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The Dissertation Advisory Committee and the student’s Department Chair, as representatives of the faculty, certify that this dissertation has met all standards of excellence and scholarship as determined by the faculty. The Dean of the College of Education concurs.

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ABSTRACT

SOUNDINGS: MUSICAL AESTHETICS IN
MUSIC EDUCATION DISCOURSE
FROM 1907 TO 1958
by
Jeremy M. Kopkas

In this dissertation I examine the discourse of music educators as it relates to musical aesthetics in the United States from the creation of the Music Supervisors’ Conference in 1907 to the year of the publication of *Basic Concepts of Music Education: The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part 1* in 1958. The purpose of this dissertation is to show that philosophical discussion, especially in relation to musical aesthetics, was much more comprehensive than previously acknowledged. The conventional view that the arguments supporting music education were primarily utilitarian is a limited interpretation of the discourse prior to 1958. In actuality, arguments about music extended beyond its practical social, economic, and political utility. Additional aesthetic theories guided the field and girded ideas of musical understanding and informed instruction. A better understanding of the discourse of this period contributes to more informed conversations about musical aesthetics and its relation to music education. Utilizing philosophical analysis and archival research, I argue in this dissertation that the philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics was rich, varied, insightful, and pervasive. The evidence in this dissertation refutes the standard interpretation which eschews the possibility of discourse on aesthetics taking place prior to 1958. I show that there was deeper philosophical analysis than what is
currently acknowledged by those who presently make the claim that what was intended to happen generally in the field of music education and during instruction was solely guided by utilitarian philosophy. In other words, it expands the current understanding of philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics in music education before the Music Education as Aesthetic Education movement that is argued to begin with the publication of *Basic Concepts*. 
SOUNDINGS: MUSICAL AESTHETICS IN MUSIC EDUCATION DISCOURSE FROM 1907 TO 1958
by
Jeremy M. Kopkas

A Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Educational Policy Studies in the Department of Educational Policy Studies in the College of Education Georgia State University

Atlanta, Georgia 2011
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing, much like the disciplines of philosophy and history, is a process which incorporates numerous perspectives and is often the result of thought over time. Rarely are large works written in one sitting, and while there may be the occasional genius who is able to sequester himself/herself and produce works of brilliance, I am not one of them. Instead I am indebted to many individuals and unnamed forces that have influenced my thinking and this dissertation. In particular those who have endured the challenges of interacting with me during this process deserve special mention. It is because of them this project has taken its present form.

The guidance, thoughtful advice, and personal attention I received from members of my dissertation committee were integral to my own thought process and to this work. On several occasions my committee chair, Deron Boyles, took more time away from his busy schedule than he could spare. Had he not given this dissertation the attention he did it would be a much more scattered and longer study. His profound influence on me has helped to guide my thinking about knowledge issues in education. Philo Hutcheson provided important historical insights from the time I began to struggle with the topic, which was almost at the beginning of the doctoral program. The guilt I felt by asking him to read so many long iterations of ideas contained within this larger work runs deep, yet he read my papers with great attention and care each and every time. I was also privileged to work with David Myers, whose knowledge and experience in the field of music education were indispensable. It is with his help, over the course of several individual meetings, that this topic took its final form. Even while he was hundreds, and sometimes thousands of miles away, he continued to assist me in this research. Jodi Kaufmann, a last moment addition to the team, was willing to pitch in and participate as an important member of the committee. Each of you has bought to this dissertation important insights from your areas of expertise making it a more thorough and substantial study. Finally, I am thankful to the members of the Southeastern Philosophy of Education Society and Southern History of Education Society who helped critique aspects of this paper.

There are many others who have helped me through the program and with this dissertation. Tom McIntyre is largely responsible for recommending that I pursue a doctorate and, understanding my interests, nudged me toward the Educational Policy Studies program at Georgia State University. John and Marcia Robinson, my parents and musicians in the truest sense, taught me many important lessons, of which music was a bigger part than they are aware. Their invaluable perspectives as music educators and their stories of their own training as musicians and scholars helped me to think of this project as something that could be managed.

Finally, it is with the utmost sincerity and heartfelt emotion that I thank my family for putting up with me for the past five and one-half years. Grace and Charlie have been patient beyond what should be required of any six and two-year-old while I wrote this
“blah, blah, blah” book. Most of all, I thank Diane, my dear and loving wife, for whom none of this would have been possible. She read countless papers over the course of the program and many drafts of this dissertation to ensure that I submitted work that had proper comma placement and grammatical structure – no small matter since my topics and writing style can be considered less than dynamic. Hers was truly a labor of love. She held the family together and was an exceptional parent, wife, and teacher, while I took on a project that was far more selfish and far less formidable than anything she was doing. She is the most remarkable intellectual I have ever encountered, and it is to her that this project is dedicated.
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CHAPTER 1

OVERTURE: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

An examination of the writing and research on the subject of music education from the time of music’s official sanction in the public schools in the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century to the present reveals a consistent theme of justification for music’s inclusion as a course of study in the curriculum. Leading public figures in United States education and music education history from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such as Horace Mann, and numerous music educators including Charles Aiken, Luther Whiting Mason, Frances Elliott Clark, Osbourne McConathy, Will Earhart, Peter Dykema, Lilla Belle Pitts, Russell V. Morgan, and Robert Choate supplied a variety of arguments supporting the instruction of music in schools. In 1836 the Boston Academy of Music, of which Lowell Mason was a member, issued a report that argued for music education’s importance on the grounds of its intellectual, moral, and physical benefits in addition to the Academy’s assertion that music was an important recreational diversion from more “laborious” academic work.¹ Since these early years research has been conducted and opinions given with the goal of showing the ways in which music does indeed improve the intellectual, moral, and physical capacities of the student and by extension society. The prevailing logic of this largely utilitarian philosophical

¹ Edward Bailey Birge, History of Public School Music in the United States (New York: Oliver Ditson Co. 1928; reprint Washington D.C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1966), 40 – 43. 1838 is the date often given as the point at which public school music received public support. It was on August 28, 1838 that the Boston School board voted to place music side by side with arithmetic and grammar in several of the public schools in the city.
perspective is that if music can be shown to improve the student and society, then it ought to continue to be an important part of the school curriculum and valued as integral to a student’s educational experience at public expense.

Confronted with the dynamic nature of politics, public opinion, and economic conditions, music educators have relied on traditional rationales focused on intellectual, moral, and physical benefit as justification for music’s inclusion in the curriculum. Music educators rely on this type of justification because of music’s historically marginalized status as *extra curricular*. Music’s marginalized status in schools is due in part to its abstract nature and the view that it is not a necessary means of satisfying the needs of a society whose notions of success and usefulness are based largely on material concerns. Therefore, music educators have made utilitarian arguments so music would be perceived by the public as more than just an aside. The common view of music as merely educational “icing” contributed to music education historian Michael Mark’s assertion that prior to 1958 music educators employed utilitarian philosophy to justify music’s existence.² Mark’s analysis, however, is problematic because of the limited way in which he interprets the writings of music educators prior to 1958 as focusing solely on the defense of music education using utilitarian philosophical perspectives.

That music educators have argued for music’s importance using utilitarian justification is not in question. What is questionable is the view that utilitarianism was the singular perspective held by music educators from 1907 to 1958. Mark’s other arguments relating to the views of music educators prior to 1958 are also problematic. In addition to his primary argument that utilitarianism was the sole perspective of the time,

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he also states there was nothing written by music educators prior to 1958 that was philosophical, or there was only rationale—not philosophy—given on the importance of music instruction. Nevertheless Mark’s views, especially as they relate to utilitarianism, are valid because music educators are required to appease many masters – music, students, society, and education itself. The field of music education is faced with the challenge of reconciling music with and in the realm of wider human experience. Furthermore, external and broader educational concerns regarding the nature of music education, or for that matter any so called school subject, necessarily involves promoting goals such as clear thinking, empathy, and being “able to detect when a man is talking rot.”

Although Mark’s analysis is valid, it is ultimately limited. While music educators have infused broader educational goals, they have also put into practice ideas rooted in philosophy prior to 1958 that had fidelity to their subject matter, specifically musical aesthetics. Mark, however, asserts this happens after 1958. Mark specifically argues in “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic” that the movement of MEAE began in 1958 with the publication of an article in Basic Concepts of Music Education: The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, by Allen Britton titled “Music in Early American Public Education: A Historical Critique.” Scholars also support the idea that

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the MEAE movement was furthered in the following year with the publication of Charles Leonhard’s and Robert House’s, *Foundations and Principles of Music Education*. Mark also makes the same claim in, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” and again in “Historical Precedents of Aesthetic Education Philosophy.” More recently Marie McCarthy and J. Scott Goble echo Mark’s interpretation in “The Praxial Philosophy in Historical Perspective.” These authors also assert that “prior to the 1950s music education had been associated with a variety of functional values…in post-World War II years…a number of scholars…began to work toward formulating a new philosophy built on principles drawn from Western aesthetics.” Supporting Mark’s general argument, McCarthy and Goble go on to state “*Basic Concepts in Music Education* (1958)…was a landmark in formally launching the philosophy of music education as aesthetic education.” Mark’s analysis, echoed by McCarthy and Goble, is so generally accepted that I will henceforth call it the standard interpretation or conventional view.

What is not generally accepted is that philosophical discourse relating to aesthetics existed prior to this time. I argue the term musical aesthetics and its core principles which focus on the nature, meaning, and value of music are embedded in the discourse of music educators between 1907 and 1958. Justification for my argument is forthcoming in chapters three, four, and five. A concern of the present work is the narrow, confusing, and restrictive views of what existed on the topic of musical aesthetics prior to MEAE philosophy of music education. As such, a central issue is what is

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7 Ibid.
considered philosophical. Scholars such as Mark, Leonhard, House, and music education philosopher Bennett Reimer insist that philosophical work is systematic. Specifically for Reimer, “a philosophy of music education should be a systematic statement of music education’s nature and value.” I am not suggesting that philosophy cannot be a system or does not at all contain a systematic analysis in the style of writing, but the idea that philosophy encompasses just this is limited. There is more to philosophy than the creating of a system or simply writing systematically.

Philosophy broadly conceived is an attitude toward the world as Quentin Lauer asserts in his work titled The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry. Lauer acknowledges that philosophy is difficult to define because “it [philosophy] is more like a way of life, an attitude that human beings bring with them in approaching reality—both the reality they themselves are and the reality in which they live.” In Lauer’s statements there are echoes of Ludwig Wittgenstein who asserts “all philosophy can do is destroy idols. And that means, not making any new ones – in the ‘absence of an idol.’” In the case of Wittgenstein part of his point of philosophy is to destroy systems. Additionally, Marie McGinn states that “Wittgenstein himself emphasizes over and over again that it is a method or a style of thought, rather than doctrines, that characterize his later

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A purpose of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*, according to McGinn, “is to bring about a change in our attitude, or in how we see things...[it is] aimed at working on the individual’s style of thought.” In order to achieve this “the *Investigations* requires us to accept that it sets out to bring about a shift in our understanding which cannot be conveyed to a passive audience in the form of ‘results’ or ‘conclusions.’” Because of the nature of Wittgenstein’s thought and objectives, McGinn asserts, the *Philosophical Investigations* “cannot be communicated in the form of a statement of systematic doctrines or theories.”

Invoking the thrust of Wittgenstein’s notion of philosophy, Lauer goes on to describe philosophy as a process that involves active doing. His point is best exemplified by the description of his book entitled *G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher without Portfolio*. Lauer asserts “by no stretch of the imagination could one call Chesterton a professional philosopher, and yet his writings are replete with what has to be called philosophical wisdom.”

In relation to musical aesthetics there is also more to examine than surface notions of music’s nature and value. Philosophical analysis, then, is not in place to put restrictions and limits on what philosophy is because the discipline is much more than a loose grouping of systems; it is also an attitude, a way of life, a process, and how one approaches and sees problems. Specifically related to musical aesthetics it is more than saying what music’s value for the field of music education is. It is also considering the numerous ways scholars have examined its nature and meaning to help students better understand this abstract art. My

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13 Ibid., 31.
14 Ibid., 30.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 24.
point is that a limited view of philosophical thinking and musical aesthetics by music education historians and philosophers is problematic because it creates a monistic view of the field of philosophy and musical aesthetics, which in turn stultifies philosophy of music education.

The result of a limited interpretation of what philosophy is has generated a limited view of the kinds of conversations on philosophical topics that occurred in music education prior to 1958 as being merely socially based, absent altogether, or simply justification. In other words, as Michael Mark suggests, the writings of music educators prior to 1958 are not philosophical. Another problem with Mark’s view is the idea that writings dealing with music education are provided by scholars outside the field for the support of music education. This narrow conception of philosophical discourse by contemporary music education historians and philosophers does not take into account evidence that suggests music educators in the early twentieth century actively discussed topics and shared ideas central to aesthetics and music.

This dissertation examines the discourse of music educators as it relates to musical aesthetics in the United States from the creation of the Music Supervisors’ Conference in 1907 up to the year of the publication of *Basic Concepts* in 1958. The purpose of this dissertation is to show that philosophical discussion, especially in relation to musical aesthetics, was much more comprehensive than previously acknowledged.

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18 Mark, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” asserts “those people who left writings about the role of music education, who explained to us why music education was important to their societies, were not music educators….It is here that the overlooked significance of aesthetic education as an historical turning point comes into play. There are two relevant points. First, music educators became the major spokespersons for their own profession….Second, some intellectual leaders, notably Bennett Reimer and Abraham Schwadron, began the serious study of philosophy and became philosophers themselves;” 8, 13.

19 In Bennett Reimer’s preface to *A Philosophy of Music Education*, xi – xii there is a hint that there were aesthetic aims, albeit secondary to utilitarian ones, for music education in the past but the idea is not developed.
The conventional view that the arguments supporting music education were primarily utilitarian is a limited interpretation of the discourse prior to 1958. In actuality, arguments for music’s inclusion in the curriculum extended beyond its social, economic, and political utility. Additional aesthetic theories guided the field and girded ideas of musical understanding and informed instruction. A better understanding of the discourse of this period contributes to more informed conversations about musical aesthetics and its relation to music education. Utilizing philosophical analysis and archival research, I argue in this dissertation that the philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics was rich, varied, insightful, and pervasive. The evidence in this dissertation refutes the standard interpretation which eschews the possibility of discourse on aesthetics taking place prior to 1958. I show that there was deeper philosophical analysis than what is currently acknowledged by those who presently make the claim that what was intended to happen generally in the field of music education and during instruction was solely guided by utilitarian philosophy. In other words, it expands the current understanding of philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics in music education before the MEAE movement that is argued to begin with the publication of *Basic Concepts*.

The fact that contemporary scholarship in music education continues to explore intellectual currents in philosophy and history indicates that there is sufficient interest in these areas of music education to warrant further analysis of specific matters relating to philosophy and music education in history. Generating a better understanding of the nature, meaning, and value of music in music education history will lead to more informed debate and discussion in the field. By examining evidence in music education discourse from the perspective of theories in aesthetics that focus on the nature, meaning,
and value of music, this study revises some elements of the standard and conventional views of what music education looked like philosophically before the MEAE movement.\textsuperscript{20}

Significance of the Study

Mark argues, “although they often used the word ‘philosophy,’ there is little actual philosophy in this body of literature, as we might define it today. For the most part, what has been referred to as philosophy were actually rationales.”\textsuperscript{21} He also asserts philosophy prior to MEAE rested on the claim that previous philosophy “was not actually about music education.”\textsuperscript{22} Furthermore, although music educators in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries built a body of music education literature, material from the pre-MEAE time is labeled as “justification,” not philosophy.\textsuperscript{23} The standard interpretation asserts that the writers and thinkers mentioned in the pre-MEAE period write about “the benefits of music education and reasons why it should be supported in schools.”\textsuperscript{24} That pre-MEAE philosophy was utilitarian and as such emphasized extramusical aims suggests that the pre-MEAE arguments were limited to justification, not philosophy.\textsuperscript{25}

Mark’s interpretation of music educator’s pre 1958 writing vacillates. Generally, however, he implies there is a gradation of sophistication between justification, rationale, and philosophy. While I am not taking issue with this general notion of graded sophistication, it is nevertheless necessary to draw distinctions between the concepts of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{20} I do not examine the MEAE movement in this dissertation.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Mark, “Historical Precedents of Aesthetic Education Philosophy,” 145.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Mark, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” 8.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 9.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Mark, “Historical Precedents of Aesthetic Education Philosophy,” 145.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
view, justification, rationale, theory, and philosophy. Giving basic descriptions here is important because these terms are seen in a variety of locations in this dissertation. For the purpose of this dissertation I take the term view to mean a particular perspective a scholar takes when advancing or critiquing an argument or stating a belief. Justification is the specific support given to defend a position or a basic reason for holding a belief. Rationale is a further developed explanation and argument that presents more elaborate reasons for taking and defending a position based on a belief or a particular principle. Theories are well developed statements from a particular perspective, usually generated by abstract thought, that involve a sophisticated analysis of material relating to a topic of study. Finally, philosophy is very difficult to define and can be a number of things. Some see philosophy as systems or doctrines developed by particular schools of thought. Platonic idealism is one example. Others view of philosophy as systematic approaches to the study of problems not answerable by science, math, or history. In that vein John Hospers suggests philosophy fundamentally deals with three “areas of thought…: the study of reality…the study of justification; it is concerned with how we justify the claims we make…[and] the analysis of various concepts that are central to our thought.”\(^{26}\)

And as previously stated, philosophy is also an attitude, a way of life, a process, and how one approaches and sees problems. I include elements of each of these notions of philosophy in this dissertation.

This study is significant because it revises the conventional view that pre-MEAE discourse was limited to utilitarian justification. By expanding the existing notions of philosophical discourse in music education before 1958, the end in view is threefold.

First, the study reveals a better understanding of what music educators discussed from 1907 to 1958 in the area of musical aesthetics. Second, the relationship between a utilitarian justification of music’s value to aesthetic theories is clarified.²⁷ Third, more informed discussion on music education history and musical aesthetics takes place. This dissertation argues that philosophical discourse existed in the field of music education prior to the late 1950s, and it was rooted in aesthetics, its problems, and its place in classroom instruction.

Problem Statement and Research Question

Prior to the formalized movements of MEAE and praxialism, the historical and philosophical interpretations of the period prior to 1958 in the works of Mark, Reimer, McCarthy and Goble, and David Elliott suggest philosophical discourse was nonexistent. Aesthetics is argued to have only entered into the discussion after 1958. Since the conventional view has been accepted by the field, discourse on musical aesthetics from 1907 to 1958 is not an area of research that has received widespread attention. This may be due to a lack of highly formalized philosophical work written before 1970. While providing a rationale for music’s inclusion in the general curriculum, much of the available research mentioning philosophy and music education focuses on philosophy’s

²⁷ It is interesting that the argument for music education to move beyond utilitarian justification is similar to the one used by scholars such as Charles Leonhard, who embraced the notion of music education as aesthetic education in the first place. My challenge is to the current conventional view that aesthetic theories were not a concern at all until the late 1950s. The MEAE view of its purpose to educate for music’s values is still ultimately a justificatory claim but no longer one exclusively along the lines of relating music to solely extramusical values. The emphasis shifted, but the goal was still for arguing that music should be part of the general curriculum. The difference was, again, one of emphasis; one was seeing music for its value in relation to what society needed for stability and progress whereas the other, the post 1958 aesthetic view, argued that music was valuable because of its merits as music. Perhaps it is not possible to completely move away from all types of justificatory claims since by its very nature music education seeks to educate students in music, but this type of education exists in a larger context. There is an unavoidable overlap between musical practice and musical understanding. For another explanation of the purpose and development of MEAE see Mark and Gary, *A History of American Music Education*, 3d ed., 417 – 422.
role in support of the goal of utilitarian justification. To my knowledge, no research exists that has as its focus the philosophical work of music educators relating to musical aesthetics prior to the MEAE movement. The historical and philosophical research that does exist asserts one of three conclusions: first, there was an absence of philosophy; second, there was no true philosophy, only rationale given on the importance of music instruction; and third, the philosophical perspective was utilitarian, that is, music is a justified part of the curriculum because of its practical use.

Although it would be beneficial to look at philosophy of music education from its inception in the school curriculum in 1838, the scope would be too broad. The same can be said for choosing the year 1876 when the Music Teachers National Association (MTNA) was formed. This dissertation, therefore, investigates the history of philosophical discourse of music education beginning in 1907, the year of the founding of the Music Supervisors’ Conference. It would not be a stretch to suggest the overlapping qualities of the two groups—MTNA and MSC/MSNC—render the choice of one date instead of the other as trivial. For example, as John Molnar states,

The carryover of the discussion from the MTNA to the MSNC was caused by the fact that the relationship existing between these two organizations was similar to that between the MSNC and the music section of the NEA. The leaders of the MSNC were the same persons who assumed an active leadership in school music affairs in the other two groups.

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29 Between 1907 and 1910 the organization was called the Music Supervisors’ Conference (MSC). In 1910 the MSC wrote a formal constitution, met annually, and became known as the Music Supervisors National Conference (MSNC). By 1934 the MSNC had become the Music Educators National Conference (MENC), an organization that exists today.

Even though some of the leadership and other parts of the membership were the same, there is an important difference between the two groups. The MTNA had a large contingency of private music teachers whose main interaction with public school students was in the one-on-one lesson in their studios. On the subject of the MTNA compared to the MSNC, John Beattie refers to the MTNA as representing the interests of the “outside music teacher” while the MSNC represents the “school music teacher.”

The field of music education also began to achieve a greater degree of unity and cohesion by creating another forum in which ideas were explored, exchanged, and debated by those who were considered “teachers and musicians,” and matters that may have transcended those that had been discussed by the Music Teachers National Association which had formed in 1876. Additionally, Mark and Gary suggest the efforts of the MSNC “brought social, musical, educational, and organizational development to the music education profession.” Finally, 1907 is around the time that the music curriculum expanded in schools, and classes such as appreciation and harmony were added. These additions were important because the very nature of these courses was based in examining the elements of music – the end goal was not the performance of a particular piece of music but to reach a better understanding of music. The content of matters in musical aesthetics discussed by music education scholars is at the heart of this research. It is central to this dissertation because music educators of the period not only transcended the practical rationale of utilitarianism in their writings but also used ideas from aesthetics for the purpose of informing instruction. The work focuses on the field of

33 Ibid.
music education in the United States from 1907 to 1958. The central question is: Is there compelling evidence to show that scholarly work of the period reflected and advanced theories of musical aesthetics that focused on the nature, meaning, and value of music with the intended purpose of guiding practice and informing the field at large?

Objectives of the Study

The period of history that includes 1907 to 1958 in the United States was one of educational and philosophical ferment. The span of time from the formation of the MSC to the dawn of the MEAE movement is embedded in the progressive era. During this time there was an emphasis on improving society via efficient and practical means, all of which coincides with the interpretation that philosophy of music education, if it existed prior to 1958, was utilitarian. I do not claim that the utilitarian philosophy did not exist or was not discussed by music educators. I think for the purpose of better informed music education policy, however, it is necessary to find out if it was the only philosophical view held in the discipline, especially relating to practice.

One of the concerns of this study, specifically relating philosophy to the practice of music education, is rooted in an idea put forth in John Dewey’s *The Child and the Curriculum*. He argues for reconciliation between subject matter and the interests and experiences of the child. For Dewey, the role of the teacher is to figure out “how his [sic] own knowledge of the subject-matter may assist in interpreting the child’s needs and doings, and determine the medium in which the child should be placed in order that his growth may be properly directed.”

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34 The progressive era in the United States is often accepted as beginning in the early 1890s and drawing to a close in the 1950s.
Somehow, somewhere motive must be appealed to, connection must be established between mind and material...if the subject-matter of the lessons be such as to have an appropriate place within the expanding consciousness of the child, if it grows out of his own past doings, thoughts, and sufferings, and grows into application in further achievements and receptivities, then no device or trick of method has to be resorted to in order to enlist “interest.”

Dewey’s ideas emphasize the importance of both subject matter and the interests of the child. Therefore, in relation to the subject of music in the Deweyan sense, it is improper to connect music to some distant and externally imposed notion of civic responsibility or goal of higher achievement scores. What is necessary is for the teacher to use knowledge of music to assist in the growth and expansion of the child’s consciousness and experiences. By leaving the idea of “proper direction” undefined, Dewey leaves open possibilities that do not exclude music in relation to practical purposes, but neither does it rule out the development of musical experiences for the purpose of experiential growth and the expansion of consciousness.

Educative experiences are central to the process of a child’s education. Another particular manifestation of progressive thought in education was the integration movement. Integration took many forms, but the basic idea was to expose a child to multiple areas of thought and experience while attempting to draw on common themes among what appear to be disparate groupings. For example, a social studies teacher studying the ancien régime might include works and writings of Mozart to illuminate the tensions existing between traditional bases of socio-economic power and the rising merchant class. Another example could be the physics and music classes studying the properties of sound in the school’s auditorium. In music education the integration movement prompted music educators to take a hard look at the nature, meaning, and

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36 Ibid., 205.
value of music. Music educators asked themselves questions such as, “Should music be integrated into the larger curriculum or should it remain a standalone subject because of its alleged uniqueness?” This period was rife with musical aesthetics arguments from music educators, yet there are gaps in the existing research that give credit to those in the field discussing such matters. This research fills in some of the gaps.

Another gap in existing research on the philosophical writings during this period has to do specifically with aesthetics. An important example is Eduard Hanslick’s seminal work titled On the Musically Beautiful, first published in 1854.37 Hanslick’s book sparked a lively debate which continues today on the subject of meaning in music. Music educators of the time had heard about Hanslick’s ideas and incorporated his theories on some level into their discourse for the purpose of relating it to their pursuits of more informed music instruction. In other words, Hanslick had adherents to his ideas in the field of music education, and as a result Hanslick’s aesthetic position entered the discourse of early twentieth century music educators. Another example is Dewey’s Art as Experience, which explores artistic meaning through interaction with art.38 These two works are examples that philosophical dialogues in the area of aesthetics and music continued unabated since aesthetics became popular in the eighteenth century.39 With works such as these generating discussions in the general fields of music and education, the historical record of the MSC, MSNC (later MENC)—groups that consisted of

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37 Originally written in German, the first English translation was Gustav Cohen’s 1891 version based on Hanslick’s seventh edition of 1885. By 1922 this work had reached 15 editions. A review of the book was published in the April 24, 1892 edition of the New York Times.
39 John Dewey’s work is not exclusively about music, but he does write extensively on the topic of music within the book. The term “aesthetic” was reconstituted in modern times thanks to a debate on its meaning between A.G. Baumgarten, who is said to have coined the term in his Aesthetica (1750), and Immanuel Kant. See T.J. Diffey, “A Note on Some Meanings of the Term ‘Aesthetic,’” British Journal of Aesthetics 35, no. 1 (January 1995): 61-72, 63.
“musicians and teachers”—reveals numerous aesthetic perspectives that have not been adequately accounted for in research. An objective of this research is to show that aesthetics was very much a part of the conversation in music education from 1907 to 1958.

One problem that surfaced, however, is in how these music educators interpreted the term aesthetics and used it. I seek to elucidate what was said by music educators in relation to musical aesthetics. In so doing the murkiness of the language within the literature of the common interpretation on the topic of utilitarianism is clarified, but more importantly clarification on the larger topic of musical aesthetics in the discourse of the time is achieved in my analysis of the evidence. One definition of the term aesthetics in relation to the music is that “musical aesthetics is the study of the relationship of music to the human senses and intellect.”

Another very basic approach is to consider aesthetics as “the philosophy of art and beauty – a subdivision of philosophy that deals with fundamental questions about the arts which the arts themselves are not able to answer, or are not entirely able to answer.” Dewey asserts aesthetic theories deal with the “general significance” of art. Like Dewey, Gordon Graham asserts, aesthetics is “an attempt to theorize about art, to explain what it is and why it matters.” Again, my argument contests the conventional view’s assertion that the period prior to 1958 was philosophically barren. Musicians and leading music educators during this period were

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well aware of matters relating to musical aesthetics on some level and thereby included such contemporary topics in their own dialogue.
CHAPTER 2

EXPOSITION: (AESTHETICS)

Part I – Aesthetics

This chapter clarifies what aesthetics is in order to show how the discourse of music educators coincided with the problems and theories of this branch of philosophy.¹ Dabney Townsend writes, “if one were speaking strictly historically, the history of ‘aesthetics’ would cover only the period from the mid-eighteenth century when the modern idea of aesthetics first appeared through the last two thirds of the twentieth century.”² In a similar vein, Carl Dalhaus characterizes aesthetics as an immature field only being reconstituted in the eighteenth century and still only being attached to music in the nineteenth century.³ Perhaps due to its immaturity Dalhaus suggests that

All attempts to define it, whether as a theory of perception or as a philosophy of art or as a science of beauty, suffer from dogmatic narrowness, one-sidedness, and arbitrariness…to do justice to this phenomenon requires recognizing that it is not so much a distinct discipline with a firmly limited object of inquiry, as, rather a vaporous, far flung quintessence of problems and points of view that no one before the eighteenth century could have imagined coalescing into a complex with its own name.⁴

¹ While distinctions exist between histories of philosophy (which is where I position this work) and intellectual histories, a striking similarity between the two is seen in Peter Novick’s *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession*. In his book he cites an unnamed “crusty political historian’s” characterization of attempting to write intellectual history as a task that is “like nailing jelly to the wall.” The writing of this dissertation has been no less difficult than attempting to “nail jelly to the wall.” Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988/1999), 7.


⁴ Ibid., 3.
A basic approach is to consider aesthetics as “the philosophy of art and beauty – a subdivision of philosophy that deals with fundamental questions about the arts which the arts themselves are not able to answer, or are not entirely able to answer.” Stemming from the nineteenth century, musical aesthetics, however “narrow, one-sided or arbitrary,” is often recognized as something distinct.

The idea of musical aesthetics as a distinct field of study is given by Wayne Bowman who argues musical aesthetics is a narrow term that is subsumed by the philosophy of music. For him, music philosophy is the more appropriate term because it “explores areas musical aesthetics often regards as musically incidental: matters epistemological, ethical, social, cultural, and political.” Bowman confines musical aesthetics to an “effort to describe what is distinctive about music and musical experience.” In contrast Edward Lippman writes “aesthetics as traditionally defined is a philosophy of art in an empirical sense: it considers art as it is revealed in perception and in practice.” Later, Lippman asserts

We cannot really take issue with the retention of the term musical aesthetics. Its meaning has expanded, for one thing well beyond the sphere of actual auditory impressions and their effects, and although philosophy of music is doubtless a more accurate designation for our increasingly diversified world of musical thought, musical aesthetics has the advantage of an established use that will probably overcome its disrepute.

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7 Ibid., 5
8 Ibid., 6-7.
9 Edward Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 219. Lippman continues, using Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling’s arguments, that “the philosophy of art…is concerned with ‘art in itself,’ or the essential nature of art.” Ibid.
10 Ibid., 352. Italics in original.
Finally, Willi Apel defines musical aesthetics as “the study of the relationship of music to the human senses and intellect.”

Whether it was a focus on the listener’s response or the form and content of the music, the basis of what was studied in musical aesthetics in the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century was rooted in ideas relating to Western Art Music. Music from other cultures or the jazz that would become popular in the twentieth century were not often considered worthy topics for serious study. For that matter music emanating from what is labeled Modernist generated plenty of controversy within the field of musical aesthetics, but the Modernist tradition, at least from the perspective of the critic, had emerged from the tradition of Western Art Music. Even though aesthetics had existed as an area of study since the mid-eighteenth century, its relative immaturity had the effect of lacking exhaustive development of what the object or essence of the study was. There simply was not the time for the field to develop a multiplicity of counter arguments to be formed or reworked. This is contextually important because the historical development in the field of musical aesthetics in the nineteenth century left legacies that influenced subsequent approaches to what was at the core of the discipline. That is, although a twentieth century aesthetician might reject an idea advanced in a particular theory from the nineteenth century, the two writers still worked from

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12 John Drummond asserts “Western Art Music has its origins in Europe, and the ‘canon’ of classical music consists of the works of European composers. The expanded term ‘Western’ (rather than merely ‘European’) allows the inclusion of music created and performed by others outside the region: by European immigrants into North America and their heirs; by other members of the European diaspora who settled in colonies around the world and their successors; and, more recently, by anyone who wishes to participate in what has become a global music…But what does ‘art music’ mean? It may be broadly defined as a music possessing five characteristics: it is performed by professionals who have undergone disciplinary training; it has a canon of traditional musical works, usually by identified composers; there is a notation through which these works are preserved; it has a theory of music; and it claims to be ‘artistic’. These characteristics (especially, perhaps, the last one) allow it to claim to be ‘serious music’, in contrast to ‘popular’ or ‘folk’ musics.” John Drummond, “Re-thinking Western Art Music: A Perspective Shift for Music Educators,” *International Journal of Music Education* 28, no. 2 (May 2010): 117 – 126, 120, 121.
assumptions primarily grounded in Western Art Music. The notable exception to this idea of musical aesthetics being based solely on Western Art Music is what Graham calls the “sociological or sociohistorical approach”\textsuperscript{13} and what Lippman describes as “socioaesthetics.”\textsuperscript{14} Each scholar suggests that in the twentieth century certain aestheticians and theorists such as Theodor Adorno argued musical production had a cultural connection. Sociological approaches notwithstanding, aesthetics remains difficult to discern.

The challenges of defining the term echoed in Dalhaus’ previous statement about aesthetics being a “vaporous, far flung quintessence of problems and points of view” are compounded by historical transformations. Dalhaus argues “nineteenth century writers on music…were fascinated by the problem of esthetic judgment and its philosophical basis, in the twentieth century discussion rather focuses on technical questions.”\textsuperscript{15} Lippman sees the transformation as much the same. For him there is a move from subjective content of feelings and moods where much attention is given to the emotional realm to one where a major concern in the twentieth century is reactive and holds that meaning is based on the objective form of music, that is, how compositions are to be analyzed intrinsically.\textsuperscript{16} These delineations between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, may not be strict. Overlap is common in the articulation of theories where one theory often is the basis on which another theory emerges. Theoretical

\textsuperscript{13} Graham writes “the concern of the sociological approach is with art as an historical phenomenon and a social construction.” Graham, \textit{Philosophy of the Arts}, 3. Also see further elaboration on 158 – 171 and 176-177.

\textsuperscript{14} Lippman describes the socioaesthetic as “the social component of aesthetic ideas.” Lippman, \textit{A History of Western Musical Aesthetics}, 398.

\textsuperscript{15} Dalhaus, \textit{Esthetics of Music}, 2.

\textsuperscript{16} Lippman, \textit{A History of Western Musical Aesthetics}, 351.
transformations are nevertheless necessary for building a general framework, which is important because theory provides one way of organizing the evidence.

Contextually, the study of aesthetics that informs this research is primarily from the mid-nineteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries. More specifically, I focus on problems and theories from this time that examine what music is (nature), how music is comprehended and interpreted and what it allegedly reveals (meaning), and musical judgment and why music matters (value). This framework is based on the work of both Monroe Beardsley and T.J. Diffey. In Diffey’s essay titled “A Note on Some Meanings of the Term ‘Aesthetic’” he asserts that

Whatever discipline…aesthetics finds itself to be a branch of, the same problems tend to recur, such as the nature and defining characteristics of art, the meaning works of art are said to have, how they may be judged, valued, or interpreted, the nature of imagination and of creativity, the kinds of experience offered by art, &C.  

The version of Diffey’s explanation used in this paper substitutes the words music/musical where he uses the term art. Therefore, a la Diffey, whatever discipline musical aesthetics finds itself to be a branch of, the same problems tend to recur, such as the nature and defining characteristics of music, the meaning musical works are said to have, how they may be judged, valued or interpreted, the nature of imagination and of creativity, and the kinds of experience offered by music. And from Beardsley’s Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, I rely on both the structure and content of his 1958 work which is divided into three basic sections that correspond to the domains I have labeled nature, meaning, and value. The philosophical work of Roger Scruton, Andy Hamilton, Wayne Bowman, Morris Weitz, and Graham as well as the

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historical work of Lippman, and a number of others, also informs elements of this chapter. The primary analytical tool for this section, however, and what forms the basis of much of the remaining analysis comes from Beardsley, who writes, “The problems of philosophical aesthetics…fall into three main groups…the problems raised by descriptive statements…the more debatable problems raised by interpretive statements…[and] the problems raised by the critic’s value judgments.” What are the characteristics, differences, and similarities seen in the general organizational concepts of nature, meaning, and value? Although the quality of unity or wholeness exists with these organizational concepts because each informs how we think about and experience music every one simultaneously has distinct boundaries, which is akin to the notion of part-whole relations.

The notion of the nature of music is one in which the fundamental issue is explaining what music is. In other words these theories seek to describe the essence of music and focus on music as a concept, and fall within what is often referred to as philosophical aesthetics. More specifically, Graham asserts the task of philosophical aesthetics is “to arrive at a definition, conception, or characterization of art that makes

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18 These other works were used to clarify some points made by Beardsley and were included in areas where Beardsley has what I perceive as holes or underdeveloped ideas in his work, particularly since his approach to aesthetics is primarily object-centered rather than subject-centered.

19 Monroe Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958), 10. Even though a second edition was published in 1981 to further clarify some of his points and address various criticisms of his 1958 edition, the year of publication of the earlier work is particularly important to this dissertation since, as stated in the previous chapter, this is often the date given as the beginning of the music education as aesthetic education movement. Therefore, Beardsley’s work represents a sound depiction of what was understood in the field of aesthetics to that point in time. For Beardsley there is a natural path to the problems of the nature, meaning, and value of art. In order to evaluate a work he insists that at first certain questions must be answered, “for often critics are interested in describing and interpreting works of art because they want to evaluate them; they use descriptive and interpretive statements as reasons for, or partial reasons for, normative statements.” Ibid., 10-11.
explicit the necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being a work of art.”

In a subsequent section of this paper, the problems and theories that focus on the nature of music will be addressed; this is also the case for meaning and value. The next concept to define is meaning.

Again, in its simplest form meaning is how music is comprehended and interpreted. Or, to put it another way, what is allegedly revealed by music. The articulation of this category comes from Lippman’s argument of the difference between nineteenth and twentieth century musical aesthetics. As mentioned above, for him there was a move from subjective content of feelings and moods where much attention is given to the emotional realm to one where a major concern in the twentieth century is reactive and holds that meaning is based on the objective form of music, that is, how compositions are to be analyzed intrinsically.

Beardsley is, again, particularly helpful in explaining one way I am using the term meaning. He writes, “A critical interpretation…is a statement that purports to declare the ‘meaning’ of a work of art…I use the term ‘meaning’ for a semantical relation between the work itself and something outside the work.”

The difficulty of articulating meaning lies in the relations between composer, musical work, and the percipient. Are we to comprehend and interpret music for its alleged expression of emotion, or how it may represent an external idea or symbol, or are we only able to analyze the structural form of the composition? Although there are no simple solutions to these questions, these questions are the very ones at the core of the

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22 Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 9. Italics in the original. Beardsley goes to give examples and writes “suppose it is said that a tone poem contains a joyful affirmation of life, or that it ‘refers to’ something in the life of the composer; or that a dance ‘represents’ the awakening of young love; or that a bridge in a novel ‘symbolizes’ or ‘signifies’ the crises of life; or that a modern office building ‘expresses’ the functional efficiency of modern business. These statements are critical interpretations.” 9-10.
idea of meaning. And more often, as suggested by Lippman, meaning is based on analysis of the composition.

Meaning is distinct from the notion of nature because, as Graham explains, there are problems with descriptive theories. He poses the following question: “is a [descriptive] theory of art about the kind of human judgment and/or perception that arises when we are confronted with a work or art, or is it a theory about actual objects – paintings, poems, plays, pieces of music, and so on?” Likewise it is distinct from ideas of value because the primary focus is not one that contains the same emphasis on the extramusical as certain normative theories do. This is not to say that normative theories are only concerned with the extramusical but to simply state that the importance of internally constituted understanding is not the only aspect of the idea of value. The idea of meaning is closely related to Immanuel Kant’s perspective on aesthetics. Graham writes, “Kant has a philosophy of art as well as an account of the aesthetic judgment. That is to say, he is concerned both with the artifact of art and the attitude we bring to them.” Kant argues “in all beautiful art what is essential consists in the form, which is purposive for observation and judging.”

Experiencing beauty is thus, for Kant, a doubly reflective process. We reflect on the spatial and temporal form of the object by exercising our powers of judgment (imagination and understanding), and we acknowledge the beauty of an object when we come to be aware through the feeling of pleasure of the harmony of these faculties, which awareness comes by reflecting on our own mental states.

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23 Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, 153.
24 Ibid., 13.
Meaning has at its core the uncovering of the artistic process by examining the musical work and our interpretation/understanding/comprehension/ of it or what is revealed by it; in the twentieth century, according to Dalhaus and Lippman, the analysis of the composition is the way in which we are to better understand how we make sense of it, which leads us to the concept of value.

Value-based theories are concerned with why music matters (music’s intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian worth) and how it is possible to make an evaluation. These theories, as described by Graham and Beardsley, are called normative. Should we care about music and if so why? Graham claims normative theories “see what values music, or painting, or poetry can embody, and how valuable this form of embodiment is.” Graham’s explanation, however, is not wholly satisfying. There are significant and subtle differences between different types of value, especially in relation to music educators’ attempts to justify music’s inclusion in the curriculum based on certain notions of the value of music.

The problem I brought to light in the previous chapter on the difference between justification and philosophy has at its core the issue of value. Justification for something can be achieved in a philosophical manner; it depends in large part on what types of arguments are used to support such justificatory claims. One specific aspect of the use of

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27 The terms intramusical and extramusical, in relation to normative theories, are aligned closely with the concepts of intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian value, with intrinsic and instrumental value being explained later in the paragraph and with all terms being explained and related later in the chapter.

28 Crawford, “Kant,” 173. Graham’s treatment of the notion of value is not always clear. At one moment he claims normative theories have an evaluative component as seen in his assertion the aim of a normative conception of art “is to sort out from among the things known as art those which truly deserve the label.” Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, 153. This use of the term is not consistent with his use of the term in the above section of the paper. For the purposes of this paper Graham’s notion and understanding of value from page 173, which stems from his subsequent development of the idea of value citing Hegel, Schopenhauer, Collingwood, and Scruton on pages 173-175, informs just one way that I will use the term value.
justificatory claims for music education comes from differences associated with the general heading of extrinsic value. Under the general label of extrinsic value lie the terms instrumentalism and utilitarianism. The latter term has frequently been the philosophical view used to support music’s value in the schools. Writers on the topic of value have positioned themselves in numerous ways regarding their view on the utility of music. One example is Gordon Graham’s description of Benedetto Croce’s expressivist position on value in the latter’s *Guide to Aesthetics*. Graham writes that Croce “denies that art has anything ‘utilitarian’ about it…to understand its [art’s] meaning and value we need only look at the work itself and can ignore the world beyond the work,” 29 Ancient Greek thinkers had a different view of music’s utility by citing its effect on the character, known as ethos theory. The differences between the various theoretical perspectives on the value of music lie in how the theorist uses, sees, and understands differences between intrinsic, instrumental, inherent, and utilitarian value. Making a distinction among these types of value is important because many music educators looked to the arguments from utilitarian theory in an attempt to place school music on par with other subjects.

Philosophically speaking the term utilitarianism shares overlapping characteristics with instrumentalism. The two terms, sometimes used interchangeably, are not identical. 30 The chief difference is that the theory of instrumentalism, as used in

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30 Another component of the problem with the use of the term utilitarian by music education historians in particular is that it is applied too loosely. That is, because writers such as Michael Mark do not focus on the shades of difference between utilitarianism and theories such as Marxism or the ideas of Collingwood, for example, all such designations get labeled as part of a theory that is ill-defined. The lack of attention to the variations within instrumentalism is part of the reason there has been a misinterpretation of pre-1958 philosophy of music education. Additionally, while there are differences between pragmatism and utilitarianism, and even instrumentalism and pragmatism, detailed explanations of the delineations are, like the variations of German idealism, not necessary here, and there is not the space in this dissertation to explain the differences. For descriptions and differences between pragmatism and utilitarianism, see
discourse on the arts, places value and importance on the experiencing of the object where the possible ends-in-view are not fixed, final, or necessarily practical.

Utilitarianism, on the other hand as used in discourse on the arts, sees particular and practical ends-in-view that include social, political, moral, and/or economic effects being generated from the experience between the aesthetic object and percipient. The social, moral, political and/or economic effects are said to influence the individual and society. An additional difference is that instrumentalism relies on the so-called doctrine of immediacy which posits that “aesthetic value is something that is immediately experienced and known; it does not have to be calculated or inferred, but is open to direct inspection—consummatory, if anything is.” Utilitarianism does not rely on the necessity of the immediate experience but rather on the consequences which follow the experience or are somehow indirectly related. The overlapping quality is that both incorporate extramusical or extrinsic elements—those that may not be exclusively related to music—in determining value. Beardsley describes the instrumentalist position on aesthetic value as such, “if it be granted that aesthetic experience has value, then ‘aesthetic value’ may be defined as ‘the capacity to produce an aesthetic experience of some magnitude.’” He continues by arguing using the instrumentalist position that “To say that an object has aesthetic value is (a) to say that it has the capacity to produce an
aesthetic effect, and (b) to say that the aesthetic effect itself has value.”\textsuperscript{33} Notice in Beardsley’s explanations there is evidence of the importance of the experience but nothing beyond that immediate happening. To put it another way, using the instrumentalist line of reasoning one is not necessarily expected to become a better mathematician as a result of playing the saxophone, but the believer in utilitarianism would make the argument that the value of music is that it does.

Beside the differences between the instrumentalist and utilitarian positions there are also distinction made between intrinsic, inherent, and instrumental value. Beardsley defines each as follows:

To say that a value of an object is an instrumental (or extrinsic) value is to say that the object derives its value from being a means to the production of some other object that has value…to say that a value of an object is an intrinsic (or terminal) value is to say that the object has that value independently of any means-end relation to other objects.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 510. Beardsley takes time to analyze each of these positions and shows the weaknesses of each. For something to have intrinsic value, according to the rationalist, the effect or quality of the object or experience is self-evident “and without any indirect or covert appeal to human experience.” Therefore, the truth or beauty in an object or event would be self-evident regardless of any prior contact or experience. Trying to imagine something that has no reference to our experience is very difficult, especially for the empiricist. Beardsley makes note of the difference between the empiricist and the rationalist and one can infer from his analysis that the empirical position pushes the intrinsic theory of value very close to, if not completely in, the instrumentalist camp. His analysis of instrumentalism includes the criticism that “it is said to be self-contradictory…[and] meaningless.” To put it another way, if you can only judge whether something has value in relation to other things or actions, how can anything ever be said to be of value? Where does the value really lie? To this question the instrumentalist might reply using support from the doctrine of immediacy, but this type of response leans toward intrinsic value, something the instrumentalist rejects. In relation to the idea of meaninglessness he is a bit unclear, but if I understand his example it is that for something to be a value instrumentally it must be in relation to something that has value, so never getting to anything that has value is not only self-contradictory but also makes the position meaningless. Even though he critiques both positions, he also provides examples in his analysis of how each position can be valid. It is not, however, important to consider the supporting arguments for each theory here. Beardsley, \textit{Aesthetics}, 540 – 543.
Relying on the work *Values of Art* by Malcom Budd, Matthew Kieran in his essay titled “Value of Art” describes the difference between instrumental value and intrinsic value.\(^{35}\)

Kieran writes that

> If we value a work instrumentally, it is merely a contingent means to a particular end. To value Bach’s *Cello Suites* just because they cheer me up implies that they are replaceable by something that performs the same function as well or better...however, to find intrinsic value in a work is to appreciate the imaginative experience it properly affords, which may be beautiful, moving, uplifting, pleasurable, insightful or profound. But it is the particular nature of the work that guides our active mental engagement and responses to it. Hence there is something about the experience of a particular work, if it is intrinsically valuable, that cannot be replaced by any other.\(^{36}\)

The difference between the two, as Kieran argues, is “for something to possess inherent value it must not only be the means to a valuable end, but also the means must partly constitute and thus be internal to the ends involved.”\(^{37}\) Kieran suggests “that the primary value of art concerns the ways in which works enrich how we understand ourselves and the world.”\(^{38}\) By asserting music is infungible, its value comes from creating a unique experience where important insights are gained about ourselves (individually and collectively) and the world, emotionally or otherwise, which is just one example of the way value is used. My use of the term value not only includes the intrinsic and instrumental perspectives on the concept but also inherent and utilitarian views as well as the aspect of evaluation/judgment which in some cases overlaps the aforementioned terms on value. Music’s intrinsic value is simply one where “any experience enjoyed as

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\(^{35}\) Matthew Kieran, “Value of Art,” *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, eds. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 293-305. Kieran places the idea of value within philosophical aesthetics whereas Graham does this only partially. For Graham the notion of value falls more clearly within what he calls normative theory.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 293.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 294. Italics in original. Kieran conflates intrinsic and inherent value, a mistake in my view (the difference will be seen later in the chapter).

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 299.
an end-in-itself or as complete in itself.”\textsuperscript{39} Intrinsic value is a term occasionally substituted for inherent value, but like instrumentalism and utilitarianism there are differences.

