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**Encountering Christianity In Twentieth Century East Asia: A Case Study Of Jiang Wenhan And Takeda (Cho) Kiyoko**

Linlin Victoria Lu

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the twentieth-century Christian indigenization movement in East Asia through a case study of Jiang Wenhan of China and Takeda Kiyoko of Japan, two leading scholars and Christian activists in their respective countries. Drawing primarily on their own writings and recorded activities, both published and unpublished, my narratives include their interactions with Christian leaders and public intellectuals in six aspects – theological, missiological, political, ethical, sinological, and ecumenical – to pinpoint what social-political actions Asian Christians took in response to the unsettling changes and the ecumenical movements of their times.

This study also highlights the historical encounters with Christianity in China and Japan to uncover the roles of Asian Christians in the reconstruction of Christianity in East Asia after World
War II. It focuses on how Christianity, as a centerpiece of Western civilization, was perceived and received in China and Japan, each with its own distinctive culture, and how this “foreign” religion took root in Asia through confrontational encounters, including the global and the local process of cross-cultural transmission between the “universal” and the “particular” in confrontation, adaptation, competition, coexistence, and mutual influence.

As part of globalization, Christian indigenization in East Asia sharpened the churches’ awareness of standing in a dynamic interaction within a multi-cultural and multi-religious society. The profound impact of state-religion hegemony in China and Japan not only created the unique characteristics of local churches and Christian communities but also made two important bases for Christianity: a non-denominational Three-Self church in China and the multi-denominational churches in Japan. From this point of view, Christianity, after repeated endeavors, has finally integrated into East Asian nations. In helping to transform Christianity into an indigenized Asian religion, Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko, each in their own way, have made Christian faith more accessible to the common people and Christian churches more acceptable in society. Their interactions with each other and their practices in the indigenization movement, with their Sino-Japanese Christian solidarity crossing a broad terrain from Shanghai to Tokyo, stood as one of the most significant achievements of Asian Christianity in the twentieth century.

INDEX WORDS: Asian Christianity, Indigenization, Chinese Communism, Japanese Emperor, Three-Self Principles, Tree-Grafting Approach
ENCOUNTERING CHRISTIANITY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EAST ASIA
A CASE STUDY OF JIANG WENHAN AND TAKEDA (CHO) KIYOKO

by

LINLIN VICTORIA LU

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the College of Arts and Sciences
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ENCOUNTERING CHRISTIANITY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EAST ASIA

A CASE STUDY OF JIANG WENHAN AND TAKEDA (CHO) KIYOKO

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August 22, 2020
DEDICATION

To Jiang Wenhan and Takeda (Cho) Kiyoko
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My heartfelt gratitude also goes to Professors Kate E. Wilson and Charles G. Steffen, two principal members of my dissertation committee who were instrumental to my research at every step and, in particular, shouldered the main tutoring work after Professor Reynolds passed away on March 11, 2020. From the inception of my thesis to its completion, their thoughtful advice and recognition of the value of my research always warmed my heart and gave me confidence. My gratitude to them is beyond this short acknowledgement. Their guidance and inspiration will continue to benefit my further pursuit of knowledge in the field.

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struggles and joys on this journey. I also owe special thanks to Frederic and Jeffrey, my two beloved sons and the pillars of my strength. Boiled down simply: without my family, I would be nothing.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ V

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... XIII

LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... XIV

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................... XV

1  INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

1.1  Theme and Objectives .......................................................................................................... 1

1.2  Two Asian Representatives ................................................................................................. 3

1.2.1  Friendship and Solidarity ............................................................................................... 4

1.2.2  Continuing Unfinished Discourse .................................................................................. 7

1.3  Historiography and Context ............................................................................................... 7

1.3.1  Perspectives from the West – Paradigm Shift ................................................................. 8

1.3.2  Perspectives from China and Japan – Response and Reinterpretation ......................... 12

1.4  Indigenization Movements in Modern East Asia ................................................................. 15

1.4.1  Indigenization and the Three-Self in China .................................................................... 16

1.4.2  Indigenization and Christianity “Made in Japan” .......................................................... 19

1.5  Methods, Source, and Outline of Chapters ....................................................................... 22

1.5.1  Methods and Theory ....................................................................................................... 22

1.5.2  Sources ............................................................................................................................ 25

1.5.3  Outline of Chapters ......................................................................................................... 27
2 A CHINESE PROTESTANT ........................................................................................................28

2.1 From Changsha to Shanghai, 1908-1930 ...........................................................................28

2.1.1 Confucian Classics ........................................................................................................29

2.1.2 Changsha YMCA ..........................................................................................................30

2.1.3 YMCA Guangzhou Convention ....................................................................................33

2.1.4 Student Activist ............................................................................................................35

2.2 YMCA Student Secretary, Pre-1937 ................................................................................37

2.2.1 A Complex Identity .......................................................................................................38

2.2.2 Role Models ..................................................................................................................39

2.2.3 Chinese Student Christian Movement .........................................................................44

2.3 Christian Leader in Wartime Service, 1937-1945 ............................................................48

2.3.1 Christianity in Times of Crisis .......................................................................................49

2.3.2 Wartime Relief Agent ....................................................................................................52

2.3.3 A Trip to Yan’an, 1939 ................................................................................................55

2.4 The Tide of Revolution, 1945-1949 ..................................................................................61

2.4.1 Returning to China, September 1947 ............................................................................61

2.4.2 WSCF Conference in Asia, 1948 ..................................................................................63

2.4.3 People’s Republic of China, 1949 ................................................................................64

2.4.4 Common Program and the United Front ......................................................................66

2.5 Three-Self Reform Movement, 1950 and Beyond .............................................................68
2.5.1 Three-Self Principles................................................................. 68
2.5.2 Christian Manifesto, July 28, 1950.............................................. 70
2.5.3 First National Protestant Christian Conference, 1954................... 74
2.6 Christians in the Cultural Revolution Era, 1966-1976......................... 77
  2.6.1 The Red Guards and Eradication of the “Four Olds”.................... 77
  2.6.2 Christianity in Trial by Fire...................................................... 79
2.7 Reform and Revival, 1978-1984..................................................... 82
  2.7.1 The Implementation of Religious Policy..................................... 82
  2.7.2 A New Beginning................................................................. 84
  2.7.3 Rebirth of Religious Studies.................................................... 89
3 SEEKING THE WORTHY ..................................................................... 92
3.1 Chinese Student Movement.......................................................... 93
  3.1.1 The Tide of History................................................................. 94
  3.1.2 Major Debates on Culture and Religion.................................... 102
  3.1.3 To Ride in the “New Thought Tide”........................................... 112
  3.1.4 Conclusion: Chinese Student Movement.................................... 118
3.2 Christianity in China ..................................................................... 126
  3.2.1 Christianity in China, Pre-1800................................................. 127
  3.2.2 Protestant Missionaries in China, 1807-1949............................... 131
  3.2.3 Christianity in Communist China, 1949-1966.............................. 136
3.2.4 Conclusion: Burdened Past but Bright Future, Post-1978 .................................. 145

4 A JAPANESE CHRISTIAN ......................................................................................... 149

4.1 A Girl of Hyogo, 1917-1939 ............................................................................. 149
  4.1.1 Taishō Era, 1912-1926 .............................................................................. 150
  4.1.2 Mother: A Lifelong Role Model ............................................................... 154
  4.1.3 Kobe College: A Dual Identity ................................................................. 157

4.2 The War and the World, 1939-1942 ................................................................. 165
  4.2.1 Christianity in Early Shōwa Era, 1926-1945 .............................................. 165
  4.2.2 The First World Conference of Christian Youth, 1939 ......................... 172
  4.2.3 Studying in the United States, 1939-1942 ................................................ 174

4.3 Student Director of YWCA-Japan, 1942-1953 ................................................ 176
  4.3.1 Postwar Reconstruction ........................................................................... 178
  4.3.2 Reconnecting with the World ................................................................. 180
  4.3.3 Ideas across Cultures ............................................................................... 183

4.4 International Christian University, 1953-1988 ................................................ 186
  4.4.1 ICU - Postwar Christian Project ............................................................... 188
  4.4.2 Yuasa Hachiro and ICU ......................................................................... 194
  4.4.3 International Intellectual Exchange ......................................................... 197
  4.4.4 President of World Council of Churches ............................................... 201

4.5 From Japan to Asia, Pre-2018 ......................................................................... 204
4.5.1 In the Philippines ........................................................................................................... 205

4.5.2 In China ............................................................................................................................ 206

4.6 “Lifelong Homework” ........................................................................................................... 211

5 BEYOND THE BOUNDARY ....................................................................................................... 213

5.1 Christian Indigenization in Japan ......................................................................................... 213

5.1.1 The Concept of Indigenization ......................................................................................... 214

5.1.2 Indigenization in the Context of Modern Japan ................................................................. 215

5.1.3 Five Patterns of Indigenization .......................................................................................... 218

5.1.4 Nitobe Inazō vs. Uchimura Kanzō .................................................................................... 226

5.1.5 Japanese Indigenous Energy ............................................................................................. 230

5.1.6 “From Within” and “From Without” Scheme .................................................................... 232

5.1.7 “New Wine in Old Wineskins” .......................................................................................... 235

5.1.8 Conclusion: Japanese Way of Indigenization ..................................................................... 240

5.2 The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor ............................................................................. 243

5.2.1 The Emperor System ......................................................................................................... 244

5.2.2 Embracing Defeat: 1945 .................................................................................................... 246

5.2.3 Emperor System as a Problem .......................................................................................... 248

5.2.4 A System of Sōkoku (Dual Images) .................................................................................. 257

5.2.5 The Allied Occupation, 1945-1952 .................................................................................. 261

5.2.6 Conclusion: Beyond the Boundary ..................................................................................... 266
6 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 271

6.1 Asian Christianity as a “New Face” ......................................................................... 271

6.2 Asian Concept of Indigenization ............................................................................. 274

6.2.1 *From the Socio-Political Perspective* ............................................................... 275

6.2.2 *From a Cultural Perspective* ................................................................................ 276

6.3 Asian Ways of Indigenization .................................................................................... 278

6.3.1 *Chinese Way by Jiang Wenhan* ......................................................................... 279

6.3.2 *Japanese Way by Takeda Kiyoko* ..................................................................... 281

6.4 Negotiating Asian Identity ......................................................................................... 284

6.4.1 *Conflict and Complicity* ................................................................................. 284

6.4.2 *Negotiating Asian Identity* ............................................................................... 289

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 294

APPENDICES ..................................................................................................................... 339

Appendix A  Glossary ........................................................................................................ 339

*Appendix A.1 Chinese Names and Terms* ................................................................. 339

*Appendix A.2 Japanese Names and Terms* ................................................................. 341
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Protestant Population of China, 1949-1987 ............................................................. 146
Table 2 Christianity in Asia, 1970-2020 ........................................................................... 272
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Christian distribution by continent, 1970-2020................................................................. 1
Figure 2 Jiang Wenhan (Kiang Wen-han), 1940. .................................................................................. 37
Figure 3 Roster of Prominent Chinese YMCA National Secretaries and Board Members, 1919-1937............................................................................................................. 39
Figure 4 Wu Yaozong (Y. T. Wu), 1938. ................................................................................................. 42
Figure 5 Jiang Wenhan and CCP Chairman Mao Zedong at Yan'an, 1939............................................. 59
Figure 6 Roster of Prominent CCC/TSPM National Leaders, 1980....................................................... 86
Figure 7 Jiang Wenhan at Montreal Conference, Canada, 1981. ........................................................... 88
Figure 8 Takeda Kiyoko and her mother Takeda Hiroko ...................................................................... 155
Figure 9 Membership in the YWCA-Japan, 1927-1960......................................................................... 179
Figure 10 Takeda Kiyoko and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at New Delhi, 1957... 181
Figure 11 Takeda Kiyoko at ICU graduate student seminar, 1986......................................................... 187
Figure 12 Takeda Kiyoko and Mrs. Anna E. Roosevelt in New York, 1954. .......................... 200
Figure 13 Takeda Kiyoko at WCC Conference, Switzerland, 1971..................................................... 202
Figure 14 The 7th China Soong Ching Ling Camphor Tree Award, Beijing, 1994......................... 210
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCFM</td>
<td>American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSNSU</td>
<td>All-China Student National Salvation Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASS</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>China Christian Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Church of Christ in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLS</td>
<td>Christian Literature Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Church Missionary Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCUFD</td>
<td>Changsha Municipal Committee United Front Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPCC</td>
<td>Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Chinese Student Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUHK</td>
<td>Chinese University of Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMD</td>
<td>Guomindang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IACS</td>
<td>Institute of Asian Cultural Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>International Christian University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHR</td>
<td>Institute of Historical Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTR</td>
<td>Institute of Science of Thought Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWR</td>
<td>Institute of World Religions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Christian Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People’s Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPCC</td>
<td>National Protestant Christian Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUTS</td>
<td>Nanjing Union Theological Seminary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAB</td>
<td>Religious Affairs Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASS</td>
<td>Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCLF</td>
<td>Soong Ching-Ling Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>Student Christian Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDK</td>
<td>Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJF</td>
<td>Sōkeirei Japan Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPPCC</td>
<td>Shanghai People’s Political Consultative Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Student Relief Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>Service of Soldiers Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSPM</td>
<td>Three-Self Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSRM</td>
<td>Three-Self Reform Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBCHEA</td>
<td>United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCCJ</td>
<td>United Church of Christ in Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFWD</td>
<td>United Front Work Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCTU</td>
<td>Women’s Christian Temperance Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSCF</td>
<td>World Student Christian Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men’s Christian Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>YWCA</td>
<td>Young Women’s Christian Association</td>
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1 INTRODUCTION

Christians around the world today find themselves in an environment that is very different from that of a century ago. Geographically, by the end of the twentieth century, the majority of the world’s Christians lived outside Europe and North America. Globally, Christians have become increasingly diverse. More specifically, the indigenized Christian churches in East Asia have emerged as a powerhouse behind the rise of Christianity in the Global South (Figure 1).¹ Interest in the history of churches in nonwestern contexts as “old world” churches faces this new reality. Andrew F. Walls rightly points out, “The study of Christianity history will increasingly need to operate from the position where most Christians are, and that will increasingly be the lands and islands of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific.”²

1.1 Theme and Objectives

Scholars of modern Asian history indicate that the socio-political encounters of the early twentieth century stimulated the growth of national consciousness and nationalistic sentiment among Christians from East Asia. The increasing maturity of the local churches in these countries brought Christians in the region to demand independence from foreign missions and, in other words, to demand church indigeneity. Bound to make significant impact upon the worldwide Christian movement, Asian Christians from China and Japan adopted various approaches in the


realization of church indigeneity and independence. By the end of World War II, the evolution of Christianity in these two countries took different routes to adapt and reconstruct Christian faith.\(^3\)

Consequently, during the last thirty years there has been a paradigm shift in the historiography of Christianity in China and Japan from a “mission-centric” standpoint to an “East Asian church-centric” perspective. Studies on Asian indigenous churches, independent churches, and Christian activists have become popular topics in academia both within and outside Asia. My study explores the twentieth-century indigenization movement in China and Japan through a case study of Jiang Wenhan (Kiang Wen-han, 1908-1984) and Takeda Kiyoko (Cho Kiyoko, 1917-2018), two leading scholars and Christian activists in their respective countries.\(^4\) My goal is to provide a historical narrative of the lives, activities, and thoughts of these two individuals; to highlight their encounters with Christianity; and to uncover their roles in the reconstruction of Christianity in East Asia after World War II. My primary concern is how Christianity, as a centerpiece of Western civilization, was received in China and Japan, each with its own distinctive culture, and how this “foreign” religion took root in Asia through confrontational encounters. Through a record of these historical persons, I also hope to convey a broader picture of East Asian


\(^4\) Kiang Wen-han is the name Jiang Wenhan used in his works before 1949. Cho is Takeda Kiyoko’s married surname. After marriage in 1953 she continued to use her maiden name Takeda Kiyoko in her Japanese works and Kiyoko Takeda Cho in her English publications. She was a professor of the International Christian University (ICU) and well-known to generations of her students as Cho-sensei. In this study I use Takeda Kiyoko, the name she used the most in her publications.
Christians and how their distinctive approaches made Christianity more accessible to average people and the church more acceptable in society.⁵

1.2 Two Asian Representatives

Jiang Wenhan, a proponent of Social Gospel, was well known for his path-breaking work on the student Christian movement in China. He served as vice-chairman of the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF) from 1935 to 1953 and was the head of the Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) both before and after the Communist revolution. He was one of the major leaders of the Chinese Protestant Church’s Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) after 1950. His meeting with the Chinese leader Mao Zedong (1893-1976) in 1939 started his decades of complex relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Jiang was also an established scholar. His pioneering study on the student movement in China, based on his doctoral study at Columbia University in the late 1940s, remains a classic in the field. His book, *Jidujiao yu Ma-Lie zhuyi* (Christianity and Marxism-Leninism) was published in Chinese in 1950 and has been reprinted five times. His last two monographs on the history of Christianity in ancient China and Catholic Jesuits during Ming-Qing period were published in the 1980s when he was a senior research fellow at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS).⁶

Takeda Kiyoko was renowned for her work in modern Japanese intellectual history. She served as director of Japan’s Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) Student Division, the president of the Asia-Pacific chapter of the World Council of Churches (WCC), and the founding director of Asian Culture Studies at International Christian University (ICU). Her best-

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known work was a monograph on the post-war emperor system, *The Dual Image of the Japanese Emperor*, though her major contribution to the field of Christianity and Japanese culture was to identify five unique patterns in the process of accepting Christianity during Meiji Japan: compromise, isolation, renegade or apostate approach, confrontation, and tree-grafting or transforming approach. She founded the Madam Soong Ching-Ling Japan Fund (SJF, *Sōkeirei Kikinkai Nitchū Kyōdō Purojekuto I’in ka i*) in honor of the wife of Sun Yat-sen, the father of Republican China. In 1997, she received the Christian Merit Award from the Christian Association of Japan in recognition of her outstanding contribution to the Christian world.\(^7\)

**1.2.1 Friendship and Solidarity**

Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko knew each other for nearly a half a century after they first met at an international convention in 1937. They built a long-lasting friendship and intellectual communication during turbulent times in the region. The interactions between these two scholars and social activists of Christian faith well reflected the intellectual pursuits and cultural adaptations of the time.

**1.2.1.1 Shanghai – Tokyo, 1937-1945**

In 1937, Jiang Wenhan, head of the Student Division of National YMCA and vice-chairman of WSCF, attended the inauguration of the Sino-Japanese Student Christian Movement (SCM) in Tokyo. There Jiang first met Takeda Kiyoko, a student activist of YWCA-Japan at Kobe College. Two years later, on her way to Amsterdam for the World Christian Youth Conference, Takeda stopped in Shanghai, known at the time as a “city of death” because of Japanese air raids. There she reunited with Jiang, who was by then the director of the National Student Relief

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Committee (SRC) in China. Together the two prayed for Sino-Japanese SCM and peace for Asia and the world. In 1945 when war was over, the first foreign visitor Takeda welcomed in Tokyo was Jiang from China. As Takeda recalled, at the meeting Jiang “invited us to join with the Chinese SCM for WSCF Week of Prayer and World Fellowship activities, and continuously work together to build peace and democracy in Asia.”

1.2.1.2 Sri Lanka, 1948

In 1948, Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko both attended the First Asian Leadership Training Conference by WSCF at Kandy, Ceylon (today Sri Lanka). During the week of December 24-29, the two leaders met again to continue their dialogue on how to rebuild relationships between the Protestant Christian communities in China and Japan in the postwar era and, more broadly, to incorporate the Christian ecumenical movement through Christian solidarity in East Asia. During the meeting, Jiang introduced Takeda to Wu Yaozong, one of the two keynote speakers at the Conference and the top Protestant leader in China at the time.

1.2.1.3 Shanghai, 1956

In May-June 1956 Takeda Kiyoko made her first trip to Communist China. Again in Shanghai she met with Jiang Wenhan and other Christian leaders from YM/YWCA in China. She was updated about TSPM, launched in 1950 as the largest Protestant indigenization movement in the People’s Republic of China for self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation. She was

---

8 In February of 1982 at the seminar on “Chinese Revolution and Christianity,” Takeda Kiyoko briefly recalled the history of Sino-Japanese SCM, how she first met with Jiang Wenhan at the inauguration event in 1937 Tokyo, and how they had kept their friendship since then. *Asian Cultural Studies Archives*, ICU (February 17-21, 1982).

invited to attend non-denominational Three-Self church services in Shanghai, Beijing, Nanjing, and other cities, and she was very impressed by “the swift process of Protestant indigenization to purge imperialistic influence from within Christianity itself, support Communist government, cultivate a patriotic spirit to promote the Three-Self Principles, and the top-down approach for church unity and reorganization.” She also witnessed Jiang and her other Chinese friends become dedicated to the United Front, a so-called political hegemony of “seeking the common ground while reserving differences” by the Chinese state.\textsuperscript{10}

1.2.1.4 Tokyo, 1982

Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko were unable to continue their communication until after 1978 when China started the post-Mao reform and Jiang was finally “liberated” from the political persecution of the Cultural Revolution. Takeda was pleased to know that her old friend Jiang was back as the head of YMCA-China and had become senior vice-president of the China Christian Council (new CCC) and a senior special research fellow of the Institute of Historical Research (IHR) of the SASS. In 1982, Takeda invited Jiang to visit ICU. It was quite an emotional reunion after twenty-six years of separation. The topic of Jiang’s talk at the seminar was “Chinese Revolution and Christianity.” Jiang introduced his research plan for the next five years to contextualize the relation between Christianity and Chinese culture from a historical perspective. Takeda was very supportive of Jiang’s research and invited Jiang to give another speech at ICU in 1985. Unfortunately, this did not happen as Jiang died in Shanghai in 1984.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} Takeda Kiyoko, Watashitachi to Sekai: Hito o shiri kuni or shiru [Our world: Getting to know other people and countries] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1983), 27-32.

