Regional Conflict Management in Europe

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Regional Conflict Management

Edited by
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About the Contributors
This chapter assesses the prospects for the successful management of conflict in Europe during the next decade and possibly beyond. It concludes that these prospects are, on the whole, relatively bright, for two complementary reasons. First, the potential for militarized conflict in Europe is relatively low in comparison with other parts of the world and is likely to remain so. Second, the region possesses substantial institutional capabilities for collective conflict management (CCM). Indeed, Europe is arguably the region where such capabilities are best developed and most numerous.

To be sure, this forecast is not entirely sunny, and the situation does not allow for complacency. In the first place, the potential for violent conflict in Europe, although relatively small, is very real. In particular, serious political conflicts continue to smolder in Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Nevertheless, more and more of the continent is being steadily transformed into a “zone of peace” in which armed hostilities on any significant scale are highly unlikely and, increasingly, even unimaginable. Consequently, much of the conflict management activity in the region will take the form of ameliorating and even resolving remaining nonviolent intrastate and interstate differences, and such efforts will be greatly abetted by the processes associated with the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

A second caveat follows from the fact that the capabilities for CCM are lodged in several international organizations, the most important of which are the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, and the EU/Western European Union (WEU) nexus. This fragmentation of capabilities complicates the task of CCM whenever the coordination of two or more organizations is required. Thus at least as important as developing further institutional capacity is the task of improving the mechanisms for coordinating the activities.
of the various extant organizations. Nevertheless, the lack of centralization also results in a certain degree of institutional depth that allows decision makers greater flexibility and a wider range of options for conflict management.

The chapter is organized in four sections. The first section specifies the general tasks of conflict management. The second identifies the most likely regional sources of conflict during the next decade. A third section describes the existing institutional capabilities for CCM in the region. A conclusion assesses the adequacy of those capabilities in view of the nature and magnitude of the challenge, emphasizing the role that regional organizations can play in defusing remaining conflicts by promoting the internal transformation of states into stable democracies marked by the rule of law and respect for human rights.

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

In order to assess the prospects for successful conflict management, one must first identify the types of conflict that are possible and the forms of conflict management that are necessary and appropriate for addressing them.

This chapter takes a broad view of the types of conflict that might be the object of conflict management efforts in Europe. Relevant conflicts may be either intrastate or interstate in nature, although the former have dominated regional conflict management activities since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, both domestic and international conflict may assume a variety of forms. At the core of any situation that might prompt efforts at conflict management, however, is a political conflict. Political conflicts can occur between two or more groups over any objects, tangible or intangible, to which those groups may assign value, such as geographical territory, economic and financial resources, political standing, identity, religious expression, and so on.

Frequently, political conflicts are dealt with by the groups involved through nonviolent means. Indeed, the essential purpose of many political structures and processes, both domestically and internationally, is the expression and reconciliation of political differences. Where such political institutions are absent, weak, or lack legitimacy, or where the nature of the political conflict is especially acute, however, the potential exists for the conflict to become violent. One side may choose to resort to the use of armed force to achieve its goals, or an event may occur that may convince one side that it has been—or will soon be—the target of an armed attack and must react accordingly.

Consequently, the focus of this analysis is situations of political conflict in which the potential for physical violence is high, if not yet realized. Such conflicts may remain peaceful yet potentially violent, they may be ameliorated to the point where the potential for violence is low or nonexistent, or they may intensify to the point where violence seems imminent, or what I shall term a "crisis situation." Once a crisis situation is reached, two outcomes are most likely: either a de-escalation of the crisis or the eruption of armed conflict. Militarized political conflict may proceed at various levels of violence and destruction and
for varying lengths of time. Should hostilities cease and the conflict reenter a nonviolent phase, the principal possibilities are a renewal of hostilities, a continuation of tensions just short of organized violence, or a further reduction of tension to the point where a more normal situation of political conflict is arrived at (see figure 8.1).

Using this typology of conflict situations, one can identify a number of potential goals and corresponding activities for conflict management. These activities span a wide spectrum ranging from the use of various forms of diplomacy through the employment of economic instruments to the direct application of military force (see table 8.1).

Figure 8.1. Forms of Conflict
Table 8.1. Conflict Management Goals and Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of Conflict</th>
<th>Conflict Management Goals</th>
<th>Conflict Management Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Conflict (with significant potential for armed hostilities)</td>
<td>Escalation Prevention</td>
<td>Early Warning: Monitoring, Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amelioration/Tension Reduction</td>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy: Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration, Conciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Settlement/Resolution</td>
<td>Adjudication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Material Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CSBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis: Acute Political Conflict</td>
<td>Crisis Management Prevention of Hostilities De-escalation/Tension Reduction</td>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy Preventive Deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coercion: Political and Economic Sanctions, Embargoes, Threats of Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Conflict</td>
<td>Containment Suppression Alteration of Status Quo</td>
<td>Diplomacy Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Use of Force: Sanctions Enforcement, Direct Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmilitary Conflict</td>
<td>Escalation Prevention Stabilization/Tension Reduction Rehabilitation/Reconstruction Settlement/Resolution</td>
<td>Diplomacy Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arms Control/CSBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Material Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Administration/Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political/Legal Institution Building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of political conflict situations involving a significant potential for armed violence, the goals of conflict management are to prevent the conflict from escalating to a crisis situation and becoming militarized and, ideally, to lower the level of tension if not resolve the conflict altogether. To this end, relevant conflict management activities may consist of early warning; preventive diplomacy, including such approaches to conflict resolution as mediation, arbitration, and conciliation; and adjudication. Concerned outside parties might also employ a range of material and nonmaterial inducements to promote restraint in the short term and, ultimately, to lay a foundation for more peaceful relations among the local adversaries.

Should a crisis situation in which military hostilities seem imminent occur, the goals of conflict management become the prevention of the outbreak of open violence and the de-escalation of the crisis. Associated activities may consist of renewed efforts at preventive diplomacy, preventive military deployments, and
coercive actions involving political and economic sanctions, the imposition of embargoes, and the threat of force.

In the face of actual armed hostilities, conflict management goals become the containment of the fighting, its suppression, and, in some cases, bringing about changes in the status quo on the ground. Relevant conflict management activities may include not only diplomacy and the various forms of coercion described above but also the actual use of military force for the purpose of enforcing sanctions and direct intervention.

Finally, once the fighting has come to a halt, the goals of conflict management shift back to preventing a renewal of hostilities, stabilizing the situation and further reducing the level of tension, and possibly rehabilitating damaged areas. At such points, an especially wide range of activities may be appropriate. Diplomacy and coercion continue to be relevant. In addition, the establishment of arms control regimes and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) may help to limit the potential for violence and rebuild trust. Peacekeeping operations can be used to separate warring parties and to monitor and ensure their compliance with any cease-fire agreements. And reconstruction efforts may require the provision of various forms of assistance and even the assumption of administrative and other tasks by third parties.

