Covering Africa in the Age of Independence: Divergent Voices in U.S. Print Media, 1957-1975

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COVERING AFRICA IN THE AGE OF INDEPENDENCE:
DIVERGENT VOICES IN U.S. PRINT MEDIA, 1957-1975

by

CARRIE L. WHITNEY

Under the Direction of Ian C. Fletcher, PhD

ABSTRACT

This dissertation critically examines how U.S. print media sought to represent the realities of decolonizing and newly independent countries in West Africa by focusing on pivotal events and charismatic leaders from the “non” vote in Guinea in 1958 to the radical appeal of Amilcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau in 1973. The framing and agenda setting of mainstream media coverage turned leaders and events into metonyms not only for peoples and nations but also for Africa and Africans as a whole. However, the complexities of West Africa, such as political rivalry in the Congo or civil war in Nigeria, troubled such representations. Thus this dissertation tracks the widening of coverage and opening up of representations in African American and New Left print media in a time of global unrest as well as Cold War.
INDEX WORDS: West Africa, U.S. media, Cold War, Agenda setting, Framing, Decolonization
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CARRIE L. WHITNEY

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
2016
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Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
December 2016
DEDICATION

As I worked to complete this dissertation, I labored always with the support of family, friends, and colleagues who have encouraged me for many years and in some ways suffered the pains of scholarship with me. From early days in the Cube Farm to the solitary process of writing, camaraderie among the graduate students made the challenge of earning a doctorate conceivable. Beginning alphabetically, it was with Abou Bamba before I had even become a historian with whom I first went “in search of Africa.” I appreciate Abou’s understanding of my immediate obsession with Sékou Touré and for his insistence that I have something useful to contribute to scholarship. I am thankful to have made this journey with Beth Bullock Spencer who holds high standards that I find myself trying to meet. After several years of not progressing successfully from exams to prospectus, the little research group with Andrew Reisinger and Lauren Moran enabled me to move forward. From early days, Derrick Lanois proved a stalwart friend as we navigated the roles of graduate student and instructor together. And in later years, I was fortunate for the reassurance of Allyson Tadjer as we worked on opposite projects. With Abou having successfully moved on to a faculty position elsewhere, it was helpful to have another person willing to hear my thoughts on S.T.

Non-historian friends have kindly endured numerous conversations about my research as well as mitigated my ongoing sense of uncertainty. Seated on top of a mountain in New Hampshire, Dori Wolfson, a great giver of advice, first instructed me that my future lay in academia. She was, of course, correct, and since that time has not wavered in her support of my goal. My childhood friend who I would still choose as an adult, Marni Lennon has provided encouragement and counsel as I have worked to make this transition into academia. Knowing that I could always count on Marni and our PV friends Melissa Schildkraut, Tammy Lenkeit, and
Carolee Grodi has gotten me through some tough moments. Tammy, I apologize for starting every yoga class with a complaint about the state of my research. Two amazing business women who provided me with work to financially support my love of learning, Suzanne Shaw and Andi Frey deserve my warmest gratitude for their understanding of the demands that my teaching, research, and writing schedule has made on my time.

To my family, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to follow this dream. I am grateful to know that the Whitneys have been behind me cheering me on and look forward to hearing a full response to this dissertation from my father, Allan Whitney. None of this would have been possible without the assistance and devotion of my mother Wendy Whitney, who always knew that I could do it, even when I did not. Thanks, mom for the years of helping me get the space I needed to read, study, write, and try not to go crazy. Most of all, I would not have persevered in this process without the constant thought of my daughters Isabella and Colette and my desire to show them that anything was possible as long as you refuse to give up.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A work of this scope that spans more than a decade and crosses many borders would not have been possible without the support of several individuals to whom I owe a debt of considerable gratitude. Most importantly, I am grateful to Ian C. Fletcher who served as my dissertation advisor for more years than he probably expected to. Thank you, Dr. Fletcher for seeing me through the lengthy process of coursework, exams, and the various avenues of research that piqued my interest. I truly appreciate that you did not relinquish this capricious graduate student and instead had the patience to allow me explore my myriad interests. Throughout many years, you have been an advisor and a friend, and your steadfastness has made this dissertation possible.

The support and expertise of my dissertation committee members has been crucial to my research. Mohammed Hassen Ali first led me through a thrilling look at Nigerian literature, and I feel fortunate to have counted him among my committee from the beginning. His vast knowledge and encouraging manner have often driven me to look deeper and go further. During the final years of my Ph.D. program, I was privileged to become reacquainted with Leonard Ray Teel, a scholar whose work combines journalism and history. Obviously an ideal fit for my dissertation committee, Dr. Teel reinvigorated my zest for scholarship and helped get me through the writing process. A decisive member of the committee, Harcourt Fuller brought his knowledge of African history and theory to the process, injecting my research with important avenues of scholarship. His keen lines of inquiry already point me to the future possibilities for my work on Africa and U.S. media.

Throughout my graduate program, many other professors have made contributions to my research as well as my growth as a scholar, and a few must be included here. Michele Reid-
Vazquez salvaged my dissertation at a critical moment and sparked the idea for what this research would become. With his penchant for theory, Duane Corpis first induced me to begin this program in history. Christine Skwiot taught me about transnational scholarship and coached me through my first teaching experience.

Finally, I am grateful to the faculty and staff of the Georgia State University Department of History for probably too many years of support. The program has prepared me well as a scholar and a teacher, and it has proven an enjoyable experience. Additionally, I appreciate the GSU Department of Communication for offering me a home away from home during the final years of my doctoral program. I close with a last expression of gratitude to the GSU library, in particular the helpful staff of Interlibrary Loan, who managed to locate almost any source for which I had a need, allowing my research to continuously grow in richness.
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1 INTRODUCTION

In October 1958, the influential American magazine *Foreign Affairs* featured an essay by the leader of a newly independent West African nation in which he graciously and humbly asked the United States for financial support in the form of investment. President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, which had achieved independence the previous year, explained that African nations’ desire for non-alignment was simply a matter of not getting involved in a conflict that was beyond their ability to affect militarily.

But this attitude of non-alignment does not imply indifference to the great issues of our day. It does not imply isolationism. It is in no way anti-Western; nor is it anti-Eastern … On this great issue of war and peace, therefore, the people and government of Ghana put all their weight behind the peaceful settlement of disputes and seek conditions in which disputes do not become embittered to the point of violence.1

After several pages of friendly words, though taking care to hint that Ghana did have the ability to affect the balance of power through its alliances, Nkrumah closed with the bold statement, “Africa has no choice. We have to modernize. Either we shall do so in the interest and support of the West or we shall be compelled to turn elsewhere. This is not a warning or a threat, but a straight statement of political reality.”2

A decade later in the same publication, journalist Russell Warren Howe lamented the independence-era rewriting of African history that attempted to give black Africa a pre-colonial value.

Indeed, before the pan-Africanizing experience of colonialism, each tribe was ignorant of almost all African lands except its own, and those of its neighbors and present or past enemies. A female continent, Black Africa was to be "discovered," penetrated and dominated by others. There were few exceptions to this image of passivity.3

Howe described the cultural and political awakening of Africa of 1968, not as a “Renaissance but an Enlightenment.”4 Having determined that any sort of glorious African past was mere myth, Howe turned to reviewing several of the continent’s national leaders, beginning...
with Nkrumah. “Some men have carved their own mythology. Probably none has been so adept at this as Kwame Nkrumah” who “built an image of himself as a left-wing leader dedicated to a large African union and opposed to all that regionalized or balkanized the continent.” However, according to Howe, Nkrumah “opposed all movements which he could not hope to lead,” and “he inevitably opposed every union in Africa of any size, and even many small ones.” The pre-independence image of Nkrumah lingered even as he changed, and his admirers refused to acknowledge actions that contradicted that image, but “little if anything in Nkrumah’s post-independence policy suggests that he had any ideology except the desire to retain both his wealth and power … The battle against colonialism was the only battle Nkrumah honorably won.”

Between Nkrumah's own 1958 description of newly independent Ghana full of promise and exercising some degree of power and Howe's demeaning and disappointed image of black Africa in 1968, U.S. media coverage of African events and leaders varied as greatly as these two pictures. While Nkrumah had access to the international discursive space at the dawn of Ghana’s independence, by 1968, he had lost the privilege to speak for himself in *Foreign Affairs*. Deposed, Nkrumah could only be defined by the Western journalist.

**The Problem of Covering Africa**

Myths about leaders are certainly one way that media stereotypes have been applied to Africa. During the independence era, which coincided with the first decades of the Cold War, African leaders were often viewed in relation to the binary conflict, something Nkrumah, who favored non-alignment in his *Foreign Affairs* essay, claimed was not appropriate in his case. Other times, African leaders were depicted in the U.S. press as strongmen, liars, primitive and traditional, or out of control, characteristics that could too easily be equated with partiality for the East, as they were clearly undemocratic and unreasonable. Further, African leaders often
served as metonyms for their countries and even Africa as a whole, presenting a continent that was chaotic, not modern, and probably incapable of self-government. In addition to Cold War stereotypes, U.S. media coverage leaned on readily understood colonial tropes to explain African news to American readers. Stories about death, war, and famine earned headlines, often with no other news about Africa to provide a balance of coverage. While many Americans stood ideologically against formal colonialism, ideas about Africans would intersect with continuing racism in the United States as the independence era coincided with the Civil Rights Movement. In these ways, U.S. print media coverage during the long global Sixties served more often than not to replicate existing pre-colonial and colonial representations of Africa and Africans.

At the same time, within stories of death, some writers incorporated messages of hope. African leaders might be “tyrants” in many publications, but in others, they were instead called “capable.” While African masses were often faceless within U.S. news, feature stories allowed names and personalities to appear. The continent and its newly independent nations were not always important only in relation to the Cold War. Less likely to circulate within mainstream print media, these more positive or complex representations appeared in a variety of outlets being published: African American newspapers, socialist and communist publications, writer-driven essays in liberal magazines, and radical local and national media. Recovering these stories has important implications for how we study U.S. media coverage of Africa today, particularly in an age when availability of media sources has not just expanded but exploded thanks to online and social media. How the media described newly independent Africa also matters because “news shapes our assumptions about one another, prescribes the symbols with which we analyse events, informs international investment, and guides policy discussion.” In other words, media discourses about Africa created real world consequences. Negative content and imagery have
“important implications for global flows of finance, trade, tourism,” inform intercultural relations, and generate Afro-pessimism, which encourages outside intervention.\(^9\)

For many Americans during the era of African independence, print media defined independent Africa. While the discursive space of books and films certainly worked to form images in American minds, news reporting holds a special space of authority because news stories have the benefit of being considered accurate, objective, and true. News is believed in a way that fiction and other forms of narrative are not. “By the 1950s, leaders of American journalism had become committed to objectivity. The American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1923 had adopted the first national code of ethics; objectivity and impartiality had become part of the profession.”\(^10\) During the time of African independence, roughly 1957 to 1975, Africa held a significant place in American consciousness, and it was through news reporting that Americans learned about African nations and their leaders. The importance of the messaging cannot be overstated. These representations have political consequences, and the discourse surrounding the situations “shapes the possibility of action” and legitimizes “certain political actions.”\(^11\)

Several scholars have previously researched Africa’s image in Western popular media, imagination, and literature. *Mistaking Africa: Curiosities and Inventions of the American Mind* by historian and political scientist Curtis Keim points out the many inaccurate portrayals, stereotypes, and myths about Africa and Africans. Literature scholar Daniel M. Mengara’s *Images of Africa: Stereotypes and Realities* describes the replacement of African identities with a monolithic African identity created by Europeans. Similarly, Paul Landau and Deborah Kaspin’s *Images and Empires: Visuality in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa* includes studies that exemplify how “images have both underwritten and undermined the hierarchies that governed colonial Africa.”\(^12\) A volume edited by Jan Nederveen Pieterse takes the broader topic of race to
explore stereotypes of diasporic Africans by the West based on oversimplification and
generalization and determines that stereotypes make a significant impact. “Obviously, what is at
stake in these representations is not just the images themselves but also their social
ramifications.”

Additionally, several scholars have already shown that U.S. media coverage of Africa
tends to narrowly highlight death, disease, and destruction. In a 1976 article, Aaron Segal stated,
“Africa and Africans do not get along well within the United States press, radio and television –
and vice versa.” He reviewed the context that leads to detrimental coverage of Africa, including
a lack of local and long-term correspondents; economic constraints, both the expense of sending
reporters to Africa and the perceived lack of audience interest in most African stories; narrow
considerations of what is newsworthy; logistical issues; censorship and lack of welcome from
some African governments; oversimplification; and lack of context. However, apart from more
academic and policy journals about Africa, which would typically only attract a readership
already interested in Africa, Segal limits his discussion to mainstream and business media. He
makes only a nod to African American press by mentioning Ebony magazine.

Until recently, the only available edited volume dedicated to the topic of U.S. media
coverage of Africa has been Africa’s Media Image, which was published in 1992. Editor Beverly
G. Hawk sought to pull together Africanists of various disciplines as well as journalists to show
how the colonial image has remained the media image. This imagery relies on metaphors rather
than providing the necessary context, which has had ramifications for public opinion and foreign
policy. “The metaphors justify intervention, and they legitimate certain leaders and modes of
change while delegitimating others. Taken together, the metaphors condemn armed resistance as
dysfunctional and primitive.” The discussion in *Africa’s Media Image* reflects the concerns and issues of the 1980s.

In a new book considering sub-Saharan Africa’s media image in the twenty-first century, scholars follow Hawk’s work and respond to the question of how international media coverage of Africa has changed in the twenty years since it was last examined in her pioneering book even though

> historically much of the international reporting of Africa has been through the focus of aid and development. Just as the tropes for framing Africa have frequently been through disaster coverage – stories of war, famine, and crisis – so what has followed from that is the emphasis in reporting upon how Western actors are responding and reacting, usually through some kind of aid or related intervention.

The essays in *Africa’s Media Image in the 21st Century* strive to move beyond traditional critiques of media coverage to look at the scope of representations existing in an age of digital media and African correspondents. They also consider the response of the media to decades of critique while still problematizing what is reported and the new messages conveyed in this coverage.

I argue that prefigurations of some of the non-colonialist representations available today were already present in certain U.S. print media sources during the Sixties, precisely the period scholars have determined provided mostly negative coverage of Africa. While many mainstream outlets offered only narrow images of Africa, broadening the scope of publications under review paints a much more nuanced picture. Despite the Cold War, some writers and editors were able to imagine African struggles outside the East-West conflict, and others at times threw off colonial imagery and racism to depict Africans as intellectuals and advocates who offered models of hope rather than despair. As the New Left expanded and liberalism dominated, images of non-aligned African leaders could sometimes break out of the limited Cold War framework.
Likewise, as the war in Vietnam unfolded, colonialism and interventionism earned increasing contempt. In some cases, Africans – leaders and occasionally ordinary people – gained the opportunity for self-representation within U.S. media outlets. Even if this type of Africa reporting was not the most prevalent, it is important to remember that these stories were published, working against the grain of Cold War dichotomies and colonial stereotypes.

Theoretical Framework: Agenda Setting, Framing, and Discourse Analysis

The 1978 edited volume *Women and the News* stemmed from a conference based on the “general, and presumably unarguable, premise that there is a relationship between what is reported as news and what individuals and groups think of as socially and politically important.”\(^1\) The essays examine the concepts of agenda setting, in which media establish what are matters of concern, and audiences make the items covered in the news part of their personal agendas; access to the media, which determines whose voices are heard; and definitions of the news, which determine what is important enough to cover. Agenda setting gained prominence with Bernard Cohen’s *Press and Foreign Policy*, which made the claim in 1963, that while the media cannot tell people what to think, it can tell people what to think about. *Women and the News* editor Laurily Keir Epstein reinforced this point by citing a 1976 study that determined newspapers were the media type with the largest agenda-setting impact.\(^2\) Thus, media decide what we think about, and during the long global Sixties, print media still held sway. What constitutes “news” can be determined by something as unrelated to newsworthiness as the organizational structure of the outlet. In other words, what fits where; for example, “the quality of the picture is far more important to a television news story than is the actual content of the
Events are sometimes considered “news” only when they have been carried on AP or UPI or covered in the New York Times or Washington Post.

What follows agenda setting, which can be thought of as choosing the story that will earn coverage, is framing. Framing determines how that story will be told and explained to the audience. Attention to framing “shares with agenda-setting research a focus on the public policy issues in the news ... However, it expands beyond what people talk or think about by examining how they think and talk.” Or more simply, "News frames are the windows in which the news is presented … In considering the framing of a story, scholars analyze the cultural and social norms that are embedded and communicated within a specific news item." To tell a story, journalists rely on symbols they expect will be understood by their readers so that “framing is a social process, conditioned by the personal beliefs of the journalists and the organizational and professional constraints imposed upon them.” Moreover, initial frames can often be replicated as journalists rely on previously published material when researching their stories and might even interview the same sources. We will see this happen with coverage in Nigeria, when writer Renata Adler describes gleanin g background information from journalist Frederick Forsyth’s book, The Biafra Story.

Hand-in-hand with framing, discourse analysis can illuminate the powerful structural meanings contained in news coverage. Cultural studies scholar Sara Mills explained that, according to post-colonial discourse theory, the struggle over representation has had “had far-reaching effects, in that it informed racist knowledge and practices, constructing the grounds within which debates about race were largely conducted and the typologies within which indigenous people and their descendants were forced to be categorised and to categorise themselves.” Not simply ideological in nature, it had material consequences. Discourse can be
defined as “the way a subject is talked about,” including the way nations are talked about, according to Giovanna Dell’Orto. “In international mass communication, the media are a part of the negotiation of power across national and cultural borders because they serve to integrate discourses that convey and help fix identities of other nations, thereby delimiting policy options.”

According to Dell’Orto, the first goal of discourse analysis is to identify the major themes and prevalent linguistic choices in the texts. To identify themes in a diverse range of media that does not necessarily rely on a common set of social and political beliefs, I will borrow from the constant comparative method as described by Marian Meyers as a way to look for “patterns and themes” of representation. This is a deductive approach through which texts are compared, and as categories emerge, they are compared with additional texts. In this way, the categories are defined “by the texts rather than being predetermined, as is generally the case in quantitative content analysis.” Due to the fact that my research covers a range of states and leaders, over a fifteen-year time period, not beginning with predetermined categories will allow for the texts to speak for themselves.

While media play an agenda-setting role, influencing what the public thinks about, and through framing and discourse can guide audiences in how to think, the debate over media’s ability to cause or affect political action continues. Journalist Asgede Hagos examined the relationship between media and foreign policy and found neglect in coverage was coupled with neglect in foreign interest. When such events were covered by the U.S. press, abundant distortion existed. Hagos argues that the press coverage follows the government foreign policy line unless a foreign issue becomes domestic.
In the 2010 edited volume *Public Policy and Mass Media: The Interplay of Mass Communication and Political Decision Making*, Katrin Voltmer and Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten turned from examining mass media’s role in shaping public opinion to its potential for affecting political decision making. While it seems that the media should not have a significant effect on policy making, many studies have shown an important link. “The most obvious link between mass communication and policy making is public opinion … Adapting to the priorities of the media is therefore a strategy to respond to what are believed to be the demands and preferences of the electorate.”

According to the authors, public policy makers use the media to monitor public opinion. However, rather than media shaping policy, news is more often a “joint product” created through interactions between media and politicians. "Hence, policymakers and journalists, especially at the top level of each elite group, can be seen as interpretive communities with each part having an impact in the formation of policy." At other times, media can be found to have no noticeable impact on policy makers or their decisions. Despite being only sometimes effective at affecting policy outcomes, the media do have an important role in determining what the public pays attention to – agenda setting. "This body of research has shown that the salience of issues on the media agenda not only affects which problem citizens consider most important, but also their policy preferences and how they evaluate political officials." A study with a long timeframe showed that “most of the time the media follow the cues provided by political elites, [but] they also play an important role in detecting new problems and elevating them to the attention of the policymakers.” In the end, the question is not whether the media are powerful, but which conditions allow the media to sway policy. By controlling the discourse, media constitute rather than reflect reality by ignoring topics deemed un-newsworthy. "Finally, access to discursive power can affect the ability of political actors to assert their interests. At the
same time, the public perspective on the content of a topic may shift, as has been seen in many policy fields, including economic policy, the environment, foreign-policy and immigration.\textsuperscript{34}

**Scholarship: The Global Sixties and the Cold War**

The age of African independence was concurrent with the era of unrest and upheaval across the globe known as “the Sixties.” Historians increasingly favor the notion of a “long global Sixties” from the 1950s to the 1970s. In the 2013 edited volume *New World Coming*, the contributors call for a shift of scholarship “away from the main centres and major events that have thus far dominated representations of the period.”\textsuperscript{35} This means both shifting the gaze away from the United States as well as widening the timeframe. While Jeremi Suri’s *The Global Revolutions of 1968* temporally expands by beginning with events leading up to 1968 (“the origins of the global revolutions”), he limits the players to the West, including Europe, and the East, comprising the Soviet Union and China. Although he mentions that protestors in Latin American and Africa overthrew leaders and challenged foreign sponsors, there is slight recognition, apart from Vietnam, that the Third World existed as a site of conflict for the superpowers. It served as a peripheral place where superpowers could use force if necessary “in pursuit of global order and an image of strength at home.”\textsuperscript{36} Nevertheless, Suri draws from thinkers like Frantz Fanon and shows that First World and Second World leaders reacted by trying to promote a Cold War détente that enabled “cooperative arrangements among former adversaries to counteract common disorders at home.”\textsuperscript{37} Suri argues for the global nature of the 1960s, yet he fails to truly draw the non-aligned Third World into the narrative when he claims that the “Cold War, more than anything else, created a remarkable conjuncture among societies in the 1960s.”\textsuperscript{38}
In Mark Kurlansky’s *1968: The Year that Rocked the World*, “people were rebelling over disparate issues and had in common only that desire to rebel, ideas about how to do it, a sense of alienation from the established order, and a profound distaste for authoritarianism in any form.” One common issue was the Vietnam War. U.S. intervention in Vietnam earned animosity at a moment when “colonies were struggling to re-create themselves as nations, when the ‘anticolonial struggle’ had touched the idealism of people all over the world.” Dubinsky and her fellow contributors to *New World Coming* recommend moving away from using categories like “youth revolt” and “middle-class alienation” to study the Sixties because they refer narrowly to unrest in the United States. Africa, too, was rocked by 1968; for example, a state of emergency was declared in Senegal when the Association of Senegalese Students and the Dakar Association of Students called for a strike on May 27, 1968, and the trade unions joined them. Andy Stafford is one of only a few scholars to write about May ’68 in Senegal, finding that it was both linked to struggles in France and based on “domestic” tensions reaching back to the early 1960s. “Despite the internal causes of Senegal’s revolt, we can now see that the links with France and its own uprising were undeniable.”

Given that the Sixties have been studied in Western-centric ways, we need instead to look at “how transnational ideas and culture interacted with particular local conditions, generating diverse meanings.” In this way, many more voices can be inserted into the narrative, allowing it to become truly global. In fact, the Sixties were a time when a “nascent global consciousness emerged.” As people around the world challenged dominant power structures, they did so with a feeling that they were acting concurrently with others in a global sphere. “The local and the everyday were read through a larger transnational lens, and resistance was forged at least in part through the interaction of daily experience with an understanding of global developments.”
With this scope in mind, the editors of *New World Coming* include studies of protest and politics in Palestine, music in Tanzania, and Canadian media coverage of the Congo. This approach allows the experience of the Sixties in the Third World to become central to the explanation of the Zeitgeist of a period that could be extended from Bandung in 1955 to the independence of Angola in 1975.

How can political upheaval in Africa be seen in a global context, rather than simply constructed as indicative of modernity instead of backwardness? West African politics can be inserted into the long global Sixties and connected with the rest of the world by resituating independence as part of a global and transnational phenomenon or process. In this way, West Africans, too, can be imagined as part of the movement fueled by a desire to challenge authority.45

One of the obstacles in the way of including African political projects in the global Sixties is that they are usually considered only in light of the Cold War. In *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, Odd Arne Westad brings to the fore the importance of the Third World and describes decolonization and superpower confrontation as linked, yet he envisions the Third World as a geopolitical space acted upon by the United States and the Soviet Union. He does not raise the voices from within the Third World. In contrast to Westad’s First- and Second-World focus, Vijay Prashad takes the Third World as his stage in *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World*. Prashad begins by explaining that the Third World was a “project,” one intended to create a new world, without colonial powers, where the nations of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean could unite around an agenda and wield influence in forums like the United Nations: “[T]he Third World project included a demand for the redistribution of the world’s resources, a more
dignified rate of return for the labor power of their people, and a shared acknowledgement of the heritage of science, technology, and culture.”

Prashad explores a variety of sites and moments when various actors – mostly Third World leaders, but occasionally the doubly disenfranchised, like women – met, debated, and planned. For all its diversity, the Third World maintained an overarching interest in anti-colonialism, peaceful coexistence, and non-alignment. In 1958, the Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru explained the main points of the Third World platform: “political independence, nonviolent international relations, and the cultivation of the United Nations as the principle institution for planetary justice.” As such, according to Prashad, the Third World held a political agenda.

Prashad’s Third World project spanned the long global Sixties and can be seen as indicative of the initiatives of the decolonizing peoples in that historical context. Thus Third World actors were agents of change who saw the United Nations as a crucial arena and strove to democratize the organization. In 1961, leaders met in Belgrade to form the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Although they opposed the violence of the arms race (wars of the powerful), violence to throw off colonialism (wars of the weak) was acceptable. As a result, they backed the liberation organizations leading the struggles in the Portuguese colonies as well as apartheid South Africa.

By recognizing Third World agency, we can reimagine regions like West Africa as integral participants in the global Sixties rather than a side story to the Cold War. This takes the Third World from an object of policy to a subject of history:

Between the 1950s and 1970s, the Third World formed a unique political force outside the atomic face-off between the United States-United Kingdom-France and the USSR. Filled with tactical and strategic disagreements on how to deal with colonialism and imperialism, the Third World nonetheless had a core political program around the value of disarmament, national sovereignty, economic integrity, and cultural diversity.
Scholarship: U.S.-Africa Relations

As African nations gained independence, American scholars quickly developed interest in analyzing U.S. foreign relations with Africa. The trajectory typically starts with the Atlantic slave trade and moves on to the work of missionaries and the Africa Colonization Society in the early nineteenth century. U.S. relations were mediated by European empires during colonial rule, but independence brought new opportunities for American involvement in Africa. Of course, this new phase of U.S.-Africa relations opened during the Cold War. The continent had to fit into this binary strategic framework, and specific countries received priority depending on their value in the “great game” between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Although many scholars of U.S.–Africa foreign relations would agree with political scientist Edmond J. Keller that “Africa has never been central to US foreign policy,” an increased interest in Africa characterized President John F. Kennedy’s administration. Philip E. Muehlenbeck’s *Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders* argues that while Kennedy was an “ardent Cold Warrior” in his policies toward Europe, Latin America, and Asia, he saw the “courting of Third World nationalism – and African nationalism in particular – as a policy that transcended the Cold War.” Muehlenbeck contends that Kennedy realized there was an economic divide between the global North and South and did not want the new states of the South to turn against their trading partners in the North. Kennedy relied on personal diplomacy with African leaders. In fact, he probably developed relationships with even “radical” African leaders like Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré because there was more ground to be gained with them than with already pro-Western African heads of state. Historian Robert B. Rakove agrees with Muehlenbeck’s argument that Kennedy developed important new connections with Third World leaders, who appreciated his efforts. “Kennedy’s policies, as
understood by the peoples of the developing world, made them receptive to his image.”

Receptivity proved short-lived, however. Following Kennedy’s death, President Lyndon Johnson declined to continue his policies. The Johnson administration was uninterested in aid to nations that criticized his policies or chose non-alignment.

Turning from viewing U.S.-Africa relations principally in relation to the Cold War, George White Jr. has highlighted the racist underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and argued that racism rather than East-West rivalry drove policy decisions and discouraged American investment in the development of Africa. “The Cold War provided the perfect environment for the preservation of whiteness. The Eisenhower administration’s objective was to ‘hold the line’ during the tumultuous transformation of the 1950s so that the global stream of benefits and burdens would not change.”

Racism in foreign relations was linked to the Civil Rights upheaval at home. In *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena*, Thomas Borstelmann has shown how U.S. foreign policy decisions were made within a balancing act of welcoming African dignitaries and pleasing Dixiecrats in the South. However, for White, the decision about whose interests mattered most in the balance of power was clear: the normalcy and superiority of whiteness was upheld unilaterally. The “only plausible explanations for African radicalism were Black incompetence, insatiability, and blind hatred of Whites, fed by Communist propaganda.”

Widening the scope of foreign affairs studies, Brenda Gayle Plummer examines the involvement of African American leaders and activists in the issue of independence struggles in Africa. As “partially successful modifications” were achieved for blacks in the United States, the link between civil rights and global radicalism was broken, and the movement for racial justice was subordinated to the moderate liberal establishment in the United States. Plummer follows the
work of Penny Von Eschen and Carol Anderson, but what is new here is that she aims to resituate the civil rights and black power movements as terms of global decolonization rather than American desegregation. This means that the struggles of black peoples around the world spoke to, answered, and affected each other, and that these multiple struggles had consequences for the avenues opened and closed to black Americans. Rather than simply demanding the recognition of interchanges between African American and African freedom fighters, Plummer pushes for the inclusion of a multiplicity of black and other voices from the United States, Africa, and the wider diaspora. She explains that historians of Black Power have made “sweeping assertions for the sameness of black activism,” but “nuanced views of black political and cultural activity in the 1960s and 1970s are moving to the fore.” 55 Plummer includes an exceptionally broad range of activists from conservative to radical and accommodationist to separatist. Their voices as well as the voices of mainstream journalists will be part of this dissertation.

Sources

In order to move beyond historical and media studies that consider only mainstream or elite media representations of newly independent Africa for American consumers of news during the Cold War and the global Sixties, this study engages with publications with large and small audiences; liberal as well as radical perspectives; and experts on Africa and journalists without a background in the continent. Through the inclusion of publications of the African American press, my dissertation seeks to add to the conversation begun by Plummer, James Meriwether, Von Eschen, and other scholars who examine the stake African American print media claimed in the discourse about Africa. 56 Likewise, the inclusion of New Left and other radical publications
points not only to the broadening of Africa coverage but also to the emergence of critical stances toward U.S. Africa policy in the turbulent Sixties.

**Argument**

Through news reporting and human-interest stories, popular media, images, and literature, the American public, including those who would seek to influence U.S. foreign policy, came to know independent Africa. Depictions, particularly in print news media, have been shown to have social and political consequences. For Africa, from the time of the Atlantic slave trade through the twentieth century, these depictions have most often come from Western journalists, expats, advocates, and writers rather than from African sources. This lack of access to global discursive space has enabled American interventions in Africa to be more palatable and even seemingly necessary. For example, following his June 30, 1960 independence speech, no international publication printed an interview with Patrice Lumumba, Congo’s first Prime Minister. He was silenced outside his country, which limited the range of possibilities for U.S. policy toward the Congo. As has been established by several media scholars, the relationship between the media and public policy as well foreign affairs can have profound effects on the course of history.

Although several scholars have explored U.S. foreign reporting, coverage of Africa is almost completely omitted from the story. Additionally, media studies have tended to rely on a narrow range of sources. The large volume *Journalism’s Roving Eye: A History of American Foreign Reporting* by John Maxwell Hamilton criticizes previous studies of foreign correspondence for their reliance on elite media. “Scholarly article after scholarly article carries a title along the lines of ‘New York Times and Network TV News Coverage of Foreign Disasters’
and ‘Foreign News in Four U.S. Elite Dailies: Some Comparisons.’ He admits that while elite media typically have the best foreign news coverage, the approach has limitations if we are interested in learning what the broad public could ascertain from the press about the wider world. After all, few Americans read The New York Times.

Previous Africa-centered analyses of U.S. media coverage, such as Hawk’s Africa’s Media Image, display an overwhelming interest in South Africa, or confine themselves to elite media sources. While the new volume Africa’s Media Image in the 21st Century examines contemporary coverage, it does not recover voices from the historical past. Nevertheless, American writers who considered Africa outside of the typical narrative of mainstream and elite media were active during the independence era, and they broadened the discussion of the possibilities of policy. It was these reporters and editors who worked to crack open the discursive space to make new representations imaginable.

A historical project, this study listens to the disparate voices in U.S. print media outlets during the long global Sixties and reintegrates them into the narrative of independence in West Africa and the American response to this dramatic change in the global order.

**Plan of Dissertation**

Chapter One, “Votez ‘Non,’” focuses on the independence of Guinea, which was achieved when Charles de Gaulle reentered French political life to create a new constitution and granted territories throughout the French Union the choice of closer association or outright independence. Otherwise an overwhelming success, de Gaulle’s 1958 constitution and offer of membership in the new French Community did not pass muster in Guinea, where the nationalist leader Ahmed Sékou Touré compared the proposed “new” relationship to a horse and rider and
predicted Guinea would be the horse. In the months leading up to and following the referendum vote, U.S. media featured coverage of both Touré and de Gaulle, typically depicting these figures in contrasting ways. The mainstream news magazine *TIME* used Touré to represent independent Africa’s potential for failure by characterizing him as dictatorial, backward, naïve, and prone to communism. An accusation of communism was a simple and oft-used way to demonize an African leader during the Cold War. However, the images of Touré in an African American media outlet such as *Chicago Daily Defender* reveal hope for Africa’s future that is couched in civil rights language and ideas of freedom. The French general and war hero de Gaulle might have been considered a savior of France in the mainstream *TIME* magazine, but by contrast, he served as a symbol of colonialism and oppression in the *Defender*.

In Chapter Two, the “danse macabre” of the Congo crisis is examined through reportage of the death of the country’s first Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, which occurred in January 1961, just six months after the Congo’s independence. While U.S. print media coverage of the crisis often employed a reductionist view of actors and events and viewed this African struggle through the lens of the Cold War, examining media professing a range political orientations creates a kaleidoscope of images. Moving politically from right to left, this chapter reviews articles from *Foreign Affairs*, *The New Republic*, *Monthly Review*, and *Political Affairs*. Even as Lumumba’s death was met with relief in coverage that focused on non-aligned nations in the Cold War battle, the Congo’s struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism came to the fore when the East-West dichotomy ceased to be the determining factor. In that case, Lumumba’s death became the assassination of a legitimate leader of a sovereign nation.

Chapter Three’s stories of “African Success, Failure, and Famine” recount the Biafra War or Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970. Resulting from two coups, pogroms, and the secession
of the Eastern Region known as Biafra, the war led to a significant humanitarian crisis. As Biafrans, particularly children, starved from food shortages when the Nigerian federal government blockaded what its leader Yakubu Gowon saw as rebel territory, U.S. media outlets conveyed images of malnourished babies, reports of suffering Biafrans, and stories of heroic, often Catholic, aid workers. While political and military reportage earned column inches, the Biafran famine secured more. The U.S. government’s refusal to intervene in an “internal crisis,” in reality a show of support for the British government’s backing of the Nigerian government, opened a rift between humanitarian and political concerns. Americans could send food and medical supplies to the starving masses without advocating independence for Biafra. In order to track the simultaneous circulation of political and the humanitarian coverage about the Nigeria-Biafra War, I will discuss essays from *Foreign Affairs* and *The New Yorker*, a magazine of “reporting and commentary.”

Chapter Four takes the liberation of Guinea-Bissau as its subject, as told through media coverage of the “Gentle Rebel,” Amilcar Cabral. He was the founder of the PAIGC, the organization that fought for the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde from Portugal. From 1963 until 1974, the PAIGC engaged in guerrilla warfare, winning popular support and taking territory step by step from a colonial army that refused to negotiate a settlement to a war it could not win. While Guinea-Bissau was poor and underdeveloped, Portugal’s southern African colonies Angola and Mozambique possessed significant natural resources. Portugal was unwilling to leave Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde for fear of the domino effect on its richer colonies. The PAIGC’s fight, taking place during the Vietnam War, led the U.S. media to draw parallels, but the U.S. government refused to abandon its NATO ally. Nevertheless, even mainstream U.S. media coverage depicted Cabral in a positive manner and conceded the justness
of his cause. For Cabral, independence was not the final goal; colonial society had to be remade in a revolution as well. Drawing from Marxist theory, but always insisting on localizing revolution, he proposed a truly democratic society and equal representation for women. Radical U.S. media outlets, the number of which had risen considerably by the end of the Sixties, treated seriously Cabral’s innovative ideas. Assassinated in January 1973, Cabral did not live to see independence. This final chapter closes my study with a look at Cabral’s character and politics, which were celebrated in the New Left magazine *Ramparts*, the African American journal *Freedomways*, and the Atlanta underground newspaper *The Great Speckled Bird*. Even though U.S. coverage continued to focus on leaders, the attention to Cabral, an intellectual and a revolutionary of Africa and the Third World, suggests how much America and Africa had changed over the course of the turbulent Sixties.
Future texts will hardly be able to ignore the man of whom the jigging, clapping Guineans sing: Everybody loves Sékou Touré. Independence is sweet; Nothing is more beautiful than to be independent chez soi. Sékou Touré! Vive Sékou Touré, our clairvoyant chief.\footnote{61}

The year following Ghana’s independence brought an important vote to the French Union. In an attempt to resuscitate France’s imperial glory and rescue a country in crisis, Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle developed a new constitution that would inaugurate France’s Fifth Republic. Included in this constitution was the stipulation that overseas territories could become members in the new French Community of free states, or by voting against the September Referendum, would gain immediate independence. When voters went to the polls on September 28, 1958, Guinea stood alone throughout the Union with a “No” vote. The drama that unfolded leading up to the vote as well as the clash between de Gaulle and Guinean leader Ahmed Sékou Touré provided fascinating copy for American readers. With de Gaulle earning \textit{TIME} magazine’s cover as “Man of the Year” on January 5, 1959, and Sékou Touré taking the cover just one month later, impressions of these leaders reached into the homes and minds of American readers.\footnote{62} This chapter will illustrate how the US print media used dichotomous reportage of these leaders to show the divergences between the two countries, as each leader’s personality became a stand-in for the spirit of his people and nation, and in Touré’s case, for Africa in general. This chapter will provide an in-depth comparison of coverage of Sékou Touré and de Gaulle in \textit{TIME} and the \textit{Chicago Defender} during 1958 and 1959. Examining inclusions from both a mainstream and an African-American publication offers an impression of the competing
narratives surrounding the character of Sékou Touré, which elucidates ideas about independent Africa’s potential for success and failure.

2.1 Duelling Myths

Maverick, dictator, hero, tyrant, Guinea’s first leader after independence, Sékou Touré has often been characterized as having made in isolation Guinea’s decision to reject the French Community. Guinea’s popular decision has been depicted as Sékou Touré’s “no” vote. However, more recent scholarship has shown that Sékou Touré followed the will of the Guinean people, who through mass mobilization, convinced him to stand firmly against Charles de Gaulle’s offer of association and choose complete independence. In order to accurately examine the media coverage of Sékou Touré at the time of Guinea’s independence, it is necessary to forget the 26 years that followed that led Charles Sorry to compare him to Hitler and compare his pretended love for the people was like that of a paranoid tyrant for his prisoner. As Moustapha Diop advises, “il importe de distinguer deux périodes principales: l’avant et l’après 1958.”

Born in 1922 in Faranah in central Guinea to a butcher father and a mother whose lineage connected to Samori Touré, the 19th-century leader of resistance to French colonialism, Sékou Touré attended koranic and primary school there. Following the regional school in nearby Kissidougou, he earned a primary certificate in Conakry. He was later expelled from the Georges Poiret technical school, but completed correspondence courses to finally become an accountant. By 1945, Sékou Touré began to emerge politically when he created the first union in Guinea; he later became the secretary general of l’Union des syndicats confédérés. In 1946, Sékou Touré participated in the Congrès Constitutif du RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, the founding event of the inter-territorial alliance of political parties, which had been organized by Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire and Modibo Keïta of Mali) in Bamako. The early
RDA had links to the French Communist Party, which was the only political party present in Bamako during the conference, but it broke those ties five years later. In 1950, the Guinean RDA took the name Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), and Sékou Touré became its second secretary general.

Even before his appointment to the PDG, Sékou Touré organized strikes in Guinea, one of which landed him in prison. In 1953, he spearheaded a two-month general strike to enact a labor code for the French territories. The mounting importance of the PDG led to Sékou Touré’s election as territorial advisor in 1953 and mayor of Conakry in 1955, titles he held concurrently with several others. Within the Afrique-Occidentale Française, he continued to grow in fame. In 1956, on his third attempt, Sékou Touré was elected a deputy to the National Assembly. As a deputy, he pushed for equality within the French Union, for example, on March 22, 1956 he proposed equal pay for functionaries in the territories and those in the metropole. He took part in the debates over the loi-cadre colonial reform in 1957, which he condemned for attempting to prevent African unity through the breakup of the federations and reorganization of the French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. However, it was the passing of the loi-cadre, which necessitated new elections and saw Sékou Touré secure the position of vice-president of the government council of Guinea; at this time, the PDG, Sékou Touré’s party, earned the clear majority of seats.

Interestingly, Sékou Touré voted in favor of the proposition to revise the French Constitution on May 27, 1958 but abstained from the June 1 vote to approve Charles de Gaulle and his new cabinet. Nevertheless, de Gaulle won the election of June 1 with 329 votes in favor and 224 against.
Concerning the future of French West Africa’s status and relationship with France, Sékou Touré clashed with Houphouët-Boigny, leader of the RDA, who favored federation. On the other side were proponents of confederation including Senegal’s Léopold Senghor. According to Saloum Dakté, Sékou Touré was so sure of his national popularity in Guinea that he was willing to oppose someone as powerful as Houphouët-Boigny. However, according to Elizabeth Schmidt, in addition to conflict between Sékou Touré and Houphouët-Boigny, there was internal conflict between Guinean party leaders and the Guinean people leading to “fissures in the nationalist movement.”

Thus, despite his post-independence myth, in early 1958, Sékou Touré was not yet the all-powerful leader he would become. Furthermore, Sékou Touré came late to the push for independence (and the “no” vote, as we will see), focusing instead on the idea of compromise with the colonial government. Abdoulaye Diallo has attempted to deconstruct the myth of Sékou Touré and found that in a January 5, 1956 speech congratulating his party followers on the recent successful elections, he spoke to an audience of 15,000 about his desire to collaborate sincerely with the French whom he stated loved Africans and understood the interests of Africa.

Sékou Touré catapulted to international fame during de Gaulle’s visit to Guinea. As part of his Africa campaign to promote his new Constitution on which the full electorate could vote in the form of a referendum, de Gaulle visited Conakry on August 25, which proved to be a defining moment for Sékou Touré. The two speeches by two charismatic figures presented two different conceptions of nationalism and history. While dialogue could have been possible, the character of each man came into play to prevent agreement on either side. The myth of Sékou Touré as the champion of the African cause was born on that day. “Depuis le 25 août à l’Assemblée territoriale des Conakry, l’animosité entre ces deux fortes personnalités déteint sur
les relations franco-guinéennes.” Although de Gaulle made overtures to the Guinean people, Sékou Touré spoke strongly against joining a French Community where Guinea would be the horse and France the rider. On this day, Sékou Touré made his famous statement: *Nous préférons la liberté dans la pauvreté à la richesse dans l’esclavage* (We prefer poverty in freedom to riches in slavery).

The general against whom Sékou Touré railed boasted a much greater international status than did the Guinean leader. Timelines of Charles de Gaulle, tend to highlight specific, pivotal events, only strengthening his mythological stature. De Gaulle’s image in the public mind has been defined by his war heroism as a captain in World War I; his June 18, 1940 radio broadcast urging French resistance to Germany; the triumphal re-entering of Paris in 1944; abdication in 1946 when the Fourth Republic constitution would not be written according to his design; another re-entry, this time to politics when France-in-crisis begged him to assume the helm in 1958; and finally, the massive strike of May 1968, which led to his eventual second abdication the following year. His policy of *grandeur* and belief in French importance and singularity is well known. Thus, by the time of the 1958 referendum vote, de Gaulle would have been recognized among U.S. print media audiences, and most readers would have already formed some type of opinion about him, particularly in regard to his World War II leadership and frequent contention with American leaders. De Gaulle was a “providential figure” who would appear and reappear “at moments of despair in national history.”

Born in Paris in 1890 to a family of six children, de Gaulle demanded to act as King of France during play even as a child. With a lineage that included royalty by way of *noblesse de robe*, by de Gaulle’s generation, the family had fallen on harder financial times. His schoolteacher father taught him history, and even in early writings, the future general showed a
penchant for military strategy, leadership, and fervent ambition. As did Napoléon, de Gaulle “undertook to transcend his own origins … he sought to create his own elite.” Embarking on this path wholeheartedly, de Gaulle attended St. Cyr, a French military academy, and later began World War I as a captain. His capture during combat earned him the Legion of Honor, and he published his first book in 1924, *La discorde chez l’ennemi* (*The Enemy’s Dissensions*). Marrying a traditional French wife in 1922, de Gaulle presided over a family of three children. He served under Marshal Philippe Pétain, who then held the highest position in the French military. Under the direction of Pétain, de Gaulle began the book that became *France and Its Army*, and although Pétain aspired to take credit for the book, de Gaulle opposed him, later publishing the book with a reference to Pétain’s assistance in the forward. “The affair of the book foreshadowed the cataclysmic dispute that was to erupt between the two in June 1940.” Throughout the 1930s, de Gaulle proposed military strategy, advising that France develop a professional army and mechanized force. Although French military leaders lacked interest in his ideas – even finding them anti-republican – he saw that precisely these strategies were being implemented by Germany.

