript{39}

METHODS AND FINDINGS

The data utilized for this study is cross sectional and therefore a variety of ordered logit regression analyses are examined to test expectations of the hypotheses discussed above. Ordered logit regression provides the appropriate model parameters to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, integration.\textsuperscript{40} Six models are examined below. Two models for each individual year, and a pooled sample combining the 1998 and 2008 waves of data are analyzed. Pooling the data allows for increasing the N, if variables exhibit the same behavior over multiple years, and the implications of increasing time after the initiation of a power sharing agreement and institutions.\textsuperscript{41}

The pooled data model (Table 4) indicates confirmation of the hypotheses discussed above. The second proposition of the first hypotheses which posits a greater impact of outgroup benefit on the dominant group is confirmed. Outgroup benefit is found to have a negative and significant impact on the dominant, Protestant, group. Protestants who responded that they thought Catholics had benefited the most from the GFA were 39.2 percent less likely to be

\textsuperscript{38} Additionally, it is possible that there could be an interaction effect between these two variables. Models were run with an interaction term combining the affects of the economic status variable and the income variable. The interaction term had little effect on the model as a whole and was an insignificant predictor of integration itself.

\textsuperscript{39} The literature indicates that sex is unlikely to have a significant impact on ingroup/outgroup behavior due to the primary ingroup identification (e.g. Jorst 2001). While there is no expectation that the sex of a respondent will have any explanatory over behavior the alternative of this is that it does impact behavior, or willingness to integrate here, and is therefore included as a control.

\textsuperscript{40} See Long and Freese (183-184, 2006) for full discussion of ordinal outcome modeling.

\textsuperscript{41} Note that the data has been weighted to account for sampling error related to disproportional household size, in accordance with the NILT “Technical Notes” (1998-2008).
willing to integrate in all four areas than those who felt that Protestants benefited the most (see Table 6). This finding is confirmatory of assumptions of group threat affects within social dominance theory. The outgroup benefit variable is not significant for those individuals identifying as Catholic.

Table 4: Ordered Logit Regressions - Pooled 1998 & 2008 Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willingness to Integrate</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Protestants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup Benefit</td>
<td>-.204</td>
<td>-.429***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.125)</td>
<td>(.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment</td>
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<td>-1.087***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.183)</td>
<td>(.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Nationalist Elites</td>
<td>-.565***</td>
<td>1.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.170)</td>
<td>(.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Unionist Elites</td>
<td>.727***</td>
<td>-.496***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.162)</td>
<td>(.104)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>.865**</td>
<td>-.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.286)</td>
<td>(.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Status</td>
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<td>.199</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.134)</td>
<td>(.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Attendance</td>
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<td>-.085*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.051)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
</tr>
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<td>.138**</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.047)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.040)</td>
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<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
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<td>Sex</td>
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<td>-.469**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.175)</td>
<td>(.157)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>-.006</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
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<td>-1183.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Ordered Logit Regressions – Willingness to Integrate for Individual years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup Benefit</td>
<td>.350**</td>
<td>-.529***</td>
<td>-.126**</td>
<td>-.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.199)</td>
<td>(.105)</td>
<td>(.170)</td>
<td>(.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment</td>
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<td>-1.534***</td>
<td>-821**</td>
<td>-.695**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.272)</td>
<td>(.297)</td>
<td>(.261)</td>
<td>(.246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Nationalist Elites</td>
<td>-.547*</td>
<td>1.299***</td>
<td>-.559*</td>
<td>.930***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.262)</td>
<td>(.229)</td>
<td>(.253)</td>
<td>(.172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Unionist Elites</td>
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<td>-.452**</td>
<td>.740**</td>
<td>-.557***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.263)</td>
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<td>.874*</td>
<td>-.383</td>
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<td>(.426)</td>
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<td>(.380)</td>
<td>(.278)</td>
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<td>.078</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.167)</td>
<td>(.156)</td>
<td>(.237)</td>
<td>(.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Attendance</td>
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<td>-.067</td>
<td>-.162*</td>
<td>-.084</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.080)</td>
<td>(.050)</td>
<td>(.070)</td>
<td>(.057)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>.120*</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.177*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.073)</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
<td>(.074)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
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<td>.024</td>
<td>-.015</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.053)</td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td>(.061)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>.003</td>
<td>.017*</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Sex</td>
<td>-.159</td>
<td>-.490*</td>
<td>-.103</td>
<td>-.489*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.233)</td>
<td>(.211)</td>
<td>(.265)</td>
<td>(.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.0762</td>
<td>.1255</td>
<td>.0584</td>
<td>.0789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
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<td>-655.028</td>
<td>-330.211</td>
<td>-507.585</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>433</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 6: Percent Change For Protestants given Outgroup Benefit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 → 2</th>
<th>2 → 3</th>
<th>3 → 4</th>
<th>4 → 5</th>
<th>(min → max)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-8.75</td>
<td>-11.28</td>
<td>-12.91</td>
<td>-12.94</td>
<td>-45.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-3.63</td>
<td>-3.32</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2.67</td>
<td>-12.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled</td>
<td>-8.32</td>
<td>-9.8</td>
<td>-10.62</td>
<td>-10.52</td>
<td>-39.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Models for 1998 reconfirm this finding, however outgroup benefit in 2008 is not significant at the .05 level for either group. *Outgroup benefit* with a p-value of .066 is however still noteworthy, especially considering the reduction of effect given the percent change. This finding is confirmatory of assumptions of group threat affects within social dominance theory. The outgroup benefit variable is not significant for those individuals across years and reduces substantially from 1998 to 2008. Percent change in 1998 indicates that Protestants who responded with the highest perception of outgroup benefit were 45.8 percent less likely to be willing to integrate in all four areas than those who responded with the highest levels of ingroup benefit. In 2008 the percent change is just under 13 percent. Additionally, 26 percent of this 45.8 percent change in 1998 is occurring between respondents who felt that both groups benefited equally and those who felt the greatest levels of outgroup benefit. This finding indicates the high level of impact that perceptions of outgroup benefit have on high levels of willingness to integrate. Again, these findings confirm social dominance theories. Additionally, Crighton and McIver's (1991) findings that the dominant group is more susceptible to “fear of extinction” are reconfirmed within the pooled model and the 1998 model. However, the fact that the 2008 model produces insignificant relationship between outgroup benefit is important to the evolutionary story of post conflict in Northern Ireland. Catholics and Protestants in 2008 are not making decisions about wanting to integrate with the outgroup based on outgroup or ingroup benefits.

