Punitive Warfare: Measuring The Effects of a Punitive Disposition On Public Support For War

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PUNITIVE WARFARE: MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF A PUNITIVE DISPOSITION ON PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR WAR

by

PAUL IAN THOMAS

Under the direction of Jason Reifler

ABSTRACT

Recent research has posited that retributiveness is an individual level disposition that can help us understand foreign policy preferences (e.g. Liberman 2006, Liberman 2007, Liberman in press, Stein n.d.). However, previous research is limited in two related respects. First, previous research relies on correlational data, blunting our ability to make clear causal inferences. Also, retributiveness is not made theoretically distinct from general hawkishness. In this paper, I present results from two experiments to refine our understanding of how retributiveness can affect support for use of the military. In the first experiment, I examine how retributiveness affects support for greater military commitment across a number of potential missions. In the second experiment, I examine how retributiveness interacts with different rhetorical justifications for military endeavors (e.g. punishing transgressors versus eliminating a foreign policy threat).

INDEX WORDS: War, Punishment, Retribution, Vengeance, Just war theory, Public opinion, Experimental research, Survey
PUNITIVE WARFARE: MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF A PUNITIVE DISPOSITION ON SUPPORT FOR WAR

by

PAUL IAN THOMAS

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PUNITIVE WARFARE: MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF A PUNITIVE DISPOSITION ON
SUPPORT FOR WAR

by

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1 INTRODUCTION

A large range of work exists which argues that public support for war is dependent on a combination of situational factors and various dispositional perspectives. Situational factors such as perceived risks, elite cohesion and the presence of American interests have long been seen as vital to the prospects of any war seeking democratic government gaining the necessary support to carry out their plans. Recent works have also suggested that the prospect of success, whether viewed in general or in the context of specific types of missions, is particularly salient. If the situational factors align correctly, then even those who would otherwise be opposed to war can be persuaded that it is the correct course of action. What is less clear is how specific dispositional characteristics might affect support for wars that have less clearly defined American interests or outcomes that are likely to be considered successful. If success is not clear, or the goal of the mission is ambiguous, how will different dispositional traits affect support for war?

Previous studies of mass public foreign policy attitudes have provided conflicting evidence. Whereas public opinion of foreign policy was once regarded as volatile (Almond 1950; Lippman 1955) and lacking structure (Converse 1964), more recent works have sought to clarify the intellectual structures that may explain how the public will develop preferences about foreign policy. Page and Shapiro (1988) found that aggregate public opinion was in fact far more stable than the Almond-Lippman consensus suggested. Wifffkopf (1986, 1990) developed a two dimensional model encompassing support for, or opposition to, accommodative and militant interactions with the world. While Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) developed a hierarchical model to assess how general attitudes may affect the public’s foreign policy preferences.\(^1\) Although the

\(^1\) For other hierarchical models relating to political attitudes see: Malka, Soto 2011 and Schwartz et al 2010
methodologies and theoretical underpinnings of these authors have often varied, the underlying similarity between them suggests that the public is often unaware of the specific details of foreign affairs, but is generally capable of employing various heuristic tools to understand and form opinions about foreign policy (Holsti, 1992).

Further studies are necessary to assess how these varying cognitive frameworks interact with situational variables in the minds of the public. Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) found that in experimental conditions, both military assertiveness and the isolationist tendencies of respondents proved to be important dispositional factors affecting support for conflicts. While military assertiveness tends to lead to higher levels of support for many conflicts, its positive effects are mitigated when American interests are lacking.

In order to overcome even the most ardent isolationists, conflicts must cross national boundaries and involve a nation that could ultimately threaten the United States (Hermann et al, 1999; 558). As is the case with militarism, American interests must be present, and the threat must be significant. The research shows that respondents would rather stop a formidable adversary early, rather than later when they may become even stronger.

Due to the dangers associated with most military missions, the public is generally risk averse when they must first consider going to war. Prospect theory posits that individuals view potential outcomes to various actions from their perspective of the status quo. If an action is undertaken to gain something with the potential for loss if it fails, then many people are unlikely to support the action. On the other hand, if the status quo is being threatened, then many people will become much more accepting of risk in order to maintain their current holdings. In essence, this suggests that people generally tend to be loss-averse (Boettcher, 2004: 333).
This tendency towards loss aversion has a significant impact on support for military conflicts because the benefits of any foreign policy initiative are often abstract and remote. At the same time, the potential drawbacks to a conflict, such as weakened economic performance or casualties, are more likely to have a direct impact on the lives of the public. As a result, military campaigns are viewed with skepticism or suspicion. However, a large body of work has been developed detailing the types of conflicts that are most likely to overcome public skepticism and ultimately receive support.

Nincic (1997) argues from the perspective of prospect theory and suggests that foreign policy goals which protect American interests, such as securing energy supplies and protecting American business interests abroad, will garner more support than promotive policies, such as strengthening the United Nations or promoting democracy abroad, which would require an expenditure of presently held resources towards a goal that might not be achieved (Nincic, 1997: 100-101). Bruce Jentleson (1992: Jentleson and Britton 1998) argues that the principle policy objective (PPO) is a significant factor in determining whether the public will accept American military involvement in a crisis. In particular, when the PPO is foreign policy restraint, such as preventing one nation from invading another, the public will be much more supportive than in a situation in which the PPO is internal political change, such as efforts to alter the domestic political institutions of another nation (Jentleson 1992: 53). Patricia Sullivan’s (2007) findings can be used to support the arguments of Jentleson, as she explains that missions which require a higher level of coercion against a foreign nation are less likely to succeed than those which merely require brute force, such as the acquisition or defense of territory (Sullivan 2007: 504,511).
Whatever terms are used to describe the different types of missions that are most likely to garner public support, the common underlying factor is a greater probability of success. Indeed, recent work has found that public beliefs about the likelihood of success are one of the most significant factors affecting support for any conflict (Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, 2009:123).

