Understanding the Gender Gap in the Republican Party on State Judiciaries

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Understanding the Gender Gap in the Republican Party on State Judiciaries

by

Reagan Griggs Pritchett

Under the Direction of Amy Steigerwalt, PhD

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

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ABSTRACT

A clear gender gap exists in the Republican Party. Less female Republicans also serve on state judiciaries compared to their male counterparts. This dissertation seeks to better define the reasons why we see so few women on state judiciaries. I propose a Supply and Demand Theory to test the gender gap on state judiciaries. First, I theorize that there exists a diminished supply of Republican women even available to ascend to state judiciaries. I also look at whether female lawyers that identify as Republican have lower ambition levels of ascending to the state bench. Through the demand side theory, I theorize that voter biases exist among Republican voters and that there are also lower levels of recruitment among Republican elites. Through this dissertation, I will use both survey data and survey experiment data to determine what factors influence the gender gap on state judiciaries.

INDEX WORDS: Republican Party, Gender Gap, State Judiciaries
Understanding the Gender Gap in the Republican Party on State Judiciaries

by

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my family: my mom, my dad, my husband, my granny, and my late pa. You all have been my light, my encouragement, and solid foundation. You have been with me through it all and for that, I will be forever grateful.
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1 INTRODUCTION

During the winter of 2020, I began a campaign to run as a Republican political candidate. In particular, I ran as a Republican candidate for Chief Magistrate Judge in my hometown. Despite meeting a large number of great and supportive people, I ultimately lost the election. More importantly, this experience taught me many lessors about politics and partisanship. It sparked my interest into problems that persist for women trying to ascend to political offices, especially among the Republican Party. Historically underrepresented in every political facet, American women have lacked roles in state legislatures, Congress, and even the judiciary. Though women make up over half the population of the United States, they still compromise only a fraction of the political branches. Research shows, however, that women’s presence in both the legislature and on judiciaries increases descriptive and substantive representation of women (Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 1999). Additionally, it has also been shown to increase legitimacy for the political branches, and increase participation among historically underrepresented groups (Mansbridge 1999; Childs and Krook 2009). Eighty-three other nations surpass the United States for the number of women serving on their respective national legislatures (Fox and Lawless 2010). In particular, Republican women, make up an even smaller fraction of the political branches. As of the 116th Congress, 25 women served as United States Senators. Of those 25 women, only 8 were Republican women. A similar story can be told for the United States House of Representatives. Of the 102 women that served in the House during the 116th, only 13 of them were Republicans (CAWP 2019). In fact, according to Politico as of August 2019, more men named Jim served in the House of Representatives than Republican women that had announced that they were running for reelection in 2020.
The states tell a similar story too. As of 2019, only 29 percent of state legislators are women. Of that 29 percent, 68 percent of women serving in state legislators are Democrats (CAWP 2019). This reality begs the question, where are the Republican women? Studies have tried to explain the paucity of Republican women legislators. Among the reasons found include the socialization of women, lack of ambition by women, lack of recruitment by elites and the party, and even voter biases (Sanbonmatsu 2006; Fox and Lawless 2010; Thomsen 2015). While many of these factors apply to women generally, these institutional and societal level factors seem to plague Republican women even more than Democratic women.

Not surprisingly, these same issues arise when we turn to the makeup of state judiciaries. As of 2019, women only made up about 30 percent of state courts. (NAWJ 2019). Though the number of women on both the state and federal benches has increased over the last decade, the numbers are not proportionate to the national population or the amount of women coming out of law schools. Most important to this research is that Republican females, in particular, are even less present than their Democratic female and Republican male counterparts on state judiciaries (Thomsen 2015). Women comprise only 22.7 percent of state courts in Republican states compared to 33.1 percent of state courts in Democratic states (NAWJ 2019; Berry et al. 1998).

Though there has been an increase in the number of women practicing law, the American Bar Association finds that only a small number of women are ascending to state benches. Just as in the study of legislative politics, descriptive stats show that Republican women are at a particular disadvantage on state judiciaries (Martin 1987; Bratton and Spill 2002). According to the ABA, Democratic governors are more likely to appoint women to the bench. In addition, Democratic dominated states have a much greater likelihood than Republican dominated states of electing women to appellate courts and intermediate courts of appeal. For example, 42.9
percent of women were elected in majority Democratic states compared to only 27.8 percent of women in majority Republican states. Though judicial scholars have uncovered that women exist in lower numbers on both federal and state judiciaries compared to their male counterparts, little research exists looking at it by party and ideology. This dissertation thus seeks to explain why Republican women are lagging behind their Democratic counterparts in terms of obtaining representation on state judiciaries across the United States. While the fact remains that we see more Democratic women on state courts than Republican women, little research exists to tell us why this is the case. There is still much work to do in explaining why this gender gap exists within the Republican Party.

Through this research I hope to understand what factors influence these disproportionately low numbers of Republican women on state judiciaries. Because of the differing selection methods across state judiciaries, it is interesting to study how Republican women could be affected differently by institutional structure. Differences in elite recruitment, voter biases, and lower levels of ambition have been used to explain why women continue to be underrepresented, thus I seek to apply these questions to Republican women seeking state judiciaries. Are Republican women socialized to be less politically ambitious? Are they recruited less by party elites, elected officials, or judges in that state? Or are there voter biases that may exist toward women in the Republican Party? Do the high levels of asymmetric party polarization arguably present in the Republican Party affect women’s successful accession to state courts? Or are institutional features driving the gap that exists with women within the Republican Party?

This analysis seeks ultimately to add to existing research by explaining the gender gap present within the Republican Party on state intermediate and final appellate courts. Few, if any,
studies have investigated why we see a lack of Republican women on state judiciaries. This research is important because it helps tell the story of an entire subset of the population of women. This research can help us to understand why Democratic women seem to be moving forward in number, but Republican women are dwindling. In particular, it helps highlight the struggles of Republican women in ascending to the bench. It also helps to provide more general answers surrounding who makes it to the bench, who does not, and why. In chapter 2, I provide I review relevant literature and argue that an amalgamation of both supply and demand forces are affecting the gender gap among the Republican Party. In chapter 3, I study the supply of women by conducting a content analysis of both the pipeline of women available to ascend to state judiciaries, as well as the ambition levels of lawyers for both the judiciary and other political offices. In chapter 4, I study demand forces such as voter biases and elite recruitment by conducting both a survey experiment and analyzing existing survey data. Lastly, in chapter 5, I summarize all the chapters’ findings and provide the implications for the findings. I also provide directives for future research on the gender gap among the Republican Party.
2 LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

The glass ceiling of the legal power structure has more cracks today than in the past. Three women serve on the Supreme Court, a woman has been both Attorney General of the United States, as well as Solicitor General. Women make up about 436 of the Article III Federal judgeships, and many more spots on state judiciaries. Their numbers, however, are still lacking compared to their male counterparts. Ditslear and Baum (2001) shows that in proportion to the number of women successfully completing law school, women are still not being picked or elected as judges similarly as men. Scholars have attempted to discern what factors affect women’s accession to both the federal and state judiciaries.

Scholars have turned to both institutional and structural characteristics of the courts to explain why we see lower numbers of women despite higher numbers coming down the legal pipeline (Alozie 1996; Brace et al. 2000; Bratton and Spill 2002; King 2002; Hurwitz and Lanier 2003). Prestige theory suggests that the higher the level of court, the less likely females are able to achieve a seat (Alozie 1996). These types of explanations suggest that women will be more likely to be chosen for less prestigious courts, as there are more seats, and competition is lessened (King 2002). However, research exists arguing against prestige theory, in particular, with appointment style courts, where the selector will arguably receive more political capital from the appointment of a historically underrepresented group. Research shows that in more recent years, women are more likely to be selected or elected to state courts of last resort, than intermediate appellate courts (Hurwitz and Lanier 2003).

Who sits on state judiciaries is often affected by the selection method of the state (Baum 1997). Governor selections of candidates is very similar to that of the president selecting for the federal judiciary (Baum 2001). At the federal level, Democratic presidents are more likely to
pick female candidates for the federal judiciary than Republicans (Alozie 1996). Liberal elites are said to value qualities like fairness and equality, which women are thought to possess (Bratton and Spill 2002). Similar to the Federal judiciary, Democratic governors select more women than Republican governors (Baum 2001). Turning to judicial elections, Frederick and Streb (2008) examine state intermediate appellate courts from 2000-2006, and find that judicial elections do not necessarily hinder women’s ascension to the bench, especially in Democratic states. Democratic and liberal female candidates are found to win more often in Democratic states, as compared to Republican or conservative female candidates in red states (McDermott 1995; 1997).

Scholars also look at ambition levels of possible female candidates to explain why we see gender gaps in political office (Jensen and Martinek 2008; Williams 2008). Ambition levels are tested by looking at a candidate’s desire to ascend to the bench. Scholars find that the judiciary can be very different than that of Congress. Because women are entering the legal profession in record numbers, there is no shortage of females coming down the legal pipeline. Ultimately, scholars have found very different levels of ambition for women seeking the judiciary than that of women seeking a legislative career. Williams’s (2008) study of attorneys in Texas finds that female attorneys express higher levels of political ambition than their male counterparts, especially those that had held office prior. Williams finds that perception comes into the ambition calculus, as women that perceive tougher races or a harder time reaching the judiciary choose to not pursue it. The study of ambition has produced mixed results, however, because scholars also have found that women may see the elevated position of a judgeship in a softer light in some ways. Because attorney’s hours and lifestyle are often not conducive for women wanting a family or a more normal schedule, the judiciary can be a better option (Jensen and
Martinek 2008). Jensen and Martinek (2008) look at judicial ambition by surveying female and male members of the New York State Supreme Court. They find that women were three times more likely than male members to want to move up in a judicial career.

Overall, the judicial literature suggests key differences between obtaining a seat on the bench at all levels and obtaining a legislative seat. Female judicial candidates tend to have higher levels of ambition and be better equipped for the bench (Jensen and Martinek 2009). Despite the heightened levels of ambition among female judges, however, they still exist in smaller numbers compared to male judges. In particular, a gender gap exists in the Republican Party for women on state judiciaries. For example, in Republican-held states like Mississippi, the largest gender gap exists in portion to the number of women in the state versus the number of women on the state judiciary (Fix and Johnson 2017). Through this study, I hope to further our understanding of both state judiciaries and Republican women candidates. I seek to show that it is harder for female Republicans seeking to ascend to state judiciaries. I also seek to discern what causes the gender gap that persists in the Republican Party.

2.1 The Supply Side and the Gender Gap

Despite women entering the legal field at the same rate as men, only 32 percent of state judges are women (The Gavel Gap). This number often decreases drastically when looking at states where the ideology of the elites and/ or ideology of the state’s citizens are Republican such as Alabama, Mississippi, or Tennessee. One explanation for this gap is a person’s party identification and political socialization. Scholars have found that the socialization of Republicans is quite different than that of Democrats. Party identification remains the central
factor in how individuals vote and how they tend to see the world around them (Converse and Pierce 1985; Miller, Shanks & Shapiro 1996).

Just as the Michigan model found in the 1960s, partisanship tends to be inherited from parents through a process of socialization. It is described as a funnel of causality, where everything tends to be seen or connected to partisanship (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). Because children tend to grow up and be in the same social structure as their parents or guardians, they tend to think like their parents and parental experience is relevant to their own life and future (Achen 2002). If your parents were Republicans and you were raised as a Republican, according to certain scholars and political theories, you would probably be a Republican too. This, however, makes for a very different socialization process depending on party, as the Republican Party during the last several decades has become increasingly conservative, the party of men, and less welcoming of ideas such as feminism (Rymph 2006; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016; Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin 2011).

During the 1970’s when the United States was focused on an era of women’s feminism through things like the Equal Rights Amendment and legalized abortion, the conservative right was starting to form, harden, and push back against feminism. When Ronald Reagan was chosen as the Republican nominee and elected to office in 1980, scholars contend that this was the end of bipartisanship for America’s women’s movement (Rymph 2006). Republican women of the 1970s and 1980s disagreed with Reagan, the party platform, and the alignment with ultra conservatives, but just as the GOP was losing women, it was gaining more white men (Rymph 2006).

Into the 1990’s, there was a clear divide in the two parties, and women became Democrats in much larger numbers than men. All the while, Republicans used rhetoric to
“liberalize” the Democrat Party, and link it more and more to women. In 1995, Senator Trent Lott, a Republican from Mississippi, was even quoted as trying to describe the difference in the two parties, “just like men and women…I like to think we are the party of Mars” (Rymph 2006 p.233). Still, however, even as anti-woman rhetoric was sweeping the Republican Party, white women were evenly split between both Al Gore and George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election. Scholars have tried to explain this paradox by looking at the socialization of these type of women, suggesting there are strong ties to the Republican Party through both moral and religious conservative considerations (Rymph 2006). For most Republican women, party transcends gender. Though the Republican Party is not the party of women or women’s issues, females raised and socialized within the party will still choose to support the Republican Party. This, however, can create a conundrum for women seeking political office, as scholars have overwhelming found a positive correlation between political conservatism and gender roles (Howell and Day 2000; Ciabattari 2001). I argue these differences in socialization and the differences that exist within the two parties help explain the lack of Republican women coming down the pipeline. Though a number of American women identify as Republicans, due to an increasingly conservative party platform that does not support ideals like feminism and women’s issues, smaller numbers of women have the notion to pursue political office.

Another factor explored in recent years is asymmetric polarization that scholars argue has been present in both Republican voters and Republican elites in recent decades. For purposes of this discussion, polarization could also be affecting both the supply and demand side by creating a more conservative base of voters and elites, that in turn lowers ambition levels for women entering the pipeline and deciding to run for political office. Party polarization also helps drive the difference in the partisan gender gap. Because party polarization is driving the two parties
from one another, with Democrats and Republican’s views differing on all types of issues, this helps explain why we see such a gap in the number of women among the two parties (Thomsen 2015). Many external factors have been produced to help explain the rising partisan polarization in Congress. Explanations like the extremism of party activists, redistricting, and a growing overlap between partisanship and ideology have been sufficiently produced to show the distance between the two parties (Rohde 1991; Theriault 2004).

Theriault (2008) shows that internal factors in Congress provide a large portion of the growing divide between the in and out parties. At one point in history, liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats existed, and coexisted within the parties. Today, however, that is much less the case, with very strong ideologies leading both parties. Following realignment, control was taken out of the hands of committee leaders and put into the hands of the leaders of the majority party. These leaders had a great deal of power, and the majority party stressed the importance of sticking together, while reducing defection and the reduction of working across party lines (Aldrich and Rohde 1997; Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005). The majority party sought out their own agenda and pushed their own policy goals, while limiting the goals of the minority party. Procedural rules on things like limiting debate and recommitting has helped drive a more homogenous party (Aldrich and Rohde 1997). This party homogeneity has also led to a growing partisan divide across all types of issues, including social and cultural issues like gender. In previous decades, positions on social and cultural issues like gender equity were only minimally related to partisanship. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, elites in each party began having very different views on gendered issues. These polarizing issues became in part the backbone driving the two parties further apart (Thomsen 2015). In particular, the Republican Party has taken a steep asymmetric thirty-five year march to the right (Hacker and Pierson
2015). Led by groups like the Christian Right and the Right to Life, the Republican Party is very far from the median voter of yesteryear.

The most politically active Republicans are also the most conservative, with the base of activists growing for both parties as polarization increases (Abramowitz 2010). Using the liberal-conservative scale of the American National Election Survey, Abramowitz (2011) finds that today’s Republicans having a steadily increasing conservatism score as rank and file Republicans follow elites to the right. Additionally, these same increasingly conservative Republicans, have very negative views of Democrats and Democratic candidates. Of this swath of the electorate, these “new” Republicans of the 21st century are increasingly older, white, wealthier and more religious and believe in things like the right to life and reduced government. They are increasingly against more progressive social issues like gay marriage. Increasing conservatism even gave rise to movements like the Tea Party following the election of President Barack Obama, with its supporters being farther to the right than the Republican Party itself. Tea Party supporters grew in number in part due to things like racial resentment of President Obama, and resentment of a more liberal presidential agenda.

In general, the Republican Party as a whole has even become more traditional in recent years with strong beliefs in ideals like orthodox religious practices and commitment (Layman and Green 2006). Driven by things partisan media outlets like Fox News and increasingly conservative extremists in the Republican Party, the party electorate has followed suit (Abramowitz 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2006; 2015). Red state voters in particular were found to have very strong religious ties that helped drive their opinions. They tend to be Protestant, born-again Christians, and attend religious services at least once a week (Green and Guth 1988; Woodberry and Smith 1998; Wilcox 2018). Among white red state voters, religious observance
is highly correlated with political attitudes and behavior (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). In particular, with this category of the electorate, church attendance and either being a born-again Christian or an evangelical Christian is more strongly correlated with party identification than variables like education, income, and sex. For white Americans identifying as the most conservative, religiosity has a stronger influence on vote choice than any other characteristic. This type of voters also tends to have very strong negative opinions about things like gay marriage and abortion (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Evans (1997) argues that membership in social groups like a political party determines how someone feels about things like abortion and gender roles. Because strong conservatives have increasing conservative views about things like gender roles, the party is being driven farther from the ideological center (Hacker and Pierson 2006). This diversion from the ideological center is making it harder for moderate candidates to be elected. Additionally, conservative religious views have been found to manifest to lower levels of general political ambition (Moore 2005).

The Republican Party has enjoyed success in recent decades in both Congress and state legislatures; this success, however, is asymmetric among genders. Though the Republican Party has grown in strength in state legislatures, Republican women have not shared the same successes (Carroll 2002). Fewer Republican women are present today in state legislatures than in 1988, and of the ones that are present, they are more conservative. Because women are often seen as more moderate, this would help explain why it is increasingly difficult for women to be elected to the Republican Party (Dolan 2014). Though less Republican women now identify as moderate, as they have had to adapt in a strong Conservative base present in states. Though some women in the Republican Party have chosen to adapt and become more Conservative, others have chosen to opt out of a political life all together. Ideological moderates are less likely to seek
office, as it is often hard to get elected. Even once elected, moderates have a more difficult time achieving policy goals or advancing within the party. An extreme ideological environment has become increasingly hostile for those in the middle. Because parties now work more as a team, promoting their own party, while seeking to tear down the other party, a candidate must either be similar to the existing party structure or conform to it in order to be successful (Thomsen 2018).

The theory of party fit looks how at well a candidate can ideologically conform in order to affect policy, advance within the party, and form bonds with fellow members of the party (Thomsen 2014; 2018). This theory seeks to explain whether the candidate wants to conform and be a member of the party team. In a polarized environment where moderates are punished, often those that could be seen as moderate, like Republican women will choose not to run for political office (Thomsen 2014; 2018). If Republican women choose to not conform, then their chances of advancing within the party are smaller.

Party polarization has created a highly conservative and often hostile place for women. Because the state’s electorate is the same ideologically when selecting members for the state legislature, Congress, or the state judiciary, party polarization will affect all branches. Women running for the judiciary could also seek to not conform to the party image, and thus will choose to opt out of running altogether. In an increasingly polarized party of older white men, less females will successfully reach the bench as women are seen as often falling to the left of the Republican Party and the perceived Republican conservative values. I theorize that Republican partisan polarization will affect women in their calculus to run, their ability to be recruited, and their ability to be successfully elected to different levels of the state judiciary.