The second hypothesis which discusses the implications of attachment to an ingroup is strongly supported by the pooled sample as well as the 1998 and 2008 models. Individuals identifying as Catholic or Protestant who also identify with one of the primary political groups
(Nationalists or Unionists) are significantly less likely to want to engage with the outgroup. These results confirm that attachment to an ingroup, in this case the political group increases negative perceptions, or at least impedes positive feelings about the outgroup. Catholic respondents in 1998 who are attached to one of the primary political groups are 24 percent less likely to be willing to integrate in all four areas than those who are not attached. In 2008 the percent difference is just less than 20 percent, and the pooled model finds that Catholic attached respondents are 21 percent less likely than Catholics that are not attached. The impact of Protestant attachment to a political group is largely the same as it is for Catholic respondents. Protestants in 1998 who respond as identifying as Unionist or Nationalist are 34.9 percent less likely to be willing to integrate in all four areas than those who do not identify with one of these political identities. In 2008 the impact drops greatly respondents are only 7.5 percent less likely to be willing to integrate in all areas (see Table 7). This drop in percent change between these two years indicates that attachment to a political group for Protestants matters less for informing a person’s willingness to integrate ten years after the GFA. More specifically, we can infer from these results that this impact that attachment has on integration is primarily coming from attachment to the political ingroup.42

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7: Percent Change given Attachment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42 Secondary models were also run with a Nationalist identification variable for the Catholic models and a Unionist identification variable for the Protestant models. Results within these models were nearly identical to those presented in this paper.
Table 8: Percent Unionist and Nationalist by Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Unionist</strong></td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>99.06</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unionist</strong></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Nationalist</strong></td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalist</strong></td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is known that Catholics primarily identify as Nationalist and Protestants identify primarily as Unionists, as this is apparent in Table 8. In 1998 and 2008 approximately only 1 percent of Catholics identify as Unionists while the majority that attached with one of these groups identifies as Nationalist. Likewise, less than .5 percent of Protestants identify as Nationalists while around 70 percent in both 1998 and 2008 identify as Unionist. The second hypothesis, that “strength of identification with one’s ingroup will negatively and significantly impact willingness to integrate with the outgroup,” is strongly confirmed with these findings. Additionally, findings are consistent between groups unlike outgroup benefit.

