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Explaining Shifts in White Racial Liberalism:
The Role of Collective Moral Emotions and Media Effects

by

Zachary Goldberg

Under the Direction of Sean Richey, PhD

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2022

ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to understand the causes of racial liberalism among white Americans, including overtime shifts therein. Drawing on intergroup emotions theory from social psychology, I propose that negative ingroup-focused moral emotions—namely white shame and guilt—are important factors in the formation of racially liberal attitudes, such as white support for race-based affirmative action and government assistance. I further argue that not all whites are equally susceptible to such emotions; that those inclined towards structural attributions for inequality (e.g. white liberals) are more likely to experience them; and that the racial attitudes of such whites are thus more elastic than those of others. Finally, I contend that the salience of these emotions varies as a function of the availability of racial equalitarian media messaging that speaks to black-white status differences in terms of past and/or present white racism. Using cross-sectional, time series, panel, and experimental data, I test these propositions across multiple empirical chapters. I find general support for the theory across multiple methodologies. In the main, the findings suggest that, net of other attitudinally important variables (e.g. racial resentment, social dominance orientation), white racial attitudes would be far more conservative in the absence of collective shame and guilt; that overtime increases in white racial liberalism temporally follow increases in the availability of racial equalitarian media messaging, particularly among white liberals and Democrats; and that racial equalitarian media messaging elicits white shame and guilt, which, in turn, increase the expression of racially liberal attitudes and policy preferences. Taken as a whole, the findings have important implications for the existing literature on white racial attitudes, which remains overwhelmingly focused on negative or prejudicial intergroup orientations.

INDEX WORDS: Intergroup Emotions Theory, Group-based emotions, Collective shame, Collective guilt, Racial Liberalism, Reparations, Affirmative action

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Explaining Shifts in White Racial Liberalism:
The Role of Collective Moral Emotions and Media Effects

by

Zachary Goldberg

Committee Chair: Sean Richey

Committee: Toby Bolsen

Judd Thornton

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Services

College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

May 2022

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to those who have supported me throughout my life as well as those that have stood by me during my nearly six-year doctoral journey. This includes my dear wife, Narinder, who patiently and lovingly put up with my obsessive (perhaps autistic) work habits, and who—together with my cats Cosmo and Lyla--helped to preserve my sanity in an otherwise lonely (and messy) apartment. It includes my father and mother, who brought me into this world and showered me with love and support every step of the way. Needless to say, without them, there'd be no dissertation. It includes my zaydee and late bubby—the best and most loving grandparents a person could ever hope for. It includes my sister Sara, who, despite her early hardships, always believed in me and inspired me to pursue my dreams. Finally, though no by no means exhaustively, it includes my best friends Barry and Benji who've filled my life with meaning and plenty of laughs. Thank you both for always being there for me.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Just over two decades ago, Kuklinski et al. (1997) concluded their study of white attitudes towards affirmative action with the following prediction:

“As more time passes, as memories of legalized segregation and overt exploitation fade, we can expect a growth in the number of whites who believe African-Americans share at least partial responsibility for their circumstances and, going a step further, who believe that continuing problems African-Americans face are a consequence not merely of their circumstances but of their own motivations and desires. If so, anger and resentment over affirmative action will increase, not decrease” (p.416).

Decades later, the opposite has transpired. In what some have called the ‘Great Awakening’, the racial attitudes of white Americans overall have become more liberal and supportive of pro-black policies, like affirmative action, over the past decade than at any previous point on record. In particular, and in a trend that predates the Trump presidency, overwhelming majorities of white Democrats and liberals now attribute the persistence of black disadvantage primarily to historical and/or contemporary discrimination and perceive their own racial group as uniquely and illegitimately advantaged. Coincidentally, support for race-conscious policies, such as affirmative action, financial reparations for slavery, and race-based government assistance, have reached record highs. In fact, by some measures, the racial liberalism of white Democrats and liberals has even surpassed that of their non-white counterparts. What is more, the former has since become the *only* demographic to exhibit at once favoritism towards other racial/ethnic groups and a bias against their own¹.

Against the backdrop of these seismic attitudinal shifts, white Democratic politicians and political candidates have increasingly adopted racially liberal or ‘woke’ rhetoric that would have been electorally risky in campaigns past. Speeches of white candidates during the 2019-2020

¹ These data are reviewed in Chapter 4.

Democratic presidential primaries projected this paradigm shift. At a Democratic presidential debate in 2019, senator Kirsten Gillibrand marketed herself as one who could “explain to white women in the suburbs that when their son is walking down the street with a bag of M&Ms in his pocket, wearing a hoodie, his whiteness is what protects him from being shot”. Even moderate Democratic candidates, such as the now president Joseph Biden, followed suit. Speaking at a recent event hosted by Al Sharpton, the now President Biden said: “we have a lot to root out, but most of all the systemic racism that most of us whites don’t like to acknowledge even exists. There’s something we have to admit—not you, me, white America—has to admit there’s still systemic racism.”

What accounts for this apparent attitudinal transformation? Why are some whites increasingly supportive of policies that exclusively benefit members of other ethnic/racial groups and for which they conceivably bear much of the costs? In truth, answering these questions requires first accounting for white racial liberalism in general. Specifically, what explains such ‘woke’ or pro-outgroup orientations among white Americans? And if the extent of these orientations varies across time, what drives this variation?

1.1 Statement of Problem

1.1.1 Explaining White Racial Liberalism

The existing political science literature on racial attitudes provides informative but ultimately incomplete answers to the preceding questions. First, with occasional exceptions, this literature is overwhelmingly focused on explaining the negative, prejudicial, or conservative intergroup attitudes of white Americans. Indeed, Chudy, Piston and Shipper (2019) note that the “lion’s share of existing research focuses on untangling the harmful effects of prejudice; as

such, it has offered us insufficient guidance on the consequences of racial attitudes beyond prejudice.” (p.2). Newman et al. (2013) echo this assessment in the context of research on immigration attitudes: “Within all of this work there is little to no research examining the factors that lead people to be supportive of immigrants. Few published studies explicitly seek to explain pro-immigrant sentiment, and one of the only individual-level factors consistently identified throughout the opinion literature to weaken opposition to immigration is education” (p.583-584).

A consequence of this tendency is that we know far more about the antecedents of racially conservative orientations among white Americans than we do about the factors that promote racially liberal or pro-outgroup orientations. As Newman et al. lament, the latter questions are often “left to be answered primarily by implication through inverting known findings” (ibid.). In other words, if the harboring of racial resentment and negative racial stereotypes explains whites’ *opposition* to equity-oriented racial policies, whites’ support must be a function of low-racial resentment and/or the non-holding of negative racial stereotypes. Of course, these inferences raise more questions than they answer. For instance, if ‘low’ racial resentment merely signifies the absence of anti-black prejudice, why does it predict pro-minority favoritism? Why do ‘low resentment’ whites discriminate against members of their own racial group in favor members of racial/ethnic out-groups? What other (moral) constructs and emotions reside at the ‘low’ level of the scale? Is it possible that attitudes towards blacks and other disadvantaged racial/ethnic minority groups are at least partially a function of whites’ attitudes towards other whites? Existing theories of symbolic and modern racism and racial resentment are largely silent on these questions. While recent research has sought to challenge and revise prevailing scholarly conceptions of white racial resentment in favor of a moral or justice-oriented framework (e.g. Davis and Wilson, 2021), it nonetheless gives little attention to ‘woke’ or

racially liberal whites —i.e., whites who are sympathetic towards non-whites and negative if not discriminatory towards other whites.

Other major theories of group attitudes are perhaps more explanatory but still insufficient. For instance, social dominance theory would attribute such pro-outgroup tendencies to a more basic and relatively stable anti-hierarchy orientation. By this account, white racial liberalism thus reflects an individually differing sensitivity to existing inequities and concomitant desires for their elimination. While a useful as a general theoretical starting point, this understanding has not sufficiently elaborated on why, for instance, ‘low resentment’ whites are might be more favorable to wealthy blacks than poor whites (Wright et al.). Nor is it sufficiently clear why concerns for inequities between certain racial/ethnic groups (e.g. white vs. black) or social categories (e.g. race) are prioritized over those between others (e.g. Asian vs. white; class). Finally and perhaps most importantly, if white racial liberalism is an expression of a more basic and relatively stable anti-hierarchy orientation, how are we to understand the fact that levels of the former appear to vary—in some period, quite dramatically--overtime? Why doesn’t white racial liberalism remain relatively constant? What time-dependent, contextual, or affective variables might mediate or heighten the influence of this orientation on white racial attitudes?

1.1.2 Explaining Overtime Variation in White Racial Liberalism

The foregoing two questions similarly push against traditional assumptions regarding the stability of racial attitudes. In the accounts of some scholars, racial attitudes are unique in their degree of ‘crystalization’; i.e. they develop early, remain relatively stable across the lifespan, and relate to ‘easy issues’ that even politically uninformed Americans can form strong opinions on. As such, large shifts in racial attitudes are either unexpected or limited to more malleable periods of a person’s development. And yet that large and rapid shifts *have* occurred raises the possibility

that white racial attitudes are more elastic than previously recognized. To be sure, while generational replacement—such as the rise of Millennial and Gen-Z white Americans—higher rates of education, and greater exposure to racial diversity or contact with racial minorities may contribute to shifts in racial attitudes in the long-run, such trends tend to be much too gradual and steady to account for the pattern, pace, and magnitude of recent change observed in the data.

Party-centric models of racial attitude change would appear to offer a better and parsimonious explanation. For instance, Carmines and Zeller's (1989) 'issue evolution' model (see also Levendusky 2009) largely attributes partisan changes in racial attitudes to the partisan sorting that follows from salient and divergent elite position-taking on new political issues. In this account, shifts in white racial liberalism are a product of shifts in the racial policy positions and rhetoric of party elites. Stated plainly, if Democratic Party leaders have gone 'woke' on race, rank-and-file Democrats will either follow suit—thereby adopting racially liberal policy attitudes as their own—or jump ship, perhaps to the Republican Party. In other words, increases in white racial liberalism among may be entirely a function of elite cue-taking among rank-and-file white Democrats and liberals as well as influxes of racial liberals into—and the exit of racial conservatives from-- the Democratic party. Meanwhile, increases in racially liberal position-taking among party elites may simply reflect efforts at appealing to racial identities and issues that resonate with non-white constituencies that will soon constitute a majority of Democrats. Add to this the divisive—some would say racist—rhetoric and immigration policies of former President Donald Trump, and it's no mystery why Democratic politicians have shifted in a 'woke' direction.

But while cogent, such party-centric models ultimately rest on the reasonable but nonetheless questionable assumption that party elites invariably engineer rather than respond to

shifts in public racial liberalism. As Lee (2002) argues in greater depth, these models either downplay or ignore the role of social movements and activist groups, including their effects on issue salience and public awareness. And yet, as Lee documents with respect to shifts in racial attitudes during the civil rights period, political scientists have increasingly noted the growing influence of activist groups over party agendas and rhetoric (e.g. Layman et al. 2010; Brawn et al. 2012). One recent study finds that political discourse and activism on social media causally influences the issues that politicians speak to (Barbera et al., 2019). That white Democrats and liberals engage in significantly higher rates of political participation and activism than their non-white counterparts thus has important implications for understanding the overtime dynamics of racial attitudes². For it suggests that party position-taking is not an unmoved mover of racial attitudes; that it is also affected by rather than merely effects changes in the racial attitudes of the politically engaged, who are disproportionately white. As it happens, some of the 2020 Democratic primary candidates (e.g. Elizabeth Warren, Kirstin Gillibrand) that were or are most outwardly progressive on racial issues and immigration were more popular among white than non-white Democrats (Su & Hickey, 2019). Furthermore, and as this dissertation will document, increases in racial liberalism among white Democrats and liberals at times precede those observed among their black and non-white counterparts. All of this raises the possibility that Democratic politicians are just as much, if not more so, appealing to racially liberal or ‘woke’ white Democrats as they are to their non-white counterparts.

Thermostatic models of public opinion are also limited in their ability to explain overtime and recent movement in racial attitudes. For they would predict that the latter swing against the

² Racial/ethnic disparities in political participation have long been documented (e.g. Verba et al. 1993). Appendix A presents a graph of time series data from the Cooperative Election Study, which shows that these disparities are also manifest among Democrats of different racial/ethnic backgrounds.

political and policy status-quo—in the racially liberal direction under a racially conservative administration or policy regime and vice versa. However, and as this dissertation will demonstrate, overtime variation in racial attitudes generally do not adhere to such an up-and-down pattern. Moreover, the emergence of the ‘Great Awakening’, a period corresponding to some of the sharpest increases in white racial liberalism on record, can be traced to the second term of the Obama administration and the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement—not the reign of Trump or a racially conservative Republican president that one would otherwise expect.

Unsatisfied with prevailing macro-level accounts of racial attitudes, Kellstedt (2000; 2003) proposed and offered support for a theory in which increases in public racial liberalism are a function of the salience of egalitarian value cues in race-related media coverage. This research was important not only in documenting significant overtime variation in racial attitudes, which suggests the existence of racial policy ‘moods’, but also in calling into question the assumption that the media plays a limited to no role in their formation. At the same time, Kellstedt’s work either leaves open or raises a number of important questions that subsequent research has generally neglected to investigate. One of them is that Kellstedt’s theory is group-general and fails to consider the possibility of heterogenous media effects--that different demographics and political subgroups (e.g. white liberals) respond differently than others (e.g. white conservatives) to the same race-related media stimuli. More specifically, it doesn’t consider how people’s racial group memberships (e.g. belonging to a historically advantaged or disadvantaged racial group), orientations to inequality (e.g. social dominance), and other background traits inform and mediate their interpretation of and respond to race-related news media. Instead, it effectively treats the public as a homogenous bloc that responds to egalitarian media cues in a uniform or

unidirectional fashion. Addressing these blind spots is key to elaborating the causal process through which these cues impact (or don't impact) the expression of racial attitudes.

1.2 Research Questions

The broader questions this dissertation seeks to answer is why and when do members of advantaged or dominant social groups become political champions of and exhibit favoritism towards members of disadvantaged outgroups. More specifically, though, this dissertation is interested in understanding this phenomenon as it obtains among white Americans. Accordingly, it attempts to explain: a) why some white Americans support affirmative action and other race-conscious policies that afford preferential treatment or assistance to blacks and other racial/ethnic minorities, and b) why some white Americans are at once critical or negative towards other whites and sympathetic or positive towards racial/ethnic outgroups.

This dissertation believes that answering the preceding questions is essential for the answering of another; namely, what explains variation in white racial attitudes across time? Why are increases in white racial liberalism observed in some periods, but not others? By identifying the variables that contribute to white racial liberalism cross-sectionally, this dissertation hopes to also uncover the variables that influence it longitudinally.

1.3 Theoretical Contributions

This thesis aspires to address a number of glaring gaps in the political science literature's understanding of racial attitudes. As was noted already, the overwhelming majority of existing topical research is limited to explaining whites' opposition to equity-oriented policies that benefit blacks and other racial/ethnic minorities, liberal immigration laws, and prejudicial outgroup-focused attitudes and behavior in general. A consequence of this parochialism is the relative paucity if not absence of theories that make sense of racially liberal or pro-racial- outgroup-

oriented whites. Absent such a theory, existing theories can provide only an incomplete account of white racial attitudes. But not only is such a theoretical framework critical for understanding white racial liberalism or ‘wokeness’ at the individual-level, but it is also crucial for understanding why and how these attitudes vary or grow across time.

This dissertation promises to correct for this theoretical deficit by formulating, elaborating, and ultimately testing a group-based moral emotions account in which white Americans’ moral appraisals of and attitudes towards racial/ethnic outgroups are considerably influenced by those of and towards fellow whites. More specifically, it proposes that, to a significant degree, white racial liberalism reflects appraisals of the (ill)legitimacy of whites’ advantaged social position, their ingroup’s complicity in the persistence of racial inequality, and concomitant feelings of shame, guilt, and anger over their ingroup’s immoral past and present. Overtime variation in white racial liberalism thus reflects variation in the salience of these negative ingroup-focused moral appraisals and emotions. And the latter, in turn, is argued to be a function of the salience of race-related media messaging that explicitly or implicitly speaks to white-black status differences in terms of past and/or present white racism.

While furthering political scientists’ understanding of white racial liberalism, the group-based moral emotions theory offered and tested in this dissertation additionally contributes to both proximately and distally related lines of research. In the first case, the few existing political science studies of the effects of group-based moral emotions on white racial liberalism (e.g. Chudy, Piston, & Shipper, 2019) consider only the effects of collective guilt on support for black political candidates and pro-black policies. However, collective guilt is but one of a family of negative ingroup-focused emotions, and it may not even be the most important for explaining these and other attitudinal outcomes. This dissertation addresses this oversight by additionally

considering the highly related but nonetheless distinct emotion of collective shame. On top of this, it also examines whether white guilt and shame over white America's mistreatment of blacks have 'spill-over' effects on attitudes towards other racial/ethnic outgroups, including policies (e.g. immigration) that implicate them.

This dissertation also contributes to enduring scholarly debates over the meaning and validity of what is arguably the most widely used measure of white racial attitudes in the social sciences—the 'racial resentment' battery. Specifically, it tests of the proposition that racial resentment and related measures (e.g. modern racism) essentially capture whites' endorsement of structural vs. individual-level attributions for the persistence of black disadvantage. These attributions, in turn, are theorized to inform whites' group-based appraisals of responsibility for the conditions of blacks. Finally, it is argued that the strong relationships between racial resentment, on one hand, and white collective shame and guilt on another reflect the fact that the expression of the latter is conditional on appraisals of ingroup moral responsibility. Crucially, this interpretation has the potential to explain previously documented relationships between 'low' white racial resentment and, inter alia, pro-black favoritism and policy support.

In demonstrating the importance of negative ingroup-focused moral appraisals and emotions for white racial liberalism, and the media's role in their activation, this dissertation contributes to theories of social movement influence as well as existing debates regarding the stability of racial attitudes and the scope of the media's attitudinal influence. For one of the implications of this dissertation's theory is that an avenue through which civil rights, racial justice activists, and news media effect changes in white racial attitudes is via the elicitation of negative white-focused moral appraisals and emotions. If so, an additional implication is that the stability of white racial attitudes is overstated (or is the product of protracted lulls in the

availability of appraisal-triggering stimuli) and/or that stability is more characteristic of white subgroups (e.g. conservatives) that either resist, avoid, or tune-out appraisal-triggering media messaging. This dissertation thus helps to reconcile earlier studies' findings of attitudinal stability with recent research that attests to the racially liberalizing influence of the Black Lives Matter movement.

1.4 Clarifications, Definitions, and Provisos

Before presenting the layout out of this dissertation, a few terminological and normative clarifications are in order. First, as the reader has likely noticed, I use the terms 'racial liberalism', 'woke', and 'pro-outgroupness' more or less interchangeably. As I define them, the first two of these terms are synonymous with one another. Specifically, I conceive of 'racial liberalism' and 'wokeness' as consisting of the following core beliefs:

1. Outcome disparities between white and black Americans are largely if not entirely attributable to the effects of past and present white racism.
2. White Americans are illegitimately advantaged on account of their racial group memberships.
3. White Americans have a moral obligation to eliminate these disparities and counteract their illegitimate racial advantages via the enactment of race-conscious policies that afford special treatment or assistance to blacks and other disadvantaged racial/ethnic minority groups.

A 'pro-outgroup' orientation, then, represents the culmination of this belief set and refers to the tendency of favoring disadvantaged racial/ethnic groups over whites in terms of, inter alia, social policy, allocations of resources, assignments of reward and punishment, and in the expression of compassions and resentments.

As will be stated on other occasions in the chapters that follow, this dissertation is and will remain entirely agnostic as to the normative propriety of these moral-political orientations. For whether ‘wokeness’ or ‘pro-outgroupness’ among whites is morally desirable entails a subjective value-based assessment that is ultimately irrelevant to the research questions under study. The same is true of this dissertation’s treatment of negative ingroup-focused emotions, such as ‘white shame’ and ‘guilt’. While these terms have at times been used to deride, dismiss or discredit left-wing or progressive racial justice activism, this dissertation recognizes the emotions in question as universal human phenomena of evolutionary significance. Their use in this dissertation thus remains wholly academic and descriptive. Whether or not white Americans *should* feel guilt or shame for their racial group memberships is of no interest to the current research.

In a similar vein, this dissertation takes no position as to the cause or nature of disparities between racial/ethnic groups. It does not assume or even comment on the truth of different causal narratives (discrimination, culture, biology etc.) for the theory it advances does not depend on the validity of any. This dissertation is thus also silent on the question of both the existence or extent of white privilege as well as the desirability of its recognition among whites. What’s relevant is only that some whites do perceive themselves as benefiting from illegitimate racial advantages; and that this perception has consequences for their racial attitudes, including how they feel about their own racial ingroup.

A final point of clarification relates to the objects of this dissertation’s theory and analysis. Specifically, this dissertation is primarily concerned with explaining racial liberalism as it manifests among white Americans; and, therefore, white Americans are at the foreground of its theory and empirical hypotheses. To be clear, though, this is not because understanding the racial

attitudes of other groups is uninteresting or unimportant. Rather, it is largely because the theoretical drivers of racial liberalism among members of majority or high-status racial groups are unique in important ways from those of their minority or low-status counterparts. In a word, the group-based moral appraisals (e.g. unfairly privileged, racist) and emotions (e.g. shame, guilt) that promote ‘woke’ attitudes among white Americans are qualitatively different from those (e.g. indignance, white-focused anger, ingroup-focused empathy) expected to encourage them among blacks and other racial/ethnic groups. Widening the ambit of study to include the racial attitudes of non-white racial/ethnic groups would thus result in a dissertation that is not only longer than the current document, but one that risks being thematically incoherent and desultory. This being said, the intergroup moral emotions theory on which this dissertation rests is broad enough to accommodate and cogently account for the racial attitudes of other groups. But I nonetheless opt to leave this undertaking to future research and researchers.

1.5 Outline and Structure of Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into 8 subsequent chapters, each of which are outlined and described below.

1.5.1 Chapter 2: Literature Review

Chapter 2 begins with a review and discussion of both group-level and individual differences accounts of racial attitudes. Appraising these theoretical frameworks to be lacking for explaining racial ‘wokeness’ or pro-outgroup attitudes and behaviors among white Americans, it proceeds to introduce intergroup emotions theory as a means of addressing these questions. In particular, this section presents research on the importance of negative ingroup-focused moral appraisals and emotions—specifically, collective shame and guilt—for the expression of pro-outgroup/anti-ingroup orientations. It also reviews and discusses the differences between these

emotions, including their unique but often overlapping effects on intergroup attitudes and behaviors.

1.5.2 Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses

On the basis of the insights from intergroup emotions theory, Chapter 3 derives and presents a series of preliminary hypotheses that are designed to test the relative importance of white shame and guilt for white Americans' support for equity-oriented pro-black policies (e.g. affirmative action, financial reparations) and expressions of outgroup favoritism. Thereafter, the chapter shifts its focus towards identifying the individual-level predispositions that condition whites' expression of ingroup-critical emotions and, consequently, pro-outgroup/ingroup-critical racial attitudes. To this end, it surveys and discusses research on individual and ideological differences in orientations to and beliefs about the nature of group inequality. In the main, this discussion links differences in whites' susceptibility to collective guilt and shame to the differential endorsement of structural vs. individual-level attributions for racial inequality. These attributions, in turn, inform both the perceived legitimacy of whites' advantaged social position as well as their racial group's perceived responsibility for the persistent disadvantages of blacks and other groups of color. This chapter subsection concludes with the prediction that, owing to their greater embrace of bias-centric accounts of group inequality, white collective guilt and shame will be greater among white liberals than conservatives.

Subsequent subsections of chapter 3 consider the implications of intergroup moral emotions theory for overtime variation in white racial liberalism. After reviewing literature on the attitudinal effects (and lack thereof) of news media both historically and in the digital age, I develop and forward an ingroup-critical emotions model of media-driven changes in white racial attitudes. Essentially, this model posits that overtime variation in white racial liberalism at least

partly reflects variation in the salience of ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions; and that the in, in turn, reflects variation in the salience of media messaging that speaks to white-black status differences in terms of past and/or persistent white racism. However, and integrating the theoretical insights of earlier sections with the work of Zaller (1992), this model also asserts that this media messaging's positive effects on white racial liberalism are moderated by several important ideological and cognitive predispositions that influence not only the likelihood of receiving and engaging with such messaging, but also whether an individual reacts to it in a white-critical and pro-minority fashion.

This chapter concludes with a series of observational and experimental predictions that follow from this theoretical model, which are then put to the test in the remaining chapters.

1.5.3 Chapter 4: Racial Equalitarian Media and Racial Awakenings

Chapter 4 is this dissertation's first empirical chapter—one that sets the stage for the others that follow. It is guided by two research objectives whose attainment is crucial for affirming the plausibility of this dissertation's theory: 1) demonstrating variation in white racial attitudes across time, and 2) testing whether overtime variation in white racial attitudes temporally proceeds variation in the availability of specific media messaging that is theoretically implicated in the expression of ingroup-critical emotions. It begins by showcasing various nationally representative time series of white racial attitudes to illustrate the 'Great Awakening' and the magnitude of recent variation therein. It then pivots to the question of what drives overtime variation in white racial liberalism in general. Towards answering this question, this chapter introduces a novel times series measure of white racial liberalism as well as a measure of 'racial equalitarian' media messaging. These two variables are then subjected to granger causality tests so as to determine the direction of any possible causal relationship. The analysis

concludes with a series of lagged dependent models, which test the robustness of the media-attitudes relationship in the presence of plausible confounding variables.

1.5.4 Chapter 5: The ‘Floyd Effect’ on White Racial Liberalism

This chapter addresses several limitations of the previous by quasi-experimentally testing the effects of the May 25, 2020 killing of George Floyd on white racial attitudes, including those previously linked to measures of collective shame and guilt. Specifically, differences in means tests and both bivariate and multivariate regression models are used to assess whether the Floyd incident occasioned significant increases in whites’ perceptions of anti-black discrimination, in the extent that whites’ attribute black disadvantage to racism and discrimination, in whites’ support for granting blacks monetary reparations, and in the share of whites’ that have unfavorable views of whites vs. blacks. A causal mediation model is then used to test whether or to what extent such increases were mediated by increases in media messaging that is theoretically expected to elicit white shame and guilt.

1.5.5 Chapter 6: The Importance of Collective Shame and Guilt for White Racial Liberalism

This chapter leverages both novel and pre-existing cross-sectional survey data to examine the predictive effects of white shame and guilt on various racial attitudes, including support for pro-black and liberal immigration policies, racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth, and anti-white sentiment. Importantly, it makes the case that the predictive effects of shame and guilt on these outcomes are as strong if not stronger than those of some of the most widely used attitudinal measures in the literature, namely ‘racial resentment’ and ‘social dominance orientation’. In addition to conventional linear and logistic regression models, this chapter features a number of factor analyses to examine the shared variation and assess the statistical distinguishability of

shame, guilt, and racial resentment. It later leverages these methods to test whether, as predicted, racial resentment is statistically indistinguishable from measures of structural/bias-centric vs. individual-level attributions for black disadvantage. Subsequent tests examine whether this general ‘attributions’ factor accounts for ideological differences in the expression of shame and guilt. This chapter concludes with attempted replications of results on a nationally representative sample of white respondents.

1.5.6 Chapter 7: White Shame, Guilt, and Racial Liberalism in the Laboratory

This chapter uses a large-sample experimental design to test whether a) media messaging that is theoretically expected to increase feelings of white shame and guilt actually does so, and whether b) such messaging has a liberalizing effect on racial attitudes via its influence on shame and guilt. It begins with analyses of treatment effects on expected mediators (i.e., shame and guilt) and primary outcome variables, including pro-black policy support and ingroup vs. outgroup warmth. Expected heterogenous effects are also tested and examined by interacting the treatment with baseline measures of political ideology and party affiliation. Finally, causal mediation models are fitted to examine whether or to what extent main treatment effects are indirectly conveyed via increases in shame and guilt.

1.5.7 Chapter 8: The (Not-)Guilty and (Un)Ashamed in Their Own Words

To what extent are ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions actually manifest in the thoughts and sentiments of white respondents? Addressing this question is the object of this dissertation’s final empirical chapter. To this end, it shifts to a qualitative approach and reviews the voluntary open-ended responses submitted by experimental study participants from the previous chapter. It identifies and surveys examples from two thematic response categories: ‘ingroup-critical’ and ‘defensive’ respondents. It concludes with a mixed-methods analysis that

examines whether the frequency of each response type systematically varies across the experimental conditions; and, further, whether response types meaningfully correlate with quantitative measures of shame and guilt.

1.5.8 Chapter 9: Conclusion

This closing chapter provides brief chapter-by-chapter summaries of this dissertation's main empirical findings. Their limitations and theoretical implications are also discussed, including suggestions for future research.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Chapter Overview

Existing research on racial attitudes can be generally categorized into two dominant theoretical paradigms. Headlined by realistic conflict theory and social identity theory, the first set of theories understands racial attitudes in terms of intergroup processes or as the product of group-level phenomena. The second set of theories, which encompasses, *inter alia*, theories of authoritarianism and social dominance, posits that individual differences in core psychological predispositions mediate the influence of intergroup processes on racial attitudes³. Despite their differing approaches to the study of racial attitudes, the research emanating from these paradigms has mostly sought to explain negative or derogatory outgroup orientations. This limited focus is a problem for theorizing about the ‘Great Awakening’, where the object of analysis is precisely the ‘positive’ or pro-outgroup end of the attitudinal spectrum.

Accordingly, while this literature review covers several important findings relating to pro-ingroup and anti-outgroup orientations, it largely focuses on those that shed light on their less-explored pro-outgroup and anti-ingroup antipodes. It begins with a brief survey of several seminal theories from the ‘intergroup processes’ school of racial attitudes, namely realistic conflict and social identity theory. It then introduces a relatively newer theory within this tradition, intergroup emotions theory (IET), and reviews related research whose findings form the theoretical backdrop of this dissertation’s central hypotheses (which are then formulated and presented in the proceeding chapter). In particular, these sections explain why IET is the theoretical framework that is best equipped to account for the racially liberal sentiments of some

³ In other words, these theories contend that not all ingroup members respond (be it positively or negatively) similarly to outgroups in the same social context or under the same circumstances. They purport to explain why and how these reactions differ as a function of different psychological orientations and personality tendencies.

white Americans. As will become clear, a key insight of these sections is that whites' racial and immigration policy preferences are not just informed by their appraisals of and feelings towards *other* racial groups but are equally shaped by those of and towards their *own*.

2.2 Explaining Racial Attitudes

2.2.1 *Realistic Conflict Theory (SIT)*

Like many theories of intergroup attitudes, realistic conflict theory (RCT) attempts to explain why members of a social group are often hostile or uncooperative towards members of other outgroups. To this end, RCT attributes such anti-outgroup tendencies to competition over finite material resources or mutually incompatible interests (Blumer, 1958; Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966; see Jackson 1993 for a review). Thus, in explaining why whites hold prejudicial attitudes against racial out-groups—including why they tend to resist or oppose remedial group-conscious policies, such as affirmative action—this framework stresses the 'realistic' threats the latter are perceived to pose to the material resources and/or advantaged social position of the former (Blumer, 1958). For instance, to the extent that living in close proximity to non-white populations entails greater competition for local resources (e.g. jobs, public services) and unequal burden-sharing, one hypothesis predicts that white racial animus increases with the percent of non-whites residing in the local environment (Key, 1949). This line of reasoning has been extended to the context of immigration, where the size (or growth thereof) of local immigrant populations is predicted to negatively affect white immigration attitudes (Ha, 2010; Newman, 2013). While not explicit in most formulations of RCT, one can invert the theory to explain positive outgroup attitudes or intergroup harmony; i.e. group members that are positive towards outgroups are those whose material wellbeing or interests are secure from outgroup threats. In the context of immigration, for instance, one study found that blue-collar (who are

more likely to compete with cheap labor) and white-collar (who are more likely to benefit from) workers were less and more likely to support increasing immigration levels, respectively (Betts, 2005; See also Facchini & Mayda, 2006).

And yet evidence supporting such RCT-derived hypotheses has been mixed and inconclusive. Oliver and Mendelberg (2000), for instance, failed to uncover any consistent relationships between black population size and racial antagonism among whites. Instead, they found that whites residing in low-status zip-codes (i.e. those with lower average educational attainment and income) were more hostile towards blacks irrespective of the local black population size. Rather than perceiving objective threats to material resources, these authors speculate that racial animus among less-educated white residents may be a means of achieving or maintaining ingroup esteem (which accords with a theory I review below). Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) similarly note that only state-level Latino population size, rather than neighborhood racial context, had a significant negative impact on white immigration attitudes. However, as in Oliver and Mendelberg (2000), they found that this effect was often conditional on education, with less-educated and better-educated white respondents exhibiting conservative and liberal immigration attitudes, respectively, in states with large Latino populations. Whereas RCT would suggest that these relationships are due to the link between education and income—with financially insecure whites perceiving greater realistic threats from Hispanic immigration—Kaufman (2018) notes that controlling for education renders income an insignificant predictor of voting for restrictionist immigration candidates (e.g. Trump) and policies (e.g., Brexit). This coheres with Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) comprehensive review of the immigration attitudes literature, which generally shows that personal income and economic circumstances do not meaningfully explain

anti-immigration attitudes. Instead, the weight of the evidence shows symbolic and socio-tropic concerns to be far more predictive (though see Malhotra et al. 2013).

2.2.2 Social Identity Theory (SIT)

While incorporating some of the insights of RCT, social identity theory (SIT) argues that intergroup attitudes are more than just a reflection of the presence or absence of threats to material resources (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986). Rather, they are the sum of a more general psychological need for sustaining or achieving social self-esteem through positive social comparisons of one's ingroup vs. other outgroups. This need for positive group distinction can manifest in social competition whereby group members work to ensure that their ingroup is more favorably evaluated than others on important social attributes and outcomes. Such competition is theorized as being most likely to occur when an intergroup consensus obtains over the value of status-conferring attributes (e.g. wealth), when group boundaries are impermeable (i.e. upward mobility is denied to members of lower-status groups) and social hierarchies are perceived to be unstable and illegitimate. Under these conditions, social competition can manifest in in-group favoritism (i.e. behaviors that preserve or enhance the social standing of one's in-group relative to an out-group) and/or out-group derogation (i.e. behaviors that weaken or maintain the inferior social standing of an out-group relative to one's in-group). On the other hand, when a dominant group's standing is perceived by all to be legitimate and stable—i.e. as the outcome of its superior performance on a valued social dimension—group hierarchies are seen to reflect the 'social reality' and go uncontested.

SIT further contends that whether one's ingroup is advantaged or disadvantaged under existing social structures influences his/her attitudes towards inequality (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003). For members of advantaged groups, the

notion of group equality threatens the maintenance of a positive group identity in that it entails a loss of status and influence. Thus, such individuals are expected to adopt or promote beliefs that affirm the legitimacy or deservingness of their ingroup's dominant social position. In contrast, for members of disadvantaged groups, equality serves the goal of maintaining a positive group identity to the extent that it entails relative *gains* in status and influence. Members of disadvantaged or lower-status groups are thus expected to adopt or promote beliefs that (de)legitimize group (in)equality. But unlike individual differences theories that view such beliefs as reflecting a more general and stable orientation to inequality, SIT holds them to be both context and group-dependent (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). This because people typically belong to different groups (e.g. black and male) that variably benefit from (or are disadvantaged by) inequality in different social environments (Reynolds et al. 2001). Whether a person views himself as privileged or disadvantaged thus depends on which social categorization or group membership is salient.

Applied to the American racial context, SIT holds that whites engage in ingroup favoritism and/or act prejudiced towards racial outgroups when a) racial group memberships are salient, and b) their advantaged social position is insecure or is challenged by racial outgroups who contest the legitimacy of the status quo. While acknowledging that members of privileged groups do not always exhibit these pro-ingroup and/or anti-ingroup behavioral tendencies, earlier versions of the theory say little about ingroup members who sympathize with outgroups, including those who *oppose* or actively *challenge* their ingroup's position on the latter's behalf. (Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). Ultimately emerging to fill this gap is intergroup emotions theory (IET), which serves as this dissertation's primary theoretical framework.

2.2.3 *Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET)*

Missing from earlier formulations of SIT is an explicit consideration of the importance of group moral reputations for positive group evaluations. More specifically, in addition to competence, warmth, and other dimensions, people evaluate ingroups and outgroups in terms of their moral character. In fact, some recent research even suggests that moral appraisals are more important for positive group evaluations and ingroup esteem than are appraisals of competence and sociability (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Soral & Kofta, 2020; Hitlin, Kwon, & Firat, 2021; Brambilla et al. 2021). IET thus expands on SIT by underscoring how group members are sensitive to and seek to preserve or enhance their ingroup's moral reputation. Specifically, it holds that when group-memberships are salient, people appraise social events and outcomes not solely in terms of their effects on personal interest, but *also* in terms of their implications for both their ingroup's and their own moral reputations (Smith, 1993; Mackie et al. 2000).

For members of advantaged groups, the moral reputation of their ingroup is of both personal and systemic significance. In the first case, they are a source of personal esteem, and thus individuals desire to feel proud, not ashamed, of their group memberships. Moral reputations can also influence relations with other outgroups. If one's ingroup is appraised as morally corrupt or dubious by members of other outgroups, the prospect of intergroup harmony and cooperation diminishes while the prospect of rejection and conflict increases. Further, at the interpersonal level, how one's ingroup is morally appraised by other outgroup members can affect how the latter view and act towards *individual* members of the former. This is especially the case when groups are distinguishable on the basis of visible characteristics. Individual ingroup members, in other words, can benefit from or be burdened by their ingroup's moral

reputation. In the second (i.e. systemic) case, ascriptions of immorality to advantaged groups undercuts the legitimacy (and thus stability) of its relative social position.

Although bolstering or glorifying the ingroup and/or derogating outgroups is one possible (and perhaps the most common) means by which group members respond to threats to their moral identity—such as when an advantaged ingroup’s social position is attributed to its mistreatment or persecution of an outgroup(s)—the IET literature importantly acknowledges and offers an account of those that respond in a pro-outgroup and/or anti-ingroup fashion. As will be elaborated on below, it shows that, for some group members, moral identity threats actually trigger self and/or ingroup-critical emotions that motivate the adoption of pro-outgroup attitudes and behaviors as a means of moral atonement, self-affirmation, and/or self-distancing. Of these emotions, the two that have attracted the lion’s share of scholarly attention are collective guilt and shame.

2.2.3.1 Collective Guilt

Until relatively recently, collective guilt was thought to be the most pro-social negative ingroup-focused moral emotion. Indeed, a large number of studies show feelings of collective guilt to be an important predictor of advantaged ingroup members’ support for policies that compensate historically victimized outgroups (see Ferguson & Branscombe 2014 for a general overview review of these findings; see Leach & Cidam 2015 and Hakim, Branscombe, & Schoemann 2021 for meta-analyses). Before reviewing some of these findings, it’s important to clarify the psychological mechanism (namely, cognitive dissonance) through which guilt is thought to motivate pro-outgroup behavioral and attitudinal tendencies.

Recall that group members are sensitive to their ingroup’s moral reputation, as it is a source of pride that also bears on their own individual moral reputations and self-concepts. They

thus aspire to regard—as well as aspire for other groups to regard--themselves and their ingroup as virtuous. However, when group members perceive that their ingroup is responsible for injustices against other groups, these aspirations are compromised. The discrepancy (i.e., dissonance) that emerges between group members' *desired* and *actual* moral selves can generate both negative self-focused and ingroup-focused negative emotions, which, in this case, manifests as collective guilt. Importantly, the experience of this emotion is not dependent on individual group members being directly involved in their ingroup's misdeeds. In fact, the perception that oneself and one's fellow group members unjustly benefit from their group's mistreatment of other outgroups, or that one is doing nothing to rectify an ingroup's past and/or continued wrongdoings against an outgroup(s), is sufficient to elicit it (Hoffman, 1998).

Most relevant to the current discussion, though, is that guilt is a psychologically aversive and stressful emotion, and thus group members are motivated to resolve or assuage it. This entails closing the perceived gap between one's actual and desired moral self. Engaging in behaviors (e.g. voting for a political candidate from a disadvantaged outgroup) and/or supporting compensatory policies (affirmative action, reparations) intended to elevate an afflicted outgroup(s) and atone for an ingroup's immoral actions, is thus a means to this end. At one level, it communicates remorse to and a desire to make amends with a victimized outgroup(s), thus beginning the process of repairing an ingroup's tainted moral status in the eyes of others. At another, it restores a sense of virtue in individual group members, which moderates the discomfort they feel over their membership in a morally tainted group and/or the privileges it affords them (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Rothschild & Keefer, 2017).

Consistent with this logic, in one of the first studies of guilt in the American racial context, Swim and Miller (1999) found that feelings of 'white guilt' uniquely predicted support

for affirmative action for African Americans. More recently—and in one of the only political science papers on the topic—Chudy, Piston & Shipper (2019) showed that, net of racial resentment and other background variables, feelings of white guilt were a statistically and substantively significant predictor of support for affirmative action and warmth towards President Barack Obama. In a separate experimental study, the authors found that white guilt moderated the depressive effects of a race-conscious (vs. universal/race-blind) policy frame on support for targeting job training programs towards black Americans. In another, they found that ‘guilty’ participants were significantly more likely to favor a black vs. an otherwise identical white political candidate.

Similar findings have been reported in other national contexts (e.g. Yugoslavia: Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Germany: Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb, 2012; Chile: Brown et al., 2008; Norway: Gausel & Brown, 2012; Israel: Solak et al. 2016). For instance, Leach, Iyer and Pedersen (2006) found that non-Aboriginal Australians who considered their group to be advantaged over Aboriginal people expressed greater collective guilt over their country's historical mistreatment and the persisting disadvantages of the latter. Guilt, in turn, predicted both willingness to engage in political action (e.g. sending a letter of protest to the Australian government, helping to organize pro-Aboriginal demonstrations on behalf) of Aboriginal people and general support for compensation (e.g. ‘Australian society has a responsibility to compensate Aborigines with jobs and education through government programs’). Likewise, Fourie and Verwoerd’s (2021) recent study of a nationally representative sample of white South Africans found that expressions of guilt over the COVID-related hardships of black South Africans were the strongest predictor of signing petitions (vs. not signing or signing counter-petitions) that urged the government to enact various equity-oriented policies (e.g. affirmative action, expropriation of white-owned land

without compensation, free college for black students). In contrast, and perhaps speaking to the suggested limits of empathic concern as a motivator of prosocial change in contexts of group power differentials⁴, expressions compassion were not significantly associated with this outcome.

While many of the findings noted above are cross-sectional, a number of experimental studies that manipulate feelings of collective guilt attest to its causal influence on pro-sociality (Doosje et al. 1998; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Mallet & Swim, 2007; Stewart, Latu, & Branscombe, 2010; Zimmermann et al. 2011; Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb, 2012; Faulker, 2017) . For instance, one of the first experimental studies of collective guilt in the American racial context was conducted by Iyer, Leach, and Crosby (2003), who varied the wording of items measuring perceptions of anti-black discrimination to either exclusively focus on blacks (e.g. ‘Many Black employees face racial bias when they apply for jobs or are up for a promotion’) or whites (‘Many white employers are racially biased in their hiring and promotion practices’). The authors found that whites receiving the ‘white-focused’ version expressed greater levels of group-based guilt, which, in turn, predicted support for pro-black affirmative action policies. A subsequent study by Powell, Branscombe, and Schmitt (2005) framed inequality in terms of either white privilege (‘White Americans enjoy many privileges that Black Americans do not’) or black disadvantage (‘Black Americans face many disadvantages that White Americans do not’) and presented subjects with either a list of different domains in which White Americans are relatively privileged (‘White Americans can easily rent or purchase housing in any area where they can afford to live’) or in which Black Americans are relatively disadvantaged (‘Black

⁴ Some researchers argue that, absent commitments to norms and goals of group equity, empathic concern is likely to manifest as a kind of fleeting pity that is less focused on the causes of an outgroup’s disadvantage (Zaki & Cikara, 2015; Malbois & Clavien, 2019).

Americans often have difficulty renting or purchasing housing, even in areas where they can afford to live'). They found that white subjects assigned to the 'inequality as white privilege' condition expressed greater collective guilt and lower white identification than those in the 'inequality as black disadvantage' condition. Collective guilt, in turn, fully mediated the negative effects of the white privilege condition on 'modern racism'.

Despite these findings, a number of scholars have questioned the pro-social potential of collective guilt. Some (e.g. Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004) contend that, because it is a distressing self-focused emotion, the pro-sociality it motivates only goes as far as needed for resolving or soothing psychological discomfort. By this account, and as Steele (2006) similarly argues, supporting policies like affirmative action for blacks is a low-cost means by which white people can feel good about themselves and their racial group membership. Concerns for black disadvantage are thus secondary to achieving psychological equanimity. And yet still others argue that the relationship between collective guilt and pro-sociality is, in fact, mostly capturing the more potent and further-reaching effects of collective shame (Allpress et al. 2014), an emotion I turn to next.

2.2.3.2 *Collective Shame*

If collective guilt was initially conceived as the most pro-social ingroup-critical emotion, the opposite was thought to be true for collective shame. Indeed, in early research, collective shame was often linked to self-defensive or anti-social behavior, such as avoiding contact with or conversations about the outgroup's victimization and/or a desire to 'cover-up' an ingroup's wrongdoing or decrease its public salience (Tangney, 1995; Lickel et al. 2005). This is because collective shame, in contrast to guilt, is tied to a more global and thus psychologically threatening appraisal in which the moral essence of the self and one's ingroup is deemed to be

defective. Such appraisals, in turn, were theorized to motivate the desire to hide from or avoid shame-eliciting stimuli, such as the potential condemnation of others. Rees, Klug, and Bamberg (2015) summarize the traditional distinction between guilt and shame as follows: "...when one has behaved badly (guilt), one can apologize or repair the damage done. But if one is a bad person (shame), the only possible ways of avoiding the negative emotion would be to hide or avoid the issue" (p.441).

More recent research, however, suggests that the relationship between shame and anti-social behavior is an artifact of treating feelings of rejection and inferiority as constituents of shame (Gausel and Leach, 2011; Gausel, Leach, and Brown, 2012), or of not partialing 'image shame' from 'moral shame' (Allpress et al. 2014). Specifically, while generally correlated, these studies find that ingroup members' concerns and motives vary in response to perceptions of ingroup immorality. Members that primarily concern themselves with the reputational (or social image-related) costs and social rejection that attend public revelation of their ingroup's misdeeds are likely to engage in self-defensive avoidance. Allpress et al. (Ibid.) thus classifies these image-related concerns (or 'image shame') as 'non-moral' to the extent that they are primarily occupied with the social fallout of the immorality's *publicization* rather than with the immorality itself. This is contrasted with those whose central concern is their ingroup's general failure to live up to personally important moral values. The (moral) shame resulting from such appraisals encourages group members to adopt attitudes and behaviors that morally distance themselves from their ingroup while communicating their alignment with or desire to uplift members of victimized outgroups. Consistent with this, and similar to the findings of Gausel, Leach, and Brown (2012), Allpress and colleagues found that image-related shame (e.g. 'I feel disgraced because the behavior of British people toward Iraqi people has created a bad image of Britain in

the eyes of the world’) uniquely predicted self-defensive orientations (e.g. ‘I wish that people would stop going on about the invasion of Iraq’) after controlling for *moral shame* (e.g. ‘Our treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it means to be British’). Further, once partialing out the effects of image shame, moral shame uniquely predicted pro-outgroup orientations (e.g. ‘I think that the British government should compensate Iraqis financially for injustices that have occurred during the invasion’).

2.2.3.3 *Shame vs. Guilt*

In addition to clarifying the pro-social effects of collective moral shame, recent research also suggests that these effects are stronger or further reaching than those of collective guilt. Because the two tend to be moderately to highly correlated, the question of whether they are distinct emotions has long been an object of scholarly debate (Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004). Resolution of this question was hampered by the fact that many studies either only examined the effects of these emotions in isolation of each other or featured measures of guilt that were confounded with items asking about shame (e.g. Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen, 2006). This raised the possibility that the previously documented relationships between collective guilt and pro-sociality were, in fact, evidencing the influence of shame. Recent studies that have measured both shame and guilt together point in this direction (Allpress et al. 2010; Allpress et al. 2014; Berndsen & Gausel, 2015; cf. Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb 2012). For instance, the aforementioned Allpress et al. (2014) found that, when entered together, moral shame, but not guilt, predicted support for apologizing to and compensating Iraqi victims of British military operations (study 1). And while guilt remained a significant predictor of these outcomes in a subsequent study (study 2), its effect size was much lower than that of moral shame. McConnell (2015) similarly found that, when entered separately into the model, both white shame and guilt significantly

predicted support for affirmative action, modern racism, and racial justice engagement.

However, when modeled together, only white shame significantly predicted these outcomes.

In addition to predicting pro-sociality towards specific victimized outgroups, the effects of shame have also been found to carry over to attitudes towards unrelated but similarly perceived outgroups. For instance, Rees, Allpress, and Brown (2013) found that German respondent's collective shame (but not guilt) over the country's Nazi past expressed increased support for ethnic Turks living in Germany (Study 1). In a second study, collective shame (but not guilt) over the UK's actions during the Iraq war predicted more positive attitudes towards Pakistani immigrants—a relationship that was mediated by a perceived moral responsibility to atone for British actions as well as a perceived similarity between Iraqis and Pakistanis. The authors interpret these findings in terms of a shame-related sense that one's ingroup has “an outstanding moral debt to repay as a result of the in-group's original transgression” (p. 398).

While far more suggestive, the findings of other studies are consistent with shame having an effect on immigration attitudes. For instance, Green et al. (2011) observed that Swiss respondents who were more critical of their country were significantly less likely to express restrictionist immigration attitudes. In the American context, Casellas and Wallace (2018) found that white privilege awareness—a strong correlate of white guilt (Swim & Miller, 1999) and shame (McConnell, 2015)—explained unique variance in support for collaboration between local and federal authorities in the enforcement of US immigration laws. This could be because the public largely associates ‘immigrants’ with Hispanics and other non-white ethnic/racial groups (Perez, 2010; Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015). And, consistent with the reasoning of Rees, Allpress, and Brown (2013), to the extent that they are perceived to suffer high degrees of racial

discrimination⁵, whites who are ashamed of their ingroup's historical mistreatment of blacks are likely to feel that their ingroup has a special moral obligation to help and protect other racial/ethnic minority groups, including non-white immigrants⁶ (Skentny, 2009⁷).

Collective shame in response to ingroup immorality has also been shown to uniquely predict anger towards as well as desire to distance oneself from one's ingroup (Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005; Lickel et al., 2005; Iyer et al., 2007). This 'distancing' behavior has been interpreted as reflecting a "pro-social desire to object to immorality" or a "*supportive strategy* toward the harmed group in response to immorality" (Berndsen & Gausel, 2015, p.730). For example, Piff, Martinez, and Keltner (2012) assigned American participants to read a passage describing human rights abuses committed by the US (North Korean) military (study 1) and write about a time they felt that the US (a foreign nation) transgressed against another group of people. The authors found that those assigned to read or write about US-perpetrated (i.e. ingroup) harms expressed significantly greater feelings of collective shame and guilt than those assigned to read and write about harms perpetrated by a foreign country. Shame, but not guilt, predicted subsequent hostility towards the US, a desire for it to be punished, and willingness to volunteer for an anti-American student organization. Berndsen and Gausel (2015) reported

⁵ Given America's history of racist immigration policies (Tichenor, 2009), it's also likely that some (likely well-educated) whites have come to view immigration restrictionism as racially motivated or as a means of upholding white majority status. Suggestive of this, in a March 2021 YouGov survey commissioned by the Cato Institute, 39% of white respondents (including 75% of Democrats vs. 11% of Republicans) thought that those supportive of decreasing immigration into the US were motivated by racist beliefs as opposed to a sincere interest in controlling America's borders.

⁶ Data from a February 2018 AP-NORC survey shows that white liberals and moderates (but not conservatives) assess 'immigrants' to be just as disadvantaged as blacks in terms of 'getting ahead in the US'. A September 2019 CNN poll further shows 50% of respondents felt that immigrants face 'a lot of discrimination' as compared to 44% who said the same with respect to African Americans. While one might attribute these attitudes to the Trump presidency, Goldberg (2019) notes that perceptions of discrimination against immigrants have been on the rise since at least the early 2000s.

⁷ Skentny (2009) speaks of the 'black analogy' or the extent that non-black ethnic/racial groups can plausibly draw parallels between their own disadvantages and those of blacks. The author argues that groups that successfully make this analogy are more likely to be included in affirmative action efforts.

similar findings in the Australian context. After being informed of a protest in which European Australians expressed negative sentiment towards Australians of Middle-Eastern descent, the authors found that European Australians' subsequent reporting of shame, but not guilt, predicted anger towards (e.g. "I feel angry at Australians who are against Middle-Eastern Australians") and wanting to self-distance from other Australians (e.g. "When Australians express negative opinions about Middle-Eastern Australians, I want to distance myself from them"), with anger partially mediating the effects of shame on distancing. More recently, Dai (2020) found that, after viewing the results of a survey in which a majority of whites indicated that President Donald Trump's views accurately reflect (vs. don't reflect) their own beliefs, white liberals showed increases in shame-related racial disidentification (e.g. 'Being a white American gives me a bad feeling') and support for racial equity policies.

The theoretical reasons as to why collective shame might be a stronger motivator of more general pro-outgroup attitudes and behaviors than guilt relate to the differing natures and scope of the appraisals that trigger each emotion. Allpress et al. (2014) argue that guilt arises from one's personal or fellow ingroup members' violation of specific normative prohibitions (e.g. 'it is bad to steal, but I stole'). However, a specific norm violation does not necessarily implicate or threaten one's general sense of his/her own and/or his/her ingroup's moral worth. Rather, one can maintain the perception of the self or of the ingroup as generally moral but still feel guilty that he/she or fellow group members engaged in normatively proscribed behavior (e.g. stealing)⁸. In this case, the pro-outgroup effects of guilt are limited to compensating (e.g. via financial reparations) specific outgroups for the specific damages resulting from one's own or one's ingroup's counter-normative behavior. Shame, in contrast, arises when an ingroup's behavior is

⁸ Further clarifying this point, and distinguishing between norms and values, Teroni and Deonna (2008) note that the violated norm in question need not be linked to a self-relevant or internalized moral value.

perceived to seriously violate and undermine values that are central to a person's moral self-concept. Unlike guilt, it invites greater soul-searching and questioning of the self's and ingroup's moral essence. Rather than an isolated instance of counter-normative behavior, the moral violation is seen as revealing something fundamentally defective about one's own moral character and/or that of his/her ingroup. Because of this, shame encourages pro-outgroup attitudes and behaviors whose scope includes but is not limited to correcting the specific damage inflicted on any specific outgroup, as in the case of guilt. Instead, it motivates the expression of a more general pro-outgroup orientation whose function is additionally to a) morally distance or distinguish a person from a morally tainted ingroup, such that one's social ingroup is effectively recast as a moral outgroup, b) signal a person's moral objections to ingroup behavior, with the hope of rehabilitating or pressuring it to reform, and c) challenge or undermine the power and influence of an ingroup so that it ceases to be a source of social injustice and outgroup suffering (Knowles et al. 2014).

Of course, the moderate to strong correlation between collective guilt and shame entails that they are not mutually exclusive and often co-occur. So how do we then reconcile this with the notion that they correspond to different appraisals? What are the attitudinal and behavioral consequences when both emotions are active? While there is no single definitive answer to these questions, several accounts have been proposed. First, in line with the reasoning above, it's possible for one to feel guilty about an ingroup's immoral behavior while *also* feeling ashamed to the extent that the behavior is perceived to reflect a flawed moral essence. In this case, though both guilt and shame are operative, the need to repair a globally defective moral character is a more powerful motivator of pro-outgroup behavior than is the need to repair the consequences of a specific immoral act. As Lickel et al. (2014) suggest at the intrapersonal level, "guilt's strong

link to apology and reparation might, in some circumstances, moderate the extent to which people feel they need to change” (p.1058). By this account, when guilt is accompanied by shame, the effects of the former are secondary and become subsumed under those of the latter. The effects of guilt, in other words, become largely redundant or irrelevant when combined with shame.

Gausel and Brown (2012) advance and test an alternative account in which guilt and shame differ less in terms of the behavior vs. character foci of their underlying moral appraisals, and more in terms of the levels at which they motivate prosocial attitudes and behaviors. Specifically, these authors distinguish between group members’ personal (i.e. individual) and ingroup selves (i.e. their existence as group members), which they contend are differentially associated with guilt and shame. By their model, in the face of ingroup moral failure, guilt is expected to promote anger towards and a desire to reform the *personal* self, whereas shame inspires anger towards and a desire to reform the *ingroup* self. As the authors explain, the reason for this is that “shame is often experienced as more intensely disturbing than guilt” as “people normally appraise shame as having more serious implications for the personal self, than does guilt” (p.552). Thus, group members are inclined to avoid the more psychologically threatening feelings of shame by shifting the focus of negative global appraisals *away* from the personal-self and *towards* the ingroup-self. On the other hand, because guilt is less psychologically threatening than shame, group members who feel guilty are more willing to accept its personal implications (as they don’t include an indictment of one’s moral being). Consistent with this logic, Gausel and Brown (2012) found that Norwegian participants’ guilt--but not shame—with respect to their ingroup’s historical mistreatment of Tater minorities predicted anger towards (e.g. ‘I feel angry at myself’) and a desire to change the *personal* self (e.g. ‘Right now I feel like changing the way

I behave’)—with the former partly mediating the latter outcome. In contrast, shame—but not guilt-- predicted anger towards (e.g. ‘I feel angry at Norwegians’) and a desire to reform the *ingroup self* (e.g. “At this moment I feel like changing the way Norwegians behave”)—with the former once again partly mediating the effects of latter. While the authors do not explicitly address the simultaneous operation of the two emotions, their model implies that those who feel both guilt *and* shame will express anger towards and a desire to reform *both* their personal *and* their ingroup-selves. It also implies that shame is a further-reaching predictor of pro-outgroup orientations because it is the more group-oriented of the two emotions. However, whereas theories that distinguish guilt and shame in terms of behavior vs. character-focused appraisals expect the effects of shame to be largely absorbed by those effects of guilt when both emotions are active, Gausel and Brown’s (2012) model suggests that their combined effects on pro-outgroup attitudes and behaviors may be greater than those of either emotion alone⁹. And this is due to the fact that such outcomes would be subject to both personal *and* ingroup motivations, each of which push them in the same direction (though not necessarily with the same force).

To ensure the reader has a clearer understanding, the diagram below offers a visual summary of the main theoretical claims and relationships discussed above. Using the work of Rees, Allpress, and Brown (2013) and Allpress et al. (2014) as a guide, the bottom and top portions of the diagram depict the popular local vs. global distinction of guilt and shame along with each emotion’s relationship with differing scopes of pro-outgroup response. The middle portion of the diagram adds the theoretical model of Gausel and Brown (2012), which distinguishes guilt and shame in terms of the motivational focus of moral reform.

⁹ I am generally agnostic as to which of these accounts is more correct (scholarly debate on this question continues to this day). I include this discussion only to pre-emptively address potential questions regarding the simultaneous operation of guilt and shame.




Figure 2.1 Illustrative summary of relevant theoretical processes

2.3 Theoretical Implications

All told, IET is critical to understanding white racial attitudes because, particularly when racial identity is salient, race-related phenomena and policies are often interpreted in group-based terms. To be sure, this assertion is not necessarily novel. Political scientists have previously noted that group-based appraisals of deservingness and concomitant feelings of resentment and anger strongly influence whites' support for pro-black social policies (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Banks & Valentino, 2012). However, in their near exclusive focus on negative or prejudicial racial attitudes, they've largely failed to recognize that group-based appraisals and emotions vary in tenor and are not always out-group focused. Specifically, whereas some whites appraise blacks as undeserving of government assistance, others appraise whites as being illegitimately advantaged, responsible for black disadvantage, and as thus receiving 'more than

they deserve'. And whereas the former appraisal can be expected to seed anger or resentment towards blacks and thus opposition towards their political demands, the latter is expected to generate ingroup-critical feelings of shame, guilt, and anger towards other whites, which, in turn, should inspire support for pro-black policies. Thus, an important contribution of IET is the illumination of a wider but generally overlooked universe of group-based appraisals and emotions that are just as relevant to explaining positive as they are to explaining negative racial attitudes. In practical terms, it teaches us that measures of negative racial attitudes, such as 'racial resentment', don't simply indicate the presence or absence of anti-black affect, but also the presence or absence of moral considerations and emotions that are critical of whites.

2.4 Chapter Summary

What explains 'woke' or racially liberal attitudes among whites? Why do some whites support social policies that exclusively benefit blacks and/or members of other racial/ethnic outgroups? Why do some support increasing immigration to US whereas others do not? The current chapter reviewed literature that addresses these questions in terms of intergroup processes, including the presence of group competition for resources and threats to social and moral identities. According to realistic conflict theory (RCT), the answer to these questions is to be found in the existence or absence of outgroup threats to material resources and interests. More specifically, this account holds that whites support policies like affirmative action and higher immigration when these policies are not perceived as compromising or negatively impacting their personal material wellbeing.

However, this chapter reviewed research suggesting that neither perceptions of realistic threat nor objective factors that should occasion them (e.g. local black population size, residential proximity) are important determinants of racial attitudes. From the perspective of

social identity theory (SIT), this is because material threats are only one possible driver of intergroup attitudes. Moreover, when material threats are relevant, they are more likely to be so at the ingroup rather than individual-level. In other words, whites oppose racially liberal policies less because they threaten their personal standings and more because they threaten that of their ingroup as a whole. But, crucially, SIT also maintains that a group's 'standing' isn't reducible to its material wellbeing. Rather, it more broadly consists of a group's relative social status, which itself is determined by the summed evaluations of a group's relative performance on socially valued attributes and outcomes (some of which may be economic). And because people derive personal esteem and meaning from their group memberships, they are naturally inclined to evaluate their ingroups positively in comparison to outgroups. When an ingroup's dominant social position is secure or not contested by lower-status outgroups, intergroup harmony is expected to prevail. But when perceived as illegitimate and/or challenged by other groups, ingroup members can be expected to defend their group's social position by engaging in pro-ingroup and/or anti-outgroup behaviors.

And yet some ingroup members respond to charges of status illegitimacy by allying or showing solidarity with lower-status outgroups and condemning or opposing their own ingroup. The current chapter introduced intergroup emotions theory (IET) to help explain this phenomenon. Its review of this literature underscored the fact that ingroup members are sensitive to and seek to defend or enhance their group's moral reputation. This moral reputation is threatened when, *inter alia*, a) an ingroup is appraised as responsible for serious harms against outgroups, b) an ingroup's advantaged social position is appraised as having been unjustly achieved and maintained via the mistreatment of outgroups, and/or c) an ingroup is appraised as indifferent or unresponsive to the plight of outgroups.

Even if not directly complicit in their group's wrongdoing, these ingroup-critical moral appraisals can trigger psychologically discomforting feelings of collective guilt and/or shame on the part of individual members. In some of the more recent theoretical accounts, collective guilt is said to arise when one's own and/or fellow group members' specific behaviors or actions are seen to violate a widely accepted normative prohibition(s)—regardless of whether the violated norm is important to one's moral self-concept. Collective shame, a more distressing emotion, follows from globally appraising an ingroup as morally corrupt or as embodying moral values that are fundamentally at odds with one's own cherished moral commitments. Both of these emotions are distinct but can overlap when ingroup behavior is seen to violate a normative prohibition that is also central to a person's moral orientation. In this case, one feels guilty that his/her ingroup acted immorally. But rather than viewing it as an isolated lapse in virtue, the immoral act(s) in question are seen to exemplify an ingroup's globally defective morality. In other words, a white person can feel guilty when fellow ingroup members are racist towards blacks to the extent he/she sees himself/herself and others as either personally benefiting from and/or doing nothing to stop such behavior. And he/she may feel ashamed to the extent that such behavior is viewed as emblematic of the ingroup's general moral disposition.. Likewise, a white person can feel guilty when perceiving that his/her racial group enjoy advantages that were obtained through the oppression and exploitation of others. And he/she may also feel ashamed to the extent that the ingroup's casual enjoyment of these privileges is seen as speaking to its defective moral character.

Most importantly, this chapter reviewed research suggesting that feelings of collective guilt and shame among members of advantaged groups motivates the adoption of pro-outgroup attitudes and behaviors. While debate persists on this question, the popular account holds that

because it's focus is limited to a harmful ingroup action(s) as opposed to the ingroup's moral character as a whole; and because the harmful action(s) may merely constitute a violation of a normative prohibition as opposed to a personally important moral value, the pro-social effects of collective guilt are believed to be limited to general support for policies that compensate specific outgroups for specific ingroup transgressions. The pro-social effects of collective shame, in contrast, are believed to be more outgroup-general and further-reaching. As was discussed, this is because shame is believed to uniquely correspond to negative appraisals of an ingroup's morality as a whole. Accordingly, the adoption of pro-outgroup orientations serves not just to improve the wellbeing of a victimized outgroup(s), but to also morally distance a person (both socially and psychologically) from while attempting to reform or challenge his/her immoral ingroup.

The chapter that follows will discuss some of the implications of these findings for the political science study of white racial attitudes. It will also outline a theory that identifies collective moral emotions as a central mover of white racial liberalism across time. In the course of formulating hypotheses that test this and related propositions, the chapter will turn to literature from the 'individual differences' school of racial attitudes for greater theoretical elaboration. The goal here is to attain insight into an important but outstanding question: what distinguishes whites who experience ingroup-critical emotions from those that don't? The answers to this question will not only underscore individual differences in the susceptibility to these emotions, but, in doing so, they will also explain why increases in racial liberalism are more likely for some subgroups of whites than others. This discussion will set the stage for another that considers the role of the media in the activation of ingroup-critical emotions and, thereby, in effecting increases in racial liberalism.

3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, I showed that intergroup emotions theory (IET) has several important implications for research on white racial attitudes. First, it shows that morality is a critical dimension on which people evaluate groups. Social identity theory (SIT) holds that people naturally compare their ingroups against outgroups on valued attributes, and want to see their ingroups come out ahead. As positive comparisons or those that favor the ingroup are crucial for members' realization of proud and stable social identities. SIT views ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation as a means by which group members compete with outgroups for positive social comparisons. IET thus extends these insights by underscoring how group members are sensitive to and seek to protect, enhance or repair their ingroup's moral reputation. Although bolstering the ingroup and derogating outgroups¹⁰ is one possible means by which group members respond to threats to their moral identity—such as when their ingroup is accused of discriminating against or persecuting an outgroup(s)—the IET literature demonstrates that some respond in an opposite or pro-outgroup fashion.

Second, the findings from the IET literature show how ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions can be powerful shapers of racial attitudes, in general, and liberal racial attitudes, specifically. Although political scientists have previously noted how public policy preferences are “shaped in powerful ways by the attitudes citizens possess toward the social groups they see at the principal beneficiaries (or victims) of the policy”, little attention has been given to the role

¹⁰ Admittedly, the review of the IET literature has hitherto largely focused on pro-outgroup responses to moral identity threats. Proceeding sections will highlight the predispositions that influence whether ingroup members respond in this fashion or, as is more often the case, become defensive and resentful.

of group-based moral emotions¹¹ in the formation of these attitudes (Nelson & Kinder, 1996, p.1055-56). In particular, scholars have largely neglected to consider that how whites feel about their *own* racial group can be just influential for their racial policy preferences as how they feel towards *other* racial groups. What is more, the IET literature suggests that how whites feel towards other racial groups is, at least in part, a function of how they feel towards other whites. While it's been acknowledged that attachment or love for one's ingroup does not necessarily translate to animosity towards other outgroups (e.g. Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999), the IET literature suggests that the inverse of this relationship (i.e. negative orientations towards one's ingroup, positive orientations towards outgroups) is a real phenomenon¹².

On the basis of these theoretical insights, the current chapter begins by forwarding three primary hypotheses as to the effects of collective guilt and shame on different white racial attitudes. It then proceeds to consult several individual differences accounts of racial attitudes for the purpose of identifying variables that condition group members' susceptibility to ingroup-critical appraisals, emotions, and the resulting adoption of pro-outgroup attitudes. These insights are then formulated and added as secondary hypotheses that elaborate the antecedents and causal nature of primary predictors while explaining their connection to one of the most widely employed measures of racial attitudes in the political science literature (namely, 'racial

¹¹ To be sure, political scientists have noted that pro-social emotions like 'empathy' are important predictors of support for social welfare (e.g. Feldman et al., 2020) and humanitarian immigration policies (e.g. Pagano & Huo, 2007; Newman et al. 2013). However, with a few exceptions (Sirin, Valentino, & Villalobos, 2016; 2017), the effects of empathy are typically assumed to be group-neutral. Perhaps on account of this, scholars typically examine empathy in isolation of other pro-social emotions. And yet other research has shown that empathy often coincides with feelings of guilt and/or shame. In fact, some find evidence that empathy mediates the effects of collective guilt and shame on reparation attitudes (Brown & Cehajic, 2008), while others find evidence that guilt mediates the effects of empathy on charitable donations (Basil, Ridgeway, & Basil, 2007) and pro-outgroup political activism (Mallet et al., 2008). The point here is that, when studying pro-social political attitudes and behaviors, political scientists often fail to recognize the group-based dimensions of emotions that are assumed to be group-neutral.

¹² Kinder and Cam's (2009) seminal work on ethnocentrism includes but a single mention of this phenomenon, referring to those with greater ingroup than outgroup prejudice a "topsy-turvy world in which out-groups are seen as virtuous and in-groups as utterly without virtue" (p.56).

resentment' and 'social dominance'). Finally, I review literature and derive testable hypotheses as to when, how and why white racial liberalism increases across time. I make the case that the presumed stability of racial attitudes and their unresponsiveness to media input is overstated and holds for some segments of the public more than others. While doing so, I explain how the media, and particularly new media, influences white racial attitudes via its activation of ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions.

3.2 Primary Hypotheses (1-3)

Though their underlying motivations may differ, group-based guilt and shame have both been implicated in support for policies that compensate outgroup victims of specific ingroup wrongdoings. Accordingly, it follows that feelings of collective guilt and shame are both important but varying determinants of racial liberalism among whites¹³. We would thus expect that, when entered together, both guilt and shame will independently predict variance in support for pro-black policies, such as affirmative action, group-based government assistance, and financial reparations. This proposition is operationalized with the following hypothesis:

H1. Whites' feelings of collective shame and guilt for their ingroup's past and present mistreatment of blacks will independently predict support for pro-black policies.

Given that a number of previous studies have previously documented such relationships, to find that both white guilt and shame predict support for outgroup-specific restitution would be empirically unsurprising. However, recall that a subset of these studies indicate that shame encourages more general 'pro-outgroup' orientations (e.g. Rees, Allpress, & Brown 2013). Others do not directly establish this relationship, but are nonetheless suggestive of it (e.g.

¹³ Note that the hypotheses that follow from this premise assume that guilt and shame are statistically distinguishable. While recent research suggests they will be, this assumption needs to be validated for the hypotheses to be tested in their current form.

Casellas and Wallace, 2018). Based on these findings, we would expect that whites' feelings of collective shame, but less so guilt, over anti-black racism and racial inequality would motivate the expression of liberal immigration attitudes. To recall, this is because the focus of guilt may be limited to the ingroup's perceived responsibility for specific normative violations (committed by an otherwise moral ingroup), whereas the focus of shame is on the ingroup's (im)moral nature as a whole. Thus, the pro-outgroup effects of shame are further-reaching to the extent that the ingroup's immoral essence and legacy, rather than a specific or isolated wrong, requires redress. In the specific racial context of the United States, appraising the moral character of white Americans as essentially defective (or racist) is expected to encourage 'ashamed' whites to adopt socio-political attitudes (e.g. support for lax immigration policies) that serve to morally distinguish or distance themselves from other white Americans¹⁴, communicate solidarity with 'outgroups of color' or the perceived victims of white supremacy and racism, and challenge their ingroup's perceived illegitimate and pernicious socio-political influence. Accordingly, a second main hypothesis predicts that:

***H2.** Whites' feelings of collective shame for their ingroup's past and present mistreatment of blacks will predict support for increasing the number of immigrants admitted into the US.*

To the extent that white shame centers around their ingroup's mistreatment of non-white outgroups, one wouldn't expect pro-immigration sentiment among whites to be entirely race-neutral. In other words, it's likely that whites who are ashamed of their ingroup's moral legacy will be biased in favor of non-European vs. European immigrants. Beyond reflecting a sense of white Americans' moral obligation to protect and improve the lives of those their ingroup had

¹⁴ The idea is to adopt and express support for policies that white Americans as a whole are perceived to oppose for racist reasons.

historically excluded, a pro-non-European/anti-European bias can also be a means of moral distancing or self-distinction; i.e. taking a position that is perceived to be at odds with ingroup interests communicates one's moral uniqueness and solidarity with other outgroups (Berndsen & Gausel, 2015). Additionally, insofar as white Americans are essentialized as 'racist' or are perceived to be complicit in the maintenance of a racist social order, some 'ashamed' whites may even regard favoring non-European over European immigrants as a means of eroding their ingroup's socio-political dominance¹⁵. An auxiliary hypothesis thus predicts that:

H2A. Whites' feelings of collective shame for their ingroup's past and/or present mistreatment of blacks will predict a preference for immigrants from non-European vs. European countries.

As will be noted in a subsequent chapter, an examination of feeling thermometer differentials reveals that, over the past few years, white liberals and democrats have increasingly rated non-white racial/ethnic groups significantly more warmly than they do other whites. To the best of this author's knowledge, no previous study has probed and sought to explain this pattern. However, some of the research reviewed earlier shows that feelings of collective shame can elicit ingroup-directed anger and a desire to distance oneself from one's ingroup. It's thus reasonable to predict that these affective responses will manifest in how whites rate racial outgroups relative to other whites:

¹⁵ While this may seem far-fetched, data from a nationally representative 2021 Cato Institute/YouGov survey show that 16.5% of whites (including roughly 33.5% of white liberals and 7.2% of white conservatives) selected 'reduces the power of the white majority' as one of the benefits of immigration into the US. To put this into perspective, this is significantly higher than the share (9.7%) that selected 'increases American wages', though significantly lower than the share (51%) that selected 'increases diversity of thought'. These data are available upon request.

***H3.** The more that whites feel ashamed of their ingroup's past and present mistreatment of blacks, the warmer they will be towards non-white racial/ethnic groups (e.g. blacks, Hispanics) relative to other whites.*

One limitation of H1-3 is that talk is cheap. And those who give racially liberal responses in the context of a survey about race may be doing so not on account of genuine moral commitments but out of a desire to not come across as racist. This possibility raises an important question: will 'ashamed' or 'guilty' respondents who support pro-black policies and/or increasing [non-white] immigration be willing to sacrifice their time and/or money to assist members of other outgroups? Some studies point in the affirmative direction. For instance, Stewart, Latu, and Branscombe (2010) had an experimenter offer participants antidiscrimination flyers that they could then distribute on their college campus. The authors found that white guilt predicted the number of antidiscrimination flyers that were taken from a folder of 50. More recently, Solak et al. (2016; study 2) found that white guilt predicted agreeing to make a monetary donation to Amnesty International to "further their campaign to promote racial equality and prevent police mistreatment". If these findings are valid, we might similarly expect to find that:

***H4.** Whites' feelings of collective shame and guilt for their ingroup's past and present victimization of blacks and the persistence of racial inequality will independently predict the size of monetary contributions to a non-profit pro-black advocacy group.*

Further, and for the same reasons given for hypotheses 2 and 3, we would expect collective shame, but not guilt, to predict monetary contributions to a non-profit pro-immigrant advocacy group:

H5. Whites' feelings of collective shame for their ingroup's past and present victimization of blacks and the persistence of racial inequality will predict the size of monetary contributions to a non-profit pro-immigrant advocacy group.




Figure 3.1 Illustrative summary of H1-H5

Note. Solid arrowed lines represent direct effects

3.3 Predicting the Expression of Collective Guilt and Shame

Of course, not all (and likely not even most) ingroup members react to charges of ingroup immorality or illegitimacy with feelings of guilt, shame, and pro-outgroup behavior. In fact, previous studies indicate that the expression of ingroup-critical emotions among members of advantaged groups are conditional on perceiving an ingroup to be responsible for the suffering or inferior conditions of other outgroups (Zimmermann et al. 2011); and, relatedly, on perceiving an ingroup's superior social position vis-à-vis other groups to be illegitimate (Bahns &

Branscombe, 2011; Tabea et al. 2019; Kende et al. 2020). Naturally, those that perceive that their ingroup is *not* responsible for the suffering of others and/or perceive that their ingroup's relatively advantaged social position is *justly* deserved are unlikely to feel 'guilty' or 'ashamed' because of it. To the contrary, they are likely to take umbrage at the idea that they and their ingroup are advantaged on account of the mistreatment or exploitation of others. But what determines or influences perceptions of ingroup responsibility and status illegitimacy? In what follows, I make the theoretical case that these perceptions are largely governed by group members' orientations towards or understandings of between-group inequality, which, in turn, is closely associated with their political ideologies. Very briefly, I argue that collective guilt and shame among white Americans is conditional on attributing disparate racial group outcomes to past and/or present racial discrimination. And because white liberals are more inclined towards such structuralist attributions than conservatives, they are also more likely to engage in ingroup-critical moral appraisals and express associated emotions. Finally, I also review and discuss several theoretical accounts of these differing attributional tendencies, which ultimately inform this dissertation's theory of how and among whom white racial attitudes become more liberal across time.

3.3.1 Individual Differences in Orientations to Inequality

People differ in the extent that they believe that human outcomes reflect just deserts; i.e. that people generally get what they deserve (see Rothmund, Becker, & Jost 2016 for a review). And these differences generally fall along ideological lines. Conservative are more likely to believe that individual success and failure is the product of individual choice or merit, such as the dedication or effort one invests in a given domain of activity (Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993). They are more likely to feel that individuals have agency or control over their lives, regardless of

the environment they're born into (Ekins, 2019). Liberals, in contrast, are more likely to believe that individual outcomes reflect the positive or negative influence of variables outside of one's control, such as whether one was born into poverty or the access one has to a quality education or healthcare (Furnham, 1982; Sniderman et al. 1986; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992; Christiansen & Lavine, 1997; Napier et al. 2006; Weiner, Osborne, & Rudolph, 2011; Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012). While these findings concern attributions of social inequality in general, they are applicable to racial inequality as well. Much as white liberals are more likely than white conservatives to attribute poverty to external or societal-level factors, they are also more likely to attribute black disadvantage to discrimination and bias. White conservatives, in contrast, are more likely to attribute it to endogenous or dispositional factors, such as high rates of illegitimacy, fatherless homes, lack of motivation, welfare dependence, and, though much less common, genetic differences (Iyengar, 1991; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Hughes & Tuch, 2000; Skitka et al. 2002; Hunt, 2007; Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010; Suhay & Jayaratne, 2013).

While liberals and conservatives differ in the extent that they think that past and/or present discrimination is important for explaining the persistence of racial inequality, the reasons for these differences are the object of an enduring scholarly debate. There at least three main theoretical schools of thought this question, each of which are identified and discussed below.

3.3.2 Symbolic/Modern Racism Theory

As the proponents of theories of 'symbolic' or 'modern racism' see it, individual or endogenous attributions of racial inequality generally reflect anti-black prejudice. Specifically, these scholars contend that the old-fashioned or blatant biological racism of the past has either been superseded by or became cloaked in less controversial assessments of outgroup value

deficits (McConahay & Hough, 1976; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Henry, 2005). This ‘new’ form of racism is generally characterized by the belief that a) racial discrimination is no longer a barrier to black advancement; and b) blacks reject the traditional family structure and the Protestant work ethic (e.g. self-reliance and individualism) in favor of welfare dependence, out-of-wedlock births, and/or criminality. These perceptions and stereotypes then give rise to the beliefs that blacks have only themselves to blame for their poor socio-economic condition and, relatedly, that they are ‘too demanding’ or have ‘gotten more than they deserve’ from government. Thus, by this account, conservatives resist attributing black disadvantage to discrimination both because they deny the persistence of anti-black discrimination and also because they endorse stereotypes of blacks as lazy and unwilling to take responsibility for their own conditions.

3.3.3 The Principled Politics Approach

In stark contrast to the above, those who subscribe to the ‘principled politics’ approach contend that differences in whites’ attributions of racial inequality generally reflect the application of differing nonracial ideological principles and values, at least among the better educated¹⁶ (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; Sniderman et al., 1986; 1991). For instance, liberals and those who think people have less control over life outcomes are more likely subscribe to the ‘equality’ and ‘need’ principles of distributive justice (Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012). Though similar, the former principle calls for an equal distribution of resources regardless of individual contribution, while the latter prescribes that they be apportioned on the basis of individual needs. On the other hand, conservatives and those inclined to attribute individual outcomes to individual agency are more likely to subscribe to the ‘equity’ or ‘merit’ principle,

¹⁶ That is, those with the cognitive sophistication to reason in an ideologically consistent fashion.

which holds that resources should be allocated on the basis of one's contribution to a given activity or public good (Lerner, 1980; Faccenda & Pantaleon, 2011). Research indicates that liberals are more likely to judge public policies as more fair when they based on the equality principle, while conservatives are more likely to judge as more fairly those based on the merit principle (Rasinski, 1987; Mitchell et al., 2003). Indeed, Mitchell et al. (2003) found that liberals were much less sensitive than conservatives to considerations of economic efficiency and deservingness when it comes to redistributions of wealth. Liberals tended to be far more supportive of transfers of income from the wealthy to the poor even when these transfers had low efficiency and were not tied to work requirements. More generally, liberals prioritized reducing class differences even when doing so was relatively wasteful.

Thus, owing to their differing principles of distributive justice, liberals and conservatives differ in their beliefs about the proper role and size of government, with the former preferring a larger welfare state and greater regulation of inequality and the latter preferring a smaller welfare state and less if any regulation. Accordingly, by the 'principled politics' account, conservatives might be reluctant to attribute black disadvantage to discrimination to the extent that this attribution will be used as the basis for greater government control over private affairs and the enactment of inefficient or counter-productive policies that reward the undeserving and undercut norms of self-reliance (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Conversely, liberals might be motivated to endorse this attribution to the extent that it justifies greater government oversight and policies that mitigate inequality.

3.3.4 Cognitive Accounts

A third school of thought holds that differing attributions of black disadvantage at least partially reflect differing levels of cognitive and political sophistication. For instance, Gomez

and Wilson (2006) argue that people of lower cognitive ability are less capable of making causal associations between individual conditions and broad societal forces. As such, they cognitively default to causally linking individual conditions to “the most obvious proximal factors (which in the case of racial disparities would be African Americans themselves) or events” (p. 615). The opposite is true of the cognitively sophisticated, who have both the ability and the requisite knowledge to make causal linkages between blacks’ socioeconomic conditions and structural factors. Skitka et al. (2002) similarly hold that individualist attributions for social problems are intuitive and, consequently, overriding them in favor of structuralist attributions is cognitively taxing and thus requires sufficient cognitive resources and motivation (e.g. such as when individualist attributions are in conflict with one’s moral values).

Elsewhere, Feldman and Huddy (2010) suggest that non-structuralist attributions of black disadvantage may have less to do with ‘denying’ the reality of racial discrimination than with the difficulty in both observing and linking it to unequal outcomes:

“Discrimination is difficult for experts to conclusively demonstrate; the same undoubtedly holds true for ordinary people. It is therefore possible that the denial of discrimination is linked to an inherent difficulty in attributing unequal racial outcomes to differential treatment, especially for individuals unschooled in scientific research methods. Some whites may feel they have never witnessed or seen direct evidence of such categorical discrimination” (p.28).

Thus, by these accounts, that white conservatives are less likely than liberals to attribute black disadvantage to discrimination is at least partly due to their lower cognitive capacity for making proximal-distal connections in general. This could also explain why white liberals and conservatives often diverge in their definitions and interpretations of racism and discrimination. As Grady (2015) found, among conservatives, the latter generally encompass overt individual-

level prejudice and deliberate discrimination. Liberals, in contrast, are more likely to espouse both these *and* systemic/structural definitions.

3.3.5 *Motivated and Group-Based Accounts*

In the ‘motivated social cognition’ account, people adopt ideologies that serve their deeper psychological and epistemic needs and/or which justify their preferred societal arrangements. In the first case, system justification theory (SJT) contend that people fear the uncertainty and threats to stability that attend alterations to the societal systems they inhabit (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Owing to this, they are motivated to evaluate the social systems they live under in positive terms. For to evaluate them negatively or as unjust would entail they need reform, which would threaten the continuity of the status quo and, thereby, social stability. Accordingly, people sensitive to these threats are inclined to ‘rationalize’ unjust or unequal social structures. And, conservatism, a status-quo-defending ideology, is argued to be a natural fit for such individuals (Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Nosek, & Grosling, 2008). SJT accounts thus hold that conservatives tend to perceive less racial discrimination and/or attribute racial inequality to endogenous factors (e.g. lack of motivation, family instability) out of a need to construe the status-quo as legitimate and not requiring systemic reforms¹⁷ (Major et al. 2007; Blodorn et al. 2016).

¹⁷ A major limitation of the SJT account of racial attitudes is that it says a lot more about conservative than liberal motives. Some have even charged that it operates on the assumption that conservatives are more biased or more in denial of social reality than are liberals (Duarte et al. 2015; Crawford & Jussim, 2017); or that liberalism is ‘more correct’ or preferable to conservatism (Tetlock, 1994; Haidt, 2013). For instance, SJT contends that conservatism is a means of ‘rationalizing away’ inequality in defense of an otherwise unjust status quo. However, such rests on the (liberal) assumption that the status quo is devoid of justice and merit-based outcomes; and that inequality is largely a function of bias. More plausible, in my view, is that American society is neither perfectly just nor unjust, but that when it comes to perceiving social reality, some individuals are inclined to see the justice and fairness therein while others are motivated to see the opposite.

A second but not necessarily conflicting theory, social dominance theory (SDT), holds that differing attributions of inequality are the corollaries of individual differences in a more basic orientation towards the desirability or tolerance of social hierarchies and competition (see Sidanius & Pratto 2012 for a review). The preferences that follow from this orientation, in turn, are said motivate the adoption of belief systems that serve to either justify or de-legitimize existing social structures. For instance, ‘hierarchy enhancers’-- those preferring hierarchical or inegalitarian social structures --see a world that is a competitive ‘dog eat dog’ jungle in which the strongest or most competent group(s) dominate the weak. To protect or legitimize existing group hierarchies, such individuals are inclined to view between-group inequality as the legitimate or natural outcome of a group’s superior competitive abilities. The idea that their ingroup’s social position was unjustly obtained at the expense of other groups is thus seen as threatening insofar as it justifies the expropriation of status and influence from the former to the latter. On the other hand, ‘hierarchy attenuators’ are those inclined towards intergroup cooperation (vs. competition), and egalitarian social structures and outcomes. Towards justifying the reduction or elimination of existing group hierarchies, such individuals are likely to view group inequalities as both unnatural and as generally resulting from oppressive social institutions and practices, rather than from fair and open competition. For them, the notion that group disparities are mostly or at least partially ‘natural’ is threatening insofar as it entails that social interventions aimed at addressing them are doomed to fail (Winegard et al. 2018). Even worse, it can be used to justify treating groups unequally or to slash programs that aid low-status groups.

Thus, in the American racial context, SDT would regard non-structuralist attributions of inequality to be ‘hierarchy legitimizing myths’—beliefs that whites¹⁸ adopt to rationalize racial

¹⁸ The mention of ‘whites’ here shouldn’t be taken to mean that non-whites cannot or don’t adopt hierarchy-legitimizing myths. Indeed, Sidanius et al. (2017) clarify that the theory has been refined to “reflect the general

inequality and protect their ingroup privilege from attempts at hierarchy-attenuation. On the other hand, the view that discrimination is the cause of black disadvantage constitute ‘hierarchy-delegitimizing myths’¹⁹ that egalitarian or hierarchy-averse whites adopt to justify the enactment of hierarchy-attenuating policies (e.g. affirmative action). Accordingly, to the extent that it reflects the endorsement of endogenous vs. structuralist attributions of black disadvantage, proponents of SDT contend that ‘symbolic racism’ constitutes a hierarchy-legitimizing ideology, rather than a new value-based form of anti-black prejudice (though see Brandt & Reyna 2012 for a hybrid interpretation). In support of this, measures of social dominance orientation (SDO) have shown to be a unique and strong predictor of MR/SR (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Monteith & Spicer, 2000; Sidanius et al., 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992). Sidanius et al. (1992, 1999) have also shown that SR mediates the relationship between SDO and hierarchy-enhancing racial policy preferences

As it happens, the subgroup of white Americans most inclined towards endogenous or non-structural attributions of racial inequality—namely, white conservatives—tend to score highest on measures of ‘social dominance orientation’ (SDO), the scale used to capture differences along the pro- vs. anti-hierarchy spectrum. In contrast, the subgroup most inclined to towards structural or discrimination-based attributions of racial inequality—white liberals—tend

desire to establish and maintain structured intergroup relations regardless of the position of one’s own group(s) within this hierarchy” (p.152).

¹⁹ My criticism of the SDT literature is that it tends to pay outsized attention to the ‘pro-hierarchy’ end of the spectrum. Though proponents of SDT do acknowledge the concept of ‘hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths’ (or ‘delegitimizing myths’) and related orientations in theory (e.g. Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006), research placing them as the center of analysis remains few and far between. This is somewhat surprising given that, with few exceptions, most people in most countries tend to score on the ‘anti-hierarchy’ and ‘anti-dominance’ ends of the SDO scales (Pratto et al. 2013). In fact, while scoring higher than liberals, data from The American Panel Survey (TAPs) show that the average white conservative scores below the midpoints on both SDO dimensions. Thus, it could be the case that liberals are more anti-hierarchy than are conservatives ‘pro-hierarchy’. As Reyna (2017) argues, this raises the possibility that many of relationships between SDO and race-related outcome variables are driven by those at the anti-hierarchy end of these scales.

to score the lowest (Chambers, Swan, & Heesacker, 2015). Of course, this is no coincidence—as SDT holds that people gravitate towards differing ideologies as a function of their utility in justifying (conservatism) or de-legitimizing (liberal egalitarianism) prevailing social hierarchies.

Importantly, research suggests that orientations towards social hierarchies may additionally influence whites' attributions of racial inequality via their effects on attention and information processing tendencies. For instance, SDO is negatively associated with other-oriented dimensions of (in)justice sensitivity, a narrow and relatively stable personality trait, which influences the centrality of justice-related concerns in one's processing of and response to social events and outcomes (Reese, Proch, & Cohrs, 2014; Eftedal et al. 2020). Research shows that other-oriented 'justice sensitive' individuals tend to recall more (in)justice-related stimuli and interpret ambiguous or neutral incidents as instances of injustice (Baumert et al. 2011), react with greater emotional intensity to incidents of injustice (Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Schmitt, 2007), spend more time ruminating about the unjust treatment of others (Schmitt, Neumann, & Montada, 1995), exhibit a lower threshold for the conceptualization of injustice (Mcgrath et al. 2019), and, importantly, are more likely to feel guilt and shame in response to perceiving themselves responsible for or as benefiting from injustice against others (Montada, Schmitt & Dalbert, 1986; Gollwitzer et al. 2005). Waldfogel et al. (2021) further find that social egalitarians (those scoring low on SDO) are more attentive to inequality-related visual cues and are more accurate at identifying evidence of bias against disadvantaged (but not advantaged) social groups.

In addition to affecting the processing of inequality-related information, some research indicates that (anti-)egalitarian orientations may also influence the perceived magnitude of

inequalities²⁰. For instance, Kteily, Sheehy-Skeffington, and Ho (2017) found that ‘hierarchy-attenuators’ (low SDO) and ‘hierarchy-enhancers’ (high SDO) tended to perceive larger and smaller power gaps, respectively, between different ethnic/racial groups, genders, economic classes. In a subsequent study (5), the authors asked respondents to recall the degree of inequality they saw in images that variably depicted different degrees of inequality. They found that those low (high) on SDO tended to report seeing greater (lesser) degrees of inequality than what was actually featured in the images assigned to them. Additional evidence was given by Chambers, Swan, and Heesacker (2014; 2015), who used objective income and economic mobility statistics to test the accuracy of respondents’ estimates of the degree of inequality. They consistently found that liberals and those low on SDO tended to *overestimate* the longitudinal growth in the earnings gap between higher and lower income categories (2014) while tending to *underestimate* the proportion of those who advance from the latter to the former (2015). In contrast, conservatives and those high on SDO, on average, underestimated the degree of downward mobility but were more accurate in their estimates of income gaps and upward mobility.

²⁰ While neither study directly measured SDO, data from Haaland and Roth (2017) as well as McCaffree and Saide (2021) suggest that liberals (i.e., those who tend to score highest on SDO) might even overestimate the extent of anti-black discrimination in certain contexts. Specifically, the former show that white liberals (M=31:1) and conservatives (M=18:1) were the least and most accurate, respectively, in estimating the number of resumes that blacks would have to submit for each job callback (the ‘real’ ratio, 15:1, was derived from the widely cited correspondence study of Bertrand & Mullainathan 2004). More recently, McCaffree and Saide (2021) showed that liberals vastly overestimated both the number of unarmed black men killed by police in 2019 as well as the percent of those killed by police that were black. In the first case, around 44% of liberals (vs. 20% of conservatives) estimated that 1,000 or more unarmed black men were killed by police in 2019. According to the Mapping Police Violence database, the *overall* number of blacks killed by police in that year was 27. Similarly, the average liberal (conservative) estimated that 58% (40%) of those killed by police in 2019 were black, which is more than double the actual base rate (roughly 25%). My interpretation here is that the relative accuracy of conservatives in both cases was incidental: i.e. it’s not that conservatives are more ‘informed’ about the degree of discrimination or police homicides, but rather that the actual estimate happened to converge with their ideological biases.

3.3.6 *Orientations to Inequality and Ingroup-Critical Emotions*

The current dissertation does not intend to resolve the question of which of the proceeding accounts best explains why white liberals and conservatives differ in their attributions of racial inequality. The point, for now, is only that these attributional differences, regardless of their underlying motives, affect the perceived legitimacy of whites' social position relative to blacks and other low-status racial/ethnic minority groups. Simply put, whites that don't perceive there to be a great deal of discrimination against blacks and/or attribute black disadvantage to factors that don't implicate their ingroup's past or present victimization of blacks are unlikely to perceive whites to be collectively responsible for racial inequality. On account of this, they will be less likely to think their racial group's relative social position is illegitimate and will thus be less likely to experience the ingroup-critical moral emotions that motivate pro-outgroup behavior.

Supporting the foregoing proposition, Puryear et al. (2019) found that a white privilege exercise—in which subjects were instructed to consider the unique racial advantages they enjoy over blacks—increased feelings of group-based guilt among those who scored low but not high on a pre-treatment measure of symbolic racism (SR); which, to recall, is an attitudinal measure that some contend²¹ captures inequality-legitimizing beliefs (Sidanius et al. 1992, 1999) or systemic vs. endogenous attributions of racial inequality²² (Gomez & Wilson, 2006; Kam & Burge, 2017; Simmons & Bobo, 2018). These results align with an earlier study by Leach, Wayne, and Iyer (2006) in the Australian context, where ethnic European subjects' symbolic

²¹ In fact, Tarman and Sears (2005) concede that, statistically speaking, SR is best represented by a two-factor model consisting of latent variables for 'individualistic' and 'structuralist' attributions for black disadvantage.

²² Banks and Valentino (2012) similarly suggest that SR is "rooted in blame appraisals" (p. 287), which have downstream effects on group-based emotions. However, their focus is limited to negative outgroup-focused emotions, whereas the object here are negative ingroup-focused emotions.

prejudice against Aboriginal people predicted lower levels of group-based guilt²³. Likewise, an experiment by Solak et al. (2016) found that white Americans' expressions of collective guilt for the state of race relations between whites and blacks was conditional on legitimacy perceptions (e.g. 'Discrimination against Black Americans is no longer a problem in the US'). Similar findings have been reported with respect to moral shame. Tabea et al. (2019; see Kende et al. 2020 for similar findings) found that participants who scored higher on system justification—i.e. those who felt that LGBT individuals (study 1) and women (study 2) weren't discriminated against--were less likely to express feelings of shame in response to information attesting to the existence of sexual and gender discrimination. Rather than desire that their ingroup act more morally towards the outgroups in question, such individuals were more likely to demand that the latter acknowledge that they are treated fairly.

3.4 Secondary Hypotheses (H6-6A)

Because white liberals are more likely than conservatives to attribute white-black status differences to the depressive effects of slavery and past and/or present racial discrimination, they are also more likely to think that white Americans are responsible for causing and maintaining black disadvantage, and thus that their advantaged social position is illegitimate. Accordingly, if, as the literature suggests, expressions of ingroup-critical emotions are conditional on perceptions of ingroup responsibility and illegitimacy, it follows that:

***H6.** Relative to white conservatives, white liberals will express significantly higher levels of collective shame and guilt for their ingroup's past and/or present victimization of blacks.*

²³ Importantly, this relationship was partially mediated by (reduced) acknowledgement of ingroup privilege while the effects of modern prejudice on general support for affirmative action for Aborigines were, themselves, partially mediated by feelings of group-based guilt

However, if perceived responsibility and illegitimacy is indeed the variable that drives liberal vs. conservative differences in ingroup-critical emotions, we would expect that controlling for its effects will largely eliminate them. More specifically, to the extent that ‘symbolic racism’ reflects a racial-hierarchy-legitimizing belief system, it follows that:

H6A. Controlling for symbolic racism will eliminate liberal vs. conservative differences in expressions of guilt and shame.

3.5 Explaining Changes in White Racial Liberalism Across Time

If ingroup-critical emotions are important predictors of white racial liberalism, it follows that overtime shifts in white racial liberalism reflect overtime shifts in the salience of ingroup-critical emotions. And because ingroup-critical emotions are activated by appraisals of ingroup immorality and illegitimacy, it follows that their salience is a function of the availability of appraisal-triggering information. Taken together, the current section makes the theoretical case that ingroup-critical emotions interact with the media environment to effect changes in racial attitudes. However, and extending the insights of the preceding sections, it ultimately argues that the racial attitudes of some white subgroups (namely, white liberals and Democrats) are more sensitive to shifts in the media environment than others.

3.5.1 The Case for Attitudinal Stability and Minimal Media Effects

That shifts in the media environment can spur meaningful changes in racial attitudes across time is by no means an empirically uncontroversial proposition. In fact, it is at odds with several major theoretical assumptions in the political science literature. First, aside from the ‘life long openness’ model, most existing theories of racial attitudes conceives of them as being generally stable. In fact, Converse (1964) viewed racial attitudes and policy preferences as the only stable and meaningful elements of the average person’s political “belief system”. Likewise,

Sniderman and Piazza (1993) write that, when it comes to race, Americans “have their feet, if not exactly set in cement, then at any rate firmly planted” (p.137). Subsequent research has generally supported these accounts. For instance, Sears and Levy (2003) and Henry and Sears (2009) generally find that racial attitudes crystalize during young adulthood (typically between the ages of 18-25) and remain relatively stable across the life span. Other research suggests that racial attitudes crystalize even earlier (in childhood) and more or less persist for the duration of one’s life (Sears & Funk, 1999). On immigration, Kustov, Laaker, and Reller (2021) similarly find attitudes to be “remarkably stable across time”. Although exogenous ‘shocks’ (e.g. economic recessions, refugee crises) may have some effect, it is small and transitory, with immigration attitudes quickly reverting back “to an individual’s long-term equilibrium” (p.2)

The general stability of racial attitudes can be at least partly attributed to the fact that issues of race are cognitively ‘easy’: i.e. little policy expertise or knowledge is required for the formation of racial attitudes (Carmines & Stimson, 1980, 1982; Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997). Unlike in more esoteric domains like healthcare and trade policy, a person can more readily lean on his/her moral intuitions, symbols, values, and social perceptions (including stereotypes²⁴) to inform his/her position on racial issues and his feelings towards other racial groups (Feldman, 1988; Sears & Levy, 2003). ‘Race’ is also by no means a novel issue, but one that routinely features prominently in American political discourse. The upshot is that additional exposure to race-related information is unlikely to move people’s attitudes in drastically different directions.

The foregoing is consonant with the dominant Minimal Effects Paradigm in the communications literature, which holds that the power of the mass media to *directly* influence

²⁴ On this point, Sniderman et al. (1986) suggest that “attributions in the case of needy *groups* are more available—because more automatic or well rehearsed—than in the case of specific *individuals*. For in the case of groups the attributions people offer are more likely to be scripted, drawing on stereotypes about the group in question and expressing widely shared beliefs about the causes of success and failure” (p.424-425).

attitudes is minimal (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1944; Kinder, 2003). As Richey (n.d.) writes, a central reason for this is that “most human beings have heard millions of words about politics before they interact as an adult with any political messaging, such as a campaign commercial or a post on social media” (p.3). In other words, to successfully influence, media messaging must compete with or outweigh the effects of years of prior socialization, life experience, and other social shapers of attitudes. What is more, even its potential for influencing is conditional on people tuning in and engaging with the message. The reality of selective exposure, whereby politically uninterested or partisan consumers ‘tune out’ media content they find boring or disagreeable, effectively limits the space for mass influence (Klapper, 1960; Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Iyengar and Hahn, 2009). On top of this, political media messaging is seldom uniform or monolithic. On any political or social issue, one is likely to encounter competing arguments whose attitudinal influence cancel out in the aggregate or which prompts people to default to their preexisting values when deciding on the position to adopt (Zaller, 1992; Sniderman, 2000). Thus, rather than changing minds on the issues, what *direct* influence the media has is limited to shaping perceptions of issue importance (i.e. ‘agenda setting’) and/or the issue-dimensions on which the performance of elected officials is evaluated (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Aside from this, the media can only hope to impact attitudes indirectly or via a ‘two-step’ information flow process: i.e. the media influences opinion leaders who, in turn, influence those in their social networks that listen to them (Katz 1957).

3.5.2 The Case for Media-Driven Racial Attitude Change

But there are good reasons for suspecting that the alleged stability of racial attitudes and the minimal effects of the media in attitude formation are overstated. First, as Kellstedt (2000; 2003) notes, few Americans directly observe racial discrimination against blacks and other

ethnic/racial minorities. Instead, their perceptions of discrimination and race relations are typically informed by what they hear or observe in the media. Early work by Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur (1976) speaks to this through the concept ‘media dependency’²⁵. The general idea is that when people have no direct personal experience with or information about a given social issue, “they are dependent on in the media for information, and therefore more likely to be influenced” (Gavin, 2018,p.832). Put differently, in the absence of direct information about the severity of an issue, people often rely on cognitive heuristics, such as the ‘availability heuristic’—or the frequency at which they recall hearing about an issue in the media—to make assessments of prevalence and risk (Kuran & Sunstein, 1998). Similarly, in the account of exemplification theory, media coverage of concrete or specific cases and incidents, especially when emotionally-charged, can lead people to (rightly or wrongly) treat them as exemplars of a broader social issue or phenomenon (Gibson & Zillman, 1994; Zillman, 2002). As media coverage seldom reports base-rate information regarding the prevalence or risk of a phenomenon, perceptions thereof often hinge “entirely on the provision of exemplars” (Zillman, 2002, p.22).

