What Difference do the Government Institutions of Haiti and the Government Institutions of the Dominican Republic Make for Tourism Growth?

Ludmilla Anglade

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses

Recommended Citation
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/12530366
WHAT DIFFERENCE DO THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OF HAITI AND THE
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MAKE FOR
TOURISM GROWTH?

By
LUDMILLA MARIE ANGLADE

Under the Direction of Under the Direction of Henry Carey, PhD

ABSTRACT

This comparative case study examines the actions that the Haitian and Dominican governments, respectively, have taken to develop and sustain tourism within their borders. My premise is that governments, through state institutions and policies, can implement branding strategies that impact and change existing country image perceptions. Expanding on the determinants of tourism demand literature, I present a theoretical framework for how government institutions collaborate to create a favorable country brand by investing in the development of functional benefits \{public safety and infrastructure quality\}. The functional benefits are then supplied to the mass tourist market, who demands them in order to visit, lodge and spend money in the country. The findings of this study confirm that a causal relationship exists between a country’s level of stability and tourism arrivals and receipts, further establishing this study’s theory that high levels of investment in infrastructure quality and nation branding can positively influence country image perception to generate arrivals and receipts. Surprise outcomes regarding crime’s impact on arrivals and receipts present future opportunities to advance the literature.

INDEX WORDS: Public Safety, Infrastructure Investment, Nation Branding, Tourism Drivers, Political Stability, Marketing Promotion, Government Policy, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Country Image Perception, Tourism Arrivals and Receipts
WHAT DIFFERENCE DO THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OF HAITI AND THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MAKE FOR TOURISM GROWTH?

by

LUDMILLA MARIE ANGLADE

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2018
WHAT DIFFERENCE DO THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OF HAITI AND THE
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MAKE FOR
TOURISM GROWTH?

by

LUDMILLA MARIE ANGLADE

Committee Chair: Henry Carey
Committee: Charles Hankla
            Jennifer McCoy

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
August 2018
DEDICATION

To Dr. Henry “Chip” Carey - all his encouragement, support, and patience with me through this entire process was immeasurable. And, to the few and far between special friends (Michelle, Timethia, Nadine, Angela, Begum, Elder Yul, and Collette) whose truth telling, motivating words, confidence in me and endless support was pivotal in helping to advance this thesis. The completion of this project would not have been possible without them.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I sincerely thank God for getting me to the finish line. Everyone associated with the completion of this thesis was so invaluable to me. I want to thank Dr. Sara Gershon for extending my graduation deadline (several times!). And, very special thanks to Dr. Henry "Chip" Carey for bearing with me with an attitude of grace as I labored through the many years it took to finish this thesis. Truly, I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Charles Hankla and Dr. Jennifer McCoy for being part of my thesis committee. Their contribution helped me push past the proposal stage to a successful defense…thank you so much! Many thanks to my family: our Haitian roots helped inspire this project. I give special recognition to my dear friend, Michelle, who was at my first grad school degree graduation (when I should have finished this degree). She really provided understanding, instead of being critical about the time I was taking to finish this thesis (even though, technically I did work full time, while completing my MIB and an MBA during this entire 9-year process). Her support through the end means so much to me. I give special thanks to my friend, Timethia, who really went above and beyond to look over my thesis (numerous times), help me with my proposal & defense presentations (and she even sent me her dissertation slides as a guide). My dear friend, Nadine…her motivation, prayers and unwavering support pushed me to finish. My friends, Elder Yul, Collette and Robin, I am so grateful for their care and spiritual support. I give thanks to my friend, Angela, for teaching me to reach for authenticity; that message truly made a difference. I’m so grateful for my friend, Begum, for the special visits, the laughs, being positive and always believing the best for me! And, I’m thankful for my friend, Xotchitl, who made me laugh countless times; and, she helped me relieve stress my entire grad school experience with those random “happy hours”—especially while I juggled this thesis, work, gym, the MIB, followed by the MBA. Many thanks to Anna and her family, as
well as my Victory family, for their prayers on my behalf. Thank you to my InterNations family...Gonzalo, Mariella, Magaly, Daphne, Malaika, Daniel, Liliana, Rachel, Caesar, Turki, Pranav and Kara. You mean so much. I want to thank my fit-fam (Donna, Candice, Kendall, Courtney, Wallace, my coaches and trainers, Dave, Jesus, Jose and Gui, to name a few). I needed those special times and stress relievers...I’m also grateful for the laughs (there were many).

Thank you to my old co-workers for their support (Val, Regina, Delphia, Beverly, Barbara and Nina); and to my Too Groovy salon family (Shannon, Dawn and Angela) for their well wishes. Finally, special thanks goes to the Political Science and Business departments at GSU (especially Dr. Dakhli, Pedro Carillo and my fellow grad students from both departments for all of their input, guidance and support over the years).
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................. V

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ XII

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ XIII

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... XIV

1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Purpose of the Study ........................................................................................................... 2

1.2 Background on Tourism in Haiti and the Dominican Republic ...................................... 2

1.3 The Gap in the Literature that this Paper Resolves ............................................................ 4

1.4 My Argument ....................................................................................................................... 5

1.5 Tourism Demand Determinants Literature ........................................................................ 6

1.1.1 Political Stability as a Security Determinant ................................................................. 7

1.1.2 Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure ............................................................................. 10

1.1.3 Nation Branding as a Marketing Determinant ............................................................ 14

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .......................................................................................... 17

2.1 Public Safety Theory ......................................................................................................... 18

2.2 Infrastructure Investment Theory ..................................................................................... 19

2.3 Nation Branding Theory .................................................................................................. 21

2.4 Country Image Perception (Intervening Variable) ............................................................ 22

2.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (Dependent Variable) Theory .......................................... 24
2.6 Independent Variables .............................................................................................. 25  
2.6.1 Public Safety (IV1) ........................................................................................... 25  
2.6.2 Infrastructure Investment (IV2) ....................................................................... 29  
2.6.3 Nation Branding (IV3) ................................................................................... 33  
2.7 Intervening Variable ............................................................................................. 37  
2.7.1 Country Image Perception .............................................................................. 37  
2.8 Dependent Variable ............................................................................................ 39  
2.8.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts ...................................................................... 39  
2.9 Methodology ....................................................................................................... 44  
3 Analysis: Comparative Case Studies ........................................................................ 48  
3.1 Haiti Tourism Case Study (1940-2017) .................................................................. 49  
3.1.1 Public Safety .................................................................................................... 49  
3.1.2 Infrastructure Investment .............................................................................. 53  
3.1.3 Nation Branding ............................................................................................ 56  
3.1.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception ..................................... 58  
3.2 Dominican Republic Case Study (1940-2017) ................................................... 60  
3.2.1 Public Safety ................................................................................................. 60  
3.2.2 Infrastructure Investment .............................................................................. 62  
3.2.3 Nation Branding ............................................................................................ 63  
3.2.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception ..................................... 65
3.3 Haiti and Dominican Republic Comparative Case Study (1940-2017) .......... 66

3.3.1 Public Safety.................................................................................................. 66

3.3.2 Infrastructure Investment............................................................................. 68

3.3.3 Nation Branding ........................................................................................... 70

3.3.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception ..................................... 73

4 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 77

REFERENCES................................................................................................................ 87

APPENDICES................................................................................................................. 93

Appendix A - Public Safety/Crime Rate Level (Haiti) ............................................. 93

Appendix B - Public Safety/Crime Rate Graphs (Haiti) ......................................... 94

Appendix B.1 Other types of crime prevalent in Haiti ............................................ 94

Appendix C - Public Safety/Political Stability Index (Haiti)................................. 95

Appendix D - Public Safety: Political Stability Percentile Rank (Haiti) ............. 96

Appendix E - Infrastructure Investment/Public and Private Sector (Haiti) ........ 97

Appendix F - Infrastructure Investment/PPIs (Haiti)............................................. 98

Appendix G – Nation Branding/Public and Private Tourism Promotion (Haiti) . 99

Appendix H – Nation Branding/Public Tourism Promotion Investment (Haiti) 100

Appendix I – Haiti’s Country Image Perception Scale........................................... 101

Appendix J – Tourism Arrivals and Receipts Graph (Haiti)................................. 102

Appendix J.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (Haiti, 1940-1980):.......... 102
Appendix T.4 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (D.R., 2001-2016): ........ 119

Appendix T.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (D.R., 2001-2016): ........ 120

Appendix U – References for Country Image Perception (Haiti and D.R.) ........ 121
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Most Significant Determinants of Tourism Demand (Dependent Variable) 
Identified in Literature ........................................................................................................................................ 7

Table 2.1 Theoretical Expansion of the Determinants of Tourism Demand Literature ...... 18

Table 3.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts in Haiti (1940-2016): Scaled ratings based on analysis of data compiled for each variable .................................................................................................................. 47

Table 4.1 Tourism arrivals and receipts in the Dominican Republic (1930-2016): Scaled ratings based on analysis of data compiled for each variable .................................................. 48
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2-1 Theoretical Model- How the Independent Variables Interact with the Intervening Variable to Increase Tourism Arrivals and Receipts .......................... 24

Figure 3-1 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1945-1984) ....................... 50

Figure 3-2 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1995-2015) ....................... 50

Figure 3-3 International receipts in Haiti between 1950-2015 ........................................ 51
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. Dependent Variable (DV)
2. Dominican Republic (D.R.)
3. Independent Variables (IVs)
4. Public Funding Division of Dominican Republic’s Central Bank (INFRATUR)
5. Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure (PPI)
6. Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)
7. World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
1 INTRODUCTION

For many low-income developing countries, with limited natural resources to competitively trade globally, tourism often serves as a vital economic driver. To that end, governments of these nations will make attempts to attract private sector investment, to generate tourist arrivals and travel receipts, with the hopes that an abundance of tourism development will create linkages with other sectors to produce growth in their economy. The reliance on this industry is paradoxical, as governments of many poor nations habitually underestimate their role as the key stakeholder in determining the acute strategies which will attract, grow, and retain tourism demand. Furthermore, government leaders, of developing countries, may desire to generate economic growth through tourism channels; however, they fail to consider that tourism is as particularly sensitive to political factors as it is to economic and environmental ones. Moreover, governments must understand that their country projects an image that potential investors and tourists may perceive as feasible for investment and travel. The global perception of a country is partially exogenous and beyond a government’s control. However, there are preemptive measures that governments can take, to attract tourism, to contribute to a positive perception of their country as a viable travel destination. Developing countries’ governments, who are successful at generating a thriving tourism sector, work to create safe and stable political environments, invest a tremendous amount of state capital in tourism sustainability, hire destination managers, execute sound tourism public policies, and consult with public relation firms to assist in the process. Conversely, governments who fail at fostering a sustainable tourism industry, and remain in economic jeopardy, can attribute as reasons political instability, insufficient security policies, and deficient tourism promotion strategies, along with a lack of capital expenditure investment in developing quality infrastructure.
1.1 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to advance the tourism determinants literature by 1) evaluating the effectiveness of government institutions in generating higher levels of tourism arrivals and receipts in two test countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic; and 2) providing a more comprehensive theory and methodology for measuring security, infrastructure, and marketing promotions’ impact on tourism demand. The main question I seek to answer in this paper is what difference do the government institutions for each country make in producing tourism growth? Ultimately, I expect the answer to this question to solve the conundrum for why Haiti’s once thriving tourism sector deteriorated while the Dominican Republic’s tourism industry sustained even though both countries, respectively, endured similar political and socioeconomic challenges.

1.2 Background on Tourism in Haiti and the Dominican Republic

In a 2004 economic and sector study regional report by the Inter-American Development Bank, the history of tourism in Haiti is outlined and the sector is categorized as having uneven development that was marred by many “setbacks” (Lundhal, 2004). Tourism began in mid-1940 with around 5,000 visitors (Lundhal, 2004); and, by 1956, Haiti had reached 67,700 travelers (Séraphin, 2011). During the 1950s and early 1960s, Haiti was perceived by travelers as a good place to visit. And, subsequently, during that time, Haiti experienced one of the fastest growth rate of visitors in the Caribbean (Séraphin, 2011). Travelers to Haiti preferred visiting the island compared to its neighbor, the Dominican Republic, which was not yet known as a worthy travel destination (Séraphin, 2011). However, violent unrest during the cruel dictatorship of Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier led to a sharp decline in visitors in 1963. After that, Haiti was considered unsafe by travelers and a country to avoid. The negative country perception ended when Jean
Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier became president in 1972; and, tourism experienced a revival. Tourist numbers peaked to 300,000 visitors by 1980 (Steif, 1985; Fass, 1988). However, this upsurge was temporary as a rumor developed in 1982 that AIDS originated in Haiti; and, then Duvalier’s dictatorship was overthrown in 1986. Except for cruise ship tourism in Labadee, Haiti’s mass tourism potential collapsed after the 1986 coup; and, a series of political and socio-economic problems began to plague Haiti that had lasting effects well into late 2010. In late 2010, after a 7.0 earthquake hit the country, the Haitian government began making serious efforts to revitalize tourism (Séraphin, 2011). Foreign investors began constructing hotels in Haiti to cater to the country’s new brand of travelers: aid workers, missionaries and business people. There is now legitimate hope that the country may finally capture a small portion of the mass tourism market of overnight visitors.

Around the time that Haiti’s tourism sector was first developing in the 1940s, the neighboring Dominican Republic’s tourism industry was non-existent. The 1960 Fodor's Guide to the Caribbean, Bahamas and Bermuda (1960) offered an extensive 29-page review of Haiti as a travel destination and classified it as "most exotic, very rewarding, plenty of accommodations from simple, low-budget to luxurious" (p. xxii; Fuller, 1999). Meanwhile, the 9-page assessment of the Dominican Republic was that it had 56 revolutions and 43 presidents between 1844 to 1930; and, the country was considered a "comic opera prototype of Caribbean instability" (Fodor, 1960). Furthermore, in its discussion of the Dominican tourism office, Fodor described that the "Direccion General de Turismo" (328) was "the only official tourist office in the Caribbean which seems to us to fail consistently in its task of promoting tourism. Its inefficiency is lamentable. Its standards of courtesy, far below the normal Dominican level...The office's policy...does not seem to be aimed at facilitating travel or the circulation of information
about the republic's tourists’ suggestions... We cannot deplore too strongly the uncooperative attitude and the general inefficiency..." (Fodor, 328). By 1967, when the Dominican government had commenced taking significant steps to build tourism, Haiti's tourism industry had experienced strong growth (Fuller, 1999). However, at present, there is a stark contrast between the flourishing mass tourism sector of the Dominican Republic which had 5,959,300 million stay-over arrivals (with 335,000 cruise ship arrivals) in 2016 (WEF Report on the Dominican Republic, 2018). In 2016, Haiti’s small niche market of visitors received 515,804 stay-over arrivals (with 673,501 cruise ship passengers) (WEF Report on Haiti, 2018). The drastic turnaround for the Dominican Republic’s tourism sector can be attributed to strong political support for tourism development by the Dominican government (Fuller, 1999; World Bank, 2011).

1.3 The Gap in the Literature that this Paper Resolves

During my preliminary research on the determinants of tourism demand for this study, I discovered a gap in how the main drivers of tourism demand are operationalized. Much of the tourism determinants literature focuses on identifying the main individual drivers of tourism demand. However, discussions on whether and how those drivers are connected or how they can be managed to produce tourism demand are insufficient. The literature identifies political stability (treated as evidence of tourism safety and security), infrastructure quality, destination attractiveness and marketing promotions (or nation branding) among a list of significant individual drivers of tourism demand for developing countries. Yet, a scholarly focus on individual drivers is inadequate because it does not provide a complete explanation for how tourists are often sensitive to a combination of factors which influence their travel behavior. If a
country is politically stable, for example, but it lacks quality infrastructure and marketing promotions about the country is low, it is unlikely that country will see a rise in travel arrivals.

Tourism demand is essentially subject to potential travelers’ preferences based on their perception of a country’s overall reputation as a travel destination. And, several factors work to create a country’s image which, over time, produces its reputation to the potential travelers and investors. Therefore, a scholarly discussion on how a country’s image is perceived, based on those significant tourism drivers, is very important because a potential tourist’s perception of a country is what ultimately influences travel behavior. Despite this, there is a lack of research on how the most significant drivers identified in the literature, beyond political stability, contribute to a country’s image to impact a traveler’s perception of the destination. In addition to safety concerns, infrastructure quality and marketing promotions are important drivers that influence country image. Moreover, the tourism driver literature also does not adequately explain the role of governments have in managing tourism drivers to influence how their country is perceived by potential tourists. In addition, the exclusive focus on political stability in the literature as the primary indication of security in a country is insufficient. As a measure for safety and security, in addition to political stability, I focus on crime rates in each test country. Finally, as one of the test countries, Haiti, has a unique demographic of tourists, I expand on how tourism demand is traditionally measured to sufficiently assess the overall level of tourism arrivals and receipts for each test country. The purpose of my study is to examine government effectiveness in creating a positive country image perception that produces an increase in tourism arrivals and receipts.

1.4 My Argument

I evaluate the political and social, pull or “attractive”, and tourism competitive factors that significantly impact tourism arrivals in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Many potential
causes may exist to explain why the Dominican Republic has fared better in its tourism sector compared to Haiti. To narrow down the endogenous contributing factors, it is important to determine the strategic actions (or, rather, inactions) taken by the key stakeholder in each country, namely the government, in establishing, advancing and sustaining tourism within its borders. I contend that governments, through state institutions and policies, can implement strategies to impact and change existing country image perceptions to generate an increase in tourism arrivals and receipts (tourism arrivals and receipts are an expansion of the common measurement for tourism demand that will be explained in my theory section). The strategies are based upon government institutions: 1) ensuring that tourists enjoy a politically stable and crime safe environment through the implementation of public safety measures (a political factor); 2) investing in the construction of quality infrastructure (a pull factor) using public and private sector capital investments; and 3) engage in tourism marketing through nation branding policies and partnerships with the private sector (a tourism competitive factor).

I hypothesize that successful management of these three factors by effective government institutions are essential to create a positive country image which increases tourism arrivals and receipts. This thesis will evaluate how effective government institutions were in controlling these factors in three comparative studies: 1) a separate historical individual country analysis comparing Haiti’s past and current tourism sector; 2) a historical individual country analysis comparing Dominican Republic’s past and current tourism arrivals and receipts; and, 3) a comparison between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

1.5 Tourism Demand Determinants Literature

The literature on tourism demand has established that tourism demand is influenced by numerous factors. The most comprehensive study, on which variables most impact tourism
demand in developing countries, provides a panel data analysis of Latin American and Caribbean countries and establishes three main classifications for the determinants (Pivčević et al., 2016): 1) pull (or attractive) factors—based on the characteristics of the inbound travel destination which includes destination promotional programs, destination attractiveness, social and cultural ties, climate, events; 2) political and social factors—which includes political stability within the inbound travel destination as important for security as the study establishes that the higher the political stability, the higher the tourism demand (Eugenio-Martin, Morales and Scarpa, 2004 as mentioned in Pivčević et al., 2016); and 3) pull-tourism competitiveness factor—an inbound country determinant of tourism demand that includes nation branding/marketing promotions.

The determinants, from the three classifications, with the most positive, statistically significant and correlated relationship with tourism demand are reflected in Table 1.1 below. The current literature provides a foundation for further expansion that the theoretical framework of this paper is based upon.