Kieran leaves a middle ground between his explanation of the difference between instrumental value and his description of intrinsic value mentioned above.\textsuperscript{40} This middle ground hinges on the word inherent. Beardsley describes inherent value as “the capacity of aesthetic objects to produce good inherent effects—that is, to produce desirable effects by means of the aesthetic experience they evoke.”\textsuperscript{41} In the same section on inherent value Beardsley argues “aesthetic objects differ from… directly utilitarian objects in that their immediate function is only to provide a certain kind of experience that can be enjoyed in itself.”\textsuperscript{42} Therefore, as I echo Beardsley’s use of instrumentalism, inherent value inclines toward intrinsic value while still clinging to the basic precepts of instrumental value theory. Beardsley’s assessment of Clarence Irving Lewis’ \textit{An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation} further clarifies the relationship between intrinsic, inherent, and instrumental value as a way to delineate the terms.\textsuperscript{43} Beardsley states,

Note that my term “instrumental value” covers the same ground as his term “extrinsic value,” but is defined in a more neutral way: where as I say simply that if \( Y \) has value—whether this value is itself intrinsic or instrumental—and \( X \) is a means to \( Y \), then \( X \) has instrumental value, Lewis puts into the definition of “extrinsic value” that the object having it is a means, directly or indirectly, to the realization of intrinsic value. Lewis holds that only experiences or their qualities can have intrinsic value; when an object directly, or immediately, causes an experience having intrinsic value, the extrinsic value of the object is said to be “inherent”; when an object is a means to the production of an object with inherent

\textsuperscript{40} Beardsley describes his use of instrumentalism in Beardsley, \textit{Aesthetics}, 524 – 543.
\textsuperscript{41} Beardsley, \textit{Aesthetics}, 573.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 572.
\textsuperscript{43} Clarence Irving Lewis, \textit{An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation} (La Salic, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1946).
value, its value is said to be “instrumental.” Thus inherent value and instrumental value are, for Lewis, subdivisions of extrinsic value.\(^\text{44}\)

In addition to the idea of value being connected with intrinsic and/or extrinsic explanations of why music matters there is another aspect of the domain and that is evaluation.

Beardsley’s explanation of normative statements are “critical evaluations…that apply to works of art the words ‘good’ or beautiful,’ their negatives, or other predicates definable in terms of them.”\(^\text{45}\) Assessments on the merits of a work either in isolation or in relation to others are just as important to musical aesthetics as gaining insights about ourselves. Discussions regarding base music, good music, and great music have existed at least as far back as the ancient Greeks. And these types of value judgments are made using informed analysis, but how the judgments are made and the justification for such assertions are key problems in musical aesthetics—one of the tasks of musical aesthetics is to generate ideas as to how these types of assessments can be made. Interestingly, these notions of value also relate to each other. The very act of evaluating tells us something about our humanity. That we can experience an aesthetic object and provide a reasoned explanation and engage in dialogue regarding its quality and significance is uniquely human. The challenge of explaining the distinctions between these notions of the nature, meaning, and value of music is difficult because these ideas contain many overlapping characteristics that create a quality of unity.

In terms of unity, assertions regarding the meaning of music in the evidence also take into account notions of why music matters, just as arguments focusing on music’s value may result in a better understanding of the characteristics of music. For example,

\(^{44}\) Beardsley, \textit{Aesthetics}, 547.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 9.
though dealing with the arts generally as opposed to music specifically, R.G. Collingwood in *Principles of Art* explains the process of imaginative discovery and the expression of emotion, which lead him to conclude that art is a process of self-discovery for both creator and percipient.\(^{46}\) While asserting art’s peculiar value Collingwood concurrently argues that a defining characteristic of art is that it involves emotional experience. This is similar to both Tolstoy, who, in his *What is Art?*, argues art is “a medium for the transmission of feelings” [of the artist] and for Croce who claims art is intuitive expression.\(^ {47}\) In the case of these theorists the value lies in the variety of insights art provides while each establishes necessary requisites for art. Additional examples that display the quality of unity are given by Dewey.

Dewey connects the ideas of why art matters with those of interpretation and comprehension (meaning). For him meaning is connected with experience, and more specifically in *Art as Experience*, with “aesthetic experience.”\(^ {48}\) Dewey describes the aesthetic experience as connecting both artist and percipient in an active process of “doing and undergoing,” involving “outgoing and incoming energy” where there is “perception organically, sensory satisfaction, external embodiment, and dynamic organization.”\(^ {49}\) Additionally, Dewey asserts “that which distinguishes an experience as esthetic is conversion of resistance and tensions, of excitations that in themselves are

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\(^{48}\) Dewey, *Art as Experience*.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 50-53, 57.
temptations to diversion, into a movement toward an inclusive and fulfilling close.”

Furthermore,

In art as an experience, actuality and possibility or ideality, the new and the old, objective material and personal response, the individual and the universal, surface and depth, sense and meaning, are integrated in an experience in which they are all transfigured from the significance that belongs to them when isolated in reflection.

Meaning is achieved through experience in the undergoing and doing, and art, therefore, offers a unique way of experiencing. For Dewey this active process is what makes art valuable, particularly in the social sphere. Again, each of these examples shows the quality of unity between nature, value and meaning of art generally, though it is possible to transpose these ideas to music specifically. Concurrently, these examples show apparent distinction of how the nature of art can be isolated from its interpretation and comprehension. And in the discourse of music educators similar threads appear. Rarely if ever did a music educator address the meaning of music without also addressing its value, for example. There is unity through distinction.

Defining what music is, for example, has been and undoubtedly will continue to be an important part of musical aesthetics. However, examining the characteristics of music is not the only way music has been examined in aesthetics. Therefore, rather than being focused solely on the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be called music—its nature—the subsequent chapters also focus on notions of meaning and value. Taking a wider view of what aesthetics examines—nature, meaning, and value—enables the nuanced language from the discourse of music educators relating to aesthetics in the first half of the twentieth century to be better understood. In other words, if leading

50 Ibid., 58.
51 Ibid., 309.
proponents of the conventional view take aesthetics to be consumed with the idea of articulating necessary and sufficient conditions of music or one version of the instrumentalist position on value, then their position might make more sense. It would be a worthwhile endeavor to further research the assumptions present day music education scholars make about aesthetics. Although research examining the assumptions of present day music education scholars regarding the discipline of aesthetics might be valuable, it is not the focus of this work. This dissertation may, however, act as a catalyst for subsequent analysis of contemporary discourse in music education philosophy.

As a way of showing what is meant by looking beyond the scope of aesthetics just converging on the nature of art, the work of Collingwood is again a good example. While Collingwood states emotional experience and imaginative discovery are necessary and sufficient properties for something to be called art, this point is not the sole aim of his *Principles of Art*. For Collingwood, the idea of imaginative discovery and emotional expression lead to self-discovery and self-knowledge. Collingwood’s assertion is more in line with what is referred to as the cognitivist notion of value rather than with a necessary and sufficient property of art. That is, his assertion is tied more closely to normative theory than to descriptive or conceptual theory, although he makes arguments that are appropriate to each group of theories, the emphasis is simply on the normative side. Therefore, the most appropriate course of action in terms of organization of this complex field of aesthetics is one which holds that a distinction of its parts is necessary.

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53 In the strict sense of the term cognitivism Gordon Graham denies that Collingwood is a cognitivist. For Graham, he is an expressivist. Graham, *Philosophy of the Arts*, 175. No doubt Graham is correct but because of his particular emphasis on normative ideas I place him in league with someone having cognitivist leanings. Interestingly enough my understanding of cognitivism comes largely from the work of Graham who writes “it is a theory that art is valuable because of what we learn from it.” Graham, *Philosophy of the Arts*, 43. To me, self-knowledge and self-discovery are important in terms of “what we learn” from art.
for the sake of clarity while simultaneously accepting a quality of unity in the relations of
distinct parts.

The parts (nature, meaning, and value) of musical aesthetics, while inextricably
linked with the whole (how we think about and experience music), provide a clear way of
organizing the evidence, which influences the structure of the remainder of the
dissertation. Music’s nature, meaning, and value as seen in the problems and theories of
musical aesthetics discussed by music educators brings into relief the rich, varied,
insightful, and pervasive perspectives of this group. This organizational structure also
allows for key problems and theories to be addressed without having to go into great
detail on every development in the field from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Additionally, it allows for the examination of particular key problems and theories that
focus on music. Finally, this organizational structure acknowledges the basic principles
of musical aesthetics while also recognizing the complexity of the discipline. Proceeding
this way, however, will not be easy since the discipline is “a vaporous, far flung,
quintessence of problems and points of view.” However, in order to carry on there must
be some form of organizing the material so the numerous problems and theories make
sense to both the writer and reader. After all, these scholars who claim that aesthetics is
difficult to define and explain wrote books and papers on the subject that are organized
along the themes those authors found important, which typically are developmental
accounts of specific theories and ideas in time. So, even though Dewey suggests the
abundance of aesthetic philosophies makes it “impossible to give even a résumé of them
in a chapter,\textsuperscript{54} the work marches onward in what I see as one approach to organize the material that helps answer my question.

While musical aesthetics specifically plays a predominant role in this analysis because of its explicit connection to music, it cannot be the sole means of coming to a better understanding of the philosophical discourse in general aesthetics among music educators in the first half of the twentieth century. So, before elaborating on the various aesthetic problems and theories that are contained within the tripartite mode of examination, it must be understood that while musical aesthetics is of primary importance in my work, it is not exclusive. It would be myopic to assume that the early writers and thinkers in the field of music education only exposed themselves to scholarly work specifically relating to music. It is just as likely for these writers and thinkers to have read general aesthetic theorists like Tolstoy, Santayana, Croce, or Collingwood, and apply the ideas of these philosophers and their comments on music and the arts as it would have been for them to have read Hanslick, Busoni, or Adorno. Just as I have borrowed from Beardsley’s general arguments on aesthetics (with a few examples from music), these music educators borrowed heavily from general aesthetics and applied the ideas to their discussion of music and music education. Now that aesthetics has been explained in general, and a workable definition of musical aesthetics as a way to interpret music education discourse has been given, we move to the next step. The next part of the dissertation is a detailed explanation of the substance of each of the categories of musical aesthetics within the context of aesthetic problems and theories.

\textsuperscript{54} Dewey, \textit{Art as Experience}, 286.
Part II – Problems and Theories in Aesthetics

Morris Weitz argues, “each of the great theories of art – Formalism, Voluntarism, Emotionalism, Intellectualism, Intuitionism, Organicism—converges on the attempt to state the defining properties of art.” Gordon Graham agrees and states, “philosophical aesthetics has been concerned with the definition of art, of trying to say what art is, rather than why it is valuable.” Weitz and other critics have pointed out the failure of many definitions dwelling on necessary and sufficient properties. Such difficulty leads me to believe there is simply more to understanding art than is able to be accounted for in a limited definition. That definitions of art fail because of the emphasis on necessary and sufficient properties of art is really at the heart of what Weitz is doing. My critique of Weitz, however, is that what he proposes is still largely within the bounds of what is labeled as philosophical aesthetics. He merely broadened the definition of art to include nearly everything. Rather than stating how this or that definition is incomplete for the whole of aesthetics, I look at aesthetics in a way that tries to capture the complexity of the “far flung, vaporous, quintessence of problems and points of view.” I do not, however, try to offer my own definition of what art generally, or music specifically, is. Instead the work in the rest of this section is an examination of how others have defined and problematized musical aesthetics. I do this to establish a basis on which to judge the

55 Morris Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 15, no. 1 (September, 1956): 27-35, 27. The statement above is not Weitz’s primary argument. For Weitz the definitions proposed by each of the great theories are essentialist and therefore fail. What he proposes instead is looking at art as an open concept and considering the ways in which the arts are built upon a network of resemblances.

56 Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, 149. It is important to note, however, that Graham also acknowledges the normative theories as being important to aesthetics, though he says that approach is not as common. See also page 149.

57 I do note that Weitz uses the word “converge” for a reason, which is most likely an acknowledgement that aesthetic theories work on additional problems as well, but by choosing the word “converge” without acknowledging what else is explored by the various ‘great theories,’ he is also guilty of essentialism, even reductionism, in much the same manner he takes issue with in his paper.
extent to which problems and theories relating to the nature of music are part of the conversation of music educators. I suggest that studying music education discourse through the lens of aesthetic problems and theories better captures the variety of philosophical perspectives of music educators. Problems in aesthetics are necessarily attached to the various theories that seek to explain the nature, meaning, and value of music. That is, without the problems there would be no development of theory, and these music educators were in a position to understand problems inherent to the nature, meaning, and value of music every bit as much as they were capable of citing a specific theory and its proponents. One aspect of recognizing problems or theories in musical aesthetics is in regard to how the necessary and sufficient conditions of music are examined and explained. Trying to define music creates a number of problems and numerous theorists provide examples of the characteristics of music.

Explanations and Problems on the Nature of Music

The first domain of focused attention that pertains to examining the problems and theories is the nature of music. Key problems are rooted in questions such as what is music? How is music described? What are its characteristics? It is in this domain that the aesthetic object is studied and analyzed. Beardsley’s description of analysis involves “distinguishing, discriminating, and describing in detail…first, what is true of the parts, and, second, how the parts contribute to the peculiar qualities of the whole.”58 Later in his chapter Beardsley elaborates on numerous terms that are important for this investigation since each sheds light on ways in which music educators talked about music with each other and devise plans to relate the perception of music in practice. The material below aids in the interpretation of aspects of discourse among music educators.

58 Beardsley, Aesthetics, 77.
from 1907 to 1958. The basis of Beardsley’s establishment of categories for aesthetic analysis is the part-whole relationship. Simply put the parts are the “obvious and emphatic features, its dominant patterns or qualities”\textsuperscript{59} that emerge when perceiving the object, and in combination make up the whole. Subordinate to the fundamental part-whole category of aesthetic analysis are additional categories for further aesthetic analysis Beardsley calls complexes, elements, local qualities and regional properties (summative and emergent).\textsuperscript{60} Although these terms might seem cumbersome at first, they are helpful when attempting to analyze music aesthetically. These terms are important points of departure from which the meaningful discourse of music educators is analyzed in order for teachers of music to more clearly describe what is often considered the most abstract of the arts, music.

Though not flawless Beardsley’s assertions about the necessary and sufficient conditions of music, and his application of these and other categories of aesthetic analysis to music provide a solid framework from which music education discourse can be examined in the area of the nature of music. The extensive quotation below shows his application of his notion of part-whole relations specific to music, and these views are seen—in chapter three—in the discourse of music educators on the nature of music. Beardsley asserts that

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 78.
\textsuperscript{60} In general relation to art \textit{complexes} are defined by Beardsley as “any part of a sensory field [where] further parts can be discriminated within it,” while \textit{elements} are partless homogenous parts, and, therefore, aesthetic analysis cannot go beyond elements. The elements, however, according to Beardsley, do have certain qualities that can be perceived which he calls \textit{local qualities}. His example is of the white area inside the letter “O” as being a local quality. He continues by explaining what a regional property is, the most complicated of his categories of aesthetic analysis. Beardsley defines a \textit{regional property} as “a property, or characteristic, that belongs to a complex but not to any of its parts.” For him there are two additional distinctions behind his notion of regional property – summative and emergent. According to Beardsley, a \textit{summative regional property} is a combination of parts that is not present in each part by itself. While an \textit{emergent regional property} is “something new and different that seems to emerge from the combination.” For example, Beardsley writes, “the brightness of a white light made up of two white lights is summative; the color of a light made up of two different colored lights is emergent,” 84.
a musical composition, or auditory design, is a complex event, and its elements are smaller events, little—though sometimes momentous—changes that are occurring simultaneously and successively...these changes can be described by their termini, for a change is always from something to something—from loud to soft, from low to high, from sweet to harsh. The termini of musical changes are sounds, and these we shall here regard as the elements of music. Sounds have many properties, all of which can be of musical significance, but like the properties of visual areas they are conveniently divided into two groups: basic and dependent. Every sound has (1) a certain duration, that is, it lasts a certain length of time, (2) intensity, or degree of loudness and softness, (3) timbre, or quality—for example, shrillness, smoothness, scratchiness, hoarseness. Some sounds also have (4) pitch, that is they are high or low; and these sounds are called tones, the rest noises...Not every random collection of sounds, however, is music—not even every collection of tones...the essential quality of music...is a special auditory movement...Certain sounds or sound complexes seem to call for, or point toward, other sounds to come...The series of sounds fuses into a single process, and exhibits direction and momentum...When a series of tones becomes a melody it acquires some further regional qualities that are of the greatest importance in music. First, it acquires direction: it moves upward or downward or remains steady, grows louder or softer, and tends toward an implicit goal...And second, it becomes a whole, in which the parts, without losing their identity, fuse together. The wholeness of the melody seems to depend upon two other regional qualities, cadence and contour.61

Beardsley goes on to explain rhythm and tonality, and describes harmony as “two or more tones sounded together: the resulting chord fuses into a whole with a quality of its own.62 He discusses many other related points in detail, but I think the point has been made that his explanations include many of the necessary and sufficient conditions of music and are foundational to any meaningful basic aesthetic analysis.

Beyond the basic categories of aesthetic analysis outlined by Beardsley that pertain to the nature of music are the more sophisticated concepts of form, structure, and texture, and the relations between them. These terms make up the last points in this section relating to the nature of music. While texture is “anything going on at a given moment that can be described in terms of relations among the nearby parts,” structure is

61 Ibid., 97-100. Italics in original.
62 Ibid., 104.
“classified by reference to the number of their main parts, or sections,” and it is here Beardsley begins to highlight some problems that surface with this understanding as well as the problem that emerges from the relation between form and structure. First, “what constitutes a section, or main part, or a musical composition?” Second, “can either [texture and/or structure] occur without the other?” But the most important problems deal with what Beardsley calls kinetic pattern and musical expectation. Kinetic pattern is “the pattern of variation in its propulsion, or intensity of movement,” and he relates these ideas to the “regional qualities of the musical process.” For Beardsley musical expectation is divided into two parts, and the first of these parts is tied to the subjective listener. The first part of musical expectation is explained as an experience in which “the listener’s feelings are constantly guided and aroused.” The second part is more intellectually focused and “based on generalizations from past experience of certain types of music.” And with each of the aforementioned parts, the important problem that emerges, and one debated by philosophers, musicians, and music educators for hundreds of years, is “what is it that arouses our expectations about music?” The answers to these problems are given by a number of philosophers espousing this theory or that, but these will be addressed in a subsequent section. For now the last item to determine is form.

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63 Ibid., 179.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid., 180.  
66 Beardsley argues that the notion of kinetic pattern is often overlooked by critics because it is less formal. He asserts that it is “the most fundamental aspect of musical form.” Beardsley, Aesthetics, 184.  
67 Ibid., 185.  
68 Ibid., 187.  
69 Ibid., 188.  
70 Ibid.
Beardsley uses the term form, again, in two ways. The first way he uses the terms is to make a distinction between aesthetic objects, and in using it in this manner he acknowledges there is “a distinction between its form and its other aspects,” which causes problems. For example, “can form be separated from content? Is the form of an aesthetic object more, or less, important than its content, or its meaning?” The second way he uses form is as a way of asking “how well formed it is.” And it is with this latter designation he sees the ideas of complexes, elements, and regional qualities as being categories converging in the concept of unity, which is the term Beardsley substitutes for this second notion of form. Beardsley asserts that

When we speak of the unity of an aesthetic object, or say that one object is more or less unified than another, we mean to refer to a quality that different objects can possess in different degrees…we could say that an object has organic unity if and only if it is a complex – in other words, reserve “organic unity” for unity that is a regional quality…In critical discourse, we are not concerned with the unity possessed by elements of aesthetic objects, but only of complexes; in this context unity, if it is a quality at all, will always be a regional quality.

Discussions focusing on determining whether one piece of music is more unified than another based on the regional properties of melody, harmony, rhythm, and tonality and the concept of kinetic pattern, and of these relations in the complex are the basis of what happened in harmony and theory classes like those outlined by Thomas Tapper and put

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71 Ibid., 165.
72 Ibid., 190.
73 Ibid., 191. Beardsley again divides the term unity into two distinct parts: completeness and coherence. He describes completeness as “appear[ing] to require, or call upon, nothing outside itself; [having] all that it needs; [being] all there.” In negative terms, and in relation to music, one might think of Shubert’s Symphony no. 8 in B minor as having a state of incompleteness. Beardsley’s notion of coherence contains three principles: “focus…the dominant pattern, or compositional scheme…balance and equilibrium, [and] similarities [or] harmony…in other words, consistency of style, throughout the design.” Beardsley, Aesthetics, 193 – 195.
74 Ibid., 191. Italics in the original.
into practice by Brock McElheran.\textsuperscript{75} A related problem is “what makes a group of movements, as in a sonata or suite, constitute a coherent whole?”\textsuperscript{76} Though by no means an exhaustive list of all categories of analysis or list of problems, these introductory statements are a good starting point from which to examine music education discourse from 1907 to 1958 relating to the first area of aesthetic enquiry, the nature of music. The following section under the category of the nature of music shows various aesthetic theories and their attempts at working through these specific types of problems in musical aesthetics.

Theories on the Nature of Music

The material for this section comes largely from Weitz’s essay titled “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics” and his book \textit{Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings}.\textsuperscript{77} Other material is based on selections from \textit{The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics} edited by Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes, Lippman’s \textit{A History of Western Musical Aesthetics}, and Bowman’s \textit{Philosophical Perspectives on Music}, as well as a few other sources.\textsuperscript{78} As mentioned above Weitz’s purpose in his essay is to critique “each of the great theories of art,” with the aim of opening up the concept of art rather than relying on restrictive definitions that limit what art can be. His critique provides the

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\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 199.

\textsuperscript{77} Morris Weitz, \textit{Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings} (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1959). Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” 27 – 35. Like Beardsley’s \textit{Aesthetics: Problem in the Philosophy of Criticism}, the aforementioned works of Weitz’s were published during the period covered in this dissertation, which provide valuable insight to the issues as each was understood in aesthetics up to that point in history. Even though 1959 is one year removed from this study, the readings included are from earlier than 1959. The only exception is one essay by Erich Kahler titled “What is Art?”, which was written particularly for this publication, but even it is a response to Weitz’s 1956 essay.

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names of the leading proponents of each theory as well as concise and appropriate
definitions for “Formalism, Voluntarism, Emotionalism, Intellectualism, Intuitionism,
[and] Organicism.” 79 Prior to the more modern “great theories” listed by Weitz,
however, were definitions proposed by Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. The descriptions of
art given by these ancient thinkers served as a foundation for the field of aesthetics.
Furthermore, although the work of these authors is far removed from the period covered
in this dissertation, it is difficult to locate modern discussions that neglect to mention
their descriptions or fail to critique their ideas, in fact, music educators of the period were
no strangers to these classical thinkers, even citing them on a number of occasions.
Because music educators made use of the work of classical thinkers a brief overview of
the perspectives of these forerunners of modern aesthetic thought are mentioned below
before getting to the other theories listed by Weitz.

79 Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” 27. For some unknown and unstated reason Weitz
does not define Intellectualism in this essay. One clue of what he might mean by Intellectualism comes
from an essay in a book he edits titled Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings. The
essay that offers a clue as to a possible intended definition is titled “Art as a Virtue of the Practical
Intellect.” Interestingly enough it comes just prior to Croce’s work “Art as Intuition,” and just after DeWitt
H. Parker’s “The Nature of Art,” which in Weitz’s “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics” is the work he uses
to define Voluntarism. His publication titled “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics” originally written for The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism—cited above— is also included in his Problems in Aesthetics: An
Introductory Book of Readings, but after the three aforementioned works. Since it is unclear whether the
Maritain work was meant to characterize what Weitz calls Intellectualism, I describe intellectualism here in
the footnote instead of in the main body of the dissertation. In Jacques Maritain, “Art as a Virtue of the
York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1959/1964), 79 “art…is the straight intellectual determination of
works to be made.” He goes on in a footnote to state “as a rule the thing to be made, or the work to be
done, refers to the realm of knowledge for the sake of action, not of knowledge for the sake of knowledge.
That is why it is said in a general way that art belongs to the sphere of the practical intellect.” After
clarifying the difference between speculative intellect (knowing for the sake of knowledge) and practical
intellect (knowing “for the sake of action…to mold intellectually that which will be brought into being.”
Ibid., 78) and the useful arts (arts created by the intellect to meet and satisfy a specific and practical need.
Ibid., 84) and fine arts (the need of the intellect to manifest externally what is grasped within itself, in
creative intuition, and to manifest it in beauty.” Ibid., 85) he says “the work to be made is an end in itself,
and a certain singular and original, totally unique participation in beauty, reason alone is not enough for the
artist to form and conceive this work within himself in an infallible creative judgment…and we see that the
fine arts, though they are more fully intellectual than the useful arts, imply, however, a much greater and
more essential part played by the appetite [drive/motivation/desire], and require that the love for beauty
should make the intellect co-natured with beauty.” Ibid., 87. Therefore, according to Maritain, art is the
“operative virtue of the practical intellect.” Ibid., 91.
Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus give descriptions of art that are metaphysical and “all three are deeply concerned with art as imitation.” For Plato, art is imitation of an ideal form, which to him is real. But the artistic object, according to Plato, is twice removed from the ideal/real form. For Plato the artist relies on secondary mimesis. In other words the artist imitates a representation of the form made physical, such as a chair. Plato’s idea of form is more problematic for music than the visual arts, but according to Plato in his *Laws*, music is mimetic for the good. Frederick Copleston argues “that to make music imitative implies a widening of imitation to include symbolism.” Similar to Plato, Aristotle argues, art “like natural objects in general, embodies universals or Forms, it is not…metaphysically suspect, but a revelation of reality.” Copleston relates Aristotle’s theory to music by suggesting Aristotle believes “musical tunes contain in themselves imitations of moral moods.” Aristotle’s version of mimesis differs from the Platonic view because he does not see the mimesis as twice or thrice removed but rather as manifested in the art form itself. Last, Weitz suggests art for Plotinus

is one aspect of the truly Real, which is also the truly Beautiful. It is the embodiment of the One in the materials of this world, engendered by the activity of the artist’s soul. Indeed, art is more real than the natural object it may represent because of this participation in it of the artist’s soul.

Traces of the definitions of art proposed by these three ancient philosophers are seen in the more modern theories of expressivism and German idealism. Descriptions of the

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80 Weitz, *Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings*, 4. Though Aristotle’s version is less metaphysical than that of Plato or Plotinus.
82 Ibid., 258.
modern theories and how each defines the nature of art, and by extension, music are also intriguing.

Formalism is the first theory addressed by Weitz in his essay “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics.” He relies on the work of Clive Bell and Roger Fry to assert “its defining property is significant form, i.e. certain properties of lines, colors, shapes, volumes—everything on the canvas except the representational elements—which evokes a unique response to such combinations.”\(^{86}\) Weitz continues by suggesting “the nature of art, what it really is, so their theory goes, is a unique combination of certain elements…in their relations.”\(^{87}\) Rather than writing about the visual arts, which is what Bell and Fry did, Eduard Hanslick wrote about music and is the prototypical formalist on the topic. Hanslick’s *On the Musically Beautiful* is seminal in the field of music.\(^{88}\) The importance of his work for the field of music and aesthetics is due to his assertion that music is beautiful in and of itself, descriptions and definitions of music ought to focus only on the essence of music, nothing outside the music itself. His ideas are the basis of the notion of music for music’s sake. He argues the beauty of a musical composition is a specifically musical kind of beauty. By this we understand a beauty that is self-contained and in no need of content from outside itself, that consists simply and solely of tones and their artistic combination. Relationships, fraught with significance, of sounds which are in themselves charming—their congruity and opposition, their separating and combining, their soaring and subsiding—this is what comes in spontaneous forms before our inner contemplation and pleases us as beautiful…a musical idea brought into complete manifestation in appearance is already self-subsistent beauty; it is an end in itself, and it is in no way primarily a medium or material for the representation of feelings or conceptions.\(^{89}\)

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\(^{87}\) Ibid. Italics in the original.


\(^{89}\) Ibid., 28.
The overlap with meaning and value is apparent in the above explanations. In terms of meaning, musical analysis is self-contained and is defined more easily in negative terms. That is, instead of stating what formalism is, it is more convenient to argue what it is not. According to the formalist music is not analogous to language, politics, or feelings. Relying on the work of Moritz Lazurus, Edward Lippman writes:

> music cannot represent a conceptual content…nor is it an imitative art since it cannot properly be directed to the imitation of natural sounds. Even definite feelings and affections…cannot really be represented by it. In short, music can represent nothing other than itself, that is, measured tones in relations that are beautiful.\(^90\)

It follows, then, that in connection with the category of value the formalist argues it is intrinsic. R.A. Sharpe asserts “a formalist is somebody who thinks that the value of music lies in its formal properties of design and line and not in its expressive capacity…what matters is beauty and that beauty is a matter of form.”\(^91\) The linking of formalism’s nature with its meaning and value returns us to the basic idea that it “is a view of music that finds the distinguishing or most significant aspects of the art to be its form, the property in fact, that defines its essential nature.”\(^92\) The formalist’s notions of the nature of music are different from the so-called emotionalist.

Emotionalism, according to Weitz, is a theory where art is not to be defined by its “significant form but rather the expression of emotion in some sensuous medium.”\(^93\) Emotionalism is also referred to as Expressivism, which is the word used in the remainder of the dissertation. Gordon Graham, who like Weitz cites Tolstoy as the prototypical emotionalist/expressivist, defines the latter term as the view that art “is

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\(^92\) Ibid., 292.
essentially a form of expression, and what is more, the expression of feeling.” This is to say “that artists are people inspired by emotional experiences, who use their skill…to embody their emotions in a work of art, with a view to stimulating the same emotion in an audience.” The theory of emotionalism sees meaning and value in the emotional experience and the act of expressing and reacting. The problems associated with emotionalism as well as intuitionism, in relation to the meaning of music, are mentioned in the section below.

The term expressivism as defined by Graham also contains ideas of what Weitz calls Intuitionism—the next term defined in this section. Weitz says

Art is identified not with some physical, public object but with a specific creative, cognitive and spiritual act. Art is really a first stage of knowledge in which human beings (artists) bring their images and intuitions into lyrical clarification or expression. As such, it is an awareness, non-conceptual in character, of the unique individuality of things; and since it exists below the level of conceptualization or action, it is without scientific or moral content.

The similarity between the terms expressivism and intuitionism is based on Graham’s quoting of Croce’s *Guide to Aesthetics*, originally published in 1920. Graham describes Croce’s argument that art is intuition by stating “what lends coherence and unity to intuition is intense feeling. Intuition is truly such because it expresses an intense feeling and can arise only when the latter is its source and base.” Beardsley suggests “in intuition we are in direct communion with the object; since our grasp of it is not mediated by symbolic devices, intuitive knowledge is ineffable, and conveyable, if at all, only be

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94 Graham, “Expressivism,” *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 133. It is worthwhile to mention that on the same page Gordon Graham argues the expressivist theory is applied only to musical compositions from approximately 1850 – 1930, which overlaps the period covered in this dissertation.
95 Ibid.
97 Ibid., 134.
According to Croce, intuition and feeling are bound to each other, which is why I believe Graham combines the ideas Weitz views as distinct, namely the latter’s understanding of emotionalism and intuitionism. Expressivism and intuitionism are also similar in that each position asserts art’s non-conceptual character. The difference between Weitz’s emotionalism and Graham’s expressivism is located in the distinction Graham makes between “being an expression of and being expressive of.” He argues that

Where a specific emotion can be assigned to a work of art, the work is an expression of that emotion and appreciation of the work consists in feeling that emotion itself. If now we say that the work is not an expression of, but rather is expressive of, the emotion, appreciating would seem to consist in being brought to a heightened awareness of that emotion. However, this does not involve undergoing any element of that emotion.

The language of expression and expressive is common among music educators discussing music’s relation to feeling, which is seen in chapter four. Another important perspective on expressivism is the thought of Dewey.

Dewey’s view put forth in *Art as Experience* bears mentioning not only because this book was published in the midst of the years covered in this study but also due to the fact he was a leading philosopher working in the United States whose writings had received attention in the field of education. For Dewey

What has been said in general about the power of an art to take a natural, raw material and convert it, through selection and organization, into an intensified and concentrated medium of building up *an experience*, applies with particular force

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99 Graham makes a distinction between conceptual knowledge and intuition by asserting “conceptual knowledge (and under this label we may include philosophy, history, and science) is founded upon a distinction between reality and unreality, so that it must compare its hypotheses with ‘the world out there.’” And quoting directly from Croce’s Guide to Aesthetics, he writes, ‘in contrast, intuition refers precisely to the lack of distinction between reality and unreality—to the image itself—with its purely ideal status as mere image.” Graham, “Expressivism,” *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, 135.
101 Ibid., 142.
to music. Through the use of instruments, sound is freed from the definiteness it has acquired through association with speech. It thus reverts to its primitive passional quality. It achieves generality, detachment from particular objects and events. At the same time, the organization of sound effected through the multitude of means at the command of the artist…deprives sound of its usual immediate tendency to stimulate a particular overt action. Responses become internal and implicit, thus enriching the content of perception instead of being dispersed in overt discharge.¹⁰²

So, for Dewey a necessary and sufficient condition for something to be called music is for it to be a particular kind of experience, more specifically, an aesthetic experience, which is privileged over the aesthetic object. The aesthetic object is simply “the product of an interaction between the living organism and its environment, an undergoing and a doing which involves a reorganization of energies, actions and materials.”¹⁰³ The next theory on the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be called art is from the Organicist.

Organicism, according to Weitz, is the view that “art is in its nature a unique complex of interrelated parts,”¹⁰⁴ which is akin to Beardsley’s description’s of the necessary and sufficient elements included in his description of music seen above. Since much of this theory was alluded to earlier in the chapter it is hardly necessary to develop the ideas further here.¹⁰⁵

The last example Weitz gives is of Voluntarism. The leading proponent of this definition of art is Dewitt Parker.¹⁰⁶ Weitz paraphrases Parker’s theory defining art as the

¹⁰² Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 248. Italics added. Dewey’s explanation on having an experience was mentioned earlier in the chapter.
¹⁰⁵ See Beardsley’s chapter titled “Artistic Form.”
¹⁰⁶ Dewitt Parker lived from 1885 – 1949. He was a professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan and his many works include *The Principles of Aesthetics* (Boston, MA: Silver, Burdett and Company, 1920) and *The Analysis of Art* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1926). The reason I am giving this background on Parker and his work is because not only were his writings on aesthetics
“embodiment of wishes and desires imaginatively satisfied, language, which characterizes the public medium of art, and harmony, which unifies the language with layers of imaginative projections.” The definition of Voluntarism brings to an end the list of Weitz’s “great theories of art.” Beyond the “great theories” listed by Weitz are a few additional theories that Lippman and others mention which specifically have to do both with the general field of aesthetics and musical aesthetics.

Idealism, which has its roots in Platonic thought, is transformed in the late eighteenth and through the nineteenth century by German thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Schelling, and Schiller where it becomes German idealism. Although each thinker represents a particular strand of idealism, the similarity of each rests, like Plato, on metaphysical descriptions of art. It is not necessary here and there is not the space in this dissertation to explain the differences, for example, of the critical idealism of Kant and the transcendental idealism of Schopenhauer. What is important, however, is to locate similarities among these thinkers in terms of their discourse on aesthetics, more specifically, musical aesthetics. Dale Jacquette asserts the similarity among Schopenhauer, Schiller, and Schelling “is a commitment to the problem set by Kant of trying to reconcile the fundamental opposition between freedom and necessity.” He continues by suggesting there are two levels of this struggle. The first is the “will

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struggling tragically or heroically against the forces of moral and political authority, social conformity and the regimentation of artistic styles in the world of art.”\textsuperscript{109} The second is metaphysical. Here Jacquette argues “it is the same battle for the supremacy of the human spirit and its sense of freedom in conflict with the necessity of natural forces represented by the rigidity of natural scientific law.”\textsuperscript{110} The ideas Jacquette describes lead to a description of art, specifically music, then, as an idea. In more sophisticated terms, Bowman says “idealism often attributes to music extraordinary significance as a surrogate for something beyond its own phenomenal existence.”\textsuperscript{111} Because of music’s alleged surrogate nature, the task of these nineteenth century idealists was to “wrestle with music’s ephemeral, felt nature, seeking to explain how such ephemerality relates to the realm of ideas, and to show how music differs from the baser, sensory experience in which it obviously originates.”\textsuperscript{112} Last, Bowman writes that music to the idealists is at once autonomous and heteronomous; important for what it is and for what it reveals; expressive without expressing anything definite; feelingful, yet not concerned with feelings-felt. Music is not a referential or representational affair, yet it affords intuitions or insights of profound transcendental significance. Music is at once an end in itself and a means to spiritual elevation, at once fundamentally mindful and fundamentally felt.\textsuperscript{113}

The idealist is someone who sees importance in the extramusical, such as morality, while also looking to intramusical elements, such as the mindful construction of harmonic phrases.

The next theory on the nature of music is Symbolism, which has similar features with idealism. Beardsley, who lumps symbolism and semiotics together under the term

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Bowman, \textit{Philosophical Perspectives on Music}, 128.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 69.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 128.
signification theory, says the significationist argues “music is an iconic sign of a psychological process. It ‘articulates’ or ‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does so by presenting auditory equivalents to some structural or kinetic aspects of that life.”\textsuperscript{114} Bowman, who argues that symbolism has similar characteristics to idealism because of its emphasis on the thoughtful and feelingful, explains the theory as one where music signifies, inclines toward, and/or refers or represents something extramusical.\textsuperscript{115} Leading thinkers on symbolism/semiotics/significationism, are Ernst Cassirer, Charles Peirce, and Ferdinand de Saussure, with the work of Cassirer having significant influence on Susanne Langer who specifically addresses and spends much time on the topic of music. Because of Langer’s influence on the philosophy of music education, which is described in the forthcoming section of this chapter, her take on symbolism is of particular importance. For Langer, music is a symbol which is “non-discursive or presentational,” and “unconsummated.”\textsuperscript{116} To put it another way, music is symbolic not for how we think linguistically but rather as insight into “how feelings go.”\textsuperscript{117} Additionally, music is “unconventionalized, unverbalized freedom of thought.”\textsuperscript{118} For her, “we cannot know the world as it ‘really’ is…only those aspects that get refracted for us by symbols and are

\textsuperscript{114} Beardsley, \textit{Aesthetics}, 333. Where Beardsley describes a “sign” as “any object or event that stands for something else, or leads us to take account in some way of something else besides itself, “iconic signs” are “in some important way similar to their significata, that is, to the things they stand for.” Ibid., 332 – 333.

\textsuperscript{115} Bowman, \textit{Philosophical Perspectives on Music}, 199.

\textsuperscript{116} Langer explains discursiveness this way: “all language has a form which requires us to string out our ideas even though their objects rest one within the other…only thoughts which can be arranged in this peculiar order can be spoken at all. Any idea which does not lend itself to this ‘projection’ is ineffable, incomunicable by means of words whereas symbolism in non-discursive or presentational form is “different from the laws of syntax that govern language. The most radical difference is…they do not present their constituents successively, but simultaneously, so the relations determining a visual [musical] structure are grasped in one act of vision [hearing]…furnished by our purely sensory appreciation of forms.” And, according to her, an unconsummated symbol is “a significant form without conventional significance.” Susanne Langer \textit{Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art}, 3d ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 81-82, 93, 241.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 244.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 243.
thus rendered conceivable.”¹¹⁹ In Langer’s view music has a very important function for humankind because of its symbolic presentation. Not all, particularly the next group of theorists called the Objectivists, agree with the perspective of symbolism/semiotics/significationism.

Lippman argues the objectivists “examined music in its own right, seeking a rationale for the musical work without looking beyond the music into any attendant circumstances or extramusical influences. He continues by suggesting the disagreements between symbolism/semiotics/significationism contrasted with those of objectivism, a formalist legacy.¹²⁰ Two well known thinkers on objectivity in musical aesthetics are Heinrich Schenker and Ferruccio Busoni. In relating the work of Schenker, Lippman writes

Schenker takes issue in particular with Schopenhauer’s claim that the composer reveals the innermost core of the world. What he really reveals is the organic and absolute nature of the life of tone. The intrinsic laws of tone are like the laws of the cosmos: they rest on only a few fundamental forces.

Like Schenker, Busoni argues “representation and description are not the nature of music; herewith we declare the invalidity of program-music.”¹²¹ Later he says of music “let it be pure invention and sentiment, in harmonies, in forms, in tone-colors.”¹²² Lippman claims for the theorists of objectivity that there was an emphasis on “simplicity… forms, styles, and stylistic features of the past…Simplicity in itself somehow fosters musical objectivity, which is thus connected with both historicism and the social motive of

¹²² Ibid., 95.
accessibility.” His latter statement on simplicity is pertinent because the objectivity of Busoni and other thinkers of the so-called Young Classicist and “Neue Sachlichkeit (new objectivity, new matter-of-factness)” movements were in relation to tradition.

Busoni senses the new trends in music happening in the early twentieth century and, according to Lippman, writes about “artists that cling to the tradition that is currently in favor and those who seek to free themselves from it.” One indication from Busoni on what Lippman is trying to express in relation to tradition comes from a letter to Busoni’s son Raffaello on June 18, 1921. In it Busoni writes “every recent or new means, should it be capable of expressing something which cannot be expressed in any other way, ought to be adopted and employed; intentional disdain of effective new means.

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123 Ibid., 398. Here forms is not identical to the Platonic essence of the term but rather as described by Wallace Berry in Form in Music (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966): “It is the sum of those qualities in a piece of music that bind together its parts and animate the whole. It is the product of intellectual control over the musical ideas which bring a composition into existence. It is a discipline through which the inherent power of the musical materials is realized and directed to an end that is convincing and seemingly inevitable...when music theory speaks of traditional forms, its reference is to established models of musical structure which were brought to consummate realization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which show remarkable viability today.” Wallace Berry, Form in Music (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), preface. Italics in the original. Examples include, strophic, binary, ternary, theme and variation, fugue, sonata, and canon.

124 Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 400. Busoni wrote in German, and there are different ideas behind the term “classicism.” Edward Lippman calls the movement “Young Classicism,” while Antony Beaumont uses the term “Young Classicality” and Della Couling calls it “Young Classicity.” In Antony Beaumont’s translation of a letter to Busoni’s son Raffaello on June 18, 1921 Ferruccio Busoni writes, “I have been misunderstood, in that the multitude construed Classicality as something retrospective... I lay stress on the importance of the word ‘Young’ in order to distinguish Classicality from conventional classicism.” The German term is junge Klassizität and, according to Della Couling the translation to “Young Classicism” comes from the loose translation of the German by Rosamund Ley. Recent differences on the translation of the term stem from Rosamund Ley’s Ferruccio Busoni: The Essence of Music and Other Papers (New York, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 1965) translation. The Ley piece is the one cited by Lippman. At this point the reader might be wondering how could Busoni’s scholarly work, if not translated until 1965, be included in this study? Busoni, a composer, musician, conductor, teacher, and writer, coined the term “Young Classicality” in 1919. He is referenced by W. Otto Miessner in 1912 at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Music Supervisors’ National Conference held at St. Louis, Missouri, March 19 – 22, 1912 in a paper titled “The Child Voice in Song Interpretation.” Therefore, it would appear as if at least some of his work had either been translated or the scholar who was exposed to Busoni understood German. In any case the point is that some music educators were familiar with Busoni’s musical or scholarly work and perhaps both.

125 Ibid., 398.
achievements strikes me as unreasonable and impoverished.” At the same time, in explaining his doctrine of Young Classicity as related by both Lippman and Della Couling in Ferrucio Busoni “A Musical Ishmael,” Busoni calls for a return to what he conceived to be the true purpose of music: a return to harmony, to melody, to “the most highly developed (not the most complicated) polyphony,” and away from what is “sensuous,” music as description, not “profundy and personal feelings and metaphysics, but Music which is absolute, distilled, and never under a mask of figures and ideas which are borrowed from other spheres.” He certainly did not mean by this a return to the styles of the past, but faithfulness to what he conceived as the higher purpose of music, “the conclusion of previous experiments.”

This material on Busoni’s Young Classicality says two things. First, the doctrine of Young Classicality is connected with the tradition of Hanslick’s formalism, which is evidenced by Philip Stoltzfus, who asserts, “Busoni helped renew scholarly interest in Hanslick and Mozart.” This connection between Busoni’s philosophical position and formalism reinforces Hanslick’s influence in the twentieth century. Second, the Young Classicist and Neue Sachlichkeit movements, as elucidated by Erich Dolflein, who was a critic of the time and participant in the Neue Sachlichkeit movements, led to another type of objectivity. What Dolflein suggests in his “Die Neue Musik des Jahres” in 1926, as cited by Lippman, is “along with this acquisition of a self-evident quality and a relaxation into objectivity and playfulness, the public of modern music has fundamentally changed.” Lippman correctly takes Dolflein’s idea to mean “there was a change in the

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127 Della Couling, Ferrucio Busoni “A Musical Ishmael” (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2005), 350 – 351. The quoted material in the block quote above is also found in Edward Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 399.
129 Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 401.
social situation of music.” Reinforcing the change Dolflein proposes in the situation of music and aesthetics at the time, Lippman includes another excerpt from Dolflein’s article in Melos titled “Über Grundlagen der Beurteilung Gegenwärtiger Musik” in 1928. Here Dolflein argues

this orientation to use and the style connected with the use is the real outcome of the Neue Sachlichkeit….Thus a closer tie of music to the human being and to human beings among one another in their relation to music, a human resolution, was yielded by the idea of objectivity.

Lippman’s analysis of Dolflein’s writings shows the connection of a social component to music. What happens historically and philosophically, suggests Lippman, is the “social influence and social explanation [of Neue Sachlichkeit] are replaced here by social interpretation and by an incisive criticism of the social order.” The philosophical transformation of objectivism now focusing on social critique, called socioaesthetics here, is exemplified by Theodor Adorno.

Socioaesthetics is tied to objectivism by Lippman. Furthermore, because of the theory’s connection with modernism and its examination of the relation of society and music, a natural association existed for music educators to discuss. Marxist views on music of the time also resemble the place of music in society. Adorno, one of the leading...

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131 Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 402.
133 Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 404.
134 Ibid., 205
135 My first encounter with the term socioaesthetic was in Lippman’s, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 398. An explanation of it will follow in the paragraph on socioaesthetics and Marxism. Socioaesthetics can be classified as similar to the following: the sociological approach to music, the sociology of art, or sociological aesthetics. Gordon Graham argues “sociological alternatives to philosophical aesthetics may be grouped under a variety of labels: Marxist aesthetics, structuralism, critical theory, deconstructionism, postmodernism.” Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, 158. I prefer the term socioaesthetics because it is concise, yet it takes into account the expansion of the field of aesthetics in the twentieth century by taking into account elements from the disciplines of sociology and aesthetics simultaneously.
philosophers on musical aesthetics in the twentieth century, wrote a number of works in
the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s on topics covering aesthetics and music’s relation to
society. Discussions regarding socioaesthetic and/or Marxist themes taken up by
music educators with the aim of influencing practice were limited. As a theory, however,
it shares some basic tenets with modernism (a topic mentioned in music education
discourse), which brings the conversations about contemporary music into clearer
focus. Music educators occasionally explored socioaesthetic concepts and even
brought some of them to the attention of other conference members. More specifically,
in the words of Lippman interpreting Adorno, the socioaesthetic perspective is one where
“music reflects society.” Furthermore, and elaborating on the Marxist perspective,
Beardsley argues the “Principle of Nonneutrality…is the statement that every aesthetic
object of any noteworthy degree of aesthetic value has a tendency to promote, or to
interfere with, our social and political goals, whatever they may be.” The notion of
reflecting society is a bit simplistic which is why Hamilton rejects Lippman’s claim
regarding Adorno’s work. Instead, Hamilton argues that Adorno thinks “music is not

136 Of the numerous works on music and aesthetics he wrote during this time period his
Philosophie der Neuen Musik (1949) is one of his major publications. Adorno published seminal works
that overlap the time period studied in this dissertation and while there is evidence his ideas were
incorporated into some of the papers neither he nor his work is named. A partial answer to Adorno not
being cited is because his publications were originally written in German thereby limiting accessibility to
many music educators in the United States.
137 “Modernism is a problematic and highly contested concept” according to Andy Hamilton who
continues by giving a number of descriptive elements that accompany the term modernism which include:
“modernism saw itself as progressive…modernists rebelled against classical standards imposed by the
academy…art should disrupt conservative tastes to reveal hidden truths and make prophetic criticism…its
self-conscious attention to the artistic medium itself…modernist art is self-conscious, self-reflective, and
self-critical…many of its proponents regarded modern art as a necessary response to the contemporary
world of industrialization and mass culture.” Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music, 154 – 156. Additionally,
Hamilton writes about Adorno’s “rejection of beauty in modern art, ‘all of [whose] beauty consists in
denying itself the illusion of beauty.”’ Ib., 162.
138 Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 473.
139 Beardsley asserts the principle of nonneutrality rests on the basic Marxist notion that
“considerations of aesthetic values are to be subordinated to political ones, for…aesthetic objects cannot be
simply a reflection of society, and so he does not subordinate aesthetic values to social and economic ones as classical Marxism does.”140 To Hamilton, Adorno saw music as an important component of society, not merely a reflection of it. Hamilton’s assessment is closer to Adorno’s definition of art, which is “concentrated social substance.”141 As such it “contains within itself the contradictions of social reality. Its material is a sediment of social relations and is ‘historical through and through.’”142 According to this view, art is very much an embedded part of social relations and the historical process and as such occupies an interesting position. First, in relation to the social nature of art Hamilton cites directly from Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory:

Art…is social not only because of its mode of production…but not simply because of the social derivation of its thematic material. Much more importantly, art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position only as autonomous art. By crystallising in itself as something unique to itself, rather than complying with existing social norms and qualifying as ‘socially useful’, it criticises society by merely existing...through its refusal of society, which is equivalent to sublimation through the law of form, autonomous art makes itself a vehicle of ideology.143

Second, Wayne Bowman points out the relation between modern music and its social context in the philosophy of Adorno:

Truly “modern” music has the capacity to undermine the sense of organic wholeness that lulls people into the false belief that all is well. Thus though music often functions ideologically, it can also function redemptively. It may function as an instrument of propaganda or as a bearer of truth. Music can sever the status quo, but it can also resist it…music in modern society is situated between two dialectically opposite poles: as commodity, it perpetuates false consciousness; as social critique, it subverts ideology and serves authentic consciousness…it is capable of revealing with utmost clarity “the contradictions and flaws which cut through present-day society”…because music is itself a social fact, it cannot directly resolve the problem of its own alienation. The most

140 Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music, 181.
141 Ibid., 169
142 Ibid.
it can do is “portray within its own structure the social antinomies which are also responsible for its own isolation.”