During the interwar period and World War II, de Gaulle strove to make his ideas heard and accepted. He had “earned a reputation in military circles as a maverick with a tinge of insubordination … If de Gaulle did not see himself as *the* key player, he saw himself as *one* of the key players in the momentous events to come.” Following the German invasion of France and the institution of the Vichy government led by Pétain, de Gaulle established the Free France movement from London, gained the trust of Winston Churchill and led the Resistance, altering his status from maverick to France’s savior, a position he had seen himself occupying all along. Although little known outside military circles before 1940, de Gaulle became recognized by the
Allies as the “legitimate representative of the French people” as his “Free French movement gradually established its leadership over the French Resistance.” At this time, De Gaulle identified himself with France itself “as a way of constituting a new legitimacy for his weakened and demoralized people. This legitimacy, which de Gaulle claimed to represent, was based on honor, duty, and a greatness (grandeur), and not on legal norms, which at the time were deficient and had to be changed.” From London, he claimed leadership of France beginning June 18, 1940 when he made his celebrated radio announcement urging France not to capitulate. In retaliation, the Vichy government found his claim illegitimate, and he was ordered to return to France, which he did not, leading him to be sentenced in absentia to prison and later death.

Returning to France in August 1944, after liberation, de Gaulle, and therefore France, was triumphant. “[On] August 26, 1944, in another symbolic gesture of great meaning at the time and in the future, de Gaulle was able to create an ‘irresistible national movement’ in his favor, symbolized by a procession down the avenue des Champs-Elysées with himself at the head.” Staying a short time at the helm of the provisional post-war regime, de Gaulle resigned on January 20, 1946 due to the move of the nation toward a government with a Parliament stronger than the executive branch. “It was only in May 1958, in the wake of the crisis provoked by the brutal and fratricidal colonial war in Algeria, that the General was able to return to power to implement his vision of a presidential republic.”

De Gaulle had retired to Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises to work on his three-volume War Memoirs when he was called back into service as the Algerian War of Independence threatened to tear France apart. The National Assembly elected him 329-224, and in addition to gaining full head of state power for six months, de Gaulle was authorized to draft a new constitution that would be ratified by referendum. In order for this power to be put in de Gaulle’s hands, Article
90 of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic had to be amended. De Gaulle’s drafted constitution “was presented to and approved by the voters in a referendum on September 28, 1958, without having been discussed and voted by the National Assembly.”

Historian Sudhir Hazareesingh seeks to analyze the legend of de Gaulle, who in one person became “liberator, founding father, educator, protector and martyr.” Although de Gaulle was unquestionably “one of the towering figures of twentieth-century world politics,” he “did not have many admirers in the United States.” In fact, according to Hazareesingh, FDR accused de Gaulle of having a Joan of Arc complex. Certainly, he had imagined himself as the savior of France from his early days.

“During the first quarter of a century after World War II, no West European political leader – not even Konrad Adenauer – could rival the international stature of Charles de Gaulle.” Upon returning to power in 1958, the General’s main aim was to return France to a position of importance on the world stage through a policy of grandeur. Mark Kramer explains that de Gaulle was “synonymous not only with the policy of grandeur but with the French state itself.” His desire for French “power status” notwithstanding, de Gaulle secured the presidency at a moment of crisis in France, indeed that was the reason the French coaxed him back. One of the issues facing de Gaulle, according to Kramer was “the debilitating impact of World War II on European colonial empires and the growing pressure for decolonization.” In the same way that the Algerian War had been raging for several years when de Gaulle took office in 1958, the wave of decolonization had begun in Sub-Saharan Africa, and he would be forced to work through the movement.

Guia Migani explains, “When Charles de Gaulle returned to power in June 1958, French authority in the colonies was in crisis.” By that time, France had withdrawn from Indochina,
the Algerian War had begun, Tunisia and Morocco had become independent, and the former British colony Gold Coast had gained independence in 1957. Although Migani, like Frederick Cooper, notes that many Sub-Saharan African leaders were interested in equal status more than independence during the 1950s, it had become obvious that Paris needed to “take initiatives in order to increase the power of the African leaders.” Nevertheless, maintaining the hope of preserving l’Algérie Française, “the French government could not negotiate independence with the African territories and, in the same, fight to preserve Algeria as a French department.” This situation affected how de Gaulle would deal with the overseas territories in the new constitution, as the French Community enabled Paris to reaffirm its authority, while preparing the African territories to run their own territory in the future. In the end, the potential for future independence did not prove sufficient for Guinea, the only territory to reject de Gaulle’s constitution.

Though history witnessed Sékou Touré’s reign lasting for nearly 30 years, in 1958, he was something of an upstart. American readers of TIME or even the Chicago Defender would likely have been unfamiliar with the Guinean leader, and the coverage at that time served in part to introduce him to the American public. By contrast, Charles de Gaulle would have been well known or recognized by most readers. His World War II fame, America’s friendship with and interest in France, and de Gaulle’s exciting return to power in May 1958 to solve the Algerian crisis would have made him a household name. It is vital to review U.S. print media coverage of these two figures through the lens of 1958: de Gaulle’s myth had already been established, while Sékou Touré’s lay in the future.
2.2 The Politics of French West Africa

When the Fourth French Republic came to power in 1946, it revised the status of the French colonies, creating the *Union Française* and setting up Federations of *Territoires d’outremer* (TOM). The two Federations comprised Mauritania, Senegal, Sudan, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Dahomey as the West African Federation and Congo, Gabon, Chad, and Central African Republic as the Equatorial Federation. While Madagascar did not belong to either Federation, Togo and Cameroon were U.N. mandated territories. Additional power was given to the territorial governments with the passing of the Loi-cadre Deffere in 1956, which implemented universal suffrage in the territories and transferred certain capacities to the territorial governments. Saloum Dakté describes the loi-cadre as working as a “political bunker” that responded imperfectly to the desire for independence and equality in the overseas territories. At the time, most French West African leaders opposed the law, and Senegal’s Senghor claimed it Balkanized the territories because it restructured the previously larger territorial regions into smaller units.

With de Gaulle’s return to power in June 1958 and his National Assembly-given ability to draft a new constitution for France, events moved quickly throughout the summer. While it did not demand immediate independence, the RDA presented to de Gaulle a document seeking the ability of territories to choose independence by electoral vote in the future. Although this document was presented by Sékou Touré on behalf of the RDA on August 5, it showed the incontestable political supremacy of Côte d’Ivoire’s Houphouët-Boigny. On August 19, de Gaulle added an amendment to the Constitution to give the territories the possibility of reaching independent State status in the future. Nevertheless, he warned committee “‘Mais on ne peut concevoir une territoire indépendant et une France qui continuerait de l’aider. Le Gouvernement
By August 20, de Gaulle embarked on a tour of the African territories in order to rally support for his constitution and the French Community, arriving in Guinea on August 25.\textsuperscript{100}

De Gaulle intended the French Community to serve as a solution to the Algerian problem, as he promoted the concept of “association,” according to Michel Winock.\textsuperscript{101} In a footnote, Winock mentions that de Gaulle’s August 25 speech at Conakry showed that inclusion in the French Community would be voluntary, in part because this was how he already imagined the future relationship between France and Algeria.\textsuperscript{102} The new constitution was presented to the French people, including those in the territories, on September 4. Although it would be rejected by Guinea, the Constitution earned nearly 80 percent approval from the French electorate and led to de Gaulle’s election as president on December 21, 1958.\textsuperscript{103}

During the first half of September, Sékou Touré, as a leader in Guinea, had not yet come out with a definitive answer for France, however, pressure from grassroots organizations in Guinea fully leaned toward rejecting de Gaulle’s offer of Community. At this time, Sékou Touré met with university students in Paris who were critical of de Gaulle’s constitution, and the student organization FEANF sent representatives to sway Sékou Touré toward the “no” vote. In early September, the Guinean PRA (Parti de Regroupement Africain) and women and youth wings of the RDA asked for Sékou Touré to oppose the constitution. In fact, the UGTAN (Union Générale des Travailleurs d’Afrique Noire) board of directors had advocated a “no” vote on August 27.

By mid-month, all RDA branches other than Guinea and Senegal had sanctioned the constitution. Sékou Touré had awaited the final version of the constitution before deciding. On September 14, 680 Guinean RDA delegates met to determine through a vote, the party’s final
decision. According to Schmidt, Sékou Touré had not yet taken a final stance, but he worried that if he voted in favor of the constitution, his party would remove him and replace him with Koumandian Kéïta. “Thus, it was not until September 14, two weeks before the referendum, that Sékou Touré came out definitively for a ‘No’ vote.”

During a speech that day covered by Agence France-Presse, Sékou Touré publicly and emphatically stated that he would not join a community that would be French instead of multinational. The Guinean RDA officially broke from the larger organization, and by September 16, the Guinean RDA and PRA united behind the “no” vote, however, expecting collaboration with France as an independent country.

In response to the September 14 announcement, France almost immediately began treating Guinea “like a hostile territory.” Vacationing teachers were not allowed to return to Guinea and the governor planned for evacuation. The referendum vote on September 28 heavily favored independence with 1,136,324 votes (95.22%) against the Constitution and only 56,981 votes (4.78%) in favor. With the referendum results in on September 29, Guinea stood alone among French territories in its refusal of de Gaulle’s offer of community, and de Gaulle made good on his August 25 threat of consequences should Guinea choose independence. French technical and administrative personnel were commanded to destroy archival material and leave the country. France suspended aid to Guinea and canceled the Konkouré River dam project. France pulled out its infrastructure so completely that phone lines, medicines, and even plates were destroyed or removed. The actions of France stimulated “chaos in the economic and administrative sectors of Guinea.”

On October 2, 1958, Guinea held its official independence day ceremony. Not a single representative of France attended. Although Sékou Touré continued to make overtures toward de
Gaulle and the French government, he remained unsuccessful in brokering friendship. While Ghana and Liberia quickly recognized Guinea, the United States hesitated, instead following France’s lead. Then de Gaulle’s government went further than rejection. As Schmidt asserted, “Determined to destroy the man he could not seduce, de Gaulle ordered the French secret services to bring down Sékou Touré’s government,” and thus began twenty years of plots to overthrow it.

Sékou Touré did not falter and looked elsewhere for support. With a November visit to Ghana, he and Nkrumah formed the Union of Guinea-Ghana. By December 9, Iraq and Japan presented Guinea’s candidacy for the United Nations, to which it was admitted on December 13. It was not until January 2, 1960 that France finally conferred diplomatic recognition on Guinea, and by that time, it had become apparent that the remainder of former French West Africa would soon follow in Guinea’s independence footsteps.

Although the story of Guinea’s “No” vote has often been told as one of a faceoff between Charles de Gaulle and Sékou Touré, the situation was more complex, and followed many years of events leading up to the Sept. 28 referendum vote. Scholars fall into three camps from which to view the political situation in Guinea in 1958. Some, particularly those writing from Guinea during Sékou Touré’s rule, tout him as the “Man of 1958” who it might seem was the only Guinean voting on September 28. Much U.S. media coverage follows this pattern, focusing solely on Touré. Another line of scholarship from historians including work from Sikhe Camara and El Hadj Saloum Diakite, assert that Sékou Touré led his people toward the “no” vote, but the masses did follow him on the journey toward independence. More recent studies, such as those by Elizabeth Schmidt and Abdoulaye Diallo, put forth the idea that the desire to break from France spouted from the people of Guinea who moved a hesitant, undecided, and sometimes
accommodationist Sékou Touré to take up their cause. According to Abdoulaye Diallo, the first historigraphic work of 1958 was Sidiki Kobélé Keita’s *Ahmed Sékou Touré: L’homme du 28 septembre 1958*. This exculpatory work was published in 1977, while Sékou Touré held office, by a professor at the Institut Polytechnique de Conakry. This work poses Sékou Touré and the PDG as the only authors of the “No” vote. Admirers Lasiné Kabe and Sylvain Soriba Camara offer the same interpretation. These African scholars who clearly disapprove of Sékou Touré nonetheless cite him as the driving factor of the “no” vote and Guinean independence. Likewise, many Western scholars have followed the same pattern.108

Charles Sorry’s work from 2000 details the evolution of Sékou Touré from a hero of his people – an angel – to a demon. Despite his acrimony towards the leader, Sorry does not hesitate to view him as all-powerful, even stating, Sékou Touré “s’élevait aussi au pouvoir, tel ce soleil-là, avec toute las force de la confiance du people investie en sa personne.”109 Rather than noting the cohesion between Sékou Touré and the people’s movements, Sorry traces the disappearance of the JRDA, CNTG, and URFG (youth, workers and women’s movements), which were subsumed by the larger political organization, the PDG. Even while claiming for Sékou Touré such intense authority, Sorry diminishes his value at independence by stating that Sékou Touré was able to unify diverging trends, although those trends only differed in their claims, but not in their opposition to colonialism. In fact, the people of Guinea had already felt the injustice of colonialism by the time Sékou Touré rose to notoriety. Nevertheless, he holds the honor of bringing the naturally revolutionary people to independence. For Sorry, Sékou Touré’s success stemmed from his charm, elegance, and abilities as an orator. Propelled by events, he became a celebrated man and a model of the African political man. “En Afrique et ailleurs, Sékou Touré était un symbole de la lutte anticolonialiste.”110
While Ibrahima Baba Kaké’s *Sékou Touré: le héros et le tyran* was published a few years after Touré’s death and seeks to offer a complete biography of the leader, for better or worse, the author nonetheless states grandly, “Sékou Touré ayant fait voter ‘non’ au référendum du 28 septembre, il ne reste plus qu’à proclamer la République.” In this statement, we see Sékou Touré acting alone, first voting against de Gaulle’s constitution, then proclaiming the nation. He is George Washington, both freedom fighter and father of the country.

Maurice Jeanjean’s *Sékou Touré: un totalitarisme africain* places full authority with the figure of Sékou Touré, beginning as early as August 29 when Jeanjean states the leader felt it necessary to justify his choice to vote against the referendum to the PDG activists, Guinean citizens, and the French economic leaders. Thus, Sékou Touré developed language delineating France and de Gaulle’s government. Sékou Touré explained that Guinea would always say “yes” to France, but would have to say “no” to a constitution that made slaves of the people.

Jeanjean seems to blame Sékou Touré for losing the friendship of France, and states that even before August 25, the Guinean leader had already decided to vote “no,” but he wanted to shift the responsibility to de Gaulle for provoking him.

Even Guia Migani simplifies Guinea’s no vote thus:

Apart from Guinea, all the African territories voted for the new Constitution. For reasons of political prestige, Sekou Touré, the leader of Guinea, chose independence. As a member of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*, an African party, he wanted to assert himself as the advocate of independence against the party chairman, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, the leader of Ivory Coast, who supported the Community. Furthermore, Touré thought that de Gaulle’s threat to cut aid was a bluff.

In Migani’s account, Sékou Touré stands up not to de Gaulle, but to Houphouët-Boigny, and was prompted by his ego rather than the will of the people.

For El Hadji Saloum Diakité, the story of the September 28 vote began on June 3 when de Gaulle presented the first iteration of the new constitution. What followed was a period of
negotiation during which Sékou Touré opposed the constitution as written and saw the shift as leading to eventual independence, but was not forcefully declining participation or campaigning in Guinea for his people to vote against it. There was a period of diplomacy during which leaders, mostly led by either Senghor or Houphouët-Boigny sought adjustments to the constitution inline with their overarching goals. De Gaulle engineered to keep the territories happy by allowing for various types of alliances in the new constitution. Thus, most leaders, other than Sékou Touré and Bakary Djibo of Niger worked to bring their citizens to a positive vote. Disappointed by the provisions of the constitution, Sékou Touré did not support it, stating, “‘Une communauté qui n’est que l’Union française rebaptisée, c’est à dire las vielle marchandise dont on a changé l’étiquette. Nous voterons « non » à l’inégalité, nous voterons « non » à l’irresponsabilité.’” 114 During de Gaulle’s August 25 visit, just a month prior to the referendum vote, Sékou Touré continued trying to convince France to modify the proposed constitution; otherwise Guinea would vote “no.” 115

Diakité, too describes the August through September situation in Guinea as one in which Sékou Touré influenced the people, not the other way around. He asserts that during the August 25 visit, de Gaulle underestimated the situation in Guinea, and his words proved too mild to ameliorate the public opinion, and it seemed that de Gaulle’s advisors expected the population to vote in favor of the referendum despite the strong words presented by Sékou Touré, demanding adjustments. Thus, de Gaulle understood too late, the political influence of the Guinean leader. 116 Diakité describes the PDG and Guineans as being “married” to Sékou Touré. The “no” vote was a political victory that was the result of both a long-term policy that strengthened the unity of action and the cohesion of Guineans. Diakité does mention that outside the PDG, other political organizations including the Bloc africain de guinée (BAG) and the Démocratie socialiste de
guinée (DSG) also favored the “no” vote, but their audience was limited. Despite the fact that some moderate RDA members tried to convince Sékou Touré against the “no” vote, with “discipline” and “fervor,” 95% of the population of Guinea rejected the submitted constitution, and with their massive “no,” ended 60 years of colonialism. Through the inclusion of the word “discipline,” Diakité shows that the people followed the authority of Sékou Touré, who led them to reject the constitution. At the same time, by explaining that they voted against the constitution that was submitted to them (“le projet constitutionnel qui leur est soumis”), Diakité puts the fault squarely on de Gaulle who refused to amend the constitution in the manner demanded by Sékou Touré.

The citizenry of Guinea figure into the Guinean independence retelling in teleological works written during the years of Sékou Touré’s administration, but they are simply the background to the march led by the Guinean RDA. In Alpha Diawara’s *Guinée: la marche du people*, the RDA’s purpose since its formation was to form a unified front. In Guinea, the PDG took up this cause, and included active participation from trade unions, youth, and grassroots activists. If Sékou Touré does not receive all of the credit, the party does. When France presented the referendum, only Guinea escaped this latest colonial plot, and it was thanks to the PDG, which had a genuine influence over the population.

Likewise, Sikhe Camara’s *La Guinée vers le socialisme* details the straight path Guinea toward socialism, here more directly under the guidance of Sékou Touré. According to Camara, the separation from France was actually definite as early as June 1, 1958, and it was the leader of the RDA, Sékou Touré, who would be the bearer for not only the activists of the RDA, but for the masses of Guinea who were all onboard for the journey with the PDG. Once the referendum had been presented,
le Camarade Ahmed Sékou Touré, avait tout naturellement et bien vite compris que la meilleure méthode était en fait de conditionner et mobiliser ses populations déjà conscientes … Dès lors, il anima intensément toutes plateformes politiques des organisations de travailleurs, des femmes et des jeunes sur les plans africain, français et international, car sa force maîtresse véritable était celle de son Peuple déjà unanime derrière lui.\textsuperscript{120}

When Guineans voted on September 28, they were carried by Sékou Touré’s influence, and he had spared no effort in working to convince his peers to vote “no” as well.

More recently, scholars including Elizabeth Schmidt have taken a holistic approach to the independence of Guinea. In \textit{Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea}, Schmidt introduces the topic of Guinea’s independence coming “through popular referendum” and does not mention Sékou Touré until page three.\textsuperscript{121} For Schmidt, the real story is the years of political mobilization by grassroots militants.\textsuperscript{122} She explains that rather than asserting his will on the people to whom he was charismatic and all-powerful, “Sékou Touré was pushed to the Left by grassroots militants, particularly trade unionists, students, women, and youth – not the other way around.”\textsuperscript{123} Throughout September 1958, university students in Paris, women and youth, the Guinean PRA and UGTAN came out in favor of a “no” vote and put pressure on Sékou Touré and the Guinean RDA to do the same. Meanwhile, the Guinean RDA waited for the final version of the constitution before passing judgment, and on September 14, Sékou Touré publicly stated he would reject de Gaulle’s offer. For the next two weeks, Sékou Touré threw his influence behind the no vote. For Sékou Touré as well as the various Guinean associations, at no point, did the break from the community mean a break from relations with France, and both looked forward to “frank and loyal collaboration between the two countries.”\textsuperscript{124}

Abdoulaye Diallo has also focused on deconstructing the aura surrounding Sékou Touré’s role in the “no” vote. In his \textit{Sékou Touré : 1957-1961 : Mythes et réalités d’un héro}, Diallo
explains that the entire Guinean population played a vital role in Guinea’s rebuff of France’s offer, particularly the students and teachers.\textsuperscript{125} While Sékou Touré and the PDG maintained ambiguous positions, only coming late to espousing the rejection of the constitution, it was the participation of students and teachers, coupled with socio-economic factors that led Guinea to independence. Previous scholarship has created a myth around the personality of Sékou Touré as the sole or at least main cause of Guinea’s independence vote, but Diallo strives to highlight a different image of Sékou Touré, that of a man who collaborated with the colonial administration, thinking that it was too soon to question their domination, and of a leader hesitant to assert the “no” vote even after students, teachers, and other political actors had done so without hesitation long before.\textsuperscript{126} In fact, Sékou Touré’s turn to the “no” vote had much to do with de Gaulle’s stubbornness and the \textit{gaullien} and \textit{sékoutouréen} egos.\textsuperscript{127}

L’ambiguïté de son discours appelant à améliorer ce qui existe et non à l’indépendance immédiate et sa prise de position tardive alors que la campagne studentantine et de ses adversaires politiques pour le ‘non’ battait son plein ne concourent pas à valider la thèse selon laquelle Sékou Touré est l’homme du 28 septembre. Par contre, la portée mondiale de certains passages de son discours prononcé lors du passage improvisé de De Gaulle à Conakry laisse plutôt penser qu’il est ‘ l’homme du 25 août 1958.’\textsuperscript{128}

An earlier work by Lasiné Kaba, which was part of a contemporary African history collection aimed toward a general audience, depicts the September 28 vote as the culmination of “diverse aspirations and thoughts, the result of a profound realization to which social, religious and cultural forces largely contributed.”\textsuperscript{129} For Kaba it is vital that the opposition to the PDG not be omitted from the story. “Le succès du référendum n’incombe pas seulement au PDG-RDA dont le rôle est incontestable, mais aussi, dans une grande mesure, aux organisations syndicales et studentaines et aux autres formations politiques. Les dirigeants de l’opposition et du BAG en particulier ont su se comporter en opposants loyaux. »\textsuperscript{130} In fact, the honor of independence
belongs to all of the people of Guinea, not just *l’homme de 28 septembre*. It was the unity of the parties and the social forces that obliged the PDG to adopt a more radical attitude.\(^{131}\) Despite the reference to opposition and the role of unions and students, Kaba turns to focus on “le grandeur de ces personnages tient à leur capacité d’exprimer les aspirations profondes de leurs peuples, de s’identifier avec eux et de s’en faire la conscience vivant.” Thus, Sékou Touré and Charles de Gaulle, whom Kaba calls a larger than life figure, the man of June 18 and « le symbole vivant de l’espérance de la France,» became the emphasis of the Guinean independence story as told by the U.S. press.\(^{132}\)

### 2.3 Coverage in *TIME*

Founded by Henry R. Luce in 1923, *TIME* is a weekly news magazine with a significant mainstream readership, and during the early years of decolonization remained under the watchful eye of Luce. Known as the originator of the term the “American Century” for his 1941 article in *Life*, another of his publications, Luce encouraged the United States to forgo isolationism and exert its political and economic influence globally.

Consider the 20\(^{th}\) Century. It is not only in the sense that we happen to live in it but ours also because it is America’s first century as a dominant power in the world … No narrow definition can be given to American internationalism of the 20\(^{th}\) Century… As America enters dynamically upon the world scene, we need most of all to seek and to bring forth a vision of America as a world power which is authentically American and which can inspire us to live and work and fight with vigor and enthusiasm.\(^{133}\)

Each week, *TIME* offered its readers a quick summary of news events at home and around the world, but without the “myth” of objectivity, as mandated by Luce. “Asked once why *TIME* did not present ‘two sides to a story,’ Luce replied: ‘Are there not more likely to be three sides or 30 sides?’”\(^{134}\) The week before Luce’s death in 1967, Time, Inc.’s four major publications – *TIME, Life, Fortune*, and *Sports Illustrated* – including international editions, boasted a combined total of 14,331,458 copies.\(^{135}\) Luce’s obituary in *TIME* quoted Lyndon
Johnson who stated that Luce’s magazines “are an authentic part of life in America.” Led during Luce’s lifetime by his personal zealous political agenda defined in the American Century, and questions about how well *TIME* represented the whole of America notwithstanding, the magazine’s circulation alone allows it to be considered as a paradigm of mainstream U.S. print media in the mid-twentieth century.

With the ascent of Charles de Gaulle to the office of Prime Minister on June 1, 1958, *TIME* provided almost weekly coverage of France and its foreign affairs, giving particular attention to the Algerian War of Independence. In the August 11 “New Look for Government?,” *TIME* announced that de Gaulle had given his drafted constitution to “a 39-man Constitutional Consultative Committee,” and, in a characteristic touch, gave them precisely 20 days to consider it. The article concentrates on the changes to government structure provided by the new constitution, which showed “a profound determination to clip the wings of the negative and vacillating National Assembly” and a double-headed executive featuring a “President elected for seven years, and with powers greater in some respects than those of the President of the U.S.” Alluding to de Gaulle’s arrogance again in the next issue, “Take it or Leave It” describes de Gaulle’s presentation of the constitution “with his customary lofty dignity,” but in this case explains that with the constitution, de Gaulle needed to solve two problems – “the chaos of a supreme but irresponsible Parliament, and the long struggle to find some permanent policy for France’s colonies.” De Gaulle confidently assumed the overseas territories would approve his plan, otherwise, “they must secede and suffer all the ‘risks and perils.’”

Following the discussion, “the Premier strode out of the Palais Royal, announced that he would visit French West Africa and Madagascar to sell his program in person before the people troop to the polls to vote yes or no next month.” The image of de Gaulle presented in the two
articles is one of a kingly, arrogant leader, but also of a disciplining father figure who will make the nation and territories swallow what is good for them.

As likely ratification of de Gaulle’s new constitution approached, *TIME* turned from coverage of France’s conflict with Algeria and the proposed layout of the Fifth Republic government to focus on the future of French West Africa. With the referendum vote just over a month away, the August 18, 1958 article “French West Africa” offered a preview of the tour de Gaulle would embark on two days later. Attention turned to de Gaulle’s constitution and the question of the successes, failures, modifications, and continuation of colonialism arose. Guinea and Sékou Touré figured highly in the article, Sékou Touré’s voice representing the danger of France’s secession offer as opposed to the sensible Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast who was quoted stating, “We don’t want independence. My neighbor Nkrumah in Ghana is independent, and as a result must support an army which is very expensive. Who is really independent, anyway?”¹⁴³

In this article’s appraisal of French colonial efforts, the white man’s burden has been more successful in some regards than others – healthcare has improved, while illiteracy was “still enormous.” Infrastructure could be called spotty, for example the Office du Niger constructed a $21 million dam across the Niger River, but tracks from a still nonexistent railroad sit atop it. And the article reminds that a lot of French money has been spent on development since 1948.

It is important to situate Sékou Touré and Guinea within this larger context of West Africa and U.S. portrayal of colonialism. One main point made by the *TIME* coverage is that despite colonial efforts, Africa remains a land where tradition has not been fully eradicated by modernity. An opening vignette describes a ceremony in the capital of Upper Volta that “has changed not one jot in centuries” and is “in a way symbolic of the whole region’s inheritance of
Africa is portrayed as: illiterate (Africans voting on the constitutional referendum will simply choose a white or green card to signify their vote), barbaric (“Just outside the teeming modern city of Abidjan, villagers still slaughter small children and toss their disemboweled bodies into the river to make sure of a good year’s fishing”), impoverished (Mauritania “felt itself too poor to have a capital of its own” and Senegal’s economy depends on peanuts), confused about its gender roles (“among the Tuareg tribes of the Niger, it is the men, not the women, who wear veils”), and rural (Mauritania has only four towns with populations greater than 3,000 people, and Upper Volta boasts as many livestock as people). In keeping with the notion of France’s civilizing mission, colonialism has been more of an obligation than a benefit for France (a Mauritanian emir stated, “‘No one can say that France has exploited Mauritania. On the contrary, it has been for her a burden.’”).

Nonetheless, the French have made “isolated but highly promising efforts at development” of “these destitute lands.” The Ivory Coast “is rich by comparison” and Guinea “has plunged into the most ambitious industrial program in French West Africa” as Sékou Touré receives applause for ending the system of canton chiefs, while North American and European funds have begun backing a $200 million bauxite program. Without explicitly stating it, the article implies that these strides forward would be lost were precipitous independence to come to West Africa.

While Houphouët-Boigny provides the image of an ideal African – educated and content, a man who was able to stave off the influence of French Communists on the RDA – as “French West Africa’s most noted political leader,” he contrasts starkly with Sékou Touré who already inspires concern even if the French “regard him benignly as one of the ablest administrators in the whole territory.” Sékou Touré is described as “a onetime Marxist and incorrigible troublemaker
for France,” a “ruthless man who used to burn the houses of his enemies” and one who sees the “loi-cadre as only one step toward autonomy.” Although Sékou Touré claims, “I am no socialist,” he admits to having studied the principles of many economic programs, which he would like to adapt to the needs of Africa. Most importantly, Sékou Touré hopes to attract investment capital. At this point, Sékou Touré does not rally publicly for independence, but neither does he inspire the American confidence that Houphouët-Boigny does.

The article closes with a reminder that 1958 was not the moment to break from France, and Sékou Touré at this point, offers an ambiguous request for interdependence within a Franco-African community.

Though some young hotheads cry for independence, what the present generation of leaders want is something a good deal more mystical and at the same time more realistic – a kind of proud brotherhood, not only with all of Africa, but also with France. “Our fundamental choice,” Touré has said, “resides in the entire decolonization of Africa – its men, its economy, its administrative organization, in order to build a solid Franco-African community. Our heart, our reason, even more than our most evident self-interest, makes us choose, without hesitation, interdependence and liberty in this union, rather than a definition of ourselves without France and against France.”

*TIME* continued to follow the saga of de Gaulle’s African constitutional campaign tour with articles on August 25, September 8, September 15, September 22, and September 29. Throughout the coverage, de Gaulle is one great man, acting alone. We can imagine him sitting in an office, penning the constitution, then piloting his own aircraft around Africa. He might have had the weight of the world – or at least the francophone world – on his shoulders, but he was the man who could carry it. Any flaws were in his haughty personality, but not in his actions or decisions. Coverage of de Gaulle is also consistent in reiterating that he is not a communist. Whether it is reference to his lack of support from the French Communist Party or communism,
de Gaulle wages a “battle for votes” that can be inferred to also be a battle against communism. In this way, he would be on the right side in the Cold War.\footnote{152}

Once he had presented the new constitution, de Gaulle began a campaign to sell it – to the Constitutional Council, to French citizens in the hexagon, to African territories, to overseas departments, and even to people in Algeria. Throughout the TIME coverage of de Gaulle’s constitutional campaign, he is depicted as having made a magnanimous offer to the territories, and since he did not have the full backing of the current government, it was only de Gaulle who could be called liberal-minded enough to consider a plan so progressive.

The parliamentary commission also thought too harsh De Gaulle’s implied ruling that any overseas territory casting a majority vote against the new constitution in next month’s referendum would be considered to have voted itself clean out of the French Union. Instead, they proposed that, in such a case, the territorial assembly be allowed to decide whether or not to hold a second, local referendum on the specific issue of independence.\footnote{153}

History depicts the results of the Sept. 28 referendum as an enormous success, and indeed, 79.3% of metropolitan votes were cast in favor of it, and throughout most of Africa, the votes for it were in the ninetieth percentile.\footnote{154} The referendum achieved 82.6% of the votes overall. Voter turnout also ran high, with an average of 80.48% of voters casting a ballot. Although the metropole showed the highest voter turnout at 84.94%, most African territories topped 70% in participation. Lower turnout in Chad (66.19%), Mali (45.38%), Niger (37.42%), and Dahomey (55.65%) was bolstered by high figures in Ivory Coast (97.56%) and Mauritania (84.22%).\footnote{155} In Guinea, 85.5% of voters participated in the referendum vote.\footnote{156} During de Gaulle’s campaign, the race had seemed much closer, with “experts in Paris” expecting the constitution to pull in only 60 to 65% of the vote.\footnote{157} Despite the fact that millions around the world would vote, it was de Gaulle who was personally responsible for getting votes. In Algeria,
a directive to “create a De Gaulle myth” meant “the picture of the general must appear everywhere.” And in France, a takeover of media platforms by Information Minister Jacques Soustelle became “sycophantic in praise of De Gaulle.”

While Sékou Touré has been presented as “Guinea” and characteristic of the qualities Africans more generally, de Gaulle typically stands apart from and above his people. De Gaulle has earned his place through leadership qualities, his intellectualism, and his willingness to move his country forward whether or not all of the French are ready. By contrast, Sékou Touré has achieved his position through mysticism and force.

*TIME* provided two articles about de Gaulle’s tour of France’s African territories, and the first, published in the September 8 issue, takes a different overall tone in its coverage by emphasizing some of colonialism’s more violent episodes such as the 55,000 to 80,000 Malagasy lives lost during the 1947 revolt in Madagascar. This article is less complimentary to de Gaulle and details more of the challenges encountered on his campaign trail: sporadic applause in Madagascar, reservations expressed by politicians in Brazzaville, “ominous mutterings from native political bosses in the 13 territories of French Africa,” jeering demonstrators in Senegal, and necessarily secret meetings with local Algerian dignitaries. Nevertheless, de Gaulle displays “political savvy,” and “despite occasional catcalls, De Gaulle’s trip was a political triumph.”

“Free to Choose Freedom,” published the day after the referendum vote, but obviously written earlier due to *TIME*’s weekly publication schedule, reviews the expectations about votes that will come from the African territories, but gives about half of the word count to the personality clash between de Gaulle and Sékou Touré. Here, the ability to vote for the constitution or gain independence is again touted as benevolent, “Never before in history has an imperial nation made such an offer.” Yet, Africans are confused: “For two days De Gaulle was
subjected to the curious experience of hearing irate Africans loudly demand something he had already offered them.”

De Gaulle’s personality in the TIME coverage from presentation of the constitution to the results of the campaign (July through September 1958), can be summed up with this statement in “Selling the Constitution,” “But the No. 1 statesman of the new way is the general himself – proud, dedicated, remote, positive, full of paternal silences and prestigious mysteries.”

Sékou Touré also features in the articles from September 8 and 29. In “The Campaigner,” he is called a “firebrand” who annoyed de Gaulle by shouting his famous quote about preferring poverty in independence to richness in slavery. The article (incorrectly) notes that Sékou Touré “also promised to vote yes to the constitution.”

In “Free to Choose Freedom,” the clash between Sékou Touré and de Gaulle earns more copy, as by the time of its writing, it had become apparent that Sékou Touré did not support the constitution. In fact, he “thundered” and “cried” that Guinea would vote no to a rebaptized French Union. Sékou Touré’s comments are called an “outburst.” Rather than talking calmly in a civilized and mature manner, Sékou Touré consistently is described as using the communication methods of a child. Even worse, his refusal of the French constitution could stem more from a “personality clash” with de Gaulle than from shrewd political decision making. In this article, he is already a tyrant: “In French Guinea what Sekou Touré (sic) says goes. His political control is so tight and his followers so quick to violence and intimidation that even French observers gloomily expect Guinea to vote no by more than 90%.”

There is no evidence of the nuanced situation involving the unions, students, teachers, and grassroots activists unearthed by Diallo, Kaba, and Schmidt.

Even worse, while in the August 18 article “French West Africa,” Sékou Touré had explained that he was not a socialist, here he is called, “A Marxist-trained unionist himself, Sekou
Touré [sic], 36, envisions a Guinean government in which labor unions will be the prime instruments of administrative power.” Again, he is contrasted with Houphouët-Boigny who “has come a long way since the days when he was an admirer of Communism.”\(^\text{167}\) In fact, communism is the real enemy to the French Union, and potential votes against the constitution, may stem from leftist leanings more than anything else: “Djibo Bakary, another Marxist-trained unionist who heads the government of French Niger, announced that he and his followers were voting no … and Senegal, with its potent Communist minority, may go either way.”\(^\text{168}\) The conflict between communism and the referendum further underlines the fact that de Gaulle is not a communist.

Only Guinea declined the French Community and gained independence, and de Gaulle’s constitution was regarded as an overwhelming success.

In 1959, \(\textit{TIME}\) magazine devoted its January 5 “Man of the Year” cover to Charles de Gaulle, but Sékou Touré earned his place next month, taking the February 16 issue cover.\(^\text{169}\) While de Gaulle’s image announced that he had earned the title “Man of the Year,” Touré’s cover included the text “Black Africa: The Dawn of Self Rule.” De Gaulle’s image is a commissioned portrait painted by artist Bernard Buffet, and he gazes toward the right, into the future.\(^\text{170}\) The background is a steely blue, and de Gaulle is neatly attired in a suit with tie, ready for business. By contrast, Sékou Touré gazes, or almost leers, over his shoulder to the left, toward the past.

With a colorful background and a casual open-collar shirt, he could be a conga player more easily than a national leader. Despite these differences, both figures display qualities of masculinity and strength. If Sékou Touré does not wear modern business attire, he does boast a powerful countenance in the photo.

Each cover announced the name of its subject, listing “Guinea’s Sékou Touré” and simply “De Gaulle.” This denotes an important difference between the two leaders. One the one
hand, most readers would have been familiar with de Gaulle prior to picking up a copy of *TIME*. On the other hand, many will meet Sékou Touré for the first time during press coverage of 1958 and 1959.

Continuing divergences appear in the Letter from Publisher, who was James A. Linen for both issues. In the letter introducing de Gaulle, Linen begins by explaining the significance of *TIME*’s Man of the Year, which could be a hero or a villain. “But always, he has met one criterion: who during the year, did most to change the news, for better or for worse.” Interestingly, Linen mentions that readers can submit ideas for Man of the Year – although that has no bearing on the ultimate choice of editors – and in this case, 47% of readers had suggested de Gaulle to earn the title. Linen summarizes the main point of what is to come in the full article by writing, “De Gaulle is by no means the world’s greatest statesman. But to a degree unmatched by any other world figure, he gave the year’s news the flavor of his own complex, often misunderstood personality.” The de Gaulle feature that follows rescues his image from the arrogant wartime figure H.G. Wells called “‘an utterly sincere megalomaniac’” to France’s benefactor whose “solemn hauteur” serves the intended purpose of allowing his people to revere him. He is a family man and an intellectual who has benefited from a dozen years’ retirement, which allowed him to reflect and improve.171

The publisher’s letter opening the issue featuring Sékou Touré begins by tracing the “awakening” of Africa, which can be viewed on a series of *TIME* covers beginning with the one dedicated to Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie, the 1936 Man of the Year. Jumping to 1952, *TIME* featured Daniel Malan, the Afrikaner Prime Minister of the apartheid Union of South Africa who wanted to maintain the subjection of the black majority. The next year, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah represented “the face of Black Africa nationalism.” Both King Mohammed V
of Morocco and Ferhat Abbas, head of the Algerian rebel government-in-exile, graced covers in 1956. Paternalistic language represents Sékou Touré, Guinea, and Africa’s current political situation. “Now comes young, vigorous Sékou Touré of Guinea, the man who said ‘No’ to De Gaulle and who has become one of the most powerful figures in the reversed ‘Scramble for Africa’ – that of the Africans themselves,” Linen writes. The article to follow will not only introduce Sékou Touré, it will report on “the first unsteady steps of an infant nation and the growing pains of a continent.” Within the article, those “unsteady steps” display the disorder of Conakry: “For lack of help, ministers had to do the secretarial work while visitors clogged their waiting rooms. Telephones did not work, clerks scuttered about looking for the only copy of the diplomatic list. Messages were sent in to the Minister of Health while he was performing surgical operations.”

Drastic divergence in representation continues in the articles. The piece on de Gaulle begins with symbols of modernity: events of 1958 such as voice recording, radiation readings, and a mention of the previous year’s Sputnik launch. The article explains that during 1958, many new leaders came to power as discontent raged from “Caracas to Khartoum.” Most of these leaders rose through military overthrow and had little real plan beyond seizing power. However, one leader did achieve positive ends, the 1958 Man of the Year, Charles de Gaulle. By contrast, the Sékou Touré article begins by resorting to familiar colonial tropes to situate the American reader in Africa. The writer describes the dancing of “graceful, black-skinned Guinea women,” xylophones that reach a “fever pitch,” and wailing griots. American readers would easily recognize that this was not a Western political celebration. Elsewhere, the article describes the inauguration of Sékou Touré’s infrastructure campaign with the “wild beating of the tom toms.”
De Gaulle is quickly distanced from any relationship with communism when the author describes that he has proved “once again the fundamental Christian proposition that history is shaped by individuals, not by blind faith or inexorable Marxist laws.” This claim reminds readers that de Gaulle is a Christian. By contrast, the article on Sékou Touré notes his “Marxism” several times. His role in the Guinean trade unions gained the notice of French communists who brought him to Warsaw and Prague from whence he “came back spouting Marxism.” Later, it was Sékou Touré who reorganized Guinea’s RDA along communist lines. Further, the article not only mentions Sékou Touré’s Koranic education, but the introduction, with the description of dancing women at the independence celebration, alludes to a primitive form of paganism, allowing readers to easily take away the idea that Sékou Touré is not Christian. Whether he holds firm religious beliefs remains unclear, and irrelevant since his true faith is shown to be communism. The discourse works to remove Guinea and Sékou Touré from any claim on Western modernity. Even though he wore a “European business suit” to the ceremony, his voice reached “close to frenzy,” a description that could call to mind a lack of civilized manners or radicalization.

De Gaulle earns monikers including soldier, scholar, and writer. He is a man who has bequeathed his gifts on the country of France. “Charles de Gaulle … has restored the supremacy of internal law and given France a new constitution … has all but destroyed the Communist Party as an active factor in French government, has laid the groundwork for a fruitful new relationship between France and her onetime African colonies, and has immensely strengthened France’s moral and psychological position in revolt-torn Algeria.” These laudatory sentences impart the idea that de Gaulle has acted alone in rescuing France. In this, his coverage converges with the feature about Sékou Touré, and he and de Gaulle can be imagined as mirror images. Often discussed as the only person of note in Guinea – any other humans there are the naked, shrieking
masses, “Sékou Touré decided to say no to De Gaulle…”\textsuperscript{178} and in his leadership role, Sékou Touré’s behavior is representative of West African leaders as a whole: “The black men, mainly in the West of Africa, who are leading their illiterate millions to freedom talk mystically of an eventual United States of Africa and of something called African Personality.”\textsuperscript{179}

While each man speaks for his country, de Gaulle earned his leadership role through his “solemn hauteur” and “the year’s most impressive display of political mastery,” while Sékou Touré had a “singularly unmajestic” childhood, was “always making trouble” as a civil servant, and after founding Guinea’s first labor union “began to take on that mystical aura so valuable to African leaders.”\textsuperscript{180} The notion that African leaders earn their power through some sort of witchcraft supports notions that democracy belongs to the West and implies that political reason is a Western quality. For readers unfamiliar with the political history of Sékou Touré, the article outlines his rise to power under the loi-cadre. Having “stomped out all opposition at home,” when the loi-cadre was passed in 1956, he was “ready” to take charge and became the vice president, second in command under the territorial governor. The article describes Sékou Touré’s sweeping changes during which he removed village chiefs and set up village councils, elected by universal suffrage “grass-roots democracy” that was “something new to French Africa.”\textsuperscript{181} However, the reader is soon reminded of Sékou Touré’s Marxism, as well as the late benefits of French imperialism in the territory, which meant roads and malaria control. The following text revisits Sékou Touré’s unstable nature – he “snapped” a reply at the French and met de Gaulle’s “dramatic” offer of Community with the “thundered,” now famous remark, “We prefer poverty in liberty to riches in slavery.”\textsuperscript{182}

Although de Gaulle figures heavily into the article about the referendum vote, Sékou Touré and Guinea are absent from the article on de Gaulle, suggesting that France was more
important to Guinea’s future than was Guinea to France’s. Despite Guinea’s “no” vote, France’s constitutional referendum is depicted as a complete success as well as a magnanimous gesture on the part of de Gaulle, who “By tying the vote on autonomy for France’s Black African territories to the vote on his proposed constitution, he obliged right-wingers to swallow his liberal colonial policy, at the same time picked up 9,000,000 African votes to swell his majority in the constitutional referendum.”

Incorporating Guinea’s “no” would complicate the historical narrative offered in the article. Even as the TIME article recognizes the challenges ahead for de Gaulle, particularly in the situation with Algeria, which has drained the French economy, it ends on a hopeful note explaining that problems “provide a kind of elation to a man of De Gaulle’s temperament,” and closes with, “In 1958, obedient to his maxim, glory gave herself to Charles de Gaulle.”

Most of the de Gaulle cover story concentrates on his long public history as a young officer in the First World War, an accomplished author and military strategist between the wars, the leader of the Free France movement, and head of France’s postwar provisional government. Yet this larger than life figure can also be seen as human – he is a churchgoing family man, remains polite and formal with his Cabinet ministers, and is classically trained and intellectual in outlook. Apparently unlike Sékou Touré, who grasped at and seized power, de Gaulle returned to liberated Paris a hero in 1944 with “only his own character” blocking him from “a dictator’s power.” He chose to restore democracy in France rather than take “drastic action that might have eased France’s grievous economic problems.”

In contrast to the laudatory image of de Gaulle, the leadership character imposed on Sékou Touré in the February TIME article suggests “black insatiability,” historian George White, Jr.’s critique of the way that black expectations are seen as unreasonable, regardless of how
reasonable they may be. In the contrast between TIME’s coverage of de Gaulle and Sékou Touré, it is apparent that the normalcy and superiority of whiteness was upheld unilaterally. The “only plausible explanations for African radicalism were Black incompetence, insatiability, and blind hatred of Whites, fed by Communist propaganda.” The constant references to Sékou Touré’s Marxism show that this progressive African leader already in early 1959 had begun to earn a negative reputation in the United States. In de Gaulle, megalomania was forgivable thanks to his wartime heroism and (cultural/racial) superiority. When Sékou Touré is described as only needing three to four hours of sleep a night and a leader “driving his countrymen as hard as himself,” this has nothing to do with individual self-discipline. Instead it “bears a disturbing resemblance to the communes of Communist China” or even the forced road labor of the ancien régime. A more compelling comparison might have been forced labor during European colonialism, but the writer makes no disparaging remarks about France’s modern history.