**Table 1.1 Most Significant Determinants of Tourism Demand (Dependent Variable) Identified in Literature**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes/Influences</th>
<th>Tourism Demand Determinants</th>
<th>Independent Variables in the Literature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and Social Factors</td>
<td>▪ Political Stability/Security</td>
<td>▪ Political Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pull Factors</td>
<td>▪ Destination Attractiveness</td>
<td>▪ Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Infrastructure</td>
<td>▪ Tourism Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Competitiveness Factors</td>
<td>▪ Marketing Promotions</td>
<td>▪ Nation Branding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.1.1 Political Stability as a Security Determinant

One of the major considerations for a potential traveler seeking to visit any foreign destination is the country’s political stability and internal security environment. In tourism
demand literature, the predominant focus has been the destination’s level of political stability. Generally, any evidence of unrest within a country will likely deter visitors from deciding to travel to that destination. Hall (1994), determined that political stability is a “fundamental precondition” (Hall, 1994) to establishing a successful tourism sector. Baker (2012) contends that “modern mass tourists tend to long for relaxing, safe, and unconcerned vacations when they travel.” (Baker, 2012: 91)

Studies centered on the impact of political stability on tourism demand have varied in focus, methodology and scope. Many authors have differed on the parameters for measuring political stability or rather its inverse, namely, political instability as well as the testing variable for tourism. One branch of scholarship discusses political instability and its potential impact on traveler behavior in certain countries. However, that stream of literature also heavily examines the effect of terrorism on tourism development. Researchers, under this stream, diverge on whether to treat terrorism as a measure of political instability or as a phenomenon that is either incidental to or creates instability. This debate often distracts researchers from developing studies on the types of security challenges that may influence tourism demand beyond political stability. Despite these deviations, all scholars agree that political stability is vital for tourism; and, by contrast, political instability within a country produces a negative effect on both tourism demand and overall tourism development.

Regarding the first stream of scholarship on the impact of political instability on tourism demand, many researchers believe that terrorism is significant to the overall study of political instability’s influence on tourism development (Alvarez & Campo, 2014; Coshall, 2003; Maditinos & Vassiliadi, 2008; Nassar, 2012; Neumayer, 2004; Sonmez, 1998; Yap & Saha, 2013). Contrarily, others debate that terrorism is often an exclusive phenomenon that only
certain countries experience. Furthermore, terrorism is not only separate from political instability, but driven because of it (Campos, 2009). However, proponents of including terrorism as a form of political instability assert that the study of them are important or relevant to tourism because researchers have identified that terrorists often, specifically, target tourists to advance their terroristic goals (Sonmez, 1998; Neumayer, 2004). Reports of politically motivated attacks on tourists legitimizes the security concern that potential travelers have as they make travel decisions. However, beyond terrorism, the literature has not provided further evidence that travelers have been targeted in destinations where other forms of political instability are prevalent.

Out of the first branch of scholarship, a second stream of literature emerged to provide explanations for why political instability adversely affects tourism demand. Political instability often generates negative publicity; and, because of deleterious travel reports, tourism demand decreases (Thapa, 2003). The decline in tourism arrivals comes from the fact that political instability, along with civil unrest and war, often creates the perception of a safety risk for travelers (Lepp, 2003). Therefore, the perceptions of political instability and safety become the prerequisite for tourists to travel (Hall and O’Sullivan, 1996). The second branch of literature concerns itself with the measurement of increase or decrease in tourism travel based on a country’s temporary or long-term instability. Depending on a travel consumer’s perception of the country’s risk for travel, research findings are that the perception of high travel risk not only influences a travel consumer’s behavior, but the country’s overall image (Ryu, 2005). Furthermore, the longer the period of instability, the more likely a travel consumer will determine that a country is too unstable for travel (Yap & Sap, 2013). However, if the instability
is incidental, stemming from an event or series of events, travel consumers will view the instability as temporary.

In his literature review of the subject, Hall reiterates Richter and Waugh’s (1986) contention that governmental leaders underestimate political peace as the primary and fundamental precondition for tourism development (Nyaruwata, 2013). Ultimately, tourists seriously consider safety and security problems when choosing travel destinations (Nyaruwata, 2013). Therefore, it is the government’s responsibility to create a politically stable environment to attract and retain a thriving tourism industry for the purposes of economic development (Nyaruwata, 2013). Causevic and Lynch (2013) point out that there is void in the research with studies focused on how governments handle challenges with political instability within their borders. Most specifically, literature is still lacking on regulations and laws which are created to manage tourism development post-conflict or counteract the decline in tourism demand caused by political instability (Causevic and Lynch, 2013).

1.1.2 Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure

Much of the tourism determinants literature focuses on infrastructure quality as a vehicle to develop tourism and attract tourism demand. Few tourism driver studies specifically investigated spending on infrastructure directly. Within the research on the tourism drivers, that lead to successful tourism development, authors either incidentally mention which stakeholder is most fiscally responsible for spending on infrastructure or they fail to adequately specify the responsible party. The literature on this subject is important for two reasons: 1) establishing that infrastructure is a prerequisite for maintaining a successful tourism sector; and 2) incidentally linking the importance of spending on infrastructure to tourism demand.
The study that comes close to discussing the stakeholders most responsible for infrastructure spending is Giap et al’s study on Malaysia’s tourism sector. Giap et al (2016) contends that government expenditures on tourism promotion and infrastructure, specific to the enhancement of airport facilities, are the main determinants of tourism demand in Malaysia. Similar studies on developing countries also identify infrastructure quality as either an important factor or the most vital determinant of tourism demand (Khadaroo-Seetanah, 2007; Dwyer & Spurr, 2011; Assaf & Josiassen, 2011; Seetanah et al, 2011; Giap et al, 2016 and Jovanovic & Illic (2017)). However, despite their shared contention that having a quality infrastructure impacts tourism demand, the authors differ on which type of infrastructure is most relevant for tourism. Furthermore, the tourism demand literature asserts that small island countries are particularly impacted by the quality of their infrastructure especially as it applies to their airport conditions (Giap et al, 2016). The argument was previously established by McElroy’s study on small island tourism development where the author found it difficult to classify the least traveled islands (McElroy, 2006). This was because the least traveled islands had the tendency to lack enough government expenditures to sustain tourism due to their inadequate land infrastructure development; and, as a result, those islands were not prime for mass tourism or significant tourism demand (McElroy, 2006).

Across the literature, authors diverge on their conceptualization of tourism infrastructure. Some authors classified the infrastructure that impacted tourism demand in limited terms of land or road networks (McElroy, 2006). While other researchers focused their studies on the impact that transport infrastructure (in terms of transport services) had on tourism demand (Prideaux, 2000; Khadaroo & Seetanah, 2007; Seetanah et al, 2011). Prideaux (2000) referred to transport infrastructure as public infrastructure, which includes a country’s transport system. He further
defines the transport system as it applies to tourism as “the operation of, and interaction between, transport modes, ways and terminals that support tourists into and out of destinations and also the provision of transport services within the destination.” (Prideaux, 2000). He argued if tourists were hindered to travel to their chosen destinations by inefficiencies in the country’s public infrastructure, the likeliness of them choosing alternate destinations increases. This is because transport inadequacies create a lengthy and uncomfortable travel within a tourist’s travel destination as well as drives the cost of travel to uncompetitive prices (Prideaux, 2000; Seetanah et al, 2011). Based on a country’s transportation systems need for efficiency, Prideaux (2000) further argues that transportation infrastructure is a precondition of a successful tourism sector. However, Prideaux does not address the country’s government’s role in financing or arranging private sector capital to fund its transportation infrastructure.

In their journal article “Does Infrastructure Matter in Tourism Development” centered on the island of Mauritius, Seetanah et al (2011) mention that many different forms of infrastructure (road, communication, waste and energy) collectively serve as fundamental parts of a country’s tourism industry. The researchers suggest that the various types of infrastructure jointly comprise the basis for a country’s “tourism infrastructure” (Seetanah et al, 2011); and tourism infrastructure, is one of the leading drivers of tourism. Seetanah et al (2011) extend the measurement of the tourism infrastructure model to include the number of hotel rooms available within Mauritius. The authors reiterate that government expenditure on tourism infrastructure, among other tourism related spending such as tourism promotion, is highly significant for generating tourism demand. Moreover, in their extension of the tourism infrastructure model, they find that hotel capacity is statistically significant for travelers who seek to stay at hotels; but, it is not significant for tourists who prefer lower cost options (Seetanah et al, 2011).
Assaf and Jossiassen (2012) confirmed that a country’s tourism and related infrastructure base of quality roads, railroads, ports and airports was the most important determinant of tourism demand. This is because a tourist’s ease of movement is impacted by the quality of a nation’s infrastructure (Prideaux, 2000; Assaf and Jossiassen, 2012). The authors attempt to combine the road and land infrastructure with transportation infrastructure to create a more comprehensive definition of tourism infrastructure. The study is significant in that it also established that government expenditure was a highly ranked determinant that positively impacted tourism performance. Moreover, the small island, Jamaica, which has a similar political, economic and social system with the test countries of this thesis was included as a test country within Assaf and Jossiassen’s study. It was one of the nations showing a positive performance measurement against government expenditures and infrastructure.

Research conducted by Giap et al (2016) on tourism demand determinants in the developing country, Malaysia, produced statistically significant results that government expenditure on tourism promotion along with infrastructure investments in airport facilities created tourism sector growth. The study provides insight on three key factors relevant to this thesis: 1) it confirms that government expenditure is an important aspect of tourism demand and 2) reiterates the value of infrastructure as a tourism driver; and 3) by finding government expenditure on tourism promotion a causal factor of tourism sector growth in a developing test country, it establishes a link between government spending and a factor of nation branding (i.e. tourism promotion). The areas for further study based on gaps in Giap et al’s (2016) research include: 1) extending the conceptualization of tourism infrastructure to a more comprehensive categorization; and 2) assessing the impact of government expenditure on a newly conceptualized tourism infrastructure on tourism demand.
Li et al (2013) conducted a study on tourism development in Malaysia, using a triangular causal relationship model and inverted tests, and found that government capital investment in infrastructure and other tourism drivers leads to an increase in tourism receipts. The researchers then determined that, because of the increase in tourism receipts, economic growth within the country was achieved (Li et al, 2013). An important study that included Haiti and the Dominican Republic, along with other developing countries with similar political and socioeconomic backgrounds, measured the direct relationship between economic tourism and growth from 1985 to 1998 (Eugenio-Martin et al, 2004). Significant to this thesis, it was discovered that tourism increases if three key factors are established: infrastructures, education and safety. The implications from the Eugenio-Martin et al (2004) study are that capital investment in infrastructure and safety, factors which are essential for attracting tourist investors and tourists, will lead to an increase in tourism development.

1.1.3 Nation Branding as a Marketing Determinant

Nation branding is still developing as a concept in political science scholarship. An ongoing debate persists within the literature concerning nation branding. There is a misperception about nation branding solely being a marketing tool versus a concentrated strategy which governments can actively implement with the help of tourism promotional agencies. Challenges exist on how measure or conceptualize nation branding, as governments often confuse it with public relations; and, as a result, nations often employ promotional advertising campaigns instead of improving the structural problems within their country that contribute to their brand image. Despite the scholarly dispute, the consensus of authors, across all disciplines, is that nation branding a determinate of tourism demand.
Simon Anholt first coined "nation brand" term in 1996 (Anholt, 1996). The term referred to the genuine reputation of states; and, thereby, nation branding included the cities, regions and municipalities that behave similarly to brand images of corporations and products (Anholt, 2011). Anholt posited that those images are pivotal to advance, prosper and properly manage nations (Anholt, 1996; Anholt, 2011). To understand the dynamics of how to best brand a country, several researchers from various disciplines have adopted broad interpretations and variations of the nation brand designation. Because of extensions of the nation brand definition in the literature, there is a noted debate among scholars concerning the use of the nascent term “nation branding” (Anholt, 2011, Kaneva, 2011). Further, Anholt believes that the growing use of the term “nation branding” is misleading to his original theory on nation brands (Anholt, 2011); and governments, in collusion with branding consultants, mistakenly believe they can manipulate their country image using commercial advertising to promote a better reputation than they possess. The controversy over the practical use of nation branding in literature has created a lag in the discipline which needs to be remedied. Nation branding studies are pivotal for tourism development research to explain how to measure the impact of a country’s reputation on tourism arrivals and tourism investment. It is also valuable to understand how governments can develop a strong brand image despite having experienced political, social and economic widely known difficulties within their country’s borders.

The most comprehensive literature review on nation branding and state image comes from researcher Nadia Kaneva (Kaneva, 2011). In recognition of the discourse between scholars on the use of the terms nation brand versus nation branding, and to advance research on the subject matter, Kaneva argues that critical studies have a minority perspective in the ongoing debates about the nation branding concept (2011). To resolve this, the author reviewed 186
research studies across various disciplines, from 1997 to 2009, to clarify the actual significance of the numerous perspectives on nation brand research. Recognizing the widely accepted term “nation-branding” as the act of branding a nation (Kaneva, 2011), Kaneva identifies that there are three categories of literature, namely, technical-economic, political and cultural. Most relevant for the development of this thesis, are the studies classified as 1) technical-economic—which are concerned with economic growth, efficiency, and capital accumulation and include many tourism studies; and 2) political—which are mainly centered on the influence of country images on states’ participation in a global system in the area of international relations (Kaneva, 2011).

In today’s globalized world, nations and brand image integrate in the minds of potential customers and investors creating a “country of origin” effect (Van Ham, 2009). The country of origin effect is where a nation’s reputation influences consumer purchasing power or foreign direct investment (Van Ham, 2001; 2009). A state’s good reputation and image is part of its “strategic equity” (Van Ham, 2001) where a country, much like a company’s products, relies heavily on consumer and investor confidence based on their interpretation of that brand’s quality. Szondi, 2008, defined nation branding as the strategic self-preserving means in which countries created “reputational capital through economic, promotion and social interest promotion at home and abroad” (Szondi, 2008: 5). The main benefit of nation branding is to strengthen the country’s brand (Anholt, 2009), as well as improve the national image through promotional efforts. Morgan and Pitchard (2000) explained the importance of branding countries by stating that the competition for travelers in tourism is not achieved through brand value; instead, effective nation branding influences what is perceived and felt by travelers about the destination. Tourism branding and promotion cannot be conducted without considering the country’s image.
Therefore, tourism promotion is only successful if countries first develop a successful national brand (Cromwell, 2016).

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Several possible factors impact tourism demand. Therefore, predicting the specific elements that produces demand is complex. Despite the various possible variables that exist as determinants, certain significant tourism drivers can be further developed to help predict the likelihood that governments of developing countries can implement strategies that impact country image perceptions to attract more visitors and travel receipts. I argue that it is probabilistic that tourism arrivals and receipts, the dependent variable of this paper, is generated when travelers perceive a country’s image as positive and viable for travel based on a combination of three independent variables derived from the main drivers of tourism demand: public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding, a country’s ability to develop a strong brand that it can successfully market and promote to its target market of potential travelers. The premise for my theory is that governments, through state institutions and policies, can implement strategies that impact and change existing country image perceptions. This is accomplished when government institutions work together to create a favorable country brand by investing in the development of functional benefits {public safety and infrastructure quality, as foundation for destination’s appeal} that is supplied to the potential travelers who demand them in order to visit, lodge and spend money in the country.

My theoretical framework is based upon an expansion of the most statistically significant tourism demand determinants identified in the literature namely, political stability and security, infrastructure quality and nation branding as the vehicle for marketing promotions. In this paper, I develop more precise measurements for these variables as well as expand on the
operationalization of tourism demand in the form of “tourism arrivals and receipts” which serves as the dependent variable of this study. Table 2.1 outlines the expansion of the most significant determinants of tourism demand that was used as the basis for this paper’s independent variables.

Table 2.1 Theoretical Expansion of the Determinants of Tourism Demand Literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes/Influences</th>
<th>Tourism Demand Literature Independent Variables</th>
<th>Thesis Independent Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and Social</td>
<td>• Political Stability</td>
<td>• Public Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td>o Crime rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tourism Infrastructure</td>
<td>o Political stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Destination Attractiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pull Factors</td>
<td>• Nation Branding</td>
<td>• Infrastructure Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Marketing Promotions</td>
<td>o Government spending on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Private sector investment in infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Competitiveness</td>
<td>• Nation Branding</td>
<td>• Nation Branding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td>o Public tourism promotion investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Public Private Tourism Promotion Partnerships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 Public Safety Theory

Safety and security are prerequisites for successful tourism development, as tourists desire to travel to destinations that are safe and where security is assured (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006). If travelers believe a destination is unsafe, it will cause them to develop a negative impression of that destination, thereby causing tourism demand to decline (George, 2010; Ghaderi et al, 2017). The literature on tourism demand has established that political stability is a positive determinant of tourism demand. Scholarship has also determined that the converse relationship exists when instances of political instability threaten safety and security at tourist destinations. The focus on political stability as a measure of security is well founded. However, the measurement of security must be expanded include the examination of other potential security threats that may serve as deterrents to travel. There are four potential instigators of
security threats that may cause tourists to avoid a travel destination: 1) crime-related incidents; 2) terrorism; 3) war; 4) and civil/political unrest (Pizam, 2006). Terrorism, war and civil/political unrest and other violent occurrences are often linked and classified under political instability by researchers. Crime-related incidents are important, but not collectively included or considered in terms of its relationship to tourism demand as politically stability (Ghaderi et al, 2017).

However, crime-related incidents or the perception that a destination has a high level of crime could potentially render a destination as unsafe.

Findings on crime rates and tourism indicate that theft is often the widely reported crime against tourists (Glensor and Peak, 2004). However, in the event tourists do not report crimes against them, crime rate levels will indicate the overall safety of the travel destination. Crimes against tourists typically occur in areas that experience higher overall crime rates. Travelers are at risk to other crimes in addition to thefts such as assaults, homicides, robberies, scams and credit card fraud. Furthermore, the assessment of crime rate levels indicates the effectiveness of the government providing tourism security (Glensor and Peak, 2004). To address the gap in the literature that singularly addresses the impact of political stability on tourism demand and the lack of studies on the level of crime rates and tourism demand, I develop the public safety variable that includes the measurement of crime rates as well as political stability.

### 2.2 Infrastructure Investment Theory

Previous literature has measured investment in public infrastructure through infrastructure rankings that assess the quality of a nation’s infrastructure. Undoubtedly, a quality and modern infrastructure is an important driver of tourism development (Sakai, 2007; Jovanovic and Ilic, 2016) because infrastructure facilitates the commerce of tourism (Sakai, 2007). Infrastructure makes the private distribution of tourism services more efficient as all forms of
transportation infrastructure (road, air and sea) are important for travel to and within a destination - especially for countries with remote attractions to offer. Moreover, overnight tourists serve as temporary residents of a destination; therefore, the demand for physical infrastructure such as water, sewer, electricity and communication is also important for investment. Public infrastructure is a fundamental function of the government (Hodge and Greve, 2017), who will allocate public capital on infrastructure if tourism is intended to be a vital part of the country’s economy (2017).

The level of public expenditures the government allocates is directly correlated with its intention to actively develop its infrastructure (Sakai, 2007; Jovanovic and Ilic, 2016). In addition to public investment in infrastructure, it is important that the private sector is given incentives to invest in infrastructure. While the state is directly responsible for transportation and environmental infrastructure, social tourism infrastructure (rooms to accommodate tourists and other supportive physical structures that facilitate activities and services to attract tourists such as hotels, stadiums, convention centers and galleries) (Jovanavic and Ilic, 2016). Social infrastructure, as part of the overall tourism infrastructure framework, requires extensive investment from the private sector (Jovanavic and Ilic, 2016). Vives, Benavides, and Paris (2010, p. 412) contend that nearly all public infrastructure endeavors will need the participation of the public and private sectors; therefore, infrastructure projects are generally public-private partnerships. To effectively assess the government’s role in building and improving infrastructure, I will use government’s spending on infrastructure and private sector investment (including public-private partnerships in infrastructure) as the measurements for the infrastructure investment variable.
2.3 Nation Branding Theory

Nation branding has been a challenge for scholars to define and measure. The dispute on the conceptualization and operationalization has led to the creation of a country brand index which is more of a measurement of country image quality than it is on effective branding efforts. This paper bypasses the debate on how branding is operationalized to provide a simpler measurement for tourism promotions. The goal of nation branding is for countries to self-evaluate, conduct a situation analysis of the country’s strengths and weaknesses, and recognize what needs to be achieved to make the country more attractive as a destination (Nawaz & Hassan, 2016). For countries, this involves investing heavily in the factors that drive tourism, developing policies to encourage tourism and then promoting the country brand through marketing initiatives.