Since art is part of the historical process in the view of theorists of socioaesthetics and in terms of philosophical aesthetics, music is both social critique and social force.

From Socioaesthetics and Objectivism to Formalism, Idealism, and Expressivism the many theories in aesthetics and musical aesthetics presented here each posit a unique definition of art and/or music. Whether a necessary and sufficient condition for something to be called art or music is intuition, experience, or idea, it is clear that what music is is an actively debated topic now and in the history of musical aesthetics. Another contested area in musical aesthetics is explanations and problems on Meaning/Interpretation/Comprehension.

Explanations and Problems on Meaning/Interpretation/Comprehension/Revelation

The second domain of focused attention that pertains to examining the problems and theories in musical aesthetics is the meaning of music—how music is comprehended, interpreted, and what is revealed by music. The idea of meaning is approached in part by analysis of the relations between composer, musical work, and the percipient as well as, depending on the theory, each of these independently. Generally, key problems are rooted in questions such as “does music have a meaning, in some noteworthy sense? If so, how do we know what that meaning is?” More specifically, other key questions generate debate by asking if we are to comprehend and interpret music for its alleged expression of emotion; how it may represent an external idea or symbol, or; are we only able to analyze the structural form of the composition? One of the most familiar


problems of musical aesthetics falls in this domain, the problem of music as a language, and/or its relation to words. It is in the category of meaning where uncovering of the artistic process by examining the musical work and our response (interpretation and comprehension) to it is central.

Beardsley’s notions of meaning are divided in ways where interpretation and comprehension may be informed by the composer, composition, and listener individually and/or collectively. In this section, however, problems are combined with theories to show how the theories address the problems. The two main groups of theories are expressionist and significationist, which he writes about with the purpose of proving each is false while admitting “a large part of discourse about music consists of just such statements.” These theories give insight to musical meaning and interpretation, and from a philosophical standpoint they lead only to further speculation. The arguments that take place among the theorists espousing one theory over another, for example the formalist versus the expressivist, are some of the most charged in musical aesthetics because meaning necessarily involves interaction between subject and object. Beardsley writes

When descriptions are put into the form of descriptions, they back up their claims by the music itself, and they lead attention to the music. When they are put in the form of statements about signification they lead away from the music, very often either into biographical internationalism disguised as musicological expertness or affective free-associationism disguised as semiotical profundity.

The difficulty given above might be one reason the proponents of MEAE have had such a difficult time trying give direction to the movement let alone justify music’s place in the curriculum. This is because the debates, although fruitful and healthy for the

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146 Ibid., 337.
147 Ibid., 338.
field, led to no certain philosophical conclusions of meaning and understanding in all instances of music. Good cases have been and will continually be made arguing the position of expressivism over formalism, or for some middle ground between the two, but for now the problem of definitive and certain meaning in all music continues to beguile the field. Furthermore, the debate between expressivism and formalism is just one element of aesthetic discourse, and as I suggested earlier, this is a reason to more thoroughly examine the discourse of the first half of the twentieth century through the lens of a more complete definition of musical aesthetics. These arguments over the meaning and comprehension of music have existed in musical aesthetics since the beginning of the discipline and continue in the field of music education today. My work establishes that the period from 1907 to 1958 was not a philosophically barren place but rather one where musical aesthetics and its accompanying problems and theories were being actively discussed and meaning is one area where there was little consensus. Therefore, even though Beardsley attempts to dismiss the expressive and signification theories, the debates that occurred surrounding these two leading theories generated important progress in both musical aesthetics and music education of the period, especially in relation to notions of the language of music.  

Expressive theories in musical aesthetics advance the idea that the music is expressive of some quality, emotion, or feeling. Again, it is not the explicit task here to critique or to prove this or that of the various theories within this category as false but rather to show, with the aim of better understanding, how expressivism explains meaning in music or presents a problem for aesthetics. Beardsley asserts that expressive theories

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148 Beardsley’s problem with these theories is that music, especially music without words attached, cannot be empirically proven to elicit meaning. For him music is a process where the most it can achieve in relation to the expressive theories is the imitation of certain kinetic qualities.
are explained using the formula “$X$ expresses $Y$, where $X$ is the musical work, or some part of it, and $Y$ is a psychological state or quality.”¹⁴⁹ Theorists who support expressivism deal with problems that relate to examining how a piece of music expresses the composer’s state of mind, the state of mind of the percipient, or some combination of the two in relation to the music.¹⁵⁰ For example, how was the composer’s supposed state of melancholy at the time of the composition of the piece shown in the work? Or, is the composition, as a whole or at least in part, written to evoke melancholy in the listener? Beardsley suggests the heart of the expressivist theory espouses the embodiment or objectification of emotion rather than a mere venting of emotion.¹⁵¹ According to him the notions of “embodied” and “objectified” as explained by an expressivist using the first sentence below are as follows:

“The composer has objectified (embodied, expressed) joy in his scherzo” means “(1) he has been moved by a feeling of joy to compose the scherzo; (2) he has given the scherzo a joyful quality; and (3) the scherzo has the capacity to give him the same feeling of joy when he hears it again, and consequently to give it to the listeners, too.”¹⁵²

Even if the composer could embody or express the emotion of joy in music, problems arise with the standpoint of the listener to comprehend the so called joy. Additionally, the subjective quality of the interpretation creates difficulties in determining whether it is joy, delight, contentment, or serenity. However, Beardsley goes on to argue that expressivism points to “an important fact about music—namely, that it has human regional qualities.”¹⁵³ These human regional qualities are in relation to the idea of regional qualities mentioned above. According to Beardsley, there is similarity “to

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 326 – 328.
¹⁵¹ Ibid., 327.
¹⁵² Ibid., 327 – 328.
¹⁵³ Ibid., 331.
qualities of human behavior, especially to mental states and processes: somberness, serenity, frolicsomeness, determination, calm, voluptuousness, [and] indecisiveness.\textsuperscript{154}

So, distinguishing between what music allegedly expresses and what it means is an extremely difficult task.

The second theory for examination is signification. In the two decades surrounding the center of the twentieth century there was much attention being given to the work of Langer’s \textit{Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art}.\textsuperscript{155} Her ideas in \textit{Philosophy in a New Key} and the follow-up work \textit{Feeling and Form} are integral components in the writings of such leading lights of the MEAE movement as Reimer.\textsuperscript{156} Her work is also cited in \textit{Basic Concepts} and \textit{Foundations and Principles of Music Education}. As mentioned in the previous chapter \textit{Basic Concepts} and \textit{Foundations and Principles} are credited by contemporary music education historians and philosophers as launching the MEAE movement. In these works, especially the latter, there is an emphasis on expressivism and signification a la Langer.\textsuperscript{157} The attention she as a significationist and the expressivists have received is important and justifiable. This attention, however, has limited the degree to which aesthetics in music

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{154}] Ibid., 328. For Beardsley the notion of human regional quality is where expression theory reaches its limits. He argues that the statement “‘the music is joyous’ is plain and can be defended [while] ‘the music expresses joy’ adds nothing except unnecessary and unanswerable questions.” Beardsley, \textit{Aesthetics}, 331.
\item[\textsuperscript{156}] Susanne Langer, \textit{Feeling and Form} (New York, NY: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1953).
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education is seen as anything other than the reification of the phrases “music is the tonal analogue of emotive life”\textsuperscript{158} or music as “non-discursive symbolism.”\textsuperscript{159} Dwelling on this single facet of aesthetic discourse has limited the understanding of how aesthetics was, and might currently be, used in music education practice. Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with signification theory, these ideas are important developments in the philosophical discourse in music education. But, again, her theories and signification are just one aspect of aesthetic discourse.

Signification theory posits that “music does have a referential relation to things outside itself, and [significationists] propose to analyze this relation in semiotic terms, that is, using the concept of \textit{sign}.”\textsuperscript{160} Beardsley separates this group of theorists from expressivists because, in his words, “signification theorists set aside the venting and the evoking of emotions as not properly a matter of meaning at all,” furthermore, “they do not think statements about musical meaning can be reduced to descriptions.”\textsuperscript{161} More precisely, “music is an iconic sign of psychological processes. It ‘articulates’ or ‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does so by presenting auditory equivalents of some structural or kinetic aspects of that life.”\textsuperscript{162} This theory, Beardsley argues, rests on the following propositions: “(1) A musical composition can be iconic with a psychological process, that is, it can be similar to such a process in an important way. (2) By virtue of its iconicity, the composition is a sign of the psychological process.”\textsuperscript{163} He also says that music shares similar aspects to what has been previously referred to as

\textsuperscript{158} Langer, \textit{Feeling and Form}, 27.
\textsuperscript{159} Langer, \textit{Philosophy in a New Key}, 93 – 102.
\textsuperscript{160} Beardsley, \textit{Aesthetics}, 332. Italics in the original. Signification might also be referred to as semiotics or semiology.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 333.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid, 334.
“kinetic patterns” or “kinetic qualities.” That is, there can be overlap between such musical and mental features as “tempo, variations of intensity, impulsiveness, relaxation, and tension, crescendo and diminuendo.” For Langer, meaning in music is “as a formulation and representation of emotions, moods, and mental tensions and resolutions—a ‘logical picture’ of sentient, responsive life and a source of insight into it.” Furthermore, Lippman writes that Langer asserts “the content of music is symbolized, and what it invites is not emotional response but insight.” Also in relation to signification theory in terms of meaning, interpretation, and revelation Bowman asserts

What music does…is enable conception. This act of coherence making is…the common foundation of thought and music; this achievement of coherence, not the logical operations by which it is subsequently manipulated and ordered is the root of humankind’s distinctive mental power. In other words, thought and music are each ways—albeit contrasting ways—of ‘transforming reality symbolically’.

But, although plausible and defensible, signification, like expressivism, generates the challenge of specifically determining if the accurate meaning is derived through the so called sign. Here Beardsley uses an example: “One chair may be exactly like another, but that does not make it signify the other.” For him, “we cannot decide among the innumerable possible qualities, so that if the music is a sign at all, it is ambiguous.”

Whether we accept or reject signification theory is not the issue. The point of the brief explanation of the theory, and its merits and defects, is that it shows a way of seeing the discourse of music educators presenting, elaborating on, and possibly defending an important theory in aesthetics. However, making the historically developmental

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164 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
168 Ibid., 335. Beardsley goes on to explain different kinds of signs – conventional and natural – and in so doing concludes music can be iconic but not an iconic sign. By this he means that one can accept the first proposition mentioned earlier but ought to reject the second. Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 336.
169 Ibid., 336.
associations and connections from the conclusions drawn in this dissertation to contemporary music education philosophy and musical aesthetics is not what is undertaken in this work. Links between the past and present can be topics of further study, especially in relation to the next problem in musical aesthetics, the relation of music to words and/or language.

This section on the relation of music to words and/or language has three main components. The first two, music’s uses of words in song and the idea of program music, are talked about by Beardsley, and the third, the relation of linguistic structure and musical structure, is addressed by Scruton from *The Aesthetics of Music.*

Beardsley poses two questions on the relation of words and music: “How is music related to the sound of the words? And how is music related to the sense of the words?” For him these questions are superseded by the problem of “the connection between the sound of the music and the meaning of the words.” Regarding the first two problems Beardsley presents what he calls Fusion Theory as way to see the degree to which music and words might be associated. For Beardsley, Fusion Theory rests on the principle that

A musical passage is coherent with—appropriate to—a verbal discourse sung to it if it has some fairly intense human regional qualities that are either qualities

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170 Although Scruton is a contemporary philosopher and some of his arguments rely on material that was not available to earlier scholars, he brings the problem of the notion of the language of music into clear relief. I will limit reference to his work by merely presenting the comparisons he makes between language and music. The interested reader should note that in his chapter “Language” he takes the view that associations between language and music are “more metaphor than simile,” and from “Understanding” he says “the one who hears a sentence with understanding is able not merely to paraphrase it, but also to use the information contained in it, in theoretical and practical reasoning. He has acquired a ‘mental content’, which outlives the experience of the sentence and enters his cognitive repertoire. No such thing happens when we understand music. There is nothing we can do with our musical understanding in the immediate circumstances of life. The content of a piece of music is the intentional object of purely musical perception, and can exist in no other form—even if it has relations and analogies in language…the meaning of a piece of music does not reside in it in the way that meaning resides in language.” Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetic of Music* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1997), 202, 237. Italics in the original.


172 Ibid., 341.
designated by the words or qualities of the events or situation described by the words.\textsuperscript{173}

With this theory the reader can most likely remember his or her beginning chorus teacher instructing the group on calmly singing a lullaby or giving an enthusiastic rendition of \textit{Happy Birthday}. In relation to the idea of word meaning and musical sound the issue is complex because in program music the composition “depends on its own musical unity and continuity upon purely musical relations among its parts: it calls for development, for recapitulations, for variations or thematic combination.”\textsuperscript{174} On the other hand a story follows a path which is not necessarily similar, and it must achieve other aims such as “character-development and conflict resolution.”\textsuperscript{175} Although the problem above of word meaning in relation to musical sound begs the question to an extent, Beardsley’s assertion “where the music is large and symphonic, and the story must be recalled from an earlier reading that has no perceptible connection with the music itself, the correspondence of music to words will probably remain a mere correspondence”\textsuperscript{176} is warrantable. His argument is justified based on the main problems related to meaning and interpretation given at the outset of this section, namely how can we be certain that intentionally and particularly organized musical sounds mean something such as farm, flying, fantastic, or furor. Showing specific relations between words and music is a common but suspect practice by aestheticians and some music educators. Another relationship, no less common or suspect, was presented by aestheticians and music educators who argued that organized sound had a closer association with language.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 344.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 351.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 350.
The notion of music as a language is based upon the ideas that music and stories do have special structures. And it is within this idea of structure that Scruton analyzes the similarity between the structure of music and the structure of language and linguistic and musical rules. But while analyzing and comparing the structure of each may give some clues about how we might begin the process of interpretation, where does it leave us regarding insights into meaning? Attempting to move closer toward solving the music-as-a-language problem, Scruton examines what language is and the elements that make it work. For him “language is essentially an information-carrying medium, intelligible in principle to every rational being, and governed by rules which organize a finite vocabulary into a potential infinity of sentences.”

Though music does not contain rules in relation to parts of speech, is there something about music’s structure that enables us to display our humanness? Can music convey information the way language does? Scruton uses the linguistic terminology of syntax and semantics for the purpose of discovering whether music shares the qualities embodied by these terms. Scruton writes,

Our sense of musical syntax is not of a step-by-step substitution of syntactically equivalent components, but of context-dependent affinity between tones. Certain elements belong together, even when separated by intervening material—like the dominant and the tonic chords in a lengthy cadence.

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177 Scruton, *The Aesthetic of Music*, 172. Although it is not clear whether music mirrors all of the elements of his definition of language such as a rule guided-structure, Scruton acknowledges that music is more than a “mere surface level phenomenon—a mere matter of style.”

178 Ibid., 172.

179 Scruton says “at the surface level…syntactic intuitions tell us whether a sentence is a possible sentence in English, which of its component sounds is a word rather than a phoneme, and how the words are linked. Semantic intuitions tell us whether a sentence has meaning, and what the meaning is.” Scruton, *The Aesthetic of Music*, 177. He acknowledges that it is possible to assert “music as a rule-governed art, whose meaning is worked out through its structure” but after a series of counter examples concludes that “music has a structure of a kind. But it is not a syntactic structure [and] there is no semantic structure in music.” Ibid., 210.

180 Ibid., 186. Italics in the original.
Taking a cue from signification theory in relation to semantics, Scruton seeks another possible solution to music as a language problem. He suggests,

We could use the linguistic analogy to cast light on the meaning of music, therefore, only if we could also think of music in the same structural terms—in other words, only if we could envisage the meaning of any piece of music as in some way composed from the meanings of its elements. We should need some musical equivalent of a vocabulary—phrases, harmonies, progressions, and so on with a fixed and repeatable significance, whose contributions to the meaning of any musical whole is, if not exactly rule-governed, at least regular and predictable.\(^{181}\)

As will be seen in chapter four, music educators of the time also debated the kind of vocabulary or parts of speech music contained and what a parallel with language might mean for the instruction of students. Examples of the music to language comparison occurred when classes dissected a composition in a theory or music appreciation class as well as when instructors helped a choir attempt to capture the essence of a piece for a performance. Between the concepts of syntax, semantics, and structure there exists a number of ways music educators associated language and music.

The problems of meaning as presented in this section are numerous and complex and are only part of the field of musical aesthetics. Problems such as deciding if and how compositions can be comprehended and interpreted according to theories provided by

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\(^{181}\) Ibid., 203. Italics in the original. Following this statement Scruton examines Deryck Cooke’s *The Language of Music* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1959). Cooke argues there is such a vocabulary that contains meaning. Examples of this vocabulary of meaning include: “minor second:…spiritless anguish, context of finality; major second:…pleasurable longing, context of finality; minor third:…stoic acceptance, tragedy; major third:…joy; minor sixth:…active anguish in a context of flux…Ascending I-(2)-3(4)-5 (Major):…outgoing, active, assertive emotion of joy…Descending 5-(4)-3-(2)-1 (Minor):…an ‘incoming’ painful emotion, in a context of finality: acceptance of, or yielding to grief; discouragement and depression; passive suffering; and the despair connected with death.” Cooke, *The Language of Music*, 90, 115, 133. Scruton concludes that Cooke’s thesis “is the outcome of a long tradition of ‘making and matching’; and his ‘rules of meaning’ are really habits of taste.” Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetic of Music*, 208. It may also be of interest to the reader that Bennett Reimer uses the work of Cooke to explain various positions in musical aesthetics and contribute to the construction of his philosophy of music education. Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 18 – 19, 30.
significationists or expressivists are compounded when trying to understand the relations between composer, composition, and percipient.

Theories on the Meaning and Interpretation of Music

Because of the longstanding traditions of expressivism and significationism, these theories are in the forefront of the debate among music educators discussing ideas and problems related to meaning. Although the theories of expressivism and significationism generally encompass a great variety of perspectives on meaning (as mentioned in the above section Explanations and Problems on Meaning/Interpretation/Comprehension), these two positions, however, are not the only views on meaning in music.

For the ancient Greek thinkers, especially Plato, mimetic theory interpreted music as revealing “things about the harmony of the universe we could not otherwise know….music imitates the beauty of the harmoniously balanced soul.”182 Meaning for the formalist rests on self-contained musical analysis and is defined more conveniently in negative terms. That is, instead of stating what formalism is, it is easier to argue what it is not. According to the formalist music is not analogous to language, politics, or feelings. In the words of the formalist Hanslick “Music consists of tonal sequences, tonal forms; these have no other content than themselves…its content is nothing but the audible tonal forms; since music speaks not merely by means of tones, it speaks only tones.”183 He continues by clarifying that although

Music has no content in the sense of ‘subject matter.’ It does not follow that music lacks substance…regarding the accusation of contentlessness, music has content, but musical content…but only by firmly denying any other kinds of ‘content’ to music can we preserve music’s substance. This is because from indefinite feeling, to which at best such a content is attributable, no spiritual

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183 Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful*, 78. Hanslick describes the notion of content in music as “a subject, the question about the ‘what’ of a composition.” Ibid.
content derives; rather, in each composition, the content derives from its particular tonal structure as the spontaneous creation of mind out of material compatible with mind [i.e., the tones].

The formalist sees music as revealing and interpreting the art form in relation to itself, that is, musically.

The position of the German idealist on meaning and interpretation is different from the formalist. Generally for the idealist, in relation to meaning, “Music and musical experience are somehow, uniquely able to penetrate and reveal the innermost nature of the world and human experience.”

Bowman writes that for Kant meaning exists within the aesthetic experience, which is contemplative delight in the imaginative perception of form...an experience at once feelingful and mindful, yet reducible to neither feeling nor mind...judgments of taste represent a kind of knowing of which intellect is incapable, a distinctive kind of cognitive activity mediated by natural and artistic beauty.

Similarly for Hegel, “Music’s abstract inwardness promises to acquaint people with the inner soul-life, while at the same time enriching and vitalizing it through its immediacy, vividness, and intimacy.” In other words, for thinkers such as Schiller, Schelling and Schopenhauer, whose ideas can be linked to the work of Kant and Hegel, what is interpreted is music’s revelatory power of “inward, sensual, expressive phenomenon...the ineffable, inner nature of reality.” Like the German idealist view on the nature of music, the perspective of these writers on the subject of meaning is also metaphysical.

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184 Ibid., 82 – 83. Italics in the original.
186 Ibid., 70.
187 Ibid., 105.
188 Ibid., 72.
Metaphysical perspectives on meaning are not the concern of the experientialist. Thinkers such as Dewey see meaning and the revelatory power of music in direct relation to the experience itself. The type of experience sought by Dewey is one in which “the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment…that its close is a consummation not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience.”189 For a philosopher such as Dewey the meaning, interpreting and revealing brought forth by an experience has both an immediate and distant quality because “what the live creature retains from the past and what it expects from the future operate as directions in the present.”190 The immediacy of meaning in an experience is an observation “that is both action in preparation and foresight of the future.”191 The distant quality of meaning is difficult to determine since the exact long term outcome of an experience may not be elicited until it is brought into relation with other such experiences or other ends pursued at a later time. In summation, the immediate and distant qualities of deriving meaning through experience are where “in life that is truly life, everything overlaps and merges.”192 Dewey’s explanation of an experience is rooted in the primary aim of his work. In this book Dewey puts forth the argument that for art to reach its fullest potential in terms of meaning and value it must be integrated with life. To put it another way, the process of living in the world, according to Dewey,

is a combination of movement and culmination, of breaks and re-unions…the live being recurrently loses and reestablishes equilibrium with his surroundings. The moment of passage from disturbance into harmony is that of intensest life….In a

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190 Ibid., 18.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid., 17.
world made after the pattern of ours, moments of fulfillment punctuate experience with rhythmically enjoyed intervals.\(^{193}\)

With its arguably outward focus in terms of human relations, Dewey’s perspective on meaning in art is one where an aesthetic experience is “the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ.”\(^{194}\) Arts’ revelatory power and value, according to Dewey, is one that enables us to more fully understand and deal with our environment, which is the case for both artist and percipient.

The experience of the composer and listener in relation to the production and reception of music within the larger society are ideas developed by the sociological offshoot of musical aesthetics called socioaesthetics here. Theodor Adorno is arguably the prototypical scholar of the time in the field of the philosophy of music as it relates to sociology. Music for Adorno is cultural and as such any search for meaning necessarily involves commenting on social relations, social structures, and social institutions, for example.\(^{195}\) With roots in Marxist thought the relations of meaning and value in music are nearly contingent. The reason it is difficult to separate meaning from value in philosophy arising from Marxist thought is that “all music functions ideologically to perpetuate bourgeois consciousness.”\(^{196}\)

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\(^{193}\) Ibid., 16.

\(^{194}\) Ibid., 19.

\(^{195}\) The primary social institution mentioned in Adorno’s work is the so-called culture industry. Andy Hamilton writes the culture industry “diverts the revolutionary potential of the proletariat.” Hamilton, *Aesthetics and Music*, 171. Relating and using the work of Adorno, Hamilton continues “Adorno prefers the term ‘culture industry’ to ‘mass culture’ because it is not a culture that arises spontaneously from the masses but is administered from above: ‘the culture industry piously claims to be guided by its customers and to supply them with what they ask for. But while assiduously dismissing any thought of its own autonomy and proclaiming its victims its judges, it outdoes in its veiled autocracy, all the excesses of autonomous art…It drills them in their attitudes as if it were itself a customer.’” Hamilton, *Aesthetics and Music*, 117 quoted directly from Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life*, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London, UK: Verso, 1974), 200 – 201.

\(^{196}\) Bowman, *Philosophical Perspectives on Music*, 312.
modern music and modern society, the links to Marxism are still present. Adorno sees as necessity the broadening of an understanding of classical Marxist thought on the relations existing between music and society by asserting,

Music in modern society is situated between two dialectically opposite poles: as commodity, it perpetuates false consciousness; as social critique, it subverts ideology and serves authentic consciousness...it is capable of revealing with utmost clarity ‘the contradictions and flaws which cut through present-day society.’

With modern music and the work of Stravinsky as exemplar, what is revealed by music is “like critical philosophy, [it] is obliged to attempt to transform ‘the cultural consciousness of the masses.’ To do this it must both engage and extend that consciousness.” Furthermore, “the ‘most advanced’ modern music, then, is music that pursues its social obligation not by attempting social ‘relevance’, not by pursuing popularity or utility, but rather ‘by developing within music itself...those elements whose objective is the overcoming of class domination.’” Socioaesthetic theory asserts meaning and revelation in music are inextricable with the existing social situation. “As a fundamentally social phenomenon, distinctions between music’s musical and social value are completely spurious: music’s socially critical function is exercised within its own formal language and technique.”

The points of view on the meaning of music according to what it allegedly reveals are numerous. The reader has undoubtedly noticed at this point that each major theoretical perspective in musical aesthetics integrates the major premise of its

197 Ibid.
198 Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 312 – 313. The quoted passages in the above block quote are from Theodor Adorno, “On the Social Situation of Music,” Telos 35 (Spring 1978); 128.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid., 314.
understanding of the nature of music into what it argues the meaning and/or revelation of music is. Whether music reveals a fuller understanding of our environment, the inner nature of reality, reality symbolically, or means nothing beyond itself, it is clear that just like the nature of music, the meaning of music is an actively debated topic now and in the history of musical aesthetics. It is through the struggle of searching for meaning that another component of musical aesthetics emerges, value.

The final category of contestation in musical aesthetics is value. Unlike the first two categories where each was divided into two distinct and subsequent sections—the explanations and problems of such and such, and the theories of so and so—this final section is more fluid (closer to how expressivism and significationism were incorporated into the writing on meaning in music). The connection between problems and theories is more fluid in this final section because of the complex nature of value. The first layer of complexity is the way the idea of value is discussed—as a means of evaluation and why music is important. Added to the two ways in which value is used is a second layer of complexity which involves the intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian positions on value. Therefore, even though this final section on value is once again broken down into two subsequent segments, the problems and theories are covered without as much attention to distinction between problems and theories due to the nature of what the concept of value includes. And to avoid redundancy, the section covering theories on value will be brief.

Explanations and Problems of Value

The third domain of focused attention that pertains to examining the problems and theories in musical aesthetics is value—musical judgment and why music matters.
Fundamentally value based theories are concerned with how it is possible to make an evaluation and why music matters at all. The key problems are rooted in questions such as should we care about music, and if so why? What makes one musical work more valuable than another? On what basis can a determination of the aesthetic value of music be made?

Can a feature be a merit in one [piece of music] and a defect (or neither) in another? Or does calling the feature a merit in one [piece of music] entail, or presuppose, a general principle according to which it is meritorious wherever it occurs?²⁰²

What roles do beauty, truth, and culture have in determining value? Finally, “does aesthetic experience have value, and if so why?”²⁰³

The concept of value is primarily an idea of assessment which is rooted in the analysis of a perceptive, thoughtful response to an aesthetic object or experience. This assessment and analysis lead to some conclusion regarding music’s intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and/or utilitarian end. Whilst certain aspects of the previously introduced concept of meaning may also be construed as responses to music, there is a difference. The reason for the separation is that interpreting and comprehending a piece of music is

²⁰² Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 464. In the original quote Beardsley uses the word “poem” where I insert “piece of music.”

²⁰³ While I acknowledge beauty is a facet of aesthetics, it is only one element of this type of philosophical inquiry. An emphasis on the concept of beauty stems from eighteenth century and early nineteenth writers, such as Immanuel Kant, who had questions relating to beauty as primary components in their work. In Paul Guyer’s editors’ preface of Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment* he asserts “what was to become the central thought of the analysis of aesthetic judgment in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, the idea that in a judgment of taste a person can claim intersubjective validity for the feeling of pleasure that she experiences in response to a beautiful object because that pleasure is produced, in an attitude of disinterested contemplation….” Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer & trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), xvii. It is also interesting to note that issues surrounding beauty as a topic in aesthetics have continued to be dealt with, but it is not, certainly in the twentieth century, the major focus it once was. This point can be seen in Beardsley’s *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* where Beauty theory is but one component he uses to examine aesthetic value. It is in this section, however, that Monroe Beardsley asks a very good and persistent question: “is there such a simple phenomenally objective quality as beauty?” Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 508.

mainly an intramusical affair with some extramusical components. In other words, whether one is critiquing the music from the standpoint of significationist percipient or a musicologist with expressivist tendencies researching various conditions under which the piece was composed, the concern is with what it is in the music that elicits emotion or signifies nationalist sentiment for example. It is mainly about the music, what it reveals and, at most, is one step removed from the music to the composer or the percipient(s). Meaning’s difference from value in relation to the intramusical/extramusical bifurcation is a matter of degree. Where meaning may take into consideration if an emotion is elicited, the concept of value deals with subsequent questions such as does this particular piece bring out such and such emotional quality in a better way than another piece and is the emotion something of worth to those who experience this piece of music? It is one thing to suggest that music expresses melancholy and another to determine why the expression of melancholy matters or to debate why the composition is judged to have artistic merit in its expression of melancholy versus another piece’s depiction of the same. Value moves beyond the attempt to comprehend and interpret by using elements from artistic meaning to make judgments of quality in relation to other works and itself as well as contemplating music’s worth and importance to us as humans. This is not to say that the focus on value is the lone idea explored in normative theories but rather that these theories emphasize value. I see the notion of value not only from the view of making evaluative judgments of quality and worth but also in asking why it matters (incorporating intrinsic, inherent, and instrumentalist perspectives).

Evaluation of music is the first area of focused attention. What sorts of issues are revealed when making a determination of the aesthetic value of music? As a basis for
making a critical determination of value Beardsley divides the “reasons and judgments” for evaluating whether one work is better than another into three categories: genetic, affective, and objective. For Beardsley, genetic reasons for saying one work is better than another is a reference “to something existing before the work itself, to the manner in which it was produced, or its connection with antecedent objects and psychological states.” Examples of genetic reasons are “it fulfills (or fails to fulfill the artists intention…it is an example of successful (or unsuccessful) expression…it is skillful (or shows poor workmanship)…it is new and original (or trite)…it is sincere (or insincere).” Beardsley dismisses these reasons and labels them as problematic based on similar conclusions drawn in his assessment of expressivists’ attempting to find the composer’s mindset present in a composition because, “the resulting judgment is not a judgment of the work, but only of the worker, which is quite a different thing.” And in reference to the category of originality he questions if originality is always to be regarded highly. For example

Suppose there are two of Haydn’s symphonies very much alike, and we do not know which he wrote first; are we going to say that A becomes better when we decide that it was the earlier, but reverse our judgment when newly discovered band parts give priority to B?

Beardsley defines affective reasons for evaluating the quality of a work as “the psychological effects of the aesthetic object upon the percipient.” Examples include:

“it gives pleasure (or gives no pleasure)…it is interesting (or dull and monotonous)…it is

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205 Ibid., 456 – 470.
206 Ibid., 457.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid., 458.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
exciting, moving, stirring, rousing…it has a powerful emotional impact.”

Problems are again revealed with judgments made according to these criteria. How are fine distinctions to be made between the emotional impact of Beethoven’s *Piano Concerto No. 5 in E-flat Major, Op. 73* and Bela Bartok’s *Piano Concerto No. 1, Sz. 83*. Furthermore, “what in the aesthetic object causes the emotional response?” These are clearly difficult questions to answer, which leads to the third category of reasons and judgments used in evaluation, objective.

Beardsley defines an objective reason as one that “refers to some characteristic—that is, some quality or internal relation, or set of qualities and relations—within the work itself, or to some meaning-relation between the work and the world.” In this category Beardsley relies on material rooted in the nature and meaning of art and divides objective reasons into three “canons:” unity, complexity, and intensity. Examples of unity include: “it is well organized (or disorganized)...it is formally perfect (or imperfect)...it has (or lacks) an inner logic or structure and style.” Next are examples of complexity: “it is developed on a large scale...it is rich in contrasts (or lacks variety and is repetitious)...it is subtle and imaginative (or crude).” Finally, the term intensity is in relation to human regional qualities and examples include: “it is full of vitality (or insipid)...it is forceful and vivid (or weak and pale)...it is beautiful (or ugly)...it is tender, ironic, tragic, graceful, delicate, richly comic.”

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212 Ibid., 461.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid., 462.
215 Ibid., 462 and 466 – 470.
216 Ibid., 462.
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid.
that these so-called canons are not universal but only reveal “general tendencies.”\(^{219}\)

Furthermore, there are philosophical problems revealed when evaluating works according to these canons and criteria.

The philosophical problems of making judgments relating to value covered by Beardsley underscore the difficulty of these types of determinations. For example, does it necessarily follow that when a composition is unified it is good?\(^{220}\) Basically, the problem here is one of determining how such critical justifications assessing value can be made.\(^{221}\) In the last pages of his chapter on “critical evaluation” he addresses relativism.

For Beardsley the relativist argues that restrictions are always placed on critical judgments, which include individual, social, historical, and cultural qualifiers.\(^ {222}\)

Beardsley suggests the relativist’s position rests on two primary arguments: variability and inflexibility.\(^ {223}\) Variability is difference in taste, which in the end is a problem for the relativist. For Beardsley, “Variability is an empirical fact; Relativism is a theory about the proper way to define the term ‘good.’”\(^ {224}\) So, “variability does not prove

\(^{219}\) Ibid., 472.
\(^{220}\) Ibid., 471.
\(^{221}\) Ibid., 473. Beardsley elaborates on two theories that deal with our ability to make normative judgments about art. The first is performatory theory. This theory is one in which evaluations are mainly “nonlinguistic acts,” and, according to Beardsley, asserts that although a definition of “good” cannot be made, “critical evaluation utterances may be just or unjust; they are not, however, true or false. The problem here is that the reasons given for determining whether the evaluation is justified or not are ultimately normative. For additional clarification and explanation see Beardsley’s critique on page 474. The second theory is what Beardsley calls the emotive theory. He suggests that “despite its grammatical form, a critical evaluation is not a statement, but a combination of two components, an exclamatory component, which gives evidence of the speaker’s feeling…and an imperative component, which calls upon the listener to share the speaker’s feelings. The problem for Beardsley here is that the emotivist “claims that the emotive aspect of ‘good’ is precisely its normative aspect. Take away the emotive effect, and you no longer have a critical evaluation; keep the critical evaluation, and you have the emotive effect, and the fallacy. On what grounds, then, shall we decide whether the emotive aspect of a word is its normative aspect?”\(^ {474-475, 477}\).

\(^{222}\) Ibid., 482.
\(^{223}\) Ibid., 483.
\(^{224}\) Beardsley goes on to assert “it by no means follows from the fact that people like different aesthetic objects that they cannot do any more in judging them than record their likings.” Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, 484.
relativism." But the relativist does have a noteworthy counterargument, and Beardsley sums it up as follows: "the only way we can justify a standard...is to derive it from another, and more general, standard." The other argument in the relativist’s tool kit is that of inflexibility, which Beardsley equates with determinism. It is in the process of undermining the inflexibility argument that Beardsley echoes an idea that dates most likely from the ancient Greeks and in more recent times from at least the late eighteenth century which is the notion of the role of the arts in the elevation of taste and of the mind. It is also similar to numerous statements given by music educators of the time as to the importance of music education. Beardsley asserts

There is a great deal of evidence...to show that individual tastes can be changed, that it is possible to increase subtlety of discrimination and range of enjoyment and complexity of understanding by appropriate training. And if it is possible to change, or to develop tastes, then we cannot avoid the question whether they should be changed. The Relativist does not meet this question by redefining words so that it cannot be asked.

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225 Ibid., 509.
226 Ibid., 485.
227 Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1794) in part develops and expands Plato’s contention that the arts ennoble the mind.
228 There were a number of papers, panel topics, and discussions at the MSNC conferences over the years that mentioned the importance of music for the mind and subsequently elevating taste such as one given by Karl Gehrkens, “Ultimate Ends in Public School Music Teaching,” Journal of Proceeding of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Music Supervisors’ National Conference held at Pittsburgh, PA March 22 – 26 1915, (privately printed), 55 – 65 – panel discussion follows on the topic of “ultimate end” from Julia E. Crane, T.P. Giddings, John W. Beattie, George Oscar Bowen, and from the floor on 65 – 76 (No publication information is given for MSNC Journal of Proceedings prior to 1926). Another example is from Mary Conway, “The Appreciation of Music in the Grades,” Journal of Proceeding of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Music Supervisors’ National Conference Held at Minneapolis, MN April 27 – May 1 1914, (privately printed), 78 - 86. Some of these papers also weigh in on the debate between base, good, and great music. One particular example is given by Mary J. Armitage, a music supervisor from Bowling Green, Kentucky, who writes “the average child prefers ragtime and the cheap song of the street to the classics. Just as naturally as he prefers candy to soup, or Charlie Chaplin to Forbes Robertson, and it devolves upon the Supervisor to offset that taste and give him a liking for something infinitely better.” Mary J. Armitage, “How to Introduce Music Appreciation Into Schools which have Never had Music,” in the Journal of Proceeding of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Music Supervisors’ National Conference Held at Philadelphia, PA March 22 – 26 1920, (privately printed), 51 – 54, 51.
229 Unfortunately Beardsley does not supply the reader with the “great deal of evidence.” However, on the next page and in relation to undermining relativism, Beardsley does supply the following line of reasoning: “the central question is whether there is any conclusive proof that there are certain reasons for critical judgments which would be given or accepted by one group of critics but which another group of critics would consider completely beside the point, and that there is in principle no rational
We are now in a better position to determine the extent to which music educators from 1907 to 1958 justified music’s value relying on affective reasons of making evaluative statements, or if they went further by making statements that infused the so-called canons of objective reasoning.

Now that the topic of making evaluative judgments of quality and worth has been covered we can move to the second use of the concept of value in this dissertation, which is determining why music matters. Beardsley’s exploration of the concept of aesthetic value moves beyond accounting for “reasons and judgments” to questioning why an aesthetic object and/or the aesthetic experience has importance and matters. In other words, the concept of aesthetic value used in this manner transcends determining the quality and good-making elements of a composition, for example, by getting into why music matters to humanity.

Beardsley writes about three theories that deal with aesthetic value.\(^{230}\) The first is Beauty Theory. He explains, “The aesthetic value of an object consists in its possession of a certain unique regional quality, called ‘beauty,’ and the degree of its aesthetic value is determined by the intensity of this quality.” That is, in relation to the concept of value in aesthetics, “the aesthetic object is aesthetically valuable because it is beautiful, and this does not mean that it is beautiful because it is beautiful.”\(^{231}\) Beardsley continues, “The beauty theory...may be summed up in three sentences: 1. Beauty is a regional quality of...
perceptual objects.  2. Beauty is intrinsically beautiful.  3. ‘Aesthetic value’ means ‘value that an object has on account of its beauty.’

Philosophical problems exist with the term beauty, which led Beardsley to define the theory the way he does. For example, is beauty objective or subjective? Can an aesthetic object be aesthetically valuable without an element of beauty? What are the properties of beauty? He also mentions the problems of variability of meaning. The crux of the theory, according to its adherents, is based on the notion that “to justify the judgment that an object has aesthetic value…you first show that it has beauty, from which it logically follows that it has aesthetic value.” This idea is what beauty theorists claim gives music its value. It is unclear, however, if all of this does logically follow. Beauty theory is only one way of considering aesthetic value.

Aesthetic value, according to Beardsley, can also be determined by what he calls “psychological definitions.” The “psychological” notion of value is primarily subjective because it rests on the supposition that for anything to have value there must

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232 Ibid., 506 – 507.
233 Ibid., 506.
234 Ibid.
235 Ibid., 507.
236 Beardsley supplies a number of perspectives on beauty theory, which include the “transcendental,” “naturalistic,” “formalistic,” and “intellectualistic.” Beardsley defines the transcendental form of beauty theory as “a platonic universal that exists, or subsists, outside of space and time, but supervenes upon the aesthetic, which then embodies it more or less fully.” He defines the naturalistic form of beauty theory as one where “beauty is an emergent from the object, a regional quality like any other.” In relating the two theories he asserts “to this metaphysical difference there corresponds an epistemological one: in the Transcendental version, beauty is apprehended by a faculty of intuition; in the naturalistic version, it is simply perceived by the senses—heard, or seen.” He goes on to suggest that “both forms of this theory…agree that the occurrence of beauty in the object, whether it is supervenient or emergent, depends upon the other features of the object, its elements, internal relations and other regional qualities.” Beardsley writes that the formalistic form of the theory suggests “beauty is a function of certain formal properties of the object, and it seeks for as exact as possible a description of these beautiful-making properties.” Finally, he defines the intellectualistic form of beauty theory partially in negative terms. For Beardsley, “it is not the elements, internal relations, and other regional qualities of the object that are the conditions of its being beautiful, but its embodiment, or showing forth, of some conceptual or cognitive content.” What this intellectual content is, however, is quite mysterious. Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, 507 – 508.
237 Ibid., 512.
be something “in relation, direct or indirect, to the needs or desires of human beings.”

And in the case of this theory value is rooted in the psychological states or attitudes toward the object. That is, proponents of this notion of value theory assert that value is attached to something because of how we feel about it. Beardsley writes, “To put it in a familiar, though casual, way, it is not liked because it is good, but good because it is liked.” Beardsley also makes the point that these theories on value are intrinsically based: “the attitude of liking is understood to be taken toward the object not because it is a means to anything else, but simply for its own sake.” But problems emerge here because value as proposed by this theory is primarily attitudinal which takes us back to similar issues mentioned above associated with taste and variability. Beardsley states it this way; “the language of likes and dislikes is an important and useful language, but it is not the language of critical judgment. ‘Is it good?’ cannot be reduced to ‘Do you like it?’...or even to ‘Will I like it?’” Making a leap from the first question to the second would be a problem of consistency, and is a philosophical stumbling point for music educators of the period writing on the topic of value. The last topic relating to value is no less problematic and has generated debate in the field of music education for some time.

Finally, a significant problem associated with any argument of musical value, whether it originates from the perspective of a utilitarian, an instrumentalist, or an adherent to the idea of the intrinsic value of music, is: are the aesthetic object and the

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238 Ibid., 513.
239 Ibid.
240 Beardsley notes that both beauty theory and “psychological definitions” see value as intrinsic. The main difference is in relation to the object – “beauty and the value that inheres in it are characteristics of the aesthetic object itself, quite independently of the way anyone feels about it.” Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 513.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid., 514.
243 Ibid., 523.
aesthetic experience infungible? Or to put it another way, can something else be substituted for music and the aesthetic experience of it? And by extension if music is infungible, to what other ends has it connected? These are problems that have bedeviled the field of music and music education at least as far back as the time of ancient Greece. Some of the perspectives from various theories attempting to give solutions to these problems relating to value follow. I combine some of the problems and theories here so the reader will see both the complexity of this final category of aesthetic analysis and as a way to have a clearer picture of how theories are used to generate solutions to problems.

The first view is aestheticism. The view taken by the aesthete is aligned closely with those adhering to the intrinsic and/or inherent value of art and is usually rejected by the instrumentalist. According to Beardsley, aestheticism takes two forms. The first is “not with art for the sake of citizenship, or patriotism or mysticism, or anything else, but with Art for Art’s Sake only.”\(^{244}\) The second, a logical extension of the first, “is a pure and single-minded view, which maintains the supreme value of art over everything else.”\(^{245}\) The aesthete is not concerned with the indirect side effects of music or the aesthetic experience.

The second view Beardsley covers is of the so-called moralist. Before getting into the two main moralist arguments he defines the moralist in basic terms as “one who judges aesthetic objects solely, or chiefly, with respect to moral standards.”\(^{246}\) The first

\(^{244}\) Ibid., 562. Beardsley calls this the Argument from Innocuousness. He continues “far from being a handmaiden to other goals, art gives us immediately, and richly, the best there is in life, intense awareness—it gives us what life itself aims at becoming, but seldom achieves outside art. This part of the Aestheticist view is connected, of course, with a Psychological Definition of value; it claims that there is an end in itself, an intrinsic good, and that aesthetic experience is that good.” Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, 563. Italics in the original.

\(^{245}\) Ibid., 563. Beardsley calls this the Argument from Aesthetic Primacy.

\(^{246}\) Ibid., 564.
argument is what Beardsley refers to as the “Argument from Reduction.”

The crux of the matter here is determining “whether a particular aesthetic object is a good one or not is reduced to the (moral) question whether the feelings it arouses are good or bad.”

Beardsley labels the second argument as the “Argument from Correlation.”

The Argument from Correlation allows for a distinction between aesthetic value and moral value, but a determination of the aesthetic value is dependent upon the moral worth of the object. If the object has low moral worth, then it has little aesthetic value.

The problem of a connecting aesthetic value and morality was discussed by music educators during the first half of the twentieth century within the context of World War One, The Great Depression, and the Cold War. For example, and in light of these trying times in the history of the United States, the argument from correlation has, in the previous chapter, been loosely applied by Edward Bailey Birge. As will be seen in chapter five some music education scholars even went so far as to deliberately and thoughtfully examine the aesthetic/moral relationship and determined, just as Beardsley states, “an analogy is not a causal connection.”

Other perspectives on aesthetic value, including Adorno’s socioaesthetic and/or Marxist positions, are also seen in the evidence.

247 Ibid. Beardsley asserts the “reductive form of moralism appears in the philosophy of Plato…and Tolstoy.” Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 584. Beardsley also asserts that Aristotle, in response to Plato’s Argument from Reduction, offers an early defense of the inherent value of art with his use of catharsis.” Ibid., 587.

248 Ibid., 564.
249 Ibid., 565.
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid., 566. Beardsley writes that the Argument from Correlation “has traditionally relied heavily upon a supposed connection between moral order and aesthetic order, and no doubt there is a deep and profound analogy between them. Many of the regional qualities we find in art are most aptly, but of course metaphorically, named by qualities taken over from the moral aspects of human nature they are ‘disciplined,’ ‘decisive,’ ‘decorous,’ ‘controlled,’ ‘sound,’ ‘strong,’ ‘calm,’ ‘bold,’ ‘healthy,’ to cite only positive terms.” Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 565 – 566.
Andy Hamilton writes that for Adorno, autonomous artwork has “no direct social function but does have a social situation.” And that social situation rests in part on what Beardsley labels the “Principle of Nonneutrality, which is the statement that every aesthetic object of any noteworthy degree of aesthetic value has a tendency to promote, or to interfere with, our social and political goals, whatever they may be.” The idea that there is an important relationship between music and society, especially possible political and economic side effects, would seem to place socioaesthetics at the opposite end of the instrumentalist spectrum from aestheticism. Yet almost paradoxically Adorno’s so-called objectivist approach argues “the ‘most advanced’ modern music, then, is music that pursues its social obligation not by attempting social ‘relevance’, not by pursuing popularity or utility, but rather ‘by developing within music itself…those elements whose objective is the overcoming of class domination.” Reconciliation of Adorno’s aloof form of objectivity with the argument that music is solidly rooted in the social situation comes in the form of asserting that music is an important component of society not merely a reflection of it. It is in Adorno’s view that the “most advanced” modern [autonomist] music does not have a “direct social function.” Just like the other theories, however, there are problems explored by the socioaesthetic perspective.

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254 Beardsley asserts the principle of nonneutrality rests on the basic Marxist notion that “considerations of aesthetic values are to be subordinated to political ones, for…aesthetic objects cannot be politically neutral.” Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, 567 – 568.
256 Hamilton, *Aesthetics and Music*, 182. Further down the page Hamilton describes a direct social function as “one which has to be grasped, in order to have any understanding at all of the event or process in question. Until I know that a certain event is a religious service rather than a university graduation ceremony, I will not be in any position to know what secondary functions it may have.” Ibid., 182 – 183. Hamilton goes on to say that there is really no direct social function of attending a concert...“Today, in concert performance, Bach’s music exhibits purposiveness without a purpose.” Ibid., 183. Not only is the idea of purposiveness without a purpose similar to what Kant says about art, but also the statement is at the heart of what Dewey sees as the problem of art in relation to the life of human beings.
A key problem examined by such writers as Adorno wrestles with the degree to which art has freed itself from the patronage of the nobility or the church—autonomy—while entering a so-called market, which, according to the modernist, it simultaneously critiques. For Adorno art is both autonomous and commodified, which is a dichotomy.\textsuperscript{257} To put it another way, the question is whether music has merely traded a patron of one kind for another—reducing or negating its autonomy—while the aesthetic object is bought and sold in a so-called marketplace—increasing the extent to which it is commodified. A component of this problem involves music affiliated with modernism, and it is this aspect where music educators of the period make comment. In the first half of the twentieth century, major shifts were occurring in the world of music. For example, the turn toward atonality was altering the traditional musical landscape and Schoenberg launched his twelve-tone method,\textsuperscript{258} and in the United States specifically Jazz entered the scene. Atonality, serial music, and jazz not only disrupted traditional styles of music but also were in themselves considered to embody the principles of modernism. In an odd twist of the autonomy-commodity dichotomy, art music created at this time shows a “rupture between high and popular culture, it sets itself against popular culture,”\textsuperscript{259}

\textsuperscript{257} Andy Hamilton states Adorno sees the ideas of Kant (art as autonomous) and Marx (art as commodity) in dialectical relation. Andy Hamilton, \textit{Aesthetics and Music} (London, UK: Continuum: 2007), 167 – 168.

