Spring 5-13-2011

From Orators to Cyborgs: The Evolution of Delivery, Performativity, and Gender

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FROM ORATORS TO CYBORGS: THE EVOLUTION OF DELIVERY,
PERFORMATIVITY, AND GENDER

by

VICTORIA E. WILLIS

Under the Direction of George Pullman

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this project is to provide a thorough account of delivery by tracing the history and evolution of delivery from antiquity to the present day in order to expose the spread
and transmission of proto-masculine ideologies through delivery. By looking at delivery from an evolutionary perspective, delivery no longer becomes a tool of rhetoric, but the technology of rhetoric, evolving over time in the same way the system of rhetoric itself has evolved.

Contemporary scholarship on delivery continues to look at delivery as a tool—as the ink, the paper, the computer screen, the keyboard, the font, the hypertext, the web design, and so forth—of communication. Contemporary scholarship re-works the classical definition of delivery to fit into a contemporary context, and consequently ignores the proto-masculinity embedded into classical delivery and its spread from public speaking to all speaking situations—and the larger consequence of this approach is that proto-masculinity remains embedded and idealized.

Focusing specifically on delivery’s history and evolution into a post-human, cyborg technology demonstrates how proto-masculinity has operated within delivery and how proto-masculinity has been spread through delivery instruction. The importance of re-situating delivery within the rhetorical canons affects rhetoric as a whole because it demonstrates that not only is delivery still crucial to rhetoric, and possibly still the most important rhetorical canon, but also because it de-naturalizes the proto-masculine imperatives embedded within delivery and conveyed through delivered language performances.

INDEX WORDS: Delivery, Rhetoric, Performativity, Gender, Masculinity, Rhetorical history, Post-humanism, Cyborg, Prototypical masculinity, Post-feminism, Orators, Cultural studies
FROM ORATORS TO CYBORGs: THE EVOLUTION OF DELIVERY,
PERFORMATIVITY, AND GENDER

by

VICTORIA E. WILLIS

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment for the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
2011
FROM ORATORS TO CYBORGS: THE EVOLUTION OF DELIVERY, PERFORMATIVITY, AND GENDER

by

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May 2011
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although an incredible number of people have offered me immense support and encouragement throughout the writing of this dissertation, I would particularly like to thank my committee members, colleagues, friends, and family.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my director, George Pullman, for his invaluable guidance, insight, patience and all around brilliance. Without George, I might still be wandering the halls trying to focus my ideas, and chapter one might still be about 80 pages long. I cannot thank him enough for his help and support.

I would like to thank Marti Singer, for her wonderful cheerleading, great feedback, and endless enthusiasm (and chicken dish!). I deeply appreciate everything she’s done for me.

I would like to thank Cal Thomas, for his excellent feedback, generous support and understanding, and the occasional jazz CD and music chat. It’s meant more to me than I can say.

I would like to thank the incredible faculty in the Department of English at Georgia State University and my fantastic colleagues in the graduate program. Learning from them and with them has been a pleasure.

I would like to thank my amazing colleagues in the Office of Institutional Effectiveness and my former colleagues in the library—work has never been more fun, and their support is much appreciated.

I would like to thank Chris Stone, my wonderful boyfriend, and who acts as my very own Green Lantern power ring by giving me the will, support, love, and hope to get through anything. And I would also like to thank his greyhound, Juice, who gets me out of the apartment (frequently) to reconnect with the outside world.
I would like to thank my family, especially my Mom, my Dad, and my brother, Mac, who
provided me with love and support, and who smiled tolerantly through long-winded monologues
about several of these chapters.

I would like to thank Julie and Damon Hawk, whose friendship and kindnesses (not to
mention BBQ and comics) made much of this writing process happen.

And I would like to thank the many friends and colleagues who have supported me
throughout graduate school, including the ones in other states. I couldn’t have done this without
them.
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INTRODUCTION

On the first day of the first class I taught, I forgot to introduce myself. The moment my class started, I leaped into a free-writing activity with my students, only realizing fifteen minutes into the activity that I had not only failed to tell my students who I was, I had also neglected to introduce them to the course. I had a lesson plan (my first one), and these details were outlined in my notes. But I was so uncomfortable standing in front of the class, wearing my new loafers and pale blue blouse and business skirt that I simply forgot. Twenty-five pairs of eyes stared at me standing in front of the room, and I suddenly realized that I was not only on stage, but also that I had no idea what to do with my hands, or with my shaking voice, or with my stance. Twenty-five pairs of eyes were looking at me, and twenty-five students were trying to determine what the course would be like based on my appearance and behavior. I had a syllabus and a teaching philosophy that I believed in, I had pedagogical theory and training, and I had a professional wardrobe that barely suited me. I knew how to do everything I needed to do in order to teach this course, except how to do the actions of teaching. I had everything but delivery.

I was never taught how to deliver my course material in the classroom. The last time I received instruction in delivery was in a sophomore level speech class, where we were taught to make our speeches memorable by catching the audience’s attention (an injunction which led one student to set his hand on fire to begin his speech). But instruction in vocal projection, posture, carriage, tone modulation, gestures, walking, dress—these were things I learned in a horrifying etiquette class my mother forced on me when I was twelve years old, and they involved learning to walk with a book on my head and how to take off my white gloves one finger at a time for tea. My younger brother was not subjected to the tedium of etiquette class, and the lessons I learned in delivery from my etiquette class dealt more with gender expectations than with how I would
comport myself in public. Unless I planned to serve my students high tea, the delivery I had learned was useless. I had to figure out delivery while doing it—an experience that led me, in part, to this project on delivery. The assumption that if I knew my course material and pedagogical theory, then I would just naturally be able to teach, seemed to underlie what appeared, at first, to be an endemic disappearance of delivery in rhetoric. From classroom teaching to academic conferences where scholars read directly from their papers (or PowerPoint slides), delivery appeared to be absent.

It seemed strange, and somewhat improbable, for delivery to have completely vanished from contemporary rhetoric. Classical rhetoric, on which contemporary rhetoric was founded, set great store by delivery. When an orator spoke in ancient Greece, his delivery was a crucial component, if not THE most crucial component, of his persuasion. Demosthenes was quoted by several sources, perhaps most notably Cicero and Quintilian, as saying the three most important features of rhetoric were delivery, delivery, and delivery. Delivery, in the context of ancient Greece and Rome, included vocal projection and inflection, gestures, facial expressions, dress and appearance, stance, comportment, and demeanor. I would define classical delivery, then, as the physical art of speaking, where an orator complements and augments the persuasive qualities of his speech with persuasive physicalities that speak to his ethos and authenticity as a speaker. Or, to put it another way, delivery didn’t focus on what on orator said, but rather on how he said it—how he embodied authority and ethos in his speech and conveyed his character to his audience. How an orator in antiquity gave his speeches became increasingly important in ancient rhetorical studies. With Plato, delivery as an aspect of rhetoric was only implied; he never mentioned delivery by name, but provides demonstrations of delivery in Phaedrus. Aristotle, in On Rhetoric, discussed delivery and seemed to consider it a “necessary evil;” delivery could
sway an audience where logical argument could not, and although logic should have been the
driving force behind argumentation, the vulgarity of audiences necessitated the use of delivery as
a means to persuade. Cicero and Quintilian, however, thought that delivery was necessary in and
of itself, and did not see the same detrimental qualities in delivery that Aristotle saw. Cicero
addressed the importance of delivery frequently, and included instruction on delivery woven
throughout the rest of his instruction on rhetoric. Quintilian, however, wrote the most extensive
treatment of delivery in antiquity, and devoted a book of *The Orator’s Education* to instruction
on delivery alone. Even with the detailed instructions provided by classical rhetoricians, delivery
still did not receive the same amount of attention as other canons of rhetoric in antiquity; in
comparison, the work on delivery seems meager. At the same time, however, the emphasis
placed on delivery cannot be ignored. Even delivery’s detractors, particularly Aristotle, agreed
that delivery was essential to rhetoric and oratory.

Contemporary rhetoric, in contrast, almost entirely ignores delivery as a central facet of
rhetorical study, and contemporary scholarship tends to address delivery only in conjunction
with technology, such as printing, and digital and/or electronic rhetorics. I make the distinction
between digital and electronic rhetorics because digital rhetorics seem, to me, to focus more on
digital languages, both computer programming languages and websites, and on communicating
through digital technologies, such as the Internet; in other words, digital rhetoric seems to focus
on composing through technology. Electronic rhetorics appear to deal more with electronic
fluency and literacy among technology users and with electronic communication through devices
such as computers, cell phones, and webcams; in other words, electronic rhetorics focus on
technology usage for the purpose of communicating. Within these areas of rhetoric, delivery is
discussed as a transmission or presentation of information and language, and is redefined,
moving away from its classical definition. I would define delivery associated with technology as the presentation of the printed word, including formatting, font, paper color and weight, ink color and depth, visual clarity, and reading ease. Robert Conners’ “Actio: A Rhetoric of Written Delivery (Iteration Two)” is an excellent example of scholarship on delivery that focuses on the presentation of words on the printed page, as is Sam Dragga’s “The Ethics of Delivery.” Both articles focus on layout, ink, color, font, and formatting in their discussions of delivery. Similar to printing technology delivery, I would define delivery associated with digital rhetorics as the presentation of the virtual word and images, including web design, hypertext font, color schemes, visual clarity, and reading ease. Scholarship concerning contemporary digital delivery includes Jay Bolter’s Writing Space and James A. Inman’s Computers and Writing. I define delivery associated with electronic rhetorics as the transmission of digital information through mediums such as websites, netbooks, cell phones, e-readers, blogs, video games, and other electronic device and software driven language and communication technologies, and this electronic delivery includes the technological literacy and fluency involved in using these technologies for communication. Literacy and Computers: The Complications of Teaching and Learning with Technology, edited by Cynthia Selfe and Susan Hilligoss and Electric Rhetoric by Kathleen Welch are wonderful examples of scholarship on electronic delivery.

Delivery’s definition is each of these cases is similar to, but not the same as, the classical definition of delivery. Although contemporary scholarship on delivery associated with printed technologies or with digital technologies derive from classical rhetoric, and focus on the presentation of the material, electronic delivery focuses more specifically on the transmission of electronic information--which again, is similar to classical delivery’s focus on the transmission of oral and visual information, but the mediums of that transmission, orators and electronics, are
greatly different. Contemporary scholarship centering exclusively on delivery in a classical sense, either as subject of study or as a subject of instruction, is notably lacking. Very few contemporary scholars address delivery in the classical sense. The contemporary scholarship that does focus on classically defined delivery focuses on women in rhetoric. Lindal Buchanan’s *Regendering Delivery: The Fifth Canon and Antebellum Women Rhetors* and Carol Mattingly’s *Appropriate[ing] Dress: Women’s Rhetorical Style in Nineteenth Century America* are among the few works that investigate classically defined delivery, and both focus on women’s delivery and creation of public speaking spaces in the nineteenth century. It is significant that the few contemporary pieces of rhetorical scholarship on classically defined delivery address gender because in antiquity, orators were men. The rules for delivery in classical rhetoric were not intended for women because women could not become orators. Orators were men who were educated, financially sound citizens with family (or who were usually pursuing marriage and family life), privilege, social position, and prestige. The current scholarship that focuses on delivery and women in rhetoric is geared toward including women orators in the rhetorical canon and investigating how women created the *ethos* necessary for public speaking. Although it is important to include women orators in rhetoric, Cheryl Glenn argues in “Remapping Rhetorical Territory” that it is not enough to include and situate women within rhetoric when rhetoric itself is a masculine construction; we must re-conceptualize rhetoric itself (293-294). However, in order to re-map rhetoric, the history of delivery needs to be mapped in the first place.

The history of delivery needs to be charted for more than the re-mapping of rhetoric. The map itself appears to have gaps and holes where delivery seems to have disappeared or have been lost. Delivery, once central to rhetoric in antiquity, is now only associated with technological, digital, and electric rhetorics. At some point in rhetoric, delivery stopped being
associated with orators and *actio* and started being associated with machines and transmissions, and tracing the history of delivery is necessary to show how this shift occurred. When contemporary scholarship does focus on classically defined delivery, and orators who use delivery, the scholarship focuses on gender and women orators. Tracing the history of delivery is also important to show how delivery and gender are connected and how those connections have evolved over time. Not only does delivery need to be mapped, but the mapping of delivery also calls into question our re-mapping practices. The assumption that rhetoric is, as Glenn claims, a masculine construction is problematic because it assumes that men have made rhetoric and does not take into account that men are also expected to conform to masculine ideologies and imperatives. Although women were excluded from classical rhetoric, and subsequently neglected in the history of rhetoric until recently, men have not been liberated by this exclusion. Masculine dominance over women and other marginalized subjects comes at a cost—conformity. Men are more confined by their status in rhetoric than liberated by it because they are forced to conform to “natural” roles of masculine superiority just as much as women have been forced to assume “natural” positions of inferiority. And delivery instruction prescribed and reinforced this masculine position by delineating masculine behavior. Glenn assumes that men have made rhetoric, but how has rhetoric made men? In the history of delivery, why has delivery shifted from orators to machines? And what are the consequences of shifting delivery from the center of rhetoric and redefining it while moving it to the sidelines?

In the history of delivery that I have pieced together in order to answer these questions, I have taken a post-feminist and post-humanist perspective. I call my lens “post-feminist” because I think that gender imperatives do more than operate to marginalize women—I think they also function to regulate the behavior of men. I have problems with the word “patriarchy,” and how I
hear the word used (both in writing and speech) as if there really exists a group of white middle-class men who carry Patriarchy Membership Cards in their wallets and who lay down rules of behavior for all other persons to follow. The idea of patriarchy, in my opinion, is a controlling ideology that not only marginalizes and controls women but also controls men and marginalizes those who can’t or won’t follow patriarchal rules for behavior. Men who deviate from these standards, who do not follow what I choose to term “proto-masculinity,” are also marginalized and excluded. I think that by continuing to use terms like “patriarchy” or “masculine canon,” we perpetuate the contrasted masculinities of those ideas. For example, the canon of literature has been attacked for being “patriarchal,” “masculine,” and “literature written by a bunch of dead white men.” And while many of the works of the literary canon have indeed written by dead white men, these men did not embody masculinity. By calling them masculine because they were men, and by calling the literary canon masculine because it was written by men, we perpetuate the idea of proto-masculinity, suggest that proto-masculinity is the standard everyone must conform to in order to succeed, and resign ourselves to a canon where women and persons who were (and are) not white, male, heteronormative can only be included in special sections devoted to them alone. Literary anthologies are an excellent example, where “literature” pervades the collection, but special subdivisions are constructed and devoted to women writers, African-American writers, Hispanic writers, etc. By continuing to call the literary canon “masculine,” we continue to perpetuate the masculinity of the canon.

I define the term “proto-masculinity” as an idea of the idealized masculinity, which contains traits of social status, class, color, sexuality, and education, to which a man is expected to conform and perform, and to which he is expected to acquiesce when he can’t successfully compete. This idea of ideal masculinity is merely that—an idea—but men are instructed through
delivery to perform this ideal as if these traits are inherent and innate. Proto-masculinity contains the traits of whiteness and racial privilege, elevated social status, upper and middle class monetary power, normative sexuality, and advanced education that are associated with an elite man. “Proto” comes from “prototype,” which I’m using to suggest a prototypical construction of masculinity. Proto-masculinity is a model of masculinity from which performed masculinities are derived. Like Plato’s forms, proto-masculinity is an idea, a vision, of ideal masculinity. This ideal masculinity is a controlling ideology that not only marginalizes subjects like women, who are not allowed access to the advantages of being a member of the elite because of their gender, but also sets a standard for male performance which marginalizes some men while constraining others. In order to be a “real man,” a man must perform the proto-masculinity appropriate to his time, whether he is the ideal orator in ancient Rome or the perfect gentlemen in antebellum America. In other words, proto-masculinity is the male version of True Womanhood.

In classical rhetoric, proto-masculinity was embedded into delivery through rhetorical instruction and practice in ancient Greece and Rome. Young men who were taught how to be orators during their rhetorical training were also taught how to be men. Rhetorical instruction in delivery taught young men how to stand, vocalize, gesture, dress, smile, frown, gaze, and all the actions appropriate to public speaking. As instruction in delivery developed, particularly with the Cicero and Quintilian, these instructions in how to deliver a speech became equated with how to deliver character—proto-masculine character. All of the characteristics of delivery—voice, face, body, hands, gesture, dress—were thought to indicate the character of the orator himself. And because delivery was considered a “natural” skill, the characteristics of proto-masculine character associated with delivery were embedded into rhetorical instruction. The process of learning how to be an orator became intertwined with the process of learning how to be a proto-
masculine man. In classical rhetoric, delivery began to evolve even as it was developed more extensively in rhetorical treatises. The delivery of character became so important that even before an orator spoke, he was instructed to engage in the delivery of his character. Quintilian’s *On the Orator’s Education* was particularly important to intertwining proto-masculinity. His definition of an orator as “a good man speaking well” emphasized the embedment of proto-masculinity into delivery, and his claim that speech and delivery were one and the same extended the location of delivery from the public arena of the orator’s stage to all speaking situations.

As delivery changed over time, it evolved, growing from a system for teaching orators how to act and perform on-stage to a system that instructed men how to behave in private settings as well. I use the term “evolution” to discuss how delivery has changed over time because delivery is social system and social systems evolve. Delivery is a system because it is composed of parts—gestures, facial expressions, posture, voice, and dress—that interrelate and work together to form a whole—the representation of the character of the orator. And delivery is a social system because delivery operates in the social context of oratory and in the relationship between the orator and audience. As Niklas Luhmann states in *Social Systems*, “Thus we give a double answer to the question of what comprises a social system: communications and their attribution as actions. Neither aspect is capable of evolving without the other” (174). Delivery is not just a form of communication; it is the physical action of communication. And evolution is, for Luhmann, an inherent part of social systems’ growth. Rather than simply growing larger or changing completely, delivery evolves in a way that builds upon and alters its systematic structures. During antiquity, delivery is structured as a system for instructing orators how to perform appropriate behaviors and action while speaking in public. After antiquity and with the rise of printed communications, delivery evolves into etiquette. Instructions for behavior and
actions in rhetoric evolve into etiquette instruction in every day life during the Enlightenment, and etiquette continues to prescribe proto-masculinity. Delivery’s structure evolves from a prescribed set of rules for behavior and action during public speaking, to a prescribed set of rules for behavior and action in all speaking situations. The evolution of delivery describes how the fundamentals of delivery—the concern over voice, dress, facial expressions, stance, and gestures—remain indicators of character and self, but change location from public speaking to private speaking. Delivery saturated conduct manuals, although it was no longer called “delivery,” but “etiquette” instead. The proto-masculinity embedded into delivery instruction remained intact with its evolution—only with the evolution of delivery, a man was required to perform proto-masculinity in private spheres as well as public ones. Delivery’s saturation of all speaking situations, not just public speaking, led it to evolve into performativity. Judith Butler’s performativity detaches gender from the speaker, and shows that gender performance is merely that—a performance. Butler’s detachment of gender demonstrates that proto-masculinity is not inherent in orators or speakers, but a manifestation of their performances. Erving Goffman in particular demonstrates delivery’s evolution by looking at performances in social situations in daily life. Delivery is not just system for communicative action, but a rhetorical system, where performances are based on rhetorical situations. Gender, then, is manifested in rhetorical situations; it is created in the interactions between speakers and audiences. And proto-masculinity is perpetuated not only because it continues to be performed, but also because audiences continue to expect and evaluate performances of it.

Delivery, then, isn’t just a tool that one uses to perform gender; it is a technology that people use to create identity and gender in rhetorical situations. Because delivery constructs gender within the interactions of speakers and audiences, delivery is a post-human technology,
and more specifically, a cyborg technology. Post-humanism, as defined by N. Katherine Hayles, is the fluidity of boundaries between a person’s body and a person’s environment, where a person’s identity and subjectivity is created in the interactions between a person’s self and environment (2). These fluid boundaries between body and environment are evident in many daily activities. One of the best examples is when we parallel park our cars. When we drive, we gain a sense of the exterior parameters of our cars. The sense we have of our bodies and our physical locations in space shifts when we drive to include the exteriors of our vehicles—we extend our cognition and sense of physical space to include the parameters of our cars. This extension is particularly important when we parallel park—we use our sense of our cars’ parameters, the width, length, and breadth of our vehicles, to negotiate our cars into a parallel space. We cannot rely solely on sight because our vision doesn’t encompass the necessary range to parallel park; instead we must keep turning our heads, and using our sense of our cars’ size to back into the space. Our sense of our physical bodies extends to include our cars, demonstrating the fluidity of the boundaries between bodies and environments. This extension is particularly evident when we parallel park someone else’s car—we are not used to the parameters of the vehicle, the way the car handles, the touch of the accelerator, and so when we parallel park someone else’s car, we tend to feel awkward and displaced. We are used to our own cars like we are used to our own bodies; when we parallel park someone else’s car we become aware that we are parking a car, a body, that is not our own. In order to drive, we must extend the boundaries of our bodily awareness to include our cars, and this extension is post-human. Parallel parking, of course, hardly manifests subjectivity and identity in the same way that delivery does; the example merely shows the mechanics of post-humanism’s boundary fluidity. Writing, however, is an example that shows how identity and subjectivity are created in interactions. When we
write, we extend our consciousness just like we extend our bodily awareness when we drive. Andy Clark, in *Natural-Born Cyborgs*, uses the example of writing to explain how we extend our minds through the technology of writing (75-6). When we write, we engage with our writing and the act of putting it on paper. We don’t merely write everything done and are done; as we write, we read what we have written previously, we amend and revise our ideas, and we write again. We interact with the sheet of paper, or the computer screen, which serves as a storage unit for our thoughts, an extension of our memories, allowing us to build our ideas. As Clark puts it, “The whole process of critiquing, rearranging, streamlining, and linking is deeply informed by specific properties of the external media, which allow the sequence of simple, pattern-associative reactions to become steadily organized and to grow (hopefully) into something like an argument or presentation (75-6). When we switch writing mediums, from keyboard to pencil, for example, the mental extension becomes more evident because we must shift our thinking to accommodate the new medium. Our thoughts are constructed in the extension of our minds to our paper and computer screens; writing is quite literally thinking. It is in this space, this fluidity of boundaries between self and environment, that interactional subjectivity can be constructed.

When an orator and an audience interact, the person speaking and person(s) listening are both engaged in constructing meaning and constructing character. Delivery is like the mechanics of parallel parking or the process of writing. It is not merely a tool or device used for speaking; delivery is not like the car or the pencil. Delivery is the interactional process, the technology, which constructs speakers. The ability of people to extend their minds and bodies into the fluid boundaries of self and environments is an indication of post-humanism that demonstrates that humans are, in fact, cyborgs. Hayles, like Andy Clark, does not think that post-humanism dictates literal cyborgism (Hayles 4; Clark 179). Cyborgs are humans who have extended their
influence on and interactions with their environments through the use of machines and technologies (Clark 179). In the science-fiction conception of cyborgs, this extension is completed with implanted chips and machinery, creating a human/machine hybrid. But post-human cyborgism is subtler. Instead of robotic arms, we have keyboards and computer mice to interact with computers. We have “magic” mice, track pads, and touch screens that respond to gestures—the various finger swiping movements that manipulate information on computer, cell phone, e-reader, and iPod screens. We have pencils and pens to interact with paper. And because we have evolved into cyborgs, delivery has also evolved into a cyborg technology that demonstrates our post-humanism through the construction of self in the interactions between speakers and audiences. Looking at delivery as a cyborg technology gives us the ability to disrupt the proto-masculinity embedded into delivery. Proto-masculinity becomes, in this perspective, not a set of imperatives embedded into delivery irrevocably, but a construction that occurs in interactions. Because proto-masculinity occurs in interactions, proto-masculinity is not only an artificial construction of gender, but also one that can be changed. And the first step in making that change is becoming aware of the proto-masculine imperatives embedded in delivery, the history and evolution of delivery, and the creation of gender through speaker and audience interactions.

It is important to outline delivery’s history and evolutionary process because by overlooking delivery, or modifying it to fit into current rhetorical inquiries into technological communication, we also overlook the proto-masculine gender imperatives that were embedded into delivery. Overlooking these proto-masculine imperatives embedded into delivery naturalizes those imperatives and contributes to the construction of proto-masculinity as the default, the standard, of superior gender performance. If delivery continues to be thought of as a tool, a thing
that rhetoric can put back into its canon toolbox until a need for it arises, then delivery remains marginalized in rhetoric and proto-masculine standards are perpetuated. The marginalization of delivery, despite its evolution and transformation, contributes to the circulation of proto-masculine imperatives because proto-masculinity becomes naturalized when the system to which it is attached becomes invisible. Proto-masculine imperatives appear to be innate when we ignore the system that conveys those imperatives.

The purpose of this project is to provide a thorough account of delivery by tracing the history and evolution of delivery from antiquity to the present day in order to expose the spread and transmission of proto-masculine ideologies through delivery. By looking at delivery from an evolutionary perspective, delivery no longer becomes a tool of rhetoric, but the technology of rhetoric, evolving over time in the same way the system of rhetoric itself has evolved. Contemporary scholarship on delivery continues to look at delivery as a tool—as the ink, the paper, the computer screen, the keyboard, the font, the hypertext, the web design, and so forth—of communication. Contemporary scholarship re-works the classical definition of delivery to fit into a contemporary context, and consequently ignores the proto-masculinity embedded into classical delivery and its spread from public speaking to all speaking situations—and the larger consequence of this approach is that proto-masculinity remains embedded and idealized. Focusing specifically on delivery’s history and evolution into a post-human, cyborg technology demonstrates how proto-masculinity has operated within delivery and how proto-masculinity has been spread through delivery instruction. The importance of re-situating delivery within the rhetorical canons affects rhetoric as a whole because it demonstrates that not only is delivery still crucial to rhetoric, and possibly still the most important rhetorical canon, but also because it de-naturalizes the proto-masculine imperatives embedded within delivery and conveyed through
delivered language performances. This destabilization of proto-masculine imperatives shows that gender is constructed within deliveries between speakers and audiences, and gender performances change and adapt within rhetorical situations through delivery.

Chapter one traces the origins of delivery in classical rhetoric from Plato to the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. The development of delivery in antiquity demonstrates how masculine ideals became inscribed into discourse. Modes and ideals of masculinity were taught in conjunction with rhetorical (and philosophical) training, and students were required not only to learn these standards, but also to perform them. For example, James Fredal discusses the primacy of ethos to persuasion by looking at Aristotle's assessment of character on one's ability to persuade. It is, says Aristotle, a "controlling factor in persuasion" (38, 1.2.4). For the ancient Greeks, character was developed through habit--making choices to act a certain way, then repeating those choices and action until they became "second nature."

Chapter Two focuses on the growth and evolution of delivery in classical rhetoric, and investigates Quintilian's contribution to delivery—the most exhaustive extant account of delivery from antiquity. Following Cicero, Quintilian defined an orator as a “good man speaking well” (2.15.1-2), and rhetorical instruction not only outlined and prescribed standards for “speaking well,” but also for being a “good man.” Quintilian’s definition and instruction provided a distinct concretization of embedded proto-masculine ideals into delivery, and also began to set the stage for moving delivery from public addresses into private modes of communication. Quintilian claimed that delivery and speech are the same, and he extended delivery and proto-masculinity from public speaking and into all speaking situations.

Chapter Three discusses the rise of print, and delivery’s fall from favor in rhetorical studies. The marked revival of delivery in the 1700s and 1800s, conducted by Thomas Sheridan,
Hugh Blair, and Gilbert Austin, coincided with a tremendous increase in etiquette instruction. A repercussion of the fluctuating social classes during this time period (due to the discovery of the “New World,” emigration and immigration, Enlightenment ideologies, and growing concern with morality, behavior, and linguistic propriety because of increased social mobility), etiquette served not only to move delivery off the stage and into the parlor, but also served to perpetuate the gender instruction embedded in delivery and make it explicitly instructed for private settings. Delivery became prescribed for performances on and off the stage, making speakers, in general, performers of oratory.

Chapter Four argues that delivery’s next evolutionary step is from performance to performativity. With delivery’s spread from public to private modes of speaking, and delivery’s embedded proto-masculine ideals, delivery expands from a prescriptive set of instructions to include a method of analysis for detaching gender from the speaking subject. The development of performativity and its evolution from delivery is traced, from J.L. Austin, to Jean-Francoise Lyotard, to Jacques Derrida, to Judith Butler. Butler’s performativity receives particular emphasis because of her focus on gender, but her lack of rhetorical theory makes her performativity incomplete. Erving Goffman’s system of performance, when taken into consideration, corrects this lack and demonstrates how delivery evolved into performativity.

Chapter Five investigates the recent revivals of scholarly interest in delivery in conjunction with technology, particularly digital and electronic communication. These revivals, however, fail to take into account the historical evolution of delivery; consequently, they incorrectly attempt to reconfigure delivery to fit into a paradigm of transmission appropriate to the digital age. Walter Ong’s primary and secondary oralities, and his description of the shift in consciousness created from moving between aural/oral and visual communication, demonstrates
that delivery is itself a technology, a system used to organize ideas and information. As a technology, delivery has evolved to allow users to exert and extend their influence, using language, on the world around them. Delivery has not only evolved into a technology, it has evolved into what Andy Clark terms a nonpenetrative cyborg technology (108). And the users of this technology have evolved also, from orators to cyborgs, who use the technology of delivery to affect and influence their environments.

Chapter Six applies the evolution of delivery to the short web-film musical *Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog*, which takes place in a comic book world of superheroes and supervillains. The two antagonists, Dr. Horrible and Captain Hammer, battle for supremacy of proto-masculine performance—a battle which can be overshadowed by their positions of supervillain and superhero within the narrative. However, the superpowers of both characters merely serve to mark their post-human cyborgism, and their delivery’s perpetuation of proto-masculine ideologies is the primary conflict within the narrative. This reading demonstrates that if we neglect delivery’s evolution and its perpetuation of proto-masculine ideologies, and if we neglect how the technology of delivery creates gender in the locus between audiences and speakers, then the system of delivery will continue with all its proto-masculine imperatives intact.

Chapter Seven concludes the inquiry into the evolution of delivery by arguing that delivery has not only been embedded with proto-masculinity ideals, but the evolution of delivery, with these gender imperatives intact, is cause for re-assessing the place of delivery within the rhetorical canons.
1 THE ORIGINS OF DELIVERY IN CLASSICAL RHETORIC

The knack of delivery

Plato coined the term “rhetoric” in *Gorgias* to define the art of persuasion (Schiappa 457). In *Gorgias*, rhetoric is defined as the art used to change the minds of a group of people (452e); it is used to persuade people and produce conviction, but it does not help people distinguish between right and wrong. For Plato, rhetoric’s inability to help create morality relegates rhetoric to an inferior position, below philosophy. In Robin Waterfield’s translation of Plato’s dialogue, Socrates compares rhetoric to cooking, and declares that they are both branches of flattery [kolakeia] (along with sophistry and ornamentation) (463a-463b). Forms of flattery, in this sense, are not arts that require expertise, but are instead knacks [empeiria] that please and gratify an audience. He goes on to state that “rhetoric is a phantom branch of statesmanship,” and proceeds to establish a split between body and mind, where statesmanship concerns the mind, and medicine and exercise, for example, concern the body (463d-464b). Rhetoric, then, is only an illusory branch of the mind’s faculties, a false way of seeking knowledge. And because rhetoric is a false branch of only the mind’s faculties, Plato does not explicitly address the physicality of rhetoric, or the use of the body in producing or delivering oratory. Rhetoric’s ability to produce pleasure rather than truth alone was for Plato the chief problem with rhetoric. Plato believed that rhetoric should ensure speeches of high moral content, rather than focusing on speeches that produce pleasure. The only positive way to use rhetoric, Plato states in *Gorgias*, is to convince friends and family who have done wrong to turn themselves in for punishment, thus allowing them to be truly happy by paying the price for wrong-doing. In *Gorgias*, Plato claims that “we must have nothing to do with flattery in any of its guises—not only flattery of
oneself, but flattery of others, too, whether they’re in small groups or in a large crowd. And rhetoric (just like any other activity) should only ever be used in service of right” (527c).

To say that Plato had a poor opinion of rhetoric, particularly in *Gorgias*, would be putting it mildly. An orator’s ability to delight or please his audience was, Plato thought, a form of flattery that discarded or veiled objective truth. Instead of persuasion based on logical argument and moral correctness, rhetoric was based on persuasion where an audience could become convinced by a pretty phrase or gesture, a well-timed facial expression or clever use of rhetorical figures. In other words, one of Plato’s objections to rhetoric was to the part of rhetoric that Aristotle would later classify as delivery. Although Plato doesn’t name delivery explicitly as a part of rhetoric that he finds distasteful or false, he implicates delivery in his claim that rhetoric flatters and appeals to faculties other than logic and reason. In *Phaedrus*, Plato’s disavowal of delivery becomes more apparent, even as his stance on rhetoric changes. In this dialogue, Phaedrus says that he’s under the impression that appearance is more important than truth in rhetoric, and explains that it “is not necessary for the intending orator to learn what is really just, but only what will *seem* just to the crowd who will act as judges. Nor again what is really good or noble, but only what will *seem* so. For that is what persuasion proceeds from, not truth” [emphasis added] (260A). Socrates agrees that this viewpoint is widespread, but declares that it is incorrect. He contends that in order for someone to make a proper speech, he must be a philosopher (261A). Socrates calls rhetoric “a way of directing the soul by means of speech, not only in the lawcourts and on other public occasions, but also in private” (261A). Plato’s definition here is important because he places rhetoric in both public and private spheres. For the ancient Greeks, however, public speaking was a function of citizenship, and was more highly esteemed than speaking in private spheres.
The speeches given in *Phaedrus* demonstrate the correct ways of speaking, and also, by extension, imply that delivery is not an important feature of rhetoric. When Phaedrus rehearses Lysias’s speech, Socrates tells him that “It’s a miracle, my friend; I’m in ecstasy [sic]. And it’s all your doing, Phaedrus: I was looking at you while you were reading and it seemed to me the speech had made you radiant with delight” (234D). Socrates praises the delivery of the speech, while at the same time pointing out the content of the speech is repetitive and unimpressive (234E-235A). By implication, how Phaedrus gives the speech masks the content of the speech itself. Socrates’s first speech, which he claims is as bad as the one Phaedrus rehearsed, removes delivery almost entirely because Socrates speaks with his head covered. Although Socrates claims that covering his head will avoid embarrassment (237A), it also serves the dual purpose of hiding his delivery of the speech itself. Without delivery, the content of the speech can later be analyzed on its own merit, setting the stage for Socrates’s second speech, a speech that demonstrates Plato’s ideals of rhetoric through it’s mastery of philosophical categorization. In this speech, Socrates has no need to cover his head, implying that his rhetorical abilities do not rest in mere delivery, but in his ability to classify and organize his ideas. A speaker who practices the rhetoric that Plato outlines in *Phaedrus* is actually a philosopher, not a mere rhetorician.

Plato implied the delivery of speech was less important than the speech itself. At the same time, however, Plato also implies that delivery can appeal to and flatter an audience on the basis of something other than reason. Plato attempts to define rhetoric as a philosopher’s art, and claims that only philosophers, with their ability to distinguish truth and fact, are able to speak appropriately. The ramifications of Plato’s theories on rhetoric are that the part of rhetoric that later comes to be called delivery is marginalized and set-up as an imperfect and manipulative art.
In addition, the difficulty in pinning down this part of rhetoric is established early on. Plato, a master of breaking things down into their components, does not address delivery explicitly, and seems unable to classify a speech’s delivery except by implying the speech is different from the speaking. It is not until Aristotle begins analyzing and describing rhetoric in *On Rhetoric* that delivery is first categorized and described as a feature of rhetoric.

**Vulgar delivery and masculine traits**

Aristotle begins book three of *On Rhetoric* by describing how delivery has, until this point, received little attention separately from rhetoric or drama, in part because “the poets themselves acted their own tragedies” (3.1.3). As George Kennedy explains, “There was no need to consider the oral interpretation of a poem or play separately from the presentation of it by the author” (218). Additionally, a work or treatise on delivery had not yet been composed, and delivery, as a subject in and of itself, had not received an extended treatment or analysis. Aristotle thinks that this may be because “delivery seems a vulgar matter when rightly understood” (3.1.5). The vulgarity of delivery, for Aristotle, is similar to Plato’s implicit objections to this facet of rhetoric. Delivery is able to persuade an audience through devices other than logic and reason. However, Aristotle goes on to say that delivery is important because rhetoric deals with opinion, and even though delivery is not “right,” it is necessary. Delivery “has great power, as has been said, because of the corruption of the audience” (3.1.5). Because audiences do not focus solely on logical argumentation, and do not always pay attention to content alone, delivery is able to persuade where logic fails. The flaw is not necessarily in logical argumentation, but in audiences who are more willing to be swayed by pleasing oratory or a pleasing orator than the strength of his argument alone.
For Aristotle, delivery includes “volume, change of pitch [\textit{harmonia}], and rhythm” (3.1.4). He contends that, “Whenever delivery comes to be considered it will function in the same way as acting,” and acting, for Aristotle, was a natural talent, an innate art (3.1.7). But acting, and delivery, both have artistic elements, because they involve \textit{lexis}. The element of \textit{lexis}, of “how things are said,” or style, is what causes awards to be given to those who are more adept at delivery and acting, because they have a greater effect of expression (3.1.7). This “effect of expression” is similar to the pleasing effect of rhetoric that Plato describes because Plato is also discussing the effect that the expression of an oration can have on an audience. Additionally, Aristotle’s contention that delivery is akin to acting in that it is something innate could be the same reason why Plato calls rhetoric a knack, rather than a developed skill, in \textit{Gorgias}. The idea that delivery is something a man simply has, rather than something he is taught, could also be why delivery was so difficult to classify. The production of delivery becomes more difficult to pin down because by claiming that delivery is a natural talent, it becomes difficult to separate the delivery from the speaking man. An orator, in this description of delivery, is either born with the skill to deliver or he isn’t; there is no room for separating the speaker from the act of speaking.