I will focus on how much public and private investment has been allocated to marketing promotions as the measurement for nation branding, including favorable policies that encourage tourism development. The public sector is responsible for building a country brand image and the promotion of its tourism sector outside of the country (Nawaz & Hassan, 2016). The level of capital investment from the public and private sectors signifies the priority governments place on building a positive image of their country. At the beginning of tourism development, government authorities from the national and regional level take a primary leadership role promoting tourism. To that end, the government is the pioneer in all facets of tourism development including marketing endeavors (Nawaz & Hassan, 2016). However, as tourism successfully develops through later stages, effective nation branding causes the public sector to partner with the private sector in its nation branding efforts (Göymen, 2000; Mckercher & Ritchie, 1997; Nawaz & Hassan, 2016). The evidence of public sector expenditures on tourism
marketing and public-private sector partnerships to promote tourism will serve as the variables that comprise nation branding in this paper.

2.4 Country Image Perception (Intervening Variable)

Country image perception is discussed in numerous scholarly reports on tourism development. This is because the perception of a country can contribute to its overall reputation over time in the mass tourism market based on the continual information potential travelers receive. The perception of a country’s image ultimately influences travelers’ decision to visit that destination. For travelers, a strong positive country brand image projecting a destination’s appeal will likely create a higher demand for travel to that destination over other possible destinations with weaker and negative brand images (Ezeudiji et al, 2016).

Country image perception is often caused by the image projected to and developed emotionally by travelers (Lopes, 2011; Rajesh, 2013; Ezeudiji et al, 2016). The traveler’s perception derives from direct travel experiences (Lopes, 2011; Ezeudiji et al, 2016) or from external information sources about a destination (Tasci & Gartner, 2007; Ezeudiji et al, 2016) that is then conveyed to the public. The destination travel information may take the form of a traveler’s country travel warning reports, mass media reports or by public comments made available to them from seemingly credible sources such as, for example, United States’ president Donald Trump’s “shithole” comment about Haiti. The information received about a destination, which affect tourist perceptions, are exogenous to the inbound travel destination; and, therefore, they are beyond the destination’s control. However, there are internal country image management strategies, in the form of nation branding, that destinations can implement to influence how their country is perceived.
Country image perception originates from tourism demand based on a traveler’s desire for destination attractiveness. Therefore, for a tourist destination, its supply (or its country’s brand essence) must project a positive country image to satisfy tourism demand. Crouch (2011) stated that it is up to the country to supply destination attractiveness, which is comprised of important elements: “the reality of the destination’s attributes and qualities (destination’s appeal), and how this reality is communicated to and perceived by tourists (destination’s knowledge and understanding), in comparison to the other information received about other destinations” (Crouch, 2011; as discussed in Ezeuduji et al, 2016). The country’s brand essence provides the “functional and emotional benefits of a brand” (de Chernatony & Harris, 2010 as discussed in Ezeuduji et al, 2016) as well as establishes the country’s competitive advantage over its potential competitors in the mass tourism market. As the costs associated with travel are large and infrequent, potential travelers will likely choose a destination with a positive image over one that is unfavorable; and, they will favor the destination that can offer the functional and emotional benefits demanded for traveling outside of their usual habitat (Ezeudiji et al, 2016). While the emotional benefits (i.e. visiting family, attending business events, sight-seeing and visiting attractions) (Ezeuduji et al, 2016) are acknowledged, the focus of this paper will be on the functional advantages that the destination can supply to meet a tourist’s demand. The functional benefits are tangible in nature, serve as the basis for a destination’s appeal and positive country image; and those benefits are comprised of a country’s physical characteristics such as tourism security, quality infrastructure and facilities (Pawitra & Tan, 2003; Vengesayi, 2003; Ezeudiji et al, 2016). Ultimately, to match tourism demand and exceed traveler’s destination costs, destinations need to provide a balance of functional and emotional advantages by producing a positive country brand.
2.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (Dependent Variable) Theory

Tourism demand is often measured in the literature by “international arrivals” per year indicating overnight stays or “international visitors per year” that includes all visitor types (i.e. cruise arrivals) if overnight arrival data is unavailable. For the purposes of this paper, I will expand on most of the literature’s operationalization of tourism demand and create a new dependent variable called “tourism arrivals and receipts”. Tourism arrivals and receipts will consist of two components: 1) the international arrivals per year and b) international receipts per year. Considering the case studies of this thesis will conduct analysis over a time series, over which one of the test countries departed the mass tourism market to evolve into a niche tourism market (which includes an extensive cruise tourism sector), it is important to evaluate the actual growth rates of tourism over time.

Figure 2.1 below provides a visual overview of the theoretical framework of this paper and how the independent variables interact with country image perception to generate increases in tourism arrivals and receipts.
2.6 Independent Variables

2.6.1 Public Safety (IV1)

a. **Conceptual definition:** State security measures taken to protect people against safety and security risks such as crime and unintended consequences of an involuntary nature such as political instability\(^1\). Two variables make up public safety, the main independent variable of this paper; and they are namely, crime rates and political stability.

1. **Crime rates**— Crime rate is the total crimes complied to “assess the effectiveness of a crime control policy, and the impact of the policy on the risk of crime victimization”\(^2\).

2. **Political stability**— Following Hurwitz, political stability is: “(1) the absence of violence; governmental longevity/duration; (3) the existence of a legitimate constitutional (4) the absence of structural change; and (5) a multifaceted societal”\(^3\)

b. **Operationalization:** Public Safety (IV1) will be measured using several data sources for the 1940-2017 period that covers the entire tourism cycles for the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

**Crime rates**— I will measure crime rates for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, from 1940-1999 using information gathered from: 1) Country Study on the Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress (Library of Congress, 2001) which contains a discussion of major crime incidents (such as homicides, assaults, thefts and robberies, drug trafficking related

---

\(^1\) Public safety definition—is my conceptual definition based on a combination of definitions from the tourism determinants literature defining safety and security. My conceptual definition is derived from this link: [https://erl.ucc.edu.g/pspu/bitstream/123456789/3157/1/GETRUDE%20POKU.pdf](https://erl.ucc.edu.g/pspu/bitstream/123456789/3157/1/GETRUDE%20POKU.pdf)


crime and rape). From 1995-2010, for the Dominican Republic, I will use the indicators from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UNODC measure is the number of intentional homicides (which is generally used in the literature on crime to measure crime rate level in many countries); and, intentional homicide is defined as unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person. From 2011-2017, I will use the number of intentional homicides data available in the Overseas Security Advisory Center (OSAC) Reports on Dominican Republic.

For Haiti, from 1999-2016, I will use the UNODC data on intentional homicides (available from 1999-2012) and use the U.N. MINUSTAH Audit Reports (for the 2013-2017 period) that reported data on intentional homicides.

For 1940-2017, much of the public safety (IV1) data on crime rates and political stability for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, is unavailable or sporadic. For both countries, published statistics for both indexes were instituted in the mid-1990’s. Furthermore, numerous international organizations assert that crime rates in the Dominican Republic and Haiti have been underreported (Library of Congress, 2001; OSAC, 2007-2018; MINUSTAH, 2012). As a result, I am using the more readily available international homicide rates to indicate crime levels where statistics on other types of crime which affect tourists (robberies and thefts, assaults, kidnappings, and rape) are widely unavailable for the time discussed in this paper. Due to the unreliable or missing data for the public safety (IV1), I have developed the following subjective judgment operationalization:

**IV1(A) Public safety/crime rates** –To distinguish between low and high crime rate levels, I will implement a scale of low, moderate, high and critical.
For crime rates preceding the time where actual numbers were reported (1940-1994), I will use the information discussed in the Library of Congress Report on the level of crime in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (2001) to assign the level of crime rate. For crime rate data that was reported in numbers during 1995-2017, the crime rate category will be based on the number of international homicides reported. The higher the number of international homicides reported, the more unsafe the country. The Overseas Security Advisory Center (OSAC - https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=22180) provides a description for each level of crime rate:

“Low”—indicates that there is low threat of crime and for reported international homicide numbers of 0-500; “Moderate”—indicates that the threat of crime is moderate, and there is some crime but it is less likely to occur and for reported international homicide rates of 501-1,000; “High”—indicates that the threat of crime is high, common and there is a likely chance of occurrence and for international homicide rates of 1001-2000; and “Critical” – the highest level – indicates that the threat of crime is very common, very high, imminent and very likely to occur, and for international homicide rates of 2001-above. The lower the level of crime rate, the higher the public safety level.

periods of political stability/instability for each country. For 1996-2017, I will measure political stability using the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project that reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories over the period 1996–2016, for six dimensions of governance solely focusing on the political stability and absence of violence statistics as the measure for political stability. The WGI percentile rank indicators for political stability and absence of violence/terrorism “measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism” (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=1181&series=PV.PER.RNK). Percentile rank indicates the rank of a country among all countries that are covered by the indicator. “0” corresponds to the lowest rank and “100” to the highest rank.

Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the public safety (IV1) prior to 1995, I have developed the following subjective judgment operationalization:

IV1(B) Public safety/political stability— To distinguish between the lowest percentile rank and highest percentile rank of political stability in each test country, I will implement a scale of stable, moderate, and unstable. Expanding on the WGI’s percentile rank measurement definition, a percentile rank of “0-49” corresponds to unstable (active incidents of violence, political unrest and political instability); a percentile rank of “50-89” corresponds to moderately stable (no major incidents, there may be some random political unrest or temporary instability incidents); and a percentile rank of “90-100” corresponds to stable (no threat of major incidents, political

---

unrest, violence and political instability is unlikely). For political stability information during the period, 1940-1994, I will assign the level of stability from the information reported in the Library of Congress Report on Haiti and the Dominican Republic (2001). For political stability that was reported in country rank figures by the WGI from 1995-2016, the closer the percentile rank of the country is to 100, the more stable the country. The more politically stable the country, the higher the public safety level.

**Public Safety (IV1) Hypothesis** - The lower the level of crime rates and the more political stable the country, the higher the public safety which produces a positive country image perception that attracts more tourism arrivals and receipts.

### 2.6.2 Infrastructure Investment (IV2)

a. **Conceptual definition**: the public and private spending on all the facilities used to deliver energy, water, sanitation, telecommunication and transport (land, air, and sea). Two variables make up infrastructure investment, a main independent variable of this paper; and they are namely, public spending on infrastructure and private sector investment in infrastructure.

1. **Public spending on infrastructure**— state, regional and local spending on infrastructure services. Infrastructure is defined to cover six sectors: irrigation, energy (primarily power), transport, communication, wastewater management, and water supply.

2. **Private sector investment in infrastructure**— capital investments in infrastructure in the form of a) full privatization or stand alone in infrastructure developments.

---


or projects; or b) public-private partnerships (PPPs), which are partnerships between public sector organizations and private sector investors and business for the purpose of designing, planning, financing, constructing, providing and/or operating infrastructure, facilities or related services. 

b. **Operationalization:** Infrastructure investment (IV2) will be measured using several data sources for the 1940-2017-time period that covers the entire tourism cycles for the Dominican Republic and Haiti.


---


Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the IV2(A) infrastructure investment/public spending on infrastructure prior to 2018, I have developed the following subjective judgment operationalization:

**IV2(A) Infrastructure investment/public spending on infrastructure:**—To distinguish between low and high infrastructure investment levels, I will implement a scale of low, moderate, and high. For the period 1940-2017 for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, specific capital investment was not readily available for the entire period. However, based on information provided by the reports on public spending mentioned above on public infrastructure building and improvements, a classification can be made on the level of infrastructure investment for this period. For capital investments in infrastructure that was available, the categories covered under the scale for public spending on infrastructure are as follows: a “low” level investment (in millions) corresponds to $0-500; a “moderate” level investment corresponds to $501-1,000; and a “high” level investment corresponds to $1,001-above. The higher the level of public spending on infrastructure, the higher the infrastructure investment.

**Private sector investment in infrastructure**—I will measure private sector investment in the Dominican Republic, from 1940 - 2017 using information provided on a) public-private partnerships for investment in energy, water, sanitation, telecommunication and transport (land, air, and sea) infrastructure (PPI); and b) the number of hotel rooms, representing tourism physical infrastructure, gathered from the following sources: 1) 2001 Country Study on the Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress (for the time period 1940-2001); 2) IMF
Working Paper, 2007 (for the time period 2002-2006); 3) The Seaside Resorts in the Dominican Republic; A Typology journal article (Myer-Arendt, 1992); 4) Tourism in the Dominican Republic Project Paper (Barrera et al, 2007); 5) Tourism Development in the Dominican Republic: An examination of the impact on coastal households (Duffy et al, 2016); and 6) PPP capital investment data (in millions USD) from the PPP Knowledge Lab: https://pppknowledgelab.org/ (for the time period 1990-2017). For Haiti, I will measure private sector investment in infrastructure for the time period 1940 - 1990 using information provided on a) public-private partnerships for investment in energy, water, sanitation, telecommunication and transport (land, air, and sea) infrastructure; and b) the number of hotel rooms, gathered from the following sources: 1) 2001 Country Study on the Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress; 2) The Haitian Dilemma journal article (Preeg, 1996); Reviving Haiti’s Paradise journal article (Luxner, 1999); and 4) PPP capital investment data (in millions USD) from the PPP Knowledge Lab: https://pppknowledgelab.org/ (for the time period 1990-2017).

Due to the unreliable or missing data for IV2(B) Infrastructure Investment/ Private sector investment in infrastructure, I have developed the following subjective judgment operationalization:

IV2(B) Infrastructure Investment/Private sector investment in infrastructure— I will implement a scale of low, moderate, and high to indicate a) the level of public-private partnerships in infrastructure (PPI) and a scale of low, moderate, high and very high to

---

indicate b) the level of hotel rooms investment that funded infrastructure projects and hotel developments between 1940-2017. For PPIs, the World Bank’s PPI Database reports capital investment in infrastructure in millions (USD). Based on information provided by the World Bank’s PPP Knowledge Lab, a “low” level investment (in millions) corresponds to $0-500; a “moderate” level investment corresponds to $501-1,000; and a “high” level investment corresponds to $1,001-above. The higher the level of PPP investment in infrastructure, the higher the infrastructure investment. For the level of hotel rooms investment, a “low” number of hotel rooms corresponds to 0-7,999; a “moderate” level investment corresponds to 8,000-19,999; a “high” level investment corresponds to 20,000-49,999; and a “very high” level investment corresponds to “50,000-above”.

**Infrastructure Investment (IV2) Hypothesis** – The higher the level of public spending and private sector investment in infrastructure, the higher the investment in infrastructure which produces a positive country image perception that attracts tourism arrivals and receipts.

### 2.6.3 Nation Branding (IV3)

a. **Conceptual definition**: Defined as the coordinated government efforts to manage a country’s image in order to promote tourism, investment and foreign relations¹¹ (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). Nation branding consists of two variables:

1. **Public tourism promotion investment**— National, regional and local government expenditures spent to advance tourism promotional activities including tourism

---

promotion, marketing, visitor information services, administrative and other public services related to tourism development.12

2. Public-private tourism promotion partnership—a partnership between the public and private sector to develop, position and execute destination branding, tourism promotion and marketing activities.13

b. Operationalization: The nation branding (IV3) will be measured using several data sources for the 1940-2017-time period that covers the entire tourism cycles for the Dominican Republic and Haiti.


---


13 Public-private tourism promotion partnership definition— is my conceptual definition based on the World Travel and Tourism Council discussion on private sector’s marketing role in conjunction with the public sector http://www.ontit.it/opencms/export/sites/default/ont/it/documenti/archivio/files/ONT_2003-08-13_00163.pdf

For the Dominican Republic and Haiti, for the period 1995 – 2017, I will measure public tourism promotion investment using the “government spending on travel and tourism percentage” statistics from the World Bank’s World Trade and Tourism Council data set\(^\text{14}\). The figures include a percentage of total tourism expenditures of local and regional government individual spending on the indices used to assess nation branding for tourism development such as tourism marketing, visitor information services, administrative services and other public services associated with tourism promotion. The World Economic Forum that produces the Travel and Tourism annual reports by country indicate that the percentage is used to determine the level of priority that governments give to travel and tourism promotion.

Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the IV3(A) nation branding/public tourism promotion investment prior to 2017, I have developed the following subjective judgment operationalization:

**IV3(A) nation branding/public tourism promotion investment:** To distinguish between low and high public tourism promotion investment levels, I will implement a scale of low, moderate, and high. For the period 1940-1994, for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, public tourism promotion investment financial statistics were not readily available for the entire period. However, based on information provided by the reports on public tourism promotion investment mentioned above on government investment in

tourism promotion, a classification can be made on the level of tourism promotion investment from the public sector for this time. For the period 1995-2018, I used the “government spending on travel and tourism percentage” statistics from the World Bank’s World Trade and Tourism Council to determine the percentage levels for the nation branding/tourism promotion investment’s “low-moderate and high” scale in conjunction with the World Trade Council’s methodology for investment level. A “low” level was based on a percentage of 0-9% of total tourism expenditures on public tourism promotion; a “moderate” level investment was based on a percentage of 10-19% of total tourism expenditures on public tourism promotion; and a “high” level investment was based on a percentage of 20%-up of total tourism expenditures on public tourism promotion. The higher the level of public tourism promotion investment, the more effective the nation branding.

Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the IV3(B) nation branding/public-private tourism promotion partnerships from 1940-2017, I have developed the following subjective judgment operationalization:

**IV3(B) nation branding/public-private tourism promotion partnerships:** I will implement a scale of low, moderate, and high. For the period 1940-2011, for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, public-private tourism promotion partnership spending data was not available for the entire period. However, based on information provided by the reports on public-private partnerships for tourism promotion, a classification can be made on the level of tourism promotion investment for this time. The higher the level of investment of public-private sector tourism promotion partnerships, the more effective the nation branding strategy.

**Nation Branding (IV3) Hypothesis:** The higher the level of public tourism promotion investment and public-private partnerships, the higher the nation branding which produces a positive country image perception that attracts tourism arrivals and receipts.

2.7 **Intervening Variable**

2.7.1 **Country Image Perception**

a. **Conceptual definition of intervening variable:** the sum of beliefs, ideals, and impressions people have toward a certain country based on interpreted information received regardless of the nation’s real character\(^\text{15}\). In this paper, country image perception is measured by travel destination information.