Another important factor affecting support is the elite discourse surrounding a conflict or a potential conflict. Berinsky (2007) argues that individuals within the public will often rely on the positions of elites to provide a reference point amidst the opinions surrounding war (Berinsky, 2007:978). Gelpi et al. also found that higher levels of elite cohesion proved to be beneficial. The strongest levels of support came to conflicts that received unanimous support from domestic elites (the President, as well as bipartisan support in Congress) as well as international support from allies such as NATO and international organizations such as the United Nations (Gelpi et al., 2009: 117).

However, aside from the commonly researched situational and dispositional factors, there are other dispositional perspectives that may help to explain support for war. One potential area worth exploring is how differing conceptions of justice affect support for war. In particular, it is likely that those who support punitive justice will be more hawkish in some situations than those who view justice in different ways. Recent work has suggested that democracies which still use the death penalty are also more likely to support the use of military force abroad (Stein 2011). In the case of the United States, Liberman (2006) discovered that death penalty supporters were more likely to support both the 1991 and 2003 Persian Gulf Wars when they were framed as a war of good versus evil (Liberman, 2006; 711).

These works raise the possibility that the desire to punish wrongdoers may have a powerful impact on whether or not supporters of punitive justice will support specific conflicts.
that may otherwise be inadvisable. If that is the case, then how will this desire for punitive justice relate to other dispositional tendencies, such as isolationism, militarism, and ideology, as well as specific situational factors? Is it possible that the desire to punish might mitigate the negative impact of other factors in a potential conflict? In order to measure the relationship between various dispositional frameworks and situational factors which may affect them, a survey was conducted which included an experiment that sought to test out the relationship between the wide array of influences that affect public support for war. The data should show that among those who favor punitive punishments, there will be greater levels of support for foreign conflicts that seek to punish other nations for their actions rather than merely seeking peace or restitution.

2 UNDERSTANDING THE PUNITIVE MINDSET

The idea of war as a means of punishment is hardly a new concept; it has been used as a justification throughout history. As the international community has developed and matured, particularly in the aftermath of World War II and the formation of the United Nations, the idea of one state punishing another for its wrongdoings has become increasingly unacceptable. The UN Charter specifically prohibits its member nations from taking action against other states that would violate the core principles of international peace. Instead the emphasis is placed on collective action, authorized by the Security Council to defend member states from acts of aggression.²

Of course seeking justice through punishment had detractors long before the modern era. In Book I of the Republic, there was a brief discussion of retributive justice. Despite the

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argument advanced by Polemarchus claiming that justice meant benefitting one’s friends and harming one’s enemies, Plato was skeptical, claiming that when humans are harmed, they will inevitably become worse. Making someone worse off would be an act of injustice, and because a just man would never intentionally commit an act of injustice, he concludes that if one says “that a just man should harm his enemies… what he says is not true. For it has become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone.” Aristotle dealt with the motivation behind retribution when he defined anger as “an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards one’s friends”.

3 See Plato’s Republic 335c-335e 

4 Taken from Luban 2011 pg 28, see also Aristotle Rhetoric, 2.2, 1378a31-32

The movement of international law towards collective security, as well as the moral criticisms of retributive justice stem from the dangers associated with the pursuit of punishment as its own end. When an act of wrongdoing is committed, it sparks feelings of outrage. The act of the wrongdoer demonstrates selfishness and a lack of concern and empathy for those that suffer by their actions. The goal of retributive justice is to provide punishment in order to prevent the wrongdoer from committing the same act again in the future, as well as warning others that negative actions will result in similar consequences. However, for retributive actions to be justified, the act or punishment must be secondary to the more important ideal of restitution for the victim (Day: 1978).

One common criticism of punitive justice is that the punishments that are meted out often have nothing to do with restitution for the victim. Instead, the act of punishment can easily become its own end, which in turn leads to punishments that may be disproportionate to the original crime that was committed. The potential for disproportionate punishment is one of the
greatest dangers associated with retributive punishments. The death penalty, in turn, is viewed by its detractors as one of the most enduring examples of a harsh, puritanical reaction to injustice. Critics claim that the death penalty fails to meet the criteria of a justifiable retributive punishment because it offers nothing more than vindictive satisfaction to those who have suffered as a result of the crime committed.

Of course, most death penalty supporters see it in much different terms. One study found that over 85% of death penalty supporters believed that society benefitted more when murderers were executed instead of being sentenced to life in prison (Ellsworth and Ross 1983:151). Additionally, over 90% of death penalty supporters disagreed with the statement that the death penalty does nothing for the victims of crime (Ellsworth and Ross 1983: 152). Other works have suggested that there may be an underlying physiological mechanism that provides pleasure when punishment is enacted, even if it leads to some sort of loss for the one inflicting the punishment (Quervain et al; 2004).