Trust in political elites, which address the third hypothesis, has the expected result as well and is significantly impactful on individual willingness to integrate. In the pooled model individuals who trust in outgroup elites (Protestants trusting in Nationalist elites or Catholics trusting in Unionist elites) are significantly more likely to say they would integrate with the outgroup. Protestants who trust both Nationalist groups/individuals are almost 43 percent more likely to be willing to integrate in all four areas than Protestants who trust neither. Catholics who trust both Unionist groups/individuals are 32.5 percent more likely to want to integrate in all four areas than those who don’t trust either.
Alternatively, those who trust in ingroup elites (Protestants trusting in Unionists or Catholics trusting in Nationalists) are less likely to desire contact with the outgroup. Protestants trusting both political ingroups are 24 percent less likely to want to integrate than those who don’t trust either. Catholics are 27 percent less likely to want to integrate in all areas if they trust both political ingroups. This relationship is confirmed with the 1998 and 2008 models and can be seen in Table 9. These relationships indicate that at the individual level trust if contextualized and specified to groups can be predictive of an individual’s likeliness to want to integrate with the outgroup.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Percent Change in those Willing to Integrate in all Four Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust in Outgroup Elites</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants (who trust nationalist elites):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics (who trust unionist elites):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust in Ingroup Elites</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants (who trust unionist elites):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-11.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>-11.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>-22.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-7.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-5.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-12.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-12.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-12.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-24.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics (who trust nationalist elites):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-13.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-13.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-26.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-13.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-13.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-26.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-13.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-13.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-27.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The more important interpretation of these findings however is the change between 1998 and 2008 for Protestants. There is very little change in both the impact of ingroup and outgroup elite trust on willingness to integrate for Catholics. Looking at the change over years for Protestants this is not the case. There is a 20.69 percent point reduction in the impact that trust in outgroup elites has on respondents willingness to integrate. This change is also apparent in a respondent’s trust in their ingroup, were there is a 9.61 percent point change over the decade since the GFA was initiated. Therefore over time, the impact of Protestant trust in all elites (ingroup or outgroup) has less of an impact on their willingness to integrate than Catholics. This finding buttresses those from the first variable analyzed, outgroup benefit. Over the ten year period since the GFA there has been a change in what impacts Protestant’s willingness to integrate. Aggregate levels of willingness to integrate are increasing and it is surely due in part to this reduction of influence of perceptions of outgroup benefit and trust in political elites impacting behaviors.

Contact is important to willingness to integrate only for only Catholics in the 1998, 2008 and the pooled data model. Contact is positive and significant for Catholics in these models indicated that interaction at schools provides positive reinforcement for mixing. While these findings are not seen for those indentifying as Protestant, there is no indication that contact necessarily reinforces or increases negative stereotypes as O’Leary and McGarry (1995) posit, just that other factors matter more (have more explanatory power) for Protestants than contact in schools. An alternative explanation for this variation between group effects is that group fears of the dominant group are more salient and therefore reduce the impact of contact in schools (interaction could be perceived more negatively by Protestants).
The remainder of the variables, used to control for potential alternative causes or explanation of additional variation in levels of willingness to integrate have varying levels of significance and impact in the six models. *Religious Attendance* is the only additional variable, which has not been discussed thus far, to be significant within the Catholic group models. Increased religious attendance reduces the likelihood of a Catholic respondent’s willingness to integrate. Religious attendance is significant at the .001 level in the pooled model and at the .05 level in both the individual year models. This variable is also significant for Protestants but only in the pooled model, and only at the .05 significance level. Again this indicating that frequency of attendance to church or engagement with their group has a negative impact that on willingness to integrate with the outgroup. These findings point out the increased strength of attachment and tensions and negative that ingroup attachment can produce. This negative relationship provides an opportunity for post conflict reconciliation groups to target people who attend churches, which can be propagators of divisive socialization.

*Education* is also a significant predictor of Protestant willingness to integrate across both individual year models and the pooled model. *Sex* and *age* are both significant in all three Protestant models. Female Protestants, therefore, were more likely to be willing to integrate than their male counterparts, and older Protestants were more willing to integrate than younger Protestants. It is in line with previous research that education is a significant predictor of increased tolerance and acceptance of the other.

Given previous literature the finding that women are more willing to integrate than male Protestants is not surprising. A possible reason for this variation is gender differences in support for war and conflict (as discussed by Conover & Sapiro 1993) rather than group identity. The puzzle here however is that this significant difference in gender is only present for Protestants. It
is unclear why Protestant women would be more likely to be willing to integrate, while there is no significant difference between male and female Catholics.

Age is positively predictive of willingness to integrate which is contradictory of the expectations in much previous literature. However, the assumption that younger people will be more tolerant because of a more liberal and open ideology might be a false assumption within a post-conflict context where full integration and reconciliation has not taken place. In Northern Ireland the younger portions of the population did not live through the height of ‘the Troubles’. It is easy for the violent conflict to be glorified or at least separation to be more accepted. While the older portions of the populations still remember vividly the cost of intolerance and non acceptance and are therefore more willing to integrate. Again, it is unclear why these factors are only significant for Protestants.