Two possible media effects can be operative here: persuasion and framing effects (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Slothuus, 2008). First, the media is essentially updating people’s assessments of the scope or severity of discrimination. By exemplification theory, when the media extensively covers individual cases of alleged anti-black discrimination, viewers are likely to perceive them to be instantiations of a broader or more prevalent phenomenon. This can be

²⁵ This concept bears close resemblance to the *substitution hypothesis* born out of ‘cultivation theory’, which, broadly construed, posits that media consumption (e.g. crime-related news) shapes people’s perceptions of social reality (e.g. the world is a violent place; Gerbner et al. 1977; Doob & Macdonald, 1979; Gerbner et al. 1980). Like ‘media dependency’, the substitution hypothesis suggests that media effects will be most pronounced among consumers who lack personal experience with a given social phenomenon. Other hypotheses within this tradition, like ‘audience reception theory’, suggests that these effects are conditional on consumer background characteristics, experiences, and predispositions (Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2014; Roche, Pickett, & Gertz, 2016).

considered a ‘persuasion effect’ insofar as a person *previously* thought the issue of racial discrimination to be minor or non-existent, but has shifted this assessment in response to new exemplifying information. Second, among both those who already or don’t already believe there to be a high degree of racial discrimination, the media increases the accessibility and salience of racial discrimination as an attribution of racial inequality and, thereby, as a consideration that informs racial policy preferences. All told, because perceptions of racial discrimination both shape the perceived legitimacy of racial inequality and, likely as consequence, are strongly predictive of support for racially liberal policies like affirmative action (e.g. Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Valentino & Brader, 2011; DeBell, 2017; Haaland & Roth, 2017), it follows that one way the media can influence racial policy preferences is through its influence on perceptions of racial discrimination as well as the weight given to racial discrimination in people’s attributions for black disadvantage.

Kellstedt (2000; 2003) offered some of the first evidence of the media’s influence on public racial policy liberalism. He conceptualizes American racial attitudes as an “internal tug-of-war between cherished values that conflict with one another—a struggle where one side gains ground over a period of time but the other side never truly loses, regaining strength and pulling back the other way” (Kellstedt, 2003, p. 10). The ‘cherished’ but conflicting values he speaks to are those of egalitarianism and individualism. His thesis is that whether public racial attitudes swing in the liberal or conservative direction is a function of the extent that news outlets emphasize egalitarian or individualist value considerations in their coverage of race-related issues. Combining times series of news content data and racial policy attitudes, he finds that aggregate swings in racial policy liberalism do indeed proceed shifts in the frequency at which race-related media coverage speak to violations of egalitarian (vs. individualistic) norms.

However, while noteworthy, it's not clear that this relationship is driven by framing as opposed to informational or persuasion effects²⁶. Because the author's operationalization of 'egalitarianism' includes article that mention anti-black discrimination and unequal treatment, this relationship may, in fact, be *also* evidencing the updating of public perceptions of the prevalence or severity of racial discrimination²⁷.

Given that Kellstedt's analysis predated the rise of digital media, a case be made that, by furthering the public's exposure to incidents of alleged racial injustice, the digitalization of news has only enhanced the media's potential to influence racial attitudes. First, digital and social media platforms allow users to document, upload, and disseminate stories or events that traditional media is limited in covering (Fox & McEwan, 2019). In the context of police brutality, Intravia, Thompson, and Pickett (2020) note that "the widespread use of mobile devices that capture photos and record videos can quickly go viral on the Internet and social media and increase the public's exposure to negative police-citizen encounters" (p.58). Indeed, research shows that content that provokes negative emotions or moral outrage are more likely to go viral online or be shared on social media (Berger and Milkman, 2012; Valenzuela, Pina, & Ramirez, 2017; Jost et al., 2018; Brady, Crockett, Van Bavel, 2020). One study found that people were more likely to learn about immoral acts online than through traditional media (print, TV, radio etc.) and that online exposure, in turn, predicted greater moral outrage (Crockett, 2017). Other studies have noted significantly positive relationships between digital news consumption, on one hand, and perceptions of racial discrimination (Amaya, 2017) and police illegitimacy

²⁶ As Slothuus (2008) notes, researchers have typically failed to distinguish between these two effects. Instead, many studies purporting to show 'framing effects' have used experimental manipulations that combine both persuasive information *and* emphases on specific considerations or issue dimensions. A consequence of this practice is the obscuring of the mechanism by which attitudes are changed. Attitudinal shifts that are attributed to 'framing effects' may, in fact, be the result of persuasion (and vice versa).

²⁷ That Kellstedt found no significant effects of individualistic value frames on racial policy liberalism makes this interpretation very plausible.

(Intravia, Thompson, & Pickett, 2020) on another. Digital news media thus conceivably has greater potential to trigger what Kuran and Sunstein (1999) term ‘informational cascades’ wherein initial media coverage of an event stirs public outrage (including protests) and responses from political elites, which, in turn, stimulates further event or issue-related media coverage²⁸. For instance, when user-uploaded content, such as a black person’s interaction with police or a prejudiced white person, goes viral online, it is often receives attention from traditional and mainstream news media and, thereafter, from political and party elites²⁹ (Freelon, McIlwain, & Clark, 2018).

The more frequent circulation and thus reach of racial injustice-related media should also make it harder for whites to dismiss incidents of discrimination as isolated or non-racial phenomena. For instance, Sigelman et al. (1997) found that the police killings of Malice Green and Rodney King, respectively, decreased and had no significant effect, respectively, on the extent that whites’ attributed racial inequality to discrimination. They speculated that whites may be more likely to isolate such incidents “by treating them outside the historical context of discrimination against blacks” (p.790). And yet a more recent studies by Sawyer and Gampa (2018) and Mazumder (2019) found that white racial liberalism significantly increased during the Black Lives Matter period, which was marked by a series of high-profile police shooting incidents. It’s thus possible that single incidents of racial injustice are easy to dismiss as episodic or unrepresentative of the treatment of blacks at large, but *multiple* (and video-documented) incidents in close succession cultivate the perception that they are instantiations of a broader and

²⁸ Birkland (1998) similarly discusses the agenda-setting effects of ‘focusing events’ on interest group mobilization.

²⁹ The role of political elites is worth dwelling on, as Barbera et al. (2019) show evidence that legislators are more likely to follow than originate partisan discourse on Twitter. This is important in that, by speaking to issues and adopting issue-frames (e.g. ‘systemic racism’, ‘privilege’) that resonate with partisan social media users and activists, politicians may be amplifying and disseminating them to wider (or social media inactive) audiences.

more pervasive phenomenon. Consistent with this interpretation, Carter and Murphy (2017) found that exposure to multiple (vs. one) autobiographical essays discussing black authors' experiences of subtle racial discrimination increased white participants' perceived prevalence thereof and decreased perceptions that the authors were playing the 'race card'.

While increasing the availability and reach of race-related news content, the digital media revolution has also changed the mode through which such content is consumed. Whereas the format of news coverage in earlier eras was largely limited to print and audio, the advent of camera phones has made it so that developments can now be vividly video-captured in real time. This innovation is important as there are reasons for believing that video news formats are more emotionally and thus attitudinally impactful than printed news (cf. Powell et al. 2018). First, as Mullinix, Bolsen, and Norris (2021) argue, video footage of racial incidents features *episodic* frames in that they focus attention on specific events and characters as opposed to presenting abstract or general information about the broader issue context (i.e. *thematic* frames). Aaroe (2011; see also Gross, 2008) demonstrates that the latter tends to elicit stronger emotional responses and, when they do, are more effective at inducing attitude change in the direction implied by the frame. This is because episodic frames are said to increase the 'transportability' of the viewing experience or the extent that viewers "get immersed in a narrative and feel empathetic toward the story characters" (Lee & Shin, 2014, p. 1091). For instance, Oliver et al. (2012; see also Maier, Slovic, & Mayorga, 2017) showed that, relative to thematic framing, episodic framing of health care issues (which focused on a specific person and his/her experiences with the healthcare system) increased story engagement, which, in turn, predicted stronger feelings of compassion and support for improving the healthcare of vulnerable populations. More germane to the issue of race, Mullinix, Bolsen, and Norris (2020) tested the

affective and attitudinal impact of articles and videos documenting instances of police use of lethal or non-lethal police against African American men. With no exceptions, the authors found respondents who viewed the lethal or non-lethal videos either alone or in combination with text expressed stronger feelings of anger, anxiety, and upset than those in the purely textual or control conditions. Turning to attitudinal outcomes, the authors observed a pattern of additive effects such that the combination of text and video footage led to lower trust and confidence in law enforcement than either in isolation³⁰. Given that videos are increasingly embedded in textual news articles, this finding is noteworthy and suggests that, to the extent that it elicits stronger affective reactions, new media may have greater potential to effect attitude change³¹ (Holbert, Garrett, & Gleason, 2010). Research also shows that information that provokes strong emotion is better encoded in memory (see McGough 2002 for a review). As such, exposure to emotionally provocative race-related stimuli may have a more enduring effect on racial attitudes³².

New media should also afford whites more frequent direct exposure to the concerns, sentiments, and racial activism of black Americans. For instance, blacks are just as likely to use social media as whites, and are even slightly overrepresented on some platforms, like Twitter (hence the term ‘Black Twitter’; Smith & Anderson, 2018). They are also more likely than

³⁰ It’s worth noting that the effects of all conditions were moderated by racial resentment, which underscores the importance of congruency between predispositions and information for message reception and attitude change (Zaller, 1992).

³¹ Bennett and Iyengar (2008) are more skeptical of this proposition. They argue that new media has increased audience fragmentation and selective exposure, which undercuts the media’s ability to influence mass attitudes. In reply, Holbert, Garrett, and Gleason (2010) counter that recent trends of media fragmentation, individuation, and digitalization actually afford more opportunities for lasting persuasion effects. Specifically, and drawing on the insights of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Priester, & Brinol, 2002), they posit that greater individual choice over the *what*, *when*, and *how* of media consumption ensures that those tuning into a message have both the *ability* and the *motivation* to receive it. The upshot is that the new ‘pull’ media environment may conduce to deeper cognitive engagement that is more likely to result in enduring attitude change.

³² As far as this author is aware, no research has *directly* tested this hypothesis. However, the findings in Mazumder (2018) are suggestive in that whites residing in counties that experienced historical civil rights protests were, years later, more racially liberal (e.g. greater support for affirmative action, lower racial resentment) than those living in counties in which protests were absent.

whites to use social media to share race-related, including activist, content (Anderson, 2016). Thus, since the advent of social media, white social media users—and, via cross-medium information transfer, even non-users—are likely hearing black voices more frequently than ever before. This has implications for the current theory, as recent research suggests that ingroup members who are exposed to outgroup expressions of ingroup-directed emotions (in this case, black expressions of disappointment) report higher levels of collective guilt and greater willingness to participate in collective action³³ (Solak et al. 2016).

3.5.3 A ‘Zallerian’ Ingroup-Critical Emotions Account of Media-Driven Racial Attitude Change

Recall that intergroup emotions theory holds that, when specific group categories are salient, group members appraise information in terms of its implications for ingroups and outgroups. Further, when group categories are salient, so too are the social status differences between them. Accordingly, by increasing the salience of racial group memberships and the status differences between them, increased media reporting on racial discrimination and bias is likely to promote or activate group-based moral appraisals of blame and responsibility for racial inequality. Even when such coverage is episodic or focused on specific instances of alleged discrimination (e.g. George Floyd), people are likely to perceive such cases as exemplars of a broader social problem (i.e., racism and racial inequality) that some group is responsible for creating and/or allowing to persist. As the dominant racial group, these appraisals of blame and responsibility are likely to implicate or be focused on white Americans. And this is especially likely to be the case when media coverage implicitly or explicitly attributes a racial issue(s) to

³³ Importantly, and consistent with research reviewed in section 2.6, the expression of guilt was conditional on the perceived legitimacy of racial inequality.

the effects of past and/or present white racism—which I hereafter refer to as ‘racial equalitarian media’³⁴. In turn, negative white-focused moral appraisals are likely to give rise to emotions that are critical of white people and sympathetic to blacks and/or other racial minorities. Related to this point, Zaller (1992) notes how media messages “may involve subtle or even subliminal images, and considerations may involve feelings or emotions” (p.41)³⁵. Accordingly, when white Americans’ are exposed to racial equalitarian media messaging, I argue that such considerations are likely to include ingroup-critical moral appraisals—which can be considered the ‘cognitive’ dimension of a consideration³⁶—and emotions (the ‘affective’ dimension). What is more, I contend that these group-based moral considerations have animated white racial liberalism throughout American history. In Myrdalian³⁷ (1944) terms, their expression can be traced to the ‘American Dilemma’ that crystalized with the ratification of the Founders’ constitution—a dissonance between the nation’s avowed moral ideals of liberty and equality for all and its actual moral practice of denying them to African slaves and their descendants.

Evidence of this can be found in the writings of abolitionists, which not only expressed shame and guilt over slavery but also acknowledged the utility of provoking these emotions for effecting social change³⁸ (Lamb-Brooks, 2016). It can also be found in the written letters sent by

³⁴ What do I mean by ‘racial equalitarian media’? I mean media that embodies the general assumptions of Myrdalian anti-racist thought—that blacks and whites are inherently of equal ability, and thus differences between them must be attributable to the direct and/or indirect effects of historical and/or continued white racism (Horton, 2005; Jackson, 1994; Weiner, 2004). These assumptions, which are now widely endorsed (at least among ‘polite society’), seminally influenced the civil rights movement, the enactment and interpretation of civil rights law, and the adoption of affirmative action policies.

³⁵ Unfortunately, despite their relevance to attitude formation (Petty & Brinol, 2015), emotions do not receive extensive treatment in Zaller’s theory of public opinion.

³⁶ Zaller’s (1992) conceptualizes ‘considerations’ as consisting of a combination of cognitive and affective elements.

³⁷ Myrdal (1944), himself, implicitly and explicitly refers to feelings of guilt (or coping with them) on several occasions. In one instance he writes he writes: “Meanwhile each of the two guilty regions points to the other’s sins—the South assuaging its conscience by the fact that ‘the Negro problem is finally becoming national in scope’ and the North that ‘Negroes are much worse off in the South’” (p.47).

³⁸ For instance, Angelina Grimke, an antebellum political activist, defends the strategy of “influencing slaveholders by a feeling of shame and odium, as well as by a sense of guilt” (Grimke, 1838, p.126). Gillhooley (2020) writes how abolitionists “sought to relieve their guilt and expunge the national sin” through their political activism (p.156).

non-southern whites to president Eisenhower amidst Southern resistance to desegregation efforts, in which expressions of shame were dominant theme. As Lee (2002) observes, many of such authors reported feeling “ashamed to be white” and mentioned how, owing to their commitment to racial equality, segregation and racism worked to diminish their “cherished self-conception” (p.116). Reacting to a 1963 CBS TV episode that highlighted the conditions of impoverished blacks, one Northern woman wrote: “I am ashamed to be one of the so-called white Christians who have let such a situation exist. I feel guilty as I look around my clean suburban home and my small ones sleeping in clean beds” (Bodroghkozy, 2012, p.169). A viewer from North Dakota adds: “I was both angry and guilty. Angry because of the awful agony of the young couple. Guilty because as a white man I am partially responsible for anguish so rife and unnecessary and damaging” (Ibid.).

In fact, like the abolitionist movement before it, the strategy of the civil rights movement at least partly rested on evoking such emotions among the white majority. As Bobbit (2007) tells it, “King himself was very much aware that his strategy involved evoking a sense of guilt in white Americans” (p.37). Indeed, Martin Luther King Jr. himself spoke directly to such sentiment on multiple occasions, in one of which noting how the nonviolent Civil Rights movement “arouses a sense of shame within them [the white community]...I think it does something to touch the conscience and establish a sense of guilt” (Clark, 1963, p.42). Dr. King also undoubtedly appreciated how media coverage of racial injustices (e.g. the lynching of Emmett Till, efforts at preventing school desegregation in Little Rock) played an indispensable role in transmitting the information that elicited these emotions. Speaking at a Selma protest, King proclaimed that: “We are here to say to the white men that we no longer will let them use

clubs on us in the dark corners. We're going to make them do it in the glaring light of television” (Bodroghkozy, 2012, p.2).

While slavery and state-sanctioned racial discrimination and violence are no longer, media messaging that accentuates white vs. black status differences and implicates white Americans in the mistreatment of blacks or the persistence of black disadvantage remains a trigger of white collective shame and guilt today. For instance, against the backdrop of media discourse on the role of racism in the federal government’s laggard response to hurricane Katrina, Blodorn and O’Brien (2011) found that white residents of New Orleans who perceived racism in Katrina-related events reported higher levels of collective guilt. More recently, Schildkraut’s (2019) qualitative study found that many white liberal respondents reported an increased sense of racial privilege—a precursor for feelings of shame and guilt--, which they frequently attributed to “the role of the media and the police”. In the words of one respondent: “Anytime I see the news of a black person dying to the police I think about how I’ve been pulled over in traffic and only gotten warnings because I’m white” (p.433).

The qualitative evidence reviewed here suggests that ingroup-critical emotions have always influenced the racial liberalism, including activism, of white Americans; and that media has always played a role in their activation. However, it also lends support to the conceptualization of ingroup-critical emotions as ‘time-dependent phenomena’, which refers to the notion that the salience of specific group categorizations, the status differences between them, and the degree that people appraise information in terms of such categorizations are not constant (Smith & Mackie, 2006). As was noted in the previous chapter, people can identify with different groups at different levels of social categorization (Turner et al. 1987; Oakes et al. 1994; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). And which group memberships are salient varies across time. For

example, during times of war or in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, one's American or *national* identity is likely to be more salient than his/her racial or ethnic identity. As such, status differences between the US and other countries are also likely to be more salient. However, during periods of racial turmoil or following incidents of alleged racial injustice (e.g. Hurricane Katrina, the killing of Georgie Floyd), the opposite is likely to be the case. And this is due, at least in part, to the availability of cues in the information or media environment that elevate racial over national self-categorizations (and vice versa).

Taken together, because the availability of racial equalitarian media varies across time, so too does the salience of racial group memberships and the status differences between them; and because the salience of racial group memberships and between-group status differences varies across time, so too does the likelihood of engaging in group-based moral appraisals and experiencing group-based emotions. When these appraisals are negative and racial-ingroup-focused, they give rise to ingroup-critical emotions, including collective shame, guilt, and/or ingroup-directed anger. These emotions and their underlying appraisals then enter as 'considerations' that inform white Americans' (racially liberal) responses to survey questions about race and racial policy.

The above raises an important theoretical question: does white racial liberalism fall as the availability of racial equalitarian stimuli declines? According to intergroup emotions theory, not necessarily—as the repeated experience of group-based moral emotions overtime can have lasting effects (Smith & Mackie, 2006). Specifically, and through the process of classical conditioning, when whites repeatedly experience guilt and/or shame in response to instances of perceived racial injustice against blacks, it is expected that these feelings will eventually become

associated with their mental representations of blacks³⁹. In this case, these emotions are likely to be reactivated whenever blacks are encountered or thought about. The upshot is that repeated episodic emotional experiences can have enduring effects on racial attitudes. Such accords with the findings of Mazumder (2018), who found that whites residing in counties that saw civil rights protests were more racially liberal decades later.

3.5.3.1 The role of predispositions in exposure and reactions to racial equalitarian messaging

Of course, as Zaller's theory⁴⁰ and my own acknowledge, not all white Americans will be equally or similarly exposed to racial equalitarian media messaging, nor will they all be equally or similarly receptive to it upon exposure. Instead, and generally speaking, the white Americans most likely to both attend and react to racial equalitarian media in an ingroup-critical fashion are those that fall on the 'liberal' end of the ideological spectrum. My reasoning is as follows:

First, relative to their conservative counterparts, self-identified liberals tend to score higher on average on a family of attributes that are associated with greater and more diverse information consumption and political awareness. For instance, liberals tend to score higher⁴¹ than conservatives on measures of psychological constructs like 'need for cognition' (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, & Haidt, 2012; Carraro et al. 2011; Stern et al. 2013), broad personality traits like 'openness' (Caprara et al. 1999; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Rentfrow et

³⁹ This is similar to the 'association-propositional evaluation' (APE) model adopted by Sawyer and Gampa (2018) to explain movement-driven increases in white racial liberalism. By their account, the Black Lives Matter movement modified whites' implicit and explicit racial attitudes by altering existing or creating new (positive or sympathetic) associative evaluations of black people.

⁴⁰ The congruency between individual predispositions and media messaging is an important feature in Zaller's (1992) model of message reception and attitude change.

⁴¹ An important caveat is that, while significant, these relationships tend to be modest in size and hold more for socio-cultural than economic dimensions of liberalism (conservatism).

al. 2009), and other individual-level variables like educational attainment and cognitive ability⁴² (Xu, Mar, and Peterson, 2013). All of these variables, some of which are closely related (e.g. openness and need for cognition; Ksiazkiewicz, Ludeke, & Krueger, 2016), are believed to have downstream effects on information-seeking and consumption tendencies as well as political interest and engagement. For instance, need for cognition, which broadly relates to one's enjoyment of complex or effortful thinking, has been positively linked with political news consumption and attention (Perse, 1992). Openness, a highly related personality trait, is found to positively predict broad/deep information-seeking behaviors (Heinstrom, 2005), earlier adoption of new social media platforms (Guadagno, Okdie, and Eno, 2008), online news consumption (Gerber et al. 2010; Jordan et al. 2015), and both the diversity and number of news sources consumed (Sinderman et al. 2020). Cognitive ability is positively associated with political interest and engagement (Dawes et al. 2014, 2015; Weinschenk et al., 2019), and is also found to facilitate information-seeking, comprehension, and the integration of new knowledge (including current events) into long-term memory (Hambrick et al. 2008). Thus, to the extent that liberals score higher than moderates and conservatives on these variables, they are more likely to be active consumers of socio-political news, especially on the web, and thus have greater opportunities to be exposed to racial equalitarian messaging.

Second, white liberals also tend to score higher on two related predispositions that are more directly influential for *engagement* with as well as *reacting* to and processing racial equalitarian messaging in an ingroup-critical manner. The first is other-oriented injustice sensitivity, which, as was noted in section 3.3.1, is positively predictive of both dwelling on as

⁴² Time series data from the General Social Survey (1972-2018) show that whites that self-identify as 'liberal' consistently score higher on measures of verbal ability and educational attainment than those that self-identify as 'conservative'; and these differences have increased across time.

well as the emotional intensity of one's reaction to incidents of injustice against others. Greater injustice-sensitive individuals have also lower thresholds for what counts as injustice, which increases the scope of possible triggers of moral-emotional attention. The second is egalitarian/anti-hierarchy ideology (i.e., social dominance), which, similar to injustice sensitivity, positively predicts both attention to inequality-related stimuli and greater sensitivity to evidence of bias against low-status groups. Most importantly, whites higher on this orientation also tend to be more inclined towards structuralist or bias-centric accounts of racial inequality (if only because the alternatives are perceived to 'justify inequality' or 'blame the victim'), which means they are also more likely perceive disparate racial group outcomes (or social positions) to be illegitimate and their racial ingroup responsible for their existence. Taken as a whole, insofar as white liberals score higher on these predispositions, they are more likely than others to a) seek out (vs. avoid) and become both emotionally and cognitively invested in racial equalitarian media messaging, which is conducive to more enduring attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Priester, & Brinol, 2002); and b) accept (rather than resist) racial equalitarian media messaging, which increases the likelihood that they will engage in ingroup-critical moral appraisals and experience feelings of guilt, shame, and/or ingroup-directed anger.

Consistent with the preceding suppositions, Takahashi (2021) observed that white liberals were both significantly less avoidant of and also rated media articles implicating white people in racism as significantly less threatening than conservatives. Further, Derosa (2017) found that conservatism negatively predicted feelings of shame, guilt, and anger in response to images depicting police and other racialized violence against black people. Similar to Takahashi (2021), she also observed that conservatives were more likely to report wanting to avoid information about race and police relations than liberals. Additionally, anger and shame interacted with

political orientation in predicting avoidance such that liberals, but not conservatives, who reported these emotions showed a greater interest in engaging information about racial issues. These findings suggest not only that liberals are more likely to experience negative group-based emotions when faced with racial-injustice-related information, but also that these emotions motivate a desire to further seek out and consume such information. White conservatives, in contrast, are more likely to resist or avoid such messaging and/or tune into ideologically-congruent media (e.g. Fox News) instead.

For all of the above reasons, ingroup-critical considerations are likely to also arise more naturally for white liberals than conservatives. Specifically, due to their greater exposure to and interest in racial equalitarian media, they are likely to be more cognitively accessible for liberals such that their emergence is less dependent on explicit priming or media framing. For instance, was the federal government's laggard and inadequate relief response to black victims of Hurricane Katrina evidence of a racist social system that privileges white over black lives? Or was it simply the result of government incompetence? For white liberals, the former interpretation is more likely to be cognitively accessible even in the absence of exposure to information that explicitly promotes it. This is because the consideration—that society unjustly privileges whites over blacks—has already been internalized. As such, mere exposure to information about the plight of black Katrina victims may be sufficient for evoking ingroup-critical moral appraisals. On the other hand, the emergence of ingroup critical appraisals among those for whom they are less or not at all cognitively access will be more dependent on information that *explicitly* primes them. While only suggestive of this, Cooley, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Cottrell (2019) found that, relative to white liberals, white conservatives who read about a court case in which a black (white) robbery suspect was questionably shot by police significantly

less likely to attribute the incident to racial bias and significantly less likely to think that it ‘reflects the presence of racism’ in American society. However, when participants first read about ‘white privilege’ before reading about the court case, attributions and perceptions of racism increased regardless of ideology.

3.5.3.2 A rough conceptual model of media-driven white racial attitude change

For the sake of clarity, the diagram below offers a rough visual summary of the main causal processes that comprise my ingroup-critical emotions theory of media-driven increases in white racial liberalism. It begins with an exogenous ‘shock’ in the form of an immoral act (typically perpetrated by a white person) or a phenomenon or event that negatively and disproportionately affects member(s) of a historically victimized low-status racial group (a).




Figure 3.2 Conceptual model of media-driven white racial attitude change

Exogenous shocks can be anything that is likely to generate media coverage and attracts public and political attention—from unjustified police shootings and racially-motivated hate crimes to the racially insensitive or bigoted remarks of politicians, the racially discriminatory behavior of

private citizens, and even new research that speaks to racial discrimination in different public and/or private domains. Whatever its specific form, the 'shock' leads to increases in the availability of racial equalitarian media coverage **(b)**, which implicitly or explicitly frames the act, event, or phenomenon in question in terms of a broader narrative of racism and white supremacy. Greater availability and individual predispositions **(c)** that bear on general and, more specifically, race-related media attention and engagement (openness, cognitive ability, injustice sensitivity etc.) increases a person's likelihood and his/her frequency of exposure to racial equalitarian messaging **(d)**. In the minds of the exposed, exposure proximately functions to increase the salience of racial group categories and the status differences between them **(e)**, increase the perceived degree or prevalence of mistreatment against the racial/ethnic minority group(s) in question **(f)**, and contextualize an issue or event as part of a broader phenomenon (rather than an isolated incident). These effects heighten a white person's awareness of his/her membership in an advantaged racial group, which prompts group-based appraisals of responsibility for the conditions of the low-status racial outgroup in question **(g)**. Whether these appraisals are negative and white-focused (vs. defensive and outgroup-focused) depends on the extent that a white person attributes ingroup vs. outgroup-status differences to past and/or present mistreatment **(h)**. And the extent that a white person endorses such attributions is a function of both predispositions **(i)**; e.g. social dominance) and the perceived degree of discrimination against the outgroup in question **(j)**. The latter, which itself is partly a function of exposure (to the extent that lower perceptions of discrimination result from a lack of awareness or information) and predispositions **(k)**; e.g. social dominance, injustice sensitivity), serves to increase the weight given to racial discrimination in these attributions. Appraisals of white Americans as either indirectly or directly responsible for the inferior conditions of a racial outgroup **(l)** is likely to

feed into appraising their social position as illegitimate (**m**). These ‘local’ or wrongdoing-focused appraisals produce an emotional response (**n**) in the form of collective guilt (**o**). However, they can also serve as the basis for more global negative appraisals of white Americans’ moral character (**p**), which elicit feelings of moral shame (**q**). Together, ingroup-critical appraisals and the emotions they promote become ‘considerations’ that inspire the expression of group-specific and/or group-general racially liberal attitudes (**r**).

To be clear, in the interest of simplicity, the diagram above does not depict all possible nodes or outcomes. For instance, a more elaborate rendering would have included a path to ‘outgroup-critical’ appraisals (e.g. undeserving, lazy, violent) and emotions (e.g. anger, disgust), which are likely to promote a racially conservative response. Additionally, in theory, there should also be a path running from ‘ingroup-critical emotional response’ or ‘racial liberalism’ back to ‘exposure’ insofar as the former motivate further racial equalitarian media consumption. Nonetheless, though incomplete, I felt it necessary to provide the reader with some visual summary of primary theoretical variables and processes—especially before proceeding onward to the formulation of relevant hypotheses.

3.6 Primary Hypotheses (7-16)

Like Kellstedt (2000; 2003; see also Engelhardt, 2019), this dissertation contends that both the stability of racial attitudes and the non-role of the media in their formation is much overstated. However, whereas Kellstedt’s theory of media-driven racial attitude change is group-neutral and identifies shifts in the availability of egalitarian value frames as the causal mechanism, this dissertation offers a theory that is specific to white Americans⁴³ and in which

⁴³ To be sure, the theory can be adapted to explain increases in racial liberalism among non-white racial/ethnic minority groups. However, this adapted theory will inevitably feature group-based appraisals and emotions that are unique to such groups.

the media affects racial attitudes via the activation of group-based moral appraisals and emotions. By this latter account, shifts in white racial liberalism across time at least partly reflect shifts in the salience of ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions. And shifts in the salience of the latter, in turn, reflect shifts in the salience or availability of ('racial equalitarian') media coverage that implicates white Americans in the genesis and/or persistence of black disadvantage⁴⁴. If these theoretical premises are valid, this dissertation expects to find that:

***H7.** Variation in white racial liberalism (t) follows variation in the salience of racial equalitarian media ($t-1$)⁴⁵.*

However, it's also possible that the inverse relationship is true—i.e. shifts in salience of racial equalitarian media may follow shifts in white racial liberalism to the extent the latter increases demand for the former. Alternatively, the relationship might be reciprocal such that both variables are mutually influential. Thus, if the causal relationship truly runs from media to racial attitudes, I additionally need to show that:

***H7A.** The salience of racial equalitarian media (t) is not significantly predicted by previous levels of white racial liberalism ($t-1$).*

On the basis of the parallel publics assumption, Kellstedt (2000; 2003) opted to limit the focus of his analysis to aggregate public racial policy liberalism. However, this chapter identified a number of predispositions (openness, injustice sensitivity, egalitarianism etc.) that are likely to influence both exposure to and whether a person reacts to racial equalitarian media in an ingroup-critical and, thereafter, racially liberal fashion. Thus, theoretically speaking, there's no

⁴⁴ Naturally, there is likely to be a high degree of overlap between 'racial equalitarian media' and Kellstedt's operationalization of 'egalitarian value frames', as the former inevitably features the latter.

⁴⁵ Following Kellstedt, I also expect this relationship to hold after adjusting for potential confounds, such as the general availability of race-related media, generational replacement, consumer sentiment, and budgetary allocations for civil rights agencies. These control variables will be discussed in the next chapter.

reason to expect shifts in racial liberalism will manifest to the same degree across all segments of the public. Accordingly, to the extent that white liberals and, by extension, white Democrats score higher on relevant predispositions, the effects of racial equalitarian media on racial liberalism are expected to be stronger for these subgroups than for white conservatives and Republicans:

H7B. *The effects of shifts in the salience of racial equalitarian media on racial liberalism will be significantly stronger for white liberals and Democrats than white conservatives and Republicans.*




Figure 3.3 Illustrative summary of H7 and respective secondary hypotheses

Note. Solid lines with black arrowheads denote significant direct effects. Dotted lines with white arrowheads denote insignificant direct relationships. Line thickness denotes the anticipated strength or size of each relationship.

As will become more apparent in the coming chapter, a principle limitation in the preceding hypotheses is that testing them entails time-series analyses of aggregated (annual) data. While this approach may be sufficient for detecting broad trends across decades of time, the non-granularity of the data lends itself to commissions of the ecological fallacy and unavoidably

leaves many questions important questions unanswered. For instance, such an analysis would not be able to tell us the source of variation in racial equalitarian media. Nor can we be sure that any overtime relationships between these media trends and those in white racial liberalism are necessarily causal. Though theoretically plausible confounds will certainly be controlled for, such controls are likely to be both imperfect (i.e. contain a considerable degree of measurement error) and non-exhaustive. In the latter case, we can never be sure that we've controlled for all variables that may explain both increases in media coverage and white racial liberalism.

One avenue for addressing these limitations is to subsequently adapt and test the hypotheses in question using a quasi-experimental design and more granular data. The unexpected but widely publicized May 25 death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police affords such an opportunity. It catalyzed one of the largest and longest waves of mass-protest in American history. Media coverage of the incident and subsequent protests was so persistent that one would practically have to go 'off the grid' to avoid it. Furthermore, a notable feature of these protests was the conspicuous representation of a sizeable number of white Americans. Indeed, whether it was white protestors brandishing 'white silence=violence' and 'Black Lives Matter' signs or surges in the book sales of *White Fragility* and other anti-racist literature, the Floyd incident clearly had the trappings of many in the media deemed a 'racial reckoning' (McLaughlin, 2020). It thus presents me with the perfect case study for testing some of same the theoretical assumptions that are reflected in hypotheses 7A-B.

But just what are we looking for, exactly? More specifically, if—as my theory would predict-- the death George Floyd indeed increased the salience of racial equalitarian messaging and, as a result, the salience of ingroup-critical emotions, such as shame and guilt, what would we expect to observe in the data? Unfortunately, the data on which these analyses will be

conducted do not feature direct measures of white guilt and moral shame. As such, I have no choice but to consider the effects of the Floyd incident on highly related variables. One such variable is racial resentment (the reverse-coded version of which I term ‘racial liberalism’), which is shown to be strongly correlated with collective guilt and shame⁴⁶—a finding that is replicated in a later chapter—and which, as discussed, is also theorized to be an antecedent of these emotions⁴⁷. Accordingly, if the Floyd incident occasioned increases in white shame and guilt, we would also expect to observe coincident decreases (increases) in racial resentment (racial liberalism):

***H8.** Compared to the pre-Floyd period, white racial liberalism is significantly higher following the George Floyd incident.*

Recall that feelings of collective moral shame have been associated with a desire to self-distance oneself from one’s morally tainted ingroup. One possible means by which such distancing behavior may manifest is in how favorable ingroup members are towards their racial ingroup vs. racial outgroups⁴⁸. Thus, if the death of George Floyd indeed increased white feelings of moral shame, it is also expected to have a negative effect on whites’ favorability towards other whites relative to blacks:

***H9.** Compared to the pre-Floyd period, whites’ favorability towards other whites relative to blacks will significantly decline following the George Floyd incident.*

⁴⁶ Most recently, Agadjanian et al. (2021) report a correlation coefficient of $r=0.65$ between racial resentment and white guilt. Data from a March 2021 Cato Institute/YouGov survey shows a correlation coefficient of $r=0.75$ between racial resentment and white moral shame.

⁴⁷ To be clear, ‘racial resentment’ is merely a modified and shorter measure of ‘symbolic’ or ‘modern racism’. To the extent that it captures structuralist vs. individualist attributions for black disadvantage (what proponents of social dominance theory would consider hierarchy (de-)legitimizing beliefs), it is theorized to condition the expression of collective shame and guilt.

⁴⁸ Chapter 6 presents evidence consistent with this suggestion. Specifically, it shows that white moral shame is the strongest predictor of rating racial outgroups more warmly than fellow whites.

Further, past research shows white shame and guilt to be strong predictors of support for giving monetary reparations to black American descendants of slavery. Accordingly, if the Floyd incident increased levels of shame and guilt, it can also be expected to have increased white support for cash reparations:

H10. *Compared to the pre-Floyd period, white support for paying financial reparations to black people is significantly higher following the George Floyd incident.*

Hypothesis 7B predicted that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals would be more responsive to shifts in the salience of racial equalitarian media coverage than those of white Republicans and conservatives. To adapt this proposition to the current study, the following auxiliary predictions are added:

H8A-10A. *The effects of the Floyd incident on all outcome variables will be stronger for white Democrats and liberals than for white Republicans and conservatives.*

Finally, and consistent with earlier discussion, the effects of the Floyd incident on white racial attitudes will be inevitably and largely channeled through the media, as the effects could only be direct for those that had first-hand exposure to the incident. Moreover, at the time of this writing, there exists no evidence that the police officer (Derek Chauvin) that killed George Floyd did so on account of racial bias. Media framing and commentary is thus essential for giving the incident ‘racial equalitarian’ meaning; that is, connecting it to the broader narrative of racism and white supremacy. Accordingly, a basic prediction is that the Floyd incident will occasion significant increases in the frequency of racial equalitarian media:

H11. *The salience of racial equalitarian media will be significantly greater in the post-Floyd period.*

However, if racial equalitarian media indeed carries the liberalizing effects of the Floyd incident on white racial attitudes, additional mediational hypotheses need to be tested:

H8B-10B. *The salience of racial equalitarian media will mediate the effects of the Floyd incident on all outcome variables.*




Figure 3.4 Illustrative summary of H8-10 and respective secondary hypotheses

Note. Solid lines with black arrowheads denote significant direct effects. Lines with white arrowheads denote significant indirect effects. Line thickness denotes the anticipated strength or size of condition effects.

Clearly, none of the preceding hypotheses directly get at whether the predicted relationships conform to the specific causal mechanisms that this thesis proposes. For even if white racial liberalism, including variables that are good predictors of guilt/shame, follows the specified media coverage and/or is found to spike in the post-Floyd period, it need not be the case that ingroup-critical appraisals and emotions mediates these relationships. Furthermore, hypotheses 1-5 were designed to test *only* whether ingroup-critical emotions are uniquely *associated* with racial policy liberalism and pro-outgroup orientations. What's needed, then, are

experimental versions of these hypotheses. The first of these hypotheses thus directly tests whether, as theorized, exposure to racial elicits ingroup-critical emotions:

H11. Whites who are exposed to racial equalitarian media report greater collective guilt and moral shame than those exposed to a race-neutral stimulus.

Once again, though, and for the same reasons that informed H7B and H8A-10A, not all whites are expected to be equally or similarly affected by racial equalitarian stimuli. Instead, and in virtue of scoring higher on predispositions that positively influence ingroup-critical responses to such stimuli, white liberals and Democrats might be expected to report higher levels of post-exposure guilt and shame than conservatives and Republicans. On the other hand, given the potential for ceiling effects, the inverse is also plausible. Specifically, white liberals and Democrats may already score high enough on collective guilt and moral shame that any attempt at elevating these emotions will, at most, prove only marginally effective. White conservatives, in contrast, are likely to score very low on these measures, which would leave greater room for the stimulus to affect them. Rather than opt for one over the other, I pit these two possibilities against each other in the following secondary hypotheses:

H11A. White liberals and Democrats will report significantly greater increases in post-exposure collective guilt and moral shame than conservatives and Republicans.

H11B. White conservatives and Republicans will report significantly greater increases in post-exposure collective guilt and moral shame than liberals and Democrats.

If H11 holds true, it is expected that increased levels of post-exposure collective guilt and moral shame will, in turn, lead to increases in support for pro-black policies. A test of this proposition entails two predictions. First, it is predicted that:

***H12.** Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media will show greater support for pro-black policies than those exposed to a race-neutral stimulus.*

Next, collective guilt and moral shame are both expected to mediate the effects of racial equalitarian media exposure on support for pro-black policies:

***H12A.** The effects of media exposure on support for pro-black policies will be mediated by feelings of collective moral shame and/or guilt.*

As was explained earlier, collective shame, more than guilt, is expected to have spill-over effects on attitudes and support for policies that aren't directly related to blacks. An initial test of this proposition was formulated in H2, which predicted that feelings of ingroup-critical emotions over whites' past and/or present victimization of blacks and the persistence of racial inequality would be associated with pro-immigration attitudes. H3 further specified that moral shame will increase favoritism towards non-European vs. European immigrants, while H4 predicted it would also relate to being warmer towards racial/ethnic outgroups relative to other whites.

Reformulated for the experimental context, the following similarly predict that:

***H13.** Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media will show significantly greater support for increasing the number of immigrants admitted into the US than those exposed to a race-neutral stimulus.*

***H14.** Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media will admit significantly more immigrants from non-European vs. European countries than those exposed to a race-neutral stimulus.*

***H15.** Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media will be significantly warmer towards racial/ethnic minority groups relative to other rights than those exposed to a race-neutral stimulus.*

H13A-15A. *The effects racial equalitarian media exposure on the above outcome variables will be mediated by collective moral shame.*

A final set of hypotheses confronts the possibility that the effects of racial equalitarian media exposure on pro-outgroup attitudes are a matter of social desirability concerns. That is, when whites are made to think of or perceive their ingroup as responsible for the origins and persistence of black disadvantage, subsequently liberal attitudes on affirmative action and immigration might be driven more by a concern for appearing non-prejudiced than a desire to address and/or distance oneself from the ingroup's perceived immorality. One way of accounting for this possibility, which this research will adopt, is to test whether ingroup-critical emotions predict a willingness to engage in personally costly pro-outgroup behavior. For consistency with H5, I operationalize this outcome variable in terms of monetary contributions to a non-profit pro-black advocacy group. The prediction is then that:

H16. *Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media donate significantly more money to a pro-black advocacy group than those exposed to a race-neutral stimulus.*

Because both shame and guilt are associated with policies that compensate or benefit *specific* victimized groups, both emotions are also expected to mediate the effects of racial equalitarian media on donations to a pro-black advocacy group:

H16A. *The effects of racial equalitarian media exposure on donations to a pro-black advocacy group will be mediated by collective shame and guilt.*

Finally, because it theorized to predict a more group-general form of pro-outgroupness than guilt, collective shame is also expected to account for post-exposure increases in donations to a pro-immigration advocacy group:

H17. Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media donate significantly more money to a pro-immigration advocacy group than those exposed to a race-neutral stimulus.

H17A. The effects of racial equalitarian media exposure on donations to a pro-immigration advocacy group will be mediated by collective shame.




Figure 3.5 Illustrative summary of H11-17 and respective secondary hypotheses

Note. Solid lines with black arrowheads denote significant direct effects. Lines with white arrowheads denote significant indirect effects.

3.7 Chapter Summary

The central claim of this dissertation is that white racial liberalism is at least partly driven by the negative but pro-social moral emotions that whites feel towards their racial ingroup. Stated differently, white racial attitudes would be far more conservative in the absence of collective shame and guilt. This chapter forwarded several hypotheses that attempt to

demonstrate this basic relationship. However, it also went on to argue that the salience of ingroup-critical emotions and their underlying moral appraisals is not constant but rather varies across time in response to specific shifts in the information environment. More precisely, the salience of ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions varies as a function of the availability of media messaging that implicitly or explicitly implicates white Americans in black disadvantage and the persistence of racial inequities. As the availability of such ‘racial equalitarian’ messaging increases, so too does the salience of racial group memberships and the status differences between them. Consequently, members of different racial groups become more likely to appraise social issues, events, and outcomes in group-based terms. For white Americans, greater exposure to racial equalitarian messaging increases the likelihood that group-based appraisals will be critical and focused on their ingroup’s responsibility for others’ disadvantages, the legitimacy of its social position, and/or its (im)moral legacy and character in general. As such, it also increases the likelihood that white Americans will experience feelings of collective shame and guilt that ultimately motivate the expression of racially liberal attitudes.

While available data doesn’t permit a test of *all* aspects of this theory (for example, no public opinion surveys have consistently measured racial identity importance let alone white guilt and shame over time), this chapter posited several hypotheses that serve to test whether increases in racial equalitarian media coverage do indeed move white racial attitudes in a liberal direction. At the same time, it contends that not all whites will have equal exposure nor will all react similarly to such media stimuli. A principal reason for this is that, in addition to differing on predispositions that influence an individual’s frequency of exposure to racial equalitarian media, white Americans also differ on those that influence the likelihood of responding in an ingroup-critical fashion.

On this point, this chapter discussed three closely related variables that are likely to condition a white person's susceptibility to ingroup-critical appraisals: namely, egalitarian/anti-hierarchy ideology, attributions for racial inequality, and the perceived legitimacy of racial group status differences. Specifically, the more ideologically opposed a person is to group status differences and hierarchies, the more he/she will be inclined to attribute them to correctable societal factors, such as racial discrimination. And the more that a person attributes group status differences to discrimination, the more likely he/she is to perceive his/her racial group's advantaged social position as illegitimate and his/her racial group as responsible for the creation and maintenance of an unjust social order. Finally, the more a person appraises his/her racial group's social position as illegitimate and his/her racial group as responsible for injustices against others, the more likely he/she will experience ingroup-critical emotions like collective shame and guilt.

Given that white liberals tend to have stronger egalitarian/anti-hierarchy orientations and are also more likely to attribute racial inequities to past and/or present discrimination than conservatives, it follows that racial equalitarian media exposure is more likely to trigger ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions among the former than the latter. Indeed, for white liberals, exposure to information that highlights racial injustice, discrimination, and unequal group outcomes is unlikely to be easily resisted. To the contrary, such information can be expected to increase the weight ascribed to discrimination as a cause of racial inequality and, as a consequence, increase the perception that whites are illegitimately advantaged and indirectly and/or directly responsible for black disadvantage. On the other hand, to the extent that white conservatives are less threatened by group inequalities and are more inclined to attribute them to endogenous factors (e.g. cultural pathologies), they are more likely to cognitively resist

messaging that suggests that whites are illegitimately advantaged and responsible for the disadvantages of blacks and other groups. As a consequence, they will be less likely to engage in critical moral appraisals of fellow white Americans and, therefore, less likely to experience feelings of collective guilt and shame.

Several hypotheses followed from the foregoing assumptions. First, to the extent that they are more attentive and susceptible to racial equalitarian media, increases in the frequency of racial equalitarian media are expected to more strongly affect the racial attitudes of white liberals than conservatives. Second, relative to conservatives, white liberals are also expected to express higher levels of collective guilt and shame—both cross-sectionally and in response to racial equalitarian media. Finally, to the extent it captures structuralist vs. individualist attributions for black disadvantage—or what some collectively conceive of as ‘inequality (de)-legitimizing beliefs’—symbolic racism is expected to account for ideological differences in the expression of these emotions.

Before proceeding onwards, it’s important to acknowledge that there is no single ‘smoking gun’ piece of evidence that can validate my theory in its entirety. Instead, the object of the remainder of this dissertation is to showcase multiple bodies of evidence that point in the same direction. The next chapter begins this empirical quest at the aggregate level of analysis. Its purpose is to ‘set the stage’ for the more direct tests of this theory’s predictions that will occupy subsequent chapters. In particular, it will assess whether white racial liberalism indeed varies across time in response to race-related media trends. Demonstrating as much constitutes a basic but critical step in the course of testing my theory. For failure to do so would be a fatal blow to the notion that the media effects shifts in racial liberalism through its generation of ingroup-critical emotion.

4 RACIAL EQUALITARIAN MEDIA AND RACIAL AWOKENINGS

4.1 Introduction

In the introductory chapter, I mentioned that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals have become more liberal over the past ten years than at any point in decades. Both the magnitude and speed of this change has been termed by some as the ‘Great Awakening’ (Yglesias, 2019). So, what does the ‘Great Awakening’ look like in practice? And what is responsible for it and similar if smaller shifts in white racial attitudes over the past 60 years? The current chapter begins with a graphical overview of the ‘Great Awakening’. It will then introduce a novel index of racial liberalism that captures shifts in white racial attitudes as far back as the 1950s. Accompanying this is another index that measures the salience of ‘racial equalitarian media’—i.e., media messaging that speaks to black-white inequities in terms of anti-black discrimination, racism, and racial injustice. These two indexes will serve as the primary dependent and independent variables, respectively, for the hypothesis tests that follow.

In all, this chapter aims to show that a) racial attitudes are far from static across time, b) shifts in racial attitudes follow shifts in the flow of racial equalitarian media messaging; and that c) white Democrats and liberals are much more sensitive to these informational trends than are their Republican and conservative counterparts. To be sure, assuming they hold, none of these findings would directly validate this dissertation’s primary contention regarding the role of in-group critical emotions in the adoption of racially liberal attitudes. However, their absence would certainly call this theory into question. For if racial attitudes are static and more or less unresponsive to increases in ingroup-critical stimuli, on what basis can we suppose that shifts in the salience of ingroup-critical emotions drive movement in racial liberalism? The hypotheses

tested in this chapter are thus critical for demonstrating that this theory is indeed consistent with what is observed in the data.

4.2 A Graphical Tour of the Great Awakening

The ‘Great Awakening’ of the past decade can be characterized as a rapid surge in the number of whites who endorse four overarching beliefs: (1) Racial discrimination against blacks is a frequent and pervasive phenomenon; (2) Inequalities between blacks and whites are primarily, if not entirely, the result of past and/or present discrimination; (3) White people enjoy illegitimate advantages on account of their skin color; (4) The government and other institutions of political and economic influence should enact policies that compensate blacks for their collective disadvantage and eliminate disparities in group outcomes.

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below provide a graphical summary of some of these trends in the form of 24 different smoothed time series of racial attitudes⁴⁹. With few exceptions, we see that white liberals and Democrats have either surpassed or closed the gap in racially liberal responses that existed for decades between them and their non-white counterparts. For instance, and referring to Figure 4.2, data from the General Social Survey shows that beginning in 2010, the percentage of white liberals who disagreed with the statement: “Blacks should work their way up without special favors,” has grown in almost every subsequent year the question was asked. Starting in 2010, when 24% of white liberals (21% of white Democrats) said they disagreed with the statement, the number rose to 30% (23%) in 2012, then 36% (26%) in 2014, and finally to 52% (39%) in 2016. It sits at around 50% as of 2018. Between 1994 and 2012, there was never a year in which more white liberals or Democrats gave this response than their nonwhite

⁴⁹ These series were generated using data from the American National Election Study, General Social Survey, Pew Research Center, and an assortment of surveys downloaded from the Roper Center for Public Opinion database. All data are weighted to be nationally representative of the public at large. The exact sources for each time can be found in Appendix A.1.

counterparts. By 2016, however, a divide that started appearing in the preceding few years came into full relief—that year, 29% of nonwhite liberals (28% of nonwhite Democrats) and 38% of Black liberals (34% of Black Democrats), disagreed that “Blacks should work their way up without special favors.” In other words, by 2016, white liberals were almost 80% more likely to give this response than nonwhite liberals, and almost 40% more likely than Black liberals.




Figure 4.1 Selection of smoothed time series of racial attitudes for white and non-white liberals and white conservatives




Figure 4.2 Selection of smoothed time series for white and non-white Democrats and white Republicans




Figure 4.3 Time series of percent of whites attributing black disadvantage to discrimination (Left) and disagreeing with ‘without special favors’ for blacks (Right) by ideological self-placement

Note. Data are weighted.

In addition to predating Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign and eventual election, a close-up of these trends shows that more white liberals attribute black-white inequality to racial discrimination than at any point since at least the 1970s. Data from the Pew Research Center (Figure 4.4) largely dovetails the patterns observed in the General Social Survey (Figure 4.3). In 2012, just under 36% of white liberals and 42% of white Democrats felt that racial discrimination was the ‘main reason why many black people can’t get ahead these days’. In fact, a somewhat greater proportion (44.8%, 47.5%) felt that ‘Blacks who can’t get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own condition’. Just two years later (i.e. 2014), however, the former response grew to 50.3% and then to 57% in 2015. As of 2019, 79% of white liberals and just under 70% of white Democrats gave this response. By comparison, the responses of white moderates, conservatives, and Republicans exhibit little to no contemporaneous change.

Perhaps naturally, increases in the percent of white liberals and Democrats who attribute racial inequality to discrimination coincide with similar increases in the percent that perceive there to be ‘a lot of’ discrimination against blacks and consider racism to be a ‘big problem’ in American society, respectively. Referring to Figure 4.5 below, from 2009 to 2014, the percent of

white Democrats and liberals who perceived there to be ‘a lot of discrimination’ against blacks jumped from 52.1 and 60.5% to 64% and 72%, respectively. By 2018—the final year of the series—these figures had further grown to 87% and 90%. By comparison, the net change among conservatives (34.5% to 48%) and Republicans (37% to 50%) from the beginning to the end of the series was far more modest.




Figure 4.4 Percent of whites selecting ‘racial discrimination’ as the main reason for black disadvantage by ideology and party-ID




Figure 4.5 White perceptions of anti-black discrimination by ideology and party-ID

Note. Data are weighted.

Similarly, Figure 4.6 shows that, between 1995-2011, the percent of white liberals and Democrats who perceived ‘racism’ in the US to be a ‘big problem’ ranged from 30.7% and

25.7% to 46.8% and 52%, respectively. These proportions steadily grew to 61% and 53% in 2015, to 77% and 75% in 2017, and, finally, to 84% and 79% in 2020.




Figure 4.6 White perceptions of the severity of the problem of racism by ideology and party-ID

Note. Data are weighted.

Although across a much more limited time frame, the panel data presented in Figure 4.7 suggests that shifts in attitudes towards black disadvantage coincide with shifts in attitudes towards white advantage. Specifically, the percent of white liberals who think that white people benefit ‘a great deal’ from advantages in society that black people do not have jumped from roughly 38% in 2016 to 55% in 2018. Once again, among white moderate and conservative panelists, the same response increased modestly to not at all over the same period.

Earlier it was argued that feelings of shame over an ingroup’s moral deficiencies can elicit a desire to distance oneself from his/her ingroup. One possible instantiation of this is showing greater solidarity with a racial/ethnic outgroup(s) relative to one’s ingroup. In other words, as whites come to appraise their racial ingroup with moral illegitimacy and racist tendencies, we would expect to see an increase in expressions of solidarity with non-white outgroups. Feeling thermometer data from the American National Election Studies is consistent with this possibility. As shown in Figure 8, 2016 marked the first year on record that white liberals rated blacks, Hispanics, and Asians significantly more warmly (an average of +3 points)

than their own racial ingroup. By 2020, the final point in the series, this pro-outgroup warmth bias had grown to an average of 10 points on the 0-100 feeling thermometer scale⁵⁰.




Figure 4.7 White privilege beliefs among white panelists by ideology




Figure 4.8 Racial/Ethnic ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer differentials by ideology

Note. Data are weighted. Scores below horizontal red line along the y-axis (the neutral point) indicate that respondents rated racial/ethnic outgroups more warmly on average than their own ingroup.

⁵⁰ Interestingly, the previous trend in this direction in the white vs. blacks series also *appears* to have begun during a period of racial tension and perceived injustice (e.g. the 1992 acquittal of police in the Rodney King incident and subsequent LA riots).

A nearly identical pattern is observed in panel data from the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group (VSG), which began in 2011. Figure 4.9 shows that white liberal panelists in 2011 were 7 to 12 points warmer towards whites than they were towards blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. By 2016, though, these differentials were trending in the opposite (i.e., pro-outgroup) direction. By 2020, white liberal panelists were 12 to 14 points warmer towards the three racial/ethnic minority groups than they were towards whites, which closely approximates the estimates from the ANES.




Figure 4.9 Racial/Ethnic ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer differentials by ideology

Note. Data are weighted. Scores below horizontal red line along the y-axis (the neutral point) indicate that respondents rated racial/ethnic outgroups more warmly on average than their own ingroup

Figure 4.10, which uses data from the most recent waves of the ANES (top) and VSG (bottom) surveys, suggests that white liberals are currently the only demographic group that exhibits this pro-outgroup tendency. Indeed, regardless of political orientation, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians all rated their racial/ethnic ingroups significantly more warmly on average than racial/ethnic outgroups.




Figure 4.10 Racial/Ethnic ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer differentials by race/ethnicity and ideology

Note. Data are weighted. Bars represent the average difference between how warm a respondent was towards his/her racial/ethnic ingroup vs. racial/ethnic outgroups. Negative scores indicate that respondents rated racial/ethnic outgroups more warmly on average than their racial/ethnic ingroup. Top panels show estimates from the ANES 2020 Time Series. Bottom panels show estimates from the 2020 wave of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group.

Importantly, the emergence of this pro-outgroup warmth bias among white liberals is not solely driven by greater *relative* warmth towards racial/ethnic minorities. Instead, it is also a function of increases in outright negative sentiment towards other whites. Figure 4.11, which presents time series data from the ANES (left panel) and the VSG (right panel) indicates that the percent of white liberals who rate ‘whites’ in the ‘cool’ (below 50) region of the feeling thermometer while rating blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in the neutral or warm regions has been steadily growing since 2011-2012 (ANES: 1.4%, VSG: 1.2%) and reached series highs (ANES: 11.4%, VSG: 18.2%) in 2020. In fact, both the ANES and VSG data indicate that there were far more ‘anti-white’ white liberals in 2020 than there were ‘anti-minority’ white conservatives⁵¹ (ANES: 1%, VSG: 2.5%).

⁵¹ By ‘anti-minority’ I mean respondents who rated whites at or above the neutral point (50) while rating blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in the ‘cool’ (< 50) region of the thermometer scale.




Figure 4.11 Trends in ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer scores by ideology

Note. Data are weighted. Plots represent the percent of respondents that rated whites below and blacks, Hispanics, and Asians at or above the neutral point (50) of group feeling thermometer scales (0-100). Estimates for certain ideological groups in certain years are missing due to the absence of observations in the ‘anti-white’ category.

It is reasonable to ask whether these rapidly shifting sentiments—perceiving greater discrimination against blacks, greater white privilege, and attributing black-white inequality to racial discrimination—coincide with greater support for pro-black social policies. Based on the findings of Piazza and Sniderman (1993), it’s possible for whites to acknowledge discrimination against blacks while remaining opposed to policies that, by conferring preferential treatment on the basis of race, treat the ‘disease’ (i.e. discrimination) with the disease itself. However, a white liberal might be more likely to think such policies are ‘just’ to the extent that they level an otherwise unjustly uneven playing field. If whites are illegitimately advantaged in higher education and employment, so this argument goes, granting special advantages to blacks is only fair.

Figure 4.12 presents data that supports this. In contrast to white moderates and conservatives, white liberals show considerable increases in support for pro-black policies even when the question makes implicit or explicit mention of preferential treatment. For instance, the percentage of white liberals who favor giving preferences to blacks in hiring and promotion and who feel that the ‘government has a special obligation to improve the living standards of blacks’ grew from 16.6% and 16.8% in 2010 to 41.5% and 50.9% in 2018. But while the number of white moderates and conservatives who feel that the US spends ‘too little on improving the conditions of blacks’ increased significantly over this time period, the level of support for the ‘special treatment’ items hardly moved. As we will see, this finding may have important implications for the measure of racial liberalism that is introduced below.




Figure 4.12 Whites' racial policy attitudes overtime by ideology

Note. Data are weighted.

4.3 What moves white racial mood?

The data featured in the previous section suggests that the assumed stability of white racial attitudes is incorrect. Although they may not undergo substantial changes with any regularity, such changes do periodically occur. The question the remainder of this chapter will deal with is ‘why’. What is it that moves white racial attitudes in a liberal or ‘woke’ direction?

The previous chapter proposed that variation in white racial liberalism is a function of the frequency at which the media discusses black-white inequities in terms of white racism and racial discrimination. Once again, this proposition is similar to the one advanced by Kellstedt (2000; 2003), which posited that increases in public support for racially liberal policies follows from increases in the salience of egalitarian (vs. individualist) value cues in the media's coverage of racial issues.

What is novel about my theory is the mechanism through which the media affects racial attitudes and of the populations that are likely to be most affected. In the case of the former, my theory argues that increases in such media content increases the salience of group-based, including group-critical, moral appraisals and considerations. For whites with strong egalitarian moral commitments, these moral appraisals are likely to be ingroup critical and are thus likely to trigger feelings of ingroup-focused guilt and shame that inspire pro-outgroup attitudes. This latter point gets at the second area of divergence: whereas Kellstedt's theory implies that media effects are similarly felt across all segments of the American public, my own suggests that, due in part to their differing orientations to inequality, they will affect the racial attitudes of white liberals and Democrats the *most* and white conservatives and Republicans the *least*.

4.3.1 Measuring Racial Liberalism

In the abstract, tests of the foregoing hypotheses seem straightforward: one need only examine whether the attitudinal trends reported earlier follow similar trends in racial equalitarian media. However, we quickly encounter an initial barrier. While media coverage is consistently present across time (the New York Times doesn't take holidays), survey questions on race are *not*. For instance, the General Social Survey, which launched in 1972, transitioned away from annual to biennial surveys in the 1990s. Surveys by the American National Elections Study are

typically conducted even less frequently—every election year or every two years. To make matters worse, the same surveys questions are not consistently asked across all survey waves. The General Social Survey, for instance, only started asking about pro-black affirmative action in 1994. In other cases, survey questions (e.g. attitudes towards racial busing, desegregation) have been discontinued and only cover a limited time period. Thus, conventional methods for generating singular aggregate indices of racial attitudes—e.g. standardizing and averaging responses to disparate items, extracting a dominant factor via factor analysis—confront us with a missing data problem. To designate one single indicator as our measure of racial liberalism wouldn't yield enough datapoints to be practically useful in statistical analysis. To simply standardize and average multiple time series of attitudes would result in a scale of questionable reliability, as the nature of the questions asked differ as a function of the racial issues du jour.

To circumvent these missing data issues, I follow Kellstedt's (2000; 2003) lead in adopting Stimson's (2018) dyadic ratios algorithm (DRA) to generate an aggregate index of racial liberalism. Stimson initially developed this approach for constructing aggregate measures of public policy liberalism. Its logic is similar to that of a principal component analysis: individual topic-related items are assumed to share or map onto a common latent construct. But whereas the input in principal component analysis typically consists of the raw responses to individual questions in a given sample, the DRA utilizes what are essentially the ratio of 'liberal' responses to the sum of liberal and conservative responses⁵². This allows for 'scores' across items to be combined and comparable across time.

But given that survey questions on race span multiple theoretically distinct attitudinal dimensions—from approval of interracial marriage and racial stereotypes to perceptions of

⁵² A critical assumption here is that policy questions in any issue domain have 'liberal' and 'conservative' responses.

discrimination and support for affirmative action--what items should be included as valid indices of racial liberalism? The answer depends on one's operationalization of 'racial liberalism'.

Kellstedt (2000; 2003) opted for an operationalization that is limited to racial policy preferences. The resulting index, which he defines as 'racial policy liberalism', is thus constructed only from survey items that are manifestly about racial policy. A potential advantage of this approach is its clear facial validity: measures of racial policy preferences are used to measure aggregate racial policy preferences. It is thus easier to envision such items genuinely sharing a common dimension, which may not be the case if policy-unrelated items (e.g. perceptions of discrimination) were included. However, given that we are working with annual aggregate data, a potential downside to this specificity is a considerable loss of information and greater measurement error.

First, with individual-level cross-sectional data, statistically distinguishing between different attitudinal dimensions is relatively straightforward. Running a factor analysis on a set of cross-sectional measures of racial policy preferences and attributions of racial inequality will conceivably show such items loading onto distinct factors. With aggregated annual data, however, things get more complicated. For instance, if overtime variation in items tapping attributions of racial inequality generally coincide with overtime variation in items measuring racial policy preferences—i.e. when one goes up, so does the other—they are likely to load onto a common factor *even if* they constitute discrete attitudinal dimensions. The inherent constraints of Stimson's DRA, which allows only for the estimation of up to two dimensions, only compounds this situation. Further, as Kellstedt (2000) notes, even items that measure the same policy area (e.g. busing, school segregation) as others can load weakly or negatively onto the same factor.

This is likely to be the case for shorter series constructed from fewer datapoints⁵³. And this can pose problems for interpretation: do certain items load onto separate dimensions because they are distinct or is their weak relationship with a theoretically predicted common dimension the result of sampling error?

Thus, while greater specificity should, in theory, improve measurement validity, both the aggregated structure of the data and the built-in limitations of the DRA do not allow one to easily infer that this is indeed the case. And a researcher has to weigh this uncertainty against the greater certainty of this approach's attendant costs. For instance, if in certain years measures of perceived discrimination and attributions of inequality are more abundant than measures of racial policy preferences, limiting ourselves to the latter can result in 'noisier' estimates for certain years. And if all these measures do indeed covary, we are effectively sacrificing information for little to no gain.

Taking this tradeoff into account, I attempt to strike a balance with an operationalization of racial liberalism that is broader than mere policy preferences, but which still retains internal coherence. Specifically, and as illustrated in Table 4.1 below, my criteria for item inclusion generally adheres to my earlier characterization of the 'Great Awakening'. Accordingly, items asking about attributions of racial inequality, perceptions of discrimination, racial advantage, and support for 'hierarchy-attenuating' racial policies are all eligible for inclusion. On the other hand, items measuring explicit anti-black prejudice ('would you vote for a black president?'), racial stereotypes, and feelings towards blacks are excluded. This decision is both a theoretical and empirical one. First, compared to the items that meet the inclusion criteria, such items evoke

⁵³ Stimson's DRA requires that individual series consist of at least three different datapoints. Series that minimally satisfy this requirement are much more vulnerable to sampling error. As a skewed sample at one datapoint can have a significant effect on a series' correlation with the composite series.

stronger social desirability pressures. With few exceptions, the series for these items exhibit clear linear or deterministic (and typically downward) trends⁵⁴. This has generated debate in the social sciences over whether the American public is genuinely becoming less prejudiced or whether respondents are simply more conscious of egalitarian norms and thus avoid giving responses that can be perceived as ‘racist’.

Table 4.1 Item selection criteria with examples

| Selection Criteria | Example Item #1 | Example Item #2 | Example Item #3 | Example Item #4 |
|--|--|---|--|---|
| Does the item ask about the degree or severity of discrimination or racism against blacks? | How big a problem is racism in our society today? Is it a big problem, somewhat of a problem, a small problem, or not a problem at all? Source: ABC News/Washington Post (N=7) | How serious a problem do you think racial discrimination against blacks is in this country--a very serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, not too serious, or not at all serious? Source: Pew Research Center (N=8) | Just your impression, in the United States today, is there a lot of discrimination against Blacks, or not? Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Pew Research Center (N=7) | Next, we'd like to know how widespread you believe the problem of racism is against blacks among police officers in this country. Would you say it is very common, fairly common, fairly rare, or very rare? Source: CNN/ORC (N=4) |
| Does the item ask about attributions of black-white inequality? | Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class | (Please choose the statement that comes closer to your own views--even if neither is exactly right.)...Racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can't get ahead these days, blacks who can't get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own condition | On the average (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are mainly due todiscrimination? | (For each of the following statements please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statement.)... Black people are not achieving equality as fast as they could because many whites don't want them to get ahead |

⁵⁴ Admittedly, the same critique can be levelled at some of the items that did meet my criteria for inclusion. But the issue is one of degree.

| | Source: ANES (N=16) | Source: Pew Research Center (N=16) | Source: General Social Survey (N=23) | Source: ABC News/Washington Post (N=5) |
|--|--|--|--|---|
| Does the item ask about perceptions of white advantage and/or black disadvantage? | In general, who do you think has a better chance of getting ahead in today's society-- white people, black people, or do white people and black people have about an equal chance of getting ahead? Source: CBS/New York Times (N=9) | Now, read each statement and please say if you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with each one.)...Blacks and other minorities receive equal treatment as whites in the criminal justice system Source: Public Religion Research Institute, ABC/Washington Post (N=10) | In general, do you think that Black people have as good a chance as white people in your community to get any kind of job for which they are qualified, or don't you think they have as good a chance? Source: Gallup, CNN/ORC (N=17) | Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. Source: CCES (N=4) |
| Does the item ask about attitudes towards 'hierarchy attenuating' racial policies? | Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about your opinion -- are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks? Source: General Social Survey (N=13) | We should make every possible effort to improve the position of blacks and other minorities, even if it means giving them preferential treatment Source: Pew Research Center (N=15) | As I read some pairs of statements, please tell me whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own views -- even if neither is exactly right.)...Our country has made the changes needed to give blacks equal rights with whites, our country needs to continue making changes to give blacks equal rights with whites Source: Pew Research Center (N=8) | Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about it? Source: ANES (N=20) |

I thus avoid these complications by sticking to items whose non-liberal response categories are less socially taboo. Second, the response categories for some of these items do not readily lend themselves to clear ideological demarcation⁵⁵. For instance, given a 7-point measure of perceived black criminality or intelligence, at which level(s) does a ‘conservative’ response end and a ‘liberal’ response begin? The same question besets the inclusion of 0-100 racial group feeling thermometers: is a ‘conservative’ response a 60 and below? A 50 and below? There are no obvious answers.

Overall, and with the help of the Roper Center for Public Opinion’s data archive, I identified 90 different questions across 66 years (1954-2020) that both meet the criteria outlined above and which were asked at 3 or more different time points. To the best of my knowledge, this is the largest (and longest) aggregate index of racial attitudes ever assembled⁵⁶. Figure 4.13 shows the number of survey items per year from which the indexes were calculated across the 1954-2020 period.




Figure 4.13 Number of survey items per year by racial liberalism index

⁵⁵ And because these trends are deterministic, they are likely to be less responsive or moved by exogenous ‘shocks’, such as a high-profile police shooting.

⁵⁶ To contrast, Kellstedt’s index is limited to just 19 items spanning the years 1950-1993.

Before introducing the index itself, several things should be noted. First, no items could be found for two of the years (1969, 1979) under study. The DRA thus estimates their respective racial liberalism scores using the liberal-conservative response ratios of adjacent years⁵⁷. Second, some indexes (e.g. sample, white) are comprised of more items than others (e.g. white x party, white x ideology). In some cases, this is because only cross-tabs of responses—rather than the complete dataset—were accessible via Roper’s data archive. In other cases, it is because standard measures of ideological self-placement were not consistently administered until the 1970s. And in still other cases, party affiliation was asked in lieu of ideology. Third, in some cases, the same questions were asked by different surveys. For instance, the American National Elections Study (ANES), General Social Survey (GSS), Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), and Public Religion Research Institute have all fielded at least one of the items comprising the standard 4-item ‘racial resentment’ battery across 3 or more time points (some of which overlap). One solution is to pool these surveys and create singular series for each item. This, however, can be risky if different survey organizations employ differing sampling methodologies or recruit different samples. Thus, in such cases, and with a few exceptions⁵⁸, I opted to treat the items as independent series. In the above example, this means separate series for each of the listed survey organizations.

Some coding clarifications are also in order. Recall that the DRA works off the ratio of ‘liberal’ to the sum of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ responses. Many of the included items (e.g.

⁵⁷ Specifically, and to give an example, the estimate for 1969 is interpolated from the change (or lack thereof) in the response ratio between 1968 and 1970.

⁵⁸ In a small subset of these cases, the questions were never asked at more than two timepoints by the same survey. That is, one survey organization may have only asked it in 1980, whereas another asked it in 1984 and again in 1988. As Stimson’s DRA requires that each series consist of 3 or more datapoints, I’m left with the option of either omitting or pooling these data and treating them as a singular series. Because such instances were infrequent, and because the total volume of included items should mitigate the bias of any sampling discordance, I opted for the latter approach. Just to be sure, though, I also estimated the composite indexes both with and without the pooled survey items. In the end, their inclusion did not meaningfully change the DRA estimates.

‘Are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?’) do indeed have clear ‘conservative’ (‘opposed’) and ‘liberal’ (‘favor’) responses. For some items, though, the ideological lines are less obvious. For instance, one item reads: “How much discrimination is there in the US today against [Blacks]?”. The response categories are ‘A lot’, ‘Some’, ‘Only a little’, or ‘None at all’. In this case, it is not obvious which we should code as the ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ responses. However, two considerations come to mind. First, only a minority of respondents in any given year fall into the bottom two categories; that is, overwhelming majorities of respondents consistently acknowledge or perceive at least ‘some’ discrimination against black (with ‘some’ being the modal response). To code the ‘Only a little’ and ‘None at all’ categories as ‘conservative’ and ‘Some’ and ‘A lot’ as liberal some’ and ‘a lot’ categories as ‘liberal’ could be a problem to the extent that the ratios fed into Stimson’s DRA are less stable when the numbers are lopsided or heavily skewed in one direction. An alternative, which I adopt, is to treat the ‘a lot’ category as the ‘liberal’ and the remaining response categories as the ‘conservative’ response. In addition to yielding a less lopsided ratio, this approach also makes theoretical sense. It comports both with part of my conceptualization of ‘woke’ racial attitudes as well as with literature suggesting that perceptions of discrimination are ideologically motivated⁵⁹. But if the reader is skeptical of this decision, it should be noted that it is not a very consequential one. Ultimately, so long as some shift in the ratio of responses is detected, it will be reflected (with some or varying degrees of error) in the DRA’s index estimation (Stimson, 2018).

⁵⁹ In the first case, one component of what I characterize as ‘woke’ racial attitudes is a belief—rightly or wrongly-- in the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in American society. This is arguably better captured by the ‘A lot’ than ‘Some’ category. In the second case, due to their differing orientations to inequality and distributive justice, conservatives are inclined to downplay the extent of discrimination, whereas liberals are inclined to magnify it. Accordingly, a typical conservative response can be expected to fall below the ‘A lot’ category (i.e. anywhere short of acknowledging widespread discrimination), while a typical liberal response can be expected to above the ‘only a little’ category.

Table 4.2 shows the DRA estimation statistics for the racial liberalism indexes of different group categories⁶⁰. For the sample as a whole (i.e. all respondents irrespective of race, party, and ideology), the first dimension of the racial liberalism index accounts for 52.1% of all the variance in the ratios of 90 time series. The mean and median series loadings on the first dimension were 0.563 and 0.742, respectively. By comparison, the same figures for Kellstedt's (2000) index were 0.546 (mean) and 0.606 (median). Figure 4.14 compares Kellstedt's sample-level racial policy liberalism index to my own sample-level racial liberalism index. Though his covers a shorter time period, the two are nonetheless highly correlated ($r=0.76$). My own racial liberalism index thus appears to have reliability; and, assuming Kellstedt's index is construct valid, reasonable validity as well.

Table 4.2 Summary statistics for differential racial liberalism indexes

| Time Coverage | 1954-2020 | | | | | | 1972-2020 | |
|---|-----------|-------|-----------|------------|----------------|--------------|------------|------------|
| | Sample | White | Non-White | White Dem. | Non-White Dem. | White Repub. | White Lib. | White Con. |
| 1st Dimension | 52.1% | 51.4% | 46.2% | 65.7% | 43.9% | 41.7% | 63.9% | 39% |
| 2nd Dimension | 18.2% | 20.3% | 16.7% | 16.5% | 17.1% | 19.1% | 14.2% | 20.5% |
| Mean 1st Dim. Loading | 0.563 | 0.548 | 0.447 | 0.665 | 0.377 | 0.298 | 0.684 | 0.242 |
| Median 1st Dim. Loading | 0.742 | 0.730 | 0.665 | 0.870 | 0.581 | 0.576 | 0.849 | 0.496 |
| Number of series | 90 | 83 | | 81 | | | 72 | |

Interestingly, the estimates for the white Democrats and white liberal indexes are most impactful, with the first dimension accounting for just under 66% of the variance in the former

⁶⁰ A complete list of all the items and their loadings for each series can be found in Appendix A.1.

and just under 64% in the latter⁶¹. By comparison, those for the white Republicans and conservatives are much weaker, with the first dimension accounting for just under 42% in the former and 39% in the latter. One can also see that constituent items tended to load much more strongly for white Democrats and liberals than for their Republican and conservative counterparts. In fact, the estimates for the latter subgroups fall well short of those of the sample as a whole. They are more comparable to those of the non-white groups than they are to those of white Democrats and liberals⁶². The reason for these differences is not immediately clear, though it suggests that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals are much more coherent than those of other groups. I return to this question in the chapter discussion.

My generation of different racial liberalism indices for different population subgroups begs the question: is it even necessary or worthwhile? Despite my theoretical rationale, the ‘parallel publics’ view would suggest not. Kellstedt (2003), for his part, argues that “lumping black and white respondents together is easily justifiable”; and that it would actually be “more

⁶¹ It should be noted that the indexes for the partisan and ideological subgroups were constructed from the responses of those who self-identified as white or non-white (see below) and either democrat/liberal or republican/conservative. Depending on the survey, this could mean respondents had to choose from one of three ideological response categories (liberal, moderate, conservative) or, in other cases, rate their degree of ideological self-identification along 5 or 7-point Likert scales (e.g. 1=Very liberal, 7=Very conservative). In the latter case, responses were collapsed to a 3 category scale (i.e. ‘Somewhat liberals’ were coded together with ‘very liberals’). The index for whites is slightly more complicated. Survey questionnaires in earlier decades (1960s) typically measured ‘race’ with 3-category items (e.g. white, black, other). As the Hispanic population started to grow, surveys added a separate item that asked whether the respondent was of Hispanic ethnicity. As my interest is in the attitudes of whites of European ancestry, including white Hispanics in my operationalization of ‘white’ could pose problems if the racial attitudes of the two groups meaningfully differ. For instance, increases in white racial liberalism could reflect increases in the size of the white-Hispanic population and/or an increased propensity among Hispanics to identify as white. Accordingly, and because Hispanics could have constituted only a tiny share of those placing in the ‘white’ category in earlier surveys, the responses comprising the white index are limited to those who self-identified as ‘white’ in surveys spanning the 1950s-1960s, and those who self-identified as ‘white’ while reporting no Hispanic ancestry in later years. The ‘non-white’ index consists of respondents who did not meet any of the foregoing criteria. If the interest here was in understanding the dynamics of non-white racial attitudes, this approach would be very problematic, as it fails to account for the steady overtime shift in the composition of the non-white population. But in the current project, non-whites are included only as a rough comparison group. Even so, I attempt to statistically control for this demographic change where necessary to improve the reliability of estimates.

difficult to justify separating blacks and whites, for little support for such a procedure can be found in the data” (p.75). In the current study, not only am I disaggregating the public by race, but by partisanship and ideology as well. While there will certainly be absolute differences in the racial liberalism scores of these differing populations, the question is whether they move in the same direction by similar amounts at the same time. If the answer is ‘yes’, then there would be little sense in statistical differentiation.




Figure 4.14 Comparison of author’s racial liberalism index and Kellstedt’s (2000, 2003) racial policy liberalism index (1958-1993)

In the end, the data tells a more complicated story—one of ‘imperfectly parallel publics’. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the intercorrelations between the raw and first-differenced racial liberalism indices for different populations and political subgroups, respectively. Beginning with the former, several interesting observations can be made. First, compared to non-whites (whose coefficient falls just short of conventional levels of significance), we see that variation in white racial liberalism is much more strongly correlated with variation in sample racial liberalism. To some extent, this is unsurprising. For decades, whites constituted overwhelming majorities of

survey respondents. The non-white indices were thus generated from much smaller samples, which would increase random errors associated with sampling fluctuation. Table 4.4 also shows that the first-differences of the non-white (and white; $r=0.704$, $p < 0.001$) series do significantly and positively correlate ($r=0.390$, $p=0.001$) with those of the sample as a whole. This suggests that year-to-year changes in racial attitudes among respondents as a whole *do* coincide with changes among both whites and non-whites. And, indeed, the changes across the two groups are significantly positively correlated ($r=0.354$, $p=0.004$). But by far the most surprising finding is that, while correlated in levels of the data ($r=0.707$, $p < 0.001$), year-to-year changes in the series of non-white Democrats ($r=0.193$, $p=0.120$) are not significantly related to those in the series of their white counterparts. The former are, however, significantly related to those of white Republicans ($r=0.290$, $p=0.018$) and conservatives ($r=0.408$, $p=0.004$).

Table 4.3 Intercorrelations between racial liberalism indexes

| | Mean | SD | N | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|--------------------------|------|-------|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1. Sample | 5.58 | 0.100 | 7 | | | | | | | |
| 2. White | 1.82 | 0.320 | 7 | 0.968*** | | | | | | |
| 3. Non-White | 9.66 | 0.840 | 7 | 0.220† | 0.153 | | | | | |
| 4. White Dem. | 2.70 | 0.290 | 7 | 0.920*** | 0.942*** | 0.081 | | | | |
| 5. White Lib. | 8.12 | 0.650 | 9 | 0.864*** | 0.891*** | 0.061 | 0.955*** | | | |
| 6. Non-White Dem. | 0.23 | 0.590 | 7 | 0.790*** | 0.764*** | 0.400*** | 0.707*** | 0.526*** | | |
| 7. White Repub. | 3.97 | 0.460 | 7 | 0.604*** | 0.606*** | 0.006 | 0.489*** | 0.167 | 0.764*** | |
| 8. White Con. | 9.70 | 0.610 | 9 | 0.198 | 0.129 | 0.569*** | -0.095 | -0.068 | 0.473*** | 0.726*** |

Note. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.4 Intercorrelations of year-to-year changes between racial liberalism indexes

| | Mean | SD | N | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|--------------------------|-------|-------|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------|---------|----------|
| 1. Sample | 0.461 | 0.320 | 6 | | | | | | | |
| 2. White | 0.481 | 0.620 | 6 | 0.704*** | | | | | | |
| 3. Non-White | 0.116 | 0.260 | 6 | 0.390** | 0.354** | | | | | |
| 4. White Dem. | 0.661 | 0.800 | 6 | 0.525*** | 0.714*** | 0.269* | | | | |
| 5. White Lib. | 0.465 | 0.160 | 8 | 0.466*** | 0.437** | 0.142 | 0.679*** | | | |
| 6. Non-White Dem. | 0.318 | 0.770 | 6 | 0.407*** | 0.301* | 0.715*** | 0.193 | 0.067 | | |
| 7. White Repub. | 0.286 | 0.100 | 6 | 0.236† | 0.167 | 0.171 | -0.123 | 0.074 | 0.290* | |
| 8. White Con. | 0.119 | 0.620 | 8 | 0.407** | 0.291* | 0.365* | 0.241† | 0.235 | 0.408** | 0.621*** |

Note. †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Upon first examination, it is not clear what to make of these findings. One potential clue is found in the differing average variances and year-to-year changes between the different series. The second and third columns of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show that the white Democrats and liberal series exhibit both higher degrees of average variance and year-to-year change than any other group-level series. Once again, the same statistics for the non-white Democrats and liberal series more resemble those of white Republicans and conservatives than those of white Democrats and liberals. In other words, despite the large absolute gaps between them, the attitudinal dynamics of the former are more in sync with each other than they are with white Democrats and liberals. Thus, racial attitudes may show parallel movement across most segments of the population, but this pattern somewhat diverges for white Democrats and liberals.

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 also show that variation in racial liberalism among whites as a whole is more strongly correlated with that of white liberals ($r=0.89$) and Democrats ($r=0.94$) than that of white conservatives (0.13) and Republicans (0.61). The same holds when we look at the correlations between the first-differences of these series: white Democrats ($r=0.714$, $p < 0.001$) and liberals ($r=0.437$, $p=0.002$) correlate much more strongly with whites as a whole than do white Republicans ($r=0.167$, $p=0.180$) and conservatives ($r=0.291$, $p=0.045$). This *could* suggest that shifts in white racial attitudes are disproportionately driven by the former, which would accord with the expectation that those of the latter are less responsive to shifts in the media environment.

Figures 4.15 and 4.16 below, which graph the racialism liberalism scores across time for the different subgroups, offer visual insight into some of the patterns reported above. It also affords a clearer picture of what some have termed the ‘Great Awakening’. First, with some fits and starts, we see that nearly all of the listed subgroups trended in a racially liberal direction from the mid-1970s into the mid-1990s. At around the latter point, the trend appears to stabilize for white Democrats and liberals while reversing in the conservative direction for the non-white groups, white Republicans and white conservatives. These patterns more or less persist until 2014, a year marked by a series of widely publicized police shootings, racial unrest, and BLM protests. Up to this point in time, white Democrats never scored less than 10 points lower on the index than non-white Democrats. And, with a few exceptions, white liberals never surpassed the scores of their non-white counterparts. But in 2014, the slopes of the line for both white Democrats and liberals (and, though less clearly, for Republicans and conservatives) suddenly shifts in the upward direction. Interestingly, it was not until the following year (2015) that non-white Democrats followed suit. Taken together, as non-white Democrats and white Republicans

and conservatives trended together in a racially conservative direction, the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals held steady. This, together with their somewhat sharper rate of ascent in subsequent years, allowed white Democrats to close nearly the entirety of the gap with non-white Democrats; and for white liberals to surpass and subsequently remain above the racial liberalism of non-white liberals. What accounts for the apparent divergence of white Democrats and liberals from other groups is not immediately obvious. For now, it suffices to demonstrate that the series are ‘imperfectly parallel’, which offers some justification for their differentiation.




Figure 4.15 Racial liberalism overtime among the public as a whole and for race x partisan subgroups (1954-2020)

Note. Colored lines along the y-axis represent the median for each respective group series. The percent of variance accounted for by each group index’s first dimension is in parentheses.

The question of ‘parallel publics’ aside, Figures 14 and 15 also suggest that the post-2013 era saw both the largest and quickest shift in racial attitudes on record. What is more, this upward trajectory continued through the end of the series. By 2020, white Democrats and liberals placed 24 and 26 points above their series medians, respectively; and, on the other side of the political aisle, white Republicans and conservatives placed 6 and 1 point(s) above their own. In

other words, on net, the attitudes of the latter groups have hardly moved, whereas those of the former have become unprecedentedly progressive—so much so that they now ‘compete’ with their non-white counterparts.




Figure 4.16 Racial liberalism overtime among the public as a whole and among white liberals and conservatives (1972-2020).

Note. Colored lines along the y-axis represent the median for each respective group series. The percent of variance accounted for by each group index’s first dimension is in parentheses.

But while the ‘Great Awakening’ may constitute the largest and quickest shift in racial attitudes in the current data, there have clearly been ‘mini Awakenings’ scattered across earlier periods in time. The question before us is whether and to what extent the media has driven this variation. Towards arriving at an answer, the following section introduces my measure of ‘racial equalitarian media’ coverage.

4.3.2 Measuring ‘Racial Equalitarian’ Media Messaging

In the previous chapter, I identified ‘racial equalitarian’ media as a theoretically likely trigger of ingroup critical appraisals and emotions among white Americans. Such media was characterized as that which (a) highlights status differences between black and whites

Americans, and (b) implicitly or explicitly attributes these differences to the effects of past and/or present white racism. More generally, messaging that elicits feelings of white guilt and shame should explicitly or implicitly speak to the illegitimacy of racial inequality and the advantages that whites unfairly enjoy therefrom.

When compared to the racial liberalism index, constructing a measure of the frequency at which media coverage touches on the above themes is far less exacting. The first hurdle is identifying a news archive from which to gather the data. I have opted to use ProQuest, which stores articles from a diverse array of news publications. I am limited to those whose content availability spans the temporal duration of the racial liberalism series. The largest, if only, publication that satisfies this requirement is the New York Times (NYT). As the NYT is sometimes considered to be a left-of-center newspaper, this raises potential questions of coverage representativeness; that is, the NYT's readership is disproportionately comprised of those on one side of the political spectrum. However, as one of America's largest national newspapers, its issue coverage at any given time is likely to be moderately to highly correlated with that of other publications. Kellstedt, for instance, found that his measure of egalitarian cues in Newsweek correlated at $r=0.58$ with another derived from the New York Times. Other research has established even stronger correlations between the issue coverage of the NYT and that of other newspapers (e.g. Baumgartner et al. 2008; Barabas & Jerit, 2009). Thus, we can be somewhat comfortable in treating the NYT as a rough bellwether or proxy of the news agenda as a whole. But just to be sure, I will generate the same index for other news publications and assess the strength of their relationship with the NYT.

Table 4.5 details how the articles comprising my index of 'racial equalitarian' media coverage were selected. Specifically, each of the articles tallied by my index had to include one

term (or variants thereof) from each of the four columns: they had to mention a term relating to blacks or race, a term relating to whites, a term relating to disparate outcomes, and, finally, a term relating to some form of (historical and/or persisting) mistreatment. Because it is possible that racial attitudes respond to *any* media coverage of race, I additionally create index of the volume number of NYT articles that either mentioned at least one of the terms in column 3. This will ultimately serve as a control variable for testing whether racial attitudes are indeed uniquely responsive to the themes discussed.

Table 4.5 Search terms for ‘racial equalitarian’ and race-related articles

| Index | Num. of Articles | ProQuest Search Terms (1954-2020) | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------|---|-------|--|---|
| | | | AND | AND | AND |
| Racial Equalitarian Media | 9557 | Black OR African American(s) OR Negro OR Racial | White | disparity OR gap OR inequity OR inequality OR underrepresented OR overrepresented OR disproportionate OR “more likely” OR “less likely” OR “as likely” | racism OR racist(s) OR bias OR discrimination OR prejudice OR injustice OR oppression OR slavery OR enslave OR marginalized |
| Race-related media | 625518 | Black OR African American(s) OR Negro OR Racial | | | |

Table 4.6 gives several randomly selected excerpted examples of ‘racial equalitarian’ news articles included in the index. For instance, a 2004 article titled ‘Study Says White Families Wealth Advantage Has Grown’ begins by noting the findings of a recent study, which suggested that the wealth gap between white and black (and Hispanic) families had become even larger as a consequence of recent economic recession. It then quotes a researcher who attributes this gap to a “history of discrimination”. Similarly, a 2015 article titled ‘Racial Penalties in Baltimore Mortgages’ cites a study indicating that black borrowers were charged higher rates than similarly situated whites, which is taken as evidence that “whiteness still confers ‘concrete advantages in

the accumulation of wealth’’. Consistent with my operationalization of ‘racial equalitarian’ messaging, all of these examples foreground and problematize status differences between whites and blacks while implicitly or explicitly attributing them to the effects of past and/or present discrimination.

Table 4.6 Sample of excerpted ‘racial equalitarian’ news articles in the New York Times

| <p>Study Says White Families' Wealth Advantage Has Grown October 18, 2004</p> | <p>Racial Penalties in Baltimore Mortgages May 31, 2015</p> | <p>In Treating Patients for Pain, a Racial Gap December 28, 1999</p> | <p>Health Insurance Gaps Laid to Racial Bias May 14, 1991</p> |
|---|---|---|---|
| <p>The enormous wealth gap between white families and black and Hispanic families grew larger after the most recent recession, a private analysis of government data has found.</p> <p>... White households had a median net worth of greater than \$88,000 in 2002, 11 times that of Hispanic households and more than 14 times that of black households, the Pew Hispanic Center said in the study, being released Monday.</p> <p>... "Wealth is a measure of cumulative advantage or disadvantage," said Roderick Harrison, a researcher at the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, a Washington research organization that focuses on black issues. "The fact that black and Hispanic wealth is a fraction of white wealth also reflects a history of discrimination."</p> | <p>...It found that black borrowers in Baltimore, especially those who lived in black neighborhoods, were charged higher rates and were disadvantaged at every point in the borrowing process compared with similarly situated whites.</p> <p>...Had black borrowers been treated the same as white borrowers, the authors say, their loan default rate would have been considerably lower. Instead, discrimination harmed individuals and entire neighborhoods.</p> <p>...Over the life of a 30-year loan, the researchers say, these racial disparities would cost the average black borrower an extra \$14,904 -- and \$15,948 for the average black borrower living in a black neighborhood -- as compared with white borrowers.</p> <p>...As the study notes, these facts show that whiteness still confers "concrete advantages in the</p> | <p>Black patients with broken arms or legs were less likely to be given painkillers in an Atlanta emergency room than white patients with similar injuries and complaints of pain, a new study has found.</p> <p>...Dr. Lewis R. Goldfrank, the director of emergency services at Bellevue Hospital Center in Manhattan, said the results spoke for themselves. "I think it's racism, flat out," he said. "This is a critical issue for emergency medicine and medicine in general. How can we say that we have the best medical care in the world and at the same time not be able to assure everyone -- with confidence -- that they'll get the same treatment as the next person, regardless of their skin color? This is a wake-up call to our inability to understand the needs of diverse groups of people in our society."</p> | <p>The editor of a medical journal said today that longstanding racial discrimination was one reason black and Hispanic people were slipping through ever-widening cracks of the nation's health care system.</p> <p>Inequity in access to health care in the United States, he said, is due in part to "longstanding, systematic, institutionalized racial discrimination."</p> <p>Black and Hispanic people have higher rates of unemployment than whites, and more often have low-level jobs. So, Dr. Lundberg said, they have less employment-related health insurance and are less likely to receive medical care.</p> |

| | | | |
|--|---|--|--|
| | <p>accumulation of wealth through homeownership" and that pervasive racial disadvantage continues to "undermine black socioeconomic status in the United States today."</p> | | |
|--|---|--|--|

Note. Text in bold font denotes 'racial equalitarian' search terms.

Due to the fact that volume of annual NYT articles available in ProQuest varies across time, we cannot just use indexes of the raw annual counts. Instead, we must use normalized indexes that are insensitive to such variation. Two normalization approaches are possible. The first is to divide the annual raw article counts by the total annual number of available articles. The second is to divide the annual raw article counts by the total annual number of available articles that refer to race. In the end, and after comparing the indexes derived from each of these methods, I find that the latter (i.e., racial equalitarian articles as the percent of all race-related articles) is somewhat more strongly associated with each of the racial liberalism series than the former. On these grounds, I measure the salience of racial equalitarian media in terms of its share of all race-related article, and 'race-related media' in terms of the percent of all annual NYT articles that mention either 'black(s)', 'African American(s)', 'Negro(es)', and/or 'racial'.

Figure 4.17 shows the percent of NYT articles that meet the 'racial equalitarian' search criteria between 1953-2020 and 1953-2015. I opted to graph both the complete and truncated series so as to underscore the variation that is obscured in the former. The obscuring of this variation is largely the result of unprecedented increases in the frequency of such media coverage

towards the final years of the series—a period spanning the first Trump administration and the 2020 killing of George Floyd. Consider that until 2013, the percent of annual NYT articles matching the search criteria was never above 0.2%. This ceiling was finally altered in 2013 (0.26%) and has grown in every year since. By 2019, the racial equalitarian share reached 1.1% of *all* articles before more than doubling in 2020 (2.4%). A glance at Figure 4.18 might suggest that these record-setting increases are simply a byproduct of record levels of coverage on race in general. But Figure 4.19 shows that this is not the case: the volume of racial equalitarian articles has reached record levels even when measured as the percent of all race-related articles.




Figure 4.17 ‘Racial equalitarian’ articles as the percent of all New York Times articles




Figure 4.18 Race-related articles as the percent of all New York Times articles




Figure 4.19 ‘Racial equalitarian’ articles as the percent of all race-related articles in The New York Times

But are the trends in the NYT data representative of those media coverage at large? I attempt to get at this question by examining the relationships between the NYT racial equalitarian media index and versions constructed from articles featured in ProQuest’s Los Angeles Times (LAT) and Wall Street Journal (WSJ) archives, respectively. While data for the latter two series are only available beginning in 1985 and 1984, respectively, Table 4.7 shows strong in-levels (i.e., not first-differenced) and first-differenced correlations between them and that of the NYT index. In other words, increases in racial equalitarian messaging in the NYT usually coincides with similar increases in the LAT and WSJ. We can thus tentatively conclude that the trends in the NYT data are not ‘unique’ but rather reflect genuine shifts in the national media agenda.

Table 4.7 LAT and WSJ Correlations with NYT ‘Racial Equalitarian’ Articles Indexes

| Publication | N | ‘Racial Equalitarian’ articles as percent of all articles | | ‘Racial Equalitarian’ articles as percent of all race-related articles | |
|-----------------|----|---|------------------|--|------------------|
| | | In levels | First-difference | In levels | First-difference |
| LAT (1985-2020) | 36 | 0.977*** | 0.959*** | 0.968*** | 0.898*** |
| WSJ (1984-2020) | 37 | 0.983*** | 0.945*** | 0.849*** | 0.742*** |

Note. †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

As a final check, I compare my tally of annual racial equalitarian articles in the New York Times with a close approximation⁶³ of Kellstedt’s (2003) tally of the annual number of race-related Newsweek articles that featured at least one reference to egalitarian considerations and values. Because articles related to racial discrimination and inequality feature prominently in both indexes, we would expect to observe at least some meaningful overlap in their time series. And, referring to Figure 19 below, we indeed do. The two series are moderately but significantly correlated both in levels of the data ($r=0.461$, $p=0.002$) and at their first differences ($r=0.445$, $p=0.004$). Accordingly, we can be confident that my index of racial equalitarian articles is capturing meaningful trends in race-related media coverage.

⁶³ Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain the raw data directly from the author. Instead, using an open-source tool called WebPlotDigitizer, I extracted the data from a screenshot of Kellstedt’s (2003) chart of the annual number of articles containing egalitarian cues (pg. 38). While the extracted count is unlikely to perfectly match the original count, it is nonetheless a very close approximation.




Figure 4.20 Comparison of Kellstedt's tally of Newsweek 'egalitarian cues' with author's count of racial equalitarian articles in The New York Times (1953-1994).

4.3.3 *White Racial Liberalism vs. Racial Equalitarian Media Messaging: A*

Comparison of Trends

Having introduced the racial liberalism and racial equalitarian media scales, the two series will now be visually compared. Figure 4.21 does this with the white index. The two series do appear to be strongly correlated. Of course, any two series that share an overtime trend will be strongly but often spuriously correlated. Figure 4.22 thus graphs the first-differences of each series. While not as readily discernable with the naked eye, we do see some evidence of a genuine (though not necessarily causal) relationship. Generally speaking, when the racial equalitarian share of race-related articles increases, so does white racial liberalism.




Figure 4.21 White racial liberalism and the salience of racial equalitarian media across time




Figure 4.22 Year-to-year changes in white racial liberalism and the salience of racial equalitarian media

Table 4.8 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients between the racial equalitarian media index and each racial liberalism series. In levels of the data, we see that the former is strongly correlated with (in order of magnitude) the racial liberalism series of white Democrats, white liberals, whites as a whole, the sample as a whole, and non-white Democrats. In contrast, it is correlated more weakly but still positively with the white republican series, weakly negatively with the white conservative series, and insignificantly negatively with the non-white series. The more rigorous test, though, is in the 'First-difference' column. Here we see that only year-to-year changes in the racial liberalism series for the sample ($p=0.060$), whites ($p=0.013$), white Democrats ($p=0.043$), and white liberals ($p=0.088$) are at least marginally significantly ($p < 0.1$) correlated with year-to-year changes in racial equalitarian media coverage. Such *could* be interpreted as preliminary support for H7B, which predicted that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals would be more responsive to shifts in the frequency of racial equalitarian media than their Republican and conservative counterparts.

Table 4.8 Correlations between racial liberalism and racial equalitarian media series

| Racial Liberalism | N | In levels | First-difference |
|--------------------|----|-----------|------------------|
| Sample | 66 | 0.755*** | 0.234† |
| White | | 0.778*** | 0.305* |
| Non-White | | -0.058 | 0.069 |
| White Democrat | | 0.847*** | 0.252* |
| Non-White Democrat | | 0.609*** | 0.098 |
| White Republican | | 0.342** | -0.008 |
| White Liberal | 49 | 0.818*** | 0.251† |
| White Conservative | | -0.294* | 0.189 |

Note. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

4.4 Control Variables

If it can be established that shifts in racial attitudes follow shifts in the availability of racial equalitarian media messaging, the question then becomes whether this relationship is genuine or confounded by other variables. There are several theoretically plausible confounds, some of which were identified and tested in Kellstedt (2000, 2003). But even assuming the media independently influences racial attitudes, another question is how this influence compares to that of other attitudinally-relevant variables. The sections that follow review the covariates that will join our models of racial liberalism.

4.4.1 Non-Racial Policy Liberalism

What if increases in racial liberalism are epiphenomenal to a more general shift in public policy liberalism? In other words, because liberal racial policies entail greater government intervention on matters of race, increased support for such policies may simply reflect greater public acceptance of government intervention in general. In fact, Stimson's (2018) index of aggregate public policy mood includes several items that measure support for pro-black affirmative action and race-targeted government assistance. It is thus important that we include a measure of general public policy liberalism, without racial policy items, as a control variable. One way of doing so is to simply recompute Stimson's publicly available Policy Mood index while excluding race-related items. The problem is that the underlying data is at the sample level; i.e. item response ratios are not disaggregated by race or political orientation. We would thus be regressing each group-specific racial liberalism series on a group-general policy liberalism variable, which—unless the latter is group-invariant across time—could bias our results.

A better and more consistent solution, which I have opted to pursue, is to turn to some of Stimson's original data sources and generate group-specific policy mood variables. Specifically, using data from the General Social Survey (1972-2018), American National Elections Study (1956-2016), Pew American Values Survey (1987-2012), Cooperative Congressional Election Study (2014-2019), and the Democracy Fund's Voter Study Group (2011-2019), I create corresponding general policy mood series for each group racial liberalism series. Constituent items include preferred levels of government spending across the universe of non-racial policy domains; general preferences over the extent of government services; attitudes towards the government's responsibility for reducing income inequality, guaranteeing jobs, and caring for the needy; and general preferences about the size and scope of the federal government⁶⁴.

Figure 4.23 compares the resulting non-racial policy liberalism index for the sample series to Stimson's estimates of Public Policy Mood. Overall, and despite the former's use of different data sources, the two series appear to show a reasonable level of correspondence ($r=0.663$, $p < 0.001$; r first difference= 0.397 , $p=0.001$). Figure 4.24 adds the non-racial policy liberalism series for white Democrats and Republicans, while Table 9 shows the intercorrelations across all four both in levels of the data and at their first differences. All told, and to varying degrees, all four series are moderately to strongly intercorrelated. We can thus be confident that the non-racial policy liberal series are capturing the same latent sentiment as Stimson's index.

⁶⁴ The entire list of items, including their factor loadings, can be found in Appendix A.2.




Figure 4.23 Comparison of author’s non-racial policy liberalism index and Stimson’s index of public policy mood




Figure 4.24 Comparison of author’s non-racial policy liberalism indexes and Stimson’s index of public policy mood

Table 4.9 Correlations between author’s non-racial policy index (NRPL) and Stimson’s index of public policy mood

| | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------------|-----------|------------------|-----------|------------------|
| | In Levels | First Difference | In Levels | First Difference | In Levels | First Difference |
| 1. Stimson Index | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2. Sample NRPL | 0.663*** | 0.397** | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 3. White Democrats NRPL | 0.819*** | 0.428*** | 0.721*** | 0.757*** | --- | --- |
| 4. White Republican NRPL | 0.436*** | 0.407** | 0.895*** | 0.795*** | 0.390** | 0.576*** |

Note. †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

4.4.2 Generational Replacement

Increased in racial liberalism could be the result of younger and more liberal generations replacing those older and more conservative. For instance, Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo (1997; chapter 4) argue that the socializing contexts in which people come of age strongly shapes their racial attitudes. Those who were born and grew up prior to the Civil Rights era, when prejudicial attitudes against blacks were the norm and (in the South) enshrined in state institutions, are generally found to be more racially conservative than those born after. Kellstedt (2000) controls for this cohort effect by counting the proportion of the adult population that turned 18 during or after 1963. However, his data runs only to 1993, when the oldest respondent in this cohort would have been 48 (born 1945) and the youngest respondent 18 (born 1975). The current data runs through 2020, which means that later samples will increasingly include ‘Millennial’ and, if to a lesser extent, ‘Gen-Z’ respondents. Grouping respondents from these cohorts with their ‘Baby Boomer’ and ‘Gen-X’ predecessors implicitly assumes that there are no meaningful differences in the racial attitudes of the older vs. younger post-Civil Rights generations. Given the unlikelihood of this proposition, my measure⁶⁵ of generational replacement counts population proportions for each birth cohort, beginning with the ‘Lost Generation’ (1883-1900) and ending with the oldest members of Generation Z⁶⁶ (1997-2001). I then combined the Gen-X with the Baby Boomer variable and the Gen-Z with the Millennial variable.