Taken together, these works suggest that supporters of the death penalty and retribution in general, derive pleasure from the act of punishment, and believe that society benefits, even if unnecessary costs are incurred in order to carry out acts of punishment. If this is the case, then it is particularly dangerous in the realm of international relations, because states have often played the role of judge, jury, and executioner when they have been wronged by other states or entities. For retribution to be justifiable, it must remain proportionate to the crime, and when the aggrieved party is able to choose the punishment of its enemy, it will often lead to an overreaction as vengefulness will distort that sense of proportionality. Luban refers to a “biased judgment objection” in describing this situation because “all states believe that justice lies on their side, and their adversary has committed abominable injustice. And therefore the
punishment theory of just cause is an open invitation to self-serving, unfair, overly harsh, and excessive punishment” (Luban, 2011: 25).

In the context of public support for war, the retributive tendencies of society at large likely play an important role in determining how leaders in a democratic state will frame a conflict. Given the complicated and often abstract nature of foreign policy, the average citizen often operates at a deficit when it comes to accurate information about potential conflicts. The literature suggests that in order for citizens in a democracy to be persuaded that a conflict is worthwhile leaders must convince them that the conflict is within the national interest, that the level of risk is proportionate to the potential gains from the conflict, and that the likelihood of success is high as well. However, leaders also routinely employ idealistic moral arguments that are intended to persuade those who might otherwise be unmoved by arguments rooted in the national interest (Liberman, 2006: 688).

In the case of democracies that support the death penalty, these moral arguments are often framed as a matter of good versus evil. When foreign policy matters are framed in this way, societal acceptance of retributive justice is a strong positive predictor for war support (Stein, 2011: 11). For instance, in the case of the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, death penalty supporters were found to be 36% more likely to support the war compared to death penalty opponents (Liberman, 2006: 689). Among American elites, death penalty support was found to increase both the acceptance of the invasion of Iraq, as well as tolerance for casualties (Liberman, 2007: 4).

Studies related to the death penalty and foreign policy preferences suggest that there is a connection between support for punitive justice within the domestic sphere and support for wars that seek to punish those who violate international norms. However, death penalty support alone
can not act as the sole identifying factor for a punitive mindset. While many death penalty supporters likely do favor punishment over other means of pursuing justice, many death penalty advocates support capital punishment due to its perceived effectiveness. Many believe that it functions as a powerful deterrent to violent crimes, while ensuring that those who are convicted will not be able to go free on parole or some unjust legal technicality (Ellsworth and Ross, 1983: 156). In one study, when the death penalty was framed as a means of society getting revenge against criminals, only 45% of death penalty supporters agreed (Ellsworth and Ross, 1983: 151-52). These findings suggest that support for both the death penalty and retribution in general is borne from emotion, but few supporters are willing to admit it.

The death penalty study conducted by Ellsworth and Ross in 1983 gives the impression that supporters of capital punishment find many reasons for doing so, just as opponents find many reasons for their opposition. While fascinating, their work is limited to the domestic sphere, and can only raise more questions than answers about potential foreign policy implications. In contrast, the works of Stein (2011) and Liberman (2006, 2007) both seek to establish a link between support for capital punishment and punitive warfare. However, they are limited to aggregate correlational data that does not allow us to make causal inferences. A gap exists within the literature that, if filled, may allow researchers to come to a better understanding of attitudes towards justice, as well as how public support for war is formulated. By employing individual level survey data focused solely on the relationship between attitudes towards punishment and foreign policy preferences, positive steps may be taken towards achieving both of these lofty goals.
3 METHODOLOGY

In May of 2012, an online survey was administered to a sample of 450 people through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mturk) program. The mturk program allows researchers to reach a broad subset of people who are paid a token sum of money to participate in a survey. Although it does not provide the most statistically diverse set of respondents, the mturk program does allow for a large, geographically diverse group to be surveyed relatively quickly and inexpensively. That being said, young white males were overrepresented in this particular sample. Those identifying themselves as males made up 59% of the sample, while 79% identified themselves as being Caucasian. 56% of respondents were between the ages of 18-29. The sample was also well educated, with approximately 39% of respondents having completed at least a 4 year college degree. Ideologically, the respondents were left leaning, with 55% identifying themselves as liberal, 23% identifying themselves as conservative, and 20% identifying as moderates.

After answering a set of demographic questions, respondents were asked a variety of questions relating to their feelings regarding the death penalty, their preferences regarding punishment of crime in general, as well as a battery of foreign policy questions. A two part randomized experiment was included at the end of the survey to assess what types of relationships existed between the subjects’ previous responses and their views on a hypothetical situation involving a military intervention. Ultimately, four independent variables were derived from the data: a punitive scale, an isolationist scale, a militarism scale as well as ideology. It is expected that isolationists will generally be opposed to taking military action in the majority of situations, while a punitive disposition will likely lead to support for war in circumstances in which there is a clear “villain” that needs to be punished.
The selection of questions was meant to test whether or not a punitive justice model could be developed to compete against the more commonly used militant/accommodation, internationalist/isolationist, and ideological models. In total, four questions were used to assess punitive tendencies. Table 1 lists the questions as well as the distribution of answers:

**Table 1: Punitive Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punitive Scale</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly</td>
<td>Oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you support or oppose the use of the death penalty for people convicted of murder?</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you support or oppose the use of the death penalty for people convicted of crimes other than murder?</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We need a tougher approach to crime with an emphasis on stricter sentencing, capital punishment for more crimes, and fewer paroles for convicted felons.</td>
<td>Strongly</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The best way to reduce crime is to punish criminals through long sentences and other harsh measures.</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cronbach’s Alpha Test Scale: .8114

The overall reliability of the scale is quite high (Cronbach’s alpha=.8114) which suggests that this set of questions does capture an underlying value of punitiveness. The two death penalty questions were coded from 1-7, while the two general punishment questions were coded
from 1-5. In both cases, higher values were linked to greater support. While a majority of
respondents favor capital punishment for murder, less than 25% of respondents were in favor of
capital punishment for crimes other than murder. Support for the other questions relating to
punishment in general was only slightly higher, with approximately 30% of respondents favoring
tougher sentences and harsher treatment for prisoners.