In order to examine the effects of Republican’s socialization and partisan polarization, I first look at the supply of women available to the Republican Party. I theorize that the supply of
women coming down the pipeline has been inevitably affected by both socialization within the Republican Party as well as the increasing levels of polarization. The supply side argument looks at both women entering jobs that eventually lead to office, and women entering lower levels of political office that will eventually lead to higher office. Looking at what has been deemed the “social eligibility pool,” scholars argue that the more women in a state’s workforce and in jobs that are considered gateways to politics, the more women will be elected in that state (Hill 1981; Nelson 1991). According to Paxton and Kunovich (2003), ideological beliefs help to influence a woman’s decision to run for political office regardless of education or type of job. Crowder-Meyer and Lauderdale (2014) find that the proportion of women in the Democratic pool that could potentially run is three times larger than the Republican pool of women. Since the presidential election of 1980, a larger number of women have demonstrated a preference for the Democratic Party. This turn may affect the number of future female office holders available to the Republican Party (Caul 1999).

In particular, more traditional and conservative ideological beliefs often create barriers, limiting both the ambition for the jobs that lead to a political career and an actual political career (Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Gender role stereotypes often assume larger numbers of women in the home as mothers and caregivers (Bauer 2013). Within the Republican Party, in particular, there are higher rates of homemakers among women. The Republican Party often is seen as defending traditional gender roles, ultimately favoring women outside the public sphere (Sanbonmatsu 2002). When looking at the careers that lead to possible office such as education, law, and activism, a survey found that there are more Democratic women in these professions than Republican women (Fox and Lawless 2010). I therefore theorize that less Republican women will enter into jobs that lead to a seat on the bench.
2.2 The Supply Side: Ambition

Ambition is another example and component of the supply side theory of the gender gap. Past scholars like Sanbonmatsu (2002) have introduced us to the importance of looking at the stage prior to entering politics. By only studying the women that are present politically in the Republican Party, one would miss an entire area of research. Building on Sanbonmatsu, I seek to explain the gender gap in the Republican Party by analyzing why women decide to not run or ascend to state judiciaries. Using the Citizen Political Ambition Panel Study, Fox and Lawless determine that women of comparable background and credentials are much less likely than their male counterparts to see themselves as qualified for political office. Women also tend to be more risk-averse than men and also tend to weigh things like family responsibilities higher than men (Fox and Lawless 2004). Over double the number of Republican women see themselves as “not at all qualified” compared to Republican men (Fox and Lawless 2011). Gender roles formed during socialization still continue to perpetuate women’s low self-assessment of their political skills, as the process of socialization still tends to favor women outside the public sphere (Fox and Lawless 2011). For example, women with children in the home were significantly less likely to have progressive ambition, as opposed to their male counterparts (Fulton et al. 2006). Overall, marriage, children, and family life remain a larger hurdle for women compared to men. Because the Republican Party is increasingly the party of men and is more conservative and patriarchal, perhaps the hurdle created by family and children is even bigger for women seeking office within the Republican Party (Bledsoe and Herring 1990; Maestas et al. 2006).

When looking at the judiciary, studies suggest ambition calculations may differ from those of candidates to the legislative branch. Williams (2008) and Jensen and Martinek (2008) show that women can be just as ambitious or more ambitious than men when seeking a higher
bench in part because potential female candidates see women and minorities advancing at higher numbers. Women see more chances for advancement within the judiciary than legislatively. Scholars find that higher ambition for the Judiciary may be related to working hours, pay, and stability associated with the Bench versus private practice or corporate law (Williams 2008). These studies, however, do not discern how party affiliation plays a role in the decision to run. I propose that party identification will affect a woman’s ambition for seeking the bench. Though Jensen and Martinek argue that judicial ambition is higher than legislative ambition, I believe in this case, party transcends general levels of ambition. Because the Republican Party in both state legislatures and in Congress affects the ambition of Republican women even more than Democratic women, I theorize that it will also affect the ambition of Republican women seeking the bench in similar ways. I also theorize that due to findings like that of Williams and Jensen and Martinek, that Democratic women will express higher levels of ambition for the Judiciary than you find when looking at their ambition for political office.

Though research has shown that women have less ambition for office than men in general, I theorize that Republican women in particular will express lower levels of ambition for both political office and the Judiciary due to the increasingly conservative views of the modern Republican Party. There is a partisan distinction between the views of women’s role in society and woman’s ability to work outside the home, with the Republican Party encouraging less women than the Democratic Party. Even the growing prevalence of the Christian Right tends to hinder women’s ambition and recruitment. Because of the increasing wave of conservatism and asymmetric polarization, women who are often seen as more ideological moderate than men, are recruited less. This in turn adds to the apprehension of Republican women and their emergence into the public sphere (Thomsen 2015). If women in general have lower ambition
levels, the question remains as to how party and specifically, the Republican Party plays into this calculus. I theorize that aspects like religion and patriarchy that are most prevalent in the Republican Party will decrease ambition levels among women who actively and frequently practice religion. Conservative Christianity discourages women from public roles that take them away from children and family (Moore 2005). Because the Republican Party of today tends to be more conservative than that of the past, increasingly, more traditional views are starting to take hold of the party. This steep 35-year march to the right by the Republican Party has sharpened an already conservative base to be even more conservative in recent years (Hacker and Pierson 2006; 2015). Charles Peek, George Lowe, and Susan Williams (1991) conclude this gendered opposition is associated with women’s conservative beliefs as measured by views of the Bible. In turn, these traditional views tend to leave women more apprehensive of entering a public sphere dominated by men, inadvertently lowering political ambition. Thus, I theorize that despite literature showing increased ambition levels among women for state judiciaries, Republican women will have decreased ambition levels for the Judiciary as well as for political offices.

If, however, Republican women were socialized in more politically minded households, I hypothesize that this may positively affect ambition levels for state judiciaries. Political socialization in politically minded households could be a mediating factor to the very conservative and anti-woman rhetoric being seen in the Republican Party. Political socialization in the family unit can certainly shape both young women and men’s political interests and ambition. Children raised in homes where parents discuss politics often, develop more political knowledge and a propensity to be politically engaged. Additionally, it would lead scholars to assume that being raised in politically active households, would also lead to greater political
ambition levels (Jennings 2002; Verba, Schlozman, and Burns 2005; Jennings and Stoker 2012; Fox and Lawless 2014). According to Fox and Lawless (2003), however, women experience less of a political upbringing than men. Their survey of lawyers, business leaders, educators, and political activists found that women 20 percent less likely than men to have spoken about politics with their parents. They were also 15 percent less likely to have been encouraged to run for political office by their parents (Fox and Lawless 2003). Additionally, I would suspect these numbers to be even higher for Republican women based on the factors I look at in this dissertation.

2.3 The Demand Side: Voter Biases

Election style states have a higher number of private practice attorneys ascending to the bench, rather than government-law experience or those from the most prestigious law schools. In both types of election style states, data show that a higher number of women successfully ascend to state judiciaries compared to appointment states (Johnsen 2016). However, the number of women elected to state courts again differs by partisanship. Due to possible Republican voter bias, this type of selection method is a great arena with which to discern whether it exists and what factors create and affect levels of bias. Because of the different selection methods of states, there have been mixed findings by studies looking at gender and state judiciaries. Bratton and Spill find female appointments are more likely in states with Democratic governors. Gender diversified courts are also more likely in liberal states, regardless of the selection style (Martin 1987; 2004 Bratton and Spill 2002). Sigelman and Welch (1984) contend that women and other political minorities are more likely to win elections in districts where constituents are more liberal, either because of the perception that women are more liberal or because they will bring a unique set of views to the bench (McDermott 1997). Hurwitz and Lanier (2003) found similar
results when looking at how ideology affects diversity on the bench, by finding that liberal elites and a liberal electorate is more likely to support diversity on the bench.

The origins of differing voter views among the party can be traced to after realignment when the Democratic Party became the party of the historically underrepresented. The Democratic Party opened its arms to both African Americans and women. This signaled a vast change from the political climate prior to realignment (Lawson 1985). Following the “Year of the Woman” in 1992, many more women existed in Congress, especially among the Democratic Party. This is in part due to the issues that are perceived to be owned by one party or the other. For example, the Democratic Party is thought to be the party of issues like education, welfare, and women/ minority rights. On the other hand, the Republican Party is thought to be the party of the economy and defense. Due to the masculine nature of these issues, women are thought to be better prepared among Democratic issues and the Democratic Party rather than Republicans and Republican owned issues (Dolan 2014).

In lieu of perfect information, voters use cues or heuristics in order to make political decisions. These heuristics or shortcuts include anything from making a decision based off of party, incumbency, etc (Popkin 1995; Lupia 1994). A voter may only know that the person is an incumbent Republican, but they choose that person regardless, because they have held office previously. More likely, they choose the person and that particular heuristic because of partisanship. Partisanship is the strongest heuristic voters use when making decisions politically. More relevant to this study is that voters use gender as a heuristic as well. Unfortunately for Republican females, gender and partisanship may clash for Republican voters. Previous studies have found that female candidate’s traits are often evaluated differently than their male counterparts (Cook and Wilcox 1995; McDermott 1997; King and Matland 2003). Several
experiments have found that candidate sex has an effect on voter evaluations of candidate competency, personal traits, and beliefs (King and Matland 2003). For example, gender schema theory finds that traits like empathy and caring are female traits. Whereas, leadership and decisiveness are seen as male traits (King and Matland 2003). Because females are seen as being more liberal, more progressive, kinder, and softer on things like crime and defense, this can clash with the Republican Party and what they are perceived to stand for (Dolan 2014). Taber and Lodge (2006) find that voters will react to information in a biased way when party cues are present. This is especially the case in low information races like that of judicial races (Abramowitz 1980; McDermott 1997). In particular, McDermott (1997) found that in low information races, gender can act as a social information cue that would signal to voters that women candidates are more liberal than their male counterparts in the same party. The study also found that Democratic female candidates fared worse among conservative voters than Democratic men. Though, they point out the effect is less clear for Republican women as Republican women running for office provide conflicting information cues for voters (McDermott 1997).

In a study completed by Dolan and Sanbonmatsu (2009) using the 2006 American National Election Studies Pilot Study, the authors find that there exist gender and party stereotypes as respondents believed that both Democratic and Republican men were able to handle crime better than women. They also find that those surveyed believed women to be more liberal on issues like abortion than males. Overall, they conclude that Republican women are at a heightened disadvantage as they may be seen as providing voters with mixed messages. Republican women provide a liberal cue through their gender, but a conservative cue via the party (Dolan 2004; Dolan and Sanbonmatsu 2009). Republican voters were less likely to see
Republican women as prepared emotionally for politics, and as a result Dolan finds that Republican voters lacked confidence in Republican women’s abilities as politicians. In turn, as Republican women evaluate their chances and decide to enter races, they could take this into consideration, thus limiting the amount of Republican women coming down the pipeline (Dolan and Sanbonmatsu 2009). If women are already seen as being softer and weaker on crime, this could put them at a disadvantage when running for state judiciaries.

Previous experiments have found that in lieu of other relevant information, individuals will use their gender schemata when evaluating candidates (Banducci et al. 2002). They will also use party schemata to make decisions about candidates. Lastly, individuals will use nonpolitical information like trait evaluations when making political estimations. After providing participants with traits, gender, and partisanship in their experiment, King and Matland (2003), find that Republican women did better than Republican men among Democrats and Independents. Republican women, however, were at a particular disadvantage among Republican voters. They find that gender schemata had an effect on voter evaluations, even more so than the party heuristic provided. Candidate sex and perceived liberal traits appear to send a cue to Republican voters that a Republican woman is more liberal than a comparable Republican male. Ultimately, stereotypes about candidate traits and policy positions can have a direct impact on the evaluations people make about candidates and vote choice (Dolan 2004). Dolan and Sanbonmatsu (2009) find that gender stereotypes that benefit women are less important to Republican voters, than those that are perceived to be their weaknesses. Overall, these gender stereotypes harm Republican women more than Democratic women.

I theorize that voters will use cues like gender stereotypes and previously held beliefs about gender when making their decisions, and these cues could harm a Republican woman in
particular. The gender stereotypes and traits associated with females is quite different than those of the Republican Party, and in lieu of other information, voters may rely on partisanship and stereotypes when making a decision about a candidate. Just as Fox and Smith (1998), I theorize that a bias still exists against women candidates, and in particular among Republican voters.

2.4 The Demand Side: Elite Recruitment

Scholars have shown a possible bias to exist not only between voters and females running for political office, but also elites and their recruitment or support of females in the political realm. According to Fox and Lawless (2005) recruitment is a vital ingredient in closing the gender gap, as it particularly pertains to women’s ambition for even seeking political office. If women are not encouraged to seek office, they are less likely to consider it and less likely to perceive themselves as being able to be successful. Using the Citizen Political Ambition Panel Study, Fox and Lawless conclude that similarly situated and highly qualified women from both parties are less likely to be recruited to run for political office than their male counterparts. Candidates must rely on support from the institutions, and this can be difficult when the institutions are dominated by men and are ingrained in patriarchy (Enloe 2004).

Different research suggests that party leaders, organizations, and elected officials serve as gatekeepers to political office. They have also been found to as negative gatekeepers for women as they may not recruit women or support their candidacies (Carroll 1994; Niven 1998; Sanbonmatsu 2002). Once again, differing recruitment patterns are found to be also based on party, with Republican women being recruited in lesser numbers than their Democratic female counterparts. Thirty six percent of Democratic women compared to only 24 percent of Republican women were recruited to run by political activists. Overall, when asked why they often did not recruit women for political office, party leaders cite family obligations as reasons
why women would be less sought after or perceived as interested in running (Fox and Lawless 2010).

The Judiciary in particular, offers a unique arena with which to test women’s recruitment to the bench because of the differing methods with which they could be brought there. The structural design surrounding state judiciaries in different states, allows for a test of whether women are recruited in states with elections or recruited by entities like appointment commissions and state legislators and governors. For example, because often the ones doing the appointing are male, scholars suggest that there will be more males than females recruited for state judiciaries (Alozie 1996). Alozie, however, does not discern whether party plays a role. Though this dissertation focuses on elite recruitment in an election style state (Georgia), the judiciary has many ways to look at elite recruitment. I would like to continue this dissertation in future research by looking at other selection methods.

For example, appointment states put power in the hands of elites and those that have traditionally held power (Johnsen 2016). Even in states with nominating commissions that are supposed to be nonpartisan, data suggests that merit selection does not value private practice or business law experience in women. Some scholars suggest that overall, merit systems hinder those of non-traditional backgrounds like women, who cannot muster the support of those who can influence nomination. In merit systems where recruitment is either by commission or the governor, women rarely pass muster as merit selection tends to favor the existing elite and establishment (Johnsen 2016). Research shows, however, that these type of selection mechanisms can put electorally accountable governors under pressure to diversify the bench (Graham 1990). This pressure however, is more relevant in states held by a Democratic governor rather than a Republican governor. Appointment methods have been argued to produce higher
levels of females on state judiciaries, in part due to asymmetric information (Bratton and Spill 2002). Governors or commissions know how many women exist on state judiciaries, whereas voters do not. Appointing elites or commissions know the value of gender diversity, if only just as a token woman. Bratton and Spill (2002), show that appointment style states lead to more female judges, though if only to break up all-male courts. They also find that once a woman does ascend to the court, the likelihood of another woman ascending actually goes down.

For purposes of this study and because I am using data from an election style state, I consider recruitment to mean by party organizations or state leaders (Fulton et al. 2006). Due to women’s lack of recruitment in the Republican party, I theorize that Republican women being appointed to the bench will be no different. I theorize that male Republicans will be recruited more often than female Republicans. Female judicial candidates do better electorally in Democratic states and have been found to be more successful in Democratic appointment states. Because of this and that I am using the state of Georgia to study elite recruitment, I expect to find women being recruited less than men.

2.5 Theoretical Expectations

I theorize that there is a supply and a demand side to the gender gap argument, and that both supply and demand forces help to explain the paucity of Republican female judges on state judiciaries. The supply side looks at how many women are even available as possible candidates, while the demand side looks at the need/ want for Republican women on state judiciaries. State judiciaries have institutional variation that allows for the testing of both supply and demand side features. In general, because of the variation in selection methods for state judiciaries, it allows a comprehensive view of elites, voters, and ambition levels of potential candidates. This
dissertation will focus on mainly election type states, specifically when looking at something like elite recruitment.

On the supply side, I argue that fewer women are available as candidates within the Republican Party in part due to socialization effects and lower levels of ambition among Republican women. On the demand side, I propose that both voter biases and gender differences in elite recruitment affect the gender gap as there is a smaller demand for Republican women to sit on state judiciaries. Through this study, I hope to further our understanding of both state judiciaries and Republican women candidates. I seek to show that it is more difficult for female Republicans seeking to ascend to state judiciaries. I also seek to discern what causes the gender gap that persists in the Republican Party.
3 SUPPLY SIDE: ELIGIBILITY AND POLITICAL AMBITION

3.1 Introduction

Women like Ruth Malhotra tuned into C-SPAN and other news networks on September 26, 2020, to watch President Trump officially announce and introduce his nominee for the U.S. Supreme Court to replace the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. To Ruth and others like her, this was a historic moment. His nominee was a woman named Judge Amy Coney Barrett, a Catholic mother of 7 children. An unlikely nominee for some, Pat Roberts even asked on-air on the Christian Broadcasting Network, “That’s going to be tough, to be a judge and take care of all those kids, won’t it?” (Graham 2020).

Justice Barrett reflects a story that women all over can identify with. As a wife and a mother, questions surround her ability to do her job as a judge while also managing her obligations to her family. Society forces women to pit their career ambitions against familial responsibilities. Yet, Justice Barrett presents an icon for many women like Ruth Malhotra. She shows that women can excel at a demanding job, while also prioritizing family and faith. Though Justice Barrett is both ambitious and successful, she is the exception and not the rule, especially in conservative and Republican spheres. Rhetoric surrounding her nomination proves that, as the questions being asked about her ability to juggle career and family responsibilities were not asked of similarly-situated men. When Justice Brett Kavanaugh was nominated for the Supreme Court in 2018, despite having a wife and children, he was not asked about his ability to be a father and a judge; Judge Barrett’s mentor, Justice Antonin Scalia, a father of 10, was not asked at his confirmation hearing how he managed.

The conflict between ambition and family also occurs in more liberal circles: Hana Schank and Elizabeth Wallace were college classmates who each had high levels of ambition in
college and directly after, but years later found themselves putting career and life ambitions on the backburner for life, marriage, and children. Wondering whether their experiences were mirrored by others, Schank and Wallace investigated the career trajectories of their female college friends. In college and even post-college, these women seemed to have high hopes and ambitions. Schank and Wallace (2019) found that most of the women in their friend group at Northwestern University had hopes of being in President Clinton’s Cabinet in one capacity or another. Schank, however, like many other women, ditched these dreams soon after graduating college, and now spends her days working from home while taking care of children. Even after being offered her dream job at 40, she turned it down due to the long hours and being away from her children for 12-hour shifts.

After interviewing many of the women from their college sorority at Northwestern, Schank and Wallace found that while many succeeded in pursuing ambitions post-college, such as going to medical school or law school, those ambitions slowed down after getting married and starting families. Of the women they contacted, a large group of women comprised what they deemed “opt outers.” These opt outers are woman that graduated from Ivy League schools, and even had successful careers directly after college. However, at some juncture post-college, their careers and professional ambitions took a backseat to other concerns. In Shery Sanberg’s playbook, these women would have been “leaning out.” Sanberg, a New York Times Best Selling author of what has been deemed the “Feminist manifesto,” described leaning in and leaning out. Those leaning in can balance a work and home life, while those leaning out, choose not to. The opt outers seem to have several things in common. They have a deep desire to be the primary caregiver to their child or children. They have a spouse that could not devote as much time to caregiving, and it may not have made sense financially to have childcare. They had jobs
that did not offer very much flexibility and thus they had to choose one path over another. Most of the women in this category expressed a sense of loss for giving up their jobs and ambitions and wished to one day return to them. But, overall, the story they tell suggests women must still balance, if not choose between, work and life obligations in ways men simply do not.

