Motivating Emotional Content

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ABSTRACT
Among philosophers of the emotions, it is common to view emotional content as purely descriptive – that is, belief-like or perception-like. I argue that this is a mistake. The intentionality of the emotions cannot be understood in isolation from their motivational character, and emotional content is also inherently directive – that is, desire-like. This view’s strength is its ability to explain a class of emotional behaviors that I argue, the common view fails to explain adequately. I claim that it is already implicit in leading theories of emotion elicitation in cognitive psychology – “appraisal theories.” The result is a deeper understanding of emotional intentionality. Employing Peter Goldie’s “Feeling Theory” of the emotions as an example of the common view, I suggest that emotional feelings, too, should be understood on this model: emotional feelings toward items in the world cannot be disentangled from felt motivation.

MOTIVATING EMOTIONAL CONTENT

by

BENJAMIN C. SHEREDOS

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For my parents

Bob and Irene

Who have taught me about the emotions for 25 years

With their unending love and support

Both for each other

And for all their children
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is a common view among philosophers that emotions are intentional states, in the sense that they have aboutness, or content, or the ability to represent (Kenny, 1963; Nussbaum, 2001, 2004; Prinz, 2004; Solomon, 2003; DeLancey, 2002; de Sousa, 2004). Equally common is the view that emotional content is descriptive, similar to the content of a belief or a perception. Thus the literature is replete with claims such as the following:

“[E]motions are similar to beliefs… we can… explain this similarity by claiming that emotions are judgments…” (Solomon 2003, p. 7).

“[E]motions… represent abstract concerns… in just the way that paradigm instances of perceptual states do” (Prinz 2006, p.158).

“[E]motions present us with an entire information processing system on its own, [distinct from, but similar to, perception], a parallel representational system for understanding the world” (de Sousa 2004, p. 68).

One way to understand descriptive content is by means of Searle’s (1983) notion of directions of fit, now widely employed to distinguish two broad classes of intentional states. Paradigmatic examples of states with a purely “Mind-to-World” direction of fit are beliefs. If I believe that \( p \), the intentional object of my mental state (what it is about) is the proposition \( p \). My belief purports to represent the way the world really is, and if it is false (if, in fact, \( \neg p \)) it is the belief, not the world, which is at fault. In Searle’s words, “it is the responsibility of the belief, so to speak, to match the world” (1983, p. 8). ‘Fitting’, for a belief, is being true. Beliefs are thus said to have descriptive content – they purport to ‘describe’ (in a loose sense) the way the world is.

Paradigmatic examples of states with a purely “World-to-Mind” direction of fit are desires. If I desire that \( p \), the intentional object of my mental state is, again, the proposition \( p \). Unlike a belief my desire does not purport to represent the way the world is, but rather the way I want it to be. If my desire is unfulfilled (if, in fact, \( \neg p \)), then “it is, so to speak, the fault of the
world” and I cannot “fix things up” by saying that my desire was “mistaken” (ibid., p. 8).

‘Fitting’, for a desire, is being fulfilled, not being true. For this reason desires are said to have 
directive content. A desire that \( p \) directs us to bring about its fulfillment, by bringing it about in 
the world that \( p \).

Thus the common view – common to the otherwise widely diverse views of Solomon, 
Prinz, and de Sousa– is that emotions have a purely Mind-to-World direction of fit. Part of the 
appeal is that this view neatly explains our propensity to assess an emotion’s appropriateness. 
Fearing impending bodily harm is appropriate and healthy; the fear ‘fits’ as it were. Fearing 
public spaces (for no further reason) is considered inappropriate (and possibly a sign of mental 
disorder) in the sense that fear does not ‘fit’ public spaces. My main point in this paper is that 
assembling emotional content to merely descriptive content fundamentally misconstrues the 
way in which emotions are about the world. I will argue that emotions represent, roughly, the-
way-the-world-is-and-should-be-dealt-with; put another way, emotions exhibit both directions of 
fit at once; or again, as intentional states, emotions bear both descriptive and directive content. 
Those who endorse the common view of emotions are correct in recognizing the descriptive 
aspect of their intentionality, but mistaken in supposing that directive aspects can be “added-on” 
in the form of distinct intentional states, such as desires. My alternative view preserves the 
possibility of assessing an emotion’s appropriateness, but it also makes sense of the 
commonsense view that emotions are motivating states. In the philosophical literature, the 
general idea that there might be states with dual directions of fit is not novel. Ruth Millikan 
(1996) calls such states “pushmi-pullyu representations,” and I will later draw from her account. 
Insights along similar lines can be found in ethics, where some theorists have proposed “besires”
(Altham, 1986). I shall later address objections raised by several prominent authors against the idea that descriptive and directive contents may at times form an indissoluble whole.

In this paper, I will focus on one specific version of the view that emotions have a purely Mind-to-World direction of fit recently proposed by Peter Goldie (2000, 2002). Goldie’s theory is especially interesting because it argues against what he calls “add-on theories” of emotional feelings. In a nutshell, the add-on theorist approaches the emotions solely with an eye for their intentional content, leaving their phenomenology to be ‘added-on’ later. In Goldie’s view, an understanding of emotions’ intentionality and phenomenology cannot be separated. As a result, Goldie’s adherence to the common view is novel: he delineates a kind of emotional experience he calls “feeling towards”, which has a purely Mind-to-World direction of fit.

In Chapter 2, I review Goldie’s ‘feeling theory’, showing how it compares to other variants of the common view. Goldie offers a framework – available to all proponents of the common view – for providing an explanation of one class of emotional behaviors. I call these Emotional Standard Actions. The argument in chapter 3 is negative, and suggests that this account of emotional behaviors is of limited utility. I define a class of Irruptive Emotional Behaviors that pose a problem for the common view: if emotional content is purely descriptive, then we cannot explain these behaviors adequately. The task of chapter 4 is to offer a corrective, providing a philosophically-satisfying account of Irruptive Emotional Behaviors by explaining the nature of directive emotional content. I examine Élisabeth Pacherie’s proposal to do just this, by drawing from Nico Frijda’s psychological theory of the emotions. In chapter 5, I argue that we would be mistaken to suppose that we can disentangle two distinct forms of emotional content – one descriptive, the other directive. I claim that many empirical researchers (including Frijda) already implicitly recognize that emotional content is composed of unitary states that
exhibit dual directions of fit, and I provide this account explicitly. Returning to Goldie, I suggest that emotional feelings, too, exhibit dual directions of fit. In chapter 6 I consider objections against the possibility of states with dual directions of fit, and close by diagnosing the misconceptions that fuel adherence to the common view of emotional content as purely descriptive.
CHAPTER 2
EXPLAINING EMOTIONAL ACTIONS

I begin this chapter by sketching the classic Davidsonian account of actions, as well as the central role of deliberative practical reasoning in this account. I then review Goldie’s objection against add-on theories of emotional feelings, setting the stage for his own feeling theory.

Davidson defined an action as a behavior done for a “primary reason”, where:

“R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the description d only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under the description d, has that property” (Davidson 1963, p.5).

I might perform an action under the description “going to the kitchen for French wine” if I have a pro attitude of desire toward actions that result in my drinking French wine, and an instrumental belief that movements toward the kitchen will have that result (meet that description). My belief and desire together form my primary reason for acting. On this account, the performance and explanation of an action presupposes an agent’s practical rationality. Actions are done for a primary reason, arrived at in thought by pairing beliefs and desires via means-end reasoning. If rational thought is not available to form a primary reason for acting, then the behavior is not properly called an action – whatever else it may be. In slogan form: “no actions without primary reasons; no primary reasons without deliberative thought.” The Davidsonian explanation is thus, famously, two explanations: a rationalizing explanation, whereby we identify the agent’s reason for acting, and a causal explanation, whereby we explain what caused the action. The two neatly overlap since primary reasons play both roles. Primary reasons, as internal states, cause actions, and as contentful states reached via deliberation, rationalize them. Further, an accurate description of an action depends on locating the primary reason for which it was performed. My
act of *going to the kitchen for French wine* might be described in many ways, but what makes it *that very action*, rather than another (‘moving ten paces south’) is my primary reason for acting.

Often, locating an agent’s primary reason for acting can be as simple as asking them, “why did you do it?” (“I wanted French wine, and thought that going to the kitchen was the way to get it”). In conclusion, according to Davidson a difference in primary reason entails a difference in action, and vice versa.

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**2.1 ADD-ON THEORIES AND EMOTIONAL STANDARD ACTIONS**

Some emotional behaviors seem to fit the Davidsonian framework well -- I call these “Emotional Standard Actions” (hereafter, “ESAs”). These are behaviors performed by a minded agent, for a primary reason, *out of* an emotion. Goldie provides an example. Jim insults Jane. Jane gets angry at him, and, after stewing a bit, decides to exact her revenge by hitting him. Jane’s hitting Jim might be explained with reference to belief and desire: a desire to *get back at Jim*, and a belief that hitting Jim is a way to get back at him.

Goldie’s objection to add-on theories of emotional feelings – theories that leave aside emotional phenomenology to be added-on once an account of emotional intentionality has been provided – arises in this context. He claims that add-on theories arise from viewing the Davidsonian explanation of ESAs as adequate (2000, p. 40). For this account is compatible with Jane never actually being in the emotional state of anger, and with her never *feeling angry* as a result of Jim’s rascality. The proposed explanation would fit all cases where the relevant propositional attitudes were present – whether the agent was experiencing an emotion or not. The add-on theorist might take this to be a virtue of the proposed account – emotional actions are seen as fundamentally the same as non-emotional actions, guaranteeing the generality of the
Davidsonian framework. In all cases, we explain actions by appealing to primary reasons that are formed in deliberative thought by pairing beliefs and desires via means-end reasoning. Feelings are added on wherever present, without altering the basic ‘feelingless’ explanation in terms of propositional attitudes and thought.

Goldie rejects this ‘feelingless’ conception of emotional thought. He claims, instead, that emotional thought is distinct from non-emotional thought. In particular, Goldie posits a class of emotional desires, which are distinct from our everyday desires. This distinction is drawn as the difference between thinking with and without feeling. Due to the nature of emotional thought, “when an action is done out of an emotion, the whole action, and the whole experience of the action, is fundamentally different,” contrasted with a seemingly similar action done without feeling (say, Jane hitting Jim without being angry) (ibid, p. 40). To understand this claim, we need to examine Goldie’s account of emotional feelings in more detail.

2.2 GOLDIE’S ‘FEELING THEORY’ OF THE EMOTIONS

My goal in this section is to provide an overview of Goldie’s feeling theory. The two main points to be covered are, first, Goldie’s own account of the intentionality of emotional feelings (section 2.2.1), and second, the relationship between feelings and thought (section 2.2.2). An understanding of these ideas will set the stage for Goldie’s explanation of ESAs, which I return to in section 2.3. I shall be arguing in chapter 3 that ‘thinking with feeling’ cannot be employed to explain a class of emotional behaviors that are distinct from ESAs, thus it will be important to understand what ‘thinking with feeling’ is. In this chapter and the next, I will also be concerned to situate Goldie’s claims within current trends in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience of the emotions. Reading Goldie, one finds a wealth of illustrative
examples drawn from fine works of literature, but a real paucity of empirical data to back up substantive claims. In part, this can be attributed to the difficulty of investigating phenomenology empirically; there truly are, in many ways, a paucity of relevant data. But it is also in part an unfortunate oversight: emotional experience and its relation to thought are areas of lively, ongoing research. Where possible I shall try to offer correctives to this oversight – some substantive, some provisional.

2.2.1 THE INTENTIONALITY OF FEELING TOWARDS

In Goldie’s view, an adequate account of emotions’ intentionality cannot be provided without an understanding of emotional phenomenology:

[E]motional feelings are inextricably intertwined with the world-directed aspect of emotion, so that an adequate account of an emotion’s intentionality…will at the same time capture an important aspect of its phenomenology…phenomenology infuses both attitude and content (Goldie, 2002, p. 242).

In order to explain the relation between emotional phenomenology and intentionality, Goldie posits a novel class of emotional feelings, which he calls “feeling towards.” These emotional experiences are directed beyond the body, at some item in the world. If John steals my car, I will feel anger towards John. Feeling towards are phenomenal states with a Mind-to-World direction of fit that purport to be about the qualities of emotionally-relevant items in the world (Goldie, 2000, pp.78-9). For example, in an emotional feeling of anger towards John the car thief one will experience him as broadly offensive; in an emotional feeling of fear towards a bear one will experience it as dangerous, etc. As noted earlier, the “fit” between an emotion and the world can be assessed along these lines. Feeling fear towards a bear “fits” since the bear is truly dangerous. Feeling fear towards public spaces (for no further reason) does not “fit”, since public spaces are
not (inherently) truly dangerous. Like a belief, a feeling towards has a kind of responsibility for fitting the world.

Despite this similarity with beliefs, feeling towards are distinct in that they are not necessarily propositional attitudes, or intentional states directed at a proposition. In Goldie’s words “the object of an emotion need not be a proposition, and can be, for example, a person” (ibid., p. 22). In the example above, Jane need not be angry that Jim was offensive, rather she might simply feel anger towards Jim. In making this claim, Goldie is in good empirical company. As DeLancey puts it unapologetically, construing all intentionality on the model of linguistic structures “…is so alien to all of the best work being done in the sciences of the mind that it is nothing less than absurd” (DeLancey, 2002, p. 101). DeLancey is specifically concerned to defend such a pluralist view with regard to the emotions, claiming that as intentional states, emotions can be directed at either a proposition or a “concretum”, a physical item like a fire, snake, person, etc (ibid., p. 89). As DeLancey notes, it is reasonable to suppose that a ‘concretum-directed’ form of emotional intentionality is more basic or elementary than the propositional form (2002, p. 94). This is so since many organisms exhibit complex fear responses, yet likely lack cognitive prerequisites for taking up attitudes toward propositions. The result, in DeLancey’s view, is a “hierarchical” view of the mind, according to which the capability of emotions to be propositional attitudes is viewed as an extension of their more basic concretum-directedness, allowing the organism to engage emotionally with a broader class of emotional stimuli and events (ibid., p. 98).

Likewise, Goldie claims that one can unreflectively feel an emotion without being reflectively self aware that one is feeling an emotion (ibid., pp. 62-72) and linguistic abilities are not prerequisites for feeling towards (ibid., p. 116). As an analogy, one can have a visual
experience of an apple without being reflectively aware that one is seeing an apple. This, combined with the foregoing claim that feeling towards need not be directed at a proposition, allows Goldie’s account to range over emotions in organisms with less sophisticated cognitive abilities than those of human adults. Despite this, if an adult human feels anger towards Jim, she will typically have a belief that recapitulates the descriptive content of the feeling in a propositional format: a belief that Jim is offensive (ibid., p. 22). There is a “conceptual relation” between an emotional feeling towards and certain beliefs (ibid., pp. 21-2; see also Kenny 1963). As noted in the introduction, this relation has led some authors, e.g., Solomon, to the view that emotions are identical with beliefs or judgments of some kind. Goldie calls this an “over-intellectualization” of the emotions, and insists that even in cases of adult humans with capacities for reflective conceptualization, such beliefs need not necessarily be present during an emotion: the descriptive content of feeling towards may remain unreflective and concretum-directed (ibid., pp. 22-4).

There is a deeper issue here, regarding the very idea of a state with a Mind-to-World direction of fit as deployed within philosophical theories of the emotions. This can be illustrated by focusing on an obvious target of Goldie’s charge of over-intellectualization in theories of the emotions – “cognitivist” theories. Cognitivism is often characterized as any view that claims that emotions are constituted by beliefs or judgments (see, e.g., Robinson, 2004). Martha Nussbaum endorses this claim, saying that “beliefs are connected to the emotions in a very intimate way: they appear to be part of what the emotion itself is… Fear involves a belief about possibilities imminent in the Future… Pity requires a belief about someone else’s significant suffering. And so forth” (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 27). Nussbaum’s brand of cognitivism is, however, a particularly strong form, and for a suite of related reasons, there is a cottage industry aimed at making a
much weaker claim. Robert Solomon – whose work was seminal in defining and defending
cognitivism for over 30 years – intimated the motivations behind these revisions clearly with two
powerful charges against the utility of understanding emotions in terms of beliefs.

