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Understanding the Dearth of Contacts between Citizens and their Members of Parliaments in Africa

Jean Francois Koly Onivogui

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UNDERSTANDING THE DEARTH OF CONTACTS BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THEIR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT (MP) IN AFRICA

by

JEAN FRANCOIS KOLY ONIVOGUI

Under the Direction of Carrie Manning, PhD

ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to understand when and why ordinary citizens in Africa initiate contacts with their Member of Parliament. It fills an important gap in the literature by probing the roles of intermediary informal institutions to facilitate interactions between citizens and their representatives. To answer this question, I analyze cross-national survey data with logistic regression models, three-stage-least square regression models, and seemingly unrelated regressions, using Afrobarometer survey data from over dozen African countries. I find that African citizens use two intermediary informal institutions to contact their representatives: grassroots organization and traditional and religious authorities. Importantly, these channels help to strengthen the weak political attachment ordinary citizens have with their political systems in Africa. I also show that the key causal factor to contact between MPs and their constituents is MPs displaying a willingness to listen to their constituents.
INDEX WORDS: Contact of members of parliament, Grassroots associations, Traditional Authorities, Direct contacts, Listening of MPs
UNDERSTANDING THE DEARTH OF CONTACTS BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THEIR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT IN AFRICA

by

JEAN FRANCOIS KOLY ONIVOGUI

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University 2019
UNDERSTANDING THE DEARTH OF CONTACTS BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THEIR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT IN AFRICA

by

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College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
May 2019
DEDICATION

To my beautiful country Guinea

To my Guinean and American families

To my mother Iyee, my father Apaa, and to my baby Augustine (Titi)
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# TABLE OF CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... V

LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... XI

1 CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1

1.1 Importance of Constituent-Representative Relationship .............................................. 2

1.2 Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 4

1.3 Gaps in the Literature ..................................................................................................... 12

1.4 Theory and Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 13

1.4.1 Hypothesis I: Membership in grassroots increases contact with MPs more than individual politically relevant characteristics. ............................................................ 15

1.4.2 Hypothesis II: In comparison to citizens’ contacts with formal institutions (party officials), citizens’ contacts with informal institutions predict a greater likelihood of contacting members to the parliament. .............................................. 16

1.5 Research Design and Method ......................................................................................... 16

1.5.1 Data source .................................................................................................................. 16

1.5.2 Design and Operationalization ................................................................................... 17

1.5.3 Models used for the analyses ..................................................................................... 21

1.6 Summaries of Empirical Chapters .................................................................................. 21

1.6.1 Contribution to the literature: ................................................................................... 22

2 CHAPTER II: GRASSROOTS ASSOCIATIONS AS VECTOR OF CONTACT OF MPS ................................................................................................................................. 24
2.1 Scope, Research Design, and Argument ................................................................. 24

2.1.1 So Why? ................................................................................................................. 25

2.2 Section I: Associational Life In Africa ................................................................. 27

2.2.1 Typology of Associational Life In Africa ......................................................... 27

2.2.2 Debate About Characteristics of Associational Life In Africa ......................... 32

2.3 Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................... 38

2.3.1 Literature review .............................................................................................. 38

2.3.1. The argument .................................................................................................... 43

2.4 Section III: Research Design and Methodology ................................................. 49

2.4.1 Data .................................................................................................................. 49

2.4.2 Operationalization of the Independent variables ............................................. 53

2.5 Discussion of the Results .................................................................................... 57

3 CHAP III: AFRICAN TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES AND RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS AS INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS TO CONTACT MPS ... 66

3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 66

3.1.1 Research questions .......................................................................................... 66

3.1.2 The Argument .................................................................................................. 67

3.1.3 The Scope of the chapter three .................................................................... 69

3.2 Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................... 71

3.2.1 Literature Review ........................................................................................... 71
3.2.2  Theory................................................................. 91

3.3  Research Design and Methodology ................................................. 95

3.3.1  Data source........................................................................ 95

3.3.2  Operationalization and variables .............................................. 95

3.4  Results and Discussion.............................................................. 98

4  CHAPTER IV: DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THEIR MPS.
  ................................................................................................................. 103

4.1  Introduction................................................................................... 103

4.1.1  The Research Design................................................................. 106

4.2  Theoretical Debates About Dyadic Relationships in Africa................. 107

4.2.1  Dyadic, Person to Person, Interactions Between Citizens and MPs are
  essentially Clientelistic........................................................................ 108

4.2.2  MPs Misconstrue their Constituents’ Demands in Africa.................. 109

4.3  Theory ......................................................................................... 111

4.3.1  Dyadic contacts serve to build a political bond between representatives and
  constituents.......................................................................................... 112

4.3.2  MPs’ ability to Listen, an Exogenous factor, is the driver of Citizen-MP
  Contacts.............................................................................................. 120

4.4  Research Design and Methodology .................................................. 124

4.4.1  Data source................................................................................. 125

4.4.2  Operationalization........................................................................ 126
LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Status of Recognition of Traditional Authorities in the 20 countries .................. 75
Table 3.2 Results of the logistic regression ........................................................................... 99
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables ........................................................................ 133
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of some variables from raw survey results ....................... 134
Table 4.3 The results of the Biprobit regression are summarized in the table 4 below .......... 2
1 CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is about the relationship between citizens and their elected officials in Africa. Specifically, it asks the following question: *Under what conditions do citizens in Africa’s new democracies contact their national representatives or members of parliaments (PM)?*

The legislator-constituent relation is at the heart of representative democracy (Fenno, 1978). Peter Veit et.al (2008) assume that representative democracy is an “institutionalized form of participation” that compensates for the impracticability of direct democracy on a large scale. However, representative democracy plays its full role only when legislator play their role as the direct linkage between citizens and their governments (World Resource Institute, *On Whose Behalf*, 2008: 5). Thus, legislator-constituent relationships involve two ways of contacts between MPs and their constituents. The first, and most explored, way is the top-bottom. In this top-bottom perspective, MPs initiate contacts and strive to stay connected to their constituents. For instance, in the case of the United States, these interactions include Members of Congress (MCs)’s ’activities in Washington DC and in their districts related to constituency services, sending out mails, newsletters, press releases, and interviews. The second way of the contacts goes from citizens to their representatives. This includes individual or group initiative to reach out to their MCs. In this dissertation, I call these interactions the bottom up contacts. Citizens establish these direct contacts using several tools of communication such as face-to face, regular or electronic mails, phone calls, and lately, social media. The volume of these contacts in the United States speaks to their importance in the policy processes. According to Jacob R. Strauss and Matthew E Glassman (2016:5) citizens initiated nearly 400,000,000 emails, 22 million of franked mailed.

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1. As an international student living in the United States for the last 12 years, I have been impressed by numbers of ways in which the American society operates. One example is the timely response of firemen to emergency calls of 911; another example is the relatively
reassuring presence of law enforcement agents in communities (of course, the debate about police brutality toward minorities still continues).

1.1 Importance of Constituent-Representative Relationship

The citizen-MP relationship has numerous advantages in democracy. According to the National Democratic Institute (NDI, 2008), the citizen-MP relationship highlights the primacy of citizens in the representative democracy, irrespective of the electoral system. It also sheds a light on the linkage function of legislators (8). The National Conference of State Legislatures in the United States (NCSL) states that one of the primary jobs of MPs is to bridge the divide between citizens and often a faceless and arcane government. Moreover, the MP-citizen relationship provides a channel for a flow of information and meaningful conversation between citizens and their law makers in order for citizens to have their inputs in the policy process (Kutz, 1997:6). Finally, a healthy MP-citizen relationship allows MPs to embrace diverse concerns and integrate them in the democratic policy processes (Dahl, 1989). Yet direct contacts between MPs and citizens in African countries raise some eyebrows because of the persistent culture of patrimonialism (Bratton et.al. 2005, 151). However, Kurtz (1997) maintains that a healthy MP-citizen relationship in new democracies deepens the roots of democratic tradition (3). Lindberg (2010) corroborates that such a relationship helps to educate citizens to hold realistic expectations about their MPs (who are often seen as "walking ATM" (Kurtz, 1997:17). In sum, contacts are important because they embody and vindicate the democratic theory of representation. In the words of one the eminent political scientists, V.O. Key, Jr. (1961:15) if citizens, for whatever reasons, fail to have their input in the democratic policy process, the whole fuss about normative theory of democracy becomes meaningless.

Although these two examples put the United States in stark contrast with Guinea, they have not piqued my curiosity as the representative-constituent relationship in the United states has. This relationship, often taken as granted by many Americans, continues to puzzle me for at least two reasons. First, the legislator –constituent relationship highlights the primacy of citizens in the democratic system; and second, this relationship validates and materializes the very abstract concepts of principle-agent theory (PAT). Simply put, the PAT suggests that elected officials are the agents who work for the principle, their constituents (Gailamrd, 2012).
Without direct contacts between citizens and their representatives, the democratic linkage of accountability breaks down, causing the representative to be insulated and nonresponsive. With such an importance, contacts between citizens and their representative become a noteworthy subject of study. So, I set out to find out about conditions under which contacts between citizens and their MPs happen in African countries.

To start my investigation, I turned to the Afro barometer’s public opinion surveys to get an appraisal on the topic with a particular emphasis on the types of contacts their targets in Africa. The Afrobarometer reports that citizens in Africa initiate eight types of contacts. These contacts target their local councilors, their national members of parliament (MP), party officials, government agencies, traditional rulers, religious leaders and some influential persons. A quick look at the raw data from the Afrobarometer round 6 shows that on average, 29% of citizens contact their traditional rulers, 37% of Africans reach out to their religious leaders, and only 12% contact their national representatives in these 36 countries. Furthermore, there is wide variation among countries. For instance, whereas 35% of Liberians contact MPs, only 3% in Madagascar bother to do so. As for contact of informal leaders, 58% of Sierra Leoneans contact religious and 65% of them contact traditional rulers. On the other hand, intriguingly, not one citizen contacts traditional rulers or religious leaders in Mauritius and Cape Verde, countries rated as free by Freedom House. I quickly discovered that these data raise more questions than they answer. Among these questions are the following: Why do Africans contact more informal institutions (traditional rulers and religious leaders) more than their formal ones (MP and local councilors)? The conventional wisdom will point to some observable institutional and structural differences as explanatory factors (electoral rules, geographical size, colonial past, demographic, or gdp). However, these variables fail to
explain thoroughly the variations. Consider these cases. Take Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. These two
countries have approximately the same size, same demographic, and same electoral system (the
First Pass the Post), but Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire have drastically different contact rates. On
average, 18% of Ghanaians contact their MPs on the yearly basis. In contrast only 8% of citizen in
Cote d'Ivoire do so. Another example is Togo and Sierra Leone. The two countries are similar in
every aspect but different in their contact rates. Still another example, Tanzania and Uganda. These
countries have different electoral systems, geographical size, but they have virtually the same levels
of contact of their MPs. What explains these widespread variations? More generally, what explains
the interactions between citizens and their representatives?

1.2 Literature Review

Contacts, along with voting, campaign activities, contribution, protest, are what scholars
have called conventional political participation (Brady Schlozman, and Verba, 1995). Now,
political participation is a multidimensional concept whose definition has generated innumerable
heated debates among scholars. One of the controversial issues has to do with where to draw the
line between conventional and non-conventional acts of participation. That debate remains
unsettled. Nevertheless, scholars have agreed on a minimal common denominator in defining
political participation as "ways in which citizens communicate information to government officials
about their concerns and preferences and to put [hopefully] pressure on them to respond" (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Rosenstone, 1993; Bratton, 2005; Teixeira, Griffin, Frey, 2017). But
what does the literature say about causes of contacts?

As with other forms of political participation, scholars have found citizen-initiated contacts
to be related to three broad categories of variables: individual level variables (socio-economic
status, demographic, issues preferences), institutional level variables (electoral systems, party
systems, resources, decentralization, political history), structural variables (geographical size of the country, population density). At the individual level, four schools of thought debate about the causes of contacts: the Columbia school, the Michigan school, the Rational Choice school, and the Civic voluntarist model. The Columbia school, known as the sociological school, was the first political behavior school. Led by Lazarsfeld and his colleagues in the 1940s, this school posited that political participation is rooted in citizens’ sociological characteristics (social economic status). Drawing from the economic model of behavior, the Columbia school likened citizens to consumers. Like buyers, citizens are more influenced by brand loyalty and their social networks; they are less influenced by commercials. Hence their later controversial thesis of “minimal effects of campaigns.” Furthermore, and perhaps mistakenly, Lazarsfeld et.al (1948) argued that party identity had negligible effects on political participation (voting). Such conclusion shows why the Columbia school failed to account for Truman’s victory in 1948 where Dewey was given serious chance for winning (Niemi, 2010:15). This failure of the Columbia school sets the stage for a new paradigm that explains political participation. The new paradigm was the social psychological perspective promoted by the Michigan school. In *the American Voter* (1960) the proponents of the Michigan school, Campbell, Converse, and Miller, (1960), proposed a new model that revolves around three attitudes: Americans’ attitudes toward the Democratic and Republican parties, their attitudes toward daily issues, and toward political actors (Niemi, 2010:17). Campbell, Converse, Stoke and Miller put an extra emphasis on party identification, contending that this variable has “long and short term effects” (Niemi et.al, 2010:16). With this argument, the Michigan school explained plausibly Truman’s electoral victory in 1948, which, they contend, was due to party identity’s long term effects of Democrats toward Truman. The party long term effect is people’s long standing psychological attachment to the party irrespective of its performance (Niemi
et al. 2010). The crux of their theory is the “Funnel of Causality.” The Funnel of Causality integrates individual social backgrounds, psychological attachment to one’s family and to one’s party. However, putting the party identification as the primal mover and neglecting variables such as daily issues drew severe criticisms to the Michigan school. For instance, the Michigan Model showed its weakness in failing to explain the switch of many republicans in 1964 presidential election, causing Lyndon Baines Johnson to win a historical landslide victory (Niemi, 2010:23). In 1964, preeminence of domestic issues not party identification make people switch.

The most vocal critic of the Michigan school was the rational choice theory school. According to the proponents of this school (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1974, to name few) people get involved in politics not because of psychological attachment or purported sense or civic duty but out of their own personal interests (Downs, 1957). Put another way, issues people care about weigh heavily in their motivation to participate. The Rational Choice Theory school’s explanation of political participation has been credited as the most elegant and parsimonious theory in the sense that it puts the finger on what really motivates people to get involved in the first people (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba, 1995: 283). At the same time, the opponents of the Rational Choice Theory argue that if the core premise of the rational choice theory (the cost benefits analysis) is taken to its logical conclusion, there would be hardly a reason to partake in crucial forms of participation such as voting. Indeed, it has been shown that the costs of voting outweigh its benefits, at least for ordinary citizens (Green and Shapiro, 1994:75 ). As a result, political participation would be an irrational act. Furthermore, Green and Shapiro contend that any attempt by Rational Choice theorists to add civic duty as justification for political participation amounts to committing a post-hoc fallacy (Green and Shapiro, 1994:72-96).

To date, the most comprehensive model explaining political participation [contact] is the
civic voluntarist model, promoted by Brady, Schlozman and Verba hereafter (BSV) in 1995. In this model, BSV start by acknowledging the merits of the Rational Choice theory’s terse explanation of motives of participation, then quickly criticize it for its incapacity to evaluate how many people would likely participate (284). To determine why, who, and when do people participate, BSV, forge a theory that integrates preceding variables (Social connections, SES, demographics, and issues) and add new variables: civic skills learned from social institutions and stockpiled throughout life (12). The originality of the civic model lies in its effort to highlight the roles of "pre-political" institutions such as unions and religious institutions that provide individuals with transferable skills to smooth their navigation in a political world. As highly generalizable as they are, these theories have been more focused on matured democracies than on nascent democracies, like those in Africa. Specifically, when it comes to political participation in Africa, the majority of studies take a macro level perspective involving the institutional variables: electoral systems the Single Member District (SMD) also known as the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) and the Proportional Representation (PR), or some variants or mixed of the two, political parties’ formal structure and linkages to its members, countries' history (colonial legacy), political culture (patrimonialism, authoritarianism), decentralization, and countries’ structural variables (geographical size, population density).

Electoral system is the first variable and probably the most purported as the cause of variations in rate of contacts between MPs and citizens (Lijphart 1989; Mattes and Mozzaффar 2016, Bratton et.al. 2005, Cho 2010). According to this argument, in comparison to the PR system, the SMD system tends to encourage more direct contacts between constituents and their MPs than does the PR system. In the SMD system, most of MPs' electoral fortune depends on the nature of their relationships with their districts. As a consequence, MPs take advantage of the smallest opportunity to connect with their constituents. On the other hand, in the PR system, MPs owe their presence
and position in the legislature to the party officials; their loyalty is stronger toward the party than toward their districts. In short, as Kurtz puts it, while the SMD promotes “downward accountability,” the PR system favors the “upward accountability” (Kurtz, 1997: 13). The literature is full of examples supporting this argument. In the case of the SMD, scholars point to electoral rational that underpins the potency of the constituency. Constituency potency manifests itself through a high volume of interactions between the representatives and her voters and the reflection of voters’ preference in public policies (Stoke and Miller 1963: 48). One way constituency potency manifests itself is what Mayhew (1974) calls *Electoral Connection* in the United States. In this constituent-representative connection, all members of Congress do can be summarized in three activities: advertisement, credit claiming, and position taking. The goal of these activities is to be in sync with her district. For instance, the congressional literature has demonstrated the validity of the constituency potency argument through several investigative approaches including experiments (Glazer and Robbin, 1985; Kousser, 2007) and innumerable quantity of observational studies (Fenno 1978, Mayhew 1974, Kingdon 1981, Lazarus 2010). Altogether, the argument is that MCs strive to conform to their districts because the survival of their political career depends on their districts. Scholars often picturize this adaptability of MCs using evolutionary biology terminologies. For instance, using a natural experiment, Glazer and Robbin show that MCs ideological stance “mutated” by 15% to align with that of their new districts redrawn after the 1980 reapportionment (265). They contend that “MCs are not like leopards who do not change their coast. MCs are like chameleons who adapt to their political environment” (269). Kousser et. al (2007), through another natural experiment, stress MCs’ adaptability to the preferences of their districts. Kousser and his colleagues took advantage of the opportunity of the recall of the California’s Democratic governor, Gray Davis in 2003, to evaluate the ideological readjustment of the Democratic party’s legislators
in the California’s General Assembly. They found that elected Democrats who understood the
signal sent by the Democratic governor’s removal saved their seats by shifting about 5 to 15%
rightward (834). Stimson et al. (1995) use the same simile by likening MCs to “Antelopes in an
open field; they cock their ears and focus their full attention on the slightest sign of dangers” [coming from the district.] (559).

Legislative-constituent relationships in emerging democracies are also examined through
party voter linkages. The argument is that party’s formal structures and its membership tend to work
as motivator or inhibitor of contacts between MPs and citizens. Because party systems and
structures are direct consequences of electoral systems (Duverger, 1952), the discussion on electoral
systems finds some echoes here. For instance, in the SMD systems, “party discipline” tends to be
laxed, leaving individual legislators a considerable room for autonomous initiatives (Mayhew
1974:34). In addition, in the SMD system, MPs' districts are known, relatable, and form a concrete
geographical and political areas where elected officials cultivate their MP-constituent relationships.
On the other hand, the PR system extols strong party discipline, often punishing any legislator who
toes the party line. In this case, MPs in the PR system are forced to favor their party position often
at the expense of the preferences of their districts (Mattes and Mozzaffar, 2016). Mattes points out
that in extreme cases of the PR system, it is the very concept of constituency that constitutes the
problem. Some MPs from the PR system such as in South Africa do not have a specific district. In
lieu of a geographically distinct area, they are assigned “shadow districts” where constituency
becomes a loose reality (Mattes 2002:34). However, other scholars question the party structure
logic in this SMD versus PR system. Mezey (1994) contends that more than parties’ formal
structure, it is the party’s internal working and country specificity that explains variations of
contacts between citizens and their MPs. Carey’s (1996) study of Costa Rica substantiates Mezey’
argument. Carey (1996) shows that in Costa Rica, a country staunchly attached to the PR system with strong discipline, MPs and Citizens have a higher rate of contacts than in surrounding countries using the SMD system. This is so because MPs are encouraged to cultivate constituency service and to stay connected with their assigned districts (17). Butler et al. (2016) reports strong dyadic relationships between MPs and their voters in Sweden, a PR country with powerful parties. Butler et al. (2016: 2-27) explain that big parties have started cultivating dyadic relationships and pay attentions to local issues due to the electoral successes of small niche parties. To sum up, the argument of electoral system as primary explanatory variable is too inconsistent to pretend an unquestionable explanation of contacts between citizens and their MPs. The rational of party membership is also proposed as an explanatory variable. The rational of party membership is the justification that undergirds citizens’ attachment to their party of choice, i.e., the so-called “voters-party linkage.” Kitschelt (1997, 2002, 2002) enumerates three types of rational that justify citizens’ adhesion to parties: “symbolic”, “issue-based,” and “clientelist.” Symbolic linkages describe a type of relationships between a “charismatic leader” and his fellow citizens whereby the “charismatic leader” seeks to please everyone, despises formal policy processes, lacks any ideological consistency, and favors parochial interests over national ones (1454). Kitschelt understands "clientelistic linkages” to be unequal relationships that tie a "client" to a patron whereby the patron provides privates goods in exchange for political or electoral support. As for the “issue-based” or programmatic linkages, Kitschelt contends that they are based on the sharing of ideological stances or issue position among party members. Empirical evidence shows that “clientelistic linkages” and “symbolic linkages” are more common in emerging democracies than in consolidated ones. Scholars debate about disastrous impacts of these types of linkages on democratic process (1456). Kitschelt (1997, 2000, 2002), Bratton and Van de Wall (2003), complain about the polluting effects
of these “clientelistic” and “symbolic linkages” on civic efficacy and democratic accountability. Others, Keefer (2007) Lindberg (2010) and Hagopian (2007), while acknowledging the nefarious effects of clientelistic linkages, somehow project a hopeful future for emerging democracies. For instance, Keefer (2007) Keefer and Khemani (2007: 1-27) claim that clientelistic relationships are necessary phases that emerging countries have to go through as long as their living standards remain low. They argue that in the long run, when people’s living standards improve to a sustainable level, they will make it a point of honor to have their voice heard, not bought. Another way party membership influences contact is through the pattern of party formation. Manning (2005) reports that parties in Africa emerge not out of social pluralistic incentives like in the western world but from economic mismanagement and ethnic or geographical motives. This pattern of party formation exacerbates reinforcing cleavages instead of making parties a tool of overlapping politically relevant identities. Manning (2005) suggests that parties could serve as training grounds for democrats, when they increase the level of crosscutting cleavages among their members (723).

Outside the realm of political party, decentralization is one of the main institutional variables seen as cause of contacts between citizens and their MPs. Decentralization consists of devolving certain measure of power to local authorities (Hankla and Downs, 2010; Tiebout, 1954; Treisman, 2001, 2007; Ackerman, 2007). This institutional design is hailed by its proponents for its governing aspect of bringing closer governors and governed. The assumption is that the closeness and better knowledge of people’s needs improve contacts, and basic service delivery (water, sewage, schools, and health services). Pioneering studies done by Tiebout (1954) and successive scholars (Lewis 1998; Ackerman, 2007) have evidenced that decentralization reduces corruption, increases contact between citizens and their MPs, and provide swift responses to citizens' demands. But decentralization has its critics as well. Scholars such as Treisman (2001, 2003, 2007), Wibbels,
and many others counter argue that decentralization hampers economic growth (Zoe and Davoodi 1997), promotes corruption, increases inflation (Treisman 2003). Veit et.al (2008) contend that in most case in Africa, decentralization in reality amounts to nothing but a deconcentration, in the sense that the transfer of authority to local citizens is done without a real transfer of power to carry out their tasks (On Whose Behalf? 2008: 12). Hankla and Downs (2010:32) also insist that the legislative bodies in decentralized localities ought to be elected and, as much as possible, representative both descriptively as well as substantively. A pretty high standard scarcely reached in Africa’s hyper centralized political systems (Veit, 2008). In conclusion, one realizes that both individual level and institutional level variables offer causal explanations that are at best partial and often shaky.

1.3 Gaps in the Literature

Some important observations transpire from the above review. First, the enumerated individual level variables purported to cause contacts between citizens and their MPs (political participation) have arguably to do more with mature democracies than with new democracies. Because contacts between citizens and their MPs necessitate both individual and contextual variables, one should not jump into a conclusion that an increase in citizens’ social economic status will translate into a corresponding increase in their level of contacts in every country. For instance, Larreguy and Marshall (2013) found that education, a key individual level variable in the SES argument, is not conducive to active participation in politics in Nigeria (36). Secondly, in the case of emerging democracies, the literature on MP-citizen relationships focuses more on macro-level variables (states, legislative branch, parties, and elections) and neglects the interactions between elected officials and citizens. Moreover, the existing literature overlooks numbers of variables with potential explanatory power regarding contacts between citizens and their MPs. These variables
include the role of memberships in informal associations, and the roles of local and traditional leaders and citizens’ perception of their MP’s willingness to listen to their concerns. The present dissertation aims to fill these gaps.

1.4 Theory and Hypotheses

Against the conventional wisdom, I argue that one should not assume that SES and demographic variables the leading explanatory variables that motivate citizens to contact their MPs in Africa. Take for instance gender, education, and residency. Existing theories would want us to believe that higher level of education and urban dwelling correlate with higher level of political participation. However, Larreguy and Marshall (2013) find that although education increases support for democracy, further investigation shows that this support is abstract and shallow; educated people pay a mere lip service to democracy. When it comes to concrete democratic actions such as using formal channel to contact MPs, education has an inconsistent effect (8). However, this is absolutely not a validation of Huntington’s 1968 gradualist thesis about education producing a so-called “anti-democratic sentiment among educated citizens in developing countries (Quoted in Larreguy and Marshall, 2013:7). Rather, a neutral effect of education on active participation in Nigeria might be highlighting a far more sinister political environment where educated people, already seen as suspicious or subversive individuals to authoritarian governments, refrain from any type of political involvement. In addition, the variable gender has a negative relationship with contacting MPs. This relationship is perhaps shedding a light on cultural and social barriers that continue to prevent women from getting involved in public affairs like their counterpart men in several areas in Africa. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, scholars who have investigated how citizens are connected to their governments in Africa have observed a general disconnect between governs and governors. Barkan (1978, 2004) writes about citizens’ weak attachment to
their political system in Africa. Specifically, Bratton et al. 2005 use the term “Representation gap” to describe the scarcity of interactions between representatives and their constituents (151).

The central argument of this dissertation is that citizen would initiate a direct contact with their representative only if the latter displays a willingness to listen to her constituents. But because citizens’ perception of MP’s willingness to listen to them is low, I contend that ordinary Africans contact their elected representative through two intermediary informal institutions. The first intermediary institutions are memberships in associational organizations (membership in religious and community development associations, or associations to raise an issue). Several reasons motivate citizens to turn to grassroots organization as the channel to contact their MPs. Few are worth mentioning. In a context where citizens complain about being neglected and are weakly attached to their political systems, unformal grassroots emancipate and empower citizens to convey their concerns to their MPs. Indeed, political violence is still current and freedom of expression very scarce in Africa. The Afrobarometer round 4 survey results show that 80% of Africans fear to say what they wish (Online data analysis). In a such a circumstance, being a member of an unformal grassroots association help to boost citizens’ courage to communicate with their representatives. Also, unformal grassroots associations are known to offer a safer place where members air their grievances (Warren, 2001). These social fora foster generalized trust and mutual trust, encouraging members to share values and concerns (Paxton, 2000, 2002). Furthermore, by putting together their voices, members of these unformal grassroots associations get a sense of collective efficacy (Olson, 1982:32). Equally relevant is the fact that unformal grassroots’ safe place serves to educate and empower their members. In these associations, citizens learn by being involved in the planning, organizing and executing activities. Members internalize democratic values and increase their civic skills (Fung 2003, 515-539). More importantly, membership in these unformal association is
citizens’ springboard to reach out to their representative to the national legislative body (MP). To test the causal impact of membership in unformal grassroots associations on the likelihood to contact one’s MP, I generate the hypothesis below.