1.2.2 Continuing Unfinished Discourse

It is no accident that I would be interested in the history of Christianity in twentieth-century East Asia. For more than a decade I worked and associated with institutions and church organizations in China, Japan, Britain, and the United States, which provided the opportunities to have contact with individual Christian scholars and church leaders. In particular, I have had the privilege to work for Jiang Wenhan in Shanghai and study with Takeda Kiyoko in Tokyo.12 Through close interaction with them I came to realize that their life experiences and professional accomplishments, already formed as a coherent story through a distinguished context of China and Japan, can be a wonderful case study to illustrate the relation between religion, state, and culture. My memory of these two incredible human beings has also inspired me to elaborate on the origins of East Asian Christians and how, as a grouped agent, they acted in the historical trajectory by which the twentieth-century history of indigenized Christianity was created.

In 1988 when I met with Bob Whyte, author of Unfinished Encounter, at the British Council of Churches in London, I was encouraged by him to write about Chinese Christians. Although I was unable to do so for the next twenty years or so, to study the history of Christianity in modern Asia has always been the goal of my intellectual pursuit. Studying in the Ph.D. program of the history department at Georgia State University has finally allowed me to carry on this research and bring it to a fruitful outcome. This dissertation is a product of an intellectual quest long in the making.

1.3 Historiography and Context

The decline of faith in European churches and the growth of Christianity in the non-Western world over the past century have profoundly changed Christianity. While remaking East

12 From 1981 to 1984, I worked for Dr. Jiang at the SASS, while from 1985 to 1987 I studied with Prof. Cho, who was my supervisor not only for my academy work at ICU but also for my life in Japan.
Asia and rising in the global south, Christianity has altered and been shaped by the social, economic, political, and cultural encounters of these diverse areas. Then, what is the role of Christianity in modern East Asia? How should the impact of Christianity on China and Japan be evaluated?

### 1.3.1 Perspectives from the West – Paradigm Shift

Twentieth century scholars and historians had to search for a new direction in the study of East Asian Christianity. This resulted in a series of paradigm shifts, which can be taken to represent a linear historical development, although at times they also contended with one another. Kenneth Scott Latourette, a pioneer in missionary studies, first reconstructs the story of Christian missionary experiences in China and analyzes why Christianity should and could set foot in China in the modern era. In his view, Christianity in modern China was inextricably bound with the Western encroachments on the nation, and the missionary enterprise was an important part of the impact of the West upon China.\(^{13}\) John King Fairbank, who is generally regarded as the dean of China Studies in the U.S., advocates the impact-response paradigm in the study of modern Chinese history. Based on this paradigm, the Christian missionary movement in modern China was a preeminently people-to-people phenomenon, and China was at the receiving end of the cultural flow. The history of Sino-foreign relations in modern China was that of conflicts and exchanges between two cultural zones: China and the West. In that conflict and exchange, missionaries were the immediate bridge, and the indigenization of Christianity in China therefore was essentially China’s response to the West.\(^{14}\)

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Joseph R. Levenson proposes another model of “tradition versus modernity” and reckons the two as keys to understanding modern Chinese history. Rather than emphasizing Western impact as a major factor for the modernization of East Asia, Levenson draws attention to East Asian cultures themselves as an important factor for the development of Christian indigenization in China.\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, Paul A. Cohen proposes a more China-centered approach in the study of modern Chinese history during the 1980s. He actually leads another paradigm shift from a “mission-centric” to a “China church-centric” perspective in the historiography of Christianity in modern China. Both Levenson and Cohen emphasize the cultural dilemmas facing many Chinese intellectuals in the late Qing dynasty. Emotionally frustrated in their efforts to find a satisfying reconciliation of the Chinese and Western intellectual traditions, many Chinese intellectuals rejected both Confucian China and the Christian West, turning to Communism in the hope that they could be both modern and Chinese.\textsuperscript{16}

Cohen’s approach inspired Jessie G. Lutz and Daniel H. Bays, who have given much of their attention to the social contexts of Chinese Christians. Since the early 1990s, Lutz’s various studies have focused on Hakka Chinese, who became the first Chinese evangelists working for the Basel Mission.\textsuperscript{17} Bays’ numerous studies look into the growth of independent Christianity in China, especially the work done by the Chinese Christians themselves. In his writings, Bays contends that Christianity, a religion that originated in the North and West, now has become a


religion of the East and South. Chinese Christianity in particular is already one of the most interesting and important cases of inculturation of the essential doctrines and rituals of Christianity into an originally non-Christian cultural setting.\textsuperscript{18}

Scholars of modern Japanese history apply the impact-response model to survey the history of Christianity in modern Japan. Marius B. Jansen argues that the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1890 stimulated Japanese nationalism. Since Christians advocated spiritual autonomy and freedom of conscience, they became an important stimulant in Meiji intellectual life, playing leading roles in social reform and political change.\textsuperscript{19} Edwin O. Reischauer compares the postwar Japan with its prewar history, and contends the positive influence of Christianity in Japanese society, in particular among the educated classes of Japan. As thoroughly westernized elite groups, Japanese Christians represented the best-educated leading elements in society and therefore exerted disproportionate influence.\textsuperscript{20}

John Breen and Mark Williams inspect the impact and response of Christianity in modern Japan differently. They admit that Christianity has made a significant contribution to the cultural exchange between Japan and the West. Its impact was complex and not always easy to evaluate. In fact, many aspects of the Christian contribution could be seen negatively. Japan’s Christian interlude in much of the Tokugawa period led to intolerance, death, and exile for many Japanese


Christians, and eventually helped to bring about the Tokugawa isolationist policy.\textsuperscript{21} George Elison and Kiri Paramore also assess the influence of Christianity in the Tokugawa period, and show many levels of Japanese response to Christianity. To Elison, Christianity failed to make any lasting positive contributions to Japan. Instead, it reified the state control over society and religion and therefore contributed to the isolationist stance of the Tokugawa Shogunate.\textsuperscript{22} Paramore claims that modern anti-Christian discourses in Japan increasingly served the purposes of contemporary political criticism and controversy that had little to do with Christianity. It became an ideological strategy constructed against Western enemy powers and, at the same time, a means to strengthen a Japanese imperial state dedicated to the emperor-centered political structure after the 1868 Meiji Restoration.\textsuperscript{23}

More recently, Emily Anderson reviews the interactions between Christianity and the rise of the Japanese empire during the period from the 1880s to the 1930s, especially how Japanese Christians, including both those who supported and opposed imperialism, formulated specifically Japanese forms of Christianity in Meiji and Taisho Japan. In her story of Japanese Christians, particularly about Protestant Congregationalists who strove to be recognized as useful in the growing Japanese empire, Anderson is right. Being a minority group, Japanese Christians made great – sometimes painful – efforts to show that they were relevant and useful to society. They made every effort to be a tool of God’s kingdom, which in reality was the instrument of imperial Japan. The voices of dissidents were ultimately drowned out in the face of total war simply because


\textsuperscript{23} Kiri Paramore, \textit{Ideology and Christianity in Japan} (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 78-102.
the image of their utopia was always bound to the reality they experienced on earth, no matter how it was constructed with religious language and representations.  

1.3.2 Perspectives from China and Japan – Response and Reinterpretation

Contemporary historians in China and Japan tend to agree that the entire nineteenth-century Christian missionary enterprise worked hand in hand with imperialistic expansion and that missionary endeavors were sheltered and protected by Western gunboats. Although labelled as cultural imperialism and facing fundamental resistance, the complex impact of Christianity in two countries as a “foreign religion” associated with imperialism is still debatable.

At the Montreal Conference held in 1981, Chinese scholar Zhao Fusan discussed the impact of missionary enterprise in modern China. Zhao argued that on the one hand, Christianity came to China in the modern era with Western colonial expansion. The modern missionary movement took advantage of the unequal treaties and extra-territorial rights and served, whether consciously or unconsciously, colonial interests. As such, Christianity never really appealed to the hearts and minds of Chinese people. On the other hand, missionary work was different from colonialism. In fact, many missionaries voiced sharp criticism of colonialism and imperialism, including a few who sympathized with the communist revolution and got into trouble with their mission board. Christians in China gave their support to the missionary movement as a manifestation of their Christian concern and humanity for other people.

Gu Changsheng reconstructs the missionary activities chronologically from Catholic Jesuits who came to China in the seventeenth century to Protestant missionary work prior to 1949.

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Gu based his conclusion on, like many other Chinese historians of his time, the “methodology of Marxist dialectical materialism.” Still, he finds that the missionaries’ activities in modern China were a combination of both aggression and friendship.\textsuperscript{26} Wu Guo and Yang Huilin focus their attempts on the impact of Christianity in China and sift through intellectual and religious results of missionary efforts. Wu traces the complex reasons for anti-Christian sentiments and attacks in the context of the modern Chinese social and intellectual transformation and highlights the self-defense and painstaking experience of early Chinese Christian leaders, who attempted to reconcile their dual identity as both Christian and Chinese. To Wu, the anti-Christian movement in China and its aftermath should be seen as a component of modern Chinese intellectual history and as part of the Chinese search for an ideology to solve its national crisis.\textsuperscript{27} Yang reviews local histories of Christianity to chronicle its enduring good and illuminates the unexplored links between Christian indigenization and Chinese culture. The legacy of Western missionaries, once viewed as agents of Western imperialist values, contributed greatly to vigorous Sino-Christian theology, as the movement possesses great value for cross-cultural and inter-religious dialogue.\textsuperscript{28}

From the Japanese perspective, Takeda Kiyoko claims the impact of Western culture upon modern Japanese thought. A number of clearly defined patterns evolved in Japan for the reception of Western thought, for instance, the prominent examples of “Japanese Spirit and Western Techniques” and “Eastern Ethics and Western Science” adopted during Meiji-era Japan. Yet the


\textsuperscript{28} Yang Huilin, \textit{China, Christianity, and the Question of Culture} (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2014), 3.
welcome reception of Christianity in Japan was somewhat exceptional among Asian nations, because such response was an attempt made by Japanese intellectuals to understand the essence of Western culture. The indigenization of Christianity in Japan was a cultural transformation between Christian ethos and Japanese culture, or as Takeda defines, an eternal dialogue between Christianity, an integral part of Western culture with its unique pattern of thought, and Japan, an Asian country has its own distinctive culture. Takeda classified the process of accepting Christianity into five unique ways of approach: compromise, isolation, renegade or apostate approach, confrontation, and tree-grafting or transforming approach.\(^{29}\)

In contrast, Ama Toshimaro presents the concept of “non-religious” (*mushukyo*) in Japanese culture to interpret the Japanese reaction to Western impact. Although Christianity has been notably active in Japan since the mid-sixteenth century, Japan nevertheless remains one of the least-evangelized nations of the world. According to Ama, other than state influence over the development of Christianity, there is a long-established paradox in Japanese spirituality: being non-religious in a religious culture. The Japanese generally lack a culture or desire to commit to a particular organized religion, oftentimes fusing Shintoism, Christianity, and Buddhism into a hybrid form of spirituality. The majority of Japanese dislike revealing their religious faith, not because they are uncomfortable with a particular religion but because they lack the courage to find true meaning in life through such religions. As such, being non-religious is an expression of self-protection against dealing with one’s true self.\(^{30}\)

\(^{29}\) Cho, “The Christian Encounter with the Traditional Ethos of Japan,” 111-44.

1.4 **Indigenization Movements in Modern East Asia**

Scholars of modern East Asian history generally regard Christianity in East Asia as a reformed and indigenized version of the religion. In the twentieth century, China and Japan went through different historical paths of revolution, reform, and redevelopment. Amidst profound political and socioeconomic changes, these two nations therefore had their own unique reactions and adaptations to the alien religion.

What, then, is the concept of indigenization? Sociologists define the term as an act of making something foreign one’s own. Applied to Christianity, this is the historical encounter in which Christianity as a foreign-born religion is adapted to native culture.\(^{31}\) According to Mark Mullins, indigenization, inculturation, contextualization, and/or syncretism are the terms used to describe the process whereby “foreign” and previously irrelevant traditions become meaningful and rooted in local culture.\(^{32}\) Theologians and missiologists often refer to the legitimate indigenization of Christianity as the “inculturation” or “contextualization” of the Gospel, while “syncretism,” a pejorative term, is reserved for illegitimate forms of religious synthesis.\(^{33}\) Though the missionary “carriers” of a religious tradition certainly contribute to the process of cultural transformation through their translation efforts, indigenization ultimately depends upon the creative efforts of the local people. This indigenization process takes many years and is usually


achieved after considerable friction between the initial foreign carriers of the religion and the growing local leadership.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{1.4.1 Indigenization and the Three-Self in China}

In the minds of many Chinese, nineteenth-century missionaries were associated with the aggressions of the West. Such a nationalistic sentiment contributed to growing xenophobia and anti-Christian incidents in the country. It also gave birth to indigenous Chinese churches. Many Chinese Christians sought for church independence and autonomy. They felt that they had to indigenize Christianity for the needs of the country and its people, and they expressed these around the principles of “Three-Self”: self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation. This idea ironically originated with Henry Venn and Rufus Anderson, two nineteenth-century Protestant missionaries who aimed to plant the roots of Christianity by indigenizing the faith among the Chinese themselves. However, after 1910, this idea took a different path toward Chinese nationalism.

At the Edinburgh Conference of 1910, Cheng Jingyi (Cheng Ching-i), a leading Chinese Christian delegate, confronted his Western colleagues with the urgent question of the independence of the Chinese church. Thereafter, more Chinese Christian leaders sought to get rid of Western mission board control. Meanwhile, they started to make great efforts to integrate Christian faith with Chinese culture. Among these leaders were Zhao Zichen, Wu Leichuan, Xu Baoqian, Wu Yaozong, Jiang Wenhan, Liu Tingfang, and later Ding Guangxun and others.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} Mullins, \textit{Christianity Made in Japan}, 6.

\textsuperscript{35} “Report of the Commission II” in \textit{World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh 1910}, (Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier, 1910), 352. It should be noted that Cheng was not speaking against any Christians or missionaries at that time. Rather, he was pleading for the missionaries’ understanding of the urgent situation in China. Cheng was indeed trying to bridge China and the West.
Among them, Wu Yaozong (Y. T. Wu) was the leading figure of the Church independence and indigenization movement and the foremost Chinese Christian proponent of Christian-Communist cooperation before 1949. Wu declares that in order for Christianity to be accepted in China, it must bear practical meaning in the lives of the people. Wu advocates adding the “liberation theme” into the theological approach of indigenization, namely the material, spiritual, ideological, and political liberation. Moreover, Wu declares a special role for Christians to share in the secular movement for social change in order to cope with the Chinese revolution. Jiang Wenhan believed in Wu’s idea that the mission of Chinese Christians was to transform their religion from the “tool of imperialism” to an indigenized Chinese faith. He thus promoted Wu’s theory that the essence of Christianity was revolutionary, but in fact it became a conservative, even reactionary, force in twentieth-century China. Ding Guangxun (K. H. Ting), the head of TSPM and new CCC after 1980, followed Wu and Jiang to declare independence from the churches in the West and pledge loyalty to the Communist Party. Ding proclaimed the goal of TSPM in post-Mao China as continuously seeking unification of the Chinese Christian community under the United Front policy of the Communist Party. Chinese Christians should get along well with non-Christians and atheists of all sorts, in particular the Communists. Ding declared that Chinese

36 Wu Yaozong, “Jidujiao de Gaizao” [Reconstruction of Christianity], Da Gong Bao (July 16, 1949); Also in Heian yu Guangming [Darkness and light] (Shanghai: Shanghai Qingnian Shuju, 1949), 230.


Christianity after the 1980s faced two major challenges: continuing to rebuild China’s indigenous church under TSPM and reconstructing indigenous Protestant theology with Chinese characteristics.40

Hong Kong scholar Wu Ziming (Peter Tze Ming Ng) interprets the historical development of Chinese Christianity from a global-local perspective. Ng argues that a new awareness of social responsibilities among Chinese Christians contributed to the modernity of China. There is still a tendency in academia to overemphasize the role of Western powers in globalizing Christianity and overlook local initiatives. Scholars in the field should look more to Chinese sources from both state-controlled Three-Self churches and the “silent majority” of independent/underground churches to examine the impact of Chinese culture upon Christianity. Chinese Christianity is one typical model of world Christianity. It is the interplay of universal and particular aspects as well as the global and local forces that shaped the characteristics of Chinese Christianity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.41

American scholar Philip L. Wickeri focuses on the history of indigenization of Christianity in China since 1949. He looks at Chinese Christians’ self-identity and how they have sought to situate themselves in a socialist society within the framework of the United Front. Wickeri specifically explores the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) as both a Chinese and a Christian movement, arguing that the TSPM, despite its problems, has made Christianity more accessible to


41 Peter Tze Ming Ng, Chinese Christianity: An Interplay between Global and Local Perspectives (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 2.
the Chinese and the church more acceptable in the society.\textsuperscript{42} By defining the roots of the TSPM and how Chinese Christian leaders coped with the reality of living under a Communist regime, Wickeri argues that the life and work of Chinese Christians must be understood and told in the context of China’s national politics.\textsuperscript{43} More recently, Chloe Starr contends that twentieth-century Chinese Christians advocated church indigenization and theological integration with Chinese culture but struggled to reconcile their dual identity as Christians and as patriotic Chinese. Like other contemporary public intellectuals, they could not avoid political ideologies but did their very best to engage Christianity with Chinese culture. Their call for Christianity to serve social needs and their reinterpretations of Christian doctrines not only enhanced the indigenization of Christianity in China but also gave birth to a new Chinese Christian theology.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{1.4.2 Indigenization and Christianity “Made in Japan”}

Like China, Japan was forced to open to the West by gunboats led by American Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853. After a 140-year-long seclusion, Christianity reappeared in Japan in 1859. The Meiji period (1868-1912) witnessed not only the fast growth of Christianity, particularly Protestantism, but also the development of indigenous Christian movements, aimed at synthesizing Christian faith with traditional Japanese beliefs.

Uchimura Kanzō claims that Japan adopted Western civilization but not Christianity in the Meiji period. He argues that Christianity could save Japan and the Japanese, but he insisted that it must be a kind of reformed Christianity in which the Japanese can receive the Christian faith.

\textsuperscript{42} Philip L. Wickeri, \textit{Seeking the Common Ground: Protestant Christianity, the Three-Self Movement, and China's United Front} (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publisher, 2011). Xxiii-iv.


\textsuperscript{44} Chloe Starr, \textit{Chinese Theology: Text and Context} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 42.
directly from God without any foreign intermediary. This idea led Uchimura to start his non-church movement, a dissenting action to the mainstream church, and advocate for Christianity to be grafted with Japanese Bushido to form a national religion that can replace Japanese nationalism, which was often belligerent and xenophobic.\(^4\) Nitobe Inazō also engages his inquiry into the ethos of Bushido to discuss the sources of the indigenization as eight virtues most respected by Japanese people: rectitude, courage, benevolence, politeness, sincerity, honor, loyalty, and self-control. By comparing Bushido with other cultural traditions of Japan, such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shintoism, Nitobe believes in a resemblance between Bushido and the spirit of Christianity. To him, Christian missions did and might continue to do great things for Japan in the domain of education, especially moral education. Nevertheless, Christianity as an ideology could only be subordinate to Bushido. Therefore, it was unavoidable that Bushido emerged as a new ethics and a principal driving force behind the construction of a new Japan.\(^4\)

In her response to the critical question of what is Japanized Christianity, Takeda Kiyoko emphasizes a cultural transformation within the Japanese tradition in facing the impact or challenges from the West. According to Takeda, twentieth-century Christians in Japan need new insight and new approaches to discover the seeds of “the wheat” that are sometimes unexpectedly hidden in the very bosom of “the weeds.”\(^4\)\(^7\) A group of Japanese theologians published the first book on the history of Japanese theology in 1997. Written by Furuya Yasuo (editor) and four other eminent theologians - Dohi Akio, Toshio Sato, Yagi Seiichi, and Odagaki Masaya - the book


recounts the tumultuous history of Japanese Christianity and analyses the context, methodology, and goals shaping Japanese theology today. The authors present the historical encounters between Japan and Christianity and define the core of Japanese theology on two major issues: the historical relationship between Japan and Christianity and the development of new Christian theology in Japan.48

American scholar Mark R. Mullins indicates that for centuries the relation between Japan and Christianity has been an uneasy one. Compared with their Asian counterparts, the churches in Japan have never counted more than a small number. But another side of the story is little known and rarely told: the rise of indigenous movements aimed at a Christianity that is made in Japan and faithful to the scriptures and apostolic tradition. In his research, Mullins presents thirteen indigenous groups since the Meiji period that developed by and large on their own without much influence from missionaries and churches. He explicates Uchimura Kanzō’s mukyokai movement among other subgroups, the confluence of Christianity and concerns for ancestors, and a comparison of Christianity in Korea and transplanted Korean Christianity in Japan. By analyzing a variety of new interpretations of Christian traditions, Mullins emphasizes the importance of native initiatives and the voice of Japanese Christians at the grassroots level.49 Carl Michalson summarizes several unique characteristics that have been developed in Japanese theology and indicates that Protestant Christianity is only about 160 years old in Japan. That means the Japanese


49 Mullins, Christianity Made in Japan, 1-10, 24-25, 198-99.
church is among the younger churches in Christendom. Yet, of all the younger churches, it is apparently the first to have developed a significant theology.50

No doubt, the new perceptions and views that the aforementioned Asian Christians held raised important questions about Christianity as a true world religion. Through the lens of the impact-response paradigm, we see that Asian Christians started to emphasize the churches developed independently from Western missionaries. Their patterns and approaches have caught attention outside Asia because they reflected much more than just the ways in which a global religion was received locally; they involved the very essence of Christian thought adopted into a non-Christian society as indigenous Asian churches with a new identity of Asian Christianity.

