

Spring 5-2011

Communicating with the World: History of Rhetorical Responses to International Crisis and the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication

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COMMUNICATING WITH THE WORLD: HISTORY OF RHETORICAL RESPONSES
TO INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND THE
*2007 U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION*

by

LAUREL ROSE BERRYMAN

Under the Direction of Dr. Mary Stuckey

ABSTRACT

Following the events of September 11, 2001, we have seen a revival in American public diplomacy. I argue the U.S. continues to rely on similar rhetorical responses to crisis that are an essential part of American public diplomacy interconnected through history, from the birth of our country to the recent *2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*. Tracing this recurring rhetorical process from our founding to the Carter Administration illustrates our reliance on similar rhetoric despite changing contexts. I use Burke's concept of identification and the interrelated use of ethos and enemy construction to demonstrate the rhetorical parallels between the Carter Administration's 1979 Communication Plan with Muslim countries and the 2007 NSPDSC. This analysis not only contributes to the gap in public diplomacy research but provides insight into American public diplomacy since 9/11.

INDEX WORDS: Public diplomacy, Rhetoric, Communication, Identification, Enemy construction, Ethos

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2011

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May 2011

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Mary Stuckey for all the help, time and inspiration she has given me throughout this process. In addition I want to thank Dr. James Darsey and Dr. Carol Winkler, who have intellectually inspired me. I would also like to thank Pauline Rose Clance, Nancy Zumoff and Lanier Clance who have continued to listen and encourage me despite my frustrations, supporting me in every possible way. I am deeply grateful for my friend, Amy Rovere and the endless amount of time she spent not only editing my chapters but listening and helping me work through my thoughts. I would also like to thank my wonderful and supportive partner Eran Ayal for the continuing love and positive encouragement he continues to give me. Finally, I want to thank my parents for their love and support and instilling in me a deep interest in the world that continues to inspire me.

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Chapter 1:

Introduction: Understanding American Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is one of the most salient political communication issues in the 21st century. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor¹

From the conception of our country until the end of the Cold War, public diplomacy was an important part of American foreign policy (Galal 2). At the end of the Cold War, Americans started to become less involved with issues of public diplomacy thus leading to decreased funding and eventually the merging of the United States Information Agency (USIA) into the Department of State (Melissan 6). In a Congressional Research Report by a specialist in foreign policy, Susan B. Epstein explains that we became complacent following the Cold War. Congress and former administrations disregarded the need for public diplomacy, and it became “viewed as having a lower priority than political and military functions” (2). The merging of the USIA, decreased funding, and the favorable U.S. image prior to 9/11 are all factors that contributed to the loss of value and effectiveness in public diplomacy during this time (Rugh 156-157).² Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, public diplomacy has again become an important part of the American way of thinking (Melissan 6). This “revival” in American public diplomacy, is a result of the political climate since 9/11 and our war on terrorism with “anti-American/West Islamic militants” in the Middle East, primarily in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq (Snow and Taylor ix). Since 9/11, there have been various programs initiated by the U.S. government to inform,

¹ Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. “Preface and Introduction.” In *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. Eds. New York. Taylor and Francis (2009): 3-11.

² Also please see “*Views of a Changing World: How Global Publics view War in Iraq, Democracy, Islam and Governance and Globalization*,” June 2003 by The Pew Global Attitudes Project which shows a major decline in worldwide opinion following 9/11. Report can be found at <http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf>.

engage, and influence people worldwide about American values and interests. As a country, we have taken a greater interest in the study, practice, and future of public diplomacy following the 9/11 attacks. Evidence of such interest can be seen in various reports on public diplomacy, which have been published not only by government agencies, but nonprofit organizations, universities, corporations, and academic communities (Snow and Taylor ix).

This thesis will demonstrate the importance that analyzing public diplomacy rhetoric can serve and further help curtail the current lack of rhetorical analysis within the majority of public diplomacy scholarship. It is important to look at public diplomacy from a rhetorical viewpoint because “public diplomacy is, at its core, a necessarily suasive endeavor, concerned with the influence of foreign audiences and the modification of their behavior in some way” (Gerber 123). I will analyze and draw specific attention to the 2007 *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPDSC)* which is important because it is the first comprehensive strategy for creating identification in U.S. history. I will further argue that this document illuminates the history of public diplomacy and shows us how we keep recreating the same tactics/appeals since the founding of our nation. We know a great deal about how presidents react to foreign policy crises,³ but have produced very little scholarship on how the executive branch’s bureaucracy has rhetorically responded to international crises with such a strategy. This thesis is one effort to begin to close this gap.

According to the University of Southern California Center for Public Diplomacy, there is no agreed upon definition for public diplomacy. Governments, scholars, and practitioners all have their own varying definitions of public diplomacy (“What is Public Diplomacy”). The working definition the Center proposes is: “the ways in which governments (or multi-lateral

³ See *The Presidency and Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis* by Denise M. Bostdorff. University of South Carolina. 1994; *The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric*. Eds. Amos Kiewe. Preager. 1994.

organizations such as the United Nations), acting deliberately, through both official and private individuals and institutions, to communicate with citizens in other societies” (“Defining PD”). The U.S. State Department Web site states that the goal of “American public diplomacy outreach [...] includes communications with international audiences, cultural programming, academic grants, educational exchanges, international visitor programs, and U.S. Government efforts to confront ideological support for terrorism” (“Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs”). In short, our goals can be conceptualized as interacting and communicating with foreign nations in order to advocate alternative thinking and diffuse threatening extremist philosophies, which are materialized through a variety of communication outlets. There is widespread agreement on the importance of American public diplomacy, but, as a nation, we are still on a quest for its most effective form.

William A. Rugh of Georgetown’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy argues that we must not think of public diplomacy as the “panacea” of foreign policy, however, it is vital to not dismiss its importance (Introduction, 1). He draws attention to the importance of public diplomacy by pointing out the 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy that stated, “In government throughout the world, public opinion greatly influences the direction of policy” (qtd. in Rugh 1). Public diplomacy practices are facing some inevitable changes due to technological advances and changing attitudes. However, many of the strategies and tactics overwhelmingly remain the same (Rugh, Introduction 3).

In moving forward the U.S. must be “fully aware of past and present approaches [...] we should not try to reinvent the wheel” (Rugh 3). A 2009 U.S. Government Accountability Report found that we have spent close to \$10 billion on various communication endeavors to forward our goals, but “foreign public opinion polling data shows that negative views toward the United

States persist despite the collective efforts” of the variety of U.S. government agencies (“U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues”).

Although this report does not reflect the change in public opinion that occurred after President Obama was elected, Nancy Snow, a public diplomacy scholar, notes goodwill towards the U.S. cannot be sustained solely by the new Administration. Snow argues it is unrealistic to think that successful public diplomacy projects can be secured by a few who hold high ranking appointments (Snow “The Death of Public Diplomacy”). Despite the fact that the “Obama Effect” led to more immediate positive global opinions about America, Snow explains, “it’s a dangerous path on which we tread,” for we have yet to receive a new public diplomacy strategy by the Department of State and the newly appointed Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (Snow “The Death of Public Diplomacy”). Currently we face a “golden opportunity” to capitalize on any positive opinion and credibility Obama created. It is critical we seize this moment, or we may not succeed at redefining America as a non-hegemonic power (Snow “The Death of Public Diplomacy”).

One of the most important places for President Obama and the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to make positive and lasting changes is in crafting a new strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication. A 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office titled “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight” explains that a new national communication strategy is critical for the Obama Administration and Congress (1). The report further explains that the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 required that President Obama issue a new comprehensive strategy by December 2009 to guide interagency efforts” like the June 2007 national communication

strategy.⁴ For our country to maintain any goodwill gained by the 2008 election, a reworked and more effective national communication strategy would prove useful. The ways in which the U.S. communicates with other nations worldwide must remain a priority by the Obama Administration in order for us to change our image and reach our greater goals. The 2007 *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* not only can provide a valuable foundation for informing forthcoming initiatives but is essential to understand because no plan in U.S. history has been conceived to provide a comprehensive strategy to communicate American values and create identification with foreign audiences.

The 2007 *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* was not surprisingly one of the most anticipated strategies in the post 9/11 public diplomacy efforts (Dale). This strategy was developed under former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes. During her term, she formulated a policy-coordinating committee that released the 2007 NSPDSC publication (Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and National Security” 2). It served as an umbrella national strategic plan to be implemented in all government agencies. During the Bush Administration, the NSPDSC was implemented by the Department of Defense. Upon publication of this document in June 2007, Hughes presented it at a Department of Defense Conference. She explained how the document was a product of extensive research on past efforts, as well as recommendations and ideas about American public diplomacy. The plan contained three main communication strategies:

Our first strategic imperative is that America must offer people across the world a positive vision of hope that is rooted in our deepest values, our belief in liberty, in justice, in opportunity.

Our second strategic imperative is to isolate and marginalize the violent extremists and

⁴ The full report by the GAO can be found at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09679sp.pdf> with details on why the 2007 NSPDSC was not effective and gives recommendations for the forthcoming strategic communication plan.

undermine their efforts to try to appropriate religion to their cause. We must remind people that America and the West are not in conflict with any religion, but are open to all religions, and people of all faiths worship freely in America.

The third imperative, and this one sounds kind of simple – comes from a beloved former ambassador named Frank Wisner, who told me that especially at a time of war and common threats, that it is very important that America actively nurture and foster common interests and common values between Americans and people of different countries and cultures and faiths across the world (Hughes “Strategic Communication”).

The communication strategies outlined by Hughes at the Department of Defense Conference illustrate the NSPDSC’s principle goals and major rhetorical themes that will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 3. In this statement, Hughes emphasizes the opportunities the U.S. can provide for a better life, our desire to work with all people in fighting extremists and how America must continue to nurture commonalities that all human beings share. These key components are important because they focus on democratic values, constructing the enemy as a threat to humanity and the promotion of common interests/values. These themes reveal themselves repeatedly both in the NSPDSC and in American public diplomacy history. This speech serves as a telling example of the various rhetorical choices I will analyze within the following chapters.

A rhetorical analysis of the 2007 NSPDSC helps show how the U.S. has sought to implement a standard across all sectors of government and contributes to public diplomacy scholarship by revealing how our government continues to use recurring rhetoric, teaching us about our past and important as we create new rhetoric. Understanding and analyzing past rhetorical choices is necessary in order to leave problematic strategies behind and embrace new ways of communicating. In conducting a close rhetorical reading of the 2007 NSPDSC, I will show how the document reveals our nation’s continued reliance of similar rhetorical appeals to foreign audiences. Although created under the Bush Administration, a more nuanced and in-

depth analysis of this text warrants attention because it is a historical public diplomacy document which will be used to inform the forthcoming strategy (“U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues” GAO report).

The 2007 NSPDSC is a combination of recommendations and mandatory communicative actions each government agency was to use in developing departmental communication strategies. The 2007 NSPDSC is important because it is the first national strategic communication plan of its kind designed to be implemented in all government agencies. The 2007 NSPDSC is a response to crisis, and shows how we again have seen an extensive resurgence in American public diplomacy since September 11, 2001. Therefore, it is vital to examine the rhetorical workings within this important government document that will greatly shape our future diplomatic efforts.

To demonstrate this recurring pattern of rhetoric in U.S. public diplomacy history, I will first give a brief historical overview of the use of public diplomacy since the founding of our nation. Next, I will use a Carter document to argue how it serves as one of many examples of similar rhetorical strategies used in the 2007 NSPDSC, which exemplifies current rhetorical strategies in American public diplomacy along with an increase in the iterative appeals our nation has used since its founding.

In order to argue these claims, I will first review the substantial lack of rhetorical analysis/frameworks in post 9/11 conversations and scholarship on public diplomacy. I will also propose that public diplomacy be studied through a rhetorical framework while acknowledging the importance of the 2007 NSPDSC as a significant historical piece of rhetoric. Next, I will detail how public diplomacy is understood, then describe American public diplomacy efforts since 9/11. By detailing past efforts by former Under Secretaries of Public Diplomacy and Public

Affairs, I will contextualize the relevance of this office's activities, explain how approaches to public diplomacy continue to evolve, and discuss why the expectations for 2007 NSPDSC were high following former public diplomacy efforts. Finally, I will show how a close rhetorical reading of the 2007 NSPDSC will illuminate a recurring process in American public diplomacy of how we define the enemy and appeal to our desired allies through various rhetorical tactics.

Rhetoric and Post 9/11 Public Diplomacy

The recent trend in American public diplomacy research is to primarily evaluate its success. Few look at how we rhetorically conceptualize or "sell" ourselves. Our discipline can make significant contributions to the field of public diplomacy by not only analyzing public relations and media campaigns but also in examining discourse and rhetoric. Analyzing American rhetoric is important because how we envision and construct the public image can greatly affect either the success or failure when building relationships with other nations. Craig Hayden of the University of Southern California's Institute for Public Diplomacy has embarked upon discourse analysis within recent American foreign policy rhetoric. He explores foreign policy rhetoric as "imaginary" with "inconsistencies, strategies of mystification, and discursive world-building" (Hayden 2-3). Comparing past Cold War discourse with current foreign policy arguments, he argues that previous discourse were more successful than contemporary argumentation (Hayden 32). His analysis finds that "American values are conflated as universal truth," therefore concluding that the focus of public diplomacy has been about the "battle of ideas," which has become overwhelmingly important in current public diplomacy (Hayden 32).

Another scholar who discusses the use of discursive/rhetorical norms within public diplomacy is Bruce Gregory, director of the Public Diplomacy Institute at George Washington University. He briefly explains that discourse surrounding public diplomacy efforts can be

problematic, and it is difficult to avoid implementing your own ideologies and norms in other cultures (Gregory, "Discourse Norms" 11). He contends that public diplomacy cannot always escape discursive reasoning because discourse is rooted in power that influences the interconnected parts of "tone, style, doctrines, perceptions, budgets, time horizons, and organizational structures" (Gregory, "Discourse Norms" 13-14). The very nature of public diplomacy is laden with specific values and interests. Gregory continues to analyze these possible problems but concludes strategic communication is necessary in diplomatic efforts but not without "firewalls" to avoid "covert and coercive instruments of statecraft" (Gregory, "Discourse Norms" 15). The nature of how we communicate and make rhetorical choices can greatly influence our effectiveness. These choices are important because the ways in which we communicate impact how we are perceived by foreign nations. In order to foster the relationships that we are seeking, it is absolutely essential that we not dismiss the role of communication in public diplomacy.

Similarly, Mathew Gerber argues that approaching public diplomacy from a communications perspective would be extremely beneficial, and how public diplomacy has ignored the importance of the communication field, which is unfortunate because many have tried to contribute to it in the past (120). He states that "public diplomacy is, at its core, a necessarily *suasive* endeavor;" therefore, it is necessary that we analyze public diplomacy within the communication field (123). Not only does Gerber argue that public diplomacy be approached from a communications perspective, but he proposes that it would be even more beneficial to think of public diplomacy as a rhetorical genre (121). He asserts that "rhetorical approaches to the study of public diplomacy are the most appropriate" because the fundamental elements of public diplomacy discourse are "*suasive*" with the goal to convince audiences of a particular

viewpoint (Gerber 130). In examining public diplomacy from a generic approach, he believes will “enrich the study of public diplomacy and its sub-genres, particularly from the academic lens of communication studies” (Gerber 130). Although few have argued for public diplomacy to be seen as a rhetorical genre, other communication scholars believe the field of communication has much to contribute to public diplomacy. Vidhi Chaudhri and Jeremy Fyke, for instance, argue that many past efforts examine rhetoric in political communication and foreign policy, but few look at public diplomacy and rhetoric (Chaudhri and Fyke 5). Although more communication scholarship analyzing public diplomacy is beginning to emerge, there is still a significant lack of scholarship specifically from a rhetorical perspective.

One book that analyzes current public diplomacy rhetoric and specifically strategic communication is, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion*, where the authors examine the use of strategic communication in the fight against violent extremism (Corman, Trethewey & Godall). They argue that communication has been ignored and “all significant diplomatic accomplishments are rooted in communication strategies” (Corman, Trethewey & Goodall ix). They delve into different failed attempts of strategic communication since the attacks on 9/11, including case studies of our government’s use of communication in terrorism and national security. Finally, they compose a new strategic communication plan. Their analysis includes an evaluation of the 2007 *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* from the theoretical framework of a strategic communication perspective. The authors state that this current strategy, like many post 9/11 strategies, needs to be reworked and take on a more “modern perspective of communication” (Corman, Trethewey, & Goodall 168). Their analysis brings focus to the fact that “language is crucial in constructing the reality of what the U.S. is doing and in helping guide others’ perceptions. Words matter, and to act otherwise misses an

opportunity for positive persuasion” (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 182). Without positive rhetoric, foreign policy cannot be as effective on its own. We must not dismiss the power of rhetoric, and it must go hand in hand with policy.

As the scholarship surrounding public diplomacy continues to develop, we are beginning to recognize the valuable contribution our discipline can make. In the article “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” Eytan Gilboa argues that “experts and practitioners in public diplomacy have often ignored relevant information in communication,” such as public relations, branding, media effects, public opinion, rhetoric, and cultural studies which can make numerous contributions to the contemporary studies of public diplomacy (Gilboa 73-74). As the field of public diplomacy changes and new theories are developed the “relevant knowledge in communication” should not be dismissed for it can provide useful in future analyzes (Gilboa 73). In analyzing public diplomacy rhetoric, it is first necessary to understand the current multifarious dimensions of public diplomacy.

Understanding Public Diplomacy

The term “public diplomacy” was first coined by Edmund Gullion in 1965 and characterized as one-way communication that relied heavily on the work of ambassadors (Tiedeman 10). This traditional view of public diplomacy is often synonymous with propaganda or psychological warfare, which was reflective of the Cold War (Simpson 11). This view of public diplomacy can be conceptualized as using “strategies and tactics designed to achieve the ideological, political, or military objectives of the sponsoring organization [...] through exploitation of a target audience’s cultural-psychological attributes and its communication system” (Simpson 11). The difference in the “new” concept of public diplomacy and the previous one lies in abolishing the use of coercion and exploitation of the target audience in

reaching one's goals. This new concept of public diplomacy is ideally supposed to thrive by creating trusting and honest relationships through face-to-face communication and active listening when working to further a country's goals.

Although the definition of public diplomacy is widely debated, public diplomacy described in novice terms is a process "to understand, inform, engage, and influence foreign societies-friendly and hostile, and wavering-through a variety of information, culture, education, and advocacy programs" (Smith 117). The process of public diplomacy is how we communicate and interact with foreign nations to cultivate relationships, whether it is through similar interests, such as music, knowledge, health, or environmental concerns. Another scholar broadly defines public diplomacy as an amalgamation of listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, and international broadcasting (Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies" 31). American public diplomacy is grounded in the idea that we will bring peace to the world with freedom and democracy. The goal for diplomacy is to rely more heavily on "trust and credibility" and "two-way dialogue" by approaching other nations in an honest and truthful manner (Melissan 15).

Whether our efforts are deemed public diplomacy or propaganda, we must acknowledge that each one of these terms has many things in common. Currently, most scholars and government officials alike agree that public diplomacy relies primarily on what Joseph Nye has termed "soft power," meaning a reliance on attracting the world to a country's values and culture (5-6). This idea of public diplomacy has become popular since 9/11, because there is an "outpouring of public commentary and criticism of the efforts to revive U.S. public diplomacy [...as] a significant indicator of broader public concerns about America's role in the world" (Kennedy and Lucas 321). Following the crisis of 9/11 and our engagement in the Iraq war, the U.S.'s image has predominately remained negative despite our continued efforts in countering

anti-Americanism. Extensive amounts of energy have been invested not only by the U.S. government in evaluating America's role worldwide but also by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and scholars who continue to debate, criticize, and put forth recommendations on how to engage the world.