In this chapter, I ask what influences how women balance these competing demands, particularly in the context of deciding to pursue a seat on the bench. Scholars have often studied the “step” before women enter public lives. Ambition levels are studied as a way to determine whether the lack of women in the public sphere is a product of outside forces out of their control, or whether women choose to not enter into the public sphere due to a lack of ambition (Fox and Lawless 2004). Justice Barrett’s confirmation revealed that women still face questions surrounding their ambition for entrance into professional and public lives, and the choices associated with displaying such ambition, that men do not, even in 2020. The question is how society’s continued emphasis on the trade-offs women face between the public and private spheres influences women’s desire and ability to play a prominent role in the public sphere. Lower ambition levels are not necessarily limited to women who have chosen family over careers. Even women in pipeline careers to either the judiciary or another political position often do not necessarily aspire to become a judge or politician.

Furthermore, one of the defining features of the story of Justice Amy Coney Barrett is her relative novelty: a deeply conservative, religious, Republican mother who also has a successful career. Overall, Republican women are not well represented on state (or the federal) judiciaries, whether with respect to their Republican male counterparts or their Democratic female counterparts. Building on the work of Sanbonmatsu and others, I seek to explain the gender gap in specifically Republican elected officials by analyzing why women decide to run or not for
state judiciaries. As detailed in Chapter 2, the supply component of my theory posits that less women will even be available to the Republican Party due to lower numbers of women in the pipeline. Additionally, of those available to ascend to state judiciaries, Republican women will express lower ambition levels for both the judiciary and other political offices than Democratic women. I further postulate that these proposed lower ambition levels may be a function of important socialization forces, including childhood messages and religiosity.

This chapter begins by identifying the number of women who could even run for or be appointed to state judiciaries (lawyers). One important question explored here is whether the size of a state’s pipeline varies based on its ideological orientation. I then use two different surveys of lawyers, one of Georgia lawyers and one national survey, to determine whether the party gap in female state judges is perpetuated by lower ambition levels among Republican women lawyers. My focus throughout this chapter is to discern whether differential forces seem to be driving the decisions made by Republican women as opposed to Democratic women and Republican men.

3.2 Pipeline and the Supply Theory: Measuring the Number of Women Lawyers Across the 50 states

The pipeline theory predicts that higher amounts of women entering lower levels of public office, such as state legislatures, will then lead to higher amounts of women ascending to higher political offices like Congress (Carroll 1985; Fox and Lawless 2004; Mariani 2008). Some pipeline studies go a step further, examining those who are in careers that most typically produce potential political candidates.

In order to be a judge on most state courts, and for all appellate positions, you must be a lawyer and admitted to the relevant state’s Bar. There thus exists a definable population of
people who can potentially consider running for a state-level judgeship. Are women less likely than men to be lawyers, and, more specifically, is the percentage of female lawyers in Republican states lower than the percentage in Democratic states? One potential explanation for the lack of women on state judiciaries and more specifically, in Republican-held states, is that there are simply less women who are lawyers in Republican-held states.

H1: There will be fewer female attorneys in Republican states.

I first examine the number of women coming out of law schools. Schank and Wallace (2019) argue that ambition levels are high during college and graduate school but then drop off after women have graduated and entered the workforce. This argument suggests women should enter and graduate from law schools at the same rate as men nationally. Table 3.2.1 shows first year law school enrollments as a function of gender from 1990 until 2016. There was an approximately 7 percent relative increase in the percent of women compared to men enrolling from 1990 to 2000, bringing the rates to relative parity. From there, the numbers fluctuated from year to year. In 2005, women made up about 47.5 percent of the first-year students entering law school. In 2010, 47.1 percent of first-year law students were female. Notably, however, women surpassed men in first year enrollment nationally in 2016 and now make up the majority of students entering into law school.
Table 3.1 2016 National Law School Enrollment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male Enrollment</th>
<th>Female Enrollment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
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</table>

I then look at the top five law schools in the United States to determine if this relative gender parity translates to the top law schools in the country. Table 3.2.2 presents those findings. At all but one of the top five schools in 2016, women were still in the minority. The margins, however, are slim. I finally look at law school enrollment by state. Most notably, all five states with the highest percentage of women enrolled in law school as of 2018 are led by a Democratic Governor and are liberal according to the Gallup ideological spectrum (see Table 3.2.3). In contrast, all five states with the lowest percentage of women enrolled have a Republican Governor and are conservative according to the Gallup ideological spectrum. This final table starts to suggest that the pipeline of women who may become potentially available for state judiciaries – i.e., those women who have enrolled in law school – differs somewhat dramatically by state and along ideological lines. While 57% of students enrolled in Washington law schools are women, Utah and Idaho only have 42% and 41% women, respectively. Such a gender disparity in law school enrollment may have important effects on who enters the legal profession in each state, and eventually becomes eligible for a potential judgeship.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Law Schools</th>
<th>Male Enrollment</th>
<th>Female Enrollment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Yale</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
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<td>Stanford</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
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<td>Harvard</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Chicago</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Columbia University</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Female Enrollment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
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<td>California</td>
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<td>New Mexico</td>
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<td>Colorado</td>
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<td>South Carolina</td>
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<td>Minnesota</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>51%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>49%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>47%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>47%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How many of these potential lawyers enter the legal profession and thus become potentially eligible to serve on a state court? And, do these state-based gender disparities continue when we look at practicing lawyers? Nationally, the percentage of lawyers who are women has increased steadily in the past two decades. According to the ABA, in 2005, 29.4 percent of lawyers in the US were women. In 2011, they made up 31 percent, and as of 2019, women made up about 38 percent of the total number of lawyers in the US. While more women are entering the legal profession than ever before, women lawyers still clearly lag behind the number of men lawyers nationally.

To determine the number of women available to even ascend to each state’s judiciary, I investigate the number of women lawyers in each state using data collected from state’s bar associations. This data gives me a raw count of lawyers and other demographics by state. Not all 50 states offer this demographic data. Of the 50 states, I study 21 of those states that offer gender demographics. Nine of the states have Republican governors and 11 have Democratic governors. Additionally, and in order to divide the states by partisan distinction, I also take the ideology score for state elected officials by Berry et al. This score is based on the partisan configuration of state government and interest group ratings of the state congressional delegation (Berry et al. 1998). Figure 3.2.1 reports those results. Women made up 31 percent of the lawyers in Republican states, and 37.4 percent of the Democratic states. Though subtle, there is a noticeable and statistically significant 6.4 percentage point decrease in the number of female lawyers in Republican-led states versus Democratic-led states. This gender gap has the potential to then influence directly the gender composition of state benches.

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Additionally, the U.S. census collects data on all those in a legal profession by state. This data includes not just lawyers, but also legal assistants, paralegals, and magistrates. Figure 3.2.2 presents these findings. Overall, women make up 51.6 percent of the legal profession in those same Republican states and 53.1 percent of the legal profession in the Democratic states. This finding suggests that women pursue legal careers, and are slightly more likely to do so than men, but are choosing to do in a career other than as a lawyer. I also break the percentages of women present on state judiciaries into selection methods. I find the highest percentage of women on Republican state judiciaries with a merit selection system. Conversely, I find the highest percentage of women on Democratic state judiciaries with appointment selection systems (either legislatively or gubernatorially).

Additionally, though the number of women lawyers has subtly increased in the last decade, these slight increases are not similarly reflected on state judiciaries. For example, according to both the ABA and The Gavel Gap, in 2005, women made up 28.2 percent of state courts of last resort. In 2019, women made up only about 30 percent of the same courts. I take data from those 27 states discussed above to further explore the effect of state party control on difference between state courts. As shown in Figure 3.2.3, women comprise only 22.7 percent of state courts in Republican states compared to 33.1 percent of state courts in Democratic states. There is a 10-percentage point and statistically significant difference between the types of states.

Taken together, the results presented above suggest that women are pursuing legal careers, but there is a precipitous drop-off from the number of women in law school to the number of practicing female lawyers to the number of female state judges. In other words, the pipeline for women to the judiciary begins strong, but the cadre of women attending law school is not in turn reflected on state judiciaries. These gender differentials are then heightened even
more when we begin to explore the gender makeup of state judiciaries in concert with the ideological leanings of the individual states. In Republican states, women are much less likely to be lawyers and to sit on the state bench, as compared to their Democratic counterparts.

Additionally, scholars have found differences to exist among states based off the selection method of the state (Alozie 1996; Bratton and Spill 2002; Hurwitz and Lanier 2003). Similar to the existing research, I find differences between states based off selection methods. Interestingly, more women are found on state judiciaries in Republican states with merit systems. When looking at Democratic states, a higher percentage of women is present on state judiciaries in states that appoint (either legislatively or gubernatorially). Overall, these findings suggest that there are other barriers to the judiciary for women, and particularly Republican women, than simply whether they choose to attend law school. I thus turn now to the other supply side component of my argument: ambition levels.

*Figure 3.1 Distribution of Lawyers Per State by Gender and Partisan Affiliation*
Figure 3.2 Distribution of Individuals in the Legal Profession Per State by Gender and Partisan Affiliation

Figure 3.3 Distribution of State Judiciaries by Gender and Partisan Affiliation
Figure 3.4 Number of Women on State Judiciaries by Selection Method: Republican States

Figure 3.5 Number of Women on State Judiciaries by Selection Method: Democratic States
3.3 Ambition and the Supply Theory: Measuring Ambition of Women Lawyers

Scholars such as Fox and Lawless (2005), emphasize the importance of looking at the stage prior to entering politics and ascertaining the level of “ambition” potential candidates hold to try and ascend to political offices. These scholars argue that the question of ambition is particularly salient with respect to explaining the amount (or lack thereof) of women in elected office. By only studying the women that currently are officeholders, we cannot truly explain why those women decided to run for office, while others did not, nor identify what may block or inhibit women from running for office in the first place.

Scholars examine ambition levels through surveys of “potential” candidates. Using the Citizen Political Ambition Panel Study, Fox and Lawless (2004) find that women of comparable background and credentials are much less likely than their male counterparts to assess themselves as qualified for political office. As Schank and Wallace (2019) contend from their all too familiar story of women’s ambition levels waning, women also tend to be more risk-averse than men and tend to weigh things like family responsibilities higher than men. Other studies find that women with children in the home were significantly less likely to express progressive ambition, as opposed to their male counterparts (Fulton et al. 2006). Overall, marriage, children, and family life remain a larger hurdle for women compared to men. Further, because the Republican Party is increasingly the party of men and is more conservative and patriarchal, the hurdle created by family and children may be even bigger for women seeking office within the Republican Party (Thomsen 2015). Republican women are more than twice as likely to evaluate themselves as “not at all qualified” as compared to Republican men (Fox and Lawless 2011).

Grace Gedye (2020) tries to answer the question of why elected Republican women are so few in number. Even in 1992, the so-called “Year of the Woman,” Democratic women were
the majority of women elected to Congress. Since 1992, the percentage of female elected officials in each party has diverged even further. While political action committees like EMILY’S List have furthered the interest of Democratic women in their quest for political office, the same cannot be said for Republican women. Republican women have received little support from either large PACs or from the (mostly male) party establishment. Malliga Och and Shauna Shames (2019), writing for the Chicago Tribune, describe a situation within the Republican Party in which Republican women face hurdles that Democratic women do not, especially since the Republican Party disfavors the idea of “identity politics.” Wineinger (2017) argues the GOP has historically dismissed and continues to dismiss representational claims about identity or diversity. The need for women’s representation is not necessarily recognized as a problem that needs to be addressed. As such, it is harder to put in place organizations like EMILY’S List that could help increase Republican women’s political numbers. One consequence is that only 13 Republican women serve in the United States House of Representatives as of 2020 and 9 Republican women in the Senate.

Donald Trump’s election to the Presidency in 2016 resulted in an even further shift of women away from party politics in any capacity. Gedye (2020) cites a survey by the Public Religion Research Institute in 2016 that shows that only forty percent of Republicans believed that the country would be better off with more women in public office. This means that sixty percent, or a majority of Republicans, either do not see the lack of women in the public sphere as a problem, or they simply do not want to see women in the public sphere. According to Laurel Elder (2018), the Republican Party increasingly relies on a very conservative base, focused primarily in the Southern United States and is dependent on votes from white Evangelicals. The Evangelical Christian organizational structure is a patriarchal model that places women at odds
with non-traditional gender roles (Bishop 2019). This increasingly less supportive voting base and party establishment makes it a more hostile environment for women to break into. According to an article in the New York Times by Nancy Cohen in 2019, the 2010s and especially post-2016, has put Republican women with political ambition in a precarious position: Republican women’s ambition is waning and this group is becoming more and more reluctant to step up as political candidates. “In the past 10 years, they have become an endangered species on the political stage.”

The issues leading to a dearth of Republican women in Congress extends to other political positions lower down the pipeline. There are less Republican women in state legislatures, gubernatorial positions, and state judgeships. Women make up only a small percentage of political and judicial positions in most states with a conservative ideological composition. For example, as of 2020, Georgia only has 3 women on their State Supreme Court and 5 women on their state intermediate appellate courts. However, other studies suggest judicial ambition calculations may differ from those made by candidates for the legislative branch. Williams (2008) and Jensen and Martinek (2008) show that women can be just as ambitious or more ambitious than men when seeking a higher bench, in part because potential female candidates see more chances for advancement within the judiciary than in the legislative branch. Scholars find that higher ambition for the judiciary may also be related to working hours, pay, and stability associated with the bench versus private practice or corporate law (Williams 2008). These studies, however, do not discern how party affiliation may play a role in the decision to run.

While Williams (2008) and Jensen and Martinek (2008) suggest that the forces that forestall women from expressing ambition for political office may be lessened or even missing
when examining the question of ambition for judicial office, I posit that this is true only for Democratic women. Previous studies report that Republican women, in particular, express low levels of ambition to run for office, due in part due to the increasingly conservative views of the Republican Party (Thomsen 2015). There is a partisan distinction between the views of women’s role in society and woman’s ability to work outside the home, with the Republican Party encouraging less women than the Democratic Party. Even the growing prevalence of the Christian Right tends to hinder women’s ambition and recruitment. A disconnect is present within the Christian Evangelical Republican base and beliefs on things like a woman’s role. The Evangelical Republican base that now dominates the Republican Party often holds certain beliefs about women’s roles and men’s roles, with women’s roles centered in the private sphere (Bishop 2019). These forces combine to make the political environment, even for judicial positions, less hospitable for Republican women.

H2: Women will express lower ambition levels for the judiciary compared to men.

H3: Republican women will express lower ambition levels for the judiciary compared to Democratic women, Republican men, and Democratic Men.

H4: Similar to Democratic women, Republican women will express lower ambition levels to run for political office compared to their male counterparts.
Data and Methods

To test the different factors that could influence ambition levels among Republican women as compared to other potential judicial candidates, I use data from a survey collected by Garth, Nelson, Dinovitzer, Plickert, and Sterling (2013) for the American Bar Association. This “After the JD” survey was a concept first thought of by the National Association of Law Placement over 40 years ago and with the financial help of the Soros Foundation, the American Bar Foundation, the Law School Admission Council, Access Group, and the National Science Foundation, the study was able to become a reality. The goal was to create a study that would follow lawyers over a long period of time to provide a nationally representative picture of lawyer’s career trajectories.

This longitudinal survey provides data on a national cross-section sample of lawyers from the time they passed the bar, to their career choices through 2012. It has three separate waves of data. This particular analysis looks at the third wave of their study, a decade plus after passing the bar (Garth et al. 2013). I use the third wave because it has data on ambition levels for the judiciary, something the other waves of the study are lacking. Additionally, this study allows me to understand ambition levels of Republican women many years after law school. It gives 12 years of professional and personal pathways of respondents. I test for both their judicial ambition levels and their general political ambition levels (for other offices other than the judiciary) using this data set. Though this data is from 2013, it provides a comprehensive study of a national sample of female lawyers. Due to the constraints of this dissertation, future research would look at an updated national sample and could compare those longitudinally.

The two dependent variables for the analysis reported below reflect the two ambition questions asked of each of the survey respondents. The first question asked, “How important are
each of the following long-term goals to you: become a judge?” The second asked, “How important are each of the following long-term goals to you: become a politician?” In both cases, respondents answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1, not important at all, to 5, very important.\(^2\) Since both of these dependent variables are ordinal, I estimate the models using ordered logit.

The main independent variables of interest are party and gender. The variable reflecting self-identified party affiliation, Republican, is coded 1 for Republicans, and 0 for Democrats. Though this dissertation is testing the dearth of Republican women, unfortunately, the ABA data is skewed significantly to the Democratic side. Of the 2,933 lawyers surveyed, only 625, or 21 percent, identified as Republican, and only about 257 (41 percent) of those 625 respondents are women. Overall, only 9 percent of the sample identified as Republican women. Female is coded as 1 for women and 0 for men. As discussed in Chapter Two, scholars find that women, regardless of party, express lower ambition levels than their male counterparts. I expect to find that both Democratic and Republican women lawyers will hold lower ambition levels for either a judgeship or political office than their male counterparts.

I also include dummy variables for race, marriage, children, age, and ranking. The coefficient for race is labeled as Minority with whites coded as 0, and all non-white respondents coded as 1. Marriage is coded as 0 if the respondent is not married, and 1 if they are married. Children is coded as 0 if the respondent does not have children, and 1 if they do have children. Based on past literature, I expect those that are married or that have children to have lower

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\(^2\) The After the JD Third Wave Study gave respondents a scale from not at all important to extremely important when answering the questions of “How important are each of the following long-term goals to you: become a judge?” and “How important are each of the following long-term goals to you: become a politician?” This was a five-point scale, but only provided “not at all important” and “extremely important” as the word choices with assumptions of a scale between the two end points (sans word description). This is depicted in all the figures from this study.
ambition levels than those that are single and/or childless. I also include a dummy variable for age. *Over 40* is coded as 0 for lawyers under 40 and 1 for lawyers over the age of 40. I expect older women to have higher ambition levels for both being a judge and running for political office than younger women. Lastly, a variable is included that reflects each respondent’s law school ranking and was coded from 0-4. Respondents were coded 4 if they graduated from a top ten ranked law school. Respondents who graduated from a law school ranked between 11-20 were coded as 3 and 21-30 coded as 2. Those that graduated from a tier 3 school were coded as 1 and those that graduated from a tier 4 were coded as 0. I expect that those that went to top ranked law schools to express more ambition than those respondents that attended lower ranked law schools.4

**Results**

Figures 3.6-3.9 report the descriptive results of judicial ambition by party and gender. A look at the descriptive statistics shows that 146 of the 254 Republican women or 57 percent surveyed about judicial ambition answered that becoming a judge was “not at all important.” Conversely, 204 of the 400 Republican men or 51 percent who were surveyed about judicial ambition, answered that becoming a judge was “not at all important” to them. This actually indicates that a higher percentage of Republican women have the lowest reported levels of judicial ambition compared to Republican men. I also find a low percentage of both Republican

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3 Law school rankings provided by US News and World Reports.
4 Because the After the JD Third, Second, or First Waves did not provide demographic questions regarding states of the respondents, this analysis does not control for the selection system or state of respondents. The author does recognize the need for the inclusion of both of these control variables, as past literature has found the importance of the method of selection on gender diversity of state courts (Brace, Langer and Hall 2000, Ditslear & Frederick and Streb 2008). Future research would need to include these controls in the models to fully assess how all the factors taken together show a more accurate picture of the gender gap of the Republican Party on state judiciaries. The models are, however, clustered on participant ID instead of state variation.
men and Republican women when answering “extremely important.” Turning to the Democratic Party, Figures 3.8 and 3.9 give these findings. About 63 percent of the Democratic women surveyed answered “not at all important” when asked about ambition to become a judge. When asked the same question, about 55 percent of Democratic men answered that becoming a judge was “not at all important.” Significant to this study, this indicates that larger percentages of women answered “not at all important” when asked about their ambition to become a judge. Contrary to what was hypothesized, however, Democratic women seem to answer “not at all” to the importance of becoming a judge more often than Republican women. Specifically, 6 percent more Democratic women answered “not all important” to the question of becoming a judge. The proceeding models test this relationship further.