I did this for three reasons. First, to include all but one generation variable in a regression model would have induced unreasonably high levels of multicollinearity (because shifts in one

⁶⁵ For comparison, I also re-create Kellstedt’s generational replacement variable, which estimates the proportion of respondents born in and after 1945.

⁶⁶ Technically, Gen-Z is said to run through 2012. But any person born after 2001 would still be too young (and too few in number) to be included in the samples underlying the final years of the racial attitudes data.

almost always co-occur with shifts in others), which could render parameter estimates unstable and complicate hypothesis testing. Second, the Gen-Z variable includes too few respondents to stand on its own. Finally, when it comes to racial attitudes, the Baby Boomer and Gen-X cohorts are more similar to each other than they are to Millennial and Gen-Z (and vice versa; DeSante & Smith, 2020).

The resulting estimates, which were computed for each of the populations under study, were derived from two different data sources. For all political groups, I use the American National Election Study (ANES), which has data for age, party, and race from 1948-2016, and for ideology from 1972-2016. For the sample and race-only groups, I use data from the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey⁶⁷ (CPS; 1961-2019). As the former survey is not conducted on an annual basis, values are interpolated for missing years.

4.4.3 Consumer Optimism

Perhaps variation in racially liberal attitudes are a function of economic optimism. For instance, Durr (1993) argues that as perceptions of economic conditions shift in the positive (negative) direction, the public becomes more (less) willing to pay bankroll liberal social policies. Like Kellstedt (2000), I control for this possibility with the University of Michigan's time series of consumer expectations. For this variable, data is available for all the years of the racial liberalism series (1954-2020).

⁶⁷ My reason for using a separate data source for the sample and race-only generation variables is to keep missing value interpolation to the minimum. Unlike the ANES, the CPS has been conducted annually since 1961. Given the choice between using estimated vs. observed values, the latter is always preferable. That being said, I tested data from both sources and found that the CPS estimates better fit the models. However, it also should be noted that using one over the other does not substantively alter the general pattern of results.

4.4.4 Racial Policy Output

As suggested in the work of Wlezien (1995), it is possible that racial attitudes respond ‘thermostatically’ to the racial policy status quo. That is, when racial policy becomes more liberal, it ultimately produces a conservative backlash, which elected representatives respond to by cutting regulations and spending for Civil Rights agencies. Conversely, when racial policy moves in the conservative direction, the public is more likely to see merit in enacting racially liberal policies. Similar to Kellstedt (2000), I account for this possibility with a rough index of racial policy spending. Specifically, I measure annual budgetary allocations for six main anti-discrimination agencies as the proportion of all expenditures. These six agencies are the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (1958-2020), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1965-2020), the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Education (1965-2020), the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Program in the Department of Labor (1966-2020), the Office of Civil in the Department of Health and Human Services (1978-2020), and the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity in Housing and Urban Development (1969-2020). Values for years preceding the existence of these agencies are coded as 0. To generate an aggregate index, I first standardized and then averaged the values across agencies. The series for the resulting variable is shown in Figure 24 below.




Figure 4.25 Index of federal spending on civil rights enforcement

4.4.5 Educational Attainment

Overtime increases in racial liberalism could stem (at least in part) from overtime increases in educational attainment. One of the more important findings of Sniderman and Piazza's (1993) study of white racial attitudes was the positive effect of education on racial tolerance and policy liberalism. Gomez and Wilson (2006) similarly link greater education to structural (vs. individual-level) attributions for racial inequality. One interpretation of such findings is that education tends to promote egalitarian values, exposure to and tolerance for racial/ethnic, diversity, and higher-order cognitive skills that facilitate more sophisticated causal attributions of racial inequality. Another interpretation is that education enhances awareness of social norms, which, in turn, encourages people to give politically correct, if dishonest, responses to race-related survey questions. Whatever the case, the possibility that increases in educational attainment effect increases in both racial liberalism (or at least racially liberal responding) and also in the demand for or in the output of racial equalitarian media cannot be excluded. I thus

control for this potential influence using data on educational attainment from the ANES⁶⁸.

Specifically, and for each population group, I calculate the percent of respondents with at least a BA degree. Values for missing years are again interpolated.

4.4.6 Non-White Controls

Any time series analysis of ‘non-white’ attitudes has to contend with the fact that the racial/ethnic constitution of this category has changed markedly since the immigration reform laws of 1965 and after. Whereas blacks may have comprised the overwhelming majority of non-white survey respondents in the 1960s and 70s, this predominance has steadily eroded ever since. This poses obvious problems for statistical inference in that what may appear as ‘declines’ in non-white racial liberalism may actually be due to increases in representation of non-black racial/ethnic minorities whose racial attitudes are more conservative. Aside from gathering data for specific or all racial/ethnic groups, the only recourse this leaves us is to try to statistically control for the changing composition of the non-white population. I attempt to do so with data from the CPS, which has measured racial identification in some form since 1961. Specifically, I create variable that stores the black share of the non-white population for each year between 1961-2019. I then interpolate missing values for the years spanning 1954-1960.

Another potential source of error in using data from aggregate ‘non-white’ respondents is the overtime sorting of non-whites into the Democratic Party⁶⁹. If non-whites increasingly

⁶⁸ The choice of using the ANES rather than the CPS data rests on the disharmony of the latter’s measure of education. Specifically, until 1992, the CPS asked respondents to indicate their highest year of school attendance. Thereafter, it asked respondents to report their highest *completed* level (or degree) of schooling. While the CPS dataset features a harmonized variable that combines the two versions, there are still major discontinuities in the data that I wasn’t able to resolve.

⁶⁹ At this point, one may reasonably ask why I am only including such controls for non-whites. In the first case, it would seem appropriate to also control for the white proportion of the US in the white models. For perhaps steadily increasing exposure to racial/ethnic diversity has a liberalizing effect on white racial attitudes. In the second case, whites themselves have sorted into the Republican party; so why not also control for the proportion of whites who identify as either Republican or Democrat? The simple answer to both of these questions is that I actually initially tested such variables in models of white racial liberalism and, to my surprise, observed that—across all

identify as Democrats, they are likely to increasingly adopt—if they do not already hold--the party's position on race. To account for this possibility, I use data from the ANES to create a variable that stores the proportion of non-whites that identify as Democrats in each survey year between 1956-2016. Values for missing years are interpolated.

4.5 Methodology

The first step in my analysis is to determine the causal order that best fits the data. On this count, my hypothesis predicts that shifts in racial attitudes will temporally follow shifts in racial equalitarian news media. To assess whether this is indeed the case, my analysis begins with separate⁷⁰ two-variable granger causality tests for each racial series (white, non-white) and each of the race x party and white x ideology series. Granger causality tests examine whether the previous values of one variable significantly improve estimates of subsequent values of another net of its previous values (Freeman, 1983). An important and often prohibitive assumption of these tests is that of series stationarity. Simply put, variables are assumed to have time-invariant means, variances, and autocorrelation structures. Failure to meet this requirement can result in spurious relationships.

In the case of the current data, the time series graphs included earlier hardly depict a pattern of stationarity. In fact, they show the presence of structural breaks or durable shifts in series' means. The results of several different unit root tests⁷¹, which are summarized in Table

specifications—they contributed nothing in terms of error reduction. To the contrary, models that include them fit the data much more poorly than models that don't. Nor do these variables accounted for any of the effects of racial equalitarian media on white racial liberalism. For whatever reason, and as will be shown below, this wasn't the case for models of non-white racial liberalism, in which such variables resulted in significant reductions in error. Nevertheless, for transparency sake, I provide a regression table of models of white racial liberalism specified with these controls in Appendix A.3.

⁷⁰ Separate tests are conducted out of concern for multicollinearity. Especially given the relatively small size of the current dataset, the entry of multiple variables and lags could result in high intercorrelations that bias tests of the null hypothesis (For more on this issue, see Mansson, Shukar, & Sjolander, 2014).

⁷¹ The full results for each test can be found in Appendix A.4-A.7.

4.10, confirm this visual inspection. With one exception (non-white racial liberalism in the ADF), the null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be rejected for any of our variables in levels of the data. However, most of the tests were not designed to test for stationarity in the presence of structural breaks. A consequence of this is that these tests are likely to be biased in favor of not rejecting the null hypothesis. To correct for this, Clemente, Montanes, and Reyes (1998) developed tests of stationarity in the presence of either one or two structural breaks. The results of these tests (for two structural breaks) are presented in the bottom-right corner of Table 4.10. They generally converge with those of others. Specifically, none of the variables are consistent with the hypothesis of stationarity in levels of the data. At first difference, this hypothesis can be rejected for non-white Democrats and white Republicans, but not for any other series. With the exception of the non-white series, which requires a 3rd difference to reach stationarity, all of the remaining series achieve stationarity at second difference.

Table 4.10 Summary of unit root test results

| | Augmented Dicky-Filler | | | | Phillips-Perron | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | At Level | 1st Diff. | 2 nd Diff. | 3 rd Diff. | At Level | 1st Diff. | 2 nd Diff. | 3 rd Diff. |
| Sample | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | S | --- | --- |
| Non-White | S | --- | --- | --- | NS | S | --- | --- |
| White | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | S | --- | --- |
| White Democrats | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | S | --- | --- |
| Non-White Democrats | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | S | --- | --- |
| White Republican | NS | I | S | --- | NS | S | --- | --- |
| White Liberal | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | S | --- | --- |
| White Conservative | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | S | --- | --- |
| Racial Equalitarian Media | NS | NS | I | S | NS | I | S | --- |
| | Kwiatowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin | | | | Clemente, Montanes, Reyes | | | |
| Sample | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | NS | S | --- |
| Non-White | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | NS | NS | S |
| White | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | NS | S | --- |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|----|----|-----|-----|----|----|-----|-----|
| White Democrats | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | NS | S | --- |
| Non-White Democrats | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | S | --- | --- |
| White Republican | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | S | --- | --- |
| White Liberal | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | NS | S | --- |
| White Conservative | NS | S | --- | --- | NS | NS | S | --- |
| Racial Equalitarian Media | NS | NS | S | --- | NS | NS | S | --- |

Note. NS=Non-stationary, S=Stationary, I=Inconclusive. 'Inconclusive' refers to cases wherein test results indicate stationarity at some but not all lag lengths. Lag lengths were determined on the basis of selection statistics (AIC, SBIC, HQIC etc.). Where statistics failed to converge on a single lag length, multiple lag lengths were tested.

Table 11 summarizes the consistency of results across the four unit root tests in terms of their suggested order of integration. Three of the four tests indicate that the sample, white, white Democrat, non-white Democrat, white Republican, white liberal, and white conservative series are integrated of order 1, while the remaining test supports integration of order 2. The results for the non-white series is more conflicting. One test supports stationarity in levels of the data, another (specifically, the Clemente, Montanes, and Reyes test) at 3rd difference, and the remaining two point to stationarity at first difference.

Table 4.11 Consistency in unit root test results

| Order of integration | Sample | Non-White | White | White Dem. | Non-White Dem. | White Repub. | White Lib. | White Con. | REM |
|----------------------|--------|-----------|-------|------------|----------------|--------------|------------|------------|-----|
| I(0) | 0/4 | 1/4 | 0/4 | 0/4 | 0/4 | 0/4 | 0/4 | 0/4 | 0/4 |
| I(1) | 3/4 | 2/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 0/4 |
| I(2) | 1/4 | 0/4 | 1/4 | 1/4 | 1/4 | 1/4 | 1/4 | 1/4 | 3/4 |
| I(3) | --- | 1/4 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1/4 |

Note. REM=Racial Equalitarian Media

Determining the order integration is important for conducting the robustness check that will follow the conventional granger tests. Specifically, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) propose a procedure for testing granger (non-)causality in the context of non-stationary data. After determining the maximum lag length p on the basis of information criteria (AIC, SIC etc.), this

procedure calls for adding m exogenous lags of each variable in a VAR model in the levels of the data, where m is defined as the maximum order of integration for the group of variables⁷². Thus, if one variable is $I(1)$ and another is $I(2)$, we would include 2 exogenous lags for each variable in each equation. If, for example, the information criteria suggest a lag length of 4, the 5th and 6th lags of each variable are added to the exogenous part of the VAR model. Finally, a Wald test is used to test whether (only) lags p are equal to 0 in each equation. Rejection of the null signifies rejection of Granger non-causality.

Table 4.12 shows the lag lengths suggested by various information criteria for each ‘racial liberalism + REM’ equation⁷³. For the sample, non-white, non-white Democrats, and white conservative equations, all but one of the diagnostics (the likelihood ratio test) recommend a lag length of 1. For the remaining equations, the results are split: the HQIC and SBIC recommend a lag length of 1, while the FPE and AIC point to lengths of (depending on the series) 3 to 5 lags. In light of this dissensus, and as a check of robustness, I will test whether the results cohere across differing lag orders.

Table 4.12 Lag lengths suggested by various selection statistics

| Variables | LR | FPE | AIC | HQIC | SBIC |
|---------------------------|----|-----|-----|------|------|
| Sample + REM | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Non-White + REM | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| White + REM | 8 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| White Democrats + REM | 8 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Non-White Democrats + REM | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| White Republican + REM | 7 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| White Liberal + REM | 4 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 |

⁷² In the presence of non-stationary data, the Wald test statistic does not follow its usual asymptotic χ^2 under the null hypothesis. The addition of m exogenous lags serves to correct for this.

⁷³ Kellstedt’s (2000) Granger analyses used two lags, though he offered no explicit justification for doing so.

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| White Conservative + REM | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
|--------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|

Note. Maximum lag length is set to 10. LR=Likelihood Ratio, FPE=Final Prediction Error, AIC=Akaike's Information Criterion, HQIC=Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion, SBIC=Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criterion, REM=Racial Equalitarian Media.

4.6 Results (Part 1)

Table 13 presents the results of these tests for the sample overall and the two racial series. First, we see that the pattern of results for the sample and white equations are remarkably similar. We find strong evidence that, regardless of lag length, racial equalitarian media (REM) granger-causes sample (1 lag: $p=0.001$) and white racial liberalism (1 lag: $p = 0.001$; 5 lags: $p=0.019$) but no evidence that sample (1 lag: $p=0.852$) and white racial liberalism (1 lag: $p=0.893$; 5 lags: $p=0.211$) drives racial equalitarian media. In stark contrast, and irrespective of lag length, we find no evidence that REM granger-causes non-white racial liberalism (1 lag: $p=0.180$), nor any evidence that non-white racial liberalism granger-causes REM ($p=0.702$).

Table 4.13 Granger test results for sample and racial group series (1954-2020)

| | | Sample | | White | | Non-White | |
|---------------------|------------|----------------------|-------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | Endogenous Variables | | | | | |
| Exogenous Variables | Lag length | RL | REM | RL | REM | RL | REM |
| REM | 1 | 0.001 | --- | 0.001 | --- | 0.180 | --- |
| | 2 | 0.002 | --- | 0.002 | --- | 0.704 | --- |
| | 3 | 0.007 | --- | 0.009 | --- | 0.752 | --- |
| | 4 | 0.014 | --- | 0.012 | --- | 0.279 | --- |
| | 5 | 0.024 | --- | 0.019 | --- | 0.297 | --- |
| RL | 1 | --- | 0.852 | --- | 0.893 | --- | 0.702 |
| | 2 | --- | 0.828 | --- | 0.226 | --- | 0.952 |
| | 3 | --- | 0.999 | --- | 0.417 | --- | 0.921 |
| | 4 | --- | 0.454 | --- | 0.192 | --- | 0.821 |
| | 5 | --- | 0.716 | --- | 0.211 | --- | 0.885 |

Note. N=66 for all equations. Cell entries are p-values from Wald tests. P-values in bold font represent those derived at lag length(s) suggested by different selection statistics. REM=Racial Equalitarian Media, RL=Racial Liberalism.

Table 4.14 presents the results for the race x party and ideology series, respectively.

Starting with the equations for white Democrats, we see clear evidence that the REM variable

granger-causes racial liberalism at both suggested lag lengths (1 lag: $p < 0.001$; 3 lags: $p=0.006$) but no evidence that racial liberalism drives REM (1 lag: $p=0.697$; 3 lags: $p=0.500$). The pattern of results for non-white Democrats is virtually identical. They suggest that the REM granger-causes non-white Democrats racial liberalism (1 lag: $p < 0.001$), but not the inverse (1 lag: $p=0.533$). Turning to the white Republican equations, the results become more equivocal. Evidence for joint causation is found at nearly all lag lengths. Thus, unlike the case of white Democrats, the data is not clearly consistent with a unidirectional causal relationship running from REM (1 lag: $p=0.028$; 5 lags: $p=0.001$) to racial attitudes (1 lag: $p=0.047$; 5 lags: $p=0.032$). Instead, the data suggests that the relationship is generally reciprocal for white Republicans.

Table 1: Granger test results for racial group x party/ideology series (1954-2020)

| | | White Democrats | | Non-White Democrats | | White Republican | | White Liberal | | White Conservative | |
|----------------------|------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------------|--------------|
| Endogenous Variables | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Exogenous Variables | Lags | RL | REM | RL | REM | RL | REM | RL | REM | RL | REM |
| REM | 1 | 0.000 | --- | 0.000 | --- | 0.028 | --- | 0.000 | --- | 0.173 | --- |
| | 2 | 0.002 | --- | 0.001 | --- | 0.077 | --- | 0.011 | --- | 0.301 | --- |
| | 3 | 0.006 | --- | 0.002 | --- | 0.042 | --- | 0.024 | --- | 0.741 | --- |
| | 4 | 0.010 | --- | 0.004 | --- | 0.063 | --- | 0.028 | --- | 0.880 | --- |
| | 5 | 0.010 | --- | 0.006 | --- | 0.001 | --- | 0.008 | --- | 0.790 | --- |
| RL | 1 | --- | 0.697 | --- | 0.533 | --- | 0.047 | --- | 0.893 | --- | 0.647 |
| | 2 | --- | 0.558 | --- | 0.477 | --- | 0.026 | --- | 0.140 | --- | 0.645 |
| | 3 | --- | 0.500 | --- | 0.848 | --- | 0.120 | --- | 0.083 | --- | 0.651 |
| | 4 | --- | 0.321 | --- | 0.128 | --- | 0.009 | --- | 0.354 | --- | 0.180 |
| | 5 | --- | 0.386 | --- | 0.265 | --- | 0.032 | --- | 0.539 | --- | 0.221 |
| N | | 67 | | | | | | 49 | | | |

Note. Cell entries are p-values from Wald tests. P-values in bold font represent those derived at lag length(s) suggested by different selection statistics. REM=Racial Equalitarian Media, RL=Racial Liberalism.

Although spanning a shorter time period, the results for the white liberal equations largely mirror those of white Democrats. We see clear evidence that REM (1 lag: $p < 0.001$; 4 lags: $p=0.028$) granger-causes white liberal racial liberalism, but no evidence for the inverse relationship (1 lag: $p=0.893$; 4 lags: $p=0.354$). In contrast, the results of the equations for white

conservatives do not resemble those of white Republicans. In fact, we see no evidence that REM (1 lag: $p=0.173$) and white conservative racial liberalism (1 lag: $p=0.647$) are causally related in any direction at any of the 5 lag lengths.

Thus far the results have wholly accorded with expectations. We observed clear evidence that movement in white racial liberalism proceeds movement in REM. Moreover, we also uncovered some evidence that this pattern is unique to non-white Democrats, white Democrats and white liberals. But can we trust these results? Because all our variables non-stationary, there is a reasonable possibility that they are spurious. Accordingly, and as mentioned earlier, I assess the robustness of these results with Toda and Yamamoto's (1995) procedure for testing granger non-causality in the presence of non-stationary data. The battery of unit root tests conducted earlier indicated that nearly all of the racial liberalism series were integrated to either order 1 or 2, while the REM variable was integrated to order 2. With this ordering, the Toda and Yamamoto procedure would call for the inclusion of two additional lags for each (in levels) variable in the exogenous component of each equation.

Table 4.15 displays the results of the Toda Yamamoto test for the sample, white and non-white equations. With the addition of 2 exogenous lags, neither REM (1 lag: $p=0.111$) nor sample racial liberalism (1 lag: $p=0.957$) are significantly granger-causal at the suggested lag length. However, and turning to the equation for whites, the results once again indicate—if less clearly—that REM granger-causes white racial liberalism (1 lag: $p=0.046$; 5 lags: $p=0.043$), but not the inverse (1 lag: $p=0.352$; 5 lags: $p=0.512$), at both of the suggested lag lengths. Finally, and replicating the pattern of results observed earlier, we see that the effects of REM on non-white racial liberalism (and vice versa) are indistinguishable from 0 across all five lag lengths.

Thus, with the exception of the sample equation, these results generally accord with those from the conventional granger tests.

Table 4.15 Toda and Yamamoto test results for sample and racial group series (1954-2020)

| | | Sample | White | | Non-White | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | Endogenous Variables | | | | | |
| Exogenous Variables | Endogenous Lags (p) | RL | REM | RL | REM | RL | REM |
| REM | 1 | 0.111 | | 0.046 | --- | 0.428 | --- |
| | 2 | 0.061 | | 0.128 | --- | 0.208 | --- |
| | 3 | 0.081 | | 0.148 | --- | 0.156 | --- |
| | 4 | 0.117 | | 0.098 | --- | 0.166 | --- |
| | 5 | 0.042 | | 0.043 | --- | 0.143 | |
| RL | 1 | | 0.957 | --- | 0.352 | --- | 0.592 |
| | 2 | | 0.993 | --- | 0.237 | --- | 0.707 |
| | 3 | | 0.734 | --- | 0.402 | --- | 0.778 |
| | 4 | | 0.945 | --- | 0.627 | --- | 0.918 |
| | 5 | | 0.886 | --- | 0.512 | --- | 0.643 |

Note. N=67 for all equations. Cell entries are p-values from Wald tests. P-values in bold font represent those derived at lag length(s) suggested by different selection statistics. Two lags are added to the exogenous part of each equation. REM=Racial Equalitarian Media, RL=Racial Liberalism.

Moving to the results for the race x party and ideology equations (Table 16), we once again find that REM granger-causes white Democrats racial liberalism (1 lag: $p=0.007$; 3 lags: $p=0.009$) at both suggested lag lengths, while observing no evidence for causality in the inverse direction (1 lag: $p=0.945$; 3 lags: $p=0.528$). Turning to non-white Democrats, the results are generally at odds with those reported earlier. At the lag length suggested by nearly all of the selection statistics, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effects of REM on non-white Democrats racial liberalism are equal to 0 (1 lag: $p=0.149$). Nor can we reject it for the inverse of this relationship (1 lag: $p=0.617$). It's only when the lag length is set to 4 or 5 that we can finally do so for the former (4 lags: $p=0.004$; 5 lags: $p < 0.001$), but not the latter (4 lags: $p=0.915$; 5 lags: $p=0.816$) relationship. As with non-white Democrats, the results for the white republican equations also diverge from those obtained under the conventional granger tests. Before we observed a pattern suggestive of joint causation. Under the current tests, though, we see that this pattern has disappeared. At the first of the two suggested lag lengths, the effects of

REM (1 lag: $p=0.065$) on white Republican racial liberalism approach but fall short of significance at the 95% level, while the effects of the latter (1 lag: $p=0.336$) do not come close to reaching significance at this threshold. At the second of the two suggested lag lengths, though, the REM's effects (5 lags: $p=0.016$) on white Republican racial liberalism are distinguishable from 0, while the latter's effects (5 lags: $p=0.154$) on REM are not.

Table 4.16 Toda and Yamamoto test results for the racial group x party/ideology series (1954-2020)

| | | White Democrats | | Non-White Democrats | | White Republican | | White Liberal | | White Conservative | |
|---------------------|--------|----------------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------------|--------------|
| | | Endogenous Variables | | | | | | | | | |
| Exogenous Variables | P Lags | RL | REM | RL | REM | RL | REM | RL | REM | RL | REM |
| REM | 1 | 0.007 | --- | 0.149 | --- | 0.065 | --- | 0.034 | --- | 0.835 | --- |
| | 2 | 0.009 | --- | 0.283 | --- | 0.239 | --- | 0.029 | --- | 0.708 | --- |
| | 3 | 0.009 | --- | 0.158 | --- | 0.136 | --- | 0.005 | --- | 0.946 | --- |
| | 4 | 0.012 | --- | 0.006 | --- | 0.197 | --- | 0.006 | --- | 0.901 | --- |
| | 5 | 0.011 | --- | 0.000 | --- | 0.016 | --- | 0.003 | | 0.895 | |
| RL | 1 | --- | 0.945 | --- | 0.617 | --- | 0.336 | --- | 0.163 | --- | 0.372 |
| | 2 | --- | 0.420 | --- | 0.552 | --- | 0.758 | --- | 0.140 | --- | 0.721 |
| | 3 | --- | 0.528 | --- | 0.781 | --- | 0.570 | --- | 0.339 | --- | 0.227 |
| | 4 | --- | 0.628 | --- | 0.915 | --- | 0.171 | --- | 0.545 | --- | 0.438 |
| | 5 | --- | 0.350 | | 0.816 | | 0.154 | | 0.325 | | 0.090 |
| N | | 67 | | | | | | 49 | | | |

Note. Cell entries are p-values from Wald tests. P-values in bold font represent those derived at length(s) suggested by different selection statistics. Two lags are added to the exogenous part of each equation. REM=Racial Equalitarian Media, RL=Racial Liberalism.

Finally, the pattern of results for the white liberal and conservative equations is generally the same as that obtained in the conventional Granger models. Once again, and regardless of lag length, we see that REM granger-causes white liberal racial liberalism (1 lag: $p=0.034$; 4 lags: $p=0.006$) but observe no evidence that white liberal racial liberalism granger-causes REM (1 lag: $p=0.163$; 4 lags: $p=0.545$). Turning to the white conservative equations, we again find no evidence that either of the variables are granger-causal at any lag length.

4.6.1 Preliminary Discussion

The results thus far largely accord with earlier predictions. First, we observed evidence that variation in white (but not non-white) racial liberalism temporally proceeds variation in the proportion of annual race-related news articles that speak to black-white status differences in terms of racial bias and injustice (i.e., REM). This pattern persisted when adjusting for the non-stationarity of the data. Second, and as also predicted, we consistently found that movement in white Democrats and white liberal racial liberalism temporally followed movement REM. This was the case across all lag specifications both before and after adjusting for non-stationarity. On the other hand, the results for white Republicans were more equivocal, while those for white conservatives showed no evidence of significant granger effects in any equation. In the case of the former, we initially observed a pattern of joint causation such that white Republican racial liberalism was both granger-caused by and also granger-caused variation in REM. Adjusting for non-stationarity overturned this pattern. The effects of REM on white Republican racial liberalism either approached or reached significance at the two suggested lag lengths, while the effects of the latter on the former were consistently indistinguishable from 0. *some* evidence of a causal relationship running from REM to white republican racial liberalism was found at a lag length of 1, where the effects of the former on the latter were significant at the $p < 0.1$ level. But whether these ‘marginally significant’ effects are genuine or simply random noise is unclear. For white conservatives, though, the results were clear. As expected, in none of the equations nor at any of the lag lengths did REM significantly granger-cause racial liberalism (and vice versa).

If, as the results suggest, REM drives white racial liberalism, the next question is whether this effect is substantively meaningful both in and of itself and in relation to that of other

variables. First, it is possible that the relationship itself is confounded by other variables that explain both variation in racial attitudes and in REM. Second, even if the effects of media on racial attitudes are unique, they may be paltry and/or dwarfed by the effects of other variables. Like Kellstedt (2000), I attempt to address these questions with a series of lagged dependent variable models⁷⁴. In the analyses that follow, the dependent variables are the racial liberalism series for the sample as a whole and for each subpopulation. A lagged racial liberalism variable is included as a covariate to control for the effects of previous lags of exogenous variables that are left out of the model. As detailed earlier, the exogenous variables include the percent of annual NYT articles that refer to black people or mention the term ‘racial’, the proportion of Baby Boomer/Gen-X and Millennial/Gen-Z respondents, the percent of respondents with at least a BA degree, federal spending on civil rights agencies, consumer optimism, and (non-racial) public policy liberalism.

4.7 Results (Part 2)

The granger test results provided some but ultimately ambiguous evidence that REM drives shifts in the racial liberalism of the sample as a whole, clear evidence that it drives drifts in racial liberalism among whites, and no evidence that it causes shifts in racial liberalism among non-whites. The results⁷⁵ of the dynamic regression model⁷⁶ for sample racial liberalism are shown in Table 4.17. Those in column (a) indicate that REM remains a significant ($p < 0.001$)

⁷⁴ In light of the non-stationarity of some of the variables, a dynamic regression model could output spurious results in the absence of at least some cointegration. Fortunately, the residuals of all the models below are stationary. The ADF test statistics all exceed the 0.05% critical values suggested by MacKinnon (1990, 2010). Engle-Granger tests were additionally run and the null hypothesis of no cointegration was rejected for all models.

⁷⁵ Because data for non-racial policy liberalism was not available for the years 1954, 1955, and (at the time of this writing) 2020, all model results are limited to the 1956-2019 period. While this entails a loss of three observations, it helps to ensure that estimates are comparable across models.

⁷⁶ Neither the Breusch-Godfrey nor the Durbin h test indicated the presence of serial correlation in any of the models.

predictor of racial liberalism net of the previous year's racial liberalism. Specifically, a standard deviation (SD) increase (+0.92 percentage points) in the racial equalitarian share of race-related articles is expected to produce a 0.259SD rise (+1.39 points) in sample racial liberalism. To be clear, these are only the *immediate* or short-run effects. The coefficient on the lagged racial liberalism indicates that roughly 76% of these immediate effects persists into the following period. Interestingly, and turning to column (b), controlling for the share of all NYT articles that refer to blacks or race enlarges the magnitude of the immediate effects by roughly 74% ($\beta=0.451$; $p < 0.001$), which amounts to a more 2.4-point increase on the racial liberalism index. Also of note, the coefficient for the race-related articles variable is both significantly negative and less than half the size ($\beta=-0.204$; $p=0.028$) of that of REM. This suggests that, once the influence of REM articles is removed, race-related media actually has a *negative* effect on sample racial liberalism⁷⁷. More importantly, it suggests that sample racial liberalism doesn't respond to the volume of race-related news content in general, but rather to the frequency at which the media discusses black-white status differences in terms of racial discrimination and injustice.

Column (c) adds the two generational cohort variables. Such leads to a very modest reduction in the effects of REM ($\beta=0.442$, $p < 0.001$) which remain a significantly positive predictor of sample racial liberalism. Column (d) controls for higher educational attainment, which, in addition to boosting model fit (Adjusted $R^2=0.892$), considerably enhances the significant positive effects ($\beta=0.531$, $p < 0.001$) of REM on racial liberalism. These effects are moderated, but remain both sizeable and significant ($\beta=0.448$; $p < 0.001$), after the remaining control variables are added in column (e). Specifically, and in terms of the metric of the

⁷⁷ This is similar to what was observed in Kellstedt (2000), which found that the number of Newsweek stories on race had a negative (but statistically insignificant) effect on racial policy liberalism.

dependent variable, holding all other predictors constant, a standard deviation increase in REM predicts a roughly 2.4-point increase in sample racial liberalism. The results of a likelihood ratio test also indicate that a model excluding the REM variable would see a significant reduction ($p < 0.001$) in overall model fit. Although the effects of the two generational replacement ($\beta_{\text{Boomers/GenX}} = -0.984$, $p < 0.001$; $\beta_{\text{Millennials/GenZ}} = -0.900$, $p < 0.001$) and educational attainment ($\beta = 1.59$, $p < 0.001$) variables are larger in size, REM continues to account for variation in racial liberalism is noteworthy.

Table 4.17 The determinants of sample racial liberalism (1956-2019)

| | Sample | | | | |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) |
| Racial Liberalism (t-1) | 0.755*** (0.070) | 0.706*** (0.068) | 0.725*** (0.086) | 0.604*** (0.066) | 0.619*** (0.069) |
| REM | 0.259*** (0.053) | 0.451*** (0.097) | 0.442*** (0.094) | 0.531*** (0.081) | 0.448*** (0.091) |
| Race-Related Articles | --- | -0.204* (0.090) | -0.220* (0.097) | -0.202* (0.086) | -0.109 (0.082) |
| Black Proportion of Non-White Population. | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-White Proportion Democrat | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Proportion Boomer/Gen X | --- | --- | -0.040 (0.086) | -1.13** (0.335) | -0.984*** (0.374) |
| Proportion Millennial/Gen-Z | --- | --- | 0.039 (0.054) | -1.01** (0.281) | -0.900*** (0.288) |
| Percent With College Degree | | | | 1.81** (0.501) | 1.59*** (0.514) |
| Civil Rights Spending | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.076 (0.117) |
| Consumer Sentiment | --- | --- | --- | --- | -0.047 (0.043) |
| Non-Racial Public Policy Mood | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.137* (0.051) |
| Constant | 0.063** (0.050) | 0.059*** (0.048) | 0.061*** (0.051) | 0.051 (0.042) | 0.052 (0.042) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.845 | 0.858 | 0.855 | 0.892 | 0.895 |

Note. N=64 in all models. Cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table 7.18 presents the results from the white and non-white models, which, initially, seem to suggest that increases in REM don't equally affect the attitudes of whites and non-

whites. Specifically, and referring to columns (a) in both models, we see that REM significantly positively predicts white racial liberalism ($\beta=0.307$, $p=0.001$) while only weakly and insignificantly positively influencing that of their non-white counterparts ($\beta=0.076$, $p=0.143$). The difference in the size of these coefficients is significantly different from zero ($p=0.016$). But, as suspected, this result proves to be misleading. Column (aa) of the non-white model shows that once the black proportion of the non-white population ($\beta=0.291$, $p=0.035$) and the proportion of non-whites identifying as Democrats⁷⁸ ($\beta=0.127$, $p=0.219$) is held constant, the effects of REM turn significantly positive and balloon in size ($\beta=0.311$, $p < 0.001$). They are now statistically indistinguishable ($p=0.976$) from those acting on white racial liberalism. Moving to column (b), we see that, once again, controlling for the percent of NYT articles that are race-related (column b) substantially boosts the effects of REM on both white ($\beta=0.543$, $p=0.001$) and non-white ($\beta=0.586$, $p < 0.001$) racial liberalism. Controlling for generational replacement (columns c) results in a tiny reduction in these effects for whites ($\beta =0.525$; $p <0.001$) and a small boost ($\beta =0.627$; $p < 0.001$) for non-whites. Subsequently adjusting for rates of higher educational attainment (columns d) enlarges the effects of REM on white racial liberalism ($\beta=0.685$; $p<0.001$) while moderating its effects on non-white ($\beta=0.566$; $p < 0.001$) racial liberalism. Further adjusting for civil rights spending, consumer optimism, and non-racial policy liberalism (columns e) model attenuates, but hardly eliminates these effects. In substantive terms, a one standard deviation increase in the volume of REM predicts roughly 3.2 and 2.5 point increases in white ($\beta=0.565$; $p <0.001$) and non-white ($\beta=0.425$; $p=0.002$) racial liberalism, respectively. To give a rough estimate of the practical impact of these effects,

⁷⁸ Somewhat surprisingly, in addition to yielding a poorer fits across all models, adjusting for the white proportion of the population and the proportion of whites self-identifying as democrats had virtually no effect on the relationship between racial equalitarian media and white racial liberalism. These control variables were thus excluded from the models shown. Readers interested in viewing these excluded results can refer to Appendix A.3.

consider that, between 2010 and 2019, white racial liberalism increased by roughly 16 points. If the parameter estimates are to be trusted, this would mean that more than half of this change (9 points) can be attributed to increases in the volume of REM.

Table 7.18 The determinants of white and non-white racial liberalism (1956-2019)

| | White | | | | | Non-White | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (a) | (aa) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) |
| Racial Liberalism (t-1) | 0.705*** (0.098) | 0.641*** (0.098) | 0.643*** (0.140) | 0.456*** (0.118) | 0.423** (0.127) | 0.852*** (0.073) | 0.652*** (0.112) | 0.614*** (0.113) | 0.644*** (0.123) | 0.699*** (0.123) | 0.713*** (0.117) |
| REM | 0.307** (0.090) | 0.543** (0.132) | 0.525*** (0.121) | 0.685*** (0.111) | 0.565*** (0.097) | 0.076 (0.051) | 0.311** (0.082) | 0.586*** (0.144) | 0.627*** (0.145) | 0.566*** (0.128) | 0.425** (0.129) |
| Race-Related Articles | --- | -0.247** (0.089) | -0.253** (0.087) | -0.227** (0.074) | -0.110 (0.069) | --- | --- | -0.253* (0.109) | -0.392* (0.170) | -0.374* (0.155) | -0.287* (0.128) |
| Black Proportion of Non-White Population | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.291* (0.135) | 0.327* (0.128) | 0.477* (0.224) | 0.519* (0.230) | 0.375† (0.218) |
| Non-White Proportion Democrats | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.127 (0.103) | 0.247* (0.118) | 0.266* (0.122) | 0.281* (0.119) | 0.333** (0.121) |
| Proportion Boomer/Gen X | --- | --- | -0.008 (0.116) | -1.19** (0.416) | -1.09* (0.469) | --- | --- | --- | -0.014 (0.080) | -0.368† (0.193) | -0.259 (0.266) |
| Proportion Millennial/Gen-Z | --- | --- | 0.035 (0.056) | -1.01** (0.325) | -0.947** (0.316) | --- | --- | --- | 0.241 (0.209) | -0.151 (0.277) | -0.087 (0.316) |
| Percent With College Degree | --- | --- | --- | 1.91** (0.604) | 1.84** (0.601) | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.721† (0.362) | 0.502 (0.375) |
| Civil Rights Spending | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.065 (0.111) | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.321 (0.199) |
| Consumer Sentiment | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.046 (0.045) | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.033 (0.061) |
| Non-Racial Public Policy Mood | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.128* (0.055) | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.384** (0.137) |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Constant | 0.059** (0.056) | 0.054*** (0.054) | 0.047** (0.061) | 0.038 (0.050) | 0.035 (0.049) | 0.028† (0.067) | 0.022 (0.060) | 0.021 (0.059) | 0.022 (0.059) | 0.023† (0.057) | 0.024** (0.056) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.822 | 0.842 | 0.837 | 0.871 | 0.875 | 0.715 | 0.761 | 0.770 | 0.771 | 0.787 | 0.798 |

Note. N=64 in all models. Cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Earlier it was predicted that racial equalitarian media would have stronger effects on white Democrats and liberals than white Republicans and conservatives. The results in Table 4.19 below appear to offer only mixed support for this proposition. In columns (a), we see that, net of lagged racial liberalism, increases in REM have a significantly positive influence on white Democrat racial liberalism ($\beta=0.252$, $p < 0.001$) but only a modest and insignificant positive effect on white Republican racial liberalism ($\beta=0.040$, $p=0.241$). Importantly, the difference between these coefficients is statistically distinguishable from zero ($p < 0.001$). Turning to columns (b), we see that controlling for the volume of race-related content again increases the magnitude of these effects for both groups. A standard deviation increase in REM corresponds to a significant 0.364SD (or +3.05 points; $p < 0.001$) increase in white Democrats racial liberalism and to an insignificant 0.128SD (+0.91 points; $p=0.062$) increase in white republican racial liberalism, though the difference in the size of these coefficients is not significant ($p=0.104$)

While the results thus far cohere with predictions, they take a curious and unexpected turn in the remaining three models. Specifically, after adjusting for generational replacement (columns c), the effects of REM on white Republican racial liberalism ($\beta=0.389$, $p < 0.001$) become somewhat larger (if insignificantly so, $p=0.561$) than those on white Democrat racial liberalism ($\beta=0.316$, $p < 0.001$). What explains this turnaround is not immediately clear, but it appears to be largely driven by the Millennials/Gen-Z variable. While not shown below, when only the Boomers/Gen-X variable is added to the model, the effects of REM on white Republican racial liberalism ($\beta=0.131$; $p=0.094$) fall short of significance at the 95% threshold. But when the Millennials/Gen-Z variable takes its place, REM's effects on white Republican racial liberalism become both significant and more than double in size ($\beta=0.265$; $p=0.002$). A

plausible interpretation of these dynamics is that the Millennials/Gen-X covariate is acting as a suppressor variable. While it has only a weak and insignificant bivariate association with white Republican racial liberalism ($r=0.054$; $p=0.663$), it appears to account for criterion-irrelevant variance in the REM variable, with which it is strongly correlated ($r=0.719$; $p < 0.001$). The removal of this criterion-irrelevant variance would then improve the estimates of its effects on racial liberalism, which, in turn, would also improve the overall fit of the model (as indicated by the boost in adjusted R^2). All of this is consistent with what is observed here. The mystery, though, is why this suppression effect isn't similarly observed among white Democrats. In the interest of proceeding with the remainder of the results, I leave this question to secondary analysis.

Continuing with columns (d), we see that adjusting for higher educational attainment further moderates the effects of racial equalitarian media on white Democrat racial liberalism ($\beta=0.252$; $p=0.001$), while enhancing those acting on white Republican racial liberalism ($\beta=0.484$; $p < 0.001$). Remarkably, the latter coefficient is nearly twice the size of the former, though this difference falls well short of conventional levels of significance ($p=0.167$). Adding the remaining control variables to the model (columns e) further increases the size of this disparity, which nonetheless still falls short of significance ($p=0.110$). In this final model, a one standard deviation increase in racial equalitarian media predicts a 1.9 and 3-point rise in white Democrat ($\beta=0.223$; $p=0.010$) and white Republican ($\beta=0.486$; $p < 0.001$) racial liberalism, respectively. Despite the smaller size of the former, the inclusion of racial equalitarian news salience in the white Democrats model still results in a significant improvement in model fit ($p=0.008$).

Table 4.19 The determinants of white Democrat and Republican racial liberalism (1956-2019)

| | White Democrats | | | | | White Republican | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) |
| Racial Liberalism (t-1) | 0.784*** (0.064) | 0.772*** (0.059) | 0.728*** (0.087) | 0.655*** (0.077) | 0.616*** (0.090) | 0.908*** (0.039) | 0.866*** (0.064) | 0.421** (0.142) | 0.393* (0.147) | 0.392* (0.140) |
| REM | 0.252*** (0.053) | 0.364*** (0.074) | 0.316*** (0.069) | 0.252** (0.074) | 0.223* (0.084) | 0.040 (0.033) | 0.148† (0.078) | 0.389*** (0.090) | 0.484*** (0.130) | 0.486*** (0.128) |
| Race-Related Articles | --- | -0.131† (0.067) | -0.145† (0.080) | -0.108 (0.074) | -0.047 (0.088) | --- | -0.123 (0.107) | -0.244* (0.102) | -0.306* (0.123) | -0.295* (0.121) |
| Proportion Baby Boomer/Gen X | --- | --- | 0.008 (0.079) | -0.432* (0.165) | -0.336* (0.171) | --- | --- | 0.464** (0.129) | 0.265† (0.152) | 0.326† (0.176) |
| Proportion Millennial/Gen-Z | --- | --- | 0.111† (0.062) | -0.417* (0.201) | -0.405* (0.212) | --- | --- | -0.375*** (0.086) | -0.471*** (0.117) | -0.480*** (0.109) |
| Percent With College Degree | | | | 0.940** (0.312) | 0.849** (0.315) | | | | 0.246 (0.152) | 0.218 (0.156) |
| Civil Rights Spending | --- | --- | --- | --- | -0.002 (0.064) | --- | --- | --- | --- | -0.033 (0.113) |
| Consumer Sentiment | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.026 (0.039) | --- | --- | --- | --- | -0.026 (0.033) |
| Non-Racial Public Policy Mood | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.054 (0.064) | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.010 (0.059) |
| Constant | 0.059** (0.038) | 0.058*** (0.037) | 0.055*** (0.039) | 0.049** (0.035) | 0.046 (0.036) | 0.032† (0.040) | 0.031 (0.039) | 0.015*** (0.033) | 0.013*** (0.033) | 0.014** (0.034) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.908 | 0.913 | 0.915 | 0.928 | 0.926 | 0.892 | 0.895 | 0.920 | 0.921 | 0.918 |
| N | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 |

Note. N=64 in all models. Cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Overall, increases in college-education prove to be the strongest predictor ($\beta=0.849$; $p=0.007$) of racial liberalism for white Democrats. A one standard deviation increase (+10.5 percentage points) in the share of white Democrats with at least a BA degree is expected to increase racial liberalism by 7.1 points. For white Republicans, though, these effects are both smaller and statistically insignificant ($\beta=0.218$; $p=0.168$). Instead, and in terms of absolute size, REM is the strongest predictor of white Republican racial liberalism. Needless to say, this result is unexpected and will be further anatomized below.

Given the ideological-partisan sorting of the past few decades, one would expect to observe a similar pattern of results for white liberals and conservatives. And, as shown in Table 4.20 below, we generally do. Beginning with columns (a), the unadjusted effects of racial equalitarian media on racial liberalism is significantly positive for white liberals ($\beta=0.317$; $p < 0.001$) while much weaker and insignificant for white conservatives ($\beta=0.056$; $p=0.425$)--a difference that is unlikely to be zero ($p=0.003$). Controlling for the volume of race-related news articles (columns b) again enhances these effects considerably for both white liberals ($\beta=0.553$, $p < 0.001$) and conservatives ($\beta=0.260$; $p=0.047$). The difference between these coefficients remains significant ($p=0.045$) at the $p < 0.05$ level. The results in columns (c), which adjusts for generational replacement, exhibit the same pattern as before: the effects of racial equalitarian media on white liberal racial liberalism are slightly attenuated ($\beta=0.472$; $p < 0.001$), while those acting on white conservative racial liberalism are further magnified ($\beta=0.410$; $p=0.030$). Controlling for higher educational attainment (columns d) has the inverse effect—slightly boosting the influence of REM on white liberal racial liberalism ($\beta=0.492$, $p < 0.001$) while slightly lowering its influence on white conservative racial liberalism ($\beta=0.401$; $p=0.035$).

Table 4.20 The determinants of white liberal and conservative racial liberalism (1972-2019)

| | White Liberal | | | | | White Conservative | | | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) |
| Racial Liberalism (t-1) | 0.740*** (0.087) | 0.706*** (0.078) | 0.461*** (0.093) | 0.454*** (0.097) | 0.379** (0.114) | 0.909*** (0.070) | 0.793*** (0.084) | 0.660*** (0.094) | 0.661*** (0.095) | 0.465** (0.135) |
| REM | 0.317*** (0.080) | 0.553*** (0.097) | 0.472*** (0.080) | 0.492*** (0.095) | 0.514*** (0.102) | 0.056 (0.069) | 0.260* (0.127) | 0.410* (0.182) | 0.401* (0.183) | 0.428* (0.187) |
| Race-Related Articles | --- | -0.259** (0.069) | -0.164 (0.102) | -0.185† (0.101) | -0.213 (0.106) | --- | -0.301† (0.164) | -0.204 (0.223) | -0.200 (0.219) | -0.151 (0.212) |
| Proportion Baby Boomer/Gen X | --- | --- | 0.181* (0.086) | 0.196† (0.105) | 0.200 (0.139) | --- | --- | 0.091 (0.078) | 0.104 (0.128) | 0.368 (0.279) |
| Proportion Millennial/Gen-Z | --- | --- | 0.251** (0.061) | 0.267* (0.111) | 0.307* (0.120) | --- | --- | -0.384** (0.132) | -0.375* (0.165) | -0.492† (0.259) |
| Percent With College Degree | --- | --- | --- | -0.049 (0.111) | -0.047 (0.110) | | | | -0.017 (0.144) | -0.153 (0.180) |
| Civil Rights Spending | --- | --- | --- | --- | -0.065 (0.051) | --- | --- | | --- | -0.059 (0.102) |
| Consumer Sentiment | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.039 (0.065) | --- | --- | | --- | -0.110 (0.099) |
| Non-Racial Policy Liberalism | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.033 (0.128) | --- | --- | | --- | 0.184 (0.112) |
| Constant | 0.037* (0.050) | 0.035*** (0.046) | 0.023** (0.039) | 0.023** (0.039) | 0.019* (0.040) | -0.034 (0.066) | -0.030* (0.064) | -0.025 (0.061) | -0.025 (0.062) | -0.017 (0.060) |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.882 | 0.902 | 0.928 | 0.927 | 0.927 | 0.799 | 0.812 | 0.832 | 0.828 | 0.832 |
| N | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 |

Note. N=64 in all models. Cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

In the final model (columns e), which further adjusts for civil rights spending, consumer optimism, and non-racial policy liberalism, a one standard deviation increase in REM is expected to increase racial liberalism by just under 4.1 points for white liberals ($\beta=0.514$; $p<0.001$) and by 2.4 points for white conservatives ($\beta=0.428$; $p=0.028$). To offer a rough approximation of their practical impact, consider that between 2013-2019, racial liberalism jumped by just over 20 points for white liberals and by 6.4 points for conservatives. The estimates in column (e) suggest that 10.3 and 2.7 of these points, respectively, can be attributed to increases in REM across this same period.

Overall, and unlike the results in the final model for white Democrats, REM proves to be the strongest single predictor of racial liberalism among white liberals. For white conservatives, it is also influential though it trails the (negative) impact ($\beta=-0.492$; $p=0.065$) of a growing Millennial/Gen-Z cohort. However, as we will discover below, the significant effects of REM on both white republican and conservative racial liberalism are conditional on controlling for this latter cohort variable. And that none of the effects are strong or significant in its absence suggests that the relationship has a time dependency that is not the case for the racial liberalism of white Democrats and liberals. Thus, what was initially interpreted as evidence inconsistent with hypothesis H7B may actually prove consistent in the final analysis.

4.8 Robustness checks and secondary analyses

Given that the both racial equalitarian news salience and racial liberalism surged to unprecedented levels in the past decade, it's appropriate to ask whether the results observed above are largely, if not entirely, driven by this 'Great Awakening'. In other words, do the significant predictive effects of racial equalitarian news salience vanish when we exclude the

‘Great Awakening’ period? Is racial equalitarian news salience as predictive of racial liberalism in earlier decades?

To get at the foregoing questions, I sequentially rerun the models in columns (e) of each table while trimming 5 years off the data each time. Table 4.21 presents the beta coefficients of racial equalitarian media for each time period for the sample as a whole, whites, and non-whites. The top row of results are those from columns (e) of Tables 4.17-4.18, the data for which runs from 1956-2019. When we limit the data to the 1956-2015 period, which is still long enough to cover the early years of the Great Awakening, we see that the effects of REM are relatively smaller but remain significant for all three of the listed populations. But when we truncate the data to the 1954-2010 period, we see that only the coefficient for the sample ($p=0.033$) and for whites ($p=0.006$) achieves statistical significance at the $p < 0.05$ level. Across all of the data periods, which conclude with 1954-1985, the white coefficient reaches $p < 0.05$ significance in all but the 1954-1990 period. Furthermore, its size does not systematically or linearly change from one data period to the next. Unsurprisingly, given that whites constituted the overwhelming majority of respondents in earlier decades, we see a similar pattern for the sample coefficients. From 1954-2010, the sample coefficient reaches significance at the $p < 0.05$ level ($p=0.033$), but its size is somewhat reduced relative to estimates over longer time spans. This is likely due to the steep drop in the size of the non-white coefficient ($p=0.567$), which is no longer significant in this period. In fact, across all subsequent periods, the non-white coefficient not only never reaches significance, but it also progressively declines and, with one exception, becomes consistently if modestly negative. These results are broadly consistent with those observed in the granger tests, which offered no clear evidence that REM is causally related to non-white racial liberalism.

Table 4.21 Effects of REM on sample, white, and non-white racial liberalism in various time periods

| Period | N | Sample | White | Non-White | H0: White – Non-White=0 |
|-----------|----|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| 1956-2019 | 64 | 0.448*** (0.091) | 0.565*** (0.092) | 0.425** (0.129) | 0.339 |
| 1956-2015 | 60 | 0.343*** (0.064) | 0.384*** (0.082) | 0.241** (0.086) | 0.179 |
| 1956-2010 | 55 | 0.274* (0.124) | 0.404** (0.139) | 0.088 (0.153) | 0.013 |
| 1956-2005 | 50 | 0.260† (0.133) | 0.376* (0.145) | 0.012 (0.180) | 0.006 |
| 1956-2000 | 45 | 0.281† (0.156) | 0.387* (0.172) | 0.072 (0.232) | 0.021 |
| 1956-1995 | 40 | 0.347* (0.149) | 0.429* (0.175) | 0.014 (0.227) | 0.023 |
| 1956-1990 | 35 | 0.488* (0.197) | 0.410 (0.249) | -0.021 (0.250) | 0.032 |
| 1956-1985 | 30 | 0.735* (0.281) | 0.691* (0.299) | -0.139 (0.317) | < 0.001 |

Note. With exception of the right-most column, which shows p-values from a Wald test of equality of coefficients, cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All estimates are adjusted for the control variables featured in columns (e) of the primary models.

The left side of Table 4.22 below shows the coefficients of REM for the white Democrat and Republican models. The most important and assuring observation here is that, with one exception, the coefficients for white Democrats remain statistically significant across all data periods. In stark contrast, we find that the larger coefficient for white Republicans in the 1954-2019 period is apparently an outlier. While it remains significant when the data is shortened to the 1954-2015, it is more than half the size of its 1954-2019 counterpart. In fact, such appears to mark the beginning of the end of the REM-racial liberalism relationship for white Republicans. Indeed, when we examine the white Republican coefficients for the remaining periods, we see that they become progressively smaller—ultimately in the negative direction—while never approaching statistical significance. What is more, the differences between the white Republican and Democrats coefficients become statistically significant and progressively widen across all remaining time periods. In other words, the lack of earlier support for the prediction that REM

would have a stronger effect on white Democrats than white Republican racial liberalism appears to be largely a product of the ‘Great Awakening’ years. As was noted earlier, it’s during these years that the decades long decline in white Republican racial liberalism finally reversed.

Table 4.22 Effects of REM on the white Democrat, Republican, liberal, and conservative racism liberalism in various time periods

| White x Party | | | | | White x Ideology | | | | |
|---------------|----|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|-----|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|
| Period | N | White Dem. | White Repub. | H0: White Dem. – White Repub.=0 | Period | N | White Lib. | White Con. | H0: White Lib. – White Con.=0 |
| 1956-2019 | 64 | 0.223* (0.084) | 0.486*** (0.128) | 0.110 | 1972-2019 | 47 | 0.514*** (0.102) | 0.428* (0.187) | 0.641 |
| 1956-2015 | 60 | 0.226** (0.075) | 0.215** (0.066) | 0.913 | 1972-2015 | 43 | 0.303*** (0.076) | 0.132 (0.085) | 0.059 |
| 1956-2010 | 55 | 0.372** (0.113) | 0.070 (0.079) | 0.008 | 1972-2010 | 38 | 0.240* (0.092) | 0.103 (0.102) | 0.227 |
| 1956-2005 | 50 | 0.386** (0.124) | 0.019 (0.085) | 0.002 | 1972-2005 | 33 | 0.265* (0.105) | -0.047 (0.121) | 0.025 |
| 1956-2000 | 45 | 0.420* (0.167) | -0.102 (0.088) | < 0.001 | 1972-2000 | 28 | 0.185† (0.096) | -0.124 (0.122) | 0.030 |
| 1956-1995 | 40 | 0.459* (0.176) | -0.108 (0.092) | < 0.001 | 1972-1995 | 23 | 0.173† (0.095) | -0.137 (0.116) | 0.029 |
| 1956-1990 | 35 | 0.401† (0.197) | -0.154 (0.120) | 0.001 | --- | --- | | | |
| 1956-1985 | 30 | 0.605* (0.222) | -0.064 (0.205) | 0.004 | --- | --- | | | |

Note. With exception of the right-most column, which shows p-values from a Wald test of equality of coefficients, cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All estimates are adjusted for the control variables featured in columns (e) of the primary models.

The above may also explain why the white Republican coefficient shrinks and becomes insignificant in the absence of controlling for the size of the Millennial/Gen-Z population. Specifically, if REM only significantly predicts white Republican racial liberalism in the final years of the data, it follows that earlier variation in the former is unrelated to variation in the latter. But, as illustrated in Figure 4.26 below, because growth in the white Republican Millennial/Gen-Z population partially coincides with both increases in REM and the reversal of declines in white republican racial liberalism, controlling for it serves to suppress the variation in REM that is criterion-irrelevant. On the other hand, because all of these trends move more or less

in the same direction for white Democrats, the Millennial/Gen-Z variable has a confounding rather than a suppressive influence on the REM-racial liberalism relationship. Hence, controlling for this variable enhances the effects of REM for white Republicans while moderating them for white Democrats.




Figure 4.26 Generational composition of white Democrats and Republicans across time.
 Note. Plots for white Democrats and Republicans are graphed along different y-axes (not shown)

Though the underlying sample of cases is smaller, the patterns for the white liberal and conservative coefficients, which are shown in the right side of Table 4.22, are very similar. The effects of REM on white liberal racial liberalism reach or approach conventional levels of significance in all time periods. But for white conservatives, they only approach significance in the 1972-2019 period. And, similar to the case of white Republicans, the size of the coefficient steadily declines and ultimately becomes and remains negative by the final two data periods. At the same time, the difference between them and the white liberal coefficients both widens and reaches conventional levels of significance.

In sum, the results of these secondary analyses generally comport with what the earlier granger tests suggested. They show that the relationship between REM and racial liberalism is

largely limited to or is only time-independent among white Democrats and liberals. In contrast, they suggest that the significant and (for white Republicans) stronger relationship that was subsequently observed for white Republicans and conservatives is largely an artifact of trends that transpired during the Great Awakening period. When these years are excluded from the data, the effects of racial equalitarian news salience on white Republican and conservative racial liberalism are both no longer significant and are also significantly smaller than those for white Democrats and liberals.

4.9 General Discussion

Overall, the findings of this chapter generally cohere with earlier predictions. First, H9 predicted that increases in the salience of racial equalitarian media (REM) would effect increases in white racial liberalism. In the end, the results of all analyses lend support for this proposition. Both the conventional and stationarity-corrected granger tests suggested that REM granger-causes white racial liberalism, but that white racial liberalism does not granger-cause REM (H9A). Additionally, a series of dynamic regression models showed that the effects of REM on white racial liberalism were both statistically and substantively significant net of a host of theoretically-relevant confounds. Literally interpreted, the estimates of these effects would indicate that around a half of the increase in white racial liberalism from 2010-2019 was due to contemporaneous increases in REM. While the reality is likely more complicated, the evidence suggests that these effects are far from trivial, especially when the long-run effects are considered. When one further considers the likely measurement error embedded in the REM and racial liberalism indexes, they may even be understated.

Critically, the results also consistently showed that the effects are not simply due to increases in race-related news coverage in general as opposed to increases in coverage of black-white inequities and injustice. In fact, adjusting for the volume of race-related news articles actually considerably bolstered the effects of REM. This suggests that white racial attitudes do not simply positively respond to *any* media coverage of race, but specifically media messaging that speaks to black-white status differences in terms of past and/or present discrimination.

While no formal predictions were made with respect to the drivers of non-white racial liberalism, it bears asking whether the effects of REM are unique to whites. On this point, it should be clarified that there's *nothing* in this dissertation's theory that suggests that non-white racial attitudes should be impervious to trends in REM. Instead, the theory would only predict that such messaging activates different sets of group-based moral emotions in whites than non-whites⁷⁹. Unfortunately, the present data does not permit a test of this hypothesis. That being said, the best we can say is that the evidence on this question proved inconclusive. On one hand, the non-white racial liberalism series did not significantly correlate with the REM index. Both the conventional and Toda and Yamamoto granger tests also provided no evidence that REM granger-caused non-white racial liberalism (or vice versa). However, the results of the dynamic regression models raised the possibility that these results were, in fact, biased on account of not adjusting for the overtime changes in racial/ethnic composition and partisan leanings of the non-white population. When the latter was controlled for, the effects of REM on non-white racial liberalism were at once statistically significant and also statistically distinguishable from those on white racial liberalism. However, we ultimately learned that these effects may, in fact, be an artifact of the Great Awakening years. When these years are excluded from the analysis, the

⁷⁹ Specifically, whereas such coverage is expected to elicit ingroup-focused guilt, shame, and anger among whites, it is likely to stoke feelings of outgroup (i.e. white)-directed anger and victimhood among non-whites.

effects of REM on non-white racial liberalism become both small and insignificant. This could be because there is genuinely no causal relationship or, quite plausibly, the non-white variables have too much error that, despite the best efforts of this researcher, could not be statistically corrected for in the present data⁸⁰. Future researchers interested in the dynamics of non-white racial attitudes are thus advised to disaggregate the non-white category into different racial/ethnic groups so as to preclude the possibility that parameter estimates are biased by demographic changes.

A secondary hypothesis (H9B) predicted the effects of REM on racial liberalism would be stronger for white Democrats and liberals than for their Republican and conservative counterparts. This chapter can offer qualified support for this prediction. First, only the white Democrat and white liberal racial liberalism series were at least marginally significantly correlated at first difference with the REM index. Further, both granger tests indicated that REM granger-caused white Democrat and liberal racial liberalism, while neither provided clear and consistent evidence that such was the case for white Republicans and conservatives. This pattern also reared itself in the results of the first two dynamic regression models. Controlling for previous racial liberalism and, thereafter, the volume of race-related news coverage, REM significantly positively predicted both white Democrat and liberal racial liberalism. For white Republicans, though, the effects to this point were both insignificant and significantly smaller than those for white Democrats and liberals. Among white conservatives, they achieved significance after adjusting for the volume of race-related news coverage, but remained significantly smaller than they were for white liberals.

⁸⁰ Some evidence favoring the former interpretation was observed in the robustness checks. Specifically, the woke news coefficient for non-whites was both insignificant and negative during periods in which blacks still constituted the overwhelming majority of the non-white population. But if this interpretation is valid, it begs the question: why are non-white racial attitudes not similarly influenced by increases in racial equalitarian news salience?

Subsequent models, however, would yield evidence against H9B. After controlling for generational replacement, namely the proportion of Millennial and Gen-Z Republicans, REM's effects on white republican racial liberalism not only became significant, but they were also (insignificantly) larger than those observed for white Democrats. The effects on white conservative racial liberalism also grew in size, though they remained [insignificantly] smaller than they were for white liberals. By the final model, the effects of REM were over twice the size for white Republicans than for white Democrats, while the effects for white conservatives were smaller but indistinguishable in size from those for white liberals.

Had the analysis ended here, the verdict on H9B would have been inconclusive at best. But, as with the case for non-whites, subsequent tests suggested that the effects on white Republican and conservative racial liberalism may be illusory. As once the data for the 'Great Awakening' years is excluded from the model, the effects for these subgroups all but disappear and become significantly smaller than those for white Democrats and liberals. Meanwhile, the effects for the latter groups remain generally significant and positive as far back as the 1954-1985 and 1972-2005 periods, respectively. Together with the fact that the granger test results only indicated causality in the case of white Democrats and liberals, the totality of the evidence would seem to support H9B. Perhaps a more qualified if literal interpretation of the data would be that the predictions of H9B hold until the onset of the Great Awakening. Such, of course, would assume that the subsequent rise in white Republican and conservative racial liberalism was caused by, rather than merely coincided with, record increases in racial equalitarian news salience. While the present data does not allow for a sufficient test of this supposition⁸¹, it's not altogether implausible nor inconsistent with this dissertation's theory. For instance, it could be

⁸¹ A granger test on such a small number of data points is unlikely to yield reliable inferences.

that white Republicans and conservatives—and the news outlets they attend to—generally avoid or remain unaware of ingroup-critical information until its availability reaches a threshold at which it can no longer be ignored. For white Democrats and liberals, which are more likely to attend to or seek out such information, this threshold will naturally be lower.

An additional and non-exclusive possibility is that, whether due to greater cognitive and political sophistication or fewer value conflicts, the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals are more coherent than those of other groups. If so, then the lower responsiveness of other groups to shifts in REM could stem from the fact that their disparate racial attitudes—perceptions of discrimination, attributions of inequality, support for race-conscious policies etc.—have weaker covariation. Evidence suggestive of this was observed in the covariance structures of the items comprising the racial liberalism indexes of different groups. Specifically, whereas the first dimension of the white Democrat and liberal racial liberalism indexes accounted for 63-66% of constituent item variance, this figure was noticeably lower (39-46%) for all other groups.

Of course, there may be many other interpretations that are equally if not more consistent with these data. Rather than engage in tireless conjecture, the following chapter will utilize other data in search for deeper insight.

4.10 Conclusion

If white racial attitudes are generally immobile or unresponsive to shifts in the information environment, the theory presented in this dissertation is hard to defend. After all, if changes in white racial attitudes do not follow changes in the flow of race-related media messaging, the idea that ingroup-critical appraisals and emotions mediate such a relationship becomes non-sensical. While not presenting any evidence of this mediation, the preceding

chapter nevertheless laid the initial empirical groundwork while replicating the substantive findings of Kellstedt (2000, 2003).

First, it established that white racial attitudes do indeed vary over time, but in some periods and among some political groups more than others. In regards to the first point, Baumgartner et al.'s (2009) characterization of the speed and (in)frequency of policy change seems apposite to the current context : though racial attitudes are generally more or less stable for extended stretches of time, when they do change, the change is typically rapid and substantial. Further, while periods of parallel changes in racial attitudes across different demographics are certainly discernable in the present data, some divergence from this pattern was also observed. Specifically, trends in the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals did not always resemble those of their Republican and conservative counterparts.

Second, this chapter offered consistent evidence that variation in white racial attitudes follows, rather than precedes, variation in the frequency at which black-white status differences are discussed and attributed to racial discrimination in the news media. Although more equivocal, the evidence also suggests that white Republicans and conservatives are, on balance, less responsive to these changes in the news media than white Democrats and liberals.

But the evidence offered here is limited in that it rests on aggregate small sample data, including variables that likely contain non-negligible degrees of measurement error, and some whose missing values had to be interpolated. We also can't be certain that the REM-racial liberalism relationship is not spurious or the result of other unconsidered variables; nor that it holds at the individual-level. The extent that the REM index is capturing reporting on real world events (e.g. police shootings) or abstract discussions of racial inequality (or both) is also unclear. Thus, what we need is corroborative and granular data; a closeup rather than a birds-eye view of

the media and attitudinal dynamics. Such is the purpose of the next chapter, which will leverage quasi-experimental and panel designs in the search for supplemental evidence.

5 THE 'FLOYD EFFECT' ON WHITE RACIAL LIBERALISM

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented evidence that shifts in white racial liberalism follow shifts in the salience of media highlights status differences between whites and blacks in terms of racial discrimination and bias. It also provided evidence suggesting that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals are more sensitive to these media trends than are Republicans and conservatives. However, because the underlying data was aggregated at an annual level, there were a number of questions that went unaddressed. First, the specific drivers of variation in racial equalitarian media (REM) remain unclear. Is movement incident-based--a response to high profile cases of alleged racial injustice? Or does it more generally follow the salience of race in political discourse (or both)? Second, while the racial liberalism index used in the previous chapter was exhaustive and useful for tracking racial attitudes across time, it risked conflating distinct attitudinal dimensions, such as perceptions of discrimination and support for pro-black policies. The theoretical connection between the items comprising the index and the ingroup-critical emotions that inform responses were also less than obvious. Finally, the data did not allow me to definitively conclude that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals are more sensitive to REM stimuli than Republicans and conservatives.

The current chapter sheds light on the preceding questions by studying the impact of the May 25 death of George Floyd on white racial attitudes. More specifically, it attempts to get at the following:

- 1) Did the widely publicized killing of George Floyd increase white racial liberalism?

- 2) Did the widely publicized killing of George Floyd increase the frequency of racial equalitarian news coverage?
- 3) Does the frequency of racial equalitarian news coverage predict racial attitudes before and after the Floyd incident?
- 4) Did the Floyd incident equally affect the racial attitudes of white Democrats/liberals and Republicans/conservatives?

Crucially, the data allows me to get at these questions and also permits me to examine whether attitudinal markers of collective shame and guilt are apparent in the wake of the Floyd incident.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I will briefly review the theoretical logic and expectations that inform this chapter's hypotheses (H8-H10). In the process, I will clarify how anticipated findings relate to and serve to advance this dissertation's theory. I will then introduce the novel dataset and research design on which this chapter's analyses are based. Next, I discuss the quasi-experimental methods used for causal inference, including their assumptions and limitations. I also discuss several robustness tests used to ensure the validity of the results. After reviewing the variables, I will proceed to test the central hypotheses. The section thereafter scrutinizes the data with additional tests and analyses. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the main results and sets the stage for the chapter that follows.

5.2 Theoretical recapitulation and the current study

As was previously noted in Chapter 3, group-based emotions, such as collective guilt and shame, are 'time-dependent phenomena'. Their activation is ultimately function of 'exogenous shocks' that increase the availability of information that implicates and renders salient specific group identities. In the case of racial group identities, such 'shocks' can include high-profile incidents of alleged or actual racial injustice committed by members of a dominant racial group

against members of disadvantaged others. As these events heighten awareness of racial group memberships and the status differences between, group members are likely to process and appraise them in group-based terms and become sensitive to their implications for their ingroup's social standing. For members of advantaged racial groups, one such appraisal concerns the moral reputation and legitimacy of their ingroup's social status. As theorized, this is especially likely to be the case when media coverage of racial incidents implicitly or explicitly speaks to the illegitimacy of prevailing status differences and the complicity of the advantaged racial group in their continuation. Those susceptible or sympathetic to such messaging—i.e. those inclined towards societal or structural accounts of group differences—are likely to appraise themselves and/or their ingroup as either directly and/or indirectly responsible for the plight of disadvantaged outgroups. When the focus of these ingroup-critical moral appraisals are limited to specific ingroup moral violation--as opposed to the morality of the ingroup as a whole--ingroup members are likely to experience and express feelings of guilt and remorse. These feelings, in turn, inspire support for reparative policies that compensate a victimized outgroup. But when the focus of a moral appraisal is more global and implicates an ingroup's essential (defective) moral character, ingroup members are likely to experience and express feelings of collective moral shame. In addition to inspiring support for more expansive pro-outgroup policies, moral shame is also likely to motivate the adoption of attitudes and behaviors that serve to morally distinguish or distance group members from their morally-tainted ingroup.

The previous chapter offered evidence that increases in the frequency at which news media implicates whites in black disadvantage tend to move white racial attitudes in a racially liberal or pro-black direction. However, the data was much too coarse for identifying the 'exogenous shocks' or salient racial events that effect shifts in such media coverage.

Additionally, the use of a Stimsonian racial liberalism index did not allow me to demonstrate increases in specific racial attitudes that are theoretically and empirically associated with moral shame and guilt.

Studying the attitudinal effects of the Floyd helps me to fill these gaps. First, the ‘exogenous shock’ of the Floyd incident enables a test of whether the frequency of racial equalitarian media is at least partly a function of the occurrence of racialized events that involve white ‘perpetrators’ and black victims. Second, the dataset featured in this chapter contains measures of several attitudinal bellwethers of collective guilt and moral shame. The first of these measures are ‘racial resentment’, which, as a subsequent chapter will show, strongly overlaps with moral shame and guilt to the point that it’s not obvious that they are statistically distinguishable constructs. The strength of these relationships suggests that if the Floyd incident is found to affect levels of white racial resentment, we can reasonably infer (though by no means conclude) that it also affected levels of white guilt and moral shame. A second measure, ratings of racial group favorability, allows me to test whether the Floyd incident increased attitudes that signal or reflect ingroup-distancing. Because it is both theoretically and empirically predictive of such attitudes, to find that post-Floyd whites rated other whites more unfavorably—and blacks more favorably—would constitute indirect or suggestive evidence of the operation of moral shame. A third and final measure is of support for reparations. Both past research and a subsequent chapter in this dissertation find moral shame and guilt to be among the strongest predictors of reparative pro-outgroup policies, including granting cash reparations to African Americans. Thus, if the Floyd incident is found to increase whites’ support for reparations, we can reasonably infer that it also increased levels of moral shame and guilt.

Lastly, the data permits a test of whether increases in racial equalitarian media mediates the effects of the Floyd incident on these attitudinal outcomes. Demonstrating as much would lend additional supportive evidence to a critical plank of my thesis—i.e. that, due to its activation of ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions, white racial attitudes are sensitive to media coverage that implicates whites in the persistence of racial inequality.

To be clear, none of these anticipated findings would constitute ‘smoking gun’ evidence of my theory’s validity. After all, the dataset I work with in this chapter does not include direct or explicit measures of white guilt and moral shame. And, if such a dataset was available, it would be foolish to settle for proxy measures or variables that are strongly associated with these emotions. But under the current circumstances, the best I can do is demonstrate a pattern of results that strongly converge with the expectations of my theory. The search for more direct evidence will be left to subsequent chapters.

5.3 Methodology

5.3.1 Data

Data for the attitudinal variables used in this study come from the Democracy Fund + UCLA’s Nationscape tracking survey, which was fielded by the survey organization Lucid. This rolling cross-sectional survey canvassed different nationally representative samples of American adults (18+) nearly every day between July 18, 2019 and July 1, 2019. The pooled dataset consists of 318,736 respondents, 67.5% of which identify as non-Hispanic whites and 47% as male (Mean age=44.5). The average daily sample consists of 911 respondents (Median=868, SD=473), including an average of 615 non-Hispanic whites (Median=583, SD=318).

5.3.2 Procedure

For the current study, I employ an Unexpected Event during Surveys Design (UESD) to assess the causal effect of the Floyd incident on white racial attitudes (see Munoz, Falco-Gimeno, and Hernandez 2020 for an overview of this method). This approach attempts to approximate the inferential power of a traditional randomized experiment by exploiting exogenous variation in substantively relevant variables that is induced by the unexpected occurrence of an event at a given time interval. In the present context, the occurrence of the Floyd incident serves to exogenously assign cross-sectional survey respondents to ‘treatment’ (those surveyed after the Floyd incident) and ‘control’ (those surveyed before the Floyd incident) groups.

As implied, a critical requirement for causal identification here is that an event occurs unexpectedly, as predicted events (e.g. an election outcome) can lead to violating assumptions of excludability and temporal ignorability. The former specifies that any differences between respondents interviewed before and after the event be due solely to the event’s occurrence. A potential complication here is the occurrence of collateral events⁸² such that an unexpected event occasions a series of subsequent events that affect responses on Y. The months of protests triggered by the Floyd incident would reasonably fall into this category. As such, any differences between pre-Floyd and post-Floyd attitudes cannot be narrowly interpreted as a consequence of the event itself. Instead, they will be interpreted⁸³ as the joint effect of the Floyd incident plus subsequent media and public reactions (e.g. protests).

⁸² Simultaneous events pose similar threats to excludability. However, to the best of this author’s knowledge, there was no Floyd-unrelated event that co-occurred with the Floyd incident and subsequent protests that would similarly affect responses to race-related outcome variables. As such, this issue is less of a concern.

⁸³ For simplicity, I nonetheless refer to the effects as those of the ‘Floyd incident’ or ‘Floyd effect’

The assumption of temporal ignorability assumes that the occurrence of an event does not influence the selected timing of survey interviews. In other words, the time at which survey respondents are scheduled to be interviewed should be as good as random. All individuals should have an equal probability of being interviewed before or after an event's occurrence. Threats to this assumption could arise if, for instance, the occurrence of an event makes some respondents more willing to participate in a survey than others (Brehm, 1993). As the Nationscape survey relies on online non-probability samples, the prospect of this may not be trivial. To mitigate any such bias, I first conduct a series of balancing tests to examine the extent of unit homogeneity—i.e. whether pre- and post-Floyd samples meaningfully differ on key sociodemographic and political background characteristics. Where statistically significant differences are observed, I use entropy weighting to match the means of covariates across samples (Hainmueller, 2012). This allows me to relax the strict ignorability assumption and to rely on the more tenable conditional ignorability assumption, which holds that “treatment status is independent of individuals' potential outcomes conditional on a set of covariates” (Munoz, Falco-Gimeno, & Hernandez, 2020, p. 10).

Noncompliance poses an additional problem for causal inference in the UESD framework. Specifically, though post-event respondents are all assumed to have been ‘treated’ by the event, some may actually have little to no awareness of the event and, thereby, they may not have been ‘treated’ in practice. While this issue is most likely to arise when events have low public salience, it can also surface in the hours and days immediately proceeding highly salient events. The latter is most likely to be the case in the context of the Floyd incident. The media data presented in Figure 5.1 suggests as much. For instance, New York Times articles and Twitter tweets mentioning ‘George Floyd’ only begin to appear two days after the incident. At

least some of this lag is undoubtedly because the incident occurred on the *night* of May 25--with Floyd officially pronounced dead at 9:25PM. Furthermore, the video footage of the incident seems⁸⁴ to not be released publicly until the night of May 26. Thereafter, it would have taken at least some time for much of the public—or, more specifically, a sufficient subset of Nationscape survey respondents—to have watched the video and/or to become aware of the incident.




Figure 5.1 The salience of the Floyd incident as reflected in media coverage, Google searches, and Twitter tweets

The foregoing considerations are particularly pertinent to the selection of temporal bandwidths when analyzing the data. If too narrow a bandwidth is chosen, such as the days immediately preceding and proceeding the Floyd incident, respondents' exposure thereunto—and the number of respondents themselves--might be too limited for detecting causal effects. On the other hand, if the bandwidth is too wide, I run the risk of incident-unrelated trends and events influencing any observed differences in attitudinal outcomes.

⁸⁴ This impression is based the time-stamp of the first Google news search result that referenced the video.

Weighing these tradeoffs, I opt for a bandwidth of ± 38 days around the day of the incident, but I also test shorter and longer bandwidths as a robustness check. This decision is informed by several considerations. First and most basic, a 38-day bandwidth corresponds to the period between the Floyd incident and the final survey day (July 1). And, as suggested in Figure 1, the Floyd incident and subsequent protests were still salient topics in both media coverage and Twitter discourse even at the conclusion of the survey. For instance, on July 1, 2020, ‘George Floyd’ was still being mentioned in just under 16% of all New York Times articles. Thus, any causal ‘Floyd effect’ should still be operative in the final weeks and days of the data. Second, 38 days should provide sufficiently balanced and large enough samples for detecting small differences. Given that the racial attitudes under analysis have already undergone dramatic change in previous years, as was shown in Chapter 4, we would expect any post-Floyd change to be relatively smaller in magnitude (due to ceiling effects). A bandwidth of 38 days should be wide enough to generate enough observations for detecting small attitudinal changes while being narrow enough to mitigate threats to excludability. With all of the above being said, to exclude the possibility that observed effects are unique to a 38-day bandwidth, I will also test whether alternative bandwidths meaningfully alter the pattern of results. In addition, to test for any overtime decay (or growth) in observed effects, I interact the treatment variable with a ‘days from incident’ variables in all analyses (see the section below)

Of course, even if it can be established that post-Floyd racial attitudes significantly differ from those pre-Floyd, a question that remains is whether the effect is unique to racial attitudes. If, for instance, post-Floyd respondents are significantly more liberal even on policy issues that are not obviously race-related (e.g. abortion, climate change, healthcare), any ‘Floyd effect’ would be too indiscriminate to be interpreted as uniquely racial. As an additional robustness

check, I will thus examine whether post-Floyd increases are manifest in any non-racial policy attitudes.

5.3.3 Primary Variables

5.3.3.1 Experimental Instruments

This study's treatment is operationalized with a dummy variable that codes respondents surveyed between April 17-May 24 as '0' (i.e. the control group) and those surveyed between May 26-July 1 as '1' (the treatment group). As was mentioned above, this variable will be interacted with another that stores the number of days between the day of the Floyd incident and the day on which respondents were surveyed. As our bandwidth is 38 days, this latter variable ranges from -38 to +38 with 0 representing the day of the Floyd incident. For eventual robustness checks, I create similar variables for narrower bandwidths of ± 7 and ± 14 days as well as wider others that cover the entire pre-Floyd (July 18 2019-May 24 2020) and post-Floyd (May 26-July 1 2020) period.

5.3.3.2 Outcome Measures

Racial liberalism is measured with an averaged index of three variables ($\alpha=0.68$). Two of these variables come directly from Kinder and Sanders' (1996) racial resentment scale⁸⁵. The first asks respondents the extent that they disagree (1) or agree (5) with a statement that reads, "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class". The second measures disagreement (1)/agreement (5) with a statement that reads, "Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special

⁸⁵ Unfortunately, the Nationscape survey did not include all four items that constitute the standard racial resentment battery.

favors”. Finally, the third constituent variable⁸⁶ asks respondents how much discrimination (1=None at all, 5=A great deal) they think there is “in the United States today” against a list of social groups one of which are blacks. Respondents who neglected or weren’t able to provide data for all three variables (just under 2% of the sample) are coded as missing. To generate the index, I take the mean scores across the three constituent variables and then standardize the composite output.

Pro-white (vs. black) favorability is measured as the difference between respondents’ favorability of whites vs. blacks. ‘Favorability’ here refers to survey items that asks respondents whether they have a favorable impression towards blacks and whites. I code ‘haven’t heard enough’ responses (which amount to 12.9% and 12.7% of all responses to the white and black favorability items, respectively) as a middle or neutral category⁸⁷ (3) to create 5-point scales ranging from ‘Very unfavorable’ (1) to ‘Very favorable’ (5). I then subtract the black from the white favorability scores to generate a differenced scale that ranges from -4 (strong pro-black bias) to 4 (strong pro-white bias).

Support for reparations is measured with an item that asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with a policy of granting “reparations payments to the descendants of slaves”. I code ‘agree’ responses as ‘1’ and ‘disagree’ and ‘not sure’ responses as ‘0’.

Racial equalitarian media is measured with an index first introduced in the previous chapter. However, in the present chapter, time dimension of the index is in days rather than

⁸⁶ Though this item does not feature in Kinder and Sander’s (1996) racial resentment battery, it does capture a core element (i.e. denial of discrimination against blacks) of most scholarly conceptions of symbolic racism. In addition, an almost identically worded item (‘How much discrimination against blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead?’) is included in the Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (Henry & Sears, 2002). Finally, a Cronbach’s alpha test shows that the inclusion of this variable leads to greater reliability ($\alpha=0.68$) relative to a two-variable scale in which it is excluded ($\alpha=0.58$).

⁸⁷ To exclude this many respondents from the analyses would be to sacrifice a large amount of data. The 5-point scales, which code the foregoing as the ‘neutral’ category, also correlate a bit more strongly with each other ($Rho=0.30$) than do the 4-point scales ($Rho=0.25$).

years. Specifically, the index was recreated so as to cover the time duration of the sample data (July 18 2019-July 1, 2020). In addition, the normalization method I use is the percent of daily NYT articles, rather than the percent of daily race-related NYT articles⁸⁸. Thus, each data point represents the percent of NYT all articles in each day that satisfy the search criteria presented in section 4.3.2 of chapter 4.

5.3.4 Control Variables

As the approach taken here is quasi-experimental, and thus the researcher is unable to randomly assign values of predictor variables, I need account for the possibility that at least some of the post-Floyd attitude change results from variation in the composition of the sample. Following the recommendations of Munoz, Falco-Gimeno, and Hernandez (2020), I begin with a series of balancing tests that compare the treatment and control samples on a battery of covariates that potentially influence both survey participation and racial attitudes. These covariates are political ideology (1=Very liberal, 5=Very conservative), party affiliation (1=Strong Democrat, 7=Strong Republican), educational attainment (1=Less than high school diploma, 6=Doctorate degree), household income (1=Less than \$15,000, 24=\$250,000 and above), sex (1=Male, 0=Female), political interest (1=Hardly at all, 4=Most of the time), and census region (1=South, 0=Northeast/Midwest/West). Figure 5.2 graphs the regression coefficients for the treatment (vs. control) group on each of these variables for white respondents. While between-group differences are generally modest and indistinguishable from 0 across most of the 8 variables, those for ideology ($\beta=0.028$ $p=0.049$), political interest ($\beta=-0.031$; $p=0.011$), and sex ($\beta=-0.017$; $p=0.010$) do reach conventional levels of significance.

⁸⁸ Whereas the former fit the data more poorly than the latter in the previous chapter, the opposite is the case here.




Figure 5.2 Test of unit homogeneity (white sample)

Note. Plots are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Confidence intervals that do not overlap with the red line on the x-axis indicate the presence of significant differences in a variable between white respondents in the 38 day post-Floyd period and white respondents in the 38 day pre-Floyd period.

As I will also be examining whether the Floyd effect is conditional on political orientation, I conduct the same tests for white Democrats, liberals, Republicans, and conservatives. The results are presented in Figure 5.3. Beginning with white Democrats, we see that those in the treatment group were slightly but significantly less educated ($\beta=-0.054$; $p=0.050$), have lower household incomes ($\beta=-0.321$; $p=0.031$), and are less likely to be male ($\beta=-0.030$; $p=0.007$) than those in the control group. Differences in all other variables are not distinguishable from 0. Turning to white Republicans, the only difference that achieves significance is political interest ($\beta=-0.033$; $p=0.041$). For white liberals, only the male composition is significantly different from the control group ($\beta=-0.029$; $p=0.031$). Finally, for white conservatives, none of the differences in any of the covariates reach significance at the 95% level, though differences in the male composition fall just short ($\beta=-0.021$; $p=0.061$).




Figure 5.3 Test of unit homogeneity (white subgroups)

Note. Plots are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Confidence intervals that do not overlap with the red line on the x-axis indicate the presence of significant differences in a variable between white respondents in the 38 day post-Floyd period and white respondents in the 38 day pre-Floyd period.

In sum, while the treatment and control group are virtually indistinguishable on most of the eight covariates, there are some small but significant imbalances. In order to be sure that they do not contribute to any observed Floyd effect, I use Hainmueller and Xu's (2013) Stata 'ebalance' package to implement an entropy balancing procedure. Specifically, this software enables me to reweight the data so that the treatment and control samples among whites overall and within each political subgroup have identical means across all covariates⁸⁹.

⁸⁹ I additionally include these covariates as statistical controls in several of the analyses.

5.4 Results

5.4.1 Pre/Post-Floyd trends in racial equalitarian media: testing H11

Hypothesis 11 predicted that the salience of racial equalitarian media would be significantly greater in the post-Floyd than the pre-Floyd period. I test this prediction with a visual inspection of the REM data. Figure 5.4 graphs the REM series both for the entire period of the Nationscape data (left panel) as well as for the ± 38 day bandwidth (right panel) that will be used in most analyses. As expected, the racial equalitarian share of daily New York Times (NYT) jumped to series highs following the Floyd incident (dashed red line). Specifically, from July 18, 2019 to May 24, 2020, an average of 0.92% of daily NYT articles fit the REM search criteria. But from May 26 to July 1, this daily average climbed to 6%, a more than 6-fold increase. Further, there was not a single day of the pre-Floyd period in which REM coverage (Max=4.29%) reached or exceeded this threshold. In fact, there were no REM articles whatsoever for 37% of the 313 pre-Floyd days. In contrast, this cannot be said for any of the 38 days in the post-Floyd period. While none of this is surprising, these results confirm H11 and offer evidence that at least some of the overtime variation in REM is driven by high profile racialized police incidents. In practical terms, they suggest that when such incidents occur, the media increasingly publishes articles that highlight black-white status differences while discussing them in terms of discrimination and bias. Of course, if no post-Floyd shifts in attitudes are observed below, the significance of such media coverage would be called into question. Thus, the attitudinal outcomes are where we turn to next.




Figure 5.4 Racial equalitarian articles as the percent of daily New York Times articles

Note. Dashed red vertical line represents May 25 (the day of the incident), while the two horizontal lines along the y-axis denote the series means for the pre-Floyd (light black line) and post-Floyd (light green line) periods.

5.4.2 *Direct effects of the Floyd incident on white racial attitudes: testing H8-10*

Figure 5.5 graphs lowess-smoothed (bandwidth=0.3) time series of each of the three outcome variables. Referring first to the left-most panel, we indeed observe a noticeable post-Floyd bump in white racial liberalism, which accords with the expectations of H8. Table 5.1, which displays the means of each outcome variable for the 38 days before and after the Floyd incident, confirms that white racial liberalism significantly ($p < 0.001$) increased by roughly 0.174 of a standard deviation. However, if looking at the dark black line, the eyeball test would suggest that that this increase pre-dated the Floyd incident. In which case, can we really be so confident that the post-Floyd bump would not have occurred in the absence of the Floyd incident? In truth, the apparent pre-Floyd increase is a graphical artifact. Figure 5.6, which graphs the series for the ± 38 day bandwidth, shows that while racial liberalism did inch upwards in early May, it was actually trending downward both in the days leading up to and also on the

day of and days immediately proceeding the incident itself. Thus, there's no evidence that the post-Floyd increase is merely a continuation of pre-Floyd trend.




Figure 5.5 Pre and post-Floyd trends in white racial attitudes (complete series)

Note. Plots are LOESS-smoothed with 95% confidence areas. Parallel green and black lines along the y-axis represent the white sample's mean racial liberalism score before and after the death of George Floyd, respectively.




Figure 5.6 Pre and post-Floyd trends in white racial attitudes (± 38 days)

Note. Plots are LOESS-smoothed with 95% confidence areas. Parallel green and black lines along the y-axis represent the white sample's mean racial liberalism score before and after the death of George Floyd, respectively.

Table 5.1 Comparison of means tests

| | Racial Liberalism | | Pro-White (vs. Black) Favorability | | Support for Reparations | |
|------------|-------------------|-----------|------------------------------------|----------|-------------------------|----------|
| | -38 Days | +38 Days | -38 Days | +38 Days | -38 Days | +38 Days |
| White Mean | -0.181 | -0.007*** | 0.194 | 0.150* | 16.29% | 18.94%** |
| N | 20,228 | 20,735 | 20,154 | 20,640 | 6,870 | 6,972 |

Note. Data limited to white respondents. Cell entries are predicted margins from OLS models.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Continuing onward to, the effect of the Floyd incident on favorability of whites vs. blacks is comparatively less pronounced but still discernable. We see that the gap between white and black favorability ratings was trending in the pro-white direction in the weeks and days leading up to the Floyd incident. But after May 25, this trend abruptly reverses and moves in the negative direction before rebounding in the later weeks of the post-Floyd period. Overall, though, and consistent with H10, the pro-white favorability difference among whites fell by 0.044 points, a very modest but nonetheless significant ($p=0.018$) decrease. Interestingly, and likely explaining the modesty of this change, when the individual favorability variables are collapsed into ‘favorable’ and ‘unfavorable’ dummies, we see that almost of all the change is driven by increases in ‘unfavorable’ views of *both* whites (+2.6 points, $p < 0.001$) and blacks (+2.9 points, $p < 0.001$). And, as we will see later, this latter change (i.e., increases in unfavorable views of blacks) is entirely attributable to an eventual white Republican and conservative post-Floyd backlash.

Finally, the pattern for reparations attitudes is more difficult to interpret. H9 predicted that white support for reparations would significantly increase from the pre- to post-Floyd period. In the end, while white support is significantly ($p=0.003$) but modestly higher on average in the post-Floyd (18.94%) vs. the pre-Floyd (16.29%) period—and does appear to point upward after May 25--the long-run trend does not appear to depart much from that of the latter.

5.4.3 *Indirect effects on white racial attitudes: testing H8B-10B*

Hypotheses 8B-10B predicted that the effects of the Floyd incident on each outcome variable would be at least partially explained by increases in REM. Columns (b) of Table 5.2 begins a test these predictions. First, controlling for REM leads to a roughly 40% reduction in the treatment's direct effects on racial liberalism ($\beta = 0.103$; $p < 0.001$) while reducing them to insignificance in the case of pro-white vs. black favorability ($\beta = -0.017$; $p = 0.579$) and support for reparations ($\beta = -0.060$; $p = 0.966$), the latter of which turn negative. Further, net of the treatment, REM remains a significantly positive predictor of racial liberalism ($\beta = 0.012$, $p < 0.001$) and support for reparations ($\beta = 0.479$; $p = 0.018$), but an insignificantly negative predictor of favorability towards whites vs. blacks (-0.005 ; $p = 0.463$). When excluding REM and adjusting for the 8 control variables (columns c), the effects of the treatment on racial liberalism ($\beta = 0.174$, $p < 0.001$) and pro-white vs. black favorability ($\beta = -0.043$; $p = 0.014$) change very little from their baseline (columns a), though its effects on support for reparations ($\beta = 3.45$, $p < 0.001$) is moderately boosted. When REM is added to these covariate-adjusted models (columns d), though, the treatment no longer significantly predicts favorability ($\beta = -0.018$, $p = 0.525$) nor support for reparations ($\beta = 1.97$, $p = 0.128$), while its effects on racial liberalism ($\beta = 0.120$) are moderated but remain significant at the $p < 0.001$ level. The results of a causal mediation analysis⁹⁰, which are shown in Table 5.3, confirm these patterns. They indicate that around 32%

⁹⁰ These mediation models were fitted using Stata's 'sureg' (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) command. Each model consists of two equations: one regressing the outcome variable(s) on the treatment, the REM index, and background covariates, and another regressing REM on the treatment and background covariates. Following the guidance of Preacher and Hayes (2008), I calculate the indirect or mediated treatment effects by multiplying the covariate-adjusted effects of the treatment on REM by the covariate-adjusted effects of REM on a given outcome variable. I then calculate bootstrapped standard errors for these estimates from 10,000 replications.

of the treatment's total effects on white racial liberalism are mediated by REM ($\beta=0.057$, $p < 0.001$). For favorability towards whites vs. blacks, this figure jumps to 58%, though, in the case, only the total effects of the treatment ($\beta=-0.043$, $p=0.012$) are distinguishable from zero ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=-0.025$, $p=0.263$; $\beta_{\text{Total}}=-0.018$, $p=0.529$). Finally, virtually all (94%) of the treatment's total effects on support for reparations is mediated by REM ($\beta=0.080$, $p=0.004$). Thus, we find evidence that REM partially and fully mediated the treatment's total effects on white racial liberalism (H8B) and support for reparations (H10B), respectively, but no conclusive evidence that REM mediated its total effects on white vs. black favorability ratings (H9B).

Table 5.2 Direct effects of treatment and REM on white racial attitudes

| | Racial Liberalism (Z) | | | |
|----------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| Treatment | 0.173*** (0.014) | 0.103*** (0.023) | 0.174*** (0.012) | 0.120*** (0.018) |
| REM | --- | 0.012*** (0.003) | --- | 0.009*** (0.003) |
| Constant | -0.181*** (0.010) | -0.190*** (0.010) | 1.02*** (0.044) | 1.02*** (0.034) |
| N | 40,963 | | | |
| R ² | 0.007 | 0.008 | 0.346 | 0.347 |
| | White - Black Favorability | | | |
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| Treatment | -0.044* (0.019) | -0.017 (0.024) | -0.043* (0.014) | -0.018 (0.022) |
| REM | | -0.005 (0.004) | --- | -0.004 (0.003) |
| Constant | 0.194*** (0.013) | 0.198*** (0.013) | -0.795*** (0.073) | -0.792*** (0.073) |
| N | 40,794 | | | |
| R ² | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.090 | 0.090 |
| | Support for Reparations (%) | | | |
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| Treatment | 2.65** (0.890) | -0.060 (1.40) | 3.45*** (0.819) | 1.97 (1.29) |
| REM | --- | 0.479* (0.203) | --- | 0.262 (0.181) |
| Constant | 16.29*** (0.009) | 15.93*** (0.622) | 62.04*** (3.35) | 61.94*** (3.34) |
| N | 13,842 | | | |
| R ² | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.170 | 0.170 |

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 5.3 Results of causal mediation models

| | Racial Liberalism | White – Black Favorability | Support for Reparations |
|---------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Direct Effect | 0.119*** (0.018) | -0.018 (0.029) | 0.005 (0.035) |
| Indirect via REM | 0.057*** (0.014) | -0.025 (0.023) | 0.080** (0.028) |
| Total Effect | 0.176*** (0.012) | -0.043* (0.017) | 0.085*** (0.022) |
| Proportion Mediated | 0.323 | 0.582 | 0.942 |

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with bootstrapped standard errors (10,000 reps) in parentheses. The mediator variable in each model is the Racial Equalitarian Media (REM) index. All models are adjusted for background control variables

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

5.4.4 Effects of treatment x time on white racial attitudes

Columns (a) of Table 5.4 display the estimated effects of the treatment x days interaction on each of the three outcome variables. For white racial liberalism, this interaction is significantly negative term ($\beta = -0.004$; $p = 0.002$), which indicates that the incident's effects on this outcome became increasingly negative in later days of the post-Floyd period. A similar pattern is observed for differences in white vs. black favorability. Though modestly lower overall, the significantly positive treatment x days interaction ($\beta = 0.005$; $p = 0.003$) reveals that the effects of the Floyd incident ultimately moved in the pro-white direction with the passage of days. In contrast, when it comes to white support for reparations, the interaction term is insignificant ($\beta = -0.077$; $p = 0.342$), which suggests that the positive effects of the Floyd incident on this variable are fairly constant across the 38 days of the post-Floyd period. Adjusting for the 8 control variables (columns b) does not meaningfully change the interaction term's coefficient for any of the three outcome variables.

Table 5.4 Results of treatment x days interaction models

| | Racial Liberalism | | Pro-white vs. Black Favorability | | Support for Reparations | |
|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Treatment | 0.113*** (0.028) | 0.118*** (0.023) | -0.101** (0.037) | -0.080** (0.028) | -0.320 (1.79) | 0.633 (1.66) |
| Days from incident | 0.004*** (0.001) | 0.003*** (0.001) | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.001 (0.001) | 0.117* (0.049) | 0.124** (0.045) |
| Treatment x Days | -0.004** (0.001) | -0.003** (0.001) | 0.005** (0.002) | 0.005** (0.002) | -0.077 (0.081) | -0.098 (0.075) |
| Constant | -0.113*** (0.018) | 1.08*** (0.046) | 0.172*** (0.025) | -0.815*** (0.077) | 18.47*** (1.13) | 64.42*** (3.49) |
| N | 40,963 | | 40,794 | | 13,842 | |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.008 | 0.347 | 0.001 | 0.090 | 0.002 | 0.171 |

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Coefficients in columns (b) are adjusted for ideological strength, party strength, education, household income, age, sex, political interest, and region of residence.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The results thus are generally consonant with earlier predictions. Statistically significant changes in the racially liberal direction were observed for all outcome variables in the 38 days following the Floyd incident. However, all of them were relatively modest in magnitude, while those for racial liberalism and pro-white favorability eventually trended in a racially conservative direction. As I will demonstrate below, at least some of this can be attributed to the countervailing effects of intra-white ideological polarization.

5.4.5 Direct effects on white racial attitudes by party/ideology: testing H8A-10A

Hypotheses 8A predicted that the effects of the Floyd incident on racial liberalism would be stronger for white Democrats and liberals than for Republicans and conservatives. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 offer visual support of this hypothesis as it pertains to racial liberalism: the post-Floyd increases among white Democrats and liberals are much more pronounced than those observed for Republicans and conservatives. In fact, the comparison of means in Table 5.5 shows that racial liberalism increased by 0.239SD ($p < 0.001$) and 0.254SD ($p < 0.001$) among the former two groups, respectively, and by 0.125SD ($p < 0.001$) and 0.122SD ($p < 0.001$) among the latter.

As reflected in Figure 5.13, which graphs the average marginal effects from the treatment x party/ideology interaction terms, the differences in the size of these coefficients are all significant at the $p < 0.001$ level.




Figure 5.6 Pre and post-Floyd trends in white racial liberalism by party and ideology (complete series)




Figure 5.7 Pre and post-Floyd trends in white racial liberalism by party and ideology (± 38 days)
 Note. Plots are LOESS-smoothed with 95% confidence areas. Parallel green and black lines along the y-axis represent a subgroup's mean racial liberalism score before and after the death of George Floyd, respectively.

Hypothesis 9A, which relates to the effects of the treatment on pro-white vs. black favorability differences, also finds support in the data. These trends are visualized in Figures 5.8 and 5.9. Though white Democrats (Mean₋₃₈=-0.120) and liberals (Mean₋₃₈=-0.179) rated blacks more favorably than whites on average even in the 38-day pre-Floyd period, this difference grew by 0.149 ($p < 0.001$) and 0.195 ($p < 0.001$) points, respectively, in the 38 days following the Floyd incident. In contrast, though white Republicans (Mean₋₃₈=0.443) and conservatives (Mean₋₃₈=0.445) rated whites more favorably than blacks on average in the pre-Floyd period, the size of these pro-white favorability differences actually slightly *increased* in the post-Floyd period—by 0.058 points ($p=0.021$) for white Republicans and by 0.108 points ($p < 0.001$) for white conservatives. In absolute terms, the size of the changes in this variable for these two subgroups was significantly smaller than that of those observed among white Democrats ($p < 0.001$) and liberals ($p < 0.001$), which accords with H9A.




Figure 5.8 Trends in whites' favorability towards whites vs. blacks by party and ideology (complete series)




Figure 5.9 Trends in whites' favorability towards whites vs. blacks by party and ideology (± 38 days)

To examine whether these changes in favorability differentials are driven by increases in favorable vs. unfavorable views of whites and/or blacks, I create dummy variables for the 'favorable' and 'unfavorable' categories of each group's favorability scale. The average change in these response categories for each group are shown in Figure 5.10 below. For white Democrats, we see that the changes are almost equally due to increases in unfavorable views of whites ($\beta=0.027$, $p=0.001$) and increases in favorable views of blacks ($\beta=0.024$, $p=0.008$). Among white liberals, however, *all* of this change is driven by decreases in favorable views ($\beta=-0.038$, $p=0.001$) and slightly larger increases in unfavorable views of whites ($\beta=0.043$, $p < 0.001$). Interestingly, for both white Republicans and conservatives, the comparatively modest changes appear to be entirely due to increases in unfavorable views of whites ($\beta_{\text{WhiteRep}}=0.022$, p

< 0.001 ; $\beta_{\text{WhiteCon}}=0.020$, $p < 0.001$) and even larger increases in unfavorable views of blacks⁹¹
 $(\beta_{\text{WhiteRep}}=0.057$, $p < 0.001$; $\beta_{\text{WhiteCon}}=0.057$, $p < 0.001$)



Figure 5.10 Average effects of treatment on percent of whites with ‘favorable’ and ‘unfavorable’ views of blacks and whites by party and ideology.