\(^{15}\) Country image perception—the conceptual definition is developed following a combination of concepts from the country image literature (Nagashimu, 1970; Shields, 1991; Martin and Eroglu, 1993; and Haider et al, 1994)
b. **Conceptual definition of Travel Destination Information (TDI):** interpreted information received by potential visitors about a country from secondary (induced, organic and autonomous information compiled from other people or through organizations) sources that creates a perceived image of the country as a travel destination and influences potential visitors’ travel behavior.\(^{16}\)

- **Mass media reports**—is a diversified collection of media technologies, in the form of print, digital, and broadcast, that provides information to a wide public audience.\(^{17}\)

- **Travel guides**—A printed or digital book that provides information and advice about the culture, history, geographical location, accommodations, restaurants, attractions, transportation and activities of travel destinations to actual or potential visitors or tourists.\(^{18}\)

- **Travel destination surveys**—Travel destination survey is a detailed investigative study of a travel market, destination or geographical area used to collect data on attitudes, impressions, opinions, preferences, satisfaction level by polling a section of the population.\(^{19}\)

---

\(^{16}\) Travel destination information (TDI)—the conceptual definition is developed through a combination of concepts from the following source: Marine-Roig, E. (2017). Measuring Destination Image through Travel Reviews in Search Engines. *Sustainability*, 9(8), 1425. doi:10.3390/su9081425


\(^{19}\) Travel destination surveys—the conceptual definition is developed using a combination of concepts from: OECD-https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2620

- **Travel reviews**—subjective published accounts by visitors of a travel destination that offer potential travelers with information about the travel destination, including opinions about the country, its attractions and amenities, hotel accommodations, restaurants and other country travel information based on the travel review writer’s first-hand experience\(^{20}\).

- **Country safety rankings**—indices of compiled and analyzed data from public sources that rank the world’s countries by safety\(^ {21}\).

c. **Operationalization:** The more favorable the travel destination information (mass media reports, surveys, travel reviews and country safety rankings), the more positive a potential traveler’s perception of a country’s image as a viable travel destination. For the test countries, Dominican Republic and Haiti, I will measure country image perception using travel destination information as referenced in Appendix U.

2.8 **Dependent Variable**

2.8.1 **Tourism Arrivals and Receipts**

a. **Conceptual definition:** the total number of people who travel or desire to travel, and the total amount of money they spend to use tourist facilities and services at their travel destination—which is located away from their places of work or residence\(^ {22}\). Tourism arrivals and receipts are comprised of 1) the number of international tourism arrivals; and 2) international tourism receipts per year.

---

\(^{20}\) Travel reviews—the conceptual definition is based on my research on travel reviews (source: Trip Advisor report https://www.tripadvisor.com/pdfs/OnlineTravelReviewReport.pdf) and my own understanding of the purpose of travel reviews.

\(^{21}\) Country safety rankings—the conceptual definition is based on indices on safety rankings: Safe Around: https://safearound.com/danger-rankings/

\(^{22}\) Tourism growth—the reference to tourism growth is based on an expansion of Cooper et al., 1993 (Cooper, C., Fletcher, J., Gilbert, D., & Wanhill, S. (1993), "Tourism: principles & practice", Longman: Harlow, UK.) definition on tourism demand. I combine the two common measurements of tourism demand namely, number of tourist arrivals and tourism receipts per year. The number of arrivals and receipts over time is referred to as each country’s overall tourism growth.
1. Number of international tourism arrivals\textsuperscript{23} -- Refers exclusively to:
   a. Tourists (overnight visitors) i.e. a visitor who stays at least one night in a collective or private accommodation in the country visited. Same-day visitors are not included.
   b. The number of arrivals - not to the number of persons. The same person who makes several trips to a given country during a given period will be counted as a new arrival each time, as well as a person who travels through several countries on one trip is counted as a new arrival each time.

2. International tourism receipts per year (ITRs)\textsuperscript{24} -- ITRs are receipts earned by a destination country from inbound tourism. The ITRs scope:
   a. ITRs cover all tourism receipts resulting from expenditure made by visitor arrivals from abroad.
   b. Include the receipts generated by overnight as well as by same-day trips.
   c. But exclude the receipts related to international transport contracted by residents of other countries (for instance ticket receipts from foreigners travelling with a national company)

b. \textbf{Operationalization}: For the dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts, in the Dominican Republic and Haiti I will use World Bank data for the two measurements of tourism arrivals and receipts: a) “number of international tourism arrivals” and b) “international tourism receipts per year” available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.RCPT.CD for the period 1995-2017. For the number of international tourism arrivals and international receipts per year data, prior

\textsuperscript{23} Number of international tourism arrivals is defined by the UNWTO World Tourism Organization
\textsuperscript{24} International tourism receipts is defined by the UNWTO World Tourism Organization
to 1995 (1960-1994), I will use statistics compiled from the following sources: a) for Haiti: The Political Economy of Survival Reduced Haiti (Fass, 1990); The Library of Congress Country Report on Haiti and Dominican Republic, 2001; and b) for the Dominican Republic: The Library of Congress Country Report on Haiti and Dominican Republic, 2001; Tourism Development in the Dominican Republic (Fuller, 1999); Economic Growth Data Report on the Caribbean (1980-1986); and the Dominican Republic Tourism Report (1979-1992). The higher the number of international tourism arrivals and the higher the international tourism receipts per year, the higher the increases in tourism arrivals and receipts.

To make comparisons of annual or period growth for each measurement of my dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts, I calculate the growth rate in terms of percentage growth. For the calculation, I used the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) method\textsuperscript{25} to calculate the growth rate either annually or per tourism period (depends on the available years for statistics on arrivals and receipts), for each test country; and, then I calculated the growth rate either yearly (where available) by the entire tourism period (to show the total rate of growth for that time). I divided the value of the arrivals and the receipts, respectively, at the end of the period in question by its value at the beginning of that period, raise the result to the power of one divided by the period length, and subtracted one from the subsequent result. After the conversions, I developed a graphs to show the variation of tourism arrivals and receipts per period.

Due to the unreliable or missing data for the DV-tourism arrivals and receipts/number of international tourism arrivals and international tourism receipts per year from 1940-1994,

\textsuperscript{25} https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cagr.asp
I have developed the following subjective judgment operationalization: The number of international tourism arrivals and international receipts will converted to the percentage rate of growth (either over time if there is a gap in years between figures or yearly if the available statistics are sequential. A scale of low, moderate and high level will be assigned to DV(A) tourism arrivals and receipts/number of international arrivals as follows: After obtaining the growth rate by period, I compare the growth rate results to the average growth rate for that region during each period of time using data about the average growth rate from the Americas from the World Tourism Organization (from http://tourlib.net/wto/WTO_highlights_2000.pdf). According to the 2000 World Tourism Organization Report (WTO, 2000), “Between 1950 and 1980 the number of international arrivals corresponded to an average growth rate of 7% for the Caribbean region. My starting point for all tourism arrivals and receipts scales covering the tourism time periods in this paper (1940-2016) is to place any number under the “average growth rate” under the “low” category. Any number within 2% over the average growth rate is “moderate” and 3% over the average growth rate is high. The average tourism arrivals and receipts rate scale (for 1950-1980) is as follows: a “low” average tourism arrivals and receipts rate corresponds to 0-6.99%; a “moderate” average tourism arrivals and receipts rate corresponds to 7-9.99%; and a high average tourism arrivals and receipts rate corresponds to 10%-above. According to the 2017 World Tourism Organization Report (WTO, 2017), the number of international arrivals in the Caribbean region for the period, 1980-1995, corresponded to an average growth rate of 5 per cent. For the average tourism arrivals and receipts rate scale (for 1980-1995): a “low” average growth rate of international arrivals corresponds to 0-4.99%; a “moderate” average growth rate of
international arrivals corresponds to 5-7.99%; and a “high” average growth rate of international arrivals corresponds to 8% - above. Also, according to the 2017 World Tourism Organization Report (WTO, 2017), for the scale from 1995-2016, the number of international arrivals in the Caribbean region corresponded to an average annual growth rate of 2.7 per cent. For the tourism arrivals and receipts rate scale (for 1995-2016): a “low” average growth rate of international arrivals corresponds to 0-2.69%; a “moderate” average growth rate of international arrivals corresponds to 2.7-4.99%; and a high average growth rate of international arrivals corresponds to 5%-above.

For DV(B) tourism arrivals and receipts/number of international receipts per year, a scale of low, moderate and high level average tourism arrivals and receipts rate of receipts will be assigned as follows: For growth in yearly receipts, growth for the Caribbean was approximately 10% annually between 1940 and 1990 and the receipts from tourism were approximately 13% between 1990-2000. For years that overlap, I multiply the average growth rate for each of the years that overlap by the number of years in each period of the overlap. Subsequently, I add the overlapping year amounts and divide by the total number of years to get the average growth for the period. Tourism receipt average growth rate fell in 2000 to 3.9% (Hills and Lundgren, 1977). The average tourism arrivals and receipts rate scale for international annual receipts (1940-1990) is as follows: a “low” average growth rate of receipts corresponds to 0-9.99%; a “moderate” average growth rate of receipts tourism corresponds to 10-12.99%; and a high tourism arrivals and receipts corresponds to 13%-above. The average tourism arrivals and receipts scale for international annual tourism receipts (for 1990-2000) is as follows: a “low” average growth rate of receipts corresponds to 12.99%; a “moderate” average growth rate of
revenues corresponds to 13-17.99%; and a high average growth rate of receipts corresponds to 18%-above. The average tourism arrivals and receipts scale for international annual tourism receipts (for 2000-2016) is as follows: a “low” average growth rate of tourism receipts corresponds to 0-3.89%; a “moderate” average growth rate of tourism receipts corresponds to 3.9-5.99%; and a “high” average growth rate of tourism receipts corresponds to 6%-above.

2.9 Methodology

To investigate my question, I employ three qualitative comparative analysis case studies evaluating the theoretical arguments presented in this study. I analyze the years when tourism was in the nascent stage of development in the two test countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, to the present (1940-2017), divided in block of twenty-year periods: 1940-1960; 1961-1980; 1981-2000; and 2000-2017, for most of the variables in this paper. The first case study is an evolution of Haiti’s tourism sector, a time series comparison evaluating the individual relationship between public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding on tourism arrivals and receipts. In addition, I also examine the interaction of the independent variables to create a positive country image that generates tourism arrivals and receipts. The second case study conducts the same analysis on the Dominican Republic. Finally, the third case study conducts a similar analysis in a comparative study between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

The statistics on the variables which comprise the independent (public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding), interactive (country image perception) and dependent (tourism arrivals and receipts) variables of this study come from multiple data sources. For the data on public safety comprised of crime rates and political stability percentile ranks for 1940-2017, I compile and organize the major crime incidents and threats to political
stability into the four periods of each test countries' tourism development into tables and graphs
that indicate the crime rate and political stability level (see Appendices A-D for Haiti and
Appendices K-N for the Dominican Republic). For the information on infrastructure investment
comprised of public expenditures, private sector and public-private partnership capital
investments in infrastructure for 1940-2017 (into the four tourism development time periods), I
organize the data on infrastructure investments, classify the type of investment and the level of
investments in tables and graphs (see Appendices E-F for Haiti and Appendices O-P for the
Dominican Republic). Likewise, for the information on nation branding comprised of public and
private tourism promotion investment, I compile the data in tables and graphs for the tourism
period and categorize the investment type and level for each of the test countries (see
Appendices G-H for Haiti and Appendices Q-R for the Dominican Republic).

For the interactive variable, country image perception, there were several forms of travel
destination information sources (from mass media reports, travel guides, travel reviews and
country safety rankings) that provided either favorable or unfavorable reviews of Haiti and the
Dominican Republic, respectively. I examined each of the data sources and provided a
categorical scale for the country perception for Haiti and Dominican Republic divided in ten-
year time intervals covering 1940-2018 (see Appendix I for Haiti and Appendix S for the
Dominican Republic). Finally, the statistics for tourism arrivals and receipts for 1940-2017 were
provided by the World Bank and various country reports on Haiti and the Dominican Republic or
Caribbean regional reports. I organized the raw data into spreadsheet and developed graphs to
show the variation of tourism graph over designated tourism period covered in this paper. Then,
I assigned a scale level for international arrivals and receipts for each of the test countries (see
Appendices J for Haiti’s tourism arrivals and receipts and Appendices T for the Dominican Republic’s tourism arrivals and receipts).

For each of the variables of this paper, scaled categories were defined as subjective judgements to compensate for either missing, unreliable or unreported information. The scaled categories, for each variable, are compatible to make analysis of the relationship between them more transparent. After the designating the scaled ratings for each variable, I compiled a final table comprised of all the variables of this paper and their corresponding rating for both test countries namely, Haiti and the Dominican Republic (see Tables 3.1 and 4.1 on the following pages). I will use these tables as the basis for the three case study analyses.
Table 3.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts in Haiti (1940-2016): Scaled ratings based on analysis of data compiled for each variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tourism Periods</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Interactive Variable</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Tourism 1930-1940</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High (1930-1940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprived Tourism 1981-2010</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejuvenated Tourism 2011-2016</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 The names of each tourism period are loosely based on based on Hugues Séraphin’s 2016 study on marketing to diaspora community, which categorized the level of tourism that existed during those times.

27 Tourism growth (in terms of absolute numbers over time)—no figures available prior to tourism starting in Haiti in 1945.

28 The ratings for each scale are reported except as footnoted as there may be deviations in terms of how data sources report their scaled statistics inconsistent with the scales used in this report.

29 OSAC (2012-2017) Reports on Haiti rated the crime level as “critical” in their scale whereas the scale of this study classifies it as “high” instead.

30 WGI indicators indicate levels of political stability for Haiti that would classify the country as “unstable”. However, the indicator is based solely on measuring “absence of violence” as a security risk measurement; this indicator does not indicate the potential governance level which would provide a better measurement for stable government (such as governance and the effectiveness of its government institutions, rule of law and corruption levels.)
Table 4.1 Tourism arrivals and receipts in the Dominican Republic (1930-2016): Scaled ratings based on analysis of data compiled for each variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tourism Periods</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Interactive Variable</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Safety</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Nation Branding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Investment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime Rates31</td>
<td>Public &amp; Public-</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre- Tourism 1930-196032</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Tourism 1961-1980</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Unstable (1961-1975)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Tourism 1981-2000</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Tourism 2000-2016</td>
<td>High-Critical33</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3  ANALYSIS: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

As indicated in the methodology section of this paper, I analyze the theory of this paper in this section and conduct hypothesis tests on two countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic to determine if there is an impact tourism arrivals and receipts as predicted.

---

31 The ratings for each scale are reported except as footnoted as there may be deviations in terms of how data sources report their scaled statistics inconsistent with the scales used in this report.
32 While tourism was non-existent in the Dominican Republic until 1971, this period is included to show overall variance with later periods; and to remain consistent with the period for comparison purposes with Haiti.
33 OSAC (2012-2017) Reports on the Dominican Republic rated the crime level as “high” (2001-2014) and then “critical” in their scale from 2015-2017 and the data on crime levels per homicides supports this rating.
3.1 Haiti Tourism Case Study (1940-2017)

3.1.1 Public Safety

From the time that Haiti’s tourism sector began developing in the mid-1940s, the Haitian government continually declared that it was crime free up until 1986 when crime rates began rising considerably. Tourists, prior to 1986, enjoyed attractions and resorts that were “virtually free of street crime” (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Moreover, aside from instances where the country experienced political instability: 1) during 1956-57, when President Paul Magloire was overthrown for attempting to extend his constitutional term of office (Haggerty, 1989) and the country experienced five governments within a nine-month period; and 2) during President Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier’s administration from 1962-1971, the country was moderately stable until Duvalier’s son, Jean Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier was overthrown in 1986 (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Haggerty, 1989). Tourism arrivals and receipts was high through Haiti’s “Golden Tourism Period” (1940-1980), as it averaged a total growth rate of 14% for international arrivals and international receipts. This figure was double the regional growth rate of 7% for international arrivals in the Caribbean; and, Haiti was also faring higher than the growth rates for international receipts which was 10% (see Appendices J.1 and J.2). As there were bouts of political instability, the rate of tourism arrivals and receipts (in terms of international arrivals as international receipts data is sporadic) slowed before picking back up in 1972 after Jean Claude Duvalier instituted many policies favoring private investment geared towards tourism development (Country Report, 2001).

In 1945, when tourism started, Haiti’s international arrivals was 5,000. By 1956, arrivals grew to 67,000 (nearly 5.5 times the amount of its 1950 figure-12,000 arrivals). In 1963, during Francois Duvalier’s brutal dictatorship, the arrivals fell to under 50,000; but, they climbed to
over 159,000 by 1972 after Jean Claude Duvalier took office and kept rising until its peak in 1979 with 338,900 (Figure 3.2). From 1980-1986, during which political unrest was beginning to stir leading to Jean Claude Duvalier’s ouster in 1986, tourism arrivals and receipts remained at moderate levels; however, the number of arrivals was slowly declining while the tourism receipts from 1979-1984 was steadier (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3-1 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1945-1984)

Figure 3-2 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1995-2015)
Following Jean-Claude Duvalier’s coup in 1986, a long-standing history of political instability began to plague Haiti. The country had 18 regime changes of government between 1986 and 2014 with former presidents Leslie Manigat ousted in a coup in 1988 and Jean Bertrand Aristide overthrown in 1991 (he was restored in 1994 and finished his term in 1996) and 2004 (after returning to power in 2001) (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Furthermore, since the crime rate levels were simultaneously rising around 1986 (and a rumor arose linking the origin of the AIDS virus to Haiti in 1982), tourism arrivals and receipts in terms of overnight visitors severely declined to stagnant levels. While Haiti’s cruise ship tourism began to significantly rise in the 2000s, the dynamics of Haiti’s tourism sector concerning overnight visitors transitioned from a mass tourism contender to a niche tourism market of diaspora, business and aid/missionary travelers. Haiti’s inability to manage public safety since 1986 appears to be a major contributing factor in the decline of overall tourism arrivals and receipts.
Haiti’s military forces, the Forces Armees d’Haiti (FAd’H), had been policing the country, as Haiti had no national police force until one was instituted in 1989 (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Fad’H found itself unable to combat the severe security and crime the country was facing by the late 1980s was inadequate. Despite the Haitian National Police (HNP) finally being instituted, managing crime has remained a major challenge for the country. After Jean Bertrand Aristide’s coup in 2004, the United Nations sent peacekeeping forces (MINUSTAH) for 13 years to assist the HPN and bring stability to the country. However, MINUSTAH’s legacy is a reported mixture of partial success and disaster. The mission was blamed for bringing the cholera to the country post-Haiti’s 2010 earthquake and 134 members of MINUSTAH have been accused of sexual assault crimes (Johnston, 2017). While MINUSTAH has been credited with restoring some stability (the slight rise of which is evident in Appendix D from 2009-2016), the country remains classified as “unstable” according to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) measuring the likeliness of political instability and/or politically motivated violence. Unfortunately, the classification was confirmed as Haiti’s recent bout of violent protests in Haiti stranded several missionary groups, mostly from the United States.

A recent report by the U.S. Department of State on Haiti, indicates that the Haitian National Police has been underreporting the country’s crime rates. The underreporting of crime insinuates that Haiti is statistically safer than its Caribbean counterparts (OSAC Report, 2018). Haiti, like many countries in its region, had not been providing reliable data on recorded crimes for several years. In fact, recoding systems for crime reporting were not instituted in Haiti until 2000 (UNODC Report, 2002). For the last seven years that OSAC has reported on Haiti, the U.S. Department of State has been classifying Haiti’s crime rate levels as “critical” (OSAC
Reports, 2012-2018); however, the scale for crime rates in this paper classifies Haiti as “high” due to its reported homicide estimates from 1999-2016 as well as the limited data available for other forms of crime (see Table 3.1 in the Methodology section; and, Appendix A and B for Haiti’s specific crime rate information).