Belief is too loosely tied to perception to account for those case where one has an
emotion immediately upon coming upon a situation, and it is too tightly tied to the
logic of propositions to explain, for example, how we can often hold conflicting (but not literally contradictory) emotions at the same time (Solomon, 2003, p.8)

Scarantino (forthcoming) argues that when faced with such arguments, cognitivists tend to adopt
an “elastic strategy,” stretching the application of the terms “belief” and “judgment” to cover
these problematic contexts. Nussbaum, for example, explicitly suggests that in order to explain
the emotions of nonhuman animals and infants “we probably should understand the notion of
‘belief’ extremely broadly and elastically, as any cognitive state that involves seeing X as Y”
(Nussbaum, 2004, p. 27). This construal of “belief” is not consonant with that of the Davidsonian
framework. In light of her elastic reading of “belief,” Nussbaum’s claim that emotions
necessarily contain beliefs plausibly amounts to little more than the claim that emotions have a
Mind-to-World direction of fit. As we have seen, beliefs are straightforward examples of states
with a Mind-to-World direction of fit. But Davidsonian beliefs – prototypical beliefs – must
satisfy a suite of further important criteria: they must be propositional attitudes that play a certain
role in rationalizing and causing behavior, via the relations they enter into with desires in means-

There is thus a risk here of degenerating into a semantic dispute. If one defines a belief as
any state with a Mind-to-World direction of fit, then it will be difficult to deny that all emotions
are, or involve, ‘beliefs.’ But we should resist doing so, since (i) the fully-clothed Davidsonian
notion of belief is an extremely useful one; (ii) it makes good sense to view mental states besides
beliefs (e.g., perceptions) as having a Mind-to-World direction of fit; (iii) the central explanatory role that Davidsonian beliefs are built to play does not need to be filled in many emotional contexts (as admitted by Nussbaum); and (iv) forcing Davidsonian beliefs into emotions would erase the distinction between conflicting and contradictory emotions, as noted by Solomon.

I shall say more about this confusion in chapter 3.

In the meantime, I will be using the term “belief” to refer to states that have a Mind-to-World direction of fit and the additional features Davidson suggested. We should not assume that emotions are or contain prototypical beliefs because they appear to have a Mind-to-World direction of fit. As such, Goldie’s feeling theory is best viewed as a viable alternative to extant cognitivist accounts of emotional intentionality. Indeed, regarding the problematic cases just described, Goldie’s account appears to fare better than cognitivist accounts. As remarked, unreflective consciousness is presumed to be something that nonhuman animals and infants are capable of. Unreflective feelings also appear to evade Solomon’s remaining critiques against beliefs. Since unreflective feelings towards can be concretum-directed, they are not “too tightly tied to the logic of propositions to explain, for example, how we can often hold [have] conflicting (but not literally contradictory) emotions” (Solomon, 2003, p.8). Nor is it the case that they are “too loosely tied to perception to account for those cases where one has an emotion upon immediately coming to a situation” (ibid., p.8). Returning to the visual analogy, nothing prevents me from having a visual experience of an apple upon immediately being faced with an apple – regardless of whether I am reflectively aware that I am now having a visual experience of an apple. Mutatis mutandis for emotional experience. Nothing prevents me from having an experience of fear upon immediately being faced with a dangerous situation – especially not
whether I am (or have the opportunity to become) reflectively aware that I am now feeling fear towards that danger. On Goldie’s account, the latter presupposes the former.\(^9\)

### 2.2.2 ENGAGEMENT AND THINKING WITH FEELING

Feelings towards are also described as a form of “engagement” with the world, which render one “poised for action in a new way – poised for action out of the emotion.” (ibid, p. 61). It is Goldie’s notion of *engagement* that encapsulates his objection to add-on theories of emotional feelings. Goldie claims that an action performed *out of an emotion* is fundamentally distinct from a non-emotional action. For example, if I kill Jim in a fit of anger, this action is not identical to a planned and premeditated murder, *plus* a feeling of anger. This distinction may not be apparent to an outside observer, but is rather drawn “from the personal point of view: there is a difference in what it is like to act out of an emotion and not out of an emotion” (ibid., p. 41).

Goldie traces the difference to two forms of thought, which he distinguishes as thinking *with* and *without* feeling. A thought experiment is employed to elucidate these claims, constructed on analogy with Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986) famous “Mary” argument against materialism.\(^{10}\) Consider Irene, an “icy-cool ice-scientist.” Irene has knowledge of all the physical properties of ice. With one look at a frozen pond, she can recognize where the most dangerous sections are – where the ice is thin, slippery, etc. But Irene has never *felt* fear. She has only “theoretical concepts” of dangerousness and fear, construed in purely functional terms (Goldie, 2002, p.245).

One day Irene walks onto the ice, falls, and for the first time, *feels fear towards* the dangerousness of the ice.

After feeling fear, Goldie claims that Irene gains new abilities to think about the dangerousness of the ice. She gains a “perceptual concept” of dangerousness, which outstrips her
prior theoretical concept. She also gains a “phenomenal concept” of what it is like to feel fear. As a result, the way the dangerousness of the ice is ‘grasped’ has changed: “Before, when [Irene] said, ‘That ice is dangerous’, the thought expressed was a judgment made without feeling; afterwards what she expressed was feeling [fear] towards the ice” (ibid., p. 245). As a result of feeling fear towards the ice, Irene “gains new powers and potentialities” of thought and feelings – what Goldie describes as “functional differences that parallel the acquisition of her new concepts”, which “reverberate through the rest of her mental economy” (ibid, p. 245).

Now, Goldie’s explanation of Emotional Standard Actions (ESAs), and his notion of feelings towards as engagement, are bound up with this conception of thinking with feeling. Here is why. Along with her new ‘concepts’, Irene gains a new understanding of why dangerousness merits a fearful response of avoidance: falling on ice hurts, it invokes a sense of helplessness, it evokes disturbing imagery about falling through the ice and perishing, etc. Once Irene knows what it is like to feel fear towards the ice, she has first-person access to these facts, which make it clear that dangerousness merits a fearful response of avoidance. Her failure to avoid the dangerousness of the ice led to undesirable experiences and thoughts, hence it will be brutally apparent to her that it is desirable to avoid the dangerousness of the ice in the future. As a result, in the future a feeling of fear will render her poised for action out of the emotion. She gains new abilities for various forms of thinking with feeling: believing with feeling that the ice is dangerous (that it offers possibilities for future experiences of pain, helplessness, etc.) and desiring with feeling to avoid the ice. And with these new abilities come new possibilities for engagement.

That emotional feelings influence thought is an idea familiar to all of us from everyday life. It is worth noting further that the account Goldie sketches can potentially sit well within
disparate scientific approaches to the emotions. In the realm of cognitive psychology, Scherer (2004) has suggested that emotional feelings function as a monitoring system, integrating information from component cognitive, neurophysiological, and motor processes involved in the onset, persistence, and behavioral expression of an emotion, and in turn regulating those component processes. Similarly, from the perspective of neurobiology, Damasio asserts that emotional feelings play the role of “amplifying the mental impact of a given situation and increasing the probabilities that comparable situations can be anticipated and planned for in the future so as to avert risks and take advantage of opportunities” (Damasio, 2004, p. 57). There is general consensus among researchers that emotional feelings exert an important influence on thought, planning, and eventually, behavior.

As for hard evidence in support of the claim, the few data available in this young area of research are suggestive. Niedenthal et al (1999) have reported findings suggesting that occurrent emotional experiences of happiness, sadness, and fear each have characteristic effects on the way subjects categorize stimuli (terms and pictures) for perceived similarity. Generally, subjects who report experiencing strong emotional feelings (i) pay more attention to emotional similarities between stimuli than do controls, and (ii) perceive emotional similarities to be greater than do controls. The authors interpret these data as support for a broader thesis: that objects or events which have elicited the same emotional experience are categorized as similar on that ground alone – independently of their intrinsic properties. Clore & Gasper have put forth a more general emotion categorization hypothesis, according to which, “similarity of emotional reactions promotes inclusion of different situations into a single belief structure,” resulting in a “co-mingling” of beliefs relevant to each situation (Clore & Gasper, 2000, p. 28). On this account, beliefs formed about one situation would tend to be generalized to the other, building conceptual
relations and licensing new inferences on the basis of shared phenomenology. I submit that we can understand Goldie’s general idea of “believing with feeling” as, essentially, the emotion categorization hypothesis. The idea is that the emotional experiences we have toward things in the world have an effect on the way we think about those things, in ways that influence means-end reasoning about them, and hence our behavior towards them. This is a reasonable view, shared by many empirical researchers, though susceptible to further refinement. For the moment, I will also be taking Goldie’s claims about “desiring with feeling” at face value. It is specifically by grounding ’emotional desires’ that feelings gain purchase in Goldie’s explanation of ESAs. I turn now to this explanation.

2.3 GOLDIE’S EXPLANATION OF EMOTIONAL STANDARD ACTIONS

We are now in a position to examine Goldie’s explanations of emotional behaviors. In this section I provide his account of ESAs, which draws from the account of feelings towards sketched in the previous section. In chapter 3, I will define a distinct class of emotional behaviors that, I argue, are not amenable to the explanation of ESAs that Goldie offers. The result will be to limit the scope of Goldie’s explanation of emotional behaviors, restricting it to the subset of ESAs.

Formally, Goldie’s explanation of ESAs turns out to be a species of the standard Davidsonian account. He claims, in effect, that ESAs are caused by, and done for, a feeling-laden primary reason. Recall Jane’s ESA of hitting Jim. Goldie claims that in virtue of feeling anger towards Jim, Jane will have a primitively intelligible emotional desire to get back at Jim. Primitively intelligible emotional desires have two key features. The first has already been encountered: an emotional desire is a desire with feeling, invoking the deployment of the kinds
of perceptual and phenomenal concepts that Irene gains after the fall. Secondly, an emotional desire “is primitively intelligible if it cannot be better explained by anything other than the emotion of which it is a part” (ibid. p. 43). Goldie elucidates this claim only by saying that “it is just the sort of desire which angry people paradigmatically have” (ibid, p. 43). Thus Jane’s action is, after all, explicable in terms of a desire (with feeling) to get back at Jim, and an instrumental belief that hitting Jim is a means to this end. So, as recommended by the Davidsonian account, the (feeling-laden) primary reason both rationalizes and causes the action. Citing Jane’s feeling of anger towards Jim provides no further reason for her ESA, “for there is no further reason; it is rather to put into context all the reasons [Jane might] have already given” (ibid., p. 42). Citing the emotional feeling in our explanation serves to impose a broader intelligibility on the action, by deferring to the agent’s personal history, and the “larger narrative” of their life, of which the feelings, thoughts, and action are parts (ibid, p. 35).

What of Goldie’s claim that ESAs are “fundamentally different” from non-emotional actions? (ibid. p. 40). As we have seen, a broadly Davidsonian account of action presupposes an account of deliberative thought, whereby beliefs and desires are combined to form a primary reason for acting. Now, a feeling-laden primary reason is built up out of a belief and the kind of ‘desire with feeling’ that Irene gains after the fall. And a primitively intelligible emotional desire is fundamentally distinct from a ‘feelingless’ desire, since the former is a form of thinking with feeling, dependent upon prior phenomenal experience in accordance with the emotion categorization hypothesis. This distinction between types of desires carries through to primary reasons as well, allowing us to distinguish feeling-laden primary reasons from their more familiar ‘feelingless’ cousins. And as we saw above, on the Davidsonian account, a difference in primary reason entails a difference in the action performed. As a result, ESAs are fundamentally
distinct from non-emotional actions, since they are each performed for disparate types of primary reasons.

Despite their central role in explanations of ESAs, ‘primitively intelligible emotional desires’ receive very little elaboration beyond the foregoing in Goldie’s writings. As we learned from Irene, having an *emotional* desire requires that the subject have experienced the relevant emotion. But ‘primitive intelligibility’, is simply characterized in terms of the emotional desires that a person (or better, that *particular* person) typically has when experiencing the emotion.

I shall be returning to this point in chapter 5 below, after proposing my own account of emotions as intentional states that exhibit dual directions of fit. I will suggest that this account offers a substantial explanation of *why it is* that people typically have primitively intelligible emotional desires. The result is a deeper understanding of primitive intelligibility, and of ESAs themselves. First, however, I will try to motivate this view, by examining shortcomings of the common view of emotional content as purely *descriptive*. The critical failure of the common view is its inability to explain a distinct class of emotional behaviors: Irruptive Emotional Behaviors. In the next chapter, I show why Goldie’s view does not provide an adequate explanation of these behaviors, and generalize the issue to other variants of the common view.
CHAPTER 3
WHERE THE STANDARD ACCOUNT FAILS

In this chapter, I show why the common view of emotional content as purely descriptive faces serious difficulties in explaining a large class of emotional behaviors – perhaps the majority of them. In 3.1, I define the problematic class of “Irruptive Emotional Behaviors,” and explain the difficulties they pose for proponents of the common view – again, employing Goldie as an example. In 3.2, I orient the discussion towards cognitive psychology of the emotions. In a nutshell, Irruptive Emotional Behaviors are the stock-in-trade of psychological theories of the emotions; hence we should look to such accounts for insights in devising a robust philosophical account of such behaviors. In chapter 4, I pursue such an explanation in some detail, following Élisabeth Pacherie’s empirically-informed account.

3.1 IRRUPTIVE EMOTIONAL BEHAVIORS

Before proceeding, it will be useful to consider reflexive behaviors: e.g., withdrawing one’s limb from a painful stimulus, or sneezing in response to an irritant in the nasal passage. One characteristic of reflexive behaviors is their inflexibility. Stimulate the (intact) nervous system in the right way, and the response ensues without fail. Reflexive behaviors are ‘brute’, in the sense that their explanation is purely causal, and requires no reference to mental states. The nervous system acts as a simple input-output device: in goes stimulation (e.g., pain, irritation), out comes behavior (e.g., withdrawal, sneezing).

In the psychological literature, there is some debate as to whether any emotional behaviors are, in this sense, reflexive. A possible case of a reflexive emotional behavior might be a startle response to a loud noise – freezing, closing the eyes, and hunching the shoulders.
Some prominent psychologists (e.g., Ekman, Friesen, & Simons, 1985) refuse to countenance reflexive behaviors as truly “emotional,” reserving the term for behaviors that are flexible to some degree. Similarly, Scherer (1994) has argued that the function of emotions is to “decouple” stimulus and response, instead producing behavior that is flexibly geared to present circumstances. If there are reflexive emotional behaviors, these theorists would consider them to be the limiting cases– rare cases where flexibility is lacking entirely.

What I want to focus on here are what I call “Irruptive Emotional Behaviors” (hereafter, “IEBs”). As I intend to use the term, IEBs sit somewhere in-between reflexive behaviors and ESAs. As an example of an IEB, take a case that Goldie considers: “you are wandering across the road with your thoughts – in that excellent phrase – ‘miles away’ and you suddenly see a bus coming towards you. In fear, you throw yourself out of the way of the bus” (Goldie, 2000 p. 46). I take such a behavior to be a paradigmatic example of an IEB. Like reflexive behaviors, IEBs seem to be ‘automatic’; but an IEB is less ‘brute’ than a reflexive behavior. It is a flexible, context-specific behavior. However it is that the behavior is produced, it is not likely to be in terms of a simple input-output device: in goes a bus-perception, out comes jumping. As a modicum of flexibility, one has the option of jumping to the right or to the left. If there is a wall to the right, and open space to the left, one will not ‘reflexively’ jump headlong into the wall. If Scherer and others are right, perhaps all behaviors that deserve the title of “emotional” are either IEBs or ESAs. If they are wrong, then it suffices for my purposes to simply note that even if some emotional behaviors are reflexive, surely not all of them are.

But even if it is granted that IEBs are not reflexive behaviors, it might be claimed that there is no need to distinguish them from ESAs. For we have in-hand an explanation of flexible behaviors– the (revised) Davidsonian account of actions. I intend IEBs to be a class of goal-
driven behaviors, and for this reason they are, in a certain respect, similar to ESAs. I think we must recognize that explaining IEBs (like bus-jumping) requires positing some state with directive content. Consider Davidsonian actions. A slew of states with purely Mind-to-World directions of fit (beliefs) do not suffice to explain goal-directed behaviors (actions) without reference to some goal, derived from some state(s) with a World-to-Mind direction of fit (desires). An IEB like bus-jumping is a goal-directed behavior: one behaves in a way that is, fundamentally, so as to avoid getting hit by the bus. Further, the attempt can fail, so it makes sense to speak of a goal (to avoid the bus) that can be fulfilled or unfulfilled. Unlike reflexive behaviors, we need more than a purely causal explanation of IEBs. And, like ESAs, we need an explanation that posits some state with directive content – a contentful explanation, in addition to a causal one.