Aristotle also appears to conflate delivery and style. He writes, “The subject of expression, however, has some small place in all teaching; for to speak in one way rather than another does make some difference in regard to clarity, though not a great difference; but all these things are forms of outward show and intended to affect the audience. As a result, no one teaches geometry this way” (3.1.6). Kennedy footnotes the word “expression,” explaining that the word used here was “\textit{Lexis}, here apparently including delivery” (219). And as Martin Jacobi points out, “Aristotle mentions that delivery for an orator is necessarily different from its use by the tragic actor, but excepting a few brief comments, he does not take up this point, directing us
instead to the *Poetics*. Further, he too [along with Plato] conflates delivery and style, noting that what is available in one canon is usually similarly so in the other” (18).

The conflation between delivery and style starts to disappear, however, later on in Book Three, when Aristotle begins discussing differences between works written to be read, and works written to be delivered. He writes,

> On comparison, some written works seem thin when spoken, while some speeches of [successful] orators seem amateurish when examined in written form. The cause is that [their style] suits debate. Thus, things that are intended for delivery, when delivery is absent, seem silly, since they are not fulfilling their purpose. For example, *asynætes* and constant repetition are rightly criticized in writing but not in speaking, and the orators use them; for they lend themselves to oral delivery. (3.12.2)

Some styles are better suited to oral delivery, and some are better suited to writing. But rather than conflating delivery and style, Aristotle is explaining how they are related. Delivery influences style, and style can influence how one delivers a speech. Aristotle goes on to explain,

> But [in speech] it is necessary to speak the same thought in different words; this, as it were, leads the way for the delivery: ‘He is the one cheating you; he is the one deceiving you; he is the one trying to betray you.’ This is the sort of thing Philemon the actor used to do in *Old Man’s Madness*, [a comedy] by Anaxandrides, when reciting [the passage about] Rhadamanthus and Palamedes and in the ego passage in the prologue of *The Pious*. For if one does not act out these lines, it is a case of ‘the man carrying a beam.’ (3.12.3)

The style of these words is such that if one were to simply read them, instead of hearing them delivered, they would lose their effectiveness. Similarly, the purpose of delivering a speech can
influence the style of speaking. Aristotle states earlier, “One should not forget that a different lexis is appropriate for each genus [of rhetoric]. For the written and agonistic [style] are not the same; nor are the demegoric [deliberative] and the dicanic [judicial], and it is necessary to know both” (3.12.1). There are styles of delivery that are appropriate for different lexis, which in turn are appropriate for different kinds of speeches.

It is also important to remember that, for Aristotle, delivery focused on the voice, specifically pitch, volume, and rhythm (3.1.4). Delivery involves, then, vocalizations appropriate to the speech style, which is appropriate to the speech genre. One would not, for example, shout lines of poetry. Aristotle’s distinction between delivery and style is one of performance—public performance. Aristotle’s categorization of rhetorical genres into deliberative, judicial, and epideictic forms of rhetoric are all forms of rhetoric appropriate for public audiences. Aristotle relocates rhetoric into public spheres only, a marked difference from Plato’s claim that rhetoric is used for both public and private speech. Within the realm of public speaking, delivery and style are related. Aristotle recognizes that there are different kinds of performances that are suited to particular styles of language usage. And that different language styles are suited to different types of rhetoric.

Although Aristotle recognizes the necessity of delivery, he sees delivery as “vulgar.” Because the audience is “corrupt,” and not always persuaded through logic alone, delivery becomes necessary to convince an audience. And delivery can detract from clarity and precision, even though it is a powerful tool of persuasion. Aristotle writes, “Where there is most need of performance, the least exactness is present” (3.12. 5). Delivery can also mask the ability of the speaker. Aristotle gives the example of Gorgias, and writes, “Since the poets, while speaking sweet nothings, seemed to acquire their reputations through their lexis, a poetic style came into
existence [in prose as well], for example, that of Gorgias. Even now, the majority of the uneducated think such speakers speak most beautifully” (3.1.9). The problem with delivery, then, isn’t that it is not an effective means to persuade, but almost that it is too effective. A delivery style that focuses on poetics, for example, detracts from argumentation. And what’s even worse, for Aristotle, is that these delivery styles have become standards for measuring speaking. It is important to note that even while Aristotle claims that a poetic style of delivery has come into being, he also believes that delivery is an innate talent (3.1.7). The contradiction between innate delivery and learned delivery styles suggests that delivery is something both possessed and acquired, and the distinctions between the two are not crystal clear. Even more importantly, this contradiction demonstrates that the process of how an orator delivers his speeches and constructs his delivery is still a bit of a mystery in early rhetorical history.

Perhaps the still as yet to be defined aspects of delivery, and the continued difficulties that arise when attempting to pin delivery down, are why Aristotle spends very little time discussing delivery, even though he regards it as a powerful facet of rhetoric. His discussion of delivery is confined to Chapter 1 of Book Three, and he returns to delivery in Chapter 12. He offers almost no advice or prescription concerning delivery, other than to say that it should be appropriate for the style and should not be overly poetic. In other books of On Rhetoric, however, Aristotle discusses and describes character and emotion, both of which have aspects that are later incorporated into delivery. For example, Aristotle says the necessary parts of happiness include “good birth, numerous friendships, worthy friendships, wealth, good children, numerous children, a good old age, as well as the virtues of the body (such as health, beauty, strength, physical stature, and athletic prowess), reputation, honor, good luck [eutykhia], virtue” (1.5.4). These traits are significant because they point towards an idea of a good or desirable
manhood. Women were not citizens in ancient Greece or Rome, and were not able to publically address audiences. Rhetorical treatises, such as Aristotle’s, were written to teach and benefit men, particularly young men entering into their rhetorical studies. In addition to being born male, a man needed to have all the necessary qualities in order to be happy: money, a social circle, offspring (and presumably marriage to a woman), a good character and reputation, and an appropriate appearance. Aristotle’s traits place value on economic advantages, social savoir-faire, physical appearance, and virtuous character. A particular kind of masculinity, one that is desirable, privileged, and ideal, starts becoming loosely associated with the performance of rhetoric in Aristotle’s treatise. For example, the virtues of the body, in this section, include appearance and movement, which later become more prominent features of delivery. Another example comes from Book Two, where, in describing anger, Aristotle writes, “The person who gives insult also belittles; for insult [hybris] is doing and speaking in which there is shame to the sufferer” (2.2.5). Although Aristotle does not specifically include gestures or facial expressions, he does speak of actions, of “doing” that happens in addition to, and during, speaking.

**Standardizing oratorical masculine performance**

Body movements, gesture, and facial expressions were added to delivery in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Delivery, in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, is defined as “the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture” (1.2.3). The author adds that delivery (along with the “faculties” of invention, arrangement, style, and memory) can be acquired by three means: “Theory, Imitation, and Practice” (1.2.3). In Book Three, the author more specifically describes delivery and its importance to rhetoric. The author explains:
Many have said that the faculty of greatest use to the speaker and the most valuable for persuasion is Delivery. For my part, I should not readily say that any of the five faculties is the most important; that an exceptionally great usefulness resides in the delivery I should boldly affirm. For skilful invention, elegant style, the artistic arrangement of the parts comprising the case, and the careful memory of all these will be of no more value without delivery, than delivery alone and independent of these. (3.11.19)

Delivery alone, for the author, is more valuable than the other four parts of rhetoric combined without delivery. Because of its importance and contribution to the other four parts of rhetoric, the author wants to give delivery a more extensive treatment than it has received previously in rhetoric. According to the author, many writers have neglected discussing delivery because they thought it would be impossible to describe “voice, mien, and gesture” (3.11.19). The author's reasoning is different from Aristotle’s, who failed to treat delivery in depth because he considered it vulgar.

The author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium divides delivery into two parts: Voice Quality and Physical Movement (3.11.19). Voice Quality is further subdivided into Volume, Stability, and Flexibility. Of these parts, “vocal volume is primarily the gift of nature; cultivation augments it somewhat, but chiefly conserves it” (3.11.20). Stability and Flexibility are both gained and cultivated, to varying extents, by declamation. The author, then, goes on to discuss Stability and Flexibility and how declamation can help develop these parts of Voice Quality. Maintaining Stability of the voice also helps prevent injury to the windpipe, and the author gives advice about pausing, conversational tones, and avoiding “piercing exclamations” (3.12.21). Stability and conservation of the voice go hand in hand, and the author remarks, “How often must we be duly thankful to nature, as here! Indeed what we declare to be beneficial for
conserving the voice applies also to agreeableness of delivery, and, as a result, what benefits our voice likewise finds favour in the hearer’s taste” (3.12. 21). The natural talents of delivery, for the author, become more clearly defined than in Aristotle, and focus on the physical ability to speak to an audience. These physical abilities belong exclusively to men, for the author, because only men could speak publicly and deliver orations. Women were not considered potential orators because they were not citizens. However, these categories set apart physical distinctions of what is desirable in male speakers; only men who have the time, and quite likely money, to develop these natural attributes and conserve his voice would be able to produce the most pleasing vocal qualities.

Flexibility of the voice is further subdivided into Conversational Tone, Tone of Debate, and Tone of Amplification (3.13.23). Each of these is further subdivided. The Conversational Tone, the “closest to daily speech,” is divided into the Dignified, the Explicative, the Narrative, and the Facetious. The Tone of Debate, which is “energetic and suited to both proof and refutation,” is divided into two parts: the Sustained and the Broken. And the Tone of Amplification, which “either rouses the hearer to wrath or moves him to pity,” is divided into the Hortatory and the Pathetic (3.13.23-24). For each of these categorizations of Flexibility, the author proceeds to outline a vocal delivery specific and appropriate to each. For example, the author instructs:

For the Narrative Conversational Tone varied intonations are necessary, so that we seem to recount everything just as it took place. Our delivery will be somewhat rapid when we narrate what we wish to show was done vigorously, and it will be slower when we narrate something else done in a leisurely fashion. Then, corresponding to the content of the words, we shall modify the delivery in all the kinds of tone, now to sharpness, now to kindness, or now to sadness, and now to gaiety. (3.14.24)
For the Broken Tone of Debate we must with deepest chest tones produce the clearest possible exclamations, and I advise giving as much time to each pause as to each exclamation. (3.14.24)

It is important to note that these categorizations match tones in speaking to the content of the speech being delivered. Speaking more quickly is meant to demonstrate faster action in the content of the speech, and speaking happily is meant to pair with happier content. The performance of the speech is paired with the content of the speech, creating the illusion that performance is natural, pairing the performance with the content. Delivery appears, to the audience, to be something natural, rather than something that is produced. Also of note is the inclusion of Narrative Conversational Tone as a category because it moves conversational tones from private spheres of speaking and adds them to the stage of public oratory. The author implies that an orator’s delivery may need to mimic a conversational style of speaking while on stage in order to prove or refute a point. Delivery, here, is located in the public arena, and while private spheres may offer things of use to delivery, they are not themselves the subject of rhetorical treatises. Delivery again appears to be natural by mimicking “natural” private conversational styles while on stage.

After addressing the eight categories of Flexibility, the author finishes his instruction on Voice Quality and moves on to Physical Movement. “Physical movement,” the author explains, “consists in a certain control of gesture and mien which renders what is delivered more plausible” (3.15.26). After defining Physical Movement, the author gives a general description of appropriate Physical Movement, stating, “Accordingly the facial expression should show modesty and animation, and the gestures should not be conspicuous for either elegance or grossness, lest we give the impression that we are either actors or day labourers. It seems, then,
that the rules regulating bodily movement ought to correspond to the several divisions of tone comprising voice” (3.15.26). The prescriptive guidelines for the body’s performance privilege class and status. The orator is instructed to separate his appearance from that of the laborer or actor, and to perform in a manner fitting to his status, which is above of that of a worker or mere entertainer. The speaking man is supposed to be a man who is dignified and respected, not too upper-class and not too lower-class. This performance of class is part of the orator’s performance of his own character. For example, as young men practiced debating, displays of paideia, or education, demonstrated their wealth and social status (Gleason xxi). The development of paideia “required time, money, and social position” and its display served to distinguish the “authentic” elite from the uneducated poor (Gleason xxi). Similarly to his distinctions of vocal quality, the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium focuses on attributes of masculinity that are connected to social status.

Very briefly, when compared to his treatment of the voice, the author discusses each of the physical movements associated with the eight tones he outlined for Flexibility. For example, for the Narrative Conservational Tone, a speaker should use the same physical movement as outlined for the Dignified Conversational Tone: “the speaker must stay in position when he speaks, lightly moving his right hand, his countenance expressing an emotion corresponding to the sentiments of the subject—gaiety or sadness or an emotional intermediate” (3.15.26). And for the Broken Tone of Debate, “one must extend the arm very quickly, walk up and down, occasionally stamp the right foot, and adopt a keen and fixed look” (3.15.27). Movements and physicality become connected to the vocal tones, which in turn are connected to the content of the speech. The matching and corresponding moments help naturalize the appearance even further, downplaying the production of a speech’s performance. Moreover, the connection of
gestures to tones again emphasizes the appropriation of private conversational speaking to the stage in order to persuade an audience, again placing delivery squarely in the public arena.

The author, after giving descriptions of appropriate physical movements to accompany the eight tones of Flexibility in Vocal Quality, concludes this section on delivery with a disclaimer and an injunction. He states:

I am not unaware how great a task I have undertaken in trying to express physical movements in words and portray vocal intonations in writing. True, I was not confident that it was possible to treat these matters adequately in writing. Yet neither did I suppose that, if such a treatment were impossible, it would follow that what I have done here would be useless, for it has been my purpose merely to suggest what ought to be done. The rest I shall leave to practice. This nevertheless, one must remember: good delivery ensures that what the orator is saying seems to come from his heart. [emphasis added]

(3.15.27)

The author’s concluding disclaimer and parting advice before moving on to memory are important because they demonstrate how a systematic treatment of delivery has, until this point, been neglected because of the difficulty of capturing delivered performances in words. The author also emphasizes that good delivery ensures that what the orator is saying seems to come from his heart--delivery, here, is acknowledged as a production of artifice. The author’s presentation of delivery constructs delivery as a means for transmitting not only the content of a speech, but also the content of the orator’s character. A speaker, for the author, needs to present himself as having a certain social status through his use of voice and gesture. Pairing his voice and gesture to the content of the speech makes the speaker credible, but also constructs and conveys the speaker’s self to the audience. Part of this self-identity is the speaker’s masculinity.
The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* only mentions delivery once more outside of the section on delivery. In Book Four, which focuses on style, the author discusses delivery as a method of “Refining,” which is “dwelling on the same topic and yet seeming to say something ever new . . .

We shall not repeat the same thing precisely--for that, to be sure, would weary the hearer and not refine the idea--but with changes. Our changes will be of three kinds: in the words, in the delivery, and in the treatment” (4.42.54). The author gives an example of how to change the words of an idea in order to refine the idea, and discusses the changes in delivery next. He states, “Our changes reside in the delivery if now in the tone of conversation, now in an energetic tone, and now in variation after variation of voice and gesture, repeating the same ideas in different words, we also change the delivery quite strikingly. This cannot be described with complete effectiveness, and yet it is clear enough. Hence there is no need of illustration” (4.42.54). The author’s claim that no demonstration is necessary is interesting because of the immense detail he provides in his section on delivery. Perhaps the author believed that he had already outlined delivery sufficiently in his previous section; at the same time, however, his categories and classifications are so rigorous that it is somewhat surprising to see so little detail here. The implication that, even after a great deal of meticulous categorization and prescription, an orator will be able to just do it, again blurs the distinction between delivery skills that are possessed and ones that are acquired.

Because the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is so detailed concerning delivery, the author’s guidelines concerning delivery include detailed prescriptions concerning masculine performance. Written for a young man pursuing the study of rhetoric, the assumption that the orator is male becomes dovetailed with a list of instructions concerning how, exactly, to act like the right kind of male, a respected, middle-class, moderate, and moral male, while speaking in public spheres.
The addition of gesture begins to blur Plato’s division between the mind and body, and rhetoric, in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, begins to more explicitly include the body in rhetoric with the body’s inclusion in delivery. Masculinity, instead of just becoming a style of delivery, becomes the style of delivery. Within a masculine delivery there are options for a speaker, but the orator must conform himself to a specific masculine performance. In the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, this masculine performance starts becoming explicitly standardized in conjunction with rhetorical instruction. Additionally, this masculine performance is explicitly public; it is a masculinity that is performed before an audience while an orator is speaking. Cicero, with his desire to paint a portrait of the ideal orator, will solidify this connection even further and begin constructing not only an ideal orator, but also an ideal masculinity that his orator performs.

**The ideally masculine orator**

In *On the Ideal Orator*, Cicero expands and revises the description of delivery and its importance to rhetoric. For Cicero, delivery

must be regulated by the movement of the body, by gesture, by facial expression, and by inflecting and varying the voice. Just how much effort this requires, even by itself, is indicated in the trivial art of actors on the stage. For although every one of them strives to regulate his facial expression, voice, and movement, we all know how really few actors there are, and have been, whom we can watch without irritation. (1.18)

Cicero, like Aristotle, believes that delivery is similar to acting. By making this comparison, Cicero draws attention to the performative nature of delivery itself. Delivery isn't just something one does, as the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* implies in Book Four, it's a performance, a controlled regulated, of voice, gesture, and body. Although the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* implies that
delivery is based upon a natural talent, but refined by practice and learning, the author does not make the same comparisons to acting that Aristotle and Cicero do. While Cicero makes comparisons between delivery and acting, he also believes that delivery is a natural ability. He writes,

[These are] the qualities that no one doubts are innate: I mean flexibility of tongue, the sound of the voice, powerful lungs, physical vigor, and a certain build and shape of the face and body as a whole. By this I do not mean to say that some people cannot be refined by art—for I am well aware that what is good can be made better by teaching, and that what is not very good can still be honed and corrected. But there are certain people whose tongues are so faltering, whose voices are so harsh, or whose facial and bodily movements are so uncouth and rude that they cannot enter the ranks of the orators, even if they are intellectually gifted and have a firm command of the art. (1.114-115)

Those with a natural ability for delivery are, of course, men. Cicero’s distinctions of natural ability only apply to men because rhetoric and oratory continued to exclude women, who were without citizenship and public voices. And for men, Cicero’s standards for perfection in an orator were high. Any other art, he explains, can do without the perfection needed to be an orator; an orator must have “the acumen of a dialectician, the thoughts of a philosopher, the words, I’d almost say, of a poet, the memory of a jurisconsult, the voice of a tragic performer, and gestures close to those of a consummate actor. This is why nothing in the human race is more rarely to be found that a perfect orator” (1.128). Although Cicero does concede that men who have been less blessed with natural gifts for oratory can become adept at public speaking (1.132), his purpose is not to describe orators and oratory in general, but to specifically describe the ideal orator. And
the ideal orator, for Cicero, must be born with natural talents for delivery, and have his natural talents enhanced by training.

By setting his standards for an orator so high, and by attempting to describe an ideal orator, Cicero begins to concretely and explicitly embed more than general masculine ideals into delivery (and through delivery, into rhetoric); he begins embedding an ideal masculinity, a proto-masculinity, a fantasy of masculinization that can never truly be attained. Cicero constructs an idea of the ideal man as he constructs his ideal orator. In order to be an orator, a man must have "natural" talents or traits that, for Cicero, contribute to the performance of an ideal masculinity that is delivered during speeches. This idealized masculinity, this proto-masculinity, is similar to the idealized representations of masculinity in Greek and Roman statuary, where men are represented as having “naturally perfect” physiques. In both rhetoric and sculpture, proto-masculinity becomes naturalized through this embedding, hiding the very proto-ness, the ideal-ness, of the masculinity that Cicero describes. The orator's masculinity becomes definitively embedded as upper-class, ethnically “superior”, dignified, socially savvy, civically influential, conforming to cultural norms of sexuality, and power-possessing through his speaking. Because Cicero is describing his idea of an ideal orator, who delivers a proto-masculinity, Cicero's regime to achieve oratorical and masculine perfection requires more practice and training than previous writers on rhetoric have prescribed.

The orator’s training for delivery, under Cicero, is more strenuous and rigorous than recommended by the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. And while the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* advises against actorly mannerisms, Cicero advocates using actors as models for practicing good delivery. Cicero states, “Now as to the voice, the breath, and the movement of the entire body and of the tongue itself, the exercise of these requires hard work rather than art.
Here we must carefully consider who are to be our models, and whom we want to resemble. We must observe actors as well as orators to make sure that we do not, through bad practice, develop any tasteless or ugly habits” (1.156). Observing and modeling himself after actors will allow an orator to develop his innate talents for delivery by discerning the traits in other public performances that he wants audiences to see in himself. At the same time, however, Cicero cautions against being too actorly in the delivery of speech. Later in On the Ideal Orator, he explains, “Who would deny that an orator, in his movement and bearing, needs the graceful gestures of Roscius? Yet no one would advise the young men who aspire to be orators to toil over learning gesture in the way that actors do. What is so essential to the orator as his voice? Still, I will recommend no aspiring orator to become a slave to his voice, like the Greek tragic actors” (1.251). Cicero's comparison of the orator's voice to the actor's voice again highlights the performativity of delivery. By advising the use of actors for oratorical models, while at the same time cautioning the orator to refrain from being too actorly, Cicero emphasizes that there is a particular kind of performance that an orator needs to construct--a performance that doesn't look like a performance. Additionally, this performance is quite explicitly a public performance; delivery is located in the public sphere. Cicero's rigorous training program is designed so that the orator can walk this public performative line and reach the pinnacle of oratorical perfection.

Cicero’s standard of oratorical excellence is so high that he advises devoting oneself completely to the study of oratory alone. Other pursuits should be put aside, and the young orator in training should follow the example of Demosthenes, practicing constantly and attempting to better his speaking skills through a variety of activities designed to improve articulation and breathing (1.260-261). Cicero emphasizes strengthening natural gifts and overcoming natural handicaps, and uses the example of Demosthenes practicing declamatory exercises while pacing
and speaking around a mouthful of pebbles to overcome his speech impediment. The example of Demosthenes is particularly interesting because Cicero also believes that a man born with imperfections of voice or body is unable to achieve oratorical excellence (1.114-115). Demosthenes, then, appears to more of an example of the rigorous practice needed to achieve oratorical perfection than an example of overcoming handicaps. An orator’s art resides in his ability to perform excellence, to practice excellence, rather than merely be born excellent.

Excellence of delivery is important for Cicero, because, “Every thought must have weight, every word must be impressive; to this must be joined a delivery that is varied, vehement, full of ardor and energy, full of real emotion” (2.73). Delivery is a public performance in the service of constructing a reality for the audience.

Delivery is increasingly emphasized not only as a vehicle for conveying the words and thoughts of the orator, but also as a vehicle for conveying the orator himself. For Aristotle, delivery is a necessary evil; for the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, delivery is of primary importance to persuasion and needs to be paired appropriately with the subject matter of the speech. Cicero, however, begins to explicitly describe delivery as more than a means of transmission of the speech, but also as a way to transmit character. He writes,

Portraying their characters in your speech, then, as being just, upright, conscientious toward the gods, subject to fear, and patient of injustice, is enormously influential. And if this is handled agreeably and with taste, it is actually so powerful--whether done in the prologue or when narrating the facts or when bringing the speech to its conclusion--that it often has more influence than the case itself. Moreover, so much is accomplished by speaking thoughtfully and with a certain taste, that the speech may be said to mold an image of the character of the orator. Employing thoughts of a certain kind and words of a
certain kind, and adopting besides a delivery that is gentle and shows signs of flexibility, makes speakers appear as decent, as good in character--yes, as good men. (2.184)

For Cicero, delivery makes and is made by character. Delivery is the action that makes character visible and audible to audience, and when the audience sees and hears an orator’s delivery of character, the audience associates the delivered character with the orator himself. As the orator performs his character, his makes his character for his audience. And this construction of character while performing character naturalizes the proto-masculine ideal even further, implying that an ideal man, an ideal masculinity does indeed exist and is more than a fantasy or idea to strive for. As an ideal orator performs the proto-masculinity his audience requires, his appearance of being proto-masculine becomes, for the audience, a reality of his proto-masculinity. In other words, the audience buys his act, making his actions seem like his essence.

Similar to J.L. Austin’s speech act (discussed more fully in chapter four), the orator’s delivery is a speech act where instead of a sentence or phrase serving as the action itself, an orator’s delivery of his character serves as his character, as himself. Cicero begins to make the proto-masculine ideal tautological; the proto-masculine ideal of manhood exists in the ideal orator and can be delivered, and with an ideal orator’s delivery of his proto-masculinity, he proves it exists.

Cicero begins to conflate the distinction between making an image of a good man and being a good man when he begins discussing the evocation of emotion. He claims that emotion cannot be evoked by an orator unless the orator seems to experience that emotion himself, and that seeming to experience that emotion will genuinely arouse that emotion in the orator (2.189). He goes on to state, “I swear to you that every time I have ever wanted to arouse grief or pity or envy or hate in the hearts of jurors through my oratory, I was invariably, while working to stir the jurors, thoroughly stirred myself to the same feelings to which I was trying to lead them”
For Cicero, the arousal of emotion in the audience can only happen through the arousal of emotion in the orator, and this arousal of emotion is authentic and genuine, stemming for the practiced display of emotion in the orator’s speech. Delivery, which is used to arouse the audience’s emotions, is created through the display of the orator’s real emotions. And the delivered display of the orator’s real emotions is cultivated and practiced. This creates a feedback loop between orator and audience, where the orator tailors his cultivated delivery of real emotion to an audience, and this delivery to an audience creates a real emotion in the orator. The feedback loop of the orator’s delivery of emotion and the orator’s real emotion is the same sort of feedback loop of the orator’s delivery of character and the orator’s real character. As an ideal orator delivers his character of being a good man, he becomes a good man through his delivery.

Cicero goes on to describe how the delivery of an emotion affects the audience,

It isn’t easy to make a juror get angry at the person you choose, if you are seen to take the matter calmly yourself; or to make him hate the person that you want him to, unless he has first seen you burning with hate; or to bring him into a state of pity, unless you have shown signs of your own grief by your words, thoughts, voice, face, and even by bursting into tears. For no material is so easy to kindle, that it can catch fire unless fire is actually applied to it; likewise, no mind is so susceptible to an orator’s power, that it can be set on fire unless the orator who approaches it is burning and all ablaze himself. (2.190)

Cicero explains that the orator genuinely experiences these emotions because of the nature of the thoughts and ideas that he must speak. The nature of emotional oratory, and of being an orator, will incite emotional responses in the orator. As Cicero states, “For oratory that aims at stirring the hearts of others will, by its very nature, stir the orator himself even more strongly than it will
any member of his audience” (2.191). Although Cicero does not explicitly state that the creation of emotion is the result of a feedback loop between the orator and the audience, the arousal of emotion appears to take place within the delivery itself, in the interaction between the orator and the audience. The feedback loop created by the conveyance of emotion relies upon the space between the audience and the orator in order to come into being and exist as an effective persuasive mechanism. An orator without an audience (including himself as audience) will not be able to deliver emotions that set himself ablaze; without an audience, an orator speaks into a void, an abyss that cannot provide the interpersonal interactions necessary to create the catalyst necessary to turn delivered emotion into real emotion. The interactions between the orator and the audience are necessary to make delivery effective.

In order to move the audience, an orator should intermingle and interchange his modes of delivery to demonstrate his ethos and convey his pathos. Delivery should be varied. Cicero distinguishes between two modes of delivery, and writes that “just as that other element of speech, which must recommend one’s decency and thus support one’s image of being a good man, should be gentle and low-keyed, as I have often said already, so this element, by which the orator aims at changing hearts and influence them in every possible way, should be intense and vehement” (2.211). The variation of these two modes and their influence upon one another creates a more persuasive speech. By demonstrating that he is a good man with his gentleness, and alternately stirring his audience’s emotions with his intensity, an orator creates the ultimate combination of persuasive appeals. Cicero states, “For something of that gentleness, which wins us the favor of the audience, ought to flow into this vigorous forcefulness, by which we stir the audience; and gain from this forcefulness some spirit must animate that gentleness” (2.212). The alternation of gentleness and forcefulness itself creates a kind of feedback loop, where each
quality influences and informs the other. These kinds of delivery interact and construct a more polished means of persuading an audience.

Along with different kinds of delivery, an orator can have his own type of delivery, his own delivery style, altogether. Cicero describes the differences in the styles of delivery between Sulpicius and Cotta, saying that

[Cotta] is polished and precise, setting out his case in proper and fitting words. He always sticks to the issue, and when his sharp eyes have seen what he must prove to the jurors, he leaves aside all other arguments, focusing his attention and his speech on that point.

Sulpicius, on the other hand, has enormous mental vigor and a very rich and strong voice; his body is full of energy, his movements dignified, and his language is also so impressive and copious that his natural abilities seem to make him better equipped for oratory than anyone else. (3.31)

These styles, however, are always styles appropriate to men performing masculinity under the rubric of proto-masculinity. The performance of ideal masculinity allows for some stylistic variations and individuality, further naturalizing proto-masculinity as an inherent, existing form of masculinity that is out there in the world. By claiming that different performances of masculinities stem from different styles, rather than different masculinities themselves, individual orators are able to retain their individuality while proto-masculinity, as an ideal, goes unthreatened. Proto-masculinity, the idealization of a man who is upper-class, ethnically “superior,” dignified, socially savvy, civically influential, conforms to cultural norms of sexuality, and power-possessing continues as a single ideal; variations in performers are not variations of proto-masculinity, but “natural” variations of style, of expression, of this idea.
Cicero’s discussion of the styles of delivery is part of the introduction to the section devoted to style. As Cicero continues his discussion of style, elements between style and delivery seem to become conflated. For example, Cicero states, “Well, then, the orator must deliver the material [ . . .], as well as express it in a certain way. And tell me, is there a better way of expression--for I will see to delivery later--than to speak correct Latin, clearly, with distinction, and in a manner that is suitable and appropriate to the particular matter at issue” (3.37). And then he categorizes correct Latin, including pronunciation, and clarity as the first two qualities of style. After describing these qualities, he proceeds to discuss the last two qualities of style, distinction and appropriateness. Even though correct pronunciation seems more suited for delivery than for style, Cicero compares dialectical differences, and his discussion of style is really a discussion of pleasing and displeasing dialects. He states, “Thus, there is a particular kind of accent characteristic of the Romans who are from the city itself, in which there is nothing that can give offense, nothing unpleasant, nothing to provoke criticism, and not to sound or smell of foreignness. So let us cultivate this accent, and learn to avoid not only countrified roughness, but also peculiar foreign pronunciation” (3.44). The discussion of dialect, along with correct pronunciation, demonstrates that proto-masculinity is, as Cicero describes it, a distinctly Roman masculinity. While the performance of masculinity may allow for different styles, it does not allow for speakers who are rural or foreign. Also implied in this description is a class standard, because the sort of dialect that Cicero recommends for cultivation would probably have been the dialect and speaking patterns of the educated middle and upper classes. Proto-masculinity is reinforced by style, even as style appears to allow for variations of delivery. Some deliveries, such a Roman dialect, are deemed acceptable while others, such as rural or foreign accents, should be avoided. The variations of style are regulated to variations of proto-masculinity,
further embedding and naturalizing proto-masculinity by making it appear that each individual orator is naturally proto-masculine, and not as if he is performing a specific ideal of masculinity.

The final section of *On the Ideal Orator* focuses specifically on delivery. It is extremely short, possibly because Cicero addresses delivery throughout *On the Ideal Orator*. The introduction to this section re-emphasizes the importance of delivery to creating an ideal orator:

All of these things, however, are as effective as their delivery makes them. Delivery, I am telling you, is the one dominant factor in oratory. Without it, even the best orator cannot be of any account at all, while an average speaker equipped with this skill can often outdo the best orators. It is to delivery that they say Demosthenes, when asked what was the most important in oratory, gave first, second, and third place. And I generally tend to think that what Aeschines said is even better. [He was asked to read] the speech that Demosthenes had delivered.[. . .] This he did in a powerful and extremely pleasant voice, and when everyone expressed admiration, he said, ‘How much more you would admire it, if you had heard Demosthenes himself!’ (3.213)

Cicero cannot emphasize the importance of delivery enough. However, he doesn’t devote a great deal of time to prescribing methods of delivery; instead, he describes methods of delivery. He describes the voice and how the voice changes when expressing different emotions; for example, he states, “Happiness needs another tone, unrestrained and tender, cheerful and relaxed” (3.219). To describe gestures, he states “All of these emotions ought to be accompanied by gestures--not those used on the stage, which depict individual words, but gestures that indicate the content and the ideas as a while, not by imitating them, but by signifying them. For this, one needs the
vigorous and manly attitude of the body derived not from stage actors, but from those who fight with weapons or in the palaestra” (3.220). And while gestures are important, Cicero states,

But everything depends on the face; and this, in turn, is entirely dominated by the eyes. [. . .] For delivery is wholly a matter of the soul, and the face is an image of the soul, while the eyes reflect it. The face is the only part of the body that can produce as many varying signs as there are feelings in the soul; and there is surely no one who could produce these same effects with his eyes closed. [. . .] It is the eyes that should be used to signify our feelings in a way suited to the actual type of our speech, by an intense or relaxed, or a fixed or cheerful look. (3.221-222)

Cicero's statement that "delivery is wholly a matter of the soul" further naturalizes and embeds the concept of proto-masculinity into delivery. If the delivery is a matter of the soul, and the soul is the essence of one's identity and individuality, then what the orator delivers is his own soul. But if the orator must create his character as he conveys it, his soul is also created by delivery. Cicero's use of the term "soul" implies that there is already a “something,” an essence that makes up the orator's character. Since a part of the orator's character is his masculinity, the implication is that masculinity, and particularly this ideal proto-masculinity, is part of the character's soul—something inherent and natural in the speaker himself. Because delivery is “wholly a matter of the soul,” and “the one dominant factor in oratory,” identity and delivery become not just intertwined, but the entire foundation of Cicero’s treatise on rhetoric.

Cicero spends so little time directly addressing delivery in the final section of On the Ideal Orator because he discusses delivery throughout his treatise. Delivery adumbrates his discussion of rhetoric, demonstrating its foundational importance to rhetoric overall. And Cicero’s treatise focuses on describing, rather than prescribing, delivery. The reason Cicero
spends so little time prescribing techniques for delivery is that he believes that delivery is an augmentation of natural endowments. Delivery, and practicing delivery, depends on refining what one has been born with--a speaker must have a natural ability for delivery. And delivery itself is a natural act--it is a natural form of expression. Cicero writes, “Delivery is, so to speak, the language of the body, which makes it all the more essential that it should correspond to what we intend to say; and nature has given us eyes, as it has given the horse and the lion their manes, tails, and ears, for indicating our feelings” (3.222). Delivery is how people express their emotions, and expression of emotions is a natural force. Cicero continues,

Now all the elements of delivery possess a certain force that has been bestowed by nature. That is why delivery strongly affects even the inexperienced, the common crowd, and also foreigners. After all, words only affect those who are joined to the speaker by the bond of a shared language, and clever thoughts often escape the understanding of those who are not so clever. But delivery, which displays the feelings of the soul, affects everyone, because everyone’s soul is stirred by the same feelings, and it is through the same signs that people recognize them in others and reveal them in themselves. (3.223)

It seems as though Cicero gives so little instruction on how to actually deliver a speech because delivery is natural--delivery doesn’t seem to need to be taught to an orator, it merely needs to be clarified and maintained in an orator. Similar to the author’s observation in Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero states that a pleasing delivery is naturally what is also best for the voice: “In order to preserve the voice nothing is more useful than frequent modulation, while nothing is more harmful than unrestrained, uninterrupted exertion. And indeed, what is more suitable for our ears and for a pleasing delivery than alternation, variety, and change” (3.224-225).
Cicero seems to offer contradictory theories during his discussions of delivery concerning what is natural and what is artificial. Even though he claims that delivery is natural, and that an orator must be born to it, he gives the example of Demosthenes, who was not born with a natural ability to deliver, but who instead needed to work rigorously and practice diligently in order to obtain it. Cicero also recommends this kind of practice in order to become an ideal orator and he distinguishes between different kinds and styles of delivery. And while it seems that Cicero is creating a paradox by claiming that delivery is natural, but also artificially constructed through practice and refinement, he is not. At the end of the introduction to his section on delivery, he writes, “I am talking about this in some detail because the orators, who act in real life, have abandoned this entire field, while the actors, who are only imitators of reality, have appropriated it. And no doubt, reality always has the advantage over imitation. Yet if reality by itself were sufficiently effective in delivery, we would have no need for any art at all” (3.214-215). Cicero makes a distinction here between where the acting of the orator and the acting of the actor occur. Although both act in public arenas, on stages, the orator acts in real life, as a part of reality, while the actor acts in a fictional setting, with a fictional plot. In other words, the stage of reality is different from the stage of fiction, but art becomes necessary for both. Delivery, for Cicero, is natural, but needs artifice--practice and refinement--to make it more effective. Despite his claim that delivery is a natural talent, Cicero’s emphasis on practice and refinement emphasizes the artificiality of delivery; delivery is not merely a natural performance, but a constructed performance. Because the orator is still acting, on the stage of reality rather than the stage of fiction, he still needs the art of delivery.