\textsuperscript{258} Atonality is defined by Barbara Russano Hanning as “music that is not based on the harmonic and melodic relationships revolving around a key center; it is the opposite of tonal, which characterizes most music of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.” Barbara Russano Hanning, \textit{A Concise History of Western Music} (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1998), 492. She summarizes the main points of the twelve tone method as: “the basis of each composition is a row or series consisting of the twelve tones or pitch classes of the octave arranged in an order the composer chooses; the tones of the series may be used both successively (as melody) and simultaneously (as harmony or counterpoint), in any octave and with any desired rhythm; the row may be used not only in its original or ‘prime’ form but also in intervalically inverted form, in retrograde order (backward), or retrograde inverted form, and in transpositions of any of the four forms; and the composer must use all twelve pitches of the series before going on to use the series in any of its forms again.” Ibid., 495. Italics in the original. Because of the composition being based on a “row or series” of tones it is often referred to as serial music.

\textsuperscript{259} Hamilton, \textit{Aesthetics and Music}, 158.
something the composer and music educator Howard Hanson lamented. Absolute art music could be considered the quintessential example of aestheticism. Against the backdrop of modernism and socioaesthetics, other types of music such as marches, funeral music, or hymns, which have a particular function, can cause difficulty in making a determination of value because it is unclear how to separate intrinsic from instrumental value. Whatever the case for so-called modern music and its relation to society and/or itself, the altering of the musical landscape in turn influenced the field of aesthetics. On the one hand musical aesthetics now included such things as socioaesthetics where philosophers such as Adorno argued the fragmentation in music reflected what he viewed as the fragmentation in society.\textsuperscript{260} On the other it was argued the isolation of avant-garde music from mass culture created a situation where this type of music could only be examined objectively in relation to itself.\textsuperscript{261} Finally, a major problem for socioaesthetics was that the analysis of the problems in this branch of aesthetics are squarely rooted in time. Many philosophers argue that philosophy deals with problems that are timeless. The problems presented in this last section are by no means easy to solve and are still being debated. For example it is difficult to determine whether the music of Schoenberg and Stravinsky reflected a new form of objectivity (the intrinsic) or a more extreme form of social critique (the instrumental). To the Marxist the answer is clear. Art is not to be separated from political, social, or economic life. Besides intrinsic value and the examples of instrumental value of moralism, socioaesthetics and/or Marxism that have

\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., 153.

\textsuperscript{261} Edward Lippman sees a transformation in the twentieth century perspectives of objectivity and autonomy in musical aesthetics that is in opposition to socioaesthetics. It is a shift in the location of meaning and value and mirrors a similar transformation in literary criticism between structuralism and post-structuralism. Lippman, \textit{A History of Western Musical Aesthetics}, See Chapters 13 and 15.
been given, what other possibilities exist for instrumentalism that are not as extreme? In the words of Beardsley, what are the inherent values of art?262

If music has inherent value then, according to Beardsley, this notion rests on the idea of being able to “show that the having of this aesthetic experience…makes its own contribution to human welfare.”263 This contribution is unique because it resides in having undergone an experience with music itself. The main difficulty here is the effect of aesthetic objects is often supported by evidence that “is scattered, uncertain, [and] subject to distortion by faulty introspection and emotional bias.”264 Regardless of the nature of evidence on the topic of inherent value, it is explored by numerous philosophers and aestheticians.

Other than referencing Aristotle’s notion of catharsis and ethos theory, Beardsley’s work on ideas connected to the instrumentalist position leaning toward inherent value does not name some other leading contributors in the main part of his text. Even though his list of “predictions” generally takes into account ideas formulated by scholars such as Schopenhauer, Schiller, Santayana, Dewey, and Collingwood, it lacks the development needed for a thorough analysis of music education discourse. Therefore, in addition to Aristotle, I also include the names and perspectives of those writing on the topic of instrumental/inherent value.

263 Ibid., 572.
264 Ibid., 573. Beardsley proposes a list of inherent values “in the form of predictions rather than outright assertions.” They are as follows: “aesthetic experience 1. relieves tensions and quiets destructive impulses…2. resolves lesser conflicts within the self, and helps to create an integration, or harmony…3. refines perception and discrimination…4. develops the imagination, and along with it the ability to put oneself in the place of others…5. an aid to mental health…6. fosters mutual sympathy and understanding…7. offers an ideal for human life.” Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 574 – 576.
Theories on Value (Additional Perspectives on Intrinsic, Instrumental, and Inherent Value)

For the ancient Greeks value was primarily utilitarian with some instrumental inclinations. The Greek notions of musical value, especially utilitarian and instrumental value, have manifested themselves in many ideas regarding music to this day. Generally music “was to impart to the soul…what was noble and pleasing…music affords enjoyment and recreation; but its higher mission was to comfort and calm the troubled soul.”265 For Plato, “music which ennobled the mind was of a far higher kind than that which merely appealed to the senses…bold and stirring melodies were for men, gentle and soothing ones for women.”266 More specifically, music could be valued for its emotional and ethical effects. For example,

The manly and serious Doric scale should be exclusively used in the education of youth, as it was considered to be the only one calculated to inspire respect for the law, obedience, courage, self-esteem, and independence. The Lydian scale, imported from Asia was less highly esteemed. Plato considered that melodies founded upon it had a voluptuous, sensual, and enervating tendency, fitted at best only for the accompaniment of orgies…Aristotle ascribed to the Phrygian scale the power of inspiration, to the Dorian the qualities of repose and dignity, and, in opposition to Plato, attributed to the Lydian scale power of awakening the love of modesty and purity.267

Shifting slightly from the arguably utilitarian bent of the above representations of ethos theory is Aristotle’s notion of catharsis, which moves toward the instrumental, and according to Beardsley the inherent, perspective on value. In Politics, Aristotle argues, “music should be studied, not for the sake of one, but of many benefits, that is to say, with a view to education or purgation; … music may also serve for intellectual

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266 Ibid., 153.

267 Ibid., 134.
enjoyment, for relaxation and for recreation after exertion.”\footnote{268} And later in Poetics on the topic of catharsis Aristotle asserts, in proposing the elements tragedy, that in addition to being “the imitation of an action that is serious,” tragedy also contains “incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions.”\footnote{269} In relating catharsis to inherent value, Beardsley writes, “Aristotle’s exact meaning is still not agreed upon by scholars, but there is no doubt that he believed the tragic effect to justify the social worth of tragedy, because it shows that tragedy accomplishes more than idle stimulation of feelings.”\footnote{270} The manner in which the topic of music showed up in a number of works by Plato and Aristotle, such as The Republic, Timaeus, Laws, Politics, and Poetics, in addition to the work of Pythagoras, Plotinus, and even what is arguably the first treatise solely on music, Aristoxenus’ The Elements of Harmony, shows the Greek view of music as possessing value is unquestionable. The kind of value music had for these ancients was arguably utilitarian and instrumental with some indication that inherent value was recognized.

With the exception of the formalist, in the nineteenth and twentieth century normative theories were predominantly focused on the emotional experience or the expression of feeling created or produced by music. The formalist, as mentioned earlier by R.A. Sharpe, “is somebody who thinks that the value of music lies in its formal properties of design and line and not in its expressive capacity…what matters is beauty

\footnote{269}Aristotle, Poetics 1449b 25 in The Complete Works of Aristotle The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 2320. Poetry in the Greek sense of the word is something more than a rendering of verse in the form of a sonnet for example. It includes a dramatic enactment that was often accompanied by a chorus and music. Greek poetry in this manner is more akin to Opera or Musical Theatre. 
\footnote{270}Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 587.
and that beauty is a matter of form." Value for the formalist is intrinsic. Intrinsic value is also the position of Organicism, but things are a bit more complex here. Archie Bahm in "The Aesthetics of Organicism" argues that organic enjoyment, which includes feelings of pleasure, enthusiasm, satisfaction, and contentment as variable aspects is idealized as the type of intrinsic value to be kept in mind, rather than either alone, when the aesthetic is referred to as intuition of intrinsic value...For Organicism, the end-in-itself quality of intrinsic value experiences is aspectival...[since] experience is, by its very nature dynamic, i.e., an organic mixture of events and duration...value experiences are more or less enduring, and variability in duration is to be expected normally.  

Basically, for the organicist the experiencing of music is to be "enjoyed as an end-in-itself" in a multifaceted network of aspects. From this point forward arguments on value move toward the inherent and instrumental.  

Contained within the theories of expressivism, emotionalism, and intuitionism and even German idealism are views on inherent value that give music an important place in human life. Generally, for the German idealist the value of music is in its ability to reveal the innermost nature of reality. More specifically, Beardsley asserts for Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller, "the enjoyment of art and the perception of beauty are a necessary state in the development of rationality and freedom." Furthermore, Jacquette claims that Schiller "insists on understanding the value of art on its own terms for the role it plays in adding meaning and color to our lives, even when its secondary purpose is to condition citizens for participation in a morally elevated political state." According to Graham, Schopenhauer and Collingwood, "both believe that the chief task

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271 Sharpe, Philosophy of Music: An Introduction, 16, 23.  
273 Ibid., 449.  
274 Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 587.  
of aesthetics is to explain the value and importance of art."\textsuperscript{276} Or, in negative terms, “normative theories of art concern themselves not with the definition of the nature of art but with its value.”\textsuperscript{277} For Schopenhauer, a philosopher whose ideas influence much nineteenth century thought in aesthetics, art

repeats or reproduces the external Idea grasped through pure contemplation, the essential and abiding in all the phenomena of the world; and according to what the material is in which it reproduces, it is sculpture, or painting, poetry or music. Its one source is the knowledge of Ideas; its one aim the communication of this knowledge.\textsuperscript{278}

Andy Hamilton explains Schopenhauer’s theory as “art as a form of knowledge…while ordinary perception is focused on particular material objects, aesthetic perception attends to the permanent ideas behind them.”\textsuperscript{279} And, according to Graham, “Collingwood, in contrast to Schopenhauer…thinks the value of art lies in its character as the expression of feeling, and not some special apprehension of reality.”\textsuperscript{280} More to the point, Graham states elsewhere on Collingwood “the end of art is self-knowledge, knowledge of our own emotional state.”\textsuperscript{281} Colingwood argues in \textit{The Principles of Art} “to know ourselves is the foundation of all life that develops beyond the mere psychical level or

\textsuperscript{276} Graham, \textit{Philosophy of the Arts}, 175. Italics in original.
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid., 176.
\textsuperscript{279} Hamilton, \textit{Aesthetics and Music}, 76.
\textsuperscript{280} Graham, \textit{Philosophy of the Arts}, 175.
\textsuperscript{281} Graham, “Expressivism,” \textit{The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics}, 140. Immediately following in Graham’s essay he writes that Collingwood does move the value of art beyond self-knowledge for the creator alone to self-knowledge for the larger community. Though Graham does not specify how he does this, an example is a follows: the artist “undertakes his artistic labor not as a personal effort on his own private behalf, but as a public labour on behalf of the community to which he belongs…the audience is perpetually present to him as a factor in his artistic labour…as an aesthetic factor, defining what the problems is which as an artist he is trying to solve—what emotions he is to express—and what constitutes a solution of it. The audience which the artist thus feels as collaborating with himself may be a large one or a small one, but it is never absent.” Collingwood, \textit{Principles of Art}, 315.
experience."^282 So, for him self-knowledge is the value of art, both for individual and community. The idea of community and an individual in the larger community is important in determining value for the Dewey.

Dewey, according to Beardsley, “emphasized the continuity of aesthetic experience and life, and has pleaded the cause of the arts as of the highest value to human beings because of their uniting and liberating effect.”^283 The inherent value of music for Dewey lies in the uniqueness of the aesthetic experience it offers. For another twentieth century philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, Beardsley writes that Whitehead argued the arts are important particularly in education because “they help people to see things as wholes, in their concrete organicity, rather than becoming prey to abstractions.”^284 For Langer, a significationist, “the significance of the musical image always derives from what it shows us of the quality of motion, of passage, of felt time, and most importantly feeling.”^285 The inherent value of music for her is, “the education of feeling, as our usual schooling in factual subjects…is the education of thought.”^286 Later, Bowman writes what nicely sums up her perspective on the inherent view of music: “music presents us with…an image that reveals to us the otherwise hidden truth about how feelings feel.”^287

Each of these aforementioned arguments on the topic on value—whether from Aristotle, Schopenhauer, Collingwood, Dewey, or Langer—embrace instrumental and/or inherent perspectives on value. In other words, art has an extraartistic, or in the case of music, an extramusical function. That is the value of the work, process, and/or experience, though

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^282 Collingwood, Principles of Art (Oxford, 284.
^283 Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 588.
^284 Ibid., 588.
^285 Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 213.
^286 Langer, Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key, 401; quoted in Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 214.
^287 Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 215.
not wholly separated from the object, is rooted in the subjective (individual or collective). The idea of being extramusical emphasizes what the music helps to accomplish rather than what it is. What it does, or its end, may not be completely musically centered. In the case of normative theory, however, it is argued that the extramusical value necessarily comes through contact with music, and, therefore, music is unique in what it accomplishes as compared to sports, for example. This was discussed above in the earlier section on value quoting Kieran and is based on the difference between instrumental value and intrinsic value, ideas primarily tied to why music matters.

Last, for Adorno, “the value of modernist artworks lies in their truth and not in any pleasure that that they may occasion.” Adorno’s assertion, however, brings to light a problem for art and music, which is its truth content. However, since truth is primarily an epistemic concern, it will not be covered in my research. In relation to value theory, his view on the value of art is more instrumentalist than utilitarian because it is a step back from the Marxist notion of nonneutrality. Paradoxically it is also rooted in formalism because the aesthetcian is supposed to look upon the music as music. Adorno does not say that music must always promote or interfere with ideology. Instead his conception of the value of modern music is broader because of “its capacity to confront and challenge consciousness or awareness, and to undermine ‘false consciousness’ rooted in stereotype and habit.”

Bowman goes on to argue that

by wrenching music from the realm of autonomous, aesthetic insularity, Adorno paved the way for explanations of music’s nature and value that challenge some of music philosophy’s most cherished and time honored beliefs. As something that is fundamentally and invariably social, music is never innocent, never pure. In fact, myths of purity and innocence themselves serve the sociopolitical end of

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masking music’s social complicity, sustaining the social status quo while going unacknowledged, unexamined, and unchallenged.\textsuperscript{290}

Arguments regarding the value of music are contested. If a problem of a particular value theory ever appears to be close to resolution, countless new questions and challenges arise from those offering opposing solutions. This generative quality of problems in musical aesthetics in relation to nature, meaning and value will likely result in reflexivity and the better articulation and understanding of how we think about and experience music. Take for example the work of Adorno, who, according to Wayne Bowman, forced a reflexive reexamination of tradition in the field of musical aesthetics. By arguing that music is “concentrated social substance,” Adorno not only caused a reassessment of long standing beliefs, but by doing so he also broadened the field of musical aesthetics which led to an arguably more complete understanding of how we think about and experience music. On a much smaller scale, developing a more complete understanding of the philosophical discourse of music educators from 1907 to 1958 will enhance our understanding of the philosophy of music education as it relates to musical aesthetics. The task of examining, interpolating and analyzing the evidence through the lens of what is the crux and substance of musical aesthetics proposed in this chapter enables a deeper understanding of the philosophy of music education in roughly the first half of the twentieth century.

Musical aesthetics, in this chapter, is related as follows: music defined as $X$ or $Y$ means either $Q$ or $R$, and since music reveals $Q$ or $R$, it may be judged to be good or bad, or is important, because of $A$ or $B$. Arriving at this point is important in order for an orderly analysis of the discourse of music educators to take place. Because of the

\textsuperscript{290} Ibid.
complexity involved, brevity was not possible. I do not claim to have covered in detail every aspect of each problem or theory, and I have likely left out problems or theories and examples in each category of musical aesthetics other researchers will undoubtedly criticize me for omitting. What I have included, however, is, based on an examination of the evidence. What is covered in the subsequent chapters are cases where musical aesthetics was an integral part of the discourse in music education from 1907 to 1958. By revealing the essence of the discourse of musical aesthetics in music education prior to the music as MEAE movement, I achieve the purpose of exposing music educators to a deeper understanding of the philosophical discussion relating to the aesthetics. The material presented in this chapter is a way of looking at the discourse of the period that moves beyond Mark’s limited interpretation. The evidence I present in chapters three, four, and five revises the limited and confusing conventional views of philosophical discourse from 1907 to 1958.

Part III – Problems with the Conventional View

It is confusing to determine which of the three alternatives relating to philosophy of music education (mere rationale, absence of, or utilitarian) best captures the essences of discourse in the period prior to 1958. Part of the confusion is the result of two papers published by Mark. In his “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic,” Mark writes “Basic Concepts was the philosophical culmination, in the United States at least, of thousands of years of utilitarian philosophy. Several authors discussed music education philosophy in utilitarian terms.” While in “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education” he argues:

first, the new philosophy brought closure to the venerable relationships between music education and societal philosophy... second, the new philosophy did not replace an older philosophy. Instead, its advocates attempted to offer a more respectable intellectual support system than could be imparted by the variety of rationales that had previously served as a sort of ersatz philosophy.

It is a mistake to think it possible to have it both ways. Either there was a philosophy or there was not. The use of the word “new” also implies that something had come before. McCarthy and Goble, in “The Praxial Philosophy in Historical Perspective,” also label the notion of MEAE a “new” philosophy. Again, the use of the term hints at there being philosophy prior to the so-called new one since there is a developmental quality to history, be it dialectical or synthetic. In Mark’s and Gary’s third edition of *A History of American Music Education*, they suggest that when the influence that progressive education philosophy had on a number of school disciplines faded in education, so too did a philosophy that would unify the field of music education. Mark and Gary continue, “One of the most critical needs of the music education profession was a central unifying philosophy to replace the philosophical support of progressive education.”

This argument denies that any meaningful philosophical writing relating expressly to music education came from within the field prior to 1958, and if there was anything philosophical being discussed, it came from a philosophy outside the arts and from individuals outside of music education. This most recent historical evidence points to there being philosophy but only one category of philosophy (utilitarian) and only as it applies to a larger context and still only one provided by a general movement in education embraced unilaterally by music educators. The resolution of the muddled

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295 Ibid., 417.
meaning surrounding what existed philosophically prior to the late 1950s is another reason for reexamining the evidence of this earlier period. This reexamination of the evidence from the lens of aesthetics clears up what is portrayed as empty, ambiguous, or monistic.

The standard interpretation that pre-MEAE philosophy either did not exist or was exclusively utilitarian as suggested by Mark, implies that previous statements made by the writers and thinkers within music education are somehow philosophically empty. The early statements given by pre-1958 music educators are often currently understood only as mere justification or rationale for teaching the subject in schools. Not only is this a conclusion that deserves investigating because it relies on an examination of evidence based on a narrow conception of philosophy of music education prior to 1958, but it is also an example of a phenomenon whereby contemporary attitudes, ideas, and thoughts are seen as somehow superior to the attitudes, ideas and thoughts of the past. Little credit is given to the work of past writers and thinkers as contributing in meaningful ways to what is argued as a significant happening in more recent times.\textsuperscript{296} Change is privileged over continuity. Assertions that pre-MEAE scholarly writing was either not philosophical or philosophically empty, or utilitarian, lead to a logical argument that there was a significant change or philosophical shift that occurred in 1958. What results from the shift is argued to be in some way superior, but more importantly as distinct and unique, to what came before. It implies that there was no discourse on issues central to aesthetics until 1958.

\textsuperscript{296} In Mark and Gary’s \textit{A History of American Music Education} 2d ed. Will Earhart is briefly noted as being a forerunner of the aesthetic education movement, but this notion is dropped from their \textit{A History of American Music Education} 3d ed.
It is not possible at one moment to describe the philosophy of music education as utilitarian and at another moment to argue that there was rationale without philosophy prior to 1958. It cannot simultaneously be both, and it does not leave open the option that there were other philosophical discussions taking place. Regardless of the chosen position of either case, whether the philosophy that existed was utilitarian as stated in Mark’s “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic,” or if there was only rationale as he argues in “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” the portrayal of the so-called new direction in philosophy of music education is one in which MEAE is still seen as novel. By showing that there was philosophical discourse prior to 1958, music education can move beyond the notion that discussions about music were based primarily on its practical social, economic, and political utility.

Another reason additional scholarship on the topic of philosophical discourse prior to 1958 in music education is significant is that the underlying assumptions originating in contemporary scholarship are based on non sequitor argumentation and lead to the hasty conclusion that utilitarian philosophy guided practice just as the MEAE philosophy was advanced to do. The lack of any formalized or clearly articulated statements of philosophy does not necessarily mean that there was an absence of philosophy or that philosophy played little or no part in intellectual developments and discourse in music education circles at the time. In fact, there was meaningful philosophical discourse in music education prior to 1958, and this study shows a more comprehensive and accurate depiction of the period.

The evidence used to support the standard interpretation results in a non sequitor. What the standard view espouses is a philosophy for music education (a
rationale for music’s inclusion in the curriculum) instead of a philosophy of music education (the principles meant to guide the practice of music instruction). It is a non sequitur because the interpretation assumes a link exists between utilitarian philosophy and practice—just as the movement for MEAE philosophy did by tying together a rationale for the support of formal music classes with a philosophy that guides and informs instruction—and is problematic because it relies on the belief that a philosophy and purpose for music education is identical to philosophy and practice of music education; it neglects any emphasis on the relation of philosophy as a guide to actual classroom instruction in favor of a wider view of the importance of music for society.

The widely accepted view of the so-called utilitarian philosophy for music education and the obvious and expressly extramusical claims attached to it have affected the degree to which attention has been given to what the leaders within the field of music education emphasized in the way of music’s nature, meaning, and value. Embedded within the problem of a limited view of pre-MEAE philosophical discourse is the notion that any philosophical support was given by those outside the field. This idea is likely to have

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298 Mark, in “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” asserts “those people who left writings about the role of music education, who explained to us why music education was important to their societies, were not music educators….It is here that the overlooked significance of aesthetic education as an historical turning point comes into play. There are two relevant points. First, music educators became the major spokespersons for their own profession….Second, some intellectual leaders, notably
had an effect on the degree to which attention has been given to what the leaders within
the field of music education said about the field themselves. In summary, the
philosophical discourse in music education is more complex than previously thought.

The crux of the standard interpretation is that it was not until the MEAE
movement that music was taught in a manner that was primarily for the sake of music and
musical understanding. This line of reasoning suggests that there was no philosophical
discourse present that emphasized the nature, meaning, and value of music—this was
only something to come as a result of the music as aesthetic education movement.

Although utilitarian philosophy was a philosophy that occasionally guided practice, it did
not uniformly manifest itself that way prior to the MEAE movement. Furthermore, to
assert that a utilitarian philosophy was the sole philosophy in music education assumes
that what was going on in the larger field of education directed what went on in terms of
guiding music instruction and that progressive philosophy only rested on utilitarian
premises. Both of these ideas result from a narrow and limited conception of philosophy
and its purposes. Framing an entire period where many dynamic events occurred
(philosophical and otherwise) is an oversimplification.

The characterization of any period in time as being particularly static deserves
questioning. The period before 1958 was an extremely dynamic time in music
education. For example, the orchestra and band movements in schools in the United
States were well underway. The child study movement was popular, and music teacher
preparation was moving out of the normal school and into colleges and universities and
was becoming more rigorous and formal. The confluence of these factors created a

Bennett Reimer and Abraham Schwadron, began the serious study of philosophy and became philosophers
themselves;” 8, 13.
vibrant atmosphere in music education that provided fertile ground for questions and
discussions relating to practice to occur. Furthermore, since course offerings in music
expanded to include not only band and orchestra but also appreciation and theory,
discourse on topics in aesthetics were opened up for discussion. Specific examples of the
combination of expanded course offerings in relation to instruction in the music
classroom are the works of Thomas Tapper whose writings include elements of tonal
theory in addition to utilitarian values such as good citizenship.

The inclusion of musical understanding is problematic for the standard
interpretation of philosophy of music education. In addition to his book *The Music
Supervisor: His Training, Influence and Opportunity*, 299 which deals with the topic of
justifying music in the curriculum based on so-called utilitarian rationale, there are also
two published books of his on harmony 300 that were designed for use in the music
classroom. What is absent in the harmony books is any mention of music for utilitarian
purposes. The focus is on understanding tone, tone combination, and tone thought, all
formalist ideas about music. In other words, the focus is on helping students to achieve
greater musical understanding of “tonally moving forms,” 301 not on how the student can
be a contributing member of society. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that a teacher
ignored the phrasing of a particular passage, the tone quality emanating from the clarinet
section, or attempted to get students to imagine the emotions of the composer while
expounding on the piece’s supposed civic value.

300 Thomas Tapper, *First Year Harmony* (Boston, MA: The Arthur P. Schmidt Co., 1908) and
*Second Year Harmony* (Boston, MA: The Arthur P. Schmidt Co., 1912). *First Year Harmony* was
reprinted in 1930, 1936 and in 1938 and *Second Year Harmony* was reprinted in 1932 and again in 1940.
If the discourse was more than a rationale of utilitarian philosophy, then what did the philosophical discourse of the period 1907 to 1958 look like? The next three chapters show what the conventional view argues does not exist. The evidence presented on the following pages, using the analytical framework established in this chapter, shows that the philosophical discourse of the period was in fact rich, varied, insightful, and pervasive.
CHAPTER 3
NATURE

If philosophy of music education from 1907 to 1958, more specifically discourse relating to musical aesthetics during the period, could be described using sonic terminology, the closest is the Greek word συµφωνία (symphonia), or symphony. Translated it means a sounding together, a harmony. The problem with using the word symphony is that it implies a sense of acting in concert; also implied is a degree of unity and a traditional and pleasing consonance, which the discourse does not fully express. Cacophony is no more accurate because there were themes and threads that existed in the historical material. The discourse of the time was much more than a meaningless, discordant, and harsh mixture of sound. The perspectives that reflected and advanced ideas from musical aesthetics by the writers and thinkers in the field of music education did follow some distinct and semi-predictable patterns. Quite often, however, multiple philosophical points of view are held or seen by an individual in one piece of work or over a scholar’s lifetime. Additionally the aesthetic views held by one music educator at a given point in time, sometimes incompatible, were not always held unanimously by the entire group but were often one of several. Change in perspective from one point in time to another or one view in opposition to others is not uncommon. Edward Lippman states Richard Wagner’s treatises and essays in the field of aesthetics fall externally into five groups separated from one another by intervals of ten years…this body of writings contains a remarkable variety of aesthetic ideas, some of which
contrast each other, a circumstance that is not surprising in view of the span of
time involved.¹

Consensus of perspective was not the case when it came to discourse relating to musical
aesthetics in music education. In fact the evidence supports that views in the field of
music education during the period relating to musical aesthetics were not only present but
also varied, noteworthy, insightful, and naturally embedded in the perspectives of music
educators. Like much in history the perspectives were not a spontaneously or perfectly
formed set of ideas with accompanying meanings; the ideas were not like the stories
about the spontaneous birth of Aphrodite or Dionysus. The thoughts of these writers
were articulated over time and in time – there was a sense of “sounding together.”

The evidence reveals two types of material relating to musical aesthetics on the
topics of music’s nature, meaning, and value. The first type of matter includes examples
where musical aesthetics are at the core of the topic being addressed. To put it another
way, musical aesthetics, or a component of it, is specifically addressed, and in some cases
the purpose of the work is to advance an idea from the discipline of musical aesthetics.
For example, Will Earhart’s The Meaning and Teaching of Music blends his scholarly
discovery of the interconnected problems of “philosophy, aesthetics, psychology, and the
practice of teaching.”² Often the works of the first type use the work of a particular
philosopher or aesthetic theory to argue and advance an idea as to what the nature,
meaning, or value of music and music education is. The second type of material is less
explicit regarding its author’s use of ideas relating to musical aesthetics. By this I mean

¹ Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 243. Lippman describes Wagner’s
aesthetics at this point as having a social outlook. “Art as conceived as a manifestation of society,” making
it a forerunner to socioaesthetics. Furthermore, “feeling rather than understanding is to play the central role
in the drama of the future…actions become intelligible through their emotional motivation, and it is
through feeling that understanding is to be achieved.” Lippman, A History, 243-270.
the scholar was making or advancing an idea on a topic that was not expressly philosophical but rather echoed or reflected a particular or underlying philosophical perspective. Gleaning or interpolating an implied aesthetic position or view such as the relation of words to music in a work that purports to be about the instruction of choral music is an example. A specific example of the second type of material is Ralph Peterson’s “The Unaccompanied Choir—Its Relation to Expressive Speech”\(^3\) In this paper he argues that a highly trained a cappella singing emphasizing “beautiful speech” leads to “more expressive singing”\(^4\) while also embracing a significationist perspective in what he wants to see choral directors do in practice. In other words, while a particular scholar is conveying, elaborating, or explaining the integration of music with other courses in the curriculum, for example, he/she may knowingly or subconsciously accept and/or use certain premises and points of view from Dewey’s assessment in *Art as Experience* of the meaning of music.

Differentiation between the two types of material is necessary against the backdrop or accompaniment of multiple philosophical perspectives (sometimes even occurring in one document). One type of material contains an argument advancing one or more ideas from musical aesthetics while another is an echo or reflection of arguments borrowed from musical aesthetics. References to the nature of music, for example, were frequently embedded within conversations on meaning and value, so it is helpful to see which type of material—first or second—the writer used. Some material had the nature of music as a main idea in the work and referenced various philosophers or theories to

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\(^4\) Ibid., 279.
support or advance a particular view. Other papers mentioned the nature of music in a casual manner and/or merely as a supporting idea for another point being made. Just because one was a music educator did not mean every aspect of the nature of music was thoroughly translated and explored. When a particular point of view or problem was explored, it also did not mean the nature of music was the only topic discussed. Finally, music educators of the period who may have felt or thought they understood what music is in a deeper way than did a typical philosopher untrained in music still did not advance a unified view of the nature of music. On the surface it seems musicians should understand the nature of music, but after further analysis a variety of perspectives emerge on what music *really* was.

Reasons for differing views on the nature of music also varied. Although the reason for the differing views and their links with ideas on the nature, meaning, and value of music are difficult to state with certainty, some influences appear that give hints of perspectives. One might have to do with a particular teacher’s outlook, education, and experience, a challenge to prove. Another had to do with currents in the field of education happening at the time such as the so-called progressive education movement, which is seen in some of the evidence. During this period in the field of music education, transformations also occurred that indicate a slight relation to the differing views on the categories of musical aesthetics—nature, meaning, and value. The birth of the band and orchestra happened in the early decades of the twentieth century. Additionally, music appreciation, theory, harmony, and eurhythmics courses were also offered in schools at the time. For the sake of clarity the material in this and the next chapter of this dissertation will be divided into two main categories. The first category that shows
particular views on the nature, meaning, and value of music sorts the evidence according to the paper’s intended audience – Performance based courses (band, orchestra, and chorus). The second category is the Non-performance courses, which includes music appreciation, harmony, theory, where an emphasis was placed on listening. The second category contains two other designations however; generalized topics, which were papers, addresses, books, and archival material geared toward the field of music education writ large; the second grouping deals with the integration movement in vogue during the later decades of the period. What the remainder of this dissertation looks like organizationally is straightforward.

Each chapter places the evidence into two main sections (performance and non-performance based material). And within each section the evidence is comingled between the first type of material (musical aesthetics as central to the work) and the second (the underlying influence and reflection of ideas seen in musical aesthetics) depending upon the musical aesthetics idea being addressed in that space. The chapters are aligned with my view of what musical aesthetics is set out earlier in this work. Nature is the subject of chapter three; Meaning is the subject of chapter four; and Value is the subject of chapter five. The intention of organizing the material in this manner is for increased focus and clarity of thought as well as for reinforcing assertions made at the beginning of this dissertation. The material presented will show that instead of a time that has been characterized as a barren philosophical wasteland, the writings and addresses of music educators involving musical aesthetics was varied, noteworthy, insightful, and naturally embedded in the perspectives of music educators. There is more
continuity than the standard interpretation allows between the MEAE movement and what existed before.

Musical aesthetics was part of the discourse from 1907 to 1958. The nature of music was one element in musical aesthetics that existed in the evidence of the time. Discourse about the characteristics of music occurred in both types of material (as an echo of underlying influence from musical aesthetics and musical aesthetics as a central part of the work) as well as in the two main sections in the forthcoming chapter (performance based and non-performance based work). Additionally, arguments about the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be considered music incorporated views and perspectives from expressivist, intuitionist, experientialist, and formalist standpoints. Not everyone, however, was convinced of the degree to which music educators were aware of the nature of music or at least certain aspects of it. Will Earhart, for example, wrote “musicians and teachers of music persistently overlooked the aesthetic importance of tone.”\(^5\) The differing levels of awareness of the nature of music among music educators can be attributed to the fact that these teachers and musicians were continually surrounded by tone. The issue of tone is also not the only avenue to explore the nature of music.

Performance Based Courses - Chorus

Aesthetic theories on the nature of music such as formalism, expressivism, and significationism, are seen in the evidence related to performance based courses. Trends emerge in the writings of those on choral music in relation to particular theories on the nature of music. Whereas the performance based work of music educators speaking on

\(^5\) Earhart, *The Meaning and Teaching of Music*, 66. Tone, for the formalist, is something that separates music from other arts, and as such is a unique characteristic of music.
issues relating to instrumental music shares many of the same views as the choral component, the themes are not as consistent. Topics in the discourse relating to choral music frequently reflected or advanced expressivist views including those of Tolstoy’s emotional expression, Croce’s intuition, and Dewey’s experientialism as well as those of significationist thought that suggest “music is an iconic sign of a psychological process. It ‘articulates’ or ‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does so by presenting auditory equivalents to some structural or kinetic aspect of that life.”⁶ While these ideas appeared in the evidence on topics relating to instrumental music, there were also leanings to the formalist and objectivist mindsets. Rarely, however, did either the vocal group or the instrumental group dig into problems on the topic of the nature of music that went beyond the categories of musical aesthetics. Problems like the extent to which regional and kinetic patterns of music create greater or lesser degrees of unity in particular pieces of music, or what it is that arouses expectation in music were largely absent. Mention of problems on form, structure, and texture might emerge from time to time, but these discussions were limited in terms of scope, depth, and frequency. Regardless of some of the inconsistencies pointed out, the discourse on the nature of music was an important aspect of the musical aesthetics conversation in performance based courses.

Instances where the nature of music is part of the conversation reveals in the evidence perspectives that are more often associated with a particular theory rather than in relation to a given historical context. W. Otto Miessner wrote, “Art in its LOWEST form is but an imitation of Nature…in the HIGHEST form it is an expression of

SPIRITUAL ideals.” In this paper Miessner delves into the teaching of the aesthetic drawing on Platonic, expressivist, voluntarist, German idealist, and significationist positions for the purpose of showing how these ideas are valuable in the teaching and production of good vocal music. For Miessner, reflecting a hybrid expressivist and voluntarist view, “imagination is the magical Aladdin’s lamp which kindles the divine spark in an art expression, and transforms...mere vocal utterances into expressions full of vitality, action, feeling.” The core of Miessner’s idea is that music necessarily includes “a sense of proportion, of harmony, of designs and the contrasting elements of unity and variety,” and the use of imagination. The roles of the teacher and vocalist are important because through the use of imagination in music as the latter imitates or expresses, the artist can transform the conditions in nature or of feeling or emotion into something explicit. His ideas on the nature of music that incorporate a variety of influences are not unusual.

Synthesizing the essence of a particular theory’s argument in musical aesthetics with another regardless of the degree of compatibility was common among music educators at the time. The synthetic practice of joining this idea with that is common practice in philosophical and historical scholarship, and sometimes this practice can generate sophisticated results. Synthesis, however, can also cause compatibility problems that may not be resolved over the course of a brief paper or address. For some music educators the synthesis of ideas was the result of trying to advance an argument for

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8 Ibid., 34.
9 Ibid., 32.
10 Ibid., 33.
one thing and using supporting evidence from multiple perspectives to do that. Sometimes it worked, and in other instances it did not. An example of a successful attempt at synthesis could be incorporating views from Deweyan thought on the integration of music with various subjects in the curriculum and using arguments suggesting the value of music is instrumental. A less successful attempt could be defending the practice of learning to read the notes of music using formalist and significationist arguments on the nature of music. In either case there is evidence that suggests ideas from musical aesthetics were incorporated in the written work of music educators.

D.A. Clippinger, a voice teacher and scholar from Chicago, explained in 1914 what he meant by “musicianship.” For him the concept includes, “melody, harmony, tonality, the control of the vast amount of material constituting music…[and] the development of tone quality and taste.”¹¹ Formalist notions of music are implicit in his understanding of musicianship as it relates to the nature of music. For the formalist the necessary and sufficient conditions of music are the musical combinations of notes on the staff paper, and for Clippinger this takes the form of “melody, harmony, tonality,” the stuff that “constitutes music.” Clippinger goes on to say, “The singing tone is round, full, rich, steady, resonant, and sympathetic, and these elements of good tone must all be definitely fixed in the mind of the singer or they will never be expressed though his voice.”¹² While this statement still contains formalist tendencies such as “full,” “steady,” and “resonant” it begins to address elements contained in expressivist theory. The phrase

¹² Ibid., 95.
“sympathetic expressions” gives away the expressivist view. Later in the paper he fully embraces the expressivist position on the nature of music. He writes, “Art is a transfer of feeling, and the feeling is not in the medium...when we listen to the orchestra, the music is what we feel...real art therefore consists of pure feeling rather than material objects.” Clippinger does not stop with combining formalist and expressivist views on the nature of music; he also adds hints of German idealism.

Quoting Whistler, Clippinger writes, “Art is an expression of eternal, absolute truth.” This idea, when coupled with the latter’s next statement that “Music begins where speech leaves off. It can awaken one’s feelings, emotions, and aspirations which are beyond speech” displays echoes of Schopenhauer and Schiller. By using elements of formalist, expressivist, and German idealist thought on the nature of music Clippinger effectively argues for the musical teaching of singing and the development of musicianship but at a philosophical cost. Although the tenets of formalism, expressivism, and German idealism are embedded in his argument and reflect his philosophical approach to teaching singing, he does not bother with the fact that the formalist position does not accept music as analogous to feelings. For that matter he also does not wrestle with whether the embodied feeling was the composer’s—an expressivist view—or if it was an expression of the metaphysical Idea—a German idealist view.

Clippinger’s work is an example of something that reflects some sense of musical aesthetics, and the use of this awareness is used to support his idea of teaching. It is also an example that shows how certain ideas were synthesized but not in any thorough or successful way. This piece was also not written for the purpose of advancing an

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13 Ibid., 96.
14 Ibid., 99.
15 Ibid.
argument where one philosophical position is shown to have particular merits while another is argued to be deficient. An example of a work that uses merits and defects of certain philosophical perspectives in a synthetic manner comes from Will Earhart.

In *The Meaning and Teaching of Music* Earhart argues for the development of the aesthetic attitude. He says, “instead of projecting ourselves into the objective world that we might master it, we should accept ourselves as the central fact and allow the world to enter us, then we should have exchanged the factual for the meaningful.”

Throughout the book he cites the work of Bell (formalist), Henri Bergson (intuitionist), Santayana (expressivist) by name and Croce by implication. Here, however, the specific concern is with the nature of music as it relates to singing. On this topic Earhart shows the characteristic arguments of two theories for the purpose of using these ideas to advance his own. First he cites the work of Richard Wagner, specifically his *Opera and Drama* (1851) where Wagner argues music is “emotional speech” or “tonal speech.”

“Emotional” or “tonal” speech, according to Wagner, is the beginning and end of verbal speech. This so-called emotional speech, as related by Earhart, “arose through the *feeling* of the utterer and were intuitively understood by the *feeling* of the hearer.”

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17 According to Lippman this work was written during the period Wagner espoused the theory of emotional realism in aesthetics. Lippman explains the idea of emotional realism as music that contains “specific and clearly defined feelings along with representation of external scenes and events...the ideal was vocal music rather than instrumental, and in particular opera, in which the greatest realism and force could be achieved and the feelings in fact made coincident and apparently identical with those of experience outside music. The central subject matter was sensuous and erotic feeling, which found direct and forceful expression.” Lippman, *A History of Western Musical Aesthetics*, 239.
18 Earhart use of the phrase “emotional speech” is from the W. Ashton Ellis translation of Wagner’s *Opera and Drama* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1900). Tonal speech is the translation given by Lippman, which is likely his own translation since he reads German. Lippman, *A History of Western Musical Aesthetics*, 256.
19 Lippman, *A History*, 256. From Richard Wagner, *Opera and Drama* (1851), 91
for Earhart, Wagner saw music as “an art of expression.” In opposition to Wagnerian aesthetics, Earhart juxtaposes the notion that music’s origins are based on “natural sonorities” and, therefore, are characteristically instrumental, not vocal. The “natural sonorities” theory on the origins of music are based in both Platonic mimesis and formalist views on the nature of music. That is, the tone is paramount and the combination of tones imitates sounds originally found in nature and as such are good.

For Earhart, “instrumental music is more specifically musical than song because its entire appeal lies in the musical field and is not derived from associated interests connoted by song text.” Earhart’s critique of the locus of each of these theories led to his assertion that the teacher is to arouse in the mind of the student what is contained in the mind of the musician, namely “tones, tunes, harmonies, rhythms, forms, which shape themselves again and again in his imagination, to his absorbed delight.” More specifically, it is “musical power…which is to be educated,” and for Earhart, “those powers are…an aesthetic sensitivity to tone (the very substance of music) in all its colors, degrees of force, ranges of pitch, melodic undulations, modes of rhythmic motions, and architectonic arrangements.” Earhart’s argument shows the synthesis of assertions from

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21 Ibid., 86. Earhart’s examples regarding choral performance are linked with expressivism. One example of the link between choral music and expressivism in Earhart’s book is a brief critique where he relates the teaching of music to a kindergartner or first grader. He says “if we assume concrete life-situations interest him—and they do; but not musically—we will bring him song-texts of more or less literal character, and of less or more poetic quality, and hang theses on questionable tunes that owe their dubious nature to the fact that they were regarded as subsidiary to the main purpose anyway.” Ibid., 92. Italics in the original

22 Ibid., 87-88. Earhart labels this “pleasure-of-the-Ear-in-Tone theory.”

23 Ibid., 15.

24 Ibid., 118.

25 Ibid., 119-120. He continues to explain his idea of the aesthetic sensitivity to be developed through education by suggesting that since it is “aesthetic and moving, [it] is not a present sense-perception alone, but leaves a residue of auditory imagery which forms the substance of whatever musicalness there is in the child and constitutes the foundation of all further development. To add to this stock of imagery, not only in the way of remembering pieces but also in the way of remembering general musical effects, and to promote active dealings in these.”
various ideas originating in musical aesthetics. Although his writing on this subject is mainly formalist, he advances a philosophical position intended to have an influence in music education practice as it relates to performance.

Earhart’s views are an exception to my argument that the majority of philosophical perspectives on musical aesthetics in relation to vocal performance are expressivist. He does, however, acknowledge that in the field of music education, expressivist ideas are common in the instruction of songs—more will be said on this point in the subsequent chapter on meaning. Expressivist and significationist perspectives on the nature of music in relation to vocal music that reflect and advance philosophical views persist through 1957. During the years of World War II and in the period thereafter, however, there is less material on the nature of music in the work done on vocal music. The material from 1941 through 1957 is mainly a reflection of underlying ideas in musical aesthetics, and when these ideas are present they are often tied to some aspect of patriotism. For example, in “The Code for the National Anthem of the United States of America” it is written, “since the message of the Anthem is carried largely in the text, it is essential that emphasis be placed upon the singing of the Star-Spangled Banner.”26 Furthermore, and continuing along significationist lines, “the slighting of note value in the playing or singing of the National Anthem seriously impairs the beauty and effectiveness of both music and lyric.”27 When vocals are part of the music, as the above example shows, it is difficult to extricate textual meaning from ideas about pitch, rhythm, and harmony as well as other musical qualities such as kinetic

27 Ibid.
pattern or unity. Vocal music has a straightforward connection to expressivist and significationist notions of the nature of music. The same does not hold for these theoretical perspectives on the nature of music as each is associated with music generated by the use of humanly constructed instruments.

Performance Based Courses – Band, Orchestra, and Individual Instrument Classes

Courses in instrumental music, which include band, orchestra, and various individual instrument classes in group format, such as piano or violin, shared many of the same general underlying philosophical ideas in relation to aesthetics as the vocal courses did. Ideas reflected, advanced, and synthesized material from musical aesthetics but the difference, as stated earlier, was a greater—though not exclusive—association with formalist thought.²⁸

A reason for the link between formalist musical aesthetics and instrumental music is due to the fact that much music written for band or orchestra is absolute music. Absolute music, as described by Sigmund Spaeth,

is music that depends entirely on its own material to establish a mood or create directly an emotional or intellectual response. It has not descriptive title, nor does it lean on any other extraneous factors for support. It is music pure and simple, with nothing but tones and time to carry its message…titles or playing directions may give a hint as to the gayety or somberness of their mood, but beyond this their message is absolute, an abstract proposition, entirely removed from the concrete except as it exists in the materials of music itself and the physical qualities of the interpreting instruments.²⁹

Absolute music is often juxtaposed in musical aesthetics with so-called program music, or music “which, by its title, or descriptive analysis, or its words, actions, scenery or accompanying pictures, tells a story, indicates a definite episode, hence follows a distinct

²⁸ One notable exception to this argument may exist in the music written for marching band. ²⁹ Sigmund Spaeth, The Common Sense of Music (New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1924/1933), 86. This book went through fifteen printings and three school editions.
Program music need not necessarily be vocal music, but a good example of program music is opera. Likewise, absolute music need not necessarily be instrumental. One example might be a chorus humming a piece that has no title. The point is that the music written for the instrumentalist tends to be absolute, such as a Bach or Brahms concerto, and its descriptions, therefore, are more readily linked with formalism. Aestheticians could provide many counter examples, but in music education the association between formalism and instrumental performance is present. For example, Lucy Markham Chinn, in posing a question to a fictitious piano class, asks “What is music?...finally, the idea is advanced that music is beautiful sound.” A formalist response for sure. For her, “the objective is to begin study with the ear…first, about objectives outside music; then we notice the difference between tone and noise.” The importance given to listening in this example is in place so the piano student is better able to acquaint himself to music along formalist lines. Formalism here, however, is only reflected in her argument, it serves as the aesthetic foundation of her practice, but there is no critique and problems with this perspective are not considered.

Earhart’s work is more sophisticated than Chinn’s because he advances a philosophical idea and relates it to instrumental performance. Examining the merits and defects of expressivism, Earhart accepts for music education the formalist arguments of Bell and Edmund Gurney. By using specific examples from Beethoven’s *Fifth Symphony in C Minor, Op. 67* Earhart argues this monumental work expresses something in C-Minor; something that appears to need rather insistent reiteration; something that moves restlessly, urgently, but ‘without joy’; that now

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30 Ibid., 85.  
32 Ibid., 313.
thunders, now whispers, now gropes, now moves confidently; that is compounded of sounds by flutes that express flute-meanings; of sounds like timpani that express timpani-meanings and horn meanings. If we seek more explicit ‘explanation’ than this we shall probably descend for it.  

While this example shows the link between formalist ideas and instrumental music, Earhart acknowledges that music education is not limited to instrumental music.

Therefore, he advances formalist ideas for music education generally because for him if one does know, and is keenly responsive to, the factors that constitute music in general, he is then prepared to enjoy specific modes of employment of these factors that are represented in many compositions of different types. The material presented to young children, therefore, does not represent repertory so much as it represents their introduction to tone, rhythm, color, form, design.

The inner workings of a piece of music are at the heart of Brock McElheran’s argument for generating a more artistic performance. Although he does not exclusively write about the instrumental ensemble, rehearsals of the instrumentalist occupies much of his attention. For him, the use of theory in rehearsals, particularly harmony, “can speed up the learning of notes, correct bad intonation, and improve the aesthetic effect of a piece.” He takes ideas from musical aesthetics to justify his argument that the structure of music is important to pay attention to in rehearsals. His critique of modern practice in rehearsal rests on the notion that “most musicians recognize the importance of phrasing and hidden themes, but in this age, relatively little time is spent in thinking about the aesthetic and emotional quality of structure.” Using formalist language regarding the nature of music, he makes a comparison between architecture and music. McElheran writes, “It is not too far fetched [sic] to compare the element of structure in music with

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34 Ibid., 105-106.
36 Ibid., 52.
the beauty of design in a statue or cathedral…the musical effect may be built up by
counterpoint, fugue, fugal device, or by harmonic pattern, as is so often the case in
Beethoven’s key relationships.”