Numerous academic and news articles contribute to this analysis. These articles have drawn attention to the U.S.'s unsuccessful strategies by tracing previous Cold War efforts and recommending new tactics to combat an unfavorable image of the U.S. and its engagement worldwide. Mark Leonard argues that public diplomacy currently lies in the hands of "Britney Spears, Amnesty International, a little truth, empathy, and understanding" (48). Thus, American public diplomacy needs to be approached from every possible level including pop culture, NGOs and improved interpersonal skills. He believes that American public diplomacy needs to be "about building relationships, starting from understanding other countries' needs, cultures, and peoples and then looking for areas to make common cause" (Leonard 50). According to Leonard, rather than telling others how to live, we must first listen and understand the complexities of a society's culture, or we will only be met by resistance. These criticisms have not been entirely ignored by those in power, however the U.S.'s previous attempts to reach others has not been successful (Lord & Lynch 3-6). To further understand the present concept of public diplomacy, I will next chronicle the practices of American public diplomacy since the September 11th terrorist attacks.

The Current Context: Public Diplomacy in the Post 9/11 World

With the rise of worldwide anti-American sentiment since the U.S.'s war and engagement in Iraq following 9/11, interest in public diplomacy has grown dramatically in the United States and has become a focal point of American consciousnesses (Snow & Taylor ix). Again, we see

how a pivotal historical crisis spawned an overwhelming “information and propaganda effort not seen since George Creel’s Committee laid a foundation for advertising America in wartime” during World War I (Snow, *Information* 53). Our government’s mobilization efforts in promoting America’s image and the use of public diplomacy strategies have become paramount following the attacks on 9/11 (Snow, *Information* 53-54). Public diplomacy has expanded beyond propaganda or psychological warfare to what Jan Melissan characterizes as “old wine in new bottles” by going through a repackaging and becoming an upgraded product (3). These changes, prompted by the aftermath of 9/11, resulted in a transformation of requirements for public diplomacy by the U.S. government (Melissan 5).

After 9/11, our government realized the necessity of public diplomacy and implemented many new offices and positions. This resulted in public diplomacy involving an even broader spectrum of communication channels, which manifested in broadcast, film, music, NGOs, corporations, agencies, individuals, radio broadcast, Internet, and exchange programs. Many of these efforts were put in place by the newly developed position and office within the State Department of Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Although the Under Secretary position was developed under President Clinton in 1999 following the dissolution of the United States Information Agency in 1998, the position did not enter the public eye until the events of 9/11 (“Under Secretary,” *Serving History*). Charlotte Beers, while not the first Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, became a highly publicized and central component to the present state of American public diplomacy. Beers emerged during the Bush Administration as the solution to “selling the American brand” and combating anti-Americanism (Snow, *Information* 84-85). Well known for her ability to brand anything from KFC, IBM, and from Uncle Ben to Jaguar, the executive branch thought the

she would be an ideal candidate for taking on the task of branding the U.S. (Snow 84). Secretary of State Colin Powell knew that the U.S. needed a different approach to public diplomacy and believed Beers was perfect for the job (Snow, *Information* 84). Powell explained that Beers, as the new Under Secretary, would work to change the U.S. approach to public diplomacy from the “old USIA way to really branding foreign policy [...] marketing American values to the world and not just putting out pamphlets” (qtd. in Snow, *Information* 85). This approach to brand American public diplomacy was different from the past because the focus was to create an emotional connection with the audience unlike ever before (Snow, *Information* 84-85). As we faced a new world with differing technological advances and political challenges this new approach in how the U.S. communicated with the world was not only needed but welcomed.

On October 2, 2001, Beers was sworn in as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (Snow, *Information* 86). Beers stated that her new appointment was “the most sophisticated brand assignment I have ever had. It is almost as though we have to redefine what America is” (Tiedeman 39). Beers, being entirely new to the world of international relations, had absolutely no experience and was completely ignorant of the daunting task upon which she was embarking (Snow, *Information* 87). With Beers’ minimal experience and the undertaking of such a critical position, it was not surprising that she immediately came under scrutiny. William Drake from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for instance, stated, “I just find the notion that you can sell Uncle Sam like Uncle Ben’s highly problematic” (Fullerton & Kendrick 24). Drake’s response highlights the difficulty and problems one can encounter in trying to simplify a nation’s complexities and sell it like rice. In responding to critics upon her appointment, Secretary Powell explained how Beers “got me to buy Uncle Ben’s Rice, so what’s wrong with getting somebody who knows how to sell something? We are selling a product. We need

someone who can rebrand American foreign policy [and] rebrand American diplomacy” (Fullerton & Kendrick 24). As a nation we needed a more effective approach to public diplomacy, and Secretary Powell was confident that Beers’ past experience in the advertising industry could serve as a more practical approach to combat the plummeting public opinion of American foreign policy in the world. Although the idea of selling foreign policy or a country’s image is nothing new in the history of America, it is precarious to assume a country’s foreign policies will always be perceived in a credible and non-hegemonic manner when promoted this way.

Beers quickly got to work in crafting persuasive ways to “sell” America. However, many of her efforts resembled former Cold War tactics. For example, one of the first programs implemented, Rewards for Justice, was composed of a series of public service announcements (PSAs) to help the U.S. fight terrorism. Based on the 2001 Patriot Act, authorization was given to the Secretary of State to offer up to \$25 million in rewards to finding terrorists (Powell). This same program, first implemented by President Reagan in 1984, had paid over \$7 million to twenty-two different informants before 9/11 (Snow, *Information* 91). The PSAs were published in the form of radio announcements, posters, and leaflets (Fullerton & Kendrick 81). The most familiar of these announcements was the radio spot used in an interview by Diane Sawyer with Under Secretary Beers. The announcement stated the following: “Do you know a terrorist? [...] The United States government is offering rewards of up to \$25 million for information that prevents an international terrorist act against U.S. persons or property or brings to justice persons who have committed one” (Fullerton & Kendrick 85). This PSA encourages audiences not only to assume a greater fear against extremists but reiterates that terrorists are everywhere and you may have the power to stop them.

The call for informants in the fight against terrorism continued as Beers worked to create a booklet entitled *The Network of Terrorism*. Printed in thirty-six languages, the booklet told the story of all known terrorist groups worldwide and became the most extensively distributed diplomacy pamphlet in U.S. State Department history (Fullerton & Kendrick 87). Beers also worked to put together an anthology of American writers, entitled *Writers on America*, and strongly encouraged more international exchange (Fullerton & Kendrick 88-89). These examples are important because they show that despite Secretary Powell's goal for Beers to rebrand America and reinvent public diplomacy, these tactics are further evidence of how we rely on strategies from the past. Like these other efforts to rebrand American public diplomacy the revamping of Voice of America Arabic is one lasting Beers' effort that also reveals similarities to the past.

Beers initiated the re-branding of former Voice of America Arabic into what is now known as Radio Sawa, a radio station founded by the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the U.S. Congress (Tiedman 43). It first began March 23, 2002, as an FM station broadcast from Washington D.C. and Dubai. The goal was to reach the young Arab population with news programs and contemporary American and Middle Eastern music ("About Us," *Radio Sawa*). Young Arabs were a major percentage of the target audience because they could have a significant influence on forthcoming U.S. foreign policy and how the Middle East perceives the U.S. (el-Nawawy 185-6). The concept of Radio Sawa was thought to be a more attractive, "hipper" way to reach the target audience. The rebranding effort aimed to join the Arab World and United States thus named "Sawa," the Arabic translation for "together" (el-Nawawy 189). Before Radio Sawa's March 2002 launch, Congress granted them \$35 million (Fullerton & Kendrick 96). Although the concept of Radio Sawa was conceived before 9/11, it was not

launched until after the attacks because the importance of influencing public perception in the Middle East was not seen as vital until then (Tomlinson). The revamping of Voice of America Arabic into Radio Sawa was a concerted effort to positively influence the Middle East.

The content of Radio Sawa differs from the former Voice of America Arabic because there is little focus on news and the primary draw is popular music. One of the members of the Broadcasting Board of Governors argued “the way to win hearts and minds in the Middle East is to appeal to young people” (Fullerton & Kendrick 97). A 2004 Nielsen poll showed it leading in Middle East international broadcasting with an average 38 percent of fifteen years or older listening weekly (Fullerton & Kendrick 97). The opposing argument, however, is that the previous format of VOA Arabic was more beneficial. The numbers have shown that despite this criticism, Radio Sawa is attracting many listeners. However, a recent study by communication scholar Mohammed el-Nawawy found that young Arab students’ perception of “Radio Sawa’s credibility was not correlated with how frequently they listened to its programming news” (200). He also found that, “attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy have worsened slightly since their exposure to Radio Sawa” and the U.S. funded television station, Al-Hurra (el-Nawawy 201). This study reveals that despite the popularity of Radio Sawa among young Arabs, the station is used solely for entertainment purposes rather than as a news source. Instead, young Arab students trust Arab networks for news. Despite such studies, broadcasting continues to expand and is one of the biggest components in American public diplomacy.

The focus on State Department broadcasting continues to grow. Fifty percent of public diplomacy funding in 2004 went towards broadcasting (Galal 4). One of the largest broadcast public diplomacy campaigns, called the “Shared Values Initiative,” was during Beers’ tenure as Under Secretary. The campaign was deemed a failure by academics, media outlets, government

officials and advertisers (Fullerton and Kendrick 101). However, both Powell and Beers continued to claim the initiative served its purpose (Fullerton and Kendrick 121, 130). The “Shared Values Initiative” primary format was broadcast but also included other multidimensional efforts. The content of the initiative was based on a RoperASW Worldwide tool for research called ValueScope. This research worked to identify “core belief systems based on personal values” throughout the world and suggested similar values of faith, family, and learning existed between the Muslim world and the U.S. (Fullerton & Kendrick 27). Based on this research, Beers decided to focus on religious tolerance. Because of the possible problematic nature of the U.S. State Department sponsoring such an initiative, Malik Hassan, a Muslim medical executive, helped create the nonprofit group The Council of American Muslims for Understanding (CAMU) to sell the campaign (Fullerton & Kendrick 30). There was a concern the campaign would be perceived as propaganda if sponsored by the U.S. government, so CAMU promoted the campaign, but the U.S. government paid for it.

The campaign had a religious focus with the goal of sending the message that Americans are fighting a War on Terrorism, not Muslims. The initiative also included diplomatic speeches, newspaper ads, internet sites, and a magazine entitled *Muslim Life in America* (Fullerton & Kendrick 31; Alsultany 611). The commercials were the most important part of the initiative which focused on a baker, doctor, school teacher, journalist, and New York City firefighter (Fullerton & Kendrick 33). Each segment contained the same few elements: a positive testimonial about life in America and people’s active practice of their religion emphasizing Americans’ tolerance for the Muslim faith (Alsultany 611). The firefighter, Farooq Muhammed, epitomizes the campaign when he states, “I’ve never gotten disrespected because I’m a Muslim [...] we’re all brothers and sisters. Here I am as one human, taking care of another” (qtd. in

Plaisance 259-260). The story of this individual is noteworthy because it is an example of creating rhetorical identification, which I will argue is one of the recurring practices in American public diplomacy.

Once it aired, the “Shared Values Campaign” was poorly received, and the State Department quickly pulled it (Fullerton & Kendrick 36). The reasons for discontinuing the ad campaign were never entirely clear, although Patrick Lee Plaisance’s analysis of the “Shared Values Campaign” determined that it represented a form of propaganda with numerous problems (250). Professor Christopher Simpson stated, “The central illusion here is that the U.S. is somehow not getting its message across; the large majority of people in the Middle East understand pretty well what the United States is actually saying and doing, and no amount of propaganda is really going to change that” (qtd. in Plaisance 266). The campaign was seen as deceptive, which not only misrepresented the experience of American Muslims, but also misled people regarding the actions of the U.S.

There were extensive negative reactions to this campaign from the international and national media, academia, diplomats, the advertising community, and the U.S. government. The reaction to the “Shared Values Campaign” is perhaps best expressed by Youssef Ibrahim of the Council on Foreign Relations: “It was like this was the 1930s and the government was running commercials showing happy blacks in America” (qtd. in Snow, *Information* 102). Instead of communicating American policies that would lead to greater interaction and dialogue with Muslims, this quote exemplifies how the campaign’s priority was to portray American Muslims as happy and satisfied. It was no surprise to find the campaign was unsuccessful in curbing anti-American sentiment, especially when a Zogby opinion poll in eight Muslim countries showed a rise in Anti-Americanism (Snow, *Information* 103). Beers, however, refused to admit failure.

She defended the campaign, stating to CNN that the goal was to start a dialogue and that was exactly what it did (Fullerton & Kendrick 38). The problem was that the “dialogue,” festering in the Muslim world became more detrimental than helpful to the U.S. image. Despite the effort to sway public opinion in the Muslim world, we lacked the proper technique “in changing the attitudes of the public” (Bernays 958). In response to the campaign, Beers stated, “The more negative the response from the underground powers in the Muslim world, the more effective the campaign” (Fullerton & Kendrick 38). In spite of her attempt to reach extremist groups and open up dialogue, her campaign, instead, contributed to the U.S. losing support from allies and left minimal room for positive relationship building or communication.

Although Beers had additional plans for similar campaigns, her tenure ended just seventeen months after it began (Edelstein & Krebs 90). Unlike her supporters, the State Department sided more closely with the mass media and anonymously provided fodder for criticism. There were numerous claims by unnamed U.S. officials who felt her appointment was laughable; others charged that she was “failing” and nothing she did actually worked (Fullerton & Kendrick 117). This criticism all happened behind closed doors and when her appointment ended, several Members of Congress lauded her work. Secretary of State Colin Powell was especially proud of Beers, stating she possessed “incredible expertise” (Fullerton & Kendrick 117). Beers’ tenure as Under Secretary had been enormously public and not surprisingly Secretary Powell and Members of Congress complimented her to ensure the future credibility of the new position.

The failure of the “Shared Values Campaign” was repeatedly claimed to be a result of not understanding our target audience and anti-American sentiment continued to grow following the campaign (Snow, *Information* 105). The Pew Research Center found that the image of the U.S.

fell drastically from 2002 to 2006 (Corman, Treathway & Goodall 28). This campaign effort is relevant because Beers' tenure as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was influential to the future of the position and contextualizes how dire public diplomacy had become.

Following the problematic "Shared Values Campaign" and declining U.S. image, Congress decided to put together a panel to investigate why the U.S. had such a poor image in the world (Fullerton & Kendrick 118). This was a bipartisan panel, chaired by former United States Ambassador to Syria and Israel Edward P. Djerejian. This panel eventually released the report "Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World," also known as the "Djerejian Report" (Fullerton & Kendrick 118). This report provided the following recommendations: the creation of a White House Director of Public Diplomacy, an increase in scholarships/fellowships, and an evaluation of the "Shared Values Campaign." It concluded that a need existed for advertising in public diplomacy (Fullerton & Kendrick 118). Further engagement in all government sectors was deemed necessary and the problem with the "Shared Values Campaign" was not that advertising could not be effective but we needed to find the best form and way to use advertising.

As the U.S. continued to use advertising throughout public diplomacy; however, our efforts proved ineffective. A 2003 report showed that the U.S. was spending close to \$600 million to win over the world, but our image continued to decline globally (Edelstein & Krebs 90). With the War in Iraq, our numbers continued to fall, not only in the Middle East but in other nations, such as France, Germany, and Britain (Edelstein & Krebs 90).

Despite the bleak outlook, in 2004 the U.S. decided to launch the television station Al-Hurra. Al-Hurra, meaning "Free One," which operates from the nonprofit Middle East

Television Network but is funded and run by the Broadcasting Board of Governors and U.S. Congress (Lynch 106). An initial budget of \$62 million was granted to Al-Hurra with the goal of providing an alternative to the very popular Al-Jazeera network (Lynch 101-106). Al-Hurra follows the same framework of CNN with twenty-four hours news and is broadcast to twenty-two countries in the Arab World (PBS Online Newshour). Al-Hurra seeks to counter any kind of anti-American news with “accurate, balanced, and comprehensive news” reporting (“About Us,” Al-Hurra). The station has been regarded with much cynicism regionally and continues to be seen as propaganda (Lynch 104-105). Ambassador William Rugh explains that “these efforts have been a disaster, in terms of reaching appropriate audience sizes, and more importantly, in influencing attitudes” (qtd. in Svet 21). Another scholar, when analyzing Al-Hurra, explained the market difficulty and how Al-Hurra could possibly turn into a fiasco (Lynch 102). Al-Hurra also lacks a specific audience and the news coverage continues to be limited compared to its counterparts and fails to join any Arab conversations (Lynch 103-104). Although Al-Hurra is another possible means to reach the Arab world, it has yet to prove itself effective.

Al-Hurra had done little to impact our image and a 2004 poll by Zogby International reported that negative attitudes towards the U.S. were 98 percent in Egypt and 94 percent in Saudi Arabia. Terms that were associated with the U.S. included “unfair foreign policy, imperialistic, and oil interest” (Svet 11). Despite the fact these polls clearly show what is most disliked about the U.S., the strategies implemented have not addressed these opinions. The office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was successful in its initiatives or campaigns post-9/11 and needed a better strategy to address the negative perceptions of the U.S. worldwide. At this time, the scene was perfectly set for the forthcoming Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes. Many were frustrated that public diplomacy

efforts had little funding, success, guidance or staff. Karen Hughes, a former Bush staffer, arrived to implement a more successful strategy than her predecessors (Edelstein & Krebs 91).

Karen Hughes, deemed one of the most powerful women working for President Bush, was chosen to be the next Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy. She was known for selling messages and worked on the White House Iraq Group whose sole goal was to sell the Iraq War to the American people (“Karen”). The appointment of Hughes was intended to counter many of Beers’ efforts; however, her choices followed many of Beers’ same principles. Hughes, previously a very successful political campaign manager, relied heavily on advertising and fell victim to the same problematic assumptions as Beers (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 11). Despite the fact that Hughes emphasized the importance of listening and conducted a “listening tour” to learn about other cultures, this became another outlet to send our most important message of democracy, freedom, and religious pluralism (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 11). The “listening tour” did not receive a warm response, and frustration erupted against our “selling” the American way of life (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 12). The U.S. image continued to fall, and a 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project stated, “America’s global image has again slipped and support for the war on terrorism has declined even among close U.S. allies” (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 28). The situation continued to look grim and a new communication strategy was still needed. In response to this uncertainty, Karen Hughes, in collaboration with the Policy Coordinating Committee, created the influential 2007 publication *The U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* (NSPDSC). The plan was for the NSPDSC to be coordinated at all agency levels and to disseminate a coherent message at all levels of the U.S. government. Although the NSPDSC was not fully implemented it still proves to be an influential and historical document in American public diplomacy.

The NSPDSC was composed as the U.S. faced growing political challenges and the goal for this communication strategy was to help counter the negative image that had developed during U.S.'s engagement in Iraq. Following 9/11, President Bush began a war under the false assumption that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that were an eminent threat to American security (Galbraith 1-2). As the war progressed into a more intensified endeavor for the U.S. in our search for WMD's and efforts to implement democracy into Iraq, a disconnect existed between our policies and rhetoric (Zaharna 3). Instead of the U.S. bringing peace and democracy to Iraq, the result was the Iranian militia returned to Iraq (Galbraith 21). Thus with the U.S. presence in Iraq, tensions between Sunnis and Shiites escalated leading to a civil war that allowed Iran to strengthen its power in Iraq but in the world (2, 17, 26). Despite the U.S.'s claim that Iran was an of the "Axis of Evil," Galbraith details that no diplomatic, military or other efforts were used in order to counter the power Iran was gaining in Iraq (3). Ultimately, U.S. policies in Iraq consequentially helped Iran become a greater nuclear threat worldwide (Galbraith 2-3). This political context surrounding the creation of the NSPDSC not only helps one better understand the strategy but shows how no concordance existed both between American policy and rhetoric with Iraq or Iran.

Understanding the historical context of American public diplomacy following 9/11 and prior to the NSPDSC is useful because it allows us to comprehend "new" concepts of public diplomacy and new offices/positions that have been established within the government. With public diplomacy's growing importance in the U.S., discussing the various initiatives we have engaged in the last nine years is necessary because it illustrates how we continue to remake history regardless of various technological, political, financial, or cultural changes.

METHODOLOGY

This thesis focuses on an example of American public diplomacy and provides an examination of the present public diplomacy rhetoric through the textual analysis of the 2007 *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* (NSPDSC). The methodology for this thesis is two-fold. I analyze how this publication is an important piece of historical rhetoric with similarities to past American public diplomacy initiatives which provides a historical context for the NSPDSC. I rely on historical criticism because it reveals that the present is not unlike the past and illuminates how certain strategic rhetorical choices were made. Not only does this analysis exemplify our continued iterations of public diplomacy throughout history, but also shows how we approach those whom we deem as the enemy or threat.