Finally, and turning to support for reparations (Figures 5.11 and 5.12), whereas support significantly increased by roughly 5.6 ($p=0.001$) and 7.4 ($p=0.001$) percentage points among white Democrats (24.4% \rightarrow 29.9%) and liberals (34.0% \rightarrow 41.4%)⁹², respectively, it (insignificantly) grew by only 1.3 ($p=0.180$) points among white Republicans and by 2 points ($p=0.050$) points among conservatives. Supporting H10A, the differences in the size of these changes between these groups (White Democrats vs. Republicans: $p=0.033$; White Liberals vs. Conservatives: $p=0.031$) are all significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

⁹¹ As will be further elaborated on below, the treatment x day interactions helps to make sense of these patterns.

⁹² For both white Democrats and liberals, virtually all this increase in support is a function of movement out of the ‘disagree’ category. The small but significant increase among white Republicans, meanwhile, is mostly due to movement out of the ‘not sure’ category.




Figure 5.11 Trends in white support for reparations by party and ideology (complete series)




Figure 5.12 Trends in white support for reparations by party and ideology (± 38 days)

Note. Plots are LOESS-smoothed with 95% confidence areas. Parallel green and black lines along the y-axis represent a subgroup's mean support for reparations before and after the death of George Floyd, respectively.




Figure 5.13 Summary of average treatment effects on white racial attitudes by party and ideology

Table 5.5 Comparison of means tests

| | Racial Liberalism (Z) | | Pro-White (vs. Black) Favorability | | Support for Reparations | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------|------------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------|----------|
| | -38 Days | +38 Days | -38 Days | +38 Days | -38 Days | +38 Days |
| White Democrat | 0.361 | 0.600*** | -0.120 | -0.270*** | 24.37% | 29.94%** |
| White Republican | -0.597 | -0.472*** | 0.443 | 0.501* | 11.21% | 12.53% |
| White Liberal | 0.496 | 0.750*** | -0.179 | -0.373*** | 34.02% | 41.43%** |
| White Conservative | -0.690 | -0.568*** | 0.445 | 0.553*** | 7.95% | 9.97%* |

Note. Cell entries are predicted margins from OLS models in which the treatment is interacted with either ideology or party-ID.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

5.4.6 Indirect effects via REM

The middle section of Table 5.6 indicates that adjusting for the 8 control variables does little to attenuate the baseline effects (top section) of the treatment. If anything, doing so actually enhances its effects on support for reparations among all subgroups. Models in the bottom section of Table 5.6 add REM x party-ID/ideology interaction terms⁹³. We now see that the

⁹³ Thus, each of these models contains two interaction terms: one where the treatment is interacted with party-ID/ideology and another where REM is interacted with party-ID/ideology.

average treatment effects on racial liberalism are reduced by just over a third among white Democrats ($\beta=0.240 \rightarrow 0.158$), by 27% among white Republicans ($\beta=0.125 \rightarrow 0.091$), by 40% among white liberals ($\beta=0.248 \rightarrow 0.149$), and by a little under 15% among white conservatives ($\beta=0.115 \rightarrow 0.098$). Further, holding both the treatment and all other covariates constant, the independent effects of REM on racial liberalism are significantly positive *only* for white Democrats ($\beta=0.014$; $p < 0.001$) and liberals ($\beta=0.017$; $p < 0.001$). In contrast, its effects on racial liberalism among white Republicans ($\beta=0.006$, $p=0.099$) and conservatives ($\beta=0.003$, $p=0.449$) are not distinguishable from zero. Turning to the reparations models, controlling for REM reduces the treatment's effects on support to insignificance for white Democrats ($\beta=6.29$, $p < 0.001 \rightarrow 1.02$, $p=0.699$) and liberals ($\beta=7.87$, $p < 0.001 \rightarrow 0.943$; $p=0.785$), while somewhat enhancing them for white Republicans ($\beta=1.83$, $p=0.050 \rightarrow 3.08$, $p=0.037$) and conservatives ($\beta=2.19$, $p=0.031 \rightarrow 2.83$, $p=0.086$). As in the case of the racial liberalism models, the independent effects of REM on support for reparations are only positive and only reach significance among white Democrats ($\beta=0.921$, $p=0.012$; $\beta_{\text{Republican}}=-0.222$, $p=0.248$) and liberals ($\beta=1.23$, $p=0.012$; $\beta_{\text{Conservative}}=-0.113$, $p=0.623$). Finally, controlling for REM somewhat reduces the treatment's effects on white vs. black favorability for white Democrats ($\beta=-0.147$, $p < 0.001 \rightarrow \beta=-0.101$, $p=0.029$), only marginally for white liberals ($\beta=-0.185$, $p < 0.001 \rightarrow \beta=-0.172$, $p=0.004$) and conservatives ($\beta=0.112$, $p < 0.001 \rightarrow \beta=0.095$, $p=0.048$), and not at all for white Republicans ($\beta=0.055$, $p=0.027 \rightarrow \beta=0.055$, $p=0.186$). Diverging from the results of the other two outcome models, REM has no independent effects on the favorability differentials of any of the 4 groups.

Table 5.6 Baseline and adjusted treatment effects on white racial attitudes

| | Racial Liberalism | | | | Pro-White vs. Black Favorability | | | | Support for Reparations | | | |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | White Dem. | White Repub. | White Lib. | White Con. | White Dem. | White Repub. | White Lib. | White Con. | White Dem. | White Repub. | White Lib. | White Con. |
| Baseline Models | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Treatment | 0.239*** (0.021) | 0.125*** (0.017) | 0.254*** (0.026) | 0.122*** (0.026) | -0.149*** (0.030) | 0.058* (0.025) | -0.195*** (0.039) | 0.108*** (0.029) | 5.57** (1.73) | 1.13 (0.106) | 7.41** (2.27) | 2.02* (1.03) |
| Constant | 0.361*** (0.015) | | 0.496*** (0.018) | | -0.120*** (0.021) | | -0.179*** (0.027) | | 24.37*** (1.16) | | 34.02*** (1.55) | |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.257 | | 0.348 | | 0.063 | | 0.080 | | 0.040 | | 0.124 | |
| Controlled Models (Excluding REM x Party/Ideology Interaction) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Treatment | 0.240*** (0.019) | 0.125*** (0.016) | 0.248*** (0.023) | 0.115*** (0.018) | -0.147*** (0.029) | 0.055* (0.025) | -0.185*** (0.037) | 0.112*** (0.029) | 6.29*** (1.62) | 1.83* (0.935) | 7.87*** (2.17) | 2.19* (1.01) |
| Constant | 1.05*** (0.053) | | 1.17*** (0.066) | | -0.826*** (0.089) | | -0.965*** (0.114) | | 59.73*** (4.05) | | 60.55*** (4.93) | |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.368 | | 0.441 | | 0.095 | | 0.127 | | 0.172 | | 0.199 | |
| Controlled Models (Including REM x Party/Ideology Interaction) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Treatment | 0.158*** (0.031) | 0.070** (0.022) | 0.149*** (0.036) | 0.098** (0.028) | -0.101* (0.046) | 0.055 (0.042) | -0.172** (0.059) | 0.095* (0.048) | 1.02 (2.62) | 3.08* (1.48) | 0.943 (3.46) | 2.83† (1.65) |
| REM | 0.014*** (0.004) | 0.006† (0.004) | 0.017*** (0.005) | 0.003 (0.004) | -0.008 (0.006) | 0.000 (0.006) | -0.002 (0.008) | 0.003 (0.006) | 0.921* (0.366) | -0.222 (0.192) | 1.23* (0.489) | -0.113 (0.229) |
| Constant | 1.04*** (0.053) | | 1.16*** (0.066) | | -0.820*** (0.089) | | -0.963*** (0.114) | | 59.18*** (4.03) | | 59.75*** (4.89) | |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.368 | | 0.442 | | 0.095 | | 0.127 | | 0.174 | | 0.201 | |
| Group N | 15,851 | 20,631 | 10,514 | 13,714 | 15,824 | 20,503 | 10,941 | 14,306 | 5,358 | 6,923 | 3,749 | 4,786 |
| Model N | 36,482 | | 25,337 | | 36,327 | | 25,247 | | 12,281 | | 8,535 | |

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized conditional coefficients from these treatment (REM) x ideology/party-ID interaction terms with robust standard errors in parentheses. Both the baseline and the first controlled model include treatment x party-ID/ideology interaction terms. The second controlled model adds an REM x party-ID/ideology interaction.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

The results thus far suggest that REM partially and completely mediates the effects of the treatment on racial liberalism and support for reparations, respectively, among white Democrats and liberals. In contrast, little to no evidence of mediation is observed for these outcomes among white Republicans and conservatives. Lastly, when it comes to white vs. black favorability differentials, no clear evidence of mediation is observed for *any* of the 4 groups.

To provide a more formal test of this suggested mediation, I fit a series of moderated mediation models⁹⁴ with Stata's 'sureg' command. Each of these models consists of two equations: one where REM is regressed onto the treatment, and another where the outcome variable is regressed on treatment x ideology/party-ID and REM x ideology/party-ID interactions along with the background/demographic control variables. Indirect effects are then calculated by multiplying each group's estimated REM coefficient in the outcome equation by the coefficient of the treatment in the REM (mediation) equation. Direct effects are calculated by multiplying each group's coefficients in the outcome equations. Standard errors for all of these estimates are bootstrapped from 10,000 replications.

The results of these moderated mediation models are shown in Table 5.7. For the racial liberalism models, they generally confirm what was suggested above: just under 40% and 33% of treatment's total effect on white Democrat ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=0.080$, $p=0.001$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=0.034, 0.125) and liberal ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=0.098$, $p < 0.001$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=0.045, 0.147) racial liberalism, respectively, was indirectly conveyed via REM. In contrast, none of the effects via REM on white Republican ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=0.032$, $p=0.123$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.009, 0.073; share mediated=17.4%) and conservative ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=0.016$, $p=0.465$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.027, 0.060; share mediated=10.5%) racial liberalism approach significance. Differences in the

⁹⁴ Why moderated mediation? Because the effects of both the treatment and REM are conditional on party-ID and ideology.

size of these indirect effects are significant for those between white liberals and conservatives ($p=0.014$, $z=2.34$) but fall short of significance for those between white Democrats vs. Republicans ($p=0.126$, $z=1.53$). For support for reparations, around 77% and 86% of the treatment's total effects on white Democrat ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=0.048$, $p=0.025$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=0.006, 0.090) and liberal ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=0.068$, $p=0.015$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=0.014, 0.124) support, respectively, are mediated through REM. Among white Republicans ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=-0.013$, $p=0.266$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.035, 0.010) and conservatives ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=-0.008$, $p=0.804$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.033, 0.018), these indirect effects are negative and indistinguishable from zero. Differences in the size of these coefficients are significant both for those between white liberals and conservatives ($p=0.014$, $z=2.46$) and also for those between white Democrats and Republicans ($p=0.012$, $z=2.50$). Finally, the treatment's indirect effects on white vs. black favorability ratings via REM do not approach significance for any of the 4 groups ($\beta_{\text{Dem-Indirect}}=-0.043$, $p=0.213$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.111, 0.026; $\beta_{\text{Rep-Indirect}}=0.002$, $p=0.959$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.060, 0.066; $\beta_{\text{Lib-Indirect}}=-0.012$, $p=0.786$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.105, 0.077; $\beta_{\text{Con-Indirect}}=0.017$, $p=0.644$, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.057, 0.088).

In sum, REM mediated more than a third and nearly all of the treatment's effects on racial liberalism and support for reparations, respectively, among white Democrats and liberals. In stark contrast, and in line with theoretical expectations, indirect effects on these outcomes tended to be significantly smaller and never approached significance for white Republicans and conservatives. Lastly, no significant indirect effects via REM were observed for any of the 4 groups when it comes to white vs. black favorability ratings.

Table 5.7 Results of moderated-mediation models

| | Racial Liberalism | | | | White – Black Favorability | | | | Reparations | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | White Dem. | White Repub. | White Lib. | White Con. | White Dem. | White Repub. | White Lib. | White Con. | White Dem. | White Repub. | White Lib. | White Con. |
| Direct Effect | 0.160*** (0.031) | 0.152*** (0.034) | 0.150*** (0.036) | 0.135** (0.040) | -0.104* (0.046) | -0.097† (0.051) | -0.172** (0.059) | -0.167* (0.066) | 0.014 (0.027) | 0.003 (0.030) | 0.011 (0.035) | -0.003 (0.039) |
| Indirect via REM | 0.080** (0.023) | 0.032 (0.021) | 0.098*** (0.027) | 0.016 (0.022) | -0.043 (0.035) | 0.002 (0.033) | -0.012 (0.046) | 0.017 (0.037) | 0.048* (0.022) | -0.013 (0.012) | 0.068* (0.028) | -0.008 (0.013) |
| Total Effect | 0.240*** (0.019) | 0.184*** (0.041) | 0.247*** (0.022) | 0.152** (0.047) | -0.148*** (0.028) | -0.095 (0.064) | -0.185*** (0.037) | -0.150† (0.079) | 0.062*** (0.016) | -0.010 | 0.079*** (0.022) | -0.010 (0.042) |
| Proportion Mediated | 0.333 | --- | 0.397 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.774 | --- | 0.861 | --- |

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The mediator variable is the Racial Equalitarian Media (REM) Index.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Taken together, and with the exception of the preceding, these results are generally consistent with the notion that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals are more responsive to increases in REM messaging than their Republican and conservative counterparts.

5.4.7 *Treatment x days interaction effects*

The analyses thus far have been largely concerned with the main effects of the treatment. But given the mass protests and, in some cases, looting and violence that unfolded during the 38 days following the Floyd incident, we're also interested in determining if and to what extent these effects evolve with the passage of time. Accordingly, columns (a) of Table 5.8 show the baseline effects of a three-way treatment x days x party-ID/ideology interaction on each outcome variable. Beginning with racial liberalism, we see that the positive effects of the treatment become significantly *stronger* with the passage of days for white Democrats ($\beta=0.006$; $p < 0.001$), insignificantly stronger for white liberals ($\beta=0.003$; $p=0.096$), and significantly *weaker* or negative for both white Republicans ($\beta=-0.003$; $p=0.009$) and conservatives ($\beta=-0.004$; $p=0.003$). A similar pattern is observed for the treatment's effects on pro-white vs. black favorability ratings. As more days elapse in the post-Floyd period, the negative effects become insignificantly stronger for white Democrats ($\beta=-0.006$; $p=0.072$), insignificantly more positive for liberals ($\beta=0.003$; $p=0.338$), and significantly positive or pro-white among white Republicans ($\beta=0.009$; $p < 0.001$) and conservatives ($\beta=0.009$; $p < 0.001$). Recall that for the latter two subgroups, the effects on these favorability differentials were limited to increases in unfavorable views of both whites *and* blacks. Though not shown, when 'unfavorable' dummies on the treatment x day interaction, we learn that unfavorable views of whites significantly *decrease* with the passage of days among white Republicans ($\beta_{\text{WhiteRep}}=-0.001$, $p=0.005$; $\beta_{\text{WhiteCon}}=0.000$,

$p=0.727$) while those of blacks significantly *increase* among both subgroups ($\beta_{\text{WhiteRep}}=0.002$, $p=0.007$; $\beta_{\text{WhiteCon}}=0.003$, $p=0.001$) While somewhat speculative, these results are suggestive of a Floyd ‘backlash’ among white Republicans and conservatives as (presumably) ‘riots’ and ‘looting’ became more prominent in later post-Floyd media coverage. Finally, the interactive effects on support for reparations are indistinguishable from 0 for all subgroups.

Table 5.8 Results of treatment x days x party-ID/ideology interaction models

| Racial Liberalism | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | (a) | | (b) | | (a) | | (b) | |
| | White Dem. | White Repub. | White Dem. | White Repub. | White Lib. | White Con. | White Lib. | White Con. |
| Treatment | 0.112** (0.041) | 0.107** (0.033) | 0.113** (0.038) | 0.113*** (0.031) | 0.202*** (0.051) | 0.119** (0.038) | 0.186*** (0.047) | 0.119** (0.035) |
| Days from incident | 0.003** (0.001) | 0.000 (0.001) | 0.003*** (0.001) | 0.000 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.000 (0.001) | 0.002 (0.001) | -0.000 (0.001) |
| Treatment x Days | 0.006*** (0.002) | -0.003** (0.001) | 0.005*** (0.001) | -0.003** (0.001) | 0.003† (0.002) | -0.004** (0.001) | 0.003* (0.002) | -0.004** (0.001) |
| Constant | 0.377*** (0.026) | | 1.08*** (0.057) | | 0.491*** (0.034) | | 1.17*** (0.072) | |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.258 | | 0.369 | | 0.349 | | 0.442 | |
| White vs. Black Favorability | | | | | | | | |
| Treatment | -0.134* (0.060) | -0.068 (0.052) | -0.122* (0.058) | -0.060 (0.052) | -0.305*** (0.077) | -0.052 (0.058) | -0.271*** (0.074) | -0.030 (0.058) |
| Days from incident | -0.000 (0.001) | 0.003** (0.001) | -0.001 (0.001) | 0.003* (0.001) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.004** (0.001) | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.004** (0.001) |
| Treatment x Days | -0.004† (0.002) | 0.009*** (0.002) | -0.004† (0.002) | 0.008*** (0.002) | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.009*** (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.008*** (0.002) |
| Constant | -0.067 (0.042) | | -0.786*** (0.097) | | -0.119* (0.053) | | -0.919*** (0.124) | |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.064 | | 0.097 | | 0.081 | | 0.128 | |
| Support for Reparations | | | | | | | | |
| Treatment | 0.600 (3.42) | -1.76 (2.05) | 1.76 (3.24) | -1.01 (1.94) | 2.47 (4.49) | -0.538 (2.17) | 5.24 (4.32) | -0.571 (2.08) |
| Days from incident | 0.129 (0.079) | 0.080† (0.079) | 0.118 (0.075) | 0.075† (0.044) | 0.126 (0.103) | 0.070 (0.047) | 0.066 (0.098) | 0.075 (0.047) |
| Treatment x Days | 0.146 (0.126) | 0.025 (0.072) | 0.116 (0.119) | 0.005 (0.070) | 0.199 (0.158) | -0.011 (0.078) | 0.136 (0.153) | -0.021 (0.076) |
| Constant | 26.46*** (2.13) | | 62.05*** (4.46) | | 35.07*** (2.91) | | 60.76*** (5.48) | |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.041 | | 0.173 | | 0.124 | | 0.200 | |

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in columns (b) are adjusted for ideological strength, party strength, education, household income, age, sex, political interest, and region of residence.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Models in column (b) adjust the above estimates for the 8 background/demographic control variables. Save for the interaction term reaching $p < 0.05$ significance for white liberals ($\beta=0.003$, $p=0.035$) in the racial liberalism model, this adjustment does not meaningfully change any of the baseline estimates.

5.5 Robustness checks and secondary analyses

5.5.1 Tests of bandwidth sensitivity

To what extent are the preceding results a function of the selected time bandwidth? I examine this question by re-running my models at bandwidths of a week, two weeks, and for the full sample (i.e., July 18 2019-May 24 2020 vs. May 26-July 1 2020). Table 5.9 below presents the results. Beginning with ± 1 week, we see that racial liberalism was insignificantly and significantly higher, respectively, among white Democrats ($\beta=0.034$; $p=0.448$) and liberals ($\beta=0.118$; $p=0.047$) in the week following the Floyd incident than in the week preceding it. However, the results of the treatment x days interaction terms ($\beta_{\text{WhiteDem}}=0.047$, $p=0.005$; $\beta_{\text{WhiteLib}}=0.050$, $p=0.019$) suggests that these differences start becoming larger in the later days of the first post-Floyd week. This would be consistent with the several days lag in media coverage of the incident that was noted earlier. Indeed, when the bandwidth is expanded to ± 2 weeks, thus capturing this later growth, all of the main effects become comfortably significant ($\beta_{\text{WhiteDem}}=0.140$, $p < 0.001$; $\beta_{\text{WhiteLib}}=0.218$, $p < 0.001$). On the other hand, the week to week differences for both white Republicans ($\beta=0.097$; $p=0.007$) and conservatives ($\beta=0.099$; $p=0.017$) do reach significance at the $p < 0.05$ level. The interaction terms for both of these groups are significantly ($\beta_{\text{WhiteRep}}=0.026$, $p=0.045$) and insignificantly ($\beta_{\text{WhiteCon}}=0.020$, $p=0.159$) positive, though, which suggests that the previously observed decay or reversal in their racial liberalism occurred in later weeks.

Table 5.9 Model results at alternate bandwidths

| | ±1 Week | | | ±2 Weeks | | | Full sample | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| | Racial liberalism | White – Black Favorability | Support for Reparations | Racial liberalism | White – Black Favorability | Support for Reparations | Racial liberalism | White – Black Favorability | Support for Reparations |
| Whites | | | | | | | | | |
| Treatment group | 0.072* (0.030) | -0.080* (0.040) | 1.35 (1.93) | 0.133*** (0.023) | -0.083** (0.030) | 2.06 (1.46) | 0.208*** (0.011) | -0.038** (0.014) | 3.76*** (0.698) |
| Treatment x Days | 0.057*** (0.015) | -0.051* (0.020) | 0.183 (1.01) | 0.024*** (0.006) | -0.013† (0.007) | 0.184 (0.363) | -0.001 (0.001) | 0.004** (0.001) | 0.028 (0.064) |
| N | 8,462 | 8,432 | 2,900 | 15,411 | 15,347 | 5,244 | 190,199 | 190,211 | 63,066 |
| White Democrats | | | | | | | | | |
| Treatment group | 0.034 (0.045) | -0.154* (0.067) | 5.62 (3.85) | 0.140*** (0.033) | -0.144** (0.049) | 4.09 (2.78) | 0.254*** (0.016) | -0.153*** (0.022) | 5.88*** (1.36) |
| Treatment x Days | 0.047** (0.017) | -0.021 (0.022) | 2.99* (1.48) | 0.030*** (0.006) | -0.009 (0.008) | 0.234 (0.510) | 0.006*** (0.002) | -0.004† (0.002) | 0.504*** (0.067) |
| N | 3,353 | 3,343 | 1,133 | 6,054 | 6,042 | 2,069 | 74,544 | 74,567 | 24,738 |
| White Republicans | | | | | | | | | |
| Treatment group | 0.097** (0.036) | -0.054 (0.058) | -2.70 (2.06) | 0.113*** (0.033) | -0.035 (0.042) | 0.209 (1.62) | 0.174*** (0.013) | 0.065** (0.020) | 3.20*** (0.763) |
| Treatment x Days | 0.026* (0.015) | -0.005 (0.022) | -0.195 (0.670) | 0.009† (0.005) | 0.003 (0.008) | 0.606* (0.308) | -0.003** (0.001) | 0.009*** (0.002) | -0.212*** (0.045) |
| N | 4,168 | 4,148 | 1,424 | 7,637 | 7,592 | 2,590 | 94,273 | 94,267 | 31,259 |
| White Liberals | | | | | | | | | |
| Treatment group | 0.118* (0.059) | -0.261** (0.086) | 2.73 (4.97) | 0.218*** (0.041) | -0.244*** (0.065) | 4.41 (3.68) | 0.244*** (0.019) | -0.166*** (0.029) | 9.02*** (1.78) |
| Treatment x Days | 0.050* (0.021) | -0.014 (0.028) | 1.68 (1.89) | 0.034*** (0.007) | 0.002 (0.011) | 0.648 (0.675) | 0.003† (0.002) | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.199 (0.158) |
| N | 2,254 | 2,245 | 774 | 4,067 | 4,053 | 1,403 | 49,257 | 49,241 | 16,312 |
| White Conservatives | | | | | | | | | |
| Treatment group | 0.099* (0.041) | -0.014 (0.064) | -2.09 (2.36) | 0.111*** (0.031) | -0.007 (0.047) | 1.68 (1.79) | 0.164*** (0.015) | 0.097*** (0.024) | 2.82** (0.825) |
| Treatment x Days | 0.020 (0.014) | 0.032 (0.021) | 1.78† (0.943) | 0.008 (0.006) | 0.001 (0.008) | 0.759** (0.271) | -0.004** (0.001) | 0.009*** (0.002) | -0.011 (0.078) |
| N | 2,949 | 2,948 | 988 | 5,374 | 5,368 | 1,813 | 66,392 | 66,446 | 21,993 |

Note. The 'Treatment group' and 'Treatment x Days' rows represent separate models. Cell entries in the 'Treatment group' row are unstandardized bivariate OLS coefficients. Cell entries in the 'Treatment x Days' row are the unstandardized OLS coefficients from three-way treatment x days x party-ID/ideology interactions. Constituent terms and their coefficients are not shown.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

The pattern for white vs. black favorability ratings are somewhat different. Both white Democrats ($\beta=-0.154$, $p=0.021$) and liberals ($\beta=-0.261$, $p=0.002$) were significantly less pro-white and more pro-black in their favorability responses in the week following the Floyd incident. However, and referring to the interaction terms, the magnitude of the treatment's anti-white/pro-black effects on these differentials did not meaningfully change as the days elapsed ($\beta_{\text{WhiteDem}}=-0.021$, $p < 0.345$; $\beta_{\text{WhiteLib}}=-0.014$, $p=0.629$). In contrast, while in the expected direction, the week to week changes among white Republicans ($\beta=-0.054$, $p=0.354$) and conservatives ($\beta=-0.014$, $p=0.831$) are not significant—nor are the interaction terms. That these pre vs. post-Floyd differences remain insignificant even when the bandwidth is widened to ± 2 weeks speaks both to their modest size and conflicting directions (i.e., increases in white unfavorability ultimately fade and are replaced by increases in black unfavorability).

Turning to support for reparations, white Democrat ($\beta = 5.62$; $p=0.144$) and liberal ($\beta=2.73$, $p=0.583$) support was nominally but not significantly higher in the 7 days following the Floyd incident. Though the treatment x days interaction effects were significant for white Democrats ($\beta=2.99$, $p=0.043$)—and insignificant for white liberals ($\beta=1.68$, $p=0.374$)—they become indistinguishable from zero when the bandwidth is widened to ± 2 weeks. That the main effects remain insignificant at this bandwidth but are significant at ± 38 days suggests that the increases in support are too modest to be detected in smaller samples. Though in the other direction, a similar picture appears to hold for white Republicans ($\beta=-2.70$; $p=0.191$) and conservatives ($\beta = -2.09$; $p=0.377$), for whom support was nominally but insignificantly *lower* in the week following the Floyd incident. At ± 2 weeks, these changes become positive but still fall short of 0.05 significance ($\beta_{\text{WhiteRep}}=0.209$, $p=0.897$; $\beta_{\text{WhiteCon}}=1.68$, $p=0.348$).

In sum, and depending on the subgroup in question, the results of the above indicate that post-Floyd changes in racial liberalism and pro-white vs. black favorability are generally apparent in the 7 days following the Floyd incident. These changes, however, come into starker relief when the bandwidth is expanded to ± 2 weeks. This is both due to larger sample sizes as well as subsequent growth in the magnitude of the Floyd effect. On the other hand, and likely owing to smaller sample sizes, increases in support for reparations were comparatively static and only reached significance at higher bandwidths.

5.5.2 Are the Floyd effects limited to racial attitudes?

An outstanding question is whether the effects of the Floyd incident were unique to racial attitudes. Recall that non-racial policy liberalism emerged as a significant positive predictor of racial liberalism in some of the models of chapter 4 (and in the models of Kellstedt 2000). Thus, we can't discount the possibility that the Floyd incident effected increased liberalism in general. To examine this possibility, I regress 56 different non-racial policy measures—all dummy-coded so that '1' denotes a 'liberal' response--on the ± 38 days treatment variable for whites as a whole and for each white subgroup. There are two things we are looking for. The first is consistency: are there significant increases in liberal responses across the universe of available policy items? Of course, with 280 different hypothesis tests (56 items x 5 groups), we would expect 14 of them to reach 0.05-level significance on chance alone. Thus, we must also examine the relative magnitude of any significant increases: are they of similar size to those observed for the racial outcome variables?

Figure 5.14 shows the percent of hypothesis tests that reached different thresholds of significance for whites as a whole and for each white subgroup. Overall, shifts in the liberal direction were significant at the 95% threshold or lower in 41 of the 280 (or 14.6%) hypothesis

tests. Sixteen of these tests were significant at the $p < 0.01$ level, while just three were significant at the $p < 0.001$ level. To contrast, across the 20 (4 items x 5 groups) hypothesis tests conducted on the 3 racial liberalism and single reparations item(s), 65% (or 13) were significant at the $p < 0.001$ level, while only 1 fell short of the $p < 0.05$ level. For the hypothesis tests conducted on the white Democrat and liberal samples, 91.1% (or 5 of 56) and 92.9% (4 of 56), respectively, fell short of the $p < 0.05$ threshold. Thus, among these groups, the number of tests that reached this level of significance was not much above what would be expected by chance. Among white Republicans (76.8%) and conservatives (85.7%), though, the number is considerably higher.




Figure 5.14 Distribution of p-values

Figure 5.15 scatter plots the p-values for both the non-racial and racial items for each white subgroup. Interestingly, we see that the non-racial issue items that reached the $p < 0.05$ level tended to differ by subgroup. For instance, among white Democrats, no significant changes were observed in the issue categories of healthcare, the environment, taxes, education, gun control, foreign policy, and trade policy. However, among white Republicans, and with the exception of taxes, there were significant changes on at least one item in each of these categories.



Figure 5.15 Scatter plot of p-values by issue category

Note. Dashed red and green lines along the y-axis represent the $p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.001$ significance cutoffs, respectively. Figures in parentheses denote the number of survey items in each issue category.

When correcting for multiple hypothesis testing, though, it becomes clear that, with a few exceptions, only the race outcome variables remain significant. To implement this correction, I opted to use the Romano-Wolf procedure for multiple comparisons (Romano & Wolf, 2005a, b, 2016). This procedure resamples from the data to create an asymptotic approximation for the distribution of effects in a dataset. Compared to the familiar and conservative Bonferroni (1935) procedure, this method affords researchers superior type-I and type-II error rates by accounting for underlying dependencies among groups of p-values. In resampling the data to generate a null distribution of test statistics whilst reckoning with variable intercorrelations, it allows researchers to observe which in a set of tests are more likely to be representations of chance and which tests stand apart from those tests consistent with the null.

Figure 15.6 depicts Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values for each white subgroup based on 1,000 bootstrap replications⁹⁵. Among white Democrats and liberals, three of the race outcome

⁹⁵ For this procedure, I use the ‘rwolf’ Stata package developed by Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019).

variables are all significant at the $p < 0.01$ level while support for reparations is significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. The only race-unrelated item to reach significance at the $p < 0.05$ threshold after correction is one of the dataset's 4 measures of modern sexism. Specifically, the percent of white Democrats and liberals disagreeing that 'women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve' went up by 5.7 and 7.2 points, respectively, in the 38-day post-Floyd period. While it's not immediately clear what to make of these increases, it should be noted that they are significantly smaller ($p < 0.001$, $p < 0.001$) than the 11.2 and 10.7 point increases in the percent of white Democrats and liberals, respectively, who disagreed that 'blacks should work their way up without special favors'.




Figure 15.16 Romano-Wolf p-values

The picture for white Republicans is slightly different. Replicating the main results, the change in Republican support for reparations is not distinguishable from 0, though changes in the other three race outcomes are significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. Two of the non-racial outcomes, namely support for allowing transgender people to serve in the military ($p=0.046$) and support for a public healthcare option ($p=0.036$), reach significance at the $p < 0.05$ level. A third,

opposition to deportations ($p=0.082$), is significant at the $p < 0.1$ threshold. Finally, among white conservatives, only the 9.1-point increase in the percent who perceive there to be ‘a lot/a great deal’ of discrimination against blacks remains significant ($p=0.001$) at the $p < 0.05$ level. The 2-point increase in the percent disagreeing that ‘blacks should work their way up without special favors’ item falls just short of this threshold ($p=0.060$), while similar increases in the percent agreeing with the ‘Generations of slavery and discrimination’ (+3.6%, $p=0.842$) item and in those supporting reparations (+1.2%, $p=0.889$) fall well above it.

Overall, then, when adjusting the hypothesis tests to account for the presence of false positives, the variables that remain significant at least at the $p < 0.05$ threshold are largely limited to this study’s primary outcome variables. Such not only offers compelling evidence of the Floyd effect, but also its outcome specificity.

Further evidence of this specificity can be found in comparisons of the change in the proportion of whites who perceive there to be ‘a lot’ or ‘a great deal’ of discrimination against blacks vs. other social groups. Table 5.10 shows that, across all white subgroups, shifts in perceptions of discrimination against non-black groups were significantly smaller than, and often in the opposite direction to, shifts in perceptions of anti-black discrimination. Interestingly, we also again observe some evidence of a Floyd backlash among white Republicans and conservatives for whom the percent perceiving ‘a lot’ or ‘a great deal’ of anti-white discrimination went up 2.5 ($p=0.004$) and 1.7 ($p=0.089$) points, respectively. This is consistent with what was observed in the main analyses wherein it was found the effects of the Floyd incident on these subgroups’ racial liberalism and pro-white vs. black favorability ultimately moved in the racially conservative direction in the later days of the post-Floyd period⁹⁶.

⁹⁶ While not reported above, a treatment x days interaction significantly positively predicted white Republican ($\beta=0.002$; $p < 0.001$) and white conservative perceptions ($\beta=0.002$; $p=0.018$) of anti-white discrimination. This once

Table 5.10 Change in share perceiving ‘a lot/a great deal’ of discrimination against different social groups

| | Whites | Blacks | Asians | Muslims | Christians | Women | Men |
|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Whites | 0.009 (0.006) | 0.092*** (0.007) | -0.018** (0.006) | -0.005 (0.007) | 0.001 (0.006) | 0.014* (0.007) | 0.001 (0.005) |
| White Democrats | -0.016* (0.007) | 0.086*** (0.010) | -0.037** (0.011) | -0.005 (0.010) | -0.014* (0.007) | 0.010 (0.011) | -0.018* (0.009) |
| White Republicans | 0.025** (0.009) | 0.093*** (0.009) | -0.010 (0.008) | -0.008 (0.010) | 0.011 (0.009) | 0.015† (0.008) | 0.009 (0.008) |
| White Liberals | -0.007 (0.010) | 0.074*** (0.011) | -0.029* (0.014) | 0.011 (0.012) | -0.021* (0.009) | 0.007 (0.014) | -0.018* (0.009) |
| White Conservatives | 0.017† (0.010) | 0.092*** (0.011) | 0.003 (0.009) | 0.002 (0.012) | 0.023* (0.011) | 0.031** (0.010) | 0.019* (0.009) |

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for the political subgroups were estimated from treatment x party-ID/ideology interactions. Dependent variables are dichotomous (e.g. 0=None at all/A little/A moderate amount, 1=A lot/A great deal).

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Though the Floyd incident may have most strongly affected perceptions of anti-black discrimination, this specificity is not equally manifest in comparisons of black/white vs. other group favorability ratings. Table 5.11 shows the change in ‘favorable’ and ‘unfavorable’ responses for each of the 15 target groups featured in the dataset. These results make clear that shifts in favorability were not limited to blacks and whites. Looking only at the racial/ethnic and social group targets, we see that there is not a single one for which no significant movement can be found across any of the subgroups. We also see that, for whites as a whole, movement was greater in the favorability ratings of several other social groups than it was in those of whites and blacks. For instance, the percent reporting favorable and unfavorable impressions of gays and lesbians increased and decreased by +3.8 (p < 0.001) and -3 (p < 0.001) percentage points, respectively. In contrast, movement in the impressions of ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ is limited to +2.6 (p < 0.001) and +2.9 (p < 0.001) point increases, respectively, in the percent reporting ‘unfavorable’ impressions. At the same time, it is noteworthy that ‘whites’ are the only social

again suggests that the racially liberalizing effects of the Floyd incident were short-lived for these two subgroups, which was not the case for white Democrats and liberals.

group target that saw significant increases in ‘unfavorable’ responses across *all* white subgroups. For white Democrats and liberals, increases in unfavorable views of ‘white men’ (+3.1 and +4.8, respectively) constituted the single greatest shifts in sentiments towards any of the listed ethnic/racial and social groups. On the other hand, for white Republicans and conservatives, the largest singular changes were +5.7 ($p < 0.001$) and +6.7 ($p < 0.001$) point increases, respectively, in the percent reporting ‘unfavorable’ impressions of blacks. These are followed by +4.6 ($p < 0.001$) and +5.2 ($p < 0.001$) point increases, respectively, in the percent reporting ‘favorable’ impressions of ‘gays and lesbians’.

Table 5.11 Changes in whites’ favorability/unfavourability towards various social groups

| | | Whites | White Democrats | White Republicans | White Liberals | White Conservatives |
|--------------------------------|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Whites | Favorable | 0.006 (0.006) | -0.018† (0.010) | 0.004 (0.007) | -0.039** (0.012) | 0.006 (0.009) |
| | Unfavorable | 0.026*** (0.004) | 0.026** (0.008) | 0.023*** (0.005) | 0.044*** (0.011) | 0.020** (0.006) |
| White Men | Favorable | -0.001 (0.006) | -0.018 (0.011) | 0.010 (0.008) | -0.041** (0.014) | 0.012 (0.009) |
| | Unfavorable | 0.025*** (0.005) | 0.031** (0.010) | 0.021*** (0.006) | 0.048*** (0.013) | 0.019** (0.006) |
| Blacks | Favorable | 0.009 (0.006) | 0.025** (0.009) | -0.010 (0.009) | 0.012 (0.010) | -0.022* (0.011) |
| | Unfavorable | 0.029*** (0.005) | 0.003 (0.007) | 0.057*** (0.008) | 0.007 (0.008) | 0.067*** (0.009) |
| Hispanics | Favorable | 0.026*** (0.007) | 0.020* (0.010) | 0.030** (0.009) | 0.010 (0.011) | 0.025* (0.011) |
| | Unfavorable | -0.021*** (0.005) | -0.013* (0.007) | -0.026*** (0.007) | -0.012 (0.008) | -0.016* (0.009) |
| Asians | Favorable | 0.027*** (0.007) | 0.020* (0.010) | 0.033** (0.009) | 0.005 (0.011) | 0.034** (0.011) |
| | Unfavorable | -0.026*** (0.004) | -0.019** (0.006) | -0.028*** (0.007) | -0.010 (0.008) | -0.023** (0.008) |
| Undocumented Immigrants | Favorable | 0.022** (0.007) | 0.018 (0.011) | 0.026** (0.008) | 0.021 (0.013) | 0.027** (0.009) |
| | Unfavorable | -0.023** (0.007) | -0.014 (0.011) | -0.029** (0.009) | -0.028* (0.012) | -0.025* (0.010) |
| Muslims | Favorable | 0.022** (0.007) | 0.022* (0.011) | 0.022* (0.010) | 0.022† (0.012) | 0.018 (0.011) |
| | Unfavorable | -0.015* (0.007) | -0.019* (0.009) | -0.012 (0.010) | -0.019† (0.010) | -0.008 (0.012) |
| Jews | Favorable | 0.007 (0.006) | 0.004 (0.010) | 0.014 (0.009) | 0.003 (0.011) | 0.013 (0.011) |
| | Unfavorable | -0.009* (0.004) | -0.008 (0.006) | -0.011† (0.006) | -0.009 (0.008) | -0.010 (0.007) |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Evangelical Christians | Favorable | -0.003 (0.007) | -0.019† (0.011) | 0.008 (0.010) | -0.036** (0.013) | -0.003 (0.011) |
| | Unfavorable | 0.001 (0.007) | 0.018 (0.011) | -0.009 (0.008) | 0.028* (0.014) | 0.005 (0.008) |
| Gays and Lesbians | Favorable | 0.038*** (0.007) | 0.028** (0.009) | 0.046*** (0.010) | 0.009 (0.011) | 0.052*** (0.018) |
| | Unfavorable | -0.030*** (0.006) | -0.028*** (0.007) | -0.036*** (0.010) | -0.013 (0.009) | -0.033** (0.011) |
| Socialists | Favorable | -0.008 (0.007) | -0.020† (0.012) | 0.001 (0.007) | -0.009 (0.014) | 0.009 (0.008) |
| | Unfavorable | 0.003 (0.007) | 0.012 (0.010) | 0.001 (0.009) | 0.001 (0.012) | -0.015 (0.011) |
| Labor Unions | Favorable | -0.020** (0.007) | -0.045*** (0.011) | -0.003 (0.010) | -0.055*** (0.013) | 0.004 (0.012) |
| | Unfavorable | 0.017* (0.006) | 0.034*** (0.009) | 0.005 (0.010) | 0.042*** (0.011) | 0.000 (0.012) |
| Police | Favorable | -0.112*** (0.007) | -0.201*** (0.011) | -0.047*** (0.008) | -0.228*** (0.013) | -0.032*** (0.009) |
| | Unfavorable | 0.127*** (0.006) | 0.214*** (0.011) | 0.061*** (0.007) | 0.232*** (0.013) | 0.045*** (0.008) |
| Republicans | Favorable | -0.012 (0.007) | -0.036*** (0.009) | 0.003 (0.008) | -0.047*** (0.011) | 0.006 (0.010) |
| | Unfavorable | 0.010 (0.007) | 0.034** (0.010) | 0.003 (0.007) | 0.039** (0.012) | -0.003 (0.008) |
| Democrats | Favorable | -0.001 (0.007) | -0.002 (0.009) | -0.005 (0.008) | 0.005 (0.011) | 0.002 (0.009) |
| | Unfavorable | -0.001 (0.007) | 0.004 (0.007) | 0.005 (0.009) | -0.001 (0.010) | -0.003 (0.010) |

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for the political subgroups were estimated from treatment x party-ID/ideology interactions. Dependent variables are dichotomous (e.g. 0=Neutral/Favorable, 1=Unfavorable). †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Considering now the political group targets, we see that the favorability ratings of ‘police’ saw the greatest change of all group targets. Among white Democrats and liberals, for instance, ‘unfavorable’ views of the police jumped roughly +21 (p < 0.001) and +23 (p < 0.001) percentage points, respectively. Unfavorable views of the police also increased among white Republicans (+6.1; p < 0.001) and conservatives (+4.5; p < 0.001), though much more modestly. While not surprising, such constitutes the most unambiguous evidence of the causal effects of the Floyd incident. Less expected, at least upon first examination, is that these causal effects also appear to extend to ‘labor unions’, which, at least traditionally, are generally allied with the Democratic Party. While no changes significant changes are observed for white Republicans and

conservatives, among white Democrats, favorable and unfavorable views of ‘labor unions’ dropped and increased -4.5 and +3.4 percentage points, respectively, in the 38-day post-Floyd period. Among white liberals, these figures were -5.5 and +4.2 percentage points. A plausible explanation of these findings is that attitudes were not souring on labor unions per se, but to police unions and their perceived resistance to policy reforms. While only suggestive, Figure 10 below indeed shows that Tweets and Google searches referring to ‘police union(s)’ spiked in the post-Floyd period. But as this question is largely tangential to the thrust of the current study, I will leave it aside for future research.




Figure 5.17 Pre and post-Floyd trends in the frequency of Twitter tweets mentioning (left) and Google search interest (right) in the term ‘police union(s)’

Finally, of the two partisan target groups, significant changes obtain only for favorability/unfavourability of Republicans among white Democrats and liberals. Among the former group, favorability of Republicans fell 3.6 points ($p < 0.001$) while unfavorability increased 3.4 points ($p=0.002$). For white liberals, these figures were -4.7 ($p=0.001$) and +3.9 ($p=0.001$) percentage points. On one hand, this *could* suggest that the ‘Floyd effect’ is essentially

a partisan effect. That is, to the extent that non-whites and homosexuals are associated with the Democratic party; and to the extent that the response of Trump and Republican Party to the Floyd incident was perceived as antagonizing and unsympathetic, it's possible that the Floyd incident made white Democrats and liberals more favorable to political ingroup members and less favorable towards groups (whites, white men, evangelical Christians, police etc.) associated with the political outgroup. And yet this interpretation can't readily explain why unfavorability of whites initially increased among white Republicans and conservatives—nor does it account for their increases in favorable views of Asians, Hispanics, and homosexuals⁹⁷.

5.6 Discussion

The current study sought to replicate and extend some of the findings reported in chapter 4 by examining white racial attitudes and the frequency of racial equalitarian media both before and after the May 25th death of George Floyd. First, it was predicted that the Floyd incident would result in significant increases in racial liberalism and in support for reparations, and in significant decreases in favorable views of whites vs. blacks. All of these predictions bore out in the data. Compared to the 38 days preceding the Floyd incident, white racial liberalism—i.e. the percent perceiving 'a lot/a great deal' of discrimination against blacks, disagreeing that blacks should work their way up 'without special favors', and agreeing that slavery and discrimination has impeded black advancement—was significantly higher in the 38-day post-Floyd period. So was support for granting cash reparations to blacks, which saw a roughly 3 percentage point increase. In the other direction, we observed a significant decrease in the extent that whites were rated more favorably than blacks. We also saw that the frequency of racial equalitarian media,

⁹⁷ The idea that these latter increases result from greater social desirability pressures in the post-Floyd period is also dubious, as it does not explain why white Republicans and conservatives felt 'comfortable' reporting greater negativity towards blacks.

which was found to be a robust predictor of racial liberalism in chapter 4, spiked considerably in the post-Floyd period; and that this increase partially and almost entirely mediated the effects of the Floyd incident on white racial liberalism and support for reparations, respectively.

However, it was ultimately learned that both the magnitude and nature of the treatment's effects were obscured by intra-white polarization. Consistent with hypotheses 8A-10A, the Floyd incident was found to have a significantly stronger liberalizing effect on the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals than on those of their Republican and conservative counterparts. First, among the former two subgroups, scores on the racial liberalism index were roughly a quarter of a standard deviation higher in the post-Floyd period—an increase that was more than double the size of the one observed among white Republicans and conservatives. What is more, a series of interaction models showed that the positive effects of the Floyd incident on the racial liberalism of these latter two subgroups ultimately turned negative—moving attitudes in the conservative direction—in the later days of the post-Floyd period. Importantly, this pattern was not observed among white Democrats and liberals. To the contrary, we observed some evidence that the positive effects for these subgroups *grew* (in the racially liberal direction) with the passage of time.

Second, and supporting H9A, declines in pro-white vs. black favorability were found to be significantly larger among white Democrats and liberals than Republicans and conservatives. For white Democrats and liberals, these larger declines were the largely the result of concurrent *decreases* in favorable views of whites, on one hand, *increases* in unfavorable views of whites, on another. But among white Republicans and conservatives, initial increases in unfavorable views of whites ultimately faded and were overtaken by larger increases in unfavorable views of blacks. Together with the ultimately negative effects of the Floyd incident on these subgroup's

racial liberalism, as well the small increase in the percent perceiving ‘a lot/a great deal’ of discrimination against whites, these findings are suggestive of a right-wing backlash against the rhetoric and perceived violence of subsequent Floyd protests. At the same time, they also suggest that the Floyd incident activated ingroup-critical emotions among all white subgroups, but particularly among white Democrats and liberals⁹⁸. This interpretation, though, is somewhat complicated by the fact that significant swings in the favorable/less unfavorable direction were also observed in the favorability ratings of other social groups⁹⁹, such as homosexuals (among all but white liberals), Asians (among all but white liberals), Hispanics (among whites as a whole, white Democrats, and white Republicans), and Muslims (among all but white conservatives). However, given that moral shame is thought to encourage a broader form of pro-sociality or ‘pro-outgroupness’, these findings are not altogether inconsistent with this dissertation’s theory.

Third, though the Floyd incident significantly increased support for reparations across most of the white subgroups, this increase was found to be significantly larger among white Democrats (+6.3 points) and liberals (+7.9) than Republicans (+1.8) and conservatives (+2). While even the former two increases are not especially large, the reader should bear in mind that this is a policy on which public opinion has remained relatively stable across time. For instance,

⁹⁸ Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, white shame appears to be one of, if not *the* strongest predictor(s) of rating blacks (among other racial/ethnic outgroups) more favorably than whites.

⁹⁹ While there may be many other possible accounts of this pattern, one possibility is that, given the close association and active collaboration between the Black Lives Matter and LGBT movements, protests against racial injustice will inevitably feature rhetoric in support of LGBT rights. In fact, as shown on the left side of the figure in Appendix B.1, the Floyd incident clearly occasioned an increase in both Twitter mentions of and Google search interest in ‘LGBT’. Thus, the public salience of LGBT issues was clearly greater in the post-Floyd than pre-Floyd period. Second, in recent years, ‘people’ or ‘communities of color’ have become the dominant umbrella terms for non-whites, particularly in discussions of racial justice and inequality. And, similar to the trends in ‘LGBT’, the right side of the figure in Appendix B.1 shows that Tweets and Google searches referring to ‘of color’ and ‘PoC’ jumped considerably in the post-Floyd period. An implication here is that the rhetoric surrounding racial incidents that implicate blacks increasingly refer to non-whites as a whole. Thus, the association of ‘blacks’ with ‘people of color’ entails that incidents that trigger sympathy towards blacks effectively triggers sympathy to non-whites as a whole. In fact, this is precisely one of the predicted effects of white moral shame that will be tested in a later chapter.

the available polling data¹⁰⁰ on this policy question shows that between 1997 and 2015, support for reparations among white Democrats ranged between 11-13%. A more than 6 point increase in the space of several weeks is thus quite unprecedented. And, given their documented relationships with support for reparations, it also suggests that, as my theory would predict, the Floyd incident increased the salience of ingroup-critical emotions.

Finally, auxiliary hypotheses H8B-10B received partial support in the data. With respect to H8B, the results showed that frequency of racial equalitarian media (REM) mediated roughly a third the Floyd treatment's positive effects on racial liberalism among whites as a whole. More dramatically, and supporting H10B, it was found that REM completely mediated the treatment's positive effects on whites' support for reparations. Crucially, in both cases, the results of subsequent moderated mediation models revealed that these indirect effects via REM were larger and only significant for white Democrats and liberals—i.e., groups that are more likely to tune into and consume (vs. avoid) REM messaging. Coupled with the findings of chapter 4, this suggests that increases in racial liberalism among white Democrats and liberals are far more a function of increases in REM than is the case for white Republicans and conservatives. On the other hand, that none of the liberalizing effects of the Floyd incident on the racial attitudes of white Republicans and conservatives were significantly mediated through REM; and, further, that these groups' racial attitudes ultimately trended back in the racially conservative direction as the post-Floyd days elapsed suggests that they are more likely to ultimately tune out REM messaging and tune into racially conservative messaging.

¹⁰⁰ A time series graph for this item, along with all the data sources used in its construction, can be found Appendix B.2

One glaring exception to the pattern of REM mediation was H9B, which received limited to no support in the data. Specifically, the treatment's indirect effects via REM on white vs. black favorability ratings were not significant for whites overall nor for any of the 4 political subgroups. Why this was the case is unclear. One unexplored possibility is that the treatment's effects on favorability ratings were actually mediated by racial liberalism. By this account, REM essentially acted as a distal mediator; that is, it spurred increases in racial liberalism, which in turn, spurred decreases in white vs. black favorability¹⁰¹. If true, it would suggest that changes in some racial attitudes follow from REM-driven changes in others. Future research should examine whether this is indeed the case.

5.7 Conclusion

The current chapter attempted to fill several of the outstanding empirical gaps from the previous. One of its central findings was that the Floyd incident effected attitudinal outcomes (increased negativity towards whites, support for reparations) that are both theoretically and empirically linked to ingroup-critical emotions. If only indirectly, it also offered evidence suggesting that white Democrats and liberals—those whose egalitarian moral commitments make them more susceptible to their expression—experience these emotions more strongly than their Republican and conservative counterparts. However, to be compelling, the case for this dissertation's theory cannot rest on indirect evidence alone. Despite frequent references to the influence of ingroup-critical emotions on white racial attitudes, I've yet to present any evidence that directly substantiates this supposition. And actual measures of these emotions have thus far

¹⁰¹ Consistent with this, the effects of the treatment on the white vs. black favorability ratings of white Democrats and liberals are reduced to insignificance when adjusting for racial liberalism. A proper test of this account, though, requires the fitting and comparison of this and alternative mediation model specifications.

been absent. Thus, in the chapters that follow, we will finally move beyond ‘indirect’ evidence and ‘suggestive’ relationships and head-on confront this dissertation’s core propositions.

6 INGROUP-CRITICAL EMOTIONS AND RACIAL LIBERALISM

6.1 Introduction

The purpose of the current chapter is severalfold. First and most basic, it will attempt to demonstrate what has hitherto been only theoretical: i.e. that ingroup-critical emotions are important predictors of racial policy liberalism, and pro-outgroup orientations more generally. But more than that, it will also compare their predictive effects to those of other attitudinal measures, such as racial resentment and social dominance, which are considered by some to be the primary determinants of white racial attitudes. Towards facilitating these analyses, this chapter will also examine whether, as theory and past research suggest, the ingroup-critical emotions of shame and guilt are statistically distinguishable constructs. Part of this test will rest on the results of a factor analysis, while another will explore whether, as expected, shame predicts a broader form of 'pro-outgroupness' than does guilt. Finally, this chapter will attempt to shed light on the root of ideological differences in the expression of ingroup-critical emotions. Such is important not only for setting the stage for the chapter that follows, but also for explaining why the racial attitudes of white liberals are more sensitive to shifts in the salience of racial equalitarian media.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will introduce the data and the variables that will feature in subsequent analysis. Next, I will conduct both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses in an attempt to verify that shame and guilt are statistically distinguishable, and thus worthy of being treated as separate variables. Tests of primary hypotheses will follow, which will examine the relationships between ingroup-critical emotions and support for pro-black and liberal immigration policies. Thereafter, ideological differences in ingroup-critical emotions will be examined, including the potential of racial resentment to account for them. This analysis

consists of three parts. The first uses factor analysis to determine whether racial resentment, moral shame and guilt are statistically distinguishable concepts. The second uses factor analysis to test whether, as theorized, racial resentment is statistically indistinguishable from societal vs. endogenous attributions of racial inequality. The third uses linear regression to examine the extent that controlling for this expected general racial resentment factor accounts for liberal-conservative differences in moral shame and guilt. A final empirical section consists of a robustness check and an attempted replication of primary hypotheses on other data.

6.2 Data/Methods

The primary data featured in this chapter was gathered via the online crowdsourcing service Prolific in collaboration with a fellow researcher from the Department of Psychology at Michigan State University¹⁰². Data collection commenced and was completed on August 27, 2020. Overall, the survey drew participation from 1,011 American adult respondents who were compensated at a rate of \$10 per hour of their time. Of this sample, 59 respondents indicated a racial/ethnic background other than ‘White American/Caucasian’ and were excluded from the dataset¹⁰³. An additional 62 respondents had missing data on one or more model-relevant variables. To keep the sample size constant across models, these respondents are also excluded from analyses, leaving an operational sample of 890 respondents (Mean age=34.3, SD=12.59). In

¹⁰² This study received the approval of the Institutional Review Board at Michigan State University (MSU). It was funded by an internal grant received by collaborator and MSU Department of Psychology member, Carlos David Navarrete.

¹⁰³ To clarify, Prolific allows for pre-screening of respondents on various background traits, including race and ethnicity. And my collaborator and I made sure to apply a filter that ostensibly limited the availability of the survey to non-Hispanic white American respondents. However, Prolific profiles of respondents may contain faulty or outdated information. Where discrepancies surfaced between the race/ethnicity listed on the respondents’ Prolific profiles and that reported during the survey, such respondents were dropped from the data.

terms of demographic and political composition, 47% of this sample identified as male, 66.6% as Democrat¹⁰⁴ (vs. 23.9% Republican), and 55.5% reported having a Bachelor's degree or more.

6.2.1 Primary Variables

6.2.1.1 Ingroup-critical emotions

Collective shame is measured with two separate 4-item and 3-item indexes¹⁰⁵, all of which are adapted from Brown et al. (2008). Each index corresponds to one of two theorized dimensions of shame: *moral shame* and *image shame*. Recall (see section 2.2.3.2 of Chapter 2) that earlier researchers mistakenly concluded that shame was predictive of anti-social behavior. More recently, however, researchers have argued that this relationship is, in fact, an artifact of not partialing 'image shame' from 'moral shame', the latter of which *is* predictive of pro-sociality (Allpress et al. 2014). A true account of moral shame's relationship with pro-outgroup attitudes thus requires that we adjust for variation in the former that is more related to reputational than moral concerns. Likewise, an accurate reading of the effects of 'image shame' on pro-outgroup attitudes requires that we remove variation related to moral shame. Of course, if these two dimensions of shame are statistically indistinguishable, then the theoretical distinction between them is moot (if not questionable) and a singular 'collective shame' index would be justified. The same applies to collective guilt, which is operationalized with an index consisting of four 7-point Likert items that were also adapted from Brown et al. (2008). Specifically, if variation in the items constituting my measure of guilt largely overlap with variation in those intended to capture shame, then there's little to gain (apart from strong multicollinearity) from treating them as separate constructs in this study's analyses. The first analysis below will thus be

¹⁰⁴ This political imbalance informed my decision to attempt a replication of reported findings in more representative samples.

¹⁰⁵ The items and their descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.1 below.

a factor analysis to determine the degree of unique variation in each of the three affective constructs. In the meantime, question wordings and descriptive statistics for each of the items comprising the three measures of ingroup-critical emotions are provided in Table 6.1 below. Each item is measured along a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly agree’ (7).

Table 6.1 Measures of white moral shame, image shame, and guilt

| | N | Mean | SD |
|--|----------|-------------|-----------|
| Moral Shame | | | |
| | --- | --- | --- |
| When I think of the manner in which black people have been treated, I sometimes think that we white Americans are racist and mean. | 940 | 4.90 | 1.91 |
| My racial group’s treatment of black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it <i>means</i> to be white. | 940 | 4.60 | 2.05 |
| I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white people | 940 | 5.11 | 1.87 |
| I do <i>not</i> feel ashamed to be white for the way we treated black people (r) | 940 | 4.40 | 1.85 |
| Image Shame | | | |
| I feel humiliated when I think of how white Americans are seen negatively by others for how they have treated black people | 937 | 3.84 | 1.87 |
| I feel disgraced because the behavior of white Americans towards black people has created a bad image of white Americans in the eyes of others | 937 | 4.36 | 1.87 |
| To think how white Americans are seen for their treatment of black people makes me feel ashamed | 937 | 4.29 | 1.86 |
| Guilt | | | |
| I feel guilty for the manner in which black people have been treated by white Americans | 938 | 4.59 | 2.00 |
| I feel guilty about the social inequalities between white and black people. | 938 | 4.49 | 1.97 |
| Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of white Americans towards black people | 938 | 4.41 | 2.04 |
| When I think about then racism that exists towards black people, I feel guilty to be a White American. | 938 | 3.84 | 2.01 |

Note. All items are answered on a 7-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’.

6.2.1.2 *Pro-black policy support*

I operationalize pro-black policy support with three different items. The first is a measure of support for affirmative action for blacks in the labor market, which was taken from the General Social Survey. This item begins by briefly stating general arguments in favor of (‘Some people say that because of past discrimination, black people should be given preference in hiring

and promotion’) and against (‘Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion is wrong because it discriminates against whites’). Respondents are then asked to give their own opinion on a 5-point scale (1=Oppose strongly, 5=Favor strongly; Mean=2.88, SD=1.32). The second item, which is also taken from the General Social Survey, is a measure of support for government assistance for blacks. As with the affirmative action measure, this item begins with a general argument in favor of (‘black people have been discriminated against for so long’) and against (‘should not be giving special treatment’) the government having a “special obligation to help improve [black people’s] living standards”. Respondents are then asked to place themselves on a 5-point scale (Mean=3.46, SD=1.39) ranging from ‘I strongly feel that our government should not be giving special treatment to black’ (1) to ‘I strongly feel that our government should help black people’ (5). A third and final item, which was taken from a September 2019 AP-NORC survey, measures support for paying reparations for “slavery and racial discrimination in this country by making cash payments to African Americans who are descendants of slaves” on a 5-point scale (1=Oppose strongly, 5=Favor strongly; Mean=2.88, SD=1.50).

The above items form a reliable index¹⁰⁶ ($\alpha=0.878$), with Spearman Rho correlation coefficients ranging from 0.689 to 0.732. I thus generate a summary scale by averaging them together and standardizing the composite to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. But, as a check of robustness, I will also analyze these outcomes individually to ensure that no single item is responsible for the summary scale’s relationship with any of the ingroup-critical emotions.

6.2.1.3 *Immigration liberalism*

To test whether, as predicted, ingroup-critical emotions spillover to attitudes and policies implicating non-black racial/ethnic minority groups, I include three different measures of

¹⁰⁶ A Cronbach’s Alpha test shows that reliability significantly declines if any of the three items are dropped.

immigration policy attitudes. The first item measures support for increasing [legal] immigration into the US with a question taken from the General Social Survey. This question reads: “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the US to live should be increased, decreased, or kept the same as now?”. Responses (Mean=4.64, SD=1.56) range from ‘Decreased a lot’ (1) to ‘Increased a lot’ (7).

A follow-up question, which I personally developed for the current study, asked respondents to indicate the percent of immigration admissions that they think should be allocated to “European and non-European countries”. Respondents were asked to enter a percentage figure (Mean_{European}=44.54%, SD=16.38%) blank boxes corresponding to each set of countries.

As a check against the possibility that the expected pro-immigration effects of collective shame differ as a function of the legality of the immigration in question, a second item that asks about decriminalizing illegal border crossings was taken from the 2018 American National Election Studies Pilot survey. This item measured the extent that respondents either favor or oppose “ending criminal penalties for people crossing the US border illegally” on a 5-point scale (1=Oppose strongly, 5=Favor strongly; Mean=3.27, SD=1.44).

6.2.1.4 Racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth

I measure the tendency to favor racial outgroups over one’s racial ingroup with four 0-100 feeling thermometers, which ask respondents to rate their feelings towards whites (i.e. the ingroup; Mean=70.42, SD=23.29), blacks (Mean=72.33, SD=23.38), Hispanics (Mean=72.33, SD=23.16), and Asians (Mean=73.78, SD=22.36). I then subtract the white thermometer scores from each of the three racial/ethnic outgroup scores to create warmth differential scales. As the three differential scales form a reliable composite index ($\alpha=0.952$), I also generate a summary scale by averaging across them (Mean=2.39, SD=24.02).

6.2.1.5 *Pro-outgroup behavior*

To examine the possibility that the effects of ingroup-critical emotions on attitudinal outcomes are driven by socially desirability pressures, I design and include a measure of pro-outgroup behavior. This measure begins by introducing respondents to two non-profit advocacy organizations—one of which is committed to “dismantling systemic racism and building anti-racist multicultural diversity within institutions and communities”, and another that is committed to “overturning strict immigration laws and defending the rights of undocumented and new immigrants”. Respondents are then told that these organizations are “financially dependent on individual donations to fund their operations”; and that the researchers would like to give them “the opportunity to make a contribution of up to ten dollars to each organization”. Respondents are then instructed to indicate their intended monetary donations on sliding scales ($\text{Mean}_{\text{Anti-racism}}=3.79$, $\text{SD}=3.81$; $\text{Mean}_{\text{Pro-immigration}}= 3.66$, $\text{SD}=3.78$) ranging from 0 (i.e. no donation) to 10 (maximum donation). Finally, to bolster the credibility of the cover story, respondents are told that the researchers will “record [their] contributions and follow up with more information at the conclusion of the survey”.

6.2.2 *Secondary/Control Variables*

6.2.2.1 *Symbolic racism*

Given that some consider it to be the most robust predictor of racial policy attitudes, it important that I compare the predictive effects of ingroup-critical emotions to those of symbolic racism. In the current study, I operationalize this construct with Kinder and Sanders’ (1996) four-item ‘racial resentment’ scale (e.g. ‘Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class’), which respondents respond to on 5-point Likert scales (1=Strongly agree, 5=Strongly disagree). Where

necessary, I reverse-code the items so that higher scores denote greater racial liberalism. The composite scale ($\alpha=0.899$; Mean=3.72, SD=1.17) is generated by averaging the responses across the 4 items. I then standardize the scale to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

It should be noted that controlling for racial resentment entails a very rigorous test of the independent pro-social effects of ingroup-critical emotions. This is partly because, as some researchers have argued (e.g. Schuman, 2000; Carmines, Sniderman, & Easter, 2011), the racial resentment scale conflates racial prejudice with opposition to liberal racial policies. A consequence of this (i.e. content overlap between X and Y variables) is an artificial inflation of racial resentment's relationship with separate measures of support for liberal racial policies. In the current study, this means that controlling for racial resentment in models of pro-black policy support may misleadingly render the effects of other predictors insignificant. Nonetheless, controlling for it is important for determining whether ingroup-critical emotions account for unique variation in racial policy attitudes or whether their effects are mostly redundant.

6.2.2.2 Attributions for racial inequality and perceptions of racial discrimination

One of the hypotheses tested in this chapter is that racial resentment will account for ideological differences in ingroup-critical emotions. The underlying reasoning is that the expression of the latter is conditional on the perceived legitimacy of black-white status differences, which, itself, is argued to be a function of the extent that a person attributes black disadvantage to past and/or present bias and discrimination vs. endogenous group factors (e.g. cultural deficits, illegitimacy rates). I join past researchers in contending that the racial resentment scale largely measures these attributional tendencies. To test this assumption, I examine racial resentment's relations to three measures—two of which I personally developed-- that capture (a) perceptions of the severity of anti-black discrimination in contemporary US

society, and (b) the extent that a respondent thinks that past and/or present discrimination explains contemporary black-white inequalities. The wording of each of the three items is shown in Table 6.2. In the first, respondents are asked to indicate on a 0-100 scale the extent they believe that socio-economic inequalities between blacks and whites are due to past and/or current racial discrimination and bias¹⁰⁷. The second gets at the same question by asking respondents the extent that they disagree or agree with the notion that equal economic outcomes between blacks and whites would prevail today in the absence of past and/or present discrimination. The third and final item simply measures respondents' perceptions of the severity of existing anti-black discrimination. While all three items do form a reliable index ($\alpha=0.818$), they are used only for assessing their statistical relations with the racial resentment indicators.

Table 6.2 Measures of attributions for racial inequality

| | N | Scale | Mean | SD |
|--|-----|-------|-------|-------|
| On average, African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Using the sliding scale below, to what extent do you think these differences are the result of past and/or current racial discrimination and bias ? A 0 on the scale below means that you think they are not at all due to past and/or current discrimination and bias; a 50 would mean that you think they are equally due to past and/or current discrimination and bias AND other factors unrelated to discrimination and bias; and an 100 would mean that you think it is entirely due to past and/or current discrimination and bias. | 936 | 0-100 | 65.03 | 27.84 |
| To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? If not for past and current discrimination, black and whites today would earn the same incomes | 936 | 1-7 | 4.97 | 1.57 |
| Please tell me how much discrimination there is against each of the following groups in our society today. Would you say there is a lot of discrimination, some, only a little, or none at all? Blacks. | 936 | 1-5 | 4.00 | 1.05 |

¹⁰⁷ Some of the wording for this item was adopted from the General Social Survey's measures of racial inequality attributions. These measures differ from the one I use in that they list four different causes (e.g. lack of education) and ask respondents on a dichotomous yes/no scale whether they think black-white differences are mainly due to each. The advantage of my measure is that it is designed to better get at the extent that respondents feel black-white differences are accounted for by discrimination vs. other factors. Its primary disadvantage is that it does not probe the specific 'other factors' that respondents attribute black-white inequality to. For present purposes, though, this disadvantage is irrelevant as my interest is solely in determining how much respondents attribute black-white differences to discrimination and bias.

6.2.2.3 *Social dominance*

By my theory, the expression of ingroup-critical emotions should be at least partly dependent on one's orientation to social inequality and social hierarchies. Thus, specifying models that include both measures of emotions and orientations is highly questionable if the researcher's interest is in the former's relationship with racial policy attitudes. But for the same reason that I control for racial resentment, I opted to include social dominance orientation as a control variable in certain models to examine the extent that the effects of ingroup-critical emotions are independent. Specifically, I use the abbreviated 8-item SDO7 battery developed and tested in Ho et al. (2015). Half of these 7-point (1=Strongly disagree; 7=Strongly agree) items are designed to measure the 'pro/anti-dominance' dimension of SDO (e.g. 'An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom'), while another half is intended to capture its 'pro/anti-egalitarian' dimension (e.g. 'Group equality should not be our primary goal'). I recode each of the items so that higher scores reflect stronger anti-dominance and pro-egalitarian orientations, respectively. I then create summary measures for each of the two dimensions by averaging responses to the 4 dominance ($\alpha=0.815$, Mean=5.75, SD=1.21) and 4 egalitarianism ($\alpha=0.785$, Mean=5.52, SD=1.22) items. These summary measures are then standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

6.2.2.4 *Demographic/Background variables*

As additional controls, I include measures of age, sex (0=Female, 1=Male), education (1=High school or less, 4=Graduate degree), political ideology (1=Very liberal, 7=Very conservative), and party affiliation (1=Strong Democrat, 7=Strong Republican).

6.3 Results/Analysis

6.3.1 *Are white moral shame, image shame, and guilt statistically distinct?*

To assess the empirical case for operationalizing shame and guilt with three separate indexes, I begin by subjecting their constituent items to exploratory factor analysis. I use oblique promax rotation to allow for intercorrelations between factors. The results, along with the descriptive statistics and question wording for each 7-point item (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree), are provided in Table 6.3. Overall, they support the 3-factor solution suggested by recent theory. The items designed to tap moral shame load separately (with loadings ranging from 0.519 to 0.739) from those intended to get at image shame and guilt. Likewise, the items developed to measure image shame load separately (0.726 to 0.789) from those relating to moral shame and guilt. Finally, the guilt items load more strongly on a third factor (0.512 to 0.802) than either of the factors representing moral and image shame.

Table 6.3 Results of exploratory factor models

| | Moral Shame | Image Shame | Guilt |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| When I think of the manner in which black people have been treated, I sometimes think that we white Americans are racist and mean. | 0.739 | 0.008 | 0.143 |
| My racial group's treatment of black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it <i>means</i> to be white. | 0.682 | 0.086 | 0.171 |
| I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white people | 0.568 | 0.135 | 0.273 |
| I do <i>not</i> feel ashamed to be white for the way we treated black people (r) | 0.519 | -0.012 | 0.111 |
| I feel humiliated when I think of how white Americans are seen negatively by others for how they have treated black people | -0.100 | 0.789 | 0.093 |
| I feel disgraced because the behavior of white Americans towards black people has created a bad image of white Americans in the eyes of others | 0.128 | 0.735 | 0.048 |
| To think how white Americans are seen for their treatment of black people makes me feel ashamed | 0.154 | 0.726 | 0.095 |
| I feel guilty for the manner in which black people have been treated by white Americans | 0.087 | 0.076 | 0.802 |
| I feel guilty about the social inequalities between white and black people. | 0.146 | 0.075 | 0.749 |
| Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of white Americans towards black people | 0.157 | 0.131 | 0.640 |
| When I think about then racism that exists towards black people, I feel guilty to be a White American. | 0.205 | 0.157 | 0.512 |

| | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Proportion of variance explained | 0.735 | 0.675 | 0.799 |
| χ^2 | 10000 | | |
| N | 937 | | |

Note. Cell entries are oblique-rotated factor loadings.

I next attempt to validate this 3-factor structure via a confirmatory factor analysis¹⁰⁸, the results of which are presented in Table 6.4. Column (a) tests a one factor model in which all items form a common dimension. Measures of fit suggest that this model fits the data relatively poorly (R-RMSEA=0.226, R-CFI=0.961, R-TLI=0.951). Columns (b) and (c) test different two-factor models. The first tests the assumption that image and moral shame form a common dimension, which is distinct from white guilt. The fit of this model is superior to the previous one-factor model, but still poor relative to the models that follow (R-RMSEA=0.200, R-CFI=0.970, R-TLI=0.961). A second two-factor model tests the assumption that moral shame and guilt form a common dimension whose variation is distinct from that of image shame. This model is found to be superior to the previous two-factor model, but still fits the data rather poorly (R-RMSEA=0.150, CFI=0.983, TLI=0.978). Column (d) tests the theorized three-factor model in which the indicators comprising each emotion form unique respective dimensions. Of the four models tested thus far, measures of fit indicate that this three-factor model offers the best fit to the data (R-RMSEA=0.105, R-CFI=0.992, R-TLI=0.989). Thus, a three-factor solution receives the most support in the data. However, a glance at the inter-factor correlations reveals very strong relationships between factors, particularly between moral shame and guilt (0.933).

¹⁰⁸ All confirmatory factor analyses in this chapter are conducted using R's lavaan package, which offers superior flexibility to Stata's 'SEM' command when it comes to modeling non-continuous data. For the estimation method, I use diagonal weighted least squares as it provides more accurate parameter estimates than maximum likelihood when assumptions of multivariate normality are violated and/or when data are ordinal.

Table 6.4 Results of confirmatory factor models

| | (a) | (b) | | (c) | | (d) | | | (e) | (f) | | | |
|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Factor 1 | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | General Factor | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | General Factor |
| When I think of the manner in which black people have been treated, I sometimes think that we white Americans are racist and mean. | 0.831 (0.011) | 0.844 (0.010) | --- | 0.838 (0.010) | --- | 0.858 (0.016) | --- | --- | --- | 0.399 (0.026) | | | 0.786 (0.014) |
| My racial group's treatment of black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it <i>means</i> to be white. | 0.912 (0.006) | 0.938 (0.006) | --- | 0.919 (0.006) | --- | 0.954 (0.019) | --- | --- | --- | 0.365 (0.020) | | | 0.885 (0.009) |
| I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white people | 0.873 (0.008) | 0.895 (0.008) | --- | 0.881 (0.008) | --- | 0.912 (0.018) | --- | --- | --- | 0.225 (0.021) | | | 0.864 (0.010) |
| I do <i>not</i> feel ashamed to be white for the way we treated black people (r) | 0.675 (0.016) | 0.688 (0.017) | --- | 0.684 (0.016) | --- | 0.706 (0.014) | --- | --- | --- | 0.320 (0.022) | | | 0.648 (0.018) |
| I feel humiliated when I think of how white Americans are seen negatively by others for how they have treated black people | 0.763 (0.013) | 0.777 (0.013) | --- | --- | 0.822 (0.012) | --- | 0.822 (0.013) | --- | --- | | 0.532 (0.020) | | 0.672 (0.018) |
| I feel disgraced because the behavior of white Americans towards black people has created a bad image of white Americans in the eyes of others | 0.799 (0.011) | 0.812 (0.011) | --- | --- | 0.862 (0.010) | --- | 0.863 (0.014) | --- | --- | | 0.480 (0.019) | | 0.722 (0.016) |
| To think how white Americans are seen for their treatment of black people makes me feel ashamed | 0.862 (0.009) | 0.882 (0.008) | --- | --- | 0.961 (0.006) | --- | 0.960 (0.017) | --- | --- | | 0.470 (0.017) | | 0.808 (0.012) |
| I feel guilty for the manner in which black people have | 0.934 (0.005) | --- | 0.944 (0.004) | 0.938 (0.004) | --- | --- | --- | 0.944 (0.031) | --- | | | 0.414 (0.046) | 0.909 (0.009) |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------|----------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----|------------------|------------------|------------------|--|--|------------------|------------------|
| been treated by white Americans | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| I feel guilty about the social inequalities between white and black people. | 0.915 (0.005) | --- | 0.926 (0.005) | 0.920 (0.005) | --- | --- | --- | 0.926 (0.030) | --- | | | 0.175 (0.032) | 0.903 (0.008) |
| Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of white Americans towards black people | 0.927 (0.005) | --- | 0.940 (0.004) | 0.933 (0.005) | --- | --- | --- | 0.940 (0.030) | --- | | | 0.122 (0.027) | 0.927 (0.006) |
| When I think about then racism that exists towards black people, I feel guilty to be a White American. | 0.913 (0.006) | --- | 0.930 (0.005) | 0.920 (0.006) | --- | --- | --- | 0.930 (0.030) | --- | | | 0.011 (0.025) | 0.937 (0.006) |
| Factor 1 | --- | --- | 0.915 (0.006) | --- | 0.818 (0.011) | --- | 0.779 (0.014) | 0.915 (0.007) | 0.933 (0.162) | | | | |
| Factor 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.820 (0.011) | 0.835 (0.068) | | | | |
| Factor 3 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | | | 0.982 (0.903) | | | | |
| Robust RMSEA | 0.226 | 0.200 | 0.150 | 0.105 | 0.079 | | | | | | | | |
| Robust CFI | 0.961 | 0.970 | 0.983 | 0.992 | 0.996 | | | | | | | | |
| Robust TLI | 0.951 | 0.961 | 0.978 | 0.989 | 0.994 | | | | | | | | |
| Robust X ² | 2139.310 | 1659.147 | 948.516 | 466.827 | 226.125 | | | | | | | | |
| df | 44 | 43 | 43 | 41 | 33 | | | | | | | | |
| p < | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | | | | | | | | |

Note. Cell entries are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Gignac and Kretzschmar (2017) argue that the results of correlated factor models can be misleading, and that a general factor model should be additionally fitted to better evaluate the distinctiveness of hypothesized dimensions. This is the purpose of column (e), which replaces the correlated three-factor model with a general factor model in which between-factor relationships are recast as the result of a single factor. The three rows preceding the fit statistics in column (e) show the strength of these loadings. Specifically, 93.3% of the variance in the ‘moral shame’ factor, 98.2% of the variance in the ‘guilt’ factor, and 83.5% of the variance in the ‘image shame’ factor is shared with the general factor.

Following the recommendations of Gignac and Kretzschmar (2017), I calculate the unique variance in of each of these factors using Schmid and Leiman’s (1957) decomposition procedure¹⁰⁹. Using the transformed loadings, I then computed the OmegaHS coefficient for each of the three lower-order factors¹¹⁰. These coefficients can be interpreted as the ratio of reliable variance specific to a lower-order factor to the total variance in its indicators. They suggest that just 13.4%, 28.6%, and 3.6% of the modeled common variance in the indicators of moral shame, image shame, and guilt, respectively, is unique to those factors. In other words, these results suggest that most of the variance in each of the emotions is shared or result from a common factor. The bifactor model depicted in column (f) provides a different but substantively similar look at the unique vs. shared variance across factors. Here, indicator loadings on each group factor represent the non-general or unique variance, while loadings onto the general factor signify the general or shared variance¹¹¹. For instance, the guilt indicator loadings on the group

¹⁰⁹ This procedure entails subtracting the squared general factor loadings from 1 and multiplying the differences by their respective lower-order factor loadings.

¹¹⁰ This is done by dividing the sum of the squared decomposed lower-order factor loadings by the sum of the decomposed lower-order and general-factor loadings.

¹¹¹ It should be noted that, in general factor models, local dependence violations are absorbed into the general factor, whereas they are absorbed by the group factors in the case of bifactor models.

factor range from 0.011 to 0.414 while those on the general factor range from 0.903 to 0.937. This means that hardly any of the variance in the guilt indicators is unique to the guilt group factor. With group factor loadings ranging from 0.225 to 0.399, the picture is comparatively less extreme in the case of moral shame. But a majority of the variance in its indicators is still shared with the general factor. Of the three group factors, the indicators loading on the image shame factor exhibit the greatest degree of non-general variance. The group factor loadings of these indicators range from 0.470 to 0.532, while their general factor loadings range from 0.672 to 0.808.

In sum, there is a high but varying degree of generality in these data. Variance in guilt appears to be the most general, followed by moral shame and image shame. Confronted with this reality, there are several possible approaches I can take when modeling the influence of ingroup-critical emotions on the outcome variables featured in this study. The first is to ignore the results from the general factor model in favor of the hypothesized correlated three-factor model. In practical terms, this would entail the creation of three separate summary scales, all of which would be included in the regressions I run below. The principal advantage of this approach is that it is supported by theory, allows for the testing of the emotion-specific hypothesis, and comports with the results of the exploratory factor analysis. But the obvious disadvantage is that the large overlap in the variance of the three hypothesized emotions could, on account of strong collinearity, render parameter estimates unreliable. A second approach acknowledges the apparent unidimensionality of the three factors and opts for a general 'ingroup-critical emotions' factor. While not supported by theory, this approach has the advantage of reduced collinearity and parameter estimates that are more reliable. A third approach is a compromise between the previous two. It acknowledges the overlapping variance of the three factors, but also notes that

this overlap is greatest for moral shame and guilt and less so for image shame. This approach thus calls for combining the moral shame and guilt indicators while leaving those of image shame as separate. Its advantage is that it reduces the extent of collinearity while still allowing for tests of some emotion-specific hypotheses¹¹². Its downside is that it preserves some (potentially high) degree of collinearity and is inconsistent with the theory that guilt and shame are distinct if overlapping emotions.

In the end, and for the purposes of the main analyses, I opt for the first and third of the approaches above. This decision is informed by both theory and empirical observation. In the first case, recall that recent theory suggests that variation in collective shame reflects both moral and image-related concerns. Whereas the former is found to positively predict pro-social/pro-outgroup orientations, the effects of the latter are found to be negative. Thus, modeling both of these dimensions together should remove the variation in moral shame that overlaps with image-related concerns while removing the variation in image shame that overlaps with moral concerns. The expected outcome is that moral shame will then become a stronger positive predictor and image shame a negative predictor of pro-outgroup attitudes. On the other hand, if all of the emotions are treated as a single factor, the ‘negative’ or anti-social variation in shame can no longer be partialled out. A potential consequence of this is that the pro-outgroup effects of this general ‘ingroup-critical emotions’ factor will be at least somewhat attenuated. But rather than merely speculate, I will examine this possibility in the coming section.

Beyond this theoretical rationale, the results of both the EFA and CFA suggested a 3-factor solution best fit the data. While the general factor model suggested a high degree of

¹¹² For instance, because image-related shame is theorized to negatively associate with pro-outgroup attitudes and behavior, controlling for its influence should enhance the effects of moral shame/guilt. On the other hand, if all of the emotions are combined to form a single index, the negative effects of image shame would conceivably suppress some of the pro-social influence of moral shame/guilt.

overlapping variance, which would increase the risk of strong collinearity, some have argued that, owing to advances in computational algorithms an accuracy, “multicollinearity does not affect standard errors of regression coefficients in ways previously taught” (Friedman & Wall, 2005, p.127). Nevertheless, rather than ignoring such concerns altogether, I will use variance inflation indicators to monitor the extent of the problem. And, as a robustness check, I will later rerun the models using the bifactor loadings for each of the three group emotion factors¹¹³.

With the above being said, the remaining question is how to construct the individual emotion variables. The approach I adopt is to create factor-weighted summary indexes¹¹⁴. Specifically, I multiply each respective emotion indicator by the product of its lower-order factor loading (column d of Table 6.4) and the general factor loading of its respective group factor¹¹⁵ (column e). I then add these weighted indicator scores together and standardize the composite scores to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. To create the combined ‘moral shame/guilt’ index, I follow the same procedure as before but sum across the moral shame and guilt indicators. For exploratory purposes, I also generate a combined ‘ingroup-critical emotions’ scale that sums across *all* factor-weighted indicators.

¹¹³ The bifactor loadings are essentially residualized of shared variance. Using them in regression models thus allows one to examine how successful conventional models were in partitioning outcome-related variance across highly colinear predictors.

¹¹⁴ In truth, these factor-weighted summary scales are almost perfectly correlated—and, in the case of guilt, *is* perfectly correlated—with their (equal) unit-weighted counterparts. Specifically, the bivariate Pearson coefficients between each emotion’s factor-weighted and unit-weighted summary scale are 0.9992 (moral shame), 0.9998 (image shame), and 1 (guilt). Given that the lower-factor loadings were generally similar for each emotion, this is not unexpected. While an argument could be made in favor of using the unit-weighted scales, I opt to stick with the factor-weighted versions in the event that the small differences between them are substantively influential in the aggregate.

¹¹⁵ For instance, for the first moral shame indicator in column (d) of Table 3, I multiply the raw variable by 0.800, which is the product of 0.858 (lower-order loading) and 0.933 (general factor loading). I then follow the same procedure for the remaining 3 indicators and sum the output.

6.3.2 *The effects of white shame and guilt on pro-black policy preferences: testing H1*

I begin by estimating a series of basic OLS models with the pro-black policies index as the outcome variable. These models are methodologically oriented—they are intended to examine the performance of the emotion variables so as to assess their viability as separate predictors. Columns (a)-(c) of Table 6.5 show the bivariate standardized effects of the individual emotion variables, respectively, on support for pro-black policies. By itself, the moral shame index ($\beta=0.723$, $p < 0.001$) explains around 52.3% of the variance in this outcome, while the guilt index ($\beta=0.700$, $p < 0.001$) alone accounts for 49%. By comparison, the bivariate effects of image shame ($\beta=0.477$, $p < 0.001$) are significantly weaker—explaining roughly 23% of the variance in the pro-black policy index.

Column (d) tests whether entering moral and image shame simultaneously into the model enhances the positive effects of the former while shifting those of the latter in the negative direction. This prediction receives some support. We see that the coefficient on moral shame ($\beta=0.743$, $p < 0.001$) slightly increases while the once significantly positive bi-variate effects of image shame ($\beta=-0.029$, $p < 0.001$) are now insignificantly negative. However, somewhat unexpectedly, we also observe (column e) that this pattern is much more pronounced when guilt is substituted for moral shame. Specifically, the effects of the former ($\beta=0.775$, $p < 0.001$) increase to an even greater degree while those of image shame become *significantly* negative ($\beta=-0.101$, $p=0.009$).

A comparison of the results in column (e) and (g), though, suggests that both moral shame and guilt contribute to this pattern. When moral shame ($\beta=0.490$, $p < 0.001$) is added to the model, the significantly negative effects of image shame are further boosted ($\beta=-0.168$, $p < 0.001$). The degree of collinearity in this model (Mean VIF=3.33, Max VIF=4.20) is perhaps less

than desirable, but still tolerable by conventionally suggested thresholds¹¹⁶. When the combined moral shame/guilt index ($\beta=0.867$, $p < 0.001$) is substituted for the respective individual scales (column h), this collinearity naturally declines (Mean VIF=2.24). Importantly, the fit of this model (Adjusted $R^2=0.562$) is virtually equal to the model in which the emotions are entered as separate predictors (Adjusted $R^2=0.563$).

Table 6.5 Exploratory models of pro-black policy support

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) | (h) | (i) |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Moral Shame | 0.723*** (0.021) | --- | --- | 0.743*** (0.031) | --- | 0.460*** (0.044) | 0.490*** (0.045) | --- | --- |
| Image Shame | --- | 0.477*** (0.029) | --- | -0.029 (0.033) | -0.101** (0.038) | | -0.161*** (0.034) | -0.168*** (0.033) | --- |
| Guilt | --- | --- | 0.700*** (0.023) | --- | 0.775*** (0.037) | 0.313*** (0.046) | 0.409*** (0.051) | --- | --- |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.867*** (0.031) | --- |
| 'Ingroup-Critical Emotions' Index | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.699*** (0.022) |
| Constant | -0.001 (0.023) | 0.002 (0.030) | 0.002 (0.024) | -0.001 (0.023) | 0.002 (0.025) | -0.001 (0.023) | 0.000 (0.022) | 0.000 (0.022) | -0.000 (0.024) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.523 | 0.227 | 0.490 | 0.523 | 0.493 | 0.551 | 0.563 | 0.562 | 0.489 |
| Mean VIF | --- | --- | --- | 1.86 | 2.25 | 3.40 | 3.33 | 2.24 | --- |
| VIF Moral Shame | --- | --- | --- | 1.86 | --- | 3.40 | 3.48 | --- | --- |
| VIF Image Shame | --- | --- | --- | 1.86 | 2.25 | | 2.31 | 2.24 | --- |
| VIF Guilt | --- | --- | --- | --- | 2.25 | 3.40 | 4.20 | | --- |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | --- | 2.24 | --- |

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Column (i) shows the bivariate effects of the 'Ingroup-critical emotions' index ($\beta=0.699$, $p < 0.001$). As expected, these effects are considerably weaker than those of the moral shame/guilt index in column (h). They also account for significantly less variance in the pro-black policy index (Adjusted $R^2=0.489$). Finally, though not shown, moral shame did not

¹¹⁶ Of course, this issue may worsen as additional variables are entered into the model. I will thus continue to monitor it in all subsequent analyses

significantly ($\beta=-0.027$, $p=0.220$) interact with those of guilt, which suggests that their effects on pro-black policy support are additive rather than conditional on one another.

The above results suggest that lumping image shame with the moral shame and guilt—as is the case with the singular ‘ingroup-critical emotions index’—understates the combined effects of the latter two emotions. While collinearity could become an even greater concern in more elaborate models, it is tolerable at present. Accordingly, for all subsequent models, I will report the full results for those estimated with the emotions as individual predictors while also reporting (in grey font) the parameter estimates for the moral shame/guilt index (modeled separately).

I now proceed to the results of controlled models, which are presented in Table 6.6. Those in column (a), the baseline model, are identical to the results reported in column (g) of Table 6.5. To recapitulate, they show that both moral shame ($\beta=0.490$, $p < 0.001$) and guilt ($\beta=0.409$, $p < 0.001$) independently positively predict support for pro-black policies, which accords with the prediction of the H1. While the effects of the former are a bit stronger than the latter, the difference is not distinguishable from zero ($p=0.388$). Combined, a one standard deviation increase in moral shame/guilt corresponds to a 0.867 ($p < 0.001$) standard deviation increase in pro-black policy support—a truly large effect. Image shame ($\beta=-0.161$, $p < 0.001$), on the other hand, turns into a significant negative predictor of pro-black policy support when moral shame and guilt are held constant.

Thus far, then, the results all accord with earlier predictions. But to what extent are the positive effects of moral shame and guilt confounded by political orientation and/or other

background variables like education? The model¹¹⁷ depicted in column (b) attempts to address this question by adding controls¹¹⁸ for ideology, party strength, education, age, and sex.

Table 6.6 Effects of predictors on pro-black policy index

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) |
|--|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Moral Shame | 0.490*** (0.045) | 0.297*** (0.046) | 0.179*** (0.049) | 0.372*** (0.044) | 0.168** (0.049) | 0.128** (0.048) |
| Image Shame | -0.161*** (0.034) | -0.095** (0.032) | -0.092** (0.030) | -0.144*** (0.033) | -0.097** (0.030) | -0.067* (0.030) |
| Guilt | 0.409*** (0.051) | 0.361*** (0.047) | 0.361*** (0.045) | 0.401*** (0.044) | 0.359*** (0.044) | 0.332*** (0.042) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 0.867*** (0.031) | 0.632*** (0.041) | 0.524*** (0.044) | 0.741*** (0.037) | 0.514*** (0.044) | 0.454*** (0.043) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 0.419*** (0.036) | --- | 0.411*** (0.039) | 0.351*** (0.040) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | 0.122*** (0.029) | 0.059† (0.030) | 0.044 (0.029) |
| SDO-Anti-Dominance | --- | --- | --- | 0.080** (0.029) | -0.029 (0.030) | -0.023 (0.031) |
| Background/Demographic control variables | --- | √ | --- | --- | --- | √ |
| Constant | 0.000 (0.022) | 0.414 (0.072) | -0.009 (0.020) | 0.002 (0.022) | -0.008 (0.020) | 0.307 (0.070) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.563 (-.0002) | 0.634 (.0004) | 0.643 (-.0017) | 0.582 (.0005) | 0.644 (-.002) | 0.678 (.0015) |
| Mean VIF | 3.33 (2.24) | 2.20 (2.03) | 3.36 (2.69) | 2.94 (2.32) | 3.07 (2.63) | 2.33 (2.19) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.48 | 4.40 | 4.67 | 4.13 | 4.81 | 5.09 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.31 | 2.47 (2.45) | 2.37 (2.33) | 2.35 (2.31) | 2.39 | 2.51 (2.50) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.20 | 4.35 | 4.23 | 4.21 | 4.24 | 4.38 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.45 | 3.72 | 2.96 | 3.83 | 4.24 |

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R² row correspond to changes in Adjusted R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted for the separate indexes. †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Adjusting for background/demographic covariates moderates the effects of all three emotions, particularly those of moral shame ($\beta=0.297$, $p < 0.001$) whose coefficient is now

¹¹⁷ Collinearity in this ‘separate emotions’ model was at an acceptable level overall (Mean VIF=2.36). However, while still falling below conventionally suggested thresholds (< 5), the relatively higher variable inflation factor scores of moral shame (VIF=4.23) and guilt (VIF=4.27) may or may not be a cause for concern. The inflation score of the combined moral shame/guilt index is naturally lower (VIF=3.28).

¹¹⁸ Given the large number of response categories in some of these categorical and ordinal control variables (e.g. ideology, party-ID etc.), I opt to exclude their parameter estimates from the regression tables featured in this chapter. Complete regression tables that include these parameter estimates are provided in Appendix C.

(insignificantly, $p=0.413$) weaker than that of guilt ($\beta=0.361$, $p < 0.001$). The combined effects of these emotions are reduced by roughly a quarter of their baseline magnitude (column a), but they still remain strong. Specifically, holding all other variables constant, a one standard deviation increase in moral shame/guilt is expected to produce a roughly 0.63 standard deviation ($p < 0.001$) increase in pro-black policy support. Neither a two-way moral shame/guilt x ideology ($p=0.985$) nor a moral shame/guilt x party ($p=0.933$) interaction was significant, which suggests that the strength of the effects of these emotions are not conditional on political orientation.

Given its strong associations with moral shame ($r=0.730$) and guilt ($r=0.617$), perhaps the effects of these emotions are epiphenomenal to or confounded by 'racial resentment'. Column (c) tests this assumption by adding racial resentment (reverse-coded) as a covariate and dropping (for now) the demographic/background control variables. In the end, the inclusion of racial resentment ($\beta=0.419$, $p < 0.001$) considerably reduces the effects of moral shame ($\beta=0.179$, $p < 0.001$) while attenuating those of image shame ($\beta=-0.092$, $p=0.002$) and guilt ($\beta=0.364$, $p < 0.001$) to a somewhat lesser degree. Nonetheless, the majority of the effects of the moral shame/guilt index ($\beta=0.524$, $p < 0.001$) are independent of racial resentment, which suggests that previous political scientists have generally overlooked an important source of variance in pro-black policy support.

The model shown in column (d) similarly tests the extent that the effects of moral shame and guilt are independent of social dominance orientation (SDO), which, like racial resentment, is also identified as an important predictor of racial policy attitudes. In the end, the entry of the two SDO dimensions ($\beta_{\text{SDO-Egal}}=0.122$, $p < 0.001$; $\beta_{\text{SDO-AntiDom}}=0.080$, $p=0.009$) does not moderate the coefficients on the three emotions to the same degree as racial resentment. The

effects of moral shame ($\beta=0.372$, $p < 0.001$) decline somewhat, while those of guilt ($\beta=0.401$, $p < 0.001$) and image shame ($\beta=-0.144$, $p < 0.001$) are only marginally affected. When racial resentment is re-entered into the model (column e), the positive effects of moral shame ($\beta=0.168$, $p < 0.001$) and guilt ($\beta=0.359$) are naturally further reduced. Nonetheless, net of two of the most influential predictors of racial policy attitudes identified in the existing literature, the combined effects of moral shame/guilt remain large and significant ($\beta=0.514$, $p < 0.001$). In fact, when the demographic/background controls rejoin the model (column f), the effects of the moral shame/guilt index ($\beta=0.454$, $p < 0.001$) on pro-black policy support are larger than those of any other variable, including racial resentment ($\beta=0.351$, $p < 0.001$).

As the use of the pro-black policy index somewhat obscures the practical impact of moral shame and guilt, I estimate a series of binary logit variables (1= Favor, 0= Neutral/Oppose) for each of the former's constituent policy items. Figure 6.1 graphs the predicted probabilities of favoring each of the three policy outcomes at differing levels of the moral shame/guilt index and for different model specifications corresponding to three of the letter-coded columns of Table 6.6.




Figure 6.1 Predicted probabilities of favoring a given pro-black policy at varying levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index.

As shown, the positive influence of the moral shame/guilt index on the likelihood of endorsing each policy item is fairly if varyingly large. Holding image shame to its mean, a 1 standard deviation shift from below to above the sample mean level of moral shame/guilt predicts a nearly 64 point increase (0.076→0.716) in the odds of favoring affirmative action, just under a 75 point increase (0.157→0.903) in the odds of favoring group-based government assistance, and almost a 70 point increase (0.075→0.773) in the odds of favoring reparations. These expected increases are somewhat attenuated, but remain large when adding and holding the demographic/background controls to their medians/means¹¹⁹ (Model B). The same +1SD swing now predicts just under a 52 point increase (0.091→0.611) in the odds of favoring affirmative action, and roughly 60 point increases in the odds of favoring group-based government assistance (0.242→0.841) and reparations (0.077→0.666), respectively. Finally, additionally holding racial resentment and the two SDO variables to their means (Model F) further reduces these estimated increases to 31 points (0.107→0.087) in the case of affirmative action and to roughly 43-44 points (0.254→0.688) for group-based government assistance and reparations (0.077→0.516).

To compare these effects with those of racial resentment, I re-run Model F with the moral shame/guilt index set to its mean. In the end, moving 1 standard deviation from below to above mean racial resentment predicts increases in support for affirmative action (+33 points; 0.079→0.408), group-based government assistance (+45 points; 0.245→0.690), and reparations (+28 points; 0.116→0.399) that are statistically and substantively indistinguishable in size from

¹¹⁹ Apart from age, all background control variables are ordinal or categorical. Thus, age is held to its means, whereas all other controls are held to their medians/modes. In the current sample, this translates to a respondent that is female, 34 years of age, self-identifies as 'slightly liberal', leans towards the Democratic party, and has a BA degree.

those observed for moral shame/guilt, though the increases in support for reparations (44 points vs. 28 points) are noticeably (if still insignificantly, $p=0.133$) smaller.

6.3.3 *The effects of white shame and guilt on immigration policy preferences: testing H2-H2A*

Given that my measures of guilt and shame exclusively reference whites' treatment of blacks, their positive effects on support for pro-black policies are perhaps unsurprising. But hypotheses H2-2A predicted that these emotions, particularly shame, would also influence attitudes towards policies that do not directly implicate black Americans. I thus begin by testing whether ingroup-critical emotions affect preferences for different levels of immigration into the US.

Table 6.7 presents results from a series of ordinal logit models¹²⁰ with the 7-point measure of support for increasing immigration levels as the outcome variable. The baseline model (column a) exhibits a pattern that is similar to the one observed in Table 6.6. Specifically, both moral shame ($OR=2.92$, $p < 0.001$) and guilt ($OR=1.43$, $p=0.008$) significantly *positively* predict supporting higher levels of immigration, while image shame ($OR=0.588$, $p < 0.001$) *negatively* predicts such preferences. However, as expected, the effects of moral shame are significantly stronger ($p=0.002$) than those of guilt. But the combined effects¹²¹ of these two emotions are very large ($OR=4.03$, $p < 0.001$). Table 5B shows the predicted probabilities of each response at one standard deviation below and above the means of the moral shame/guilt

¹²⁰ A brant test indicated that these models violate the proportion odds assumption. Using Williams' (2006) *gologit2* Stata package, generalized ordered logit models—which correct for these violations—were subsequently estimated for comparison. The predicted odds of these models did not meaningfully differ from those observed in the conventional ordered logit models. As such, and because their results are easier to present, I opted to stick with the latter.

¹²¹ Once again, moral shame did not significantly interact with guilt ($OR=1.05$, $p=0.508$) in predicting preferred immigration levels.

index. Holding image shame to its mean, those placing one standard deviation below the mean of this index are far more likely to give a ‘decrease’ (36.3%) or ‘kept the same’ (42.2%) than an ‘increase’ (21.5%) response. For those scoring 1 standard deviation above, though, an ‘increase’ response (75.3%) becomes far more likelier than a ‘decrease’ (3.5%) or ‘kept the same’ (15%) response. Interestingly, this movement is primarily into the ‘increase a moderate amount’ (+27.7%; 0.073→0.350) and ‘increase a great deal’ (+26.1%; 0.024→0.285) response categories as opposed to into the ‘increase a little’ category (+6.3%; 0.118→0.181).

Table 6.7 Effects of predictors on preferred immigration levels

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Moral Shame | 2.92*** (0.359) | 2.03*** (0.279) | 1.68*** (0.234) | 2.14*** (0.291) | 1.57** (0.227) | 1.50** (0.230) |
| Image Shame | 0.588*** (0.060) | 0.664*** (0.070) | 0.668*** (0.068) | 0.629*** (0.065) | 0.679*** (0.070) | 0.702** (0.074) |
| Guilt | 1.43** (0.192) | 1.28† (0.175) | 1.29† (0.166) | 1.42* (0.193) | 1.31* (0.181) | 1.24 (0.172) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 4.03*** (0.421) | 2.45*** (0.311) | 2.10*** (0.275) | 2.92*** (0.352) | 1.99*** (0.269) | 1.78*** (0.248) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 2.32*** (0.237) | --- | 1.97*** (0.210) | 1.66*** (0.185) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | 1.13 (0.111) | 1.03 (0.099) | 0.987 (0.095) |
| SDO-Anti-Dominance | --- | --- | --- | 1.61*** (0.158) | 1.37** (0.137) | 1.36** (0.143) |
| Background/Demographic Controls | --- | √ | --- | --- | --- | √ |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.086 (-.0048) | 0.121 (-.0019) | 0.112 (-.0005) | 0.104 (-.0012) | 0.118 (-.0002) | 0.136 (-.0004) |
| /cut1 | -3.38 (0.158) | -4.81 (0.355) | -3.56 (0.168) | -3.52 (0.167) | -3.61 (0.170) | -4.61 (0.363) |
| /cut2 | -2.61 (0.122) | -3.98 (0.332) | -2.76 (0.129) | -2.71 (0.127) | -2.80 (0.130) | -3.76 (0.340) |
| /cut3 | -1.98 (0.106) | -3.30 (0.327) | -2.09 (0.107) | -2.04 (0.104) | -2.11 (0.108) | -3.05 (0.335) |
| /cut4 | -0.088 (0.073) | -1.27 (0.309) | -0.064 (0.076) | -0.066 (0.075) | -0.056 (0.077) | -0.934 (0.316) |
| /cut5 | 0.854 (0.079) | -0.256 (0.306) | 0.934 (0.081) | 0.901 (0.080) | 0.949 (0.082) | 0.107 (0.313) |
| /cut6 | 2.33 (0.110) | 1.32 (0.310) | 2.46 (0.114) | 2.41 (0.113) | 2.49 (0.115) | 1.72 (0.317) |
| Mean VIF | 3.33 (2.24) | 2.20 (1.95) | 3.36 (2.69) | 2.94 (2.30) | 3.07 (2.62) | 2.33 (2.19) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.48 | 4.40 | 4.67 | 4.13 | 4.81 | 5.09 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.31 (2.24) | 2.47 (2.34) | 2.37 (2.33) | 2.35 (2.31) | 2.39 (2.36) | 2.51 (2.50) |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| VIF Guilt | 4.20 | 4.35 | 4.23 | 4.21 | 4.24 | 4.38 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.28 | 3.72 | 2.96 | 3.83 | 4.24 |

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Pseudo R² row correspond to changes in Pseudo R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table 6.8 Predicted probabilities of preferring different levels of immigration at varying levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index

| | Model A | | Model B | | Model E | | Model F | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | -1SD | +1SD | -1SD | +1SD | -1SD | +1SD | -1SD | +1SD |
| DECREASE | 0.363 | 0.035 | 0.241 | 0.050 | 0.190 | 0.057 | 0.208 | 0.076 |
| Decrease a lot | 0.125 (0.018) | 0.009 (0.002) | 0.066 (0.017) | 0.012 (0.003) | 0.050 (0.010) | 0.013 (0.003) | 0.052 (0.013) | 0.017 (0.005) |
| Decrease a moderate amount | 0.108 (0.017) | 0.010 (0.002) | 0.072 (0.016) | 0.014 (0.004) | 0.056 (0.011) | 0.016 (0.003) | 0.062 (0.014) | 0.022 (0.006) |
| Decrease a little | 0.130 (0.017) | 0.016 (0.003) | 0.103 (0.020) | 0.024 (0.007) | 0.084 (0.013) | 0.028 (0.005) | 0.094 (0.019) | 0.037 (0.010) |
| KEPT THE SAME | 0.422 (0.022) | 0.150 (0.015) | 0.464 (0.023) | 0.234 (0.039) | 0.456 (0.023) | 0.263 (0.027) | 0.476 (0.025) | 0.330 (0.045) |
| Increase a little | 0.118 (0.012) | 0.118 (0.015) | 0.163 (0.024) | 0.237 (0.020) | 0.187 (0.018) | 0.243 (0.017) | 0.176 (0.024) | 0.253 (0.018) |
| Increase a moderate amount | 0.073 (0.009) | 0.350 (0.021) | 0.102 (0.021) | 0.320 (0.033) | 0.126 (0.017) | 0.294 (0.025) | 0.109 (0.022) | 0.247 (0.038) |
| Increase a great deal | 0.024 (0.004) | 0.285 (0.026) | 0.031 (0.008) | 0.159 (0.034) | 0.041 (0.007) | 0.143 (0.020) | 0.031 (0.023) | 0.093 (0.023) |
| INCREASE | 0.215 | 0.753 | 0.296 | 0.716 | 0.354 | 0.680 | 0.316 | 0.593 |

Turning to column (b) of Table 6.7, we see that adjusting for ideology, party, education, age, and sex moderates the positive effects of moral shame (OR=2.03, $p < 0.001$) and guilt (OR=1.28, $p=0.073$)—the latter of which now falls short of the 95% significance threshold-- while also reducing the negative effects of image shame (OR=0.651, $p < 0.001$). The combined influence of moral guilt and shame (OR=2.45, $p < 0.001$) is reduced to just more than half its original size. Nevertheless, these effects remain very meaningful. The corresponding Model B in Table 6.8 shows that, when image shame and the 5 background controls are set to their medians/means, moving one standard deviation below to above the mean of the moral shame/guilt index predicts a 42 point increase (0.296→0.716) in the probability of giving an

‘increase’ response, and roughly 23 and 19 point declines in the odds of giving a ‘kept the same’ (0.464→0.234) and ‘decrease’ (0.241→0.050) response, respectively. Once again, movement into the ‘increase’ category is largely confined to the ‘increase a moderate amount’ (+21.8%; 0.102→0.320) and ‘increase a lot’ (12.8%; 0.031→0.159) responses. Two-way moral shame/guilt x ideology ($p=0.308$) and moral shame/guilt x party-ID ($p=0.159$) interactions were not significant, which suggests that, in addition to being mostly independent of it, the strength of these effects does not vary by political orientation.

