Spring 5-4-2021

Salmon or Chameleon? Rethinking Evangelical Political Behavior

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SALMON OR CHAMELEON?

RETHINKING EVANGELICAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

by

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Under the Direction of Judd Thornton, PhD

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2021

ABSTRACT

The prevailing narrative in political science is that evangelical identity drives the political behavior of evangelicals. This has generated a variety of puzzles for us, in that we struggle to explain how people who are quite similar in terms of their religious beliefs can be quite different in terms of their politics.

I challenge this prevailing narrative. More specifically, I contend that evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of political behavior and that it is outweighed by other relevant factors, such as race and education. Thus, evangelical identity can be more correctly understood as a factor that potentially mitigates the effects of other factors that more directly determine political behavior. In reality, however, this does not occur frequently because most Christians never reach the point in their faith journey at which they truly make their political perspective subject to their faith perspective.

I test this contention using seven measures of political behavior as dependent variables: whether respondents voted for Donald Trump in 2016; a measure of Party Identification; whether respondents support gay marriage; whether respondents support a pro-life position; whether respondents support a ban on assault rifles; whether respondents support legal status for persons brought to the United States illegally as children but who have since graduated from high school in the United States; and whether respondents agree with the statement that racial problems in the United States are rare, isolated situations. The data set is the Common Content section of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, supplemented by county level indicators drawn from the 2016 American Community Survey.

The results indicate that, for all seven dependent variables, the strongest effect of evangelical identity is exceeded by the effect of at least one other measure, such as race or education. Further, for all but two of the dependent variables, the strongest evangelical effect is exceeded by the effect of at least one county level indicator, such as the percentage of the county population holding at least a high school diploma. Thus, I conclude that evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of political behavior.

INDEX WORDS: Evangelical, Identity, Republican, Political behavior

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May 2021

DEDICATION

For Susan, Janae, and Parker, with whom I missed far too many moments over this little project.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I cannot but express my profound gratitude to Judd Thornton, for his patience in putting up with me, even when I should have already known the answers to my nagging questions; to Toby Bolsen, for his infectious enthusiasm and continuous support; and to Sean Richey, for his quiet but profoundly useful comments and suggestions. This would not have been possible without all of them truly going above and beyond to help make sure it happened.

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1 INTRODUCTION

> If the Christian community doesn't rise up like it never has in modern political history, and if we allow through our inaction, the left to remove this man from the Oval Office, then we will deserve everything that we get. And if they get the White House back, it will be open season on Christian ministries, on churches, the IRS will be able to persecute those faith-based organizations again.
>
> They will – under Obamacare – be able to force them to pay for abortion again. They will be able to sue the Little Sisters of the Poor and drag God-fearing nuns into federal court again to make them pay for abortion. That's what will happen. And it we don't turn out and vote in the biggest numbers ever, we deserve it to happen.

The above statement was made by Ralph Reed, head of an organization called the Faith and Freedom Coalition (Galloway, 2019). He is not new to such hysterics, having worked in years past as the head of the Christian Coalition, an entity affiliated with televangelist Pat Robertson. Apparently, Reed made the statement to promote his (then) forthcoming book explaining why Christians are mandated – by their faith – to adamantly support Donald Trump.

Such unbridled support of President Trump is not limited to evangelical political operatives, however. A number of evangelical pastors and others have expressed similar sentiments, frequently offering a faith-based justification for specific policies. Perhaps the most vocal among these is Robert Jeffress, pastor of mega-church First Baptist in Dallas. Jeffress has defended such theologically significant principles as the proposed wall on the southern border, pointing out that God commanded Nehemiah to build a wall around Jerusalem and stating that, "[t]he Bible says even Heaven itself is going to have a wall around it" (Cole, 2019).

Of course, the vexing aspect of examples such as these is how evangelicals could have come to so strongly support Donald Trump, a man whose history and continued behavior would seem to present an example that is radically different from what they claim to believe. In unraveling this mystery, it is useful to begin with a brief review – at least from a political and social perspective – of the evangelical movement in the United States.

According to Michael Gerson (2018), evangelicalism was the predominant religious tradition in America during the 1800s, but by the early 1900s evangelicals would be largely disengaged from society. Part of this can be explained by the shift from postmillennialism to premillennialism. While this may sound insignificant, it is of more than theological importance. Generally speaking, postmillennialism holds that the Second Coming of Christ will occur following a period of one thousand years of relative peace and prosperity for mankind. Thus, this view offers incentives for seeking to influence society for the good, in that Christ will not return until after this has been achieved. Premillennialism, on the other hand, posits that the period of peace and prosperity cannot occur until after the Second Coming and that – despite any human efforts to the contrary – society will continue to deteriorate to the point that only Christ will be capable of cleaning up the mess. If that's what you believe, your religion obviously doesn't offer much encouragement for you to get out and try to engage society for the good.

The other big factor at work was continued scientific progress, particularly the emergence of evolution theory. This fractured evangelicalism into progressives, who sought to build common ground between the old faith and the new science, and fundamentalists, who doubled down on their emphasis on traditional religious views. Thus, fundamentalism became associated with anti-scientific and anti-intellectual perspectives, culminating in the famous "Scopes monkey trial" challenging the teaching of evolution. While they actually won the trial, "[f]undamentalists became comic figures, subject to world-class condescension" (2018, p. 47). This only exacerbated their withdrawal, and evangelicalism lost its preeminent status in American religion.

Scholars generally agree that things remained that way until after World War II, when evangelicals began to re-engage society (Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2018; Gerson, 2018). This reboot of evangelicalism still offered conservative beliefs but with a softer edge that tried to drop the anti-intellectual cast that had been a feature in decades past; its public face was a young evangelist named Billy Graham (Putnam & Campbell, 2010, p. 13). Centered primarily in the South, evangelicals had for decades been aligned with the Democratic Party, but that began to change after the Democrats nominated a Catholic (Kennedy) for president in 1960 and Republican nominee Goldwater

appealed strongly to their conservative views on social issues in 1964. It continued into the 1970s as evangelicals saw traditional values continue to erode (*Roe v. Wade*, etc.) and mobilized in an effort to defend them. This unfolded even as one of their own occupied the White House, but Jimmy Carter had disappointed them by his lack of enthusiasm in embracing their conservative social views. Ironically, Carter had been elected in large part based on his ability to persuade more moderate voters who had been suspicious of evangelicals, while most of them had voted for Gerald Ford in 1976 (Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2018, Chapter 8).

At any rate, "[t]he Moral Majority appeared at about the same time that the actual majority was more and more comfortable with divorce and couples living together out of wedlock" (Gerson, 2018, p. 48). Still, evangelicals made the dramatic shift from avoiding politics to actively engaging. Secular conservatives, seeing opportunity, began actively seeking to attract religious conservatives to a common cause. Ronald Reagan courted them hard in 1980, and the Republican Party offered platform planks and prominent roles for evangelicals. The shotgun wedding worked, and it bore fruit as evangelical leaders, who had been motivated primarily by moral issues like abortion and school prayer, began offering religious justification for conservative positions on a range of other issues. "Thus, increased defense spending was a way to keep the nation free for the continued preaching of the Gospel, and support for the governments of Taiwan and South Africa was necessary to protect Christian allies from the 'Godless forces of anti-Christ communism'" (Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2018, p. 198). Some evangelicals, including Jerry Falwell, went even further, such as offering a religious basis for issues like balanced budgets and flat-rate taxation (Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2018, Chapter 8).

The Republican Party began to distance itself somewhat after Bill Clinton defeated George H. W. Bush in 1992, perhaps in no small part due to concerns on the part of moderate voters that evangelical influence over the party had gotten out of hand. Being left at that point with few policy successes to show for two decades of activism plunged the evangelical political movement into a period of reflection. What emerged was the conclusion that too much emphasis had been placed on national politics, which led to a new emphasis on electing friendly candidates to state and local office, together with actively developing

grassroots membership organizations to carry the flag. In addition, efforts were made to tone down the group's previously strident language and replace it with more neutral-sounding terms. Thus, a group that many observers had presumed dead was able to find new political life (Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2018, Chapter 8).

Still, though, how do we get from there to Donald Trump? In one sense, evangelical support of Trump was nothing new. While it may have been a more extreme example, it was really just another verse of a hymn first sung more than three decades earlier. Ronald Reagan certainly didn't fit the part in terms of his personal history, yet evangelicals coalesced around him – even against one of their own – in 1980. "This would set a precedent for supporting candidates who might fall short of conservative Christian standards in their personal lives but pledged to support the movement's agenda" (Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2018, p. 198). To evangelicals, words apparently speak louder than actions.

Another observer contends that "the evangelical road to Donald Trump" actually started earlier – much, much earlier. Evangelical historian John Fea contends that, looking all the way back to the earliest English settlements in America, "…it is possible to write an entire history of American evangelicalism as the story of Christians who have failed to overcome fear…" (2018, p. 75). Their fears led evangelicals to adopt an approach to public engagement rooted in their own anxiety. This accelerated in more recent decades, thanks to developments like *Roe v. Wade*. Then evangelicals had to deal with Barack Obama, who seemed to be the personification of many of their fears, and what appeared to be the very swift arrival of gay marriage.

During the 2016 campaign, candidates like Ted Cruz and, to a lesser extent, Marco Rubio stoked evangelical fears by painting a grim picture of what life would be like for them should the wrong candidate be elected. Ironically, the fearmongering worked too well. Evangelicals looked back at them through their anxiety and concluded they weren't strong enough or mean enough to make an effective protector. Another candidate was.

After clinching the Republican nomination, Trump worked hard to woo evangelicals. According to Fea, his best move was to release a list of judges he would consider for the appointment should there be

a vacancy on the Supreme Court. This struck a nerve with evangelicals, who in many ways saw the Court as the root of the assault on traditional values. Still, it wasn't at all clear whether they would rally to the support of a candidate as flawed as Trump.

Those doubts began to evaporate once Hillary Clinton secured the Democratic nomination. She had been on evangelicals' prayer lists since 1992, when her comments about staying home and baking cookies were interpreted as a rejection of traditional values. By 2016 evangelicals considered her openly hostile on issues like abortion and gay marriage, while being ambivalent – at best – on other key issues like religious freedom. Thus, forced to choose between "the strongman who paid lip service to their values and their age-old adversary in the culture wars," many evangelicals felt they had no choice but to vote for Trump (Fea, 2018, p. 72).

Viewed from this perspective, it is reasonable to at least ponder whether the overwhelming evangelical votes for Trump were really the equivalent of overwhelming endorsement of Trump. Ed Stetzer and Andrew MacDonald (2018, p. 21) contend that "…many of Trump's evangelical voters were not enthusiastic about him as a candidate." Stetzer and MacDonald reached that conclusion based on data from a 2018 survey done by the Billy Graham Center Institute at Wheaton College. The survey divided respondents into three categories: those who self-identified as evangelicals; those who were classified as evangelicals based on their agreement with certain belief statements; and those who fit neither of the first two categories. Focusing on those who were classified as evangelical by belief, the primary factors cited for their vote in 2016 included things like the economy (17%) and health care (11%); factors like abortion and personal character of the candidate brought up the rear in single digits. Thus, per Stetzer and MacDonald, evangelicals primarily cast their votes based more on traditionally Republican issues than conservative social issues. Further, fully 75% of these evangelical voters expressed a willingness to vote for a Democratic candidate for president, with the caveat that he or she be considered pro-life. Perhaps most telling, however, was the fact that only half of these voters said their vote was cast for a preferred candidate, while one-third said their vote was cast against a disfavored candidate (Clinton edged out

Trump here by a margin of 18%-15%). Dissatisfied with both major candidates, one in five of these evangelicals did not vote in 2016.

What are we to make of this? Are evangelicals the staunch Trump supporters some reports would have them to be? According to one now-famous statistic, exit polling showed that fully 81% of white evangelicals cast their votes for him in 2016 (Martinez & Smith, 2016).

And what of the connection between evangelicals and the Republican Party more generally? The linkage now appears to be well beyond the point where it has been accepted as gospel, even among political scientists (*See*, for example, Wilcox & Robinson, 2010; Mason, 2018; Putnam & Campbell, 2010). One scholar (Patrikios, 2013) contends that the connection has become so strong that evangelical and Republican have become a single, fused identity. Thus, all evangelicals see themselves as Republicans and behave in ways such an identity would suggest.

While there is broad agreement that a connection exists, there is debate as to how the connection between evangelical and Republican actually works. In other words, what is it about evangelicals that leads them to identify as Republicans? Brint and Abrutyn (2010) identify five types of explanations: religiosity, moral standards traditionalism, gender and family ideology, class culture, and cultural geography. Each of these will be considered in turn.

Essentially, religiosity is grounded in the observation that, in terms of their politics, religious people behave differently from those who are less religious (or even non-religious). For example, Layman (2001) describes a religion-based "great divide" in the American public. One side of this divide is made up of highly religious people, especially evangelicals, who have a strong focus on moral issues. The other side consists of those who are less religious (or even non-religious) who tend to emphasize social or economic issues. Due to stances such as opposition to abortion, the former have gravitated toward the Republican Party, whereas the latter have gravitated toward the Democratic Party.

The basic argument of religiosity is that highly religious people emphasize their religious perspective to the degree that it shapes other aspects of life, such as politics. In seeking to explore this connection, scholars focus on indicators such as frequency of church attendance and Bible reading. Some

scholars, including Brint and Abrutyn, include components of beliefs, such as whether the Bible is the literal word of God. Ultimately, the contention is that high levels of religiosity are associated with conservative positions on political issues and identification with the Republican Party.

Next, as described by Brint and Abrutyn, moral standards traditionalism is rooted in very clear ideas of right vs. wrong. This means personal behavior should be governed by very strict guidelines. Adherents believe these guidelines should be applied to the entire society, regardless of whether some members may have differing moral views, and there is no room for adjustment. These guidelines tend to be expressed in terms of traditional standards, which are seen as threatened by social change. Thus, this perspective is associated with conservative political views. This is measured by indicators such as whether moral guidelines should be adjusted to reflect societal changes and whether "newer lifestyles" generate societal decline.

Gender and family ideology, meanwhile, is rooted in differing views of the family unit and how it should function. This approach rests on work such as that of Lakoff (2002). Essentially, Lakoff explains the differing political ideologies of liberal and conservative in terms of "Strict Father Morality" versus "Nurturant Parent Morality." Not surprisingly, the "strict father" is associated with conservative, while the "nurturant parent" is associated with liberal. Thus, for example, the strict father blocks access to abortion so that individuals are denied a means to escape the consequences for their actions that created the unintended pregnancy.

Brint and Abrutyn connect these concepts to evangelicals in a rather straightforward way. The strict father approach becomes the corollary to the biblical description of the family. This view highlights the predominant role of the husband relative to the wife, while children are expected to respect and obey parental authority. Thus, since evangelicals are more likely to share this view of the family, gender and family ideology becomes a potential explanation for connecting evangelicals with conservative politics. This is measured by indicators such as views on the extent to which spouses should have equal roles in the home.

Next, class culture is suggested as a potential explanation for the linkage between evangelicals and the Republican Party. This is of particular applicability for white evangelicals. While there continues to be some debate among scholars as to precisely how the connection works, the emphasis here is on lower levels of income and education. This is especially true for whites, as lower levels of income and education make them the most vulnerable section of the predominant racial group.

While evangelicals look more like the rest of the population in these terms than they did once upon a time, gaps remain. According to Greeley and Hout (2006, pp. 98-100), what they call "Conservative Protestants" do not compare favorably to other religious groups. Only seventeen percent of them hold college degrees, a proportion just over half that of Catholics and mainline protestants and just under one-fourth the rate for Jews. They are also more likely to hold blue-collar jobs than members of the other groups, and their family income lags by amounts ranging from around $8,000 per year to about $21,000 per year. Brint and Abrutyn explore class culture using measures such as income and years of education.

Finally, cultural geography suggests that evangelicals tend to be Republican because of where they live. Greeley and Hout (2006, pp. 92-93) note that a little more than half of Conservative Protestants live in the South. Catholics and Jews tend to live in the Northeast, while the non-religious are relatively evenly distributed throughout the country. In addition, Conservative Protestants demonstrate a marked tendency to not live in large metropolitan areas; in other words, they are much more likely to be found in small towns and rural areas.

As Brint and Abrutyn note, this is not insignificant, as rural areas tend to be more politically conservative, while urban areas tend to be more politically liberal. They measure cultural geography using a dummy variable for whether the respondent lives in the South and indicators for residence in a small town or rural area.

Using a variety of conservative political positions as dependent variables, Brint and Abrutyn find a relatively mixed bag and conclude that "the conservative attitudes of white Christians in the United States are not due to membership in particular religious traditions, but rather to social circumstances and

value commitments that are found more often among them. Low education levels, moral traditionalism, religiosity, and male-dominated gender role attitudes are the proximate causes of conservative political attitudes" (2010, p. 344). However, while religious identity does not appear to be the predominant factor in adopting conservative political positions, it does appear to be more strongly linked to Republican identity.

This is important because, once adopted, partisan affiliation influences a host of political behaviors, including voting. Of course, it is not possible to undertake a discussion of voting without considering *The American Voter*, the seminal work of Campbell et al. (1960). Broadly speaking, *American Voter* undermines the idealistic notion of voters as informed citizens who study issues, investigate the positions of the candidates, and make rational voting decisions by voting for the candidate who best fits their own positions. Indeed, the authors find that only about one in ten citizens can be said to be politically informed. Instead, vote choice is driven largely by partisanship (party ID), which is largely affective and strongly linked to the party ID of one's parents. Party ID is not necessarily linked to the individual's ideology and issues and frequently contradicts them. The study is based on panel surveys of large numbers of voters in the 1950s, especially the Eisenhower elections of 1952 and 1956. Nonetheless, *American Voter* continues to profoundly shape contemporary research on vote choice.

More recently, Bafumi and Shapiro (2009) explore the contemporary impact of partisanship on vote choice. They contend that, while it declined for a time, partisan voting is back in a big way. However, contemporary partisanship looks very different from that described in *American Voter*. The 1950s brand of partisanship was not based on ideology and issues but instead on affective attachment to a political party that frequently contradicted these fundamental concerns. Contemporary partisanship, on the other hand, is strongly linked to these influences. Thus, these days few liberals see themselves as Republicans, and few conservatives see themselves as Democrats. More importantly, they are much more likely to vote accordingly.

To be fair, vote choice is complex and involves a variety of possible explanations. For example, the political knowledge of the typical voter – or perhaps more correctly the lack thereof – continues to

generate research and debate. Generally speaking, the fundamental question here is whether – despite their low information levels – voters can nonetheless somehow manage to vote effectively. Popkin (1991) advocates for a low information rationality approach, which essentially contends that such voters can still manage to vote effectively based on information shortcuts (heuristics). While they may not be well informed about politics, as they go about their lives people learn things that they can apply when needed in order to reach an appropriate decision even in the absence of high information levels. For example, a voter who pays little attention to politics but knows that her pro-choice positions are her most important political values can fairly easily learn that these positions are advanced through voting for Democratic candidates. This is facilitated by the parties working to give very clear cues regarding what their party emphasizes.

On the other hand, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) represent the contrary approach. Essentially, this approach challenges the effectiveness of vote choice based on heuristics. As Delli Carpini and Keeter point out, at least some threshold level of knowledge is required in order to use heuristics. Without at least this basic level of knowledge, voters cannot determine what cues are appropriate to use and the circumstances under which they should be applied. Further, more informed citizens are more likely to support democratic norms, make vote choices that better reflect their interests, etc.

In a more specific setting, Lupia (1994) conducted exit polls of voters in a 1988 California election including several ballot initiatives regarding insurance reform. These were chosen specifically because they were low information issues that lacked ballot cues such as party and incumbency. Ultimately, Lupia finds that voters who were not too well informed on the issues but who knew one key piece of information – the position of the insurance industry – voted in ways that were very similar to voters who were well informed. Thus, Lupia argues, low information voters are able to use information shortcuts well enough to participate as effectively as more informed voters (at least in terms of addressing their own interests).

Meanwhile, Bullock (2011) challenges the position that low information voters are more susceptible to manipulation by party elites. Bullock conducts an experiment in which some respondents

are shown news articles with party cues, while others are shown articles including policy information. He finds that policy information matters just as much as party cues – sometimes much more – with regard to the position subsequently taken by the respondent. This means low information voters are not necessarily reduced to objects of manipulation by the party elites.

While we may be tempted to dismiss such a debate based on the assumption that it ultimately makes no difference in election outcomes, Bartels (1996) dispels this notion. Analyzing presidential elections from 1972 to 1992, Bartels concludes that – relative to a fully informed electorate – low knowledge voters generated an average bump of two percentage points for Democrats and five percentage points for incumbents. Thus, low knowledge voters present more than just an academic discussion.

These factors consider characteristics of the voter, but it is also useful to consider external factors. For purposes of this review, research on external factors impacting individual vote choice is condensed into the categories of candidates and campaigns, elite cues, the media, retrospective voting, and social networks. Each of these will be considered in turn, but even this range of categories necessarily excludes a great deal of existing research.

The level of attention paid to candidates and campaigns – not to mention the amount of money spent on campaigns – belies the presumption that they matter in terms of vote choice. Does empirical research support this presumption?

Druckman (2004) explores the impact of campaigns in the 2000 U.S. Senate election in Minnesota. He conducts a content analysis of pre-election campaign coverage and exit polling of voters on election day. The key finding is that, when asked to name the issues on which their vote choice was based, voters who had been attentive to the campaigns (as determined by their responses to exit polling questions) named issues that had in fact been emphasized by the campaigns, whereas inattentive voters named other issues. Thus, Druckman concludes that campaigns do have a meaningful impact on vote choice.

Turning to candidate related cues, Arceneaux (2008) investigates the impact of issue positions taken by candidates. More specifically, given the tendency of voters to rely on party based cues,

Arceneaux asks whether candidates generate backlash when they take positions contrary to the party line. Based on an experiment in which respondents are shown news articles with differing combinations of party cues and issue positions, he finds that voters do evaluate those candidates more harshly. The likelihood of this increases as the salience of the issue and the information level of the voter increase.

Next, McDermott (1998) considers the impact of the candidate's race and gender in low information elections. Essentially, McDermott recognizes the value of party and incumbency as cues in such races but argues that race and gender cues should be added to the mix. In a nutshell, her argument is that voters use race and gender based stereotypes to project candidates' issue positions in order to choose the candidate that is closer to their own positions. For example, voters think women are more liberal than men; thus, a liberal voter would choose the female candidate over the male candidate based on the presumption that she is the better match on issue positions.

Finally, Goren (2002 and 2007) examines the impact of perceived character weaknesses of presidential candidates using the character traits of competence, leadership, integrity, and empathy. This is essentially a motivated reasoning argument (as in partisans looking for a reason not to like the candidate of the other party). Ultimately, Goren concludes that this is especially likely to happen when the perceived weakness of the other candidate is the trait the partisan considers to be owned by her own party and when the other candidate is either the incumbent president running for reelection or the incumbent vice president running for president.

As for the media, Druckman (2005) uses content analysis of pre-election coverage and exit polling in the 2000 U.S. Senate race in Minnesota to explore the relative impact of newspaper versus television coverage on vote choice. Overall, he finds that both mediums offer similar content but that the quantity of the coverage is quite different (newspapers offer more). The key question, however, is whether this difference affects voters. Based on exit poll responses, Druckman concludes that newspaper coverage plays a significant role in informing voters but that television coverage does not.

While Druckman examines mainstream media, Levendusky (2013) explores the impact of partisan media. Based in an experiment in which different groups of respondents were exposed to

excerpts from apolitical consistent, or cross-cutting programs, Levendusky concludes that exposure to partisan media outlets does impact voters. More specifically, he concludes that such exposure causes individuals to have a more negative view of the other party, to trust the other party less, and to be less supportive of bipartisan approaches.

From a normative perspective, retrospective voting plays an important role in our political process. By linking vote choice with past performance, it offers a way for elected officials and political parties to be held accountable for their actions.

Using survey data from elections in 1956 through 1974, Fiorina (1978) examines the conventional wisdom that people vote their pocketbooks. That is, people vote for the president's party when times are good but against it when times are bad. More specifically, Fiorina explores whether there is a link between vote choice and personal economic circumstances. He concludes that personal economic circumstances do in fact affect vote choice in presidential elections. The same is true in congressional elections, but not after 1960. In light of these findings, it is perhaps not surprising that the effect is stronger in presidential election years than in midterm election years. On an interesting side note, personal economic circumstances are not found to affect whether an individual votes.

Moving the discussion forward about two decades, Fiorina et al. (2003) explore the impact of retrospective voting in the 2000 presidential election between Al Gore and George W. Bush. The results of that election call the impact of retrospective voting into question, in that the traditional peace and prosperity perspective should have generated a significant electoral advantage for Gore. Interestingly, the authors relate the results of an expert panel assembled at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, which was held about two months before the election. On average, the assembled experts predicted that Gore would receive 56 percent of the popular vote on the way to a relatively easy win. Obviously, we know in hindsight that Gore significantly underperformed these predictions, ultimately receiving barely over 50 percent of the popular vote and losing the electoral college – and the presidency – to Bush.

While the authors' discussion of how Gore's shift to the left of Clinton's centrist positions and similar issues ultimately lost votes is an interesting read, the key takeaway here concerns retrospective voting. The authors conclude that it is not dead, but they remind us that it is only one factor in the voting equation and that its impact fluctuates from election to election.

Finally, this review of external factors turns to a consideration of how voting behavior may be impacted by the influence of other individuals with whom voters associate. Klofstad et al. (2013) explore the impact of disagreement among one's social network. A key contention of these authors is that disagreement is not just disagreement; we must recognize and account for different types of disagreement. Persons exposed to partisan political disagreement tend to have stronger political preferences than those exposed to general political disagreement. Moreover, general political disagreement has broader effects on individuals but – significantly – does not reduce turnout.

This last point specifically contradicts the conclusions of Mutz (2002). She argues that exposure to disagreement in one's social network matters, in no small part because it makes it less likely that the person will vote. This results from a direct effect of discouraging participation and an indirect effect of generating greater ambivalence.

Of course, it cannot be overemphasized that partisanship affects political behavior in very broad and fundamental ways that extend beyond simply whether and for whom a person votes. This is particularly true in light of the *American Voter* approach to partisanship. While it can move to a degree, partisanship remains planted for the long term and shapes how people view the political world. This is due in large part to partisanship being affective in nature, which means that it is adopted through more of an emotional attachment than a rational tallying up of the relative pros and cons of supporting a particular party. Thus, it is not unusual for people to vote in ways that are contrary to previously held positions on issues in order to support their preferred party.