It is important to look at this strategy in the historical context of American public diplomacy because it not only tells us about our past, but it reveals a more in-depth perspective on the context of public diplomacy today. A message or strategy is “fundamental to an appreciation of the entire event” therefore; we must look at the message within its historical context (Rosenfield 58). By looking at the message within its historical context, we can then reveal how such “works were produced, showing how the messages are themselves a reflection of their era” (Rosenfield 60). Analyzing this text within its historical context will show that “ideas are not here treated as entities, which enjoy an independent existence” rather they are a “product” of a particular environment, created from many different aspects of a historical context, therefore serving a purpose for society during that specific moment in time (Wrage 29). Ideas of a time are affected by various “exigencies” within a particular context that allow us to “gain insight into the life of an era” and to “observe the reflections of prevailing social ideas and attitudes” (Wrage 33). This is useful in understanding why certain rhetorical strategies were

chosen for “ideas are framed in a context of rhetorical necessities and possibilities” (Wrage 33). For the historical context will influence particular rhetorical responses of that time.

An analysis of the NSPDSC through a historical approach will reveal that “rhetoric of public address does not exist for its own sake” (Wrage 31). Analyzing this text through this lens is helpful in explaining the “essence” of a message that is crafted with the goal of changing one’s mindset and forming new persuasions (Wrage 31). By looking at the text within both the current and historical context of public diplomacy, we can better understand what is going on rhetorically during this context and how individuals choose to persuade an audience. We can also evaluate whether the messages were successful (Zarefsky 31-32). This vantage point gives meaning to “persuasive discourse” in its particular historical context (Ball 63). This form of analysis is useful for it provides an alternative to “see rhetoric as a perpetual and dynamic process of social construction, maintenance, and change rather than an isolated, static product” (Turner 4). Therefore, we can understand current public diplomacy rhetoric, not as an insulated manifestation of the times, but rather as an interconnected piece of rhetoric that has existed since the founding of our country. The NSPDSC publication warrants attention for it is an example of a very important recurring process in American history.

After showing how the NSPDSC serves as historical rhetoric, I will analyze the text using Kenneth Burke’s concept of identification and the components of ethos and enemy construction within identification. Burke describes identification as “A is not identical with his colleague B,” but if they have similar interests “A is *identified* with B. Or he may *identify himself* with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so” (*Rhetoric of Motives* 20). However, this does not mean that you lose your individuality, rather you are “both joined and separate” (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 21). Identification takes place

when people identified through a common interest or “substance,” but that does not mean they lose their “distinctness” (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 21). A group of people is created through identification and joined around some “common substance of meaning” (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 23). This “substance” can be something as small as people who like pets to a political reason to go to war.

Following 9/11, identification became pervasive because it was the way in which we “confront the implications of division” (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 22). It became clear that America was divided from our attackers, and we began to see people join together on the common substance of fighting the terrorists. It is not uncommon to see a rhetorical resurgence of identification during such crises like the attacks of 9/11, for “identification is compensatory to division” and allows us to identify the evil enemy (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 22). For identification to exist there must be division; they require one another. Burke further explains the reason for rhetorical identification exists because humans can never completely share the same common substances, and there will always be something which divides them (*Rhetoric of Motives* 25). It is because of this inability to completely identify with one another that we need rhetoric. The emphasis on identification in America’s fight on terrorism stems from the problem that “individuals are at odds with one another” and without division no need would exist “to proclaim their unity” (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 22). Following 9/11, it became overwhelmingly obvious that an organization of individuals existed with distinct divisions from us. As we continue our fight against terrorism, the process of identification becomes even more salient not only at the executive level of government but everywhere.

The process of identification inevitably relies upon ethos to create common ground and to rhetorically define and unite an audience against the shared enemy (Cheney 148). To further

explore the Burkean use of identification in the text, I will look at it in conjunction with ethos and enemy construction which reveals not only how we currently engage with the world, but also is telling of our past and forthcoming strategies. By looking at these concepts of ethos and enemy construction I show how the U.S.'s use of these rhetorical choices are foundational to American public diplomacy and will likely continue to reoccur in U.S. efforts for years to come.

In conducting my analysis, I will analyze this rhetorical process of identification within the text. I will first look at the use of ethos throughout the NSPDSC document and analyze how ethos is salient in trying to create a common ground around shared values, threats, and interests with the audience. Ethos is an important part of the process of identification for it is related to the ways rhetoric can persuade one to identify with something. Burke refers to the importance of Aristotle's concept of ethos in *A Rhetoric of Motives* stating, "You persuade a man only insofar as you talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, *identifying* your ways with his [and] the identifying of himself with his audience will be more effective if it is genuine" (55-56). In order for the rhetor to persuade its audience in identification these characteristics must be highlighted which further enhance the rhetors credibility and goodwill.

Finally I draw attention to how the text rhetorically "constructs" the enemy as the other while maintaining identity and unity (Edelman 87). And how the 'other' is further constructed as an "extreme threat to freedom and civilization" (Ivie, *Democracy* 46). I analyze how the text rhetorically defines the enemy and how the other becomes representative of "demons that savagely massacre innocent people and thereby threaten to destroy all of civilization" (Ivie, *Democracy* 135). For, the enemy is characterized as the greatest threat to all humanity with no regard for religion or nationality who seeks to bring violence to the world.

Chapter Preview

Chapter Two will look at the recurring historical process by giving an overview of how public diplomacy has existed since the founding of our country and how we have always sought to create commonalities with other nations. I will then give a historical overview of public diplomacy since the founding of our nation and draw attention to choices that show similarities with today's tactics. Then I will show how the NSPDSC is illustrative of a current historical context and how as a nation in the face of crisis, we iterate similar strategies. Finally, to further exemplify this recurring historical process I will look at the Carter Administration's plan which was put forth during the Iranian hostage crisis. By closely examining the context surrounding the Carter Administration's document, I will show how this is a comparative example of our recurring acts in public diplomacy.

Chapter Three will look at how the NSPDSC acts rhetorically. I will analyze how the text conceives our target, the Middle East, and how the text works to create identification with the audience. I will analyze three rhetorical strategies within the text; use of ethos, construction of the enemy, and the process of identification and how all of these work in tandem with one another.

Chapter Four will explore some of the problems/shortcomings with these rhetorical tactics in public diplomacy. I will conclude by reiterating the importance of this scholarship not only in our current context but in the future.

Chapter 2:
A Brief History of American Public Diplomacy from Our Founding
to the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis

Let facts be submitted to a candid world. -Declaration of Independence, 1776

Since the founding of our nation, public diplomacy has played a significant role in influencing the nature of our relationships with other nations. The Continental Congress, Benjamin Franklin, President George Washington, Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), John F. Kennedy (JFK), Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Harry Truman, and many other presidential administrations all employed public diplomacy (Waller, *The American Way* 1, 19; Galal 2). The first letters of the 1774 Continental Congress provide examples of how we have always sought to create identification rhetorically through common values and ideals while clearly defining and attacking the enemy (Waller, *The Public* 40). The founding document of the United States, The Declaration of Independence, also shows the use of this rhetoric in our country's public diplomacy. The Declaration not only was significant for the colonies, but it also served as a "manifesto" in appealing to worldwide opinion and support for the American colonies during separation from British rule (Waller, *The Public* 93).

In this chapter, I suggest that the rhetoric of American public diplomacy is part of a recurring rhetorical process that has existed since the inception of our country and impacts the social reality of various historical contexts (Turner 2). I examine how public diplomacy has been an important American practice since the founding of our nation and an enduring process that continues to rely on many consistent rhetorical appeals or "symbols and systems of symbols [to influence] beliefs, values, attitudes, and action" despite changing contexts (qtd. in Turner 2).

Public diplomacy serves as a "product of social environment, as arising from many levels of life, and as possessing social utility" (Wrage 29). Therefore, the idea of public diplomacy depends upon the political context and is never independent, because it is "framed in the context

of rhetorical necessities and possibilities” (Wrage 29, 33). A historical overview of public diplomacy since the founding of our nation through the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War further reveals our perpetual use of rhetoric that creates identification by promoting common values and interests which are manifested within changing historical contexts during national and worldwide crises.

By surveying different periods in U.S. history, we can see the importance and reasons for crafting varying kinds of public diplomacy rhetoric. Analyzing this iterative rhetorical process in history allows us to better understand how public diplomacy has “enabled, enacted, empowered, and constrained the central concerns of history: human action and reaction” (Turner 8). Such analyses let us contextualize current public diplomacy while understanding how the rhetorical choices made today are influenced by the past. Public diplomacy rhetoric can be explained as “part of an ongoing historical conversation that is rooted in the past, has meaning in the present, and has implications for the future” (Ball 62). Looking at the history of public diplomacy and “the study of tried-and-true methods from the Twentieth Century will help practitioners avoid unnecessarily re-inventing through trial and error, and will provide historical precedents” (Waller, *The Public* 20). We must understand the “perpetual and dynamic process” of the history of public diplomacy, because it “is constituted through communication. Thus, when we deny history, we deny ourselves.” By ignoring rhetorical history we miss the opportunity to learn about our past choices that can help us anticipate our future (Turner 4; Ball 62).

As I will show in the historical overview, the use of public diplomacy rhetoric has always shown itself during times of national stress. As Cull suggests, the United States “since its birth, in time of crisis [has] sought to present its image to the world” (*The Cold War* 1). In the history of the United States, crises have continually provided environmental contexts where rhetoric is

elicited in response. Rhetorical constructions have been used to persuade foreign audiences to identify with our crisis and restore a favorable image of the U.S. to the world. An examination of American crises and our responses to foreign publics through varying public diplomacy tactics allows us to see rhetorical similarities during each context and understand that these crises subsequent responses are not completely independent from one another. Instead, they are historically interconnected.

To further support my argument, I will show that a reading of the Carter Administration's communication plan crafted following the Iranian Hostage Crisis serves as a rhetorical artifact that exemplifies the unchanging rhetorical process the U.S. continues to use in public diplomacy. I will analyze the communication plan by first contextualizing the crisis then drawing attention to the rhetorical choices in creating identification, constructing enemies, and enhancing ethos. As I will show in Chapter 3 with my analysis of the 2007 *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*, these rhetorical strategies demonstrate that our nation continues to rely on much of the same rhetoric in the face of crisis.

An American Convention

Public diplomacy has long been a part of American diplomatic practice and was used during the establishment of our country (Waller, *The Public* 40). In the fight for American independence, not only was public diplomacy used to create a greater bond with foreign publics over a common enemy, but it was also used to emphasize similar values and ideas (Waller, "The American" 3). The Continental Congress first employed public diplomacy in 1774 by making public appeals to Canada, Jamaica, Bermuda, and Britain in its quest for support of the American colonies (Waller, *The Public* 40; Taylor 134). Samuel Adams, John Hancock, Benjamin Franklin, and George Washington were all influential in the initial rhetorical pleas for support of

the American colonies (Taylor 134). These initial appeals led to writing The Declaration of Independence in 1776 (Waller, *The Public* 93). The founders intended for this document not only to appeal to its domestic audience but also to an international one (Cull, *The Cold War* 2).

This proclamation is a telling example of public diplomacy at that time, and shows us how the use of similar rhetorical patterns have been a continuous part of American public diplomacy. Our nation's founding documents reveal our attempts to influence world opinion through an emphasis on the value and interest of ideas (Waller, *The Public* 100). The United States was created from ideas that needed promoting and support to sustain them (Cull, *The Cold War* 1). John Adams expressed this sentiment best when he said that the American Revolution was a "struggle for the hearts and minds of the people" (qtd. in Taylor 142). Similarly, Thomas Jefferson engaged in this struggle by working to promote the ideas surrounding the establishment of the American democratic republic (Ardnt 15). Jefferson also worked to rally support for the American colonies, claiming that the Declaration of Independence was "motivated by 'a decent respect to the opinions of mankind'" (Bardos 425). Thomas Paine and Benjamin Franklin both worked in Paris trying to change what they considered the misperceptions of America and were also pivotal figures in winning the war of ideas (Cull 1-2). Each of these founders played an important part in engaging with foreign publics in promoting the fundamental ideas and values of American independence. During this early period of American history, public diplomacy was practiced in print and person and seen as an important element of American diplomatic efforts.

As public diplomacy became institutionalized in the U.S. and part of the "great battleground of ideas" it began to take on other forms (Waller, *The Public* 100). For example, during the 19th century, the press was heavily used as a means to rally support not only at home but in Europe as well (Cull, *The Cold War* 3-4). Public diplomacy efforts were used during the

Civil War, most specifically in trying to persuade international opinion to side with the Confederacy or the Union (Taylor 169). These efforts were often carried out by placing ads and articles in international papers and by conducting lectures (Cull, *The Cold War* 2-3). Another popular tactic in selling the image of the U.S. at this time was the use of the World Fairs, beginning in London in 1851 with the Great Exhibition (Cull, *The Cold War* 3).

As the 19th century came to an end, public diplomacy began to reveal itself in more forms. Our nation ceased trying to persuade the world to support us in domestic issues and the idea that Americans could take on all the world's problems became omnipresent (Cull, *The Cold War* 5). This thinking resulted in new strategies of diplomacy to educate and promote American ideas, such as international exchange. In addition, private organizations were set up at this time to enhance communication and learning between nations (Cull, *The Cold War* 5). As the institutionalizing of American public diplomacy continued, it established itself as a fundamental doctrine within our society. It wasn't until the 20th century, however, that the United States became heavily immersed in public diplomacy, and we began to see an even greater reliance on rhetorical appeals.

Reaction to the World Wars and the Increasing Use of Public Diplomacy

The ever-changing political context and challenges of the world during the 20th century resulted in a remarkable demand for the use of public diplomacy. This political context gave the U.S. an even greater opportunity to devise broadening uses of rhetorical strategies in persuading foreign nations. With the beginning of the World War I, the United States government began an enormous surge of public diplomacy. President Wilson went to work selling the war by creating the Committee on Public Information (CPI) under the direction of George Creel (Cull, *The Cold War* 6). The CPI, although initially created to influence the domestic public, was the first agency

to inform foreign publics about U.S. ideology (Hixson 1). The CPI used photographs, newspapers, films, and foreign journalists to help counter German propaganda (Taylor 184). Although fairly successful in swaying worldwide opinion, the CPI was shut down in 1919 for being “too partisan” (Cull, *The Cold War* 9; Tuch 14). Following the work of the CPI and through the 1930s, we saw a strong effort to counter German influence through the cultural diplomacy of private and government implementation of such things as international libraries and exchange programs (Cull, *The Cold War* 9-10; Lord, “The Past” 49).

It wasn't until World War II that the rhetorical fight between ideas and values became such a strong focus of American public diplomacy (Bardos 426). Although in 1938 FDR created the Division of Cultural Relations within the State Department to encourage cultural diplomacy, the U.S. didn't become thoroughly engaged in the ideological fight worldwide until the war (Cull, *The Cold War* 11-12). FDR continued implementation of additional cultural diplomatic initiatives such as the Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Affairs, headed by Nelson Rockefeller, and the Office of the Coordinator of Information, which largely targeted Latin America (Cull, *The Cold War* 12-13). During this time, the U.S.'s ideological engagement in the war became extremely significant and symbolic, because the fight against Hitler “became increasingly identified with the historical mission of the United States” (Cull, *The Cold War* 12). Americans identified with the fight against Hitler because he symbolized a threat to every value and idea for which America stood. As the motive for war became more personal, public diplomacy rhetorical strategies became more significant and began to emerge largely inside two agencies—the Voice of America and the Office of War Information.

Voice of America (VOA)

Many of the campaigns and initiatives in public diplomacy following World War II were based on articulating FDR's four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom to worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear (Waller, *The Public* 100-101). As the need for more ideological engagement worldwide became apparent, FDR created the Foreign Information Service in 1941, which later became the Office of War Information (Cull, *The Cold War* 13). This office oversaw the creation of the VOA radio broadcast, which continues to be paramount in U.S. public diplomacy (Hixson 2).

The VOA radio broadcast was first launched following the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor (Cull, *The Cold War* 14). The goal of the VOA was to "tell the truth" to the world (Cull, *The Cold War* 14). The first broadcasts were in Europe twenty-four hours a day and eventually reached over 100 million people in 45 languages (Galal 2; Hixson 29). The VOA was deemed a "reliable source of news" available for people who could not trust their own countries' news sources, and it became a major tool for disseminating our rhetorical appeals (Bardos 428). The VOA is a crucial example to highlight because it continues to serve as a major agent in exercising American public diplomacy rhetoric despite varying historical contexts.

When it started, the role of the VOA was "to disseminate information pertaining to American life, policy, industry, techniques, culture, and customs" (qtd. in Cull, *The Cold War* 31). The VOA enabled the U.S. to appeal to foreign audiences by rhetorically constructing information about the U.S. to enhance our credibility as well as persuade the audience to identify with our politics. The VOA broadcast became so successful in the ideological fight against communism that the Soviets began jamming the broadcasts in 1949 (Hixson 33). Despite Soviet

efforts to inhibit VOA broadcasting, Truman devised ways to curtail Soviet jamming and the VOA continued to broadcast “truthful information” to communist countries (Hixson 35-37).

As with any government initiative, the VOA was controversial because some believed it was not a truthful source of news and could never fully represent all the varying American voices (Hixson 30). Interestingly, the VOA mandate was not written into law until 1976, which stated information must be presented that is “accurate, objective, and comprehensive” (qtd. in Tuch 88). Although the VOA still hails itself as “a trusted source of news and information,”⁵ the VOA still uses rhetoric to promote American interests even with the charter. In fact, the Broadcasting Board of Governors runs the VOA and describes the VOA’s strategic goal as “reporting [that] provides an alternative to extremism and authoritarianism, fosters respect for human rights, supports popular aspirations for freedom in repressive societies, and communicates what America stands for—our policies, values and culture”(“BBG Fact Sheet”). As this statement shows, the goal of VOA is inherently rhetorical because the larger objective is to report news that not only communicates information but also American values and interests. Therefore, the VOA exemplifies a consistent rhetorical process despite the changing political contexts in American public diplomacy.

Office of War Information (OWI)

Shortly after the launch of the VOA, the OWI became more engaged worldwide by expanding its reach to Africa and East Asia distributing foreign policy information via books, magazines, newspapers, films, leaflets, and radio (Cull, *The Cold War* 15-17). Over the next several years the OWI continued to expand and develop various divisions such as the Political Warfare Division and the Division of Cultural Relations, all of which worked to implement

⁵ See <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/>.

ideological rhetoric in the quest for de-nazification (Cull, *The Cold War* 18-20). For example, the OWI used its Political Warfare Division to spread messages demonizing the enemy through leaflets and radio (Cull, *The Cold War* 17). The OWI focused and relied upon ideology to create identification with foreign publics. The OWI continued to characterize the enemy this way both during the World War II and Cold War as the ideological fight grew more significant (Cull, *The Cold War* 20).

One scholar explains that the Cold War divided the world “into a bi-polar competition that was characterized more by a war of words and the threatened use of nuclear weapons rather than their actual use” (Taylor 250). This historical context reveals how the focus on ideological differences was the result of the “rhetorical necessities” of that moment (Wrage 33). The rhetorical emphasis on identification, enemy construction, and ethos not only became salient in our public diplomacy tactics, but was embodied in similar methods that continued to contribute to the persisting rhetorical process in American public diplomacy.

The Challenges of the Cold War Bring Public Diplomacy Forward

The history of Cold War public diplomacy elucidates our widespread emphasis on rhetoric during the Cold War, which has been called a “contest of ideologies” and a “war of words” (Taylor 250). After the defeat of the Nazis, a common enemy to fight no longer existed. (Taylor 250). Instead, the Soviets emerged as the U.S.’s primary enemy, and tactics were used to solidify the uncertainty and terror felt because of this enemy (Taylor 253). We began to argue that the Soviets represented a deep-seated evil, and we tried to rally other countries to join our cause. The Soviets’ worldwide diplomacy was well funded, and it became vital that we counter this effort with massive public diplomacy tactics of our own (Taylor 256).