1.5 Methods, Source, and Outline of Chapters

1.5.1 Methods and Theory

To present the stories of Jiang and Takeda, I will employ the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s “thick description” to depict their lives and, in particular, their Christian pursuits in the context of twentieth-century East Asia.51 The sources presented above will be used to describe the important facets of their lives, including their social and academic activities, their Christian faith, and their testimonies about Asian Christianity. Among the topics to be discussed will be Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko. For the former, I will explore his 53-year experience with YMCA in China; his close relationship with Wu Yaozong, the key leader of Chinese Protestant Christianity and the founder of TSPM; his social activities in his various capacities before 1949 both domestic and international; and his leading role in Chinese church indigenization


under the Three-Self principles and communist United Front policies. For the latter, I will discuss her experience with Japan’s YWCA and engagement with the international ecumenical movement, her advocacy of postwar women’s liberation and involvement in Japan’s resurgent intellectual culture, and her principle contributions to the research on the cultural encounter with Christianity in modern Japan.

Max Weber’s concept of religion in society and Helmut Richard Niebuhr’s theory on Christianity and culture will be applied to analyze the lives of Jiang and Takeda. I will particularly focus on their Christian faith and intellectual thought, their distinguished ways of practicing Christianity, and their unique roles in indigenizing Christianity in East Asia. Drawing primarily on their own writings and recorded activities, both published and unpublished, my narratives will also include their interactions with Christian leaders and public intellectuals from six aspects – theological, missiological, political, ethical, sinological, and ecumenical – to pinpoint what social-political actions Asian Christians took in responding to the unsettling changes and church ecumenical movements of their times.


Antonio Gramsci’s theory of “cultural hegemony” will be applied to assess the hegemonic significance of Christianity through the complexity of modern Asian history. Several experiences shaped the church-state configurations in twentieth-century China and Japan; for instance, in prewar Japan, Protestant churches failed to raise their voices against the growing Japanese military empire. It was only after World War II that critical self-reflection led the United Church of Christ in Japan (UCCJ) to recover their prophetic role in relation to the state. China, as another example, featured the dominance of the Communist Party after 1949 that shaped the relationship between church and state. In the absence of a democratically defined representation of the different parts of society, the new government used their political agencies like Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) and United Front Work Department (UFWD) to exercise the scrutiny of the party-state on Christianity and other religions. After the 1980s, the same atheist government called for having a harmonious society in China. The expression “harmonious society” (hexie shehui) became a hegemonic discourse playing a critical role in the development of all aspects of culture, religion, and social institutions in China, and Christianity is part of it.

Christian indigenization in East Asia, as part of globalization, sharpened the churches’ awareness of standing in a dynamic interaction within a multi-cultural and multi-religious society. The profound impact of state-religion hegemony in China and Japan not only created the unique characteristics of local churches and Christian communities but also made two important bases for Christianity: a non-denominational Three-Self church in China and multi-denominational churches in Japan. From this point of view, Christianity, after repeated endeavors, has finally integrated into East Asian nations.

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1.5.2 Sources

My primary sources for this study include unpublished documents such as personal letters, manuscripts, and lecture notes. A number of audio tapes and letters are valuable for understanding Jiang’s thoughts on the history of Christianity in China:

(1) “Qingnianhui de Lishi” (The History of YM/YWCA) – a lecture delivered by Jiang Wenhan at SASS in 1983;

(2) Four seminar audio tapes that recorded Jiang’s three lectures on the theme of “Chinese Revolution and Christianity” at ICU in Japan in February of 1982;

(3) Personal correspondences between Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko;

(4) A hand-written manuscript titled “Jiang Wenhan” by Jiang’s wife Yao Xianhui in 1988.

Various memories, diaries, and correspondences regarding Jiang and Takeda were obtained from archival materials dated 1949-1966 of YM/YWCA and TSPM churches in China, from the Shanghai Municipal Archives, and from records of the Japan YM/YWCA in Tokyo after 1945.

Numerous Protestant journals are available both in China and Japan. Chinese journals include Ching Feng: A journal on Christianity and Chinese religion and culture, Tian Feng (Heavenly winds), Jinling Shenxue Zhi (The Gazetteer of Nanking Theological Seminary), Zongjiao (Religion), Dangdai Zongjiao Yanjiu (Contemporary religious studies), Jidujiao yu Jindai Zhongguo Lishi Wenhua Xilie (Series of Christianity and modern Chinese history and culture), Zongjiao yu Shijie (Religion and the world), Zongjiao Wenti Tansuo (Studies of religious issues), Shijie Zongjiao Yanjiu (Research of world religions), Shijie Zongjiao Ziliao (Source materials for world religions), and Shijie Zongjiao Wenhua (World religions and culture). Among
influential journals in Japanese are Shisō no Kagaku (Science of Thought), Tenbō (Outlook), Deai (Encounter), Kiyo (Summary), Kirisutokyō Sekai (Christian world), Kirisuto Kyōgaku Kenkyū (Christian studies), and Kirisutokyō Nenkan (Christian yearbook). Journals in English include Chinese Theological Review, China Study Project Journal, Bridge, China Bulletin, Japan Christian Quarterly, Japan Christian Review, Japanese Religions, Asian Cultural Studies, and Comparative Culture.

Another set of source materials are the writings of early twentieth-century pro-indigenization activists and other nationalistic writers. These authors were associated with the process of church independence and wrote on the subjects in Chinese, Japanese and English. In China, these materials include the writings of Jiang Wenhan, Cheng Jingyi, Zhao Zichen, Wu Yaozong, Ding Guangxun, Zhao Fusun, Yu Rizhang (David Yu), and others. In Japan, these include the works of Takeda Kiyoko, Uchimura Kanzō, Nitobe Inazō, Kagawa Toyohiko, Arishima Takeo, Arahata Kanson, and Furuya Yasuo.

Pitts Theology Library at Emory University is one of the main venues I used to search for original documents from China’s YM/YWCA before 1949. Its special archives for newspapers, magazines, and publications in both Chinese and English are particularly useful for this research in the following topics: (1) American missionaries in China during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; (2) WSCF Conferences before 1949; (3) CCC in the Republican period (1912-1949); and (4) Protestant Churches newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets published in Chinese.

Primary sources also come from a number of institutions in Asia. The Research Center at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) holds most of Jiang’s unpublished papers and works donated by his eldest son, Reverend Franklin Jiang, in 2012. Also, ICU in Tokyo keeps Takeda’s monographs and research papers from her 35 years of tenure there. In addition,
information about Jiang and Takeda also comes from the archives of WSCF, WCC, and IHR at SASS, the National Headquarters of YM/YWCA, and China’s National Committee of TSPM of the Protestant Churches.

**1.5.3 Outline of Chapters**

This study is organized into two main parts, each consisting of two chapters, and an introduction and a conclusion. The Introduction provides an overview of the research, including an outline of the historical encounters between Christianity and East Asian nations and the notion of indigenization. The section also provides an interdisciplinary historiography and literature review of Christian indigenization in East Asia. Finally, my years of contact with both Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko gave me first-hand knowledge about these individuals and their work and has proven to be very helpful in my research.

Chapter One focuses Jiang Wenhan’s life: his legacy as a twentieth-century Protestant social reformer in CSCM and China’s national YMCA, his close relationship with Wu Yaozong, and his decades of complex relations with CCP. Chapter Two analyzes Jiang’s scholarly works on the history of Christianity in China and his contributions to the Christian indigenization in China. Chapter Three provides a biography of Takeda Kiyoko with highlights given to her role as a prominent Japanese intellectual for Christian humanism, her leadership in Japan’s YWCA and engagement with the international ecumenical movement to advocate for women’s liberation, and her unofficial diplomacy in postwar Japan-Asia relations. Chapter Four analyzes Taketa’s scholarly works, thoughts, and contributions to Japanese intellectual history and Christian education in Japan.
PART ONE: JIANG WENHAN (1908-1984)

2 A CHINESE PROTESTANT

Jiang Wenhan was a twentieth-century Protestant social reformer and a key leader of SCM in China. His scholarly contribution to the Chinese Student Movement was highly praised by American scholars Kenneth Scott Latourette and John King Fairbank, yet his 54 years of work at YMCA in China, his lifelong dedication to the indigenization of Christianity in China, and his decades of complex relations with CCP have still been unaddressed in existing scholarship. Part One contains two chapters. Chapter one tells the story of Jiang Wenhan: his life and work, his role in shaping the course of Christianity in twentieth-century China, and the broad cultural and historical background of his time. Chapter two provides an in-depth analysis of the interactions of Christian ideas and practices in modern China, with a focus on the indigenization movement promoted by Jiang Wenhan – a previously untouched topic.

2.1 From Changsha to Shanghai, 1908-1930

Born into a non-Christian family on June 5, 1908, in Changsha, Hunan province, Jiang Wenhan was the only son of Jiang Shipa (? - 1925), a learned man who was a sishu (traditional private school) teacher and a part-time fortuneteller. Like many educated Chinese at the time Jiang’s father had a passion for making his son a learned man to serve the country. As such, Jiang started to learn Confucian classics at the age of four. He was required to recite the classics by heart and to practice the art of calligraphy at least one hour a day. Although the Confucian examination system had been abolished in 1905, Jiang’s conservative father told him that the literary training

of classical learning was a highroad to public service, and therefore he should be more ambitious and well prepared to enter the public service through officialdom.\(^{57}\)

### 2.1.1 Confucian Classics

Jiang Wenhan was told that Confucius was not an ordinary teacher but a teacher of morals. The central aim of Confucian teachings was harmony of human relationships. In Jiang’s comprehension, Confucius taught people to recognize the fundamental structure of human society in terms of the “Five Relationships.”\(^{58}\)

When the ‘Five Relationships’ are duly recognized, we can then determine our proper duties toward each other. The ‘duties of universal obligation’ are five, and they are ‘those between sovereign and minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder brother and younger, and those belonging to the intercourse of friends.’ Our ethical ideals are determined by our status in this system of human relationships. ‘As a sovereign, he rested in benevolence. As a minister, he rested in reverence. As a son, he rested in filial piety. As a father, he rested in kindness. In communication with his subjects, he rested in good faith.’\(^{59}\)

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\(^{57}\) Confucian examination system refers to Chinese imperial examinations, a civil service examination system in Imperial China for selecting candidates for the state bureaucracy. Although the exams had precedents from earlier times their implementation as a tool of recruitment selection only started in earnest during the mid-Tang dynasty. The system reached its apogee during the Song dynasty and lasted until the final years of the Qing dynasty in 1905. Jiang Wenhan, “Wo de qingshaonian” [My youth] in Jiang Wenhan Jinian Wenji, 11; Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 247. For multidimensional analyses of the civil examination system, see Benjamin A. Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) and Civil Examinations and Meritocracy in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

\(^{58}\) The Five Relationships, or so-called Five Bonds in Confucian ethic code are: ruler to ruled, father to son, husband to wife, elder brother to younger brother, friend to friend. Specific duties were prescribed to each of the participants in these sets of relationships. Such duties are also extended to the dead, where the living stand as sons to their deceased family. The only relationship where respect for elders isn’t stressed was the friend to friend relationship, where mutual equal respect is emphasized instead. All these duties take the practical form of prescribed rituals, for instance wedding and death rituals. See Benjamin Elman, John Duncan and Herman Ooms, ed., Rethinking Confucianism: Past and Present in China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, 2002), 1-30; Tu Wei-ming, “Confucian Tradition in Chinese History,” in The Heritage of China: Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization, edited by Paul S. Ropp (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 112-37; Stephan Feuchtwang, “Chinese religions,” in Religions in the Modern World: Traditions and Transformations, ed. Linda Woodhead et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 100-24.

\(^{59}\) Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, 6.
Jiang also learned that the goal of his life was to be a man performing his duty. “According to the Confucian tradition, a man’s duty is a response to the demands made upon him according to his concrete personal relationships with other people. Social harmony will result if everyone fulfils his human duties.” The Confucian teachings of Benevolence (ren) and Forgiveness (shu) were the highest virtues of a moral man’s life, with the Chinese ideograph of ren represented by two men in relationship to each other, and shu a forgiveness from the heart to keep the relationship.

Confucius once defined Jen [ren] as ‘to love men.’ He also said that Jen is humanity. To be a man of Jen is to reach the highest of human possibilities in terms of the completed fulfillment of the mutual good. The passive aspect of Jen is Shu, the ideograph for which is a combination of ‘like’ and ‘heart.’ It means putting oneself in another’s place. It is a principle of inference, the basis of the Chinese Golden Rule. When Tzu Kung [Zi Gong] asked whether there is one word which could serve as a guide of action in one’s life, Confucius answered, Shu, and explained it to mean, ‘What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.’

Jiang noted that Confucianism, which dominated the learned class in imperial China for two millennia, was really a practical code of conduct. It began with the self and expanded to the more immediate and then the more remote relationships. “Confucius maintained that if one has rectified his own conduct, he will have no difficulty in governing other people, but if he fails to regulate his own conduct, he will be unable to rectify that of others.”

2.1.2 Changsha YMCA

Trained in Confucian classics, Jiang Wenhan came into contact with Christianity when he entered Changsha YMCA English night school at the age of eleven. Prior to this, Jiang was homeschooled until age nine when he was sent to a nearby private primary school. After two years of study, he graduated first place in his class, went to First High Primary School of Changsha

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County, and soon became an advanced student in all disciplines. Jiang’s father wanted him to learn English in the belief that knowledge of English would enhance his son’s potential for securing a civil service position in the government, perhaps in the postal or customs services as both were run largely by the British. Consequently, Jiang was sent to the English night school of Changsha YMCA.\(^{62}\)

The YMCA or Y was a product of the nineteenth-century Christian volunteer movement. Filled with a strong evangelical spirit and enthusiasm, young and idealistic men sought to convert non-Christian lands for the Kingdom of Christ or, in the words of John Raleigh Mott (1865-1955) in 1897, for “the World’s Conquest.”\(^{63}\) Started in 1844 by George Williams (1821-1905) in London, England, YMCA came to China in 1896 through a group of American Protestant Christian missionaries who went to China for the mission of *The Christian Occupation of China*.\(^{64}\) The North American YMCA Association in Tianjin formed the first inner city YMCA in China in 1900. Other YMCA programs followed in Shanghai (1900), Fuzhou (1905), Guangzhou (1909),

\(^{62}\) Jiang, “Wo de Qingshaonian,” 12.

\(^{63}\) John R. Mott, *Strategic Points in the World’s Conquest: The Universities and Colleges as Related to the Progress of Christianity* (New York: Student Volunteers Movement for Foreign Missions, 1897), 11.

\(^{64}\) *The Christian Occupation of China* is a book published in 1922 simultaneously in English and Chinese by the Special Committee on Survey and Occupation, commissioned by the China Continuation Committee. The volume was intended as a progress report on the status of Christian churches in China, including social and economic background and local conditions, in preparation for foreign missionaries to turn control over to Chinese Christians, but instead, partly because of the provocative title of the English version, was one of the provocations of anti-Christian movements of the early 1920s. See Milton Stauffer, ed., *The Christian Occupation of China: A General Survey of the Numerical Strength and Geographical Distribution of the Christian Forces in China Made by the Special Committee on Survey and Occupation China Continuation Committee 1918-1921* (Shanghai: China Continuation Committee, 1922); Jiang Wenhan, “Guanyu Zhongguo Jidujiao Qingnianhui Lishi,” in *Jiang Wenhan Jinian Wenji*, 184-85; Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement*, 50-51.
Nanjing (1909), Shantou (1910), and Hong Kong (1910). Changsha YMCA was founded in 1910 with the support of local Protestant churches, Chinese literati, and social elites. By 1919, it had more than 1,750 members, and its Board of Directors oversaw 8 departments including social services, boys, sports, moral education, general affairs, intellectual education, member communication, and students with each department managing 3-5 different programs.

As Jiang Wenhan points out in his autobiography, 1910-1919 was a “golden age” for Changsha YMCA. The branch enjoyed a high public profile from frequent visits of government officials and local news reports. When its new site was finally completed in 1926, YMCA facilities included a number of open-air tennis courts, an outdoor cinema, and a middle school and evening school to the public. Dedicated to the Christian principle of “not to be served, but to serve,” the new site and its four education programs facilitated mass education, physical fitness, and public service, which attracted Jiang Wenhan and many Chinese youth to develop a healthy “body, mind, and spirit.”

Through Changsha YMCA, Jiang also became a frequent visitor of Changsha Lutheran Church nearby. He recorded,

Having an open-minded father and growing up in the Republican era, I was able to attend Changsha Lutheran Church service and to play inside of YMCA building.

The Y was like magic to me! I was 12 years old then and was told that direct contact with “foreign devils” (missionaries) was a scary and bad thing to do, but look, here I met with them almost every day, and I was not hurt! Instead, I studied English with them, watched American western-cowboy movies, played chess and table-tennis, went to the gym and swimming pool, and every day I enjoyed delicious cookies and sometimes even cakes.

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66 Zhao Xiaoyang, Jidujiao Qingnianhui zai Zhongguo: Bentu he Xiandai de Tansuo [YMCA in China: Inquire on indigeneity and modernity]. (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2008), 66-69. Also see “Qingnianhui han ge huiyuan muji juankuan” [Letter from YMCA to members for fund raising], in Da Gong Bao, April 8, 1919 (6): 4;

Here I was free to make new friends, read many new books in a small library, attend Bible study every Wednesday night, and go to summer camps as a Boy Scout member. Inside of the Y, I was protected despite endless wars outside among the warlords. For all my time at the Y, I have never seen one of them break into the Y building to kill someone.68

Young Jiang was eager to explore Christianity. Being so dedicated, Jiang never missed one class during four entire years. He became a committee member of the Boy Scouts and was recommended for the 1922 YMCA National Summer Camp at Lushan (Mount Lu) of Jiangxi province. It was there Jiang made himself fluent in English. He was immediately selected as the youngest student speaker for the 1923 YMCA National Convention in Guangzhou, a city a thousand miles away in southeast China. Accompanied by a Chinese secretary of Changsha Y, Jiang took the boat to Guangzhou. It was on the stop in Shanghai that Jiang saw the infamous park rules posted at the front entrance of Shanghai Bund Park that excluded “Chinese and dogs” from entering.69 Young Jiang was so angry that he never allowed himself to forget it.

What can I do to make a change? I kept asking myself. As a boy who came from a non-Christian family and grew up in the city most famous for its anti-Christian tradition, surprisingly I prayed to the God who was in my mind to deliver China from such humiliation. At that time, I was not a Christian, and the God I prayed to was such a vague Supreme Ruler, without a beginning or an end.70

2.1.3 YMCA Guangzhou Convention

At the 1923 YMCA Guangzhou Convention, Jiang Wenhan was age fifteen and seeking a new beginning to his life. Sun Yat-sen (also known as Sun Wen or Sun Zhongshan, 1866-1925),

68 Jiang, “Wo de Qingshaonian,” 9-12.

69 The enforcement of the ban varied over time, but before June 1928 most Chinese, save for a few amahs and individuals with special permission, were barred from the park. For details of the ban and a revisionist view on the controversies over it, see Robert A. Bickers and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, “Shanghai’s ‘Dogs and Chinese Not Admitted’ Sign: Legend, History and Contemporary Symbol,” China Quarterly, no. 142 (1995): 444-66.

70 Jiang Wenhan, “Chinese Revolution and Christianity: Lecture3: Reconciliation with God and Reconciliation with Men.” Seminar audio tape in English made by and archived in International Christian University Comparative Culture Research Institute, Japan, on February 21, 1982.
the first president of the Republic of China and the first leader of GMD, welcomed Jiang and more than 300 delegates. In his opening remarks, Sun called for Chinese youth to study his revolutionary theory of San Min Principles, or “Three Principles of the People” (san min zhu yi), namely, nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood. As he explained:

Why do we say that the Three Principles of the People will save our nation? Because they will elevate China to an equal position among the nations, in international affairs, in government, and in economic life, so that she can permanently exist in the world. The Three Principles of the People are the principles for our nation’s salvation; is not our China today, I ask you, in need of salvation? If so, then let us have faith in the Three Principles, and our faith will engender a mighty force that will save China.71

In his speech, Sun highly praised YMCA social programs of character-building and reaffirmed the profound role of Christianity in the course of national revolution. He claimed that China’s future in social, moral, and political construction needed Christianity and YMCA in particular. He called upon all Chinese youth for “saving China through character building” (guomin yao yi renge jiuguo). The primary role of YMCA was to transform the minds of 400 million Chinese through character building or, in other words, to put Christian principles into practice through association programs that promoted healthy spirit, mind, and body as well as to build youth leadership and social responsibility with a keen concern for the local community and the country.72

Jiang was inspired by Sun’s speech and his revolutionary “Three Principles of the People.” He described the experience to be like hearing the peal of thunder in silence, his heart was struck,

71 Sun Wen, San Min Zhu Yi [Three principles of the people] (Shanghai: Sanmin Gongsi, 1927), 38; Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, 82-83.