THE NEED FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN EUROPE

The next step in assessing the prospects for successful conflict management involves identifying actual and potential regional conflicts. To do this, one must first establish the boundaries of the region in question. Regions are contested concepts, and Europe is no exception. To avoid an extended discussion, this chapter will simply define Europe as consisting of the those territories located east of the Atlantic Ocean, north of the Mediterranean Sea, and west of the Ural Mountains and Caspian Sea. In addition, the United States and Canada are regarded as regional actors, if not European states, in view of their long-standing membership in postwar European security organizations.

Within this area, one finds that a high percentage of the actual or potential military conflicts are located either in the Balkans or on the territory of the former Soviet Union (see table 8.2). The remainder of Europe, especially the territory of those states belonging to NATO or the EU, is virtually free of interstate and intrastate political conflicts that could acquire a military dimension in the foreseeable future. This skewed geographical distribution has implications for actual utility of the institutional capabilities for CCM in the region, as will be discussed below.

In addition, many of the conflicts of relevance to this study, whether internal or international in nature, have a significant ethnic basis. They stem from the presence within the territory of individual states of two or more distinct
and sizable ethnic groups and the existence of some substantial grievance on the part of at least one of the groups vis-à-vis the other(s). The precise nature of the grievance(s) can vary, but as a result of such grievances, ethnic groups may seek greater political autonomy, outright independence, or unification with neighboring countries dominated by members of the same nationality.

The following summary description distinguishes between those conflicts that are located in the FSU and those elsewhere. As Philip Roeder has noted, “the space previously within the Soviet Union now constitutes a distinct international region.” It also differentiates between those conflicts that have a significant ethnic basis and those with other underlying causes.5

Outside the Former Soviet Union

Outside of the former Soviet Union, the most acute ethnic conflicts tend to be found on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The recent bloody struggles between Kosovars (of Albanian ethnicity) and Serbs in Serbia, Croats and Serbs in Croatia, and Serbs, Croats, and Muslim Bosniaks in Bosnia are well known. In addition, tensions exist between the Hungarian minority and the Serb majority in the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina, while those between the Albanian minority (approximately 30 percent of the population) and the Macedonian majority in Macedonia were exacerbated by the influx of refugees from Kosovo. Outside of the Balkans, violence has long been a common feature of relations between Turkey and its Kurdish minority.

Most of these ethnic conflicts also have a significant external dimension. The treatment of the Albanian minorities in Serbia and Macedonia has been at the

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Table 8.2. Conflicts in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Basis of Conflict</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside FSU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Albania-Yugoslavia (Kosovo)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Albania-Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Vojvodina)</td>
<td>Bosnia-Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Croatia-Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Slovenia-Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary-Romania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary-Slovakia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary-Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey-Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within FSU</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Russia-Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)</td>
<td>Russia-Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Russia-Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia (Chechnya, etc.)</td>
<td>Armenia-Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ethnic</td>
<td>Yugoslavia (Montenegro)</td>
<td>Yugoslavia-Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Macedonia-Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greece-Turkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
center of disputes between Albania and those two countries, respectively. During the early 1990s, forces from Serbia were involved in fighting in both Croatia and Bosnia. Hungary has expressed concern about the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in not only Serbia but also Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Likewise, Turkey has criticized Bulgaria’s treatment of the Turkish minority (eight hundred thousand) in that country.

Not all of the potential domestic and interstate conflicts outside the FSU can be said to have primarily ethnic foundations, however. In Albania, the potential for violence has been exacerbated by the lack of strong political institutions and a weak economy. Montenegro has been rent by a power struggle between those who would maintain close ties to Serbia and those favoring an opening to the West. On the international side of the ledger, Greece and Turkey have occasionally come close to blows over competing territorial claims in the Aegean, and tensions have at times been high between Greece and Macedonia because of feared revanchist designs associated with the disputed appropriation of various cultural symbols. Finally, the Bulgarians have never recognized the existence of a distinct Macedonian nationality, raising the specter of at least an implicit claim to Macedonian territory.

Before moving on to consider the situation in the FSU, it is important to note those once-feared conflicts that have dissipated or that appear to have been exaggerated in some accounts. Perhaps most notable in this regard are the improvements in relations that occurred between united Germany and its immediate eastern neighbors, Poland and the Czech Republic, during the 1990s. Although not all outstanding issues have been resolved and some bitter feelings remain, armed conflict between these states is unimaginable today. Likewise, significant progress has been made toward a resolution of the problems created by the Hungarian diaspora, especially the Hungarian minority in Romania (Transylvania). And even parts of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia and increasingly Croatia, have become remarkably stable over the course of the last decade.

Within the Former Soviet Union

A comparable number of violent and potentially violent political conflicts can be found on the territory of the former Soviet Union. This state of affairs should come as no surprise, given that the Soviet Union employed repressive measures to weld together a plethora of nationalities and afforded them few opportunities for meaningful self-expression or self-determination for more than half a century, notwithstanding pretenses to the contrary. These conflicts can be roughly grouped into four subregional categories.

The first concerns relations between Russia and the Baltic states, especially Estonia and Latvia. Russia has been at odds with its much smaller northwestern neighbors to varying degrees over borders, military basing rights, and, most importantly, the treatment and status of ethnic Russians, who have constituted roughly 30 percent of the populations of Estonia and Latvia.
The situation of ethnic Russian minorities has also burdened Russian relations with several other former Soviet republics, most notably Ukraine and Moldova. In the former, the problems created by the presence of some eleven million Russians have been compounded by the concentration of many of them in industrial regions that border Russian territory and Russian claims to the Crimea, which was transferred by Russia to Ukraine in the 1950s and contains a substantial presence of ethnic Russians. In Moldova, the geographically concentrated Russian minority has even attempted to establish an independent republic, which has nevertheless failed thus far to garner international recognition.\(^\text{12}\)

Most of the violent conflicts on the territory of the FSU have taken place in the Caucasus region. The territorial integrity of Georgia has been forcibly challenged by armed, ethnically based secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nearby, Azerbaijan has been engaged in a violent struggle with separatist ethnic Armenians in the province of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has in turn strained relations between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia.

Finally, Russia faces severe internal ethnic troubles of its own. The most prominent of these are also to be found in the Caucasus, where Russia has already waged two expensive wars in Chechnya in less than a decade. Nevertheless, a real potential for violent, ethnic conflict exists in a number of other parts of the country as well, such as Tartarstan, where long-suppressed national minorities strive for greater autonomy if not outright political independence.\(^\text{13}\)

**INCENTIVES FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

What incentives might other states in the region possess for seeking to manage these conflicts? After all, even if potentially violent conflicts exist, those not directly involved will be disinclined to engage in conflict management efforts if they have no compelling interest to do so, in view of the risks and costs. And as Richard Ullman convincingly argued a decade ago, the stakes that the more stable countries of western and central Europe have in other parts of the region are lower than ever.\(^\text{14}\)

Nevertheless, the incentives for conflict management in Europe are not negligible and, indeed, have been sufficient to prompt numerous efforts at CCM, including military operations of substantial magnitude, since the end of the Cold War. The strength of these incentives will vary, however, depending upon the precise nature and location of the conflict. As Joseph Lepgold has noted, moreover, even where significant incentives exist, states may be inhibited from taking strong action because of the collective action problems associated with peace operations.\(^\text{15}\)

In the case of conflicts outside the FSU, especially in southeastern Europe, one important incentive is the danger that a violent conflict, if unaddressed, will spread to adjoining territories through a process of spillover, the uncoordinated
intervention of outside parties, or both. A second incentive follows from the be-
lief that the illegitimate resort to arms should not go unpunished, as it may oth-
erwise encourage disgruntled groups located elsewhere to use violence if they
believe that it promises success and that they can act with impunity. A some-
what more self-interested consideration is that large-scale violence can gener-
ate equally large-scale outflows of refugees. In the early 1990s, for example,
over eight hundred thousand Bosnians alone sought refuge in other European
states, including more than four hundred thousand in Germany,\(^{16}\) while at the
end of the decade, nearly a quarter million Kosovars fled to neighboring Mac-
donia. Nor, as Western governments have learned in Bosnia and Kosovo, do the
material costs stop mounting when the fighting comes to an end. Outside par-
ties interested in preventing a renewal of violent conflict may have to consider
making substantial financial contributions to the process of reconstruction over
a prolonged period.