Yet IEBs do not fit the Davidsonian model of a rationalizing explanation – one that presupposes propositional and conceptual abilities deployed in inferential thought. The response taken to the bus is – rightly, I think – described by Goldie as “animal-like”, and “immediate and unreflective” (ibid., p. 47). He notes that there is no role for beliefs and desires to play in an explanation of the behavior (ibid., p. 115). In such cases, positing beliefs and desires to explain the behavior is said to be a merely “honorific” rationalization after the fact, not a true explanation (ibid. p. 137). As he puts it colorfully, beliefs and desires “come too late” to causally explain the response (ibid., p. 46). As I like to put it, IEBs are unthinking goal-directed behaviors. IEBs might be considered the upper bound in non-human animals and infants, who arguably lack capacities for practical reasoning (ibid., pp. 115-6, Bermudez, 2003, Davidson 1975).
With respect to Goldie’s particular theory, IEBs challenge us to refine the idea (discussed in section 2.2.2 above) that a feeling towards is an *engagement* with the world that renders us ‘poised for action out of the emotion’. I claim that an IEB is no less a sign of *engagement* than an ESA: experiencing an emotion poises us for these goal-directed behaviors as well. The puzzle is that in IEBs, deliberative thinking with feeling has no explanatory role to play – all that is left from Goldie’s account is the purely *descriptive* content of feelings towards. This exposes several key shortcomings of Goldie’s account.

First, calling upon a feeling towards to ground a primitively intelligible emotional desire will not contribute to an explanation of IEBs, since desires cannot be causally implicated in the production of the behavior. The way desires *can* causally influence behavior is by becoming part of a primary reason for acting – but primary reasons, and desires, are idle in the context of IEBs. In the adult human case, we might attribute such a desire *after* the event, but this is merely ‘honorable.’ In non-human animal cases, it is not clear that positing such a desire could ever be more than metaphorical.

Second, it is not clear how a feeling towards’ purely *descriptive* content could poise one for the behavior – let alone *cause* it – in the absence of some *directive* state. This is so even if we assume that the *descriptive* content of an emotional feeling towards is propositional in format, such that it *could* be paired with a desire in means-end reasoning *if* one were present. But in fact, we are not entitled to this assumption. As we saw above, a feeling towards is not necessarily a *reflective* experience, and can be directed at a concretum, rather than at a proposition. It takes some extra ‘cognitive work’ to reflectively conceptualize the content of a feeling towards in terms of a belief – the kind of cognitive work that simply is not done prior to the production of IEBs.
Third, even if we did, somehow, make palatable the claim that an emotional desire is present, it is not at all clear how positing a pre-existing *directive* state like a desire might help things, since practical reasoning is not available to combine this with the purely *descriptive* content of feeling towards. (Again, this is so even if we assume, wrongly, that the *descriptive* content of feeling towards is necessarily propositional).

Perhaps for related reasons, the explanation Goldie offers of IEBs is simply that one is “in the grip” of the emotion. (ibid., p. 122-3). The fact that one is experiencing the emotion, by itself, explains the behavior. Now we can, with charity, read this as (a sketch of) a causal explanation of IEBs. Surely it *is* the emotion that causes the behavior. But if this is the *only* explanation we can provide, then emotional motivation is treated as a black box: in goes fear, out comes avoidance. This is, in effect, to assimilate IEBs to the class of reflexive behaviors. My main objection to Goldie’s view can thus be put rather simply: this purely causal explanation is not an adequate account of IEBs. We need some kind of ‘contentful explanation’, though not the kind of *rationalizing* explanation provided by citing a primary reason for action.\(^\text{15}\)

For similar reasons, I suggest that adherents to the common view of emotional content as purely *descriptive* will have difficulty explaining Irruptive Emotional Behaviors. The central issue concerns our view of emotional motivation. When it comes to Emotional Standard Actions, Goldie’s theory shows us how we can explain goal-directed emotional behaviors while holding that emotional content is purely *descriptive*. One way to do so is by adding-on *directive* content in the form of a desire. In Goldie’s case, his objection to “add-on” theories of emotional phenomenology leads him, in turn, to add on a primitively intelligible *emotional* desire, construed as a form of thinking with feeling. But, proponents of ‘feelingless’ variants of the common view are no better off. The general problem posed by IEBs is that although a suitable
explanation seems to require some kind of directive content, desires – whether emotional or not– are simply unavailable.

It is worth stressing, in this respect, that Goldie is actually in a slightly better position with regard to IEBs than some other proponents of the common view. For example, the cognitivist claim that emotions are or contain beliefs (or judgments) seems ill-placed in explaining IEBs, because those terms have well-established explanatory roles in contexts that smack of rational deliberation. Similarly, Goldie’s account of ESAs, bound up as it is with the notion of propositional thinking with feeling, offers little help in explaining IEBs. But unlike the cognitivist, Goldie can still lay claim to some content in these cases: the concretum-directed content of feeling-towards. The cognitivist must engage in some questionable semantic stretching to even suggest that one had, e.g., a belief that the bus would soon be upon one. It remains open to Goldie to claim that one is unreflectively feeling fear towards the bus, yet the only directive content he mentions comes in the form of emotional desires. So on its own, the concretum-directed descriptive content of feeling-towards can’t get an explanation of IEBs off the ground.

How ought we to conceive of these “missing” directive states, and how ought we to explain IEBs? One might claim that this is a pseudo-question. Michael Smith, for example, holds that “being in a state with which the world must fit is desiring” (1987, p. 55). Thus Smith apparently reads “state with directive content” as “desire,” rendering it a contradiction in terms to speak of a state that has directive content and yet is not a desire. As David Lewis (1988) notes, this “inclusive” reading of ‘desires’ is exceptionally weak. Indeed, it is as weak as the cognitivist’s “elastic” conception of beliefs that we encountered in section 2.2.1 above. Smith seems to simply define “desires” as any states with a World-to-Mind direction of fit. I shall
discuss Smith’s views further in chapter 6, but for now, I again wish to orient the discussion with regard to Davidsonian, prototypical desires. Prototypical desires are more than just states with a World-to-Mind direction of fit. They are also propositional attitudes that play a central role in the formation of primary reasons via practical reasoning. If one wishes to apply the term ‘desire’ to all directive states, regardless of whether they play these important functional roles, my argument will not be much changed. The task will then be how to understand these other ‘desires’ and how they might be involved in the production of IEBs. But, as we will see in this chapter and the next, there is good reason to resist inflating the term’s extension in this way. Just as it is fruitful to think of perceptual states as having a Mind-to-World direction of fit despite not being prototypical beliefs, so many have sought to explain behaviors by positing states with a World-to-Mind direction of fit which do not count as prototypical desires. A philosophical account of emotional intentionality has much to learn from these accounts.

It might be asked why we should toy with our account of emotional intentionality at all, and why we could not find some other, non-propositional, non-emotional directive state to do the job. The motivation for the revision is that, all else equal, we would do well to maintain an element of parsimony from Davidson’s account: that both our causal and contentful explanations of a behavior ‘overlap’, in implicating the very same states and processes. As noted in response to Goldie’s statement about IEBs, it surely is the emotion that causes the goal-oriented response. As I shall discuss presently, that is, by nearly all accounts, exactly what emotions do. And if that is the case, it would be nice to have a contentful explanation of how emotions, themselves, can do that.
3.2 THE COMMON VIEW IN CONTEXT

Psychologists are no strangers to emotional behaviors performed in the absence of deliberative thought, since they are no strangers to the emotional behaviors of non-human animals and infants. A central posit in psychological theories of emotion are appraisal processes – these are any processes, whether automatic or variable, conscious or unconscious, which imbue stimuli with emotional significance (Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003 for a review of appraisal theories). The need for positing such processes arises for reasons we have just discussed: most emotional behaviors are not “brute,” in the sense that they cannot be explained purely causally, as reflexes. In addition to the flexibility of emotional behaviors, there is another feature of reflexes which is lacking in emotional behaviors. Reflexive behaviors are triggered by a well-defined style of stimulation (often mechanical), but each emotion can be elicited as a response to a heterogeneous class of stimuli. There do not appear to be intrinsic properties shared, for example, by all and only dangerous things. The core hypothesis of appraisal theories is that “it is the appraisal, not the stimulus event, that is crucial to understanding which emotion occurs when” (Ekman & Davidson 1994, p. 176). In other words, a cognitive process of appraisal underlies the recognition of stimuli as dangerous, offensive, pleasant, and so on, and such recognition is necessary for emotion elicitation. “Being appraised as dangerous,” for example, is on this view an extrinsic property of otherwise diverse stimuli, which provides a way of understanding their common role in eliciting fear.¹⁶

Philosophers who adopt the common view of emotional content as descriptive often cite appraisal theories to elucidate or support their claims.¹⁷ We have seen, for example, that Nussbaum’s conception of “belief” is quickly stretched to read “any cognitive state that involves
seeing X as Y” (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 27). This is, in effect, the core hypothesis shared by appraisal theories, and indeed Nussbaum appeals to the works of Richard Lazarus in fleshing out her claims (ibid, p. 37, note 30). Yet as Paul Griffiths (1990; 1997; 2003) has stressed, weakening our conception of, e.g., belief, such that it can gain support from appraisal theories has the effect of undermining substantive claims put forth in philosophy of the emotions. The problem, as Griffiths puts it, is that “emotions do not walk in step with cognitive evaluation [i.e., appraisal] of the stimulus unless the notion of ‘cognitive evaluation’ is broadened to include sub-personal processes” (Griffiths, 2003, p. 41; Teasdale 1999). In other words, appraisal theorists have no qualms about applying the notion of appraisal to cognitive processes that are very much unlike the kind of rational, deliberative thought that characterizes prototypical beliefs. As I would put the issue (for present purposes): one can adopt an elastic conception of belief and thereby situate one’s claims within appraisal theories, but upon doing so one closes off any clean inferential route back to the far stronger claim that emotions contain prototypical beliefs. (*Mutatis mutandis* for cognitivist theories that favor judgments over beliefs).

But there is a further striking contrast between the common philosophical view of emotions and appraisal theories. Emotion researchers across the board recognize that a fundamental task in understanding the emotions consists in understanding their motivational character. From a Darwinian perspective, emotions are viewed in terms of “their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life tasks” such as “achievements, losses, and frustrations” (Ekman, 1994; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992). From the perspective of neurobiology, Damasio views emotions as “part of the bioregulatory devices with which we come equipped to maintain life and survive,” with attention paid to their role in shaping behavior (Damasio, 2000).
Appraisal theorists are no exception to this general rule. Lazaraus, whose works are perennially cited by proponents of the common view, defines appraisal as a process of evaluation which principally enables us to “respond selectively to conditions signifying harm, threat, and benefit, and, thereby, to cope adaptively” with such situations in ways that “often require long-range coping strategies based on a sophisticated anticipation of the future” (Lazarus, 1994, p. 163). Scherer similarly construes emotions on the model of “a relevance detection and response preparation system in which organisms can perceive and evaluate a wide range of environmental stimuli and events (even those that are irrelevant for survival) and have an extensive repertoire of behavioral response alternatives at their disposal” (Scherer, 1994, p. 128). In other words, the task of an appraisal theory is to explain the goal-orientedness of emotional behaviors, in addition to the onset of an emotion in response to some stimulus, appraised as significant.

Nico Frijda (1987; 2007) places more emphasis on this feature of appraisals than do most other emotion theorists. Frijda describes clearly the central problem that what I have called IEBs pose for the common view: “Emotional behaviors paradigmatically are impulsive actions and always are in nonhuman organisms… They are in some sense goal directed, and yet there is no prior aim” (Frijda, 2007, p. 46). Élisabeth Pacherie (2002) has sought to employ Frijda’s account in explaining IEBs. It is the task of the next chapter to discuss Pacherie’s explanation, providing a technical account of the directive content of emotions. Once we have done so, we will be in a position to examine how this account of emotional motivation might be paired with the common view of descriptive emotional content. In chapter 5, I will argue that the relationship between directive and descriptive emotional content is an intimate one. We should not simply leave the common view as it stands, adding Pacherie’s independent (and independently plausible) account of emotional motivation. Rather, the descriptive and directive
aspects of emotional content should be seen as an indissoluble whole – a view that (I shall argue) is already implicitly endorsed by Frijda, and many other emotion theorists. Further, I will suggest that the same claim holds for the intentionality of emotional experiences: felt motivation and feeling towards cannot be entirely disentangled.
CHAPTER 4
EXPLAINING IRRUPTIVE EMOTIONAL BEHAVIORS

In chapter 2, I provided an overview of Goldie’s feeling theory, and his explanation of Emotional Standard Actions (ESAs). I then argued in chapter 3 that this view offered no satisfactory explanation of Irruptive Emotional Behaviors (IEBs), suggesting that this problem also generalized to ‘feelingless’ variants of the common view of emotional content as purely descriptive. What we need to do is make sense of the “missing” directive states, providing a contentful explanation of IEBs which distinguishes them from reflexive behaviors. We need a refined understanding of emotional motivation, or what Goldie called engagement – the way undergoing an emotion poises us for actions out of that emotion.

4.1 SETTING THE STAGE

Élisabeth Pacherie (2002) has offered a contentful explanation of IEBs, and a robust one at that. Her view offers an empirically-informed and technical account of our missing directive states, and provides us with the tools to refine our understanding of emotional motivation. In the remainder of this chapter, I will be working my way to Pacherie’s account, but this will require some stage-setting. In the first place, Pacherie’s account depends crucially on endorsing a revision to the Davidsonian explanation of actions. Pacherie (2000, 2002) has followed many authors in viewing Davidson’s original account as inadequate (Brand 1984; Searle 1983; Bach 1978), and I begin in 4.1.1 by examining Searle’s revision of the Davidsonian account. Searle’s account of actions allows us to extend the classic explanation to cover a broader class of behaviors, by providing us with a new kind of directive state – “intentions-in-action.” This in turn provides the hope that intentions-in-action might be just the directive states we need, and that Searle’s account might offer an explanation of IEBs where the original account failed. In
4.1.2, I examine Pacherie’s (2002) empirical framework for understanding intentions-in-action in terms of Jeannerod’s (1994) neurophysiological theory of motor representations. This account clarifies and supports Searle’s original claims, by appealing to intentional states with dual directions of fit. I pause in 4.1.3 to discuss Millikan’s general characterization of such states – which she calls “Pushmi-Pullyu Representations.” In 4.2 I return to examine Pacherie’s own Frijda-inspired account of IEBs, showing how it solves the problems encountered in chapter 3.

4.1.1 SEARLE

In this section I will review Searle’s (1983) revision of Davidson’s explanation of actions. This will be done in two stages. First, I will review the basics of Searle’s account, building some terminological bridges by sketching his revised understanding of primary reasons. I will then gloss some well-known issues with Davidson’s account, showing how they lead Searle to further revisions. In the end, we will have an account of two distinct directive states that can cause and explain actions: ‘prior intentions’ and ‘intentions-in-action.’

Davidson’s ‘primary reasons to act’ are referred to by Searle as ‘prior intentions’; the two notions are interchangeable. Generally, Searle (1983) sought to provide a technical account of an intentional state’s direction of fit. We have already encountered the notion of ‘responsibility for fitting’ as applied to intentional states. Searle understood such features as the conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state. For a belief, these are truth-conditions; for a desire, the notion of conditions of fulfillment is more apt. Part of Searle’s addendum to the Davidsonian framework consists in making explicit further conditions of satisfaction that are at play in the production of action. The key condition of satisfaction he adds is called causal self-reference. The claim that prior intentions to act cause actions is, of course, at the heart of Davidson’s account. Searle goes a step further in claiming that a primary reason represents its own causal
role in the production of action: “[a] prior intention, is self-referential in the sense that its
Intentional content determines that it [i.e., the prior intention] is satisfied only if the event that is its condition is satisfaction is caused by it [that very prior intention]” (ibid., p. 93, emphasis added). This claim will require some elaboration.

To understand causal self-reference, it is useful to contrast the satisfaction conditions of intentions with those of desires. Suppose I desire that my bank account contains $10,000 by noon tomorrow. If it turns out that, at noon tomorrow, my bank account does contain $10,000, then my desire has been fulfilled. The manner in which the money got there is irrelevant to the fulfillment of the desire, and the desire can be fulfilled without any contribution on my part. Perhaps the IRS made an error in issuing my tax returns for this year, or perhaps a wealthy and beloved family member has passed on, leaving me as a beneficiary. The point is that however it comes about that $p$, the desire that $p$ has been fulfilled. For this reason, we are often cautioned to “be careful what we wish for.” A desire can be fulfilled in ways we do not expect, and might not enjoy – as when the IRS botches my tax returns (then threatens an audit), or when newfound wealth comes on the heels of a loved one’s passing.