Further, people tend to alter their positions on political issues in order to accommodate their preferred party. Dancey and Goren (2010) use National Election Studies data and content analysis of television news coverage to explore the impact of elites on the positions of voters on key issues during the

Clinton Administration. They argue that elite debate generates increased coverage of an issue, which, in turn, causes voters to tune in to the debate and update their own positions. Thus, elite debate provides a mechanism that helps voters keep their issue positions up to date with their preferred party. In the absence of elite debate, such reevaluation does not occur, and voters' positions remain dormant.

Levendusky (2010b) reaches similar results. Based on an experiment in which some respondents were given elite cues on issues before being asked to state their own position while other respondents were not, Levendusky concludes that elite cues cause voters to reexamine their own positions and adopt more consistent attitudes. Again, the significance here is that people tend to adapt their issue positions to conform with their preferred party; they do not choose their preferred party based on their pre-existing issue positions.

Finally, Nicholson (2012) examines the impact of out-party leaders. People create in-groups and out-groups to help them organize and understand their world. In the political realm this translates to parties: the individual's chosen party (in-group) and the opposing party (out-group). Nicholson's core argument is that party leaders impact voters more than party labels. Using experimental questions embedded within a survey of the 2008 presidential election, Nicholson's key finding is that partisans adapt their own positions so that they are opposite positions taken by the out-party leader but that the party label itself does not generate such reevaluation. Thus, if you want to get people in rural Georgia to support something, just show them a clip of Nancy Pelosi talking about how much she hates it!

The net result of all of this is that the electorate has become much better sorted than it was once upon a time. While *The American Voter* described a population who routinely voted in ways that were contrary to their own issue positions, that is much less frequent today. Per Levendusky (2010a), this is a consequence of people increasingly adapting their issue positions to match their preferred party, even though the other party might actually be a closer fit for their own interests. This is exacerbated by exposure to partisan media (which Levendusky says increases disdain for the out-party) and the fact that many people now selectively expose themselves only to comparable media sources (thus creating an "echo chamber").

More recently, Lilliana Mason (2018) explores the continuing impact of partisanship. Essentially, Mason sees contemporary partisanship as a "mega-identity." That is, all individuals hold a variety of identities – racial, religious, partisan, etc. Historically, some of these identities tended to create cross-cutting cleavages, in that they acted to moderate the effects of partisanship. More recently, however, these other identities have become aligned with one or the other partisan identities. The result of this alignment is that, instead of acting to moderate the effects of partisanship, aligned identities reinforce and exacerbate partisanship.

Further, identity is a social phenomenon, not one driven by issue content. Thus, for example, behavior is driven by the fact that people see themselves as conservatives, not by whether they actually hold conservative positions. Indeed, while they likely do not realize it and are highly offended at the mere suggestion, most people modify their issue positions to maintain congruence with their partisan identity. This is reinforced by the modern ability to consume information only from "friendly" sources, which allows people to completely avoid exposure to information that may challenge their existing views. Thus, contemporary political behavior has become identity-driven and highly partisan, utterly unfettered by facts and issue content.

Mason identifies clear patterns of identities that align with partisanship. Perhaps chief among them is race: "[t]he parties have grown so divided by race that simple racial identity, without policy content, is enough to predict party identity" (2018, p. 33). Religion is another key factor: "[t]he Republican Party became firmly affiliated with conservative Christianity," which led people to further define their partisanship in terms of whether they shared that religious identity (2018, p. 33). Ultimately, then, white evangelicals have come to see themselves as staunch Republicans, while African-Americans and the non-religious (and perhaps those from more moderate religious traditions) consider themselves Democrats, even though some of these groups do not appear to be all that different from white evangelicals from a religious perspective. Indeed, African-Americans and Latinos have been described as more deeply religious than whites (Putnam & Campbell, 2010).

The idea that evangelical identity appears to manifest itself differently among whites than among non-whites has not escaped the notice of other scholars. For example, McKenzie and Rouse (2013) explore differing levels of interest in egalitarian issues among white, black, and Latino religious groups. The issues included overcoming discrimination against women, reducing intolerance toward homosexuals, policies to assist the poor, and policies to achieve racial parity. As might be expected, the level of interest among those considered religiously conservative varied across groups. Whites were less interested in all of these issues. Latinos were less interested in the gender discrimination and intolerance toward homosexuals issues, whereas blacks were less interested only in the intolerance toward homosexuals issue. McKenzie and Rouse contend that these variations are explained by the fact that, even among those with religiously conservative beliefs, religion is experienced in different cultural settings across the groups.

More recently, Wong (2018) explores differing levels of support for conservative political positions among White and non-White evangelicals within the context of the 2016 presidential election. She finds that Whites are consistently more conservative – and more Republican - than their non-White counterparts across a range of political issues. Wong contends that this is explained by high levels of "in-group embattlement" among Whites, which basically means that their political behavior is largely motivated by the desire to resist demographic changes they see unfolding in American society.

For an even broader context, McAdams and Lance (2013) compare the political behavior of American evangelicals with their counterparts in Brazil. While the two groups look quite similar in their positions on moral issues like abortion and gay marriage (Brazilian evangelicals are notably even more staunchly opposed to abortion), Brazilian evangelicals otherwise appear somewhat more moderate to liberal in their politics, such as party identification. This suggests that the political context within which individual adherents live out their daily lives also plays an important role in how they view the connection between their religion and their politics.

Where, then, does this leave us with regard to white evangelicals? In reality, what is the nature of the relationship between their evangelical identity and their political behavior? Many of the perspectives

described above offer meaningful contributions, yet they fail to fully connect the dots. I would suggest that a large part of why we struggle with this question is that we have built up a conventional wisdom around evangelicals that is simply not accurate.

This has caused us to view white evangelicals as salmon. That is, we see them as single-minded and doggedly determined to go their own way – upstream – no matter what is going on in the political environment around them. Instead, I would suggest that we might better understand them if we come to recognize that they have quite a bit of chameleon in them.

In other words, I contend that the fundamental flaw that leads to our misunderstanding of white evangelicals is that we erroneously think that their religion dictates their politics. We think this because there are validity problems with the criteria we use in reaching that conclusion. They tell us in our surveys of their high degree of religiosity, which largely means level of religious observance (frequency of church attendance, for example) and that their faith is very important to them. Our error lies in taking these things to mean that their religion must dictate their politics. In doing so, we have conflated two related – yet distinctly separate – things. More specifically, we equate these things with high levels of spiritual maturity, which is what we actually need to understand. I contend that it is not only possible - but very common - for individuals to be highly observant yet still have a very superficial and immature faith perspective, at least as applied to politics. The evangelical word is "discipleship," which essentially means that believers should strive to become more Christ-like and allow their faith to shape all areas of their lives. In reality, however, few approach such a standard. This means that – for many of them – their political behavior is shaped more by their own preferences and the political environment around them than by their faith perspective. Thus, to use Mason's parlance, their religion fails to mitigate their partisanship because they never reach the point in their faith journey at which they truly make their politics subject to their faith. Indeed, while many of them manage to convince themselves that their political behavior is simply an extension of their faith, in reality the opposite is true. Like Mason's partisans, they not only fail to recognize this but become defensive and enraged at the very suggestion.

Ultimately, this is why we continue to struggle with questions like why it is that Non-White and White Evangelicals – despite their religious similarities – are so different in their politics.

How, then, do we go about seeking to disentangle the relationship between evangelical identity and political behavior? The essence of the contention here is rather straightforward. If evangelical identity really is the predominant determinant of political behavior, it stands to reason that it should have a larger effect than other relevant variables on those outcomes. This may not be true all the time, but it should be true at least much of the time. In testing this contention, the analysis will be somewhat informal, in that it will not involve directly comparing coefficients to each other. Rather, the analysis will be more holistic in nature in that it will consider the overall impact of the relevant variables relative to each other.

Due to its sheer size, including numerous respondents from every state and its inclusion of many useful indicators, the analysis will be conducted using an augmented version of the common content section of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2017). This data set includes a total of 64,600 respondents, with just under 9,000 of them self-identifying as white evangelicals. Since the data set identifies the county of residence for each respondent, it can be augmented with a variety of county-level indicators to explore the impact of environmental factors. This will be done using 2016 ACS estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau (United States Census Bureau, 2016). The dependent variables to be used reflect a variety of measures of political behavior in three basic groups. The first group includes variables that are direct indicators of political behavior; the second group includes variables for which certain positions are commonly associated with evangelicals; and the third group includes variables for which positions routinely follow ideological – although not necessarily religious – dimensions.

While the specific variables are explained more fully in Chapter Two, the first group includes whether respondents voted for Donald Trump in 2016 and a measure of party identification. The second group includes whether respondents support gay marriage and whether they support a pro-life position. The third group includes measures for gun control (whether respondents support a ban on assault rifles),

immigration (whether respondents support legal status for "Dreamers"), and racism (whether respondents consider racial problems in the United States to be rare, isolated situations).

As indicated above, the essential contention here is that evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of any of these behaviors and that it is outweighed by other relevant factors. Thus, the hypotheses to be tested can be expressed as follows:

> H_1: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant in voting for Donald Trump and is outweighed by other relevant variables.
>
> H_2: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of party identification and is outweighed by other relevant variables.
>
> H_3: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of support for gay marriage and is outweighed by other relevant variables.
>
> H_4: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of support for a pro-life position and is outweighed by other relevant variables.
>
> H_5: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of support for a ban on assault rifles and is outweighed by other relevant variables.
>
> H_6: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of support for legal status for Dreamers and is outweighed by other relevant variables.
>
> H_7: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of believing that racial problems in the United States are rare, isolated situations and is outweighed by other relevant variables.

Thus, these hypotheses will be supported if the results of the models indicate that, on the whole, other relevant variables have a larger overall impact than evangelical identity on the outcomes. Conversely, these hypotheses will not be supported if the results indicate that, on the whole, evangelical identity has a larger overall impact than other relevant variables on the outcomes.

Moving forward, Chapter Two explains the variables to be used and presents the results of the Level 1 models. Chapter Three adds the Level 2 variables and presents the results of those models. Chapter Four turns the tables a bit by using the measures of evangelical identity as dependent variables instead of independent variables and exploring the relative impact of the other relevant variables on the adoption of these identities. Finally, Chapter Five discusses conclusions and suggestions for future research.

2 EFFECTS OF EVANGELICAL IDENTITY

As explained in Chapter One, the essential contention here is that evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of political behavior and is likely outweighed by other factors such as race, education, etc., including variables at both the individual and county level. The data set used here is the common content section of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2017). This data set was chosen because it includes measures that are useful for all of the variables discussed below and because it is a very large data set, including a total of 64,600 respondents. Thus, it allows analyses to be conducted on a scale somewhat larger than possible with many other data sets. The 2016 survey is used due to the importance of exploring evangelical support for Donald Trump. Also, because the data set includes the county of residence of the respondents, it can be augmented with county level indicators. This will be discussed more fully in Chapter Three, in which Level 2 variables will be added to the models.

The Level 1 variables that will be used here can be divided into three groups. These are measures of evangelical identity (independent variables), measures of political behavior (dependent variables), and measures of demographic factors such as race and education (control variables). Each group is addressed in the following discussion.

Evangelical Identity. Because evangelical identity is so central to the contentions presented here, it is appropriate to begin with these measures. The approach used here draws heavily on the work of Burge and Lewis (2018). As explained by Burge and Lewis, measuring "evangelical" for research purposes is not nearly as simple as it might at first appear. The two major approaches employed by existing research are the self-identification and affiliation approaches. The self-identification approach largely hinges on asking respondents the standard question of whether they consider themselves to be born-again or evangelical Christians. However, noting some examples of other research that developed problems from stopping with this one question, Burge and Lewis recommend pairing it with a second question to determine whether respondents also consider themselves to be Protestant. Thus, per Burge and Lewis, respondents should be classified as Evangelical if they self-identity as both born-again and

Protestant. In addition, in order to avoid conflating Evangelicals with Black Protestants (one of the other major religious traditions included in the RELTRAD approach below), Burge and Lewis contend that a control for race should be included that essentially removes Black respondents.

In compliance with these recommendations, the Evangelical measure used here is a binary one that classifies respondents as evangelical if they answer "yes" to the question asking "Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian, or not?" (pew_bornagain) and "Protestant" to the question asking "What is your present religion, if any?" (religpew). The race control is addressed by running each model once with all respondents included and once with Black respondents removed; the results for both versions are presented.

The affiliation approach is based on the work of Steensland et. al. (2000), which evaluates the belief structure of the religious tradition with which respondents are affiliated in order to determine whether they should be classified as evangelical. This is known as the RELTRAD approach, and, as noted by Burge and Lewis, it is the predominant approach in contemporary usage. Using the possible choices for religious affiliation available to respondents in the data set, there are respondents who state an affiliation with twenty traditions considered to be evangelical under the RELTRAD approach. However, since the majority of these are small (particularly in relation to the total number of respondents in the survey), the analyses here are based on the six largest such groups as measured by the number of respondents who state an affiliation with the group. The six (in no particular order) are Church of Christ, Lutheran Missouri, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, American Baptist, and Other Baptist. All of these are binary measures based on whether respondents indicate an affiliation with each group in response to the appropriate questions.

Still, there is a challenging group that is not effectively addressed by the RELTRAD approach: Nondenominational Evangelicals. From the RELTRAD perspective, this group is particularly challenging because – by definition – nondenominational evangelical congregations are generally not affiliated with a larger religious tradition. Thus, it is not possible to evaluate them in reference to a larger, shared set of beliefs, as that may actually vary quite a bit from local congregation to local congregation.

It is tempting to simply ignore them, but this is difficult due not only to the fact that they use the term "evangelical" to describe themselves but also because they make up one of the largest groups, second only to Southern Baptists in the number of respondents included. Ultimately, they are included in the models as a separate measure of evangelical identity, and the results are reported alongside those of the other groups.

Not surprisingly, these differing approaches to measuring evangelical identity make things a bit messy, especially in this chapter. This is true because accommodating the various approaches requires running each of seven models (one for each dependent variable explained below) three different times, one each for Evangelical, Evangelical / Black respondents removed, and RELTRAD. The models are identical but for the evangelical measures used, and the results are presented alongside each other for comparison.

Control Variables. As suggested above, the control variables are essentially demographic measures that describe personal characteristics of the respondent. As such, they do not require elaborate explanation.

Age is respondent's age, which is calculated by subtracting respondent's year of birth (birthyr) from 2016 (the year in which the survey was conducted). While it is true that this may result in missing the correct age by one year, depending on whether the respondent's birthday happened to fall before or after participating in the survey, this does not generate any issues of concern.

Education is respondent's level of education. It is based on a six point scale (educ) including no high school; high school graduate; some college; two year degree; four year degree; and post-graduate. Higher values indicate higher education levels.

Party ID is respondent's preferred political party. It is based on a seven point scale (pid7) ranging from Strong Democrat (1) to Strong Republican (7). Thus, higher values represent stronger Republican identification.

Male is a binary indicator of gender. It is recoded from a basic gender question (gender) so that it is coded 1 if respondent is male and 0 if not. The recoding reflects the expectation that males are more likely to behave in certain ways, such as voting for Donald Trump and identifying as Republican.

White is a binary indicator of race. It is recoded from a basic race question (race) so that it is coded 1 if respondent is White and 0 if not. The recoding reflects the expectation that Whites are more likely to behave in certain ways, such as voting for Donald Trump and identifying as Republican.

Church Regular is a binary indicator of how frequently respondent attends religious services aside from weddings and funerals. It is recoded from a seven point scale about church attendance (pew_churatd) so that it is coded 1 if respondent attends church at least once a week and 0 if not. The recoding reflects the expectation that regular church attenders may be more likely to behave in certain ways, such as voting for Donald Trump and identifying as Republican.

Dependent Variables. There are a total of seven dependent variables loosely understood to belong in one of three subgroups. The first subgroup (Trump Vote and Party ID) is intended to address overtly political behavior. The second subgroup (Abortion and Gay Marriage) is intended to address policy issues that normally have a strong association with evangelicals. The third subgroup (Gun Control, Immigration, and Racism) is intended to address policy issues that normally reflect an ideological dimension but not necessarily a religious dimension. Each of the variables is addressed in turn below.

Trump Vote is a binary measure coded 1 if the respondent voted for Donald Trump in 2016 and 0 if the respondent voted for a different candidate. It has been recoded from a question about presidential vote choice (CC16_410a), and respondents who declined to reveal their vote choice or who were not asked this question because they did not vote in 2016 are dropped from the sample.

Party ID is a seven point scale measuring respondent's preferred political party (pid7). Values range from Strong Democrat (1) to Strong Republican (7). Thus, higher values represent stronger Republican identification, whereas lower values represent stronger Democratic identification. Of course, since the measure is used in different ways in different models, Party ID is not included as an independent variable in models in which it is the dependent variable.

Gay Marriage is a binary measure that simply asks respondents whether they support allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally (CC16_335). It has been recoded 1 for respondents who support gay marriage and 0 for respondents who oppose it. Of course, this is a policy issue strongly associated with evangelicals, and they are expected to demonstrate less support than other respondents.

Pro-Life is a binary measure that asks respondents whether they support a policy that permits abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger (CC16_332b). It has been recoded 1 for respondents who support the policy and 0 for those who do not. Along with gay marriage, this is a policy issue strongly associated with evangelicals, and they are expected to be more supportive of the policy than other respondents.

Dreamer is a binary measure that asks respondents whether they support granting legal status to persons who were brought to the United States illegally as children but have since graduated from high school in the United States (CC16_331_3). It has been recoded as 1 for respondents who support the policy and 0 for those who do not. This particular immigration question was chosen in order to explore whether the sympathetic aspect (emphasizing children) leads evangelicals to adopt a softer (as in less politically conservative) stance than other respondents.

Assault Rifle Ban is a binary measure that asks respondents whether they support a ban on assault rifles (CC16_330d). It has been recoded as 1 for respondents who support such a ban and 0 for those who do not. This measure was chosen because such a ban is popular (roughly two-thirds of all respondents support it), so it creates an opportunity to see whether evangelicals take a more politically conservative position than other respondents.

Racism asks respondents to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the statement that racial problems in the United States are rare, isolated situations (CC16_422f). It is a five point scale that has been recoded so that 1 represents Strongly Disagree and 5 represents strongly agree. This measure was chosen because it essentially extends respondents an opportunity to deny that racism is a problem in the United States without expressly saying so. Thus, it allows an opportunity to see whether evangelicals take a more politically conservative position than other respondents.

Models. Finally, it is appropriate to offer a brief description of the models used before proceeding to the analyses. Most of the dependent variables are binary (Trump Vote, Gay Marriage, Pro-Life, Assault Rifle Ban, and Dreamer), so logit models are used in those cases. Cells in the results tables for those models report marginal effects, predicted probabilities, and *p* values. Regression models are used for the remaining dependent variables (Party ID and Racism). Cells in the results tables for those models present regression coefficients, predicted values, and *p* values.

Having covered these basics, the remainder of the chapter presents and discusses the results of the models. The order of the presentation essentially tracks the three subgroups of dependent variables as described above, with separate sections for primary effects of evangelical identity, interaction effects of evangelical identity, and effects of the control variables.

2.1 Primary Effects of Evangelical Identity

Trump Vote and Party ID. As described above, the first subgroup of dependent variables represents overtly political behavior. Results for the primary effects of evangelical identity on Trump Vote and Party ID are presented in Table 2.1. Shaded cells represent $p > .05$.

Turning first to Trump Vote, of immediate interest is the fact that a majority of these measures – five out of nine – do not approach statistical significance at the $p > .05$ level. Of the remaining four, three do achieve high levels of significance, while one at least reaches the $p > .10$ level. The one is Lutheran Missouri ($p > 0.085$), which increases the probability of voting for Trump by a little under three percent. The final three are split, with Nondenominational Evangelicals being almost seven percent more likely to vote for Trump. Significantly, the broader measures of evangelical identity (both with and without Black respondents being included) are negative, meaning they reduce the probability of voting for Trump by almost four percent. In addition, none of these measures changes the predicted outcome, as none of them move the predicted probability of voting for Trump past the .500 level in either direction.

Table 2.1 Primary Effects of Evangelical Identity on Trump Vote and Party ID

	Trump Vote	Party ID
Evangelical	-.035 .426/.391 ($p > 0.000$)	-.576 3.481/3.917 ($p > 0.000$)
Evangelical/No Blacks	-.039 .461/.422 ($p > 0.003$)	.285 3.694/4.153 ($p > 0.000$)
Church of Christ	-.027 .417/.390 ($p > 0.690$)	.087 3.560/3.360 ($p > 0.735$)
Lutheran Missouri	.027 .416/.443 ($p > 0.085$)	1.179 3.547/4.435 ($p > 0.000$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.067 .415/.482 ($p > 0.000$)	.739 3.525/4.616 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.099 .416/.515 ($p > 0.547$)	1.135 3.548/4.559 ($p > 0.000$)
Southern Baptist	.074 .413/.487 ($p > 0.149$)	-.345 3.526/4.259 ($p > 0.000$)
American Baptist	.041 .416/.457 ($p > 0.330$)	-.594 3.560/3.685 ($p > 0.000$)
Other Baptist	.030 .416/.446 ($p > 0.518$)	-.709 3.556/3.951 ($p > 0.000$)

The results for Party ID are more pronounced, however. Note that all but one of these measures (Church of Christ) are very highly significant ($p > 0.000$). In addition, as indicated by the predicted values, all of these make respondents more Republican than respondents who do not identify with any of these categories, but the effects are so modest that only about half of them change the predicted outcome. Evangelical / Black respondents removed, Lutheran Missouri, Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, and Southern Baptist all make respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale. Even then, however, the highest predicted value is a four, which equates to Independent on the seven point Party ID scale.

Overall, these results suggest that the primary effects of evangelical identity on the overtly political dependent variables are much smaller than conventional wisdom might have suggested. Two of the three statistically significant measures (both of the broad Evangelical measures) actually have a negative effect on the probability of voting for Donald Trump, and none of them changes the predicted outcome. The effects on Party ID are stronger, with all but one of the evangelical identity measures being highly statistically significant. Even then, however, the magnitude of the effects is very modest. While five of them make respondents one level more Republican, none of them manage to produce a predicted value that reaches even the weakest level of Republican on the Party ID scale.

Gay Marriage and Pro-Life. The next subgroup of dependent variables represents "hot-button" social issues for which Evangelicals are strongly associated with certain positions. Results for the primary effects of evangelical identity on Gay Marriage and Pro-Life are presented in Table 2.2. Again, shaded cells represent $p > .05$.

Two points are readily apparent from the results for Gay Marriage. First, the majority – though not all – of the evangelical identity measures achieve statistical significance at a high level. Second, all of the ones that do so have a negative effect on support for gay marriage.

However, looking beyond these broader points reveals – yet again – that the impact of evangelical identity is somewhat modest. Of the six measures that fit the two points above, only two of them (Nondenominational Evangelical and Pentecostal Assemblies of God) reduce the predicted probability of supporting gay marriage from above to below the .500 level. None of the Baptist categories – including the traditionally conservative Southern Baptists – fall below the .500 level (although Southern Baptist does come very close), while the broader Evangelical measure has little effect at all.

Abortion is another issue strongly associated with Evangelicals. As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, recall that the abortion measure used here asks respondents whether they support the policy position of prohibiting abortion except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life.
As with Gay Marriage, six of the nine measures of evangelical identity achieve high levels of statistical significance. Evangelical / Black respondents removed actually reduces predicted support for the Pro-

Life position, while the other five all have positive effects. Four of these five (Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, and American Baptist) increase the predicted probability of supporting the Pro-Life position from below to above the .500 level, while the fifth (Other Baptist at .499) barely misses.

Table 2.2 Primary Effects of Evangelical Identity on Gay Marriage and Pro-Life

	Gay Marriage	Pro-Life
Evangelical	- .016 .654/.638 ($p > 0.004$)	- .045 .475/.430 ($p > 0.934$)
Evangelical/No Blacks	- .017 .663/.646 ($p > 0.120$)	- .053 .471/.418 ($p > 0.002$)
Church of Christ	.058 .650/.708 ($p > 0.692$)	- .045 .455/.410 ($p > 0.220$)
Lutheran Missouri	- .051 .651/.600 ($p > 0.318$)	.076 .454/.530 ($p > 0.247$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	- .249 .657/.408 ($p > 0.000$)	.087 .454/.541 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	- .239 .652/.413 ($p > 0.000$)	.095 .455/.550 ($p > 0.002$)
Southern Baptist	- .157 .657/.500 ($p > 0.000$)	.089 .452/.541 ($p > 0.000$)
American Baptist	- .100 .651/.551 ($p > 0.000$)	.119 .454/.573 ($p > 0.000$)
Other Baptist	- .118 .653/.535 ($p > 0.000$)	.045 .454/.499 ($p > 0.000$)

Looking at these effects overall, six of the nine measures of evangelical identity achieve statistical significance for each of these dependent variables. As expected, with the exception of Evangelical / Black respondents removed for Pro-Life, the effects are negative for Gay Marriage and

positive for Pro-Life. Six of the effects (two for Gay Marriage and four for Pro-Life) move the predicted probability past the .500 level.

Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, and Racism. The final subgroup of dependent variables represents issues for which positions may tend to break down along ideological – although not necessarily religious - dimensions. Results for the primary effects of evangelical identity on Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, and Racism are presented in Table 2.3. Again, shaded cells represent $p > .05$.

Table 2.3 Primary Effects of Evangelical Identity on Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, and Racism

	Assault Rifle Ban	Dreamer	Racism
Evangelical	.011 .663/.674 ($p > 0.006$)	.047 .464/.511 ($p > 0.003$)	-.262 2.353/2.063 ($p > 0.000$)
Evangelical/No Blacks	.007 .644/.651 ($p > 0.916$)	.049 .456/.505 ($p > 0.001$)	-.166 2.405/2.104 ($p > 0.001$)
Church of Christ	.018 .666/.684 ($p > 0.824$)	.023 .474/.497 ($p > 0.081$)	.149 2.282/2.249 ($p > 0.370$)
Lutheran Missouri	- .043 .667/.624 ($p > 0.105$)	- .061 .475/.414 ($p > 0.004$)	.438 2.279/2.501 ($p > 0.002$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	- .089 .669/.580 ($p > 0.004$)	- .038 .475/.437 ($p > 0.324$)	.112 2.280/2.418 ($p > 0.092$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	- .030 .667/.637 ($p > 0.928$)	.001 .474/.475 ($p > 0.836$)	-.031 2.282/2.245 ($p > 0.816$)
Southern Baptist	- .041 .668/.627 ($p > 0.986$)	- .066 .477/.411 ($p > 0.000$)	.084 2.279/2.367 ($p > 0.119$)
American Baptist	.017 .666/.683 ($p > 0.610$)	- .038 .475/.437 ($p > 0.001$)	.265 2.279/2.509 ($p > 0.004$)
Other Baptist	- .057 .667/.610 ($p > 0.351$)	- .084 .476/.392 ($p > 0.000$)	-.008 2.281/2.347 ($p > 0.906$)

The primary effects – or perhaps more correctly non-effects – of evangelical identity on Assault Rifle Ban are rather straightforward. Only two of the nine measures reach statistical significance, and they present mixed results. Evangelical has a small positive effect on support for the ban, while

Nondenominational Evangelical has a modest negative effect. However, perhaps due to what appears to be a rather strong level of support overall, neither of them changes the predicted outcome.