1.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Membership in grassroots increases contact with MPs more than individual politically relevant characteristics.

The second informal linkage institutions are the traditional rulers and religious leaders. It also appears that informal leaders provide a sort of back-door channel through which citizens communicate with their representatives. African traditional Authorities (ATA) and Religious leader are the first point of contact mostly for their incontrovertible social utility. Traditional and religious authorities are known for their social stewardship. In many areas, they are the primarily caregivers in pandemic or routine health issues. According to Patterson (2015), these institutions provide 40% of healthcare in Sub-Saharan Africa (175). ATA and religious leaders are also actively involved in social peace maintenance in their communities. Survey results from the Afrobarometer round 1 and 2 indicate that citizens primarily choose these institutions over formal judicial process to resolve their every conflict. Furthermore, these institutions play important administrative roles albeit controversial in some countries. Nevertheless, the ATA and religious leaders enjoy a great deal of legitimacy and serve as opinion leaders (Logan, 2000, 2008, 2011). Altogether, these functions make ATA and religious leaders the most powerful predictor of contacts with MPs. The mechanism goes as follows: citizens first meet and express their concerns to their religious and traditional leaders who, in turn, convey citizens’ preferences to formal representatives, the MPs. To further highlight the causal effect of ATA to contacting MP, I contrast it with the effect of parties as channel of contact between citizens and their MP. The hypothesis below tests the empirical evidence of the causal relationship between ATA and contact with MPs.
1.4.2 Hypothesis II: In comparison to citizens’ contacts with formal institutions (party officials), citizens’ contacts with informal institutions predict a greater likelihood of contacting members to the parliament.

Yet my argument posits a third and more direct connection between citizens and their MPs. This premise of my argument is evidenced by the experimental section. The premise suggests that the MP’s direct reply or feedback to citizens have a powerful causal effect on citizens’ motivations to interact with their MPs. From the above theory, I generate the seven following hypotheses.

Hypothesis III: In countries where citizens have low political efficacy, MPs’ attentiveness has a far more causal effect on citizens’ initiative to contact than individual and country level factors (gdp or electoral rules).

1.5 Research Design and Method

1.5.1 Data source.

The data used in this study comes from the Afrobarometer survey database. Although I draw evidence from the Afrobarometer survey rounds 1 through 6, the bulk of the analyses are done from the Afrobarometer round 3 and round 4. These surveys were taken between 2005 and 2006(round 3) and from 2008 to 2009 (round 4). For the round 3, the sample units consist of 18 Sub-Saharan countries including: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, Uganda, Senegal South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Afrobarometer round 4 added two new countries, Liberia and Burkina Faso. In total, the scope of the Afrobarometer round includes Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The rationale behind the choice of Afrobarometer rounds 3 and round 4 stems from the richness of these rounds in representative-
constituent-related topics in Africa. In addition to the common questions about types of contacts, this round allows the researcher to delve into the role expectations of both citizens and the members to the parliaments across the continent. For instance, it asks questions about citizens’ expectations about MPs’ roles, MPs’ visits, vote buying, MP’s ability to listen to their constituents. More importantly, the timing of these surveys (2006 through 2009) gives the investigator the unique opportunity to assess the extent to which the dyadic electoral connection between citizens and their elected officials has taken root two decades after the seeds of democratization were sowed in Africa. The Afrobarometer is a research-based organization that specializes on public opinion and attitude in Africa. To my knowledge, it is the only research-based organization that records ordinary people’s views on democracy, governance, political participation, institutional performance and democratic accountability. The design of the research has citizens’ contact of Members of parliament as the outcome variable and the MPs’ listening ability as the primary independent variable. To these two key variables, I add numbers of alternative or control variables micro level, meso level and macro level (gdp per capita and electoral rules).

1.5.2 Design and Operationalization

The subject matter of this dissertation is to understand condition under which citizens initiate communication with their elected officials. The key dependent variable of the dissertation is contact with Members of the Parliament (Contact MPs). The three independent variables of interest are unformal grassroots associations, traditional and religious authorities, and citizens’ perception of MPs’ listening ability. To get a good grasp of the study at hand, it helps to provide a clear definition of key concepts used.

1. **Contact with MPs:** According to this dictionary, to contact is "to reach out to and establish a communication with someone else in order to convey a significant signal" (Webster, 2017).
Accordingly, citizens reach out to MPs to expose an issue, ask help, or exchange views. In comparison to other forms of participation, BSV argue that contacts are “information rich” acts; they permit explicit statement of concerns or preferences.” (page). For instance, compared to both vote and protests, contacts add more nuances and put a human face to an issue. In contrast, voting is a blunt act, “poor information” and occasional (25). Additionally, contacts between representatives and citizens are not only promoted but they are also enshrined in the US constitution through the first Amendment. Finally, citizens' initiated contacts bear some policy implications, mostly during MCs voting decisions. According to the Congressional Management Foundation, citizens' contacts are likely to sway 48% of MCs who have not made up their mind yet (CMF, 2017).

How is the variable contact measured? In the Afrobarometer, the variable contact of MPs is captured by the following questionnaire: “During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views: A Member of Parliament/National Assembly Representative?” Coded as an ordinal level variable, the dependent variable Contact MP ranges from 0 to 3 according to responses given (with 0 meaning no contacts, 1 for only once; 2 for few times, and frequent contact is 3) (codebook Afrobarometer round 3 through 6). A cursory look to the Afrobarometer shows that Liberia and Sierra Leone come neck a neck ahead of all other countries in terms contacts of MPs with respectively 35% and 34% of citizens contacting their MPs. To put in perspective, these figures are equal to the number of contacts of elected officials in the United States, 34% according to Brady, Schlozman, and Verba, 1995: 34.)

The chart below shows contact MP levels in 36 countries.

Contact with Local leaders: They consist of group of citizens with a relatively higher social status that influence local opinion and hold an elected or appointive office in the circumscribed area (Veit et al. 2008: 26). Empirical evidence shows that the purview of their jurisdiction varies from one
country to another. For instance, whereas local leaders’ mandate is strictly limited to local affairs in Ghana, local leaders in South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe are allowed to intervene in local as well as national issues. Whatever maybe the extent of their political power, these influential citizens tend to be ordinary citizens’ first “go-to” persons. In the Afrobarometer, the variable contact of Local Councilors is captured from the following questionnaire: “During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views: A Local Government Councilor?” Coded as an ordinal level variable this variable Contact of Local Councilors ranges from 0 to 3 according to responses given (with 0 meaning no contacts, 1 for only once; 2 for few times, and frequent contact is 3) (codebook Afrobarometer round3-6)

Religious leaders and Traditional rulers are seen as one of the hallmarks of the African social political landscape (Logan, 2008). These local notables get their influence from a customary or religious sources and hold a big sway in ordinary citizens’ everyday lives. The range of their interventions goes anywhere from officiating marriages, religious services, or settling disputes, to outright material assistance (medicinal, food, or money). They can also serve political cue providers, whom national political figures often compete to get their endorsement (Veit et.al 2008, 26). In the Afrobarometer, the variable contact of religious leaders, traditional rulers are captured from the following questionnaire: “During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views: A traditional ruler/ religious leaders” Coded as an ordinal level variable, this variable ranges from 0 to 3 according to responses given (with 0 meaning no contacts, 1 for only once; 2 for few times, and frequent contact is 3) (codebook Afrobarometer round3. The table below provide a picture of the descriptive statistics of types of contacts.

These associations are networks of citizens loosely or strongly
interconnected through tribal, village or professional relationships. Informal and often unstructured, these interconnections tie citizens of roughly similar social economic statuses, gender, the same age cohort, or cross generational groups. Bratton (1994) argues that these associational organizations play numerous roles including economic (tontine, where the group puts a set amount of money, together and gives it to each its members at his or her turn). These associations may also be used as spokes-organ for it members and workhorse for community development activities (Kraus, 2002). Afrobarometer captures this variable with the following questionnaire: “Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: farmers association, community developments, trade unions, business association, religious association?” Membership to association is a variable coded as a dichotomous variable (Yes=1; no=0)

4. MPs Listening: “How much of the time do think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Members of Parliament/National Assembly Representatives?” External Efficacy and internal Efficacy: Scholars define external efficacy as the belief citizens hold about the responsiveness of government authorities to his or her demands (Niemi et.al 1991). As for internal efficacy, it refers to the belief about one’s ability to understand and navigate and participate effectively in politics (Niemi et.al.1991).

5. Electoral Rules and Gross Domestic Product Per Capita Electoral: To complete the model, I control for three contextual variables: electoral system, the economic level of each country (GDP per capita). Following Kuenzi and Lambright’ footsteps, I code electoral system as a dichotomous variable (Single Member District countries are coded as =1) and (Proportional Representation countries are coded as =0). As for the GDP per capita, I log the value taken from the World Bank database. I run
a series of logit regressions followed by a post estimation using marginal effect of listed variables in individual countries' data.

1.5.3 Models used for the analyses

Because my primary outcome variable dichotomous level variable, I use a maximum likelihood model of estimation MLE. Specifically, I use the logit and probit models and proceed to evaluate the substantive meanings of regression results using the Marginal Effect post estimation. In the fourth chapter, evaluate a possible reciprocal causal relationship between contacts and listening using the Biprobit and the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. The results are displayed in Chapter II, III, and IV. Below is a brief summary of these empirical chapters.

1.6 Summaries of Empirical Chapters

My dissertation probes the bottom-up interactions between citizens and their representatives. Specifically, it seeks to answer the following research question: Under what conditions do citizens initiate a contact with their Member of Parliament?

The response to this question is the central argument of the dissertation. It states that because MPs are not very attentive to ordinary people, these ordinary people use two intermediary informal institutions to contact their representatives. These meso organizations consist of informal grassroots organizations and the traditional and religious authorities. However, although these informal organizations play this role, direct contacts between citizens and their representatives is the ideal democratic channel. More importantly, this channel helps to strengthen the weak political attachment ordinary citizens have with their political system in Africa (Barkan, 2004). I show that the causal factor of this direct contact is MP’s displaying a willingness to listen to their constituents.
1.6.1 Contribution to the literature:

This dissertation makes three original contributions to the literature. First, it uncovers the roles of informal institutions (informal grassroots organizations and traditional authorities) as linking institutions that connect ordinary citizens to their Members of Parliament (MP) more than do formal channels (parties). Second, the dissertation uses the strong constituent-representative connection in the US as a benchmark to show that direct contacts initiated by citizens serve to build a political bond that sadly lacks in Africa. The third contribution pertains to the determinants of political participation. The findings demonstrate that contextual variables such as the MPs’ willingness to listen to their constituents is a powerful predictor of citizens’ participation.

Altogether, the dissertation answers to the following three sub-questions: first, what are these grassroots associations and how do they connect citizens to MPs? Second, what are the traditional authorities and how do they connect citizens to their MPs? And finally, under what conditions would citizens initiate a direct contact with their representatives? The first empirical chapter of the dissertation (Chapter II) uncovers the role of informal grassroots organizations. From Tocqueville onward, civic associations have been considered as breeding grounds of democracy (Putnam, 2002; Skocpol, 2003). However, when it comes to Africa, scholars diverge on characteristics and democratic dividend of these organizations. The chapter two addresses this debate, defines these organizations, describes them and explores their purposes. Building on the American political behavioral and institutional literature, I develop a theory that explicates the causal mechanism of how these informal organizations serve as linking institutions between citizens and their MPs in Africa. Results from a quantitative analysis of Afrobarometer data support my theoretical expectations. These findings cast a positive light on these otherwise pervasive yet hidden
beneath academic radars. Communal and associational life are at the core of African social and political daily life; they wield a substantial influence on individual and member’s behavior.

The second sub-question is about the second intermediary institution: Religious authorities and traditional leaders. These institutions are integral to the African social political landscape. The reaction to these structures have been multiple. Acknowledged or rejected, they cannot simply be ignored. The chapter III takes on the debate that opposes the two camps on the role of these institutions in the African democratic process. Acknowledging each side’s point, I argue that this issue should not be an either-or matter. Framing it that way amounts to a false dichotomy, simply because traditional authorities are parts and parcel of the African social political DNA. In the meantime, these institutions in many places on the continent have had a tarnished legacy and continue to be weaponized against their own very people. The middle-of-road argument I make is to acknowledge them, train them and take advantage of their popular legitimacy to disseminate democratic values. Mozambique has successfully attempted such an integration of traditional authorities. My argument is substantiated by an empirical evidence from the Afrobarometer data. It shows that African traditional authorities are the most powerful predictor of contact with MPs.

The third sub-question is about the direct contact between citizens and their representatives. Using intermediary institutions such as grassroots and traditional authorities are necessary useful, but they muddle the accountability connection. In order to develop a political bond between ordinary citizens and their elected officials, the ideal solution is to have citizens directly contact their representatives. Once again, when it comes to Africa, this relationship is subject to a heated debate as well. At issue is the dyadic, face to face interactions between elected officials and ordinary citizens. Two camps emerge from the literature. The first camp perceives the MP-citizen interaction as fundamentally clientelistic because they declare it based on private good delivery. The second
group rejects this position by affirming that MPs misconstrue their constituents’ needs. The chapter takes the stand that dyadic relationship is the key to strengthening the weak attachment citizens have to their political system in Africa. I use the strong citizens-congress members tie in the US as a benchmark to develop the argument. The findings support the fact that clientelism has very little to do with what motivate citizens to contact their representatives. Evidence show that MPs’ attentiveness is the most powerful motivating factor to contact MPs.

2 CHAPTER II: GRASSROOTS ASSOCIATIONS AS VECTOR OF CONTACT OF MPS

This chapter is about the roles of membership in civic associations in the constituent-representative relationship in Africa. It assesses the causal linkage between membership in civic associations and contacts with members of national parliaments in Africa (MP). Specifically, the chapter seeks to suggest an answer the following question: What are the theoretical and empirical causal links between membership in these grassroots organizations and contacts with members of parliament (MPs). Its approach is mainly quantitative.

2.1 Scope, Research Design, and Argument

The scope of the article is limited to the twenty countries covered in the Afrobarometer round 4 consisting of Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The research design explores the impact of informal civic and communal organizations in facilitating contacts between members of these organizations and their members of parliaments. The outcome variables are political contacts with formal political office holders (MPs, Government agency, and Local Councilors) in these twenty countries. Although I test the effects of several
alternative explanatory variables on contacts with MPs, Government Agencies, and Local Councilors, I focus on the impact of the primary independent variable, grassroots associations of civic voluntary and communal development across the twenty countries. Using a quantitative method, I perform logistic regressions using each individual country’s data and the merged data to substantiate the hypotheses. From these quantitative investigations, emerges the central claim of the chapter. It argues that because direct contacts between individual citizens and their MPs are scarce in countries surveyed by the Afrobarometer, citizens use informal grassroots associations in forms of civic voluntary and communal development organizations as an intermediary institution to reach out to their representatives.

2.1.1 So Why?

It is hard to overemphasize the importance and pervasiveness of communal life style in Africa. African communal life, expressed in vibrant and informal grassroots associations, remains one of the social and cultural hallmarks of the continent (Bratton, 1994, 2005). Yet, to the best of my knowledge, these organizations have rarely been object of a systematic and a rigorous academic investigation. Two reasons are suggested to explain this lack of academic interest. First, by law, these organizations are not required to register in such data base in mature democracies as well as in nascent ones. For instance, according to Toepler (2003), in the United States, these organizations are not covered by the Business Master File (BMF) database. The BMF is the Internal Revenue Service database that collects information on associations with a spending above five thousand dollars ($5,000) in gross receipts. Missing from this database are faith-based institutions, cultural, and community-based organizations. In the United States, by law, these informal and unincorporated organizations are not required to file the IRS form 900 (Toepler 2003, 245). The second reason is due to a methodological omission. These
organizations are not on the radar of social scientists because standard survey questions fail to capture them. Case in point, the questions on membership in civic organizations in the General Social Survey (GSS) have a set list of organizations that limits respondents’ options to add grassroots associations. Paxton and Rap (2015) corroborate this fact and highlight the political potential of these bottom up organizations (213). Fortunately, the Afrobarometer has opened-ended questions about membership in associations, leaving to respondents to fill in whatever associations they claim to be members. Consequently, an article that highlights the participatory dividend of these widely common organizations in Africa is worthwhile. The central contribution of this article is to rigorously investigate and cast a positive light on the communication role these grassroots associations play in facilitating contacts between citizens and their MPs.

This article is structured into three sections each of which answers a sub question. The first section answers the following sub question: *what types of associations (grassroots organizations) are we talking about?* This section achieves three goals: first it describes the types of associational life captured by Afrobarometer. Second, it provides a conceptual clarification of this multidimensional concept of association and highlights the types of associations relevant to the present study. Third, the first section reports the scholarly debates on specificities of African Associational life, whether it is “ascriptive” or “non ascriptive”, “pro democratic or anti-democratic. The second section answers the following sub question: *What do we know about grassroots organizations as causes of contacts between constituents and their representatives?* The answer to this question grounds the chapter in the political participation theoretical framework. Finally, the third section replies to the sub question about *empirical evidence that substantiates the supposed causal links between membership in grassroots organizations and contacts with MPs.*
Here I assess the two hypotheses generated from the argument, present results, and I close the chapter with insightful discussions.

2.2  **Section I: Associational Life In Africa**

Beginning with Tocqueville onward, civic associations have been considered as a breeding ground where democratic citizenship develops (de Tocqueville, 1838, Skocpole, 2003). However, the number of entities that takes on the terminology of associations are innumerable. Hence the necessity to define what types of associations are germane to this study. Despite carrying multiple meanings, associations in this study refer specifically to grassroots associations (GAs) that are more or less informal webs of social interconnections outside the realm of family where citizens join other citizens to achieve personal or common goals (Tosen et.al. 2001,10). The object of the present article consists of informal civic voluntary associations (community development organizations) and religious association. Professional organizations and labor unions are beyond the scope of the investigation. In addition to defining and describing informal civic associations, this section sheds a light on how African associational is perceived in the literature. More to the point, I report the existing debates about specific characteristics of African Associational life. I start with the typology of memberships the Afrobarometer offers in its surveys.

2.2.1  **Typology of Associational Life In Africa**

The Afrobarometer Round 4 dataset captures four forms of associations: religious associations, civic voluntary associations, labor and trade unions, and professional associations. Of the four types of associations, the religious associations claim the lion’s share of membership. The Afrobarometer round 4 reports on average, 73% of those surveyed are members of a religious association group; 38.5% claim a membership in a community development or civic voluntary association.
Religious Group Associations.

Africa displays one of the highest percentage of membership in religious groups. On average, 3 out of 4 Africans claim a membership in these organizations. This is higher than the religious membership in the US, which is estimated at 55% (Mike Lee, 2016). Perhaps two reasons explain the high number of membership in religious groups in Africa. First, the pervasiveness of poverty and hardship; and second, the proliferation of charismatic churches and several other syncretic movements (Bratton, 2005). The Afrobarometer enumerates a total of nine religious groups. For convenience, I group these religious groups into two general categories: Christians and Muslims. Geographically, Islam comes as the number one religious group in most northern and western parts of the African continent; in the central and the southern Africa, Christianity comes first. The size of membership in these religious groups varies across countries. Countries with the highest rate of membership in religious groups include Liberia and Malawi each at 90%; Ghana, 88%; Nigeria, 83%; and Uganda with 82.5% of respondents. On the other hand, Lesotho and Cape Verde have relatively lower rates of membership in religious groups with 44% and 41% respectively.

Interactions between religious associations and the political elite also vary from one country to the other on the continent. In Senegal and Ghana, faith-based organizations do not shy away from political involvements. On the contrary, in Nigeria or in Cote d’Ivoire, religious leaders manage to cultivate a neutral attitude toward the political issues, or they warn outright their flocks against any political involvement. In Senegal, the most powerful religious organization is the Brotherhood of the Morridiya. Cheick Gueye (2001, 109-122) considers this organization as an informal and fluid network of people whose cohesion is rooted in Islamic and some ethnic morals. The linchpin connecting members is a mixture of the Islamic brotherhood and African communal norms. This
grassroots association permeates every aspect of the Senegalese social and economic life. Its social network comes in play during important social events such as in weddings, in christenings, and in burials. The Brotherhood network serves also as job provider. It handles a large swath of trade consisting of a chain of economic agents from micro-financers to producers and to street vendors. In addition to its economic role, the Brotherhood constitutes a powerful political tool of mobilization due to its large and loyal members. In Senegal, aspiring politicians and actual political officials from all religious obedience seek the endorsement and “blessings” from the Murid, the head of the organization (Gueye 2001, 119). Similar to Senegal, religious groups in Ghana can be active in local political life. In his comparative study of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, McLean (2004, 589-717) suggests that churches wear multiple hats in Ghana: they provide spiritual as well as material goods to their followers. Churchgoers are members in several other community organizations. This multi-membership expands the chain of solidarity and corroborates the conventional wisdom that overlapping memberships at local level fosters democratic attitudes. More importantly, the religious groups are also connected to local governments in Ghana, thus channeling their members’ preferences to the local elites. Conversely, in Nigeria, spiritual needs take precedence and mega churches rather stay away from any political involvement. For instance, according to Yomi Oruwari (2001, 77-89), the church of Port Harcourt graciously provides its members with welfare, health care, and housing services, but it sternly forbids them from any political activity. Another communality among mega churches in Nigeria is that they are solid and profitable business ventures where believers are exalted to give generously because “God loves cheerful givers” (Oruwari 2001, 87).

Religious groups show their vitality through gender-based organizations elsewhere beyond the twenty countries covered in Afrobarometer Round 4. One illustration is the Swaziland
Women’s *Burial Society*. According to Miranda Miles (2001, 62-75) Swazi women unite to overcome their social and economic vulnerability. Having migrated from poverty stricken rural areas, most of these women find themselves exposed to harsh living conditions in cities. To overcome these hardships, members of the Burial society create church-based organizations with multiple functions (62). Usually, these associations provide a social comfort, a religious training, and more importantly a mutual material assistance when death strikes; hence their name of *Burial Society*. But the functions these associations play go far beyond a mere burial assistance. For instance, the *Burial Society* in Swaziland promotes rotating credits among its members. Also, because the majority of these women are domestic workers, they take advantage of their work in the houses of the political elite to convey the concerns of group members (Miles, 2001, 69). In sum, religious groups play more than a spiritual role; they play also and more often social, economic as well as political roles.

2.2.1.2 Civic Voluntary Groups.

Like religious groups, the size and rate of membership in these civic voluntary and community development associations vary from one country to another on the continent. At the top of the scale, Mali comes first with 64% of those surveyed claiming a membership in a civic voluntary or community development association; Liberia comes in second with 57%, followed by Kenya 54%, Senegal 48% and Malawi 44%. At the bottom of the scales are Zimbabwe (21%) and Madagascar (18%) in the Afrobarometer round 4. Although Afrobarometer does not specify the types and structural levels of these voluntary civic groups and community development groups, conventional wisdom categorizes them as mostly informal with the exceptions of cooperatives. Even so, most of these cooperatives were disbanded or incorporated in the political parties (Landell Mill 1992,123). In addition, few if any of these cooperatives are
registered. So, for practical purposes, these entities will be considered as structurally informal grassroots associations.

The takeaway from these succinct descriptions of a widespread and some say vibrant African associational life is as follows. First, these organizations are informal, autonomous, and may or may not be hierarchical. Second, they are located in rural as well as urban areas with rural areas having slightly more active members (16%) than do city dwellers (11%). Third, membership in these associations vary. It can be inclusive or exclusive, favoring ethnic homogeneity (in Ghana) or ethnic heterogeneity (in Cote d’Ivoire). Furthermore, these grassroots associations display a considerable degree of overlapping membership. For instance, in the 36 countries surveyed in the Afrobarometer round 6, on average, 35.9% of active members in community development associations are actively involved in religious organizations; 25.8% of the leadership in community development occupy official positions in Churches and Mosques (Afrobarometer online analysis). Fourth and perhaps most importantly, these organizations provide a safe place for their members to air grievances and are connected formally or informally to local and national representatives (Boyte and Evans, 1986)

**Table 2.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ASSOCIATIONAL MEMBERSHIP (Afrobarometer Round 4)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics</th>
<th>Types of Associations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Min</strong></td>
<td>42. (Cape Verde)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Max</strong></td>
<td>49.2 (Kenya)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2.2 Debate About Characteristics of Associational Life In Africa

To what extent the above grassroots associations serve as a breeding ground for democracy in Africa? The answer to this question is subject of a heated scholarly debate pitting two sides against each other. The first group claims that African associational life is incongruous to democratic citizenship development because it is ascriptive (not voluntary) and stifled by the African political context (Ekeh, 1992). The second group rejects this pessimistic view of grassroots associations on the ground that associational life in Africa is vibrant based on its autonomy, its free membership, and its socio-economic functions (Bratton, 1994, 2004; Totsenten et.al., 2001). Before delving into the debate, it is worth noting that no consensus has been reached on the issue; the jury is still out.

The first group contends that African grassroots associations weaken citizens’ democratic attitudes because they are ascriptive and stifled by detrimental political environments (Ekeh, 1992; Jorgensen, 1996). A membership is said to be ascriptive when it is made up and held together by kinship and cultural norms instead of having members adhere freely. Citizens become members of associations by force either because they are born into it or through their tribal connections. Ekeh (1992) points to two negative consequences of such ascriptive membership for democracy. First, ascriptive members in African associations divide people into "in-group" and "out-group" members and harbor a negative perception toward out-group members. Put otherwise, ascriptive membership devalues those that are outside the close knitted kinship, deeming them less morally worthy of connections (ibid). As a result, this type of associational membership is detrimental to citizens’ democratic attitudes. Secondly, in limiting citizens’ freedom of choice, ascriptive membership curtails citizen’s agency. This is in stark contradiction to democratic fostering organizations as described by de Tocqueville and his followers. That is,
in a Tocquevillian type of civic associations, individuals are acknowledged as worthy beyond their group identity (Ekeh 1992, 187). What makes these Tocquevillian associations a breeding ground for democracy is the universalism and equal treatment among members and demonstration of moral empathy to each other (de Tocqueville, 1838; Skocpole, 2003). In other words, Tocquevillian associations serve as bridges between several individuals from different familial or kinship backgrounds (Putnam, 1993). Furthermore, the bridging characteristic qualifies Tocquevillian associations as elements of the civil society because they are outside the realm of the family and occupy the space between the family and the state. In contrast, grassroots associations in Africa are a sort of a continuum of kinship (Ekeh 1992). As a result, they fail to fill the void between the state and the family, causing these two entities to be far from one another (Ekeh, 1992). Ekeh (1992) concludes that because African GAs display ascriptive membership, they are incongruous with democratic development. Therefore, African associational life is moribund and apathetic.