_Figure 3.6 Raw Percent: Republican Women and Judicial Ambition_
Figure 3.7 Raw Percent: Republican Men and Judicial Ambition

Figure 3.8 Raw Percent: Democratic Women and Judicial Ambition
Table 3.4 reports the results for the factors that influence a lawyer’s ambition to attain a judgeship at some point in their career. This model is included as a baseline model with which to compare Republican women and what make them different. Overall, the model performs quite well and confirms previous studies on females and judicial ambition. Four of the seven independent variables are significant at conventional levels (p<0.05) while one is significant at (p<0.10). Female is negative and significant, indicating that women are less likely to display progressive ambition for a position as a judge compared to men. Holding all else constant, women are 7% more likely than men to report that becoming a judge is “not at all important.” All other responses from “not important” to “extremely important” differ only slightly. For example, men are 1.3% more likely to report ambition for the judiciary to be “extremely important.” My other primary variable of interest, Republican, is also negative and significant at
the (p<0.10) level of significance. Holding all else constant, Democrats are actually 4% more likely than Republicans to report a complete lack of judicial ambition, opposite what I hypothesized. Just like the variable for women, responses by party only differ slightly. Republicans, for example, are predicted to be about 1% more likely than Democrats to report ambition for the judiciary to be “extremely important.” Minority is positive and significant at p<0.05. Again, contrary to expectations, this finding indicates that non-whites express higher ambition levels for the judiciary than white respondents. The result for Ranking reveals that, as expected, lawyers graduating from top ranking law schools report higher ambition levels for the judiciary than those from lower ranked law schools. Conversely, Age is negative and significant meaning that older lawyers have less ambition for a judgeship. Lastly, the variables for Children and Marriage fail to reach statistical significance. These results are important to provide a baseline to compare to when subset by gender and party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Errors)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.266 (0.092)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.171 (0.100)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>0.342 (0.164)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>-0.200 (0.129)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.107 (0.109)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranking</td>
<td>0.233 (0.042)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.239 (0.095)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 1,921

*The model displays ordered logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.
Do we find the same results if we examine the intersection of gender and party on political ambition? Figures 3.10-3.13 report raw percentages of responses to the political ambition question, broken down by party and gender. Similar to judicial ambition, when examining the summary statistics by gender, higher percentages of Republican women are reporting that becoming a politician is “not at all important” compared to the other possible answers. 195 of the 254 or 77 percent of the Republican women surveyed answered that becoming a politician is “not at all important.” Of the 403 Republican men surveyed, 232 or 58 percent report that becoming a politician is “not at all important.” However, 171 Republican men answered differently on the scale of importance. On the opposite end of the scale, about 5 percent of Republican men report that political ambition is “extremely important,” compared to about 2 percent of Republican women reporting that political ambition is “extremely important.”

The most interesting finding, however, is the stark difference between Democratic men and Democratic women. As shown in Figures 3.12 and 3.13, a smaller percentage of Democratic men than Democratic women report that becoming a politician is “not at all important.” When looking at Democratic women, 82% answered that becoming a politician was “not at all important,” compared to 70 percent of Democratic men’s answer to the same question. When comparing the two parties, 5 percent more Democratic women answered “not at all important” than their Republican women counterparts. Once again, the descriptive statistics suggest that overall gender party differences are more heavily concentrated in the Democratic, versus the Republican Party. Similar to judicial ambition, the proceeding models test these findings further.
Figure 3.10 Raw Percent: Republican Women and Political Ambition

Figure 3.11 Raw Percent: Republican Men and Political Ambition
Figure 3.12 Raw Percent: Democratic Women and Political Ambition

Figure 3.13 Raw Percent: Democratic Men and Political Ambition
Table 3.5 reports the results for the various factors that influence a lawyer’s desire to become a politician. Mirroring previous studies, women display lower ambition levels to run for political office. The full model shows that the coefficient for *Female* is negative and significant, confirming $H_4$. Holding all else constant, the model predicts that women are 15% more likely than men to report having never had political ambition. Additionally, the coefficient for *Republican* is positive, but barely misses the threshold of being significant at the 0.05 level of statistical significance. Holding all else constant, Democrats are 4.8% more likely than Republicans to report having never had political ambition. Similarly, *Minority* is positive but just shy of the threshold of the 0.05 level as well. *Ranking* is positive and significant. Those that attended top ranked law schools thus not only exhibit higher levels of ambition for judicial seats but also for elected political office in general. Finally, *Age* is again negative and significant at $p=0.08$, suggesting older lawyers express less ambition to run for elected office than younger lawyers.

These initial results suggest that, on the whole, women are less likely to express high levels of ambition than men, while Republicans are more likely to express political ambition. Attending a top ranked law school corresponds to higher levels of ambition as well. And, notably, non-white lawyers express more ambition than white lawyers. Age also matters: all else being equal, younger lawyers express more ambition to both political and judicial offices than older lawyers. Alternatively, marriage and children do not appear to have an aggregate effect on ambition levels. But, what happens as we begin to further explore how gender and party identification may interact?
Table 3.5 Predictors for Ambition to Become a Politician: Full Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Errors)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.874 (0.105)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.103 (0.055)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>0.326 (0.177)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>-0.133 (0.147)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.091 (0.126)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranking</td>
<td>0.224 (0.047)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.185 (0.106)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 1,955

*The model displays ordered logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.

To further test for the influence of gender differences within the two parties on judicial ambition, I re-estimated the original model reported in Table 3.4, but first on the subsample of Republican lawyers and second on the subsample of Democratic lawyers. Table 3.6 reports these results, revealing some important intra-party differences. The coefficient for Female is negative for both Republicans and Democrats, but only statistically significant for Democratic women. This finding means that, contrary to expectations, while Democratic women lawyers do express significantly lower levels of ambition than their male counterparts, Republican women lawyers do not. Turning to the control variables, only Ranking and Age are significant for Republican lawyers. Mirroring the previous results, those Republicans that attended top ranked law schools display higher ambition, while older Republicans express lower ambition. In contrast, three of
the control variables are significant in the Democratic model. For Democratic lawyers, the coefficients for Minority and Ranking are positive and statistically significant, indicating that Democrats that identify as a minority exhibit higher ambition levels for a judgeship than whites. Additionally, those that attended top ranked law schools display higher ambition for pursuing a seat on the bench than those respondents from lower ranked law schools. Lastly, the coefficient for Marriage is negative and statistically significant in the Democratic model. This means that Democratic lawyers that are married exhibit lower ambition levels than lawyers that are not married. These results thus suggest that, while the coefficient is negative for Republican females, it fails to reach statistical significance. The negative significant finding for Female from the aggregate results appear to be concentrated more among Democratic women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Republican Lawyers</th>
<th>Democratic Lawyers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Standard Errors)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.181 (0.165)</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>0.507 (0.775)</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>0.192 (0.254)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.084 (0.209)</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranking</td>
<td>0.232 (0.075)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.350 (0.162)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 616

Table 3.6 Predictors of Ambition to Become a Judge, By Party

*The model displays ordered logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.
To systematically assess this question, I again re-estimated the model initially presented in Table 3.5, but first on the Republican lawyer subsample and then on the Democratic lawyer subsample. Table 3.7 reports that the coefficient for Female is negative and significant in both the Republican and Democratic lawyer’s models, confirming H4. Corroborating previous literature, I find that female lawyers, regardless of party, exhibit lower ambition levels to run for elected office than their male lawyer counterparts. Holding all else constant, Republican women are 19% more likely than Republican men to report that becoming a politician is “not at all important” to them. Similarly, Democratic women are 14% more likely than Democratic men to report that becoming a politician is “not at all important” to them. Marriage is also a significant indicator of political ambition. Both coefficients for ranking are positive and significant. Lastly, age is negative and significant at the (p<0.05) level for Republicans, indicating that older Republicans express lower ambition levels to run for political office than younger Republicans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Republican Lawyers</th>
<th>Democratic Lawyers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (p-value)</td>
<td>Coefficient (p-value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.904 (0.188) 0.00</td>
<td>-0.812 (0.133) 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>0.630 (0.648) 0.33</td>
<td>0.334 (0.190) 0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>0.179 (0.275) 0.51</td>
<td>-0.296 (0.177) 0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.125 (0.223) 0.57</td>
<td>0.063 (0.157) 0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranking</td>
<td>0.216 (0.085) 0.01</td>
<td>0.208 (0.059) 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.394 (0.181) 0.03</td>
<td>-0.055 (0.136) 0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=619</td>
<td>N=1,304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The model displays ordered logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.*
Figure 3.14 Margins: Republicans and Political Ambition (by Gender)

Figure 3.15 Margins: Democrats and Political Ambition
Overall, the party-separate results suggest that the role of gender differs across the two parties, and across the two types of ambition. Confirming earlier work, women in both parties express lower ambition for political offices than men. Important differences emerge, however, when we examine the question of judicial ambition: here, and somewhat surprisingly, while the aggregate results suggest gender differences, the party models reveal that these differences are concentrated in the Democratic Party. Democratic women are significantly less likely than their male counterparts to express ambition for judicial office. Conversely, while Republican women report lower ambition levels than their Republican men counterparts, this finding fails to reach statistical significance. These findings suggest it may not be that Republican women lawyers do not want to join the state bench at much lower levels than their male counterparts. Additionally, the findings discussed earlier do reveal that many Republican-led states simply have fewer Republican female lawyers than Democratic-led states, thus somewhat helping to explain interstate gender disparity levels. But, most important, Republican women themselves express interest, at levels on par with Republican men, to join the state judiciary. Therefore, once again we must ask, how might we explain the dearth of Republican women on the state benches from the supply-side vantage point? In the final section of this chapter, I explore the role of socialization on ambition levels.

3.4 Socialization and Ambition

Though socialization can occur throughout someone’s life, childhood is particularly moldable. It is the time in life when social skills, personality traits, and values are cemented into place (Maccoby 1992; 1994). According to Bugental and Grusec (2007), socialization includes biological and social-cultural mechanisms that serve to shape outcomes in one’s environment. Socialization is an umbrella of both learned and acquired competencies (Bugental and Grusec
Simply put, socialization affects how we view the world around us, including how we view politics. Socialization can also affect a person’s ambition levels. Gender role ideals formed through socialization still continue to perpetuate women’s low self-assessment of their political skills, as the process of socialization still tends to favor women playing roles outside the public sphere (Fox and Lawless 2011).

Scholars find that the socialization of Republicans is quite different than that of Democrats, and particularly with respect to gender roles. The Republican Party as a whole has even become more traditional in recent years with strong beliefs in ideals like orthodox religious practices and commitment (Layman and Green 2006). Red state voters report very strong religious ties that help drive their opinions (Moore 2005; Abramowitz 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2006; 2015). They tend to be Protestant, born-again Christians, and attend religious services at least once a week.

The strong linkage between religious affiliation and beliefs and partisanship has important consequences for the socialization process of women growing up in Republican households. Peek et al. (1991) conclude this gendered opposition is associated with women’s conservative beliefs as measured by views of the Bible. In turn, these traditional views tend to leave women more apprehensive of entering a public sphere dominated by men, inadvertently lowering political ambition. Conservative Christianity discourages women from public roles that take them away from children and family (Moore 2005). According to Elder (2018), the Republican Party increasingly relies on a very conservative base, focused primarily in the Southern United States and dependent on votes from white Evangelicals. The Evangelical Christian organizational structure is a patriarchal model that places women at odds with non-traditional gender roles (Bishop 2019). I therefore hypothesize that Republican women who
report high levels of religiosity will be less likely to express high levels of ambition due to this disconnect between Conservatives in the Republican Party and women’s roles.

Political socialization in politically minded households, however, could be a mediating influence on the very conservative and anti-woman rhetoric seen in the Republican Party. Political socialization begins in childhood, with one of the primary agents of socialization being a child’s parents or guardians; partisanship itself is “inherited” from one’s parents (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). According to Fox and Lawless (2003), however, women experience less of a politically-oriented upbringing than men. Their survey of lawyers, business leaders, educators, and political activists found that women were 20 percent less likely than men to have spoken about politics with their parents. Women were also 15 percent less likely than men to have been encouraged to run for political office by their parents (Fox and Lawless 2003). I thus expect that women will be less likely to report having experienced political socialization as children. I do, however, also hypothesize that Republican women (because of the possible Conservative and often Christian/patriarchal structure of their upbringing), will be less likely to report discussing politics with their parents while growing up than their Democratic and Republican men counterparts. However, those respondents who did experience political socialization as children will be more likely to express higher judicial ambition levels as adults than those who did not, regardless of party.

H5: Regular Church attendance will have a negative effect on ambition levels for Republican women.

H6: Women will be less likely to report discussing politics with their parents while growing up than their men counterparts, regardless of party.
H7: Republican women will be less likely to report discussing politics with their parents while growing up than their Democratic and Republican men counterparts.

H8: Parents discussing politics growing up increases ambition levels of adults, regardless of party.

Data and Methods

In order to test my socialization hypotheses, I use data collected by Yoshana Jones Hill of Georgia State University’s Political Science Department. She conducted a survey of 762 Georgia lawyers between 2019-2020 using Qualtrics. Jones Hill asked different demographic, political, and ambition questions. Table 3.8 reports the breakdown of survey respondents by both gender and party. Of the 762 lawyers surveyed, 385 identified as male, 317 identified as female, and 57 chose to not give a gender. One hundred and sixty-three men identified as Republican and only 70 women identified as Republican.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This survey asked multiple questions pertaining to political ambition. The main question of interest, and the one I will use as my dependent variable, simply asks, “Do you have ambition to run for political office – yes or no?” It is coded as 0 for no, and 1 for yes. Descriptive statistics show that 568 individuals chose to answer this question. Of those 568, 250 (44%) answered that they did not have political ambition, while 318 (56%) answered that they did have political ambition. Other questions of interest include demographic questions asking about party identification, gender, and age. For party, the responses could be either Republican, Democrat, or
Independent. For purposes of testing just Republicans and Democrats, I dropped Independents from the models. I coded Republicans as 1 and Democrats as 0. Female is coded as 0 for men and 1 for women. Additionally, age is coded from 0-5, with 0 being the oldest individuals (i.e., born before 1950) and the 5 being the youngest, or those born after 1990.

Socialization questions were asked such as “Do you attend church?” and “Did your parents discuss federal politics growing up?” Church Attendance was coded on a 4-point scale from 0, “never” to 4, “weekly.” Politics Discussion was coded from 0-5, from 0, “never” to 5, “Yes, very frequently.”

**Results**

I begin by exploring the relationship between these socialization factors, gender and partisanship. Each bar graph below shows a raw percentage of the answers to the socialization questions subset by gender and party. Figures 3.16-3.19 report on church attendance. When looking at church attendance of Republicans, I find that Republican women report attending church “at least monthly” at a greater frequency than their Republican male counterparts. Alternatively, only about 35 percent of Republican women report weekly church attendance, compared to Republican men’s 40 percent. Democratic men and women report very similar percentages of church attendance, especially when looking at those that report “never” attending church and those that attend church weekly. When comparing them to their Republican counterparts, Republican men still retain the top stop for those that attend church weekly.

Figures 3.20—3.23 report responses to the question about political socialization. Overall, Democratic women and men report discussing politics growing up more frequently than their
Republican counterparts. Democratic men reported the highest frequency of parents occasionally discussing politics when they were growing up, with the majority of every sample reporting at least occasionally to very frequently. Additionally, and interestingly, Democratic women report the highest percentage of parents frequently discussing politics when growing up. Republican men reported the lowest frequency of parents discussing politics while growing up, while Republican women were the most likely to report their parents “never” discussing politics, confirming H7.

*Figure 3.16 Raw Percent: Republican Women and Church Attendance*
Figure 3.17 Raw Percent: Republican Men and Church Attendance

Figure 3.18 Raw Percent: Democratic Women and Church Attendance
Figure 3.19 Raw Percent: Democratic Men and Church Attendance

Figure 3.20 Raw Percent: Republican Women and Discussion of Politics by Parents
Figure 3.21 Raw Percent: Republican Men and Discussion of Politics by Parents

Figure 3.22 Raw Percent: Democratic Women and Discussion of Politics by Parents
To assess any further potential party differences, I run and provide another series of descriptive statistics via Figures 3.24-3.31. Due to the small number of Republicans, and more specifically Republican women in this sample, this particular section is still exploratory. In future research, I would like to build on this study and have a larger sample with which to test any differences socialization has on judicial ambition levels. Figures 3.24, 3.25, 3.26, and 3.27 all provide judicial ambition levels based off respondent’s answers to their level of church attendance. I find frequent or more regular church attendance increases their ambition levels. This finding would be contrary and opposite to what I hypothesized for Republican women, and something I would want to explore more in detail once I had a larger sample to test from. I find very little differences between Democratic men and women, their church attendance or how that church attendance affects their levels of judicial ambition. The other component of the socialization hypotheses tested looked at how judicial ambition levels were affected by
respondent’s parents discussing politics while growing up and this is displayed in Figures 3.28-3.31. Interestingly, I found that Republican women were one of the only categories studied that had the highest ambition levels when they reported that their parents “very frequently” discussed politics while they were growing up. The difference is statistically significant at the \( p<0.1 \). Democratic men were the other subset but, it was much smaller in number when compared to their Republican women counterparts. This would suggest a possible significant relationship present for Republican women’s judicial ambition levels and socialization factors like the “discussion of politics” when growing up.

*Figure 3.24 Church Attendance: Republican Women and Level of Judicial Ambition*
Figure 3.25 Church Attendance: Republican Men and Level of Judicial Ambition

Socialization: Church Attendance

Level of Judicial Ambition

Never | Seldom | Monthly | Weekly

Figure 3.26 Church Attendance: Democratic Women and Level of Judicial Ambition

Socialization: Church Attendance

Level of Judicial Ambition

Never | Seldom | Monthly | Weekly
**Figure 3.27** Church Attendance: Democratic Men and Level of Judicial Ambition

Socialization: Church Attendance

**Figure 3.28** Discussion of Politics: Republican Women and Level of Judicial Ambition

Socialization: Discussion of Politics
Figure 3.29 Discussion of Politics: Republican Men and Level of Judicial Ambition

Figure 3.30 Discussion of Politics: Democratic Women and Level of Judicial Ambition
To test for whether a significant relationship exists between socialization forces and judicial ambition, I estimated a logit model using the above-described variables. Table 3.9 reports the results of the model estimated on the full sample of Georgia lawyers surveyed. The coefficient for Female is negative, suggesting that women have lower judicial ambition. The coefficient, however, fails to reach statistical significance. Notably, parents discussing Politics is positive and statistically significant at (p<0.1). To get a better understanding of the substantive effect of the significant variables, I use simulations to calculate the predicted probabilities.

