In the Arena: Deep South Racial Threat and Contact

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by

KURT HITZEMAN

Under the Direction of Toby Bolsen, PhD

ABSTRACT

Political Science offers one overarching paradigm of racial attitude formation and development for the South: group conflict and racial threat (Key 1949, Blumer 1958). In contrast, the theory of intergroup contact (Allport 1954) offers an interactionist prescription for alleviating prejudice formation, regardless of cause or nature. Within and outside the South, existing political research has largely discounted or ignored intergroup contact as a viable theoretical contribution. Additionally, the distinctions between prejudices (thoughts) and discrimination (behaviors) have been articulated unartfully. I develop a new structural theory of modern Southern white racism that clearly identifies the key individual-level pillars on which the institution of racism is supported. Furthermore, a secondary model also describes the central modern process of racial attitude formation as well as the process for affecting calculated behavior between races. I use data from the 2007 Racial Attitudes in America Survey as well as data from an original 2016 Dictator Game Survey Experiment to empirically test major propositions implied by the models.

INDEX WORDS: Race, Discrimination, Prejudice, Intergroup Contact, Threat, The South
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KURT HITZEMAN

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1 CHAPTER 1: THE ARENA

“Now, I’m an optimist. I see signs of great hope. But it’s tough. The third rail of politics – the third rail of life in the South – is race.”

Roy Barnes, as quoted in Atlanta Magazine (August 2015)

On February 12, 1971, Americus, Georgia was featured in Life magazine as having one of the last American public school systems to fully integrate. Five years later, Habitat for Humanity was founded at nearby Koinonia Farm and a human rights champion from Plains, Jimmy Carter, was elected to the nation’s highest office. Carter’s insistence on racially-progressive policies began with his first elected position as a member of the Sumter County Board of Education. In particular, he advocated for the consolidation of several disparate rural schools. Just a couple decades later, many white children growing up in this one rural, southwest Georgia county were educated with black classmates by black teachers and directed by black principals at the elementary, middle, and high school levels.

This anecdote in the American narrative of race relations and racial educational progress provides some brief insight of what has transpired since the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954. Integration and the provision of civil rights has allowed for the potential of equal status educational settings for white and black Americans. However, existing alongside this narrative is the equally-powerful story of segregated private academies, shuttered business and industry, white financial retreatism, and growing poverty and crime in the same rural, Southern communities that served as ground zero for integration in the middle of the twentieth century. Broadly speaking, the characterization above carries with it a paradox of extreme contrasts: Where have we succeeded? Where have we failed?

The broad research question underscoring this dissertation is: What are the contemporary processes underpinning white racism? Social scientists have certainly exhausted themselves in
trying to ascertain the fluid effects of our civil rights history, and they have done so while broadening the analysis to include all racial groups in all areas throughout the United States. For example, Black (2004) and Carmines (1989) demonstrate the role of race in holistic partisan realignment, Glaser (1994, 2005, 2013) assesses the state of racism as it specifically relates to public policy, and McClain et al. (1998, 2006) evaluates the intersection of black and emerging Latino competition for the next generation of race scholars. The question is a giant one, and it is not one easily answered. But I do consider that we may uncover and explain some changes that have occurred, and I argue that we may do so most effectively if we first narrow our focus.

To begin, I will limit my study to the evaluation of white racism with regards to black Americans. The historical evidence is more exhaustive in this conception than in others, and the potential for exploring causal mechanisms with broader external validity is greater thus. Second, I limit my study to the American South (most specifically, the Deep South). Although the composition of several urban areas in other regions include large black populations, there is no more fertile ground for evaluating race relations than in the very places that were the foci of civil rights changes. The Deep South is where integration has affected the landscape of public accommodations most completely due to an historically high concentration of black residents. In assessing modern realities, I choose to focus on the place where the narrative is most complete.

Next, I choose to focus on a primary debate throughout the literature: racial threat and intergroup contact. While these two causal mechanisms appear to be clearly at odds with one another, a closer look uncovers that each may affect white racism in different ways. In essence, the reality is not zero sum; both forces may move simultaneously, even within the same individual. My theory suggests that while Deep South racial threat often persists in promoting
discriminatory choices, intergroup contact has also had a definite effect on limiting white prejudicial attitudes.

Articulating the differences between discrimination and prejudice alone is not necessarily a novel enterprise. Sociologists have made that distinction a mandatory piece of introductory textbooks (Thomas 2005). However, a careful review of the literature suggests that they have often been confused or used interchangeably as a means of explaining the existence and determinants of racism (for example, see Henry and Sears 2002). Criticisms of symbolic racism follow this logic very closely in that they articulate that policy preferences are more so akin to discriminatory behaviors than being solely evidence of prejudicial attitudes (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Unfortunately, this same criticism oftentimes falls short of actually showing where “racially conservative” policy preferences do not align with individual attitudes and are simply conservatism in general. On this point of explanation (and others akin to it) I seek to make the greatest headway.

Logically, we see prejudice as a gateway towards discrimination. Conversely, we typically assume that a lack of prejudice should lead to inclusive preferences or behaviors. What I endeavor in this dissertation is to uncover a paradox of attitudes and behaviors that oftentimes belies this logic and these assumptions. Additionally, I will build upon the soundest methods available to focus on a specific geographic area of interest. I assert that the most complete evidence of intergroup contact on the reduction of white prejudice may be gathered in the Deep South. I also concede that this region is uniquely susceptible to racially-discriminatory behaviors due to perceived threat.
The specific contributions of this project are firstly methodological: I will clearly separate prejudice from discrimination. I will seek to minimize social desirability bias while acknowledging that it is pervasive. I will cross-reference contextual variables of reality and perception to assess contact. And I will employ public as well as original research data explicitly gathered for the purpose of studying the entirety of the Deep South. To my knowledge, the previously mentioned steps have not been accounted for holistically in a single study. Secondly, the broad contribution of this project is innovation as well as application: In assessing the findings, we may hopefully employ a revised understanding of white racism to pave the way for future education and policy prescriptions.

In practice, I will utilize national survey data to compare Deep South white prejudice to that of the rest of the nation. If prejudice has decreased as a result of equal status contact, then the difference between regions should be minimal. I will additionally utilize the same public data to show the effects of racial context on prejudice in the Deep South. This starting point in testing the hypotheses linked to my theory allows for an update and counterpoint to other academic findings.

But due to a number of limitations in this and other national surveys, I will also present the findings of a carefully-designed original survey and experiment. This original data will allow me to pinpoint prejudice and discrimination while addressing much of the worrisome aspects in the literature. I will present findings in the clearest way possible, regarding the debates over how to measure and assess prejudice and discrimination. The “gap” that I perceive in our scholarship to this point is not necessarily one of a lack of theories. Rather, it is the lack of a clear focus (and

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1 Prejudice is defined as preconceived opinions divorced from reason or experience (Allport 1954). Discrimination is generally defined as the unjust treatment of certain categories of people (Thomas 2005). The obvious separation here is one of thought and action.
cohesive theory) on a uniquely-situated geographic area combined with a host of methodological complexities.

In the end, my prescription for white racism will not be definitive. My desire to investigate this topic is obviously one deeply-rooted in my personal belief in racial equality. But the systematic denial of equality and justice to black Americans has a long history in both mind and in deed. Glaser and Ryan (2013) present a convincing case that our present realities do offer an opportunity to “change minds if not hearts.” They argue that white discrimination may be mitigated when the white ingroup calculus is transformed to include black neighbors. I argue that hearts (or perhaps attitudes) have already changed. If my assertions are correct, then innovations on their prescription may offer the next best hope for fully realizing equality and justice in the Deep South.

1.1 Literature

Political research has reaffirmed Key’s (1949) original race thesis time and again for the Old South. Key argued that Southern politics revolved around the relative social, economic, and spatial positioning of African-Americans. Key utilized qualitative methods in compiling exhaustive case studies on the politics of eleven “Deep South” states. Thus, the unique nature of this classic work rests in its regional and historic specificity. Over five-hundred interviews were conducted across these states in Part One. Key gave particular attention to gubernatorial elections and administrations in each. In Part Two, Key assessed the phenomenon of Southern solidarity in national politics. In Parts Three, Four, and Five, Key returned to a discussion of the states, comparatively assessing the degree to which political phenomena were evident across state lines.

Ultimately, Key (5) theorized that “In its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro.” Thus, the broader significance of this work rests in Key’s
insistence that racism was an important causal variable in Southern politics. Below, I examine how Key’s “threat” hypothesis (with regard to the black belt) and his analyses of Southern Democratic factionalism (with regard to disenfranchisement and electoral rules) served as launching points for later scholarship dealing with race and politics.

Race relations, widespread poverty, and political nonparticipation were all central to dysfunction in Southern Politics. However, Key argued that the problem of white and black race relations undergirded the other two factors, especially in regions of the South with the highest percentages of black residents. Specifically, the “threat” hypothesis focused discussion on peculiarities of those regions wherein whites in small numbers grasped power and influenced state and national politics disproportionately to their voting population. That central hypothesis presented states: As the black population increased in Southern counties, attitudes of white supremacy influenced politics with a higher frequency than in areas of lower black populations. “When applied to politics white supremacy in its most extreme formulation simply means that no Negro should vote.” (Key, 646)

Of utmost importance to the black belt hypothesis was the additional observation that white dominance could not be conceptualized in terms of race alone. Rather, it was understood to mean supremacy of those whites with elite status, or those referred to in the late nineteenth century as the Bourbon elites. Key argued that white supremacist attitudes stemmed from the reproduction of a model of racial supremacy born in the antebellum South. Thus, attitudes developed among the white elites reflected the immediate threats they perceived that racial relations had on economic conditions. To this end, he posited that (white elite) politicians from the black belt would be the most vocal about maintaining white supremacy due to an “under siege” mentality.
Key offered a detailed characterization of white supremacy in the South, citing differences between the paternalistic form of racism employed by elite whites and the confrontational and outwardly violent racism practiced by poor whites (both inside and outside of the black belt). Regardless of character, however, it is clear that those more passive manifestations of white supremacist attitudes served as a political trump card. Key ultimately argued that the policies of the wealthy, black belt landowner favored the wealthy, black belt landowner.

To achieve white supremacy, Key argued that black belt whites regulated access to and control of the institutions of political power. Key chronicled the systematic exclusion of black voters in the South at the turn of the twentieth century. While the elimination of black voters could be erroneously understood as a strategy to preempt “black supremacy” in politics, Key maintained that white supremacy at the state level was never in question. Instead, he argued that white elites in the black belt primarily sought to control politics within their own districts, and the extension of this grasp on power translated to policies that limited inclusiveness throughout Southern states.

In response to the extension of voting rights mandated by the Fifteenth Amendment and the Populist uprising of the 1890s, Southern states employed poll taxes, literacy tests, residency requirements, the grandfather clause (Louisiana), and white primaries (until 1944). Key argued that these measures, while ultimately and effectively disenfranchising black voters, were not aimed solely at limiting inclusiveness based on race: Key pointed to the exclusion of poor white voters (especially outside of the black belt) as a secondary, but important, aim. As a result, he noted that the mechanisms of maintaining white supremacy in the black belt served not to dictate
what racial group controlled the whole of Southern politics, but rather they served to ensure what segment of the white population was in control.

The South, politically-dominated by minority interests, largely existed without a true party system for much of its history. Instead, the Southern Democratic Party enjoyed a political monopoly both within the black belt and across state and national politics. The disenfranchisement in the South observed by Key limited a dimension of democracy later posited by Dahl (1972): competitiveness. More recently, Aldrich’s (2011, 15) judgment that “democracy fails when there is but one party” coincides precisely with Key’s classic analysis of Southern dysfunction.

At the state and local levels, two-party competition was potentially detrimental to black belt whites and their grasp on power. Instead, by further reinforcing white supremacy with a party label, a static condition of the “Solid South” was locally maintained under the guise of association with the national Democratic Party. Key argued that as power was increasingly concentrated in the hands of black belt whites, factionalism prevailed more so than when that same power was dispersed. He utilized the case studies of individual Southern (and former Confederate) states to test this hypothesis.

Key asserted that, in practice, factions actually ruled Southern politics. White Southerners tended to care less about the Democratic Party platform than they did about the potential utility of maintaining a stranglehold on the political machinery through a single “party.” Factional leaders held real political influence in these systems, and cults of personality provided the foundation for political mobilization in particular campaigns.

Key noted that primaries within the one-party South often provided several candidates for a single office. Thus, he viewed these primaries as factional competitions that were generally
candidate-centered. An extension of these contests was the state-wide primary, in which the personal appeal of specific candidates was utilized as capital in “winnable” districts.

Aggregated to the federal level, solidarity between Southern states was aided by the one-party system. Key observed that regional interests dominated Southern Democrats in Congress, and racial matters induced consensus. However, nonracial matters invited regular disagreement, lending further evidence for Key’s primary thesis that racial conflict explained much of Southern politics. In whole, coordination of the (Southern) party in government was more organized at the national level than at the state or local level, and it was consistently dependent upon racial attitudes.

Case studies of the 1928 and 1948 Presidential Elections provided further insight into the basis of Southern solidarity. In counties consisting of low numbers of black residents, Hoover actually won a large number of votes from non-black belt whites who balked at Smith’s Catholicism. Only the black belt vote maintained unrivaled Democratic loyalty. Twenty years later, Thurmond relied on that loyalty in his Dixiecrat bid. At that juncture, clear economic alliances between wealthy agrarian interests and Southern industry could be observed. This cooperation, combined with racial undertones, served as a testament to Key’s conclusion that, “When racism triumphs within the South… the state party organizations are apt to assert their independence because they are odds with the national majority.” (392)

And while an analysis of voting in national elections across the South indicated a measure of partisan diversity within the electorate by 1949, Key’s analysis of Southern Congressional voting from 1933 to 1945 painted a different picture. Entrenched Southern Democrats in government cohered in voting behavior at a rate that superseded other voting blocs, including that of non-Southern members. By and large, Southern Democrats stood together on
policy matters, even to the point of colluding with Republicans in the Senate. Most telling, though, is the finding that rural Southerners maintained solidarity at the highest rates in the House.

Since the Civil Rights reforms of the 1960s and the end of *de jure* disenfranchisement and segregation, the importance of race in New South politics has not waned (Giles 1977; Glaser 1994; Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens 1997; Valentino and Sears 2005; Knuckey 2006, Acharya, Blackwell and Sen 2016). However, important questions remain in identifying the processes by which race currently influences Southern politics.

In recent years, the South’s economy has diverged greatly from its agrarian past. Southern industrial and post-industrial employment now offers a rationale for the boom of Sunbelt emigration. Apart from the continued presence of African-Americans in the traditional black belt of cotton production, a large number of non-white Southerners also reside in several urban areas (e.g. Atlanta). However, the shift in economic production and black “return migration” has not been limited to these urban areas (Hunt, Hunt and Falk 2013). The black belt has also experienced economic diversification, begging the question of whether modern racial attitudes are consistent with the local (economic) realities that Key (1949) observed in the first half of the twentieth century.

The primary focus of this review is to assess the state of the political science literature with regard to three main areas: The South, Racial Attitude Formation, and Measuring Racial Attitudes. Afterward, I offer two veins of research (largely) from other disciplines that provide increasing depth and point of view for alternative theory-formation.

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2 In 2010, the black population of the City of Atlanta accounted for 54% of the total population. In 1900, the black population accounted for 40%. Source: United States Census Data WWW.CENSUS.GOV
1.1.1 *The Deep South*

Key’s (1949) understanding of the geography of the South underpins his most compelling argument on racial attitudes. It appears intuitive for many political scientists to still assume his “threat” hypothesis of the black belt regarding the present-day South. He posited that white supremacy was most prevalent in areas of high black populations (i.e. the black belt). Coincidentally, the locus of much political power in the Deep South was also located in these rural areas. His observation lends explanation as to why the policy preferences of Southern politicians were so racially-conservative for nearly a century following the end of Reconstruction.

Giles (1977) picks up on Key’s primary test by analyzing ANES data from the early 1970s. He corroborates with Key’s threat hypothesis, issuing an update of sorts following landmark legislation in the 1960s. A careful critique of his methodology reveals problematic interaction terms as well as an additive index to test for “attitudes.” Despite being focused on national data, his analysis includes an argument for the continued use of contextual variables when dealing with the South alone. Valentino and Sears (2005, 679) also argue that a focus on what is considered the “Deep South,” as opposed to the South in general, is warranted: “The South, and especially the Deep South, includes a disproportionate share of the highly racially conservative whites.”

Glaser (1994) presents the most recent research strictly loyal to Key’s (1949) and Giles’ (1977) county unit of analysis; he concludes that a “threat” still exists in the black belt (at least up to 1988). Primarily, Glaser utilizes contextual variables of demography to proxy for threat (e.g. black population percentage). More recently, Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2016) also contend that Southern racism is more prevalent in areas of higher black populations. They
incorporate new variables (historical economic inequality) to account for threat (or at least historical and persistent racism). Outside of these findings, relatively little corroboration of the “threat” hypothesis or any other alternative hypotheses exists within the recent political literature.3

While Taylor (1998) contends that the modern South is still a prejudicial South, her findings (within the sociological literature) are limited to data from 1990. She does directly address the concentration of black residents within Southern locales and finds less evidence for “threat;” however, the data she utilizes is limited in that it disproportionately samples from metropolitan areas-only and lacks the specificity of neighborhood, zip code, municipality, or even county-level individual predictors. Her analyses do not incorporate rural data whatsoever.