At the same time, one should not discount the significance of purely human-
itarian motives to protect the innocent and to minimize the suffering of peoples
affected by conflict. In an age when the various media provide a steady stream
of stories about and images of the consequences of violence, most citizens in
the advanced industrial countries of Europe no longer have the luxury of being
able to remain ignorant of military depredations taking place on their continent.
Thus even where the material stakes have appeared to be low, Western gov-
ernments have come under considerable public pressure to do something to
stem the violence.

As a general rule, the incentives that the states of western and central Europe,
not to mention those of North America, have to take action are not as great
when it comes to conflicts within the FSU. The level of humanitarian concern
may be equally high. But because such conflicts are further removed geo-
graphically, these states are much less likely to be affected directly or indirectly,
except where a conflict threatens to destabilize Russia or to reverse the hard-
won democratic advances that have been made there. Conversely, the costs and
risks of involvement are likely to be higher, especially where it might put them
at odds with Russia.

The risk of serious tensions over conflict management strategies is not negli-
gible, given that Russia is itself a party to many of the conflicts in the FSU and
that, even where it is not, Russian incentives for intervention are arguably
broader and potentially inconsistent. Beyond those incentives shared with the
other states in the region, such as preventing spillover effects, they include Rus-
sia's determination to remain a major player in all aspects of European security
affairs, notwithstanding its current economic and political weaknesses. And in
those areas that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, such as the Transcau-
casus, Russia's motives may extend to a desire to retain or reestablish a signifi-
cant degree of hegemonic influence.\(^{17}\) Needless to say, such goals may at times
result in Russian actions that run counter to traditional conflict management
prescriptions.\(^{18}\) They also complicate Western calculations of how to proceed,
given the understandable desire to maintain good working relations with Russia on a range of other important issues.

In sum, both outside and within the FSU, the precise nature and strength of the incentives to engage in CCM will vary from state to state and from conflict to conflict, but they will rarely be entirely absent. The more practical question concerns the point at which they will be sufficiently strong to prompt action. In particular, will outsiders see fit to intervene early enough or in the most effective manner? The answer to this question depends, in part, on the tools available for CCM, to which I now turn.

INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR COLLECTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE

With the partial exception of Russia, the principal actors in the region are likely to engage in conflict management activities only collectively through existing multilateral security institutions. Europe possesses a set of relatively highly developed institutional capabilities of potential use for CCM. Most of these capabilities are lodged in a variety of regional organizations, the most important of which are the OSCE, NATO, and the EU/WEU. In the discussion that follows, I shall refer to such bodies as regional conflict management organizations (RCMO).

Needless to say, given their diverse origins, purposes, and memberships, these organizations differ considerably in terms of their potential CCM capabilities. The OSCE is the only truly pan-regional organization. NATO and the EU/WEU have restricted memberships but are of potentially great relevance to CCM efforts beyond the territory of their members. Yet other RCMOs, like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), are confined in both their membership and activities to particular subregions.

All, however, have evolved considerably during the past decade and will probably continue to do so. Thus the overall picture is very much a work in progress. Nevertheless, the situation has probably stabilized enough that it is possible to provide a description and comparative analysis of these organizational capacities that will not immediately become obsolete. This analysis will consider each of the following relevant organizational characteristics:

1. membership and, where it may differ, geographical area of responsibility (see table 8.3)
2. functional mandate
3. decision-making process
4. organizational capabilities and resources (see table 8.4).

With regard to the fourth characteristic, it should be emphasized that the interest of this study lies in the assets possessed by the organizations themselves
Table 8.3. Membership in European Conflict Management Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>WEU</th>
<th>CIS</th>
<th>Other OSCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Albania, Andorra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Romania</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table excludes the five Central Asian republics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis Situation</th>
<th>OSCE</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>EU/WEU</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political conflict</td>
<td>HCNM</td>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>Satellite Center</td>
<td>UN (preventive deployment, preventive diplomacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Secretary-General/IS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Court of Conciliation and Arbitration</td>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring missions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Personal representatives</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FSC (arms control, CSBMs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis situation</td>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>IMS (sanctions enforcement)</td>
<td></td>
<td>UN (mediation, sanctions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military conflict</td>
<td>Missions (sanctions assistance)</td>
<td>IMS (sanctions, threats of force, use of force)</td>
<td>Military staff (peace making)</td>
<td>UN (mediation, sanctions, mandate to use force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmilitary conflict</td>
<td>Missions (Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo)</td>
<td>IMS/PFP (peacekeeping)</td>
<td>Military staff (peacekeeping)</td>
<td>UN (monitoring, peacekeeping, administration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPC (peacekeeping)</td>
<td>Satellite Center (monitoring, verification)</td>
<td></td>
<td>CIS (peacekeeping)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FSC (arms control, CSBMs)</td>
<td>Humanitarian Office</td>
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</table>
rather than the national resources of their members. Nevertheless, the two may be closely related insofar as one purpose of the former is to facilitate and ensure the efficient use of the latter.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE is the most comprehensive, both geographically and functionally, of the RCMOs in Europe. All states in the region are eligible for membership, and in fact virtually all European states are members. Correspondingly, the OSCE possesses a standing mandate to address conflicts throughout the region, subject to decision-making constraints. The OSCE is the only RCMO in Europe that is considered a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

At the same time, the OSCE has a very broad mandate with regard to conflict management. Its various decision-making bodies can authorize a wide variety of measures. These include short-term fact-finding and rapporteur missions, long-term in-country missions that may serve several purposes (sanctions assistance, monitoring and verification, etc.), personal representatives of the Chairman-in-Office (CiO), and additional measures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Furthermore, the OSCE may undertake peacekeeping activities, although this option has not yet been exercised. Nevertheless, the mandate of the OSCE is oriented much more toward the goals of dispute resolution, early warning, escalation prevention, and crisis management rather than dealing with actual military hostilities. In particular, it lacks any explicit authority to call for the employment of coercive measures, such as economic sanctions and the use of military force, by its members.