72 Ibid; Xi Xiande, Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng yu Jidujiao (Sun Zhongshan and Protestant Christianity) (Taipei: Jinxuan Chubanshe, 1980), 120.
and he felt a call from Christ. On Christmas Day of 1923, Jiang was baptized at Changsha Lutheran Church (xinyihui) at the age of fifteen.\textsuperscript{73}

\subsection*{2.1.4 Student Activist}

From 1926 to 1930, Jiang Wenhan tried to complete his college education after graduation from Liling Zundao Middle School of American Methodist Church Mission. But because of the wars and social turmoil in the region, he had to transfer from Yali College to Huazhong University, both operated by Yale Foreign Missionary Society, and finally to Jinling University (University of Nanjing), which was established by American Methodist Episcopal Church Mission. In each school, Jiang was a student activist and president of campus YMCA club. Referring to his six years from 1924 to 1930, Jiang called it a “real cross-cultural experiment through YMCA.”\textsuperscript{74}

Notably, by 1922 YMCA in China was the most popular Christian institution, especially among Chinese youth. There were all together 183 YMCAs with a total membership of 24,135 and 90 student YWCAs with about 6,000 members. “In most of the cities, the site of the Y was so well known that without knowing the street address, just ask for the Y, and a rickshaw driver knew exactly how to bring you there.”\textsuperscript{75} Among Chinese students, two YMCA spokesmen from the World Youth Association, John R. Mott (1865-1955) and George Sherwood Eddy (1871-1963),

\textsuperscript{73} The church Jiang baptized in was established by Norwegian Lutheran China Mission Association in 1891, which was just down the street from his house. The church survived as an organized body after the Chinese Civil War but was gradually absorbed into the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China. See Jiang, “Wo de qingshaonian,” 15; R. G. Tiedemann, \textit{Reference Guide to Christian Missionary Societies in China: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century} (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 148.

\textsuperscript{74} Jiang, “Guanyu Zhongguo Jidujiao Qingnianhui Lishi,” 182-83.

were the most popular American Protestant evangelists. During their one-month joint tour of 1913, Mott and Eddy were welcomed by nearly 80,000 Chinese (35,000 being students), with an average of more than 2,000 per night. In his 1907 visit to China, Mott advocated his idea of expanding YMCA work into government schools in order to appeal Christianity to Chinese intellectuals. Eddy went on his evangelistic tours in 1914 and 1915 with his message full of the “Social Gospel.” “He spoke of the evils of the capitalist system and preached the need for an intellectual, social and spiritual revolution. Most of his members of audience were interested in his critique of the West rather than in his religious message, but to many Christians it seemed that at last the conversion of China was a real possibility.”

Like many other contemporary Chinese students, Jiang Wenhan adored John Mott and admired his ardent enthusiasm to bring the Gospel to the world and his way to propagate the Kingdom of Christianity in China. By looking at John Mott as his role model, Jiang saw himself practice Christian faith as a YMCA student agent. At Jinling University, Jiang carried out

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76 John Raleigh Mott was an evangelist and long-serving leader of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF). He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1946 for his work in establishing and strengthening international Protestant Christian student organizations that worked to promote peace. Intimately involved in the formation of the World Council of Churches in 1948, that body elected him as a lifelong honorary President. His best-known book, The Evangelization of the World in this Generation, became a missionary slogan in the early 20th century. Yale University Divinity School Library archives a collection of John R. Mott Papers: 1813-1982 (RG 45). George Sherwood Eddy was a leading American Protestant missionary, administrator and educator. He was a prolific author and indefatigable traveler. His main achievement was to link and finance networks of intellectuals across the globe, especially Christian leaders in Asia and the Middle East. He enabled missionaries to better understand and even think like the people they were serving. His long-term impact on the Protestant communities in the United States, and in the Third World, was long lasting. From the 1930s onwards, he became a Christian socialist. Yale University Divinity School Library archives a collection of George Sherwood Eddy Papers: 1851-1981 (RG 32).

77 Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, 50-51.


various YMCA programs on character building, mass education, and citizenship training. He directed a Bible study every Wednesday night and two Sunday schools for faculty members and local residents. He organized a Christmas Eve celebration, an Easter music concert, and a slide show of religious education. He expanded service to those sick and needy inside of the campus, and connected local farmers to off-campus Sunday schools evening training classes. Jiang was the head of the Student Christian Fellowship (jin-da tuanqi, formed in July 1927 by student and faculty Christians to counter anti-Christian sentiments), where he actively promoted the ideas of “Practice Faith with Reason” and “Experience Religion with Life.” Jiang’s leading role to contextualize YMCA in the Chinese situation quickly made him a rising star of Chinese SCM. Before his graduation, Jiang had already gotten a job offer from Wu Yaozong to work as a student secretary at YMCA National Association in Shanghai (Figure 2).  

2.2 YMCA Student Secretary, Pre-1937

In July 1930, with a “Golden Key” award under his belt from Jinling University, the 22-year-old Jiang Wenhan started to work at the National YMCA Student Division (xiaohui zu) with Wu Yaozong as the head of the department.  

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81 Figure 2. Jiang Wenhan (Kiang Wen-han), 1940. Courtesy of the YMCA of the USA Archives. Minnesota University Libraries; Jiang, “Wo de qingshaonian,” 16-18; Jiang, “Wu Yaozong,” 20.

82 The job “Student Secretary” refers to a young man hired to administer student YMCAs. In 1879, student work first became an official part of the American YMCA’s agenda when the International Committee in New York created the Student Division. See Jiang “Wo de qingshaonian,” 16-18; Zhao, Jidujiao Qingnianhui zai Zhongguo, 10-14, 23-36.
2.2.1 A Complex Identity

By 1930, Chinese YMCA was situated in 41 cities and 133 campuses including 21 Student Christian Fellowships. The main areas of Y’s work included public education lectures, social service activities, Western sports, and physical education. Young Chinese, especially students, became increasingly interested in social service (shehui fiw) and reform issues at this time, and their acceptance and promotion of this type of work made it a priority for YMCA-China.83

Jiang Wenhan quickly noticed that Chinese YMCA, the organization he worked for and so identified with Anglo-American values, was often depicted as a middle-class, business-friendly, evangelically-motivated, and Guomindang-supporting organization. All of this was true but not complete. The Y’s initial appeal in large part actually rested on its success in the indigenization of Christianity, especially in making Chinese leaders of the organization. The Y was formally established in China in 1895, and by 1915 it had its first Chinese general secretary, Wang Zhengting (Cheng-ting Wang, 1882-1961). The Y leadership continued to be selected from the ranks of the college-educated Chinese elite, many of whom had also earned graduate degrees in the United States, and as such were the elite of the elite. In addition, the Y’s connection to modernizing urban elites, politicians, businesspersons, and professionals further secured its influence in the larger Chinese society. The board of directors of the Y’s National Association showed some diversity, but they all came if not from the ranks of capitalist entrepreneurs then at least from the Chinese elite. As a matter of fact, five of the eight ministers in the 1928 Nationalist Cabinet were Christian, and all of these five were either YMCA leaders or sons of Y secretaries. Furthermore, the Y continued its strong support of the Nationalist government, especially during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). Finally, the Chinese Y’s complex identity included its

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Christian vocation: its mission of serving God and serving others. This mission, especially the concept of serving others, along with the International YMCA movement, the Student Volunteer Movement, and the major American missionary governing board, was coming under the influence of the Social Gospel.⁸⁴

Being new at the organization, Jiang Wenhan was immediately attracted to a pool of talented people in the National Association. Among them, two widely respected colleagues became his role models: Yu Rizhang (David Z.T. Yui, also Yu Jih-chang, 1882-1936) and Wu Yaozong (Figure 3).⁸⁵

### 2.2.2 Role Models

Yu Rizhang, one of the most prominent Chinese Protestant leaders of the Republican period, was the head of YMCA National Association for twenty years. In 1923, it was Yu who advised Sun Yat-sen to talk about “saving China through character building” at the Guangzhou YMCA National Convention.⁸⁶ Yu was eager to see the Y take a more active role

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⁸⁵ Figure 3. Roster of Prominent Chinese YMCA National Secretaries and Board Members, 1919-1937.

⁸⁶ Jiang, “Guanyu Zhongguo Jidujiao Qingnianhui Lishi,” 186-94. Yu Rizhang was a Chinese Protestant Christian leader who led the Chinese National YMCA in the 1920s and 1930s. He was a leader in what Daniel Bays called the “Sino-Foreign Protestant Establishment,” a generation of Chinese Protestant Christians who worked to make Christianity independent of foreign control and relevant to the emerging Chinese nation. See Bays, A New History of Christianity in China, 92-120.
in addressing China’s social problems and believed this change was necessary for making China a wealthy and powerful nation guided by proper moral principles. Thus, in 1920 he coined the phrase “saving China through character building,” which became the guiding principle of Chinese YMCA throughout the 1920s. Yu explained the attraction of his initiatives in terms of their philosophical similarities to Confucianism and firmly believed that the group’s fourfold program, which drew on Christian values with emphasis on physical, mental, moral, and social development, was the most effective way to build this character. In 1922, Yu was chosen to be head of the National Christian Council (NCC) to promote greater cooperation between different Christian groups in China and to manage some common issues such as local evangelism, rural life, the family, indigenization of the church, and international connections. Besides, Yu was a talented diplomat with vision. In 1929, he traveled to Japan four times in an effort to promote peace between the two countries. In 1932, following the Japanese control of Manchuria, Yu traveled to the United States and met with various American leaders, including Secretary of State Henry Stimson, to convey China’s view of the crisis.

For six years, Jiang worked under Yu’s supervision. To him, Yu was a man of the world, a powerful Chinese elite, a talented negotiator from political and social standpoints, and of course an influential Christian leader.

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87 The fourfold program of young men was first developed by the New York City association in 1866 and became the foundation of the Y’s international work. See Jiang, “Guanyu Zhongguo Jidujiao Qingnianhui lishi,” 186-94; Yu Rizhang, “The Indigenization of the YMCA in China,” letter to Charles A. Herschleb, on March 10, 1925. Box 4, Correspondence, YMCA USA. Herschleb was General Secretary of the YMCA in Jinan and Secretary of the International Committee of the YMCA.

When he became General Secretary in 1916, the first thing he did was to simplify the administration by merging eight separate units into three. He emphasized the primary role of YMCA to be flexible and adjustable based on the needs of social change. At our meetings Yu liked to collect various input and then put heads together so as to get better results. Because our Association was located in the Shanghai International Settlement, many rich people from the Settlement tried to connect with Yu. Some even sent him a car as a gift. Once my department had a fundraiser, and I reported to Yu for help. I saw him pick up the phone and called Yu Qiaqing, head of the Shanghai Stock and Commodities Exchange, and the money quickly started pouring in.  

There is no doubt that Yu Rizhang was a social revolutionary who influenced Jiang with his bold approaches to reform in China. But it was Wu Yaozong, the head of the Student Division whom Jiang first met at the 1923 Guangzhou Convention, who had the most profound impact in Jiang’s Christian mind.  

“Always quiet and often deep in thought, sometimes even a bit mysterious,” Wu Yaozong was a May-Fourth-generation intellectual who came into contact with Protestant Christianity through YMCA’s social service programs. Converted to Christianity by the call of Sherwood

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90 Wu Yaozong was a Protestant Christian leader in China who played a key role in the establishment of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement. The Chinese Communists call him a “role model for patriotic religious people” while many Christians call him “the traitor of Christianity.” To Jiang Wenhan, Wu was a “patriotic Chinese Protestant, and a revolutionary prophet in leading the indigenization of Christianity in Communist China, while Wu Zongsu, Wu’s only son who has immigrated to America, defines his father as a Christian thinker, an idealist, and a tragic figure in the history of Christianity in the twentieth century China. See Wu Zongsu, “Luohua youyi, liushui wuqing – Wo suo zhidaoo de fuqin Wu Yaozong” [Fallen flowers have a purpose; Flowing water is ruthless - Wu Yaozong, a father I know], an opening note at “Wu Yaozong yu Zhongguo Jidujiao xueshu yantaohui” [Conference on Wu Yaozong and Protestant Christianity in China] in 2010, later was included in Dashidai de Zongjiao Xinyang: Wu Yaozong yu Ershi Shiji Zhongguo Jidujiao [Religion in big era: Wu Yaozong and the twentieth century Chinese Protestant Christianity], ed. Fuk-tsang Ying (Hong Kong: Christian Study Center on Chinese Religion and Culture of CUHK, 2011).

91 Jiang, “Wu Yaozong,” 15; Jiang, “Lecture 2.” So many times Jiang Wenhan was amazed for how fast Wu Yaozong could write and publish. Wu Yaozong was a prolific author. His works, including many previously unpublished diaries and personal correspondences, are published by The Chinese University of Hong Kong. See Ying Fuk-tsang, ed., Wu Yaozong Quanji 1-4 Juan [Complete works of Y. T. Wu vol. 1-4]. (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Hong Kong Press, 2011-2018). Also see Zhao Xiaoyang, Wu Yaozong Juan [Collective Works of Wu Yaozong]. (Beijing, Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2014).
Eddy, Wu was by the 1930s a YMCA national secretary, colleague of Eugene Barnett, and an editorial board member and frequent contributor to the *Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal*. Obviously, Wu stood out as a true Christian intellectual in the very practical world of YMCA and was respected for his voluminous publications in Chinese and in English. Wu read voraciously, and as chief editor of the Association Press, he was constantly recommending Jiang new English works to be translated (Figure 4).\(^{92}\)

Instilled with the patriotic and nationalist spirit of the May Fourth Movement, Wu Yaozong was the first who decided to form Chinese SCM. He helped lay its groundwork by promoting SCM through his “Life Club” (*shengmingshe*) in 1920 and proposed his plan at the 1922 WSCF Beijing Conference. As the leading figure of Chinese SCM, many times Wu urged Jiang for a thorough “Self-Liberation” (*ziwo de jiefang*).\(^{93}\) Wu was also a well-known pacifist who penned the charter of the Chinese Fellowship of Reconciliation (*Zhongguo weiaishe*) in the 1930s, assisted in editing the magazine *Reconciliation* to advocate for the peace movement, and later became the chief editor. He was deeply influenced by Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), the leader of the Indian independence movement who inspired the world by his nonviolent revolution. For a long time, Wu rejected the idea of applying radical means in social transformation, as Jesus Christ would not support the use of violence. He advocated “a great movement of social consciousness” through the

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use of the spirit of Christ. Underlying this stand was his belief in the principle of reconciliation. Until 1931, Wu was a fervent supporter of the principle of reconciliation.\(^9^4\)

Wu emphasized “a revolutionary role of Christianity as a social reformer.” For him, Christianity’s great redeeming power should be put to transforming society, to achieving social justice. Jesus was not only viewed as an ethical character but also a social revolutionary. In the 1920s the major concern for Wu was how to save the country. Some proposed science or establishing industries as the way. YMCA, as represented by Yu Rizhang, called for the salvation of the nation by character building. Wu Yaozong also emphasized the importance of character and morality but did not think of them as the crux of China’s problems. The cultivation of character and morality was inseparable from the material conditions of society.\(^9^5\) By 1930 Wu encountered challenges in finding the best way out for the country and in addressing the active anti-Christian critiques. To counter the latter, Wu had the idea of creating a “Chinese Christianity” independent from foreign missionaries and finance. Nevertheless, Wu continuously proposed a society of love to be attained by the love of Jesus Christ. However, his position changed during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).\(^9^6\)

To Jiang Wenhan, in person, Wu Yaozong was extremely just, reliable, and forthright.

What he said was of a piece with what he believed and thought. Everyone could perceive his conduct and innermost heart from his speeches and writings. His heart was


without deceit, and his talk and his walk were one; indeed his walk bore out his talk. He did not cover up his faith, his thinking, or his point of view. He had the courage to insist on what he felt to be right, but also to correct what he perceived to be his mistakes. He thus became the role model for my Christian life.97

2.2.3 Chinese Student Christian Movement

Student Christian Movement (SCM), a movement of young people, was the product of several student movements in the early twentieth century dedicated to missionary work overseas, of which the Student Volunteer Movement was of special importance.98 Closely associated with YM/YWCA, SCM carried out the mission of “evangelization of the world in this generation” called by John R. Mott, the famous American Protestant evangelist, to demonstrate the values of openness, inclusiveness, radicalism, and an open and challenging approach to the Christian faith. SCM was very influential during the early twentieth century, playing a part in the creation of several important conferences and organizations. The movement was instrumental in bringing about the Edinburgh Missionary Conference in 1910, a conference that marked the beginnings of the modern ecumenical movement, played a vital role in the formation of WSCF in 1895, and together with WCC was also involved in the formation of Chinese SCM in 1922.99

According to Jiang Wenhan, Chinese SCM, while jointly represented by Student Division of national YM/YWCAs and Student Christian Fellowship groups in colleges and secondary schools affiliated with WSCF, was autonomous, self-directing, ecumenical, and non-


denominational. The perceived need for a Chinese SCM did not emerge until after the 1922 WSCF Conference in Beijing. Despite the storm of opposition by the Anti-Christian Student Federation nationwide, 764 Christian leaders from thirty-two nations gathered together to demonstrate the spiritual solidarity of Christian students of all nations and all races, including 600 Chinese delegates from 140 boys’ schools and 50 girls’ schools. The Conference accepted the proposal to establish Chinese SCM and adopted this new reality in China: “To lead students to realize that the principles of Jesus Christ should rule in international relationships, and to endeavor by so doing to draw the nations together.”\(^{100}\) In the motto of “One Family under Heaven,” the Conference was themed on “Christ in World Reconstruction,” in particular, the relevance of Christianity to social and economic reconstruction after World War I, as it declared,

> We, representing Christian students from all parts of the world, believe in the fundamental equality of all the races and nations of mankind and consider it as part of our Christian vocation to express this reality in all our relationships. We consider it our absolute duty to do all in our power to fight the cause leading to war, and war itself as a means of settling international disputes.\(^{101}\)

The 1922 WSCF Beijing Conference inaugurated Chinese SCM and thereby brought a new sense of unity among Chinese student Christians. The Chinese SCM began to take shape as a united national body comprising all the voluntary student Christian organizations in college and secondary schools across the country. The movement redefined its mission statement in 1927 by calling “in the spirit of Jesus, to create fellowships of youth and to build sound character, with a view to the emancipation and development of the life of the people.”\(^{102}\) Jiang Wenhan


became the youngest member at Chinese SCM National Preparatory Committee meeting in 1931. Together with seven other leaders, he pledged to “build the nation through personal character” (*renge jiuguo*), to search for an intellectual foundation of Christian faith, to live Christian faith through social service, to affirm the social responsibility of the Christian movement, to promote Christianity as a source for social change in China, and to lead Chinese SCM as the way of missiology with one possible source of guidance that appealed to Chinese youth as the wave of future.¹⁰³

Before taking the job at YMCA, Jiang Wenhan was a college student activist who committed himself to the ecumenical movement. His experience as YMCA Student Secretary convinced him the need to be involved in Chinese SCM. Month by month, he traveled around the clock to meet with local Y members and college volunteers to implement Chinese SCM campus and community programs. Often he preached at local churches to promote Chinese SCM, sometimes even in English, although he was not an ordained minister. He designated himself to the following five areas of responsibility:

(1) To promote the Student Christian Movement, organizing and guiding Christian fellowships among students in all China’s colleges and middle schools;
(2) To develop service opportunities and activities for students;
(3) To train student leaders;
(4) To encourage opportunities for student reflections;
(5) To assist and provide relief for students in stressful circumstances.¹⁰⁴

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He actively participated in the Universal Day of Prayer for Students designated by WSCF. At the same time, he reached out to Japanese SCM for a joined day of prayer every last week in April. In 1937, he was the first Chinese SCM leader to visit Japan for the inauguration of Sino-Japanese SCM. In Tokyo he met for the first time with Takeda Kiyoko, a student activist of YWCA-Japan. The two immediately became good friends. The dialogues they started were on Asian SCMs cooperation to the course of Sino-Japanese peace and transpacific Christian fellowship.\textsuperscript{105}

As a part of WSCF, Chinese SCM played an important role during the Sino-Japanese War. It was the only national student body in China that enjoyed a historical continuity uninterrupted by political interference. After a decade of preparation and hard thinking, Chinese SCM came out with its readiness to accept the call of the United Front to utilize its instrumental efforts as a spiritual and moral basis for China’s reconstruction. Although the numerical strength of Chinese SCM was not phenomenal, its proportionate strength was significant, especially as “there is in it an earnest search to make Christian faith more socially effective through manifestation of Chinese SCM both local and universal.”\textsuperscript{106}

Jiang Wenhan became a frontrunner of Chinese SCM who designated himself to “seek for the truth and love in faith on Jesus Christ, and to live his Christian faith through social service.” Meanwhile, he promoted social responsibility of Christianity by making himself a student agent for social change in China. His leading role to rally the Chinese student Christians for social reform and reconstruction won him recognitions from the national YMCA, the Protestant churches in

\textsuperscript{105} On February 19, 1982 in Tokyo, Japan, at ICU Asian Culture Research Center, right after Jiang Wenhan delivered his second lecture on theme of “Chinese Christianity after 1949 Revolution,” Kiyoko Takeda Cho, the host professor and the Director of the Center, joined in the discussion about the Sino-Japanese SCM inaugurated in 1937 and how her cooperation with Jiang Wenhan since then.