Giles and Buckner (1993) investigate whether threat leads to political decisions by concentrating on the Louisiana Senate campaign of David Duke. They caution on the use of aggregate data to infer individual factors and they, like Voss (1996), propose that contextual threat may be overly-embraced. But each of these studies is anecdotal (focused on a narrow geography and a highly-specific political campaign). Other important voting factors, such as education, migration, and wealth, are introduced. To a large degree, the summation of both is that racial threat should not be as directly related to political outcomes as in the past.

Carmines and Stimson (1981, 1986) and Carmines (1989) contend that white partisan realignment in the Republican stronghold of the South first evolved out of racial attitudes. However, they also contend that party identification has evolved. Whether or not racial attitudes play a vital role on both sides of the aisle is somewhat controversial. Black (2004) argues that the

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3 Note that I am specifically referring to tests which are focused on the South alone. Although Voss (1996, 2000, 2004) has argued repeatedly for new research to holistically treat this area as distinct (and more critically delve into contextual determinants), his research tends to direct criticism at how political scientists have defined and used “context”. 
Democratic Party is now the party of racial inclusion, asserting that racist white voters would be
less-inclined to vote for Democrats. His ANES analysis clearly shows that race does matter for
party I.D., but he leaves room for debate on attitudes. It appears that the “Reagan Years” were
particularly formative for realignment. Black furthermore observes that, regardless of race, racial
attitudes, and a changing electorate, white men continue to dominate the “party in government.”
Taken altogether, race informs electoral behavior, but racism is perhaps another matter.

The South, then, is an enigma. We have diminishing empirical testing of threat to support
the notion that prejudice and discrimination are the driving forces for racism (and thus
party/policy preference) in racially-diverse areas. We also find that the political imperatives of
today’s South owe less to rural hoarding of power and more to a variety of evolving issues.
These policy issues may ultimately cut along racial lines, but the scholarship is conflicted on
causality. Glaser (2005) concludes that broad parallels to Key’s group conflict South are
justifiably-drawn. His case studies, reveal much continuity within the region as well as vested
interests in allowing racial conservatism to take root. Redistricting, he argues, increasingly
makes minority districts obsolete. However, he also later concedes that there are clear instances
in which group conflict is mitigated within communities (Glaser and Ryan 2013).

Ultimately, there are logical conundrums that go unanswered: If racism via threat is a
driving force for partisanship and policy preference, then why are voters in racially-diverse areas
(e.g. the black belt) still voting Democratic in higher proportions (Figure 1.1.1)? And, if
Republican strongholds actually exist in less racially-diverse areas, then how might we conclude
that racism via threat is the reason for continued racial political polarization in the South?4

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4 Racial bloc-voting is the obvious answer here, but we still have problems with continuing to assume Key’s logic
on white politicians maintaining white political supremacy. There must be alternative processes at play aside from
race, or there must be a mechanism by which white citizens in less-diverse areas have become more prejudiced.
Note: Lighter-shaded areas denote higher percentages of votes for Hillary Clinton (D). Darker shaded areas denote higher percentages of votes for Donald Trump (R). Data Source: The Associated Press\(^5\)

**Figure 1.1.1 Deep South County-Level Results of the 2016 Presidential Election**

I contend that the patterns of “red” and “blue” counties that persist best reveal attitudinal prerogatives rather than behavioral ones. Modeling voting as an extension of identity (Campbell et al. 1960) is well-documented in the political science literature. I do not discount the economic merits of voting; rather I simply contend that the voting data may suggest deeply-held attitudes more so than economic decisions. As McGann (2016) argues, the true question of voting motivations is an empirical one. Thus, we must turn to the data.

To be clear, the analyses in this study do not fully explain the electoral phenomenon depicted in the in the 2016 Presidential Election (consistent through several election cycles since 1984). Instead, the goal here is to evaluate contemporary white racial attitudes in the effort to (first) uncover whether white prejudice is indeed more prevalent in the areas of increased black populations.

For future projects, we may then update our empirical findings while also bringing to light one of three potential electoral scenarios for future empirical research: 1) Black voters

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overcome a significant racially-conservative white voting bloc in black belt areas (status quo assumption); 2) Black voters simply outnumber a racially-ambivalent (but presumably more Republican) white population in black belt counties (consistent with some limited modern research); or 3) Black voters join with a newly-formed bloc of white voters who are less racially-conservative (and presumably more Democrat) than in other areas in the Deep South (this scenario would indicate a significant break with the status quo).

In attempting to uncover the foundations for these propositions, I find it particularly helpful to not only limit my study to the “South” but, furthermore, to limit it to the “Deep South.” The Deep South consists of those states wherein the black belt is contained. The juxtaposition of both racially-homogenous and racially-heterogenous counties in the same political state units provides an opportunity for clear comparative analysis. Going back to Key, these state units include South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.

1.1.2 The Construction of Racial Attitudes

Two competing theories of racial and political attitude structure dominate the political science literature, both owing to a rational choice calculus. While other theories (such as the principled politics model and social dominance theory) also exist alongside group conflict theory and symbolic racism, those literatures have not been extensively-developed regarding Southern politics. Furthermore, those theories do not specifically address the formation of racial prejudice (rather they address alternative explanations for racially-divided outcomes). For the purposes of this project, it seems appropriate to focus on those veins of research most applicable to the South and to attitude formation.

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6 See Sears, Sidanius and Bobo (2000) for a discussion on nation-wide declines in racial prejudice.
Group conflict theory posits that individuals develop an “us” versus “them” mentality with regard to racial group membership. Narrowly-conceived, politics is a “zero-sum” game and individuals compete with those outside their racial group (Glaser 1994, 23). Bobo and Kluegel (1993) provide some added dimension to this description, asserting that group competition may not be the standard for attitude formation, but that it is extremely powerful when considering racially-salient policy attitudes connected to race-targeting. Bobo and Kluegel present a paradox of lessening support for these policies in the midst of supposed lessening hostility, even though they do concede that attitudes do not necessarily have to be linked to that lack of support in the 1990 GSS they use. Regarding the South, Key’s (1949) “threat” hypothesis is grounded in this theory of group conflict. Several New South analyses test and support the hypothesis, using traditional (direct) prejudice as a barometer (Giles 1977; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Glaser 1994).

Blumer (1958) provides the theoretical foundation for defining prejudice as an outcome of group conflict. His seminal essay argues that individual attitudes of prejudice may only be rationally-realized through group membership. He provides an extensive discussion as to how lower-status whites might be the most susceptible to developing prejudice out of fear that their “superior” racial status might be threatened through competition. He argues that one must accept a group membership first in order to adopt prejudiced feelings towards an out-group. He proposes four characteristics of prejudice in this conception: 1) demand for superiority, 2) feelings that the out-group is alien (different), 3) maintenance that out-groups do not deserve privilege or advantage, and 4) that out-groups ultimately threaten the in-group. Furthermore, Blumer contends that abstract stereotyping is utilized as a tool for perpetuating perceived separation from the out-group in general (not necessarily individualized). Bobo and Hutchings
(1996) directly test and confirm Blumer’s thesis of racial alienation using the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey. They incorporate measures of job, political, housing, and economic competition to assess the extent to which racial group membership leads to feelings that gains are zero-sum. Whites perceptions of competition with blacks are particularly powerful in their models.

Bledsoe, Welch, Sigelman and Combs (1995) insert a compelling argument indirectly linked to the usage of stereotyping (see also Gay 2004). They assert that black in-group solidarity is more prevalent given higher percentages of in-group members (e.g. segregated neighborhoods). Their data is gleaned from a National Science Foundation survey of Detroit-area residents in 1992. Whereas integration of neighborhoods may negate solidarity, it also reduces the level of prejudice “felt.” Thus, as Kaiser and Wilkins (2010) further argue, an individual’s perception of conflict is important to forming a context of competition. For individuals in diverse settings, the perception of conflict might actually be diminished, rather than heightened. Kaiser and Wilkins make a noteworthy contribution methodologically in that they reject the assumption that attitudes towards individuals are equally distributed amongst all members of the same racial group.

According to the logic of Blumer (1958), the lack of contact with the out-group would help to entrench stereotypes of the other while simultaneously creating the perception of threat from the “outsider” alien group. On the surface, these arguments do not provide a foil to group conflict theory; but they do issue a challenge to the logic behind Key’s (1949) contextual

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7 Gay uses the concept of “linked fate” to operationalize the dependent variable on a 4-Point Likert scale. The methods choices are problematic due to the number of interaction terms utilized without proper model specification to account for those interactions. Gay finds that linked fate lessens as the neighborhood quality of life (income levels, etc.) rises. Social engagement, however, increases.
hypothesis with regard to the South. Furthering this challenge, Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004, 260-261) acknowledge conflict (in the vein of Blumer) but also find that integrated educational settings may combat the formation of prejudice: “While some theory suggests a curvilinear relationship between the percentage of the population that is black and anti-black prejudice (Blalock, 1967), no study of which we are aware indicates a definitive point at which animosity towards blacks recedes.” Their study links GSS and Census data from 2000.

Symbolic racism posits that political conflicts that divide the public along racial lines actually reflect values and beliefs that are commonly associated with concepts of “whiteness” or “blackness.” While on the surface, symbolic racism in the New South looks like a “white” versus “black” contest, it is actually dependent upon the racial constraints that individuals perceive for specific issues (i.e. advancement of civil rights and government assistance). Kinder and Sears (1981) argue that political conflicts do not reflect overt prejudice based on race; rather, they assert that the “battle lines” are drawn on policy (see also Abramowitz 1994; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). In essence, this conception of racism maintains that racial division in politics is not necessarily based on race alone but rather the ideological differences of blacks and whites that retain latent vestiges of racism.

Henry and Sears (2009) explore symbolic racism with regard to the lifespan of individuals’ policy preferences. They assert that attitudes are largely consistent once adulthood is reached. They contend that ideological differences are particularly susceptible to divergence in the earlier years of life while “leveling off” once the age of eighteen is reached. Logically, this conclusion lends to an examination of educational contexts, particularly those affected by integration. Symbolic racism is sometimes referred to as a form of modern racism (James et al. 2001), as it may be subtler and indirect.
At its core, symbolic racism is presented in the political science scholarship as an innovation on how to assess racist attitudes within the context of a modern world where explicit racism is harder to observe. Due to social desirability bias, the proponents of using the symbolic racism scale point to the difficulty in gathering reliable data without some means of “ferreting out” implicit racial bias with specific regard to policy imperatives. Sears and Henry (2001) have offered the following as the most pervasive indicators of such implicit racial bias: 1) “Blacks no longer face much prejudice or discrimination;” 2) “The failure of blacks to progress results from their unwillingness to work hard enough;” 3) “Blacks are demanding too much too fast;” and 4) “Blacks have gotten more than they deserve.” In summation, the usage of such an innovation as symbolic racism is a choice of methodological preference. But it is a preference (if utilized) that does not square with the delineation of prejudice and discrimination that I offer in my theory.

The most direct challenge to the utility of symbolic racism comes in the form of the principled politics model (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). A basic explanation of how this model compares might be best illustrated on a continuum of “how much” direct prejudice applies. For group conflict, prejudice is a clear determinant for establishing subsequent political choices. For symbolic racism, prejudice exists “in the background” as an informer of political choices, but not as a determinant. In principled politics, prejudice has receded to the point where it does not clearly affect political choices. Thus, this model contradicts symbolic racism on the grounds that too much of what is measured by the symbolic racism scale may actually be attributed to genuine policy preferences that go beyond race.

While the development of these theories is substantial on the aggregate level, the relative lack of current empirical study on racial attitudes juxtaposed with political behaviors across the Southern landscape offers no answers in assessing shifts that may have occurred in the recent
past. Simply put, these efforts assume an intractable measure of racial division that exists within one of either two models. On the one hand, group conflict suggests that racial conflict (via threat) leads to political realities. On the other hand, symbolic racism suggests that expressed political preferences lead to furthered racial division because the outcomes of racial threat are only masked. Any differences uncovered between attitudes and policy preferences are “explained away” with social desirability bias.

Causality is the barrier to understanding here. Accepting these theories for the formation of attitudes and the expression of racism is dependent upon ignoring the power of the other. Coupling them together likewise necessitates the acceptance of circular reasoning. Obviously, the processes underlying attitude formation are fluid and changing in the South as in all areas. Reconciling the models in the present requires a more detailed look into what occurs within and between areas that differ in racial composition and context. Reconciling the models as applied to the South requires a more detailed look into the South. Lastly, reconciling the models requires a more detailed look into how racial context “fits” into theories of attitude formation in general.

1.1.3 Other Efforts in Measuring Racial Attitudes

In order to accurately assess racial attitudes in the Deep South of today, three broad methodological issues appear to take precedence. First, measures of prejudice that fail to incorporate a calculus based in group membership fail to accurately capture the relative social distance that individuals perceive between their in-group and out-groups (Blumer 1958, Bobo and Hutchings 1996, McClain et al. 2006). Also, measures of implicit attitudes are, by nature, problematic because they rely on uncovering that which cannot be readily observed. Bobo (1983, 1200), for instance, offers a critique of early symbolic racism development in stating, “Such a formulation of self-interest treats subjective reactions to… contact with blacks as irrelevant or,
more likely, presumes that they will be negative.” Bobo essentially argues that an assumption of threat without any regard to how intergroup contact might mitigate racism is faulty (or too presumptuous).

Bobo incorporates factor analysis in assessing that the presumption is too narrow in focus. His analyses of 1972 and 1976 NES data yield that opposition to policies indicate a resistance to threat by an out-group in general, regardless of race. The self-interest prerogatives of symbolic racism belie the power of group membership generally: “.... Racial Intolerance (2) scores and Segregationism (2) scores increase as neighborhood racial composition moves from largely black to largely white.” (1207)

Outside of the considerable (and methodologically-complex) development of the updated symbolic racism 2000 scale (Henry and Sears 2002), political scientists have often relied on additive indices (Giles 1977) or convenient proxies (Glaser 1994) that oftentimes more readily measure actions as opposed to beliefs (e.g. vote choices). The theoretical controversies of symbolic racism, as well as the substantial critiques of measures rife with social desirability bias, have led to considerable difficulty in developing a consensus. Fisher (1993, 303) defines this sort of bias as “systematic error in self-report measures resulting from the desire of respondents to avoid embarrassment and project a favorable image to others.”

Subsequently, it has become incumbent upon the researcher to utilize simplified methods to capture explicit prejudice within the context of how one views himself and his in-group (while simultaneously limiting social desirability bias). Ditonto, Lau and Sears (2013) concur on this point, offering that perhaps political scientists (including Sears) have spent too much time in trying to uncover hidden prejudice. They maintain that traditional (or explicit) measures of prejudice do a better job of predicting policy attitudes on racial issues. In particular, the “Affect
Misattribution Procedure” performs poorly in this analysis and appears to be a severe stretch methodologically.

Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) appears to offer an attractive compromise on all counts (see also Dixon 2006). They utilize a simple additive index of responses to the 2000 GSS that captures the relative distance between how whites perceive themselves in relation to other racial groups on three dimensions of traditional stereotyping. This measure limits bias by using a series of questions not targeting any specific prejudice towards any specific group; rather, it gauges a general “feeling” across different intervals of survey items. These studies additionally confront the central discussion of threat and contact; the conclusion is that threat may exist, but it is dependent upon individual-level choices and much further work is necessary to flesh-out the ultimate determinants.

Secondly, the demographic contextual variables utilized in most research are simply too limited in scope. Giles and Buckner (1993) and Voss (1996) provide two examples of scholarship that address contextual racial threat in a very limited geographic area (Louisiana) within the framework of a racially-charged political campaign (David Duke). The external validity of these studies is dubious at the outset (even within the Deep South). Hopkins (2016), in fact, questions the validity of using contextual variables at all. He argues that, for the most part, the empirical challenges (e.g. multiple contextual levels, ecological fallacy, etc.) are too manifest to rely upon such variables. However, he does cite racial and ethnic contexts as perhaps being the exception to the rule (if based in sound theory).

Many social scientists cite metropolitan areas used in the General Social Survey to approximate intergroup threat or contact (Glaser 1994, Taylor 1998, Dixon 2006). But these areas do not fully-represent rural populations, nor do they contain more specific means of
assessing specific local populations (i.e. zip codes). Surely, survey items that inquire about workplace composition, number of black friends, etc. may be utilized. However, self-selection remains a problem by operationalizing in this fashion; after all, respondents may be describing outcomes of attitude-formation rather than the process itself.