A further limitation of the OSCE is the cumbersome nature of its decision-making process. In principle, all of its decision-making and negotiating bodies operate by consensus, which “is understood to mean the absence of any objection expressed by a participating State to the taking of the decision in question.” This requirement might not be so onerous but for the large and diverse nature of the OSCE membership and the resulting divergence of interests. In addition, decisions of the organization are not legally binding.

Nevertheless, the OSCE has, over the past decade, developed several exceptions to the consensus rule that enhance its abilities to address conflicts in the region. Under the “consensus-minus-one” principle, actions can be taken without the consent of the state concerned in “cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violation” of OSCE commitments. This mechanism was used to suspend Yugoslavia’s membership in 1992. Under the “consensus-minus-two” rule, the Ministerial Council can instruct two participating states that are involved in a dispute to seek conciliation, even if the participating states object to the decision, although this option has not yet been made use of. And the Chairman-in-Office may designate personal representatives on his or her own responsibility.

In addition, the OSCE had developed a variety of additional mechanism and procedures that are intended, in cases requiring rapid action, to facilitate
prompt and direct contact between the parties involved in a conflict and the mobilization of concerted action by the OSCE. The “Vienna Mechanism” obliges states to respond to requests for information relating to human dimension obligations and to hold bilateral meetings when requested. The “Moscow Mechanism” allows a group of six or more states to initiate the dispatch of a mission of experts to assist a state in the resolution of a particular question or problem relating to the human dimension.\footnote{22} The “Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities” obliges states to provide information regarding any unusual and unscheduled activities of their military forces when requested. And several other mechanisms were rendered superfluous by the establishment in 1993 of the Permanent Council of national representatives, which can meet on short notice.

To support its various conflict management activities, the OSCE has developed a number of distinct capabilities and resources since the end of the Cold War. Perhaps the most important of these is the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), which is responsible for overall support for the implementation of OSCE tasks in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and postconflict rehabilitation, and for daily follow-up and liaison for the execution of OSCE decisions. Since 1999, the CPC has maintained an Operations Centre to identify potential crisis areas and to plan for future missions and operations. Nevertheless, given the small size of the CPC, the OSCE’s ability to prepare and support peacekeeping operations in particular remains highly limited at this point.

Several other structures also merit mention. The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) functions as an instrument of preventive diplomacy. The HCNM aims to identify—and promote the early resolution of—ethnic tensions that have the potential to endanger peace, stability, or friendly relations between the participating states of the OSCE. The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) contributes to early warning and conflict prevention, in particular by monitoring the implementation of human dimension commitments. And states may submit disputes to the OSCE-related Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, whose final decisions are legally binding, although not all OSCE states are parties to the convention establishing the Court and the Court has not yet been used.

Somewhere between a decision-making body and an organizational capability is the multipurpose Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Its main objectives include conducting negotiations on arms control, disarmament, and confidence- and security-building and holding regular consultations and intensive cooperation on matters relating to security. The FSC is also responsible for the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), the holding of Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings, the provision of a forum for discussing and clarifying information exchanged under agreed upon CSBMs, and the preparation of seminars on military doctrine. Among its achievements have been the negotiation of a CSBM regime for Bosnia and a subregional arms control agreement for much of the former Yugoslavia.
NATO, which dates back to 1949, is the oldest of the European organizations with significant CCM capabilities. It is also arguably the one whose security functions have changed the most over the years. In sharp contrast to the OSCE, NATO began as a traditional alliance with a primary focus on the protection of its members against external threats. Only in the 1990s did it acquire explicit conflict management responsibilities. As a result of this rather different life history, many of the areas in which the OSCE is weakest are those in which NATO is strongest, and vice versa.

Unlike the case of the OSCE, membership in NATO is restricted. The existing members may chose to invite other states to join the organization, but there are no explicit criteria for membership. Currently, NATO has nineteen members. Nevertheless, NATO involves a number of other states in its activities through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (which supplanted the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1997) and, especially, its Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Participation in the PFP is based on agreements negotiated between individual countries and NATO regarding the scope, pace, and level of joint activities in which they would like to engage. Currently, some twenty-seven additional states have established cooperative programs with NATO under the PFP.

The North Atlantic Treaty was carefully worded to ensure that members' obligations to one another did not extend beyond their territories in Europe and North America (with the exception of attacks on member forces located in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic). At the same time, however, the Treaty does not prohibit the members from acting collectively outside this so-called North Atlantic Area, should they wish to do so. In addition, under the terms of the PFP, NATO is obliged to consult with any active participant if that state perceives a direct threat to its security.

One consequence of NATO's restricted membership is that its decisions do not automatically command legitimacy in areas outside those covered by the treaty. As a result, members are typically—but not always, as evidenced in Kosovo—reluctant to act collectively "out of area" in the absence of an explicit mandate from the United Nations or the OSCE. In practical terms, this means that the use of NATO for CCM activities is highly unlikely on the territory of the former Soviet Union and, especially, in Russia proper.

During the Cold War, NATO's formal mandate focused on the closely related tasks of deterring military attacks on its members and defending them should an attack nevertheless occur. Since the end of the Cold War, this mandate has been considerably broadened and now includes explicitly the functions of "conflict prevention and crisis management." The alliance's most recent strategic concept, adopted in 1999, notes the possibility of conducting "crisis response operations" such as those that have been carried out in the Balkans and reiterates NATO's offer to support "peacekeeping and other operations under
the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.24

Although the strategic concept is less explicit on this point, it also envisages a variety of activities intended to ameliorate or even resolve political conflicts. Through the “active pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue” with nonmembers, NATO aims “to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead to instability and conflict.” This task complements the alliance’s long-standing (at least since the admission of Germany in 1955), if always implicit, function of defusing political conflict among its members by increasing transparency, promoting military interdependence, and perpetuating U.S. involvement in European security affairs.25

Like the OSCE, NATO acts on the basis of consensus. This requirement means that decision making on contentious issues, such as those often associated with conflict management, can be slow and difficult.

For several reasons, however, consensus is generally easier to attain in NATO than in the OSCE. Most obviously, the achievement of consensus is facilitated by NATO’s smaller membership. Perhaps even more important is the fact that, as a general rule, the interests of NATO countries are more closely aligned with one another than are those of OSCE members, which is a consequence of the alliance’s restricted membership. A third factor is the large number of well-exercised bodies and procedures for timely consultation and the exchange of information. In addition, deliberation within the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s highest-level decision-making body, can be expedited by the presence of a strong secretary-general, who can use his authority to propose and broker compromises in cases where the membership is divided.26 Finally, in some instances, the existence of a dominant member, the United States, has helped to overcome differences where it has been willing to lead.

NATO’s most distinctive organizational asset for carrying out crisis management activities is its integrated military planning and command structure and associated multilateral military assets, such as the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force. When supplemented by PFP-related bodies, especially the Partnership Coordination Cell, the integrated military structure (IMS) greatly facilitates the collective deployment and use of military forces by NATO members and partner countries. Even as it has been considerably streamlined since the end of the Cold War, this structure has developed the ability to orchestrate out-of-area multilateral military operations of substantial size and complexity, as evidenced by the various NATO actions in the Balkans. Consequently, NATO remains the RCMO best positioned to engage in the enforcement of sanctions, peacekeeping, direct intervention, and other types of military operations.