Implemented in 1948, the Smith-Mundt Act sought to renew American communication with the world and the goal to “promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding” (qtd. in Taylor 256). This act allowed the U.S. to target foreign publics through all forms of communication, “including print, radio, film, exchange programs, and exhibitions” (Hixson 11).⁶ The Smith-Mundt Act served as a license for our government to engage in numerous persuasive strategies for years to come. The Smith-Mundt Act further exemplifies the importance we put on public diplomacy tactics, thus giving evidence to our reliance and use of rhetoric in public diplomacy. It was during the Cold War that targeting foreign publics became extremely significant.

The 1948 Marshall Plan, which was devised to help in the economic recovery of European countries following World War II, was also influential (Cull, *The Cold War* 37). Although the plan was initially supposed to inform Europeans of the positive engagement of the U.S. in Europe, it eventually became a means to inspire foreign audiences about “the American way of life” (Cull, *The Cold War* 38). Instead of engaging exclusively in efforts to renew Europe’s economy, the Marshall Plan became an outlet for “the assimilation of American technical and business acumen” (Hogan 428). The plan worked to create and implement initiatives for a neo-capitalist society in Europe that helped the U.S. “achieve the political and strategic objectives of American diplomacy” (Hogan 429). As Waller suggests, the goal of the plan was to essentially “win the hearts and minds of Europeans” (*The Public* 199). Although the Marshall Plan was put in place to help “revive Europe’s shattered economies,” the plan was tied to the larger diplomatic goals of the United States to further persuade foreign publics that we

⁶ However, the Act also later banned the United States Information Agency and the State Department from propagating information within the United States (Waller 488). And currently the details of the Act are being debated and whether our current political context/crisis warrants changes to the Smith-Mundt Act.

were not the enemy, but rather a trusted resource during crisis. Although The Marshall Plan resulted from a crisis in Europe, it provided the U.S. an opportunity to use and capitalize on rhetoric to ensure our role in the world and counter Soviet expansion.

Following the enactment of the Marshall Plan, we saw the fight against communism become even stronger with the actions of Senator Joseph McCarthy, the House of Representative's Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), the FBI and through cultural media such as film (Taylor 258-59). The belief in the worldwide threat of the Communist enemy became so pervasive that they were deemed the devil and represented a looming danger to all mankind (Taylor 259). The "Red Menace" came to represent everything that threatened the core American values that the U.S. stood for (Taylor 259). Not only did we see a resurgence of public diplomacy, but during this era, we also heavily relied upon the rhetorical construction of communists as the enemy as well as the rhetorical use of identification.⁷

The fear of the Communist threat continued through the Truman presidency. We began to witness a more concentrated effort to promote common values and interests, especially with the "Campaign for Truth" in combating communism (Taylor 257-58; Cull, *The Cold War* 23). This campaign was the first strategic plan to ever officially acknowledge "psychological activities" as necessary to influence foreign publics (Cull, *The Cold War* 54). These activities were justified by the rearmament program based on the 1950 National Security Council Report 68, which stated the Soviets wanted to take down the free world (Taylor 257). The U.S. considered itself the representative of the free world and increased its focus on expanding the "credibility of

⁷ Please see Robert L. Ivie, "Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War," *Communication Monographs* 47 (1980): 279-294 and Robert L. Ivie, "Literalizing the Metaphor of Soviet Savagery: President Truman's Plain Style," *Southern Speech Communication Journal* 51 (1986): 91-105.

American power” worldwide. This effort was influential in shaping American public diplomacy efforts for years to come (Cull, *The Cold War* 54).

As President Truman stated in 1950, the goal of the “Campaign for Truth” was to “make ourselves known as we really are—not as Communist propaganda pictures us” (qtd. in Cull, *The Cold War* 55). This campaign provided a revived conviction in the fight against communism, for we were in “a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men” (qtd. in Hixson 14). The administration attempted to convince others to identify with us rather than the communist enemy by portraying a real, honest image of the United States. However, U.S. information strategies were still on shaky ground. In spite of the Truman Administration’s various ideological efforts, we were struggling to achieve this goal (Cull, *The Cold War* 80). Reports of the Soviet information campaigns showed that they were “spending proportionately forty times as much” as we were in this ideological fight (Hixson 25).

Clearly the United States needed a better infrastructure and more success in fighting communism. This need led to the creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953. Under President Eisenhower, this overseas agency had a mission “to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which are consistent with the national objectives of the United States” (Galal 2). With the slogan “Telling America’s Story to the World,” the USIA’s goal was to persuade worldwide public opinion in both the short and long term (Galal 2; Bardos 426). The agency attempted to exert influence through film, television, radio, exhibitions, tours, private and citizen engagements, and international exchanges.

U.S. public diplomacy continued to expand with the USIA throughout Europe and Latin America as the Cold War progressed. In the 1950s, we witnessed intense engagement with the Middle East and Asia in condemning communism and promoting commonalities (Cull, *The Cold*

War 120-23). The USIA played a major role in the history of American public diplomacy, because it originated during a crisis and functioned as a major channel in convincing the world to follow our lead.

With the USIA's efforts during the Eisenhower Administration, the Soviets fought back with the launch of campaigns to promote "peaceful coexistence." The need for a more effective strategy became imperative for the U.S. (Cull, *The Cold War* 126-27). This need led to an emphasis on more initiatives to spread U.S. ideologies and the creation of the Special Ideological Working Group in 1955. This group published books and magazines focusing on distinguishing the difference between communism and democracy and providing explanations of "freedom" (Cull, *The Cold War* 127).

The next turn in U.S. public diplomacy came during JFK's Administration. During his campaign, he had promised to work at rejuvenating the image of the U.S. worldwide (Cull, *The Cold War* 189). The JFK administration changed the approach to public diplomacy with a softer and friendlier approach to international audiences (Waller, *The Public* 114). A greater focus was also placed on citizen diplomacy and the establishment of such organizations as the Peace Corps and the U.S. Agency for International Development (Waller, *The Public* 114).

In addition to these efforts, JFK hired the broadcaster Edward R. Murrow in 1961 as the new director of the USIA in to help enhance the U.S.'s image. Murrow played an important role in helping to change the way USIA engaged with the world (Tuch 25-26). Murrow's goal for the USIA was for it to become an "integral part of the making as well as the execution of American foreign policy" (Cull, *The Cold War* 190). Murrow's philosophy for public diplomacy can be expressed through his famously quoted statement, "they expect [the USIA] to be in on the crash landings... we had better be in on the takeoffs" (qtd. in Waller, *The Public* 330). For Murrow, it

was necessary that the USIA be involved in the making of foreign policy and not just in saving the U.S.'s image following poor choices. For successful public diplomacy, the USIA needed to take on a larger role “in the global development of ‘free governments’ [by] engaging with accusations of racism [and] ‘identify’ the U.S. with ‘the revolution of rising expectations’ across the globe” (Cull, *The Cold War* 192). It was important to persuade the world to identify with us and join our fight against the Soviets and Murrow played a vital role since efforts to counter Soviet campaigns had previously been ineffective.

As the nation continued to face crises, such as the Civil Rights Movement, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War, we relied upon both the VOA and the USIA to inform the world of these events—but to do it by rhetorically constructing the ideals of the U.S. in the most favorable way possible (Cull, *The Cold War* 206-14). For example, rather than focusing on the internal conflicts and riots occurring during the civil rights movement, the USIA described it as “a positive expression of the American Democratic spirit” (Cull, *The Cold War* 212). As the Vietnam War progressed, it became extremely difficult not only for the VOA and USIA but also for other public diplomacy programs and initiatives to convince the world of the U.S.'s justification in its fight against Vietnam (Cull, *The Cold War* 287-88). The declining state of the U.S.'s international image led to the 1968 Congressional hearings on “The Future of United States Public Diplomacy,” but these hearings did little to change the situation (Cull, *The Cold War* 290).

When President Nixon entered the White House, American public diplomacy lost much of its former importance (Lord, “The Past” 50). Henry Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Advisor, had a major impact on public diplomacy by restructuring the USIA so it no longer influenced foreign policy (Cull, *The Cold War* 294). The international coverage, exhibitions, and

goodwill tours of the 1969 moon landing were surprisingly successful efforts that proved effective in improving worldwide public opinion of the United States (Cull, *The Cold War* 305-306). Over the next several years, the debate continued between members of Congress on whether U.S. public diplomacy agencies were informing foreign publics in the most effective manner (Cull, *The Cold War* 340). When Jimmy Carter became president, the primary goals of his administration were to focus on human rights and reorganize the structure of U.S. public diplomacy (Cull, *The Cold War* 364; Lord, "The Past" 51).

The Carter Administration and Public Diplomacy

The Carter Administration emphasized the importance of public diplomacy (Lord, "The Past" 51). In 1978, the administration restructured the USIA and temporarily renamed it the International Communication Agency (ICA) (Lord, "The Past" 51). The restructuring of the USIA into the ICA included two major changes: 1) all public diplomacy activities happened within the ICA whereas some had previously been carried out by the State Department, and 2) the concept of "mutuality" was added to the focus of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy would no longer be solely about persuading or informing foreign publics but also about learning from them (Tuch 31-32). The new emphasis on mutuality was important because it was supposed to produce more dialogue between nations and therefore be more useful than relying on one-way communication. Although these changes were implemented, the focus reverted back to one-way public diplomacy tactics.

Under the direction of John Reinhardt, the newly organized ICA initially made progress in winning the "war of ideas" (Cull, *The Cold War* 382). But, as public diplomacy initiatives continued to expand in the Middle East, they were not enough to counter the effects of later events during the Carter Administration (Cull, *The Cold War* 383). The political environment

surrounding the Iran Hostage Crisis forced the Carter Administration to respond rhetorically. This crisis during the Carter Administration serves as a telling example of how the United States continues to construct similar rhetoric and how this rhetorical process in public diplomacy is enduring in U. S. history. There has been no other crisis in American history that is precisely identical to the hostage crisis; however, the rhetorical response that has materialized throughout our past persists and reveals itself anew in every crisis. To further argue the consistent nature of public diplomacy as rhetorical process, next, I will look at the context and plan put forth by the Carter Administration following the Iran Hostage Crisis. This plan serves as one historical artifact where the U.S. tried to reach out to the Muslim world by rhetorically focusing on creating identification through common values and ideals.

Iran Hostage Crisis

To understand the Carter Administration's Communication plan, I must first explain the historical context, which will illuminate the rhetorical choices in greater detail. The Iran Hostage Crisis came at a very unfortunate time for our country because we were already facing a crisis of ideology worldwide. Our values had become questionable, and it became difficult to persuade foreign audiences to identify with U.S. interests and ideas. With the failed war in Vietnam and the illegal actions of the Nixon Watergate scandal, the United States had lost traction in convincing the world to follow its lead (Farber 16).

Not only did the Iran Hostage Crisis represent a challenge to American ideology, but the militant takeover of a U.S. embassy symbolized the greater threat of Communist control worldwide. The civil unrest in Iran made us fearful of the overwhelming danger of the Soviet Union (Farber 5). Although the public diplomacy efforts in the Muslim world at that time were targeted to convince them against Soviet persuasion, anti-Americanism was prevalent. This

negative view of the U.S. continued because we were seen as “the major force spreading this cultural and political creed [of secular modernism] throughout the world” (Farber 5). The U.S. was seen as forcefully imposing American ideologies in the Middle East which was not welcomed.

Despite the Carter Administration’s revitalization of public diplomacy efforts, the administration ignored particular countries like Iran, which can be seen as a strategic and deliberate choice (Cull, *The Cold War* 386). Cull argues that the Carter Administration faced a major disparity between their “noble rhetoric” of public diplomacy efforts and the reality that we supported the Shah of Iran (*The Cold War* 386). This support contributed to the perception that the U.S. was a “hypocritical source of that country’s ills” (Cull, *The Cold War* 386). The U.S.’s negative image was the result of the close allied relationship maintained with the Shah of Iran for close to twenty-five years (Farber 103). The situation in Iran which led to the overthrow of the Shah’s government during the 1978 revolution was a distressing situation for the United States. The takeover by the fundamentalist regime of the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini threatened the U.S.’s reliance on Iran as a major oil resource as well as reaffirmed the threat of Soviet power in the Middle East (Farber 108; Cull, *The Cold War* 386).

Following the government takeover in Iran, the Carter Administration realized the severity of the situation and possible growing problems with the new Islamic fundamentalist in power. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor, began briefing President Carter on this situation by stressing the need to continue to reach out to Muslim countries in order to help counter Islamic fundamentalism (Farber 106). At that moment it became vital that we not only gain support against Islamic fundamentalists, but also encouraged Muslims to identify with the U.S. and not the Soviets. We faced a crucial moment when our rhetorical choices in

approaching the Muslim world would impact our relationship and image in the region for years to come. Brzezinski explained that in order to gain support in the Middle East, the U.S. must focus on our shared interests and values, which would help communicate our greater “support for a world of diversity” (qtd. in Farber 107). Unfortunately, this did not materialize in the form of much diplomatic engagement or dialogue and contributed to our difficulty in persuading Muslims. It became clear the U.S. was failing to convince Muslims in the ideological fight against the Soviets and more needed to be done.

Not long before the Iran Hostage Crisis, Brzezinski expressed concern that we were losing the ideological battle against the Soviet Union, had been “excessively acquiescent,” and that President Carter must “toughen both the tone and the substance of our foreign policy” (qtd. in Farber 118). During the Carter Administration, the international perception of the U.S. continued to be unfavorable. Brzezinski became increasingly concerned that we were unable to prove to the world that we were more invested than the Soviet Union in worldwide interests (Farber 118).

The attitude of Muslim countries toward the U.S. continued to decline—particularly when President Carter allowed the Shah to seek refuge in the United States on October 23, 1979. This action further angered militant students, who stated that “by allowing the Shah to enter the U.S., the Americans have started a new conspiracy against the revolution. If we don’t act rapidly, if we show weakness, then a superpower like the U.S. will be able to meddle in the internal affairs of any nation in the world” (qtd. in Farber 128-29). These students wanted their actions to not only to be symbolic of Iran’s sovereign power in opposition to the superpower but to further represent support and strength for any nation who felt the U.S. was interfering in their affairs. This agitated political climate in Iran led to a crisis for the United States. On November 4, 1979,

student demonstrators overpowered the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking hostages (Sick 197, 214). The students who took over the American embassy felt this was a way to show everyone in the world that the power of the American government was wavering and that “God is the ultimate power” (qtd. in Faber 129). The students felt their actions were symbolic of God’s power and that despite the power Americans held, no one, not even the U.S., could overcome the ultimate will of God.

Although the U.S. embassy was taken over by demonstrating students with whom Khomeini claimed he had no involvement, the takeover no longer represented an act of political protest; instead it became an all-out battle of Iran verses the United States (Sick 209). The struggle was no longer about negotiating with militant students; it morphed into a campaign of convincing the world to unite against Iran through the “demonstration of the powers of moral and political suasion” (Sick 217). The U.S. rallied every possible resource in order to condemn Iran and assert its position of power in the world. Various means of persuasion were employed by the U.S. not only to denounce the student’s actions but garner support against Iran.

The hostage crisis resulted in immediate efforts to counter anti-American sentiment throughout the Muslim world. Gary Sick described the “U.S. campaign of persuasion and pressure that was mounted in the days and weeks following” this crisis as “probably the most extensive and sustained effort of its kind” to date (217). The Special Coordination Committee began the effort to analyze the situation the very next day. Headed by Brzezinski, it was the first of many meetings, but no one expected the crisis would last as long as it did (Farber 139-42).

Several days following the taking of the American embassy, Brzezinski required that the VOA Farsi service conduct programming in the Middle East (Cull, *The Cold War* 388). The goal of this programming was to portray the Soviet Union in an unfavorable light because the

unraveling situation threatened our relationship with Iran and might lead to the Soviets gaining power in the Middle East (Cull, *The Cold War* 388). James M. Rentschler, a member of the National Security Council, recommended that our programming put extensive focus on identification with Muslims by drawing attention to “the commonality of values, spiritual and secular, that link our societies” (memo to Brzezinski 12/3/79). Efforts continued as the attackers held the Americans hostage for 444 days and we persisted with the use of international opinion, the U.N. Security Council, and the removal of the Shah (Farber 12). However, winning the war of ideas required much more involvement in the Muslim world (Farber 12). The administration’s executive branch spearheaded a communication effort illuminating the rhetorical process within American public diplomacy and foreshadowing the forthcoming ideological struggles we would face with the Muslim world.

Communicating with Muslim Countries

One month following the hostage takeover of the American embassy in Tehran, the Carter Administration responded to the crisis with a hastily designed communication plan intended to engage the Middle East. Both Brzezinski and the ICA director, John Reinhardt, were major players in formulating and implementing this response plan to counter anti-Americanism and Soviet rhetoric in Muslim countries. On December 12, 1979, Brzezinski informed Reinhardt that communication with Muslim countries must be enhanced, and it was important to “underscore American identification with the authentic values for which Islam stands” (memo to Reinhardt 12/12/79). In response to Brzezinski’s request, Reinhardt outlined a plan with both a simplified focus and goals, in order to create identification with Muslims based on common values and interests (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). This text constitutes an example of the historical process of public diplomacy rhetoric in the United States. By analyzing this historic

rhetoric, we can further understand how our nation continues to use similar ideological tactics, and how the 1979 communication plan purposed during the Iran crisis is not that different from the NSPDSC composed in response to the attacks on 9/11.

The Text

The communication plan composed to address Muslim countries was a hurried endeavor. The U.S. faced an immediate crisis and a rapid response was necessary. Essentially, two main players at that time crafted this communication proposal: Brzezinski and Reinhardt. Documents from The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library reveal that they discussed the ideas and composed the actual plan in the form of confidential memos, although they briefed other members of the National Security Council on the plan as well (Reinhardt memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79, Brzezinski memo to Reinhardt 12/12/79).

The final, succinct four-page plan is detailed in a memo from Reinhardt to Brzezinski on December 12, 1979, with the subject line “Communication with Muslim Countries” (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). They defined the plan as a response to two major “phenomena which require[d] urgent address” briefly explained as the negative perception of the U.S. in the Islamic world and the need to “engage Muslims” by emphasizing commonalities and identification, which both needed to be addressed in the short and long term (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). Although the plan addresses both short and long-term goals, they were both seen as equally pressing. Following the explanation of the goals for communicating with Muslim countries, Reinhardt details a nine-point action plan. This text reveals the use of the rhetorical process of identification and its contributing strategies of enemy construction and ethos enhancement.

Rhetorical identification takes place when people are “identified in terms of some principle they share in common” or when they share “substance” (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives*

21). The use of identification cannot be present without its antithesis, division; thus, rhetorical identification leads to acknowledging the enemy or other (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 22). Identification must be “affirmed precisely because there is division” and only is useful in this antagonistic relationship (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 22). Therefore, to create identification in opposition to the enemy, one must emphasize the shared common interests or substance with the audience. Within this part of the process of identification, the use of ethos or elements of character becomes necessary because one can be persuaded “only insofar as you can talk his language by [...] image, attitude, idea *identifying* your ways with his” (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 55). As Aristotle describes, the importance of ethos in persuasion, in addition to “good sense, good moral character, and goodwill,” is useful even without “any proof of it” (91). The use of ethos and enemy definition are contributing appeals within the rhetorical process of identification. Next, I will explain the specific appeals to identification within this communication plan.

Identification

One of the major rhetorical themes in the plan drafted by the Carter Administration is the reliance on the use of identification. The process of working to create identification is ubiquitous throughout the four page memo. The plan discusses the ways that the U.S. can work to identify itself with Muslims and the religion of Islam to meet our needs. The short-term goals of the plan address how the U.S. was perceived as an enemy to Islam in the Middle East. In order to change this negative perception, we needed to counter the idea that the “U.S. is hostile to the whole of Islam” by placing ourselves alongside of Islam and focusing extensively on identification (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). We needed to clarify that Americans were aware there existed “various manifestations of Islam” and that we respected the Islamic religion, but we did not support the

side of Islam of the fundamentalist Ayatollah Khomeini (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). By working to create a clear rhetorical distinction between the different facets of Islam, the plan explains, “U.S. interests will be served by projecting our appreciation of the fact that Islam takes many forms, of which the Ayatollah is not a leading representation” (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). The goal of creating this kind of identification was not only to change the perception Muslims had about the United States’ appreciation for Islam, but also to reiterate the idea that we were working with the Middle Eastern nations and not against them. For example, the plan points to the need to respond “to both their general ‘Third World’ identity and their role as representatives of a serious religion, many (but not all) of whose values we share” (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). Distinguishing their religion as valuable is important because with rhetorical identification, we are “both joined and separate” and identify with one another based on common substance or shared commonality. Therefore, “‘identification’ [...] does not deny [...] distinctiveness” and despite the fact that one may be persuaded to identify another, individuality is not dismissed (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 21).