The problem of self-selection diminishes (but does not entirely vanish) with the use of linked-aggregate data. Subsequently, one is left with a choice between two problematic alternatives (self-selection or ecological inference). Baybeck (2006) directly addresses these demographic “problems.” He proposes reporting on hierarchical levels of geographic residence as well as incorporating demographic perception as an interaction term. Essentially, single measure are not particularly accurate ones. These suggestions appear most prudent when provided both specific geographic data as well as demographic perception data. The moderating variable in this sort of model is the actual demographic makeup of an area whereas the mediating variable is the individual’s perception of threat or contact within the area. Interestingly, he also contends that factor analysis has been under-utilized to account for these contextual complexities.

Lastly, problems of measurement confound many of the observational methods utilized to date. That is, one must assume that prejudiced attitudes may be accurately estimated via questionnaires. For substantive political logic, one must also assume that those attitudes (when captured) actually manifest into some real-world outcomes. Although these assumptions are often commonplace and acceptable for social science research, a simple solution exists: experimental methods. Coupling observational analyses of prejudice (what people think) with experimental analyses of discrimination (what people do) presents perhaps the most
comprehensive path towards answering the fundamental questions about the Deep South that are treated here.

In the following section, I introduce new perspectives that provide potential theoretical pathways into furthering the discussion of prejudice vis-à-vis discrimination.

1.1.4 Alternative Research

First articulated within social psychology, Allport (1954) posits that encountering different races regularly can reduce racial conflict and prejudice:

“Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups.” (281)

Extending to political science, intergroup contact theory might also induce political outcomes that are not prejudice-dependent. Simply put, if the attitudes of black belt whites have been changed by integration since Key (1949), then it seems reasonable for political scientists to consider whether the integration of public schools has provided the means.

This theory (see also Pettigrew 1998) is clearly opposed to group conflict theory and suggests a mechanism by which symbolic racism may be mitigated; refining this theory offers the opportunity to ascertain how attitudinal shifts have been made possible in the “New South” in regard to prejudice and (ultimately) discrimination. In offering an explanation for current phenomena that is not widely-accepted within the political science literature, I contend that this particular theory provides a current account that is lacking and a starting point for further research. Dixon (2006) does provide a detailed description of the “dueling” processes of threat and contact, but he concludes that both are essentially plausible in attitude formation. His
analysis stops short of addressing discrimination or the South directly, and he neglects to offer an explanation as to how threat persists despite integrated educational contexts.

Further contrary to the group conflict theory strongly supported in Key’s (1949) analysis of the Old South, intergroup contact theory is not dependent upon disenfranchisement and civil inequality. Rather, it supposes the possibility of *de facto* social equality that stems from decades without Jim Crow and an end to *de jure* inequality since Allport (1954). In addressing the condition that both white and black citizens can share in some common social, political, or economic goals; I acknowledge that intergroup contact is clearly is at odds with the persistence of symbolic racism as well. In Allport’s conception, prejudice that emerges in spite of intergroup contact is simply irrational.

“Whereas a substantially rational calculus underlies racial conflict in the self-interest model, a psychological and largely irrational calculus underlies the classical prejudice model (Jackman 1994, 954).” Motivated reasoning, of any sort, is the process by which judgments are guided by prior-attained desires and feelings. Kunda (1999) refers to this type of reasoning as “hot cognition.” Contrary to “cold-cognition,” which is based on deliberative, information-driven processes, hot cognition allows for biases, prejudices, and potentially-unrelated goals to enter into the decision-making process at specific moments. The motivated reasoning that Kunda describes actually may drive the processing of information in particular ways (depending upon individual and contextual factors). Thus, she argues that we are Bayesian, but “imperfect.”

For decades, motivated reasoning was dismissed as a viable explanation for certain cognitive phenomena. Ostensibly, the desire to “thicken” rational models (rather than allow for different processes) fueled this conclusion. Recent research, however, has explored motivated
reasoning systematically and across the social sciences. Since Kunda (1987, 1990, 1999),
political science has also jumped on board.

Primarily, for my discussion here, I will narrow the focus to allow for a discussion on
how directional motivated reasoning in expressed attitudes or opinions (e.g. discriminatory
choices) may tap-into “irrational” or “imperfect” prejudices not necessarily based in a rational
prejudicial model. The goal of the individual who reasons in this fashion is to arrive at an
ultimate judgment which is aligned with a particular direction (e.g. racially-prejudicial) while not
necessarily intending to do so on the merits of prejudice alone. Clearly, political research in this
vein seems logical.

Experimental methods have been put to great use by political scientists seeking out
evidence of motivated reasoning. Taber and Lodge (2006) find that their test subjects are
“unable” to come to conclusions independent of their directional goals, regardless of information
updates (i.e. affirmative action). Thus, in contrast to the normative ideal Evans and Over (1996)
put forth, Taber and Lodge assert that moderating the power of directional motivation in such a
manner may well be a fool’s errand. Ultimately, they argue that we are all motivated in our
reasoning.

Druckman (2012) offers a careful critique of Taber and Lodge’s work that builds upon
the caveats in Druckman and Bolsen (2011). He asserts that accuracy motivations may play a
more pivotal role in the expression of political attitudes. Indeed, the dual goals of seeking
accuracy while also protecting a cultural identity (Kahan 2015) may form the basis of an internal
tug-of-war. Citing Bolsen et al. (2011), Druckman reports that individuals who are induced to
seek accuracy are inclined to form judgments beyond a partisan motivation (or racial motivation
for my purposes here). Ultimately, he concludes that individual- and contextual-level factors may mediate or moderate the extent to which differing forms of motivated reasoning manifest.

The scholarship in assessing individual- and contextual-level factors is developing and not without controversy (as mentioned previously in measuring racial attitudes). Ambivalence is cited as one such individual factor. “Need for cognition” is another. Kahan (2013, 2015), for instance, reports that individuals with high cognition needs are actually more likely to engage in partisan motivated reasoning. However, Nir (2011) finds evidence to the contrary. Nisbet et al. (2013) differentiate between “open-minded” and “closed-minded” individuals to conclude that some people are simply more or less malleable when confronted with new information. But it is uncertain, methodologically, whether or not “closed-mindedness” aligns with a low need for cognition in their study. All in all, the most compelling evidence seems to be gathered by Kahan, who echoes Druckman’s critique by demonstrating that (yes) partisan motivating reasoning exists, but that it does not rest solely with a closed-minded, ambivalent, and ignorant mass of people. Instead, an individual may be persuaded by context to seek out partisanship or accuracy. Later, I contend that racial context may be included here, as well.

Contextual-level factors, such as repeated exposure, social acceptance, or perceived competition/conflict can induce accuracy-seeking (Chong and Druckman 2007). Anxiety, as well, can prompt individuals to further rely on the most-trusted (or correct) information they have gathered. Druckman and McDermott (2008), for instance, provide compelling observational evidence for the power of frames in moderating partisan motivated reasoning. Their work explores the range of contextual emotions, finding that those that feel uncertain or distressed choose to seek accuracy by deferring to frames (instead of their gut). Glaser and Ryan (2013) provide additional linkage to this assertion on racially-salient issues.
All in all, it is clear that directional motivated reasoning is a force in making political judgments. However, the strength of this singular force is not absolute. Neither unbounded rationality nor a desire to protect one’s tribe hold total sway over attitudes and opinions. Instead, a range of personal factors and a varying world of information and changing circumstances allow the freedom to tap into that force which is most useful to us at any given time (be it partisanship, accuracy, or racial discrimination).

1.2 Theory

Given the widely-held causal assumption that race plays a formative role in the South (and thus our understanding of Southern Politics), a logical framework must be articulated for moving forward. Firstly, we must recognize that the political science literature tends to treat the overall subject as one of race within extant political processes (racialized politics) or political processes within extant racial contexts (the politics of race). Race, being a socially-constructed phenomenon itself, is a particularly troublesome topic in reconciling these dual conceptions simultaneously. In a state of nature, the game of politics may exist without regard to race. I claim that I may seek to obtain or assert political agency regardless of who I am dealing with. Thus, the existence of race may be understood to be potentially endogenous to politics itself (that is, new politics that emerge when individuals have differing physical characteristics and choose to make these differences salient).

I assert that institutionalized racism\(^8\) remains as the appropriate construct for political scientists to consider when evaluating how racial inequality may be explained. For in examining the phenomena that evolve following the “injection” of race, we may understand how and why

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\(^8\) That is, racial inequality as a status quo *de facto* reality, stemming from *systemic* intergroup social, political, and economic interactions (Klitgaard 1972).
racial groups seek to maximize political utility. Furthermore, as political institutions change alongside established (but also changing) racial contexts, political scientists may more accurately evaluate political realities given an established state of the world.

Understanding the role of race in individual-level Southern Politics must alternatively begin with an acknowledgment of institutionalized racism as the proper basic assumption. Rather than assuming a causal mechanism whereby “racism leads to politics of a certain kind,” we must start with an understanding that political processes form first, and racial contexts emerge and evolve later as a hallmark of creating systemic inequality. Omi and Winant (1986) provide a strong theoretical base for this conception. They argue that race is a constructed identity, heavily dependent upon the inequalities that exist prior to and during the construction. The further processes described in the alternative research of Allport (1954) and Kunda (1999) articulate the threads of specific development with regard to attitudes and behaviors that manifest as race is being concurrently constructed. After accepting this premise of a fluid process, analyses of the contemporary state of Southern Politics may be more clearly undertaken.

The established reality of racial inequality is thus not *prima facie* evidence of “racism” for individuals, but rather it is clear empirical evidence of a political system that persists in unequally promoting the goals of historically-privileged racial groups. But democratic political and social processes allow for change, and so in articulating this conceptual framework I allow for the possibility that institutionalized racism itself might change. That change, however, must begin with individual-level causal mechanisms that limit prejudice (in attitude formation) and discrimination (in political preference).

It is quite surprising that a unifying theory has not been put forth in an attempt to explain changes in individual-level Southern political calculi. Our scholarship suggests that we can
accept at the very least that the advent of legal and social changes in the American South have allowed for the possibility of prejudicial or discriminatory changes. But, given the dearth of research on race, we should also be able to clearly delineate between the determinants of prejudice and discrimination. It appears that much effort in attempting to explain the politics of the contemporary American South gets “lost in translation” in improperly equating prejudice with discrimination or simply stating that measures of one or both of these individual variables is evidence of “racism”. Similarly, the unequal state of nature (systemic racism) is oftentimes framed as a simplistic “soul writ large” rather than as perhaps a critical and primal actor itself.

To improve upon our prior efforts, I find it necessary to join two diverse literatures (largely) outside the purvey of political science with that of the rational choice race literature within political science. The alternative literatures explore two central topics: 1) intergroup contact and 2) motivated reasoning. It is my mission to explain more succinctly how contemporary Southern social and political structures allow for limiting explicit prejudice while (at the same time) promoting discrimination in singular political/economic decisions.

I frame my alternative theory here. I first accept systemic, institutionalized racism as the state of the world for the American South. I identify the historically-privileged group as self-identified white Southerners. I then assume that current realities are path-dependent upon changes to political institutions that have occurred since the middle of the twentieth century (e.g. the integration of public accommodations, especially schooling). Lastly, I narrow my focus to the related (but not identical) predictors of racial inequality towards black Southerners. I do not consider that accepting the current state of the world negates the possibility that systemic racism may still be affected by these predictors (discrimination and prejudice). Inequality is not
presently intractable via pervasive law; rather, it is undergirded by pillars of action and thought (see Figures 1.2.1 – 1.2.3).

The intent of presenting the changing nature of racism using these models is not predicated on accepting that law and policy fail to exhibit characteristics that have inequitable results. Instead, the intent is to display the fact that federal law has mandated that they should not (on their face). Critical theory establishes, in part, that all structures may entrench inequities. That contention is not being challenged or treated here. This effort is intended to use what data suggests (earnings gaps, incarceration rates, etc.) as the prior information necessary to state that a system of racism exists regardless of contradictions of law or insidious vested racial interests. The foundation for the observed racism that exists within the formal institutions is then conceived to be a product of the individual thoughts and actions of those that operate within the structure.

Figure 1.2.1 The Antebellum Construct of Systemic Racism (Pre-1870)
I contend that changes in American political institutions have lessened white prejudice towards black out-groups while further entrenching discriminatory behaviors towards all perceived out-groups. This theory is not necessarily limited to the Deep South, where demography has allowed for social integration to be realized most fully (e.g. educational...
settings) within the context of frequent close-encounters with racial out-groups. It should, however, be tested there first. Therefore, the developmental processes described by Allport (1954) and Blalock (1967) are accepted for individual attitudes. Paradoxically, though, the group-level rational choice processes described by Blumer (1958) are also conditionally accepted (though with less distinction given to group membership and more of a consideration to individual-level calculi). As a corollary to Blumer, the “hot cognition” of Kunda (1999) plays a role in specific choices in specific settings, as individual-level calculi are susceptible to intervals of directional motivated reasoning.

Figure 1.2.4 The Contemporary Process affecting Systemic Racism (1974-Present)

To summarize in plain language (see Figure 1.2.4), I posit that white Southerners (in the aggregate) have become less prejudiced while maintaining high levels of discriminatory tendencies. The most extreme divergence of these variables should be observed where white and black individuals live in close proximity to one another. The demographic racial context, therefore, has emerged as a powerful predictor for current Deep South political reality, owing to an historical persistence of highly-salient racial inequality in that geographic area as well as the
increased probability that salience of that kind frames decisions racially. Again, the Deep South (as defined originally by Key) holds the potential for evaluating these processes most fully.

Those states that contain the black belt are not only the historic “ground zero” for evaluating the intersection of race and politics, but they are also critical in the present-day. The durable demographic characteristics of the rural regions of these states (permitting high intergroup contact between blacks and whites) yields much more useful data than a study that also includes largely white Southern regions (e.g. Appalachia). Certainly, there is a story to be told in regard to the traditionally-recognized “Upper South” (North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, etc.) or even looking west towards Texas. But it has been made clear within the literature that does cover the South that something is inherently different about what is defined as the Deep South. Since Key spent considerable time defining the black belt as the cradle of white supremacy in his day, I have chosen to test my contradictory theory in the very same place. At the very least, we can logically assume larger shifts in wider geographic areas if there are clear shifts here.

This theory blends together the processes of belief formation with those of group identification and decision-making. Controversially, perhaps, I even offer that individual-level rational choice is much more salient in this conception – that is, white individuals should also discriminate more readily towards other white individuals, as more “players” now exist within the racially-integrated game of acquiring social, political, and economic power. Economically, the scope of the conflict (Schattschneider 1960) has broadened, owing largely to legal protections but also to cultural shifts.

The implications of this theory are far-reaching. Though I limit my current study to a specific region here, I do so as a form of “toughest test.” If the results bear-out that changes have
indeed occurred, then I see no reason why further hypothesis-testing should not be carried out for other areas of the country. Again, however, I would caution that history does play a critical role. Some battles (so to speak) have already been fought in the Deep South. Elsewhere, those battles may have yet to be realized. It is that history that I will try to bring into clearer focus in the next Chapter.

2 CHAPTER 2: “RECONSTRUCTION” 1870 – 1974

"What a marvelous moment for baseball. What a marvelous moment for Atlanta and the state of Georgia. What a marvelous moment for the country and the world. A black man is getting a standing ovation in the Deep South for breaking a record of an all-time baseball idol. And it is a great moment for all of us, and particularly for Henry Aaron, who was met at home plate, not only by every member of the Braves, but by his father and mother."

Vin Scully, Dodgers Radio Network (April 8, 1974)

My theory is dependent upon a key major assumption: Deep South racism is an institution that has developed over time. Most specifically, I contend that major shifts have brought us to the point that the primary supports of racism are individual-level discrimination and prejudice. The nature and form of that institution obviously informs what is “happening” in the present. Carmines (1989) has conducted a comprehensive process-tracing on race in American politics. Using Darwinian logic as a lens into the construct of racism, he highlights the way in which race has continually shaped the nature of political alignment beyond the “Civil Rights Era.” I largely agree, though I choose to start with actions and thoughts rather than political realignment.

Several historians in the latter half of the twentieth century have described that era as a “Second Reconstruction” (Woodward 1957) that coincided with statutory and common law changes aimed at civil equality for black Americans (particularly in the South). I argue that Reconstruction, as a concept, began with the Fifteenth Amendment and ended only with broad
cultural acceptance of black Americans holding some equal-status roles in society by the early 1970s. Recent years have seen the birth of the phrase “white-lash,” describing a reaction to that cultural shift. But, during the period of Reconstruction that I describe, systemic racism (as we know it) was developed and cultivated. Akin to Carmines, I intend to present historical evidence of the organic and changing nature of racism generally.

The logical argument to back these assertions up is quite simple. It would be naive to suggest that Jim Crow was simply a continuation of past institutions. Instead, it was a structured plan executed to specifically deal with new times. It subsequently birthed a new racialized reality, not dependent upon slavery. With constitutional law no longer protecting inequalities based on race alone, inequalities clearly observed and perpetuated afterward were the product of a series of economic, social and state-level political decisions. These decisions were specifically targeted, for the greater part of the Reconstruction era, at subjugating black Americans as second-class citizens in the Deep South.