The principal question that has arisen regarding the utility of the IMS concerns possible instances in which one or more members might wish not to participate in a proposed joint military operation outside the NATO area. During the Cold War, the military structure made no provisions for less than unanimous engagement in defense operations by participating states, reflecting the near
water-tight obligation to provide assistance contained in Article 5 of the treaty. Many now imaginable out-of-area conflict management activities would carry no such obligation, however. To address this potential problem, the alliance has developed and begun to implement the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), which is intended to allow "coalitions of the willing" to draw upon NATO headquarters and other military assets in order to engage in nondefense actions, as long as no member expresses an objection to them.

In contrast to the OSCE, NATO's organizational capabilities for nonmilitary aspects of conflict management are much less well articulated. Nevertheless, a substantial reservoir of such capabilities is inherent in the large International Staff (IS) maintained by the alliance in Brussels. In particular, the NATO secretary-general possesses the stature and authority to serve as an effective intermediary, as evidenced in Macedonia in 2001.

**European Union (EU)/Western European Union (WEU)**

The EU and the WEU were originally distinct organizations. During the past decade, however, they have drawn ever closer together, especially with regard to potential activities in the area of crisis management. Consequently, it is necessary to consider them together for the purposes of this chapter.

Currently, the EU and WEU are the least developed of all the major European security institutions as RCMOs. In particular, their dedicated organizational capabilities and resources for engaging in conflict management activities are less substantial than those of either the OSCE or NATO at the moment. Nevertheless, this situation is very much in flux, as the EU has recently launched an unprecedented effort to develop a capacity to conduct military missions in response to international crises. In view of the EU's success in other fields of international cooperation, its potential to become a leading, if not the leading, regional organization in the field of conflict management is considerable, although it is too early to discern clearly how far the EU will actually proceed along this path and the form that it will eventually take.

Like NATO, both the EU and the WEU have restricted memberships. There is much overlap among the three organizations. Of the current fifteen EU members, eleven also belong to NATO and the other four participate in the PFP. All ten present WEU members are in both NATO and the EU.27

At the moment, it is arguably more difficult for former Soviet bloc states to join the EU (and, by extension, the WEU) than NATO because of the significant economic ramifications of membership in the former. Nevertheless, beginning in the 1990s, the WEU has sought to work as closely as possible with non-members, creating the categories of Associate Member (for European NATO members not in the EU), Associate Partner (for states in neither NATO nor the EU), and Observer. Likewise, the EU has recently indicated its desire to involve nonmembers to "the fullest possible extent" in EU-led crisis management activities, although concrete arrangements have yet to be devised.28
Neither the Treaty on European Union (TEU) nor the modified Brussels Treaty on which the WEU is based establishes a clear geographical area of responsibility. Nevertheless, the implications of recent decisions are that both organizations regard a wide range of foreign, security, and defense policy activities beyond the territory of their members as falling within their competence.

Within this broad mandate, what specific types of conflict management activities are envisioned? The original Brussels Treaty of 1948 was concerned with the defense of its signatories against attack, but this function was assumed by NATO in the mid-1950s. In 1987, however, WEU leaders called for concerted policies toward crises outside of Europe, paving the way for the dispatch of a small WEU naval contingent to the Persian Gulf. And in 1992, they articulated a detailed set of military actions, collectively known as the “Petersberg tasks,” for which their forces might be used: humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping operations, and the use of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The following month, the WEU approved the deployment of a naval task force to the Adriatic to monitor the UN arms embargo against former Yugoslavia.

Although its origins date back to the 1950s, the EU did not acquire broad competence in the area of security and defense, as part of a common foreign and security policy, until the formulation and ratification of the TEU (commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty) in the early 1990s. Further amendments, contained in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, explicitly identified the Petersberg tasks as part of the EU mandate in this area, setting the stage for a process whereby the EU will assume all WEU functions except that of collective defense. More recently, the European Council, the EU’s highest-level decision-making body, has frequently emphasized the importance of the EU’s tasks in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. In fact, the EU has already been very active since the early 1990s in attempting to resolve regional political conflicts, prevent their escalation, and stabilize and reconstruct war-torn areas.

As with NATO, WEU decisions are made on the basis of consensus. Whether consensus is any easier (because of its smaller membership) or difficult (because of the lack of a dominant power) to achieve in the WEU than in NATO on weighty issues is difficult to ascertain, given that the WEU has been used relatively infrequently and in much more limited ways.

The situation in the EU is more complicated. Initially, the TEU required that substantive decisions regarding the common foreign and security policy be made unanimously, except where it had been previously agreed to act on the basis of a qualified majority. The Amsterdam Treaty, however, established a more differentiated process. In principle, the Council would act unanimously when making decisions. However, one or more members could abstain without preventing the adoption of a decision by the others.

Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the option of “qualified abstention,” involving a formal declaration, whereby the abstaining party would not be obliged to apply the decision even as it accepted that the decision committed the
EU as a whole. Only if the members qualifying their abstention represented more than one third of the weighted votes would a decision not be adopted. Nevertheless, a single country could still block the adoption of a decision by explicitly opposing it, and this novel procedure does not apply to decisions having military or defense implications.

More recently, the EU has created new political and military bodies within the European Council to facilitate effective and timely decision making during the conduct of military crisis management operations. A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) consisting of national representatives will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of such operations. In addition, a Military Committee (MC) has been established to provide military advice and make recommendations to the PSC.

The principal limitations of the EU and WEU with regard to their potential use for conflict management lie in the area of organizational capabilities and resources. Thus far, the EU has relied primarily on the European Commission, its executive organ, to support nonmilitary crisis management activities. Given its size and resources, the Commission has a great capacity to coordinate diplomatic efforts, observer missions, economic assistance, sanctions, and other measures. Nevertheless, the EU has created few dedicated assets to implement its decisions, and these have tended to be ad hoc bodies with country-specific mandates, such as the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) in the former Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Task Force, and the European Agency for Reconstruction.

This situation may see significant change in the near future, however. The EU presidency concluded its work in 1999 with a call for the development of a "rapid reaction capability in the field of crisis management using nonmilitary means." Among the elements envisioned for such a capability were an inventory of relevant national and collective personnel, material, and financial resources, a coordinating mechanism within the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, and rapid financing mechanisms, such as a Rapid Reaction Fund. In addition, the recently created office of High Representative for the EU in the area of foreign and security policy provides a potentially useful focal point for preventive diplomacy and crisis management activities.

On the military side, the primary crisis management capabilities have resided until recently in the WEU, which established a small planning cell (subsequently renamed the Military Staff) and a satellite data interpretation center in the early to mid-1990s. Nevertheless, the WEU possesses no forces or permanent command structures of its own and relies instead on NATO or individual countries to provide them on a case-by-case basis.

The organizational resources of the EU have been even more limited. It was not until 1999 that the EU made it a priority to acquire a capacity for autonomous action, including the launching and conduct of EU-led military missions, in response to international crises. Particular importance was assigned to the reinforcement of EU capabilities in the fields of intelligence, strategic transport, and
command and control. In addition, the EU agreed to create a new Military Staff within the Council that would provide military expertise and support, and perform early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks. The ultimate goal is to be able to deploy within sixty days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to fifty to sixty thousand persons.