That desires can be fulfilled in this way indicates that causal self-reference is not part of a desire’s satisfaction conditions: I, and my desiring that $p$, need not play any role in the fulfillment of my desire that $p$. In contrast, prior intentions (primary reasons) do have causal self-reference as a satisfaction condition. As Searle puts it, “When I try to make the world be the way I intend it to be, I succeed if the world comes to be the way I intend it to be (world-to-mind direction of fit) [but] only if I make it be that way” (ibid., p. 96, original emphasis). The way we make the world the way we intend it to be is, of course, by acting on our prior intentions, and exerting causal influence on the world via behavior. And, following Davidson, the way we are
trying to explain an action is by appealing to the content of the prior intention that causes it. So, if we are to appeal to the content of a prior intention to explain a particular action, then in order to be distinguished from a desire, part of its content must be that the action is caused by that very intention. If I have a prior intention to raise my arm, then the content of my intention must be “at least” that I perform the action of raising my arm by way of carrying out this intention, where ‘carrying out an intention’ involves the causal implication of the intention in the production of the action (Searle, 1983, p. 85-6). This is causal self-reference: a prior intention to $E$ is not satisfied unless that intention plays the appropriate causal role in producing the aimed-at event of $E$-ing. Unlike satisfying a desire, it does matter how the aimed-at event of a prior intention gets brought about. Suppose I desire that I have coffee, and so form the prior intention to brew a fresh pot of coffee, but then find that one of my housemates has already done so. I cannot satisfy my intention ‘on the cheap,’ so to speak – dodging my own intended causal role but still (paradoxically) doing as I intended. My desire for coffee might be satisfied (assuming they brewed the real stuff, not decaf), but my intention to brew coffee has been flouted. I did not fulfill my intention by merely finding the fresh coffee. I did not do anything; my housemate beat me to it.

So far, we have discussed Searle’s understanding of prior intentions (primary reasons) as intentional states that exhibit a purely World-to-Mind direction of fit, and have causally self-referential directive content (ibid., p. 97). Fulfilling the aim of a prior intention requires acting on that intention, and prior intentions represent their own causal role in the production of action. But Searle departs further from Davidson than this, and for good reason. I said in chapter 2 above that on the Davidsonian account, a behavior must be caused by a primary reason if it is to qualify as an action: “No action without primary reasons; no primary reasons without
deliberative thought." There are several well-known counterexamples to this account, which led Searle (1983) to propose a further substantive revision to Davidson’s theory. One of the most pressing concerns regarding Davidson’s account is straightforward and intuitive. Insofar as it is the task of an explanation of actions to make sense of the distinction between things that we do and things that happen to us, Davidson’s account falls short. There are many things that we do that do not seem to qualify as Davidsonian actions: specifically, the class of things we do in the absence of deliberative means-end reasoning. This is equally a problem for Searle’s account, as it stands: the causal self-reference of prior intentions does nothing to enhance our explanation of behaviors that do not fit the Davidsonian framework, since the problem is that prior intentions cannot be causally implicated at all in these cases – these actions are performed without any prior intention. And there are further difficulties that Davidson and Searle (thus far) share. Suppose I have a prior intention to raise my arm, and call the event of me, raising my arm, \( E \). It is a notable fact that I might raise my arm in any number of ways, physically, and there are endless permutations of behavior that fit the description of “raising my arm”. In other words, there is more than one way to \( E \), thereby satisfying the content of the prior intention.

This raises a serious issue about how any given prior intention to \( E \) might cause me to \( E \). If there are multiple ways to \( E \), then it seems there must be multiple, possible, causal chains leading from a prior intention to the action in question– at least one for each manner of \( E \)-ing one might have performed (or does perform over time). This suggests that prior intentions causally underdetermine the actions that, by hypothesis, they cause. Given an agent’s prior intention to \( E \), it follows that (if all goes well) they will \( E \), but this leaves unexplained the particular manner in which they do so. This difficulty is inherited by Searle’s account. The prior intention represents its own causal influence in \( E \)-ing. But if there are multiple ways to \( E \), it seems that the prior
intention does not represent enough causal influences to actually explain the action in question. The causal influences that are left out are the ones that determine, on any particular occasion, the way one really does E. So there appears to be, causally and explanatorily, a gap between prior intentions and actions. And that gap must be closed if prior intentions are to serve as the locus of both a contentful and a causal explanation of actions.

Searle offered a solution to this problem by distinguishing two kinds of directive states involved in the production of action: prior intentions to act and intentions-in-action (Searle, 1983, ch. 3, and esp. sections III and IV). Intentions-in-action are posited to fill these gaps by causally mediating between prior intentions and the actions they cause. On this view, a prior intention to act is the distal cause of an action. A prior intention causes intentions-in-action, which are the proximal causes of the physical movements that make up an action’s performance. Like prior intentions, intentions-in-action have a purely World-to-Mind direction of fit, and are causally self-referential (ibid, p. 97). But there is a one-to-many relation between a prior intention and the intentions-in-action that proximally cause behavior. A suite of intentions-in-action jointly cause the behavioral minutiæ that compose an instance of E-ing. A prior intention to E is about the entire action of E-ing. But, where E is raising my arm, there might be an intention-in-action to rotate my shoulder just so, another to un-bend my elbow just so, etc. Unlike prior intentions, the content of intentions-in-action is much more determinate: intentions-in-action cause each part of the whole act of E-ing. Owing to causal-self reference, one of the satisfaction conditions on my intention-in-action to rotate my shoulder just so is that my shoulder-rotation is caused by this very intention-in-action. In this way, both a contentful and causal explanation of the particular way one Es can be provided. Although a prior intention to act does not represent the parts that compose a particular instance of E-ing, the intentions-in-
action that jointly, proximally cause those behaviors do. A prior intention to act represents a
determinable aim – a class of events collected under a single description as E-ing. Intentions-in-
action represent the determinate micro-aims that, when jointly attained, constitute a particular
instance of E-ing.

Intentions-in-action thus provide a means of closing the gap between prior intentions and
the actions they cause and represent. This has the effect of preserving Davidson’s original
project. But intentions-in-action also provide us with the means to explain a broader class of
behaviors than Davidson’s original account. Consider, for example, the fact that we can quickly
adapt our behaviors to achieve our prior aims. In pursuing our prior aim of E-ing by taking steps
to E, we interact with the world in ways that can influence the achievement of our aim. Suppose I
form the prior intention to go to the kitchen for French wine, and begin walking to the kitchen,
only to realize that I’ve forgotten my glass in the other room. I acted on my prior intention when
I left the room, but this had the unintended result of flouting my own aims. In this case, one
might claim, the thing to do is form a new prior intention to go fetch the glass, then return again
to my original intention, glass in-hand. But we often adapt our behaviors to attain our ends “on
the fly,” in contexts that don’t admit of further rational deliberation. I made a spelling error when
typing the previous sentence and had to correct it – but I did not form a new desire to remove it,
and a new belief that tapping the “backspace” key precisely 6 times was a means to this end. I
just did it.

According to Searle, it is generally possible to perform an action without prior
deliberative thought and planning (ibid., pp. 84-94). In these cases, intentions-in-action cause the
action without any causal contribution by a primary reason, and one ‘just acts,’ or ‘just does it’.
In other words, “being caused by an intention-in-action” is a necessary and, often, sufficient condition of actions. Here is Searle:

…suppose I am sitting in a chair reflecting on a philosophical problem, and I suddenly get up and start pacing about the room… I don’t in any sense have a plan to get up and pace about. Like many of the things one does, I just do these actions; I just act… All intentional actions have intentions in action but not all intentional actions have prior intentions… I can do something intentionally without having formed a prior intention to do it…. (ibid., p. 84-5).

So, in addition to shoring up Davidson’s account, Searle’s explanation of actions is also meant to have a broader range of application. It is here that we begin to see how Searle’s account might offer an explanation of IEBs, via the notion of intentions-in-action. Intentions-in-action have the necessary World-to-Mind direction of fit to explain goal-driven behaviors, and are available in the absence of primary reasons to act, in unthinking behaviors like IEBs.

Pacherie (2002) pursues this line, seeking to explain IEBs by appealing to intentions-in-action. But first, Pacherie supplements Searle’s account, drawing from Jeannerod’s (1997) neuropsychological theory of motor output in order to provide an empirical framework for understanding intentions-in-action – a move she has defended and elaborated further elsewhere (Pacherie 2000; forthcoming). In the next section, I lay out Pacherie’s account of intentions-in-action as Jeannerod’s ‘Motor Representations’, explaining how it relates to, and departs from, Searle’s proposal. For our purposes, the notable features of this Jeannerod-inspired account are threefold: (i) it provides a more robust account of intentions-in-action, and how they cause behavior in the absence of prior intentions to act; (ii) it further clarifies the notion of causal self-reference; and (iii) it accomplishes (i) and (ii) by construing intentions-in-action as a class of intentional states with dual directions of fit. This last point is the crucial departure from Searle’s original account, and understanding it will merit a brief discussion of the very idea of a state with dual directions of fit. In 4.3, I note that intentions-in-action, so-construed, are an example of
what Ruth Millikan (1996, 2004) has called “Pushmi-Puliyu Representations,” and I show the benefits of viewing Pacherie’s account from this broader perspective. Having elaborated this, I proceed to examine Pacherie’s explanation of IEBs in 4.4.

4.1.2 JEANNEROD

The account of intentions-in-action that Pacherie provides can be understood in terms of the following three claims:

1. The content of intentions-in-action is not propositional.

2. Intentions-in-action can themselves be unreflective. Having such an intentional state does not presuppose any conceptual thought or linguistic capacities on the part of the agent, nor does it require the agent’s reflective self-awareness that they have such an intentional state.

3. Intentions-in-action guide, shape, and monitor an action until its completion, thus the content of an prior intention “cannot fully and inexorably determine at the outset the exact way the action will be performed” (see Pacherie 2002, p. 66 for the quote, as well as the other points).

The ideas behind (1) & (2) ought to be familiar from our discussion in 2.2 of unreflective feelings towards. (3) is Pacherie’s characterization of the gap between actions and prior intentions which we lately observed. To this, we add two claims about motor representations (“MRs”) derived from Jeannerod’s (1994) theory:

4. MRs represent the body in action.

5. MRs represent a goal of action in a “pragmatic mode” (Pacherie 2002, p. 67-8; Jeannerod 1994).

Each claim will require some unpacking.

In representing the body in action, motor representations encode more than just an aimed-at event. Jeannerod cites studies suggesting that motor representations encode the amount of force required in order to achieve that aim (Decety, et al 1993; Gandevia, 1987; Gandevia and
McCloskey, 1977; McCloskey et al, 1983). This explains why, for example, when rotating the shoulder so as to raise one’s arm, one does not “overshoot,” whipping one’s arm wildly. Put in terms of causal self-reference: MRs represent how much causal influence they should have in the production of an action. Further, evidence from studies of paralyzed patients suggests that the amount of force encoded in motor representations correlates to the patient’s conscious sense of effort when attempting to move (Gandevia, 1982; Scheerer, 1987).

In representing a goal of action in a “pragmatic mode”, motor representations encode features of objects in ways unlike representations in other modalities. To begin with, MRs are multi-modal representations, and involve both a visual and a proprioceptive component. But further, “[p]ragmatic representations involve a rapid transformation of sensory input into motor commands. Object attributes are represented [only] to the extent that they trigger certain motor patterns. Pragmatic representations thus specify how to deal with the object” (Pacherie, 2002, p. 68). To take an example, suppose one tokens an MR, reaching out and grasping the handle of a nearby coffee cup. On this view of motor representations, the relevant attribute of the cup – its handle – is represented as graspable by certain motoric means, or via certain motions. This content is partly constituted by visual data regarding not only the shapes of graspable things, but also regarding the way the act of grasping looks. This feature of MRs helps to explain how we adapt our behaviors “on the fly” in order to attain our ends. Since MRs are visuo-motor representations, part of their conditions of satisfaction is that our visual experience of the unfolding act meets certain constraints. During the production of action, visual feedback provides information about whether our behavior is going as planned. Thus the MR(s) involved in grasping the handle of a cup can be said to represent affordances, in Gibson’s (1979) sense (see also Scarantino, 2003).
What then is the relation between prior intentions, intentions-in-action, and MRs?

Following Jeannerod, Pacherie suggests that prior intentions and intentions-in-action just are MRs, saying that there is only “a hierarchy of motor representations such that the goals and parameters of the actions coded for at higher levels act as constraints on the lower levels of motor representations” (ibid., p. 67). This view echoes the distinction, drawn in the previous section, between determinable and determinate aims – as well as, again, DeLancey’s (2005) hierarchical conception of mind. Upon forming a prior intention to act, one has established an MR that represents the determinable aim that one perform a complex movement which fits a certain description – E-ing. This aim acts as a constraint in that in order to actually E, one must perform a concerted suite of determinate movements which jointly count as E-ing. In other words, one has to token a set of MRs – intentions-in-action – that will cause behaviors which jointly fulfill the description of E, i.e. satisfy the aim of your prior intention. Here again, the idea of a concretum-directed intentional state proves useful. The problem with Davidson’s original account is that failing to explain the causal gap between prior intentions and determinate behaviors leaves us with an account of “mental causation at a distance” (ibid., p.62). Jeannerod’s account provides an ingenious solution. The most determinate MRs have as their satisfaction conditions events involving particular concreta – nearby objects, and the parts of body used to manipulate them. The last in a long line of MRs don’t just represent the body’s causal powers, they are the body’s causal powers – they are the proximal causes of bodily movements. This is causal self-reference at its most potent.

Pacherie stresses that these two aspects of MRs are not truly distinct. “What the motor representation represents are neither states of the body per se nor states of the environment per se, but rather dynamic relations between body and goal” (ibid., p. 69). As a result, attaining
Pacherie’s empirically informed conception of intentions-in-action involves a move away from the Searlian view that intention-in-action have a purely directive content. In her words, “the classical distinction between states with a mind to world direction of fit and states with a world to mind direction of fit gets blurred at the level of [motor] representations” (ibid., p.70). More concretely, an object or situation in the world, to which one is responding with behavior “is coded in terms of a goal it affords, and the goal itself is coded in terms of the means – i.e. the motor commands – towards its achievement” (ibid., p. 70). MRs represent their own causal influence over behavior in virtue of representing objects in the world as potential objects of bodily manipulation; the entire modality of Motor Representation is infused with reference to the body’s causal powers.22

These claims bring us face-to-face with the notion of an intentional state with dual directions of fit. Understanding such states is crucial for understanding the benefits of Pacherie’s explication of intentions-in-action, and we can employ the case of MRs to get a better grasp on how such states enter into contentful explanations of behavior. Further, in chapter 5 I shall be arguing that emotions themselves exhibit dual directions of fit, in a way distinct from MRs. It will thus be helpful to pause and offer a more general characterization of such states, before proceeding on to Pacherie’s explanation of IEBs.

### 4.1.3 MILLIKAN

On Pacherie’s account, intentions-in-action exhibit both descriptive and directive content. Such Janus-faced intentional states are what Ruth Millikan (1996, 2004) calls “pushmi-pullyu representations” (“PPRs”). I cannot here undertake a review of the entirety of Millikan’s influential theory, and I do not intend my claims to rise and fall with hers. I aim to borrow only the general idea of a PPRs, construed as “basic kinds” of intentional states, which are
“undifferentiated between presenting [purported] facts and activities appropriate to those facts” or again which “represent facts and give directions or represent goals, both at once” (Millikan, 2004, p. 158).

One of Millikan’s examples of an external (non-mental) PPR is a hen’s call to her chicks upon finding food. The call signals to the chicks to undertake the goal-directed behavior of approaching their mother’s location to acquire food. The call has a context-specific directive content to the chick: “go there now and eat!” Concretum-directed intentional states are well-suited to playing the role of guiding context-specific behavior here and now. The hen’s call, for example, directs the chicks to bring it about that they arrive at the location of the food, i.e., the location of the hen issuing the call. (Viewing PPRs as concretum-directed also helps to explain a sense in which they are ‘basic’ intentional states, for reasons suggested in Chapter 3. Having concretum-directed intentional states is arguably less cognitively taxing than having intentional states that are directed towards propositions). But since the call purports to signify the presence of food, it has a kind of ‘responsibility’ for fitting the world, similar to a belief. The call will be inappropriate if there is no food present. But we cannot differentiate these two features of the call – that is in part why it seems aptly described as a food call. So, fusing both aspects together, the call has roughly the content ‘food-here-come-and-get-it’.

With this rough sketch of PPRs in-hand, we can see that Pacherie’s account of motor representations renders them instances of internal (mental) PPRs. As we have seen, MRs represent objects under a “pragmatic mode,” in which attributes of objects are descriptively represented in a way that cannot be extricated from directive content. A motor representation represents certain aims, but it also has a kind of responsibility for fitting the world. We can say that motor representations are responsible for representing the ways we truly can physically
engage with objects in the world, using our bodies. The content of an intention-in-action will go unsatisfied, and our behaviors will be unsuccessful, if our intentions-in-action do not track our actual abilities to manipulate objects in the world. If, for example, my intention-in-action represents the handle of my coffee cup as being slightly closer than it actually is, or represents the amount of force required to reach it as slightly greater than it is, I will likely knock it right over, and fail to actually grasp the handle.