In addition to the questions regarding support for punishment, several questions were
asked regarding the extent to which respondents support American involvement in global affairs.
The questions relating to isolationism are presented below in Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Isolationism Scale</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The United States shouldn’t risk its citizens’ happiness and well-being by getting involved with other nations.</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. needs to simply mind its own business when it comes to international affairs.</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbach’s Alpha Test Scale: .7568</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall strength of the isolationism scale is high (Cronbach’s alpha=.7568), which
again indicates that these questions tap into an underlying trend regarding support or opposition
to American involvement with other nations. As was the case with the individual components of
the punitive scale, responses to the isolationist questions were coded from 1-5, with higher
values indicating greater agreement with the statements presented. Both of the isolationist

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5 An alternative coding of the Punitive variable was also used in which each of the variables was recoded into
interval variables with a total range of 0-1. This was done to further ensure the reliability of the scale. The
substantive effect of the scale remained the same regardless of which version was used, hence the omission of the
alternative variable from any of the models.
questions used had similar results, with approximately 40% of respondents agreeing that the United States should avoid becoming too involved with the affairs of other nations.

Finally, a number of questions were asked which assessed the degree to which militarism was present in the minds of the respondents. Ultimately, three questions were used to form the basis of the militarism scale. The questions and their distribution of responses are listed below in table 3:

**Table 3: Militarism Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militarism Scale</th>
<th>Strongly</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is necessary to strike at the heart of America’s enemies.</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States needs a strong military to be effective in international relations.</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power.</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbach's Alpha Test Scale: .7381</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As was the case with the punitive and isolationism scales, higher values of the variables within the scale are linked to greater amounts of support (coded 1-5). The resulting scale shows strong significance (Cronbach’s alpha is .7381). While a majority support the idea of the United States having a strong military in general (52% support), there was less agreement among respondents regarding the other questions, as only 30% of respondents were in favor of striking at the heart of American enemies. Both the militarism and isolationist scales also produced large swaths of people who chose to express no opinion on the subject of foreign policy (typically
around 25% or so) which was a good deal higher than those who chose not to express an opinion in regards to the more domestically oriented questions about crime and punishment.

In addition to scales measuring militarism, isolationism and moral punitiveness, ideology represents another important independent variable when explaining support for war. Within the dataset, the variable Ideology has a range of 1-3, with 1 representing those who described themselves as anything between slightly and strongly liberal. 2 represents those who identified as moderates, and 3 represents those who identified as anything between slightly and strongly conservative.

The first test that was run was a comparison of the effects of the four independent variables in a variety of general military scenarios. Respondents were asked if they would be willing to support the use of American military force in six different scenarios. In each of these scenarios, respondents had a choice of 5 answers with 1 representing strong opposition, and 5 representing strong support for the action in question. In addition the respondents were randomly assigned into two groups. One group saw each scenario framed with the use of Air Strikes, while the other group saw each scenario framed with Ground Troops.

The choice was made to use two different frames to measure the extent to which higher levels of American involvement might affect the levels of support across different dispositional perspectives. Previous research has found both that mission type and the extent of missions have a significant impact on support (see Jentleson 1992: Nincic 1997 & Jentleson and Briton 1998). The scenarios were divided into two basic classifications, humanitarian and security related interventions. The results of the humanitarian scenarios are displayed in Table 4.

Models 4.1 and 4.2 are devoted to a scenario in which a foreign government commits acts of mass murder or genocide against its own population. Model 4.1 includes each of the main
scale variables, as well as ideology and the effects of the ground troop versus air strikes frame.

As one would expect, given the lack of clearly defined American interests, both isolationism and conservatism (ideology is coded so that higher values link to self described conservatives) were linked with opposition to the idea of using American forces to prevent a government from killing its own citizens. Militarism had a positive, highly significant, and powerful effect on support for the use of force. On the other hand, the punitive variable failed to reach significance, and there was no statistically significant difference in responses between the ground troops and air strikes frames, as indicated by the weakness of the ground troops variable in the model.

Model 4.2 is nearly identical to 4.1 except for the omission of the militarism scale. Militarism was removed in order to assess whether or not it was minimizing the effect of the punitive variable in model 4.1. In the case of stopping genocide, however, this does not appear to be the case, and overall, the results are very similar in both models despite the removal of the militarism scale.

Models 4.3 and 4.4 test the respondents’ attitudes towards assisting a democracy in overthrowing a dictatorship. In model 4.3, both isolationism and conservatism were strongly linked to opposition to the use of American force, while militarism was related to support for intervention. As compared to the air strikes frame, the suggestion of using ground troops to assist in a democratic movement actually produced a negative, significant effect among respondents.

In model 4.4, the militarism scale is removed once again, and this time, the omission allows the punitive scale to become positive and highly significant, which indicates that in this type of situation, a punitive disposition may be activated by the idea of punishing an illegitimate leader. However, it seems unusual that this relationship exists in the help democracy scenario,
but not in the stop genocide scenario, despite the obvious similarities. Isolationism remained negative and significant, while the effects of ground troops and ideology were weakened.