The principal challenge facing the EU in the development of such a capacity is the expressed need to do so “without unnecessary duplication” of NATO assets. Consequently, emphasis has been placed on developing more effective European military capabilities on the basis of existing “national, binational, and multinational capabilities.” The presence of this constraint suggests that the EU will continue to rely heavily on the use of NATO resources and capabilities, should they be available, to mount operations of any significant size for the foreseeable future.

Other Regional Conflict Management Bodies

This survey does not exhaust the list of bodies that have made a contribution to conflict management in the region or could do so in the future. One of these is the Contact Group, which has been used to good effect in Bosnia. In fact, the Contact Group is not a formal organization but rather an informal mechanism for coordinating the policy of a handful of major powers: the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Italy. As such, it might be viewed as an emergent regional security council, although it has thus far confined itself to addressing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

This arrangement results in both significant advantages and limitations in comparison with other RCMOs. On the one hand, the small size of its membership, the lack of formal procedures, and the possibility of secrecy may facilitate the reaching of agreements in a timely manner, while the identity of its members ensures that any agreements will be backed by significant national resources. On the other hand, the exclusion of other countries may generate hard feelings and cast doubt on the broader legitimacy of any agreed actions, at least until they are considered in other organizational fora. In addition, the Contact Group possesses no capabilities of its own. Consequently, it seems likely that it will be used only sporadically and as a complement to other organizations.

Europe also features several subregional security organizations, the most important of which is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS was hastily established at the end of 1991 as part of the process by which the USSR was dissolved. Originally consisting of eleven of the fifteen former Soviet republics, it was initially given only a very limited organizational structure and no formal authority in the area of security, reflecting the reluctance of most of its members to create any powerful institutions that could threaten their newfound sovereignty. The highly restricted institutional design was supplemented in 1993 by a Charter that provided for policy coordination and joint consultation in security and defense policy and created a council of foreign ministers
and a council of defense ministers. It also established a High Command of the United Armed Forces that could exercise control over groups of military observers and collective peacekeeping forces. Nevertheless, only seven of the eleven original members signed the Charter, greatly limiting its potential application. In fact, the CIS has been employed for the purpose of conflict management only once so far, and then only to give international legitimacy to a Russian peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia. As Neil MacFarlane concludes, “to the extent that [the CIS] serves any purpose, it is as an instrument of Russian foreign policy in the former Soviet space.”

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Before assessing the adequacy of these bodies for regional crisis management, it is necessary to consider the role of the United Nations (UN). Not only is the UN the principal extraregional institution of relevance, but it is also the main vehicle for involvement by potentially interested nonregional powers, notably China by virtue of its status as a permanent member of the Security Council. During the Cold War, the UN was rarely called upon to promote security in Europe. That task fell almost exclusively to the opposing alliance systems and, later, the CSCE. Since 1990, however, the global body has been pressed into service on numerous occasions as a substitute for or complement to regional organizations attempting to deal with conflicts on the continent.

There is no need to review the UN’s membership and geographical area of responsibility, functional mandate, decision-making procedures, and organizational capabilities and resources, all of which are well known. For the purposes of this chapter, it will suffice to describe the ways it has been used in Europe during the past decade. These uses fall into four broad categories, reflecting the organization’s comprehensive authority.

First, in areas characterized by active hostilities, the UN—or, more accurately, the Security Council—has been the principal author of international sanctions on combatants, most notably in the former Yugoslavia. There, it has variously established an arms embargo, a comprehensive trade embargo, a no-fly zone, safe areas, and heavy weapons exclusion zones. Where the deployment and use of military forces has been deemed necessary to enforce these sanctions, the Security Council has provided mandates to NATO and other regional organizations.

Second, the UN has sponsored peacekeeping operations, preventive military deployments, and observer missions intended to prevent the outbreak or a renewal of hostilities in areas characterized by high levels of tension. In some cases, such as Croatia and Macedonia, these activities have been carried out by traditional “blue helmet” forces. In Bosnia and Kosovo, however, where the military requirements of the mission were expected to be high, the UN has turned responsibility for implementation over to NATO.
Third, the UN has played an important role in postconflict political and economic rehabilitation. In Kosovo, for example, the UN has assumed overall authority as well as day-to-day responsibility for the civilian administration of that war-torn province. Finally, at various stages in several conflicts, the UN has used diplomacy to prevent the escalation of violence and to assist with the search for peaceful solutions.

EVALUATION: THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

This survey finds that Europe possesses an abundance of institutional capabilities for collective conflict management, many of which reside in three sets of organizations: the OSCE, NATO, and the EU/WEU. Moreover, these capabilities are quite diverse in nature, corresponding to the full range of potentially desirable crisis management activities identified above (table 8.4). Thus, on paper at least, the overall potential for successful conflict management in Europe seems quite high.

Two additional observations lend further credence to this general conclusion. The first is that these capabilities are not simply the result of abstract speculation about what might be desirable. Rather, they have been developed largely in response to the need to address specific recent conflicts in the region, suggesting their relevance to likely future conflicts as well. The second and related observation is that many of these capabilities have been tested in a number of conflict situations during the past decade, to increasingly (although not always) good effect.

The 1990s witnessed multiple cycles in which regional conflicts elicited the development of new organizational capabilities, which were then employed and, where necessary, modified to increase their effectiveness. Through such a process, for example, the ability of the OSCE to plan, deploy, and support long-term missions has been greatly enhanced. Likewise, NATO, in response to external pressures, has made the transition in but a decade from a military organization designed only for deterrence and defense to one that can mount collective enforcement and peacekeeping operations of unprecedented size and intensity. In fact, NATO has supplanted the UN as the principal source of peacekeeping forces in the region. Although the EU has evolved perhaps the most slowly of the major regional organizations, it has departed the furthest from its original purposes, as witnessed by its recent efforts to develop a military capability of its own and to promote stability in Southeastern Europe. And one body, the Contact Group, owes its very existence to post-Cold War regional conflicts, although the limits of its usefulness were also made clear by the deep divisions among its members that arose over the handling of the Kosovo crisis.

To be sure, one can point to numerous instances in which one or more European RCMOs proved ineffective or inadequate for the conflict management
task at hand. Indeed, there has probably been no occasion on which a regional organization has performed flawlessly or achieved all of the goals set for it. The more important point, however, is that these CCM capabilities have evolved considerably over time largely in response to their perceived shortcomings and failures. Consequently, the past performance of European RCMOs provides little basis for assessing the future prospects for successful conflict management, although the overall trend—from the EU’s unsuccessful diplomacy as Yugoslavia dissolved in 1991 to NATO’s forceful intervention in Kosovo at the end of the decade—seems positive.

**Within the Former Soviet Union**

Nevertheless, the availability and potential effectiveness of these CCM capabilities varies considerably depending on the location of the conflict (see table 8.5). The prospects for successful CCM are dimmest within the FSU, where the involvement of RCMOs is highly dependent upon the approval of Russia. As a result, NATO and the EU/WEU are unlikely to be called upon to address conflict in the region because of Russian mistrust of the Western powers that dominate them. And even though the mandate of the OSCE extends throughout Europe, the nature and degree of that organization’s involvement in the FSU also remains hostage to Russian policy.