With Cicero’s work on rhetoric, delivery moves from its origins in Plato, as an undefined and suspicious part of rhetoric that effects men’s passions rather than their reason, to a
foundational part of rhetoric that, while clearly marked as one of the rhetorical canons, is so
intrinsic to the art of rhetoric itself that it can only be described and emphasized. Delivery
permeates Cicero’s discussions of rhetoric as whole, and is re-located to a public place that not
only persuades an audience, but that constructs the orator’s identity in a tautological fashion. In
other words, for Cicero, delivery makes the man that makes himself through his delivery. And
this man is a man who performs proto-masculinity in a way that is individual, through his own
unique style, and yet also conforms to proto-masculine ideals and expectations. With the now
foundational role of delivery to rhetoric, Cicero sets the stage for orators who will be expected to
be good men, speaking well.
2 GOOD MEN SPEAKING WELL

Authentically masculine delivery

After delivery evolved from a suspicious and vulgar part of rhetoric into a foundational and crucial canon that informed nearly the entirety of an orator’s speech, delivery evolved even further, moving into private spheres and emphasizing masculine behaviors. After Cicero created the ideal of an orator who is made by his own delivery, while at the same time making his delivery from his own character, Quintilian expanded delivery by offering prescriptive instruction on delivery and blurring the boundaries of public and private speaking. Quintilian re-inscribed the necessity of manly behavior, and additionally contrasts manly speaking to both effeminate speaking and feminine speaking, stating clearly that masculine speaking qualities are superior to both in oratory. His treatise on rhetoric is one of the most thorough and extensive extent treatises from Roman rhetoricians, and was also one of the most influential treatises on rhetorical instruction. While he continued to make delivery central to rhetoric, he also evolved delivery by emphasizing a seemliness of behavior, a decorum or etiquette of masculinity, which an orator needed to follow in order to be a good man, who spoke well.

Quintilian’s treatment of delivery in The Orator’s Education is the most detailed and exhaustive account remaining from antiquity. In Quintilian’s twelve-book treatise on rhetoric, delivery takes up almost half of book eleven. Quintilian believes that delivery is a natural ability that needs to be cultivated and refined in order to be improved. He writes, “Well, let [those] who habitually disapprove of care, art, polish, and any product of study in oratory as being unaffected and unnatural [. . .] keep their opinion that to be born is enough to make a man an orator; but I hope they will pardon the efforts of those of us who think that nothing comes to perfection unless
nature is assisted by art” (11.3.11-12). While cultivation is necessary to create a strong and effective delivery, there must be a natural basis for the cultivation. Good delivery will be unattainable if one has deformities that cannot be corrected or one lacks any of the physical abilities necessary to deliver speeches. Quintilian's assessment that delivery must be rooted in natural abilities echoes Cicero's argument that an orator must be born with the natural endowments that will enable him to deliver speeches effectively. By reiterating Cicero's claim, Quintilian re-inscribes and reemphasizes the idea that delivery is fundamentally something that is natural, and only refined through practice and study. Additionally, because public speaking was still largely confined to men, only men were able to have the natural abilities that, with refinement, would allow them to become orators.

Quintilian, following Cicero, quotes Demosthenes to demonstrate the importance of delivery: “[W]hen Demosthenes was asked what was the most important thing in the whole business of oratory, he gave the prize to Delivery, and he gave it the second and the third place, too” (11.3.6-7). Quintilian also agrees that delivery can be more important than what is said, and he states, “[Delivery] has an extraordinary force and power in oratory. Indeed, it matters less what sorts of things we have composed within ourselves than how we utter them, because people are affected according to what they hear” (11.3.2). Delivery’s power lies in its ability to affect the audience and stir the audience’s emotions. Like Cicero’s claim that the emotions must be shown to be experienced by the orator, setting the orator aflame and making him a tinder to set the audience ablaze, Quintilian makes a similar analogy, stating, “Again, all emotions inevitably languish, unless they are kindled into flame by voice, face, and the bearing of virtually the whole body. Even when we have done all this, we shall be lucky if the judge catches our fire; if we sit back and take no trouble, we cannot possibly move him, or stop our drowsiness from making
him lose interest” (11.3.4). Delivery can persuade an audience through passion and emotion, but only when the orator appears to be experiencing that same emotion. And the persuasive power of delivery is such that the rousing of emotions alone can sway an audience, more so than the content of the speech itself. The quality of delivery that Aristotle most despised is the same quality that Quintilian uses to reemphasize delivery’s importance to rhetoric. A good delivery can make weaker speeches more effective at persuading audience than better speeches that have a weaker delivery. Like the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, Quintilian states, “I have no hesitation is saying that even a mediocre speech, made attractive by the power of Delivery, will carry more weight than the best speech deprived of this help” (11.3.5). Delivery, for Quintilian, is more powerful than the other elements of rhetoric combined.

Quintilian, like Cicero and the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, also makes a comparison to actors, saying that actors demonstrate the power of delivery. Quintilian observes, “And if Delivery has this power to produce anger, tears, or anxiety over matters which we know to be fictitious and unreal, how much more powerful must it be when we really believe!” (11.3.4-5). Again, Quintilian’s statement is reminiscent of Cicero’s take on the difference between the actor’s stage and the orator’s stage, further reifying Cicero's distinction between "real" acting and fictional acting by continuing to contrast the reality of oratory with the fiction of acting. In addition, Quintilian’s comments speak to the audience’s perceptions of the orator and the actor; the audience knows the actor is acting, but the audience believes the orator and the reality of the orator. The orator is not perceived as an actor, even though he is acting. The orator’s performance is perceived as being the authentic orator himself. The audience knows the actor is performing a role and playing a character that is not himself, but the orator has no role and no character to play but himself. The audience doesn’t perceive the orator as a fictional character in
play, but as a real man who is speaking his mind. Quintilian speaks directly to the perceptions of the audience, while Cicero and previous rhetoricians spoke to the performance of the orator and its effects on the audience. The distinction is important because Quintilian makes it clear that the audience sees the orator’s speech as a reality, and is affected by the speech because it is seen as authentic and genuine.

**The parts and features of proto-masculine delivery**

For Quintilian, delivery consists of two parts: voice and gesture. Gesture includes gestures involving the head, hands, face, neck, shoulders, arms, body, feet (stance and gait), and even dress, and gesture must conform to the voice in order to be effective. Quintilian explains that of voice and gesture, “One appeals to the eye, the other to the ear, the two senses by which all emotion penetrates to the mind” (11.3.14). For Quintilian, both parts of delivery appeal to an audience’s emotions during oratorical performances, and these parts are categorized by which senses they affect in audience members. Again, Quintilian speaks to the audience’s perceptions, how the audience sees and hears an orator, when he begins breaking delivery down into its components. Although this categorical breakdown is similar to the ones proposed by Cicero and the author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Quintilian emphasizes the audience’s sensory perceptions as the rationale for constructing two distinct categories. While previous rhetoricians begin incorporating combinations of audio and visual elements in persuasion, Quintilian makes the split the basis for categorization, which is why “Gesture,” as a category, consists of so many seemingly disparate elements. Quintilian’s use of the audience’s reception of a speech as his basis for classifying delivery is significant because delivery, in Quintilian’s treatise, shifts from focusing on the orator alone to focusing on the orator and the audience together. The feedback
loop between orator and audience that Cicero describes is the basis for Quintilian’s
categorization of the features of delivery.

The first of these two categories, the voice, deserves two main considerations according
to Quintilian: the nature of the voice and the use of the voice. The nature of the voice consists of
its volume and quality (11.3.15). Quality, however, is “more complex” than volume, and
Quintilian never quite defines it. He does say that, “A voice may be clear or husky, full or thin,
smooth or harsh, limited or rich, hard or flexible, resonant or dull” (11.3.15), which implies that
there are many different kinds of voices that all have a desirable quality or qualities. When
Quintilian begins to discuss the use of the voice, he also discusses how vocal exercises can
impact the quality of the voice. He writes,

But the proper regime for the orator is not that of the voice-trainer, though these two
professions have many needs in common: first, a robust physique, to save the voice from
dwindling to the feeble shrillness of eunuchs, women, and invalids (this can be assured
by walking, rubbing with oil, sexual abstinence, and easy digestion--in other words,
frugal life); and secondly, a healthy throat--that is to say a soft and smooth one--for any
defect here produces a voice which is broken, muffled, harsh, or cracked. (11.3.19-20)

In this passage, Quintilian begins to do more than reify the connection between delivery and
proto-masculinity. He also begins to explicitly privilege men's voices, specifically men who are
able to perform proto-masculinity, over all other voices. An orator, Quintilian contends, needs to
take the appropriate precautions to ensure than his voice does not "dwindle," or lessen in quality,
and sound like that of a woman, which is described as having a "feeble shrillness" and is
presented as being far less desirable. The quality of a woman's voice is automatically and
"naturally" lower than that of a man's. However, the very fact that a man must take precautions,
must exercise his voice and adhere to a vocal training regime, implies that this "natural"
separation of vocal qualities between men and women is not so natural after all. Again, a proto-
masculine quality is ascribed to the voice, and is what an orator should strive to achieve. And for
Quintilian, proto-masculinity is explicitly privileged in comparison to women and “lesser”
males. Miriam Brody, in Manly Writing: Gender, Rhetoric, and the Rise of Composition,
discusses Quintilian’s explicit privileging, “Manly writing must be victorious over effeminate
writing, as the masculine in culture is the privileged and superior referent. The responsibility to
pursue manly eloquence was elevated to the binary struggle to maintain gender as it had been
cast” (30). Although Brody tends to conflate femininity and effeminancy, she does agree that
Quintilian privileges masculinity above other genders. Not only is proto-masculinity desirable
and ideal, but also better when specifically contrasted with other genders. Rather than merely
remaining an ideal to be achieved, proto-masculinity now becomes an ideal that should be
achieved because it is better than the alternatives.

After stating the similarities between the voice trainer’s and orator’s regimes, Quintilian
continues to show how the two regimes are different and why they must be different. An orator,
who must speak publicly and who is constantly busy with public duties, does not have the time to
devote between trials to tuning his voice through the scales or set fixed times to go walking.
Even diets must differ between the orator and the voice trainer (11.3.22). The voice trainer needs
to have a softer voice, and so his regime must be suited to constructing a soft voice. The orator,
on the other hand, “often [has] to speak in harsh, agitated tones, spend wakeful nights, imbibe the
soot of midnight lamps, and persevere when [his] clothes are soaked in sweat. So let us not
soften our voice by coddling, nor accustom it to habits which it is going to miss; let its exercise
be like its real use; let it not fade away in silence, but be strengthened by habit, by which all
difficulties are made easy” (11.3.23-24). Quintilian advises practices in all weather, and all seasons, asking, “Are we to abandon our clients if we have to speak on sunny, windy, wet, or warm day” (11.3.27)? It is necessary for an orator to be able to speak in all conditions, and to have a voice strong enough to be able to deliver well in any kind of weather. The strength of voice that Quintilian advocates is suited for public speaking, and locates rhetoric within a public sphere. In order to speak before an audience, no matter the weather or location, Quintilian advises against acquiring habits that reduce the voice by practicing oratory in all conditions and weathers. A public voice is privileged, here, over a voice used in private conversations or spheres. Even in these spheres, an orator should use the voice he has cultivated for public use. By implication, Quintilian is making all locations of speaking public spaces, and located all rhetoric within public domains. By speaking every day, and practicing every day, Quintilian claims, “not only are the voice and lungs strengthened, but we acquire decorous bodily movements suited to our style of speaking” (11.3.29). In addition to making all rhetoric public, the gestures associated with speaking must be decorous. Quintilian also embeds appropriateness, or decorum, into rhetorical instruction, paving the way for decorum associated with politeness and manners.

The four features of good delivery, for Quintilian, are the same as the four features of good speech. Quintilian states that there is no difference between oratorical speech and delivery, and instructs, “Speech must be correct, lucid, ornate, and appropriate, and so too must Delivery” (11.3.30). Correctness includes having a clear, city accent, a healthy voice free of defects, a voice that is pleasing, and breath that is even and of appropriate length (11.3.30-32). Lucidity involves completely pronouncing words, without excessive emphasis on each letter, and distinct pauses in the right places (11.3.33-39). Ornate delivery is both even and varied. The voice should not be jerky and irregular, but should vary in intonations and not be monotonous (11.3.43-44).
Quintilian gives the analogy of monochromatic paintings, stating, “Artists who painted in a single colour nevertheless made some things stand out more than others, since otherwise they could not even have given proper outlines to the limbs of their figures” (11.3.46). By conflating speech and delivery, Quintilian continues to conflate public and private realms of speaking. By equating delivery to everyday speaking, the locations of speaking become indistinct—all that matters is that the speaker/orator follows the rules of good speaking and good delivery, which are the same. Quintilian can even almost be said to conflate rhetoric and proto-masculinity. If a proto-masculinity becomes embedded into delivery by ascribing certain idealized masculine behaviors as desirable and attainable to an orator, then stating that speech and delivery are the same embeds these characteristics further into all speaking situations. The collapse of public and private spheres of speaking furthers the inscription of proto-masculinity into all speaking situations. Any man who has access to proto-masculine privilege should be able to perform, and embody, an ideal masculinity through his speech, and through his speaking, in any situation. Proto-masculinity becomes more than oratorical performance, but also a performance in everyday rhetoric. Rhetorical training could be said to have a formative effect on young men, where rhetoricians and orators who sold their rhetorical instruction suggested to parents that rhetorical training would make their boys into men.

While there are several ways these first three features of good delivery can be flawed or found wanting, the most intolerable fault in delivery is to delivery speeches in a sing-song manner. Quintilian states,

[T]he sing-song manner [. . .] is the chief problem in every Cause and every school nowadays--and whether it is more useless than disgusting I do not know! What is less becoming to an orator than a theatrical recitative which sometimes sounds like the
excesses of a drunken orgy or a riotous party? What can be more counterproductive in emotional appeals than if, when what is called for is sorrow, anger, outrage, or pity, the speaker not only distances himself from these emotions (which he should be implanting in the judge’s mind), but destroys the very dignity of the court by a sort of naughty song and dance act? (11.3.57-58)

Quintilian’s condemnation of sing-song delivery leads into his discussion on appropriateness. While Quintilian does acknowledge that delivery and variations in pitch and intonation are a song, of sorts, the “song” aspect of delivery should not be the emphasis of delivery. A sing-song delivery detracts from the naturalness of the orator's performance, and emphasizes that his performance is just that--a performance--by mimicking a recitative theatricality. Quintilian abhors not only the staged artificiality of a sing-song recitation, but equates it to something that sounds like a "drunken orgy or riotous party," behaviors that are also condemned for their lack of proto-masculinity. A gendered value judgment is implicit in Quintilian's condemnation, because an ideal man carries himself with dignity and does not act, or speak, in such a way. Appropriateness, and later seemliness are, for this reason, important facets of Quintilian's discussion of delivery and rhetoric. Because Quintilian’s rhetoric is largely public, which he achieves by describing all speaking as rhetoric, it is important for a man to be able to carry himself with dignity and self-assurance. In other words, a man’s etiquette is a crucial part of his character. The better a man’s sense of social skills and savoir-faire, the better his delivery will be.

Quintilian defines appropriateness as “Delivery adapted to the subject on which we are speaking” (11.3.61). He continues, and describes how delivery is adapted to subject matter:
[Delivery’s adaptation] is mainly ensured by our actual feelings; the voice sounds as its strings are struck. But some emotions are real, others pretended or imitated. Real emotions burst out naturally—sorrow, anger, outrage, for example—but they lack art, and have therefore to be disciplined by training and method. Emotions contrived by imitation, on the other hand, involve art, but they have no basis in nature, so that the first thing for us to do is to be genuinely affected, form a picture of the situation, and let ourselves be moved by it as though it was real. (11.3.61-62)

Again, emotion is what controls the adaptation of delivery to particular subjects. By changing the emotional tones of one’s delivery, an orator can deliver speeches in a manner suitable for the subjects of the speeches. Matching the emotional tones to the content of the speech gives the semblance of authenticity, of real-ness, to the orator's delivery. The orator is instructed to create a "picture of the situation" so that he is "genuinely" moved and that his emotions are authentic and not contrived. However, this picture is itself artificial. If the orator were genuinely moved, there would be no need to create a situation that causes him to be moved so that he can use his emotions to appeal to an audience. The orator is instructed first to be his own audience, and respond emotionally as the audience would, and then use his emotions to affect his listening audience. A feedback loop of sorts is created here, similar to Cicero’s rhetorical instruction, where the orator's performance does not come within, is not something inherent in himself, but something that is constructed in loops starting with himself. This feedback loop operates not only for voice, but in Quintilian's account of gesture, it operates for gesture as well. The rhetorical awareness of audience in creating this feedback loop is associated with decorum because it immediately follows his condemnation of “sing-song” delivery. For Quintilian, being appropriate is more than just matching subject matter and emotion; it is matching the two while still retaining
decorum and dignity in gesture and bearing. Quintilian’s association of rhetoric and decorum begins to pave the way for delivery’s evolution towards etiquette.

After discussing the voice and the properties of the voice, Quintilian moves on to discussing gesture. He states, “The importance of Gesture for an orator is evident from the simple fact that it can often convey meaning even without the help of words” (11.3.65). Quintilian gives the example of a dance, where a dancer conveys emotion and meaning through gestures and physical movements, rather than through speech. Because gesture conveys meaning, it is important that the gesture match the words and emotion of a speech. As Quintilian puts it, “if Gesture and facial expression were out of tune with speech, and we looked cheerful when what we were saying was sad, or shook our heads when asserting something, our words would lack not only authority but credibility” (11.3.67). The other important aspect of gesture is seemliness. According to Quintilian, “Seemliness also comes from Gesture and movement” (11.3.68). What is seemly is seen in physical movements and what is seen in the body. For example, Quintilian instructs students on the importance of the head in delivery, and advises appropriate carriage: “It is the head which occupies the chief place in Delivery (as it does in the body itself), both as regards the seemliness of which I have just spoken and as regards meaning. [. . .] For seemliness, it must first be upright and natural. If lowered, it indicates humility; if thrown back, arrogance; if inclined to one side, languor; if held stiff and rigid, a certain brutality of mind” (11.3. 69-70). Quintilian defines the meanings of several head postures, and tells his students which posture they should use to communicate “seemliness,” which ties in with his ideas of a good man. An orator who is seemly carries himself in such a way as to communicate proto-masculine ideals of dignity, etiquette, and confidence, which reflect behaviors associated with class and socio-economic status. Even as Quintilian re-inscribes the performance of proto-masculinity into
delivery, he continues to expand delivery further by adding seemliness and decorum into the necessary elements for a good delivery. Seemliness conveys character, and that character is the key to a convincing delivery. Because delivery is the most important component of rhetoric, one that can make poor speeches seem better than they are, and because character is a key factor in delivery, Quintilian almost appears to instruct that a good man, or a man who, at least, appears good, will be more convincing through his goodness than through his ability to speak well.

Quintilian continues analyzing the body and physical movement by discussing the face, which he says is sovereign. He states, “It is [the face] that makes us humble, threatening, flattering, sad, cheerful, proud, or submissive; men hang on this; men fix their gaze on this; this is watched even before we start to speak; this makes us love some people and hate others; this makes us understand many things; this often replaces words altogether. Therefore in plays composed for the stage, artists in delivery borrow extra emotion from the masks” (11.3.72-73). Echoing Cicero, Quintilian also says that the most important part of the face is the eyes, and “[t]he mind shines through especially in these” (11.3.75). The face, particularly the eyes, are important because they have central roles in expressing and conveying emotion and character. Again, the conveyance of character is central to delivery because Quintilian emphasizes the importance of the eyes over all other facial features in delivery because the eyes express character. Quintilian’s comparison to acting implies that character is something that is performed. The tautological loops of delivery-makes-the-goodness-of-the-man, while the-goodness-of-the-man-makes-the-delivery appear to break down. The loops appear to vanish as Quintilian implies that a good man is what makes the delivery, even while suggesting that the appearance of goodness can be cultivated and achieved through practice and instruction. The disappearance of the loops naturalizes the looping process of delivery, making the mechanism
invisible and the orator performing proto-masculinity into the proto-masculine man. In other words, an orator who performs being a good man is a good man in the eyes of the audience, and because he is a good man in the eyes of the audience, he is a good man in the essence of his character who makes a good delivery based on the strength of his character.

Quintilian goes on to state that along with the face, the neck is important to delivery. The neck should always be held straight in order to produce the voice effectively (Quintilian 11.3.82). And Quintilian explains, “Rarely is it becoming to shrug or hunch the shoulders, because this shortens the neck and produces a Gesture of humiliation and servility, suggesting hypocrisy, because people use it when they are pretending to flatter, admire, or fear” (11.3.83). He suggests, “A moderate extension of the arm, with the shoulders relaxed and the fingers spreading out as the hand is advanced, is a very becoming Gesture for continuous passages that run smoothly (11.3.84). Relaxation of the neck, shoulders, and arms is important for Quintilian, because these parts support the face and hands. Posture and carriage are important to conveying seemliness because they convey proto-masculine ideals of character—the confidence of a man’s bearing should demonstrate his entitlement and privileged position over others. And seemliness is important because it conveys a rhetorical sense of social awareness and etiquette, highlighting Quintilian’s collapse of public and private rhetorical space. In addition, the very detailing of all the necessary elements that contribute to the construction of a seemly posture, carriage, and presentation demonstrate how constructed this seemliness is. A "natural" carriage would not need the explicitly detailed instructions that Quintilian outlines—it would, in effect, happen naturally. Even the way an orator stands or holds his head is part of his performance, and as a consequence, he must practice standing and how he holds his head and carries his shoulders. The hands need
even more practice because they are crucial to gesture, and hand gestures are used in every culture to convey meaning.

Without the hands, Quintilian states, “Delivery would be crippled and enfeebled,” (11.3.85). He goes on to state the hands almost “speak for themselves” (11.3.85). The reason, Quintilian explains, is that hands convey meaning almost universally—hand gestures seem to be common to every nation and people, and everyone seems to be able to understand one another through the use of hand gestures (11.3.87). It is important, however, to use all gestures, and not just hand gestures, to augment or accent what one is saying. Although it is possible to convey imitation through mimicry, such as conveying the idea of a lyre player by pretending to hold and play the instrument, mimicry should not be used when pleading (11.3.89). Gesture needs to be adapted to and must accommodate the spoken words; mimicry is a distracting visual display that should be avoided. Quintilian’s advice to avoid mimicry is significant because mimicry would also fail to convey the seemliness and clues to character that the physical aspects of delivery are meant to impart. Mimicry not only fails to convince the audience of the authenticity of the orator’s self, but is also dangerous because it suggests that an orator’s self can be imitated. Mimicry must be avoided in order to perpetuate the illusion that the orator is who he says he is. Because gesture needs to convey character and seemliness, Quintilian outlines several specific hand gestures and when they should be used. For example, holding the middle finger against the thumb is an extremely common hand gesture, which is particularly useful in the prooemium when the hand is moved forward and gently side to side (11.3.92). When extended further forward, this gesture is useful in Narrative. However, the gesture is no longer effective if the speaker makes the gesture using only his elbow, instead of sweeping his entire arm (11.3.92). Quintilian describes twenty-three specific gestures, and seven kinds of motion (where only
circular movements are bad, and should be avoided) (11.3.105). Hand movements should generally begin on the left and end on the right, and the movements “should begin and end with sense, for otherwise the Gesture will either anticipate the voice or lag behind it, and in either case the result is unsightly” (11.3.107). Hand gestures should never be higher than eye level, and should never be lower than the chest (11.3.113). And most hand gestures should be expressed by the right hand. Quintilian explains,

The left hand never rightly makes a Gesture on its own, but it often lends support to the right, if we are either (1) telling off arguments on our fingers, or (2) turning our palms away to express horror, or (3) making an objection by thrusting them forward, or (4) stretching both hands out sideways, or (5) lowering them in apology or supplication (but note that these are distinct Gestures), or finally (6) raising them in prayer or stretching them out to point to something or in invocation [. . .]. (11.3.115)

Nervousness or nervous behavior and gestures are considered faults. Although Quintilian does point out that “Every individual has his own faults,” (11.3.121), he lists several faults of nervousness, including: “[S]truggling with a mouth that refuses to open; making a rumbling noise, as if something is stuck in your throat, if you memory has failed or your thoughts will not come to mind; wiping your nose without turning aside to do so; walking up and down in mid-sentence; stopping suddenly and pausing for applause” (11.3.121). These faults of nervousness are distinct from faults of nature, according to Quintilian. These are faults of performance. The distinction is significant because it again emphasizes the performative nature of an orator’s delivery, not only in his speech, but also in his conveyance of character and decorum. Nervousness shows that the orator’s character is constructed, and that his proto-masculine performance is just that—a performance. Nervousness in an orator lifts the illusion that he is
simply being himself, and makes it obvious that he is performing the role of speaker and the proto-masculinity associated with that role.

Concerning gestures of the body, Quintilian advises against “thrust[ing] the chest or stomach forward. This arches the back, and all bending backwards is unsightly” (11.3.122). Sightliness is also of primary importance in the placement of the feet. Quintilian declares’ “It is unsightly to stand with the right foot in front, and to put the same hand and foot forward together” (11.3.125). Putting too much weight on one foot while raising the other, shifting from foot to foot, too much walking, poising a foot on tiptoe, jumping backwards, effeminate movements, rocking back and forth, moving the shoulders too much, leaning inappropriately, and eating and drinking during the course of a speech are all movements and gestures of the body that must be avoided in order to be a good orator (11.3.125-136). Quintilian's exactitude in detailing how an orator should stand and carry himself again underscores the artificiality of delivery and proto-masculinity. These behaviors and mannerisms, these matters of posture and foot placement, must all be prescribed in detail, because they are not natural ways of performing. They must be practiced and refined by the orator in order to create a pleasing and appropriately proto-masculine performance of his character.

A pleasing visual appearance lies in more than just seemly gestures and upright posture. Quintilian also addresses matters of dress and fashion. Quintilian claims that although there is no special uniform or fashion for an orator, the orator’s dress is noticed more than others. He writes, “As with all men of standing, it should be distinguished and masculine. Toga, shoes, and hair invite criticism both for too much care and for not enough” (11.3.137). Fashions change, Quintilian notes, and an orator needs to wear dress that is suitable for his time period, although he doesn’t need to follow faddish trends. The toga should allow gesture and delivery and not
impede motion or hand movement. At the same time, Quintilian notes that, “This close attention to dress applies only at the beginning of a speech” (11.3.144). As a speech progresses, it is natural for the speaker’s clothing to become rumpled and disheveled, and for his hair to become mussed. Indeed, this rumpling of appearance is not only acceptable, it also appears to be cultivated in some cases to achieve a greater oratorical effect. Quintilian states,

As [the speech] proceeds, almost by the beginning of the Narrative, it is quite proper for the fold to slip, apparently accidentally, off the shoulder; and when we come to Arguments and Commonplaces, it is quite proper to throw the toga back from the left shoulder, and even to let the fold down. You can pull the toga away from the throat and upper chest with the left hand, for everything is now hotting up. And just as the voice becomes more vehement, so the clothing gets into battle mode, as it were. (11.3.144-145)

Because fashions in appearance change, Quintilian feels it necessary to point out that keeping with fashion is important, as long the orator's appearance is not that of one devoted to fashion. The orator should still appear dignified, modest, and masculine. By pointing out the change in fashions, Quintilian acknowledges that appearance and delivery are not natural, and should be changed, in moderation, to keep in accordance with current social standards of dress. His analogy to battle makes it clear that the orator's appearance must conform to masculine standards, which, it can be extrapolated, also change over time like fashions do. By conforming to fashions, the orator’s delivery conforms to specific and exclusive social norms, again emphasizing the need for the orator to be socially aware with his mannerisms and appearance. Even though Quintilian is focusing on appearance in the public sphere by specifically addressing
appearance during public speaking, because he also claims that all speech is rhetoric, he implies
the importance of appearance off-stage, and in other circumstances, as well.

**Different deliveries, different masculinities**

After outlining the major components of voice and gesture, Quintilian begins discussing
circumstances of delivery. Even after an orator has mastered components of voice and gesture,
there are other aspects of delivery that require his attention. An orator must be aware of

1. Who he is, whose court it is, and who is present. Permissible forms of behavior, as of
speaking, vary with speaker and audience. The same features of voice, Gesture, and walk
are not equally appropriate to speaking before the emperor, the senate, the people, and the
magistrates, in a private and in a public trial, in an application for a hearing and in an
actual pleading. Anyone who sets his mind to it will be able to suggest the differences.

2. What is his subject, and what he wants to effect. (11.3.150-151)

Similar to changes in fashion, Quintilian notes changes in rhetorical situations, and instructs the
orator to alter his delivery according to the situation in which he finds himself. Additionally, he
suggests that the differences in rhetorical situations are so obvious that he doesn't need to outline
them--any orator who thinks about the situations he encounters will be able to determine the
differences for himself. Quintilian recognizes that different social situations require deliveries of
different characters, and, by extension, different masculinities. Speaking before an emperor, for
example, would require a man to perform proto-masculinity in a manner that is both humble and
deferent to the emperor, but aware of his own proto-masculine privilege in society—his audience
would be addressed as his superior. The same man speaking to an audience of young male
students would not be humble and deferent, and could address his audience as his potential
equals. Delivery, and performed masculinity, are not static, and while ideal orators may have ideal deliveries and perform proto-masculinities, there is more than just one delivery, one performance, one masculinity that can be used for all situations. From these ideals come a web of applied and performed masculinities, characters, and deliveries, that all depend on the rhetorical situation that the orator is within.

Quintilian claims that delivery “has to effect three objects: it must conciliate, persuade, and move. That is should also give pleasure is a natural corollary of this” (11.3.153). He then goes on to describe how delivery achieves these objects. Conciliation is achieved through the “acceptability of character,” which, Quintilian remarks, “shines through somehow also in the voice and the Delivery” (11.3.154). It is also achieved through a charming style (11.3.154). For persuasion, Quintilian states, “The power to persuade comes from confident assertion, which is sometimes more effective than the Proofs themselves” (11.3.154). He advises, “So let your confidence and firmness be apparent, at least if you have the authority to back them” (11.3.155). And finally, for the third objective, “The power to move rests on realizing or imitating emotions” (11.3.156). Quintilian again emphasizes the very objects of delivery that Aristotle objects to. Quintilian encourages the use of delivery for the same reasons that Aristotle finds delivery vulgar, and that Plato finds rhetoric suspicious—because the audience is susceptible to persuasion through pathos and ethos rather than through logos alone. These objects of delivery, however, are not vulgar or negative objects for Quintilian because he assumes that the orator is a good man, who has good intentions. At the same time, however, Quintilian instructs students of rhetoric to perform these qualities of goodness so that they are apparent to an audience. The effect of delivery on an audience is also evident in Quintilian’s claim that rhetoric, and specifically delivery, should indeed produce pleasure—an aim that Aristotle and Plato would
have vehemently disagreed with. Quintilian’s focus on the effects of delivery, and the audience’s perceptions and reception of delivery, continues to shift the focus of delivery off of the orator alone, and to the rhetorical situation of the oratory.

In order for a speaker to create a favorable impression prior to his speech, Quintilian gives advice on how to carry oneself before speaking. He instructs that,

[when a judge or court usher] calls upon us to speak on our Cause, we must get up without hurrying, and then spend a little time arranging the toga or, if need be, putting it on afresh—in the public courts, I mean, because this will not be allowed before the emperor, a magistrate, or a tribunal—so as both to make our dress more decent and to give ourselves a little time to think. Even when we turn to the judge and ask and receive the praetor’s permission to speak, we must not burst out immediately, but allow a brief pause for reflection. [. . .] In this period of delay, some “stop-gaps,” as the actors say, are not inappropriate: stroking the head, looking at the hand, cracking the fingers, pretending to summon up our energies, confessing nervousness by a sigh, or doing whatever suits your particular character; and this can go on for some time if the judge is not yet paying attention. (11.3.156-159)

Even before the orator speaks, he is engaging in delivery, the delivery of his character. The orator's performance begins before his speech does; in fact, the orator is always performing his character when he is in front of an audience. By instructing the orator to "pretend" and use actorly "stop-gaps," Quintilian again underscores the performative and artificial nature of delivery. Even more importantly, Quintilian is implying that the performance of delivery begins to occur before the actual performance does—in other words, the orator is performing even before his speech begins, unlike the actor, whose performance of his fictional role begins when
the play begins. The crucial significance of Quintilian’s instruction is the moving of performance outside of the usual parameters of a performance. The performance of oratory doesn’t begin with the orator begins giving his speech; on the contrary, it begins when the orator is named as orator and asked to get up and speak in public. The bulk of Quintilian’s advice, moreover, is aimed at delivering character, down to details concerning knuckle cracking and sighing. By beginning delivery before the performance of the speech begins, character is further naturalized as something inherent and innate in the speaker. The proto-masculinity of the character, by extension, is also naturalized further. The orator is seen as being proto-masculine, not performing proto-masculinity. And proto-masculinity is then seen as something natural, something one is, instead of something one does. If the orator begins performing before his performance begins, the orator’s performance appears to be more authentic and genuine to his audience, both in his character and delivery, and in his speech itself. And significantly, proto-masculinity appears to be a reality, rather than an artificial performance.

Quintilian goes on to give overviews of what kinds of delivery are suitable for the parts of a speech. He advises that a speaker use an even delivery with a quiet voice and modest gestures for the Prooemium (11.3.161). For the Narrative, a speaker should use a more conversational voice, only slightly sharper, and a natural tone (11.3.162). The Proofs require a more complex and varied delivery, and Argumentation, which is more energetic, requires a matching energetic delivery (11.3.163-164). Digressions, Quintilian writes, tend to be more smooth and relaxed (11.3.165). And the Epilogue needs to have an emotional delivery that matches the emotions the speaker is trying to convey or arouse in his audience (11.3.170-174). After detailing different kinds of delivery for different parts of a speech, and explaining how different thoughts and words require different deliveries, Quintilian then specifies that “It is true
that the main consideration in Delivery is what is becoming, but it is often the case that different things become different speakers. There is a hidden and inexplicable principle behind this and, though it has truly been said that ‘the main thing in art is that what one does should be becoming,’ this is something which is neither attainable without art nor wholly communicable by art” (11.3.177). It is not enough to know the fundamentals and nuances of delivery; it is also necessary to tailor different deliveries to one’s own personal style. Quintilian advises, “So let everyone ‘know himself,’ and take counsel in forming his Delivery not only from general rules, but from his own nature. Not that there is anything fundamentally wrong in a man’s finding everything, or at least most things, appropriate for him to do” (11.3.181). Each speaker has characteristics as a person, and as a speaker, which make him unique. Even though specific kinds of delivery are more suited for certain parts of a speech than others, an orator still needs to choose delivery styles that suit him, and that capitalize upon his abilities and personal attributes. It is crucial, for Quintilian, for an orator to deliver in a way that is seemly and becoming to his sense of self. And Quintilian’s emphasis on encouraging orator’s to develop deliver styles that are not only appropriate, but unique to themselves, again re-inscribes a naturalization of the actions and behaviors that delivery conveys. By creating a delivery style that looks unique, an orator appears to deliver his authentic self, and takes attention away from the fact that his delivery, and through his delivery, his persona, is created. The delivery style doesn’t just look like it belongs to the orator, as Quintilian suggests it should, it looks like the orator himself—not the orator’s performance of himself. In other words, the orator must learn to act like he is speaking authentically.
**Authentic and fictional proto-masculine performance**

Quintilian concludes his book on delivery by emphasizing that an orator should not pursue learning about gesture or voice to the exclusion of all else; after all, the orator is not an actor. An orator does not perform in a fictional setting according to a fictional script, like an actor, but instead performs his self as something that is real, and that is part of reality. An orator who only pursues learning about the performative facets of oratory will inevitably begin to act his speeches by becoming too highly stylized, rather than deliver his speeches with the appearance of authenticity necessary to create the illusion that he is not acting, but merely speaking. Quintilian states, “Oratory as a different flavour: it does not wish to be too highly spiced, because it is a real activity, not an imitation” (11.3.183). Styles in delivery may change, and these styles should be followed, but in moderation. For example, “Nowadays, however, a somewhat more agitated style of Delivery is regarded as acceptable, and is indeed appropriate in some contexts; but it needs to be under control, lest, in our eagerness to pursue the elegance of the performer, we lose the authority of the good and grave man” (11.3.184). For Quintilian, retaining a performance that subscribes to proto-masculine ideals is more important than following trends in delivery and performance. Styles in delivery must be tailored to suit an acceptable masculinity. His distinction between acting and oratory continues to echo distinctions made by Cicero and the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. The performance of oratory is a real performance, not a fictional performance delivered by an actor.

All of these requirements for self-presentation, which evolved from Aristotle’s description of voice to Quintilian’s meticulously detailed account, were elements of delivery that had to be learned and practiced. Men were trained, through rhetorical training, to become men, to become the sort of man that befitted the status and public standing of an orator. Maud Gleason,
in *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome*, explains, "All well-born males were trained in adolescence, by competing with their peers, to display the ‘cultural capital’ that distinguished authentic members of the elite from other members of society who might quite literally speak a different language" (xxi). By becoming an orator, and striving to be an ideal orator, men had to perform not just masculinity, but being an ideal man. This particular kind of masculine performance of being an ideal man, of proto-masculinity, was created through the requirements necessary to making a "good" delivery. This masculine performance is that of an upper-class, educated, civically and politically involved, socially active, etiquette adhering, influential white man. Men perform this kind of manliness through their rhetoric and delivery. Masculinity, in this sense, isn't just constructed, but created into a proto-masculinity that acts as a standard to which men must conform. As a controlling ideology, this ideal masculine standard not only controls marginalized subjects like women, non-white persons, lower class persons, etc., through exclusion, but it also controls the men who were forced to perform their possession of this type of ideal masculinity and who were forced to attempt to adhere to this masculinity's standards.