Through time, however, challenges to Jim Crow gradually led to (aforementioned) legal and policy changes (e.g. Executive Order 9981, Brown v. Board of Education, Civil Rights Act of 1964). These decisions are also part of the story of Reconstruction, and they add depth and dimension to the discrimination and prejudice that have always been the bulwark of what we observe regarding racism. But they do not mark the end of the story.

Ultimately, the “Reconstruction” presented here is not the history of a region made-over. Instead, it is a brief history of how racism as we know it was constructed and re-constructed from 1870 to 1974. The shifts in attitudes and behaviors I describe in my theory for the contemporary Deep South are not solely a result of landmark political events. They are a result of the nature of
racism itself being changed over time (owing to the legal pillars as well as the individual-level pillars).

Cultural context can color the rational and “irrational” individual-level pillars with perhaps more meaningful data than our models can describe. At the conclusion of nearly every historical discussion on the Civil Rights Era, singling-out a particular date for “change” becomes a tough proposition (just as discussing “change” alone). Identifying any specific year (such as 1974) can be even more problematic. As I described in Chapter 1, the early 1970s in Southwest Georgia were pivotal for racism in that time and in that place. However, I contend that the Deep South as a whole experienced a like change during that particular period. For the first time, young Southern schoolchildren entered truly integrated public schools in the early 1970s. The proof that this time period was consequential for the entirety of the region can be found in federal court mandates throughout the South (i.e. Coweta County School District) that persist to this day. But even the rendering of dated court decisions does not provide enough specificity.

Instead, I choose to point towards 1974 for cultural import. For the whole region (and perhaps a nation), one night in the early spring stands-out singularly. As Vin Scully made his 715 call on Dodgers Radio, two young, white Georgians ran past security and onto the field at Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium. They did not try to impede Henry Aaron’s trip around the bases; they celebrated with him. But despite that open and public acceptance, tens of thousands of letters of hate mail rested in boxes at the Aaron residence.

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9 In the specific case of Coweta County, efforts to create magnet programs or open enrollment have been denied as recently as 2000.

10 In 2014, Mr. Aaron gave an interview on the 40th anniversary of his achievement. During the interview, he criticized several national political figures on their treatment of then-president Barack Obama. The Atlanta Braves immediately began to receive a rash of new hate mail directed towards Aaron. Broadly conceived, these events further convey a paradox of acceptance and condemnation (i.e. “white-lash”).
To be clear, I do not hold that the middle-aged and young adults in the crowd at that game were suddenly transformed. In fact, the lack of formal adulation by the white establishment of the era upset Aaron considerably. What I do offer, though, is that the moment Aaron broke Ruth’s record survives as a symbolic event that goes far beyond simple sport. Atlanta became the home of the first Deep South major professional sports franchise in 1966. A black Southerner from Mobile, Alabama (playing for that first franchise) eventually broke down a wall of supremacy in a sport long-dominated by whites within a decade. The breaking of that glass-ceiling existed in the private sphere. And the continued celebration of that event by Southern generations that have followed signals that white Southerners of a younger sort were finally ready to accept a hero outside of their own racial group.\(^{11}\) John R. Tunis once quipped “Losing is the great American sin.” For the first time, many white Southerners embraced a black winner in their midst as their own.

After the record was broken, a local Atlanta reporter (Charlie Roberts) asked Herbert Aaron (Henry’s father) about the significance of the home run. Mr. Aaron replied with a story about a fox: “The fox had been running from the dogs all night and finally, as he ran to the top of the hill and realized he couldn’t get away, he saw the sun coming up. And when he saw that sun, he just sat down. He looked at the blazing dawn and he said, “I don’t care if they do catch me now, ’cause I done set the world on fire!”” (Walburn)

### 2.1 A Brief Chronology

In the Deep South, the traditionally-recognized Reconstruction period lasted from the end of the Civil War to the Compromise of 1877. During that period black Southerners experienced

\(^{11}\) For a broader and more contemporary context, we could highlight the Election Night Acceptance Speech of Barack Obama in November of 2008 as a similar cultural event for the nation.
their greatest political participation under the protection of military forces. Southern states had numerous black office-holders. Hiram Revels and Blanche Bruce served as United States Senators from Mississippi. Seventeen black Southerners served in the United States House of Representatives (Kennedy and Cohen 2013).

Black Southerners sought to acquire as much education as possible to validate their newfound freedom and status. The Freedman’s Bureau, as well as local and state entities, provided many of these opportunities from 1865-1900. Historically-Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) took form throughout the South.

A major effort was made to educate black Americans in the “industrial arts”. Especially formative at the Tuskegee Institute, this movement sprung forth from Booker T. Washington’s “Atlanta Exposition Speech” in 1895. Many blacks entered this era with high aspirations, looking to incorporate the Protestant ethic of hard work and economic gain into the story of their rise.

However, local and state efforts of white supremacy held in-check much of the progress made after troops returned North. Political, economic, and social gains were also rolled-back by Redeemers and the Klan in the closing decades of the Nineteenth Century. Reconstruction graft and corruption was alleged by white leaders, now firmly back in control. Subsequent statutory disenfranchisement via poll taxes, literacy tests, and the like was justified openly. African-American religious organizations, notably the African Methodist-Episcopal Church, began to serve as the only viable form of organization for many black communities in the South and throughout the nation.

“Exodusters” comprised a group of several thousand black farm workers who chose to leave the Deep South for greener pastures in Western and Great Plains states. Their protest was
rooted in the economic plight of a people mostly resigned to sharecropping or, at best, tenant farming once federal oversight and support started to wane. Voices (e.g. DuBois and the later Niagara Movement) dissenting from Washington’s 1895 speech started to demand more strident legal action to counter the realities facing black America.

Many black Americans were resigned to the realization that the federal government simply accepted their inferior status, post-1877. Even the national Populist movement, rooted in labor and farming, turned a blind eye to the plight of the Southern black citizen. Thomas E. Watson, an ardent populist U.S. Representative from Georgia, sought to unite rural white and black laborers during the era. However, even he turned a blind eye to his fellow black Georgians once Bryan was defeated in the Election of 1896.

Perhaps most consequential, given the long view and the crux of this overall study, is the case of public accommodations. Racial segregation was (and is) the cauldron in which irrational prejudice is brewed. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was passed to outlaw legal segregation. However, it was declared unconstitutional in 1883 and was further put to rest in the case of *Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)*. Equal access to vital services such as education was thus denied.

Frederick Douglass perhaps described the early status of racism in this era most clearly: “The color line meets [the Negro] everywhere, … [and leaves him] a rejected man.” (Douglass 1883) That rejection is the succinct takeaway.

Despite these difficulties, black Southerners started to form associations in more diverse arenas than the church in the early twentieth century. HBCU fraternities and sororities such as Omega Psi Phi and Alpha Kappa Alpha emerged while the National Negro Business League promoted black-owned businesses and civic involvement. These efforts were carried out most
effectively in small clusters but would prove vital as organizational foundations in later decades (Thorpe 1968).

The Progressive Movement in local, state, and national politics held much of the promise of earlier populism for these groups. However, persistent racial violence and lingering prejudicial dogmas in white intellectual circles portended the reality on the ground. Riots abounded throughout the nation during the presidencies of Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson.12 A separatist movement (the United Negro Improvement Association) began to form in New York City, spearheaded by Marcus Garvey. That group’s demise, linked ultimately to Garvey’s conviction of mail fraud, proved telling of the times. Even when black America sought to distance itself, obstacles abounded.

Franz Boas lent early academic legitimacy at Columbia University to the notion that the plight of black Americans was due to persistent prejudice rather than biological imperatives (Boas 1921). Several of his students, notably Margaret Mead and Zora Neale Hurston, would later serve as acolytes of this changing narrative. But the host of the contemporary academic community met those assertions with denial at the time.13 Racial-progressives were generally put on the constant defensive by further arguments that “Americanism” was clearly “white.” (Evans 1926) That growing white nationalism, in the wake of a World War and twenty years of Progressive policies, allowed for the rise of a new Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s.

By the Jazz Age and into the 1930s, another new demographic development was taking shape for black Americans, most consequentially in the South. Decades of revitalizing Southern

12 New Orleans and New York City 1900; Springfield, OH 1904; Brownsville, TX, Greensburg, IN, and Atlanta 1906; Springfield, IL 1908; East St. Louis, IL, and Houston 1917; Red “Summer of Hate” 1919 (25 race riots across several states). Note: The NAACP furthermore estimates the total number of black lynching deaths from 1882-1968 at 4,743 persons. Data Source: “History of Lynchings.” NAACP.org http://www.naacp.org/history-of-lynchings/ (accessed November 1, 2017).
13 Prominent black academics, like Carter G. Woodson, faced even steeper challenges.
town economies with textile mills and rebuilding urban trade centers had finally bore some economic fruit (in providing a more diversified job market). Coupled with the first generations of college-educated black adults, some of whom also brought worldly experience through the Great War, the culture of black Southerners was no longer confined to the field or the rural church sanctuary. Although textbooks for American schoolchildren often focus on the Harlem Renaissance and other revelations of a Great Migration to the North, black culture became increasingly urban in the South as well.

Working-class black Southerners gained sophistication and economic relevancy in moving to where jobs existed (e.g. Atlanta, Birmingham, etc.). The social and business organizations from the turn of the century started to incorporate more than just their elite counterparts. The advent of higher literacy rates, the automobile, and federally-funded projects to bring electricity to the rural South all contributed to a rising economic tide for the black South. By no means were the results on par with the white South, but the achievements leading up to America’s involvement in World War II were considerable (and built upon the efforts of black leadership).

To articulate the development of racism as it evolved through these first twentieth century decades, one must remember the “rejected” black citizen from the end of the nineteenth century. Regardless of persistent racial violence, segregation, and popular white nationalism (e.g. Birth of a Nation), the black Southerner of the 1930s was increasingly hard to outright reject. He was more incorporated into the growth of a modern and industrialized region of the country, with organized institutions that had survived a lack of support or recognition from white America. He also was a more constant presence in crowded cities, where legalized discrimination via segregation was laid bare.
Systematic economic exclusion was becoming a harder road to hoe for white supremacists. At the same time, political exclusion was firmly intact but was facing a changing landscape on the national level. Northern Democrats sought to court the black vote increasingly in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, foreboding inter-partisan differences between New Dealers and Solid South pols. No longer could Southern white Democrats write-off entirely the strength of a repressed black vote that might not reliably go Republican. Concordantly, Northern Democrats sensed a voting bloc that was denied access at the booth.

Richard Wright, in Chapter 13 of Black Boy, offers a contemporary account of racism during that time: “But I could not conquer my sense of guilt, my feeling that the white men around me knew that I was changing…. My days and nights were one long, quiet, continuously contained dream of terror, tension, and anxiety. I wondered how long I could bear it.” (Wright 1945) His use of the word contained most definitively describes the aims of the racist institution then.

War-time production brought Executive Order 8802 and an end to discrimination in defense-industry jobs in 1941. Coupled with Truman’s desegregation of military units, the federal government seemed to signal changing times that the Deep South would have to wrestle with. Certainly, the historic rejection and containment of black interests seemed at-odds with liberal and democratic ideals on which the war effort rested.

However, Kenneth B. Clark expressed that the general feeling amongst black Americans was “reality-bound” after the war (Redding 1968, XXV). Politically and economically, there had been modest gains. Socially and culturally, however, black citizens (especially Southerners) were resigned to the fact that the underlying attitudes of whites were slow to move. Subsequently, the realization that there was serious work to do remained. One anecdote passed down through the
generations during this time (to Southern black children) was the following: “In the North, they
don’t care how high-up you get, as long as you don’t live too close. In the South, they don’t care
how close you live, as long as you don’t get too high-up.”

Emboldened by the prospect of further political action, black Americans spear-headed
what is commonly referred to as the “Civil Rights Movement.” The NAACP became
instrumental in prosecuting the pivotal *Brown v. Board of Education* court case. That class-
action suit, filed in 1951, asked that segregation in public schools be formally struck-down. In
the fall of 1955, the first mandated, integrated public school opened. Encouraged by that
decision, high-profile boycotts and sit-ins followed.

The 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott, in support of Rosa Parks, added to the public spaces
in which black Americans sought equal access. In 1957, a watershed event at Central High
School in Little Rock, Arkansas brought federal support to the overall cause. The “Little Rock
Nine” were escorted there by National Guard troops ordered in by President Eisenhower.

By 1962, universities such as Ole Miss also began to integrate in the Deep South. The
violence of the Birmingham fire-bombing campaign captured further reaction from President
John F. Kennedy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. In endorsing the overall movement, it
was at this point that the prospect of a new Civil Rights Act took material form.

Signed into law by Lyndon Baines Johnson in 1964 (following the assassination of
Kennedy), the bill outlawed any existing legislation that allowed for discrimination. Its ultimate
approval gained traction following the influential March on Washington in August 1963, where

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14 Original source unknown, though I have heard this exact phrase in numerous conversations with black colleagues
through the years.
15 For the purposes of my scientific inquiry, I find it problematic to use this term regularly. Civil Rights, in general,
have been extended or restricted throughout American history. Furthermore, any serious discussion about the racial
element therein must acknowledge the whole of historical movements, rather than selected pieces. I do not offer a
“better” term here. I can only offer that the coining of the phrase and its regular usage tends to elevate the events of
the 1950s and 1960s, potentially at the detriment to an analysis of what came before.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. enunciated his “Dream.” Johnson described the signing of the bill as such: “Yet millions are deprived of those blessings (of liberty) …. because of the color of their skin …. but it cannot continue. Our Constitution, the foundation of our Republic, forbids it. The principles of our freedom forbid it. Morality forbids it. And the law I will sign tonight forbids it.”

In late 1964, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference selected Selma, Alabama as the focal point for their fight towards ending voting suppression. That city was home of the white Alabama Citizens’ Council, an organization created to combat the effects of the new Civil Rights Act. Early efforts there gained international attention in the form of the Nobel Peace Prize to King. Furthermore, in 1965, three separate marches were met with violent attacks by local law enforcement. Camera footage spread throughout the United States and the world, bringing voting rights to the forefront of the national discussion.

Formally, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ended statutory prejudice in the nation’s voting systems. Immediately, blacks began voting and running for public office in numbers not seen since the Compromise of 1877. However, just days after the signing, a violent riot in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles resulted in thirty-four deaths. That event served as a testament to the racial violence that persisted on the street, regardless of progressive political achievements.

Racially-motivated violent crimes continued through the middle of the twentieth century. Although lynching had been occurring at an alarming rate for decades, high-profile incidents gained increased national attention due to the advent of television news as well as higher overall literacy rates post-World War II. The case of Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-old who was

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murdered in 1955, shocked many around the country. Emmett’s mother, Mamie Bradley, demanded that an open-casket funeral be held to show the effects of the hate crime to the nation. The social “caste system” in the Deep South furthermore brought danger to white Americans seeking to combat it. During the “Freedom Summer” campaign of 1964, two white Northerners and a black Southerner were murdered outside of Philadelphia, Mississippi for their efforts in registering voters.17

“Black Power,” a philosophical response to the pacifist leanings of the SCLC, added further dimension to the era. As eventual Chairman of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (succeeding John Lewis), Stokely Carmichael evolved to espouse the construct of Black Power most clearly. He stated that freedom (as granted by new legislation) was never truly a victory. Rather, freedom was a birthright that needed to be achieved in society, where power dynamics did not always adhere to the principles of written law. Thus, oftentimes, that power would need to be taken instead of only received. Earlier, in March of 1960, an advertisement bought by Atlanta HBCU leaders in the Constitution, Journal, and Daily World foretold this new message: “We do not intend to wait placidly for those rights which are already legally and morally ours to be meted out to us one at a time.” (Sitkoff, 71)

The Black Panther Party carried that message further. Selling Mao’s “Little Red Book” to students at U.C. Berkeley, the group began funding the purchase of military-style uniforms and firearms in 1966. The aim was to combat social ills such as hunger in black communities but to do so actively and through a show of unified force. The group’s forthright rhetoric and ideological linkage to Malcolm X led to distinct fear across white America, leading F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover to target the organization aggressively.

17 Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, and James Chaney were the victims. Popular culture eulogized the trio in several songs during the subsequent Cultural Revolution that lasted into the early 1970s.
Towards the end of this time period, the high-profile assassinations of leaders like King and Malcolm X served as a bitter denouement. In retrospect, it appears that these people and events “fast-tracked” the American nation on a course towards dealing with racism in the public sphere. No longer could black Americans be “rejected” or “contained” legally. A holistic investigation into the meaning of that era leaves us with several more unanswered questions, though. Was it simply the culmination of decades of slow movement? Did the psychological shock of World War II provide a catalyst for a rapid increase in tolerance and equality? Were the policy remedies effective in dealing with systemic racism? Did the movement “end?”