A concentration on common interests or substance is necessary in creating identification because it elucidates the many values that are shared despite individual differences. The plan addresses how “a principal purpose of this continuing discourse will be to expand awareness of commonalities where they exist” (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). The emphasis on identification with the Muslim world focused on values and commonalities. This focus was key in countering any hostility to the U.S. and hopefully influencing the negative perception of the U.S. particularly in Iran as well as surrounding countries. The plan further describes how we must “involve religious/intellectual leaders from Muslim countries in much more directly value-centered discussions with American counterparts both in the U.S. and abroad” (memo to

Brzezinski 12/12/79). The use of identification in this communication plan not only reiterates the commonalities between the U.S. and the Muslim world but also further defines the common enemy.

Enemy Construction

The United States was not only facing the students who took hostages and control over the American embassy, but we were also fighting the greater threat of Soviet power in the Middle East. It was absolutely vital that we gain the support of the Muslim world to side with the U.S. over the Soviets because, as Brzezinski stated, they were a threat to the “domination of Middle East oil” (qtd. in Farber 170). As the plan shows, gaining support against the Soviets became essential as part of the plan’s conception. Members of the Carter Administration knew it was imperative to do everything in the Muslim world “to erode Soviet identification with the non-aligned countries,” and in order to do this, Soviets must be constructed as the ‘other’ (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79).

In constructing the enemy, they must be “identifiable persons or stereotypes of persons to whom evil traits, intentions, or actions can be attributed” (Edelman 87). This communication plan achieves this goal by attributing the situation in Afghanistan with the Soviets. The plan states, “For both short- and long-term purposes, the invasion of Afghanistan provides an extraordinary opportunity (which we are seizing) to dramatize Soviet military and cultural imperialism” (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). By rhetorically emphasizing the situation in Afghanistan and the Soviet’s connection to it, we hoped to dispel any thought that the Soviets were anything but the enemy. The use of enemy construction furthers the idea of the Soviet Union as “evil” and accentuates the dangers Muslims faced if they identified with the Soviets.

Clearly defining the enemy inherently led to an emphasis on enhancing the ethos of the United States.

Ethos Enhancement

This communication plan's use of ethos works to address ways to improve the U.S.'s image in the Muslim world. The plan describes specific rhetorical tactics that we needed to implement to increase goodwill toward the U.S. In order to enhance "U.S. interests," the plan states it was necessary for us to continue "projecting our appreciation of the fact that Islam takes many forms" because in doing this, the perception of the U.S. would become more positive. The plan states that such rhetoric would be used in "media output" and also through "official public statements" (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). The plan emphasizes the need to "enhance our own psychological posture in Muslim minds," which essentially stresses the rhetorical importance of heightening the character of the U.S. and the need "to engage with influential Muslims" (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). By persuading "influential Muslims" that the U.S. possessed nothing but goodwill toward the Middle East and Islam, we would enhance the U.S.'s moral character and also inevitably reach a larger population of Muslims, thus forwarding our goals. The focus on "influential Muslims" allows us to communicate our commonalities via these "influential" individuals to part of the Muslim public we normally would not be able to reach, therefore furthering our ability to enhance our ethos.

Another tactic of the plan that ensures a focus on ethos involved reaching out to Muslim students in the U.S. and finding "ways of enhancing the probability that their experiences here will contribute to the objectives outlined" (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). This communication plan sought to find every possible way to work and implement rhetorical uses of ethos enhancement. The composition of the "Communication with Muslim Countries" memo in

response to the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979 by the Carter Administration's executive branch is a useful example for examining the rhetorical process of American public diplomacy.

As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 3, the 2007 *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* (NSPDSC) reveals many of the same rhetorical tactics used in the Carter Administration "Communication with Muslim Countries" plan and is stunningly similar to present plans for engaging the Muslim world. This plan was drafted in response to the Iranian Hostage Crisis but, unfortunately, was not as effective as the Carter Administration had hoped. This communication plan illustrates how American public diplomacy rhetoric has not changed throughout history even with the different contexts, and the principal goals of American public diplomacy in the Middle East remain today.

Conclusion

Today, as the U.S. again faces crises, we must learn from our past and look at historical examples of public diplomacy efforts like the communication plan with Muslim countries that was put forth by the Carter Administration. The crisis in Iran involving the fall of the Shah, the takeover by the fundamental Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the taking of American hostages at the American embassy became the biggest failure of the Carter Administration (Farber 11-12). As Farber states, the overwhelming failure at that time in Iran and the Middle East "led, indirectly, some two decades later" to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (8).

The communication plan put forth by the Carter Administration serves as a comparative rhetorical example from U.S. history that helps illuminate how this public diplomacy process is continuing. Presently, we see its emergence in the face of the crisis on September 11 and the *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*. The preceding outline of the history of U.S. public diplomacy shows how this process is woven into a very deep part of

American politics, which we continue to iterate in the face of crisis. Although no context has been exactly the same as that of the Iran Hostage Crisis, the consistent rhetorical appeals of identification, ethos, and enemy construction continue to reveal themselves.

The analysis of the Carter Administration's plan serves as a comparative example that the rhetorical choices of identification, enemy construction, and ethos are not unique to 9/11 and further iterates the need for rhetorical analysis in the field of public diplomacy. The next chapter analyzes the rhetorical workings within the NSPDSC plan and shows that although the political environment changes, the rhetorical responses primarily stay the same.

Chapter 3:
Rhetorical Identification in the
2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication

We will lead the cause of freedom, justice, and hope, because both our values and our interests demand it. We believe in the timeless truth: To whom much is given, much is required. We also know that nations with free, healthy, prosperous people will be sources of stability, not breeding grounds for extremists and hate and terror. By making the world more hopeful, we make the world more peaceful- and helping others, the American people must understand we help ourselves.

President George W. Bush⁸

As the United States continues to fight its War against Terror, a rhetorical process of American public diplomacy continues to reveal itself. As I have shown in previous chapters, public diplomacy rhetoric is created in response to a particular historical context or crisis. American public diplomacy has historically relied on identification with enemy construction and appeals to Aristotelian ethos. In my analysis of the *2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* (NSPDSC), I will show how this communication plan exemplifies the rhetorical choices of the United States including identification through the use of ethos by creating a common ground and constructing the ‘other’ or enemy. My analysis will show that the rhetorical process of identification used by our administration reveals significant parallels between the 2007 NSPDSC and the Carter Administration’s plan, “Communication with Muslim Countries.” The 2007 NSPDSC, like Carter’s plan, constitutes a significant example of the recurring historical process in American public diplomacy that I have outlined in previous chapters and requires further attention as the first U.S. strategy of this magnitude that sought to implement a single departmental identification strategy in approaching foreign audiences and most specifically the Muslim world

⁸ As quoted on cover page of “U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.” *Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee*. June 2007. Web.10 May 2008.

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, relations with the Muslim world were strained. As many previous efforts had proved unsuccessful in winning the “hearts and minds” of the Muslim world, the 2007 NSPDSC was devised as a communication strategy to persuade people in the Middle East to side with us in the War on Terror. In addition to this goal, this communication strategy was also designed to persuade Muslims that the United States is not their enemy. Like the communication plan put forth under the Carter Administration, the 2007 NSPDSC addressed the Muslim world and emphasized identification through common interests and values, enemy construction, and specific appeals to national ethos.

Despite other similarities with Carter’s Communication Plan with Muslim Countries, the 2007 NSPDSC is unique as the *first strategic* communication plan composed for implementation in all sectors of the government. The NSPDSC is considered the first ever national strategic communication plan of this caliber developed in U.S. public diplomacy. Therefore, the NSPDSC not only warrants attention as a historical text in American public diplomacy but also because of the potential influence the plan would have had if it had been implemented in *all* government agencies.

The NSPDSC was also the first broad scale plan that served as a set of guidelines for each of the government’s agencies in composing their own individual communication plans. Due to the enormity of this endeavor—as comprehensive and reflective of all aspects of government—the NSPDSC took a great deal of time to craft with the necessary input of many sectors. As the Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes stated in the cover message of the strategy, “The plan was developed by the inter-agency PCC on strategic communications and is the result of extensive input from different agencies, as well as major recommendations from more than 30 reports on public diplomacy, GAO reports, IG

recommendations and consultations with private sector communications professionals” and serves as a “comprehensive blueprint that brings all of our resources to bear on representing America as a whole” (Waller, “Exclusive: New State Department”). Hughes’ introduction to the NSPDSC reiterates the importance of this plan not only at the government level but in American society as a whole. While crafting the NSPDSC, Hughes and the Policy Coordinating Committee considered recommendations not only from government reports but various scholars, NGOs, consultants and other professionals in composing a coherent communication strategy that depicts all aspects of the U.S. The NSPDSC was composed at a crucial time when the U.S. image was suffering a deep decline.

After 9/11 and the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. was desperate for anything that would counter its unfavorable image in the Muslim world, therefore the NSPDSC was highly anticipated (Dale, “Credible American diplomacy”). This political situation prompted the development of this “new” strategy to combat extremist ideology. Despite high expectations, this “new” communication strategy proved itself to be a recreation of past American public diplomacy rhetoric. For, “the strength, success and security of the United States of America rest on our commitment to certain fundamental values and principles. These values gave birth to our nation, and govern our actions in the world,” it is these values which have and continue to shape our public diplomacy tactics (NSPDSC 2). The NSPDSC, like former public diplomacy rhetoric, reflects how the historical and political contexts serve a “social utility” for public diplomacy during specific times while also intrinsically linked by these fundamental values. These values influence forthcoming rhetoric and shape how we continue to rhetorically engage the world, and show how creating identification over common values and interests continues to be essential in our public diplomacy efforts.

Major Themes in the NSPDSC

This chapter first illuminates the rhetoric of the 2007 NSPDSC through Burke's concept of identification. Next, I will argue that the NSPDSC further exemplifies the continuing rhetorical process of American public diplomacy by examining the rhetorical workings of the process of identification and its interrelated appeals to ethos and enemy construction within this text. As I have demonstrated in earlier chapters, the process of identification is not unique to a single political context. We continually see a resurgence of identification during times of crisis, evident in the post 9/11 public diplomacy efforts. Through an analysis of the NSPDSC I show how the U.S. continues to return to the rhetorical process of identification, appeals to ethos and enemy construction as a means to reaching foreign audiences.

As explained in Chapter 2, Burke's concept of identification is significant because identification reveals not only how we confront division from the enemy but how we unify with one another. Therefore, enemy construction and appeals to ethos become relevant. Using this framework, I return to Burke's explanation that identification takes place when, "A is not identified with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is *identified* with B. [...] In being identified with B, A is "substantially one" with a person other than himself. [...] Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another" (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 20-21). Therefore, by drawing attention to the 'other,' what divides you from 'them,' the other is brought into focus. And by distinguishing A from B, ethos comes into play, because it is these appeals to ethos and identifying common substances that work to create identification between A and B.

In the following sections, I first highlight the main themes within the NSPDSC, and then examine how the use of ethos and its interrelated components of finding substance/common

ground and the ability to be joined but separated are used. Next, I address the ongoing emphasis on enemy construction through uniting against a common enemy, which is part of the larger rhetorical process of identification. Finally, I draw specific attention to the “Core Messages-Specific to the War on Terror” that constitutes a significant and problematic rhetorical example of my inquiry in the NSPDSC. Through the examination of this text, I demonstrate how this method of analysis is significant to American public diplomacy by arguing how the NSPDSC illuminates the importance of this rhetoric in American history and reveals parallels to past reactions to crisis by the executive branch. This analysis of the text will explore the current state of American public diplomacy rhetoric and show how it simultaneously serves as a comparable example of past American public diplomacy efforts, such as the Carter Administration’s Communication plan with Muslim Countries. In Chapter 4, I will further discuss this analysis of the rhetoric of the NSPDSC, as well as argue that the examination of the broader history of American public diplomacy will allow us to better expose and understand the underlying possibilities and problems we will face in the future.

Although the NSPDSC was conceived as the underlying strategy for *all* American public diplomacy, it is clear in reading the document that with the U.S.’s image crisis in the Middle East and the threat of extremism and terrorism in that region, that the intended targeted audience of the implemented communication plan was Muslims. As this analysis will demonstrate identification within the plan is used to reach the Muslim World and once again, the U.S. is “engaged in an international struggle of ideas and ideologies” (NSPDSC 11). And it is because of this struggle that we rely on former rhetorical choices similar to the ones we have used throughout American public diplomacy history and more specifically during the Carter Administration’s 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis, “Communication Plan with Muslims.”

The NSPDSC is a more in depth and detailed document than the Communication Plan put forth by the Carter Administration which was drafted over several days. These differences likely result from the amount of time spent developing each plan. The Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the Policy Coordinating Committee spent close to a year developing the NSPDSC. The document is thirty-four pages long, but the actual plan is only twelve pages. The core plan comprised the following pieces: Mission and Priorities, Strategic Objectives, Strategic Audiences, Public Diplomacy Priorities, Interagency Coordination, Initial Communication Activities, Needed Resources, and Conclusion. The remaining pages are five attachments called the Action Plan for Strategic Objectives, General Communication Guidelines, Core Messages Both General and Specific to the War on Terrorism, Additional Communication Vehicles, and Evaluation and Accountability. Each piece of the plan was created to build a comprehensive strategy that government officials and departments would use as a guide in achieving the U.S.'s larger goal of gaining support worldwide in our fight against extremism and most specifically from the Middle East.

Overview of the rhetorical workings of the NSPDSC

The rhetorical themes of the NSPDSC can be succinctly described as “communicating America’s views, values and policies in effective ways to audiences across the world,” which will be explored in further length within this chapter (12). By focusing on communicating “America’s views, values and policies,” we can see that the use of rhetoric becomes pivotal within the NSPDSC. These rhetorical choices are outlined as three strategic objectives on page three of the plan, which are representative of the primary rhetorical focus in the NSPDSC and reveal the use of identification and its corresponding appeals to ethos and enemy construction. The strategic objectives are as follows:

- I. America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in our most basic values.
- II. With our partners, we seek to isolate and marginalize violent extremists who threaten the freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture and faith.
- III. America must work to nurture common interests and values between Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures and faiths across the world (3).

Ethos: The first objective solicits attention to American ethos by stating that our country represents “hope” and “opportunity” in the world, thus a symbol of goodwill. The focus on ethos works to characterize America as a positive force in the world, based on the fundamental “values” that shape our country and by identifying with America, others will have access to more opportunities. This leads to the idea that the U.S. is more credible because we are working not only to improve the lives of Americans but *all* people worldwide. Using ethos in this way is important in providing an opportunity for greater persuasion because the principle goal of the U.S. is presented as bringing progress to people everywhere.

Enemy Construction: The second objective defines the enemy and amplifies the danger posed by that enemy, stating that “violent extremists” challenge the “freedom and peace” not only of Americans but of “civilized people of every nation, culture and faith.” Such language defines the enemy in opposition to all freedom-loving and peace-seeking people worldwide while simultaneously reiterating the “they” versus “us” division, and the use of “civilized” inherently generates its opposite, the “barbaric” other, which rhetorically constructs the enemy (Ivie, *Democracy* 149). The use of this language automatically creates the binaries of “us” vs. “them” which creates identification and simultaneously a rhetorical division that results in particular valued associations of the defined enemy or other. Associating values with the other allows more opportunities for persuasion because it provides an additional reason for the audience to identify against an enemy who possess no moral compass.

Identification: The third objective delineates the focus in this plan and its reliance on creating identification based on a common substance, or “interests and values,” which allows Americans and foreign publics to be consubstantial. This rhetoric allows consubstantiality through identification because it seeks to create unity over a commonality or substance. But this rhetoric maintains the uniqueness of all individuals emphasizing that although we may have varying cultures and faiths, ultimately, our “interests and values” are the same, therefore we are “both joined and separate” (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 21). This distinction of being joined and separate reiterates that although we may differ in religion, politics and ways of living, we are bound by common interests and values all human beings share.

I will argue these objectives constitute the rhetorical themes that are continually used in American public diplomacy. These objectives are representative of the document as a whole and provide a brief overview into the themes that I analyze within the NSPDSC and further argue is representative of the perpetual use of rhetorical identification in the history of American public diplomacy. In the following sections I delve into further detail about each corresponding part of my analysis. First, I will return to how the use of ethos is an important component within the process of identification.

Framework of Ethos

Aristotle describes that in the theory of ethos, for a rhetor ethos is the “most effective means of persuasion he possesses” (25). Ethos or character in persuasion is used when there is the ability to “inspire trust in [the] audience” through the “good qualities” of “good sense, good moral character, and goodwill” (91). When these qualities are present in rhetoric, ethos is useful in persuading an audience to identify with the rhetor. Aristotle explains that when opinions are divided, ethos helps “make us think him credible [because] we believe good men more fully and

more readily than others” (25). Therefore, one is more likely to identify with someone who presents themselves as more credible and trustworthy. In extending this theory, Burke argues that within ethos are the “conditions of identification” for it is only when a rhetor shows the “appropriate signs of character” by “*identifying* your ways with his” is it possible to persuade them of a particular opinion (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 55). And by using one’s character or goodwill to establish similar qualities, identification works to persuade one to identify with the rhetor along with differing “opinions,” “attitudes,” or “values” (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 55-56). The use of ethos is extremely important in identification, because people want to identify with others who possess good moral characteristics.

Ethos in NSPDSC

The use of ethos is an essential part of the NSPDSC designed to help improve the image of the United States and served to “spotlight ways in which American assistance is helping real people achieve better lives” (14). The NSPDSC works to encourage government officials and departments to emphasize positive actions of the American government worldwide, in order to elicit identification with other people which projects goodwill toward the United States while attempting to strengthen our country’s image. There are a variety of instances in the NSPDSC that emphasize the importance of America’s actions of goodwill towards the world. For example, one section explains the importance of “America’s deeds,” and how we must highlight “the tremendous impact Americans are making on lives around the world every day” (7). An emphasis on the U.S.’s good deeds works to strengthen American ethos because detailing positive U.S. actions provides proof to the audience that the U.S. is a prominent resource for people in need across the world.

The report also continues to claim, “all agencies and embassies should make a major commitment to more aggressively tell the story of how [...] programs are helping people improve their lives and opportunities” (7). This highlights the need for departmental officials to seek out every possible uplifting story that represents how the U.S. provides for people worldwide and vigorously communicate these examples.

Drawing attention to American efforts worldwide provides useful in enhancing ethos by working to extend others’ goodwill towards the United States and show our level of morality and generosity towards others. Crafting a positive ethos is essential in gaining the trust of the audience because without this ability to persuade an audience of one’s good moral character, it is difficult to encourage identification and further persuade them of particular opinions.

The rhetoric within the NSPDSC emphasizes the need for public officials to enhance ethos by communicating values that highlight American efforts worldwide in order to illustrate the spirit of selflessness of Americans. The NSPDSC states that all public officials and departments need to focus on the fact that the U.S. is a positive force and “across the world, America feeds the poor, educates the illiterate, cares for the sick and responds to disasters” (13). Thus the plan encourages a concentration on the global actions of Americans which provides an opportunity to enhance the credibility of the United States as an influential country in the world, thus placing us on a higher moral ground in the fight for the greater good of all humankind. The strategy describes the need for all government officials and departments to draw attention to “key influencers” which can work to generate “a ripple effect throughout society” and provide greater opportunities to convince the intended target that the U.S.’s intentions stem from a place of goodwill and trust (4). Encouraging communication that draws attention to important individuals or “opinion leaders” deemed representative of good character, values, and persuasions of Muslim

faith, allows more opportunities to further enhance ethos because these “clerics, educators, journalists, women leaders, business and labor leaders” in these societies can be useful in advancing overall U.S. goals (4).