TIME states of Touré that he “combines the Marxist genius for organizing with an almost mystical view of himself as the father of his people.” In the case of de Gaulle, it is the French people who see him as the father and indeed the savior of his people. While the idea does not become evident in the TIME article, at home, Sékou Touré was imagined in a similar way, according to Kaba, Alpha Diawara, and Sikhe Camara. Further, the TIME article explains that Guinean administration runs “not through government but through a single party” and that Sékou Touré claims the Party functions democratically because all of the representatives are elected at the local level. Even worse, Sékou Touré seeks to trade with his “old Communist friends,” and has begun working with East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union, inspiring fear that he will try to run private trade through government agencies. Touting Sékou Touré’s Marxism served as a straightforward method of allowing readers to dislike him, modifying his
African alterity through a linkage to the more familiar alter-West of communism, and encapsulating him within a known negative boundary. Nevertheless, the article features plenty of additional reasons not to admire him.

A brief mention of Sékou Touré’s meeting with Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, who pledged $28 million to assist the country following France’s cold shoulder, explains that nothing has come of the offer from Nkrumah. Ghana’s role has little importance anyway, because France has “swallowed its indignation over the man who said no” and recent agreements “place the country squarely back in the French Community.” It has not taken long for Guinea to understand that “independence is a relative thing.” In fact, the article does not fully recommend independence for African nations. Guinea, just after the “no” vote, was “on its own,” while other countries fared better: the British left Ghana in good shape economically, Liberia had investment from Firestone Tire & Rubber, and Ethiopia was fortunate to have Swedes training its air force and Americans running its airline. The idea is that African countries could not survive alone. “It will not be easy for Africa to be completely itself, for no other continent has been so swept by foreign influence.” Even worse, Africans have more to fear from each other than whites, the article purports, mentioning riots against immigrants from Togoland and Dahomey in Côte d’Ivoire. Even Nkrumah has already begun to fall out of favor with other Africans; as evidence there is a quote from Mamadou Dia of Senegal who states, “‘Ghanocracy … does not interest us.’” Thus, the dream of a United States of Africa may be yearned for, but it is “impractical.”

Overall, with its reliance on colonial tropes and fear of communist leanings, the article on Sékou Touré represents American conceptions and fears of new African leaders and independent Africa more generally even as the United States and the American public assumed their roles as world leaders at a time when decoloniation and Cold War transformed the once Eurocentric
world order. The Guinean president serves as a stand-in for West Africa or Black Africa at the
dawn of self rule. He is “brash” like a child and is married to a second wife – it remains
unclear whether he is divorced or practices polygamy. The Touré couple’s move into the palace
rings of farce when the article mentions that there is no phone. Thus, Sékou Touré and Guinea
are simply playacting; Guinea is a child’s dollhouse of a country. The exiting French were at
fault for the lack of modern conveniences, although the article explains, “The Guineans charged
that the departing French were taking everything,” however, the tone questions whether the
accusation was substantiated.

Like Touré, who appears precipitous in leading his people to reject the French
Community, Africa as a whole is childish or unreasonable in its desires. The article states that
Africa is in no mood to be practical, more colonies are hastily pushing for independence, and
Africans are “impatient at having their history written by others.” A break from the colonial
power seems ridiculous and impractical when the article reminds that until Europeans arrived,
Africa was “the continent that could not write,” a case of journalistic prejudice masking
journalistic ignorance.

The one aspect in which the images of de Gaulle and Sékou Touré converge in the TIME
cover stories is in the use of masculinist representations. With his “hulking, outsized (6 ft. 4 in.)
body,” de Gaulle “restored” the country and gave France a new constitution. De Gaulle inspires
the confidence due a soldier and a father. The article on Sékou Touré offers a brief history of
colonialism in the area, during which nineteenth century Europeans began “penetrating the thick
forests of Guinea.” Here, Europe is the male actor, and Guinea is not only female, but
primeval. By the moment of independence, Sékou Touré is “broad-shouldered” and “handsome.”
If not educated and reasonable, he is at least strong, although describing a national leader in this
way is incongruous to the duties he will face in a global economy, and the description offers a subconscious reference to his Mandinka heritage and the residual stereotypes of African slavery in American culture.

Throughout the February cover story, Sékou Touré clearly serves as a metonym for his people in a way that de Gaulle does not. The citizenry of Guinea, so involved in the move toward independence, were obscured, and a reader might think that other than Touré and assorted political figures, the only other people in Guinea were naked dancing women and shrieking griots. At the very least, the masses have no agency. By contrast, the France of de Gaulle teems with the diversity of a complex society; from Communists to protesting students. Because Sékou Touré’s image fills the cover of the issue, but the article speaks more broadly of Guinea and Africa, he becomes a metonym of West Africa – his childishness, virility, impatience, bad political decisions, and primitivism are indicative of the continent and what is to come under self-rule. By contrast, the cover story on de Gaulle is just that – a biography of one great man who is neither a quintessential European nor responsible for the personality of an entire country. In fact, de Gaulle possesses a deep and unique character; Sékou Touré is a mere silhouette.

For American journalists writing in the context of the Cold War and American racism, Sékou Touré and Charles de Gaulle fit easily into the binary logic of primitive and modern, childlike and paternal, communist and non-communist, mystical and intellectual. At times, Houphouët-Boigny was also used as a foil to Sékou Touré, the Ivorian representing the Westernized African who had fought off his initial youthful communist interest, and the Guinean portraying the potential danger of an independent Africa that was possibly communist and definitely authoritarian.
2.4 Coverage in the *Chicago Defender*

The *Chicago Daily Defender*, one of only three national African American daily newspapers, covered the situation in Africa through the lens of the struggle for racial equality in the United States.\(^{198}\) Founded as a weekly publication in 1905 by Robert S. Abbott, the *Defender* became a daily in 1956 under the guidance of Abbott’s nephew John H. Sengstacke who had taken over in 1940. Abbott’s goal in creating the newspaper was to make it “a force to combat the pervasive racism of the era,” and he advocated “fearless militancy in protest against wrongs.”\(^{199}\) Despite the strong early-twentieth-century words of the paper’s founder, by the 1970s, the *Defender* earned criticism from the Black Power Movement for being too accommodating. In his 2016 book *The Defender: How the Legendary Black Newspaper Changed America From the Age of the Pullman Porters to the Age of Obama*, journalist Ethan Michaeli details the work of the *Defender* in the struggle for racial equality and depicts it as a publication whose leaders did not hesitate to promote a political stance in the paper. Although he explains that Sengstacke “never attempted to exercise control over the content of the newspaper, believing in the autonomy of his editors,” Michaeli also mentions that W.E.B. Du Bois and editor Metz Lochard were let go for becoming affiliated with the Henry A. Wallace Progressive presidential campaign in 1948 while the paper – and Sengstacke – announced support of Truman, pinning hopes for positive civil rights action on his presidency.\(^{200}\) Maintaining the paper’s firm, yet not radical political orientation, the “Defender Platform” established by Abbott in 1905, continued to be printed in each edition during the years of decolonization in Africa:

1. “American race prejudice must be destroyed.”
2. The opening up of all trade Unions to blacks as well as whites.
3. Representation in the President’s Cabinet.
4. Engineers, firemen and conductors on all American railroads, and all jobs in government controlled industries.
5. Representation in all departments of police forces over the entire United States.
7. Motormen and conductors on surface, elevated and motor bus lines through America.
8. Federal legislation to abolish lynching.

From the platform, it follows that the Defender’s primary focus would not be foreign news, and despite the exhaustive nature of his book about the newspaper, Michaeli pays little notice to the Defender’s foreign news coverage, showing it to be an outlet concentrated on topics of national importance. Nevertheless, the Defender did take interest in international news and followed the decolonization of Africa while also keeping an eye on Allies like France. The platform stance against racism remains threaded through coverage of the 1958 French Referendum.

Inclusions about Sékou Touré and Charles de Gaulle were many from June 1958 to June 1959, but the Defender largely relied on UPI stories for coverage. The tone of articles written by Defender staff contrasts starkly with that of the copy pulled from the wire. In UPI pieces, Sékou Touré earned many of the monikers already noted in TIME coverage: communist or potential communist, unrealistic, and a known troublemaker. When articles were penned by Defender reporters, editors, and columnists, Sékou Touré’s image shows drastic improvement, and he becomes a hero, optimistic, and a go-getter. What both types of coverage share is a notion that it was Sékou Touré who was responsible for the “no” vote in Guinea. As in some of the TIME coverage, there is no mention of the popular vote or assistance or support from others. One article even states that Sékou Touré had no opposition in Guinea, which was wholly untrue as Diallo and Schmidt have shown. Thus, whether negative or laudatory, the Defender coverage of Sékou Touré utilized his image alone as the definition of Guinean politics, society, and culture.
The internal *Defender* articles were also prone to oversimplification of Sékou Touré’s person and personality. As in the *TIME* coverage, he ceases to be a complex figure, but in the *Defender*, Sékou Touré falls prey to the trope of the noble savage as writers seek to glorify him even as they become mired in what scholars would today call Afro-optimism. Sékou Touré again served as a metonym for black Africa, but in the *Defender* the image was positive.

As in *TIME*, de Gaulle earned more coverage than Sékou Touré during the year under review. When including Africa or Guinea, the coverage focuses specifically on de Gaulle’s return to power and his offer to the colonies with the new constitution. However, coverage of de Gaulle and Africa comprises only about a third of the total amount of de Gaulle inclusions during the year. Even when the question of African independence is involved, de Gaulle is depicted as slightly grandiose, probably the best remedy for France’s troubles, and in possession of reasonable reactions to various situations. Like Sékou Touré, de Gaulle too acts alone. He has written the constitution, it is his constitution, he tours Africa to sell it, he makes decisions, and he reaffirms himself. Unlike the *TIME* coverage that depicts de Gaulle as exceptional, in the *Defender*, de Gaulle represents France. The June 4, 1958 column “Watch on the Potomac” by journalist Robert G. Spivack states, “It was once said of the French general: ‘De Gaulle does not think of himself as a Frenchman. He thinks of himself as France.’” Coverage in the *Defender* upholds this idea.

The first inclusion of Sékou Touré and the possibility of rejection of the referendum vote occurs on August 12, 1958. The article explains that the French have offered its territories two options – integration or secession – and states that many African leaders want neither and favor a system more equivalent to the British Commonwealth. The terms “integration” and “secession” utilized by the *Defender* would have resonated with its readers. Integration was an important
aspect of the Civil Rights Movement, and secession would have called to mind the American Civil War. African independence was often depicted through the lens of the concurrent Civil Rights Movement and was described with terms such as “integration” and “secession” rather than “membership in the French Community” and “independence” as stated by de Gaulle and Sékou Touré. 205

In his August 25, 1958 speech in Conakry, de Gaulle never uses the word “integration” to describe the offer of the new constitution but prefers various versions of “Communauté,” which he uses five times. He also speaks of “l’oeuvre commun” that Guinea and France have accomplished together. Likewise, Sékou Touré’s August 25 speech includes eight uses of “Communauté,” and no use of the word “intégration.” 206 While Sékou Touré includes “sécession” once in his speech, he actually states that Guinea’s desire for independence is not the same as secession. “Nous ne confondons pas non plus la jouissance de ce droit à l’indépendance avec la sécession d’avec la France, à laquelle nous entendons rester liés et collaborer à l’épanouissement de nos richesses communes.” 207 He prefers to speak of independence, a word he uses four times, and decolonization, which he uses twice. De Gaulle never mentions secession, but does utilize independence twice. Interestingly, the Defender coverage does not focus attention on Sékou Touré’s equating colonialism and the offer of French Community with slavery even though in his August 25 speech, he calls three times for emancipation and makes his famous statement, “Nous préférons pauvreté dans la liberté à la richesse dans l’esclavage.” 208

Divergences in Sékou Touré’s image are apparent in the Defender’s reliance on stories that came from UPI as opposed to internally-penned articles. Following the referendum vote, the Defender quickly ran a story from UPI with a Conakry dateline titled “Only Guinea Fails To OK De Gaulle.” 209 Despite earlier Defender inclusions that characterized Sékou Touré as simply
“Premier of French Guinea” who advocated a Commonwealth, once Guinea had actually voted against the constitution, the tone of UPI coverage changed. Previously, Sékou Touré had been in concert with other African leaders, like Senghor, but on September 30, Guinea stood alone, and Sékou Touré was described as “an extreme leftist who was educated in Moscow and Prague.” Although he hoped for continued aid from France, Touré should have heeded “De Gaulle’s warning that any colony that chose freedom would be cut off at the pockets.”

If UPI had become concerned about Sékou Touré’s Marxist tendencies, the Defender reporters had not. Just a week earlier, the Defender proudly announced that Sékou Touré, speaking for his people, would vote “no” on September 28, calling him “a bright new sun … rising on the African horizon.” The article looks forward to the future end of colonialism sparked by Sékou Touré’s decision. “Thus the first blow in the possible break-up of the French colonial empire has been struck. Toure, who is Premier of the Guinean government, is one of the ablest among clever French African leaders.” The article includes a long quotation from Sékou Touré where he states that Guinea will vote “no” to a repubtized French Union, and claims Sékou Touré’s statements “jolted metropolitan France,” still expecting a “yes” vote for the constitution. Although Sékou Touré has drawn the ire of the pro-de Gaulle camp in the French press, which “has charged him with seeking to become a ‘black African Nasser,’” the Defender states, “We cast our vote for Sekou Toure!” Post-independence coverage of Sékou Touré in the Defender remained positive, citing “a new African figure, vocal and resonant” in whom “Africa has a leader of unsurpassable dynamism, courage and aggressiveness.”

The article goes on to praise Sékou Touré and dismiss the charges that he is a communist:

He is a gifted speaker whose oratory and logic are irresistible. When he speaks France and Africa listen. He is a spellbinder of the first magnitude. Only 36 years old, he is
endowed with remarkable organizational talents. A fearless, tireless leader who is not beyond personal sacrifices for the cause in which he believes and for the people whom he loves.

Because he was President of the General Confederation of labor [sic], because he attended the Institute of Economic Studies in Prague, and later visited Moscow and Warsaw, he is called a leftist, a radical, a convinced Marxist. Nkrumah is assailed in the same manner by the British press. In fact, any one who disagrees with the status quo is called a left-winger, or pink or a red. Negro leadership everywhere must expect to be smeared. Toure is a convinced nationalist who prefers liberty than slavery for his people. No power on earth can prevent French Guinea from taking its place among the free nations of the world.214

In order to support Sékou Touré, the Defender had to downplay or even negate his leftist label, as during the Cold War, African Americans had less freedom to espouse a variety of political viewpoints. According to historian Penny Von Eschen, the Cold War put an end to the black radical anticolonialism in the United States. The rhetoric of antiracism and anticolonialism had to be recast in a patriotic frame.215 Yet once the Defender elides Sékou Touré’s leftism, the coverage can more safely allude to a connection between the struggle to end colonialism and the fight for racial equality in the United States, one of the “free nations of the world.” Somewhat in contrast to Von Eschen’s findings, Brenda Gayle Plummer has traced this trend in Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 and argued that the years from 1935 to 1960 constituted a transition in black politics from isolationism to internationalism.216 Considering the coverage of Guinea’s “no” vote, we note both phenomena as the Defender featured news of decolonization in Africa and looked toward African leaders for inspiration, yet made a point of first qualifying leaders like Sékou Touré and Nkrumah as non-communist.

The tone of the representation of Sékou Touré in the Defender deviates from what was running concurrently in TIME in that where the Defender complimented him with the description of aggressive, TIME considered him power hungry. In the Defender, his tirelessness showed self-
sacrifice, but in TIME, it only led him to drive his people too hard. However, if TIME’s coverage weighed on the negative aspects of Sékou Touré’s personality, the Defender fell into what is now called Afro-optimism in its description of both the leader and his country’s future, some statements more accurate than others.

With the Ivory Coast, Guinea “has the most promising future of all the West African territories.”\(^{217}\) This is in part due to a $500 million investment program already in play, which drew from international investors, not just France. “This strong position gives considerable substance to the appeal by Toure to the rest of African to follow Guinea’s example.”\(^{218}\) It seems huge international investment would be a next easy step following independence, although it actually was not. A month earlier, the Defender had warned that African leaders were “realistic enough to know that French Africa would not be able to maintain its independence for long without mortgaging its economic future to some other hungry colonial powers.”\(^{219}\) Nevertheless, Guinea had opted for independence and required a positive spin to be put on the situation. In a complete reversal, the post-independence Defender article stated, “French Guinea is rich in aluminum and other ores, it can sustain itself without mortgaging liberty to greedy, land-hungry colonial powers.”\(^{220}\) Additionally, while the Western white world was “not shouting hallelujah to these spectacular, unwanted developments,” and claimed “Africa is not ready for self-rule; that African economy is primitive and ruinous,” the reply could be, “Africa is an old continent; if its economy is unstable why did it not collapse long ago?”\(^{221}\) While expressing excitement about Guinea’s bauxite deposits, the article failed to recognize that mining and extracting aluminum from bauxite require major industry and energy due to the difficulty of the process.

Both the UPI articles and the Defender’s own coverage served to create and solidify the myth of Sékou Touré for the readership. Here, as in TIME, Sékou Touré acted alone and
instructed his people what to do. Statements like “he said to his people” and France had thought “Toure would vote ‘yes’” show Sékou Touré as the decision-maker, and the entire mass of Guineans as his subjects. With the “no” vote, Sékou Touré was destined to not only be a mythical figure in Guinea, but throughout the world. “Toure’s successful bid for independence for his country, is a major event not alone in modern African history, but in world history as well.”

Nevertheless, despite the Defender’s praise of Sékou Touré, the paper’s coverage relied on colonial language with which to describe Touré, Guineans, and Africans, thereby relegating them to a primitive place even if they were admirable. In this way, the Defender used the trope of the noble savage to define Guinea and Sékou Touré. In several articles, people are referred to as “natives” or “African natives” rather than simply “Africans.” Historian Curtis Keim has explained that terms like “native” are fraught with colonial meaning even when used to denote people actually indigenous to a place. Guineans are also idealized with statements such as, “And, any honest traveller can testify to the courage, honesty and loyalty of the African native.” Thus, when Sékou Touré is described in the following paragraph as a “spellbinder,” it is a short leap to imagine him as some sort of witchdoctor. The difference between TIME and the Defender is that TIME views the traditional nature of Africa, and therefore Sékou Touré as backward, while the Defender imagines some of the same qualities as an idealized form of humanity.

In 1959, UPI articles run in the Defender continued to remind readers of Sékou Touré’s leftist leanings including one written by a stringer in Conakry who had the benefit of a personal interview with the Guinean leader. The Defender published “Guinea’s Chief Bids For United States of Africa” on March 17, 1959 and again on March 28, 1959, showing that the paper placed
importance on the future of Africa. In this article, Sékou Touré calls for independence across Africa and the formation of the United States of Africa as the only way to solve the continent’s complex problems, which remained unnamed in the article. The reporter describes the Guinean president as “a 37-year-old former trade union leader who rose in 10 years to become the head of the world’s newest nation.” If the vague reference to trade union involvement and speedy rise to complete power did not give the reader cause to consider Sékou Touré a possible communist, the comment a few paragraphs later likely would: “The premier, who has attended schools in Moscow and other Communist capitals, led Guinea to independence.” The writer next describes the challenges Guinea must face as it “struggle[s] to build a prosperous nation.” Unlike Ghana, which had been well-prepared by the British, “Guinea must learn from scratch.”

As in the *TIME* article, this one also states that Guineans “charged” that the French took everything when leaving the country after the vote from fountain pens to plans for Conakry’s sewers. Again, the sense is that the allegations have not been proven. Yet here, the people charging France with this offense are called “bitter citizens.” The reporter next details some of the problems facing Guinea, particularly due to the walk-out of more than 3,500 French civil servants, reminding readers that the country had not been prepared for self-rule. “Long lines form at the airport where one Guinean stamps passports – a job once done by three French men. Downtown, three men try to run a government office formerly staffed by 12 Frenchmen.” The country has serious staffing issues – a viewpoint that was also presented in the *TIME* cover story.

In the closing paragraph of the March 1959 *Defender* article, Sékou Touré is permitted to rebut the allegation of communism; he “insisted that the trade links he has forged with Russia and the Communist Eastern European nations could not affect Guinea’s sovereignty, and were made on ‘a basis of liberty and equality.’” While the article’s headline touts Sékou Touré’s
desire for a continental political union of Africa, the content of the article serves to question the benefit of Sékou Touré’s desire to be at the forefront of African nationalist movement, which would lead to that unity.

In April 1959, the *Defender* published an opinion piece “The World Looks At Africa,” which offered Sékou Touré as the sole mouthpiece of the continent. By April 1959, longtime editor Louis Martin had left the *Defender*, interestingly to assist newly independent Nigeria with creating a media infrastructure, and a February 28, 1959 article announced L. Alex Wilson Wilson as the new editor-in-chief.\(^{230}\) Wilson had “gained national and international attention during his coverage of admission of Negro students to Central High school [sic] in Little Rock.”\(^{231}\) Readers may have remembered Wilson – he was the reporter beaten during riots over school integration in Little Rock on Sept. 23, 1957, and his photo appeared in news outlets across the nation the following day. *The New York Times* included a front page article with the headline “President Threatens to Use U.S. Troops, Orders Rioters in Little Rock to Desist; Mob Compels 9 Negroes to Leave School,” which included a photo of Wilson being kicked with the caption “Violence in Little Rock: Alex Wilson, Negro reporter, is kicked at Central High by white man holding brick.”\(^{232}\) Additionally, Wilson had served as a United Nations war correspondent during the Korean War.

Under Wilson’s guidance, the story of decolonization in Africa continued to be told through the lens of the African American experience. Colonialism was about racism, and it “subjugated the black man, altered his cultural pattern, destroyed in many instances his possibilities of development, used his wealth, taken his land, his power and dominated his thoughts.”\(^{233}\) Although the April 1959 article states, “African leaders are as one in their objectives,” it singles out Sékou Touré as the leader of the move toward independence. “To-date
the most forceful spokesman for African nationalism is Sekou Toure, President of the young Republic of Guinea. Youthful (37), very dark, with deep-set brooding eyes and a striking presence, President Toure is one of the major personalities to be reckoned with in the great upsurge which is underway.” Through looking only at Sékou Touré (no other African leaders are mentioned in the article), and claiming that all African leaders were of one mind, the article oversimplifies the range of political situations and opinions of African leaders, and obscures those of African peoples. Even within the French Community, the conflict between Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny concerning federation and confederation shows that leaders were not “of one mind,” and Sékou Touré certainly did not speak for all of them anymore than he did for the continent as a whole. Again, we see the development of the myth of Sékou Touré. Further condensing the continent into a monolith, the writer states:

African leaders are as one in their objectives. They want independence and unity. They are leading a revolution in the name of all, unjustly enslaved and frustrated by centuries of colonization … It is evident that Africa will have to evolve revolutionary principles that are best suited to her conditions and experience. Such principles may be radical, but not necessarily Marxist. First of all there is no class problem. There exists one and same class – that of the dispossessed.234

This op-ed presents a Manichean view of the political, cultural, and socio-economic conditions in Africa in 1959, a counter to the colonialist view of Africa and Africans as divided and burdened by cultural, technological, and political deficits.

While Sékou Touré earned a significant amount of coverage in the Defender during 1958 and 1959, de Gaulle earned more. As the Defender strove to cover struggles around racism and colonialism, de Gaulle remained a person of international interest whose decisions could have important consequences for Africa. Speculation over his return to power and what it could mean for Africa earned a June 2, 1958 article, which worried that “If Gen. Charles de Gaulle, who has been called to power, assumes the ugly role of a dictator, as some observers are
predicting, the French African colonies will see an indefinite postponement of their fervent wish for self-government.” However, the article presents de Gaulle’s post-war progressive ideas toward outdated colonialism as possible indication that “Africa and France may see brighter days.”235 Regardless of what de Gaulle’s assumption of power would mean for Africa, columnist Robert G. Spivack considered de Gaulle’s effects on France. In his June 4, 1958 syndicated “Watch on the Potomac,” which he wrote as the Washington correspondent for The New York Post until 1961 when he was able to independently syndicate it, Spivack depicts de Gaulle as a leader with a “father image.” France had a need for a hero to come to the rescue, and de Gaulle fit the bill. De Gaulle could bring his strength, stubbornness, and steadfastness to alter the character of France into that image as well. Spivack, who later called himself “a strictly old fashioned liberal, not one of these new Leftists”236 reviewed France’s many problems including a history of invasion by Germany, the impending loss of empire and fighting in North Africa, explaining that Frenchmen saw de Gaulle as bringing hope back to France. Thus, France was weak, but de Gaulle was strong. The hope would be for France to become de Gaulle-like, because truly they were one and the same. “It was once said of the French general: De Gaulle does not think of himself as a Frenchman. He thinks of himself as France.”237 It is unclear whether this statement would have reminded readers of the Sun King’s pronouncement, “L’état c’est moi,” but the idea of an all-powerful ruler is implicit in Spivack’s writing.

Spivack continued to write about de Gaulle, dedicating his September 22 column to an examination of the proposed French constitution. Again, he equated the general and the hexagon, writing, “Yet, de Gaulle is the personification of France. Some say if you understand him, you understand France.”238 According to Spivack, during his three months in office, de Gaulle “does seem to have brought more order,” and while the constitution invoked fear because it “places too
much authority in the hands of the chief executive,” the concern was not with de Gaulle’s abuse of power, but “that they provide a springboard for some future French Hitler.”

In column inches in the *Defender* and in actual fact, de Gaulle’s sphere of influence, thus his claim to news coverage, was greater than Sékou Touré’s. During the year from June 1958 through June 1959, de Gaulle earned coverage in about five times as many *Defender* articles as did Sékou Touré, even being included in articles about Africa when Sékou Touré was not. For example, the August 18, 1958, “Rough Going From Africans” detailed the dashing of de Gaulle’s hopes for federation by “the mounting wave of demands for independence” from territorial leaders. The *Defender* continued to follow de Gaulle’s journey toward referendum and covered his Africa tour, including two articles from UPI on August 26: “Fear DeGaulle Losing Bid to Hold Colonies” and “De Gaulle Wins, Loses In Africa.” The articles describe de Gaulle as “looking vigorous,” winning “thunderous ovation,” and receiving the respects of local chiefs while the crowd shouted “‘vive De Gaulle.’” Nevertheless, de Gaulle is said to have failed in rallying support among the local politicians and only “bucking a seemingly irreversible drift toward independence in the African territories.” Reportage two days later comes from Dakar where de Gaulle faced “the roughest reception experienced so far,” as “[t]housands of Senegalese roared ‘De Gaulle, go home’ and ‘we want independence.’” In response, de Gaulle told the crowd to take their independence if they wanted it, but he “warned independence would mean the end of French aid.” De Gaulle’s attitude and countenance display paternalism, he is again a father ready to scold his “roaring” children. A photo included in the same edition shows de Gaulle holding his arms up in a V-shape, possibly for “victory,” although the caption again details the negative aspects of his reception in Dakar.
His success in France notwithstanding, de Gaulle does not win favor when placed in opposition to Africa and African leaders. The Defender took a stern stance against racism and colonialism as similar forms of oppression. Months later, after Guinea’s independence, the Defender criticized de Gaulle for his questioning of the votes cast by the United States in the United Nations – one in favor of Guinea’s seat in the international organization and the other concerning Algeria. When U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles does not challenge de Gaulle’s attitude, the Defender questions Washington’s commitment to “the rewarding principle of self-determination.” While Dulles remains idle, the Defender demands why there should be any question of Guinea’s right to a seat in the U.N.

De Gaulle’s question on this point raises a grave moral issue. Was France half-hearted in its gesture of free choice to the African colonies last September? Is de Gaulle entertaining measures of reprisal against the colonials that chose independence? These are disturbing issues that call for a re-assessment of the political philosophy of [de Gaulle]…

The coverage of de Gaulle in the Defender at a critical time in France and Africa’s history serves to show two sides in conflict with each other. Continually imagining Sékou Touré in positive ways, even when inaccurate, the coverage of this national leader sometimes unintentionally relies on colonial discourse and leans on the image of the noble savage. In contrast, de Gaulle takes on the character of a stern oppressor who loses despite the constitution having been ratified by 82.6% of French voters throughout the Union. Furthermore, in the Defender coverage, de Gaulle’s paternalistic attitude mirrors that of a colonial power.

2.5 Conclusion

The mainstream press, as evidenced by news weekly TIME magazine’s 1958 coverage of Sékou Touré, was eager to show independent Africa’s potential for failure, while coverage in the African American newspaper Chicago Defender sought to imagine a bright future for the
continent, and its coverage of Guinea upheld that ambition. Using the “face-off” between Sékou Touré and Charles de Gaulle to depict a dichotomous relationship between Africa and the West, *TIME* posited Sékou Touré, and thereby Guinea and Africa as a whole, as traditional, childlike, savage, and prone to communism, while de Gaulle represented the values of modernity, paternalism, and Western civilization. By contrast, the *Defender* literally defended Sékou Touré whenever possible, holding him up as a powerful example of Africa’s potential for the near future. The African American press did not fear black rule in Africa, and through the use of terms relevant to U.S. history and the Civil Rights Movement, Sékou Touré’s bravery and bravado towards a former colonial master became a victory for African Americans too. However, the *Defender* writers relied on Afro-optimism and even colonial discourse of the noble savage rather than imagining Sékou Touré as a complex figure with potential weaknesses.

Most noticeable in the *Defender*’s coverage, Sékou Touré was a symbol of freedom: the Guinean president was not actually a Marxist, he benefited from full support of his people, and he represented strength rather than the Draconian rule alluded to in *TIME*. As his opposite, de Gaulle stood for Western imperialism and arrogance. Despite his successes, de Gaulle drew questions about potential constitutional failure, accusations of possible dictatorship, and reprimands of opposing African freedom and progress.

In both *TIME* and *Defender* press coverage, the people of Guinea were obscured, and Sékou Touré represented the country. Despite the fact that the referendum was a popular vote, readers of *TIME* and the *Defender* could have the impression that Sékou Touré was the only person voting in Guinea. The role of the teachers, students, unions, and grassroots activists disappeared as Sékou Touré made decisions for his country. The *Defender* even published an article stating that Africans were all of one mind. While the mainstream press helped reify the
myth of Charles de Gaulle as the savior of France, Sékou Touré was placed in opposition to him. The coverage in *TIME* advanced de Gaulle as a figure not equivalent to his people but different from them, which was what gave him the power to lead. However, in the African American *Defender*, de Gaulle represented France and Frenchman, as well as colonial oppression generally.

As the American public followed the story of independence in Africa, print publications offered competing narratives of the continent’s future. For mainstream outlets like *TIME*, the fear of the failure of self-rule for Africans was expressed in terms of potential for communism and dictatorship, rolled up in a package of traditional values and primitivism. The person of Sékou Touré encapsulated these fears, and *TIME* warned about this “mystical” leader with “old communist friends” who could be the first of many to too-early grasp independence on the “impractical” and “impatient” continent. Useful for highlighting Sékou Touré’s Otherness, the figures of de Gaulle and Houphouët-Boigny represented the height of Western classicism and the good Westernized African respectively. At the same time, Sékou Touré signified Africa’s potential for strength and greatness in African American news outlets such as the *Chicago Daily Defender*. Willing to defy a leader of de Gaulle’s stature, the Guinean president possessed “unsurpassable dynamism, courage and aggressiveness.”\(^{247}\) Although some *Defender* coverage, specifically that gleaned from UPI, mirrored the attitudes of the mainstream *TIME* reportage, when the opinions stemmed from *Defender* reporters, Africa’s future could not be more hopeful with its strong leaders like Sékou Touré, its mineral deposits, its honest “natives,” and burgeoning freedom. Even as the *Defender* succumbed to Afro-optimism, it offered a hopeful narrative of Africa that diverged from what was offered by the mainstream press.

As for the limber, goateed adventurer who in a few dizzy years had skyrocketed from postal clerk to world figure, Tshombe had only a terse epitaph: "The fuss over this evil man will soon die down. The people have no memories here. C'est fini." 248

Within a few years of Ghana’s independence, Ralph Bunche and others had titled 1960 the “Year of Africa,” as nation after nation gained sovereignty. International attention soon turned to the mineral-rich Belgian Congo, which celebrated independence on June 30, 1960. Although Western leaders first found nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba a viable option to unify the country and lead a stable government, after his unplanned independence speech, the country’s first Prime Minister acquired a reputation as “unreliable, anti-Belgian, anti-white, perhaps a communist and probably crazy.” 249 With the swift onset of a post-independence political crisis including a military mutiny and regional secession, Lumumba became a symbol of everything that could and would go wrong in Africa, and his undeniable political experience transmuted into a suspected communist orientation. Following Lumumba’s assassination in January – reported only after it was officially announced by seceding Katanga’s leaders in February – 1961, U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold intensified the organization’s military efforts in the Congo. Earlier unwilling to mobilize U.N. troops in the Congo other than as peacekeepers, Hammarskjold’s staff initiated multiple actions to remove mercenaries and quell the Katanga secession. On his way to Ndola, Rhodesia to meet personally and privately with Katanga’s leader Moise Tshombe to seek an end to the conflict, Hammarskjold died in a plane crash of still unknown cause.

At the time of his assassination, Lumumba symbolized the instability of post-independence African governments and the possibility of chaos if pro-Western leaders did not
take power. Congo was depicted as primitive, tribal, violent, and incapable of self-rule. “Africa was coming into the heads of ordinary citizens. Americans learned what they knew about the continent from Tarzan movies… Good knowledge of experts, such as it was, however, hardly reached decision-makers, who gave no priority to Africa. Eisenhower tiptoed around the independence of Ghana and Guinea in the late 1950s and the State Department took its cues from the Europeans.” Rather than acknowledging issues of racism, colonialism, and economic underdevelopment that lay at the heart of decolonization, U.S. media coverage turned to the simple dichotomies of the Cold War to make Lumumba’s assassination understandable and even acceptable. Imprisoned within a Cold War construct, Lumumba’s image in mainstream U.S. press remained anti-American, radical, and dangerous. A front-page article in the Atlanta Constitution on February 11, 1961, originating from UPI, labeled him “the pro-Communist Lumumba” and stated, “Dead or alive, Lumumba threatened to plunge The Congo into civil war.” Once the “official” story of Lumumba’s death had been delivered by Katanga Interior Minister Godefroid Munongo, TIME magazine reviewed the situation in Congo, reminding readers that Lumumba “dreamed of bossing a united Congo in the grand style of … Nkrumah.” Although he had failed, Lumumba was still the “‘best demagogue around.’” As a result, his assassination was greeted with a sense of relief within many mainstream U.S. media sources. However, examining the treatment of Lumumba’s assassination in a variety of print outlets with a range of political viewpoints – from liberal to socialist to communist – uncovers other reactions to his death and adds depth to his portrayal in the media.

3.1 The Congo in Historical Context

With the world’s second largest rainforest, the Congo was imagined for Europeans by explorers like Henry Morton Stanley whose “environmental racist determinism” has “contributed
to the misrepresentations that have pervaded Western perceptions of Africa from the times of European military conquest up to the present day.” Violence characterized much of the Congo’s early colonial history. Initially the personal territory of King Leopold II of Belgium, the Congo Free State was a “devil’s paradise” scarred by forced labor to harvest wild rubber and ivory. The impact of the rubber trade devastated the area. Between 1880 and 1920, the population decreased by 50%.

Reeling from negative media coverage of Leopold’s Congo Free State by journalist Edmund Morel and the 1904 Casement Report describing the king’s malevolent regime, the embarrassed Belgian government took control of the Congo in 1908. It espoused a policy of “benevolent paternalism” that saw the state, corporations, and the church working together for capitalistic and materialistic ends. The situation did not improve for the Congolese, who continued to live through “one of the most draconian colonial regimes in Africa.” Congo was administered under, to use a British colonial doctrine, a dual mandate to generate profit for Belgium and advance the civilizing mission. Politically, native chiefs were put in place by the colonial administrators who (incorrectly) saw native politics as a story of clashing tribes. Small political units called chefferies (chiefdoms) had reached more than 6,000 by the 1920s when the administrators began merging chefferies into secteurs, while still selecting compliant chiefs to lead these larger units.

The Belgian style of colonialism was highly restrictive when it came to opportunities for the native Congolese. Most primary education and professional training was handled by the Catholic Church, tax imposts were used to mobilize people into the labor force, and internal migration required a passeport de mutation. Unlike the French and British, the Belgians maintained an elite class in the Congo without providing Western education. “Worst of all, the
Congolese elite, carefully groomed and coached by Belgian missionaries and educators, was cut off from the rest of the world thanks to colonial propaganda and censorship. Years later at the time of independence, not a single Congolese had been trained as an administrator, lawyer, judge, or medical doctor. Most economic development in the Belgian Congo took place in mineral-rich Katanga, which boasted 80% of the railroad construction, and by the 1950s, one-third of the white population in Congo lived in that province. Moreover, the administration in Katanga reported directly to Brussels, and private investment was encouraged.

After the First World War, a growing number of Congolese began moving to cities where they engaged with Western cultural and political institutions, and a middle class developed. With an eye on developments in the neighboring French Congo, évolués started to ask for more involvement in the government. The onset of the Second World War brought the reinstatement of forced labor, which had been abolished in the 1930s. Congo’s economic and material contributions proved critical for the Allies. During the war, Congo’s first African newspaper *La Voix du Congolais* was established as an intellectual Congolese elite developed. Following the war, ethnically based cultural institutions and groups arose in order to maintain traditional ties within multi-ethnic urban environments. Together with alumni associations (future national leaders Kasavubu and Lumumba each belonged to one) and *cercles d’études et d’agrément pour évolués* (Lumumba led one), these organizations provided prototypes for future political parties. “Nationalist ideas were not a part of Congolese political life until relatively late, and when they did appear they were immediately elided with ethnic sentiments and interests.”

The first proposed plan of independence for Congo included a gradual emancipation after thirty years during which an educated African elite would be created, and independence would consist of a *confédération belgo-congolaise*. Évolués declined this offer, although other
Congolese agreed in part. Ethnic organizations easily mutated into political parties, and the demand for true independence was raised. Some parties remained ethnically based, such as Joseph Kasavubu’s ABAKO, whose membership came from the Bakongo ethnic group, speakers of Kikongo language. However, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) sought to unify across ethnic identity groups. MNC became the party of Lumumba who traveled to Accra, Ghana in December 1958 for the All-Africa People’s Conference and returned with a powerful speech demanding independence as a right. During 1959, Belgium agreed to hold representative elections by universal suffrage and to grant independence “without haste.” At the January 1960 Independence Roundtable in Brussels, the date for independence of the Congo was set for June 30, 1960. Since no single political party had the majority, Lumumba and Kasavubu formed an uneasy alliance and created a coalition government with Kasavubu as President and Lumumba as Prime Minister.

A metonym for African primitivism since Joseph Conrad portrayed it as the “heart of darkness” in 1899, the Belgian Congo on the eve of independence “for many Western observers … symbolized the inherent inability of Africans to rule themselves.” At the independence ceremony on June 30, 1960, Lumumba made a speech that inflamed Western listeners and rallied the Congolese. The events that soon followed – mutiny of the Force Publique on July 5, military interference from the Belgian Council of Ministers on July 9, port attacks by Belgian naval forces on July 11, and the secession of Katanga the same day – imparted to the world an image of a government not in control of the country. President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba dismissed each other on September 5, and by September 14, Joseph Désiré Mobutu, at that time acting as leader of the Force Publique, with the encouragement of the CIA, announced a military coup and created another national government. Mobutu put Lumumba under house arrest for his
own safety. Lumumba left his residence, or “escaped,” on November 27 and was captured by Mobutu’s troops a few days later. Initially, Lumumba was kept at Camp Hardy in Thysville, but when his movement showed no sign of giving up, those in power sought a different solution to the problem of Lumumba. On January 17, 1961, Lumumba was transferred with Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito to Elizabethville, the capital of secessionist Katanga and home of his enemy Tshombe. Today it is known that the three men were assassinated that evening. In 1961, the world only knew that Lumumba had been taken to Katanga, which was considered a highly dangerous move by those holding Lumumba. On February 10 came an announcement that the three prisoners had escaped, and three days later Tshombe’s minister of the interior Munongo announced that they had been killed by villagers during their flight. He said that “the bodies had been identified and secretly buried, and that the name of the tribe responsible would not be revealed for fear of Lumumbist reprisals.”

Political scientist Kevin C. Dunn has shown that the crisis in 1960 was rooted in conflicts over Congolese identity and who had the authority to create or define it. This identity construction had “direct material consequences.” In the United States, The New York Times and other newspapers and magazines gave front-page coverage to the crisis. They did not report definite news of Lumumba’s death until February, and when they did, they repeated the official story. U.S. government reactions conformed to Kennedy’s expression of “shock” – even French press reported “le président Kennedy se déclarait profondément choqué.” Although questions were raised at the time about the accuracy of reporting on Lumumba’s death, there was not much doubt then that it was an internal affair – more evidence that the Congolese could not handle self-government.
When considering the Congo, the U.S. government and media drew on colonial imagery, updated by Cold War discourses, according to Dunn. The result was direct intervention by Washington to “stabilize” the Congo, showing that discourse has the power to shape the possibility of action. And yet, the narrative of Cold War intervention did not exhaust the stories circulating around the Congo. Some outlets reported Lumumba’s ouster and subsequent death as a conspiracy while others merely questioned Katanga’s escape story, raising an eyebrow, but not pointing a finger. For the most part, mainstream media coverage quickly moved from concern over Lumumba’s death to framing the Congo crisis in the binary structure of the Cold War and assessing its impact on the balance of power in the East-West clash.

3.2 Cold War in Africa

Cold War scholars including Michael Clough have noted the strong influence the Cold War agenda had on policy-making toward Africa, stating that because the East-West conflict was most important, the U.S. commitment to democracy and development often took a backseat. This meant that after WWII, the U.S. foreign policy agenda was more concerned with stabilizing Western Europe as a safeguard against Soviet influence than it was with decolonization. In fact, American policy makers feared that immediate decolonization could lead to chaos and an opening for Soviet influence. However, once African independence began, the State Department founded its first Bureau of African Affairs in 1958. Although the Kennedy administration wooed African peoples and leaders, this increased interest in the continent was still part of the overarching concern with Cold War rivalry. “American interest in Africa peaked during the Kennedy era. Although cloaked in the rhetoric of liberal internationalism (and reinforced by a genuine desire to help fledgling African states), John Kennedy’s eagerness to become involved in the continent’s affairs was driven by the same geopolitical concerns voiced by Nixon, his rival
in the 1960s presidential election.” Kennedy’s Africa policy meant augmented aid, which went from $110 million in 1958 to $519 million by 1962. Nonetheless, the entire continent still gained only a small percentage of total US overseas aid, just 8% in 1962. Clough sees a waxing and waning of US interest and aid to Africa in line with American perception of the global communist threat. By 1965, a notion that newly independent African nations retained stronger ties to their former colonizers than to the Soviets led to decreased assistance.

Historian Peter A. Dumbuya has tracked a more drastic U.S. response to the spread of communism in Africa during the Cold War and explains that, the United States often overreacted to potential Soviet influence, by the backing of racist regimes and corrupt dictatorships that shared Washington’s anti-communist worldview. As the United States gave up the Monroe Doctrine in favor of the Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Secretary of State John Foster Dulles claimed that development would halt communist infiltration, and “aid was meant to promote sound economic development as an important factor contributing to democratic political evolution.” This justified U.S. intervention in African affairs, even as aid and trade remained low. “From the outset, the United States and its NATO allies overestimated Communist interests in order to strengthen their influence throughout Africa during the decolonization period.”

Abdul Karim Bangura found that U.S. aid to West African countries has followed U.S. economic, moral, and political objectives on the continent, and U.S. policy has been influenced by “fear of radical nationalism in Africa” or the “Congo syndrome.” Subject to U.S. Cold War objectives and fears, it has been uneven and inconsistent, especially in supporting real, long-term development.

Turning from a Cold-War lens on U.S.-Africa relations, historian George White Jr. has highlighted racist underpinnings to U.S. policy toward Africa. While the East-West divide no
doubt affected American actions, it was racism that drove policy decisions and caused the United States to shy away from commitments to African development. “The Cold War provided the perfect environment for the preservation of whiteness. The Eisenhower administration’s objective was to hold the line during the tumultuous transformation of the 1950s so that the global stream of benefits and burdens would not change.”\textsuperscript{269} Part of the reason for the racism in African policy was that the administration saw foreign relations through the lens of the Civil Rights upheaval at home. In \textit{The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena}, Thomas Borstelmann has similarly shown how U.S. foreign policy decisions were made within the context of the balancing act of pleasing or at least not offending actors ranging from African dignitaries to Southern Dixiecrats.\textsuperscript{270} However, for White, the decision about whose interests mattered most was clear: the normalcy and superiority of whiteness was upheld unilaterally. According to foreign policy makers, the “only plausible explanations for African radicalism” of the type that could lead to a character like Patrice Lumumba were “Black incompetence, insatiability, and blind hatred of Whites, fed by Communist propaganda.”\textsuperscript{271}

3.3 \textbf{Who Was Patrice Lumumba?}

The coming of independence in Africa in 1960, coincided with the deterioration of relations between the United States and Cuba, and “the revolution in Cuba and the dangerous Castro were the lens through which American decision-makers viewed the Congo.”\textsuperscript{272} They imagined Lumumba as a budding Castro. Recalling that Castro had initially denied communism, Americans saw his shifting stance as founded on a lie and assumed Lumumba would follow the same path. Labeling him as fast-talking, militant, and communist ignored his complex ideas, for Lumumba, like many other Third World leaders, preferred nonalignment. He called his policy “positive neutralism.”\textsuperscript{273} In fact, as Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick have shown in their
new book *Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba*, “the record shows little to mark him as a revolutionary,” despite the presence of some Marxist advisors.