Holding all else constant, lawyers whose parents discussed politics growing up in some capacity, even when answering from rarely to very frequently, are 16.3 percent more likely to express higher levels of judicial ambition than those who did not to report such political socialization (see Figure 3.24). No other variables reach statistical significance.
I also estimated a separate model for men and women in order to ascertain if any of the expected effects were present when broken down by gender. Table 3.10 reports those findings. The coefficient for party under model 1 is positive and significant. After running the margins, I find that Republican women were 15 percent more likely to express higher judicial ambition than their Democratic women counterparts (Figure 3.33). This is particularly interesting because in the full model, the coefficient is negative, but when breaking it down by gender, we find that the coefficient for party is positive. This indicates that the results from the main model appear to be driven primarily by Democratic women and that the Republican women surveyed actually had higher levels of judicial ambition. Lastly, the coefficient for church attendance is also positive and significant in model 1. Holding all else constant, those that report weekly church attendance are 16 percent more likely to express higher ambition levels compared to those that report never attending church. This is also opposite of what I originally hypothesized.

Table 3.9 Socialization and Ambition: Full Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Errors)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.213 (0.199)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.264 (0.275)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
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<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.143 (0.249)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>0.135 (0.073)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>0.101 (0.091)</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
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</table>

N= 432

*The model displays logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.
Table 3.10 Socialization and Judicial Ambition by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Female Lawyers</th>
<th>Male Lawyers</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Male Lawyers</th>
<th>p-value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Errors)</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Errors)</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.236 (0.439)</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.078 (0.127)</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.138 (0.117)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
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<td>-0.488 (0.418)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Children</td>
<td>0.194 (0.342)</td>
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<td>Politics</td>
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<td>0.043 (0.104)</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>0.216 (0.137)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.043 (0.126)</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The model displays logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.*
Figure 3.33 Margins: Gender, Party, and Judicial Ambition

Figure 3.34 Margins: Females, Church Attendance, and Judicial Ambition
3.5 Conclusion

The results of this chapter reveal a mixed bag in terms of supply-side arguments for why we continue to see a dearth of Republican women on state judiciaries. Historically and even today, lower numbers of women hold seats on state judiciaries. In particular, states that identify as historically Republican have lower numbers of women on state judiciaries than states with Democratic leadership or more liberal ideologies. One potential explanation is that the pipeline of potential women lawyers is less in more conservative, or Republican-led, states. I find some evidence to support this claim: while the overall number of women in law schools is on parity with that of men, the bottom 5 states for female enrollment in law schools were all red or conservative states. I also find that women make up 33.1 percent of the lawyers in Republican-led states, as compared to 38.1 percent of lawyers in Democratic-led states. Though subtle, there is a noticeable 5 percentage point difference in the number of female lawyers in Republican states and Democratic states. Lastly, according to both the ABA and The Gavel Gap, in 2005, women made up 28.2 percent of state courts of last resort, and in 2019, this number rose to only about 30 percent of the same courts. Once again, we also find significant variation across states based on ideological leanings: When breaking it down by party and state, women currently make up only 23.4 percent of all state courts in Republican states. Women make up about 32.1 percent of all state courts in Democratic states. That is almost a 9 percent difference between the two parties, suggesting something more than a mere pipeline problem in terms of who is eligible for ascension to the state bench.

Another potential supply-side explanation is that the increasingly large gender gap on state courts between red and blue states reflects Republican women simply not wanting to ascend to the bench. Numerous previous studies suggest that, particularly in the legislative context,
women are less likely to express ambition to run for office, and Republican women display lower levels of ambition than Democratic women. Do we find the same in the judicial context? Taken together, the results above do not confirm that Republican women lawyers possess overall lower judicial ambitions than their Democratic female counterparts. While the models examining the full survey samples reveal that women are less likely to report high ambition than men, those results include both Republican and Democratic women. When looking specifically at women, the results from the main model appear to be driven primarily by Democratic women. Democratic women are significantly less likely than Democratic men to express ambition for the judiciary. When testing Republican women, however, were found to be no more or less likely to express ambition than their Republican male counterparts at a significant level. It should be noted however, that both Democratic and Republican women expressed significantly lower levels of political ambition (i.e., ambition for non-judicial elected offices) than men.

Finally, though it was suggested that factors like religion and a stronger Christian Evangelical base would have a negative impact on women that identified as Republican, I also did not find this to be the case. In fact, I found the opposite to be true. Women that attended Church regularly had increased judicial ambition. Additionally, Republican women actually had much higher ambition levels than their Democratic women counterparts. Lastly, Republicans (both men and women) whose parents discussed politics when growing up had higher ambition levels. This would suggest that socialization of children by parents or guardians when growing up does in fact affect judicial ambition levels of adult lawyers.

Thus, the chapter taken overall, I find a disconnect both between the number of women working as lawyers and sitting on state benches in Republican-led states, and between the stated level of interest in ascending to the state bench expressed by Republican women lawyers and
then their likelihood of actually sitting on state benches. Republican women in the ABA’s survey, as well as the smaller sample surveyed by Jones Hill, do not have lower ambition levels at significant levels of interest. But, they are not currently represented on the state benches. Because of the mixed findings in regard to Republican women, I look toward my demand side argument to fully understand the gender gap as the story of this dearth may lie with Republican voters or Republican party elites. In my next chapter, I explore whether the gender gap stems from a lack of demand. Though a substantial percentage of Republican women express ambition for the judiciary, perhaps the demand is not there for them to hold these positions. As previous literature has found, voters can have biases against women candidates. In states where women are elected to state judiciaries, this could help explain lower numbers of women, and particularly Republican women. Similarly, in states where women are appointed, if they are not being recruited and selected by state elites, then one would also expect to find lower numbers of women. Chapter 4 explores these demand forces by looking at both voters and elites.
4 THE DEMAND SIDE: VOTER BIASES AND ELITE RECRUITMENT

Pew Research examined American’s views of women’s progress 100 years after the ratification of the 19th Amendment. One stark finding from this research is the differences that emerge among the parties. Fifty-nine percent of those surveyed believe the Democratic Party has done a fair amount to advance women’s rights, while only thirty-nine percent said the same thing of the Republican Party. Twenty-nine percent of those surveyed believe that President Trump had done a fair amount to advance women’s rights. Conversely, sixty-nine percent believe that he did very little, if any, to help in the advancement of women’s rights. Pew also found that forty-eight percent of Republicans believed that the country had done enough in the quest for women’s rights, and seventeen percent believed that too much had been given in the way of women’s rights. Perhaps most telling, when broken down by gender, only twenty-eight percent of Republican men felt that the country had not done enough to advance women’s rights, with 4 in 10 Republican men answering that women’s gains have come at the expense of men. In contrast, seventy percent of their Democratic male counterparts believe the country has not done enough to advance women’s rights. These stark party differences about the advancement of women in society may also reveal important differences in how voters and party elites of each party view the current gender gap in elected officials, as well as the potential candidacies of women for public office.

The question begs to be asked: Are women running for office discriminated against by voters and party elites simply because they are women? And, is such potential discrimination equally felt by potential female candidates from both parties? I, myself, have attempted this difficult feat within the Republican Party. This past year, I decided to qualify and run for the office of Chief Magistrate Judge in my hometown. Unlike the Georgia Superior Courts and
appellate courts, the Magistrate and Probate Court judges in Georgia are often selected through partisan elections. Additionally, unlike the other courts in the Georgia legal system, these are citizen-judge positions that do not require a law degree or other type of legal training.

I, in addition to being a PhD candidate in Political Science/Public Law, have a Master of Arts and Bachelor of Science in Political Science. I have taught American Government at a R1 University for several years. I have even worked for the Georgia General Assembly. I am from the small town where I qualified, and my family name is fairly well known. Politics is actually in our blood and in the name, as my husband is currently a City Council member and my father-in-law serves on the Board of Education.

Four men and I qualified to run for the Magistrate position, all from the same political party. That meant that the winner of the primary election would run unopposed in the general election and thus be the winner of the November 2020 election. After the primary election was moved to June 2020 from May due to Covid-19, I qualified for a runoff election as no one received above 50% of the vote. Out of almost 7,000 votes cast, only 53 votes separated myself and my male runoff opponent.

During the runoff campaign, a surprising number of voters expressed clear concerns about my candidacy due to my gender: I had voters email my campaign saying that I was a “headstrong woman not of their generation.” I was criticized for keeping my maiden name in my full legal name. I had opponents make public comments pertaining to my ability to run with “two last names.” I was frequently called “a little girl with a Ph.D. who did not have real world experience.” Lastly, social media posts by those in the county suggested because I was a young female, I was not capable of dealing with criminals through the position of Magistrate Judge. My opponent spent his entire campaign comparing and contrasting himself to me, and even made
very harsh posts against me on platforms like Facebook without consequence. These personal posts would include comments about my age, inexperience, and my inability to deal with dangerous criminals. These posts would lead to comments that used very gendered rhetoric.

When I decided to push back, I was unfavorably looked down upon and called out by voters. Even people that did not know me but supported me would point out the “double standards I was experiencing as a female.” At one community event, I was sitting eating lunch when an older gentlemen approached my table and asked, “is this where the beauty queens are sitting?” This was a question I felt sure he did not ask my male opponent.

When it was all said and done, out of almost 5,000 votes cast, I lost by 246 votes. After, I had people tell me that “they and their family were shocked that a young female made it as far as I did in such a conservative Republican county.” While not true of every Republican voter, my experience suggests voter biases still exist and are present within an ever-increasingly conservative Republican Party. My election mirrored what we see happening across the country with Republican women. Studies continually find that Republican women face a harder road to elected office than Democratic women (Dolan 2014; Thomsen 2019). There are, especially compared to their Democratic counterparts, very few Republican women in Congress, and very small percentages of women on state judiciaries in Republican-held states. Are voter biases driving this dearth of elected Republican women office holders?

Women remain underrepresented compared to men, but there is not usually a clear black and white answer as to why. It often comes down to questions surrounding ownership of issues, gender stereotyping, and gender role expectations. Some argue that women’s gender stereotypes are incompatible with campaigning and certain political offices. Hillary Clinton is quoted as telling 60 Minutes, “there was a Hillary standard and then there was a standard for everyone
else.” US diplomat Madeleine May Kunin wrote an op-ed for the *Boston Globe* during the 2016 election arguing that if a woman is running for president, she better be perfect due to the double standards surrounding being a woman. Quoted from the same Boston Globe piece, Kim Churches, CEO of the American Association of University Women says that "Women just have to work doubly as hard as the male candidates to attract and retain voters." Previous studies have found that women are evaluated differently when looking at traits, behavior, and their beliefs and actions when running. Candidate sex can even have an effect on evaluation of candidate competency by certain voters (King and Matland 2003; Dolan 2014).

Specifically, when looking at the Republican Party, party support is also lacking for women. Women on the right complain that they receive very little support when considering or attempting to run for political office. An article by Maggie Astor with the *New York Times* explains how Republican women just do not receive the same levels of support for office as Democratic women. The article describes Republican women as being afraid to emphasize gender as an asset within the Republican Party, something Democratic women can do. A very important component of running for office is monetary support and Republican women tend to have very different experiences than their Democratic female counterparts when looking at party support and monetary support. When Republican Ruth Papazian of New York was running against Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, she details a race where funding differences were very apparent. While groups on the right similar to Emily’s List on the left have emerged such as Maggie’s List and Republican Women for Progress, there are many less available to women in the Republican Party and they often provide far less money. Astor explains that Republican women are choosing to mobilize themselves because they feel the party is just not going to do it.
Each of the issues discussed above – voter biases, the reluctance of party elites to recruit and support female candidates– offers a window into the potential demand-side barriers to Republican women gaining elected office. Through this chapter, I focus on these two different components of my demand side theory. First, I examine the influence of potential Republican voters’ biases on support for female judicial candidates utilizing an original survey experiment. Second, I investigate, using survey data, whether we find party differences in the degree to which women are recruited to run for state judiciaries or other political offices.

4.1 Voter Biases and Women in Politics

Since the 1950s, voter biases against women have been detected in public opinion surveys. Sapiro (1980) uses experimental studies to test voter perceptions about candidate sex. Sapiro finds that voters often use stereotype on character and policy issues when deciding how to vote. Leeper (1991) similarly finds that voters infer politically about female candidates based on female stereotypical traits. Voter biases has been found to have drastically fallen in the last 30 years, however. In 1993, for example, only 9 percent of those surveyed by the National Election Studies (NES) responded that they did not feel “a woman was qualified to be president” (Fox & Smith 1998). Despite these findings even as far back as the 1990s, however, women are still dramatically underrepresented in public office. Dolan (2009) contends that despite the findings of a number of scholars that contend that women are not suffering on election day due to their sex, we must not assume that gender is irrelevant to politics or the ability of a woman to be elected to public office.

In lieu of perfect information, voters use cues or heuristics in order to make political decisions. These heuristics, or shortcuts, can be based off of factors such as party, incumbency, gender, traits, and issue ownership (Popkin 1991; Lupia 1994). Partisanship is the strongest
heuristic voters use when making political decisions (Popkin 1991). More relevant to this study is that voters use gender as a heuristic as well. Unfortunately for Republican women, gender biases and partisanship may clash for Republican voters. Previous studies find that female candidate’s traits are often evaluated differently than those of their male counterparts (Cook and Wilcox 1995; McDermott 1997). Several experiments reveal that candidate sex has an effect on voter evaluations of candidate competency, personal traits, and beliefs (King and Matland 2003). For example, gender schema theory finds that traits like empathy and caring are believed to be female traits, whereas leadership and decisiveness are seen as male traits (Sanbonmatsu 2002; King and Matland 2003). And, linking candidate sex to certain traits and beliefs has important implications for how voters view candidates: Because female candidates are seen as being more liberal, more progressive, kinder, and softer on things like crime and defense, their candidacies face more pushback from Republican Party voters (Dolan 2014). Lawless (2004) finds that post 9/11, evaluation of women candidates was at a decade’s low. She contended that perhaps voter biases against women are connected to the political climate. When issues that are dominated by male stereotypical traits (like defense and war) are present, women do not fare as well. Conversely, when these are not present in the political environment, women tend to do better in elections (Lawless 2004).

Previous experiments find that in lieu of other relevant information, individuals will use their gender schemata when evaluating candidates (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Banducci et al. 2002). They will also use party schemata to make decisions about candidates. Lastly, individuals will use nonpolitical information like trait evaluations when making political estimations. After providing participants with traits, gender, and partisanship in their experiment, King and Matland (2003) find that Republican women did better than Republican men among Democrats and
Independents. Republican women, however, were at a particular disadvantage among Republican voters. They find that gender schemata had an effect on voter evaluations, even more so than the party heuristic provided.

These previous studies all suggest that the dearth of Republican women in elected office may be a function of implicit gender biases (because of held beliefs about traits and issue ownership) held by Republican voters. Chapter 3’s findings imply that Republican women are ready and willing to run for office, but they can only successfully gain office if voters select them. If Republican voters fear female candidates are too liberal, or not sufficiently strong on “law and order,” then they may be unwilling to vote for them even if they have “Republican” next to their name. I therefore hypothesize that Republican voters will evaluate female judicial candidates more negatively than male candidates through both a feeling thermometer and by answering a suitability to politics question, and that Republican voters’ evaluations of female judicial candidates will be more negative than the evaluations of Democratic voters. I further posit that Republican voters will be less likely to vote for female judicial candidates than Democratic voters.

H9: Given the differing policy, issue stands, and endorsements, Republican voters will rank women lower on the 100-point feeling thermometer than Democratic voters.

H10: Given the differing policy, issue stands, and endorsements, Republican voters will be less willing to vote for the female candidates than Democratic voters.

H11: Republican voters are more likely to answer that they “disagree” when given the statement “women are suited for politics,” than Democratic voters.
Data and Methods

Understanding the dearth of female Republican state judges also requires understanding how voters in states with judicial elections evaluate female candidates. By testing candidate evaluations and vote choice, I will be able to discern whether voters evaluate women more negatively than men as potential candidates (King and Matland 2003; Dolan 2015), as well as whether potential biases against female candidates are stronger among Republican, as opposed to Democratic, voters.

In order to test for potential voter biases, I conducted a survey experiment testing candidate evaluations and vote choice. I conducted this survey using Amazon’s Mturk, with a total of 380 respondents that identified as either a member of the Republican or Democratic parties. Specifically, 156 respondents identified as Republican. Researchers argue that Amazon Mturk samples tend to be younger, less diverse, less religious, and more liberal (Berinsky et al. 2012; Huff and Tingley 2015; Clifford et al. 2015). Though other studies provide evidence of the validity of samples drawn from Mturk, thus proving that it is a valid tool for social science researchers (Paolacci et al. 2010; Clifford et al. 2015). A pretest asked respondents demographic questions and questions about their political attitudes. Two questions asked respondents their level of agreement with the statement that “females or males were better suited for politics.” The survey instrument then presented respondents with three different hypothetical races for a state Supreme Court. Each candidate was listed by name along with their stances on policy issues, their stances on the role of the judiciary, and their differing endorsements. I used issues based on data collected from 2016 state judicial elections. I looked at four different candidate’s campaign websites or campaign Facebook pages from three states. I used their stated policy positions and beliefs on the roles of the judiciary to create the hypothetical candidate statements provided in
the survey. The policy issues discussed were abortion, gay marriage, separation of Church and State, the 2nd Amendment, and the 4th Amendment. Similar to Fox and Smith, I created three versions of the survey, varying the gender of the candidates in each race. Survey respondents were then assigned to read one of the three forms at random, and reflect on each of three elections presented in each form. An overview of the election pairings is presented below in Figure 4.1.

**Figure 4.1 Hypothetical Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election 1</th>
<th>Form 1</th>
<th>Form 2</th>
<th>Form 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election 1</td>
<td>John Parker (Liberal)</td>
<td>John Parker (Liberal)</td>
<td>Jan Parker (Liberal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vs. Andrew Thomas (Conservative)</td>
<td>vs. Andrew Thomas (Conservative)</td>
<td>vs. Andrew Thomas (Conservative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 2</td>
<td>Jacob Walker (Moderate)</td>
<td>Jacob Walker (Moderate)</td>
<td>Jennifer Walker (Moderate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vs. Carly Smith (Moderate)</td>
<td>vs. Caleb Smith (Moderate)</td>
<td>vs. Carly Smith (Moderate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 3</td>
<td>Stacey Johnson (Liberal)</td>
<td>William Johnson (Liberal)</td>
<td>Stacey Johnson (Liberal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vs. Kevin Anderson (Conservative)</td>
<td>vs. Kevin Anderson (Conservative)</td>
<td>vs. Karen Johnson (Conservative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elections 1 and 3 are designed to tap into respondent ideology. Election 2, however, contains two “moderate” candidates. The description given to respondents about the moderate election in both forms also solely includes issues specific to the judiciary and endorsements, and does not include the policy positions listed for candidates in Elections 1 and 3. This helps to test for a clear gender bias when respondents were only given gender (the race between a moderate man and a moderate woman) and not any type of ideological cues. Lastly, Election 3 provides a more ambiguous name for the liberal candidate, in order to test the differences between a clear male and female race and a non-clear male and female race. The Appendix provides the full survey instrument. Survey respondents were then asked to rate the candidates from the three elections on a 10-point feeling thermometer. The respondents were also asked which candidate they would most likely vote for in each race.
**Results**

Table 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 all report the percentage of vote choice for each candidate in each election by party of respondent. In Table 4.1, 39 percent of Republicans with Form 1 answered they would vote for John Parker (a liberal candidate) over Andrew Thomas (a conservative candidate). Comparatively, only 28.1 percent of those that identified as Republicans would vote for Jan Parker on Form 3. As a reminder, the candidate’s names were the only component of the election that changed from the different forms. Holding all else constant, John Parker received almost 10 percent more of the vote by Republicans than Jan Parker did. This difference is also significant at the 0.05 level of significance. Thus, when the candidate is identified as being “liberal,” Republican voters are significantly more likely to choose the male version than the female version.