Column (c) in Table 6.7 indicates that racial resentment (OR=2.32, $p < 0.001$) single-handedly moderates the effects of moral shame (OR=1.68, $p < 0.001$) to an even greater extent than the 5 background controls combined. The influence of guilt (OR=1.29, $p=0.064$) and image shame (OR=0.668, $p < 0.001$), on the other hand, are relatively less affected, while that of moral shame/guilt (OR=2.10, $p < 0.001$) is reduced to roughly half its baseline magnitude. Column (d) substitutes the two social dominance dimensions for racial resentment. While the (anti) dominance dimension has a significant positive influence (OR=1.61, $p < 0.001$) on preferring higher levels of immigration, its effects again appear to be more independent of moral shame (OR=2.14, $p < 0.001$) and guilt (OR=1.42, $p=0.011$) than was the case for racial resentment. Further evidence of this is found in column (e), which keeps the two dominance dimensions in the model while adding racial resentment. While remaining significant, the positive effects of moral shame (OR=1.57, $p=0.001$) and, if to a lesser extent, guilt (OR=1.31, $p=0.048$) are once again substantially reduced. However, the combined effects of these emotions remain fairly sizeable (OR=1.99, $p < 0.001$). Referring to the corresponding Model E of Table 6.8, holding image shame, racial resentment, and the two social dominance dimensions at their means, moving 1 standard deviation below to above mean moral shame/guilt predicts a nearly 33 point

increase (0.354→0.680) in the probability of giving an ‘increase’ response, most of which is again due to movement out of the ‘kept the same’ (-19.3%; 0.456→0.263) and into the ‘increase a moderate amount’ (+16.8%; 0.126→0.294) and ‘increase a lot’ (+10.2%; 0.041→0.143) categories. Adding the 5 background controls to the model (column/Model F) does not drastically change these estimates. Fixing all other variables at their means/medians, moving from one standard deviation below to above mean moral shame/guilt (OR=1.79, $p < 0.001$) is expected to produce a nearly 28 point increase (0.316→0.593) in the probability of an ‘increase’ response, including 13.8 and 6.2 point increases in the odds of giving an ‘increase a moderate amount’ (0.161→0.313) and ‘increase a lot’ (0.031→0.093) responses, respectively.




Figure 6.2 Predicted probabilities of preferring different levels of immigration (7-point scale) at varying levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index




Figure 6.3 Predicted probabilities of preferring different levels of immigration (collapsed 3-point scale) at varying levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index

While the preceding results suggest that ingroup-critical emotions, particularly moral shame, are important determinants of support for lax immigration policies, we can't discount the possibility that this relationship is unique to *legal* immigration. Accordingly, in what follows, I test whether the effects of ingroup-critical emotions similarly extend to attitudes towards illegal immigration.

Table 6.9 presents the results of a series of ordinal logit models¹²² with the 5-point measure of support for decriminalizing illegal border entries as the dependent variable. In column (a), the baseline model, we see that the significant positive effects of moral shame (OR=2.70, $p < 0.001$) are of a comparable size to those observed for preferred legal immigration levels. Once again, they are also significantly larger ($p=0.003$) than those of guilt (OR=1.30, $p=0.036$). Image shame again emerges as a significant negative predictor (OR=0.798, $p=0.027$),

¹²² These models also violate the proportional odds assumption. But as before, their estimates do not meaningfully differ from those obtained from (gologit) models that correct for this violation.

though its effects on the current outcome are somewhat weaker than those observed in the previous immigration levels model.

Table 6.9 Effects of predictors on attitudes towards the decriminalization of illegal border crossings

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Moral Shame | 2.70*** (0.354) | 1.67*** (0.233) | 1.49** (0.216) | 1.97*** (0.270) | 1.39* (0.201) | 1.25 (0.184) |
| Image Shame | 0.798* (0.078) | 0.960 (0.100) | 0.912 (0.093) | 0.848 (0.086) | 0.915 (0.093) | 1.00 (0.106) |
| Guilt | 1.30* (0.165) | 1.18 (0.148) | 1.18 (0.154) | 1.29* (0.163) | 1.18 (0.147) | 1.13 (0.145) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 3.46*** (0.396) | 1.88*** (0.239) | 1.70*** (0.226) | 2.45*** (0.270) | 1.60*** (0.207) | 1.38* (0.185) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 2.49*** (0.258) | --- | 2.19*** (0.236) | 1.68*** (0.203) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | 1.25** (0.096) | 1.17† (0.109) | 1.09 (0.104) |
| SDO-Anti-Dominance | --- | --- | --- | 1.41*** (0.131) | 1.18† (0.112) | 1.15 (0.111) |
| Background/Demographic Controls | --- | √ | --- | --- | --- | √ |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.091 (-.0043) | 0.148 (-.0012) | 0.124 (-.0004) | 0.109 (-.0014) | 0.128 (-.0002) | 0.162 (-.0001) |
| /cut1 | -1.89 (0.097) | -3.92 (0.323) | -2.02 (0.106) | -1.96 (0.103) | -2.03 (0.104) | -3.63 (0.325) |
| /cut2 | -0.743 (0.077) | -2.66 (0.302) | -0.769 (0.080) | -0.765 (0.079) | -0.777 (0.081) | -2.33 (0.307) |
| /cut3 | -0.068 (0.074) | -1.90 (0.294) | -0.035 (0.076) | -0.065 (0.074) | -0.039 (0.075) | -1.54 (0.300) |
| /cut4 | 1.27 (0.088) | -0.366 (0.284) | 1.39 (0.087) | 1.32 (0.086) | 1.40 (0.092) | 0.032 (0.292) |
| Mean VIF | 3.33 (2.24) | | 3.36 (2.69) | 2.94 (2.30) | 3.07 (2.62) | 2.33 (2.25) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.48 | | 4.67 | 4.13 | 4.81 | 5.09 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.31 (2.24) | | 2.37 (2.33) | 2.35 (2.31) | 2.39 (2.36) | 2.51 (2.40) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.20 | | 4.23 | 4.21 | 4.24 | 4.38 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | | 3.72 | 2.96 | 3.83 | 4.12 |

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Pseudo R² row correspond to changes in Pseudo R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table 6.10 shows the predicted probabilities (which are visualized in Figure 6.4) in of each response along the 5-point support for decriminalization scale at 1 standard deviation below and above the means of the combined moral shame/guilt index. The estimates of Model A

indicate that, holding image shame to its mean, those who place 1 standard deviation below the mean of moral shame/guilt have a 24% chance of giving a ‘favor’ response, as compared to a 78.6% chance for those scoring 1 standard deviation above. And, in what has become a familiar pattern, most of this shift can be attributed to movement into the ‘favor strongly’ (+41.6%; 0.078→0.494) response category.

Table 6.10 Predicted probabilities of differing levels of support/opposition to decriminalizing illegal border crossings at varying levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index

| | Model A | | Model B | | Model E | | Model F | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | -1SD | +1SD | -1SD | +1SD | -1SD | +1SD | -1SD | +1SD |
| Oppose | 0.618 | 0.123 | 0.397 | 0.157 | 0.419 | 0.219 | 0.359 | 0.227 |
| Oppose Strongly | 0.343 (0.028) | 0.043 (0.007) | 0.157 (0.031) | 0.050 (0.011) | 0.171 (0.022) | 0.074 (0.012) | 0.132 (0.028) | 0.074 (0.017) |
| Oppose Somewhat | 0.275 (0.020) | 0.080 (0.010) | 0.240 (0.029) | 0.107 (0.020) | 0.248 (0.023) | 0.145 (0.018) | 0.227 (0.031) | 0.153 (0.027) |
| Neither | 0.141 (0.013) | 0.092 (0.010) | 0.187 (0.016) | 0.127 (0.018) | 0.182 (0.016) | 0.151 (0.015) | 0.192 (0.017) | 0.164 (0.019) |
| Favor somewhat | 0.163 (0.016) | 0.292 (0.018) | 0.282 (0.032) | 0.362 (0.021) | 0.263 (0.022) | 0.342 (0.020) | 0.304 (0.032) | 0.365 (0.024) |
| Favor Strongly | 0.078 (0.012) | 0.494 (0.029) | 0.134 (0.027) | 0.354 (0.047) | 0.136 (0.020) | 0.288 (0.030) | 0.144 (0.030) | 0.243 (0.041) |
| Favor | 0.241 | 0.786 | 0.416 | 0.716 | 0.399 | 0.630 | 0.448 | 0.608 |




Figure 6.4 Predicted probabilities of differing levels of support/opposition to decriminalizing illegal border crossings at varying levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index.

Continuing onwards, adding the 5 background controls to the model (column b of Table 6.9) reduces the still significant positive influence of moral shame (OR=1.67, $p < 0.001$), while rendering the effects of guilt (OR=1.18, $p=0.198$) and image shame (OR=0.960, $p=0.696$) insignificant at even the $p < 0.1$ threshold. The combined effects of moral shame/guilt (OR=1.88, $p < 0.001$) also see a substantial reduction, but they remain very meaningful. The corresponding predicted odds in Table 6.10 show that, while setting all other predictors to their medians, a swing from 1 standard deviation below to above mean moral shame/guilt is expected to result in a 30 point increase (0.416→0.716) in the odds of giving a ‘favor’ response, including a 22 point increase (0.134→0.354) in the likelihood of a ‘favor strongly’ response. The strength of these effects did not significantly vary by ideological self-placement ($p=0.239$) nor partisanship ($p=0.342$).

Turning now to columns (c)-(e) of Table 6.9, we see that, as before, the positive influence of moral shame is far more reduced with the addition of racial resentment (column c; OR=1.49, $p=0.006$) than with the addition of the two SDO dimensions (column d; OR=1.97, $p < 0.001$). But even when these three variables are entered together (column e), the positive effects of moral shame (OR=1.39, $p=0.021$) remain statistically significant. The positive influence of guilt, on the other hand, is no longer significant (OR=1.18, $p=0.184$). The combined effects of moral shame and guilt (OR=1.60, $p < 0.001$), though, are both statistically and substantively significant. Referring back to Table 6.10, respondents who scored one standard deviation above mean moral shame/guilt but at the means/medians of all other predictors are just over 23 points (0.399→0.630) more likely to give a ‘favor’ response—and roughly 15 points (0.136→0.288) more likely to give a ‘favor strongly’ response--than those scoring 1 standard deviation *below*.

Column (f) of Table 6.9 re-enters the 5 background controls into the model. We now see that the effects of moral shame (OR=1.25, $p=0.133$) are both reduced and no longer significant at even the $p < 0.1$ level. However, its inflation factor (VIF=5.09) is now problematic by conventional standards, which suggests that the loss of significance could be due to strong collinearity. Be this as it may, the effects of the combined moral shame/guilt index (OR=1.38, $p=0.016$), while moderated, are still both statistically and substantively significant. Referring again to Table 6.10, when all other variables are fixed at their means/medians, a respondent who scores 1 standard deviation above mean moral shame/guilt is 16 points (0.448→0.608) more likely to favor--including nearly 10 points (0.144→0.243) more likely to 'favor strongly'--decriminalizing illegal border entries than those scoring 1 standard deviation below.

The above results demonstrate that the effects of ingroup-critical emotions on immigration liberalism are not confined to attitudes towards *legal* immigration, but rather appear to influence immigration attitudes in general. And yet another question is whether or to what extent this pro-immigration sentiment is race neutral; that is, do ingroup-critical emotions, particularly moral shame, predict favoritism towards immigrants from non-European vs. European countries? To get at this question, I estimate a series of linear regression models with my measure of racial immigration favoritism as the outcome variable. The results are presented in Table 6.11 below.

Hypothesis 2A predicted that moral shame, more than guilt, would predict favoring non-white over white immigrants. The results of the baseline model in column (a) support this proposition. Whereas moral shame ($\beta=6.04$, $p < 0.001$) significantly positively predicts admitting more immigrants from non-European vs. European countries, the effects of guilt ($\beta=1.64$, $p=0.115$) are both significantly smaller ($p=0.017$) and insignificant in and of themselves.

Table 6.11 Effects of predictors on percent of immigration admissions allocated to non-European countries

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) |
|--|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Moral Shame | 6.04*** (0.974) | 2.66** (0.963) | 0.273 (1.02) | 2.84** (0.971) | -0.124 (0.991) | -0.253 (0.966) |
| Image Shame | -3.07*** (0.799) | -2.36** (0.767) | -1.77* (0.748) | -2.03** (0.753) | -1.34† (0.733) | -1.48* (0.733) |
| Guilt | 1.64 (1.05) | 1.63 (1.00) | 0.752 (0.989) | 1.54 (1.00) | 0.935 (0.973) | 1.29 (0.966) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 7.68*** (0.797) | 4.08*** (0.956) | 1.01 (0.967) | 4.17*** (0.821) | 0.836 (0.936) | 1.09 (0.966) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 7.87*** (0.757) | --- | 6.05*** (0.816) | 5.07*** (0.883) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | -0.513 (0.709) | -1.43* (0.694) | -1.84** (0.689) |
| SDO-(Anti)Dominance | --- | --- | --- | 6.00*** (0.702) | 4.39*** (0.700) | 4.54*** (0.743) |
| Background/Demographic Control Variables | --- | √ | --- | --- | --- | √ |
| Constant | 55.64*** (0.515) | 57.31*** (2.12) | 55.47*** (0.484) | 55.64*** (0.487) | 55.50*** (0.470) | 53.36*** (2.13) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.122 (-.0053) | 0.202 (-.0003) | 0.228 (.0008) | 0.214 (.0001) | 0.263 (.0005) | 0.290 (.0003) |
| Mean VIF | 3.33 (2.24) | 2.20 (2.03) | 3.36 (2.69) | 2.94 (2.30) | 3.07 (2.62) | 2.52 (2.19) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.48 | 4.40 | 4.67 | 4.13 | 4.81 | 5.09 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.31 (2.24) | 2.47 (2.45) | 2.37 (2.33) | 2.35 (2.31) | 2.39 (2.36) | 2.51 (2.50) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.20 | 4.35 | 4.23 | 4.21 | 4.24 | 4.38 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.45 | 3.72 | 2.96 | 3.83 | 4.24 |

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R² row correspond to changes in Adjusted R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in moral shame corresponds to a 6 point increase in the percent of immigration admissions that a respondent would allocate to non-European countries. For instance, a respondent scoring 1 standard deviation below mean moral shame is expected to be allocate admissions almost evenly (49.6%) across the two sets of countries. On the other hand, those scoring 1 standard deviation above mean moral shame are expected to favor non-European immigration at a rate of 61.6%. Though the effects of guilt are individually

insignificant, a standard deviation increase in the combined moral shame/guilt index predicts a nearly 8-point increase ($\beta=7.68$, $p < 0.001$). The results for image shame again accord with the theoretical literature. Excluding guilt and moral shame from the model (not shown), a one standard deviation increase in image shame predicts a significant ($p < 0.001$) 2.4-point *increase* in the percent of admissions allocated to non-Europeans. However, when guilt and moral shame are added to the model, these effects remain similar in magnitude ($\beta=-3.07$, $p < 0.001$) but are now in the *negative* or pro-European direction.

Given that immigrants disproportionately affiliate with the Democratic party, it's possible that the above relationships are confounded by partisanship. Column (b) tests this account by adjusting for political ideology and party affiliation along with the three other background controls. As shown, while still significant, the effects of moral shame ($\beta=2.66$, $p=0.006$), are less than half their original size. Those scoring 1 standard deviation above mean moral shame are now expected to favor non-European immigration at a rate of 58.3% as compared to a rate of 53% among those scoring 1 standard deviation below. While the positive effects of guilt ($\beta=1.10$, $p=0.284$) remain individually insignificant, a standard deviation increase in the combined moral shame/guilt index is expected to result in just more than a 4 point increase ($\beta=4.08$, $p < 0.001$) in the percent of admissions allocated to non-European countries. At one standard deviation below the mean, a respondent favors non-European immigration at a 51.6% rate. At one standard deviation above, this rate jumps to almost 60%. Thus, regardless of a respondent's party affiliation, higher levels of moral shame/guilt results in greater favoritism towards non-European immigrants. However, a significant ($p=0.010$) two-way moral shame/guilt x party interaction shows that the effects only reach significance and are also more than twice and nearly 8 times the size among white Democrats ($\beta=5.76$, $p < 0.001$) than among white independents ($\beta=2.53$,

$p=0.130$) and white Republicans ($\beta=0.757$, $p=0.598$), respectively. A similar pattern is observed when a moral shame/guilt is interacted with ideology: the effects of the former are largest and only reach significance ($\beta=5.15$, $p < 0.001$) among white liberals ($\beta_{\text{Moderate}}=2.79$, $p=0.123$; $\beta_{\text{Conservative}}=2.01$, $p=0.165$). Thus, whereas this wasn't the case for previous outcome variables, political orientation appears to condition the effects of moral shame/guilt on favoring non-European vs. European immigration.

The results in columns (c)-(e) suggest that the main effects of moral shame are almost entirely accounted for (or perhaps mediated by) racial resentment. Specifically, column (c) shows that, when racial resentment is added to the model, the effects of moral shame ($\beta=0.273$, $p=0.790$) become indistinguishable from 0. And, notably, this is also the case for the combined moral shame/guilt variable¹²³ ($\beta=1.00$, $p=0.300$). Controlling for both SDO dimensions (column d) does not produce a similar outcome. The effects of both moral shame ($\beta=2.84$, $p=0.004$) and the combined moral shame/guilt index ($\beta=4.24$, $p < 0.001$) remain significantly positive when these SDO indexes are entered into the model and racial resentment is dropped. And, though not shown, the latter remain significant ($\beta=3.06$, $p=0.001$) when the background controls are added to this model¹²⁴. In the final model (column f), the combined effects of moral shame and guilt ($\beta=1.09$, $p=0.258$) are both only positively and only reach significance among white Democrats ($\beta=2.40$, $p=0.020$; $\beta_{\text{Independent}}=-1.01$, $p=0.555$; $\beta_{\text{Republican}}=-2.11$, $p=0.130$). Thus, the results suggest that the effects of moral shame and guilt on favoritism towards non-European immigration are conditional on political orientation and also overlap considerably with those

¹²³ The effects of this variable remain significant for white Democrats ($dy/dx=2.05$, $p=0.046$), but they are less than a third of their baseline size.

¹²⁴ The moral shame/guilt interaction term, however, shows that these effects are stronger and only significant for white Democrats ($\beta=4.43$, $p < 0.001$; $\beta_{\text{Independent}}=1.31$, $p=0.425$; $\beta_{\text{Republican}}=0.082$, $p=0.951$) and white liberals ($\beta=3.76$, $p < 0.001$; $\beta_{\text{Moderate}}=1.76$, $p=0.270$; $\beta_{\text{Conservative}}=0.132$, $p=0.348$)

6.3.4 *Effects of white shame and guilt on racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth*

Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 briefly noted that, for the first time on record, the average white Democrat and liberal feeling thermometer score in 2016 was warmer towards racial/ethnic outgroups than other whites. Chapter 5 subsequently revealed that, in the wake of the George Floyd incident, whites—and particularly white Democrats and liberals—exhibited an increased tendency of rating whites less favorably/more unfavorably than blacks and other racial/ethnic minorities. My theory argues that both of these findings are reflections of white shame, which is expected to motivate a desire to morally distance or distinguish oneself from one’s morally tainted ingroup while signaling solidarity with non-white racial/ethnic outgroups. But is the current data consistent with this assertion? I attempt to answer this question below by modeling the average difference between a respondent’s feeling thermometer ratings of whites vs. racial/ethnic outgroups¹²⁵.

Table 6.12 presents the results from a series of linear regression models. Recall that hypothesis 3 expected that moral shame, more than guilt, would predict rating racial/ethnic outgroups more warmly than other whites. Consistent with this expectation, column (a) shows that moral shame ($\beta=11.96$, $p < 0.001$) is a strong and significantly positive predictor of this tendency. In contrast, the predictive effects of guilt ($\beta=1.91$, $p=0.218$) are both significantly smaller ($p=0.001$) and insignificant in and of themselves. When combined, though, a standard deviation increase in moral shame/guilt is expected to result in nearly 14 points more warmth towards racial/ethnic minorities vs. whites. The predicted margins, which are graphed in Figure 6, show that a respondent who scores 1 standard deviation below mean moral shame/guilt rates

¹²⁵ Because the effects of none of the ingroup-critical emotions significantly differ as a function of the specific target group (Blacks, Hispanics, Asians), I opt to use the average differential as the outcome variable. Results for group-specific models are reported in the Appendix.

whites 11.8 points more warmly on average than blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Those who score 1 standard deviation above the mean, however, rate the latter groups nearly 16.2 points more warmly on average than whites. Once again, and broadly supportive of recent theory, the effects of image shame are significantly positive when entered alone into the model ($\beta=5.82$, $p < 0.001$), but they turn significantly negative ($\beta=-3.89$, $p = 0.001$) upon the addition of moral shame and guilt.

Table 6.12 Effects of predictors on non-white vs. white warmth differentials

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) |
|----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Moral Shame | 11.96*** (1.48) | 8.30*** (1.51) | 7.00*** (1.57) | 6.90*** (1.35) | 5.62*** (1.47) | 5.51*** (1.52) |
| Image Shame | -3.89** (1.13) | -2.49* (1.24) | -2.77* (1.23) | -2.44* (1.18) | -2.14† (1.20) | -1.77 (1.22) |
| Guilt | 1.91 (1.55) | 1.50 (1.41) | 1.15 (1.50) | 1.71 (1.46) | 1.45 (1.46) | 1.36 (1.40) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 13.99*** (1.10) | 9.22*** (1.47) | 7.46*** (1.51) | 8.18*** (1.25) | 6.48*** (1.44) | 6.25*** (1.52) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 6.78*** (1.06) | --- | 2.62* (1.16) | 1.78 (1.27) |
| SDO- Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | 0.854 (1.02) | 0.174 (1.06) | 0.055 (1.09) |
| SDO- Dominance | --- | --- | --- | 8.35*** (0.995) | 7.42*** (1.01) | 6.71*** (1.05) |
| Constant | 2.35** (0.724) | 13.87*** (3.10) | 2.19** (0.713) | 2.35** (0.681) | 2.28** (0.682) | 10.39*** (3.12) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.215 (-.0136) | 0.261 (-.0067) | 0.250 (-.0046) | 0.302 (-.0038) | 0.306 (-.002) | 0.314 (-.002) |
| Mean VIF | 3.32 (2.24) | 2.19 (2.02) | 3.36 (2.68) | 2.94 (2.30) | 3.07 (2.61) | 2.32 (2.18) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.47 | 4.38 | 4.66 | 4.12 | 4.80 | 5.08 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.30 (2.24) | 2.47 (2.45) | 2.36 (2.34) | 2.35 (2.32) | 2.39 (2.37) | 2.51 (2.49) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.19 | 4.34 | 4.22 | 4.20 | 4.23 | 4.36 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.45 | 3.69 | 2.95 | 3.80 | 4.23 |

Note. N=889 for all models. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R² row correspond to changes in Adjusted R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
 † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

As was suggested earlier in the context of favoritism towards non-European immigrants, given that the average respondent is likely to associate racial/ethnic minorities with the Democratic Party, it's important that I test whether the relationships reported above are confounded by partisanship. In the end, the results in column (b) show that, controlling for party affiliation, ideology, age, education, and sex, both moral shame ($\beta=8.30$, $p < 0.001$) and the combined moral shame/guilt index ($\beta=9.22$, $p < 0.001$) remains a significantly positive predictor of pro-outgroup feeling thermometer bias. At one standard deviation below mean moral shame/guilt, a respondent is expected to rate whites 6.8 points more warmly on average than the three racial/ethnic minority groups. At one standard deviation above, this margin reverses to roughly 11.6 points in favor of the non-white groups. However, these effects are qualified by significant ($p < 0.001$) moral shame/guilt x party interaction¹²⁶. The predicted margins from this interaction are shown in Figure 6. In the baseline model, a standard deviation increase in moral shame/guilt corresponds to roughly 11.9 points ($p < 0.001$) more warmth towards racial/ethnic outgroups among white Democrats as compared to approximately 4.8 ($p=0.047$) and 1.7 ($p=0.430$) points more warmth among white Independents and Republicans, respectively¹²⁷. Further adjusting for ideology, education, age, and sex (Model b) slightly enhances these conditional effects for all partisan groups ($\beta_{\text{Democrat}}=12.23$, $p < 0.001$; $\beta_{\text{Independent}}=5.36$, $p=0.027$, $\beta_{\text{Republican}}=3.63$, $p=0.131$). Thus, while the positive effects of moral shame/guilt are generally independent of partisanship, their magnitude does indeed vary as a function of partisanship.

¹²⁶ A moral shame/guilt x ideology interaction is also significant ($p=0.003$), but it results in a relatively smaller boost in overall model fit.

¹²⁷ For ease of presentation, and due to the small number of Republicans in the sample, these interaction effects were modeled with the collapsed 3-point party-ID variable.




Figure 6.5 Predicted non-white vs. white warmth differential at varying levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index

Note. Points above and below the dashed red line denote pro-outgroup and pro-ingroup feeling thermometer biases, respectively. The x-axis represents differing levels along the combined moral shame/guilt index.




Figure 6.6 Predicted non-white vs. white warmth differentials by party-ID at various levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index

Note. Points above and below the dashed red line denote pro-outgroup and pro-ingroup feeling thermometer biases, respectively. The x-axis represents differing levels along the combined moral shame/guilt index.

Columns (c)-(e) of Table 6.12 once again examine the extent that the pro-outgroup effects of ingroup-critical emotions are independent of racial resentment and social dominance orientation. The results in column (c) show that the addition of racial resentment ($\beta=6.78, p <$

0.001) into the model substantially reduces the coefficient of moral shame ($\beta=7.00$ $p < 0.001$) while cutting the combined effects of moral shame/guilt ($\beta=7.46$ $p < 0.001$) to nearly half their baseline (i.e. column a) size. Now, scoring 1 standard deviation above the mean of the latter shame predicts rating racial/ethnic minority groups just under 10 points more warmly than whites, while those 1 standard deviation below are expected to be roughly 5.1 points warmer towards whites than non-whites. Column (d) drops racial resentment from the model and adds the two SDO dimensions. The inclusion of the latter also reduces the coefficient of moral shame ($\beta=6.90$ $p < 0.001$) and the combined moral shame/guilt index ($\beta=8.18$, $p < 0.001$). When all three of these variables are entered together (column e), the effects of moral shame ($\beta=5.62$, $p < 0.001$) and moral shame/guilt ($\beta=6.48$, $p < 0.001$) are further reduced but remain significant. The addition of the remaining control variables (column f) does not meaningfully change these results. Net of all other variables, a standard deviation increase in moral shame/guilt predicts nearly 6.3 points ($p < 0.001$) more warmth towards racial/ethnic minorities relative to whites. At one standard deviation below, the average respondent is expected to favor whites by a 3.8 point margin. At one standard deviation above the mean, non-whites are rated roughly 8.7 points more warmly than whites. Once again, these effects are qualified by a significant ($p < 0.001$) moral shame/guilt x party interaction. While the effects are positive for white independents ($\beta=1.28$, $p=0.614$) and Republicans ($\beta=0.479$, $p=0.837$), they are far stronger and only achieve significance among white Democrats ($\beta=8.89$, $p < 0.001$). That being said, with the exception of SDO-(Anti)Dominance ($\beta=6.74$, $p < 0.001$), the effects of moral shame/guilt are at least nominally stronger than every other predictor in the model, including racial resentment ($\beta=2.13$, $p=0.090$)

Whites with high levels of moral shame and guilt may rate racial/ethnic outgroups relatively more warmly than other whites, but do they actually harbor negative feelings towards the latter? Recall that section 4.2 of Chapter 4 cited data from the ANES, which showed that the share of white liberals who rated racial/ethnic minorities at or above the midpoint of the feeling thermometer scale while rating whites below it (i.e., in the ‘cool’ region) reached a record high in 2020. Once again, my theory would suggest that this trend is at least partly the product of increases in collective shame. To determine whether shame plausibly accounts for these increases in ‘anti-whiteness’, I transform the white feeling thermometer into an ‘anti-white’ dummy that assigns a ‘1’ to respondents (9.7%) who rated whites in the ‘cool’ region (i.e. < 50) of the scale while rating all other racial/ethnic groups at or above the midpoint¹²⁸ (i.e. the neutral and ‘warm’ areas of the scale). All other respondents are coded as ‘0’. I then estimate a series of binary logit models that mirror the OLS specifications in Table 6.12 but which include the ‘anti-white’ dummy as the outcome variable.

The results of these models are reported below in Table 6.13. In the baseline model of column (a), we see that moral shame (OR=6.36, $p < 0.001$) significantly and strongly increases the odds of rating whites on the negative or ‘cool’ side of the feeling thermometer scale. On the other hand, neither guilt (OR=1.11, $p=0.698$) nor image shame (OR=0.834, $p=0.251$) significantly influence this likelihood. In fact, guilt contributes practically nothing to the fit of *any* of the models. And, in certain models (columns b & d), the combined influence of moral shame and guilt is even weaker than the individual influence of the former. Thus, while the complete and original results are provided in Table 6.13, I drop guilt as a covariate when

¹²⁸ I code this variable as such to ensure that I’m predicting only the tendency to be cool towards whites and neutral or warm to all other groups. Assigning a ‘1’ to all those who rated whites below the midpoint risks including respondents who were negative towards *all* racial groups.

calculating the predicted odds of ‘anti-white’ ratings. These predicted odds are shown in Figure 6.7. In Model A, which holds image shame to its mean, we see that moving from one standard deviation below to above mean moral shame corresponds to nearly a 21 point increase (0.006→0.216) in the odds of placing in the ‘anti-white’ category, while a min-max swing predicts a roughly 34 point increase (0.001→0.337).

Table 6.13 Effects of predictors on probability of ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer scores

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
|-------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Moral Shame | 6.36*** (1.82) | 5.13*** (1.68) | 3.83*** (1.24) | 3.94*** (1.31) |
| Image Shame | 0.834 (0.132) | 1.00 (0.174) | 0.921 (0.151) | 1.05 (0.185) |
| Guilt | 1.11 (0.293) | 1.01 (0.275) | 1.05 (0.277) | 0.993 (0.237) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 5.49*** (0.578) | 3.68*** (1.09) | 2.91*** (0.869) | 2.75** (0.851) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 1.69 (0.562) | 1.47 (0.471) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | 1.32 (0.297) | 1.30 (0.312) |
| SDO-(Anti)Dominance | --- | --- | 1.13 (0.294) | 1.13 (0.320) |
| Constant | 0.040*** (0.009) | 0.130** (0.081) | 0.034*** (0.008) | 0.088*** (0.055) |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.190 (-.0243) | 0.234 (-.0188) | 0.208 (-.0124) | 0.243 (-.0131) |
| Mean VIF | 3.32 (2.24) | 2.29 (2.10) | 3.07 (2.61) | 2.52 (2.26) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.47 | 4.33 | 4.80 | 5.04 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.30 (2.24) | 2.46 (2.43) | 2.39 (2.37) | 2.50 (2.48) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.19 | 4.32 | 4.23 | 4.35 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.41 | 3.80 | 4.21 |

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Pseudo R² row correspond to changes in Pseudo R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.




Figure 6.7 Predicted probability of an ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer score at varying levels of moral shame

The results in column (b) show that moral shame ($OR=5.13$, $p < 0.001$) remains a significantly positive and strong predictor of negative white thermometer ratings when the 5 background controls are added to the model. The effects of guilt ($OR=1.01$, $p=0.961$) and image shame ($OR=1.00$, $p=0.993$), however, remain negligible and insignificant. The marginal odds shown in Model B of Figure 6 suggest that the adjusting for the background controls did very little to attenuate the baseline effects of moral shame. Holding all other variables to their medians, jumping from 1 standard deviation below to above mean moral shame predicts just over a 14 point increase ($0.006 \rightarrow 0.147$) in the odds of providing an ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer score, while a min-max swing predicts a bit more than a 22 point increase ($0.001 \rightarrow 0.225$). Whereas these effects were conditioned by partisanship in the warmth

differential models, the two-way moral shame x party interaction is not significant ($p=0.537$) here¹²⁹.

Column (c) shows that the entry of racial resentment ($OR=1.69$, $p=0.115$) and the two SDO dimensions ($OR_{SDO-Egal}=1.32$, $p=0.212$; $OR_{SDO-AntiDom}=1.13$, $p=0.647$) into the model moderates the still significant effects of moral shame ($OR=3.83$, $p=0.002$) to a similar degree as the background controls. However, none of these three variables—nor guilt ($OR=1.05$, $p=0.865$) nor image shame ($OR=0.921$, $p=0.615$)—significantly affect the probability of giving an ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer score. In the final model (column d), in which the background controls are also added, the effects of moral shame ($OR=3.94$, $p < 0.001$) remain significant and are even slightly boosted. In fact, with the exception of age ($OR=0.959$, $p=0.006$), moral shame is the only variable in the model that significantly predicts ‘anti-white’ thermometer scores. Model D of Figure 6.7 shows at 1 standard deviation below mean moral shame, a respondent has only a vanishingly small and insignificant 0.7% ($p=0.118$) chance of rating whites in the ‘cool’ side of the thermometer scale. At 1 standard deviation above, though, these odds climb to 9.4%¹³⁰ ($p=0.041$).

All told, the results above indicate that moral shame is not only a robust predictor of cooler feelings towards whites *relative* to racial/ethnic outgroups, but that it also uniquely predicts outwardly negative feelings towards whites as well. However, due to the small number of ‘anti-white’ respondents, estimates of these effects come with a high degree of uncertainty. In a later section, I will attempt to replicate them on a larger and more politically balanced sample.

¹²⁹ This lack of significance likely owes itself to a lack of power stemming from the small number of ‘anti-white’ respondents in the sample, particularly among Republicans ($N=3$) and Independents ($N=6$).

¹³⁰ To be sure, and as is evident in Figure 6, these estimates are very noisy. For instance, the 95% confidence interval around the 9.4% figure ranges from a low of 0.2% to a high of 27.5%.

6.3.5 *The effects of white shame and guilt on pro-outgroup behavior: testing H4-H5*

To this point, all of the analyses have focused on the effects of ingroup-critical emotions on pro-outgroup or anti-ingroup *attitudes*. One potential criticism with this is that ‘talk is cheap’. Particularly in the context of a survey that asks sensitive questions about race, expressions of support for pro-black and liberal immigration policies may only amount to token ‘signaling’ or respondent efforts to present themselves as non-prejudiced to the researcher. Accordingly, and while by no means a perfect solution, I test the extent that ingroup-critical emotions are also predictive of pro-outgroup behavior that entails a personal (if modest) financial cost. Specifically, respondents were given the opportunity to donate up to \$10 to a racial justice and/or pro-immigration advocacy organization. To bolster the cover story¹³¹, they were also told that their contribution would be recorded and that the researchers would ‘follow up with more information at the conclusion of the survey’. These ‘donation’ variables thus serve as the outcomes in the analyses that follow.

Because the prediction errors for each of the two donation items are strongly correlated ($r=0.723$), I opt to model the data with series of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) equations. This method allows for errors to correlate across equations, which potentially improves the efficiency of the estimates over those that would be obtained through a standard equation-by-equation OLS model. The results of these SUR equations are presented in Table 6.14 below.

¹³¹ Whether or to what extent the respondents actually bought this cover story is unknown.

Table 6.14 Effects of predictors on monetary donations (\$)

| | Racial Justice Advocacy Group | | | | Pro-Immigration Advocacy Group | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| Moral Shame | 0.898*** (0.218) | 0.857*** (0.243) | 0.869*** (0.256) | 0.869** (0.261) | 0.559* (0.220) | 0.367 (0.243) | 0.427† (0.258) | 0.356 (0.261) |
| Image Shame | -0.310† (0.181) | -0.274 (0.186) | -0.319† (0.184) | -0.287 (0.187) | -0.213 (0.182) | -0.109 (0.185) | -0.214 (0.185) | -0.128 (0.187) |
| Guilt | 0.810** (0.242) | 0.722** (0.244) | 0.821** (0.242) | 0.741** (0.244) | 0.937*** (0.243) | 0.797** (0.243) | 0.912*** (0.244) | 0.796*** (0.244) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 1.66*** (0.169) | 1.51*** (0.216) | 1.61*** (0.229) | 1.52*** (0.239) | 1.42*** (0.179) | 1.12*** (0.216) | 1.30*** (0.230) | 1.13*** (0.239) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | -0.215 (0.197) | -0.277 (0.214) | --- | --- | 0.154 (0.198) | -0.044 (0.213) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | 0.202 (0.174) | 0.151 (0.175) | --- | --- | 0.220 (0.175) | 0.175 (0.175) |
| SDO-Dominance | --- | --- | 0.118 (0.168) | 0.190 (0.174) | --- | --- | -0.187 (0.169) | -0.121 (0.174) |
| Constant | 3.79*** (0.118) | 3.90*** (0.526) | 3.82*** (0.118) | 3.94*** (0.537) | 3.68*** (0.119) | 4.97*** (0.525) | 3.68*** (0.119) | 4.98*** (0.536) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.139 (.0006) | 0.137 (.0009) | 0.139 (.001) | 0.138 (.0006) | 0.114 (.0007) | 0.127 (.0004) | 0.114 (.0000) | 0.125 (.0005) |
| Mean VIF | 3.32 (2.24) | 2.19 (1.94) | 3.07 (2.61) | 2.32 (2.18) | 3.32 (2.24) | 2.19 (1.94) | 3.07 (2.61) | 2.32 (2.18) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.47 | 4.38 | 4.80 | 5.08 | 3.47 | 4.38 | 4.80 | 5.08 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.30 (2.24) | 2.47 (2.33) | 2.39 (2.35) | 2.51 (2.49) | 2.30 (2.24) | 2.47 (2.33) | 2.39 (2.35) | 2.51 (2.49) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.19 | 4.34 | 4.23 | 4.36 | 4.19 | 4.34 | 4.23 | 4.36 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.27 | 3.82 | 4.23 | 2.24 | 3.27 | 3.82 | 4.23 |

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are unstandardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R² row correspond to changes in Adjusted R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Beginning with columns (a), we see that *both* moral shame ($\beta=0.898$, $p < 0.001$) and guilt ($\beta=0.810$, $p=0.001$) significantly predict greater monetary contributions to the racial justice advocacy group, which offers support for H4. While the effects of the former are slightly larger than the latter, the difference is not distinguishable from 0 ($p=0.835$). In terms of the combined effects ($\beta=1.65$, $p < 0.001$), moving from 1 standard deviation below to above mean moral shame/guilt is expected to produce a nearly \$3.30 (+0.870SD) increase (\$2.16→\$5.45) in monetary contributions. The results also suggest that a model that substitutes this variable for the

separate moral shame and guilt indexes fits the data just as well if not slightly better (Δ Adjusted $R^2=+0.0006$). In fact, this remains the case across every model, which suggests that the effects of moral shame and guilt on these outcomes substantially overlap. Turning now to the right side of Table 14, we observe a similar but also unexpected pattern. While moral shame ($\beta=0.559$, $p=0.011$) and guilt ($\beta=0.937$, $p < 0.001$) both independently predict greater donations to the pro-immigration advocacy group, the effects of the latter are now noticeably (though not significantly, $p=0.374$) larger than the former. The effects of moral shame are also significantly smaller ($p=0.038$) than those observed in the ‘racial justice group’ model, while those for guilt are not significantly different ($p=0.482$). Thus, H5, which predicted that moral shame would be more predictive of pro-immigration donations than guilt, receives no support in these results. When combined, though, a 1 standard deviation shift from below to above mean moral shame/guilt ($\beta=1.42$, $p < 0.001$) corresponds to a \$2.85 (+0.756SD) increase (\$2.26→\$5.10) in pro-immigration donations. The difference between this increase and the one observed for the racial justice group equation is significant ($p=0.083$) at the $p < 0.1$ level.

The results in columns (b) show that adjusting for the 5 background controls only modestly reduces the effects of moral shame ($\beta=0.857$, $p < 0.001$) and guilt ($\beta=0.771$, $p=0.001$) on contributions to the racial justice group. However, their inclusion does reduce the positive effects of moral shame ($\beta=0.392$, $p=0.103$) on pro-immigration contributions to insignificance. Those of guilt ($\beta=0.797$, $p=0.001$), on the other hand, are only marginally affected. For the racial justice group equation, a one standard deviation swing from below to above mean moral shame/guilt ($\beta=1.51$, $p < 0.001$) predicts a \$3.01 increase in donations (+0.790SD; \$2.30→\$5.32). For the pro-immigration group equation, the same swing in moral shame/guilt ($\beta=1.19$, $p < 0.001$) is expected to result in an increase of \$2.24 (+0.594SD; \$2.48→\$4.86). The

difference between these two increases is significant ($p=0.017$) at the $p < 0.05$ level. The influence of moral shame/guilt on both donations is also again qualified by significant party x moral shame/guilt interactions. However, in this case, the interaction is in the positive (i.e. non-Democrat) direction. Specifically, the average effect of a standard deviation increase in moral shame/guilt on racial justice donations are roughly \$0.99 ($p=0.003$) and \$0.91 ($p=0.030$) greater for white Republicans ($\beta=2.13$, $p < 0.001$) and independents ($\beta=2.06$, $p < 0.001$), respectively, than Democrats ($\beta=1.14$, $p < 0.001$). Similarly, for the pro-immigration group equation, the average effects are \$0.74 ($p=0.028$) and \$0.60 ($p=0.155$) greater for white Republicans ($\beta=1.59$, $p < 0.001$) and independents ($\beta=1.44$, $p = 0.001$) than Democrats ($\beta=0.936$, $p < 0.001$), though only the first of these differences is significant at the $p < 0.05$ threshold.

Columns (c) substitutes racial resentment and the two SDO dimensions for the background controls. We see that the positive effects of moral shame ($\beta=0.869$, $p = 0.001$) and guilt ($\beta=0.821$, $p=0.001$) on racial justice donations change very little from their baseline. For donations to the pro-immigration organization, the effects of moral shame ($\beta=0.427$, $p=0.098$) are now somewhat smaller and only significant at the $p < 0.1$ threshold, while those of guilt ($\beta=0.912$, $p < 0.001$) are hardly affected. Notably, neither racial resentment ($\beta_{\text{RacialJustice}}=-0.215$, $p=0.273$; $\beta_{\text{Proimmigration}}=-0.154$, $p=0.436$) nor either of the SDO dimensions (SDO-E: $\beta_{\text{RacialJustice}}=-0.202$, $p=0.174$; $\beta_{\text{Proimmigration}}=-0.220$, $p=0.175$; SDO-D: $\beta_{\text{RacialJustice}}=-0.118$, $p=0.168$; $\beta_{\text{Proimmigration}}=-0.187$, $p=0.270$) significantly affect donations to either advocacy group.

Finally, returning the background controls to the model (columns d) does not meaningfully alter the effects of moral shame ($\beta=0.869$, $p=0.001$) nor guilt ($\beta=0.741$, $p=0.002$) on contributions to the racial justice group. Together, a one standard deviation shift from below to above mean moral shame/guilt ($\beta=1.52$, $p < 0.001$) predicts a \$3.04 increase (+0.798SD);

\$2.28→\$5.33) in these contributions. Crucially, apart from ideological self-placement, no other variable in the model is found to significantly affect these donations. The coefficients on every other variable are also significantly smaller than either those of moral shame or guilt. Turning now to the final pro-immigration equation, we again see that guilt ($\beta=0.796$, $p < 0.001$) but not moral shame ($\beta=0.356$, $p=0.172$) significantly affects donations, which is counter to the expectations of H5. Their combined effects, however, are significantly positive ($\beta=1.13$, $p < 0.001$). A one standard deviation jump from below to above mean moral shame/guilt predicts a \$2.25 (+0.596SD; \$2.55→\$4.81) increase in donations to the pro-immigration advocacy groups, respectively.




Figure 6.8 Predicted donations (\$) to racial justice and pro-immigration advocacy groups at varying levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index




Figure 6.9 Average effect of a standard deviation increase in combined moral shame and guilt on donations (\$) to racial justice and pro-immigration advocacy groups by party identification.

6.3.6 Explaining ideological differences in white shame and guilt: testing H6-H6A

This chapter has thus far spoken very little to ideological differences in the expression of ingroup-critical emotions. This is no small omission, as a central plank of this dissertation's theory is that not all whites equally susceptible to ingroup-critical emotions; and that, on account of their differing orientations to racial inequality, white liberals are more likely than conservatives to perceive racial inequality—white advantage and black disadvantage—as illegitimate. Perceptions of illegitimacy, in turn, are theorized as conditioning the expression of ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions. While hypothesis 6 predicted that white liberals would express higher levels of collective shame and guilt than moderates and conservatives, auxiliary hypothesis 6A was formulated with the intention of testing whether differing understandings or attributions of racial inequality would account for these differences. It predicted that, to the extent that measures of 'symbolic racism' actually capture perceptions of discrimination and attributions of black disadvantage, controlling for it should mostly if not

entirely account for differing levels of ingroup-critical emotions between white liberals and conservatives. The analyses that follow thus evaluate evidence of this account in the current data.

I begin by first showing the magnitude of the ideological differences in levels of ingroup critical emotions and racial resentment. Figure 6.10 below graphs the factor-weighted standardized and unstandardized/unit-weighted scores for each variable along a collapsed 3-point measure of ideological self-identification.




Figure 6.10 White shame, guilt, and racial resentment by ideological self-identification

Consistent with H6, white liberals are generally a world apart from conservatives and even moderates on each of these outcomes. Compared to conservatives, they score 1.32 standard deviations higher on moral shame, 0.77 standard deviations higher on image shame, 1.07 standard deviations higher on guilt, and 1.51 standard deviations higher on (reverse-coded) racial resentment. Whereas the average white liberal respondent tended towards an ‘agree’ response to

each of the items comprising moral shame and guilt, the average white conservative respondent tended towards a ‘somewhat disagree’ response.

Given its sizeable relationships with moral shame ($r=0.730$) and guilt ($r=0.617$), and the fact that these are the variables on which the ideological divide is greatest, I will next focus on whether racial resentment accounts for liberal-conservatives differences in moral shame and guilt. But due to their strong relationship, this analysis begins with an attempt at verifying that these variables are statistically distinguishable constructs.

Table 6.15 presents the results of an exploratory factor analysis of the moral shame, guilt, and racial resentment items. They suggest that racial resentment indeed constitutes a distinct factor. All of its 4 constituent items load most strongly (0.606 to 0.885) on factor 2 and only weakly on factors 1 (-0.032 to 0.132) and 3 (-0.043 to 0.137).

Table 6.15 Results of exploratory factor models

| | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 |
|---|----------|----------|----------|
| Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (r) | -0.032 | 0.871 | -0.036 |
| Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. | 0.063 | 0.664 | 0.105 |
| It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. | 0.018 | 0.885 | -0.043 |
| Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. | 0.132 | 0.606 | 0.137 |
| When I think of the manner in which black people have been treated, I sometimes think that we white Americans are racist and mean. | 0.254 | 0.190 | 0.534 |
| My racial group's treatment of black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it <i>means</i> to be white. | 0.425 | 0.037 | 0.519 |
| I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white people | 0.466 | 0.114 | 0.407 |
| I do <i>not</i> feel ashamed to be white for the way we treated black people (r) | 0.241 | 0.221 | 0.251 |
| I feel guilty for the manner in which black people have been treated by white Americans | 0.932 | 0.070 | -0.053 |
| I feel guilty about the social inequalities between white and black people. | 0.875 | 0.093 | -0.017 |

| | | | |
|---|-------|--------|-------|
| Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of white Americans towards black people | 0.862 | 0.010 | 0.033 |
| When I think about then racism that exists towards black people, I feel guilty to be a White American. | 0.786 | -0.028 | 0.099 |
| Proportion of variance explained | 0.779 | 0.662 | 0.648 |
| X^2 | 11000 | | |
| N | 936 | | |

Note. Cell entries are oblique-rotated factor loadings.

The results of a subsequent confirmatory factor analysis are shown in Table 6.16. Column (a) fits a single factor model, which fits the data rather poorly (R-RMSEA=0.220, R-CFI=0.953, R-TLI=0.943; R- X^2 =2499.387). A correlated 3-factor model, which is fitted in column (b), fits the data much better (R-RMSEA=0.107, R-CFI=0.990, R-TLI=0.987; R- X^2 =592.492). We also see that the ‘racial resentment’ factor correlates strongly with both moral shame (0.819) and guilt (0.700), which suggests a considerable degree of shared variance. To examine this further, column (d) adds a general factor. While fitting marginally worse than the previous (R-RMSEA=0.113, R-CFI=0.988, R-TLI=0.985; R- X^2 =658.773), the results show that, of the three group factors, the ‘racial resentment’ factor loads the weakest (0.797)—but still strongly—onto the general factor. The OmegaHS score of the ‘racial resentment’ group factor is 0.149, which suggests that 14.9% of the reliable variance in its indicators can be uniquely attributed to the group (vs. general) factor. By comparison, the OmegaHS scores of the ‘moral shame’ and ‘guilt’ group factors are 0 and 0.035, which means that virtually *all* of the variance in their respective indicators can be attributed to the general factor.

Table 6.16 Results of confirmatory factor models

| | (a) | (b) | | (c) | | (d) | | (e) | | | (f) |
|---|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Factor 1 | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | General Factor |
| Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (r) | 0.910 (0.008) | 0.911 (0.008) | --- | 0.937 (0.008) | --- | 0.919 (0.008) | --- | 0.936 (0.008) | --- | --- | --- |
| Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. | 0.860 (0.011) | 0.862 (0.011) | --- | --- | 0.878 (0.011) | 0.873 (0.011) | --- | --- | 0.876 (0.011) | --- | --- |
| It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. | 0.894 (0.009) | 0.896 (0.009) | --- | 0.916 (0.008) | --- | 0.902 (0.009) | --- | 0.916 (0.008) | --- | --- | --- |
| Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. | 0.875 (0.010) | 0.878 (0.010) | --- | --- | 0.894 (0.010) | --- | 0.908 (0.010) | --- | 0.892 (0.010) | --- | --- |
| Percent of racial inequality attributed to past and/or present discrimination | 0.790 (1.03) | --- | 0.818 (1.05) | --- | 0.800 (1.03) | --- | 0.806 (1.04) | --- | --- | 0.821 (1.05) | --- |
| How much discrimination is there against blacks in our society today? | 0.804 (0.014) | --- | 0.849 (0.015) | --- | 0.815 (0.014) | --- | 0.822 (0.013) | --- | --- | 0.847 (0.015) | --- |
| If not for past and current discrimination, black and whites today would earn the same incomes. | 0.661 (0.019) | --- | 0.690 (0.019) | --- | 0.670 (0.019) | --- | 0.675 (0.019) | --- | --- | 0.690 (0.019) | --- |
| Factor 1 | --- | --- | 0.933 (0.011) | --- | 0.914 (0.009) | --- | 0.930 (0.009) | --- | 0.924 (0.009) | 0.867 (0.015) | 0.919 (0.161) |
| Factor 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.959 (0.011) | 0.996 (11.80) |
| Factor 3 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.950 (0.369) |
| Robust RMSEA | 0.145 | 0.142 | | 0.081 | | 0.122 | | 0.075 | | | 0.079 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------|---------|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------|
| Robust CFI | 0.977 | 0.980 | 0.993 | 0.985 | 0.995 | 0.995 |
| Robust TLI | 0.966 | 0.967 | 0.989 | 0.976 | 0.991 | 0.990 |
| Robust χ^2 | 289.156 | 257.363 | 93.119 | 193.983 | 69.623 | 75.518 |
| df | 14 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 11 | 11 |
| p < | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |

Note. Cell entries are standardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

The bifactor model in column (e) offers an alternative means of assessing the extent of non-general vs. general variance. Here we see that the group-factor loadings of the racial resentment indicators range from 0.449 to 0.621, which suggests that 20.2% to 39.9% of their variance is explained by the group-factor. To contrast, the indicator loadings on the moral shame and guilt group factors, respectively, range from 0.031 to 0.226¹³² and 0.331 to 0.452, which means that roughly 0.096% to 5.1% and 11% to 20% of their variance is accounted for by their respective group factors.

Two conclusions follow from the analyses above. First, it appears that a majority of the variance in racial resentment is general or results from a common dimension that is shared with moral shame and guilt. As will be further discussed later, this could have important implications for how scholars interpret its relationship with racial policy attitudes. Second, despite this generality, a non-trivial if still minority share of the variance in its constituent items appears to be unique to racial resentment. Whether this means that racial resentment is distinct enough from moral shame and guilt to be treated as a separate construct is certainly debatable, and it warrants further research. But for the purposes of examining whether or to what extent it accounts for ideological differences in ingroup-critical emotions, I will proceed on the (in my assessment, reasonable) assumption that it is.

Having shown some evidence that moral shame and racial resentment are statistically distinguishable constructs, the next step is testing my theory's assumptions about the nature of the latter. Specifically, if racial resentment taps perceptions of the prevalence or severity of discrimination against blacks along with its role in explaining black disadvantage, we would expect explicit measures of the latter and some or all of the racial resentment items to share a

¹³² The group-factor paths of one of the moral shame indicators had to be dropped on account of negative variance.

common latent variable. The 3 explicit measures used here, which were first introduced in section 6.2.2.2, are designed to assess (a) respondents' perceptions of the severity of anti-black discrimination today, and b) respondents' beliefs about the extent that existing black-white socio-economic disparities can be attributed to past and/or current discrimination. I begin by entering these 3 items into an exploratory factor analysis with the 4 racial resentment items. The oblique-rotated results, which are shown in Table 6.17, portray a somewhat complicated picture. On one hand, they suggest a two-factor solution is superior to a single. However, one of the racial resentment items ('blacks have gotten less than they deserve') loads more strongly on the 'discrimination/attributions' (0.543) than the intended racial resentment factor (0.345), while a second ('Generations of slavery and discrimination') loads almost equally strongly on both (0.430 vs. 0.425).

Table 6.17 Results of exploratory factor models

| | Factor 1 | Factor 2 |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|
| Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (r) | 0.157 | 0.746 |
| Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. | 0.430 | 0.425 |
| It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. | 0.094 | 0.775 |
| Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. | 0.543 | 0.345 |
| Percent of racial inequality attributed to past and/or present discrimination | 0.715 | 0.157 |
| How much discrimination is there against blacks in our society today? | 0.566 | 0.250 |
| If not for past and current discrimination, black and whites today would earn the same incomes | 0.651 | 0.044 |
| Proportion of Variance | 0.915 | 0.891 |
| X ² | 4374.33 | |
| N | 936 | |

Note. Cell entries are oblique-rotated factor loadings.

At first blush, these results would appear to be in line with Tarman and Sears (2005), which found that these two specific racial resentment items loaded on a ‘structural attributions’ factor, whereas the ‘try harder’ and ‘without special favors’ items loaded on a separate ‘individual attributions’ factor. Specifically, because the three explicit attribution measures all reference discrimination—a structural attribution—they perhaps naturally cohere with the ‘structural’ racial resentment items.

To resolve any remaining ambiguity, I turn again to a confirmatory factor analysis to compare the fits of different model specifications. The results in Table 6.18 suggest that, of the six models, the single factor model (column a) fit the data the poorest (R-RMSEA=0.145, R-CFI=0.977, R-TLI=0.966; $R-X^2=289.156$). The fit of a two-factor model (column b) wherein the racial resentment and the discrimination/attribution items load on separate factors is only marginally better (R-RMSEA=0.142, R-CFI=0.980, R-TLI=0.967; $R-X^2=257.363$). Column (c) fits a different two factor solution in which the paths for the two racial resentment items that cohered more or equally strongly with the discrimination/attribution items in the EFA are removed from factor 1 and added to factor 2. The results indicate that this model fits the data considerably better than the previous two (R-RMSEA=0.081, R-CFI=0.993, R-TLI=0.989, $R-X^2=193.983$). And, despite loading almost equally strongly on both factors in the EFA, the results in column (d) show that keeping the ‘generations of slavery’ indicator in the racial resentment factor actually leads to a deterioration in model fit (R-RMSEA=0.122, R-CFI=0.985, R-TLI=0.976, $R-X^2=193.983$).

Table 6.18 Results of confirmatory factor models

| | (a) | (b) | | (c) | | (d) | | (e) | | | (f) |
|---|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Factor 1 | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | General Factor |
| Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (r) | 0.910 (0.008) | 0.911 (0.008) | --- | 0.937 (0.008) | --- | 0.919 (0.008) | --- | 0.936 (0.008) | --- | --- | --- |
| Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. | 0.860 (0.011) | 0.862 (0.011) | --- | --- | 0.878 (0.011) | 0.873 (0.011) | --- | --- | 0.876 (0.011) | --- | --- |
| It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. | 0.894 (0.009) | 0.896 (0.009) | --- | 0.916 (0.008) | --- | 0.902 (0.009) | --- | 0.916 (0.008) | --- | --- | --- |
| Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. | 0.875 (0.010) | 0.878 (0.010) | --- | --- | 0.894 (0.010) | --- | 0.908 (0.010) | --- | 0.892 (0.010) | --- | --- |
| Percent of racial inequality attributed to past and/or present discrimination | 0.790 (1.03) | --- | 0.818 (1.05) | --- | 0.800 (1.03) | --- | 0.806 (1.04) | --- | --- | 0.821 (1.05) | --- |
| How much discrimination is there against blacks in our society today? | 0.804 (0.014) | --- | 0.849 (0.015) | --- | 0.815 (0.014) | --- | 0.822 (0.013) | --- | --- | 0.847 (0.015) | --- |
| If not for past and current discrimination, black and whites today would earn the same incomes. | 0.661 (0.019) | --- | 0.690 (0.019) | --- | 0.670 (0.019) | --- | 0.675 (0.019) | --- | --- | 0.690 (0.019) | --- |
| Factor 1 | --- | --- | 0.933 (0.011) | --- | 0.914 (0.009) | --- | 0.930 (0.009) | --- | 0.924 (0.009) | 0.867 (0.015) | 0.919 (0.161) |
| Factor 2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.959 (0.011) | 0.996 (11.80) |
| Factor 3 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.950 (0.369) |
| Robust RMSEA | 0.145 | 0.142 | | 0.081 | | 0.122 | | 0.075 | | | 0.079 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------|---------|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------|
| Robust CFI | 0.977 | 0.980 | 0.993 | 0.985 | 0.995 | 0.995 |
| Robust TLI | 0.966 | 0.967 | 0.989 | 0.976 | 0.991 | 0.990 |
| Robust χ^2 | 289.156 | 257.363 | 93.119 | 193.983 | 69.623 | 75.518 |
| df | 14 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 11 | 11 |
| p < | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |

Note. Cell entries are standardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Having established (at least in the current data) that racial resentment is more or less indistinguishable from discrimination-based (vs. individualist) attributions of black disadvantage, I now extract a new variable consisting of the general factor scores. This variable will be used to test H6A, which predicted that controlling for attributions of black disadvantage would largely account for ideological differences in the expression of moral shame and guilt. For comparison, I also test the influence of the original 4-item racial resentment index; and, because they are also theoretically implicated in ideological differences, that of the two SDO dimensions.

Table 6.19 presents the results of a series of linear regression models in which the factor-weighted z-scored moral shame index is regressed on a collapsed 3-point measure of ideological self-placement either alone or with other covariates. Cell entries for each ideology category are predicted margins (i.e. predicted moral shame z-score), while those for other variables are standardized beta coefficients. The bottom row shows the difference between white liberal and conservative margins, the significance of which is determined with a Wald test. In the baseline model shown in column (a), we see that white liberals and conservatives are roughly 1.34SD apart on moral shame. The model in column (b) examines how much of this difference is accounted for by standard background/demographic control variables¹³³ (i.e. party identification, education, sex, and age). In the end, the entry of these variables reduces the white liberal-conservative ‘moral shame gap’ to roughly 0.74SD. Thus, these variables collectively explain approximately 45% of the baseline difference. Model (c) drops these predictors and adds the new racial resentment general factor scale. As expected, the inclusion of this variable dramatically

¹³³ For simplicity’s sake, and because my focus here is solely on explaining ideological differences in moral shame as opposed to variation in moral shame in general, I exclude the parameter estimates for each of the background/demographic control variables.

narrows the ‘moral shame gap’¹³⁴. While the liberal-conservative difference remains significant, it is now less than one-fifth its baseline size (0.243SD, $p=0.001$). By itself, then, the general ‘racial resentment’ factor accounts for nearly 82% of the original gap. For comparison, the results in column (d) suggest that the standard 4-item racial resentment scale explains just under 71% of the gap. The general factor thus explains 0.151SD more of this difference, a difference which itself is significant ($p=0.004$) at the $p < 0.01$ level.

Table 6.19 Explaining ideological differences in moral shame

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Liberal | <i>0.438***</i> (0.032) | <i>0.266***</i> (0.037) | <i>0.102**</i> (0.029) | <i>0.151***</i> (0.033) | <i>0.275***</i> (0.032) | <i>0.095**</i> (0.029) | <i>0.072*</i> (0.031) |
| Moderate | <i>-0.583***</i> (0.082) | <i>-0.446***</i> (0.085) | <i>-0.185**</i> (0.068) | <i>-0.255***</i> (0.071) | <i>-0.430***</i> (0.072) | <i>-0.192**</i> (0.065) | <i>-0.141*</i> (0.067) |
| Conservative | <i>-0.905***</i> (0.069) | <i>-0.470***</i> (0.092) | <i>-0.141*</i> (0.060) | <i>-0.244***</i> (0.067) | <i>-0.508***</i> (0.069) | <i>-0.115*</i> (0.059) | <i>-0.080</i> (0.070) |
| General RR Factor | --- | --- | <i>0.693***</i> (0.027) | --- | --- | <i>0.622***</i> (0.034) | <i>0.596***</i> (0.037) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | --- | <i>0.607***</i> (0.032) | --- | --- | --- |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | --- | <i>0.385***</i> (0.037) | <i>0.179***</i> (0.032) | <i>0.176***</i> (0.032) |
| SDO-(Anti)Dominance | --- | --- | --- | --- | <i>0.063†</i> (0.037) | <i>-0.066*</i> (0.031) | <i>-0.070*</i> (0.032) |
| Demographic/ Background controls | --- | √ | --- | --- | --- | --- | √ |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.336 | 0.401 | 0.603 | 0.547 | 0.467 | 0.617 | 0.626 |
| Liberal - Conservative | <i>+1.34***</i> | <i>+0.736***</i> | <i>+0.243**</i> | <i>+0.394***</i> | <i>+0.784***</i> | <i>+0.210**</i> | <i>+0.152†</i> |

Note. Cell entries in italic font are predicted margins. Cell entries corresponding to other predictors are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The results in column (e) show that, by themselves, the two SDO dimensions account for approximately 41% of the liberal-conservative moral shame gap. Thus, while explaining somewhat more of the difference than the background/demographic controls, their moderating influence is far more limited than that of the racial resentment variables¹³⁵. In fact, when

¹³⁴ While purely suggestive, the results of a mediation analysis confirm the superiority of a model in which racial resentment mediates the effects of ideology (AIC=3746.115, BIC=3779.825) over a model in which ideology mediates the effects of racial resentment (AIC=4778.394, BIC=4812.103).

¹³⁵ Theory would suggest that the social dominance dimensions are antecedent to attributions, and thus the latter are a more proximate cause of shame and guilt. While the cross-sectional nature of the data doesn’t permit a true test of

comparing the results in column (f) to (c), we see that, net of the general racial resentment factor, the two SDO variables only independently narrow the gap by an additional (but statistically insignificant, $p=0.928$) $0.033SD$. Finally, when the background/demographic controls rejoin the model (column g), the gap further declines to 0.152 and is now only significant ($p=0.089$) at the $p < 0.1$ level.

Overall, the above results suggest that the overwhelming majority of liberal-conservative differences in moral shame is accounted for by the general racial resentment factor. Table 6.20 below shows the same with respect to liberal vs. conservative differences in guilt.

Table 6.20 Explaining ideological differences in guilt

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Liberal</i> | <i>0.359***</i> (0.036) | <i>0.217***</i> (0.045) | <i>0.063†</i> (0.035) | <i>0.111**</i> (0.038) | <i>-0.224***</i> (0.037) | <i>0.061†</i> (0.035) | <i>0.050</i> (0.040) |
| <i>Moderate</i> | <i>-0.493***</i> (0.078) | <i>-0.329***</i> (0.084) | <i>-0.143*</i> (0.071) | <i>-0.210**</i> (0.072) | <i>-0.369***</i> (0.072) | <i>-0.155*</i> (0.068) | <i>-0.127†</i> (0.070) |
| <i>Conservative</i> | <i>-0.740***</i> (0.069) | <i>-0.417***</i> (0.100) | <i>-0.069</i> (0.068) | <i>-0.171*</i> (0.073) | <i>-0.411***</i> (0.071) | <i>-0.056</i> (0.066) | <i>-0.041</i> (0.080) |
| General Factor | --- | --- | <i>0.614***</i> (0.031) | --- | --- | <i>0.567***</i> (0.038) | <i>0.548***</i> (0.041) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | --- | <i>0.527***</i> (0.035) | --- | --- | --- |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | --- | <i>0.370***</i> (0.039) | <i>0.182***</i> (0.037) | <i>0.181***</i> (0.036) |
| SDO-(Anti)Dominance | --- | --- | --- | --- | <i>0.001</i> (0.040) | <i>-0.116**</i> (0.035) | <i>-0.123**</i> (0.035) |
| Demographic/ Background controls | --- | √ | --- | --- | --- | --- | √ |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.230 | 0.281 | 0.440 | 0.388 | 0.330 | 0.455 | 0.462 |
| Liberal - Conservative | <i>+1.10***</i> | <i>+0.634***</i> | <i>+0.132</i> | <i>+0.282**</i> | <i>+0.636***</i> | <i>+0.117</i> | <i>+0.091</i> |

Note. Cell entries in italic font are predicted margins. Cell entries corresponding to other predictors are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

At baseline (column a), white liberals score $1.10SD$ higher than conservatives on guilt.

The background/demographic controls collectively reduce this difference to $0.634SD$ ($p < 0.001$), which is roughly 58% of its baseline size. In contrast, the general RR factor alone

this account, it would explain why attributions better account for liberal vs. conservative differences in the expression of shame and guilt.

(column c) cuts the gap to a statistically insignificant 0.132SD ($p=0.121$), which is just 12% of its baseline magnitude¹³⁶. Once again, the standard racial resentment index (column d) reduces this gap to a slightly but significantly ($p=0.038$) lesser degree. The liberal-conservative divide (0.282SD, $p=0.002$) also remains statistically significant in this model, which wasn't the case in the model with the general RR factor. Turning to columns (e) and (f), though the two SDO dimensions explain around 42% of the original gap when entered alone, their independent moderating influence falls to a paltry -0.015SD when the general RR factor is added.

All told, the preceding results indicate that, as predicted, nearly all of the white liberal-conservative differences in moral shame and guilt are a function of differing orientations to or understandings of racial inequality. However, given the cross-sectional nature of these data, it must be emphasized that this account is purely suggestive.

6.3.7 Secondary analyses/robustness check

6.3.7.1 Examining the residualized effects of white moral shame and guilt

Based on recent theory, both moral shame and guilt were expected to predict support for policies that attempt to repair the ingroup's specific wrongs against a specific outgroup (i.e., blacks), while only moral shame was expected to predict a more general pro-outgroup/anti-ingroup orientation. Overall, the behavior of moral shame and guilt approximated these theory-driven predictions. Even where guilt was found to be significantly associated with outcomes beyond pro-black policy support, its effects were almost always at least nominally smaller than those of moral shame. The question is whether this pattern was obtained because the underlying theory is indeed correct or whether the pattern itself is merely a statistical artifact. In support of

¹³⁶ A mediation analysis again supports the superiority of a model in which racial resentment mediates the effects of ideology (AIC=4056.004, BIC=4089.714) over a model in which ideology mediates the effects of racial resentment (AIC=5088.283, BIC=5121.993).

the latter account, the results of an earlier confirmatory factor analysis suggested that most of the variance in the moral shame and guilt indicators was shared between them. These findings could be reasonably interpreted as indicating moral shame and guilt are hard to distinguish at the construct level. Treating their scale scores as separate predictors risks a model with strong collinearity, rendering their parameter estimates unstable and unreliable, and little room for theoretical interpretation due to the poor independent measurement of moral shame and guilt. The stronger effects of moral shame versus guilt on outcomes that do not obviously implicate black Americans may simply be random — a byproduct of the difficulty OLS models have in assigning outcome variance across correlated independent variables.

Cleaner estimates of the unique or non-shared effects of the three emotions can be achieved by using a bifactor model to compute factor scores for their prediction of each of the outcome variables featured in this chapter. Such a bifactor model was previously fitted and reported in column (f) of Table 6.4 in section 6.3.1. To this model, I now add regression equations that regress the different outcome variables on each residualized group factor and the general factor. In a second model, I add the group factor of racial resentment. The purpose here is to test whether, net of their shared variance, the residual or unique variance of shame, guilt, and racial resentment significantly relates to each outcome. More generally, it is a means of assessing the reliability of earlier models' assignments of outcome variance to highly collinear predictors.

Columns (a) in Table 6.21 reports the standardized beta coefficients of the three emotion group factors (i.e., their bifactor loadings) and a general factor for each model. For instance, in the model predicting pro-black policies, virtually all of what was previously reported as the independent effects of guilt can be attributed to variance shared with other putatively explanatory

factors. In other words, the variance guilt retains after being stripped of its general variance is not significantly predictive ($\beta=0.052$, $p=0.117$) of pro-black policy support. The same cannot be said of moral ($\beta=0.254$, $p < 0.001$) and image shame ($\beta=-0.155$, $p < 0.001$); their residualized variance still significantly positively and negatively predicted pro-black policy support, respectively. Nonetheless, most of the effects of the three emotions on this outcome appeared to stem from what they share ($\beta=0.707$, $p < 0.001$). Column (b) adds the bifactor results for the racial resentment group factor. Doing so moderates the coefficient on moral shame ($\beta=0.146$, $p=0.001$), which suggests that at least some of its unique outcome-related variance overlaps with that of racial resentment. Additionally, the unique variance in guilt then related significantly ($\beta=0.087$, $p=0.012$) at the $p < 0.05$ level, suggesting that the absorption of racial resentment's shared variance into the general factor increased the unique outcome-related variance in guilt.

The pattern of results in the 'immigration levels' model is substantially like what was observed in the earlier ordinal logit regression. The residualized effects of moral shame ($\beta=0.393$, $OR=1.55$, $p < 0.001$) are the largest of the three, followed by image shame ($\beta=-0.176$, $OR=0.629$, $p < 0.001$), and guilt ($\beta=0.101$, $p = 0.018$). As expected, the unique effects of moral shame are significantly larger than those of guilt. Thus, for this outcome, the effects of the three emotions are a combination of the unique effects of each factor *and* those common to all factors ($\beta=0.415$, $p < 0.001$). Column (b) in this model shows the unique outcome-related variance in racial resentment ($\beta=0.418$, $p < 0.001$) is both significant and equal in size to that of moral shame ($\beta=0.399$, $p < 0.001$). With the addition of racial resentment, guilt's unique outcome-related variance becomes indistinguishable from 0, which suggests that it largely overlapped with that of racial resentment.

Table 6.21 The residualized effects of white moral shame, image shame, guilt, and racial resentment on primary outcome variables

| | Pro-Black Policies | | Immigration Levels | | Decriminalize Border Crossings | | Non-European Immigration | | Outgroup vs. Ingroup Warmth | | Racial Justice Advocacy | | Pro-Immigration Advocacy | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Moral Shame | 0.254*** (0.032) | 0.146** (0.042) | 0.393*** (0.039) | 0.399*** (0.085) | 0.318*** (0.037) | 0.198** (0.065) | 0.276*** (0.046) | 0.318*** (0.088) | 0.391*** (0.041) | 0.673*** (0.000) | 0.125* (0.051) | 0.113† (0.067) | 0.053 (0.050) | 0.051 (0.067) |
| Image Shame | -0.155*** (0.026) | -0.140*** (0.025) | -0.176*** (0.035) | -0.211*** (0.036) | -0.073* (0.034) | -0.131*** (0.036) | -0.135*** (0.038) | -0.150*** (0.041) | -0.164*** (0.032) | -0.114** (0.041) | -0.080 (0.041) | -0.062 (0.042) | -0.071 (0.041) | -0.038 (0.044) |
| Guilt | 0.052 (0.033) | 0.087* (0.035) | 0.101* (0.043) | -0.005 (0.055) | 0.073† (0.039) | -0.051 (0.048) | 0.086† (0.075) | 0.033 (0.060) | 0.081* (0.036) | 0.159* (0.068) | 0.047 (0.046) | 0.063 (0.057) | 0.032 (0.047) | 0.104† (0.084) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | 0.312*** (0.024) | --- | 0.418*** (0.033) | --- | 0.346*** (0.028) | --- | 0.430*** (0.039) | --- | 0.416*** (0.040) | --- | 0.007 (0.038) | --- | 0.035 (0.352) |
| General | 0.709*** (0.039) | 0.723*** (0.040) | 0.415*** (0.027) | 0.459*** (0.031) | 0.469*** (0.027) | 0.527*** (0.027) | 0.277*** (0.032) | 0.298*** (0.036) | 0.413*** (0.027) | 0.391*** (0.036) | 0.360*** (0.043) | 0.371*** (0.045) | 0.348*** (0.042) | 0.339*** (0.043) |
| N | 937 | 936 | 936 | | 937 | 936 | 937 | 936 | 935 | | | | 936 | 935 |
| Robust X ² | 265.740 | 1424.755 | 254.690 | 1396.706 | 264.615 | 1413.877 | 253.142 | 1385.056 | 277.357 | 1430.199 | 247.0 | 1401.280 | 245.681 | 1399.591 |
| R ² | 0.594 | 0.668 | 0.367 | 0.589 | 0.332 | 0.456 | 0.178 | 0.398 | 0.356 | 0.817 | 0.154 | 0.159 | 0.130 | 0.131 |

Note. Cell entries are standardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Overall, whereas most of the effects of the 4 factors on pro-black policy support are overlapping or attributable to the general factor, their effects on support for increasing immigration are more evenly distributed between shared ($\beta=0.459$, $p < 0.001$) and unique variances.

The pattern of results in the ‘Decriminalized Border Crossings’ model is both like that of the previous ‘Immigration Levels’ model and also accords with what was observed earlier in the conventional ordinal logit model. I thus skip ahead to the ‘Non-European Immigration’ model whose results were somewhat at odds with those reported in the earlier OLS model. These latter results indicated that, while moral shame was a significantly positive predictor of favoritism towards non-European immigrants, its effects became indistinguishable from 0 when adjusting for racial resentment. But the results of the corresponding model (b) in Table 6.21 suggest that OLS may have mistakenly attributed moral shame’s unique outcome-related variance to racial resentment. Specifically, once their overlapping variance is absorbed into the general factor ($\beta=0.298$, $p < 0.001$), moral shame’s unique variance remains significantly predictive of admitting more non-European than European immigrants ($\beta=0.318$, $p < 0.001$). The effects of guilt, however, is significantly smaller and never reaches conventional levels of significance in either model.

Turning to the ‘Outgroup vs. Ingroup Warmth’ model, we see that the pattern of results is substantially like those from conventional OLS. However, whereas adjusting for racial resentment nearly halved moral shame’s coefficient in the earlier model, its inclusion here actually dramatically enhanced the effects of the latter’s outcome-related variance ($\beta=0.673$, $p < 0.001$). Further, whereas guilt was not significantly predictive in the earlier model, its effects (β

0.159, $p=0.020$), now reach conventional levels of significance in the current model, though they are still significantly smaller than those of moral shame.

Relative to the previous models, the results of last two — i.e., those with the ‘donation’ outcome variables — appear to diverge the most from what was observed earlier. Recall that, in the SUREG models, moral shame and guilt were found to be equally strong predictors of donations to the racial justice advocacy group, while the latter was found to be a stronger predictor of donations to the pro-immigration group. These results are generally overturned in the current models. Specifically, referring to column (b), none of the four factors retained unique variance that significantly influenced donations to the racial justice organization, though the variance in moral shame ($\beta=0.113$, $p=0.090$) was significantly predictive at the $p < 0.1$ level. If these results are to be trusted, what was previously reported as the independent effects of moral shame and guilt now appears to be mostly attributable to what they share ($\beta=0.371$, $p < 0.001$). The same is true with respect to their effects on ‘pro-immigration’ donations. Here too, only the general variance ($\beta=0.339$, $p < 0.001$) is significantly predictive of contributions.

In sum, examining the influence of the non-shared shared variance in each of the emotions served to both affirm and contradict the results of the earlier regression models. In the first case, both moral shame and guilt — though more so the former than the latter — had unique variance that was significantly predictive of pro-black policy support. In addition, and as in recent theory, the unique variance in moral shame was consistently a stronger predictor than that in guilt for permissive immigration policies as well as favoritism towards non-white immigrants and racial/ethnic outgroups in general. And, while not mentioned above, the unique variance in image shame was a consistently negative predictor of every outcome variable under study, which also lends itself to recent theory. On the other hand, the results indicated that most of the effects

of the three emotions (and racial resentment) on pro-black policy support were shared. This was even more the case when it came to the two donation outcomes, relationships of which were almost entirely attributable to the general factor. I discuss the implications of these results in the discussion section.

6.3.7.2 *Replication*

To what extent are the relationships between ingroup-critical emotions and pro-outgroup policies an artifact of the current dataset? Given that the data used in this chapter was gathered from an online and predominantly left-leaning sample, can we be confident that these relationships would also obtain in other data? Previous studies, including most recently by Agadjanian et al. (2021) and Chudy, Piston, and Shipper (2019), have established significant relationships between white guilt and pro-black policy orientations. Thus, we can be more confident that such a relationship is genuine. On the other hand, and to the best of this author's knowledge, the analyses in this chapter constitute the first attempt at extending this relationship to pro-immigration and pro-outgroup/anti-ingroup sentiments. And while significant relationships were reported in the current sample, whether they'd replicate in other data remains to be seen.

I briefly attempt such a replication in the analyses below. The replication data¹³⁷ comes from a March 2021 YouGov survey commissioned by the Cato Institute, which was generously

¹³⁷ An earlier version of this chapter relied on data from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) Team Module of Indiana University and the 2016 American National Elections Studies (ANES) Pilot survey. The problem with these data is that they only include measures of guilt; and these guilt measures are different from the administered in my Prolific study. As this chapter has shown, guilt is a much weaker predictor of immigration attitudes than moral shame. And if the latter is not included in a model of immigration attitudes, any effects of guilt are likely to reflect the stronger predictive influence of shame. Fortunately, the 2021 YouGov survey—which was conducted after the initial draft of this chapter was written—included 3 of the 4 measures of moral shame that featured in my Prolific study. Accordingly, I opted to consign the original (CCES, ANES) replication analyses to the appendix while substituting analyses of the YouGov data.

shared with me by the author of the survey's questionnaire¹³⁸. This nationally representative survey (N=2,600) includes a sample of 1,486 non-Hispanic white respondents. Most importantly, it fielded 3 of the 4 moral shame items that featured in my Prolific study. It also included a 2-item measure of racial resentment, racial/ethnic group feeling thermometers, a large array items measuring immigration attitudes (including preferred levels of immigration), and a two-item measure of dispositional compassion, which will allow me to examine whether or to what extent that effects of shame on pro-immigration attitudes are actually attributable to more general feelings of sympathy for those in need. Finally, the survey included the standard 4-item social conformity (vs. personal autonomy) scale, which many researchers use to measure authoritarian predispositions. Given previously documented relationships between this scale and anti-immigration orientations, I feel it is important to investigate whether or to what extent it accounts for moral shame's pro-immigration influence.

A comparison of the descriptive statistics of the Prolific and YouGov samples is provided in Table 6.22. As is clear, the latter sample is far more politically balanced than the former. Relative to their Prolific counterparts, non-Hispanic YouGov respondents were more likely to identify as Republican (44.9% vs. 24.1%) and conservative (46% vs 21.9%), less likely to have earned a Bachelor's degree or higher (31% vs. 54.6%), and were considerably older (Mean=50.7 vs. 34.2). Thus, these data offer an adequate test of whether the effects of moral shame reported earlier similarly obtain in samples with greater external validity.

Table 6.22 Comparison of sample demographics

| | YouGov White Sample | Prolific White Sample |
|----------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|
| % Democrat | 38.7% | 64.7% |
| % Republican | 44.9% | 24.1% |
| % Liberal | 24.6% | 63.8% |
| % Conservative | 46.0% | 21.9% |
| % Male | 48.9% | 47.0% |

¹³⁸ These data are available upon request.

| | | |
|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| % BA+ Degree | 31% | 54.6% |
| Mean Age | 50.7 (17.7) | 34.2 (12.5) |
| N | 1,486 | 937 |

| | N | Range | Mean | SD |
|---|-------|----------|------|-------|
| Moral Shame ($\alpha=0.917$, Mean=2.95, SD=1.44) | | | | |
| When I think of the manner in which black people have been treated, sometimes I think that we white Americans are racist and mean. | 1,480 | 1-5 | 3.01 | 1.54 |
| My racial group's treatment of black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it <i>means</i> to be white. | 1,482 | 1-5 | 2.85 | 1.52 |
| I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white people | 1,483 | 1-5 | 3.09 | 1.55 |
| Racial Resentment ($\alpha=0.783$, Mean=2.70, SD=1.33) | | | | |
| Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. | 1,485 | 1-5 | 3.10 | 1.54 |
| Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (r) | 1,484 | 1-5 | 2.50 | 1.40 |
| Dispositional Compassion ($\alpha=0.631$, Mean=3.44, SD=0.98) | | | | |
| How accurate are the following statements at describing yourself? | | | | |
| I suffer from others' sorrows. | 1,485 | 1-5 | 3.03 | 1.18 |
| I feel sympathy for those who are worse off than myself. | 1,484 | 1-5 | 3.84 | 1.11 |
| Social Conformity/Authoritarianism ($\alpha=0.589$, Mean=0.45, SD=0.32) | | | | |
| Which do you think is more important for a child to have? | | | | |
| Obedience or self-reliance | 1,486 | 0-1 | 0.31 | 0.46 |
| Be considerate or well behaved | 1,486 | 0-1 | 0.34 | 0.47 |
| Independence of respect for elders | 1,486 | 0-1 | 0.62 | 0.49 |
| Curiosity or good manners | 1,486 | 0-1 | 0.55 | 0.55 |
| Immigration Attitudes | | | | |
| In your view, should immigration to the U.S. be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased? | 1,485 | 1-5 | 2.78 | 1.17 |
| After the pandemic, would you favor or oppose eliminating all restrictions on immigration and allow anyone to move to US who wants to? | 1,486 | 1-4 | 1.90 | 0.98 |
| Do you think it is acceptable or unacceptable for people to illegally immigrate to the United States? | 1,482 | 0-1 | 0.23 | 0.42 |
| Non-White vs. White Feeling Thermometer Differentials ($\alpha=0.925$, Mean=3.10, SD=23.16) | | | | |
| Whites - Blacks | 1,476 | -100-100 | 1.71 | 24.87 |
| Whites - Hispanics | 1,477 | -99-100 | 3.91 | 24.42 |
| Whites - Asians | 1,477 | -96-100 | 3.67 | 25.21 |

Table 6.23 above presents the list of primary predictor and outcome variables used in the forthcoming analysis. As in the Prolific analysis, racial resentment¹³⁹ is reverse-coded so that higher scores denote greater racial liberalism. I then average its constituents items together to form a composite index ($\alpha=0.783$), which I standardize to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The same is done with respect to the three moral shame ($\alpha=0.917$) and the two dispositional empathy items ($\alpha=0.631$). For the measure of authoritarianism, I extract a dominant principal component factor, which accounts for 45% of the variance in the 4 dummy-coded constituent items. Finally, for simplicity's sake, I dichotomize the three immigration items such that liberal responses (i.e., 'Increased', 'Favor', 'Acceptable') are coded as '1' and all other responses as '0'. White vs. non-white warmth (and 'anti-whiteness') is measured the same way it was in the Prolific analysis—i.e., as the average of differences between ratings of whites vs. blacks, Hispanics, and Asians.

Because all of the pro-immigration outcome variables are dichotomous, I model them with binary logistic regression. The results of these models¹⁴⁰ are shown in Table 6.24 below. Due to the length of this chapter, I will keep the analysis of these results as brief as possible and provide only a general summary.

¹³⁹ The strength of the correlation ($r=0.753$) between racial resentment and moral shame is almost identical to what was observed in the Prolific sample ($r=0.725$), which offers further evidence that they are indeed highly overlapping constructs.

¹⁴⁰ To keep sample sizes consistent across models, I include only respondents with complete data on all variables.

Table 6.23 Effects of white moral shame on pro-immigration policy preferences

| | Increase immigration levels | | | | Eliminate all restrictions on immigration after COVID | | | | Acceptable for people to illegally immigrate | | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| Moral Shame | 5.03*** (0.504) | 3.31*** (0.420) | 2.39*** (0.305) | 2.24*** (0.322) | 3.22*** (0.242) | 2.29*** (0.233) | 2.02*** (0.217) | 1.82*** (0.216) | 3.74*** (0.327) | 2.53*** (0.287) | 2.02*** (0.240) | 1.88*** (0.248) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 2.87*** (0.351) | 2.18*** (0.283) | --- | --- | 1.98*** (0.211) | 1.59*** (0.188) | --- | --- | 2.24*** (0.259) | 1.78*** (0.235) |
| Authoritarianism | --- | --- | 0.814* (0.072) | 0.891 (0.083) | --- | --- | 0.999 (0.079) | 1.07 (0.092) | --- | --- | 0.731*** (0.062) | 0.752** (0.073) |
| Empathy | --- | --- | 0.817* (0.065) | 0.844* (0.071) | --- | --- | 0.789** (0.059) | 0.812 (0.063) | --- | --- | 0.742*** (0.062) | 0.808* (0.069) |
| Demographic /Background Controls | --- | √ | --- | √ | --- | √ | --- | √ | --- | √ | --- | √ |
| Constant | 0.223*** (0.021) | 1.04*** (1.04) | 0.222*** (0.022) | 0.685 (0.313) | 0.284*** (0.021) | 7.80*** (3.62) | 0.299*** (0.023) | 6.65*** (3.06) | 0.196*** (0.017) | 11.69*** (0.021) | 0.191*** (0.018) | 8.23*** (4.11) |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.268 | 0.349 | 0.343 | 0.377 | 0.173 | 0.252 | 0.206 | 0.265 | 0.195 | 0.294 | 0.260 | 0.341 |
| N | 1,471 | | | | 1,472 | | | | 1,468 | | | |

Note. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Overall, moral shame remains a statistically and substantively meaningful predictor of each pro-immigration outcome regardless of model specification. Figure 6.11 graphs the predicted probabilities of each outcome at various levels of moral shame. In model B, which holds all background/demographic controls to their medians/modes¹⁴¹, a respondent placing 1 standard deviation below moral shame has just a 3.4% (95% CI=1.3%, 5.4%) chance of supporting increased levels of immigration, a roughly 8% (95% CI=4.1%, 11.9%) chance of supporting the removal of all immigration restrictions, and a 3.5% (95% CI=1.4%, 5.5%) chance of reporting that it is ‘acceptable’ for people to immigrate illegally. At 1 standard deviation above, these odds jump to 27.5% (95% CI=17.7%, 37.4%), 31.1% (95% CI=21.5%, 40.1%), and 18.6% (95% CI=10.9%, 26.4%), respectively. Furthering adding and holding racial resentment, authoritarianism, and compassion to their means (model D) leads to a modest attenuation of these figures. In all, the effects of moral shame on these outcomes are least nominally larger than every other predictor. And considering that moral shame could not be statistically ‘cleansed’ of its image-shame-related variance¹⁴², they may even be understated in these data.




Figure 6.11 Predicted probabilities of different pro-immigration responses at varying levels of white moral shame

¹⁴¹ Which translates to a respondent that is female, 50.7 years of age, attended ‘some college’, and self-identifies as ideologically ‘moderate’ and politically ‘independent’.

¹⁴² Unfortunately, the YouGov survey did not include the ‘image shame’ items.

A final set of models—one OLS and the other binary logit—attempts to replicate moral shame’s positive associations with white vs. non-white warmth differentials and anti-white (whites < 50, racial/ethnic outgroups > 49) feeling thermometer scores. Results from these models are shown in Table 16B. Starting with the warmth differential (OLS) models, we see that net of all background/demographic controls (column b), a standard deviation increase in moral shame predicts 5.9 points ($p < 0.001$) more warmth on average towards racial/ethnic minority groups relative to fellow whites¹⁴³. While further adjusting (column d) for racial resentment, authoritarianism, and dispositional compassion moderates this coefficient¹⁴⁴, it remains significant and continues to be at least nominally larger than that of every other predictor.

Table 6.24 Effects of white moral shame on non-white vs. white warmth (left) and the probability of an ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer score

| | Non-White vs. White Warmth (OLS) | | | | ‘Anti-White’ Score (Logit) | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| Moral Shame | 8.10*** (0.614) | 5.91*** (0.848) | 3.43*** (0.897) | 3.64*** (0.989) | 5.51*** (1.59) | 4.17*** (1.21) | 3.24*** (1.08) | 3.65*** (1.15) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 4.04*** (0.897) | 3.46*** (0.958) | --- | --- | 1.56† (0.373) | 1.23 (0.292) |
| Authoritarianism | --- | --- | -4.13*** (0.640) | -3.00*** (0.665) | --- | --- | 0.764 (0.132) | 0.842 (0.161) |
| Compassion | --- | --- | 1.91** (0.615) | 1.72** (0.625) | --- | --- | 1.20 (0.147) | 1.24† (0.156) |
| Demographic /Background Controls | --- | √ | --- | √ | --- | √ | --- | √ |
| Constant | 2.85*** (0.595) | -9.08*** (3.94) | 2.77*** (0.604) | -5.21 (3.92) | 0.020*** (0.006) | 0.50** (0.052) | 0.019*** (0.006) | 0.038** (0.040) |
| Adjusted/Pseudo R ² | 0.124 | 0.181 | 0.188 | 0.213 | 0.178 | 0.248 | 0.207 | 0.259 |

Note. N=1,461 in all models. Cell entries from the OLS models are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Cell entries in logit models are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

¹⁴³ As was the case in the Prolific sample, these effects (column b) are qualified by significant shame x party ($p < 0.001$) and shame x ideology ($p < 0.001$) interactions. They are significantly stronger for white Democrats ($\beta=12.69$, $p < 0.001$) and liberals ($\beta=16.62$, $p < 0.001$) than for white independents ($\beta=5.80$, $p < 0.001$), moderates ($\beta=5.96$, $p < 0.001$), Republicans ($\beta=1.72$, $p=0.122$), and conservatives ($\beta=2.11$, $p=0.066$).

¹⁴⁴ To continue from the footnote above, moral shame’s effects here (column d) remain strongest among white Democrats ($\beta=9.51$, $p < 0.001$) and liberals ($\beta=13.68$, $p < 0.001$) and weakest among white Republicans ($\beta=0.065$, $p=0.962$) and conservatives ($\beta=0.829$, $p=0.507$).

Consistent with the Prolific results, the results from the ‘anti-white’ logit models once again show moral shame to be the strongest predictor of assigning a ‘cool’ or below-midpoint score to whites and neutral to ‘warm’ scores to all other racial/ethnic groups¹⁴⁵. Holding all background/demographic variables to their means/medians (column b), a respondent placing 1 standard deviation below the mean of moral shame (OR=4.17, $p < 0.001$) is expected to have just a 0.6% chance (95% CI=-0.2%, 1.3%) of reporting an ‘anti-white’ thermometer score. These odds climb to 9.3% (95% CI=2.5%, 16.0%) for those placing 1 standard deviation above.




Figure 6.12 Predicted probabilities of an ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer score at varying levels of moral shame

In column (d), we see that further adjusting for racial resentment (OR=1.24, $p=0.368$), authoritarianism (OR=0.840, $p=0.367$), and compassion (OR=1.25, $p=0.083$) attenuates these effects (OR=3.65, $p < 0.001$) only moderately. In addition, as in the earlier Prolific model, only the effects of moral shame and age (OR=0.976, $p=0.003$) are significantly predictive of anti-white

¹⁴⁵ ‘Anti-white’ feeling thermometer scores were given by only 5.3% (N=78) of white respondents. This figure reaches 12.8% among white liberals, which is almost identical to the (record high) share observed in the 2020 wave of the ANES.

scores. And despite its reputation as the most powerful predictor of all things race, the (insignificant) effects of racial resentment on this outcome are once again dwarfed by those of moral shame.

6.4 Discussion

On balance, the results of the analyses in this chapter are generally in alignment with most of this dissertation's earlier predictions. At the same time, they raise a number of interesting questions that will have to be left for future research. In what follows, I discuss and weigh the evidence for each hypothesis.

6.4.1 Ingroup-critical emotions and pro-black policy support

Hypothesis 1 predicted that both moral shame and guilt would independently predict support for pro-black policies. The theoretical reasoning was that, though moral shame should motivate broader pro-sociality than guilt, both should be implicated in support for policies that compensate outgroup victims of *specific* ingroup wrongdoings. The results of the analyses in section 6.3.2 clearly supported this prediction. Moral shame and guilt were found to be similarly strong predictors of pro-black policy support. What is more, the effects of these variables remained statistically and substantively significant net of a host of potential confounds, including racial resentment, social dominance, and political orientation. And their combined effects were both larger than any other variable in the model and were also not conditional on political orientation. Together, these results suggest that models of white racial policy attitudes that neglect to include measures of ingroup-critical emotions are overlooking an important source of variation.

At the same time, these results are also qualified by what was later learned via the bifactor regressions. When the emotion variables were stripped of their shared variance, only the

unique variance in moral and image shame significantly predicted pro-black policy support. Even so, the majority of the effects across all emotions were found to be driven by a common factor. The point then is not that guilt is irrelevant to pro-black policy support, but that almost all of its influence is shared with other emotions. Theoretically speaking, this is unsurprising given the scholarly understanding of guilt and moral shame as distinct but typically overlapping emotions. This finding also has implications for future research. As far as I am aware, the analyses in this chapter were the first to explicitly model the effects of both guilt *and* moral shame on pro-black policy attitudes. Though limited, all previous political science research on this topic either only considered to the effects of guilt or conflated guilt with shame. A consequence of this is that effects attributed to guilt may actually be attributable to moral shame and/or a shared general factor. This is likely to result in biased parameter estimates that understate or not do not accurately reflect the true relationship between racial policy preferences and ingroup-critical emotions.

6.4.2 Ingroup-critical emotions and immigration liberalism

A second hypothesis predicted that moral shame, more than guilt, would positively affect support for increased immigration. In the end, this prediction was largely born out in the data. As expected, in the main analyses, moral shame indeed proved to be a strong and significantly positive predictor of support for higher levels of immigration. However, in all but the final model, the latter's association with guilt was significantly positive at least at the $p < 0.1$ level. Still, the effects of guilt were consistently--and at times substantially--weaker than those of moral shame, though the difference between the two did not always reach conventional levels of significance. When combined, though, the effects of moral shame/guilt on support for increasing immigration were at least nominally larger than those of every other predictor. Importantly, their

influence was also found to be strongest on movement out of the ‘kept the same’ and into the ‘increase a moderate amount’ and ‘increase a lot’ response categories. Thus, the higher a respondent’s level of moral shame/guilt, the *less* likely he/she was to support sustaining existing levels of immigration and the *more* likely he/she was to support more than modest increases in immigration. Interestingly, the strength of these effects did not significantly vary by political orientation.

Subsequent models examined whether the pro-immigration effects of ingroup-critical emotions were unique to *legal* immigration or whether they similarly affected support for permissive policies towards illegal immigration. In the end, the results were in line with the latter conclusion. As was the case in the legal immigration levels models, both moral shame and guilt significantly positively predicted favoring the decriminalization of illegal border entry—though this was true of the latter only in the baseline and SDO models. And, once again, the effects of the former were also significantly to marginally significantly stronger than the latter. Most importantly, the combined effects of both remained significant across all models. Similar to before, the marginal odds indicated they also had the greatest influence on ‘favor strongly’ responses.

Later bifactor regressions generally corroborated these findings. Once their shared variance was removed, the effects of the unique variance in moral shame on both support for higher levels of legal immigration and decriminalizing illegal border entries were significantly positive, and relatively large in the case of the former. In contrast, the effects of guilt’s unique variance were both significantly smaller and not consistently distinguishable from 0.

In light of the politically unbalanced sample and the fact the current chapter marked the first study to assess the effects of ingroup-critical emotions on immigration attitudes, I attempted

to replicate some of these relationships on a nationally representative sample. This attempt was largely successful. As in the Prolific sample, moral shame was again found to be a robust predictor of supporting increased immigration. It also emerged as the strongest predictor of supporting the elimination of all immigration restrictions and tolerating illegal immigration. These relationships persisted net of controls for racial resentment, authoritarianism, compassion, and political orientation. Accordingly, we can be confident that the Prolific findings are not merely artifacts of a demographically unrepresentative sample.

6.4.3 Ingroup-critical emotions and pro-outgroup bias

Two hypotheses were formulated for the purpose of examining the effects of ingroup-critical emotions on pro-outgroup orientations. The first predicted that the pro-immigration effects of moral shame would be race-conscious as opposed to universalist or color-blind. Specifically, moral shame (but not guilt) was expected to predict a preference for admitting immigrants from non-European vs. European countries. This prediction was generally supported. In both the baseline model and when adjusting for political orientation and demographic/background covariates, moral shame significantly increased the percent of immigration admissions that a respondent would allocate to non-European vs. European countries. While the effects of guilt on this tendency were in the positive direction, they never reached conventional levels of significance. Later it was discovered that the combined effects of these variables were moderated by partisanship. Specifically, they were found to be relatively stronger for and were only consistently significant among Democrats. Given the public's likely association of non-white immigrants with the Democratic Party coalition, this could suggest that

the effects of ingroup-critical emotions on these allocation decisions are bounded by considerations of political power¹⁴⁶.

The bifactor regression models generally upheld the above results. Whereas the unique variance in moral shame significantly positively predicted favoring non-European over European immigrants, that in guilt did not. Furthermore, whereas the effects of moral shame in the conventional OLS model became indistinguishable from 0 when adjusting for racial resentment, they remained sizeable and significant in the bifactor model. Once again, given the strong collinearity between moral shame and racial resentment (which will be further discussed below), it's possible that OLS mistakenly attributed all of the former's outcome-related variance to the latter. This underscores the value of bifactor models for computing cleaner parameter estimates of highly collinear predictors.

A second hypothesis of the 'pro-outgroup' variety anticipated that moral shame, more than guilt, would predict greater relative warmth towards racial/ethnic outgroups vs. whites. The results from the main analyses, which were later partially¹⁴⁷ replicated on the YouGov sample, fully supported this proposition. Across all models, higher levels of moral shame corresponded to significantly greater relative warmth towards racial/ethnic minorities vs. whites. In contrast, though in the positive direction, the effects of guilt never approached significance and were consistently significantly to marginally significantly (i.e. $p < 0.1$) smaller than those of moral shame. With the exception of the (anti)dominance SDO dimension, moral shame as well as the combined moral shame/guilt index proved to be the strongest predictors of rating racial/ethnic minorities more warmly than whites. Indeed, in the final model, they were even stronger than

¹⁴⁶ In other words, if Republicans perceive that greater numbers of non-white immigrants will ultimately reduce or threaten their party's political clout, the influence of other racial-group-based moral considerations is likely to be weaker.

¹⁴⁷ I say 'partially' because the YouGov dataset lacked a measure of guilt.

racial resentment, which was no longer significant. The strength of these effects, however, was conditioned by political orientation such that they were stronger for white democrats (liberals) than for independents (moderates) and Republicans (conservatives).

That the effects of moral shame on pro-outgroup warmth were both the strongest of the three emotions as well as stronger than those of racial resentment was further supported in the bifactor regression. While the unique variance in both moral shame and guilt significantly predicted pro-outgroup warmth, the effects of the former were significantly larger. When the unique variance in racial resentment was added to the model, this difference further widened. The unique effects of moral shame were also larger than those of racial resentment, though this difference only reached significance at the $p < 0.1$ level.