I must defer historical judgment on the first couple questions and let historians argue the merits of their conclusions. Anecdotal evidence in race relations can point to successes and failures in the years since. However, it does remain vital that I explain my answers to the last two in order to achieve my ends.

2.2 Were the policy remedies effective? Did the movement “end?”

Firstly, the efficacy of policy changes is relative. In judging whether or not the institution of racism was fundamentally changed, my theory clearly states that it was. However, I reserve judgment as to how effective reams of policy have been alone. I am more interested in how the discriminatory acts and prejudicial thoughts of white Southerners have been altered in the aftermath. After this long “Reconstruction,” racism has been described in a multitude of new ways. I contend that the most accurate descriptions hinge on observing the system through a local lens. Chester Devillers commented on his own community of Darien, Georgia at the end of his political career in 1989:

“There are still too many bigots and racists among both black and white. It has gotten somewhat better, but we still haven't arrived. We have a long way to go. Some people feel we should have never integrated, that we should have worked on making things equal.
We were separate, but we never would have been equal. There are people here today who are not totally pleased with integration, and I guess they never will be. But if they can just leave the young children alone, integration will do some good. My philosophy has been in order for me to get the same food, I have to sit at the same table.” (Greene, 335)

Fundamentally, I do glean optimism from the changes I describe in my theory. Furthermore, I will seek to provide evidence in the following Chapters that reveals weaknesses in the pillars of systemic racism. Most directly, I would argue that desegregation of public schools (specifically) has proven to be the most consequential process in the path-dependent “Reconstruction” of the South and its racism. The fruits of that process have led to more equal-status intergroup contacts than any other.

What we should be able to find evidence for is that the individual-level behaviors and attitudes of white Southerners who have been educated in integrated classrooms have since become divergent. In assessing the simple theoretical models that I put forth, it is clear that I view the removal of legal pillars as a primary source of the shift. The fact that racism still remains, however, reveals that it simply has evolved once again.

This question is a bit rhetorical in nature, as I have described civil rights as organic and variable. Underlying the answer I give is the fact that I argue that something did necessarily change by the early 1970s. The defining moment in our nation’s cultural history that I provided at the outset of this Chapter can (and should) be investigated. I am certain that countless other events might imbue a sense of racial “achievement” or “harmony” for other Americans.

The process of furthering intergroup contact has occurred over decades in the Deep South. Fundamentally changing white Southerners’ actions and thoughts has never been an easy proposition, even with the advent of integrated schools and increasingly-diverse neighborhoods.
I cannot state that my theory was birthed on April 8, 1974, but the import of young white Southerners embracing an iconic black Southerner exists in that event.

The movement towards more equal civil rights will ever reach a conclusion, but I do think we can point to a moment in our history when it became evident that white and black Southerners were finally able to acknowledge each other’s existence and (perhaps) work towards a relationship of non-zero-sum engagements with one another. The movement did not end but the specific character of racism that pre-dated it did.

This statement is perhaps the most controversial to make at the conclusion of a timeline on the development of systemic racism. And perhaps it is the hardest to definitively prove, as most assumptions in political science are. Beyond the richness of the cultural context, I can only point to what the data reveals as a counterpoint to the host of assertions otherwise. And, in a hopeful sense, if we can assume that the character of racism has changed in a specific arena, then we can also alter our strategies in the continuance of a movement towards increased civil equality.

3 CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS UPDATE VIA NATIONAL SURVEY DATA

“Outside of the metropolitan areas, integration of the public school systems is complete because of the historic intermixing of white and black homes…. On farms and in small towns there has always been a close and personal relationship between individual black and white citizens, even when the strictest legal segregation was observed in public facilities and at social functions. After de jure segregation ended, there was no need to walk across the street and say, “I would like to introduce myself. I’m your white neighbor who has lived here for the last forty years.”

Jimmy Carter, Why Not The Best?

Glaser (1994) concludes that Key’s (1949) threat hypothesis still holds up to empirical study. But little research has been accomplished in recent decades to replicate or update these findings. Taylor (1998) finds less evidence for “threat” than Glaser; however, the data she
employs is limited to samples from metropolitan areas alone (mostly outside the South). In the quote above, former President Carter presents the reality of growing up in the Deep South and the impact of the end of segregation on those that lived through it. It is that reality that I seek to investigate in the modern context.

A band of black belt counties still votes Democrat in local, state, and national elections. This Democratic support varies from county to county, but it is consistent with high percentages of black residents in black belt areas that closely follow a line of traditional cotton production from South Carolina to Louisiana. It is not clear whether this phenomenon is due to attitudinal or economic prerogatives.

Carmines and Stimson (1981, 1984, 1986, 1989) contend that Southern partisan realignment has evolved from shifting racial attitudes. Yet Voss (1996) finds anecdotal evidence in Louisiana that realignment is not necessarily caused by “threat.” Black (2004) argues that the Democratic Party is now the party of racial inclusion, asserting that prejudicial white voters would be less-inclined to vote for Democrats. All conclude that race informs electoral behaviors.

Explaining the blue counties amongst the red appears simple; one should simply identify the black belt counties with the highest proportions of black residents (a Democratic voting bloc). However, this assumption offers no empirical explanation for the voting behavior of contemporary black belt whites (nor does it juxtapose that behavior with racial attitudes). Logically, it appears highly unlikely that racially conservative white Democrats still exist in these regions as their interests would not rationally align with that of the modern party. Whether or not prejudice itself is more prevalent in the black belt than elsewhere is also uncertain.

While the development of competing theories of threat and contact is substantial, current empirical study on racial attitudes and political behavior across the Southern landscape offers no
easy answers in assessing change over time. On the one hand, threat suggests that racial conflict leads to political realities. On the other hand, contact suggests that political preferences that contribute to systemic racism may be mitigated by interracial interaction.

Reconciling both of these models in the present requires a more detailed look into what occurs within and between areas that differ in racial composition and context. Much of Key’s (1949) “backbone of the Old South” remains demographically intact within the black belt. To assess whether or not phenomena of voting behaviors requires a new understanding of race relations in the South, the attitudes and behaviors of modern Southern whites must be explored.

In accordance with the theory that equal-status contact has had a mitigating impact on prejudice in the Deep South, I test three specific predictions that directly challenge group threat regarding racial attitudes.

\[ H_{1A}: \text{Rates of white prejudice are not higher in the Deep South than outside the Deep South.} \]

\[ H_{2A}: \text{Higher black populations have a greater effect on lessening white prejudice in the Deep South than in the non-Deep South.} \]

\[ H_{3A}: \text{In the Deep South, rates of white prejudice are lower in areas of higher black populations than in areas of lower black populations.} \]

Individual-level data from the Racial Attitudes in America Survey (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2007) is the primary source for analysis. This survey includes questions relating to (but not limited to) race, racial attitudes, age, gender, income, and education level. Quite fortunately, this survey data also includes zip codes for all respondents that are
typically missing from most other contemporary national surveys. Additionally, I use 2010 United States Census data in linking populations and the percentages of black residents in the “Deep South” as well as the rest of the nation.

The analysis is to be divided into three sections. First, I describe the data and methods utilized for testing. Secondly, I present the estimation and results. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion on the implications of the findings.

3.1 Data and Methods

Individual-level data from the Racial Attitudes in America Survey (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2007) is the primary source for analysis. This survey includes questions relating to (but not limited to) race, racial attitudes, age, gender, income, and education level. Quite fortunately, this survey data also includes zip codes for all respondents that are typically missing from most other contemporary national surveys. Additionally, I use 2010 United States Census data in linking populations and the percentages of black residents in the “Deep South” as well as the rest of the nation. Only respondents identifying themselves as white have been included.

3.2 Dependent Variable

Operationalizing prejudice is perhaps the most limiting aspect of this empirical study. To put it bluntly, there are countless competing measures that exist within the literature. This Pew survey has been chosen very carefully because it allows a more detailed consideration of geographic determinants while also focusing questions on racial issues. The opportunity does

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18 Several variables include observations of “no response.” Thus, the number of observations within each may vary slightly.
19 Whereas Glaser (1994) also includes a comparative analysis of the “Outer South”, I have chosen to focus solely on the Deep South in order to describe the modern electoral phenomena of the black belt within the context of Key’s (1949) “threat” (see also Valentino and Sears 2005 for further justification).
exist to co-opt a previously-used method of measuring prejudice (e.g. symbolic racism scale) using any one of a host of other surveys (e.g. ANES), but (to my knowledge) these simply do not satisfy the requirements for my specific topic because of the lack of contextual variables contained within (e.g. zip code).

Ultimately, I have selected a “toughest test” to code for Explicit White Prejudice using the Pew survey. Because of the considerable debate as to how to appropriately measure prejudice (e.g. symbolic racism), I do think it necessary to describe the steps I undertook to address the potential bias inherent in my ultimate choice of a dependent variable. Due to the nature of the survey questions, combining elements of both traditional prejudice and symbolic racism appeared to be prudent at the outset (there was no comprehensive battery in the Pew survey that was directly derived from a previously-used method). Using Taylor’s (1998) subscales for traditional anti-black prejudice, I first coded “aversion to contact with blacks” as well as “anti-egalitarianism” using questions that proxied for these sentiments. Furthermore, using Henry and Sears’ (2002) Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale, I also accounted for “excessive demands” of blacks (256) and “undeserved advantage” of blacks (256). Five questions were ultimately selected from the survey, and responses were rescaled from 0 to 1 (for simplicity alone) so that higher scores indicate increased probabilities of prejudice and lower scores indicated decreased probabilities of prejudice. The mean prejudice scores across all questions indexed for relative white prejudice at the individual level. I then utilized factor analysis to evaluate the statistical value of this index for my study. Ultimately, though, the result yielded little usefulness. The questions did not converge on an acceptable level to assume some latent “prejudice” was evidenced therein. If I was to persist in lumping together these questions, I could not in good conscience justify the
theoretical and methodological bases on which they rested. In the end, I have opted for a simpler (yet wholly justifiable) course of action.

One particular “thermometer” question asked respondents to rate their feelings towards blacks along a 4-point Likert scale.\(^{20}\) There are inherent problems with coding these responses with no alteration. First, it is highly unlikely that the substantive difference between responses is equidistant (it may take much more for someone to move from “favorable” to “unfavorable” than from “very” to “mostly”). Secondly, social desirability bias is of great concern with such a limited number of options (limiting my ability to uncover nuance as well as implicit feelings).\(^{21}\) Therefore, the only inherent prejudice or racism that I can confidently proxy from this question alone is whether a white respondent indicated either a “mostly” or “very” unfavorable feeling towards blacks.

Since discounting variation of responses is atypical, I argue that it is most prudent in this specific case because all of the suitable alternatives have been properly vetted and I cannot account for social desirability bias in keeping with the ordinal scale as-is. What I can do, however, is positively identify where animus exists by reduction. This strategy entails avoiding the pitfalls of justifying the prominence of the aforementioned subscales (over other choices) while simplifying the proxy. In the end, respondents simply said what they meant.

Dixon (2006) actually argues that this kind of simple method is superior. If a respondent is clear enough in his or her intentions to register an “unfavorable” feeling, then the prejudice is explicit and undeniable. This variable, a dichotomous coding of *Explicit White Prejudice*, offers the best iron-clad testing opportunity from the Pew survey. Certainly, there may be bias in the

\(^{20}\) Very favorable, Mostly favorable, Mostly unfavorable, Very unfavorable

\(^{21}\) While many opted for a “No response”, a vast majority did fortunately answer along the scale.
underreporting of prejudice in general, but there can be no argument as to what the respondents who answered “unfavorable” felt.

3.3 Independent Variables

Census data from 2010 is used to code for the percentage of black residents (*Percentage Black*) in the zip code for all respondents (included those outside of the Deep South). This variable proxies for racial context in that it directly correlates to the probability of contact with and/or threat from people of color. Additionally, I have coded the percentage of black residents in the nearest municipality and county of residence for Deep South respondents (this was also accomplished using Census data combined with map studies). I have chosen to test for all three of these different geographic areas to more fully depict the effects of racial composition on white racism (Baybeck 2006). Although zip code demographics are the most specific of these measures, cities and counties provide additional units in accounting for threat (through differing levels of contact) within a community. Including these levels may yield greater insight.

*Percentage Black* is the primary variable of interest due to the considerable work that has been done to equate racial threat with high levels of contact. Logic would have it that higher percentage of black residents that live in a particular area would equate to higher levels of contact with those black residents. Additionally, since this study is focused on particular areas with high levels of black populations, it is paramount to utilize such a contextual variable.

Consistent with other work in the racial attitudes literature, *Age*, *Gender* (0 = Male, 1 = Female), *Income*, and *Education Level* serve as “individual-level predictors” (Taylor, 519) for estimating white racism. In large part, the inclusion of these variables accounts for much nesting within the dataset. The income and education values within the dataset originate as ordinal data.

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22 In whole, 1932 separate data observations were matched and coded in addition to the original data.
that indicates direction (as opposed to specific substantive values). Taylor argues that
generational differences, gender gaps, income factors, and learning all contribute heavily towards
different levels of prejudice in a host of studies. We should anticipate that younger generations,
females, and well-educated respondents would exhibit lower levels on average. However, the
data on income level is generally mixed.

The natural log of Population for zip code, nearest municipality, and county of residence
serves as a “locality-level predictor” (Taylor 1998, 519) in estimating white racism. I expect an
inherent difference in attitudes based upon urban and rural settings. Self-selection may play a
role in where one lives. By including this variable, I attempt to more accurately explain the
realities within black belt and non-black belt locales.

3.4 Testing

Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I use maximum likelihood
estimation to assess impact of Percentage Black on Explicit White Prejudice in the Deep South
and outside the Deep South. I have included three geographic levels for modeling the Deep
South. Initial descriptive statistics confirm that observations of Explicit White Prejudice are
much rarer than otherwise (less than 20%). Thus, I estimate a firthlogit model to mitigate bias
from rare events (Firth 1993).23 I also use a simple difference of proportions t-test to compare
Explicit White Prejudice in the Deep South with elsewhere.

23 Although other options exist for rare events modeling (exact logistic regression, relogit (King and Zeng 2001),
scobit), penalized MLE via firthlogit consistently exhibits the least bias upon Monte Carlo simulation (Leitgoeb
2013).
3.5 Analyses

Below, I present the results of my analyses. Although they address the hypotheses somewhat “out of order”, the presentation should nonetheless make sense as I begin broadly and narrow the focus throughout.

Table 3.5.1 Summary Statistics and Difference of Proportions t-test for Explicit White Prejudice Within and Outside the Deep South

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<th>Deep South</th>
<th>Non-Deep South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportions of Explicit White Prejudice</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td>.726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5.1 presents the simple results of the $t$-test. I juxtapose the proportions of Explicit White Prejudice for both Deep South and non-Deep South respondents. Subsequently, there is no statistical evidence with which to reject the null hypothesis for $H_{1A}$. Substantively, the data suggest that observed processes affecting racism may not actually differ much within and outside of the Deep South. The preponderance of political science research in this area suggests otherwise, of course, and so this singular finding must be taken in stride.

In Table 3.5.2, I contrast demographic determinants of contact (and thus potential threat) for the most-specific geographic variable available (zip code). In doing so, I seek to address whether or not there is a significant difference between the Deep South and elsewhere in this conception. The resulting estimation yields a striking difference. For one, the sign for Percentage Black differs in each. Additionally, there is evidence enough to suggest that, while close contact does perhaps moderate Deep South prejudice, it does so in the opposite direction of that which is typically expected (more on this later). There is evidence enough here to reject the null hypothesis for $H_{2A}$, but this fact obviously does not square with the prediction of the opposing
hypothesis. In fact, there is statistical evidence to suggest that a countervailing hypothesis should be investigated.

Table 3.5.2 Estimates of Explicit White Prejudice as a Function of Black Population Percentage in Zip Code (Deep South and Non-Deep South)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Deep South</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Non-Deep South</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Black</td>
<td>-3.884</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.698</td>
<td>.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.446)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.687)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.957</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-1.517</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>-.369</td>
<td>.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.688)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.218)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.136</td>
<td>.383</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.156)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.054)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.995</td>
<td>-.150</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.212)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.072)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.885</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.353)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.108)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Parameters estimated via firthlogit. The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. Statistical significance reflects a two-tailed test. Log Likelihood is penalized.

I estimate three concurrent models in Table 3.5.3 to account for any variation in results that might accompany testing for different population areas. The directional sign is consistent across all measures, though it is in the opposite direction of what would be expected. With over 88% confidence, I estimate that higher percentages of black residents in zip code have a significant negative effect on white racism in the Deep South. The more diffuse regions of municipality and county offer lessening statistical support for that conclusion, but that really all makes substantive sense. White respondents should be most-affected by a “close” demography while experiencing a weakening effect as the (real) distances between individuals in an area increase.
Table 3.5.3 Estimates of Explicit White Prejudice as a Function of Multilevel Black Population Percentages (Deep South)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Zip Code</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Black</td>
<td>-3.88</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>-2.628</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td>-5.585</td>
<td>.743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(expected sign +)</td>
<td>(2.446)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.877)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.786)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.957</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.875</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-1.517</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>-1.447</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>-1.393</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.688)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.668)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.136</td>
<td>.383</td>
<td>-.135</td>
<td>.375</td>
<td>-.104</td>
<td>.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.156)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.152)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.995</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.792</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.212)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.205)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.885</td>
<td>-.092</td>
<td>.592</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.353)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.172)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                         | 120      | 121     | 121          |

Note: Parameters estimated via firthlogit. The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. Statistical significance reflects a two-tailed test. Log Likelihood is penalized.