American policymakers parenthetically but recurrently noted not the communism of Lumumba but his unreliability. He was a man whom they could buy but who would not stay bought … The State Department’s intelligence division emphasized that nothing substantiated the allegation of Lumumba’s communism or communist sympathies, and noted his own description of himself as an African nationalist.274

According to Gerard and Kuklick, the most accurate description of Lumumba was that of a State Department official who called him an unscrupulous opportunist who was loyal to neither East nor West, and at the same time, likely the most capable and vibrant politician in the Congo. However, within the CIA, Lumumba’s reputation suffered from much more derogatory characterizations. Allen Dulles saw Lumumba as anti-Western, which in the 1960s was akin to being communist. The CIA’s man in Congo, Larry Devlin, argued that if Lumumba remained in power, it would prove a Soviet victory, and result in a domino effect, influencing surrounding countries, destabilizing northwest Africa, and eventually causing Italy and Greece to go over to the East.275 “Basing their projections on an interpretation of Cold War events, Dulles, Devlin … accepted a scenario of ‘chaos to communism.’ This set of beliefs generalized about how the USSR manipulated unstable personalities and political situations to make a successful revolution.”276

Even before independence, the Congo exhibited a level of chaos that worried the Eisenhower administration into action. Thus Lumumba’s death was not met with disappointment by the U.S. government. In fact, the CIA had already plotted to kill him. From the moment of his independence speech, Lumumba had been seen in the West as a precarious firebrand. Denying Lumumba access to global discursive space enabled Americans to see intervention in the Congo reasonable and even necessary. Following Lumumba’s independence speech, no international
publication published an interview with him. He was silenced outside his country, opening up possibilities for U.S. policy toward the Congo. Still, the eyes of Americans and other peoples around the world were on the Congo. As Lumumba stated in a final letter to one of his wives, “our poor people whose independence has been turned into a cage, with people looking at us from outside the bars, sometimes with charitable compassion, sometimes with glee and delight.”

Events unfolding in the Congo yielded sensational headlines. After independence, the Force Publique, Congo’s army, was a remnant of colonial rule still led by Belgian officers and commanded by Belgian General Emile Janssens. The Force Publique mutinied on July 5, 1969, and Lumumba attempted to quell unrest in the army with a promise of Africanization and raises. Stories of disaffected soldiers attacking fleeing Belgian civilians and raping Belgian women circulated, leading Belgium to send troops to Elizabethville at the request of its regional leader Moise Tshombe. “Over the next week the Belgians intervened in more than twenty places. As they did so, Lumumba and Kasavubu desperately cast about for a way to replace the Belgians.”

When Lumumba visited the United States and Canada in July 1960, he was told by both governments that assistance from them would be funneled through the United Nations, but the organization proved unhelpful. U.N. neutrality led to Lumumba’s fateful decision in late August 1960 to accept military transport from the Soviet Union in order to get his troops to areas under rebellion. Examining new sources, Gerard and Kuklick show that various international parties encouraged Kasavubu to dismiss Lumumba, which he did on September 5. “The Belgians advised Kasa-Vubu about what they considered a coup d’état, but Kasa-Vubu used the UN to carry it out.” These details are new, but even as early as 1968 Conor Cruise O’Brien, a U.N.
special representative in Congo’s Katanga region during the crisis, had stated, “Whether or not U.N. officials played a part in the shaping of Kasavubu’s coup, there is no doubt that they did what they could to make the coup a success.” When Lumumba dismissed Kasavubu in turn, a stalemate ensued until chief of staff Joseph Mobutu declared on September 14 that he was neutralizing both of them as well as parliament. Mobutu’s “coup” resulted in “the definitive ouster of Lumumba, the suppression of the Parliament – in which Lumumba still had a majority – and the expulsion of the Russian and Czech diplomatic missions.” At each stage, the U.N. “officially” remained neutral:

> The United Nations protected him [Lumumba] for a time, “at his residence” – i.e. as long as he kept out of politics. When he left his residence, and was apprehended by those who later handed him over to his murderers, the United Nations could have intervened to save him, but in fact washed it hands of him. “As Mr. Lumumba had left on his own responsibility, orders were served to U.N. troops to refrain from any interference in regard to Mr. Lumumba’s movements or those of his official pursuers.”

According to O’Brien,

> Hammarskjöld’s policy towards Katanga, culminating in his decision to bypass the Prime Minister of the Congo in order to negotiate direct on 12 August 1960 with the President of a seceding province of that country, and the use made of this in secessionist propaganda were the factors that provoked Lumumba in his fatal step of calling for Russian aid, in order to transport his troops to Katanga.

O’Brien references international relations scholar Catherine Hoskyns, who worked with anonymous sources, and reports that at the news of Lumumba’s capture Ghanaian U.N. troops had asked to rescue him, but their proposal was refused.

> After his imprisonment and assassination, Lumumba’s image in the Congo, Africa, and many other parts of the world, became martyr-like. Literary evidence of this could be seen as early as 1968 in O’Brien’s play “Murderous Angels” and continues in the present day. Haitian filmmaker Raoul Peck has twice visited the subject of Lumumba’s downfall, first with the 1990
documentary “Lumumba: La mort du prophète” and then with the 2000 feature “Lumumba.” Peck’s documentary title makes his position clear. In his biopic, viewers meet a sanitized version of the leader, which avoids complexities such as Lumumba’s summer 1960 visit to Washington, D.C., which earned ire from Belgians when Lumumba slept in the same bed that the King Baudouin had used, and Canada, when he met with the Soviet as well as Canadian officials. Further, Peck depicts Lumumba in romantic terms as a family man, but as writer Ludo de Witte explains in The Assassination of Lumumba, his final letter may have been intended for his fourth wife Pauline Opango or his third wife Pauline Kie, who visited him during his imprisonment in Thysville. In fact, the letter begins, “Ma compagne chérie,” rather than “Ma femme Pauline.” He was something of a ladies man, according to Gerard and Kuklick. Peck’s desire – or need – to portray Lumumba as more prophet than politician, illuminates the position Lumumba still occupies. “The name and fate of Patrice Lumumba have really reached the minds and hearts of millions of Africans… For those who loved him, followed him and mourned him, Lumumba represented the rejection of slavery.”

3.4 Lumumba’s Ghost

Following the announcement of Lumumba’s murder – confirmation of what most assumed would or already had happened – on February 13, 1961, protests broke out around the world. “Some Western commentators, pointing to Lumumba’s leftist links, denounced the demonstrators as communist-inspired.” Focusing specifically on the “riots” at the U.N., James Meriwether has reviewed mixed reactions to the protests in the African American press, finding, “Not surprisingly, black Americans themselves differed in their views of the protests at the UN. Indeed, black responses to the U.N. demonstrations further demarcated the widening rifts within black America over the scope and meaning of the domestic freedom struggle, as well as over the
relevancy of Africa.” This spectrum ranged from conservative voices stressing their Americanism – for example, Atlanta’s Daily World’s calling the demonstrations “nothing short of ‘a disgraceful spectacle which will not help the cause of our race,’” coupled with a warning “not to be duped by communists” – to more militant voices, such as columnist James Hicks writing that the actions at the United Nations were justified and whose “stance received ringing endorsement from readers of the Amsterdam News.”

The divide was real:

Even as organizations like the NAACP recognized the importance of African independence movements and the broader struggle against white supremacy … many of these liberal activists remained wary of black nationalism, leftism, and militancy. They worried about possible negative fallout from the actions of the demonstrators, and distanced themselves from the events at the UN.

According to Penny Von Eschen, this attitude aligns with the centrist position the NAACP espoused as a survival mechanism during the 1950s. Closing her narrative in 1957, just at the moment of Ghanaian independence, she shows that Cold War pressures put an end to the heyday of black anticolonial politics of the 1940s. In the Cold War context, the rhetoric of antiracism and anticolonialism had to flow from an explicitly patriotic standpoint. In Meriwether’s telling, while the NAACP’s Roy Wilkins “emphasized the shock and horror caused by the murder of Lumumba,” he also “attempted to isolate the UN protests from mainstream black Americans.”

Conservative gradualists saw first and foremost communism and racialist nationalism and thus rejected Lumumba. Liberal, pragmatic activists embraced a free contemporary Africa yet struggled to balance the desire to support and promote an independent black Africa with wariness about Lumumba. An increasingly militant segment of black America found in Lumumba a black nationalist hero who had worked unwaveringly to save his country from Western economic exploitation, neocolonialism, and dismemberment – a view that reflected the rising tide of domestic militancy and interest in broader pan-African ties, which in coming years would seep more deeply into both cultural and political realms.
Historian Brenda Gayle Plummer paints an even more complex picture by including a broad variety of sources, asserting that “black America” was always diverse and comprised many voices. When Africans and African Americans threw eggs at the Belgian embassy after news of Lumumba’s assassination went public, Wilkins could claim that the (global) protests did not represent the “American Negro.” However, despite denials, “black opposition to the handling of the Congo crisis remained widespread.”

Mainstream newspapers and magazines picked up news of Lumumba’s death and the resulting protests, seeking to “minimize the growing restlessness and militancy in black America and the relationship of these sentiments to events in Africa.” Following Lumumba’s death, *Newsweek* conducted interviews and “blithely concluded, ‘Responsible Negros want no part of the “black nationalism” movements that have proliferated in the Negro community in recent years.’” But Meriwether notes that James Baldwin “eloquently expressed the fallacy of Newsweek’s position” in a *New York Times Magazine* article in March 1961, illustrating the fact that mainstream press sometimes presented multiple and dissident viewpoints.

Although *Death in the Congo* offers a well-rounded picture of Lumumba and the other actors in this *danse macabre*, Gerard and Kuklick conclude that “contingency, confusion, duplication of labor, and bungling” rather than simple conspiracy, shaped his fate. Many scholars and artists have expressed outrage at what happened to Lumumba. In his seminal work on Lumumba’s death, Ludo de Witte describes an interview with Belgians who were involved in one way or another: “Not one of these Belgians, in positions where they could have influenced the course of events, expressed a single word of regret for the three nationalists, not a single word.”
A director in the U.N.’s Division of Political and Security Council Affairs during most of 1961, Conor Cruise O’Brien first wrote *To Katanga and Back*, published in 1962, before he was moved by Catherine Hoskyns’ 1965 *The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-1961*, to consider the role of the U.N. in the Congo and Lumumba’s death in a new way through the medium of theater. “The germ of *Murderous Angels* is the conception that Hammarskjöld, for exalted and convincing reasons, and in the service of humanity deliberately brings about the downfall and refrains from preventing the death of Patrice Lumumba, which in its turn precipitates his own downfall and death.”

Even after the death of Lumumba, the Congo crisis continued to rage. Given the Congo’s mineral wealth, Washington determined its interests would be served by taking a lead in the country’s affairs.

### 3.5 The Congo Crisis in Print

This chapter focuses on editorial commentary on of the meaning and ramifications of Lumumba’s imprisonment and assassination in print publications across a wide political spectrum. Beginning with the establishment and moving to the left, I show how policy and opinion journalism on Lumumba illuminates the story of the Congo and its importance in the Cold War 1960s. As previous scholars have shown, the Eisenhower administration, diplomats, and intelligence agents in Congo were hostile towards Lumumba. They saw him at the time and later in their memoirs as uncontrollable. From Lumumba as an individual to the Congo as a place – that it was a sovereign nation was up in the air – we will see that Lumumba was easily discredited within some media sources to the extent that his death was regarded with indifference or even relief. When Lumumba earned posthumous column inches, he often served as a metonym for the Congo: unpredictable, incomprehensible, defiant, a Soviet pawn, and a potential ally of Nasser and Nkrumah. It is the Congo’s need for outside assistance that makes Lumumba a
liability, because he does not accept Western direction and seems open to other troubling relationships.

While the newly inaugurated President Kennedy, claimed to be “shocked” by Lumumba’s death, the voices of American policy makers were not raised in his defense. The ghastly episode became an opportunity to bash the Soviets as well as justify U.S. intervention in Africa and elsewhere. But if Lumumba served as a Cold War punching bag for some, how did coverage and commentary differ in publications espousing liberal and leftist politics?

To set the gauge for comparison, I begin with Foreign Affairs. Filled with lengthy articles each month, the journal tackled the global topics of the day. Readers included government officials, opinion makers, experts, journalists, writers, reporters, and academics, who appreciated its in-depth coverage of events and issues almost before they happened. Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong selected the future of the United Nations as a critical question to be examined in the April 1961 issue. He used the “crisis precipitated by the death of Patrice Lumumba” as the starting point to question the U.N.’s survivability if the Soviet Union could not check its desire to control the organization.

Touted as a publication of liberal America – President Kennedy was photographed holding a copy – The New Republic opened its February 27, 1961 issue with a hopeful article “Reprieve in the Congo?” A three-page opening to “The Week,” the views contained in the article can be attributed to the editorial staff, led by editors Gilbert A. Harrison and Helen Fuller. Its optimism was characteristic of a liberalism that believed it had “the best and the brightest” on its side and could lead the world as well as the United States.

To the left of liberalism, there were stirrings in ideas and activism that had not been seen since the mid-1940s. These stirrings were evident in both the badly shaken “old left” and the
youthful “new left.” In March 1961, editors of the independent socialist magazine *Monthly Review* questioned President Kennedy’s “New Labels for Old Products” in their “Review of the Month.” Concerning foreign affairs, editors Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy determined that while “the new administration has most insistently proclaimed its intention to adopt new policies” regarding the Congo and Laos, there was nothing “new” to be found.

The Communist Party’s *Political Affairs* magazine also took notice of events. It refused to accept the official version of “The Murder of Lumumba” in the March 1961 “Notes of the Month.” Perhaps surprisingly, under editors Herbert Aptheker and Hyman Lumer, *Political Affairs* removed the Congo from the Cold War binary and reported that the conflict in the Congo was “no struggle between rival factions, hostile tribes or ‘pro-Communist’ and ‘anti-Communist’ leaders.”

These media outlets encompass a diversity of political orientations from elite to liberal to radical. Their editorial angles may align with the official lines of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations or veer to condemnations of the United States and the United Nations. Given the polarization around U.S. foreign policy later in the decade, it is instructive to trace the widening of the spectrum years earlier.

### 3.6 *Foreign Affairs*

Editor for fifty years by the time of his retirement in 1972, Hamilton Fish Armstrong helped make *Foreign Affairs*, published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “the most influential magazine for the analysis and debate of foreign policy and economics.” Armstrong was twenty-nine years old when he joined Harvard professor Archibald Cary Coolidge to co-found the journal in 1922. He had already graduated from Princeton, served in World War I, and taken a position at the *New York Evening Post* as well as developed the internationalist stance for
which he would become known. His managing editorship at *Foreign Affairs* came in tandem with the executive directorship of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was told by Walter T. Mallory who succeeded him at CFR, “‘[T]he Council has been your creation.’”306 Considering his roles at both the Council and the magazine – the most famous article in *Foreign Affairs* enunciated the anti-Soviet strategy of containment – Armstrong must be recognized for his great influence over U.S. foreign policy.307 A lifetime of travel and access to the world’s political leaders gave him insight and judgment. For example, he proffered a timely warning of the consequences of the rise of Hitler in his 1933 book *Hitler's Reich: The First Phase*.

Born in New York in 1893, Armstrong lived his entire life in the same house and grew up in a “circumscribed world of ordered privilege whose affluent, well-travelled, and sophisticated men and women traced their lineage back to the Founding Fathers and their principles to the American Revolution.”308 Upon Armstrong’s death, President Nixon commented that he had been a “valuable source of counsel for several generations of American leaders.”309 The bolstering of the journal and the Council were his life’s work.310 According to historian William L. Langer, “Under his stewardship the magazine attained a world reputation and an influence out of proportion to its circulation.”311 In 1923, *Foreign Affairs’* circulation was 3,700, and in 1973, it was 70,000 copies, relatively small when compared to a mainstream publication like *TIME* that reported a worldwide circulation of 3,000,000 in March 1960.312 However, *Foreign Affairs* reached “centers of policy making and scholarship in every corner of the world.”313 Some of this influence – gained hand-in-hand with the Council – developed through “numerous study sessions and discussion groups” that “served the purpose of helping to hammer out an elite consensus on foreign policy.”314 These meetings helped fashion initiatives like the Marshall Plan and NATO.
Established in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations is a “noncommercial, nonpolitical organization.” However, Marxist historian Laurence H. Shoup has claimed that the Council was created to influence the U.S. government and “controls foreign policy on behalf of the ‘capitalist class.’” The organization’s history came about from blending leading New York lawyers, bankers, and “other men of affairs” with the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, which had been founded by experts from the Paris Peace Conference, so that the Council became a fusion of the academic and business worlds. “From the beginning the emphasis was on the influential rather than simple mass appeal,” and the Council’s disclaimer that it did not “represent any consensus of beliefs” was true in Foreign Affairs’ editorial policy, which included articles from a range of contributors holding a variety of beliefs and political orientations. However, “in practice the organization attracted and represented primarily those elite Americans who had supported American intervention in the First World War and strongly believed that the United States should have been more involved in world affairs after 1920.”

Armstrong had claimed that it was the magazine’s policy to include different points of view so that Americans could “form their own ideas, trusting that native common sense will gradually develop good foreign policy.” At the same time, certain principles informed his entire career, “and through it the policy of Foreign Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations.” His position could be described as modified Wilsonianism with a “concern for national security and a readiness to use force when necessary, as does his involvement in the Council’s assistance in developing the policies under which the United States pledged itself to resist the spread of Soviet influence in Europe immediately after the Second World War.”

Having been present at the 1945 San Francisco Conference that finalized the details of the United Nations Organization, thanks to a part-time, non-salaried position with the Secretary
of State, and serving on the bipartisan American delegation, Armstrong took upon himself the task of analyzing the condition of the organization’s viability in a 1961 essay in his magazine, “UN on Trial.” 

Responding to a remark from the closing of the previous December’s General Assembly that “The United Nations is done for,” Armstrong uses Soviet reactions to Lumumba’s death to illuminate some of the problems within the United Nations, most of which seem to stem from Khrushchev’s aggressive behavior as well as non-aligned nations’ naïveté. Here, the importance of Lumumba’s assassination is how it fits into the Cold War between the U.S.-led and Soviet-led worlds. The first malign demonstration of the Soviets was inside the United Nations:

the manner in which the Soviet block and fellow-travelling states exploited the crisis precipitated by the death of Patrice Lumumba. They pounced on the killing to attack ferociously and with preposterous untruth the United Nations itself, its operations in the Congo, the office and person of the Secretary-General and all countries which recognized the government of President Kasavubu.

Outside the United Nations, the Communists then masterminded the demonstrations that took place worldwide in protest of Lumumba’s assassination: “To add intimidation to calumny they organized attacks on foreign embassies (including in some instances those of the United States) in capitals where no public act can be spontaneous and the only demonstrations possible are those approved by the government itself.”

According to Armstrong, the United Nations is under attack by the Soviets who are using Lumumba’s murder as a means to accuse the organization and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld of wrongdoing, which he claims to be erroneous. The Communists are also using the event to lure support from “a considerable group of African and Asian states” in hopes of demonstrating to “the American public that the United Nations had become helpless and useless and that continued membership was a waste of effort and money.” In fact, Moscow had attacked
Hammarskjold on February 4, 1961, branding him “an accomplice and organizer of Mr. Lumumba’s murder,” some nine days before his actual death was announced by Munongo.

Throughout the essay, Lumumba’s death is viewed only in light of how it might affect East-West relations and the balance of power in the United Nations. “The murder of Patrice Lumumba gave the Soviets the opportunity they wished to bring the two forces into head-on collision in conditions which they hoped would not be favorable to the West.”

Armstrong had previously grappled with solutions to the balance of power within the United Nations. In his 1947 book *The Calculated Risk*, he supported the Marshall Plan,

but also called for the modification of the United Nations charter to allow nations which so desired to sign a separate protocol under which they bound themselves to come to the aid of any nation attacked in contravention of any international treaty. This provision was intended to circumvent the veto power on any United Nations action which its Charter gave to all five permanent Security Council members, including the Soviet Union.

The adhesion of many newly independent countries to the United Nations of course complicated power relations in the Security Council as well as the General Assembly. In the 1961 *Foreign Affairs* essay, Armstrong’s fear is leftist tendencies in, and the general weakness and pliancy of, non-aligned nations. At the same time, the Soviet foothold in Africa most likely will not last:

although the Soviets currently exercise great influence with certain ambitious African leaders, they must foresee difficulties … Aid programs and anti-colonist oratory will not be enough to satisfy them once they being vying in earnest for supremacy … Soviet encouragement of the Pan-African movement has been profitable … but there are differences within the movement which orators on the theme of “the African personality” skim over lightly. Already these differences … reveal the outlines of serious future disputes.

As the Soviets work to procure allies among the Afro-Asian states, Armstrong recognizes that the United States has “found itself included in some general mistrust because it has
maintained links with its wartime allies in defense organizations against Communist aggression.” Acknowledging that several NATO countries continue to possess colonies, he explains the dilemma of the United States between weakening its alliances by favoring independence or damaging the confidence of the “African peoples” by maintaining its alliances. Typically, the U.S. government has chosen to “straddle the issue, without remarkable success.” A case in point, is the U.N.’s recent Declaration for an immediate end to colonialism, which found the United States torn between an “innocuous” proposition and the prospect of “more Congos” – the Congo representing the chaos that could ensue from precipitous independence. In the vote, the United States elected to abstain.

Seeking to exonerate the policy of the U.N. towards the Congo, Armstrong reminds his readers that when the special emergency session of the General Assembly was called to consider the Congo crisis, “the Secretary-General received a vote of 70 to 0 in support of the policy he had been following in the Congo.” Yet just two months later, Hammarskjold’s actions had fallen out of favor based on “growing African fear that Belgium was seeking to regain control of the Congo and that U.N. operations were favoring this result.” However, Armstrong justifies the presence of thousands of Belgian advisors and technicians in the Congo “because only they could keep necessary public services running.” He declines to consider why that might be the case and does not review old colonial policy that left newly independent Congo virtually without a professional class. Hammarskjold, Armstrong states, was required to “show strict neutrality as between Congolese politicians and factions,” but many African states had come to feel that “what they had favored in principle worked in practice against ex-Premier Lumumba, who had more and more become a symbol in their eyes of extreme nationalism and, in distinction to President Kasavubu, of resistance to the former colonial power.”
In December 1960, two resolutions had been introduced regarding U.N. action in the Congo. One from India, which was backed by the Soviet Union, called for the release of “former Premier Lumumba” and neutralization of Colonel Mobutu’s forces. The second, introduced by the United States and Britain, called on President Kasavubu to summon a roundtable of Congolese leaders to work towards reconvening Parliament. Both resolutions failed. By referring to Lumumba as “ex-Premier” and “former Premier” and Kasavubu as “President,” it is clear that Armstrong recognizes the authority of Kasavubu’s government and found his dismissal of Lumumba to be legitimate. Further, whatever its level of success, the U.N. mission in Congo remained vital because increased “anarchy in the Congo” would lead to the “Soviet Union as the ultimate beneficiary.”

Again, the Congo’s sole importance is as a Cold War proxy, and “the killing of Patrice Lumumba” merely a “signal for the Soviet Union to withdraw its ‘recognition’ of Secretary-General Hammarskjold and label him an assassin.” By a February 21 vote, the Soviet resolution to oust Hammarskjold was defeated, and the U.N. Security Council agreed to “take appropriate measures to prevent civil war in the Congo, including ‘the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.’” The United Nations could ask for “immediate withdrawal ‘of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and advisers not under the United Nations command, and mercenaries.’” Armstrong’s emphasizes Soviet opposition to Hammarskjold – “the Soviets had been so outraged by his impartiality in the Congo crisis that they had promised to destroy both him and his office” – so that one might think Moscow would be responsible for his death fewer than six months later.

Closing the essay, Armstrong returns to his concern about the allegiance of newly independent nations: “we should be able to put ourselves on the side of independence more clearly than we have done so far.” In fact, he advises extending goodwill beyond the General
Assembly by making personal friendships with diplomatic representatives from these countries: “many delegates who find themselves in strange surroundings will be as grateful for friendship and guidance as they will resent being ignored, particularly if they have reasons to imagine that this may be because of their color.” The benefit of forming alliances with non-aligned countries was diplomatic. After all, the United States and the Soviet Union already have the power to destroy each other; “what matters is [a neutralist nation’s] political weight in the world forum where its vote counts equally with the vote of any of the larger powers.”

*Foreign Affairs* did not dedicate an essay to Lumumba or to the Congo in 1961. Instead Lumumba was folded into the larger Cold War between Moscow and Washington, a struggle that played out continuously within the United Nations and where the “hearts and minds” of “unaligned” African and Asian nations were up for grabs. The problem for Armstrong was the “tendency of some newer African and Asian states in the General Assembly to be ‘neutral on the side of the Soviets.’” Thus, Armstrong used Soviet reactions to Lumumba’s death to display their irascible nature and to make recommendations about how the United States might make gains in a changing General Assembly. He did not recognize that Cold War skirmishes in the United Nations could become full-scale battles in the Third World.

### 3.7 The New Republic

At the time of the Congo crisis, *The New Republic* was under the control of editor and publisher Gilbert A. Harrison and managing editor Helen M. Fuller. Harrison served a long term at the magazine, from 1953 to 1974, and during his tenure, the publication was “a strong voice on behalf of the civil rights movement.” Following initial support of the Vietnam War, the publication opposed it and criticized Johnson and Nixon. Harrison’s personal history included supporting inter-religious cooperation at the University Religious Conference, where he met
Eleanor Roosevelt who invited him to chair the youth division of the Office of Civilian Defense. He served in the Army Air Forces in the Second World War and then co-founded and chaired the liberal American Veterans Committee. With his wife, an heiress and descendant of Cyrus McCormick, he purchased The New Republic.

Harrison “published an intellectual, liberal but non-doctrinaire journal of opinions, politics and arts” that, according to reporter Walter Pincus, was a must-read for the liberal left while Harrison was at the helm. “[T]he magazine … was considered for most of the 20th century as the leading liberal political magazine in the nation.” Attesting to the magazine’s influence is the story that the morning after Harrison published an editorial calling for a Democratic Party challenge to President Johnson, Minnesota Sen. Eugene McCarthy appeared on Harrison’s doorstep, “with the New Republic under his arm and a light in his eye.” Working on the editorial team with Harrison, Helen Fuller was trained in law and had served as a special attorney with the Justice Department and as director of the National Youth Administration before joining the New Republic in 1941. Fuller began as Washington editor and political science director until she was named managing editor in 1952. Ten years later, Fuller left the magazine to write full time and soon published Year of Trial: Kennedy’s Crucial Decisions, a review of the president’s leadership. As we have seen, the magazine’s liberal credentials were confirmed by the fact that “the dashing, young President Kennedy had been photographed boarding Air Force One holding a copy.”

This liberalism was longstanding. Founded in 1914, and backed by banker Willard and wife Dorothy Straight, The New Republic’s initial progressive orientation benefited from its first editor Herbert Croly who had already written a “landmark book of progressive reform ideology, The Promise of American Life.” Croly advocated a democracy that would become “a force for
national organization and achievement rather than timidity and drift. Similarly, in foreign affairs the United States must break the shell of isolationism and assume a positive and responsible place among the nations. The *New Republic* was dedicated to these high purposes.\textsuperscript{347}

In its early years, the political and social bent of the magazine remained slightly on the left, and it enjoyed a friendly rivalry for readers with *The Nation*. Son of Willard and Dorothy, Michael Whitney Straight took over as publisher and brought in Henry A. Wallace as editor in 1946, aiming to double circulation, albeit not in a cost-effective manner. Wallace departed two years later to run his presidential campaign, and the magazine endorsed his opponent Harry Truman. With the onset of the Cold War, *The New Republic* espoused a more mainstream American liberalism that was still present when the Congo crisis occurred. A new hardheadedness “coincided with liberalism’s turn in that very same direction. In those years after the war” *New Republic* writers “dispensed with all the old utopian fantasies about radically remaking society … the United States faced real enemies in the world … *The New Republic* insisted on drawing fine distinctions that were actually quite important, the sort of nuance that was dismissed as mealymouthed by progressives further to the left.”\textsuperscript{348}

According to Franklin Foer, a recent editor of *The New Republic*, “This is the combination of styles – passionate but realistic, hardheaded but permissive of idealistic daydreams – that makes *New Republic* liberalism so confounding to both left and right. It is a style that through all the changes in ownership, has never faded.”\textsuperscript{349} Liberalism of the *New Republic* sort, he says, “quibbles with capitalism and our constitutional system – views them as imperfect and in need of constant improvement – but it has ultimate faith in both.”\textsuperscript{350}

Just prior to the official announcement of Lumumba’s death, *The New Republic* considered his imprisonment in the February 6, 1961 “From Jail to Power.”\textsuperscript{351} The article finds
fault with “President Kasavubu” who removed Lumumba from power because that action only
gave Lumumba the mystique of martyrdom. By exonerating him from any responsibility,
Kasavubu assured Lumumba’s “symbolic position” as a “rallying point for militant nationalists
all over Africa.” According to this article, clearly, it is Kasavubu alone who is at fault; there is
no mention of supporting forces or foreign interlopers in the Congo. While Lumumba here earns
none of his oft-cited labels – leftist, Marxist, pro-Communist, radical – his portrait is not
flattering, for he sits “quietly in his prison cell watching his legend grow” without having to
commit himself to any course of action.

More troubling than Lumumba’s image in the rhetoric of the article is the accompanying
political cartoon, which depicts two African-looking men in suits staring hungrily into a very
large pot, one holding a big knife and the other a fork. The pot contains boiling liquid, and on the
Relying on the colonial trope of cannibalism, one that was particularly associated with the
Congo, the cartoon implies that a “native” could don a suit, but would still practice cannibalism,
whether in actual fact or for political reasons. This implication of political cannibalism is
fulfilled two issues later when the article “Lumumba’s Murder” looks briefly at the “political
assassination” within “this most troubled of African nations.” Bad news for Lumumba, it
seems, who is described as “a very human African national whose association with the Soviet
Union was pragmatic rather than ideological” (it is unclear what the writer means by “human,”
possibly a more polite way to call him “civilized”) but worse news for those who are left to deal
with his successor Antoine Gizenga who is “a far shrewder and more disciplined politician” and
whose “association with the Soviet Union is basically ideological.” Nevertheless, if the United
States can perform “some very expert footwork in the UN,” civil war and an East-West clash in Congo may yet be avoided.  

A third, this time more substantial, feature appeared the following week. As with the previous articles on Lumumba and the Congo, the February 27, 1961 “Reprieve in the Congo?” was included in the regular section “The Week.” However, in this case, the Congo piece led the section. The tone of “Reprieve” is positive, proffering the idea that Lumumba’s murder has brought hope despite “pro-Lumumba riots in the halls of the UN by American ‘Black Moslems,’ the violent demonstrations in Lumumba’s memory all around the world, Katanga President Moishe [sic] Tshombe’s gloating, champagne-sipping interview.” This hope can be seen in the United Nations.  

From Ceylon and Liberia to Nkrumah’s Ghana, each of the U.N. proposals under consideration concerning Congo now “directly contravenes Soviet UN Delegate Zorin’s demand for withdrawal of the United Nations force from the Congo in one month.” Each proposal also supports a stronger UN stance and reorganization of Congolese forces into a “unified non-political force” under UN auspices. None demands the ouster of Kasavubu. The reactions to Lumumba’s death also show that African leaders are not necessarily pro-Soviet. In fact “it is the Soviets who have been aligning themselves with the more militant Africans — not the other way around.” Kennedy’s statement that the Big Powers did not require protection from the United Nations, but “it is the small countries who have gained in stature and security as a result of its existence” appears to have had a positive effect, according to the article’s author.  

As the writer rejoices over this apparent U.S. triumph in the United Nations (the Armstrong article in Foreign Affairs provides a more uncertain assessment of the balance of power), a sense of acquiescence to U.S./U.N. strategies pervades the description of agreement from various Africans, both militant and particularist, and the Conciliation Committee. Now that
just about everyone has realized the Soviet plan to remove U.N. troops and let the Congolese
work out their own political solutions would be a terrible idea, The New Republic advises the
United States to recognize its own culpability: “it is an open secret that the American Embassy in
Leopoldville played an operational role in the consolidation of the Kasavubu regime that went
somewhat beyond the normal limits of diplomacy.” Washington must also prepare for tensions
with some NATO allies – “painful as it may be, we are going to have to fish or cut bait – and
publicly – about Belgian irresponsibility to the whole Western cause in the Congo.” The
overarching message for liberal readers of The New Republic is that Lumumba’s death has
opened a real opportunity for the United States, via the United Nations, to aid Congo, secure
allies there and possibly elsewhere in Africa, and thwart the Soviets at the same time: “The
Kennedy Administration knows that the only hope of rescuing the Congo from the brink of
further disaster is by removing it from East-West competition and forging an Afro-Asian
consensus to protect it.”

3.8 Monthly Review

If Wallace’s departure from The New Republic to run for President felt like a defection,
the election loss of the Progressive Party candidate moved radical friends Leo Huberman and
Paul M. Sweezy to found the independent Marxist journal, Monthly Review. Like-minded
individuals from different backgrounds, Huberman and Sweezy, were offered backing by F.O.
Matthiessen, a friend of Sweezy’s who was a Harvard professor of American Literature and had
recently come into an unexpected inheritance. The inaugural issue of Monthly Review, published
May 1949, launched with an essay from Albert Einstein titled “Why Socialism?” Since that time
– the Monthly Review still appears every month – contributors have included intellectual radicals,
such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Loraine Hansberry, Cornel West, Jean-Paul Sartre, Fidel Castro, and the economist Joan Robinson.

Unaffiliated and non-sectarian, the editors’ central goal with the *Monthly Review* was “‘the critical appraisal of the capitalist order in the light of reason,’” the important point being that the publication “stood in fundamental opposition to the whole of the capitalist order – economic, cultural, ideological, political, and social.” According to the manifesto “Where We Stand,” which was included in the May 1949 issue and reprinted in the first issue of every subsequent year,

> there are still many Americans who believe with us that, in the long run, socialism will prove to be the only solution to the increasingly serious economic and social problems that face the United States. It is because we hold firmly to this belief that we are founding MONTHLY REVIEW, an independent magazine devoted to analyzing, from a socialist point of view, the most significant trends in domestic and foreign affairs.

After the initial grant from Matthiessen ran out, the Monthly Review Associates was established in 1951, made up of subscribers who were also contributors, keeping the publication, which did not accept advertising, afloat.

From 450 copies of its first issue, the magazine had reached a circulation of 6,000 in 1954, “where it remained until the early 1960s.” In fact, the magazine “thrived in the atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s,” serving “to provide an arc of continuity between the disintegration of the old left and the emergence of a new one.” A 1957 readers’ poll revealed that most *Monthly Review* subscribers had higher-than-average incomes, 72% were college graduates, and 42% had attended graduate school, meaning that, unfortunately, the editors had not achieved their goal of reaching a broadly working-class readership.

Called “the nation’s leading Marxist intellectual and publisher during the cold war” by *The New York Times*, Paul Sweezy developed his radicalism as a “response to the Great
Depression” and wanted the government to do more to “offset what he considered capitalism’s failings.” Born April 10, 1910 to a father who was vice president of First National Bank of New York, Sweezy earned his bachelor’s degree and doctorate from Harvard, having also studied at London School of Economics. During the Second World War, he served as an officer in the Office of Strategic Services (the pre-cursor to the CIA) and returned to Harvard as an instructor, but left when he was passed over for a tenure track position in favor of a non-Marxist scholar. It was thanks to an inheritance from his banker father that he was able to become a full-time writer and editor. During the McCarthy era, Sweezy was tried on a charge concerning the content of a guest lecture he had given at University of New Hampshire. His appeal went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, where his conviction was overturned on technical grounds.

Sweezy’s co-editor Leo Huberman was an “accomplished labor educator, journalist and writer of best-selling histories of economic development and labor struggles.” He was born in Newark, New Jersey on October 17, 1903 to parents he called “working intellectuals who became middle class.” Even before co-founding Monthly Review, he had written Man’s Worldly Goods: The Story of the Wealth of Nations, a book that sold a half-million copies and uses history to explain economics and vice versa. Unlike Sweezy, Huberman attended public schools, worked during his vacations, and completed a two-year teacher’s diploma, then taught as he took afternoon classes at New York University. In this way, his socialism had experiential roots compared to Sweezy’s largely intellectual commitment. After earning his bachelor’s degree, Huberman taught at a progressive school in Greenwich Village. He wrote We the People, a history of the United States from the perspective of the working people and then went to London to research what would become Man’s Worldly Goods. Huberman published several books on economics and history, served as labor editor of the left-wing New York newspaper
PM, and worked in union schools during his off time, even creating a maritime library program. “Interestingly, the only self-congratulatory quote in [his] brief autobiography relates to the achievement he most valued in a remarkable career: worker’s education.” Huberman also drew the ire of the McCarthy Committee and appeared in front of it as a hostile witness. During the last years of his life, he “probed and challenged the ongoing tragedy of white supremacy in the United States.”

Sweezy and Huberman received editorial assistance from Paul A. Baran, “probably the only publicly declared Marxist then teaching in an American department of economics” until 1965. He wrote *The Political Economy of Growth*, “which explained the enormous discrepancy between rich and poor nations as the result of the imperialist structure of the world economy.” He also co-wrote *Monopoly Capital* with Sweezy, which was greeted with rave reviews from the *New York Review of Books* to *The Nation*. “For the New Left that emerged at this time it became one of the fundamental texts.”

Although *Monthly Review* pushed for socialist solutions at home, the editors also “saw the cold war and the construction of the US ‘security state’ as the most formidable threat to global survival” and asserted that “democratic promise rested in an interracial and international coalition of peoples breaking free of empire at home and (as it became more and more apparent) in distant parts.” During the Cold War era, Sweezy and Huberman “traveled widely, meeting with writers and militants” and gave the Third World increased attention. When journalist I.F. Stone wrote a book about the Korean War, but could not find a publisher, the *Monthly Review* Press was created and has “become one of the leading publishers of radical books in the world,” including books “critical of American foreign policy and unable to find a mainstream outlet.”
The press has published works by Che Guevara, Kwame Nkrumah, Louis Althusser, Amilcar Cabral, and many other notable authors. With decolonization unfolding throughout the world, the editors “focused more and more upon empire as the key mode of global development and its hardest-hit victims as the most likely prospects for challenging the system.” *Monthly Review* included “World Events” in each issue. Radical scholar and advocate of the simple life Scott Nearing wrote the column until the early 1970s. In the March 1961 issue, he wrote “As the Belgians Continue to Return--” describing how Patrice Lumumba was driven “out of the Congo premiership” while “a certain reticence was maintained in the West regarding Belgium’s position in the Congo.”

Nearing explains that a four-part strategy was used to create and exploit the crisis in the Congo: denouncing Lumumba as a Communist to inspire fears of a Soviet base in the Congo turned a majority of U.N. member states against him; staging a coup in Katanga; organizing a military rule in Leopoldville “headed by strong man Mobutu”; and isolating Lumumba from his Congolese followers. “All of these objectives were achieved under the watchful eyes of the United Nations police forces.” The result was the re-entry of Belgians into the Congo, a development also discussed, albeit in a more positive manner, by Armstrong in *Foreign Affairs*. Nearing describes the events of 1960-1961:

> These political maneuvers provided sensational headlines for stories from the Congo. Behind the scenes Belgian, British, and the United States interests moved swiftly to violate their promises of Congolese independence and to re-establish their threatened privileges, first in mineral-rich Katanga and eventually in the entire Congo … Reoccupation of the Congo by Belgian personnel constitutes an authentic counter-revolution.

Nearing depicts Lumumba as a legitimate leader of the Congo who has been ousted by foreign interventionists. He angrily denounces the recolonization of the Congo and blames the
U.S. government as one of the culprits. His summary of the situation represents a complete shift from the point of view taken by *Foreign Affairs*, which depicts the United States working through the United Nations in the best interest of the Congo, or the *New Republic*, which urges foreign intervention to save the Congo from civil war and worse.

In the same issue, the “Review of the Month” section looks at President Kennedy’s foreign policies just a few weeks after taking office. The title “New Labels for Old Products” gives away what the editors think about them. According to one of *Monthly Review*’s recent editors, Robert W. McChesney, “‘Review of the Month’ is the most important feature of the magazine.”³⁸⁶ By 1961, this section, which had begun as a “series of short commentaries,” focused on a single subject, and was written by both editors.³⁸⁷ The editors explained in 1956, “We try in every case to tackle problems fresh and as a whole … Drafts then have to be exchanged between the editors by mail, and we often submit them to one or more persons in whose judgment and knowledge of the particular subject we have special confidence.”³⁸⁸

Focusing specifically on the Congo and Laos, countries where the editors assert “the new administration has most insistently proclaimed its intention to adopt new policies - no doubt because it was in these areas that the old policies were most obviously failing,” the March 1961 “Review of the Month” demonstrates the desire among some in the West to keep the Congo “weak, divided, and permanently exploitable.”³⁸⁹ The article closes with the date February 12, 1961, the day before Lumumba’s death was announced, and the topic of his murder is not addressed. However, he and his followers are represented as cogent as well as legitimate voices in the Congo: a federalized government “would be the greatest victory for the colonists and their stooges, the greatest defeat for the forces of progress in the Congo.” The “forces of progress” are explained in the next sentence: “There is not the slightest chance that the Lumumbists will fall
into this clumsy trap, or that Lumumba’s partisans abroad, whether in Ghana or Guinea or the Soviet Union, will accept anything less than real independence and unity for the new Congo Republic.\textsuperscript{390} The \textit{Monthly Review} editors do not shy away from aligning Lumumba’s movement with African radicals and even the Soviets and raising the stakes of anticolonialism. The U.S. government under Eisenhower and now Kennedy, is ignorant at best, culpable at worst:

It is not impossible that Kennedy and his advisors have only confused ideas about why recent policies in Laos and the Congo have been failing so ignominiously … Eisenhower’s foreign policy failed not only in the sense of exacerbating rather than contributing to the settlement of crises … it also failed in the sense that time and again it put the United States in the worst possible light in the eyes of the world.\textsuperscript{391}

Nevertheless, if the Kennedy administration cannot help solve problems, it will at least make American policies “appear attractive” by blaming their failure on the “bad faith and evil intentions of the other side,” which encompasses the Soviets and Armstrong’s “unaligned” nations that refuse to side with the West in the UN General Assembly:

the Kennedy administration has neither the understanding nor the will to shape a foreign policy designed to settle the great crises of our time and thus to end the cold war; instead it will devote its talents and energies to shaping a foreign policy which will attract the support of the uncommitted and wavering nations and peoples of the world and in this fashion help to win the cold war.\textsuperscript{392}

3.9 \textit{Political Affairs}

The While \textit{Monthly Review} editor Sweezy has been described as the leading twentieth-century American Marxist intellectual, \textit{Political Affairs} editor Herbert Aptheker earned the title “the most dangerous Communist in the United States” from FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. “A Theoretical and Political Magazine of Scientific Socialism,” \textit{Political Affairs} was the monthly
publication of the U.S. Communist Party (CPUSA), and successor to *The Communist* since 1944.\(^{393}\)

The editor of *Political Affairs* from 1953 to 1963, Aptheker was a “prolific Marxist historian” whose long career focused on black history. He was a “dominant voice on the American left in the 1950s and 1960s” and, like the *Monthly Review* editors, appeared in front of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.\(^{394}\) “Through his scholarly work … and in editing *Political Affairs*, he carved out a niche for himself in the party as an intellectual.”\(^{395}\) A longtime friend, Aptheker served as W.E.B. Du Bois’s literary executor and oversaw the publication of his correspondence and collected writings.

Aptheker was born in Brooklyn on July 31, 1915 to Jewish immigrant parents from Russia. In 1932, Aptheker drove to Alabama with his father, witnessing the Jim Crow South for the first time. It was this event that he credited with the birth of his anti-racism. He returned to the region as an educational worker for the Food and Tobacco Workers Union and served on the Abolish Peonage Committee, which campaigned against sharecropping.\(^{396}\) Aptheker earned a doctorate in history from Columbia University in 1943 with a dissertation, later published as a book, entitled *American Negro Slave Revolts*. He joined the Communist Party in 1939, having been introduced by his wife Fay who had already become a member.\(^{397}\) Aptheker served in the U.S. Army during the Second World War. An academic and prolific writer, he was unable to secure a university teaching position until 1969 due to his political affiliation.\(^{398}\)

During the McCarthy era, *Political Affairs* struggled to expand its readership due to “blackballing of the magazine by news outlets, above all in New York City, which limited circulation of the magazine … to relatively few people, mostly party members.” The party was hit hard by Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in 1956, and many members left. As Aptheker
worked to reach new audiences through a broader range of writers, CPUSA Chairman Gus Hall was displeased. “By the early 1960s Hall’s tolerance of Aptheker’s editorship had reached its limits: he rejected the inclusion of contributions from nonparty leftists and decided to remove Aptheker from the magazine,” explaining that although “Aptheker projects the correct Party line in the monthly publication of “Political Affairs,” he never consults the Party leadership.”