As a general rule, Russia will probably prefer to act alone, or at least without external constraints, within the former Soviet space and especially on its own

**Table 8.5. Organizational Conflict Management Capabilities by Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Outside FSU</th>
<th>Inside FSU</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early warning: monitoring,</td>
<td>OSCE (HCNM, ODIHR), EU (satellite center, humanitarian office, monitoring missions)</td>
<td>OSCE, UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>observation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive diplomacy and</td>
<td>OSCE (HCNM, LT missions), EU (HiRep), Contact Group, UN</td>
<td>OSCE, UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crisis diplomacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjudication</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive deployments</td>
<td>UN, NATO, OSCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion: sanctions</td>
<td>UN, OSCE, EU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion: military threats</td>
<td>UN, NATO (IMS), WEU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of force: sanctions</td>
<td>NATO (IMS), WEU</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of force: direct intervention</td>
<td>NATO (IMS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UN, NATO (IMS, PFP), EU, OSCE</td>
<td>CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms control/CSBMAs</td>
<td>OSCE (FSC), EU (satellite center)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and technical</td>
<td>UN, OSCE, EU (Agency for Reconstruction, monitoring missions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil administration/policing</td>
<td>UN, EU/WEU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution building</td>
<td>EU, UN</td>
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territory. Russia acted on its own initiative to address the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, eventually sending forces to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (The latter deployment was later authorized as a regional peacekeeping operation by the CIS, although it continued to be manned and financed exclusively by Russia.) And in Chechnya, it has strongly resisted even the most limited proposals by the OSCE and the Council of Europe to dispatch small numbers of observers. To make matters worse, Russia may sometimes have an interest in exploiting ethnic divisions in the former Soviet republics in order to enhance its influence in those states.

In some cases, Russia may be willing to allow the involvement of the OSCE and the UN where doing so appears to advance its own interests. In the Baltics, the OSCE proved useful in ensuring that the interests of Russian minorities were protected. And Russia was able to secure the approval of the UN Security Council for the peacekeeping force that it had already deployed in Abkhazia, thereby legitimating its actions, although it was unsuccessful in obtaining external financing for the operation.

Russia's relationship with these organizations has not been entirely one-sided, however. In several ways, OSCE involvement in the Baltic worked in favor of Estonia and Lithuania, and the resolution of the conflicts there will certainly reduce Russia's influence in the long term. In return for UN and OSCE support in Georgia, moreover, Russia has been required to make accommodations that in turn have limited its freedom of action. International observers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have increased the level of transparency and to some extent acculturated Russian forces to international norms regarding peacekeeping.

Outside the Former Soviet Union

In contrast, the prospects for successful conflict management in areas lying outside the FSU are relatively bright. There, the full range of CCM capabilities has been employed and is likely to be available for use in the future. Rather than an insufficiency of capabilities, a principal challenge is posed by their dispersal among multiple organizations. No single RCMO can perform all the conflict management activities that might be desirable in a given instance. Each suffers from important limitations in terms of geographical area of responsibility, functional mandate, and organizational capabilities and resources.

This decentralization can result in several different types of problems. First, the existence of multiple organizations may encourage buck-passing, as occurred to some extent in the early stages of the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. At that time, NATO stood on the sidelines while the EU demonstrated the then very limited nature of abilities in the field of conflict management. Second, it creates the potential for interorganizational conflict and the wasteful duplication of assets. Certainly, the initial deployment of separate NATO and WEU naval task forces in the Adriatic to monitor the UN embargo on the former Yu-
goslovnia did not represent the most efficient use of member states' military resources. So far, however, serious problems of this nature have been avoided, although such concerns underlie many of the disagreements over the desirability and feasibility of an EU military force, given the existence of NATO. Thus at least as important as augmenting the conflict management capacity of European RCMOs is the need to ensure that their existing capabilities are well used through careful coordination both during and between crises.

At the same time, it is important to recognize the advantages afforded by this decentralization and perhaps even some organizational redundancy. It broadens the range of options available to decision makers, providing them with fallbacks should an initial approach prove ineffective. Likewise, it enables interested outside parties to bring multiple pressures to bear on conflict situations, as exemplified by the simultaneous NATO and EU diplomatic initiatives in Macedonia in 2001. Alternatively, decentralization may allow for effective task specialization and thus a politically wise distribution of the burdens of conflict management, as long as adequate coordination is attained. Indeed, the functions and capabilities of the OSCE, NATO, and EU might be viewed as increasingly complementary. Certainly, all three of these RCMOs in partnership with the UN have been able to accomplish more working side by side in Kosovo than any one of them might have achieved alone.

A further caveat follows from the enduring dependence of RCMOs on the UN, especially the need for approval by the UN Security Council for the undertaking of coercive sanctions, peacekeeping, and other military actions. With the partial exception of the OSCE, which could, in principle, mount peacekeeping operations without reference to the global body, the security organizations in Europe lack the authority to engage in coercive or forceful activities on their own. Consequently, military actions without a UN mandate will lack legitimacy and, as a result, may want for domestic as well as international support.

To be sure, the recent case of Kosovo, where NATO forces engaged in a large-scale bombing campaign against Serbia over the objections of two permanent members of the Security Council, would seem to contradict this assertion. Nevertheless, Kosovo is much more an exception to the rule than an indication of likely future trends. This aberration was only made possible by an unusual set of circumstances, particularly Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's long history of using violence and flouting international efforts to promote peace in the Balkans. Also noteworthy are the limited aims pursued by the NATO allies, which never denied Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, and the leading UN role in subsequent efforts to restore order in the province. In general, NATO members remain unlikely to take forceful action without the prior approval of the UN.

Notwithstanding such constraints, the most striking feature of the current situation in Europe outside the FSU is the relative abundance of organizational capabilities for CCM in comparison with the potential need to employ them. Even as these capabilities were being built up during the 1990s, a number of regional
conflicts were being defused and even resolved. Military conflict within and among the states of Central Eastern Europe now seems no more plausible than in Western Europe, and even parts of the former Yugoslavia—Slovenia and perhaps now Croatia—have become highly stable. As a result, few political conflicts with a significant potential for violence remain outside of the FSU and the Balkans, and in almost every part of the Balkans, the major RCMOs are already heavily involved in activities ranging from the suppression of violence to post-conflict rehabilitation.

The Future Importance of Transformational Processes

In view of this situation, one might be tempted to venture that, again with the exception of conflicts in the FSU, the main European RCMOs are in the process of putting themselves out of business. Such a conclusion would betray, however, an inappropriately narrow conception of conflict management. There is still much work to be done, but it is not the type of work, such as air strikes and aggressive peacekeeping, that makes headlines. Rather, the focus will be on transforming potential sites of conflict into stable, prosperous democracies where internal and international differences are consistently addressed through peaceful means. The ultimate goal would be to convert the entire region into a zone of peace in which militarized political conflict is impossible or unimaginable.