As for Dreamer, recall that the measure used here asks respondents whether they support legal status for persons brought to the United States illegally as children but who have since graduated from high school in the United States. These results are a bit more promising, with six out of the nine measures reaching statistical significance. Interestingly, both of the broader Evangelical measures increase support, while all four of the RELTRAD measures have negative effects. However, only the two broader Evangelical measures move the predicted probability of support past the .500 level in either direction.

The final issue in this subgroup is Racism. As explained at the beginning of the chapter, the measure used asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement that racial problems in the United States are rare, isolated situations. Higher values indicate stronger agreement with the statement, indicating that the respondent does not consider racism to be a widespread problem. As can be seen, less than half of these measures (four out of nine) are statistically significant. Both of the broader Evangelical measures have negative effects, suggesting that these respondents are more likely to see racism as a problem, while both of the RELTRAD measures have positive effects. However, none of them change the predicted value on the five point Racism scale.

Looking at the evangelical identity effects for this subgroup overall, the measures reach statistical significance less than half the time (12/27). Further, the evangelical measures change the predicted outcome only twice, with both of those being the broader Evangelical measures on Dreamer. Notably, however, the broader Evangelical measures consistently produce more liberal positions, while – with one exception – the RELTRAD measures produce more conservative positions.

Looking at the effects across all seven dependent variables, the evangelical measures reach statistical significance only 55.5% of the time (35/63) and change the predicted outcome only 20.6% of the time (13/63). In addition, the thirteen instances of predicted outcome change are quite concentrated, with five of them coming through increasing the predicted probability of supporting the Pro-Life position

from below to above the .500 level and four more through making respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale (although even then failing to generate a predicted value higher than Independent on the seven point scale). All things considered, then, suggesting that the primary effects of evangelical identity fail to produce a strong impact in these results would be something of an understatement.

However, it is always possible that the interaction effects of evangelical identity could produce stronger results. The analysis proceeds to those results in the next section.

2.2 Interaction Effects of Evangelical Identity

It is not feasible to consolidate the tables showing interaction effects in the same manner as the tables showing primary effects, so these results will be presented in a separate table for each dependent variable. However, the subgroups of dependent variables will be maintained as before.

Trump Vote and Party ID. Interaction effects of evangelical identity with White and Church Regular for Trump Vote and Party ID are presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. As before, shaded cells represent $p > .05$.

Turning first to Trump Vote, the interaction effects achieve statistical significance only 55.5% of the time (20/36) and change the predicted outcome only 11.1% of the time (4/36). All four of the predicted outcome changes occur through the interaction with White, for which Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, American Baptist, and Other Baptist all increase the predicted probability of voting for Trump from below to above the .500 level. Notably, Southern Baptist makes both Whites and Non-Whites more likely to vote for Trump (although the effect is about four times as large for Whites), while the other three have positive effects for Whites but negative effects for Non-Whites. This suggests that race is an important factor here, and it will be revisited during the discussion regarding control variables. These results are shown in Figures 2.1 – 2.4.

While none of the interaction effects with Church Regular change the predicted outcome, it is interesting to note that the effects for the broader Evangelical measures are consistently negative and

roughly twice as large for Church Regulars than for Non-Church Regulars. On the other hand, the RELTRAD effects are mostly positive and consistently larger for Non-Church Regulars.

Table 2.4 Interaction Efects of Evangelical Identity - Trump Vote

	Non-White	White	Non-Church Regular	Church Regular
Evangelical	-.063 .237/.174 ($p > 0.000$)	-.027 .482/.455 ($p > 0.000$)	-.025 .368/.343 ($p > 0.000$)	-.063 .584/.521 ($p > 0.000$)
Evangelical/No Blacks	-.052 .332/.280 ($p > 0.206$)	-.038 .484/.446 ($p > 0.206$)	-.030 .394/.364 ($p > 0.000$)	-.066 .655/.589 ($p > 0.000$)
Church of Christ	.002 .216/.218 ($p > 0.504$)	-.035 .476/.441 ($p > 0.504$)	-.010 .366/.356 ($p > 0.068$)	-.073 .556/.483 ($p > 0.068$)
Lutheran Missouri	.061 .216/.277 ($p > 0.185$)	.017 .475/.492 ($p > 0.185$)	.024 .365/.389 ($p > 0.732$)	.034 .555/.589 ($p > 0.732$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.045 .215/.260 ($p > 0.504$)	.073 .474/.547 ($p > 0.504$)	.091 .364/.455 ($p > 0.000$)	.000 .555/.555 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	-.007 .217/.210 ($p > 0.002$)	.130 .474/.604 ($p > 0.002$)	.131 .365/.496 ($p > 0.003$)	.010 .555/.565 ($p > 0.003$)
Southern Baptist	.022 .215/.237 ($p > 0.003$)	.089 .472/.561 ($p > 0.003$)	.079 .363/.442 ($p > 0.718$)	.060 .551/.611 ($p > 0.718$)
American Baptist	-.052 .217/.165 ($p > 0.005$)	.067 .475/.542 ($p > 0.005$)	.065 .365/.430 ($p > 0.052$)	-.026 .556/.530 ($p > 0.052$)
Other Baptist	-.022 .217/.195 ($p > 0.022$)	.045 .475/.520 ($p > 0.022$)	.040 .365/.405 ($p > 0.331$)	.005 .555/560 ($p > 0.331$)



Figure 2.1 Interaction of Southern Baptist over White - Trump Vote



Figure 2.2 Interaction of Pentecostal Assemblies of God over White - Trump Vote



Figure 2.3 Interaction of American Baptist over White - Trump Vote



Figure 2.4 Interaction of Other Baptist over White - Trump Vote

Table 2.5 Interaction Effects of Evangelical Identity - Party ID

	Non-White	White	Non-Church Regular	Church Regular
Evangelical	1.417 2.835/2.249 ($p > 0.000$)	1.417 3.732/4.565 ($p > 0.000$)	-.032 3.336/3.804 ($p > 0.465$)	-.032 3.887/4.236 ($p > 0.465$)
Evangelical/No Blacks	.226 3.221/3.495 ($p > 0.000$)	.226 3.797/4.297 ($p > 0.000$)	-.045 3.499/3.970 ($p > 0.344$)	-.045 4.284/4.708 ($p > 0.344$)
Church of Christ	-.075 2.701/2.518 ($p > 0.778$)	-.075 3.893/3.687 ($p > 0.778$	-.887 3.386/3.419 ($p > 0.000$)	-.887 4.048/3.197 ($p > 0.000$)
Lutheran Missouri	-.379 2.695/3.852 ($p > 0.116$)	-.379 3.878/4.661 ($p > 0.116$)	-.073 3.375/4.276 ($p > 0.640$)	-.073 4.029/4.880 ($p > 0.640$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.565 2.680/3.355 ($p > 0.000$)	.565 3.853/5.105 ($p > 0.000$)	-.210 3.368/4.523 ($p > 0.026$)	-.210 3.967/4.877 ($p > 0.026$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	-.235 2.691/3.878 ($p > 0.251$)	-.235 3.881/4.824 ($p > 0.251$)	.171 3.382/4.344 ($p > 0.330$)	.171 4.016/5.163 ($p > 0.330$)
Southern Baptist	1.545 2.718/2.332 ($p > 0.000$)	1.545 3.840/5.007 ($p > 0.000$)	-.132 3.362/4.155 ($p > 0.093$)	-.132 3.986/4.552 ($p > 0.093$)
American Baptist	1.229 2.714/1.927 ($p > 0.000$)	1.229 3.888/4.367 ($p > 0.000$)	-.635 3.386/3.697 ($p > 0.000$)	-.635 4.050/3.650 ($p > 0.000$)
Other Baptist	1.539 2.722/2.008 ($p > 0.000$)	1.539 3.880/4.705 ($p > 0.000$)	-.018 3.384/3.808 ($p > 0.887$)	-.018 4.041/4.353 ($p > 0.887$)

As shown in Table 2.5, the interaction effects of evangelical identity on Party ID reach statistical significance 50.0% of the time (18/36) and change the predicted outcome 33.3% of the time (12/36). The predicted outcome changes are very concentrated, however, with half of them coming from evangelical identity making Whites more Republican. Four of the evangelical measures (Evangelical, Evangelical / Black respondents removed, American Baptist, and Other Baptist) make Whites one level more Republican. Nondenominational Evangelical and Southern Baptist make Whites two levels more Republican, although the predicted value is barely beyond the Independent level on the seven point scale. These are the most significant impacts and are shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. As for Non-Whites, Nondenominational Evangelical makes them one level more Republican, while American Baptist makes

them one level less Republican. Thus, American Baptist has a negative effect on Non-Whites but a positive effect on Whites (Figure 2.7).



Figure 2.5 Interaction of Nondenominational Evangelical over White - Party ID



Figure 2.6 Interaction of Southern Baptist over White - Party ID



Figure 2.7 Interaction of American Baptist over White - Party ID

The interaction effects with Church Regular (those who attend church at least weekly) are more muted. Both Church of Christ and American Baptist make Church Regulars one level less Republican, while Nondenominational Evangelical makes both Church Regulars and Non-Church Regulars one level more Republican. Interestingly, while the predicted value for Non-Church Regulars does not change, the effects of American Baptist are such that Church Regulars end up being slightly less Republican than Non-Church Regulars (Figure 2.8).



Figure 2.8 Interaction of American Baptist over Church Regular - Party ID

Overall, as with Trump Vote, race seems to be a factor of interest. The most notable results here lie in several measures of evangelical identity making respondents more Republican, with Nondenominational Evangelical and Southern Baptist making them two levels more Republican. Still, however, the results are modest, with the strongest predicted value barely crossing into the weakest level of Republican identity (5) on the seven point Party ID scale.

Gay Marriage and Pro-Life. The analysis now turns to the second subgroup of dependent variables, those for which Evangelicals are typically associated with a particular position. Results of the interaction effects for Gay Marriage and Pro-Life are presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.

Table 2.6 Interaction Effects of Evangelical Identity - Gay Marriage

	Non-White	White	Non-Church Regular	Church Regular
Evangelical	- .034 .650/.616 ($p > 0.008$)	- .009 .656/.647 ($p > 0.008$)	- .014 .752/.738 ($p > 0.657$)	- .022 .380/.358 ($p > 0.657$)
Evangelical/No Blacks	- .021 .689/.668 ($p > 0.674$)	- .016 .657/.641 ($p > 0.674$)	- .017 .758/.741 ($p > 0.698$)	- .016 .373/.357 ($p > 0.698$)
Church of Christ	.031 .641/.672 ($p > 0.331$)	.069 .653/.722 ($p > 0.331$)	.015 .749/.764 ($p > 0.001$)	.179 .370/.549 ($p > 0.001$)
Lutheran Missouri	- .041 .642/.601 ($p > 0.720$)	- .056 .655/.599 ($p > 0.720$)	- .056 .750/.694 ($p > 0.479$)	- .037 .372/.335 ($p > 0.479$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	- .263 .648/.385 ($p > 0.818$)	- .243 .660/.417 ($p > 0.818$)	- .285 .754/.469 ($p > 0.000$)	- .146 .382/.236 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	- .308 .643/.335 ($p > 0.202$)	- .213 .656/.443 ($p > 0.202$)	- .243 .751/.508 ($p > 0.462$)	- .229 .375/.146 ($p > 0.462$)
Southern Baptist	- .114 .646/.532 ($p > 0.000$)	- .125 .662/.487 ($p > 0.000$)	- .162 .755/.593 ($p > 0.870$)	- .146 .382/.236 ($p > 0.870$)
American Baptist	- .093 .643/.550 ($p > 0.745$)	- .103 .654/.551 ($p > 0.745$)	- .130 .750/.620 ($p > 0.001$)	- .016 .371/.355 ($p > 0.001$)
Other Baptist	- .111 .645/.534 ($p > 0.370$)	- .121 .656/.535 ($p > 0.370$)	- .112 .751/.639 ($p > 0.391$)	- .132 .374/.242 ($p > 0.391$)

Perhaps surprisingly, the interaction effects make a rather weak showing with regard to support for Gay Marriage. These effects reach statistical significance only 27.7% of the time (10/36) and change

the predicted outcome only 8.3% of the time (3/36). Southern Baptist reduces predicted support for Gay Marriage from above to below .500 for Whites, as does Nondenominational Evangelical for Non-Church Regulars. On the other hand, Church of Christ increases predicted support from below to above .500 for Church Regulars. Overall, while most of the statistically significant effects fail to change the predicted outcome, it is worth noting that – except for Church of Christ – the effects are consistently negative.

Table 2.7 Interaction Effects of Evangelical Identity - Pro-Life

	Non-White	White	Non-Church Regular	Church Regular
Evangelical	- .054 .513/.459 ($p > 0.876$)	- .041 .460/.419 ($p > 0.876$)	.000 .417/.417 ($p > 0.000$)	- .170 .636/.466 ($p > 0.000$)
Evangelical/No Blacks	- .107 .514/.407 ($p > 0.000$)	- .042 .462/.420 ($p > 0.000$)	- .004 .414/.410 ($p > 0.000$)	- .202 .644/.442 ($p > 0.000$)
Church of Christ	- .110 .489/.379 ($p > 0.206$)	- .020 .442/.422 ($p > 0.206$)	- .017 .417/.400 ($p > 0.046$)	- .123 .562/.439 ($p > 0.046$)
Lutheran Missouri	.062 .488/.550 ($p > 0.710$)	.082 .441/.523 ($p > 0.710$)	.083 .416/.499 ($p > 0.573$)	.059 .560/.619 ($p > 0.573$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.060 .488/.548 ($p > 0.190$)	.098 .440/.538 ($p > 0.190$)	.124 .415/.539 ($p > 0.000$)	- .017 .562/.545 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.085 .489/.574 ($p > 0.998$)	.099 .442/.541 ($p > 0.998$)	.166 .417/.583 ($p > 0.000$)	- .105 .563/.458 ($p > 0.000$)
Southern Baptist	.066 .486/.552 ($p > 0.209$)	.097 .439/.536 ($p > 0.209$)	.122 .413/.535 ($p > 0.000$)	- .003 .561/.558 ($p > 0.000$)
American Baptist	.109 .487/.596 ($p > 0.825$)	.123 .441/.564 ($p > 0.825$)	.151 .416/.567 ($p > 0.004$)	.030 .561/.591 ($p > 0.004$)
Other Baptist	.046 .487/.533 ($p > 0.808$)	.045 .441/.486 ($p > 0.808$)	.082 .416/.498 ($p > 0.000$)	- .058 .562/.504 ($p > 0.000$)

The interaction effects look stronger for Pro-Life than for Gay Marriage, but they are still not particularly strong. These effects achieve statistical significance 50.0% of the time (18/36), but the contrast is rather stark. Only one measure (Evangelical / Black respondents removed) is significant for the interaction with White, while all the measures except one (Lutheran Missouri) are significant for the interaction with Church Regular. However, the predicted outcome changes only 22.2% of the time

(8/36). Perhaps surprisingly, the changes in predicted outcome are split evenly between positive and negative effects. Evangelical / Black respondents removed lowers the predicted probability of support from above to below .500 for Non-Whites. Evangelical, Church of Christ, and Pentecostal Assemblies of God do likewise for Church Regulars. Meanwhile, Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, and American Baptist all increase predicted support from below to above the .500 level for Non-Church Regulars. Interestingly, this means that Pentecostal Assemblies of God affects Church Regulars and Non-Church Regulars in opposite directions (Figure 2.9).



Figure 2.9 Interaction of Pentecostal Assemblies of God over Church Regular - Pro-Life

Overall, then, the interaction effects of evangelical identity on Gay Marriage and Pro-Life are quite weak. At best, statistical significance is reached only about half the time, while the predicted outcome is changed no more than about one in five times. Further, even when the predicted outcome is changed, the changes are equally split between positive and negative effects.

Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, and Racism. Thus, the analysis now reaches the interaction effects for the final subgroup of dependent variables. As described earlier, these are variables for which positions might be expected to fall along ideological – although not necessarily religious – dimensions.

Table 2.8 Interaction Effects of Evangelical Identity - Assault Rifle Ban

	Non-White	White	Non-Church Regular	Church Regular
Evangelical	.033 .729/.762 ($p > 0.000$)	.002 .638/.640 ($p > 0.000$)	.007 .682/.689 ($p > 0.156$)	.021 .610/.631 ($p > 0.156$)
Evangelical/No Blacks	.004 .676/.680 ($p > 0.781$)	.008 .637/.645 ($p > 0.781$)	.005 .668/.673 ($p > 0.375$)	.015 .569/.584 ($p > 0.375$)
Church of Christ	.001 .737/.738 ($p > 0.703$)	.025 .639/.664 ($p > 0.703$)	.004 .683/.687 ($p > 0.261$)	.057 .620/.677 ($p > 0.261$)
Lutheran Missouri	- .071 .737/.666 ($p > 0.368$)	- .033 .640/.607 ($p > 0.368$)	- .045 .683/.638 ($p > 0.726$)	- .038 .621/.583 ($p > 0.726$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	- .039 .738/.699 ($p > 0.009$)	- .108 .642/.534 ($p > 0.009$)	- .110 .685/.575 ($p > 0.000$)	- .029 .623/.594 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	- .007 .737/.730 ($p > 0.477$)	- .039 .640/.601 ($p > 0.477$)	- .027 .683/.656 ($p > 0.713$)	- .040 .621/.581 ($p > 0.713$)
Southern Baptist	.003 .737/.740 ($p > 0.003$)	- .059 .642/.583 ($p > 0.003$)	- .044 .684/.640 ($p > 0.508$)	- .032 .623/.591 ($p > 0.508$)
American Baptist	- .012 .737/.725 ($p > 0.278$)	.027 .639/.666 ($p > 0.278$)	.014 .683/.697 ($p > 0.793$)	.024 .620/.644 ($p > 0.793$)
Other Baptist	- .025 .738/.713 ($p > 0.137$)	- .070 .640/.570 ($p > 0.137$)	- .052 .684/.632 ($p > 0.449$)	- .073 .621/.548 ($p > 0.449$)

Results for the interaction effects on Assault Rifle Ban are shown in Table 2.8. Briefly put, there is little to see here. Statistical significance is reached only 22.2% of the time (8/36). None of the effects change the predicted outcome, which may be due in part to the support levels being so high overall. To the extent that there are any worthwhile results, it may be that Evangelical has positive effects while the RELTRAD measures have negative effects. In other words, Evangelical tends to produce more liberal positions, while RELTRAD tends to produce more conservative positions.

Table 2.9 presents the interaction results for Dreamer. There is more here than for Assault Rifle Ban, although that does not necessarily mean much. Statistical significance is achieved 33.3% of the time (12/36), and the predicted outcome changes 13.8% of the time (5/36). The direction of the predicted outcome changes is split rather evenly. Church of Christ, Lutheran Missouri, and American Baptist all

reduce the predicted probability of supporting Dreamer from above to below the .500 level for Non-Whites. Church of Christ increases the predicted probability of supporting Dreamer from below to above .500 for Whites, while Evangelical does the same for Non-Church Regulars. Thus, Church of Christ produces negative effects for Non-Whites but positive effects for Whites. Also, as with Assault Rifle Ban, the general pattern – while limited in scope – is that Evangelical tends to produce more politically liberal positions, and the RELTRAD measures tend to produce more politically conservative positions.

Table 2.9 Interaction Effects of Evangelical Identity - Dreamer

	Non-White	White	Non-Church Regular	Church Regular
Evangelical	.048 .510/.558 ($p > 0.822$)	.047 .446/.493 ($p > 0.822$)	.041 .489/.530 ($p > 0.016$)	.063 .394/.457 ($p > 0.016$)
Evangelical/No Blacks	.066 .498/.564 ($p > 0.212$)	.045 .447/.492 ($p > 0.212$)	.044 .483/.527 ($p > 0.080$)	.061 .376/.437 ($p > 0.080$)
Church of Christ	- .083 .523/.440 ($p > 0.016$)	.064 .455/.519 ($p > 0.016$)	.003 .493/.496 ($p > 0.081$)	.077 .421/.498 ($p > 0.081$)
Lutheran Missouri	- .157 .523/.366 ($p > 0.026$)	- .023 .456/.433 ($p > 0.026$)	- .075 .494/.419 ($p > 0.107$)	- .022 .421/.399 ($p > 0.107$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.000 .521/.521 ($p > 0.050$)	- .051 .456/.405 ($p > 0.050$)	- .059 .494/.435 ($p > 0.000$)	.024 .420/.444 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.034 .522/.556 ($p > 0.405$)	- .013 .456/.443 ($p > 0.405$)	- .019 .493/.474 ($p > 0.082$)	.056 .420/.476 ($p > 0.082$)
Southern Baptist	- .093 .526/.433 ($p > 0.102$)	- .055 .458/.403 ($p > 0.102$)	- .066 .495/.429 ($p > 0.997$)	- .065 .426/.361 ($p > 0.997$)
American Baptist	- .108 .524/.416 ($p > 0.016$)	- .011 .456/.445 ($p > 0.016$)	- .041 .494/.453 ($p > 0.701$)	- .030 .422/.392 ($p > 0.701$)
Other Baptist	- .099 .526/.427 ($p > 0.685$)	- .079 .457/.378 ($p > 0.685$)	- .079 .495/.416 ($p > 0.372$)	- .100 .424/.324 ($p > 0.372$)

Finally, interaction effects for Racism are shown in Table 2.10. Recall that higher values represent stronger agreement with the statement that racial problems in the United States are rare, isolated situations. As with the other dependent variables in this subgroup, there is little to report. Statistical significance is achieved only 33.3% of the time (12/36), and predicted outcomes are changed only 2.7% of the time (1/36). The only predicted value change is for Evangelical, which reduces the predicted value for Non-Church Regulars by one level on the five point Racism scale. The direction of the effects is a rather mixed bag overall, although it bears noting that the effects are consistently negative for Church Regulars.

Table 2.10 Interaction Effects of Evangelical Identity - Racism

	Non-White	White	Non-Church Regular	Church Regular
Evangelical	.024 2.142/1.826 ($p > 0.399$)	.024 2.420/2.138 ($p > 0.399$)	-.178 2.225/1.981 ($p > 0.000$)	-.178 2.722/2.299 ($p > 0.000$)
Evangelical/No Blacks	-.108 2.289/2.077 ($p > 0.007$)	-.108 2.427/2.109 ($p > 0.007$)	-.179 2.265/2.009 ($p > 0.000$)	-.179 2.831/2.395 ($p > 0.000$)
Church of Christ	-.119 2.057/2.100 ($p > 0.486$)	-.119 2.353/2.296 ($p > 0.486$)	-.355 2.197/2.254 ($p > 0.003$)	-.355 2.526/2.234 ($p > 0.003$)
Lutheran Missouri	-.267 2.055/2.478 ($p > 0.066$)	-.267 2.349/2.508 ($p > 0.066$)	-.050 2.195/2.426 ($p > 0.587$)	-.050 2.520/2.716 ($p > 0.587$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.114 2.058/2.100 ($p > 0.074$)	.114 2.350/2.518 ($p > 0.074$)	-.235 2.194/2.395 ($p > 0.000$)	-.235 2.526/2.486 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.044 2.058/1.980 ($p > 0.733$)	.044 2.353/2.329 ($p > 0.733$)	-.154 2.197/2.201 ($p > 0.143$)	-.154 2.526/2.373 ($p > 0.143$)
Southern Baptist	.073 2.057/2.081 ($p > 0.201$)	.073 2.349/2.457 ($p > 0.201$)	-.202 2.193/2.333 ($p > 0.000$)	-.202 2.528/2.462 ($p > 0.000$)
American Baptist	-.048 2.052/2.319 ($p > 0.658$)	-.048 2.351/2.569 ($p > 0.658$)	.003 2.196/2.424 ($p > 0.979$)	.003 2.520/2.753 ($p > 0.979$)
Other Baptist	.134 2.058/2.019 ($p > 0.086$)	.134 2.351/2.451 ($p > 0.086$)	-.105 2.196/2.292 ($p > 0.212$)	-.105 2.524/2.507 ($p > 0.212$)

All things considered, the interaction effects of evangelical identity on this last subgroup of dependent variables is – bluntly put – weak. Statistical significance is never higher than 33.3%, while

predicted outcomes are never changed more than 13.8% of the time. The direction of the effects is a rather mixed bag, although there is something of a tendency – perhaps less so for Racism – for Evangelical to produce more liberal positions, while the RELTRAD measures produce more conservative positions.

2.3 Control Variables

Now that the impact of the direct effects and interaction effects of evangelical identity on the dependent variables has been explored, it is appropriate to consider the impact of the control variables; these are demographic indicators such as age, education, etc. Recall that the essential contention here is that evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of political behavior and that it is likely outweighed by other relevant variables. Thus, it is necessary to consider the effects of the control variables in order to compare their relative impact with that of the evangelical measures. The dependent variables are presented in the same three subgroups explained previously.

Trump Vote and Party ID. Results for the effects of the controls on Trump Vote are presented in Table 2.11. Notably, all six of them achieve very high levels of statistical significance ($p > 0.000$), and this remains constant across all three approaches to measuring evangelical identity. Thus, statistical significance is achieved 100.0% of the time (18/18).

The predicted outcomes are changed 38.8% of the time (7/18). Both Age and Party ID increase the predicted probability of voting for Trump from below to above the .500 level in all three models. Education reduces the predicted probability of voting for Trump from above to below the .500 level in the Evangelical / Black respondents removed model and may well have done so in the other models but for the fact that the beginning point is just below .500 (.488, .494). While they do not change any predicted outcomes, Male, White, and Church Regular have consistently positive effects.