I balk at rejecting the null hypothesis for $H_{3A}$ outright. However, the findings here are highly intriguing, especially given the black belt electoral phenomenon cited in Figure 1.1.1. Notwithstanding the clear lack of support for status quo hypotheses across the board, I find an opportunity for new direction within the limited analyses here. These are more than null or disconfirming findings. At the very least, the presence of significant racial “threat” in attitude formation (as specified by Key) appears to be disputed. Key’s arguments, as applied to white supremacist behavioral choices, are not the topic here. Rather, in presenting the evidence as I have, I assert that prejudicial attitudes are not necessarily formed most prevalently in geographical areas with great racial heterogeneity.
Lastly, a close look at Figure 3.5.1 provides perhaps the greatest jumping-off point. As black population percentages increase from one interval to the next, it is clear that the likelihood of white racism declines at each step. Even more intriguing is the shifting magnitude evident in the predicted probabilities. The relationship is not linear for this “counter-threat”. Instead, it appears to be mediated by other significant factors as part of a process that is distinctly moderated by the size of out-groups in close proximity. The greatest volatility, it seems, appears to be at lower levels of black populations. However, it is also important to note that relative likelihoods of increased prejudice (values above zero) stay virtually constant throughout.

Note: Brackets are 95% C.I.

Figure 3.5.1 Predicted Probabilities of Explicit White Prejudice in the Deep South
3.6 Discussion

The sum total of the analyses yields considerable support for the three hypotheses at the outset of the Chapter. Though statistical significance does not yield necessarily to a smoking-gun of change, the substantive significance of these findings rests with the fact that they are contradictory to a host of previous studies.

Not only do the results seem to imply that there is little difference in overall levels of prejudice within and outside of the Deep South, but they also illustrate that the process of contact leads to differences in racial attitudes depending on where one resides. The “diminishing returns” of contact given larger contexts of contact (zip code – municipality – county) is likewise intuitively powerful. At more intimate levels of relative closeness, the effects on whether one exhibits animus are more extreme.

Though these analyses fall short of a comprehensive test of my theory, they do provide valuable support and insight for further testing of additional hypotheses. To advance the theory, I need to be able to carefully replicate and expand upon these results while also articulating how discrimination ties into the overall system of racism in the modern Deep South.

I argue that it is critical to understand the barriers towards doing so. For one, the topic of racism is (in and of itself) emotionally- and ideologically-charged. Even for the most professional of social scientists, there are normative considerations that simply cannot be brushed aside easily. And, partially because of those normative considerations, any new or innovative efforts in addressing the topic may be met with a professional scrutiny that can be insurmountable from the outset. Particularly in the case of this study, focused on white racial attitudes in the cradle of historic white supremacy, the die has been cast for many who have preceded in these efforts.
Thus, significant steps must be made in unraveling the several threads of contradictory findings in this Chapter alone. Subsequently, I attempt to more appropriately model a new understanding of Deep South threat in Chapter 4. Objectively critiquing the current scholarship, I concede that useful data has been simply hard to come by. Therefore, I present evidence from an original study that has been designed specifically to address the theoretical and methodological controversies that remain from this present effort.

4  CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS UPDATE VIA ORIGINAL SURVEY EXPERIMENT

“Once the realization is accepted that even between the closest human beings infinite distances continue, a wonderful living side by side can grow, if they succeed in loving the distance between them which makes it possible for each to see the other whole against the sky.”

Rainer Maria Rilke, Letters to a Young Poet

I contend that modeling racism as a system provides the best option in evaluating how racialized politics may be explained. By examining the political phenomena that evolve following the “injection” of race, political scientists may seek to understand how and why racial groups seek to maximize political utility in a variety of environments. As the political landscape changes alongside racial context, political scientists may more accurately evaluate political realities given that modeling. Only in accepting these realities may progress amongst races that live in close proximity be achieved.

Analyzing the role of race in individual-level Southern Politics must likewise begin with an acknowledgment of the undergirding supports of racism. Rather than assuming a causal mechanism whereby racism simply leads to phenomena in and of itself, I begin the discussion of causality by addressing process.

Individuals are not simply “racist” within the context of certain systemic environments. That reasoning is, of course, an ecological fallacy. Rather, the unequal promotion of goals is a
hallmark of behavior that supports an unequal system. Likewise, individual-level mechanisms that promote the development of irrational prejudice are another support. Scholarship suggests that we may posit that the advent of legal and social changes in the American South have allowed for the possibility of prejudicial or discriminatory changes. But, that possibility hinges on an evaluation of those very supports of systemic racism.

In order to address the limitations of the Pew survey data (specifically related to measuring attitudes), as well as to distinguish between attitudes (prejudice) and behaviors (discrimination) regarding race, I test two specific predictions. Using an original survey and experiment designed to assess contextual demographic effects, I specifically target white racial attitudes and behaviors within the Deep South. Prejudice is assessed via a battery of feeling thermometer questions\(^{24}\), while discrimination is assessed via a dictator game experiment. The two hypotheses are:

\[ H_{4A}: \text{In the Deep South, rates of white prejudice are lower in areas of higher black populations than in areas of lower black populations.} \]

\[ H_{5A}: \text{In the Deep South, rates of white discrimination are higher in areas of higher black populations than in areas of lower black populations.} \]

These two predictions serve to highlight the paradox put forth within my theoretical section: Deep South whites exhibit seemingly implausible racially-pluralistic attitudes and racially-protectionist behaviors at the same time. Racial demography, serving as the primary contextual variable via contact as well as threat, is purported as the catalyst for such divergence.

\(^{24}\) Precisely the same as Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) and Dixon (2006).
To test for my contention that individual-level competition also may trump racial group-level competition as a curious by-product, I offer one additional hypothesis test:

\[ H_{6A}: \text{In the Deep South, rates of white discrimination towards blacks are not distinguishable from rates of white discrimination towards other whites.} \]

It is critical to understand that discrimination, as narrowly-measured by this dictator game experiment, begins with individuals possessing some level of utility at the outset. This precondition, as I see it, squares with systemic inequality via institutionalized racism. Thus, on face value, external validity should not be so problematic so as to not present the results of such a test.

The analysis is to be divided into three sections. First, I describe the data and methods utilized for testing. Secondly, I present the estimation and results. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion on the implications of the findings. The Research Design and Survey Instrument are detailed in the Appendix.

### 4.1 Data and Methods

Individual-level data was compiled from an original electronic survey experiment conducted from February to April of 2016 at a large, public university in Atlanta, Georgia. University students voluntarily participated in an undergraduate survey pool, in which they were able to choose from a variety of research projects to participate in. The total number of participants was 407.\(^\text{25}\)

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\(^{\text{25}}\) Several variables include observations of “no response”. Thus, the number of observations within each estimation varies.
The specific title of the project was “Prejudice and Discrimination: A Dictator Game Experiment.” The survey included questions relating to (but not limited to) race, racial attitudes, age, gender, income, political opinions and ideology, and demographic determinants. Participants could access the survey and experiment via mobile device or desktop computer at any time of day during the run. Given the specific focus on white attitudes and behaviors, usable responses from the highly-diverse pool of participants were actually limited to 91 upon final coding. This limitation was anticipated; the final number was adequate and appropriate for the methods utilized.

Although external validity is often questioned when it comes to analyses of student populations, the recent broad usage of such pools in political science research has yielded a substantial defense for this form of data collection. Kam (2011) argues that undergraduate student populations substantively may not differ from the wider population. She offers only two situations in which this actually affects the legitimacy of an experimental research design: 1) when there is a heterogeneous causal effect not modeled for; and 2) the students differ from the “target population” with reference to the moderating variable of interest. Bornstein (1999) provides earlier experimental evidence for the same.

A key component of the structure of the survey instrument was to “drill-down” into an array of specific items that are typically missing or not present together in national surveys. For instance, respondents’ home zip codes and high schools of attendance were gathered in addition to respondents’ perceptions of the racial makeups of the same. Baybeck (2006) asserts that using different hierarchical levels as well as measures of perception is the logical next step towards

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26 The institutional IRB mandated that, while minority students could gain access to the survey experiment at the outset, a “kick-out” mechanism needed to be put in place in order to only gather data that would be actually be used (e.g. that from self-identified “white” respondents). Also, all coding steps have been documented and are available upon request.
providing valid tests on racial context. The addition of the school environment is the most original innovation, of particular importance to my theoretical development.

The specific questions asked during the survey experiment were: a) What is the zip code of your hometown?; b) To the best of your knowledge, please estimate the population percentages of the following racial groups in your home community: (Whites, Blacks, Hispanic or Latino (Non-White); c) What high school did you graduate from?; and d) To the best of your knowledge, please estimate the amount of personal contact you had with members of the following racial groups in your home community (including your educational environment): (Whites, Blacks, Hispanic or Latino (Non-White).

Post-survey experiment, I used 2010 United States Census data in linking those zip code populations and the percentages of black residents residing in each. For high school data, I cross-referenced each individual school with the latest State Board of Education statistics at the time of the study (December 2016 updates). Due to the nature of the project, only respondents originally from the “Deep South” were included in analyses. The specific juxtaposition of racial contexts within this defined area provides the clearest test on whether contact is, indeed, consequential (and whether post-integration realities differ). This very specific choice is not simply intended to offer a critique of Key. That extensive work is a foundation of understanding as well as an enlightening window into the South of his time. However, as I noted in Chapter 2, the American institution of racism has undergone several changes in the eighty or so odd years since.

27 Data Sources: SCHOOLGRADES.GA.GOV; WEB.ALSDE.EDU; ED.SC.GOV; HIGH-SCHOOLS.COM (Private Schools)
28 Whereas Glaser (1994) also includes a comparative analysis of the “Outer South”, I have chosen to focus solely on the Deep South in order to describe the modern electoral phenomena of the black belt within the context of Key’s (1949) “threat” (see also Valentino and Sears 2005 for further justification).
No other studies of which I am aware combine a focus on white attitudes and behaviors in the Deep South with updated methods for defining racial context, prejudice, and discrimination.

4.2 Dependent Variables

One of the most exciting aspects of this study is the pairing of fairly recently-developed operationalizing methods for prejudice and discrimination with the aforementioned demographic data. Referenced previously, Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) and Dixon (2006) advocate a simple additive index that captures the relative distance between how whites perceive themselves in relation to other racial groups on three dimensions of traditional stereotyping.

This strategy combats social desirability bias by using a series of questions not targeting any specific prejudice towards any specific group. Instead, it provides a “feeling thermometer” on members of the racial out-group in relation to the respondent’s feelings about his or her racial in-group. The questions used address attitudes on intelligence, commitment to working hard, and commitment to family values. These three specific domains have consistently been cited by the racial attitudes literature as hallmarks of historical stereotyping (Dixon 2006).

The specific questions asked during the survey experiment were: a) Where would you rate (Whites, Blacks, Hispanic or Latino (Non-White)) in general on this scale? (Intelligent to Unintelligent); b) Where would you rate (Whites, Blacks, Hispanic or Latino (Non-White)) in general on this scale? (Hard-working to Lazy); and c) Where would you rate (Whites, Blacks, Hispanic or Latino (Non-White)) in general on this scale? (Very committed to strong families to Lacking a commitment to strong families).

After data collection via a 7-point Likert Scale, I have coded for White Prejudice by simply gathering the positive cumulative scores for white respondents’ attitudes of their in-group
in relation to their black counterparts. In this conception, a higher score indicates higher levels of *White Prejudice.*

The operationalizing of *White Discrimination* is likewise paramount. While clear evidence of discrimination may be gathered in aggregate data and descriptive statistics, stand-alone surveys used for the purpose of investigating individual-level data are severely limited. A researcher may seek responses directed towards past behavior or even hypothetical situations, but pure behavioral data is best-attained through experimental research (Druckman et al. 2011).

A dictator game experiment was utilized at the conclusion of the survey that placed an economic decision squarely in the hands of the respondent. They were informed that they had been “awarded” ten raffle tickets for their participation that could be kept or donated to a “research assistant:”

> “Thank you for taking part in this survey. As a token of gratitude, you have been given ten raffle tickets assigned to your survey ID. You may choose to keep any number of the raffle tickets for yourself, or you may choose to donate any number to a Political Science research assistant. How many raffle tickets would you like to donate to my research assistant (Derek) on the left? The placement of such privilege in the hands of the white respondents was specifically designed to mimic historic racial economic inequalities.”

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29 More-positive judgments were assigned a value closer to “1” while more-negative judgments were assigned a value closer to “7”.

30 In the actual instrument, the pictures were placed to the left of the text.
There may be something about the process of treating that biases the effects of the causal mechanism (e.g. Hawthorne Effects). A major part of countering this problem is in developing procedures that anticipate how subjects will interpret the treatment. In order to ensure a low likelihood of testing effects, the researcher should be careful not to give “too much” information about what the experiment is all about. In layman’s terms, the procedures of the experiment should “hide” the fact that subjects are being observed relative to a particular effect. Although no prize or award was clearly mentioned, the onus was on the holder to either keep his or her economic advantage or (as the key alternative) to donate a portion of their newfound personal utility to the assistant. See Figure 4.2.1 for a depiction of the two fictitious research assistants, both referred to as “Derek” in the experiment. The treatment was randomized to only expose the subject to either one photo or the other.

Background, clothing, and facial expressions were kept consistent for each treatment. Additionally, recent research suggests the name (and spelling of) “Derek” does not conform to broad racial or ethnic expectations (Tzioumis 2018). According to Holbrook, Fessler, and Navarette (2016), that specific inclusion of a name could prove problematic if not given adequate forethought. Recent advancements in graphic design capabilities have made it possible to alter the “race” of such treatments using the same standard face (Iyengar et al. 2013). However, I
judged that the products of such manipulation often exhibit artificialities. In the end, I opted for presenting the donation decision as more personal (i.e. named) and visually realistic.

Although the lurking variable of altruism might contribute to higher or lower donations in general, the beauty of the experimental method is to essentially negate the effects of such via randomization. What remains is a simple measure of how much each subject was willing to give, thus allowing an insight into any White Discrimination that might be evidenced. Essentially, White Discrimination is reduced to the amount of tickets donated, logically affected only by the racially-based randomized treatments within the statistical models ultimately presented.

4.3 Independent Variables

The most consequential variable for development here is that of Racial Context. To reiterate, Census data from 2010 is used to code for the percentage of black residents in the home zip code for all respondents. Additionally, I have coded the percentage of black students in the high schools of attendance using the most recent public data available from the time of the study. The perception of each respondent on the racial makeup of these differing localities has also been collected, using open-ended percentage-based estimates for zip codes and contact-level estimates via a 7-Point Likert Scale for schooling environment.

While I have replicated the relative power of the zip code variable in this instance (shown in the modeling in Chapter 331), I have also chosen to incorporate the educational setting as it is a foundation of my theory. Based on law and professional standards, the potential for equal-status intergroup contact is greatest in this arena. Even in relatively heterogenous communities, though, some white students may attend largely-segregated private academies or public magnet schools

31 The relative impact of racial context on attitudes appears to diminish with less-specific spatial targeting. For the individual-level unit of analysis, it is most appropriate to pin-down the context that most directly impacts individuals.
with varying degrees of diversity. They may also participate in homogeneous extracurricular activities. I will discuss the further statistical implications of these facts below.

Modeling of multilevel data structures, such as the aforementioned one, can present numerous statistical problems due to nesting and clustering (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). In Chapter 3, I displayed basic, juxtaposed analyses to further the discussion of context without confounding these problems. As an advancement on that effort, I now present a combination of levels that (I contend) provides even greater construct validity. The relative “intimacy” of the school setting combined with the zip code setting provides the opportunity for political scientists to proxy more effectively for contact.

Factor analysis (or latent variables analysis) is utilized in an attempt to incorporate each of these variables into one single construct (Racial Context). Both the reality and the perception of intergroup contact for individual respondents is thus captured. Although contextual variables often prove highly-problematic in the social sciences, research has indicated that racially-based conceptions may be the exception (Hopkins 2016). Essentially, we can logically assume some correlation between actual and perceived demographic observations at these levels. However, the attempt here is to build on that assumption.

Upon reviewing factor analyses of all combinations of the four variables that proxy for contact, three of those (percentage of black residents in zip code, perception of percentage of black residents in zip code, and percentage of black students in the high school of attendance) exhibit high congruence.\(^ {32}\) Preliminary analyses also appeared to show that the scaled responses for contact in the school setting revealed self-selection data that did not exhibit such high congruence.\(^ {33}\) In plain language, the statistics seem to bear-out that a latent variable does indeed

\[\text{Cronbach’s Alpha } = .879\]
\[\text{Cronbach’s Alpha } = .333\]
exist in this case. Using the Cronbach’s Alpha rule-of-thumb, I have designated that variable as 
*Racial Context* (see Table 4.3.1). The higher the value for *Racial Context*, the more intergroup
contact is presumed to be present.