Table 4: Linear Regression Results of Humanitarian Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian Military Interventions</th>
<th>4.1 Stop Genocide</th>
<th>4.2 Stop Genocide</th>
<th>4.3 Help Democracy</th>
<th>4.4 Help Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground troops</td>
<td>0.0274 (0.101)</td>
<td>0.0330 (0.106)</td>
<td>-0.198* (0.0976)</td>
<td>-0.194+ (0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punitive</td>
<td>-0.0517 (0.0477)</td>
<td>0.0679 (0.0456)</td>
<td>0.0490 (0.0460)</td>
<td>0.146*** (0.0435)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>0.406*** (0.0645)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.328*** (0.0623)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolationism</td>
<td>-0.115* (0.0506)</td>
<td>-0.199*** (0.0509)</td>
<td>-0.215*** (0.0488)</td>
<td>-0.282*** (0.0486)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.251*** (0.0694)</td>
<td>-0.198** (0.0719)</td>
<td>-0.140* (0.0670)</td>
<td>-0.0975 (0.0686)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>3.436*** (0.262)</td>
<td>4.459*** (0.214)</td>
<td>2.896*** (0.253)</td>
<td>3.724*** (0.204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

"+ p<0.10  * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"

In the next set of scenarios, respondents dealt with military situations related to general security issues that were more closely tied in to American interests than the humanitarian oriented scenarios. Table 5 shows the results of the regression analyses of these scenarios.
Table 5: Linear Regression Results of Interests Based Military Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground troops</th>
<th>5.1 Kill Terrorists</th>
<th>5.2 Kill Terrorists</th>
<th>5.3 Expand Land</th>
<th>5.4 Expand Land</th>
<th>5.5 Protect Oil</th>
<th>5.6 Protect Oil</th>
<th>5.7 Support Dictator</th>
<th>5.8 Support Dictator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.165+</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.00375</td>
<td>0.00858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0858)</td>
<td>(0.0977)</td>
<td>(0.0926)</td>
<td>(0.0936)</td>
<td>(0.0953)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.0995)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punitive</td>
<td>0.0130</td>
<td>0.197***</td>
<td>0.142**</td>
<td>0.198***</td>
<td>0.120**</td>
<td>0.293***</td>
<td>0.0669</td>
<td>0.193***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0404)</td>
<td>(0.0423)</td>
<td>(0.0436)</td>
<td>(0.0404)</td>
<td>(0.0448)</td>
<td>(0.0453)</td>
<td>(0.0468)</td>
<td>(0.0451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>0.626***</td>
<td>0.189**</td>
<td>0.588****</td>
<td>0.428***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0547)</td>
<td>(0.0591)</td>
<td>(0.0607)</td>
<td>(0.0635)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolationism</td>
<td>-0.111**</td>
<td>-0.239***</td>
<td>0.0337</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0272</td>
<td>0.0937+</td>
<td>-0.0594</td>
<td>-0.147**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0429)</td>
<td>(0.0472)</td>
<td>(0.0463)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0476)</td>
<td>(0.0506)</td>
<td>(0.0497)</td>
<td>(0.0504)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.00803</td>
<td>0.0738</td>
<td>0.118+</td>
<td>0.143*</td>
<td>0.149*</td>
<td>0.225**</td>
<td>0.0880</td>
<td>0.146*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0589)</td>
<td>(0.0666)</td>
<td>(0.0636)</td>
<td>(0.0638)</td>
<td>(0.0653)</td>
<td>(0.0714)</td>
<td>(0.0684)</td>
<td>(0.0713)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>2.177***</td>
<td>3.755***</td>
<td>0.526*</td>
<td>1.003***</td>
<td>0.0644</td>
<td>1.547***</td>
<td>0.831**</td>
<td>1.906***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N | 440 | 440 | 440 | 440 | 438 | 438 | 438 | 438 |

Standard errors in parentheses

"+ p<0.10  * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"

Models 5.1 and 5.2 measure respondents’ attitudes towards using the American military to attack terrorists and destroy their bases or camps. In model 5.1, militarism continues to be a powerful indicator of support, with a strong coefficient and a high level of significance. Using ground troops to fight terrorists caused a slightly significant, negative reaction among respondents, which may be explained by a general tendency towards war weariness given American war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade. When the militarism scale is
removed from the analysis in model 5.2, the punitive scale becomes positive and highly significant while very little changed amongst the other variables.

Models 5.3 and 5.4 measure respondents’ support for using the American military to help an American ally expand its territory. In model 5.3, both the militarism and punitive scales were positive and significant. The significance of the punitive scale is particularly surprising, given the fact that assisting an ally in expanding their territory makes no mention of punishing evil or provides any other justification for using force. When militarism is removed in model 5.4, the punitive scale remains positive while ideology becomes significant and positive as well. One possible explanation could be that ideology, militarism, and the punitive scale are linked to some extent by an underlying motivation towards supporting American interests. However, the expand land scenario does little to explain how helping an ally expand their territory would be helpful to American interests, other than presumably hurting an enemy of the United States while making an ally more powerful.