Additionally, the 1998 model indicates economic status is significant at the .05 level for those identifying as Protestant. This indicates that in 1998 those identifying as Protestant and felt that their household income was doing well over the past five years were more likely to be in favor of mixing. The economic status variable is not significant in any of the other models. Income, the second economic indicator, has no impact within all of the models indicating that other factors play a more deciding role in willingness to interact with the outgroup than a person’s income. Overall socio-economic indicators, measured with the education, income and economic status variables play a minimal role in predicting likeliness of willingness to integrate with the outgroup across groups and time.
CONCLUSIONS

The three primary hypotheses are confirmed with this study. The political ingroup attachment variable is significantly predictive in all of the models, and re-confirms social identity theories about ingroup attachment and the implications for increasing prejudices and reduction of tolerance for an outgroup, for both the socially and politically dominant and minority groups.

The results of the statistical models indicate that while ingroup attachment and elite trust variables remain salient as predictors of willingness to integrate long after the initiation phase of a peace process there is some significant change taking place. There has been some reduction in the impact that perception of outgroup benefit and attachment has on willingness to integrate for Protestants. Social interaction legacies are lingering but fading ten years after the GFA was initiated. Comparing the statistical results and percent change results with the descriptive aggregate survey data it is apparent that there is change taking place; both in the causal mechanisms that lead to willingness to integrate and in the overall willingness to integrate within Northern Irish society.

This study finds that by trust in political elites can be a predictive explanatory variable by contextualizing elite trust according to ingroup and outgroup attachment. Trust in outgroup and ingroup elites increases and decreases, respectfully, the likelihood for willingness to integrate. But there have been large decreases in the impact that trust in elites has on one’s willingness to integrate for Protestants, which reduces motivation for outgroup tension and more opportunities for positive interaction.

Attachment to an ingroup is the stickiest legacy of war in terms of negative impact on willingness to integrate, however 10 percent fewer people identify as Unionist or Nationalist in the decade since the GFA. In sum, the shedding of stratifying identities will positively impact
relationships between previously stratified groups within hierarchical societies, and dominant
group perceptions that the outgroup is benefiting more from power sharing agreements need to
be overcome to increase social tolerance. This increase in tolerance could be an indicator of
future integration over time. However there are potential negative paths that the Northern Irish
society and political system could follow.

This aggregate level change seems to be occurring in spite of the consociationalist
institutions, which promotes “good fences” for “good neighbors” and the maintenance of
separate identities, rather than because of them. It is important to note the differences between
levels of willingness to integrate and actual levels of integration that have taken place in
Northern Ireland in the ten years since the GFA was signed and ratified. School integration is an
excellent example of where segregation continues. In 2007 at the primary school level 94 percent
of Protestants attended “controlled” schools, which are 76 percent Protestant. 92 percent of
primary age Catholic students attended Catholic schools which are almost 98 percent Catholic.
Only about 8 percent of Catholics and Protestant identifying children attend integrated schools
(6.4 percent of Protestants and 3.4 percent of Catholics).\footnote{Department of Education –Northern
Ireland “Northern Ireland Summary Statistics – Pupil Religion by School Management type
2000/02 – 2009/10” \url{http://www.deni.gov.uk/index/32-statisticsandresearch_pg/32-
statistics_and_research_statistics_on_education_pg/32_statistics_and_research-
numbersofschoolsandpupils_pg/32_statistics_and_research-northernirelandsummarydata_pg.htm}}
Workplace integration however has experienced higher levels of integration, and recently number of mixed marriages has increased.
A recent BBC article stated that 1 in 10 marriages in Northern Ireland are now mixed.\footnote{BBC News “More mixed Couples tying the knot” \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/8344480.stm}}
This is suspected to be a consequence of mixing in the workplace as well as other areas of new shared
space. So while scholars like Jennifer Todd state that “implementation of the GFA has been
slow and uneven, and its impact on the mass public indirect.”(Todd 2007, 566) There are some
social shifts taking place. Although they are taking place slowly, this is expected in post conflict societies.

Shifts in willingness to integrate discussed and the individual level causal mechanisms clarified in this thesis allow for identification of potential policy targeting areas of opportunity to promote increased tolerance and social trust between groups (including contact, church attendance, elite behavior, and political ingroup identification). Therefore, while the findings of this study indicate that attachment to one’s own group is the primary lingering legacy of war; other legacies’ impacts are fading within the majority of the population. Overall willingness to integrate is increasing, as is peaceful social integration, both of which have larger implications for sustainable peace and peace duration. Identification and understanding of these individual level causal mechanisms is therefore imperative for the full understanding of post conflict societies and maintenance of peace.
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ARK. “Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey - 2003 Main Questionnaire” Queen’s University Belfast and University of Ulster. ARK [distributor].