Following Aptheker’s dismissal, Hall appointed Hyman Lumer as editor; he had served as associate editor under Aptheker. Earlier a biology professor at Fenn College and Western Reserve University, Lumer had served as the National Education Secretary of the Communist Party; he also served an 18-month prison sentence. In 1958, he had been convicted of “conspiring to file false non-Communist affidavits under the Taft-Hartley law.” In 1965, still the editor of Political Affairs, Lumer would publish the pamphlet, “What are we doing in the Congo?,” a synopsis of U.S. intervention throughout the crisis. Both Aptheker and Lumer were on staff at Political Affairs when Lumumba was jailed and assassinated.

In its March 1961 edition, Political Affairs offers a scathing critique of the management of events in Congo that had led to the death of Lumumba. Referencing Frantz Fanon, the article contends that the recent “brutal murders” of Lumumba, Mpolo, and Okito represented an effort of “dying colonialism to prolong its parasitic existence.” Not surprisingly given the contrasting political orientations of the two publications, this version of the Congo crisis is the polar opposite of the Foreign Affairs essay, which named the Soviet Union as causing trouble in the United Nations as Hammarskjold and his supporters worked to quell the native unrest. In “The Murder of Lumumba,” located in the regular section “Notes of the Month,” the Political Affairs editors make three main points: Lumumba was the Congo’s legitimate leader as chosen by the Congolese people; imperialists are the “real assassins”; and the United States plans to
replace the Belgians to gain access to Congo’s resources. Focusing on the external causes of the crisis rather than reducing it to an African problem removes the notion of chaos and incapacity that obscure the dynamics of the situation in the Congo. The editors clarify that the colonialists are “reaping the whirlwind” of their actions – specifically assassination of certain Congolese leaders in Lumumba’s movement – and “chaos and confusion in the Congo have multiplied,” but in *Political Affairs*, the madness and brutality flow from Western imperialism rather than African nationalism.

“It was Lumumba, as the recognized leader of the Congolese people and the symbol of their inspirations, who blocked the path of the imperialists and their tools, and for that he was killed,” the article explains. None who opposed him can claim to speak for the Congolese people – Tshombe is an “undisguised puppet of the Belgians” and the “pro-imperialist roles of President Kasavubu and his hatchet-man General Mobutu are scarcely less evident.”404 Although Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba, his action was illegal, and this “usurpation of power was followed by the equally illegal arrest of Lumumba.”405 On the next point, *Political Affairs* and *The New Republic* agree. “Lumumba only grew all the more in stature” when he was imprisoned. Yet for *Political Affairs*, Lumumba’s martyr status that took him from jail to power led to the “desperate decision to do away with him.”406 The editors give no credence to the idea that Lumumba was killed while escaping; he was intentionally and deliberately murdered.

The details of Lumumba’s death are “shrouded in mystery and the Tshombe gang in Katanga has belligerently announced that it intends to keep them that way.” However, the conflict in the Congo “is no struggle between rival factions, hostile tribes or ‘pro-Communist’ and ‘anti-Communist’ leaders.” Instead, “whoever may have wielded the actual murder weapons,” the assassins were “Belgian colonists and their accomplices” striving to deprive the
Congo of true independence. Further, Lumumba’s murder, Kasavubu and Mobutu’s ascendancy, Tshombe’s secession, and the Belgian reentry – “the whole outrageous business” – were all made possible by “the disgraceful role of the UN forces in the Congo ... under Dag Hammarskjold” who insisted on following a policy of neutrality even though Lumumba had asked for help. In lieu of aiding Lumumba’s government or even consulting with him, Hammarskjold “countenanced and supported the illegal actions of Kasavubu and Mobutu” and has allowed Tshombe to defy the United Nations by building an army of mercenaries. And the organization persisted in its course “despite repeated protests in the UN by Lumumba, as well as by the Soviet Union and other countries.” These protests are likely some of the vociferous outbursts by Khrushchev that had so offended *Foreign Affairs* editor Armstrong.

Finally, *Political Affairs* enlightens readers about the true objective of the United Nations’ unjust decisions. While the editors’ disdain for Hammarskjold is apparent, they admit that he “has not acted on his own, but as the faithful servant of the imperialist powers in the UN – above all the dominant power, U.S. imperialism.” The Congo crisis is a conflict created by neo-colonialist forces and projects. The United States intends to “restore imperialist control in the name of the UN, in order to replace Belgium as the dominant power in the Congo.” The editors state that this is the reason Washington has recognized Kasavubu’s government and allowed his seating in the United Nations, although Gizenga “alone represents the true interests of the people.” Kennedy and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson insist on “retention of the UN troops in the Congo, on the basis of the same false ‘neutrality’ as before” because what is really at stake in the Congo is profitable access to the nation’s strategic mineral resources.
As a solution, *Political Affairs* supports the proposals of the Soviet Union, which would be to remove Hammarskjöld, back Gizenga, drive out the Belgians and mercenaries, and disarm Kasavubu and Tshombe. In direct opposition to the assessment of *Foreign Affairs*, these editors state, “The United States and its supporters in the UN self-righteously charge the Soviet Union with seeking the UN’s destruction. But it is those who have acted to convert it into an instrument of imperialism who are wrecking it as an instrument for world peace.”

Aptheker, a scholar of black history, continuously confronted racism and racist histories and was ideally suited to consider Congo’s right to independence in fact, not just in name. His obituary in *The Guardian* noted his challenge of U.B. Phillips’ early-twentieth-century racist history, in which blacks were portrayed as “passive, inferior people whose African origins were devoid of civilisation.” Aptheker countered with an image of Southern history defined by “the drive of the rulers to maintain themselves in power, and the struggle against this by the oppressed and exploited.” He likely saw the same factors at work in the struggles over colonial domination and national liberation in Africa.

### 3.10 Conclusion

Conflict continued in Congo after Lumumba’s death. As Kasavubu reconvened the government, with Cyrille Adoula as prime minister, U.N. troops moved to take control of Katanga and expel its mercenary army. In September 1961, Hammarskjöld was on his way to meet Tshombe in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia when his plane crashed in suspicious circumstances. Secession in Katanga – and fighting – continued until 1963. Rivalries for power also persisted, and the “internal situation in the Congo generally remained unsettled.” In 1964, President Kasavubu welcomed Tshombe into the government, and Tshombe released hundreds of political prisoners, including Gizenga, in hopes of reconciliation. However, rebels throughout the country
continued to strike. The dwindling U.N. forces left the Congo in mid-1964, at which time Mobutu claimed that his army was “capable of maintaining order.” In 1965, Mobutu staged another coup, deposed Kasavubu, and assumed the presidency. Although he initially stated that he would hold the presidency for five years, Mobutu led the country, which he later renamed Zaire, for more than thirty.

The political machinations that enabled Mobutu’s ascendency did not occur without the involvement of foreign powers. Historian Piero Gleijeses has shown how even Cold War events cannot be reduced to East-West conflicts. In the case of the Congo, the United States, Cuba, Tanzania, South Africa, Rhodesia, and Egypt played parts in the ongoing crisis. Nevertheless, U.S. print media coverage of the Congo crisis and death of Lumumba often offered a reductionist account of actors and events. By examining a range of media providing coverage of the same situation, a more nuanced story begins to emerge.

Some publications, including The New Republic, relied on colonial tropes to connect readers to events taking shape in the Congo. From the political cartoon reimagining cannibals in suits to the idea that the Congo needed assistance from the West. The New Republic seemed to suggest that the liberal notion of modern progress could be exported at least partially to Africa. For Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Lumumba and the Congo crisis were Cold War conflicts that could best be resolved on the battlefield of the U.N. General Assembly floor. The United States needed to gain support from Afro-Asian nations in order to ensure that the balance of voting power would be on the side of the West rather than the Soviets. Some of Armstrong’s assumptions and estimates appeared in The New Republic as well, as the editors were encouraged by various proposals that promised to counter Soviet plans. Neither of these
publications recognized Lumumba as the Congo’s legitimate leader, or mourned his dismissal, detention, and death.

By contrast, for the editors of both *Monthly Review* and *Political Affairs*, Lumumba was the rightful leader of the Congo as chosen by the Congolese people. His overthrow was illegal, and his murder was an assassination. Rather than casting blame on the Soviets – who were depicted by *Foreign Affairs* and *The New Republic* as trying to stir up trouble – the left-wing editors pointed to the United Nations. While *Monthly Review* discussed the British, U.S., and Belgian forces working behind the scenes of the United Nations activities in Congo, *Political Affairs* more boldly stated that U.S. imperialists were the culprits and were preparing to replace the former colonial power with a new brand of neo-imperialism.

While the three other publications largely considered the Congo through the lens of the Cold War, *Political Affairs* surprisingly offered the only view that removed the Congo crisis from the Cold War binary and positioned it as a neocolonial maneuver driven by the United States. For Aptheker and Lumer, events in the Congo must be viewed in the harsh light of imperialism and racism. Adding this voice to the Congo story problematizes the justification for U.S. intervention in the Congo, the ultimate result of which was to solidify Mobutu’s power for decades to come. In the United States during the 1960s, disregarding the Cold War would have been viewed as picking the wrong side. Already known for choosing communism, for which they each paid a price, the *Public Affairs* editors offered a bold as well as critical story of decolonization in Africa, even if only to their small readership. If American Communists could think outside their own box in the early 1960s, an even wider spectrum of voices on West Africa would emerge in the years to follow.
Africa’s most populous nation faced the challenges created by the arbitrary borders and ethnic divisions that had been exacerbated during colonialism when the January 15, 1966 military coup in Nigeria led to the execution of the Northern Hausa Prime Minister and the installation in his place of southeastern Igbo General Johnson Aguiyi-Irons. A counter-coup on July 29 the same year resulted in the coming to power of Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon. Although Gowon provided an opportunity for compromise because he was both a Northerner and a Christian, killings of Igbo residents in the North followed the contested inauguration of his leadership. Ten months later, on May 30, 1967, the Eastern Region under the military government of Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu seceded, declaring the independent state of Biafra. Nigeria fell into a civil war, which did not end until January 1970.

The conflict was closely followed by U.S. media. Mainstream media outlets like *TIME* provided ample coverage of the crisis, and more importantly for Biafra, photo inclusions. During 1967, thirteen weekly issues of *TIME* featured inclusions about Nigeria, and following Ojukwu’s charge of genocide during an Address to the joint meeting of the Consultative Assembly and the Council of Chiefs and Elders on January 27, 1968, images of starving Biafrans, mostly children, upped the coverage to seventeen weeks for the year, including a cover featuring Ojukwu. How to locate the war was uncertain. “Nigeria” was the location in the title in most articles, even when Biafra was the subject. For example, “Nigeria: Agony in Biafra” and “Nigeria: Biafra’s
Two Wars” were titles in August 1968. Seventeen weeks of *TIME* included the Biafra-Nigeria war again in 1969, and by that year, “Biafra” earned the dateline more than Nigeria.

While coverage of the Nigeria-Biafra War earned significant placement in mainstream press, including television, the conflict seemed to secure more interest from the American public than it did from the U.S. government. This was due in part to sympathy raised by the widespread images of the starving children that later came to represent “Africa,” so starkly, for example during the famine-relief efforts of Band Aid’s “(Feed the World) Do They Know It’s Christmas?” and USA for Africa “We Are the World” campaigns during the mid-1980s. While international agencies like Joint Church Aid and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as the American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive (ACKBA) at home sprang to the aid of Biafrans, donating funds and supplies for the relief effort, the U.S. government under both the Johnson and Nixon administrations refused to use its diplomatic influence to promote a peace settlement or become involved militarily. As Nixon commented, there was a difference between responding to a humanitarian crisis and getting involved in other nations’ politics. The United States was willing to do the former, but not the latter. Nevertheless, American organizations quickly emerged in support of the relief effort for Biafrans, which became an international affair. Journalist Philip Gourevitch has credited news coverage of Biafra with the birth of humanitarian aid. “Suddenly, Biafra’s hunger was one of the defining stories of the age – the graphic suffering of innocents made an inescapable appeal to conscience – and the humanitarian-aid business as we know it today came into being.”

Many studies have looked at British and international press coverage of the conflict, for example Adepitan Bamisaiye’s 1974 article “The Nigerian Civil War in the International Press” in *Transition*. By contrast, American media coverage has received little scholarly or critical
attention.\textsuperscript{424} Although the U.S. government declined military support of either side, the conflict shows how government policy and press coverage converged and diverged. Whether referred to as the Nigeria-Biafra War or the Nigerian Civil War, the conflict earned significant attention in U.S. print media and often served as a lens through which various publications sought to promote specific ideas on economic development, neo-imperialism, and the United Nations. And while Washington eventually got on board with the relief effort, the U.S. government did not take a political position on the war. In effect, it supported Nigeria and its British backers, a position that, despite efforts by politically minded organizations like ACKBA, typified much American press coverage.

Where U.S. print media coverage of Guinea’s independence and the Congo crisis had often singled out leaders as expressions of the Zeitgeist and representative of the will of their nation and people, the story of war in Nigeria was told less through the personalities of leaders and took people as the main subjects. “Biafrans” – starving, modern, educated, and righteous – conflicted with “Nigerians” – represented mainly by the Federal Military Government (FMG). While the FMG’s Gowon and Biafra’s Ojukwu continuously earned column inches, the Biafran famine secured more. And if the diplomatic solution remained unclear, the humanitarian need was unquestionable.

In order to analyze this rift between the humanitarian and the political concerning the Nigeria-Biafra War, articles in two publications will be considered – the quarterly political and diplomatic journal \textit{Foreign Affairs} and the weekly magazine offering a “mix of reporting and commentary,” \textit{The New Yorker}.\textsuperscript{425} Both provided lengthy pieces on “the trouble with Nigeria.”\textsuperscript{426} While \textit{Foreign Affairs} coverage early on noticed discontent in the new nation’s government and near the end of the war featured an essay on political recommendations for the reunification of
Nigeria, *The New Yorker* staked its claim in the realm of on-the-ground correspondence, human-interest with a political agenda, with a significant essay by Renata Adler. In keeping with *The New Yorker*’s own trend of serious writing in an age of New Journalism, the type of reportage produced by Adler could easily have called to mind Susan Sontag’s “Trip to Hanoi” that had been featured in *Esquire* the previous year.

Exploring this oscillation between coverage of political/diplomatic and humanitarian concerns provides a clear picture of how the mass concern felt in America for the Biafrans could have been coupled with Washington’s refusal to back the would-be independent nation in its efforts or to step in and put an end to the war. At no time did the U.S. government consider a solution beyond “One Nigeria,” as will be seen from the recommendations in *Foreign Affairs*, a magazine published by the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Moreover, while some action could have been taken by the United Nations, on the heels of the Congo disaster and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold’s suspicious death following U.N. action to oust mercenaries and broker peace, U.N. policy under U Thant lay decisively on the side of non-intervention.

After a hiatus, Biafra has experienced renewed interest. Recent years have seen an eruption of books and novels depicting the war years, particularly by those who lived through it. The Biafran Zionist Movement is still active, and on November 5, 2012, one hundred men and women were arrested carrying the Biafran flag through the streets of Enugu, Nigeria. Most recently, a new collection edited by Toyin Falola and Ogechukwu Ezekwem considers the intellectual history of the Nigeria-Biafra War through an examination of war literature, both fiction and non-fiction.
Scholarly interest in the question of genocide in Biafra has also been renewed, warranting a special edition of *Journal of Genocide Research* in 2014, and the crisis with Boko Haram has even the media looking to the past for answers or comparisons. Nigerian playwright Wole Soyinka recently invoked the civil war when railing against the election-focused government for negotiating with fundamentalists rather than fighting them: “‘The threat that this situation poses for Nigeria is worse than the crisis of Biafra that had almost destroyed the country in the 1960s.’”

While Soyinka’s statement may be more a criticism of the government than a comparison of the thousands killed by Boko Haram since its first attack in 2003 to the millions who perished in the 1960s war, Biafra has not been lost from international memory. Indeed, the images of starving African children have become a recognizable trope throughout the West, and the first image that appears on the Wikipedia page for “kwashiorkor” today is a child from the “Biafra War.” Often, the visual of starvation and famine supersedes any need to consider causation. As Amartya Sen explains, “Famines imply starvation, but not vice versa.” Instead, “ownership of food is one of the most primitive property rights, and in each society there are rules governing this right.” His explanation is that starvation results from a failure to be “entitled” to a “commodity bundle” with enough food. In the case of Biafra, starvation resulted from war and a population cut off from food supply lines, but the stark images offered a distillation of starvation, often omitting its political cause. What is more, the starvation images conform to the stereotype of African poverty, for as Sen states, “starvation implies poverty.” By the conclusion of the conflict, war had cost Nigeria an estimated $840 million, and two to three million people had died. During the war, “deaths due to hunger and starvation totaled sometimes as many as 10,000 a day.”
4.1 Background to Biafra

Delineated territorially in 1914 to coalesce the British West African colonies of Southern and Northern Nigeria, Nigeria gained independence on October 1, 1960 as a federation, despite many of the nation’s leaders favoring confederation. While Nigeria claimed many assets – a large population, a fledgling oil industry – the composition of the federation indicated problems ahead. The legacy of colonialism and the 1914 borders left Nigeria divided among three main ethno-linguistic groups – Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba – with roughly 250 additional smaller ethnic groups throughout the country. Reinforcing separate identities, the British created three regional political divisions along major ethnic group lines. Simply explained, the Hausa-Fulani Muslims, occupied the Northern Region, which was the largest in square mileage and population. In the Western Region, site of the capital Lagos, the Yoruba dominated and were a mix of Christian, Muslim, and practitioners of Yoruba religion. The Eastern Region was mostly occupied by the Igbo, many of whom were Christian. The Eastern Region gave rise to the largest population of Western-educated Nigerians as well, so that in Lagos and other parts of the country, the majority of administrative positions were held by Igbo. “At the national level, the three ‘mega-tribes’ competed for state resources that had become increasingly lucrative thanks to the revenues from oil and other commodities.”

Politically, post-independence Nigeria was divided among three main parties, more or less congruent with the main ethnic groups and three regions: the Hausa-led Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in the North, the Yoruba Action Group (AG) in the West, and the Igbo-dominated National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the East. “These regional based parties assured two things: firstly that none of the parties could govern Nigeria on its own, and secondly that ethnic conflict was only a matter of time away.” However, while the parties
were commonly identified with these ethnic group interests, the actual party membership was not quite that simple, as explained by Richard Sklar:

In Northern Nigeria, the NPC endeavored to reconcile traditional authority in all parts of that culturally diverse region with the requirements of modern government. Rooted in the Muslim emirates, the party was never intended to promote a specifically ethnic interest. NPC policies were generally true to the nonsectarian precept of the party’s regionalist motto: “One North: One People Irrespective of Religion, Rank or Tribe.”

In Eastern Nigeria and later the Mid-West, the NCNC rarely lost an election in the Igbo-speaking constituencies. Yet this party was also supported by a decisive majority in the preponderant, Edo-speaking, linguistic group of the Midwest. Furthermore, the NCNC retained sizeable pockets of electoral and parliamentary strength in the Yoruba-speaking Western Region until 1964. Similarly, the Action Group, rooted in its Yoruba origins, emerged in 1956 as the foremost party of ‘minority’ group interests in the Eastern and Northern Regions.

At independence, the NPC, with the largest population, led the federal elections, with their man Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa taking control as Prime Minister. Detractors claimed that Balewa was a mere puppet of the Premier of the North, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. With the South split between the NCNC and the AG, Bello’s “ability to hold the North together meant that the NPC in essence became Nigeria’s ruling party.”

Through a temporary alliance, the NCNC’s Nnamdi Azikiwe served first as Governor General, and then President when the country became a republic in 1963, effectively leaving the AG and its leader Obafemi Awolowo out in the cold. “Southerners resented the fact that the government was being ruled by proxy by a regional ruler and viewed Bello as the real power behind the throne.”

Within the ranks of the AG, a rift occurred between Awolowo, who favored opposition to the conservative federal government and Samuel Akintola, Premier of the Western Region, who asserted that developing stronger links with the federal government was a better strategy. Akintola led the formation of a new party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP),
which aligned itself with the NPC and others, later forming the Nigeria National Alliance (NNA). Due to multiple crises in the Western Region, the government declared a state of emergency and imprisoned Awolowo. Eventually, the NCNC and AG’s oppositional group joined forces to create the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) in time for the 1964 elections.

Nigeria was rocked by one crisis after another following independence. Even prior to the elections, strife among regions developed concerning the census. Since population determined representation, the Northern Region and southern regions bolstered their population figures. The North also earned criticism for its practice of counting its entire population, which was roughly double its electorate, despite the fact that women were not allowed to vote in the traditional Muslim Northern Region. When the 1964 elections took place, the NCNC partially boycotted them, allowing the NPC to maintain federal control. According to Richard Sklar, the rigged Western regional election the following year led to months of violent unrest in that region, which culminated in the coup d’état of January 1966.442

4.2 Two Coups

Called the Young Majors Coup, the overthrow of Balewa’s government and the assassination of Balewa, Bello, Akintola, and several others, in January 1966 saw Maj. Gen. Johnson T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo, assume power. Although Ironsi had not been among the planners of the coup, many of the coup plotters were Igbo. Once in control, Ironsi appointed military governors to each of the four regions (the Mid-West had been created out of Western territory in 1963), including Ojukwu as military governor of the Eastern Region and Gowon as army chief of staff. Ironsi suspended the constitution and centralized the government, causing
Northern outcry and threats of secession over what it determined was an Igbo takeover. In May 1966, riots in the North led to the killing of 3,000 Igbo citizens residing there.\textsuperscript{443}

The historian Frederick Cooper describes Ironsi’s government as a simple outburst of “military populism,” but the major general was seen as an “Igbo power grabber” in the North. Nigeria’s second coup, in July 1966, overthrew and assassinated Ironsi and other leaders, a strike viewed in Eastern Nigeria as “an anti-Igbo move.”\textsuperscript{444} The original intention of the Northern coup plotters was secession, but the new leader Gowon was persuaded by the British High Commissioner and the American ambassador that Northern secession would be injurious to that region’s economy. Immediately following the coup, “the government of Nigeria had virtually ceased to function and was in danger of totally breaking down, leading to a state of anarchy. Gowon at that point in time was simply a compromise candidate for the post of military head of state.”\textsuperscript{445} However, in the Eastern Region, Ojukwu refused to recognize Gowon’s leadership. Killings of Igbo in the North resumed in September 1966, and the toll mounted rapidly over the next several months.\textsuperscript{446} Northern Igbos fled the region for the East, and words like “pogrom” and charges of “genocide” began to circulate. “Whether representatives of the Nigerian state systematically organized the killings remains disputed. At the very least, the Nigerian government failed to halt the riots.”\textsuperscript{447}

A meeting held in Aburi, Ghana in January 1967 offered an opportunity for leaders to “settle their differences and compromise over what had become an extremely intractable problem.”\textsuperscript{448} However, each of the participating leaders was constrained by circumstances in the region he represented: the West had recently been in political turmoil, the North had come close to secession with the second coup, and the East was on the verge of rebellion. Ojukwu was interested in the future of Nigeria as a confederation, while Gowon wanted to see the unity of the
army restored and “to pull Nigeria back from the brink of anarchy and total disintegration.” According to historian Michael Gould, the smaller indigenous groups “could see that greater autonomy by the four regions would lead to the denigration of the smaller ethnic groups in Nigeria” and the North “could see their oligarchic power being threatened should Nigeria become a confederation.” Ojukwu’s view prevailed, and Nigeria became a confederation. Since Ironsi had appointed Ojukwu military governor of the Eastern Region, he remained in control there. However, Gowon did not honor the agreements of Aburi.

Scholars today emphasize the role oil played in the Nigeria-Biafra War, but, as we shall see, U.S. news coverage during the conflict only mentioned the resource in passing. Yet, for Cooper, oil proved more pivotal than ethnic troubles. “Nigeria plunged into civil war soon after oil exports began… Eastern autonomy seemed the only way to keep regional hands on the spigot.” Due to the fact that oil requires little labor, much of it from foreigners, and it necessitates few relationships - mostly between rulers and global firms - “it defines a spigot economy: whoever controls access to the tap, collects the rent.”

On May 27, 1967, Gowon announced the division of Nigeria into twelve states, and by May 30, the former Eastern Region under Ojukwu declared the independent nation of Biafra. Claiming fear of genocide and broken accords, and in accordance with “the joint session of the enlarged Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders, after full deliberation,” Ojukwu proclaimed “that the territory and region known as and called Eastern Nigeria together with her continental shelf and territorial waters shall henceforth be an independent sovereign state of the name and title of ‘The Republic of Biafra.’” It was not coincidental that secession quickly followed Gowon’s May 27 division of the country into a dozen states. The new partition took oil-producing areas, which had previously been located
within the Eastern Region, out of the section that comprised Igboland, so that the oil was no longer geographically under Igbo control. Nevertheless, the geographic entitlement to oil was not asserted as a reason for secession. When Biafra declared independence, its boundaries as claimed by Ojukwu included the entire former Eastern Region, far outside of Igboland, and incorporating the oil producing areas as well as Port Harcourt.

Gowon immediately stated that the Nigerian federal government would “crush” the rebellion. In addition to mobilizing the armed forces and barring “the foreign press from printing anything detrimental to his government,” Gowon placed an embargo on Biafra’s ports and discontinued telecommunications links.454 A bomb explosion in Lagos on July 2 was attributed to Biafran terrorists, and Igbos living there were attacked, causing many of them to leave the capital city for Biafra. On July 6, 1967, fighting began with a federal attack, and the FMG considered the conflict a police action that would succeed quickly.

“The FMG’s major strategic advantage was not its military force, but its diplomatic status: internationally recognized statehood. That the FMG could argue that it was a sovereign government facing an insurgency was decisive.”455 It allowed for the organization of a blockade and for foreign governments and international agencies like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations to deem the war an internal matter in which they declined to intervene. International recognition also meant that Nigerians were able to purchase weapons through open international trade, while Biafrans relied on the black market. Despite the claim that the conflict was a civil war and unsuitable for interference from international actors, the British and Soviets backed the FMG with weapons, while the Biafrans belatedly received support from the French. The Portuguese dictatorship and South African and Rhodesian apartheid
regimes clandestinely supported Biafra, supposedly in hopes of weakening one of Africa’s strongest states. Later, China cast its vote for Biafra, partly to oppose the Soviet Union.456

“Realizing their slim chances on the battlefield, the Biafran leadership moved the conflict into the propaganda domain.”457 Biafrans put forth representations of their citizenry as modern, educated, talented, and Christian, while maintaining that the Nigerian government sought to exterminate them, a genocide that was prompted by jealousy and disdain for their aforementioned positive attributes. Nigerians, it was stated, were fearful of Igbo adaptability and success. Once the effects of the blockade were in full force, the international press circulated images of starving Biafran children across the world.

Since Britain was held partly responsible for the genocide claim due to its support of the FMG, the British government sponsored an internal observer team to visit Nigeria and report on the genocide issue. During the visit, the Nigerian government did not permit the team to enter Biafran territory – precisely where the genocide as a result of the fighting and the famine was said to be taking place. Notwithstanding this obstructed view of events, the international observers concluded that “genocide was not taking place, and international public opinion largely concurred.” Further, the conflict was officially termed a civil war.458

By the war’s end more than 30 months later, Biafra had shrunk to a tenth of its initial territory, and as the FMG stepped up its efforts in early January 1970, “a coordinated effort by 3 divisions” proved too much for the Biafran military. Ojukwu left for asylum in Ivory Coast, and Maj. Gen. Philip Efiong (Effiong) remained to announce by radio Biafra’s surrender on January 12. The formal document was signed three days later, and while Gowon proclaimed a reunification “with our brothers,” Ojukwu called “on the world to save the Ibos from ‘complete annihilation’ by Nigerians” asserting that the government would execute elite Biafrans and fail to
feed the masses. Casualty numbers varied. Journalist Mark Kurlansky reported the civilian death toll by starvation at one million. Other estimates place casualties as high as two million. Hundreds of thousands to a million Biafran refugees were said to be hiding in the bush and clogging roads.

4.3 Theory, Methods, and Sources

As Paddy Davies, the Biafran Propaganda Director explained in the 1995 documentary Biafra: Fighting a War Without Guns, Biafra fought two wars – military and propaganda. “Biafra was blockaded by air, land and sea, and so it had to no outlet. It therefore had to turn to propaganda.” Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe has detailed his experience as part of the state propaganda team in his 2012 war memoir There Was a Country. Throughout the conflict, both sides issued conflicting communiqués, and as political scientist Peter Schwab has shown, cities were continuously up for grabs as the FMG and the Biafran government would lay claim to control over various areas. The press often reflected such conflicting accounts, and in a single news article, mixed messages might appear. News coverage tended to follow only one side or the other, for instance, accepting or denying charges of genocide. For outlets or reporters interested in the Biafran side of the story, media coverage mirrored the shifts in the state propaganda campaign throughout the course of the war. Historian Douglas Anthony has explained that Biafra positioned itself as modern, the victim of genocide, a neo-imperial pawn, and a casualty of white supremacy. While promoting Biafra’s modernity and claims of genocide were commonplace in U.S. media coverage, reporters and editors were less likely to include criticism of Western imperialism and claims of racism. U.S. audiences consumed images of starving African children, but not accusations of white supremacy, which would have removed blame for the conflict from the FMG or the rebels and placed it on Western imperial shoulders.
Despite conflicting messages, visual images added credibility to reports on the Biafra-Nigeria War, in particular, those that chronicled the humanitarian crisis. Writers on the Nigeria-Biafra War typically boasted some type of authority to speak about the country. Whether a journalist visiting Nigeria or more likely Biafra, a scholar of Africa, an aid worker or religious figure, or an actual Nigerian or Biafran citizen, opinions were stated as fact due to the writer’s special knowledge of the country, people, and conflict. This type of on-the-ground reporting served activists well, as Lasse Heerten and A. Dirk Moses have shown: “Making use of the channels of the mass media age, this new breed of activists believed in what became known as témoignage, the outspoken public discourse of what humanitarians and journalists had witnessed in the field.”

The FMG and Biafra each waged propaganda campaigns, and “it became almost impossible to ascertain a relatively objective picture, and arguably these opposing views fostered divergent and opposing western opinion which unfortunately helped to sustain the war’s longevity.”

Biafra’s propaganda effort was bolstered by a sophisticated international public relations strategy that swung public opinion, if not global political opinion, on its side. Claims of genocide were backed up by stark photos of children starving and suffering from kwashiorkor.

This genocide claim provoked an international debate about the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Nigeria. It also placed immense pressure on the British government, whose support for the FMG attracted accusations of neo-colonialism by Biafran proponents. Public opinion there was firmly on the Biafran side; government rhetoric about Nigerian unity and its long-standing military relationship was no match for images of starving babies, the widespread circulation of which was part of the Biafran public relations campaign.

Messages of genocide were paired with characterizations of Biafrans as Africa’s most modern, educated, and capable people. In this case, Igbo/Biafrans became almost synonymous and often interchangeable. The theme of intelligent Igbo/Biafrans runs through U.S. media coverage whether pro-Nigeria or pro-Biafra and regardless of whether or not the writer agreed
with the genocide claims.

Even though, Biafrans and others raised accusations of genocide against the Nigerian government, the claim of genocide was eventually disregarded or officially invalidated by the international observers, the OAU, and even Azikiwe. Despite a massive amount of international attention during the war, Biafra was rarely considered outside Nigeria by the 1970s. However, recent scholarly interest and literary coverage of the war and its legacy mean that Biafra needs to be inserted into genocide studies. According to Heerten and Moses, editors of the *Journal of Genocide Research*’s special issue on the Nigeria-Biafra War, the conflict had previously been omitted because its characteristics lay outside the Holocaust-generated definition of genocide. With the Biafra journal issue, the authors aim to “historicize the discourse about genocide and Biafra” to highlight its relevance “for genocide studies, and suggest how assumptions dominating the field could be reconceptualized in view of the issues raised by the conflict.”

“Genocide” was used to mobilize public opinion and humanitarian aid, and as early as the 1966 pogroms, a claim for genocide had been launched. The Igbo were soon cast as the “Jews of Africa,” according to Heerten. In the media and among sympathetic organizations, comparisons were drawn between Biafra and Auschwitz encouraging aid and assistance, even as pro-Nigerian rhetoric worked to delegitimize Biafra and rebut the charge of genocide. Despite Nigerian efforts, images circulating the globe gave credence to the possibility of genocide. As Heerten explains, the power of the images of starving Biafra children stemmed from their association with the Holocaust. The images from Biafra reminded countless contemporaries in Western Europe and the United States of the photographs taken during the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps; fears of an “African Auschwitz” abounded. These associations were also cultivated by Biafran propaganda, which relied heavily on allegations of genocide and a language of comparisons connecting the Biafran crisis with the fate of Europe’s Jews during World War II.
Much was at stake in determining whether or not Igbo were the victims of genocide. Had genocide been proven, member states of the U.N. who had signed the “Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” would have been required to intervene. According to the Genocide Convention, which entered into force on January 12, 1951, genocide meant, “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group.” Further, punishable acts included not only genocide, but the attempt to commit genocide or complicity in genocide as well, and the Convention stated that “whether committed in a time of peace of in a time of war,” genocide was a “crime under international law” for which the culprit would be punished.\(^{470}\)

### 4.4 Understanding or Understating the Role of Oil

Today, Nigeria’s importance in the production of oil is well known, and in 2009, Max Siollun touted the country as projected to provide 25% of the United States’ oil supply by 2015. While U.S. oil imports from Nigeria have instead declined since 2010, it nevertheless has at times been a significant supplier.\(^{471}\) Thus, with Nigeria's current status as an important oil-producing nation, scholars have begun to look more closely at the role oil played in the Nigeria-Biafra war. Access to oil was not part of the Biafran or Nigerian propaganda campaign, but it did play an important role in both international interest, such as the supply of weapons from Britain, and some scholars cite it as a reason the FMG insisted on maintaining unity as well as a factor in the date of Biafra's secession. In U.S. media coverage of the war, oil earned few mentions, and writers repeatedly stated that Biafrans chose to secede out of fear for their lives. However, international attention turned to Nigeria's oil capabilities in May 1969 when Biafran forces attacked an oil facility, killing eleven workers and taking another eighteen – Italians, Germans, and a Jordanian – captive.\(^{472}\) Following international outcry and negotiation by the Pope, the
prisoners were released. According to historian Roy Doron, “Biafra sought not only to hold the workers hostage, but to frighten the oil industry, which the Biafrans considered complicit in what they characterized as a genocidal war.” Biafrans knew that oil was a vital issue of the war and their future, whether or not U.S. media opted to feature the issue of oil in coverage of the war, and regardless of whether they included oil in their propaganda campaign.

While modernity and claims of genocide, neo-imperialism, and white supremacy were discourses mobilized by the Biafrans, the Nigerian government made assertions about civil war, rebellion, and the safety of Igbo people as well. Although as Anthony states, the Biafrans efficaciously succeeded in their public relations campaign, not all reporters fell under the spell of the Biafran publicity team. U.S. media coverage included voices raised in favor of each side of the conflict.

The goal here is not to find out which propaganda campaign was more accurate, what the true causes of the war were, or what really happened. Rather, my dissertation looks at the types of messages circulating within U.S. print media leading up to, during, and just after the war. Which versions of the crisis earned headlines in U.S. print media, and what if any conflicting viewpoints were available to American readers?

4.5 Early Post-Independence Discord in Foreign Affairs

Nigeria experienced two coups and widespread unrest before Biafran secession took place. In 1965, Foreign Affairs published a lengthy article by Nnamdi Azikiwe, at the time President of Nigeria, in which the potential for conflict was palpable. Called “the father of African independence” by Achebe, Azikiwe, known as “Zik,” grew up in many parts of the future country and was a founding leader of its nationalist movement. Born in 1904 in the North to Igbo Christian parents, he learned to speak Hausa before being sent to live with Igbo
relatives in the eastern city of Onitsha. Azikiwe later moved to Lagos where his father worked, and next followed him to Kaduna. As a university student in the United States, he earned degrees in Religion and Anthropology and taught Political Science. Azikiwe became interested in Garveyism, which informed his later nationalist rhetoric.475

Before returning to Nigeria, Azikiwe spent time in the Gold Coast city of Accra, working as the editor of the African Morning Post and acquiring admirers “especially young aspiring freedom fighters, including Kwame Nkrumah, the greatest of them all.”476 Back in Lagos in 1937, Azikiwe founded The West African Pilot, distinguishing it from the competition, newspapers that “went out of their way to be highbrow,” and using accessible English in order to “speak directly to the masses.”477 He went on to establish newspapers in cities like Ibadan and Onitsha and founded the African Continental Bank in 1944 in a move to gain financial autonomy from the British. At independence, Azikiwe became Governor General, and when the country shifted to a republic in 1963, he was redesignated President. A member of the body that mandated Biafra’s separation from Nigeria in 1967, Azikiwe would later withdraw his support for Biafra.478

In his 1965 Foreign Affairs article, “Essential for Nigerian Survival,” Azikiwe depicts post-independence Nigeria’s volatile political situation and responds to the challenges facing Nigeria’s unity and claim to democracy. He reviews the recent problems with the census and the elections and then makes recommendations for necessary constitutional changes in order for the Federal Republic of Nigeria to endure.479 In summary, he lists among the problems with the current government structure and practice: uneven representation, the rushing of government measures through Parliament, “carpet-crossing” (party switching while in office), major issues with the judiciary, legalized intra-regional discrimination, and lack of power for the Head of
State combined with a “power-loaded” Head of Government. The article provides an illuminating perspective on antagonisms on the eve of the conflict in Nigeria.

Azikiwe recommends specific solutions to Nigeria’s problems, beginning with changes to representation, “Either there should be universal adult suffrage in the North or the seats allocated to it to be reduced to make it reflect its male population only.”\textsuperscript{480} He calls for reform of the Senate, which has no power of consequence and should be vested with “complete concurrent jurisdiction with the House of Representatives,” and for Senators who stand for election in their constituencies so that the Senate will not become the place for those who failed to win popular elections.\textsuperscript{481} Likewise, extensive reforms of the judicial system were required, for example, accused persons should have the ability to decide whether to use the Sharia Court of Appeal, particularly since not everyone in Nigeria who might fall under this jurisdiction would be Muslim (i.e. Christians living in the North).

Whilst I admit that only persons learned in Islamic jurisprudence should be appointed to dispense justice in customary courts where Muslims may be tried, yet I must insist that the courts of the land should not take cognizance of the religious beliefs or political attachment of any person when his liberty is placed in jeopardy. After all, Nigeria is a secular state; it is not a Christian or an Islamic state.\textsuperscript{482}

In a footnote, Azikiwe offers some examples of the severity of local courts, which include customary and al-kali courts, such as rioters being sentenced to twenty-four years in prison and flogging with twelve strokes of the cane, or some Action Group supporters accused of criminal defamation being sentenced to twelve months in prison and eighty strokes of the cane.\textsuperscript{483} Already shedding light on regional divisions, he states that the solution to the problem of discrimination is constitutional amendment: “Therefore, our Constitution must be revised to enable Nigerian nationals – be they Northerners or Easterners or Westerners or Mid-Westerners or Lagosians … to enjoy all the rights and fulfill all the obligations of Nigerian citizenship.
anywhere in Nigeria.” Additionally, the restructuring of the regions should be executed so that “no one region should be in a position to dominate the rest.” Hand-in-hand with these reforms Azikiwe calls for diversification of the federal system by basing it on the local authorities and provinces as well as the regions to “expand the areas in which the Federal Government shares responsibility so that all the governments of the Federation participate in the crusade for even development, and thus ensure economic, social and political equality for all, irrespective of the abstruse doctrine of states’ rights.”

Although early in the article Azikiwe mentions that the recent crises have even included “the threat of secession by one of the four regions forming the Federation,” his writing focuses only on what must be done to ensure that this does not happen, that Nigeria does not become a Confederation or worse, cease to exist. His optimistic outlook sweeps “tribalism” under the rug; in fact, he never mentions ethnic groups by name and only refers to regions, parties, and religions – all designations that could live together in a modern nation-state. He closes by reiterating that the solution does not lie in loosening the bonds, but by tightening them: “The central problem of federalism in Nigeria is how to coexist in harmony. How can people who speak diverse tongues and have inherited different cultural traditions cultivate a national spirit of oneness?” His answer is, by enlarging the scope of authority of the Federal Government.

Zik was a founding leader of Nigeria and a staunch proponent of One Nigeria during the move toward independence, and more than anything, his Foreign Affairs article shows he had not changed his nationalist view of the importance of the national form of state. “We must either have one country or separate and independent countries. We are either Nigerians or we are not.” Despite his emphasis on solutions, Azikiwe points his finger at the “real” causes of Nigeria’s problems: Nigerians who lack (Western) education, are too traditional, or oppose
federalism; those who are opportunistic, tribal, or regional in their loyalty; or discriminatory. These are the enemies of democracy. Azikiwe states, “The requirements of contemporary political life are becoming extremely complex and the demands of the modern state on the citizen are becoming more exacting, if not confounding,” and also, “The majority of Nigerians are still illiterate; their cultural development is still limited to the tribal level, comparatively speaking, so that it is the source of power and show of authority that appeal to the primitive mind, the poverty-stricken opportunist, and the sophisticated careerist.”

For all of his promotion of One Nigeria, Zik has a specific vision of what Nigeria should look like, which was not a country led by a traditional, Muslim, or religious majority. While he never refers to ethno-linguistic groups by name, Azikiwe does specifically blame Northerners and Muslims for some of Nigeria’s problems.

The American Foreign Affairs reader may or may not have known the names of various Nigerian government, party, and regional leaders and what these names meant. However, what would have resonated would have been the idea that Nigeria was in crisis, and the setback resulted from some of the population’s attempt to hold onto seemingly traditional cultural and religious values and identities. Here, the Muslim population and the North are aligned with tradition, leaving the various regions of the south to represent modernity and hope for Nigeria’s future. The very characteristics Zik applies to the Nigerians who will provide the nation’s solution - “We must ensure that well-educated people of good character are elected to parliamentary seats in order to participate intelligently and responsibly in parliamentary debates” – will be the traits Biafrans claim for themselves, and the U.S. media will apply to both “Biafrans” and “Igbos.” Azikiwe’s framing of the issues represents a nationalist discourse that could not fit Nigerian Islamic or “tribal” identities into its modern political culture. Although
“Essentials for Nigerian Survival” advocates One Nigeria with a strong federal government, we can already see in 1965 that there were two perceived Nigerias – one modern, one traditional. This dichotomy will be mobilized in Biafra’s publicity campaign at secession just two years later.

4.6 Civil War or War of Independence?

*TIME* and other news publications gave significant coverage to the Nigeria-Biafra War during 1968, however, *The New Yorker* magazine paid minimal attention to the conflict despite the war’s escalation. As Kurlansky pointed out in the title of his book, widespread unrest in 1968 “rocked the world.” The war in Nigeria had plenty of competition for headlines from events occurring in places like Vietnam, France, Mexico, and Czechoslovakia, as well as the United States. “Most of the world, preoccupied with the year’s busy agenda, regarded this war with a fair amount of indifference, not supporting the Biafran claims to nationhood, but urging the Nigerians to let relief planes get through.”

Nevertheless, to the surprise of many, the war in the West African country escalated. On January 27, 1968, Ojukwu officially charged Nigeria with genocide. Port Harcourt fell to the Nigerian army in June, a devastating defeat for Biafra that cut its access to the sea. In his 2013 book on the Biafran war, Michael Gould states, “international journalism, describing life in Biafra and giving snapshot pictures of malnutrition, starvation, genocide and indiscriminate bombing of innocent civilians by Federal Government aircraft, led the Federal authorities to invite an international observer team to look into these descriptions and accusations.” A group of foreign observers, including representatives from the United Nations and the OAU, began a tour of Nigeria on September 25.
Biafra’s success in gaining international sympathy was uneven. Although Ojukwu requested assistance from Washington in January 1968, the U.S. government Feb. 5 reaffirmed its support for the Nigerian federal government. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey said in Washington that the U.S. ‘has in no way encouraged or otherwise supported the rebellion in Nigeria.’ He added that the U.S. ‘regards the breakaway movement as an internal conflict which in the last analysis only the parties themselves can solve.’

Biafra did gain recognition and support from some unlikely allies, including Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Zambia during April and May. France announced its support of Biafra in late July, and China joined the cause in September. Later in the year, the U.S. Senate began to take more notice. “On August 2 the war became a U.S. political issue when Senator Eugene McCarthy criticized President Johnson for doing little to help and demanded that he go to the United Nations and insisted on an airlift of food and medicine to Biafra.” And on September 23, during a speech to the Senate, Ted Kennedy pressed the administration to send relief to Biafra. By December, President Johnson officially urged both sides to end the war. Johnson’s appeal did not generate any momentum – Nigeria and Biafra had stumbled through several attempts at peace talks during the year, but each proved more fruitless than the previous – and the lame duck president was of course hardly a credible advocate of peace.

Representatives for both sides had met in London in May 1968 to arrange peace talks in Kampala, Uganda, which began on May 23. Without compromise, the Nigerian government continuously insisted on renunciation of secession before a ceasefire would be initiated, while the Biafrans insisted that no agreement that assumed Biafra as part of Nigeria could be entertained. In July, parties met in Niamey, Niger where they agreed to hold OAU-led peace talks in Addis Ababa and developed an agenda for the upcoming meeting. From August 5 to September 9 in Addis Ababa, the two sides again failed to make headway. “During the
negotiations, the 2 parties presented their own peace formulas – the Nigerians demanding that the Biafrans renounce secession and the Biafrans claiming that Biafra must be accepted as an independent state.”