While the expand land scenario does not make the presence of American interests entirely clear, the scenario used in models 5.5 and 5.6 does. In that scenario, respondents were asked to answer whether or not they would support the use of American force to ensure that the United States’ supply of oil could not be threatened by another group. The results are similar to the expand land scenario, both the militarism and punitive scales are positive and significant in model 5.5. Ideology is also positive and significant, with a slightly higher coefficient than was found in either expand land scenario. In model 5.6, the results are roughly the same without the militarism scale; the notable changes being a slight increase in the strength of both ideology and the punitive scale.
The final pair of models dealt with the respondents’ attitudes towards assisting a friendly dictatorship seeking to suppress an anti-American democratic movement. In model 5.7 the militarism scale is highly significant and positive, while none of the other variables were significant. When militarism is removed in model 5.8 however, the punitive scale becomes highly significant and positive, while both ideology and the isolationism scale also become significant. What is surprising about model 5.8 is that the punitive scale seems to be going in the wrong direction, because even an anti-American democratic movement could be viewed as more just and more deserving of support than even the friendliest tyrant. The positive coefficient of the ideology variable and the fact that ideology and the punitive scale both became positive and significant when militarism was removed suggests that the relationship between these three variables is perhaps more intertwined than was initially expected.

In terms of the overall responses, each dispositional perspective seems to exhibit the expected traits. Isolationists were opposed to every scenario, while conservatives were more likely to support interventions that involved American interests, such as protecting oil, while being opposed to interventions that were less clearly aligned with the national interest, such as stopping genocide. Militarism was most supportive across all of the scenarios, suggesting that the militarism scale taps into the ‘trigger-happy’ part of respondents’ mindsets. What seems less clear is how the punitive scale can be used to form generalizable theories based on the results from these scenarios. In situations in which a clear villain could be drawn (genocide, helping democracy, killing terrorists and protecting a friendly dictator), the punitive scale garners mixed results. Sometimes those who are high on the punitive scale support the promotion of retributive justice (helping democracy, killing terrorists), while at other times they seem to favor promoting injustice (protecting dictator) or their attitudes are simply unclear (stopping genocide).
Moreover, while the presence or absence of the militarism scale had effects on all of the variables, it seems to particularly impact the level of significance found in the punitive scale.

These results indicate that punishment and general militarism are closely aligned. The relationship may in fact be more tightly aligned than punitiveness and conservatism, given the fact that the two variables seem to differ when American interests are not present in a potential military intervention. While it is not certain, it may be possible that a disposition towards moral punitiveness may in fact be an underlying trait of those who take a militant stance towards foreign affairs in general.⁶ The final part of the survey seeks to address the relationship of punitiveness towards the other independent variables in a more controlled fashion.

4 EXPERIMENT RESULTS

The experiment within the survey consists of two parts, which were meant to mimic certain aspects of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. This conflict was chosen for several reasons: the first is that it provides an opportunity to use experimental data to examine Peter Liberman’s (2006, 2007) theories regarding moral punitiveness surrounding the Persian Gulf War. It also provides an interesting scenario to test the punitive model on its own, because while many would agree that the initial intervention to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait was necessary and justifiable, the subsequent calls by some for a further invasion of Iraq to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from power enjoyed far less support. Yet those calls for vengeance against the Iraqi regime highlight the often blurry line between restitution and revenge that has made retributive wars so controversial.

⁶ Alpha testing of the individual components of the punitive scale and the militarism scale put together yielded a test scale of .8286. However, exploratory factor analysis was conducted which produced three distinct factors, which correlated with the individual components of the scaled variables i.e. death penalty, general harsh punishments for crime, and militarism. While there may be an underlying connection between militarism and punitiveness, it will require more work to fully explain what that connection may be.
The first part of the experiment mimics the actual conditions surrounding the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Respondents were told that an aggressive regime had attacked its neighbor without provocation and was likely to conquer them if the United States did not join a global coalition working to stop the invasion. Table 6 shows the results of a linear regression for the first part of the experiment. Despite the severity of the situation and the complete support of the international community, both ideology and the isolationist scale had negative relationships with the first part of the experiment. While the punitive scale had a slightly negative coefficient, the relationship was not significant. Militarism however, had a strong, positive, significant relationship. The lack of a significant relationship from the punitive scale is unexpected because the wording of the question makes it clear who the wrongdoer is and specifies that at the least, the United States will not be alone in attacking this foe.

One potential reason why the first part of the experiment lacks support may be because the question was worded in a way that made no mention of things that might pertain to American interests, such as either of the countries being an ally of the United States, or whether or not significant natural resources were at stake, as they were in the original Persian Gulf conflict. While the militarism scale seems to be capturing the dynamic of hawkishness, the lack of significant results from the punitive scale suggests that the relationship between retribution and support for war may be tempered to a large degree by the presence or absence of American interests.

Given the lack of support in the first part of the experiment, it may seem doubtful that support will exist for the second part which depicts an escalation of the use of force. Respondents were told that following a successful intervention, the aggressor state had retreated
Table 6: Linear Regression of Experiment Part 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 6.1</th>
<th>Experiment Part 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punitive</td>
<td>-0.0543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0572)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarism</td>
<td>0.418***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0777)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.408***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0834)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolationism</td>
<td>-0.378***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0606)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>5.818***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

"*** p<0.001" "** p<0.01" "* p<0.05"

from its neighboring country and ended its attack. With a weakened military, the aggressor state could be easily conquered, and that it would likely attempt to invade its neighbor again if given the chance. Respondents were then asked if they would support further military operations against the aggressor state.