Rehearsal are then used to help students understand
“the true nature of form in music” through emphasis on certain passages that allegedly
resemble formal characteristics in the sister arts. Oddly, the comparison does not rest on
extramusical associations because what he is comparing is a matter of form and design
not on what the design means or an emotion brought about by contact with the form
itself. Teaching for aesthetic effect and with aesthetic principles in mind was not limited
to performance based courses. Topics on and from musical aesthetics are also seen in the
discourse in other areas of music education such as in the music appreciation class and in
generalized address on music to the entire field.

Non-Performance Based Courses – Appreciation, Theory, Harmony, and Music History

The next area of music education discourse reflecting underlying support or
rejection of particular ideas in musical aesthetics and/or advancing certain views on the
philosophical subject are found in the non-performance based evidence. Like the
previous section on the nature of music that distinguished the performance based material
into two categories, the instrumental and the vocal, this section is also subdivided. The
first section includes perspectives and ideas from musical aesthetics in the classes where
listening to music is emphasized. Examples of these courses seen in many, but by no
means all schools and mainly in the upper grades—junior and senior high—are music
theory, music appreciation, harmony, and music history. The material examined in the

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37 Ibid., 53.
38 Ibid.
39 What music appreciation meant, consisted of, and was designed for was contested. In an
explanation that occupies a sort of middle ground, Russell Morgan suggests appreciation” is the chief
second division of this section includes topics generalized for all of music education not necessarily related to any specific category of music instruction previously mentioned and points of view regarding music in the curriculum. Examples of these generalized topics include addresses and discussions like Karl Gehrkens “Ultimate Ends in Public School Music”\textsuperscript{40} and Lilla Belle Pitts’ “The Place of Music in a System of Education.”\textsuperscript{41} Unlike the previous section the notion of the nature of music in non-performance based courses and in generalized discourse is more developed and recurrent throughout the period.

Because non-performance based courses necessarily spend less time learning such things as fingering technique or proper tonal production—the technical “how to” training objective of singing, playing, and listening. It consists chiefly of the development of right attitudes and emotional responses—reactions to musical stimuli.” Russell Morgan, “Developing a Program for Music Education,” in Yearbook of the Music Supervisors National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1931), 61-66, 63. Lillian Baldwin also defends a broad conception of what music appreciation is in her 1938 address to the MENC. For her “the feature which distinguishes an appreciation class from all other musical activities is that here, history, biography, theory and illustrative playing and singing become means to an end which is neither knowledge nor performance but intelligent enjoyment of music.” Lillian Baldwin, “Music Appreciation in General Classes and for Special Groups,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1938), 191-194, 194. Everyone did not accept these broad defenses of music appreciation classes. In 1932, Thomas Briggs encapsulates the divide adequately in his statement “I seem to detect a distinct tendency to deprecate the teaching of appreciation without performance.” Thomas Briggs “A Layman Listens to Musicians—and to Music,” in Yearbook of the Music Supervisors National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1932), 36-41, 36. On one side of the debate James Mursell asserts “First, you will do everything in your power to give the child ample experience in directed listening. In this respect music education of the past years has been lamentably deficient. Performance has enormously overshadowed listening.” James Mursell, “The Claims of Music in the School Curriculum,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1935), 21-26, 22. Disagreeing, J. F. Messenger writes “educationally, music is for the performer more than the listener. I recognize the value of listening to good music, but that is not the greatest value. Music is a form of expression of ideas and feelings, and as such it does not matter if there is no listener. It is an expression of personality.” J. F. Messenger, “Living Humanities,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1935), 54-57, 56. The modern derivation of this debate is seen in the disagreement between Bennett Reimer and David Elliott over musical understanding and musical knowledge.


elements of playing music—more class hours could be spent on a broader range of musical topics. Examples of possible study include biographical information on composers or the elements of folk music infused into particular compositions. A transformation from an emphasis solely on playing to one on a broader understanding of music is mentioned by Karl Gehrkens in his “Theory Courses for Students of Applied Music.”

This is not to say that the leader of a performance group did not address musical topics as part of the class instruction. I merely suggest that without the time required to put together a performance more time could be spent in the non-performance based course on a wide ranging variety of topics and subjects relating to music. In other words, it is rare for the orchestra leader to explore the structure and evolution of choral music from the Troubadours to Palestrina and later to the Oratorio, while preparing for the upcoming festival or contest.

The broader range of topics that could be and were discussed in the non-performance based courses allowed for a diverse number of perspectives on the nature of music. Formalism in this period girds many thoughts on the nature of music. In Osbourne McConathy’s 1910 address “High School Music” he described coursework undertaken at Chelsea High School in Chelsea, Michigan.

Theoretical music…aims to develop the power to think in tones in correct melodic and harmonic relations…the training will develop a keen sensitiveness to the

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42 Karl Gehrkens, “Theory Courses for Students of Applied Music,” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference, Thirteenth Annual Meeting Philadelphia, PA March 22 – March 26, 1920 (Privately printed,1920), 81-83. He writes, “Our present idea of musical education implies the training of the intellect and of the emotions as well as the fingers…for this reason, a body of facts, known as Music Theory, has been gathered together, organized, and arranged, and these facts, together with the study of notation as ordinarily included in such activities as sight-singing and ear-training and involving both melodic and harmonic construction, is now agreed ought to be studied practiced, and absorbed by all students.” p. 81.
beauties of rhythm, melody, and harmony, and will be a means to opening to them the inner purpose of the technical elements of composition.\textsuperscript{43}

Will Earhart presents the report of the Committee of High School Music at the 1912 MSNC meeting. Earhart, speaking for the group, argues there must be genuine musical knowledge that accompanies the teaching and learning of music. For the committee genuine musical knowledge in music appreciation meant “analysis of the form and content of these [great composers’] compositions, together with contributory study of musical history, biography, form and forms, and THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE ELEMENTS AND LAWS OF MUSICAL BEAUTY.”\textsuperscript{44} Not only are formalist notions of the nature of music present but this is also an example where practice is intended to be influenced, and with an underlying philosophical position. Although the committee does not develop what “the elements and laws of musical beauty” are, it is implied that content and form provide the structure on which such elements and laws are investigated and realized. Formalism persisted in its connection with discourse on the topic of music appreciation as can be seen in Earhart’s 1948 Music Educators Journal article “The Roots of Appreciation,” as well as Sudie Williams’ 1920 address “Music Appreciation in the Elementary Grades.” Citing an unattributed source she conveys “music is stored up thought told in beautiful tones.”\textsuperscript{45} These examples contain


\textsuperscript{44} Will Earhart, “Report of the High School Committee,” \textit{Journal of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference}, Fifth Annual Meeting St. Louis, MO March 19 – March 11, 1912 (Privately printed, 1912), 60-65, 61. Capital letters in the original. The purpose of the committee was “to formulate and recommend a course in music for high schools together with a plan for administering the same.” Ibid., 60.

underlying formalist ideas. A more sophisticated approach that cites formalist ideas and also exposes problems with differing viewpoints came from Earhart.

In relation to formalism in non-performance based courses, and in a philosophical manner, Earhart charges the materialist and empirical philosophy embraced by society and rooted in the work of Francis Bacon is epistemologically limited. For Earhart, “science, then cannot guide us in moral and aesthetic matters.”46 He takes the aesthetic as another way of knowing and uses this idea to encourage teachers of music education to consider “(1) What is there in music to be appreciated? (2) What is the nature of appreciation? (3) What is its value in human life?”47 It is in response to the first question that Earhart supplies a formalist answer, which he acknowledges is adopted from Goodhart Rendel’s definition of music in Fine Art. He asserts, “the material of music is commonly said to be tone.”48 In a subsequent passage his formalist position is advanced while critiquing expressivism and intending to influence practice. For him,

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\text{tone is also the one exclusive and distinguishing possession of music...considering the universality of response to tone, its basic character, its intensity, and its value, it would appear that to seek beauty and purity of tone, and develop discrimination with respect to it, in every form of musical activity, should be the paramount concern of every teacher...the majestic beauties of form also come forth in clearer relief when programmatic and highly emotional interests are not advanced to the forefront of attention.}49
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Although Earhart’s position on the nature of music shows a formalist influence in relation to appreciation, his work is still typical of many music education scholars.

His work, while incorporating ideas from musical aesthetics, blends two or more theoretical perspectives. Earhart’s writings, as will be shown throughout this dissertation,

\[47\text{ Ibid., 20.}\]
\[48\text{ Ibid., 21.}\]
\[49\text{ Ibid., 22.}\]
display aspects of formalism, but however highly he regarded it, it was not the only 
theory for which he expressed support. “The Roots of Appreciation” is a good example 
of his embracing more than one perspective on the nature of music. He both 
acknowledges expressivism as a valid position while simultaneously calling into question 
some of the basic tenets of the theory. For example, and in reference to the nature of 
music, he recognizes “in all the arts, aestheticians find three factors, namely Material, 
Form, and Expression.” By taking Santayana’s headings on the nature of art as 
“Material, Form, and Expression” from the philosopher’s *The Sense of Beauty* and using 
these to justify his argument that music be taught more thoughtfully, Earhart gives tacit 
support to expressivism. And it is under the heading of expressivism that he both 
supports and calls the theory into question by exposing a major problem with it. He 
writes, “All agree that any work of art seems somehow to be expressive. The difficulty 
begins when we ask what is expressed?” Here Earhart leans toward an expressivist 
view of a necessary and sufficient condition of music, namely that it is an expression, and 
then he does what formalist critics of expressivism typically do, and that is cast doubt on 
the precision of what is expressed. More will be brought up on this topic in the chapter 
on meaning. The point for now is to state that discourse on the nature of music was 
varied, and the variability sometimes happened within a single paper.

Variation on the nature of music also appears with regard to perspectives reflected 
and advanced from other theories such as Platonism, German idealism, and views fully in 
support of expressivism. A.E. Winship argues in a characteristically German idealist

50 Ibid., 21.
51 Ibid., 22.
manner, “Music is physical and intellectual life spiritualized.” Similarly, in answering the question “What is appreciation?” Augustus Zanzig calls into question tenets of formalism and an element of significationism by giving an explanation of music and music appreciation that reflects an underlying German idealist and Langerian view on musical aesthetics. For him

Music is often undistinguished from merely sensuous pleasure; from knowledge about music; or from the pride of performance…or it is identified with sentimentality and with delight in ‘pictures’ and stories supposed to be suggested by the music. But to appreciate a man is to participate completely, self-forgetfully, in his life; it is in the ideal sense, to live in him, and there feel the motion of his spirit, hidden from ordinary sight. And so is it to appreciate music, which is an image of that inner motion. Each of these authors asserts that the nature of music “affords intuitions or insights of profound transcendent significance. Music is at once an end in itself and a means of spiritual elevation, at once fundamentally mindful and fundamentally felt.”

The expressivist view on the nature of music is also found in the non-performance classes. Franklin Dunham, in “A Music Understanding Course for the Junior High School” uses the expressivist view of Walter Spalding as groundwork and an important component for approaching deeper musical understanding. Music, according to Spalding, “is a tone picture of an emotional experience, regulated by an overwhelming intellectual power.” Dunham then asserts that certain things such as “cacophony” or

54 Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 128.
other “harmonious sounds” do not constitute music.⁵⁶ Therefore, while form may not be required, content is.⁵⁷ Unfortunately, Dunham does not go on to question if form can be separated from content, he simply accepts that “Musical Understanding must necessarily consist of a knowledge of the form, the emotional and intellectual content, and the relative development background which music composition possesses.”⁵⁸ Dunham clearly embraces expressivism by suggesting that understanding cannot be fully complete unless there is knowledge of what it is the music allegedly expresses, its “emotional and intellectual content.” Along similar lines Thomas Briggs claims, “Art is anything produced which results in a satisfying emotional response.”⁵⁹ Using a musical example to justify his position he writes, “Nothing is art, not even the masterpieces of Mozart, Bach, Mendelssohn and Beethoven, unless it results in a feeling satisfying to someone.”⁶⁰ It is not clear in Briggs’ paper if eating ice cream in the park on a pleasant summer day could also bring about a “satisfying emotional response.” However, his definition of art not only states ideas at the heart of expressivism, but it is also highly subjective. Both the expressivist and subjective components of Briggs’ definition are ideas he advances in the course of the paper. While one might call his definition relativistic, it is, in my view, merely a matter of taste and preference. Furthermore, as Beardsley explains, “It is the existence of divergent preferences that gives rise to dispute in the first place; the problem

⁵⁶ Ibid., 223.
⁵⁷ Ibid.
⁵⁸ Ibid., 224. Italics in the original.
⁵⁹ Thomas Briggs, “Appreciation: A Definition and Some Conclusions,” in *Journal of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference*, Nineteenth Annual Meeting Detroit, MI April 12 – April 16, 1926, ed. Paul J. Weaver (Privately printed, 1926), 50-55, 52. While Briggs may be considered an outsider he was well aware of issues relating to music and music education. In this article he mentions attending a concert with his colleague at Columbia, Charles Farnsworth, a music education insider.
⁶⁰ Ibid.
of Relativism is what can be done about the dispute after it arises." While Briggs does not offer much on the problem of relativism Beardsley describes, he does justify and advance his own position using arguments from variability and the argument from inflexibility. From the argument of variability he asserts, “art is personal, that it differs with individuals.” From the argument from inflexibility he argues art “differs with fashion, modes and countries.” Briggs’ main purpose was to ensure more students would be able to appreciate music by making it more emotionally accessible through experience. To achieve this end his inclusion of philosophical arguments displays how educators could use a theoretical position in musical aesthetics with the intent of influencing practice.

Historical context had no substantive effect on the topic of the nature of music in non-performance based courses from 1907 to 1958. Neither war nor peace nor depression nor prosperity appeared to have influence over the argument’s underlying problems and theories relating to the necessary and sufficient conditions of music in musical aesthetics. In 1945, for example, while there were numerous papers being written with suggestions for music teachers to support the war effort, there were, on the topic of the nature of music (this is not the same for value), arguments that continued from the earlier periods. Bertha Bailey’s “High School Theory,” for example, presents an explanation of what the high school theory course ought to look like. Embedded in her description is the notion that music is a “complete expression.” The expression of

61 Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 489.
62 Refer to chapter two for explanations and Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 483 – 489.
64 Ibid.
which she speaks is further defined and fundamentally linked with the structures of music. “Tempo, dynamics, tone, all of these problems are \textit{in} the music and will only come out as they should if one has a good grasp of the construction.”\textsuperscript{66} Bailey’s ideas on the nature of music, much like Earhart’s, have a formalist bent. Yet, while there is similarity on the topic of the characteristics of music, there is, as can be seen in this section, nothing anyone would call consensus. Furthermore, context did not significantly influence ideas here. Whether the material was from Earhart’s Report of the High School Committee written in 1912 or his “The Roots of Appreciation” written in 1948, or Dunham’s “A Music Understanding Course” written in 1926 or Bailey’s “High School Theory” written in 1945, ideas about how music is described were more dependent upon a theory’s merit for music in the eyes of the music educator than in the time period in which such educators wrote.

Generalized Topics and Integration

Included in this last part of the section of non-performance based topics are subjects from the field that are generalized to the entire field of music education. Papers and ideas here are as specific as the integration of music within the curriculum and as general as arguments on the principles and objectives of school music. Here again, the larger economic and political context has little bearing when it comes to the subject of the nature of music. What one begins to notice, however, is that the larger ideas within the discourse are influenced by both social, political, and economic factors as well as the educational spirit of the time. Not too far removed from World War II Howard Hanson, in his “The Scope of the Music Education Program,” examines the role of music

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 50. Italics in the original.
education in relation to general education “in line with the best in progressive thought,”\textsuperscript{67} as well as situating it within the efforts put forth by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in promoting international understanding. So, while context and setting are important for the analysis of the main ideas presented in many of these works, often linked with notions of value, the descriptions of music are not fundamentally altered by context. There simply is not much of a story to be told. The themes in musical aesthetics that appear in the previous sections on performance and non-performance based topics, such as formalism, expressivism, and significationism, remain and are advanced in the historical evidence from music educators. One notable exception to the lack of context in other theories on the nature of music comes from socioaesthetic theory. Socioaesthetic theory rests on the notion that art is “concentrated social substance,”\textsuperscript{68} and as such it is necessarily bound to context. In any case the discourse in generalized topics relating to the nature of music continued to not only be present but also varied, rich, noteworthy, insightful, and naturally embedded in the perspectives of music educators. Additionally, of all the sections of this dissertation containing material on the characteristics and descriptions of music, the part on generalized topics is larger in both size and scope.

Absence of a plot and/or any mean spirited debate does not make this section on generalized topics in music education on the nature of music devoid of interest. On the contrary. What is fascinating from a scholarly standpoint is the multiplicity of perspectives revealed in an area that the standard interpretation of philosophy of music education argues is philosophically barren, especially in relation to aesthetics. The 1914

\textsuperscript{67} Howard Hanson “The Scope of the Music Education Program,” \textit{Music Educators Journal} 34, no. 6 (June-July 1948) : 7-8, 54, 56-57, 7.

\textsuperscript{68} Hamilton, \textit{Aesthetics and Music}, 129.
MSNC convention was held from April 27 through May 1 in Minneapolis, MN, and at the banquet held on Wednesday evening at Hotel West, Charles Farnsworth argued for the teaching of “right feeling” in music. In arriving at this conclusion he asserts, “When people get up and say all these glorious things about music,--music is a language etc. I feel in one sense, like saying, rot!...it is the feel.” Farnsworth’s assertion about the nature of music is interesting not only because it displays the underlying expressivist view, but also because of the idea that feeling can be and must be taught. The belief that feeling can be taught is an idea from Langer that was attached to the MEAE movement, which shows continuity from the first half of the century to the second. Continuity is also seen in Karl Gehrkens paper “Ultimate Ends in Public School Music Teaching” and the subsequent discussion generated from his address. A question Gehrkens asks music educators to consider is whether the group should develop the “esthetic and emotional nature of the child…or shall we emphasize theory-teaching most strongly, assuring that it is knowledge about music.” At the conclusion of the discussion Karl Gehrkens issued a statement at the request of Arthur Mason, president of the MSNC at the time, which reflected the attempt to resolve the question. Gehrkens writes that while the so-called scientific side of music is to be studied,

it should always be as a means to an end and never as an end in itself…these technical aspects of musical study must never be allowed to interfere with the legitimate working out of those emotional and aesthetic phases of music which constitute the real essence of the art; in other words it is the art side of music with its somewhat intangible influence which we are seeking to cultivate.

70 Ibid.
72 Ibid., 76. Italics in the original.
Here, again, in the adopting of an expressivist position where emotion is a necessary and sufficient condition of music there is a presupposition that, on some level, feeling is teachable. Following this address and discussion, music educators continued to use ideas from expressivist theory in conjunction with explanations of descriptions of music.

The address of Herbert Weatherspoon at the MSNC meeting in 1929 titled “Aesthetic Education and Music” supports the larger argument made in this dissertation in a few ways. First, his message explicitly links aesthetic education with the instruction of music, which predates the standard interpretation’s assertion of the origins of MEAE movement by thirty years. Second, it is another argument for the cultivation of feeling. Rhetorically he asks

are we even now cramming so many little heads full of information and facts, instead of leaving a little room for the feeling, for all of the beauty of life which so many pass by and wholly miss, just because they never have been taught to see, to hear, and to feel?\textsuperscript{73}

Finally, while he does use an expressivist assertion regarding the nature of music, he also includes ideas on meaning and value from German idealism, Plato, and some material from Bell, a formalist, and perspectives found in the work of Dewey and Collingwood. Weatherspoon’s argument that music “arouses the same or like emotions in the crowd or in the classroom,”\textsuperscript{74} is immediately followed by “[it] develops that kind of understanding which as Plato says precedes reasoning power.”\textsuperscript{75} Since it is not the place to go into meaning and value in this chapter, it simply stands as an example supporting my larger thesis and shows an expressivist outlook.


\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 349.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
Expressivist notions on the necessary and sufficient conditions of music are seen in numerous other works throughout the period. In 1933 Orville Borchers writes, “Art is a human expression from one person to another of those ideals and expressions of life which are governed by laws of beauty and grandeur.”\textsuperscript{76} James Mursell states, “Two aspects of esthetic experience are present in the enjoyment of music…one aspect can be described as awareness, interest, and insight regarding music, and the other as emotional expression through music.”\textsuperscript{77} In 1941 Hanson argues music “is the greatest educator of the emotions.”\textsuperscript{78} Scribbled on notebook paper for a music class she was teaching or a speech she was preparing Pitts asserts, “music is as direct a conveyor of emotions as a ‘blow or a caress.’”\textsuperscript{79} In 1954 Karl Ernst wrote music “is an art of expression and communication which goes beyond words.”\textsuperscript{80} Replete with references to expressivist ideas about the nature of music the period of 1907 to 1958 was one in which the connection between music and emotion was abundantly evident.

There are simple reflections of expressivist ideas from early in the century when Gehrkens wrote, “music is a language of the emotions”\textsuperscript{81} to later when Pitts wrote, “music offers a means of expression and communication that goes deeper than reason and

\textsuperscript{78} Howard Hanson, “The Democratization of Music,” Music Educators Journal 27, no. 5 (March-April 1941): 14.
\textsuperscript{79} Lilla Belle Pitts, Series 1 – Classroom Music, [ca. 1928-1956], Special Collections in Performing Arts, Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.
\textsuperscript{80} Karl Ernst, “Where Do We Go From Here?,” Music Educators Journal 40, no. 3 (January 1954): 17-20, 17.
beyond the power of words."^{82} Also included in the material from this time are sophisticated treatments of expressivism. Earhart’s “Beethoven, The Interpreter of Life” written in 1909 is dedicated to considering the insights into human life the composer had that are then revealed in his music. Oleta Benn, a contributor to *Basic Concepts in Music Education: The Fifty–Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education,*^{83} states a problem with expressivist doctrine in 1956. She writes, “the famous question which asks whether or not the tonal art expresses emotion, and, if it does not, what then does it express?”^{84} Later in the paper, after some analysis of elements of the nature of music, she argues that the “material of our art is sound”^{85} and as such the form consists of “tonal combinations or tonal designs which go forward in time.”^{86} She also develops the idea of music being expressive. She does not think that such a thing as “tonal design” is enough to satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be labeled music. Instead she says in addition to the basic element of sound and forms “we are obliged to consider the remarkable effects which result from the exploitation of the properties of tone by the composer.”^{87} Benn continues,

> These properties are not so barren when used by the artist in the expression of his idea; they are not detached from the impressive form as conceived by the composer. The contrasts, the similarities, the tension, the relaxation, the rapid pace, the gradual ritard (sic), the change of mood, of tonal color, the hesitancies, the climatic peaks, the gentle close, the short biting staccato, the calm legato line—indeed all the means by which expression is achieved, are never divorced

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^{83} It is an article by Allen Britton in this book that Mark makes the argument the MEAE had its origins.


^{85} Ibid., 127.

^{86} Ibid., 128.

^{87} Ibid., 129.
from the notational designs in the composer’s mind—they are an integral part of the composition.\textsuperscript{88}

Benn gives her readers an answer to the earlier problem by using examples of what is expressed in the music although she does not follow it through with specific music examples showing such and such is expressed. Nevertheless she advanced the notion that a characteristic of music is not sound alone but rather how that sound and tonal design are used in order to express something in the composer’s mind. The non-conceptual quality music possesses, according to the expressivist, is an idea that Dewey also mentions. It is also under the influence of the pragmatists that some music educators wrestled with ideas of expressivist thought.

Dewey writes in \textit{Art as Experience}, “Through the use of instruments, sound is freed from the definiteness it has acquired through association with speech. It thus reverts to its primitive passional quality. It achieves generality, detachment from particular objects and events.”\textsuperscript{89} The work of the Pragmatists, especially the ideas of Dewey given in \textit{Art as Experience}, are peculiar on the topic of the nature of music. The ideas are peculiar because the group occupies two camps. Primacy is in the experience itself and as such the experience is at the center of the philosophical investigation. It is as a corollary that the material that relates to or is used in the experience is examined. Because of the primacy accorded the experience, the pragmatist school of thought has more affinity with the categories of meaning in musical aesthetics. There are, however, clues from these thinkers that show an alignment with expressivism and the nature of music.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Dewey, \textit{Art as Experience}, 248.
Music educators of the time spoke of students experiencing music and the importance of the musical experience, but it was not as common for these writers to refer to an experience in the Deweyan sense when examining the nature of music. Foster McMurray, however, shows the link between the experience and music in his 1956 paper “A Pragmatic Approach to Certain Aspects of Music Education.” He writes,

As the listener listens he finds himself responding to heard sounds, and whatever he hears, and only what he hears, is that which causes in him a qualitative response…if the experience of goodness in an episode of music should lead the listener to want to find more of that goodness in the future, then, if he is intelligent, he will want to know somewhat of that which a composer must know.

Even here the connection with expressivism is muddled, mainly because the emphasis is on having an experience rather than all the correlatives of the experience. William Kilpatrick explains it like this, “the actual experiences as we have them constitute at once the matter of study and the stuff of the explanation.” That is, you cannot divorce the experience from what constitutes it. If a particular musical passage allegedly expresses an emotion of some sort, you examine the emotion in context, that is, in the experience of the music. So, “whenever man by his conscious contriving succeeds in effecting desired results, there is art in its broadest but essential definition.” Finally, in espousing a constructivist view of teaching music where “emphasis is placed upon creative activity

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91 Ibid., 107. McMurray states the listener must become familiar with the structural elements of music, but even that familiarity is not a guarantee the particular quality will be experienced identically or have a similar magnitude to that in the original composition. Ibid., 107-108.


93 Ibid.
and constructive doing.”"\textsuperscript{94} Frank Baker states, “Music becomes a means of child development through self-expression, a thing to be lived rather than to be learned.”\textsuperscript{95}

Even though ideas relating to the expression of emotion as a characteristic of music are as common as adjudicators at music contests, not everyone agreed with expressivist sentiment. Notions of expressivism did not go unchallenged, although pointed long-running debates between those calling music expressive and those doubting music’s ability to clearly express particular emotions were infrequent. Again, it is difficult to argue that the nature of music is based solely on tonal relations when in the same address there is tacit acceptance that music also is self-expression. Music educators, however, who referenced formalist thinkers like Bell and Hanslick and displayed skepticism to elements of expressivism and significationism, did just that. While this does not necessarily mean the work of these music educators was any less philosophical because two viewpoints were used to support an argument, inferences can be made regarding where these scholars were in the articulation on material relating to musical aesthetics. First, there was likely confusion on comprehending the compatibility of fine gradations of various differences between philosophical theories. That is, for example, if music is a language why is it precluded from also being tonally moving form? Second, there is the manner in which the schools of thought are employed. Here, it was that elements of a theory lent support to a larger argument where a variety of evidence was used to justify a point unrelated to musical aesthetics specifically. Finally, there was a sort of pluralism in the field. Music educators, in attempting to solve problems in


\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 490.
music education and because of their experience as musicians etc., possessed a particular insight that enabled them to argue music may be more than one given set of precepts—a synthesis if you will. It, therefore, should not be wholly disheartening from a philosophical standpoint to work through Earhart’s thoughtful arguments with the knowledge that they rest on claims of both Bell and Santayana.

Earhart is an interesting case. He clearly has a formalist leaning which is seen in comments such as “all of us who are purists or absolutists in music….” But on the issue of the nature of music the formalist aspect of his view of music is only partial. Earhart is keenly aware of topics central to musical aesthetics. He begins his address to the New Jersey State Teacher’s Association by suggesting that problems in teaching music “arise in part from incomplete or imperfect conceptions of the nature and function of music. What music is, how it makes its appeal to us…are questions that aesthetics and a psychology of beauty might answer.” From there he outlines “two aspects of musical aesthetics,” which are located in the origins of music and correspond generally to the ideas of expressivism and formalism. In reference to the origins of music and expressivism he cites Wagner’s assertion that music is “emotional expression.” And for formalism he refers to “a contrasting doctrine, which…would declare that music arose from the pleasure of art in tone.” Earhart follows up his definitions of the two contrasting doctrines with an observation regarding how practice is guided by the

96 Will Earhart “Teaching Music: The Art and The Child” – Series 1 – Writings, an address given to the New Jersey State Teacher’s Association on November 12, 1932, 1-7, 6, Special Collections in Performing Arts, Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.
97 Ibid., 2.
98 Ibid. The ideas he outlines in this 1932 speech are seen again in his 1935 publication The Meaning and Teaching of Music 84-88.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 3
acceptance of the ideas from one or the other. He writes “in the choice of music for orchestra, band, choruses, and in the quality and trend of our interpretative instructions and directions, we all reveal a more or less complete acceptance of one or the other of these doctrines.”101 From here he continues criticizing the theories by drawing out elements of each on the characteristics of music as well as its meaning, and concludes by saying, “the significance of this discussion to a group of teachers lies in its emphasis on the purely tonal values that inhere in music.”102 His conclusion reveals his formalist stance on the nature of music, but he never truly gives up his affinities for Santayana.

Other writers also display formalist characteristics in their views in the area of generalized topics on music education. Mabelle Glenn writes, “Music is a tone pattern. In the more complex forms it is merely, to the uninitiated, a confusion of sounds ‘in motion’ that, upon closer acquaintance, becomes an orderly arrangement of tone.”103 Spaeth begins The Common Sense of Music with the formalist statement “music is the Organization of Sound toward Beauty.”104 Much later in the book he writes

the underlying purpose of the composer is always to make his melodic material as interesting as possible to the hearer…by introducing even a few of the numerous devices known to musical elaboration, he can create a diversion which will then emphasize all the more the beauty of the melodies themselves, when they are heard again, in part or as a whole.105

The reader has most likely noticed that the emphasis Spaeth gives to the composer’s work relies on formalist theory. The so-called trick of the contrast relies on “numerous devices” which need not have any relations to the emotion of the composer or percipient,

101 Ibid., 4.
102 Ibid., 6.
105 Ibid., 248.
but are rather “admirably clever” constructions of the melody itself. Spaeth, however, does not think that formalist ideas are the only ideas in music since he writes on a great variety of material that explains and has as a basis for his arguments material from other theoretical schools of thought. In another case of multiple philosophical personalities James Mursell argues that “an essential task of the music program is that of bringing beauty to the child—beauty in a peculiarly compelling form—tonal beauty.” Formalist ideas were also included in the historical material in a sophisticated manner.

Hanson writes in a lengthy and highly formalist statement

The greatest problem in the study of music, from the standpoint of the musician or layman, is found within the nature of the material with which the art is made…the art of music is the art of sound. Its media are sound and time…the musician, in order to make himself, borrows terminology from other fields. He speaks of color, but this is a term borrowed from painting…music is not blue or green, or black or white, or bright or dark. There may be connotations in the mind of the listener, but they are only connotations. The critic may speak of line or form in music, but these are terms borrowed from architecture, from sculpture…there is no line or form in music, but only tonal or time relationships, and yet we frequently speak of writing a symphony as though we were building a structure of brick, stone, or steel. The problems may be analogous, but they are fundamentally entirely different. The musician, whether he be creator or performer, only confuses himself by these analogies.

Hanson makes the reader aware that the difficulties presented in musical understanding are rooted in the nature of music itself. In making his argument, Hanson’s formalist position refutes significationist notions of the nature of music calling this latter position a

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106 Ibid., 249.
107 James Mursell, “The Essentials of Elementary School Music,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1938), 70-73, 72. Borrowing the term multiple personality from the field of psychology might offend Mursell since he spent much of his life studying music and psychology. The term, however, fits because while he shows formalist tendencies on the subject of the nature of music, he takes a wholly contradictory view when it comes to the value of music, which will be seen in chapter five on value.
108 Howard Hanson, “The Scope of the Music Education Program,” Music Educators Journal 34, no. 6 (June-July, 1948): 7-8, 54, 56, 57, 8.
so-called crutch and “an impediment rather than an aid to his understanding.” Views rooted in aesthetic formalism like Hanson’s above, or those espousing expressivism on the nature of music were not accepted by all, and were just two of many theories linked to music education where questions arose regarding music’s characteristics.

H.L. Butler argues in “The Vital Elements of Music” that such elements are originality, sincerity, nobility, vitality, and quality. In the course of his paper he references Hanslick’s critique of Wagner and cites Calvocoressi’s *Musical Taste and How to Form It*, in which the latter suggests, “theoretical considerations can never provide a standard or proof of beauty...analyzing can only tell us how sounds are combined, without ever helping us to know why certain combinations leave us entirely unmoved.” Once again a writer has not only shown an understanding of theories in the field of aesthetics but has effectively used such ideas to advance a related argument, in this case that quality music instruction should employ those inner and vital elements Butler says are necessary and sufficient conditions of music.

The notion that there are qualities to music outside of the tonal relations or the expression of emotion lead us at this point to two other oft recurring theories revealed in the evidence—signification and socioaesthetics. Significationists are those who suggest music “is an iconic sign of a psychological process” or “signifies, inclines toward, and/or refers or represents something extramusical,” which includes such things as

109 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
language and feeling. Echoing the arguments of the significationist is J. Victor Bergquist who recognizes the problem of describing music. In responding to the problem of what music is, he says it is “a language, a universal language, the most comprehensive means of expression.”\textsuperscript{115} Bergquist’s assertion is distinct from expressivism because in this brief statement he invokes music’s similarity to language and, while mentioning emotions, recognizes that emotions are brought about by the symbolic material of language. He asserts later, with a resounding significationist quality, the philosophy of music is “the relationship of beats and tones, and their application to the emotional and intellectual life of man.”\textsuperscript{116} Therefore, in practice, the teacher is to reconcile the aforementioned philosophy with an “understanding of the student mind.”\textsuperscript{117}

In the same book of proceedings, William Bentley writes, blending significationism and Platonic mimesis, “Music is the beautiful language of nature herself, for there is scarcely anything on land or sea which cannot be mirrored through music.”\textsuperscript{118} He follows this significationist and mimetic assertion on the nature of music with a similar statement that uses an example readers today would consider racist. On the topic of folk songs and “negro spirituals” he says, “music is the language of emotion, and in the simple songs of simple people we feel the pulse, the temperament, the real character of these people.”\textsuperscript{119} Each of these works not only reflects the underlying aesthetic theory of signification but each also closely examines music and its extramusical associations in

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 190.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 228.
order to justify their respective arguments. Bentley even refers to the Greek musical
philosophy of “celestial harmonies” and “music of the spheres.” While his reference to
these Greek ideas might suggest his paper is really idealist in that it calls on the mimetic
quality of music, this would be an incomplete understanding. For Bentley the problem is
his use of the term mirror, a metaphor to which he applies ideas from many aesthetic
theories. The essence of what he is really trying to get at is beyond simple Platonic
mimesis. For Bentley, extramusical associations may take—mirror—whatever form they
may, be it emotional, societal, or physical, whereas Platonic mimesis is traditionally
restricted to the good alone. The point is that Bentley actively engages the reader in
thoughtful writing that relies on ideas about music found in aesthetics but does it in a way
that relates to his purpose, which is for the music teacher to be aware that music is far
more than notes on a page and should be taught with this in mind. Like Bentley,
Bergquist uses philosophical material to support a position. But unlike Bentley,
Bergquist advances a specific idea relating to a position in aesthetics. Bergquist’s work
relies on significationism and he methodically displays and connects the material of
music with extramusical associations, some of which will be addressed in the following
chapter on meaning. Bergquist’s purpose, like Bentley’s is characteristically
significationist because it calls for educators to “lead students to the wellspring in their

\[\text{\textsuperscript{120}}\text{Ibid., 226.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{121}}\text{In Bentley’s paper there are additional theoretical cues using the mirror metaphor. From
Platonic and German idealism, for example, “music not only mirrors earthly tings, but things divine are
brought into our mental vision through this medium,” which he supports with a statement from Edgar Allen
Poe (p. 229). But also echoing socioaesthetics he asserts “some of our jazz music and popular songs of the
day mirror our present social condition (p. 228). And from expressivism he borrows the notion that a
composer’s work mirrors his emotions in music (p. 228).}\]
own lives. Let them hear, use, and see, musically.”\textsuperscript{122} These are ideas that imply extramusical associations in a symbolic manner.

James Koontz also ties together ideas from signification and teaching by suggesting “Teachers can and should help students to translate these [musical] experiences into the language of feeling. One of our primary tasks is to develop the latent aesthetic sensibilities of our students to beauty in all its varied forms.”\textsuperscript{123} Koontz continues, “some of the highest and holiest concepts developed by the mind of man have their expression in the symbolism of art and music,” as such “it is imperative for us [music educators] to read and comprehend the symbolism before we can share in the experiencing of such concepts.”\textsuperscript{124} Here again ideas of underlying aesthetic theory are used with the intention to influence practice.

While there are a number of perspectives on what is entailed in the practice of music, such as listening, performing, or integrating music with other subjects in the curriculum, one of the ways learning of music that was promoted was as a creative endeavor. Often the creative program took the form of students writing their own compositions and staging musical events which showcased the work of students. During World War II Pitts even made a connection between the war and creative music. She describes the Victory Corp Project as one where “every Victory Corp School is being urged to provide its own Victory Corp song. This offers a timely and real incentive to thousands of our boys and girls…to compose such songs for their own particular

\textsuperscript{122} Bergquist, “Do We Use and See What We Hear?,” \textit{Studies in Musical Education, History and Aesthetics}, 191.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
schools.” Additionally, the Schools at War Project promoted a song-writing project that asked students to infuse in their composition the ideas of saving, serving, and conserving. This type of creative music could be critiqued by a scholar embracing socioaesthetic perspectives. To prove his point the socioaesthetician would argue the compositions of a wartime creative project shows how social and economic concerns take priority over aesthetic concerns. The Marxist’s point about endeavors such as the Schools at War Project would apply the principle of nonneutrality to prove the argument. That is “every aesthetic object of any noteworthy degree of aesthetic value has a tendency to promote, or to interfere with, our social and political goals, whatever they may be.” It is not clear, however, if student compositions had any so-called aesthetic value. Regardless, the question of whether music generated through wartime creative projects was noteworthy or even the subject of analysis by a Marxist or socioaesthetician is debatable, especially since a writer embracing the latter position roils at the suggestion that music has utility. Including the idea here does, however, force an examination of the evidence reflecting the socioaesthetic and/or Marxist view of the nature of music.

Socioaesthetics, particularly the work of Adorno, defines art as “concentrated social substance.” Art itself is, therefore, historically bound and is a product of social context. In “Recognition of Beauty Through Art, Literature, and Music” Dudley Watson argues that for art to be creative it cannot be imitative, thus he would reject what Pitts called for earlier. For Watson, “one sees in art a great struggle of youth, modern as

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126 Ibid.
everything else. Art today is a reflection of this struggle.” Cloea Thomas in “Modern Music for the Elementary Grades Children” writes

The phenomenal speed of mechanical inventions of the past sixty years and the rapidly increasing problems of social adjustment were so troubling the creative artists in all fields that the various phases of the struggle and the resulting nervousness were bound to be expressed.

She continues, “in music we recall the steady use of dissonance, in the struggle for freedom in form, the effort to express man’s reaction to the new mechanical forces in his environment, in the use of chromatics, polytonality and atonality.” Pursuing the Adorno-esque perspective in practice the teacher is to select appropriate music that has “the characteristics of the movement and [are] not too complex or too long.” By exposing the students to modern music the hope in socioaesthetic terms, was to give them “a feeling for tonal patterns and harmonies and rhythmic combinations that are particularly the vocabulary of the modernist.” It is clear from this statement how the socioaesthetic movement is a descendant of the formalist school where the emphasis is on music as an object and the focus is to be “tones and their artistic combination.”

However, it is also clear, that while the emphasis is placed on the object, the music, this music is itself a construction of history and social relations, something the formalist rejects.

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131 Ibid., 316.
132 Ibid. Examples of her specific recommendations include “Bela Bartok—Folk Harmonizations; Debussy—Golliwogs Cake Walk…Saint-Saëns Carnival of the Animals…Honneger’s Pacific 231…Hindemith’s Let’s Build a Town.”
133 Ibid.
Cultural context is at the heart of socioaesthetic doctrine, and since this is the case views associated with it are occasionally reflected in music education discourse relating to the integration of music with the rest of the school curriculum. As part of the so-called Progressive movement in education the idea surfaced in music education in the 1920s and 1930s that music should be integrated to both the life of the student and to the rest of the curriculum. To put it another way, “the child, then must also maintain his personal integrity, his sense of being, of existing as a complete whole. But he also cannot exist independently of that larger group we call organized society with which he is by nature integrated.” And in socioaesthetic parlance music, like each of the arts and sciences, is, in turn an integral part of a larger whole which we may term life, experience, or state of culture; it is intimately related with life situations; indeed, it could not exist independently of them.

While the crux of Miessner’s argument deals with the problem of maintaining music’s integrity as music, he does assent, “music is integrated experience, that it is inseparably bound up with life.” It is, therefore, incumbent upon the music teacher to enable “the children to experience music in relation to other activities in the curriculum.” But, he goes on to say this must be done in a way that maintains the identity and integrity of music. In 1948 Herold Hunt also writes about the integration of music, but in specific

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135 It could be argued that integration was, in fact, a philosophy of music education that predated the Music Education as Aesthetic Education Movement. It was thoughtfully debated and it generated all sorts of questions about the aim and purpose of education generally and music education specifically. The philosophy of integration had many who accepted it precepts and many who were less sure. The development of such an idea that integration could be considered a philosophy of music education would be another way of rejecting Mark’s claim there was no philosophy prior to the MEAE movement. In either case it is not the purpose of this dissertation to argue that integration was a philosophy of music education since the focus of this work is on aesthetic discourse in the field.


137 Ibid.

138 Ibid., 122. Italics in the original.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.
relation to the humanities courses. For him “music is truly the finest expression of beauty and it is the truest interpreter of social conditions.” It is evident from the material above that socioaesthetic perspectives share some affinity to ideas in the integration movement. Socioaesthetic views, however, are not the only ones seen relating to problems and theories on the nature of music and the subject of integration.

Integration and the nature of music are subjects that correlate with one another. It is the purpose of the nature of music to examine the necessary, and sufficient conditions for something to be labeled music and the notion of integration brings questions about the characteristics of music to the fore. Questions about the descriptions and characteristics of music are apparent in integration because music educators must, in their support or refutation of integration, show and explain how music’s characteristics make it music. Lylian Niquette Simpson, a supporter of integration and an assistant project supervisor of the Federal Music Project, argues

> Without emotion there may be craftsmanship, but not art…our responsibility as educators is to help him in his search for material which will be the right medium for working out his ideas, his feelings and emotions and to help him in the building up of an integral experience out of the interaction of organic and environmental conditions and energies.

An argument for integration from Simpson had to include what her view of a necessary and sufficient condition of music was. In this case the support for integration rested on underlying expressivist and Deweyan expressivist notions of music. Pitts offers a

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142 Lylian Niquette Simpson, “Music Study Correlated with Other Arts,” in *Yearbook of the Music Educators National Conference* (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1937), 110-111, 110. The Federal Music Project was a part of the Depression era New Deal policies of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Its purpose was to put composers, conductors, and musicians to work who, like many others, were hit especially hard by the sustained economic downturn.
143 Expressivist because music contains an emotion, and Deweyan expressivist because the emotion is brought about through a particular kind of experience.
nearly identical argument. Wanting to integrate but also maintain the integrity of music she argues, “music engages the emotions and the imagination far beyond most school experiences; therefore it induces mood and states very susceptible to aesthetic impressions.” In a piece that mentions Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Berkley, Hume, William James, and Dewey, Orville Borchers defines integration as a “dynamic unifying force in the complete fusion of a whole experience.” For him, in relating music to the “complete fusion of a whole,” and in a more cautionary manner, projects selected for integration should not view music as a mere adjunct. He argues that music must be more than a handmaiden to the other subjects because the “emotional aspect is becoming increasingly dominant in education.” Even though he does not thoroughly defend why it is only music that can bring about a particular emotional experience, he does say that music is possessed of the unique qualities of emotion, self-expression, and social relations. Not all agreed, even using expressivist support, that integration was good for the field.

Osbourne McConathy questioned the role of music in the integration movement. For him music “has a significant place of its own, a place which deserves its own cultivation apart from all other associations.” Interestingly he uses expressivism, German idealism, and Aristotelian catharsis as his defense. “We must do our part, and more than our part, to show that music still maintains its place as humanity’s great

146 Ibid., 127.
147 Ibid., 128.
148 Ibid.
spiritual and emotional expression and release.”

Also seeing music against the backdrop of integration from more than just an expressivist perspective was Nellie Zetta Thompson. Her view displays an underlying significationist bent. The core of her argument is really about the role of the teacher using music for uplift in the community. Her attempt to make the case for uplift relies in part on a specific suggestion that “literature and music can be brought into close association by studying music and literary types of elements, by viewing them as integral parts of cultural epochs, or by a topical bond.”

Although Thompson’s article is not a demanding or probing work, the evidence supports that there were underlying philosophical positions supporting statements of belief. It was, in these cases, the movement toward integration, that revealed how debate in one aspect of the discipline was a cause for argumentation using philosophical support, regardless of the degree to which the philosophical position was understood.

Discourse relating to musical aesthetics in the nature of music varied from the simplistic reflection of one or another theory to a more sophisticated awareness and incorporation of problems and theories from musical aesthetics. What is also apparent in the evidence is a lack of consensus regarding the nature of music, which should not be surprising considering philosophers themselves are not in full agreement on any subject. If philosophers and other researchers cannot agree on every aspect of a debate, why should that be expected of music educators? Much like the field of musical aesthetics, there does not appear to be any particular position that was dominant or more accepted than another among music educators on the subject of the nature of music. As a result

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150 Ibid.
151 Nellie Zetta Thompson, “Attrited or Attuned Ears?” *Music Educators Journal* 34, no. 3 (January 1948): 34, 39-50, 34.
there is little movement toward any type of agreement on the necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of a philosophical argument. It may be tempting to assume that many music educators believe very strongly that the characteristic of music can be easily uncovered. But even if this assumption were true, further analysis reveals they do not always articulate their arguments for this belief consistently. The arguments for a particular position on the nature of music exist, and in some cases they are well thought, reasoned, and systematic statements, but even in these cases the field, while “sounding together,” has not proceeded in concert. The fact that there are disparate views on the nature of music leads to the question of whether the same holds true for the categories of meaning and value.
CHAPTER 4
MEANING

The patterns that were revealed in the previous chapter on the nature of music are similar to those seen in the material on musical aesthetics from music educators on the topic of the meaning of music. That is, the discourse that included material relating to the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be labeled music were embedded in the same work that also mentions ideas relating to the interpretative and revelatory aspects credited to music. Also, the arguments in the discourse range from material that merely reflects the underlying philosophical problem or theory to arguments that show a keen awareness of musical aesthetics and use the branch of philosophy in a way to advance ideas. Finally, in terms of patterns, this time a difference between nature and meaning, there are more references to and reliance on expressivism and signification than any other set of problems or theory. This is not to say problems and theories from other philosophical systems were not part of the dialogue but rather that theories such as formalism, socioaesthetics, and German idealism were not as frequently mentioned in the papers and addresses of the time. While there are similar patterns that surfaced in the evidence on the topics of nature and meaning, like choral performance being linked with expressivist or significationist thought, there are important differences.

Distinctions between the nature and meaning of music, because of their part-whole relations, are sometimes challenging to parse out because of their interconnectedness. Differences, however, are seen. For example, an expressivist sees
the nature of music as an expression of some quality, emotion, or feeling. Music, then, is a revelation of the embodiment or objectification of emotion.\(^1\) The emotional quality allegedly invoked in the music must next be examined in terms of meaning. The emotions of say anguish or desire were either placed in the music by the composer in an attempt to convey such emotions based on his own experience, or the percipient’s state of mind is such that he interprets anguish or desire in the music. In both cases there is some type of extramusical association that has been, in part, influenced by experiences with the object of music. Whether these expressions were intended or received as such is not a point to be debated here. The example is merely to show how meaning is distinct from nature.

Even though there is some degree of relation between nature and meaning, the intent of this chapter is not to compare how the two are used. The structure from the previous chapter, however, is maintained. The first section covers material in performance based choral instruction. The next section is brief because of the limited amount of material on musical aesthetics for performance based instrumental courses. Part two of the chapter is much more extensive because there is a great deal of evidence for the non-performance based courses (although later in the time period the line is blurred between performance and non-performance based course). There is some evidence, for example, that suggests music appreciation begins to shift from being primarily a listening based course to one where listening has an added musical participation component. In other instances evidence coming from the performance based course documents show a shift to broaden musical understanding by infusing

\(^1\) Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, 327.
elements of appreciation into rehearsal. The evidence for the generalized topics section is vast. First, however, is the section on topics covering choral performance.

Performance Based Courses - Chorus

Significationist perspectives vary, but each rests on the notion that extramusical connections are not only necessary and sufficient but also help in making meaning. Included in significationist arguments are points of view that music is “an iconic sign of psychological processes. It ‘articulates’ or ‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does so by presenting auditory equivalents of some structural or kinetic aspects of that life.”

Musical meaning can, therefore, be symbolically related to the “rhythm of life.” Another perspective relating to signification is the fusion theory in which it is argued there is correspondence between the words in a piece of music and the music itself. The meaning of music is subsumed by text. Fusion theory places verbal language in a privileged position in front of the music. Beyond the basic elements of fusion theory are arguments that suggest music has its own vocabulary. In this theory the music is what expresses meaning through chord progressions and certain tonal combinations. For example, a “minor second [means] spiritless anguish, context of finality.”

So, in addition to meaning being revealed as symbolic of psychological processes, connection and correspondence to language and meaning is also a topic covered in signification theory.