This is a significant clarification of Searle’s notion of causal self-reference as a satisfaction condition of intentions-in-action. Searle’s original idea was that the content of prior intentions, and intentions-in-action, included reference to their own causal powers. But this really does seem to pack some descriptive content into such states, despite his claim that they have a purely World-to-Mind direction of fit. Pacherie’s account provides a better understanding of causal self-reference, in part by recognizing intentions-in-action as states with dual directions of fit. An MR must represent the body’s causal powers accurately if the relevant behavior is to be produced, hence intentions (and intentions-in-action) have a responsibility for fitting the world they aim to change.

With this account of intention-in-action in hand, we are in a position to examine Pacherie’s explanation of IEBs.

**4.2 PACHERIE’S EXPLANATION OF IRRUPTIVE EMOTIONAL BEHAVIORS**

Upon offering her revision of Searlian intentions-in-action, Pacherie seeks to provide an explanation of what she calls “impulsive emotional actions.” Her examples include “punching someone in a bar brawl, running away in fright, hugging one’s fellow supporters in joy at the victory of one’s football team, and so on” (Pacherie, 2002, p. 76). These are the kinds of behaviors that I have referred to as Irruptive Emotional Behaviors – unthinking, goal-driven
behaviors. There is surely no brute-causal explanation of the examples Pacherie provides. (In goes a perception of a bar brawl, out comes punching; in goes a perception of one’s team’s victory, out comes hugging).  

As noted, Pacherie frames her discussion of emotional behaviors in terms of Nico Frijda’s (1986, 2007) theory of the emotions. We saw in chapter 3 that Frijda recognized the task of providing a contentful explanation of IEBs, saying: “Emotional behaviors paradigmatically are impulsive actions and always are in nonhuman organisms… They are in some sense goal directed, and yet there is no prior aim” (Frijda, 2007, p. 46). Frijda endorses the core claim of appraisal theorists – that what elicits an emotion is not a stimulus or event per se, but rather an evaluation of such. But with her eye toward explaining IEBs, Pacherie focuses on Frijda’s claim that the result of such appraisal is emotional motivation, construed as a change in one’s state of action readiness, and the establishment of an action tendency.

Action tendencies are a subset of states of action readiness, and the entire class is construed as presently-occurring states of an organism. Frijda defines both as follows:

Action tendencies are not mere representations of desirable states; they are not mere wishes. They are states of preparation to achieve their aims; the preparation may be merely central [i.e., in the brain], or extend to the muscles, the thoughts, and the glands. States of action readiness that are not action tendencies are states of absent, diffuse, partial, or disorganized preparation (Frijda, 2007, p. 29).

First and foremost, states of action readiness are occurring states of an organism which are preparatory – they are states of an organism which poise the organism for behavior. A straightforward example would be changing one’s posture in orientation towards a stimulus. This postural state poises one for behavioral engagement with the stimulus in the sense that one now has the stimulus in one’s sights. But states of action readiness are not merely states that render one superficially poised for behaviors that might never be pursued, or that might only be pursued
for some further reason. For example, if I happen to be standing with my weight on my left foot, I might superficially be described as being poised to kick with my right foot, or as being poised to do any number of things that might require having my weight on my left leg. This is not what Frijda would call a state of action readiness. Rather, action readiness is “readiness for achieving a particular aim” and states of action readiness are themselves intentional, directive states (ibid., p. 27).

Pace the cognitivists, Frijda endorses an elastic conception of aims as concerns and writes: “Every emotion hides a concern, that is, a motive or need, a major goal or value, a more or less enduring disposition to prefer particular states of the world” (ibid., p. 7). From our vantage point, we can see that what Frijda has in mind is at minimum the general claim that emotions involve a World-to-Mind direction of fit. Frijda provides a more specific characterization of emotional aims as “relational aims: to attain, regain, reject, [or] remove particular objects from interaction” (ibid., p. 27). The pursuit of relational aims is manifest in emotional behavior itself, and is marked in our functional description of such behaviors as “approach and withdrawal; opening up or exposing oneself; efforts to influence other individuals; or suspending interaction” (ibid., p. 27).

When I provided an example of an IEB in chapter 3 (jumping fearfully out of the way of an oncoming bus) I similarly suggested that the behavior implied what we can now see as a relational aim: avoidance of the bus. The relational aims that direct us to IEBs can be further characterized in terms of concretum-directed intentional states. In characterizing the goal-directedness of bus-jumping, I suggested that the attempt can fail. The sense in which one might fail to fulfill the aim of avoiding the bus could not be clearer: one might fail to avoid that very bus, the concretum. Unlike the satisfaction of desires, fulfilling such an aim does not primarily
consist in anything so heady as bringing it about that \( p \). It consists, rather, in life-preserving engagement with the world here and now. As Frijda puts it, paradigmatic examples of emotions “emerge in actual interactions. They are elicited by events that are being appraised while actually dealing with them. You bump into them, they bump into you. One is facing events that deploy within their spatiotemporal context” (ibid., p. 107).

I also suggested in chapter 3 that IEBs challenged us to refine the notion of emotional motivation, or engagement – the idea that (experiencing) an emotion poises us to act out of the emotion. The account of engagement that Goldie offered was murky, and it turned out that all of an emotion’s motivational character was pawned off on (primitively intelligible emotional) desires. The idea of a concretum-directed relational aim avoids my objections against desires, and thrives within the contexts of IEBs. To put it bluntly, the problem with citing desires in our explanation of IEBs is that they are either not present or irrelevant, since IEBs are unthinking behaviors performed in the absence of means-end reasoning, and by organisms who lack a capacity for propositional attitudes. But, as we noted in 3.1, concretum-directed intentional states (like an unreflective feeling towards) are available in the context of IEBs. It is the concretum-directedness of states of action readiness that allows us to tie them to Pacherie’s account of MRs, allowing a contentful explanation of IEBs.

For ease of exposition, let us consider a particular IEB – rapidly fleeing from a bear in a state of panicky fear. Pacherie states that in such cases, there can be a “direct” transition between “emotional perception” (descriptive content) and intentions-in-action (2002, pp. 77-8). In particular, as our sketch of IEBs requires, deliberative practical reasoning need not intervene to pair descriptive and directive content (ibid., pp. 77-8). As Pacherie puts it, there is a “persisting focus on the present situation”, and there is no consciously accessible process of transition “from
the bear being frightening to the bear as to be fled away from” (ibid., pp. 77-8). In other words, as per Frijda’s account, once the bear is appraised as dangerous, the result is a change in action readiness. A present action tendency is established, construed as an intentional state which represents a concretum-directed relational goal: avoidance of the bear.

This action tendency functions much like a prior intention to act – minus the trappings of deliberative thought. The action tendency represents a determinable aim of performing a complex behavior satisfying the description avoiding the bear. If all goes well, a suite of MRs then jointly cause a determinate behavior which satisfies this description. Since successfully avoiding bears is tricky business, considering again the IEB of bus-jumping will make clearer how a determinable emotional aim can be successfully carried out. In order to achieve the concretum-directed relational aim of avoiding the bus, one must carry out a suite of intentions-in-action which jointly satisfy that description. The constraints imposed by this determinable aim can explain, for example, why one jumps to the left, rather than headlong into a brick wall to one’s right. The content of MRs is encoded in a pragmatic mode which involves “a rapid transformation of sensory input into motor commands” (Pacherie, 2002, p. 68). Sensory, i.e., perceptual, input can also play a role of guiding the selection of one MR over another in producing behavior. Given some perceptual input indicating a brick wall to one’s right, and open space to one’s left, our successful bus-jumper is one whose intentions-in-action have been properly constrained by the determinable aim provided by an action tendency. The attempt can fail of course – precisely when one carries out an intention-in-action that fails to satisfy the emotional aim. This might occur in one of two principled ways, if the bus-jumper (i) fails to acquire or utilize the relevant perceptual input regarding the brick wall, or (ii) carries out an
intention-in-action that misrepresents her bodily abilities (by, e.g., inaccurately representing the amount of force required to jump out of the way).

Pacherie’s account of IEBs thus offers precisely what we wanted: a contentful explanation of IEBs which distinguishes them from reflexes. In IEBs, an action tendency causes a behavioral response, unmediated by deliberative practical reasoning. Action tendencies intercept the link between prior intentions and behavior that is observed in ESAs, establishing an aim that is carried out by descending a hierarchy of MRs which jointly cause the suite of movements that compose observed behavior. And although this is hypothesized to be precisely the way that prior intentions get carried out, we can nonetheless distinguish between Pacherie’s contentful explanation of IEBs and a Davidsonian rationalizing explanation of ESAs. Unlike the propositional format of Davidson’s primary reasons for acting, the content of action tendencies can be understood in terms of the satisfaction conditions of concretum-directed, relational aims. Further, unlike prior intentions, concretrum-directed relational aims are established by an emotional appraisal, and deliberative reasoning need not play a role.

Pacherie’s account is firmly rooted in empirical data, and the accounts of Jeannerod and Frijda fit together like they were made for each other. In following Pacherie and Frijda, we have vindicated the motivational character of emotions, and left their descriptive content intact. What more could a philosopher ask for?
CHAPTER 5

MOTIVATING EMOTIONAL CONTENT

Pacherie’s explanation of IEBs posited a “direct” transition between “emotional perception” and intentions-in-action (Pacherie, pp. 77-8). This suggests a clean distinction between the descriptive content of emotional appraisals, on the one hand, and the directive content of emotional aims, on the other. On this view, it might be supposed that proponents of the common view had it largely right, at least about descriptive emotional content. For reasons discussed in chapters 2 and 3, we might part ways with, e.g., cognitivists, in recognizing that the emotions’ descriptive content can at times be concretum-directed. But we might nonetheless suppose that we have a complete picture by recognizing that emotions have two distinct kinds of content – one purely descriptive, the other purely directive. Proponents of the common view could then have their cake and eat it too, supposing that emotional motivation can be “added-on” where needed – either in the form of a desire, in the case of ESAs, or in the form of a concretum-directed relational aim in IEBs.

What I want to suggest is that on the present account, the intentionality of emotions should not be viewed as comprised of two distinct components: one descriptive, the other directive. Rather, like MRs themselves, emotional content is best viewed on the model of Pushmi-Pullyu Representations: emotions are unitary intentional states that exhibit dual directions of fit. The ‘transition’ between apprehending an item as emotionally-relevant and being motivated to engage (or disengage) with it behaviorally is a myth – whether the transition is to be mediated by rational deliberation, or Pacherie’s ‘direct’ route. This claim is implicit in most appraisal theories – though, as I will remark in a moment, Frijda says it fairly explicitly – and is only a short step away from Pacherie’s explanation of IEBs.
5.1 APPRAISALS AND THE UNITY OF EMOTIONAL CONTENT

In 3.2, I noted that proponents of the common view of emotional content as purely descriptive often cite appraisal theories in support of their claims. There, I suggested two reasons for viewing this as a mistake. First, following Scarantino (forthcoming) and Griffiths (2003), I suggested that most proponents of the common view could only seek support from appraisal theories by adopting an “elastic strategy,” thereby effacing their substantive claims. Secondly, I suggested that this interpretation of appraisal theories was in any case selective, since appraisal theorists recognize as part of their task an explanation of emotional motivation. Here, I will note a further methodological miscommunication: a failure to observe the distinction – and relationship – between appraisals as contentful states, and appraisals as cognitive processes.

 Earlier, following appraisal theorists, I provided a sketch of appraisal processes as ‘any processes, whether automatic or variable, conscious or unconscious, which imbue stimuli with emotional significance’ (Lazarus 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird 1987; Ellsworth & Scherer 2003). An appraisal process is thus defined functionally, as any process that establishes an appraisal state, where the latter is minimally construed as some intentional state which is about a stimulus, and which represents it as emotionally significant. According to most appraisal theorists, one criterion (of many) on which stimuli are appraised as emotionally relevant is in relation to the organism’s pre-existing goals. This is variously referred to in the literature as an appraisal of “goal relevance,” “motive consistency,” “importance” and “perceived obstacle,” or “concern relevance” and “goal/need conduciveness” (for a review, see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). One becomes angry toward the obstruction that interferes with one’s best-laid plans; one is joyous upon hearing that the obstruction is removed, and one’s goals will soon be achieved; one fears that which could destroy capacities for further self-fulfillment, and so on. In other
words, the content of an appraisal state is fixed with implicit reference to directive content. We can say, following Searle, that one of the satisfaction conditions on an emotional appraisal is that the object of appraisal be goal-relevant.

A contrast with visual perception will help make clear what is at issue – and will also show why Pacherie’s conception of “emotional perception” is misleading as a way of understanding descriptive aspects of emotional content (2002, p. 77-8). As I sit typing, I have a visual experience of a cluttered desk, strewn with stacks of books, papers, etc. I can see clearly that this book is red, that one blue, and so on. My perceptions (purport to) provide me with access to (among other things) the colors of things in the world nearby. And what I do perceive in visual experience is not sensitive to my goals and aims. I cannot, for example, perceive the red book as blue, simply because I now want a citation from the blue one, and would very much like it to be nearby. Nor does the book’s perceived color change when I decide that I won’t need the citation after all, or that I would like to go see a movie tonight with friends, or that I would very much like to be done writing for the day. The descriptive content of perception is not dependent on our aims in this way. In contrast, suppose I feel sadness about some event. This implies that the event in question is relevant, in some way, to my aims, projects, and values. Nussbaum appears to be aware of this when she writes that “we have emotions only about what we have already managed to invest with a certain importance in our own scheme of goals and ends” (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 29). (But again, given the elastic conception of concerns that appraisal theorists appeal to in understanding directive content, their views would offer no inherent support to the claim that it is our prototypical desires that play this role). Unlike seeing something as red, appraising an item as emotionally-significant involves having an intentional state about that item insofar as it is goal-relevant. For this reason, understanding the way in
which emotions are about the world on the model of the purely descriptive content of perception is of limited use.\(^2\)

Consider now appraisals as ongoing processes (see especially Lewis, 1996; 2005). On this view, information about both the external world and one’s own concerns is continuously being integrated in an ongoing process of appraisal. An appraisal state is formed when a relatively stable pattern of information is detected which indicates the presence of an emotionally-relevant situation or event. In focusing on the explanation of IEBs, Pacherie focused on the directive content of emotions, construed in terms of action tendencies. But this leaves aside a broad swath of states of action readiness – of which action tendencies are only a subset – and emotional motivation and appraisals are intertwined in ways that make a hard and fast distinction spurious. Frijda writes at length concerning the importance of states of action readiness to ongoing appraisal processes:

Formation of an appraisal pattern capable of evoking a state of action readiness that leads to action [i.e., an action tendency] is a process that stretches out over time… Feedback from attention and changes in its focus modify the available information… These interactions recruit aspects of appraisal and potentiation of action tendency [i.e., action readiness generally], that amplify until felt and observable emotion peaks…Appraisal stabilizes when it has developed so that a given action readiness has emerged and settles in preparation and execution of action… Feedback from action readiness and action further stabilizes the appraisal” (Frijda, 2007, p. 114, emphasis added).

What I want to stress is the claim that feedback from action loops back and is integrated into ongoing appraisals. This feature of appraisals sits well with our understanding of emotional aims as concretum-directed relational aims. Satisfying relational aims (avoidance and approach, removal of an obstacle, and so on) requires continuous attention to the current relation between oneself and the aimed-at event. One must not only appraise the stimulus as significant and goal-relevant, one must re-appraise how well one is faring in coping with the stimulus as emotional
engagement unfolds (cf. Lazarus, 1966, 1991, 1994; Scherer, 1994, 2004). Often, this is as straightforward as monitoring one’s spatial relation to the emotionally-relevant item in the world with which one is engaged.

Here, the example of fleeing from a bear is instructive. Upon elicitation of fear, a concretum-directed relational aim is established: avoidance of the bear. Fulfilling this aim is, as remarked earlier, tricky business, but it largely consists in putting some significant distance between oneself and the bear. In order to do so, one must keep track of one’s relation to the bear – a difficult task if one has turned tail to run, thereby effectively limiting perceptual input regarding the bear’s location to only the auditory modality. Sprinting to one side has the advantage of perhaps preserving visual input, but at the cost of putting less distance between oneself and the bear. Negotiating successful avoidance is difficult, in part, due to such tradeoffs. It is here that “unfocused” states of action readiness have a key role to play. In the onslaught of many emotional engagements, fulfilling an emotional aim depends on being, as it were, “ready for anything.” States of action readiness are states of diffuse preparedness, motivational states whose intentionality has not yet coalesced into the particular aims characteristic of action tendencies – a useful thing to have when one doesn’t quite know what to do in order to achieve a determinable emotional aim.