Because only certain males were in a position to receive rhetorical training that would teach them to construct ideal masculinities, the masculinization of delivery standards became so embedded into the process itself that it creates a feedback loop. Only a young Roman man, for example, who was well-born and economically privileged would have been in a position to receive the schooling and training necessary to become an orator and contributing citizen. The advantages of being a male of the upper class social and financial circles allowed a man access to the training that would reinforce and define his privileged status. The traits of masculinity associated with this status were (and are) arbitrary. Even with the advantages of his birth, a
young Roman boy still had to be taught how to become and be a Roman man, despite the fact that his birth status is what gave him access to this knowledge. This looping process ensured that the elitism of ideal masculinity remained elite, and it allowed ideal masculinity to rationalize the exclusion of the majority of the populace, retaining power in the hands of a select few candidates.

The elitism and advantages, however, of those performing ideal masculinity, are somewhat illusionary. The performers themselves are regulated by the accuracy and “authenticity” of their performances. In order for the delivery of a standardized, ideal masculinity to work, it has to be sanctioned and approved by an audience. Part of the performativity of masculinity is its rhetoricity--the audience must agree with and condone the performer's delivery as being appropriately masculine. The interaction between the audience and the orator creates another kind of feedback loop, where the orator’s performed ideal masculinity is tested and evaluated by an audience other than his teacher, his classmates, and himself. As Maud Gleason puts it, "One reason these [oratorical] performances were so riveting was that the encounter between orator and audience was in many cases the anvil upon which the self-presentation of ambitious upper-class men was forged" (xx). The audience judged whether or not an orator’s delivery and performance was appropriate, compelling, and convincing. The feedback loop of constructing ideal masculinity was monitored by the feedback loop created by the interactions between orators and audiences. And delivery was key to these interactions. The feedback loop which allows gender standards to be indoctrinated through rhetoric and the feedback loop which allows gender performance to be monitored and evaluated through audience interactions are both rooted in delivery. In Maud Gleason’s words,
[M]anhood was not a state to be definitely and irrefutably achieved, but something always under construction and constantly open to scrutiny [. . .] Rhetoric was a calisthenics of manhood. This is easier for us to grasp if we remember that the art of self-presentation through rhetoric entailed much more than mastery of words: physical control of one's voice, carriage, facial expression, and gesture, control of one's emotions under conditions of competitive stress--in a word, all the arts of deportment necessary in a face-to-face society where one's adequacy as a man was always under suspicion and one's performance was constantly being judged. (xxii)

The orator’s performance was distinct from the actor’s performance, and judged differently, because it was a “real” performance. Actorly oratory was repeatedly admonished, and the majority of rhetorical textbooks writers point out the differences between oratory and acting.

Quintilian’s treatise relocates delivery so that it no longer concerns only public oratory, but all speech. The performance that the orator was required to give was a performance that not only began before his speaking, but one that continued into arenas outside of the rhetorical stage. Although Quintilian does not explicitly admonish orators to continue performing in their private lives, his instruction that an orator must be a good man implies that an orator must always perform the qualities of “good” and “man,” regardless of whether or not he is in the process of addressing an audience. Quintilian’s treatise also explicitly connects “good” with “man,” ensuring the continued production and embedding of proto-masculine ideals, the values and characteristics associated with the “good” part of “good man,” into manliness and masculinity. Delivery transmits more than the orator’s speech; it also transmits the embedded ideologies of gender, specifically proto-masculinity, and privileges that ideology, creating a hierarchy of gender and performance. Delivery doesn’t instruct an orator in how to perform; instead, it tells
men how to perform and how to transmit information through a performance while privileging some subjects and performances over others. Quintilian’s relocation of rhetoric is significant because by including all speech under the purview of rhetoric, performances of gender, and especially those of good men, explicitly move from the stage into daily life. And a man will be expected to perform being a “good man” not just while speaking in public, but anytime he speaks, in any rhetorical situation. His character, his “good-man-ness,” will need to be displayed, and the construction of etiquette books will instruct any young man, who wants to achieve the social status that performances of proto-masculinity can give, how to do so. Delivery will continue to grow and evolve, moving off the stage, and into the performances of everyday life. With this relocation, the question of acting and performance will fall by the wayside, and the distinction between delivery and gender performance will continue to collapse.
3 ETIQUETTE, MANNERS, AND CLASSY DELIVERY

The rise of print and the rise of etiquette

An early Renaissance rhetorician, Peter Ramus, was intent on overthrowing the three rhetorical giants from the classical era, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, and argued that their conclusions and categorizations of rhetoric were unsound and illogical. When Ramus first published his *Arguments in Rhetoric Against Quintilian* in 1549, there were 100 editions of Quintilian’s *The Orator’s Education* in print (Murphy 38). Quintilian’s writing was extremely popular when Ramus attempted to prove that Quintilian’s rhetoric was unsound. In *Arguments in Rhetoric Against Quintilian*, Ramus states that Quintilian followed Aristotle’s error in assigning five parts to rhetoric. According to Ramus, “The parts of the material which belong to the art of rhetoric are only two, style and delivery” (87). Ramus continues to add that Quintilian’s definition of an orator, “a good man speaking well,” is also an error because rhetoric is a virtue of intelligence, and not of morality (87). Ramus asks, “What then, O Quintilian? Is he who knows what is honest and just, himself honest and just? How few are the spendthrifts and cutthroats who do not know what is honest and just?” (88). Quintilian succeeds, in Ramus’s opinion, in defining the goal of rhetoric as speaking well and not persuasion. But he is led astray by his insistence on tying the idea of “good man” into orator. Ramus continues to argue against this part of Quintilian’s definition by stating,

Suppose we apply to the dialectician and the arithmetician what Quintilian says about the orator. Neither the dialectician nor the arithmetician can be perfect without a knowledge of all subjects, since the practice of all the arts which concern humanity is linked by a certain common bond and connected by a certain kinship. Yet who believes that the
dialectician and the arithmetician are correctly defined if they are called “good men skilled in debate or in calculation” and perfect in every branch of knowledge and virtue?

(91)

Ramus contends that morality is not linked to rhetorical skill any more than it can be linked to mathematical skill. The idea that language, that rhetoric, contains a prerequisite of being "good" is, for Ramus, a ludicrous idea. Although Ramus attempts to counteract the idea that morality, virtue, and "goodness" are connected to oratory and rhetoric, his very contention is significant because it demonstrates how deeply tied into rhetoric the idea of a "good man" had already become. Classical rhetoric had inscribed the necessity of "good man" so overtly into delivery that Ramus, in his attempts to define and create a "new" rhetoric based on science, found it necessary to address the idea of "good man" in order to begin weeding out the superfluous and inaccurate instructions for virtue and goodness created by the classical rhetoricians. Speaking, oratory, and rhetoric are, indeed, performances for Ramus, but they are performances that do not rely upon a man's delivery of inherent virtue. The idea of the "good man speaking well," for Ramus, is simply wrong.

In fact, Ramus contends the majority of The Orator's Education is wrong. For Ramus, “Rhetoric is the science of speaking well; the subject matter of the orator is whatever is laid before him a subject for speech” (103). And while delivery and style are the only parts of rhetoric, “Invention, arrangement, and memory are parts of another discipline, namely dialectic” (105). Even when Quintilian treats delivery in book eleven he commits several errors. Ramus states, “The chapter on delivery is crammed with many quite useful precepts of the same sort, but it is burdened with just as many trivialities, so that the absurdities easily outstrip the relevant teachings. Indeed his scrupulousness in the multitudinous sections concerning voice and gesture
is futile, since the whole theory, gathered together in so many thousands of lines, could be put down clearly in a few words” (159). Ramus does not state these trivialities specifically, nor does he provide a summary of what makes good delivery, instead leaving his commentary on the largest extant instruction on delivery to two sentences. Although Ramus contends that delivery is one of the two parts of rhetoric, he doesn’t spend much time discussing it in any depth. He concludes by stating,

Therefore, if we wish to analyze everything brought together these last five books, and if we wish to know what the outline of the theory was--even if we may not say of these books what was said before about the books on invention and arrangement (namely, that Quintilian thoroughly mixed up art and the practice of art)--yet it can certainly be pointed out that the art of rhetoric is burdened with may useless precepts about style and delivery, and that the description of theory vaunts a far greater appearance of empty ostentation and pomp than it reveals a system of true and solid theory. (159-160)

Ramus believed that the rhetorical construction concerning delivery, and style, contained excessive and needless amounts of instruction, possibly because of the time rhetoricians, particularly Quintilian, spent on outlining the necessary virtues that contributed to a good delivery. Rhetoric, for Ramus, is the practice of theory, and the practice itself consisted only of delivery and style. Ramus appeared to believe that delivery was something that happened naturally, since he spent so little time writing about it or offering instruction for good delivery. This lack of instruction in delivery points to the idea that delivery was something an orator just did, rather than something an orator studied. Ramus's largest contention concerning delivery was that delivery should be divorced from virtue and morality. His contention demonstrates how classical rhetoricians, and Quintilian in particular, embedded proto-masculinity, ideal masculine
behaviors, into delivery by highlighting the need to rid rhetoric of these ideals. Ramus’s lack of instruction and his implication that delivery was something an orator just did, rather than something an orator practiced and studied, had the side-effect of naturalizing delivery, and by extension the practiced proto-masculinity connected with delivery, into something that was innate in an orator. Even as Ramus tried to separate virtue and morality from rhetoric, he implied that those qualities could be natural qualities when he implies that delivery is a natural activity.

Because printed communication was gaining popularity due to increasing literacy and decreasing production costs, style was more important to Ramus than delivery (Bizzell and Herzberg 678). As Walter Ong puts it, “Ramism is above all, although not exclusively, a manifestation of the subtle and apparently irresistible shift sacrificing auditorily oriented concepts for visually oriented ones that sets in with medieval scholasticism and on which most of the characteristic manifestations of the modern as against the ancient world depend” (235). The new emphasis on writing as a primary means of transmission not only began to reconfigure the rhetorical canons to be better suited to the written word, such as reconfiguring Arrangement to apply to the organization of sentences and paragraphs that were written to be read, but it also created the rise of an anachronistic assumption that classical rhetoricians and orators also perceived of and used delivery as an “add-on” to the rhetorical canon. The assumption that delivery was nothing more than a spoken performance that was an additional element to the rhetorical canon, a final “step” in the classical rhetorical process, made it possible for delivery to be de-emphasized with the rise of print. The neglect of delivery also meant that the indoctrinated gender construction and regulation that was previously achieved through rhetorical instruction embedded with proto-masculinity was no longer as available. Gender performances needed to be regulated, and these performances needed to adhere to delivery's already established gendered
prescriptions, in both public and private rhetorical locations, and not just on the stage. In the early 1500s, shortly after print began its spread, etiquette manuals burst onto the stage, more than doubling in the number of manuscripts produced in previous centuries and replacing the instruction in proto-masculinity that was once offered to orators. The 1500s and 1600s saw a constant marked increase in the number of etiquette manuals and conduct texts, largely due to the discovery of the North American continent. With the discovery of North America, and the subsequent explorations and colonization of the continent, more young men, and families, were leaving European nations to venture abroad and settle in these new lands. As they left their cultures and countries behind, etiquette books provided a means to continue the social rituals and customs on the new continent. Hemphill claims that one of the reasons for studying these older etiquette manuals is to investigate "... how Americans have needed manners" (8), a social code that could work and lay the foundations for culture in the new world. The epoch of etiquette was, however, the 1800s, and the ante-bellum era ushered in the pinnacle of etiquette text production. According to Hemphill, "Over two hundred different works prescribing proper face-to-face behavior were published or imported in northern America before 1861 (5). Tapering off in the early 1900s, etiquette book production remained popular and constant through present day.

At the same time of etiquette’s height in popularity, Thomas Sheridan, Hugh Blair, and Gilbert Austin began calling for a return to delivery. A renewed focus on, and inclusion of, delivery in education, and most particularly rhetorical education, was critical to institute a return of morality to England. Without delivery, language usage suffered, and through the lack of adequate lingual expression, the general populace was no longer able to perform as upstanding citizens. By focusing on delivery and emphasizing oratorical practices, particularly, for Blair, in the pulpit, people could return to morality by learning to once again be Quintilian’s "good men"
who "spoke well." An overall concern with morality and language usage became prevalent during the Enlightenment and Belle-Letttristic periods. With the rapid socio-economic changes and increasing social mobility offered by the new democracy of the United States, and later by the industrial revolution, the regulation of social norms and prescribed social roles became more urgent. Both the ability to transverse social classes and the introduction of women into the workforce created anxiety about men’s social roles and behavior. Etiquette books focused at first primarily on men’s behavior and conduct, and attempted to quell the anxiety produced by shifting social roles by prescribing appropriate behavior. Starting in the 1700s, and peaking in the late 1800s, etiquette books also focused on women’s roles and behavior, and provided women with instruction on how to act as a hostess, wife, and mother. The focus on delivery, both in etiquette and on the podium, was an attempt to compensate for changing social mobilities and possibilities by instilling morality, through performances of appropriate social behavior, in the populace.

This conjunction between etiquette and delivery is significant because gender became regulated and prescribed, through rhetoric, in both public and private spheres. Etiquette followed delivery's injunctions toward behavior and speaking, but in settings more appropriate to conversation and social occasions as opposed to the stage of public speaking. The resurgence of delivery once again regulated the performance of gender on stage by addressing public speaking, but the rise of etiquette spread the gender prescriptions and idealizations in delivery, concretizing delivery's place off-stage and in private speaking as well as on. With delivery’s shift to include both public and private spheres, the gender prescriptions and proto-masculine idealization became even further naturalized. By prescribing gender regulations for behavior off-stage, as well as on-stage, etiquette not only carried delivery in privatized spheres, but also created a
means to define what kind of behavior was “appropriate” in off-stage interactions. Texts such as Richard Allestree’s *The Gentlemen’s Calling* (1673), Nicholas P. Gilman’s *Conduct as a Fine Art* (1892), Godfrey Golding’s *The Book of Good Devices* (1873), Linus Pierpont Brockett’s *Men of Our Day; or, Biographical Sketches of Patriots, Orators, Statesmen, Generals, Reformers, Financiers, and Merchants, Now on the Stage of Action* (1868), the anonymous *Advice to Young Gentlemen on Entering Society* (1839), and Philip Dormer Stanhope’s (the Earl of Chesterfield’s) *Practical Morality, or, A Guide to Men and Manners* (1848) were just a few of the etiquette manuals available during the height of etiquette’s popularity that offered instruction to young men who wished to learn how to conduct themselves appropriately (Newton 145-68).

Additionally, through these etiquette books particular kinds of behavior became idealized and desirable in social, off-stage interactions, further extending the entrenchment of proto-masculinity into delivery. With the written consensus of these codes of behavior, deviations from these codes became more apparent. The offender’s behavior could be normalized by applying himself to the study of these manuals, and enforced through the social ostracizing of others if he failed to learn and adhere to the necessary conduct codes. Peers and social betters of a man who spoke loudly and with wild gestures could snub him by not returning his calls on their homes. The man, watching the depletion of his social circle and social mobility, could study etiquette manuals to learn the appropriate and polite ways of speaking to his acquaintances. Once he has learned the code and is able to follow it, the man can once again have access to his social spheres and social mobility.
Morality and masculinity in delivery and etiquette

In the elocutionist movement of the 1700s, Thomas Sheridan emphasized the decline of eloquence in Britain and the necessity for public speaking training, particularly in his works *A Course of Lectures on Elocution* (1762) and *British Education: Or, The source of the Disorders of Great Britain. Being an Essay towards proving, that the Immorality, Ignorance, and false Taste which so generally prevail, are the natural and necessary Consequences of the present defective System of Education. With an attempt to shew, that a revival of the Art of Speaking, and the Study of Our Own Language, might contribute, in a great measure, to the Cure of those Evils* (1756). The reappearance of delivery in the 1700s stemmed from a concern that language, and thus morality, was declining in quality. Sheridan re-emphasized delivery in an attempt to remedy poor preaching practices, which he believed would lead to lower moral standards (63-5). The 1700s also saw a marked increase in the production of etiquette texts and manuals, further emphasizing the overall concern with declining morality and shifting social codes and constructions. A large part of this concern was an attempt to keep solid boundaries between upper and lower socio-economic classes. The resurging interest in delivery during the elocutionist movement and the spread of etiquette and conduct texts was an attempt to re-create and re-solidify the boundaries between classes. Hemphill writes, "In adopting the courtesy code for themselves, the elite would attempt to exert mastery over their demeanor, body carriage, facial expressions, and talk before others, and to a far greater extent than they would encourage in ordinary folk" (24). Etiquette books were historically primarily addressed to men, and it wasn't until the mid 1700s, when women’s social status also began to shift more dramatically, that etiquette manuals and conduct guides began to primarily address women and instruct them in hostessing, wifery, lady-like conduct. Hemphill goes on to state, "While women were instructed
to let modesty direct their body carriage and facial expressions, gentlemen were given more specific and elaborate instructions that emphasized the importance of body control. Reflecting the expectation that they would be much in society, the courtesy works gave men advice on gestures of salutation and the proper use of place in encounters that no one bothered to give women" (57). The primary focus of etiquette manuals for gentlemen remained on making good men. Hemphill goes on to explain, "While grace in carriage was supposed to appear natural, the discussions of proper posture and movement suggest that the authors realized that such grace did not always come naturally. . . A man's walk, it was claimed, was an index of his character" (25). The emphasis in etiquette on carriage and posture echoed Quintilian’s advice to men concerning their walk, stance, body movements, and even the arrangement of their togas.

Sheridan's revival of delivery and his emphasis on curing moral evils echoes the concerns of the etiquette manuals of his time. In *A Course of Lectures on Elocution*, Sheridan begins his argument by criticizing the popular focus on writing and the neglect of speaking and delivery. For Sheridan, writing has been given preeminence above what it deserves, and problems in communication stem from the fact that writing cannot achieve the same nuance and does not have the same power as the spoken word. He states in his introduction, “In short that some of our greatest men have been trying to do that with the pen, which can only be performed by the tongue; to produce effects by the dead letter, which can never be produced but by the living voice, with its accompaniments” (xii). He continues by explaining “But that the bulk of my readers, may not enter upon the discussion of this point, with all their prejudices about them, they are desired to reflect, that language is the great instrument, by which all the faculties of the mind are brought forward, moulded, polished, and exerted: and what we have in use two kinds of language; the spoken, and the written. The one, the gift of God; the other, the invention of
man” (xiii). Language, for Sheridan, is the greatest of all instruments, whose purpose is to allow the thoughts and ideas of men’s minds to be expressed. Spoken language is a gift bestowed by God for this purpose, while written language is an invention created by man for convenience. The emphasis on written language creates problems of communication because it does not properly showcase and express men’s faculties of thought. Written language, for Sheridan, is artificial because it was created by man, while spoken language is natural because it was God-given. Sheridan’s chief concern is ridding delivery of all artificiality in order to return to man’s natural, and morally good, God-given state. Curing the moral ills of England and curing artifice in language go hand-in-hand. Sheridan’s purpose is particularly significant because he situates virtue and goodness as distinct from artificiality and performance. Instructing people in a “natural” delivery will return people to expressions of “natural” morality. Sheridan’s purpose re-embeds the idea of good man, of proto-masculinity, into delivery.

Sheridan starts his lectures by criticizing reading ability in Britain. He specifies “That a general inability to read, or speak, with propriety and grace in public, runs thro’ the natives of the British dominions, is acknowledged; it shews itself in our senates, churches, on the bench and at the bar” (1). This inability to read, and a deficiency in speaking, both arise from artificial causes (Sheridan 3). The natural implements for speaking are fine--the physical ability to speak is, for most speakers, intact. The inability to read aloud or speak properly is caused by improper teaching. Sheridan specifies that “we are taught to read in a different way, with different tones and cadences, from those which we use in speaking; and this artificial manner, is used instead of the natural one, in all recitals and receptions at school, as well as in reading” (4). This artificial manner, taught and passed down, is inadequate for persuasion. Sheridan, following Cicero’s instruction, explains that anyone who attempts to persuade another to his own point of view must
first deliver himself as if he is wholly convinced of the argument himself. He states, “that in order to persuade others to the belief of any point, it must first appear, that the person who attempts it is firmly persuaded of the truth of it himself; how can we suppose it possible that he should effect this, unless he delivers himself in the manner which is always used by persons who speak in earnest?” (5). For Sheridan, the reliance on writing that occurred with the rise of the printing press corrupted the art of delivery. Reading from the written word leads to a delivery that is stilted and flawed. And this method of delivery has been taught and passed down, creating a deficiency in oratory and speaking. In order to remedy this deficiency, speakers must return to a “natural” way of speaking, and Sheridan outlines instruction methods for this natural style. However, by instructing speakers in a natural style, Sheridan merely naturalizes the performativity of delivery.

According to Sheridan, “A just delivery consists in a distinct articulation of words, pronounced in proper tones, suitably varied to the sense, and the emotions of the mind; with due observation of accent; of emphasis, in its several gradations; of rests or pauses of the voice, in proper places and well measured degrees of time; and the whole accompanied by expressive looks, and significant gesture” (10). The purpose of Sheridan’s lectures is to encourage and revive good delivery skills that focus on appropriate speech, carriage, and presentation of character, particularly among upper-class white men. Similarly, etiquette books of this period also discussed voice and proper speech coupled with gesture and carriage. Hemphill writes, "Courtesy works further advised gentlefolk not to speak too fast or too slowly, but deliberately. One was to strive for a mean between sharpness and flatness of voice, and to avoid extremes of loudness and softness" (27). In America, the Puritan elite used courtesy and manners to display self-control in their interactions with others of their class, separating them from the common folk
(Hemphill 24). With immigration from England to America, social mobility and the possibility of a new life made the revival of injunctions concerning delivery especially important for maintaining gender and class standards. Delivery preserved proto-masculine ideals, while at the same time reinforcing those ideals. The attempt to revive delivery in England, and the same concerns expressed laterally in American manners, establishes and instills the values of proto-masculinity, shoring up the hegemonic divide. The concerns of etiquette were the same issues addressed by Sheridan in his attempts to revitalize delivery through the art of elocution. However, with both etiquette and public delivery instructing men how to behave off-stage and on-stage, proto-masculine performance instruction relocates to public and private interactions. Delivery, appropriated by etiquette and manner instruction, moves laterally into the private sphere of day-to-day interactions, in addition to being revived for public speaking performances.

Sheridan’s second lecture begins by defining the art of elocution. Elocution, for Sheridan, “is the just and graceful management of the voice, countenance, and gesture in speaking” (19). Sheridan tackles the art of articulation first, and he compares a good articulation to having a good handwriting. Messy handwriting, Sheridan explains, is “disgraceful to a gentlemen,” and yet, having a messy articulation goes unchecked (20). Poor articulation is not corrected because “written language is taught by rule, and it is thought a shame for any one, to transgress the known rules of an art, in which he has been instructed. But spoken language is not regularly taught, but is left to chance, imitation, and early habit: and therefore like all other things left to chance, or unsettled principles, is liable to innumerable irregularities and defects” (Sheridan 21). Proper pronunciation is also key, and Sheridan points out how the pronunciation of the Irish, for example, is less correct than English pronunciation (31). English pronunciation itself varies, while the pronunciation of the country gentry isn’t strictly correct, it is certainly more correct
than “cockney” (34). All of these errors could be amended if proper schooling were implemented at an early age and a stricter attention paid to teaching good and correct delivery. Sheridan's emphasis on "gentlemen" and his distinction between pronunciations make his audience clear. The return to delivery is, for Sheridan, a return to the proto-masculine idealization that needed to be instilled in upper-class men. In order to keep the class boundaries clear, and continue to keep the virtues associated with proto-masculine behavior in circulation, elocution must be taught. Without instruction, gender and social distinctions fall into disarray. The emphasis on morality and class demonstrate how these proto-masculine behaviors needed to be embedded repeatedly to maintain their ideological circulation. And for Sheridan, it is only through instruction, and practice, that these behaviors can be maintained.

Improper speaking and poor delivery corrupt religion and morality. Sheridan gives several examples from sermons and clergymen speaking from the pulpit. The wrong emphasis in a passage can detract from the importance of God. Sheridan relates a passage from a service and then explains “Thro’ out the whole service indeed the awful name of God is treated so familiarly, and so little distinguished even from any particle of three letters, as must give great offence to pious ears” (63). Without appropriate emphasis, rests, pauses, pronunciation, in short, without good delivery, the essence of Christianity and morality--God--becomes muddled in with the rest of words in a sermon. Instead of a natural style of delivery where God’s greatest would be naturally emphasized, an artificial manner of speaking has supplanted natural styles of speaking. Sheridan states,

And with respect to extemporaneous speaking in public, I have not known many instances in my life in which the artificial manner, got from a bad habit of reading, or imitations of others, has not supplanted the natural manner of speaking; and even in the
best, their delivery has in many parts been much affected by it. The man is apt to harangue his fellow citizens, much in the same way, as the boy was accustomed to recite before his school-fellows; unless where nature breaks thro’ the force of habit, when the heart of the speaker is much engaged in his subject, and when he delivers himself wholly from feeling. (72)

Furthermore, the distinction between a pulpit orator and his audience creates a distinction between the figure of authority, the minister, and the attendees. As Hemphill states, "Along with other members of the Puritan elite, they observed a special courtesy-book code of behavior among themselves, in order to set themselves apart and further ensure the deference of the commons. But they did not attempt to instill this code among their flocks" (30). The good delivery that Sheridan requires from a pulpit speaker serves the same function as etiquette--the pulpit orator's purpose is not to teach his audience good delivery, but to separate him from his audience. In order to exalt God, the speaker should, in a sense, be himself exalted. He should exhibit education, learning, and erudition in order to praise God and His works. Instead of sounding naturally exalted, the artificial delivery practiced during this time, which sounded more like poorly intoned reading than natural speaking, fails to exalt the speakers, and thus the Lord. The connection between delivery and God is important because it explicitly overturns Ramus's argument that rhetoric needed to be disconnected from morality. By reviving the art of delivery, Sheridan is attempting to restore and update the idea of the naturally good man who naturally speaks well.

Similarly, etiquette instruction also warned against artificiality and affectation. Hemphill quotes John Adams as stating, "The true gentleman is easy without affectation" (76). Hemphill elaborates,
These warnings against affectation were not expressions of ambivalence about gracefulness but indications of its importance. Truly graceful behavior was behavior that appeared "artless." The conduct writers did not assume that gracefulness came naturally, for they gave extensive advice about how it might be acquired. In warning about affectation, the conduct writers were reminding the middling that a convincing performance required work. One's manner would appear affected if one had not practiced enough to make it appear natural. (77)

The appearance of "naturalness" was crucial for both delivery and etiquette, and the emphasis placed by both Sheridan and the conduct writers of the period placed emphasis on appearing natural further instilled an embedded idea of gendered behavior. Language, whether spoken on stage or off stage, needed to appear naturally delivered, creating the illusion that the proto-masculine characteristics within the speaker were real. Without this appearance of naturalness, the assumptions that gender, through delivery, was an innate quality could be called into question and could disrupt the changing social categories even further. Social mobility meant that any man could aspire to become a proto-masculine man, and without the elitism associated with proto-masculinity, the hegemonic qualities of proto-masculinity would be lost. In order to prevent just any man (or any woman) from assuming proto-masculine privilege, it was necessary to revitalize and restore proto-masculinity in delivery. Attempts to restore delivery, both on and off the stage, attempted to re-inscribe proto-masculine characteristics into discourse, while compensating for changing social structures.

In order to revive delivery and morality, Sheridan believed it was necessary to study classical rhetoric. According to Sheridan, the Greeks and Romans, who were far superior to the rest of mankind, were the nations who developed and studied delivery, and who, through their
study, perfected the art of delivery (117). Sheridan goes on to explain that the difference between the Ancients and the Moderns is that the Ancients based their signs on nature, and “from her they drew all their stores; fitted them in the nicest and exactest manner to the emotions which they were to express; and adapted them to their artificial language, that their whole delivery form’d the compleatest harmony [. . .] So that all mankind who saw and heard them, were charmed with the manner of their delivery, tho’ they understood not their speech” (117). The delivery of the Ancients, according to Sheridan, consisted of a study and use of the natural expressions of emotion. The Moderns, he contends, have replaced natural deliveries of emotion with staged deliveries. Instead of supplementing the natural language of the body, the natural expressions of emotion, with artificial manmade words, speakers are replacing the natural language of the body with artificial gestures, tones, and expressions that do not correspond to natural usages. Speaking is no longer pleasant or beautiful, or even persuasive, for Sheridan, because speakers’ delivery appears artificial. Sheridan's claim that delivery appears artificial emphasizes that he believes delivery is a natural art; delivery isn't a performance in itself, but has become a performance through poor instruction and the privileging of the written word. Sheridan’s failure to acknowledge that delivery is a performance naturalizes delivery as something innate, as a natural expression of self rather than a performance of self. Etiquette and manners instruction also emphasize this naturalization by encouraging men to act as if their behaviors were innate, natural expressions of themselves. For both kinds of delivery, public speaking and private speaking during social interactions, delivery must appear to be naturally produced.

Delivery that appears artificial detracts from the speaker’s credibility, and the loss of credibility means that the speaker’s ability to persuade is lost. Sheridan explains, “The chief end of all public speakers is to persuade; and in order to persuade, it is above all things necessary,
that the speaker, should at least appear himself to believe, what he utters; but this can never be
the case, where there are any evident marks of affectation, or art” (121). A delivery that is
natural, but imperfect, will be far more effective at persuading an audience than an artificial
textbook delivery where the speaker uses gestures and expressions by rote. According to
Sheridan, “In elocution, the two great articles are, force, and grace; the one has its foundation
chiefly in nature, the other art. When united, they mutually support each other; when separated,
their powers are very different. Nature can do much without art; art but little without nature.
Nature, assaults the heart; art, plays upon the fancy” (121). The power to persuade by conveying
emotions, that are at least seemingly genuine, is far stronger than a delivery that is too
manufactured and produced.

Although a natural and seemingly genuine style of delivery needs to be studied and
practiced, and should consistently conform to the natural language of emotions, Sheridan also
argues that delivery is an individual attribute as well. He states, “But he who endeavours to adopt
the manner of another, loses sight of his own nature, and puts a constraint upon his organs. For
men do not differ more from each other in their faces, than they do in their powers of delivery.
And the same manner which is easy and agreeable in one man, becomes constrained and
disgusting, when assumed by another” (119-120). The artificiality in delivery that Sheridan
criticizes also includes the artificiality of imitation of another’s delivery style. The artificiality of
delivery is such that Sheridan distinguishes between two kinds of delivery. He writes that most
speakers have two kinds of delivery: public and private (129). Public delivery is the one that is
“artificial and constrained;” private delivery is “natural and easy” (129-130). In order to change
the state of delivery from an artificial manner of speaking to a natural one, a speaker has but to
replace his public manner of speaking with his private manner of speaking (130). By substituting
the private manner of delivery for the public one, the matter of artificiality in public speaking can be remedied and the natural language of emotion and artificial language of words can be reunited in harmony to again effectively persuade audiences. Sheridan’s advice is particularly significant in light the rise of etiquette and manners instruction manuals. The private delivery that Sheridan outlines is the same kind of delivery outlined in etiquette texts--a kind of delivery that was also acquired and practiced in order to seem "natural and easy." The informal, or at least, less formal when compared to public speaking, conversations, salutations, and social situations required a delivery that, while more private, necessitated the same amount of study and practice that oratory did. The private manner of speaking, the art of delivery in private social interactions, was being regulated by the etiquette texts of the day to ensure that speakers, even in private, conformed to a delivery style that retained proto-masculine characteristics. A man no longer performed proto-masculinity solely when speaking publicly, but was explicitly instructed to perform proto-masculinity when speaking off-stage as well. Sheridan’s instruction to use the private manner of speaking when speaking publicly because private speaking was more natural merely reinforced the idea that performances of proto-masculinity weren’t performances at all, but natural expressions of innate male qualities. Moreover, Sheridan's recommendation that public delivery should mimic private delivery conflated the distinctions between public and private delivery. The boundaries of the stage become even more blurred in this conflation, and the location of proscenium becomes panopticonal, rather than fixed. Instruction in delivery, while being revived, also relocated to cover more ground than that of the traditional stage of public speaking and include locations for private speaking, such as parlors. And the blurring of these stage lines continued into the belle-letristic and ante-bellum periods of rhetoric, as the emphasis on delivery continued and as etiquette as practice and object of study continued to spread.
Performing authentic character in Belle-Lettristic rhetoric

Hugh Blair, the major figure of the belletristic movement, and one of the first modern rhetoricians, also resituates delivery as a canon of importance, discussing the musicality of language, the eloquence of ancient orators, and the necessity of delivery in order to create graceful speaking in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783). Blair, who was a preacher, believed, like Sheridan, that good rhetoric would lead to good moral standards, and good eloquence would lead to self-improvement and virtuous character (Bizzell and Herzberg 947-8). Following the advice of Sheridan, Blair also emphasized a conversational style of delivery, while condemning elocutional excesses (Golden and Corbett 14). Blair's reiteration of Sheridan's advice also perpetuates the shifting of delivery's placement in public and private spheres. A conversational, off stage style of delivery, for Blair, is exactly the kind of delivery one needs to produce on stage. And the "natural," gendered delivery in off-stage encounters continued to be regulated by etiquette and conduct manuals.

Blair claims that studying rhetoric is necessary for a man to be able to share and express his thoughts, and convey his meaning through either speaking or writing (in Golden and Corbett 32). At the same time, however, merely studying rhetoric is not enough. Blair writes, “I by no means pretend to say that mere rhetorical rules, how just soever, are sufficient to form an orator. Supposing natural genius to be favourable, more by a great deal will depend upon private application and study, than upon any system of instruction that is capable of being publicly communicated” (qtd. In Golden and Corbett 32). Anyone can learn a system of rhetoric, but not anyone can learn to be an orator. In order to be an orator, a man needs to show diligence and persistence in applying himself to his rhetorical studies and practicing rhetoric. The amount of effort put into study is more important then the instruction a man receives. And this private
application is only enhanced if there is first a natural talent leaning towards rhetoric to begin with. Without the study of rhetoric, however, a man is likely to be influenced by erroneous ideas of what makes good rhetoric. As Blair states,

They who have never studied eloquence in its principles, nor have been trained to attend to the genuine and manly beauties of good writing, are always ready to be caught by the mere glare of language; and when they come to speak in public, or to compose, have no other standard on which to form themselves, except what chances to be fashionable and popular, how corrupted soever, or erroneous, that may be. (qtd. In Golden and Corbett 33)

Blair's concern over the importance of studying rhetoric in order to avoid misrepresentations of appropriate speaking in popular and fashionable speakers mirrors the concern etiquette manuals demonstrated over appropriate behavior in society. Both indicate that norms, performances, and gender were changing and fluctuating, and attempts to prescribe delivery, through rhetoric or etiquette, were attempts to re-standardize gender performance. By acknowledging that rhetoric must be studied, just as etiquette needed to be studied, Blair seems to acknowledge that rhetorical performance and a good delivery are acquired through practice and application. At the same time, however, only a particular kind of man, a good man, is able to achieve mastery of rhetorical principles and delivery. Blair agrees with Quintilian that only a good man can achieve good oratory. He writes,

One thing is certain, and I shall hereafter have occasion to illustrate it more fully, that, without possessing the virtuous affections in a strong degree, no man can attain eminence in the sublime parts of eloquence. He must feel what a good man feels, if he expects greatly to move, or to interest mankind. They are the ardent sentiments of honour, virtue,
magnanimity, and public spirit, that only can kindle that fire of genius, and call up into the mind those high ideas, which attract the admiration of ages; and if this spirit be necessary to produce the most distinguished efforts of eloquence, it must be necessary also to our relishing them with proper taste and feeling. (qtd. In Golden and Corbett 36)

Along with having virtue, a man needs to use good sense in order to practice eloquence. As Blair states, “Let it ever be kept in view, that the foundation of all that can be called eloquence, is good sense, and solid thought” (qtd. In Golden and Corbett 100). These naturalized qualities of good sense and virtue lend credence to the illusion that the performance is based on inherent, natural qualities--only those possessing these qualities will be capable of good delivery. Good delivery, much like good etiquette, is supposedly possible only for select men who merely need practice to refine and capitalize upon their natural abilities--an idea that continues to naturalize the performance of gender within delivery, in both public and private spaces.

Blair’s discussion of style seems to conflate elements of style with elements of delivery. In his discussion of style and expression, Blair makes several points that seem better suited to a discussion of delivery. Blair explains, “The liberty, however, which we are now giving of the strong and passionate manner to this kind of oratory, must be always understood with certain limitations and restraints, which, it will be necessary to point out distinctly, in order to guard against mistakes of this subject” (qtd. In Golden and Corbett 103). Blair points out five specific points of style that an orator needs to be aware of. The three points concern warmth and the expression of warmth to an audience. Blair states, “At first, the warmth which we express must be suited to the occasion and the subject” (qtd. In Golden and Corbett 103), meaning that the emotion an orator conveys needs to be appropriate to the subject of the speech. The second point Blair makes is that “we must take care never to counterfeit warmth without feeling it” (qtd. In
Golden and Corbett 103). So emotions that an orator expresses must truly be his own emotions. Since these emotions are truly those of the orator, Blair’s third point is that an orator should not get carried away and become too vehement or else he will lose his audience (qtd. In Golden and Corbett 103). It is important for the orator to keep himself in check and express his passions according to Blair’s very specific rules of style. Conduct manuals during this period offer very similar advice. Conversation needed to be pleasant and warm, and instructions included "extra advice for the middling on body carriage, facial expression, and conversation aimed to explain exactly how they should expert self-mastery. The key was to remain 'unruffled,' to give a convincingly smooth genteel performance” (Hemphill 81). Because of the shifting social classes, more emphasis was placed on self-presentation and the mastery of one's self in order to give a man the ability to advance through class ranks. Particularly in America, when a man was more and more likely to encounter strangers on the street, without the guidelines of the older regimes of tradition and aristocratic social niceties to mediate his encounters, conduct focused more on self-mastery and affecting a pleasant and controlled demeanor to present to new acquaintances (Hemphill 85). By demonstrating self-control, and exhibiting warmth and refraining from excessive emotion, a man could make himself appealing to more people and demonstrate his worthiness without being forced to conform to rules that dictated his social status or worth (Hemphill 85). In other words, a man's mastery of emotional control was more appealing to public displays and public encounters off-stage, as well as on-stage.