3.1.2 Infrastructure Investment

Haiti’s overall infrastructure has been considered poor quality and a deterrent to sustainable tourism in terms of increased overnight visitor arrivals (cruise ship travelers are often insulated from being impacted by infrastructure problems as the cruise lines are “all-inclusive” sea resorts where traveler’s do not remain overnight). Prior to the advent of the country’s tourism sector in 1945, the United States was occupied in Haiti and invested extensively in building Haiti’s infrastructure in terms of roads, bridges, canals, public buildings, telecommunications, water and sewage. This massive investment contributed to the start of the country’s tourism infrastructure. By 1980, the public and public-private investment in infrastructure continued to grow with paved road projects constructed in Haiti’s major cities as well as the construction of an 80-mile from Port au Prince to Cap Hatien, i.e. “Route de L’Amitie Franco Hatienne (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Also, by 1980, private investment in terms of hotel accommodations increased from under 1,000 in 1941 to 2,000 rooms in 1960 to 3,000 rooms in 1980. The rate of hotel development during that time, to accommodate the rate of tourism arrivals and receipts Haiti was experiencing, was rapid as Haiti went from having low number of hotels at the start of its tourism sector to a moderate level. Examining the relationship between infrastructure from 1930-1980, the level of investment in infrastructure appears to be positively correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts which grew high during that period.
Since 1980, public investment in infrastructure (which, in the indices of this paper on infrastructure level, is combined with public-private partnerships (PPI) in infrastructure; this is because infrastructure projects (electricity, transportation, ports, water and sewage) are usually funded by a combination of public and public-private-partnership capital) has been rated low (see Table 3.1 in the Methodology section; and, Appendix E and F for Haiti’s Infrastructure Investment index and graphs). During 1981-2000, infrastructure projects did not exceed $500 million (Preeg, 1996; Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). According to the PPI Index, private participation in infrastructure, which is important for governments to secure to finance the extensive capital required for infrastructure projects, totaled just $129 million (to illustrate the stark contrast in investment, a comparison with the Dominican Republic’s PPI investment will be discussed in the third case study of this paper). Also, private investment receded when the number of hotel rooms decreased from 3000 in 1980 to 800 by 1999 due to a loss of tourism arrivals and receipts (to be explained further in the discussion on the interactive effects of country image perception). Moreover, for the period 2001-2017, a high level of private capital was allocated to build or improve infrastructure in Haiti, especially after the 2010 earthquake. However, only a fraction of the amount allocated was disbursed; and, accordingly, few infrastructure projects pledged were executed (PEMFAR Accountability Report, 2008; U.S. Government Accountability Office (GOA) Report, 2013)). For example, from the United States, $1.14 billion was granted by Congress and USAID pledged $651 million to building Haiti’s infrastructure which had amassed nearly $13.2 billion in damages (IADB Country Report, 2013; GOA Report, 2013). Despite this allocation, only $203 million was disbursed by the end of the accountability of funds period in 2013. Further, a $260 million project proposed in 2013 to develop ecotourism in Ile-la-Vache was halted in 2015. Haiti did have some success with its
telecommunications sector due to the Haitian government signing a public-private partnership with the Vietnam telecommunication company, Viettel, for nearly $100 million to upgrade infrastructure and services. Post-earthquake, it was one of the highest delivered capital investment in infrastructure projects to be completed.

Pending infrastructure amounts pledged and outstanding amounts allocated, but not yet disbursed, represent opportunities for increasing tourism arrivals and receipts for Haiti. During the 2000-2017, private investment in terms of hotel accommodations increased from 2,000 rooms in 2010 to nearly 4,322 by 2015 (Export.gov, 2017). After the earthquake, several hotels needed to be rebuilt and aid workers and missionaries involved in the reconstruction needed lodging. Minister of Tourism Stephanie Villedrouin acknowledged the post-earthquake growth in a 2015 article with the Haitian publication, Le Nouvelliste, and indicated that direct investments to tourism were $345 million (a moderate level amount according to the scale of this paper) (Le Nouvelliste, 2015). Further, she stated that Haiti saw a 40% increase in hotel rooms from 2011 to 2015 and claimed that the total number of hotel rooms was 9,280 (with 4,861 "classified rooms of international standard of 1 to 5 hibiscus rating, in 177 hotels). Despite the disparity in number of reported hotel rooms, private investment infrastructure from 2011-2018 has been rated as high. Tourism arrivals and receipts (the most recent numbers for all types of arrivals) for 2014 show Haiti had 1,127,577 visitors (662,403 cruise passengers and 465,174 regular tourists) with a reported increase of nearly 11% in the number of regular tourists compared to the prior year. In 2014, Haiti’s rate of increase for tourism arrivals was 13.9 percent, over 5 times the regional average of 2.7% (see Appendices J for Haiti’s average growth rates for each period of its tourism development).
3.1.3 Nation Branding

Haiti’s nation branding efforts from the inception of its tourism sector prior to the time where it experienced public safety challenges, during the 1940-1980 period, mostly relied upon public-private tourism promotion. The government allocated public funds to promoting tourism. However, according to a 1973 Organization of American States (OAS) Audit Report, Haiti’s tourism promotion budget was poorly allocated (OAS Audit Report, 1973). Nearly 60% of the total budget went to the salaries of the large staff that was employed at the National Tourist Office (OAS Audit Report, 1973). Due to the misallocation, only a small amount remained for promotion, public relations efforts, publicity and literature (i.e. advertising brochures, flyers). As a result, public spending on marketing promotions was low. Reported public-private partnership in tourism promotion involving mostly private sector funding was at a moderate level in the form of airlines, hotel investors and travel agencies. During the initial period of Haiti’s tourism sector development, it experienced a high growth rate of tourism. While its arrivals and receipts (tourism arrivals and receipts, this paper’s dependent variable) were at moderate levels compared to its region by 1956 with 67,000 visitors, from the time tourism started in Haiti in 1945 with 5,000 visitors to 10,788 in 1951, it grew tremendously in just over 10 years (Seraphin, 2011). Haiti received nearly 6 times the number of visitors in a five-year period 1951-1956.

During the 1981-2010, public investment in marketing promotions continued to remain at low levels. Haiti had experienced setbacks in its tourism sector development and tourism arrivals and receipts had stagnated. There appeared to be several reasons for this unfortunate reversal. In 1982, a rumor associated the origin of the AIDS disease to Haiti ((Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). By then, political unrest had begun against President Jean Claude Duvalier’s dictatorship culminating in his ouster in 1986 and decades of political

In terms of thousands of visitors, from 1987 to 2004, Haiti saw a reduction of 54% of arrivals (from 239,200 of all arrivals to 108,868) (Seraphin, 2011). Haiti attempted to revitalize its tourism industry in the mid-1990s and early 2000s prior to the 2010 earthquake; but, nation branding strategic efforts such as promoting the city of Jacmel were continually hampered by the country’s public safety and infrastructure weaknesses (Seraphin 2011). After the earthquake in 2010, the country began attempting to revitalize tourism with more concrete results evident in its level of arrivals and receipts outside of its more successful cruise sector. In 2011, the government appointed a Stephanie Villedrouin as Minister of Tourism, who quickly began strong efforts to rebrand Haiti in the wake of proposed and received aid to rebuild the country. The “Why Not Haiti” slogan was initiated and began appearing on the Ministry of Tourism website as well as promotional advertising literature. Within 5 years, Haiti was included in World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Index for the first time; but, it was ranked low for tourism marketing promotions. Assessing the amount that the Haitian government spends on tourism promotion, based on the percent share of total tourism expenditure for 1995-2017, the WEF Report (2015) reported that Haiti’s levels ranged from 1.7% in 1995 to 3% from 1999 to 2017). Consistent with the scale of this paper on nation branding (public spending on tourism
promotion) levels, the percentages demonstrate a continued trend of low public investment in marketing promotions. By contrast, public-private tourism marketing (another component of nation branding tourism promotional investment) has been high in terms of branded hotel promotions built after the 2010 earthquake and continued cruise ship promotions during the 2011-2017 period.

3.1.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception

Examining tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti from 1940-2016, as indicated in Table 3.1, at times, there appears to be a correlated individual relationship between each of the independent variables and tourism arrivals and receipts except for the public safety variable level in Haiti’s most recent tourism period (2011-2016). For public safety during 1940-1980, when crime was reported as low, tourism arrivals and receipts were high. Furthermore, when crime was high during the time tourism was deprived (1981-2010), Haiti’s tourism sector had a -0.30% average tourism arrivals and receipts rate (see Appendix J.3). Political stability, the other measurement of public safety created much variance with the dependent variable, throughout Haiti’s tourism periods. Tourism arrivals and receipts were affected each time the country experienced political instability. Likewise, the infrastructure investment levels, public and private, seemed to be correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts; however, there was no evidence that infrastructure investment made a direct change in tourism arrivals and receipts. This could be attributed to the periods where there was political instability (a public safety issue) and the overall tourism arrivals and receipts was adversely affected during those periods because of the reduction of arrivals and receipts. Likewise, during that time, nation branding strategies to counteract the effect of the public safety situation was at moderate levels (with moderate investments invested by the private sector for tourism promotion and low investments coming
from the public sector). Despite the modes of instability during the first half of Haiti’s tourism sector development, the overall perception of the country remained positive and tourism was growing at a high rate.

During the 1981-2010 “Deprived Tourism” period, it is evident that there is a greater impact that public safety levels have on tourism arrivals and receipts with the additive effect of low infrastructure investments (from both the public and private sectors) and a retreat in the country’s nation branding (characterized by low tourism promotion investments by the public and private sectors) on the image of the country. Travel destination information had reached potential international visitors during that time about Haiti’s political instability problems. Crime levels were not highlighted in the travel destination information I reviewed. However, political instability reports, along with the AIDS rumor, appeared to be sufficient to create the perception that the country posed a threat to public safety (as tourism arrivals and receipts plummeted during that time). While the public safety challenge appears to persist, according to reports from OSAC and country safety rankings, there seems to be some steady increases of tourism arrivals and receipts –especially since the 2010 earthquake. Strong infrastructure investments from the private sector in terms of increased hotel rooms to accommodate the significant number of projects developing to rebuild the country is likely a contributing factor. However, nation branding promotions in terms of public-private tourism promotion can also have an impact as Haiti has recently been included in country rank indexes on global competitiveness. Furthermore, the travel destination information sources, which make up the country image perception interactive variable in this study, had some positive information mixed with the mostly negative reviews of the country during the 2010-2017 period (as evidenced in Appendix I and Appendix U-the works cited for Appendix I). The Igarape Institute reported on
Haiti’s recent tourism potential that “given the relatively low incidence of criminal victimization, the perception of Haiti at arrival to departure…overall tourists felt safer than expected during their stay”\textsuperscript{34}. In line with the theory of this paper, there were no positive travel destination information discovered for 1990-2009 when public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding were at low levels that corresponded to the lowest growth period in Haiti’s tourism history.

3.2 Dominican Republic Case Study (1940-2017)

3.2.1 Public Safety

As of 2001, crime rate statistics were not published by the Dominican Republic; however, daily newspapers in Santo Domingo did regularly report criminal incidents (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). During the country “Pre-Tourism” period (1930-1960), crime was estimated at moderate levels as the country had a strong and structured national police force that had been instituted in 1936. Also, during this time, political stability was at moderate levels. The country was under the 31-year presidency of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina whose brutal dictatorship style of leadership produced stability until 1961 when he was assassinated. During that time, tourism was virtually non-existent in the Dominican Republic with no more than 500 reported visitors. Following Trujillo’s assassination, the Dominican Republic experience political instability for the next five years and existing crime incidents grew to high levels.

By 1980, the country was moderately stable politically. However, despite a strong police force of 10,000, crime in the form of drug trafficking, homicides, rape and robbery as well as counterfeiting and extortion were still major concerns for the country and at high levels (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). After tourism began in 1967, the Dominican Republic

\textsuperscript{34} https://igarape.org.br/en/is-tourism-haitis-magic-bullet-an-empirical-treatment-of-haitis-tourism-potential/
experienced unprecedented average rates of increase in tourism arrivals and receipts. In 1971, four years after the country opens its Ministry of Tourism, the first international arrivals are recorded at 137,000 tourists (overnight stays and cruise passengers) (Fuller, 1999) with an average tourism arrivals and receipt rate of 16% for international arrivals and 32% for international receipts (see Appendices T, T.1-T.5). The country’s average growth rate exceeded the Caribbean’s regional average tourism arrivals and receipts rate of 7% for arrivals and 10% for receipts. After 1971, the country’s tourism sector soared beyond any other country in its region with arrivals reaching 747,000 in 1986, 1,181,000 in 1991, and 2,211,000 in 1997 (Fuller, 1999).

In terms of international tourism receipts, in 1979, tourism receipts were US$124 million equivalent and rose to US$0.9 billion by 1989 (Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case study, World Bank 2011). Through 1981-2000, crime remained at high levels while a moderate level of stability was maintained. Likewise, in recent years 2001-2017 (according to the most recent numbers on crime-see Appendices K and L; and, for political stability-see Appendices M and N), stability as remained at moderate levels according to the World Governance Index (ranking in the 45.21 percentile in 1996 and 57.14 percentile in 2016). However, crime rates have increased to critical levels according to the homicide rates reported (other forms of crime have not been readily reported). OSAC Reports declared that Dominican Republic’s crime rate was at a critical level in 2015 as homicide rates hard reached 30.9 per 100,000 of inhabitants (OSAC, 2015-2017). However, by 2017, other global reports indicated that crime was at a level of 14.9 per 100,000 inhabitants (World Health Organization Report EFE, 2017). This figure is still classified as a high rate of crime according to this paper’s scale on crime rate levels. Concerning the individual impact of public safety on tourism arrivals and receipts, it appears that the moderately stable level of the Dominican Republic political
environment may be sufficient to not adversely impact the level of tourism arrivals and receipts (as political stability has been identified in previous literature as important for tourism demand).

3.2.2 Infrastructure Investment

The Dominican Republic has been consistent in continually seeking to improve its infrastructure in order to develop more resorts, ecotourism and attract more cruise tourism. From 1967-2017, public spending (combined with the public-private sector partnerships in infrastructure) and private sector (number of hotel rooms) indicate a high level of investment in infrastructure (see Appendix O) that appears to be positively correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts. The Dominican Republic received extensive assistance from the United States to develop infrastructure during its occupation of the country during the Trujillo dictatorship (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). The public (along with PPI) investment in infrastructure has maintained high levels, either for development or improvements of all types of infrastructure, ever since the 1940s. From 1970-1980, the Dominican Republic uses public funds to invest in the country’s physical infrastructure. The country develops INFRATUR (the Department of Investment and Infrastructure) and uses $76 million from the World Bank to develop a malecon and other tourist infrastructure in Puerto Plata (Fuller, 1999; Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case study, World Bank, 2011). In addition, by 1974, the private sector investment had provided an infrastructure investment of 3,800 rooms (up from 1,000 rooms in 1960 and 1,600 rooms in 1974) (Fuller, 1999; Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; and Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case study, World Bank, 2011).

By the end of 2000, the Dominican Republic had completed a large transportation infrastructure project funded by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to
improve maintenance systems (Country Report, 2001). At the end of 2000, hotel rooms had reached 45,000. Private sector investment in infrastructure had reached high levels where 8,562 rooms existed in the country by the late 1980s and 21,500 by 1991 (Fuller, 1999). Presently, the Dominican Republic has over 60,000 rooms, the highest in the Caribbean. In addition, the PPI (Private Participation in Infrastructure) index on public-private partnerships in infrastructure reported a total investment of US$5,581 (in millions) from 1990-2017 for 33 projects covering the following sectors: airports, electricity, ports and roads (PPI Index, 1990-2017; also, see Appendix P). Furthermore, as of 2016, statistics on international arrivals recorded numbers of 5,959,300 overnight visitors for the Dominican Republic and international receipts of US$6,723 (millions) (World Bank World Development Indicators). Considering the high levels of investment in infrastructure and the high level of tourism arrivals and receipts, there appears to be a positively correlated relationship between infrastructure investment and tourism arrivals and receipts.

3.2.3 Nation Branding

Nation branding did not become a major priority for the Dominican Republic until after Trujillo was assassinated in 1961; and, after the 5-year period of instability (with persistent unrest until 1975) that directly followed his dictatorship ended (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Since 1967, the government has been proactive to develop tourism through high investments levels of public and public-private tourism promotion partnerships by passing legislation related to tourism sector development and promotion. First, the government appointed a Minister of Tourism in 1967 (But, the Department of Ministry of Tourism did not open until 1981; see Figure 3.4). Then, the Dominican Republic passed the 1971 Tourist law to incentivize private tourism promotion (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Dominican
Republic: Defying the Odds Case Study, World Bank, 2011; Gonzalez et al, 2012). In 1979, the government allocated US$2 million for the international promotion of the country’s “Come to the land that Columbus loved best” campaign (Fuller, 1999). Further, during the 1970s, the government pursued private partnership investments to develop the first resort in Punta Cana. This initial private investment leads to numerous private sector partnerships with the government (Fuller, 1999; Library of Congress, 2001; Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case study, World Bank, 2011). During the 1980s, a Spain-Dominican cooperative tourism development project allows for several Spanish branded hotels to develop in the Dominican Republic and promote tourism. In 2000, INFRATUR, the Dominican Republic’s Central Bank for public finance of tourism promotion and infrastructure projects creates a special fund to promote tourism (Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case study, World Bank, 2011). In 1992, the Tourism Incentives Law was repealed and replaced by the tax law of the country; but, it was later reinstated to accompany the Tourism Promotion Fund that was set up to cover nation branding expenses (Gonzalez et al, 2012).

The World Economic Forum’s Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Insight Reports (2007-2018) has consistently ranked the Dominican Republic’s public tourism promotion investment as high (over 20% of total tourism expenditure is devoted to tourism promotion). The World Bank’s World Trade and Tourism Council data set provides government spending on travel and tourism for the Dominican Republic’s for 1995 to 2018 (See Appendix R). According to the high levels of nation branding, for the Dominican Republic, this independent variable is positively correlated with the level of tourism arrivals and receipts for the country.
3.2.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception

In analyzing the scaled ratings, for each of the variables in Table 4.1 for the Dominican Republic, most of the individual relationships between the independent variables of this paper - specifically, infrastructure investment and nation branding, establish a positive correlation with the level of tourism arrivals and receipts. This is consistent with the literature on tourism demand as well as the theoretical expectations in this study. The higher the infrastructure investment and the higher the nation branding investment (public and private spending for both variable), the higher the level of tourism arrivals and receipts. However, the public safety independent variable, comprised of crime rate levels and political stability rankings, produces an outlier relationship that is not consistent with the theory of this thesis. In this study, the higher the public safety level, the higher the tourism arrivals and receipts. However, the crime rate level for the Dominican Republic has been consistently high through the entire period of tourism development for the country (1967-2017).

Alternatively, the other variable that comprises public safety, political stability, was unstable from 1961-1975; however, the country has enjoyed a moderate level of political stability since that time. The reason for the deviation could be that crime rate does not have much of a bearing on tourism arrivals and receipts. Another reason could be that the independent variable public safety provides enough of a security assurance for travelers if political stability is at least at moderate levels. In that case, then the theory about political stability as a security measure, under the public safety variable, would be positively correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts. Finally, it is also probable that the combination of high levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding offset the lower levels of public safety risk created by the higher levels of crime. The implication is that even with lower levels of
public safety, tourism arrivals and receipts can be high if infrastructure and nation branding investments are high. As those two variables can create a positive country image that offsets any negative reports provided by the travel destination information sources on public safety. In examining the country image perception during the country’s tourism development, when the country image perception was negative, tourism arrivals and receipts were low. Likewise, when the country image perception was positive, tourism arrivals and receipts were high. This is consistent with the theory of this paper. In one recent travel destination information source, Safe Around (2017), the Dominican Republic is ranked as 106/128 for safety (see Appendix S for the Dominican Republic’s Country Image Perception Scale). However, the UL Safety Index (2017), ranks the country as average 59/100 for safety concerns. Also, while one mass media report, the Daily Mail in the U.K., indicates that the country has a high murder rate, which was confirmed by the WHO EFE, 2017 report, nearly all travel reviews and guides (for 2010-2017) have reported the Dominican Republic as safe for travel. Moreover, a travel survey - the Canadian Omni Survey (2012) - polled 1,002 surveyors and 7/10 view the country as safe for travel.