Music educators from 1907 to 1958 who conducted choruses in the school setting and/or spoke about particular aspects of choral music and choruses in the school setting both reflected ideas from signification theory and used significationist thought to advance their own arguments in relation to meaning. One remarkable example of a work that has

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2 Ibid., 333.
3 Cooke The Language of Music, 90.
the question of the meaning of music at its core is Miessner’s 1912 paper “The Child Voice in Song Interpretation.” In this paper, Miessner delves into the practice of teaching choral music relying on perspectives from musical aesthetics. Throughout the work he reflects ideas from German idealism and expressivism, and at one point he even quotes Ferruccio Busoni’s “Sketch of a New Esthetic of Music.” It is near the end of his paper where he directly advances ideas from fusion theory in the teaching of song. He asserts

We must lead children first of all to grasp the poetic thought, to determine the mood, atmosphere or setting...we must teach children how to determine which phrases express mood, which WORDS express color, action, feeling, and how to EXPRESS WITH THEIR FACES, as well as with their voices, the fuller and deeper meaning of these key words. The tonal beauty of a language, its color value, lies almost wholly in its vowel elements, while its consonant elements give meaning, character, and express dramatic intensity.4

By way of illustrating what he meant by the above statement Miessner included the following material:

| a | in far (distance) | m | in mother (tenderness) |
| a | in awe (reverence) | m | in mighty (power) |
| a | in May (brightness) | d | in dearest (affection) |
| a | in praise (worship) | d | in death (bereavement) |
| a | in afraid (fear) | s | in sailing (pleasure) |
| e | in cheer (happiness) | s | in sorrow (sadness) |
| e | in deceived or grieve (disappointment) | sh | expressing sympathy |
| o | in glow (warmth) | sh | expressing impatience |
| o | in cold (coldness) | f | in fair (beauty) |
| oo | in true (faithfulness) | f | in fierce (ugliness) |
| oo | in brooding (gladness) | |

For Miessner there is correspondence between the “character of the text and the music.”6

These extramusical associations both aid in understanding and enhance the quality of performance.

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4 Miessner, “The Child Voice in Song Interpretation,” 34. Capitalized words in the original
5 Ibid., 34.
Fusion theory continued to underpin the work of a number of music educators during this period. Mabelle Glenn writes

the song content should always influence the tone…the lilt of the poem has its influence on ‘lifting’ the tone. Selecting the climactic phrases and picking out the important words in each phrase help in building up in the minds of children in the intermediate grades a feeling for measure accent, phrasing and tone color.²

Ralph Peterson argues in 1937 for “making our singers conscious of beautiful speech will serve as a desirable short cut to more expressive singing.”⁸ Support for his thesis is generated from a philosophical issue mentioned at the beginning of his paper.

No matter how fine and resonant the tone, how excellent the dynamics, the product is still poor singing if the singer has nothing to say. Herein lies the crucial problem of vocal expression, for the supreme purpose of singing is just that—expression—expression of what? Not words alone, but of ideas, emotions, thought, impressions.

For him, “the verbal and the musical ideas must fit into a unified whole—they must match, otherwise one nullifies the effect of the other.”¹⁰ Hollis Dann echoes a similar position and also includes other aspects from significationist thought. “The soloist, the chorus, must react to the emotional stimuli of words and music, must feel the rhythmic swing, the surge of tone, the thrill of the climax; must dramatize the story, sense the humor and pathos of the text.”¹¹ Alice Inskeep, in recalling the choral conducting of William Tomlins, remembers the “stress he placed on thought in tone, vital, dramatic,

⁶ Ibid.
⁹ Ibid., 278.
¹⁰ Ibid.
interpretive expression of the text, and words making up the text.” She continues by elaborating on an idea central to fusion theory. Her example is “last night it was so cold, but that means nothing unless you prolong your vowel as c-o-l-d. Something is far off, yet not so far unless you prolong the vowel and say it was so f-a-r off.” Each of these scholars clearly adopts a significationist position in terms of meaning and does so in an effort to influence practice and vocal performance.

Pursuing musical understanding through practice and performance generated debate among music educators. Much of the evidence reflects one of two views. The first is that emphasis in music education should be placed on building proper technique for a solid performance. The second view considers emphasis on technical aspects of musical performance alone to be incomplete music education. Thinkers identifying with the second view tend to support ideas about music education which encompass not only a technically sound performance that includes achieving high standards of musical reproduction but also other elements relating to musical understanding such as what the music allegedly reveals. George Howerton was a music educator who embraced the second view of music education. He decries what he sees as “our tendency toward overemphasis on performance” and asserts “we are attaching much too great an importance on technique.” Instead of overemphasizing superior technical performance Howerton argues, “There should be an indication that the singer has some perception at least of the inner content of the text.” For him, “technique and emotional expression

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13 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
must be combined.”16 Echoing Howerton’s sentiments is Ivivine Shields who writes, “it is not the reading of the music, but the reading of something into it that counts.”17 Shields provides an example of what is meant by the above statement. Describing a rehearsal led by Arturo Toscanini, Shields tells the story of how the noted conductor used the imagery of a handkerchief floating to the ground for how he wanted the ensemble’s tone to float.18

It is a Los Angeles high school teacher who also ties together practice, signification, and the second view of music education. Olga Sutherland asserts the “task facing the voice teacher of the high school student is that of developing in him the ability to interpret his music.”19 Her suggestions for how to accomplish the task of getting a student to “interpret his music” relies on views borrowed from signification theory such as kinetic pattern, psychological processes and an association with language. Her first step is creating the mood, which the teacher would do by playing a song in its entirety.20 For her, “there must be a feeling of movement in the song from beginning to end for continuity. Where moods change within the song, the singer must convey that thought.”21 The next step for the teacher is to work on phrasing. Here Sutherland suggests, “the musical phrase usually coincides with a thought or sentence. It is very important that the student think in terms of sentences and not in single words.”22 Lastly for Sutherland is the topic of imagination. She calls for the singer to “live his song” so

16 Ibid., 332.
18 Ibid., 351.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
that he “re-create it in the mind of the listener. (The song is a drama without action, a picture without paint).” Sutherland’s methods reflect various elements of signification in order to advance a view that musical performance is much more than flawless technique.

Choral performance being much more than simply notes and markings on a score is not only expressed by those advancing or reflecting significationist thought. Expressivism and German idealism also convey that there is a deeper meaning to music. In 1912 Alexander Henneman argues that while scientific knowledge of how tones are produced by the human anatomy has led to advances in the field, it is a mistake to make this the sole basis for how music is taught. His argument reverberates with material from the debate between those espousing technical perfection for performance and those who think of music as a grander affair packed with significance. Combining ideas from expressivism and German idealism Henneman argues, “Music, more than all other arts…expresses feeling. The voice being the most human of all instruments, reveals like nothing else, our soul states.”

Clippinger like Henneman argues that, aesthetically speaking, there is much more in “Training of a Singer” than vocal methods alone. As mentioned in chapter three Clippinger brings together several philosophical perspectives in his paper. Here, expressivist and German idealist views on meaning are seen in his argument. Clippinger asserts feeling and nothing else is the “material of the singer’s art.” Taking the expressivist argument practically verbatim, he continues by stating,

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23 Ibid., 359.
“The singer evokes within himself feelings which he has experienced and by means of his voice transfers these feelings to others.” Phrasing is Clippinger’s answer for how feelings are apparently transferred from the singer. Clippinger’s use of meaning is in one sense straightforward in that it is achieved through a reliance on vocabulary. In a less direct way meaning also transcends dictionary like references. Drawing on Hegelian thought Clippinger argues

By means of imagination we take the materials of experience and mold them into idealized forms…every song has an atmosphere, a metaphysical something which differentiates it from every other song. The singer must discover it and find the mood which will perfectly express it…the song is that which comes from the soul of the singer, it is not in the printed page.

Clippinger’s view on meaning and music supports an important though subtle argument in his paper which is for music education—specifically relating to singing—to “develop the spirituality and imagination” of students. His views remain consistent on meaning, which are seen again in an address he gives in 1925, “Collective Voice Training.” In relating meaning to practice he writes

The pure singing tone is one that may be used to express all normal, healthful emotions; such as joy, freedom, courage, affection, sympathy, revereance (sic), etc. You will observe that these are all mental qualities, and the tone necessary to express them must be firm, steady, full, rich, resonant, and sympathetic.

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 97
28 Ibid., 99. Clippinger cites Hegel in his paper.
29 Ibid., 100.
30 D.A. Clippinger, “Collective Voice Training,” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference, Eighteenth Annual Meeting Kansas City, MO March 30 – April 3, 1925 (Privately printed, 1925), 56-64, 59. This phrase is nearly identical to the one used in his 1914 Address. Additionally Clippinger mentions he studied aesthetics more or less seriously for twenty five years p. 57 and his explanation of the aesthetic sense is “the sense of discrimination and judgment,” the basis of what we call artistic taste, p. 57 which holds to a tradition in aesthetics that it is the study of how and on what basis such judgments can be made. In other words his statements explicitly show he had, in fact, studied and understood aesthetics, an idea that subverts current interpretations of the writing that occurred during this time.
Choral music and choral music instruction as a means of revealing emotions or some other extramusical association as argued in signification theory was not limited to this kind of musical performance alone.

Performance Based Courses – Band, Orchestra, and Individual Instrument Classes

Ideas from expressivism and significationism are seen throughout the period in conjunction with the instrumental practice and performance. Russell Morgan began his 1926 address “Musical Perception and the Orchestra” by defining musical perception. According to Morgan it is “a process of acquiring an accurate mental image of musical composition. This image…includes melody, harmony, rhythm, form, beauty of tone, and interpretation.”31 In relation to music and meaning “these elements are foundational in building thorough musical understanding on the part of the student.”32 Clearly, Morgan believes meaning and interpretation is something that can be understood, and it is therefore important for the teacher to bring these ideas out in the process of instruction. To achieve this lofty goal of musical interpretation the teacher must understand “interpretation depends first upon a concept that is clear-cut in all details.”33 What Morgan insists is that the elements of a piece of music must reside in both the music and mind of the performer. For example, a melody must be present and clearly distinguished. Once all of the elements contained in the concepts are comprehended and absorbed by the performer “freedom begins.”34 The teacher must consciously encourage the student to do more than simply play the notes; he must help the student construct the so-called mental

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32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 225. The concept of interpretation in its “clear-cut details” includes the things Morgan mentions above such as melody, harmony, form, beauty of tone.
34 Ibid.
image. Morgan relies heavily on the notion that there is something that is expressed so much so that he concludes his paper by asserting that the development of musical perception from contact with the work of the great master acts as a catalyst for a student’s own self-expression. Morgan’s purpose in the address is in line with those music educators mentioned earlier who believe it is important to develop musicians rather than “performers who are not musicians at all, but musical mechanics.” While philosophical in substance Morgan’s arguments do not adequately get at what is to be expressed other than a few passages which are primarily formalist. To put it another way, what Morgan asserts is that in order to be a true musician, you must be able to interpret the music beyond the notes printed on the page. However, the only support he uses to identify what is to be interpreted and expressed are ideas like various instruments trading parts in the overall melodic flow, an idea which is valid but not consistent with the way he uses the term art expression.

Not all philosophical discussions were as ambiguous on expressivism as the one above given by Morgan. In 1954 Melvin Bernasconi wrote a paper for the Music Educators Journal titled “Instrumental Music and the Philosophy of Music Education.” Bernasconi’s paper is the application of Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience applied to the instrumental class. Showing Dewey’s thoughts in action Bernasconi makes it a

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 226
38 Ibid., 224.
39 Ibid., 225. His implicit use of art expression is packed with more than mere dynamics or simply one group of instruments fading into the background while another instrument is highlighted, but he does not take the time to explain it more than this.
point to contrast the former’s emphasis on experience with what traditional philosophy counts as knowledge. He writes

the student must learn technique to play music. The classicist would say that accumulation of facts represents knowledge per se in connection with the goal and that it requires no immediate application to a present purpose; that the function of mind in regard to this matter is to collect information. The experimentalist, relating learning to human beings, conceives of the mind as the intentional interaction of a person with himself and his environment.  

Meaning is then bound up in the immediate experience, that is, the doing and undergoing of ensemble members “where ends are contingent, contextual, related and in process.”

Meaning is in the process, and “these children know what to do on the basis of what they have done and want to do as a result of that background of doing.” Although Bernasconi’s statements differ from other expressivists on the subject of meaning in the sense that he seeks to explain how meaning is made, it still leaves open what that meaning might be. The indefinite nature of Bernasconi’s work is more intentional than in Morgan’s because by applying Dewey’s notions of an experience, meaning is not a fixed point. Bernasconi’s writing is also intentionally meant to influence practice, and it does so by advancing a particular philosophical position to achieve this goal.

Articulating a philosophical position is often the result of much concentration and thought. The material relating to instrumental performance, while rooted in philosophy mainly reflected the problems and theories of musical aesthetics. For example, Harold Friedman argues. “we can teach music as a language, using the piano as the medium of

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41 Ibid., 49.
42 Ibid.
its expression.” Scruton would undoubtedly cringe at Friedman’s suggestion that “all elements of language have their counterparts in music.” His rationalization of signification and structural theory is, nevertheless, plain to see. He asserts the child is “taught to recognize word groups in sentences. He then builds up a vocabulary, learns spelling, enunciation, sentence structure, grammar, etc…we should follow a similar course in music.”

The music and language association takes on a different form regarding instrumental music than what was seen in the previous section on choral music. The examples from choral music made use of fusion theory while the example immediately above from Friedman and what follows below echo the structural similarities noted by Scruton. Donald March, in contributing his view on musicianship from the view of an instrumental music practitioner, states, “Music is a language, and we must help our students to extract intelligent meaning from its sentences.” Furthermore, the teacher should carefully direct “attention to such considerations as where a phrase really ends, whence it is derived, why a note is stressed or why we must make a false accent here, we shall develop taste, imagination and musical insight in our pupils.” Notice the links with the structural elements of language, the notion of a phrase and how to separate more important items from the rest of the material. March’s example is also another case where an underlying idea from musical aesthetics is used to influence practice.

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44 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
References to music as language, or the universal language are quite common in music education discourse; these examples show that some music educators thought about the connection between the two.

Instrumentalist performance papers reflecting and advancing ideas of signification and expressive theories might seem slightly surprising since several of the views on the nature of music were formalist. Upon further analysis, however, the fact that there were so few formalist perspectives on the instrumental side of performance should not be astonishing. The lack of formalist perspectives is not surprising because the formalist would simply assert there are no extramusical associations. So, while others are apt to go on about meaning in terms of expression or association with language, the formalist scoffs at such suggestions. The writing of the formalist in terms of meaning is mainly as a rejection of extramusical claims. The burden of proof remains on the expressivist or significationist and so the formalist is mute. The characteristics of the discourse on musical aesthetics from the period, however, are such that compatibility between and among various theories and the associated problems was not always consistent. Whether this is the result of trying to provide answers to the many questions in the field of music education or that the philosophical positions were not carried to their logical conclusions is not clear. What is evident is that multiple philosophical prospective were seen in the work of these writers and thinkers.

Philosophical ideas reflected or advanced in this section on the meaning of music in performance based courses are of a type that is meant to guide and influence practice. That is, there is necessarily discussion that pairs ideas from significationism or expressivism with vocal and instrumental education. Writers on the meaning of music
debated the importance of performance techniques in relation to what many concluded was far more than just flawless technical reproduction of the markings on the score. The efforts of these thinkers was to advance an idea that authentic musicianship involves interpreting and revealing thoughts and ideas of the composer and his music. Whether the revelation came in the form of a choral or band director linking music with language or a particular emotion, the important thing was that meaning and performance were bound to each other.

**Non-Performance Based Courses – Appreciation, Theory, Harmony, and Music History**

Meaning’s relation to performance, an idea held by many of the aforementioned scholars, was not limited to just the performance based paper topics. As a matter of fact there is far more evidence from the non-performance based course papers and topics generalized to the whole field regarding the meaning of music. I am not suggesting that one path to get at meaning in music is superior to another—performing or listening—but am simply stating meaning was a topic addressed philosophically during the period by music educators and the majority of the evidence comes from the non(explicitly)-performance based material. Numerical support for this statement is straightforward. There were nearly twenty papers etc. that reflected or advanced philosophical positions on meaning from the performance based choral material. During the same period there were nearly 120 on topics meant for the whole of music education in the public schools. Clearly meaning was an important and often discussed subject in music education discourse from 1907 to 1958.

Music educators talked about issues related to meaning that were not related to performance. Some of the conversations were about the music generally and the
experience of interacting with music in a setting that did not necessarily involve singing or playing an instrument. Even without trying to explain meaning in relation to performance, the work of these scholars still relied a great deal on expressivist and significationist thought. Still further, it is in this section that there is much more questioning regarding meaning and music educators probed questions in a deeper fashion. To put it another way, the manner in which and the frequency of authors questioning expressivism or significationism or the work of a specific writer on musical aesthetics was increasingly present. There was also slightly more consistency within works in the sense of sticking to and accepting a particular philosophical perspective on meaning. In other words, on the topic of how music was to be interpreted there was less vacillation from expressivism to formalism, for example, in the same paper, although this is still seen regularly. If an author looked at meaning from the significationist perspective, the concepts and ideas from that theory or the problems associated with it were often carried throughout the work. While there may have been a greater degree of consistency, there was still not any disciplinary consensus. However, it is very clear in this section that signification and expressive theories were where most music educators sought explanations for music’s meaning.

Writing on music’s meaning in non-performance based courses, which often had listening and the analysis of music as primary paths to understanding music, reflected many of the characteristics listed above such as an emphasis on signification and expressivist views, but other theoretical perspectives also exist. Additionally it is in this section that more debate about meaning emerges.
At the 1914 MSNC meeting held in Minneapolis, MN, Theo Fitz delivered a paper called “The Appreciation of Music in the Grades” in which he included examples of voice placement using a children’s choir and diagrams sketched on a blackboard.\textsuperscript{48} Unfortunately no written record could be found of the content and points made by Fitz, but another paper was given by Mary Conway after his, and the subsequent discussion of her work, against the backdrop of the Fitz work, consumed the rest of that particular afternoon session. The substance of this discussion shows that these early music educators were aware of problems with meaning in music.

The first discussant, Agnes Freyberger [sic], gives an example she used in her classes where the children listened to the song \textit{Chanticleer} by Elizabeth Wheeler.\textsuperscript{49} The children respond to the words and ideas in the song and arrive at the conclusion that \textit{Chanticleer} is a rooster.\textsuperscript{50} Although this is signification on a very basic level, it does show that at an early age children are taught to think that there is a story to music, that there are necessarily extramusical associations. After an exchange between Fryberger and Eckert on musical understanding in which the former suggested it could be achieved through listening and the latter said it was necessary to also participate through playing and singing, Peter Dykema chimed in. In his very brief response he offers a challenge to the significationist perspective using a formalist argument. He says,

\begin{quote}
This particular piece played had no more suggestion of ‘butterflies,’ to me than a group of children dancing at a May party—absolutely no more of one than of the
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{49} Agnes Fryberger was the Assistant Supervisor of Music to Thaddeus Giddings in the Minneapolis schools. Her name was misspelled by the person recording the addresses – the correct spelling is Fryberger.

other. To me it was absolutely false to try to find butterflies in that thing…we must not get into the false notion that a literal interpretation of music is true musical appreciation.\textsuperscript{51}

Immediately following Dykema’s statement is another given by Charles Farnsworth who also shows problems with signification but more from the position of an expressivist. Farnsworth relates an experiment he tried while at Columbia’s Teachers College. In the experiment art student’s listened to piano pieces composed by Chopin and a minuet by Paderewski.\textsuperscript{52} The students were then asked to draw what they felt the music meant to them.\textsuperscript{53} The results showed that while the art could be classified according to the two pieces

no two subjects were alike; there was everything imaginable,–merely showing that while the story has nothing to do with it, the mood has everything to do with it. When you play a piece and tell the child the story, you are limiting that mood to your own interpretation, and I think that is wrong.\textsuperscript{54}

Differing views on the subject of music’s meaning continued throughout the period of study.

Dykema and Farnsworth along with others questioned signification theory. This theory was not the only one questioned and/or supported. Expressivist and formalist doctrines had their share of critics and supporters. Sudie William adopts an expressivist stance on meaning in her 1920 address. She says, “we must impress on the minds of the pupils the fact that music is a form of human expression—one of the ways thought is


\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
conveyed from one person to another.” She relates an example of a boy listening to pieces being played at a music contest. He was apparently so moved by the experience he declared that the contest made him love music.

For the first time it dawned on me that it [music] had a meaning—that it was not merely a jumble of sounds. In studying the motives and themes and how they were used to express the composer’s thought, it flashed upon me as it had never done before that it all meant something.

Williams’ use of this example shows that meaning lies somewhere outside music though she does not develop the idea any further.

Fryberger’s comments on formalism and expressivism are evident; they also show her thoughts on the matter of meaning had been refined since her earlier 1914 address. By 1920 she argued, “the mere reading of notes will not make one think of what he hears…merely singing is not an end in itself. The process is too formal, and one knows the danger of formalism.”

Although it is not wholly clear what problems exist with formalism and as such it is difficult to determine what she truly means when using it, it is apparent that meaning is derived from expressivist and/or significationist thought. Fryberger suggests the music appreciation teacher read songs and song books and ask a few questions when performing an evaluation of such work. The third question undoubtedly relies on fusion theory and significationist thought: “Does the music bring out the meaning of the words?” Her analysis continues on the next page where she

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Agnes Fryberger “Music Appreciation as Related to the Curriculum” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference, Thirteenth Annual Meeting Philadelphia, PA March 22 – March 26, 1920 (Privately printed, 1920), 57-61, 58. While I do not think she is referring solely to formalism in the sense Hanslick used it, there is an indication that implies this philosophical position, namely that note reading alone and analysis of the notes themselves is far too sterile in the understanding of music. She may also be referring to a very rigid manner of teaching students to sing.
discusses some objective ideas about music such as the “character of its motion (or rhythm); the appeal of its melody; the distinctive force of its harmony; the noticeable features of its structure and form.”\textsuperscript{59} There is for her, however, a subsequent step. It is the next step that is more subjective and ties in ideas from expressivism. “One may always ask after hearing music: What emotion does it stir? What lines of thought are aroused? What imagination does it provoke? In short, what did the piece mean to you?”\textsuperscript{60} What she expects of the appreciation student is to make intelligent comment on the music from both an objective and subjective determination. In relation to the subjective, her point is what is expressed is personal and specific emotions are difficult to get at. So, while she accepts the expressivist position that there is an emotional response in the listener, she also asks, “who shall say what the composer had in mind when he created a certain piece of music?”\textsuperscript{61} Fryberger’s views are interesting because she accepts certain notions from both formalism and expressivism while questioning others from those identical theories. She accepts the idea that there are certain elements of music that can only be assessed in terms of what they are as music, rhythm, melody, harmony, etc. At the same time, however, she says there is a subjective element which places meaning outside the music, something the formalist rejects. Curiously enough, while she accepts the idea there is an emotional response by the listeners, she questions the extent to which it has anything to do with the composer.

Frances Clark also straddles the line by questioning the formalist position on meaning and does so in her 1924 address “Music Appreciation of the Future.” She

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
asserts “music itself is more than its technique, or its mathematics.” Yet earlier, in developing a significationist position that rhythm, melody and tone color mirror aspects of daily life, she says of melody that

the bits and fragments of melody called motive and theme that furnish the colored threads of the pattern the composer weaves, whether simple or intricate, whether a blanket or dull drab or a riot of Basket colors…it always rests upon a definite theme or central melodic figure. Her characterization of melody is significationist e.g. “Basket colors” and the elements of music mirroring aspects of daily life, but the idea’s foundation is formalist e.g. “it always rests upon a definite theme or central melodic figure.” She continues to embrace both perspectives later in the paper, much like Fryberger. Clark asserts, “from simple song form and dance form through the suite to the sonata form and the analysis of the symphony, the study of form lies in the immediate field of intelligent listening.” This analysis of form for Clark is a necessary requisite of “Music Understanding, or still better—Music Consciousness.” It cannot be neglected, however, to mention again the end of her address where she quotes T.T. Munger who wrote, “emotion is the summit of existence, and music is the summit of emotion—the art pathway to God.” The synthesis of significationist, expressivist, and formalist views of Fryberger and Clark reveal the complexity in musical aesthetics. It is very difficult to maintain one perspective, and attempts to do so are often the subject of intense scrutiny. This complexity also reveals something about music itself, namely that efforts to describe its nature and meaning place boundaries on something that is abstract and multi-elemental.

63 Ibid., 274.
64 Ibid., 275.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 278. Clark does not cite the Munger quote.
In other words, music can be object or experience or phenomenon, or something else entirely, and attempts define it or get at what it reveals, if anything at all, can at best be merely analyzed from a particular standpoint.

Music educators continued to debate ideas relating to meaning throughout the period and the problems these debates consisted of recurred. From the address mentioned in the previous chapter by Dunham is material from the discussion that followed his address. S.M. Cate wonders about an issue she has observed in music education and in her inquiry questions the significationist position on meaning. Cate writes

It seems to me the idea of a story is very much carried out in the grades, and I want to know, does so much emphasizing of the story get the child into a frame of mind where it thinks whenever a piece of music is played there has to be a story connected with it?  

Mohler’s immediate reply to Cate was, “there is never a story in music only when there is one. There is always some beauty of form and some beauty of melody…you can’t have beauty without form, you can’t have form without content.” While Dunham does not mention if form can be separated from content, Mohler’s comments are firm in asserting the two cannot be. Unfortunately, neither scholar fully explains what the content is, which would be of great help in making a determination about meaning. For example, if something is written in sonata form, what does the content of that form mean? How is the argument made and justified or supported? Does the fact that music might be written in such a form as a sonata have any bearing on its meaning? Mohler would say yes, but without detailed elaboration on content, it is difficult to be sure. The closest Mohler gets

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to the relation of form and content is to suggest that “a selection of music” can generate reflection based in experience for a student, and once this happens “the substance matter of the music” aligns with “a necessary response in the children.”  

At this point he introduces the idea of symbolic content and music in order to try to make a connection between form and content. Using the work of Robert Schumann as an example he asserts the composer, through observing the play and activity of his children, “caught the rhythmic motives that represented their activities, and he holds them in these melodies.” So, while Mohler rejects the idea of a specific story being attached to every piece of music, he accepts that there is symbolic content that is rooted in form. Even though Mohler’s argument is not a tight argument, it is at least an example of material from musical aesthetics permeating a discussion in music education that shows how philosophical ideas underpinned and advanced debate.

The complexity of music and the supposed meaning it has draws people to comment on the subject rather than having the opposite effect. Attempts to comprehend music continued and continued in relation to the problems with a solely formalist position. Again, from Bergquist’s “Harmony Alive” is his notion that “mere facts, rules about parallel fifths, octaves, augmented seconds, etc. are not inspirational.” His basic premise is to make harmony a relevant and exciting class endeavor. To achieve his lofty aim of making “harmony alive” he relies on the significationist parallel between music and the structural elements of language. At first the student is “to find an idea in tones, balance if [sic] with another. With every question (antecedent phrase) find an answer

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69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid.  
(the consequent phrase)...as one sentence is completed add a contrast, then return to the first, the simple Ternary form.”

The next step in his language/music relation presages the significationist work of Deryck Cooke’s *The Language of Music* by 33 years.

Bergquist argues, “in intervals we find interesting moods’ in thirds, sixths, and open fifths, we find much emotional desire; in augmented seconds and Dim. Fourths, etc. we find pathetic melodic effects.” On the surface, to many musicians and music educators teaching appreciation, the ideas Bergquist advances on the relation of language and music make sense.

Willys Peck Kent was desirous of music teachers doing more to teach music understanding. In his 1915 address “Music for Every Man: Suggestions for Courses in Music Appreciation” one of the topics he spoke about was “the Analogy between the *Spoken Language* and *Music.*” Peck’s analysis begins

> we find in language many onomatopoetic words, whistle, boom, mew; and in music we find one, namely thunder; this is probably the only one, for the other sounds of nature the composers try to introduce into their music are so badly misrepresented that we have to be told what they mean...so music is but slightly concerned with the imitative word.

He continues “we find in language *Arbitrary Words,* apple, boat, etc. and in music the arbitrary motives of Wagner; the only way one can know what these mean, in nearly all cases is to be told.” It is his third comparison between music and spoken language that most closely aligns with what Beardsley calls kinetic patters or kinetic qualities, which

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72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 257. Bergquist’s 1926 work post dates an earlier 1921 address to the MTNA where he also aligns musical ideas with language. I reference this other paper in the main body of the paper in the section on generalized topics to the field.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid. Italics in the original
are typical in significationist descriptions on meaning. His assessment of this third group of words “which express an idea in terms of another unrelated idea” is that “music makes very little effort to accurately describe concrete things, but aims only to arouse in the listener such a feeling as those things would arouse were they present.” The best that music can do is to “express motions, and emotions, without any definite representation.” To reinforce his point he introduces a formalist counter-argument to the idea of music representing anything in a definite way. “If the musician is inclined to point the finger in scorn at such efforts, the Futurist has only to reply:--listen to MacDowell’s Wild Rose; can you hear the five petals? Do those sound pink to you?” Therefore, the best music can do in terms of meaning is approximate kinetic patterns, which is a view in line with significationists such as Langer.

Questions about signification and meaning, especially in the relation of words and music continued in the period. Always eager to question the significationist point of view, Earhart, in his “The Roots of Music Appreciation,” asserts the goal of “beauty and purity of tone…is easier in connection with instrumental music, because in vocal music story telling or emotionally charged words constantly beckon toward other effects.” On expression he writes, “as a function of art [it] is the subject of endless debate among aestheticians…all agree that any work of art seems somehow to be expressive. The difficulty begins when we ask what is expressed.” But at the end of his paper he takes a Langerian tack when it comes to generating some kind of answer about meaning. He suggests “We yield ourselves to the symphony and are borne forth on its current. The

77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Earhart, “The Roots of Music Appreciation,” 22
81 Ibid.
journey will not be uneventful, but every question raised will be answered, every tempest encountered be won through, every expectation, every yearning, satisfied.”

Although he appears to be inconsistent here since much of his work had a formalist slant particularly when it came to the nature of music, Earhart clings to a view that holds a sense of mystery and reverence for music. In this light his questioning of significationist and expressivist thought are tools used to work out his own understanding of music’s nature, meaning, and value.

In a similar philosophical manner, Kate Mueller studies how to better train and measure the ability of the listener. One of the challenges she faced in designing tests to better understand music and musical form was “the part played by words in the development of musical ideas and music appreciation.”

For her, divorcing explanations about music and what music means from verbal utterances is nearly impossible. This idea about a necessary connection between words and music poses significant challenges for the significationist and formalist. In her paper it is not so much that she disbelieves ideas inherent in significationist and formalist thought, but her beliefs of how humans developed language historically to explain our experiences make the problem of any relation between the two difficult to solve. Her grasp of the problem is sound, and she explains it in a direct manner. On the subject of the relation of words and musical ideas being debatable she writes, “Some argue that music cannot be described in words, and that the attempt to do so befuddles the mind.”

For this group “music must be understood ‘directly’ as pure perception, without any intermediary symbols from another

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82 Ibid., 57.
84 Ibid.
This idea is akin to Hanslick’s notion that “musical content is nothing but the audible tonal forms...music has content, but musical content” and Langer’s idea that music is the “tonal analogue of emotive life.” The formalist and the Langerian significationist have similar views here because each does not think “statements about musical meaning can be reduced to descriptions.” It is on the point of the kind of “description” where the formalist and linguistic significationist differ because the latter says these kinds of verbal descriptions using “symbols from another avenue” are possible and required. The counter argument to the notion of direct understanding purely perceived is “when we lack proper words to use as symbols for manipulating and communicating our experiences it is doubtful if the experience is precise or vivid or clear to us.” Therefore, it is necessary to rely on words for descriptions of music and what it may mean. Mueller writes, “to acquire any other system of symbolization for ordering one’s thoughts would be even more difficult than learning a new language, a foreign vocabulary and grammar.” All of these thoughts on music and language of course pose challenges for the teaching of music appreciation. Therefore, she acknowledges that since the time has not come when youth are “habituated in the use of kinesthetic perceptions or other types of visual or auditory perceptions, color, shape, pitch or tone...children and amateurs who want to understand the music of their times have perforce to learn about it through words.” Mueller’s statements show a keen awareness of matters addressed in musical aesthetics. She was not alone in thinking matters in

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85 Ibid.
86 Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 332.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., 7.
aesthetics were important in music education, especially in non-performance based courses.

In 1938 Vincent Jones called for “advanced courses” on a number of topics in music, one being “criticism and aesthetics of music.” 90 The substantive material of musical aesthetics was undoubtedly a component of the discourse. The frequency of material containing substance on topics from musical aesthetics more than trebled in the papers and addresses that music educators geared toward the entire field as compared to the three areas mentioned thus far. While some of the statements and perspectives mirror the ideas already shown, there is slightly more diversity in this last section with theories present here but not in the evidence related to the performance and non-performance courses. 91

Generalized Topics and Integration

1907 was year one for the conference that became the Music Educators National Conference. Topics of discussion at the first conference in Keokuk, Iowa were varied although they generally were geared toward improving music instruction in terms of methods used to develop the technical aspects of music making. Music educators discussed teaching music making and continued the ongoing debate, from the nineteenth century, of rote singing versus music reading (rote versus note). Molnar cites Philip C. Hayden’s “Rhythm Forms Demonstration” the latter of whom referred to C.A. Fullerton’s presentation at the first meeting where he made a connection between “the

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91 There are numerous works that I could have addressed in the body of this work. The documents used include a range of material from the very basic to the sophisticated, similar to what was found in the historical data.
teaching of music reading and the teaching of reading words.” Molnar states Fullerton “urged that the pupil be taught to grasp the meaning of the words and music of the song, rather than to rattle off meaningless notes and syllables.” In 1912 Karl Gehrkens recognized that while songs are “based on an interesting story or description,” he also wanted students to understand the importance rhythm and the beauty of music as necessary to music making. Associations between words and stories and music were part of the discussion in the early years of the conference.

In 1921 Bergquist examined the connection between language and music. He extends his elaboration on the relation of music to language to include specific examples of what music allegedly says. His purpose is to help teachers give students the ability “to see, to recognize, and to analyze what we hear in order to thoroughly understand.” As such, “the vision of music as a language should not be lost sight of.” He provides a practical example for teaching understanding by posing a problem to a hypothetical class: “what is music made of and how is it made?” His explanation to get the class started is that “music is a language, the universal language, the most comprehensive means of expression. What do we express in music? Our emotions, our feelings.”

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93 Ibid.
95 Components of this paper are seen again in his 1928 work “Harmony Alive” in the MSNC Journal of Proceedings 255-258.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 183.
99 Ibid.
then asked to give examples of feeling while the teacher sits at the piano “and improvise[s] on the words suggested.” Bergquist then asks the class to express themselves musically. What Bergquist establishes here is the expressivist position in the teaching of music. This expressivist position, however, is not the only idea taken from musical aesthetics, so too does he borrow from signification theory. It is his use of the latter theory that is remarkable because his ideas presage the work of Cooke and some basic elements seen in Langer’s philosophy.

In *The Language of Music* Cooke argues there is a vocabulary of music that contains meaning. He provides examples such as “minor second:…spiritless anguish, context of finality; major second:…pleasurable longing, context of finality; minor third:…stoic acceptance, tragedy; major third:…joy; etc.” Bergquist, 38 years earlier than Cooke, proposes a “dictionary of intervals” for the student to use in writing appreciation, and understanding of music. It is necessary to insert an extensive quotation here to in order to capture the depth and fullness of his suggestions. Bergquist argues

A major second,…an active combination, wants to be continued, suggests trouble, restless, uncertain, asking, anxious; an harmonic and melodic interval. An augmented second,…taken melodically in its key setting arouses a feeling of lonesomeness, of anguish, a questioning character…A major third,…restful kindly, peaceful, quiet, a question (why)…the diminished fourth harmonically indefinite, melodically a most expressive interval, a pleading character.

What may be the most telling connection between the two works is not that one predated the other but the differences in the so-called vocabulary. Notice the example of major second and major third. For Bergquist the major second suggests “trouble, restless, uncertain, asking, anxious.” The same interval according to Cooke suggests a

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100 Ibid.
101 Cooke’s *The Language of Music*, 90
102 Bergquist, “Do We Use and See What We Hear?” 184-185.
“pleasurable longing.” The interval of the major third suggests for Bergquist a sense of peaceful and quiet contemplation while for Cooke it is simply joy. And it is the differences in the supposed vocabulary that pose such a difficult problem for the significationist. Even though each author advances his idea that there is a language of music and attaches a vocabulary to such a language, others argue (and noted in the inconsistencies in the above examples) it is not possible to have a definite vocabulary. The closest Bergquist can really come to a definition of arguable substance is his notion that “the relationships of beats and tones, and their application to the emotional and intellectual life of man is the philosophy of music.”

Some music educators continued to insist there was a connection between music and language. Miessner stresses in his 1931 paper “Names for Tones” the importance of teaching music reading (still debating what was mentioned at Keokuk). Justifying his position on the value and importance of reading music, Miessner incorporates the significationist position that music and language are related. From Miessner’s perspective music is “intelligible discourse,” because it “embodies degrees of emotion and shades of meaning analogous to poetry and drama.” For him music has “vocabulary and idioms, as well as structure and design” it has a “means of development” that is “rhythmic, thematic, harmonic and dynamic.” Even though it appears that Miessner has already concluded music is a language, over the next few pages he takes a philosophical approach in supporting his position. He writes, “the questions before us, then are these: Is music a language? If so, What is its nature and how shall it be

103 Ibid., 190. It is the idea of the emotional life of humans that Langer takes up in her Philosophy in a New Key (1942).
105 Ibid., 155.
He frames a response to these questions that is based on work done in philosophy, science, and music history. Referencing the like of Aristoxenes, Ptolemy, Ambrose, Gregory, and Hucbald in the development of tonality, Miessner asserts

It is important to remember that, from the earliest attempts to organize musical sounds, it was absolutely indispensible, that names for tones should be found, for without names for things, no clear thinking is possible. Indeed it was this vital need for signs, names and characters to represent things and meanings that impelled the invention of language, numbers, and letters, as well as musical names and devices of notation.

The parallels he draws between music and language include: “First, in that all languages words have no intrinsic or inherent meanings, but only those assigned to them and accepted by general consent and custom.”  “Second…laws of simplicity and euphony—of easy utterance—prevail.”  And “Third…children learn their language by imitation and constant use.”  While Miessner is specifically addressing the practice of naming tones and tonal ideas, he is doing so drawing support from the manner in which he sees language developing. He is, therefore, not supporting an idea such as fusion theory but rather an idea that music, at its core is really a language. The equivalents he advances of each characteristic of language stress his main point which is the importance and necessity of teaching the reading of music.

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106 Ibid., 153. Italics in the original.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., 156. His idea of names for tones transcends the simplistic view that what sounds at 440Hz is given the name A. While this is part of his argument, he does not leave it at this association without implication for what else this might mean for music. Italics in the original.
109 Ibid., 153. Italics in the original.
110 Ibid. Italics in the original.
111 Ibid. Italics in the original.
112 Marion Flagg does not cite the views of Miessner, but her 1949 article “The Written Language of Music” mirrors the arguments put forth in the Miessner’s work. She writes that the symbols of music “stand for orderly and organized classification of experiences and become tools for independent use. It is thus that the written language evolves.” Marion Flagg, “The Written Language of Music,” Music Educators Journal 35, 3 (January 1949): 6-8, 30, 7.
Lastly, on the relation of music and language is material from the Pitts papers.\textsuperscript{113}

In one particular set of papers Pitts begins, “Notation is not music, (is not song) but merely a systematic way of recording music by means of visible marks, (Signs, symbols) ‘notes’ made to call to mind the way music goes.”\textsuperscript{114} From this point she moves to the topic of music and language citing the work of Leonard Bloomfield’s \textit{Language}. She connects the structural elements of language to those of music. She writes

> melody-tune-phrases-material may be viewed as consisting of any number of successive parts in which distinctive features occur (same and different)…word-‘man’ with one and same meaning, ‘tonic chord’ with many different ‘effects’ caused by key changes, context, key, and harmonic changes. It is, nevertheless, a significant and recurring musical idea or phonetic grouping. Phonology and semantics based on assumption that in every speech-community (communicative language-music) some vocal utterances are alike in form and meaning.\textsuperscript{115}

In another lengthy but insightful elaboration on the linguistic/music connection in relation to practice and meaning she says

> Gross, over-all effect of a phrase of music to the ear and its distinctive features as these recur in successive song experiences-Distinctive features occur in lumps (or bundles) or groups…a statement of the ‘meaning’ of a musical figure, motive or melody is a weak point since it is of necessity one of association with children and people who are only normally sensitive to musical relationships per se…[therefore] Everything in a hearers world has some effect on his interpretation of meaning in the imprecise language of music which is its own meaning-its form may be said to express its musical content. The context in which children learn songs, rhythm, of their verbal association should meet a child’s need to take for granted the imprecision and associations which a given song calls up.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{113} Leahkim Gannett, a research Librarian at the Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library at the University of Maryland compiled the Pitts papers and notes that “Pitts herself arranged her papers into seven series.” It is in the first series labeled “classroom music” that there are numerous handwritten papers she used in her teaching and talks on the topic of teaching music. Pitts did not write dates on much of the material so it is difficult to give an exact chronological reference. However, Ms. Gannett dated the classroom music series material from 1928 to 1956 with the “bulk from 1948-1956.”

\textsuperscript{114} Lilla Belle Pitts, Series 1 – Classroom Music, [ca. 1928-1956], Special Collections in Performing Arts, Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. Underline in the original.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. Underline in the original.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid. Underline in the original.
What Pitts encourages is the teaching of music in a way that lets the child’s imagination and creativity connect to a multi-sensory experience that enhances understanding through reading music. Pitts like other scholars wants to have the association between music and language both ways. Her explanation relies on structural signification, but there are hints of formalism and Langerian signification as well. The formalist assertion comes out in the phrase relating to the imprecise language of music; it has its own meaning and its own content. The Langerian component enters in when she refers to the “imprecision and associations which a given song calls up.” In a closer link with the work of Langer, who she cites at the end of the paper, she writes, “the general picturization to the eye of how music feels and goes is the surest way to ‘charge’ or to infuse patterns of notes with meaning.” Pitts’ thoughtful analysis of music and language takes into account the significationist perspectives and concludes the closest link between the two is largely imprecise.

Besides the association with language, spoken, structural or otherwise, music educators also addressed the aspect of music as a symbol. David Mattern related a story at the 1923 conference in Cleveland, OH of the noted conductor Albert Coates. In a rehearsal of the allegro giocoso movement of Brahms’ Symphony No. 4 Opus 98 he said to the horns

‘this passage is like the opening of a furnace door—blazing heat,’ on to the trumpets in a martial theme—‘now let the flags fly,’ or again to the horns playing the noble theme in the Cesar Franck D Minor Symphony—‘this is the soul of chivalry,’ and again, ‘this is the cold grey cathedral at dawn—the snow is falling.’

117 Ibid.
This kind of imagery is said to help in the understanding of music and is typically used by significationists, but they are not the only group to enlist the power of an impression.

In 1932 Ernest Fowles wrote, “let us make no mistake with reference to aesthetics. They are the real things in life, the intangible, the unseen…music offers a training ground for aesthetics more valuable than perhaps that afforded by any other subject of human concern.”\textsuperscript{119} His use of the term aesthetics reflects the notion that there is material to be understood in the world that cannot be linked with science and scientific understanding, a traditionally Kantian view. Aesthetics, for him, in German idealist and significationist thought represents connection with and understanding ideas that are non-quantifiable. Meaning and music are related through “the physical, the material, and the emotional.”\textsuperscript{120} First, in terms of rhythm “everything in the world is influenced by, nay, is the embodiment of rhythm; the plants, the tides, the progression of time…rhythm is the bubbling, effervescing element of all healthy life.”\textsuperscript{121} Fowles claims, music has rhythm in “a far more definite and spiritual manner.”\textsuperscript{122} On another topic, this time the mental aspects of meaning and music, Fowles played a tune in which the main theme was hidden. After a number of audience members were unable to catch the masked melody he said “remember that even very musical people are often oblivious to the inside texture of music.”\textsuperscript{123} Finally, on the subject of music and emotional life he asserts, “The emotions work in waves corresponding to the lines of verse or the phrases of music…music sublimates them, deifies them, makes them living and human…music is

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. To support this claim he plays Maurice Greene’s \textit{Allemanda}.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 23.
instant in its reflection of these waves.” And in a statement that could have come directly from Langer, had it not been for his address taking place ten years before the publication of Philosophy in a New Key, Fowles says after playing the Episode from Chopin’s G minor Nocturne…”the passage holds its power because it pictures so inimitably the rise and fall of the emotions of man.”

Echoing this view of Fowles, James Mursell states, “music in particular is emotion captured and crystallized in tone.” Finally, on the subject of signification Pitts made some handwritten notes that may have been for a class she was teaching or a speech she was to make. She writes, “Signs and symbols are intellectually recognized as standing for those things and experiences which are as permeated with personal and social significance that we can say they are appreciated and understood.” For children the idea of signs and symbols acquiring meaning is a challenge, especially when it comes to understanding music. On this subject Pitts writes, “Children confronted with translating written musical notation into rhythmic, tonal or moving-sound relations, which convey meaning/are patterned, have the bewildering task of finding out the essential characteristics of music reading.” Signification underpinned much of Pitts’ thoughts on music and meaning in her personal papers. It is also clear from the amount

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124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 24.
127 It is indicated in her notes that these were made for and during class as well as for speeches she often gave.
128 Lilla Belle Pitts, Series 1 – Classroom Music, [ca. 1928-1956], Special Collections in Performing Arts, Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.
129 Ibid.
of evidence explored in this section that significationist ideas were ever present in music education discourse.

Questions about signification as an acceptable theory to explain meaning and some of the tenets associated with it often show up in the evidence. Lillian Baldwin, for example, argues, “no person can teach another by direct instruction how to feel…we cannot teach feeling as such, yet to minimize it importance…is to make music a craft instead of an art…for music is a language of feeling.”130 Here Baldwin questions an idea connected with signification theory that feeling can be taught, but simultaneously she accepts the relationship between feeling and music which puts her in a difficult place, philosophically speaking. Her way out is to suggest that while the teacher cannot directly teach feeling, the teacher can create an environment that prepares “The way for the emotional response, the teacher then helps the listener recognize the factors that caused it.”131 Harrison LeBaron echoes this idea, asserting “it is very probable that we cannot directly teach musical feeling any more than that results will come by saying, let us now be happy or glad or sad.”132 Also like Baldwin his way out of an earlier suggestion regarding his explanation of musical feelings resulting from music as opposed to associations with other fields or experience is similar. He says, “our educational need, then, is to know how to develop perception of the elements, that sensitiveness to each may be progressively advanced.”133 Both Baldwin and LeBaron see the role of the teacher as one who establishes conditions for understanding, and then it is in the

131 Ibid., 95.
133 Ibid., 80.
experience with music and making music in these environments established by the teacher that deeper interpretation and musical feeling occurs. Other music educators also tried to use aesthetic discourse to solve problems and advance ideas relating to practice.

Those looking to advance a particular philosophical position of their own questioned ideas associated with signification during this period in a thoughtful manner. The work of Edward Howard Griggs, for instance, was a philosophical potpourri, but he was skeptical when it came to signification. In “Music’s Meaning to Humanity” he acknowledges Platonic mimesis, Expressivism, and spends time advancing a view that ties “music’s meaning to humanity” to German idealism. For him, “Alone or in combination, music does its work, cultivating and refining the sensuous and emotional susceptibility, and thus rendering one more finely and deeply responsive to all beauty, to love, the moral ideal and religion.” He continues in the German idealist view to assert that music takes us to a place where “the ideal seems possible, and is more possible. Thus the marvelous, fluid, ever-growing temple of sound…recreated in liquid wonder of flowing forms by each artist anew, fulfils a wondrous function for the spirit of man.”

The German idealist perspective that “music and musical experience are somehow, uniquely able to penetrate and reveal the innermost nature of the world and human experience” is plain to see in Griggs’ writing. To get to this point Griggs rejects some aspects of formalist and signification theory. From the standpoint of Hegel, while music

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134 Edward Howard Griggs, “Music’s Meaning to Humanity,” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference, Seventeenth Annual Meeting Cincinnati, OH April 7 – April 11, 1924 (Privately printed, 1924), 337-348, 348. The Grigg’s case is interesting because the identical paper, including the title (the “to” is changed to “for” in the 1927 paper) shows up in the 1927 Yearbook, 145-154. His work, with changed title, but little else, shows up again in the 1930 Yearbook “Music and American Culture” 40-50. Again in 1938 the same work appears under the title Cultural Life in America 11-17. So, even though he is technically not a music educator, music educators thought enough of him to have him address four of their meetings.

135 Ibid., 348.

136 Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 129.
gets at the inner soul-life, it does so “through its immediacy, vividness, and intimacy.” Griggs agrees with Hegel stating that while an analytical or formalist approach to studying music is helpful for appreciation, it is “always a means to an end, and should not be confused with the direct response to the appeal of art.” The significationist, who is searching for those extramusical associations, is not concerned with the immediacy of the experience in the same way as the German idealist is. Griggs provides some insight of the difference and why the formalist and significationist approaches ought to be rejected. For the former, he asserts, “one may carry the analysis of the structure of a Wagner opera so far that one hears the motifs and not the music.” For the latter (significationist) he relates a personal experience where he witnessed William T. Harris interpreting Beethoven’s *Moonlight Sonata*. Griggs writes

> The sonata was played over by a masterly artist, and Dr. Harris took it up, passage by passage and interpreted the development. Its central conflicts, he said, represented the struggle of Titans with the gods. …it was all deeply interesting; yet if the hearer supposed Beethoven wrote the sonata to illustrate that story he would utterly misunderstand the music.