One reason for Blair’s seeming conflation of style and delivery may be that Blair’s discussion centers on “the style and expression suited to the eloquence of popular assemblies” (qtd. In Golden and Corbett 102). Because Blair discusses style that is suited to eloquence, his discussion is framed by the fifth canon of delivery. However, Blair’s treatment of delivery is
somewhat vague. After discussing style and expression, Blair writes, “Of pronunciation and
delivery, I am hereafter to treat apart. At present it is sufficient to observe, that in speaking to
mixt assemblies, the best manner of delivery is the firm and the determined” (qtd. In Golden and
Corbett 105). It may be possible that Blair neglects to address delivery more specifically because
of delivery's lateral move into etiquette and conduct manuals. Delivery's treatment in these texts,
which were written to instruct one in off-stage, private conversation and social situations, is
Blair's model for the naturalness that one needed to cultivate in order to speak on-stage. With the
prevalence of etiquette and conduct texts in the late 1700s, Blair may have overlooked a more
specific discussion of delivery because discussions of delivery were so widely available. For
example, Blair instructs the orator to take care and be a man of his time, and to appeal to his
audience by following current conventions and customs. He states that an orator must take into
consideration the public ear and decorum. The public ear, according to Blair, needs to be taken in
consideration because the public will not be receptive to imitations of ancient orators or speakers
from other times. The public needs to be appealed to in a current manner, without excessively
extravagant tones or gestures (qtd. In Golden and Corbett 104). Similarly, Blair’s fifth point is
that “in all kinds of public speaking, but especially in popular assemblies, it is a capital rule to
attend to all the decorums of time, place, and character” (qtd. In Golden and Corbett 104). It is
not necessary for Blair to detail exactly what these mannerisms and decorums are because
etiquette and manners manuals had already provided that instruction.

Blair only explicitly treats delivery in one lecture, the thirty-third, in his book. He begins
by recounting the anecdote of Demosthenes’s answer that delivery, delivery, and delivery are the
three most important points in oratory. Blair then explains why delivery is so important, stating,
“To superficial thinkers, the management of the voice and gesture, in Public Speaking, may
appear to relate to Decoration only, and to be one of the inferior arts of catching an Audience. But this is far from being the case. It is intimately connected with what is, or ought to be, the end of all Public Speaking, Persuasion; and therefore deserves the study of the most grave and serious Speakers, as much as of those, whose only aim is to please” (203-204). Delivery is connected with and important to persuasion because “the tone of our voice, our looks, and gestures, interpret our ideas and emotions no less than words do; nay, the impression they make on others, is frequently much stronger than any that words can make” (Blair 204). For example, it is going to be difficult, if not impossible, to persuade an audience if the audience is not convinced that the orator is genuine (Blair 205). Blair, like Sheridan, emphasizes the importance of delivery appearing genuine and natural, of an orator’s delivery being indistinct from the orator himself, when speaking to an audience. Delivery is more than merely decorative or pleasurable; it is crucial for conveying a man’s character to the audience.

As Blair goes on to outline the components of creating a good delivery, he also refers the reader to Thomas Sheridan’s Lectures on Elocution, and credits Sheridan for the precepts he describes. For Blair, the goals of delivery include “first, to speak so as to be fully and easily understood by all who hear him; and next, to speak with grace and force, so as to please and move his Audience” (205). And Blair agrees with Sheridan than delivery should capitalize upon and enhance what Nature has bestowed. It is the departure from a natural manner of speaking that has made public speaking so poor. Blair asks, “What is the reason of our being often so frigid and unpersuasive in Public Discourse, but our departing from the natural tone of Speaking, and delivering ourselves in an artificial affected manner?” (218). Like Sheridan, he instructs, “But the capital direction, which ought never to be forgotten is, to copy the proper tones for expressing every sentiment from those which Nature dictates to us, in conversation with others;
to speak always with her voice; and not to form to ourselves a fantastic public manner, from an absurd fancy of its being more beautiful than a natural one” (220). Blair also advocates a style of delivery that appears natural and innate.

Blair differs slightly from Sheridan when he states, “However, although nature must be groundwork, I admit that there is room in this matter for some study and art. For many persons are naturally ungraceful in the motions which they make; and this ungracefulness might, in part at least, be reformed by application and care” (222). Sheridan, on the other hand, says an orator who speaks from the heart and with genuine passion may lack polish, but will be just as able to persuade as an orator who has studied rhetoric. The aesthetic of an orator’s delivery seems more important to Blair, who also advises against nervousness when speaking. Blair states, “I shall only add further on this head, that in order to succeed well in delivery, nothing is more necessary than for a speaker to guard against a certain flutter of spirits, which is peculiarly incident to those who begin to speak in public. He must endeavor above all things to be recollected, and master of himself” (223). Nervousness will detract from the orator’s ability to persuade, and his ability to please, an audience, as does any sort of affectation while speaking. Blair concludes by reiterating more of Sheridan’s precepts, saying that delivery must be unique to each orator, and that orator’s should carry their private manner of speaking into the public arena in order to achieve good delivery (224). At the same time, Blair encourages instruction in delivery, and advises speakers to practice their delivery. For Blair, a delivery should appear natural and refined, rather than merely being a spontaneous expression from the speaker’s heart. With practice, a speaker’s ability to persuade through his delivery will be more effective than a speaker who has never honed or refined his delivery skills. Practice allows a speaker to revise and polish the best qualities of his performance, instead of relying on raw spontaneous expression that could contain
delivery flaws. Through practice, a speaker can eliminate his delivery flaws while retaining the qualities that allow his speech to appear natural. This distinction is important because Blair acknowledges that delivery is a performance, whereas Sheridan locates delivery as a form of natural expression.

Although Blair borrowed his theory of delivery almost completely from Sheridan, he remains somewhat vague about particulars. He does not, for example, lay down specific gestures for an orator to learn. Rather, he explains that every nation has gestures that are natural to its citizens. For example, Blair states, “The French and Italians are, in this respect, much more sprightly than we” (221). He criticizes the ancient systems of oratory of being “too systematical” (qtd. In Golden and Corbett 136). Blair states that, “they aim at doing too much; at reducing rhetoric to a complete and perfect art, which may even supply invention with materials on every subject; insomuch, that one would image they expected to form an orator by rule, in as mechanical a manner as one would form a carpenter. Whereas, all that can, in truth, be done, is to give openings for assisting and enlightening taste, and for pointing out to genius the course it ought to hold” (qtd in Golden and Corbett 136). The resistance to systems of oratory is similar to the resistance of the older hierarchical systems of aristocracy in etiquette. While both rhetorical and etiquette instruction continue to outline and prescribe how good speaking can be achieved, they both are also attempting to construct a way of behavior that allowed privileged men (and, to a certain extent, women) to retain their social statuses during a period of increased social fluctuation and mobility.
A system of practical delivery

One of the most exhaustive and meticulous treatments of delivery from this time period is Gilbert Austin’s *Chironomia, or A Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery* (1806). David Potter remarks in the foreward to the 1966 reprint that, “For almost a century after its publication in 1806, Gilbert Austin’s *Chironomia* exerted a profound influence upon the history and teaching of rhetoric and oral interpretation in Europe and, especially, in America. Within the past fifty years, however, copies have become exceedingly rare” (Austin v). More specifically, Austin changed how delivery was taught and studied, especially in America, and attempted to bring it to the forefront of rhetorical study (ix). Rhetorical training, Austin contended, was insufficient because the canon of delivery had been neglected and because the act of speaking is fleeting--while words can be written and preserved, the delivery of words becomes lost in transcription (x). The loss of transcriptionality is important to Austin because he believed that delivery was not interchangeable; each orator’s delivery style depended on his status and profession. As Mary Margaret Robb and Lester Thonssen state, "[Austin] also makes clear that the different professions make different demands upon the speaker and that their techniques are not interchangeable; the clergyman must not sound like the actor" (xii). Because delivery isn't interchangeable, establishing a system of delivery, especially gesture, is Austin's goal. He writes, "To distinguish the character of the delivery belonging to each profession, to discriminate their peculiar manner, force, and expression, and if possible to mark the limits of each distinctly, lest they should indecorously break in upon the bounds of each other, is the proper object of a system of gesture, and one of its most arduous labors" (135). By studying delivery, an orator would be able to use the delivery appropriate to his audience, speech, and situation. Robb and Thonssen explain, "Austin believed that delivery must change according to different circumstances,
different audiences, and different sentiments, and that the actor, the minister, the lawyer, and the political orator must be their own judges to the manner chosen. Training of the voice and the body depended upon much laborious practice and the techniques learned must be adapted to each occasion" (xx-xxi). Austin's attempt to construct a new system of delivery in order to compensate for the myriad rhetorical situations a speaker may find himself in is particularly noteworthy because of prior rhetoricians resistance to creating new systems. However, Austin's system is an attempt to return to a stronger regulation of behavior, controlling as many situations as possible that a speaker may find himself in.

Austin creates his system of delivery by drawing on older models of rhetoric. In his preface, Austin complains that his contemporaries "have neglected to pay due attention to the precepts and authority of the great ancient masters; and that they have passed over in total silence the works of the older rhetoricians, as well as of some, who may be almost reckoned among the moderns, whose works contain much valuable instruction on the subject of delivery" (v). At the same time, however, Austin points out that even the ancient rhetoricians did not provide a comprehensive system of delivery. He states that "yet it is a fact, that we do not possess from the ancients, nor yet from the labours of our own countrymen, any sufficiently detailed and precise precepts for the fifth division of the art of rhetoric, namely, rhetorical delivery, called by the ancients actio and pronunciatio" (ix). Austin intends to compile his system from various sources, while also adding and updating the rules for delivery. His intent to update the rules for delivery is significant because it implies that the rules for delivery must be appropriate for the time period. The classical systems of delivery were suited for the classical orators, but men speaking in the 1800s need a system that prescribes behavior and actions that are appropriate for the 1800s. The
behavior dictating what constitutes proto-masculinity has changed over time, and updating the rules for delivery will, by extension, update masculine ideals.

Austin's system, however, can never be complete in and of itself because it relies in part on the user, the orator, and his own natural abilities. Austin explains,

But rules, even if perfect, cannot be expected to bestow genius where nature has denied it, nor yet to operate any absolute change upon the natural abilities of men: true genius, whithersoever it turns, will always find out a sure and effectual passage for itself through every obstacle; it either creates rules for itself, or is above the rules. But for the ordinary description of men, that is for the great majority, rules are not only useful, but perhaps indispensable, the better to bring forward and improve the talents which they may possess, and to afford the necessary support, and supply the necessary confidence to the diffident and reserved. (x)

Austin's intent is not to provide a merely theoretical model of delivery, but one that is useful--much like the etiquette texts of the day. Delivery, for Austin, is the praxis of oratory. He writes, "The management of the voice, the expression of the countenance, and the gesture of the head, the body, and the limbs, constitute the external part of oratory; and relate to the personal talents and efforts of the public speaker, in like manner as the other divisions of rhetoric, invention, disposition, choice of words, and memory, relate to those of his understanding" (1). It is interesting to see how delivery is not related to understanding, for Austin, but to effort and practice. Austin locates delivery in the physical body, and the body’s performance; through practicing one’s performance, one’s delivery can improve, even if one lacks “true genius.” Even though Austin believes that a natural disposition is important as a foundation for good delivery, he is writing for the average man, who may not have been blessed with “true genius”. Etiquette
and manners instructions treat delivery similarly. In etiquette books, "natural" skill is less natural than it is acquired. As Cecil Hartley states, "If politeness is but a mask, . . . it is a mask which will win love and admiration, and is better worn than case aside. . . . It will soon cease to be a mask” (qtd. in Hemphill 144). Hemphill goes on to explain that, "The real goal was not a sincere performance but a convincing one, and stiff behavior would give one away" (144). While this sort of ease was supposed to be enhanced from training and practice, it is clear that delivery within etiquette was considered less of a natural talent and more of an acquired one during this time period.

Austin's work remained popular, particularly in America, well into the antebellum period. Etiquette writers, during this time period, began to proclaim the need for "a uniquely American code" of social conduct (Hemphill 147). And while delivery continued to address the appropriate behavior for speaking on stage, etiquette began to overtly address private discourse as also occurring on-stage, conflating the distinctions between on and off stage speaking even further. Hemphill discusses the practice of visiting one's neighbors and friends, and entering the parlor for social visits. As Hemphill explains,

Some [conduct] authors advised leaving one's hat, cloak, and umbrella with the servant or in the entry if received for a visit; but more told women to leave their bonnets and shawls on, and men to take their hats and canes into the drawing room with them, as in so doing they signaled that their visit would be short. So ritualized were these visits, then, that there was even a way to silently indicate that one was indeed making a ceremonious rather than a friendly visit--one simply held on to one's hat. Some scholars have observed that these entrance rituals, assisted by the servant, allowed middle-class persons to prepare for the rigorous performance demands of the middle-class parlor. Household
geography itself provided what one has called "ceremonial frames" for the individual to pass through on the way to this most explicitly social, and theatrical, zone of the house.

(153)

Even conversations and performances taking place in locations once considered off-stage for speaking were explicitly now considered on-stage. The entrance to the parlor served as a proscenium for the speaker, the visitor, in making social calls and visits. Delivery, once considered appropriate to public speaking, relocated and became more explicitly included in private speaking and social conversation. Etiquette's incorporation and appropriation of delivery into private spheres, in addition to its revival in public spheres, made performance a crucial concern for a speaker in any situation, and all performers were, in a sense, orators. And the relocation of delivery into private spheres allowed a stronger regulation of gender performances. Arthur Martine outlines the requirements for an ideal conversationalist, which are terribly similar to Cicero's requirement for an ideal orator. Martine states, "Whoever would shine in polite discourse must at least be well versed in the philosophy of life, and possess a fair acquaintance with general and natural history, and the outlines of science. And though he need be neither a poet nor an artist, he must be well read in poetry and acquainted with fine arts; because it is only by their study that taste can be cultivated and fancy guided" (15-16). All speakers, whether in social situations or public speaking engagements, had become performers of oratory.
4 RE-DOING DELIVERY

**Delivery as a performative device**

In classical oratory, gender was embedded into delivery, and through delivery, into rhetorical performances. Later development of rhetorical precepts, from the late medieval/early Renaissance to the Belletristic and Antebellum periods, continued to embed gender ideals and proto-masculinity into delivery, but also created rhetorical instruction that allowed the teaching of delivery to move from on-stage to off-stage interactions and polite conversation. Delivery became more than a set of rules dictating one’s performance while giving a speech; it became a set of rules directing one’s gender performance in everyday life. The evolution of delivery into areas once considered private because they occurred off-stage not only reconfigured the dichotomy of public and private, but also re-assessed the nature of performance in daily life. Performance, and the adequacy, correctness, and authenticity of one’s performance, became a primary concern in one’s social and interpersonal interactions in a multitude of settings. These codes of correct performance grew out of the codes for correct delivery—the rules for how a person presented him or her self off-stage became indistinct from the rules for how a person delivered his or her character on-stage.

The evolution of delivery from public to private spheres is significant because delivery is the code and the application of a set of rules regarding how one should act and what those actions mean—rules that are based on social norms and customs. The expansion of delivery underscores how delivery operates as a performative device, a mechanism that reveals the construction of performances, for creating and transmitting gender, where authority and ethos have become tied to certain performances of masculinity—performances of proto-masculinity.
Delivery is not only performative, it also creates the very citationality, the repetition that creates authoritative meaning, that makes performativity possible. Gender, then, is a negotiation between speaker and audience within their rhetorical situation—a thing that is only present within delivery. And because delivery is taught, because delivery has rules, gender ideals have become embedded into our use and perception of language. Certain masculinities or kinds of manliness are authoritative not simply because they involve the gender of a man, but because they cite an authoritative construction in which a proto-masculinity has become embedded.

Gender performativity, from literary theory, investigates and analyzes the construction of gender performances. Gender performativity is also the next major development in the evolution of delivery. As delivery fell by the wayside in rhetorical studies, literary studies became more concerned with cultural and social interactions of textuality and subjectivity. Delivery, and the instruction about how to perform one’s character, was transformed into the study of how one’s performance of self was created and expressed. While delivery, from classical rhetoric through post-ante-bellum rhetoric was primarily concerned with describing and prescribing how to deliver one’s proto-masculine character while speaking, gender performativity endeavored to deconstruct and analyze how performance created gender and subjectivity. Instead of studying delivery from the perspective of rhetoric, gender performativity studies delivery from the perspective of literary theory. Delivery evolves, through performativity studies, from an instructional paradigm that embeds proto-masculinity to a descriptive analysis of how that paradigm makes gender happen through performance in public and private spaces.
In literary theory, performativity is composed primarily of three main theories: linguistic performativity, post-modern performativity, and gender performativity. Linguistic performativity was first introduced by J. L. Austin in his work *How to Do Things with Words* (1962). J.L. Austin introduces the idea of the speech act, which is an utterance that performs an action, instead of merely describing or referring to an action. According to J.L. Austin, there are two kinds of utterances: performative utterances, which perform actions, and constantive utterances, which make statements or describe actions and situations. A performative utterance, such as “I bet you a dollar,” is the action of betting. With the statement “I bet you,” the action of betting takes place. A constantive utterance, such as “He bet you a dollar,” describes the action of betting. No bet is actually being placed, instead, a bet is being described. While constative utterances are either true or false, performative utterances are instead felicitious or infelicitious—appropriate or inappropriate. The utterance, “I bet you a dollar” is not true or false. Rather, the utterance is felicitious if the speaker has the authority, or has the dollar, to bet. If the speaker has no authority to bet, if he has no money, then the utterance is infelicitious, and fails to work properly.

Although J.L. Austin deliberately excluded literature from his theory of performativity and restricted performative utterances to speech acts that are more extemporaneous than scripted (22), Culler explains how J.L. Austin’s performativity, in spite of his restrictions against literature, has impacted literary theory and language:

The essential thing is that, against the philosophical model for which the norm for language is to make statements about what is the case, Austin has provided an account of the active, productive functioning of language [. . .] the first result of the performative is
to bring to center stage a use of language previously considered marginal--an active, world-making use of language, which resembles literary usage--and to help us to conceive of literature as an act [. . .] Second, for Austin in principle at least, the performative breaks the link between meaning and the intention of the speaker, for what act I perform with my words is not determined by my intention, but by linguistic and social conventions. (144-145)

In other words, delivery makes the man. The “active, productive functioning of language” is part of what allows meaning to be constructed through action. Delivery, *hypokrisis*, *actio*, has always emphasized the action of oratory. The meaning is made in the speaking, and in the movements, gestures, dress, etc. that accompany the speaking. And that meaning’s construction is determined by “linguistic and social conventions,” and how the action fulfills the audience’s expectations. With linguistic performativity, delivery evolves from an expression of “innate” character and proto-masculinity, to a performance that creates character and proto-masculinity through the performing of it.

Jacques Derrida, in “Signature Event Context,” adds to J.L. Austin’s performativity, arguing that in order for an utterance to be performative it must also be repetitive. Derrida asks, “Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a 'codified' or iterable form, in other words if the formula that I utter to open a meeting, christen a boat, or undertake marriage were not identifiable as conforming to an iterable model, if it were not thus identifiable as a kind of citation?” (18). A performative utterance, according to Derrida, relies on preceding utterances of the same kind, in the same sort of context. In order for an utterance to be performative, it must be able to be recognized as performing a particular action, repeating a certain code; otherwise, the utterance will fail. As Culler explains, “The possibility of serious
performatives depends upon performance of a script" (151). As delivery evolved, moving from stage performances in oratory to off-stage performances in etiquette, the gendered behaviors embedded within delivery became more codified, becoming not just “scripts,” but scripts that are written and circulated with the intention of guiding and regulating behaviors occurring in conjunction with language. As the scripts for delivery became more explicit, the performativity of delivery also became more apparent, and attempts to regulate the performance of delivery demonstrated how gender norms within delivery fluctuate according to changing social customs, and are not attached to a person’s biological sex.

**Gender performativity**

Judith Butler’s gender performativity draws on J.L. Austin’s linguistic performativity, and particularly on Derrida’s citationality. However, as Butler moves away from linguistic performativity and into gender performativity (while still retaining some linguistic elements in her theory), she moves away from the rhetorical implications that J.L. Austin and Derrida address. J.L. Austin, for example, implicitly discusses whether the speaker has the ethos to make a performative utterance. Derrida contributes to this ethos construction by adding the necessity of citationality. Butler does not make use of the rhetoricism, or rhetorical implications, surrounding linguistic performativity, and her inattention to rhetorical implications makes her theory incomplete. By focusing on the construction of gender identity as an effect of gender performance, she seems to reify the illusion of a single gender identity per person, which is made through the performance of one set of gendered acts. And while Butler’s goal is to displace gender acts from the subject, her argumentative seems to reify proto-masculinity by assuming that only certain ideals of masculinity and femininity can be performed (*Bodies That Matter* 231-
2). At the same time, however, Butler’s gender performativity constitutes the next step in the evolution of delivery, because it detaches a person’s gender from body and relocates it in social norms that performances are required to adhere to.

Butler’s theory hinges upon the argument that gender itself is performative. Butler states that "[gender] is a compulsory repetition of prior and subjectivating norms, ones which cannot be thrown off at will, but which work, animate, and constrain the gendered subject, and which are also the resources from which resistance, subversion, displacement are to be forged" (“Critically Queer” 22). For Butler, gender is constructed, not by an autonomous subject, but by discourse and repetition. The reiteration of behaviors associated with gender is what makes gender happen. There is no inherent gender, only behaviors that create the effect of gender. As Butler states:

In the place of an original identification which serves as a determining cause, gender identity might be reconceived as a personal/cultural history of received meanings subject to a set of imitative practices which refer laterally to other imitations and which, jointly, construct the illusion of a primary and interior gendered self or parody of the mechanisms of that construction. (Gender Trouble 138)

Drag, Butler contends, parodies the idea that gender is an inherent trait and reveals gender’s instability. She writes:

The performance of drag plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the performer and the gender that is being performed. But we are actually in the presence of three contingent dimensions of a significant corporeality: anatomical sex, gender identity, and gender performance [. . .] In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency. (Gender Trouble 175)
Drag, in Butler’s performativity, subverts gender norms. Drag demonstrates that there is no inherent, original gender and that gender is not attached to anatomical sex. Gender identity is a constructed identity, made through the reiteration of gendered acts.

In *Bodies That Matter*, Butler carries her argument further, and reworks her theory of performativity, emphasizing that performativity is not an autonomous choice. She writes, “Gender norms operate by requiring the embodiment of certain ideals of femininity and masculinity, ones that are almost always related to the idealization of the heterosexual bond” (231-2). Gender operates to promote heterosexuality, and heterosexuality is embedded within gender ideals. She gives the example of the performative pronouncement “It’s a girl!” and explains that this initial pronouncement serves to sanction the eventual marriage performative pronouncement “I pronounce you man and wife” (232). She continues to say that:

[The naming of a person as “girl”] initiates the process by which a certain 'girling' is compelled [. . .] This is a “girl,” however, who is compelled to “cite” the norm in order to qualify and remain a viable subject. Femininity is thus not the product of a choice, but the forcible citation of a norm, one whose complex historicity is indissociable from relations of discipline, regulation, punishment. Indeed, there is no “one” who takes on a gender norm. On the contrary, this citation of the gender norm is necessary in order qualify as a “one,” to become viable as a “one,” where subject formation is dependent on the prior operation of legitimating gender norms. (*Bodies That Matter* 232)

Not only is gender constructed, according to Butler, but so is anatomical sex. With one’s entrance into the world, and the pronouncement of “It’s a girl!” upon the discovery of the anatomical sex of the subject, the subject is brought into gendered discourse where certain gender connotations and expectations are linked to the pronouncement of sex. Anatomical sex
cannot be separated from gender, because language operates to construct values and expectations around the pronouncement of anatomical sex. Although gender is a construction, it is not a construction that can be chosen; it is a construction that is regulated and forced upon the subject.

Butler’s theory of performativity, however, is not without problems. Moya Lloyd points out some of the more problematic flaws and contradictions in Butler’s performativity, notably the distinction between performance and performativity. With Butler’s drag example, Lloyd states, she abandons J.L. Austin’s distinction between pure speech acts and parasitic speech acts. While J.L. Austin deliberately excludes scripted performances, such as literature and theatre as parasitic because they use language in ways that deviate from “normal use” (Austin 22), Butler does not. This collapse of pure and parasitic “means that an easy separation between a performance and the performative is difficult to uphold since both reiterate the same conventions. So, if performativity produces that which it names, what is it that prevents a performance operating performatively?” (Lloyd 20). Lloyd goes on to interrogate the difference between a performance and performativity, looking to Butler’s definition of a performance in *Bodies That Matter* as a “bounded act.” But what, Lloyd asks, is a “bounded act?” The suggestion that a performance involves a subject who willingly chooses, while performativity does not, is problematic because it implies a subject where Butler has already said there can be no subject. How can there be a choosing subject when the possibility of choosing is nonexistent? Lloyd contends that:

Performance is characterized, by [Butler], as a form of ‘theatricality’ [. . .] By this, she means, that a performance is theatrical in the sense of miming or hyperbolizing existing signifiers. This is not theatre as self-creation nor self-display, nor as pure invention. It is the performance of certain signs, certain outward codifiers [. . .] This intimates that
performance also undermines the idea of voluntarism since the subject of drag is taking up and reciting the terms that always already constitute gendered identity. If this is so, it does not explain why or how the act is bounded. Indeed, it suggests that paradoxically, a performance is itself performative. That is, its conventions too exceed, constrain, and precede the performer. (202)

This lack of distinction between performance and performativity seems to conflate the two, and is, I think, what leads to so many mis-readings of Butler. Despite the fact that Butler insists, repeatedly, that there is no choosing subject, that gender is not something one can choose like one chooses one’s clothes (Bodies That Matter 231), many readings of Butler continue to think that gender, because it is a construction, is also a choice. Butler’s drag example, I think, continues to problematize this distinction. While she argues, in Bodies that Matter, that drag is subversive because its effects cannot be calculated, Lloyd points out that we cannot concede that there are no calculated effects: “Even though there is no guarantee of efficacy, there is a likelihood that certain parodic practices will be more efficacious in certain contexts than in others” (207). Lloyd criticizes Butler for not being rhetorical enough in her theory of performativity. Butler does not take the effects a performance has on an audience into account, and although the presence of an audience is implied in her theory, she does not address the audience explicitly. Her speaker/performer has no volition to construct messages, and she ignores the exigence and the context of the performance. By creating a situation where there is, and is not, a choosing subject, and by not offering an account of effectiveness, on an audience, of performance or performativity, Butler excludes rhetoric from her theory. Lloyd states:

One of the weaknesses of the concept of performativity as an explanation of gender is that it is comprehensible primarily as an account of individuation: the historicity of a
particular subject’s construction as a gendered being. As a consequence, it is easy to
over-emphasize the discontinuities in gender performance; to present them as indicative
of disruptive behavior. What is occluded, as a consequence, is the space within which
performance occurs, the other involved in or anticipated by the production, and how they
receive and interpret what they see. The possibility for continual resignification
immanent to performativity hides that the fact that not all resignifications are pertinent or
efficacious politically; indeed they are highly contingent. Only some performances in
some contexts can impel categorical rethinking. (210).

While gender is, indeed, constructed by the discourse surrounding individuals, particularly the
discourses of delivery and etiquette, the maintenance and regulation of gender, situational
performances and delivery of gender, and rhetoricity of gender remain, for Butler,
unacknowledged. Discourse may indeed construct gender, but discourse and language are
systems that are applied and operated by users. While delivery, and the gender constructs and
performances embedded within delivery, evolved to move beyond public spheres and into
private realms, the person engaged in the performance is also engaged with language, semiotics,
an audience, contextual situations, and settings. Much in the same way that people are born into
a language system that already exists, gender itself is a system that already exists between
people. Discourse does not occur in a vacuum any more than subjectivity does. The rhetoricity of
any performance must be taken into account.

Drag highlights the weaknesses in Butler’s theory because drag is a rhetorical act that
depends on context and audience. A person in drag walking down the street, for example, is
going to be significantly different, both rhetorically and performatively, than a person in drag
who is part of a drag show. The audience of a drag show has paid to see a performance and
expects to be entertained. The audience knows that the person in drag is in drag and that the performance is a performance, and the audience will frequently evaluate the person’s performance based on theatrical criteria. But the audience of the person in drag walking down the street may not know the person is in drag, might not recognize the performance, and will probably not evaluate it with theatrical criteria—in fact, they may not even give the person in a drag a second glance. Butler does not make the distinction between the two, or investigate either one rhetorically. Butler states:

Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts. The effect of gender is produced through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self. (Gender Trouble 179)

This stylization of the body, and emphasis on gestures and movements, and “styles of various kinds” is delivery. Even though Butler neglects rhetorical considerations, her gender performativity still evolves delivery by looking at gender as an effect and production of performance. While previous work on delivery instructed speakers to follow a set of rules to express character and gender to an audience, Butler analyzes how gender is created not as something innate or biological, but through the act of performing itself. Butler’s theory is very valuable because she demonstrates that gender is not something that is biologically innate, something that is “natural,” but instead something that is made through performance, discourse, and repetition. Neither masculinity nor femininity is a “natural” characteristic, and Butler’s theory overturns the assumptions of “natural” gender made by classical, Enlightenment, and
Belle-lettristic rhetoricians. However, her theory still presumes that a gender identity is a single illusion, that there is one single illusory gender per person, and her assumption reinscribes prototypical genders by suggesting that a person must be either masculine or feminine, that these characteristics of masculine and feminine are clearly delineated, and that these characteristics are not interchangeable or performable according to rhetorical situations. A person’s inability to choose their gender, in Butler’s theory, ignores a person’s ability to address, adapt, and perform for an audience (or for oneself). Even conceding that person cannot choose her or his gender, a person is still certainly able to choose aspects of how that gender is performed, largely dependent upon the rhetorical situation involved. For example, a woman who must perform a feminine gender can perform that feminine gender differently in different situations. At a dance club she may choose to wear a bright red lipstick to draw sexual attention, at work she may choose a more subdued pink or rose to draw professional attention. Additionally, Butler’s available gender identities rely on performances of femininity or masculinity, categories whose characteristics are so defined and delineated that they do not appear interchangeable. If the woman in the previous example wears black lipstick, it becomes difficult to categorize her performance based on Butler’s theory. While the woman’s act of wearing lipstick is a performance of femininity, her choice of black lipstick would not generally be read as a feminine performance. Butler inadvertently re-inscribes proto-masculinity (and proto-femininity) into her theory of performativity.

Although Butler’s performativity is crucial for de-essentializing gender, and for understanding how gender is constructed, her lack of attention to rhetorical canons and performance, and specifically delivery, make her theory static. Gender, for Butler, can never be chosen. And although citationality is an important component of performativity, the substance of
the citation, the behaviors that are being cited, are not explicitly addressed, which implies that these gendered acts are static. Jonathan Culler, in his discussion of performativity, discusses the necessity of citationality to create authority. He states, "These [the declarations made by certain officials] are cases where one generally supposes that the utterance creates the situation it names because of the authority of the speaker--judge, umpire, or other authority. But Butler insists, rightly I think, that [. . .] it is in the repeated citation of norms, the application of rules, that the authority of a mode of speaking is generated [. . .] Citation helps create authority" (159). But gendered acts have changed meaning over time, and there is no inherent gender meaning in the acts that are cited. Meaning is created during the citation, the performance, the delivery of the act itself. To say that gender is made, that it is a product, or an effect, of performance (which, for Butler, shares the same characteristics as delivery), means that gender is an effect of a technology--delivery. Gender is an interaction between a system and the users of that system, between speakers and delivery. The evolution of delivery into performativity demonstrates, however, that a person can have several gender identities, which are constructed by rhetorically situated gendered acts that are performed through delivery. Even though Butler does not explicitly address the possibility of a person having rhetorically situated gender identities, her gender performativity opens the door delivery’s further evolution into rhetorically situated performativities.

For example, a man speaking well isn’t seen as authoritative because he is a man, he is seen as authoritative because he is following established patterns of delivery that create his authority as a male speaker. He is standing up straight, gesturing appropriately, speaking clearly and distinctly, varying his pitch and tone, dressing appropriately, making eye contact with his audience, and matching his facial expressions to his speech. He is citing proto-masculinity,
because in order to speak well, he must follow the rules. The audience’s interpretation and reading of his citation is what creates his manliness—it is constructed by both the speaker and the audience at the same time. Gender is never attached to any one body—it is always attached to multiple bodies, occurring in the locus of delivery between them. And the locus of delivery must also be felicitous in order to be effective. Culler states, "The felicitiousness of a literary utterance might thus involve its relations to the conventions of a genre" (149). In order for delivery to be felicitous, to work, it must conform to the felicitousness demanded by the rhetorical situation between the speaker and audience. In terms of performance, Erving Goffman states, “Sometimes when we ask whether a fostered impression is true or false we really mean to ask whether or not the performer is authorized to give the performance in question, and are not primarily concerned with the performance itself” (59). And as the rhetorical situation between speaker and audience fluctuates, either because of setting, audience, or the even the speaker’s own subjectivity, so much the speaker’s delivery, including her or his performance of gender, fluctuate. A man speaking at a podium to an audience of scholars during a conference, for example, is going to cite a different kind of masculinity than when he speaks to his children at the dinner table. At the podium he cites a professional masculinity and speak to his audience as an expert wearing a suit and tie among equals, while at the dinner table he cites a fatherly masculinity and speaks to his audience as a relaxed, affectionate authority wearing more leisurely clothes among his kin. He will cite yet another masculinity when he speaks to colleagues at a restaurant, and yet another when he speaks to non-academic friends at a restaurant. Among his colleagues he cites a professional but relaxed masculinity, an expert with his tie loosened, and among his non-academic friends he cites a friendly and casual masculinity, a buddy in jeans and a t-shirt. His citation of masculinity may even differ depending on which group of colleagues, which
conference, and which restaurant determines his rhetorical situation. The citation the speaker follows, regardless of whether it is on-stage or off-stage, public or private, will be determined, at least in part, by the rhetorical situation of the speaking itself.

**Performativity and the rhetorical situation**

The rhetorical situation, usually depicted by a triangle consisting of an audience, a speaker, and a message, was defined by Lloyd Bitzer as the "complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence” (6). The rhetorical situation is much more dynamic when delivery and performativity are taken into account. Although the rhetorical situation is meant to be a dynamic interaction between the speaker, audience, and message, the concrete separation of these parts into distinct categories can also lead to an illusion of separation that limits the dynamic interactions of the rhetorical situation itself. The rhetorical situation, with delivery and performativity taken into consideration, actually acts more similarly to Leo Bersani’s re-working of psychoanalysis in his article “Psychoanalysis and the Aesthetic Subject.” Bersani gives two close readings of Pierre Michon’s *La Grande Beune* (1996). The first is a traditional psychoanalytic reading, involving the projection of the subject onto the world. The second reading involves the re-positioned aesthetic subject, where the subject is projected on by world, and then re-projects onto world. Bersani argues, “[T]he aesthetic subject, while it both produces and is produced by works of art, is a mode of relational being that exceeds the cultural province of art and embodies truths of being” (164). Bersani suggests that while traditional psychoanalytic studies seem to create dialectical relationships between subject and object,
Rethinking subjectivity as aesthetic disrupts this binary division by creating a circular pattern, where it becomes difficult to tell where the world ends and the subject begins, and vice versa.

Bersani’s aesthetic subject is important because it demonstrates the dynamism of the rhetorical situation, particularly in regard to delivery, performativity, and gender. A speaker’s gender is constructed through performance, not only directed toward the audience, but also toward the speaker her/him self. The speaker is also an audience, and the speaker’s evaluation of the audience’s reaction, of his/her own performance, and the audience’s evaluation of the speaker’s performance, and possibly their own, create this same circular pattern, affecting not only the performance, but the language used as well. Goffman calls this system “a kind of interactional modus vivendi” and explains, “When we allow that the individual projects a definition of the situation when he appears before others, we must also see that the others, however passive their role may seem to be, will themselves effectively project a definition of the situation by virtue of their response to the individual and by virtue of any lines of action they initiate to him” (9). In this framework, gender, as manifested through delivery, does not belong to either the speaker or the audience—it belongs to the situation that created a particular gender construction.

For example, during a job interview, an interviewee is expected to demonstrate his or her suitability for the job in question. Interview attire, frequently a suit, is worn. Questions need to be answered, skill must be demonstrated, and a delivery appropriate to an interview situation must be performed. This delivery includes a presentation of gender. While both men and women can wear suits, women can wear either pants or a skirt, and men can only wear pants. Men can wear ties, but women cannot. And women can wear make-up, earrings, and high-heels that are interview appropriate, while men cannot. Posture, voice, gesture, facial expressions, and eye
contact are also regulated by delivery. And this delivery is meant to convey to the audience
characteristics and qualities of the interviewee. Goffman states,

When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the
impression that is fostered before them. They are asked to believe that the character they
see actually possesses the attributes he appears to possess, that the task he performs will
have the consequences that are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in general, matters are
what they appear to be. (17)

But outside of an interview scenario, these same performances can become inappropriate. One
would hardly put on a suit and perform a gender appropriate to a job interview while taking out
the trash or while attending a heavy metal concert. The audiences for the latter activities are
different. Taking out the trash is solitary activity, where the performer is his or her own
audience. At the concert, there is an audience of which the person is a part, but also still a
performer, engaging in appropriate concert going behavior, dress, and gender performance. The
way gender is delivered changes, and the person performing the gender monitors and adapts to
the varying situations that require difference kinds of gender performance.