3.3 Haiti and Dominican Republic Comparative Case Study (1940-2017)

3.3.1 Public Safety

In assessing the scaled ratings of each variable under public safety (Tables 3.1 and 4.1 in the Methodology section of this paper), the public safety levels for the Dominican Republic (Table 4.1) show that crime levels (from 1961-2016) have been high in the country - even while political stability has been at a moderate level. Despite these findings, tourism arrivals and receipts (yearly arrivals and receipts) has been persistently high for the country its Early Tourism Period (1961-1980). For Haiti, crime rates were reported low while political stability ranged
from unstable to moderate levels during the time it enjoyed its highest rates of tourism arrivals and receipts (1940-1980). After political instability became prevalent and crime rate rose in 1986, tourism arrivals and receipts stalled for Haiti. While political instability does threaten safety and security at tourist destination, high levels of crime should create a more immediate concern for travelers who may be direct targets for criminals. However, the findings of this paper do not support that assumption.

The Dominican Republic’s public safety levels is perceived higher than Haiti’s, even though crime has been high in both countries. In examining the reasons for this puzzle, it is importance to look at the functional security benefits that the Dominican Republic provides potential travelers when it comes to ensuring their safety. The Dominican Republic, as part of their tourism promotion strategies implemented specific safety measures to insulate travelers from the crime levels that persist in the country. The country has a national police force of over 10,000 members; however, they also instituted a “special police force” to provide security for tourist areas (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014). Since 2000, the Tourist Police (POLITUR)-made a department of the Ministry of Tourism by a presidential decree-has provided security to the tourism zones created by the Dominican government. In 2014, the government passed the Organic Law of the Armed Forces (No. 139-13), which transformed the Tourist Police into Tourist Security Specialized Corps (CESTUR) (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014). The goal of the law is to upgrade the efficiency of the security plan being promoted by the Dominican government. With law No. 139-13, CESTUR is transformed from a department of the Ministry of Tourism to a department of the Ministry of Defense (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014). As a member of the Defense Corps for National Security, CESTUR is defined in the new law as “specialized working units, made up by chosen members of the military institutions, with the aim
of providing security and protection in certain strategic areas vital for guaranteeing national interests.” (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014). The creation of CESTUR demonstrates a high level of planning, investment and coordination of the Dominican Republic’s key government institutions—their Ministry of Tourism and Department of Defense. As part of their promotional campaign, the Ministry of Tourism has included information about the tourist police as a preemptive strike against any travel warnings coming from the outbound country threatening the image of the country. The special tourist police have been noted by travelers who express feeling safe through travel reviews. One traveler on the popular travel review site, Trip Advisor, noted “Very fun and safe to walk the streets, tourist police are everywhere” (TripAdvisor, 2016).

3.3.2 Infrastructure Investment

As established in the tourism demand literature, quality infrastructure is important for tourism; and, as theorized in this paper, continued investments to improve all forms of inadequate infrastructure is necessary to increase tourism arrivals and receipts. When tourism stagnated in Haiti, its public infrastructure spending and its private sector investments in infrastructure were simultaneously at low and moderate levels considering the country needed quality infrastructure. Following Crouch (2011), it is up to countries to supply destination attractiveness in the form of quality infrastructure (i.e. adequate accommodation and transportation networks). Destinations with a strong infrastructure forge the type of functional benefits that potential tourists demand. To achieve destination attractiveness extensive investments in infrastructure must be made. Infrastructure investments are made possible through government partnerships with the private sector (public-private participation in infrastructure).
Despite the high amounts of capital pledged by various funding sources, the execution of infrastructure projects remain slow in Haiti relative to the high need for better infrastructure. Haiti’s water and sewage system have been operating below capacity for a long time. Despite international aid pledged to improve the sanitation infrastructure all over the country, project plans have not progressed in the last five years passed the initial stages (Reddy, 2017). In addition, the one treatment plant that was completed is underperforming because cost allocations were misdirected leading to a shortage to cover plant maintenance and payroll.

By contrast, the Dominican Republic’s investments in infrastructure have been consistently high—especially through its partnerships with the private sector. Allocated capital has been disbursed to cover infrastructure projects; and, moreover, projects have been successfully completed. The infrastructure investments could be attributed to a high private sector investor confidence in allocating and disbursing large capital to the country. This indicates that compared to the Dominican Republic, Haiti has longstanding problems with governance. A 2008 Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review (PEMFAR) Country Report on Haiti (World Bank, 2008), a collaboration between the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and the Government of Haiti discusses the challenges Haiti faces managing public expenditures, public spending allocation and securing private sector investment on infrastructure. As discussed previously in this paper, Haiti has not always completed projects from disbursed capital for infrastructure improvements. The PEMFAR Report (2008) advised Haiti that effective management of aid flows was vital. Further, the country needed to improve its level of financial governance by continuing economic governance reform initiatives that began in 2004. It appears that plans to increase accountability, transparency and efficiency in the use of public capital to “ensure that public investment
translates into accumulation of capital and growth” (PEMFAR Report, 2008), were not fully implemented. The same report noted that relative to the need, government expenditure on infrastructure and security were low.

3.3.3 Nation Branding

The test countries in this case study comparison have two different country brands. The Dominican government has worked hard to build a brand categorized by beautiful beaches, all-inclusive resorts, incredibly warm water and fruity cocktails (Antillean Media Group Report, 2016). At the inception of its tourism industry in 1967, the Dominican Republic devoted extensive public capital to build its nation brand. To actively promote the development of its tourism sector, the government passed the Tourist Law in 1971 to incentivize the private sector to partner with the government to promote tourism. From that time to the present, both public and private partnership investments to promote tourism have remained at high levels. According to figures from the World Bank, the Dominican government devotes 22% of the country’s total tourism expenditure (public investment) to tourism promotion (see Appendix R). In return, the country’s brand is strong and tourism arrivals and receipts have been unprecedented compared to other travel destinations within its region. The persistent high levels of nation branding in relation to high increases of tourism arrivals and receipts is consistent with the theoretical assumptions of this paper.

By contrast to the Dominican Republic, Haiti’s brand once developed as “Tropical Idle” and the “Pearl of Antilles” deteriorated until recently when branding efforts were revitalized in 2012 to encourage potential visitors to consider “Why not, Haiti?” as their next travel destination. Also, unlike the Dominican Republic, Haiti has historically devoted a much lower percentage share of total tourism expenditure to tourism promotion. From data available from
the World Bank, the country’s percentage share of total tourism expenditures that goes to
tourism promotion has been at 3% since 1999. According to the scale developed for nation
branding in this paper, this is a low investment for public expenditures on tourism promotion.
Regarding investments from the private sector, from 1945-1980, tourism promotion investment
from public-private partnerships was at moderate levels. However, during that time tourism
arrivals and receipts were moderate. After the country’s tourism sector deteriorated in 1986,
public spending on tourism promotion fell to all time low percentages (from 1.7-2% according to
World Bank figures available for 1995-1998; see Appendix H); and, public-private partnerships
to promote tourism also stagnated at low investment levels (see Appendix G). Recently, since
the late 2000’s, while public spending has remained at a low rate of 3% (Appendix H), tourism
promotion spending from public-private partnerships has been high (see Appendix G). The
higher levels of investments from the public-private partnerships have slowly begun to build a
more favorable country brand for the country as Haiti was included in the World Economic
Forum’s Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report rankings for the first time in 2013 (World
Travel and Trade Report, 2013). The country ranked last out of 140 countries in 2013; however,
its most recent ranking was 133rd out of 141 countries in 2015. Considering Haiti has not yet
built a sustainable brand, continued high levels of nation branding investments are necessary to
counteract the negative country brand reputation it has developed over the years.

Nation branding is effective when governments promote the most attractive
characteristics of its country to the right target market to achieve its goals for increasing tourism
arrivals and receipts. At the inception of their tourism industries, both the Dominican Republic
and Haiti promoted their brand to the mass tourism market for overnight visitors and cruise ship
passengers. While Dominican Republic has been historically successful in mass tourism for
overnight visitors, trailing behind Haiti only in terms of cruise ship passengers, Haiti’s inability to counteract its negative country brand image changed the dynamics of its target market. When Haiti’s tourism sector stagnated in 1986, after the AIDS rumor and Duvalier coup, it began to draw visitors only from its diaspora community. As a result, its low investment in promoting tourism and the lack of priority in revitalizing tourism immediately after those crises pulled the country away from the mass tourism market. The country’s success in cruise ships arrivals at Labadee (Haiti’s small peninsular province) only resulted from the decrease in safety risk that Labadee provided cruise passengers, as it was physically insulated from the areas in Haiti facing political unrest. Unfortunately, the travel receipts from same day travelers produce lower tourism receipts than that of overnight stays. Meanwhile, until 2011 when Haiti began revitalizing its tourism market for overnight stays, the country projected a brand image of poverty, having a weak infrastructure, and being constantly plagued by political instability to the extent that it relied on aid to survive. The non-profit driven form of nation branding, attracted a new niche market of overnight tourists in the form of aid workers, missionaries, and business travelers. Unfortunately, this type of tourism promotion is incompatible with the high levels of nation branding investment and positive marketing campaigns that are required to capture even a small share of the mass tourism market. No longer the “Pearl of the Antilles”, from its mass tourism market days that ended in 1986 (Fuller, 1999; Seraphin, 2011), country promotional advertisements often projected Haiti as hopeless with the destination’s attractiveness only being used to generate more fundraising capital (Antillean Media Group Report, 2016). As the country has done since 2011, Haiti must continue to disburse higher levels of nation branding investments to promote a positive image that is targeted to a smaller share mass market.
3.3.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception

The findings in Figure 3.1. on the scaled ratings for all variables for Haiti, indicated that for the public safety variable, while crime was low and stability was at moderate or unstable levels (during 1940-1985), tourism arrivals and receipts were moderate at best; and higher tourism arrivals and receipts were likely hampered by the random bouts of political instability or unrest (during 1956-1957, 1961-1962 and 1982-1985). During those times, infrastructure investment from public and public-private partnerships and direct spending from the private sector (in terms of hotel accommodations such as the construction of Club Med and the Hyatt) ranged from moderate to high levels. In addition, the country perception of the country was positive until 1982 when travel destination sources reported that AIDS originated in Haiti and political instability created a decline in tourism arrivals and receipts in 1984 (see Appendix I). However, from 1983 to 2000, public safety in Haiti was at low levels due to the combination of high crime and political instability. During this time, infrastructure spending was low (as public and public-private partnerships diminished alongside the closing of many privately-owned hotels).

Consistent with the low levels of public safety (indicating a security risk), low infrastructure investment and low public spending on nation branding (cruise ship tourism promotion was at moderate levels; but, this did not impact overnight travelers), tourism arrivals and receipts were low. The stagnation of Haiti’s tourism sector at that time is consistent with the theory of this paper as low levels in each variable were insufficient to counteract the negative country perception that had formed globally. In the final period covered in this paper, 2001-2016, public safety has remained low overall due to high (critical according to OSAC reports) levels of crime and political instability. However, infrastructure investment (public & public-
private partnerships along with direct private investment in terms of hotel accommodations) increased to high levels in late 2010 due to the earthquake that hit Haiti. Moreover, nation branding efforts have been at high levels (not from public spending on tourism promotions; but, from private investors).

Despite the public safety levels, indicating a high threat of security risk, higher levels of consistent increases in tourism arrivals and receipts were evident starting in 2013. Recent media sources (travel blog and reviews) reported that any overnight visitors indicate that the reason for their stay in Haiti was for vacation purposes, not aid or missionary work, thereby indicating the country’s small penetration into the mass tourism market (Walton, 2016). Also, during the 2001-2016, while the overall country perception remains negative, some favorable reviews and reports have begun to describe Haiti as safe and appealing to visit as other travel destinations in the Caribbean. The implication of this slight reversal in country perception is that the higher levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding are working to counteract the negative image of the country.

Likewise, according to the findings in Figure 4.1. on the scaled ratings for all variables on the country, the Dominican Republic also demonstrated that there were countereffects of high levels of investments in infrastructure and nation branding on public safety levels in terms of generating increases in tourism arrivals and receipts. Like crime in Haiti (since 1986), crime has been high in the Dominican Republic (since 1961) with only a moderate level of political stability as the differentiator between the two countries for the public safety independent variable. The countereffects appear higher for the Dominican Republic as it has a long history of high investment in infrastructure and nation branding, thereby contributing to its positive country perception by the global community. However, as discussed above, Haiti’s recent nation
branding investments have produced strong destination marketing promotions which are beginning to be discussed in travel destination sources.

The main question of this study is what difference does the government institutions of Haiti and the government institutions of the Dominican Republic make for tourism growth, in terms of increases in arrivals and receipts? I believe this study provides a clear answer, even with the findings that crime does not have as great an impact on tourism arrivals and receipts as expected when interacting with nation branding and infrastructure. Each of the independent variables of this paper represents an area where government institutions in each country can effectively manage functional benefits (such as providing security for and promoting the existence of safety police to tourists as well as quality infrastructure) to generate increases in tourism arrivals and receipts.

Public safety is managed by each country’s national police. Whereas it was previously discussed that Haiti’s national police underreported crime, experienced policing challenges and needed the assistance of MINUSTAH to help raise the stability level in the country after 2004, the Dominican Republic (who also had a previous problem underreporting crime) has demonstrated better governance in this area. As part of its tourism development, the country passed legislation to provide special tourist police as a branch of the country’s Ministry of Defense.

The Dominican Republic has an effective Ministry of Tourism. The special tourism forces were formerly a branch of the tourism department of the country; however, after the role of the tourist police was expanded, it was transferred to the department of defense. However, both ministries work to assure tourists of the presence of security within the country. Information about the special police is included in the country’s tourism promotion literature.
As a result, any travel destination information a potential traveler might receive to indicate that the Dominican Republic is unsafe is counteracted by direct promotional information from the country’s Ministry of Tourism that their safety is assured.

In assessing whether the country has been effective in building a country brand that projects a positive image, the evidence lies in the information that potential travelers receive from the Dominican Republic that they interpret as positive. During my research on country image perception, I discovered several travel destination information sources advising potential travelers about the country’s special tourist police. Many travel reviews, travel guides and mass media reports assured visitors that the tourist police were specifically placed in areas most frequented by travelers.

In addition to its tourism ministry and security forces, the Dominican Republic has better governance in terms of its infrastructure investment. While Haiti has had repeated challenges completing infrastructure projects and securing higher levels of disbursement from its public-private partnerships, the Dominican Republic has a high level of partnership investment from the private sector. The country has a strong central bank with a division (INFRATUR) that was created at the start of its tourism sector development to specifically to fund infrastructure projects. INFRATUR receives private sector investments, as well as disburses public-private partnership and public funding to successfully complete the country’s infrastructure projects. Furthermore, the country has several all-inclusive resorts located in designated tourism zones. The designated tourism zones were tax incentives created by law to encourage private sector development and infrastructure improvement. The designated tourism zones are protected by the special tourist police forces to insulate travelers from high crime areas throughout the country.
4 CONCLUSION

For the test countries in this study, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, I examined how effective their government institutions were in providing functional benefits, such as public safety and infrastructure investment, as part of their country brand offering to satisfy the demand of their target market of potential travelers. I theorized that higher levels of the independent variables, public safety (which was comprised of political stability and crime rates), infrastructure investment (comprised on public, public-private partnerships and private sector investment \{hotel rooms\}) and nation branding worked to create a positive brand image. The favorable country brand is what countries promote to potential travelers to influence their travel decisions, as well as counteract any negative travel destination information they may receive from outside sources. Countries that were successful would experience a rise in international tourism arrivals and receipts. Considering the literature had already established an individual correlation between political stability, infrastructure investment and nation branding with tourism demand, I expected that my newly operationalized independent variables and dependent variable would indicate a better causal relationship to explain how countries generate increases in tourism arrivals and receipts.

My findings were not entirely as expected. Political stability, one of the variables used to measure the level of public safety in each test country, was the only variable which produced a strong causal relationship with the dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts. For the Dominican Republic, its period of political instability preceded the formal inception of its tourism sector development in 1967. As a result, tourism inflows were virtually nonexistent; and, the first recorded set of arrivals was 230 visitors in 1930 (see Appendix T.1). However, around 1971, when the country began experiencing the moderate levels of political stability that
exists presently, the increases in tourism arrivals and receipts in the Dominican Republic have consistently remained at high levels.

Generally, over the different tourism periods for both countries, I observed that whenever political instability was evident, tourism arrivals and, in most times, receipts declined significantly. Furthermore, when both countries transitioned from a period of instability to moderate levels of political stability, the tourism arrivals and receipts increased to high levels. The exception to that finding was during Haiti’s most recent tourism period (2011-2016), during which the government took steps to revitalize tourism with extensive infrastructure and nation branding public and public-private sector investments. During that time, crime (the other measure for public safety) was high; and, the country was classified as unstable (at a percentile rank ranging from 17.54/100 in 2011 to 22.38/100 in 2016—see Appendix B) according to the levels on political stability described under the World Governance Indicators on “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” that I used to determine the level of security risk in each country. However, over the 2011-2016 period, Haiti experienced an average 13.9% increase in tourism arrivals (see Appendix J.4) was over 5 times the annual average (2.7%) increase for arrivals in the Caribbean region. During 2011-2016 period, tourism receipts grew an average of 3% for Haiti, about less than 1% of the annual average for receipts in the Caribbean (see Appendix J.5). The unexpected outcome indicated that there was likely an additive effect coming from the inclusion of the other independent two variables in my theoretical framework, which I will discuss further in this conclusion.

For my intervening variable, country image perception, the outcomes were mostly as expected for both countries. Country image perception for both Haiti and the Dominican Republic were directly impacted by information pertaining to the political stability level of the
country. In nearly every instance, when each country was categorized as unstable, then the rate of arrivals and receipts declined. When at least a moderate level of stability existed in both countries, they each experienced high levels of increase in arrival and receipts. For the Dominican Republic, the outcomes were in line with previous findings from the literature on tourism demand and the theory of this paper. When the country image perception was negative ("comic opera prototype of Caribbean instability" (Fodor, 1960), then arrivals and receipts were at low levels. However, since the perception of the country has been positive since 1970’s, increases in arrivals and receipts have been high. In Haiti’s case study, the findings were not as distinct. During the 1940-1980 and 1981-2010 periods, when country image perception was positive (Haiti was described by a 1976 New York Times article as “exotic and fascinating, possessed of a rich culture, a tempestuous past and a smiling, friendly populace”35), the country experienced high increases in arrivals and receipts (see Table 3.1). Predictably, when perception of the country was negative (according to the 1994 Baltimore Sun article “Haiti has been so messed up for so long, it can't even do tourism anymore”36), tourism was negatively impacted as tourism arrivals and receipts declined by -30% for the entire period (see Table 3.1). However, in Haiti’s most recent tourism period, the country image perception is still negative (a 2012 L.A. Times article was entitled “For troubled Haiti, tourism is a tough sell”37). Despite this, the country experienced a high increase in arrivals (see Table 3.1 and Appendix J.5) and tourism receipts were just slight under the regional average. As country image perception, from the demand side (i.e. potential travelers), is influenced by travel destination information sources, the results for Haiti indicated that it was possible that information was coming from the supply side

37 http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/22/business/la-fi-haiti-tourism-20121122
(i.e. the potential travel destination) that could explain the difference in Haiti’s case. The outcome revealed that there was an impact from the independent variables that seemed to bypass the normal effects of the intervening variable, country image perception, on the level of arrivals and receipts.