###
APPENDIX – VARIABLES, MEASURES AND CODING

Dependent Variables

[INTEGRATION]
Willingness to integrate measures, neighborhoods, school and workplace are coded as ordinal variable:

4 = prefer mixing in all four areas;
3 = prefer mixing in three areas and no mixing in one area;
2 = prefer mixing in two areas and no mixing in the other two areas;
1 = prefer mixing in one area, prefer own community only in three;
0 = prefer own community/no mixing;
(Don’t know responses coded as missing data)

Independent Variables

[OUTGROUPBENEFIT]
Ordinal Variable: This variable combines the Main groups variable (above) and a variable which gauges perceived group benefit from the GFA (goodfri).

2 = Most outgroup benefit (if Nationalist Benefit the most and Maingroups = 1, or if Unionist Benefit the most and Maingroups = 0)
1 = A little more outgroup benefit (if Nationalist Benefit a little more and Maingroups = 1, or if Unionist Benefit a little more and Maingroups = 0)
0 = Both groups benefit equally
-1 = A little more ingroup benefit (if Nationalist Benefit a little more and Maingroups = 0, or if Unionist Benefit a little more and Maingroup = 1)
-2 = Most ingroup benefit (if Nationalist Benefit the most and Maingroups = 0, or if Unionist Benefit the most and Maingroup = 1)

[TRUST IN NATIONALIST ELITES]
1998 survey: Two dichotomous variables one for each individual elite aggregated.

2 = Trust in Two Nationalist Elites (John Hume or Gerry Adams)
1 = Trust One of the two Nationalist Elites
0 = Do not trust either Nationalist Elite

2008 Survey: Ordinal variables of trust for each of the Two Nationalist Political Parties*

2 = Trust in the Two Nationalist Parties (Sinn Féin and SDLP)
1 = Trust in One of the Nationalist Parties
0 = Do not trust either Nationalist Party
(Don’t know responses coded as absent data)
[TRUST IN UNIONIST ELITES]
1998 survey: Two dichotomous variables one for each individual elite aggregated.
2 = Trust in Two Unionist Elites (Ian Paisley and David Trimble)
1 = Trust One of the two Unionist Elites
0 = Do not trust either Nationalist Elite

2008 Survey: Ordinal variables of trust for each of the Two Nationalist Political Parties
2 = Trust in the Two Nationalist Parties (DUP and UUP)
1 = Trust in One of the Nationalist Parties
0 = Do not trust either Nationalist Party
(Don’t know responses coded as absent data)

* The 2008 question for each political party is recoded as dichotomous variables that are aggregated for the trust variables above follows:
1= Definitely trust or probably trust
0= Neither trust nor distrust, probably distrust, definitely distrust

[ATTACHMENT]
Gauging Attachment to a Political Group: Dichotomous variable
1 = Unionist or Nationalist
0 = Neither
(Don’t Know or Other coded as missing data)

[RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE]
Measures frequency of church attendance to gauge strength of attachment as either Protestant or Catholic:
Ordinal Variable
5 = Once a week or more
4 = 2 to 3 times per month
3 = Once per month
2 = Several times per year
1 = Less than once per year
0 = Never attend church
*(Don’t know coded as absent data also in the 1998 and 2008 waves some original response categories are collapsed to comprise the same 6 categories)*

[CONTACT]
Dichotomous Variable recode of (slfmxschool)
1= Yes, attended mixed school
0 = No, did not attend a mixed school
(Don’t know responses coded as absent data)

[ECONOMICSTATUS]
Ordinal Variable (recode of hincpast)
1 = Household income has gone up more than prices over the past 5 years
0 = Household income has kept up with prices over the past 5 years
-1 = Household income has fallen behind prices over the past 5 years
[EDUCATION]
Ordinal variable ranging from 0-5. Data from the three waves are standardized categories 4 and 5 in original 1998 data are collapsed and become equivalent to 4 in 2008 (recoded as 2 for this study).
   0 = No Formal Education;
   5 = Degree level or higher

[INCOME]
Ordinal level categorical variable: Range 1(under £3000) -10 (over £40,000)
2008 data categories are collapsed to match as closely as possible to 1998 data which are grouped the same.

[SEX]
Dichotomous Variable
   1 = Male
   0 = Female

[AGE]
Continuous Variable
   Range 18 – 95 (2008)
   (Don’t know, not answered or refused coded as absent data)