Election 2 reflected a moderate versus a moderate candidate and took away any potential ideological/partisan heuristics. Interestingly, there was no statistically significant difference for Republican respondents between the forms identifying the candidate as either male or female. In fact, when the candidate was presented as Carly Smith, rather than Caleb Smith, she only received 0.7 percent less vote choice among Republican voters. Alternatively, as theorized, when analyzing Democratic voters, Carly Smith received 67.2 percent of the vote choice, to Caleb Smith’s 58.6 percent, a statistically significant difference. Lastly, when looking at Election 3, when the forms switch from conservative Kevin Anderson to conservative Karen Anderson, Karen received more of the vote choice than Kevin Anderson by both Republicans and Democrats. Most notably, Karen Anderson received almost 14 percent more of the vote choice from Republican respondents than Kevin, also a statistically significant difference.
These results present some mixed findings. On one hand, I find very little evidence of bias from Republican respondents for conservative or moderate female candidates. In election 2, when given the choice between a moderate male candidate or moderate female, the woman only received 0.7 less percent of the vote from Republicans, a statistically insignificant difference. Election 3 revealed that, opposite my predictions, Republican voters were more likely to support the female conservative candidate than the male conservative candidate. One potential question for future research is whether some of the effect found for Election 3 stems from the use of a gender-neutral name that was then interpreted differently based on its mate: did respondents reading Form 1 assume “Stacey” was a man when paired with “Kevin” while those reading Form 3 assumed “Stace” was a woman when paired with “Karen”? Regardless of such an effect, these results suggest Republicans are not necessarily predisposed to reject female Republican candidates. On the other hand, perhaps the most interesting finding is that Republican voters disliked more intensely the liberal female candidate than the liberal male. Taken together, these results suggest that Republican voters are not inclined to reject female candidates due simply to their gender. Rather, Republican voters’ responses are a function of both gender and ideology, with Republican voters less inclined to support liberal women – who studies suggest are more liberal than their male colleagues (see Table 4.1) – compared to liberal men, but supportive of conservative women.
### Table 4.1 Percentage of Vote Choice for Hypothetical Judicial Election 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Percentage of Vote Choice</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Percentage of Vote Choice</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Liberal vs Conservative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Candidate:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Parker (Form 1)</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Parker (Form 3)</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Candidate:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Thomas (Form 1)</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Thomas (Form 3)</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.2 Percentage of Vote Choice for Hypothetical Judicial Election 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Percentage of Vote Choice</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Percentage of Vote Choice</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderate vs Moderate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Walker (Form 1)</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Walker (Form 2)</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carly Smith (Form 1)</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caleb Smith (Form 2)</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.3 Percentage of Vote Choice for Hypothetical Judicial Election 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Percentage of Vote Choice</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Percentage of Vote Choice</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal vs Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Candidate:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stacey Johnson (Form 1)</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stacey Johnson (Form 3)</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Candidate:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Anderson (Form 1)</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen Anderson (Form 3)</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 provide the thermometer results for the hypothetical judicial candidates. These are the average mean thermometer ratings for each candidate in each election. As is the case with the voting selection data, I find very little evidence of Republican voter bias against female candidates via thermometer ratings of potential candidates. Though there was a 10-percentage point difference in vote choice between John and Jan Parker, Republicans gave Jan Parker an average thermometer rating that was only 0.4 point different than that of John Parker. In Election 2, Carly Smith had a higher thermometer rating than when respondents were provided with the male candidate Caleb Smith by 0.3 points. Interestingly, though Karen Anderson had almost a 14 percent advantage in vote choice, respondents given Form 1 gave Kevin Anderson a thermometer rating 0.2 points higher than when provided with the female candidate Karen Anderson in Form 3. After running the two-tailed t test to determine the difference in means between the male and female candidates, they all failed to reach statistical significance. Lastly, and similar to what I theorized, Democrats consistently gave female candidates higher thermometer ratings than when they were provided with the male candidates in each election. Though, these findings too, failed to reach statistical significance.

Table 4.4 Thermometer Ratings for Hypothetical Judicial Election 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Liberal vs Conservative)</td>
<td>Average Therm Rating</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Candidate:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Parker (Form 1)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Parker (Form 3)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Candidate:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Thomas (Form 1)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Thomas (Form 3)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4.5 Thermometer Ratings for Hypothetical Judicial Election 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderate vs Moderate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Walker (Form 1)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Walker (Form 2)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carly Smith (Form 1)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caleb Smith (Form 2)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.6 Thermometer Ratings for Hypothetical Judicial Election 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal vs Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Candidate:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stacey Johnson (Form 1)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stacey Johnson (Form 3)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Candidate:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Anderson (Form 1)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen Anderson (Form 3)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.7 Two-tailed t-test of Thermometer Ratings for Hypothetical Judicial Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Parker</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Parker</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carly Smith</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caleb Smith</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Anderson</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen Anderson</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, in order to capture whether any overt bias could be picked up through the survey, I also included a question asking respondents how much they agreed with the statements, “Most women are suited for politics,” and “Most men are suited for politics.” Tables 4.8 and 4.2.9 provide the raw data output of that answer broken down by party. Though smaller percentages answered that they “strongly disagreed” or “somewhat disagreed” that women were suited for politics, it is worth mentioning that the sum of those totals for each male and female question was quite different. Twenty-six Republicans, or 19 percent of those Republicans surveyed, answered that they did not feel women were suited for politics, while only thirteen, or 9 percent, answered that they did not feel men were suited for politics, a statistically significant difference. Thirty-five Democrats, or about 7 percent of the Democrats surveyed, also expressed disagreement with the statement that women were suited for politics. An approximately equal number of Democratic respondents (36 Democratic respondents 7%) answered that men were not suited for politics. Ultimately, the descriptive results reveal that almost 1/5 of the total Republican respondents admitted that they did not believe in women’s ability to be in any type of political office.

I estimated a logit model to further test for any party effects on respondents’ answers to the female political statement. This statement was made into a dichotomous variable, with those answering “disagree” or “somewhat disagree” being coded as 1, and , those who answered “somewhat agree” or “agree” are coded 0. Party is coded as 1 for Republicans, and 0 for Democrats. Gender is coded as 1 for women and 0 for men (Female). Age is coded from 0-5, with the youngest (under 20) being coded as 0.5. Lastly, I provide a variable for education.

5 Age is coded as: If a person was under 20 years of age, they were coded as 0. Twenty to 30 years of age was coded as 1. Thirty-one to 41 years of age was coded as 2. Those respondents ages 41-50 were coded as 3. Following the same pattern, those from 51-60 were coded as 4 and everyone over 60 was coded as 5.
Education is coded as 0-3, with those only having some high school education coded as 0, and those with post-graduate degrees being coded as 3.

The results of this model are presented in Table 4.2.10. The coefficient for Republicans is positive as theorized, but it is not statistically significant. Education is negative and significant (p<0.1), indicating that as a respondent’s education level rises, so does the likelihood that they agree with the statement that women are suited for politics. Thus, while these results suggest that party does not help to explain who was less likely to view women as unsuited for politics, the comparison discussed above between the answers to the male and female-framed questions suggests Republicans are somewhat more likely to be suspicious of women in politics overall than their Democratic counterparts. Taken together, the results of this survey experiment give mixed results that beg further testing. Perhaps, ideology/party of the candidate themselves in relation to the voter are connected to a Republican’s willingness to vote for women rather than an overt bias for women candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=475</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Education was coded from 0-3. If a respondent had some high school education they were coded as 0. If a respondent had graduated from high school, they were coded as 1. Bachelor’s degrees were coded as 2 and lastly, post-graduate degrees were coded as 3.
Table 4.9 Response to Question: "Men are Suited for Politics"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=475</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.10 Females Suited Logit Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Errors)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.314 (0.293)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.215 (0.301)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.226 (0.173)</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.312 (0.186)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N= 362</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The model displays ordered logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.

4.2 Recruitment and Women in Politics

The above results suggest Republican voters are not necessarily predisposed against female candidates for judicial office. The only finding that would somewhat suggest so occurred when Republican voters were asked about “females being suited for politics.” Even so, this was a small segment of the overall sample and would require further research. The previous chapter similarly showed that Republican women are ready and willing to be seated on state court benches. Then why do we continue to see a dearth of Republican women on state courts? One final possibility is that Republican Party elites fail to recruit potential female candidates for judicial seats. Previous studies suggest elites are less likely to recruit and support female candidates as compared to male
candidates (Fulton et al. 2006). According to Fox and Lawless (2005), recruitment is a vital ingredient in closing the gender gap. If women are not encouraged to seek office, they are less likely to consider it and less likely to perceive themselves as being able to be successful in a campaign for elected office. Using the Citizen Political Ambition Panel Study, Fox and Lawless conclude that similarly situated and highly qualified women from both parties are less likely to be recruited to run for political office than their male counterparts. Other research suggests that party leaders, organizations, and elected officials serve as gatekeepers to political office, and are many times negative gatekeepers for women as they are not as likely to recruit women or support their candidacies (Carroll 1994; Niven 1998; Sanbonmatsu 2002).

According to an article by Maggie Astor in the New York Times, Republican women find very little party support when attempting to run for office. Republican women also tend to report that party leaders just do not value them. Republican women do not enjoy the same elite recruitment or financial assistance from the Party like Democratic women do, and this tends to have a trickle-down effect (Astor 2019). Additionally, according to the Equal Justice Initiative, women running for state judiciaries similarly see very little elite, party, or monetary support, especially in Republican-held states. Overall, this point is what this dissertation chapter seeks to explore. While many studies test the lack of recruitment by party elites in the political setting, little research investigates if gatekeepers to state judiciaries are more likely to recruit men or women. Further, do we observe differences in gender-based recruitment efforts across parties? I theorize that Republican women will be recruited less for the state judiciary than Republican men and Democratic women.

H1: Women, regardless of party, will be recruited less than their men counterparts by party officials, elected officials, and judges for the judiciary.
H$_{13}$: Republican women will be recruited less than Democratic women by party officials, elected officials, and judges for the judiciary.

**Data and Methods**

In order to test the recruitment of Republican women lawyers, I am once again using data collected by Yoshana Jones Hill of Georgia State University’s Political Science Department. She surveyed 762 Georgia lawyers between 2019-2020 using Qualtrics. Additional information and demographic breakdowns from this survey are reported in Chapter 3. The study asked each respondent about whether, and how many times, they had been recruited to run for judicial office by either a party official, elected politician, and/or judge. (See Appendix for the full wording of these recruitment questions). Three separate ordinal variables were created, and these serve as my three dependent variables for the below analysis. These recruitment variables are coded from 0-3, with 0 being a party official/elected politician/judge had “never” suggested they run for judicial office, 1 reflecting “once or twice,” 2 reflecting “3-5 times,” and 3 being “more than 5 times.” My primary independent variable is Female, coded 0 for men and 1 for women. Age is dummy variable coded from 0-5, with 0 being the oldest individuals (i.e., born before 1950) and the 5 being the youngest, or those born after 1990. I did not include age as a dummy variable when I subset the models for the Republican Party. Lastly, I include dichotomous dummy variables for whether each respondent is currently married or has children. For the following

---

7 Age is coded as 0-5. 0 being the oldest respondents or born before 1950. 1 being coded as from 1950-1960. 2 being coded as 1960-1970. 3 being coded as 1970-1980. Being born between 1980-1990 was coded as 4. Lastly, anybody born after 1990 was coded as 5.

8 Due to the exploratory nature of this small dataset, I chose to drop age from the model for Republicans in order to have more confidence in what is being tested. A large percentage of Republicans were being dropped from the model when age was included (from 104 to 86), significantly affecting the number of observations while dropping them below 100. After examining the data, I find that a larger percentage of Republicans, when compared to Democrats in the sample, either chose not to answer the age question or incorrectly completed the answer.
analysis, I estimate 9 different ordinal logit models all using each of the three dependent variables discussed above. Three of the models are full models using all of the respondents and testing each different recruitment question. The other 6 models are subset for party and testing each different recruitment question. I also include bar graphs for the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables when broken down by party and gender.

**Results**

To explore the potential interaction of party and gender, Figures 4.2-4.5 report the descriptive statistics for the breakdown of party official recruitment by party and gender. I find the largest percentages of those respondents answering “never” to the question of party official recruitment is concentrated among Republican women, and especially Democratic women. Seventy-eight percent of Republican women answered “never,” compared to only 63 percent of Republican men. Similarly, 83 percent of Democratic women answered “never,” compared to 75 percent of Democratic men. When looking at the “more than 5 times” answer to level of recruitment, I find that only 3 percent of Republican women answered that they had been asked/suggested to run for the judiciary by party officials more than 5 times, compared to 14 percent of Republican men. These small numbers are matched on the Democratic side, with 3 percent of Democratic women and 4 percent of Democratic men reporting being recruited “more than 5 times.” All other answers in between these two opposite ends of the spectrum seem to fluctuate only slightly between party and gender. The proceeding models test these findings further.
Figure 4.2 Raw Percent: Republican Women and Recruitment by Party Officials

Figure 4.3 Raw Percent: Republican Men and Recruitment by Party Officials
Figure 4.4 Raw Percent: Democratic Women and Recruitment by Party Officials

Figure 4.5 Raw Percent: Democratic Men and Recruitment by Party Officials
Table 4.11 reports the results for the first ordered logit model examining recruitment by party officials. Just as in Chapter 3, I provide baseline models in order to compare what makes Republican women different than Democratic women, Republican men, and Democratic men in later models. The baseline models show a comparison to what has been found in past research, and how Republican women differ from the models where all are pooled together. The coefficient for Female is negative and significant (p<0.05). This finding indicates that, holding all else constant, women are less likely to be recruited to run for judicial office by a party official than men. After running the margins for Female (See Figure 4.6), I find that there is an 8 percent increase in the probability that women have “never” been recruited by party officials compared to men. Additionally, I find a 2-percentage point increase for men when looking at the answer of being recruited “more than 5 times.” The coefficient for Party is positive and also significant (p<0.05). This would indicate that Republicans report higher levels of recruitment than their Democrat counterparts. The probability that Democrats have “never” been recruited by a party official is 79 percent, compared to Republicans at 66 percent. Lastly, the coefficient for Children is positive and significant, indicating that lawyers with children have been recruited more than those without children.
**Table 4.11 Recruitment by Party Official, Full Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Errors)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.509 (0.222)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.663 (0.272)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.066 (0.089)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>-0.027 (0.269)</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.494 (0.283)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 517

*The model displays logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.

**Figure 4.6 Margins: Gender and Recruitment by Party Officials**

![Figure 4.6](image-url)
Table 4.12 reports the results for the ordered logit models examining recruitment by party officials and subset by party. I estimated the same model twice, once on the subset of respondents who self-identified as Republican (Model 1), and then again on the subset of respondents who self-identified as Democrats (Model 2). The coefficient for *Female* is negative and significant (p<0.05) in Model 1. This finding indicates that, holding all else constant, Republican women are less likely to be recruited to run for judicial office by a party official than Republican men. After running the margins for (Republican)*Gender*, the probability that Republican women have “never” been recruited by a party official is 80 percent, compared to Republican men at 59 percent (See Figure 4.8). The coefficient for *marriage* is negative and significant (p<0.1), indicating that those Republicans that are married actually report lower levels of recruitment for the judiciary than those that are not married.
Turning to Model 2, Democratic women were similarly less likely to be recruited by party officials than Democratic men; this coefficient is significant (p<0.1). After running the margins, I find a 6-percentage point increase for Democratic women when looking at the answer “never,” when compared to Democratic men (See Figure 4.9). No other variable in the model for Democrats has a significant effect on recruitment trends. Thus, taken together, these two models suggest that, holding all else equal, officials of both parties are consistently less likely to recruit women as opposed to men to state judgeships.

Table 4.12 Recruitment by Party Officials, by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Republican Lawyers</th>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic Lawyers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Standard Errors)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Standard Errors)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-1.090</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.439</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.493)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>-0.874</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.513)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.335)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.525)</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>(0.324)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N= 102</td>
<td></td>
<td>N=468</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The model displays ordered logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.
Figure 4.8 Margins: Republicans and Recruitment by Party Officials

Figure 4.9 Margins: Democrats and Recruitment by Party Officials
Figures 4.10-4.13 report the descriptive statistics for the breakdown of elected official recruitment by party and gender. Sixty-two percent of Republican women report having “never” been recruited by elected officials, compared to only 50 percent of Republican men. Similarly, 65 percent of Democratic women report having “never” been recruited by elected officials, in contrast to 55 percent of Democratic men. In this case, the largest percentage of those not being recruited by elected officials is Democratic women. Perhaps most interesting, however, is the stark difference between Republican women and men when being asked about a recruitment level of “more than 5 times.” Only 6 percent of Republican women answered that they had been recruited by an elected official more than 5 times, versus an astounding 24 percent of Republican men surveyed. This is an 18-percentage point difference or put another way, only ¼ of Republican women were recruited at the same high level as their Republican male counterparts. Following the same pattern, 11.3 percent of Democratic men answered “more than 5 times” when asked about recruitment by elected officials, compared to only 6 percent of Democratic women. Overall, according to the descriptive statistics, women in both parties are recruited less than men, with Democratic women reporting the least amount of recruitment by elected officials. I now include a series of models further testing these findings.
Figure 4.10 Raw Percent: Republican Women and Recruitment by Elected Officials

Figure 4.11 Raw Percent: Republican Men and Recruitment by Elected Officials
Figure 4.12 Raw Percent: Democratic Women and Recruitment by Elected Officials

Figure 4.13 Raw Percent: Democratic Men and Recruitment by Elected Officials
Table 4.13 reports the results for the ordered logit model examining recruitment by elected officials on the full sample. The coefficient for Female is again negative and significant (p<0.1). This finding indicates that, holding all else constant, women are less likely to be recruited to run for judicial office by a party official than men. After running the margins for Gender (See Figure 4.14), I find that there is a 7 percent increase in the probability that women have “never” been recruited by party officials compared to men. Additionally, I find a 2-percentage point increase for men when looking at the answer “more than 5 times.” Two control variables are also significant: Age and Children. The coefficient for Age is positive, indicating that younger individuals are recruited more by elected officials for judicial office. Lastly, and just as in the full model for party official recruitment, the coefficient for Children is positive. This finding means that lawyers with children are more likely to be recruited for judicial office by elected officials as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Errors)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.334 (0.182)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.362 (0.247)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.214 (0.073)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>0.224 (0.227)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.425 (0.226)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 520

*The model displays logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.
Table 4.3.4 reports the results for the ordered logit testing elected official recruitment, subset by party. Once again, I estimated the same model twice, once on the subset of respondents who self-identified as Republican (Model 1), and then again on the subset of respondents who self-identified as Democrats (Model 2). Though I find the coefficient for Female to be negative in Model 1, it fails to reach statistical significance; no other variable in the model significantly predicts recruitment of potential Republican candidates by elected officials. Turning to Model 2, (Democratic)Female is negative and significant (p<0.1). After running the margins for Gender (See Figure 4.15), similar to the findings in the descriptive statistics, I find that there is a 7 percent increase in the probability that Democratic women have “never” been recruited by elected officials compared to men. Additionally, Age is positive and significant (p<0.05), suggesting that younger (Democratic) lawyers are recruited more often than their older (Democratic) colleagues.