In sum, Frijda asserts that “appraisal and response develop in mutual interaction” (Frijda, 2007, p. 115). We have, of course, encountered contentful states with similar features in Pacherie’s account of Motor Representations, discussed in 4.2. Like actions, goal-oriented emotional behaviors are adaptable “on the fly.” So, like MRs, emotional content seems to involve a “pragmatic mode” of representation, involving the rapid transformation of sensory input into motor commands. Unlike MRs, which are supposed to encode mainly visual sensory
input, appraisal states can encode information from every sensory modality. Tastes, smells, and touches can be disgusting; sounds, sights, and movements can be frightening, etc. Appraisal processes play the role of integrating this information and inducing states of action readiness. We have already seen how action tendencies, in particular, can be called upon to explain emotional behaviors. Like MRs, the content of appraisal states seems to involve a kind of implicit reference to ourselves, and to the causal powers we have at our disposal. Unlike MRs, appraisals can include reference to more than just the causal powers of our bodies. I can fear the loss of my quick wit, or anticipate sadness upon seeing my drained bank account. In representing stimuli as goal-relevant, the entire modality of appraisal states is infused with reference to my capabilities and aims generally – be they bodily, intellectual, financial, etc.

What I am suggesting now is that emotionally-relevant properties of objects – their dangerousness, their offensiveness, etc. – are represented to the extent that they trigger states of action readiness. The descriptive content of emotional appraisals (“dangerousness, there”) is bound up with the concretum-directed relational content of emotional aims (“a thing to be avoided, now, by any means”). Emotional appraisals are Pushmi-Pullyu Representations: intentional states which are “undifferentiated between presenting facts and activities appropriate to those facts” or again which “represent facts and give directions or represent goals, both at once” (Millikan, 2004, p. 158). Like MRs, appraisals represent dynamic relationships between ourselves and the attainment of some goal(s). The impulse to ‘split’ this content into two distinct states is unmotivated, and should be resisted. Following Millikan, we ought to view this as a unitary intentional state, with roughly the content, e.g., danger-to-be-avoided-now. More generally, understanding emotional content as pragmatic means viewing emotional content as representing the-way-the-world-is-and-should-be-dealt-with. Put another way, emotional
appraisal is a process of detecting emotional affordances (cf. Gibson, 1979; Scarantino 2003; Griffiths 2003). Apprehending an object as e.g., dangerous is apprehending it as to be feared, with the latter term read to include implicit reference to the relational aims that are characteristic of fear. Mutatis mutandis for other emotions.

There is one further claim from the passage above that I wish to discuss further: Frijda’s remark that ongoing emotional engagement involves interactions with the world that “recruit aspects of appraisal and potentiation of action tendency, that amplify until felt and observable emotion peaks” (Frijda, 2007, p. 114, emphasis added). We have just discussed one of the major claims here: emotional motivation and appraisal are ongoing processes, and the intentionality of emotions, like MRs, cannot be fully determined at the outset of an emotion episode. But the emphasized portion of the quote indicates that Frijda is making a claim not just about emotional intentionality, but also about phenomenology. This, in turn, suggests an amendment to Goldie’s feeling theory, to which I now turn.

5.2 GOLDIE REVISITED

Way back there in 3.1, I noted that Goldie’s feeling theory fared slightly better in the contexts of IEBs than other versions of the common view. The reason was that, in countenancing unreflective feelings towards as concretum-directed intentional states, Goldie’s account preserved the presence of at least some emotional content in the context of IEBs. At that time, we followed proponents of the common view in thinking that such content was purely descriptive.

My proposed amendment to Goldie’s theory, in light of the foregoing, is that a feeling towards is an internal (mental) PPR. It is a pushmi-pullyu feeling (“PPF”): a feeling of the way the world is, and what to do about it. Feelings towards cannot be extricated from felt emotional motivation. PPFs are experiences that are about the-way-the-world-is-and-should-be-dealt-with.
(Or, equivalently, our emotional experiences are about “how we are faring in the world,” cf. Ratcliffe, 2008). Am I here flouting Goldie’s strictures, adding-on emotional feelings to an account of their intentionality in a way that is illegitimate? I think not. This account is loyal to the phenomenology of most if not all emotions, and hinted at by a colloquial explanation of emotional behaviors: “I felt like doing it.” The felt motivational character of emotions is so readily apparent when in their throes, one wonders how it could have been missed in Goldie’s return to emotional phenomenology. Part of the reason might consist in Goldie’s (partial) adherence to a long tradition, well-known from the works of William James (1884), which views emotional feelings as experiences of the body in turmoil. James famously held, more strongly, that such bodily changes are necessarily felt, and that emotions themselves just are such feelings of the body. Goldie remarks that he is “wholeheartedly in agreement with the spirit of what James says, and the emphasis he puts on feelings” (Goldie, 2000, p. 54). Perhaps this might explain the oversight of felt motivation in Goldie’s account.

My construal of emotional phenomenology in terms of PPFs is not, however, in direct opposition to this view. The account I have in mind is intended to be at home in Frijda’s account. When one feels emotions towards an item, its qualities and features are present to one’s experience in a particular way:

the felt qualities include those of being targets for action, their perceived instrumentality for ongoing or planned actions, their nearness for grasping… During emotion, the felt quality of ‘desirable’ changes into that of ‘desired!,’ of ‘an object-to-be-possessed-not-in-possession’ into ‘the object-to-be-possessed!’ (2007, pp. 204-5).

Such qualities are to be understood in terms of felt action readiness. Action readiness, as we have seen, is an occurrent state of preparedness for action, and “the preparation may be merely central [i.e., in the brain], or extend to the muscles, the thoughts, and the glands” (Frijda, 2007, p. 29).
In other words, felt changes in action readiness are intended to be the very experiences of bodily changes that James referred to. Where Frijda and I part ways with James and Goldie is in recognizing such bodily changes as inherently both descriptive and directive contentful states. Experiencing a state of action readiness is experiencing an item as emotionally-relevant (and, as goal-relevant).

This conception of emotional experience allows us to explain IEBs in a way that is amenable to Goldie’s account, and also solidifies his explanation of ESAs. For viewing emotional experiences as PPFs allows us to explain why it is that people typically have primitively intelligible emotional desires. Consider Goldie’s claim that when one has a feeling of, e.g., anger towards a concretum, one will also likely have a belief that recapitulates the descriptive content of that feeling towards: a belief that the concretum is broadly offensive. I suggest that a similar story can be told regarding the directive content of emotional feelings. Consider again Jane’s primitively intelligible emotional desire to get back at Jim. People in Jane’s position typically have such a desire because their emotional feeling of anger is already inherently motivational. A feeling of anger is, in part, felt action readiness – and states of action readiness are themselves directive states. Given sufficient opportunity, Jane becomes reflectively aware of her concretum-directed relational aim to get back at Jim, and this directive content is recapitulated in the form of an emotional desire. This desire is primitively intelligible to us, as third parties, because we know what it is like to feel anger, and part of what it is to feel anger is to feel motivated towards such aims. People feeling that emotion typically have that desire because they often have the opportunity to reflectively conceptualize unreflectively felt motivation.
In IEBs, an unreflective emotional experience is inherently motivational and causes a response, unmediated by practical reasoning: there is no opportunity to reflectively conceptualize one’s emotional experience in terms of beliefs or desires, and such states do not enter causally into the production of emotional behavior. Goldie’s sketched causal explanation of IEBs is vindicated, while preserving the distinction between reflexive behaviors and IEBs. For if emotional experiences are PPFs, then citing them in our explanation of irruptive behaviors captures the broadly Davidsonian insight that an explanation of goal-directed behavior must appeal to both descriptive and directive content. Parsimoniously, this account offers both explanations at once: experiencing the emotion (construed as an internal state) causes the behavior, and (construed as a PPF) is simultaneously the locus of a contentful explanation.
CHAPTER 6
SOME OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED

I now want to consider some objections against the idea of a state with dual directions of fit. In 6.1, I address a pressing concern for my account – Michael Smith’s (1987) blanket claim that the very idea of a state with dual directions of fit is logically incoherent. I follow several authors in diffusing this charge, suggesting that it is especially inconclusive as applied against my account of emotional content. In 6.2, I note that Goldie and Smith share a second argument against states with dual directions of fit. By examining the context in which Smith deploys his argument – in the ethical debate over ‘besires’ – I suggest that Goldie’s objection glosses a substantive issue about the nature of emotion, motivation, and reason. In 6.3, I bring these concerns to the forefront, and further distinguish my view from that of Pacherie, and Frijda, making clear how I suggest we view the unity of emotional content. In the end, I will have distinguished the motivational character of emotions from three separate conceptions of reasons for acting, and explained the relationship between emotional motivation and reason. I will conclude in 6.3 by diagnosing the appeal of the common view of emotional content as purely descriptive.

6.1 DEFENDING THE VERY IDEA OF DUAL DIRECTIONS OF FIT

Michael Smith has put forth two arguments against the possibility of states with dual directions of fit. I discuss the first in this section, the charge of logical incoherence: “Taken quite literally… the idea that there may be a state with both directions of fit is just plain incoherent” (Smith 1987, p. 56). If this were true, my account (as well as both Pacherie’s and Millikan’s) would surely face difficulties. But Smith’s claim rests on a substantive, counterfactual account of directions of fit. According to Smith, a belief that \( p \) (and any state with a Mind-to-World
direction of fit) is (in part) defined as a state that is disposed to go out of existence upon perceiving that \( \sim p \). A desire that \( p \) (and any state with a World-to-Mind direction of fit) is (in part) defined as a state that is disposed to endure despite perceptions that \( \sim p \), disposing the subject to bring about \( p \). So, on this account, a state with both directions of fit would, ‘by definition’, be a state that was paradoxically disposed to persist and expire in the face of such perceptions (ibid., p. 56-7).

We can better understand Smith’s charge of logical incoherence by comparing it with a view of directions of fit that Mary Clayton Coleman calls “statistical holism:” a particular mental state has a kind of direction of fit just in case it has most of (or enough of) the family of properties that constitute prototypical cases of a state with that same direction of fit (Coleman, 2008, p. 130-2). Smith’s blanket claim that the idea of a state with dual directions of fit is logically incoherent can then be viewed as the claim that there are particular properties shared by all states with a given direction of fit: namely, the dispositional properties outlined in the counterfactual analysis above. The ‘essential’ properties of descriptive and directive states that Smith outlines are what we might call their epistemic profiles: descriptive states with the content that \( p \) expire in the face of perceptions that \( \sim p \), whereas directive states with the content that \( p \) endure. \(^{31}\)

Are these epistemic profiles really essential properties of states with descriptive and directive content? In fact, some authors have argued that beliefs and desires can lack these properties – and presumably, if anything has descriptive/directive content, beliefs/desires do. There are some apparent objections to the claim that all beliefs that \( p \) have a disposition to expire upon perceiving that \( \sim p \). Coleman offers the case of a person who is familiar with the Muller-Lyre illusion (ibid., p. 131). In such a case, the person will continue to believe that the lines are
the same length, despite the perceptual appearance that the lines are not the same length. So there is at least a prima facie reason to think that “being disposed to expire in the face of a contradictory perception” is not an essential property of all beliefs. A fortiori, being disposed to expire in the face of a contradictory perception is not an essential property of states with a Mind-to-World direction of fit.

Sobel and Copp (2001) have offered an complementary argument against construing desires as essentially having the epistemic profile Smith proposes. Consider the following case.

[T]he fair-weather fan: Sue says she roots for the 49ers. But we have noticed that the team Sue says she roots for changes frequently, apparently in response to the recent successes or failures of the team in question. Sue says that she desires that the 49ers do well. But their not doing well tends to drive this desire out of existence” (Sobel & Copp, 2001, p. 48).

In this case, it seems, Sue’s desire does not have the epistemic profile Smith proposed as essential for all states with directive content. Sue’s desire that \( p \) tends to go out of existence upon perceiving that \( \sim p \). And yet, it makes good sense to attribute this desire to Sue: she says she has it, she acts like she has it (watching all the 49ers games, defending their prowess against criticisms – for a while), and she reasons like she has it (say, in carefully evaluating a recent trade for its impact on the team’s success). It also makes sense to say that Sue’s desire expires, and is replaced by a new desire, when she learns that the 49ers are doing poorly.

So Smith’s proposal – to define descriptive and directive content in terms of their epistemic profiles – is questionable, since prototypical examples of such intentional states arguably lack these properties. I will also note one further way of responding to Smith’s objection, put forth by Olivia Little (1997). Little grants that Smith’s objection goes through against some states with dual directions of fit, but suggests that others are left unscathed. Here is Little:
It is certainly true… that a mental state cannot have a belief-direction of fit and a desire-direction of fit with respect to one and the same proposition… Now some people seem to assume that where there is one mental state there is one propositional content; when they are confronted with the possibility of a state with double directions of fit, they wonder what ‘its’ propositional content could be. But there is no one propositional content of a mental state with double directions of fit, anymore than there is one propositional attitude involved in such a state… it is a believing-attitude directed toward one proposition, and it is a desiring-attitude directed towards another. There is nothing formally odd in saying that a belief(p) can also be the desire(q), just as there is nothing formally odd in noting that the mathematical operation ‘add(2)’ is also the operation ‘subtract(-2)’ (Little, 1997, p. 64).

Little’s claim is that, even though it is logically incoherent to talk of states that had a single proposition p as both their descriptive and directive content, this does not impugn the idea of a state with dual directions of fit that had p as its descriptive content, and q as its directive content.

So, not only has Smith failed to show that states with dual directions of fit are logically incoherent, he has overlooked a (possible) set of states with dual direction of fit that neatly avoid the charge. 32

In sum, it seems that Smith’s charge of logical incoherence is perhaps unwarranted as it stands, and deserves qualification in any case. That may seem like good news for my account, but I want to suggest that the charge of logical incoherence, when applied against my view of emotional content, misses the mark by a far wider margin: each of the authors I have cited overlooks the very possibility of concretum-directed intentional states. Both Smith and his critics take it as given that the states we are concerned with are propositional attitudes. There is good reason for this assumption: the chief targets of Smith’s arguments are ethical theorists who explicitly take this view. In the next section, I will examine Smith’s second argument, making clear what is truly at issue in this ethical debate. But before doing so, I will offer a brief sketch of why I think emotional content lies further afield of Smith’s claims than even the states Little describes.
It is difficult to make sense of how the intentional states I have been concerned with might be susceptible to analysis in terms of the *epistemic profiles* Smith sets forth. Apprehending a stimulus as dangerous, I have an intentional state whose unitary content is about dynamic relations between myself and the goal of avoiding the stimulus. The stimulus is apprehended as dangerous *in virtue* of being apprehended as affording certain responses on my part, and as being goal-relevant. Since this unitary intentional state *constitutes* the apprehension of the stimulus as dangerous, it is unclear what it would mean to ask whether this intentional state was disposed to persist or expire in the face of perceptions to the contrary. Applying Smith’s account of *epistemic profiles* here is wrongheaded. A *belief* that a stimulus is dangerous can be challenged or supported by evidence for or against it, and might be (rationally) propelled out of existence if I note, for example, that the stimulus does not *seem* or *appear* to be dangerous. But my appraisal of a stimulus as dangerous *just is* my evidence for believing it is dangerous – my having that appraisal, as an intentional state, *constitutes* the stimulus’ appearing or seeming dangerous. Assessing an appraisal’s *epistemic profile* would be like asking whether my perception of something as red is disposed to persist in the face of perceptions that the thing is red, or whether it is disposed to disappear in the face of perceptions that the thing is not red. Such claims cannot help but be uninteresting – they amount to the claim that intentional states are disposed to exist when they exist, and disposed to go out of existence when they do not exist.

**6.2 ‘BESIRES’, MOTIVATION, AND REASONS**

Smith has another line of argument against states with dual directions of fit, which Coleman (2008) calls “the Weakness of the Will argument:”

If my belief that I ought to φ and my desire to φ were part of a single state, then it would be impossible for me to believe that I ought to φ and yet fail to be at all motivated to φ. And it is obvious, according to Smith, that this kind of weakness
of will is possible. This is what I call the weakness of will argument (Coleman, 2008, p. 134; see also Smith, 1994)

As it turns out, Goldie himself considers and rejects the possibility that feelings towards might have dual directions of fit, providing his own version of the Weakness of the Will argument:

“if feeling towards has both directions of fit, then it is not possible, for example, to have feelings of fear towards something and yet not be motivated at all to act appropriately…the claim that feeling towards is believing and desiring entails that it is not possible (conceptually impossible) to be in a feeling-towards condition without motivation” (Goldie 2000, p. 81).

Importantly, Goldie mirrors Smith in construing a state with dual directions of fit as a unitary state that incorporates the features of beliefs and desires. Smith puts forth his arguments as part of a larger debate in ethics concerning just such states: ‘besires’, as they were christened when first proposed by J.E.J. Altham (1986). In responding to the Weakness of the Will argument, I shall also be denying up and down that emotional content should be understood in terms of besires. In order to do each properly, I will need to make clear what besires are alleged to be, and what the Weakness of the Will argument is intended to prove.