Each of the major RCMOs discussed in this chapter has already played a role in this transformational process and can continue to do so. In the case of the OSCE, focal points for such activities are the HCNM and the ODIHR. The mandate of the HCNM describes the position as “an instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage.” As noted above, the High Commissioner’s role is to identify and to seek the early resolution of ethnic tensions. Although the HCNM is not intended to act as an advocate for national minorities, the HCNM’s recommendations to states often concern the adoption of measures to ensure adequate protection of the rights of persons belonging to minority groups.40

The ODIHR, founded in 1990 as the Office for Free Elections, works to transform member states in three principal ways. It promotes democratic elections, particularly by monitoring election processes. It provides practical support, such as training programs, technical assistance, education projects, and the dissemination of information, for the consolidation of democratic institutions and human rights and the strengthening of civil society and the rule of law. And it monitors the compliance of member states with their human rights commitments.41

The transformational potentials of NATO and the EU are probably even greater. NATO already works to incorporate potential sites of conflict in Europe into the western zone of peace through two principal, related mechanisms. The first of these is the PFP, which from the beginning has had an explicitly transformational agenda. A central purpose of the PFP has been to promote the commitment to democratic principles. In particular, non-NATO participants pledge themselves to work toward democratic control of their armed forces and transparency in national defense planning and budgeting.42
The NATO enlargement process has taken these objectives a step further. The 1995 “Study on NATO Enlargement” set forth the following transformational rationales: encouraging and supporting democratic reforms; promoting good-neighborly relations; increasing transparency in defense planning and military budgets; and reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values. NATO has resisted establishing explicit criteria for membership. Nevertheless, successful applicants almost certainly have to be stable democracies. In addition, the prospect of membership provides aspirants with a powerful incentive to resolve conflicts with their neighbors, as exemplified by the successful conclusion of an agreement in 1996 between Hungary and Romania regarding the Hungarian minority in Transylvania after years of bickering. Although some have questioned whether NATO has in fact done anything to advance democratization, membership in the alliance seems certain to lock in the important democratic gains that have been made in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War.

In the long term, however, it may be the EU that does the most to eliminate the potential for military conflict in Europe. The EU disposes of unmatched material resources that can be used to promote economic development, internal reform, and external reconciliation in potential or actual trouble spots. A leading example of such an effort is the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process, which offers substantial economic, financial, and technical assistance to five Balkan states in return for their compliance with a variety of conditions regarding political and economic development and regional cooperation.

Additional resources are being devoted to preparing twelve candidate countries for membership. Although these states are already characterized by stable democratic institutions, substantial progress toward the establishment of market economies, and relatively good human rights records, the process of preparing for EU membership entails undertaking internal changes that go far beyond those required by NATO. Once admitted, moreover, new members will find themselves enmeshed in a set of institutional relationships, involving the sacrifice of some national sovereignty, that largely precludes the possibility of and eliminates the utility of resorting to political violence. A further advantage of the EU is that it is not encumbered like NATO by the baggage of the Cold War, allowing it to include among its current candidate members Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all former Soviet republics.

Thus, it seems quite plausible that, within a decade or two, the zone of peace will have expanded to include most of Europe outside of the FSU and even the Baltic states. Most if not all of these states either will be full members of the EU and NATO or will enjoy very close ties with both organizations. With the exception of the remaining areas of the FSU, traditional conflict management activities—early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and so on—will have been rendered largely irrelevant. It can also be reasonably hoped that substantial and growing ties between the inhabitants of this region and their eastern neighbors, especially Russia and Ukraine, will exert pacifying and stabilizing effects on the latter.
Perhaps the biggest remaining question is whether the members of NATO and the EU will have the political will to see this transformational process through to a desirable conclusion. The costs of EU enlargement, while probably manageable, have nevertheless engendered stiff political opposition from many of the domestic actors who stand to lose. The NATO deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo have frequently been criticized for their open-ended nature and the lack of any well-defined exit strategies. And the new Bush administration took office in 2001 having talked in the presidential campaign about establishing a new “division of labor” within NATO, whereby the United States would no longer participate in Balkan peacekeeping operations, a move that many observers feared would prevent the West from achieving its goals in the region and could even pose a serious threat to the alliance itself.46

One should not exaggerate the obstacles, however. Despite the criticism directed at the NATO deployments in the Balkans, they have proven remarkably enduring. Certainly, the experience of Bosnia, where alliance forces have been stationed for more than half a decade, suggests that it may be possible to sustain such missions for an extended period of time. And it did not take long for President Bush to affirm the continuing importance of full U.S. participation.47 Finally, although enlargement of the EU to include states from the former Soviet bloc is not yet a certainty, the organization took the final steps in the process of preparing itself for the acceptance of new members with the approval of Treaty of Nice in late 2000. The completion of the current negotiations on accession now seems to be just a matter of time.

NOTES

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1. As discussed below, I define Europe to include much but not all of the former Soviet Union.


3. I borrow the term “zone of peace” from Richard H. Ullman, “Enlarging the Zone of Peace,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (Fall 1990).

4. This area includes the Transcaucasian republics but not the Central Asian republics of the FSU.

5. A useful survey is Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Conflicts in the OSCE Area (n.d.); available online at www.prio.no/html/osce-contents.asp [accessed 24 August 2002].

6. Technically, Serbia forms part of Yugoslavia, which also includes Montenegro. Because these conflicts involve the Serbs in particular rather than Yugoslavia as a whole, however, direct reference will frequently be made to Serbia.

8. Writing more than a decade ago, Larrabee noted the existence of an important ethnic dimension to this conflict concerning the rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece (Larrabee, “Long Memories and Short Fuses,” 76). More recent reports suggest a significant improvement in Greek-Macedonian relations since the mid-1990s, however.


18. Russia has been accused of encouraging and assisting separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and the Dniestr region of Moldova. For an overview of Russia’s involvement in Georgia, see S. Neil MacFarlane, “On the Front Lines in the Near Abroad: The CIS and the OSCE in Georgia’s Civil Wars,” *Third World Quarterly* 18 (1997).

19. The OSCE currently has fifty-five members, including five Central Asian republics.

20. See also Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, *European Security Institutions: Ready for the Twenty-First Century?* (Dulles, Va.: Brassey’s, 2000), 118.


22. The term “human dimension” refers to the commitments made by OSCE participating states to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote the principles of democracy and, in this regard, to build, strengthen, and protect democratic institutions, as well as to promote tolerance throughout the OSCE area. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE Handbook).


25. For further discussion, see John S. Duffield, “NATO’s Functions After the Cold War,” *Political Science Quarterly* 109 (Winter 1994/95).

26. A good example is Secretary-General Manfred Wörner’s role in facilitating the February 1994 NATO decision to impose a heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo.
27. The five EU members that do not belong to the WEU are Denmark, which is in NATO, and the traditionally neutral Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and Austria.
30. A principal exception is the EU’s small European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO).
32. The High Representative also serves as secretary-general of the intergovernmental European Council.
34. Not participating initially were the three Baltic states and Georgia. In late 1993, however, the latter was pressured into joining in return for Russian help in dealing with its internal conflicts.