But rather than merely predicting greater *relative* warmth towards racial/ethnic outgroups, other models, which were replicated on the YouGov sample, showed moral shame to be a strong and significantly positive independent predictor of outright negativity towards whites. Indeed, across all models, the greater a respondent's moral shame, the greater the likelihood that he/she rated whites in the negative or 'cool' region and non-whites in the neutral or warm region of the feeling thermometer scale. Neither racial resentment nor any of the two SDO dimensions independently predicted this outcome. Overall, the effects of moral shame on this outcome were stronger than every other predictor in the model. These theoretically expected findings are important in that they suggest that moral shame does not merely encourage greater sympathy or identification with racial/ethnic outgroups, but that it also motivates moral disapproval if not rejection of one's racial ingroup.

6.4.4 Ingroup-critical emotions and pro-outgroup behavior

Another set of hypotheses predicted that moral shame and guilt would differentially predict engaging in pro-outgroup behavior. First, it was expected that both moral shame and guilt would independently predict monetary donations to a racial justice advocacy group. The results of the main analyses completely supported this prediction. Across all models, the effects of moral shame and guilt on contributions were both significantly positive and virtually equal in magnitude. In fact, apart from those of ideology, the effects of no other variables reached conventional levels of. The effects of moral shame and guilt were also larger in size than those of any other variable. However, these results proved to be generally at odds with what was subsequently found in the bifactor models. The latter results indicated that nearly all of the independent positive effects of moral shame and guilt were, in fact, attributable to a common factor. On one hand, one might interpret this as invalidating the hypothesis in question. But, to the contrary, that the assumed independent effects of moral shame and guilt on racial justice donations were entirely absorbed in the general factor implies that their effects were overlapping and thus indistinguishable from one another. To be clear, evidence against the current hypothesis would entail finding that the unique effects of one were significantly different from the unique effects of the other. In the end, though, this is not what was observed.

A second hypothesis expected to find that moral shame, more than guilt, would predict monetary donations to a pro-immigration advocacy group. This prediction was not borne out in the data. In the main analyses, the positive effects of moral shame on this outcome only reached significance in the baseline model, while those of guilt were nominally larger and remained both statistically and substantively meaningful across all models. However, that the combined effects of moral shame and guilt were significant and greater in size than the individual coefficient of

the latter suggested a higher degree of overlap in the effects of the two variables. This inference was later supported in the bifactor regression, which showed that the effects of both variables were, as in the previous case, almost entirely attributable to the general factor. Why no support was found for this hypothesis is unclear. One possibility is that the theory that motivated it is either wrong or in need of revision. Another admittedly speculative but not implausible possibility is that monetary donations are actually a token or relatively undemanding form of pro-outgroup behavior. The implication here is that moral shame (but not guilt) would, in fact, emerge as a unique predictor of pro-outgroup behavior that incurs a greater personal investment.

6.4.5 Ingroup-critical emotions and racial resentment

While this chapter was primarily concerned with the effects of ingroup critical emotions, their close relationship with racial resentment can't be ignored. Racial resentment was found to be strongly correlated with moral shame¹⁴⁸ ($r=0.73$) and, if to a lesser degree, with guilt ($r=0.62$). In many of the main analyses, it was clear that the former two (colinear) variables were competing for outcome variance, which would explain why the effects of one was, at times, reduced to insignificance in the presence of the other. This raised the question: are racial resentment and moral shame (and perhaps guilt) one and the same? Or are they distinct but significantly overlapping constructs?

While the data was less than dispositive on these questions, they appear to point towards the latter account. First, an exploratory factor analysis showed that the items comprising the racial resentment scale loaded separately from those constituting the moral shame and guilt scales. A confirmatory factor analysis was next conducted, the results of which supported the superiority of a 3-factor over a single-factor model. However, a general factor model was also

¹⁴⁸ Though on shorter scales, the relationship observed in the YouGov sample was even slightly stronger ($r=0.75$).

fitted, which ultimately revealed that that only around 15% of the reliable variance in the indicators of racial resentment could be uniquely attributed to their group factor. Although this degree of unique variance was larger than what was found in moral shame and guilt, it is still too low for concluding with high confidence that racial resentment inhabits a distinct attitudinal dimension. A subsequent bifactor model also showed that the degree of unique variance varied across the four racial resentment indicators. At the low end, for instance, just 20% and 25% of the reliable variance in the ‘blacks have gotten less than they deserve’ and ‘generations of slavery and discrimination’ indicators, respectively, could be uniquely attributed to their respective group factor. For the remaining two indicators, these figures were 39% and 40%.

That much of the variance in racial resentment is shared with moral shame and guilt could have important implications for how the scale is interpreted. First, absent controlling for them, any relationship between racial resentment and racial policy preferences is likely to at least partly reflect the influence of moral shame and/or guilt. This would help explain why some studies, including the recent Agadjanian et al. (2021), find that racial resentment is a stronger predictor of pro-black favoritism than anti-black prejudice. As several of the analyses in this chapter have shown, moral shame is the strongest predictor of such favoritism when it comes to feeling thermometer differentials. Thus, it stands to reason that moral shame is implicated in racial resentment’s relationship with whites’ attitudes towards blacks and other whites. The same is likely to be true of racial resentment’s relationship with immigration attitudes. Though this relationship been previously documented, its meaning is unclear. A conventional interpretation is that racial resentment reflects a “broader syndrome against non-white ethnic/racial groups”, which, because they are disproportionately non-white, affects attitudes towards immigrants (Miller, 2018, p.9). However, if racial resentment and moral shame are both strongly correlated

and similarly predictive of immigration attitudes, this interpretation is incomplete or misleading. As racial resentment's effects on white immigration attitudes may not simply reflect prejudice towards racial/ethnic outgroups, but it may additionally or more so reflect shame-motivated negativity towards other whites. Second, as was shown in the previous two chapters, white scores on the racial resentment scale vary across time, including in response to high-profile racialized events (e.g. The death of George Floyd). Given their strong intercorrelations, it follows that decreases in white racial resentment generally coincide with increases in moral shame and guilt. If true, this would constitute compelling evidence in favor of my 'group-based moral emotions' account of white racial attitudes¹⁴⁹.

6.4.6 Ideological differences in the expression of ingroup-critical emotions

An alternative interpretation of racial resentment's close relationship with ingroup-critical emotions is the latter follow from the former. As I explained in chapter 3, this is because the expression of ingroup-critical emotions is conditional on both the perceived responsibility for as well as the perceived legitimacy of racial inequality. And perceptions of responsibility and legitimacy, in turn, will be largely a function of one's attributions of racial inequality—i.e. the extent to which one attributes it to systemic (e.g. racial discrimination and bias) or to endogenous factors (cultural deficits, illegitimacy rates, biological differences etc.). Thus, to the extent that racial resentment captures these differing attributions, it should logically precede the expression of ingroup-critical emotions. And because white liberals are more likely to attribute black-white inequality to racial discrimination and bias than conservatives, it follows that this difference

¹⁴⁹ Unfortunately, whereas we have one for racial resentment, we lack the necessary time series of moral shame to test this account. But given that it is an important predictor of white racial attitudes, research organizations that survey public opinion across time (ANES, General Social Survey etc.) should consider adding measures of ingroup-critical emotions into their standard questionnaires.

accounts for their differing levels of moral shame and guilt. In other words, racial resentment should at least partially mediate the relationship between ideology and ingroup-critical emotions.

A section in this chapter sought to test whether the data was consistent with the above assumptions. First, factor analyses were conducted to examine the extent that racial resentment and attributions of racial inequality were statistically distinguishable. Findings from an initial exploratory factor analysis showed that two of the very racial resentment items that were found in previous research (i.e., Tarman & Sears, 2005) to load on a separate ‘structural attributions’ factor did, in fact, load more or equally strongly on a factor that was shared with explicit measures of discrimination-based attributions. A subsequent confirmatory factor analysis confirmed that a model in which these two items loaded on this group factor had a superior fit to one in which they loaded together with the remaining two racial resentment items. In the end, though, the difference was moot, as the results of a general factor model showed that virtually all of the variance in each group factor was attributable to a common dimension. On the basis of these results, all of the items were combined into a factor-weighted index. Next, I estimated a series of linear models that began by regressing moral shame and guilt onto self-reported ideology and, thereafter, onto the modified racial resentment index. As expected, the latter accounted for nearly all of the baseline liberal-conservative differences in moral shame as well as *all* of the differences in guilt. In contrast, social dominance orientation—another theoretically plausible mediator—explained a much smaller share of these differences; and a negligible share when entered together with racial resentment.

While the above findings are consistent with expectations, they are also purely suggestive--and this fact can't be overstated. For instance, it's possible that the causal order (if there is one) runs in the other direction such that liberals' feelings of moral shame and guilt

inspire ‘woke’ responses to the racial resentment items. Though this wouldn’t make theoretical sense—moral shame and guilt are unlikely to *cause* one’s attributions of inequality or perceptions of racial discrimination—the point is that there is no way to properly adjudicate between these and many other possible pathways with cross-sectional survey data. In fact, moral shame/guilt and racial resentment could be so intertwined that it might even be difficult, if not impossible, to tease them apart experimentally¹⁵⁰. In these circumstances, the best a researcher can do is offer evidence that accords with a theoretically-supported model while leaving the door wide open for alternative accounts.

6.5 Conclusion

Whereas such relationships were only implied or theoretically assumed in previous chapters, the current chapter finally brought evidence attesting to importance of ingroup-critical emotions for understanding white racial attitudes. Specifically, white guilt and moral shame—along with the factor they share—proved to be strong and unique predictors of support for race-based equity policies, including reparations, affirmative action, and special government assistance for blacks. This was the case even in the presence of other variables, such as racial resentment and SDO, that scholars have long considered to be central determinants of whites’ racial policy preferences. In fact, in some cases, the effects of ingroup-critical emotions were even stronger than those of these other variables. More importantly, they weren’t limited to policies that implicate black American. Moral shame, in particular, was found to also strongly influence attitudes towards immigration and racial/ethnic outgroups more generally. The more that white respondents felt ashamed of their racial ingroup’s treatment of blacks, the more they

¹⁵⁰ Simply put, if both racial resentment and moral shame/guilt generally move in unison, determining whether one ‘causes’ the other becomes a serious challenge. An alternative is to experimentally manipulate people’s attributions of racial inequality (rather than using racial resentment as a rough proxy thereof) and examine whether this effects between-condition differences in ingroup-critical emotions.

supported increasing legal immigration and relaxing restrictions on illegal immigration. Revealingly, the findings also suggested this greater desire for more and easier immigration wasn't race-neutral. The more moral shame a respondent reported, the more likely he/she was to favor immigration from non-European vs. European countries. Likewise, the greater a respondent's feelings of moral shame, the more likely he/she was to rate racial/ethnic outgroups more warmly than other whites. And rather than merely predicting greater *relative* warmth towards the former, the findings also showed that moral shame increased the likelihood of being outright 'cool' towards the latter.

Taken together, the findings in this chapter speak to one of the central theoretical arguments in this dissertation: whites' orientations towards racial/ethnic outgroups, including support for policies that exclusively or disproportionately benefit them, are intimately related to their orientations towards their own racial ingroup. More specifically, how whites feel about or appraise the moral status of their ingroup is an important determinant of their attitudes towards racial/ethnic outgroups. Or, in practical terms, whites' opposition to or support for affirmative action and higher levels of immigration is not only shaped by their feelings towards blacks and Hispanics but also—if not more so—by their feelings towards other whites. With few exceptions, political scientists have given outsized focus to the former and have generally overlooked the importance of the latter. The findings in this chapter will hopefully serve as a corrective to this blind spot.

At the same time, the work in this chapter is hardly unimpeachable. While I will leave a thorough review of its limitations to the final chapter, the findings here rest on cross-sectional data, and thus can't be interpreted as causal. On this point, it should be noted that the barrier to causal inference here is less the non-excludability of reverse causation (insofar as ingroup-

critical emotions are unlikely to be ‘caused’ by support for affirmative action or greater immigration) and more the non-excludability of confounding variables. Theoretically plausible confounds like racial resentment, SDO, and political orientation may have been controlled for, but they hardly exhaust the universe of possible variables whose omission would create the illusion of a causal relationship between ingroup-critical emotions and racial policy preferences. Addressing this causal hurdle requires experimental evidence, the search for which is the object of the next and final empirical chapter.

7 WHITE SHAME, GUILT, AND RACIAL LIBERALISM IN THE LABORATORY

7.1 Introduction

To this point, this dissertation has produced only indirect and suggestive evidence of the importance of collective shame and guilt for white racial liberalism. Chapter 4 showed that increases in white racial liberalism follow increases in the extent that news media implicates whites in the historical and continued disadvantage of African Americans. Chapter 5 expanded on these findings by showing that the death of George Floyd occasioned increases in white racial liberalism and whites' negativity towards other whites; and that these increases were partially mediated by an upsurge in racial equalitarian media coverage. Finally, the previous chapter documented strong relationships between white moral shame and guilt, on one hand, and pro-outgroup/anti-ingroup attitudes and policy preferences, on another.

The current chapter seeks to provide a direct experimental test of some of the central pillars of this dissertation's overarching theory. Specifically, and using data gathered from a large survey experiment of white Americans, I test whether a) exposure to racial equalitarian news media heightens feelings of white moral shame and guilt, and whether b) increases in these moral emotions, in turn, inspire the expression of pro-outgroup attitudes and policy orientations.

This chapters begins with an introduction and discussion of the experimental design, including the potential challenges of conducting priming studies in the current media and political environment. I then proceed with a discussion of the survey sample and, thereafter, a review of the variables that feature in this study's analyses. Analyses of results follow and are divided into sections that correspond to this study's primary and secondary hypotheses. Specifically, I begin each analysis with a test of the experimental treatment's main effects on primary outcome variables. I then pivot to tests of conditional hypotheses, which concern

whether the effects of the treatment on attitudinal outcomes vary as a function of political ideology and/or party identification. A final section of analyses tests this study's mediational hypotheses, which deal with the question of whether the treatment on pro-outgroup attitudes and policy preferences are conveyed through moral shame and/or guilt. This chapter concludes with a discussion of main findings and suggestions for future research.

7.2 Experimental design

7.2.1 Considerations/Challenges

At the outset, it's worth noting that the deck is likely to be stacked against observing any significant experimental effects. In the previous chapter, I raised the possibility that white racial attitudes, particularly those of Democrats and liberals, had already shifted so much in the liberal direction that there might be little room for significant additional movement. Significant movement in the liberal direction was observed in response to the Floyd incident, but it was generally modest in scope. And though we are now roughly a year past the Floyd incident and attendant mass protests, there's little reason to expect things to be any different. For instance, a recent Axios/Ipsos survey, which was conducted just a month before this chapter's experimental data was gathered, found that 90% of white Democrats (vs. 35% of Republicans) agreed that the (Floyd-related) events of the past year had made "[them] realize there is still a lot of racism" in the US. Sixty-four percent of surveyed Democrats (vs. 30% of Republicans) also indicated that they had personally taken actions "to better understand racial issues in America", including reading articles and videos (55% vs. 21.5% of Republicans), discussing the topic with friends and family (51.9% vs. 25.1% of Republicans), and watching documentaries or films (40.8% vs. 12.5% of Republicans). Given this greater awareness, and given that racial justice rhetoric has only become further entrenched in the messaging of news media, political elites, and

corporations in the post-Floyd period (to say nothing of ongoing cultural battles over the teaching of ‘critical race theory’ in public schools), white racial attitudes may even be less sensitive to ‘woke’ stimuli today. Indeed, reminders of ‘white privilege’, ‘systemic racism’, and ‘white supremacy’ are practically unavoidable in the current information environment.

A potential consequence of this is that white-critical moral considerations—or strategies to resist or reject them—might already be so cognitively available and accessible that experimentally priming them becomes superfluous. Merely asking about race may be sufficient for eliciting ingroup-critical moral considerations and emotions among white liberals and Democrats¹⁵¹. White Republicans and conservatives, meanwhile, may now associate (and thus readily dismiss) any ingroup-critical messaging with ‘critical race theory indoctrination’ or the New York Times’ 1619 Project, which have become salient talking points on the political Right.

Though likely ceiling effects make conducting an experimental priming study under these conditions less than ideal, I do not have the option of traveling back in time a few years to the pre- or earlier years of the Great Awakening period. Instead, I have settled for designing an experiment that (hopefully) delivers sufficient power for detecting even very small ($d=0.15$) differences between experimental groups.

¹⁵¹ Consider that in the cross-sectional data featured in the previous chapter, the mean response among white liberals and Democrats to the moral shame and guilt items fell between the ‘somewhat agree’ and ‘agree’ categories. Conceivably, an experimental prime would thus need to be powerful enough to move the mean of this subgroup towards a ‘strongly agree’ response.

7.2.2 Data

Data for the current experiment was gathered from a survey 1,314¹⁵² of US-born non-Hispanic white American respondents between June 14¹⁵³ and July 9, 2021¹⁵⁴ via the crowd-survey platform Prolific. Of this sample, 28 respondents opted out of the survey prior to completing post-treatment measures. They were thus excluded from all analyses, which reduced the working sample to 1,286 participants. Participants were paid at a rate of \$8 per hour of their time, though the median completion time was just shy of 15 minutes. Table 7.1 below details the demographic and political composition of the sample. As is clear, this is not a nationally representative sample of the non-Hispanic white American population. Rather, it is one that is predominantly left-leaning, college educated, and younger. As such, it must be noted that none of the findings in this study can be confidently generalized to the broader white American population. But while lacking external validity, this sample is nonetheless sufficient for

¹⁵² The original sample actually consisted of 1,543 respondents. These additional 229 respondents are those that were assigned to what was intended to be an ‘anti-guilt/shame’ stimulus condition. However, this 3rd condition was ultimately discontinued due to, inter alia, its length and complexity, which resulted in an attrition rate that was roughly 3 times higher ($p < 0.001$) than that observed in the two other conditions. A further discussion of this decision and its consequences is provided in Appendix D.2.

¹⁵³ All primary hypotheses were pre-registered via aspredicted.org on June 14, 2021. A copy of this pre-registration report can be found in the Appendix D.1.

¹⁵⁴ This protracted recruitment period largely reflects the difficulty I had in sampling sufficient numbers of right-wing respondents. Because several of this study’s hypotheses call for interacting the treatment with political orientation, I strove to recruit relatively even numbers of Democrats and Republicans so as to achieve sufficient power¹⁵⁴. To this end, two versions of the same study were advertised on Prolific—one that was made exclusively available to respondents listing Democratic Party affiliation in their account profiles, and another that was exclusively available to those indicating Republican Party affiliation. Each study was capped at 800 respondents. Unfortunately, and despite my best efforts, this sampling strategy confronted a reality in which eligible Democrats outnumbered eligible Republicans by a factor of five. A consequence of this is that the quota for Democrats was reached within just a couple of days, whereas the completion rate for Republicans languished at 35% (280/800) even more than a week after the study was posted. This forced me into choosing between waiting indefinitely for all of the Republican slots to be filled—and delaying my dissertation work in the process—or making the remainder available to US-born non-Hispanic whites of *any* (including ‘none’ or ‘other’) party affiliation. I opted to wait an additional week, during which time the Republican completion rate reached 45%. But, given the glacial pace at which slots were being filled, I thereafter decided to widen the survey eligibility to include non-Republicans. The upshot was a final sample that was predominantly Democrat/liberal, but which also featured a sizeable minority of Republicans and conservatives.

conducting initial tests of some of my theory's central implications. I leave it to future research to determine whether the results of these tests are more broadly applicable.

Table 7.1 Sample demographics

| | |
|-------------------------|--------------------|
| Percent Democrat | 70.1% |
| Percent Republican | 24.8% |
| Percent Liberal | 66.2% |
| Percent Conservative | 22.1% |
| Percent Male | 42.1% |
| Percent with BA+ Degree | 54.9% |
| Average Age | 35.69 (SD=12.8) |
| N | 1,314 |

7.2.3 Procedure, experimental stimuli, and variables

The purpose of the study was described¹⁵⁵ as an attempt to “gain a better understanding of people’s evaluations of and engagement with online articles”. Additionally, respondents were told that the researchers were separately interested in “testing new measures of social attitudes for use in future research”. Next, respondents completed a battery of demographic and political background measures. Thereafter, they were randomly assigned to one of two conditions¹⁵⁶: a guilt/shame stimulus condition and a neutral stimulus condition. After reading the assigned stimulus article, respondents were given a number of filler questions¹⁵⁷, including items asking them to rate the article along several general criteria (e.g. clarity, easy to follow, informative) and an attention check¹⁵⁸. They were then told they’d next be asked a series of questions about “some of the social and political attitudes” they may hold, some of which may or may not be

¹⁵⁵ The adoption of this cover story was motivated by a concern for potential demand effects, the risk of which are likely to increase if respondents are able to divine the true purpose and intent of the study.

¹⁵⁶ As was noted in footnote 5, the initial design featured a third ‘anti-guilt/shame’ stimulus condition. An explanation as to why this condition was ultimately abandoned can be found in the Appendix B.

¹⁵⁷ These filler questions were included in the hope of bolstering the cover story’s credibility.

¹⁵⁸ 89.9% of participants in the neutral condition vs. 87.2% of those in the guilt/shame condition correctly answered the attention check. And the difference between these two rates was not distinguishable from 0 ($p=0.126$).

directly related to the articles they were assigned to read. Respondents were also told that the purpose of any article-related questions they encounter was to “gain a better understanding” of the responses they gave to the filler questions; and that other article-unrelated questions were asked for the “purpose of testing and validating new survey measures of social attitudes”¹⁵⁹. After clicking the ‘next’ button, respondents completed measures of white moral shame and guilt. These items were followed by measures of this study’s primary outcome variables, including support for different pro-black policies, support for increasing immigration, preferences for immigration from Europe vs. other regions, warmth towards whites vs. non-white minority groups, and monetary contributions to anti-racist and pro-immigration advocacy groups. The survey concludes by debriefing respondents as to the actual nature and purpose of the study.

7.2.3.1 *White guilt/shame stimulus*

Those placed in the guilt/shame condition were shown and asked to read an editorial article recently published by the Los Angeles Times Editorial Board, which was titled ‘A century after the Tulsa massacre, we have yet to atone for America’s Racism’. The 957-word article recounts a number of historical cases of white supremacist violence against non-whites, but focusses in particular on the anti-black Tulsa race massacre of 1921. It notes that the US economy was built on the backs of African slaves and discusses how, throughout American history, white Americans have used violence and discrimination to thwart the social mobility and integration of blacks and other non-whites. It argues that the legacy of white supremacy is still apparent in America today, such as in the “ongoing deplorable levels of police killing often-unarmed Black Americans”. Importantly, it contends that white Americans still benefit from this

¹⁵⁹ These explanations were included so that respondents in the neutral stimulus condition would be less likely to wonder why they were being asked race-related questions that had nothing to do with the assigned stimulus. The idea was to reduce the possibility that these respondents would become aware that they were in the control group.

legacy in a society in which “Black Americans have less access to healthcare, face more hurdles accumulating wealth and accessing capital, often are educated in de facto segregated schools, and face harsher police scrutiny and more severe criminal penalties”.

This article was selected for its consistency with Chapter 4’s operationalization of racial equalitarian media. Specifically, the article a) highlights the persistent disadvantages of African Americans relative to white Americans, and b) attributes these outcome disparities to the history and continued effects of white racism. Theory suggests that these attributes will prime negative moral appraisals of whites and, in turn, trigger feelings of collective shame and guilt.

7.2.3.2 *Neutral stimulus*

Respondents assigned to the neutral stimulus condition were shown and asked to read a 1,268-word article on the cost and regulations of interstate logo signs, which was taken from the website Jalopnik. Its selection was largely based on a desire to field a stimulus that was as politically neutral as possible.

7.2.3.3 *White moral shame and guilt*

Measures of white moral shame¹⁶⁰ and guilt are identical to those used in the previous chapter. The only difference is that each of these emotions is now measured with 3 items (specifically, those that showed the highest factor loadings in the Chapter 6) rather than the original 4. This decision was made in order to shorten the length of the survey (and thus the cost)

¹⁶⁰ The measure of ‘image shame’ that featured in the previous chapter was not included in the current study. This is for two reasons. First, testing the effects of the treatment on moral shame should not require statistical adjustments for image shame. If the treatment is effective, between-condition differences in moral shame will be apparent regardless. Moreover, statistically adjusting a post-treatment variable with another post-treatment variable is methodologically questionable and is likely to denature or confound the treatment’s effects on moral shame. Second, moral shame, not image shame, is the theoretical object of interest in this dissertation. Image shame is only relevant to the extent that adjusting for it helps to isolate the pro-social effects of moral shame on relevant outcome variables. Outside of cross-sectional analysis, its utility is questionable and does not warrant increasing the length (and cost) of the survey for the sake of its inclusion.

as much as possible. Question wording and descriptive statistics for all 6 items are shown in Table 7.2 below. For use in analyses, I create summary measures of each emotion by averaging across each 3-item battery ($\alpha_{\text{Shame}}=0.923$, $\alpha_{\text{Guilt}}=0.955$). I then normalize each scale to a standard deviation of 1 and a mean of 0.

Table 7.2 Measures of white moral shame and guilt

| | Mean | SD |
|--|------|------|
| Moral Shame | 5.03 | 1.78 |
| When I think of the manner in which black people have been treated, I sometimes think that we white Americans are racist and mean. | 5.09 | 1.83 |
| My racial group's treatment of black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it <i>means</i> to be white. | 4.80 | 2.00 |
| I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white people | 5.20 | 1.89 |
| Guilt | 4.73 | 1.89 |
| I feel guilty about the social inequalities between white and black people. | 4.69 | 1.93 |
| Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of white Americans towards black people | 4.67 | 2.05 |
| I feel guilty for the manner in which black people have been treated by white Americans | 4.82 | 1.95 |

Note. N=1,286 across all items

7.2.3.4 *Pro-black policy preferences*

The pro-black policy index used in the current study is constructed from the same three 7-point Likert items (i.e., support for giving affirmative action to blacks in the job market, support for giving blacks special group-based federal assistance, and support for giving cash reparations to blacks) that featured in the previous chapter¹⁶¹. Question wording and descriptive statistics for each of the three items are shown in Table 7.3. While the analysis will examine the treatment's effects on each item individually, it will also test its effects on the composite of the

¹⁶¹ These three items were again adopted for consistency's sake. However, in retrospect, the wording of two of these items (e.g. '...wrong because it discriminates against whites'; '...should not be giving special treatment to blacks') has the potential to weaken the effects of the treatment, and thus their usage was ill-advised. For instance, priming considerations of unfairness or discrimination against whites may detract from the guilt/shame stimulus' focus on white racism and moral responsibility. It could be argued, then, that these outcome measures offer a very conservative test of the treatment's effects on pro-black policy support.

three. I generate this composite index by averaging across the three items ($\alpha=0.892$). In some analyses, I include a standardized or z-scored version of this index that is fixed to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

Table 7.3 Measures of pro-black policy support

| | Mean | SD |
|--|-------------|-----------|
| Pro-Black Policy Index | 4.34 | 1.84 |
| Some people say that because of past discrimination, Black people should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of Black people is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about your opinion -- are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of Black people? (1=Oppose strongly, 7= Favor strongly) | 3.99 | 1.90 |
| Some people think that Black people have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to Black people. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? (1=I strongly feel that our government SHOULD NOT be giving special treatment to blacks; 7=I strongly feel that our government SHOULD help Black people) | 4.93 | 2.00 |
| To what extent do you favor or oppose the United States federal government paying reparations for slavery and racial discrimination in this country by making cash payments to Black Americans who are descendants of slaves? (1=Oppose strongly, 7= Favor strongly) | 4.09 | 2.18 |

Note. N=1,286 across all items

7.2.3.5 Immigration policy preferences

Immigration policy preferences are measured with two items. The first is the same 7-point measure of desired immigration levels that was used in the previous chapter. A second asks respondents to specify the share (%) of annual immigration admissions that they think should be allocated to each of 5 geographic regions: Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. Preference for European (vs. non-European) immigration is then operationalized in two ways. The first, which is similar to the approach taken in the previous chapter, is the percent of immigration admissions that respondents allocate to Europe¹⁶². The second utilizes the fact that

¹⁶² Recall that in the previous chapter, this variable was measured with a question asking respondents to specify the share of immigrants they'd admit from European vs. non-European countries. A potential drawback of this measure is that forcing respondents to choose between European vs. non-European countries increases social desirability pressures (i.e., respondents might be disinclined to favor European vs. non-European immigrants for fear of being

respondents are being asked to allocate immigration admissions to 5 different regions while being told to assume that the desire to immigrate is invariant across them. A ‘region-indifferent’ or equitable allocation is thus one that apportions 20% of admissions to each of the five regions. In contrast, those whose allocations are biased against or in favor of a given region(s) can be expected to allocate less or more than 20% of admissions to a given region. On the basis of these parameters, I transform each 0-100 scale into 3-point scales wherein respondents who allocate less than 20% of admissions to a given region are coded as ‘1’, those who allocate exactly 20% as ‘2’, and those who allocate more than 20% as ‘3’. Item wording and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4.

Table 7.4 Measures of immigration preferences

| Immigration Levels | Mean | SD |
|--|-------------|-----------|
| Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is now? (1=Decreased a lot, 7=Increased a lot) | 4.72 | 1.58 |
| Immigration Allocations | | |
| Regardless of whether you think the level of immigration should be decreased, increased, or kept the same, what percent of the total number of immigrants admitted to the US every year do you think should be allocated to immigrants from each of the following regions? Assume that the demand for immigration into the US is constant across these regions; that is, the number of people who'd like to immigrate to the US is the same in every region. Please enter a numerical figure (0-100) into each of the boxes below indicating the percent of all immigration admissions you would allocate to each of the regions below. Note that the figures you provide below MUST sum to 100. Also, note that you are NOT required to allocate admissions to every region listed below. If you prefer not to admit immigrants from a given region, you would enter '0' into the corresponding box below. | | |
| Latin America (0-100) | 21.29 | 8.72 |
| < 20% | 14.1% | |
| 20% | 64.4% | |
| > 20% | 21.5% | |
| Asia (0-100) | 19.90 | 6.47 |
| < 20% | 16.6% | |
| 20% | 68% | |
| > 20% | 15.4% | |
| Middle East (0-100) | 17.02 | 6.97 |
| < 20% | 31.3% | |
| 20% | 63% | |

perceived as prejudiced against non-whites). I thus opted for a revised measure that captures pro/anti-European immigration bias in a more subtle or indirect fashion.

| | |
|-----------------------|---------------|
| > 20% | 5.7% |
| Europe (0-100) | 22.89 13.15 |
| < 20% | 16.1% |
| 20% | 62% |
| > 20% | 21.9% |
| Africa (0-100) | 18.90 6.45 |
| < 20% | 20.7% |
| 20% | 67.5% |
| > 20% | 11.8% |

Note. N=1,286 across all items

7.2.3.6 Racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth

As in the previous chapter, racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth ($M=-4.46$, $SD=23.61$) is measured as the average difference between respondents' feeling thermometer ratings (0-100) of whites ($M=67.7$, $SD=23.16$) vs. ratings of blacks ($M=71.6$, $SD=22.6$), Hispanics ($M=71.6$, $SD=22.5$), and Asians ($M=73.2$, $SD=21.6$). In addition to examining the average of these differences, the analyses will also look at the effects of the treatment on each individual dyad.

7.2.3.7 Pro-outgroup behavior

To examine whether the expected pro-outgroup effects of the guilt/shame treatment additionally rear themselves in altruistic pro-outgroup behavior, I include measures of monetary donations to anti-racist and pro-immigration organizations that are mostly identical to those used in the previous chapter. The sole difference is that whereas possible donations to each advocacy organization was capped at \$10 in the previous study, they are now capped at \$20 in the current experiment.

Table 7.5 Measures of pro-outgroup behavior

| | Mean | SD |
|---|------|----|
| Here are two organizations that work to advance different social causes. | | |
| Crossroads Antiracism is a non-profit advocacy organization committed to dismantling systemic racism and building anti-racist multicultural diversity within institutions and communities. This mission is implemented primarily by training institutional transformation | | |

| | | |
|--|-------|-------|
| teams, helping them analyze racism and develop and implement strategies to dismantle racism within their structures | | |
| The American Immigration Council is a non-profit advocacy organization committed to overturning strict immigration laws and defending the rights of undocumented immigrants. This mission is implemented through litigation, research, legislative and administrative advocacy, and public outreach. | | |
| As non-profit organizations, both are financially dependent on individual donations to fund their operations. We'd like to give you the opportunity to make a contribution of up to twenty dollars to one or each of these organizations. Please use the sliding scales below to indicate how much you'd be willing to contribute. If you ARE interested in contributing, we will record your contribution and follow up with more information at the conclusion of the survey. If you ARE NOT interested in contributing to an organization(s), you can leave the slider(s) at 0. | | |
| Crossroads Anti-Racism (0-20) | 5.25 | 6.83 |
| The American Immigration Council (0-20) | 4.90 | 6.59 |
| Summed Index (0-40) | 10.15 | 12.76 |

Note. N=1,286 across all items

7.2.3.8 Control variables

In theory, random assignment should equalize experimental groups on all known and unknown pre-treatment variables. However, this equalization is often imperfect. Occasionally, randomization will even result in groups that are statistically significantly imbalanced or different on one or more pre-treatment variables purely by chance (Rosenbaum, 2002). Such imbalances—even when small and/or statistically insignificant—can result in biased estimates of treatment effects, particularly when a covariate is outcome-predictive (Altman, 1985). For instance, if a treatment is intended to elicit a politically liberal response, and the treatment group is more liberal on-average than the control group, then estimates of observed between-group differences in post-treatment responses may be partly or even mostly capturing the effects of this ideological imbalance. Given the problems such imbalances pose to causal inference, experimental researchers often adjust for pre-treatment covariates in models of treatment effects so as to obtain estimates that are at once maximally efficient and minimally biased. I too adopt this practice in the current study, though I also report the raw or unadjusted estimates in a separate column.

As the comparison of means in Table 7.6 indicates, pre-treatment covariates are generally (but by no means perfectly) balanced across the two stimulus conditions. For instance, while those in the guilt/shame group are somewhat more liberal, more identified with the Democratic party, and less educated than those receiving the neutral stimulus, none of these differences reach significance at even the 90% threshold. Only differences in the proportion of respondents residing¹⁶³ in the Midwest ($p=0.043$) and West ($p=0.010$)—which is highest and lowest, respectively, among those in the guilt/shame condition—are significant at conventional levels. But, as noted earlier, even statistically insignificant imbalances can add ‘noise’ to estimates of treatment effects; hence, I control for all covariates listed below.

Table 7.6 Pre-treatment covariate means by study condition

| | Scale | Neutral | Guilt/Shame |
|-------------------------|---|------------------|-------------------|
| Ideology | 1=Very liberal, 7=Very conservative | 3.02 (0.071) | 2.92 (0.072) |
| Party-ID | 1=Strong Democrat, 7=Strong Republican | 2.97 (0.084) | 2.83 (0.086) |
| Age | N/A | 35.81 (0.505) | 35.64 (0.506) |
| Percent with BA+ Degree | 1=High school or less, 4=Graduate degree | 56.74 (1.96) | 53.82 (1.96) |
| Proportion Male | 0=Female, 1=Male | 0.419 (0.019) | 0.427 (0.020) |
| Region | Proportion Northeast | 0.200 (0.015) | 0.172 (0.015) |
| | Proportion Midwest | 0.216 (0.017) | 0.264* (0.017) |
| | Proportion South | 0.377 (0.019) | 0.412 (0.019) |
| | Proportion West | 0.208 (0.015) | 0.153* (0.015) |

Note. Cell entries are means with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

¹⁶³ Region of residence was derived using the GPS coordinates of respondents’ locations. These coordinates are automatically recorded by Qualtrics, the survey platform I used to distribute the survey.

7.3 Results/Analysis

7.3.1 Main effects on white moral shame and guilt

Hypothesis 11 predicted that whites exposed to racial equalitarian media content would express significantly higher levels of moral shame and guilt than those exposed to a neutral stimulus. Table 7.7 below tests this proposition by regressing z-scored measures of these emotions on the dichotomous guilt/shame vs. neutral treatment variable. Columns (a) present the raw or unadjusted effects of the treatment on each emotion, while the models in both columns (b) and Figure 7.1 adjust these estimates for ideology, party identification, age, sex, education, and region. Overall, the results fully accord with theoretical expectations. In columns (a), we see that respondents who received the guilt/shame treatment scored close to 0.2SD higher on moral shame ($\beta=0.184$, $p < 0.001$) and roughly 0.14SD higher on guilt ($\beta=0.136$, $p=0.010$) than those assigned to the neutral stimulus condition¹⁶⁴. As expected, and as reflected in their lower standard errors, adjusting for pre-treatment covariates increases the precision of these estimates ($\beta_{\text{Shame}}=0.155$, $p < 0.001$; $\beta_{\text{Guilt}}=0.110$, $p=0.012$).

Table 7.7 Raw (a) and adjusted (b) treatment effects on white moral shame and guilt

| Neutral stimulus (N=645) | Moral Shame | | Guilt | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Guilt/Shame stimulus (N=641) | 0.184*** (0.051) | 0.155*** (0.039) | 0.136* (0.053) | 0.110* (0.044) |
| Constant | 0.154*** (0.036) | 1.10*** (0.078) | 0.146** (0.037) | 1.05*** (0.091) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.009 | 0.435 | 0.004 | 0.344 |

Note. Cells are unadjusted (column a) and unadjusted (column b) standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

¹⁶⁴ Though somewhat different in size, differences in the coefficients for shame and guilt are indistinguishable from 0 ($p=0.108$).




Figure 7.1 Adjusted white moral shame and guilt by study condition

7.3.1.1 Interactive effects on white moral shame and guilt

Secondary hypothesis H11A anticipated the treatment's effects on shame and guilt would be stronger for white liberals and Democrats than for conservatives and Republicans, while a competing hypothesis (H11B) expected the reverse. I test these competing predictions by interacting the treatment dummy with collapsed 3-point measures of ideology and party identification¹⁶⁵. Table 7.8 reports the unadjusted (a) and covariate-adjusted (b) average marginal effects of this interaction. In the end, neither H11A nor H11B find support in the data. First, while the effects of the treatment on moral shame does not reach significance among conservatives ($\beta=0.148$, $p=0.146$), their magnitude is statistically indistinguishable ($p=0.971$) from that of the effects among liberals ($\beta=0.144$, $p=0.001$). The same holds true when comparing the effects among Democrats ($\beta=0.173$, $p < 0.001$) and Republicans ($\beta=0.184$, $p=0.043$).

¹⁶⁵ While I report them nonetheless, the reader should note that the estimates for the tiny sample ($N=60$) of non-leaning independents are highly unreliable. I thus do not spend much time discussing the results for this group.

Unexpectedly, the largest increases in shame are actually observed among self-identified moderates¹⁶⁶ ($\beta=0.303$, $p=0.027$), though they do not clearly differ statistically from those among liberals ($p=0.265$) or conservatives ($p=0.362$).

Table 7.8 Average treatment effect by ideology and party identification

| Guilt/Shame Condition | Moral Shame | | Guilt | |
|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Liberal (N=432) | 0.122** (0.044) | 0.133** (0.041) | 0.104* (0.052) | 0.116* (0.050) |
| Moderate (N=77) | 0.241† (0.142) | 0.240† (0.134) | 0.094 (0.150) | 0.091 (0.141) |
| Conservative (N=132) | 0.165 (0.103) | 0.163 (0.101) | 0.103 (0.107) | 0.098 (0.104) |
| Democrat (N=459) | 0.144** (0.046) | 0.150*** (0.042) | 0.128* (0.054) | 0.136** (0.049) |
| Independent (N=31) | 0.182 (0.244) | 0.090 (0.224) | -0.019 (0.258) | -0.102 (0.248) |
| Republican (N=151) | 0.180† (0.098) | 0.182* (0.090) | 0.082 (0.103) | 0.083 (0.096) |

Note. Cells are unadjusted (column a) and unadjusted (column b) average marginal effects with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure 7.2 Average treatment effect by ideology and party identification

¹⁶⁶ This could merely be suggest a lack of power to detect between-condition differences among smaller-N subgroups.

All of what was said above with respect to the interactive effects on shame similarly applies to those on guilt. While largest and only reaching significance among liberals ($\beta=0.122$, $p=0.019$) and Democrats¹⁶⁷ ($\beta=0.144$, $p=0.005$), none of the treatment's effects on guilt significantly differ across ideological and partisan subgroups.

7.3.2 Main effects on pro-black policy support

Hypothesis 12 predicted that exposure to the guilt/shame stimulus would inspire greater support for compensatory and equity-oriented pro-black policies. By my theory, this is because support for such policies constitutes a means of coping with or alleviating the feelings guilt and/or shame that attend membership in a morally-tainted ingroup. In the case of collective guilt, supporting reparative pro-black policies allows ingroup members to feel as if they're doing *something* (and thereby feel better about themselves) to atone for their ingroup's historical and/or continued mistreatment of blacks, which they perceive themselves as unjustly benefiting from. In the case of moral shame, support for such policies additionally serves as a means of morally distinguishing or distancing oneself from an ingroup that is perceived to be morally defective.

The models in columns (a) of Table 7.9 test H12 by regressing each of the three 7-point racial policy items along with the combined index on the treatment variable. Columns (b) again adjust the results for differences in pre-treatment covariates. Overall, we see that the treatment resulted in statistically significant increases in support for all three racial policy items. Specifically, and adjusting for covariates, participants in the guilt/shame condition were significantly more likely to favor affording blacks preferential hiring and promotions in the job market ($\beta=0.235$, $p=0.008$), special group-based government assistance ($\beta=0.322$, $p < 0.001$),

¹⁶⁷ This could merely be suggest a lack of power to detect between-condition differences among smaller-N subgroups.

and monetary reparations for historical slavery and discrimination ($\beta=0.274$; $p=0.007$). As shown in the bottom three rows, all these increases were also relatively similar in magnitude, ranging from just under a 6.8 percentage point bump (40.3% \rightarrow 47.1%) in support for affirmative action to a 7.5 point climb (43.5% \rightarrow 51%) in support for cash-based reparations. Interestingly, whereas increases in support for this latter policy mostly stem from significant declines in ‘neutral’ responses, the majority of the increases in support for affirmative action and race-based government assistance (64.4% \rightarrow 71.7%) are a function of significant declines in ‘oppose’ responses. In other words, and generally speaking, the treatment was more likely to pull respondents away from one side (i.e. ‘oppose’) of the scale to the other, rather than nudge them out of positions of neutrality or ambivalence.

Table 7.9 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on pro-black policy support

| | Affirmative Action | | Race-based Government Assistance | | Reparations | | Index (Z-Scored) | |
|------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Neutral stimulus (N=645) | | | | | | | | |
| Guilt/Shame stimulus (N=641) | 0.263* (0.105) | 0.235** (0.085) | 0.373** (0.111) | 0.324*** (0.086) | 0.293* (0.121) | 0.265** (0.098) | 0.158** (0.052) | 0.140*** (0.039) |
| Constant | 3.86*** (0.075) | 5.20*** (0.185) | 4.75*** (0.081) | 6.42*** (0.181) | 3.95*** (0.086) | 6.55*** (0.211) | 0.162*** (0.037) | 1.11*** (0.083) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.004 | 0.365 | 0.008 | 0.422 | 0.004 | 0.365 | 0.006 | 0.457 |
| % Favor | +7.11* (2.76) | +6.80** (2.40) | +8.35** (2.59) | +7.31** (2.13) | +7.91** (2.78) | +7.52** (2.44) | --- | --- |
| % Not sure/Neutral | -0.344 (2.22) | -0.728 (2.21) | -2.74 (1.68) | -3.10† (1.65) | -4.57* (1.99) | -5.08* (1.99) | --- | --- |
| % Oppose | -6.77* (2.68) | -6.07* (2.34) | -5.62* (2.30) | -4.21* (1.89) | -3.34 (2.70) | -2.44 (2.33) | --- | --- |

Note. Cell entries in column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted differences between conditions on 7-point measures of policy support (top) and in terms of changes across collapsed response categories (bottom). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure 7.3 Adjusted mean response to 7-point racial policy measures by study condition




Figure 7.4 Adjusted share (%) of 'favor' responses by study condition

The final column of Table 7.9 reports the unadjusted and adjusted effects of the treatment when all three racial policy items are averaged and combined to form a singular index. Holding pre-treatment covariates constant, we see that the effects of the treatment amounted to a 0.14SD ($p < 0.001$) increase in support on average across the three policy items. These effects are thus

modest but discernable. Incidentally, they are also strikingly similar in magnitude to those observed on post-Floyd white racial liberalism in Chapter 5—a point I will return to in the discussion.

7.3.2.1 Interactive effects on support for pro-black policies

Are the effects of the treatment on pro-black policy support conditional on ideology or partisanship? Secondary hypothesis H12A predicted that the effects would be stronger for white liberals and Democrats than conservatives and Republicans, while H12B expected to find the reverse. To test these competing accounts, I once again interact the treatment variable with ideology and party identification. Table 7.10 reports the unadjusted (a) and adjusted (b) average marginal effects of the treatment for each political subgroup. The general pattern of results resembles what was observed the previous interaction models. More specifically, though the effects of the treatment on each individual policy item and on the combined policy index are only significant among liberals and Democrats (and independents), their size do not significantly differ between any of the political subgroups. For instance, the adjusted effects on support for affirmative action are stronger for liberals ($\Delta=0.249$, $p=0.017$) and Democrats ($\Delta=0.289$, $p=0.005$) than conservatives ($\Delta=0.137$, $p=0.461$) and Republicans ($\Delta=0.098$, $p=0.165$), but neither of these differences are distinguishable from 0 (liberals vs. conservatives: $p=0.599$; Democrats vs. Republicans: $p=0.327$). Had such differences consistently favored either set of groups over the other, we'd have some reason to suppose that they are genuine but perhaps not detectable due to lack of statistical power. However, when it comes to race-based government assistance, the direction of the effect differences reverses—i.e., they are nominally stronger for white conservatives ($\Delta=0.381$, $p=0.098$) and Republicans ($\Delta=0.394$, $p=0.058$) than for liberals ($\Delta=0.269$, $p=0.003$) and Democrats ($\Delta=0.251$, $p=0.006$). More consistent are the effects among

self-identified moderates (and pure independents), which are again generally the strongest of all subgroups. However, the estimates are too uncertain to conclude as much with any confidence.

Table 7.10 Average treatment effect on support for pro-black policies by ideology and party identification

| Guilt/Shame Condition | Affirmative Action | | Government Assistance | | Reparations | | Index (Z-Scored) | |
|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Liberal (N=432) | 0.193† (0.112) | 0.249* (0.110) | 0.238* (0.095) | 0.269** (0.090) | 0.187 (0.131) | 0.247* (0.122) | 0.105* (0.049) | 0.130** (0.045) |
| Moderate (N=77) | 0.221 (0.258) | 0.326 (0.247) | 0.379 (0.326) | 0.488 (0.299) | 0.337 (0.307) | 0.358 (0.299) | 0.159 (0.137) | 0.199 (0.125) |
| Conservative (N=132) | 0.186 (0.191) | 0.137 (0.186) | 0.403† (0.240) | 0.381† (0.230) | 0.237 (0.212) | 0.212 (0.202) | 0.140 (0.099) | 0.124 (0.094) |
| Democrat (N=459) | 0.243* (0.111) | 0.289** (0.102) | 0.219* (0.096) | 0.251** (0.090) | 0.221† (0.129) | 0.284* (0.118) | 0.116* (0.049) | 0.140** (0.044) |
| Independent (N=31) | 0.207 (0.353) | 0.106 (0.366) | 1.18* (0.508) | 1.02* (0.499) | 1.05* (0.508) | 0.783 (0.520) | 0.415* (0.205) | 0.325 (0.206) |
| Republican (N=151) | 0.112 (0.178) | 0.098 (0.165) | 0.388† (0.221) | 0.394† (0.208) | 0.102 (0.200) | 0.115 (0.180) | 0.102 (0.092) | 0.103 (0.083) |

Note. Cell entries in column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average marginal effects from treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001



Figure 7.5 Adjusted average treatment effect on pro-black policy support by ideology and party identification

Figure 7.6 present the results in terms of average changes in the percent in each subgroup giving a ‘favor’ response to each of the three policy items. Arrayed as such, we see that several

of the coefficients for subgroups that were not significant in Table 7.10 now reach significance. For instance, among political moderates, net support significantly increased by 12.3 (p=0.034) percentage points in the case of support for affirmative action points in the case of support for government assistance, and by 16.5 points (p=0.017) when it comes to support for cash reparations. Among conservatives and Republicans, we observe sizeable and statistically significant increases in support for government assistance ($\Delta_{\text{Conservative}}=+12.48$, p=0.016, $\Delta_{\text{Republican}}=+13.57$, p=0.005), but more modest and insignificant increases in support for affirmative action ($\Delta_{\text{Conservative}}=+1.16$, p=0.781, $\Delta_{\text{Republican}}=+3.52$, p=0.328) and cash reparations ($\Delta_{\text{Conservative}}=+6.09$, p=0.166, $\Delta_{\text{Republican}}=+3.48$, p=0.374).




Figure 7.6 Adjusted treatment effects on percent change in ‘favor’ responses by ideology and party identification

The results for liberals and Democrats can be somewhat misleading, as these groups generally began the survey with varying high levels of support for all three policies. For instance, overwhelming majorities of liberals (83.9%) and Democrats (81.8%) in the neutral stimulus group supported special government assistance for blacks, and these rates rose by only 3.6 (p=0.134) and just under 4 points (p=0.096) among their guilt/shame condition counterparts.

Clearly, these are noticeably smaller increases than those observed among moderates, conservatives, independents, and Republicans; and some of these differences even approach conventional levels of significance (Liberal vs. Moderate: $p=0.056$; Liberal vs. Conservative: $p=0.117$; Democrat vs. Republican: $p=0.072$; Democrat vs. Independent: $p=0.083$). However, such comparisons obscure the fact that, owing to their higher levels of baseline support, change among liberals and Democrats occurred more *within* than between response categories. For instance, ‘slightly favor’ responses were 4.2 ($p=0.126$) and 2.8 ($p=0.292$) points lower and ‘strongly favor’ responses 7.7 ($p=0.013$) and 6.8 ($p=0.022$) points higher among guilt/shame condition liberals and Democrats, respectively. In contrast, none of the other groups saw declines in any of the three ‘favor’ categories, which indicates that the larger respective increases therein were entirely a function of movement out of the ‘oppose’ and ‘neutral’ categories. How about the other two policies? While much higher than for all other subgroups, baseline liberal and Democratic support for affirmative action (55.5%, 53.4%) and reparations (58.9%, 55.8%) was considerably lower than it was for government assistance. Consequently, we see larger increases in ‘favor’ responses among liberals and Democrats in the guilt/shame condition: +7.4 ($p=0.022$, 0.017) points in the case of affirmative action, and 5.9 ($p=0.067$) and 8 ($p=0.009$) points with respect to government assistance and reparations.

In sum, no clear support is found for either of the two competing hypotheses. Treatment effects on attitudes towards affirmative action and reparations were stronger for liberals and Democrats than for conservatives and Republicans, but these differences never approach conventional levels of significance. They also reverse direction in the case of attitudes towards government assistance such that the effects were stronger for conservatives and Republicans. But neither were these differences distinguishable from chance. All told, the effects of the treatment

were found to be generally stronger for moderates and independents, though the imprecision of these estimates renders them questionable.

7.3.3 Main effects on pro-outgroup attitudes and policy orientations

To this point, the analysis has examined the liberalizing effects of the guilt/shame stimulus on attitudes and policies that exclusively implicate African Americans. Hypotheses H13-H15, however, expect these effects to extend to outgroup-oriented attitudes and policies more broadly, including those related to immigration. The theoretical reasoning, which will be further tested in later mediation models, is that feelings of moral shame over white Americans' treatment of blacks encourage a) pro-sociality towards racial/ethnic outgroups that are seen as 'parallels' to blacks (i.e., those perceived to also suffer directly or indirectly from white racism), and b) the adoption of attitudes that serve to morally distinguish an individual from his/her 'benighted' ingroup majority (i.e., those perceived as committed to preserving the social and political dominance of white Americans).

7.3.3.1 Effects on preferred immigration levels

First, H13 predicted that those receiving the guilt/shame treatment would favor higher levels of immigration into the US. The model shown in the first column in Table 7.11 below tests this prediction by regressing the 7-point measure of preferred immigration levels onto the treatment variable. While in the expected (i.e., positive) direction, the unadjusted coefficient ($\beta=0.126$, $p=0.154$) reported in column (a) is both very small ($+0.074SD$) and statistically insignificant. The bottom three rows present the results in terms of percentage changes in the three collapsed response categories. They indicate that the treatment led to a roughly 4.7 point ($p=0.092$) rise in the percent supporting at least some increase in existing immigration levels, though this difference is only significant at the $p < 0.1$ level. Column (b) shows that it also

shrinks ($\beta=3.57$) and is no longer even $p < 0.1$ significant ($p=0.137$) when adjusting for baseline covariates. These results can offer only limited support for H13.

Table 7.11 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on preferred immigration levels

| | Preferred Immigration Levels | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) |
| Neutral stimulus (N=645) | | |
| Guilt/Shame stimulus (N=641) | 0.126 (0.088) | 0.076 (0.070) |
| Constant | 4.66*** (0.065) | 6.31*** (0.156) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.001 | 0.390 |
| % Decreased | -2.70 (2.00) | -1.22 (1.77) |
| % Kept the same | -1.98 (2.58) | -2.36 (2.50) |
| % Increased | 4.69† (2.78) | 3.57 (2.40) |

Note. Cell entries in column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted differences between conditions on the 7-point measure of preferred immigration levels (1=Decreased a lot, 7=Increased a lot) and in terms of changes across collapsed response categories (bottom). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure 7.7 Adjusted average response to 7-point measure of preferred immigration levels (left) and adjusted support for increasing immigration (right) by study condition

7.3.3.1.1 Interactive effects on preferred immigration levels

Table 7.12 reports the results of ideology/party x treatment interaction models that examine whether the effects on preferred immigration levels are conditional on political orientation. The first model uses the complete 7-point immigration levels scale as the outcome variable. Hypothesis 13A, which expects the average effects to be stronger for liberals and Democrats, receives no support in the results. In fact, we observe virtually no change in the preferences of these groups ($\Delta_{\text{Liberal}}=0.005$, $p=0.947$; $\Delta_{\text{Democrat}}=0.046$, $p=0.554$). On the other hand, and lending some support to hypothesis H13B, we see relatively stronger but still insignificant marginal effects on the preferences of conservatives ($\Delta=0.235$, $p=0.176$) and Republicans ($\Delta=0.184$, $p=0.161$).

Table 7.12 Unadjusted and adjusted average treatment effects on preferred immigration levels by ideology and party identification

| | Immigration Levels (Δ 7-point) | | Increased ($\Delta\%$) | | Kept the same ($\Delta\%$) | | Decreased ($\Delta\%$) | |
|-------------------------|---|-------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Guilt/Shame Condition | | | | | | | | |
| Liberal (N=432) | -0.013 (0.086) | 0.005 (0.080) | -0.490 (3.18) | -0.135 (3.02) | 1.61 (3.02) | 0.960 (2.95) | -1.12 (1.46) | -0.825 (1.54) |
| Moderate (N=77) | 0.102 (0.231) | 0.154 (0.224) | 12.64 \dagger (7.53) | 13.91 \dagger (7.48) | -17.62* (7.97) | -16.92* (8.10) | 4.97 (6.41) | 3.00 (6.10) |
| Conservative (N=132) | 0.285 (0.184) | 0.235 (0.173) | 9.21 \dagger (4.73) | 8.08 \dagger (4.64) | -3.06 (5.72) | -2.41 (5.79) | -6.15 (5.90) | -5.66 (5.59) |
| Democrat (N=459) | 0.022 (0.085) | 0.046 (0.077) | 1.15 (3.11) | 1.71 (2.93) | 0.327 (2.96) | -0.391 (2.86) | -1.47 (1.47) | -1.32 (1.51) |
| Independent (N=31) | 0.062 (0.367) | -0.133 (0.375) | 17.80 (11.93) | 12.72 (12.32) | -26.36* (12.44) | -24.46* (12.34) | 8.57 (10.55) | 11.74 (10.48) |
| Republican (N=151) | 0.237 (0.173) | 0.184 (0.161) | 7.15 \dagger (4.33) | 6.63 (4.27) | -2.84 (5.47) | -3.38 (5.43) | -4.31 (5.53) | -3.25 (5.24) |

Note. Cell entries in column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average marginal effects from treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

$\dagger p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In terms of percentage changes in response categories, support for increasing immigration was roughly 8.1 ($p=0.082$) and 6.6 ($p=0.120$) points higher among guilt/shame condition conservatives and Republicans, respectively. However, only the first of these figures reaches

significance at the $p < 0.1$ level, and neither are clearly distinguishable (Liberal vs. Conservative: $p=0.136$; Democrats vs. Republicans: $p=0.340$) from the (null) changes observed among liberals ($\beta=-0.125$, $p=0.964$) and Democrats ($\beta=1.71$, $p=0.559$). Unexpectedly, and as was the case in the analyses of pro-black policy preferences, the greatest degree of change in the ‘increase’ category is found among moderates (and independents). For this group, support for increasing immigration levels was just under 14 percentage points higher ($p=0.063$) in the guilt/shame than the neutral condition. While this difference falls short of conventional levels of significance, averaging it with that observed among conservatives results in a combined coefficient ($\beta=11.00$, $p=0.012$) that is both statistically different from zero and also significantly different ($p=0.037$) from the coefficient for liberals.




Figure 7.8 Unadjusted support for increasing immigration levels by ideology and party identification

Taken together, these results offer only limited support for primary hypothesis H13 and secondary hypotheses H13A-B. The main effects on support for increasing immigration—whether measured along the full 7-point scale or in terms of changes in the ‘increase’ category—

are in the expected direction, but not statistically different from zero. Results from the interaction models further showed that the effects on supporter were stronger for conservatives and Republicans than for liberals and Democrats—which is consistent with H13B-- but the differences in these coefficients are not statistically significant. It is only when the coefficients for conservatives are combined with those of moderates—a practice that was not pre-registered—that the differences with liberals become significant.

7.3.3.2 *Effects on preferences for European vs. non-European immigration*


Hypothesis 14 further predicted that the guilt/shame treatment would inspire a preference for non-European over European immigration. The models in Table 7.13 test this prediction in terms of the percent of all immigration admissions that participants allocated to Europe vs. 4 other regions. The unadjusted results in column (a) of the Europe model indicate that the treatment effected a modest but statistically significant ($p=0.032$) 1.6-point ($-0.1SD$) *decrease* in allocations for immigrants from Europe. Adjusting for baseline covariates slightly moderates this coefficient ($\beta=-1.21$, $p=0.073$), which is now only significant at the $p < 0.1$ level. Figure 7.9 graphs the covariate-adjusted allocations to each region by study condition. As shown, though those in the treatment group still allocated more admissions to Europe on average than to other regions, this bias is somewhat attenuated. Notably, Europe was the *only* region to see a reduction in allocations. Allocations to Asia remained more or less the same ($\beta=-0.015$, $p=0.966$), while those to Latin America ($\beta=0.473$, $p=0.322$), the Middle East ($\beta=0.218$, $p=0.362$), and Africa ($\beta=0.535$, $p=0.134$) saw small but statistically insignificant upticks.

Table 7.13 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on share (0-100%) of immigration admissions allocated to Europe vs. non-European geographic regions

| | Europe | | Asia | | Latin America | | Middle East | | Africa | |
|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Neutral stimulus (N=645) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Guilt/Shame stimulus (N=641) | -1.57* (0.732) | -1.21† (0.674) | -0.018 (0.361) | -0.015 (0.355) | 0.666 (0.486) | 0.473 (0.477) | 0.272 (0.389) | 0.218 (0.362) | 0.650† (0.359) | 0.535 (0.357) |
| Constant | 23.67*** (0.540) | 18.44*** (1.55) | 19.91*** (0.266) | 18.39*** (0.795) | 20.96*** (0.339) | 21.26*** (0.980) | 16.88*** (0.290) | 21.31*** (0.290) | 18.58*** (0.359) | 20.60*** (0.741) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.003 | 0.124 | -0.000 | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.042 | -0.000 | 0.072 | 0.003 | 0.047 |
| < 20% | 5.23* (2.05) | 5.13* (2.03) | 0.570 (2.07) | 0.450 (2.05) | -2.56 (1.94) | -1.94 (1.86) | -3.07 (2.59) | -2.78 (2.48) | -1.74 (2.26) | -1.38 (2.20) |
| 20% | -1.01 (2.71) | -1.69 (2.67) | -0.976 (2.60) | -1.06 (2.56) | 0.712 (2.67) | 0.392 (2.64) | 0.081 (2.69) | -0.261 (2.63) | -3.93 (2.61) | -4.31† (2.56) |
| > 20% | -4.22† (2.31) | -3.43 (2.18) | 0.407 (2.01) | 0.608 (2.00) | 1.84 (2.29) | 1.55 (2.32) | 2.99* (1.29) | 3.04* (1.33) | 5.67* (1.80) | 5.70** (1.82) |

Note. Cell entries in first row of column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted differences between conditions in the percent of immigration admissions allocated to a respective region. Cell entries in the bottom three rows indicate percentage changes in allocation type (i.e., biased against, equitable, biased in favor). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

**Figure 7.9 Adjusted immigration allocations (0-100%) by study condition**

The bottom three rows of Table 7.13 offer an alternative means of understanding these results. Recall that because participants must allocate admissions to 5 regions, and are also

instructed to imagine that the desire to immigrate to the US was invariant across them, a region-indifferent or equitable allocation is one that grants 20% of admissions to each region. In contrast, those that grant less or more than 20% of admissions can be said to either be biased against or in favor of a given region. Accordingly, and in the case of Europe, we see that the share of respondents allocating less than < 20% of admissions was just more than 5 percentage points ($\beta=5.13$, $p=0.012$) higher in guilt/shame condition--an increase that is small but reaches significance at the $p < 0.05$ level. Coincidentally, we also see statistically significant 5.7 (p=0.002) and 3-point (p=0.022) increases in the share giving more than 20% of admissions to Africa and the Middle East, respectively. Increases of this sort are also observed for Latin America, but they are smaller ($\beta=1.55$, $p=0.504$) and not distinguishable from chance.




Figure 7.10 Adjusted share (%) in allocation category by study condition

Taken as a whole, the results are broadly consistent with H14. Those in the guilt/shame condition admitted slightly lower rates of immigrants from Europe and slightly higher rates from Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Subsequent analysis further revealed that these changes resulted from small but significant increases in the share of participants whose allocations were biased against immigrants from Europe, on one hand, and significant increases

in allocations that were biased in favor of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East, on another. These changes, however, tended to be very modest.

7.3.3.2.1 Interaction effects on immigration allocations

Do the preceding results vary by political orientation? Hypothesis 14A predicted that the treatment would effect a greater bias against (in favor of) European (non-European) immigration among liberals and Democrats, while H14B expects these effects to be stronger for conservatives and Republicans. Once again, the results of the ideology/party-ID x treatment interaction models reported in Table 7.14 do not clearly support either of these predictions. Small but statistically significant declines in allocations to Europe are observed among liberals ($\Delta=-1.23$, $p=0.036$) and Democrats ($\Delta=-1.34$, $p=0.021$), while somewhat larger and smaller statistically insignificant declines are found among conservatives ($\Delta=-1.81$, $p=0.416$) and Republicans ($\Delta=-0.916$, $p=0.660$), respectively. However, in neither case are the differences between these opposing political categories distinguishable from chance (Liberal vs. Conservative: $p=0.801$; Democrat vs. Republican: $p=0.844$).

Table 7.14 Adjusted average effects of treatment on immigration allocations by ideology and party identification

| Guilt/Shame Condition | Europe | | Asia | | Latin America | | Middle East | | Africa | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Liberal (N=432) | -1.11† (0.591) | -1.23* (0.589) | -0.235 (0.371) | -0.248 (0.371) | 0.783 (0.557) | 0.802 (0.565) | 0.066 (0.369) | 0.144 (0.361) | 0.501 (0.384) | 0.537 (0.391) |
| Moderate (N=77) | -0.800 (2.37) | -0.845 (2.36) | 2.00† (1.08) | 2.16* (1.09) | -1.43 (1.23) | -1.25 (1.21) | -0.478 (1.11) | -0.631 (1.09) | 0.701 (1.00) | 0.567 (1.02) |
| Conservative (N=132) | -1.94 (2.24) | -1.81 (2.24) | -0.493 (1.04) | -0.587 (1.05) | 1.09 (1.25) | 0.917 (1.24) | 0.754 (1.15) | 0.871 (1.14) | 0.590 (0.965) | 0.611 (0.968) |
| Democrat (N=459) | -1.38* (0.598) | -1.34* (0.579) | -0.068 (0.354) | -0.073 (0.351) | 0.748 (0.532) | 0.668 (0.529) | 0.044 (0.358) | 0.097 (0.349) | 0.658† (0.376) | 0.651† (0.383) |
| Independent (N=31) | -1.62 (3.73) | -0.224 (3.62) | 1.40 (1.91) | 1.26 (1.94) | -1.58 (2.86) | -1.90 (2.89) | 1.36 (1.73) | 0.902 (1.78) | 0.434 (1.68) | -0.035 (1.62) |
| Republican (N=151) | -1.11 (2.13) | -0.916 (2.08) | -0.133 (0.979) | -0.147 (0.959) | 0.560 (1.09) | 0.347 (1.07) | 0.299 (1.08) | 0.356 (1.02) | 0.383 (0.889) | 0.360 (0.881) |

Note. Cell entries in column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average marginal effects from treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors

are in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 7.15 presents the results in terms of changes in the share of each group that allocate admissions equitably across regions (20%) or in a way that is either biased against (< 20%) or in favor of (> 20%) a given region(s). We see that much of the increase in anti-Europe allocations that was observed earlier is actually driven by liberals and Democrats. Specifically, the share of liberals and Democrats that allocated less than 20% of admissions to Europe were a statistically significant 6.3 ($p=0.021$) and 7.1 ($p=0.006$) points higher, respectively, in the guilt/shame condition. In contrast, these figures were just 1.1 ($p=0.743$) and 1.3 ($p=0.693$) points among conservatives and Republicans, respectively—smaller, but still not significantly so (liberals vs. conservatives: $p=0.144$, Democrats vs. Republicans: $p=0.168$). Concurrently, the share of liberals and Democrats granting allocations favorable to Africa, respectively, jumped by 6.6 ($p=0.004$) and 7 ($p=0.001$) points, and those favorable to the Middle East by 4.1 ($p=0.017$) and 3.5 ($p=0.030$) points. Increases in these (i.e., > 20%) allocations among conservatives ($\Delta_{\text{Africa}}=0.514$, $p=0.884$; $\Delta_{\text{MiddleEast}}=1.35$, $p=0.560$) and Republicans ($\Delta_{\text{Africa}}=4.07$, $p=0.260$; $\Delta_{\text{MiddleEast}}=3.18$, $p=0.166$) tended to be smaller (though not significantly so) and not distinguishable from 0.

In sum, and offering some support for hypothesis H14A, these results do show that the treatment occasioned a larger anti-Europe/pro-non-Europe admissions bias among liberals and Democrats than conservatives and Republicans. However, estimates of these differences are much too uncertain for concluding them to be genuine.

Table 7.15 Adjusted average changes in allocation type by ideology and party identification

| | Europe | | | Asia | | | Latin America | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | < 20% | 20% | > 20% | < 20% | 20% | > 20% | < 20% | 20% | > 20% |
| Liberal (N=432) | 6.31* (2.73) | -3.73 (3.21) | -2.58 (2.27) | 3.25 (2.43) | -5.27† (3.02) | 2.02 (2.24) | -4.25* (1.86) | 0.955 (3.17) | 3.30 (2.93) |
| Moderate (N=77) | 6.51 (4.71) | -6.65 (7.91) | 0.144 (7.35) | -0.829 (5.35) | -1.22 (7.66) | 9.51 (6.55) | 7.29 (6.69) | -8.20 (7.73) | 0.913 (5.64) |
| Conservative (N=132) | 1.10 (3.37) | 7.63 (5.84) | -8.74 (5.87) | -2.56 (5.07) | 11.49* (5.86) | -8.93† (4.85) | -1.65 (5.26) | 3.62 (5.92) | -1.97 (4.79) |
| Democrat (N=459) | 7.11** (2.56) | -4.51 (3.11) | -2.60 (2.29) | 3.12 (2.34) | -6.44* (2.95) | 3.32 (2.22) | -2.17 (1.88) | -1.37 (3.08) | 3.54 (2.78) |
| Independent (N=31) | -6.60 (8.56) | 16.71 (12.04) | -10.11 (10.48) | -12.69 (8.70) | 22.57* (11.48) | -9.88 (9.64) | -5.06 (9.92) | 19.71† (11.58) | -14.65† (8.68) |
| Republican (N=151) | 1.32 (3.34) | 2.21 (5.59) | -3.52 (5.51) | -3.69 (4.64) | 8.37 (5.56) | -4.69 (4.66) | 0.364 (4.94) | 0.647 (5.61) | -1.01 (4.63) |
| | Middle East | | | | | | Africa | | |
| Liberal (N=432) | -3.18 (2.86) | -0.959 (3.14) | 4.13* (1.72) | | | | -2.06 (2.43) | -4.60 (3.04) | 6.66** (2.29) |
| Moderate (N=77) | 2.00 (7.65) | -1.96 (7.92) | -0.048 (3.61) | | | | 0.453 (6.51) | -9.88 (7.46) | 9.43† (5.11) |
| Conservative (N=132) | -4.19 (5.86) | 2.83 (5.80) | 1.35 (2.32) | | | | -0.730 (5.78) | 0.216 (5.90) | 0.514 (3.53) |
| Democrat (N=459) | -2.34 (2.82) | -1.15 (3.06) | 3.48* (1.60) | | | | -1.34 (2.39) | -5.68† (2.96) | 7.02** (2.19) |
| Independent (N=31) | -18.89† (11.18) | 23.56* (11.80) | -4.67 (7.32) | | | | -8.77 (10.54) | 12.36 (11.40) | -3.59 (5.79) |
| Republican (N=151) | -0.171 (5.55) | -3.01 (5.52) | 3.18 (2.29) | | | | 0.573 (5.30) | -4.64 (5.56) | 4.07 (3.61) |

Note. Cell entries are (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average effects on percentage changes in allocation type from treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

7.3.3.3 Main effects on racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth

For the same reasons that H14 expected the treatment to elicit an anti-European/pro-non-European bias in immigration allocations, H15 predicted that a similar bias would manifest in how warmly participants rate members of their (white) racial ingroup relative to members of non-white outgroups. Table 7.16 presents unadjusted and adjusted results from a series of regression models in which differences in warmth towards whites vs. blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are regressed onto the treatment variable. Figure 7.11 graphs the adjusted margins of these results. Overall, the data give clear support to H15. In each case, we see that the treatment

led to statistically significant enlargements of baseline warmth differentials that already favored non-whites over whites. While the gap between warmth towards whites vs. blacks ($\beta=-3.25$, $p=0.012$) increased the most on average, the size of this increase is not significantly different from that observed between whites vs. Hispanics ($\beta=-3.15$, $p=0.016$) or whites vs. Asians ($\beta=-2.57$, $p=0.036$). Interestingly, these changes were less driven by participants ratings whites less warmly ($\beta=-0.574$, $p=0.647$), and more driven by increases in warmth towards blacks ($\beta=2.67$, $p=0.028$), Hispanics ($\beta=2.58$, $p=0.033$), and Asians ($\beta=1.99$, $p=0.087$).

Table 7.16 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth differentials

| | Whites vs. Blacks | | Whites vs. Hispanics | | Whites vs. Asians | | Whites vs. non-Whites (Average) | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Neutral stimulus (N=645) | | | | | | | | |
| Guilt/Shame stimulus (N=641) | -3.63** (1.40) | -3.25* (1.28) | -3.27* (1.41) | -3.15* (1.30) | -2.81* (1.32) | -2.57* (1.22) | -3.27* (1.31) | -2.99* (1.20) |
| Constant | -2.14* (1.05) | -23.32 (3.12) | -2.21* (1.02) | -24.37*** (3.12) | -4.13*** (0.973) | -23.37 (2.96) | -2.83** (0.963) | -23.69*** (2.92) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.004 | 0.186 | 0.004 | 0.181 | 0.003 | 0.177 | 0.004 | 0.199 |

Note. Cell entries in first row of column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted coefficients for the effects of the treatment on whites vs. non-whites feeling thermometer (0-100) warmth differentials. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure 7.11 Adjusted racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth differentials by study condition

7.3.3.3.1 Interaction effects on racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth

Like others before it, secondary hypothesis H15A predicted that the treatment would have stronger effects on the white vs. non-white feeling thermometer ratings of liberals and Democrats than of conservatives and Republicans. H15B expected to find the opposite pattern of results. Table 7.17 reports the average marginal effects of the treatment on the various warmth differentials for each political subgroup. Once again, the results do not clearly support either of the two competing hypotheses. With only one minor exception (whites vs. Hispanics among liberals), the coefficients for liberals and Democrats are never even nominally larger than those observed for conservatives and Republicans. To the contrary, and offering some support for H15B, the coefficients are almost always larger for the latter than the former two subgroups. For instance, the effect of the treatment on white vs. non-white warmth differentials was over one point larger among conservatives ($\Delta=-4.06$, $p=0.065$) and Republicans ($\Delta=-3.74$, $p=0.085$) than liberals ($\Delta=-2.71$, $p=0.085$) and Democrats ($\Delta=-2.51$, $p=0.093$).

Table 7.17 Unadjusted and adjusted average treatment effects on racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth by ideology and party identification

| Guilt/Shame Condition | Whites vs. Blacks | | Whites vs. Hispanics | | Whites vs. Asians | | Whites vs. Non-Whites (Average) | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Liberal (N=432) | -2.49 (1.70) | -3.00† (1.64) | -2.54 (1.74) | -3.19† (1.67) | -1.40 (1.64) | -1.93 (1.59) | -2.14 (1.63) | -2.71† (1.57) |
| Moderate (N=77) | -2.85 (3.24) | -1.74 (3.36) | -5.93† (3.56) | -4.87 (3.70) | -2.68 (2.94) | -1.93 (3.00) | -3.82 (3.02) | -2.85 (3.14) |
| Conservative (N=132) | -4.84† (2.63) | -5.02† (2.63) | -1.88 (2.47) | -2.18 (2.48) | -4.79* (2.38) | -5.00* (2.32) | -3.84† (2.21) | -4.06† (2.20) |
| Democrat (N=459) | -2.52 (1.68) | -2.74† (1.57) | -2.57 (1.72) | -2.96† (1.61) | -1.55 (1.61) | -1.85 (1.51) | -2.21 (1.61) | -2.51† (1.50) |
| Independent (N=31) | -7.70 (5.11) | -5.02 (5.19) | -8.74† (5.01) | -6.00 (5.34) | -6.03* (2.34) | -3.59 (2.85) | -7.49* (3.69) | -4.87 (3.98) |
| Republican (N=151) | -4.56† (2.47) | -4.20† (2.43) | -3.07 (2.40) | -2.96 (2.40) | -4.39† (2.38) | -4.05† (2.34) | -4.01† (2.19) | -3.74† (2.17) |

Note. Cell entries in columns (a) and (b), respectively, are adjusted and unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average effects on racial ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer (0-100) warmth differentials from treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

As the unadjusted margins in Figure 7.12 suggests, this is likely due to the fact that warmth ratings among liberal and Democratic participants were already considerably biased in favor of non-Whites, whereas conservatives and Republicans expressed a clear bias in favor of whites. Be this as it may, in neither case is the difference in the size of effect distinguishable from 0 (liberals vs. conservatives: $p=0.612$; Democrats vs. Republicans: $p=0.642$).



Figure 7.12 Unadjusted racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth differentials by study condition, ideology, and party identification

In sum, while the pattern of findings is overall more aligned with H15B than H15A, the uncertainty of the estimates does not allow me to conclude with any confidence that the effects were genuinely stronger for conservatives and Republicans than liberals and Democrats.

7.3.4 Main effects on donation behavior

All of the analyses thus far have only looked at the effects of the treatment on racial attitudes. However, hypothesis 16 expects these effects to also influence participant behavior; namely, the extent that they donate money to advocacy organizations that advance policies that

ostensibly benefit racial/ethnic outgroups. Table 7.18 considers the effects of the treatment on monetary contributions (\$0-\$20) to anti-racism and pro-immigration advocacy groups. We see that not only are the effects of the treatment on the size of donations to each organization very small (roughly half a dollar) and statistically insignificant, they are also in the negative direction ($\beta_{\text{Anti-Racism}}=-0.469$, $p=0.211$; $\beta_{\text{Pro-Immigration}}=-0.557$, $p=0.119$).

Table 7.18 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on monetary donations

| | Anti-Racism Organization | | Pro-Immigration Organization | | Total | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Neutral stimulus (N=645) | | | | | | |
| Guilt/Shame stimulus (N=641) | -0.473 (0.381) | -0.469 (0.374) | -0.576 (0.367) | -0.557 (0.357) | -1.05 (0.711) | -1.03 (0.693) |
| Constant | 5.49*** (0.270) | 8.28*** (0.876) | 5.19*** (0.263) | 8.17*** (0.882) | 10.68*** (0.504) | 16.44*** (1.68) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.000 | 0.062 | 0.001 | 0.076 | 0.001 | 0.075 |
| Change in Percent Donating | -2.97 (2.79) | -2.90 (2.74) | -4.84† (2.78) | -5.00† (2.72) | -3.89 (2.79) | -3.87 (2.75) |

Note. Cell entries in first row of column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted between-condition differences in monetary donations (0-20\$) to each respective advocacy organization. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure 7.13 Adjusted average donation (top) and donor rate (bottom) by study condition

Structuring the results in terms of changes in the percent that donated a non-zero sum of money does not alter this conclusion. The rate of donations to the anti-racism and pro-

immigration groups in the guilt/shame condition was 2.9 ($p=0.291$) and 5 ($p=0.066$) points lower than in the neutral condition, though only the latter difference approaches conventional levels of significance. Taken as a whole, the results provide no support for hypothesis H16. If anything, they suggest that the treatment actually worked to modestly discourage donations to activist organizations.

7.3.4.1 Interaction effects on donation behavior

While the primary hypothesis finds no support in the data, it's still possible that the effects of the treatment on donation behavior are conditional on political orientation. This possibility, which follows from secondary hypotheses H16A-B, is put to the test in Table 7.19.

Table 7.19 Unadjusted (a, aa) and adjusted (b, bb) average treatment effects on monetary donations (a, b) and share of donors (aa, bb) by ideology and party identification

| Guilt/Shame Condition | Anti-Racism Organization | | | | Pro-Immigration Organization | | | | Total | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (aa) | (bb) | (a) | (b) | (aa) | (bb) | (a) | (b) | (aa) | (bb) |
| Liberal (N=432) | -0.888† (0.491) | -0.781 (0.495) | -5.56 (3.43) | -4.88 (3.44) | -0.889† (0.476) | -0.763 (0.477) | -6.71* (3.43) | -6.09† (3.44) | -1.78† (0.920) | -1.54† (0.924) | -7.04* (3.41) | -6.51† (3.42) |
| Moderate (N=77) | 0.995 (1.10) | 1.25 (1.10) | 5.96 (8.02) | 8.10 (8.00) | -0.141 (0.974) | 0.165 (0.953) | 2.12 (7.86) | 4.54 (7.78) | 0.854 (1.96) | 1.41 (1.94) | 5.96 (8.03) | 8.40 (8.07) |
| Conservative (N=132) | -0.492 (0.590) | -0.586 (0.571) | -2.93 (5.57) | -3.74 (5.42) | -0.282 (0.605) | -0.394 (0.564) | -5.85 (5.52) | -6.61 (5.32) | -0.775 (1.13) | -0.980 (1.07) | -2.51 (5.69) | -3.12 (5.54) |
| Democrat (N=459) | -0.620 (0.476) | -0.524 (0.480) | -4.16 (3.32) | -3.67 (3.33) | -0.773 (0.462) | -0.665 (0.461) | -5.69† (3.31) | -5.33 (3.31) | -1.39 (0.891) | -1.19 (0.892) | -5.54† (3.31) | -5.09 (3.31) |
| Independent (N=31) | 1.97 (1.62) | 1.87 (1.63) | 20.80† (12.25) | 20.15 (12.28) | 1.89 (1.27) | 1.78 (1.28) | 21.25† (11.65) | 20.46† (11.79) | 3.87 (2.71) | 3.65 (2.75) | 20.80† (12.25) | 21.06 (12.37) |
| Republican (N=151) | -0.827 (0.583) | -0.723 (0.555) | -5.78 (5.34) | -5.08 (5.22) | -0.758 (0.568) | -0.678 (0.540) | -9.10† (5.26) | -8.91† (5.10) | -1.58 (1.10) | -1.40 (1.04) | -5.56 (5.40) | -5.00 (5.30) |

Note. Cell entries in columns (a) and (b), respectively, are adjusted and unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average effects on monetary donations from treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Cell entries in columns (aa) and (bb), respectively, represent percentage changes in the share of participants that donated at least some non-zero amount of money. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results can be summarized as follows. When it comes to the size (columns a-b) of monetary contributions to each organization, the effects of the treatment are negative and statistically insignificant for all political subgroups except moderates and independents, for whom the effects are positive and generally insignificant. The negative effects on donations were

somewhat stronger for liberals ($\Delta_{\text{Anti-Racism}}=-0.781$, $p=0.115$; $\Delta_{\text{Pro-Immigration}}=-0.763$, $p=0.110$; $\Delta_{\text{Total}}=-1.54$, $p=0.095$) than conservatives ($\Delta_{\text{Anti-Racism}}=-0.586$, $p=0.305$; $\Delta_{\text{Pro-Immigration}}=-0.394$, $p=0.564$; $\Delta_{\text{Total}}=-0.980$, $p=0.358$), and for Republicans ($\Delta_{\text{Anti-Racism}}=-0.723$, $p=0.193$; $\Delta_{\text{Pro-Immigration}}=-0.678$, $p=0.210$; $\Delta_{\text{Total}}=-1.40$, $p=0.180$) than Democrats ($\Delta_{\text{Anti-Racism}}=-0.524$, $p=0.275$; $\Delta_{\text{Pro-Immigration}}=-0.665$, $p=0.149$; $\Delta_{\text{Total}}=-1.19$, $p=0.182$), but none of these differences approach statistical significance. This remains the case for changes in the rates of donors (columns aa-bb). Specifically, though the share of liberals and Democrats donating to at least one organization was 6.5 ($p=0.057$) and 5.1 ($p=0.124$) points lower in the guilt/shame condition, respectively, these declines were not significantly different from those observed among conservatives ($\Delta=-3.12$, $p=0.573$) and Republicans ($\Delta=-5.00$, $p=0.573$).




Figure 7.14 Average total donation by study condition, ideology, and party identification

In sum, neither primary hypothesis H16 nor one its two competing secondary hypotheses finds support in these data. Both the main effects as well as those observed among the dominant political subgroups were negative and not significantly significant. While the expected positive effects were observed among moderates (and independents), their estimates are too uncertain to be in any way conclusive.




Figure 7.15 Average treatment effects on size (top) and rate (bottom) of total donations/donors by study condition, ideology, and party identification

7.3.5 Tests of mediation

The next series of hypotheses to be tested are mediational. Specifically, hypotheses H12C-H16C predicted that the effects of the treatment on each outcome variable would be at least partially mediated through moral shame and/or guilt. However, because the main effects of the treatment on several outcomes were not significant, I focus only on those that were; namely, support for pro-black policies, immigration allocations to Europe, and warmth towards whites vs. non-whites.

I begin with H12C, which expects the effects of the treatment on support for pro-black policies to be mediated by *both* moral shame and guilt. The theoretical reasoning here is that, despite stemming from different negative moral appraisals, the pro-social effects of each of these emotions overlap when it comes to rectifying ingroup harms against *specific* or directly affected

outgroups. I conduct a test of this proposition with a series of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) equations. The first two equations constitute the models for the hypothesized mediators wherein moral shame and guilt are each regressed on the treatment and pre-treatment covariates. The third equation features the pro-black policy index as the outcome variable, which is then regressed onto the treatment, moral shame, guilt, and pre-treatment covariates. Standardized coefficients from these equations are shown in the H12C diagram of Figure 7.16. When all other variables are held constant, we see that the effects of the treatment ($\beta=0.056$, $p=0.072$) on pro-black policy support are both moderated and no longer significant at the $p < 0.05$ level, while those of moral shame ($\beta=0.376$, $p < 0.001$) and guilt ($\beta=0.241$, $p < 0.001$) are both significantly positive.




Figure 7.16 Path coefficients from SUREG models

On their face, these results are indicative of partial mediation. To validate this inference, I calculate the direct, indirect and total effects of the treatment using Stata's 'nlcom' command. As is recommended in cases of non-normally distributed data (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008), I obtain bootstrapped standard errors for these estimates from 10,000 replications. The results are displayed in column (a) of Table 7.20.

Table 7.20 Direct, indirect, and total treatment effects on pro-black policy support

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Direct Effect | 0.056† (0.031) | 0.050 (0.032) | 0.085** (0.033) | 0.060† (0.031) |
| Indirect via Shame | 0.058*** (0.016) | 0.090*** (0.023) | --- | |
| Indirect via Guilt | 0.026* (0.012) | --- | 0.055* (0.022) | |
| Indirect via Shame/Guilt | --- | --- | --- | 0.080** (0.024) |
| Total Effect | 0.140*** (0.039) | 0.140*** (0.039) | 0.140*** (0.039) | 0.140*** (0.038) |
| Proportion Mediated | 0.603 | 0.643 | 0.390 | 0.572 |
| Proportion Mediated by Shame | 0.415 | --- | --- | --- |
| Proportion Mediated by Guilt | 0.188 | --- | --- | --- |
| RMSE | 0.545 | 0.558 | 0.569 | 0.547 |
| AIC | 6686.695 | 4894.153 | 5239.524 | 5076.949 |
| BIC | 7037.527 | 5126.321 | 5471.692 | 5309.117 |

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Consistent with H12C, roughly 60% of the treatment's total effects on pro-black policy support are conveyed through both moral shame ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=0.058$, $p < 0.001$; Proportion mediated=0.415) and guilt ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=0.026$, $p=0.020$; Proportion mediated=0.415), though the former mediates twice as much of the effects as the latter. Columns (b)-(d) report the results for alternate model specifications wherein guilt (b) and shame (c) are removed as mediators, and when both are combined to form a single mediator (d). While the current specification (a) has the

lowest the average error (RMSE=0.545), a between-specification comparison of the information criterion (AIC=4894.153, BIC=5126.321) actually favor the model (b) in which guilt is dropped as a mediator. In this latter specification, the direct effects of the treatment no longer approach $p < 0.05$ significance, and shame alone carries just under 65% of the total effect. To contrast, when shame is dropped as a mediator, the direct effects of the treatment are significant at the $p < 0.01$ level while 39% of the total effects are channeled through guilt. Taken as a whole, although the results of the original model are consistent with H12C, it appears that little is lost—and some parsimony even gained—when the indirect effects are made to exclusively run through shame.

The next mediation model offers a test of H14C, which predicted that shame, but not guilt, would mediate the negative effects of the treatment on the share of immigration admissions allocated to Europe. To briefly review, the theoretical logic here is that, insofar as its underlying moral appraisals tend to be narrowly focused on the ingroup's *actions* (as opposed to its moral character as a whole), the pro-social effects of guilt are expected to be limited to compensating only those outgroups that were or are directly affected by an ingroup's harmful behavior. In contrast, the pro-social effects of shame extend more broadly, as they stem from negative and totalizing appraisals of an ingroup's moral essence, which, in turn, inspires a desire for moral separation and the weakening of the ingroup's (negative) influence altogether.

Referring back to the bottom-left diagram in Figure 7.16, we see that when all other variables are held constant, the direct negative effects of the treatment are no longer significant at even the $p < 0.1$ level. Further, and offering initial support for H14C, the predictive effects of moral shame ($\beta = -0.177$, $p < 0.001$), but not of guilt ($\beta = -0.067$, $p = 0.121$), are significantly negative. This suggests whatever indirect effects on this outcome exist, they are likely to run through moral shame. The corresponding mediation results, which are reported in Table 7.21,

corroborate this assessment. Only the treatment's indirect negative effects through shame ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=-0.027$, $p=0.017$) are distinguishable from zero. In contrast, those that run through guilt ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=-0.007$, $p=0.232$) are both miniscule and insignificant. Overall, just over 45% of the treatment's total effects on allocations to Europe are indirect, with 35.5% of this share running through shame and 9.6% running through guilt. As before, and comparing across specifications, the information criterion (AIC=5692.265, BIC=5924.433) favor dropping guilt as a mediator (column b). When this is done, the direct effects of the treatment are further moderated ($\beta_{\text{Direct}}=-0.041$, $p=0.326$) while shame alone now shoulders 47.1% of the total effect. Though all of these results accord with H14C, that the total effect ($\beta_{\text{Total}}=-0.077$, $p=0.074$) of the treatment only reaches $p < 0.1$ significance renders their reliability uncertain.

Table 7.21 Direct, indirect, and total treatment effects on European immigration allocations

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
|------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Direct Effect | -0.042 (0.042) | -0.041 (0.042) | -0.056 (0.042) | -0.046 (0.042) |
| Indirect via Shame | -0.027* (0.011) | -0.036** (0.011) | --- | --- |
| Indirect via Guilt | -0.007 (0.006) | --- | -0.021* (0.009) | --- |
| Indirect via Shame/Guilt | --- | --- | --- | -0.031** (0.010) |
| Total Effect | -0.077† (0.043) | -0.077† (0.042) | -0.077† (0.043) | -0.077† (0.043) |
| Proportion Mediated | 0.451 | 0.471 | 0.268 | 0.405 |
| Proportion Mediated by Shame | 0.355 | --- | --- | |
| Proportion Mediated by Guilt | 0.096 | --- | --- | |
| RMSE | 0.760 | 0.761 | 0.764 | 0.761 |
| AIC | 7540.751 | 5692.265 | 5996.028 | 5927.488 |
| BIC | 7891.583 | 5924.433 | 6228.196 | 6159.656 |

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A third and final mediation model tests hypothesis H15C, which expects that at least some of the effects of the treatment on rating non-white groups relatively warmer than whites run through moral shame. The standardized path coefficients shown in the bottom-right diagram of Figure 7.16 offers preliminary support for this prediction. First, when shame and guilt join the model, the effects of the treatment are reduced to insignificance ($\beta=-0.065$, $p=0.168$). Second, whereas the effects of shame ($\beta=-0.341$, $p < 0.001$) are significantly negative and moderate in size, those of guilt ($\beta=-0.062$, $p=0.187$) are much smaller and not distinguishable from chance. This pattern of results strongly suggests that at least some of the effects of the treatment on white vs. non-white warmth differentials run through moral shame.

Table 7.22 Direct, indirect, and total treatment effects on racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
|------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Direct Effect | -0.065 (0.048) | -0.063 (0.048) | -0.092† (0.048) | -0.074 (0.048) |
| Indirect via Shame | -0.053** (0.016) | -0.061*** (0.017) | --- | --- |
| Indirect via Guilt | -0.007 (0.006) | --- | -0.032* (0.013) | --- |
| Indirect via Shame/Guilt | --- | --- | --- | -0.051** (0.016) |
| Total Effect | -0.124* (0.050) | -0.124* (0.050) | -0.124* (0.050) | -0.124* (0.050) |
| Proportion Mediated | 0.479 | 0.491 | 0.261 | 0.408 |
| Proportion Mediated by Shame | 0.424 | --- | --- | --- |
| Proportion Mediated by Guilt | 0.055 | --- | --- | --- |
| RMSE | 0.830 | 0.830 | 0.843 | 0.832 |
| AIC | 7764.785 | 5915.63 | 6247.54 | 6158.797 |
| BIC | 8115.617 | 6147.798 | 6479.708 | 6390.966 |

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The mediation results reported in Table 7.22 above show that this is indeed the case. Approximately 42.4% of the treatment's total effects ($\beta_{\text{Total}}=-0.124$, $p=0.013$) are channeled

through shame ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=-0.053$, $p=0.001$), whereas just a paltry and insignificant 5.5% are mediated through guilt ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=-0.007$, $p=0.272$). Once again, the information criterion (AIC=5915.63, BIC=6147.798) in column (b) suggest that dropping guilt as a mediator better fits the data. By this specification, just under half (49.1%) of the treatment's total effects run through shame ($\beta_{\text{Indirect}}=-0.061$, $p < 0.001$). Taken together, these results perfectly align with the prediction of H15C.

7.3.6 Exploratory/Unregistered analyses

Some research finds that reminding white Americans of their declining majority status can trigger greater racial and immigration conservatism as well as fear of and anger towards racial/ethnic minorities, on one hand, and greater sympathy towards other whites on another (Outten et al. 2011; Craig & Richeson, 2014a, 2014b; Major et al., 2016). This raises an interesting question: how might whites react to the prospect of a majority-minority America after being primed with feelings of guilt and shame over their ingroup's racist legacy? While no predictions were formally pre-registered, my theory would expect that feelings of moral shame would lead some whites to actually embrace the fall of their ingroup's dominant social status. And this is because moral shame follows from globally appraising an ingroup's status as essentially immoral and the source of others' oppression. By this logic, white decline promises the coming of a less racist and more just and equitable social order.

To explore the above question, a subset of participants¹⁶⁸ (N=481) were asked to indicate how sad they feel “that America is projected to lose its white majority by the year 2042” on a 7-

¹⁶⁸ For purely exploratory purposes, this item was belatedly added to the survey questionnaire during the final weeks of data gathering. Importantly, because it was administered only after all of the racial and immigration policy-related questions were completed, its inclusion could not have biased responses to other post-treatment items.

point scale¹⁶⁹ (Mean=3.97, SD=1.32) ranging from ‘Very sad’ (1) and ‘Very happy’ (7), where the neutral category (4) is ‘Neither sad nor happy’. If the theoretical reasoning given above has merit, it is expected that a) the guilt/shame stimulus will lead to increases in ‘happy’ responses, and b) these increases will be mediated by moral shame more than guilt. I test the first of these (unregistered) predictions by regressing the ‘sadness-happy’ scale onto the treatment dummy and pre-treatment covariates. To better examine whether the treatment effected changes across response categories, I also created and regressed dummy variables corresponding to each of the three response types¹⁷⁰ (i.e. Sad, Neither sad nor happy, Happy). The unadjusted (a) and adjusted (b) results from these models are displayed in the first row of Table 7.23. First, the treatment led to a small 0.129SD increase ($\beta=0.174$ $p=0.148$) in the ‘happy’ direction that slightly grows (0.146SD) and approaches conventional levels of significance ($\beta=0.196$, $p=0.076$) when adjusting for pre-treatment covariates. The results from the dummy response models, which are visualized in Figure 7.17, show that this adjusted change consists of a roughly 5.4 percentage point ($p=0.088$) increase in ‘happy’ responses, which was mostly driven by decreases in ‘neither sad nor happy’ responses ($\beta=-4.01$, $p=0.348$).

Table 7.23 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on majority-minority sentiments

| | 7-point scale | | Sad ($\Delta\%$) | | Neither sad nor happy ($\Delta\%$) | | Happy ($\Delta\%$) | |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|--|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| Guilt/Shame stimulus (N=236 vs. 245) | 0.174 (0.120) | 0.196† (0.110) | -2.23 (3.51) | -1.36 (3.30) | -1.26 (4.32) | -4.01 (4.28) | 3.50 (3.32) | 5.37† (3.15) |
| Constant | 3.89*** (0.087) | 4.93*** (0.266) | 19.18*** (2.52) | 4.21 (7.43) | 66.94*** (3.01) | 56.20*** (10.42) | 13.88*** (2.21) | 39.59*** (8.17) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.002 | 0.186 | -0.001 | 0.148 | -0.002 | 0.053 | 0.000 | 0.134 |
| Liberal (N=155 vs. 152) | 0.105 (0.140) | 0.166 (0.138) | 2.10 (3.03) | 1.68 (3.17) | -7.11 (5.28) | -8.53 (5.23) | 5.01 (4.84) | 6.85 (4.69) |

¹⁶⁹ This measure was taken from a survey of white Americans that was conducted by a research collaborator at Michigan State University.

¹⁷⁰ In terms of the rates of these differing responses, 18.1% of participants (7.5% of liberals vs. 38.7% of conservatives) reported feeling ‘sad’, 66.3% (69.4% of liberals vs. 59.4% of conservatives) reported feeling ‘neither happy nor sad’, and 15.6% (23.1% of liberals vs. 1.9% of conservatives) reported feeling ‘happy’.

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Conservative (N=73 vs. 82) | 0.237 (0.191) | 0.246 (0.199) | -8.44 (7.84) | -8.46 (7.92) | 9.51 (7.90) | 8.29 (8.19) | -1.07 (2.19) | 0.176 (3.06) |
| Democrat (N=153 vs. 158) | 0.127 (0.139) | 0.166 (0.134) | 0.902 (3.10) | 1.36 (3.11) | -6.14 (5.25) | -8.47† (5.12) | 5.24 (4.78) | 7.11 (4.57) |
| Republican (N=83 vs. 87) | 0.250 (0.186) | 0.243 (0.190) | -7.70 (7.38) | -6.20 (7.35) | 7.59 (7.48) | 4.68 (7.48) | 0.111 (2.34) | 1.52 (2.65) |

Note. Cell entries in the first row of columns (a) and (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted differences between conditions on the 7-point measure of sadness/happiness towards the decline of America's white majority and in the percent of participants falling in each collapsed response category. Cell entries in the bottom four rows of columns (a) and (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average margins from treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001




Figure 7.17 Adjusted share of participants in each response category by study condition

Results in the bottom 4 rows of Table 7.23 are from models that interact the treatment with measures of ideology and party identification, respectively. They indicate that the treatment had a slightly larger—but not significantly so—effect on the responses of conservatives ($\beta=0.246$, $p=0.217$) and Republicans ($\beta=0.243$, $p=0.201$) than on those of liberals ($\beta=0.166$, $p=0.231$) and Democrats. However, the results from the dummy response models show that the nature of these changes varied across these groups. White liberals and Democrats became more likely to give a ‘happy’ response ($\beta_{\text{Liberal}}=6.85$, $p=0.144$; $\beta_{\text{Democrat}}=7.11$, $p=0.120$) and less likely to give a ‘neither sad nor happy’ response ($\beta_{\text{Liberal}}=-8.53$, $p=0.103$; $\beta_{\text{Democrat}}=-8.47$, $p=0.099$). In contrast, white conservatives and Republicans were more likely to move from a ‘sad’ ($\beta_{\text{Conservative}}=-8.46$, $p=0.286$; $\beta_{\text{Republican}}=-6.20$, $p=0.400$) to a ‘neither sad nor happy’ response ($\beta_{\text{Conservative}}=8.29$,

$p=0.312$; $\beta_{\text{Republican}}=4.68$, $p=0.532$) than move from either of these two categories to a ‘happy’ response ($\beta_{\text{Conservative}}=0.176$, $p=0.954$; $\beta_{\text{Republican}}=1.52$, $p=0.567$). While an interesting pattern, it’s important to emphasize that almost none of these changes approach conventional levels of significance.

I next fit a series of mediation models to examine whether or to what extent the modest effects of the treatment on responses to the sadness-happiness scale are conveyed through moral shame and/or guilt. Note that apart from a different outcome variable, the specifications of these mediation models are identical to those fitted earlier. As before, I obtain bootstrap standard errors from 10,000 replications. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7.24 below.

Table 7.24 Direct, indirect, and total treatment effects on majority-minority sentiments

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Direct Effect | 0.091 (0.106) | 0.093 (0.105) | 0.152 (0.109) | 0.118 (0.107) |
| Indirect via Shame | 0.120** (0.045) | 0.103** (0.037) | --- | --- |
| Indirect via Guilt | -0.014 (0.019) | --- | 0.045† (0.027) | --- |
| Indirect via Shame/Guilt | --- | --- | --- | 0.078* (0.034) |
| Total Effect | 0.196† (0.110) | 0.196† (0.109) | 0.196† (0.110) | 0.196† (0.109) |
| Proportion Mediated | 0.537 | 0.525 | 0.227 | 0.397 |
| Proportion Mediated by Shame | 0.611 | --- | --- | --- |
| Proportion Mediated by Guilt | -0.074 | --- | --- | --- |
| RMSE | 1.11 | 1.11 | 1.14 | 1.12 |
| AIC | 3262.262 | 2526.701 | 2682.049 | 2634.712 |
| BIC | 3533.694 | 2706.264 | 2861.611 | 2814.274 |

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

As anticipated, column (a) shows a significant positive indirect effect via moral shame ($\beta=0.120$, $p=0.007$) and an insignificant negative indirect effect via guilt ($\beta=-0.014$, $p=0.447$). This negative indirect influence through guilt is likely due to its (spuriously) positive effects being entirely confounded by moral shame. Indeed, when moral shame is dropped from the model (column c), the indirect effects ($\beta=0.045$, $p=0.096$) via guilt are positive and approach significance. Further, and similar to what was observed in most of the earlier mediation analyses, the fit statistics indicate that a model in which moral shame is the lone mediator (column b) is superior to all others. By this specification (column b), roughly 53% of the treatment's total effects (or 0.77SD of the total 0.146SD increase) are conveyed through moral shame.

In sum, and conforming to earlier expectations, the treatment led to a small increase in the share of those that report feeling 'happy' about the decline of America's white majority. This effect, however, only reached significance at the $p < 0.1$ threshold. But given that effects of comparable size (i.e., 0.1-0.15SD) emerged as significant for other outcomes, this is likely to be at least partly due to the reduced power of a smaller sample. In other words, though the effects are small, they are unlikely to be zero. Finally, a mediation analysis indicated that a majority share of these small treatment effects was conveyed through moral shame. In contrast, the indirect effects via guilt were negligible and became insignificantly negative in the presence of moral shame.

7.4 Discussion

Many of the findings presented above are concordant with theoretical expectations. First, the results showed that, relative to a neutral stimulus, exposure to racial equalitarian media content led to significantly higher levels of moral shame and guilt. Subsequent analyses also found that this exposure elicited significantly greater support for pro-black policy preferences.

Notably, this was despite the fact that the wording of these policy measures explicitly primed considerations of discrimination against whites. But the effects of the treatment did not end with attitudes towards pro-black racial policies. They also extended to how warmly participants rated whites vs. non-whites as well as the share of immigration admissions they allocated to Europe vs. non-European countries. In the first case, the guilt/shame treatment effectively exacerbated participants' pre-existing tendency towards ratings members of non-white minority groups more warmly than fellow whites. And there was no exception to this pattern: warmth towards blacks, Hispanics, and (if lesser so) Asians all went up, while that towards whites slightly dipped. In the second case, the treatment led to a significant drop in the share of all immigration admissions that were apportioned to Europe. Further analysis showed that this effect was driven by increases in the share of participants whose allocation decisions were at once biased *against* Europe and biased *in favor* of immigration from Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. That allocations to Asia changed relatively little is potentially of theoretical significance¹⁷¹, given that Asian Americans are among those widely perceived as suffering minimal levels of racial discrimination and social disadvantage, whereas black (Africa) and Muslim Americans (the Middle East) are widely perceived to suffer the greatest¹⁷². Finally, an exploratory analysis showed that the treatment also occasioned a small increase in the share of participants that report being 'happy' about the eventual demise of America's white majority. However, and likely because the analysis was underpowered relative to others, this increase was only significant at the $p < 0.1$ threshold.