For both countries, during my analysis, there were periods where a correlated relationship was predictably evident between individual independent variables and the dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts. However, for the public safety independent variable, my findings indicated that crime rate levels did not appear to impact tourism arrivals and receipts as expected. As a security measure, no apparent causal relationship with tourism arrivals and receipts could be determined in the case study analyses for Haiti or the Dominican Republic. It appeared that there were times that high levels of crime were correlated with low levels of tourism arrivals and receipts. Alternatively, there were times when crime was at low levels in a period while increases in tourism arrivals and receipts were high. However, after evaluating the tourism periods for both cases, crime proved not to be a causal factor. Case studies for both countries showed that high percentages of arrivals and receipts were generated during periods when crime was high (see Tables 3.1. for Haiti and 4.1 for the Dominican Republic).

To explore this puzzle further, I examined the individual impact of the remaining two variables in my theoretical equation and their impact on tourism arrivals and receipts in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. For Haiti, there were varied levels of public spending, public-private partnerships and private sector investments in infrastructure throughout each period of their tourism sector development. Despite the different levels of investment, they did not create any apparent variations on the dependent variable in each period. In one period (1981-2010), there was a general correlation between infrastructure investment and tourism arrivals and
receipts. During that period, low levels of public spending, public-private partnerships and private sector investments in infrastructure corresponded to low levels of tourism arrivals and receipts. However, that relationship was not as clear in the previous period (1940-1980) where similar low levels in public and public-private partnerships still generated a high increase over time in arrivals between years where figures were available (24% in 1950, followed by 41% in 1956 and 6% in 1960—see Appendix J.1). Tourism receipts for 1960 indicated a 14% increase over time from 1950 figures (see Appendix J.2). Furthermore, despite public and public-private private sector investment in infrastructure being at moderate levels during this period (1940-1980), tourism arrivals declined in 1963 and dropped to -24% for tourism arrivals and -53% for tourism receipts from previously recorded figures (see Appendices J.1 and J.2). This meant that changes in the level of another independent variable was likely creating that variance.

For the Dominican Republic, infrastructure investments for public and public private partnerships and private sector investment have consistently been at high levels since the beginning of their tourism sector (see Table 4.1). As tourism arrivals and receipts have been at high levels for the Dominican Republic during each of their tourism periods, infrastructure investment does appear to have a positive correlated relationship with the dependent variable. This is expected and in line with previous literature on tourism demand determinants as well as the theory of this paper.

For the nation branding independent variable, the impact of public tourism promotion and public-private tourism promotion in terms of generating tourism arrivals and receipts varied between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. For Haiti, between 1940 and 1980, public tourism promotion was low; however, public-private tourism promotion was at a moderate level. Despite the low level of public tourism promotion, it appeared that a moderate level of public-private
tourism promotion was sufficient to produce high levels of tourism arrivals and receipts (see Table 3.1). During the next period (1981-2010), when public and public-private tourism promotions were both at low levels, tourism arrivals were at low levels as expected. In Haiti’s final tourism period, public tourism promotion was low while public-private tourism promotion was high; and, this resulted in a high level of tourism arrivals while tourism receipts were at low levels (see Table 3.1). For the Dominican Republic, public and public-private tourism promotion were both low at the beginning of their early tourism period (1961-1980). Tourism arrivals and receipts did not begin experiencing increase until after public and public-private tourism promotion reached high levels (after 1967 for public tourism promotion and 1971 for public-private partnerships—see Table 4.1). Therefore, some level of nation branding is strongly correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts. However, a causal relationship between nation branding and tourism arrivals and receipts is not as evident as it is with political stability.

The results of my intervening variable, country image perception, helped clarify the nature of the relationships between the independent variables of this paper. In terms of interaction between the independent variables in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, I observed that when either country experienced political instability and a low level of public safety (where crime and instability simultaneously existed as in Haiti’s case), high levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding (only high levels of public-private tourism promotion for Haiti) appeared to offset the perception of the security threats. This is where the previously discussed outcomes, for country image perception, indicated that certain variables were interacting to offset any negative information being provided to outbound potential travelers (which often deterred their decision to travel). However, despite the potential threat that a high crime level and political instability in Haiti could pose, tourists still chose to visit Haiti during the 2011-2016.
However, it was unclear whether the overcompensation was based on a combination of high levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding; or, if high rates of one variable was creating the overcompensation. It was not determined if the high level of nation branding (or a high level of one component of it), as the promotional component of my theory, was sufficient to offset the perception of security risk for travelers.

For Haiti, the public spending measure of the nation branding independent variable, remained at low levels for Haiti across all time periods; however, moderate levels of the public-private component of the nation branding seemed sufficient to help counteract the negative country image impact that political instability caused during 1940-1980 period. After the political instability period passes, the country image perception intervening variable becomes positive. This indicates that a moderate level of investment in public-private tourism promotion in Haiti can be sufficient to impact perception. However, in comparing the interactions between the variables in both cases, the country image perception only changed from negative to positive when political stability was moderate and nation branding investment was at least moderate in one of its variables (public-private promotion in Haiti’s case). The same type of additive effect between the three variables existed in the Dominican Republic, at its early stage of tourism development; however, the investment in both components of nation branding and infrastructure investment were high, while political stability remained at moderate levels. The sustainability of this additive relationship indicates: 1) that with high levels of nation branding and infrastructure investment, and moderate political stability, governments can create a favorable country brand; 2) the country brand is strong enough to project a positive country image that generates high levels of tourism arrivals and receipts - even when the crime rate is high.
While my hypothesis tests were not completely confirmed (as I predicted all three independent variables would be high to generate a high increase tourism arrivals and receipts), my theoretical framework concerning the necessary, additive relationship between my independent variables, and their ability to influence country image perception by providing functional benefits (reduction of security risk via at least moderate stability and infrastructure) to generate tourism arrivals and receipts is confirmed. What this means is that government institutions can effectively manage the level of security risk by providing adequate infrastructure that insulates travelers from unsafe conditions created by crime and/or some level of political instability. For example, the Dominican Republic has the all-inclusive resorts which provide amenities to travelers to the extent that they do not have to leave the resort to enter areas were crime may be prevalent. In addition, the country provides and promotes their special tourism police. The Dominican Republic has done this successfully due to its level of governance, as well as the effectiveness of their Ministry of Tourism, their Ministry of Defense and other institutions which collaboratively work together to provide those type of functional benefits.

Future studies on tourism development or demand should expand the number of independent variables to determine the level of governance for their test countries. Moreover, political stability should be treated independent of crime rates or solely as a determinant of security risk. In this study, because I was measuring for public safety, I only used the World Governance Indicators (WGI) for political stability/absence of violence. However, the key difference between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is their political stability levels in terms of effective governance and institutional strength, not occurrences of violence. The success in governance for the Dominican Republic is because it had fewer regime changes than Haiti, who had 18 governments in a less than 30 years. The frequent change of governments makes it
difficult to produce policies that require continuity, persistent investment, extensive planning, and financial accountability as tourism development does. In recent years, studies show that Haiti’s level of governance has increased, even if the global community still classifies the country as “unstable” from the political instability/absence of violence perspective. Expanding the literature in the future would be helpful in seeing the variance levels of stability in Haiti and countries like it. The theoretical framework I provide in this study allows for future scholarship to build upon my arguments to provide further explanations for how governments can effectively manage their country brand, tourism development and global perception to generate increases in tourism arrivals and receipts.

The findings of this study also produced a unique problem concerning the measurement of crime rates for public safety, a main independent variable of this paper, and its impact on tourism arrivals and receipts. This quandary serves as an opportunity for further studies to provide more concrete explanations for the variance concerning what creates the perception of a threat to safety in this paper’s findings. While political stability is used as a common measure for security risks, I expected that including the crime rate as a variable for public safety would be an even more important indication of the level of security risk in each country.

In conclusion, this study highlighted the issue of underreported crime and the lack of national crime statistics system in many countries. The scarcity of reliability of crime data information explains why literature on tourism demand determinants tends to exclude it as a measurement for security. Political instability is widely reported by most country’s media sources. Therefore, travel warnings or information about the volatile environment within a foreign destination is more accessible. To advance the literature in this area, there are several variables that can be used to determine why crime is underreported and how it impacts travel
safety when tourists are given misinformation about crime abroad. For destinations where crime is being or has been underreporting, it will be important to look at corruption levels, governance, the strength of and reliability of the country’s security institutions (such as their national police).
REFERENCES


Coshall, J. T. (2003). The threat of terrorism as an intervention on international travel flows. Journal of Travel Research, 42(1), 4e12


Henderson, Dorothy. 2011. The Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds Draft Case study, World Bank

Jaramillo, L. Y C. Sancak. 2007. “Growth in the Dominican Republic and Haiti: Why has the Grass been Greener on one Side of Hispaniola?”. IMF Working Paper.


Yap, Ghialy, and Shrabani Saha (2013). "Do political instability, terrorism, and corruption have deterring effects on tourism development even in the presence of UNESCO heritage? A cross-country panel estimate." Tourism Analysis 18.5: 587-599.

Haiti-OAS Audit Report, 1973

### Appendix A - Public Safety/Crime Rate Level (Haiti)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Major Crime Incidents</th>
<th>Reported Crime Rate Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-1960</td>
<td>▪ Haiti’s military (Forces Armees d'Haiti—FAd'H) inadequately polices the country as Haiti has no national police force</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1980</td>
<td>▪ Haitian government continually reports Haiti is “free of crime”</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-2000</td>
<td>▪ 1986—crime levels are continually reported as “rising” (through the 2000s) and undermines the Fad’H credibility</td>
<td>Low (reported until 1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ 1990s—Haiti tries to build its national police force to combat severe security and crime problems (police force starts in 1989)</td>
<td>High (since 1986)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2001-2016        | ▪ 2001—2016:  
  o Kidnappings (until 2013), homicides, car jackings and robberies are a major crime concern                                                                                                                  | High                                          |
|                  | ▪ Haiti’s overall crime rate is classified as “high” but considered lower than other countries in its region mainly due to a lack of mass tourism and continued “underreporting” (especially of homicide rates 2007-2011) | (But, OSAC repeatedly reports as Critical)     |
|                  | ▪ 2010—Nearly 5,000 prisoners escaped from the national penitentiary during the earthquake and only 25% are recaptured                                                                                           |                                               |
|                  | ▪ 2014—2017: Kidnappings are diminishing (especially incidents against American victims)                                                                                                                             |                                               |
| 2001-2016        | ▪ See homicide (and other crime rate, as available, for Haiti in Appendix B)                                                                                                                                            |                                               |

---

40 Based on OSAC (2006-2018) Reports  
41 Based on OSAC (2006-2018) reports that classify crime rate levels as “critical” mainly based on the homicide rates and other violent crimes such as kidnappings, rapes, assaults, shootings and carjackings
Appendix B - Public Safety/Crime Rate Graphs (Haiti)

Appendix B.1 Other types of crime prevalent in Haiti

**Category scale for crime level (based on number of homicide or crime incidents)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Crime Rate Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-500</td>
<td>Low rate of crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1000</td>
<td>Moderate rate of crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001-2000</td>
<td>High rate of crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-above</td>
<td>Very high rate of crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C - Public Safety/Political Stability Index (Haiti)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Incidents threatening political stability</th>
<th>Stability Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1930-1960   | - 1956 - Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier seizes power in military coup and is elected president (his violent regime lasts from 1956-1971).  
- 1958 - Creation of violent paramilitary force Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale (VSN) known as the Tontons Macoutes following coup attempt against Francois Duvalier  
- 1960 - Upper-class Haitians gradually leave Haiti to flee Duvalier’s dictatorship | Moderate (1930-1955)  
Unstable (1956-1960) |
| 1961-1980   | - 1961 - Jacques Stephen Alexis’ failed Communist coup against Duvalier; Alexis is tortured than murdered  
- 1976 - Widespread protests against the repression of the nation's press take place | Unstable (1961-1971)  
Moderate (1972-1980) |
| 1981-2000   | Between 1986 and 2014, Haiti had 18 regime changes/changes of government  
- 1982 – 1985  
  o Political unrest begins against Duvalier’s dictatorship; food riots against poverty turn towards the government; students killed in Gonaïves spark angry major demonstrations against the government (plus AIDS rumor starts in 1982)  
- 1986 – Jean Claude “Baby Doc” who succeeded his father, “Papa Doc” in 1971 flees Haiti in the wake of the discontent started in 1982; and is replaced by Lieutenant-General Henri Namphy  
- 1988 - Leslie Manigat becomes president, but is ousted in a coup led by Brigadier-General Prosper Avril, who installs a civilian government under military control.  
- 1991 - Populist priest Jean Bertrand Aristide, elected president by large majority, is unwilling to govern within political system and alienates elite and foreign community. He is overthrown and replaced by military-supported puppet government.  
- 1999-2000 - Following two years of stalemate between the executive and the opposition-led legislature, President Preval dissolves the legislature and rules by decree. Preval uses unchecked executive power to ensure victories for his party, Fanmi Lavalas, in 2000 legislative and presidential elections. | Moderate (1981-82)  
Unstable (1983-2000) |
| 2001-2017   | WGI Political stability estimates– see Appendix D for WGI political stability estimates  
WGI percentage rank estimates during this time range from 0-100% on the political stability/absence of violence scale. The closer to 100%, the more stable the country. Stability is rated as unstable due to the low score range Haiti has achieved. | Unstable |

https://larevueindigene.wordpress.com/reference/chronology-of-haitian-history/  
43 Represents the level of stability during the period, except as noted
Appendix D - Public Safety: Political Stability Percentile Rank (Haiti)

**Category scale (the closer to 100%, the more stable the country)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentile Rank (0-100%)</th>
<th>Political Stability Level</th>
<th>Political Stability Level Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-49%</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Active Incidents of violence, political unrest and political instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No major incidents; but, there may be some random political unrest or temporary instability incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-89%</td>
<td>Moderately Stable</td>
<td>No threat of major incidents, political unrest, violence and political instability is unlikely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-100%</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix E - Infrastructure Investment/Public and Private Sector (Haiti)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Infrastructure Investments (PPI=public private partnerships in infrastructure)</th>
<th>Investment Type</th>
<th>Investment Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1930-1960   | • 1915-1934: U.S. occupation brings the building of infrastructure (roads, bridges, canals, public buildings, telecommunication, water and sewage)  
• 1956: Haiti receives a $2.6 million loan from World Bank to improve its transportation infrastructure (725 miles of primary and secondary roads) | Combination:  
  - Public & PPI | Moderate:  
  - High (1930-1941)  
  - Low (1942-1960) |
|             | • Number of Hotel Rooms: under 2,000 | Private | Moderate |
  o Paved road project constructed among Haiti’s major cities & secondary road is built in rural areas (Route de l’Amitie Franco-Haitienne)  
  o Improvements in electricity, telecommunication, airfreight facilities in Port au Prince; construction of two industrial parks  
  o Secondary road project funded by USAID, World Bank, and IDB | Combination:  
  - Public & PPI | High |
|             | • Number of Hotel Rooms: approx. 3,000 including Club Med & the Hyatt (by 1980) | Private | Moderate |
| 1981-2000   | • Secondary road project funded by USAID, World Bank, and IDB | Public | Low |
|             | • Number of Hotel Rooms:  
  o 3,000 (by 1981)  
  o 800 (by 1999) - Club Med closed in 1986, reopened in 1997; but, closed for good in 1998 | Private | Low |
| 2001-2017   | • 2001-2007: $129,720,000 allocated (infrastructure improvement); but, only $37,890,000 executed  
• Post 2010 earthquake:  
  o $1.4 billion granted by U.S. Congress for reconstruction USAID pledges $651 million ($203 million disbursed by 2013)  
  o Vietnam telecommunication company, Viettel, grants nearly $100 million to upgrade infrastructure  
  o 2013-2015: $260 million Ile-la- Vache project proposed, then halted - land ownership dispute  
  o 2017: Infrastructure investment proposed by China $30 billion proposed; but not yet received | Combination:  
  - Public & PPI | High - (allocated-but only about 40% disbursed) |
|             | • Number of Hotel Rooms:  
  o 2,000 (2010); but over 4,322 (by 2015);  
  o Minister of Tourism claims 9,280 hotel rooms [including 4,861 of classified rooms of international standard 1 to 5 hibiscus, in 177 hotels] | Private | High |

---

Appendix F - Infrastructure Investment/PPIs (Haiti)

Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Haiti Public-Private Partnerships 1990-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects by sector</th>
<th>Number of Projects</th>
<th>Total Investment (in Millions)</th>
<th>Investment Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$67</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT (Information and Communications)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$1</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ports</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$57</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sewage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$1</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category Scale of PPI Investment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructure PPI (in Millions)</th>
<th>Investment Level in infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0-500</td>
<td>Low level of investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$501-1000</td>
<td>Moderate level of investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,001-up</td>
<td>High level of investment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix G – Nation Branding/Public and Private Tourism Promotion (Haiti)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Nation Branding/Public &amp; Private Tourism Promotion</th>
<th>Investment Type</th>
<th>Investment Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-1980</td>
<td>▪ A 1973 Organization of American States (OAS) Audit Report indicates that Haiti’s tourism promotion budget has been poorly allocated—60% of the total budget goes to the salaries of a large staff in the National Tourist Office—only a small amount for promotion, public relations, publicity and literature (public investment)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Private marketing funding from Pan Am, American Airlines and hotels</td>
<td>Public-private tourism marketing</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-2011</td>
<td>▪ 1982: Haiti is associated with AIDS</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ 1980s: Tourism offices closed in 5 cities globally and promotion diminished</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ By 1986, there was no Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ 1990s: Allocated budget for tourism diminishes as tourism stagnates</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s-2011:</td>
<td>▪ Cooperative-American Airlines proposes $25K marketing promotion partnership (public-private)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Royal Caribbean invests $5 million to develop &amp; market cruise tourism in Labadee (public-private)- but briefly suspends cruises after Aristide is overthrown in 1991</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Funding from the OAS to revitalize tourism ($300K)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2017</td>
<td>▪ Haiti appoints a new Minister of Tourism</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Extensive branding begins in Haiti</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ “Why Not Haiti” slogan -beyond just cruise tourism promotions</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Haiti begins to be included in the Global Competitiveness index (2015); but, is ranked low for tourism marketing promotions</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ IADB/MIF Funding for tourism projects</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Center for Facilitation of Investments (CFI) in Haiti facilitates public-private tourism promotion in Jacmel, Ile La Vache and Cote de Fer (est. $289 million USD)</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ FDI-3 new luxury branded hotels built (Best Western, Royal Oasis and Marriott) and promoted to accommodate post-2010 earthquake travelers</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Appendix H – Nation Branding/Public Tourism Promotion Investment (Haiti)