The NSPDSC reinforces that public officials and departments must use ethos in communication tactics to foster more confidence and trust in the ideals of the United States, because “we believe all people are equal and equally valuable, we believe people everywhere should be free to speak their mind, to participate in their government, to worship as their conscience dictates, to assemble freely and to pursue opportunity, economic, political and creative” (27). This statement is significant because it represents the values that can help advance the moral character of the United States and create trust thus this rhetoric can provides an opportunity for identification. By pinpointing the rhetorical need to associate the U.S. with characteristics of freedom and other human rights, communication efforts implemented by government officials in persuading the target audience of a particular opinion are more likely to be successful. This kind of approach serves as a tool to help government officials in crafting more effective rhetoric because it becomes almost impossible for anyone to argue against a desire for a society possessing such characteristics for these things could arguably be the fantasy for all human beings. The NSPDSC emphasizes that the U.S. must be communicated as a beacon of hope that can provide an opportunity for all people to possess such human rights therefore situating the U.S. as not only as inspirational but the key to Muslims ever acquiring similar freedoms.

Therefore, it is at this juncture that the audience the plan seeks to communicate with can be easily persuaded to identify with us. The United States no longer becomes defined in the audience’s eyes as just a favorable country but rather one symbolic of human rights and values

that the U.S. believes our targeted audience wishes to achieve. By placing such an emphasis on America's moral character, the image of the United States is projected as a predominately credible good willed force that can provide nothing but "progress, prosperity, and peace" for everyone in the world (27).

The NSPDSC focuses on how government officials and departments need to use rhetoric that works to persuade the audience not only of America's credibility but also we seek similar goals as Muslims such as "freedom," "dignity," and "hope for a better life" (3). The action plan detailed in Attachment A for the first strategic objective further focuses on ethos with the goal to "reinforce a positive vision of hope and opportunity," thus showing how to enhance the U.S.'s ability to create identification through our good moral character (13). This section addresses the need for departments implementing the plan to "seek opportunities to link programs and policies with America's values," that specifically "spotlight ways in which American assistance is helping real people achieve better lives; collect and share success stories" (13–14). This objective emphasizes the need to promote the positive acts of Americans in order to foster goodwill towards the U.S. It also aims to illustrate the need to communicate to foreign audiences that the United States not only can be trusted but is forefront throughout the world in helping people in need. By communicating through claims about national ethos in an effort to establish identification, this rhetoric can mobilize others around commonalities for "America has long been a beacon of hope and opportunity for people across the world and [represents] that beacon of hope for a better life" (3). As I have demonstrated, the NSPDSC's emphasis on the rhetorical use of ethos is useful in persuading others that one can be trusted on goodwill and further allows for the audience to identify with the rhetor of a particular opinion. Like ethos enhancement, the

focus on finding substance or a common ground is an additional component addressed in order to persuade the audience to rhetorically identify with us.

Finding Substance or Common Ground

The NSPDSC relies heavily on creating identification through the emphasis on a common substance. Burke explains that it is because no one is “wholly and truly of one substance,” that we use rhetoric to create identification, and why “two persons may be identified in terms of some principle they share in common, an ‘identification’ that does not deny their distinctiveness” (*Rhetoric of Motives* 21-22). Therefore, this commonality that identifies one with another allows two persons to be “consubstantial” and unique at the same time (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 21). Cheney describes this strategy of identification as “the common ground technique [...] where the rhetor equates or links himself or herself with others in an overt manner” (148). Thus, using this rhetoric assumes that a substance exists which makes these two groups consubstantial. As the NSPDSC dictates, we need to “promote linkages between the American people and the rest of the world by reminding diverse populations of our common interests and values” (12). It is these linkages of substance—or in this case common values or interests—that allow identification to happen.

These “fundamental values” are the substance that we use to create common ground with our targeted audience (2). The NSPDSC broadly defines these substances as “common interests and values” that allow for “progress, prosperity and peace around the world” (3). The rhetoric surrounding common substances is somewhat vague, which is useful because it allows for individual interpretation that in turn promotes greater identification with an audience. And even if there are only a few substances that join the two groups together, identification works when a group is persuaded that commonalities *do* exist between each group.

One of the most prominent common substances that the NSPDSC relies upon to create identification is the emphasis on the one characteristic that people of all nations share: humanity. The reliance on the shared interest of humanity is useful in public diplomacy because as the NSPDSC explains “far more unites us as human beings than divides us” (3). Therefore, if there is no other characteristic that bonds us with one another, ultimately we are joined by our common will to survive as human beings. In using language that focuses on this greater shared interest of humanity, the NSPDSC consequentially addresses other “common threats” to the world at large and human survival (3). By addressing our common quest for human survival, the possible threats to human livelihood become apparent. For example, the NSPDSC elucidates that our shared interests as human beings are “expanding economic opportunity, promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts, enhancing scientific collaboration, fighting diseases that respect no border, and protecting our common environment” (3). By highlighting these aspects of humanity that are critical to the quality of life, the possible fleeting nature and threat to humans becomes figural in creating a conducive situation for identification to take place.

As discussed earlier, although identification is elicited based on these “common interests and values,” it results in two groups as “consubstantial” without dismissing certain differences. We may be divided by varying aspects such as geography, politics, religion, and ways of life, even though linkages are created through “common interests and values between Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures, and faiths across the world” (3). This emphasis on commonalities while simultaneously acknowledging a country’s individual characteristics is relevant because it rhetorically serves to encourage further identification with U.S. public diplomacy goals. In what follows I will further address the NSPDSC plan’s focus on common interests and values by examining the action plan in its attempt to reach these goals.

Attachment A, part three, in the NSPDSC provides a more detailed action plan pertaining to the third strategic goal, “Nurture and Project Common Interests and Values” (22). Similar to the previous examples of the creation of identification through commonalities, this action plan pinpoints useful places to create bonds with our targeted audience and provides hypothetical examples of how this approach can be effective. The action plan is composed of five components:

1. Each agency should identify and build on areas in which their expertise/mandate corresponds with a common interest of the world.
2. Develop active, agency-specific alumni networks of current and former official guests, speakers, professional exchanges and study programs as resources for outreach.
3. Greater focus should be placed on three major areas that human beings across the world care most about: health, education and economic opportunity.
4. Expand private sector linkages.
5. Sharing the best of American culture mitigates negative images and misunderstanding (22–24).

These components outline the importance in emphasizing the “common interest of the world” and the need to work with others as partners (22). Some of the components provide examples, such as climate/environment issues that affect all of the world’s people. By constructing messages that seek to build relationships around a greater common interest, we can see where identification can take place. For example, the second, third, and fourth components of this action plan are constructed with a focus on commonalities that we share with our targeted audience in order to cultivate bonds surrounding issues such as health and economics. By highlighting such crucial issues that people of all nationalities face, it becomes easier to persuade

the target audience to identify with us for these issues and challenges are framed to emphasize how they are relevant to all people

The fifth component draws specific attention to the U.S.'s poor image in the Middle East. It stresses the need to use all aspects of American culture that could provide useful in the identification process with Muslims. Even if we don't share commonalities in cultural aspects, we must use any aspects, such as "sports activities to forge a common bond" or emphasize how the arts are a "shared language" that can help "bridge political and policy differences" therefore reminding "us of our common humanity" (24). The use of these common interests gives the United States a way to reach this target audience, for if "U.S. science and technology are widely respected in the Muslim world," we have gained "a promising entry point for engaging citizens and society" (24). Once we are able to engage the audience through this focus on various commonalities, the process of identification is able to work. The reliance in American public diplomacy rhetoric on creating "common interests or values" or what Burke would call a shared "substance" continues to be used in creating identification with targeted audiences. Like past American public diplomacy efforts, the NSPDSC works to incite identification most specifically on the commonality of a shared humanity and the components surrounding it.

Joined but Simultaneously Separated

When identification takes place over a shared or common substance, this bond does not dismiss the fact that each is "unique," because they become "both joined and separate" (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 21). As Burke suggests, one can be both joined and distinct because "to begin with 'identification' is [...] to confront the implications of division" (*Rhetoric of Motives* 22). Identification is not relevant in efforts of public diplomacy unless some kind of division exists. Therefore, it is only through division, or each one's uniqueness, that identification can be

“affirmed with earnestness” (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 22). As Burke further explains, if we “were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity” and this could only be if we “were wholly and truly of one substance” (*Rhetoric of Motives* 22). Thus, identification works to create unification while also maintaining the individuality of the people who are identifying with the rhetor.

The NSPDSC acknowledges that although we share many common interests and values with people around the world, America and other nations are distinct and no single nation or people are entirely identical. The fact that we are a “multicultural nation” that “respects people of different cultures, backgrounds and faiths” makes it more likely others will identify with us (3). By drawing attention to the fact that we value diversity and our society comprises such differing people, works to create identification because the audience becomes included in our diversity. Emphasizing the uniqueness of varying nations works to establish the idea that we are all equal, distinct nations who can unite together. By stressing that the U.S. is representative of diversity and respects *all* people despite our differences, automatically establishes respect for the targeted audience and works to further the identification process.

Although the NSPDSC acknowledges people’s unique attributes, it does so to reiterate the primary goal of creating alliances. The NSPDSC explains that the U.S. is not only willing to “be a partner for progress, prosperity and peace around the world” but also possesses the fundamental values to head such actions (3). Therefore, despite these differences, America seeks to be forefront in helping all people to maintain individuality as they seek “prosperity and peace” (3). This establishes the U.S. as leading the ultimate quest for people of all faiths and ways of life to achieve these goals.

The NSPDSC states that, in order to ensure each nation's distinctiveness, the U.S. will promote "platforms where divergent ideas are encouraged and freely and openly debated" (25), thus, establishing the U.S.'s greater commitment to support the "deep belief in freedom, and the dignity and equality of every person" (3). This statement emphasizes the need for government officials and departments to advocate such rhetoric in order to persuade the target audience that the overall goal of U.S. diplomacy is not solely to achieve specific policy goals but to further the interests and the greater good of *all* people in the world. Therefore, stating all people's ideas are welcomed and every person deserves to be treated equally allows for greater identification because the U.S. is characterized as embracing all people.

Ultimately through this process of identification, the U.S. is not asking people to give up their "culture, background [or] faith" but rather to become involved in the greater quest for "a better life for all of the world's citizens" (3). Using language like "world citizens" provides a greater possibility for persuading others to identify with us because the U.S. is characterized as a non-hegemonic entity where "the United States Government seeks to partner with nations and peoples across the world" to improve *all* lives (3). Therefore Americans are established foremost as concerned world citizens that want to improve the world for all people. Persuading others to identify with the U.S. in this partnership consequentially leads to the conclusion that Muslims are identifying not only with Americans but *all* nations around the world who seek an improved quality of life for all people.

Although the NSPDSC places much focus on world citizens working together, the document simultaneously emphasizes the importance in communicating that all people can be united yet distinct stating, "We believe all individuals, men and women, are equal and entitled to basic human rights, including freedom of speech, worship and political persuasion. While the

form of government will vary, we believe all people deserve to live in just societies that protect individual and common rights, fight corruption and are governed by the rule of law” (2). This statement advances the belief that it is necessary for nations and individuals to maintain their autonomy while working towards common goals and against threats. As discussed earlier, with identification we see “implied in it at every turn, its ironic counterpart: division” (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives* 23). Thus, for the U.S. to reach its public diplomacy goals through the process of identification, a strong emphasis on shared interests and commonalities works because when “people are divided from each other [we] must use language, or rhetoric, to promote identification or overcome division” (Jasinski 305). To overcome this division, identification appeals to the commonalities between A and B. The NSPDSC promotes identification as a means to Americans “‘waging peace,’ working to bring about conditions that lead to a better life for people across the world and mak[ing] it more difficult for extremism to take root” (12). In creating identification with the common goal of worldwide peace, the NSPDSC elicits the question of the other that we are uniting against which leads to identifying and constructing the enemy.

As I have shown, the NSPDSC evokes the rhetorical process of identification through such appeals to ethos, common substance, and the ability to be both joined and separated as a means of advancing U.S. political goals. Although each of these components of identification is significant within the NSPDSC, arguably the most salient corresponding component within identification is enemy construction or defining the ‘other.’ In the post 9/11 world and the War on Terror, the use of identification has served as a way we unify against the common enemy. In the following section, I will turn to address how the enemy is constructed within the NSPDSC and specifically to the War on Terror.

Enemy Construction

The NSPDSC relies upon enemy construction as yet another strategy to create identification. A substantial amount of the plan focuses on methods to counter “violent extremists” and messages we need to send in reference to the War on Terror. The use of “identification through antithesis,” Cheney suggests, is extremely effective, because it gives us a “common enemy” to organize against (148). The rhetoric of enemy construction can be persuasive because, as Burke describes, “men who can unite on nothing else can unite on the basis of a foe shared by all” (“The Rhetoric” 209). The NSPDSC’s focus on a common enemy was emphasized because it allows identification to happen even if identification cannot be created through other common interests. In the current political context, the threat of terrorism has become the ultimate foe and constitutes the common ‘other’ that people throughout the world can unite against for the greater good.

Enemies can be described as “identifiable persons or stereotypes of persons to whom evil traits, intentions, or actions can be attributed” (Edelman 87). As Edelman indicates, “enemy construction typically grows from [...] anxieties of the present” (88). Therefore, it is during times of crisis, or in anxieties like in the post-9/11 world, that enemy construction becomes prevalent. And as we see with the NSPDSC, which was produced out of the anxiety of terrorist threats and a weakened U.S. image in the Middle East, our reliance on constructing the enemy has become important in creating identification. In this section, I will briefly revisit the elements of rhetorical enemy construction in relation to identification and analyze its use in the NSPDSC.

Victim/Savior

Rhetoric surrounding enemy construction often establishes a victim/savior relationship. By defining the enemy “as evil automatically establishes oneself as virtuous,” which further

identifies the savior “as emerging from an innocent past and as destined to help bring about a brighter future world cleansed of the contamination the enemy embodies” (Edelman 76). In this relationship, the savior is characterized as an “innocent hero” without any inhumane or unethical history and a heroic force fighting against the evil enemy to create a better world for everyone (Edelman 76). As we see within the NSPDSC, the construction of the violent extremists or the enemy of al Qaeda reveals the United States as the savior, while the primary victims of this enemy are Muslims, because “most of [al Qaeda’s] victims have been fellow Muslims [who] pervert Islam by advocating the mass murder of innocents” (28). The portrayal of Muslims this way provides an opportunity to reinforce the idea that the U.S.’s role is the virtuous savior fighting the enemy, and further instills fear in the audience because Muslims become the ultimate victims of these evil ‘others.’ Despite the fact that extremists are “fellow Muslims,” the NSPDSC emphasizes that what extremists primarily seek is a world of violence by their distortion of Islam. Communicating this victim/savior relationship allows identification against the common enemy and ensures the moral place the U.S. holds in relation to extremists.

Regardless of any commonalities Muslims may share with violent extremists, these Muslim extremists are characterized as the epitome of an evil enemy because as the NSPDSC states “their agenda is to impose a Taliban-like regime on the many proud and sovereign nations of the Islamic world, and they have nothing but intolerance for all those who do not share their extremist beliefs—including fellow Muslims” (28). Defining the extremist threats as intolerant terrorists towards Muslim way of life establishes the enemy as a harboring threat to all people in the Middle East, thus giving them only two options, to identify and seek help from the savior or be taken over by the evil ‘other.’ This polarizing language establishes a binary dilemma where Muslims must either join the U.S. in fighting extremists or succumb to the violent ills of

extremists. Characterizing these two options at such extremes gives further evidence that Muslims should identify with the U.S. against extremists.

This rhetoric further solidifies the victim/savior relationship by associating the enemy as a threat to *all* Muslims way of life, and asserts that the U.S. seeks to protect, nurture, and help Muslims worldwide live in peace. The NSPDSC stresses one of the primary goals of extremists is to take over all Islamic nations and further extend their oppressive ideology across the world by mobilizing Muslims worldwide to join in their violent regime. Thus, the premier victims of violent extremists are Muslims both in the Middle East and throughout the world. As Edelman suggests, defining the evil other or in this situation, extremists, automatically depicts the hero that will save these innocent victims from this threat and bring peace to their world (86).

Encouraging Action

In the case of the NSPDSC, identifying with the savior serves as a persuasive means of reaching particular goals, such as getting the Muslim world to support the U.S. in the fight against extremism. The NSPDSC explains that the kind of society the extremists seek for the Muslim world resembles the one in Afghanistan, where “freedom of expression and worship [are] not allowed” (21). As Edelman suggests, “communication about enemies exemplifies the performative nature of language [and that] language is manifestly a form of action, not a tool for describing a situation” (88). Therefore, these rhetorical choices used to construct and describe the enemy in the NSPDSC works to elicit Muslims to act by identifying against the extremists.

The purpose of using this language is not necessarily to provide an accurate description of the enemy based on evidence. Instead, the language serves a “performative nature” by ultimately inundating one with fear and persuading them to take a specific action (Edelman 88). This action can vary to either elicit another to identify with a particular opinion or persuasion or

take a physical action. Edelman describes how language surrounding enemy construction does more than characterize the enemy; it serves as a warrant for some kind of action (88).

The NSPDSC describes the extremists as such an extreme threat to Muslims this helps move the audience to action through identification with the emphasis on how extremists threaten the freedoms of the Muslim world. By persuading Muslims to identify with us against the violent extremists, we are able to create what Kertzer describes as “solidarity without consensus”—although we may share a common enemy and interests, we don’t share concordance on everything (67–69). Therefore by creating solidarity, we are able to persuade Muslims to unite and identify with the U.S. in the greater fight against extremism regardless of cultural and ideological differences.

Uniting Against a Common Enemy while Maintaining Differences

Although one of the main themes in constructing the rhetorical enemy is uniting and identifying against the common “other,” emphasis on this theme can be problematic because it often erases any “differences among the people labeled the enemy” (Edelman 77). This step often results in the enemy being constituted by a single characteristic, such as “a common color, religion, ideology, or nationality,” which leads to gross generalizations and stereotypes (Edelman 77). The NSPDSC addresses this danger by explaining in its General Communication Guidelines (Attachment B) that we must “use caution when dealing with faith issues in the public sphere” because pinpointing extremists by one sole characteristic can result in the dangerously inaccurate idea that *all* Muslims are extremists (25). This characterization is problematic because by drawing attention to a single characteristic of extremists, and in this case their Islamic faith, it erases all of differences between extremists and other Muslims. The NSPDSC explains that when communicating with the Muslim world, “government officials should be extremely cautious and

if possible, avoid using religious language, because it can mean different things and is easily misconstrued,” then it clarifies that extremists are “murderers who pervert religion, members of a cult that promotes death and destruction rather than legitimate practitioners of any faith” (25). Avoiding language about religion is necessary when defining the enemy because through this rhetoric, the United States could easily be seen as anti-Muslim, which in turn not only hurts our ability to get Muslims to identify with our cause but negatively impacts our over-all public diplomacy goals in the Middle East.

Distinguishing between Muslim extremists and Muslim people as a whole is essential. Following the 9/11 attacks the U.S. continued to engage in activities and rhetoric that assumed all Muslims were extremists (Moore “Post 9/11”). By continuing down this path of fallacious arguments—that these particular extremists were Muslims, all Muslims must be extremists—we do ourselves a disservice. As history has shown us, extremism does not stem from a particular religion. Rather, it can be found in all communities and faiths. Therefore, it becomes even more important to use targeted rhetoric to clarify the distinction between the small percentage of Muslim extremists and remaining Muslims. The NSPDSC states that it is absolutely imperative in our communication to “avoid phrases such as the ‘Muslim community’ that imply it is monolithic [since] Muslim communities, like other faith communities, are diverse” (25). These kinds of distinctions are important because as the U.S. works to persuade Muslims, assuming all people of the Islamic faith are identical makes it difficult for communication to take place. The U.S. needs to understand that people practicing Islam are as heterogeneous as the Christian and Jewish faiths.

To further avoid the lumping of *all* Muslims into the single enemy, the plan suggests that when we need to “make a point that involves Islam,” we must “quote Muslim voices themselves”

(25). This distinction reiterates that only a small population practicing Islam are “violent extremists,” and we should draw specific attention to Muslim voices because they can be the most influential in fighting this common enemy. Highlighting the role of influential Muslims builds on how people of Islamic nations are more likely to respond and be persuaded by Muslims voices for these individuals are crucial in countering extremism.