Not surprisingly, Party ID has the largest impact, increasing the predicted probability of voting for Trump from about five percent to more than ninety percent moving from Strong Democrat to Strong

Republican on the Party ID scale. Results for the Evangelical model are presented in Figure 2.10; the results are substantially similar across all three models.

Table 2.11 Effects of Control Variables - Trump Vote

	Evangelical	Evangelical/ No Blacks	RELTRAD
Age	.188 .342/.530 ($p > 0.000$)	.202 .371/.573 ($p > 0.000$)	.184 .344/.528 ($p > 0.000$)
Education	-.124 .488/.364 ($p > 0.000$)	-.136 .530/.394 ($p > 0.000$)	-.135 .494/.359 ($p > 0.000$)
Party ID	.880 .047/.927 ($p > 0.000$)	.879 .051/.930 ($p > 0.000$)	.884 .045/.929 ($p > 0.000$)
Male	.031 .401/.432 ($p > 0.000$)	.028 .438/.466 ($p > 0.000$)	.027 .403/.430 ($p > 0.000$)
White	.055 .373/.428 ($p > 0.000$)	.023 .433/.456 ($p > 0.000$)	.051 .376/.427 ($p > 0.000$)
Church Regular	.024 .413/.437 ($p > 0.000$)	.027 .448/.475 ($p > 0.000$)	.041 .408/.449 ($p > 0.000$)



Figure 2.10 Effect of Party ID on Trump Vote / Evangelical

Age also appears to have a significant impact, as the probability of voting for Trump increases from below to above the .500 threshold as age increases. Figure 2.11 presents the results of the Evangelical model. The results are substantially the same for the other models, except that the .500 threshold is crossed at an earlier age point in the model with Black respondents removed.



Figure 2.11 Effect of Age on Trump Vote / Evangelical

While it changes the predicted outcome only in the Evangelical model with Black respondents removed (Figure 2.12), essentially because the predicted probability of voting for Trump is just below .500 for the lowest education level in the other models, education also has a significant impact. Unlike age, however, the impact of education is consistently negative. Respondents are somewhat less likely to vote for Trump as education level increases, as the predicted probability of doing so drops by about thirteen percent for the most highly educated.



Figure 2.12 Effect of Education on Trump Vote / Evangelical / Black respondents removed

Moving now to the impact of the control variables on Party ID, these results are presented in Table 2.12. Again, statistical significance is achieved at a very high $p > 0.000$ 100.0% of the time (15/15).

Table 2.12 Effects of Control Variables - Party ID

	Evangelical	Evangelical/ No Blacks	RELTRAD
Age	.004 3.451/3.754 ($p > 0.000$)	.006 3.589/4.113 ($p > 0.000$)	.004 3.429/3.795 ($p > 0.000$)
Education	-.098 3.822/3.330 ($p > 0.000$)	-.118 4.096/3.505 ($p > 0.000$)	-.116 3.871/3.288 ($p > 0.000$)
Male	.302 3.419/3.720 ($p > 0.000$)	.241 3.662/3.903 ($p > 0.000$)	.273 3.432/3.705 ($p > 0.000$)
White	.890 2.719/3.896 ($p > 0.000$)	.418 3.398/3.858 ($p > 0.000$)	1.027 2.739/3.888 ($p > 0.000$)
Church Regular	.432 3.448/3.874 ($p > 0.000$)	.503 3.657/4.152 ($p > 0.000$)	.648 3.399/4.021 ($p > 0.000$)

The predicted outcomes change a bit more frequently here than for Trump Vote, coming in at 40.0% (6/15). Except for Education, the effects are all positive.

However, as suggested by the predicted values, the effects of these variables – while consistent – are modest. In the Evangelical model, White is the only variable that actually changes the predicted outcome (Whites are one level more Republican on the Party ID scale than Non-Whites). Meanwhile, dropping Black respondents from the model produces three control variables that change the predicted outcome. One of these is Church Regular, which indicates that respondents who attend church at least weekly are one level more Republican on the Party ID scale than respondents who do not. Getting older also makes respondents more Republican, but the effect is so modest that the next level on the Party ID scale is not reached until after age eighty (Figure 2.13). Similarly, as mentioned above, increasing levels of education make respondents less Republican; however, the Party ID level shifts simply by graduating from high school (Figure 2.14). Finally, in the RELTRAD model both White and Church Regular make respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale.



Figure 2.13 Effect of Age on Party ID / Evangelical / Black respondents removed



Figure 2.14 Effect of Education on Party ID / Evangelical / Black respondents removed

Overall, then, the effects of the control variables on the two most overtly political dependent variables are fairly strong. This is particularly true for statistical significance, which reaches $p > 0.000$ for all of the controls across all three models. Further, the predicted outcome changes roughly four out of ten times. The direction of the effects is quite consistent, with Education having negative effects and all of the other measures having positive effects.

Gay Marriage and Pro-Life. Having addressed the overtly political dependent variables, the discussion moves now to the second subgroup of dependent variables, those with certain positions traditionally associated with evangelicals.

Of course, opposition to gay marriage is a position strongly associated with evangelicals. Results for the effects of the control variables are presented in Table 2.13. As before, all of them are very highly significant ($p > 0.000$), and this remains true across all three models. Thus, statistical significance is achieved 100.0% of the time. The predicted outcomes change 38.8% of the time (7/18), and all of these effects are negative.

Both Age and Party ID reduce the predicted probability of supporting Gay Marriage from above to below the .500 level in all three models. Church Regular does so in the RELTRAD model and barely misses the mark in the other models, reducing the predicted probability of support by roughly twenty percent to .501 and .504, respectively.

Table 2.13 Effects of Control Variables - Gay Marriage

	Evangelical	Evangelical/ No Blacks	RELTRAD
Age	-.266 .738/.472 ($p > 0.000$)	-.261 .747/.486 ($p > 0.000$)	-.271 .739/.468 ($p > 0.000$)
Education	.118 .586/.704 ($p > 0.000$)	.113 .598/.711 ($p > 0.000$)	.148 .569/.717 ($p > 0.000$)
Party ID	-.391 .808/.417 ($p > 0.000$)	-.410 .839/.429 ($p > 0.000$)	-.415 .816/.401 ($p > 0.000$)
Male	-.057 .677/.620 ($p > 0.000$)	-.066 .692/.626 ($p > 0.000$)	-.048 .673/.625 ($p > 0.000$)
White	.093 .583/.676 ($p > 0.000$)	.057 .612/.669 ($p > 0.000$)	.108 .571/.679 ($p > 0.000$)
Church Regular	-.206 .707/.501 ($p > 0.000$)	-.209 .713/.504 ($p > 0.000$)	-.297 .727/.430 ($p > 0.000$)

Among these variables, Party ID has the single largest impact. Moving from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican lowers the predicted probability of supporting gay marriage from just over eighty percent to just over forty percent, but support does not drop below fifty percent until reaching Fairly Strong Republican (Figure 2.15).

Increasing age and regular church attendance reduce support by significant levels, although the impact of Age is more consistent across the models; the predicted probability of support falls below fifty percent in all three models for Age but only does so in the RELTRAD model for Church Regular. However, as reflected in Figure 2.16, the predicted probability does not fall below fifty percent until a highly advanced age is reached.



Figure 2.15 Effect of Party ID on Support for Gay Marriage / Evangelical



Figure 2.16 Effect of Age on Support for Gay Marriage / Evangelical

Turning now to Pro-Life, recall that the measure used asks whether respondents support a policy prohibiting abortion except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life. The effects of the control variables are presented in Table 2.14.

Table 2.14 Effects of Control Variables - Pro-Life

	Evangelical	Evangelical/ No Blacks	RELTRAD
Age	.008 .452/.460 ($p > 0.379$)	.004 .449/.453 ($p > 0.681$)	.006 .453/.459 ($p > 0.553$)
Education	-.169 .546/.377 ($p > 0.000$)	-.161 .538/.377 ($p > 0.000$)	-.185 .555/.370 ($p > 0.000$)
Party ID	.247 .350/.597 ($p > 0.000$)	.265 .329/.594 ($p > 0.000$)	.259 .345/.604 ($p > 0.000$)
Male	.078 .419/.497 ($p > 0.000$)	.081 .412/.493 ($p > 0.000$)	.075 .420/.495 ($p > 0.000$)
White	- .091 .520/.429 ($p > 0.000$)	- .087 .522/.435 ($p > 0.000$)	- .097 .525/.428 ($p > 0.000$)
Church Regular	.086 .444/.530 ($p > 0.000$)	.086 .442/.528 ($p > 0.000$)	.114 .429/.543 ($p > 0.000$)

The most immediate takeaway from these results is that – unlike the control variables for the previous dependent variables – not all of them achieve statistical significance. However, all except Age reach $p > 0.000$ across all three models, meaning that statistical significance is achieved 83.3% of the time (15/18). Further, the predicted outcomes change 66.6% of the time (12/18). Both Education and White reduce the predicted probability of supporting the Pro-Life position from above to below the .500 level across all three models. Both Party ID and Church Regular do likewise but in a positive direction. Male does not change any predicted outcomes but does come close in all three models.

Party ID again has an important impact, with the predicted probability of supporting the Pro-Life position shifting from below to above fifty percent once respondents move from Independent to Lean Republican on the Party ID scale. While negative, Education also has a consistent effect, with support falling below fifty percent once respondents move beyond high school graduate on the Education scale.

Since these results are substantially the same across all three versions of the model, only results from the RELTRAD model are presented in Figures 2.17 – 2.18.



Figure 2.17 Effect of Party ID on Pro-Life Support / RELTRAD



Figure 2.18 Effect of Education on Pro-Life Support / RELTRAD

Overall, the performance of the control variables continues to be quite strong for this subgroup of dependent variables. As a group, they fail to reach statistical significance 100.0% of the time only because Age fails to do so for Pro-Life. Further, the rate at which the predicted outcomes change is fairly good for Gay Marriage (38.8%, 7/18) but quite strong for Pro-Life (66.6%, 12/18).

Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, and Racism. The final subgroup of dependent variables consists of those that might be expected to break along ideological – although not necessarily religious - dimensions. Results for Assault Rifle Ban are presented in Table 2.15.

Statistical significance continues to be strong at 72.2% (13/18). However, Party ID, which lowers the predicted probability of supporting the ban from above to below the .500 level, is the only control that changes the predicted outcome. Thus, that figure comes in somewhat lower than the controls for the other subgroups at 16.6% (3/18). This appears to be because the overall level of support begins at such a high point that even the significant negative effects of Male – the only other control with consistently negative effects – are not enough to change the predicted outcome.

Table 2.15 Effects of Control Variables - Assault Rifle Ban

	Evangelical	**Evangelical/ No Blacks**	**RELTRAD**
Age	.242 .571/.813 ($p > 0.000$)	.239 .552/.791 ($p > 0.000$)	.244 .570/.814 ($p > 0.000$)
Education	.087 .619/.706 ($p > 0.000$)	.081 .602/.683 ($p > 0.000$)	.095 .615/.710 ($p > 0.000$)
Party ID	-.500 .864/.364 ($p > 0.000$)	-.508 .864/.356 ($p > 0.000$)	-.504 .865/.361 ($p > 0.000$)
Male	- .169 .746/.577 ($p > 0.000$)	- .179 .733/.554 ($p > 0.000$)	- .168 .746/.578 ($p > 0.000$)
White	- .015 .678/.663 ($p > 0.113$)	.000 .646/.646 ($p > 0.917$)	- .013 .676/.663 ($p > 0.076$)
Church Regular	.006 .664/.670 ($p > 0.484$)	.008 .643/.651 ($p > 0.349$)	- .009 .668/.659 ($p > 0.004$)

Again, Party ID has the biggest impact and is the only control that produces a shift in predicted probabilities crossing the .500 threshold in either direction. Notably, the predicted probability of support for an assault rifle ban remains above .500 even for those who identify as Lean Republican; it only drops below .500 for the two most Republican levels on the Party ID scale. Since these results are substantially the same across all versions of the model, only the RELTRAD results are presented in Figure 2.19.



Figure 2.19 Effect of Party ID on Support for Assault Rifle Ban / RELTRAD

Moving on to Dreamer, results for the effects of the controls are presented in Table 2.16. At 88.8% (16/18) overall, the controls continue to perform at a very high level of statistical significance. The predicted outcome changes 33.3% of the time (6/18), with all of those instances resulting from Education and Party ID.

As is not atypical, Party ID has the single largest impact. Support for the policy is highest among Strong Democrats, then declines steadily until reaching Strong Republican. Notably, the predicted probability of support is above .500 only for those who at least Lean Democrat. Since these results are substantially the same across all three models, only results from the RELTRAD model are presented in Figure 2.20.

Table 2.16 Effects of Control Variables - Dreamer

	Evangelical	Evangelical/ No Blacks	RELTRAD
Age	-.056 .494/.438 ($p > 0.000$)	-.056 .485/.429 ($p > 0.000$)	-.051 .492/.441 ($p > 0.000$)
Education	.167 .385/.552 ($p > 0.000$)	.166 .376/.542 ($p > 0.000$)	.175 .381/.556 ($p > 0.000$)
Party ID	-.418 .657/.239 ($p > 0.000$)	-.442 .674/.232 ($p > 0.000$)	-.424 .660/.236 ($p > 0.000$)
Male	- .010 .479/.469 ($p > 0.006$)	- .017 .473/.456 ($p > 0.000$)	- .010 .479/.469 ($p > 0.011$)
White	.019 .461/.480 ($p > 0.000$)	.008 .459/.467 ($p > 0.057$)	.023 .458/.481 ($p > 0.000$)
Church Regular	- .006 .474/.468 ($p > 0.066$)	- .003 .465/.462 ($p > 0.331$)	- .027 .480/.453 ($p > 0.000$)



Figure 2.20 Effect of Party ID on Dreamer / RELTRAD

With the exception that the effects are positive instead of negative, the results are quite similar for Education. Support is lowest among respondents who did not graduate from high school, then increases steadily as education level increases. Notably, the predicted probability of support does not cross the .500 threshold until respondents hold a four-year college degree. Since these results are substantially the same across all three models, only results from the RELTRAD model are presented in Figure 2.21.



Figure 2.21 Effect of Education on Dreamer / RELTRAD

None of the remaining control variables cause the predicted probability of support to shift from below to above fifty percent or vice versa. This is particularly interesting for Church Regular, which has a modest negative effect. Church folks – at least arguably – might have been expected to be a little more receptive than less so.

Finally, the analysis of the impact of the controls turns to Racism. Recall that this measure asks respondents to rate their agreement on a five point scale with the statement that racial problems in the United States are rare, isolated situations. These results are presented in Table 2.17.

Performance with regard to statistical significance continues to be very strong at 94.4% (17/18) overall. Indeed, White in the Evangelical / Black respondents removed model is the only one that fails to

reach $p > 0.000$. This is not surprising, as the contrast with Black respondents is lost by removing them from the model.

The predicted outcomes change 16.6% of the time (3/18). All of the changes are accounted for by Party ID, which comes fairly close to making respondents two levels higher on the Racism scale.

Table 2.17 Effects of Control Variables - Racism

	Evangelical	Evangelical/ No Blacks	RELTRAD
Age	-.003 2.391/2.108 ($p > 0.000$)	-.003 2.432/2.185 ($p > 0.000$)	-.004 2.399/2.096 ($p > 0.000$)
Education	-.024 2.347/2.229 ($p > 0.000$)	-.020 2.390/2.291 ($p > 0.000$)	-.030 2.364/2.214 ($p > 0.000$)
Party ID	.189 1.784/2.920 ($p > 0.000$)	.187 1.811/2.934 ($p > 0.000$)	.191 1.779/2.927 ($p > 0.000$)
Male	.266 2.164/2.430 ($p > 0.000$)	.274 2.212/2.486 ($p > 0.000$)	.262 2.166/2.428 ($p > 0.000$)
White	.102 2.200/2.307 ($p > 0.000$)	.020 2.337/2.336 ($p > 0.212$)	.088 2.212/2.305 ($p > 0.000$)
Church Regular	.190 2.254/2.407 ($p > 0.000$)	.193 2.308/2.467 ($p > 0.000$)	.215 2.238/2.429 ($p > 0.000$)

Again, Party ID is the only control that actually produces a different value on the Racism scale. Even then moving beyond Lean Democrat only drops the predicted value from 2 to 1, the value expressing the strongest level of disagreement with the Racism statement. In other words, only respondents with the two strongest levels of Democratic identity have a different value from everyone else on the Racism scale. These results are substantially the same across the models, so only results from the RELTRAD model are presented in Figure 2.22.

While it does not change any of the predicted outcomes, it is interesting to note that Church Regular has a modest positive effect. This indicates that those who attend church at least weekly express a slightly higher level of agreement with the Racism statement than those who do not.



Figure 2.22 Effect of Party ID on Racism / RELTRAD

Overall, then, the performance of the controls for this last subgroup of dependent variables is quite strong. This is particularly true for statistical significance, which never drops below 72.2%. The range of predicted outcome changes is either 16.6% or 33.3% for all three dependent variables. However, Party ID is the only control that changes predicted outcomes for all of them.

2.4 Summary

Now that the results for primary effects, interaction effects, and the control variables have been presented, this section of the analysis proceeds to a comparison of their relative impact. In summarizing these results, it is useful to begin by reviewing the primary effects of evangelical identity on the dependent variables. These are presented in Table 2.18. Cells for Trump Vote, Gay Marriage, Pro-Life, Dreamer, and Gun Control show marginal effects, predicted probabilities, and *p* values. Cells for Party ID and Racism show regression coefficients, predicted values, and *p* values. Shaded cells represent $p > .05$.

Table 2.18 Effects of Evangelical Identity - Dependent Variables

	Trump Vote	Party ID	Gay Marriage	Abortion	Dreamer	Gun Control	Racism
Evangelical	-.035 .426/.391 ($p > 0.000$)	-.576 3.481/3.917 ($p > 0.000$)	- .016 .654/.638 ($p > 0.004$)	- .045 .475/.430 ($p > 0.934$)	.047 .464/.511 ($p > 0.003$)	.011 .663/.674 ($p > 0.006$)	-.262 2.353/2.063 ($p > 0.000$)
Evangelical/ No Blacks	-.039 .461/.422 ($p > 0.003$)	.285 3.694/4.153 ($p > 0.000$)	- .017 .663/.646 ($p > 0.120$)	- .053 .471/.418 ($p > 0.002$)	.049 .456/.505 ($p > 0.001$)	.007 .644/.651 ($p > 0.916$)	-.166 2.405/2.104 ($p > 0.001$)
Church of Christ	-.027 .417/.390 ($p > 0.690$)	.087 3.560/3.360 ($p > 0.735$)	.058 .650/.708 ($p > 0.692$)	- .045 .455/.410 ($p > 0.220$)	.023 .474/.497 ($p > 0.081$)	.018 .666/.684 ($p > 0.824$)	.149 2.282/2.249 ($p > 0.370$)
Lutheran Missouri	.027 .416/.443 ($p > 0.085$)	1.179 3.547/4.435 ($p > 0.000$)	- .051 .651/.600 ($p > 0.318$)	.076 .454/.530 ($p > 0.247$)	- .061 .475/.414 ($p > 0.004$)	- .043 .667/.624 ($p > 0.105$)	.438 2.279/2.501 ($p > 0.002$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.067 .415/.482 ($p > 0.000$)	.739 3.525/4.616 ($p > 0.000$)	- .249 .657/.408 ($p > 0.000$)	.087 .454/.541 ($p > 0.000$)	- .038 .475/.437 ($p > 0.324$)	- .089 .669/.580 ($p > 0.004$)	.112 2.280/2.418 ($p > 0.092$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.099 .416/.515 ($p > 0.547$)	1.135 3.548/4.559 ($p > 0.000$)	- .239 .652/.413 ($p > 0.000$)	.095 .455/.550 ($p > 0.002$)	.001 .474/.475 ($p > 0.836$)	- .030 .667/.637 ($p > 0.928$)	-.031 2.282/2.245 ($p > 0.816$)
Southern Baptist	.074 .413/.487 ($p > 0.149$)	-.345 3.526/4.259 ($p > 0.000$)	- .157 .657/.500 ($p > 0.000$)	.089 .452/.541 ($p > 0.000$)	- .066 .477/.411 ($p > 0.000$)	- .041 .668/.627 ($p > 0.986$)	.084 2.279/2.367 ($p > 0.119$)
American Baptist	.041 .416/.457 ($p > 0.330$)	-.594 3.560/3.685 ($p > 0.000$)	- .100 .651/.551 ($p > 0.000$)	.119 .454/.573 ($p > 0.000$)	- .038 .475/.437 ($p > 0.001$)	.017 .666/.683 ($p > 0.610$)	.265 2.279/2.509 ($p > 0.004$)
Other Baptist	.030 .416/.446 ($p > 0.518$)	-.709 3.556/3.951 ($p > 0.000$)	- .118 .653/.535 ($p > 0.000$)	.045 .454/.499 ($p > 0.000$)	- .084 .476/.392 ($p > 0.000$)	- .057 .667/.610 ($p > 0.351$)	-.008 2.281/2.347 ($p > 0.906$)

Since there are nine measures of evangelical identity and seven dependent variables, the table contains sixty-three cells. Only thirty-five of them are shaded, which means that evangelical identity is statistically significant barely over half the time (55.5%).

More telling, however, is the extent to which evangelical identity "moves the needle." In other words, to what extent does evangelical identity change the predicted outcome? This is determined by looking at whether evangelical identity changes the predicted value on the Party ID and Racism scales and whether it produces a change in predicted probabilities that crosses the .500 threshold in either direction for the remaining dependent variables, which are binary. Based on this metric, evangelical identity "moves the needle" in only thirteen of the sixty-three squares, barely one in five (20.6%).

In addition, this limited impact occurs in somewhat concentrated ways. Party ID accounts for five of the thirteen changes in predicted outcomes. Evangelical / Black respondents removed, Lutheran Missouri, Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, and Southern Baptist all make

respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale. The three other statistically significant measures of evangelical identity (Evangelical, American Baptist, and Other Baptist) make respondents more Republican, just not by enough to change the predicted value.

Pro-Life accounts for four more of the changes in predicted outcomes. Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, and American Baptist all increase the predicted probability of supporting the pro-life position from below to above .500. The other two statistically significant measures of evangelical are split; Other Baptist just misses moving the needle (predicted probability .499), while Evangelical / Black respondents removed actually decreases support for the pro-life position.

Gay Marriage and Dreamer split the final four changes in predicted outcomes. Nondenominational Evangelical and Pentecostal Assemblies of God both drop predicted support for gay marriage from above to below .500, while Southern Baptist barely misses (predicted probability .500). Evangelical, American Baptist, and Other Baptist all reduce support, just not by enough to move the needle (all three still favor it). As for Dreamer, both measures of Evangelical (with and without Blacks included) increase the predicted probability of support from below to above .500. Notably, the remaining statistically significant measures (Lutheran Missouri, Southern Baptist, American Baptist, and Other Baptist) all reduce the predicted probability of support, with all values below the .500 level.

This leads to a rather interesting observation. For the three variables that are intended to explore whether evangelicals might break in a more politically conservative direction than other respondents (Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, and Racism), a very clear pattern emerges. It is spotty, of course, since less than half of those cells reach statistical significance, and most of the effects are rather modest. Still, the broader Evangelical measure consistently breaks in a more liberal direction, while the specific traditions consistently break in a more conservative direction. This pattern holds across all three issues.

To be sure, evangelical identity can also exert influence through interaction effects. For example, recall that Nondenominational Evangelical and Southern Baptist both make Whites two levels more Republican on the Party ID scale. Still, however, the overall impact of evangelical identity is not exactly

dominant. The interaction effects achieve statistical significance only 38.8% of the time overall (98/252), and they produce outcome changes only 13.1% of the time (33/252). Both of these are even lower than the results reported for the direct effects of evangelical identity.

In the bigger picture, the control variables appear to have more consistent impact than evangelical identity. It is not feasible to construct a table for the controls, as it would contain 123 cells! Nonetheless, the control variables achieve statistical significance in 111 out of 123 opportunities, which is much higher than for the direct effects (90.2% compared to 55.5%). Further, the controls change the predicted outcome in 44 of those 123, which is approaching double the rate for the direct effects (35.8% compared to 20.6%). Party ID is the predominant factor by far, moving the needle in all eighteen opportunities. Education does so in eight of twenty-one opportunities, mostly by consistently increasing support for Dreamer and reducing support for Pro-Life. Age does so seven times, mostly by increasing support for Trump and decreasing support for Gay Marriage. Church Regular changes the outcome six times, with half of those coming through increasing support for Pro-Life. White performs similarly, with three of its five outcome changes coming through decreasing support for Pro-Life. Finally, despite being statistically significant in all twenty-one opportunities, Male fails to change any predicted outcomes at all.

Perhaps more telling, however, is that all seven hypotheses are supported by these results. Literally every dependent variable has at least one other factor that, on the whole, appears to have larger overall impact than evangelical identity. These include Age, Education, and Party ID for Trump Vote; White for Party ID; Age, Party ID, and Church Regular (RELTRAD) for Gay Marriage; Education and Party ID for Pro-Life; Age, Education (RELTRAD), Party ID, and Male for Assault Rifle Ban; Education and Party ID for Dreamer; and Age and Party ID for Racism. Importantly, this is the case even though the evangelical measure with the strongest effect for each dependent variable is used as the benchmark for that dependent variable. Given these results, it is difficult to argue that evangelical identity is the predominant determinant of political behavior.

Finally, before concluding the discussion here, it is worthwhile to revisit the issue perhaps most closely associated with evangelical political behavior: support for Donald Trump. Table 2.19 presents the

results of the Trump Vote models seen previously alongside Trump's actual performance for each group in 2016.

Based on these results, two things seem apparent. First, several of these groups did indeed strongly support Donald Trump with their votes in 2016, as Trump received upwards of sixty percent of the votes from six of these nine groups. Second, their evangelical identity does not appear to be the reason why this happened. Only three of the nine measures reached statistical significance in the models, and two of those project a modest decrease in Trump support. The third, Nondenominational Evangelical, fails to move the predicted probability of voting for Trump above the .500 level. This offers even further evidence that evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of political behavior.

Overall, then, the results based on the individual level variables are very supportive. The next step is to add county level variables to the mix, and this occurs in Chapter Three.