\textsuperscript{106} Kiang, \textit{The Chinese Student Movement}, 133.
China, and the international Christian community. Jiang was called a “Christian social reformer,” but he considered himself a Chinese Protestant who followed Jesus Christ rather than a social revolutionary. All he did was to make his Christian message more acceptable to Chinese youth; all he wanted was to see the “Kingdom of God” realized in China, not a “new social order.” Certainly, Jiang differentiated himself from a Marxist atheist.  

In 1932, Jiang attended the General Committee Meeting of WSCF in Netherlands and was elected as executive committee member. On his journey by ship from Shanghai to Zeist, he met Yao Xianhui, his future wife. Yao was a Baptist and a native of Nanchang, Jiangxi province, and leader of student YWCA from the University of Shanghai (known as Hujiang University in Chinese). Together they represented Chinese SCM at the General Committee and later married in July 1934. That same year, the couple went to Philadelphia where Jiang studied at the University of Pennsylvania and earned a master’s degree in history. They returned to China in 1935, and soon Jiang succeeded Wu Yaozong as executive secretary of the Student Division. He also became vice president of WSCF at the age of 27. Jiang held the position until 1953.

### 2.3 Christian Leader in Wartime Service, 1937-1945

Japanese aggression against China started on September 18, 1931, and intensified to a full-fledged Second Sino-Japanese War, known in China as the War of Resistance against Japan, on

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107 In 1982 at General Assembly of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Jiang was invited for the first time to openly discuss the YMCA in China, his role with the National Association, and his understanding of Social Gospel in the Chinese SCM before 1949. Jiang Wenhan, “Qingnianhui zai Zhongguo” [YMCA in China]. Institute of Historical Research Meeting Minutes (May 7, 1982).

108 Yao Xianhui, forward to Jiang Wenhan Jinian Wenji, 1-3.

July 7, 1937. The war created a national crisis. On December 9, 1935, students in Beijing went onto the streets demanding national resistance against Japanese aggression. Many of them were members of YM/YWCA and Chinese SCM. Subsequently, student demonstrations occurred in almost all major cities. In spite of the government restrictions the All China Student National Salvation Union (ACSNSU) was formed in Shanghai on March 28, 1936. With the support of Madame Sun Yat-sen and other prominent intellectual leaders, ACSNSU established a national anti-Japanese united front with the goal of saving the nation. In June of the same year, Lu Xun (Lu Hsun, 1881-1936), the most influential writer among Chinese students and a leading figure of the League of Chinese Leftist Writers, gave a message from his sickbed to support students.

For the reality of the upsurges throughout the country, brought about by the spontaneous movement of the students, we can really see, along with the intensified invasion by Japanese imperialism and the accelerated selling out of the nation by the traitors, all of which indicates the acuteness of the national crisis, that the majority of the Chinese nation who do not wish to become slaves have consciously arisen and have shown their iron determination to destroy the semi-colonial yoke which the enemy has placed upon us. The students are the most sensitive fighters and the foremost sentries in the struggle for liberation of semi-colonial nations. So it was not difficult for their spontaneous movement for national salvation to influence the whole country and even the whole world, which is now wavering at the cross-roads between light and darkness.

2.3.1 Christianity in Times of Crisis

What role should Chinese Christians play in shaping the course of anti-Japanese war? During those crucial years, Jiang Wenhan stood out to express his view. In January 1936, Jiang

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111 Lu Xun was the pen name of Zhou Shuren, a Chinese writer, essayist, poet, and literary critic. He was a leading figure of modern Chinese literature. In the 1930s, he became the titular head of the League of Left-Wing Writers in Shanghai. Shortly after his death, Mao Zedong called him “the saint of modern China,” but used his legacy selectively to promote his own political goals.

112 Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, 103-107, 117.
joined with Wu Yaozong and other Church leaders to issue a statement to fully support the national resistance movement:

> We love peace, but we love justice more. We are against any action that will lead to unnecessary sacrifice, but we are not afraid to shed our blood for the sake of truth and justice. We pledge ourselves to back up to the utmost the nationwide movement of resistance which has arisen throughout the country.\(^{113}\)

At the Pacific Area Conference of WSCF held in 1936 at Oakland, California, Jiang condemned the continued aggression of the Japanese. He pointed out that China’s national crisis brought Chinese SCM under the influence of the United Front. There was a strong sense of patriotism and social responsibility among Christian students to support the formation of a political united front for China’s national salvation:

> We find that the Chinese Christian students have identified themselves with the general student movement. The isolation of the Christian student is breaking down. One dominant note of the general student movement in China today is the formation of a ‘United Front’ in an incessant struggle for national liberation… It is significant to note that students in the Christian institutions have taken a notable part in most of the recent demonstrations. The discussions of our various student Christian groups and conferences have centered chiefly on the question of national salvation. The publication of our Christian students during the past year has shown a dominant concern over the question of the responsibility of Christian students in the task of national salvation. The Provisional Council of SCM stated in its proclamation last January: ‘Not only do we sympathize with the student national salvation movement of the country, we are also willing to continue to take an active part of it.’\(^{114}\)

Jiang was deeply involved in the national salvation united front through the Mass Singing Movement, initiated in February 1935 by Liu Liangmo (1909-1988), his colleague at the National Association.\(^{115}\) “China Sing” made national salvation vocal among young volunteers and inspired

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\(^{113}\) Ibid. Xing, *Baptized in the Fire of Revolution*, 107.

\(^{114}\) Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement*, 125.

\(^{115}\) Liu Liangmo was a musician and Chinese Christian leader known for his promotion of the patriotic mass singing movement in the 1930s and promotion in the United States of support for China’s resistance to Japan in World War II. As a covered CCP member according to Jiang Wenhan, Liu was also a leader of TSPM after 1949.
them to join the Anti-Japanese Aggression Movement. Joined by students, office workers, shopkeepers, apprentices, clerks, and soldiers all over the country, Jiang led Chinese SCM participation in the Mass Singing Movement, which started with about sixty people and ended with thousands. One song called “The March of the Volunteers,” written by the young student Nie Er (George Njal, 1912-1935), was Jiang’s favorite:

Arise! Ye who refuse to be bond slaves!
With our very flesh and blood
Let us build our new Great Wall.
China’s masses have met the day of danger,
Indignation fills the heart of all of our countrymen.
Arise! Arise! Arise!
Many hearts with one mind,
Brave the enemy’s gunfire,
March on!
Brave the enemy’s gunfire,
March on! March on! March on! On!\textsuperscript{116}

Jiang was sharply critical on Christian pacifism toward military resistance against Japanese aggression. As he said at the Pacific Area Conference of WSCF in 1936, “When China launched its full-fledged war of resistance against Japan, many Chinese student Christians were greatly troubled by the role of Christianity. They asked how, if Christianity is a religion of love, can the Christian students support military resistance against the Japanese aggression?”\textsuperscript{117} By comparing Christian pacifism with Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violence ideology, Jiang called for a unity of consciousness of Christian faith and Chinese patriotism for the cause of China’s national salvation. He did not hesitate to urge all Chinese Christian youth, “If the choice is between force and


cowardice, then force is preferable to cowardice.” “We are willing to sacrifice everything in the struggle against imperialism in general and in the resistance against Japanese aggression in particular.”"\textsuperscript{118} In his report submitted to the Christian Council for Higher Education in February 1937, Jiang frankly spoke about the secularization of Christian colleges in China during this crucial period and the increasing concern among students on politics. He reminded the Council that “Chinese students had shifted their interests and were not satisfied with religious principles and generalities.” They became more and more interested in seeking solutions to resolve political and economic problems instead of having isolated rural experiments.\textsuperscript{119}

\subsection*{2.3.2 Wartime Relief Agent}

The War against Japan witnessed unprecedented military participation by the public in China. One primary conduit of service directed to soldiers during the war was the Chinese YMCA.\textsuperscript{120} According to Jiang Wenhan, the Service to Soldiers Program (SSP) of YMCA in China was initiated during WWI and became institutionalized during the War against Japan between 1937 and 1945. In 1933, Jiang and other student secretaries joined the frontline to provide both temporal and spiritual needs for Chinese soldiers, particularly wounded soldiers. For more than three months, Jiang lived with the soldiers, listened to their stories, prayed for those wounded, and

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\textsuperscript{119} Ibid; Whyte, \textit{Unfinished Encounter}, 172.
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wrote letters for them to be sent home. He organized “Soldiers Sing for China” to boost soldiers’ morale and started adult literacy classes. He negotiated with General Yan Zhen to open a soldier service center directly operated by local YMCA branches in Army Camp No. 35 frontline and insisted that all programs were non-religious and non-partisan.  

The SSP became so popular that more student volunteers of Chinese SCM joined to serve at the frontline. During the eight-year war, SSP branches served all across China and had the largest and longest operations of YMCA sub-branches. Compared to the pre-war period, the scope and time duration of SSP, as well as the number of soldiers who benefited from their work, all increasing dramatically. By 1943, seven district offices directed forty SSP branches with more than three hundred SSP traveling teams deployed each year to work at hospitals, army units, and schools for military children. At the peak of its activity, YMCA wartime service programs were available in forty-two cities of ten provinces with over three hundred full-time professionals who offered various kinds of service.  

The war inevitably meant serious disruption to Christian life, especially in Japanese-occupied areas. The suffering of the Chinese people was horrifying, and Chinese Christians organized themselves to help. In 1937, the Christian Forward Movement was established for relief work, spiritual uplifting, and coordination with the Nationalist government. To help thousands of Chinese students displaced by the war, in 1938 the YMCA organized the All-China Student Relief Committee (SRC) with Jiang Wenhan as the executive director. Under a non-religious and non-
political role, Jiang led the relief programs to serve refugee students with food supplies and travel stipends, later adding winter clothing, food supplies, and medical supplements. Jiang himself made strenuous efforts to train relief volunteers, talk to radio stations, write articles for newspapers, and attend local gatherings for public fundraising. Within two years, he directed SRC project to quickly expand into seventeen local relief centers, seven student communes, three new YMCA facilities in southwest China, and a relief service team in every college campus.\textsuperscript{124} He utilized the resources of Chinese SCM to collaborate with other patriotic social groups and organizations and in many instances to make Chinese Christians and non-Christians join forces for wartime student service projects.\textsuperscript{125} In addition to striving for continuous international aid, Jiang closely connected himself with WSCF Executive Committee, the International Missionary Council, and World Student Fund for financial assistance.\textsuperscript{126} Moreover, he promoted the wartime Chinese SCM to the countries like Japan, Australia, Europe, and the United States for Christian solidarity. Each year during the Week of Prayer for World Youth initiated by WSCF, Jiang called upon the Christian world praying for an end of the war.\textsuperscript{127}


\textsuperscript{126} Kiang Wen-han, “The Education Trek” in China Christian Year Book (1938-1939): 197-98; Kiang Wen-han, “A Trip to the Southwest in the fall of 1943” (January 10, 1944):1-6, letter from National Student Relief Committee in Chongqing, China to World Student Service Fund at New York. Yale University Divinity Library archives the document.

\textsuperscript{127} Jiang, “Kangzhan Shiqi de Qingnianhui Gongzuo,” 66-67.
As a Christian agent representing China’s YMCA, Jiang Wenhan led Chinese SCM to shape the role of Christianity during national crisis. Under his leadership, Chinese SCM dedicated to the principle of secular nonpartisanship in order to offer Chinese student Christians a platform to participate in service of the country as a third force. Jiang and his SCM programs quickly became popular and even brought some attention from CCP. He was invited by CCP in 1939 to open a refugee student center in Yan’an.\footnote{Phillip A. Potter, the World Christian Council General Secretary, highly commended Jiang and his work:}

The SCM, under the dedicated, wise and competent leadership of Kiang Wen-han, who was also Vice-Chairperson of the Federation for many years, played a very significant role of accompanying the thousands of displaced students who were forced to move from the south and east to the north-west of China. Even there they were subject to frequent air bombings by the Japanese.\footnote{The SCM, under the dedicated, wise and competent leadership of Kiang Wen-han, who was also Vice-Chairperson of the Federation for many years, played a very significant role of accompanying the thousands of displaced students who were forced to move from the south and east to the north-west of China. Even there they were subject to frequent air bombings by the Japanese.}

### 2.3.3 A Trip to Yan’an, 1939

Jiang Wenhan noticed that following the resumption of the cooperation between GMD and CCP in 1937, Communist publications were allowed to circulate openly.

Many students seemed to be keen about Communist ideology, for instance, Mao Zedong’s essay “On Protracted War” (1938), Kai Feng’s book on the united front against Japan (1938), and Ai Siqi’s *Philosophy of the Masses*, which introduced the philosophy of dialectic materialism. [Ai’s work was] first published in 1936, but before the end of the war it had reached its seventh edition. They also searched for information about the Communists in the Northwest, the Eighth Route Army or the reorganized Red Army.\footnote{Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement*, 121; Mao Zedong’s article in Chinese is “Lun Chijiu Zhan” [On Protracted War], dated in May, 1938. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* in English, vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), 113-94. Kai Fen’s book in Chinese is *Kangri Minzu Tongyi Zhanxian Jiaocheng* [Tutorial on National Anti-Japanese United Front], dated in September, 1938; Ai Siqi’s book in Chinese is *Dazhong Zhexue*.}

\footnote{Jiang Wenhan, “Huiyi Yan’an zhixing” [Recalling my trip to Yan’an] in *Jiang Wenhan Jinian Wenji*, 151-173.}

\footnote{Potter, “The Student Christian Movement and the Chinese Church,” 64.}
Impressed by the increasing popularity of Communism among Chinese youth, Jiang read Edgar Snow’s *Red Star over China* (1936), which was the first book about the life of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist leaders at Yan’an, and a number of news reports on a trek of Chinese students to Yan’an. “It is the strangest pilgrimage of modern times – seeking in Yan’an, capital of the Red Army, the truth that will save China!” Decades later Jiang wrote:

During this crucial midst of propaganda and counterpropaganda, I am eager to seek the truth of Chinese communism by myself. Perhaps through a trip to Yan’an, I may develop some kind of mutual respect and even a coalition with the Communists for the sake of national salvation.

In March 1939, Jiang discussed with the Executive Committee of WSCF about his view on wartime China, political unity, and Chinese students. To him, the war against Japan was an important part of Chinese liberation. China was fighting for a new democratic country not only for its own liberation but also for the vindication of international justice and the sanctity of international treaties. Chinese youth were taking a very important part in the struggle for national salvation. Their biggest contribution was so-called “political work” to arouse the morale of the masses, to spread political education among the soldiers, and to try to “convert” Japanese soldiers captured in the fighting. The ultimate victory would be on the Chinese side, and the only way to attain this victory was through political unity of the nation. Hence, Jiang declared, “It is a time for Chinese Christians to reexamine the whole idea of coalition and co-operation.”

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132 Jiang, “Huiyi Yan’an Zhixing,” 152.

Jiang decided to closely observe Chinese Communism. The opportunity came when the CCP invited the national YMCA to open a student service center in Yan’an. In June 1939, Jiang and two of his coworkers made their trip to Yan’an. In his article “Recalling my trip to Yan’an” (Huiyi Yan’an Zhixing),134 Jiang wrote, “Joining me for the trip were Liang Xiaochu (S.C. Leung, 1889-1967), general secretary of the National Association, and George Ashmore Fitch (1883-1979), deputy general secretary for Service to Soldiers and director of the Nanjing Safety Zone International Committee.135 At the city of Xi’an, we met with Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) who offered to drive us to Yan’an with his group of more than 300 passengers.”136

From June 25 to June 28 we stayed at Northwest Hotel (Xibei da ludian). Next to our hotel was a so-called “new market” crowded with people. A Border Region Bank and a quite well-established grocery store were also close by. From local people we were told the regional government banned planting opium, gambling, and prostitution. Unemployed people were organized for public welfare projects, such as building schools, factories, constructing roads, bridges, and other services. Border bandits were cleared, and people felt safe now walking on the street at night. From government officials we learned that the Communists focused on employment, public health, and mass education. In addition to a stable economy, there was no robbery, no prostitution, and no opium, and the unemployment rate was zero. The rate of literate people had grown from one percent to ten percent; the number of elementary schools increased from one hundred twenty to eight-hundred; there were eight factories, four textile cooperatives, and seven industrial cooperatives. There was a hospital and a nursery. At Yan’an, people read New China Daily

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135 Jiang, “Huiyi Yan’an Zhixing,” 152.

136 Zhou Enlai at the time was deputy director of the Political Department of the Military Committee. Two Communist leaders who drove with Jiang and his delegation were Lin Boqu (1886-1960), chairman of the Shan-Gan-Ning Border Region Government, and Qin Bangxian (also Bo Gu, 1907-1946), chairman of the Northwest Branch of the Soviet Government at Yan’an and Director of the Xinhua News. In addition, about three hundred passengers traveled with the delegation. Many of them were young students who planned to study at Yan’an, some were overseas Chinese, and a few were Japanese war prisoners. It was the first time for Jiang to hear people call each other “Comrade” (tongzhi).
(Xin Zhonghua Bao) and several magazines, including Solidarity (Tuanjie), Liberation (Jiefang), Youth Front (Qingnian Zhanxian), Production Movement (Shengchan Yundong), and Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funu).  

During his three-day trip, Jiang made nonstop visits to the Shan-Gan-Ning Border Region government, the official anti-Japanese aggression club, and the labor union. He also surveyed the Counter-Japanese Military and Political University (Kangda), Women’s University, and Lu Xun Arts School and had a group discussion with ACSNSU. To Jiang, Kang Da made the unique impression as another good example of a wartime united front. There was no enrollment test but one general requirement: the applicants must be determined to resist Japanese aggression. Incredibly, among 5,000 enrolled students, there were about 100 women and a small group of Chinese students from overseas, mainly from Southeast Asia. Nearly 70 percent of the Kang Da students ranged from 14 to 25 years of age, 80 percent were peasants or workers, 50 percent were Communist party members, and 20 percent were army commanders, political commissars, or high-level government personnel. There were about 1,000 faculty members who came from all over the country; many were CCP leaders at Yan’an. Despite the fact that the students had to live in primitive cave dwellings and attended their classes in the open air, Kang Da and its unique short-term curriculum on military and political trainings attached patriotic youth to Yan’an. They were open-minded, optimistic, and determined. Their motto was “solidarity, intensity, solemnity, and

137 Jiang, “Huiyi Yan’an Zhixing,” 154-57.

138 Kang Da was Counter-Japanese Military and Political University founded in 1931 in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province. In 1937, Lin Biao was its president, Liu Bocheng was vice-president, and Mao Zedong was its chairman of the Board of Education. In March 1943, Xu Xiangqian succeed Lin Biao as the president. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the university was merged into PLA National Defence University. Sun Yang, “Zhongguo Kangri Junzheng Daxue chengwei quanguo renmin xinmuzhong de kangzhan baolei” [Chinese Anti-Japanese Military and Political University as Anti-Japanese War Fortress]. Jiefangjun Bao, June 21, 2015.
liveliness,” and their call “courageous!” When marching on the streets in uniform, they demonstrated the real Yan’an spirit.\textsuperscript{139}

Of course, the climax of the trip was an interview with Mao Zedong and other key leaders (Figure 5):

The interview lasted for more than three hours. Mao Zedong was a Hunanese from Xiangtan, really not far from my hometown of Changsha. He spoke in Hunan dialect with a strong accent, which only I could understand but not my two colleagues with one being Cantonese and the other an American, so naturally I became an interpreter during the entire interview.\textsuperscript{140}

Mao Zedong obviously welcomed the plan to open a YMCA student center at Yan’an. Regarding Jiang’s question on the Anti-Japanese National United Front, Mao explained on the vital importance of including “all parties and groups, people in all walks of life and all armed forces as a united front of all patriots – the workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen.”\textsuperscript{141} He then turned to the Party’s policy on religious freedom and stated, “We are different in faith because you are theists and we are atheists. But we are not trying to open up a debate on atheism and theism with you. Instead, we believe in religious freedom in China, and we also believe that materialists and idealists can coexist and cooperate with one another on a political level, and that we should practice mutual respect. It is our sincere hope that between us, we can follow a path of cooperation.” Mao further said:

There should be no doubt about the foundation which has been laid for our long-term operation with friends from religious circles, and we hope that you are also confident

\textsuperscript{139} Jiang, “Huiyi Yan’an Zhixing,” 159-160.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. 166-67. Figure 5. Jiang Wenhan and CCP Chairman Mao Zedong at Yan’an, 1939, http://www.cccctspm.org/.

about this. Our principle is: “No commonality of view shall be enforced, but we shall respect one another and be flexible.” Of course we do not cover up or evade the differences there are between us. Yet it is our common wish to cooperate on the basis of the “Anti-Japanese National United Front,” which also serves as the basis for cooperation among all patriots around the country, including religious people from every part of society.\textsuperscript{142}

The trip to Yan’an and the meeting with Mao Zedong was an eye-opening experience to Jiang. As he summarized in his survey report to WSCF, “Yan’an offered me a totally different story about the Communist government and its bold social reforms. Yan’an Communists truly represented the side of suffering Chinese, the same spirit of Christ. Like the beacon of new democratic China, Yan’an was indeed extraordinary, unforgettable, and spiritually inspirational!” More importantly, Jiang was assured that “the CCP believed in religious freedom in China and intended to unify all the progressive forces and all people, including Christians, loyal to the cause of resisting Japan.”\textsuperscript{143} Hence, Jiang was convinced that Chinese Christians would have an opportunity to work with the Chinese communists for this common goal. He started to cooperate with CCP for refugee student relief in the Yan’an area. Through working with Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu (1886-1975), and other Yan’an leaders, he sent collected funds and relief materials to the Tingan International Student Sanatorium. Often Jiang and his wife met with Zhou and Dong undercover. He was often inspired by conversations with them over the dinner table and enthusiastically called for Christianity and Communism working together for China’s national salvation:

Chinese Christians should be more adaptive and positive with an open mind in practicing their Christian faith, and the Chinese Christian movement should be more practical and pragmatic toward non-Christian youths who were captivated by Communism

\textsuperscript{142} Jiang, “Huiyi Yan’an Zhixing,” 166-67.