However, several scholars reject the argument above based on the definition of grassroots associations and functions they play. Seen from the perspective of Smith (1997), one of the most eminent scholars of grassroots, African associational life is dynamic. He defines grassroots associations (GAs) as locally based grassroots that are autonomous and run on a voluntary basis with an uncoerced membership (269). Elia soph Nina (2009) complements Smith’s definition by attributing the civic nature to these grassroots associations. Nina contends that GAs are civic organizations as long as they allow people to “come together and act collectively in finding solutions to common issues” (295). Toestensen et.al (2001) add that it is not only the level of formalization of associations’ structures that makes them part of the civil society, but also the
functional space they occupy between families and the state apparatus. They offer the following definition of civil society that encompasses the above grassroots associations:

We define civil society as the public realm of organized social activity located between the state and the private household (or family)—with the following additional specifications. Civil society contains informal as well as formal elements; however, with a modicum of organization. Loose networks qualify as civil society organizations, but spontaneous activities do not (p.18).

In his article, *Civil Society in Africa* (1994), Bratton offers the most direct rebuttal to scholars who describe African Associational life as solely ascriptive and moribund. He contends that associational life in Africa is not restricted to kinship associations. There are numerous other types of associations that play multiples social functions (4). He starts by conceding that from the outside, African societies seem to have few intermediary institutions between the state and the household. However, seen from within, African societies display dynamic social networks. These networks may be based on age cohorts, sex, class, or professions (7). Bratton (1994) indicates that because these grassroots associations play several functions, (expressing group identity, giving sense of belonging to its members), they command a broad allegiance from both city dwellers and folks in the villages. Moreover, he adds that associational phenomenon is universal; it is not limited to a single type of society (8). As Nesbit (2010) puts it “the need for association springs from one of the powerful of human nature, need for a clear sense of cultural purpose membership, status, and continuity” (12). Furthermore, based on the criteria of social functions performed by these grassroots organizations, it can be argued that associational life in Africa is vibrant. Supporting this view, Wellman (1999) contends that grassroots associations in Africa are primarily used as “survival strategy” in countries where the state continuously defaults on providing basics needs to
its citizens (135). Couto (1999) takes this positive outlook to a new level. For him, not only do GAs heal the wounds inflicted by an unfettered and rogue capitalism (and structural adjustment in Africa), but also they convey a distinct political voice (36). The second point of contention among scholars lies on whether these grassroots associations yield a democratic dividend. Specifically, the issue centers on the extent to which these organizations, stifled by detrimental political environments in Africa, have contributed to the bettering of constituent-representative relationships. This debate also opposes two camps: the first group contends that historical and political environment in Africa have continued to curtail grassroots and citizens’ capacity to relate to the state and its representatives (Mills, 1992; Johnson & Kumburu, 2016; Jalal, 1995; Schaffer, 1998; Ekert, 2007). These authors ground their arguments on the checkered history of grassroots associations in Africa during independence and post-independence eras, all marked by exacerbated authoritarianism. The second group, although they do not reject entirely the conclusion of this historical argument, they prefer to see the glass half full, emphasizing the incremental progresses achieved in African democratic processes (Goetz, 2005; Lindberg, 2006; Manning, 2002; Bratton, 2004).

African grassroots organizations have had a checkered history that has reduced their ability to connect citizens and state representatives. Landell Mills (1992: 543-567) laments that unlike on every other continent where grassroots flourished, on the Africa continent, nationalist leaders cut short the development of GAs after gaining independence from colonial powers. He claims that these nationalist leaders in Africa used grassroots movements as a tool of mobilization in their struggle for independence. Once they acceded to the power, the new nationalist leaders turned against these grassroots movements. These nationalist leaders felt compelled to reject these grassroots and replace them with an avalanche of social reforms, aiming at "modernizing" the
African social structures and political culture. Across the continent, GAs knew variety of misfortunes going from being incorporated into political structures to being completely banned. In the same vein, Johnson & Kumburu (2016, p159-166) evoke the case of Julius Nyerere, the long serving charismatic leader of Tanzania. According to Johnson & Kumburu (2016), Nyerere thought to transform the vibrant and autonomous grassroots associations into a political machine with his romantic concept of *Ujamaa*. In Swahili, *Ujamaa* means a collective lifestyle where community members share their proprieties (Johnson & Kumburu, 2016). Despite strenuous oppositions from villagers, Nyerere and his henchmen succeeded in slowly stifling these dynamic social and economic structures and in turning them into a political instrument (166). Like Nyerere, several African first leaders thought that state building should start by disrupting social and cultural organizations. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia promoted his version of “Humanism” and the dictator Mobutu in Zaire hailed “*le retour a authenticite*” (Mill 1992, 555). In Guinea, Sekou Toure waged a war against the Loma culture of sacred forest, pretending to force these people into modernity (McGovern, 2014). Each of these ill-conceived political and social reformations succeeded only in disrupting a natural grassroots free involvement in the state building and alienating ordinary citizens (Mill 1992; Johnson & Kumburu, 2016).

At individual level, five decades after independences, deleterious political environments continue to imprint far reaching impacts on citizens’ democratic empowerment, further damaging the constituent-representative relationship. Authors suggest that self-insurance or civic efficacy needed to hold authority accountable is never to be taken as granted in a place where political apathy has deep seated historical and cultural roots. For instance, Mulgan (2000) reports that it is not a small matter for an average African citizen, irrespective of her socio-economic status, to be assertive about her or political rights (34). For a rural woman to stand up in front of local officials
and accuse them of lying is a gutsy move in a society still governed by male dominance (Mulgan, 2000). Similarly, Jalal (1995) makes a historical argument rooted in the path-dependency logic. He contends that Africans fail to connect with their political leaders because such actions were prohibited and costly during the colonial period. Furthermore, since subsequent political power holders in Africa have imitated colonial practices, they have continued to openly repress individual initiatives to reach out to the state and its representatives (Grossman et al. 2016).

In response to this picture, other scholars (Goetz, 2005; Lindberg, 2006; Manning, 2002) put forward incremental progresses made in African political processes. Goetz (2005) suggests that democratic transitions on the continent have liberated public willingness and its need for more answerability from public officials. He contends that the third wave of democracy has brought in its wake competitive electoral politics that promote constituent-representative relationship (149-150). Drawing from Rustow’s 1970 famous idea of habituation, authors such as Lindberg suggests that repetitive democratic processes including frequent elections will end up improving citizens’ democratic attitudes as a byproduct. Along the same line, Manning (2002) reports the progress made toward peace by former warring factions in Mozambique through the habituation of political processes (Manning 2002, 63-84). For these authors, a complete transition overnight would be illusory. As Bratton (1994) puts it, “History matters” (45). That is not to say that history will forever grip African political development. Democracy is a way of life; it takes a time to get used to it.

The above discussion has shed a light on different stances on African grassroots’ characteristics, nature, functions, and their purported causal link with democracy. Altogether, each side presents convincing arguments; however, all things being equal, empirical observations tend to favor the side of a vibrant association life in Africa. Yet, the real question goes
beyond settling a debate about the nature and typology of grassroots associations to ask about the extent to which the body of knowledge in political science knows about the role these grassroots associations play as cause of contact between citizens and their representatives. In other words, what does the existing literature say about this question?

2.3 Theoretical Framework

2.3.1 Literature review

Couto (1999) states that grassroots associations play at least two important roles, one social-economic and the other political (39). One way to evaluate grassroots associations’ political impact is to assess the extent to which they promote or hinder their members’ political participation. Specifically, how do they improve or restrict contact between citizens and members of parliaments in countries surveyed by the Afrobarometer? Framing this question in terms of factors known to influence political participation allows the existing literature to suggest some answers. In the extant literature, conventional wisdom distinguishes at least two levels of variables (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Hansen and Rosenstone, 1993). Aggregate level variables include memberships in civic voluntary associations, membership in unions labor or trade. As for individual level variables, they trace their lineage from the behavioral revolution’s approach to social science. Here the emphasis is put on the individual characteristics (promoted notably by the Michigan school, the strategic mobilization model by Hansen and Rosenstone, 1993; and the civic voluntarist model by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). The communality of these quantitative schools is that they focus on politically relevant characteristics of individual citizens such as education, interest in public affairs, resources, gender, residence, political activity. These authors assume these characteristics to be driving forces of individual political participation).
2.3.1.1 Individual level variables

One of the most well-known assumptions of these behavioral schools is that individual educational attainment increases political participation. The earliest version of this claim is to be found in the modernization theory. According to the modernization school of thought, education empowers citizens to get involved in politics (Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1968). La Due and Huckfeldt (1998) argue that the positive relationship between and political participation is “one of the most reliable results in empirical social science” (567). In the same vein, Hillygus (2005) states that the idea that education is the primary driver and increases political participation is largely “uncontested” (22). Putnam (2000) posits that education is the best individual level predictor of participation (157). There are, however, several problems with these law-like statements. For one, the debate about education as "a cause" versus “education as a proxy” remains far from settled (Berinsky and Hanz 2011). Secondly, contextual factors need to be taken into account in developing countries. For instance, according to Crake et.al. (2015), in electoral authoritarianism, educated voters do exactly the opposite of what education is supposed to promote. If education increases citizens’ critical capacity, political awareness, educated citizens in authoritarian systems may believe that participation in a sham political process is futile, and worst, it amounts to legitimating the incumbent autocrats (3). Crake et.al. (2015) present the elite disengagement in politics in Zimbabwe as evidence of the dampening effect of education on political participation (1-33).

Scholars have found also gender difference to influence political participation. For mature democracies, gender differences in participation and in ideology, referred to as “gender gap,” have had substantial implications in policy representations. For instance, Pippa Norris and Ingleheart (2003) find that women are more liberal than men in the western world. This gender gap in developing world has taken the name of “traditional gap” due to the tendency of women to
harbor more conservative stances (Bratton and Logan 2006, 1-22). They caution that ideological and participatory implications of gender gap in western world may not travel well in Africa. Whereas in mature democracies women are known to hold more liberal values in mature democracies, in Africa, Bratton and Logan (2006, 9) find that women tend to take more conservative stances on social issues. However, they report that any stark difference between men and women would be deceptive because both genders agree on the majority of issues (2). In fact, quantitative investigations have shown that women’s overwhelming response of “don’t knows” is responsible for skewing their positions on several issues (6). Nonetheless, Bratton and Logan stress that women express a clear choice for peaceful political process. Perhaps, this explains women’s reserve about multiparty electoral competitions tinged with ethnic violence (25). Yet Gottlieb et.al. (2015) find that gender differences albeit small on the average, still remain significant across policy domain and across countries in Africa. Gotlieb and colleagues also point out that gender gaps in policy preferences correlate with gender gaps in political participation and representation (21).

Political scientists have also pointed to resources as a key to political participation. The resource model pioneered by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) contends that citizens’ time, material possessions, and stockpile of skills accumulated throughout life their lifetime foster participation. The strategic model, a related model to the resource, rooted in the rational choice model, argues that even if citizens have all the resources, these resources are completed by the motivation of the elite. Rosenstone and Hansen claim that citizens may well have resources, but it is only when the elite provides more incentive that citizens get mobilized. The elite strategically targets the most movable citizens to induce them to get involved in the political process (Hansen and Rosenstone 1993). However, applied to an African context, the resource model has proven not fitting. Dione et al. (2014) examine the impact of remittance on the “recipients’ willingness” to get
involved in the political process. The authors find that remittance have nuanced effects on political participation behavior of the recipients. Recipients of remittance are less likely to vote and to contact MPs but more likely to demonstrate. Those receiving remittance take part in demonstrations because they can afford to take time off as long as their involvement does not incur physical repressions. Overall, remittance reduces the household’s reliance on state patronage (13). Yet similar studies conducted in Mexico found remittance beneficiaries lacking motivation to participate (Bravo, 2007). Other individual levels variables such as residence, and politics interest are positively related with political participation. Urban dwellers are also said to be more active and politically sophisticated than their rural counterparts, hence "urbanite" are easier to mobilize than villagers. Finally, the levels of interest in politics maybe both a cause and an effect of individual efficacy to get involved in politics (Bratton, et.al., 2005).

2.3.1.2 Aggregate level variables

The second types of variables found to influence participation are group level variables, otherwise known as the variable of membership in civic associations. The connection between membership in grassroots associations and political participation has become an established (de Toqueville, 1838; Putnam, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Skocpol, 2003; Couto, 1999; Bratton, 2004; Smith, 1998; Minkoff, 2016). Mark E. Warren (2001) emphasizes the positive impacts of these associations on their members. According to him, associations enhance citizens’ sense of self-worth, allowing them to acquire new civic skills and virtues. Secondly, civic associations provide a physical arena for a peaceful deliberative process, where members safely open up to each other without fear. Thirdly, acting as an intermediary institution, civic associations give its members the opportunity to interact with state institutions (182-207). Along the same line, Andrews and his colleagues (2010) draw from the American experience to illustrate the role of
membership as an incubator of social movements. Throughout the American political history, membership in associations has been the driving force for political change. Some landmark examples of association memberships that changed the political landscape include members of Abolition Society whose members pushed for the end of slavery in the South; members of the Sons of Temperance whose efforts played a major role into the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment; membership in numerous faith-based organizations that sustained the Civil Rights Movements in the late 1950s and 1960s (Andrew et al. 2010).

Notwithstanding the foregoing examples, scholars continue to debate about the difference between political and nonpolitical groups in terms of their participatory outputs. Leighley (1996) defines political groups as the ones that seek to have their say in the decision-making process of public policy (455). Morales (2009, 3-60) echoes Leighley’s stance and adds the ways in which these groups influence the shaping of public policy. According to him, political groups use two tactics: direct and indirect forms of actions. For instance, when these political groups engage in strikes and demonstrations to voice their concerns, they are using the direct form of action. On the other hand, when they target elections by impacting positively or negatively the voting turnout rate, political groups are using the indirect form of action. The second question raised by scholars concerns the difference between active and passive membership in terms of their effects on political participation. Distinguishing active and passive members, Skocpole (2003) refers to active members as those who show up and meet other members face to face. In contrast, passive membership includes all those members who are “extra-local and show their support through check books rather than being physically present” (30).

The debate about the extent to which the kind of organizations (political or nonpolitical) and types of memberships (active or passive) affect political participation covers a voluminous
literature with contradictory findings. Fortunately, Debra Minkoff (2016) presents a comprehensive investigation that results on more conciliatory findings. She uses a counterfactual method and draws two important conclusions. First, political organizations do score more political activism than nonpolitical groups. But there is also a support for the argument that membership in civic organization enhances political participation. As for the types of memberships, she maintains that both active and passive membership increase political participation (425-68).

The preceding two sections (on associational life in Africa and the literature review) have achieved two goals. First, the section on associational life has shed a light on debates about the distinctiveness of African grassroots associations in so far as their democratic dividend is concerned. Second, the literature review has shown contradictory findings between mature and new democracies regarding driving factors of political participation. The most striking illustration being the discrepancies about the effects of education in established democracies (Norway) versus its effects in nascent democracy (Nigeria) or in an authoritarian regime (Zimbabwe). More importantly, reviewing the literature has highlighted the fact that grassroots organizations in Africa have not yet been object of a rigorous academic scrutiny in their roles as an intermediary institution to contact MPs. This article fills that gap. In the following paragraphs, I delineate the argument and the two hypotheses.

2.3.1. The argument

The central argument builds on previous theories about the democratic dividend of civic groups (C. Gs) in mature democracies and on theories of political participation in Africa. In the literature, C.Gs. have been branded as training grounds where citizens learn to hone their democratic skills and build their civic virtues. These benefits come by through the intensity and scope of membership. Intensity of involvement refers to the amount of social interactions that occur
within civic groups. Several authors have demonstrated that during these face-to-face interactions, citizens develop their civic skills by actively engaging in the organization, the planning, and execution of civic activities. Civic groups also offer safer areas that facilitate public deliberation (Areto, 1994; Habermas, 1996) and social interactions with positive democratic outcomes. During these social interactions, C.Gs. have been found to improve citizens’ democratic attitudes and behavior. Many scholars have shown that membership in civic group enhance interpersonal and generalized trust. For instance, Paxton (2007), Putnam (1993) have found that sanctions upheld in these organizations and shared norms among members increase generalized trust and reciprocity. They also specify that this trusting relationship among members does not result from individuals’ proclivity to trust anyone, but it is generated from the social setting within which members interact (Paxton 2007, 53). Yet this claim has been challenged in two comparative studies. First, Norris (2000) and Widner and Mundt (1998) have found that membership in C.Gs in developing countries dampens generalized trust. For instance, Widner and Mundt (1998) report that interpersonal trust has a negative relationship with membership civic groups in Botswana and in Uganda. Kuenzi (2008) attributes the negative relationship between generalized trust and civic membership to low institutional trust. In her analysis, Kuenzi finds that institutional trust (i.e, political trust) is the catalyst that connects membership in civic group to generalized trust. In other words, C.G member’s interactions with formal and informal institutions also shape their attitudes. Secondly, Varshney (2003) also questioned the benevolence of community-based organizations. In her study about sources of ethnic violence in India, Varshney (2003) argues that formal organizations (such as unions and professional associations) are better proximate cause to peace than communal organizations on the ground that they have a cross-cutting membership. In contrast, communal organizations are filled with ethnic –driven membership and overlapping cleavage factors.
(Varshney 2003, 23). Yet in a similar study of the relationship between violence and social capital in Africa, Bhavnani and Backer (2007) report that Varshney (2003)'s theory is challenged in Africa. Specifically, they show that membership in communal organizations are not driven by ethnicity. As a matter of fact, members of majority ethnic groups scarcely claim to belong to a civic group in Africa. It has also been established that membership in C.Gs contribute in shaping citizens’ behavior through the time-honored social influence. According to Huckfeldt and Prague (1995), “an individual is imbedded within a particular context, the context structures interaction patterns and political information is conveyed through social interactions and individual response is based upon this information” (36). This observation was first revealed by the Columbia School, which emphasized the idea that individuals are to be understood within the larger social aggregate of which they are a part. Aggregate behavior is to be understood as more than a simple accumulation of individual preferences.

Civic groups are mobilizing collective forces. Through social interactions, C. Gs become tools to disseminate information and increase political salience of issues (Olsen, 1982). Furthermore, greater personal involvement due to collective decision making reduces the cost of mobilization. By reducing the cost of mobilization, CGs lessen the free rider problem. Knoke (1986) asserts that this is done through normative expectations of fairness among members (7). Similarity of goals and shared values and norms reinforce psychological bonds among members, leading individual members to yield to the group the direction of their behavior (Knoke, 1986). As a result, CGs increase collective efficacy and provide a channel to communicate members’ preferences. As Olsen (1982, 32) explains it, collective efficacy is gained when members acquire info about relevant public issue, they pool together their resources and channel their preferences.
Still, several factors conspire to hinder the positive impacts of CGs. As previously alluded to, informal grassroots associations in Africa suffer from lack of academic interest, scarcity of data, and their so-called ascriptive characteristics. For instance, Ekeh (1992) holds that grassroots in Africa are incongruous with democratic tenets because of their kinship driven membership. Another criticism leveled at CGs in Africa is the pervasive informal nature of these organizations. To this, Rosenblum (1998) replies that the richness of CGs does not lie in their level of formalization. CG may well be hierarchical in organization, exclusive in membership and still be able to foster self-respect in their members and expose them to contrary views (1998). Bratton et.al 2005, 143-301) go further than Rosenblum in their advocacy of informal organizations and actions of these voluntary associations. They argue that because informality is what characterizes political participation in Africa, specifically during the interelection period, scholars should make a space for activities that are done in these conditions. They enumerate two main activities that they find central to political participation on the continent: “communing” and “contacting.” Communing include all activities done by the community such as attending community meeting. According to Bratton et.al, (2005) communing is a distinctive aspect of political participation in Africa because it carries some normative expectations in regard to social interactions. Civic groups in Africa are first and foremost social venues where members come to socialize, share concerns, and set the community’s agenda (301). In these associations, Africans expand their political resources and deliberate in local arena about local and national issues. As for contacting, Bratton and his colleagues acknowledge the fact that Africans enjoy more face-to face interactions than any other forms of interactions (291). Perhaps the weakness of formal institutions has forced Africans to prefer this form of direct democracy by engaging directly office holders. Yet, the abysmal rate of contacts between citizens and MPs led Van De Wall (2003) to observe that only a small fraction –
the haves- that actually gets to contact political figures. The majority of citizens is alienated from the state and its representatives. In these cases, CG become the reliable medium through which citizens contact their representatives in Africa.

I argue that citizens use grassroots associations as intermediary channel to contact their members of parliament because their membership in these grassroots emancipates them from fear of replications and makes it easier to mobilize them in conveying their voices to representatives. Furthermore, grassroots associations offer safer social environment for its members to voice their concern because GA membership increases interpersonal trust among its members (Putnam, 1993; Couto, 1999; Paxon, 2002; Paxton, 2007). This increase in social trust is induced by widespread known norms and shared interpretations of the world (Putnam, 1993; Couto, 1999; Warren, 2001; Paxton, 2002). As a result, members’ sense of weeness increases, making every member’s behavior and expectations predictable. Additionally, the sense of weeness of members promotes positive self-image, fosters openness toward other members and expends each member’s sphere of influence (Warren, 2001).

Membership in GAs also helps citizens overcome their fear and encourage them to specifically contact their Members of parliament (Couto, 1999; Warren, 2001). One of the long-lasting legacy of authoritarianism and colonialism in Africa is political violence and its eroding effects on individual willingness to take political initiative (Grossman, 2016). This has made GAs a de facto intermediary channel to convey citizens’ preferences to their MPs. The grassroots membership becomes a springboard to move out from their fear. Grassroots membership in GAs in Africa can be assumed to mobilize easily their members in contacting their MPs because they reduce transaction cost, provide psychological bonding, and contribute in building civic skills (Fung 2003, 515-539). In societies where basic procedures are young and fragile, civic
associations organize, emancipate an empower individual citizens to contact their MPs (Baiocchi, 2002). The following two hypotheses are generated from the above theory.

### 2.3.1.3 Hypotheses

**Hypothesis I** *Membership in GAs emancipate citizens from their fear and prompt them to get more involved in community affairs such as attending community meetings.*

One can assume that getting together to raise an issue and discuss in a small setting refines the formulation of members’ concerns. This attitude of “joiner” is perhaps stronger in a place where community issues drive these “getting together” to raise issues (33% of active members contact formal leaders for community problems versus 23% for personal problems). Additionally, in a place where individuals rely on social interdependence to survive, social organizations spring organically and form grassroots associations. These grassroots associations cultivate psychological bonds among members, which enables them to open up and let the group serve as their motivator. Huckfeldt and Prague (1995) call this phenomenon “the effect of a time-honored process of social influence”

**Hypothesis II** *Membership in grassroots increases contact with MPs more than individual politically relevant characteristics.* As Olson (1982) contends, with their similar preferences, GA membership fosters conditions where members pool together their resources to generate more potent collective influence greater than individual action:

Association membership broadens one's sphere of interests and concerns, so that public affairs and political issues become more salient to the individual. (2) It brings one into contact with many diverse people, and the resulting social relationships draw the individual into a wide range of new activities, including politics. (3) It gives one training and experience in social interaction and
leadership skills that are valuable in the political sphere. (4) It provides one with multiple channels through which he or she can act to exert influence on politicians and the political system (p.32). In short, membership in civic associations prompt citizens to attend community meeting and to generate collective efficacy necessary to contact their MPs.

2.4 Section III: Research Design and Methodology

What evidence substantiates the supposed link between membership in grassroots organizations and bottom up contacts between citizens and their MPs?

2.4.1 Data

Does membership in GAS better explain contacts with members of parliaments than individual characteristic in Africa? Put simply, of individual level variables and community –level variables, which ones better predict the likelihood of contacts between constituents and their representatives in Africa? This question originates from the conventional wisdom that maintains that individual level variables are the primary driving force behind political participation in mature democracies. Yet a closer look at the extant literature shows that theories of political participation in these established democracies may not be vindicated in nascent democracies (Gottlieb et.al. 2015; Dione et al., 2014). To set the record straight, this section compares the effects of individual level variables to community level variables. By community level variables, I mean the two informal associations covered in Afrobarometer surveys: community development or civic voluntary groups and religious groups. Individual level variables are the social economic status and demographics variables. All of the data and variables measurements are drawn from the Afrobarometer round 4 surveys. The Afrobarometer is an independent group of academic and professional researchers who run survey of public opinion and attitude in Africa. It started in 1999 with the round 1 covering 12 countries. Eighteen years later, the Afrobarometer has expanded the scope from 12 countries to 37
countries on the African continent. The main topics covered consist of democracy, governance, individual perceptions of corruption, horizontal and vertical accountability, state-society relationship, democratic institutions, and basic living conditions. I justify my choice of the Afrobarometer round 4 on the richness of this round on the two key topics of this chapter: constituents-MP relationship and associational life in Africa. The round 4 was conducted between 2008-2009, nearly two decades after the end of the third wave of democracy and at a time when African political regimes sought to consolidate their democratic changes. The round 4 in particular, probes constituent-representative relationship, asking questions about the rate of interactions between citizens and their members of parliaments (MPs), citizens’ perceptions of their MPs’ roles, motivations, number of MP’s visits, reason for contacting MPs, the fulfillment of MPs’ functions (legislative, representation, oversight, and), keeping campaign promises or lack thereof, and the extent to which there exist a gap of expectations and reality.

2.4.1.1 Dependent Variable 1: Contacts with Formal Office Holders

Representative democracy is premised on the proposition that citizens, as the source of the political authority, choose to entrust this power to representatives. For these "custodians" of people’s power to act fully on the behalf of citizens, there must exist clear channels of communication and constant interactions between constituents and their representatives. Political scientists have dubbed such interactions political participation, a multidimensional concept that takes on multiple meanings. This article focuses on Africans’ specific actions of reaching out to their members of parliament (MPs). According to Bratton and colleagues (2005), contact is an individual or group initiative to connect with office holders (143). Due to pervasive institutional weakness in surveyed countries, direct contacts come as the primary way of conveying meaningful message to representatives during the periods between elections. The same institutional weakness
explains why most of these contacts involve face-to-face and oral rather than written interactions. However, these private and intractable interactions raise the threat of clientelistic or paternalistic behaviors. Admittedly, scholars have acknowledged that one of the particularity of political participation in Africa is that the line between civic oriented and patron-client behavior are blurred (Bratton et.al 2005,144). Altogether, the dearth of formal connections makes contacting of political office holders (local or national) as the surest way to express their preferences (Bratton et.al.2005).

In a healthy democratic system, these contacts reflect the primacy of citizens in the state-society relationship. In mature democracies contacts with representatives reveals one of the powerful ways of expressing constituency potency. The United States provides the more telling example of this dyadic relationship. According to the Congressional Management Foundation(CMF), representatives’ decisions are 36% influenced by contact from constituents (CMF,2015,12).