Griggs goes on to give other examples of conflicts in mythology and history just as suitable even suggesting these ideas may help people who have difficulty understanding music, “but if it is supposed to give the meaning of the music, it is worse than useless, positively hampering a sound response to music, by substituting something else for it.” The extramusical associations draw attention away from the music and thus restrict it meaning and power.

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137 Ibid., 105  
139 Ibid. Italics in the original.  
140 Ibid., 345.  
141 Ibid. Italics in the original.
J.J. Weigand wrote reviews on some of the research being conducted in music education and found a few projects on “musical meanings.” His brief reports include recent studies of the last decade.\(^{142}\) One project by Higginson studied adolescent boys with the aim of finding out the nature of associations made while listening to music without being given the title.\(^{143}\) Of the various associations the ones that stood out were “(a) those that had their origins in a corresponding emotional quality evoked by the musical composition; (b) those that had their origins in a perceptual activity; (c) those that had their origins in wandering thought.”\(^{144}\) Higginson found nothing definite. Reinforcing Higginson’s conclusions, Riggs did a similar experiment with college students and “found that it is possible to tell whether music is joyful or sad, but finer discriminations are not accurate.”\(^{145}\) The problem with determining so-called finer discriminations is precisely a problem Beardsley highlighted with signification theory.

Max Schoen gives a stinging critique of Langer’s theory in his 1954 JRME article “On Musical Expression.” In this paper he focuses on association between music and feeling and how Langer handles the topic. According to Schoen, Langer’s central theme is determining if music is the language of emotion, a medium of self-expression.\(^{146}\) Schoen takes issue with her conclusion that music is not the language of emotion or self-expression but rather “formulation and representation of emotions, moods, mental tensions and resolution—a ‘logical picture’ of sentient, responsive life, a source of


\(^{143}\) Ibid., 48-49.

\(^{144}\) Ibid., 49. There were no references listed in the article for the original studies.

\(^{145}\) Ibid.

Schoen does not agree the so-called logical picture is not a case of self-expression and supports his expressivist position in the following passage: “The composer’s knowledge of human feeling is his knowledge, and what he expresses is his knowledge in his own unique way, and his expression is therefore self-expression and nothing else.”

Schoen’s critique is, again, proof that music educators not only debated topics in musical aesthetics but did so in thoughtful, insightful, and philosophical ways showing they understood far more about musical aesthetics than the common interpretation allows.

Two archival documents from Earhart also identify problems with signification and say it gets in the way of understanding. In his undated “The What and Why of the Y.S.P.C.” he criticizes the teaching of choral music using the idea of a song story. His goal for the choir is to move toward an instrumental approach to music. If a choir can look at music more as a tonal art, like the instrumentalist or a cappella choir does, then the focus is on understanding the music as opposed to the “dramatic literary interests.”

His speech to the Department of Music of the New Jersey State Teacher’s Associations in 1932 titled “Teaching Music: The Art and the Child” also criticizes the tenets of signification but more precisely and more powerfully. Employing a formalist critique—a position he acknowledges espousing himself—Earhart argues what is expressed, rather than “impressed,” is a function of the form, and this should be enough to bring about and

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148 Ibid., 60. The reason for Schoen’s particular critique may be located in his seeing the issue through the lens of the psychologist, and it was noted on the first page of his article the tension that existed between the two disciplines as each vied for respectability at the time. Italics in the original.

satisfy the need for delight and understanding.¹⁵⁰ Those who would oppose such a view
Earhart refers to as “ardent pragmatists and romanticists”¹⁵¹ who have inappropriately
used the term expression. The solution for Earhart is to argue that the term “expression”
should be abandoned “to the associationists entirely” because it has been used
“persistently to connote extraneous ‘meanings’”¹⁵² Teachers should, therefore,
emphasize the “purely tonal values that inhere in music,” instead of “the non-musical or
associational or expressional meanings connected with music to a point that prevents
attention to the constitutions and behaviors of the tones themselves.”¹⁵³ Not only is
Earhart’s argument using language from musical aesthetics—even citing aestheticians
such as Santayana—but they are also given to influence practice, and in this case it is a
call to teach music with a “more soul-searching scrutiny of our aesthetic doctrines.”¹⁵⁴
This is obviously an argument that is both rooted in aesthetics and one in which music
teaching should be conducted along the lines of formalist doctrine.

Imanuel Willheim’s formalism, like Earhart’s, results in the philosophical
questioning of expressivism. Willheim argues that true understanding comes from the
structural analysis of the composer’s so-called plan.¹⁵⁵ He includes five steps to help
achieve such structural understanding and argues that “by introducing the student to
musical organization we furthermore wean him from many erroneous concepts…the
music-is-an-expression-of-the-composer’s-feeling’ theory becomes superfluous as soon

¹⁵⁰ Earhart refers to himself as a purist or absolutist, terms that are interchangeable with formalist.
¹⁵¹ Will Earhart, “Teaching Music: The Art and the Child” Speech Given to the Department of
Music of the New Jersey State Teachers Association on November 12, 1932 Atlantic City, NJ 1-7, 6, Series
1 – Writings - Special Collections in Performing Arts, Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library, University
of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.
¹⁵² Ibid., 6.
¹⁵³ Ibid., 7.
¹⁵⁴ Ibid.
¹⁵⁵ Imanuel Willheim, “A Structural Approach to Musical Understanding,” Music Educators
as he is able to trace the logical growth of a musical idea.”¹⁵⁶ Willheim does not leave it at that in his criticism of expressivist theory. He continues by saying those who link music and emotion fall prey to “the following dangerous corollary: since music is emotion translated into sound, the only way the listener can cooperate with the composer is by being receptive to the artist’s ‘emotions.’”¹⁵⁷ This places “the responsibility of comprehension” on the composer which implies a passive audience.¹⁵⁸ To those who assert the structural approach is sterile because the percipient knows what is going to happen before it does, his response is that “the process of co-creating with the artist” enhances the depth of enjoyment and subsequent meaning.¹⁵⁹

Understanding the composer occupies a central role in expressivist theory because the expressivist argues that the embodiment of such and such emotion that is in the work is, at least in part, a reflection of the composer’s state of mind at the time. Parks Grant thinks an idea like the one just mentioned is absurd. In “What the Music Educator Can Learn from the Composer” Grant argues, “the outrageous notion that the mood of a piece essentially reflects its authors emotional state at the time he composed it cannot be too insistently stamped out—one of the most naïve to which the gullible mind is prey.”¹⁶⁰ He continues, “Only a few moments careful reflection would readily show that any piece requiring several days or weeks to write would be an incomprehensible garble of shifting

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¹⁵⁶ Ibid.
¹⁵⁷ Ibid.
¹⁵⁸ Ibid. Even though Willheim is commenting specifically on college music appreciation and survey courses the problems he mentions are paralleled in the same types of courses in secondary schools. As an example it is plausible that “the experts entrusted with these introductory music courses cannot agree on the nature of their subject matter” is the same whether the instructor is teaching such courses at either level p. 38.
¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 39.
In one fell swoop his does away with Tolstoy’s primary argument in *What is Art?* Parks’ albeit brief statement and paper have plenty of philosophical counter argument to undermine the expressivist position. His goal is for the music educator to better understand how the composer approaches his work in order for the former to play and interpret it more intelligently. That is, instead of trying to figure out what emotion is expressed, time would be better spent on rendering a particular passage more musically in a performance, apart from any specific emotion.

Other music educators of the time approach the subject of meaning in a philosophical manner as well. Charles Farnsworth, in his paper “Beauty in Music,” argues appreciation and interpretation of the beautiful is necessarily bound to the percipient. Getting to this conclusion he acknowledges that the term “beauty” has many applications. Since he is primarily concerned with the musical effect of beauty for the listener, he spends a great deal of space developing how the listener is to be prepared for the experience and not as much clarifying what he means by beauty. For him beauty and music are synonymous in a German idealist’s view. That is, the percipient is enwrapped in the experience, “the soul finds itself, unhampered, in an ideal state.” The role, then, for the teacher is to help the student to both recognize and be attuned to beauty as it is manifested in art that is seen or heard in the everyday lives of percipients. So instead of beauty being in the object of music alone, as the title suggests, beauty is also a desirable response by the properly prepared percipient. Farnsworth writes, “While

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161 Ibid., 28.
163 Ibid., 405.
164 Ibid., 406.
beauty has its origin in an external stimulation, this external stimulation does not produce
the desired effect unless, besides the sensuous and perceptive responses, there is a feeling
of response that gives the total experience most of its value.”¹⁶⁵ Therefore, meaning,
value, and beauty are part of the subjective experience, an experience where the
“expression of spirit” conjoins body and soul.¹⁶⁶

The role of the listener was also a concern of Eugene Stimson. In “What is Real
in Music?” he shows that he relies on both expressivist and German idealist positions in
relation to meaning. Stimson argues, “music is the expression of the human soul…[it] is
the human race’s mean of expressing something that no other medium so exactly
expresses; and the expression of this is meaningless and in vain unless you and I permit
this expression function through us.”¹⁶⁷ His purpose is to encourage music educators to
bring out in students “that natural responsiveness to music which is the varying but
universal birthright of all human beings.”¹⁶⁸ Music is the expression and our
responsiveness to what is being expressed as having meaning is the goal of music
education for Stimson.

One of the theories where the role of someone actively engaged in perceiving
and/or performing and/or composing is highly evident is seen in experientialist
philosophy. Oddly, however, while Dewey is referenced many, many times by music
educators in their writing there are not nearly as many references that specifically relate

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 411.
¹⁶⁶ Ibid. Also from the German idealist perspective Earl Harper writes, “what the creative or re-
creative artist reveals to his fellow men may be truth so exalted that neither he nor any other man can
verbalize it much less incarnate it.” Earl Harper, “Moral and Spiritual Values in Music Education” Music
National Conference, Twenty-Third Year, Second Biennial Meeting Chicago, IL March 23 – March 28,
¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 57.
his work *Art as Experience* to meaning making in the music classroom. Therefore, the material in this paragraph is taken from ideas embraced by some the experientialist progressive educational thought in vogue at the time. Lillian Fox was a so-called pedagogical progressive. For her it is important to provide experiences where musical knowledge is pursued in a meaningful way. Echoing a Deweyan goal for art she writes, “Music is not something separate and apart from life. It is an integral part of life.” Defense of this point by Fox includes a number of ideas relying on significationist precepts to spark the creative efforts of her students in making and creating music. That is, she used something the children could relate to from observation and experience as a spark to initiate the telling of a story through music. Her end goal, while not wholly significationist fell back in line with Deweyan experientialist and expressivist thought. The projects were not only a means to build “skills and techniques” as “the need arose, but also the refining and deepening of emotions and the enrichment of personality through fuller self-expression.” Again, this is an example of incorporating thoughts and ideas from philosophy and aesthetics meant to influence instruction in a very specific way.

Creative music and the integration movement were efforts at the time where student learning was thought to be enhanced if more and better links between life and school as well as cross-curricular connections were made. The integration movement and

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171 Ibid., 340.
creative music projects were embedded in pedagogical progressivism. Pitts stated, regarding the movement, “The more I study the philosophy of integration the more I am convinced it is not a scientific, but an aesthetic approach to education.”¹⁷² Pitts also observes that the movement is meant to foster exploration in a curricula which is “experience-centered, value-centered, and social-centered.”¹⁷³ She, for one, saw advantages for music to be part of the integrated program. However, the reader will recall from the previous chapter the acceptance of integration for music was not always the case. Many music educators were desirous to maintain music’s integrity as a standalone subject. Many others, like Pitts, however, asserted while it was fine for the occasional relation with a social studies lesson, the primary purpose of music education must still remain—music must be taught as music. Still others thought music should only be seen as one of many subjects deserving no special recognition beyond its function in society, merely another subject that has an important relation to human life but no more so than math or literature. For example, if a social studies lesson on reconstruction in the post-civil war era was the topic then the teacher (not necessarily a music teacher) would include illustrations of music of the time. Music for this final group was viewed as subordinate. One would be hard pressed to find music educators solidly in this third group. For those in the first or second group the mindset was since music was integrated with life, then music ought to be seen as a necessary component of the curriculum in such a way that emphasized “not quantities of subjects but qualities of experience.”¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² Lilla Belle Pitts, “The Advantage to Music of an Integrated Program,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1938), 344-346, 345. At the time this was written Pitts was the Supervisor of Junior High School Music in Elizabeth, NJ.
¹⁷³ Ibid.
¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 346. Italics in the original.
particular the emphasis on the quality of experience was important because the belief was the experience was memorable and important and, therefore, meaningful.

In much of Deweyan and pedagogically progressive thought social relations were vital for more democratic living. It is on the topic of social relations that there exists an intersection of aesthetics’ concern for meaning, modernism, and music education, but one in this next case that is hardly Deweyan. Discourse reflecting and advancing ideas from socioaesthetics necessarily involved a social component. For socioaestheticism, especially for Adorno and Marx, and to a lesser extent Busoni, music is inextricably linked with the social situation. Music is a form of social critique, and it can be an object of ideological persuasion. Music, then, is very much a production of its time, and so-called modern art music in particular is music for itself that simultaneously seeks to subvert class domination. This idea of music existing for itself while having a social function at first appears paradoxical. However, Bowman suggests it is through its own formal language that the social critique is undertaken.\textsuperscript{175} Music, through itself, reveals social structures and social relations.

Socioaesthetic thought is difficult to locate prior to the 1920s, and when it does surface in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s it is often, though not always, seen on topics covering so-called modern or contemporary music. One writer in particular—Hanson—shows elements of socioaesthetic thought in his writing, arguably because as a modernist composer (and the director of the Eastman School of Music) he was tuned into the subtleties of the movement. Hanson argues in 1938, for example, the composer of contemporary music should be more in touch with mainstream tastes of his time while the performers of the time ought to make more of an effort to embrace music written in their

\textsuperscript{175} Bowman, \textit{Philosophical Perspectives on Music}, 314.
Hanson’s “The Status of Contemporary Music” has strong echoes of socioaesthetic notion on the meaning of music. He begins by acknowledging any analysis of music should also take into consideration the “forces and conditions which directly and indirectly influence it.” He continues by saying, “the music of today is the only music which can embody the consciousness of today. Composers should be writing honestly but fearlessly their own interpretation of their own times.” For him there are three types of composers of contemporary music, the first type is those who follow the trajectory of music from the past. Examples from this group include Jean Sibelius, early Arnold Schoenberg, and Randall Thompson. The second type of composer desires a separation from the past and this group consists of those who employ atonality and polytonality in their works. Members of this group are Dmitri Shostakovich, Aaron Copeland, and George Antheil, and Hanson asserts they are suspicious of “expression and sentiment of emotion.” The third type of composer has a rebellious streak, “to such artists realism in art is all important, and to them realism is synonymous with the expression of the tragedies and sordidness of many phases of human life.” Hanson criticizes this group by suggesting music is not very good social propaganda, therefore, since it may be a release from reality, the goal of trying to avoid reality subverts the reason music exists. While he does not supply the reader with examples here of composers in this third group there is enough written to let us know he thinks they have missed the mark. It is not with the first or second group but with the second group that

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177 Ibid.
178 Ibid., 33-34.
179 Ibid., 36
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
we gain an insight into Hanson’s aesthetic propensities. Hanson’s description of how this second group developed its style is reminiscent of Busoni’s views in *New Objectivity*. For Busoni, new music should attempt to explore and express material in new ways but do so in “a return to harmony, to melody, to ‘the most highly developed (not the most complicated polyphony),’ and away from what is ‘sensuous,’ music as description.”¹⁸² Hanson says of this group, “these composers…turned back to the practice of polyphony.”¹⁸³ Using the work of Palestrina as an example, Hanson writes that there was rhythmic independence and the “various melodic lines were integrated and fused” in an “underlying sonorous background almost completely constant in structure.”¹⁸⁴ If there was dissonance it was resolved in terms of the overall consonant structure.¹⁸⁵ In the new music, using a Busonian description, “the contemporary polyphonic atonalist separates from his sixteenth century brother. In this music there is no underlying consonant sonority.”¹⁸⁶ The examples Hanson uses in his paper show both the nature and underlying meaning of music in Busoni’s objectivity, a forerunner to socioaesthetics. As music it is historically rooted, it consists of traditional musical elements such as harmony and rhythm; it also rejects some of the emotional connections often said to be in music—the last of which is a point which Hanson also sees as problematic—and it is socially situated. Therefore, its meaning is bound to the existing social reality.¹⁸⁷

Hobart Sommes is the obscure music educator I spoke about in chapter two. That is, he is the lone example that exists in the evidence that ties in specifically Marxist

¹⁸³ Hanson, “The Status of Contemporary Music,” 35.
¹⁸⁴ Ibid.
¹⁸⁵ Ibid.
¹⁸⁶ Ibid.
thought and music. His general call is for music educators to continue their push for
music to be a necessary component in general education mainly because of its spiritual
nature. He argues that in this age of science the spiritual side of man should also be
cultivated.\footnote{Hobart Sommes, “Shield This Light” *Music Educators Journal* 37, 4 (February-March 1951): 26-27, 46, 26. This paper was originally read at the 1950 convention of the Kansas Music Education Association and is reprinted from the Kansas Music review, official organ of KMEA.} On the topic of Marxism and music Sommes writes

> The Marxist school asserts that music, as one of the forms of human culture, is
nothing but a minor byproduct of the economic structure within which it is
written, and its products are either a justification or a condemnation of the
economic system which gives it birth…the Marxists say that music can only
produce an emotion for or against the government.\footnote{Ibid., 27. Sommes asserts “some of our captains of industry maintain that creative music is one of the least material manifestations of culture, and has nothing to do with economic, social, or political activities, and should be treated in the same realm as a hobby such as the cultivation of rare orchids—beautiful, but expensive and unnecessary,” 27. He argues both parties are wrong.}

Sommes’ mentioning of the tenets of Marxist philosophy on music and its meaning
shows an astute awareness of ideas in musical aesthetics. So, even though he does not
use the perspective of Marx, or refute it in a systematic manner, it is nevertheless
included to advance his idea that music can be a positive force in the United States and
the world. Simply put, contrary to the standard interpretation, the music educators of this
period were talking about highly philosophical matters.

> These two examples under the general socioaesthetic umbrella also show how
there is distinction in socioaesthetics. The Marxist sees music as having a primary social
function—what Beardsley refers to as the principle of non-neutrality. As such, its
meaning is in direct relation to the economic superstructure. Sommes’ use and
understanding of Marxist aesthetics subsumes music as a “minor byproduct of the
economic structure.” Hanson’s work reveals how the ideas of Busoni and Adorno—
though neither are specifically mentioned—are broader than those of the Marxist.
Instead of music being merely subsumed in the economic structure, music is capable of much more than subverting or supporting a given ideological perspective. Hanson’s work shows how music is both related to the social conditions—those “forces and conditions” he speaks of—yet music most certainly relates to itself, which can be seen in the difference between the atonal and polyphonal work of so-called contemporary composers and their relation to the past in their newer forms of music. So, meaning is simultaneously musical in the formalist sense, of which objectivism and socioaesthetics in the twentieth are offshoots, and socially situated because it is a product of the time. This also happens to be an instance where meaning is subtly rooted to context, and context will be much more overt in the next chapter on value.

Meaning, interpretation, or what music is said to reveal contains a complex milieu of perspectives and problems, some of which I highlight in this chapter. Formalist, significationist, expressivist, and socioaesthetic points of view in the evidence have shown that these views are present and debated. Sometimes these debates often were embedded within arguments unique to music education. One example seen is this chapter was the problem of musical understanding as it relates to the role of the percipient and the performer. Another ongoing debate centered on musical understanding and the learning of music—the rote versus note argument. Music educators were also considering what their role in the integration movement looked like or how to successfully introduce contemporary art music into the classroom. Fundamentally, however, when it came to considering the meaning of music there was a reliance on ideas from musical aesthetics regardless of whether these were embedded in the debates above or as standalone questions on what is allegedly revealed in music, for example is music a language? The
complex milieu of problems and perspectives occupied a great deal of space and
generated much discussion. The fact that there are many points of view on the problems
of meaning in one’s aesthetic position as compared to another’s simply displays the
diversity, or lack of unity depending on one’s perspective, of discourse in musical
aesthetics. Varied voices on the topic of the meaning of music in music education were
prevalent in the discourse. Many music educators had reflexively considered what music
means, which is a quality also seen in why this group thinks music matters.
CHAPTER 5

VALUE

Diversity in the musical aesthetic perspectives from the last chapter on meaning also appears in this chapter on value. There is, however, an additional element that shows up in the discourse on value that was not in the earlier chapters – the larger historical context. Another wrinkle in this chapter is the two ways in which people use the word value. There is material that covers evaluation, that is, making judgments about the quality of music. The other material connects to the question of why music matters. Think of it this way, an evaluative question asks, “What music is good?” and a question on why music matters asks, “What good is music?” Evaluation occupies the first section of this chapter and I make no effort, nor is it necessary to subdivide perspectives on evaluation into the performance and non-performance based categories. The reason for this is the evidence does not show any noticeable difference in the arguments of what good music is. In other words the point of view of a work on the subject of good music for chorus contains a negligible difference as compared to someone discussing good music in a paper on music appreciation.

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1 While context did affect discourse on nature and meaning in subtle ways, it was typically seen within the context of music education specifically. For example, the arguments made using support from musical aesthetics on the rote versus note debate provide a definite internal context for the question. Beyond this there was the educational context, which influenced views on such things as the integration movement. Finally, there were socioaesthetic views that were naturally affected by contemporary happenings, but even these were still largely embedded in material related to the field. One example here is the use of so-called modern art music in the classroom.
Evaluation and Judgment

Evidence of judgments about music is far more uniform here than in any other category of this dissertation. For the vast majority of music educators who wrote on the topic during this period, the goal of music education in relation to musical judgment was the elevation or cultivation of taste. Someone with cultivated taste, according to these writers, understood why certain types and styles of music were superior to others. Therefore, the role of the music teacher was one where developing an understanding and appreciation of honest, sincere, and complex music, usually Western Art Music, was expected. Good and great music was Western Art Music, and in order to be considered someone with elevated taste, the percipient should be able to recognize and be sensitive to differences in quality between a Mozart symphony and Scott Joplin’s ragtime music.

Mary Conway was very concerned with what was passing for music in the early years of the twentieth century. She associates rag-time music with evil saying, “a certain type of modern song can break down in half a minute the careful teaching of years in church, Sunday-school and home.” Quality music education was considered a necessary requisite to cure the corrupted tastes of the average person. Mary Armitage expressed in 1920 “the average child prefers rag-time and the cheap song of the street to the classics…and it devolves on the supervisor to offset that taste and give him a liking for something infinitely better.” Many music educators shared her basic view. Paul Weaver

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3 Mary Armitage, “How to Introduce Music Appreciation into Schools which have Never had Music,” in *Journal of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference*, Thirteenth Annual Meeting Philadelphia, PA March 22 – March 26, 1920 (Privately printed, 1920), 51-52, 51. While Armitage asserts there is a difference in the performing and listening sides of music, an implication that there is a distinction here between performance and non-performance based music, her argument for each ultimately rests on the same premise. She asserts, “the great majority of our children will never be either
argues in 1929 “the chief concern of all music education is the cultivation of discrimination.”⁴ A number of these music educators advancing the notion that part of the role of the music educator was to elevate taste did so in a manner reminiscent of Plato, Aristotle and Schiller. Birge wrote in 1910 “the cultivation of taste is of prime importance.”⁵ Similarly, Anton Embs asserts the purpose of school music is to “develop the musical taste of the child.”⁶ Along those same lines Osbourne McConathy suggests, “Music should inspire to noble thoughts and feelings,”⁷ a classical Greek view. Echoing Schiller, Louis Mohler makes a connection between listening to good music and the development of cooperation and more democratic living.⁸ Spaeth advises the average listener “not to worry about your musical taste. It will develop normally if you hear enough music, both good and bad.”⁹ Little had changed by the 1950s. In “A Question of Taste in High School Band Music” Joseph Doran laments good music does not exist in the majority of literature available to the band. Instead, “it primarily consists of popular music and novelties.”¹⁰ Like many music educators he equated good taste with Western Art Music. “Public School music—band, orchestra, and vocal groups—must work at all

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times to develop taste in the youth of America.”\textsuperscript{11} To support his point that the band is a group capable of artistic production, he urges band directors to not only include marches but also the work of Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Ravel, Holst, even Stravinsky and Bartok. Mursell shared the same sentiment. He wrote in 1935 that is was the responsibility of the music educator to influence the lives of children with the music of the great masters. Referencing Bach, Beethoven, Mozart, and Chopin, Mursell insisted it was the music educator’s responsibility to call attention to “the work and utterances of these men. The mere existence of such work is the greatest single reason for music study.”\textsuperscript{12} Educators desired the study of better music, but for some, what better music actually looked like was an idea not fully developed. At the 1937 Eastern Music Educators Conference in Buffalo, NY a panel discussion was dedicated to what “more and better music” looked like. Yet even here specificity is lacking. Russell Morgan, for example, merely drew on the traditional delineation between the music of the great masters and “cheap tawdry music.”\textsuperscript{13} The larger goal was for the better teaching of good music. To this effect, it is apparent that these music educators thought taste could be improved and that good music had certain prescribed characteristics.

Making music judgments is a central idea in musical aesthetics and music educators were, in fact, aware of this. In 1925 Clippinger devotes an entire section of his address to musical judgment. He lists several kinds of judgments such as “is the tone…too bright, too somber, or is it the right color?...is it too thick or thin? Is it steady

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
or unsteady? Is it harsh or mellow and sympathetic?” Clippinger also goes on to state that the aforementioned judgments “all have to do with musical taste, of which aesthetics is the philosophy.” Once again, the evidence is overt and in this case it is an example of what a music educator understood aesthetics to be as well as keys to making such judgments. Frances Martin specifically asks, “What are some of the criteria of good music?” in her article “A Plan for Good Music.” She continues by generating a series of questions that enable teachers to judge the merits of a composition. For starters she judges a good work on the basis of whether the composers name appears “in studied music reference books.” The follow-up question also relates to the noteworthiness of the composer and his music as being necessary criteria for something to count as good music. Questions four and five inquire about the appropriateness of the score considering what kind of group will perform it and whether it corresponds well with the original. The remaining questions, (six, seven, eight, and nine) delve into the musical experience itself. However, while Martin’s perspectives rest on the notion that good music must “have some value, whether it be technical, social or educational,” she does not spend any time developing how good music has social value. She also does not discuss what elements of her view of good music enrich the experience. Not all views of what good music is were as simplistic as Martin’s.

15 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 56, 57.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
Anne Pierce also made suggestions for music educators to consider when selecting music. First on Pierce’s list is that the “materials must be of good quality.” And in determining the worth of the music Pierce includes the characteristic that it possesses certain qualities. She, unlike Martin, acknowledges there are differing views on what constitutes good music. Pierce writes that for some, good music is music that is structurally sound, and for others music that has withstood the test of time is good. These perspectives, for Pierce, are incomplete. Her recommendation is that instead of using these two criteria alone, the teacher is to seek “the superior and permanent.” Her notions of good music share in a simple way the genetic, affective, and objective reasons given by Beardsley in making judgments of musical worth. Specifically, Pierce writes good music “is sincere in expression,” (a genetic reason); it is “presented in such a way as to arrest and hold attention and interest,” (an affective reason); and finally, it is “well-planned and constructed…in fact the details of melodies, chords, cadences, dissonances, motives, and phrases must be so worked out as to give the listener an impression of coherence,” (an objective reason). Once again is it unmistakable that some of the music educators of the period understood and could make well formed arguments on the subject of separating good and cheap music using language of evaluation from musical aesthetics.

H.L. Butler is another example of a music educator who has reflexively thought about the notion of good music. Mentioning Hanslick, Butler argues that good music

22 Ibid., 148.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. Refer to chapter two for the explanations of these reasons in making an evaluation of what is good music.
possesses certain inner qualities. For him, these elements are “Sincerity, the true and the honest; Originality, the genuine output of the individual imagination; and Nobility, the freedom from cheapness, vulgarity, and banality.”\footnote{Butler, “The Vital Elements of Music,” 67. Italics in the original.} He continues by arguing the sum of these three elements is vitality, a quality that enables a masterpiece to persist.\footnote{Ibid.} In other words, a tune “is not great because it is difficult to sing from a technical standpoint. It is great because it has in itself the vital elements, originality, sincerity, and nobility, which in turn give it vitality, or the power to live.”\footnote{Ibid.67-68. Italics in the original.} Butler’s assertion, like those of Pierce, also echoes Beardsley’s reasons for making judgments, in this case genetic reasons. But while Beardsley took issue with qualities of sincerity, originality, and nobility, Butler simply accepts these ideas as the vital elements of music—ideas specific to making evaluations.

There were other music educators who also showed an awareness of and advanced ideas from musical aesthetics in their work. Minerva Bennett deliberately and explicitly incorporated arguments and theories in musical aesthetics in her Master’s thesis. On the topic of taste Bennett relies on the work of M.D. Calvacoressi, Dewey, Frederick Lund, and W.H. Hadow. From Calvacoressi she borrows the idea that taste can and should be developed, and some music educators ought to help students refine their ability to discriminate between good and bad music.\footnote{Minerva M. Bennett, “A Study of Aesthetic Values Inherent in Music and Music Education”( Master’s thesis, Temple University, 1935), 101-108. She also acknowledges that Calvacoressi’s view from his Musical Taste and How to Form It (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1927) rests on the notion that those in the best position to cultivate taste are the most studied and the most experienced, which implies that their sensibilities guide the field as a whole.} In order to develop the ability to discriminate, she advocates the application of Deweyan thought. The student and teacher are involved in the process of learning what it is the artist experienced as the work was
produced.\textsuperscript{29} She takes from Hadow’s work his evaluative reasons for something being labeled as good music.

Bennett applies Hadow’s four principles of judgment from his \textit{Studies in Modern Music} for the purpose of arguing that education and experience are the foundations for making authoritative judgments about the quality of music.\textsuperscript{30} These are “the principle of vitality…the principle of labor…the principle of proportion…fourth, that of fitness.”\textsuperscript{31} Explanations given for each of these principles of judgment adhere, like the works of Butler and Pierce, to Beardsley’s description of genetic, affective, and objective reasons.\textsuperscript{32}

Approaches to evaluating music appear in Henry Moses’ “An Icky Looks at Good Music.”\textsuperscript{33} Moses posed two questions to nearly 850 students: “(1) Define what you mean by good music. (2) On what basis do you judge whether music is good or not good.”\textsuperscript{34} The students’ answers to the second question fell into distinct categories of reasons for being able to make such judgments. It will not surprise the reader at this point to find out that the reasons given by the students fell into the affective and genetic categories. In

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 106. Minerva argues further it is “through education [that] the taste of music becomes refined and sensitiveness to the best in it is developed,” 107.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Bennett, “A Study of Aesthetic Values Inherent in Music and Music Education” 101-108.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Vitality for Butler is different from Hadow’s use of the term as seen in Bennett’s thesis. Bennett’s paraphrasing of Hadow asserts vitality has to do with “the conception of the ideas expresses in the composition their originality and their genuineness,” qualities Butler attributed solely to originality. Hadow’s principle of vitality would have been classified by Beardsley as a genetic reason. The principle of labor is also akin to a genetic reason because it is measured by “skilled and finished workmanship,” p. 108. The principle of proportion is “objective” because it’s focus is on how well organized it is—something that can be determined in a fairly straightforward manner. Finally, fitness is closely related to affective reasoning since it is concerned with “the mood to be expressed,” p. 108
\item \textsuperscript{33} Moses explains an “Icky is a jitterbug term for one who doesn’t know the latest in jive.” Henry Moses, “An Icky Looks at Good Music,” \textit{Music Education Journal} 31, 1 (September-October 1944): 28, 31, 65, 28.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
fact, Moses notes “there was little factual basis for objective reasoning.”35 There is, however, an interesting twist in Moses’ analysis based on discussions he had with groups of students involved in the study. For “music to be great, [it] must not only be well written and well played but must also have a good purpose…[it] must also carry out that purpose.”36

Finally, Howard Murphy points out the difficulty of evaluating modern music in “Judgment Values for Contemporary Music.” Since “a conservative is a man who worships dead radicals,”37 fair evaluation of so-called modern music is problematic. He notes that Beethoven was criticized harshly in his time and until perspective is gained meaningful evaluation is difficult. What, then, can be done? Murphy suggests that modern music can be evaluated effectively. To do so requires making the new music more familiar through repeated hearing.38 The next task is to better understand the composer’s use of “new technical devices.”39 It is this second category that aspires to objective reasons for evaluation. Here Murphy divides the structural aspects of modern music four ways: “(1) The extensive use of dissonance, (2) the new melodic line, (3) rhythmic complexity, (4) the new formal structure, or means of obtaining continuity.”40 Changed conceptions of music, according to Murphy, should enhance rather than obstruct our ability to evaluate modern music. So, while tastes change, percipients are in no worse a position to make an educated evaluation if they become more familiar with the music and group the technical devices used by the composer. And in his follow-up

36 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
article in the next issue of the Music Educators Journal, he sets out to establish specific
criteria and make such an informed judgment.

Murphy’s ideas about judgment are meant to influence practice. He explicitly
states that teachers teaching modern music “must make some evaluations, however
tentative. As teachers of music we cannot evade this responsibility; indifference is as
deplorable as dogmatism.”41 He thus establishes basic criteria for the teacher to consider
in performing such evaluations. Once again, the criteria fell into the categories
mentioned by Beardsley. The first question of new music is, does it successfully “convey
mood or emotion to the auditor?”42 which combines genetic and affective reasons.
Second, does the new music possess a quality of unity in its design?43 According to the
criteria Murphy lays out, “new music is to be judged primarily in its power of
communication, on its sincerity, and on its technical competence.”44 These judgments, in
turn, rest on genetic, affective, and objective rationales.

The recognition and establishment of criteria for evaluating music is yet one more
way the evidence points to important matters from musical aesthetics finding their way
into the discourse of music educators. Although there were definitely music educators
who were content to suggest an underlying association with basic principles in musical
aesthetics such as the objective of elevating taste, not everyone was satisfied to leave it at
that. Several scholars probed issues associated with how it was possible and in what
ways evaluative judgments about music could be made. Whether the topic was music
appreciation, a performance based piece, or something generalized to the entirety of the

22-23, 23.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
field, these music educator’s perspectives were explicitly attached to ideas on evaluation and cultivating taste that were directly linked with influencing practice. Separating good music from that of lesser quality and applying criticism for doing so to make some evaluative judgment is only one aspect of questions about musical value.

Why Music Matters

The idea of value was one of the most personal and possibly the most volatile of all the categories of musical aesthetics discussed in music education. The divergent views are the result of the steady and careful articulation of ideas and reflexively considering music’s value in light of new developments in the field such as the orchestra and appreciation courses, and the larger educational and historical contexts. The question of why music matters has been a constant one for music educators. Mursell writes “as applied to our own field, it takes the form of asking why music should be taught in schools.”

Music’s inclusion in the general curriculum has been supported using numerous arguments, which rest on four distinct ways of understanding value: intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian. Mark’s interpretation would have us believe that for a thousand years the answer to the question “why music matters” rests solely on utilitarian claims. Mark’s assertion would have us believe that aesthetics has no concern with extramusical associations whatsoever. While utilitarian claims are present in the evidence, they are by no means the only ones. It is in the category of value where some of the deeper probing of ideas from musical aesthetics occurs, which in part

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46 Mark argues “music education philosophy developed over 1,000 years. The developmental process was not evolutionary because the philosophy remained essentially the same from Plato’s time to mid 20th century.” Mark, “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic,” 15-21, 20.
explains the divergent views. It is also in relation to value where music educators display they are beings in time, subjects who question ideas to better understand the present.

The question of why music matters has persisted and will continue to persist. Therefore, music educators have often relied on contemporary influences that are either accepted or rejected to argue a point for the value of music, and, by extension, music education. These writers and thinkers have at times observed the effects of the intensification of industrial production and have commented upon the positive development of the industrial age as well as problems stemming from an obsession with materialism, especially during the Depression years. Other threads exist in the evidence such as ideas of value tied to the integration movement and the performing versus listening debate. Additionally, there are utilitarian claims for music during World War II and the Cold War years, yet here too are a group of music educators who reject those claims. While there are pregnant internal questions related to value such as whether music be considered “art or science”? or whether its basis is “intellectual or emotional”? these questions are nevertheless anchored in the explicit material and the subtext of evidence. Perspectives on intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian value are both plain to see and underlie the arguments presented by music educators.

Much like the previous section on evaluation, there is a negligible difference in the evidence on the topic of value that makes any pointed distinction between the performance and non-performance categories superfluous. Any noteworthy difference on a specific topic relating to value between the performance and non-performance categories I bring to the reader’s attention when a point needs to be emphasized. Problems and theories of musical aesthetics have overlapping elements on the question of
value. The Moralist using an argument from correlation, for example, suggests that for a work to be adjudged as having merit it must have a moral component. If the moral component of the work is high, then its value is high. In this instance the quality of the work—an evaluative statement—is inextricably linked with notions of why music is important, why we should care about it—a normative statement. To put it another way, the judgment of the quality of the work is related to its inherent, instrumental and/or utilitarian value. It is not enough simply to judge the work according to its own merits; there is necessarily an extramusical component attached to its worth, and how far that extramusical component is extended depends on the theorist’s take on value.

Moralism, because of its connection to evaluation and explanation of value, is a good place to transition from the first section of this chapter to the last section on the subject of value in music education. Echoing Plato’s ethos theory, which suggests music could be valued for its emotional and ethical effects, Ralph Baldwin argues, “the teaching of music in the public schools should exert an influence in the upbuilding of character and affect for good the conduct of the children.” He continues by suggesting music “should have a restraining and refining influence upon character and conduct, and thus certain ethical value should accrue.” Baldwin’s argument assumes music is a moral force and as such is one that sees music as having utilitarian value. Bruno Ussher writes,

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47 Ralph Baldwin, “Efficiency in School Music, Teaching and Practical Test of Same,” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference, Seventh Annual Meeting Minneapolis, MN April 27 – May 1, 1914 (Privately printed, 1914), 43-48, 44. I am using the words moral and ethical interchangeably with the knowledge that this may displease any number of philosophers. So, while the substance of the terms appear as distinct, the implications of each are similar. Therefore, a single term is used that conflates the aims of the two, and that word is good. Ideas on moralism are manifest in Platonic ethos theory; the difference lies in the degree of value applied: inherent, instrumental, intrinsic.

48 Ibid.
“believing as I do in the educational, character-forming mission of music” leaving little doubt of his Platonic view of music. McConathy expressed similar sentiment by asserting, “Music should inspire to noble thoughts and feelings.” And for McConathy the idea of moral uplift was utilitarian. He suggests that since the Depression was having such a negative effect on the lives of people “music can contribute to the upbuilding of morale, to the steadying of nerves, to the welfare of our community.” The emphasis here is on the good that can be achieved through music.

Another example showing the issue with judgment that incorporates the moralist perspective is given by J.F. Messenger. His argument in “Living Humanities” is for music teachers to teach music to help students lead better, fuller, richer, and deeper lives. Music is part of our human nature and as such is a means to individual and societal improvement. Messenger writes, “I recognize the value of listening to good music, but that is not its greatest value…help me to develop a larger and nobler and sweeter personality. If music will do that, then music is good.” Messenger’s moralist bent moves away from utilitarianism toward instrumentalism. True, there is still the hint of having a noble mind, but his view is more general than the preceding perspectives of Baldwin and McConathy. The effect music has on the personality may lead to benefits for the individual and society, but he does not go so far as to propose a view that is fixed and final, he leaves it open. This is not the case for Baldwin and McConathy who make direct and practical connections to life. McConathy sees music being helpful in tough economic times and Baldwin speaks of ethical values as if they are currency stored up to

51 Ibid.
52 Messenger, “Living Humanities,” 56.
be spent in a practical manner. Messenger’s moralist stance is more instrumental and less utilitarian because the focus is in line with the argument from reduction. That is, the feelings aroused by contact with the object (music) causes good feelings, therefore, the object is good. Subsequently, the effect on the personality and feeling may be for good, but the good is not necessarily predetermined. The emphasis is on the idea that music can be moral rather than what the moral specifically leads to. Admittedly, this distinction between utilitarian and instrumental value is very fine, especially since moral issues are linked with utilitarianism. The distinction here is due to Messenger’s moralist position as it is proximally related to evaluation.

Mursell gives us one of the most developed arguments relating to music and morality in his *Human Values in Music Education*. In chapter five “Music as a Moral Force” Mursell’s basic claim is there must be a moral component to music education. He deviates, however, from an outright acceptance of a straightforward Platonists view. As a matter-of-fact he questions Plato’s supposition in *The Republic* that “the Ionian and Lydian modes [were] lax, effeminate and convivial.”53 Instead, Mursell asserts, “no music, good, bad or indifferent, has in itself any direct intrinsic magic, moral power.”54 For him “music is a moral force in education simply because it lends itself to the creation of morally and socially significant situations.”55 Mursell’s treatment of the topic of music and morality is thoughtful and well developed. He presents what he sees as fallacies on the topic and systematically undermines each view that he sees as incorrect.

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54 Ibid., 142. He also says “in view of the whole nature of music, as an art which can catch and convey emotion, but which cannot formulate ideas or doctrines, we are unable to resist the conclusion that, to attribute to it various kinds of intrinsic moral influence, is sheer superstition and mythology…we cannot magically expect, for instance, that it will magically transform a bad man into a good one; or that it is capable, alone, of preventing a child from sliding into a criminal career.” Ibid., 163-164.
55 Ibid., 142.
After he completes his critique of the subject of music and morality he advances his own view that shares elements from the argument from reduction, and inherent and instrumental explanations of value.

Mursell’s assertion regarding music and morality is “that music properly organized and presented is a constructive factor in human life. Music favors the kinds of attitudes leading to constructive and creative social adjustment and effective self-expression in a social medium.” Mursell takes from the argument of reduction the notion there are certain attitudes generated from contact with music, but this is as far as he develops his line of thinking here. From instrumentalism he assumes that there is some social and personal “adjustment” derived from the experience with music. Finally, in relation to inherent value, he follows his claim with a portion of the chapter that deals with the evaluation of music. For Mursell, it is only through music, more specifically “superior music,” that a certain type of experience is had. It is “superior music,” that favors “the kinds of attitudes” that can have a moral dimension; not mathematics for example.

Music is a specific kind of moral agent, a view linked with inherent value.

Mursell was not alone in his cautious attitude and perspective on music and morality. William Finn argued in 1917 that since music is “sense-impressive” it can, at least, relate to morality indirectly. Furthermore, “it must be concluded that great as the

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56 Ibid., 164. Bennett questions that supposed ethical implication of music in much the same way Mursell does. In fact, she cites Mursell’s work Human Values in Music Education. Like Mursell Bennett asserts “a careful study of morality, however, reveals quite clearly the fact that right and proper behavior does not come as the result of exposure to good things.” Bennett, “A Study of Aesthetic Values Inherent in Music and Music Education,” 146. She eventually espouses an inherent and instrumentalist position on value by using Dewey’s ideas from Art as Experience. The educated imagination in the aesthetic experience with music can be “an instrument of moral good.” Ibid., 148

57 Ibid., 165. Mursell describes what he means by superior music and explains how it is better at lending itself as a moral force than inferior music. His arguments are aligned with the genetic, affective, and objective reasons for judgment laid out by Beardsley.
potentialities of music may be, there is no definite ethical significance in its essence.”

In arriving at that conclusion, Finn questions the argument from reduction. For him, “there is no law of music structure by which a specific idea on a particular mood can be unvaryingly generated by specific sounds.” As an example he states, “there is no patriotism in ‘patriotic’ music save by association…there is no vernacular in the sayings of music. Nor can a lexicon be found for defining her speech.” So, for Mursell, Bennett, and Finn the analogy of the music/moral relationship is false, which is akin to Beardsley’s contention that “an analogy is not a causal connection,” further proof that philosophical matters were a part of the discourse of music educators from 1907 to 1958.

Philosophical perspectives also appear in the evidence in relation to the various ways of explaining value—intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian. To some extent these ways of explaining value appears in the discourse on moralism, specifically in the work of Messenger and Mursell. Quite often, however, arguments regarding intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian value surfaced that were unrelated to evaluation and went beyond the notion of music as a moral force. One view in particular rejected connection with any extramusical association.

The point of view that argues music has not extramusical associations is referred to variously as the position of the aesthete or the formalist or the absolutist. Aestheticism and formalism are views which insist the value of music is intrinsic. In other words music is for music’s sake, music has value “independently of any means-end-relation to

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59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
other objects." Purely formalistic statements regarding the intrinsic value of music are curiously absent. The cause of this paucity of material is due in part to music as necessarily relating to education. These writers and thinkers did not have the luxury of considering music as wholly separate from what was undertaken as a larger project, the education of students. It simply was not expedient for music educators in the public schools to make arguments in terms of value that music was only attached to itself. While these teachers could get away with making such statements on the topics of nature and meaning, the view of music only having intrinsic value is difficult to maintain in the school setting. Some music educators mention Bell and Hanslick in their writings but only in correlation to the nature and meaning of music. There is, in some cases, an awareness of the formalist perspective of value, but rarely are these positions advanced. Rather, when acknowledged, the view of intrinsic value is merely to call attention to another more practical and realistic perspective. Two brief examples follow. First, Earhart comments on the development of sensitivity to tone in music appreciation. The percipient ought to understand “the factors in music that make it music,” in order to better comprehend “the intrinsic value of compositions as compositions.” Second is from a resolution adopted by the MENC in New York, NY on April 2, 1936. In regard to the position of music in integration it was

reserved…that its greatest power lies in the intrinsic feeling and beauty and that the values peculiar to music should be carefully safeguarded whenever music is integrated with any other subject…such connections should always be used to enhance the meaning of music itself.

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Sometimes it is what is absent that gives us insight into what is present. Music for music’s sake is a challenging view to maintain in public school education.

Do not be fooled into thinking that the lack of evidence supporting the formalist or aesthetes point of view on value substantiates blanket utilitarian claims in music education. There is a middle ground between intrinsic and utilitarian perspectives where there is absolutely no shortage of evidence. In fact there are a number of instances where music educators make explicitly anti-utilitarian arguments on the topic of value. The philosophical working through of these ideas in the area between the intrinsicality and utility of music is no simple matter. Russell Morgan shows the difficulty by making an attempt to explain how music can aid the positive development of social values but does so while adhering to his “point that music can contribute its own worth-while values to human living without attempting to tie it up specifically with outward events.”

Morgan even goes on to rank the purposes of music education as “(1) Aesthetic Experience (2) Emotional Development (3) Creative Attitude (4) Social Values (5) Skills and Knowledge.” Inherent and instrumental notions of value occupy the middle ground between the aesthete and the utilitarian. The inherent position relies on a couple of key arguments to support claims of value for music in the classroom. First, music’s infungibility, or what Beardsley labels a “function class.” Music educators’ views on value as they are used to argue for music as important in education rest on the notion that it is only music that can accomplish what it does (whatever that may be) in the way it

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65 Ibid., 167.
66 Beardsley’s explanation is “there is something that aesthetic object can do that other things cannot do, or do as completely or fully.” Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 526.
does. Music cannot be replaced by math, literature, or the visual arts in this view.

According to a number of music educators, music is unique.

Charles Lake asks, “What is it that music may do that cannot be done better by some other subject?” For him music occupies a unique role in education because of its capacity to foster expressive and emotional growth. Much the same can be said about the views of Lewis Hilton. In addition to expressive and emotional growth, Hilton adds spiritual growth and the social nature of participation. In regard to possible social benefits of music Hilton questions whether the social benefits that may exist relating to participation are as great as those who support the notion claim they are, especially “since they may be equally attributable to membership in the pep squad, or playing with the Swiss handbell society.” He makes a case for the infungibility of music because “of the intrinsic values in music itself, not its byproducts.” Music as infungible, or function class, is one type of argument, and it connects with the second, which is music’s “immediate function is only to provide a certain kind of experience that can be enjoyed in itself.” The “certain kind of experience” may be moving, a spiritual connection, a type of sensuous excitement, or imaginative discovery; regardless, it is the specific nature of music that ensures the unique experience is had. For an adherent of inherent value, the experience is largely self-contained.

At the 1915 MSNC conference Gehrkins delivered a paper titled “Ultimate Ends in Public School Music Teaching” to which there were follow up addresses to his initial

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69 Ibid.
70 Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 572.
report on the topic. Gehrkens lays out a number of normative questions with the aim of encouraging the field to be more reflexive and to wrestle with issues of value that hopefully lead to a clearer statement of purpose. One of the main topics of discussion was where the emphasis on the teaching of music should be; intellectual, emotional, aesthetic and cultural.”