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid, 170-71.
and actively supported the patriotic and democratic movement that CCP was advocating at the time.\textsuperscript{144}

2.4 The Tide of Revolution, 1945-1949

In January 1945, Jiang Wenhan attended WSCF Executive Committee meeting at New York. At the meeting, he was offered an opportunity to pursue two PhD degree programs at Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary in New York with a full fellowship sponsored by both WSCF and National YMCA in China. Jiang welcomed this “golden opportunity” to pursue further studies and to complete his book on the ideological background of the twentieth-century Chinese student movement, a research project that he had been working on for more than ten years. He left Chongqing for New York right after the end of the war, accompanied with his wife and two children. Jiang completed all required coursework within two years, revised and filed the dissertation that he had drafted beforehand, and graduated in 1947 with doctoral degrees from both institutions.\textsuperscript{145}

2.4.1 Returning to China, September 1947

The irreconcilable ideological conflict between GMD and CCP was going to decide the future of China. When the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1937-45) ended, so did the cooperation between GMD and CCP. By June of 1947, all peace negotiations between the

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid, 167. Dong Biwu was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1939 Dong was respected by the Party as one of the Five Elders of Yan’an, along with Lin Boqu, Xu Teli, Wu Yuzhang, and Xie Juezai. Later Dong became the CCP deputy secretary of the Southern Bureau in charge of the Propaganda Department and the United Front.

\textsuperscript{145} Yao, “Jiang Wenhan.” 2. Mrs. Jiang confirmed that Jiang Wenhan graduated in 1947 with two PhD degrees in Philosophy from Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary. During his years at the national Y, Jiang hardly mentioned his two doctoral degrees to his coworkers just to avoid any unnecessary guessing. Philip Wickeri wrote in his book \textit{Reconstructing Christianity in China} that Jiang Wenhan and Ding Guangxun both attended Union Theological Seminary. Jiang received his doctoral degree in 1947, while Ding graduated a year later with a MA in religious education.
two parties had failed, and a full-scaled civil war broke out. China went through another three-and-a-half years of civil war before the Communists took the final victory in October 1949.\footnote{Spence, \textit{The Search for Modern China}, 438.}

As the civil war moved inexorably toward the victory of CCP, for individuals among the missionaries as well as Chinese Christian leaders, decisions had to be made on whether to go overseas (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, North America, or Europe) or to stay. A few left China before 1949, including those who followed the Nationalists to Taiwan. Liang Xiaochu, general secretary of YMCA in China (1935-47) who went to Yan’an with Jiang in 1939, chose to leave for Hong Kong in 1948.\footnote{Before 1949, there was an internal reorganization of the National Association due to a tit-to-tat political orientation. Liang Xiaochu was forced to resign in 1948 and subsequently went to Hong Kong. He was replaced by Tu Yuqing (Y. C. Tu), secretary from the Shanghai Association. On April 24, 1951, the \textit{People’s Daily} of the CCP accused Liang and other leaders of YMCA who left China before 1949 as “imperialist spies who used religion to invade China.” Liang was also marked by his coworkers as “scum of Chinese Christians” and a “running dog of imperialism.” Luo Guangwu, ed., \textit{Xing Zhongguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Dashi Gailan, 1949-1999} [Overview of Events of Religious Work: 1949-1999] (Beijing: Huawen Chubanshe, 2001), 46-47.} But not many did so, like Wu Yaozong and his followers inside of the National Association, as they seemed not only to be unafraid of the Communist victory but welcomed it. Many Chinese churchmen like Ding Guangxun, who was abroad at the time, actually returned home to China after the communist takeover.\footnote{Bays, \textit{A New History of Christianity in China}, 149.}

At that time, Jiang Wenhan was at Colombia University finishing his graduate work. His doctoral dissertation, \textit{The Ideological Background of the Chinese Student Movement}, was accepted by King’s Crown Press of Columbia University for publishing. By the summer of 1947, Jiang had to make a decision about whether or not he should return to China. As he recalled, “Many of my American friends tried to persuade me not to return. Some advised me to find a teaching job first to wait and see. It was Wu Yaozong who in his letter urged me not to stay. Finally I was persuaded
by Wu, but I also have my own reason to return to China.” Apparently, Jiang’s trip to Yan’an a decade ago played a role in his decision:

Ten years before the Chinese Communists liberated the whole country in 1949, I had a chance to visit Yan’an, and there I met with Mao Zedong and other major leaders of CCP. It was the meeting with Mao Zedong that made me free from fear and caused me to decide to return to China. The meeting also ensured my confidence with the Communists and their policy of the United Front on religious freedom.149

Jiang decided to return to China after graduation. He also agreed to work with Wu Yaozong for the sake of China. In September 1947, Jiang sailed back to Shanghai with his family. He was welcomed by Wu and his coworkers at the National Association.

2.4.2 WSCF Conference in Asia, 1948

Since his first day as the vice-chairman of WSCF in 1935, Jiang Wenhan was a consistent voice in promoting Chinese Christian theology. During 1945-47, he attended several postwar meetings held by WSCF in New York and Geneva to advocate the work of Chinese theologians and their influence in the context of China. At one of the meetings for planning the First Asian Leadership Training Conference in postwar Asia, Jiang nominated a list of Chinese theologians including Wu Yaozong and Zhao Zichen (T.C. Chao, 1888-1979) as leading lecturers and openly challenged some committee members who preferred Western theologians, like Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr and questioned the qualification of Asian theologians. Jiang argued, “Who says that only those Western theologians are qualified and Asian Christians are not qualified to share their Christian experiences?” He called for hearing the voice of Asian Christians.150


Jiang received almost immediate support from the majority of the planning committee. The Federation invited two Asian theologians, Wu Yaozong representing China and Daniel Thambyrajah Niles (D. T. Niles, 1908-1970) from Ceylon (Sri Lanka), to lecture at the conference in December 1948. Jiang went to the conference with a Chinese Christian delegation led by Wu Yaozong. In the city of Kandy, Ceylon, Wu Yaozong presented his life experience, centered on the theme of “Student Christian Movement – A Witness for Jesus,” to testify how Chinese student Christians joined with all Chinese people to fight during the eight-year war against Japanese aggression and how they exercised their social responsibility through the Christian movement. At the conference Jiang reunited with Kiyoko Takeda from Japan. The two resumed their conversation, and both called for the new beginning of Sino-Japanese SCM.151

2.4.3 People’s Republic of China, 1949

To Jiang Wenhan and hundreds of millions of Chinese, the year of 1949 was profound. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China with the famous words, “The Chinese people have stood up!”152 The final victory of Communism brought an unprecedented challenge on Western missionaries and the Chinese Christian community, something they had never encountered in their lifetime. “Almost everyone was naturally much concerned about religious freedom, and many of them were fearful of facing an uncertain future. But I was not worried.” Jiang further wrote:

I was one of those Protestants who had expected the Communist victory. I had come to feel that the Communist Party represented the best hope for the future of China. Through


151 Jiang, “Lecture 3.”

Y’s wartime social service programs I cooperated with the Communists. My sympathy was therefore found on the common ground with shared interest.\textsuperscript{153}

Jiang was so optimistic about the new Communist China that he claimed, “The Communist government is unique, because it always proceeds from the interest of the people, adopts the will of the people as its own will, and regards the power of the people as its power.” While condemning capitalism, Jiang also praised socialism. To him, socialism worked for the liberation of people and was democratic in nature, while capitalism enslaved the people and was autocratic in nature. Thus, communism was the real hope for the people of China. On top of that, Jiang expressed his confidence in the united front policy and the principle of freedom of religion. Therefore, in his mind, the so-called people’s democratic dictatorship would be a power structure joined by all democratic parties and the Chinese people. In his words, “If Christianity agreed to be a member of the united front, then freedom of religious belief was not only a principle, but also a practical need.”\textsuperscript{154}

The year of 1949 to a historian like Jiang Wenhan was significant, as he explained: “When Chinese people talk about Liberation, they refer to the year of 1949. If something happened before 1949, they say before Liberation; anything that happened after 1949, after Liberation. In China, before Liberation and after Liberation are similar to what is used in world history: B.C. and A.D. – old China before Liberation, new China after Liberation.” He further elaborated:

The year of 1949 was a very important date to Chinese people because the Liberation brought two fundamental changes. One was the coming of the Chinese Communists; they took over the political power in the whole country after successfully overthrowing the Guomindang government. The whole country was under a new government, that is, the People’s Government under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The other was an economic change which meant to put into effect public ownership of the means of production. There was no large-scale private enterprise in China. The nation was a socialist country.

\textsuperscript{153} Jiang, “Lecture 3.”

To Chinese people, 1949 finally brought them an emancipation from the repression and exploitation under feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucratic-capitalism. Hence, 1949 marked the new beginning of Chinese history when all people enjoyed equal opportunity and development.\textsuperscript{155}

### 2.4.4 Common Program and the United Front

Echoing Wu Yaozong, Jiang openly shared his confidence in the Communist party, praising the new government as one that was by the people and for the people. He applauded the first Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) held in Beijing in September 1949, saying that it symbolized the victory, the unity, and the will of the Chinese. It also represented “a democratic force which would knock down imperialism.”\textsuperscript{156} To him, the Common Program and in particular its clause on freedom in religious belief that was ratified by CPPCC fully brought the spirit of democratic centralism into play.

The Common Program suits China best. It will enable China to depart from a semi-feudal and semi-colonial status to become independent, democratic, peaceful, unified, and prosperous. It represents new democracy, but it is not conservative. Its ultimate goal is socialism and communism. It inclines towards the Soviet Union, people’s democratic governments, and the oppressed people. It will stand on the democratic front to resist the invasion of imperialism and strive for world peace.

The Common Program also gives legal expression to the United Front. The primary function of CPPCC is to build bridges between the Party and the eight non-Communist parties that still exist, together with other special interest groups, including Chinese Christians and other religious believers.\textsuperscript{157}

Jiang comprehended the policy of religious freedom framed within the United Front as qiutong cun-yi, which is, seeking common ground while accepting existing differences. The common


\textsuperscript{157} Jiang, “Lecture 3.”
ground (*tong*) was simply that of patriotism, socialist reconstruction, or modernization, while the existing differences (*yi*) were the differences in ideology, religious beliefs, or world view.\(^\text{158}\) To him, the spirit of the United Front was not simply uniformity of opinion but the establishment of a community of interest around a common political stance through a democratic process. For example, the Shanghai People’s Political Consultative Conference (SPPCC), where Jiang served as a member since 1962, was a political organization that included the representatives of all political parties, mass organizations, religions, ethnic minorities, and overseas Chinese. It became a channel to unify the people for political consensus.

Let me put in this way: The Liberation of 1949 has completely changed the socio-economic-political structure in China. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Government, with Marxist theory of social revolution and the United Front as a framework, a series of social, economic, and ideological reforms and reconstructions were successfully carried out and eventually won the support of the people, including many religious believers.\(^\text{159}\)

Jiang Wenhan became an important figure in the United Front. In 1953, he was appointed to the National Committee of the All-China Youth Federation (*Zhonghua Quanguo Qingnian Lianhehui*).\(^\text{160}\) In 1957, in representing Chinese Christian youth, Jiang attended the World Festival


\(^{160}\) Yao, “Jiang Wenhan,” 7-8. The All-China Youth Federation (ACYF) founded in 1949 represents many youth groups in China, with the Communist Youth League of China as a core leader. Liao Chengzhi (1908-1983) was the first Chairman of ACYF. The organization is designated to hold the banners of patriotism and socialism; encourage young people to study Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought; guide them to participate in social activities; develop ties of friendship with young people of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao and overseas Chinese; and consolidate and develop social stability and unity in China.
In 1962, Jiang was appointed by the Shanghai municipal government as the 3rd Session Member of the Committee for Ethnic and Religious Affairs of SPPCC. He resumed his position in 1977 and 1983 at the 5th and the 6th Sessions of SPPCC, respectively.\(^{162}\)

### 2.5 Three-Self Reform Movement, 1950 and Beyond

In the 1950s, through the inception of the United Front within the Common Program, Jiang Wenhan was very much dedicated to indigenization and unification of the Protestant Church based on the Three-Self Principles: self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation. He was active in government campaigns against American imperialism as well as in government economic construction programs such as the Land Reform and the Great Leap Forward. The Three-Self Reform Movement (TSRM), launched in 1950 as the largest Protestant Christian indigenization movement in twentieth-century China, made him well known in the history of Chinese Christianity. Jiang was one of the initiators.

#### 2.5.1 Three-Self Principles

The three-self principles were a missiological strategy to establish an indigenized Church in China. It was first coined in the late nineteenth century by various mission theorists and had been adopted as the foundation of TSRM for Protestant Christianity in China since 1950.\(^{163}\) In concept, Three-Self meant self-governance (zizhi) – the transfer of administrative duties to the

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\(^{161}\) Ibid. The WFYS is an international event, organized by the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students after 1947. Initially pluralist, the event became an outlet for Soviet Union propaganda for foreign audiences during the Cold War. The largest festival was the 6th, held in 1957 in Moscow, where 34,000 young people from 131 countries attended the event.


\(^{163}\) Jiang, “Lecture 2."
Chinese, self-support (ziyang) – the withdrawal of foreign monetary support, and self-propagation (zichuan) – the propagation of the Christian faith exclusively by native evangelists. The formula was first articulated by Henry Venn (1796-1873), general secretary of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), and Rufus Anderson (1796-1880), foreign secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). The principles were drafted formally in the 1892 Conference of Christian Missions held in Shanghai. It reflected an almost unanimous agreement that the future of the Chinese church depended on the indigenization of its leadership and modes of worship. Cheng Jingyi, head of NCC in 1922 and the first moderator of the Church of Christ in China (CCC) in 1927, was known for putting the three-self principles into practice in the effort to promote interdenominational union and native church leadership during the early twentieth century.

Jiang insisted that the Three-Self should emphasize the word “self.” “Why must we emphasize this word ‘self’? Because the Protestant Church before 1949 was governed by foreigners, supported by foreigners, and propagated through foreigners. Protestant religion in China was a ‘foreign religion,’ despised and rejected by the Chinese people.” Hence, the aim of Three-Self was to transform the Protestant Church from foreign government, foreign support, and foreign propagation into self-government, self-support, and self-propagation. The goal was to get rid of that inglorious “foreign” mark in order to be indigenized as a Chinese Protestant Church.

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Christianity.\textsuperscript{166}

The Chinese Communists basically accepted the principles as the state policy guidelines of Christianity in China. As a part of the United Front, the old “indigenous church principles” were reinterpreted to stress its patriotic spirit:

(1) Self-governance means that the internal affairs of the church are independent from foreign religious groups. The Catholic Church of China elects its own bishops and appoint priests from each parish through them. The religious affairs department of the central government is responsible for institutional management;

(2) Self-support indicates that the church’s economic affairs are independent of government finances and foreign religious groups. Donations from foreign religious groups and countries are not accepted. The state finance department does not set up a special budget to promote religious things, and local governments do not participate in religious activities;

(3) Self-propagation refers to the preaching and the interpretation of the doctrine exclusively by the ministers of the local church. All missionaries and clergy from outside the country are considered illegal. According to the government, priests at all levels of the church are not allowed to visit the residential and administrative areas for evangelism.\textsuperscript{167}

2.5.2 Christian Manifesto, July 28, 1950

In December 1949, nineteen Protestant Christian leaders signed a long open letter to foreign mission boards declaring the end of the missionary era:

We Christians in China feel the urgent necessity of re-examining our work and our relationship with the older churches abroad in the light of this historical change...The Christian movement will have its due place in the future Chinese society and will have a genuine contribution to make. Its future road will not be a bed of roses....It will suffer a purge, and many of the withered branches will be amputated.\textsuperscript{168}


\textsuperscript{167} Luo, Xin Zhongguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Dashi Gailan, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{168} Jiang Wenhan did not join to initiate the “Message,” although all nineteen Protestant Christian leaders were his close friends and co-workers at National YMCA. Cui Xianxiang (H. H. Tsui) et al., “Message from Chinese Christians to Mission Boards Abroad.” Documents of the Three-Self Movement: Source Materials for the Study of the Protestant Church in Communist China, ed., Wallace C. Merwin and Francis P. Jones (New York: National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1963), 14-18; Ying Fuk-tsang & Leung Ka-lun, Wushi Niandai Sanzi Yundong de Yanjiu [The Three-Self Patriotic Movement
Shortly after the message, a document titled “Direction of Endeavor for Chinese Christianity in the Construction of New China” (Zhongguo Jidujiao zai Xin Zhongguo Jianshe Zhong Nuli de Tujing), often called “Christian Manifesto” or “Three-Self Manifesto” (Sanzi Xuanyan) came out on July 28, 1950. Drafted by Wu Yaozong with input from forty Protestant leaders, the statement was an official declaration of independence from the Western Church, a call for Chinese Protestantism against Western imperialism, and a proclamation of the Three-Self Principles for the new Chinese church that was both indigenous and patriotic:

> It is our purpose in publishing the following statement to heighten our vigilance against imperialism, to make known the clear political stand of Christians in New China, to hasten the building of a Chinese church whose affairs are managed by the Chinese themselves, and to indicate the responsibilities that should be taken up by Christians throughout the whole country in national reconstruction in New China.¹⁶⁹

As one of the forty original sponsors, Jiang Wenhan claimed the manifesto to be “a definite political statement of Chinese Protestants with concise and clear content to recognize the reality of imperialism in China, to pledge to eliminate its remnants and lingering arrogances, and to reinforce the three-self principles for Christian indigenization.” As the manifesto declared, the general task for Chinese Christians was to support the Common Program under the leadership of the Communist government in order to oppose imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism and to fight for the construction of a new China. The basic principles included purging imperialistic influence from within Christianity itself, supporting agrarian reform, cultivating a patriotic spirit,

promoting the Three-Self, and adopting specific methods to search for church unity and reform church organization.”