Altham (1986) tentatively proposed besires as states that might occupy a very particular place in an ethical theory that tries to hold on to two appealing claims. The first is moral cognitivism – the claim that moral values can be objects of cognition and of knowledge. The second is motivational internalism – the claim that an evaluative moral judgment (e.g., that \( y \) is good) is inherently motivational, and provides a reason for appropriate actions (e.g., promotion). Taken together, moral cognitivism and internalism entail that if one recognizes that \( x \) is good, one thereby has a reason to promote or pursue \( x \). (Mutatis mutandis for ‘\( x \) is bad’).

Blackburn (1998) credits McDowell (1979) with a version of this view. McDowell claims that in perfectly virtuous agents, recognition of a moral property in and of itself provides a reason to act. This reason “is apprehended, not as outweighing or overriding any reasons for
acting in other ways... but as silencing them” (ibid., p. 146). Further, “the deliverances of the
sensitivity [to moral properties]... fully explain the actions which manifest virtue” (ibid., p.144).
In other words, recognizing morally-relevant properties just is having a reason to act virtuously.
And citing this intentional state is supposed to fully explain (that is, provide both a rationalizing
and a causal explanation of) virtuous actions.

Besires have been proposed to be such states: a unitary propositional attitude that
constitutes a reason for acting (morally). Smith frames the issue as a debate over the nature of
“motivating reasons,” which he defines minimally as follows:

Agent A at t has a motivating reason to φ only if there is some ψ such that, at t, A desires
to ψ and believes that were he to φ he would ψ (Smith, 1987, p. 36).

This is similar to Davidson’s original definition of primary reasons, but with two important
caveats. First, Smith’s formulation leaves out Davidson’s constitution claim – the claim that a
reason is composed of the combination of a belief and a distinct desire. Second, Smith’s
formulation leaves the role of practical deliberation in forming a reason open to debate. What
remains from Davidson’s account is the role of propositional attitudes. This sketch of
‘motivating reasons’ allows us to get clear on what the desire theorist means to claim. Besires are
unitary propositional attitudes– simultaneously a desiring that ψ and a believing that were one to
φ one would ψ. As such, besires are intended to meet the criteria for being a motivating reason,
despite the fact that they are not reached via such deliberation, and are not constituted by a
distinct belief and desire.

Now, the Weakness of the Will argument is directed against just this feature of besires:
that they necessitate being motivated to act, by inherently providing the agent with a motivating
reason for acting appropriately. Both Smith and Goldie think it apparent that one can have the
relevant descriptive state (belief that an item has a moral property, feeling towards an item in the
world) in the absence of being motivated to act. The Weakness of the Will argument is thus intended as a reductio against besires: (1) such weakness of the will is possible, (2) besires would make it conceptually impossible, (3) hence an (unqualified) desire account is false. Authors have also put forth more ‘pragmatic’ arguments against besires. Altham suggests we might reject besires out of hand, since “we need the distinction between beliefs and desires for other contexts” (1986, p. 285). Blackburn objects to McDowell’s conception with a variant of this claim, saying that it is “morally vital” that we be able to “split” recognition and motivation, opening a space for moral criticism of a person’s reasons for acting (1998, p. 97-102).

Here is what I take to be the fundamental difference between besires and emotions, construed as intentional states with dual directions of fit: I have taken care to avoid the claim that emotional content constitutes a reason for action. In contrast, the claim that virtuous acts are done for a motivating reason is the main incentive for positing besires. The two notions are simply in different businesses. In the first place, my account grew out of our recognition, back in chapter 3, that the Davidsonian account of actions was not workable as an explanation of IEBs. That is to say, IEBs are not done for a Davidsonian reason, so it was an adequacy condition on my account that it avoid the claim that emotional content constitutes such a reason. But emotional contents are not the desire theorist’s ‘motivating reasons’ either. A large part of the foregoing story is that, whether we focus on descriptive or directive aspects of emotional content, we are forced to concede their concretum-directedness when we explain IEBs. This is so since, to put it crudely, we need intentional states to explain IEBs, and we cannot have propositional attitudes. So it was also an adequacy condition on my account that emotional content not be propositional. And without being propositional attitudes at all, it is difficult to see how emotional content might approach providing a motivating reason for acting, - which is what is at issue in
the ethical debate over besires. With regard to Altham’s claim that “we need the distinction between beliefs and desires for other contexts” I respond that it is precisely our prior distinctions between prototypical beliefs and desires that I have respected. A central distinction between beliefs and desires concerns their complimentary roles in practical reasoning – and this distinction is drawn between two complimentary forms of propositional attitudes. For just this reason, calling upon them to explain IEBs has no force, since practical reasoning, and propositional attitudes, are not available in the context of IEBs. In other words, even if we weaken our conception of reasons for acting to include ‘motivating reasons’ generally, emotional contents still do not count as reasons. Like Davidsonian reasons, motivating reasons (besires) remain bound up with propositional thought, in a way that emotional content does not. For this reason the Weakness of the Will argument – as stated by Goldie and Smith alike – is misplaced as a charge against my view of emotional content and phenomenology.

This might seem to be too quick, too superficial, as a response to the Weakness of the Will argument. What hides behind the argument is a debate about the relationship between motivation and reason, and although the argument as stated does fail when raised against my account, I want to spend a moment addressing this deeper issue more fully.

6.3 EMOTION AND REASON

To drive home what I take to be the relationship between emotional motivation and reason, I want to reconstruct and critique a conception of ‘reasons for acting’ which Pacherie and Frijda seem to adopt, and which they apply to emotional content. Pacherie frames a traditional view of reasons for acting in terms of what she calls the principle of transparency: “something cannot be a reason for a subject’s beliefs or action, unless it is transparent to the subject, unless that is the subject has access to the reason in question and acknowledges it as his
reason or one of his reasons for his belief or action” (Pacherie, 2002, p. 86). She notes that in ESAs, this requirement is easily met, since rational deliberation plays the role of combining descriptive and directive content. In IEBs, the principle of transparency seems not to hold, and so, emotional content seems not to qualify as a reason for acting. Pacherie responds by suggesting that the principle of transparency is an expression of “the over-narrow conception of rationality” that allowed for objections against the Davidsonian account of actions, and which required the supplementation of intentions-in-action in the first place (ibid., p. 88). She follows Frijda, who suggests that in emotional behaviors, “the reasons for acting are rendered cognitively impenetrable” due to the way emotions can set determinable aims without the benefit of rational deliberation, and ensnare intentions-in-action all on their own (Frijda, 2007, p. 29). Here I must disagree with both Pacherie and Frijda. There is simply no motivation for assimilating emotional content to reasons for acting, and the ensuing account of reasons is spurious. Let me try to explain.

The view Pacherie seems to endorse is that …for an emotion not just to cause an action but also to rationalize it, it must be the case that (1) the emotion is appropriate, that is, that the emotional assessment of the situation [i.e., appraisal] is correct, and (2) the action generated by the emotion is indeed adaptive, that is helps to promote the ends of the agent… It seems that only when adaptiveness is assessed with respect to the immediate end at stake that [IEBs] can be said to rationalized or justified by the emotions that generate them (Pacherie, 2002, p. 85).

Not only does Pacherie abandon Davidson’s constitution claim, as well as any prominent role for means-end reasoning, her account also says nothing about the kind of content that is relevant. That is, unlike desire theorists, Pacherie has not retained adherence to the view that reasons for acting must be in a propositional format, or must involve propositional attitudes. This is in keeping with the idea of concretum-directed relational aims, as found within the synthesis of
Jeannerod and Frijda reviewed in chapter 4. But, as I argued in chapter 5, we should recognize emotional intentionality as a unitary descriptive and directive state that is bound up with our ongoing emotional engagement with the world via behavior. Emotional content, like the content of prior intentions, “cannot fully and inexorably determine at the outset the exact way the action will be performed” (Pacherie 2002, p. 66), since “appraisal and response develop in mutual interaction” (Frijda, 2007, p. 115). As a result, if our goal is to attribute emotional content to explain all and only the emotional behaviors that in fact get performed, we cannot hope to do so properly until after the deed is done – the entirety of the content does not exist beforehand. The claim Pacherie is entitled to make here is inherently ‘retroactive,’ and can be expressed as the following definition of what I will (provisionally) call ‘emotional reasons’:

\[
\text{Organism } O \text{ at } t \text{ had an emotional reason } e \text{ to } \varphi \text{ if and only if }
\]

(i) \( O \) had some descriptive state \( s_1 \) about \( x \) as an appropriate target of \( \psi \)-ing,
(ii) \( O \) had some directive state \( s_2 \) about the aim of \( \psi \)-ing,
(iii) \( s_1 \) was an accurate depiction of \( x \)
(iv) \( O \) \( \psi \)-ed,
(v) \( O \)’s \( \psi \)-ing was (distally) caused by \( s_2 \),
(vi) \( \psi \)-ing turned out to be a way of \( \varphi \)-ing.
(vii) \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) were the same state, namely \( e \).

If emotional content, as I have construed it, is to constitute a reason for acting, then it must do so on these terms. But this view rests on focusing only on those cases where an emotional behavior turns out to look (or be) rational. Condition (iii) seems to amount to the claim that one would have had a reason to believe that, e.g., the appraised item was dangerous, hence merited avoidance, and condition (vi) seems to amount to the claim that one would have had a reason to believe, e.g., that acting thus-and-so was a means to achieve the end of avoiding that danger. These are just the kind of honorific attributions that, following Goldie, we have eschewed in explaining IEBs. We saw no explanatory benefit to loosening the terms ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ in a
way that would make them applicable here. Why then should we now, in retrospect, loosen the term ‘reason for acting’ in a way as to be applicable here? Our present concern is not the status of the principle of transparency in the context of IEBs, but whether there is any benefit to adopting Pacherie’s view of emotional reasons. As far as I can see, there is not. We gain no predictive power, since the attribution of an ‘emotional reason’ cannot help but be post-hoc.\(^{40}\) We gain no explanatory power, since, as conditions (i) and (ii) make apparent, we had to employ our contentful explanation of emotional behaviors in the first place. Stretching the notion of “reason” to cover these special cases is unmotivated.

The lack of a payoff is apparent when we avoid restricting our focus to the limited range of cases that meet (iii) and (v). Sometimes emotional appraisals are “correct,” and sometimes they are not – as in cases of phobias, for example. Sometimes our emotional actions help us achieve our ends, and sometimes they do not – as when, in frightful panic, I make things worse by drawing undue attention to myself, or by injuring myself. Our emotional appraisals can be misleading, and our attempts to fulfill relational emotional aims can fail. We provide the same style of contentful explanation of these cases as we do in cases where (iii) and (iv) are satisfied. Absolutely nothing of substance is gained by saying that emotions rationalize behavior in just those cases where the behavior would have been rational, if one had been in a position to assess the appropriateness and efficacy of appraisal and response. That emotional content can have this relationship to the world is important and notable. But it seems to be captured quite well by the idea that emotional content – like all content – can present the world to us as it really is.\(^{41}\)

Pacherie’s claim regarding these cases has the polemical effect of “upgrading” our contentful explanation of IEBs to a rationalizing explanation (in some cases). Proponents of the Weakness of the Will argument start from the other direction, assuming that having a reason to
act is the only account we have of motivation. But each of these strategies is simply a mistake. To reiterate one final time: in order to explain IEBs, we need a conception of a *contentful* explanation of emotional behaviors that is distinct from a *rationalizing* explanation. Put another way, *we need an account of emotional motivation that is distinct from having a reason to act.*

I have argued that a robust synthesis of the views held by Pacherie, Jeannerod, and Frijda provides the account of motivation we need, and explains how action tendencies can cause goal-directed behaviors. Once we have this refined account of emotional motivation in-hand, there is no benefit to following Pacherie and Frijda in effacing the distinction between our contentful explanation and a rationalizing explanation. There is simply no useful sense in which emotional content constitutes a reason for acting. Rather, emotions are a fundamentally distinct form of motivation in our psychological lives.

This is not to say, of course, that one cannot *have* a reason to act out of an emotion. One can and does in just the contexts of Emotional Standard Actions. In such cases, the pre-existing content of emotions is ‘parsed’ as it were, into distinct *descriptive* and *directive* states – that is, beliefs and desires. I appraise an item as dangerous, hence as to-be-avoided. Given further cognitive integration –or, for Goldie, when I become *reflectively* aware of my Pushmi-Pullyu Feeling – I have the capacity to form a belief *that* the item is dangerous, and a desire *that* I avoid the item. This desire is properly considered ‘emotional’ due to its reliance on the pre-existing *directive* content of concretum-directed relational aims. Once established, that desire can then be paired with any instrumental belief (*that* doing thus-and-so is a means of avoided the item) in means-end reasoning, forming a prior intention to act, and thereby causing an ESA. But, to repeat: one’s *reasons* to act emotionally are derived from the *distinct* character of emotional content, which is itself inherently motivational.
6.4 DIAGNOSIS AND CONCLUSION

What is it that fuels adherence to the common view of emotional content as purely descriptive? Put another way, what is it that leads philosophers to adopt an “add-on” theory of emotional motivation? We have witnessed several confusions that support this view which, following Goldie, we can collect under the charge of *over-intellectualizing emotional intentionality*. This includes assuming that emotional intentionality should be viewed in terms of propositional attitudes, and assuming that emotional motivation should be viewed as having a reason for acting. The appeal of this over-intellectualization, I suggest, arises from a problematic approach to overcoming the traditional dichotomy between ‘reason’ and ‘passion.’

There are two elements of this dichotomy that many authors wish to avoid. The first concerns whether the emotions have *epistemic utility*. The traditional dichotomy suggests that emotions are epistemically inert ‘subjective’ states, a kind of ‘secondary quality’ that the mind projects onto the world. The second element of the dichotomy is that emotions are ‘outside forces’ that take us over, instigating involuntary behaviors that may lie outside the scope of reason (hence, too, may be immune moral praise and blame). When we set out to find some epistemic utility in the emotions, we often focus on their *descriptive* content, emphasizing that they *do have* a Mind-to-World direction of fit, hence can be assessed as appropriate or inappropriate. When we then set out to avoid the view of emotions as ‘outside forces,’ we pay keen attention to the way that some emotions depend on desires and values we have, and for which we may be held responsible. This has the effect of “outsourcing” emotional motivation to some other *directive* state.

If it is supposed that these features generalize to all emotions, then the traditional dichotomy seems to fall out of view. The dichotomy between emotion and reason is ‘bridged’
by selectively focusing on cases where the emotions fit into the model of reason: the epistemic utility (descriptive content) of the emotions is emphasized, and their motivational character (directive content) is downplayed. This strategy is epitomized by Goldie’s revision of the Davidsonian account, and his oversight of IEBs. Its influence is also apparent in Pacherie’s quick claim that emotional content be considered on the model of reasons for acting: having found a style of emotional motivation that looks like having a reason for acting, we are encouraged to assimilate the two.

I have sought to preserve some general insights from Davidson’s account of primary reasons in explaining emotional behaviors: there are descriptive aspects of emotional content, and there are directive aspects of emotional content, and it takes both together to cause goal-driven behaviors. But the fact is that emotional content is different in kind from the content of reasons: (i) emotional content has a non-propositional, concretum-directed format, and (ii) the directive and descriptive aspects of emotional content are not paired together rationally, in the way a reason for acting is; rather, they were never separate at all. Emotional motivation is fundamentally distinct from having a reason to act.

My argument has been analogous in structure to Goldie’s argument against add-on theories of emotional feelings. A certain view of emotions’ intentionality (that it is separable from phenomenology; that it is purely descriptive) gains favor when a particular explanation of emotional behaviors is viewed as adequate (Davidson’s account, or Goldie’s revision). If it can be argued that the underlying explanation of emotional behaviors is not in fact adequate (as Goldie argued against the add-on theorist; as I argued against proponents of the common view) then our view of emotional intentionality should be revised. The revision which is called for – in light of philosophical considerations, empirical data, and everyday experience – is that emotional
content forms a unitary state with dual directions of fit. This view is powerful: it allows for a explanation of IEBs and ESAs (and of the relationship between them), it provides an account of the unique character of emotional motivation, and it preserves the epistemic utility of the emotions, as a result of not over-intellectualizing emotional intentionality. We should not half-heartedly dodge the dichotomy between reason and passion by attempting to understand the latter in terms of the former. Rather, we should reject the dichotomy outright, recognizing that reason and passion, though distinct, can each aspire to the same purpose: motivating us to act in ways that promote our interests.
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she learns the ‘phenomenal’ fact of refutes materialism, since Mary should have already known what it is like to see red. Goldie does not suggest that and its proper object. As such, logical relations can be assessed between an emotion and its formal object, but not between an emotion objects, since there is no inherent link between a particular concretum (proper object) and an emotional response to it. In his view, which has been taken up by recent representationalist accounts of emotions (e.g., Prinz 2004), differentiating one emotion from another depends on distinguishing their formal object is the pond itself (or the ice itself). In his view, which has been taken up by recent representationalist accounts of emotions (e.g., Prinz 2004), differentiating one emotion from another depends on distinguishing their formal objects, since there is no inherent link between a particular concretum (proper object) and an emotional response to it. As such, logical relations can be assessed between an emotion and its formal object, but not between an emotion and its proper object.