Table 2.19 Trump Vote vs. Percent Trump

	Trump Vote	% Trump
Evangelical	-.035 .426/.391 ($p > 0.000$)	62.9 ($N = 9,350$)
Evangelical/No Blacks	-.039 .461/.422 ($p > 0.003$)	73.5 ($N = 7,850$)
Church of Christ	-.027 .417/.390 ($p > 0.690$)	38.5 ($N = 429$)
Lutheran Missouri	.027 .416/.443 ($p > 0.085$)	62.7 ($N = 737$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.067 .415/.482 ($p > 0.000$)	68.2 ($N = 1,617$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.099 .416/.515 ($p > 0.547$)	75.3 ($N = 441$)
Southern Baptist	.074 .413/.487 ($p > 0.149$)	66.3 ($N = 2,148$)
American Baptist	.041 .416/.457 ($p > 0.330$)	39.0 ($N = 385$)
Other Baptist	.030 .416/.446 ($p > 0.518$)	45.2 ($N = 757$)

3 EFFECTS OF COUNTY LEVEL VARIABLES

As Chapter Two establishes, evangelical identity does not appear to be the predominant factor in determining the political behavior of evangelicals. Indeed, the control variables have a more consistent impact on behavior than evangelical identity does, in that they are statistically significant and produce different outcomes much more frequently than do the measures of evangelical identity. Further, all seven hypotheses are supported by the Chapter Two results, as at least one other relevant variable has an overall larger effect on the outcome for each of the dependent variables than even the strongest of the evangelical identity measures.

Still, however, it is important to note that those results are produced by models including only individual level variables. That is, those models do not include any Level 2 variables to account for any influence of the environment in which respondents find themselves. Thus, the models for this chapter expand upon the previous results by adding county level variables to the mix. Before launching into that analysis, though, it is useful to briefly explore the results produced by using a very basic measure of the political environment of each county.

While admittedly somewhat crude, Figures 3.1 – 3.7 present the results of a series of models using the same dependent variables examined in Chapter Two but with only one independent variable: the percent of the 2016 vote received by Donald Trump in the county of residence for each respondent (RRH Elections, 2018, for Alaska; Politico, 2016, for all other states). The figures present predicted values for Party ID and Racism and predicted probabilities for the remaining dependent variables, which are binary. The results are quite interesting.



Figure 3.1 Trump Vote by County Percent Trump



Figure 3.2 Party ID by County Percent Trump



Figure 3.3 Support for Gay Marriage by County Percent Trump



Figure 3.4 Support for Pro-Life by County Percent Trump



Figure 3.5 Support for Dreamer by County Percent Trump



Figure 3.6 Support for Assault Rifle Ban by County Percent Trump



Figure 3.7 Racism by County Percent Trump

These results show more than simply Republicans voting for a Republican. Indeed, the graphs speak for themselves with regard to the nature of the relationships. County Percent Trump reaches $p >$ 0.000 and "moves the needle" in all of the models, in that the predicted outcome changes. Admittedly, the predicted outcome change does not occur until the outer limits of the independent variable in a couple of the models, such as support for Gay Marriage and Assault Rifle Ban. In addition, it is border-line for Racism. Using the same margins for County Percent Trump as the other models (minimum 5%) results in a projected Racism value of 2.003, whereas using the actual minimum (4.1%) results in a projected value of 1.997. Not surprisingly, the effects for Party ID are huge, barely missing a shift of three levels on the Party ID scale (2.378 – 4.993). Still, the key takeaway is that the projected outcome does change within the range of actual values of County Percent Trump for all seven models. These results certainly appear to support the contention that political environment impacts political behavior more so than evangelical identity does. Thus, the analysis now turns to exploring this impact in a more precise manner.

Like the preceding results, the models that follow use the same seven dependent variables used in Chapter Two. However, the models have been expanded to include county level indicators. This is

possible because the common content section of the CCES includes the county of residence for each respondent. Therefore, it is possible to expand the data set by using 2016 (the year of the CCES survey used) American Community Survey data maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau. This is done in such a way as to track the primary independent variables from Chapter Two at the county level. For example, the respondent's age is matched by the percent of the population of respondent's county that is age 62 or above. The binary variable for whether respondent is White is matched with the percent of the population of respondent's county that is White. The respondent's education level is matched by the percent of the county's population that holds at least a high school diploma. Gender is not included at the county level because there would be little variance, while Party ID and Church Regular are not included because the Census data does not report this information.

Meanwhile, a couple of new county level independent variables are added here that did not appear in Chapter Two. For example, since it is not unreasonable to expect that the contextual factors may have a more pronounced impact on individual behavior in smaller counties, county population is added as an independent variable. Also, since it is well established that people who live in different parts of the country do not look at politics in the same ways, it is appropriate that a control variable of some sort be added to the models to address this. In this case, the single largest group by religious tradition is Southern Baptist, and they do tend to display at least some of the behaviors that are of interest here. While there are some Southern Baptist respondents in virtually every state, they are concentrated in the South. Fully seventy-five percent of them live in the fourteen states from Texas to Virginia plus Missouri and Oklahoma. Thus, a binary variable for Southern Baptist states is coded 1 if the respondent lives in one of those states. This is not completely unlike the old dummy variable for South that routinely appeared in research of ages past, but it has been designed in a way that attempts to address evangelical identity within the larger environmental context.

Because all respondents who live in a particular county have the same values for the county level indicators, the models are run with standard errors clustered by county. In order to facilitate comparisons, tables include individual level results for the evangelical measures and control variables presented in

Chapter Two. Tables for Party ID and Racism present regression coefficients, predicted values, and *p* values; tables for the other dependent variables present marginal effects, predicted probabilities, and *p* values. As in Chapter Two, the results are presented here for each of the three subgroups of dependent variables in turn.

3.1 Trump Vote and Party ID

As before, the first subgroup includes the dependent variables that are intended to more overtly address political behavior. Table 3.1 presents the results for the direct effects of the evangelical measures for both the individual (from Chapter Two) and county models for Trump Vote. More – but still not all – of these measures reach statistical significance in the county models. Statistical significance increases from 25.0% (2/8) in the individual models to 62.5% (5/8) in the county models. Evangelical has a negative effect in both but is slightly stronger in the county model. The RELTRAD measures are all positive, but none of the evangelical measures have effects strong enough to produce changes in the predicted outcomes. Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect for Nondenominational Evangelical is cut in half in the county model. Overall, as was the case in Chapter Two, evangelical identity simply does not appear to have a very strong impact on whether respondents voted for Donald Trump.

Table 3.1 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Trump Vote - Individual vs. County Models

	Individual	County
Evangelical	-.035 .426/.391 ($p > 0.000$)	-.048 .426/.378 ($p > 0.000$)
Church of Christ	-.027 .417/.390 ($p > 0.690$)	-.027 .417/.390 ($p > 0.070$)
Lutheran Missouri	.027 .416/.443 ($p > 0.085$)	.022 .416/.438 ($p > 0.058$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.067 .415/.482 ($p > 0.000$)	.033 .415/.448 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.099 .416/.515 ($p > 0.547$)	.048 .416/.464 ($p > 0.017$)
Southern Baptist	.074 .413/.487 ($p > 0.149$)	.064 .414/.478 ($p > 0.000$)
American Baptist	.041 .416/.457 ($p > 0.330$)	.017 .416/.433 ($p > 0.402$)
Other Baptist	.030 .416/.446 ($p > 0.518$)	.018 .416/.434 ($p > 0.126$)

Results for the control variables, including the Level 2 counterparts, are presented in Table 3.2. The individual level controls achieve statistical significance 100.0% of the time (12/12), while the county level variables do so 70.0% of the time (7/10). The individual controls change the predicted outcome 33.3% of the time (4/12), but the county level variables do so 40.0% of the time (4/10). Both Age and Party ID increase the predicted probability of voting for Trump from below to above the .500 level. County Percent 62 does likewise, but County Percent HS drops the probability of doing so below .500. Not surprisingly, Party ID has the single largest impact on whether respondents voted for Trump. Age has slightly larger effects than County Percent 62, while County Percent HS has stronger effects than Education. Overall, the controls have a much stronger effect on the probability of voting for Trump than the evangelical measures presented above.

Table 3.2 Effects of Level 1 and Level 2 Variables - Trump Vote

	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	
Age	.177 .346/.523 ($p > 0.000$)	.177 .346/.523 ($p > 0.000$)	.144 .382/.526 ($p > 0.000$)	.144 .382/.526 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent 62**
Education	-.121 .486/.365 ($p > 0.000$)	-.123 .487/.364 ($p > 0.000$)	-.185 .566/.381 ($p > 0.000$)	-.202 .580/.378 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent HS**
White	.052 .375/.427 ($p > 0.000$)	.050 .376/.426 ($p > 0.000$)	.055 .376/.431 ($p > 0.000$)	.062 .371/.433 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent White**
Party ID	.881 .046/.927 ($p > 0.000$)	.882 .045/.927 ($p > 0.000$)			
Male	.031 .401/.432 ($p > 0.000$)	.030 .401/.431 ($p > 0.000$)			
Church Regular	.029 .409/.438 ($p > 0.000$)	.039 .406/.445 ($p > 0.000$)			
			.007 .414/.421 ($p > 0.121$)	.009 .413/.422 ($p > 0.051$)	**Southern Baptist States**
			-.002 .417/.415 ($p > 0.609$)	-.005 .417/.412 ($p > 0.305$)	**County Population**

Turning now to Party ID, the most immediately apparent note is that all but one of the evangelical measures are statistically significant. This is true for both the individual and county models, although the one measure that fails to achieve significance is different for each. Thus, both are statistically significant 87.5% of the time (7/8). Both also change the predicted outcome 50.0% of the time (4/8), with Lutheran Missouri, Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, and Southern Baptist making respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale. Nondenominational Evangelical and Pentecostal Assemblies of God have a coefficient representing one full level, while the others have a more modest effect that still moves the needle. These results are presented in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Party ID – Individual vs. County Models

	Individual	County
Evangelical	-.576 3.481/3.917 ($p > 0.000$)	.358 3.485/3.843 ($p > 0.000$)
Church of Christ	.087 3.560/3.360 ($p > 0.735$)	-.235 3.559/3.324 ($p > 0.008$)
Lutheran Missouri	1.179 3.547/4.435 ($p > 0.000$)	.765 3.547/4.312 ($p > 0.000$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.739 3.525/4.616 ($p > 0.000$)	1.003 3.525/4.528 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	1.135 3.548/4.559 ($p > 0.000$)	1.017 3.548/4.565 ($p > 0.000$)
Southern Baptist	-.345 3.526/4.259 ($p > 0.000$)	.636 3.529/4.164 ($p > 0.000$)
American Baptist	-.594 3.560/3.685 ($p > 0.000$)	-.181 3.559/3.378 ($p > 0.038$)
Other Baptist	-.709 3.556/3.951 ($p > 0.000$)	.107 3.555/3.662 ($p > 0.089$

Results for the control variables and their county level counterparts are presented in Table 3.4. All of them are statistically significant except County Percent 62 and County Population. This makes the individual level variables statistically significant 100.0% of the time (10/10), while the county level variables are statistically significant 60.0% of the time (6/10). Both change the predicted outcome 30.0% of the time (3/10), but they do so in different ways. Race has the largest impact, with both White and County Percent White making respondents one level more Republican across the board. County Percent White actually has a stronger effect and barely misses making respondents two levels more Republican (Figures 3.8 – 3.9). County Percent High School has a slightly stronger effect than Education, although County Percent HS in the RELTRAD model is the only one that actually changes the predicted value (by making respondents one level less Republican). The only other variable that changes the predicted value is Church Regular in the RELTRAD model, which makes respondents one level more Republican (but

just barely). Ultimately, while evangelical identity makes a stronger showing here than for Trump Vote, race still appears to have stronger effects overall.

Table 3.4 Effects of Level 1 and Level 2 Variables - Party ID

	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	
Age	.003 3.466/3.723 ($p > 0.000$)	.004 3.443/3.767 ($p > 0.000$)	-.005 3.621/3.355 ($p > 0.210$)	-.004 3.607/3.399 ($p > 0.309$)	**County Percent 62**
Education	-.085 3.786/3.359 ($p > 0.000$)	-.097 3.819/3.331 ($p > 0.000$)	-.011 3.983/3.445 ($p > 0.001$)	-.013 4.087/3.418 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent HS**
White	1.072 2.785/3.857 ($p > 0.000$)	1.035 2.812/3.846 ($p > 0.000$)	.015 2.583/3.953 ($p > 0.000$)	.015 2.568/3.960 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent White**
Male	.327 3.406/3.733 ($p > 0.000$)	.297 3.420/3.717 ($p > 0.000$)			
Church Regular	.413 3.449/3.862 ($p > 0.000$)	.605 3.398/4.004 ($p > 0.000$)			
			.167 3.498/3.665 ($p > 0.000$)	.205 3.485/3.690 ($p > 0.000$)	**Southern Baptist States**
			5.27e-09 3.551/3.578 ($p > 0.652$)	-2.70e-09 3.560/3.547 ($p > 0.825$)	**County Population**



Figure 3.8 Effect of County Percent White - Party ID / Evangelical



Figure 3.9 Effect of County Percent White - Party ID / RELTRAD

Overall, the effects of evangelical identity are stronger on Party ID than Trump Vote. This is especially true in light of the fact that the evangelical identity measures fail to produce any changes in predicted outcomes for Trump Vote. While it is certainly a closer question for the control variables, their effects are more consistent across both of these dependent variables than are the evangelical measures. This is particularly true with regard to changing the predicted outcome, as the controls do so 14 times compared to 8 for the evangelical measures.

3.2 Gay Marriage and Pro-Life

This subgroup of dependent variables includes those for which Evangelicals tend to be associated with certain positions. Table 3.5 presents the effects of evangelical identity on Gay Marriage. All of the evangelical measures achieve statistical significance in the county models, including the two that failed to do so in the individual models. Thus, the measures are statistically significant 100.0% of the time (8/8) in the county models and 75.0% of the time (6/8) in the individual models. Both sets of models change the predicted outcomes 25.0% of the time (2/8). They also do so in the same way, with Nondenominational Evangelical and Pentecostal Assemblies of God reducing the predicted probability of supporting Gay Marriage from above to below the .500 level (Southern Baptist barely misses in the individual model). Church of Christ has a modest positive effect, while the others – not surprisingly – all have negative

effects. Still, the magnitude of the effects is sufficiently modest overall that adherents of the remaining groups, although perhaps not by a large margin, tend to be more probable than not to support gay marriage.

Meanwhile, the individual level control variables achieve statistical significance 100.0% of the time (12/12), while the county level variables do so 60.0% of the time (6/10). The individual level controls also perform better in terms of changing the predicted outcomes, doing so 41.6% of the time (5/12) compared to 8.3% of the time (1/12) for the county level measures. Age, Party ID, and Church Regular (RELTRAD) all reduce the predicted probability of supporting Gay Marriage from above to below the .500 level, while County Percent HS increases it from below to above that mark. These results are shown in Table 3.6.

Table 3.5 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Gay Marriage – Individual vs. County Models

	Individual	County
Evangelical	- .016 .654/.638 ($p > 0.004$)	-.017 .654/.637 ($p > 0.030$)
Church of Christ	.058 .650/.708 ($p > 0.692$)	.059 .650/.709 ($p > 0.002$)
Lutheran Missouri	- .051 .651/.600 ($p > 0.318$)	-.059 .651/.592 ($p > 0.000$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	- .249 .657/.408 ($p > 0.000$)	-.210 .657/.447 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	- .239 .652/.413 ($p > 0.000$)	-.241 .652/.411 ($p > 0.000$)
Southern Baptist	- .157 .657/.500 ($p > 0.000$)	-.136 .657/.521 ($p > 0.000$)
American Baptist	- .100 .651/.551 ($p > 0.000$)	-.082 .651/.569 ($p > 0.000$)
Other Baptist	- .118 .653/.535 ($p > 0.000$)	- .107 .652/.545 ($p > 0.000$)

Table 3.6 Effects of Level 1 and Level 2 Variables - Gay Marriage

	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	
Age	-.270 .739/.469 ($p > 0.000$)	-.274 .740/.466 ($p > 0.000$)	-.003 .651/.648 ($p > 0.925$)	-.015 .654/.639 ($p > 0.613$)	**County Percent 62**
Education	.112 .590/.702 ($p > 0.000$)	.140 .574/.714 ($p > 0.000$)	.147 .532/.679 ($p > 0.000$)	.200 .489/.689 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent HS**
White	.091 .584/.675 ($p > 0.000$)	.105 .574/.679 ($p > 0.000$)	-.004 .653/.649 ($p > 0.805$)	-.009 .657/.648 ($p > 0.571$)	**County Percent White**
Party ID	-.388 .807/.419 ($p > 0.000$)	-.413 .815/.402 ($p > 0.000$)			
Male	-.057 .677/.620 ($p > 0.000$)	-.049 .673/.624 ($p > 0.000$)			
Church Regular	-.207 .707/.500 ($p > 0.000$)	-.291 .727/.436 ($p > 0.000$)			
			-.013 .655/.642 ($p > 0.002$)	-.029 .661/.632 ($p > 0.000$)	**Southern Baptist States**
			.020 .646/.666 ($p > 0.000$)	.030 .644/.674 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Population**

The analysis next turns to Pro-Life. As explained in Chapter 2, this measure asks respondents whether they support the Pro-Life position of permitting abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life. Results for the evangelical identity measures are presented in Table 3.7.

The evangelical measures reach statistical significance 62.5% of the time (5/8) in the individual models and 75.0% of the time (6/8) in the county models. That is reversed a bit for predicted outcome changes, with the individual models doing so 50.0% of the time (4/8) compared to 37.5% of the time (3/8) for the county models. Southern Baptist and American Baptist increase the predicted probability of supporting the Pro-Life position from below to above the .500 level for both sets of models. In addition, Nondenominational Evangelical and Pentecostal Assemblies of God do so for the individual models, while Lutheran Missouri does so for the county models.

Table 3.7 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Pro-Life - Individual vs. County Models

	Individual	County
Evangelical	- .045 .475/.430 ($p > 0.934$)	-.093 .474/.381 ($p > 0.000$)
Church of Christ	- .045 .455/.410 ($p > 0.220$)	-.029 .455/.426 ($p > 0.156$)
Lutheran Missouri	.076 .454/.530 ($p > 0.247$)	.082 .454/.536 ($p > 0.000$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.087 .454/.541 ($p > 0.000$)	.042 .454/.496 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.095 .455/.550 ($p > 0.002$)	.001 .455/.456 ($p > 0.981$)
Southern Baptist	.089 .452/.541 ($p > 0.000$)	.057 .452/.509 ($p > 0.000$)
American Baptist	.119 .454/.573 ($p > 0.000$)	.106 .454/.560 ($p > 0.000$)
Other Baptist	.045 .454/.499 ($p > 0.000$)	.040 .454/.494 ($p > 0.006$)

With regard to the control variables, however, the individual level measures outperform the county level measures. The individual measures are statistically significant 83.3% of the time (10/12), while the county measures are statistically significant 70.0% of the time (7/10). Further, the individual measures change the predicted outcome 66.6% of the time (8/12), but the county measures change the predicted outcome only 16.6% of the time (2/12). Education and White reduce the predicted probability of supporting the Pro-Life position from above to below the .500 level, while Party ID and Church Regular increase it from below to above that threshold. County Percent HS, which reduces the predicted probability to below .500, is the only county level measure that changes the predicted outcome. These results are shown in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8 Effects of Level 1 and Level 2 Variables - Pro-Life

	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	
Age	.012 .451/.463 ($p > 0.270$)	.009 .452/.461 ($p > 0.455$)	-.042 .465/.423 ($p > 0.250$)	-.038 .464/.426 ($p > 0.283$)	**County Percent 62**
Education	-.162 .542/.380 ($p > 0.000$)	-.176 .550/.374 ($p > 0.000$)	-.154 .577/.423 ($p > 0.000$)	-.183 .600/.417 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent HS**
White	-.095 .523/.428 ($p > 0.000$)	-.101 .528/.427 ($p > 0.000$)	.073 .403/.476 ($p > 0.000$)	.075 .402/.477 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent White**
Party ID	.243 .352/.595 ($p > 0.000$)	.255 .347/.602 ($p > 0.000$)			
Male	.080 .418/.498 ($p > 0.000$)	.076 .420/.496 ($p > 0.000$)			
Church Regular	.068 .437/.505 ($p > 0.000$)	.107 .427/.534 ($p > 0.000$)			
			.008 .452/.460 ($p > 0.189$)	.015 .450/.465 ($p > 0.007$)	**Southern Baptist States**
			-.022 .460/.438 ($p > 0.000$)	-.026 .461/.435 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Population**

It is a bit of an aside, since County Percent White does not change the predicted outcome. However, White shifts predicted support from above to below the .500 level, but County Percent White has a modest positive effect. This creates a rather unusual situation in which the Level 1 and Level 2 measures produce effects with contradicting directions (Figures 3.10 – 3.11).



Figure 3.10 Effect of White - Pro-Life / RELTRAD



Figure 3.11 Effect of County Percent White - Pro-Life / RELTRAD

Overall, even though this subgroup includes dependent variables for which certain positions are typically identified with Evangelicals, the performance of the control variables appears to be stronger than

that of the evangelical measures. Statistical significance is relatively comparable, but the controls perform better in terms of changing the predicted outcomes. The controls do so a total of 16 times, while the evangelical identity measures do so only 11 times.

3.3 Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, Racism

As encountered in Chapter Two, the analysis now reaches issues that may be likely to break down along ideological dimensions more so than religious dimensions. First among these is the measure that asks respondents whether they support a ban on assault rifles. Results for evangelical identity are presented in Table 3.9.

Table 3.9 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Assault Rifle Ban - Individual vs. County Models

	Individual	County
Evangelical	.011 .663/.674 ($p > 0.006$)	.015 .663/.678 ($p > 0.094$)
Church of Christ	.018 .666/.684 ($p > 0.824$)	.021 .666/.687 ($p > 0.298$)
Lutheran Missouri	- .043 .667/.624 ($p > 0.105$)	-.033 .667/.634 ($p > 0.016$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	- .089 .669/.580 ($p > 0.004$)	-.058 .669/.611 ($p > 0.000$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	- .030 .667/.637 ($p > 0.928$)	-.032 .667/.635 ($p > 0.065$)
Southern Baptist	- .041 .668/.627 ($p > 0.986$)	-.030 .668/.638 ($p > 0.001$)
American Baptist	.017 .666/.683 ($p > 0.610$)	.012 .666/.678 ($p > 0.545$)
Other Baptist	- .057 .667/.610 ($p > 0.351$)	-.047 .667/.620 ($p > 0.000$)

Given the nature of the dependent variable, it is not surprising to see much less pronounced effects here. The evangelical measures achieve statistical significance 50.0% of the time (4/8) in the county models but only 25.0% of the time (2/8) in the individual models. Further, none of them change the predicted outcomes in any of the models. This may be due at least in part to the fact that the level of

support for the ban is rather high across the board, which could work to mitigate the evangelical effects. Notably, however, the Evangelical measure has positive effects, while all of the RELTRAD measures have negative effects. This means that – to the extent that it matters – the RELTRAD measures produce a consistently more politically conservative position.

Similar effects are found when reviewing the impact of the Level 1 and Level 2 variables (Table 3.10). Support for the ban is consistently strong, and Party ID is the only variable that moves predicted support past the .500 level in either direction (strongly negative in that case). Still, support for the ban remains above .500 for all except the strongest levels of Republican identity (Figure 3.12). Statistical significance levels are rather comparable, coming in at 66.6% (8/12) for the Level 1 variables and 60.0% (6/10) for the Level 2 variables.

Table 3.10 Effects of Level 1 and Level 2 Variables - Assault Rifle Ban

	County/ Evangelical	**County/ RELTRAD**	**County/ Evangelical**	**County/ RELTRAD**	
Age	.242 .571/.813 ($p > 0.000$)	.245 .570/.815 ($p > 0.000$)	.050 .654/.704 ($p > 0.074$)	.049 .654/.703 ($p > 0.095$)	**County Percent 62**
Education	.075 .626/.701 ($p > 0.000$)	.082 .622/.704 ($p > 0.000$)	.140 .554/.694 ($p > 0.000$)	.151 .545/.696 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent HS**
White	-.003 .669/.666 ($p > 0.470$)	-.002 .668/.666 ($p > 0.724$)	-.140 .764/.624 ($p > 0.000$)	-.141 .765/.624 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent White**
Party ID	-.494 .862/.368 ($p > 0.000$)	-.496 .863/.367 ($p > 0.000$)			
Male	-.171 .747/.576 ($p > 0.000$)	-.171 .747/.576 ($p > 0.000$)			
Church Regular	.008 .664/.672 ($p > 0.153$)	-.006 .668/.662 ($p > 0.220$)			
			-.019 .673/.654 ($p > 0.000$)	-.021 .674/.653 ($p > 0.000$)	**Southern Baptist States**
			.019 .663/.682 ($p > 0.093$)	.021 .662/.683 ($p > 0.090$)	**County Population**



Figure 3.12 Effect of Party ID - Assault Rifle Ban / RELTRAD

Proceeding on to Dreamer, recall that it is an immigration measure asking respondents whether they support granting legal status to persons who were brought to the United States illegally as children but have since graduated from high school in the United States. Results for the evangelical measures are shown in Table 3.11.

The majority of the measures are statistically significant, which reflects little change from the individual to the county models. The proportion of statistical significance is 62.5% (5/8) for the individual models and 75.0% (6/8) for the county models. All of the measures begin from essentially the same point for predicted probability of Dreamer support, just below the .500 level, but they diverge from there. Evangelical (individual and county) and Church of Christ (county only) have a positive effect and shift the predicted probability of support from below to above the .500 level. Thus, the predicted outcomes change 12.5% of the time (1/8) for the individual models and 25.0% of the time (2/8) for the county models. The remaining effects are negative, which means that the RELTRAD measures except Church of Christ move respondents in a more politically conservative direction.