In a document called the “Sponsor’s Letter To the Nation” (Faqiren zhi Quanguo Tongdao de Xin), which was sent to more than a thousand Protestant Christian leaders nationwide for their signatures, Jiang and other initiators stressed the historical significance of the manifesto, its extraordinary importance to the future of Christianity in China, and how it had undergone eight drafts before being released. On September 23, 1950, the complete text of the manifesto was published on the front page of the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) together with a list of the first 1,527 signatories and along with an editorial titled “A Patriotic Protestant Christian Movement” (Jidujiao Renshi de Aiguo Yundong) to endorse the manifesto. On September 30, Wu Yaozong’s article “The Banner of the Christian Reformation” marked the beginning of the campaign for TSRM. Within six months, 180,000 signatures were collected; by the time its circulation was

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172 Ibid; Luo, Xin Zhongguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Dashi Gailan, 9-11. People’s Daily was the largest newspaper group in China and an official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Besides People’s Daily, the manifesto was also published by Da Gong Bao, Wen Hui Bao, Xinwen Ribao, Xiejin Yuekan (NCC) and Tian Feng; “Sanzi Xuanyan Zhanhao” [Special Issue for Three-Self Manifesto]; Bays, A New History of Christianity in China, 161-62.

completed in 1954, the “Three-Self Manifesto” bore the names of 417,389, or nearly two-thirds of the total Chinese Protestant population in China at the time.174

Needless to say, the TSRM was under the influence of the Chinese communist government, although the manifesto was written by Chinese Christians and not forced upon by the Communist government.175 Jiang Wenhan remembered clearly that in May 1950, Wu Yaozong and his Protestant delegates had four-hour-long meetings with Premier Zhou Enlai and other government and Party officials. The initial purpose was to report to the highest authorities the findings associated with the implementation of religious policy in the Chinese countryside. However, in their discussions with Zhou and the other leaders, Wu and his group changed the plan of reporting to the party officials. Instead, they decided to rewrite a statement to directly address the issues of the churches’ political standpoint to express their views about their own missionary past and complicity imperialism. The document, later published as “The Three-Self Manifesto,” went through eight drafts. It was coordinated by Wu Yaozong, who remained in contact with Zhou Enlai during the process, and had input from 40 Protestant leaders including Jiang Wenhan.176

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176 Ibid; Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu Jidujiao Wenti de Sici Tanhua” (May 1950) [Four Conversations on the Question of Christianity]. Zhou Enlai, *Zhou Enlai Tongyi Zhanxian Wensuan* [Collected Works of Zhou Enlai on the United Front] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), 180-87. A total of nineteen Protestant delegates, most from the local churches around Beijing and Tianjin, attended May meetings with Zhou Enlai. Each meeting lasted 3-4 hours, during which the delegates were free to present their questions on religious policy, and Zhou elaborated his own views on the subject.
2.5.3 **First National Protestant Christian Conference, 1954**

From July 22 to August 6, 1954, Jiang Wenhan attended the first National Protestant Christian Conference (NPCC) at Dengshikou Congregational Church in Beijing.\(^{177}\) Two hundred and thirty-two representatives from sixty-two churches and Christian organizations, including the independent churches who described themselves as not belonging to any denomination, gathered together for what the largest meeting was ever assembled of Protestant Christianity in China. The conference recognized the work of the past four years with major accomplishments of TSRM, including the freeing of personnel, management, and finances of the Church from imperialistic control; the severing of imperialistic relations; the beginning of wiping out imperialistic influence; and the first steps in self-government, self-support, and self-propagation. The conference also adopted a constitution and passed several resolutions. One hundred thirty-nine members were appointed to the Committee, with forty-two members in the standing committee that was chaired by Wu Yaozong and five vice-chairpersons. Jiang was elected to serve on the standing committee.\(^{178}\) The conference rebranded TSRM as TSPM with specific future tasks:

1. Call upon all Christians to uphold the Constitution of the Chinese People’s Republic and work for the establishment of a socialist society.
2. Call upon all Christians to oppose aggressive imperialism and work for an enduring world peace.
3. Continue patriotic studies by church members and church workers and clean up imperialistic influence.
5. Study the problems of self-support and find out how to solve them.

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Under the principle of mutual respect, study the work of self-propagation, get rid of imperialistic poison, and preach the true gospel.

In the spirit of “love country, love church,” promote patriotism and law observance, and thus purify the church.\textsuperscript{179}

The 1954 NPCC officially inaugurated TSPM with the purpose of uniting the Christians of China, stimulating the churches to achieve the Three-Self goals, and working for world peace. It was therefore a milestone in the context of Christianity indigenization and church unification in China. The conference, as the first Protestant national assembly after the 1949 Liberation, was held with the theme of anti-imperialism and patriotic spirit, as its slogan goes, “love country, love church.” It was entirely organized and attended by Chinese Protestants and pastoral coworkers. For the first time in history, Chinese Protestant Churches acted as an independent agent in decision-making through an unprecedented unity. For sixteen days, two hundred thirty-two delegates, representing thirty-two different denominations and thirteen independent churches, came as fourteen small discussion groups and worshipped together. The conference sent the “Letter to the Churches” to the Protestants throughout China to construct the common ground of unity while respecting interdenominational differences:\textsuperscript{180}

This church unification under the Three-Self formula did not attempt to overlook denominational diversity, and we were to make sure that our intentions would not be misunderstood. For example, we dropped the word “reform” from the name of the TSRM and clearly stated that the movement has no intention to change Christian doctrine. “Resist America, Aid Korea” was also dropped from the name because the Korean War had ended.\textsuperscript{181}

Jiang Wenhan took the lead to promote TSPM by resigning his vice-chairman position from WSCF in 1953. Still serving as the head of Chinese YMCA, he became general secretary of the

\textsuperscript{179} Jiang, “Wu Yaozong,” 55-56; Merwin and Jones, \textit{Documents of the Three-Self Movement}, 91-94.

\textsuperscript{180} Jiang, “Lecture 2.”

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid; Jiang, “Wu Yaozong,” 55-56.
Christian Literature Society (CLS, Guangxuehui) in 1955,\textsuperscript{182} general secretary of the Chinese Christian Union Press in 1957,\textsuperscript{183} and research director on how imperialism used Christianity in China with case studies of YMCA and CLS in 1959.\textsuperscript{184} In August 1961, Jiang discussed with Wu Yaozong his long-term research plan to promote the Chinese Protestantism in light with the Three-Self spirit. He published two important articles: “The history of YMCA in China” (\textit{Jidujiao Qingnianhui zai Zhongguo}) in 1961 and “What kind of organization was the Christian Literature Society?” (\textit{Guangxuehui shi Zenyang yige Jigou}) in 1963. However, his two research proposals that focused on the history of Christianity in China was approved by the Three-Self National Committee but vanished like a soap bubble in 1966 because the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” broke out.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{182} The Christian Literature Society (CLS, \textit{Guangxuehui} in Chinese), was the biggest Christian literature distribution center in China and Asia as well. Formally the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese (SDK), it was established in 1887 in Shanghai by a group of American and British missionaries including Young John Allen (1836-1907), William Alexander Parsons Martin (1827-1916), Timothy Richard (1845-1919), and Alexander Williamson (1824-1904). The Society endeavored to communicate Western concepts of Christianity and science among the Chinese through the translation of materials into the Chinese language. Its members also sought to prompt legal and institutional reform in China.

\textsuperscript{183} In March 1951, the Christian Publishing Organizations Conference was held by Wu Yaozong. The meeting passed resolution on “Direction of Endeavor for Christian Publishing Organizations” to call for an immediate action to purge “imperialistic toxins in Christian books” and to focus on two themes of “anti-imperialism” and “unification.” In 1953, the Chinese Christian Publishing Association ended itself. Under the promotion of the Three-Self Preparatory Committee, \textit{Guangxuehui} (CLS), \textit{Jinhui Shuju} (Baptist Book House), \textit{Qingnian Xiehui Shuju} (YMCA Association Press), and Zhongguo Zhurixue Hehui (China Sunday School Press) established a joint editorial committee. In December 1956, these four institutions merged into \textit{Zhongguo Jidujiao Lianhe Shuju} (Chinese Christian Union Press). See Zhao Xiaoyang, “Qingnian Xiehui Shuju yu Jidujiao Wenzhi Shiye” [YMCA Association Press and Protestant Literature], in \textit{Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo qingnian xueshu luntan} [Youth Academic Forum of Institute of Modern History of CASS] (Beijing: CASS Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, 2004), 414-36.

\textsuperscript{184} Yao, “Jiang Wenhan,” 7.

2.6 Christians in the Cultural Revolution Era, 1966-1976

In 1966, Mao Zedong launched what became known as the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in order to purge remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society and re-impose Maoism. Believing that current Communist leaders were taking the Party, and China itself, in the wrong direction, Mao called the nation’s youth to purge the “impure” elements of Chinese society and revive the revolutionary spirit that had led to victory in the civil war two decades earlier and the formation of the People’s Republic of China. The Cultural Revolution continued in various phases until Mao’s death in 1976.\footnote{Spence, The Search for Modern China, 603-17.} The violent and disastrous time of the Cultural Revolution has deeply affected Chinese politics and society for decades, yet the study of the Cultural Revolution era remains politically off limits in China, and the responsibilities of Mao Zedong is still a controversial subject. As such, information about Jiang Wenhan’s life during the Cultural Revolution is limited, and he himself has been reticent to talk about the period. However, Jiang finally broke his silence in 1982 during his lecturing tour abroad. To him, “The “Cultural Revolution” was quite a different concept from “1949 Liberation.” He said:

Chairman Mao called it the “proletarian cultural revolution.” Ironically as it turned out, the movement was neither cultural nor proletarian, or even a revolution. It was instead a manmade disaster affecting the whole country, and Protestantism was just one of its victims.\footnote{Jiang, “The Present Situation of Christianity in China,” 263.}

2.6.1 The Red Guards and Eradication of the “Four Olds”

The Cultural Revolution was a movement that intended to create a new society by destroying traditional beliefs, customs, and thinking; by purging “revisionist thought;” and by

\footnote{Date Materials for Chinese Culture and History 43} (Beijing: Quanguo Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1963), 1-42.
crushing perceived enemies of the Communist Party. In August 1966, Mao Zedong called on the Red Guards (Hongweibing) to rebel against “reactionary” authorities. In his theory, creative destruction would eradicate old habits and ideas and transform the country. More urgently and practically, Mao’s failure in the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Khrushchev’s fall in the Soviet Union impelled him to see the danger of being ousted from his own party. His heir apparent Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969) soon became his primary enemy within CCP and was one of many to die in disgrace. As Jiang described it:

The violence shook every strata of society and rippled out to the farthest corners of the country. Almost everyone in China suffered to some extent during the Cultural Revolution. Millions of people survived on a restricted diet as a result of the precariousness of the economic situation. Social and cultural life was strictly controlled, and the whole of China was swept by a Communist fervor. As such, the anti-religious movement itself was not the main or only struggling issue in Cultural Revolution era.  

The command for the subsequent struggle against religion was covered with the famous sixteen-point “Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” adopted by CCP Central Committee on August 8, 1966. Although the main target of the movement was “those who have wormed their way into the Party and are taking the capitalist road,” it also led to a decade of political and ideological campaigning against so-called bourgeois educational and cultural institutions that included Christian churches. Specifically, it called for the eradication of “Four Olds” (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits) and the transformation of education, literature, the arts, and all other parts of the superstructure that did not correspond to the socialist economic base.

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188 Jiang, “Lecture 2.”

2.6.2 Christianity in Trial by Fire

The Cultural Revolution was a fundamental change of the united front policy on religion. The framework that had guided the process of Christian indigenization over the previous seventeen years was abruptly put to an end in the summer of 1966. All over the country, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) came under attack and ceased to function, as did all religious associations, including Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist, and Islamic institutions. TSPM and YM/YWCAs were dissolved. Churches, temples, and mosques were closed, and some were even destroyed. Most religious institutions and church buildings were taken over and used as factories, warehouses, residences, or Red Guard headquarters. All religious activities were proscribed, and all church assets were confiscated. Bibles were burned. Secretly keeping a religious scripture or an artifact was a crime, and some people took great risks to save scriptures, sculptures, and buildings in the name of preserving antiques or cultural heritages. Countless pastors, including leaders of TSPM, and believers were attacked, criticized, humiliated, or sent to prison. Christians working in factories and schools were harassed, interrogated, beaten, and tortured. During the height of the Cultural Revolution, some Christians denied their faith, and others even joined in the attacks against friends and fellow Christians. For many the strain was too great to bear. Numerous people were literally persecuted to death, and others were driven to suicide or even murdered.


To Chinese Christians like Jiang Wenhan, the Cultural Revolution served as a trial by fire – all physical possessions were taken from them. Persecution on Jiang and other prominent and widely known TSPM leaders started in the summer of 1966 and was severe and extensive. Jiang Wenhan found himself in the most exposed position in facing the onslaught of the Red Guards.

On August 23, 1966, the Red Guards entered the International Community Church and smashed the tools related to religion. The coworkers of YM/YWCAs voluntarily burned the Bible at the gate of the Y’s building. At nine p.m., they opened a mass meeting and took out seven “anti-revolutionary evils,” and forced me, one of the seven, to bow my head to the masses and plead guilty. Next day, they stormed the assembly place of TSPM National Committee.\(^{192}\)

Inside of the Y’s building, Jiang was criticized with “big character posters” (Dazibao) as a representative of the bourgeoisie and exploitative classes. In one poster, his involvement in the Three-Self Movement was described as a “conspiracy between Liu Shaoqi and Wu Yaozong.” Jiang had to leave his post and endured three months of cross-examination. He was forbidden to engage in any religious activities and was even not allowed to meet his wife, children, and friends. He was forced to sweep streets daily as a sort of labor reform and public humiliation.\(^{193}\) Often he was subjected to physical abuse and ill treatment. His living standards dropped drastically as his monthly salary was suspended. Furthermore, the Jiangs were forced to share their three-room apartment with two other families that were total strangers to them.\(^{194}\) Jiang recalled,

> From 1966 to 1979, for thirteen years I went through countless abuses and attacks. But the real pain was that my books, literally over 5,000 volumes gathered through decades of collection, were all confiscated and dumped into a warehouse somewhere in the city.

\(^{192}\) Jiang, “Lecture 2.”

\(^{193}\) Yao Xianhui, “Wenhan he Ta de Shu” [Wenhan and his books]. *Jiang Wenhan Jinian Wenji*, 274-75.

\(^{194}\) Jiang, “Lecture 2.” Wu Zongsu also recorded that “Jiang Wenhan was my father’s long-time friend and our neighbor for years. During the crazy times, I saw Li Shoubao, Jiang’s coworker at the National Association, bring his people to punch and kick Jiang in front of his children while shouting, “Jiang Wenhan is an American imperialist running dog!” See Wu (2011), 586-89.
I never forget that summer night of 1966. The Red Guards broke into my house searching for the “Four Olds” to destroy but were disappointed in their discovery of only a few items of a religious nature. They picked up some of my books on the shelves, laughing, “Why do you need these written in foreign languages? You should read Chairman Mao’s works ONLY!” The leader then ordered his group to remove all my books for a close examination and called it a revolutionary action authorized by the local government. Finally they found a truck to load all my books, diaries, papers and photos, everything….

Jiang never thought that his children would also become victims of the Cultural Revolution.

At that time, Franklin Jiang had been working as a physician in Shanghai, but he was assigned to the countryside for “reeducation” while working as a peasant in a village near Shanghai. Later he trained “barefoot doctors” in rural areas. His younger brother Amos Jiang, born in New York in 1945, was sent to the interior with hundreds of other university students to build a factory and work there. Jiang’s daughter Carolyn, a professor in a music conservatory in northern China, was also subjected to cross-examination.

The lives of the Jiangs were irrevocably damaged, and their spiritual and emotional costs were extraordinarily high. More broadly, the turmoil of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution brought Christianity its most serious reversal since the 1949 Liberation. It also changed the way that people felt about one another and about where China was heading. In Jiang’s words:

During that time, I had no salary, no work, and no future. I was not put into prison. I was free [in that] I could go out, but I felt that it was worse than being jailed because in prison you serve the term and then are released. But this was like death….If I go to the street, I am worried about meeting a friend or colleague because everybody was under suspicion, and we certainly did not want to complicate things for each other, and this was what I said the disaster. The catastrophe lasted for ten years, but in the end I survived by practicing my faith underground.

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195 Yao, “Wenhan he ta de shu,” 274.

196 Ibid. During 1982 and 1983, the author interviewed each of Jiang’s three children for their experiences during the Cultural Revolution. Each time they teared up while speaking out bravely.

197 Jiang, “Lecture 2.”
2.7 Reform and Revival, 1978-1984

The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 marked the end of the Cultural Revolution and the era of fanatical Maoism. Under Deng Xiaoping’s (1904-1997) leadership, sweeping changes took place in China that had a profound impact on Christians. Jiang Wenhan was “rehabilitated” in January 1979.198

2.7.1 The Implementation of Religious Policy

Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China started economic reforms and an opening-up policy in late 1978. The country was going to modernize its economy, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology, the so-called “Four Modernizations” initialized by the late premier Zhou Enlai in 1975. In addition to promoting market economy, Deng adopted a new stance on the issue of church-state relationships by removing the state from close monitoring of cultural and social practices, including religion, and calling for “seeking unity, preserving differences” through a fully utilized United Front to make constructive use of religion. In so doing the Eleventh Plenum of the Third Party Central Committee in 1978 gave religion a new lease on life.199

Accordingly, the Party’s policy of religious freedom within the United Front was implemented. Religious persons who had been falsely accused during the Cultural Revolution were completely exonerated, while those who had been wrongly labeled as rightists during the 1950s were rehabilitated. Later in the National People’s Congress (NPC) and CPPCC at all levels, from Beijing down to the county level, a seat was set up for a Christian delegate, giving Christians the

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opportunity to take part in the political process. In addition, the Party relaxed its ideological
control in Document 19 by promulgating that “the primary concern at the moment is the common
goal of building a modernized powerful Socialist State, so the difference between believers and
non-believers at this time is secondary…According to Marxism, religion will naturally disappear
when the people are sufficiently educated and understand the secrets of science. It is useless then
to persecute religion as was done during the Cultural Revolution.” The government re-
established the religious associations, TSPM, and the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) to play their
old roles under the direction of the Party’s UFWD. In the Constitution implemented in 1982, the
government reiterated religious freedom in Article 36:

Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No
state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to
believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do
not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make
use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens
or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs
are not subject to any foreign domination.

From this point on, CCP conceded the fact that its harsh and repressive policies had driven
religion underground and outside its control. Any thought of the elimination of religions was
unrealistic; on the contrary, an idea of mutual accommodation seemed to be a more reliable

200 Jiang, “Lecture 3;” Luo, Xin Zhongguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Dashi Gailan, 254-55; Whyte,
Unfinished Encounter, 341-44.

201 On March 31, 1982, the CCP issued a document named “Guanyu Woguo Shehuizhuyi Shiqi
Zongjiao Wenti de Jiben Guandian he Jiben Zhengce” [The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious
Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period]. This directive, known as Document 19, was the most
detailed description and explanation of government religious policy that had ever been issued; moreover, it
remains the most authoritative exposition of that policy down to the present. It has not been superseded by
any of the documents put out by the government since 1982. See Luo, Xin Zhongguo Zongjiao Gongzuo
Dashi Gailan, 298-304; Wickeri, Reconstructing Christianity in China, 211; Whyte, Unfinished
Encounter, 384-88.

strategy to develop the proper relationship between the government and religious communities. Over the country’s long period of historical development, religious culture in China had become a component of traditional Chinese ideological culture. The Party therefore moved away from the Cultural Revolution’s destructive approach towards religion to rally all positive features and social strength to advance the reform movement. As such, religious belief and activities were largely de-criminalized, and believers were urged to work for the modernization of China.\textsuperscript{203} CCP expressed no interest in what religious people actually believe, only that they not challenge the hegemony of the state. As Jiang pointed out to Philip L. Wickeri during his interview, “Communists are not interested in Christianity, but they are interested in Chinese Christians.”\textsuperscript{204} The Party still viewed believers as an administrative problem; however, this time among the religious issues the party looked at, Christianity was no longer the main one. Hence it was relatively easy for Deng Xiaoping and his reform-minded colleagues to view with equanimity the renewal of Christian life and activities in the public.\textsuperscript{205}

\textit{2.7.2 A New Beginning

The CCP’s return to the United Front allowed Christianity to resurge, as Jiang Wenhan indicated. The first signs of a shift came from the appearance of sixteen religious representatives at the meeting of the Fifth CPPCC in February 1978. Three months later, CPPCC Religious Group was established. In May, Wu Yaozong was officially referred to be the Chairman of TSPM, and in

\textsuperscript{203} Jiang, “Lecture 3;” Zhao Fusun, “A Reconsideration of Religion,” in \textit{China Study Project Journal} vol.2, no.2 (August 1987), 4-16. Zhao, YMCA secretary from the Beijing branch, was vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences during the late 1980s.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. 1982 Interview with Philip Wickeri at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, also see Wickeri, \textit{Seeking the Common Ground}, 107.

January 1979 Jiang Wenhan and a group of religious leaders were finally “liberated.” He was actually arrested in Shanghai in October 1976 while the Gang of Four was overthrown in Beijing. “They accused me of two things: my work at WSCF and my years of study at Columbia University. They said my crime was to be trained for American espionage.” That being said, Jiang noted:

After the Eleventh Plenum of the Third Party Central Committee, they called all religious workers in Shanghai and made an open declaration that “Jiang Wenhan is innocent.” Only then were all accusations on me for thirteen years finally kicked out for being groundless. I was a free man! Not only was I back to the Y and TSPM but also CPPCC in Shanghai.206

The first church that reopened in September 1979 was the Moore Memorial Church (Mu En Tang), a Protestant church established by the American Methodist Church in 1874. Jiang Wenhan attended its first re-opening worship service. To his surprise, after thirteen years of closure, church attendance was far beyond expectations:

The seats were soon filled out, but people still walked in even after the service started. Some had to stand in the back; many were outside on the street. They were quiet with smiles on their faces. When the church choir started to sing, almost everyone cried. It was at that movement that I truly felt religious freedom come back.

During the process of reopening the churches, the government stopped coming to interfere in our religious internal affairs. We were free to preach what we wanted. As two articles from Party officials declared, people now recognized the constitutional right of religious freedom. Any government official who tried to interfere with the worship service of religious people will be subject to two years in prison.207

Following the Moore Memorial Church, within a year eleven churches in Shanghai reopened in addition to four in the outskirts of the city. YM/YWCAs were also reopened. Every


Sunday morning the total congregation worshiping at the eleven churches was over 20,000 people. Each church provided two services every Sunday morning, and they were entirely identical with the same pastor and sermon in order to avoid the need for those who came to the first service to try to stay for the second. By 1982, more than 1,100 Protestant churches had reopened nationwide. The total number of Protestant Christians were well over two million, as compared with about 700,000 before Liberation. Reopening more churches, however, was hardly a straightforward endeavor. Recovering church property that had been occupied by other organizations during the Cultural Revolution often proved difficult. Nevertheless, with the new party policies, church properties were returned to respective churches with repair costs and daily operating budgets covered by the state. For example, in Shanghai the property of the well-known Community Church, also called the International Church and where Jiang attended service for decades, was occupied by a Shanghai Peking opera group for rehearsals for more than ten years. Jiang recalled: “As a matter of policy, it was clear that they should return the property to the church. However, we negotiated back and forth for two years to get this property restored to us. Finally, with the support of the local district government, we got it back!”