The Afrobarometer enumerates 5 types of contacts: Contacts with members of parliament, members of government agency, members of local government council, traditional rulers, religious leaders and party officials. This chapter concentrates on the three formal office holders: members of parliament, members of government agents, and members of local government council. These variables are captured with the following generic question: “During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views:” “Members of parliament;” “Government agency;” “Local councilor.” The answers are captured on an ordinal scale with the following values: never=0; only once=1; a few times= 2; often = 3 don’t know = 9. For convenience, I recode these variables into dichotomous variables by collapsing values from 1,2 and 3 into yes =1 and never = 0.
2.4.1.2 Dependent Variable2: Attending Community Meetings

It has long been established that political participation is a multidimensional concept. This multidimensionality has opened the door to ongoing scholarly debates about whether participation hurts or promotes positive democratic attitudes and a debate about what activities constitute conventional as opposed to unconventional activities of participation. These debates bear heightened implications when applied to the specific settings of African politics. One specific question that comes to mind is: should communal activities be considered as political participatory activities? I side with Bratton et.al. (2005) who advocate for the inclusion of such acts. For Bratton and colleagues, it is important to broaden the definition of political participation in Africa because politics follows two tracks: the formal and informal ways. This makes attending community meeting specifically a key aspect of participation in Africa. Community meeting mostly happen in grassroots associations. By participating in these grassroots activities, citizens gain in democratic attitude dividend. Liz and Zhang (2017) contend that such communal activities promote individual emancipation. In this communal setting, citizens acquire civic mindedness, personal transformation that helps them overcome their fear (12). Communal participation is both instrumental and psychological when it leads to self-realization (UNPD). In the Afrobarometer round 4 datasets, this variable is captured by the following wording: “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Attended a community meeting?” The responses are distributed in four ascending order categories: no=0, but would do if I had the chance=1; yes, once or twice=2; yes, several times=3; and yes, often=4. I recode this variable into a dichotomous variable by aggregating the value from 1 to 4 into 1.
2.4.2 Operationalization of the Independent variables

From the existing literature, I enumerate below the independent variables assumed to motivate citizens to contact their MPs. I divide these variables into two groups depending on whether they are individual level variables or aggregate level variables. The first group or individual level variables include politically relevant characteristics assumed to prompt individuals in contacting their representatives. They consist of individual citizens’ age, education, gender, income, party id, and residence. The second group comprise of aggregate level or associational variables, including membership in community development group and civic voluntary group, membership

   **Age:** Extant literature shows that age has a reverse-U-shape (hyperbolic) relationship with political participation (Verba, Scholzman, Brady, 1995). This means that both younger and older citizens care less about getting involved in politics. In the Afrobarometer, age is recorded as a continuous variable, starting from 18 to 90 and plus. For this study, I categorize age into four groups: young adults (18-39); adults (40-60); senior (60-79) and older citizens 80 and plus.

   **Education:** Education is widely seen as the most reliable indicator of political participation. The underlying assumption of this perception is that education allows citizens to climb the social and economic ladder; it is the quintessential tool for social mobility and the cognitive empowerment necessary for getting involved in public affairs. The modernization theorist Lipset (1960) and new behaviorists (Nie et. 1996; Norris, 1999) articulate the causal mechanism with the following three paths: the “*positional path*”, “*the socialization path*”, and “*the cognitive path*” (quoted from Mattes and Mughogho, 2009 p.2). "The positional path" links the educated persons with others through networks established during their schooling times. Through the "socialization path," educated people internalize societal values and code of conduct to achieve their goals. Finally, the "cognitive path" endows educated people with a stockpile of skills, including practical
abilities, understanding, and critical thinking, that boost their internal efficacy and allows them to navigate and participate in the political process (Mattes and Mughogho 2009, 2-23). In the Afrobarometer surveys, education is recorded as a continuous variable categorized into 12 groups. To better capture the distinct effect of different levels of education or lack thereof, I recode education as a thirchotomous variable: The level one is coded 0 and captures all citizens with no formal education; the level two is coded 1 for those having some secondary education, or graduated from high school; and level tree, coded as 2, regroups post high school education attainment, including college and post graduate.

**Gender:** Gender is traditionally coded as dichotomous variable with female=0 and male =1. I follow the same convention. Compared to the established wisdom about gender and participation in mature democracies, the relationship between gender and political involvement in nascent democracies has also been found to be counter-intuitive. In mature democracies, political scientists revealed a *gender gap* prior to the feminist revolution of 1970s and early 1980s. However, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) show in their voluminous survey that although men participate more than women, this difference is small and meaningless statistically (153). On the other hand, Norris (2003) found a difference in partisanship and ideological stances between men and women. Their study shows women leaning toward the democratic parties with more liberal values than men. Yet Bratton and Logan (2006) find that these results do not hold in Africa. This inconsistency in findings warrants a new investigation specifically targeting women contact with their MP in Africa.

**Income** and residence are two variables assumed to prompt citizens to contact their MPs. Because low level of income is common in Africa, I choose the variable *gone without food* to capture the variance in income level that would lead citizens to contact or not their members of parliament.
Residence area. The existing literature attributes great level of political participation to urban dwellers. In Africa and in elsewhere, urbanites are seen as more politically sophisticated citizens compared to their rural counterparts. In the Afrobarometer round 4 surveys, this variable is coded as dichotomous variable with 1 rural folks and 0 for urban dwellers. I complete individual level variable with respondents' party identification. The Michigan school of social psychology of political participation dubbed the party id as the “unmoved mover.” In other words, the party id is the centripetal force that crystalizes all motivations to participate in politics. The Afrobarometer seize this variable by asking respondents to indicate their closeness to political parties. The answers are recorded as dichotomous variable with 0= no closeness and 1= close to party.

Aggregate or Community level variables-Assiociational variables and contextual variables. Membership in community development or civic voluntary groups and membership in religious groups. From de Tocqueville, onward (Putnam,2000; Skocpole,2003 Verba et.al.1995) and other political behaviorists have long maintained that associational membership boosts the likelihood of political involvement. However, concerning Africa, other scholars have questioned whether association in Africa stems or promotes political participation. From their description, one expects to see a negative relationship between the so-called “ascriptive membership” and contact of MP. The Afrobarometer codes associational membership as nominal variable. I recode it as a dichotomous variable with 1 for members and 0 for nonmembers. To complete the model, I control for three contextual variables: electoral system, the economic level of each country (GDP per capita). Following Kuenzi and Lambright’ footsteps, I code electoral system as a dichotomous variable (Single Member District countries are coded as =1) and (Proportional Representation countries are coded as =0). As for the GDP per capita, I log the value taken from the World Bank database. I run a series of logit regressions followed by a post estimation using marginal effect of
listed variables in individual countries' data. I complement these individual regressions by using merged data where I control for electoral systems and countries' economic levels (GDP per capita).

Table 2.2: Results of individual country data regressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CGs on Local Coef.</th>
<th>CGs on MPs</th>
<th>CGs on ATCM</th>
<th>CGs on agency</th>
<th>ATCM on MPs</th>
<th>Gender on MPs</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>UG</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>UGA 0.57</td>
<td>NIG 0.24</td>
<td>BTW 0.66</td>
<td>KEN 0.06</td>
<td>SEN -0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTW</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>BTW 0.56</td>
<td>BN 0.23</td>
<td>LIB 0.38</td>
<td>BTW 0.05</td>
<td>GH -0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEN</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>LIB 0.43</td>
<td>ZAMB 0.22</td>
<td>NIG 0.07</td>
<td>UGA 0.03</td>
<td>LES -0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMB</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>SA 0.04</td>
<td>NAM 0.15</td>
<td>ZAMB 0.04</td>
<td>GH 0.02</td>
<td>ZAMB -0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>NIG 0.04</td>
<td>SA 0.14</td>
<td>ZIMP 0.03</td>
<td>CV 0.02</td>
<td>BK -0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIG</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>MALA 0.03</td>
<td>LIB 0.14</td>
<td>CV 0.02</td>
<td>NIG 0.01</td>
<td>TAN -0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAN</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>MALI 0.02</td>
<td>MOZ 0.11</td>
<td>MAL 0.003</td>
<td>SA 0.01</td>
<td>LIB -0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>TAN 0.02</td>
<td>TAN 0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LES</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Benin 0.02</td>
<td>UG 0.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEN</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>SEN 0.02</td>
<td>LES 0.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOZ</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>MOZ 0.02</td>
<td>MAL 0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Coef</td>
<td>MALI 0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>SEN 0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.5 Discussion of the Results

The primary goal of this investigation is to assess the impact of grassroots associations on contacting members of parliament. It emerges from the analysis that civic groups produce the greatest effects on local elected officials followed by contact with members of parliament and contact with government agency. Membership in civic groups causes the highest rate of contact of local councilors in Uganda (0.88), Liberia (0.84), Botswana (0.8), Kenya (0.655) Zimbabwe (0.11) and Burkina Faso (0.105). But not all countries covered in the Afrobarometer 4 provide a fertile ground for civic groups. For instance, Namibia, Lesotho, and Madagascar have a very low membership rate in civic groups. In these countries, membership in civic groups has no effects on the likelihood of contacting local officials.

Figure 2.1 Impact of Civic Groups on Contact with Local Councilors
The second highest effect of civic groups is in causing their members to contact government agencies. Yet this type of contacts raises the red flag of patron-client relationships (Bratton
et.al.2005). It is limited and present only in 9 out of 20 countries. Among the twenty countries, Liberians that are members of civic groups seem to contact more government agencies (.38), Nigerians come in second with the particular fact that highly educated citizens in Nigeria contact more their government agency than their MPs (.073 >0.04). Equally, members of civic groups contact more government agencies than their MPs in Botswana (0.066> to .056), almost twice more contact of government agencies than MPs in Senegal (0.043 > 0.025).

More importantly, being member of a CG carries a substantive predictive power to contact MPs. This effect is consistent and almost general; fourteen countries out of twenty show that being a member of a civic group prompts one to have a contact with MPs. The effect of civic membership is highest in Kenya (0.61) followed by Uganda (0.57), Botswana (0.56) Liberia (0.43) and Burkina Faso (.38). For instance, being a member of a civic group increases one’s chance by 61% of reaching out to ones’ member of the national parliament in Kenya, and by 57% in Uganda and 43% in Liberia. This relationship holds even in countries with a civil war legacy. Although this coefficient is higher in countries with the Single Member District electoral system(SMD), some countries with Proportional Representation (P.R) system have considerable effect (Burkina Faso, South Africa). On the other hand, other countries such as Malawi with SMD electoral system, display virtually no contact with MPs.
Other indicators that consistently predict contact with MPs albeit with relatively much smaller coefficients include residence and age. In the Afrobarometer, residence is coded as a dichotomous variable with the following values: 0= urban and 1 = rural. From this coding, it can be inferred that the results of the statistical analyses contradict the tenets of modernization theory on the relationship between participation and urbanization. According to the modernization theory, urban dwellers participate more in politics than their rural counterparts, because they are more informed, better educated, and sophisticated. However, when it comes to political contacts, this claim is clearly unsupported in the twenty countries analyzed here. To the contrary, it appears that villagers participate more than city dwellers.

Across the twenty countries of Afrobarometer round 4, age has proven to be a reliable and consistent variable with a positive effect on contacting members of parliament. The investigation finds political contacts is more the actions of older citizens than the youth. The result suggests that citizens above 35 years and beyond are those who contact more their political representatives. This result is similar to the findings of Bratton et.al. (2005). Finally, being a member of a civic voluntary
group can predict the likelihood of attending community meeting. This is more observable in Ghana (0.34), Nigeria (0.24), Benin (0.23) and in Zambia (0.22) and Burkina Faso (0.21). Two observations are worth noting about the relationship between CGs membership and attending community meeting. First, compared to political contacts coefficients (contacts with local councilor, Government agency, and MPs), the predictive power of CGs membership on the likelihood of attending community meeting is relatively smaller. This suggests that the attendees in community meetings do not necessarily claim a membership in grassroots associations. The second observation, perhaps the most important, is that being member of CGs has a positive effect on attending community meetings in 95% of countries examined, with the exception of Zimbabwe. These meetings are informal and usually held in public arenas, where citizens air grievances and collective concerns are talked about. It appears from the statistical analysis that these meetings motivate citizens to contact their MPs. Of the countries examined, attending a community meeting is more impactful in Liberia (.41), Kenya (.006), Botswana (.005), Uganda (.003) and Senegal (.003). On the other hand, attending community meeting carries no impact in Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Namibia.

As for the educational attainment level, the effect is inconsistent across the 20 countries and at the three levels of political contacts. One major contribution of this article is that it nuances the prevailing wisdom about the impact of educational attainment reported recently by many African scholars. This article maintains that it would be a mistake to generalize the depressing effects of education on political participation in every single African country. With a scope of twenty countries, three salient observations are to be made. First, the conventional wisdom about the dampening effect of education on political participation is vindicated in Lesotho (-.061 contact with MP), Mozambique (-.023 contact with MP), Nigeria (-.012 contact with MP), Zimbabwe (-.011
contact with MP), South Africa (0.21 attend community meeting), Benin (-0.17 attend community meeting). The second noteworthy observation is that education has a positive influence at three levels of political contacts in Kenya, Liberia, Cape Verde, and Zambia. Unlike earlier analyses that captured participation as a unidimensional act, I disaggregate political contacts into three forms. Unpacking political contacts and using individual country data have allowed us to observe these positive impacts of education. With respect to national representatives, Liberia comes first with a coefficient of (0.17) seconded by Kenya (.027), and Cape Verde (0.013). In Zambia, the higher citizens' level of educational attainment, the more they contact local councilors (0.014). The level of educational attainment impacts also initiative to contact government agencies in Nigeria (.073).

Religious membership is not as effective as it could have been expected. In general, it emerges from the present analysis that the majority of the twenty countries, religious membership is not a springboard for political participation. Among the 20 countries surveyed, Mali displays the highest negative coefficient (-.098), followed by Nigeria (-0.013). On the other hand, in Liberia, Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, and notably in Zimbabwe, membership in religious group positively correlates with the likelihood of contacting their MPs. In Cape Verde, membership in religious groups has a neutral effect on political participation. Compared to civic member groups, partisanship has a much smaller coefficient and behaves inconsistently in the twenty countries with respect to contacting MPs and attending community meetings. Three scenarios are observed. In the first scenario, the variable partisanship complements civic groups to boost contact with MPs in four countries Mozambique (0.098), Uganda (0.093), Kenya (0.086), and Tanzania (0.084). The second scenario is present where citizens’ closeness to a party becomes the sole vehicle that leads them to contact their MPs. The scenario is found in Lesotho (0.099), Namibia (0.095), Zimbabwe (0.075), and Madagascar (0.064). The third scenario involves countries in which partisanship has no effect
on citizens’ willingness to contact their MPs or attend community meetings. In Burkina Faso, Mali, and Ghana, partisanship has no effect on contact with MPs; the vibrancy of civic groups remains the primary engine that mobilizes citizens to contact their members of parliament or to attend community meetings.

Gender: Following the convention, I code the variable gender as a dichotomous variable (0=female;1=male). The analysis corroborates the existing common knowledge about the gender gap in political participation in Africa. The results of the statistical analysis show that gender impacts negatively political contact variables and that of attending community meetings. The gap of participation between men and women is visible and statistically significant in 18 out of 20 countries, the two exceptions being Cape Verde and Madagascar. Unlike in elsewhere on the continent where being a woman consistently affects negatively political participation, in these two countries, the findings show that the variable gender has no statistical significance. However, the rates of membership in these two countries suggests two opposites explanations. In Cape Verde, the comparatively high rate of civic membership and political contacts suggests that both men and women equally participate at virtually same level. Consequently, the difference between the two levels of participations (men and women) is statistically meaningless. In contrast, in Madagascar, the lack of significance is due to the equal non-participation of both men and women in contacting MPs. Among the other 18 countries where gender impacts negatively contact with MP and attending community meetings, West African countries are the standard bearers with Nigeria (-.197), Senegal (-.094), Ghana (-.08), Mali (-.054), Benin (-.045). Among the west African countries, Liberia fares better with a relatively smaller negative impact of women’s participation (-.01). In addition, the gender gap worsens as one moves from national representatives to local councilors everywhere in Africa. Rural women, mostly uneducated, seem to be totally excluded
from local political activities in Mali (-.123), Senegal (-.08). Burkina Faso is the exception when it comes to the gender gap in political participation with a coefficient of -.0001. This suggests that men and women participate at a virtually equal rate in Burkina Faso. Perhaps this small negative impact reflects Thomas’ Sanakara’s national program of women’s emancipation in the mid 1980s. As for the Eastern African countries, they display similar general pattern albeit with smaller coefficients of gender gap in political contacts and political and communal activities. The average coefficient in the Eastern countries is (-0.03). Yet, among the countries in this region, women are excluded from politics in Lesotho (-.11) and Zambia (-.09) as much as they are in most West African countries. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) found that married women with young children work on average six hours a day more than men (274). It is common in Africa to see women wear multiple hats; they are in several cases the first bread winner, they take care of children and household chores. All these factors put together can explain why women are less active in political arena especially in rural areas. Like gender, it appears that political fear still hampers political participation in Liberia and Uganda, countries that have gone through civil wars.

At the outset of this article, I set out to explore the causal linkage between membership in informal grassroots associations in forms of civic voluntary and community development groups and contacts with members of parliament in Africa. Despite the pervasiveness of these organizations, there had not been a systematic study to examine the intermediary role they play in state society relationship in Africa. Authors such Eke (1992) believes that these African grassroots associations are not precursor of democracy. As for their role as vehicle of participation, scholars in mature democracies have established that individual characteristics are the primary drivers of political participation. Against these two backdrops, the present investigation has shown that grassroots in Africa are the stepping stone toward restoring the state-society relationship.
Specifically, it has demonstrated that membership in grassroots associations in forms of civic groups is more consistent and powerful indicator of contact with MP in the 20 countries surveyed than individual level variables. In so doing, the evidence supports the central argument that membership in these GAs offer a safer space for political expression, and motivate their member to get involved in communal activities. These results are in line with the findings in Bratton et.al (2005). More importantly, the GAs serve as a medium to reach out to MPs. Admittedly, these findings do not eliminate the clientelistic suspicions hanging over direct contacts between citizens and office holders in Africa. Instead, this investigation stresses the primordial roles of these numerous and organic organizations in Africa in building civic efficacy and civic involvement during the interelection periods. A future research agenda should envision undertaking a field experiment to assess these participatory impacts on the ground.

Control for contextual variables.

In order to test the validity of the aforementioned argument, I use the merged data for the 20 countries and add two macro-level contextual variables: electoral systems and countries gdp per capita. Following Kuenzi and Lambright, I code electoral system as a dichotomous variable whereby countries with the single member district electoral system are coded as 1 and the rest (Proportional Representation and various modes of mixed systems) are coded as 0. As for the countries’ economic level, I logged the gdp per capita.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficients and standard error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member civic group</td>
<td>0.289***(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.026***(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in public affair</td>
<td>0.18*** (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>0.18*** (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>0.012***(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.007*** (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Religious group</td>
<td>0.005* (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party id</td>
<td>-0.049** (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.032*** (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gdp per capita</td>
<td>-0.014*** (.002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of obs = 22324  
LR chi2(14) = 1310.88  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
Log likelihood = -6952.539  
Pseudo R2 = 0.0862

The results displayed in table 2 show that membership in civic groups is the primary independent variable that motivate citizens to reach out to their MPs across all countries. Education is surprisingly positive in the merged data, suggesting the inconsistent behavior of this variable. As for the closeness to political party, the statistical analysis highlight the pervasiveness weakness of these institutions across the twenty countries. Gender and residence maintain the same pattern as in the individual country data. Interestingly, the size of the negative coefficient of party id suggests however that this variable would have been the indisputable factor of contact between citizens and their MPs had political parties played their linking role. Overall, both individual country data and
merged data regressions confirm the importance of civic organizations as peaceful and reliable intermediary institutions that link citizens to their representatives.

3 CHAP III: AFRICAN TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AS INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS TO CONTACT MPS

3.1 Introduction

The central argument of this dissertation states that citizens in Africa scarcely reach out to their representatives directly. Instead, they contact members of parliaments from their districts through two intermediary institutions. The first intermediary institution that facilitates the bottom up contacts consists of informal grassroots organizations (often called civic and communal development groups in the Afrobarometer surveys). The second mediating informal institutions are the African traditional authorities and religious institutions. While the chapter two dealt with informal grassroots organizations and how these grassroots organizations help groups of citizens garner collective efficacy to contact their MPs, this chapter three zooms in on religious institutions and traditional authorities in their roles as linking institutions between citizens and their members to the national parliament (MP).

3.1.1 Research questions

The goal of the chapter is to answer the following questions: To what extent are religious institutions and traditional authorities useful for the constituent-representative relationship in African democratic process? Answering appropriately this question requires taking a closer look at the debate in the literature about whether or not traditional institutions are necessary for African democratic consolidation. More acrimonious, this debate pits two camps against each other “Modernists” versus “Traditionalists.” Traditionalists posit that African traditional authorities, organic emanations of the ordinary citizens, are the true representatives of the people, and as such,
these informal institutions constitute the stepping stone of any successful democratic transition in Africa (Ayittey, 1995; Lawson, 2002; Keulder, 1998). In a stark opposition, modernists, led by Mamdani (1996), one of their most vocal proponents, counter that these traditional authorities are nothing but vestiges of a colonial despotism, and they are antithetical to any democratic development in Africa (Mamdani 1996:18). As a result, traditional authorities and democratic institutions cannot coexist. A successful democratic reform in Africa ought to get rid of these institutions.

### 3.1.2 The Argument

This chapter takes the middle ground position and argues that traditional institutions are useful for democracy because they serve as a channel of communication between citizens and their representatives. The existence of traditional authorities facilitates the two-track political participation of citizens in Africa. This side-by-side use of the two modes of political participation is the use of the informal channels to reach out to formal institutions to increase citizens’ input in their political communities. Specifically, when compared to other factors that are purported to facilitating contacts between citizens and their representatives, the combine effect of these two institutions stands out as the most powerful predictor of contacting Members to the Parliament. The idea of side-by-side or low and high road of participation is akin to that of the two-track political process in Africa. Amply explained by Manning (2002) in her analysis of the Mozambican peace process, the concept of two-track practice is a realistic description of political practices in Africa where informal institutions (often ignored or dismissed) complement formal ones. Similar to Manning’s 2002 argument of the two-track implementation of the peace agreement in Mozambique, the two-track participation argument sheds a light on a common practice yet benighted by the lack of academic interest.
To demonstrate this argument, I devise the following design. My primary dependent variable is citizens’ contact of their members of parliament in Africa. My two primary independent variables are contacts of religious institutions and contacts of traditional authorities. I contrast the effects of these two primary independent variables (informal institutions) against the effects of the alternative hypothesis variables: contacts of party officials, voting, and citizens’ partisanship, controlling for individual level variables (demographic and socioeconomic) and country-level variables (electoral systems and country gross domestic product per capita). I also control for a potential selection bias caused by highly opinioned individuals who might contact both traditional authorities and MPs, rendering the causal connection between traditional authorities and MPs spurious. Following the examples of public opinion studies in American politics, I control for citizens with strong opinions by including the variable *closeness to party* that captures individuals’ ideological strength. The approach is strictly quantitative and the data comes from the Afrobarometer Round 4. Post estimations of the probit regression results support the hypothesized relationships that, together, citizens contacting these institutions a marginal effect of 4.3% more likely to contact their MP than citizens who do not contact their religious or traditional authorities. Even taken individually, contacts of religious institutions and traditional authorities remain remarkable indicator (albeit reduced) of contact of MPs (contacting religious institutions, 2.3% and contacting traditional authorities, 2%). In contrast, those who contact party officials are only 0.5% more likely to contact their MP. Unsurprisingly, weak party attachment is reflected by a negative coefficient of the variable *party closeness* on contact with MP (-2.4%). The finding on party closeness also resolves the potential treat of a selection bias and confirms the causal effects of these institutions. Another all-too-common finding in African behavioral politics is the quasi exclusion of women; the coefficient of gender is predictably negative and highly significant (-2%). These
findings are echoed in Afrobarometer surveys. On average, forty percent of ordinary citizens contact directly their religious leaders and twenty nine percent their traditional authorities on a daily basis. In contrast, very few ordinary citizens initiate a direct contact with their elected legislative officials from their districts. Practically, less than two out of ten ordinary citizens ever initiate such a contact with their representatives. An overwhelming eighty seven percent of the population lives in a total isolation from their representatives. A quick computation shows that the rates of contacts between citizens and their informal institutions is twelve-fold higher than that of the citizens-MP contacts. Obviously, these rates of contacts vary across countries, with some countries displaying a higher rate of contacts such as Botswana (20%), Kenya (19%), Liberia (18%) and others showing abysmal rates of contacts between citizens and their MPs including Madagascar (1%), Namibia (2%) Nigeria (4%). These figures indicate that informal institutions are more connected to ordinary citizens than the formal ones.

3.1.3 **The Scope of the chapter three**

This article covers only the twenty countries from the Afrobarometer Round 4, including Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The rationale behind the choice of Afrobarometer round four stems from the richness of this round in representative-constituent-related topics in Africa. In addition to the common questions about types of contacts, this round allows the researcher to delve into the role expectations of both citizens and the members of parliament across the continent. More importantly, the timing of the survey (2009) gives the investigator the unique opportunity to assess the extent to which the dyadic electoral connection between citizens and their elected officials has taken root two decades after the seeds of democratization were sowed in Africa.
**Limitations:** The main focus of the chapter is on the combined effects of the two informal institutions, African traditional authorities and religious actors, as they facilitate contacts between citizens and their MPs. Although the subject matter deals with religious institutions and their relationships to political participation, it does not attempt to differentiate the distinct effects of each religious denomination on participatory activities. In other words, I skirt the debate about the comparative effects of mainline religious denomination “old missions” versus that of new Pentecostal or new charismatic churches, or the debate about contrasting Christian versus Muslim regarding their respective effects on political participation. The article treats these informal institutions as non-state actors that perform the role of “linkage institutions” between the state and the society.

This article makes an original contribution to the legislative-constituent relationship in Africa by showing that the existence of formal channels of articulation of citizens’ preference does not render obsolete the channels of informal institutions. Secondly, the article contributes to the theory of participation by identifying these institutions as mode of political participation. Otherwise put, I am suggesting that these institutions may serve to convey citizens’ demands of accountability of their elected officials. Consequently, their fate needs not be confined in a false and rigid dichotomist relationship with democratic consolidation in Africa.

I divide the chapter into three parts. The introductory section frames the article. The second section elaborates on the theoretical framework of this chapter and comprises two subsections. The first subsection evaluates the existing literature on the political relevance of these institutions. Specifically, it critically examines supporting and opposing arguments in the academic debate about traditional authorities and religious institutions as they relate to the building of democracy in Africa.
The second subsection presents my argument as a middle course position between traditionalists and modernists. The third section consists of the empirical evidence that substantiates my argument.

3.2 Theoretical Framework

3.2.1 Literature Review

The present literature review has three subsections. The first subsection sheds a light on historical backgrounds and the debate about the resurgence of traditional authorities. The second subsection examines the different scholarly approaches used to analyze political relevance of religious institutions. The third subsection is more germane to the research question. It reviews the state of the scholarly debate about whether or not traditional institutions fit in the picture of Africa’s democratic development. I close these critical evaluations by pointing to gaps in the literature and the way to fill them.

3.2.1.1 Extant theories about resurgence of Religious and Traditional Institutions

In this subsection, I report an empirical observation about the recent revival of religious and traditional institutions and the existing speculations about the causes of this resurgence. Although the issues of resurgence of these institutions deal only tangentially with the research question of this chapter, extant theories about resurgence provide a historical background that helps better contextualize the debate between “Modernists” and “Traditionalists.” If anything, this resurgence speaks to the resilience of these institutions and their omnipresence in ordinary people' (Logan 2008, 2011). Reports from various surveys lend credence to this widespread phenomenon of resurgence of religious and traditional institutions in Africa. There is no a uniform pattern of development that fits all countries. In countries covered, these institutions have been at times tolerated, coopted, incorporated into the state apparatus, or completely banned. Despite having a
diversity of fortunes, the African traditional authorities and religious institutions have witnessed a rebirth.