Category scale for public tourism promotion investment (% share of total tourism expenditure)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% share of total tourism expenditure</th>
<th>Nation branding/public investment on tourism promotion level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9%</td>
<td>Low investment in tourism promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19%</td>
<td>Moderate investment in tourism promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% - above</td>
<td>High investment in tourism promotion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix I – Haiti’s Country Image Perception Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Travel Destination Information Source</th>
<th>Review of Travel Destination Information Source</th>
<th>Country Perception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-1949</td>
<td>Missing data</td>
<td>Later sources reveal a perception that covers this period</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1959</td>
<td>Missing data</td>
<td>Later sources reveal a perception that covers this period</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Favorable – Haiti is viewed as “fascinating” with much to offer tourists (29-page review)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Describes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Favorable on Haitian art (including souvenirs)</td>
<td>Positive (1972-1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Favorable – Haiti is fascinating and safe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Favorable – Baby Doc to undo father’s damage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Travel guide</td>
<td>• Favorable—Haiti is still “fascinating” as 1960s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Travel guide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>Mass Media reports</td>
<td>• Unfavorable--AIDS link to Haiti- tourism decline</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Unfavorable--AIDS, instability causes decline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Favorable—Haiti still has allure for business FDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mixed—AIDS stigma killed tourism; FDI hopeful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>Mass Media reports</td>
<td>• Unfavorable - Club Med Haiti’s loss of tourists</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Favorable – Haiti tries to revive tourism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>Mass Media reports</td>
<td>• Unfavorable – Haiti: an economic basket case</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mixed – Haiti is safe; negative image hurts tourism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mixed review-Haiti a mix of fun &amp; poverty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Favorable – Cruise ship boost tourism in Haiti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Unfavorable – Haiti’s brand is cursed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2017</td>
<td>Mass Media reports</td>
<td>• Unfavorable—Haiti has safety issues</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Unfavorable—safety warnings about Haiti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Favorable—Haiti is as safe as others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Favorable—on the best places to visit in Haiti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Unfavorable—Advises Haiti is dangerous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Travel guide</td>
<td>• Unfavorable – Haiti: no longer included in Guide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Travel reviews:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TripAdvisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country Safety Rankings</td>
<td>• Favorable—travelers claim Haiti is as safe as others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>World Nomad blog (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BBC article (2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Haiti Hub website</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lonely Planet (2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USA Today (2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Travel reviews:</td>
<td>• SafeAround (2017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• UL Safety Index (2017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Unfavorable – Haiti is ranked 118/128</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Unfavorable—Haiti: below average 40/100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The country image perception references are listed in a separate page in the Works Cited section of this thesis*
Appendix J – Tourism Arrivals and Receipts Graph (Haiti)

Appendix J.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (Haiti, 1940-1980):

Golden Tourism Period (1940-1980)

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1940-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average rate of international arrivals</th>
<th>Growth rate level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-6.99%</td>
<td>Low average growth rate for international arrivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9.99%</td>
<td>Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% - above</td>
<td>High average growth rate for international arrivals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix J.2 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Tourism receipts (Haiti, 1940-1980):

Golden Tourism Period (1940-1980)

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average rate of international receipts</th>
<th>Growth rate level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9.99%</td>
<td>Low average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12.99%</td>
<td>Moderate average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%- above</td>
<td>High average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix J.3 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (Haiti, 1981-2010):

Deprived Tourism Period (1981-2010)\textsuperscript{48}

![Haiti's Deprived Tourism Period (1981-2010) graph]

**Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1980-1995)**

- **Average rate of international arrivals**
  - 0-4.99%
  - 5-7.99%
  - 8% - above

- **Growth level**
  - Low average growth rate for international arrivals
  - Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
  - High average growth rate for international arrivals

**Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1995-2016)**

- **Average rate of international arrivals**
  - 0-2.69%
  - 2.7-4.99%
  - 5% - above

- **Growth level**
  - Low average growth rate for international arrivals
  - Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
  - High average growth rate for international arrivals

\textsuperscript{48} Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region
Appendix J.4 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (Haiti, 1981-2010):

Deprived Tourism Period (1981-2010)\(^{49}\)

\[\text{Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990)}\]

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
 \hline
 \textbf{Average rate of International receipts} & \textbf{Growth rate level} \\
 \hline
 0-9.99\% & Low average growth rate of international receipts \\
 10-12.99\% & Moderate average growth rate of international receipts \\
 13\% and above & High average growth rate of international receipts \\
 \hline
\end{tabular}

\[\text{Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1990-2000)}\]

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
 \hline
 \textbf{Average rate of International receipts} & \textbf{Growth rate level} \\
 \hline
 0-12.99\% & Low average growth rate of international receipts \\
 13-17.99\% & Moderate average growth rate of international receipts \\
 18\% and above & High average growth rate of international receipts \\
 \hline
\end{tabular}

\(^{49}\) Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region
Appendix J.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (Haiti, 2011-2016):

Rejuvenated Tourism Period (2011-2016)

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 2011-2016)

**Average rate of international arrivals**
- 0-2.69%
- 2.7-4.99%
- 5% - above

**Growth rate level**
- Low average growth rate for international arrivals
- Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
- High average growth rate for international arrivals

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 2000-2016)

**Average rate of international receipts**
- 0-3.89%
- 3.9-5.99%
- 6% - above

**Growth rate level**
- Low average growth rate of international receipts
- Moderate average growth rate of international receipts
- High average growth rate of international receipts
### Appendix K - Public Safety/Crime Rate Level (D.R.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Major Crime Incidents Reported</th>
<th>Reported Crime Rate Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-1960</td>
<td>Dictator Trujillo (1931-1961) uses the country’s national police force for personal means and not a national institution</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1980</td>
<td>Drug trafficking, murder, rape, and robbery to fraud, counterfeiting, and extortion are major concerns</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1981-2000         | 1980-1990:  
|                   | o Drug trafficking, murder, rape, and robbery to fraud, counterfeiting, and extortion are still major concerns  
|                   | o Government did not publish statistics on national occurrences of crime but Santo Domingo papers regularly report crime  
|                   | o Police works to crack down on crime                                                           | High                      |
| 2001-2017         | Crime common to tourists, i.e. "crimes of opportunity" are prevalent: street robbery, pocket picking, credit card fraud, ATM fraud, burglary and theft from vehicles; and, if the victim resists, injury often results  
|                   | Police response is poor                                                                          | 2001-2014: High (reported) |
|                   | 2017: Global report lists Dominican Republic as one of the 9 highest countries for crime (30.9 per 100,000 inhabitants) while 2017 reported crime as 14.9 per 100,000 inhabitants (see Appendix L) for crime rate levels according to homicide incidents per year |                                        |
|                   | See homicide levels for the Dominican Republic in Appendix L                                     |                                        |

---

Appendix L Public Safety/Crime Rate Graph (D.R.)

**Category scale for crime level (based on number of homicide incidents)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Crime Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-500</td>
<td>Low rate of crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1000</td>
<td>Moderate rate of crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001-2000</td>
<td>High rate of crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-above</td>
<td>Very high rate of crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix M – Public Safety/Political Stability Index (D.R.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Incidents threatening political stability</th>
<th>Stability Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-1960</td>
<td>- Political instability existed prior to Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina’s dictatorship and violence during the oppressive regime (nearly 20,000 Haitians living in the Dominican Republic are killed)</td>
<td>Moderately Stable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1961-1980     | - 1961: The assassination of de facto ruler Trujillo ends the regime  
- 1963-1966: Military overthrows newly elected democratic government, establishes junta, and restricts leftwing parties  
- 1965: Brief civil war between short-term president Juan Bosch Gavifio's liberal constitutionalist party and the conservative loyalist military factions. Insurrection by supporters of the deposed president results in external intervention in support of Wessin regime  
| 1996-2016     | WGI Political stability estimates– see Figure 1 for WGI political stability estimates  
- WGI estimates during this time range from -0.07 in 1996 to 0.29 in 2016 based on a -2.5 to 2.5 political stability scale. Stability is rated as low due to the low score range the D.R. has achieved. This indicates that the country has improved over time but that it maintains low level of political stability | Moderately Stable |

https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_1.pdf and  
54 WGI
Appendix N – Public Safety/Political Stability Percentile Rank (D.R.)

Category scale (the closer to 100%, the more stable the country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentile Rank (0-100%)</th>
<th>Political Stability Level</th>
<th>Political Stability Level Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-49%</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Active Incidents of violence, political unrest and political instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderately Stable</td>
<td>No major incidents; but, there may be some random political unrest or temporary instability incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-89%</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>No threat of major incidents, political unrest, violence and political instability is unlikely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix O – Infrastructure Investment/Public and PPP (D.R.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Infrastructure Investments</th>
<th>Investment Type</th>
<th>Investment Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-1941</td>
<td>Investments made in constructing roads, sanitation systems, ports and schools. Dictator Trujillo is active in improving the country’s infrastructure with help from the United States during its occupation of the country.</td>
<td>Combination:</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Number of Hotel Rooms: under 1,000</td>
<td>Public &amp; PPI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942-1960</td>
<td>▪ 1950s: D.R.’s government invests public funds to build an advance transportation infrastructure</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Number of Hotel Rooms: 1,000</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
  ▪ 1970s: D.R.’s newly formed INFRATUR (Department of Investment and Infrastructure) was given $76 million (USD) in World Bank funds to develop a malecon and other tourist infrastructure in Puerto Plata | Public          | High            |
|             | ▪ Number of Hotel Rooms: 3,800 (by 1974)                                                   | Private         | Moderate        |
| 1981-2000   | ▪ 1980-1990s: Narrow roadways, which flood easily, are improved in a large transportation infrastructure project funded by funds from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to develop better maintenance systems  
  ▪ 1990s: D.R. public works embarks on a major road improvements project in Santo Domingo | Combination:    | High            |
|             | ▪ Number of Hotel Rooms:                                                                   | Public & PPI    |                 |
|             |   o 8,562 rooms (by late 1980s)                                                           | Private         | High            |
|             |   o 21,500 (by 1991)                                                                      |                 |                 |
|             |   o 45,000 rooms (by 1999)                                                                |                 |                 |
| 2001-2017   | ▪ 2000s: The IMF approves the D.R.’s request for special funding of $56 million (USD) to rebuild infrastructure damage from Hurricane Georges (which struck in 1999)  
  ▪ See separate chart for exclusive public-private partnership (PPP) projects 1990-2017 | Combination:    | High            |
|             | ▪ Number of Hotel Rooms: 66,790 (by 2011)                                                 | Public & PPI    |                 |

---

Appendix P - Infrastructure Investment/PPI (D.R.)

Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Dominican Republic Public-Private Partnerships 1990-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects by sector</th>
<th>Number of Projects</th>
<th>Total Investment (in Millions)</th>
<th>Investment Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airports</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$350</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>$3,660</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ports</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$542</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$1,029</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category Scale of PPI Investment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructure PPI (in Millions)</th>
<th>Investment Level in infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0-500</td>
<td>Low level of investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$501-1000</td>
<td>Moderate level of investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,001-up</td>
<td>High level of investment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix Q - Nation Branding/Public and Private Tourism Promotion (D.R.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Nation Branding/Public &amp; Private Tourism Promotion</th>
<th>Investment Type</th>
<th>Investment Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1940-1980**<sup>56</sup> | - Prior to 1967: Tourism was non-existent  
- 1967-71: Government appoints a Ministry of Tourism and tourism promotion begins after passing of the 1971 Tourist Law to incentivize private tourism promotion  
- 1979: Government allocates $2 million for the international promotion of the country’s “Come to the land that Columbus loved best” campaign | Public | Low (prior to 1970) to High |
| | - 1970s-Initial private investment for the first resort in Punta Cana leads to numerous projects promoted in partnership with the government | Public-private tourism marketing | High |
| **1981-2010**<sup>57</sup> | - Tourism promotion fund established between the government and the National Hotel & Restaurants Association  
- INFRATUR, the D.R.’s Central Bank public financing department funds the promotion and completion of several tourism projects  
- 2000: A special fund is created to promote tourism | Public | High |
| | - 1980s: Spain-Dominican cooperative tourism development project builds and promotes many Spanish branded hotels | Public-private tourism marketing | High |
| **2011-2017**<sup>58</sup> | - The World Economic Forum’s Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Insight Reports consistently ranks the Dominican Republic’s public tourism promotion investment as high (over 20% of total tourism expenditure) | Public | High |
| | - Ecotourism projects - development and promotion being funded by public-private tourism marketing partnerships | Public-private tourism marketing | High |

Appendix R - Nation Branding/Public Tourism Promotion Investment (D.R.)

Category scale for public tourism promotion investment (% share of total tourism expenditure)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% share of total tourism expenditure</th>
<th>Nation branding/public investment on tourism promotion level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9%</td>
<td>Low investment in tourism promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19%</td>
<td>Moderate investment in tourism promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% - above</td>
<td>High investment in tourism promotion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix S - Dominican Republic’s Country Image Perception Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Travel Destination Information Source</th>
<th>Review of Travel Destination Information Source</th>
<th>Perception of Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-1949</td>
<td>Missing data</td>
<td>Later sources reveal a perception that covers this period</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1959</td>
<td>Missing data</td>
<td>Later sources reveal a perception that covers this period</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>Travel guide</td>
<td>• Unfavorable - D.R. viewed as unstable for travel (review of the country is only 6 pages)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TripAdvisor reviews</td>
<td>Mass Media report</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country Safety Rankings</td>
<td>Mass Media report</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SafeAround (2017)</td>
<td>Mass Media report</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UL Safety Index (2017)</td>
<td>Mass Media report</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59 The country image perception references are listed in a separate page in the Works Cited section of this thesis
Appendix T - Tourism Arrivals and Receipts Graph (D.R.)

**Appendix T.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals and Receipts (D.R., 1930-1980):**

Pre & Early Tourism Period (1930-1980)  

**Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1940-1980)**

- **Average rate of international arrivals**
  - 0-6.99%
  - 7-9.99%
  - 10% - above

- **Growth rate level**
  - Low average growth rate for international arrivals
  - Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals
  - High average growth rate for international arrivals

**Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990)**

- **Average rate of international receipts**
  - 0-9.99%
  - 10-12.99%
  - 13% - above

- **Growth rate level**
  - Low average growth rate of international receipts
  - Moderate average growth rate of international receipts
  - High average growth rate of international receipts

---

60 Pre-tourism period receipts are not available for 1930
Appendix T.2 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (D.R., 1981-2000):

Rising Tourism Period (1981-2000)\textsuperscript{61}

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1980-1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average rate of international arrivals</th>
<th>Growth level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4.99%</td>
<td>Low average growth rate for international arrivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7.99%</td>
<td>Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8% - above</td>
<td>High average growth rate for international arrivals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1995-2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average rate of international arrivals</th>
<th>Growth level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-2.69%</td>
<td>Low average growth rate for international arrivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7-4.99%</td>
<td>Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% - above</td>
<td>High average growth rate for arrivals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{61} Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region
Appendix T.3 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (D.R., 1981-2000):

Rising Tourism Period (1981-2000)

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average rate of International receipts</th>
<th>Growth rate level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9.99%</td>
<td>Low average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12.99%</td>
<td>Moderate average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%- above</td>
<td>High average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1990-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average rate of International receipts</th>
<th>Growth rate level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-12.99%</td>
<td>Low average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-17.99%</td>
<td>Moderate average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18%- above</td>
<td>High average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62 Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region
Appendix T.4 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (D.R., 2001-2016):

Golden Tourism Period (2001-2016)\textsuperscript{63}

---

**Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1995-2016)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average rate of international arrivals</th>
<th>Growth level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-2.69%</td>
<td>Low average growth rate for international arrivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7-4.99%</td>
<td>Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% - above</td>
<td>High average growth rate for international arrivals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{63} The category scale in this period starts at 1995 due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region that started at that time. But, this time period covers the tourism period in the Dominican Republic.
Appendix T.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (D.R., 2001-2016):

Golden Tourism Period (2001-2016)\textsuperscript{64}

Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 2000-2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average rate of International receipts</th>
<th>Growth rate level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-3.89%</td>
<td>Low average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9-5.99%</td>
<td>Moderate average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6% above</td>
<td>High average growth rate of international receipts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{64} The category scale in this period starts at 1995 due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region that started at that time. But, this period covers the tourism period in the Dominican Republic
### Appendix U – References for Country Image Perception (Haiti and D.R.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominican Republic (1940-present)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) 1940s-1950s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. <strong>Missing data</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. <strong>Travel guide information (negative review)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1960) incl. 9 pgs. on D.R. (negative review on the Dominican Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. <strong>Travel guide information</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1970)—information on Dominican Republic building its tourism sector (more positive than 1960 data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. <strong>Mass media reports (positive)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi. NYT article post-DR on list of countries with increased civil liberties and political rights (1979): <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/01/08/archives/survey-says-worlds-civil-liberties-have-increased-gain-in-dominican.html">https://www.nytimes.com/1979/01/08/archives/survey-says-worlds-civil-liberties-have-increased-gain-in-dominican.html</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Country Image Perception Data Sources (Dominican Republic, 1940-present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1980s</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Travel Guide information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mass media reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| i. NYT DR rediscovered:  
| ii. NYT DR safe: https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/08/nyregion/new-york-day-by-day-a-tour-for-tourism.html  
| iii. NYT article-DR tourism surges (1988):  
| iv. NYT article: more hotel in DR being built (1988):  
| **1990s** | |
| a. Mass media reports |  
| i. UK media report on DR-booming tourism:  
  https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/the-secret-life-of-merengue-island-1046049.html  
| ii. Caribbean Living Magazine -DR is best value in the Caribbean:  
  http://www.caribbeanliving.com/caribe/DominicanRepublic.htm |
| **2000s** | |
| a. Mass media reports |  
| i. US News & World report DR ranked 22 safe to travel alone and 46 in best countries for travel:  
| ii. Tourism Cluster in D.R. 2007 report (include some image stats):  
| **2010s** | |
| a. Mass media report |  
| i. Ministry of Tourism EcoTourism Dev. (2010)—incl. situation analysis of DR image -  
| b. Travel Survey |  
| i. Canadian Online Omni survey---D.R. is safe (2012)  
| c. Travel Reviews |  
| i. TripAdvisor Reviews (2010-2018)  
  https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowTopic-g147288-i27-k439705-Is_the_Dominican_Safe_for_families_or_is_it_like_Jamaica_s-Dominican_Republic.html  
| d. Country Safety Rankings |  
| i. SafeAround website (country danger ranking 2017)  
  https://safearound.com/americas/dominican-republic/Social Progress  
  Index: http://www.socialprogressindex.com/?tab=2&code=DOM |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Haiti (1940- present)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1) 1940s-1950s</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Missing data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2) 1960s</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Travel Guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Fodor’s Travel Guide to Caribbean (1960) incl. 29 pgs. on Haiti (positive review)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3) 1970s</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Mass Media Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Sports Illustrated - incl. report of tourism surge in Haiti (1973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.si.com/vault/1973/05/21/618336/to-hell-with-paradise">https://www.si.com/vault/1973/05/21/618336/to-hell-with-paradise</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. US/NY Times report incl. safety (1976)-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Travel Guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Fodor’s Travel Guide to Caribbean (1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4) 1980s</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Mass Media Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. NY Times report on impact of AIDS rumor on Haiti’s tourism (1983)-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. UK AIDS report on Haiti (attributed to tourist going to Haiti vs originating there—confirms it’s rumor vs real-2008 re 1982):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. AIDS and Unrest Image cause tourism to drop (1984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/06/13/riots-follow-liberalization-in-haiti/0bab2e94-47e5-4f4a-a2f1-75d7ec7da0e/?utm_term=.00c352c61418">https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/06/13/riots-follow-liberalization-in-haiti/0bab2e94-47e5-4f4a-a2f1-75d7ec7da0e/?utm_term=.00c352c61418</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. NYT (1986) FDI industry hopeful post-Duvalier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Travel Guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Fodor’s Travel Guide to Caribbean (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1990s | a. **Mass Media Reports**  
   i. Baltimore Sun article on Club Med Haiti’s loss of tourists (1994)  
   ii. NYT on Haitian tourism (1995)-  
| 2000s | a. **Mass Media Reports**  
   i. 2001 country report on Haiti’s non-existent tourism sector since 1990:  
      http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x9800e/x9800e10.htm | | | |
| 2010s | b. **Mass Media Reports**  
   i. World Nomad Blog report on Haiti’s safety, crime, and travel (2011 and 2018)  
   ii. BBC article on Haiti's safety for travel (2013):  
   iii. Haiti Hub website (2013) Is Haiti Safe?:  
      1. https://haitihub.com/is-haiti-safe/  
   i. SafeAround website (country danger ranking-2017)  
   ii. Social Progress Index (2017)-  
   i. Trip Advisor Reviews (2010-2018)  
| 2010s | e. **Mass Media Reports**  