George Wilmot weighs in on the topic by asking “whether we should devote very much time to the aesthetic side of music in the grammar schools, [sic] if we have to sacrifice too much of the technical worth to do so.” Farnsworth disagrees. For him the teaching of music should awaken feeling rather than emphasize how it is constituted. More specifically, and in relation to inherent value, “the intellectual element of analysis is in the aesthetic process merely as a means to the end of helping the mind grasp all that we hear and see in an art-work.” Notice the implied difference in his statement between intrinsic and inherent value. An educator of more formalist bent sees the construction of music and its analysis as being intellectual, and in this case the way music should be valued. To someone like Farnsworth, who thinks of music having inherent value it is what the music generates as a result of that specific experience with it that is to be valued, and therefore emphasized. Farnsworth’s “Ultimate End” of music teaching is “stronger feeling, not further knowledge.” His suggestion that music teaching should emphasize stronger feeling precedes Langer’s assertion that the inherent

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72 Wilmot does not recommend teaching “to the aesthetic and emotional side of the child’s nature.” Instead he supports the teaching of the technical side which he conflates with intellectual training. The aesthetic for him deals with the soft, the abstract, and the unclear and as such is difficult to quantify. This was also an argument over method, not just value, and what method was superior in bringing about more musical students. George Wilmot comments on “Ultimate Ends,” 58.
73 Charles Farnsworth, comments on “Ultimate Ends,” 59.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid. At this point in time feeling was not seen as any type of knowledge. And while it is still questioned whether feeling is or is not knowledge in the epistemic sense, the debate was moved along by Langer who asserted music gives insight into “how feelings go.” Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 244.
value of music is “the education of feeling, as our usual schooling in factual subjects…is the education of thought,” ideas which would be incorporated into the MEAE movement. Additionally, Farnsworth’s use of the term aesthetic implies nature, meaning, and value are elements in the process of musical analysis and understanding. Discussion and debate on the topic of value did not end here.

Julia Crane’s answer to the question of music’s “ultimate end” squarely placed her in the utilitarian camp. Her response on the value of music was “to produce a higher quality citizenship.” Not all of the panel discussants agreed, however, and each subsequent response backs slowly away from Crane’s claim. Thaddeus Giddings, for example, who acknowledges that education in general is to make productive citizens asserts, “the ultimate end of school music is to make the pupil as musical as possible.” He backs away from pure utilitarian claims for music by infusing a hint of instrumentalism. Yes, citizenship is important, but it is through a child’s study of music that he will, according to Giddings, also understand and appreciate music as music apart from specific fixed ends-in-view. I am not arguing that Giddings was an instrumentalist but merely suggesting that his statement begins to back away from a purely utilitarian motive for music education because he makes a distinction between music and general education where musical ends are also valued.

Backing still further away from Crane’s purely utilitarian perspective is Farnsworth who, once again, states that music teaching’s ultimate end “is that music

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77 Julia Crane, comments on “Ultimate Ends,” 65.
78 Thaddeus Giddings comment on “Ultimate Ends,” 67.
79 Giddings does not elaborate on what a productive citizen looks like.
should do for the child musically what training in the other branches of study does with reference to those subjects.”

He continues, “Music teaching should prepare the child for his present and future musical needs.” His focus is on inherent value in music, not citizenship or better math students. George Bowen echoes Farnsworth’s basic premise but does so from an instrumentalist perspective. Bowen argues the ultimate ends “are the cultural, the ethical, the educational values which are secured through a proper appreciation of value.” In the body of his response Bowen shows support for each of the components of his thesis. One example of music being instrumentally valuable is in relation to “the cultural.” The cultural allows for spiritual development and “a fuller understanding of things which pertain to the soul.” The notion of spiritual development does not necessarily inhere in the music, but it is through contact with music in the experience that music becomes a means to an end that is not fixed, final, or even practical. In this case the amorphous end is spiritual development. The differences between inherent and instrumental value as I mentioned in chapter two are blurry.

Spiritual development, for Bowen and the German idealists, is an instrumental value because music “is a means to the production of an object [spiritualness] with inherent value.” Thus, the production of spiritualness or spiritual development comes as a result of contact with music, and for Bowen spiritual development and spiritualness also have inherent value. If Bowen embraced the inherent value of music, then spiritual development would have to be something found in music; it would have to be something

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80 Charles Farnsworth comment on “Ultimate Ends,” 68.
81 Ibid.
82 George Bowen comment on “Ultimate Ends,” 71. Bowen restates his thesis on page 74 and exchanges the word “proper” for “intelligent.”
83 Ibid., 71.
84 Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 547.
that could not be separated from the substance of music itself. The instrumental value of music is due to music’s being a medium through which emotions, feelings, and moods can be expressed. Instrumental value implies there is an outward movement a value emanating from the music with the music being necessary for such a projection to happen. Inherent value has the experience of music moving inward and becoming inseparable with the qualities in the music itself. The discussion in music education certainly did not clear up perspectives on the type of value music has.

What the debate did encourage was further discussion and articulation of the ultimate ends of public school music. At the conclusion of the paper, panel discussion, and audience discussion Gehrkens crafted a statement sure to generate papers and discussions on what is important in music education.85 For this early group of music education scholars

the ultimate aim of music teaching in the public schools is to cause children to know, to love and to appreciate music in as many forms as possible, and thus to bring added joy into their lives and added culture and refinement into their natures.86

Finally, what music teachers were to emphasize was the “emotional and aesthetic phases of music which constitute the real essence of the art; in other words that it is the art side of music with its somewhat intangible influences which we are seeking to cultivate.”87 Gehrkens concluding proclamation rests on inherent and instrumental notions of value. It is not a declaration infatuated with utilitarianism.

Statements made by music educators supporting inherent and instrumentalist value positions often argued against utilitarian claims for music. Frank Beach’s 1922

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85 The MEAE movement was in many ways a movement that sought, and in some manner provided, an answer to the ultimate ends question.
86 Karl Gehrkens comment on “Ultimate Ends,” 75.
87 Ibid. Italics in the original.
presidential address was about the relationship between music and “new education.” The “new education” he refers to consists of ideas pulled from the pedagogical progressive education movement, which generally saw the value of education in instrumental terms. That is, the ends-in-view of education were not fixed or final. Beach’s examination and acceptance of the “new education” led him to assert “a narrow utilitarian view of education stunts the growth of those brought under its influence.”

Implying music education he says of so-called new education, it “stresses the importance of education for itself rather than as a means to an end, commercial or otherwise.” Echoing a similar sentiment Earhart, quoting Ruskin, writes the focus of education is so-often “advancement in life…it never seems to occur to the parent that there may be an education which, in itself, is advancement in Life.” Music is more than a worthy use of leisure or a handmaiden for other utilitarian interests, according to Earhart. Music will not achieve its highest aims until it shakes itself loose from such base ideas. Earhart sees the theory that relates the teaching of music to “social needs or social utilities” as inadequate. He asserts that this view offers a static conception of life instead of a progressive one where movement “come[s] from men who had visions of principles far above utility.” Earhart is also critical of music as a worthy use of leisure. Other than an indictment of a societal disconnect between work and interests, Earhart says music “is not merely the pastime of an occasional hour but is an influence that may persist in the whole

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89 Ibid., 25.
91 Ibid., 47-48.
92 Ibid., 48.
93 Ibid.
affective state of an individual.”  

It is reference to the idea of music as a worthy use of leisure that Earhart applies the idea of music as a function class or infungible. If music is only for leisure, how is it any different than billiards? These comments on the place of music in life and music as an art whose influence is intangible and difficult to measure questions the wisdom of the efforts by so called administrative progressives who sought to manage schools using Fordist efficiency models.

Another instance of the debate over the value of music occurred at the 1927 Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association Discussion Group on Music Education meeting. The reprint of the meeting is included in the 1927 MSNC Yearbook published later that year. The discussion topic was “A New Evaluation of Music in the Curriculum.” Dykema gave opening remarks highlighting the instrumental and utilitarian values used by music educators since 1838, and eventually asked, “What are the values of music?” Some members of the committee had already assumed at this point that music’s place in the schools was important as a “citizenship developing medium,” an overtly utilitarian claim. The most philosophical treatment of the subject of value in music came from Earhart, who mentions by name Schopenhauer, Bergson, James, Bell, and Gurney. He argues “that whenever we speak of value at all we must speak in terms of subjective testimony.” While he mentions music as a socializing force, a utilitarian value, and vocational value, also utilitarian, these are not the most

94 Ibid., 49
95 Ibid. He uses this comparison as a call to avoid cheapening what is for him something very important.
97 Ibid., 28-29.
important kinds of value, although they do contribute to the greater value. Relying on his broader notion of value and using the work of Vernon Lee, he makes a distinction between the good and the useful in relation to the beautiful, which is a highly philosophical question. Basically, his analysis highlights the difference between utilitarianism and the inherent and/or instrumentalist views on the value of music.

Without belaboring the point too much, good implies a usefulness, but that may not be the case for beauty since beauty may have no use; it may simply be enjoyed in the moment. “The beautiful is thus distinguished by the fact that it holds not future advantage but present value.” This statement alone throws into question the idea of utilitarian value because this view of value relies on consequences which follow the experience. The instrumentalist, however, can accept this position based on the doctrine of immediacy, that is, it is “something that is immediately experienced and known.”

Earhart’s view also reflects aspects of inherent perspectives on value because the experience with the object, music in this case, “has taken us utterly into it” Echoing beauty theory, Earhart asserts music has a particular kind of value. It is of the beautiful “but instead of being understood as beauty [it] has been popularly conceived as emotion.” Earhart also gives a pointed critique of utility. He asks, “shall we continue to believe that utilitarian thought and labor, if only spurred more feverishly so as to produce more tonnage, will bring about the millennium it so long has promised? Do we

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99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 36.
101 Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 534.
103 Ibid., 38. For Earhart even words have tainted the essence and meaning of music, a formalist view, at least in relation to nature and meaning.
not know that self-interest breeds self-interest, that utilitarianism breeds utilitarianism, even as war breeds war.\textsuperscript{104}

Anton Embs, president of the North Central Music Educators Conference, is also dismayed with the pervasive administrative progressive’s view of musical utility. He relates a story of a superintendent who considered the school band primarily as “an adjunct of athletics.”\textsuperscript{105} Embs’ response to this view of the band was “public school music is thus reduced to the status of mere utility; it is not an educational factor at all but a ‘servant in the house,’ tolerated only for the service it can render!”\textsuperscript{106} In the same yearbook there is a paper by Dykema titled “The Re-Evaluation of School Music.” In this document he references four views on the value of music to show how ill-defined, understood, and vague the notion’s of music’s ultimate purpose in schools is. Dykema’s paper is a call to action. “It is time that we started to study what music is doing to affect life and that we stated the results of our study in definite convincing form.”\textsuperscript{107} What he wanted from such a study was already concluded in his mind, and it is quite the opposite of what Embs and Earhart rejected, which is no surprise since Dykema’s work in music education focused a great deal on the administrative side of schooling. For Dykema music is part of the educational scheme for what it could allegedly do. More specifically the

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the final standard of value is the connecting of music with life, with citizenship—those are the means by which we will justify our subject and ourselves, by showing that music can help to develop finer men and women who will aid in carrying out the purpose for which these United States were founded.\textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{105} Embs “Public School Music: Education or Recreation,” 172.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 358.
Dykema’s views on value, then, are more consistent with administrative progressives, which are utilitarian.

The debate over value is ubiquitous. During the Depression years the tenor of the debate did not vary much. To put it another way the ongoing back and forth that had ensued between the pedagogical progressives, who largely embraced instrumentalist and/or inherent views on value, and administrative progressives, who embraced utilitarian views, continued to focus on the question of whether art had “social value or artistic value.” While it is difficult to say with absolute certainty that the Depression led to more acceptance of inherent and instrumentalist views of music what comes across in the evidence of some music educators is disillusionment with the obsession that music could help generate more productive citizens. Some writers used the challenges of the time to make certain claims for valuing music in a particular way, but there were just as many supporting one side of the debates as there were the other even as much of the industrial world sagged. Music for some was an escape; it offered solace, and, therefore, brought about questions relating to value in a way that drew attention away from an overbearing focus on material concerns. It is during the Depression that Earhart begins his book *The Meaning and Teaching of Music* with a critique of modern industrial society. This lengthy quote encapsulates Earhart’s concerns in context:

> The disarray with which the world now faces a partial retreat from a robust industrial faith, and the sense it gives us turning from a full and vivid world to one that is somewhat empty and very strange, may possibly be thus explained. In the rational and mechanistic world to which we have become accustomed, we have not been thinking primarily of men as human beings, but have rather considered them as employees and employers, producers and consumers, as an abstraction called the ‘economic man’—in short as industrial and economic units. The thinking, feeling, willing, human being, full of desires, imaginations, aspirations,
impulses both fine and foolish, has not been foremost in our thought. Now we must become acquainted with him again. It will probably take a long time.\textsuperscript{110}

Earhart’s take on value in this book reflects his earlier views on the subject, so it would be difficult to argue that the Depression altered his perspective. In Earhart’s case the Depression was used to place his argument in greater relief, the argument that music’s value is inherent.

Published in 1934, Mursell’s \textit{Human Values in Music Education} has a largely instrumentalist take on value. Unlike Earhart the views in Mursell’s book, also written during the Depression, display his notion of “human values” with an instrumentalist and sometimes utilitarian bent. Mursell writes, “music in a vacuum, music for itself alone, music as a show, loses enormously in artistic values. In proportion as it becomes woven into the texture of our daily living it acquires a new artistic significance.”\textsuperscript{111} For Mursell the human value of music “enables one to live more richly and completely; to be a stronger, better, happier, more cooperative person; to succeed more fully in the business of being human.”\textsuperscript{112} The specific “human values” he systematically evaluates are individual, moral, and social.\textsuperscript{113} In relation to the individual music is to be valued because it is a cultural inheritance and it is an emotional experience, that is “education in and through music must mean, first of all, participation in noble and humanizing emotion.”\textsuperscript{114} He also asserts that music ought to be a means to “educate children for emotional stability and permanent happiness.”\textsuperscript{115} The effects of musical experience on

\textsuperscript{110} Earhart, \textit{The Meaning and Teaching of Music}, 16-17.
\textsuperscript{111} Mursell, \textit{Human Values in Music Education}, 19.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{113} Morality was mentioned earlier in this chapter so it will not be mentioned again here.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 36.
the individual bring about a certain emotional and cultural relevancy. The end-in-view presented by Mursell here has the quality of being wide-ranging as well as particular.

The ends-in-view from Mursell’s perspective of the social value of music are also practical. It is on the topic of social value, specifically the notion that music is a worthy use of leisure, that Mursell’s thoughts differ from Earhart’s. Earhart saw the idea of music as a worthy use of leisure as problematic and a disconnect between work and life. Furthermore, social utility theories and ideas that support the view music is a worthy use of leisure neglect that life is a unified whole, and the affective influence of music is far more than just on occurrence during leisure time.116 Mursell, while using similar language, sees the leisure time activity of music as socially valuable.

Music can do much to meet the social needs and the personal problems created by the growth of routine jobs…it is one of the human occupations best adapted to such a use because of its great personal richness as an individual experience, and also because it is enjoyed on such a wide variety of occasions.117

The differences between Mursell and Earhart highlight each scholar’s distinctive take on the importance of music. Each claims that music is important in human life. Mursell’s view places music as a kind of adjunct for what really matters in life, work. Music’s value, then, is utilitarian because it helps the worker cope with the drudgery of the daily routine. Earhart’s view on this topic is instrumental because it seeks to fuse music into everyday life, into a unified whole.

Earhart also had more to say on the topic of social value. In his “What Place Have Cultural Values in Education” from 1933, he states the difference between materialistic, utilitarian, technological and rational, on one hand, and the cultural and aesthetic on the

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117 Mursell, Human Values in Music Education, 75.
other, lies in a fundamental difference of views about man and his world.”

For Earhart the aesthetic cannot be utilitarian. The “materialistic, utilitarian, and technological” are “valued because of their power to bring us something else that they themselves are not.” This is not the case for music because it is “one direct and immediate satisfaction of higher human needs.” Again, the doctrine of immediacy places his ideas on why music matters in the instrumentalist camp.

Farnsworth also addresses the question of social value. In “How Music Educates” he posits “what its value is to the race.” He philosophically questions if the value of music is pleasure that is attached to it. While pleasure is a value, it is not the ultimate aim of music at least in terms of “sensuous pleasure felt.” The ultimate value of music according to Farnsworth is its “ministering to the spiritual side of our natures.” His explanation of music’s value is one where music possesses inherent value. Connection with our spiritual nature, in the German idealist tradition, is both a valuable end and a means in which the spiritual nature of music is internal to that end. Similarly, Gehrkens writes in his 1923 president’s address, “the chief value of music lies in its effect upon the spiritual life of the individual.” Again, an espousal of the inherent value of music. In fact, he makes a statement distinguishing his view on value from instrumentalist and utilitarian views. Gehrkens argues, “Music must not, however, be thought of principally

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118 Will Earhart, “What Place Have Cultural Values in Education,” Series 1 – Writings, February 6, 1933 1-5, 4. In a handwritten note on page 5 Earhart pens “a fragment projected but never used.”

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.


122 Ibid., 33.

123 Ibid.

as a mind trainer, as a therapeutic agent, or as a religious or socializing force.”\textsuperscript{125} Music for many of these music educators occupies a unique role in education.

Just what unique role music has is at the heart of the issues on value. Perspectives have been influenced by contemporary events. The debate over a particular value of music continued throughout the period uninterrupted, but it is during World War II and the post war years that the voice of those arguing music’s value, especially in education, was primarily utilitarian. Arguments from the utilitarian perspective were present in the field ever since 1838, but it is during the war that there was a definite, intensified, and concerted effort to justify music’s value along these lines. In fact, there were various projects such as the Victory Corps Project, and The Schools at War Project where the value of music was based on utilitarian claims.\textsuperscript{126}

Utilitarian claims for music education during WWII were omnipresent. Even before the United States officially entered the war music educators were taking notice of the pressures of an ensuing war. In response to the developing events of the time, the Board of Directors of the MENC adopted as their theme in 1940 for the current two year period “Unity Through Music.” By 1941 the idea developed into “American Unity Through Music.” A general outline of this project is in the March-April 1941 issue of the Music Educators Journal. In a baldly utilitarian statement the committee responsible to the writing of this article said

On the vast tidal surge of patriotic fervor now swelling to every nook and corner of our country, our people can be united positively and idealistically through music, thus averting the inculcation of base or even beastly thoughts that accompany hate, hysteria, and fear. With music we can help to generate and mobilize the thoughts and feeling which spring from deserved pride in our country. With music we can build and sustain morale. Such building for better

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Pitts, “Creative Music and the War,” 7-8.
citizenship on the part of our entire populace, in and out of training camps, is quite as important as man power, machines, and guns. This statement is followed by an outline of “specific music activities for defense,” which includes such things as singing patriotic songs “fervently,” and arranging parades “using music in keeping with the unity themes.” Tucked in near the end of the report is an acknowledgement that these aims for music are “practical and nationalistic,” but music educators are also encouraged to remember “that without providing a measure of joy and beauty to which these other ends must be subservient, we defeat the very purpose we set out to achieve.” This group of music educators hoped to have it both ways in terms of value. As if to say “We understand that music can have utilitarian value, but even at this time we do not want it to have too much.”

The work of the committee and that of other music educators, however, continued to contain strong utilitarian value claims for music. For instance, Glenn Gildersleeve, chairman of the MENC Committee on American Unity Through Music, encourages teachers to submit material to the MEJ that may be helpful to others so they might be “led to think, feel, and act together.” He asserts, “Only through organized effort on our part will music be made most effective in sustaining morale and promoting National Unity.” Pitts, another committee member argues “music performs its greatest service

128 Ibid., 11.
129 Ibid., 13. A piece by Burton Paulu, written in the post war period, outlined a brief history that showed how music was used during the war as a propaganda tool. Paulu was critical of the general view taken by music educators as effective propaganda because of “its extrinsic or extra-musical associations. These, of course, we did not create they were already attached to the music.” Burton Paulu, “Music—War’s New Weapon,” Music Educators Journal 35, 4 (February-March 1949): 25, 55-57, 25.
131 Ibid.
when used by all of a people to communicate and to further their common purpose and ideals.”¹³² And L. Bruce Jones in “How Can the School Band Serve in Defense?” writes, “We must, for instance, include more music in our rehearsal and concert repertories that express patriotism, love of country, and the ideals for which this nation stands.”¹³³ Charles Dennis even goes so far to suggest that a soldier is more valuable if he is musical.¹³⁴ As part of the Schools at War Project the Music in the Service of Schools at War Committee printed in the 1944 MEJ an excerpt from a Treasury Department bulletin that encouraged the MENC to figure out ways schools could contribute to the cause.

What the committee encouraged in essence was hyper-utilitarianism. The charge given was to use music to help sell war bonds. This would be achieved “directly, through the concert admission charge of a bond or stamp. Indirectly, through helping build a sense of community solidarity.”¹³⁵ These are just a few of the documents during the World War II era that answer the question of music’s importance with utilitarian claims.

The utilitarian perspectives on value were prevalent in the literature, of which these are a mere smattering. There was, however, the occasional cautionary voice who questioned the degree to which music was being put in service to support the war. In 1941, just before the start of the war Hanson anticipated the demands and expectations society would place on music education in the very near future. His request of music educators was to be true to the values of music education, especially since he saw it as

“the greatest educator of the emotions.” In a measured tone with hints of German idealism Hanson advises music educators to carefully adhere to music’s primary aims. He writes

As we go into the program of national defense which is occupying so much of our thought, we must see to it that the emphasis upon national defense does not leave us spiritually bankrupt. We must preserve our ideals…in saving our bodies we must not lose our souls.

Hanson’s statement shows far less of a utilitarian mindset than those of his fellow committee members on the American Unity Through Music project.

Also unsure about values adopted for music in music education during the war, Lillian Baldwin calls for continuity that links pre-war, war, and post-war perspectives on the importance of music. In other words music educators ought to continue to emphasize the emotional and spiritual aspects of music, which is extremely important for children growing up during these tumultuous times. Using the war as a backdrop Charles Seeger is curious to see what music programs will look like in schools at war’s end.

Seeger’s historical assessment of the value and purpose of music in the United States during the last century runs counter to Mark’s thesis that the philosophy of music education was the culmination of a thousand years of utilitarianism. Seeger writes of the purpose and value that

after a century of music as a ‘good in itself,’ we swing into a program of music as ‘good for something’…in one decision the supreme criteria of ‘beauty for beauty’s sake,’ ‘music for aesthetic pleasure’…have been, at least temporarily, held in abeyance or proved false.

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136 Hanson, “The Democratization of Music,” 14.
137 Ibid. Italics in the original.
Seeger’s comments are not meant to lament the change but rather to show the influence the war had and will continue to have on culture and music education in the United States.

Although the combat ended in World War II, utilitarian views on the value of music continued. Furthering utilitarian perspectives were due in part to the new conflict that emerged following WWII, the Cold War. The hyper-utilitarian views held over from WWII were slightly transformed with ideology that stressed the United States’ way of life was in jeopardy. The United States had just concluded four years of armed struggle, and it appeared as if the country was moving from one crisis to another. Like many other citizens music educators were aware of the newly perceived challenge even with the relative calm in the immediate post-war years. Making adjustments to utilitarian perspectives on value merely required slight reorganization of the existing view to meet the new conflict. One particular adjustment during this period is the emphasis placed on utilitarianism in relation to democracy. That is, democracy is identified and considered to be specifically attached to utilitarianism and utilitarian goals.¹⁴⁰

Earnest Melby explores how the term freedom is used in contemporary language as compared to how it is applied, specifically as it relates to creativity. After lamenting the affects of McCarthyism and the present fear of the Soviet Union, he lauds the ideas of John Foster Dulles.¹⁴¹ What did this mean for music? For Melby this meant a rejection of aestheticism. For him, “the preservation of freedom is everybody’s job.”¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Further distinctions in this period of history between the utility of democratic living and utility for economic ends is an area that warrants further research.
¹⁴¹ Melby must not have been aware at the time that the work Dulles was doing in Guatemala on behalf of the United Fruit Company was undermining the freedom of the Guatemalans.
Ralph Rush, outgoing president of the MENC in 1954, wrote an article titled “Music Education in a Democracy.” In it he discussed “the task of developing music education for democratic participation and leadership.” For Rush “Music, like democracy, is a way of life; both are expressions of an inner vision of an ideal in peaceful happy living.” Music, for many of these music educators was necessarily attached to ends which were practical and had social, political, moral and/or economic effects for the participant.

Much like the utilitarian claims for music that persisted after the war, so too did questions about this kind of value for music. Immediately following the war James Nickerson examines music programs during the war and offers a critical evolution of his findings with the aim of drawing on lessons learned to advance music’s future. Nickerson was concerned with what he saw as “an uncritical acceptance of wartime music.” This so-called uncritical acceptance “revealed many careless judgments and careless practices.” Furthermore, he argues, “There has been a tending to emotionalize about the power of music. As teachers we have plead the cause of music as a morale booster.” Nickerson is critical of these utilitarian associations for music because he recognizes the value of music from an instrumentalist bent. For him, “Music as a factor in personal adjustment can stand on its own merits and does not need extravagant statements.”

144 Ibid., 23.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
Karl Ernst acknowledges the difficult position music has in general education by highlighting two perspectives on music’s value. Citing material from two different journals, *Educational Music Magazine* and *Musical America*, he brings to the attention of the reader that school administrators criticize music teachers for not placing enough emphasis on the social values of music, and musicians criticize music teaching for focusing too much on the extramusical.\(^{149}\) Picking up on an aspect of the above problem, Ernst recognizes that groups such as the National Association of Secondary School Principals have argued music contributes to good citizenship and a fuller life.\(^{150}\) He rhetorically asks, “Does it? Are students in our classes better integrated than those who are not?”\(^{151}\) He asks the question in such a way that the reader is supposed to understand he wants music educators to accept responsibility for teaching the subject both as a unique subject and as an integrated part of a larger whole. His view moved him away from a solely utilitarian perspective on value to one that includes the inherent and instrumentalist outlooks. It is not enough to teach music for its social, moral, or political effects; music must, if taught properly also coincide with values that are inherent in it such as sensuous excitement or imaginative discovery.

The issue of the purpose and importance of music and music education were at the heart of the work of The Commission of Basic Concepts. One member of that commission, Benn, dealt directly with the topic of aesthetics and value two years prior to the publication of *Basic Concepts of Music Education: The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part 1*. In her “Esthetics for the Music Educator: The Maturation of the Esthetic Sense” she asks, “whether or not art exists for

\(^{149}\) Ernst, “Where Do We Go From Here?” 17-18.  
\(^{150}\) Ibid., 19.  
\(^{151}\) Ibid.
its own sake or for the sake of man?"152 Her development of a partial answer is a complete rejection of utilitarianism. For her,

Music must remain music…if music is in the schools as a subject to be taught, as mathematics, or literature, or science are subjects to be taught, we are not permitted to change its nature from that which all musicians recognize as music. If we do so change it, we are morally, ethically, esthetically, and pedagogically suspect…we must stimulate children toward more musically impressive performance, making them aware of musical ends involved.153

She concludes her paper with a look to the future. The future of music education for her is one where “musical sensitivity” and “esthetic discrimination” are at the heart of the endeavor, there is absolutely no mention of teaching for political or social improvement.

William Schumann struck a chord by taking a stand on the value of music as being specifically musical. Like Benn, but more specific, Schumann questions the value of music along social and therapeutic lines. He criticizes music teachers for focusing too much on the extramusical. What he sees as an overemphasis on a misguided perspective of the value of music has resulted in declining standards of musicianship and performance. He asserts, “Any performance of a piece of music which is unmusical in its projection, and falls below acceptable technical and aesthetic standards, does harm to the art of music.”154 For Schumann it is the music that is important in a formalist sense, and the teacher who claims to be a musician will ensure its value is properly placed.

Theodore Normann’s rebuttal to Schumann rested on an understanding that music is in the schools “because of what it can do for, in, and to people in terms of human

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153 Ibid., 131.
Normann cites the existing difference on value as being rooted in two differing philosophies of music. The first he calls isolationist (aestheticism in this dissertation). The second philosophy is contextualist, or those who assert “art for people’s sake.” The second position is in line with the instrumental views on value. For Normann, “We should not be so concerned with the isolationist’s concern with ‘doing a disservice to the art of music’ but more importantly with the contextualist’s position of doing service to our students through music.”

His statements about the value of music are instrumental.

Since music was an established component of the general curriculum, arguments for its value focused on both keeping it there and the best way to achieve that. The evidence presented thus far has included intrinsic, inherent, instrumentalist, and utilitarian views on both aspects of the place of music, that is, first as an important subject among the other school subjects but also on what basis its value genuinely existed. To put it another way, music should be in the schools because of X where the varieties of X (intrinsic, inherent, instrumental or utilitarian value) were debated as to which was the most appropriate for X. In addition to the issues relating to value already mentioned, there are additional arguments that warrant distinction.

Beyond the argument of the moralist, the aesthete, and in the German idealist tradition—seen in inherent and instrumental theories of value in music education of the

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156 Ibid., 20.

157 Ibid., 21. Parker LeBach also responded to the Schumann article. He sides with Schumann ending his paper by asking, “Is it possible to maintain a valid philosophy of music education unless the *art of music itself* is honored as the central pillar around which our work acquires its unique value and meaning?” Parker LeBach “Why We are Criticized: A Music Educator’s Analysis,” *Music Educators Journal* 43, 2 (November-December 1956): 18-19, 19. Italics in the original.
time—other specific views require attention as distinctive cases on the intrinsic/extrinsic spectrum. While each falls somewhere on the spectrum, these additional arguments draw on the work of specific theories proposed by philosophers who considered the value of music. The ideas of Aristotle, Collingwood, and from socioaesthetics occupy the final section in this chapter.

Catharsis has value because particular emotions could, through the music as representation of an emotion, be purged and released. Aristotle’s inherent view on value is an early break from the utilitarian views of Plato. Catharsis is a response to a direct revelation of reality, and as such has inherent value. One example of this particular notion of value is seen in Paul Diederich’s evaluation of the Eight Year Study at its first quarter mark. Diederich remarks, “One of the original purposes of this study was to permit the arts, which had been crowded out of the program by college requirements, to assume their proper role in the education of adolescents.”  

One of the aspects of the program as it relates to the arts, including music, is to evaluate three primary “objectives of work in the arts.” The three objectives the research sets up as being integral, important, and valuable to study in the arts are: “(1) sensitivity to beauty…(2) the creative process, and its results in the discovery and clarification of new meanings in nature and in art…(3) emotional adjustment, resulting from the release of tensions.” Unfortunately it is in the third “objective” that “we have nothing very tangible yet to report.” However, the fact that this third so-called objective is in the study is evidence

159 Ibid., 396.
160 Ibid. italics in the original.
161 Ibid., 398.
that Aristotelian catharsis was important enough for these researchers to include in their work trusting it has value.

Catharsis is also one of several values Carleton Stewart argues coincides with the playing of an instrument in orchestra. First on his list of value is that music is an “emotional outlet that is essential for well balanced living.”\(^{162}\) Stewart’s examples reflect rather than develop particular philosophical views on value. In “Music Education for Health” catharsis is the basis on which E. Thayer Gaston promotes the value of teaching music. Citing a number of sources that are from the discipline of psychology, Gaston concludes that music education helps students “to look to music for catharsis of undue tension and relief from worry.”\(^{163}\) The premise for his argument is as follows: “the basic reason for the arts [music] throughout the history of mankind has been the resultant mental hygiene benefits.”\(^{164}\) Music’s inherent value is in part psychological, an idea that goes as far back as Aristotle.

Aristotle’s influence resurfaces in a class discussion led by Pitts. The class discussed different kinds of value music has for “young people.”\(^{165}\) The value of music as seen in the notes is “Recreation,” “Amusement,” “Release,” “Solace and Comfort;” it also has value as an “experience,” “creative self-expression,” “Group activity,” and

\(^{162}\) Carleton Stewart “A Word for the High School Orchestra,” *Music Educators Journal* 30, 3 (January 1944), 31. In addition to emotional release, Stewart also asserts the experience of performance has value because it is a “cultural force…it offers social benefits…it trains him in self-discipline…the experience of working with others…is develops self-reliance.” Italics in the original.


\(^{165}\) Lilla Belle Pitts, Series 1 – Classroom Music, [ca. 1928-1956], Special Collections in Performing Arts, Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.
The notes made on the value of music as release include the idea that music is a “release from the irksome, the factual, the humdrum and commonplace.”\textsuperscript{167} While not well developed (the class discussion itself may have given further clarity) notions of music having cathartic value exist in the evidence. Here, again, is an example where philosophical views underpin conversations about value.

Aristotle’s theory on the value of music as catharsis is often connected with inherent value. Collingwood’s assertion that music is valuable because it leads to self-discovery and self knowledge of our emotional state, like catharsis, also arises in the evidence. Collingwood’s point of view places his ideas in line with those supporting the idea that music’s value is inherent, or at most instrumentalist. In 1910, in a paper that predates Collingwood’s \textit{The Principles of Art} but is in no way nearly as developed, J.S. Collins writes that the value of music lies, in part, in its “power to translate the conventional symbols of musical notation into the sounds they are intended to represent [which] means the power to read into one’s own mind and life the thought and feeling of another.”\textsuperscript{168} The majority of uses of self-knowledge as a value, however, appear in the evidence after the publication of Collingwood’s first edition of \textit{The Principles of Art} in 1938.

Using Collingwood-like arguments, Francis Horn writes the value of music is beyond Platonic notions of worth.\textsuperscript{169} Horn asserts, “Music does more: it contributes to one’s knowledge of himself and his fellow-men, to his sense of values about life and its

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
meaning.” It is on this basis that music deserves a place in general education, claims which go against the standard interpretation that music justified its place in the curriculum only in conjunction with utilitarian thought. With a similar sentiment to Horn Raymond Reed espouses, “The arts that embody emotional participation come the nearest…to man better understanding himself.” Again, the alignment with Collingwood is reflected in the work, but it could stand further development especially since he includes elements from German idealism and other hints of instrumental value. The most developed material that relates to Collingwood comes from Pitts.

Likely written between 1938 and 1954 is a paper with the heading “How-to (Know-How).” Pitts explores “keeping ends and means in proper relationship” in the education of children. With reference to the former she asks two questions: are music educators “to nurture and develop the latent musical expressive power that is born in every child” or is “the end in music to be that of equipping children and young people with fixed amounts of knowledge?” Her answer to the first question uses an idea from Collingwood in explaining what the means are to the ends of “developing the latent musical expressive power.” The art of making music is a child’s “only means of exploring and discovering themselves—of finding out (or acting out) the meanings of life and themselves.” In relation to this comment, she continues by talking about general

170 Ibid.
172 Lilla Belle Pitts, Series 1 – Classroom Music, [ca. 1928-1956], Special Collections in Performing Arts, Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. Underline in the original.
173 Ibid. Underline in the original.
174 Ibid.
human values in music. For her the arts are a “means of cultivating sympathetic insight into one’s own relations to life.” Again, echoes of Collingwood surface, but it is unclear if she ever read Collingwood and much of her work in music education did not follow these ideas here which reflect a view that art is valued because it is self-knowledge.

It is also not clear if Carroll Reed read the work of Aristotle or anything in socioaesthetics, but ideas of each, especially the latter, arise in his “Difficulties in Comparative Measurement of Factual and Aesthetic Values.” Reed refers to the Seashore test and the Kwalwasser-Rush test that can adequately measure a student’s understanding of basic concepts in music such as pitch, rhythm, and recognition of tunes from note reading. Reed suggests, however, that while items such as pitch and rhythm are factual and as such can be measured, there is another set of values, the aesthetic, that “evade measurement but which always seem to be a driving force behind general aesthetic understandings and expression.” For Reed the teaching of music ought to contain both sets of values, the factual and the aesthetic. He argues this point because one cannot exist in isolation from the other. So, even though a teacher or administrator cannot measure such things as “personal enjoyment,” “depth of personal feeling,” or “creative stimulation which carries out into life,” it does not mean these should be cast aside. To support his argument Reed relies on the socioaesthetic perspective. He writes,

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175 Her reference to human values may be a slight nod to Mursell, a colleague of Pitts’ at Columbia, but his work does not elaborate on Collingwood’ ideas. Mursell’s book was published in 1934 and Collingwood’s was not out until four years later.
176 Ibid. Underline in the original.
177 One of the aesthetic values he refers to is emotional release.
179 Ibid.
“Any artistic expression must be understood as a personal reaction to a social pattern. The teacher must be intelligent about the society in which he is teaching, and sensitive to the ideals and emotional expression of times and place.”\textsuperscript{180} Therefore, the teacher must be aware that “great art has sprung from social conditions where these factors [aesthetic values of the personal and social nature] were best accommodated.”\textsuperscript{181} In teaching music, then, “art may exist for art’s sake in the studio or in the sophisticated circles of the intelligentsia, but in school it exists for its contribution to the lives of children.”\textsuperscript{182} Music matter’s because it can serve a dual purpose. For some circles it is rooted in the social situation even though it does not have a direct social function. But in other circles such as the school it does have a role in contributing to the lives of children where even these young people should be exposed to how society and music interact.

The social is inextricably linked with music and creativity in socioaesthetic doctrine. In a highly philosophical work John Mueller examines “The Social Nature of Musical Taste,”\textsuperscript{183} a topic that unites the first and last sections of this chapter. He conflates the idea of what is good music, an evaluative use of the term, with what good is music, a normative question. His purpose is to “discuss the problem of music…from the standpoint that music is one of many forms of human behavior with norms set up by society.”\textsuperscript{184} Mueller wholeheartedly embraces the socioaesthetic position as a way of understanding the value of music. He criticizes the German idealist standpoint he sees in the field as it connects to ethos theory and does so by referencing an ambiguous phrase in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{183} Mueller contributed a similar paper to \textit{Basic Concepts}.
  \item \textsuperscript{184} John Mueller, “The Social Nature of Taste,” \textit{Journal of Research in Music Education} 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1956): 113-122, 114. Mueller suggests “the esthetics of music are the principles of music in action. It is a synthetic discipline which embraces not only music but also sociology, psychology, history.” Ibid., 115.
\end{itemize}
the Music for Childhood Committee Report contained in *Music In American Education: Music Education Source Book Number Two*. His rejection of German idealism and ethos theory is also a rejection of the instrumental, moralist, and utilitarian conceptions of value. He wants to believe that individuals and societies can be improved through contact with music but he simply cannot accept that point. He asserts “I am dubious of the premised intrinsic ethical linkage. Music is no more moral than a card game immoral.” Not only does Mueller question the moralist he does so in relation to the infungibility question.

Mueller relates a story about a neighbor of his. Each spent his leisure hours differently, one doing chemistry and the other practicing his instrument. Both, according to Mueller, stayed out of trouble in their youth and each went on to successful and respectable careers. Why was music any more valuable than chemistry in this instance? He asserts no substantive difference could or should be made—“we are making claims for music which will not hold up…they raise hopes and expectations which cannot be fulfilled.” Music educators, in his view, are generating problems for the field. Confusion for the field does not stop with the issue of infungibility and leisure time either, according to Mueller.

The next ambiguous element of value he addresses is the notion of good music. For him, making determinations of good are confused because of the ways in which the

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185 Ibid., 116. The particular phrases he takes issue with is “(1) Strengthening Beliefs (Spiritual and Moral Values). Beliefs are often felt rather than thought through in a rational way. Children absorb many of these ideals emotionally through direct contact with great music.” Mary Tolbert, “Music for Childhood in Education Today,” in *Music In American Education: Music Education Source Book Number Two* Hazel Nohavec Morgan ed (Chicago, IL: Music Educators National Conference, 1955), 54-57, 55. It is unclear to him how this transcendental exchange between morality and great music takes place.

186 Ibid., 116
187 Ibid., 117.
188 Ibid., 118.
term is used. Here he outlines four ways good is used in the field of music education, many of which I already addressed in this chapter. What he does is problematize notions of good. Each view of what “good” is systematically evaluated and dismissed leaving the idea that “good” is socially subjective. That is, the answer to “what is good music? may differ from epoch to epoch, from person to person, and even from time to time within the same person, as well as the particular occasion.” The concept of good music is mutable, which Mueller acknowledges “is very distressing to many musicians.” The changing nature of society, however, does not lead to evaluative judgment as being relativistic. Norms are “reinterpreted” but still “present plateaus of stability. Furthermore, the social nature of taste falls under Beardsley’s argument from variability. Mueller argues that evaluation and normative statements are manifestations of social conditions. Quoting at length and implying socioaesthetic doctrine, Mueller concludes

esthetic tastes display a broad consensus, they are codified; they are the foundations of a system of theory, are culturally transmitted through school, the church, the home, and other social avenues. They are the beneficiaries of an esthetic conscience—analogous to moral conscience—which labels discrepant tastes as wrong and resist radical intrusion of new codes and systems of taste...it reflects the vicissitudes of society and of the social organism. But its social functions are pluralistic.

His point is that the value of music and notions of taste, rather than being “dogmatic, mystical finalities,” are mutable and should simply lead to a better understanding of music for the field of music education.

189 Ibid., 120.
190 Ibid.
191 Beardsley states, “Variability must be kept carefully distinct from Relativism. Variability is an empirical fact. Relativism is a theory about the proper way to define the term ‘good.’” Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 484.
193 Ibid.
Both the normative and evaluative uses of the term value, are frequently mentioned topics in the field of music education. Furthermore, like perspectives on the nature and meaning of music there is not nearly as much consensus as the standard interpretation asserts. Not all conversations on value focused on music’s utility. Notions of evaluation which codify good music, for example, do so not on the basis of one point of view but for genetic, psychological, and objective reasons. Even the moralist perspective that good inheres in the music and good music has a moral component was not accepted by everyone, least of all Mueller. In fact, there was not even consensus on the infungibility of music, an idea it seems all music educators would willingly advance. Additionally, views on the intrinsic, inherent, instrumentalist, and utilitarian value of music range from German idealism, to Aristotelian catharsis, to self-knowledge, Platonic ethos, and socioaesthetics, not just utilitarianism. The last chapter brings to a close the multiplicity of ideas and conceptions regarding musical aesthetics as seen directly and indirectly in the evidence of music education discourse from 1907 to 1958.
CHAPTER 6
CODA

Mark and Gary argue that Basic Concepts and Foundations and Principles of Music Education “are significant because they expose the music educator to aesthetics, the philosophical field devoted to examining the value of the arts.”¹ My evidence proves that their assertion is incorrect. As a matter of fact, Clippinger mentions that he studied aesthetics more or less seriously for twenty-five years, and his explanation of the aesthetic sense is “the sense of discrimination and judgment,”² the basis of what we call artistic taste, which holds to a tradition in aesthetics that it is the study of how and on what basis such judgments can be made. In other words his statements explicitly show he had, in fact, studied and understood aesthetics, an idea that subverts current interpretations of the writing that occurred during this time. Not only were music educators aware of aesthetics and gave papers displaying an astute awareness of the discipline of philosophy but Mark’s and Gary’s notion of aesthetics is also too narrow. Value is merely one aspect of aesthetics—nature and meaning round out the study of musical aesthetics. Further, philosophy is not necessarily a self-contained and restricted idea existing only between the front and back cover of a book or journal article. Philosophical ideas can be worked out systematically over time, an allowance Mark and Gary do not make. Philosophical conversations can just as easily take place across decades as they can in the pages of a Platonic dialogue.

What I found in the evidence was not only that music education discourse on and relating to aesthetics existed but also that the material of the conversation was varied, noteworthy, insightful, and naturally embedded in the perspectives of music educators. The music educators of the time who were concerned with the field of music education generally in the hopes that practice would be influenced by their ideas incorporated numerous theoretical stances on the nature, meaning, and value of music. In fact, the evidence ranged from a simple grasp of aesthetic perspectives and ideas to citations of philosophers and aesthetic theories and even further still to independent thought that incorporated and critiqued aesthetic positions for the purpose of supporting one view over another or advancing an argument of one’s own. Clark and Earhart, especially Earhart, were much more than mere “forerunners of the aesthetic education movement that began in the late 1950s.”[^3] There were far more music educators who deserve mention as contributing to aesthetic discourse in music education in the period prior to the MEAE movement. Scholars like Pitts, Hanson, Farnsworth, Gehrken, Miessner, Mursell, Benn, Bernasconi, Finn, Sutherland and many others, contributed to the philosophical development of music education prior to 1958.

The real issue for music education in relation to aesthetics is not that the period prior to 1958 was barren or only included rationale. Quite the opposite. It was as if there were too many perspectives that called for attention. The range of views on aesthetic principles, problems, and theories spawned disagreement. Talks on the nature of music, for example, in music theory and music appreciation, frequently revealed formalist views, while expressivist and significationist perspectives were ubiquitous in the discourse on meaning, with much attention being directed toward music’s relation to language. Music

educators fixated on evaluation and the elevation of taste using the German idealist standpoint. Thoughtfully examining the aesthetic/moral correlation led some, such as Mursell and Finn, to conclude that great as the potentialities of music may be, there is no definite ethical significance in its essence.⁴ Several other music educators saw the value of music through the lens of utilitarianism. But it is untenable to assert that these were the only claims music educators made reading music’s value. Opposing value based on the utilitarian perspective was a group of music educators who rejected the point of view that music’s value had extramusical benefits such as enhanced political, social, or economic life. This group who rejected utilitarian views supported the notion that music’s value was intrinsic or inherent.

Utilitarian views, however, exploded in the period immediately preceding World War II, and during the war years there was a hyper-utilitarianism that pervaded the discourse. One area for possible future research is to further develop the relationship between the hyper-utilitarian views emanating from WWII and the Cold War with the MEAE movement. That is, the MEAE movement was a reaction to the resounding and intensifying hyper-utilitarian claims during WWII and the early Cold War years. Music educators such as Britton, Leonhard, and House, perceived the field to have moved enough away from its predominantly musical roots to generate concern. A select group of music educators intuited a problem which offended their sensibilities regarding music’s aim. Reemphasizing notions of inherent and intrinsic value in music was their way of getting back to basic principles. They even attempted to insulate and protect the field from groups questioning its purpose in education. For example, if music had a privileged language of its own like math and science, then it may also appear to outsiders

⁴ Finn, “Music and Morality (A Psychological Phase),” 82.
to be a viable subject in the curriculum. Making explicit the connections between the MEAE as a reaction to the WWII hyper-utilitarian views of WWII era music education would be valuable. Seeger’s 1943 paper is one example of a link between the ever-present hyper-utilitarianism in music education discourse of the war years and the departure of the position of “a century of music as a ‘good in itself.’”

This study also opens up additional areas of research within the period of the study as well as for earlier periods. One examination could be the extent to which the integration, as tied to pedagogical progressivism, was itself a so-called philosophy of music education prior to the MEAE movement. The integration movement generated a number of philosophical and thoughtful questions about the purpose of education generally and music specifically. Scholars like Pitts, Miessner, and Simpson infused questions dealing with the nature, meaning, and value of music into arguments for and against integration. Another possible study could focus specifically on the historical continuity between pre 1958 philosophy and the MEAE movement using this study as a basis for comparison (since the MEAE movement was not the focus of this work – my assertions of continuity are inferred). Research could also be conducted on the extent to which expressivist views are seen in the writings of early music educators like Lowell Mason or Charles Aiken.

Finally, additional research may lead to a continuation of this study or the outright rejection of it. In terms of a continuation there were a few sources that may have had an important bearing on sections of this dissertation that were either not included because of an oversight or other important material I had trouble locating. One particular example is a reference in the 1936 Music Education Research Council’s (MERC) biennial report.

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which states a concern “with four studies during the past biennium.”\(^6\) Number three on the list of four is “A Philosophy of Music Education.”\(^7\) There was no mention of the content of the study other than the committee’s statement “The report on Philosophy has been discussed and agreement as to the desirable direction and scope of the study has been reached by the council.”\(^8\) By 1938 the MERC did not appear to make any progress on the study. In Russell Morgan’s biennial report the philosophy of music education study is still in the preparation and development stages.\(^9\) The next clue regarding this study’s initiative is seen in the May 1940 issue of the *Music Educators Journal*. In the article “Straight from Los Angeles” is the announcement of the forthcoming Research Council Bulletin No. 20. This bulletin “contains an outline of ‘A Program for Music Education, which is the general title for the course of study on which the MERC has been working for several years.”\(^10\) The program, which included “(a) Philosophy and Psychology of Music Education”\(^11\) was supposed to be published in one volume. Even after enlisting the support of three outstanding research librarians, Vincent Novara and Leahkim Gannett from the Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library and Kirstin Dougan of the Music and Performing Arts Library at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the closest material to this report were basic outlines in 1965 (beyond the scope of this study). The conclusion drawn between these researchers and myself is that

\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Ibid.
\(^11\) Ibid.
Bulletin 20 was not ever published, even though the committee had set a date to publish the piece over six months prior to the United States entering World War II.

History and philosophy are inherently replete with gaps and lost arguments, which makes the job of researching complicated. It is my hope, however, that the material presented in this dissertation—gaps, omissions, and other problems notwithstanding—is seen as an honest, accurate, and sincere appraisal of the philosophical work of music educators on the topic of musical aesthetics from 1907 to 1958. The idea of the nature of aesthetics as a “vaporous, far flung quintessence of problems and points of view”\(^\text{12}\) permeates music education discourse during the period just as it does general philosophical discourse since the eighteenth century. If anything, the diverse nature of the subject should be a lesson to music education philosophers and historians that pluralism need not necessarily be negative or problematic. In the pursuit of wisdom it is possible that more voices can generate more varied discussion. Soundings from various perspectives invite introspection and can lead to more informed conversation. The aim of examining past and present music education discourse is to enable better understanding of the field. Simply put, music, as a human creation and endeavor, is worthy of study because it is one more way we, individually and collectively, can better understand ourselves.

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