Resurgence of religious and traditional authorities has been well documented in surveys. Public opinion and attitude surveys give the strongest evidence to this observation. According to the world Value Survey (WVS), Africa is the most religious continent in the world. Patterson (2015) reports that religious organizations take up the lion share of non-state actors in every single country on the continent (43). Membership in religious groups has consistently soared, giving to religious actors and institutions a vast array of networks, resources and time to increase their relevance politically, economically and socially (40). The primacy of religiosity is shown through the ever-swelling rate of memberships and the importance given to religious practices by members. According to the Afrobarometer, on average, 73.2% claim to be members of a religious group and 80% claim that religion is very important. Of these members, nearly 75% are either active members or occupy a leadership position. Only a one out of four of those surveyed declare not being affiliated with any religious group (Afrobarometer Round 4, online analysis). Overall, the two monotheistic religions (Christians and Muslim) dominate the religious landscape. These two major religious groups themselves comprise of several subdivisions. For instance, among Christian religions, the Afrobarometer lists 23 subgroups including Apostolic Faith, Baptist, Calvinist, Church of Christ, Christian Church, Coptic, Dutch reform, Dutch Reformed, Evangelical, Independent, Jehovah Witness, Last Church, Lutheran, Mennonite, Methodist, Moravian, Mormon, Orthodox, Pentecostal, Presbyterian, Quaker, Seventh Day Adventist, Zionist, and Zionist. The other mainline religious group, the Muslim, is divided in two major subgroups: Sunni and Shia. Each of these subgroups include multiple brotherhoods including, Hamadiya, Ismaeli, Izala, Layenes, Mouridiya, Qadiriya, Sidiya, Tijania, Trabiya, Wahhabiya (Afrobarometer round 4). Like religious
organizations, though less in magnitude, African traditional authorities have known a resurgence across the continent. Altogether, scholars and democratic activists have enumerated five potential factors as causal explanations undergirding the upsurge of these institutions: state-centric theories, pre-colonial social organization, colonial legacy, the extent of countries’ democratic consolidation, and the influence of international actors.

The nature of a pre-existing social structure prior to colonial penetration is presumed to be source of resurgence of parallel institutions such as traditional and religious institutions in Africa. A group of African scholars categorized African precolonial political structures into two main types based on the extent of power concentration: the centralized and decentralized forms of governance (Onyejekwe et.al 2004). In the centralized type, power structure is hierarchical whereby the monarch or chief, at the top, dominated with an absolute power in the decision-making process. The centralized system displayed a sense of collective resistance in Uganda, (the Buganda empire) in Lesotho, Botswana, in Ghana (the Ashanti). In contrast, in the decentralized type, power structure was collegial and all decisions were taken on a consensual basis. The decentralized systems consisted of groups of age-sets, a conglomerate of small villages loosely tight together (Onyejekwe et.al 2004: 12). To illustrate, the decentralized types are roughly similar to the Delian League of the Greek city-state association in 478 BC with a weak enforcement power. Following the power structure, this argument infers that in places where power was highly centralized, traditional authorities resisted more to colonial powers and to new African states than in places where they were decentralized. With their hierarchical structure, these social organizations resisted total annulment often by going underground. These concealed organizations gained strength any time the formal structure failed to exert its functions. Similarly, colonial legacy is seen by many as a source of resurgence of traditional authorities (Englebert 2002). It comes as no surprise that
resurgence has happened more in Anglophone Africa than in Francophone or Lusophone parts of the continent. This institutionalist argument suggests that the British colonial model of indirect rule nurtured local powers. As a consequence, in ex-British colonies, existing local and traditional institutions grew and were strengthened by the post 1990s winds of Africa’s liberalization. Empirical observations show that despite caustic criticisms leveled at the British style of indirect ruling, traditional rulers have remained more politically relevant in ancient British colonies than in anywhere else in Africa. Still, it is fair to point out that the difference in colonial legacy mattered more at the early ages of the independence of these countries (Lee and Paine, 2016). After 1990s’ decade, virtually all African countries have witnessed a surge in the activities of these institutions, irrespective of the formal colonial power’s style of administration (direct or indirect rule). The Afrobarometer’s surveys show no difference in rates of ordinary citizens’ contacts of religious and traditional leaders among ex-colonies in Africa. For instance, from Afrobarometer Round 4, contacts of traditional and religious leaders average 27.6% in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, (all ex- British colonies). The rate of contacts of traditional authorities average 30% in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal (all former French colonies). This could mean that even in direct form of colonial rule, where notably the French brutally erased precolonial power structures, these institutions did not cease to exist; they merely went underground and resurfaced under the auspice of democratic transition. Below, table 1 summarizes briefly the style of pre-colonial political organization, colonial rule and the status of recognitions of these institutions post 1990. By recognition, scholars mean the official acknowledgement of the existence of traditional authorities and the purview of their jurisdictions. These recognitions are usually couched in legal terms in countries’ founding documents (constitutions or decrees). For instance, in Mozambique, the 2002 constitution not only acknowledges the existence of traditional authorities, but also it defines their
jurisdiction. In contrast, the latest Nigerian constitution of 1999 openly chooses to ignore traditional institutions (Peter, 2014: 136).

Table 3.1 Status of Recognition of Traditional Authorities in the 20 countries
Furthermore, authors have gone beyond the precolonial and colonial political structure to
focus on the adaptability of these social structure to the newly independent African states’ organization. The most known proponent of this contention is David Apter (1960) who divides traditional authorities into two categories: “instrumental” traditional authorities and “consummatory” ones. He defines instrumental traditional authorities as those who adapted swiftly to the new state’s organizations and remained alert to signals of state failure and seized upon those failures to reassert their existence. He cites the Buganda Empire as an illustration of instrumental traditional authorities. According to Apter (1960), despite adhering to the Idi Amin’ administration and living in low profile, the Bugadan traditional authorities took advantage of the collapse of this regime to reassert itself. In contrast, “consummatory” traditional authorities easily gave in to the attractions of the new state’s perks of power and let itself be completely captured by the states with the consequence of the dismantlement of its core structure (Apter 1960:45-68).

The fourth school of thought attributes causes of the resurgence of traditional authorities and religious institutions to failed state in Africa (Ekeh, 1975; Migdal, 1998; Sklar, 1999; Baker, 2000; Herbst, 2000; Ubink, 2008). The underlying assumption is that a badly dysfunctional state leaves a void of services that these institutions fill right-away. According to Bruce Baker (2000), state failure exhorts rival social organizations like tribal authorities to seize the opportunity and to exert their “social control” (26). This assumption would make us believe that war torn countries are fertile grounds for traditional authorities to thrive. A variant of state weakness premise is put forward by Herbst (2000). He contends that the failure of the state to project its power (due to countries’ geography and weak demographic density) opens up opportunities for remote local and regional power centers to rally around one or several unifying dimensions of their identity, be it ethnicity, language, or history (124). Ubink (2008) adds that states have given the opportunity for traditional authorities to expand for state-centric interests (23). State motivations are self-serving
when they attempt to associate traditional authorities; they aim at gaining electoral legitimacy at local level. States are also pragmatic actors in letting these institutions flourish. Ribot (2002) writes that states have learned that sidelining traditions authorities often antagonizes them and may amount to failure of state-sponsored projects at local level (16). More importantly, the state associates traditional authorities in order to use them as linkage institution to reach individual citizens. Taken to its logical conclusion, this state-centric argument suggests that traditional authorities would be silenced in strong states. Once again, the reality on the ground shows that the majority of countries that have formally acknowledged these institutions are all relatively strong states. Examples include South Africa, Ghana, Botswana, Burkina Faso and two previous countries torn by civil wars, Mozambique and Uganda. Furthermore, on the face of it, the state-centric logic comes intuitively. However, realities on the ground leave this assumption unsubstantiated. For instance, this assumption would make war torn countries a fertile ground for traditional authorities to thrive. Yet, as Englebert (2002:118-151) stresses, civil wars did not make traditional authorities emerge in Liberia, Zaire, Angola, or Cote D’Ivoire (The exception being in Sierra Leone where the elders controlled the local civil defense units, the Kamajors during the Sierra Leonean civil war.

Number of scholars have attributed resurgence to international actors (USAID and international financial institutions (Ribot,2002; Englebert, 2002; Ubink 2008; Kyed,2007) and Bratton and Logan (2011,2008). The idea is that resurgence is an outcome of the applications of conditions attached to the aid package from external actors (usually the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank). Conditions for getting these development packages include stripping African states’ budgets, encouraging decentralization and local governance. These Bretton Woods’ institutions have expanded their partnership beyond state actors to include traditional and local
authorities. For instance, Ubink (2008) reports a partnership between the Asanteeman and the Abuakwa and the World bank in funding a 5million dollars local projects in Ghana (11).

3.2.1.2 Resurgence as a signal of a failed national identity building

Rejecting all the above speculations, a group of scholars see the resurgence from a totally different vantage point, that of national unity (Bustin,1999;2000; Chabal 1994). For these scholars, rather than indicating a thriving civil society, resurgence of traditional authorities expresses a failure in the making of a unifying national identity. Bustin (1999) first pointed this out by comparing Republic Democratic of Congo to Uganda, regarding how citizens in the two countries showed their attachment to their national identity. In Uganda, Bustin (1999) noticed that despite boasting a dynamic civil society and an uptick in the activities of traditional and religious institutions, the country remains bitterly polarized between major traditional authorities. In addition to these divisions along tribal or ethnic lines in Uganda, ordinary citizens display stronger allegiance to their tribal groups than to their national identity. Citizens primarily identify themselves as Buganda, Banyankole, Basoga, Langi, or as part of one the 37 other ethnic groups. Bustin opposes Uganda to Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC). He observes that the DRC, a virtually collapsing state, a country that has gone through cyclical civil wars since its independence, citizens shows more national pride than tribal loyalty (83). Bustin (1999) hypothesizes that when the project of nation building is on the right track, all communities inclusively feel less threatened and express less the need to be acknowledged (86). Corroborating this stance, Chabal (1994) adds that national identity building has more or less succeeded in countries where the ethnic makeup is less lopsided (64). In other words, wherever one or two ethnic groups claim the status of ethnic majority, ethnic dimension of citizens’ identity becomes more salient such as in Kenya, in Rwanda, or in Ethiopia. In contrast, when country’s ethnic makeup is fairly evenly distributed, constructing national identity
is more successful because the emphasis is less on ethnic dimension than on national identity; example includes Togo, Cameroon, Tanzania, Guinea (68).

At this juncture, one can retain that resurgence of these institutions is a multi-causal, context dependent and undeniable phenomenon. Each of listed causes above is a contributing factor. What is constant is the causal connection between the advent of democratic change and resurgence on the continent. Although no statistical inference can be drawn from such a small sample of 20 countries, the temporal precedence of the advent of democracy and the subsequent formal recognitions of these institutions is irrefutable. Many countries have formally mentioned and acknowledged the rights of traditional and religious institutions in countries’ funding documents. For instance, Botswana formally acknowledged traditional and religious institutions in 1960s, Senegal in 1978; Liberia in 1986, Burkina in 1987, Ghana in 1992, Lesotho (revamped constitution 1993), South Africa in 1994, Namibia (Act of 2000); Zambia, Zimbabwe in 2013. Since resurgence seems to have gained strength on the wake of the democratic transition in Africa, one is poised to ask these two questions: how scholars have approached the political relevance of these institutions, and to what extent traditional and religious institutions contribute positively or negatively to the consolidation of democracy in Africa?

**How have scholars approached this topic?** Overwhelmingly in the existing literature the political relevance of religious and traditional authority has been approached from a macro-level perspective. At national and local levels, scholars have primarily focused on leaders’ behavior and their interactions with the state. An illustration is the roles religious leaders played in the 1990s during National Conferences in Africa. Haynes (1995) cites the role of many bishops as presiding officers of national conferences (102). These leaders were priests, pastors and bishops (for Christians) and Ulemas and Sheikdom (for Muslims). Because of these roles, many observant
perceive these leaders as democracy advocate. However, Haynes (1995:89-107) levels a vitriolic criticism at religious leaders, accusing them of being part of the hyper class that exploits the uneducated gullible poor in Africa (90). His analysis, rooted in Marxist theory of class struggle, ascribes leaders’ involvement in the national conferences to a subterfuge to maintain the status quo. He denounces the unholy connection between the political and religious elites to create a hegemonic coalition that “milk” the proletariat (95). In short, for Haynes (1995), religious leaders cannot be actors of democratic change in Africa.

A second theoretical criticism of the elite-focused approach targets its main underlying assumptions, which implies that differences in religious denominations lead to differences in political behavior. This approach traces back its roots to Max Weber (1930) who hypothesized the strong relationship between democracy, capitalism, and protestant ethics. In the recent years, both Gifford (1998) and Meyer (2004) have seen “older missions” as highly supportive of democracy. However, the relationship between democracy and religious denominations remains an unsettled debate. Cooper (1976) attributes pervasive anti-democratic sentiments among Catholics to the strong hierarchical structure of their denomination that mirrors Authoritarian regimes (75). Similarly, Reid and McClendon (2016) write about some religious leaders that have used their sermons to preach political apathy or political indifference (1045). Examples include Sufism (an extreme branch of Sunni Islam) and Black Protestants in the United States (Frazier and Lincoln,1974).

Do these institutions play a role in political participation in Africa? Several classical studies have investigated the role religious and traditional institutions play in political participation in and outside Africa. Verba, Schlozman, Brady (1995) McCauley and Boadi, 2009) Manglos and Weinreb (2012); Cooke et.al 2015; Patterson,2015 Reid and McClendon (2015). Approaching this
question from a micro level perspective, Manglos and Weinreb find that there is no difference among religious traditions when it comes to their effects on political interest (216). Manglos and Weinreb’s findings contradict the prevailing conventional wisdom that makes some religious traditions superior to other traditions in fostering democratic attitudes. They argue that when education is accounted for and coupled with religious memberships, together this interaction variable increases significantly citizens’ political interest in every single religious tradition (214).

McClendon and Reid (2015) tackle the impact of religion on political participation in Africa from psychological vantage point. They conduct an experiment in Nairobi in which they expose church goers to religious messages. They find that Pentecostal self-affirming religious message act as stimulant that motivates religious people to get involved in some otherwise intimidating political activities. Related to psychological perspective is Ellis and Haar (1998)’s article. They seek the reasons behind the pervasiveness of religious discourses and its ability to speak to power in Africa. For them, religious discourse in Africa can be seen as a countervailing power that attempts to remedy social injustices in the community (185). By claiming an access to the invisible world, religious experts serve as intermediary at several levels in Africa. They convey people’s preoccupations to both the invisible spirits and to political leaders. Since ordinary Africans believe in the interconnection between the visible and invisible worlds, citizens understand why every leader (as well as every family) has his or her own spiritual expert (marabout or medicine men). Anecdotic examples expound the disproportionate power these private marabouts have weighing in African presidents’ national or personal decisions (189).

In addition to classical studies, participatory outputs of traditional and religious authorities are said to result from their interactions with the state as well. Scholars agree that these interactions are strategic in the sense that each entity seeks to assert itself while trying to influence the other.
Furthermore, the state-society relationship involving these intermediary institutions and the state is dynamic (Cooke et.al 2015; Patterson, 2015; Lawson, 2002). Overall, the general pattern of these interactions results into one, or the combination of these four outcomes: cooperation, cooptation-capture, confrontation, and fragmentation of these institutions. When interactions result into cooperation, both the state and traditional or religious institutions seek to accommodate each other and the level of political participation is said to be high (Cooke et.al 2015: 8). The state and the non-state actors respect the limits of their respective spheres of influence and accept to compromise for the sake of stability (Cooke et.al 2015:1-126). The telltale example is the cohabitation of the Sunni Brotherhood and the state in Senegal (Cooke 2015:10).

In contrast, when interactions between state and these intermediary institutions result into a capture and (or) co-optation of the intermediary institutions, the state displays an unmitigated objective to incorporate them into its structure. Various methods are employed to achieve the goal of capture including bureaucratization, appointment to a national office to control these alternative loci of power (Downie in Cooke et.al 2015: 18). Empirical observation shows that co-optation is the most common outcome of interactions between the state and the traditional and religious actors and institutions in Africa. Usually, traditional authorities that have allied themselves with the reigning power have fallen in disgrace in the eyes of their fellow citizens. Cases of capture are more pronounced in South Africa where public distaste for chiefs who collaborated with the Apartheid remains still strong (Mamdani,1996; Ntsebezola,2002). The participatory output in the case of co-opted intermediary institutions is reduced. Similar to co-optation, disintegration dampens the participatory dividend of religious institution as a block. In the beginning, religious institutions faced the state as unified block that pushed for a democratic change (Throup in Cooke et.al, 2015: 20). As the state embarked on the track of democratic transition, this shift unleashed individual
ambitions, and differences political interest appeared. Competing ambitions from distinct ethnic or regional backgrounds open up divisions within and among religious institutions. Political competitions with a strong ethnic undertone have lead religious groups to disintegrate along ethnic lines. This has diluted religious groups’ influence on political participation (Throup in Cooke et.al, 2015:29).

Confrontation is the most extreme outcome of these interactions. Clashes between state and traditional and religious institutions were common during the early stage of democratic transition in Africa in the 1990s. When these institutions involved themselves into the struggle for democratic change, mostly through National Sovereign Conferences, they faced ruthless authoritarian rulers who dread the ballot poll and would do anything to protect their entrenched interests (Diamond, 1992). Head-butts over values and governance were frequent everywhere on the continent, most notably in Kenya, Zambia, and in Guinea. In Kenya, leaders of all Christian denominations churches and their congregations were in the forefront to demand democratic change. In Zambia, the catholic Archbishop faced off with Hasting after issuing a scathing criticism against ongoing human rights abuses in Zambian. His criticism sparked widespread outcry and contributed to the collapse of dictatorship in Zambia (Patterson, 2015). In Guinea, Mgr. Robert Sarah, the youngest bishop at his consecration (34 years), boldly and repeatedly confronted the Guinean dictator Sekou Toure for his Kangaroo courts and Gulag-type of prisons in Guinea. For this, his name was on a blacklist of people to be executed, only to be spared by the death of Sekou Toure (Christophe Le Bec, Jeune Afrique, 2014). All in all, when the outcome of the interactions between the state and these intermediary institutions is confrontation, the participatory output is understandably cut short.

*Do traditional and religious institutions promote or proscribe democracy in Africa?*
The debate about whether traditional authorities fit in the African democratic development is a fifty-year-old dispute that has come to the fore with the advent social transformation in Africa (Logan, 2008, 2011). Commonly framed as traditionalists against modernists, the essential question asks about what to do with African social organizations in the building of a genuine democracy? Broadly, the first group of scholars led by Mamdani (1996) and dubbed “modernists” contends that these institutions are nothing but remnants of colonial power structure (18). And that they have reversed the democratic accountability pathway in Africa. Instead of reinforcing the downward accountability, they reinvigorate the upward accountability. In addition, these institutions were used as instrument to implement colonial policies. As a result, these institutions need to be rid of and replaced by citizen-inspired institutions (Mamdani 1996:18.) The second group, known as “traditionalists” (Ayittey, 1991,1995; Keulder 1998; Lawson,2002;), counter that traditional institutions are the true representation of ordinary people, and that democracy and its institutions are not foreign to Africa. At the heart of the debate, specifically, modernists and traditionalist disagree on three essential features of democracy: the mode of participation, the mechanisms of accountability, and the source of democratic legitimacy.

Traditionalist and modernists diverge on how traditional authorities foster universal participation. Because by definition democracy implies universal participation, traditionalists such as Keulder (1998) posits that African tradition of community-wide- gatherings are quintessential expression of a genuine democracy. He maintains that this type of gatherings is simple, costless, direct, and accessible to everyone. Not only does everyone is welcome to participate to it, but these community-wide-gatherings offer safe areas where ordinary people express freely their concerns. Communications are simple, direct, and mostly done face- to face. In this sense, they are kin to both the American time-honored tradition of Town Hall meetings and the original Athenian direct
democracy. Regarding the manner in which the demos expresses its will, Ayittey (1995), a consummate traditionalist, claims that popular will can be expressed in two ways: majority will and unanimity. Whereas Westerners use majority rule to determine popular will, Africans voice their popular will by way of unanimity reached in community-wide-gatherings (1184). One benefit of the consensual decision making is its permanent use of persuasion to ultimately assuage the dissenting party. In contrast, the majority rule often crushes the losing minority. More importantly, the unanimity decision-making process involves everyone because only consensual decisions carry the day. In essence, while traditionalists welcome modernity, they claim that “modernization does not mean westernization” (Ayittey, 1995: 1204).

Modernists such as Molustse (2004) and Mattes (1997) reject the premise of community-wide-gatherings as an authentic and all-inclusive participatory mode. According to them neither the participatory mode in these fora nor the decision-making process is democratic. Rather, these community-wide-gatherings are restrictive, exclusive, and their decision-making process is far from consensual. Using the example of the Botswanan version of the community-wide gathering, the Kgotla, Molustse (2004) denounces this male-dominated gatherings of tribal leaders that discriminate against women and the youth (162). As for the decision-making process, Mattes (1997) counters that decisions that are taken in these gatherings are not made through free contentment of attendees. On the contrary, these decisions are arbitrary and are reached by way of “coerced consensus,” whereby obsequious deference deters the slightest opposition. Substantively, these decisions make individual preferences yield to the so-called community interest (5). He concludes that traditional authorities stand for values that are at best antithetical to democracy and, at worst, they represent a non-democratic form of government” (6).
The second point of disagreement is on the extent to which African traditional authorities are accountable to their people. For the modernist Mamdani (1996), the most telling characteristics of traditional leaders is their despotism. He claims that the institution of traditional leaders reverses the direction of democratic accountability: accountability of these chiefs is upheld upwardly and inexistent downwardly, turning them into unfettered despotic leaders (18). However, traditionalists have vigorously disputed this claim, asserting that African political systems have had its built-in mechanisms of checks and balances that even the mighty colonial power could not uproot (Ayittey,1995; Keulder,1998). Like unanimity, institutions of accountability, transparency, and checks and balances have long been practiced in Africa. Ayittey (1995) writes that in Africa’s precolonial political systems, no power was unlimited: “Kings and chiefs’ behavior were ritually controlled; their movements were hemmed in taboos to curtail discretionary use of power” (1210). Additionally, although Africans lack written constitutions, they had multiple tools to curb any despotic behavior. Gluckman (1965) gives the example of the Barotse in Central Africa and McGovern, (2014) cites the case of Kokologui of Loma in Guinea and Liberia. These checks and balances allowed a mechanism to divest culprit monarchs, or chiefs using a distinct channel of communication. For instance, the Serere in Senegal played a unique tune in drumbeat to signal impeachment and revocation of their leaders (Ayittey,1991).

The third area of dispute is the source of legitimacy of these institutions. Modernists contend that African traditional authorities lack popular legitimacy because they soiled their hands by allying themselves with the dominating power. Traditional authorities have always been tool of reinforcement in the hands of the oppressor be it the colonial rulers or the newly independent state’s representatives (Mamdani,1996; West and Klock,1999; Nteseberia; 2004). In his book Subjects and Citizens, Mamdani (1996) takes an aim at these institutions and brilliantly analyzes their power
dynamic intertwined between the colonial rulers and their local representatives. Mamdani (1996) maintains that the ultimate goal of the alliance between colonial power and traditional leaders was to segregate and exploit rural dwellers. For instance, the author details how tribal leaders in South Africa sided with colonial powers and the Apartheid regime against their own people. These chiefs and tribal leaders were straw-men who reinforced arbitrary laws and received perks for their actions (28). In the same vein, West and Klock (1999) accuse these traditional leaders for being self-serving agents who shift allegiance depending on who is in power (460). Power-starved traditional leaders’ duplicity is exposed in their dealings with both their people and formal leaders. Lawson (2002) sees them as nowadays “vote brokers” in villages (quoted in Logan 2011). Ntsebeberia (2004) views traditional leaders as more feared than respected, like the proverbial Machiavellian prince. Traditionalists reject the above description.

For traditionalists, along with providing stability in a rapidly changing world, African traditional authorities draw their legitimacy from the well of stewardship and adaptability. They deserve respect and trust because they provide a vast array of socio-economic and cultural services. In response to the accusation of traditional authorities as disloyal to their own, Williams (2010) responds that modernists mistake African traditional authorities’ adaptability to duplicity. According to him, this adaptability serves both traditional leaders and their communities because it allows the latter to “straddle easily two worlds” as they become the face of the nation at the local level and the face of their locality on the national stage (121). This has led Owosu (1996) to argue that in Ghana, traditional authorities have had a constructive relationship with formal leaders and are credited to bringing development projects in their communities (312). Finally, traditionalists claim that African traditional authorities serve as moral reference that anchors society into a solid moral ground and provides a sense of stability in a rapidly changing world.
Not all scholars see these two loci of power as competitors with a zero-sum outcome. A growing number of scholars have taken a middle ground and claims that these two entities are complementary (Kyed, 2007; Logan, 2008, 2011; Anyanwru, 2005; Ubink, 2008; de Sousa Santos, 2006). While acknowledging that traditional authorities still bear some non-democratic features and flaws, they contend that framing this debate into two starkly opposing side is misleading. In a study conducted in Limpopo Province, Anyanwru (2005) explores the complementarity between formal and informal institutions. Using a qualitative strategy, he draws from a case study the evidence that rural folks do not necessarily oppose formal and informal institutions. The author concludes that ordinary people in rural areas desire to see the two forms of authorities work hands in hands. And this collaborative working relationship becomes fruitful when traditional authorities are recognized and associated to government sponsored projects in villages. As a matter of fact, failure to associate traditional authorities to government-led health antagonizes them and results into a debacle of these projects (Trinitapoli and Weinreb, 2012). Although using a different methodology, Logan draws a similar conclusion. Her studies focus on causes of resilience of traditional authorities and their complementarity with formal institutions in Africa. Using a large dataset and a quantitative method, Logan (2008, 2011) finds that both formal and informal authorities draw their legitimacy from the same fountain. What is more, citizens perceive concomitantly these two entities as the two faces of the same currency. Citizens’ attitudes toward chiefs are nurtured by that of their attitudes of formal authorities and vice-versa. Logan concludes that the two provinces of authorities cohabitate harmoniously and there exists a symbiotic relationship between them. In her view, society effortlessly integrates the two. The integration of informal institutions into the state’s structure is concrete in Mozambique. According to Kyed (2007), this integration has proven very benefic for the state, traditional leaders, and their customers. The decree of December 15 2000
acknowledged traditional authorities and integrated them by revamping their mission and christening them as “\textit{community authority}” (8). The result has been a dynamic and continual reshaping of the state-traditional authorities whereby this productive tension increases their respective accessibility (Kyed, 2007: 25). de Sousa Santos (2006) reports “the growing activism” of these informal institutions likening them to burgeoning interest groups phenomenon in Africa (64). Taking a more realist approach to the roles of traditional authorities, Ubink and Kyed (2008:14) warn that traditional authorities need not be compared to others linkage institutions (interest groups) or given lofty goals as in matured democracies. In the investigation of their desirability in African democracy, one must take contextual reality into account. They claim that the primary goal ought to be the improvement of local governance (14).