Figure 4.14 Margins: Gender and Recruitment by Elected Officials
Table 4.14 Recruitment by Elected Officials, by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Republican Lawyers</th>
<th>Democratic Lawyers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Errors)</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.668 (0.438)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>- (---)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>-0.163 (0.442)</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.644 (0.433)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The model displays ordered logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.

Figure 4.15 Margins: Democrats and Recruitment by Elected Officials

The last dependent variable studied is the recruitment of potential candidates by judges.

Figures 4.16-4.19 give descriptive statistics for recruitment by judges tested by party and gender.

Once again, I find the pattern present in the previous analyses: women report consistently lower
levels of recruitment. Roughly 57 percent of Republican women report having “never” been recruited by judges, compared to just 44 percent of Republican men. The biggest percentage of all categories studied once again, however, is Democratic women: about 65 percent of Democratic women report having “never” been recruited by judges for judicial office. However, Democratic men in this case were not far behind Democratic women in answering “never” to the same question at 59 percent. Alternatively, only 4 percent of Republican women, compared to 19 percent of Republican men, answered that they had been recruited by a judge “more than 5 times.”

Figure 4.16 Raw Percent: Republican Women and Recruitment by Judges
Figure 4.17 Raw Percent: Republican Men and Recruitment by Judges

Figure 4.18 Raw Percent: Democratic Women and Recruitment by Judges
Table 4.15 reports the full sample and baseline model findings. The coefficient for Female is negative, but fails to reach statistical significance. The coefficient for Republican is positive and significant (p<.05). This finding indicates that, holding all else constant, Republicans are more likely to be recruited to run for judicial office by a judge than Democrats. In fact, there is a 16 percent decrease in the probability of Republicans answering “never” to being recruited by a judge compared to Democrats. The probability that Democrats have “never” been recruited by a party official is 62 percent, compared to Republicans at 46.3 percent (See Figure 4.20). In each possible answer (other than never), Republicans report a higher frequency of recruitment. Additionally, on the opposite end of the spectrum, Republicans also have almost a 6-percentage point increase in the probability of answering “more than 5 times.” This model also finds that younger potential candidates, and those with children, are more likely than other candidates to be recruited by judges.
Table 4.15 Recruitment by Judges, Full Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Errors)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.164 (0.184)</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.633 (0.237)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.286 (0.074)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>0.086 (0.227)</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.375 (0.283)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 521

*The model displays logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.

Figure 4.20 Margins: Republicans and Recruitment by Judges

To further explore the differences between party, gender, and recruitment of judges, I once again estimate two ordinal regression models subset by party. In Model 1 (Republicans), the coefficient for Female is negative and significant (p<0.05). After running the margins for Gender
(See Figure 4.21), I find that there is an 22 percent increase in the probability that Republican women have “never” been recruited by a judge compared to Republican men. The probability that Republican women have “never” been recruited by a judge is roughly 60 percent, compared to Republican men at 38 percent. All other answers, including 1-2 times and 3-5 times, is also higher for Republican men versus Republican women. When evaluating the probability of “more than 5 times,” there was a 8 percentage decrease in the probability from Republican men to Republican women. Turning to Model 2, the only coefficient that was statistically significant (p<0.00) is Age. Holding all else constant, younger Democratic lawyers are recruited at higher levels for judicial office by judges than their older colleagues.

Overall, across the six tables and 20 figures, a pattern emerges. Holding other factors constant, women of both parties are less likely to be recruited for office by party elites than men, though where these gender differences emerge varies by party. Republican women are less likely to be recruited than Republican men by both party officials and current judges, while Democratic women are less likely to be recruited than Democratic men by party officials and current elected politicians. The implication of these findings is that women are simply not being recruited at the same levels as their male counterparts, a key component of the decision for many to run for office. And, with respect to judicial seats, the lack of recruitment of Republican women by current judges may be of particular importance to understanding why we find a dearth of Republican women on the state bench.

Another important take away is the magnitude of the gender differences we find within parties. While both Democratic and Republican women are recruited less by party officials than their male counterparts, the substantive magnitude of this difference is almost triple for Republican women: Republican women are 21 percentage points more likely to report “never”
being recruited by party officials than Republican men, as compared to a difference of 7 percentage points for Democratic women versus Democratic men. Recruitment efforts by elites in both parties suggest signs of bias against women, but also reveal that the Republican Party must make much greater efforts to approach gender parity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Republican Lawyers</th>
<th>Democratic Lawyers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Coefficient</strong></td>
<td><strong>p-value</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Standard Errors)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.917</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.419)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>-0.545</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.425)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
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<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.407)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=103</td>
<td>N=471</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The model displays ordered logit coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05.
4.3 Conclusion

Chapter 3 revealed that Republican women did not necessarily lack judicial ambition. Instead, Republican women were, at times, more likely than their Democratic counterparts to express a desire to run for judicial office. This finding led me to question whether the lack of female Republican state judges was not necessarily a problem with the supply of Republican women, but rather the demand for them. In this chapter, I examined potential demand forces and specifically explored whether Republican voters and Republican party elites are biased against women running for the judiciary.

With respect to potential voter biases, the results are mixed. My original survey experiment investigated how voters responded to potential judicial candidates when the gender of the
candidate varied. While explicit bias was not found through the moderate election results of a man versus a woman, interesting findings emerged elsewhere: When the gender of the “liberal” candidate was manipulated, Republican voters chose the liberal man almost 11 percent more often than the liberal woman. An interesting finding also presented itself when respondents were asked whether members of each gender were suited for politics. Twenty-six percent of Republicans answered that they agreed when presented with the statement, “women are not suited for politics.” In comparison, only 13 percent of Republicans answered they agreed when presented with the statement, “men are not suited for politics.” Further, Democratic respondents were no more or less likely to see men or women as unsuited for political office, nor to vary significantly in their support of candidates when the gender was changed. Thus, while not in all cases, we do find more suspicion on the part of Republican voters to supporting female candidates, and a definite bias against liberal women.

My analysis of elite recruitment efforts suggests a more straightforward story: Based on a survey of over 700 lawyers from across the state of Georgia, Republican women are less likely to be recruited than Republican men by Republican Party elites and judges. Though, this survey also reveals that such elite gender bias may not be a one-party phenomenon. I also find that Democratic women are similarly less likely to be encouraged to run than Democratic men by party officials and current elected officials. These results suggest there could be problem with the recruitment of women in both the Republican and Democratic Parties. As Fox and Lawless (2005) contend, recruitment is particularly important for ensuring that women run for office. Recruitment sends important and necessary signals about whether one is qualified to run for a particular office. Similarly, being recruited also usually comes with important messages about support and resources a potential candidate can rely on if she does decide to run. Without such
signals and statements of support, many will opt out from entering the political fray. My results thus suggest that one of the necessary preconditions to seeing more Republican women ascend to state benches is sorely lacking. According to these findings, elite recruitment could be adding to the gender gap. This chapter adds to the study of the gender gap of the Republican Party on state judiciaries by showing that demand forces aid in the continuance of a gap. The findings of the chapter, taken together, help contribute to the overall study of a lack of women on state judiciaries.
5 CONCLUSION

The overarching objective of this research has sought to determine the forces driving the gender gap of the Republican Party on state judiciaries. The gender gap has been studied among political scientists when referring to all types of offices from Congress to governors. Additionally, that gap has been studied among judiciaries as well. The gender gap of Republican women, in particular, however, has yet to be studied or understood. There is also much disagreement among scholars as to what actually drives the gender gaps that persist. Certain scholars blame factors like a lack of ambition among women to run for office (Fox and Lawless 2004). Other scholars find that women do not lack ambition, but rather biased forces like voters and elites are driving the gender gap (Sanbonmatsu 2006; Fox and Lawless 2010; Thomsen 2015). While some scholars argue that voter biases do not exist all together (Fox and Smith 1998). To address these different findings, as well as to fill a gap in the literature by looking at Republican women in particular, this dissertation presented a supply and demand theory explaining the gender gap of the Republican Party on state judiciaries.

My theory combines several already present possible answers to the gender gaps we see within politics, and tests each of them to try to paint a larger picture. My theory argues that there is both a supply and demand problem present within state judiciaries. There is less of a supply of Republican women even available to ascend to state judiciaries, both because of a pipeline issue, as well as due to a lack of ambition. Additionally, there is a demand issue for Republican women because of voter biases and a lack of elite recruitment. I make this argument due to the unique circumstances present within the Republican Party, compared to the Democratic Party. For example, while the Democratic Party is known as the party of women and minorities, the Republican Party has a strong base of older white Evangelical men. The Republican Party is
increasingly conservative and has strong patriarchal religious ties (Wilcox 2018). Additionally, the Republican Party’s owned issues are not perceived to be women’s owned issues, and thus is a clash with the party image. All of these forces within the party combine to form a perfect storm for Republican women either seeking to be appointed or elected to state judiciaries. Additionally, the post-Trump Republican Party has created a particularly hostile place for women seeking any type of office (Thomsen 2015). Overall, I found very interesting findings from the groups I studied. In general, there are less women available in the Republican pipeline. Of the women present, I found mixed findings for their ambition levels. I found that ambition levels, however, were affected by socialization during adolescence. Voter biases are arguably present in certain circumstances, and elite recruitment is lacking. All of these factors combined together, provide a unique and sometimes challenging situation for Republican women attempting to ascend to state judiciaries.

In Chapter 3, I hypothesized that less women would be coming down the pipeline and thus less women were even available to ascend to state judiciaries. If less female attorneys existed in Republican states, the likelihood of their ascension also goes down. Through my research, I confirmed my first hypothesis. Though women now make up over 50 percent of all law school graduates, less female attorneys exist in states---particularly Republican states. I also found that more women existed in Republican states that had merit selection style systems versus states with elections or appointments. This finding confirms already existing literature about selection methods, but applies the findings to Republican women. I also hypothesized that Republican women would have lower ambition levels (for both the judiciary and for other political offices) compared to their Republican male and Democratic female and male counterparts. While the models examining the full survey samples reveal that women are less likely to report high
ambition than men, those results include both Republican and Democratic women. When looking specifically at women, the results from the main model appear to be driven primarily by Democratic women. Democratic women are significantly less likely than Democratic men to express ambition for the judiciary. When testing Republican women, however, were found to be no more or less likely to express ambition than their Republican male counterparts at a significant level. It should be noted however, that both Democratic and Republican women expressed significantly lower levels of political ambition (i.e., ambition for non-judicial elected offices) than men. This finding would suggest that type of political office may matter when studying the gender gap. Lastly, I looked at the socialization of women to determine if their experiences either growing up or their experiences via religion had an effect on their judicial ambition levels. While I did find that Republican women whose parents discussed politics more often growing up had higher ambition levels, their attendance at Church also raised their ambition levels (a finding that was contrary to what was hypothesized). Put together, these findings indicate that there is a supply issue with women in general, but more or less, it does not fully explain why we see so few Republican women in particular. Women make up over half of law students nationally, but state levels vary dramatically, and in partisan-linked ways. Additionally, there are less women lawyers in Republican states, and subsequently less women on those state judiciaries. But when testing ambition levels, there is not a clear picture of Republican women with much lower ambition levels compared to their Republican male and Democratic female counterparts. Thus, the findings in chapter 3 do not fully explain the gender gap of the Republican Party on state judiciaries. Ambition may be a necessary component of this study, but it is not completely sufficient to see more women ascend to the bench. Put bluntly,
voters must be willing to vote for Republican women and party officials must recruit and support their candidacies for Republican women to be successfully ascending to state judiciaries.

In Chapter 4, I theorize there is a demand issue for Republican women. I hypothesize that voters will be less willing to vote for Republican women. Additionally, I hypothesize that Republican women will be recruited less for state judiciaries by party officials, elected officials, and judges. With respect to potential voter biases, the results are mixed. While explicit bias was not found through the moderate election results of just a man versus a woman (with no partisan cues), interesting findings emerged elsewhere: When the gender of the “liberal” candidate was manipulated, Republican voters chose the liberal man almost 11 percent more often than the liberal woman. An interesting finding also presented itself when respondents were asked whether members of each gender were suited for politics. Twenty-six percent of Republicans answered that they agreed when presented with the statement, “women are not suited for politics.” In comparison, only 13 percent of Republicans answered they agreed when presented with the statement, “men are not suited for politics.” While harder to capture, these findings suggest a potential for voter bias among Republican voters.

My analysis of elite recruitment also suggests that there may be less of a demand by elites for women among the Republican Party. While I also find a difference in recruitment among Democrats and Democratic women, these findings suggest the differences among Republican men and Republican women may be starker in some cases. For example, the substantive magnitude of the difference in party official recruitment is almost triple for Republican women: Republican women are 21 percentage points more likely to report “never” being recruited by party officials than Republican men, as compared to a difference of 7 percentage points for
Democratic women versus Democratic men. According to these findings, a lack of elite recruitment by Republican party elites could be adding to the gender gap on state judiciaries.

The findings of chapter’s 3 and 4 taken together seem to suggest several key points to take away from this research. First, there is a clear difference among the numbers in women available to ascend to judiciaries despite the fact that women are entering law schools at the same rate, and even seem to not lack the ambition to become a judge. Additionally, there is some evidence among the sample tested of voter biases and a clear lack of recruitment among Republican women. When analyzed together, this suggests that there are components of both the supply and demand of Republican women that is adding to the gender gap. There are clear differences in Republican-held states. Additionally, despite the ambition of Republican women, voters may not see them suited for office and Republican elites may not be recruiting and supporting female candidacies. Future research should test all of these factors on a larger scale. By studying larger groups of attorneys, potential voters, and even elites, a much clearer picture of the Republican Party may be captured in order to test these findings further.

This research also adds to the general literature on ambition, voter biases, and elite recruitment. The analyses presented in this dissertation confirm existing literature on Democratic women, political ambition, and judicial ambition while adding interesting findings on Republican women. Democratic women lawyers have low levels of both judicial and political ambition. By looking at both the intersection of party and gender, it also shows the importance of not considering one demographic without the other. When pooled together, females had lower ambition levels. When subset for party and gender, however, I find that Democratic women had lower levels of ambition across the models. Additionally, though overt biases were not captured in the moderate elections (sans the party cues), Republican voters answered that they agreed with
the statement that “women were not suited for politics” at a statistically significant increased difference than when given the same statement about men. This finding would warrant both future research, and once again presents the importance of including partisanship when discussing voter biases. Lastly, the lack of elite recruitment experienced by females in general, and in particular by Republican women, adds to existing literature. If female lawyers are consistently being recruited less than their male counterparts for state judiciaries, perhaps this is a problem across both parties and across the political spectrum. In particular, it highlights the need for support in other areas like that of Emily’s List in the Democratic Party. Because Republican women consistently report not getting that type of support (see Chapter 3), this could also contribute to the overall argument of the gender gap in the Republican Party.
APPENDICES

Appendix A: Voter Biases Survey Experiment Instrument

Sample Student Opinion Survey

Below are four hypothetical elections for State Supreme Court. They are non-Partisan, meaning they lack a party label. Based on the information provided for each candidate, please select the candidate you would be most likely to vote for. Please also rate the candidates using a 100-point feeling thermometer like the one shown above. You may choose in increments of 10 from 0-100. Higher numbers or higher temperatures indicate more favorable feelings, while lower numbers indicate more unfavorable feelings. The number 50 indicates no or very little feeling at all about the candidates.
Appendix A.2

Judicial Election 1

John Parker (Forms 1 & 2) Jan Parker (Form 3):
- Believes in a Woman’s right to choose
- Supports upholding Gay Marriage
- Believes in more Gun Control
- Does not adhere to political pressure
- Endorsed by multiple Education Groups and PACs

Andrew Thomas (Form 1 & Form 3) & Andrew Thomas (Form 2):
- Believes in the Right to Life
- Believes in Traditional view of marriage
- Believes in Protection of 2nd Amendment
- Adheres to a strict view of Separation of Powers and believes in interpretation of the Law by the Judiciary
- Endorsed by Christian Authors, the Agricultural Commissioner, and Right to Life Groups

Would you be more likely to vote for John/ Jan Parker or Andrew/ Andrea Thomas

Thermometer Rating for John/Jan Parker__________________________

Thermometer Rating for Andrew/Andrea Thomas____________________
Judicial Election 2

Jacob Walker (Forms 1 & 2) Jennifer Walker (Form 3):

- Believes Judges must interpret the law
- Believes that judges must be tough but fair
- Believes in Separation of Powers but with a strong Judiciary
- Has Received Bipartisan support from former Presidents of the State Bar Association

Carly Smith (Form 1 & Form 3) & Caleb Smith (Form 2):

- Believes Judges must remain free from political pressure
- Believes that judges must be fair but also tough
- Believes in Separation of Powers but with a strong Judiciary
- Has Received Bipartisan support from former Presidents of State Bar Association

Would you be more likely to vote for Jacob/Jennifer Walker or Carly/ Caleb Smith 
_______________________?

Thermometer Rating for Jacob/Jennifer Walker ______________________

Thermometer Rating for Carly/Caleb Smith ______________________
Judicial Election 3

Stacey Johnson (Form 1 & Form 3) & William Johnson (Form 2):
- Believes in the Protection of the 1st Amendments Separation of Church and State
- Favors protection of an individual’s 4th Amendment Rights
- Believes that both the State and Federal Constitution must account for change in time and people or a “living constitution”
- Endorsed by multiple minority interest groups

Kevin Anderson (Form 1 & Form 2) & Karen Anderson (Form 3):
- Believes in the Protection of the 1st Amendment for individual’s religious liberty
- Favors more law enforcement
- Believes that both the State and Federal Constitution must be interpreted according to the intent of the authors
- Endorsed by Retired Sherriff’s Association and different Law Enforcement Agencies

Would you be more likely to vote Stacey/William Johnson or Kevin/Karen Anderson __________________________?

Thermometer Rating for Stacey/William Johnson __________________________

Thermometer Rating for Kevin/Karen Anderson __________________________
Appendix A.3

General Questions

1. Do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?

2. Gender?

3. Do you consider yourself Anglo, Hispanic, African American, Native American, or Asian?

4. Age?

5. What is the highest grade or year of school that you have completed? (Some High School, High School, Some College, Four Year Degree, Post Graduate)

6. How interested are you in politics? (Very Interested, Somewhat Interested, Not at all Interested).

7. Agree or Disagree: As a general statement, most males are suited for politics. (strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree or disagree, somewhat disagree and strongly disagree)

8. Agree or Disagree: As a general statement, most females are suited for politics. (strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree or disagree, somewhat disagree and strongly disagree)
Appendix B: Judicial Ambition Survey by Yoshana Jones Hill

Judicial Political Ambition Study

Instructions
Thank you very much for participating in this survey. All of your answers are confidential. Please answer the questions to the best of your ability. If you would like a copy of the results, then please write to the address at the end of the survey. Thank you.

Part I – Background and Family Life
We would like to begin this study by asking you some questions about background and family life.