*Table 4.3.1 Rotated Factor Loadings of Congruent Contextual Variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Racial Context</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Black Residents in Zip Code</td>
<td>.903</td>
<td>.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Percentage of Black Residents in Zip Code</td>
<td>.846</td>
<td>.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Black Students in the High School of Attendance</td>
<td>.755</td>
<td>.430</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following closely with other work in the racial attitudes literature, *Gender* (0 = Female, 1 = Male) and *Income* serve as “individual-level predictors” (Taylor, 519) for estimating white
racism. The income values within the dataset originate as ordinal data on a 7-Point Likert Scale
that indicates direction (as opposed to specific substantive values). Age, as well as education
level, are not included in my modeling here, as the cohort is almost entirely comprised of
university undergrads in their late teens and early twenties.

The natural log of *Population* for zip code serves as a “locality-level predictor” (Taylor, 519) in estimating white racism (exactly as in the previous Chapter). Again, I expect an inherent
difference in attitudes based upon urban and rural settings. Self-selection may play a role in
where one lives. By including this variable, I attempt to more accurately explain the realities
within black belt and non-black belt locales since black belt areas are typically more rural. Based
on past scholarship, this inclusion makes for a “tougher test” due to more liberal racial attitudes
typically being present in urban settings. Taylor’s analysis is focused on gleaning data from
metropolitan areas alone, whereas I incorporate rural areas as well.
### 4.4 Testing

Due to the continuous nature of the dependent variable, I estimate OLS regression to assess impact of *Racial Context* on *White Prejudice* in the Deep South for my fourth hypothesis. Due to the count nature of the dependent variable for my fifth hypothesis, the properly-specified model would be Poisson estimation. The method by which the data for the count variable was gathered for *White Discrimination* (given the “black” treatment) allows me to assume that there is a constant rate of occurrence as well as that the accumulated events are independent (there was only one “count” per independent subject. Additionally, the summary statistics and distribution align more fully with this model as opposed to a negative binomial estimation. Lastly, I employ a basic $t$-test for my sixth hypothesis to compare *White Discrimination* (as related to raffle donations to the “black” treatment) with that of *White Discrimination* (as related to raffle donations to the “white” treatment).

### 4.5 Analyses

In Table 4.5.1, I address whether intergroup contact specifically impacts irrational prejudicial attitudes. This estimation squares with my contention that living in black belt areas, as well as diverse urban areas, seems to mitigate the development of prejudicial attitudes. The sign for *Racial Context* is in the expected direction and I can state that, at a 90% confidence interval, the relationship is significantly negative.

#### Table 4.5.1 Estimates of White Prejudice in Deep South Locales (2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>$p$-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial Context</td>
<td>-.346</td>
<td>(.192)</td>
<td>.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.851</td>
<td>(.401)</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.162</td>
<td>(.111)</td>
<td>.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>(.258)</td>
<td>.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.592</td>
<td>(2.708)</td>
<td>.559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: Parameter estimates are OLS regression estimates. The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors computed in the usual fashion.

However, due to the innovative nature of the study, as well as the development of a new method for operationalizing contextual factors, I can accept that more replication is in order. There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis for $H_{4A}$, but that evidence may not be convincing enough for many in the field.

As displayed in Figure 4.5.1, I have replicated the substantive empirical findings from Chapter 3 with new rigor. The magnitude of the coefficient is nonsensical in the comparison. But there is no reason to suggest that these findings are inconsistent, only that they may suffer from a lack of a broader survey pool in the instance of the original survey experiment. The graphical illustration contains confidence intervals calculated to 95%. There is considerable consistency upon observing the like independent variables, even taking into consideration the different instruments from which the data was gleaned (as well as the different strategies and methods used in operationalizing).
Substantively, the lasting import of presenting these results is that they quite literally fly in the face of those asserting that racial threat is a driving force for prejudicial attitudes. If the intent of the theoretical development for threat has been to indicate otherwise (perhaps to say that the system of racism is promoted by threat) then the proprietors of that development have not communicated so clearly and consistently. Looking ahead, the testing of my fifth hypothesis most likely serves as an olive branch for that assertion.

In Table 4.5.2, I present my first analysis relating to the dictator game experiment. This test specifically addresses behaviors of discrimination related to threat. Some explanation is necessary for interpreting these results. Since the giving of raffle tickets proxies for White Discrimination, I would expect that the giving would be negatively impacted by a more-diverse Racial Context. This is exactly the sign of the estimation given here. Since there is no control
group in this experiment, I have combined traditional quantitative methods with experimental data. Treatment effects may not be homogeneous across all subjects, regardless of randomization (which is exactly what I expect here). That is, there may be subgroups within the treatment group that react to the treatment differently due to a moderating variable (i.e. Racial Context). The issue here is technically about specificity of causal claims. We cannot anticipate possessing perfect prior information about how subjects differ; but we can use what we already know in order to group them accordingly. The statistical significance is particularly profound, given discipline norms. Judging the relationship of attitudes to behaviors, the data provides a stark contrast.

Table 4.5.2 Estimates of White Discrimination in Deep South Locales (2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial Context</td>
<td>-.185</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>(.150)</td>
<td>.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>(.103)</td>
<td>.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.130</td>
<td>(1.072)</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 51
\(\chi^2\) = 6.20
Log Likelihood = -109.100

Note: Parameter estimates are Poisson estimates. The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors computed in the usual fashion.

Figure 4.5.2 more succinctly addresses probability via an odds-ratio of giving. Since maximum likelihood estimators only allow us to determine significant directionality (as opposed to magnitude), graphical illustrations provide more substantive meaning. In this case, the graph illustrates that the number of observed events of giving divided by the number of expected

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34 The absence of a control group primarily stems from constraints on obtaining enough participants in the original study to warrant a more complex design. Given additional resources, a third treatment would be an intriguing prospect (perhaps without an accompanying picture of the “research assistant”.)

35 In several cases, this type of strategy may over-complicate the results of a well-executed experiment. I have utilized this method, however, in order to illustrate the divergent effects on attitudes and behaviors as described in the fourth and fifth hypotheses.
events of giving is significantly less given the effects of Racial Context. The result is significantly lower than what we would expect absent of the effects. Again, we can assume that one observation has not impacted another based on the nature of the experiment.

Figure 4.5.2 Odds Ratio of White Discrimination

Figure 4.5.3 provides a straightforward illustration of the effects of Racial Context on both treatment groups. The linear fit graph shows that, to a great degree, estimates of behaviors are simply not the same. Though traditionally used in the discipline, linear fits for count models do contain problems of inefficiency and bias. I pause at rejecting $H_{50}$ on statistical grounds alone (based on the relatively low number of respondents.) I will make the point, however, that all indications are consistent with my theoretical development to this point. The difficulty in accounting for the specific expected number of raffle tickets donated does not constitute an overall denouncement of the central proposition.
The estimates of divergent economic behaviors for Southern whites appear to show a distinct pattern that only widens given extremes in contact. In interpreting the graph above, it is important to remember that perception is included in the context. Thus, what might at first glance seem to be a convergence of behavior at some “happy medium” of contact is actually an illustration of how equal status conditions based on the latent variable of context may alleviate large inequities in behavior.

These estimations hinge on the inclusion of *Racial Context* in the formulation. Absent of that nuance, the aggregate behaviors of Southern whites are still called into question. We assume the lasting effects of these behaviors as economic inequalities. But the individual-level processes that support systemic racism have often escaped our capacities for explanation.
Table 4.5.3 shows the results of a t-test in relation to my sixth and final hypothesis. On the surface, giving is (on the average) higher in the black treatment group, though the difference in means is clearly within the statistical “margin of error.”

*Table 4.5.3 Summary Statistics and Difference of Proportions t-test for White Discrimination in the Deep South (2016)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black Treatment</th>
<th>White Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportions of White Discrimination</td>
<td>5.490</td>
<td>4.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td>.228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Essentially, then, there is little to no observable difference in the economic behaviors of Southern whites overall (\(H_{6A}\)). Discrimination, in this rendering, appears to simply rest upon the individual calculus of the subject (with little regard to racial framing). Only when we dig deeper into the proverbial homes and schools of individuals might we find evidence of the threat that manifests into discrimination under the right conditions. If these conclusions are truly externally valid on the whole, then properly identifying those conditions is paramount.

### 4.6 Discussion

What I have sought to improve upon in this Chapter are both the methods used and the specificity with which I have tested for prejudice and discrimination. By separating out these constructs, I have demonstrated that analyzing data for one does not constitute evidence for both. Additionally, I have designed a survey experiment explicitly intended to test for prejudice while limiting social desirability bias. I have also devised a way to test for discrimination using an experiment that has heretofore not been attempted on the specific population of interest.

The replicated results (with regard to the national survey analyses) address the state of racism within the Deep South in a new and contemporary light. In Chapter 3, I asserted that the process of contact is simply different within and outside of the Deep South. Thus, the uncovered
paradox of thought and action supports my theory for this region. What that paradox does not do is reveal any lessening of racism for any particular part of the nation overall.

In recognizing that individuals may make decisions that conflict with their attitudes and opinions, though, I have uncovered perhaps the crux of what contributes to systemic racial inequality in Chapter 4. Economic decisions, or decisions based in the perceived threat of one’s relative advantage from a large out-group, affect the extent to which one is willing to invest in another (even another within one’s in-group). The cumulative effects of such behavior affect historic minority groups most, as economic advantages will continue to rest with those that already enjoy them.

And so, in addressing the state of systemic racism as a construct, the most vital of its support comes from those that utilize protectionist strategies in their day-to-day lives. And while that notion, on the surface, may appear to be simply rational in the economic context, the utility of racially-pluralistic behaviors has not been sufficiently vetted as an alternative to this point.

In the following Chapter, I will endeavor to accomplish a few final goals. Firstly, I will offer further reasoning on why it is important for social scientists to continue this work on the Deep South. Secondly, I will seek to highlight some stark contemporary evidence that something is (indeed) different in this arena. In doing so, I seek to persuade others that it is paramount to continue seeking out new and innovative approaches to fully realizing what that difference is. Lastly, I will offer an original research avenue that is open for robust criticism while providing a brief case study opportunity for anyone who wishes to test the boundaries of my final propositions.
5  CHAPTER 5: BACK TO THE ARENA

“Everyone in the South has no time for reading because they are all too busy writing.”

William Faulkner, in Conversations with William Faulkner

Where do we go from here? In a very broad sense, I have attempted to make the case that there is significant evidence to support the idea that de jure changes have led to de facto results. Always a point of contention, assertions that racism has been counteracted in the South are often put to rest by realities on the ground. I have attempted to redefine the construct of racism so as to further the conversation, rather than to be lost in a myriad of competing voices.

The positive results of public policy for promoting integrated public services and, specifically, schooling, are touted as lessening prejudice. However, the changing dynamics of a racist institution have also created the dueling narrative of discrimination brought on by real or perceived economic threats. Most specifically, I have highlighted the black belt and other highly-diverse geographic regions within the Deep South as being ground-zero for uncovering the data necessary to these conclusions.

Akin to the musings of Faulkner above, it may well be that academic Southerners and non-Southerners alike have long-ignored the evidence needed to clearly define familiar terms like racism, prejudice, and discrimination so that scientific progress can be made. In our haste as a community of scholars, many have offered explanation without returning to the foundational source of the topic. Beyond political science, anthropologists and sociologists would be well-served to conduct intense participant-observation research in the rural and urban centers of Deep South multi-culturalism. The topic of race is openly-discussed in the South daily. However, it is also a topic that is avoided daily. I would argue that the reason for avoidance is a lack of metaphorical “reading.”
Comparative political scientists also have a lot to gain in this arena. Whereas area specialists traditionally look beyond America’s borders for the development of rich cultural, structural, and game theory, the formal modeling of the intersection of racial threat and contact in our own “backyard” provides ample opportunities close to home.

For the fellow traditional Americanist, it will remain vital to stay the course on the long road to understanding local Southern cultures. Evaluating prejudice and discrimination via political and economic processes alone misses the point. Concurrent social processes are also at hand (and have been for some time) that provide the fertile ground for growing non-zero-sum environments in a changing landscape. In military service and professional sports especially, history is on the side of equal status contact being fruitful. Systemic racism is not a constant monolith. But proper statistical modeling and experimentation alone cannot forge that understanding. Sound research methods, to include participant-observation and a re-evaluation of history, can allow us to provide more insight through our work.

In Chapter 1, I referenced the work of Glaser and Ryan (2013) prominently. In doing so, I recognized that their conclusions are the closest to my own formative thoughts on the politics of race in the South. They find that specific instances may present themselves in which rational actors of both races may overcome an impetus for racially-protectionist policy decisions (such as in local school-funding referendums). Unlike the results in this study, they do still assert that prejudice is the basis for those policies at the outset. Notwithstanding the theoretical differences, the potential for combatting discrimination is well-noted.

At the center of our combined efforts to construct a normative bridge towards increased liberality and democracy, political scientists must remember that politics is essentially about “Who Gets What” (Lasswell 1936). And beyond equal-status conditions that are mandated by
law in the public sphere, we should be on the lookout for the opportunities that exist in our neighborhoods and on our city streets that are consequential to the game of politics played between people of different races daily.

The implications for doing so are far-reaching. The targeted scope of this project has been limited to analyzing black and white relations in a specific region alone, but there are countless other contemporary iterations of study that can gain from doing this job well. For instance, if the study of cooperative games is the next step towards correctly specifying the power conditions of any majoritarian/minority dynamic, then the methodological groundwork can be laid here in an analysis of a non-cooperative status quo.

5.1 Contrasts in Response

In June of 2015, nine black parishioners were killed in a Charleston, South Carolina church in a targeted hate crime. In the ensuing weeks, the grace of the victims and their families led to a response that only the most extreme of idealists could have imagined in the original birthplace of secession. The Confederate battle flag, adorning the top of the State House for most of the previous fifty-four years, came down.

The rapidity of that response, alongside the bi-partisanship and multi-racial support with which it was largely and quickly embraced, was unique within a national climate that had been shocked by numerous events outside of the Deep South, beginning with the killing of Trayvon Martin in 2012. By 2014, the number of unarmed black men killed by (mostly white) authorities became a national epidemic, prompting the Black Lives Matter movement.36

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36 Dontre Hamilton (Milwaukee, Wisconsin); Eric Garner (New York City, New York); John Crawford III (Dayton, Ohio); Ezell Ford (Florence, California); Dante Parker (Victorville, California); Tanisha Anderson (Cleveland, Ohio); Akai Gurley (Brooklyn, New York); Tamir Rice (Cleveland, Ohio); Rumain Brisbon (Phoenix, Arizona); Jerame Reid (Bridgeton, New Jersey).
Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland notably erupted into violent rioting. But in South Carolina, the response was very different. Then-Governor Nikki Haley commented on the shift, “South Carolina did not respond with rioting and violence, like other places have. We responded by talking to each other, putting ourselves in each other’s shoes, and finding common ground in the name of moving our state forward.... This State House belongs to all of us.”

Much of the credit for the eventual removal was given to younger (mostly-white) lawmakers in the General Assembly, who had grown up knowing only integration. Even the son of Strom Thurmond, the original “Dixiecrat,” agreed that the time for change was at-hand. However, the true seeds of the removal rested with black leaders who had campaigned for decades on the issue. What changed in the wake of the tragedy amounted to shift in the relative conditions of power. Once both black and white South Carolinians were joined in empathy, the barriers to a racially-pluralistic response were lifted.

In the following section, I will present a potential “next step” for political scientists to consider when studying the Deep South, or the South in general. The intent is not to conflate the very traumatic experience of the Mother Emanuel shooting with simple equal-status conditions. Neither is it an effort to contrast a certain viewpoint of the Deep South with that of the rest of the nation. Instead, it is a modest work built upon the history of a racially-diverse region that has weathered many storms in advance.

5.2 Prescription

In this section, I outline a simple game of Deep South Intergroup Contact for further development within the discipline of political science. The implications for outlining a response to seemingly intractable discrimination exist within. In summation, this game illustrates the

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37 As quoted in The State newspaper (July 11, 2015).
relative “irrationality” of hoarding a perceived or real advantage for one’s own in-group in the midst of other well-positioned out-groups. Even in the context of a very white racial context, the benefits of discrimination are called into question.

This game is two-player, simultaneous, non-zero-sum, but also non-cooperative in the present conception. First, I define the players, choices, and payoffs. Secondly, I specify the utility functions for each player. Third, I list the assumptions of the game. Lastly, I illustrate the strategic matrix and discuss the shifting of the Nash equilibrium at two different states of nature.