Erving Goffman’s work further demonstrates this interactivity with his concepts of front
stage and back stage speaking. According to Goffman, interactions are indeed theatrical and
performative, but we have moments where we are “front stage,” doing the performance, and
moments where we are “back stage,” watching and evaluating the performance. Goffman defines
“front” as “that part of the individual’s performance which regularly functions in a general and
fixed fashion to define the situation for those who observe the performance” (22). In other
words, the “front stage” is where the performing occurs before an audience who is asked to
believe that the performance is both felicitious and authentic. The setting, personal front,
appearance, and manner, all make up the “front stage” (Goffman 23-4) and together combine the rhetorical situation with the performer’s delivery. The setting consists of the location or place of the performance, while the personal front includes “insignia of office or rank; clothing; sex, age, and racial characteristics; size and looks; posture; speech patterns; facial expressions; bodily gestures; and the like” (Goffman 24). Appearance, for Goffman, indicates the social statuses of the performer, while manner is “the interaction role the performer will expect to play in the oncoming situation” (24). Ranging from context to the interaction between speaker and audience, and emphasizing delivery, the front stage is where the elements of performance come together to form a (ideally) cohesive whole.

Similarly to Butler’s claim that gender is established for subject by the discourse system that subject is born into, Goffman points out that, “When an actor takes an established social role, usually he finds that a particular front has already been established for it. Whether his acquisition of the role was primarily motivated by a desire to perform the given task or by a desire to maintain the corresponding front, the actor will find that he must do both” (27). Goffman’s claim that fronts are frequently established before the performer takes on his role differs from Butler’s claim in that Goffman is directly addressing rhetorical situations and delivery. For Goffman, the performance isn’t just dictated by discourse, but also by the performer’s specific rhetorical situations and the requirements of those situations—particularly the requirements of the audience. The establishment of front stage roles that a performer must take up is again similar to the job interview, where a performer is expected to follow job interview etiquette and delivery before entering the interview itself. How the performer proceeds to perform within that pre-established situation is going to depend on the specific “front” of that situation, as well as the response of the audience in that particular situation. Gender performance,
in this case, could alter if a man walked into an interview where all of his interviewers were women, or all men, or a mixed audience. His gender performance would further alter depending on other aspects of the front: what his audience wore, how he was dressed, the setting for the interview, the manner displayed by his audience (and himself), and so forth. Rather than being fixed and determined, as Butler implies, Goffman’s presupposition allows for gender to be determined through the interaction with the situation and audience, rather than merely through discourse itself. Gender is flexible because it has been embedded into delivery and rhetoric. Although Butler’s theory is important for detaching gender from the speaker, Goffman’s theory is also crucial to performativity because it demonstrates an evolution of delivery that centers delivery as a locus between speaker and audience.

Goffman also points out that performances that take place before others, particularly in a front stage capacity, tend to be “molded and modified to fit into the understanding and expectations of the society in which it is presented” (35). Performances tend to be attempts to embody idealized versions of what an audience expects (Goffman 35). This attempted realization of idealizations points to the embedding of proto-masculinity into delivery and etiquette, where a set of behaviors that are supposed to be the sum of manliness are expected to be performed in particular rhetorical situations. The expectation of proto-masculine idealization in performance is, I think, a consequence of the embedding of proto-masculine behavior into delivery, and later into etiquette, as the appropriate ways to behave and conduct oneself. With the codification of these behaviors, and the spread of that codification through instruction, texts, and manuals, the expectations of an audience to see these behaviors fulfilled is as pervasive and imperative as it is for a performer to adhere to these social mores. The interaction of the performer and the audience is tied together by these shared expectations. However, at the same, “the audience, in
their turn, often assume that the character projected before them is all there is to the individual who acts out the projection for them” (Goffman 48). The audience’s assumption that the performance they see is the only true and authentic performance given by the performer is the same assumption that Butler makes in her gender performativity where one gender is attached to one actor. Gender, however, along with the rest of delivery, changes depending on the situation and the audience’s expectations. Goffman quotes William James’s observation that,

. . . we may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups. Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirates among his “tough” young friends. We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club companions, to our customers as to the laborers we employ, to our own masters and employers as to our intimate friends. (48-9)

In order to learn how to perform in various rhetorical situations, Goffman suggests that persons do not learn entire scripts for every situation that one may find him or her self in, but instead learns the outline of the necessary performances, and “fills in” the details during the performance itself (73). It would be impossible to learn the details of each role independently, so performers must learn the essential elements required of each role. In this framework, proto-masculinity operates as a base level of reference for a man’s performances. An unreal idealization of masculine characteristics, then, can serve as the framework from which a performer can extrapolate the necessary gender performance for his rhetorical situation. And the embedding of proto-masculine ideals into delivery is what allows a performer to access the necessary role requirements. The man who speaks to his children and to his colleagues in different front
situations can still draw from the same proto-masculine characteristics and values to create his delivery. Both positions require performances of authority, confidence, and expertise. For the children, the man must perform the proto-masculine father, who has all the answers, will protect them and help them, and lay down the rules for bed-time. For the colleagues, the man must perform the proto-masculine colleague, who has knowledgeable answers, will help them and advise them, and assist creating schedules and deadlines for projects and meetings. However, neither performance is proto-masculine itself, but an interpretation of a set of embedded imperatives that differs according to the front of the performance and the rhetorical situation. And the performed behavior is performed based on its appropriateness to a speaker’s rhetorical situation. The gender performance is only masculine in that the behaviors and delivery of the performance have been deemed masculine by the embedding of proto-masculinity into delivery.

The system that regulates gender performances, which for Butler, is the system of discourse, is a system that is ultimately rhetorical. Goffman states that, “A status, a position, a social place is not a material thing, to be possessed and then displayed; it is a pattern of appropriate conduct, coherent, established, and well-articulated” (75). Delivery instructs performers how to adhere to this pattern in order to create performances that are felicitous in particular situations. Butler’s discourse is too broad and addresses the overarching proto-masculinity without regard to changing gender performances based on smaller rhetorical situations. Goffman discriminates between rhetorical situations further, emphasizing the rhetoricity of performativity, by discussing the co-operative aspect of some performances. He defines a cooperative performance as two or more performers who, in addition to being involved with their own distinct performances, are also involved in a “collusion or ‘understanding’ [with each other] without altering the basic frame of reference” (79-80). Goffman gives an example of
a boss and secretary who perform together in front of a client or customer, but who’s front performance alters without an outside witness—calling each other by their first names, for example, instead of using formal modes of address (79). Additionally, a person can be his or her own audience or can imagine that audience is present (Goffman 81-2). Goffman’s performativity expands the possible audiences for delivery, allowing a performer to evaluate and tailor his own performativity by being his own audience, and allowing performers to create performances together.

*Performativity and evaluation*

Within the front region, Goffman distinguishes two categories for the standards that a performer must use in order to ensure that his performance adheres to the expectations of his audience. The first of these is “politeness,” which is the way that “the performer treats the audience while engaged in talk with them or in gestural interchanges that are a substitute for talk” (Goffman 107). Politeness is a category that evolved from, and is constituted by, the set of delivery rules encompassed by etiquette. The second category, “decorum,” is more vague, and refers to “the way in which the performer comports himself while in visual or aural range of the audience but not necessarily engaged in talk with them” (Goffman 107). Goffman gives the example of “make-work” to explain decorum further, where workers make work for themselves or look busy when a manager or overseer appears to see how labor is progressing (109). In other words, decorum is a set of practices for rhetorical display when a performer is not actively speaking in a rhetorical situation, but which could support the role of performer when he is required to engage in a an active speaking role.
In addition to front stage performance, Goffman also delineates a back stage, which further adds to the development of a rhetorical performativity. For Butler, there can be no back stage because her performativity is not rhetorically constructed. Goffman, in contrast, describes the back stage as “a place, relative to a given performance, where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course” (112). Action that takes place in the back stage supports, but is not directly consistent, with the action in the front stage region (Goffman 134). In cooperative performances, the performers are more familiar with one another back stage, and can engage in jokes and behavior that would not be as acceptable in front of an audience (Goffman 128). Most importantly, however, the back stage is where the front stage performance can be analyzed, criticized, and adjusted (Goffman 112). Goffman conceives of front and back stage regions as physical locations, where a front stage region at a dinner party, for example, would be the dining room, and the back stage region would be the kitchen. A man talking to his children at the dinner table would, for Goffman, be a back stage performance, a more private sphere of delivery, while a man in restaurant talking to his colleagues would be a front stage performance, a more public sphere of delivery.

Although Goffman does not suggest that these two regions, front stage and back stage, can happen simultaneously, that we can evaluate as we perform, I think that performance and evaluation, particularly in regard to gender, do indeed occur together, and that they are not necessarily bounded by physical settings and spaces. As we perform gender, we monitor our rhetorical situations and particularly our audience’s response. During our gender performance we are also evaluating our performance and adapting our performance to our audience (even as our audience adapts their performances to ours). For example, during a job interview with a committee of men and women, a man performing masculinity may wear a suit, tie, and business
shoes. When he first introduces himself and shakes hands with the hiring committee, he may tailor his handshake grip depending on whether he is shaking hands with a man or a woman and shake a man’s hand more firmly and a woman’s hand more delicately. As he shakes hands, he monitors and evaluates his gender performance; if he miscalculates and attempts to delicately shake the hand of woman who prefers stronger handshakes and who grips his hand firmly, he will modify his performance and grip her hand more firmly in return. He evaluates his gender performance even as he is in the act of performing, and his evaluation leads him to modify his performance towards the expectations he perceives from his audience. This evaluation and modification demonstrates how gender performance is created in a rhetorical feedback loop between the speaker and the audience. One way to make this connection between evaluation and performance more apparent in gender performativity would be to include Jean-Francois Lyotard’s post-modern performativity, the third major performativity theory, in gender performativity. Lyotard’s performativity conceives of performativity as a kind of production; more specifically, one’s performance is measured by her/his effectiveness at filling certain roles. Lyotard explicates higher education as an example of this performativity of effectiveness, and states,

If the performativity of the supposed social system is taken as the criterion of relevance (that is, when the perspective of systems theory is adopted), higher education becomes a subsystem of the social system, and the same performativity criterion is applied to each of these problems. The desired goal becomes the optimal contribution of higher education to the best performativity of the social system. (48)

By the same token, the evaluation and performative effectiveness of gender is a subsystem of a larger social system of human interaction. The evaluation and effectiveness of gender
performance is a subset of the evaluation and effectiveness of speaker’s identity or character performance. As Goffman puts it, “we tend to blind ourselves to the fact that everyday secular performances in our Anglo-American society must often pass a strict test of aptness, fitness, propriety, and decorum” (55). Fulfilling these roles legitimate knowledge. Evaluating one’s gender performance, one’s gender delivery, legitimizes that delivery and gives rise to further citationality.

Goffman implies that performance roles are, in practice, less discrete than they are in theory. He outlines the roles he has distinguished based on function: “those who perform; those performed to; and outsiders who neither perform in the show nor observe it” (144). Outsiders, in Goffman’s rubric, are persons who wander into the show while neither being a part of the audience nor an additional performer. An example of an outsider, to continue the example of a dinner party, would be a stranded motorist knocking on the door to use the telephone. Goffman claims that these three roles should also be discrete by “information available and region of access” (145). Performers know information that could disrupt the believability of the performance, while the audience knows they are only being allowed to access what the performer wants them to, and outsiders know nothing. Performers also have access to front and back regions, while the audience only has access to front regions, and outsiders have no access to either region (Goffman 144-5). However, Goffman emphasizes that these roles are not, after all, so easily categorized and discrete in these terms. An example he gives of a shifting role is that of a “go-between,” which he explains through example:

When one individual in a conversation circle engages in action or speech which receives the concerted attention of the others present, he defines the situation, and he may define it in a way that is not easily acceptable to his audience. Someone present will feel greater
responsibility for and to him than the others feel, and we may expect this person closest
to him to make an effort to translate the differences between speaker and listeners into a
view that is more accepted collectively than the original projection. A moment later,
when someone else takes the floor, another individual may find himself taking on the role
of go-between and mediator. A spate of informal conversation can, in fact, be seen as the
formation and re-formation of teams, and the creation and re-creation of go-betweens.

(150-1)

With this example, Goffman appears to pointing to moments of flux within rhetorical situations,
where feedback from the audience alters performances and speech, even to the extent of altering
who is speaking. These feedback loops emphasis the shift of roles within rhetorical situations,
making performativity something that is not static, but ultimately dynamic, and dependent on
rhetoricity. The evaluation of the performance, coupled with the alteration of the performance,
and in this case, the performers, demonstrates that front and back stage processes can occur
simultaneously, even though Goffman sets up those regions as discrete entities.

Goffman also points out that the framework he constructs for performance and behavior
is not meant to be a static framework. He writes, “This framework is formal and abstract in the
sense that it can be applied to any social establishment; it is not, however, merely a static
classification. The framework bears upon dynamic issues created by the motivation to sustain a
definition of the situation that has been projected by others” (239). In other words, Goffman’s
frame appears to be static because he is constructing a theoretical categorization of the
performativity of human interactions. In practice, however, this framework is far more dynamic
because it is rhetorically based, and specifically based on delivery. Because delivery is
dependent on interactions with and responses from an audience, delivery is not a static rhetorical
canon. Part of delivery’s dynamism can be seen in the fairly exhaustive attempts of classical and later rhetoricians to describe as many delivery styles and options as possible in order to prepare the orator for any rhetorical event. As delivery evolved to include more public spaces with the addition of etiquette instruction, attempts to describe as many different scenarios for particular etiquette practices were incorporated in behavior prescriptions. Delivery itself, however, with this evolution, demonstrated that not only is it a dynamic rhetorical canon, its dynamism is what allowed (and allows) it to evolve into a system of performativity.

**The system of performativity**

The system of performativity is, for Lyotard, is based in “language games.” Lyotard states, “What [Wittgenstein] means by this term is that each of the various categories of utterance can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which can be put—in exactly the same way as the game of chess is defined by a set of rules determining properties of each of the pieces, in other words, the proper way to move them” (10). The rules of delivery, like the rules of a game, govern observable behavior and interaction. Lyotard outlines three observations concerning language games and their rules: “The first is that their rules do not carry within themselves their own legitimization, but are the object of a contract, explicit or not, between players . . . . The second is that if there are no rules, there is no game . . . . The third remark is suggested by what has just been said: every utterance should be thought of as a “move” in a game” (10). The system, like a game, has rules based on the players’ interactions. The interactions of the players make the game happen, just as the interactions of the players make delivery, etiquette, and performativity, happen. Delivery’s evolution into a system of performativity is made possible because of the interactions of players, the language users.
Delivery isn’t just action, but interaction, and must occur between a speaker and audience. Interactions between speakers and audiences are fluid because they are interdependent on each other and on the surrounding rhetorical situation. The fluidity of this space doesn’t just allow for change, it demands change; in order for a system to continue to function, it must evolve and adapt in order to perpetuate itself. Because delivery carries embedded proto-masculinity, delivery must evolve in order for proto-masculinity to remain a cultural standard. Lyotard goes on to claim that, “The true goal of the system, the reason it programs itself like a computer, is the optimization of the global relationship between input and output—in other words, performativity” (11). Performativity, for Lyotard, is the performance efficiency of a system that is self-perpetuating. Delivery’s evolution into performativity is a perpetuation, and transformation, of the system of delivery.

Delivery’s evolution into etiquette and into performativity, is how delivery maintains itself as a system. Within that system of delivery the system of gender is also maintained as system within a larger system. As Lyotard states,

One’s mobility in relation to these language game effects . . . is tolerable at least within certain limits (and the limits are vague); it is even solicited by regulatory mechanisms, and in particular by the self-adjustments the system undertakes in order to improve its performance. It may even be said that the system can and must encourage such movement to the extent that it combats its own entropy; the novelty of an unexpected “move,” with its correlative displacement of a partner or group of partners, can supply the system with that increased performativity it forever demands and consumers. (Lyotard 15)
As delivery has evolved, so has its effectiveness in perpetuating proto-masculinity. Delivery itself has become embedded and veiled, so that it continues as a prescriptive process, even as it goes unrecognized as such. Delivery is no longer taught in rhetoric; it is something that one just somehow does when speaking. Rhetorical actions are something we do everyday when speaking, and like the first year student entering a composition class who wonders why he needs to take another English class when he’s been speaking it his whole life, we also do not think we need to learn rhetorical actions, and interpretations of those actions, that we have been performing our whole lives.

Performativity’s emphasis on performed behavior is, to a certain degree, inevitable. Delivery, the basis for performativity, relies on observable behaviors that an audience uses to gain an understanding of a speaker. Goffman claims that the less we know about a person, the more we must rely on our observations of that person in order to gain knowledge (Goffman 249). When we enter a room of people, certain aspects of the rhetorical situation are hidden from us, such as the income and social standing of the people in the room or the relationships of all the people present. We must rely on our observations of dress, interactions, gesture, and physical proximity to draw our conclusions about the people in the room and figure out how to act. Attending a baby shower where the guest only knows the expectant mother is an excellent example because a baby shower is a traditional event that is not always conducted in a traditional way. Showers may have both men and women as invited guests, or they may have only women. Games may be played, and the quality and substance of these games may be silly, cheesy, taken seriously, or racy. The only given is that attendees should bring gifts. The guest must take her or his cues from the location of the shower, the dress of the guests, the food served, the interactions between guests, attentions given the hostess, attentions given the expectant mother to discover
how to act appropriately. Although the reliance on observable behavior rather than knowledge presents a paradox, it also serves to perpetuate the necessity of delivery and its evolution into performativity. Goffman, like Butler, believes that performativity is a performance that does not stem from a “self,” but that is, instead, a product created in the act of performing. Goffman very clearly states the image of the self constructed by a performance is not in any way a result of a performing individual, but the product of the staging and performing of a scene. Unlike Butler, Goffman argues that the “self” produced is a function of the interaction between a speaker and audience and other rhetorical elements of performativity. He claims,

in our society the character one performs and one’s self are somewhat equated, and this self-as-character is usually seen as something housed within the body of its possessor . . . . In this report the performed self was seen as some kind of image, usually creditable, which the individual on stage and in character effectively attempts to induce others to hold in regard to him. While this image is entertained concerning the individual, so that a self is imputed to him, this self itself does not derive from its possessor, but from the whole scene of his action, being generated by that attribute of local events which renders him interpretable by witnesses. A correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute a self to a performed character, but this imputation—this self—is a product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it. The self, then, as a performed character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location, whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and to die; it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the crucial concern, is whether it will be credited or discredited. (Goffman 252-3)
The crucial point, for Goffman, is that the self, and identity, is a “dramatic effect;” it is something that is produced through rhetoricity and rhetorical interactions, and not just discourse and language, as Butler claims. It is the active use of discourse, the rhetorical interaction between speaker and audience, and the surrounding rhetorical situation of the speaking that construct “who” a person “is.” Gender, as part of identity construction, is also made through this dynamic rhetorical interaction, and is also a product of the interaction between language system users. Gender is a system of behaviors that have been embedded into delivery, and as delivery has evolved, gender has evolved with it into a system of prescribed behaviors that are themselves again only created in a system interaction. Because gender was embedded into delivery, and delivery occurs in the interactions between speaker and audience, gender also occurs in these interactions. The feedback loop of rhetoric becomes multi-layered through this model. Gender ideals, such as proto-masculinity, were embedded into delivery in classical rhetoric, and later reinforced and spread through later rhetorical theory and the development of etiquette instruction. The system of ideal, proto-gender behaviors, embedded and spread through delivery, overlaps the system of actual gender performance and realization. Performed gender is not the same as proto-gender, and performed gender only comes into realization through performance. The performance, and gender performance, is a living system that occurs through action and interaction, while the ideal proto-gender is a system that exists only in concept.

The illusion of self, and of gender, is constructed through the overlap of these systems—the system of the performance itself with the embedded gender of the performance ideal. The attempted collusion of a realized performance with an idealized performance is what makes the performance of gender appear “real.” As Goffman states, “the performance will come off and the firm self accorded each performed character will appear to emanate intrinsically from its
performer” (Goffman 253). But the idealization and actualization of a performance is also a part of Goffman’s machinery. In order for a performance to appear “real,” not only do the elements of the performance have to come together, but those elements also need to match with the audience’s expectations and the speaker’s expectations of the performance. And this machinery, this mesh of systems to create performances, is Goffman’s central concern. He writes, “This report is not concerned with the aspects of theater that creep into everyday life. It is concerned with the structure of social encounters—the structure of those entities in social life that come into being whenever persons enter one another’s immediate physical presence” (Goffman 254). For Goffman, the structure and systems of actions, and how those actions create performances in social interactions, is what’s at stake.

The structure of performativity is rooted in the structure of delivery. As delivery evolved from a set of instructions to an orator detailing how he could most effectively physically convey his speech and convince his audience to a set of instruction concerning one’s deportment in public and social interactions, it also became the basis for the system of performances that comprise performativity. Delivery, which tells us how to act and perform on-stage, and later etiquette, which tells us how to act and perform off-stage, both create the liminal space where acting something makes it (appear) so. As far as gender is concerned, the delivery of a performer’s gender creates that gender even as gender citation and evaluation occurs. In other words, gender is an action. As a performance continues, and is evaluated by an audience and a self, gender can shift and change. The performer, acquiring feedback from his performance, will alter his performance to compensate for his audience’s response and expectations. Rather than being something created by discourse, as Butler claims, gender is something that is created by discourse interactions. Gender isn’t a passive construction that is placed on people, but an active
construction that is made by people as they interact. As Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick state in their introduction to *Performativity and Performance*, “As a certain stress has been lifted momentarily form the issues that surround being something, an excitingly charged and spacious stage seems to open up for explorations of that even older, even newer question, of how saying something can be doing something” (16). In this same vein, Lyotard claims that, “A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before. Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a person is always located at “nodal points” of specific communication circuits, however tiny these may be” (15). This location of a person at a nodal point, however, isn’t quite accurate, because the construction of a person’s identity takes place in the communication circuits that occur between nodes. Gender, then, isn’t located in node of the self, but is displaced, and located in the circuit between the nodes, between the language users.

The misconception of delivery as an “add-on,” a final stage in the rhetorical process, created the inaccurate impression that delivery is a static rhetorical canon. As Jay Bolter, discussing delivery and technology, claims:

[I]n the ancient conception, delivery comes after a text is formed; it is performance in the sense that an actor performs from the script of an ancient play. As we have seen, in hypertext there is no text prior to delivery; as an individual reading experience, the text comes into existence in the act of delivery. In this sense hypertext has more in common with extemporaneous speaking, in which there is also no text prior to the act and in which the audience can affect the text, as [sic] least through signs of approval or disapproval.

(106)
What Bolter overlooks, however, is that this phenomenon is not exclusive to hypertext, but to all delivery. And, most importantly, while delivery makes the text, it becomes embedded within the text. A website, for example, loses something of its meaning when it is transcribed into plain text and the graphics and design are lost. Gilbert Austin’s concern with transcriptionality and the loss of delivery when transcribing a text remains important. Delivery is not a supplement, and it never was. James Fredal analyzes Demosthenes' speech to argue that while scholars usually view delivery as an appendage, a "final element" to speaking, traces of delivery should be in the text—the intent to deliver should be in a text whether or not it was actually delivered. In classical texts, delivery informed arrangement, invention, and style, and can take into account an audience's (or opponent's) reaction. A performable ethos needed to be composed within the text.

Delivery not only concerned the physical performance of a speech, but also helped categorize acts and genres. How these acts were performed aided in embedding gender norms into genres. Orators were cautioned to avoid artifice in their delivery—they were supposed to appear natural to their audiences. This naturalization contributed to the naturalization of gender and ethos within genres. For example, Susan Herring and John Paolillo discovered, in their study of gender and blogs, that “the diary entries contained more ‘female’ stylistic features, and the filter entries more ‘male’ stylistic features, independent of author gender” (439). In other words, the form, the genre, of delivery is more significantly associated with masculine or feminine styles then is the gender of the author. The “genderedness” of the form/genre is what seems to determine “masculine” or “feminine” stylistic features. The author of a piece of writing performs/delivers gender stylistic traits depending on the form/genre they use to deliver their writing/message. Gender seems to be more tied to the genre of writing, and the writers perform the appropriate gender “necessary” to the genre.
The proto-gender ideals embedded into delivery evolved as delivery itself evolved, not just into written texts, but into other language spheres as well. As delivery evolved into etiquette, spreading from public on-stage oratory to more private and less formal speaking occasions, delivery also evolved into a performative system. Delivery is the performative device and the performative system, the tool and the technology, which transmits and conveys gender imperatives. However, because theories of performativity did not explicitly draw on rhetoric or the rhetorical canons to formulate their hypotheses and conclusions, delivery’s evolution into performativity has been overlooked. Instead, delivery was revived in recent rhetorical study based on the classical definitions of delivery, and re-integrated into rhetoric by focusing on the transmission of information and ideas. The evolution of delivery into performativity was neglected, further naturalizing the embedding of gender systems into delivery systems. By focusing on transmission only, and using only classical conceptions of delivery, delivery’s study in rhetoric focuses only on transmission, and emphasizes digital and electronic mediums of transmission. Delivery’s current place in rhetoric is insufficient because it fails to take into account delivery’s evolutionary history. By making technology the means by which delivery again becomes relevant to rhetoric, the technological nature of delivery itself, as a meaning making system, becomes overshadowed and overlooked. In order to understand how delivery functions in rhetoric and in rhetorical situations, and in order to de-stabilize the embedded proto-masculinity within delivery, it is necessary to examine how delivery is itself a technology, and not merely a tool of technology.
5 DELIVERY, DELIVERY, AND DELIVERY TECHNOLOGY

Delivery, technology, and recent rhetorical scholarship

While theories of performativity began coming to the forefront of literary theory, particularly with the publication of Judith Butler’s *Gender Trouble* in 1990, delivery, classically conceived as a rhetorical canon, also began to receive more attention in the field of rhetoric. This recent history of delivery is important because it demonstrates how delivery has been reconfigured in recent rhetorical study and confined to operating as a tool within rhetoric—a move that has not only perpetuated the proto-masculinity embedded within delivery, but naturalized it by making it seem invisible. Recent and contemporary scholarship in rhetoric altered the definition of delivery to fit into the scholarship revolving around rhetoric and computing technology, and neglected to take into account the history and evolution of delivery. Delivery gained more attention with the rise of computing technology, most notably with the widespread popularly of the Internet. Since the early 1990s, rhetoricians have been attempting to revive and reincorporate delivery into the rhetorical canons, focusing on delivery as a transmission or presentation of a message or text. Some attempts to revive delivery look at text itself, investigating font and formatting. Others consider delivery systems, such as websites and design layouts. And while some re-inclusions of delivery incorporate delivery’s classical roots and definitions, most reconfigure delivery entirely, focusing on visual instead of oral texts altogether. Technology, which was once used to argue for delivery’s relegation to the fringes of rhetoric, became the basis of the argument used to place delivery, if not center stage, then at least out from behind the curtain.
One attempt to re-include delivery in contemporary rhetorical studies is Sharon Crowley’s *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students*, which was inspired by Edward Corbett and Robert Conners’ *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*. In the first edition (1994), Crowley devotes an eleven-page chapter, by far the briefest chapter of her textbook, to delivery. Delivery, in Crowley’s textbook, is copy-editing and proofreading, re-conceiving delivery as a manuscript presentation. Her attempt to modernize delivery still draws upon the classical concepts of delivery as oral presentation, although she focuses on the materiality of the written or printed page in order to shift the emphasis from oral presentation and transmission to visual presentation and transmission. In later editions, the section on delivery is nearly double in size, including more information on classical delivery and also sections on oral and written delivery, although the emphasis on copy-editing and proofreading is still apparent. The latest addition, the fourth (2008), adds technology to delivery, and briefly discusses the delivery of electronic information. Her focus in the fourth edition is on electronic systems of delivery, such as email and websites, and she addresses graphic design, digital layouts, and page design.

Similarly, Robert Conners’ discussion of delivery in “*Actio: A Rhetoric of Written Delivery (Iteration Two)*,” published in 1993, also draws upon classical concepts of delivery, and addresses writing conventions and formats. While he does not focus specifically on digital technologies, he does examine the effects of printers on ink legibility, fonts, and layouts on readers, and seems to focus on the process of printing and printed materials. For Conners, "The canon of delivery has to do simply with the manner in which the material is delivered. In written discourse, this means only one thing: the format and conventions of the final written product as it reaches the hands of the reader" (65). In addition, the effectiveness of delivery deals with ethical
appeal--we create images of who we are as writers through the presentation of our manuscripts. Sloppy papers with incorrect formatting and coffee rings on them detract from the writer's ethos.

Another attempt to re-situate delivery within technology and rhetoric is Jay Bolter’s "Hypertext and the Rhetorical Canons." Bolter writes, "Hypertext moves delivery back from the margin of the rhetorical canons toward the center, and in so doing it disrupts established relationships with invention, arrangement, style, and memory. Hypertext in fact renegotiates the ratios of the five classical faculties" (100). Computer technologies, such as hypertext, re-emphasize the role of delivery in rhetoric. The rationale is that hypertext, and computer technologies, that change the way information and language is transmitted, creates a new need for re-including delivery in the rhetorical canons. Delivery remains a canon focused on transmission, but instead of focusing only on physical transmissions manifested through the body, it can also include transmissions of information and language through multi-media and digital sources.

Sam Dragga, in “The Ethics of Delivery” (1993), also attempts to address issues of delivery in technology and rhetoric and focuses on the ethics of delivery within graphic design. Re-including delivery, Dragga argues, is necessary in order to investigate and analyze the ethics of graphical presentations. His preliminary research looks at the presentation of visual information, in the forms of pictures and graphs, and the relationship of that information to printed text. A graphic designer, Dragga contends, is faced with ethical choices when presenting pictures and graphs in order to persuade a reader. The delivery of the presentation, whether through color choices on pie graphs or selections of font sizes, creates ethical situations where the designer must choose presentations that are accurate, as well as persuasive.
Although these examples of discussions concerning delivery indicate that delivery, as a rhetorical canon, is receiving some renewed attention in the field of rhetoric, discussions of delivery overall remain largely confined to classical rhetoric or rhetoric and technology. The sixth edition of the *Bedford Bibliography for Teachers of Writing* (2004), for example, contains sections devoted to invention, arrangement, and style, but delivery (and memory) are absent. Even the section devoted to technology and writing fails to mention any work connected with delivery, which is significant because most of the current work on delivery attempts to re-situate delivery within the frame of technology and rhetoric.

Perhaps the best example of the attempts to re-include delivery in rhetoric and technologies is Andrea Lunsford’s address at the Computers and Composition conference in 2006. Lunsford states:

No change has been more significant to me than the return of orality, performance, and delivery to the classroom. The increasing hegemony of writing throughout the nineteenth century had hidden the body and performance from critical view and shifted attention away from oral and embodied delivery to textual production and the printed page. Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, however, and crescendoing in the last two decades, the arts and crafts associated with the fifth canon have moved to the center of our discipline. To view writing as an active performance—that is as an act always involving the body and performance—enriches I.A. Richard's notion of the "interinanimation of words": It is not only that individual words shift meaning given their context within a sentence, but also that words shift meaning given their embodied context and their physical location in the world. (170)
She goes on to describe and discuss the new writing and rhetoric course at Stanford, and its focus on delivery in the context of digital and multi-media composition—a focus that attempts to overturn the emphasis on writing to the exclusion of all other means of communicating in the classroom. For example, the instructors would "begin with an assignment we called ‘texts in translation,’ one that asked students to take a fairly brief text and translate it from one form of delivery to another, to analyze rhetorical strategies operative in the two versions, and then present their findings to the class" (172). For Lunsford, the “return of orality, performance, and delivery” seems to come from an increasing emphasis on the use of technologies in composition, and the teaching of technologies to composition students. From her description, delivery still seems, however, to be a “final” step to the composition process, and tied directly to technologies of writing. Technology has brought about this return, and delivery remains important, it seems, only in connection with technology.

**Orality, literacy, and technology**

The attempts to revive delivery and re-include it in the rhetorical canons all hinge on expanding the definition of delivery from the body into alternate modes of transmission and presentation. The definition of delivery as an oral transmission hasn’t been entirely discarded, rather, it has been redefined in conjunction with new definitions of transmission, new ideas of textuality, and new ideologies of the bodies and physicality. In order to re-include delivery into the rhetorical canons the definition of delivery had to be altered to compensate for the cultural shift from the oral to the visual. With the introduction of print technology, Western culture shifted dramatically from an oral orientation to a visual orientation. Walter Ong states, “Writing, in this ordinary sense, was and is the most momentous of all human technological inventions. It
is not a mere appendage to speech. Because it moves speech from the oral-aural to a new sensory world, that of vision, it transforms speech and thought as well” (*Orality and Literacy* 84). Print, however, takes this transformation to the visual realm and solidifies it. As Ong states, “Print situates words in space more relentlessly than writing ever did. Writing moves words from the sound world to a world of visual space, but print locks words into position in this space. Control of position is everything in print” (*Orality and Literacy* 118).

Kathleen Welch states, "Delivery is weakened if it refers only to the gesture, physical movement, and expression that many commentators have dismissed it as doing" (21). Delivery, Welch contends, is connected to secondary orality as defined by Walter Ong: "present-day high-technology culture, in which a new orality is sustained by telephone, radio, television, and other electronic devices that depend for their existence and functioning on writing and print" (Welch 22). Primary orality, as defined by Ong and Eric Havelock, is the emphasis on speaking for communication and the transmission of ideology, norms, behaviors, and cultural values. Oral repetition is necessary to keep transmissions going in primary orality, but in secondary orality, electronic devices, such as radio, television, and the Internet, continue the transmissions.

For Ong, secondary orality “is by no means independent of writing and print, but totally dependent on them. Without writing and print, electronic equipment cannot be manufactured, and radio and television programming cannot be managed” (471). He continues to explain that, “Secondary orality, in other words, is to varying degrees literate. In fact, a residual primary orality, literacy, and secondary orality are interacting vigorously with one another in confusing complex patterns in our secondarily oral world” (476). Delivery, then, can be considered a part of primary orality, stemming from antiquity where public speaking was an important part of
society. In secondarily oral cultures, such as ours, primary orality continues to influence and affect our secondary orality. Ong points out that,

[S]cholars appear to have been quite unaware of the oral-literacy contrasts and gradual inroads of literacy upon orality. No one seems to have noticed as the teaching of rhetoric, which in its Greek original, *techne rhetorike*, means public speaking, imperceptibly became more and more, over the centuries, the teaching of writing. Earlier generations took their own residual orality for granted, so much so that they really had not even though of orality explicitly at all as a state of culture or consciousness. (467)

He goes on further to discuss teaching writing, demonstrating that this transition also happens in individuals as they begin writing, and states “Everyone who writes must move at some point or points in his or her life from the world of oral exchange and thought processes into the curiously estranged and yet fantastically productive world of absent audiences that the writer deals with” (470).

For Ong, secondary orality relies on print and writing, and primary orality became embedded into print and writing. For example, in Ong’s “Written Transmission of Literature,” he briefly outlines the development of writing, across cultures, beginning with the earliest known scripts. From there, he proceeds to writing in the Middle Ages, where he says that, “Under such conditions [the change from reading aloud to reading silently] writing was not at first really written composition, but rather oral performance in transcriptions that exhibit sometimes more and sometimes less influence of the new medium of writing” (334). In other words, as writing shifted from an oral/aural performance to a “silent” performance, the orality of writing remained present in these silence transmissions, influencing how these transmissions were written and read.
Ong’s distinctions between primary and secondary orality become, however, a little problematic, especially in light of delivery’s appearance, disappearance, and reappearance into the rhetorical canons. According to Ong’s theories of oralities, delivery should never have been excluded, either explicitly or implicitly, from the canons in the first place. However, I think the complications stem from secondary orality’s connection to “high-tech” societies. While Ong argues that orality influences print, and primary orality influences secondary orality, he does not fully address the transition from primary orality, a culture focused on oral transmissions, to secondary orality, a culture focused on electronic transmissions, other than saying that orality influences writing. Print and writing are technologies themselves. And while Ong’s transition from primary to secondary orality demonstrates how delivery can retain its importance in modern culture, it also demonstrates how it became possible to erase delivery from the rhetorical canons.

The knower and the known

Writing, for Ong, marks the transition to a new kind of consciousness, a shift from an oral consciousness to a visual consciousness. Of the three technologies (computers, print, and writing), Ong claims that writing is “the most drastic. [. . .] It initiated what print and computers only continue, the reduction of dynamic sound to quiescent space, the separation of the word from the living present, where alone spoken words can exist” (Orality and Literacy 81). The reduction of delivery, of sound, of words, from events to things produced shifts in consciousness, in human conception of time, in the ways we organize ideas. As Ong puts it,

Sound [. . .] exists only when it is going out of existence. I cannot have all of a word present at once: when I say ‘existence’, by the time I get to the ‘-tence’, the ‘exis-‘ is
gone. The alphabet implies that matters are otherwise, that a word is a thing, not an event, that it is present all at once, and that it can be cut up into little pieces [. . .]. (Orality and Literacy 90)

Print further solidifies the move away from oral consciousness and into visual. For example, Ong claims, “Before writing was deeply interiorized by print, people did not feel themselves situated every moment of their lives in abstract computed time of any sort” (Orality and Literacy 96). The internalized of print technologies allowed (or compelled) people to organize their sense of time differently. Calendars and clocks and material printed with the date were not available to most people (Ong Orality and Literacy 96). Time was not something that was generally abstracted and separated from a person. Print further separated a person from his or her knowledge, and alienated a person from his or her experiences. Eric Havelock calls this “the separation of the knower from the known,” (5), and as literacy expanded, consciousness and knowledge acquisition shifted. As Ong puts it, “By separating the knower from the known (Havelock 1963), writing makes possible increasingly articulate introspectivity, opening the psyche as never before not only to the external objective world quite distinct from itself but also to the interior self against whom the objective world is set” (Orality and Literacy 104). For example, Ong explains,

Persons whose world view has been formed by high literacy need to remind themselves that in functionally oral cultures the past is not felt as an itemized terrain, peppered with verifiable and disputed ‘facts’ or bits of information. It is the domain of the ancestors, a resonant source for renewing awareness of present existence, which itself is not an itemized terrain either. Orality knows no lists or charts or figures. (Orality and Literacy 97)
With new methods of organization, it is perhaps not surprising that texts became organized somatically, mimicking the body. “Texts,” Ong claims, “assimilate utterance to the human body. They introduce a feeling for ‘headings’ in accumulations of knowledge: ‘chapter’ derives from the Latin caput, meaning head (as of the human body). Pages have not only ‘heads’ but also ‘feet’, for footnotes. References are given to what is ‘above’ and ‘below’ in a text when what is meant is several pages back or farther on” (Orality and Literacy 99). The organization that comes with writing, and then with printing, is a delivery similar to an oral delivery in that the visual field is somatically situated.