Within that question, three conditions were controlled for, using a two by two by two factorial design which yielded eight different versions of the question. Table 7 lists those conditions:
Table 7: Experimental Control Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Support</td>
<td>Punish/Prevent</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>Prevent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes</td>
<td>Punish</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Yes</td>
<td>Prevent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Yes</td>
<td>Punish</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. No</td>
<td>Prevent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. No</td>
<td>Punish</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. No</td>
<td>Prevent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. No</td>
<td>Punish</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each condition was randomly assigned in half of all cases. For instance, half of all respondents were given the ‘punish’ frame, while the other half received the ‘preventive’ frame. Around 1/8 of the sample received the most extreme case, in which they were asked if they would support a unilateral American invasion of the aggressor state in which civilian casualties were certain to occur in order to *punish* the aggressor state for its past actions. Another 1/8 received the least extreme example, in which the United States would have implied international support for an invasion meant to prevent future attacks in which no mention of civilian casualties was made.

Model 8.1 shows the overall results of the second part of the experiment across all conditions. Compared to model 6.1, ideology loses its significance, while the isolationism scale remains negative; however, the punitive scale has not only become highly significant, but has

Table 8: Experiment Part 2 Linear Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punitive</th>
<th>Model 8.1</th>
<th>Model 8.2</th>
<th>Model 8.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.2100***</td>
<td>.1657*</td>
<td>-.2558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0662)</td>
<td>(.0808)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
also had a solid increase in its effect. This is somewhat surprising, given the fact that the punitive scale had an insignificant relationship with the first part of the experiment when clearly the aggressor nation was at fault and (in the eyes of many) deserved punishment for its actions. Furthermore, the large body of literature surrounding public support for war has almost always found that missions with limited policy objectives, dealing with cross border aggression, are supported more often than those that require a full on invasion as in the case of the second part of the experiment.
One way to explain the unexpected gap in the punitive scale’s significance between part 1 and part 2 of the experiment might be based around the perceived chance of success. Based off of the recent work of Gelpi et al (2009) which found that higher prospects of success can often mitigate the presumed dangers of a military strike, it could be argued that despite the more extensive level of involvement that an invasion would entail, the fact that the aggressor state had already suffered one defeat, and had been severely weakened overall, may instill a greater sense of confidence that an invasion would be successful. Compare that situation to the first part of the experiment in which it is made clear that even a multilateral attempt at stopping the aggressor state would likely fail without American military support, and it becomes plausible that respondents would be unsure whether or not supporting an intervention on behalf of a state they know nothing about (since the question tells them nothing about the invaded state) would be worth the potential costs. Thus perhaps it is unsurprising that only the most ardent advocates of American military power would be willing to support the first part of the experiment.

While the significant, positive relationship between the overall experiment and the punitive scale is important, it does not fully capture the dynamic of punitiveness and the other conditions. Models 8.2 and 8.3 show the interactive effect of the punitive scale with the casualties condition within the experiment. Model 8.2 is identical to model 8.1, with the exception that casualties and the punitive scale are regressed as an interaction term. This interaction was chosen to test out the effects of casualties on those with the most strongly punitive dispositions. Unfortunately the interaction term failed to gain significance in model 8.2. Further tests were conducted and it was found that the punish frame had little effect on the punitive scale. However, the international support frame does appear to have an impact on those with a punitive disposition (the presence of international support seems to hurt support among
those with a punitive disposition). Thus in model 8.3, the effects of the international support control variable are isolated by stipulating that only the responses in which international support is not present be used. When this is done, model 8.3 demonstrates that when casualties and the punitive scale interact, not only will casualties fail to dampen the support among those with punitive dispositions, it actually increases it.

The relative size of the coefficient is fairly large. What is most noteworthy however is the fact that the increase in the coefficient promotes the alarming idea that punitivists might be more supportive of a war that they know will kill civilians. This distinction could be explained by the general mindset of retribution touched upon by Aristotle and succinctly stated by Luban that “vengeful rage has no logical stopping point internal to itself.”7 Furthermore, any retributive punishment in the theatre of war will also inevitably be a collective punishment8 in which anyone may be found culpable for the crimes of the regime. So perhaps it should come as no surprise that the specific inclusion of casualties not only failed to deter punitivists, but in fact caused an increase in support.

The relationship between casualties and the punitive scale necessitated further analysis, so a linear combination of estimators test was performed using the coefficients generated in model 8.3 by the interaction of casualties and the punitive scale. Since model 8.3 used linear regression to analyze the data, it was already assumed that there was a linear relationship between the variables. By using a linear combination test, it is possible to measure the extent to which the marginal effect of casualties is influenced by individual values on the punitive scale. Figure 1 displays a graph with the results of that analysis:

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7 Luban, 2011: 32
8 Ibid, 36
At the lowest levels of the punitive scale, the interaction of casualties causes a substantial (-.9679) drop in support for the invasion featured in experiment two. This drop is significant at the 0.01 level. Such a drop should be expected; especially considering the non-casualties frame makes no mention of possible human suffering as a result of the invasion. As the punitive scale moves into the middle of its range, the interactive effect loses significance. However, the coefficient begins to shift from a negative value to a positive one, ultimately culminating in a substantial (1.038) increase in support for the invasion amongst the most ardent supporters of punitive justice when casualties are mentioned. The value of the coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.