¹⁷¹ Recall that moral shame is theorized to motivate pro-sociality towards outgroups whose experiences are perceived as analogous to those of blacks. Accordingly, to the extent that Asians are perceived to as relatively advantaged, they are less likely to fit the 'black analogy'.

¹⁷² See Appendix C for survey data on public perceptions of discrimination against various social groups and ratings of group advantage/disadvantage.

To be sure, all of these effects highlighted above were very modest—ranging from changes of 0.07SD to 0.16SD. And yet their size is also remarkably similar to that of the ‘Floyd effects’ observed in Chapter 5. In other words, the magnitude of the media’s effects on white racial attitudes in the current experimental context more or less converge on what was observed in a natural context. But whereas such a test was not possible in Chapter 5, the current study was able to get at whether and to what extent the media effects on outcome variables exerted themselves through shame and/or guilt. On this score, the results of all of the mediation models conducted accorded almost perfectly with theoretical expectations. Specifically, the treatment’s indirect effects through both shame and (if to a lesser degree) guilt accounted for clear a majority of its total effects on support for pro-black policies. Further, shame, but not guilt, significantly mediated just under half of the treatment’s effects on broader outgroup-oriented attitudes and policy preferences; namely relative warmth towards whites vs. non-whites and immigration allocations to Europe vs. non-Europe. This latter finding is particularly revealing, given that the measures of shame only explicitly referenced white and black Americans. Lastly, though purely exploratory, moral shame was found to mediate just over half of the treatment’s total positive effect on responses to the majority-minority item.

While the findings reviewed above constitute the first pieces of direct evidence in support of this dissertation’s group-based moral emotions account of white racial attitude change, an additional set of findings either run counter to or offer only weak support for several of this theory’s predictions. First, no clear evidence emerged that the treatment inspired greater support for increasing US immigration levels. What little increase was observed (approximately +3.6 percentage points) was not distinguishable from random variation. A possible exception to this pattern was found among non-liberals, and among moderates in particular. Whereas liberal

support for increasing immigration showed no change between conditions, support among moderates and conservatives jumped 13.9 and 8.1 points, respectively, in the guilt/shame stimulus group. These increases approach significance individually and become significant when averaged together. And though these results do not constitute strong support for the primary hypothesis in question, they potentially help to explain the null main effects. Specifically, baseline support for increasing immigration among liberals and Democrats was already both fairly high and much higher than among moderates and conservatives. And because the former two groups comprise the overwhelming majority of the sample, one would expect the main effects of the treatment on support to be at least somewhat attenuated. Of course, other explanations¹⁷³, which will be discussed in the concluding chapter, are possible as well.

A second set of findings—those concerning the treatment’s effects on donation behavior—were not only insignificant, but were also in the opposite direction of what was predicted. Specifically, though the treatment was expected to *increase* the size of donations to anti-racist and pro-immigrant advocacy groups, it instead effected small *decreases* both overall and for all subgroups apart from moderates and independents. While these decreases were not significant overall, they did approach significance among liberals. The reasons for this pattern of results are not immediately clear. One possible interpretation is that the pro-social effects of the treatment are limited to personally-costless moral-attitudinal signaling. If this is indeed the case,

¹⁷³ An immediate explanation for these null effects is that the alternative hypothesis and underlying theory is wrong, perhaps because the liberalizing effects of media exposure on racial attitudes are issue or group-specific rather than general. This account is plausible, but is also hard to square with the fact that significant effects were observed in both the cases of immigration allocations and *all* (i.e., the effects were not limited to feelings towards whites vs. blacks) white vs. non-white feeling thermometer differentials. Assuming the alternative hypothesis is, in fact, correct, another possibility is that the single 7-point measure of preferred immigration levels did not allow for a detectable degree of between-condition variation. And yet this account is dubious on the grounds that significant between-condition differences were observed on each of three 7-point pro-black policy items. A third (but by no means final) possibility is that, unlike the outcome variables for which significant differences were observed, the measure of preferred immigration levels makes no explicit mention of any racial/ethnic outgroup beneficiaries.

though, it begs the question why the effects were positive (albeit insignificant) among moderates (and independents). Another interpretation, which has some support in the literature (Rothschild & Keefer, 2017), is that the attitudinal measures afforded ‘ashamed’ and/or ‘guilty’ participants an opportunity for moral self-affirmation. In other words, the endorsement of pro-outgroup or policy preferences served to assuage participants’ sense of moral complicity in a perceived systemically racist society. Thus, participants may have felt less of a need to affirm their moral virtue by the time they reached the measures of donation behavior. This account is admittedly post-hoc, but it can nevertheless be easily tested in future research by situating the donation measures immediately or soon after the treatment. A third and more direct interpretation is that soliciting donations to obscure organizations is a poor and unreliable means of measuring personally-costly pro-social behavior¹⁷⁴. Future researchers should thus consider alternative measures of this outcome. Whatever the case, the existing data do not allow me to test any of this speculation. All that can be here is that, for whatever reason, the results ran counter to theoretical expectations.

Finally, none of the conditional hypotheses found clear support in the data. With few exceptions, the effects of the treatment on all outcomes only reached significance for liberals and Democrats, but this likely has more to do with lack of power than the presence of zero coefficients among conservatives and moderates. To begin, the effects of the treatment on moral shame and guilt did not significantly differ between liberals/Democrats and conservatives/Republicans. Second, though the effects on two of the three pro-black policy items were larger for liberals/Democrats than conservatives/Republicans, none of these differences

¹⁷⁴ For instance, participants may have felt wary about the donating money to organizations they know little about. They may also have been leery about having to potentially disclose personal financial information to a stranger. However, this account cannot explain why the effects of the treatment on donations were in the negative direction.

were distinguishable from chance. Similarly, the effects of the treatment on support for increasing immigration were stronger for conservatives/Republicans than liberals/Democrats, but not significantly so. Further, no obvious or consistent pattern was found in the case of immigration allocations. The negative effects on allocations to Europe were slightly stronger (but not themselves significant) for conservatives than liberals, and slightly stronger for Democrats than Republicans. Liberals/Democrats saw larger increases than conservatives/Republicans in rates of anti-European/pro-non-European allocations, but none of these differences approached significance.

That political orientation was not found to clearly or meaningfully condition the effects of the treatment is both somewhat surprising and also seemingly conflicts with what was observed in the context of the ‘Floyd effect’. On the other hand, and especially in comparison to the data used in the Floyd analysis, the conservative/Republican sample in the current study may have been too small for detecting politically-conditioned differences in treatment effects. Assuming this chapter’s estimates of these differential effects (or lack thereof) are reliable, it could also be that Prolific white conservatives and Republicans are qualitatively different—perhaps more liberal—than their counterparts in the broader population¹⁷⁵. Alternatively, given that it arguably portrayed a case (the Tulsa riots) in which black attempts at individual agency and economic self-reliance were sabotaged by white racism, it’s also possible that guilt/shame stimulus article resonated across ideological and partisan lines. I will return to and further entertain these and other possibilities in the concluding chapter.

¹⁷⁵ Some evidence for this was found when comparing the average 7-point ideology scores of conservatives (M=5.88 vs. 6.14) and Republicans (M=5.43 vs. 5.67) in the current sample to those in the most recent wave of the Cooperative Election Study.

7.5 Conclusion

Until this chapter, this dissertation provided only suggestive evidence for its group-based moral emotions model of white racial attitudes. What's long been missing is *direct* evidence that media can affect white racial liberalism via its activation of collective shame and guilt. While not without their limitations—all which will be covered at length in the final chapter-- the experimental findings of this chapter finally delivered it. First, participants who read a mainstream news editorial underscoring whites' moral complicity in the origin and persistence of black disadvantage reported significantly higher levels of moral shame and guilt than those who read a neutral stimulus. They also expressed significantly greater support for various pro-black policies, admitted significantly fewer (more) immigrants from European (non-Europe), and rated members of non-white minority groups significantly more warmly than fellow whites. Second and perhaps most important, moral shame and guilt were found to mediate *most* of the editorial's effects on pro-black policy support, and a bit under half of its effects on immigration admissions and ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer ratings.

Despite the importance of these findings for this dissertation's thesis, that they ultimately rest on numerical responses to imperfect measures of complicated social processes and attitudes should not be forgotten. Put otherwise, there is potentially a vast gulf between what the researcher *thinks* (or wants to believe) is going on in the data and what is actually going on in the minds from which they are gathered. Did the treatment article genuinely cause participants to actually *feel* ashamed and/or guilty of their racial group membership? Were these emotions and related moral considerations actually informing their responses to measures of racial policy preferences? What went through the minds of those that rated blacks and Hispanics more warmly than whites? Do such individuals *actually* harbor shame-inspired antipathy towards other whites?

Needless to say, none of these questions can be answered with regression models. Instead, the coming chapter will shift to a qualitative approach to go where the data cannot.

8 THE (NOT-)GUILTY AND (UN)ASHAMED IN THEIR OWN WORDS

8.1 Introduction

The current chapter takes a deep dive into the feelings, thoughts, and considerations that informed responses to the attitudinal measures of the previous quantitative chapter. More specifically, it attempts to shed qualitative light on the following basic theoretical question: to what extent are group-based moral appraisals of responsibility and feelings of shame and guilt for past and current racial group inequities reflected in the written remarks of white survey participants? Alternatively, to what extent—and using which theoretical strategies—did participants express resistance to these appraisals? Second, this chapter also seeks answers to two quantitative (or mixed-method-oriented) questions: did the guilt/shame treatment affect the frequency of different comment types? Are these comments correlated with some of the quantitative measures of the previous chapter?

To some extent, all of the proceeding questions bear on the validity of the findings of the previous chapter. For if the intent of that study was to encourage ingroup-critical moral appraisals and to elicit feelings of collective shame and guilt, but none of these phenomena are at all apparent in how participants describe their own experiences with the study nor in the explanations of the answers they gave, we'd have reason to question whether its results were

genuinely born from the causal mechanism that this dissertation proposes. Thus, it is important to go behind the numbers and determine whether the written sentiments of participants match theoretical expectations.

This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the basic theoretical expectations that inform subsequent analyses. It will then introduce the sample from which the data featured in these analyses was gathered as well as this study's observational procedures. Next, it will take readers on an extensive tour of sampled comments, all of which correspond to two overarching themes of theoretical interest. Following this qualitative showcase, quantitative data from the previous chapter is added to a) test whether the guilt/shame stimulus affected comment themes, and b) examine the correspondence between comment themes and quantitative outcome variables. This chapter concludes with a summary and discussion of main findings.

8.2 Theoretical expectations

As will become clearer below, the very general and voluntary open-response item utilized in this chapter's analysis does not easily lend itself to conventional hypothesis testing. This being said, several general theoretical expectations can be submitted. First, it is expected that some commenters will engage in negative group-based moral appraisals of whites; that is, they will view whites as a whole as perpetrators of harm against non-whites and/or blame white people for the disadvantages of blacks and other 'people of color'. Consequently, at least some entries are also expected to express feelings of collective shame and guilt over the authors' association with whiteness. Furthermore, much as the guilt/shame stimulus was found to elevate ingroup-critical emotions, we would also expect the frequency of thematically-related (i.e. 'ingroup-critical') entries to be greater in the guilt/shame than the neutral stimulus condition. On the other hand, to the extent that ingroup-critical stimuli (be they the survey questions themselves and/or the

treatment article) threatens participants' moral identities, we would expect that a meaningful share of entries will be defensive or counter-argumentative in orientation. And because ingroup-critical cues are expected to be most pronounced in the guilt/shame condition, the frequency of defensive comments is also expected to be greater in this condition than in the neutral stimulus group¹⁷⁶. Finally, if scores on quantitative measures of shame and guilt genuinely reflect these emotions and their underlying negative group-based moral appraisals, it follows that 'ingroup-critical' commenters will score higher and 'defensive' commenters lower on these variables.

8.3 Data/Methodology

The data used in this analysis consists of responses to a voluntary open-ended question that was included at the very end of the survey experiment of the previous chapter. The wording of this question¹⁷⁷ was as follows:

“We'd like to get a better understanding of the thoughts and considerations that inform people's survey responses. In this survey, you were asked a number of sensitive questions dealing with race, immigration, and other matters. As researchers, we know we are limited in what we can learn based on the questions we ask. If you're willing, and in the space provided below, please write a few sentences or a short paragraph describing some of the thoughts, feelings or considerations you had as you answered the questions in this survey. If you are not interested in submitting such an entry, you can proceed to the end of the survey by clicking the 'arrow' button.”

¹⁷⁶ Of course, given that my theory predicts that whites with stronger equalitarian orientations react more favorably to ingroup-critical stimuli than those with weaker orientations, interaction effects by political leanings are also possible. In this case, they would entail that increases in 'defensive' comments will be largely driven by conservatives and Republicans, while increases in 'ingroup-critical' comments will be largely driven by liberals and Democrats.

¹⁷⁷ As should be clear, respondents were not asked to respond to or write about any specific questions or topics. Thus, the substance of submitted comments was entirely at the discretion of the respondent. In some ways, this is a strength rather than a weakness, as it entails that comments will be more likely to reflect the genuine thoughts and sentiments that were most salient in the minds of authors during the course of the study. On the downside, this design makes it difficult to test specific hypotheses regarding why participants answered certain survey questions in a given way. It also entails that many comments will likely be unrelated to or won't engage the questions the researcher is actually interested in.

Of the 1,286 eligible respondents, 481 (37%) submitted written entries. Table 8.1 compares the means of non-commenters and commenters on pre-treatment covariates. Overall, commenters were significantly less liberal/more conservative, more weakly aligned with the Democratic party, and older than non-commenters. Differences on none of the other variables are distinguishable from zero.

Table 9.1 Differences of means tests: commenters vs. non-commenters

| | Ideology | Party-ID | Prop. BA+ | Age | Prop. Male | Prop. Northeast | Prop. Midwest | Prop. South | Prop. West |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Non-commenter (N=805) | 2.87 (0.063) | 2.77 (0.074) | 0.556 (0.175) | 33.74 (0.420) | 0.435 (0.017) | 0.199 (0.014) | 0.224 (0.150) | 0.393 (0.017) | 0.184 (0.014) |
| Commenter (N=481) | 3.14** (0.083) | 3.10** (0.098) | 0.547 (0.227) | 39.06*** (0.619) | 0.401 (0.022) | 0.164 (0.017) | 0.266 (0.020) | 0.397 (0.022) | 0.173 (0.017) |

Note. Cell entries are means with robust standard errors in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

For the purposes of this analysis, all 481 written responses were read and manually coded¹⁷⁸ into three general thematic categories, including one sub-category: 1. Ingroup-critical, 2. Expressions of ingroup-critical emotions (sub-category of ‘Ingroup-critical’), 3. Defensive, and 4. Other/Unrelated. Table 9.2 shows the criteria by which comments were selected and coded (which will be further discussed below) as well as the frequency of each comment theme--both as the percent of all comments and also as the percent of all comments within a given political subgroup. Overall, a small majority (53.8%) of comments—i.e., those in the ‘Other/Unrelated’ category¹⁷⁹--did not speak to or instantiate any of the ingroup-focused themes. However, given

¹⁷⁸ As I note in the discussion, my lack of a test of (intercoder) reliability calls into question the meaningfulness of results from the quantitative analyses I conduct in later sections. As such, these analyses are purely exploratory.

¹⁷⁹ Comments in this ‘other/unrelated’ category generally consisted of very brief (typically one sentence) compliments (e.g. “It was a very interesting study”) or criticism (e.g. “I am personally sick of all the surveys on racism!!!”) of the survey, explanations of positions on immigration and race-related policies, acknowledgements (e.g. “I think that racism has been and is still a problem in our country.”) and expressions of regret (e.g. “I think slavery was very wrong”) for the history and/or persistence of racism in US society, and remarks that were either very vague (e.g. ‘I considered the current state of the world while answering these questions’) or hard to meaningfully interpret (e.g. “I saw it as an avenue to say about the discrimination amongst we the whites and with the black people”).

that participants were not asked any specific thematic questions, this is to be expected.

Unsurprisingly, the share of ‘ingroup-critical’ comments was greatest among liberals (31.5%) and Democrats (31.3%)—as were expressions of ingroup-critical emotions (9.6%, 10.9%)--while the share of ‘defensive’ comments was greatest among conservatives (48.3%) and Republicans (48.5%).

Table 9.2 Comments frequencies as the percent of all comments and as the percent of comments submitted by different white political subgroups

| | Selection Criteria | All Comments | Lib. | Mod. | Cons. | Dem. | Repub. |
|---|---|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Ingroup-critical | -Faults white people/racism for others’ disadvantages -Holds white people responsible or addressing racial inequality -Negatively essentializes or generalizes about white people -Views white people as beneficiaries of racism -Expresses resentment of frustration with white people | 21.2% | 31.5% | 12.3% | 0.8% | 31.3% | 2.2% |
| Expressions of ingroup-critical emotions | -Conveys feelings of collective shame, guilt, and/or ingroup-directed anger | 7.3% | 9.6% | 9.6% | 0.0% | 10.9% | 0.0% |
| Defensive | -Rejects negative generalizations of whites -Rejects blaming whites for others’ disadvantages -Denies association with historical and/or contemporary ingroup wrongdoings -Denies ‘white privilege’ -Disputes or downplays role of racism in explaining black disadvantage -Negatively essentializes or generalizes about blacks | 25.0% | 11.3% | 42.5% | 48.3% | 12.8% | 48.5% |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | and/or other non-white racial groups | | | | | | |
| Other/ Unrelated | -Technical/survey-related criticism or compliments -Elaborates position on racial/immigration policy -Vague/uninterpretable statements -Acknowledges/regrets persistence of racism -Affirms human equality | 53.8% | 57.2% | 45.2% | 50.9% | 55.9% | 49.3% |
| N | | 481 | 292 | 73 | 116 | 313 | 138 |

With the exception of the ‘other/unrelated’, each of these comment categories will now be further introduced and explicated below¹⁸⁰. But before proceeding, it’s important for me to stress that this chapter takes no normative stance on the appropriateness or desirability of any of the comments it reviews. Ultimately, whether ‘ingroup-critical’ or ‘defensive’ comments advance the more morally ‘correct’ position is a subjective value-based question that is irrelevant to the purpose at hand.

8.4 Comment Typology

8.4.1 *The ‘Ingroup-critical’ (N=102)*

A little more than 21% of all open-response entries were classified as ‘ingroup-critical’. Entries of this sort include those that engaged in negative moral appraisals or essentializations of white Americans, faulted white Americans for the disadvantages of blacks and other ‘people of color’, asserted whites’ (including their own) moral responsibility for rectifying the harms of historical and contemporary racism, and/or expressed group-based feelings of shame and/or guilt. The comments below exemplify responses of this genre:

¹⁸⁰ Where necessary, presented comments are corrected for spelling and grammar. Further, some comments are very long and/or multifaceted in the sense that, in addition to speaking to the themes of interest, they discuss things (e.g. technical comments, immigration policy) that would, in isolation, be coded into the ‘other/unrelated’ category. In these cases, I show only the thematically-relevant portion of the comment.

“I believe that white people in general have gotten so many unfair advantages over the years that it is time to give back and make reparations to the groups of people that **we have taken advantage** of. I think educating people in the true history of the US is the only way to get more people to understand just how much **we have harmed others.**”

-36-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Liberal

“I know that racism has been a problem for a long time but the article gives specific examples of how it has persisted in our society which makes me feel like I am better prepared to tackle the issue. I want to help fight racism since **I am a part of the group that has caused it...**”

-19-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

“...I feel like **white people are responsible for the harm they have caused to black people and for every other minority that we have harmed** and I feel that that responsibility should be taken seriously without infantilizing the people we are meant to make amends to and to work towards finding solutions so there may be more equality in the future.”

-26-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

“Honestly, as white Americans, I feel like generally **we have walked over, sabotaged, and generally fucked over any and every other group of people that has come before and alongside us.** Native Americans, Africans, Asians; **we’ve** always made sure that **we** come out on top no matter who **we** have to beat down to get to the top. It is very sad.”

-28-years-old, Male, Weak Democrat, Slightly liberal

Two notable theoretical elements are common among entries of this category. First, and as underscored in bold, the authors clearly categorize themselves as belonging to a racial (i.e., white) ingroup. Although fairly basic, this is significant in that intergroup emotions theory holds that self-categorization into a common ingroup is a natural pre-requisite for engaging in group-based moral appraisals. In the present case, though the authors may not view themselves as actively perpetrating or directly responsible for harms committed against non-white ‘others’, their self-categorizations into a white collective seemingly inspires a sense of ‘responsibility by association’. In other words, they view themselves and other whites as both sharing and unjustly benefiting from a common (im)moral legacy and demeanor. Thus, those that the authors are interested in helping are not merely the disadvantaged, they are those that ‘*we*’ (i.e., white people) have disadvantaged and harmed. Indeed, some even make a point of clarifying that though they may not be individually ‘racist’ themselves or have directly injured others, they are

nonetheless white and thus benefit from a white supremacist social order, which they feel compelled to rectify:

“My main thought is that even though I may not be "racist", **I participate in racist systems and directly benefit from them.** Thus, as a person who is given power and privilege by such a system, it's my responsibility to use that power to work towards rebuilding those systems as less racist. In essence, it's not enough to be "not racist"; it is morally imperative to be actively anti-racist - or else nothing will change.”

-20-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Very liberal

“I do not consider myself racist at all, but I do realize that **my ancestors made life hell for people of color.** I also realize the government and the way the nation is heavily benefits white people. I absolutely think we should focus resources into black neighborhoods to help uplift them.”

-29-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Liberal

Interestingly, some participants are cognizant of the fact and even fear that addressing past and/or ongoing racial injustices, such as via race-based affirmative action policies, may entail a personal cost. They nonetheless rationalize it as a kind of collective comeuppance. For instance, one commenter writes:

“I believe that African-American voters and citizens are still suffering the discriminations of past generations, not to mention ongoing discrimination today; I believe that governmental efforts including hiring preference for African-American applicants is the beginning of a process to improve the long-standing inequality. **I do feel fear about my ability to compete in a professional world where I am at an explicit disadvantage, but I realize that I have to let go of that fear and recognize that many Black applicants have felt and suffered that disadvantage for decades.**”

-38-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

While acknowledging whites' moral culpability for the conditions of disadvantaged racial/ethnic minorities, other participants express being torn between wanting to help such groups and not wanting to pay a personal penalty. For some, this concern for personal interests seemingly begets feelings of guilt:

“**I know that white people are at fault** for all of the systematic racism and disadvantages that people of color suffer. I am fearful of losing my own job and my child not being able to get a job

or losing scholarships, academic placement, to someone else. **I understand that they need help, but I am fearful of missing out if that makes sense even though I feel guilty about it.**
-27-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

All told, ‘ingroup-critical’ commenters firmly believe (even if they feel conflicted over what to do about it) that their racial ingroup is the dominant source of racism in the US as well as the primary cause of black and/or others’ disadvantage. As one commenter explained, any other appraisal borders on or constitutes racism:

“I don't have a ton of input on most of the topics but I will touch on one: Inequality between black Americans and other races (specifically whites). **You basically have to either A: Admit that white people have discriminated against black Americans or B: Say that you believe that Black Americans are somehow inferior. I'm in the ‘A’ camp on this one.**”
-39-years-old, Male, Liberal, Lean Democrat.

One commenter is thus hopeful that the decline of the country’s white majority will occasion a better future:

“The thought of whites not being the majority one day is promising as I hope racism will decrease.”
-26-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

8.4.1.1 *Expressions of ingroup-critical emotions (N=35)*

Just over 7% of all commenters, including more than a third (34%) of those in the ‘ingroup-critical’ category, expressed feelings of shame, guilt, and/or anger over or towards their racial ingroup. As the theoretical literature on shame would predict, a dominant theme across many of these entries is a negative global moral appraisal of the ingroup, including an essentialization of white people as uniquely evil or immoral. For many, being associated with a group they perceive as inveterately bringing harm to others is a source of shame and anger; and, for some, existentially so. The following comments epitomize these sentiments:

“As a white person seeing the racism in America today and trying to understand the history of it, **makes me angry and ashamed of existing and being white.** Just the fact that one group can hurt so many other people is disgusting to me.”

-18-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Very liberal

“White people have been liars since the beginning. It’s awful. **I feel awful. Why is this race like this?**”

-21-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Moderate

For some participants, the shame and anger they feel over their affiliation with a ‘racist’ racial group influenced their responses to the racial group feeling thermometers of the previous chapter. As one commenter explained:

“It was tough for me to do the rating about how much I feel warmly to a certain group. I was torn between wanting group not to matter and **feeling betrayed by my fellow white people**, which ultimately led me to rank my feeling toward them as much colder.”

-24-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Very liberal

Another commenter similarly expresses feeling ‘betrayed’ by the behavior of other whites:

“Reading about **what people from my race have done to others feels like a betrayal**. Imagine thinking one group of people is superior than others. It couldn’t be me thinking that way and I am disappointed that some people tend to still have this mindset.”

-34-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Moderate

As is evident in the preceding entry, a number of commenters reported feeling shame as a direct result of the guilt/shame stimulus article:

“**Reading the article earlier made me feel truly ashamed of the behavior of white people and how they treat minorities**. It makes me feel sick to my stomach to think that my ancestors could have had any part in killing native Americans or owning slaves.”

-36-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Slightly liberal

“Reading most of it **made me feel ashamed**. I know white privilege exists and I’m not proud of it. What is worse, people who deny it or people who are proud of it. I wonder about things like that.”

-52-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Liberal

“My heart hurts and **I think it is a disgrace how we have behaved.**”

-61-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

Speaking to the expected influence of the media environment on ingroup-critical emotions, another participant mentioned the embarrassment and guilt she feels from the frequent circulation of videos documenting instances of white people acting bigoted:

“I think that as a middle-class white woman in America I have a hard time seeing people in my same racial group treat [people of color] with such disrespect. **It's like every time I turn around there is a video of someone being racist towards a [person of color] and it's not only embarrassing it's shameful.** I am not racist nor would I ever disrespect anyone the way that these people have but **I still feel the guilt of knowing that they are being mistreated so much by people like me.**”

-28-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Slightly liberal

Though not explicitly referencing media exposure, other commenters similarly report feelings of guilt and/or shame from seeing white people mistreat other non-whites¹⁸¹. For instance, one participant briefly noted that the survey “did a great job addressing the guilt I feel as a white person when seeing [people of color] being treated so horribly”.

In many cases, such as in the previous two entries, it’s not clear whether participants are using ‘guilt’ and ‘shame’ interchangeably. Of course, it would be unreasonable to expect the average person to appreciate the academic distinction between the two. A couple of participants, however, were sensitive to it. For instance, the respondent below clarifies that she feels more a sense of ‘collective shame’ than ‘personal guilt’:

“My feelings on race are hard to describe, but overall my thoughts are that I personally am not responsible for what my ancestors did to the ancestors of Black Americans, but I have been born into a world shaped by their actions and have to live with those consequences, just as Black people have to live with the consequences of being born into a world where they are treated differently because of what family they were born into. **I don't feel a personal "guilt" in the sense that I personally did anything racist or wrong, but I do feel a sense of collective shame about what has happened in the past and continues to happen today.**”

-33-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Very Liberal

¹⁸¹ Obviously, barring first-hand experiences of observing white people mistreat ‘people of color’, these sentiments can only have been informed by what participants see in the media.

Another describes her feelings as a kind of ‘embarrassed accountability’, which actually closely resembles recent scholarly conceptions of shame:

“I very much feel ashamed and angry about the things that white people do against non-white individuals. I feel responsible for helping improve relationships/conditions. **However, I don't feel guilt because I have not directly acted negatively to these groups. In life, I only feel guilty about things that I have directly done - things that were in my control.** That's not to say that I condone any of the actions by whites (my feelings are very much the opposite), it's just that I think we need a different way to describe that embarrassed accountability about actions perpetrated by whites against others.”

-31-years-old, Male, Lean Democrat, Very liberal

Similarly, a second participant reports feeling more ‘embarrassed’ than guilty:

“I thought of stories recently told to me by my colleagues, who are not white. I know and they know I'm not responsible for the shenanigans they've had to deal with, but **I'm embarrassed more than guilty about situations they and their children have to deal with that I don't.**”

-31-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Moderate

In these and other cases, participants clearly understood ‘guilt’ in terms of *personal* involvement or responsibility for immoral actions, whereas they conceive of ‘shame’ as the embarrassment they feel from their association with the racist tendencies of fellow ingroup members. Owing to their whiteness, this is an association that they cannot entirely escape even if belonging to an opposing political camp. Thus, one 68-year-old ‘strong Democrat’ woman writes that she “feels ashamed to be a white American” and is “[disgusted] with white trash Americans that the current-day Republicans have unleashed on our society.” And lest one suppose such feelings are purely or invariably partisan in nature, one commenter reports being frustrated even with fellow liberal whites:

“The thing that pisses me off the most isn't so much the history of racism in white America, but the stubborn refusal of most white people, even a lot of otherwise-liberal white people, to acknowledge it at all, much less to acknowledge that we still benefit from that legacy.”

-39-years-old, Male, Strong Democrat, Very liberal

On a few occasions, commenters were unsure over how best to characterize their emotions. Though the feelings they describe cohere with scholarly conceptions of ‘moral shame’, the term appears to evade them, perhaps because they—like others—equate it with ‘guilt’:

“...There were a lot of questions about my feelings of guilt because I’m white and I’m not sure if what I feel is guilt or just disappointment and frustration about our history and the role that white people played in that history.”

-55-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

Feelings of shame are often also implicit in expressions of ingroup-directed anger.

Indeed, and as was noted in Chapter 2, recent research finds a close relationship between the two¹⁸², with the latter conceived as following from the former. Theoretically, this is because affiliating with a group that’s perceived as failing to uphold personally important moral values engenders resentment towards (and, thereafter, a desire to confront and change) that group. Thus, one commenter clarifies that he feels *anger* towards white Americans, rather than personal guilt:

“I don't feel guilty exactly by the actions of my fellow white Americans. I feel more anger and sadness.”

-31-years-old, Male, Strong Democrat, Very liberal

Interestingly, whereas a number of (non-guilty) commenters seemingly or explicitly associate guilt with direct or personal involvement in immoral actions, at least one commenter reported feeling guilty not for something he *did*, but for the privileges he perceives himself as enjoying at the expense of others:

“For some of the questions, you asked if I feel guilty for the way white Americans treat black Americans. **I feel more personal guilt about the benefit I receive from the institutionalized racism** in our country.”

-37-years-old, Male, Strong Democrat, Very liberal

¹⁸² For instance, Iyer et al. (2007) report a correlation of $r=0.75$ between collective shame and ingroup-directed anger.

As will be further discussed later, that the object of guilt is variable (with some focused on immoral ingroup *actions* and others ingroup *advantages*) has important implications for how guilt is measured in future research.

In other cases, though--particularly those referring to the historical and/or continued mistreatment of racial minorities--what commenters report as feelings of guilt may actually be expressions of moral shame:

“I do feel guilty as a white American about how Black Americans were treated in the past and how they continue to be treated. Though I do not believe myself to be racist, I am from a rural area with small-minded people. Diversity is not great here but even I am able to witness racism in my small town.”

-37-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Moderate

“Participating in this survey did make me feel guilty about how people of other races have been treated. I am married to a Hispanic man and we have four mixed children together. I would hate for any of them to feel discriminated against. I live in a community of mostly Hispanics and have grown up that way; it's what I'm used to. I can never understand how some people could think they're better based on skin color.”

-31-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Moderate

And, at times, both moral shame and guilt show signs of being present. Indeed, recall an earlier comment in which the author reported feeling “ashamed of existing and being white”.

Likewise, the commenter below writes that she feels, inter alia, ‘guilty’ and ‘self-hatred’:

“Felt guilty, scared, suspicious, afraid for my anonymity/safety, self-hatred”

-24-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

What’s interesting here is that, for most ‘ashamed’ commenters, shame and anger is focused on or directed at other whites. They themselves don’t feel morally deficient, but they resent being associated with a group that is. However, for the commenters in question, feelings of shame and anger are additionally self-directed. According to the theoretical model and findings of Gausel and Brown (2012), this would suggest the simultaneous operation of guilt and

shame. Specifically, this model holds that, in response to ingroup moral failure, guilt motivates *self*-directed anger and a desire to change the *self* (i.e., due to feelings of moral self-inadequacy), whereas shame motivates *ingroup*-directed anger and a desire to change one's *ingroup* (i.e., owing to perceptions that the ingroup is morally deficient). When shame and guilt co-occur, however, both the self *and* one's ingroup become targets of anger and reform. I return to this point in the discussion.

8.4.1.1.1 Responding to ingroup-critical emotions

Recall that moral shame is theoretically expected to motivate a desire to morally distance oneself from as well as to confront and reform an immoral ingroup. This typically entails adopting and/or exhibiting a moral identity that is opposite the one ascribed to an ingroup. In this sense, the racial ingroup is essentially recast as a moral outgroup—one that morally 'enlightened' whites desire to rehabilitate¹⁸³. For the participant below, who additionally notes her attempts at educating 'horribly racist' family members, this adoption of an oppositional (or 'anti-racist') moral identity is a source of pride:

"My family is horribly racist. I've tried and tried and tried to explain systemic racism but it gets me nowhere and it's exhausting! **I am so proud of myself, however, for making the conscious decision to be different from them;** that I refuse to hold those disgusting views."
-28-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Very liberal

But for others, it can also be a kind of spiritual struggle—one that all whites 'must undertake'¹⁸⁴:

"I feel much shame living on the backs of my oppressive forebears. I myself was quite racist in my younger years. I had to take a hard look at myself and realize I had been conditioned by our hate-filled society. **Had I not been able to admit I was racist I would never have been able to**

¹⁸³ However, recall one commenter's hope that racism in the US will subside with the fall of the white majority. This would seem to imply that not all feel that white people can be 'reformed'; and that some (likely a small minority) see demographic replacement or the weakening of white influence as the only path towards a racially just society. Indeed, in explaining her support for increasing immigration, one 'very liberal' female commenter suggested that it "would help break the hold on power by whites".

¹⁸⁴ The implication of course being that all white people are racist or racially biased.

overcome it. Sadly, due to it being so ingrained, I still on occasion catch myself making judgements here and there based on race. **It is a difficult process but one that all white American citizens must undertake.**”

-36-years-old, Male, Independent, Liberal

As would be expected by theory, whether out of a sense of personal moral inadequacy and/or a need to morally distinguish themselves from other whites, ingroup-critical emotions appear to inspire in some participants a desire for pro-social or pro-outgroup action:

“I had a lot of feelings of guilt and a desire to learn more about racial issues in the United States. I know quite a bit of information but I feel like I haven't done anything worthwhile with that information. I want to become more of an advocate in my community for all the political things I care about.”

-29-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Very liberal

For the author below, these efforts include influencing future generations of white people as well as the formation of a more ‘racially inclusive’ social circle:

“Until the tragic death of George Floyd I did not realize the extreme challenges that black people faced in America. I have been learning about these challenges ever since. I feel that now that I know, I have a responsibility to do what I can to learn about the history of, and current practices, surrounding discrimination and racism. **Additionally, I feel that, with the knowledge I have gained, I am called to action.** Right now, I am extending my friend circle to include more BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, People of Color) people. I am also working on educating my kids around this topic. They are our future. Hopefully, I can make a difference now and they can continue to make positive gains in this area.”

-38-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Slightly liberal

And yet others report being unsure about what to do with their feelings of or wish they were doing more:

“Answering questions about race makes me feel guilty for being the race that I am. The desire to do more is there, but **aside from giving money, it's hard to know what to do.**”

-48-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Slightly liberal

“...also thought about how my white guilt was pretty useless unless it spurred me to action and that I could be doing better in that regard.”

-50-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

And still others are conflicted on or over the political solutions they should support:

“I feel guilt for how white people have treated black Americans historically and today, but I struggle with supporting certain ideas such as reparations because it has been over 150 years since the last slaves were freed”

-23-years-old, Male, Weak Democrat, Very liberal

“It was hard to answer the questions. I’m not racist. I know that, but just how not racist am I? I’m white, I know that makes me privileged, but should I be cast out to equalize or should [disadvantaged racial groups] be raised up?”

-33-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Very liberal

8.4.2 *The ‘Defensive’ (N=120)*

Though a non-trivial subset of comments were ‘ingroup-critical’, an even larger share (25%) can be broadly categorized as ‘defensive’ in nature¹⁸⁵. Entries in this category typically rejected or took issue with group-based moral appraisals and collective assignments of blame, particularly the notion that they should feel guilty or ashamed of their racial identities, or the idea that white Americans are morally culpable for the disadvantage of blacks and other racial minorities. The grounds on which they did generally correspond to several exonerative or defensive strategies previously identified in the intergroup emotions literature. Many of these strategies often overlap, but all are theorized as serving the function of repelling threats both to one’s own moral identity and/or that of his/her ingroup.

8.4.2.1 *Distancing strategies*

A common strategy ingroup members use to resist appraisals of collective moral responsibility, and thus feelings of shame and/or guilt, is to distance themselves from the wrongdoers among them. To this end, one approach is to emphasize in-group heterogeneity—the idea that an entire group of people cannot be judged or be held accountable for the misdeeds of a subset of its members (Doosje et al. 1998). By perceiving outgroup-directed moral violations to

¹⁸⁵ My use of the word ‘defensive’ is purely descriptive and should not be taken to mean that defensive responses are normatively wrong.

be the fault of an isolated and unrepresentative subgroup of *individuals*, ingroup members are able to safeguard their moral self-concepts and absolve themselves of moral responsibility for the victims. The comments below typify such an approach:

“On the questions about discrimination against blacks in the US. I always see these and feel like **"I" don't discriminate against anyone for color or religion and even "we" white people don't as a group. There is a subgroup of white people that are discriminatory** and like all things in the modern world and media, their voice is the one that gets amplified and shown.”
-35-years-old, Male, Lean Democrat, Very liberal

“I feel that there is racism still existing today BUT it cannot be blamed on people who were not even alive in the past or on one particular ethnicity such as Caucasians. EVERYONE is or has been bias/racist at one point in their life and **while there are many people who are extremely racist, you cannot blame it on every person of the same race they are from.** People need to stop looking at color, stop blaming, stop using the race card, and start worrying about how to repair the damage that's been done to our world!”
-46-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Conservative

“I don't feel guilty for the **acts of a few bad people.**”
-60-years-old, Male, Weak Democrat, Slightly liberal

“I feel that indeed history is checkered with incidents but it **doesn't represent the majority of people.** I think there are aggravating factors in each incident. Native American issues history since time immortal of conquering and conversion. I feel modern society has pockets of racism but it isn't the norm.”
-38-years-old, Male, Lean Republican, Slightly conservative

“I'm sick and tired of being told that I'm racist and a white supremacist solely because I'm a conservative white male. **There are always going to be jackasses in society who are racist** and hate people solely because of the color of their skin. That will NEVER end. **But by and large, the vast majority of white Americans have no racist feelings towards blacks.** Every other nationality worked their way out of bad situations. Blacks need to do the same. Stop complaining, stop claiming racism, and work. Be a role model. The world doesn't owe you a damn thing because of the color of your skin. Just like it owes me nothing for the color of mine.”
-48-years-old, Male, Strong Republican, Conservative

Others contend that the assignment of moral responsibility to members of an entire race is itself racist:

“I didn't feel that I was personally responsible for many of the aspects of racism **caused by others that share my race.** I feel that perpetuating such an idea creates more division and is in some ways racist in of its self.”
-21-years-old, Male, Strong Democrat, Slightly liberal

In all of these cases it is apparent that racism is understood and viewed in the traditional sense—as an interpersonal or behavioral phenomenon in which people oppress, discriminate against or are hostile to others on the basis of immutable traits. As such, racism is a belief system and mode of behavior that only *some* white people—as well as *some* people of all races—adhere(d) to or practice(d). And, in virtue of this, it is wrong—and even racist—to morally convict an entire group for sharing the phenotype of a subgroup of perpetrators.

A variation of this approach entails categorizing oneself and/or one’s ancestors as being entirely unrelated to the historical group responsible for slavery and segregation (Knowles et al. 2014). In many of these cases, the author emphasizes his/her distinct ethnic or immigrant background:

“I am the child of white immigrants from Eastern Europe. Being that, I really dislike being lumped in with typical white Americans. I fail to see many similarities that activists insist I have, or that I hold any responsibility for slavery or the current racial issues.”
-22-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Slightly liberal

“I consider myself Irish American as both sets of my Grandparents were from Ireland, so talking about feeling guilt in regards the historic racism and treatment of Black people by Whites, it feels wrong to be connected to that.”
-42-years-old, Male, Independent, Slightly liberal

“I am tired of reading about white people being so evil. My ancestors were German Jews and Canadians and Working-class Brits. We never owned slaves and I think slavery was a horrible chapter in world history”
-43-years-old, Female, Independent, Slightly conservative

Other commenters stress that their families immigrated to the US well after slavery was practiced:

“As a person whose family moved here years after slavery was ended, and a family that was disadvantaged for its immigrant status itself, I feel that there is no logical reason for us to feel guilty for [the status of African Americans] when **none of us had a role - direct or indirect- in**

their treatment. Additionally, I think that using slavery as the reason behind some complaints about a person's status today is grasping at straws."

-29-years-old, Female, Lean Republican, Moderate

In some cases, such as in the comments below, this strategy can take the form of downplaying or eschewing racial group memberships and identities altogether. For if one doesn't identify as 'white', there is no ingroup to be guilty or ashamed of:

"I am an individual. I do not strongly identify as being part of various groups. I feel no personal guilt about racism because I do not feel like I belong to the same species, let alone group as white racists."

-60-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

"I feel no guilt over the actions of white people, just as I feel not guilt over actions of French people. **Those people aren't me. I didn't do it. I'm not reaping any rewards. I don't know why I should affiliate myself with anyone else in my mind,** especially since I think 99.9% of people are stupid and cruel.

-38-years-old, Male, Independent, Moderate

Another means by which group-based responsibility—and thus feelings of collective shame and guilt—is resisted is through a strategy of temporal distancing (Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson, 2010). This response, which is reflected in the comments below, generally takes the form of perceiving historical injustices as part of a bygone era that has at most waning relevance to the lives of white and black Americans today:

"I do not believe we can hold the people of today responsible **for the actions of people more than 100 years ago.** I believe **white people DID treat blacks poorly back then. But I believe the majority of that treatment has been stopped.** I feel that people are responsible for their own actions and cannot be expected to take responsibility for an entire group of people whom they have never met."

-44-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Very conservative

"It is definitely a sad history of racism. At the same time, **at least 2 generations have passed - if not 3 where support and equality have been afforded.** Immigrants come here from far worse situations, and do well. They take the responsibility and initiative to overcome by all means. Opportunity exists--it's there for the taking."

-52-years-old, Male, Lean Republican, Conservative

Other commenters resent those they perceive as being stuck in the past:

“I think that the **people who still live in the past and think about racism all the time are the problem**. Get over it and move on. I didn't own slaves. My parents, grandparents, great grandparents, and so on, didn't own slaves. Stop blaming us.”

-42-years-old, Male, Independent, Moderate

“I feel far too much emphasis is given to racial inequality and **I am deeply offended by the suggestion that whites of today are somehow responsible for slavery and should pay reparations. No one alive today was a part of slavery**. No one alive today was ever a slave or slave owner. I personally did nothing and have nothing to be ashamed of concerning slavery and therefore it is not my responsibility to pay for something I had no part in. It is my opinion that **everyone needs to move forward, leave the past in the past and stop dwelling on it** so that we can accomplish something worthwhile now.”

-54-years-old, Male, Strong Democrat, Liberal

In addition to temporal distancing, a number of commenters also insisted that neither they nor their families benefit(ed) from the legacy and/or persistence of racial discrimination in the US. As we saw, some commenters cite their families' post-slavery immigrant backgrounds to this effect. But still others alternatively or additionally emphasize their families' and/or their own personal financial hardships:

“I felt [the treatment article] was one sided. It stated whites have it better today due to racism. **My grandparents lived in poverty. Both my parents come from poverty, and I live at poverty level**. I didn't benefit from slavery. None of my ancestors held slaves. I wasn't raised with racist views.”

-41-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Moderate

Another commenter emphasizes both her ancestors' immiseration and their own experiences of discrimination:

“I don't appreciate how this current movement is almost demonizing white people and making us feel badly for how blacks have been treated. **I am white and come from families who were too poor to ever own slaves!** My parents raised me to not be prejudiced against others for the color of their skin yet they allowed me to learn about other cultures and form my own opinions. **My European ancestors were discriminated against in this country too** but I don't notice people from those backgrounds playing and victim and demanding special preferences and reparations. **And guess what? I'm poor too! I don't have a great job or educational background and no one else pays my bills**. If I don't take care of myself from paycheck to paycheck, I end up homeless like anyone else. So I'm a bit weary of hearing how minorities thinking they have it so bad when plenty of us whites are in poor social and economic circumstances also.”

-59-years-old, Female, Lean Republican, Moderate

8.4.2.2 *Changing the object of appraisal*

Another defensive strategy identified in the literature is a shifting of the focus of negative group-based moral appraisals from whites to blacks (Rotella & Richeson, 2013). In what some would term ‘victim-blaming’, comments of this sort typically emphasize either blacks’ responsibility for their own condition or their own moral shortcomings and tendencies.

Embodying this theme, one commenter writes:

“Black people get everything handed to them and for the most part they are the criminals in this country and they are lower on the economy because they are lazy. And I am tired of hearing how bad slavery was. It was black people in Africa who sold the slaves. So black people were responsible for slavery.”

-36-years-old, Male, Weak Republican, Conservative

In addition to asserting black people’s responsibility for their own disadvantage, another commenter resents the fact that they are made to “sound like angels’, whereas white people are demonized and suffer from black criminality:

“...I also notice how the proponents of this current movement make black people sound like angels. What about the crimes they've committed on their own people, as well as other minority groups and whites? What about that fact that during the slavery era, Africans sold their own people into slavery? None of this gets mentioned and I think that is very biased and unfair. Tell the whole story or don't tell it at all. Stop playing the victim and take responsibility for your own life and circumstances like everyone else has to, including white people, have to do.”

-59-years-old, Female, Lean Republican, Moderate

Similarly, the commenters below shift the spotlight to black violence:

“I was incensed by the article I read. While I assume it is historically and factually accurate, it didn't seem to want to mention that in the years since the massacre (and other similar incidents), the trend swung sharply to the other side, to where now the looting, mobs, property destruction, and overall person-to-person violence and killings are being committed by black people to black people.”-47-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Very conservative

“I was brought up to believe everyone is equal. I was not taught to discriminate. When I see blacks destroy black business in downtown I find it difficult to feel bad for what has happened. We all have responsibilities and we live to live up to them.”

-68-years-old, Female, Weak Republican, Conservative

Rather than shifting the focus of appraisals to blacks, one commenter softens negative appraisals of whites by pointing to the even greater racism of other racial groups:

“Yes, different races treat other different races differently. Whites are bad but no one compares to racism like Asians, and yet we rarely see that story being told.”
-33-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Moderate.

Still other commenters opt to shift attention away from anti-black discrimination to the racial discrimination they perceive is practiced against whites:

“Slavery was terrible - people involved in that were mistreated terribly...but that is in the past. I work for the Federal Government and being a minority is the greatest benefit you can have at work. My wife works in an organization of approximately 500 people and they have put on paper that they will only hire black people for open positions.”
-56-years-old, Male, Strong Republican, Conservative

“...I have worked in the government sector and I was told by my director of my department that white is no longer a protected race. I feel like a minority. If we were to have a white only television channel, or we were allowed to call them certain slang names, they would be outraged.”
-51-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Moderate

A similar diversionary response, which is reflected in the comment below, is to note that whites were also the victims of slavery:

“[The survey] is almost an attack on white people. I will not teach my children to be ashamed of themselves or feel guilty for the color of their skin. **There were many white slaves as well. Irish slavery is not something discussed or even taught.** We need to eliminate hate of all kind. I think people need to get back to church and remember to love their neighbor as themselves. Stop making race an issue in the present day.”
-46-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Conservative

8.4.2.3 *Downplaying the injury and/or its consequences*

A final observed strategy, one that frequently overlaps with or incorporates the others preceding it, is to downplay, minimize, or question the role of racism in the persistence of black disadvantage (Branscombe & Miron, 2004) . Indeed, some of the entries of this sort bear a close resemblance to several of the statements featured in the conventional 4-item ‘racial resentment’

measure. For instance, the comments below note that other ethnic/racial groups were discriminated against in the past, but socioeconomically persevered nonetheless:

“My grandparents came to this country as serfs suffering from centuries of Russian oppression. They came here and were spat on by White Americans and discriminated against. All immigrant groups have gone through hardships, yet their status is not as bad as Black Americans'. Curious, is it not?”

-29-years-old, Male, Weak Republican, Slightly conservative

“I believe each individual, regardless of race, has the responsibility, and can find the wherewithal, to be successful. Several groups came to the United States as immigrants, such as the Irish and the Chinese, and found ways to better themselves, move upward in society and become successful - even wealthy.”

-64-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

Another commenter, recalls the success he’s enjoyed in spite of early adversity, including bullying he experienced at the hands of other blacks:

“I recalled my own experience as a small white boy being bullied, ridiculed, and beaten up by black schoolmates and neighbors, and growing up in poverty, and despite all this graduating with honors from two nationally recognized universities with a bachelor's and an advanced professional degree.”

-33-years-old, Male, Lean Democrat, Slightly conservative

It bears repeating that the theoretically anticipated purpose of such entries is to call into question the causal relevance of past and/or existing racial discrimination to the disparate group outcomes of today. In pointing to other ethnic/racial groups that overcame or socioeconomically excelled in spite of discrimination, the implication is that blacks’ relative disadvantage is not the fault of white America, but the fault of blacks themselves. For nearly all comments of this sort, the culprit is a lack of self-agency. For one participant, though, there are also genetic factors:

“I lived and worked in an area in [Florida] with a large black population. I worked as a home health nurse in these areas. After spending a lot of time caring for and teaching blacks, I realized that blacks and whites are not the same. **We come from different genetic backgrounds and things that are easily explained to white people would not sink in to black people no matter how many ways I reworded something.** Black people don't want to be different. If they did, they have had every opportunity to do so.”

-34-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Very conservative

Whereas many commenters merely downplay the contemporary relevance racism, others deny the existence of racism altogether:

“There is no racism in America. Those that work hard will succeed. There is no such thing as white privilege.”

-55-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Conservative

For a number of such individuals, assertions of its relevance are purely political, particularly that of the ‘systemic’ variety:

“I believe racism is still alive because people with power want it to be. They want to divide us. My answers to many would probably be viewed as racist. That’s ridiculous and the farthest from the truth. However, I refuse to believe that black Americans are oppressed when we had a black president. White Americans are becoming a minority.”

-32-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Conservative

“Systemic racism is a made-up concept that is vaguely defined in order to be twisted for political and social agendas.”

-19-years-old, Male, Strong Republican, Conservative

“I will probably sound crazy to whomever is reading but I honestly believe that all this talk of systemic is racism and evil white police is far closer to modern Jim Crow than anything else. What better way to control people than convincing them you are the only people who can save them? Convincing them that they should live in constant fear of death from the people their taxes pay to protect them? I don't believe it's true, but I believe a lot of people believe it is true and I feel deeply sad for them that they live in constant anger and fear while shitty politicians and corporations line their pockets off of it and ensure that they will be voted for by the people they pander to and keep in mental bondage.”

-33-years-old, Female, Weak Republican, Slightly conservative

“Prior to 2020, systemic racism, critical race theory, every night riots, these things did not exist... its purely political. The term divide and conquer... that is exactly what is happening to America. Poverty doesn't only affect black or brown, it affects white people too.”

-37-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Very conservative

Part of the last of the preceding entries speaks to the perceived importance of class, rather than race, for understanding contemporary inequalities. Indeed, a number of respondents feel that the emphasis on race is actually misplaced:

"I think it's been over 150 years since the civil war ended, we need to stop blaming slavery for all the woes and inequality of the African American community. **If anything, there is a class**

struggle issue in this country not a race issue. Poor whites and poor blacks are both treated like dirt, rich whites and rich blacks both keep down the lower class. It is not a race issue, it's a class issue."

-30-years-old, Male, Lean Republican, Moderate

"Just like black or brown people can come from all over the globe, so it is with white people. I have friends that appear white, but are mixed race. **I have many friends who are [persons of color] that have much privilege. I think the focus on ONLY race is misguided**, and we would benefit greater by using a multidimensional approach to trauma and privilege."

-52-years-old, Female, Weak Republican, Conservative

Whatever one thinks of the merits of such class-based arguments, their theorized function is little different from that of other defensive strategies, such as an emphasis on personal responsibility and agency. That is, rightly or wrongly, they serve to deflect moral responsibility away from the racial ingroup. For if all racial groups suffer from poverty, no single group can be blamed for it.

Likewise, whites cannot be held to blame if black's current disadvantage is the fault of socially destructive liberal welfare policies:

"Blacks were advancing in society quickly even before the civil rights act. **The Great Society destroyed the black family to make blacks dependent on the government by design**. People need to stop blaming others and take the responsibility to improve their own lives."-37-years-old, Male, Strong Republican, Conservative

"I do blame the government for the issues of racism perceived by black Americans. **The government kept Black Americans down by encouraging them not to work, to stay loyal to social programs, the encouragement of unmarried parents, etc.** This is where the biggest problems were bred for Black Americans. I am glad some are finally seeing this and are taking their own lives to build as they wish, not on government dependence."-59-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Very conservative

8.5 Quantifying the qualitative

8.5.1 *Examining relationships between comment types and quantitative variables*

To what extent do the written sentiments documented above correspond to the quantitative measures of shame and guilt from the previous chapter? Do 'ingroup-critical' commenters score higher on measures of shame, guilt, and pro-black policy support than other

and non-commenters? Are they more likely to rate whites less warmly than non-whites? Does the opposite pattern hold for ‘defensive’ commenters? I briefly explore these questions by regressing z-scored measures of shame, guilt, pro-black policy support, and racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth on a categorical variable that codes non-commenters as ‘0’, other-commenters as ‘1’, ‘ingroup-critical’ commenters as ‘2’, and ‘defensive’ commenters as ‘3’. The results¹⁸⁶ of this analysis are presented in Figure 8.1 below wherein circular black and square grey markers represent unadjusted and baseline-covariate-adjusted means, respectively.




Figure 8.1 Unadjusted and adjusted z-scores of key outcome variables by comment category

As suspected, ‘ingroup-critical’ (‘defensive’) commenters scored significantly higher (lower) than all other categories moral shame, guilt, and pro-black policy support; and significantly lower (higher) on relative warmth towards whites vs. non-whites. Though these differences are moderated when adjusting for baseline control variables, they remain statistically significant in all cases.

¹⁸⁶ A table of predicted margins is provided in the appendix.

8.5.2 *Examining treatment effects on commenting rates*

What influence, if any, did the guilt/shame treatment article have on comment type?

Given that its purpose was heighten feelings of group-based moral responsibility, shame, and guilt, we would naturally expect it to lead to an increase in entries that express these feelings. At the same time, we might also expect to observe a *decrease* in entries that reject or denounce them. On the other hand, it could also be that the treatment article threatened or offended certain respondents, who then may have been motivated to express counter-arguments that serve to neutralize group-based moral identity threats. I explore these different possibilities in the analyses below.

Before examining whether the treatment affected the tenor of written comments, I must first establish whether it affected the decision to comment at all. Figure 8.2 below shows that, overall, there were no statistically significant differences between the two study conditions in the rate at which study participants submitted written comments. The unadjusted and covariate-adjusted rates were 1.69 ($p=0.531$) and 1.3 ($p=0.627$) percentage points higher, respectively, in the guilt/shame condition, but these differences are not distinguishable from chance. I next interact the treatment dummy by ideology and party identification to determine whether the treatment uniquely affected the commenting rates of the various political subgroups. Figure 8.3 graphs the covariate-adjusted effects of the treatment on percentage changes in the share of commenters in each subgroup. They indicate that the share of conservatives and Republicans leaving written comments was 10.6 ($p=0.069$) and 11.6 ($p=0.035$) percentage points higher in the guilt/shame condition, differences that either approach or surpass $p < 0.05$ significance. In contrast, between-condition changes among liberals ($\Delta=0.277$, $p=0.931$) and Democrats ($\Delta=-$

1.62, $p=0.605$) were negligible and insignificant. Comments fell by 9.4 ($p=0.237$) points among ideological moderates, but the actual change could very well be 0.




Figure 8.2 Percent of participants submitting written comments by study condition




Figure 8.3 Average treatment effect on percent submitting written comments by ideology and party identification

8.5.3 Examining treatment effects on comment types

The next analyses consider whether the frequency of ‘ingroup-critical’ and ‘defensive’ entries varies across the two study conditions. To this end, I fit two separate OLS models that regress each comment type on the treatment dummy and pre-treatment covariates¹⁸⁷. Figure 8.4 graphs the results in terms of the percent of all comments that express or reject group-based responsibility by study condition. Referring first to the left panel, we see that there were nearly twice as many ‘ingroup-critical’ entries in the guilt/shame (25.02%) as the neutral condition (15.13%)—a difference ($\beta=9.89$, $p=0.004$) that is clearly distinguishable from zero. Likewise, and shifting to the middle panel, the share of entries expressing group-based shame and/or guilt was almost 3-times greater in the guilt/shame (9.93%) than the neutral (3.68%) condition—an increase that is also statistically significant ($\beta=6.25$, $p=0.004$).



Figure 8.4 Comment frequencies (%) by study condition

¹⁸⁷ As in the previous chapter, I correct for between-condition imbalances by adjusting for ideology, party-ID, age, sex, education, and census region.

Turning now to the right panel, we see that the rate of ‘defensive’ comments was roughly 3.7 points lower in the guilt/shame (26.60%) than the neutral condition (23.94%), but this difference does not approach significance ($p=0.319$). Comparing within-condition rates across comment categories, commenters in the neutral condition were close to twice as likely ($p < 0.001$) to author defensive (26.60%) than ingroup-critical (15.13%) entries. This disparity entirely closes and even reverses direction in the guilt/shame condition, where the share of ingroup-critical entries (25.02%) is slightly but not significantly larger ($p=0.575$) than that of ‘defensive’ entries (22.94 %).

I next test whether the effects of the treatment on comment types are conditional on political ideology and/or party-identification. The results of these tests are shown in Figure 8.5, which plots the covariate-adjusted percentage changes in each comment type across the political subgroups.




Figure 8.5 Average treatment effect on frequency (%) of comment type by ideology and party identification

Starting with the ‘ingroup-critical’ models in the left panel, we see that the share of such entries increased by 14.1 ($p=0.008$) and 13.5 ($p=0.009$) points among liberals (22.7% \rightarrow 36.4%) and Democrats (22.9% \rightarrow 36.5%), respectively¹⁸⁸. Though increases in this response type are also observed among conservatives ($\Delta=2.10$, $p=0.338$) and Republicans ($\Delta=3.62$, $p=0.164$), they are at once not distinguishable from zero and also tend to be significantly smaller in size (liberals vs. conservatives: $p=0.037$; Democrats vs. Republicans: $p=0.091$). The same pattern is found for entries that express feelings of guilt and/or shame. Their share¹⁸⁹ increased by 9.3 ($p=0.004$) and 9.6 ($p=0.004$) points among liberals and Democrats, respectively. In contrast, and quite revealingly, not a single conservative or Republican comment expressed feelings of guilt and/or shame in either of the two conditions.

Finally, the percent¹⁹⁰ of ‘defensive’ entries fell by 8.5 ($p=0.024$) and 3.8 ($p=0.319$) points among liberals and Democrats, and by 5 ($p=0.594$) and 5.9 ($p=0.484$) points among conservatives and Republicans. Interestingly, they increased by 15.2 ($p=0.203$) points among political moderates, though the 95% confidence interval (-8.2, 38.6) of this estimate is very wide and includes zero.

8.6 Discussion

8.6.1 *The ingroup-critical*

This chapter sought to shed qualitative light on the thoughts and sentiments that informed whites’ responses to quantitative measures of collective shame, guilt, and pro-black policy

¹⁸⁸ The unadjusted margins jump from 22.7% to 36.4% among liberals, from 22.9% to 36.5% among Democrats, from 0 to 1.64% among conservatives, and from 0 to 4% among Republicans.

¹⁸⁹ For the guilt/shame entries, the margins jump from 4.3% to 13.2% among liberals and from 5.7% to 14.7% among Democrats. Those for conservatives and Republicans remained at zero.

¹⁹⁰ The unadjusted margins fall from 14.9% to 7.9% among liberals, from 14.6% to 10.9% among Democrats, from 50.9% to 45.9% among conservatives, and from 50.8% to 45.3% among Republicans. For moderates, ‘defensive’ entries jumped from 32.5% to 51.5%.

support. In particular, it probed whether ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions were at all apparent in participants' written remarks. In the end, the findings of this analysis offered additional support for both the reality of these phenomena and their influence on white racial attitudes. Despite the fact that the open-response question was voluntary and very general (i.e., it did not explicitly ask participants to discuss or explain their ingroup-related attitudes and feelings), a sizable number entries manifested ingroup-critical moral appraisals, some of which explicitly communicated feelings of shame, guilt, and/or ingroup-directed anger. A dominant theme in these entries was the view that white misdeeds, past and/or present, were responsible for the disadvantaged social positions of blacks and other 'people of color'. Further, and consistent with the literature on collective shame, a number of these entries engaged in negative *global* moral appraisals of white Americans, some of which essentialized them as uniquely racist, unsympathetic, and/or indifferent to the disadvantages of others¹⁹¹.

Importantly, 'ingroup-critical' entries also afforded valuable insight into how participants understood and related to shame and guilt, which has implications for their measurement. First, whereas some commenters appeared to treat guilt and shame interchangeably, others clearly distinguished their feelings of shame from those of guilt--conceiving the former as the embarrassment that attends affiliating with a morally tainted group, and the latter as being tied to personal involvement in or responsibility for immoral actions. However, at least one commenter clarified that his feelings of guilt concern the benefits he derives from 'institutional racism' as opposed to direct involvement in outgroup-directed wrongdoing. The discrepancy between this commenter's conception of guilt—i.e. unjustly benefiting from ingroup membership—and the

¹⁹¹ As will be discussed in the next (and final) chapter, this has implications for how researchers interpret the 'low' end of the racial resentment scale. It suggests that much like some of those at the 'high' end engage in negative essentializations of blacks, there are those at the 'low' end that engage in negative essentializations of whites.

previous may be an artifact of my measures of guilt. Specifically, given that 2 of the 3 guilt items centered on ingroup *behavior* as opposed to ingroup *advantage*, respondents may have operated on a mostly behavior-oriented understanding of guilt. Assuming advantage-oriented guilt is more prevalent or descriptive of what the average white respondent feels, then my study is likely to have underestimated levels of guilt. Future research should examine this possibility by additionally fielding indicators of guilt that are advantage or status-focused.

Second, and in addition to the above, several cases were noted in which feelings of shame and guilt ostensibly co-occurred, culminating in expressions of self-hatred and a more self-focused form of shame. These observations are consistent with Brown and Gausel's (2012) theoretical model, which links guilt to self-focused anger and appraisals of moral self-deficiency, and shame to ingroup-focused anger and appraisals of ingroup moral deficiency. This model suggests that, in the presence of both emotions, the focus of appraisals and emotions encompasses the self *as well as* the ingroup. Such raises the possibility that varying foci (e.g. self, ingroup) or presence of these emotions will have differential effects on racial attitudes and pro-outgroup behavior. Future research should attempt to get at this by categorizing white respondents in terms of the extent that both emotions present as well as in terms of their focus.

Third, the analysis also uncovered some evidence for the media's theorized role as an instigator of ingroup-critical emotions. At least one commenter referred to the embarrassment and guilt she feels from the frequent circulation of videos of white bigotry. Other commenters spoke more generally to the guilt or shame they feel 'whenever they see' white people mistreating or acting prejudiced towards persons of color. Given that exposure to such incidents is only rarely direct, this suggests that the media plays an important role in exposing whites to instances of ingroup wrongdoing and, thereby, eliciting ingroup-critical moral appraisals. Future

cross-sectional and panel research should examine whether levels of shame and guilt are uniquely linked to the frequency of race-related news consumption.

Fourth, and consistent with the theorized pro-social effects of these emotions, several commenters indicated that their feelings of guilt and/or shame inspire(d) a desire for engaging in pro-social action, including political activism. Such hints at a potentially fruitful area for future political science research. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge, the effects of ingroup-critical emotions have yet to be considered in models of white political participation and behavior.

8.6.2 The defensive

Beyond getting into the minds of the ‘ingroup critical’, this chapter also offered insight into the various cognitive strategies whites employ to defend against threats to their moral status. Indeed, an even larger number of participants penned entries that were critical of or rejected the notion that they and other whites were or should feel collectively responsible for the conditions of blacks. These comments generally corresponded to—or included at least one of—three main ‘defensive’ responses previously identified in the intergroup emotions literature.

First, commenters attempted to distance themselves and/or their racial ingroup as a whole from the slave owners or segregationists of the past and/or the racially prejudiced whites of today. They did so by either a) emphasizing the marginality and unrepresentativeness of racially prejudiced or discriminatory whites; b) asserting their ancestors’ or family’s lack of connection to or involvement in historical injustices; and c) construing historical injustices as being a part of a bygone era with little relevance or connection to the white Americans of today.

Second, commenters shifted the focus of negative moral appraisals from whites to blacks and/or shifted attention to anti-white discrimination. In the first case, commenters noted Africans’ role in the transatlantic slave trade and/or highlighted black laziness, criminality, and

pendant for violence. In the second case, commenters typically pointed to the anti-white discrimination of affirmative action policies and double standards in the legitimacy afforded to expressions of racial identity.

Third and finally, ‘defensive’ commenters disputed the causal role of historical and/or existing racial discrimination in the persistence of black disadvantage. Arguments to this effect generally took the form of either a) highlighting the resilience and socioeconomic success of other oppressed or discriminated ethnic/racial groups; b) blaming black disadvantage on destructive liberal welfare policies; c) construing black disadvantage as a ‘class’ issue that affects Americans of all racial backgrounds, and d) downplaying or denying the presence of racism, particularly ‘systemic racism’, in American society.

Notably, many of these comments resemble sentiments that many scholars would conceive of as ‘racial resentment’. However, at least in the current context, this ‘resentment’ is best characterized as a response to the perceived assignment of collective blame and punishment for black disadvantage. Future research should investigate whether this perception—i.e., that whites are being unfairly blamed or collectively punished for black disadvantage—characterizes racial resentment more broadly. As it’s possible that measures of racial resentment are mostly capturing the acceptance or rejection of group-based moral responsibility for racial inequality (which would also explain the high degree of overlap between these measures and those of shame and guilt)

8.6.3 *Quantitative analyses*

After surveying the landscape of written entries, the analysis of this chapter proceeded to examine the guilt/shame stimulus affected the prevalence of ‘ingroup-critical’ and ‘defensive’ comments, and also whether these comments were systematically related to quantitative

measures of moral shame and guilt. Both of these questions were ultimately and generally answered in the affirmative. First, the rate of ‘ingroup-critical’ comments—including the rate of those expressing group-based shame and/or guilt--was significantly higher in the guilt/shame than the neutral control condition. Further, and in the other direction, the rate of ‘defensive’ comments was found to be lower in the guilt/shame than in the neutral control condition, though this difference was not distinguishable from zero. In both cases, the effects of the treatment on comment rates were both stronger for and only reached significance among liberals and Democrats. In other words, liberals and Democrats in the guilt/shame condition authored significantly more ‘ingroup-critical’ and significantly (though only for liberals) fewer ‘defensive’ entries than their counterparts in the neutral stimulus group. Thus, the evidence suggests that the treatment worked not only to increase scores on *quantitative* measures of shame and guilt (as we saw in the previous chapter), but it also led to increases in their written. Finally, and related to the previous point, ‘ingroup-critical’ commenters scored significantly higher than others on measures of moral shame, guilt, and pro-black policy support than non-commenters and authors of other/unrelated comments. The reverse pattern was found for ‘defensive’ commenters who, as would be expected, scored significantly lower on these variables.

However, despite according with theoretical expectations, the meaningfulness and validity of these findings is questionable in that the comment coding scheme was not tested for reliability. Consequently, the coding decisions rested on the subjective assessments of the researcher, which can be biased towards the attainment of theory-supporting results. As such, the findings reported here must be treated with extreme caution. Future mixed-methods research should attempt to resolve this issue by using an independent team of comment coders to assess reliability.

8.7 Conclusion

The findings of this chapter indicate that group-based ‘moral shame’ and ‘guilt’ are not ersatz concepts imposed on scales that, in actuality, merely capture social desirability and demand effects. Rather, they would appear to be genuine moral-affective phenomena that are operative in and animate the racial policy orientations of at least some segments of white America. At the same time, and rightly or wrongly, they are also moral appraisals and emotions that many resist. In the concluding chapter that follows, I discuss the implications of this reality for the political science’s understanding of white racial attitudes.

9 CONCLUSION

9.1 Introduction

This concluding chapter reviews and discusses this dissertation's main findings along with their implications and limitations. It is structured in a way that allows skimmers and non-readers of previous chapters to learn the important theoretical and empirical takeaways in a single sitting. Specifically, and beginning with chapter 4, each section is devoted to either a single chapter or a thematic pair of chapters. These sections are then split into four subsections. The first of these subsections reviews the general research questions and objectives that motivated a given study, while the remainder summarize its main findings, discuss their theoretical importance, and spell out the limitations and outstanding questions that need to be addressed in future research.

9.2 Chapter 4

9.2.1 *Background*

The question of the media's influence on racial attitudes was of paramount importance to this dissertation's theory. For if ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions drive white racial liberalism, what drives the former? The theorized time-dependency of group-based emotions—i.e., the waxing and waning of their salience overtime—presupposes external triggers. In the context of race, the most proximate triggers are thought to be race-related events or developments, such as instances of racial bias or excessive force on the part of law enforcement, racially-motivated hate crimes, and civil rights protests. However, because few whites (or people in general) directly observe their occurrence, exposure to and thus awareness of such incidents are necessarily indirect or only made possible through media reporting. The obvious implication

here, tests of which occupied this dissertation's first empirical chapter, is that white racial attitudes respond to shifts in race-related media coverage. And not just any race-related media coverage, but 'racial equalitarian' coverage that implicitly or explicitly implicates white Americans in racial discrimination and the persistence of black disadvantage. For if white Americans are to endorse compensatory race-conscious policies (e.g. affirmative action, reparations) whose costs are largely borne by whites but whose benefits are enjoyed by others, they must feel that their ingroup is morally responsible for the inferior social positions of blacks and/or other non-white racial groups.

However, the reality of this implication—that white racial attitudes shift in response to media coverage—is contested by earlier research. Firstly, racial attitudes are thought to form early and remain generally stable throughout the lifespan. Second, owing to this general stability, it is doubtful that the media can or does meaningfully shape public racial attitudes. Even if it has the potential to do so in theory, its effect is thought to be fleeting, limited, and forced to compete not only with the effects of oppositional messaging, but also even stronger and more enduring agents of attitudinal influence (e.g. early socialization, peer groups, partisanship). Consequently, where and if meaningful shifts in racial attitudes are observed, they are likely the result of newer and more liberal generations of Americans replacing those older and more conservative—not the result of any media stimulus.

All told, for this dissertation's ingroup-critical moral emotions account of white racial liberalism to have any promise, it first had to show that earlier scholarly assumptions were wrong or at least overstated. More specifically, it had to show that (a) white racial attitudes meaningfully and systematically vary across time (b) in response to media input.

9.2.2 Main findings

To this end, chapter 4 began by examining various time series of white racial attitudes, including perceptions of discrimination and white advantage, attributions of black disadvantage, and support for race-conscious policies. All of these series showed considerable overtime movement in the ‘racially liberal’ direction—particularly among white liberals and Democrats, and particularly in the past decade. Next, these and dozens of other time series were combined to form what is perhaps the longest and most comprehensive Stimsonian indexes of public racial liberalism to date. Notably, in addition to separate indexes for white and non-white respondents, indexes were also created for ideological and partisan subgroups. Interestingly, those of white Democrats and liberals accounted for much more of the variance across constituent items than was the case for the indexes of all other political subgroups. Nonetheless, all showed periodic but substantial shifts in racial liberalism, with the largest and most recent increase being the ‘Great Awakening’—a trend that began in 2014, a year marked by a series of high-profile police shootings of black men and racial unrest in the city of Ferguson. Consistent with the ‘parallel publics’ assumption, all of these series also tended to move in parallel—though there was also some subtle and meaningful divergence. Specifically, whereas racial liberalism among white Republicans, white conservatives, and non-white Democrats steadily declined from the late 1990s to roughly 2013, it held stable across this period among white Democrats and liberals. Overtime variance in racial liberalism was also greatest among white Democrats and liberals, while the year-to-year changes for these groups (vs. those for white Republicans and conservatives) were more closely associated with those in aggregate white racial liberalism. This suggests that, despite comprising a minority of whites, Democrats and liberals disproportionately contribute to variation in aggregate white racial liberalism, which accords with the theory that

their racial attitudes are more sensitive to shifts in the information environment than those of Republicans and conservatives.

While the patterns in the Stimsonian racial liberalism series indicated that racial attitudes do indeed vary significantly across time—and those of certain subgroups more than others—we were still left with the question of what drives this variation. Though a number of other theoretically relevant causal factors were also considered, subsequent analyses tested the prediction that variation in racial liberalism followed variation in ‘racial equalitarian’ media (REM) coverage, which was operationalized as the frequency of articles speaking to black-white status differences in terms of past and/or present discrimination. First, tests of granger causality indicated that REM granger-caused white racial liberalism, while no support was found for the inverse relationship. Results for the white Democrat and liberal series were substantively similar but more compelling in that REM significantly predicted subsequent levels of racial liberalism for these groups regardless of lag length. In contrast, there was no unambiguous evidence that REM meaningfully predicted subsequent levels of racial liberalism among white Republicans and conservatives at any lag length.

The above findings generally held up in subsequent dynamic structural models, which controlled for lagged racial liberalism, the annual frequency of all race-related articles, generational replacement, non-racial policy liberalism, rates of degree attainment, civil rights spending, and consumer sentiment. Net of these covariates, the effects of REM on white racial liberalism remained statistically significant and fairly large (between 0.5-0.7 of a standard deviation). In fact, controlling for the annual volume of race-related news articles actually enhanced the effects of REM, which is evidence that racial liberalism is not merely responding to the salience of race in media coverage in general, but rather to the salience of coverage that

implicitly or explicitly implicates white Americans in racial discrimination and the persistence of black disadvantage. At least in initial models, the effects of REM on racial liberalism were also significantly stronger for white liberals and Democrats than conservatives and Republicans. But curiously, after adjusting for the annual size of generational cohorts, REM's effects on white Republican and conservative racial liberalism—which did not clearly emerge as granger-causal in earlier tests—turned significant and either rivaled or surpassed the size of the effects observed for white Democrats and liberals. However, further analysis suggested that this was either a statistical artifact and/or that the racial attitudes of white Republicans and conservatives only became responsive to shifts in REM during the past decade (or, more precisely, during the Great Awakening period). Specifically, whereas the effects of REM on the racial liberalism of white Democrats and liberals were generally significant and stable across various time periods, those for white Republicans and conservatives were negligible and statistically insignificant in all periods prior to the Great Awakening.

9.2.3 Implications

The findings of chapter 4 suggest that both the assumed stability of racial attitudes and the minimal influence of the media thereon are, at the very least, overstated. While racial attitudes are not constantly shifting across time, they nonetheless show substantial periodic movement; and this movement generally follows trends in racial equalitarian media coverage. Put differently, the findings suggest that racial attitudes may be stable not because they are necessarily intrinsically so, but due to a relative void of stability-upsetting stimuli in the information environment over a given period of time. Thus, much as news media input shapes and updates public perceptions and attitudes on other political issues, so too does it in the case of race. And, considering that perceptions of both the extent and prevalence of discrimination

against blacks and other non-white racial/ethnic groups—important predictors of racial policy preferences-- can rarely be informed by first-hand observation (especially for whites), this is not all that surprising.

As far as I am aware, on top of being one of the only existing studies to systematically examine the relationship between racial attitudes and media trends, this study constitutes the first substantive replication of Kellstedt (2000; 2003). However, it goes even further by also speaking to trends in the racial attitudes of different political subgroups. Whereas Kellstedt justified his use of a single aggregate index on the basis of the ‘parallel publics’ assumption, the current findings indicate that this assumption, though valid overall, may hold less for white Democrats and liberals than for others. Indeed, the racial liberalism series for these groups showed both the greatest overtime variation and also the greatest divergence from aggregate opinion trends. Their common racial liberalism factors also accounted for the highest shares of constituent item variance. While underscoring the nuance that is lost (or the intra-group polarization obscured) through aggregation, the reasons for this pattern of findings are unclear. One possible and very plausible interpretation, which should be explored in future research, is that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals are more coherent or less internally conflicting than those of other groups¹⁹². This could be because the former are generally of higher cognitive and political sophistication and/or their racial attitudes are less likely to be shaped by multiple or competing value considerations¹⁹³ (Gomez & Wilson, 2006; Kellstedt et al. 2017). That the racial liberalism

¹⁹² Naturally, the more that constituent items covary or move together, the greater the variance explained by the common racial liberalism factor. Conversely, the more responses across items are in disharmony, the lower the common variance explained.

¹⁹³ For instance, consider a liberal and conservative who both perceive there to be a lot of discrimination against blacks. To the extent that the liberal is more likely to subscribe to the ‘need’ principle of distributive justice and prioritize care-related moral considerations above all else, he/she will be less morally inhibited to support policies like affirmative action. In contrast, while acknowledging discrimination against blacks, the conservative—who tends to subscribe to the proportionality principle of justice—is likely to be much more reluctant to support affirmative action on account of his/her merit-based conception of fairness. If so, we would expect that perceptions of anti-black

factor of non-whites (including those of non-white Democrats and liberals) also accounted for a comparatively low proportion of variance points to the former account. Future research can test this by creating and examining racial liberalism indexes for different levels of political sophistication and education.

This research also improved upon Kellstedt (2000; 2003) by examining whether the racial attitudes of different subgroups are similarly responsive to shifts in the media environment. While the findings on this question were less conclusive than desired, the balance of the evidence suggested that increases in racial liberalism generally follow increases in REM among white Democrats and liberals but less so among white Republicans and conservatives. This finding, if true, may help to explain why racial attitude polarization among whites appears to be asymmetric or disproportionately driven by those on the political left (Narayani et al., 2020). For if the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals are more coherent and sensitive to information¹⁹⁴ related to racial inequality and injustice than their political opponents, they will naturally move more quickly in the liberal direction than those of Republicans/conservatives can move in *any* direction. At the same time, as the party traditionally seen as representing the interests of America's racial/ethnic minority groups, it's likely that Democratic party elites engage in more race-related messaging than their Republican counterparts. Hence, even if not personally interested in the issue of race, white Democrats will naturally have more exposure to race-related messaging. Future research on the dynamics of racial attitudes should attempt to measure and model the frequency at which politicians from both parties engage in race-related messaging. Not only will it help to determine the contribution of this messaging to variation in REM, but it may

discrimination will be more predictive of racial policy preferences among liberals than conservatives. This proposition is actually very testable and should be probed in future research.

¹⁹⁴ Both the motivation to consume such information and the ability to coherently integrate it into existing knowledge and belief structures (i.e. cognitive sophistication) are likely to be important factors here.

also help to account for why the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals appear to be more responsive to shifts in REM.

9.2.4 Limitations

While making valuable contributions to the literature, the findings of the above study come with a number of limitations that complicate their interpretation. First, my measure of REM messaging was crude and facilely constructed. Ideally, each news article matching my search parameters should have been manually inspected so as to confirm that they genuinely fit my operationalization of REM. Unfortunately, with tens of thousands of articles to comb through, and no research assistants to help, the completion of this task would not have been feasible within a reasonable time frame. The upshot is that the validity of these measures rests on the accuracy of the ProQuest search engine—or, more precisely, the assumption that it is ‘accurate enough’ in independently identifying articles whose substance is more or less faithful to my empirical intentions. On one hand, the error introduced by the inclusion of non-REM articles could result in underestimates of the REM scale’s true effects on racial liberalism. However, assuming this is indeed the case, it would not impeach any of the relevant findings—if anything, it would suggest that the effects of REM are likely to be even larger than what was observed. On the other hand, if the non-REM articles included are systematically related to trends in racial liberalism, the construct validity of the REM scale would be compromised. Under this scenario, its effects on racial liberalism could no longer be reliably attributed to ‘racial equalitarian’ messaging. Instead, they would reflect an ill-defined mixture of REM and non-REM messaging, which would not only beg the question of whether the theoretical distinction matters in practice, but also of the importance of REM messaging as a driver of racial liberalism. While controlling for the volume of all race-related articles somewhat addresses this issue, it

does not necessarily preclude the possibility of the REM scale being contaminated by non-REM content. Absolute closure on this question can only be obtained through a manual inspection of all constituent articles—a project that will have to be left for future research. All of this being said, there's no reason to suspect that the articles returned by the ProQuest search engine defied the inputted search parameters to any consequential degree. The scale correlated reasonably well with Kellstedt's own Newsweek-based measure of racial egalitarian media cues. That it also performed as expected in the wake of the Floyd incident—findings that are reviewed below-- gives some assurance that it is capturing what it is intended to capture.

A more basic limitation is the inability to control for all possible confounding variables. The risk of confounding variables is arguably enhanced with the use of annual data. Tests of granger causality can indicate whether variation in REM in a given year predicts levels of racial liberalism in the next, but a lot variables apart from REM are operative in the span of a year that may influence subsequent racial liberalism; and these unknown factors may not have been accounted for in my models. What is more, even the factors already identified could have been off the mark. For instance, perhaps the confounding variables that were adjusted for were not reliably measured; in which case, their ability to account for the REM-racial liberalism relationship would be diminished and, consequently, the predictive effects of REM would remain misleadingly significant. Alternatively, or in addition, perhaps the effects of REM coverage result from its relationship with another race-related media messaging variable that is more central to or predictive of variation in racial liberalism. While I have no suggestions as to what this variable could be, the point is that the findings here do not exclude its existence. Thus, in addition to investigating other possible confounds and improving measures of those already

identified, future researchers are encouraged to test and compare the impact of alternative race-related media messaging variables.

Future research is also needed to assess whether or to what extent trends in racial liberalism correspond with trends in immigration liberalism. While this study's operationalization of racial liberalism was limited to attitudes related to African Americans, a case can be made that immigration attitudes are or have become, in essence, racial attitudes. As such, it is important to know whether the trends observed in this chapter are unique to attitudes implicating African Americans or whether they additionally encompass attitudes towards immigration and policies that implicate other racial/ethnic groups.

Finally, while some attempt was made to get at this question, this study could not adequately speak to whether non-white racial attitudes similarly respond to trends in REM. At least part of the issue at hand likely owes itself to the shifting racial/ethnic composition of the 'non-white' category over the past 50 years. A consequence of this is that if this shift is not reliable controlled for, and if the racial attitudes of non-black minority groups are more conservative than their black counterparts, its influence is likely to confound or obscure any relationship between REM and racial liberalism. To address this limitation, future researchers interested in the dynamics of non-white racial attitudes are advised to create separate Stimsonian indexes for respondents of different racial/ethnic backgrounds.

9.3 Chapter 5

9.3.1 Background

The findings of chapter 4 left several questions unresolved. First, if variation in REM drives racial liberalism, what drives variation in REM? The annual time unit of the REM scale affords little insight into the kinds of real-world events or developments that it responds to.

Kellstedt (2000) similarly raises this question—which he ultimately leaves to future research—with respect to his measure of racial egalitarian media frames. Second, do different dimensions of racial attitudes genuinely vary together? Or do the effects of REM drive variation in some attitudinal dimensions (e.g. perceptions of discrimination) but not at all or less so in others (e.g. support for pro-black policies)? Although the data presented in chapter 4 gave no reason to suspect differential variation across attitudinal dimensions—e.g. the factor loadings of the racial liberalism index’s constituent items did not differ by category—the composite racial liberalism index cannot provide sufficient closure to these questions. Finally, are the racial attitudes of white liberals and Democrats genuinely more responsive to REM input than their conservative and Republican counterparts? While some of the results of the analyses of chapter 4 pointed in this direction, the overall evidence was by no means dispositive or unambiguous.

9.3.2 Main findings

The above questions motivated the quasi-experimental study of Chapter 5, which examined the effects of the killing of George Floyd on both REM coverage and various white racial attitudes. Regarding the first question, this study found that the frequency of REM articles spiked in the days immediately proceeding the Floyd incident and averaged a rate over subsequent weeks that was roughly 6-times greater than that of the pre-Floyd period. Accordingly, it can be confidently concluded that high-profile racialized police shootings and/or subsequent protests for racial justice are among the real-world events that contribute to variation in REM. With respect to the second question, the Floyd incident spurred small but significant increases in a reverse-coded 3-item measure of white racial resentment, in the percent of whites supporting cash reparations for blacks, and in the percent of whites holding unfavorable views of whites. Further, these increases were significantly larger and only persisted among white

Democrats and liberals. In contrast, effects on the attitudes of white Republicans and conservatives were more modest and tended to fade or move back in the racially conservative direction over subsequent weeks. For instance, whereas views of whites and blacks among white Democrats and liberals were consistently unfavorable and favorable, respectively, across the post-Floyd period, this pattern ultimately reversed among white Republicans and conservatives such that these groups became more unfavorable to blacks and more favorable to whites as time elapsed.

Importantly, with a very small number of exceptions, significant post-Floyd increases in liberal responses were not observed in non-racial policy items, such as those relating to abortion rights, gun control, and healthcare. This is strong evidence that the ‘Floyd effect’ was specific to racial attitudes, which further supports the conclusion that this effect was causal and not a coincidental byproduct of a general pre-existing shift in policy liberalism.

Supplementing the findings of Chapter 4, subsequent models found that, net of controls, REM was significantly predictive of white racial resentment and support for reparations. However, and consistent with expectations, further analysis established that this was *only* true for white liberals and Democrats. Tying these findings together, the results of causal mediation models suggested that the liberalizing effects of the Floyd incident on white responses the two ‘racial resentment’ items and support for reparations were partly to mostly channeled through increases in REM. Once again, though, these indirect effects via REM reached significance for white liberals and Democrats, but were insignificant and paltry among conservatives and Republicans.

9.3.3 Implications

While generally supplementing and bolstering the findings of chapter 4, the current study made several important contributions of its own. First, it identified racialized incidents of excessive police force as a source of variation in the frequency of ‘racial equalitarian’ news media. Second, it is one of the first studies to show that such incidents—and/or the media coverage thereof—have the potential to cause rapid and meaningful shifts in racial attitudes. Indeed, while their magnitude shouldn’t be overstated, shifts were observed even in attitudes generally considered to be highly stable, such as ‘racial resentment’ and support for cash reparations. Once again, this suggests that racial attitudes are less ‘fixed’ than previously assumed; and that stability (or instability) therein is at least partly a function of the prevailing information environment. It further suggests that the influence of the media with respect to race is not limited to agenda-setting¹⁹⁵; that it can also move core attitudes on the causal importance of discrimination for black disadvantage and the fairness of affording special race-based assistance.

At the same time, these findings afford insight into how different subgroups respond to shifts in the information environment and, in doing so, offer some evidence consistent with Zaller’s (1992) “two-message” model. Specifically, that the racial attitudes of white Republicans and conservatives initially trended in the liberal direction before reversing and becoming more conservative may speak to the influence of competing media messaging and/or selective exposure. For instance, in the days and weeks immediately preceding the Floyd incident, white Republicans and conservatives are likely to have been predominantly exposed to sympathetic or racially liberal media messaging. But as Floyd-related protests became marked by violence and looting, the availability of more conservative messaging increased. Consequently, while white

¹⁹⁵ Evidence consistent with a pure ‘agenda setting’ effect would be if movement was *only* observed in perceptions of the extent of discrimination against blacks.

liberals and Democrats continued to consume racially liberal messaging, Republican and conservative counterparts were now largely consuming alternative and more critical narratives. From a theoretical standpoint, the consumption of racially conservative messaging would serve to shift the focus of negative group-based moral appraisals from whites to blacks, thereby buffering or suppressing feelings of collective shame and/or guilt. But the broader implication here is that periods of racial attitude stability may result not only from extended lulls in REM coverage, but also from countervailing media messaging. Whereas the former is more likely to characterize periods of stability for white liberals and Democrats, both factors are likely to be relevant to stability among conservatives and Republicans. Towards testing this account, future research on the dynamics of white racial attitudes should attempt to quantify the relative availability of racial equalitarian vs. racially conservative media messaging overtime.

Finally, this study was the first to not only document increases in anti-white sentiment among whites, but also to link them to a high-profile racial incident. This finding¹⁹⁶ is important in that it suggests that, in addition to greater sympathy towards blacks, increases in white racial liberalism also coincide with negative feelings towards whites. More generally, it speaks to this dissertation's argument that racial incidents are often—especially with the help of media framing--interpreted in group-based terms, which thus explains how the actions of a single white person (i.e., Derek Chauvin, the police officer responsible for the death of George Floyd) can rebound upon appraisals of white people as a whole.

¹⁹⁶ Kellstedt's (2000; 2003) theory is much too general to predict such a finding. Yes, racial equalitarian media primes egalitarian value considerations. But these considerations are hardly group-neutral, as they implicate the fairness of racial group outcome differences. Accordingly, moral appraisals concern not only a group's relative disadvantage, but also its relation to another group's advantage. Kellstedt thus overlooks the fact that increases in pro-black policy support coincide, to some degree, with negative moral appraisals of whites.

9.3.4 *Limitations*

The findings of this chapter come with two main limitations. First, it was not possible to differentiate the effects of the Floyd incident itself from those of the protests that ensued in its aftermath. Would the death of George Floyd still have sufficed to move attitudes absent the subsequent eruption of protests? Or were these protests, in fact, necessary for generating and sustaining the incident's media salience and thus public awareness thereof? Obviously, these are counterfactuals that can't be tested. But the point is that, while this study was able to demonstrate a causal effect, how much of it can be attributed to the Floyd incident in and of itself vs. the post-Floyd protests is not clear. A second limitation is intrinsic to the study's research questions. Specifically, this study said nothing about the effects of the Floyd incident (and/or subsequent protests) on the racial attitudes of non-white racial/ethnic minority groups. This is not because this question is unimportant, but because white racial attitudes and their explanation are the focus of this dissertation. That said, and as I reiterate and elaborate on later below, there is nothing in this dissertation's theory that precludes similar post-Floyd shifts in the racial attitudes of non-whites. I leave it up to future research, though, to tackle this question.

9.4 Chapter 6

9.4.1 *Background*

Though far short of validating it altogether, the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 affirmed the plausibility of this dissertation's group-based emotions theory of white racial attitude change. First, they established that white racial attitudes do, in fact, vary considerably if periodically over time. Second, when taken together, they offer compelling evidence that the media—particularly that which attributes racial inequities to past and/or present white misdeeds—is an important source of this variation. Third, they show that the attitudinal effects of the media are not to

limited to the perceived problem of racial discrimination, which would have suggested its role is largely that of agenda setting. Instead, and as was most clearly established in Chapter 5, the media also affects even putatively durable attitudes, such as racial resentment.

9.4.2 Main findings

The first series of analyses showed both moral shame and guilt to be strong predictors of support for hierarchy-attenuating pro-black policies, which included race-based affirmative action in employment, race-based government assistance, and monetary reparations for African American descendants of slavery and victims of historical discrimination. Though each emotion accounted for unique variation in these policy outcomes, their effects were generally shared, reflecting the high degree of overlapping variance between them. Further, their unshared effects were additive such that the two variables did not significantly interact but, when combined, their influence was larger than either of them alone. Indeed, the combined the effects of moral shame and guilt on pro-black policy support were larger than every other predictor that was considered, including partisanship, racial resentment and both social dominance dimensions.

Subsequent models tested whether these effects extended to racialized policies—namely, those related to immigration--that do not directly implicate black Americans. The expectation was that moral shame, more than guilt, would be most predictive of these policies. And this is because guilt is thought to motivate the repair of specific ingroup-perpetrated wrongs, whereas moral shame focusses on an ingroup's immoral character as a whole and is thought to motivate the adoption of broader pro-social attitudes and behaviors that serve to morally distance a group member therefrom. This expectation was generally borne out in the data. Moral shame, but not guilt, emerged as a significant and strong predictor of support for increasing immigration levels, particularly of 'increased a lot' responses. Once again, though, and despite possessing a higher

share of unique outcome-predictive variance, the pro-immigration effects of moral shame overlapped considerably with those of guilt. Their combined effects were again larger—if only nominally so—than every other predictor, including racial resentment and the two social dominance dimensions. Moral shame was also uniquely predictive of support for decriminalizing illegal crossings along the southern border. In contrast, all of the variance in guilt that related to this outcome were entirely shared with moral shame.

Several analyses also explored the effects of the two emotions on pro-outgroup/anti-ingroup tendencies. First, with the exception of the anti-dominance dimension of the SDO scale, moral shame emerged as the strongest predictor of rating racial/ethnic minority groups relatively more warmly than other whites. But more than just predicting relatively greater warmth towards non-whites, it was also the strongest predictor of scoring whites in the ‘cool’ or negative region of the feeling thermometer scale. In both cases, virtually all of guilt’s outcome-predictive variance was shared with moral shame, whereas a larger portion of that of the latter’s was unique. Second, moral shame significantly predicted admitting fewer European than non-European immigrants, whereas the effects of guilt on this outcome were almost entirely overlapping. Their combined effects were robust to all controls apart from racial resentment, though it was later discovered that this was due to multicollinearity as opposed to the relationship with moral shame being confounded by racial resentment. Third, an exploratory analysis found moral shame and guilt to be important independent predictors of feeling ‘happy’ (vs. sad and neither sad nor happy) about whites becoming a racial minority. Once again, though, virtually all of guilt’s outcome-predictive variance overlapped with that of shame’s. Finally, though the extent that each was uniquely predictive did not square with earlier expectations, moral shame and guilt were found to have the strongest positive influence on monetary donations

to a racial justice and pro-immigration advocacy group. However, a subsequent bi-factor prediction model suggested that the effects of both emotions were almost entirely the result of a common general factor.

Although a sizeable share of the effects of moral shame and guilt on the outcomes studied were independent of racial resentment, all three variables shared a high degree of outcome-predictive variance¹⁹⁷. As this has important implications for how the racial resentment scale is interpreted, an attempt was made to statistically distinguish the variance of the three variables. Results from tests of both general factor and bifactor models indicated that a clear majority of the variance in racial resentment can be attributed to a common factor that it shares with moral shame and guilt. In fact, the degree of shared variance is high enough that a case could be made that the three variables essentially spring from the same construct. However, because a non-trivial (but still minority) share of the variance across its indicators was unique from the common factor, it was concluded—albeit somewhat hesitantly—that racial resentment was strongly associated with but nonetheless distinct from moral shame and guilt. Importantly, this conclusion is actually consistent with this dissertation’s theory, which holds that racial resentment is mostly a measure of attributions of black disadvantage and is thus an antecedent of moral shame and guilt. This proposition was subsequently put to the test in factor analyses of the racial resentment items and three measures designed to capture discrimination-oriented attributions of black disadvantage. Results from an initial exploratory factor analysis showed that two of the racial resentment items loaded either more or as strongly onto the ‘attributions’ factor. A general factor model was ultimately fitted, the results of which suggested that all but a miniscule fraction of the variance in the racial resentment and attribution factors was attributable to a common dimension.

¹⁹⁷ As a secondary analysis would later show, this high-degree of shared variance explained why one or more of these variables were at times reduced to insignificance when conventionally modeled together.

Thus, in effect, they more or less measured the same construct. And, as was shown in later analyses, this shared factor accounted for nearly all of the large liberal vs. conservative difference in levels of moral shame and guilt.

9.4.3 Implications

The findings of chapter 6, some of which were replicated on nationally representative samples of white Americans, constitute strong evidence that ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions factor importantly into the racial (and immigration) policy attitudes of white Americans. While certainly not the only variables of influence, it is fair to say that these policy attitudes would be appreciably more conservative in a world in which collective guilt and shame were non-existent. A strong case can even be made that the inclusion of one or both measures of these emotions should be standard in political science models of white racial policy preferences and ingroup vs. outgroup favoritism. In fact, their adoption is arguably preferable to that of the standard racial resentment battery. Not only are their predictive effects comparable to if not larger than those of racial resentment (as well as generally larger than those of either social dominance dimension), but they are also far less susceptible to charges (e.g. Carmines, Sniderman, & Easter, 2011) that they measure what they intend to explain (i.e., racial policy attitudes) or that they conflate conservative principles with racial prejudice (e.g. Sniderman et al. 1991). While additional research comparing the effects of moral shame/guilt and racial resentment is needed, political scientists should seriously consider measures of the former as either a substitute for or a complement to the latter.

A more general implication, though, is that models of white racial policy attitudes that do not consider ingroup-critical emotions are neglecting an important source of variation. But more than that, they risk the development and/or adoption of theories of white racial policy

preferences that are exclusively centered on negative outgroup-directed prejudices and stereotypes. Indeed, the findings of this chapter underscore a central theoretical theme; namely, that how whites feel about their ingroup is just as formative for their racial policy preferences as their feelings towards non-white outgroups. They thus help to explain why whites at the ‘low’ end of the racial resentment scale show a tendency of being biased in favor of non-whites vs. whites (e.g. Wright et al., 2021; Agadjanian et al. 2021). Specifically, given its intimate association with racial resentment, and given that it emerged as the strongest predictor of being warmer towards racial minorities and cooler towards whites, these relationships with favoritism towards racial minorities are likely at least partly reflecting the hidden influence of moral shame¹⁹⁸.

The findings also have implications for understanding white pro-immigration orientations. That moral shame and/or guilt were strongly predictive of support for higher immigration levels, decriminalizing illegal border entries, favoritism towards non-European immigrants, and of feeling ‘happy’ about the decline of America’s white majority suggest that much as concerns for ingroup social position can animate support for immigration restrictionism, so too might concerns for an ingroup’s moral status be operative in support for immigration liberalism. For instance, for whites ashamed of their group membership, supporting higher levels of non-European immigration into the US may serve to both morally distinguish themselves from ‘racist whites’ while also promising to reduce white influence (and thus racial inequality) via demographic replacement. Future research should thus examine the relative importance or prevalence of the latter as a motive for supporting liberal immigration policies. To be clear,

¹⁹⁸ Consistent with this, when moral shame was added to a model predicting ingroup vs. outgroup warmth, the effects of racial resentment were reduced to insignificance.

though, pro-immigration attitudes are subject to myriad motivations, many of which are *not* group-based. But the point is that researchers should not automatically assume that pro-immigration sentiment is guided by group-neutral or race-blind¹⁹⁹ humanitarianism. For the findings here suggest that ingroup-critical moral appraisals inform the immigration attitudes of at least some pro-immigration whites.

The findings of this chapter should also help to guide future political science studies of the influence of ingroup-critical emotions on racial policy preferences. With very few exceptions, nearly all existing studies consider only the influence of white guilt. And while white guilt is certainly predictive of compensatory pro-black policies, moral shame was found to be a strong if often overlapping competitor. That it both explains unique variation in pro-black policy preferences and is also a better predictor of immigration preferences and ingroup vs. outgroup warmth cautions against studies that exclusively consider the effects of guilt. Such studies are likely to not only produce biased estimates of the effects of guilt, but they are also likely to undersell the true impact that ingroup-critical emotions have on racial policy preferences. At the same time, studies that include measures of collective moral shame are advised to partial out variation reflective of group-image-related concerns, which are negatively predictive of pro-social attitudes and behaviors. Indeed, this study showed that the effects of moral shame become even stronger when adjusting for image-related shame.

Finally, that racial resentment proved to be statistically indistinguishable from discrimination-based attributions of black disadvantage arguably has implications for its validity as a measure of anti-black prejudice. Although those that are genuinely prejudiced against blacks are more likely to reject or contest discrimination-based attributions in favor of endogenous

¹⁹⁹ Newman and Malhotra (2019) make a similar point with respect to the public's general preference for high-skilled vs. low-skilled immigration, which they contend is not race-neutral.

accounts, anti-black prejudice is not obviously a pre-requisite for doing so. Indeed, the causal ambiguity surrounding black disadvantage—the often invisible or subtle nature of discrimination²⁰⁰, the nebulosity of ‘systemic racism’, the difficulty in accurately quantifying the contribution of past and present discrimination to disparate outcomes without knowing what those outcomes would have been in the absence of discrimination etc.—inevitably invites disagreement among whites and others as to the reasons for its persistence. And, as Gomez and Wilson (2006) show, this disagreement over attributions is also partly shaped by differing levels of cognitive and political sophistication, with lower sophisticated individuals more inclined towards individualist accounts of inequality. Accordingly, and to reformulate a similar criticism advanced in Sniderman et al. (1991), to treat racial resentment as a valid measure of anti-black animus is to implicitly delegitimize all ‘non-woke’ attributions of black-white inequalities. I thus join with other researchers (e.g. Kam & Burge, 2017) in calling on those that use it to measure anti-black prejudice to reconsider their interpretation or labeling of the scale. Ultimately, though their overlap is acknowledged, researchers are encouraged to develop alternative measures that do not so readily conflate racial equalitarian orientations (or lack thereof) with racial animus.

9.4.4 Limitations

While questions of causality are at least partly addressed via the experimental study in chapter 7, a major limitation in these findings is that, with the exception of generalized empathy in the replication analysis, they do not control for outgroup-focused and/or group-neutral

²⁰⁰ One of the important effects of highly publicized racial incidents, such as the death of George Floyd, is thus to concretize racial bias and, thereby, increase the perceived plausibility of discrimination being the primary cause of black disadvantage. This explains why white racial resentment is found to decline after such incidents, which wouldn’t be the case if responses to the scale were fundamentally grounded in prejudice or its absence.

emotions. For instance, though its likely to be highly correlated with collective shame and guilt, this study did not measure or control for racial sympathy, which has also been identified as a predictor of racial liberalism (Chudy, 2021). Future research should thus compare the relative influence of different emotions with different foci (i.e., ingroup-focused, outgroup-focused) so as to better assess their importance for explaining whites' racial policy preferences. It should also attempt to get at whether positive ingroup-focused emotions, such as pride, are antipodes of moral shame and guilt or whether they are related but distinct constructs.

Additional research is also needed to confirm the statistical distinguishability of moral shame and guilt. Whereas an initial exploratory factor analysis showed their respective constituent indicators differentially loading onto separate factors, the results of subsequent general and bifactor models were far from conclusive. Specifically, they indicated that all but a tiny share of the variance in both moral shame and guilt was attributable to a common factor. This raises the possibility that the two variables may be distinct in theory but synonymous in practice. On the other hand, after residualizing them of their common variance, both moral shame and guilt still explained unique variation in pro-black policy support and ingroup vs. outgroup warmth, while only the former was predictive of immigration attitudes. This suggests that the measures overlap but that they nonetheless retain unique predictive effects. Whatever the case, the bottom line is that the question of statistical distinguishability could not be unambiguously answered. Given its theoretical and methodological importance, it is the hope that future research will provide better closure.