Table 3.11 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Dreamer - Individual vs. County Models

	Individual	County
Evangelical	.047 .464/.511 ($p > 0.003$)	.054 .464/.518 ($p > 0.000$)
Church of Christ	.023 .474/.497 ($p > 0.081$)	.046 .474/.520 ($p > 0.031$)
Lutheran Missouri	- .061 .475/.414 ($p > 0.004$)	-.036 .475/.439 ($p > 0.034$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	- .038 .475/.437 ($p > 0.324$)	-.009 .474/.465 ($p > 0.382$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.001 .474/.475 ($p > 0.836$)	.025 .474/.499 ($p > 0.234$)
Southern Baptist	- .066 .477/.411 ($p > 0.000$)	-.069 .477/.408 ($p > 0.000$)
American Baptist	- .038 .475/.437 ($p > 0.001$)	-.058 .475/.417 ($p > 0.007$)
Other Baptist	- .084 .476/.392 ($p > 0.000$)	-.088 .476/.388 ($p > 0.000$)

Results for the Level 1 and Level 2 variables are presented in Table 3.12. The Level 1 variables achieve statistical significance 91.6% of the time (11/12), while the Level 2 variables do so only 60.0% of the time (6/10). This comparison holds for changing predicted outcomes, as the Level 1 variables do so 33.3% of the time (4/12) and the Level 2 variables do so 20.0% of the time (2/10). In keeping with the pattern seen previously, Party ID has the largest impact, with only those who at least Lean Democrat remaining above the .500 level (Figure 3.13). Beyond this, the measures of age and education generate rather interesting results. County Percent 62 moves the needle in a negative direction, while Age misses only because its beginning point is just under .500 (Figures 3.14 – 3.15). Education changes the predicted outcome in a positive direction, while County Percent HS barely misses doing so (Figures 3.16 – 3.17).

Table 3.12 Effects of Level 1 and Level 2 Variables - Dreamer

	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	
Age	-.053 .493/.440 ($p > 0.000$)	-.047 .491/.444 ($p > 0.000$)	-.130 .506/.376 ($p > 0.000$)	-.132 .506/.374 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent 62**
Education	.161 .388/.549 ($p > 0.000$)	.169 .384/.553 ($p > 0.000$)	.100 .395/.495 ($p > 0.000$)	.113 .385/.498 ($p > 0.000$)	**County Percent HS**
White	.020 .460/.480 ($p > 0.001$)	.023 .458/.481 ($p > 0.000$)	.017 .462/.479 ($p > 0.266$)	.014 .464/.478 ($p > 0.366$)	**County Percent White**
Party ID	-.419 .657/.238 ($p > 0.000$)	-.423 .659/.236 ($p > 0.000$)			
Male	-.011 .479/.468 ($p > 0.002$)	-.010 .479/.469 ($p > 0.005$)			
Church Regular	-.004 .475/.471 ($p > 0.449$)	-.027 .481/.454 ($p > 0.000$)			
			.015 .469/.484 ($p > 0.004$)	.014 .469/.483 ($p > 0.008$)	**Southern Baptist States**
			.017 .471/.488 ($p > 0.052$)	.018 .470/.488 ($p > 0.051$)	**County Population**



Figure 3.13 Effect of Party ID - Dreamer / RELTRAD



Figure 3.14 Effect of Age - Dreamer / RELTRAD



Figure 3.15 Effect of County Percent 62 - Dreamer / RELTRAD



Figure 3.16 Effect of Education - Dreamer / RELTRAD



Figure 3.17 Effect of County Percent HS - Dreamer / RELTRAD

The final dependent variable to be considered is Racism. As explained in Chapter Two, this measure asks respondents to rate (on a five point scale) the extent to which they agree with the statement that racial problems in the United States are rare, isolated situations. Thus, higher scores represent lesser willingness to accept racism as a widespread problem. Results for the evangelical measures are presented in Table 3.13.

Table 3.13 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Racism - Individual vs. County Models

	Individual	County
Evangelical	-.262 2.353/2.063 ($p > 0.000$)	-.343 2.352/2.009 ($p > 0.000$)
Church of Christ	.149 2.282/2.249 ($p > 0.370$)	-.048 2.282/2.234 ($p > 0.364$)
Lutheran Missouri	.438 2.279/2.501 ($p > 0.002$)	.179 2.279/2.457 ($p > 0.000$)
Nondenominational Evangelical	.112 2.280/2.418 ($p > 0.092$)	.060 2.279/2.340 ($p > 0.042$)
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	-.031 2.282/2.245 ($p > 0.816$)	-.081 2.282/2.201 ($p > 0.170$)
Southern Baptist	.084 2.279/2.367 ($p > 0.119$)	.052 2.279/2.331 ($p > 0.054$)
American Baptist	.265 2.279/2.509 ($p > 0.004$)	.250 2.279/2.530 ($p > 0.000$)
Other Baptist	-.008 2.281/2.347 ($p > 0.906$)	.047 2.280/2.327 ($p > 0.244$)

As not atypical for the last group of dependent variables (those without clear religious dimensions), only about half achieve statistical significance. The proportion is 37.5% (3/8) for the individual models and 50.0% (4/8) for the county models. The effects are rather limited overall, with none of them producing a different predicted value on the Racism scale. Evangelical has a negative effect, while the others have a positive effect. As noted in previous sections, this means that, while the effects may not be particularly strong, the RELTRAD groups trend toward more politically conservative positions.

Results for the Level 1 and Level 2 variables are presented in Table 3.14. The Level 1 variables achieve statistical significance 100.0% of the time (12/12), while the Level 2 variables do so 60.0% of the time (6/10).

Table 3.14 Effects of Level 1 and Level 2 Variables - Racism

	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	County/ Evangelical	County/ RELTRAD	
Age	-.003 2.389/2.110 ($p > 0.000$)	-.004 2.397/2.098 ($p > 0.000$)	.000 2.284/2.272 ($p > 0.881$)	.000 2.286/2.268 ($p > 0.824$)	**County Percent 62**
Education	-.022 2.343/2.231 ($p > 0.000$)	-.028 2.360/2.218 ($p > 0.000$)	-.003 2.404/2.250 ($p > 0.033$)	-.004 2.449/2.238 ($p > 0.004$)	**County Percent HS**
White	.104 2.202/2.306 ($p > 0.000$)	.092 2.212/2.303 ($p > 0.000$)	.002 2.171/2.324 ($p > 0.002$)	.002 2.166/2.326 ($p > 0.001$)	**County Percent White**
Party ID	.189 1.785/2.918 ($p > 0.000$)	.191 1.779/2.927 ($p > 0.000$)			
Male	.267 2.164/2.430 ($p > 0.000$)	.263 2.166/2.429 ($p > 0.000$)			
Church Regular	.134 2.247/2.381 ($p > 0.000$)	.184 2.234/2.418 ($p > 0.000$)			
			-.011 2.285/2.274 ($p > 0.490$)	-.001 2.282/2.281 ($p > 0.964$)	**Southern Baptist States**
			1.15e-08 2.269/2.237 ($p > 0.003$)	1.06e-08 2.270/2.323 ($p > 0.008$)	**County Population**

Party ID again has the strongest effects. It is the only variable to produce a change in the predicted outcome and barely misses raising respondents two levels on the Racism scale. While their effects are in opposite directions, Age (negative) and Male (positive) have the next largest magnitude of effects. The measures for education (negative) and race (positive) also run in opposite directions, but it is notable that the Level 2 measures (County Percent HS and County Percent White) have stronger effects than their Level 1 counterparts. Church Regular also has a positive effect, which means that respondents who attend church at least weekly trend toward the more politically conservative position.

Overall, then, it is not unexpected that the evangelical measures are outperformed by the control variables for this subgroup. This is particularly true with regard to changing the predicted outcome. The

evangelical measures do so a total of three times across this subgroup, while the control variables do so a total of ten times.

3.4 Summary

As at the conclusion of Chapter Two, it is useful to compare the relative impact of the different types of variables. If a giant table were being constructed, including both the individual and county models would result in a total of 164 cells for the six individual level control variables. The controls are statistically significant 92.1% of the time (151/164) and result in a different predicted outcome 34.1% of the time (56/164). Doing the same for the measures of evangelical identity would result in a total of 112 cells (not including models with Black respondents dropped). The evangelical measures are statistically significant 62.5% of the time (70/112) and change the predicted outcome 15.2% of the time (17/112). As was the case in Chapter Two, which includes only the individual models, this indicates that the impact of the control variables is much more consistent than the evangelical identity measures across the range of dependent variables.

With this context established, it is now useful to compare the overall impact of these measures with that of the Level 2 variables (County Percent 62, County Percent HS, County Percent White, Southern Baptist States, and County Population). Out of a possible 70 cells, the Level 2 variables are statistically significant 62.8% of the time (44/70) and change the predicted outcome 17.1% of the time (12/70). While this does not match the performance of the controls, it is still a bit stronger than the overall performance of the evangelical measures.

Digging a bit deeper, it is instructive to compare the magnitude of the effects of Level 2 variables to that of their Level 1 counterparts. This involves three pairs of variables: County Percent 62 / Age, County Percent HS / Education, and County Percent White / White. In order to keep the comparison consistent, pairings are included only when both variables achieve statistical significance for a given dependent variable. For sake of clarity, this means that variables can still be included here if they fail to change the predicted outcome.

This reveals that the education pairing (County Percent HS / Education) is by far the strongest of the three, with both measures reaching statistical significance for all seven dependent variables. Comparing the magnitude of the effects reveals that the Level 1 effect (Education) is stronger for one dependent variable (Dreamer) and approximately equal for another dependent variable (ProLife). However, the Level 2 effect (County Percent HS) is stronger for all five of the remaining dependent variables (Trump Vote, Party ID, Gay Marriage, Assault Rifle Ban, and Racism).

The next strongest performer is the race pairing (County Percent White / White), both of which are statistically significant for four of the seven dependent variables. The Level 1 effect (White) is stronger for one of the four (ProLife), while the Level 2 effect is stronger for the other three (Trump Vote, Party ID, and Racism).

The third of the three pairings (County Percent 62 / Age) is statistically significant for two of the seven dependent variables. This one is an even split, with the Level 1 effect (Age) being stronger for Trump Vote and the Level 2 effect (County Percent 62) being stronger for Dreamer.

The Level 2 variables also perform very well when compared to the magnitude of the effects for the evangelical measures. At least one of these three demonstrates an effect that is stronger than the strongest evangelical effect for five out of the seven dependent variables (all except Gay Marriage and Racism). Both County Percent 62 and County Percent HS do so for Trump Vote (County Percent White barely misses); County Percent White does so for Party ID; County Percent HS does so for ProLife; both County Percent HS and County Percent White do so for Assault Rifle Ban; and both County Percent 62 and County Percent HS do so for Dreamer. Overall, this means that County Percent HS outperforms the strongest evangelical measure for four out of the seven dependent variables, while County Percent 62 and County Percent White do so for two dependent variables each. Obviously, then, environmental factors cannot be discounted as determinants of political behavior.

Finally, it must be noted that Age, Party ID, and Church Regular actually have a stronger effect than the strongest evangelical measure in the Gay Marriage models, while Party ID does so in the Racism models. This means that, as was the case in Chapter Two, all seven hypotheses are supported by these

results, in that for each dependent variable there is at least one other relevant variable with an overall stronger impact on the outcome than even the strongest of the evangelical identity measures. Thus, it is difficult to argue for a predominant role for evangelical identity as a determinant of political behavior.

In light of these results, it is worth considering the possibility that evangelical identity fits this puzzle in a different manner. More specifically, is it possible that the real nature of any relationship here is that both political behavior and evangelical identity are products of the same factors? This prospect is explored in Chapter Four.

4 DETERMINANTS OF EVANGELICAL IDENTITY

In this chapter the evangelical measures switch roles. That is, the measures of evangelical identity have been used thus far as independent variables, but in these models they become dependent variables. As explained at the end of Chapter Three, the purpose of this is to explore the possibility that the other independent variables may help explain both political behavior and the adoption of evangelical identity. Results showing the effects of the county indicators on the adoption of evangelical identity are presented in Table 4.1. As before, statistical significance is indicated by shaded cells.

Table 4.1 Effects of County Indicatiors on Evangelical Identity

	County Percent 62	County Percent White	County Percent HS	Southern Bapt States	County Population
Evangelical	.001 .202/.203 $p > 0.978$	.030 .181/.211 $p > 0.158$	-.183 .353/.170 $p > 0.000$	.083 .170/.253 $p > 0.000$	-.060 .215/.155 $p > 0.012$
Church of Christ	.010 .006/.016 $p > 0.138$	.008 .003/.011 $p > 0.029$	.008 .002/.010 $p > 0.057$	-.004 .009/.005 $p > 0.000$	.001 .008/.009 $p > 0.264$
Lutheran Missouri	-.004 .015/.011 $p > 0.596$	.014 .005/.019 $p > 0.000$	.014 .004/.018 $p > 0.009$	-.001 .014-.013 $p > 0.363$	.004 .013-.017 $p > 0.095$
Nondenominational Evangelical	-.026 .041/.015 $p > 0.003$	.019 .020/.039 $p > 0.000$	.008 .026/.034 $p > 0.319$	.003 .031/.034 $p > 0.137$	.001 .032-.033 $p > 0.579$
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.000 .009/.009 $p > 0.937$	.006 .005/.011 $p > 0.037$	-.009 .017/.008 $p > 0.068$	.000 .009/.009 $p > 0.546$	-.004 .010/.006 $p > 0.061$
Southern Baptist	-.024 .052/.028 $p > 0.087$	-.025 .064/.039 $p > 0.005$	-.094 .126/.032 $p > 0.000$	.065 .019/.084 $p > 0.000$	-.028 .051-.023 $p > 0.018$
American Baptist	.004 .009/.013 $p > 0.447$	-.005 .013/.008 $p > 0.125$	.002 .008/.010 $p > 0.662$	-.001 .010-.009 $p > 0.128$	-.006 .011-.005 $p > 0.001$
Other Baptist	.025 .015/.040 $p > 0.010$	-.007 .024/.017 $p > 0.090$	-.016 .032/.016 $p > 0.037$	.010 .015/.025 $p > 0.000$	-.005 .020/.015 $p > 0.126$

A quick check of overall performance regarding statistical significance reveals that the county indicators are significant in eighteen out of forty cells, which represents approximately forty-five percent overall. More specifically, three of the indicators are statistically significant for at least half of the measures of evangelical identity. These are County Percent White (five out of eight), County Percent

High School (four out of eight), and Southern Baptist States (four out of eight). Each of these will be discussed more fully in turn.

Before proceeding further, however, it should be noted that it is not particularly useful to discuss "moving the needle" in this context, since so few respondents identity with any of the measures of evangelical (the proportion is less than fifteen percent for even the broadest measure). Thus, the discussion here will focus on the relative magnitude of the effect the county indicators have on the probability of adopting the respective evangelical identities.

As noted above, County Percent White is significant for five out of the eight measures of evangelical identity (62.5%). The effects are positive for four out of the five and negative in the other. The largest positive effect is .019 (Nondenominational Evangelical), while the only negative effect is -.025 (Southern Baptist). These are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Interestingly, the predicted probability of adopting either of these identities is identical at .039.



Figure 4.1 Effect of County Percent White - Nondenominational Evangelical



Figure 4.2 Effect of County Percent White - Southern Baptist

Next, County Percent HS and Southern Baptist States are significant in four of the eight measures of evangelical identity. Three of the four evangelical measures are the same (Evangelical, Southern Baptist, and Other Baptist), while the fourth differs (Church of Christ for Southern Baptist States, Lutheran Missouri for County Percent High School).

Looking first at County Percent HS, the effects are negative on three of the evangelical measures (Evangelical, Southern Baptist, and Other Baptist) and positive on the fourth (Lutheran Missouri). The positive effect for Lutheran Missouri is .014, while the strongest negative effect is for Evangelical (-.183). These results are presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. The highest predicted probability of adopting one of the evangelical identities is for Evangelical (.170).



Figure 4.3 Effect of County Percent HS - Evangelical



Figure 4.4 Effect of County Percent HS - Lutheran Missouri

Turning now to Southern Baptist States, the effects are positive on three of the evangelical measures (Evangelical, Southern Baptist, and Other Baptist) and negative on the fourth (Church of Christ). The strongest positive effect is for Evangelical (.083), while the negative effect for Church of Christ is -.004. These results are presented in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. The highest predicted probability of adopting any of these evangelical identities – by far – is .253 for Evangelical.



Figure 4.5 Effect of Southern Baptist States - Evangelical



Figure 4.6 Effect of Southern Baptist States - Church of Christ

Before moving on, it is necessary to establish greater context with regard to the magnitude of these effects. For example, the smallest positive marginal effect of County Percent White is .006 (Pentecostal Assemblies of God). However, this more than doubles the predicted probability of adopting that identity (.005/.011). Indeed, the smallest proportional positive effect of County Percent White is just under double the predicted probability of adopting Nondenominational Evangelical (.020/.039). Further, the marginal effect for Church of Christ is only .008, but this almost quadruples the predicted probability

of adopting that identity (.003/.011; Figure 4.7). The same is true for Lutheran Missouri (.014; .005/.019).



Figure 4.7 Effect of County Percent White - Church of Christ

County Percent HS produces similar results. The only positive effect is for Lutheran Missouri (.014), but that more than quadruples the probability of adopting this identity (.004/.018; Figure 4.8). The largest proportional negative effect is for Southern Baptist (-.094), which reduces the predicted probability of adopting the identity by almost three-fourths (.126/.032; Figure 4.9). The other negative effects (Evangelical .353/.170; Other Baptist .032/.016) reduce the predicted probability of adopting the identity by half.



Figure 4.8 Effect of County Percent HS - Lutheran Missouri



Figure 4.9 Effect of County Percent HS - Southern Baptist

As for Southern Baptist States, the only negative effect is -.004 for Church of Christ, but this cuts the predicted probability of adopting the identity in half (.009/.005). The proportional positive effects range from a low of increasing the predicted probability of adopting Evangelical identity by about fifty percent (.170/.253; Figure 4.10) to a high of more than four times as likely for Southern Baptist

(.019/.084; Figure 4.11). Thus, while these marginal effects appear small, many of them are quite large from a proportional perspective.



Figure 4.10 Effect of Southern Baptist States - Evangelical



Figure 4.11 Effect of Southern Baptist States - Southern Baptist

After reviewing these results, it is now useful to explore the impact of the county indicators on the two major measures of political behavior, Trump Vote and Party ID. These results are presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Effects of County Indicators - Trump Vote and Party ID

	County Percent 62	County Percent White	County Percent HS	Southern Bapt States	County Population
Trump Vote	.139 .383/.522 $p > 0.000$	.062 .371/.433 $p > 0.000$	-.209 .585/.376 $p > 0.000$	.013 .412/.425 $p > 0.002$	-.007 .418/.411 $p > 0.153$
Party ID	-.005 3.621/3.354 $p > 0.210$	.016 2.536/3.972 $p > 0.000$	-.014 4.130/3.406 $p > 0.000$	.257 3.466/3.723 $p > 0.000$	-5.47e-09 3.563/3.535 $p > 0.672$

It is immediately apparent that the three county indicators with the largest impact on evangelical identity are all highly statistically significant for both Trump Vote and Party ID. While it fails to move the predicted probability of voting for Trump from below to above the .500 level, County Percent White has a noticeable positive effect on vote choice and barely misses making respondents two levels more Republican on the Party ID scale (Figure 4.12). County Percent HS has consistently strong negative effects, reducing the predicted probability of voting for Trump from above to below .500 and making respondents one level less Republican on the Party ID scale (Figures 4.13 and 4.14). The impact of Southern Baptist States is the weakest of the three, but the effects are consistently positive. Thus, it is apparent that the Level 2 measures of race and education have a significant impact on both political behavior and the adoption of evangelical identity.



Figure 4.12 Effect of County Percent White - Party ID



Figure 4.13 Effect of County Percent HS - Trump Vote



Figure 4.14 Effect of County Percent HS - Party ID

Turning now to the effects of the Level 1 variables on evangelical identity, those results are presented in Table 4.3. They perform more strongly than the Level 2 variables in overall statistical significance, reaching that level in 72.9% of cells (35/48). They also perform better individually, with all but one of them (Male) reaching statistical significance for a majority of the evangelical measures.

Table 4.3 Effects of Level 1 Variables - Evangelical Identity

	Age	Education	Party ID	Male	White	Church Regular
Evangelical	.103 .168/.271 *p* > 0.000	-.071 .241/.170 *p* > 0.000	.154 .138/.292 *p* > 0.000	-.034 .218/.184 *p* > 0.000	-.058 .245/.187 *p* > 0.000	.303 .118/.421 *p* > 0.000
Church of Christ	.029 .003/.032 *p* > 0.000	.007 .005/.012 *p* > 0.000	-.004 .010/.006 *p* > 0.002	.000 .008/.008 *p* > 0.446	.004 .005/.009 *p* > 0.000	.001 .008/.009 *p* > 0.382
Lutheran Missouri	.037 .006/.043 *p* > 0.000	.004 .012/.016 *p* > 0.009	.014 .008/.022 *p* > 0.000	.001 .013/.014 *p* > 0.878	.008 .007/.015 *p* > 0.000	-.001 .014/.013 *p* > 0.310
Nondenominational Evangelical	.009 .029/.038 *p* > 0.025	.007 .029/.036 *p* > 0.001	.045 .015/.060 *p* > 0.000	-.003 .034/.031 *p* > 0.030	-.010 .040/.030 *p* > 0.000	.051 .017/.068 *p* > 0.000
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.003 .008/.011 *p* > 0.114	-.007 .013/.006 *p* > 0.000	.013 .004/.017 *p* > 0.000	.000 .009/.009 *p* > 0.847	-.001 .010/.009 *p* > 0.363	.014 .005/.019 *p* > 0.000
Southern Baptist	.055 .030/.085 *p* > 0.000	-.018 .055/.037 *p* > 0.000	.036 .030/.066 *p* > 0.000	.003 .044/.047 *p* > 0.091	-.004 .048/.044 *p* > 0.110	.033 .035/.068 *p* > 0.000
American Baptist	.005 .008/.013 *p* > 0.018	-.008 .014/.006 *p* > 0.000	-.003 .011/.008 *p* > 0.021	-.001 .010/.009 *p* > 0.088	-.010 .017/.007 *p* > 0.000	.006 .008/.014 *p* > 0.000
Other Baptist	.000 .019/.019 *p* > 0.832	-.016 .028/.012 *p* > 0.000	.002 .018/.020 *p* > 0.141	-.007 .022/.015 *p* > 0.000	-.017 .031/.014 *p* > 0.000	.002 .018/.020 *p* > 0.207

While there is no Level 1 corollary for Southern Baptist States, both Education (County Percent HS) and White (County Percent White) perform well. Education is the only Level 1 variable that is statistically significant for all eight measures of evangelical; the effects are positive for three and negative for five. The positive marginal effects are small (.004-.007), but proportionately they are stronger. The .04 is for Lutheran Missouri, which increases the predicted probability of adopting the identity by one third (.012/.016; Figure 4.15). The .07 is for both Church of Christ, which more than doubles the predicted probability (.005/.012; Figure 4.16), and Nondenominational Evangelical, which increases the predicted probability by about one fourth (.029/.036). The negative marginal effects range from -.007 (Pentecostal Assemblies of God) to -.071 (Evangelical). However, the proportional effects reduce the predicted probabilities from just over one fourth for Evangelical (.241/.170) to more than one half for

Pentecostal Assemblies of God (.013/.006), American Baptist (.014/.006), and Other Baptist (.028/.012). These results are shown in Figures 4.17 – 4.20.



Figure 4.15 Effect of Education - Lutheran Missouri



Figure 4.16 Effect of Education - Church of Christ



Figure 4.17 Effect of Education – Evangelical



Figure 4.18 Effect of Education - Pentecostal Assemblies of God



Figure 4.19 Effect of Education - American Baptist



Figure 4.20 Effect of Education - Other Baptist

White is statistically significant for six of eight measures of evangelical, all except Pentecostal Assemblies of God and Southern Baptist. The effects are positive for two of the measures (Church of Christ and Lutheran Missouri) and negative for the rest (Evangelical, Nondenominational Evangelical, American Baptist, and Other Baptist). The positive marginal effects are small (.004 and .008, respectively), but they essentially double the predicted probability of adopting those identities. The negative marginal effects range from -.010 (Nondenominational Evangelical and American Baptist) to -.058 (Evangelical), but the proportional reductions in predicted probability range from just under one fourth (Evangelical) to more than half (American Baptist).

As noted above, several of the other Level 1 variables have significant effects on evangelical identity. Age is statistically significant for six of the eight evangelical measures, while Church Regular is significant for five of them. Both have consistently positive effects. The proportional effects of Age range from about one third (Nondenominational Evangelical) to more than ten times (Church of Christ). The proportional effects of Church Regular range from just under double (Southern Baptist, American Baptist) to more than triple (Evangelical, Nondenominational Evangelical, and Pentecostal Assemblies of God). Finally, Party ID is statistically significant for seven of the eight evangelical measures, with five positive effects and two negative ones. While the negative effects are modest (Church of Christ .010/.006 and American Baptist .014/.006), the positive effects range as high as four times the predicted probability (Nondenominational Evangelical .015/.060 and Pentecostal Assemblies of God .004/.017).

Moving on to the results for the Level 1 variables on Trump Vote and Party ID, those results are presented in Table 4.4. Of course, Party ID is not used as an independent variable in the model in which it is the dependent variable. Overall, these variables are statistically significant 100% of the time (11/11).

Table 4.4 Effects of Level 1 Variables - Trump Vote and Party ID

	Age	**Education**	**Party ID**	**Male**	**White**	**Church Regular**
Trump Vote	.178 .346/.524 $p > 0.000$	-.125 .488/.363 $p > 0.000$	.885 .044/.929 $p > 0.000$	.030 .401/.431 $p > 0.000$	.050 .376/.426 $p > 0.000$	.044 .405/.449 $p > 0.000$
Party ID	.005 3.420/3.808 $p > 0.000$	-.100 3.827/3.324 $p > 0.000$		.298 3.419/3.717 $p > 0.000$	1.047 2.802/3.850 $p > 0.000$	.710 3.370/4.081 $p > 0.000$

Staying with corollaries of the notable Level 2 variables discussed above, White has the largest effect of any Level 1 variable on Party ID. Simply being White makes respondents just over one level more Republican on the Party ID scale, but neither White nor Education changes the predicted outcome otherwise. As has consistently been the case, their effects are in opposite directions.

Meanwhile, it is not surprising that Party ID has – by far – the largest impact on Trump Vote. However, Age also has a significant impact and increases the predicted probability of voting for Trump from below to above the .500 level. In addition, Church Regular makes respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale.

Overall, then, the basic contention that both political behavior and the adoption of evangelical identity are shaped by common factors is supported by these results. In particular, measures for race and education level – both Level 1 and Level 2 – have a significant impact on both areas. County Percent White makes respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale; it also roughly doubles the predicted probability of becoming Pentecostal Assemblies of God and Nondenominational Evangelical and quadruples the probability of becoming Church of Christ and Lutheran Missouri. White makes respondents almost two levels more Republican on the Party ID scale and doubles the probability of identifying as Lutheran Missouri and Church of Christ. However, it also reduces the probability of adopting some measures of evangelical, ranging from roughly one-fourth for Evangelical to one-half for American Baptist.