In its first foray into the crisis in Nigeria, The New Yorker included a brief comment in “The Talk of the Town.” Founded in 1925, by the 1950s, The New Yorker was more than a magazine, it was “a habit, a status symbol, a pillar of one’s identity” and by 1969, its circulation would reach an all-time high of 482,000. In the August 3, 1968 edition, a writer laments the suffering children in Biafra and the fact that Robert Kennedy is no longer around to “arouse us all with his eloquent stammer!” The comment responds to a recent issue of Life, which featured “Biafran children whose hideous gaunt faces appeared” and “who will certainly die of protein starvation unless a way can quickly be found to get the food from where it is to where they are.” Interestingly, in its plea for people from the President to anyone who can write an “ample check,” the brief write-up does not refer specifically to Nigeria, the war, or give any explanation at all of the causes of starvation of the children. Of course, savvy and educated, The New Yorker readership would have been well aware of current events worldwide. Nevertheless, the noncontextualized plea entrenches the trope of the starving African child by separating the “image” from any sense of its cause, implying that generally, African children are starving, a representation that has not faded to this day.

Following the failed peace talks of 1968 and the official visit by the team of foreign observers who concluded that there was no genocide, the war continued through 1969. In some cases, humanitarian efforts were blamed for sustaining the Biafrans and prolonging the war. Biafra’s allies, particularly France, were the targets of similar criticism. In April 1969, another round of peace negotiations was attempted, this time in Monrovia, and again sponsored by the
OAU. Unfortunately, the meeting ended with the same result as the 1968 sessions – “the Biafran delegation refused to accept the Nigerian demand that it renounce its secession before a cease-fire.” In June, Biafrans killed eleven and captured eighteen foreign oil workers, a situation that led to public outcry throughout the West, and caused Ojukwu to question why a few white men were valued more than millions of African children.

This Biafran turn in promotional messaging could already be heard during Ojukwu’s June 1, 1969 speech that came to be known as the Ahiara Declaration, in which he positioned the Biafran struggle as part of the battle against white supremacy:

our struggle is a movement against racial prejudice, in particular against that tendency to regard the black man as culturally, morally, spiritually, intellectually, and physically inferior to the other two major races of the world - the yellow and the white races. This belief in the innate inferiority of the Negro and that his proper place in the world is that of the servant of the other races, has from early days coloured the attitude of the outside world to Negro problems. It still does today.

Ojukwu asserted partnership with peoples of African descent throughout the world, “Our struggle is not a mere resistance - that would be purely negative. It is a positive commitment to build a healthy, dynamic and progressive state, such as would be the pride of black men the world over.” He criticized the effects of colonialism as well as neo-imperialism,

We now see why in spite of Britain’s tottering economy Harold Wilson’s Government insists on financing Nigeria’s futile war against us. We see why the Shell-BP led the Nigerian hordes into Bonny, pays Biafran oil royalties to Nigeria, and provided the Nigerian Army with all the help it needed for its attack on Port Harcourt.

While much U.S. media coverage had previously reiterated Biafra’s publicity campaign, the Ahiara Declaration earned scant attention in the media outlets under review here. For the most part, Foreign Affairs assumed the crisis would only end with reunification, and The New Yorker did not shift from characterizations of starvation and intelligent Biafrans as reasons to end the war to feature the place of oil and the effects of global racial inequality on Nigeria and
Biafra’s predicament. Further, international mediation efforts were not to be mobilized to defend oil access for either side.

The year’s events proved suggestive for U.S. media coverage as some publications looked precipitously forward to a reunited Nigeria and others continued to champion the Biafran cause, although more as an inducement for humanitarian aid than one concerned with politics. Continuing its humanitarian stance on Biafra, The New Yorker published a short article six months prior to Adler’s full-scale feature. Once again included in Talk of the Town, the inclusion depicts an interview with Senator Charles Goodell who visited Biafra for a study mission and then reported to the Senate about his findings. Goodell’s tour and The New Yorker’s coverage of it clearly follows the Biafran public relations campaign points of modernity and genocide.\(^{504}\) When describing how he had become interested in Biafra, Goodell cites an Israeli philanthropist who “‘likened the situation to that of the Jews in Germany. He said that a form of genocide was taking place.’”\(^{505}\)

*The New Yorker* stayed with the idea of genocide; the later Biafran publicity tactics based on claims of neo-imperialism and white supremacy would have been less likely to rally reader support. Without referring to the international committee of observers that had determined genocide was not present in Nigeria, *The New Yorker*, through Goodell, refutes the denial of genocide by explaining that “in a country with a famine, you don’t always see the sufferers on the street … if they’re dying they stay in their huts, or they go out in the bush to die.”\(^{506}\)

Goodell’s report featured Biafran propaganda motif of modernity, and the Senator describes Biafrans as “‘an amazing people … naturally bright, friendly, optimistic … and they’re amazingly well organized.’” Further, he states, “‘The Biafrans are very resourceful … some of these people bordered on geniuses.’” Before closing, the article returns to the threat of genocide,
with increased distress now that Biafrans’ have been characterized as valuable people, “the Biafrans would be slaughtered by the Nigerians if they gave up the battle.”

4.6.1 The New Yorker’s Renata Adler Goes to Biafra

Following Senator Goodell’s eyewitness report, The New Yorker featured “Letter From Biafra” by award-winning journalist and staff writer-reporter Renata Adler who visited Biafra and penned a lengthy article, an example of témoignage writing, which was published in the October 4, 1969 issue. Just 100 days before Biafra would capitulate, the article offered the magazine’s first in-depth coverage of the crisis. Although she was only 31 years old, by the time Adler went to Biafra, her ability to report on important political events had been proven. Known for her 1965 “Letter From Selma,” which detailed the march from the Brown Chapel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Selma, Alabama, to the statehouse in Montgomery, and the 1967 “Letter from the Six-Day War,” focused on the Third Arab-Israeli War, her subsequent “Letter From the Palmer House,” about the national New Politics Convention in Chicago was included in Best Magazine Articles: 1967. These and eleven other articles, all originally appearing in The New Yorker, comprised the book Toward a Radical Middle: Fourteen Pieces of Reporting and Criticism, published in 1969. Adler finalized the Introduction in July 1969, months before her trip to Biafra.

Born in Milan, Italy in 1938 to parents who had fled Nazi Germany, Adler grew up in Connecticut, studied Philosophy at Bryn Mawr, and earned graduate degrees in Comparative Literature from Harvard and Anthropology from the Sorbonne, where she studied with Jean Wahl and Claude Lévi-Strauss. In the late 1970s, she would also earn a J.D. from Yale Law School because, as she explained later, “I believed an American journalist ought to know the law.” Adler’s career with The New Yorker spanned four decades. Beginning in 1963 as a
manuscript reader, she became a staff writer. In 1968-1969, she served as chief film critic for *The New York Times*, but did not care for the pressure of daily deadlines and returned to *The New Yorker*.

One of the pieces republished in her 2001 collection *Canaries in the Mineshaft*, which Adler regarded as addressing “misrepresentation, coercion, and abuse of public process, and, to a degree, the journalist’s role in it,” was Adler’s “Letter From Biafra.” The essay strives to elevate her hosts from unnamed subjects to valid sources, and in keeping with her disdain for unnamed sources – she was critical of Watergate coverage – she provides names, titles, and characteristics for nearly all those she met in Biafra.

Writing during the heyday of New Journalism, Adler “did not admire—‘detested,’ in fact—the sprawling and subjectivized” form. This type of reporting included narrative journalism “novelistic re-creations and works that were modeled more on a film or play, where the journalist has observed the events being described but withdraws from the narrative and presents them in the form of scenes, complete with dialogue and expository stage directions” as well as subjectivity, which sometimes “took the form of stylistic experimentation, excess, or playfulness … And sometimes, the reporter stepped out from the shadows, unashamedly put his or her subjectivity on display, and did what you learned not to do on the first day of Journalism 101, became part of the story.” Adler maintained her disdain for New Journalism in a 2014 interview, “I didn't care for New Journalism. In fact, I did sort of hate it.” Adler’s opinion of New Journalism proved to be in keeping with *The New Yorker*’s editorial department, as the trend “passed the New Yorker by. The magazine’s reportage in the mid and late sixties was … serious (if not somber), more or less impersonal, and expressed in restrained and syntactically impeccable prose.” In fact, Adler “wrote, in a word, like a square.” At the same time,
although the magazine’s editor William Shawn recognized the use of the first person in some New Yorker articles, he said, “‘The I in our first person reporting is still an observer – objective and impartial,’” yet the magazine’s reporting “was moving decisively away from traditional objectivity and impartiality” in the 1960s. Especially evident concerning coverage of Vietnam, features in The New Yorker began to display an “unmistakable political agenda.”

It is within this genre of traditionally written, but politically aware reporting that Adler’s “Letter from Biafra” lies. The article also offers an example of témoignage reporting, written accounts of what journalists observed on the ground. While the article’s copy intersects with Biafra’s early propaganda campaign, relying heavily on discourses of modernity while also replicating the image of Biafrans as smart and innovative people, Adler’s telling of the Biafran war story diverges from that of reporters who relied almost solely on state communiqués (from the FMG and Biafrans) and reports of Western humanitarian aid workers.

Adler has been described as “a ruthless investigative reporter with an ear for dialogue and an eye for human contradiction. Her writing was morally concerned and lyrical, cutting and fearless … Her reportage is rich and unfussy.” Other critics have found fault with her choice of detail. “Letter From Selma” is “charming but ultimately forgettable … the article is too full of incidental details … and reads more like limp event coverage than reporting. Her dispatches from conflict zones – the Six-Day War and Biafra – are similarly marked by halfhearted irreverence.” This may be true, but it misses the point, for she was never a war correspondent.

Like Goodell and many other international visitors, Adler went only to Biafra and did not go to Nigeria-controlled territory or meet with representatives from the FMG. She arrived in Biafra by hitching a ride at the last minute with Joint Church Aid, flying in with reporter Eric Pace of The New York Times who engaged in more traditional reporting, for example quoting
Biafran radio reports and providing opinions from “civil servants and other middle-class Biafrans” without including names or specific quotations. Adler later described her entry into Biafra:

I had wanted to go there even before the Times job came my way. It was very hard to get a visa … There was a question about other people going to Biafra, but Mr. Shawn didn’t think it was safe … I made it as far as the coast but I couldn’t get a visa. I thought, ‘I’m going to have to go all the way back to The New Yorker and say I didn’t get in.’ But suddenly, my application for a visa came through from Joint Church Aid. So we flew in on these aid planes. That was amazing.

Adler toured Biafra with a handful of hosts, accepting their rhetoric about the country and its inhabitants. In her article, she begins to utilize their internal jargon, for example, referring to areas as “disturbed” instead of overtaken. Scholars have demonstrated that Western media helped convey Biafran propaganda and embraced and reproduced it. Before arriving in Biafra, Adler had already heard the Biafran side of the story from her reading of journalist and future best-selling-thriller-writer Frederick Forsyth’s The Biafra Story, which was published in 1969. In “Letter From Biafra,” Adler refers to Forsyth’s book twice, calling it “one of the few cogent accounts of what took place” and later describes how she “spent the rest of Tuesday night [in Biafra], with a flashlight, rereading Frederick Forsyth.” Of all the items she could have transported to Biafra, she chose to bring Forsyth’s book, and it is from his work that she appears to draw her synopsis of the conflict as well. Forsyth’s book took a clearly pro-Biafra stance, as Forsyth admits in the Preface, “It is the Biafra story, and it is told from their standpoint … Where views are expressed either the source is quoted or they are my own, and I will not attempt to hide the subjectivity of them.”

With utmost authority, Forsyth, having been stationed in Nigeria by the BBC before going freelance when he refused to toe the line of the British government’s pro-Nigeria stance,
and signing the Preface with his Umuahia, Biafra location, offers background on the context that led to war. He claims it was British inattention to local desires and “the tribal hostility embedded in this enormous and artificial nation” that set up the country for failure. In Forsyth’s telling, the breakup of Nigeria was inevitable. Siding consistently with Easterners/Biafrans, he shows that the January 15, 1966 coup was not an all-Igbo affair. He states that the January coup was legitimate, in part because the mutineers were put in prison rather than achieving power, while the July coup that installed Gowon was not legitimate because the insurgents “took over the control at the Federal Government and in two Regions. The third Region recognized the new régime later. The fourth Region [Ojukwu’s] never did, nor was it obliged to by law.”

Although she did not mention it in the 1969 article, Adler was aware that her press tour was just that, and she consented to it because, like Forsyth, she believed in the Biafran cause. In a 2014 interview, she explained, “It occurred to me that a lot of what I saw was staged for me. Because they wanted to look good. I mean, first of all, the Biafrans were right. They were on the right side.”

In addition to the discourses of genocide and Biafran modernity included in her *New Yorker* article, Adler replicates the Biafran rhetoric that characterizes Nigerians as backward, and includes statements that legitimize the secession and Ojukwu’s leadership. In a 2013 interview, Adler explained her affinity for dichotomous conditions, “I loved reporting … and the characters were so colourful, and you could tell who the good guys were, and who the bad guys were.”

Much of the Biafran war reporting has been criticized for providing an image of a neo-colonial relationship between the mostly white priests and other humanitarian workers and the suffering Biafrans:

This visual image of the white man helping the African, coupled with the near invisibility of Africans as spokesmen and sources for stories, reinforced another cultural assumption.
This condescending assumption is that the white man, or former colonial masters, still need to intervene to help their African brothers and sisters. Biafran leader Col. Ojukwu only rarely granted interviews, and many of the Biafran combatants were not sought as sources once the focus of international reporting moved from the battlefield to the feeding centers and hospitals.527

Adler’s copy paints a more complex picture of the situation in the breakaway state. Voices of the Biafrans she meets – nearly all doctors, professionals or educated clergy – are heard throughout the article. Adler secures interviews with Effiong and Ojukwu. And while the “starving masses” fade into the background, Adler recognizes their invisibility: “the children of villagers who are not strong enough to trek nearer the front to buy what food there is more cheaply and trek back to market to sell it more dearly.”528 In addition to the professionals, intellectuals, and starving children in the villages and bush, Biafrans include soldiers at the front, whom Adler does not meet. Clearly, this story intentionally deviates from conventional war reporting. Printed months after The New Yorker’s 1968 inclusion on the situation in Biafra, which requested readers send off an “ample check,” Adler’s article could have encouraged both emotional and financial support for the Biafran cause.

Defining the “good guys” and “bad guys,” Adler clearly contrasts Biafrans and Nigerians. On the one hand, Biafrans are smart, professional, educated, ingenious, and legitimate in their breakaway. On the other hand, Nigeria does not uphold the terms of the Geneva Convention and bombs civilians in order to battle against its real enemy, which is modernity. In the opening paragraph of the article, Adler states, “Ever since a plane of the International Red Cross was shot down … by Nigeria,” showing immediately which side would serve as her story’s antagonists.529 Later, she describes the scene in General Effiong’s office, “On the walls were pictures of the mangled victims of Nigerian bombing raids,” reminding readers that Nigerians bombed civilians in addition to Red Cross planes.530
Nigerians have no time for education and technology: “Nigerian forces invaded Biafra … set fire to the university and destroyed all its books,” Adler explains. The image of book burning would have resonated with readers in the 1960s as a Nazi undertaking of just a few decades earlier. Furthermore, making this connection between the Nigerian government and the Nazis could have strengthened the image of Biafrans as comparable to the persecuted Jews. For Adler, too, whose parents had fled Nazi Germany, the allusion to Nazi persecution would have been particularly powerful. In a 2015 interview, she acknowledged the impact of having a family displaced by the Nazi regime, “I think it affects a lot else, specifically being a refugee. I wasn’t born there. I didn’t experience any of it. But they were refugees. So then I was thinking of this business of being a refugee, no matter in what sense.”

Adler alludes to the Nazis elsewhere in the article by stating, “But Biafrans (fighting a war, in a sense, for a position argued in Hannah Arendt’s ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’) are determined to avoid at least the accusation of passive complicity in their own destruction.” Here, the Biafrans learn from the history of genocide and responses to it and fight back in a way that Arendt would not criticize.

Throughout, Adler characterizes Nigerians as the enemies of modernity, for example, quoting Biafra’s Chief Health Officer, “‘The water supply, you may have noticed, was disrupted. All equipment was broken. All wires were cut. I think they were at war with science. I think they were at war with books.” Making matters worse, we can see that Nigerians might be controlled by the Soviets in coming years when Adler quotes N.U. Akpan, the Chief Secretary to the Military Government who said, “‘Nigeria, you see, has mortgaged its future to the Soviet Union, but we would wish after the crisis that they would be stable.’” With the diametric opposition of Nigerians and Biafrans, if Nigerians could be associated with the Soviets, by extension, the Biafrans could not.
Unlike the FMG, Biafrans earned Adler’s respect for being kind, intelligent, and modern. She explains that it was common to call Nigerians “vandals,” and quotes a Biafran woman who magnanimously refers to Nigerians as “friends” – “I call them “my friends.” I have nothing against them. We are all human beings.” Modern infrastructure earns recognition too, “Biafran roads, before the bombings the best roads in Nigeria” and “Before the crisis, we were developing sanitation-consciousness in our people,’ he said. ‘We even anticipated problems of air pollution.” A head surgeon of a teaching hospital “studied at Johns Hopkins and did his residency at Cook County Hospital in Chicago” and had a chair “littered with cartridge tapes – Bach, Mozart, Stravinsky.” In one section, Adler describes court proceedings, ongoing despite the war and turmoil within the country, and elsewhere, she mentions that Biafrans had tried conscription for three months and found people did not like it, so they stopped. These descriptions of civility negate the image of African dictators and depict Biafra as a democratic and participatory society despite the formal institutions of a military government.

Readers also meet Biafrans who are educated and accomplished men and women. By including professional women in her article, Adler proffered further evidence of Biafra’s modernity because, particularly in colonial situations, women’s bodies provided a site where cultural authenticity and tradition was upheld. While the world knew that starvation ravaged the country, Biafrans did not sit idly by waiting for supplies: “We are studying plants which will not tempt people to eat the seedlings,’ he said. ‘We are studying the wild local vegetables for identification.” And without the necessary medical equipment, Biafrans found new ways to heal: a doctor pointed out “the results of operations: a Steinmann pin, consisting of a sterilized nail through an injured limb, with a bag of pebbles for traction at the foot of the bed; a splint made of scrap metal and screws for bad fractures.” Adler describes the strategic farming
methods, which had been implemented, and “the hospital’s pharmacy, in which some young scientists were producing dextrose, extracting pain killers and tranquillizers from mixed pills (for the tetanus and artillery cases), analyzing native remedies (‘It is like deciphering a code,’ a young scientist said), and making pills in test tubes.” Even the precious necessity, oil, found new life in Biafran hands: “What fuel there is in Biafra is made in little roadside refineries.”

Throughout her visit, which seems to have lasted about a week, Adler encountered many Biafrans, nearly all of whom appear to be professionals. In her account, she never hesitates to explain her contacts’ educational backgrounds; several of them boast American or British advanced degrees. When lacking a title conferred by a university education, Adler often mentions a Biafran person’s Christian faith. Thus, Adler meets: “Arthur Mbanefo, a Biafran government official, and Professor Ben Nwosu, a Biafran nuclear physicist educated in California;” “Dr. Fabian Udekwu, head surgeon;” “Miss Etuk, who received her doctorate in child psychology from Columbia University;” “a Presbyterian elder;” “Dr. Pius Okigbo (a Biafran economist and former representative of Nigeria to the European Common Market);” “Chinua Achebe, a Biafran novelist;” “Biafran intellectuals;” “a twenty-two-year-old nurse;” “Mr. Nwokedi, who was educated at the Ibo university at Nsukka;” “Ralph and Patience Nwokedi, who are Protestants;” “Dr. Ifegwu Eke, Commissioner of Information (who studied at McGill and at Harvard, where he earned his doctorate in economics);” “Dr. Bede Okigbo… who was once Dean of Agriculture at University of Nsukka, who studied at Washington State University and Cornell;” “a lady barrister and an engineer;” and finally the leader of Biafra who is no intellectual slouch. “General Ojukwu himself, thirty-six years old, bearded, not slim, educated at Oxford, and, much later, at Warminster… His father, Sir Louis Odumegwu Ojukwu,
who began in poverty, became a small investment banker, and died one of the richest men in Nigeria.”

In the background are many children, most of whom she encounters when visiting orphanages, schools, or feeding stations. Sometimes, Adler explains who is in charge – a Western priest or a Biafran schoolteacher – but other times, the station seems almost unstaffed, and the mere evidence of the population could be more visible than the people, such as one refugee camp, which exhibited “few occupants, although hundreds of pallets and bundles of personal belongings on the floor of a single room.”

Missing from the populace were adults who were not educated professionals, although their omission from the story could have been caused by a language barrier – perhaps Adler saw them, but could not interview them – or by their presence elsewhere, at the front or in the bush.

Despite the unseen nature of most of Biafra’s starving masses, Adler remains connected to the discourse of genocide: “It is possible that another ethnic population will be decimated before modern intelligence completes its debate about the extent to which the greatest crimes can be said to be the fault of the victims of them,” she states on the article’s first page, and on the next, “Nigeria intends to eliminate the peoples of the region that is now Biafra, and that the intention of genocide is not one that you test, passively, until the last returns are in.”

Later she describes, “A naked child hunkered outside, with the swollen stomach and utter lassitude of kwashiorkor.”

These apparent differences in levels of modern intellectual professional achievement of Biafrans and Nigerians, coupled with the threat of genocide, legitimate the secession for Adler. Without directly stating a political opinion, she does treat Biafrans as leaders rather than rebels, consistently naming them as Biafrans, while referring to the other side as Nigerians and making
it clear that many non-Igbo people whom she meets are supportive of Biafra. She explains, “Members of the Eastern minority tribes have often been killed along with the Ibos, and many of the minorities who once chose to remain in disturbed areas and risk Nigerian occupation have since taken refuge in Biafra.”547 Throughout her article, Adler portrays the conflict as a war between Biafra (the former Eastern Region) and Nigeria, depicted as two sovereign entities. This is not a civil war. In these ways, without directly stating it, Adler displays her approval of Biafran self-determination and the legitimacy of secession. In this, Biafrans were “persuaded by a series, both before and since the war, of broken accords, systematic exclusions, and outright massacres.”548 Adler’s article supported other inclusions about Biafra published in The New Yorker, during the war and beyond, that urged readers to financially support the humanitarian efforts to Biafra.

In spite of her palpable admiration for the Biafrans – and by extension, their cause – Adler’s article at its core expresses a sense of chaos, which is clearly visible in several comments about driving. More than mere descriptive material, driving can be seen as a metaphor for the forward progress of the country. When Adler first arrives in Biafra, at night due to flight restrictions, her chauffeur “drove nearly blindly, with dimmed headlights.”549 Elsewhere, she illustrates the haphazard nature of an official state transport: “The driver of a State House car, who had already nearly hit a goat and a chicken, nearly ran him down,” “Before dawn on Tuesday morning, a State House car, which had already nearly run over several hitchhikers on the road to Mbano,” and finally, “On the way back to Owerri, the State House driver ran over a chicken, and he did not stop.”550 The fact that in most cases it is an official car wreaking havoc on the roads, allows the driving comments to convey the disorder and volatility of life and
government in Biafra at the time of Adler’s visit. The subtext shows that Biafra, like its vehicles, may have been on the move, but the journey appeared neither smooth nor stable.

The topic of oil earns little coverage in Adler’s account of the situation, yet today it appears to scholars to have been possibly the most crucial element in the conflict. In the writing of Adler and others, it appears quite peripheral to the war. However, a recent study by economic scholar Chibuike U. Uche has shown that “British oil interests played a much more important role in the determination of the British attitude to the war then is usually conceded. Specifically, Britain was interested in protecting the investments of Shell-BP in Nigerian oil.”

The lack of interest in oil at the time can be seen in Forsyth’s *Biafra Story*, where he considers Britain’s involvement in the conflict and determines that oil was a factor, but not a major one. “It is still difficult to discern the precise reasons for the British Government’s decision of total support for Lagos,” Forsyth explains. “As regards the oil, Nigerian propaganda stated that 97.3 per cent of the oil production of Nigeria came from non-Ibo areas.” He does not take oil as a true cause of Britain’s support for Nigeria. “Besides which, every eye-witness present during the months before the decision to break away from Nigeria was made said later that oil was not the chief motive.” Instead, Forsyth determines two possible reasons that seem discernible. “One is that Whitehall received information at the start of the war from its High Commissioner in Lagos that the war would be short, sharp and sweet, and that one should certainly back the winner.” The other likely cause of war, according to Forsyth, was that “Britain had decided, though on the basis of what reasoning no one has explained, that the Nigerian market shall remain intact no matter what the price.”

Adler follows Forsyth’s line of thinking concerning the oil situation – it was more important to Nigerians than to Biafrans: “Most of Nigeria’s oil fields are in the Biafran region,
and the oil companies had their doubts … when it was not all over quickly, the Labour Government vastly increased its shipments of arms to Nigeria, and covered it up at home.”

She also comments that although Biafra seceded as the Eastern region, which included the oil-rich areas, oil had not been a reason for earlier disputes. She places Ojukwu’s mandate to secede before Gowon’s restructuring of the country into twelve states, which placed the oil fields outside Igboland, explaining that when chiefs and elders gave Ojukwu “a mandate to withdraw from Nigeria … The next day, Gowon published a decree which, among other measures, divided the Eastern Region into three small states, with Port Harcourt and the Eastern oil fields to be excised from the Ibo region… The oil fields, which had only begun producing just before Nigerian independence, had not been a factor in the dispute before.”

Analyses of the Nigeria-Biafra War today pinpoint oil as a significant factor in the war’s progression. The opening of journalist Philip Gourevitch’s 2010 article in The New Yorker reverses the news coverage viewpoint of genocide as the cause of the war and oil interests as an effect, stating, “In Biafra in 1968, a generation of children was starving to death. This was a year after oil-rich Biafra had seceded from Nigeria.” Siollun’s book Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture 1966-1976 clearly shines a spotlight on the role of oil in Nigeria’s post-independence history. While this begs the question of whether oil was a major factor in the secession and subsequent war, the point here concerns the attitude of the U.S. media toward oil as a major factor. While oil received occasional recognition, it was not the focus of coverage. Reporters and editors preferred to concentrate on either the humanitarian issues or the need for reunification. Neither did it form a vital part of the Biafran propaganda campaign, as concerns about genocide and starving children earned more international sympathy than would stories of a territory striving to maintain control of its oil reserves. As much as today’s scholars
note the importance of oil in its origins and British support of Nigeria when looking back on the war, Adler declines to follow suit during a 2014 interview. In response to the comment “Because so many countries weren’t backing them [Biafra] presumably to get their hands on the oil,” she states, “These guys were clearly the underdogs. And they were starving,” as if talking about oil at all would diminish the humanitarian crisis she witnessed.  

Notwithstanding the success of Biafra’s public relations campaign highlighting the issues of genocide and starvation, the OAU, Azikiwe, and others officially declared that genocide was not occurring in Biafra. In turn, the breakaway state’s publicity strategy shifted its focus to issues of race and neo-imperialism, claiming that the West backed Nigeria out of fear of Biafra as a nation of sophisticated and striving black men. With the Ahiara Declaration on June 1, 1969, Ojukwu positioned the Biafran struggle within the ongoing anticolonial struggles in Africa and invited comparisons to the civil rights movement in the United States. "Where the declaration drew on conventional critiques of imperialism and white supremacy, Ojukwu presented them in dialogue with early arguments about modernity." While not eliminating the previous rhetoric around modernity, Biafrans positioned themselves “toe to toe not with 'feudal', tradition-bound northern Nigeria but with dynamic, global white supremacy.” However, although Biafra may have adjusted its propaganda tactics, these new messages were not taken up wholesale by U.S. media. In a Christian Science Monitor article, a reporter who was in attendance during the presentation of the Declaration:

downplayed Ojukwu’s racial arguments. She described his vision of Biafra as “essentially Christian in outlook, and free of neocolonialist influence”. After opining that “Ojukwu is probably overestimating the racist factor” she also noted that “focusing on the race issue has helped Biafrans define more clearly what their role might be in a broader context. They now see their conflict with Nigeria as more than a war for independence and their homeland. They are now ready to believe that they can become the first truly independent, black nation in Africa.”
By contrast, Adler openly allows Effiong and Ojukwu to make points about racism, imperialism, and the tenets of the Ahiara Declaration. Effiong tells her “If we fail, you see … then the black man in Africa is going to fail, and the minority man wherever he is. One would think we had done enough against all this to prove that we deserve to live.” Ahiara “concludes that the reason the two-year war has not won more of the worlds’ unambiguous sympathy is that the Biafran people are black,” Adler explains. When she interviewed Ojukwu, issues of race and neo-imperialism were raised, “When I asked [Ojukwu] why he thought the Ahiara Declaration had not had much of an impact, particularly among American radicals, abroad, he said it was not the sort of speech to invite ‘that sort of dramatic response.’” Later:

[Ojukwu] spoke of the black “secret admirers” of Biafra, who feared the great unknown and could not believe that Biafra might succeed. I asked him how this compared with the white liberal position, and he said he thought white liberals were more openly sympathetic… I asked whether by success he meant the establishment of the first viable black republic, able to compete on an equal basis with white nations of the world, and he said that was exactly what he meant.

One can detect here an almost Fanonian Sixties engagement with the psychological impact of colonialism and racism on people of color. But the challenge was structural as well as moral and intellectual. Finally, Ojukwu said, “This is the worst system – this colonial, this neo-colonial fraud. It can only yield short-term results. There is no logical case against Biafra.”

4.7 Toward Resolution in Foreign Affairs

Even as The New Yorker stepped into the ring to encourage sympathy and support for the Biafran cause, the contrasting show of support for One Nigeria remained firm in the second Foreign Affairs article taking the West African nation as its topic. In his July 1969, thirteen-page “Elements of a Nigerian Peace,” Rev. Joseph C. McKenna, S.J. proffers recommendations for the “specific issues of the war which must be resolved.” McKenna was one of “three Joes,”
the first Jesuits assigned to Nigeria, Fr. Joseph Schuh, S.J. having arrived on August 16, 1962. Expecting to teach at the University of Lagos when he first set off for Nigeria in 1963, he instead worked at the National Catholic Education Section of the Nigerian Bishops Conference as a Catholic education advisor. McKenna lived and worked in Surulere, part of the Lagos metropolitan area, and in 1965 became superior of the Jesuit mission in the country, “overseeing its growth and development through the tragic civil war.”

In addition to the benefit of his background as a political scientist, the choice of McKenna as author of the second Foreign Affairs examination of the situation in Nigeria was in keeping with the central voice Catholic – and Protestant – missionaries claimed during the war. Curiously, McKenna’s recommendation for peace and reunification deviates from many of the pro-Biafra utterances of other priests on the ground. The typical image of the Catholic missionary during the war was one who helped win support for the Biafran cause from the outside world and spearheaded humanitarian relief efforts.

During the war, the Catholic Church dedicated itself to serving the Biafran cause in relief and publicity efforts. It was Pope Paul VI who directed Caritas Internationalis, the Church’s emergency response organization, to initiate a relief program for Biafra. A papal peace delegate visited Biafra in January 1968, determining that roughly 3 million people had already been displaced and declaring the level of starvation “‘horrific.” On March 27, 1968, Father Anthony Byrne organized the first relief airlift to Port Harcourt based on the delegate’s report, and in July, he participated in a conference in New York where he described the starvation crisis. His speech prompted Catholic Relief Services to organize an emergency airlift, which left New York just over a week later. Church groups in Europe and North America began to send relief supplies, chartering aircraft to do so. A desire to increase relief efforts soon led to the formation
of Joint Church Aid (JCA), a consortium of groups from thirty-three countries, which was formalized at a meeting in Rome convened by a representative of Caritas Internationalis on November 8-9, 1968. JCA comprised Catholic and Protestant organizations and also gained support from the umbrella organization American Jewish Emergency Effort for Biafran Relief.\textsuperscript{572} JCA airlifts of food and medicine became more crucial after the ICRC plane was shot down on June 5, 1969.

Despite the collaborative nature of JCA, Catholic involvement remained at the forefront of the organization. “For the entire period of humanitarian assistance, the JCA relied on missionaries who were already in Biafra for the organization and distribution of relief aid. Most of these missionaries were Catholics.”\textsuperscript{573} Although the on-the-ground distribution relied on transportation provided by the Biafran government, JCA did not allow Ojukwu’s functionaries to distribute relief materials, and “church humanitarian agencies were still largely able to maintain their operational independence. Church relief officials were keen to be seen as independent actors because of the perception on the Nigerian side that humanitarian agencies were sympathetic to the Biafran cause.”\textsuperscript{574}

The FMG would have had good reason to question the Church’s support of Biafrans because Catholic missionaries often served as media sources and even tour guides for media visiting Biafra to provide coverage of the ravages of war. For example, Holy Ghost Father Kevin Doheny, a veteran missionary in Nigeria, led British television journalist Alan Hart to capture scenes of the war’s young victims in Spring of 1968. Within hours of Hart’s story airing, “people worldwide were asking how they could donate money to stop the suffering, while demanding that their governments put aside political considerations and mobilize more resources to help.”\textsuperscript{575} When international journalists turned to Forsyth for reliable sources, he led them to Irish priests,
as he had worked closely with Doheny for a BBC story. During the conflict, several Irish priests became “international celebrities” and developed a calculated communication strategy, which included an “ongoing public relations campaign on behalf of innocent victims” that was executed in Europe and the United States. By June 1968 when media coverage of the war turned to starvation, it was priests who were credited with pronouncing the statistic that by the end of the rainy season 1 million Biafrans would die from hunger-related diseases. Throughout the conflict, priests continued to serve as media sources, and Doheny wrote to his brother of his happiness with the publicity they had generated.

In the United States, the famous Life magazine photographs published on July 12, 1968 resulted in part from the photographer’s tour with Holy Ghost Father Daniel O’Connell. “While these media stories represent just a small portion of those reaching English-speaking readers, this focus on the civilian population often highlighted the twin themes suggested by Kevin Doheny: genocide and starvation.” Further, while some stories did focus on the political situation, most of the human-interest features came out of Biafra, due in part to the FMG’s refusal to share information or allow journalist access. Indeed, “the missionaries and humanitarian workers’ claims about how many people were affected, and what needed to occur to stop further death, are framed as carrying more weight than the frequent pronouncements from the Nigerian and British governments, and even from international bodies such as the United Nations and the International Red Cross.”

In his article “Blaming the Gods: Christian Religious Propaganda in the Nigeria-Biafra War,” Nicholas Ibeawuchi Omenka discusses the religious rhetoric that was “widely and effectively used as war propaganda,” whereby the actual religious diversity in Nigeria was reduced to a Christian Eastern Region (Biafra) and a Muslim North, which was then substituted
The purpose, according to Omenka, was the depiction by Biafra and international Christian bodies of the conflict as a religious war. However, “The Christian Igbo versus Muslim Hausa/Fulani stereotype of the Civil War collapses under scrutiny.” At the time war began, three Catholic ecclesiastical provinces existed in Nigeria – one in the former Eastern Region, one in Lagos, and one in Kaduna, in the North. “Yet the religious war rhetoric remained a formidable force in the Nigeria-Biafra propaganda war not only in Biafra but also among its foreign Christian sympathizers.”

This war publicity strategy served to alienate Nigerian Christians and also “threatened the very existence of the Church in Nigeria” as the FMG grew concerned about Christian humanitarian relief efforts that did not respect Nigeria’s sovereignty.

In a goodwill message to the Nigerian Catholic bishops meeting in conference in September 1969, General Gowon, the head of state, extolled the achievements of the Catholic Church in Nigeria but at the same time expressed his ‘dismay and disappointment’ over the ‘anti-Nigeria acts’ of some members of the Catholic Church overseas, who had, among other things, ‘dubbed our present crisis a religious war.’ He expected the bishops as spiritual leaders to give unflinching support to the struggle for a united Nigeria.

When it finally engaged in a concentrated propaganda campaign of its own, the FMG pressured Christian leaders “to undertake worldwide counter measures against the religious war propaganda,” which “proved very effective.”

Thus, despite his status as a Jesuit leader in Nigeria, McKenna penned his Foreign Affairs article from Lagos, even basing his information about Biafra on “journalists who visit Biafra.” His article, published in 1969, toed the line of FMG instructions and never mentioned religion: “The secession of Nigeria's Eastern Region in May 1967 and its assumption of national sovereignty as the "Republic of Biafra" erupted out of a complex skein of historical experiences, cultural differences, economics, party politics and ethnic antagonisms.”
In the opening paragraph, McKenna refers to the conflict as a civil war, making plain his political viewpoint, and although he offers an extensive show of sympathy for the Igbo, and even questions Gowon’s legitimacy, he favors unification. “The most painful and provocative incident leading to the war was the outburst of attacks on the Ibos by civilians … Unable now to feel secure away from their native soil, the Ibos saw themselves as the target of genocide. The trauma… cannot be overestimated. Secession had become almost inevitable,” McKenna explains during the article’s review of the situation up to 1969.589 Introducing Gowon as a Northerner “from one of the Middle Belt tribes,” McKenna explains, “In strictly legal terms his title to succeed Ironsi is not clear, for there was not, as in January, any formal transfer of power and Ojukwu, still Governor of the East, studiously refrained from acknowledging Gowon’s position.”590

Despite this show of understanding for the Biafran cause, McKenna seeks to elucidate the reasoning of the FMG’s refusal to accept the secession of Biafra despite the fact that “fear and personal insecurity were the prime driving force of the Ibo’s move,” fear, which he says “was a fact, and a fact to which the Nigerian Government has never given the weight it deserves.”591 Nevertheless, the government’s motivation to suppress the secession was “grounded in rational concern for the interrelated political and economic integrity of Nigeria. The prestige which the country has consistently enjoyed in international forums rests partly on its size and economic promise… Moreover, the FMG was not disposed to abandon the Eastern oil that promised development capital for the whole country.”592

McKenna’s wholehearted support of a peaceful resolution and Nigerian reunification takes into account seven issues that the country must overcome; nevertheless, he rationalizes the imperative of One Nigeria by writing “to concede Ibos independence would cause enduring
conflict in Africa as bitter as that of Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East, permanently draining the resources of both sides into a senseless arms race and possibly exposing the area once more to a dangerous rivalry of major powers. Thus, even though McKenna, who served as a Jesuit missionary in Nigeria for nearly twenty years, recognized the validity of Igbo fears that led to secession, independence for Biafra would mean the downfall of all of Africa. This viewpoint diametrically opposes Ojukwu’s claim that Biafra would signify the world’s first successful African nation.

In the final section of his article, McKenna reiterates the necessity and benefits of a united Nigeria as well as the correctness of the view of the conflict as a civil war, rather than a war of independence, underlining the idea that Biafra has nothing to gain by the continuation of fighting. Even if it were possible for

Ibos to wage guerrilla warfare long after they have lost their last airstrip… what they could gain would hardly seem to justify their heavy losses… Even if guerrilla tactics do compel a Federal withdrawal, Biafra would remain surrounded by hostile forces … landlocked and with only minimal natural resources on which to build a viable economy.

McKenna sees the people as members of one nation notwithstanding their ethnic identities, bemoaning the civilian casualties that “may already exceed 1.5 million persons – all, be it remembered, citizens of Nigeria.” A ceasefire and reunification would be in everyone’s best interest:

Economically, the peoples of Nigeria would prosper far more together than apart. Both parties would profit from a reopening of rail and motor roads from the northern states to Port Harcourt and Calabar; from the electric power and water-level control on the Niger afforded by the new Kainji Dam; and from the complementarity of Enugu coal and Jos tin, of Ogoja yams and Owerri markets, of Ibo managerial and technical skills and Rivers oil. In the long politico-military contest between the Ibos and the FMG that began in July 1966, the mutual advantage in coming to terms has seldom been as clear as in the first half of 1969.
In closing, McKenna admits, “The task of reconstruction will be vast,” but this does not sway his political belief in a united Nigeria, an opinion that converged with the position of the U.S. government. Willing to provide humanitarian aid, Washington remained “neutral” on the “civil war,” which was labeled an internal conflict, in effect supporting a unified Nigeria and maintaining Anglo-American solidarity through this rhetoric. At the end of the war, about 500 Christian supporters of Biafra, including the Holy Ghost fathers and other aid workers, were deported. By contrast, McKenna, who promoted Nigerian reunification rather than Biafran independence, remained in Nigeria until 1980.

4.8 *The New Yorker Considers One Nigeria After Biafra*

With Biafran surrender announced by President Philip Effiong on January 12, 1970 – Ojukwu had fled to Ivory Coast days earlier – U.S. media interest in Biafra and the future of reunited Nigeria continued for some time. Immediately following the conclusion of the Nigeria-Biafra War, there was an urge to make sense of what had happened and an early outpouring of academic reviews, war stories, and novels. Media coverage in 1970 looked toward Nigeria’s future and the safety of Biafrans, both civilians and soldiers, now under Nigerian control.

In keeping with its earlier coverage, *The New Yorker* voiced similar concern for the welfare of Biafrans in a January 24 inclusion in Talk of the Town titled “Aid to the Defeated.” Reviewing the situation in Biafra, determined dire despite the war’s conclusion and Gowon’s promises, *The New Yorker* visited the New York offices of several Biafran relief organizations including ACKBA, Joint Church Aid, Catholic Relief Services, American Jewish Emergency Effort for Nigerian-Biafran Relief, Biafra Relief Services Foundation, and Americans for Biafran Relief and phoned the International Services of the American National Red Cross in Washington. The consensus showed continued apprehension about the well-being of Biafrans and either a
disbelief in the Nigerian government’s claim of protection of former Biafrans or at least a lack of faith that the government would be able to get the supplies of food and other necessities to the Biafrans in time. “‘[T]he Nigerian government is utterly incapable of mounting a relief effort to feed all these people … You can’t fool around for three weeks with the life of a starving man,’” said Reverend Fintan Kilbride of the Holy Ghost Missionaries who had recently returned from a 16-day trip to Biafra and was conferring with the chairman of Americans for Biafran Relief. 601

At ACKBA, efforts were being made to convince officials to send telegrams to President Nixon “asking him to send not only relief but observer teams.” 602 The need for American government involvement was necessitated by Gowon’s condemnation of:

certain of the foreign relief agencies … for having prolonged the war by aiding Biafra… Spurning any future offers of help from these agencies, and also from any country that had been ‘studiously hostile’ toward Nigeria … Some of the affected agencies turned to the United States government in their search for a way to help, but again they were blocked, for this country’s stated policy involves a willingness to trust the Nigerian government to behave well toward the former rebels, and to accept the proposition – disputed by most of the agencies – that Nigeria will be able to provide food and medical supplies fast enough to prevent millions of people from dying of starvation. 603

Even with assistance from the U.S. government, it is questionable that Gowon would have accepted immediate relief efforts. According to Schwab, on January 11, Nixon had already ordered Air Force cargo aircraft and helicopters ready to distribute food supplies and authorized another $10 million in food and medicine. In reply, “Gowon expressed ‘warm appreciation’ for the offers of aid from Britain and the U.S. but gave no indication when he might give approval to move the stockpiled food and supplies donated by foreign countries.” 604 Massive relief was available, but the difficulty lay in getting it to those who needed it. “‘There is no need to collect more food or money now … Everything exists and is ready. The only question is getting the Nigerians’ permission to bring the supplies in,’” Samuel Krakow, director of International
Services of the American National Red Cross explains to *The New Yorker*. Multiple contacts express concern that thousands of Biafrans were hiding in “the bush,” and therefore would not have access to feeding stations even if food made its way to former Biafran territory. In the meantime, accusations of genocide continued in *The New Yorker* reportage. Father Kilbride recommends an international observer team to witness the conduct of Nigerian soldiers:

“I don’t mean just four or five people – I mean fifty people, or maybe even a hundred. Because the Biafrans are convinced that they will be exterminated … and there is much evidence to support this belief – that there will be a selective genocide, that a lot of the educated people will be killed off, maybe under the pretext of their being war criminals.”

Notwithstanding this intense level of concern in January, *The New Yorker* failed to continue to assess the situation in Nigeria/Biafra. The next inclusion of Nigeria came in the March 28 issue with a Talk of the Town article about a Judge Dillard who had just been elected to the International Court of Justice. Dillard jokes that he can fix a traffic ticket in Cameroon or Nigeria. Thus, Nigeria has been reinstated to its pre-war status as a symbol of corruption. By July, the conflict could be used as an example of the trouble with Africa in an article questioning the continuation of the Vietnam War. The reporter interviewed Eugene V. Rostow, Johnson’s Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1966 to 1969, on the necessity of U.S. intervention in Vietnam due to his “eagerness to defend it in public.” In explaining his take on U.S.-Africa foreign relations, Rostow referred to the recent war, albeit with mistakes in his recollection:

“We’ve been very passive about Africa. I don’t think we’ve been doing enough there, myself. But, again, tensions can build up pretty acutely. Take the Nigerian affair. At first, our attitude was ‘Let the British take care of it, it’s not our concern.’ Then it went to hell. And then it became insoluble. We tried to help resolve it through diplomacy, through the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Organization of African Unity. The Africans didn’t want it to come to the U.N. They wanted to deal with it themselves.”
Coverage of Nigeria in *The New Yorker* during the remainder of 1970 comprised only inconsequential mentions in three additional articles. The concern about genocide, the call for humanitarian relief, and the modernity of Biafra were not raised again that year.

### 4.9 Conclusion

Biafra’s wartime publicity campaign had long-lasting results, and the war continues to be explained in terms developed during the crisis. For example, Mark Kurlansky describes the lead-up to secession thus: Gowon came to power in a “second coup and slaughtered thousands of Ibos who were resented for their ability to adapt to modern technology.”

Throughout the war, Biafra launched a strong international propaganda campaign, which was widely recognized as more successful than the promotional efforts of the FMG. The discourses of the Biafran campaign were received with varying levels of acceptance based on the orientation of the publication, its writers, and its editors. The U.S. government’s consistent message of political neutrality conflicted with its actual backing of its ally Britain. According to Frederick Cooper, “the publicity generated sympathy for Biafra and deepened the image of Africa as a land of starving children victimized by wars that seem a product of irrational tribal enmity. That it was a war of maneuvering politicians, as much to do with geographic region as with ethnicity, was more difficult to convey than the stark images.”