9.5 Chapters 7 and 8

9.5.1 *Background*

The purpose of chapters 7 and 8 was to shore up this dissertation's causal argument. Specifically, though the findings of chapter 6 suggest that ingroup-critical emotions are heavily implicated in white racial attitudes, they provide no evidence that this relationship is causal and not the result of omitted variables. Additionally, though the findings of chapters 4 and 5 indicate that REM coverage is an important driver of white racial liberalism, they do not show that ingroup-critical emotions actually mediate this relationship.

9.5.2 *Main findings*

To address these shortcomings, chapter 7 conducted a survey experiment that randomly assigned white participants to read either an REM-oriented or neutral stimulus article. In the end, those assigned to read the REM-oriented article reported significantly higher levels of moral shame and guilt than those who received the neutral stimulus. Further, they also were significantly more supportive of various pro-black policies, admitted slightly but significantly fewer immigrants from Europe vs. non-European countries, and tended to rate non-white racial/ethnic minority groups significantly more warmly than fellow whites. Increases in general support for higher immigration levels were also observed, but they only reached significance for non-liberals, presumably because support among liberals was already very high. Intriguingly, a later exploratory analysis found that the treatment led to a small increase in the share of participants that reported feeling 'happy' about the decline of America's white majority. However, this effect just fell short of conventional levels of significance.

Overall, the treatment effects observed in this experimental study tended to be modest, but their magnitude was on par with that of the attitudinal shifts observed in the natural context

of the Floyd incident. Considering that the wording of several of the racial policy measures explicitly raised considerations of unfairness against whites, it's possible that effects would have been even larger in the absence of competing policy primes. Future research can test this by randomly assigning participants policy measures that either mention or do not mention the potential for discrimination against whites. Finally, and quite surprisingly, no clear evidence was found that the treatment effects systematically varied by political ideology or party identification. What is more, a secondary analysis found no significant treatment effects on differences in warmth towards Democrats vs. Republicans. While participants in the guilt/shame condition rated Democrats slightly more warmly than Republicans than those in the neutral condition, this (insignificant) effect was not conditioned by party self-identification. That is, even Republican participants became marginally warmer towards Democrats and cooler towards Republicans. This counterintuitive finding may suggest that ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions transcend the partisan divide.

While the significant treatment effects on racial policy attitudes are noteworthy in their own right, a critical test for this dissertation's theory centers on whether they are mediated by increases in moral shame and guilt. In the end, all of those tested showed evidence of at least partial mediation. Specifically, moral shame and (if lesser so) guilt were found to mediate most of the treatment's positive effects on pro-black policy support and just under half of its negative effects on European immigration admissions and warmth towards whites vs. non-whites. Though exploratory, a final mediation analysis showed that just over half of the treatment's total effect on responses to the 'white decline' item was conveyed through moral shame.

Using the open-response entries voluntarily submitted by a considerable subset of experimental subjects, supplemental qualitative and mixed-methods analyses followed in chapter

8. The first of these analyses identified and surveyed two main comment themes of theoretical interest. One thematic category was classified as ‘ingroup-critical’ and consisted of entries that either engaged in negative essentializations of white Americans, faulted white people responsible for the disadvantages of blacks and other racial/ethnic minority groups, and/or expressed feelings of shame, guilt, and/or anger over their racial group memberships. A second thematic category was classified as ‘defensive’ in nature. Entries of this sort generally repudiated negative appraisals of whites, denied personal and/or collective responsibility for black disadvantage, and/or downplayed or questioned the importance of discrimination for explaining its persistence. Both comment categories were ultimately regressed on the treatment variable from chapter 7. The results of these models showed that commenters in the guilt/shame stimulus condition were significantly more likely than those in the neutral condition to author ‘ingroup-critical’ entries—with this increase being significantly larger among white liberal and Democratic commenters than among their conservative and Republican counterparts. In the other direction, the rate of ‘defensive’ entries was lower in the guilt/shame stimulus condition than in the neutral condition, though this decrease was only significant for white liberal commenters. As would be expected, a final series of models found that authors of ‘ingroup-critical’ and ‘defensive’ entries scored significantly higher and lower, respectively, on quantitative measures of moral shame, guilt, and pro-black policy support than other and non-commenters.

9.5.3 Implications

The findings of chapters 7 and 8 constitute clear evidence of the media’s potential for effecting increases in racially liberal responses via the activation of ingroup-critical emotions. As with those of earlier chapters, they suggest that racial attitudes are far less static than some earlier literature has suggested. Indeed, a single brief news editorial sufficed to move policy

attitudes that might otherwise be expected to be most the ‘fixed’, such as those towards affirmative action and cash reparations. Instead, the findings are again consistent with an account whereby white racial attitudes are pliable but liberal shifts therein are conditional on the availability or salience of REM stimuli. This would entail that when the availability of REM input is low, racial attitudes remain generally stable and only move gradually as a function of natural societal-level changes (e.g. generational replacement). That even the attitudes of white Republicans and conservatives saw movement in the liberal direction suggests not only that ingroup-critical emotions transcend the partisan divide²⁰¹, but that the comparatively lower overtime variation in these groups’ racial liberalism (Chapter 4) results more from selective avoidance of or lack of engagement with REM stimuli than from being impervious to their liberalizing influence. This could explain why racial liberalism increased among these groups during the ‘Great Awakening’ period, when the frequency of REM coverage reached record highs²⁰². Obtaining a deeper understanding of partisan and ideological differences in race-related information exposure thus stands as an important objective for future research.

While contributing to the literature on the stability of racial attitudes, the findings also have potentially important implications for research that studies the attitudinal impact of racial justice movements. For instance, several recent quasi-experimental studies have linked Black Lives Matter protests to increases in white racial liberalism (e.g. Sawyer & Gampa, 2018; Mazumder, 2018) while chapter 6 of this dissertation reported similar findings with respect to the death of George Floyd and subsequent mass protests. Ultimately, racial justice movements and

²⁰¹ Recall too that the treatment had no significant effect on how warmly participants rated Democrats and Republicans. If anything, Republican participants became slightly warmer towards Democrats and cooler towards Republicans.

²⁰² In other words, it’s possible that the racial attitudes of white Republicans and conservatives only become attentive and responsive at very high thresholds of REM. And this is because, relative to white liberals and Republicans, these groups are less motivated to attend to (and are thus unaware of or ignore) such stimuli.

protests can hardly be successful absent the sympathies of at least some segments of America's white majority, which makes white Americans important targets of activist influence. While inevitably channeled through the media, the experimental findings here suggest that at least some of this influence is achieved by sowing or elevating white feelings of collective shame and/or guilt. In fact, as was briefly noted in chapter 2, the utility of manipulating white shame and guilt for the attainment of political ends was explicitly recognized by none other than MLK. Thus, models of anti-racist social movement influence could benefit from incorporating pathways that speak to the effects of messaging on group-based moral emotions.

The findings of chapter 7 also potentially contribute to literature on the efficacy of racialized policy appeals. Much of this literature has tended to focus on whites' receptiveness to implicitly or explicitly racist political messaging. Work on whites' receptiveness to pro-minority or liberal racial appeals is relatively in much shorter supply. While there is reason to suspect that racially liberal political appeals will backfire among whites (e.g. English & Kalla, 2021)--resulting in lower support for the candidate or policy in question--there is some evidence that they may actually have the opposite effect, at least among racially egalitarian whites (e.g. Arora, 2019). *If* (and a big one at that) the findings of chapter 7 are directly portable to the context of political campaigns, they suggest that, to the extent that they successfully activate ingroup-critical emotions, candidates that engage in 'racially equalitarian' messaging will, at the very least, incur no net 'white' penalty (given that no backlash was observed among non-liberal whites), and may even benefit from such rhetoric. On the other hand, and consistent with the findings of Hanania, Hawley, and Kaufman (2018), such messaging may at once incur an electoral penalty while also boosting support for advocated racial policies. Of course, given that the stimulus article was not manifestly partisan nor authored by a partisan candidate in the

context of an election campaign, there are good reasons to doubt the findings' portability. For instance, it's likely that party loyalties and animosities would have the upper hand in evaluations of general election candidates. On the other hand, perhaps 'racial equalitarian' messaging would resonate among fellow partisans at the primary election level. Whatever the case, these are all important research questions in need of further investigation.

Though more tentatively, some of these chapters' findings also add to the growing body of work that probes dominant group members' reactions to their demographic decline. Whereas nearly of this work highlights members' negative responses to reminders of their impending minority status, the current research provides some evidence that those who are ashamed of their ingroup's moral status may actually embrace it. Specifically, on top of small increases in support for higher immigration levels and preferences for non-European immigration, it found that the guilt/shame treatment led to small increases in the share of respondents that report feeling 'happy' about the fall of America's white majority. As it happens, in one of the open-response entries showcased in chapter 8, one such 'happy' participant expressed hope that the decline of the white majority would usher in a less racist society. While such sentiments may not be reflective of the majority of white Americans, they exist at some level and may even be on the rise²⁰³. The broader point, though, is that no understanding or theory of dominant group members' reactions to their demographic decline will be complete without taking such sentiments into account. It is thus the hope that future research will attempt to replicate the findings reported here and give more attention to such dispositions than they have received.

²⁰³ While not the same question, in 2016, Pew Research Center started asking whether respondents think trends towards a majority-minority America are good, bad, or neither good nor bad for the country. At this point, 7.3% of white respondents, including 17.2% of white liberals, gave a 'good' response. By 2019, this response had reached 11.6% of all whites, including 31% of white liberals. Data for the most recent years have yet to be released.

While much of the focus has been on chapter 7, the findings of chapter 8 are also theoretically and empirically noteworthy. First, they linked the written expression of ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions to quantitative measures of moral shame and guilt, which both offers some evidence of the latter's validity while also affirming the reality of these sentiments. Second, the qualitative review of 'ingroup-critical' entries found some support for the theoretical distinction between moral shame and guilt. Though some authors seemed to treat the two interchangeably, others associated guilt with personal involvement in or responsibility for immoral ingroup actions and moral shame with the embarrassment they feel from being affiliated with a morally tainted or 'racist' ingroup. This, once again, underscores why it is important that researchers distinguish the two emotions and not treat collective guilt as the only emotion of relevance.

9.5.4 Limitations

The findings of chapters 7 and 8 suffer from a number of limitations that will have to be addressed in future research. First, that moral shame and guilt carried some to most of the significant treatment effects does not necessarily mean that these variables are the only or even the most important mediators. For instance, if racial sympathy were measured in lieu of moral shame and guilt, it's possible that it too would emerge as a significant mediator of the treatment's effects on policy outcomes. Which prosocial emotion is the strongest mediator can thus only be determined by measuring others in addition to moral shame and guilt. Though all prosocial moral emotions are likely be correlated to some degree, future research should focus on assessing their relative causal importance.

Second, the experimental design only included post-treatment measures of racial attitudes. While this was done to avoid inadvertently race-priming those in the neutral stimulus

group, which could have compromised the efficacy of the treatment, it leaves unanswered the question of whether the effects of the treatment are conditional on core antecedent variables, such as the personal importance of white identity and orientations towards social hierarchies and racial inequality. For instance, my theory would predict that the racial attitudes of those with strong white identities and weak equalitarian orientations (or high on social dominance) would be less likely to respond—or may instead respond in a negative fashion—to the guilt/shame stimulus.

To get at this question, future research should consider fielding a 2-wave panel design wherein measures of (for instance) social dominance, attributions of racial inequality (or ‘racial resentment’), and racial identity importance are administered at wave 1 and the treatment and post-treatment measures at wave 2. Such research could also help to get at whether attributions of racial inequality mediate the relationship between ideology and expressions of moral shame and guilt. Suggestive evidence of this was found in chapter 6, wherein a general ‘racial resentment-attributions’ factor accounted for nearly all of the liberal-conservative differences in these emotions. However, this finding was purely correlational, and it thus awaits replication on non-observational data.

Third and somewhat related to the above, the findings were derived from an online convenience sample that was younger, more educated, and more liberal than the general white population. This not only undermines their external validity, but it also potentially explains why treatment effects were generally positive and did not meaningfully vary across political backgrounds. Indeed, this observation was somewhat at odds with the findings of chapter 6, wherein the Floyd incident precipitated larger increases in racial liberalism among white liberals and Democrats than conservatives and Republicans. Non-replication of these differential effects

could be due to the subsamples of conservative and Republicans being underpowered and/or more ideologically liberal and/or less partisan than their counterparts in the broader non-Prolific population. Of course, and as was earlier suggested, it could also be that political orientation is more determinative of whether or the extent that a person exposes him/herself to or avoids REM stimuli (perhaps in favor of competing or ideologically-congruent messaging) than how he/she reacts *upon* exposure thereunto. It's also worth noting that the findings cohere with the previously cited work of Cooley, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Cottrell (2019), who found that reading about white privilege caused white participants to perceive more police racism and to blame black victims of violent police encounters less regardless of political ideology. They are also consonant with the recent work of Jardina, Kalmoe, and Gross (2021), who observed post-2016-election declines in white identity importance—which is suggestive of the influence of moral shame—even among Republicans and conservatives. The bottom line, though, is that these findings are counterintuitive; and it's unclear whether or to what extent they will replicate on a sample that is more representative of the general white population. Thus, an important step for future research is to attempt such a replication.

Fourth, the use of a two-condition experimental design allows only basic tests of the causal mechanism that my theory proposes. For instance, if experimentally increasing ingroup-critical emotions leads to greater racial liberalism, it follows that experimentally decreasing or neutralizing them should result in greater racial conservatism. Testing whether the latter holds obviously requires the addition of a second 'anti-guilt/shame' treatment group, which should be the object of future research. While an initial attempt at such a condition was made in the early stages of data gathering, it was hastily and thus poorly designed; and the data therefrom was ultimately deemed unusable (see the Appendix for a fuller explanation). In theory, and broadly

speaking, an effective ‘anti-guilt/shame’ treatment should be one that either affirms the legitimacy of or naturalizes racial inequalities (and thus the disparate social positions of whites and blacks) and/or contests racial categorizations (e.g. by emphasizing ingroup heterogeneity) and notions of group responsibility altogether. Accordingly, it is recommended that future research first consult with the literature and pilot-test various stimuli that have the potential to achieve these desired effects. In addition to the above, two-condition designs also make it difficult to determine the specific aspects of a treatment that are responsible for its effects. For instance, was my guilt/shame stimulus effective because it linked historical incidents of white racism to the racial outcomes of today? Would it have been less effective had it not spoken to the concept of white privilege? Did the article resonate with (or at least not turn off) conservative participants because it highlighted an event in which blacks’ exercise of personal agency and attempts at economic self-reliance were greeted with a white-perpetrated race riot? These kinds of questions can only be answered with a multiple-condition design in which experimental treatments vary in their inclusion of theoretically relevant features. Future research should implement such a design in order to identify the elements of REM articles that are most relevant to the triggering of ingroup-critical emotions. Beyond its theoretical importance, such research could help inform the design of more efficient guilt/shame treatments.

Fifth, this research was unable to show that the treatment had any effect on costly pro-social behavior, which was operationalized in terms of monetary donations to anti-racist and pro-immigration advocacy groups. If anything, the opposite was found such that the size of donations among those in the guilt/shame condition was slightly (but not significantly) smaller than was the case for those in the neutral condition. The reasons for this unexpected outcome are unclear. One possible interpretation is that the effects of the treatment are limited to costless ‘virtue signaling’.

That is, it may have compelled participants to ‘talk the talk’ (i.e., by expressing support for pro-outgroup policies) so as to affirm their moral or anti-racist self-concepts. Once these self-concepts were symbolically affirmed, though, participants may have felt absolved from ‘walking the walk’ and engaging in a personally costly pro-social behavior. If so, this would have important implications for current understandings of moral shame and guilt’s pro-social influence. Future research can test this account by administering the donations measures immediately preceding the treatment so as to force participants to affirm themselves via costly pro-social behavior. And yet it could also be that monetary donations are a poor and unreliable measure of the latter—if only because participants are likely to be wary about the prospect of sharing personal financial information with a stranger. It is thus important that future research address this potential measurement bias by devising and testing alternative and less invasive measures of costly pro-social behavior.

Sixth, this research did not conclusively resolve whether the effects of the treatment meaningfully spilled-over to immigration attitudes. On one hand, those in the treatment group were slightly more supportive of increasing immigration levels, allocated somewhat fewer immigration admissions to European vs. non-European countries, and became slightly more likely to report feeling ‘happy’ about whites’ declining majority status. On another hand, these differences were modest and two of them only reached conventional levels of significance among certain political subgroups. Though all were in the theoretically predicted direction, additional research is needed to verify that these spill-over effects are genuine rather than the product of chance. This future research should consider using a multi-item index to measure immigration preferences, as the lone items fielded in the current study may not have been sufficient for capturing between-condition changes therein. Further, it should also consider

positioning these measures immediately after the treatment so as to determine whether the smaller effects on immigration attitudes observed in the current study are due to

Finally, this study cannot speak to how the racial attitudes of non-whites respond to REM stimuli. However, to reiterate a point made towards the end of chapter 4, nothing in this dissertation's theory precludes non-white attitudes from reacting similarly (i.e., shifting in the racially liberal direction) to whites. It only holds that the group-based moral appraisals and emotions that underly these reactions will be necessarily different for whites and non-whites. And this is because whites are members of a historically dominant and morally 'problematic' racial group, whereas 'people of color' belong to groups that were historically victimized and tend to be of lower-status. As such, non-whites are unlikely to feel collective shame and guilt in response to REM messaging. Conceivably, and likely depending on their degree of ingroup-identification as well as the extent they perceive their groups' relative social positions to be unjust, they are instead more likely to feel white-focused anger or resentment and a sense of collective victimhood. Whatever the case, future research should attempt to correct for this dissertation's exclusive white-focus by identifying and studying the group-based emotions that are relevant to the racial attitudes of non-white Americans. Indeed, such work is critical to the formulation of a more complete group-based emotions theory of racial attitude change.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A Introduction

Appendix A.1 Racial/ethnic differences in Democrats' political participation




Figure A1.1 Percent of Democrats reporting engaging in each political activity by race/ethnicity
 Note. Data are weighted.
 Source: Cooperative Election Study

Appendix A Chapter 4

Appendix B.1 Racial Liberalism Indexes

| Source | Item | N | White Dem. | White Repub. | White Lib. | White Con. |
|----------|---|---|------------|--------------|------------|------------|
| ABC News | I am going to read you a few statements and for each I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statement?...These days police in most cities treat Blacks as fairly as they treat Whites | 4 | 0.967 | 0.902 | --- | --- |
| ABC News | (I am going to read you a few statements and for each I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if | 3 | 0.884 | -0.241 | --- | --- |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|----|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| | perhaps you have no opinion about the statement?)...Discrimination has unfairly held down Blacks, but many of the problems which Blacks in this country have today are brought on by Blacks themselves | | | | | |
| General Social Survey | Some people think that (Blacks/Negroes/African-Americans) have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to (Blacks/Negroes/African-Americans). A. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? | 23 | 0.811 | 0.201 | 0.809 | 0.607 |
| General Social Survey | Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about your opinion -- are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks? | 13 | 0.977 | 0.182 | 0.954 | -0.193 |
| General Social Survey | We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First . . . are we spending | 31 | 0.932 | 0.346 | 0.811 | 0.514 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | too much, too little, or about the right amount on...Improving the conditions of Blacks | | | | | |
| General Social Survey | We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First, are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on...Assistance to blacks | 22 | 0.872 | 0.208 | 0.873 | 0.223 |
| General Social Survey | In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black/African-American) and white school children from one school district to another? | 17 | 0.901 | 0.857 | 0.954 | 0.88 |
| General Social Survey | Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on (READ CATEGORIES A & B). Which law would you vote for? | 24 | 0.934 | 0.461 | 0.862 | 0.079 |
| General Social Survey | On the average (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to . . .discrimination? | 23 | 0.914 | 0.586 | 0.873 | 0.357 |
| General Social Survey | Here are some opinions other people have expressed in connection with (Negro/Black)-white relations. Which statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself, feel? The first one is . . .White people have a right to keep (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and (Negroes/Blacks/African- | 15 | 0.956 | 0.983 | 0.849 | 0.854 |

| | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| | Americans) should respect that right. | | | | | |
| Pew Research Center | (Please choose the statement that comes closer to your own views--even if neither is exactly right.)...Racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can't get ahead these days, blacks who can't get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own condition | 16 | 0.956 | 0.864 | 0.984 | 0.863 |
| Pew Research Center | As I read some pairs of statements, please tell me whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own views -- even if neither is exactly right.)...Our country has made the changes needed to give blacks equal rights with whites, our country needs to continue making changes to give blacks equal rights with whites | 8 | 0.986 | 0.576 | 0.971 | -0.067 |
| Public Religion Research Institute, Gallup, PSRA/ Newsweek Poll | A black person is more likely than a white person to receive the death penalty for the same crime. | 6 | 0.971 | 0.845 | 0.959 | 0.987 |
| Public Religion Research Institute | (Now, please read the following statements on a few different topics and say if you agree or disagree with each one....Completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, completely disagree)...Police officers generally treat blacks and other minorities the same as whites | 4 | 0.118 | -0.885 | 0.395 | -0.831 |
| Public Religion Research Institute, ABC/Washington Post, Associated Press/Media General Poll | Now, read each statement and please say if you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with each one.)...Blacks and other minorities receive equal treatment as whites in the criminal justice system | 10 | 0.581 | 0.849 | 0.676 | 0.662 |
| CBS News/New York Times | In general, who do you think has a better chance of getting ahead in today's society--white people, black | 9 | 0.618 | 0.71 | 0.241 | 0.549 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|----|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | people, or do white people and black people have about an equal chance of getting ahead? | | | | | |
| ABC News/Washington Post Poll, CNN/Kaiser Family Foundation Poll, Pew Research Center | How big a problem is racism in our society today? Is it a big problem, somewhat of a problem, a small problem, or not a problem at all? | 7 | 0.911 | 0.608 | 0.973 | -0.315 |
| ANES | Some people say that because of past discrimination blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion-- are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks? | 11 | 0.705 | 0.12 | 0.569 | 0.456 |
| ANES | Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about it? | 20 | 0.237 | -0.502 | 0.144 | 0.203 |
| ANES | Should federal spending on assistance/aid to blacks be increased, decreased, or stay the same | 7 | -0.239 | -0.098 | -0.467 | 0.51 |
| Associated Press-NORC Poll | In general, do you think the police in most communities are more likely to use deadly force against a black person, or more likely to use it against a white person, or don't you think race affects police use of deadly force? | 5 | 0.98 | 0.924 | 0.856 | 0.921 |

| | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|--------|-------|-------|--------|
| ANES | How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? Blacks | 4 | 0.963 | 0.906 | 0.975 | 0.887 |
| The Roper Organization, Marttila & Kiley, Inc., Washington Post/Kaiser/Harvard Racial Attitudes Survey, Princeton Survey Research Associates International, Pew Research Center, CBS News Poll, CNN Poll | (How much discrimination do you think there is against each of these groups in society today--a lot, some, only a little, or none at all?)...Blacks/African Americans | 20 | 0.614 | 0.62 | 0.579 | 0.713 |
| Pew Research Center | (Here is another series of statements on some different topics.)...Discrimination against blacks is rare today. Do you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree? | 12 | 0.845 | 0.946 | 0.521 | 0.954 |
| Pew Research Center | We should make every possible effort to improve the position of blacks and other minorities, even if it means giving them preferential treatment | 15 | 0.878 | 0.679 | 0.302 | -0.079 |
| Pew Research Center, Public Religion Research Institute | Just your impression, in the United States today, is there a lot of discrimination against Blacks, or not? | 7 | 0.948 | 0.505 | 0.969 | 0.607 |
| ANES | Some people say that Negroes should be allowed to live in any part of town they want to. How do you feel? Should Negroes be allowed to live in any part of town they want to, or not? | 6 | -0.757 | 0.751 | 0.336 | -0.816 |
| ANES | If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do' (Agree/Disagree) | 3 | 0.999 | 0.949 | --- | --- |
| ABC News/Washington Post, Media General/Associated Press, NBC/WSJ, | Do you think blacks and other minorities should receive preference in college admissions to make | 4 | 0.87 | 0.198 | 0.719 | 0.951 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|----|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Public Religion Research Institute | up for past inequalities, or not? | | | | | |
| ABC News/Washington Post, Media General/Associated Press, NBC/WSJ | Do you think blacks and other minorities should receive preference in hiring to make up for past inequalities, or not? | 4 | 0.676 | -0.568 | 0.991 | -0.961 |
| Pew Research Center | We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country (Agree/Disagree) | 15 | 0.423 | 0.078 | 0.877 | -0.649 |
| ABC News | I am going to read you a few statements and for each I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statement?...These days police in most cities treat Blacks as fairly as they treat Whites | 4 | 0.967 | 0.941 | --- | --- |
| ABC/Washington Post | (For each of the following statements please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statement.)... Black people are not achieving equality as fast as they could because many whites don't want them to get ahead | 5 | -0.711 | -0.886 | 0.426 | -0.972 |
| ABC/Washington Post | Because of past discrimination, blacks who need it should get some help from the government that White people in similar economic circumstances don't get. (Agree/Disagree) | 4 | 0.204 | -0.311 | 0.925 | -0.023 |
| CBS News/New York Times | Do you believe that where there has been job discrimination against blacks in the past, preference in hiring or promotion should be given to blacks today? | 9 | -0.461 | -0.458 | -0.593 | 0.676 |
| CNN/Opinion Research Corporation | Next, we'd like to know how widespread you believe the problem of racism is against blacks among police officers in this country. Would you say it is very common, fairly | 4 | -0.342 | 0.874 | -0.096 | -0.22 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|----|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| | common, fairly rare, or very rare? | | | | | |
| Pew Research Center | How much, if at all, do white people benefit from advantages in society that black people do not have? (A great deal/A fair amount/Not much/Not at all) | 4 | 0.939 | -0.792 | 0.955 | -0.504 |
| CCES | Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. (Agree/Disagree) | 4 | 0.673 | -0.931 | -0.13 | -0.765 |
| Pew Research Center | How much confidence do you have in police officers in your community...to treat blacks and whites equally-- a great deal, a fair amount, just some, or very little confidence? (A great deal/A fair amount/Just some/Very little) | 3 | 0.816 | -0.446 | 0.927 | -0.578 |
| CBS News | In general, do you think the criminal justice system in the United States is biased in favor of blacks, or is it biased against blacks, or does it generally give blacks fair treatment? | 9 | 0.862 | -0.143 | 0.78 | 0.082 |
| General Social Survey | What do you think the chances are these days that a white person won't get a job or promotion while an equally or less qualified black person gets one instead? Is this very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely to happen these days? | 14 | 0.731 | -0.824 | 0.728 | -0.731 |
| Kaiser Family Foundation, Pew Research Center | Is there too much, too little, or about the right amount of attention paid to race and racial issues these days? | 3 | 0.934 | -0.108 | 0.856 | -0.556 |
| CCES | Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. | 4 | 0.822 | -0.665 | 0.279 | -0.69 |
| Gallup, Associated Press-NORC Center | In your opinion, how well do you think blacks are treated in your community-- the same as whites are, not very well, or badly? | 7 | 0.958 | 0.086 | --- | --- |
| Public Religion Research Institute | Now, as I read some statements on a few | 8 | 0.771 | -0.266 | 0.831 | 0.631 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|----|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | different topics, please tell me if you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with each one....Today discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities | | | | | |
| Gallup, CNN/ORC | In general, do you think that Black children have as good a chance as white children in your community to get a good education, or don't you think they have as good a chance? | 14 | 0.401 | -0.356 | 0.653 | 0.909 |
| Gallup, CNN/ORC | In general, do you think that Black people have as good a chance as white people in your community to get any kind of job for which they are qualified, or don't you think they have as good a chance? | 17 | 0.461 | 0.617 | 0.184 | 0.711 |
| Gallup, CNN, Pew Research Center | How serious a problem do you think racial discrimination against blacks is in this country--a very serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, not too serious, or not at all serious? | 8 | 0.895 | 0.682 | 0.973 | 0.189 |
| Public Religion Research Institute | (Now, please read the following statements on a few different topics and say if you agree or disagree with each one....Completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, completely disagree)...Over the past couple of decades, the government has paid too much attention to the problems of blacks and other minorities | 5 | 0.277 | 0.465 | 0.712 | 0.717 |
| CBS News/New York Times | Do you think the government in Washington is paying too much, not enough, or about the right amount of attention to the needs and problems of blacks and other minorities? | 5 | 0.981 | 0.95 | 0.848 | 0.81 |
| CBS News/New York Times, Princeton Survey | In recent years, do you think too much has been made of the problems | 4 | 0.59 | 0.973 | 0.831 | 0.956 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Research Associates International | facing black people, too little has been made, or is it about right? | | | | | |
| Kaiser Family Foundation | Thinking specifically about African Americans, do you think the average African American is better off, worse off, or just as well off as the average white person in terms of...income? Is that a lot better/worse off or just a little? | 3 | 0.987 | 0.971 | 0.996 | 0.84 |
| Kaiser Family Foundation | Thinking specifically about African Americans, do you think the average African American is better off, worse off, or just as well off as the average white person in terms of...education? Is that a lot better/worse off or just a little? | 3 | 0.96 | 0.953 | 0.991 | 0.871 |
| ANES | Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve (Agree/Disagree) | 17 | 0.839 | 0.866 | 0.849 | 0.888 |
| ANES | Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should to the same without any special favors (Agree/Disagree) | 18 | 0.918 | 0.522 | 0.871 | 0.645 |
| ANES | Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class (Agree/Disagree) | 16 | 0.709 | 0.712 | 0.627 | 0.848 |
| ANES | It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (Agree/Disagree) | 17 | 0.877 | 0.489 | 0.808 | 0.583 |
| General Social Survey | Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should to the same without any special favors (Agree/Disagree) | 13 | 0.977 | 0.173 | 0.915 | 0.004 |

| | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| CCES | Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should to the same without any special favors (Agree/Disagree) | 7 | 0.955 | 0.879 | 0.953 | 0.472 |
| CCES | Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class (Agree/Disagree) | 6 | 0.937 | 0.833 | 0.96 | 0.562 |
| CCES | It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (Agree/Disagree) | 3 | 0.948 | 0.946 | 0.978 | 0.89 |
| Public Religion Research Institute | It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (Agree/Disagree) | 3 | 0.998 | -0.58 | 0.997 | -0.956 |
| ABC News | If Blacks would try harder, they could be just as well off as Whites (Agree/Disagree) | 4 | 0.313 | 0.605 | 0.583 | -0.272 |
| Pew Research Center | In the past few years there hasn't been much real improvement in the position of black people in this country (Agree/Disagree) | 15 | 0.638 | 0.671 | -0.614 | -0.66 |
| Pew Research Center | (How much of a problem do you think each of the following are in the country today?... A very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem, not a problem at all)... Racism | 3 | 0.752 | -0.257 | 0.924 | -0.987 |
| USA Today, ABC News/Washington Post, Public Religion Research Institute, Pew Research Center | Do you think recent killings of black Americans by police are isolated incidents or part of a larger pattern in the police's treatment of black Americans? | 4 | 0.912 | 0.879 | 0.888 | 0.148 |
| Monmouth University Polling Institute | Do you think that racial and ethnic discrimination in the United States is a problem or not a problem? Is it a big | 3 | 0.917 | 0.645 | 0.833 | 0.508 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|--------|--------|-------|--------|
| | problem or a small problem? | | | | | |
| ABC/Washington Post | Do you think black people who live in your community experience racial discrimination, or not? Do you think it happens often, occasionally, or rarely? | 4 | -0.779 | 0.682 | --- | --- |
| ABC/Washington Post, Kaiser Family Foundation, Gallup | Do you think the federal government should or should not pay money to black Americans whose ancestors were slaves as compensation for that slavery? | 5 | 0.952 | 0.465 | 0.98 | -0.379 |
| Gallup | In Brown vs. Board of Education, the Supreme Court ruled that racial segregation in all public schools is illegal. This means that all children, no matter what their race, must be allowed to go to the same schools. Do you approve or disapprove of this decision? | 7 | 0.992 | 0.931 | --- | --- |
| Gallup | Do you think the _____ Administration is pushing racial integration too fast, or not fast enough? | 7 | -0.318 | 0.912 | --- | --- |
| Gallup | Who do you think is more to blame for the present conditions in which blacks find themselves--white people or blacks themselves? | 5 | -0.291 | -0.625 | 0.998 | 0.265 |
| Gallup | Now again remembering that government spending has to be paid for out of our taxes, let me mention some other types of programs and ask whether you think the amount of tax money being spent for each purpose should be increased, kept at the present level, reduced or ended altogether? Programs to help improve the situation of black Americans? | 3 | 1 | -0.94 | --- | --- |
| Gallup | In your view, which of the following is better--letting students go to the local | 3 | 0.177 | -0.951 | --- | --- |

| | | | | | | |
|--------|---|----|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | school in their community, even if it means that most of the students would be the same race, or transferring students to other schools to create more integration, even if it means that some students would have to travel out of their communities to go to school? | | | | | |
| Gallup | Do you believe that more should be done--or that less should be done--to integrate schools throughout the nations? | 3 | 0.939 | 0.983 | --- | --- |
| ANES | Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that white and black (1962-1966: colored; 1968,1970: Negro) children go (1964-1970: are allowed to go) to the same schools. Others claim this is not the government's business. Do you think the government in Washington should... (see to it that white and black children go (1962-1970: are allowed to go) to the same schools; stay out of this area) | 13 | 0.75 | -0.613 | 0.699 | 0.457 |
| ANES | Some say that the civil rights people have been trying to push too fast. Others feel they haven't pushed fast enough. How about you: Do you think that civil rights leaders are trying to push too fast, are going too slowly, or are they moving about the right speed? | 13 | 0.745 | 0.913 | 0.396 | 0.496 |
| ANES | Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, while other people feel that certain groups don't have as much influence as they deserve. I am going to read you a list of groups, for each one please tell me whether that group has too much | 4 | 0.939 | 0.694 | 0.96 | 0.775 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|---|---|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| | influence, just about the right amount of influence or too little influence. What about blacks? | | | | | |
| ANES | Would you say that blacks have too much influence in American politics, just about the right amount of influence in American politics, or too little influence in American politics? | 3 | 0.831 | 0.959 | 0.883 | 0.942 |
| CCES | Affirmative action programs give preference to racial minorities in employment and college admissions in order to correct for past discrimination. Do you support or oppose affirmative action? | 5 | 0.84 | -0.62 | 0.556 | -0.786 |
| CBS News/New York Times | Do you think the police in most big cities are generally tougher on whites than on blacks, or tougher on blacks than on whites, or do the police treat them both the same? | 3 | 0.884 | -0.806 | 0.999 | 0.827 |
| ABC News | (I am going to read you a few statements and for each I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statement?)...Discrimination has unfairly held down Blacks, but many of the problems which Blacks in this country have today are brought on by Blacks themselves | 3 | 0.884 | -0.241 | --- | --- |
| ANES | Would you say that whites have [too much influence in American politics, just about the right amount of influence in American politics, or too little influence in American politics? | 8 | 0.915 | 0.788 | 0.915 | 0.665 |

Appendix B.2 Non-Racial Policy Liberalism Indexes

| Source | Item | N | White | White Dem. | White Repub. | White Lib. | White Con. |
|--------|--|---|-------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|
| ANES | <p>Around election time people talk about different things that our government in Washington is doing or should be doing. Now I would like to talk to you about some of the things that our government might do. Of course, different things are important to different people, so we don't expect everyone to have an opinion about all of these. I would like you to look at this card as I read each question and tell me how you feel about the question. If you don't have an opinion, just tell me that; if you do have an opinion, choose one of the other answers.] (CARD WITH RESPONSE CHOICES SHOWN TO R: AGREE STRONGLY/ AGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY/ NOT SURE, IT DEPENDS/DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY/ DISAGREE VERY STRONGLY). 'The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost.' 1962: Now on a different problem. 'The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost.' Do you have an opinion on this or not? (IF YES:) Do you agree that the government should do this or do you think the government should not do it.</p> | 5 | 0.943 | 0.943 | 0.958 | --- | --- |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | <p>1964,1968: Some say the government in Washington ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost; others say the government should not get into this. Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other? (IF YES) What is your position?</p> | | | | | | |
| | <p>1956-1960: (Same introduction as in VCF0805 [CARD WITH RESPONSES SHOWN]). 'The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job.' 1964,1968: In general, some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his own.' Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other. (IF YES:) Do you think that the government – 2002: Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has A JOB AND A GOOD STANDARD OF LIVING. Others think the government should just LET EACH PERSON GET AHEAD ON THEIR OWN. Which is closer to the way you feel or haven't you thought much about this?</p> | 6 | 0.979 | 0.967 | 0.978 | --- | --- |
| | <p>Should federal spending on food stamps be</p> | 8 | 0.855 | 0.434 | 0.947 | 0.454 | 0.826 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | increased, decreased or kept about the same? | | | | | | |
| | Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. (2004: Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Other people feel that it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. (2004: Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2,3,4,5, or 6.) Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R) | 14 | 0.688 | 0.774 | 0.737 | 0.900 | 0.709 |
| | Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. (1972- 1978,1996-LATER: Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1). Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his/their own. (1972-1978,1996: Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at pints 2,3,4,5 or 6.) Where would you place yourself on this scale, or | 19 | 0.212 | 0.715 | 0.448 | 0.593 | 0.545 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| | haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R) | | | | | | |
| | <p>There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. Some (1988,1994-LATER: people) feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses (1984 AND LATER: for everyone). (1996,2004: Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1). Others feel that (1988,1994-1996: all) medical expenses should be paid by individuals, and through private insurance (1984 AND LATER: plans) like Blue Cross (1984-1994: or [1996:some] other company paid plans). (1996,2004: Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And of course, some people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2,3,4,5 or 6.) Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)</p> | 14 | 0.704 | 0.874 | 0.849 | 0.750 | 0.817 |
| | <p>Next, I am going to ask you to choose which of two statements I read comes closer to your own opinion. You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know which one is closer to your (2000: own) views: ONE, the less government the better; or TWO, there are more things that</p> | 7 | 0.973 | -0.490 | 0.968 | -0.413 | 0.908 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| | government should be doing | | | | | | |
| | Next, I am going to ask you to choose which of two statements I read comes closer to your own opinion. You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know which one is closer to your (2000: own) views: ONE, the main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves; or TWO, government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger | 7 | 0.915 | -0.649 | 0.932 | -0.398 | 0.926 |
| | Next, I am going to ask you to choose which of two statements I read comes closer to your own opinion. You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know which one is closer to your (2000: own) views: ONE, we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; or TWO, the free market can handle these problems without government being involved | 7 | 0.911 | -0.062 | 0.935 | 0.182 | 0.968 |
| | Should federal spending on poor people/aid to the poor/ aid to poor people be increased, decreased or kept about the same? | 8 | 0.853 | 0.161 | 0.884 | 0.209 | 0.894 |
| | Should federal spending on the childcare be increased, decreased or kept about the same? | 11 | 0.605 | 0.122 | 0.715 | -0.079 | 0.706 |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | Should federal spending on public schools be increased, decreased or kept about the same? | 12 | 0.785 | 0.567 | 0.805 | 0.321 | 0.724 |
| | Should federal spending on the homeless/government assistance to the homeless/solving the problem of the homeless be increased, decreased or kept about the same? | 4 | 0.988 | 0.958 | 0.986 | 0.805 | 0.940 |
| | Should federal spending on welfare programs be increased, decreased or kept about the same? | 9 | 0.607 | 0.796 | 0.624 | 0.870 | 0.576 |
| | Should federal spending on improving and protecting the environment (2000,2002: environmental protection; 2008,2012,2016: protecting the environment) be increased, decreased, or stay the same? | 12 | 0.920 | 0.674 | 0.951 | 0.342 | 0.937 |
| General Social Survey | Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not | 24 | 0.643 | 0.739 | 0.827 | 0.655 | 0.739 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel? (CIRCLE ONE). | | | | | | |
| | Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more," it might require a tax increase to pay for it. A. The environment. | 5 | 0.964 | 0.971 | 0.943 | 0.921 | 0.989 |
| | Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at Point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at Point 5. A. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you have up your mind on this? | 23 | 0.701 | 0.664 | 0.833 | 0.694 | 0.804 |
| | Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. A. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you | 23 | 0.687 | 0.636 | 0.850 | 0.696 | 0.764 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----|--------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | made up your mind on this? | | | | | | |
| | <p>In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctors and hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal government and that people should take care of these things themselves.</p> <p>A. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?</p> | 23 | 0.852 | 0.735 | 0.925 | 0.766 | 0.892 |
| | <p>Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Circle one number for each action to show whether you are in favor of it or against it.</p> <p>A. Control of wages by legislation.</p> | 3 | -0.266 | 0.035 | -0.307 | 0.455 | 0.388 |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>K. Welfare</p> | 31 | 0.780 | 0.899 | 0.777 | 0.839 | 0.785 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>B. Improving and protecting the environment</p> | 31 | 0.919 | 0.859 | 0.951 | 0.817 | 0.937 |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>G. Improving the nation's education system</p> | 31 | 0.529 | 0.844 | 0.432 | 0.640 | 0.706 |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name</p> | 22 | 0.167 | -0.267 | 0.357 | -0.033 | 0.593 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | <p>some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>L. Highways and bridges</p> | | | | | | |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>N. Mass Transportation</p> | 22 | -0.234 | 0.708 | 0.041 | 0.653 | 0.061 |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> | 10 | 0.875 | 0.218 | 0.857 | 0.219 | 0.871 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | P. Assistance for childcare | | | | | | |
| | We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)? C. Health | 22 | 0.918 | 0.073 | 0.916 | 0.149 | 0.899 |
| | We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)? K. Assistance to the poor | 22 | 0.647 | 0.732 | 0.673 | 0.571 | 0.675 |
| | We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First | 31 | 0.823 | 0.413 | 0.901 | 0.510 | 0.866 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)? C. Improving and protecting the nation's health | | | | | | |
| | We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)? O. Parks and recreation | 22 | 0.363 | 0.779 | 0.633 | 0.105 | 0.614 |
| | We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)? R. Developing alternative energy sources | 5 | 0.547 | 0.060 | 0.217 | 0.568 | 0.416 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>B. The environment</p> | 22 | 0.912 | 0.732 | 0.942 | 0.495 | 0.923 |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>D. Solving the problems of the big cities</p> | 31 | 0.687 | 0.766 | 0.710 | 0.647 | 0.675 |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we</p> | 22 | 0.372 | 0.601 | 0.506 | 0.455 | 0.530 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|
| | <p>spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)? D. Assistance to big cities</p> | | | | | | |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)? G. Education</p> | 22 | 0.581 | 0.449 | 0.649 | 0.493 | 0.762 |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)? F. Dealing with drug addiction</p> | 31 | 0.550 | 0.126 | 0.581 | 0.005 | 0.589 |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going</p> | 22 | 0.729 | -0.002 | 0.795 | 0.052 | 0.788 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| | <p>to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>F. Drug rehabilitation</p> | | | | | | |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>A. Space exploration program</p> | 30 | -0.117 | 0.650 | -0.246 | 0.528 | -0.236 |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>A. Space exploration</p> | 22 | -0.275 | 0.727 | -0.408 | 0.492 | -0.443 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|----|-------|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>Q. Supporting scientific research</p> | 9 | 0.480 | 0.677 | 0.553 | 0.740 | 0.612 |
| | <p>We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?</p> <p>M. Social Security</p> | 22 | 0.402 | 0.669 | 0.245 | 0.655 | 0.286 |
| | <p>Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Circle one number for each action to show whether you are in favor of it or against it.</p> <p>C. Cuts in government spending.</p> | 5 | 0.010 | 0.849 | -0.034 | 0.822 | -0.449 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| | Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more," it might require a tax increase to pay for it. B. Health. | 5 | 0.836 | 0.411 | 0.842 | 0.672 | 0.927 |
| | Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more," it might require a tax increase to pay for it. D. Education. | 5 | 0.895 | 0.821 | 0.894 | 0.903 | 0.944 |
| | Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more," it might require a tax increase to pay for it. G. Unemployment benefits. | 5 | 0.437 | 0.795 | 0.615 | 0.799 | 0.757 |
| | Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more," it might require a tax increase to pay for it. H. Culture and the arts. | 5 | 0.189 | 0.880 | 0.358 | 0.938 | -0.140 |
| | Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Circle one number for each action to show whether you are in favor of it or against it. | 5 | 0.887 | 0.751 | 0.783 | 0.797 | 0.588 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| | E. Less government regulation of business. | | | | | | |
| | Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Circle one number for each action to show whether you are in favor of it or against it. B. Control of prices by legislation. | 3 | 0.849 | 0.186 | 0.561 | -0.420 | 0.998 |
| | On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . . A. Provide a job for everyone who wants one. | 8 | 0.769 | 0.091 | 0.716 | 0.266 | 0.825 |
| | On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . . B. Keep prices under control. | 5 | 0.785 | -0.176 | 0.847 | 0.156 | 0.940 |
| | On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . . C. Provide health care for the sick. | 5 | 0.855 | 0.794 | 0.888 | 0.974 | 0.948 |
| | On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . . D. Provide a decent standard of living for the old. | 6 | 0.128 | 0.233 | 0.143 | 0.167 | 0.477 |
| | On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . . E. Provide industry with the help it needs to grow. | 5 | 0.701 | 0.979 | 0.589 | 0.907 | 0.791 |
| | On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . . F. Provide a decent | 6 | 0.583 | 0.736 | 0.797 | 0.549 | 0.895 |

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|----|--------|-------|-------|--------|-------|
| | standard of living for the unemployed. | | | | | | |
| | On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . . G. Reduce income differences between the rich and poor. | 7 | 0.046 | 0.874 | 0.424 | 0.823 | 0.571 |
| | On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . . H. Give financial assistance to college students from low-income families. | 4 | 0.465 | 0.689 | 0.746 | 0.643 | 0.681 |
| | On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . . I. Provide decent housing for those who can't afford it. | 4 | 0.559 | 0.984 | 0.636 | 0.869 | 0.606 |
| | Do you agree or disagree? B. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. | 8 | 0.676 | 0.780 | 0.349 | 0.870 | 0.444 |
| | Generally, how would you describe (Much too high, Much too low) taxes in America today... We mean all taxes together, including social security, income tax, sales tax, and all the rest. A. First, for those with high incomes, are taxes . . . | 5 | 0.586 | 0.556 | 0.571 | 0.229 | 0.595 |
| Pew Values Survey | Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good (Agree, Disagree) | 12 | 0.006 | 0.012 | 0.584 | -0.920 | 0.841 |
| | The federal government should run ONLY those | 11 | -0.585 | 0.198 | 0.240 | -0.557 | 0.784 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | things that cannot be run at the local level (Agree, Disagree) | | | | | | |
| | The federal government controls too much of our daily lives | 15 | 0.329 | 0.148 | 0.765 | -0.909 | 0.928 |
| | There needs to be stricter laws and regulations to protect the environment | 9 | 0.888 | 0.888 | 0.806 | 0.529 | 0.972 |
| | It is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who can't take care of themselves | 13 | 0.843 | 0.661 | 0.805 | 0.841 | 0.993 |
| | The government should help more needy people even if it means going deeper in debt | 14 | 0.909 | 0.861 | 0.903 | 0.239 | 0.983 |
| | The government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to sleep | 14 | 0.793 | 0.908 | 0.757 | 0.085 | 0.997 |
| Democracy Fund Voter Study Group | Do you think it is the responsibility of the federal government to see to it that everyone has health care coverage? | 4 | 0.952 | 0.817 | -0.970 | -0.489 | -0.728 |
| | How important are the following issues to you? The size of government. | 3 | -0.622 | 0.060 | 0.027 | -0.589 | 0.752 |
| | Do you favor raising taxes on families with incomes over \$200,000 per year? | 5 | -0.666 | -0.535 | -0.834 | -0.184 | 0.059 |
| | In general, do you think there is too much or too little regulation of business by the government? | 3 | -0.498 | 0.221 | -0.859 | 0.715 | -0.540 |
| | Do you think the health care reform bill that passed in 2010 should be expanded, kept the same, or repealed? | 4 | 0.970 | 0.938 | 0.210 | 0.968 | -0.474 |
| Cooperative Congressional Election Study | Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Give the Environmental Protection Agency power to regulate Carbon Dioxide emissions | 7 | 0.044 | 0.650 | 0.244 | 0.145 | 0.409 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Require that each state use a minimum amount of renewable fuels (wind, solar, and hydroelectric) in the generation of electricity even if electricity prices increase a little | 7 | 0.761 | 0.918 | 0.582 | 0.789 | 0.776 |
| | Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Strengthen the Environmental Protection Agency enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs U.S. jobs | 7 | 0.983 | 0.970 | 0.904 | 0.949 | 0.790 |
| 1 st Dimension: % Variance Explained | | | 44.95% | 44.69% | 50.71% | 35.15% | 52.43% |

Appendix B.3 Alternative specifications for lagged dependent variable model of white racial liberalism

| | White | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (a) | (aa) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) |
| Racial Liberalism (t-1) | 0.716*** (0.102) | 0.655*** (0.156) | 0.601*** (0.150) | 0.615*** (0.151) | 0.458** (0.126) | 0.438** (0.131) |
| REM | 0.242* (0.096) | 0.225** (0.074) | 0.451*** (0.127) | 0.422*** (0.104) | 0.574*** (0.102) | 0.448*** (0.092) |
| Race-Related Articles | --- | --- | -0.242** (0.082) | -0.278** (0.088) | -0.231** (0.082) | -0.139† (0.078) |
| White Proportion of Population | --- | 0.119 (0.175) | 0.143 (0.174) | 0.600 (0.564) | 0.164 (0.623) | 0.733 (0.719) |
| White Proportion of Democrats | --- | -0.204 (0.236) | -0.203 (0.231) | -0.176 (0.231) | -0.046 (0.290) | 0.254 (0.294) |
| Proportion Boomer/Gen X | --- | --- | --- | 0.294 (0.444) | -1.12 (0.798) | -0.351 (0.993) |
| Proportion Millennial/Gen-Z | --- | --- | --- | 0.310 (0.330) | -0.899 (0.623) | -0.405 (0.671) |
| Percent With College Degree | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1.93* (0.744) | 1.81* (0.733) |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Civil Rights Spending | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.036 (0.137) |
| Consumer Sentiment | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.080 (0.057) |
| Non-Racial Public Policy Mood | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.137* (0.063) |
| Constant | 0.052** (0.061) | 0.048 (0.065) | 0.044† (0.058) | 0.045** (0.062) | 0.033 (0.054) | 0.032 (0.054) |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.792 | 0.789 | 0.814 | 0.811 | 0.845 | 0.849 |

Appendix B.4 Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test results

| | Lags | At Level | | 1 st Difference | | 2 nd Difference | | 3 rd Difference | |
|----------------|------|----------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|
| | | Test Statistic | 5% Critical Value | Test Statistic | 5% Critical Value | Test Statistic | 5% Critical Value | Test Statistic | 5% Critical Value |
| Sample | 1 | -1.025 | -2.918 | -5.413 | -2.919 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-white | 1 | -2.917 | -2.918 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| White | 4 | -0.417 | -2.920 | -3.210 | -2.920 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| White Dem. | 3 | 0.300 | -2.920 | -3.823 | -2.920 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-white Dem. | 1 | -1.405 | -2.918 | -5.065 | -2.919 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| White Repub. | 7 | -1.337 | -2.923 | -2.165 | -2.923 | -4.708 | -2.923 | --- | --- |
| | 1 | -1.831 | -2.918 | -5.330 | -2.919 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| White Lib. | 1 | 0.642 | -2.938 | -4.869 | -2.941 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| White Con. | 1 | -1.655 | -2.938 | -4.313 | -2.941 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| REM | 9 | 2.194 | -2.924 | 3.405 | -2.924 | -0.104 | -2.924 | -5.772 | -2.924 |
| | 8 | 1.956 | -2.923 | 4.419 | -2.923 | -1.741 | -2.923 | -4.656 | -2.923 |
| | 1 | 5.169 | -2.917 | -2.791 | -2.917 | -10.851 | -2.918 | --- | --- |

Note. Lag-order determined by selection statistics. In cases where these indicators conflicted, more than one lag-order was tested. Null hypothesis assumes series non-stationarity. Test statistics in bold font exceed 5% critical value, indicating trend-stationarity at the listed lag order.

Appendix B.5 Phillips-Perron unit-root test results

| | Lags | In Levels | | 1 st Difference | | 2 nd Difference | |
|------------|------|----------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|
| | | Test Statistic | 5% Critical Value | Test Statistic | 5% Critical Value | Test Statistic | 5% Critical Value |
| Sample | 1 | -0.950 | -2.917 | -7.811 | -2.918 | --- | --- |
| Non-white | 1 | -2.416 | -2.917 | -6.792 | -2.918 | --- | --- |
| White | 4 | -0.824 | -2.917 | -8.501 | -2.918 | --- | --- |
| White Dem. | 3 | 0.592 | -2.917 | -7.716 | -2.918 | --- | --- |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| 7 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.141 |
| 8 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.138 |
| 9 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.141 |
| 10 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 0.139 |

Note. Test statistics in bold font are smaller than the 5% critical value (0.146). Null hypothesis assumes trend stationarity.


Appendix B.7 Clemente, Montanes, Reyes unit-root test results

| | Lags | At Level | | 1st Difference | | 2 nd Difference | | 3 rd Difference | |
|----------------|------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------------|--------|----------------------------|-------|
| | | du1 | du2 | du1 | du2 | du1 | du2 | du1 | du2 |
| Sample | 1 | 9.300 | 6.764 | -0.996 | 2.169 | -1.011 | 0.974 | --- | --- |
| Non-white | 1 | 1.286 | -3.799 | 3.668 | -3.706 | -2.257 | 1.795 | 0.728 | 0.691 |
| White | 4 | 8.973 | 6.575 | -1.382 | 2.271 | 0.965 | -1.173 | --- | --- |
| White Dem. | 3 | 9.571 | 8.442 | -0.519 | 2.509 | -0.922 | 1.118 | --- | --- |
| Non-white Dem. | 1 | 7.969 | -2.574 | 1.358 | -0.062 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| White Repub. | 7 | 13.383 | -5.995 | 0.524 | -1.103 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| White Lib. | 1 | 7.559 | 10.902 | 1.6745 | 2.550 | 0.053 | 0.006 | --- | --- |
| White Con. | 1 | 5.794 | -8.208 | 2.870 | -1.924 | -0.392 | 0.396 | --- | --- |
| REM | 9 | 3.405 | 9.157 | 0.857 | 2.095 | -0.034 | 1.696 | --- | --- |
| | 8 | | | | | | | --- | --- |
| | 1 | | | | | | | --- | --- |

Note. 'du1' and 'du2' refer to the first and second breakpoints. Test statistics in bold font are smaller than the 5% critical value (0.146) for a given breakpoint. Null hypothesis assumes trend stationarity.

Appendix C Chapter 5


Appendix C.1 Pre and post-Floyd trends in Twitter tweet frequency (top) and Google search interest (bottom) for 'LGBT' and 'People of color'/'PoC'



Note. Dashed red vertical line represents May 25 (the day of the incident)

Source: storywrangling.org, Google Trends

Appendix C.2 White support for paying reparations to blacks by party identification



Source: ABC News (June 18, 1997; June 17-18, 2020), AP-NORC (September 20-23, 2019), CNN/Kaiser Family Foundation (August 25-October 3, 2015), CNN/USA Today (February 8, 2002)

Appendix D Chapter 6

Appendix D.1 OLS model of pro-black policy support (complete results)

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) |
|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Moral Shame | 0.490*** (0.045) | 0.297*** (0.046) | 0.179*** (0.049) | 0.372*** (0.044) | 0.168** (0.049) | 0.128** (0.048) |
| Image Shame | -0.161*** (0.034) | -0.095** (0.032) | -0.092** (0.030) | -0.144*** (0.033) | -0.097** (0.030) | -0.067* (0.030) |
| Guilt | 0.409*** (0.051) | 0.361*** (0.047) | 0.361*** (0.045) | 0.401*** (0.044) | 0.359*** (0.044) | 0.332*** (0.042) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 0.867*** (0.031) | 0.632*** (0.041) | 0.524*** (0.044) | 0.741*** (0.037) | 0.514*** (0.044) | 0.454*** (0.043) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 0.419*** (0.036) | --- | 0.411*** (0.039) | 0.351*** (0.040) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | 0.122*** (0.029) | 0.059† (0.030) | 0.044 (0.029) |
| SDO-Anti-Dominance | --- | --- | --- | 0.080** (0.029) | -0.029 (0.030) | -0.023 (0.031) |
| Very liberal | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberal | --- | -0.336*** (0.062) | --- | --- | --- | -0.275*** (0.060) |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| Slightly liberal | --- | -0.515*** (0.077) | --- | --- | --- | -0.391*** (0.074) |
| Moderate | --- | -0.685*** (0.094) | --- | --- | --- | -0.478*** (0.094) |
| Slightly conservative | --- | -0.884 (0.111) | --- | --- | --- | -0.644*** (0.111) |
| Conservative | --- | -0.880*** (0.119) | --- | --- | --- | -0.637*** (0.119) |
| Very conservative | --- | -0.866*** (0.154) | --- | --- | --- | -0.575*** (0.156) |
| Strong Democrat | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Weak Democrat | --- | 0.034 (0.071) | --- | --- | --- | 0.052 (0.067) |
| Lean Democrat | --- | 0.121† (0.064) | --- | --- | --- | 0.072 (0.062) |
| Independent | --- | 0.085 (0.089) | --- | --- | --- | 0.116 (0.082) |
| Lean Republican | --- | -0.049 (0.116) | --- | --- | --- | 0.054 (0.110) |
| Weak Republican | --- | -0.006 (0.109) | --- | --- | --- | 0.118 (0.105) |
| Strong Republican | --- | 0.111 (0.119) | --- | --- | --- | 0.302* (0.123) |
| Less than High School | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Some college | --- | -0.107 (0.062) | --- | --- | --- | -0.156** (0.059) |
| BA Degree | --- | 0.000 (0.059) | --- | --- | --- | -0.055 (0.057) |
| Graduate/Professional degree | --- | 0.143 (0.072) | --- | --- | --- | 0.108 (0.069) |
| Age | --- | -0.069** (0.021) | --- | --- | --- | -0.037 (0.020) |
| Male | --- | 0.038 (0.021) | --- | --- | --- | 0.035 (0.020) |
| Constant | 0.000 (0.022) | 0.414 (0.072) | -0.009 (0.020) | 0.002 (0.022) | -0.008 (0.020) | 0.307 (0.070) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.563 (-.0002) | 0.634 (.0004) | 0.643 (-.0017*) | 0.582 (.0005) | 0.644 (-.002*) | 0.678 (.0015) |
| Mean VIF | 3.33 (2.24) | 2.20 (2.03) | 3.36 (2.69) | 2.94 (2.32) | 3.07 (2.63) | 2.33 (2.19) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.48 | 4.40 | 4.67 | 4.13 | 4.81 | 5.09 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.31 | 2.47 (2.45) | 2.37 (2.33) | 2.35 (2.31) | 2.39 | 2.51 (2.50) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.20 | 4.35 | 4.23 | 4.21 | 4.24 | 4.38 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.45 | 3.72 | 2.96 | 3.83 | 4.24 |

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R² row correspond to changes in Adjusted R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted for the separate indexes.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.2 Ordinal logit model of preferred immigration levels (complete results)

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) |
|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Moral Shame | 2.92*** (0.359) | 2.03*** (0.279) | 1.68*** (0.234) | 2.14*** (0.291) | 1.57** (0.227) | 1.50** (0.230) |
| Image Shame | 0.588*** (0.060) | 0.664*** (0.070) | 0.668*** (0.068) | 0.629*** (0.065) | 0.679*** (0.070) | 0.702** (0.074) |
| Guilt | 1.43** (0.192) | 1.28† (0.175) | 1.29† (0.166) | 1.42* (0.193) | 1.31* (0.181) | 1.24 (0.172) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 4.03*** (0.421) | 2.45*** (0.311) | 2.10*** (0.275) | 2.92*** (0.352) | 1.99*** (0.269) | 1.78*** (0.248) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 2.32*** (0.237) | --- | 1.97*** (0.210) | 1.66*** (0.185) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | 1.13 (0.111) | 1.03 (0.099) | 0.987 (0.095) |
| SDO-Anti-Dominance | --- | --- | --- | 1.61*** (0.158) | 1.37** (0.137) | 1.36** (0.143) |
| Very liberal | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberal | --- | 0.501*** (0.096) | --- | --- | --- | 0.598** (0.114) |
| Slightly liberal | --- | 0.273*** (0.063) | --- | --- | --- | 0.370*** (0.087) |
| Moderate | --- | 0.241*** (0.067) | --- | --- | --- | 0.405** (0.120) |
| Slightly conservative | --- | 0.292*** (0.091) | --- | --- | --- | 0.510* (0.174) |
| Conservative | --- | 0.164*** (0.068) | --- | --- | --- | 0.287** (0.124) |
| Very conservative | --- | 0.074*** (0.048) | --- | --- | --- | 0.134** (0.090) |
| Strong Democrat | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Weak Democrat | --- | 1.30 (0.249) | --- | --- | --- | 1.31 (0.256) |
| Lean Democrat | --- | 1.39 (0.299) | --- | --- | --- | 1.26 (0.263) |
| Independent | --- | 1.38 (0.338) | --- | --- | --- | 1.36 (0.331) |
| Lean Republican | --- | 1.45 (0.493) | --- | --- | --- | 1.66 (0.573) |
| Weak Republican | --- | 0.611 (0.195) | --- | --- | --- | 0.737 (0.244) |
| Strong Republican | --- | 0.837 (0.359) | --- | --- | --- | 1.24 (0.538) |
| High school or less | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Some college | --- | 1.17 (0.262) | --- | --- | --- | 1.02 (0.232) |
| BA Degree | --- | 1.21 (0.263) | --- | --- | --- | 1.07 (0.238) |
| Graduate/Professional Degree | --- | 1.72* (0.437) | --- | --- | --- | 1.70* (0.433) |
| Age | --- | 0.985** (0.005) | --- | --- | --- | 0.987** (0.005) |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Male | --- | 0.947 (0.124) | --- | --- | --- | 0.985 (0.130) |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.086 (-.0048) | 0.121 (-.0019) | 0.112 (-.0005) | 0.104 (-.0012) | 0.118 (-.0002) | 0.136 (-.0004) |
| /cut1 | -3.38 (0.158) | -4.81 (0.355) | -3.56 (0.168) | -3.52 (0.167) | -3.61 (0.170) | -4.61 (0.363) |
| /cut2 | -2.61 (0.122) | -3.98 (0.332) | -2.76 (0.129) | -2.71 (0.127) | -2.80 (0.130) | -3.76 (0.340) |
| /cut3 | -1.98 (0.106) | -3.30 (0.327) | -2.09 (0.107) | -2.04 (0.104) | -2.11 (0.108) | -3.05 (0.335) |
| /cut4 | -0.088 (0.073) | -1.27 (0.309) | -0.064 (0.076) | -0.066 (0.075) | -0.056 (0.077) | -0.934 (0.316) |
| /cut5 | 0.854 (0.079) | -0.256 (0.306) | 0.934 (0.081) | 0.901 (0.080) | 0.949 (0.082) | 0.107 (0.313) |
| /cut6 | 2.33 (0.110) | 1.32 (0.310) | 2.46 (0.114) | 2.41 (0.113) | 2.49 (0.115) | 1.72 (0.317) |
| Mean VIF | 3.33 (2.24) | 2.20 (1.95) | 3.36 (2.69) | 2.94 (2.30) | 3.07 (2.62) | 2.33 (2.19) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.48 | 4.40 | 4.67 | 4.13 | 4.81 | 5.09 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.31 (2.24) | 2.47 (2.34) | 2.37 (2.33) | 2.35 (2.31) | 2.39 (2.36) | 2.51 (2.50) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.20 | 4.35 | 4.23 | 4.21 | 4.24 | 4.38 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.28 | 3.72 | 2.96 | 3.83 | 4.24 |

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Pseudo R² row correspond to changes in Pseudo R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.3 Ordinal logit model of attitudes towards decriminalizing illegal border crossings (complete results)

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) |
| Moral Shame | 2.70*** (0.354) | 1.67*** (0.233) | 1.49** (0.216) | 1.97*** (0.270) | 1.39* (0.201) | 1.25 (0.184) |
| Image Shame | 0.798* (0.078) | 0.960 (0.100) | 0.912 (0.093) | 0.848 (0.086) | 0.915 (0.093) | 1.00 (0.106) |
| Guilt | 1.30* (0.165) | 1.18 (0.148) | 1.18 (0.154) | 1.29* (0.163) | 1.18 (0.147) | 1.13 (0.145) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 3.46*** (0.396) | 1.88*** (0.239) | 1.70*** (0.226) | 2.45*** (0.270) | 1.60*** (0.207) | 1.38* (0.185) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 2.49*** (0.258) | --- | 2.19*** (0.236) | 1.68*** (0.203) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | 1.25** (0.096) | 1.17† (0.109) | 1.09 (0.104) |
| SDO-Anti-Dominance | --- | --- | --- | 1.41*** (0.131) | 1.18† (0.112) | 1.15 (0.111) |
| Very liberal | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberal | --- | 0.389*** (0.079) | --- | --- | --- | 0.456*** (0.092) |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Slightly liberal | --- | 0.202*** (0.046) | --- | --- | --- | 0.267*** (0.062) |
| Moderate | --- | 0.157*** (0.044) | --- | --- | --- | 0.245*** (0.071) |
| Slightly conservative | --- | 0.106*** (0.041) | --- | --- | --- | 0.164*** (0.065) |
| Conservative | --- | 0.195*** (0.086) | --- | --- | --- | 0.332* (0.155) |
| Very conservative | --- | 0.091** (0.066) | --- | --- | --- | 0.157* (0.114) |
| Strong Democrat | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Weak Democrat | --- | 0.967 (0.182) | --- | --- | --- | 0.949 (0.181) |
| Lean Democrat | --- | 1.73** (0.329) | --- | --- | --- | 1.55* (0.299) |
| Independent | --- | 1.29 (0.331) | --- | --- | --- | 1.31 (0.327) |
| Lean Republican | --- | 0.805 (0.329) | --- | --- | --- | 0.937 (0.389) |
| Weak Republican | --- | 0.434* (0.148) | --- | --- | --- | 0.493* (0.173) |
| Strong Republican | --- | 0.907 (0.477) | --- | --- | --- | 1.28 (0.692) |
| High school or less | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Some college | --- | 1.32 (0.260) | --- | --- | --- | 1.22 (0.238) |
| BA Degree | --- | 1.15 (0.219) | --- | --- | --- | 1.08 (0.206) |
| Graduate/Professional Degree | --- | 1.48 (0.353) | --- | --- | --- | 1.45 (0.344) |
| Age | --- | 0.979*** (0.005) | --- | --- | --- | 0.981*** (0.005) |
| Male | --- | 0.823 (0.108) | --- | --- | --- | 0.841 (0.112) |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.086 (-.0048) | 0.121 (-.0019) | 0.112 (-.0005) | 0.104 (-.0012) | 0.118 (-.0002) | 0.136 (-.0004) |
| /cut1 | -3.38 (0.158) | -4.81 (0.355) | -3.56 (0.168) | -3.52 (0.167) | -3.61 (0.170) | -4.61 (0.363) |
| /cut2 | -2.61 (0.122) | -3.98 (0.332) | -2.76 (0.129) | -2.71 (0.127) | -2.80 (0.130) | -3.76 (0.340) |
| /cut3 | -1.98 (0.106) | -3.30 (0.327) | -2.09 (0.107) | -2.04 (0.104) | -2.11 (0.108) | -3.05 (0.335) |
| /cut4 | -0.088 (0.073) | -1.27 (0.309) | -0.064 (0.076) | -0.066 (0.075) | -0.056 (0.077) | -0.934 (0.316) |
| /cut5 | 0.854 (0.079) | -0.256 (0.306) | 0.934 (0.081) | 0.901 (0.080) | 0.949 (0.082) | 0.107 (0.313) |
| /cut6 | 2.33 (0.110) | 1.32 (0.310) | 2.46 (0.114) | 2.41 (0.113) | 2.49 (0.115) | 1.72 (0.317) |
| Mean VIF | 3.33 (2.24) | 2.20 (1.95) | 3.36 (2.69) | 2.94 (2.30) | 3.07 (2.62) | 2.33 (2.19) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.48 | 4.40 | 4.67 | 4.13 | 4.81 | 5.09 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.31 (2.24) | 2.47 (2.34) | 2.37 (2.33) | 2.35 (2.31) | 2.39 (2.36) | 2.51 (2.50) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.20 | 4.35 | 4.23 | 4.21 | 4.24 | 4.38 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.28 | 3.72 | 2.96 | 3.83 | 4.24 |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Pseudo R² row correspond to changes in Pseudo R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.4 OLS models of percent of immigration admissions allocated to non-European countries (complete results)

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) |
|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Moral Shame | 6.04*** (0.974) | 2.66** (0.963) | 0.273 (1.02) | 2.84** (0.971) | -0.124 (0.991) | -0.253 (0.966) |
| Image Shame | -3.07*** (0.799) | -2.36** (0.767) | -1.77* (0.748) | -2.03** (0.753) | -1.34† (0.733) | -1.48* (0.733) |
| Guilt | 1.64 (1.05) | 1.63 (1.00) | 0.752 (0.989) | 1.54 (1.00) | 0.935 (0.973) | 1.29 (0.966) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 7.68*** (0.797) | 4.08*** (0.956) | 1.01 (0.967) | 4.17*** (0.821) | 0.836 (0.936) | 1.09 (0.966) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 7.87*** (0.757) | --- | 6.05*** (0.816) | 5.07*** (0.883) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | -0.513 (0.709) | -1.43* (0.694) | -1.84** (0.689) |
| SDO-Anti-Dominance | --- | --- | --- | 6.00*** (0.702) | 4.39*** (0.700) | 4.54*** (0.743) |
| Very liberal | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberal | --- | -3.00* (1.39) | --- | --- | --- | -1.12 (1.38) |
| Slightly liberal | --- | -3.58* (1.80) | --- | --- | --- | -0.133 (1.80) |
| Moderate | --- | -4.62* (2.10) | --- | --- | --- | 0.945 (2.08) |
| Slightly conservative | --- | -8.69** (2.72) | --- | --- | --- | -3.17 (2.52) |
| Conservative | --- | -4.43 (2.94) | --- | --- | --- | 2.08 (2.88) |
| Very conservative | --- | -13.76** (4.63) | --- | --- | --- | -8.18† (4.23) |
| Strong Democrat | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Weak Democrat | --- | 0.394 (1.62) | --- | --- | --- | 0.765 (1.53) |
| Lean Democrat | --- | 3.62* (1.53) | --- | --- | --- | 2.46† (1.44) |
| Independent | --- | 2.13 (2.12) | --- | --- | --- | 2.08 (2.06) |
| Lean Republican | --- | 0.128 (2.91) | --- | --- | --- | 1.29 (2.62) |
| Weak Republican | --- | -4.35† (2.52) | --- | --- | --- | -2.01 (2.33) |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Strong Republican | --- | -9.85** (3.00) | --- | --- | --- | -4.85† (2.76) |
| Less than High School | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Some college | --- | 1.55 (1.57) | --- | --- | --- | 0.347 (1.52) |
| BA Degree | --- | 3.43* (1.58) | --- | --- | --- | 2.54† (1.52) |
| Graduate/Professional degree | --- | 4.24* (1.82) | --- | --- | --- | 4.33* (1.75) |
| Age | --- | -0.018 (0.039) | --- | --- | --- | -0.003 (0.038) |
| Male | --- | 0.960 (1.01) | --- | --- | --- | 1.60 (0.972) |
| Constant | 0.000 (0.022) | 0.414 (0.072) | -0.009 (0.020) | 0.002 (0.022) | -0.008 (0.020) | 0.307 (0.070) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.563 (-.0002) | 0.634 (.0004) | 0.643 (-.0017*) | 0.582 (.0005) | 0.644 (-.002*) | 0.678 (.0015) |
| Mean VIF | 3.33 (2.24) | 2.20 (2.03) | 3.36 (2.69) | 2.94 (2.32) | 3.07 (2.63) | 2.33 (2.19) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.48 | 4.40 | 4.67 | 4.13 | 4.81 | 5.09 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.31 | 2.47 (2.45) | 2.37 (2.33) | 2.35 (2.31) | 2.39 | 2.51 (2.50) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.20 | 4.35 | 4.23 | 4.21 | 4.24 | 4.38 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.45 | 3.72 | 2.96 | 3.83 | 4.24 |

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R² row correspond to changes in Adjusted R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.5 OLS models non-white vs. white warmth (complete results)

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) |
|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Moral Shame | 11.96*** (1.48) | 8.30*** (1.51) | 7.00*** (1.57) | 6.90*** (1.35) | 5.62*** (1.47) | 5.51*** (1.52) |
| Image Shame | -3.89** (1.13) | -2.49* (1.24) | -2.77* (1.23) | -2.44* (1.18) | -2.14† (1.20) | -1.77 (1.22) |
| Guilt | 1.91 (1.55) | 1.50 (1.41) | 1.15 (1.50) | 1.71 (1.46) | 1.45 (1.46) | 1.36 (1.40) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 13.99*** (1.10) | 9.22*** (1.47) | 7.46*** (1.51) | 8.18*** (1.25) | 6.48*** (1.44) | 6.25*** (1.52) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 6.78*** (1.06) | --- | 2.62* (1.16) | 1.78 (1.27) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | --- | 0.854 (1.02) | 0.174 (1.06) | 0.055 (1.09) |
| SDO-Anti-Dominance | --- | --- | --- | 8.35*** (0.995) | 7.42*** (1.01) | 6.71*** (1.05) |
| Very liberal | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberal | --- | -7.58** (2.27) | --- | --- | --- | -5.00* (2.26) |
| Slightly liberal | --- | -10.08*** (2.77) | --- | --- | --- | -5.81* (2.80) |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Moderate | --- | -9.93** (3.00) | --- | --- | --- | -3.88 (3.01) |
| Slightly conservative | --- | -10.83** (4.06) | --- | --- | --- | -4.77 (3.91) |
| Conservative | --- | -8.47† (4.64) | --- | --- | --- | -1.14 (4.39) |
| Very conservative | --- | -7.49 (7.25) | --- | --- | --- | -0.945 (6.39) |
| Strong Democrat | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Weak Democrat | --- | 1.46 (2.31) | --- | --- | --- | 1.25 (2.31) |
| Lean Democrat | --- | 2.93 (2.45) | --- | --- | --- | 1.83 (2.43) |
| Independent | --- | 2.85 (3.13) | --- | --- | --- | 2.38 (3.07) |
| Lean Republican | --- | 2.52 (4.11) | --- | --- | --- | 3.54 (3.97) |
| Weak Republican | --- | -3.98 (4.15) | --- | --- | --- | -1.59 (3.91) |
| Strong Republican | --- | -10.87† (5.70) | --- | --- | --- | -5.97 (5.02) |
| Less than High School | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Some college | --- | 3.30 (2.30) | --- | --- | --- | 1.97 (2.26) |
| BA Degree | --- | 0.137 (2.30) | --- | --- | --- | -0.347 (2.25) |
| Graduate/Professional degree | --- | -1.42 (2.67) | --- | --- | --- | -0.488 (2.58) |
| Age | --- | -0.095† (0.053) | --- | --- | --- | -0.117* (0.051) |
| Male | --- | -4.09** (1.41) | --- | --- | --- | -3.04* (1.36) |
| Constant | 0.000 (0.022) | 0.414 (0.072) | -0.009 (0.020) | 0.002 (0.022) | -0.008 (0.020) | 0.307 (0.070) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.563 (-.0002) | 0.634 (.0004) | 0.643 (-.0017*) | 0.582 (.0005) | 0.644 (-.002*) | 0.678 (.0015) |
| Mean VIF | 3.33 (2.24) | 2.20 (2.03) | 3.36 (2.69) | 2.94 (2.32) | 3.07 (2.63) | 2.33 (2.19) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.48 | 4.40 | 4.67 | 4.13 | 4.81 | 5.09 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.31 | 2.47 (2.45) | 2.37 (2.33) | 2.35 (2.31) | 2.39 | 2.51 (2.50) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.20 | 4.35 | 4.23 | 4.21 | 4.24 | 4.38 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.45 | 3.72 | 2.96 | 3.83 | 4.24 |

Note. N=889 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R² row correspond to changes in Adjusted R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.6 Logit models of ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometers (complete results)

| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Moral Shame | 6.36*** (1.82) | 5.13*** (1.68) | 3.83*** (1.24) | 3.94*** (1.31) |
| Image Shame | 0.834 (0.132) | 1.00 (0.174) | 0.921 (0.151) | 1.05 (0.185) |
| Guilt | 1.11 (0.293) | 1.01 (0.275) | 1.05 (0.277) | 0.993 (0.237) |
| Moral Shame + Guilt | 5.49*** (0.578) | 3.68*** (1.09) | 2.91*** (0.869) | 2.75** (0.851) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 1.69 (0.562) | 1.47 (0.471) |
| SDO-Egalitarianism | --- | --- | 1.32 (0.297) | 1.30 (0.312) |
| SDO-Anti-Dominance | --- | --- | 1.13 (0.294) | 1.13 (0.320) |
| Very liberal | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberal | --- | 5.53† (0.169) | --- | 0.652 (0.201) |
| Slightly liberal | --- | 0.459† (0.205) | --- | 0.596 (0.268) |
| Moderate | --- | 0.488 (0.288) | --- | 0.706 (0.408) |
| Slightly conservative | --- | 0.082** (0.075) | --- | 0.127* (0.118) |
| Conservative | --- | empty | --- | empty |
| Very conservative | --- | empty | --- | empty |
| Strong Democrat | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Weak Democrat | --- | 2.17* (0.855) | --- | 2.15† (0.871) |
| Lean Democrat | --- | 1.42 (0.475) | --- | 1.31 (0.444) |
| Independent | --- | 1.70 (0.896) | --- | 1.59 (0.862) |
| Lean Republican | --- | 2.22 (2.49) | --- | 2.78 (3.16) |
| Weak Republican | --- | 1.26 (1.05) | --- | 1.85 (1.57) |
| Strong Republican | --- | empty | --- | empty |
| High school or less | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Some college | --- | 1.51 (0.694) | --- | 1.54 (0.711) |
| BA Degree | --- | 1.59 (0.744) | --- | 1.61 (0.758) |
| Graduate/Professional Degree | --- | 1.91 (0.972) | --- | 2.19 (1.12) |
| Age | --- | 0.960** (0.014) | --- | 0.959** (0.015) |
| Male | --- | 0.977 (0.273) | --- | 0.962 (0.271) |
| Constant | 0.040*** (0.009) | 0.130** (0.081) | 0.034*** (0.008) | 0.088*** (0.055) |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.086 | 0.121 | 0.112 | 0.104 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Weak Democrat | --- | 0.210 (0.390) | --- | 0.162 (0.390) | --- | 0.106 (0.389) | --- | 0.084 (0.390) |
| Lean Democrat | --- | 0.300 (0.377) | --- | 0.304 (0.377) | --- | 0.360 (0.376) | --- | 0.369 (0.377) |
| Independent | --- | -0.241 (0.514) | --- | -0.277 (0.514) | --- | -0.248 (0.513) | --- | -0.236 (0.514) |
| Lean Republican | --- | -0.242 (0.649) | --- | -0.258 (0.651) | --- | -0.286 (0.648) | --- | -0.258 (0.651) |
| Weak Republican | --- | 0.350 (0.606) | --- | 0.353 (0.609) | --- | -0.308 (0.604) | --- | -0.303 (0.608) |
| Strong Republican | --- | 1.40* (0.647) | --- | 1.40* (0.657) | --- | 1.10† (0.645) | --- | 1.05 (0.656) |
| High school or less | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Some college | --- | 0.052 (0.389) | --- | 0.044 (0.389) | --- | -0.147 (0.388) | --- | -0.140 (0.389) |
| BA Degree | --- | 0.087 (0.386) | --- | 0.121 (0.387) | --- | 0.040 (0.386) | --- | 0.046 (0.387) |
| Graduate/Professional Degree | --- | 0.313 (0.436) | --- | 0.384 (0.437) | --- | 0.603 (0.435) | --- | 0.602 (0.437) |
| Age | --- | 0.001 (0.010) | --- | -0.002 (0.010) | --- | -0.023* (0.010) | --- | -0.023* (0.010) |
| Male | --- | 0.296 (0.245) | --- | 0.333 (0.246) | --- | 0.042 | --- | 0.029 |
| Constant | 3.79*** (0.118) | 3.90*** (0.526) | 3.82*** (0.118) | 3.94*** (0.537) | 3.68*** (0.119) | 4.97*** (0.525) | 3.68*** (0.119) | 4.98*** (0.536) |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.139 (.0006) | 0.137 (.0009) | 0.139 (.001) | 0.138 (.0006) | 0.114 (.0007) | 0.127 (.0004) | 0.114 (.0000) | 0.125 (.0005) |
| Mean VIF | 3.32 (2.24) | 2.19 (1.94) | 3.07 (2.61) | 2.32 (2.18) | 3.32 (2.24) | 2.19 (1.94) | 3.07 (2.61) | 2.32 (2.18) |
| VIF Moral Shame | 3.47 | 4.38 | 4.80 | 5.08 | 3.47 | 4.38 | 4.80 | 5.08 |
| VIF Image Shame | 2.30 (2.24) | 2.47 (2.33) | 2.39 (2.35) | 2.51 (2.49) | 2.30 (2.24) | 2.47 (2.33) | 2.39 (2.35) | 2.51 (2.49) |
| VIF Guilt | 4.19 | 4.34 | 4.23 | 4.36 | 4.19 | 4.34 | 4.23 | 4.36 |
| VIF Moral Shame + Guilt | 2.24 | 3.27 | 3.82 | 4.23 | 2.24 | 3.27 | 3.82 | 4.23 |

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are unstandardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R² row correspond to changes in Adjusted R² of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.8 YouGov models of white support for increasing immigration (complete results)

| | Increase immigration levels | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| Moral Shame | 5.03*** (0.504) | 3.31*** (0.420) | 2.39*** (0.305) | 2.24*** (0.322) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 2.87*** (0.351) | 2.18*** (0.283) |
| Authoritarianism | --- | --- | 0.814* (0.072) | 0.891 (0.083) |
| Empathy | --- | --- | 0.817* (0.065) | 0.844* (0.071) |
| Very liberal | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberal | --- | 0.719 (0.198) | --- | 0.773 (0.214) |
| Moderate | --- | 0.467** (0.123) | --- | 0.625† (0.168) |
| Conservative | --- | 0.311** (0.113) | --- | 0.458* (0.179) |
| Very conservative | --- | 0.303* (0.144) | --- | 0.463 (0.234) |
| Strong Democrat | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Weak Democrat | --- | 0.446** (0.118) | --- | 0.462** (0.127) |
| Lean Democrat | --- | 0.853 (0.209) | --- | 0.703 (0.176) |
| Independent | --- | 0.426** (0.109) | --- | 0.464** (0.126) |
| Lean Republican | --- | 0.249** (0.106) | --- | 0.374* (0.162) |
| Weak Republican | --- | 0.349** (0.124) | --- | 0.461* (0.169) |
| Strong Republican | --- | 0.541 (0.211) | --- | 0.663 (0.272) |
| No HS | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| HS graduate | --- | 0.803 (0.278) | --- | 0.835 (0.281) |
| Some college | --- | 1.08 (0.365) | --- | 0.981 (0.327) |
| 4-year degree | --- | 1.33 (0.482) | --- | 1.09 (0.390) |
| Post-grad | --- | 2.67* (1.02) | --- | 2.24* (0.856) |
| Male | --- | 1.89*** (0.309) | --- | 1.56** (0.262) |
| Age | --- | 0.987** (0.004) | --- | 0.992† (0.005) |
| Constant | 0.223*** (0.021) | 1.04*** (1.04) | 0.222*** (0.022) | 0.685 (0.313) |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.268 | 0.349 | 0.343 | 0.377 |
| N | 1,471 | | | |

Note. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.9 YouGov models of white support for eliminating all restrictions on immigration (complete results)

| | Increase immigration levels | | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| Moral Shame | 3.22*** (0.242) | 2.29*** (0.233) | 2.02*** (0.217) | 1.82*** (0.216) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 1.98*** (0.211) | 1.59*** (0.188) |
| Authoritarianism | --- | --- | 0.999 (0.079) | 1.07 (0.092) |
| Empathy | --- | --- | 0.789** (0.059) | 0.812 (0.063) |
| Very liberal | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberal | --- | 0.426** (0.115) | --- | 0.411** (0.116) |
| Moderate | --- | 0.348*** (0.090) | --- | 0.365*** (0.097) |
| Conservative | --- | 0.216*** (0.071) | --- | 0.234*** (0.079) |
| Very conservative | --- | 0.483† (0.189) | --- | 0.559 (0.225) |
| Strong Democrat | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Weak Democrat | --- | 0.639† (0.157) | --- | 0.659† (0.164) |
| Lean Democrat | --- | 0.559* (0.141) | --- | 0.527* (0.137) |
| Independent | --- | 0.584* (0.143) | --- | 0.625† (0.157) |
| Lean Republican | --- | 0.407* (0.151) | --- | 0.509† (0.193) |
| Weak Republican | --- | 0.416** (0.134) | --- | 0.470* (0.156) |
| Strong Republican | --- | 0.423** (0.130) | --- | 0.442** (0.137) |
| No HS | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| HS graduate | --- | 0.898 (0.304) | --- | 0.971 (0.322) |
| Some college | --- | 0.690 (0.234) | --- | 0.709 (0.237) |
| 4-year degree | --- | 0.786 (0.279) | --- | 0.771 (0.272) |
| Post-grad | --- | 0.686 (0.258) | --- | 0.669 (0.249) |
| Male | --- | 1.24 (0.185) | --- | 1.07 (0.163) |
| Age | --- | 0.967*** (0.004) | --- | 0.970*** (0.004) |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Constant | 0.284*** (0.021) | 7.80*** (3.62) | 0.299*** (0.023) | 6.65*** (3.06) |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.173 | 0.252 | 0.206 | 0.265 |
| N | 1,472 | | | |

Note. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.10 YouGov models of thinking that it is acceptable for people to illegally immigrate to the US (complete results)

| | Increase immigration levels | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| Moral Shame | 3.74*** (0.327) | 2.53*** (0.287) | 2.02*** (0.240) | 1.88*** (0.248) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 2.24*** (0.259) | 1.78*** (0.235) |
| Authoritarianism | --- | --- | 0.731*** (0.062) | 0.752** (0.073) |
| Empathy | --- | --- | 0.742*** (0.062) | 0.808* (0.069) |
| Very liberal | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberal | --- | 0.488** (0.130) | --- | 0.500* (0.136) |
| Moderate | --- | 0.352*** (0.093) | --- | 0.463** (0.129) |
| Conservative | --- | 0.328** (0.119) | --- | 0.449* (0.176) |
| Very conservative | --- | 0.810 (0.371) | --- | 1.33 (0.656) |
| Strong Democrat | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Weak Democrat | --- | 0.731 (0.192) | --- | 0.791 (0.211) |
| Lean Democrat | --- | 0.868 (0.224) | --- | 0.729 (0.196) |
| Independent | --- | 0.426** (0.116) | --- | 0.439** (0.128) |
| Lean Republican | --- | 0.248** (0.115) | --- | 0.368* (0.169) |
| Weak Republican | --- | 0.230*** (0.094) | --- | 0.304** (0.125) |
| Strong Republican | --- | 0.314** (0.125) | --- | 0.359* (0.147) |
| No HS | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| HS graduate | --- | 0.545† (0.195) | --- | 0.567 (0.206) |
| Some college | --- | 0.573 (0.198) | --- | 0.517† (0.184) |
| 4-year degree | --- | 0.472* (0.174) | --- | 0.378* (0.143) |
| Post-grad | --- | 0.867 (0.339) | --- | 0.700 (0.282) |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Male | --- | 1.32† (0.212) | --- | 1.11 (0.185) |
| Age | --- | 0.954*** (0.005) | --- | 0.957*** (0.005) |
| Constant | 0.196*** (0.017) | 11.69 *** (0.021) | 0.191*** (0.018) | 8.23*** (4.11) |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.195 | 0.294 | 0.260 | 0.341 |
| N | 1,468 | | | |

Note. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

*Appendix D.11 YouGov models of non-white vs. white warmth and ‘anti-white’ feeling
thermometer scores (complete results)*

| | Non-White vs. White Warmth (OLS) | | | | ‘Anti-White’ Score (Logit) | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| Moral Shame | 8.10*** (0.614) | 5.91*** (0.848) | 3.43*** (0.897) | 3.64*** (0.989) | 5.51*** (1.59) | 4.17*** (1.21) | 3.24*** (1.08) | 3.65*** (1.15) |
| Racial Resentment (r) | --- | --- | 4.04*** (0.897) | 3.46*** (0.958) | --- | --- | 1.56† (0.373) | 1.23 (0.292) |
| Authoritarianism | --- | --- | -4.13*** (0.640) | -3.00*** (0.665) | --- | --- | 0.764 (0.132) | 0.842 (0.161) |
| Compassion | --- | --- | 1.91** (0.615) | 1.72** (0.625) | --- | --- | 1.20 (0.147) | 1.24† (0.156) |
| Very liberal | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberal | --- | 7.77** (2.51) | --- | 6.01* (2.45) | --- | 0.453* (0.152) | --- | 0.503* (0.171) |
| Moderate | --- | 15.07*** (2.57) | --- | 11.00*** (2.54) | --- | 0.429* (0.162) | --- | 0.572 (0.228) |
| Conservative | --- | 11.49*** (2.96) | --- | 6.99* (2.93) | --- | 0.144** (0.102) | --- | 0.226* (0.162) |
| Very conservative | --- | 15.79*** (3.73) | --- | 11.07** (3.67) | --- | 0.790 (0.483) | --- | 1.23 (0.776) |
| Strong Democrat | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Weak Democrat | --- | 4.70† (2.54) | --- | 3.64 (2.45) | --- | 1.22 (0.496) | --- | 1.21 (0.488) |
| Lean Democrat | --- | -2.79 (2.26) | --- | -1.08 (2.24) | --- | 1.02 (0.373) | --- | 0.975 (0.367) |
| Independent | --- | -0.822 (2.17) | --- | -1.56 (2.11) | --- | 1.28 (0.524) | --- | 1.25 (0.532) |
| Lean Republican | --- | -2.19 (2.40) | --- | -4.27† (2.39) | --- | 1.12 (0.950) | --- | 1.40 (1.23) |
| Weak Republican | --- | 2.89 (2.69) | --- | 0.687 (2.68) | --- | 0.165† (0.165) | --- | 0.203 (0.203) |
| Strong Republican | --- | 2.00 (2.50) | --- | -0.315 (2.44) | --- | 1.16 (0.702) | --- | 1.37 (0.853) |
| No HS | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| HS graduate | --- | -0.656 (2.80) | --- | 0.127 (2.79) | --- | 1.95 (1.65) | --- | 1.82 (1.58) |
| Some college | --- | -5.14† (2.81) | --- | -3.47 (2.79) | --- | 3.04 (2.48) | --- | 2.59 (2.20) |

| | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| 4-year degree | --- | -7.44* (3.00) | --- | -4.81 (3.00) | --- | 4.66† (3.83) | --- | 3.83 (3.26) |
| Post-grad | --- | -6.34* (2.95) | --- | -3.42 (2.95) | --- | 2.71 (2.24) | --- | 2.14 (1.84) |
| Male | --- | 1.74 (1.16) | --- | 1.65 (1.15) | --- | 1.10 (0.309) | --- | 1.15 (0.334) |
| Age | --- | 0.060† (0.033) | --- | 0.041 (0.033) | --- | 0.976** (0.008) | --- | 0.976** (0.008) |
| Constant | 2.85*** (0.595) | -9.08*** (3.94) | 2.77*** (0.604) | -5.21 (3.92) | 0.020*** (0.006) | 0.50** (0.052) | 0.019*** (0.006) | 0.038** (0.040) |
| Adjusted/ Pseudo R ² | 0.124 | 0.181 | 0.188 | 0.213 | 0.178 | 0.248 | 0.207 | 0.259 |

Note. N=1,461 in all models. Cell entries from the OLS models are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Cell entries in logit models are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.

†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix E Chapter 7

Appendix E.1 Pre-registration report



CONFIDENTIAL - FOR PEER-REVIEW ONLY The effects of collective guilt and shame on white racial attitudes (#68972)

Created: 06/14/2021 12:17 PM (PT)

This is an anonymized copy (without author names) of the pre-registration. It was created by the author(s) to use during peer-review. A non-anonymized version (containing author names) should be made available by the authors when the work it supports is made public.

1) Have any data been collected for this study already?

No, no data have been collected for this study yet.

2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?

H1. Relative to all other stimulus conditions, Whites that read about 'systemic racism' and the unjust advantages their racial ingroup enjoys over blacks will a) report higher levels of collective guilt and shame, b) report greater support for pro-black and liberal immigration policies, c) exhibit cooler feelings towards whites relative to non-white racial minority groups, and d) show a greater preference for admitting non-European over European immigrants. H1A. Collective guilt and shame will mediate the effects of the treatments on racial and immigration policy attitudes.
H2. Relative to all other stimulus conditions, Whites that read an article casting doubt on claims of systemic racism and white privilege will a) report lower levels of collective guilt and shame, b) report less support for pro-black and liberal immigration policies, c) exhibit warmer feelings towards whites relative to non-white racial minority groups, and d) show a greater preference for admitting European over non-European immigrants.
H2A. Collective guilt and shame will mediate the effects of the treatments on racial and immigration policy attitudes.

3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.

1. Collective moral shame is measured with three 7-point Likert (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree) items, which were adapted from Brown et al. (2008). Respondents are given the following 3 statements and asked the extent that they agree/disagree with each:
-When I think of the manner in which Black people have been treated, I sometimes think that we white Americans are racist and mean.
-My racial group's treatment of Black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it means to be a white American.
-I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white Americans

2. Collective guilt is measured with three 7-point Likert (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree) items, which were adapted from Brown et al. (2008). Respondents are given the following 3 statements and asked the extent that they agree/disagree with each:
-I feel guilty about the social inequalities between white and Black Americans.
-I feel guilty for the manner in which white Americans have treated Black people.
-Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of white Americans towards Black people.

3. Support for pro-black policies is measured with three different items:
-Support for giving affirmative action to blacks in job hirings and promotions (1=Oppose strongly, 7= Favor strongly)
-Support for race-based government assistance to blacks (1=I strongly feel that our government should not be giving special treatment to Black people; 7=I strongly feel that our government SHOULD help Black people)
-Support for giving reparations to blacks (1=Oppose strongly, 7= Favor strongly).

3. Immigration Liberalism is measured with 3 items:
-Preferred levels of legal immigration (1=Decrease a lot, 7=Increase a lot)
-Suppose for eliminating all immigration restrictions (1=Oppose strongly, 7= Favor strongly)
-Percent of all immigration admissions respondents would allocate to immigrants from Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East

4. Warmth towards whites vs. other non-white racial minorities is measured with 0-100 group feeling thermometers for whites, blacks, hispanics, and Asians. I will then subtract warmth towards non-white groups from warmth towards whites to create a measure of relative ingroup vs. outgroup warmth.

4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?

Participants will be randomly assigned to one of 3 conditions:
1. Guilt/shame treatment #2 (LA Times editorial on the Tulsa riots and the legacy of white American racism)
2. Anti-guilt/shame treatment (substack article on the 'disparity fallacy')
3. Neutral stimulus condition (article from Jalopnik on the cost of highway food/gas advertisements)

5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.

The first analyses will (OLS) regress each of the dependent variables on the condition/treatment variable. The purpose here is to test whether levels of the outcome variables significantly vary by experimental condition. The final analysis tests a Baron and Kenny mediation model in which collective guilt and shame mediate the effects of the treatment on each of the outcome variables. This entails the specification of two models: one regressing collective guilt/shame on the guilt/shame or anti-guilt/shame treatments, and another that regresses the pro-black and immigration policy variables on collective guilt/shame and the guilt/shame or anti-guilt/shame treatments. I will then use Stata's 'medeff' command to calculate the indirect/mediated effects of the treatment conditions.

Appendix E.2 Deviation from pre-registered design

The original experimental design was largely shaped by a desire to counteract potential ceiling effects. Simply put, my concern was that participants' baseline levels of guilt, shame, and racial policy liberalism would be so high that any guilt/shame stimulus would fail to induce detectable differences across study conditions. While this concern can be partly addressed by fielding a high-powered sample, I also sought to address it by experimentally stimulating outcome variation in the racially conservative direction. The idea was that if, on account of ceiling effects, differences could not be detected between the control and guilt/shame condition, they'd at least be detected between the latter and a condition designed to reduce baseline feelings of shame and guilt. In practice, this entailed the addition of a second 'anti-guilt/shame' experimental condition. To elaborate, this condition was designed for the purpose of weakening or countering pre-existing perceptions that disparities between whites and blacks reflect the effects of historical and/or present racism and, therefore, that white Americans enjoy an illegitimate racial advantage. Such beliefs bear on the legitimacy of 'racial gaps', which is theorized to condition the expression of collective shame and guilt and, in turn, pro-outgroup attitudes and policy preferences.

However, designing a stimulus capable of manipulating such beliefs was a struggle. Indeed, and at least when it comes to pre-existing op-ed articles, there is far more 'woke' than anti-woke content to choose from—and this is before one considers questions of effectiveness. In the end, I opted to author an original article²⁰⁴ that is generally based on the writings of Thomas Sowell—a conservative black economist whose many works question the notion that racial disparities necessarily reflect systemic mistreatment. To briefly summarize, this 1300-

²⁰⁴ The article can be accessed here: <https://zachgoldberg.substack.com/p/4d865c4a-d404-4670-ad85-71dc5200efb4>

word article uses census and other data to make the point that a) large outcome disparities between groups are the rule rather than the exception—even between US-born white Americans of different European ancestry; b) when broad racial categories are disaggregated, it's clear that US-born Americans of many European ancestry groups (including those of British/English ancestry) are actually far less socioeconomically privileged than many of their non-European counterparts; c) disparities between groups are highly persistent across time, and both their size and degree of persistence show no obvious connection to historical discrimination; d) there is no clear correlation between historical discrimination/disadvantage and contemporary group outcomes; a number of groups that faced historical disadvantages (e.g. Ashkenazi Jews, Chinese, Japanese) tremendously out-perform those that did not (e.g. French Acadians, Dutch, British/English). The article concludes by arguing that, due to the foregoing, there's no falsifiable basis on which to attribute outcome disparities between white and black Americans to the effects of white racism. In other words, owing to the inevitability and pervasiveness of group disparities even in the absence of discrimination, the claim that white Americans are responsible for black disadvantage is effectively meaningless and must be taken on faith.

Unfortunately, and despite high hopes for the article's effectiveness, a number of issues came into relief when it was finally put into practice. The first is that the 'anti-guilt/shame' condition—to which the article was assigned—had a respondent attrition rate (9.4%) that was significantly higher ($p < 0.001$) than what was observed in both the neutral (2.8%) and guilt/shame conditions²⁰⁵ (3.1%). As Zhou and Fishbach (2016) warn, attrition rates that

²⁰⁵ This issue came to my attention during one of my periodic checks of data quality. These checks were necessary for identifying respondents that were either likely to be bots (based on Qualtric's Recaptcha score) and/or those who both failed the attention check *and* also completed the survey unrealistically quickly (i.e., 3 standard deviations below the sample median completion time). They allowed me to reject the submissions of these respondents, thereby freeing up participation slots for others.

significantly vary across conditions threaten internal validity. They make it difficult to distinguish treatment from selection effects, as those who opted out of the survey after receiving the treatment may be qualitatively different from those that remained. A second issue relates to the length and intelligibility of the anti-guilt/shame article. As depicted in the figure below, relative to the stimuli of other conditions, participants graded the anti-guilt/shame article significantly poorer in terms of being ‘clearly written’ and ‘easy to follow’. And, crucially, this was the case irrespective of political orientation.




Figure E.2.1 Participant ratings of stimulus articles

A third issue is that because the anti-guilt/shame article speaks to the socioeconomic success of non-European ancestry groups, it can be interpreted as being implicitly pro-immigration. This is likely to be a problem when it comes to examining and interpreting its effects on immigration attitudes, as it has the potential to increase immigration liberalism when the goal is to reduce it.

A final and more basic issue is that the guilt/shame and anti-guilt/shame articles are hardly comparable. Each presents different types and volumes of content in a different fashion. Whereas the anti-guilt/shame treatment is chockfull of infographic data and exclusively focusses on the nature of racial disparities, the guilt/shame treatment is more a traditional op-ed article that focusses on the history of American racism. Consequently, it cannot be necessarily assumed that each engages the same sets of attitudes to the same or similar degree. If this assumption does not hold, then any theoretical relationship between the two conditions is potentially compromised, which has implications for how the effects of each are interpreted.

All told, while I maintain interest in testing an anti-guilt/shame treatment in future research, the one adopted here was poorly designed. As such, any data and inferences derived therefrom are likely to be of dubious validity. Additionally, given my finite resources, keeping the condition comes with a high opportunity cost in that it entails having fewer respondents in the neutral and guilt/shame groups. There's also a more practical cost in that it frivolously complicates or at least lengthens my analyses and write-up of the results²⁰⁶. These sacrifices would have been worthwhile had the anti-guilt/shame treatment not suffered the deficits described above. But they are hard to justify otherwise, especially given my interest in maximizing power in the other two conditions.

As such, and after consulting several academic advisors, I decided to discontinue the anti-guilt/shame condition²⁰⁷. This entailed first pausing the availability of the survey via Prolific

²⁰⁶ In any event, the anti-guilt/shame condition did not significantly differ from the neutral condition on any of the outcome variables implicated in my hypotheses. While I considered combining the two, I opted against it on the grounds that a) the two conditions are hardly comparable, and b) doing so potentially changes both the nature and interpretation of differences with the guilt/shame condition.

²⁰⁷ At the time it was discontinued (on June 22), the condition consisted of 229 participants.

and, thereafter, deleting the condition from the Qualtric questionnaire's random assignment block. The survey was then re-opened on Prolific.

Lest the reader fear otherwise, it's important to note that the decision to discontinue the anti-guilt/shame condition in no way compromises the validity of the remaining two conditions. And this is because it has no influence on which of the two participants are assigned to, which remains totally random.

Appendix E.3 Public perceptions of group-based discrimination and advantage/disadvantage




Figure E3.1 Public perceptions of the degree of discrimination against different social groups

Note. Data are weighted. N=7,280.

Source: ANES 2020 Time Series




Figure E3.2 Percent of respondents perceiving 'A lot' or 'A great deal' of discrimination against different social groups

Note. Data are weighted. N=7,280.

Source: ANES 2020 Time Series




Figure E3.3 Public perceptions of the disadvantages and advantages of belonging to different social groups

Note. Data are weighted. N=6,576.

Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel: Wave 43 (January-February, 2019).