Ong goes on to examine the contextual differences between writing and speaking. Spoken words are never alone, Ong contends. He writes,

The word in its natural, oral habitat is a part of a real, existential present. Spoken utterance is addressed by a real, living person to another real, living person or real, living persons, at a specific time in a real setting which includes always much more than mere words. Spoken words are always modifications of a total situation which is more than verbal. They never occur alone, in a context simply of words. […] Yet words are alone in a text. Moreover, in composing a text, in ‘writing’ something, the one producing the written utterance is also alone. Writing is a solipsistic operation. (Orality and Literacy 100)

Ong’s formulation, however, naturalizes the “natural” speaking human, and ignores any sort of artificiality, performance, or performativity associated with a spoken event. Also, his claim that writing is an act that one does alone ignores collaborative writing or collaborative brainstorming. Although Ong appears to be elucidating on the idea that writing separates the knower from the known, and alienates a person from his or her knowledge by making knowledge an product, and
by making knowledge-making a production, he seems to take his ideas a little too far, embedding assumptions about “natural” humanity and values of individuality over collectivity.

Another difference between writing and speaking is vocal delivery, although Ong doesn’t call it that. Instead, Ong describes delivery, explaining,

In a text, even the words that are there lack their full phonetic qualities. In oral speech, a word must have one or another intonation or tone of voice—lively, excited, quite, incensed, resigned, or whatever. It is impossible to speak a word orally without any intonation. In a text punctuation can signal tone minimally: a question mark or comma, for example, generally calls for the voice to be raised a bit. (Orality and Literacy 100)

When reading, according to Ong, a reader must guess at the intonation and inflection for the words on the page. Similarly, when writing, a writer must guess at the audience’s interpretation of the words. This is why Ong declares “the writer’s audience is always a fiction” (Orality and Literacy 100). Conversely, the opposite is also true and “the reader must also fictionalize the writer” (Orality and Literacy 101). However, by calling these imagined audiences “fiction,” Ong again detracts from everyday performance in everyday life, naturalizing these performances as “real.”

And speaking is also different from writing (but not print, necessarily, in this case) in that writing can be erased and changed. Ong contends, “With writing, words once ‘uttered’, outered, put down on the surface, can be eliminated, erased, changed. There is no equivalent of this in an oral performance, no way to erase a spoken word: corrections do not remove an infelicity or an error, they merely supplement it with denial and patchwork” (Orality and Literacy 103). Print, however, creates permanence, or at least, the illusion of permanence. Ong writes, "Print situates words in space more relentlessly than writing ever did. Writing moves words from the sound
world to a world of visual space, but print locks words into position in this space. Control of position is everything in print" (*Orality and Literacy* 119). So while the spoken word is an event that can only be amended and never erased, the written word is mutable and erasable, and the printed word is more static and inflexible. The transition between vanishing to stable marks the change of consciousness from the oral to the visual.

This change of consciousness, particularly the separation of the knower from the known, eventually led to new theories about the construction of consciousness and self. Modern theories of subjectivity rely on the visual. Hegel, Lacan, and Sartre, most notably, all construct visions of selfhood that are reliant upon the gaze. Kojeve starts his reading of Hegel by claiming, "[Man is Self-Consciousness. He is conscious of himself, conscious of his human reality and dignity; and it is in this that he is essentially different from animals, which do not go beyond the level of simple Sentiment of self. Man becomes conscious of himself at the moment when--for the "first" time--he says "I." To understand man by understanding his "origin" is, therefore, to understand the origin of the I revealed by speech]" (3). However, in Hegel's master/slave dialectic, neither of the consciousnesses actually speak--both discover their "I"s through their eyes, and the realization of consciousness is made through the gaze. This processing of the environment and the self that Hegel describes is made possible through a person's alienation from himself through his alienation from his knowledge.

The alienation of a person from his knowledge makes knowledge an external that can be contained, a part of the outside environment, no longer as connected to his inner psychic life. Ong claims, "Once print has been fairly well interiorized, a book was sensed as a kind of object which 'contained' information, scientific, fictional or other, rather than, as earlier, a recorded utterance" (*Orality and Literacy* 124). The consequences of the interiorization of print also made
it possible to alienate humans from their environment. After separating the knower from the
known, and writing down knowledge and removing it from the knower, the knower, the person,
continued to be able to categorize knowledge differently than he could in an oral culture.

Lacan's theory of subjectivity is similar. In the mirror stage, the subject is organized
through his gaze upon his reflection in the mirror. By organizing the ego through a visual
imperative, Lacan’s subjectivity also demonstrates the primacy of the visual in consciousness.
Although Lacan has been criticized for structuring his theory around the visual, there is also an
oral component to his construction of the ego ideal. The parents, who hold the infant in front of
the mirror, pointing and saying, “There’s my good boy,” add a trace element of the oral to
Lacan’s organization. Lacan’s subjectivity could almost be said to demonstrate the transition
from oral consciousness to visual consciousness, or even anticipating the description of
secondary orality offered by Ong.

The ramification of these modern theories of subjectivity is that they mark a paradigm
shift in thinking about consciousness. These theories all demonstrate the move from the oral to
the visual, resituating consciousness and identity into the realm of the gaze. The shift from
orality to literacy is a necessary predecessor for the modern visual theories of subjectivity. And
the interiorization of print, including the illusion of a stable, fixed, and permanent positionality
that print gives, also gives rise to the concept that the self is a fixed, stable, coherent entity,
despite the vast amount of literature (including Lacan's fragmentation of self) that suggests
otherwise. But along with the emphasis on the visual, modern consciousness also latched onto
the illusion of permanence and the inevitability of fixed positions afforded by the advent and
mass distribution of print.
Ong states, "Print was also a major factor in the development of the sense of personal privacy that marks modern society" (*Orality and Literacy* 128). This sense of privacy further solidifies the separation of the knower from the known. The self and knowledge become discrete, fixed entities, each with discernable boundaries. Ong goes on to claim, "Print encourages a sense of closure, a sense that what is found in a text has been finalized, has reached a state of completion" (*Orality and Literacy* 129). The illusion between the self and the outside world is an illusion constructed by boundaries and organization of the written word. The visual basis of print brought the world that one experiences, through sight, into the forefront of the human experience. The self, which cannot be experienced through sight, became something Other, something private and alien. Descartes' famous thought experiment is based on the absence of sight as an affirmation of self, constructing the self as a boundary outside the outside world.

With the rise of digital technologies, however, consciousness is yet again undergoing another paradigm shift. Ong describes this shift by stating, "The electronic transformation of verbal expression has both deepened the commitment of the word to space initiated by writing and intensified by print and has brought consciousness to a new age of secondary orality" (*Orality and Literacy* 133). The upshot of the move into secondary orality is, for Ong, an outward turn, moving away from Descartes' interiority. Ong explains, "Unlike members of a primarily oral culture, who are turned outward because they have had little occasion to turn inward, we are turned outward because we have turned inward" (*Orality and Literacy* 134). Ong's description of writing serves as the best example, perhaps, of this outward/inward turn. He writes, "The very reflectiveness of writing--enforced by the slowness of the writing process as compared to oral delivery as well as by the isolation of the writer as compared to the oral performer--encourages growth of consciousness out of the unconsciousness" (*Orality and
The outward focus of writing, of separating knowledge from the knower, forces the knower into a position of being more conscious of his or her position as knower. For example, the narrator of oral epics, such as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, never appears in the saga as an "I" (Ong *Orality and Literacy* 156). The "I" appears more concretely after literacy, and, Ong contends, becomes even more entrenched with the appearance of New Criticism and Formalism (*Orality and Literacy* 157).

Despite the fact that Ong skips several hundred years of literary theory and criticism, he does have an interesting point. He claims that,

The preceding criticism has come out of a residually oral, rhetorical tradition, and was in fact unskilled in treating autonomous, properly textual, discourse. Seen in the perspectives suggested by orality-literacy contrasts, the shift from earlier criticism to Formalism and the New Criticism thus appears as a shift from residually oral (rhetorical, contextual) mentally to a textual (non-contextual) mentality. But the textual mentality was relatively unreflective. For, although texts are autonomous by contrast with oral expression, ultimately no text can stand by itself independent of the extratextual world.

Every text builds on pretext. (*Orality and Literacy* 159)

New Criticism and Formalism cemented the separation of the knower and the known.

Knowledge, contained exclusively in the text, and separate from the author, became the object of study. Although this stance has been substantially modified in subsequent literary theory, and in some cases overthrown entirely, it persists in continuing anachronistic assumptions that are difficult to completely dispel. The power of print compels us to read texts as outside of ourselves, as contained in books, and separate from our knower positionality. Ong gives the example of literary analysis of oral literature, “Exegesis of oral epic by literates in the past has
commonly seen oral epic poets as doing this same [anachronistic pattern], imputing to them conscious deviation from an organization which was in fact unavailable without writing. Such exegesis smacks of the same chirographic bias evident in the term 'oral literature’” (Orality and Literacy 139-40). Even though literary theory has progressed from New Criticism and Formalism, the idea that information moves from inside, to outside, to another inside remains. Print changed how humans process knowledge, and how knowledge itself is conceived. Ong gives the superconductor analogy of communication to demonstrate:

Thinking of a 'medium' of communication or of 'media' of communication suggests that communication is a pipeline of units of material called 'information' from one place to another. My mind is a box. I take a unit of 'information' out of it, encode the unit (that is, fit it to the size and shape of the pipe it will go through), and put it into one end of the pipe (the medium, something in the middle between two other things). From the one end of the pipe the 'information' proceeds to the other end, where someone decodes it (restores its proper size and shape) and puts it in his or her own box-like container called a mind. (Orality and Literacy 172)

This analogy has become even more entrenched with the development of electronic mediums and digital technology, where information is literally sent from one box, one computer, to another.

Marshall McLuhan's famous proclamation, "the medium is the message," marks the paradox in the conduit metaphor. As Frank Zingrone and Eric McLuhan explain, "The perception of reality now depends upon the structure of information. The form of each medium is associated with a different arrangement, or ratio, among the senses, which creates new forms of awareness. These perceptual transformations, the new ways of experiencing that each medium creates, occur
in the user regardless of the program content. This is what the paradox, 'the medium is the message,' means" (McLuhan 3). Because the medium introduces change into society, into how we think and organize our information, the medium's ability to construct change is the medium's message.

**Electronic communication and secondary orality**

With the rise of electronic communication, human communication has moved into what Ong calls "secondary orality." McLuhan describes this return/melding, and states, "In the electronic age which succeeds the typographic and mechanical era of the past five hundred years, we encounter new shapes and structures of human interdependence and of expression which are 'oral' in form even when the components of the situation may be non-verbal" (99). As our technologies have expanded, so has our consciousness. Digital information forces us to re-organize and re-conceptualize our world, much in the same way that writing, and then print, forced humans into a paradigm shift. Because we organize our communication and language differently, so we also organize our thinking, and our sense of self, differently. "Man," McLuhan writes, "the tool-making animal, whether in speech or in writing or in radio, has long been engaged in extending one or another of his sense organs in such a manner as to disturb all of his other senses and faculties" (100). Humans exert influence over the world, and the exertion of this influence constantly re-writes how people experience the world around them.

McLuhan observes that, "As long as our technologies were as slow as the wheel or the alphabet or money, the fact that they were separate, closed systems was socially and psychically supportable. This is not true now when sight and sound and movement are simultaneous and global in extent" (101). The boundaries and separation of the knower from the known are almost
starting to break down, and melt into one another. Because knowledge transmission through the
electronic printed word is now nearly as instantaneous as the transmission of sound, properties of
oral societies are mixing with the properties of print societies. The shift of consciousness from
the oral to visual is re-shifting, where electronic transmission brings us back to an earlier, oral
based, mode of thinking.

However, even though we have shifted into a secondary orality, defining our secondary
orality as secondary is still tricky. For example, Ong points out that,

We have not yet come to terms with the fact that from antiquity well into the eighteenth
century many literary texts, even when composed in writing, were commonly for public
recitation; originally by the author himself. [. . .] Reading aloud to family and other small
groups was still common in the early twentieth century until electronic culture mobilized
such groups around radio and television sets rather than around a present group member.

(Orality and Literacy 154)

At the same time, we have also not come to terms with the code-switching already inherent in
communication. Digital technology did not make the conduit. And it's difficult to say that
writing, or print, created the conduit because it is difficult to accurately imagine living in a
society without a technology that we already have.

Marshall McLuhan gives an excellent example of the permutation of technology when he
quotes Werner Heisenberg at length. Heisenberg, in The Physicist's Conception of Nature
(1958), tells this story:

In this connection it has often been said that the far-reaching changes in our environment
and in our way of life wrought by this technical age have also changed dangerously our
ways of thinking, and that here lie the roots of the crises which have shaken our times and
which, for instance, are also expressed in modern art. True, this objection is much older than modern technology and science, and the use of implements going back to man's earliest beginnings. Thus, two and a half thousand years ago, the Chinese sage Chuang-Tzu spoke of the danger of the machine when he said:

'As Tzu-Gung was travelling through the regions north of the river Han, he saw an old man working in his vegetable garden. He had dug an irrigation ditch. The man would descend into the well, fetch up a vessel of water in his arms and pour it into the ditch. While his efforts were tremendous the results appeared to be very meagre.

'Tzu-Gung said, "There is a way whereby you can irrigate a hundred ditches in one day, and whereby you can do much with little effort. Would you not like to hear of it?" Then the gardener stood up, looked at him and said, "And what would that be?"

'Tzu-Gung replied, "You take a wooden lever, weighted at the back and light in the front. In this way you can bring up water so quickly that it just gushes out. This is called a draw-well."

'Then anger rose up in the old man's face, and he said, "I have heard my teacher say that whoever uses machines does all his work like a machine. He who does his work like a machine grows a heart like a machine, and he who carries the heart of a machine in his breast loses his simplicity. He who has lost his simplicity becomes unsure in the strivings of his soul. Uncertainty in the strivings of the soul is something which does not agree with honest sense. It is not that I do not know of such things: I am ashamed to use them." (qtd. in McLuhan 124-5)

McLuhan's commentary on the story agrees. He follows this quotation by stating,

"Clearly this ancient tale contains a great deal of wisdom, for "uncertainty in the strivings
of the soul" is perhaps one of the aptest descriptions of man's condition in our modern crisis; technology, the machine, has spread through the world to a degree that our Chinese sage could not even have suspected" (125).

The problem with story, and the ideas of simplicity and technology, are the anachronisms we insist on applying to past when it comes to technology, the assumption that "old ways" were simpler, better, and more authentic. The gardener here is already using technology—an irrigation system. And more than that as well—the buckets are technological, as is the very act of gardening. And, of course, language, and the act of speaking, is technology as well. To be human is, by it's very definition, to be a technology user. And the usage of technology, and the organizing effects, could also be said to make humans into the very technologies that they use.

As Walter Ong puts it,

"Technologies are artificial, but—paradox again—artificiality is natural to human beings. Technology, properly interiorized, does not degrade human life but on the contrary enhances it. The modern orchestra, for example, is the result of high technology. A violin is an instrument, which is to say a tool. [. . .] To achieve such expression [of playing musical scores] of course the violinist or organist has to have interiorized the technology, made the tool or machine a second nature, a psychological part of himself or herself. [. . .] Writing is an even more deeply interiorized technology than instrumental musical performance is. But to understand what it is, which means to understand it in relation to its past; to orality, the fact that it is a technology must be honestly faced. (Orality and Literacy 82)"
The return to secondary orality could be more properly conceived as a return to technology. And this return to technology leads to a larger extension of influence a person can have on his or her environment, which includes, of course, other people. McLuhan claims that, Language is a technology which extends all of the human senses simultaneously. All the other human artifacts are, by comparison, specialist extensions of our physical and mental faculties. Written language at once specializes speech by limiting words to one of the senses. Written speech is an example of such specialism, but the spoken word resonates, involving all of the senses. The ancient saying, "Speak that I may see thee," was a popular way of citing this integral and inclusive quality of the spoken word. (McLuhan 321)

Returning to a form of orality returns us to this extension involving all the human senses. As readers, as users, we are no longer solely confined to either reading books or engaging in spoken conversation or orations. We can combine everything. And we do.

Technology, post-humanism, and cyborgs

This return to technology is the reason why delivery is particularly important, and particularly overlooked, in rhetoric today. Ong states that, "Print eventually removed the ancient art of (orally based) rhetoric from the center of academic education" (Orality and Literacy 127). But at the same time, a new technology, digital technology, forms the basis of the argument for reclaiming delivery. The fall of delivery from its canonical standing, and the subsequent revival of delivery, both attributed to technology, seems paradoxical. This paradox seems to stem from popular conceptions of technology, where technology is defined as anything digital or dealing with computers. The word “technology” stems from the Greek “techne,” meaning a craft or
skill—particularly one that is applied. The first recorded addition of “-logy,” stemming from the Greek “logos,” meaning, in this case, “word” or “discourse,” appears in 1615. “Technology” referred to the discourse about a craft or skill or “the scientific study of the practical or industrial arts,” and its meaning has changed very little since its coinage (“Technology”). Technology, when defined as the application of science or the organization of systems, included print and printing, which tends to be forgotten in light of current digital trends in technology. Because paper and ink are familiar, we tend to no longer associate these mediums with technology.

Technologies that we have dissociated from the term "technology" are what Andy Clark, in "Cyborgs Unplugged," calls "transparent technologies." Clark writes,

Transparent technologies are those tools that become so well fitted to, and integrated with, our own lives and projects that they are (as Don Norman, Weiser, and others insist) pretty much invisible-in-use. These tools or resources are usually no more the object of our conscious thought and reason than is the pen with which we write, the hand that holds it while writing, or the various neural subsystems that form the grip and guide the fingers. All three items, the pen, the hand, and the unconsciously operating neural mechanisms, are pretty much on a par. And it is this parity that ultimately blurs the line between the intelligent system and its best tools for thought and action. (180-1)

These translucent technologies, like writing, and even language, have become so much a part of our daily routines that they have become invisible. Digital technologies, such as computers, smart phones, and the Internet, have redefined technology into the realms of the electronic, emphasizing the invisibility of translucent technologies, and even naturalizing them. The relationship between technologies and users, between language and speakers, is such that each relationship is a system of operation. Clark gives the example of a person arriving at her office,
and working on a presentation. After reviewing notes, files, revising her ideas, drinking espresso, she is ready for her presentation. And she, like all of us, believes that she solved the problems before her and completed her presentation using her brain. But, Clark explains that, "In each case, the real problem-solving engine was the larger, biotechnological matrix comprising (in the case at hand) the brain, the stacked papers, the previous marginalia, the electronic files, the operations of a search provided by the Mac software, and so on, and so on" (178). For Clark, the user and the used are nearly inseparable. He concludes, and states, "In this way ours are essentially the brains of natural-born cyborgs, ever-eager to dovetail their activity to the increasingly complex technological envelopes in which they develop, mature, and operate" (179).

These technologies that allow us to exert influence and control over our environments are what Clark calls "nonpenetrative cyborg technologies." Translucent technologies, such as language, are also nonpenetrative cyborg technologies, which are "all the technological tricks and electronic aids that, as hinted earlier, are already transforming our lives, our projects, and our sense of our own capacities" (Clark 180). Writing is one such technology; language itself is another. Clark explains that the term "cyborg" was initially proposed by Manfred Clynes and coined in his paper "Cyborgs and Space," co-written with Nathan Kline and published in Astronautics in 1960. Clark quotes the passage introducing the term: "For the exogenously extended organizational complex . . . we propose the term "cyborg." The Cyborg deliberately incorporates exogenous components extending the self-regulating control function of the organism in order to adapt it to new environments" (qtd. in Clark 171). The initial vision of the cyborg was a human organism combined with cybernetic materials making a man-machine hybrid. However, the technologies and machines we use, while not implanted within human
physiologies, serve this same purpose and definition. These technologies, while falling short of "implants" or "chips," do extend our sphere of influence and affect the way we interact with and alter our surroundings. Because we use these nonpenetrative cyborg technologies, Clark claims that we are, already, cyborgs. We don't need machine parts; we are already part of the machine. And being a part of the machine makes all of us, together, the machine itself. In other words, we aren't just in the matrix, we are the matrix.

Technology, and the use of technology, has been given as the reason why delivery has been removed from, and then revived in, the rhetorical canons. The reason delivery was initially neglected in rhetoric dealt with the transition from oral to print communications. Digital communications created yet another shift, but one that is still oriented towards written and visual communication (although multi-media does allow for the inclusion of sound, images, moving images, and video as well). If delivery is present in technology (digital and multi-media communications), then it is most certainly present in print-based mediums. The application of delivery to print-based mediums is virtually non-existent, and delivery remains confined to the area of technology and rhetoric. But delivery has always been present, in print, and in writing as well. If the medium is, in fact, the message, then these mediums have been telling us that delivery not only exists, but that it persists. And we continue to evolve and change with our technologies.

The argument that technology has contributed to the status of delivery, either by making it obsolete or by reviving it within rhetoric, ignores the evolution of delivery within the rhetorical canons. Because the technology argument was used in an attempt to delete delivery from rhetoric, and because it is being used to revive delivery only within a specific area of rhetoric, the technology argument serves to perpetuate delivery’s marginalization almost to the point of
extinction within rhetoric as field. Delivery’s disappearance due to technological advancements, then its reappearance in service of rhetorics that deal with electronic and digital discourses, creates a situation where delivery is no longer a part of rhetoric, but a part of technological advancement or sophistication. Within rhetoric, delivery then only becomes addressed because of its relationship to technology; it is no longer a part of rhetoric, but a part of the changing technologies that influence rhetorical practices and the field of rhetoric. When the status of delivery hinges upon its relationship to technology, delivery becomes nothing but a tool. It is no longer a part of the rhetorical canons, operating alongside invention, arrangement, style, and memory. Instead, delivery becomes a tool whose purpose is to serve these other canons, depending on its current perceived usefulness.

Kathleen Welch argues that:

It is crucial to an understanding of Western literacy at the millenium to recognize that the disappearance of memory and delivery is not a benign removal; rather, it is part of a larger movement in the United States to pablumize the humanities in general, and to vitiate writing in particular by behaving as if it were a mere skill, craft, or tool. The writing-as-tool metaphor, in fact, recurs in composition textbooks, in many discussions of writing, and in many generally held assumptions about why writing is "good for you."

[...] A tool is a thing out there in the world, a palpable object that one can store in the garage and retrieve as necessary. A tool can be put aside; language cannot. (18)

Welch goes on to write that memory and delivery contain many issues of culture, society, and ideology--including the construction of private and public lives. These realms are frequently not thought of as constructions, but as separate entities (18). Removing memory and delivery help naturalize these issues, and keep us outside of language. However, delivery is not a tool that can
be put aside. Delivery has evolved into a technology, a system, which organizes and studies transmissions of communication by prescribing and evaluating ways to use tone, pitch, gesture, movement, facial expressions, and dress. While delivery, like many technologies, can be used as a tool, it is not itself a tool. And the marginalization of delivery, and failure to recognize the evolution of delivery, removes the technology that organizes transmissions, naturalizing these transmissions as something authentic, something real, something human.
THE CLOTHES MAKE THE CYBORG

Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog and the evolution of delivery

Delivery’s revival in conjunction with technology has veiled the fact that delivery is itself a technology, an organizing system, with embedded ideals of proto-masculinity that operate in performances between speakers and audiences. Because delivery is a technology that is ultimately rhetorical, the embedded gender ideals are themselves rhetorical, operating within the locus between speakers and audiences. Instead of being part of a cultural language system, as Butler proposes, or part of inherent biological traits, as the classical rhetoricians tried to insinuate, gender is a feedback loop based on delivery, on the performance of behaviors, and the alteration of that performance based on audience evaluation. Together, the speaker and the audience make gender happen.

In order to demonstrate how delivery has evolved into a cyborg technology that locates gender in the interactions between speakers and audience, it is necessary to turn to representations of rhetorical situations in popular media. Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog, an Internet serial-release musical, is an excellent example because of its technological medium (and technological subject matter), its use of public speaking, and its portrayals of exaggerated gender performances. Because delivery is not only visual and oral, but also an interaction between speaker and audience, a cinematic example provides the best medium to explore delivery as an interaction because it shows the visual and oral interactions between speakers and audiences. A popular Internet cinematic example also provides the additional benefit of exploring how delivery is presented in our culture. Perhaps the best advantage of exploring delivery through Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog is that Dr. Horrible takes place in a comic book world—a setting that is so completely fictional that it serves as a metaphor or allegory more than a representation
of “real” life. The delivery used in Dr. Horrible is used as a meta-commentary upon how delivery operates in society, which is an advantage when analyzing the embedded proto-masculinity in delivery because it shows not only how delivery is a post-human, cyborg technology, but also how delivery continues to carry embedded proto-masculine qualities. A realistic portrayal of delivery in cinema fails to capture these qualities because the portrayals act more as monologues or soliloquies, instead of interactions between speakers and audiences. Realistic portrayals of delivery tend to be addressed to the viewing audiences more than the audience in the scene, putting the viewing audience in place of the fictional audience. Dr. Horrible allows viewers to see the audience’s interactions with the speakers and allows us to see the audience’s responses to proto-masculinity in delivery. The exaggerated portrayals of proto-masculinity in the comic book world of Dr. Horrible serve to highlight the gender performances and proto-masculine deliveries within the film. The popularity of Dr. Horrible also makes it an excellent example, because it demonstrates Dr. Horrible’s cultural significance.

To say that Joss Whedon’s Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog was an Internet sensation would be putting it mildly. Written by Joss Whedon, Zack Whedon, Jed Whedon, and Maurissa Tancharoen, the short musical web-film garnered so many hits when Act 1 was released on July 15, 2008, that the online server crashed. After the acquisition of more bandwidth, and the attempted resolution of viewing problems for international viewers who wanted to participate in the Internet serial release, Acts II and III were released on July 17 and 19, respectively. With little advertisement beyond word of mouth, the 42 minute long Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog won the 2009 Hugo Award for “Best Dramatic Presentation, Short Form,” the 2009 People’s Choice Award for “Best Internet Phenomenon,” seven of the 2009 Streamy Awards for web TV, and the 2009 Primetime Creative Arts Emmy for “Outstanding Special Class—Short-format
Live-action Entertainment Programs.” Additionally, Time magazine listed Dr. Horrible as #4 in its Top 10 TV Series of 2008 and #15 in its Best Inventions of 2008—accolades that perhaps best represent the hybridity of the short musical web-film.

In Critical Studies in Television, Stacey Abbot, David Lavery, and Rhonda Wilcox all discuss the multi-layered hybridity of Dr. Horrible’s web-film format. Abbot briefly outlines the shifts between the blog space, narrative world, and cinematic flourishings throughout the web-film, and concludes that, “In typical Whedon form Dr. Horrible is a curious hybrid” (par. 2). Lavery discusses the rising popularity of “transmedia storytelling” and claims that after Dr. Horrible, “The status will no longer be quo, for Whedon or for television” (par. 7). And Wilcox considers the conjunctions between the web-film’s intertextuality and metatextuality, and claims, “We don’t just break the fourth wall in Dr. Horrible; as Zack Whedon says in ‘Commentary! The Musical,’ it feels ‘like we’re breaking the ninth wall.’ The complexity of the text gives us more and more to think about” (par. 10). And it is this complex narrative hybridization that makes Dr. Horrible appear on both on Time’s Best TV Series of 2008 (a slot Lavery called “perplexing” (par. 3) since, after all, Dr. Horrible never actually aired on television) and Time’s Best Inventions of 2008.

Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog takes place in a comic book world, where everyday society functions with the help of superheroes and the hindrance of supervillains. Within this world, the performances of gender, and particularly masculinity, are as exaggerated and satirical as the heroism and villainy of the characters. The protagonist, Dr. Horrible, a.k.a. Billy (Neil Patrick Harris), wants to join the ranks of the most illustrious and evil of the supervillains, an organization called The Evil League of Evil, run by Bad Horse, The Thoroughbred of Sin. Crime, and by extension, villainy, is not, Horrible explains, “about making money. It’s about
taking money. Destroying the status quo, because the status is NOT quo. The world is a mess and I just need to rule it.” From the start, Dr. Horrible is a horribly sympathetic character. He may be a villain, but he’s a villain who practices his laugh and defends his only somewhat-successful Transmatter Ray. He rebuts Johnny Snow’s email accusing him of standing Snow up for battle in Dooley Park by mocking Snow on his blog and saying, “besides, there’s kids in that park.” He says “dude” and “btw.” He is aggrieved and bullied by his nemesis, Captain Hammer (Nathan Fillion), who “dislocated [Horrible’s] shoulder again, last week.” And he is in love with Penny (Felicia Day), a woman he sees at his laundromat, and whom he is too shy to talk to.

**Superheroism, supervillainy, and proto-masculinity**

As far as villains go, Horrible is a far cry from the typical, and hypermasculine, villains present in comics. He is meek, geeky, and dreams of becoming the arch villain that would embody the hypermasculinity to defeat Captain Hammer, who “battles” Horrible by giving him wedgies and who performs an exaggerated proto-masculinity. Horrible’s blog narrates his triumphs and failures, and at the same time gives viewers access to the story. Barring his weak proto-masculine performance, Horrible is rather similar to the villain Lex Luthor in the recent *Justice* comic series, running from August 2005 to June 2007. In *Justice*, Luthor wants to bring down the Justice League of America, an organization of superheroes, because he believes that humanity has come to depend upon them too much and can no longer fend for themselves. In a sense, Luthor is deeply humanist, believing that natural human ability has been placed under constraints by the super-abilities of the superheroes and must be freed. As Jim Krueger writes in the “Introduction” to Volume 1,
Gone are the days of the overwaxed mustache and maniacal laugh and human-sized logger buzzsaw. No more does a villain raise his head from his sleep in the morning to consider what “evil” he might do that day. No. Even if no one else sees it, the villain, in his mind, is the hero. That is where true evil resides—in the belief that his personal good is capable of navigating and speaking to the universal good. (1)

In *Dr. Horrible*, however, the viewers do see it, and quickly begin to think of Horrible as the hero of the story. After all, Captain Hammer isn’t much of a hero. With his entrance into the story, he proclaims, “Stand back everyone, nothing here to see, just imminent danger, in the middle of it, ME. Yes, Captain Hammer’s here, hair blowing in the breeze, the day needs my saving expertise,” demonstrating his exaggerated proto-masculine confidence immediately. He saves Penny by shoving her in the garbage. And he chases Penny because Horrible loves her. Hammer tells Horrible, “You’ve got a little crush, don’t you Doc? . . . I’m going to give Penny the night of her life, just because you want her. And I get what you want. You see, Penny’s giving it up, she’s giving it up HARD. ‘Cause she’s with Captain Hammer. And these are not the Hammer.” He walks away, then returns to make his point clear, and says, “The hammer is my penis.” Captain Hammer isn’t so much a hero as he is an atrocious dick. His exaggerated proto-masculine performance presents the viewer with a satire of proto-masculinity, mocking the valuation placed on proto-masculinity in American culture.

The reversal of roles where the villain is the hero and the hero is the villain isn’t quite as cut and dried as Horrible and Hammer make it appear. It is because the viewer sees the story unfold from Horrible’s point of view that the viewer sees Horrible as the hero, and Hammer as the villain. But Horrible also appears to be the hero because he appears to be a sincerely good person, particularly in contrast with Hammer’s narcissistic, bullying misogyny and exaggerated
proto-masculinity. Horrible’s theft of the gold bars with the Transmatter Ray seems more like a deed from Robin Hood (or perhaps Green Arrow) than any “real” crime. His freeze ray is introduced through his desire to freeze time and tell Penny how he feels about her. But we never know what else he does (or intends to do) with these devices. And his reluctance to commit murder is because, as he tells Moist, “Killing isn’t elegant OR creative. It’s not my style.” His moral outrage is only implied when Moist offers candidates for murder. Horrible exclaims, “I’m not going to kill a little kid!” Moist suggests, “Smother an old lady.” Horrible turns away in disgust and says, “Do I even KNOW you?!” At the same time, however, Horrible never says that killing is wrong, or even that he is against it. Horrible, it seems, isn’t much of a hero after all; he’s merely a sympathetic villain, an underdog to Hammer’s horrifying proto-masculine performance.

Horrible is the only character who plays two parts: Billy, the quiet, dorky, “laundromat buddy,” and Dr. Horrible, who has “a Ph.D. in Horrible-ness.” As Billy, he wears jeans and hoodies and navigates the everyday world in the guise of an ordinary guy. As Dr. Horrible, he wears a white lab coat, gloves, and goggles, and schemes the downfall of society and heroes. Horrible blogs and invents freeze rays; Billy does laundry and eats frozen yogurt with Penny. In Horrible’s laundry fantasy, Billy uses the freeze ray to stop time and sing to Penny—a moment just as fantasy driven as when they dance together in the Laundromat. When Billy sings “Brand New Day,” and dons his Horrible costume, he proclaims, “Penny will see the evil me, not a joke, not a dork, not a failure,” implying that his Horrible persona is his “real” persona, and that Billy is a mask, a disguise he must wear to pass in the world. Horrible, however, is his reality, and his lab coat, goggles, and gloves, along with his technological devices, are who he really is. Billy is an extension of his arsenal of tools that he uses to “be an achiever, like Bad Horse.” And Billy
wears disguises, too—he wears a mustache and apron to pretend to work in the homeless shelter (although he never pours the soup in the bowls), and he pretends to be a shrub to spy on Penny and Hammer’s date. Billy’s performance is decidedly not proto-masculine. He blinks excessively, is too shy to speak and fumbles over his words, and skulks. Horrible, on the other hand, performs in aspiration to proto-masculinity, as seen in the fantasy scene during “Brand New Day” where a Godzilla-sized Horrible steps on Hammer. Horrible performs a thwarted proto-masculinity—he is a man who could perform manliness if only his opposition, the exaggeratedly proto-masculine Hammer, was squashed, removing him as proto-masculine standard. Horrible appears to be the “real” character, while Billy is the façade he must show the world in order to protect his “true” identity as an evil genius; Billy is the Clark Kent to Horrible’s Superman. And Horrible delivers himself as Billy when his rhetorical situations call for it—while doing laundry, talking with Penny, and spying “discretely.” His “Billy” delivery is a performance demanded by his rhetorical situation.

But even these distinctions between Billy and Horrible are muddled, because the last character the viewer sees in the show isn’t Horrible, but Billy. And, to further complicate matters, the viewer last sees Billy after Horrible has donned his Evil League of Evil Horrible attire: the red lab coat, black gloves, and goggles no longer worn on his head, but lowered over his eyes. Even after Horrible’s final transformation into full-on Dr. Horrible, emphasized by his sung statement, “Now Dr. Horrible is here, to make you quake with fear, to make the whole world kneel,” the viewer returns to Billy, in front of the blog, dressed in black and appearing in front of Horrible’s blog as Billy for the first time, in the last scene. The transformation into Dr. Horrible as a member of the E.L.E is not, then complete, and the scene implies that it was Billy, all along, who was using Dr. Horrible as a mask or disguise, and that Horrible is an extension of
Billy’s performance of masculinity. Horrible’s “Horrible” delivery appears to be just as
rhetorically dependent as his “Billy” delivery.

The conflict between natural and artificial, human and extension, is further complicated by
the “naturalness” of the other characters. Hammer is never out of costume, and he proclaims, “I
don’t go to the gym, I’m just naturally like this,” stating that his superhuman strength is an
inherent quality, but also implying that his costume (and perhaps even his cheesy personality) is
an essentialized part of who he is. Moist, Horrible’s friend and presumably a member of the
Henchmen’s Union, appears to be naturally moist. He always wears jeans and t-shirts while
sweating copiously and dampening things around him, regardless of whether he wants to or not.
Bad Horse is actually a horse, but one who communicates through the Bad Horse Chorus. The
Pink Pummeler, Purple Pimp, and members of the Evil League of Evil are only seen in costume.
And Penny, who has no superpowers, is naturally ordinary, along with the Mayor, the
newscasters, the homeless, and the groupies. In fact, the only costume changes we see, other than
Horrible’s, are those of the groupies, when they cease being fans of Hammer and don Horrible t-
shirts and goggles.