However, coupled with this lingering image of starvation and suffering were depictions of modern, educated, and savvy Biafrans, an image that has not similarly embedded itself into Western stereotypes of Africa.

Even with the extensive supply of photos and news reports covering starving children and dying babies, U.S. media coverage also featured interpretations of the war and its effects. While a liberal publication like *The New Yorker* rallied people to bolster humanitarian efforts, *Foreign Affairs* paid cursory attention to the crisis and looked toward Nigerian unity. As Forsyth asserted,
the role of the press was pivotal in the Nigeria-Biafra War, “Looking back it is odd to think that despite the efforts of the Biafran publicists and lobbyists on their own behalf, this translation of the Biafra affair from a forgotten bush-war into an international issue was basically caused by a typewriter and a strip of celluloid, used many times over. It showed the enormous power of the press to influence opinion when its organs are used in concert.”

A salient issue for recent scholarship on the conflict, oil drew minimal attention in U.S. media coverage at the time of the war. Perhaps this was because, as Uche states, “Given the fact that America had no colonial knowledge of the region, there was no basis for upsetting economic interests there.” While American companies had fledgling operations in Nigeria in 1967, 84% of the oil at that time was produced by Shell-BP, and Gulf Oil Nigeria, the American oil interest was located offshore in the Midwest region. “The consequence was that the American government did not give serious thought to the Biafran secession. It simply treated it as the internal affair of Nigeria and a British responsibility.” The U.S. government “expressed regret” but continued to reject involvement, “since it considered the dispute to be an internal matter to be settled by the two disputing parties.” However, as evidenced by coverage in Foreign Affairs and The New Yorker, the American public was responsive to views ranging from humanitarianism and sympathy of the Biafran cause to admiration for Biafra’s modernity, as well as advocacy of reunification coupled with reform in post-war Nigeria. In keeping with the hands-off policy of the U.S. government, effectively a vote for Nigerian unity and an endorsement of British policy, Foreign Affairs inclusions looked only to outline problems and solutions for the young nation.

Thus, throughout the Nigeria-Biafra War, U.S. media reflected and promoted a multiplicity of analyses, solutions, and predictions. In The New Yorker, as in Forsyth’s Biafra,
readers were exposed to a liberal viewpoint and were prompted to become actively involved through “writing a check” and providing humanitarian aid to the Biafrans who seemingly provided an example of the success of colonialism’s civilizing mission. The New Yorker coverage replicated Biafran-initiated discourses of modernity and genocide, also creating an anti-Conrad discourse that negated the dehumanization of Africans. Even if her humanistic reporting of African intellectuals and professionals, willing and able to help themselves fight a genocidal enemy has been abandoned, Adler brought to life for New Yorker readers, for a time, a new telling of the African story.

And if the Nigeria-Biafra War has been forgotten outside Nigeria, the photographic images circulated during the conflict have remained. During the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, Africa has been depicted as a space where modernity and “tradition” contended, but since then, the trope of African suffering has strengthened. Paired with that image, the notion of a continent in dire need of humanitarian aid, due to war, disease, or poverty, has only solidified in the reportage of the U.S. media.
THE GENTLE REBEL: HOW THE RADICAL PRESS DISPATCHED AMILCAR CABRAL’S PLAN TO REMAKE SOCIETY IN GUINEA-BISSAU, 1972-1975

But now the tragedy is too great for us, your Comrades. The great Cabral is now no more and no more As the whole wide world does now shockingly know; The courageous warm Cabral ’ll soon be dust, Will soon be one and the same with the very soil, The very soil for which while alive he did heartily toil.  

As Biafrans relinquished the fight for independence and Nigeria reunited, the peoples of “Portuguese Africa” continued their struggle for liberation. Like Patrice Lumumba before him, African revolutionary Amilcar Cabral was featured on the front page of The New York Times when he was assassinated in January 1973.  

Cabral, head of the PAIGC, the party fighting Portuguese colonists for the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, enjoyed a much better image in the U.S. press than had Lumumba. An agronomist and intellectual, Cabral was called “The Gentle Rebel” in his TIME magazine obituary. Although TIME interpreted the assassination as a loss to Lisbon in light of Cabral’s moderate stance, it was later determined that Portuguese forces were behind his murder. Cabral’s death only strengthened the PAIGC’s resolve: nine months later, its leaders declared Guinea-Bissau’s independence on September 24, 1973. The following April in Lisbon, fed up with colonial wars the country was fighting in Angola, Mozambique, and East Timor as well as Guinea-Bissau, the Portuguese military staged a coup, and the new government in September 1974, formally granted freedom to Guinea-Bissau. However, the goals of the PAIGC were not met completely until Lisbon conferred independence to Cape Verde in 1975.  

By the early 1970s, the question of colonialism and decolonization had become less prominent in U.S. press coverage. A decade had passed since the United Nations issued its 1960
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the majority of African countries were now independent. In the United States, the New Left was peaking, the Civil Rights Movement had given way to Black Power, and women’s rights and gay rights were rising on the agenda for social change. The Vietnam War had eclipsed American worries about Soviet influence in Africa. U.S. interest in Africa often focused on white minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia. Between 1956, when the PAIGC was formed, and 1972, on the eve of Cabral’s murder, he was featured in almost thirty articles in *The New York Times*. Given their strategic location and vast resources, Angola and Mozambique earned thousands of inclusions in that newspaper. “The economic links between the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia and South Africa are strong, and likely to grow stronger,” *The Times of London* news team determined in 1968.  

*The New York Times’* relative lack of coverage of Guinea-Bissau was not mirrored by the radical press. These outlets, which flourished during the late 1960s and early 1970s, set new agendas for what counted as important news, and framed stories and people in independent ways. Media scholars Linda Lumsden and Janice Hume argue that social movements have not fared well in mainstream coverage, but the radical press emerged to redress this negative treatment. Including the radical press in any inquiry concerning press coverage of anticolonialism in West Africa seems vital. Yet, as communication professor and former editor of *Monthly Review* Robert W. McChesney points out, “Journalism historians have shown a remarkable disinclination to study the radical and noncommercial press, particularly in the twentieth century.” He suggests this is because journalism history and the field of communication “nurtured by corporate grants and close links to the media industry, have yet to cut the umbilical cord and seriously entertain any notion of meaningful social criticism.”
Media scholar Elaine Windrich examines U.S. media coverage of the Reagan-era conflict in Angola and the propping up of “freedom fighter” Jonas Savimbi. She relied on numerous media sources, most in the mainstream press, but also some “right-wing and conservative” publications. When mentioning media that opposed Savimbi, she points out that “no label would accurately describe such diverse opposition sources as the alternative press, publications of the anti-apartheid movement, the churches and the Afro-American community, and some of the mainstream press.”

As the war continued, interest grew, and the interest in South Africa received greater scrutiny. Windrich’s study suggests there is much still to learn about the role and reach of the radical print media in the relationship between the United States and West Africa in the age of independence.

Considering the breadth of approving American media representations of Cabral, this chapter begins by reviewing the treatment of his death in The New York Times, which offers a baseline to which radical media outlets can be compared. What initially interested me about mainstream characterizations of Cabral was the fact that despite his obvious Marxist outlook and the PAIGC’s goal of social transformation as well as political independence, the U.S. mainstream media focused instead on his reluctant use of violence, soft voice, fondness for poetry, and other qualities not typically ascribed to African leaders. Cabral did indeed have a melodious voice and a peaceful manner, even though many photos showed him in fatigues surrounded by PAIGC fighters. Cabral’s image is something of an anomaly among African leaders considered in this dissertation: Nkrumah, Touré, Lumumba, Gowon, and Ojukwu.

Building on Cabral’s mainstream U.S. media image, this chapter explores coverage of Cabral in the leftist African American quarterly Freedomways, the radical monthly Ramparts, and the underground Atlanta weekly The Great Speckled Bird. Aiming for congruency, most articles
under review concern Cabral’s death and the aftermath. Stephanie Urdang’s book *Fighting Two Colonialisms* is also considered for its look at the work of the PAIGC to liberate women, something that was not a focus of media coverage in mainstream or radical press outlets.

### 5.1 Background to Liberation

Portugal’s involvement in African began some six centuries ago. Slaves were part of the trade between Portuguese and Africans in small trading posts along the Rio Grande. Guinea-Bissau is a small country, about the size of Switzerland and at the time of the liberation struggle had a population of fewer than one million Africans, 35,000 Portuguese soldiers, and a few thousand Portuguese civilians. With the scramble in Africa, the territory was given to the Portuguese as a wedge between the British and French empires in West Africa. Siting today between Senegal and Guinea (Conakry), it once stopped the French from taking a long and continuous swath of West African coast. Initially, the Portuguese did not have significant plans for the territory, nor did they understand much about the region. However, the requirement of “effective occupation” according to the Berlin Conference, led wars of conquest against the indigenous peoples. Pacification proved a slow process, which was achieved after some fifty years of military campaigning.

The land of Guinea-Bissau includes swampy lowlands along the coast and an interior of grasslands, forests, and savanna. A network of rivers characterizes the western and southern areas including estuaries from the Atlantic. Most of the urban areas are located near the coast. “The topographical features of Guinea-Bissau are striking in their variety in view of the limited land mass of the country.” Lands near rivers are fertile, while other areas have been depleted of minerals and subjected to erosion and aridity, although most land offers “varying degrees of
soil fecundity making possible the cultivation of a wide range of tropical as well as more temperate products. The Portuguese utilized Guinea-Bissau as an agricultural producer; the main crop was peanuts. As is common in colonial situations, this cash crop was cultivated at the expense of staple food crops.

Until military rule began in Portugal in 1926, the Portuguese colonial record was better than that of the Belgians. In 1932, António Salazar took the position of Prime Minister of Portugal, and under his conservative, “fascist” government, forced labor accompanied lack of opportunity for Africans. Economically, the colony was run as a monopolist trading company, the Uniao Fabril. The structure allowed for minimal development with much of the population forced to produce cash crops. Portugal did little to “improve” Guinea-Bissau. “At home and in overseas Africa, according to official statistics and information in the early 1960’s [sic], Portugal lagged behind the welfare programs established in other European countries.” Although, Portuguese colonial policy offered assimilation, the colonial government made achieving the preferential status of “assimilado” nearly impossible. In order to become assimilado, an African had to speak proper Portuguese, prove good character, qualify as educated, earn sufficient income, and manage a significant amount of paperwork. In Guinea-Bissau, only 1% of the population was literate at an elementary level. On the Cape Verdean Islands, things were different. Islanders became citizens in 1914 and were treated as assimilados. Salazar’s government did not eliminate this policy. Born in Guinea-Bissau to Cape Verdean parents, Cabral was classified as assimilado.

His status as an assimilado permitted Cabral, a rarity among Guinea-Bissauans, to travel for advanced studies in Lisbon where, like the founders of négritude in the 1930s, he met other
colonial students and initiated a project for change. Cabral worked with Angolans Agostinho Neto and Mário Pinto de Andrade to form the Centre for African Studies in Lisbon, claiming they wanted to study native African languages. The Centre allowed them to pursue political discussions about how they could play a part in liberating their countries. Upon examining the colonial structure, they determined that no real progress could be made within the framework the Portuguese had put in place. When Cabral returned to Africa, he worked as an agricultural engineer, which allowed him to tour most of Guinea-Bissau and gain a deep understanding about the cultures and peoples living throughout the territory. This experience proved critical when he began to organize the PAIGC and later envision its guerrilla war strategy.

In 1956, Cabral led the formation of the PAIGC (*Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde*), a clandestine political organization. When striking dockworkers were “shot back to work by the police” who killed fifty participants on August 3, 1959, the “whole situation suddenly sharpened.” On September 19, the PAIGC leaders met to declare struggle against the Portuguese “by all possible means, including war.” Their strategy would be to mobilize the peasants in the countryside, strengthen the organization in urban areas but keep it a secret, develop unity around the Party of the African masses without discrimination, prepare as many cadres as possible, reach out to émigrés in neighboring territories, and work to acquire the means that would be needed for success. This meant that the struggle for liberation would also need to develop outside of the country, and bases were set up across the borders in Sékou Touré’s Guinea (Conakry) and Léopold Sédar Senghor’s Senegal.

Cabral and the PAIGC did not rush into war. They began with acts of sabotage began in 1962, and armed struggle officially commenced on January 23, 1963 with an attack on the
Portuguese barracks at Tite. For several years, the PAIGC recruited, educated, and trained.

“The PAIGC needed three years of active political work in the villages before they could reply to the Portuguese with guerrilla warfare.” Cabral tailored the liberation struggle and its message to the needs and context of the Guinea-Bissauan peasants. The PAIGC fought a guerrilla war for many years, step by step, as Cabral would say, taking over territory and setting up an alternative government. Rather than beginning with the cities, they worked through the forest and agricultural areas so that by the early 1970s, they controlled what they called liberated zones in two-thirds of the country. Just before Cabral’s death, he was planning to go to the U.N. to declare an independent nation based on the territory the PAIGC governed. The rest of the territory, they claimed, was under enemy occupation.

Cabral grounded his theory and practice of revolution on a “Marxist analysis of social reality” and, more importantly, “an analysis of social reality in [Guinea-Bissau].” For Cabral, revolution had to be accompanied by social transformation. “Hence the central concept of national liberation was to be defined not so much as the right of a people to rule itself, but as the right of a people to regain its own history: ‘to liberate, that is, the means and process of development of its own productive forces.’” Thus, in the midst of the struggle in 1966, Cabral laid out a plan for “political action, armed action, and national reconstruction,” which needed to occur simultaneously. While fighting the Portuguese, the PAIGC must “Find better solutions for the economic, administrative, social, and cultural problems of the liberated areas, increase farming production, develop craft-industry, lay foundations for at least rudimentary industrial production, and continue to improve our health and education services.” Along with education, production, and political participation, women’s emancipation was part of the process of social transformation sought by the PAIGC. “Armed struggle and defeat of the colonialists
was not the ultimate goal; rather, the overall perspective of the PAIGC embraced the need simultaneously to pick up arms and to build a new, nonexploitative society.” The PAIGC ideology integrated the “emancipation of women into the total revolution.”

Cabral did not live to witness the full results of the PAIGC revolutionary strategy. Outside his Conakry home one night, returning from an event, Cabral was shot by Inocencio Kani, a PAIGC member who had been turned by Portugal. Now led by Marcelo Caetano, the Portuguese had determined that killing Cabral and other leaders of the PAIGC would cripple the organization and disrupt the liberation struggle. However, this strategy proved unsuccessful.

The plan to behead the PAIGC failed, for the collective leadership had escaped intact, minus Cabral. In fact, Cabral’s assassination had a paradoxical impact unforeseen by [Portuguese General António de] Spinola. With Cabral, the PAIGC had achieved a great deal. He had steered the party and its nationalist army to critically acclaimed success. He had helped transform the party and its structures into an entity greater than himself. The party was now indeed indispensable, even as Cabral proved not to be. He had become less than what he had helped create. And what he had helped create proved capable of marching forward with new leadership. That truly was the greatest achievement of Cabral, the true slave to a vision – an ordinary man gripped by history to do his job in the context of his time.

Shortly prior to Cabral’s assassination, the Portuguese had put in place some belated measures to improve the lives of the people in its colonial territories, hoping to win them over. Portugal was a small country without great wealth, and the colonial wars were draining its coffers. Nevertheless, Portugal was unwilling to part with the small Guinea-Bissau, lest it encourage resource-rich Angola and Mozambique to intensify their efforts for independence.

People around the world mourned Cabral’s death. He had traveled extensively and spoken at the United Nations about Guinea-Bissau’s fight for liberation. He was known for his soft-spoken, philosophical nature. Even though his guerrilla war was Marxist-inspired, Cabral was treated with respect in mainstream U.S. media coverage. However, the United States
government would never back the liberation struggle against its NATO ally.\textsuperscript{643} In 1971, Washington and Lisbon signed the Azores Agreement, which provided $436 million in much-needed aid over a two-year period, “roughly equivalent to Lisbon’s annual $400 million military security budget, most of which” supported “three colonial wars.”\textsuperscript{644}

5.2 The Mainstream Press Laments Cabral’s Death

By the early 1970s, American publications covered African colonial wars in a social and political climate that had undergone several shifts since the Congo crisis. The civil rights and later black power movements, the New Left, Vietnam, and Watergate affected the way writers reported and readers understood events like Cabral’s assassination. Coupled with the growth of alternative media sources, such as the “underground” press, the demographic of mainstream media staff had begun to change. At the elite mainstream \textit{New York Times}, for example, black journalists Thomas A. Johnson and C. Gerald Fraser would contribute some of the pieces about the PAIGC’s murdered leader.

Johnson joined the paper in February 1966, “the only black reporter at \textit{The Times},” according to former managing editor Arthur Gelb.\textsuperscript{645} He was one of the first black journalists to serve as a foreign correspondent for a major daily newspaper and was stationed in Lagos, Nigeria from 1972 to 1975, which allowed him to provide copy following Cabral’s January 20, 1973 assassination.\textsuperscript{646} Based in Vietnam among other locations prior to his stint in Africa, Johnson won awards for his coverage of black servicemen. With \textit{The New York Times}, he “often found himself as both a reporter and an interpreter of racial conflict and change.”\textsuperscript{647} Johnson’s fellow reporter Fraser had worked for \textit{The Amsterdam News}, a hotel workers union newspaper, West Indian publications, and \textit{The New York Daily News} before joining \textit{The New York Times} in 1967. As a metropolitan staff reporter, he “became a vocal advocate for improving coverage of issues
important to blacks and expanding opportunities for black journalists.” He reported on the Attica rebellion in 1971 as well as the presidential campaign of Shirley Chisholm in 1972.

With their coverage of Cabral’s death, Johnson and Fraser relied less on African stereotypes and accusations of communism than we have seen in mainstream media coverage of Sékou Touré or Lumumba. In fact, *Times* readers had the opportunity to revisit Guinea and its leader Sékou Touré when Johnson attended Cabral’s funeral in Conakry. A far cry from the dancing women, shrieking *griots*, and wild beating of the tom toms that characterized Guinea’s independence celebration in *TIME*, during this dignified ceremony, Cabral’s carriage was “slowly paced by drums and horns” as “thousands of Guinean military men and women, policemen and workers paraded through the stadium.” Johnson makes it clear who Guinea’s allies are, mentioning that parade participants carried “a mixed assortment of Soviet-made rifles, automatic rifles and submachine guns” while “six MIG fighters roared overhead.” Yet, Guinea’s enemy was quickly identified as Sékou Touré called to the crowd, “‘Racism?,’ ‘Imperialism?,’ ‘Fascism?’” to which the “multitude” responded “No!” each time. The prior day, Johnson had attended a symposium in honor of Cabral including “more than seven hours of eulogies and denunciations of ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism.’” Speakers included American writer Amiri Baraka (the former LeRoi Jones), a North Vietnamese delegation, Pedro Soarez, “leader of Portugal’s outlawed Communist party, who blamed ‘Portuguese fascists’ for the Cabral murder,” and a “bearded, heavy-set Portuguese of about 30” who said that the leaders of the armed struggle inside Portugal “supported Mr. Cabral and opposed ‘fascism.’” Thus, while acknowledging the Soviet and Communist ties of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, Johnson highlights what Cabral’s mourners identified as their enemy - fascism, possibly the only “ism” that could have trumped communism for American readers, in Portugal. In fact, he closes with a brief
paragraph about Guinea, explaining that under Touré, the country “had followed a policy of ‘African scientific socialism’” and even if Guinea had “numerous Chinese and Soviet advisers,” it also enjoyed “substantial American investment in bauxite-mining operations.”

Johnson had already contributed to an earlier piece on Cabral in The World section of the *Sunday New York Times*. This article included a section carrying C. Gerald Fraser’s byline along with a map of Africa marking the areas affected by “rebellion” and noting, “Two leaders of anti-Portuguese rebellions in Africa … have been assassinated in recent years: Eduardo Mondlane … and Amilcar Cabral.” In the first portion of the article, Johnson describes Cabral as “the small, soft-spoken Cape Verdean” and reviews some of his achievements, such as “winning about two thirds of the 13,948 square miles of Guinea-Bissau, as a United Nations observer team has verified.” Johnson refers to reports that Cabral’s forces had conducted elections, created a national assembly, and set up 200 primary schools, four hospitals, and 200 clinics.

Generally, the P.A.I.G.C. military operations have left some 10,000 Portuguese troops in control only of the cities. Recently Mr. Cabral said he would declare the independence of the areas controlled by his forces and movement sources say he had been promised the backing of some 70 nations for the move … only history can tell whether Mr. Cabral’s hope of ousting the Portuguese – or claiming independence – will be set back, or even ended.

Johnson explains why the little country of Guinea-Bissau matters: “the assassination has ramifications beyond the borders of Guinea-Bissau. Portuguese soldiers are also fighting to hold onto the vast colonies of Angola and Mozambique.” He points out that some organizations involved in “liberation movements” use “friendly African countries as their bases for making forays into white-held regions.”

The second piece of the “Symbol of Hope” article was written by Fraser and begins with the sub-headline: “He Knew He Was A Marked Man.” Fraser provides details from Cabral’s
visit to the United States the previous October and characterizes him as fitting in easily to
Western urban life: “Amilcar Cabral sat comfortably in an East Side Manhattan hotel room one
Saturday morning.” This image is consistent with Cabral’s overall profile in mainstream U.S.
media as a sophisticated intellectual. The remainder of the article features Cabral in his own
words, allowing him a measure of self-representation. Cabral recounts an attempt on his life,
explaining that the Portuguese think if they kill him, the fight will be finished. Fraser inserts a
quick background about the assassination of Mondlane of FRELIMO, the Mozambican liberation
movement, before allowing Cabral to continue to express his political ideology.

“The struggle for independence,” he said, “is not only in order to get a flag and an
anthem. Independence means something. In our own case, for us the means to change
radically the economical, social and cultural situation of our African people.”

“We fight against colonialism because colonialism is the first obstacle. We are not
against the Portuguese. We are against the Portuguese colonialism … [because] it means
humiliation, exploitation. Our people were considered … like animals. Through the
Portuguese law, in Guinea 99 per cent of the population were considered ‘indigenous’ –
that is to say without any kind of rights. The Portuguese after 500 years of presence in
our country, of more than 100 years of colonial domination, colonial peace, left us with
99.9 per cent of the [population] illiterate. Only 14 people had passed a superior course –
a university.”

Taken together with Johnson’s description of the schools, hospitals, and other advances the
PAIGC had made, readers would understand that Guinea-Bissau had achieved more during the
years of its liberation struggle than Portugal had during centuries of colonial domination.

These balanced and approving depictions of Cabral by black reporters Johnson and Fraser
were indicative of the range of New York Times coverage of his death. A short announcement in
“The Major Events of the Day” on January 22, 1973 called him a leader in the struggle “against
white supremacy.”

A January 24 article titled “Gentle Revolutionary” began, “By dint of intelligence, industry and luck, Amilcar Cabral” was “sent off to Lisbon for university training
by the white rulers of Portuguese Guinea.” He could have become an assimilado, the article
explains, however, he chose to work for self-determination and independence for his people and “launched an armed struggle to liberate his country.” He was a “soft-spoken agronomist” who established schools and hospitals, and despite military successes, he “never gave up hope of negotiating a peaceful path to independence.” In fact, when he addressed the United Nations in October 1972, “he listed first among his proposals ‘the immediate start of negotiations’ between Portugal and the P.A.I.G.C.” The article warns that Cabral’s death may have negative ramifications for Portugal if the next leader of the PAIGC lacks “residual affection for the Portuguese” that Cabral possessed.

5.3 Freedomways: Without Prejudice or Gag

In the early 1960s, following in the tradition of Paul Robeson’s monthly Freedom, some friends who had been active in the Southern Negro Youth Congress (SNYC) and were now living in New York City founded the quarterly journal Freedomways, kicking off twenty-five years of political and literary features from the black left. The founders comprised black activists from the 1940s who “managed to survive the repression of the Cold War … and carried forth the radical and progressive ideals” of that era.

In the inaugural issue, Spring 1961, the editors described the goals in forming the publication:

Conceived of necessity and with impetuous ardour … FREEDOMWAYS is born of the necessity for a vehicle of communication which will mirror developments in the diversified and many-sided struggles of the Negro people. It will provide a public forum for the review, examination, and debate of all problems confronting Negroes in the United States.

In addition to highlighting issues facing black Americans, Freedomways always sought to connect the struggle at home to the global anticolonial and anti-imperialist movement:
FREEDOMWAYS offers a means of examining experiences and strengthening the relationship among peoples of African descent in this country, in Latin America, and wherever there are communities of such people anywhere in the world. It will furnish accurate information on the liberation movements in Africa itself.

FREEDOMWAYS will explore, without prejudice or gag, and from the viewpoint of the special interests of American Negroes, as well as the general interest of the nation, the new forms of economic, political and social systems now existing or emerging in the world.\textsuperscript{664}

In keeping with this international mindset, contributors included figures like Martin Luther King, Jr., Alex Haley, Lorraine Hansberry, Alice Walker, Langston Hughes, and James Baldwin, but also Pablo Neruda, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius K. Nyerere, Agostinho Neto, Jomo Kenyatta, C.L.R. James, and Cheddi Jagan, as well as global American figures including Paul Robeson, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Shirley Graham Du Bois. According to founder and managing editor Esther Cooper Jackson,

When we were starting the journal, Du Bois advised, “Make sure that you show the relationship of our struggle to people who are struggling all over the world, that we are not alone. These are our brothers and sisters.” So, from the beginning \textit{Freedomways} sought to include articles from people in anticolonial battles in emerging nations … The pieces written by liberation fighters kept American readers informed about the liberation struggles in Angola and South African that were encouraged by the newly free nations like Ghana and Guinea.\textsuperscript{665}

In fact, Thomas Kanza, Lumumba’s representative in the United Nations, was one of the keynote speakers at \textit{Freedomways}’ first public meeting. Shirley Graham Du Bois served as general editor while in Africa and wrote many early editorials; she was associated with the magazine until her death in 1977. With Robeson’s help – he was living in London after his U.S. passport was returned in the late 1950s – \textit{Freedomways} gained an audience that included subscriptions from foreign universities. “In the 1960s and early 1970s, \textit{Freedomways} extended its solidarity coverage with reports on the antiwar movement as it related to blacks,” and was the first black publication “to take a firm stand against the Vietnam War.”\textsuperscript{666} Criticized by Harold
Cruse in *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual* for not taking a black nationalist position – he said the publication had “become a superfluous trimming for the integration movement” – *Freedomways* featured voices of “the entire Negro integrationist elite.” Nevertheless, by linking liberation struggles taking place throughout the world with the freedom struggle in the United States, the editors “played an essential role in bridging the divide between the civil rights mainstream and the more radical articulations of international black political and cultural autonomy that had existed for decades but quantitatively expanded throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.”

*Freedomways* published stories, poems, and reviews of books and music as well as political writing. Some issues contained illustrations. In the nature of political cartoons, these renderings often spread across multiple pages in more of a graphic novel style. The journal did not feature advertising other than promotion of its own offerings – special issues, requests for donations, or even sets of *Freedomways* holiday greeting cards. In layout, *Freedomways* mimicked a book so that the overall style was unencumbered, and the text meant everything.

Media scholars Olive Vassell and Todd Steven Burroughs assert that *Freedomways* was subsidized by the CPUSA, the Soviet Union, and China. Esther Jackson’s husband James was a member as was she, although she pulled back from Party activities as *Freedomways* launched. *Freedomways* did represent a “continuation of the political legacy set out by the founding cadre from SNYC,” which was often “viewed by its critics as falling within the ideological sphere of the [Communist Party].” In fact, the FBI called it a Communist publication and kept an eye on it.

Having come of “political age in an era of black Popular Front activism” in the 1930s and 1940s, the *Freedomways* founders “drew upon their experiences in broad multi-racial political
coalitions comprised of radical leftists and progressive liberals.” In the 1960s, however, this approach was no longer inspired by the increasingly hidebound CPUSA. Jackson’s success with *Freedomways* “existed outside of the Communist Party,” thriving on new forces in a tumultuous time.

Jackson downplayed the journal’s political stance and highlighted its diversity:

> On the staff and editorial board of *Freedomways* were people of various political views. Many different views were represented in the magazine, including those of communists. Sometimes we printed views we did not agree with, and we published letters from readers who took issue with previous articles. That was healthy – to have different points of view and have people react to them.

In fact, inward-looking and narrow-minded Party members questioned the way *Freedomways* “offered a forum for activists in the black freedom movement who supported nationalism and other ideas rejected by the Party.” As part of its focus on African Americans and the African diaspora, *Freedomways* espoused a policy of black editorial control. This was so important to Jackson that *Freedomways* alienated Herbert Aptheker, the editor of *Political Affairs* and literary executor of Du Bois, by not inviting him onto the editorial board.

Yet, thanks to connections the founders and editors had to the black political and literary worlds, *Freedomways* began with a strong following that grew “as writers and editors came to the forefront of the burgeoning civil rights activity of the 1960s.” The initial 1961 run was 2,000 copies. By 1967, paid circulation had risen to 5,000, and by the mid-1970s, it was approximately 8,000. Perhaps more importantly, 300 U.S. libraries as well as more than a dozen foreign libraries, held subscriptions. Major universities and institutions like the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris “held complete sets of the magazine.” What stands out about *Freedomways’* coverage of Africa is that it was not just African American driven but African driven. Inclusions
about Guinea-Bissau’s independence struggle, for example, were often written by members of the PAIGC or other Africans.

### 5.3.1 Freedomways Covers the Liberation Struggle of Guinea-Bissau

In its First Quarter 1973 issue, *Freedomways* managed to include recognition of Amilcar Cabral’s recent death with a one-page “In Memoriam.” These notices were regular features as fighters in the struggle for black liberation were lost. For example, Nagi Daifullah and Juan de la Cruz, farm workers who were murdered in California while defending the right to strike and organize, were included in the Third Quarter 1973 issue. While Cabral earned an entire page, other warriors had smaller notices taking up just a partial page. Displaying the editors’ complete admiration for the PAIGC leader, Cabral’s notice read:

**In Memoriam:** Amilcar Cabral leader of the revolution in Guinea-Bissau, co-founder of the Popular Movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA), born 1924, Assassinated January 20, 1973

ALL WHO REGARD THE STRUGGLE AGAINST RACISM AND COLONIALISM AS A SACRED OBLIGATION WILL REMEMBER AND BE INSPIRED BY THE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION OF THIS GREAT AFRICAN SCIENTIST AND REVOLUTIONARY

Including the language about “racism and colonialism” linked the PAIGC’s work in Guinea-Bissau with the global anticolonial struggle as well as the fight for racial equality at home.

*Freedomways* featured the poem “In the Memory of Comrade Amilcar Cabral” by Zimbabwean poet F. T. K. Karimakwenda later that year in the Fourth Quarter issue. The poem had been read at the Memorial Service held for Cabral in New York City on January 24, 1973. It is filled with laments for the “Founder and inspiration” who possessed a “smiling, cheerful face.” These somewhat saintly images of Cabral are contrasted with his assassins who were
“cowardly and horrible,” with “hired bullets” that killed him in “a way terrible,” and “horribly wrenched” his life away.  

Nevertheless, even though “the tragedy is too great,” Karimakwenda rallies those who are part of the freedom fight:

Comrades! Comrades! be never dismayed;  
The Great Cabral still lives in our very midst;  
In each of our hearts which for him yearned  
Let us know that always and hold it dear to our hearts …

That living heart now lies alone and cold in a grave  
But the soul always’ll be warm and’ll love forever and ever  
AND will continue to inspire all of us forever and ever;  
That dear warm soul will desert all of us never  
As with those dear souls of Lumumba, Mondlane and Nkrumah.

More than simply eulogizing the fallen leader, Karimakwenda’s poem demands that the fight against Portuguese colonialism continue, a vital comment considering the Portuguese thought that decapitating the PAIGC would end its war for liberation. Words from an African writer on African issues were a common feature in *Freedomways*, unlike so much earlier mainstream media coverage of Africa in which Africans were represented by American or European writers and experts. For liberation struggles in the Portuguese colonies, *Freedomways* had already opened up the discursive space to allow members of the struggle to speak for themselves.

Although a 1967 article “American Investment in Portuguese Africa: A Problem of ‘Democratic’ Colonialism” was written by a New York City-based freelance writer, the subject of that piece looks more at American involvement in aiding Portugal in maintaining its colonial possessions and how “Americans have become … ‘democratic imperialists.’” As war continued to rage in the Portuguese colonies, the Third Quarter 1972 issue included articles on
liberation in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. “The National Liberation Struggle in Mozambique: A Process of Transformation,” written by Armando Panguene, a representative of FRELIMO, outlines the tenets of the “national liberation struggle and the people’s war.” Like Freedomways editors, Panguene depicted the fight for the independence of Mozambique as part of a larger global imperative.

“Guinea-Bissau’s Liberation Struggle Against Portuguese Colonialism” immediately followed the feature about Mozambique. Again providing direct discursive space to those involved in the liberation movement, the article was authored by Cruz Pinto, “a representative of PAIGC.” Pinto makes five arguments in the article: liberation, revolution, and social transformation must be linked (this is Cabral’s overarching liberation premise); the PAIGC’s armed struggle is justified; the fight against imperialism and racism is a global issue; the United States is complicit in Portugal’s war to keep Guinea-Bissau colonized; and the PAIGC has achieved positive results for its liberated zones. While Cabral claimed that the PAIGC’s program was not narrowly Marxist, Pinto invokes rhetoric from the global culture of communism, such as referring to Cabral as “Comrade.”

Pinto begins the article by first explaining that independence will not be enough and must be accompanied by social transformation. “National liberation requires that there be a profound change in the process of the development of the productive forces, that is to say, it necessarily corresponds to a revolution … National liberation takes place when all the productive forces have been freed from every kind of foreign domination.”

Second, he justifies the war in several ways, pointing out that the world is on their side: “Today the whole world calls for an end to repression and the use of force against the people submitted to colonial regimes, and for support to the liberation movements in their legitimate
struggle to suppress colonialism and all other forms of foreign domination quickly. The U.N. has recognized the legitimacy of their struggle and with Resolution 1514 (XV) – Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples – insists on self-determination for all peoples. Likewise, “the OAU, the African States and the anti-colonialist forces have recognized our party as the true and legitimate representative of our people.” Portugal has been making concessions for a “better Guinea,” however, as “Comrade Cabral” told the [UN] Security Council on Africa, “the claims of Portuguese colonialism regarding the multi-racial society as well as reforms are nothing but clumsy attempts to perpetuate colonial exploitation of our people by trying to camouflage a primitive racism which has always characterized the Portuguese in Africa.

Third, Pinto professes a bond with Freedomways readers, claiming that the struggle of the PAIGC against imperialism and racism is a global one. The “peoples” understand that the anti-imperialist struggle is common, and there must be a general offensive against imperialism. Drawing parallels between the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau and of the Americans in Vietnam, Pinto describes the colonists’ use of aerial bombing against the liberated zones, the burning of harvests and killing of livestock in order to starve the people, and the use of toxic agents and defoliants supplied by the United States.

Weapons from the United States provide evidence of Pinto’s fourth assertion, which is that the United States and other NATO allies, are at least partially to blame for the continuation of the war. He considers Washington’s use of the Azores for a military base and its grant of $436 million in aid. Without economic assistance, Portugal could not continue fighting. American aid meant that the United States was complicit in the colonial war even if not directly involved militarily. The real villains were those who invested in these regimes and “who have an interest
in maintaining racism and racial discrimination.”  Elsewhere, Pinto specifically blames NATO members for giving “their protection and support to the Pretoria-Salzburg-[sic]-Lisbon politico-military bloc,” and asserts, “All the members of NATO must bear some responsibility for the continuance of the colonial system.”

Finally, despite the cooperation of so many powerful countries against the liberation of Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC, in partnership with the people, has accomplished much. The colonial economic structures and colonial production relations have been eliminated in the liberated zones. This is another example of Marxist rhetoric that would have resounded with readers of *Freedomways*. The governance of the liberated zones has been restructured politically into committees, which “are the organs of popular power and are directly elected by the people.”

The struggle has benefited the masses who previously lived in “slavery and indignity.” Their success has come from their ability to organize and lead, “a new consciousness and a new man are being created in this struggle: people who are aware of their rights and their duties, of being human and African, and who are also keen on implementing fully the objectives of our party.”

Examples of social transformation include upcoming elections for regional councils and the first National Assembly of Guinea, increased staple crop (rice) cultivation, development of cooperative production, and the training of personnel, including 425 people who had already been sent abroad to become “doctors, engineers, economists, lawyers and various technicians.” Conversely, the more than 500 years Portugal occupied the territory, led to only fourteen Guinea-Bissauans with higher education and eleven with technical education.

Although Cabral did not live to see independence, *Freedomways* continued to follow the story of the PAIGC’s liberation struggle, which culminated in the publication of an article from “The Editors” on the Third Quarter 1974 announcing victory. Portugal’s belated
acknowledgement of Guinea-Bissau’s independence, following the lead of no fewer than eighty U.N. member states, is “a tribute to the heroism and determination of the people of Guinea-Bissau, the leadership of the PAIGC in this revolution, and a fitting tribute to the martyred founder of this liberation movement, the great African patriot Amilcar Cabral.”*699* According to the editors, the victory represented an outstanding example of internationalism.

5.4 *Ramparts: The Disloyal Opposition*

If the design of *Freedomways* was almost bookish, *Ramparts* was its antithesis. Covers in the early 1970s might be anything from a raw picture of Vietnam casualties to a staged photo of John and Yoko. They were often anti-glamour, anti-photojournalism images that “screamed” at viewers rather than attracted. Indigenous people, the poor, all kinds of the world’s Others were shown in stark reality instead of idealized. The layout of the table of contents, titled “Herein,” changed regularly so that moving from one issue to the next felt somewhat jarring; there was no sense of knowing what to expect. “It represented what Todd Gitlin called ‘a New Left sensibility goes Pop’ that helped produce ‘A glamour of rebellion, a rebellion of glamour.’”*700*

*Ramparts* first appeared in May 1962, and lasted until 1975. Its genealogy demonstrates its influence, according to the magazine’s biographer Peter Richardson. For example, two former *Ramparts* writers launched *Rolling Stone*. Many *Ramparts* editors went on to long careers in journalism on both the left and the right. Contributors included Noam Chomsky, Bobby Seale, and Tom Hayden, and the magazine included literary works from Kurt Vonnegut, Gabriel Garcia Márquez, Ken Kesey, and Erica Jong. “By 1968, the magazine had ... forged links to the Black Panther Party, exposed illegal CIA activities in America and Vietnam, published the diaries of
Che Guevara and staff writer Eldridge Cleaver, and boosted its monthly circulation to almost 250,000.”

The San Francisco Bay Area magazine was founded by Edward M. Keating, who intended it to be a Catholic intellectual publication. A Stanford graduate and adopted son of a millionaire, Keating had planned to finance the magazine with what was left of his trust fund, but his wife Helen inherited a large fortune, and he was able to launch it from a much sounder footing. Ramparts followed the opposite trajectory of The New Republic, which began as a progressive outlet but became decidedly liberal over the years. Ramparts swung from liberal Catholicism to the far left. The magazine’s initially "idiosyncratic nature" owed a lot to Catholics like Keating, who opposed racial inequality and supported civil rights but "could be conservative, even reactionary" on other issues. Keating wanted Ramparts to “host serious discussions between the Catholic clergy and the laity.” The magazine slowly tackled more controversial issues such as violence in Mississippi and Harlem. With the October 1964 issue, a change to saddle-stitch binding, the inclusion of more advertising, and a new look transformed Ramparts into “a slick” journal.

Ramparts rejected the Johnson administration’s official line on Vietnam in 1965, and the staff became increasingly leftist in orientation. The editors included Warren Hinckle III, Robert Scheer, David Horowitz, Pete Collier, and Adam Hochschild. Keating was eventually removed once he stopped funding the magazine. When Eldridge Cleaver was released from prison, he joined the Ramparts staff. "Cleaver’s essays in Ramparts coincided with rising black nationalism in the Bay Area,” and Ramparts supported the Black Panther Party with coverage. In fact, Ramparts editors were a major force in generating respectability for the Panthers.
Cruse had once criticized *Freedomways* for its failure to engage with black nationalism, but the West Coast *Ramparts* took up the charge. The magazine also achieved something that *Monthly Review*, for all of its concern with workers, seemed unable to do – it reached an economically varied demographic. In January 1973, a reader whose letter was published described herself as “being on the poor side;” and explained that she regularly read the magazine at the library.707

*Ramparts* itself earned plenty of publicity. Editor Scheer appeared on *Firing Line*, a television program that featured debates with conservative host William F. Buckley. The episode’s title was "Is *Ramparts* magazine un-American?"708 Several of the team were called before a New York grand jury for burning draft cards on the cover of the December 1967 issue, and *TIME* and *Esquire* wrote about the radical magazine. *Ramparts* boasted a reach outside its readership, as mainstream publications picked up its stories and converted them to “news.”709

Despite the magazine’s influence, “when the United States signed a peace treaty with Vietnam in January 1973, the issue that had catapulted the magazine into the spotlight disappeared.”710 After Nixon's reelection in 1972, editors had characterized *Ramparts* as "the disloyal opposition.”711 According to Richardson, the magazine’s downward spiral began when editor Horowitz became heavily involved with Huey Newton and the Black Panthers. When Newtown fled to Cuba, he left Elaine Brown in charge of the organization, and Horowitz recommended Betty Van Patter to work with Brown as a bookkeeper. Following Van Patter’s death, allegedly at the hands of someone inside the Party, Horowitz and Collier began to criticize the Black Panthers and the New Left.712 The end came quickly as *Ramparts* started missing issues, and subscriptions declined to under 60,000.
Ramparts’ managing editor at the time of Cabral’s death was Bo Burlingham, who had been hired to give Horowitz and Collier more time to work on other projects. He came with his own radical background, having been president of the SDS chapter at Princeton and a member of the Weathermen. According to Richardson, Burlingham’s time at Ramparts ended late in 1973 when he realized Horowitz and Collier were not actually ready to give up control and as more of the staff began to question their infatuation with the Panthers.  

5.4.1 Cabral’s Legacy, According to Ramparts

While Ramparts regularly covered the cutting edge of leftist politics, domestic issues held sway, and much of the foreign affairs coverage in the early 1970s concerned Vietnam or Israel. Nevertheless, stories about Angola, Mozambique, and even Guinea-Bissau appeared in its pages. Ramparts did not mention Amilcar Cabral when he was alive. It did make passing references to Guinea-Bissau, in a 1969 article on “Angola: Report from Hanoi II” and a 1972 article on “Apartheid in the New Africa” where it is described as “Portugal’s third colony on the west coast of Africa.” Given this previous lack of attention, it is significant that Ramparts memorialized the PAIGC leader with “The Legacy of Amilcar Cabral” in the April 1973 issue.

Written by Brussels-born, Paris-educated Gerard Chaliand and translated from French, the laudatory article details Cabral’s death, theories about his assassination, the background of the territory and people of Guinea-Bissau, the nature of the Portuguese involvement, Cabral’s education and founding of the PAIGC as well as its links with FRELIMO and MPLA, and the victories achieved by the PAIGC. A reader without any prior knowledge of the situation in Guinea-Bissau would have found the article informative and comprehensible. Based on his knowledge, Chaliand proved an excellent choice to pen this tribute to Cabral. At the bottom of

In *Ramparts*, Chaliand names the guilty party, then reviews the possible motive for the assassination: "As he stepped from his car, he was shot down by Innocencio [sic] Kani, a member of his own party." Although it was certain Cabral was killed by a member of the PAIGC, several theories had been advanced to explain Kani’s reason for committing the murder; it could have been inspired by Portuguese agents, party dissidents, or Guineans who opposed Sékou Touré.

The portrait of Cabral is positive, even glowing, and Chaliand strives to show what an important figure he had been.

The world press immediately recognized the significance of Cabral's death. *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post* covered the story on page one. The French daily, *Le Monde*, called him an exceptional leader with the stature of a head of state. The United Nations paid tribute to him, and more than 40 delegations attended his funeral at Conakry. He was, in fact, probably the most remarkable revolutionary leader that contemporary Africa has yet produced.

Chaliand reminisces about Cabral’s "calm and humorous way of speaking, and his poetry too." Nevertheless, he explains that Cabral was "One of the rare theoreticians of the Third World, as well as a remarkably able political and military leader." Cabral had given a speech at the Tri-Continental conference in Havana in 1966 titled "Theory as a Weapon," in which he
analyzed the "role of ideology, the relationships between Marxist theory and the actual conditions (the level of the productive forces) in African societies. He also discussed the nationalist petty bourgeoisie as a potentially determining force in the revolutionary struggle."

Chaliand does not avoid Cabral’s Marxism; he celebrates it. "He lived only to lead his people to independence: an independence he hoped would be real, without a corrupt and privileged ruling class, without government ministers, and without a capital city." On the diplomatic front, Cabral was a "shrewd politician" and upheld his country’s non-aligned status. "With great deftness, Cabral maintained his objectives without serving the interests of any big power, socialist or otherwise." Cabral was liked throughout the world: he visited the Pope and made several trips to Scandinavia to secure financial humanitarian aid. He also traveled to the United States, spoke at the United Nations, and visited Europe, where only France refused him entry.

If any doubt about Cabral’s nature remained, Chaliand explains that he was not a charismatic or “‘dashing leader’” and that “he preferred patient organizing and carefully calculated political initiative to earth-shattering declarations and spectacular gestures.” Chaliand does not write a negative word about Cabral or the PAIGC, to the point that he even states that the party has "complete control" of the military.