What year were you born? ______

What is your gender?
Female
Male
Non-binary/third gender
Prefer to self-describe _________
Decline to answer

Which categories best describe you? Check all that apply.
White
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin
Black or African American
Asian
American Indian or Alaska Native
Middle Eastern or North African
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
Other race/ethnicity/origin
Decline to answer

Do you have a parent/guardian who is a first-generation American?
Yes
No

If so, please list the parent/guardian (mother, father, grandmother, etc.): __________

Are you a first-generation American?
Yes
No

What was your undergraduate major? __________
Did you attend a single-sex high school?
Yes
No

Did you attend a high school where you were a racial or ethnic minority?
Yes
No

While in high school, did you run for an elected position?
Yes
No

If so, please list the position(s): _____

Did you attend a single-sex college?
Yes
No

Did you attend a historically black college for undergrad?
Yes
No

Did you attend a historically black college for law school?
Yes
No

While in college, did you run for an elected position?
Yes
No

If so, please list the position(s): _____

While in law school, did you run for an elected position?
Yes
No

If so, please list the position(s): _____

In what category were your personal and household income (household income includes the income of every wage earning adult in your house) last year? (check one for each column)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal income</th>
<th>Household income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $25,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000 - $50,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,001 - $75,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75,001 - $100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
$100,001 - $200,000  
Over $200,000  
Decline to answer  

What is your marital status?  
Single  
Unmarried, Living as a Couple  
Married/Civil Union  
Separated  
Divorced  
Widowed  
Decline to answer  

If you are married or live with a partner, what is your spouse’s/partner’s highest educational level of attainment?  
Some high school  
High school  
College  
Graduate school  
J.D.  
M.D.  
PhD  

If you are married or live with a partner, which of the following statements best describes the division of labor on household tasks (cleaning, laundry, and cooking)?  
I am responsible for all household tasks.  
I am responsible for more of the household tasks than my spouse/partner.  
The division of labor in my household is evenly divided.  
My spouse/partner takes care of more of the household tasks than I do.  
My spouse/partner is responsible for all household tasks.  
Other arrangements; describe: __________  

How many hours each week do you spend on these household tasks? ________  

Do you have children?  
Yes  
No  

How long did you take off for maternity/paternity leave? _____  

Do your children live with you?  
Yes  
No  

Which statement best characterizes your child care, or characterized it when your children lived at home?
I am the primary caretaker of the children.  
I have more child care responsibilities than my spouse/partner.  
My spouse/partner and I share child care responsibilities completely equally.  
My spouse/partner has more child care responsibilities than I do.  
My spouse/partner is the primary caretaker of the children.  
Other arrangements; describe: ________

When your children were (are) young, what were (are) your professional responsibilities?  
I work(ed) full time.  
I work(ed) full time, but scaled back my responsibilities.  
I work(ed) part time.  
I am taking (took) a number of years off.

Do you have children under age 6 living with you?  
Yes  
No

Did you have a parent/guardian who took time off from work to care for a child?  
Yes  
No

If so, please list the parent/guardian (mother, father, grandmother, etc.): ________

In the last six years, have you . . .?  
Had or adopted a child  
Yes  No  
Undergone a career change  
Moved to a different town, city, state  
Increased your religious devotion  
Had children move out of the house  
Had to care for a sick or aging parent  
Taken on more responsibilities at work  
Dealt with a serious personal or family illness

Do you have family members who are lawyers?  
Yes  No  
Mother  
Father  
Sibling  
Grandparent  
Spouse  
Child

Do you have family members who are judges?  
Yes  No  
Mother
Father
Sibling
Grandparent
Spouse
Child

If you do have family members who are judges, which court do they serve? Please list. ________

Which statement best characterizes your attitudes toward running for judicial office in the future?
I definitely would like to do it in the future.
I might do it if the opportunity presented itself.
I would not rule it out forever, but I have no interest now.
It is something I would absolutely never do.

Part II – Political Attitudes
We would next like to ask about your political attitudes and the ways you participate politically.

How would you describe your party affiliation?
Strong Democrat
Democrat
Independent, Leaning Democrat
Independent
Independent, Leaning Republican
Republican
Strong Republican

How would you describe your political views?
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative

How closely do you follow national politics?
Very closely
Closely
Somewhat closely
Not closely

How closely do you follow politics in your local community?
Very closely
Closely
Somewhat closely
Not closely

How do you characterize the political leanings of the city or town where you live?
Heavily Democratic
Leans Democratic  
Roughly Equal Balance  
Leans Republican  
Heavily Republican

Either professionally, or outside of work, have you ever done any of the following things?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
- Engaged in regular public speaking
- Conducted significant research on a public policy issue
- Solicited funds for an organization, interest group, or cause
- Run an organization, business, or foundation
- Organized an event for a large group

Thinking about your news habits, how often do you . . . ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Every day</th>
<th>A few times a week</th>
<th>A few times a month</th>
<th>Rarely/Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
- Read a print or online newspaper
- Watch local television news
- Listen to political talk radio
- Watch C-SPAN
- Watch the Fox News Channel
- Watch CNN or MSNBC
- Read political websites
- Listen to political podcasts

When you think about politics, how important are the following issues to you when you are considering how to vote and whether to participate politically?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
- Abortion
- Education
- Health Care
- Environment
- Economy
- Gun rights
- Gun reform
- Immigration
- Crime
- Criminal Justice Reform
- Equal Rights for Women
- Equal Rights for Religious Minorities
Equal Rights for Ethnic/Racial Minorities
Gay Rights
Foreign Policy

Which classification best describes you?
Strong feminist
Strong black feminist/Womanist
Feminist
Feminist/Womanist
Not a feminist
Anti-Feminist

In general, how competitive are judicial elections in the area where you live?
Very competitive
Competitive
Somewhat competitive
Not at all competitive
I don’t know

In general, how competitive are local elections in the area where you live?
Very competitive
Competitive
Somewhat competitive
Not at all competitive
I don’t know

In general, how competitive are congressional elections in the area where you live?
Very competitive
Competitive
Somewhat competitive
Not at all competitive
I don’t know

Off the top of your head, do you recall the name of your member of the Georgia State House?
Unsure
Name: ________

Off the top of your head, do you recall the name of your member of the Georgia State Senate?
Unsure
Name: ________

Off the top of your head, do you recall the name of your member of the U.S. House of Representatives?
Unsure
Name: ________
Off the top of your head, do you recall the names of your U.S. Senators?
Unsure
Name: ________
Unsure
Name: _______

Are you at all inspired by any of the following contemporary political leaders? (check all that apply)
Donald Trump
Stacy Abrams
Brian Kemp
Andrew Gillum
Hillary Clinton
Bill Clinton
Barack Obama
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
Nancy Pelosi
Lindsey Graham
John Lewis

We would like to get your feelings about some individuals and groups within American society. When you see the name of individuals and groups below, please rate it with what we call a feeling thermometer by writing a number from 0 to 100 in the blank next to it. As indicated by the scale below, ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you don't feel favorably toward those individuals and that you feel cold towards them. Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorably and warm toward those individuals. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward an individual or group you would rate them at 50 degrees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Cold</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Very Warm</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Supreme Court justices</th>
<th>Georgia Supreme Court justices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>___________________________</td>
<td>______________________________</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justice Brett Kavanaugh</th>
<th>Undocumented immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>________________________</td>
<td>_________________________</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kay Ivey</th>
<th>William Barr</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>__________________</td>
<td>--------------</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brian Kemp</th>
<th>Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>__________________</td>
<td>___________________________</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chief Justice Harold Melton (GA Supreme Court)</th>
<th>Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms</th>
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<td>__________________________</td>
<td>__________________________</td>
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</table>


The next series of questions concerns whether you have ever considered running for office, including judicial office.

Do you hold or have you ever held elective public office?  
Yes

What office[s]? ________
What year[s] did you serve? ______

No

If no, have you ever run for public office?  
Yes

What office[s]? ________
What year[s]? ______

No

If you have never run for an elective judicial office, have you ever thought about running for judicial office?  
Yes, I have seriously considered it.
Yes, it has crossed my mind.
No, I have not thought about it.

How often do you think about running for elective judicial office?  
It is always in the back of my mind
At least once a year
Sporadically, over the years
It has been many years since I last thought about it

To the best of your recollection, how old were you when you first thought about running for elective office? _______

To the best of your recollection, how old were you when you first thought about running for judicial office? _______

Have you ever taken any of the following steps that often precede a run for office?

Yes No
Discussed running with party leaders or elected officials
Discussed running with a current judge
Discussed running with friends and family
Discussed running with community leaders
Discussed running with a legal mentor
Solicited or discussed financial contributions with potential supporters
Investigated how to place your name on the ballot

Part IV – Impressions and Experiences with Running for Office
Most citizens have never thought about running for office. But, we’re interested in your impressions and experiences even if you’re not interested in these things.

Overall, how qualified do you feel you are to run for public office?
Very qualified
Qualified
Somewhat qualified
Not at all qualified

Overall, how qualified do you feel you are to run for judicial office?
Very qualified
Qualified
Somewhat qualified
Not at all qualified

Would you be more interested in judicial office if you were appointed, rather than had to engage in a campaign?
Yes
No

Has anyone been particularly persistent or influential in trying to get you to run for judicial office?
Yes
No

If yes, what is this person’s gender? _____
What is this person’s race? _____

Is this person a lawyer?
Yes
No

What was this person’s relationship to you? ______

Regardless of your interest in running for judicial office, have any of the following ever suggested running for office to you?

Never  Once or Twice 3-5 Times More than 5 Times
A friend or acquaintance
A co-worker or business associate
An elected official
A judge (federal or state)
An official from a political party
A spouse or partner
A member of your family
A non-elected political activist
A legal mentor
A women’s organization
A member of your sorority or fraternity
Someone from your church, synagogue, mosque, etc.

Have any of the following individuals ever discouraged you or tried to talk you out of running for judicial office?

Yes   No
A friend or acquaintance
A co-worker or business associate
An elected official
A judge (federal or state)
An official from a political party
A spouse or partner
A member of your family
A non-elected political activist
A legal mentor
A women’s organization
A member of your sorority or fraternity
Someone from your church, synagogue, mosque, etc.

In thinking about your qualifications to run for judicial office, do any of the following apply to you? (check all that apply)
I know a lot about criminal justice issues.  
I have relevant professional experience.  
I am a good public speaker.  
I have strong connections in the legal community.  
I have strong connections in my local community.  
I have or could raise enough money.  
I am a good self-promoter.  
My politics are too far out of the mainstream.

Turning to your interest in specific public offices . . .

If you were to run for office, which one would you seek first? (check one)  
2) What offices might you ever be interested in running for? (check all that apply)  
School Board  
Mayor  
City, County, or Town Council  
State Legislator  
Governor  
Statewide Office (i.e., Attorney General, Secretary of State)  
Member of the U.S. House of Representatives  
U.S. Senator  
President  
Judge  
District Attorney

Would any of the following resources make you more interested in running for judicial office?  
(check for all that apply)  
Manuals and articles on campaigns and elections  
Interviews with political operatives and elected officials  
Webcasts on organizing, fundraising, and media skills  
Training programs sponsored by political organizations

Lots of people have a negative view of what is entailed in running for judicial office. How would you feel about . . .?

Comfortable  Wouldn’t Bother Me  Negative So Negative, It Would Deter Me from Running  
Spending less time with family  
Loss of privacy  
Less time for personal interests  
Hindering professional goals

If you were to run for judicial office, how would you feel about engaging in the following aspects of a campaign?

Comfortable  Wouldn’t Bother Me  Negative So Negative, It Would Deter Me from Running
Soliciting campaign contributions
Going door-to-door to meet constituents
Dealing with members of the press
Potentially having to engage in or endure a negative campaign
Receiving support from leaders in the legal community
Answering questions about your professional experiences

If you were to run for judicial office, how likely do you think it is that you would win your first campaign?
Very likely
Likely
Unlikely
Very unlikely

In thinking about your qualifications to run for office, do any of the following apply to you? (check all that apply)
I don’t have thick enough skin.
I have a lot of skeletons in my closet.
I worry about how a campaign would affect my family.
I am too old.
I am the wrong gender.
I am the wrong race/ethnicity.

Please mark your level of agreement with the following statements:

Strongly agree Agree Neither disagree nor agree Disagree Strongly disagree

Government pays attention to people when making decisions.
Courts are useful for protecting the rights of racial and religious minorities.
Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women.
Within the legal community, it is still more difficult for women to climb the career ladder.
Within the legal community, it is still more difficult for blacks to climb the career ladder.
Within the legal community, it is still more difficult for black women to climb the career ladder.

It is just as easy for women to be elected to high-level office as men.

It is just as easy for a black person to be elected to high-level office as a white person.

It is just as easy for a black woman to be elected to high-level office as any other person.

Feminism has had a positive impact on social and political life in the United States.

When women run for public office, it is more difficult for them to raise money than it is for men.
When black women run for public office, it is more difficult for them to raise money than it is for any other candidate.

Part V - Professional Experiences
The next series of questions ask about your professional work experiences as an attorney.

What year did you become a member of the Georgia bar? __________

What law school did you attend? _____

During your law school summers, did you ever work or intern in the Atlanta area?
Yes
No

Are you a member of the bar in another state?
Yes
No

If yes, which state? ______

What year did you become a member of the bar of the other state(s)? ______

Which organizations were you a member of during law school? Please list. ______

Which of the following best characterizes your current position?
Judicial law clerk
Solo practitioner
Law firm associate
Law firm partner
Federal public defender
State public defender
Federal prosecutor
State prosecutor
Other; please describe: ______

What year did you start your current position? _____

What were your previous legal positions? Please list. ______

How long did you hold each of your previous positions? ______

How often do you appear in court?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

Are you a litigation attorney?
Yes
No

What area(s) of law do you practice? Please list. _______

Are you a member of a voluntary bar association in Atlanta? If so, please list. _______

What year did you first join the voluntary bar association? _____

Have you ever held a leadership position in a voluntary bar association?
Yes
No

If so, list the position(s): _______

Have you ever been asked to run for judicial office?
Yes
No

If so, please list the office(s). _______

Do you have professional mentors?
Yes
No

If yes, do you have professional mentors in the legal field?
Yes
No

Do you have professional mentors at the firm or office where you practice?
Yes
No

Did you gain this mentor as part of a formalized mentorship program at your firm or office?
Yes
No

Do you have at least one professional legal mentor who shares both your race and gender?
Yes
No
Do you have at least one professional legal mentor who does not share both your race and gender?
Yes
No

Do you serve as a mentor to another attorney?
Yes
No

Part VI - Parental Messages
The next series of questions asks about the messages that you have received from your parent or guardian.

How often did your parents/guardians discuss state politics with you?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

How often did your parents/guardians discuss federal politics with you?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

How often did your parent/guardian discuss women’s issues with you?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

How often did your parents/guardian discuss race issues with you?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

Has your parent/guardian ever taken you with them to vote in an election?
Yes
No

Has your parent/guardian ever run for elective office?
Yes
No

If yes, please list the office. ______

Has your parent/guardian ever held elective office?
Yes
No

If yes, please list the office. ______

As a minor (under the age of 18), how often did your parent/guardian encourage you to take on a leadership position at school?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

If so, please list the position(s). ______

How often did your parent/guardian encourage you to take on a leadership position in college?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

If so, please list the position(s). ______

How often did your parent/guardian encourage you to take on a leadership position in law school?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

If so, please list the position(s). ______
How often did your parent/guardian tell you that you were expected to get married?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

How often did your parent/guardian tell you that you were expected to have children?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

How often did your parent/guardian tell you that you were expected to pursue a career outside the home?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

How often did your parent/guardian tell you that you were expected to pursue a non-domestic services career?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

How often did your parent/guardian tell you that you were expected to attend college?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

How often did your parent/guardian tell you that your career success will be beneficial to your local community?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

How often did your parent/guardian tell you that you had to academically outperform your fellow classmates?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

Did your parent/guardian ever tell you that you were expected to maintain financial independence from your spouse?
Yes
No

If yes, how often did they tell you that you were expected to maintain financial independence as an adult?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely

Part VII - Membership in Sorority or Fraternity
The next series of questions is about membership in a sorority, fraternity, or other social groups.

Were you a member of a sorority or fraternity in college?
Yes
No

Was this a single-sex sorority or fraternity?
Yes
No

What was the sorority or fraternity? Please list. _____

What year did you join the sorority or fraternity? _____

What are the pillars of your organization? ______

Do you have a parent who is also member of your sorority or fraternity?
Yes
No

While in college, did you hold a leadership position in your sorority or fraternity?
Yes
No

While in college, what type of events did you participate in with your sorority or fraternity?
Please list. ________

Within the past six years, have you made a financial contribution to your sorority or fraternity?
Yes
No

Within the past six years, have you volunteered with your sorority or fraternity?
Yes
No

After college, have you held a leadership position in your sorority or fraternity?
Yes
No

Do you have a mentor who is a member of your sorority or fraternity?
Yes
No

Have you ever attended your sorority or fraternity’s conferences?
Yes
No

Within your sorority or fraternity, how often did you hear political messages?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

Did you participate in the following activities with your sorority or fraternity?

Yes   No

Voter registration drive
Financial literacy workshop
Mental health workshop
Tutoring
Canned food drive
Are you a member of any other social organizations?
Yes
No

If yes, please list. __________

Have you ever held a leadership position in another social organization?
Yes
No

If so, please list. ______________

Part VIII - Religious Community Participation
Lastly, we would next like to ask you about your involvement with religious institutions.

What is your present religion, if any?
Protestant (Baptist, Methodist, Non-denominational, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Pentecostal, Episcopal, Reformed, Church of Christ, etc.)
Roman Catholic (Catholic)
Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints/LDS)
Orthodox (Greek, Russian, or some other orthodox church)
Jewish (Judaism)
Muslim (Islam)
Buddhist
Hindu
Atheist
Agnostic
Other

How often did you attend religious services, on average, when you were a minor (under the age of 18)?
At least weekly
Monthly
Seldom
Never

How often do you currently attend religious services?
At least weekly
Monthly
Seldom
Never

Are you a member of a local church, synagogue, mosque, temple, or other house of worship?
Yes
No
How many years have you been a member of your house of worship? ______

Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray?
Several times a day
Once a day
A few times a week
Once a week
A few times a month
Seldom
Never

How often have you heard political messages during your religious services?
Very frequently
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Very rarely
Never

Have you ever volunteered at your house of worship?
Yes
No
If so, what volunteer role(s) have you held? ______

Have you ever participated in small group study of your religious text?
Yes
No

Have you ever participated in the following activities at your house of worship? (check all that apply)
Organizing meetings
Attending meetings
Writing letters to advocate for a cause
Canvassing the community to inform them about community matters/issues
Voter registration drive
Contacting elected officials

Have you ever held a leadership position at your house of worship? Examples of leadership positions include pastor, priest, deacon, bishop, imam, rabbi, etc.)
Yes
No
If so, please list the leadership position(s). ____________
Have any of the following family members ever held leadership positions at a house of worship?

Yes  No

Parent(s)
Grandparent(s)
Spouse

Thank you for completing the survey. We truly value the information you have provided. Your responses will contribute to our understanding of judicial political ambition.

If you have any questions about the survey, please contact Yoshana Jones Hill at 38 Peachtree Center Avenue SE, Atlanta, Georgia 30303 or yjones7@gsu.edu.
Appendix C: After the JD3: Questionnaire

51. How important are each of the following long term goals to you? Check one box on each line.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not At All Important</th>
<th>Extremely Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Intellectual challenge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Help individuals</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Accumulate great wealth</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Become an influential person</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. change or improve society</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Have a satisfying career</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>g. Have a satisfying personal life</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Become a bar leader</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Become a high ranking corporate executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>j. Move into management</td>
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<tr>
<td>k. Become a politician</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Become a judge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The entire survey instrument as well as additional information can be found at:

http://ajd.abfn.org

http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/research/project/118
REFERENCES