County Percent HS makes respondents one level less Republican on the Party ID scale and reduces the probability of voting for Trump from above to below the .500 level. It also roughly quadruples the probability of identifying as Lutheran Missouri but reduces by at least half the probability of identifying as Evangelical, Southern Baptist, and American Baptist. Education has a variety of effects on evangelical identity, ranging from doubling the probability of becoming Church of Christ to reducing by half the probability of becoming Pentecostal Assemblies of God, American Baptist, and Other Baptist. Also, while it fails to "move the needle," the marginal effects of Education reduce the predicted values by about one-fourth for both Party ID and Trump Vote.

Finally, other Level 1 variables have significant and consistently positive impacts on both areas. Age moves the predicted probability of voting for Trump from below to above the .500 level. It also increases the probability of adopting certain evangelical identities, ranging from about one-third for Nondenominational Evangelical to just over ten times for Church of Christ. In addition, Church Regular makes respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale and increases the probability of adopting certain evangelical identities, ranging from roughly double for Southern Baptist and American Baptist and triple for Evangelical, Nondenominational Evangelical, and Pentecostal Assemblies of God.

All things considered, then, there is considerable evidence to suggest that both political behavior and evangelical identity can be understood in terms of common factors. In conjunction with the previous results, this indicates that continuing to view evangelical identity as a determinant of political behavior may not be the most fruitful path forward.

5 CONCLUSION

Before summarizing the results presented in the preceding chapters, it may be useful to first briefly establish the context that gave rise to this research. From my vantage point in the rural South, I have long been an observer of politics and political behavior. Something that has been of particular interest to me is the extent to which "regular folks" and "church folks" are different in their politics. Despite my efforts, a few isolated individuals aside, I have never been able to identify any such difference. To my observation, the "church folks" display the same yard signs, express the same views, and (presumably) vote the same as the proverbial folks who attend church only at Christmas and Easter, if they ever attend at all. This observation applies mostly to Evangelicals, who make up – by far – the predominant religious groups in my world.

My interest in these matters was heightened with the candidacy of Donald Trump in 2016. Surely, I thought, his arrogance, vulgar language, and boorish behavior would create some separation between at least some of the church folks and the regular folks. If that happened, I was never able to find it. Despite the fact that his own behavior was virtually the complete opposite of what they claimed to hold up as their example, the church folks embraced Trump just as enthusiastically as did the regular folks. For whatever it might be worth, Trump took 77.7% of the vote in my county in 2016 (he increased that to 78.1% of a larger turnout in 2020).

Of course, this picture of Evangelicals walking in lockstep with most everyone else is strikingly different from the picture painted by political scientists, who spill much (digital!) ink trying to explain why Evangelicals are so different from everyone else. Could it be that the Evangelicals in my world just happen to be very different from those in other places? Or could it be that we have gotten ahead of ourselves in terms of the impact on political behavior we ascribe to evangelical identity?

This is the dilemma that gave rise to the essential contention explored here. Simply put, that contention is that evangelical identity is not the predominant factor in determining the political behavior

of Evangelicals. While not necessarily irrelevant, it is outweighed by other relevant variables such as individual characteristics and environmental factors.

With this in mind, recall the overall results discussed in Chapter Two, in which the models include only Level 1 variables. Overall, the control variables are statistically significant 90.2% of the time (111/123), while the evangelical measures are statistically significant 55.5% of the time (35/63). In addition, the control variables change the predicted outcome 35.8% of the time (44/123), while the evangelical measures change the predicted outcome 20.6% of the time (13/63).

Similar patterns are observed once Level 2 variables are added to the models in Chapter Three. There, the control variables are statistically significant 92.1% of the time (151/164), while the Level 2 variables are significant 62.8% of the time (44/70). The evangelical measures bring up the rear, reaching significance only 53.6% of the time (60/112). Further, the control variables change the predicted outcome 34.1% of the time (56/164), while the Level 2 variables change the predicted outcome 17.1% of the time (12/70). Again, the evangelical measures bring up the rear, changing the predicted outcome only 15.2% of the time (17/112).

Of course, these results represent only the aggregate performance of the different types of variables. Thus, it is useful to explore the relative effects of the evangelical measures on a dependent variable by dependent variable basis. As before, the analysis that follows takes the magnitude of the strongest marginal effect of any of the evangelical measures – regardless of whether the effect is positive or negative – and compares it to the magnitude of the marginal effects of the independent variables. Of course, only variables reaching statistical significance ($p > .05$) are considered.

For Level 1 models (Chapter Two), the marginal effects of the independent variables are presented in the following order: Evangelical, Evangelical / Black respondents removed, and RELTRAD. For Level 2 models (Chapter Three), the marginal effects of the independent variables are presented in the following order: Evangelical and RELTRAD (the Evangelical / Black respondents removed models are not used with the Level 2 variables, as they made little difference with the Level 1 variables).

Level 1 Models

Trump Vote. The strongest evangelical effect is Nondenominational Evangelical (.067). This is exceeded by Age (.188, .202, .184), Education (-.124, -.136, -.135), and Party ID (.880, .879, .884).

Party ID. The strongest evangelical effect is Nondenominational Evangelical (1.091). This is exceeded by White (1.177, 1.149; These results are for the Evangelical and RELTRAD models, as the marginal effect for Evangelical / Black respondents removed does not exceed the effect for the evangelical measure).

Gay Marriage. The strongest evangelical effect is Nondenominational Evangelical (-.249). This is exceeded by Age (-.266, -.261, -.271), Party ID (-.391, -.410, -.415), and Church Regular (-.297 RELTRAD).

Pro-Life. The strongest evangelical effect is American Baptist (.119). This is exceeded by Education (-.169, -.161, -.185) and Party ID (.247, .265, .259).

Assault Rifle Ban. The strongest evangelical effect is Nondenominational Evangelical (-.089). This is exceeded by Age (.242, .239, .244), Education (.095 RELTRAD), Party ID (-.500, -.508, -.504), and Male (-.169, -.179, -.168).

Dreamer. The strongest evangelical effect is Other Baptist (-.084). This is exceeded by Education (.167, .166, .175) and Party ID (-.418, -.442, -.424).

Racism. The strongest evangelical effect is Evangelical (-.290). This is exceeded by Age (-.303 RELTRAD) and Party ID (1.136, 1.123, 1.148).

Thus, all seven hypotheses are supported by these results, as there is not a single dependent variable for which the strongest effect of any of the evangelical measures is not exceeded by the effects of at least one of the other independent variables. Party ID is the most consistent performer, exceeding the evangelical effect in every case. Age and Education are the next most consistent performers, with each of them outperforming the evangelical effect in four out of the seven dependent variables.

Level 2 Models

These models keep the Level 1 variables and add the Level 2 county indicators. Marginal effects are presented in the order described above.

Trump Vote. The strongest evangelical effect is Southern Baptist (.064). This is exceeded by Age (.177, .177), County Percent 62 (.144, .144), Education (-.121, -.123), County Percent HS (-.185, -.202), and Party ID (.881, .882).

Party ID. The strongest evangelical effect is Pentecostal Assemblies of God (1.017). This is exceeded by White (1.072, 1.034) and County Percent White (1.370, 1.392).

Gay Marriage. The strongest evangelical effect is Pentecostal Assemblies of God (-.241). This is exceeded by Age (-.270, -.274), Party ID (-.388, -.413), and Church Regular RELTRAD (-.291).

Pro-Life. The strongest evangelical effect is American Baptist (.106). This is exceeded by Education (-.162, -.176), County Percent HS (-.154, -.183), Party ID (.243, .255), and Church Regular RELTRAD (.107).

Assault Rifle Ban. The strongest evangelical effect is Nondenominational Evangelical (-.058). This is exceeded by Age (.242, .245), Education (.075, .082), County Percent HS (.140, .151), County Percent White (-.140, -.141), Party ID (-.494, -.496), and Male (-.171, -.171).

Dreamer. The strongest evangelical effect is Other Baptist (-.088). This is exceeded by County Percent 62 (-.130, -.132), Education (.161, .169), County Percent HS (.100, .113), and Party ID (-.419, -.423).

Racism. The strongest evangelical effect is Evangelical (-.343). This is exceeded by Party ID (1.113, 1.148). (Note: The effect of Evangelical is somewhat stronger than the next strongest evangelical effect, which is American Baptist (.250). If this measure is used, both Age (-.279, -.299) and Male (.266, .263) also exceed the evangelical effect.)

After completing this overview, the key takeaways are somewhat straightforward. First, there is literally not a single dependent variable in either set of models for which the magnitude of the strongest effect of any of the evangelical measures is not exceeded by the magnitude of the effect of something

else. Further, specifically with regard to the Level 2 models, there are only two dependent variables (Gay Marriage and Racism) for which the magnitude of the strongest effect of any of the evangelical measures is not exceeded by the magnitude of the effect of at least one Level 2 variable. Finally, it should be noted that the marginal effects of the other variables listed not only exceed those of the strongest evangelical effect but that they frequently do so by a wide margin. Thus, all seven hypotheses are supported by the results of both the Level 1 and Level 2 models.

Further, recall from Chapter Four that Trump Vote, Party ID, and the adoption of evangelical identity can be understood – at least to an extent – in terms of the effects of the other variables. This is particularly true for the measures of race and education, both of which demonstrate significant effects at both Level 1 and Level 2. For example, while both have significant effects on the adoption of several evangelical identities, County Percent White makes respondents one level and White makes respondents almost two levels more Republican on the Party ID scale. County Percent HS makes respondents one level less Republican on the Party ID scale and reduces the probability of voting for Trump from above to below the .500 level, while, along with Education, also demonstrating significant effects on the adoption of several of the evangelical identity measures. Without further repeating the results from Chapter Four, it is apparent that several of the relevant independent variables help explain both political behavior and the adoption of evangelical identity. Taken together, these results suggest that continuing to contend that evangelical identity is a predominant determinant of political behavior is a challenging task.

Still, if it is nonetheless considered desirable to do so, the most likely path to such an objective is an indirect one. That is, evangelical identity leads to the adoption of Republican identity, which, in turn, impacts political behavior. While such a contention may appear promising initially, that promise evaporates upon closer consideration.

As revealed above, it is certainly true that Party ID is the only independent variable with a marginal effect that is stronger than the strongest evangelical effect in all of the models, both Level 1 and Level 2. It is also true that the magnitude of the Party ID effects are frequently quite a bit stronger than

the effects of the other variables. Where the contention breaks down, however, lies in connecting evangelical identity to Republican identity.

As discussed in the results presented in Chapter Two, Party ID does appear to be the dependent variable upon which evangelical identity has the most consistent effects. All but one of these measures (Church of Christ) are very highly significant ($p > 0.000$). In addition, as indicated by the predicted values, all of these make respondents more Republican. However, the effects are so modest that only about half of them change the predicted outcome. Evangelical / Black respondents removed, Lutheran Missouri, Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, and Southern Baptist all make respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale. The modest impact is made clear by including the predicted values and marginal effects, which are Evangelical / Black respondents removed (4.153, .459), Lutheran Missouri (4.435, .888), Nondenominational Evangelical (4.616, 1.091), Pentecostal Assemblies of God (4.559, 1.011), and Southern Baptist (4.259, .733). Thus, only two of these measures have a marginal effect equivalent to a full level, and none of them have a predicted value higher than 4 – Independent – on the seven-point Party ID scale. These results are consistent with those of the Level 2 models, in which Pentecostal Assemblies of God (4.565, 1.017) is the strongest evangelical measure.

Nor is the contention saved by turning to interaction effects. Only two of them, Nondenominational Evangelical and Southern Baptist with White, produce a higher predicted value on the Party ID scale, and that is by only a small margin. The predicted value for the Nondenominational Evangelical / White interaction is 5.105, while the predicted value for the Southern Baptist / White interaction is 5.007. Thus, even the strongest interaction effects produce a predicted value that is barely beyond Independent on the Party ID scale.

In sum, then, it is certainly accurate to say that the effects of several measures of evangelical identity – both direct and indirect – make respondents more Republican than they would be otherwise. Based on these results, however, to suggest that evangelical identity makes them into anything near strong Republicans is a substantial overstatement.

At this point it may be useful to clarify something these results do not demonstrate. That is, these results do not suggest that Evangelicals do not behave in ways that are more Republican in nature than other respondents, only that their evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of that behavior. For example, recall from Chapter Two that Donald Trump received upwards of 60% of the vote from six of the evangelical groups in 2016. However, only three of those groups are statistically significant, and only one of those three actually has a positive effect on the probability of voting for Trump. In other words, they voted Republican, but they apparently did not do so due to their evangelical identity.

Of course, distinctions such as these are not of much interest to people such as candidates, campaigns, and political parties. After all, their goal is very simple: winning elections. Thus, they tend to be much less interested in *why* people vote for them than simply in *whether* people vote for them. On the other hand, of course, distinctions such as these are of great interest to political scientists, as the results both improve our understanding of political phenomena and offer guidance for future research.

From this perspective, the results here support the contention that evangelical identity is not a predominant determinant of political behavior. While not irrelevant, for literally every dependent variable in every model evangelical identity is outweighed by something else. Exactly what that something else is varies, and there is frequently more than one something else, but there are no exceptions. These effects are reviewed briefly below, with Level 1 and Level 2 variables being considered together for sake of brevity.

Age. Age outweighs evangelical identity for Trump Vote, Gay Marriage, and Assault Rifle Ban; County Percent 62 outweighs evangelical identity for Trump Vote and Dreamer.

Education. Education outweighs evangelical identity for Trump Vote, Pro-Life, Assault Rifle Ban, and Dreamer; County Percent HS outweighs evangelical identity for Trump Vote, Pro-Life, Assault Rifle Ban, and Dreamer.

Race. White outweighs evangelical identity for Party ID; County Percent White outweighs evangelical identity for Party ID and Assault Rifle Ban.

Party ID. Party ID outweighs evangelical identity for all other dependent variables.

Male. Male outweighs evangelical identity for Assault Rifle Ban.

Church Regular. Church Regular (RELTRAD) outweighs evangelical identity for Gay Marriage and Pro-Life.

Again, this research addresses only *whether* other variables outweigh evangelical identity; it does not address *when* or *why* they do so. Thus, understanding why it is that some independent variables outweigh evangelical identity for some dependent variables but not others could benefit from further research.

In addition, any lingering concerns regarding causality can be informed by future research. The contention here suggests that the behaviors demonstrated by Evangelicals are not unlike those demonstrated by ordinary partisans. That is, they modify their other positions and perspectives – including their faith perspective – in order to reconcile them with their political perspective. Of course, this is contrary to what conventional wisdom suggests – and what most Evangelicals themselves think – about how Evangelicals do politics.

Ultimately, conclusively determining whether Evangelicals modify their faith perspective to reflect their political perspective – or vice versa – will require the use of panel data collected over a period of time. Only then will it be possible to determine which perspective is modified to resolve inconsistencies between the two.

Of course, these results may also have implications on a range of larger questions, such as whether religious identity affects different groups differently. For example, McKenzie and Rouse (2013) explore differing levels of interest in egalitarian issues among white, black, and Latino religious groups. The issues included overcoming discrimination against women, reducing intolerance toward homosexuals, policies to assist the poor, and policies to achieve racial parity. As might be expected, the level of interest among those considered religiously conservative varied across groups. Whites were less interested in all of these issues. Latinos were less interested in the gender discrimination and intolerance toward homosexuals issues, whereas blacks were less interested only in the intolerance toward homosexuals issue. McKenzie and Rouse contend that these variations are explained by the fact that,

even among those with religiously conservative beliefs, religion is experienced in different cultural settings across the groups.

More recently, Wong (2018) explores differing levels of support for conservative political positions among White and non-White evangelicals within the context of the 2016 presidential election. She finds that Whites are consistently more conservative – and more Republican - than their non-White counterparts across a range of political issues. Wong contends that this is explained by high levels of "in-group embattlement" among Whites, which basically means that their political behavior is largely motivated by the desire to resist demographic changes they see unfolding in American society.

For an even broader context, McAdams and Lance (2012) compare the political behavior of American evangelicals with their counterparts in Brazil. While the two groups look quite similar in their positions on moral issues like abortion and gay marriage (Brazilian evangelicals are notably even more staunchly opposed to abortion), Brazilian evangelicals otherwise appear somewhat more moderate to liberal in their politics, such as party identification. This suggests that the political environment within which individual adherents live out their daily lives also plays an important role in how they view the connection between their religion and their politics.

These three works are examples of research contending – in various ways – that different characteristics or environments can cause people with similar religious beliefs to adopt different political behaviors. While not expressly stated, what is implied in works such as these is that religious identity is the primary determinant of political behavior. Thus, the differing characteristics and environments function as intervening factors that produce diverging behaviors from similar religious identities. Of course, this approach requires different models to account for any number of characteristics and environments that – supposedly – produce divergent political behaviors from similar religious identities.

My contention, on the other hand, presents a much simpler explanatory path. In my approach, the different characteristics or environments are themselves the primary determinants of political behavior, and religious identity simply fails to mitigate these influences. This offers a much more parsimonious explanation, while still accounting for how divergent political behaviors can be adopted by people of

similar religious identities. My approach also embraces – rather than contradicts – arguments such as those offered by Mason (2018) and others that describe people as modifying their positions and behaviors to be consistent with their already determined political identity instead of vice versa.

Unfortunately, however, there is one respect in which my approach makes understanding the relationship between religious identity and political behavior more challenging. That is, political scientists have gravitated toward using evangelical identity – especially for Whites – as a rather broad brush. Meanwhile, my results suggest that we will need to learn to think of evangelical identity in much more precise terms.

Table 5.1 presents a summary of the statistically significant effects of the evangelical identity measures on all seven dependent variables. The results are taken from the Level 2 models, which are both more complete and reflect overall greater statistical significance for the evangelical measures. Blacked out cells represent effects that fail to reach statistical significance. Shaded cells represent negative effects, while unshaded cells represent positive effects.

Table 5.1 Positive vs. Negative Effects of Evangelical Identity on Dependent Variables

	Trump Vote	Party ID	Gay Marriage	Pro-Life	Assault Rifle Ban	Dreamer	Racism
Evangelical	-.048 .426/.378	.358 3.485/3.843	-.017 .654/.637	-.093 .474/.381		.054 .464/.518	-.343 2.352/2.009
Church of Christ		-.235 3.559/3.324	.059 .650/.709			.046 .474/.520	
Lutheran Missouri	.022 .416/.438	.765 3.547/4.312	-.059 .651/.592	.082 .454/.536	-.033 .667/.634	-.036 .475/.439	.179 2.279/2.457
Nondenominational Evangelical	.033 .415/.448	1.003 3.525/4.528	-.210 .657/.447	.042 .454/.496	-.058 .669/.611		.060 2.279/2.340
Pentecostal Assemblies of God	.048 .416/.464	1.017 3.548/4.565	-.241 .652/.411				
Southern Baptist	.064 .414/.478	.636 3.529/4.164	-.136 .657/.521	.057 .452/.509	-.030 .668/.638	-.069 .477/.408	
American Baptist		-.181 3.559/3.378	-.082 .651/.569	.106 .454/.560		-.058 .475/.417	.250 2.279/2.530
Other Baptist			- .107 .652/.545	.040 .454/.494	-.047 .667/.620	-.088 .476/.388	

Evangelical is statistically significant for six of the seven dependent variables. The effects are positive for two and negative for four.

Church of Christ is statistically significant for three of the seven dependent variables. The effects are positive for two and negative for one.

Lutheran Missouri is statistically significant for all seven dependent variables. The effects are positive for four and negative for three.

Nondenominational Evangelical is statistically significant for six of the seven dependent variables. The effects are positive for four and negative for two.

Pentecostal Assemblies of God is statistically significant for three of the seven dependent variables. The effects are positive for two and negative for one.

Southern Baptist is statistically significant for six of the seven dependent variables. The effects are positive for three and negative for three.

American Baptist is statistically significant for five of the seven dependent variables. The effects are positive for two and negative for three.

Other Baptist is statistically significant for four of the seven dependent variables. The effects are positive for one and negative for three.

Thus, Pentecostal Assemblies of God is the only evangelical measure that fails to reach statistical significance for a majority of the dependent variables (three). Lutheran Missouri is the only evangelical measure to reach statistical significance for all seven dependent variables, while Nondenominational Evangelical and Southern Baptist do so for six out of the seven. Evangelical, American Baptist, and Other Baptist have more negative effects than positive. Southern Baptist is an even split, with three positive and three negative. The remaining four (Church of Christ, Lutheran Missouri, Nondenominational Evangelical, and Pentecostal Assemblies of God) have more positive effects than negative.

Looking a bit more closely, Evangelical swims against the stream of the RELTRAD measures by reducing the probability of voting for Trump, supporting the Pro-Life position, and agreeing with the Racism statement but increasing the probability of supporting Dreamer.

Church of Christ is the oddball among the RELTRAD measures, making respondents less likely to identify as Republican but more likely to support Gay Marriage and Dreamer. Thus, Church of Christ contradicts literally every other RELTRAD measure on the three dependent variables for which it is statistically significant except for American Baptist on Gay Marriage.

The results are a bit more stable for the remaining evangelical measures, Lutheran Missouri, Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, American Baptist, and Other Baptist. With the exception of American Baptist for Party ID, they at least agree as to positive vs. negative effects. However, this ignores the variation with regard to the magnitude of the effects and the fact that a number of effects fail to reach statistical significance.

If this has begun to appear as something of a mish-mash, that is actually the point. That is, the results are hardly monolithic. This underscores the need for further study in order to understand more fully which measures of evangelical identity have what kinds of connections with what aspects of political behavior.

Overall, then, the results here are promising, but further work is warranted. In the meantime, it seems safe to suggest that – contrary to the prevailing narrative – Evangelicals have more chameleon than salmon in them.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Chapter 2 Models

Appendix A.1.1 Trump Vote / Evangelical

Trump Vote	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0218683	.0009951
Education	-.2337521	.0107028
Party ID	1.000457	.0092978
Male	.2885926	.0300904
BornAgain	.9114944	.0654436
Protestant	.1396647	.0407003
1.White	.4199057	.0435804
1.Evangelical	-.6327425	.1156488
White*Evangelical		
1 1	.4676926	.089592
1.ChurchRegular	.2967478	.0440705
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	-.3603231	.0815407
Constant	-5.222962	.0866558

Appendix A.1.2 Trump Vote / Evangelical / Black respondents removed

Trump Vote	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0224169	.0010177
Education	-.2453562	.0109492
Party ID	.9905369	.0096118
Male	.2602353	.0308538
BornAgain	.9654286	.0688999
Protestant	.1948252	.0418197
1.White	.1783884	.0479727
1.Evangelical	-.4071632	.1378203
White*Evangelical		
1 1	.142035	.1123617
1.ChurchRegular	.3070082	.0450573
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	-.3538203	.0851941
Constant	-4.930065	.0910167

Appendix A.1.3 Trump Vote / RELTRAD

TrumpVote	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0212782	.0009826
Education	-.2506549	.0106221
Party ID	1.006219	.0092771
Male	.2649363	.0299088
1.White	.4355884	.0410454
1.ChurchofChrist	.2123065	.5317723
White*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	-.3630641	.5427446
1.LutheranMissouri	.6107917	.3547756
White*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	-.4797307	.3615312
1.NondenomEvangelical	.7226617	.1838767
White*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	.1171474	.1751274
1.OtherBaptist	-.1645844	.2543771
White*OtherBaptist		
1 1	.640054	.2787897
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod	.2339551	.387997
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	1.143414	.3669973
1.SouthernBaptist	.257032	.177986
White*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	.5596599	.1851137
1.AmericanBaptist	-.3734499	.3833574
White*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	1.162309	.4145885
1.ChurchRegular	.4360902	.0376891
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	-.6162978	.3376319
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	.0891417	.2599106
ChurchRegular*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	-.8175155	.1619113
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist		
1 1	-.273466	.2812307
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	-1.000635	.3398962
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	-.0564086	.1561575
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	-.7882128	.4048445
Constant	-5.045995	.084059

Appendix A.2.1 Party ID / Evangelical

Party ID	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0037829	.0004918
Education	-.0985266	.0055188
Male	.3016464	.0161313
BornAgain	.2392635	.0313866
Protestant	.2921504	.0231056
1.White	.8903248	.020446
1.Evangelical	-.5760785	.0565065
White*Evangelical		
1 1	1.416886	.0433214
1.ChurchRegular	.4324279	.0241217
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	-.0316989	.0433649
Constant	2.594573	.0353742

Appendix A.2.2 Party ID / Evangelical / Black respondents removed

Party ID	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0065419	.0005262
Education	-.1183478	.0058998
Male	.2409421	.0173108
BornAgain	.3691625	.0345653
Protestant	.5096932	.025309
1.White	.418499	.0246876
1.Evangelical	.2851045	.0770764
White*Evangelical		
1 1	.2264895	.0638089
1.ChurchRegular	.5033112	.0259211
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	-.0455681	.0481809
Constant	2.965309	.0399

Appendix A.2.3 Party ID / RELTRAD

Party ID	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0045712	.0004903
Education	-.1164883	.0055358
Male	.2729527	.0162345
1.White	1.027518	.0195814
1.ChurchofChrist	.0875136	.2589779
White*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	-.0750191	.266019
1.LutheranMissouri	1.179514	.2367442
White*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	-.3786648	.2405946
1.NondenomEvangelical	.7392397	.1042821
White*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	.5650183	.1012195
1.OtherBaptist	-.708778	.0978496
White*OtherBaptist		
1 1	1.539114	.1189674
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod	1.13544	.2135011
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	-.2351779	.2046879
1.SouthernBaptist	-.3451747	.0811711
White*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	1.544629	.0869623
1.AmericanBaptist	-.5939713	.1392147
White*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	1.229077	.166878
1.ChurchRegular	.6483026	.0204642
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	-.8873336	.2022127
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	-.0726812	.1554892
ChurchRegular*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	-.2105377	.0943196
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist		
1 1	-.0183766	.1294695
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	.1706323	.1750107
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	-.1318118	.0784631
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	-.6355903	.171625
Constant	2.64574	.0347729

Appendix A.3.1 Gay Marriage / Evangelical

Gay Marriage	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0202212	.0006396
Education	.1495615	.0071951
Party ID	-.3754321	.0052552
Male	-.3649503	.0207763
BornAgain	-1.137005	.0361301
Protestant	-.2905167	.0285796
1.White	.5591855	.0271097
1.Evangelical	-.1904768	.0657806
White*Evangelical		
1 1	.1402878	.0531469
1.ChurchRegular	-1.151268	.0279673
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	-.0229056	.0515553
Constant	3.092374	.0496224