Collectively, the proposed answers to the above questions have made considerable contribution to our knowledge. Elite approach (i.e, the macro-level) analysis has uncovered the intricacies of state-society interactions and different outcomes. For instance, it has helped put a finger on the roles played by religious leaders during the democratic change in the 1990s. However, the elite approach misses the other aspect of the story- arguably the most important- namely, the actions and attitudes of ordinary citizens on a daily basis. In the heavily elite-driven approach, commoners are left out. While such academic negligence was understandable prior to the advent of the Afrobarometer, the availability of fresh, reliable, and individual-level data on public opinion and attitudes in Africa gives researchers the opportunity to analyze how and why do ordinary citizens relate or not to their democratic institutions. After all, as Bratton says, ordinary people are those who breathe life into democratic institutions (Bratton, 2010:6). Another advantage of the individual level analysis is to test how theories on micro-foundation of political participation in mature democracies travel in an African setting. For instance, existing theories examined above on
channels of participation are limited to formal venues such as contacting your local party official, or basing your action on your partisan identity. Finally, in the debate between modernists and traditionalists, although those who choose the middle ground adopt a pragmatic posture, their position begs the questions about the democratic utility of the complementarity between formal and informal institutions. Pragmatists leave unanswered the following question: To what democratic end do informal and formal work together? The present article fills these gaps

3.2.2 Theory

Why do intermediary institutions, traditional authorities and religious institutions, serve as conduits to connect citizens to their elected officials? I argue that these institutions serve as linking institution between citizens and their MPs because of their incontrovertible social utility which allows the two-track political participation. The concept of two-track participation in this article means the coexistence of formal (less used) and the informal (more used) routes for citizens to convey their preferences. Informal channels of participation become the first conduits of citizens concerns when other linkage institutions and the state suffer from pervasive weakness. Widespread institutional weakness of formal channels compounded by lack of genuine electoral connection between representatives and their constituencies give no other choice to citizens to voice their concerns but to use what they are more familiar with, the closer traditional and religious institutions (Bratton et. al 2005:134). In addition, traditional and religious institutions are not only proximate but also, they are highly visible in rural as well as urban areas. No matter how small or isolated communities are in Africa, edifices that house religious and traditional authorities are noticeable and present everywhere (Patterson, 2015:183). As actors with a perceived legitimacy in the African society, religious and African traditional authorities provide an array of services, including socioeconomic, political, and administrative
Traditional and religious institutions serve as intermediary between citizens and their PMs because of their social stewardship in providing socioeconomic welfare (Patterson, 2015: 175; Ubink, 2008: 23; Chikadibia, 2005: 97). In absence of a publically funded welfare system, religious organizations serve as the primary caregivers in virtually all sub-Saharan African countries. This basic healthcare provision covers benign illnesses as well as deadliest pandemics such as HIV AIDS (Patterson, 2015: 178). Trinitapoli and Weinreb (2012) report that the key to understanding the decrease of HIV prevalence lies in getting traditional and religious institutions on the board of public health campaigns (4). Patterson (2015) adds that faith-based organizations provide roughly forty percent (40%) of all healthcare services and help solve other societal problems for which the state has little or no response in Sub-Saharan Africa (177). Beyond tragic pandemic diseases, religious actors and African traditional authorities help coordinate and mobilize communities to implement routine health projects or immunization in rural and urban areas. These actors also motivate rural folks in participating in local development projects such as building roads, communal areas (McCauley and Boadi, 2009:8).

Religious and traditional institutions are conduits to reach out to MP because they are instrumental in the building and maintaining of social peace in the community. The involvement of these institutions in peace-making activities are done at two levels in countries: First, in countries on verge of social turmoil, traditional and religious institutions intervene to mend crumbling national unity by organizing National Days of Prayer. However, Cooke (2015) notices that some religious or traditional institutions can abuse their position to muffle a legitimate claim in the name of a purported national unity (Cooke et.al 2015: 5). Second, in post-civil war situations, traditional and religious institutions are frequently called upon at the negotiation table to serve in many capacities: as simple witness, active participants, or a neutral third party and moral guarantee of
good faith in drafting peace settlements (Cooke et.al, Patterson, 2015). The roles of traditional and religious institutions play in resolving conflicts are not limited to peacebuilding at a nation level. In fact, it is at a community-level that these local authorities are routinely more trusted and impactful. In the Afrobarometer round 1 and 2, nearly 28% of Africans rely on traditional and religious institutions to settle disputes among different communities. This is three times higher than the 6.4% of those who choose the local courts to resolve conflicts. The recourse to traditional and religious authorities is more manifest in Botswana, where customary law and courts adjudicate nearly 80% of low levels criminal and civil cases (Shawn, 1998). Perhaps the trustworthiness of these institution contributes to holding them with in high esteem as well. In comparison to formal institutions, informal institutions (traditional and religious institutions) are perceived as more reliable and less corrupted.

The social utility of these institutions includes their administrative and political roles at local level as well. Whether formal state institutions exist or not at local level, it is here that traditional and religious institutions exert the most influence (Logan 2008, 2011; Ubink 2008). The involvement of traditional and religious institutions in local administration is more impactful in countries where this involvement is formally acknowledged like in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, and in Ghana. The extent of their power depends on contextual realities. Nonetheless, traditional authorities are known to complete the following tasks. They control local resources, land allocation, and environmental protections (Ubink, 2008; Logan, 2002, 2008, 2011; Ribot, 2000; Williams 2010). Scholars surmise that the devolution of these powers to local authorities are not benevolent. The state, or its representatives, purposefully leaves the micro-management of these complicated hot issues to traditional leaders at local level. The reason behind this concession is to let traditional leaders inevitably tarnish their reputations (Williams, 2010). Notwithstanding their
involvement in local administration, these institutions play crucial political roles locally as go-between and rallying force. As opinion leaders, traditional leaders are powerful tool of mobilization. For instance, religious actors led their flocks be at the forefront of democratic struggles in the 1990s in Kenya. They achieve this role because they galvanized masses and got their message recycled by their followers (Pauline Chang 2016). In short, the mechanism can be summarized as the picture below shows. A three-step causal process that starts with citizens, then the intermediary institutions and the MP at the end. I generate the following hypothesis from the above theory.

**Figure 3.1 Causal Mechanism linking citizens, intermediary institutions and MPs**

**Hypothesis**: In comparison to citizens’ contacts with formal institutions (party officials), citizens’ contacts with informal institutions predict a greater likelihood of contacting members to the parliament.
3.3 Research Design and Methodology

3.3.1 Data source

The data used to probe the causal relationship is specifically drawn from the Afrobarometer round 4. The Afrobarometer is a non-profit organization that conducts research on public opinion and attitudes of ordinary citizens in Africa. It records how ordinary people relate to democratic institutions in different countries. Its main themes include democracy, governance, rule of law, attitudes and behavior, and accountability.

3.3.2 Operationalization and variables

3.3.2.1 Dependent Variable: Contact with Members to Parliament.

The consistent presence of the question about contacts with one’s MP in every single round is a sign of the importance Afrobarometer surveyors attach to the constituent-representative relationship in Africa. In mature democracies, like the United States, direct contacts between citizens and their members of congress is in itself an enduring institution enshrined in the founding documents of the republic. The sheer volume of these contacts bears witness to citizens’ reliance on this venue to connect directly to their government despite the existence of alternative “linking institutions” (party, interest groups). According to Jacob R Strauss and Matthew Glassman (2016) of the Congressional Research Services, since 2011, nearly four hundred million of emails and twenty-two million of postal mails are sent every year to Congress (5). On the other hand, in every single country under investigation in this article, the rate of contact initiated by citizens to reach out to their legislative representative is very low. Less than two out of ten ordinary citizens ever initiate such a contact. The majority of these contacts are done face –to face. Although the question about writing to a representative is not asked in the Afrobarometer’s surveys, one can surmise from the very small size (0.1%) of the surveyed that write to a newspaper that no one writes to her MP.
3.3.2.2 Independent Variables: Contacts of Religious and traditional institutions

Contacting religious leaders is probably the most widespread human interactions Africans get involved in outside the realm of the family. The pervasive religiosity could be assumed to be a cause of the high rate of contact of religious leaders. In the survey, the Afrobarometer enumerates nearly 23 religious denominations. Countries vary in types of religious denominational predominance. For instance, Christians form a large majority in Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria the number of Christians and Muslims roughly distributed evenly. Because the goal of the article is not to gauge the individual effect of each religious denomination on political participation, no attempt will be made to engage in such endeavor. The goal instead is to evaluate the impact of contacting any religious institution on the likelihood of contacting members to the parliament. In the Afrobarometer, contact of religious institution takes on four ordinal values (Never = 0; only once=1; few times=2; often=3). For convenience, I recode this variable as a dichotomous variable by collapsing its values from 1 to 3 into 1. Another aspect related to religious affiliations is that 62% of those who claim a membership are actively involved in religious organizations either as leaders or active members. A cross tabulation reveals that 39% of these active members in religious institutions declare having contacted their MPs.

Contact with traditional authorities: Chikadibia Stanley (2005) defines traditional authorities as “individuals occupying communal and political leadership positions sanctified by cultural norms and values, and enjoying the legitimacy of particular communities to direct their affairs” (2). They can be seen as the most important agents of socialization in rural and urban areas (Ubink,2008:12). They occupy the space between families and the state and wield an impressive social control through the observance of customs- rules. They wear two hats: civil and religious.
The importance of these institutions is captured by Afrobarometer through the number of citizens who contact them on a daily basis. It is safe to assume that the presence of this question in every single of Afrobarometer’s surveys highlights the importance this social relationship in African communities. Responses are captured as an ordinal level variable measured in five crescendo scales from (0) to (4). Varying from one country to the other, responses rates reach the highest level in Lesotho (58%) and the lowest in Cape Verde (0%). Over the years, the contact of traditional leaders across the twenty countries remains at 30%. I transform this ordinal variable into a dichotomous variable by collapsing the three values of any contact (only once, a few times, and often) into one value (1), and I keep the value of never as (0).

**Voting:** Vote is par excellence the most direct connection between citizens and their elected officials. It gives the constituent the inherent right not only to contact but also to hold the elected official accountable. In addition, voting for a candidate gives citizens an added reason to contact those who hold an office. Despite being the less-information rich act, voting for or against an elected official signals a trust in the democratic process. In addition, voting for a candidate gives citizens an added reason to contact those who hold an office. In the Afrobarometer, the variable voted takes on seven nominal values. These values encapsulate a complex reality including citizens’ status about their voters’ registration, other structural barriers preventing them from voting, and their attitudes toward the vary act of voting. I transform the seven scale values into a dichotomous variable with 1=voted and 0= not voted all other options.

**Contact of party officials:** As voting is the *par excellence* the most direct individual dyadic connector between elected officials and citizens, party is the collective channel through which citizens with similar policy goals and ideology get together to achieve these goals. Schattschneider (1946) stated that modern democracy would not be conceivable without political parties. More than
any other linkage institutions, formal as well as informal, political parties theoretically are the best tool to aggregate and articulate citizens’ preferences. Furthermore, structurally, party should connect citizens directly to their members of parliament and the latter to their support base. As such, party should be the greatest predictor of contact with MPs.

**Control variables:** To establish a clear causal linkage between intermediary institutions and contact with MPs, I control for two sets of variables. The first set of controlled variables consists of individual level (demographic and socioeconomic) variables. The specified model includes education, age, residence, gender, and party identification. Because of the pervasiveness of low level of income, I capture individual economic situation with the variable gone without food. The second set of controlled variables comprises country-level variables (countries’ electoral systems and their gross domestic product per capita). I simplify the variable electoral system by transforming it into a dichotomous variable whereby 1= countries using single member district (SMD) system; and 0= all other electoral systems that are not SMD.

### 3.4 Results and Discussion

The goal of this chapter is to assess the extent to which intermediary institutions (traditional authorities and religious actors) conjointly and individually serve as linkage institutions that connects citizens to their members to parliament. The relationship to be measured is the simultaneous comparison of the strength of the linkages between formal institutions and MPs on one hand, and on the other hand, the strength of connection between the two informal institutions and MPs. I perform a multiple logistic regression in which I contrast the effects of contacting the two intermediary institutions on contacting MPs against that of contacting party officials, partisanship, and voting. These results hold after controlling for individual level variables (socioeconomic and demographic) as well as country levels variables (electoral system and gdp per
capita). In the table 2, the combined effect of the two primary independent variables, contact of religious institutions and contact of traditional authorities display a greater coefficient (4.31%). Substantively, nearly 4% of ordinary people who contact either one of these institutions are more likely to contact their MPs.

### Table 3.2 Results of the logistic regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Contact MP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined effects ATA +RI</strong></td>
<td>0.431***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Religious institutions</td>
<td>0.0231***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Traditional Authority</td>
<td>0.0201***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Party Officials</td>
<td>0.0057***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral rules</td>
<td>0.0227**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party id (closeness to party)</td>
<td>-0.0246***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gender</td>
<td>-0.0208***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP-capita</td>
<td>0.0139***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

ATA= African Traditional Authorities. RI= Religious Institutions.  
N= 21519. Log likelihood = -5694.6521. LR chi2(13) = 3113.23  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. Pseudo R2 = 0.2269 (***)= P-value = (000).

Contact of religious institutions. In this analysis, contacting religious institutions is a strong predictor of contacting MP (.0231) with a highly statistical significance (P-value=000 at 95% confidence interval). This means that those who contact their religious institutions are nearly 2.3% more likely to reach to their representatives than those who don’t. This finding is important when seen from the perspective of the high rate of contacts of religious institutions in Africa (on average
While contacting religious institutions comes out as a consistent indicator of contact of MPs, religious affiliations does not. This is understandable. Religious affiliations that captures the diversity or number of religious denominations is highly context-dependent. Membership in religious groups is not significative. This result echoes the findings of Manglos and Weinreb (2013) who found no individual difference in terms of participation among denominational groups (212). The present results also support Reid (2017) idea that contextual factors including local and national factors help shape the political behavior of religious members. She points to the difference in residence (rural or urban) as the driver of the difference in members’ political behavior. For instance, rural folks that are catholic behave differently from the urban catholic in Kenya and in Uganda (944). These heavily context-dependent factors explain why differences within and across denominations cancel out the impacts on participation, lending credence to the statistical result of no significance.

As theorized, contact of traditional authorities do serve as a mediating institution for citizens to contact their MPs. The results displayed in the table 2 show that this variable has a positive and statistically significant (0.201 with a P-value=000 at 95% confidence interval). Essentially, this means that citizens who frequently contact traditional authority have 2% more chance to reach out to their MPs than those who don’t. The relatively smaller coefficient of traditional authorities in comparison to religious institutions reflects their checkered history across the African continent. In a final analysis, it is perhaps important to point out that despite showing an attachment to these institutions, Africans do not request the clock of African political development to be turned back. Overwhelmingly, Africans reject a system of government conducted by traditional or religious rulers, one party rule, or military rule. Afrobarometer round 2
and 3 report that 89% prefer the democratic form of governance and reject all alternative forms of government that would supplant the democratic ones.

The inclusion of country-level variables yields two important findings. Firstly, as theorized by many scholars, electoral systems do impact representative-constituents relationship. In the table 2, the variable electoral rule (a dichotomous variable) impacts positively the contact with MPs (.022). In country with the electoral system of single member district, ordinary citizens have 2.27% chance to contact their MP than in countries with any other electoral system. Secondly, unlike the electoral system that has a positive coefficient, the country-level economic variable, the gross domestic product per capita impacts negatively contact with MPs (-013). This result too substantiates the conventional wisdom that low level of economic development hampers political participation. Unlike informal institutions that clearly impact positively bottom up communication from citizens to their representatives, formal institutions display different pictures. Starting with contact with party official, the coefficient is small but positive. This result is rather heartwarming for hopeful about democrats in Africa (scholars, citizens, and activists). Conversely, party id has a negative and statistically significant coefficient (-.024). Those who claim a partisanship are 2.4% less likely to contact their MPs). This result is alarming in the sense that it signals a disconnect between ordinary citizens affiliated to political parties and their awareness that parties exist to facilitate bottom up communication, among other functions. Unsurprisingly, neither voting nor residence has a bearing on whether or not citizens would contact their MPs.

In conclusion, democratic waves in Africa have brought in their wakes the rebirth of the most familiar and closest social organization ordinary Africans know: religious institutions and traditional authorities. For the last two decades, traditional authorities and religious institutions have known a revival across the continent. The Afrobarometer captures the importance of these
institutions by measuring how many ordinary citizens contact them. As shown in table 1 page 10 above, resurgence has occurred in virtually every single country irrespective of their colonial past. One can no longer dismiss these institutions as epiphenomena. If anything, their resurgence speaks volume about their socioeconomic relevance in ordinary people’s daily lives. Still, these institutions bear inherent non-democratic features such as the mode of selection, and sometimes their ruling principles shrouded in mysteries (Mattes, 1997). Furthermore, in many places these institutions carry a tarnished reputation for having collaborated with successive extra local powers (Mamdani 1996).

Thus, resurgence of these institutions raises a more pressing question about their fitness in the African democratic landscape. In response to this question, two camps have emerged. Recognizing the merits of each side, I have advocated a middle ground position like other eminent scholars (Bratton and Logan, Logan 2008, 2011). Yet, in this article, I go beyond mere speculation about the linkage role traditional authorities play in connecting ordinary people to formal institution to provide hard evidence about their role in constituent-representative relationship. Despite showing this tangible evidence, this investigation has some limitations. As mentioned previously, the scope of the present is limited to the 20 countries in the Afrobarometer. Another limitation is that the lack of data (qualitative and quantitative) on both African traditional authorities and religious institutions cut short a more exhaustive comparative among countries under investigation. Specifically, except in a limited number of countries where the status of institutions is clearly defined and formally recognized (Botswana, Burkina, Ghana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe), in many of them, the status is unclear (Benin, Cape Verde, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia). Future research would make a great theoretical contribution by focusing solely on each of these institutions and comparing them across countries.
4 CHAPTER IV: DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THEIR MPS.

4.1 Introduction

While the preceding chapters dealt with intermediary institutions (grassroots informal organizations and traditional authorities) that help citizens contact their Member of Parliament (MP), the current chapter focuses on direct contacts between individual citizens and their representatives. More specifically, it seeks to answer the following question: Under what conditions do citizens initiate a direct contact with their Member of Parliament (MP) in Africa? It argues that the key for citizens to directly contact their representatives lies in the attentiveness of the latter to their constituents. Attentiveness in this context refers to MP’s ability to listen to constituents’ concerns, opinions, and views. Specifically, attentiveness encompasses the perception that citizens have of their representative’s willingness to listen to their opinions, concerns, and preferences. In other words, citizens await a signal from their representative that she will respond to their initiative to contact. Put simply, citizens want their representative to display some levels of responsiveness. But the concept of responsiveness is a multidimensional one. For instance, there are policy responsiveness, responsive government, responsive party…etc. Each of these kinds of responsiveness is different one from the other and each is captured differently (Barabas, 2007:1-28). Fortunately, the conventional wisdom uses the concept of “listening to citizens” to capture responsiveness in its most basic meaning. In public opinion surveys, (Afrobarometer and American National Election Studies (ANES)), the instrument “representative listen” measures citizens’ perception that their government, or its representative, is responsive to them (Bratton et.al. 2005; Barabas, 2007, Shapiro and Page 2002, Wlezer and Soroka, 2010, Shapiro, 2011). Similarly, in this article, citizens’ perception of MPs’ listening ability will be used to capture constituents’ sense of
MP’s responsiveness. This responsiveness is hypothesized to motivate direct contact between citizens and their MPs.

However, the very topic of direct, person to person, contacts between elected officials and constituents in Africa is subject of heated debates among scholars. Two particular debates are germane to the research question above. The first disagreement is about whether individual characteristics are the leading causes of political participation before contextual variables. The second dispute has to do with factors that motivate citizens to initiate direct contacts with their elected officials. Are citizens motivated to initiate these direct contacts (dyadic) for clientelistic reasons, or they are motivated by a need to have a genuine political connection with their government?

The debate about the motivations of dyadic relationships between MP-and citizens divide scholars into two camps. On the one hand, Lindberg (2003), Morrison and Lindberg (2009) describe the person to person interactions between MPs and voters as essentially clientelistic (101). Taking their cues from African MPs’ perceptions of their constituents’ demands, these authors characterize the dyadic MP-constituent relationships as the ones in which MPs provide private goods in order to buy out voters’ political support (124). On the other hand, Barkan (1974,1978, 2009), Mattes, Mozzaaffar, and Barkan (2014), Mattes and Mozzaaffar (2016), and Young (2009), reject this one-sided characterization. For Barkan and colleagues, any description of constituent-representative relationships in Africa needs to take into account the views of constituents as well. In multiple studies, Mattes, Mozzaaffar (2016) and others show that MPs misconstrue the needs of their constituents. According to these authors, citizens expect more their MPs to listen to them and to provide collective goods than private goods (202). Where does this investigation stand on these issues?
First, the nature of direct interactions between elected officials and their constituents, I contend that direct dyadic relationships are not driven by clientelistic reasons. Rather, contacts emanating from citizens toward their representatives are caused by MPs’ ability to listen to their constituents. Underneath this observable causal relationship between citizens’ perception of their MPs’ ability to listen and their motivation to contact lies citizens’ political efficacy. Political efficacy behaves as an intervening variable in the causal connection between citizens’ perception of their MP’s listening ability and their initiative to reach out to her. An intervening variable is defined as a variable that influences the causal relationship explored but external to both the independent and the dependent variables (Tolman, 1938; Kaur, 2013:37). As an intervening variable, a citizen’s political efficacy serves as a catalyst for citizens to directly contact their MP. In other words, due to the pervasiveness of political apathy in nascent democracies, elected officials have to make the first move and send a signal to each individual constituent that her efforts to contact her representative will not be vain. Because Afrobarometer surveys capture the variable political efficacy separately, I include it as distinct variable in the model specified. Furthermore, I maintain that dyadic contacts between citizens and their MPs serve the fundamental role of building a political bond that so sadly lacks between the state and the society in Africa (Migdal, 1988; Herbst, 2000; Bratton et.al., 2005; Barkan, 2014). Relatedly, on the second debate, I argue that among causes that are purported to motivate citizens to contact their representative, MPs listening ability (an exogenous factor) carries a greater predictive power than individual level variables or country level variables. That is, citizens would contact their MPs only if they have the perception that their MPs would listen to them. I substantiate these claims quantitatively using data from the Afrobarometer Round 3. A preliminary quantitative exploration supports my arguments. Using probit regressions, the results show that the effect of the variable MPs listening has a far greater
marginal effect than that of education, party closeness, and even electoral participation (voting). The positive coefficient is highly statistically significant with a magnitude of .209. As theorized, political efficacy makes a consistent show; its coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant (.105). These results are in line with several studies on political participation in Africa where the conventional variables such as social economic status variables and demographics variables consistently make a poor show (Bratton et al. 2005; Logan, 2002, 2008, 2011; Croke et al. 2015).

4.1.1 The Research Design

The main outcome variable is the rate of contacts emanating from citizens to their member of parliament (MP). The primary explanatory variable is citizen’s perception of MPs’ ability to listen to them. Although the approach is primarily quantitative, part of the argument is substantiated by the narrative (qualitative) from both the American politics literature and the African politics literature. The scope of the chapter covers the 18 Sub Saharan countries that are listed in the Afrobarometer Round 3 including: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Although some findings from the analysis can be applied to the Sub Saharan Africa region, (level of education, low political efficacy and low level of contacts between ordinary citizens and their MPs), theoretical and empirical inferences from the results are strictly limited to countries covered by the survey.

This article makes at least two important contributions to the literature. First, the article contributes to the debate of whether or not dyadic, direct contacts between citizens and their MPs are motivated uniquely by private goods delivery (clientelism). It shows that clientelistic inclination is not the primary motivating factor to get in touch with ones’ MP. The investigation suggests that
in countries with a history of political repression, dyadic relationships help to build a bond that makes citizens take ownership in their political system. It argues that such a bond must be initiated by the elite toward ordinary citizens. In the constituent-representative relationship in new democracy, the onus of contacts from ordinary citizens to their representatives rests on the MPs. This may sound counterintuitive in the sense that the conventional wisdom expects citizens to pressure their governing bodies in order to obtain responses (Wlezer and Soroka, 2010; Easton, 1965; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, 1995). In mature democracies, government responsiveness is reactive to public demands; in burgeoning democracies, due to a legacy or ongoing repressions of civil and political rights, governing bodies must send a signal that they are willing to hear citizens’ demand before citizens get involved. The second contribution is to add to the theory of participation that contextual factors are not to be neglected. Especially, when citizens are weakly attached to their government through formal institutions, contextual exogenous factors such as an MP’s listening can help energize citizens to initiate contact with their representative. To conduct the investigation of this topic, I structure the article in four sections. The first section has introduced the article and has framed it. In the second section, I present briefly the two opposing positions. The third section draws from the two literatures (American politics and African Politics) to build the central argument of the article. The fourth section outlines the methodological approach, provides results, and discusses the evidence that supports the theory.

4.2 Theoretical Debates About Dyadic Relationships in Africa

In this section, I briefly present the arguments on both sides of the issue on the nature of dyadic political interactions in Africa. The person to person or face-to face dyadic political interactions in Africa between citizens and their representatives are seen from two opposite perspectives. The first perspective is that dyadic, person to person political interactions, specifically
between MPs and their constituents, are clientelistic in Africa (Lindberg, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2010; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2009). These authors see MP-citizens’ interaction as the mirror of patron client relationships. The second perspective posits that the MPs misconstrue the demands of their constituents (Young, 2009; Barkan, 1974, 1978; Bratton et al., 2005; Mozzaﬀar and Mattes, 2016).

Contacts are not clientelistic in the sense that when citizens initiate contacts to with their representatives, they do so not for private good provision but for collective goods. In addition, dyadic interactions between citizens and their representatives contribute to the building of normal political bond between citizens and their government through their representatives (Young, 2009; Barkan, 1974, 1978; Bratton, Mozzaﬀar and Mattes 2016).

4.2.1 Dyadic, Person to Person, Interactions Between Citizens and MPs are essentially Clientelistic

Lindberg’s scholarly work on MP-constituent clientelistic relationship covers several aspects of this relationship. Spanning over nearly two decades, the work focuses on clientelistic behavior at personal and institutional levels. For instance, in his 2010 piece, Lindberg examines sources of pressure on elected ofﬁcials, speciﬁcities of African institutional features that make them vulnerable to clientelistic behavior, and vote buying. Through interviews of MPs in Ghana and serious data gathering processes, Lindberg enumerates four sources of pressures that force MPs into clientelistic interactions with their constituents. MPs disclose to Lindberg that personal assistance comes ﬁrst followed by family issues, traditional, and religious leaders’ demands for a favor. Civil society networks exert the least pressure (117-142). Lindberg notices that, although the institution of which MPs are a part is relatively a strong institution in Ghana, some of its features and its societal perceptions nurture MPs’ clientelistic linkage to citizens. Lindberg uncovers that a combination of African political history and the way Ghanaian people perceive their MPs expose
MPs to clientelistic interactions with their constituents. For instance, MPs tell Lindberg that they are seen in their districts as the wealthiest people whose fortune has accrued with their political positions. A case in point is that MPs are considered as the proverbial “head of family” who are expected to resolve everyone’s personal problems (127). MPs explain to Lindberg that these societal perceptions raise citizens’ expectations about MPs’ capability to provide private goods (123). According to MPs, these expectations soar during electoral periods. Such first-hand testimonies have led Lindsberg (2003) to write “patron-client relations are primarily about providing material resources in exchange for personal loyalty, whereby elected officials (the patrons) deliver private goods in forms of assistance for school fees, electricity and water bills, funeral and wedding expenses; or distributing cutlasses and other tools for agriculture, or even handing of ‘chop-money’ (small cash sums) to constituents” (123-4). Several non-qualitative sources have come to the same conclusions in developing countries. However, other scholars reject the description above.