The results of the experiment were unanticipated to say the least. While it was expected that punitivists would have a higher degree of casualty tolerance than other groups, the
possibility that knowledge of expected civilian casualties would actually increase support for war was never considered. The weakness of the punish frame is also unexpected, but perhaps it should not be. Regardless of whether the punish or preventive frame was given in the experiment, the outcome was the same: the destruction of the military capabilities of the targeted regime. This suggests that at least in this situation, the framing of the intervention had little effect among those who are most supportive of punitive justice. Perhaps if the outcome associated with the punish or prevent frame had been different, the effect on punitivists would have been different as well. Finally, the role of international support was unusual. Although international support had a generally positive, though admittedly weak effect on the experiment overall, the effect among punitivists seems to be negative, given the results of model 8.3, as well as 6.1. Not only do punitivists support the use of force as a means of doing great harm to a perceived enemy of the United States, they also seem to prefer to do it unilaterally.

5 CONCLUSION

This study sought to explain how a punitive disposition interacted with other dispositional frameworks as well as common situational factors to determine mass public support for military conflicts. The results of the two part experiment as well as the generalized military scenarios contained within the survey offer several insights into the manner in which moral punitiveness affects support for foreign conflicts.

It is clear that the punitive scale has a significant impact on attitudes across a wide range of military scenarios. Utilizing several linear regression models, support for punitive justice was
positively associated with military force aiming to help democracies overcome dictators (model 4.4), combat terrorism (model 5.2), assist allies in expanding their territory (models 5.3 and 5.4), protecting American oil supplies (model 5.6) and helping a friendly dictatorial regime repress an anti-American democratic movement (model 5.8). In so far as situational factors are concerned, supporters of punitive justice seem comfortable using force in a wide array of situations in which American interests are likely present, but not always explicitly mentioned. The perceived level of interest could explain why supporters of punitive justice were in favor of helping dictators some times, while helping democracies at others, while avoiding involvement in genocidal conflicts altogether.

Although the level of risk was not mentioned in the generic military scenarios, the models presented in tables 4 and 5 did attempt to introduce risk in a controlled fashion by varying the frame received by respondents. It was assumed that if a respondent received the ground troops frame, they would intuitively consider such an operation to be risky, and potentially far more costly than they would feel if some other frame were presented. As tables 4 and 5 show however, the ground troop frame had little effect on respondents as a whole. Further analyses were attempted, including using linear regression to search for any interactions between the ground troops frame and the punitive scale, but no significant interactions were found. The one case in which risk may have affected support for a conflict among supporters of punitive justice was in the first experiment featured in model 6.1. However, the results in that case are not entirely clear since the coefficient generated by the punitive scale was insignificant, rather then negative and significant.

In the limited context of this particular survey, general situational factors had little effect on the punitive scale. This was to be expected to some extent, because information regarding the
extent to which any action was in the interest of the United States was intentionally minimized in
many of the military scenarios in order to better understand how the dispositional tendencies of
respondents would affect their reaction to generally ambiguous military scenarios. The
situational factors that were used in the second part of the experiment were varied in a controlled
fashion, though again, none of the variables in either portion of the experiment would generally
be considered part of the national interest. This makes the high levels of support exhibited by the
punitive and militarism scales, as well as the negative relationships of isolationism and ideology
much more compelling. What remains difficult to explain is exactly how to distinguish between
the effects of each dispositional scale across the range of scenarios presented in this study.

For instance, as the results show in tables 4 and 5, the effect of the militarism scale was
generally the most powerful of all of the dispositional factors. While isolationism tended to be
negative and significant regardless of the presence of the militarism scale, the punitive scale
seemed much more susceptible to the effects of the inclusion or removal of the militarism scale.
In the case of models 4.3 and 4.4, the removal of the militarism scale not only caused a fairly
large spike in the coefficient of the punitive scale, it also caused a huge shift in significance
(from no significance to being significant at the 0.001 level). While it seems apparent that there
is a relationship between the punitive scale and militarism, it remains unclear how the two can
properly be disentangled. For instance, the theoretical basis for justifying punishment as a
method of foreign policy would suggest that having a clear cut villainous leader or regime would
be critical in garnering support for a conflict. However, both the punitive and militarism scales
tended to be positive across a wide array of conditions, even those that would involve the United
States supporting the perceived villain. While it could be theorized that conservatism is the
underlying factor between both dispositions, the evidence from this data set shows that
conservatives were sometimes opposed to the same conflicts that militarist supporters favored (see models 4.3, and 6.1). At best it could be said that conservatism lines up with the punitive and militarism scales only in matters that clearly serve the national interest.

What remains then is a complex puzzle relating punitivists with militarists, with few clear ways in which to separate them. As far as this particular dataset is concerned, the most substantial difference seems to lie in how each disposition interprets the casualties frame. As figure 1 showed above, the marginal effect of casualties amongst those with a highly punitive disposition is increased support for the military intervention featured in models 8.1-8.3. What may be possible is that while militarists support the use of force for reasons related to national security or the expression of American power, perhaps punitivists view it from a moral perspective of correcting perceived injustices or reestablishing the moral balance between those whose actions are right and just (us) and whose actions are wrong and unjust (anyone who goes against us). This could explain why punitivists side with friendly dictators sometimes and rising democracies at others. Or why they support our allies’ expansion of land yet choose not to take action when countries they do not care about are invaded by other nations (i.e. model 6.1). The relationship with casualties, accompanied by the huge spike in support for model 8.1, might suggest that once punitivists become engaged in a war, it becomes a total war in which victory is defined only when the enemy has no chance of fighting back. Just as punitivists support irrevocable capital punishment for those guilty of violating domestic norms, so too will they support disproportionate, collective punishments against regimes or their citizens who violate international norms that the United States is concerned with. Undoubtedly, more research is needed to better understand the role of a punitive disposition in regards to foreign policy preferences.
WORKS CITED