While Cabral earns Chaliand’s respect, Portugal by contrast, is depicted as ruled by a "fascist government" and suffering from “economic backwardness." The colonizer had utilized indirect rule in collaboration with the patriarchal “Moslem” Foulah society, which allowed the “Portuguese to maintain a low profile at the same time as they engineered the quick and easy subjugation of the animistic population." He writes only of PAIGC victories and Portuguese dependence on "substantial military assistance from NATO countries." Throughout its
colonial rule, Portugal provided nothing beneficial for Guineans. In fact, Guineans had lived under apartheid-like conditions.\textsuperscript{728}

For its part, the PAIGC, had achieved successes in politics, education, economic equality, and women’s rights, all issues the New Left considered important. “Once having liberated territory, Cabral developed a new kind of political – administrative structure in the zones controlled by the PAIGC.” Chaliand dedicates some space to the promotion of women’s rights as part of Cabral’s revolutionary program. Committees at the village level consist of three men and two women who are elected democratically. This new grassroots political system "has not only allowed the villagers to make their voices heard, but has also noticeably altered the conditions of women and young people by encouraging them to participate in the struggle and the decision-making process,"\textsuperscript{729} Forced marriage has been forbidden and young girls "have joined the party en masse as nurses and teachers, and sometimes as fighters."\textsuperscript{730} Additionally, the Portuguese have been driven out of the economy, and the PAIGC "has established alternative economic relationships."\textsuperscript{731} The liberation forces control more than two-thirds of country, and “for the first time in 400 years … Guinean peasants had a chance to acquire some kind of education.”\textsuperscript{732}

Chaliand employs language and images that connect the struggle in Guinea-Bissau to the Vietnam War, a technique used by several of the radical journalists under review here. He explains that the Portuguese conduct offensives against liberated zones "following the pattern used by the US Armed Forces in South Vietnam."\textsuperscript{733} He compares Cabral to Fidel Castro and Ho Chi Minh, which would not have been a compliment in mainstream media outlets, but for Ramparts readers, some of whom might not have been familiar with Cabral, would have elevated his status and aroused sympathy.
In fact, in Chaliand’s view, Cabral ought enjoy as much recognition as Fidel and Ho. He possessed “special genius,” and with “years of political experience and a thorough knowledge of social conditions in the area, Cabral had prepared the conditions for an armed struggle which was to become the most significant in Black Africa.” Like the New York Times writers, Chaliand raises a question about what will be next for the PAIGC and Guinea-Bissau, stating Cabral's "political sense, his particular genius for combining intelligence, flexibility, firmness and imagination, will be hard to replace."  

5.5 The Great Speckled Bird: Subversive, Indeed

Ramparts could have been a local phenomenon, but it reached a nationwide audience, thanks in part to the publicity it received from mainstream media outlets. During the 1960s and early 1970s, local underground publications presented another way for Americans to discover opinions outside the norm and find news that mainstream sources did not deem important. Taking its name from “the fact that it voiced the opinions of leftist radicals and revolutionaries” who formed a “seditious underground,” the underground press blossomed during the era. This type of publication has been compared to the “spirit of what social media has become: a tool for mobilization, a civic rallying cry, a chronicle for news that the mainstream media chooses not to cover, and, above all, an outlet where anyone can have a voice.” By 1970 there were more than 450 underground publications in the country.

Published weekly from 1968 until 1976 in Atlanta, Georgia, by the Atlanta Cooperative News Project, The Great Speckled Bird was launched by a “group of antiwar activists” and became “one of the longest running and highest quality underground newspapers of the era.” The Bird flouted convention with a masthead of “Bird Staff” consisting of several names laid out
in random fashion without specific titles or comprehensible hierarchy. In fact, *The Bird* “functioned as a collective and positions rotated.” The paper often included typos, as well as “lack of respect … for the King's English.” *The Bird* reached a high circulation of 20,000 and maintained a press run of 13,000 during its heyday. It was the largest weekly newspaper in the state of Georgia.

Launched with an “obituary” of Ralph McGill who would not die until the following year, *The Bird*’s inaugural issue declared that it struck at liberalism’s hold on reason, McGill and the *Atlanta Constitution*, “enervating plasticity,” and a “depressing lack of meaning.” The publication would attempt to “offer some alternatives to what some call ‘The American Way of Life.’” Furthermore, “to the gentlemen of HU-AC, we are indeed subversive.” The newspaper’s leftist perspective encompassed civil rights, the anti-war movement, women’s rights, anti-colonialism, and gay rights. Unlike the editors of *Freedomways*, who supported radical involvement in broadly conventional politics, members of the underground were more likely to distrust politics and also “believed that publishing an underground newspaper could accomplish more than participating in other, more radical antiwar activities.”

Staff at *The Bird* used "street language," and unlike *Freedomways*, which was carried by university and public school libraries, *The Bird* was often charged for obscenity. After a well-known court battle, the paper was dropped by its printer and had to look elsewhere - to Alabama - for its weekly printing, and *Bird* staffers were frequently denied press cards by the Atlanta police. On May 6, 1972, the paper’s office building was firebombed, although rather than deterring staff, the attack "brought community support to *The Speckled Bird* as an outraged response to such an overt attempt at suppression of the paper."
Although *The Bird* did not identify with a particular party “line,” some staffers brought a sense of history and leftist activism that "kept the Bird politics grounded and tied to real issues – not mired in specious New Left sectarian diatribes or flying about in utopian 'hippie' lifestyles nonsense." Many of the staffers had been involved in civil rights efforts, however, *The Bird* rarely had black staff members. Nevertheless, it still reported on the black community and the Black Panthers. "There was a recognition of different fronts but one struggle."\(^{748}\)

When compared to coverage of Cabral and Guinea-Bissau’s liberation struggle in *The Great Speckled Bird, Freedomways* and *Ramparts* now appear lukewarm. Writing about Cabral, PAIGC, MPLA, and FRELIMO in *The Bird* was not reporting the struggle but taking part in it. An underground paper, it was not held to the same “objective” standard as *The New York Times* nor the highbrow rigor of the *Freedomways* editorial team. “You could walk into its offices, manuscript in hand, and have your story, poem, or artwork published.”\(^{749}\) *Great Speckled Bird* contributors, often activists or students, freely voiced opinion, and not just in the op-ed column, because the purpose of the publication was to persuade. In addition to covering news from around the community and the country, *The Bird* kept an eye on the world. The paper included stories that might not receive significant attention in the mainstream outlets it combatted, such as the *Atlanta Constitution*. “Global issues were the focus of many of *The Bird’s* articles, which were not written by foreign correspondents but still focused on injustices around the world, or detailed the antiwar or civil rights movements internationally, and included historical context."\(^{750}\)

### 5.5.1 *Amilcar Cabral Soars in The Bird*

Guinea-Bissau’s liberation struggle earned regular coverage in *The Bird*, so readers may have been familiar with Cabral at the time of his death. A 1969 article featured an interview with an anonymous MPLA leader.\(^{751}\) On the same page, the article “Portugal” explained that the
election in Portugal might not usher in change, but it could lead to attention for some issues, including liberation of the African colonies. The September 1970 “African Guerrillas” discussed a conference to “further the growth of international solidarity” with the PAIGC, MPLA, and FRELIMO. As in *Ramparts*, the wars in Portuguese Africa were equated with the war in Vietnam. “Here, in the ‘Vietnam’ of West Africa, the Portuguese have been forced into cities and ‘Strategic hamlets,’ just as the American invaders have been in Southeast Asia.”

Later that year, *The Bird* covered the invasion of Guinea (Conakry) by the Portuguese, who failed in their attempt to capture Cabral and free Portuguese agents held there.

An in-depth look at the PAIGC’s efforts appeared in *The Bird* in May 1972. “Armed Struggle in Guinea-Bissau” was published in advance of the worldwide African Liberation Day and explains the background of the embattled situation in Guinea-Bissau, quoting some information from Basil Davidson’s *The Liberation of Guinea*. While the article contains much of the same summary of the PAIGC found in other publications under review, it makes a point of considering the attitudes of the Portuguese – not the political and military leaders, but the citizens who were suffering at the behest of their country, much in the same way Americans were damaged by the war in Vietnam. Portuguese youth and students were unhappy about their country’s draft, and the forces in Africa experienced desertions. Comparing the number of troops to the country’s small population, the ratio would have been like having 2.5 million U.S. troops fighting in Vietnam. *The Bird* article reminds readers that Portugal could only continue the war and maintain its hold on Guinea-Bissau through its alliances with NATO countries.

References to Vietnam, such as “the character of Portugal’s attempts to control its African colonies – strikingly like the US involvement in Vietnam,” are combined with Marxist language that would have resonated with leftist and countercultural readers. The writer
revealed the PAIGC belief that “national liberation means more than formal independence,” further explaining that Cabral “defined national liberation as the right to regain and continue Guinea’s own history, which can only be done by ‘liberating the means and process of development of its own productive forces.’”

With its weekly format, *The Great Speckled Bird* was able to quickly announce news of Cabral's death. "Cabral Murdered," stated the headline in the February 1, 1973 issue, Cabral’s credentials deemed unnecessary in the title because the newspaper’s readership had encountered the Guinean leader’s name several times before in their publication. "One of Africa's and the world's greatest leaders died on January 20 ... Cabral, more than any other single person, symbolized, spoke for, and carried forward the struggle against white supremacy in Africa," the article began, positioning his life’s work as much bigger than liberating the small country of Guinea-Bissau. Cabral stood for the battle against white supremacy throughout the continent, now turning to the bastions of South Africa and Rhodesia. This article was culled from the Liberation News Service, a wire service used by leftist and underground publications, but there is no byline, and the two photos of Cabral appear without photo caption. The lack of authorship is slightly disconcerting because some of the article is written in first person, “Traveling in Guinea (Bissau), as I did a little over two years ago,” the writer details the singing that s/he heard, stating that Cabral’s name figured in many songs. This positivity develops in the writer’s description of Cabral:

Amilcar Cabral will long be remembered and mourned. Among other things he will be remembered as a man who was far too wise to desire for himself any more power or esteem than he served as part of the whole, far greater than himself. The people of his country held great love and respect for him, but hardly a blind adoration and dependence.
Unlike *Ramparts* and *The New York Times*, which voiced concerns about the future of the PAIGC, the goal of liberation seems assured: “Somehow, it seems particularly sad that Amilcar Cabral should have been killed at a time when his cause is nearing victory… For the time has long since passed when the death of any one man could check the struggle [sic] for independence in Guinea and Cape Verde.”

*The Bird*’s coverage of Cabral continued even after his death. While Cabral more or less disappeared from even the other leftist publications under review, *The Bird* included a February 1974 review of his book *Revolution in Guinea*, which was published by Monthly Review Press. It begins by stating that Guinea-Bissau was liberated “last year,” which means that *The Bird* subscribed to Guinea-Bissau’s proclaimed independence date (rather than the one Portugal later acknowledged – at the time *The Bird* printed this article, the Carnation Revolution of April 1974 had not yet occurred). The reviewer states that the book is an important tool in understanding African nationalism and anticolonialism and it "details the class and tribal contradictions in Guinea and how the party tries to resolve them … *Revolution in Guinea* helps our understanding of how the fight in imperialist countries unite with the fight of the Third World.” It is unclear why this book review was included in February 1973; Monthly Review Press had released the book in 1969. Regardless, it kept Cabral and the anticolonial struggle alive for *The Bird*’s readers.

A final vision of Amilcar Cabral appeared in the February 13, 1975 edition of *The Great Speckled Bird*, and its purpose could plainly be understood from the article’s title “Cabral Remembered.” Bylined with the Atlanta Regional Venceremos Brigade, a Cuba solidarity organization, the article makes clear that the success of the PAIGC has continued despite the loss of Cabral. "The leadership of the PAIGC guarantees the success of their struggle by never
falsely attributing the total strength of the people to one person… Thus when Cabral was murdered, his death did not destroy the movement, but increased its determination.\textsuperscript{766}

The article expounds on achievements after Cabral's death, such as the Declaration of Independence by the National People's assembly of Guinea-Bissau on September 26, 1973; suffrage for all those fifteen or older; equal rights for women; outlawing of tribal privileges and discrimination; and the right to work and be educated. Special attention in this article is paid to women's rights, for example, the writer mentions that polygamy had existed throughout the country, but “now, polygamy is declining.” Additionally,

The PAIGC has authorized village tribunals to grant divorces and to insure that no woman is forced to remain with a husband against her will. Many women are in positions of leadership within the PAIGC. Others were trained in the use of automatic weapons so they could participate in local militias. Some are nurses and health workers while some participate in the regular military units.\textsuperscript{767}

In the newspaper’s final article concerning Amilcar Cabral – \textit{The Great Speckled Bird} ceased publication with its October 1976 issue – the writer emphasizes the importance of women’s equality to Cabral, the PAIGC, and the Guinea-Bissauan liberation struggle.\textsuperscript{768} Other publications had sometimes mentioned women’s role in the revolution in passing, even though for Cabral, transforming society necessitated liberation of and participation by women.

\section*{5.6 Writer Stephanie Urdang Asks: How Are Women Faring in Guinea-Bissau?}

As the liberation struggle continued following Cabral’s death, the PAIGC strove to maintain its fundamental goal of social transformation. While U.S. media coverage, including articles in radical outlets, provided minimal review of women’s liberation as a fundamental concern of the PAIGC program, writer and activist Stephanie Urdang traveled to Guinea-Bissau in April 1974 and June 1976 to find out how women’s liberation was put into practice. “[P]rior to
my visit I had little concrete information about the role of women: a published interview here, a statement there, a comment in a speech of a leader.” Originally from South Africa, Urdang had left her country in 1967 out of “opposition to the bitter oppression and brutality of the apartheid regime” and was working with Southern Africa liberation support groups in New York when she heard Cabral speak at a meeting in 1969, increasing her interest in Guinea-Bissau. Her book *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau*, which details her trips to Guinea-Bissau, was published in 1979. Although the printing occurred outside the timeframe under review here, the book highlights as aspect of the revolution that was important to Cabral, but which was not often on the agenda of U.S. media reporting. Urdang writes that the book is “an analysis which grew out of the recognition that women suffer a dual oppression, expressed in Guinea-Bissau as the need for women to ‘fight two colonialisms – the one of the Portuguese and the other of men.’” For Urdang, women’s liberation can only take place in a non-capitalist society. “Unless socialism is achieved, the liberation of women cannot be realized.” Thus, the book offers two tenets, gender equality and socialism. “The revolutionary Third World society that Guinea-Bissau envisions … has no historically vested interest in sexism; it does not need divisions among the workers, it does not need unemployment. Rather, it needs the unified effort of all, and egalitarianism.”

Urdang features the personal stories of the many women she meets. Some appear more fortunate than others and deal with situations easily understood by American readers. For example, Maria explained that she and her husband both worked and had two children and a daytime paid caregiver, although they could not afford one at night. “It was expected, then, that Maria stay home to look after the children, whereas her husband, without thinking it might be unfair, was free to go and visit friends, take in a movie, or go out for a beer.” Maria stated that
education and employment opportunities would enable women to become “economically independent, and then emotionally independent. This in turn would bring respect from men.”

Other women Urdang interviewed faced issues that, while culturally removed from Western readers’ lives, would still have been understood in many ways:

“We women really suffer,” she began. “First it is the women who pound, it is the women who go to fish, it is the women who cook for the men … In addition to all of this, if his clothes are dirty, it is we women who must wash them … Once the men have tilled the land and the rice begins to grow we are then responsible for everything after that. The women alone harvest the rice and we have to transport it without their help to the village. This, I tell you, is how all women are suffering.”

Understanding the issues of women’s “suffering,” the PAIGC focused on adjusting the sexual division of labor. Breaking from traditions of forced marriage and denial of divorce rights for women, as well as polygyny, the PAIGC began a process of political education directed toward the goal of social transformation. Moving slowly allowed them to keep the people from turning against the PAIGC and the liberation effort. Unfortunately, independent Guinea-Bissau entered the world economy in a weak position, so the process of transformations was far from complete when Urdang returned after independence. Nevertheless, even as early as the fight for liberation, changes could be seen: soldiers grew their own food, which set the example of men doing agricultural work; efforts were made to equalize the numbers of boys and girls in school (Urdang reports this at about three to one); and the government was working to allocate a number of jobs to women. Still, other changes must take root in the village structure, Urdang admits. Women need political power and men need to be integrated into agricultural work. Despite the unfinished project of women’s equality, Urdang states, “In Guinea-Bissau I found what I had hoped to find: that the liberation of women is an explicit and integral part of the overall revolution.”
5.7 Conclusion

In the early 1970s, radical publications provided deeper coverage of the life and death of PAIGC leader Amilcar Cabral than did the mainstream U.S. media. Each publication viewed Guinea-Bissau’s war of liberation through the lens of what it deemed important. For Freedomways, Cabral and Guinea-Bissau represented the battle against racism, which was part of the global anti-imperialist struggle; in Ramparts, relating events in Portuguese Africa to Vietnam was key as the magazine promoted a strong antiwar agenda; The Great Speckled Bird broke the barrier between journalism and activism by often featuring articles that made calls to action, even guiding readers on how to affect global events locally; and writer Urdang, who was disappointed by the lack of coverage of women’s liberation as part of the PAIGC strategy, went to Guinea-Bissau twice to see for herself what progress had been made. Despite these differences, commonalities run through the publications. Some of these became evident in the mainstream media as well with growing diversity in their staffs.

Reviewing articles about Cabral’s death as well as others about him or the PAIGC from 1972 to 1975, all sources offered positive descriptions of him that were not based on colonial tropes or the rhetoric used to represent leaders discussed in earlier chapters. Adjectives, characteristics, and titles applied to Cabral from The New York Times to The Great Speckled Bird include: agronomist; gentle; small; successful; modern; sophisticated; soft-spoken; and an inspiration. He was determined to be more thoughtful than charismatic and was an able political and military leader, something that had not been – and often still is not – applied to African leaders (Nelson Mandela excepted). Even Cabral’s Marxist rhetoric did not lead these writers to critique him, and for some, it was a point to celebrate.
In the radical press, and in *The New York Times* as well, images of Portugal and the Portuguese government included fascist, cowardly, backward, poor, ineffective, and dependent on NATO. Only *The Great Speckled Bird* considered the people of Portugal who were forced to live under a repressive government and fight in colonial wars many did not believe in. By putting the African colonial wars in these terms, *The Bird* drew a comparison to America’s involvement in Vietnam and the millions of Americans who had turned against the war. This use of language related to Vietnam could also be seen in coverage in *Freedomways* and *Ramparts* and served as a vital way to rally support for the African liberation fighters.

While women’s liberation formed an important aspect of the PAIGC’s plan to transform society, this topic earned less coverage than war statistics or descriptions of Cabral. Urdang’s late-1970s book delved into the subject, showing the struggles women in Guinea-Bissau faced before and after independence while advocating socialism as a necessary ingredient of the remedy. *The Bird* mentioned women’s liberation only in its 1975 article, and Chaliand’s piece in *Ramparts* reviewed some of the changes the PAIGC worked to make to improve the lives of Guinea-Bissauan women. Presumably given the opportunity to write his own article for *Freedomways*, the PAIGC representative Pinto did not choose to include women’s liberation in his review of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism. By contrast, he masculinized the effort stating, “A new consciousness and a new man are being created in this struggle,” and “Our people expect the fraternal assistance of independent African people and help from socialist countries.”

Despite the gains of acceptability made by antiracism, anticolonialism, and Marxism, for the most part, even within radical U.S. press of the early 1970s, women’s liberation did not rank high on the agenda.
6 CONCLUSION: RECOVERING AFRICA

After Throughout the long global Sixties, Americans looked to the press as well as radio and television news to learn about decolonizing Africa. Of course, the age of African independence coincided with the Cold War. Rather than illuminating news from the continent in terms of worldwide political and social unrest, mainstream print media coverage often focused on newly independent African states’ perceived position in the East-West conflict and used Cold War rhetoric to define leaders in simplified terms of good or evil, friend or enemy. Indeed, the media employed African leaders as metonyms for their countries and sometimes for the continent as a whole, relying on colonial and racial tropes to frame Africa and Africans for American audiences. In setting the agenda for what would be considered newsworthy about African nations, the media all too often resorted to the topics of death, disease, and underdevelopment.

Many scholars have analyzed the negative or reductive nature of Africa’s media image, both historical and contemporary. While this kind of coverage has proven enduring, it is not in fact pervasive or inevitable. My dissertation tracks the coverage of Africa in a select but diverse set of U.S. print media outlets from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. I have used several major stories of decolonization, more or less personified by leaders in five different countries in West and Central Africa, to follow the construction of a media image of Africa and its peoples and to examine the increasingly complex, contradictory, and contested nature of this image in a time when mainstream U.S. journalism’s authority was coming into question and its perspectives and narratives were beginning to face challenges from alternative outlets. There is no denying the prestige and influence of *The New York Times* or *TIME*, but establishment accounts did not exhaust what readers could learn about Africa. When we expand the range of media sources
under review, we recover a rather more intricate, composite image of Africa that American readers had access to during the global Sixties. By adding African American, liberal, left-wing, and “underground” outlets to the sources of U.S. print media coverage, we recover a variety of often forgotten voices as well as views on Africa. Some of these voices tell us about interest and opinion around Africa in sectors of society that had been marginalized, like the black community or the “old” left. Other voices suggest emerging sectors, like the “new” left or “second wave” feminism. And of course some are simply fresh, original voices in the changing mainstream of journalism, like Renata Adler’s.

Historians have demonstrated the importance of movements and developments in the Third World during the long global Sixties. They have shown that Third World peoples and states were not mere objects in the Cold War confrontation, but actors striving to gain political independence, economic development, and cultural recognition despite global power imbalances that disadvantaged them. Just as media coverage of Africa today informs Western publics and policy makers and helps to shape such things as foreign investment, military intervention, and humanitarian aid, so did coverage forty or sixty years ago at crucial moments when decolonizing peoples and newly independent countries were trying to write their own stories and determine their own destinies.

My dissertation seeks to make three contributions to historical scholarship on American journalism, Africa and the United States, and the long global Sixties. First, this dissertation seeks to fill a gap in studies of U.S. foreign reporting by inserting Africa into this field of historical research. As journalist Asgede Hagos has found, neglect in media coverage translates into neglect in foreign interest. Concerning Africa, we can extend Hagos’s claim to neglect in scholarly attention. In his otherwise comprehensive study, *Journalism’s Roving Eye: A History*
of American Foreign Reporting, John Maxwell Hamilton only mentions Africa twice. As we have seen, however, African news earned front-page coverage even in the mainstream press during the age of independence. Reporters such as The New York Times’s Thomas A. Johnson were stationed in African cities to check the daily pulse of events, while others, like The New Yorker’s Renata Adler, made special trips to produce in-depth accounts of the African scene. We need to pay attention to coverage of Africa, past as well as present.

Second, by consulting a broader range of sources, my study challenges the absolute power of agenda setting usually attributed to powerful media agencies. It goes on to establish that writers and editors could reframe independent Africa in novel or critical ways. Whether it was championing Ahmed Sékou Touré’s challenge to Charles de Gaulle, or questioning the forces behind Patrice Lumumba’s death, or, in the case of the underground Atlanta newspaper The Great Speckled Bird, continuing to appreciate the significance of Amilcar Cabral’s revolutionary strategy rather than burying the man and his ideas as “old news” after his death, different facets of Africa and Africans came into view as a result. Indeed, in its final article about Cabral, The Bird included details of his plan for women’s liberation as well, something that had not been on the agenda previously and received little notice elsewhere. My approach does not merely replace mainstream and elite sources with dissenting, minority, and radical sources. Instead, it is interactive. When TIME used colonial and racial language to describe Sékou Touré as traditional, savage, and prone to communism, the Chicago Defender offered a contrasting image by depicting him as a leader who enjoyed the support of his people and represented the promise of modern Africa. In some cases, this reframing came through the words of Africans themselves as coverage gave leaders and others access to the journalistic discursive space. Thus Foreign Affairs featured articles by Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Nigeria’s
Nnamdi Azikiwe as well as by Western observers. When Adler penned her long essay about Biafra, she included the voices of a variety of Biafrans, from General Odumegwu Ojukwu to novelist Chinua Achebe to Miss Etuk, who received her doctorate from Columbia University. A skilled writer with a good ear as well as eye, Adler recorded and shared the musings and opinions of her hosts and in this way enabled her readers to feel that they too had seen and heard the Biafrans she met and spoke with. By 1973, mainstream media was offering Africans some opportunities to represent themselves, as The New York Times did in C. Gerald Fraser’s article on Cabral, which quoted him at length from an interview done not long before his death. Voices of Africans could be heard if an American reader knew where and when to listen.

Third, the in-depth coverage offered by writers like Adler and the essays, interviews, speeches, and statements from African leaders, writers, and activists that appeared in the press reveal the availability of multiple representations of Africa. These more positive or complex depictions of events and situations, leaders and peoples, may not have directly affected U.S. public opinion or altered U.S. foreign policy at the time. There is no question that Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong’s analysis of the Congo crisis held more weight with U.S. policy makers than did that of Monthly Review editors Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman. However, even when these publications were fleeting – The Bird published for only eight years – or circumscribed – Political Affairs was not stocked in many newsstands or bookstores – they sometimes offered accounts that later proved prophetic or at least plausible. Ramparts stopped publication in 1975, but its former staff members went on to found media outlets such as Mother Jones that carried on its spirit and style of critical journalism. Stories of Africa from these publications provide evidence of a diverse American public and trouble the notion that mainstream media always set the agenda. Indeed, it would be more accurate to argue that media
set the *agendas*, plural. When it came to coverage of Africa, writers, reporters, and editors varied in both what they covered and how they covered it. This wider spectrum of reporting always exists, whether or not we recognize it, which makes inclusion of dissenting, minority, or radical sources so vital for journalism history and media studies.

This dissertation envisions new avenues of research. A multitude of publications and reporters produced news coverage of Africa during the Cold War and the long global Sixties. Scholars may build on this work to recover still more voices and views concerned with newly independent nations elsewhere in the Global South. While my study deals with a handful of African countries, there are other countries and continents in the non-aligned and third worlds whose media images in the United States deserve scrutiny. As we consider media today in all of its diversity, and as online and social media have changed the boundaries of access to discursive space, it is important to remember that there have long existed those journalists who endeavored to set new agendas by widening the discourse about foreign affairs, reframing the understanding of what was once the colonial world and is now widely known as the Global South, and sometimes even making space in newspaper columns and magazine pages for the voices of people – ordinary people as well as writers and leaders – from these regions.
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Ramparts, 1972-1974

TIME, 1957-1973

Articles, Essays, Interviews, and Books


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1 N.B. Autobiographies and memoirs are classified under this area of primary sources.


General Assembly document A/4614; Security Council document S/4571, Report dated 5 December 1960, from the Special Representative [Dayal] to the Secretary-General, submitted by the Secretary-General to the Assembly and Council. In O’Brien, Conor


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40 Kurlansky, 1968, xviii.
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43 Dubinsky, New World Coming, 3.
44 Dubinsky, New World Coming, 3.
45 Kurlansky, 1968, xvii.
47 Prashad, The Darker Nations, 10.
54 White, Holding the Line, 22-23.
58 Dunn, *Imagining the Congo*.
67 Lewin, *AHMED SÉKOU TOURÉ*.
68 Lewin, *AHMED SÉKOU TOURÉ*.
70 Diakité, *Sékou Touré face au général de Gaulle*.
71 Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, 3.
74 Kaba, *Le “non” de la Guinée à de Gaulle*.
82 Cogan, *Charles de Gaulle*, 37.
83 Cogan, *Charles de Gaulle*, 58.
84 Hazareesingh, *In the Shadow*, xiii.
85 Cogan, *Charles de Gaulle*, 84.
89 Kramer “Introduction,” 1.
95 It is indicative of de Gaulle’s greater recognition among Americans that while there is a wealth of secondary source material available on de Gaulle in English; most sources covering Sékou Touré included here are in French.
97 Diakité, *Sékou Touré face au général de gaulle*.
98 Diakité, *Sékou Touré face au général de gaulle*, 56.
99 Diakité, *Sékou Touré face au général de gaulle*.
100 Despite the fact that de Gaulle made the African tour, most French historians discuss de Gaulle’s offer of the French Community or independence through the lens of the Algerian situation, as though the Sub-Saharan territories were either an afterthought or a means to a resolution of the crisis in Algeria.
104 Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, 161.
105 *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, 167.
106 *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, 172.
107 *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, 175.
At the same time, Sékou Touré indicated that he did not consider a “no” vote from Guinea to be an obstacle toward establishing relations with France, as one independent country to another.

Diakité, Sékou Touré face au général de gaulle, 65.

Houphouët-Boigny served as a member of the consultative committee as well as the ad hoc group focused on the territories, along with Senghor, Lamine Guèye of Senegal, Gabriel Lisette of Chad and Philibert Tsiranana of Madagascar. Although the Overseas Minister suggested adding Sékou Touré to the consultative committee, Houphouët-Boigny opposed his participation, and he was not permitted to join the committee. (Schmidt, Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 142.)
“French West Africa.”
“French West Africa.”
“French West Africa.”
“French West Africa.”
“French West Africa.”
“French West Africa.”

Not specifically focused on Africa, the September 15 article covers de Gaulle’s “battle for votes” with the Communist Party to get “his constitution” ratified.

One article finally mentions the hand of another in the writing of the constitution – TIME’s Aug. 25, 1958 “Selling the Constitution” states, “Minister of Justice Michel Debré, who had a big hand in writing the new constitution, denies that De Gaulle opposes a democratic Parliament.”


Other than Guinea, only Madagascar with 77.64% yes and Niger with 78.43% fell below the 90% approval mark, with Ivory Coast having the highest in favor at 99.99%.


“Selling the Constitution.”
“Selling the Constitution.”

“The Campaigner.”

“Free to Choose Freedom,” TIME, Sept. 29, 1958. The article does not recognize that the “offer” of independence went again what Frantz Fanon would claim as the necessity of revolution to break from colonialism’s psychological chains. However, an unidentified African political leader in Dakar complained in the Sept. 8 article: “The general misunderstands us … He wants to give us our independence, but we want to wrest it away ourselves.”

“The Campaigner.”
“The Campaigner.”

Sékou Touré’s now famous, “We will vote no to a community which is just the French Union rebaptized, that is to say, old merchandise with a new ticket,” was made during a Sept. 14, 1958 speech at the territorial conference of the PDG in Conakry.

“Free to Choose Freedom.”
“Free to Choose Freedom.”
“Free to Choose Freedom.” Interestingly, Niger not only showed exceptionally low voter turnout at 37.42%, but also a lower than average approval vote at 78.43%. By contrast, Senegal’s high voter turnout of 80.71% resulted in 97.55% ratification of the new constitution.

Cover, TIME, January 5, 1959 and Cover TIME, February 16, 1959.

Buffet’s striking portrait depicts his own opinion about De Gaulle of whom he stated, “The shape of De Gaulle’s face and his bone structure denote enormous strength of character and will power,” and “I am convinced he is what France needs.” Photo Caption, TIME, January 5, 1959.


Prior to this article, the only mention of Sékou Touré had come in a June 15, 1957 article about Nkrumah visiting the Ivory Coast. “Then he flew to French Guinea in a plane provided by the French Government and escorted by M. Sekou Toure, the R.D.A. party leader in French
Guinea, which is Ghana’s border on one side.” Ghana and Guinea actually do not share a border, a fact that later press coverage of their alliance frequently notes. ("Nkrumah Makes Ivory Coast Visit," The Chicago Defender, Jun 15, 1957."

While the August 12 article came from UPI Paris, an August 23 article without a newswire source continues the use of “integration” and “secession” to describe the offer made by the proposed French constitution.


We do not confuse the enjoyment of the right to independence with secession from France, to which we intend to stay connected and collaborate in the development of our common wealth.

We prefer poverty in freedom to riches in slavery.


Von Eschen, Race Against Empire.

Plummer, Rising Wind.


“Africa And A New Leadership,” The Chicago Defender, October 6, 1958.

Ibid.

“They Call Him Black Nasser,” “Only Guinea Fails To OK De Gaulle,” and “Africa And A New Leadership.”

The Defender did not publish an obituary for Sékou Touré upon his death in 1984.

For example in “DeGaulle And African Colonies,” The Chicago Defender, June 2, 1958, the reporter states “For a free, independent Africa, ruled democratically by trained natives would be a great boon to mankind everywhere.”


“Guinea’s Chief Bids For United States of Africa.” “Guinea’s Chief Bids For United States of Africa.”

Michaeli, The Defender, 353-4.


“President Threatens to use U.S. Troops, Orders Rioters in Little Rock to Desist; Mob Compels 9 Negroes to Leave School,” The New York Times, September 24, 1957.


"Our Opinion: The World Looks at Africa."


“Fear DeGaulle Losing Bid to Hold Colonies” and “De Gaulle Wins, Loses In Africa.”


“Tells Africans Independence Carries Price.”


“Dulles and De Gaulle.”

“Africa And A New Leadership.”


Gondola, *History of Congo*.


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Nearly 40 years later it was proved that the actual act of assassination was anything but a completely internal affair and was committed by collaborating Belgians and Katangans. See “Who Killed Lumumba,” *BBC News*, October 21, 2000, accessed May 30, 2016. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/974745.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/974745.stm)

Dunn, *Imagining the Congo*, 20.


Peter A. Dumbuya, “The United States and West Africa: The Institutionalization of Foreign Relations in an Age of Ideological Ferment,” in *The United States and West Africa: Interactions*...

266 Dumbuya, “The United States and West Africa,” 243.

267 Dumbuya, “The United States and West Africa,” 250.


271 White, Holding the Line, 22-23.

272 Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 58.

273 Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 58.

274 Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 59.

275 Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 66.

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280 Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 103.


282 O’Brien, appendix to Murderous Angels, 199.


284 O’Brien, appendix to Murderous Angels, 197.

285 Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo.

286 De Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, 184.


288 O’Brien, author’s preface to Murderous Angels, xxii, xxiv.

289 Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans, 233.

290 Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans, 235.

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292 Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans, 235-6.


294 Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans, 236.

295 Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans, 238.
Plummer, *Rising Wind*, 304.
Meriwether, *Proudly We Can Be Africans*, 238.
O’Brien, author’s preface to *Murderous Angels*, xviii.

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Roberts, “‘The Council has been your Creation,’” 65.


Roberts, “‘The Council has been your Creation,’” 69.


Roberts, “‘The Council has been your Creation,’” 79.


Roberts, “‘The Council has been your Creation,’” 91-92

Roberts, “‘The Council has been your Creation,’” 79.


Armstrong, “U.N. on Trial,” 393.

Roberts, “‘The Council has been your Creation,’” 80.


Armstrong, “U.N. on Trial.” The Soviets favored replacing the position of Secretary-General with a triumvirate comprising representatives from Western, Communist and non-aligned states. Armstrong, “U.N. on Trial,” 409.
Armstrong, “U.N. on Trial,” 410. However, if the Secretary-General’s death was not an accident, of all of the possible culprits and conspirators, the Soviet Union was the least likely candidate, according to Susan Williams, *Who Killed Hammarskjöld?: The UN, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
Petersen, *Coming of Age with The New Republic*, 5.
Foer, “The Insurrectionists,” xxv.
The brief article also discusses Jomo Kenyatta.
“From Jail to Power,” 10.
Filmmaker Raoul Peck revisits the use of this stereotype during “Lumumba” when Lumumba and Maurice Mpolo jokingly call each other “anthropophage.”
“Lumumba’s Murder,” 5.
“Reprieve in the Congo?, 1”
“Reprieve in the Congo?,” 1.
“Reprieve in the Congo?,” 3.
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The Editors, “Where We Stand,” *Monthly Review*, May 1961, 46-47. Although during the early years, the editors claimed, “socialism became a reality with the introduction of the First Five Year Plan in Soviet Russia in 1928,” they later disagreed with the economic and political direction the Soviet Union had taken.


Phelps, “Introduction.”


Uchitelle, “Paul Sweezy.”


Simon, “Leo Huberman.”

Simon, “Leo Huberman.”

Simon, “Leo Huberman.”

Phelps, “Introduction.”

Foster, “Memorial Service for Paul Marlor Sweezy.”


Phelps, “Introduction.”


Nearing, “World Events.”


“Review of the Month,” 551.

“Review of the Month,” 552.

“Review of the Month.”

The magazine eventually went to an online format and in 2013 ceased publishing, and was replaced with PeoplesWorld.org.


398 Aptheker has continued to invite controversy even after his death. His former student Ronald Radosh, “who later renounced his radical past” responded critically to a positive obituary printed in The New York Times, replacing Aptheker’s depiction as a “Marxist historian” with “the leading intellectual defender of Stalinism in the American Communist movement.” Radosh argues that “Aptheker denounced his own country as an imperialist” and defended the Soviet invasion of Hungary, even writing a book “to prove that the Soviet invasion was a progressive coup.” Three years after his death, Aptheker’s daughter Bettina Aptheker, a feminist scholar and activist, published a memoir, Intimate Politics, in which she stated that her father had molested her for ten years. Debate about Bettina’s claim aroused a “firestorm” in academic circles, and Aptheker’s biographer questions, “Should Bettina’s revelations have any bearing on Herbert’s writing and his place as a scholar of African American history?” Bettina wrote that she had forgiven him, recognizing that he was under McCarthy-induced stress throughout most of the years in question. From: Murrell, “The Most Dangerous Communist in the United States,” xv and Ronald Radosh, “How the NYT Misled Readers About Communist Herbert Aptheker,” History News Network, March 30, 2003, accessed October 27, 2016.
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/1349; and


404 “Notes of the Month,” 17.

405 “Notes of the Month,” 17.

406 “Notes of the Month,” 17.

407 “Notes of the Month,” 17.

408 “Notes of the Month,” 17-18.

409 “Notes of the Month,” 18.

410 “Notes of the Month,” 18.

411 “Notes of the Month,” 19.

412 “Notes of the Month,” 19.

413 “Notes of the Month,” 20.


“Do They Know It’s Christmas?” was re-recorded in 1989 and 2004 to raise funds for famine relief in Africa and recorded again with altered lyrics in 2014 to raise money for the Ebola crisis.


This phrase is borrowed from Chinua Achebe, *The Trouble with Nigeria* (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1983).


Toyin Falola and Ogechukwu Ezekwem, *Writing the Nigeria-Biafra War* (Suffolk, GB: James Currey, 2016).


439 Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties*.
443 Schwab, *Biafra*.
452 Cooper, *Africa Since 1940*, 172.
459 Schwab, *Biafra*, 118.
460 Kurlansky, *1968*.
469 Heerten, “‘A’ as in Auschwitz, ‘B’ as in Biafra,” 252.
Interestingly, in the extensive U.S. print media sources under review, the oil worker incident earns no coverage.

Doron, “Biafra and the AGIP Oil Workers,” 137.

Achebe, _There Was a Country_, 41.


Achebe, _There Was a Country_, 42.

Achebe, _There Was a Country_.


Kurlansky, _1968_, 259.

Gould, _Struggle for Modern Nigeria_, 139.

Schwab, _Biafra_, 59.

Kurlansky, _1968_, 259.


http://www.ontheissues.org/Celeb/Ted_Kennedy_Foreign_Policy.htm

In encouraging Nigerians and Biafrans to end their war, the United States could claim little authority as it had stumbled through nearly a year of peace talks in Paris yet continued its campaign in Vietnam.

Schwab, _Biafra_, 63.

Ben Yagoda, _About Town_ (New York: Scribner, 2000), 313.


“Notes and Comment,” 23.

Schwab, _Biafra_, 101.


Ibid.


Adler’s coverage of the war in Israel was serendipitous. In 1967, _McCall’s_ asked her to write a piece, and she suggested going to Brasilia or Vietnam. _McCall’s_ agreed to Vietnam, but stipulated that she could not write anything military or political. “On the way back, I went by
way of Phnom Penh, Hong Kong, New Delhi, Teheran, Cairo, Tel Aviv… Then I got to the Middle East. I happened upon the Six Days War, and wrote a *New Yorker* piece about it.” Interestingly, *McCall’s* declined to publish her Vietnam article, which was apparently about cock fighting, and paid her a kill rate. In Renata Adler, *Gone: The Last Days of The New Yorker* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 92.

509 Adler, *Gone*, 97.
516 Yagoda, *About Town*, 357.
520 Bollen, “Renata Adler.”
528 Adler, “Letter from Biafra,” 47.
529 Adler, “Letter from Biafra,” 47.
533 Adler, “Letter from Biafra,” 64, 95.
Adler flew to Biafra onboard a Joint Church Aid relief flight on a Saturday night, and by Thursday morning, she made what appears to be her penultimate stop at the Queen of the Holy Rosary College school before meeting Ojukwu on an unspecified day and leaving Biafra likely on a French Red Cross flight to Libreville, Gabon.

570 “Rev. Joseph C. McKenna, S.J. ’35.”
572 Omaka, “Humanitarian Action.”
577 Waters, “Influencing the Message,” 698.
580 Waters, “Influencing the Message,” 710.
583 Omenka, “Blaming the Gods,” 368.
587 McKenna, “Elements of a Nigerian Peace,” 678.
588 McKenna, “Elements of a Nigerian Peace,” 668.
591 McKenna, “Elements of a Nigerian Peace,” 672.
592 McKenna, “Elements of a Nigerian Peace,” 672.
593 McKenna, “Elements of a Nigerian Peace,” 673.
598 Waters, “Influencing the Message,” 715.
599 McKenna remained in Nigeria until 1980 and following a couple of years at Fordham University, returned to Nigeria in 1984. Before his time in Nigeria, McKenna, who earned a doctorate in Political Science from Yale University in 1955, taught at Fordham and wrote the scholarly work *Diplomatic Protest in Foreign Policy: Analysis and Case Studies*, which was published by Loyola University Press in 1962. Years later, in 1997, Fordham University Press would publish his *Finding a Social Voice: The Church and Marxism in Africa*, examining how the Church handled the influence of Marxism from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s.


“Aid to the Defeated,” 25.

“Aid to the Defeated,” 25.

Schwab, *Biafra*, 119-120.


“Aid to the Defeated,” 27.


Whitman, “A Reporter at Large,” 42.


Cooper, *Africa Since 1940*, 173.


Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 10-11.


Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 13.

632 Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 15-16.
633 Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 16.
634 Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 16-17.
635 Forrest, *Guinea-Bissau*, 33-34.
636 Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 29.
637 Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 51.
638 Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 53.
639 Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 113.
640 Cabral’s December 1966 Report in Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 114.
643 Washington also might have viewed Guinea-Bissau as part of a package deal and been more concerned about the independence of the Southern African colonies than it was about Guinea-Bissau. “The hardening American position, first under Johnson and later under Nixon, which culminated in the Azores Agreement of 1971 has no doubt been partly a response to the specter of a future, FRELIMO-ruled, militant Mozambique (a Mozambique which gets some support, need one add, from the "Communists"!),” John S. Saul, “FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution,” *Monthly Review*, March 1973, 47.
646 Martin, “Thomas A. Johnson.”
647 Martin, “Thomas A. Johnson.”
650 Johnson, “Cabral Buried in Guinea,” 2.
651 Johnson, “Cabral Buried in Guinea,” 2.
652 Johnson, “Cabral Buried in Guinea,” 2.
653 Johnson, “Cabral Buried in Guinea,” 2.
Many of the founders of *Freedomways* met in the Southern Negro Youth Congress. One of the main figures was Louis Burnham, who had been with SNYC and had also edited the Robeson-published *Freedom* in the early 1950s. Burnham passed away before *Freedomways* launched.


Rocksborough-Smith, “Bearing the Seeds of Struggle,” 98.

Pinto, “Guinea-Bissau’s Liberation Struggle,” 189.

Pinto, “Guinea-Bissau’s Liberation Struggle,” 194.

Pinto, “Guinea-Bissau’s Liberation Struggle,” 194.

Pinto, “Guinea-Bissau’s Liberation Struggle,” 194.

Pinto, “Guinea-Bissau’s Liberation Struggle,” 190.

Pinto, “Guinea-Bissau’s Liberation Struggle,” 190.


Pinto, “Guinea-Bissau’s Liberation Struggle,” 192.


Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 1.

Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 18-22.

Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 25.

Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 26.

Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 31.

Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 202.


Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 87.

Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 201.

Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 177.

Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 177.

Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 187-190.

Richardson, A Bomb in Every Issue, 181-182.


According to a small notice on page 61 of the July 1973 issue, the article was translated from French by Peoples Translation Service in Berkeley.


741 Gabb, "A Fowl in the Vortices of Consciousness."
742 Gabb, "A Fowl in the Vortices of Consciousness."
748 Gabb, "A Fowl in the Vortices of Consciousness."
749 Heckert, “The Great Speckled Bird Flies Again.”
759 “Cabral Murdered,” 5.
760 “Cabral Murdered,” 5.
761 “Cabral Murdered,” 5.
In 1969, a coalition of young people formed the Venceremos (We Shall Overcome) Brigade, as a means of showing solidarity with the Cuban Revolution by working side by side with Cuban workers and challenging U.S. policies towards Cuba, including the economic blockade and our government’s ban on travel to the island.” From “Background,” Venceremos Brigade, accessed November 10, 2016. http://www.venceremosbrigade.net/background.htm

Atlanta Regional Venceremos Brigade, “Cabral Remembered,” 8.

With its February 1976 issue, The Great Speckled Bird reduced its printing to monthly.

Urdang, Fighting Two Colonialisms, 9.

Urdang, Fighting Two Colonialisms, 15.

Urdang, Fighting Two Colonialisms, 32.

Urdang, Fighting Two Colonialisms, 16.

Urdang, Fighting Two Colonialisms, 280-281.

Urdang, Fighting Two Colonialisms, 281.

Urdang, Fighting Two Colonialisms, 115.

Urdang, Fighting Two Colonialisms, 10.


The Great Speckled Bird ceased publishing the following year, so it is not possible to know whether it would have continued to devote coverage to Cabral’s ideas or legacy.