The focus on identifying Muslim voices as a means to enhance our message serves to further encourage solidarity with U.S. efforts and help the U.S. reach its public diplomacy goals in the Middle East. As the NSPDSC explains, it is important that the U.S. “empower/highlight Muslim voices that speak out against terror and violence, even when they do not agree with every aspect of U.S. foreign policy” (25). This text highlights the political reality that the U.S. and Muslims in the Middle East do not agree on many of the same policies. However, the greater goal of both people is to fight the evil actions of the extremists. The process of seeking out Muslim voices to support our goals is useful because particular Muslim voices have a greater influence in creating identification and denouncing extremists than the U.S. ever could. The focus on influential Muslims as a means to reaching our public diplomacy goals allows the U.S. to reach a larger audience, thus creating greater identification against the enemy.

Despite our differences, ultimately the number one substance we share is the common enemy of violent extremists who threaten the faith and culture of *all* people worldwide—Americans and Muslims alike. Given the problem the U.S. faces of grouping all Muslims together as extremists the NSPDSC identifies specific ways to communicate with the Muslim audience in defining the extremists. In the next section, I will analyze the action plan on how to Isolate and Undermine Violent Extremists, which further exemplifies the use of enemy construction in the NSPDSC.

Isolate and Undermine Violent Extremists

The second strategic objective of the NSPDSC states that U.S. government officials should rely on the various interconnected components of enemy construction in order to persuade our target audience to identify with us. The five page action plan for this objective entitled, “Isolate and Undermine Violent Extremists” is further detailed in Attachment A, which includes six main components:

1. Place strategic focus on critical countries in the ideological war against terror.
2. Identify and engage key influencers whose views have a ripple effect throughout society.
3. Undermine violent extremism by fostering a climate of openness and respect for religious diversity.
4. Foster grassroots worldwide condemnation against terror; make suicide bombing a matter of shame, not honor.
5. Focus on the type of ideology and society the extremists want to impose on others throughout the world, especially Islamic nations and confront hate speech (17–21).

The first component seeks to counter the terrorists or enemies by focusing on critical countries and specifically the ideological differences between extremists by “undermin[ing] support for terrorism” (17). In targeting the specific Muslim countries that are deemed “critical” and at a greater risk of being persuaded by extremists, it became essential to create identification through the use of enemy construction to effectively undermine beliefs of violent extremists. By constituting the fight against terror and the extremists as “ideological,” this rhetoric works to persuade critical Muslim countries that these extremists seek to create a world that not only distorts their religion but also fosters a community of fear and violence. In addition, this rhetoric

automatically defines the War on Terror as composed of only two opposing ideologies, therefore reinforcing the belief that identifying with Americans is the only way to counter extremists' ideology and actions.

The second component specifically states the need to “identify and engage key influencers” in such a way that they “speak out against the extremists,” thus amplifying the enemy as evil and as a threat to humanity (17). This action plan specifies certain people who can speak out against extremism, such as religious leaders, youth, women and girls, and members of minority groups. In order to encourage the world to fight these extremists, we need influential voices of all ages, classes, and groups to denounce terrorist efforts. The role these influential voices can play in helping to characterize the extremist threat is vital because, in order to reach our goals, support must come from all sections of the Muslim community. This component serves to further illustrate how the violent extremists are divided from the majority of the world's people.

The third component in this section discusses how further identification between Muslims and Americans can work to not only solidify the enemy but serves as a “‘bridge’ between American and Muslim communities worldwide” (19). This bridge is significant because the extremists' threat is no longer seen as a danger only to people in the Middle East, but a worldwide threat to the faith of Muslims everywhere. By creating alliances and uniting with Americans against the evil extremists, Muslims can help in fighting extremism, and help promote a greater understanding and respect for religious diversity worldwide.

The fourth component describes how the U.S. must not be the only nation fighting terror. We must “foster grassroots worldwide condemnation against terror” (20). This component stresses the need to encourage more people in the world to identify with our fight against

terrorism and also serves as a way to reinforce our construction of this enemy. For example, the plan states that in order to denounce terror worldwide, we must “highlight the human cost of terror” and the gravity of such violence in order to “remind audiences that the victims of terror are often innocent children and women [that] come from more than 90 nations and many of them are Muslims” (20). Emphasizing that the “violent extremists” primarily target individuals of the Muslim faith, most specifically children and women, works to instill fear within the NSPDSC’s targeted audience, leading Muslims to identify with our cause. Stressing that governmental officials and departments communicate through this rhetoric can also work to amplify and extend the threat of extremists because it reiterates that all Muslims are innocent victims of these extremists regardless of what country you live in. Terror by extremists has become a pervasive evil that no one can escape. In rhetorically constructing the “violent extremists” who engage in terror not only identifies them as the evil ‘other’ but also frames them as the most critical threat to Muslims everywhere, particularly innocent women and children. The use of this language presents a frightening picture of the future and is further reiterated in the fifth component of this section.

The fifth component explains that the focus of public diplomacy efforts must continue to address how extremists threaten the ideology of societies worldwide, “especially Islamic nations” (21). The NSPDSC explains that the ultimate goal of these violent extremists is “to create and impose a unified, dictatorial state on the proud and currently sovereign nations of the diverse Islamic world” (21). Therefore, the violent extremists target people worldwide; however the primary targets are ultimately people in the Middle East.

The attached text regarding the action plan on how to “Isolate and Undermine Violent Extremists” provides a useful inquiry into how the NSPDSC engages the rhetoric of enemy

construction and elicits identification with Muslims to further reach the U.S.'s public diplomacy goals. As we have seen throughout the NSPDSC, the focus on enemy construction is essential in order to achieve these objectives. Using this same framework, I will next analyze another attachment specifically detailing the War on Terror.

Messages Specific to the War on Terror

A major focus on the rhetorical construction of the enemy reveals itself in three pages at the end of the NSPDSC entitled, "Core Messages-Specific to the War on Terror." Although there are many instances throughout the document that make reference to the enemy as sources of "ideologies of hate and oppression" that "threaten the freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture and faith," the final section of the plan details specific messages that should be used in regards to the War on Terror (2–3). As previously described, the mission, priorities, and strategic objectives of the NSPDSC emphasize the need for "peace around the world" and define the evil enemy as "violent extremists" (3). However, these core messages require more direct attention and analysis because they specifically highlight the rhetoric the U.S. should use when engaging the primary audience for the communication plan in order to encourage all Muslims to identify with our fight in the War on Terror.

Evoking Ideology

This detailed section of the NSPDSC describes how the enemy performs a political function, because "to name specific enemies is to evoke specific ideologies" (Edelman 82). As a result, when people identify their enemy, it reveals how they identify themselves in relation to other political ideologies (Edelman 82). Thus, when we encourage the Muslim audience to identify with us against "violent extremists" in the War on Terror, this identification serves to persuade them of American's particular political ideology—democracy. The enemy is not only

characterized as an evil force, but also as one who seeks to impose a restrictive and “uniform ideology” in the world, whereas the U.S. seeks to encourage peace and diversity (Ivie, “Images” 287). Robert Ivie describes how this kind of rhetoric creates an image of America that symbolizes the “ideology of liberty and equality for everyone” where “Americanism is for everyone, and everyone is a potential American” (*Democracy* 123). America becomes representative of a moral people who will lead all people to “salvation from the blighted world of turmoil and tyranny to a democratic promised land of peace and freedom” (Ivie, *Democracy* 125). As I discussed earlier, the U.S. becomes characterized as the savior to powerless victims of extremists worldwide by providing people opportunities to reach the political ideals of American democracy.

The construction of America in this way further defines these barbaric ‘others’ as a threat who “prevent the civilizing influence of democratic enlightenment” (Ivie, *Democracy* 149). Accordingly, the evil ‘other’ or extremists are represented as the sole reason that Muslims are unable to live in a community with freedom and equality or reach the quality of life they deserve. Ivie suggests that the U.S. has repeatedly relied on these rhetorical constructions and how “the images of the savagery of the Other and corresponding fragility of civilized institutions of freedom, democracy, reason, law, and order has been America’s traditional motive for war and ideological incentive for imposing its version of democracy on an unwilling world” (Ivie, *Democracy* 31). Defining the evil savages as a threat to a civilized world serves to persuade Muslims to identify with us when they normally would not choose to do so. These core messages address how “violent extremists” who are characterized as uncivilized, remain a threat to people worldwide with the ultimate goal to kill innocent people that seek a life with democratic ideals.

To further distinguish the ideological differences between this ‘other’ and civilized

people, the NSPDSC describes each scenario. This section of the NSPDSC specifically outlines the disparities between extremist goals and democratic or civilized ideals. As the NSPDSC states:

The difference between democratic values and the type of society that the violent extremists want is stark:

- Freedom vs. tyranny
- Tolerance and respect for differences vs. intolerance for any diversity
- Religious freedom vs. state-imposed requirements of worship
- Freedom of speech vs. imprisonment for differing views
- Freedom to associate vs. restrictions on leaving your home
- Education for all vs. no education for girls, limited education for boys
- Accountable governments with citizen participation vs. un-elected, self-declared leaders. (29)

In this quotation, we can see that the political ideology of democracy used in opposition to the kind of society the “violent extremists” seek, reestablishes the “us” versus “them” binary and leaves no room for any other kind of political ideology. When communicating these differences the audience is only given the choice of identifying with the U.S. and our political ideology of democracy or identifying with what the violent extremists seek. Our democratic ideology is turned into a universal ideology that all people in the world seek because the characteristics of this democratic ideology become associated with civilized people.

To emphasize our political ideology even further, the NSPDSC explains the importance of stressing the following:

The fight against terrorism is a concerted fight for values and principles that are universal. Much more unites us as citizens of the world than divides us. Across all borders, we share a common humanity. While the color of our skin, the language we speak, or the way we worship may be different, people everywhere aspire to speak their minds, participate in their society, worship freely, live in security, and pursue education, jobs and greater opportunities for their families (29).

In this quotation, we see how the NSPDSC seeks to extend the political ideology of democracy as a fight for *universal* values and principles insisting that despite varying differences

in “race, ethnicity or religion,” we are united by the “violent extremists” who possess “contempt for human life” (28). Using the words “universal” and “common humanity” establishes that all people of the world seek the political ideology of the U.S.—democracy.

The rhetorical construction of the enemy in this way persuades Muslims to identify with our political ideology of democracy and serves to define the U.S. as unable to do harm, establishing us as leaders against the enemy. Not only does this rhetoric explain that the only alternative to extremist ideology is our version of democracy, but it also describes how Americans can deliver Muslims freedom from these evil extremists. For example, the NSPDSC explains how “despite al Qaeda’s repeated attempts to characterize the world as being in the midst of a clash of civilizations [...] the international community—east and west, north and south—has come together in unprecedented ways to confront common threats and ease human suffering” and insists that “America is doing its part, working in partnership with countries throughout the Islamic world to improve the lives of Muslims” (29). These quotations serve to establish the common identity that people throughout the world share while emphasizing the leadership role the U.S. plays in the War on Terror, which is not just positive but crucial in improving Muslim lives. By claiming that the U.S. is an essential player in bringing peace to the world, this rhetoric proves more useful in persuading the target audience by reinforcing the idea that America’s sole goal is to help save humanity.

The NSPDSC dismisses al Qaeda’s theory that the world is in a “clash of civilizations,” which serves to further distinguish that the ideological fight is not between two varying political ideologies. Instead, the fight is between the “violent extremists” and *all* civilized peoples of the world. The War on Terror consists of the “international” and “interfaith” communities who are against “the ideology of violent extremists [who use] perverted religiosity to attempt to justify

murder, terror and violence” (29). This rhetoric draws attention to the fact that although these extremists may try to define this fight against varying civilizations or people of different cultures or faiths, this claim is inaccurate because these extremists pose a threat to all of humanity through their distortion of the Islamic religion.

Rhetorical ‘Othering’

The NSPDSC emphasizes that in order to further persuade Muslim audiences to identify with the U.S., we must stress that the U.S.’s current engagement with the Muslim world is not merely a result of the attacks on 9/11. Instead, Americans are genuinely concerned for the state of *all* Muslims as well as *all* civilized peoples. The NSPDSC attempts to encourage communication aimed at persuading Muslims that our efforts are not about seeking revenge for 9/11, but our greater concern is the threat of terrorism worldwide. By convincing Muslims that we are working in conjunction with them instead of against them, this approach serves to reestablish the binary of “us” and “them” in the War on Terror.

The use of the phrase “civilized people” in opposition to the enemy contributes to the enemy being constructed as barbaric and savage-like. Ivie describes how this rhetorical ‘othering’ “entails a set of contrasts between the threatening Other’s irrational appetites and America’s rational commitment to law, reason, and civilized order; between the brutal Other’s affinity for coercion, force, and violence and America’s steadfast regard for freedom, liberty and peace; and between the hostile Other’s willful acts of aggression and America’s reluctant acts of self-defense against unprovoked attacks on the civilized world” (*Democracy* 46). By using this rhetoric, moral attributes become associated with the savage ‘other’ verses ‘civilized’ people which works to reiterate the clear distinction between us versus them. In employing this value laden language works in creating more opportunities for identification against the other because

the enemy threatens every element of human life. Thus, the audience not only begins to see these extremists as a violent threat but a monstrous manifestation that has no regard for humankind.

The NSPDSC describes how the violent extremists possess “contempt for human life” which inherently results in the ‘other’ seen as “irrational, coercive [...] a barbarian [...] a criminal mind, a mentally disturbed or crazed adversary, a fanatic, an ideologue, and a satanic figure or profane instrument of evil” (Ivie, *Democracy* 46). The evil enemy then becomes morphed into the most threatening enemy known to all of humankind. Establishing the enemy as having no regard for life establishes a greater fear of this unpredictable ‘other’ that no person would ever consider their cause as legitimate. In contrast, the victimized or civilized peoples become defined as a symbol of freedom that is “vulnerable and fragile” and the ultimate prey of this evil other (Ivie, *Democracy* 46).

The NSPDSC also employs the emphasis on shared humanity which is what Ivie describes as “strategies of identification that address the Other, [and use] rhetorical discourse [that] bridges divisions without suppressing differences” (*Democracy* 42). As I have shown earlier this discourse within the NSPDSC works to elicit identification against the evil enemy in the fight for a peaceful world. This rhetoric serves to persuade the audience that the U.S.’s “mission is to uplift humanity” by working to rid the world of barbaric extremists (Ivie, *Democracy* 125). Establishing the U.S. as the peaceful savior allows the audience to be more easily persuaded on other particular issues when they believe they are joining a fight for humanity and civilized people everywhere.

The continued use of the civilized versus barbaric binary is also used in relation to religion. The fight against terror is no longer confined to a war between the violent extremists and the U.S. but is described as a war between extremists and “the majority of civilized people of

all faiths” who reject acts of terror (28). The NSPDSC states that “the struggle against violent extremism should unite the nations and citizens of the world because terrorism threatens all the communities of the world” (28). Focusing on the claim that extremists threaten members of all faiths and all civilized people amplifies the danger and also re-characterizes who is fighting the War on Terror. Therefore the extremists constitute a worldwide threat to all faiths and the U.S.’s War on Terror becomes seen as a global War on Terror.

The NSPDSC explains that, “all major world faiths, including Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism teach that life is precious and that the taking of innocent life is wrong” (28). By emphasizing that the world’s five major religions are opposed to taking human life, this rhetoric reiterates that these extremists symbolize evil for taking human life, while simultaneously implying that we and all other major religious groups never take innocent lives because “murdering innocent people is always wrong” (29). Again, this rhetoric assumes the major religious faiths have never taken innocent lives in the name of religion, which asserts civilized people on a higher moral ground and gives further reason to unite against the extremists.

The NSPDSC continues to reference worldwide religions to expand the idea that all people of every faith must join the fight in the War on Terror, which elicits greater identification because extremists threaten all people regardless of religion. The acts of the violent extremists are described as bringing “tragedy, destruction, death and terrible grief to innocent people from Indonesia to Morocco, Spain to Jordan, England to India and Egypt,” which reiterates that the innocent victims are differing peoples throughout the world (28). These savage ‘others’ are constructed as a destructive force to all people everywhere. They recognize no boundaries or differences because they seek to target civilized people everywhere and threaten all of humanity.

To further extend the concept that extremists do not exclude any people during terrorist attacks, the NSPDSC states, “The victims of September 11th were citizens of more than 90 different countries and adherents of many faiths, including Christianity, Judaism and Islam” (28). This repeated focus on expanding the idea of who the “violent extremists” are targeting—innocent people of many different faiths—becomes more useful in creating identification against the enemy because they sought to harm not just Americans on 9/11, but people from “many faiths” (28). Emphasizing that the victims of 9/11 were Americans of all faiths is important because it stresses how extremists have no regard for any human beings in the world.

As I have previously shown, the NSPDSC not only characterizes violent extremists as a threat to people worldwide, but also takes special care to stress how the cardinal victims of these extremists are their fellow people in the Middle East and Muslims *everywhere*. Focusing on the fact that the principal victims of extremists are Muslims is important because to be the primary target of terrorism by your own people is a difficult reality; we all want to be able to depend on our own communities. In this section, the NSPDSC continues to illustrate how Muslims are the leading victims of these extremists. For example, attention is brought to how Muslims have been victims of brutal extremists “over the past several decades” (29). These “cruelly calculated terrorist murders” against Muslims have been carried out through such acts as “bombings of a wedding celebration in Jordan [...] and day laborers in Baghdad who were trying to earn money to support their families” (29). Detailing specific terrorist acts like these reflects the violence and brutality of the extremists and substantiates the threat they pose to Muslim lives. Drawing attention to these specific acts of violence against Muslims personalizes and amplifies the threat of extremists. It is this focus on the “enemy and victim-savior” relationship that allows greater

possibilities to persuade Muslims the U.S. is a “virtuous” savior that can save them from the brutalities of their own people (Edelman 76).

The plan continues, stating that to date “the violent extremists have killed thousands of Muslims” and that Muslims have been “brutally repressed” by these extremists (29–30). By emphasizing fellow Muslims as the predominant victims of these extremists, the U.S. is further established as a savior and also provides an opportunity to reiterate that despite the terrorist acts by violent extremists, America continues to work to better *all* Muslim lives which maintains that the U.S. can provide safety, peace and prosperity.

To illustrate ways that the U.S. supports and provides a better life for Muslims, the NSPDSC elaborates by naming the U.S. as the “largest bilateral donor to the Palestinian people,” the “largest provider of help to Muslims affected by the tsunami in Indonesia and the earthquake in Pakistan,” and points out that we “provide funds for Muslim girls and boys to go to school, for Muslim women to learn English, and for Muslim young people to get training for jobs” (29). The United States is portrayed as a savior through the NSPDSC’s emphasis on these virtuous acts towards the Muslim community. Americans serve as the antithesis of the enemy because “we seek to work in a spirit of partnership with people and nations across the world to confront this ideology of hate and foster a climate of hope and opportunity” (29). Therefore, identification with the U.S. in opposition to extremists not only elicits Muslims to share our common ideology but also serves to inspire hope that our efforts against terrorism will deliver a world where they will no longer be victim to brutal violence and can live in peace.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how the NSPDSC plan constructed the enemy, characterized the U.S. in opposition to the enemy, and described the victims of the enemy

through rhetorical strategies of identification. The use of the process of identification through ethos and especially enemy construction in the NSPDSC are reminiscent of previous public diplomacy rhetoric. This plan, although considered “new,” illustrates how the U.S. continues to rely on rhetoric that uses the same tactics in creating commonalities while maintaining differences and eliciting identification through the varying components of enemy construction. My analysis of the NSPDSC examines how despite differing political contexts, the manner in which we define the evil enemy in relation to ourselves continues to be unwavering. In addition, in times of crisis we seek to inspire foreign publics through identification on the basis of our political ideology of democracy, which we assume all people worldwide seek. As I will further address in Chapter 4, using this rhetoric is problematic because it assumes that our concept of democracy is the goal for all people in the world and is the only moral and ethical political ideology for all of humanity.