4.2.2 MPs Misconstrue their Constituents’ Demands in Africa

Focusing specifically on the MP-constituent’s relationships, a group of scholars challenge the characterization of the dyadic contacts between citizens and their MPs as fundamentally clientelistic. They do so on the ground that this claim does not take into consideration the views of ordinary citizens. First, these scholars question the depiction of MP-constituent relationship as clientelistic because MPs misinterpret the need of their constituents. For Barkan and Okumu 1974, Barkan and Mattes (2014), Mattes and Mozzaifar (2016), MPs’ picture of citizens’ expectation is inaccurate. Therefore, any portrayal of the MP-constituent relationship that is solely based on MPs’ perspectives projects an incomplete painting (5). Barkan and Mattes (2014) observe that MPs’ are right for the wrong reason. For instance, MPs agree with citizens that constituency services are a
key factor in the representative–constituent relationship. However, they misunderstand what kind of constituency services citizens need. While citizens prioritize collective goods in forms of community development, MPs wrongly assume that citizens are requesting primarily personal assistance (10). According to Barkan and Mattes (2014), Mattes and Mozzaffar (2016), MPs misjudge constituents’ demands when it comes to the nature of goods (whether they need private or collective goods). Most MPs in the interviews with Lindberg declare that citizens prefer private goods. However, in the African Legislative Project and in successive Afrobarometer surveys, citizens state just the opposite. For instance, in the Afrobarometer round 4, more than half of citizens (53%) declare that they prefer collective goods (204). This preference for collective goods is reinforced by the reasons for which they contact their MPs. According to the Afrobarometer Round 3, only 29% of those who dare to meet their MPs do it for private or personal reasons (Afrobarometer online analysis, www.Afrobarometer.org August 14, 2018). The overwhelming majority contact their elected officials for community reasons. In the same vein, when asked about their preference among the four legislative functions of their MPs (oversight, law making, constituency services, and representatives), citizens rank the representative roles of their MPs as their number one choice. Ordinary people expect their MPs to fulfill their representative roles more than any other roles (Mattes Mozzaffar (2016:205). These representative roles involve MPs’ linking functions, including staying in touch with voters, visiting the district as much as possible, and, more importantly, listening to their constituents. For instance, in the Afrobarometer Round 4 survey, 45% of citizens consider listening and conveying their views to the national stage as the most important role of MPs (Barkan and Mattes, 2014:11). Young (2009) corroborates these facts in his study on voting behavior in Kenya and Zambia. He finds that MPs’ linking function is more important than a political role in the eyes of the constituents. Keeping in touch with constituents meet their social
needs and make constituents feel worthy socially (12). When voters feel that they matter, this can trigger a legitimate political support. Young (2009) demonstrates that it is the MPs’ visits in their districts that cause electoral support in Kenya and in Zambia; not private goods delivery (5). Young (2009)’s results echo citizens’ frustration that their MPs are too busy with their own issues to care about ordinary people (6). In sum, the dispute about whether dyadic interactions between citizens and their members of Parliaments is at a standstill. An appropriate way to further the debate is to provide theoretical and empirical evidence that direct interactions between individual citizens and their MP are more nuanced than they appear. In the following section, I make my contribution to the debate by taking a stance on the present debate.

4.3 Theory

Under what conditions would citizens’ initiative direct contacts with their MPs? I argue that direct contacts between citizens and their MPs are caused by MP’s ability to listen (attentiveness) than by citizens’ individual characteristics or by clientelistic enticements. Social economic status, civic voluntarism, and other state level variables are not sufficient causes for participation. Due to a low political efficacy, the motivation to participate originates from an exogenous factor, but that exogenous factor is definitely not private goods delivery. It is the MPs’ ability to be attentive to their constituents, to listen to them. This argument consists of two sub-arguments. First, contact is not motivated by clientelism; second, contact is primarily caused by an exogenous factor: MPs’ ability to listen. I substantiate each sub-argument in two steps. In the first steps, I draw from the existing literature to build the narrative that supports the claim. The second step uses a quantitative approach to evaluate the stated hypothesis generated from the theory.
4.3.1 \textit{Dyadic contacts serve to build a political bond between representatives and constituents.}

Before going any farther, it is important to acknowledge that the topic of clientelism is broad and multifaceted. Its conceptual definition continues to spike controversies among scholars. These controversies will be avoided here. What matters to the present article is that at its core, clientelism is an abnormal political linkage between office holders and citizens. It involves an exchange between a politician and a citizen whereby the former provides a material benefit for a political support from the latter (Kitschelt 2000, 2002, 2007). Transparency International, a credible organization, demonstrates that clientelism, bribery, corruption, and their variants are pervasive in the sector of public administration in new democracies, especially in Africa. In addition, it is undeniable that African political development has gone through steps from authoritarianism, single party hegemony, and electoral democracy that favor such abnormal democratic linkages. For instance, van de Wall (2001) shows that in Africa, political authority is not based on interactions between equal citizens or on the agent and principle relationship whereby the governors are the agents and citizens are the principles. It is the other way around wherein the governors dominate the governed based on patron client-client relationships: “political authority in Africa is based on the giving and granting of favors, in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that go from the village level to the highest reaches of the central state” (van de Walle 2001: 51). Furthermore, the limitation of resources play a catalyst role. As Young and Turner (1985) note, the limited access to resources leads power holders to cultivate an environment where they reward insiders: “As authoritarian rulers controlled access to office, neo-patrimonialism [is] a system where politicians are given jobs in exchange for service to the ruler” (25). In short, from the perspective of everyday bribery in public service sector and public administration, Lindberg (2010)’s description is accurate. However, Bratton and van de Walle have shown also that clientelism is limited to the upper rungs
of elite and their entourage (Bratton et.al 2005: 303). The overwhelming majority of the ordinary people are not involved in it. In the same token, the claim made here centers on interactions between ordinary people (constituents) and their MPs. Specifically, it is about what motivates ordinary citizens to contact their elected officials, not public administration workers or service providers. To further demonstrate that clientelism is not what motivates citizens to contact their MPs, I compare citizens’ expectations and representatives’ responses in the United States and in Africa. In this analogy, I use the strong connection between representatives and their constituents in the United States as the benchmark to show that dyadic contact is a key in representative–constituent relationship: it continues to be at the heart of political communication; it serves to strengthen the political bond between representatives and their constituents; it is one of the yardsticks constituents use to measure representative performance; and it defines representation styles.

Direct dyadic contacts are at the heart of political communication in old as well as in new democracies. In the United States of America, direct contacts between Members of Congress (MC) and their constituents are embedded in the founding documents and in the American political culture. Taking its origin from the Magna Carta, contacts between legislators and their constituents are so important to the American political process that they are constitutionally protected rights. These political interactions are captured by the right to petition the government. As one of the five parts of the First Amendment, the petition clause, as it is called, stipulates that “people have the right to appeal to the government in favor of or against policies that affect them or on which they feel strongly” (Quoted from Elisia Hahnenberg Copley First Amendment Center). This clause gives citizens the right to contact their government without fear and for any reasons they deem worthy. They do so either through person-to-person or through intermediary institutions (interest groups, political parties, civil society organizations). Contact
between citizens and their representatives is also stressed in Federalist Paper #51 (1788), another founding document of the Republic. Madison explains that the very rational of the shorter term for the members of the House of the Representatives is to keep them (MC) connected to their constituencies. (The term of members of the House of Representatives to the US Congress is two years. This term is shorter than senators’ six-year term). Promoting contacts from individual citizens to their representatives is an article of faith to which all members of congress pledge (Kurtz, 1997). According to Straus and Glassman (2016), representatives have kept such pledge by encouraging citizens to reach out to them through franking since the late 1600s (3). Franking is the right to send or receive a written communication from or to the constituency. To this day, it is one of the best tools to keep the two-way communication (2). Lipinski (2002) quotes Thomas Jefferson as having said that “Members of Congress have both a right and a duty to communicate with their constituents” (38). Another way to look at the importance of contacts is through the weight of participation in the American political process highlighted by Jefferson: “We in America do not have a government by majority. We have a government by the majority of those who participate [i.e., those who contact their governing bodies]. In short, continual interactions between citizens and their government are the core of the American political culture.

Permanent contacts between Members of Congress and their constituents have created and strengthened the social and political bond throughout the different stages of the US political development. From the early years of the Republic to the latest 21 centuries, different stake holders (MC and constituents) have strived to stay connected through dyadic contacts. In the beginning, MC made tour of their district on a horseback chatting and garnering opinions, complaints, or just bringing in some news to faraway constituents (Davidson et al. 2014:28). As the district population increased, members of Congress kept the pace with the growth of the population from 1800s to the
early 1920s. One way Congress kept the pace with the growth of the population was to increase the number of Congressional seats. For instance, in 1776 congress started with 65 seats. This number of seats steadily grew until 1911, when it was set at its current number of 435 (Davidson et al. 2014:34; Eckman and Petersen, 2017: 5). Moreover, the increase of the district population has never been the same everywhere. It has varied widely. An illustration of these variations is the comparison of Las Vegas (the largest Congressional district with more than 1.3 million of constituents) with the one seat district in Wyoming with barely 500,000 voters (Davidson et al. 2014:28).

Permanent contacts between Members of Congress and their constituents have created and strengthened the social and political bond throughout the different stages of the US political development. From the early years of the Republic to the latest 21 centuries, different stake holders (MC and constituents) have strived to stay connected through dyadic contacts. In the beginning, MC made tour of their district on a horseback chatting and garnering opinions, complaints, or just bringing in some news to faraway constituents (Davidson et al. 2014:28). As the district population increased, members of Congress kept the pace with the growth of the population from 1800s to the early 1920s. One way Congress kept the pace with the growth of the population was to increase the number of Congressional seats. For instance, in 1776 congress started with 65 seats. This number of seats steadily grew until 1911, when it was set at its current number of 435 (Davidson et al. 2014:34; Eckman and Petersen, 2017: 5). Moreover, the increase of the district population has never been the same everywhere. It has varied widely. An illustration of these variations is the comparison of Las Vegas (the largest Congressional district with more than 1.3 million of constituents) with the one seat district in Wyoming with barely 500,000 voters (Davidson et al. 2014:28). More importantly, the point of this historical anecdote is to highlight the fact that despite this population growth, citizens and their representatives have stayed connected through continuous contacts.
Members of Congress have expanded their manpower in their home districts to strengthen this bond with their constituents. For instance, members of the House of Representatives are allowed 18 full-time and 4 part-time congressional assistants. Senators have no limitations on the number they can hire. Currently, the numbers vary from 13 to 71 congressional assistants (Davidson, et.al 2014:147). New technology has helped also enrich this bond. A case in point is the volume of email emanating from citizens to their member of congress. According to the Congressional Management Foundation (2011) members of Congress and their staffers respond to all the 400,000,000 emails citizens send to Congress on a yearly basis (15). They respond to each and every single message with at most a delay of two-weeks (15). Such permanent constituent-representative contacts have made individual citizens have a stronger connection with their representatives.

Although less systematized in Africa, dyadic contacts remain ordinary citizens’ preferred vehicle of interaction for a number of reasons. First, the majority of ordinary citizens favor direct democracy (Bratton et.al 2005: 244). Although less systematized in Africa, dyadic contacts remain ordinary citizens’ preferred vehicle of interaction for a number of reasons. First, the majority of ordinary citizens favor direct democracy (Bratton et.al 2005: 244). They view democratic process primarily as continuous and normal person to person interactions whereby everyone gets to express their views unlike the one they live in, where they only get to interact passively and sporadically with government (Bratton et.al.2005). The abysmal rate of political participation during interelection periods in Africa confirm these observations (Bratton et.al 2005: 151). Secondly, high levels of illiteracy make face-to-face, dyadic interactions the most likely method of communication. The majority of ordinary citizens (65%) in Africa continue to live in rural areas and have no access to formal education (Grossman et.al 2014: 34). According to African library project, nearly one out of every two Africans suffer from illiteracy (www.Africanlibraryproject.org). In such a context,
face-to-face interactions become the surest way to convey one’s views and concerns. Thirdly, dyadic contact is also rooted in African tradition. Bratton indicates “people seem to expect face to face relationship with their representatives in which they can make oral demands in person” (303). Whether literate or not, African oral tradition makes the face-to-face interaction the primary channel of interpersonal communication.

Contact is also one of the most used yardsticks citizens use to measure representative’s performance in the USA as in Africa. When asked about what they would like to see their representatives most do, constituents everywhere favor proximity of and the accessibility to their elected officials (Fenno, 1978; Rosner, 2007; Barkan, 1974, 1978; Mattes and Mozzaffar, 2016). In the US, permanent contacts between representatives and constituents have built a strong political bond to the point that citizens refer to their member of Congress as “my representative so and so.” (Davidson et.al. 2014; Ansolabehere and. Jones, 2012:295-314). This bond has different names by different political scientists. While Mayhew (1974) calls, this bond the “Electoral connection”, Fenno (1978) names it “Home Style” (2). Fenno defines home style as the way members of Congress go by to achieve their three main goals: “presentation of self, explanation of Washington activities, and resources allocation” (15). The purpose of the “Home Style” is to build a trust relationship between the representative and the different circles of his constituencies. At the heart of the home style Fenno points to “the presentation of self” (54). This is the moment where the member of Congress conveys to her constituents that “I am one of you” (58). She achieves this presentation of self by opening wide her arms and becoming accessible to every single one of her constituents. Fenno maintains that the way members of congress have cultivated this bond has created two types of Home Styles: The Home Style that is “person-intensive” and the Home Style that is “policy-oriented” (34). In his book, Congress at Grassroots, Fenno (2003) writes that person to person
home style consists of interacting and knowing constituents at personal level, spending times with them, sharing their identity, and most importantly, being fully accessible to them (13). While Jack Flynt of Georgia’s 7th Congressional district exemplifies the person-intensified home style, Mc Collins of Georgia’s 8th Congressional district epitomizes the policy-focused style. Fenno (2003) explains that in policy-oriented home style, members of Congress do no cultivate a person-to-person bond, but instead share strong policy views with their constituents. It is important to point out that some members of Congress (MCs) combine the two styles in order to win the trust and the votes of their constituents. In final analysis, whether policy-focused or person-focused, dyadic contacts is the consistent vehicle of connection between members of congress and their constituents (Fenno, 1978, 2000, 2003).

Similarly, in Africa, person-to-person interactions are constituents’ preferred way to communicate with their MPs. Voters in Africa prize proximity and accessibility like their counterparts in the United States. Africans like Americans desire attentiveness from their representatives. In reality, though, citizens are left wanting the attentiveness of their representatives in Africa. For instance, 85% of citizens surveyed in Afrobarometer Round3 complain that no one pays attention to them between election. To the chagrin of ordinary Africans, the only time someone pays attention to them is during campaigns and electoral periods. Frustrated, a citizen in Tanzania complains that “politicians treat us like matchstick, once they light their cigarettes, they throw us like a garbage” (Bratton et.al 2005:138). On the other hand, constituents give higher performance ratings to any representative who puts in the effort to be accessible or visits her constituents. Also, citizens prefer representatives who live in the same local area to carpet baggers (candidates without local attachment who are imposed upon local residents from the capital cities). Bratton et.al 2005 explain that ordinary African resent particularly such pervasive practices because they feel
disrespected and exploited for electoral reasons (Bratton et al. 2005: 241). Ordinary people in Africa “value a share sense of identity based on a common place of origin for it is widely felt that only residents have an authentic appreciation for the problems of the hometown” (Bratton et al. 2005: 243). In a sense, African constituents yearn to see their MPs showcase what Fenno calls “I am one of you” (Fenno 1978: 55) as MC in the US do.

More concretely, direct contacts are the channel through which constituency service is done. Representatives everywhere rank constituency service as the most gratifying aspect of their role. In the United States, constituency service is termed “casework” (Davidson et al. 2014: 143). In the Congressional Research Service’s article, Eckman and Petersen (2017) define casework as “the responses or services that members of Congress provide to constituents who request their assistance” (2). According to the authors, casework is a tradition that traces its roots to the early years of the Republic practices (12). This tradition is so crucial in the constituent-representative relationship that it was codified in the legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (Davidson et al. 2014: 150). The codification made “de facto hiring of casework manager in Congress members’ offices” (reference). This codification has allowed citizens to expand the reasons for which citizens initiate direct contacts with their MC in their home districts or in Washington DC. Davidson et al. (2014: 131-155) report that a survey of 80% of Congress members reveal that when citizens reach out to their MC, they usually make contact for one or several of the following reasons: to express views or obtain information on a pending or already decided legislative issue; to obtain a job; regarding social security benefits, unemployment compensation or veteran benefits; regarding military cases (e.g., transfers, discharges, personal hardship); regarding tax issues; regarding legal immigration; to obtain government publications; or regarding flags that have flown on the Capital Hill (143). Yet not everyone appreciates casework. Some think that it has taken the bulk of the most precious
resource a MC has: time. Those who object to the preponderance of casework call it “constituent errand running” (Davidson et. al 2014: 32). Nevertheless, like in the US, ordinary Africans yearn for an effective constituency service delivered by their MPs. When asked in opinion surveys about the most important duty of a representative, ordinary citizens rank MP responsibility as follows: eighty to ninety percent want their representative to listen to them. Ordinary citizens perceive MPs’s willingness to listen to them as concrete manifestation of MPs’ efforts to meet citizens’ expectations (Afrobarometer Round 3 and Round 4). According to Mattes and Mozzaffar (2016), a breakdown of these expectations indicates that “27% of ordinary citizens want representatives to bring development assistance in the district, 26% for infrastructure development, educational and health issues, 25% job related help 15% agriculture and food assistance covers less than 10%. Remarkably, only 8% ask for personal assistance” (207).

4.3.2  **MPs’ ability to Listen, an Exogenous factor, is the driver of Citizen-MP Contacts**

The claim in the preceding sub-argument is that clientelistic motivation has little to do with the reason behind citizens’ initiative to contact their MP. What then prompts citizens to do so? I argue that in the particular African context, MP’s listening (responsiveness) has a greater effect on causing people to contact their representatives than all other known individual factors of political participation including social economic characteristics and system level variables. Put another way, in Africa, although the conventional wisdom suggests participation is based on SES, civic voluntarism and cognitive abilities, the way to increase citizens’ direct contacts with their MPs is to have their MPs reach out first to their constituents. MPs’ ability to listen motivates citizens to contact their elected officials because their attentiveness boosts citizens’ sense of political efficacy, which enhances political participation.
I maintain that MPs listening is the driving force of citizens’ contact because it signals to constituents that their efforts to contact their representative will not be vain. Once they get the impression that they will be heeded, citizens become motivated to initiate contact. This argument sounds counterintuitive. In the normal course of actions, one would assume that individual characteristics would be the leading causal factors to contact MPs. However, that is not the case in the bourgeoning democracies where political violence, abuse of power and low system responsiveness have fostered low political efficacy and skepticism toward the state (Bratton and Logan 2006; Grossman et.al, 2014; Coleman, 1991). The argument posits that in the African political context, it is only when the authority literally extends welcoming arms that citizens will feel safe and invited to initiate a contact. Thus, the causal mechanism of the central argument consists of two logical steps. First, when MPs open up, they send a signal to citizens that they are welcome to be contacted in the future. In short, MPs’ listening ability boosts citizens’ political efficacy. Several scholars have shown this well-established relationship in the literature (Cho, 2010; Bratton, Grossman et.al 2014, 2016). The second step is that once they feel welcomed, this makes citizens believe that their voice matters and subsequently motivates them to initiate a contact with their elected officials. Put simply, their sense of being listened to (political efficacy) triggers their participation (Clarke and Ackoc,1989 Finkel,1985; Mohler, 2004; Brady Verba, Scholzman,1995; Bratton et.al 2005).

MPs’ opening up boosts citizens’ political efficacy because constituents rate MP’s performance by the way the MP shows genuine interest in them. Davis and Coleman (1976) found this relationship in a study conducted among Blacks in the United States. They concluded that citizens’ perception of government responsiveness tends to depend on the extent to which the government allows citizens to have their input in the policy process (David and Coleman,1976;
Similarly, in Africa, ordinary people evaluate their worth in the eyes of the political system by the way government officials allow them to have their say. In ranking their MPs’ role expectations, 45% of ordinary people put MPs’ listening to them as the number one expectation (Afrobarometer Round 4). Moreover, MPs’ listening ability boosts citizens’ sense of efficacy because constituents assess their representative performance rating based on MPs’ ability to listen to constituents (Bratton et.al 2005: 303). Across the eighteen countries surveyed in this article, citizens connect representatives’ performance to how their MP shows her interest in their well-being. Citizens who think that MPs are “interested in what happens to you” and “are hearing what people like you think” are very much more likely to approve of their MP’s performance. Bratton et.al 2005 point out, “because responsive representative gain higher performance evaluation, it seems that MPs can gain considerable credit by simply making themselves available to lend an ear to their constituents” (244). Grossman et.al confirm this boosting effect of political efficacy by MPs’ availability to pay attention to citizens. In Grossman et.al.2016’s experimental study, the treatment effect is the phone calls MPs place to citizens named individually. Grossman et al. find that these calls boost citizens’ self-worth and drive substantial increase in their participation rate. They interpret these results as a vivid expression of the action of an exogenous factor on political participation in a low political efficacy context (Grossman et.al 2014, 2016). As Bratton et al. 2005 conclude, “a little bit of responsiveness goes a long way in Africa in closing the gap between MPs and their constituents” (243). In other words, MPs attentiveness would increase citizens’ political efficacy, which prompts her to get involved.

Of the many indicators of general political attitudes developed in the 1950s, sense of political efficacy is the one indicator that is the most theoretically important and frequently used. Political efficacy was initially defined as “the feeling that individual political action does have or
can have an impact on the political process” (Craig and Maggiato, 1982:86). Following Lane in 1959, scholars in 1970s came to recognize that political efficacy contains at least two separate components: internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to citizens’ beliefs about their personal competence to understand and participate effectively in politics (Finkel 1985). It is an attitude, a perception that one possesses what it takes, the necessary wherewithal, resources and skills to influence a political representative or a political process. Internal political efficacy is a cognitive trait that connects attitude to behavior. It precedes behavior and justifies it (Clarke and Ackock, 1991). Furthermore, psychologists have found it to be highly context dependent and tied to political socialization. Hence ordinary people having undergone a series of political abuses internalize a negative outlook of their political system. The external efficacy is more outwardly oriented. It is the perception that representative or the system is responsive to one’s effort to exert influence (Miller, Miller and Schneider, 1980, 273). Although there is an analytical distinction between external and internal efficacy, scholars agree that the two attitudes are closely related and feed into each other (Finkel 1989: 83). As Grossman et. al. (2016) put it, “at its heart, the concept of political efficacy assumes that “an extrinsic motivation underlies a decision to engage the political system” (1331). For this reason, internal and external efficacy will be combined to express citizens’ belief in herself to get response from government.

Political efficacy is inherently low in the eighteen African countries covered in this article due to their patterns of political socialization. Shapiro (2004) attribute the low level of basic democratic orientation to internalization of the pervasive non-democratic values during citizens’ formative years: “Many citizens in emerging democracies have been socialized into non-democratic values and they are hardly able to develop basic orientations and practices in those who are in the formative years” (Novy and Katrinak 2015:2). Grossman et al. (2016) corroborate this. They claim
that general political context and practices also contribute in lowering citizens’ beliefs that it is worth getting involved or contacting a political figure: “In many developing countries, low competitions, widespread corruption and political abuse have turned citizens into political skeptics (1331). They have learned that their actions make no difference (Lieberman, Posner and Tsai, 2014; Novy and Katinak, 2015: 3). Furthermore, a host of contextual factors have damaged ordinary citizens’ sense of political efficacy in these countries. The history of authoritarianism, legacy of colonial practices, followed by decades of single party rules and military dictatorships, civil wars, and rigged elections take their toll on citizens’ positive belief in their political systems. Scholars have also demonstrated that if and when government chooses to be responsive, those at the helm are selective in that they only reward “insiders” and ignore their critics and other outsiders (Bratton et.al.2005: 304). At individual level, the widespread low level of literacy combined with the deliberate disengagement of the highly-educated contribute to lowering political efficacy (Croke et.al 2015). The accumulation of all the above reasons sheds a light on the causes of a low level of political efficacy causing ordinary citizens to feel rather estranged from their own political community. As a result, in order to boost participation, African citizens need an exogenous and somehow an instrumental factor. From the above theory, I generate the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis I: In countries where citizens have a low sense of political efficacy, MPs’ attentiveness has a far more causal effect on citizens’ initiative to contact them than individual or and country level factors (e.g., GDP or electoral rules).

4.4 Research Design and Methodology

Establishing clear causal paths between social phenomena is the overarching goal of social science investigations. Social scientists use four approaches to identify causal determinants:
quantitative, qualitative, experimental, and formal theory. The present article uses the quantitative approach to provide empirical evidence for the central argument, which states that MPs’ listening ability has a greater predictive power than any individual or country level variables purported to motivate citizens to contact their MPs. I adopt a two-step analytical strategy to conduct this investigation. In the first step, I list the variables involved and elaborate on how they are measured (operationalization). The second step consists of the model specification, statistical procedures and the results.

4.4.1 Data source

The data used in this study comes from the Afrobarometer survey database. Specifically, I use the Afrobarometer survey round 3 that was taken between 2005 and 2006. The sample units consist of 18 Sub-Saharan countries including: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, Uganda, Senegal South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The rationale of choosing this dataset lies in the fact that it is arguably one of the most prominent topics related to the constituent-representative relationship. In addition to having commonly asked behavioral questions, the Afrobarometer round 3 touches on topics specific to citizens-representative connections that are highly relevant to the relationship explored in this article. For instance, it asks questions about citizens’ expectations regarding MPs’ roles, MPs’ visits, vote buying, and MP’s ability to listen to their constituents. The Afrobarometer is a research-based organization that focusses on public opinion and attitude in Africa. To my knowledge, it is the only research-based organization that records ordinary people’s views on democracy, governance, political participation, institutional performance and democratic accountability. In this research design, citizens’ contact of Members of parliament is the outcome variable and the MPs’ listening ability is the primary independent variable. To these two key variables, I add a number of
alternative or control variables at the micro level, meso level and macro level (e.g., \textit{gdp per capita} and \textit{electoral rules}).