Appendix A.3.2 Gay Marriage / Evangelical / Black respondents removed

Gay Marriage	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0206661	.0006948
Education	.1488869	.007806
Party ID	-.4032847	.0056555
Male	-.4377338	.0226273
BornAgain	-1.110275	.040054
Protestant	-.2497341	.0313554
1.White	.370819	.0326644
1.Evangelical	-.1449751	.0932616
White*Evangelical		
1 1	.0338607	.0803646
1.ChurchRegular	-1.21831	.0302905
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	.0226523	.0584279
Constant	3.468001	.0576599

Appendix A.3.3 Gay Marriage / RELTRAD

Gay Marriage	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0196326	.000614
Education	.1786094	.0070025
Party ID	-.3799934	.005124
Male	-.2879301	.0201284
1.White	.6632183	.0250379
1.ChurchofChrist	-.1226224	.309942
White*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	.3090511	.3178734
1.LutheranMissouri	-.2692237	.2696568
White*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	-.098491	.2751878
1.NondenomEvangelical	-1.517422	.1244904
White*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	.0290504	.1265172
1.OtherBaptist	-.5570736	.1139882
White*OtherBaptist		
1 1	-.1243818	.1388483
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod	-1.578188	.2947846
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	.3922576	.3071438
1.SouthernBaptist	-.6183683	.0943546
White*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	-.3832773	.1026733
1.AmericanBaptist	-.692388	.1591029
White*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	-.0615757	.1890189
1.ChurchRegular	-1.583106	.0241093
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	.8330618	.2432368
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	.1320017	.1864777
ChurchRegular* NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	.6591378	.1162332
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist		
1 1	-.1329527	.1550606
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	-.1808404	.2457278
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	.0161138	.098821
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	.6452252	.193822
Constant	2.605523	.0461154

Appendix A.4.1 Pro-Life / Evangelical

Pro-Life	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0004596	.000523
Education	-.1492892	.0059143
Party ID	.1776326	.0042981
Male	.3417723	.0172033
BornAgain	.661391	.0332332
Protestant	.1813066	.0243244
1.White	-.4038115	.0219976
1.Evangelical	-.0049071	.0595689
White*Evangelical		
1 1	.0071375	.04583
1.ChurchRegular	.5274273	.0253581
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	-.7654044	.0456704
Constant	-.4642728	.0388039

Appendix A.4.2 Pro-Life / Evangelical / Black respondents removed

Pro-Life	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0002294	.0005583
Education	-.1436206	.0063047
Party ID	.1912359	.0045592
Male	.3604107	.0183865
BornAgain	.6716528	.0365481
Protestant	.2065842	.0265874
1.White	-.437821	.0260165
1.Evangelical	-.2517528	.0809974
White*Evangelical		
1 1	.2857756	.0666502
1.ChurchRegular	.5402657	.0271595
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	-.9020809	.0506836
Constant	-.5084592	.0438434

Appendix A.4.3 Pro-Life / RELTRAD

Pro-Life	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0003046	.0005139
Education	-.1612119	.0058614
Party ID	.1844733	.0042441
Male	.3242611	.0170394
1.White	-.4358442	.0209365
1.ChurchofChrist	-.3414545	.2781628
White*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	.3606824	.2853639
1.LutheranMissouri	.287408	.2480979
White*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	.0937965	.2523523
1.NondenomEvangelical	.4316619	.1087659
White*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	.1381846	.1053432
1.OtherBaptist	.3757551	.0999189
White*OtherBaptist		
1 1	-.0296809	.1221654
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod	.7173293	.2281108
White* PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	-.0004371	.2154135
1.SouthernBaptist	.4366291	.0837066
White*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	.1133256	.0902413
1.AmericanBaptist	.6192357	.1443295
White*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	.0385879	.174123
1.ChurchRegular	.563099	.0214196
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	-.4269443	.2137287
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	-.0926193	.164342
ChurchRegular* NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	-.5982108	.0984844
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist		
1 1	-.6046604	.132836
ChurchRegular* PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	-1.165016	.1858443
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	-.5265911	.0819149
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	-.5130705	.1790932
Constant	-.2828399	.0376743

Appendix A.5.1 Assault Rifle Ban / Evangelical

Assault Rifle Ban	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0183196	.0006035
Education	.0977688	.0066981
Party ID	-.4270686	.0051002
Male	-.9319193	.0196346
BornAgain	-.3422688	.0366685
Protestant	-.0447066	.0282623
1.White	-.0408422	.0257736
1.Evangelical	.1887054	.0692143
White*Evangelical		
1 1	-.197465	.0541395
1.ChurchRegular	.0203483	.0290455
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	.0720541	.0508506
Constant	1.693828	.0443379

Appendix A.5.2 Assault Rifle Ban / Evangelical / Black respondents removed

Assault Rifle Ban	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0174433	.0006326
Education	.0881926	.0070179
Party ID	-.4335035	.0054345
Male	-.9611309	.0207424
BornAgain	-.3485059	.0394889
Protestant	-.0660493	.0300865
1.White	-.003099	.0296834
1.Evangelical	.0092939	.0877177
White*Evangelical		
1 1	.0201073	.0723029
1.ChurchRegular	.0286154	.0305434
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	.0482372	.0543441
Constant	1.779953	.049591

Appendix A.5.3 Assault Rifle Ban / RELTRAD

Assault Rifle Ban	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0185205	.0005971
Education	.1056584	.0066694
Party ID	-.4301708	.0050739
Male	-.9225024	.0195589
1.White	-.0436786	.0246086
1.ChurchofChrist	-.0764085	.3431014
White*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	.134807	.3537471
1.LutheranMissouri	-.4364925	.2692529
White*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	.2468563	.2744313
1.NondenomEvangelical	-.3535095	.1222103
White*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	-.3115794	.1190656
1.OtherBaptist	-.1184809	.1271285
White*OtherBaptist		
1 1	-.2192191	.1475138
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod	-.0224184	.2471098
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	-.1669827	.2345619
1.SouthernBaptist	.0018289	.1059617
White*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	-.3265618	.1114075
1.AmericanBaptist	-.0939738	.1843166
White*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	.2294599	.2114774
1.ChurchRegular	-.0696268	.0244306
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	.2941232	.2616151
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	.0611573	.1742801
ChurchRegular*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	.424339	.1068863
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist		
1 1	-.1195511	.1578118
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	-.0722065	.1963977
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	.0601109	.0909095
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	.0567836	.2158999
Constant	1.62086	.04324

Appendix A.6.1 Dreamer / Evangelical

Dreamer	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0032141	.0005301
Education	.1504775	.0059502
Party ID	-.3074967	.0044738
Male	-.0482948	.0174079
BornAgain	-.4512848	.0343349
Protestant	-.0583273	.0247399
1.White	.0871213	.0220235
1.Evangelical	.1779207	.0608111
White*Evangelical		
1 1	.0105589	.0470258
1.ChurchRegular	-.0477958	.0260278
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	.1143443	.0475574
Constant	.6404988	.0391258

Appendix A.6.2 Dreamer / Evangelical / Black respondents removed

Dreamer	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0032382	.0005678
Education	.1529532	.0063637
Party ID	-.3266333	.0047663
Male	-.0796351	.0186763
BornAgain	-.4502461	.038133
Protestant	-.025744	.0271682
1.White	.0499006	.0261924
1.Evangelical	.2745472	.0836422
White*Evangelical		
1 1	-.0861787	.0690204
1.ChurchRegular	-.027261	.0280235
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	.0933486	.0533614
Constant	.7423477	.0443512

Appendix A.6.3 Dreamer / RELTRAD

Dreamer	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0028698	.0005237
Education	.1577765	.0059259
Party ID	-.3115446	.0044411
Male	-.044288	.0173508
1.White	.0894824	.0210684
1.ChurchofChrist	-.4733862	.2717222
White*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	.6707243	.2795479
1.LutheranMissouri	-.7760188	.2686419
White*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	.6039703	.2719421
1.NondenomEvangelical	-.1104573	.1120132
White*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	-.212719	.1086655
1.OtherBaptist	-.3917931	.1021177
White*OtherBaptist		
1 1	.0524617	.1293797
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod	.0476698	.2303022
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	-.1835005	.2205426
1.SouthernBaptist	-.4098527	.0859483
White*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	.1536727	.0938558
1.AmericanBaptist	-.4949253	.1451273
White*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	.4283971	.1777041
1.ChurchRegular	-.143785	.0220806
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	.3808702	.2184884
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	.273532	.1696478
ChurchRegular*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	.3622875	.1038781
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist		
1 1	-.1277389	.1432163
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	.3346283	.1923911
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	.0003797	.0878145
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	.0702557	.1828359
Constant	.5608514	.0381962

Appendix A.7.1 Racism / Evangelical

Racism	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0035316	.0003242
Education	-.0236027	.0035224
Party ID	.1892127	.0025167
Male	.2661641	.0102469
BornAgain	.3796052	.0209972
Protestant	.0556057	.0141956
1.White	.1018802	.0136385
1.Evangelical	-.2620472	.0371183
White*Evangelical		
1 1	.0241012	.0285524
1.ChurchRegular	.1900284	.0153157
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	-.1782052	.0271177
Constant	1.568322	.0252006

Appendix A.7.2 Racism / Evangelical / Black respondents removed

Racism	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0030768	.00034
Education	-.0198859	.003691
Party ID	.1871537	.0026368
Male	.2737636	.0107429
BornAgain	.3985306	.0225231
Protestant	.0832475	.0151654
1.White	.0198283	.015871
1.Evangelical	-.1663847	.0482716
White*Evangelical		
1 1	-.107652	.0398622
1.ChurchRegular	.193024	.0161023
ChurchRegular*Evangelical		
1 1	-.1793862	.0292221
Constant	1.608708	.0276644

Appendix A.7.3 Racism / RELTRAD

Racism	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0037929	.0003222
Education	-.0299979	.0035145
Party ID	.1914226	.0024993
Male	.2622273	.0102611
1.White	.0881071	.0130556
1.ChurchofChrist	.1495238	.166964
White*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	-.1193649	.1714739
1.LutheranMissouri	.4385229	.1432789
White*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	-.2675243	.1453682
1.NondenomEvangelical	.112	.0664509
White*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	.1143579	.064077
1.OtherBaptist	-.0078103	.0661781
White*OtherBaptist		
1 1	.1337418	.0778217
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod	-.0311238	.1340519
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	.0445625	.1307338
1.SouthernBaptist	.0841611	.0539855
White*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	.0726944	.0568621
1.AmericanBaptist	.2653439	.0931804
White*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	-.0482511	.1090562
1.ChurchRegular	.2154379	.0130351
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist		
1 1	-.3550945	.1208819
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri		
1 1	-.0498779	.0918976
ChurchRegular*NondenomEvangelical		
1 1	-.2347313	.0572676
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist		
1 1	-.1051526	.0843149
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod		
1 1	-.1540034	.1051556
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist		
1 1	-.2022125	.0483414
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist		
1 1	.0030223	.1130983
Constant	1.647529	.0247662

APPENDICES

Appendix B: Chapter 3 Models

Appendix B.1.1 Trump Vote / Evangelical Clustered

Trump Vote	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0211087	.0013194
Education	-.2153979	.0109764
Party ID	1.003676	.0129273
Male	.3065473	.0323031
White	.5159424	.0479471
ChurchRegular	.2020668	.0454884
BornAgain	.9081089	.0926148
Protestant	.1257283	.0424093
Evangelical	-.4778607	.1054642
CountyPercent62	.0247832	.0048585
CountyPercentWhite	.0058411	.0015116
CountyPercentHS	-.0347234	.0040212
SouBaptStates	.0635045	.0409472
CountyPopulation	-4.10e-09	8.03e-09
Constant	-3.188787	.3695754

Appendix B.1.2 Trump Vote / RELTRAD Clustered

Trump Vote	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0205374	.0013891
Education	-.2298895	.0108218
Party ID	1.007066	.0135866
Male	.2842553	.0322646
White	.4751409	.0468155
ChurchRegular	.3661526	.0450866
ChurchofChrist	-.2552904	.1408199
LutheranMissouri	.2115033	.1113503
NondenomEvangelical	.3096058	.0781966
PentecostalAssembliesofGod	.4557678	.1910386
SouthernBaptist	.6024005	.078309
AmericanBaptist	.1575897	.1882182
OtherBaptist	.171569	.1120654
CountyPercent62	.024551	.0050907
CountyPercentWhite	.0065346	.0015488
CountyPercentHS	-.0375216	.0040676
SouBaptStates	.0806703	.0413029
CountyPopulation	-8.96e-09	8.74e-09
Constant	-2.778207	.3783781

Appendix B.2.1 Party ID / Evangelical Clustered

Party ID	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0032103	.0007296
Education	-.0853226	.0074144
Male	.3272211	.0178379
White	1.071722	.0450384
ChurchRegular	.4130244	.0294347
BornAgain	.2589571	.0576077
Protestant	.2582163	.028632
Evangelical	.3585742	.0629981
CountyPercent62	-.004823	.0038431
CountyPercentWhite	.0152286	.001621
CountyPercentHS	-.0107446	.0032029
SouBaptStates	.1671929	.0335444
CountyPopulation	5.27e-09	1.17e-08
Constant	2.283629	.2707818

Appendix B.2.2 Party ID / RELTRAD Clustered

Party ID	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0040511	.0007358
Education	-.097513	.0072112
Male	.2967447	.0178245
White	1.034811	.0426622
ChurchRegular	.6054913	.0324613
ChurchofChrist	-.2347662	.0877399
LutheranMissouri	.7651014	.0722268
NondenomEvangelical	1.003382	.0473601
PentecostalAssembliesofGod	1.016983	.0866534
SouthernBaptist	.6356176	.0445664
AmericanBaptist	-.1809537	.0872658
OtherBaptist	.1066715	.0627206
CountyPercent62	-.0037885	.0037228
CountyPercentWhite	.0154664	.0016346
CountyPercentHS	-.0133931	.0033167
SouBaptStates	.2055125	.0346974
CountyPopulation	-2.70e-09	1.22e-08
Constant	2.627823	.2804417

Appendix B.3.1 Gay Marriage / Evangelical Clustered

Gay Marriage	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0205334	.0008314
Education	.1424022	.0088064
Party ID	-.3730504	.008576
Male	-.3675686	.0232351
White	.5714583	.0341433
ChurchRegular	-1.160004	.0280239
BornAgain	-1.107011	.0396617
Protestant	-.2808187	.0306787
Evangelical	-.1084027	.0500803
CountyPercent62	-.0003003	.0032068
CountyPercentWhite	-.0002535	.0010282
CountyPercentHS	.0179439	.0026605
SouBaptStates	-.0828648	.0273316
CountyPopulation	2.56e-08	6.33e-09
Constant	1.563442	.2409333

Appendix B.3.2 Gay Marriage / RELTRAD Clustered

Gay Marriage	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0198962	.0008761
Education	.1681763	.0087915
Party ID	-.3793652	.0092393
Male	-.29844	.0231472
White	.6243954	.0382669
ChurchRegular	-1.534943	.0247441
ChurchofChrist	.3794967	.1216911
LutheranMissouri	-.3496958	.075425
NondenomEvangelical	-1.162739	.0618093
PentecostalAssembliesofGod	-1.343345	.1299738
SouthernBaptist	-.7705477	.0485744
AmericanBaptist	-.4797268	.0975319
OtherBaptist	-.6193353	.0656755
CountyPercent62	-.0016807	.0033255
CountyPercentWhite	-.0006286	.0011089
CountyPercentHS	.0230803	.0029722
SouBaptStates	-.1746288	.0298972
CountyPopulation	3.68e-08	8.80e-09
Constant	.7500789	.271076

Appendix B.4.1 Pro-Life / Evangelical Clustered

Pro-Life	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0006922	.0006277
Education	-.1417305	.0066444
Party ID	.1744761	.0055848
Male	.3491693	.0199304
White	-.4165091	.0254891
ChurchRegular	.2931875	.0266017
BornAgain	.7159671	.036042
Protestant	.1861336	.0266206
Evangelical	-.4297077	.0455918
CountyPercent62	-.003347	.0029079
CountyPercentWhite	.0035856	.0007912
CountyPercentHS	-.013578	.0023339
SouBaptStates	.0316507	.0240842
CountyPopulation	-1.94e-08	4.15e-09
Constant	.5490061	.2092956

Appendix B.4.2 Pro-Life / RELTRAD Clustered

Pro-Life	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0005093	.0006815
Education	-.1534708	.006682
Party ID	.1811294	.0059221
Male	.3335378	.0203662
White	-.4412082	.0271743
ChurchRegular	.4620681	.0267121
ChurchofChrist	-.1299691	.0917198
LutheranMissouri	.3549118	.0753855
NondenomEvangelical	.1824563	.0507891
PentecostalAssembliesofGod	.0022519	.0948202
SouthernBaptist	.2461712	.0438611
AmericanBaptist	.4610389	.0870566
OtherBaptist	.1724489	.0621449
CountyPercent62	-.003093	.0028797
CountyPercentWhite	.0036854	.0007973
CountyPercentHS	-.0160003	.0023284
SouBaptStates	.0659303	.0245803
CountyPopulation	-2.25e-08	4.49e-09
Constant	.9034094	.2088752

Appendix B.5.1 Assault Rifle Ban / Evangelical Clustered

Assault Rifle Ban	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0184027	.0006132
Education	.0848622	.0073452
Party ID	-.423184	.0088984
Male	-.9487747	.0228375
White	-.0224883	.0310995
ChurchRegular	.0428024	.0299812
BornAgain	-.333632	.0398809
Protestant	-.0183573	.0290655
Evangelical	.0869027	.051894
CountyPercent62	.0052842	.0029622
CountyPercentWhite	-.0091859	.0009818
CountyPercentHS	.0151846	.0026895
SouBaptStates	-.1069068	.0269791
CountyPopulation	2.18e-08	1.30e-08
Constant	.9738405	.244026

Appendix B.5.2 Assault Rifle Ban / RELTRAD Clustered

Assault Rifle Ban	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0186526	.000615
Education	.0915542	.0073719
Party ID	-.4249245	.0091164
Male	-.9413321	.0226623
White	-.011218	.0317534
ChurchRegular	-.0373399	.0304307
ChurchofChrist	.1208988	.1162142
LutheranMissouri	-.1822687	.0756284
NondenomEvangelical	-.3143777	.0518453
PentecostalAssembliesofGod	-.1779295	.0964519
SouthernBaptist	-.1671508	.0487342
AmericanBaptist	.0671799	.1109301
OtherBaptist	-.2629798	.0710173
CountyPercent62	.0050717	.0030413
CountyPercentWhite	-.0092647	.0010074
CountyPercentHS	.0164186	.0027422
SouBaptStates	-.117627	.0275356
CountyPopulation	2.31e-08	1.36e-08
Constant	.7983816	.2496005

Appendix B.6.1 Dreamer / Evangelical Clustered

Dreamer	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0029647	.000574
Education	.1456023	.0062291
Party ID	-.3075968	.0053958
Male	-.0509442	.0167699
White	.0912188	.0265025
ChurchRegular	-.0184353	.0243558
BornAgain	-.4587192	.0381928
Protestant	-.0624535	.0267081
Evangelical	.2490499	.0473068
CountyPercent62	-.0108757	.0027822
CountyPercentWhite	.0008942	.0008042
CountyPercentHS	.0092232	.0023342
SouBaptStates	.0658534	.022919
CountyPopulation	1.55e-08	7.97e-09
Constant	-.0756579	.2170406

Appendix B.6.2 Dreamer / RELTRAD Clustered

Dreamer	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.002658	.0005873
Education	.1519869	.0062457
Party ID	-.3108605	.0055409
Male	-.046895	.016665
White	.1022604	.0263955
ChurchRegular	-.1240216	.0229061
ChurchofChrist	.2078265	.0962718
LutheranMissouri	-.1637637	.0771251
NondenomEvangelical	-.0430116	.0492478
PentecostalAssembliesofGod	.1152611	.096875
SouthernBaptist	-.3140428	.0443736
AmericanBaptist	-.2631578	.0973307
OtherBaptist	-.4022233	.0643128
CountyPercent62	-.0109928	.0028395
CountyPercentWhite	.0007279	.0008056
CountyPercentHS	.010412	.0023061
SouBaptStates	.0612215	.0229322
CountyPopulation	1.55e-08	7.93e-09
Constant	-.2479602	.2142181

Appendix B.7.1 Racism / Evangelical Clustered

Racism	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0034915	.0004597
Education	-.0222524	.004205
Party ID	.1888202	.0038003
Male	.2666974	.0115357
White	.1036215	.016428
ChurchRegular	.1341685	.0182645
BornAgain	.3945493	.0361997
Protestant	.0608013	.0143766
Evangelical	-.3429204	.0394361
CountyPercent62	-.0002116	.0014102
CountyPercentWhite	.0016945	.0005501
CountyPercentHS	-.0030843	.0014434
SouBaptStates	-.0112841	.0163503
CountyPopulation	1.15e-08	3.92e-09
Constant	1.70788	.1265682

Appendix B.7.2 Racism / RELTRAD Clustered

Racism	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0037458	.0004982
Education	-.0283662	.0040716
Party ID	.1912246	.0038797
Male	.262955	.0116072
White	.0917711	.0165477
ChurchRegular	.1839065	.0202591
ChurchofChrist	-.0476464	.0524409
LutheranMissouri	.1789652	.042586
NondenomEvangelical	.0604217	.0296356
PentecostalAssembliesofGod	-.0810034	.0590264
SouthernBaptist	.0519358	.0269556
AmericanBaptist	.2504556	.0612183
OtherBaptist	.0467795	.0401211
CountyPercent62	-.0003188	.0014363
CountyPercentWhite	.001787	.0005549
CountyPercentHS	-.0042088	.0014771
SouBaptStates	-.0007558	.0168613
CountyPopulation	1.06e-08	4.01e-09
Constant	1.874658	.1312068

APPENDICES

Appendix C: Chapter 4 Models

Appendix C.1 Evangelical Clustered

Evangelical	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0095244	.00077
Education	-.1093439	.0096451
Party ID	.1905624	.0069569
Male	-.2698019	.0237913
White	-.4356989	.0426195
ChurchRegular	1.825896	.0284754
SouBaptStates	.6162556	.0520693
CountyPopulation	-9.88e-08	3.92e-08
CountyPercent62	.0001577	.0058143
CountyPercentWhite	.0027147	.001925
CountyPercentHS	-.0247519	.0049104
Constant	-.6184339	.44776

Appendix C.2 Church of Christ Clustered

Church of Christ	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0298924	.0026545
Education	.1692254	.0312178
Party ID	-.065287	.0213205
Male	-.0705601	.092584
White	.6124535	.1550899
ChurchRegular	.0917636	.1050323
SouBaptStates	-.6242098	.1268812
CountyPopulation	3.60e-08	3.22e-08
CountyPercent62	.0161987	.0109255
CountyPercentWhite	.0126458	.0057952
CountyPercentHS	.0285494	.0149941
Constant	-10.93729	1.298173

Appendix C.3 Lutheran Missouri Clustered

Lutheran Missouri	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0252825	.0021349
Education	.0623124	.0239605
Party ID	.1721625	.0180948
Male	.0111741	.0730382
White	.8097683	.1284099
ChurchRegular	-.0796373	.0784321
SouBaptStates	-.0899749	.0989062
CountyPopulation	5.91e-08	3.54e-08
CountyPercent62	-.0054922	.01036
CountyPercentWhite	.0152362	.0036334
CountyPercentHS	.0287472	.0109913
Constant	-10.82985	1.002887

Appendix C.4 Nondenominational Evangelical Clustered

Nondenominational Evangelical	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0036172	.0016099
Education	.0502776	.0149119
Party ID	.2374231	.0116369
Male	-.1036882	.0477153
White	-.311474	.0567387
ChurchRegular	1.430055	.0531047
SouBaptStates	.0907102	.0610278
CountyPopulation	8.21e-09	1.48e-08
CountyPercent62	-.0199291	.0066082
CountyPercentWhite	.0080115	.0022152
CountyPercentHS	.0060577	.0060829
Constant	-5.902296	.5594859

Appendix C.5 Pentecostal Assemblies of God Clustered

Pentecostal Assemblies of God	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0036004	.0022781
Education	-.1443887	.0311029
Party ID	.2504752	.0248094
Male	-.0165033	.0857792
White	-.1080968	.1188775
ChurchRegular	1.396039	.0941938
SouBaptStates	-.064766	.1071893
CountyPopulation	-9.68e-08	5.16e-08
CountyPercent62	-.0008432	.0107423
CountyPercentWhite	.0074052	.0035459
CountyPercentHS	-.0161998	.0088683
Constant	-4.970155	.8221914

Appendix C.6 Southern Baptist Clustered

Southern Baptist	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0148426	.0012318
Education	-.0924335	.0163665
Party ID	.1439539	.0110573
Male	.0689799	.0408223
White	-.0972165	.060829
ChurchRegular	.7435409	.0444048
SouBaptStates	1.603888	.069854
CountyPopulation	-1.72e-07	7.29e-08
CountyPercent62	-.0122179	.007143
CountyPercentWhite	-.0063489	.0022351
CountyPercentHS	-.0317596	.0064932
Constant	-1.557485	.6048061

Appendix C.7 American Baptist Clustered

American Baptist	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	.0066381	.0028082
Education	-.1622101	.0313436
Party ID	-.0532374	.0231481
Male	-.1467802	.0860568
White	-.9557701	.0922129
ChurchRegular	.5398468	.093774
SouBaptStates	-.1504644	.0987707
CountyPopulation	-1.47e-07	4.60e-08
CountyPercent62	.0075132	.0098906
CountyPercentWhite	-.0048072	.003133
CountyPercentHS	.004224	.0096555
Constant	-3.696911	.8435104

Appendix C.8 Other Baptist Clustered

Other Baptist	Coef.	Std. Err.
Age	-.0004012	.001889
Education	-.1703592	.02216
Party ID	.022939	.0155851
Male	-.3835466	.0635038
White	-.8093369	.0723797
ChurchRegular	.0914408	.072406
SouBaptStates	.5281368	.0722102
CountyPopulation	-6.11e-08	3.99e-08
CountyPercent62	.0185273	.0071857
CountyPercentWhite	-.0041374	.002442
CountyPercentHS	-.0140684	.0067393
Constant	-1.744781	.6053075