**Superpowers and post-humanism**

Superheroes and supervillains tend to be super on the merits of their superpowers. In
superpower mythos, a hero or villain obtains or possesses their powers through various tropes of
artificiality or natural ability. The MMORPG *City of Heroes* offers a good but problematic
breakdown of these tropes in their character builder, offering players hero powers from the
following origin categories: Mutant, Science, Technology, Natural, and Magic (Harper par. 5).
Kareem Harper summarizes these origins in a *CoH* review:
What Cryptic Studios did was take around 200 superheroes from comic history and narrow down their abilities into these five categories. Mutants are born with their powers, which usually awaken around puberty; science origin characters gained their powers through some weird scientific mishap or deliberate self-experimentation; for fans of the Punisher or Iron Man, technology origin characters use self-created gadgets to do the dirty crime fighting work; and natural origin characters, not unlike Batman, are ordinary guys that fine tuned their body to "above average" levels. Lastly, heroes with magical origins obtained their powers through a magical source, an artifact or maybe some arcane ritual. (par. 5)

While these origins are a good starting point, they do offer some problems. Superman, for example, is an alien, and I’m not sure that “Mutant” offers an accurate description of his powers. And Batman still seems more technological than natural to me (perhaps because his use of gadgetry tends to be emphasized in the films). Still, these origin categories refer to two major differences in superhero or supervillain powers: there are powers that are possessed, and there are powers that are acquired. And these powers are inside or outside the superhuman body. For Captain Hammer, there is super strength. For Dr. Horrible, there’s the freeze-ray. And either origin of power points toward the same result—the hero, the villain, is or becomes something other than human. They become super-human. Or, to put it another way, they become hybrids of human-ness and other-ness, that are more than human, that are beyond human. They are, in fact, post-human. The post-human, for N. Katherine Hayles, “does not require the subject to be a literal cyborg” (4). Rather, post-humanism is marked by the fluidity of boundaries between bodily self and environment, where the post-human subject is constructed through interactions and feedback loops between not only the self, but the self and the environment (Hayles 2).
Superpowers, whether inside or outside the body, exert influence on the world that extends the subject’s agency farther than ordinary, everyday abilities could. As Hayles states, “The post-human subject is an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction” (3). The line of difference between the body, and the tools used by the body to affect change in the surrounding world doesn’t just become blurred; it evaporates. The acquired and possessed superpowers extends Horrible’s and Hammer’s ability to participate in and interact with not only the world around them, but with each other.

And it is the post-humanity of Horrible and Hammer that is more important than their villainy or heroism, and that connects their performances (and attempted performances) of proto-masculinity. As superhero and supervillain, Horrible and Hammer have more commonalities than differences. Jim Krueger in his “Introduction” to Volume 1 of *Justice*, and writes,

Perhaps this is the difference between a hero and a villain: A villain will seek to defeat a hero for the villain’s sake; a hero will seek to defeat a villain for the villain’s sake. It’s a fight to save the enemy at the same time that it is a fight to defeat him.

This is my distinction, at least. (1)

Krueger’s distinction makes little distinction possible between Horrible and Hammer. Neither Horrible nor Hammer attempt to save the other. Horrible’s decision to kill Hammer is prompted by the epiphany that he can rid himself of an obnoxious romantic rival while at the same time fulfilling Bad Horse’s assassination requirement to join the E.L.E. And more importantly, by killing Hammer, Horrible’s proto-masculine performance will become THE proto-masculine performance; he will no longer have Hammer to compare himself to. Horrible’s motives are entirely self-serving; even though he talks about changing the world, at the same time he insults
and mocks the people of that world, calling them “sheep,” “lemmings,” and “cavemen.”

Hammer, meanwhile, constantly pummels Horrible, bullying him more than attempting to defeat him. He never attempts to save Horrible or convince him to renounce his life of crime and villainy. And when Hammer picks up the damaged Death Ray and focuses it on Horrible, he says, “I don’t have time for your warnings. You give my regards to St. Peter. Or whoever has his job, but in Hell,” a malicious muddled statement that indicates Hammer’s intent to kill Horrible, and not even for the good of society, but because Horrible has simply become too much of annoyance to Hammer’s own success and proto-masculine performace. The hero, for Kreuger, attempts to save the villain for the villain’s sake; he attempts to save the villain’s inherent goodness and humanity. But these men have no interest in each other’s humanities, they are only concerned with each other’s post-humanism and proto-masculine performances. As Horrible tells Hammer, “Your disguise is slipping, I think you’re slipping,” referring not to Hammer’s costume or persona, but his disguise as a “natural” hero and “natural” post-human, proto-masculine male. Hammer is no more a hero than Horrible is; Hammer, like Horrible, is merely another post-human performer aspiring to perform proto-masculine ideals.

It is notable in the comic book world of Horrible and Hammer that there are no superheroes; there are only people with superpowers and people without superpowers. The only “superhero” we see is Hammer; the only other superhero reference we have is to Johnny Snow, who apparently somehow shoots an ice beam and wants to battle Horrible in parks. Snow doesn’t seem very concerned with “saving” Horrible, or anyone else, for that matter. And while there is the Evil League of Evil, an organization of supervillains, and the Henchman’s Union, presumably an affiliated organization or subsidiary, there appears to be no superhero organizations or unions for superhero sidekicks. The superheroes are remarkably absent, and we
can only infer they, too, are not as heroic as media hype would make them. The furniture movers’ conversation indicates that heroes are not heroes at all in this world; when the first mover remarks, “So they say Captain Hammer’s become a crusader. Political. He’s cleaning up the streets,” his colleague replies, “About time!” The brief conversation indicates that the superheroes aren’t interested in saving people or the world. While Captain Hammer may not be an actual superhero, he has the support and admiration of society. He has media support, groupies, and influence with the Mayor. It is Hammer’s signature that convinces the Mayor to donate the building that was slated to be destroyed to the Caring Hands Homeless Shelter. Hammer’s groupies collect his autographs, hair, and dry cleaning receipts. And the two newscasters praise Hammer’s super-heroism, saying, “It’s a good day to be homeless!” and later display his quote “I wanna be an example for children and stuff” at the bottom of the screen. But when Hammer is defeated by Horrible, Horrible begins to receive media attention instead. He is named “Worst Villain Ever,” and the newscasters cry over Hammer’s defeat. He is vilified as much as Hammer was heroicized; when the groupies change costumes into Horrible t-shirts, they are merely trading one exaggeratedly post-human, proto-masculine pop icon for another.

Horrible and Hammer are more intent on their conflict with each other than with saving people or changing the world, regardless of what they say. At the same time, they agree more with each other than with anyone else, especially Penny. Both Horrible and Hammer sing that “a man’s gotta do what a man’s gotta do,” a song that ends with Horrible’s frustrated, and particularly appropriate, cry of “Balls!” This song is one of only two duets that Horrible sings, and it emphasizes the exaggeratedly proto-masculine performances of the characters. Hammer conforms to this comic books world’s current concepts of ideal manliness, and is positioned in the location of power and dominance. Dorky Billy, performing evil Horrible, aspires to
Hammer’s proto-masculine performance of power. Not only is this song one of only two where Horrible sings with other characters (the other is Billy’s duet with Penny, where he claims evil is on the rise and she claims harmony is on the rise), this song is literally a turning point for Horrible. He begins the song as Billy, talking to Penny in an alley. “She talked to me!” he rejoices, as Penny walks away, “Why did she talk to me NOW? Maybe I should . . .” he trails off, and hesitates, looking between Penny and the courier van he is about to rob. Making his decision, based on the idea that “a man’s gotta do what a man’s gotta do,” Billy proceeds with the robbery, ducking behind a stairwell and re-emerging in his Dr. Horrible lab coat, gloves, and goggles. Horrible’s decision to continue with his robbery is motivated by the same premise that Hammer uses to save lives—an imperative to conform to proto-masculine performances—and it is this crux that will ultimately result in Penny’s death.

**Post-humanism, proto-masculinity, and the death of humanism**

After all, who is Penny? Arguably the least developed character, she is also the only main character who is a woman. Although she has no superpowers, she is possibly the most heroic character in the story. She devotes herself to helping the homeless. She believes in human nature, human kindness, and hope. On her date with Hammer, after she has taken him to the homeless shelter, she sings, “And I believe there’s good in everybody’s heart, keep it safe and sound. With hope you can do your part to turn a life around.” She believes that world is “finally growing wise,” and that “harmony is on the rise.” In the laundromat with Billy she sings, “Even in the darkness, every color can be found. And every day of rain brings water flowing to things growing in the ground.” Her optimism, hope, and faith in humanity are even more poignant when she sings, “Dreams are easy to achieve, if hope is all I’m hoping to be.” Penny’s faith in hope
and the intrinsic goodness of human nature seems to define her; she hopes to be hope, and hope is what makes the realization of dreams possible. Penny’s traits and actions fall into stereotypical roles of nurturing womanhood. Her performances never dominate the performances of Horrible and Hammer, but remain in the background as supporting performances.

Penny also has the most ineffective rhetoric of anyone in the story. When she attempts to collect signatures for the Caring Hands Homeless Shelter, she sings, “Will you lend a caring hand to shelter those who need it? Only have to sign your name, don’t even have to read it. Would you help? No? How bout you?” Her appeals fail utterly as the passers-by on the street hardly look at her. No one is interested in signing her petition, or listening to her plea. It is Hammer who manages to convince the Mayor to donate the building to the shelter—not Penny. And Hammer is credited with becoming a crusader for the impoverished and homeless; Penny herself even credits him when she sings to him, “So they say we’ll have blankets and beds; we can open by Monday, thanks to you.” “Thanks to me!” Hammer replies. Hammer only credits Penny with “turn[ing him] on to this whole homeless . . . thing, which is terrible.” Even during the dedication ceremony of the homeless shelter Penny is not given a speaking role—the podium is given to Hammer, and he, instead of Penny, presents a speech on homeless problem. Penny is never heard, even when she speaks. Her delivery and her performance completely fail to engage her audiences. She never speaks from a traditional oratorical space, such as a podium or stage, and when she does speak, soliciting signatures for the shelter, her delivery expects rejection. She passively waits for people to walk by, and rather than engaging them directly, she extends her clipboard in their direction. She almost appears to be talking to herself, rather than engaging in a public address. In private conversations, however, with Horrible and Hammer, Penny initiates the conversations, and tells them about her work with the homeless. At the same time, however,
she fails to convince Horrible and Hammer to support her cause; both of them are more
interested in Penny herself than in the homeless, and only support her attempts to donate the
building to the shelter in order to further their own deliveries of themselves as good men. Penny
becomes nothing more than a foil for these men’s own deliveries of themselves.

Hammer is able to get far more people to participate than Penny does. Before beginning his
speech at the building dedication ceremony, the Mayor introduces Hammer and says, "Justice
has a name. And that name that it has, other than Justice, is Captain Hammer. Ladies and
Gentlemen, YOUR hero!" And Hammer, during his speech, tells his audience that they are
heroes, too. He not only sings that, “Everyone’s a hero in their own way,” a statement that he
continually undermines by saying things like, “you and you and mostly me and you,” but he also
encourages his entire audience to sing along. He shouts “Everybody!” and his audience becomes
his chorus. He sings “Everyone’s a hero in their own way,” and his audience replies, “We’re
heroes too!” To his statement, “Everyone can blaze a hero’s trail,” his audience sings, “We’re
just like you!” Hammer’s delivery is powerful enough to capture his audience and engage them.
He throws away his note cards, stating that he doesn’t need them. He moves from behind the
podium to address his audience, and jumps off stage to engage them in his oratory. He gestures
with his fists, which are, as Hammer stated earlier, his penis. His performance and delivery is
categorized again and again by his exaggerated proto-masculine performance.

During Hammer’s speech, Penny becomes almost invisible. While Hammer addresses his
audience, Penny attempts to slip away unnoticed, and his audience is paying no attention to her.
She is so invisible that Horrible, when he attempts to brace himself to shoot Hammer with his
Death Ray, hasn’t even realized that she is still in the room. When the Death Ray explodes,
Hammer runs out of the room shouting and crying without realizing that Penny is wounded and
dying. At first, Horrible also fails to realize that she has been wounded, and after glancing around the room he sees the girl of his dreams pierced by shrapnel. After her death, she receives some attention in the media frenzy of flashbulbs, although most of that attention is focused on Horrible as the reporters ask, “Dr. Horrible! Why’d you kill her?” Afterwards, her death is headline news, but she isn’t. “The Country Mourns What’s-Her-Name” and “Heroes Girlfriend Murdered” are splashed across the newspapers, as Horrible is lauded as the “Worst Villain Ever.” The news media focuses on Penny’s death only in relation to Hammer and Horrible and neglects to mention Penny’s attempts to help the homeless. If Penny is a hero, then she’s an unsung hero. And her death, rather than saving Horrible and turning him to a life of goodness and hope, gains him entry into the Evil League of Evil. Without superpowers, Penny cannot enter the post-human world of Horrible and Hammer; in fact, she can hardly enter society. She does not appear to have a job, and we only know her through her involvement in the homeless shelter and her relationships with Hammer and Horrible. And her speeches fail, largely due to her inability to provide a compelling delivery to her audience. If Hammer and Horrible are not just post-human, but post-humanism, then Penny is more than just humane—she is humanism itself.

Humanism, for Corliss Lamont, focuses on helping others and making others happy. Lamont states, “For Humanism the central concern is always the happiness of people in this existence . . . a happiness worthwhile as an end in itself . . .” (33). One of the only things we know about Penny is that she tries to make other happy, she tries to help others for the sake of helping. Her volunteerism, without reference to paid work, makes her efforts noble, and brings her happiness. As Lamont puts it, “Each of us will find a deeper and more sustained happiness in working for a noble purpose” (118). And Penny’s optimism and faith is part of humanism’s belief in the affirmation of life, and finding happiness and beauty in sheer existence (Lamont
Penny, who went from being “lost and lonely” to believing in the innate goodness of humanity and contributing to the betterment of others, develops her morality through human association—another humanist principle (Lamont 97). She rejects divine will, or fate, when she tells Billy that “Everything happens.” Billy responds, “Don’t say for a reason.” “No,” Penny replies, “I’m just saying that everything happens.” Penny’s poor delivery and her inability to engage her audiences also indicate her humanistic paradigm. Humanism’s emphasis on innate goodness contradicts the artificiality and cultivation, the performativity, required for a strong delivery. The values of humanism echo the values of ancient Greece and Rome, and these values are particularly evident in classical delivery, where in order to speak well, a man needed to have natural talent that he refined through practice, be innately good and virtuous, and use rhetoric for the benefit of others, whether they wanted to be helped or not. Penny’s delivery is poor for two primary reasons: first, because her humanism prevents her from using delivery that is appropriate to her time period, and second, because her feminine performativity prevents her from being a good man speaking well. In classical rhetoric, a woman couldn’t speak, and proto-masculinity was embedded into delivery instruction. Penny’s performance of gender remains strictly classically feminine—subordinate, quiet, and meek—and her gender role performance confines her to the role of love interest for Horrible and Hammer. Penny cannot speak effectively because her humanism prevents her from using an effective, contemporary delivery and naturalizes her gender as innate and subordinate. She cannot perform and participate rhetorically because her delivery has failed to evolve.

In a sense, it is both Horrible and Hammer who kill Penny. After all, Horrible and Hammer are simply two sides of the same coin: Horrible is post-human through his acquisition of powers, of technology, and Hammer is post-human through his possession of powers, of super
strength, and both perform proto-masculinity. In the final stand off between Horrible and Hammer, during the dedication ceremony of the building to the Caring Hands Homeless Shelter, Horrible and Hammer become mirror images of one another. The statue of Captain Hammer that was to be unveiled at the dedication ceremony is not a statue, but Dr. Horrible, who, when unveiled, freezes Hammer. Hidden beneath the veil, standing exactly opposite of Hammer at the podium, Horrible disguises himself as statue of Hammer while Hammer sings. The veil slips from Horrible as he laughs and fires his freeze-ray, effectively turning Hammer into a statue himself. Shortly after Horrible has been unveiled and has frozen Hammer is when he accuses Hammer, and Hammer’s disguise, of “slipping,” a noteworthy choice of phrasing since the veil has just slipped away from Horrible. Hammer remains a statue while Horrible sings, saying, among other things, that “I bring you pain, the kind you can’t suffer quietly. Fire up your brain, remind you inside you’re rioting. Society is slipping, everything’s slipping . . . away, so go ahead, run away, say it was horrible.” While Hammer is frozen into a statue, Horrible proclaims that “heroes are over with,” and braces himself to kill Hammer with his newly designed Death Ray. Hoping the Penny doesn’t see, he gets ready to pull the trigger when the freeze ray fails, Hammer recovers, punches Horrible and damages the Ray, and then explodes the Ray in a stunning misfire that inadvertently kills Penny (although no one else is physically injured, barring Hammer, who feels pain for what is apparently the first time). Horrible’s creation and introduction of the Death Ray, and Hammer’s punch damaging the Ray and his misuse of the damaged weapon, combine together to result in Penny’s death. Together, natural powers possessed and artificial powers acquired, both battling over proto-masculinity, form the weapon of humanism’s demise. And while both Hammer’s and Horrible’s performances are post-human performances of proto-masculinity, Horrible defeats Hammer, and his “natural” post-humanism
proto-masculinity. Plus, his triumph contributes to Penny’s death, and her natural humanism and classical values. Only the artificial delivery, the evolved delivery from performativity, of Horrible remains.

As Penny lies on floor, gasping and dying, she looks at Horrible and says, “Billy? Is that you? Are you all right? It’s okay. It’s okay. Captain Hammer will save us.” Penny’s recognition of Horrible as Billy merges his two identities for the first time. Her reassurances, followed by her inclusion of “us,” highlights Billy’s humanism while combined with Horrible’s post-humanist garb. The combination of Billy and Horrible’s identity, in fact, speaks to evolution. Horrible, then, is the evolutionary step from humanism to post-humanism—artificially extended through technology, and delivery, into his subjectivity. And her appeal that Captain Hammer will save them separates them both from the “natural,” post-humanism of Hammer that echoes classical values and roots, while at the same time elevating his proto-masculinity, cloaked under the guise of superherosim, The multi-layered hybridities are, indeed, complex. Post-humanism is already hybrid, a human that is human by her or his place/function/affect/operation in systems, cultures, environments, and, yes, humanity. Horrible is an artificially extended post-human, using technology to extend his effect on and existence in society. But every artificial extension is made possible by the natural capacity that humans have for extension, malleability, and change. Our natural post-human qualities, like neural plasticity, enable our artificial post-human qualities, like computers, smart-phones, and blogs—our technologies that affect how we live in our world (Clark 5-6), which are, incidentally, not terribly dissimilar in function from the Bad Horse Chorus. Horrible’s proto-masculine performance attempts, in order to gain the superiority and power that Hammer possesses, are also revealed as artificial performances, as an act that he uses as an extension of character to operate and function within this comic book world. But at the
same time, his proto-masculine performance is a technology that affects his function and location in his world. The fans and the news media are the key to the affects of Horrible’s successful performativity of proto-masculinity. After Penny’s death, the fans switch sides, and become fans of Horrible, rather than Hammer. The news media places Horrible in the slot of #1 with the accolade “Worst Villain Ever,” and Hammer’s news coverage in reduced. Since hero and villain have no real meaning in this world, the two men are effectively swapped, and Horrible now occupies the primary position of power, and becomes the reference for ideal proto-masculine performance. Because his audience recognizes and validates the efficacy of his performance, his delivery of proto-masculinity acts as a technology that effects and changes the world around him.

Penny, Hammer, and Horrible’s performances demonstrate the evolution of delivery from a prescriptive set of instructions that emphasize the development of natural, innate abilities, to a post-human, cyborgization of performance. Neither Hammer nor Horrible are innately good or innately evil, and Penny’s death serves as the evolutionary step in delivery—the end of a naturally good man speaking well and the shift to deliveries that are constructed between audience and speaker. Horrible and Hammer battle over proto-masculine, post-human performativity, and they battle for superiority of performance. The comic books world of Dr. Horrible serves to exaggerate their proto-masculine post-humanism, but they themselves are never heroes or villains, but merely post-human male performers. The audience of that battle is two-fold: the audience of characters who have no claim to post-humanity in this exaggeratedly post-human, super-human world, and the viewers of the film who watch the battle unfold. For the audience of characters, the Hammer fans, the TV newscasters, the mayor, and the population of this city, Horrible’s performance wins. The Hammer fans become Horrible fans, the news media celebrates Horrible and gives him the position of superiority and highest rank of villain,
effectively making him “number one.” And the audience shift in acceptance of proto-masculine ideals is what concretizes those ideals yet again; Horrible is only “number one” because the fans and news media, who represent society in this comic book world, say that he is number one. The delivery of proto-masculinity creates the performativity of proto-masculinity, where the performance is acknowledged and validated, through the technology of delivery, in order to be legitimate.

**Evolution, cyborgs, and proto-masculinity**

At the end of the story, in the final scene, Horrible sits at his blog, as Billy, for the first time, finishing his song with “and I won’t feel . . . a thing.” Billy’s appearance at Horrible’s blog is the realization of his own post-humanity and cyborg subjectivity—Billy is Dr. Horrible by extension. Billy’s engagement and effect on the world happens not through his ordinary “Billy-ness,” but through the enhancements that make him Dr. Horrible. And his new clothes, his new Horrible costume that he dons when he is accepted into the Evil League of Evil, indicate that his delivery of Horrible is a technology of performative rhetoric. Billy, through his performances of his subjectivity, is a cyborg, whose use of technology extends his influence on the environment around him. And his blog, Horrible’s blog, is another way he uses technology to expand and extend his delivery, his performance, his subjectivity. As Billy sits in front of his blog the viewers see that Billy is the technology user, and that his delivery is the primary technology he uses to be Horrible, not just his Transmatter Ray or Freeze Ray or Death Ray. And it is his use of the technology of delivery to perpetuate proto-masculinity that kills Penny, that results in the death of the female, because her inability to participate in the exaggerated proto-masculinity of this comic book world. Penny is collateral damage in the battle for proto-masculine dominance.
The message behind *Dr. Horrible* is death rays don’t kill people; embedded proto-masculine ideologies in the technology of delivery kill people. And, arguably, all people, not only women, because Billy, sitting at his blog, certainly doesn’t appear fulfilled, happy, or whole. Billy, with his achievement of proto-masculine dominance and his Horrible triumph, is left without feeling—a cyborg, but a broken cyborg.

In addition to the rather allegorical message of *Dr. Horrible*, the short musical web-film told in a blog frame is, itself, the message. The medium of *Dr. Horrible* allows viewers to engage in the narrative in ways that television viewing doesn’t (currently) allow. As we watch the web-film on a computer screen, we begin to engage in the video blog, interacting with our screens, and our protagonist, more closely than we do when we watch a television screen. Like Henry Jenkins’ participatory culture, where consumers and viewers interact to create new media dynamics (loc. 187), we are asked to participate as blog viewers and media consumers, both with the actors and the media format. The physical proximity of the computer is closer, the blog directly addresses us as viewers—instead of being asked to watch a narrative unfold, we are asked to listen to Horrible’s journal, his video web-log. We immediately become extended and folded into the story even as we later become more distanced by the cinematography. But we are always pulled back to the blog. We are asked to engage directly with the experience of the narrative, an experience that is normally considered humanistic, while engaging with that narrative post-humanly, through a computer, and a blog frame. And the narrative itself engages in transmedia storytelling, and “unfolds across multiple media platforms with each new text making a distinctive and valuable contribution to the whole” (Jenkins loc. 1979). Each shift within the narrative between blog, song, and film serves to hybridize these various media platforms within the narrative, while the Internet release, DVD release, Wiki, and comic serve to
expand and hybridize the narrative in different mediums. The hybridity of Dr. Horrible echoes our own hybridity as humans becoming and being post-human cyborgs. Like Horrible, we must negotiate our hybridity even as we resist it. When we watch Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog at our computers, it is our own confrontations with humanism and post-humanism, our own cyborgizations, that place us in a position to “sing along.” Our own deliveries of our selves are not only located in technology of delivery, but transmedia deliveries that spread through Facebook, cell phones, texting, websites, blogs, vlogs, Skype, etc. And the evolution of delivery into a technology of transmission is what has made this spread of transmedia self-narrative possible, and what makes Dr. Horrible such a compelling example of delivery’s evolution.

Failing to acknowledge the evolution of delivery, and delivery’s technology of transmission that creates subjectivity, including gender, within the locus of message exchange between speakers and audiences, re-naturalizes and re-concretizes proto-masculine imperatives into delivery and rhetoric. Just like in Dr. Horrible, if the proto-masculinity of the delivery is not acknowledged, and seen as an operation of delivery, it is easy to get side-tracked by the villainy and heroism of the characters. Delivery has evolved into a post-human, cyborg technology that allows us to extend our influence, to affect the world around ourselves, through language. We are, as Clark puts it, “natural-born cyborgs” (3), and in order to take advantage of the possibility cyborgization offers us, we need to stop being solely concerned with systems, and start being more concerned with the mechanics of how systems were, and are, created, and investigate how these systems have evolved, merged, and overlapped into cohesive structures. By regulating delivery to a system of mechanics for transmission, we overlook how delivery continues to prescribe values and behavior. We are, as Andy Clark claims, “creatures whose minds are special precisely because they are tailor-made for multiple mergers and coalitions” (7). We have already
extended ourselves further than ever before by using smart phones, computers, satellites, blogs, cyber-texts, pacemakers, and robotics. The further we extend, the more we de-center our own subjectivity—paradoxically enough, by using the very traits that make up our subjectivities. And delivery, particularly in light of its evolution, needs to be considered a part of this extension. Because, after all, it’s not the clothes that make the man; the clothes, instead, make the cyborg.
7 CONCLUSION

Gender studies, overall, has focused almost exclusively on investigating how gender is constructed; however, not many theorists have investigated how gender is transmitted and delivered. In rhetoric, gender theorists have focused on the recovery of women speakers and rhetors, on re-working the rhetorical canons to include women, or on how women have created, or been excluded from, spaces in which to speak. In literary theory, gender theorists have focused on the construction of gender, identity politics, and subjectivity. In both fields, these projects are crucial, but incomplete because gender continues to be presented as a construction that is made by discourse and adherence to social norms. There has been no rhetorical account of gender that looks at how gender functions as a delivered interaction between language users. The neglect of delivery, by both rhetoric and literary theory, is a lack in the discourses of both fields that naturalizes delivery as something one just does, which in turn naturalizes the proto-masculine imperatives and values embedded into delivery.

Rhetoric and literary theory are assumed to already be masculine discourses, into which women must make spaces, make voices, and make identities. This assumption is a naturalization stemming from the neglect of how gender is transmitted through and within language. Neither discourse is “already” masculine, they were made masculine through prescriptive norming and reification of masculine standards, through the citation of masculinity. The classical canon, particularly in the fields of rhetoric and philosophy, demonstrates this embedding of a certain kind of masculinity. Within both fields, historiographers have sought, and continue to seek, women thinkers, writers, and speakers whose works have not been included in the classical canon in order to include them and de-masculinize the canon itself. However, to call this canon masculine, simply because the works included within it were written by men, ignores the very
specific kinds of masculinity these men were required to enact and perform—masculinity that hinged upon class, race, citizenship, education, sexual orientation, laws, customs, and so forth. The classical canon, rather than being masculine, performs (and continues to deliver) the masculinity that became embedded within it.

It is important to re-vitalize and re-situate delivery within the rhetorical canons because delivery is a performative device, a performative technology, for creating and transmitting gender, where authority and ethos have become tied to performances of ideal masculinity. By looking at how delivery is performative, and how delivery creates the very citationality that makes performativity possible, it becomes clear that gender is a negotiation between speaker and audience—a thing that is only present within transmission. And because transmission is taught, because delivery has rules, gender ideals have become embedded in our use and perception of language. Ideal masculinities are not authoritative, are not cultural ideals, simply because they involve the gender of a man. They are ideals because they cite an authoritative construction in which an ideal masculinity has become embedded. And with the removal of delivery from the rhetorical canons, these ideals have become re-naturalized and standardized, and other subjects are left fighting for voices by speaking in the gaps and from the margins. By re-situating delivery’s importance within the rhetorical canons we can create a more effective and comprehensive approach to gender inquiry while at the same time restoring emphasis to delivery, and its evolution, in the rhetorical canons. The current practice of treating delivery like a tool that rhetoric can put aside and store, and then pick up and use as needed perpetuates the connection between ethos and authority to proto-masculine performances of gender because it does not question this connection; continuing to treat delivery like a tool creates the citationality that
continues to reify the connection between ethos and authority proto-masculine performances
gender and embed it even further.

By continuing to neglect delivery because it is supposedly no longer relevant to rhetorical
studies, or relevant only when discussing technology and the transmission of information
digitally and electronically, we not only perpetuate these ideologies, but also help naturalize
them. Delivery is critical in order to understand how systems for communicating are
performative systems, and performative technologies, because delivery is a technology that
organizes and transmits communication, including gender and gender performances. Delivery
has evolved from an instructional system of prescribed rules of behavior embedded with proto-
masculine ideals into a cyborg technology where gender is constructed within the locus of
transmission between speakers and audiences. The perpetuation of proto-masculinity within
delivery comes from the displacement of delivery to describing transmissions of technology,
without taking into consideration the evolution of delivery into a technology itself. Dr Horrible’s
Sing-Along Blog should be taken as a cautionary tale—if we simply battle for dominance, for
supremacy of gender, without taking into account the ways we deliver our battles, we easily fall
into the trap of claiming and perpetuating proto-masculinity by adopting it, by battling for the
power of those particular traits, and the collateral damage will continue to be all of the people
who, for whatever various reasons, are unable to access the power because they lack the
necessary deliveries. Instead, we need to take advantage of the benefits the cyborgization of
delivery offers us, particularly the opportunities to re-construct gender as fluid, dynamic,
unstable identity that changes within the locus of speaker and audience.

The evolution of delivery offers the opportunity to de-stabilize the imperatives of proto-
masculinity. As delivery began to evolve, proto-masculinity remained connected with spoken
performances. But with delivery’s evolution into a cyborg technology, proto-masculinity can become de-stabilized from the feedback loop of the technology of delivery. As Donna Harraway puts it in “A Manifesto for Cyborgs,” “Pre-cybernetic machines could be haunted; there was always the specter of the ghost in the machine . . . But basically machines were not self-moving, self-designing, autonomous. They could not achieve man’s dream, only mock it. They were not man, an author to himself, but only a caricature of that masculinist reproductive dream” (2272). The ghost of proto-masculinity, with delivery’s evolution into a cyborg technology, no longer fits into the cogs of the machine as smoothly as it once did. Because we are all now cyborgs (Harraway 2270), systems, and technologies of ontologies, there is no longer the same room for the “ghosts” to occupy. The possibility of constructing “rooms of our own,” as Virginia Woolf would say, is a much greater reality now, if only because as cyborgs, we are also construction workers, constructing and creating our own interfaces through language, our own cyborg identities, and our own systems of circuitry. Because our cyborgization is our own, there doesn’t have to be room for a specter to control the machine for us, unless we let it.

As a cyborg technology, delivery offers the opportunity to reinvent and reconstruct gender identification because cyborg delivery constructs gender in the liminal spaces of interactions between audiences and speakers. Gender performances do not have to conform to gender imperatives. The power of cyborgization is that hybridization allows us to move beyond static definitions. As Harraway puts it, “The cyborg skips the step of original unity, of identification with nature in the Western sense” (2270). However, the revival of delivery in conjunction with technological communication re-makes this step by situating delivery solely within its classical origins. If delivery continues to be studied only as a modified canon suited for explaining and describing electronic and digital transmission of information, then the
cyborgization of delivery through its evolution becomes lost, and so does the transformative power of delivery to reconstruct gender and ontology within the spaces of rhetorical interactions. By tying delivery to its classical origins, instead of considering how delivery has evolved from those origins, proto-masculinity remains attached to delivery systems, and the “ghost” of proto-masculinity remains the specter in the machine. In feminist rhetoric, we can see some of these repercussions, because, as Harraway states, “Taxonomies of feminism produced epistemologies to police deviation from official women’s experiences” (2277). These taxonomies themselves are based on the policing of proto-masculinity in delivery and rhetoric, which discourage men’s deviation from proto-masculine being/performing. By ignoring the proto-masculine in delivery, we allow these taxonomies to perpetuate themselves, creating systems of (r)evolution that mimic systems of oppression. Feminisms frequently create boundaries for what is female and/or feminine based on the same taxonomic structure used by proto-masculinity. Women’s experiences, then, become regulated by the same theoretical systems that attempt to overthrow patriarchal domination by reinscribing the same policing measures that patriarchy uses against men, but against women and used by women. Cyborg delivery, however, allows the detachment of delivery from the originally inscribed proto-masculine delivery, and opens the door to ontologies are that are created, in systems, by speakers, audiences, and text, instead of ontologies and gender constructions that are prescribed. Neglecting delivery as a technology, and only using it as tool for digital and electronic rhetorics, prevents the full (r)evolutionary power of delivery from being apparent. As Harraway puts it,

> It is crucial to remember that what is lost, perhaps especially from women’s points of view, is often virulent forms of oppression, nostalgically naturalized in the face of current violation. Ambivalence toward the disrupted unities mediated by high-tech culture
requires not sorting consciousness into categories of “clear-sighted critique grounding a solid political epistemology” versus “manipulated false consciousness,” but subtle understanding of emerging pleasures, experiences, and powers with serious potential for changing the rules of the game. (2291)

It is the ambiguity of cyborg delivery, the potential for making gender in liminal spaces, in the invisible circuits of speaker/audience interactions, that allows “the rules of the game,” the rules of delivery, to change.

Harraway explains that communication technologies are essential for re-creating social relations because cyborgization makes boundaries permeable. She states:

Communication technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools recrafting our bodies. These tools embody and enforce new social relations for women worldwide. . . . The boundary is permeable between tool and myth, instrument and concept, historical systems of social relations and historical anatomies of possible bodies, including objects of knowledge. Indeed, myth and tool mutually constitute each other. (2284)

This permeability is what can allow the alteration of proto-masculinity through delivery. Circuitry, such as the circuitry of the spaces in rhetorical situations, in not merely a one way street. Communications do not go from point A to point B; instead, they operate in a feedback loop, where the audience and speaker are constantly passing information back and forth in effort to maximum performative possibility. The boundaries between the two become blurry, just as the boundaries between machine and organism become blurred in the cyborg itself. Harraway claims, “Communications sciences and biology are constructions of natural-technical objects of knowledge in which the difference between machine and organism is thoroughly blurred; mind, body, and tool are on very intimate terms” (2285). Proto-masculinity is all about boundaries—
who can speak, how they can speak, and when they can speak. But cyborg delivery blurs those boundaries, and the imperatives of proto-masculinity that were embedded in delivery and spread into rhetoric can be reduced to perforated lines instead of solid, exclusionary ones. And with their perforation, the possibility of removing proto-masculinity altogether becomes possible. Harraway, instead of discussing cyborg delivery, discusses cyborg writing, and states, “Cyborg writing is about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other” (2293). But cyborg delivery has the same capabilities, and same power to seize, not tools, but systems, and use them to “mark the world.” Cyborg delivery, because it is a technology that can be used as a tool, like writing, operates within the spaces that allow change and transformation to occur.

Delivery remains the most crucial rhetorical canon because it is through delivery that cyborg politics is able to disrupt embedded proto-masculinity. Harraway claims, “Cyborg politics is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism” (2295). As delivery evolved from a set of rules, of central tenants geared towards developing the “ideal orator,” delivery moved away from the perfect translation of an orator’s character into the orator’s performance of the ideal man, and moved towards a performative construction of speaker that occurs in tandem with the audience. Proto-masculinity sets itself up as the one “true” code and system of rules of delivery, particularly with classical rhetorics insistence that delivery is refined from innate, natural talents. Cyborg delivery puts the proto-masculinity of delivery into contention, and dislocates it from its central position, allowing resistance and alteration by creating gender within interactions, instead of creating gender by following prescribed rules laid down in classical delivery. And it is cyborg delivery that we can use to, as
Harraway puts it, “learn from our fusions with animals and machines how not to be Man, the embodiment of Western logos” (2292). Instead of forcing us (or, at least, those who had the accessibility) to be “Man,” like proto-masculinity in classical delivery did, cyborg delivery allows us to engage in gender evolution, and be spectrums of genders. Our connections to each other, and language, are more complex through cyborg delivery, allowing more complex performances. Harraway states, “It is no accident that the symbolic system of the family of man—and so the essence of woman—breaks up at the same moment that networks of connection among people on the planet are unprecedentedly multiple, pregnant, and complex . . . . It is no accident that woman disintegrates into women in our time ” (2281). The multiplicity of “women,” which is also a multiplicity of the disintegration of man to men, is more than just a plurality of persons, but a plurality of person performances in one person. As cyborgs, we are circuits and hybrids and pluralities of identity; cyborg delivery highlights these pluralities and hybridities, instead of forcing us into false dichotomies of oppositional cohesions. Neglecting the evolution of delivery naturalizes delivery as a unifying system of performance, when delivery instead maximizes the hybridity of ontological constructions.

Delivery’s evolution and cyborgization must be recognized and resituated within the rhetorical canons in order to avoid the complicity of naturalization of the proto-masculine. By adding the evolution of delivery to the rhetorical map, we will be able explore how to re-map rhetoric, as Cheryl Glenn states, in order to add marginalized voices to the field (293-4). In addition, by resituating delivery and understanding delivery as a cyborg technology, not only can gender be explored and performed for the hybridity it has evolved into, but the hybridities of cyborgization of rhetoric in the digital age can be more fully explored and understood. Exploring the transition from orators to cyborgs allows rhetoric not only to understand and explore its own
cyborgizing traits, but also the place of a cyborg rhetoric within the larger scope of language studies. In this post-human evolution, rhetoric has evolved along with delivery. These evolutions should be explored, not only in conjunction with embedded proto-masculinities, but also within the field of rhetoric itself. With a cyborg delivery as a part of rhetoric, restored to the rhetorical canons, the functioning of those canons and their delineations become, by cyborg extension, less bounded as well. By looking at delivery as a cyborg technology that has evolved from the classical instruction in antiquity, we can not only de-center proto-masculine imperatives within rhetoric and open door for further explorations of gender multiplicities, hybridities, and pluralities, but we can also open doors to investigating the hybridities and pluralities of rhetoric itself.
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