The players are one white individual or group ($W$) and one black individual or group ($B$). In this game, a social situation arises in which $W$ (in direct contact with $B$) must choose to act in either a discriminatory or non-discriminatory manner. In the same social situation, $B$ (in direct contact with $W$) must simultaneously choose to respond or not respond to the perceived racial elements of $W$’s choice.

The payoffs for these choices are a utility function of some constant social, political, and economic status $S$, which is shared by both $W$ and $B$ at the beginning of the game. In plain language, the choices made by both players can impact their overall status for the better or worse because they may either gain or lose status from the other player.

To illustrate: $W$ may choose to act in a discriminatory manner and $B$ may choose not to respond. The expected utility of $W$ then reflects some constant status $S$ plus that additional status which has been “cheated” away from player $B$ (e.g. a white player may overcharge a black player for some service rendered at a place of business). On the other side, $B$ has forfeited any status gains possible from $W$, as well as his or her own power to avoid being “cheated.” However, if $B$

38 It is not dependent upon ideal cooperative situations.
chooses to respond to racist behavior (e.g. a boycott of the place of business), then “cheating” is no longer possible, and \( W \) incurs the costs of his or her behavior.

The primary variables introduced into the function account for both the magnitude of \( S \) that can be added or subtracted as well as the chance that \( B \) will respond. These variables are \( P_W \) (percent white) and \( P_B \) (percent black) and represent the simplified demographic states of nature (Racial Context) in which the game is played.\(^{39}\) \( P_R \) (chance of response) is assumed to be equal to \( P_B \). It is important to note that I am not introducing probabilities in order to model mixed strategies here. Instead, the chance of response is incorporated into the utility function as a way of modeling the relative impact of any action player \( B \) might choose, given the population parameters.

Essentially, the utility functions for each player and his or her choices are as follows:

**Player \( W \)**

- Discriminatory/No Response \( E(U) = (1 - P_R)(S + P_B S) \)
- Discriminatory/Response \( E(U) = (P_R)(S - P_B S) \)
- Non-Discriminatory/No Response \( E(U) = (1 - P_R)(S + P_B S) \)
- Non-Discriminatory/Response \( E(U) = (P_R)(S + P_B S) \)

**Player \( B \)**

- Discriminatory/No Response \( E(U) = (1 - P_R)(S - P_W S - P_B S) \)
- Discriminatory/Response \( E(U) = (P_R)(S - P_W S) \)
- Non-Discriminatory/No Response \( E(U) = (1 - P_R)(S + P_W S) \)
- Non-Discriminatory/Response \( E(U) = (P_R)(S + P_W S) \)

The assumptions inherent in the model are as follows:

1. Each player maintains ordinal preferences, seeking the highest utility possible.
2. There is complete and perfect information.
3. Decisions are made under the conditions of certainty.
4. Each player is unencumbered by “deeply rooted” prejudice (Allport 1954, 281).
5. \( S > 0 \)

\(^{39}\) One of the key “next-steps” for this model is to incorporate the new Racial Context variable described in Chapter 5.
6. $S$ is constant.
7. $P_W + P_B = 1$
8. The probability of a response for player $B$ ($P_R$) is directly proportional to $P_R$ at a 1:1 ratio.
9. The players may not gain or lose status from themselves or their own group, except when Player $B$ forfeits all status by not responding to discrimination from player $W$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player $W$</th>
<th>Player $B$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disc.</td>
<td>$\text{No Response}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Disc.</td>
<td>$\text{Response}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.2.1 The Intergroup Contact Game

An advantage of the formal matrix prescribed (Figure 5.2.1) is the ability to predict behaviors without regard to altruism (a topic previously discussed). In the dictator game experiment, I employed randomization of racial frames to neutralize the potential that altruism was being tested. Certainly, prejudices and goodwill do exist in the real world, as well as lingering *de facto* inequities. However, this game allows us to simply propose a rational set of actions for the actors involved at different states of nature. The propositions implied inform much further discussion.

The solutions to each of the games presented in Figure 5.2.2 are surrounded in bold. When solving for all possible states of nature, it can be noted that the Nash equilibrium shifts from the lower left quadrant to the lower right quadrant at exactly a 50/50 population distribution.\textsuperscript{40} The model thus proposes [Proposition 1] that it will always be in the best interests of the white individual or group to act in a non-discriminatory manner, regardless of local populations. However, the model also proposes [Proposition 2] that it is in the best interests of

\textsuperscript{40} See Figure 5.5.2 for prior support of this specification.
the black individual or group to respond only once $P_B$ reaches at least .5. Additionally, an interesting phenomenon within the model proof posits that both players derive the largest utilities possible in each game at the equilibrium. In fact, the smallest populations derive the most utility. Thus, a corollary to each proposition might state that all players derive the maximum utility from the choices at equilibrium, particularly the choices of player $B$.

![Table](image)

**Note:** This version of the game is played when the local population is 80% white and 20% black.

![Table](image)

**Note:** This version of the game is played when the local population is 20% white and 80% black.

Substantively, then, what do these propositions provide? On the one hand, this model implies that discriminatory behavior is simply irrational in a world with equal status. Within the game, the choice and ability to respond expresses these rights and protections for player $B$. On the other hand, it appears that player $B$’s choice holds some important substantive significance for the whole of society, both in determining payoffs to both sides and also in shifting the calculus of player $W$.

Further development of this formal modeling could conceivably lead to a more articulate and sophisticated specification for the conditions in which white Southerners can reach beyond
the impetus for discrimination. In reality, the onus will be on the researcher to identify not only the conditions, but also the framing by which individuals can conceive of mutual gain through cooperation (a game that I am not prepared to present in this context). The pervasive historical response is that specified by Hobbes: pre-emptive “attack.” However, if the work I have done here provides any reasonable silver lining, it is that things can and do change.

My sincere hope is that we can, as a scientific community, change in promoting this type of modeling in our applied endeavors moving forward. In an effort to exhibit the real-world consequences of how the Intergroup Contact Game plays out in different contexts, I will return to the original arena.

5.3 A Reunion

In the fall of 2018, alumni from Americus High School will meet for several reunions on Homecoming. The Class of 1999 will organize for the first time since 2008, in honor of the twentieth year since their graduation. The high school they will return to is no longer named “Americus,” but is now Americus-Sumter High School (owing to a City and County Schools merger). The impetus for the merger was birthed in early activism by Sumter County Board of Education Representatives in the 1950s and 1960s (notably Jimmy Carter). They sought to counteract what was, in those times, a system that saw the white children go to the City and the black children go to the County.

What followed in the years after full-scale integration, however, was a realignment of the status quo without further legal force. By the late 1990s, the City Schools maintained a much higher racial diversity than the County Schools (while also boasting of balanced budgets and better overall facilities). In addition, teachers, coaches, and administrators of color dominated the City Schools whereas the County Schools were led almost entirely by whites. The early
progressive efforts quite literally morphed into a process that eventually had vast unintended
effects.

Since their graduation, most of the white alumni of the Americus Class of 1999 have
moved away from their home town and have not been active in efforts to reunite. A majority of
those that do remain actually send their own children to out-of-district schools in neighboring
counties. Some even choose to support the local private academy (Southland) that was founded
in the years immediately following integration.

This type of story is not unique. In Georgia alone, mergers and full-scale movement of
white students to new schools has forged the histories of countless Deep South communities like
LaGrange, Rome, Athens, and Valdosta. The modest equal status that did exist in the few
decades following integration of the public education systems there have evolved into a very
different form of private self-selection. Not only have white families moved away, but they have
also often rescinded their financial support for the multi-cultural learning environments that
fostered them. Subsequent financial investment in new business and infrastructure has also
sought “whiter” pastures elsewhere.

Very few communities remain that support the same integrated institutions that existed at
the conclusion of “Reconstruction.” In applying anecdotal contemporary observations to this
reality, one can observe higher wages and standards of living for people of all races in those
scattered towns and cities like Buford, Thomasville, Moultrie, Cartersville, and Carrollton.

When the Class of 1999 comes together at a school that will surely feel somewhat alien to
them (Americus-Sumter High School), they will reunite with a community of peers that shared
the experience of growing up in a place that combatted prejudice daily following the infamous
cover on Life magazine. However, the harsh reality of discrimination will also be clearly evident
if reunion photos are filled only with black and brown faces. Active engagement by white Southerners in multi-racial social settings is the key to realizing equal status for all. At least in one small instance, in an isolated Deep South and black belt town, that remains a hopeful possibility.
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*Social Science Quarterly* Vol. 58: 412-17.


APPENDIX

Survey Experiment Design

I. Research Design
   A. The type of research proposed is a survey instrument with an embedded “dictator game” experiment. The entire survey and experiment is contained within an electronic-based instrument designed in Qualtrics. This survey and experiment will be completed online. A consent form precedes the survey. The subsequent survey data will mainly serve to establish many of the demographic variables of interest, though attitudinal data is also gathered. Questions will be answered with regard to race, gender, age, etc. In addition, subjects will be asked to describe the “racial environment” of their hometown. Both specific data linked to the U.S. Census as well as data on subjects’ perceptions will be collected. The experiment will involve a single-test only, randomized design that will allow subjects to choose to “share” with either a black or white fictitious individual. The “sharing” behavior proxies for a measure of racial discrimination. Specifically, the experiment proceeds as follows: Individuals will be thanked for participating at the conclusion of the survey questions. They will then be “given” 10 raffle tickets to do with as they please. Though there is no actual prize, deception is utilized in order to foster the belief that they may have something to gain by their choice. Thus, they are given the role of a dictator. They can act with complete self-interest or with a measure of altruism. A fictitious research assistant is presented as the individual with whom they may share their tickets. This research assistant differs in race according to the randomization of the treatment (i.e. one research assistant appears to be “White” and one research assistant appears to be “Black”). They choose how to allocate their tickets, and the survey ends. Due to randomization, we can assume that the only thing that differs between the two sub-populations tested is the race of the research assistant that they allocate to. Thus, the number of tickets allocated provides insight on the subject of discrimination. When coupled with the attitudinal data, the overall design should provide necessary insight for answering the primary research question. It should also allow the researchers the ability to test how closely the attitudes measured in the survey align with the behaviors exhibited in the experiment.

II. Detailed Study Procedures
   A. The data collection process is completely confidential via Qualtrics. Data collection, itself, should not take more than 10 minutes per subject. The timeline for collection is estimated to be no more than a semester (or less). The data will first be handled by the data administrator of the Political Science Research Pool. At the point the primary investigators are given the data, all identifying variables will have been removed by the administrator and a survey ID will have taken its place. The information
provided will be stored in password-protected and fire-walled computers. No identifying information will be presented or published as a result of this study. No individuals will be identified personally, and all findings will be summarized via group statistics (OLS and MLE estimation).

III. Data and Analysis

A. Sample
The sample will be gathered from the Political Science Research Pool at GSU on a volunteer-basis. Subjects are GSU undergraduate students who are enrolled in required American Government courses. The sample size is anticipated to be around 200 in total. This number is compatible with OLS and MLE statistical modeling.

B. Measurement / Instrumentation
The variables of interest are as follows: Race, Age, Gender, Ideology, Relative Prejudice (as measured via an index of three questions), Demographics of Hometown/Secondary School, Perceived Demographic Makeup of Home Community, Perceived Interracial Contact in Home Environment, Extent of “Sharing” with a Black/White Individual (as a proxy for Discrimination).
The survey measurement techniques utilized are consistent with a wealth of racial attitudes research. The dictator game, likewise, has been utilized in many political science experiments.
The data will be collected online via GSU Qualtrics.

C. Methodology
The data will be analyzed using Stata statistical software. Appropriate modeling will be dependent upon the nature of the dependent variable (continuous, discrete, etc.) as well as the distribution of the data. It is anticipated that OLS and Ordered Probit will be appropriate.
Relative levels of “prejudice” and “discrimination” will serve as primary dependent variables.
“Prejudice” will be measured as the distance between one’s opinions of other races juxtaposed with one’s own race. This method is consistent with a host of prior research.
Independent moderating variables for “discrimination” will include an interaction term of demographic makeup and perceived demographic makeup on two levels (the home community and the secondary school). The independent mediating variable for “discrimination” will be the racial treatment itself.

Survey Instrument

Prejudice and Discrimination: A Dictator Game Experiment

You may skip any questions that you prefer not to answer – no questions are required to continue.

Demographic Questions:
Q1 What is your age?

Q2 What is your gender?
- Female
- Male

Q3 What racial group do you identify with?*
- White
- Black
- Hispanic or Latino (Non-White)
- Asian or Pacific Islander
- Native American
- Multi-Racial
- Other

*Non-white participants who may have overlooked the statement that this study is focused on white racial attitudes alone will end the survey here.

Q4 What is the zip code of your hometown?

To the best of your knowledge, please estimate the population percentages of the following racial groups in your home community:

Q5 Whites:

Q6 Blacks:

Q7 Hispanic or Latino (Non-White):

Q8 What high school did you graduate from?
To the best of your knowledge, please estimate the amount of personal contact you had with members of the following racial groups in your home community (including your educational environment):

Q9 Whites:
- Almost Never
- Very Little
- Somewhat Less than Other Groups
- About the Same as Other Groups
- Somewhat More than Other Groups
- A Great Deal
- Almost Always

Q10 Blacks:
- Almost Never
- Very Little
- Somewhat Less than Other Groups
- About the Same as Other Groups
- Somewhat More than Other Groups
- A Great Deal
- Almost Always

Q11 Hispanic or Latino (Non-White):
- Almost Never
- Very Little
- Somewhat Less than Other Groups
- About the Same as Other Groups
- Somewhat More than Other Groups
- A Great Deal
- Almost Always

Q12 To the best of your ability, please estimate your yearly household income before taxes. Include the total income of all adults (like your parents) living at your home address.
- under $10,000
- $10,000 - $24,999
- $25,000 - $49,999
- $50,000 - $74,999
- $75,000 - $99,999
- $100,000 - $149,999
- $150,000 and over
Attitudinal Questions:

Q13 If you were to rank yourself with regard to political ideology, where would you fall on the following scale?

- Extremely Liberal
- Very Liberal
- Somewhat Liberal
- Neither Liberal nor Conservative: "Middle of the Road"
- Somewhat Conservative
- Very Conservative
- Extremely Conservative

Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you consider almost all of the people in that group to be "intelligent". A score of 7 means that you consider almost everyone in the group to be "unintelligent". A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

Q14 Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?

- 1 - Intelligent
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Unintelligent

Q15 Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale?

- 1 - Intelligent
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Unintelligent
Q16 Where would you rate Hispanics or Latinos (Non-White) in general on this scale?

☐ 1 - Intelligent
☐ 2
☐ 3
☐ 4
☐ 5
☐ 6
☐ 7 - Unintelligent

In the second statement a score of 1 means that you consider almost all of the people in that group to be "hard-working". A score of 7 means that you consider almost everyone in the group to be "lazy". A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

Q17 Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?

☐ 1 - Hard-working
☐ 2
☐ 3
☐ 4
☐ 5
☐ 6
☐ 7 - Lazy

Q18 Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale?

☐ 1 - Hard-working
☐ 2
☐ 3
☐ 4
☐ 5
☐ 6
☐ 7 - Lazy
Q19 Where would you rate Hispanics or Latinos (Non-White) in general on this scale?

- 1 - Hard-working
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Lazy

In the third statement a score of 1 means that you consider almost all of the people in that group to be “very committed to strong families”. A score of 7 means that you consider almost everyone in the group to be “lacking a commitment to strong families”. A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

Q20 Where would you rate Whites in general on this scale?

- 1 - Very committed to strong families
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Lacking a commitment to strong families

Q21 Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale?

- 1 - Very committed to strong families
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Lacking a commitment to strong families
Q22 Where would you rate Hispanics or Latinos (Non-White) in general on this scale?

- 1 - Very committed to strong families
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Lacking a commitment to strong families

Now I have some questions about different political institutions in our country. I’m going to show you a seven-point scale on which you can evaluate these institutions. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you consider the current performance of that institution to be "excellent." A score of 7 means that you consider the current performance of that institution to be "poor." A score of 4 means you think that the institution is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think the institution stands.
Q23 Where would you rate the Presidency on this scale?

- 1 - Excellent
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 – Poor

Q24 Where would you rate Congress on this scale?

- 1 - Excellent
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 – Poor

Q25 Where would you rate the Supreme Court on this scale?

- 1 - Excellent
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 – Poor
Randomized Treatments:
Participants will randomly receive one of the two following experimental treatments. The only substantive difference in the treatments is the race of the fictional "research assistant".

Q26B Thank you for taking part in this survey. As a token of gratitude, you have been given ten raffle tickets assigned to your survey ID. You may choose to keep any number of the raffle tickets for yourself, or you may choose to donate any number to a Political Science research assistant. How many raffle tickets would you like to donate to my research assistant (Derek) on the left?

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
Thank you for taking part in this survey. As a token of gratitude, you have been given ten raffle tickets assigned to your survey ID. You may choose to keep any number of the raffle tickets for yourself, or you may choose to donate any number to a Political Science research assistant. How many raffle tickets would you like to donate to my research assistant (Derek) on the left?

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10