\subsection*{4.4.2 Operationalization}

\textbf{Dependent Variables}: Citizens ’contacts of their Member of Parliament (\textit{contact MP}). The act of contacting an elected official or government agency, local or national, (\textit{contact MP}) is one of the four broad types of conventional political participation listed by Brady, Schlozman, and Verba in their book \textit{Voice and Equality} (1995: 88). The other three participatory types are \textit{electoral activities} (campaign work, giving money, and voting), \textit{protest} (local and national), and \textit{community activities} (membership and activity in informal organizations as well as formal organizations such as Parent-Teacher Association). According to the authors, contact is the most informative participatory act that serves to communicate citizens’ views and needs to government (55). As such, the rates of contacts between citizens and their representatives become one of the yardsticks to measure the levels of state-society interactions. In mature democracies, these rates are directly governed by countries’ electoral rules and party systems. The rates of contacts between constituents and representatives is higher in countries where members to the country’s legislative body are elected by a single member district (SMD) rule such as the United States or the United Kingdom. Under these electoral rules, the attribution of the legislative seats rests on constituents’ choices; not that of the party bosses (Cho, 2010:184). For instance, in the United States, constituent-representative interactions are one of the highest in the world, with an average of 34\% of the population (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba, 1995: 81). In contrast, these rates decrease in countries where representatives get their seats by the rule of proportional representation (PR); i.e., party bosses decide who gets what. Netherlands and Israel are examples of where contact rates are very low, ostensibly because members to the parliament are elected by the proportional representation
rule (Davidson et.al.2014: 5). Whereas the rates of contacts between constituents and their representatives are contingent upon the electoral rules and party systems in mature democracies, the lower rates of constituent-representative contact seem to have little to do with electoral rules in new democracies in Africa (Bratton et.al.2005: 152). In most Sub-Saharan African countries, contact rates are notoriously low irrespective of the electoral rules or party systems. For example, contact rates are higher in Tanzania (17%), a country that uses a mixture of SMD and PR as electoral rule, than in Nigeria (7.9%), where MPs are elected from a strict SMD electoral rule. According to the survey results from the Afrobarometer round3, the average rate of contacts for the 18 countries is 10%. This means that on average, only one out of ten people contact their MPs at most once per year. An overwhelming 90% of ordinary Africans never contact their MPs. Although this figure varies from one country to the other, the highest rate of contacts (17%) is recorded in only one country (Tanzania). The remaining countries show contact rates ranging between 4.5% (Madagascar) to 15% (Botswana). In the Afrobarometer surveys, the variable contact MP is an ordinal level variable with values ranging from “Never=0, 1=Only one time, 2=Often, to 3=Always” (Afrobarometer round3 codebook p.23). Because I am primarily interested in whether or not citizens contact (at least one time) their MPs, I transform this ordinal variable into a dichotomous variable. To do so, I collapse the value from 1 to 3 into Yes=1, and keep 0 as it is. Below is the pie chart of raw survey results of direct contacts from citizens to their MPs in the 18 countries (merged data).
Independent variables: For the last seventy years, political scientists have worked to find the causes of political participation such as contact of political officials. They have listed three main categories of determinants that drive political participation: *individual characteristics* (e.g., social economic status and demographics), *meso-level variables* (e.g., membership in organization), and *macro-level variables* (e.g., country GDP, electoral rules). Particularly, four main schools of thought have had major contributions. The *Columbian school*, which stresses social networks (*meso-level*), have been complemented by the *Michigan school*, which emphasizes a combination of social demographics and attitudinal factors centered around the party identity, called “the *unmoved mover*” by Campbell (1960). The *rationalist school* of thought highlights the role of self interest in political participation (Downs, 1957; Page and Shapiro, 1972; 2003, to name just a few). The *civic voluntarist school* of thought puts forward the interplay between resources, network, and motivation as sources of political participation (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, 1995). Although, each school of thought emphasizes a particular group of variables, the consensus has been that individual characteristics remain the driving force of political participation. A worthy academic exercise
would be to assess how these theories contextually apply to less mature democracies. For the present investigation, I contrast MPs listening ability with the above individual characteristics (age, income, education, partisanship, religion, residence, and country-level variables) to assess the predictive power of each indicator. I add the variable of clientelism to test the claim that private good delivery is the essence of MP-constituent interaction.

4.4.2.1 MP listening.

In almost every Afrobarometer survey, when asked about their perception of their MPs, ordinary citizens point first to the lack of MPs’ listening in Africa. The instrument of listening is a broad measure of governing bodies’ responsiveness in the literature and in surveys (Bratton et.al 2005; Shapiro, 2011; Wlezer and Soroka, 2010; Gilens, 2008). But the concept of responsiveness is itself a multifaceted one. It takes on at least two meanings in the literature. In its first meaning, responsiveness is viewed as a unidimensional category. In the second meaning, it is used as a multidimensional concept. For convenience, this article treats responsiveness as a unidimensional concept. That is, responsiveness corresponds to a simple reactive behavior (Mores and Taskey, 2006). Here it is referred to as simple response to a stimulus. Schumaker and Russel (1977) offer a succinct definition of this induced reaction of responsiveness. They write “responsiveness occurs when actors react positively to an external stimulus” (247). Unresponsiveness occurs when actors fail to react in the way desired by those providing the stimulus. Thus, the concept of responsiveness is concerned with the degree of linkage or congruence between stimulus variables and response variables (248). Applied to the MP-constituent relationship, it is safe to assume that listening refers to frequent visits, social interactions, and the need to see their representative pay a little attention to them and what they have to say. From the results of the surveys, it appears that very few ordinary citizens think that their MPs listen to them. A time series analysis of the variable
from Afrobarometer round 1(1999) to round 7 (2018) shows that the percentage of people who think that MPs do not listen rises year after year. It went from 35% to 42% (Afrobarometer online analysis). Once more, there is variance between countries, with a high of 59.5% of those surveyed in Nigeria and 59.3% in Malawi deeming representatives dismissive. Similarly, the rates of ordinary people who have never contacted a MP in the 18 countries under investigation has increased from 87% in Afrobarometer Round 2 (2002) to 89% in Afrobarometer round 7(2016). One way to interpret the measure of citizens’ demand for MPs listening ability is to compare the extent to which citizens expect MPs to spend time with their constituents, and the actual time these MPs spend. The gap is wide. Only 2 percent deems these visits not necessary. An overwhelming 98 percent of citizens want their MP to visit at least once a month. On average, only 17 percent of the MPs visit their constituency on monthly basis. And this figure too varies. For instance, whereas, only 5 percent of the MPs visit their constituency once a month in Benin, this number grows to 25% in Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (Afrobarometer round3). In the Afrobarometer, the variable listening is captured by the following survey question: “In your opinion, how likely is it that you could get together with others and make: Your Member of Parliament listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the community? (Afrobarometer round 4 2009, codebook p.15).” The responses are measured as an ordinal level variable, with values between 0 and 3 (0= Not likely; 1= Not very likely, 2= Somewhat likely, 3=Very likely). I recode this variable as a dichotomous variable by combining the values of 0 and 1(Not likely and not very likely) into 0; and 2 and 3(Somewhat likely and Very likely) into 1. Below is the pie chart of citizens’ assessment of their MPs’ listening ability.
4.4.2.2 Clientelism.

The conceptual definition of clientelism, which has drawn and continues to draw controversy, will be avoided here. The key aspect of the clientelistic linkage relevant to this chapter, and that is at issue, is its person-to-person political interaction. The consensus is that at its core, clientelistic linkage involves an exchange between a politician and a citizen whereby the former provides a material benefit or side payment for a political support from the latter. To better grasp the point of contention, a quick review of typology of political linkages is in order. Individual and collective interactions between government and governed have always preoccupied political scientists, leading them to continuously investigate the five types of linkage institutions. These include political parties, elections and campaigns, the media, interest groups, and the representative-constituent relationships (American Civic book 2017). However, of the five ways of connecting state and society, arguably more ink has been spent on party and constituent-representative relationship than on the remaining three. The voluminous literature both in American and in comparative politics, attest to this continual interest in collective and individual connections of

Figure 4.2 Citizens’ Rating of MPs’ Listening Ability.
citizens to their government. Looking at parties as a linkage institution in the postindustrial societies, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) point to the programmatic linkage as the bond that ties voters to their parties. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) see this type of policy agreement (program) between the elite of the party and the majority of its members as the unique viable linkage. Subsequent studies will demonstrate that parties have more than one strategy to connect with voters. Sartori (1986) shows the existence of catchall parties (1986: 55). Most importantly, Kitschelt adds clientelistic and charismatic linkages to Lipset and Rokkan’s programmatic linkage. Building on Madsen and Snow’s 1991 work, Kitschelt (2002, 2007) defines charismatic linkage as a connection between a citizen and a representative solely based on the representative personal characteristics. These may include but are not limited to representatives’ particular charisma, their proven or perceived skills. Here, individual constituents are convinced of their leaders’ personal capacity to resolve their problems and to promise a brighter future (Kitschelt, 2002, 2007p.). Still, Kitschelt’s landmark work has been on clientelism in its various forms. In this article, clientelism will be treated as it is captured in Afrobarometer surveys. In these surveys, the variable clientelism is captured with the following question: “And during the [20xx] election, how often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift, in return for your vote?” The responses range from 0 =never; 1= once or twice; 2= few times; 3= often. I transform this ordinal variable into a dichotomous by combining 1 to 3 into 1 and keep 0 as it is. Below is the pie chart of the results on clientelism in the 18 countries from the merged data.
To the above primary independent variables, I add three more variables (voted at the last elections, political efficacy, and ascribing the responsibility of MPs’ job) to apprise the causal weight of four variables in triggering contact between citizens and their MPs.

*Figure 4.3 Citizens’ witnessing or experiencing MPs’ clientelistic behavior*

In Table 1, are displayed the descriptive statistics of the variables specified in the model. The large size of the observations speaks to the merging of individual country data. The relatively
low means for Contact MP and MP listen indicate that very few people contact their MPs or think that their MPs listen. For ascribing responsibility to MP and election turnover, the respondents’ average scores (1.9 and 2) lies near the maximum (3). This translates the fact that the majority of ordinary people know what the responsibility of their MP should be and that an election theoretically has the power to remove or keep them in office.

Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of some variables from raw survey results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>18 countries Average</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact MP</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country: Madagascar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP listening</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>64.10%</td>
<td>81.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country: Malawi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientelism</td>
<td>13.30%</td>
<td>33.40%</td>
<td>48.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country: Botswana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without food</td>
<td>53.30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Efficacy</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted at the last election</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>23.70%</td>
<td>39.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country: Benin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party closeness</td>
<td>35.80%</td>
<td>61.20%</td>
<td>82.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country: Benin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careful what you say</td>
<td>83.30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascribing to MPs their Responsibility</td>
<td>26.10%</td>
<td>72.70%</td>
<td>94.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascribing to Other institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Below in Table 2 are summarized few raw survey results about the variables. In the first column of Table 2 are the variables of interest: Contact MP, MP listen, Clientelism, Gone without food, Political efficacy, ascribing to MP their responsibility, voting in the last election, party closeness, and careful about what you say. The second column comprises of the lowest values of these variables across the 18 countries. For instance, the variable Contact MP has the lowest rate in Madagascar (4.5%) and the highest value in Tanzania in the Afrobarometer Round 3.

4.5 Results and Discussion

Table 4.3 The results of the Biprobit regression are summarized in the table 4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Individual models</th>
<th>SURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1=Contact</td>
<td>M2=MP Listen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>.050(0.005) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Listen</td>
<td>0.0203(0.002) ***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.180(0.004) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientelism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.005(0.001) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted</td>
<td>-0.009(0.001) ***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascribing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.019(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral turnover</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.37(0.006) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-0.011(0.001) ***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.005(0.001) ***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gdp/per capita</td>
<td>-0.0023(0.003) **</td>
<td>0.041(0.004) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Listening</th>
<th>Party closeness</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Clientelism</th>
<th>Log</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.295 (0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.019(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td>215.2736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0.35(0.009)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.016(0.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0.0350(0.010)**</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.014(0.005)</td>
<td>0.019(0.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>0.462(0.009)**</td>
<td>-0.018(0.005)***</td>
<td>-0.0191(0.006)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0081(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>0.017(0.005)***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.020(0.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.21(0.005)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.013(0.005)***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.014(0.005)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.012(0.004)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>0.140(0.034)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>0.012(0.004)***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.018(0.004)**</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</table>

Table 4. 4. Individual country regressions
I use a probit model to conduct this analysis. The equation of the causal relationship takes the following form: \( Y = BX + Y_0 \), where \( Y = \) is the dependent variable captured by dichotomous values (Yes=1 at least one contact with the MP and No=0 never contacted a MP). \( \beta \) is the coefficient of the primary independent variable (MP listening). The coefficient of the first output of a probit statistical procedure cannot be interpreted straightforwardly like the coefficient of an Ordinary Least Square because it is a logarithmic probability (Trivedi and Cameron, 2010:24). Nonetheless, it can help indicate the sign (direction) of the coefficient. Probit, like many other maximum likelihood models, requires a postestimation procedure that can accurately compute the magnitude and statistical significance of each estimator. In the present case, I estimate the substantive value of the coefficient using the marginal effect postestimation.

Table 3 presents the results of specified models. In these two models M1 and M2, I use the merged data of the 18 countries. As predicted, the independent variable MP listening outperforms all other independent variables. The results show a marginal effect of MP listening as the leading cause that motivate citizens to initiate a contact with their MPs. In plain English, this means that after keeping all variables at their means, the effect of MP listening is likely to boost contact with MP by 2%. After assessing the effect of the MPs listening on the likelihood to increase contact from merged data, I perform individual probit regressions for each of the 18 countries. The aim of these individual regressions is to cross-compare the causal weight of MP listening in the countries under investigation. The results are presented in Table 4. MP Listening has a stronger effect in Lesotho (0.462) Tanzania (0.036), Ghana (0.35), Kenya (0.35) Uganda (0.028). Intriguingly, listening has no effect in Madagascar. The second independent variable is clientelism. As argued, the independent variable clientelism has no causal impact on the dependent variable contact with MP from the merged data. One exception is Senegal (-0.012), a Francophone country where
clientelism depresses contacts with MPs. This finding on clientelism support Lindberg’s stance and is a cautionary warning tale to refrain from quickly generalizing. Besides these two exceptions in Madagascar and Senegal, both the merged data and individual country analyses substantiate the fact that private, good delivery from the MP does not motivate ordinary citizens to contact their MPs. It might also suggest that the bulk of the Afrobarometer samples, essentially made up of ordinary everyday people who barely encounter a political figure, have little to do with gift exchanges or vote buying. These practices are limited to a circle of insiders (elite entourage) as Bratton and Van de Walle (2001) hinted. Another important finding is political efficacy. Although not the leading cause in the specified model, the coefficient of the variable of political efficacy is positive and statistically meaningful in every model. As for the act of voting, the coefficient is highly significant and negative in both merged data and country-specific data in the 18 countries surveyed. This finding highlights the fact that voting is more a duty than an empowering act. Ordinary people who vote do not see themselves as having the right to call on their MPs for any reason. On the other hand, the low level of turnout might be the reason why having voted in the last election is not conducive to initiating contact with one’s MP. Whether it be by the low level of voter turnout or any other reason, the results echo Bratton and Logan (2006)’s suggestion that ordinary people are “subjects, not citizens.” The second consistent finding is on the variable party closeness. Its coefficient is negative across every single country, emphasizing the weakness of formal institutions as a channel to connect with one’s MP. Finally, the variables electoral turnover and ascribing responsibility to MP provide some silver lining among this consistent pattern of African behavioral politics. For instance, in Cape Verde, knowing one’s MP duty and responsibilities is 4% more likely to enable citizens to contact their MPs.

A Possible reciprocal relationship Between Contacts and Listening?
The positive and meaningful impact of both political efficacy and MP listening warrant a further analysis. Specifically, the fact that MPs’ listening ability has become the main causal factor for citizens to contact their MP raises a question about a possible reverse causal relationship between MP Listening and Citizens’ contact of MPs. Do contact and listening (action-reaction or stimulus –response) have reciprocal relationship? When faced with such conundrum, social scientists turn readily to the experimental method to help them isolate temporal precedence in the course of the events. However, in the MP-citizen relationship in Africa such an experiment comes with the ever- looming threat of the Hawthorn effect. The Hawthorn effect occurs in experimental investigation when awareness of the subjects being studied lead them to provide unreliable responses (Druckman et.al 2012:125). Fortunately, there exists an alternative way to cope with endogenous relationship including the approach of instrumental variable, the two-stage least square, and the three stage least square. The two and three least square are the key tools that evaluate the distinct effect of each variable on the other. For instance, in the relationship between income and educational attainment, the two variables seem locked into a reversal causal relationship. A simultaneous equation can separate the entangled causal directions by indicating the respective causal weight of each variable. In the specific case of listen and contact reciprocal relationship, the three-least square fits squarely. It jointly determines the independent effect of each dependent variable on the other using their correlated residual as an instrument. Developed in 1962 by Zellner and Theis, the Three-stage Least Square(3SLS) gets interchanged frequently with the Seemingly Unrelated Equation or (SURE). The two models are related but different. The difference lies in the specification. In specifying the 3SLS, the two dependent variables may or may not share the same independent variables (Zellner and Theis 1962:52). In contrast, for the SURE, the independent variables must be different. Despite these differences, the 3SLS and the SURE share an important
similarity highly relevant to the present analysis. Both the 3SLS and the SURE are extensions of
the Ordinary least square. The dichotomous level of measurement of the two outcome variables of
interest (MP listening and Contact MP) violates the linearity assumption for the use of the OLS
models. Faced with such limitations, James Heckman (1978) produced a model to cope with
categorical endogenous relationships. The model, “Biprobit,” adapts to dichotomous endogenous
variables and behaves exactly like a SURE (Heckman 1978: 931). The two models can be written
as: \( Y_1 = B_1X+BY_0 \) and \( Y_2 = B_2X+Y_0 \) where \( Y_1 \) is contact MP and \( Y_2 \) is MP Listening. Since the
two seem locked into a reciprocal relationship, this can be written as: \( Y_1 <= > Y_2 \), or \( Bi_1X+BiY_i0 <= > B_2Xj2+Yj0 \). Upon performing the regression analysis, the findings do not support the fact that
there exists a reciprocal relationship. Although theoretically connected, the two variables are
causally separated. The rho is 0 indicating that a two separate probit regressions can be performed.
Furthermore, from the separate regressions, the variable contact MP has a greater effect (.983) on
MP listening than the other way around. This means that citizens have more chance to get their MP
to listen to them when they contact MPs. The variable listening has a relatively lower affect (0.20)
of contact with MP. Also, on the causes of MPs listening (Model 2), the variable clientelism is weak
but significant (-0.005), suggesting that representative-constituent relationship is more nuanced
than it appears.

5 CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

Direct interactions between citizens and their MPs are rare in Africa. Constituents and those
who are supposed to represent them seem to be living in two distinct worlds, each divorced from
the other. In most cases, survey results show that MPs tend to be alienated. The commonly known
narrative about the causes of this disconnect point to poverty, education, diseases, and other factors.
Citizens, we are told, are too poor, too uneducated, or two hungry to be concerned about policy or
contacting MPs. All these may each play a role not negligible. But what keeps citizens out from contacting their MPs is primarily MPs’ lack of responsiveness. Specifically, MPs’ lack of listening, spending time with her constituents. Although direct contacts between citizens and their representatives may raise some concerns about clientelistic behavior, they have far more potential to build a citizen-centered democracy in Africa. Concerns about direct constituents-representatives’ interactions turning into patron-client relationships are real and undeniable in Africa. However, they are circumscribed and limited to the elite and their immediate circle (van de Wall, 2001). Survey results show that very few ordinary citizens get involved in it. Surveys show also that ordinary citizens in Africa yearn for interactions with their representatives (Mattes and Mozzaffar, 2016). Statistical analyses in this article confirm that citizens want their MP to listen to them in order to faithfully represent their views on national stage. A little bit of attention from the MPs toward their constituents goes a long way (Bratton et.al.2005). In the dyadic relationships between citizens and their representatives, the analyses above show that what motivates citizens is more their MPs ability to listen to them. MPs’ attentiveness encourages constituents to express their concerns. As an exogenous factor, this attentiveness has the reassuring effect that tells ordinary people that “your concerns and voices will be heard.” The combination of the results from the merged data and the individual country level data shows a complete picture. Although in general clientelism is not a motivating factor in many countries, it does have an effect in Senegal, suggesting that the dyadic relationship is more complex than it appears.

Under what conditions would citizens initiate a contact with their MPs? The response to this question constitutes the central argument of this dissertation. It maintains that citizens would initiate a direct contact with their MPs only if the latter display a willingness to listen to their constituents. Citizens’ perception of their MPs’ ability or willingness to listen to them is the key motivator to
contact those representatives. But from survey results, citizens’ perception of their MPs’ listening ability is very low, making the level of direct contacts of MPs one of the lowest in the world. Therefore, I contend that ordinary people contact their representatives to the national assemblies through two intermediary informal institutions: membership in informal grassroots associations (community civic groups) and traditional authorities and religious leaders. But before going any further, it is worth enumerating a few benefits of a well-functioning constituent-representative relationship for the African democratic process. Citizens’ contacts with their MPs allow meaningful conversations between citizens and their representatives and greater citizens’ input in the policy process. In an African specific context, these contacts contribute in emancipating citizens and making them stakeholder in their political systems through peaceful deliberative process. Equally important, these bottom up communications build a political bond between elected officials and voters that often lacks in Africa. In short, these interactions give the primacy to citizens in every country’s democratic process irrespective of their electoral systems. Unfortunately, the abysmal rates of direct contacts between citizens and their representatives to national representatives make these benefits illusory.

Through statistical analyses and empirical observations, the dissertation sheds light on two institutions and their linking functions. The findings show that membership in informal grassroots associations and traditional authorities play the roles of linking institutions between citizens and their MPs. However, the place and functions of these institutions in the African democratic process are subject of heated academic debates. The first debate pertains to the nature and democratic dividend of informal grassroots associations. This debate opposes two camps. The first camp, those who are skeptical about the democratic attributes of these unformal grassroots, posits that these unformal grassroots organizations are merely extensions of kinship in Africa (Comaroff and
Comaroff, 1999; Jorgensen, 1992; Ekeh, 1992). Because adhering to these associations is not voluntary, these authors characterize African informal grassroots organizations as “ascriptive.” Ekeh states that these grassroots associations lack the universalism that promotes equal treatment of every member whether they are “in group” or “out group” (187). As a result, these grassroots associations do not fill the space between the state and the society; they are neither parts of the civil society nor can they serve as channel to vehicle citizens’ concerns. Scholars who see these informal grassroots associations as beneficial to democracy refute this characterization. Bratton, 1994; Smith, 1997, 1998; Totensen et al., 2001) argue that informal grassroots associations can be seen as parts of the civil society and they play social, economic and political roles for their members (Totensen et al. 2001). Chapter II of the dissertation addresses this debate and presents each side’s argument. While acknowledging the argument of the skeptics, I side with the advocates’ position (Bratton, Totensen et al. and Smith). More importantly, I argue that these informal grassroots associations work as a linking institution between citizens and numbers of political actors including MPs, local officials, and government agencies. Membership in these grassroots associations also motivates citizens to attend community meetings. The analyses support these hypotheses. For instance, being member of an informal grassroots association increases the likelihood by 75% on average to contact a local official in Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso. As for contacts with MPs, being a member of an informal grassroots associations boosts the chance by 55% on average to contact MPs in Kenya, Liberia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, and in Botswana.

The chapter makes an original contribution by casting a positive light on these informal grassroots institutions and by uncovering their connecting roles. Subsequently, this chapter has some practical implications for African democratic consolidation. This chapter call the attention of
democracy practitioner to focus on these neglected but widespread social networks and transform them into real school of democracy where members not only can internalize effortlessly democratic values but also learn to support genuinely its practice and defend it. The fact that membership in these unformal grassroots organizations is predictive of contacting local officials raises the question to know the roles these local officials play in the democratic process. It is worth mentioning that the bulk of these local officials is made up of traditional authorities and or religious leaders. The place and functions of these institutions in the constituent-representative relationship is the focus of chapter three.

Chapter three makes the argument that traditional authorities and religious leaders serve as linking institutions between citizens and their MPs. However, as in chapter two, the role and functions that the traditional authorities should play in African democratic process stirs a heated debate between “Modernists” and “Traditionalists.” The Modernists, led by Mamdani (1996), contend that Traditional Authorities are nothing but a vestige of colonialism and now serve as the instrument of the central powers. Modernists criticize African Traditionl Authorities as hindering a genuine connection between ordinary folks with their political system in Africa. Modernists also maintain that ATA have lost any legitimacy because they are weaponized their own people by the reining powers. As a result, they need to be rid of. The so-called traditionalists reject this argument. According to Traditionalists, ATA are a genuine emanation of ordinary people and should be seen their representatives. Recognizing the merits of each argument, I make a middle of road and pragmatic argument. I contend that framing the question about traditional authorities and religious leaders in terms of either/or amounts to false dichotomy. ATA are parts and parcel of the African social and political landscape. It stands to reason that one finds a way to make them useful for the thriving of the African democratic process. I observe that ATA’s role as an intermediary institution
create two track political participation in Africa that simply need to be acknowledged. Due to their social stewardship, ATA and religious leaders are implicated deeply in ordinary people’s day-to-day lives. For instance, according to Patterson, religious institutions provide 40% of health care in Sub-Saharan Africa. ATA and religious leaders are also involved in cultural and traditional events where people learn their social norms.

In order to substantiate the argument that ATA and religious leaders are de facto intermediary institutions that connect citizens to their MPs, I contrast their connecting role with that of a formal institution: political parties in Africa. In other words, I specify a model that comparatively weighs the causal effects of both contacting party and contacting ATA on the likelihood of contacting MPs controlling for other individual level variables and selection bias. Specifically, I include in the model the closeness to party to control for a possibility of selection bias. The issue of selection bias here refers to the same people with strong opinion who simultaneously contact both MPs and traditional authorities. If the variable closeness to party has a more powerful causal effect, then traditional authorities do not play the intermediary role mentioned. However, the results from the statistical analysis supports the argument that ATA indeed function as intermediary institution. The findings show that contact with ATA comes as the most powerful indicator of contacting MP. This effect is consistent and strongly statistically significant across all the 20 countries. As the argument suggests, the combined effect of these institutions is credited of predicting 0.43% of chance to contacting MPs. As for contacting party, the effect is nearly ten times lower at only 0.05%. The takeaways from this chapter similar to the one chapter II. It mainly states that states and democratic activists need to focus on these unformal omnipresent institutions to help democracy grow in Africa. Getting the minds and hearts of these actors will give a genuine chance to democracy in Africa. Specifically, integrating these institutions
will reduce the two-track participation into one track thereby reinforcing the direct connection and the accountability linkage between citizens and their MPs.

Understanding the determinants of direct contact between citizens and their MPs is the subject of the fourth chapter of the dissertation. While the preceding chapters (II and III) focus on unformal linkage institutions, the chapter IV centers on the formal and direct contacts between ordinary people and their MPs. As stated in the opening of the concluding chapter, contacts between MPs and their constituents is the core of representative democracy. For any democratic transition to succeed in Africa, it has to involve ordinary people. Otherwise, all the fuss about democratic consolidation is meaningless.

Direct contacts between citizens and their MPs is very important for many reasons. For one it contributes to empower constituents in increasing their sense of political efficacy. Equally, direct contacts between ordinary citizens and their MPs play a key role in building a political bond between them and their elected officials. Yet again, the promotion of such dyadic and person to person contacts between ordinary people and their representatives in Africa is controversial. The debate opposes two camps. The first camp contends that direct contacts between constituents and their representatives mirror a patron-client relationship in Africa (Lindberg, 2003, 2009, 2010). Lindberg and Morrison (2009) conduct serious studies in Ghana where they record MPs complaining about their constituents. MPs in Ghana tell Lindberg that their constituents primary reasons to contact their representatives is to ask for a private good delivery. The authors conclude that direct contacts contribute in worsening clientelistic interactions between citizens and the elite in Africa. However, other scholars reject this widely-held view about the African political process. Specifically, Barkan, Mattes, Mozaffar and refute the clientelist accusation on the ground that MPs in Africa misconstrue the needs of their constituents. Through survey results and statistical analyses,
they show that ordinary citizens first and foremost want their MP to listen to them, to visit them. To pay a little attention to them. Without denying the existence of the clientelist behavior in African political interactions, I side with Barkan, Mattes and Mozzafar. I use the US as a benchmark to argue that dyadic contacts build a bond and increase citizens’ perception of political efficacy.
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