For this reason, Solomon’s claims against belief-cognitivists generalize to his own account, rather than serving as a principled reason to prefer his own view of emotions as judgments.

In Kenny’s influential formulation, emotions have “formal objects” which are distinct from their “proper objects.” When Irene fears the frozen pond, the formal object of her fear is the dangerousness of the pond, and the proper object is the pond itself (or the ice itself). In his view, which has been taken up by recent representationalist accounts of emotions (e.g., Prinz 2004), differentiating one emotion from another depends on distinguishing their formal objects, since there is no inherent link between a particular concretum (proper object) and an emotional response to it. As such, logical relations can be assessed between an emotion and its formal object, but not between an emotion and its proper object.

Goldie also recognizes ‘bodily feelings’ – conscious awareness of the state of one’s body. These feelings are Intentional states directed at one’s own body, and are not especially relevant for my purposes.

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For this reason, Solomon’s claims against belief-cognitivists generalize to his own account, rather than serving as a principled reason to prefer his own view of emotions as judgments.

Fodor and Churchland agree on what propositional attitudes like beliefs and desire are supposed to be, and that is just about the only bit of their respective accounts I aim to sign on for. They disagree insofar as the former has defended the reality of propositional attitudes, whereas the latter has argued at length that there simply are no such things.

Also, concretum-directed intentional states arguably fall under Nussbaum’s notion of “seeing X as Y,” if one is willing to read “X” de re, as it were.

In Jackson’s argument, Mary the color scientist is kept in a black and white room from birth. She studies hard, and learns all the physical facts about everything, including color, gleaned from scientific theories. One day, we let her out of the room and show her something red. Jackson’s claim is that Mary learns something new when she sees red – she learns the ‘phenomenal’ fact of what it is like to see red. If materialism is understood as the claim that every fact is a physical fact, (and if our [or, Jackson’s] intuitions concerning Mary are to be trusted), then the argument refutes materialism, since Mary should have already known what it is like to see red. Goldie does not suggest that his ‘Irene’ argument has similar results.

Davidson endorses an account with further similarities to Goldie’s. He states only that it is “not necessary to classify and analyse the many varieties of emotions, sentiments, moods, motives, passions, and hunger whose mention may answer the question ‘Why did you do it?’” (1963 p. 7). He claims we can capture such nuances by incorporating them (when relevant) into the desire(s) that form the primary reason for acting. He assimilates a claustrophobic’s motivation to leave a party to a desire to avoid what one fears, and assimilates jealous motivations to a cluster of desires, collected as “the sorts of things a jealous man wants to do” (ibid.). The move here seems to me a pragmatic one (aimed at constructing a general explanatory framework) rather than an ontological one (aimed at ‘reducing’ emotions to desires).

See Bermudez 2003, ch. 1 for a review of this methodology. The general idea is captured in a well-known methodological principle in psychology known as Morgan’s Cannon: “In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes, if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution and development” (Morgan, 1904, p. 59). Morgan’s notion of a ‘scale’ of psychological processes meshes well with DeLancey’s (2002) “hierarchical” view of mind, discussed in 2.2.1. A similar principle of parsimony that applies specifically to representationalist accounts in psychology has been called Pylyshyn’s Razor, and its scope is sketched as follows: “we should not postulate representations if no explanatory advantage is gained by such a postulate… the preferred explanation is one that relies on assuming the least general mechanisms compatible with the evidence – in other words on mechanisms that are constrained in the

NOTES

1 Solomon endorses a ‘cognitivist’ theory of the emotions, and reads “I am angry at John for stealing my car” as the judgment “I am angry that John stole my car” (Solomon 2003, p. 4). On Prinz’s ‘Neo-Jamesian’ theory, emotions are a form of perception, and exhibit a characteristic feature of perception: “the generation of internal representations… [which] typically represent the mind-external stimuli” that cause them (2006, p. 138). Emotions are said to represent environmental concerns, such as danger, threat, and loss (ibid, p. 148). de Sousa suggests what he calls an “Axiological” view of emotions, according to which emotions provide us with “objective representations of values” (2004, 68, original emphasis). He favors an analogy with perception, and takes pains to preserve the cognitivist claim that emotions “have a mind-to-world direction of fit” (ibid, pp. 61-2).

2 Page numbers for internal citations to Davidson’s work are from the (1980) collection of reprints.

3 This slogan is a good representation of Davidson’s account, but also forms the basis for well-known counterexamples and critiques of his claims. I shall later consider Searle’s (1983) revision.


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6 In Kenny’s influential formulation, emotions have “formal objects” which are distinct from their “proper objects.” When Irene fears the frozen pond, the formal object of her fear is the dangerousness of the pond, and the proper object is the pond itself (or the ice itself). In his view, which has been taken up by recent representationalist accounts of emotions (e.g., Prinz 2004), differentiating one emotion from another depends on distinguishing their formal objects, since there is no inherent link between a particular concretum (proper object) and an emotional response to it. As such, logical relations can be assessed between an emotion and its formal object, but not between an emotion and its proper object.

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12 See Bermudez 2003, ch. 1 for a review of this methodology. The general idea is captured in a well-known methodological principle in psychology known as Morgan’s Cannon: “In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes, if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution and development” (Morgan, 1904, p. 59). Morgan’s notion of a ‘scale’ of psychological processes meshes well with DeLancey’s (2002) “hierarchical” view of mind, discussed in 2.2.1. A similar principle of parsimony that applies specifically to representationalist accounts in psychology has been called Pylyshyn’s Razor, and its scope is sketched as follows: “we should not postulate representations if no explanatory advantage is gained by such a postulate… the preferred explanation is one that relies on assuming the least general mechanisms compatible with the evidence – in other words on mechanisms that are constrained in the
patterns of behavior that they are able to accommodate...the weaker the power of the postulated mechanism, the less likely it is that it will be adequate to account for the evidence as more and more evidence is accumulated. This is why in cognitive psychology one is forced sooner or later to attribute more and more functions to representations” (Pylyshyn, 2007, pp. 78-9).

11 The debate is mirrored among philosophers. See, e.g., Robinson (1995) for the view that startle is a paradigm case of emotion, and Solomon (2003, ch. 9) for an argument that startle be considered an outlier, with more emphasis placed on emotions which are “comparatively sophisticated” (ibid., p. 160).

12 Although I do not wish to pursue the topic here, IEBs seem to be assessable in terms of what Bermudez calls “level 1 rationality” – a notion of rationality that is applicable to behavior tokens which are selected from a range of alternatives without the benefit of Davidsonian decision-making in supremely rational thought (Bermudez, 2003, p. 120-2). Bermudez’ claims are, for various reasons, more than I need here.

13 On occasion, Goldie also suggests that the emotional feelings involved in such behaviors may be ‘cognitively impenetrable,’ and that this may be the “evolutionary price” which is paid for speed of response (2000, p. 110). But cognitive impenetrability is defined as an incapability for one’s beliefs to affect one’s feelings (ibid., p. 76). And I take it that merely honorific beliefs don’t affect anything at all. So, further details aside, the notion of cognitive impenetrability appears idle here, particularly in non-human animal cases. Either way, this is simply to label the problem that is at issue, not to offer an explanation of it.

14 By an extrinsic property, I mean here one that is not possessed by some thing (stimulus) in isolation. Being appraised as dangerous is a relational property, dependant upon the existence of an emoter. See also note 6 above.

15 Unlike most proponents of the common view, Goldie does not cite appraisal theories in support of his claims. I think this is, again, an unfortunate oversight, since I find many of his insights to be neatly complimented by appraisal theories- for example, the idea that unreflective feeling towards can be a concretum-directed intentional state. In part, this is due to his emphasis on a distinction between “commonsense psychology” and “science,” insisting that the claims of each are not in competition or conflict. I won’t be engaging with this distinction here; suffice it to say that if Goldie’s view and a psychological theory of the emotions actually agree in some of their central claims, then this is worth noting.

16 Notably, Frijda does not use the term ‘action’ in the strict, Davidsonian sense, but rather employs it to refer to any behavior that is not reflexive. In what follows I will be continuing to employ my term “Irruptive” rather than Frijda’s ‘impulsive.’ The latter seems to me to imply a reading I sought to avoid by distinguishing Irruptive Emotional Behaviors from reflexive behaviors.

17 I provide a gloss, but these objections, and Searle’s revisions, are nicely reviewed in Pacherie (2000), and I have benefited from reading the presentation there.

18 Well, MRs cannot be said to ‘represent’ affordances in quite the sense Gibson intended, since Gibson was an anti-representationalist. Both Pacherie and Millikan are fond of putting things this way, and I shall follow them.

21 Rowlands (2006) takes this argument one step further, claiming that the behaviors intentions-in-action cause are, themselves, inherently representational. My argument does not require that step.

22 In a more intricate discussion of these matters, Pacherie asserts that viewing intentions-in-action as motor representations offers “a reductive analysis of the causal self-referentiality of intentions in action” ( Pacherie. 2000, p. 417). In the interests of exposition, I’ve foregone a more detailed discussion of Pacherie’s view, but I hope that what follows doesn’t hang on any serious ontological commitments that might be read into the notion of ‘reductive analysis.’

23 I can say with certainty that Millikan would object to my (controversial) apparent identification of the internal/external distinction and the mental/non-mental distinction. Her goal is to provide a perfectly general account of intentional states, regardless of whether they are mental, and her account has the result many internal states are intentional without being mental. For example, chemical messengers in bodily tissues and circulatory systems are counted as internal PPRs that are (one presumes) non-mental (Millikan, 2004, p. 158). Again, all I really wish to take from Millikan is her general characterization of PPRs, not her account of intentionality.

24 Once again, I am employing my alternative term “Irruptive” to put some distance between these behaviors and reflexes. (See note18).

25 Frijda frames his adherence to this claim in terms of what he calls The Law of Situational Meaning, and says “Emotions arise in response to patterns of information that represent the meaning of eliciting situations. In principle, different emotions arise in response to different meanings” (Frijda, 2007, p.4, emphases removed).

26 The linearity implied here (appraisals first, then a change in action readiness) is misleading. Frijda views appraisals as ongoing processes, shaped by continuous feedback as a situation unfolds (Frijda, 2007, see esp. ch. 4). I will return to this below.
And for this reason, the variants of the common view held by Prinz (2006) and de Sousa (2004) likewise have limited utility. See note 1.

Although I haven’t discussed them here, Goldie does make much of bodily feelings, and views his theory as an extension of James’, and takes care to preserve “the spirit” of James’ view (Goldie 2000, p. 54 & ch. 3 in passim). See also Ratcliffe (2005) for an independent reading of James which is also amenable to the claim that emotional feelings are directed at the world beyond the body.

See note 18 regarding Frijda’s use of the term ‘action’.

What is at issue here is the not the intentionality of bodily states per se, but rather the intentionality of bodily experiences. I am supposing that one can experience states of one’s body, and I’m supposing (with Frijda) that such qualities can be cast out into the world, as felt properties of objects. This view is discussed from a slightly different direction in Sheredsos (2009).

Several authors have pointed out that Smith’s own criteria might be circular. The essential properties of a state with a Mind-to-World direction of fit are defined in terms of that state’s relation to perception – but perception itself seems to have a Mind-to-World direction of fit. (See, e.g., Humberstone 1992; Sobel & Copp, 2001). There are various ways of trying to interpret Smith more charitably. I will be using my term epistemic profiles’ as I have sketched it, which is likely not as charitable as it might be. This will not affect the discussion for the worse, and in any case I will be arguing that Smith’s objection is misplaced for further reasons.

Following Little, we might distinguish two kinds of logical incoherence that would be damning. The first is the line Smith pursues: the idea of a state with dual directions of fit will be logically incoherent if it entails that such a state both has and lacks a particular property (i.e., the dispositional property of persisting in the face of conflicting perceptions). But, as Little suggests, this line of thought seems to be easily conflated with another. Propositional content is ripe for entering into inferential relations with other propositional contents, and the idea of a state with dual directions of fit might risk logical incoherence if it entails that one has two conflicting attitudes towards the same proposition (i.e., believing that it is the case that p, and desiring that p were the case). I am not certain that Little is correct in making this claim, but she does seem to make it. I might desire that Obama’s inauguration will go well, while simultaneously believing that it will go well. Am I somehow exhibiting logical incoherence in doing so, and do my attitudes toward this proposition truly conflict? Not so far as I can see. My belief that the inauguration will go well might be ‘weak’, easily buffeted by the belief that someone will cause trouble. And I might have partial evidence for each of these beliefs. Taking up an attitude of belief toward a proposition does not seem to be an all-or-nothing affair, and while there might be some internal tension between both believing and desiring that p, it is not clear that this amounts to a logical contradiction.

The attraction of this view is its import for defending moral realism – the view that moral properties and values exist mind-independently.

The attraction of this view (as diagnosed by Simon Blackburn, 1998) is its import for avoiding G.E. Moore’s famous ‘open question argument.’

As Pollard (1998) rightly notes, McDowell never employs this term, but his account captures the relevant points about desires.

(See note 35). Davidson’s claim (that recognition of a moral property – “x is good” – provides a reason for acting) does not qualify as one of Smith’s motivating reasons. Here is what I take to be the relevant similarity that would bring McDowell back into the debate: Supposing McDowell were right, then in response to the question “Why did you do it (promote/pursue x)?” one could properly answer “because I recognized x as good.” Assuming that McDowell’s moral reasons should be called “motivating reasons,” what would need to be dropped from Smith’s account of motivating reasons would be the means end relationship between the belief (that x is good) and the desire (that x be promoted) – such a relationship does not hold between the beliefs and desires McDowell is interested in.

Smith’s project in rejecting desires is to defend a stronger claim about motivating reasons, which he calls ‘the Humean theory of motivation’: “R at t constitutes a motivating reason of agent A to φ iff there is some ψ such that R at t consists of a desire of A to φ and a belief that were he to φ he would ψ” (Smith, 1987, p. 36). This comes closer to Davidson’s account, by including the constitution claim, but again the role of means-end reasoning is left murky.

Blackburn’s argument against McDowell eludes me. McDowell implies a role for desires only in explaining the ideally moral actions of perfectly virtuous agents – agents who are, by all accounts, immune to moral criticism. So one might respond to Blackburn by saying that it is (in part) precisely because we can “split” recognition and motivation in non-virtuous agents that they are susceptible to moral criticism at all.
There is a complimentary epistemic issue. I have no qualms about saying generally that we likely overlook, or miss the opportunity to examine, many intentional states—e.g. states of action readiness that form and dissipate without ever becoming focused into an action tendency.

The content-attributions I am discussing here should not be confused with *intentional generalizations* that range over multiple individuals (or over one individual on multiple occasions) – which do admit of predictive power, unlike *post-hoc* content attributions to individuals on particular occasions. Examples of such generalizations would be: “People tend to avoid things they apprehend as dangerous” and “Smith tends to approach women he apprehends as dangerous.” Attending to individual occasions is presumably what forms the inductive basis for intentional generalizations; which means that we had best settle our view of *post-hoc* content attributions before we start debating such generalizations. As the examples indicate, there will be plenty of room for debate, and we may need specialized styles of content attribution to deal with particular cases, like Smith. We might ultimately say, for example, that Smith’s experiences of fear towards dangerous women have statistically aberrant *directive* aspects, and are about non-typical relational aims.

It is also worth noting that by emphasizing the way emotions can ‘get things right,’ Pacherie adopts a notion of rationalization that is in one respect stronger than Davidson’s. Davidson would call you rational so long as you acted on your beliefs and desires – even if they were composed of falsehoods and delusions of grandeur, and even if your act was one of self-destruction. If one retains this bit of Davidson, and follows Pacherie in rejecting the transparency principle, one might wonder why it does not turn out that every emotional behavior (no matter how misdirected or flailing) should be viewed as acting on an ‘emotional reason.’ If we can err while acting on prototypical primary reasons, it is unclear why ‘emotional reasons’ should be held to a higher standard. This strikes me as doubly perplexing if emotional reasons need not be consciously accessible. Being rational in forming prior intentions to act requires, I suppose, some fairly large tracts of coherence within and between one’s beliefs, and desires, such that they can be paired in means-end reasoning. And being reflectively aware of one’s beliefs, and desires is (one would hope) a good way to effect such coherence. It seems difficult to impose any such coherence constraints on emotional reasons. My own view is that the transparency principle tracks an important aspect of the rationality of acting on *one’s own* primary reasons – an aspect that is missed by Pacherie’s account of ‘emotional reasons’ as contents that are accurate and cause adaptive behaviors.