Although the NSPDSC was not implemented in all sections of the U.S. government before a new administration took over the White House, it foreshadows future diplomacy efforts and provides a useful example we can learn from as we continue to craft American public diplomacy rhetoric. In my concluding chapter, I will discuss problems and shortcomings within the NSPDSC, how we must learn from past rhetorical processes in American public diplomacy before we can move forward, and how rhetorical analysis is a useful lens in understanding public diplomacy rhetoric as we continue to engage with foreign publics.

Chapter 4:

Conclusion: Looking to the Future of American Public Diplomacy

I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn't steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas; they are human rights. And that is why we will support them everywhere.

President Barack Obama

The history of American public diplomacy provides an opportunity to see how rhetoric has both helped the U.S. achieve its goals while simultaneously elucidating the grave failures of past and current American diplomacy tactics. Public diplomacy is the way we seek to sway worldwide public opinion and historically, how Americans have responded to crisis. Although definitions of public diplomacy continue to be debated from propaganda to public and international relations, public diplomacy can be broadly understood as how we communicate with foreign audiences through various tactics. This overview into American public diplomacy is important because it not only exposes a recurring rhetorical process, but helps Americans in better understanding ourselves.

As public diplomacy again becomes a focus in American culture and to the executive branch of government, the U.S. should change the way we communicate with foreign audiences and break the rhetorical pattern that we have relied upon since our country's founding. Although American public diplomacy's importance has wavered over the years it has remained a fundamental practice within American politics. As the U.S. currently moves forward in its quest to combat terrorism we should undertake public diplomacy through new methods and vigor to ensure our efforts are not seen solely as a projection of hegemonic power. In order to do this we must change the way Americans conduct public diplomacy with both new rhetoric and policy. Although past rhetorical appeals to the process of identification, ethos and enemy construction

may have worked at previous historical moments in winning over the hearts and minds of the world. Scholars, public officials, and a variety of organizations suggest that the current tactics the executive branch is employing no longer prove useful in today's world. Therefore, the U.S. must adapt to the reality that our approach and assumptions may need some reworking.

In this project I first began by defining and contextualizing the current state of American public diplomacy and the rejuvenation we have witnessed within public diplomacy in the post 9/11 world. The September 11, 2001 attacks and the U.S. declaration in the War on Terror all contributed to the leading concern of how the Muslim world perceived the U.S. One scholar describes that following these events, U.S. "public diplomacy was second only to the military offensive, and was the lead instrument in the battle for hearts and minds" (Zaharna 2). Thus, public diplomacy can be extremely valuable in engaging foreign audiences. As I discussed in Chapter 1, public diplomacy became essential within U.S. foreign policy, however, despite the change in political context we continued to rely on similar rhetorical patterns of the past.

Next, I evaluated the history of American public diplomacy by applying the theoretical lens of rhetorical history, in order to recognize public diplomacy as a perpetual process. Ball explains that analyzing rhetoric this way allows us to comprehend how rhetoric is part of a "historical conversation," which can help to understand our past, present, and future. By tracing the context of American public diplomacy efforts from our founding to the Iranian Hostage Crisis of the Carter Administration illustrates the importance of rhetorical history in American public diplomacy. In order to substantiate my argument I conducted a more detailed analysis of the historical context surrounding the 1979 Iran Crisis which revealed how the communication plan put forth by the Carter Administration is not an independent rhetorical manifestation of that moment, but interconnected throughout history. This plan serves as a comparative historical

artifact that exemplifies how we rely on the rhetorical process of identification and interrelated appeals to ethos and enemy construction. Additionally, an analysis of the Carter Administration's Communication plan with Muslim Countries shows that despite the plan's rhetorical appeals to create commonalities, respect of Islam, enhance goodwill towards the U.S., and construct the evil enemy as the Soviets, it failed terribly. Although the Carter Administration plan was unsuccessful in reaching its goals, the communication plan serves as a telling example of how the U.S. continues to depend on similar rhetoric in our public diplomacy tactics during times of crisis.

As I have argued in Chapter 3, the analysis of the Carter Administration's communication plan is useful because it reveals significant parallels with the 2007 NSPDSC. Through the application of the same theoretical concepts of the rhetorical process of identification, appeals to ethos and enemy construction, I illustrate that despite very different political contexts surrounding the 2007 NSPDSC and the first communication strategy ever created to influence all sectors of government, the U.S. again uses similar rhetorical patterns to persuade foreign audiences during crisis. In my analysis of the NSPDSC, rhetorical ethos is used as a means to strengthen goodwill towards the U.S. by highlighting how the U.S. provides opportunities and freedoms for all people. The plan also reveals a heightened focus on how the U.S.'s ultimate concern is humanity and the issues all people face such as environment, health and economic concerns which works to encourage identification. As the NSPDSC seeks to elicit identification over commonalities, it stresses that people can be both joined and separate thus maintaining individuality while working together for a better world.

The most prominent finding in analyzing the NSPDSC was the strong emphasis on constructing the other or enemy. The plan works by establishing a victim/savior relationship

where the U.S. is the virtuous hero to save innocent Muslims from extremists. The U.S. is constructed as moral in relation to the barbaric enemy that distorts Islam and threatens all of humankind but most especially their fellow Muslims. This rhetoric is useful to encourage Muslims to identify with the U.S. against extremists and create greater fear of Muslim extremists. To further define the enemy the NSPDSC continues by rhetorically setting up an ideological dichotomy between universal democracy and evil extremists situating the U.S. in the leadership role of saving humanity. The majority of the rhetoric within the NSPDSC shows how we continue to rely on similar rhetorical appeals and that changing political contexts have minimal impact on our response to the world.

In this concluding chapter, I will briefly revisit the importance of the utility public diplomacy rhetoric in U.S. history particularly in creating identification and the ways in which the Carter document and NSPDSC are representative of this practice. I will then address the possible problems/shortcomings of reiterating this rhetorical process in American public diplomacy. Finally, I will highlight the importance of rhetorical analysis and communication in public diplomacy scholarship. My analysis of both the Carter Administration's communication plan and the 2007 NSPDSC reveal the persisting process of public diplomacy rhetoric in America and how this provides us the opportunity to understand how we have historically communicated with the world. This analysis also shows the important contribution that rhetorical analysis can have in public diplomacy scholarship.

Remaking History

As we have seen, American public diplomacy is composed of more than a set of tactics in approaching world opinion; it is a projection of the fundamental values upon which our nation was created. This perpetual process in American public diplomacy reveals how our approach is

produced by the executive branch from necessities of particular contexts often in the face of crisis. We see how American public diplomacy proves itself as a “social utility” and a reaction to changing political environments or crisis in history. Approaching American public diplomacy rhetoric this way allows us to understand how it is rooted in the past and a part of the greater conversation of diplomacy which reflects the fundamental values and characteristics of the U.S. This rhetoric reoccurs throughout history and is brought forth during times of crisis in approaching foreign audiences.

An analysis of our present public diplomacy climate and the NSPDSC in the post 9/11 world illustrates this historical pattern and the present situation and challenges we face as we move forward in crafting American public diplomacy rhetoric. Although the NSPDSC may be considered a “new” strategy in response to the events of 9/11, my evaluation shows how this communication strategy is not an isolated and static product of this historical moment, but rather intrinsically linked to past American public diplomacy. By understanding American public diplomacy as part of an interrelated recurring rhetorical process, allows a more expansive view into to current strategies like the 2007 NSPDSC.

The context following the 9/11 attacks resulted in some fundamental changes in how the U.S. executive branch approaches public diplomacy. Since September 11, 2001 there has been a rise in U.S. involvement and emphasis in public diplomacy both at the executive level and within American society through such citizen diplomacy initiatives like Sister Cities International (“About Us”). Americans have witnessed changes at the executive level with the creation of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs position, increased focus on broadcasting with Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra TV, and numerous other campaigns and initiatives in order to persuade foreign audiences of American credibility and the fight against extremism.

Although the definitions and offices of American public diplomacy have changed following 9/11, despite these political and technological changes, essentially our efforts have stayed the same. We continue to rely on similar rhetoric that is most recently seen within the NSPDSC. The NSPDSC illustrates how our means to an end have changed minimally since our nation's inception and the reliance on this rhetoric needs altering to achieve our goals.

This examination of the unchanging process of American public diplomacy rhetoric since its origin to our present exposes how this rhetoric may remain problematic in the world we face today. An analysis of the ways the executive branch historically engages the world reveals how the U.S. continues to communicate from an unrelenting ideological mindset that asserts our democratic ideals as the only civilized way to live and results in an imbalanced power dynamic. As the Obama Administration embarks on public diplomacy, new communication strategies must be used, for our attempts at persuading the Muslim world have remained unsuccessful since 9/11. In order to reach the Muslim world we need to replace ineffective tactics so the U.S. is no longer perceived as a domineering hegemonic force and work on new rhetoric in conjunction with policy that reflects all aspects of American society, both negative and positive.

Problems/Shortcomings with Recurring Rhetorical Process

Through this study on American public diplomacy and most specifically my analysis of the 2007 NSPDSC, two important issues have become apparent that are particularly problematic and should be addressed. My analysis of the 2007 NSPDSC in Chapter 3 not only shows our continued reliance on the rhetorical process of identification, and appeals to ethos and enemy construction, but further reveals the U.S.'s assumption we have the same interests and values as Muslims. It also highlights our dependence on one-way communication instead of working to establish relationships based on shared communication and dialogue. Although we have sought

to elicit identification with Muslims based on common substances or interests, these efforts have failed to produce our desired outcome. Next, I will explore the possible problems of rhetorically focusing on common values in our public diplomacy rhetoric.

Focus on Common Values

A significant concept within American public diplomacy is the continued stress on emphasizing common values and interests with Muslims. As I have shown in my analysis of the history of American public diplomacy, we have continually relied on creating identification by emphasizing commonalities. The assumption that we share many of the same fundamental values and interests is problematic when that may not entirely be true (van Ham 432). Instead of working to embrace the fact that the U.S. may not share all of the same values as Muslims, we continue to reiterate that extensive commonalities exist and assume American values are universal. Focusing on key American values as the principal tactic to reach Muslims only proves the U.S.'s myopic outlook for engaging foreign audiences.

This false assumption leads to a further inability to persuade Muslim audiences and creates a greater divide between Americans and Muslims. One of the underlying assumptions that our nation continues to perpetuate is that "all Muslims have an innate, albeit repressed, desire to support both liberal democracy and capitalism" (van Ham 432). This kind of thinking dismisses any alternative kind of society as possessing value and presumes we know what way of life is best for Muslims. The assumption that all Muslims seek a society reflective of our own not only disregards their cultural values but further alienates Muslims, making it harder for us to reach our public diplomacy goals (Zaharna 3). The failure of several of our past diplomatic initiatives shows how the idea that all Muslims wish for a version of democracy is not an accurate reflection of this target audience. In fact, these initiatives may have resulted in an even

greater objection to American values and further promoted a negative perception of the U.S. throughout the Muslim world.⁹

Americans must understand that many of our values are not the same as those of Muslims despite the fact we may believe they should be; we need to accept this reality and find an alternative way to communicate (Corman, Tretheway & Godall 178). R.S. Zaharna explains how efforts that focuses on promoting “American culture and values may have inadvertently fueled an awakening across the Islamic world to protect and promote their own cultures and values” (3). With our response to the events of September 11, 2001 and the initiation of various extended efforts to convince people in the Middle East of our commonalities, the U.S. may have unintentionally positioned ourselves as a greater threat to Muslim values rather than working to create a platform that is conducive for communicating with one another. We continue to face the problem that American public diplomacy messages and actions in our War on Terror have been interpreted as the U.S. “impos[ing] Western values on Muslims” (Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and National Security” 3). Instead of embracing the values of others, the U.S. continues to force our values on Muslims under the guise that our primary concern is bettering their lives. Assuming American values are completely similar to theirs rather than recognizing and respecting distinct differences, disregards Muslim values and results in our inability to persuade them. This rhetorical approach is a contributing factor that leads Muslims to the conclusion that the U.S. is not trustworthy.

⁹ For further reading on problems with promoting American values please see: Shaun Riordan. “Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm? In *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissan (New York: Palgrave, 2007) 180-195.; Steven R. Corman, Angela Tretheway & H.L. Goodall, Jr. *Weapons of Mass Persuasion*. (New York: Peter Lang, 2008) 169-175.; R.S. Zaharna. “American Public Diplomacy and the Islamic and Arab World: A Communication Update & Assessment.” Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Feb. 27, 2003. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/senate_for_zaharna_27feb03.pdf; Abdelwahgab El-Affendi. “The Conquest of Muslim Hearts and Minds: Perspectives on U.S. Reform and Public Diplomacy Strategies.” *The Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Muslim World*. September 2005. http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2005/09islamicworld_el-affendi.aspx.

Many experts have argued that in order for public diplomacy to be successful, the message must be credible (Epstein 12). The debate over truth and credibility has always been pertinent in American public diplomacy. As we have seen, the past tactics of the VOA, USIA, and Marshall Plan have helped our nation succeed in reaching its goals without always being entirely accurate or truthful. Ideally, American public diplomacy efforts should stem from a sincere foundation where differences are acknowledged and audiences do not feel they are being force fed a particular way of life. Edward Murrow states, “American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that” (qtd. in Waller, *The Public* 158). Murrow describes persuasion as a simple process where the truth will allow us to persuade others of our credibility and believability; arguably the truth can prove most useful to achieving our goals but what demonstrates as most important is if the audience is persuaded of such truths.

Although the ‘truth’ is a complicated subject, what becomes significant is the *emphasis* on truth; when rhetors are perceived as credible and truthful, they are better positioned to persuade their audiences (Aristotle 25). The crafting of messages is extremely important in persuasion; however our rhetorical focus on common values may no longer be useful, especially when we dictate what constitutes universal values by which others should live. When the U.S. primarily focuses on values, public diplomacy efforts are often dismissed by Muslims as unbelievable because these tactics often ignore the political realities of U.S. foreign policy (Zaharna 3). In order to strengthen American credibility and persuade Muslim audiences, at a

minimum we need to be seen as credible and honest. To change the perception of the U.S. in the Middle East, the executive branch must not dismiss the role rhetoric can play.

It is essential that as the Obama Administration makes new changes in strategy, the executive branch continues to acknowledge the overwhelming power of words because “words matter and to act otherwise misses an opportunity for positive persuasion” (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 182). Although it has been argued that words are meaningless without any actual policy changes, which is important; nevertheless, as public diplomacy history has shown us, words are useful in influencing worldwide opinion and possibly “the most powerful weapons in a war of ideas” (Waller, *Fighting* 38). Therefore, we must understand that although truth ideally should play an important role in public diplomacy rhetoric, persuasion happens when we convince others that we are credible and truthful. However, we continue to fail—both in our foreign policy and public diplomacy rhetoric. For that reason, policy and rhetoric must go hand in hand and in order to reach our goals they must be addressed simultaneously. Policy and rhetoric rely on one another and should be approached by the very symbiotic nature that exists between them. In order to establish U.S. credibility we must stop relying on one-way communication techniques that are absent of listening with minimal dialogue that were used heavily in the past.

One-Way Communication

American public diplomacy has long relied on a variety of communication techniques in reaching its audience, but the primary mode has been through the continued use of one-way communication. Historically, our communication strategies have come from a place of power that controls the communicative process resulting in this single sided communication (Dutta-Bergman 117). One-way communication has often been through print advertising, radio and

television broadcasting where no interaction, relationship, or dialogue is created. The problem with relying primarily on this kind of communication is that it dismisses one of the most important aspects of public diplomacy—relationship building with balanced dialogue that promotes understanding and interaction. This one-way approach becomes problematic because our public diplomacy efforts often result in a propaganda-laden agenda with the goal of “massaging the minds of the public [and] on building an image and shifting public opinion about the United States” instead of creating an opportunity for open equal dialogue (Dutta-Bergman 116). Although policy changes would help alleviate this problem, we must also communicate in ways that create open relationships based on mutual interaction and understanding which can lead others to become more open to American ideas and working together to solve worldwide issues. Productive, lasting relationships with other nations will likely not succeed without open communication, for if we continue to use single-sided communication it will only bring us further from our public diplomacy goals.

Using “one-sided” communication primarily in the form of marketing and advertising is problematic because it is perceived as “an effort to manipulate worldwide opinion” (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 182). The use of one-sided communication results in a power dynamic that projects the image of the U.S. as a hegemonic entity that is trying to impose our political ideology and democratic values everywhere. By using one-way communication the U.S. is further framed unrealistically—as lacking any flaws and characterized of optimal virtue. This image is especially problematic because many U.S. actions are not reflective of American values that we work to spread throughout the world, further establishing the U.S. as hypocritical and therefore untrustworthy. Arguably real changes in public diplomacy will happen once we choose to conduct ourselves differently, but this needs to take place both through changes in foreign

policy and rhetoric. To be more persuasive, we must work on our credibility. To enhance others trust in us, the U.S. needs to avoid using deceptive motives when in reality our main concern is U.S. interests. In order for others to trust the U.S. we must try to conduct ourselves by the very values we claim represent us and accurately communicate our motives even if it may not reflect positively on the U.S.

A 2010 opinion poll on perception of the U.S. in the Middle East shows that despite the Obama Administration's efforts to improve credibility and goodwill towards the U.S. following his election, the views towards the U.S. and President Obama are on the decline (Telhami "2010 Arab"). Consequentially, this continued negative perception is the result of the executive branch's continued reliance upon a "hegemonic model of communication" in public diplomacy, efforts that do not emphasize mutual dialogue or two-way communication (Nelson & Izadi 343). In order for the U.S. to persuade Muslim audiences and bridge the credibility gap we must use other forms of communication while understanding that even if we may lack common values collaboration on some level can be possible.

Implications for Public Diplomacy Research

This analysis of American public diplomacy is useful in understanding the current context of public diplomacy, contributes to the growing field of public diplomacy research and how our executive branch rhetorically reacts to crisis. With the recent interest in public diplomacy, it is likely to develop into its own separate field and currently "progress in public diplomacy research is highly needed because of the central place it is now occupying in foreign policy and diplomacy" (Gilboa 75). Therefore as public diplomacy becomes more important the communication discipline can provide vital contributions to this research. Public diplomacy scholarship is critical and future scholarship should embrace the many ways that rhetorical

analysis can contribute to our understanding of how we engage the world. Fundamentally, public diplomacy is about persuasion, thus it should not be ignored.

In this study I have identified a significant rhetorical pattern within American public diplomacy that continues to perpetuate itself today. Further research should examine any additional rhetorical patterns that we continue to see in American public diplomacy today. Also, more analyzes of the ways that specifically current public diplomacy rhetoric impacts the national identity of our targeted audiences would be useful. In discussing our current rhetorical choices research should also explore the possible ethical implications we encounter when using such rhetoric. My analysis of the 2007 NSPDSC provides an important use of rhetoric within the document, but a further in depth analysis from other lens could provide more insight into how we choose to persuade foreign audiences.

Closing- Lasting Public Diplomacy

As my analysis has shown, since the founding of the U.S. through the 19th century to both World Wars, Cold War and to the War on Terror a pattern of public diplomacy rhetoric continues to be reiterated and remains a central tenet in American history. Although the Obama administration and the newest Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith McHale have yet to release another communication strategy, a “framework” for forthcoming changes to U.S. public diplomacy has been put forth by Under Secretary McHale. In March 2010 Undersecretary McHale released a 33 page power-point presentation at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing titled "The Future of Public Diplomacy" which is to serve as a “framework” or “roadmap” for forthcoming changes in U.S. public diplomacy.¹⁰ The main themes she outlines are to focus on shaping the narrative, expanding people to people

¹⁰ Please see http://mountainrunner.us/files/dos/PD_US_World_Engagement.pdf for complete report.

relationships or citizen diplomacy, combat violent extremism, better inform policy making, and deploy resources for better and more developed structure including new positions in order for public diplomacy to be more effective (McHale “Future of U.S. Diplomacy”). Although a detailed communication strategy has yet to be created, this framework possesses many similarities to past American public diplomacy rhetoric. As we anticipate the forthcoming strategy and changes in American public diplomacy, it is important to remember that as our world becomes more interconnected public diplomacy will likely play a larger role throughout the world and must not be dismissed as insignificant for it is “part of the fabric of world politics” (Melissan 6). While the U.S. moves towards future diplomacy it is vital that we remember the past and recognize the many ways our history can impact the present.

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