Protestant reorganization began at the meeting of TSPM Standing Committee in Shanghai from February 25 to March 1, 1980, with twenty-four delegates including Jiang Wenhan. In October of the same year, 175 leaders met at the Third National Protestant Christian Conference (NPCC) in Nanjing for their first gathering since the end of the Cultural Revolution.

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Revolution. NPCC reaffirmed the continuity of the “love country, love church” principle, the Three-Self, and mutual respect between the church and the Party, all of which were principles first articulated in the early 1950s. Parallel to National TSPM, NPCC formed new CCC with Ding Guangxun as president and Jiang Wenhan as first senior vice president (Figure 6). CCC/TSPM to Jiang Wenhan was “like the right and left hands of a man jointly performing love of country and love of Church. They are one division of labor.” TSPM committed to the principles of the United Front and to fostering the Three-Self within the Church, while “the role of new CCC is to handle those matters which local churches cannot easily do by themselves, such as Bible printing and distribution, new hymnal publication, building of church leadership, managing church international affairs, and so forth.”

The first and most important thing that new CCC did was to reopen the Nanjing Union Theological Seminary (NUTS) for pastoral education and print Bibles since most of them were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. CCC put out more than eleven million copies of the Bible in 1981. “We still need government approval for printing the Bible, but at least we are now doing it.” Jiang recalled:


210 Jiang, “Lecture 3.”

211 Nanjing Union Theological Seminary (NUTS) is the only national Protestant seminary in the PRC. Founded in 1911 as the Theological College of Jinling University, the seminary got its present name in 1952 after uniting with ten other Chinese seminaries on the east coast. In 1961 Yanjing Union Theological Seminary of Beijing also joined. NUTS is the only Protestant seminary in China to confer degrees to its students, the highest being a Master of Theology. Ding Guangxun has been the Principal of the seminary since 1953. During the Cultural Revolution the seminary closed and did not re-open until 1981. NUTS is the center for theological development in China, and many of the most well-known Chinese theologians have worked or still work there, such as Zhao Zichen, Wang Weifan, and Chen Zemin. NUTS publishes a theological journal, Jinling Theological Review (Jinling Shenxuezhi).
We greatly need to strengthen the pastoral work of our Christian communities. This is an urgent task, which calls for our deep commitment and leads us to the establishment of a national structure for Christians. After earnest prayer and long deliberation, we have decided to proceed with the preparatory work of this organization. This organization aims at giving the necessary pastoral help to Christians and Christian communities across China. It is above all a serving agency. In any question that has to do with our faith our principle is to practice mutual respect and not to interfere with or make uniform our beliefs.\textsuperscript{212}

More than a thousand young people applied for NUTS, but “because of the limitation in accommodations, the seminary could only enroll fifty-two students; among them, twenty were women. The Seminary also has a great number of students enrolled in correspondence courses in theology. These students are mainly local church ministers from all over China who are unable to study full-time in Nanjing or at a local seminary.” Many students who graduated in the mid-1980s later became leaders in regional Christian councils and in local seminaries around China. As the flagship theological seminary in China, NUTS regularly published more than 20,000 course syllabi for use in rural areas and some cities through short-term training institutes organized for volunteers and laypersons. Jiang Wenhan often visited there to lecture on the history of Christianity, Protestant Christianity in the nineteenth century, YMCA in China before 1949, and the Three-Self Principles and Christian indigenization movement after 1949.\textsuperscript{213}

The new CCC was very anxious to renew its international contact. In October 1981, Jiang Wenhan joined the first Chinese Christian delegation to attend the Montreal Conference, organized by the China Study Program of the Canadian Council of Churches (Figure 7).


\textsuperscript{213} Jiang, “The Present Situation of Christianity in China,” 264; Wickeri, Reconstructing Christianity in China, 229-33; Whyte, Unfinished Encounter, 431-32; Jiang, “Lecture 2.”
The conference was entitled “God’s Call to a ‘New Beginning’: An International Dialogue with the Chinese Church” and included 158 Christian leaders from around the world, including seven Protestants and three Catholics from China. It was intended to launch a new beginning in relationships and understanding between the Christian communities in China and those abroad, allowing Chinese Christians to speak for themselves in an atmosphere of mutual respect. Jiang was invited to speak at the conference. On his topics of “What new China means to me?” and “How ‘foreign’ was Christianity in China?” Jiang reiterated his confidence in CCP government, the religious freedom policy and the United Front, and his outlook for the indigenized Chinese Christianity. He made it clear that CCC revealed a new willingness for contact and even contributions from friendly sources abroad. At the same time, it drew a clear line between friends and those who opposed the Three-Self, especially those seeking to restore denominational organizations in China.

2.7.3 Rebirth of Religious Studies

In addition to his leadership role at YMCA, CCC, and SPPCC, Jiang also started academic research. In May 1979, Jiang Wenhan was appointed the first special research fellow by SASS to conduct the first multi-volume research project on the history of Christianity in China. Seventy-one-year-old Jiang was overjoyed by his new appointment. “It is certainly a rebirth of religious studies, a field that has been taboo for a long time, but now because CCP is back to the United Front and religious freedom policy, I can conduct this research as the first Protestant Christian with support from the government. I am overwhelmed! My responsibility is enormous, and my

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role is significant. As a special research fellow I am fully dedicated to this research project.” In his research proposal, Jiang declared, “The history of Christianity in China is a remarkable tale of the encounters between two very different civilizations and of how a foreign religion indigenized and became a vibrant torrent in China. What are the stories of Christianity in China? How should Chinese scholars evaluate the impact of modern Christian missionaries on China and especially their relations with the modernization of China?”

With support from CCC/TSPM, YMCA, and especially Shanghai RAB and SPPCC, Jiang almost immediately started his research, which was aimed at five special topics: (1) Christianity in ancient China and the Jews of Kaifeng; (2) Catholic Jesuits in China during Ming-Qing period; (3) the Opium Wars and Christianity; (4) the Kingdom of Taiping and Christianity; and (5) the Boxer Rebellion and Christianity. His purpose was to reconstruct the story of Christian missionary experiences in China and to analyze why Christianity failed to fully set foot in China. By September 1984, he had already completed two monographs: Christianity in Ancient China and the Jews of Kaifeng (1980) and Catholic Jesuits in China during Ming-Qing Period (1984). In his works, Jiang depicted three early stages of Christian presence in China. Through the lens of Chinese history, he argued that each time Christianity failed to have a lasting effect in China because it was always seen as an alien religion. Jiang’s old friend Luo Zhufeng (1911-1996), head


of Shanghai RAB since the 1950s who was also affiliated with SASS, wrote a preface for Jiang praising the book enthusiastically.\textsuperscript{217}

After the 1981 Montreal Conference, Jiang conducted a lecture tour at Yale, Columbia, University of Pennsylvania, Midwest China Center, and more than a dozen Christian organizations in the United States. In 1982 he was invited by his longtime friend Takeda Kiyoko Cho to give lectures at ICU and Tokyo Women Christian University (TWCU). In his speeches, Jiang introduced his ongoing research project on the history of Christianity in the context of China, in particular the twentieth-century Chinese Christianity indigenization movement and Chinese Communist revolution. As Jiang pointed out,

> We live in a sea of non-Christian Chinese, yet we have to bring the Gospel to this mass of non-Christian Chinese people. Therefore we must reconcile ourselves and not make ourselves alienated from those in order to make our Gospel and our preaching effective.\textsuperscript{218}

Jiang continued his dedication to his research project and almost finished an outline for his third book, \textit{The Opium War and Christianity}, but illness forced him to stop working permanently. In June 1984 he was hospitalized, and after a three-month battle with brain cancer, on September 7 he died peacefully in Shanghai, though his writing remained an unfulfilled dream. His last words were “I don’t want fame, I don’t want wealth; I just want to serve you, my Lord.”\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{217} Luo Zhufeng, forward to \textit{Zhongguo Gudai Jidujiao Ji Kaifeng Youtairen: Jingjiao, Yuanchao de Yelikewen, Zhongguo de Youtairen} [Christianity in Ancient China and the Jews of Kaifeng: Nestorians, Catholic Christians in Yuan Dynasty, and the Jews in China], by Jiang Wenhan (Shanghai: Zhishi Chubanshe, 1982), 1-4; Luo Zhufeng, last forward to \textit{Ming Qing jian zai Hua de Tianzhujiao Yesu huishi} [Catholic Jesuits during Ming-Qing period China], by Jiang Wenhan (Shanghai: Zhishi Chubanshe, 1987), 1-6.

\textsuperscript{218} Jiang, “Lecture 3.”

\textsuperscript{219} Yao Xianhui, “In Loving Memory of Dr. Jiang (Kiang) Wen-han Tenth Anniversary” in \textit{New Haven Register} (September 7, 1994), A-11.
3 SEEKING THE WORTHY

Unlike some well-known Chinese Christian theologians, such as Wu Yaozong and Zhao Zichen, Jiang Wenhan was more a doer rather than a thinker. His known works are therefore relatively limited, yet his scholarly work was groundbreaking and impressive, and in fact, he was the pioneering scholar of the country’s student movement before 1949. His 1948 monograph, *The Chinese Student Movement*, has become a classic in the field.\(^\text{220}\) He was also the leading Protestant historian of Christianity in China after 1979, very well respected by the Chinese scholarly establishment and also praised in the West for his dispassionate view on Christian encroachment to China.\(^\text{221}\)

In this chapter I will assess Jiang’s academic work on Christianity and Chinese culture based on his three monographs, *The Ideological Background of the Chinese Student Movement* (1948), *Christianity in Ancient China and the Jews of Kaifeng* (1980), *Catholic Jesuits in China during Ming-Qing Period* (1987), and an unpublished set of “Chinese Revolution and Christianity” (1982). My goal is, through an in-depth examination of his interactions with Christian ideas and practices in China, to explore the feasibility of his ecumenical convictions to promote the Protestant indigenization movement, a previously untouched topic.

\(^{220}\) The book was his PhD dissertation, *The Ideological Background of the Chinese Student Movement*, submitted to Columbia University in 1948. It was published the same year by King’s Crown Press of New York as *The Chinese Student Movement*. The book was highly praised by American scholars Kenneth Scott Latourette and John King Fairbank, but in China it was suppressed after 1949. It became the major evidence for his suffering during the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution period, and not until 1982, when he lectured at the International Christianity in Japan, did Jiang for the first time mention his book and how he saw the direct relationship between the Chinese student movement and traditional Chinese culture.

\(^{221}\) Luo Zhufeng, the director of the Religious Research Institute of the SASS, wrote the preface for each book and commended Jiang’s contribution as “the first effort made by a Chinese Protestant scholar in the field of research on Christianity in China, with a more comprehensive and systematic analysis to depict a long historical encounter of Christianity with Chinese culture and society.” ICU Asian Culture Studies, American Society of Missiology, British Council of Churches China Study Project, and Canada China Programmer also endorsed Jiang’s two books.
3.1 Chinese Student Movement

Historically, the first Chinese student movement, known as the May Fourth Movement, started from a street demonstration in Beijing on May 4th, 1919, against the Chinese government’s weak response to the Treaty of Versailles that allowed Japan to retain German-controlled Chinese territories in Shandong.²²² Several student-led movements followed: the unity of student volunteers for Christian movement in 1922, the demonstration against the unequal treaties in 1925, the condemnation of Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931, and the demand for national resistance against Japanese aggressions in 1935. By the 1940s China already had a well-established tradition of student activism. As Jessie Lutz describes it, “Youth leaders of the 1940s were conscious of the May 4th tradition, as they called it. They were proud of the tradition and felt an obligation to keep it alive. They accepted a role as a politicized elite with the right and duty to speak for the Chinese people.”²²³

Jiang Wenhan highly praised the legacy of the May Fourth Movement: “After May 4th, the Chinese student movement in China has further gone through a remarkable development. Perhaps there is no other country in the world whose educated young people have played such an important role. The uniqueness of the movement was attributed to the peculiar position which students could

²²² Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, 35-40. The May Fourth Movement was an anti-imperialist, cultural, and political movement that grew out of student protests in Beijing on May 4, 1919. Students protested against the Chinese government’s weak response to the Treaty of Versailles, especially in allowing Japan to retain territories in Shandong that had been surrendered by Germany after the Siege of Qingdao in 1914. The demonstrations sparked nationwide protests and spurred an upsurge of Chinese nationalism, a shift towards political mobilization and away from cultural activities, and a move towards a mass base and away from traditional intellectual and political elites. Many radical, political, and social leaders of the next five decades emerged at this time. The term “May Fourth Movement” in a broader sense often refers to the period during 1915–1921 more often called the New Culture Movement. For a classic study of the movement, see Tse-tsung Chow, The May Fourth Movement Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).

have played in China.” In his book, *The Ideological Background of the Chinese Student Movement*, Jiang pioneered the study of Chinese student movements by asking questions such as why and how students protested. Through examining the role of student demonstrations as important aspects of anti-Christian and anti-imperialistic nationalism in China’s modern political history, he looked at Chinese student movements from cultural, social, and political perspectives.

3.1.1 *The Tide of History*

According to Jiang Wenhan, the Chinese student movement before 1949 is related to four major historical topics in modern Chinese history: the New Culture Movement, the Revolt against Religion, the Nationalist Revolution, and the United Front.

3.1.1.1 *New Culture Movement (NCM)*

The NCM (*xinwenhua yundong*) of the mid-1910s to 1920s sprang from the disillusionment with traditional Chinese culture following the failure of the Chinese Republic, founded in 1912, to address China’s problems. Scholars such as Chen Duxiu (Chen Tu-hsiu, 1879-1942), Li Dazhao (Li Ta-chao, 1889-1927), Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), Lu Xun, and Hu Shi (Hu Shih, 1891-1962) had classical education but began to lead a revolt against Confucianism. They


225 Chen Duxiu was a Chinese revolutionary socialist, educator, philosopher, and author who co-founded the Chinese Communist Party with Li Dazhao in 1921, serving from 1921 to 1927 as its first General Secretary. He was the founder of the influential vernacular Chinese periodical *New Youth (Xin Qingnian)*. See Teng and Fairbank, *China’s Response to the West*, 240-45; Charlotte Furth, “Intellectual change: From the Reform movement to the May Fourth movement, 1895-1920,” in *The Cambridge History of China vol. 12: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 1*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 396-402. Li Dazhao was a Chinese intellectual who co-founded the Communist Party of China with Chen Duxiu and other early communists in 1921. With the collapse of the First United Front in 1927, Li was captured during a raid on the Soviet embassy in Peking (Beijing). Along with nineteen others arrested in the raid, he was executed by the orders of the warlord Zhang Zuolin on April 28, 1927. See Teng and Fairbank, *China’s Response to the West*, 246-48; Furth, “Intellectual change” in *The Cambridge History of China vol. 12*, 403-05.

226 Cai Yuanpei was a Chinese philosopher and politician. He was the president of Peking University (Beijing University) and founder of the Academia Sinica. He was known for his critical
called for the creation of a new Chinese culture based on global and western standards, especially science and democracy. Younger followers took up their call for:

1. Vernacular literature;
2. An end to the patriarchal family in favor of individual freedom and women’s liberation;
3. The view that China is a nation among nations, not a uniquely Confucian culture;
4. The re-examination of Confucian texts and ancient classics using modern textual and critical methods, known as the Doubting Antiquity School;
5. Democratic and egalitarian values, and
6. An orientation to the future rather than the past.\textsuperscript{227}

Jiang attributed the dynamic of NCM to the impact of western culture equipped with two great symbols: science and democracy. This dominance of Western influence created a new spirit of individual emancipation. “It led Chinese youth to believe that to live in the twentieth century China he must be free to do his own thinking, to choose his own life-mate, and to establish his own career. He would no longer submit himself to the dictates of his elders or the restrictions of the old conventions.”\textsuperscript{228} Above all, the students were taught to have a new sense of responsibility in public affairs. Hence, the NCM inspired patriotic May Fourth Movement (Wu-si Yundong) led by Chinese students. As a result, the awakening among intellectuals was spread to the common


people. Jiang noted, “The rapid growth of publications and social organizations was a clear indication of how the new spirit of freedom and self-expression could conquer the established habit of indifference and blind acceptance of traditions which have been so detrimental to mental and material progress in China.”

The NCM was indeed a “Chinese Renaissance.” It brought the most drastic social and intellectual change in modern Chinese history.

3.1.1.2 Revolt against Religion

The Revolt against Religion, often referred to the so-called fei-Jidujiao yundong (the Anti-Christian Movement), was an intellectual and political movement in China during the 1920s. As a consequence of NCM’s attack on religion of all sorts, rejecting all religions as superstition was common in various intellectual and political movements. The Chinese nationalists had also sought unity in China as well as a transformation in the way that Chinese society operated, which seemed to heavily rely upon Western thought and/or ideals. They brought forth age-old criticisms about the Western religion and accused Christian missionaries of actively participating in it as a way of eliminating the native culture like other foreign imperialists.

The most influential publication behind the movement was an article by Zhu Zhixin (1885-1920), a colleague of Sun Yat-sen, entitled “Yesu shi shenme dongxi?” (What is Jesus?) that was first published in 1919 and reprinted many times thereafter. Zhu argued that Jesus was an ordinary illegitimate peasant child who became the leader of a band of mystical enthusiasts with bandit


elements such as was often found in Chinese history.\(^{231}\) One precipitating factor was the publication in 1922 of *The Christian Occupation of China*, a large-scale study of China’s Protestant Christian churches and China’s resources. Although the publication had been intended to prepare the way for turning Chinese churches over to Chinese Christians, the title seemed to show a different intent. A student movement was founded, garnering support at a number of universities, initially to oppose the planned meeting of the conference of WSCF in China and more generally to counteract the baleful influence of Christianity on China’s attempts to modernize.\(^{232}\) Among other motives that were noted was the desire to reclaim infrastructure and temples that were given to the missionaries and transformed to become schools, or so-called “recovering educational rights” (*shouhui jiaoyu quan*).\(^{233}\)

The revolt turned into violent anti-Christian xenophobia nationwide with attacks and lootings of churches and burnings of Christian publications. At the peak of the violence, six Christian missionaries were killed in Nanjing in March 1927. By July, more than half of foreign missionaries had withdrawn from China and returned to their home countries. Among those who stayed, many moved to coastal cities, and only a few remained in inland cities. The movement effectively came to an end with the baptism of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi, 1887-1975) in 1929 and the appointment of Song Ziwen (T. V. Soong, 1894-1971), a Christian, as premier in 1930.\(^{234}\)

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\(^{233}\) Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement*, 52-60, 87-95, 136.

\(^{234}\) Chiang Kai-shek was a Chinese nationalist politician, revolutionary, and military leader who served as the leader of the Republic of China between 1928 and 1975, first in mainland China until 1949 and then in Taiwan until his death. See Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press, 2011). Soong Tse-ven was a prominent businessman and politician in the early-20th-century Republic of China. His father was Charlie Soong, and
The issue was also put to an end when all the missionaries left China as World War II was approaching. Jiang Wenhan concluded:

The attack on Christianity was in accord with the spirit of the Chinese Renaissance. But when the attention was focused on the mission schools, Christianity was accused as a forerunner of Western imperialism and an instrument of capitalist exploitation. The nationalistic and communistic ideologies had joined their forces in this opposition against Christianity.  

3.1.1.3 Nationalist Revolution

The Nationalist Revolution between the mid-1920s and mid-1930s was closely associated with Sun Yat-sen, his political thought known as San Min Zhu Yi and the Nationalist party GMD that he founded. Sun’s philosophy of San Min Zhu Yi - nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood - became the official ideology of GMD in 1924, but his Republic of China was in shambles. The national government in Beijing was manipulated by warlords and had no real authority over the country. China was divided by these warlords, each of whom controlled an area and was backed by a foreign power. Disappointed by the Western powers, in 1923 Sun turned to the Soviet Union for help against imperialism. In the Sun-Joffe manifesto, Sun was to receive Soviet military and financial aid in return for allowing Chinese Communist members to join GMD.

his siblings were the Soong sisters. His Christian name was Paul, but he is generally known in English as T. V. Soong. As brother to the three Soong sisters, Soong’s brothers-in-law were Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and financier H. H. Kung. See Tai-chun Kuo and Hsiao-ting Lin, T. V. Soong in Modern Chinese History: A look at his role in Sino-American relations in World War II (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Hoover Institution Press, 2003).


236 Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, 137; Sun Yat-sen’s lectures on his Three Principles were delivered in 1924. The lectures were given weekly beginning on January 27. They were composed of six lectures on nationalism, six on democracy and four on livelihood. See Sun Wen, “San Min Zhu Yi Shiliu Jiang,” in Guofu Quanj (1), edited by Qin Xiaoyi (Taipei: Guofu Quanj Bianji Wei yuan hui, 1989), 3-181; Audrey Wells, The Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen: Development and Impact (New York: PALGRAVE, 2001), 67-101.
Sun was not a Communist, but as his lectures on “Nationalism and the People’s Livelihood” in 1924 show, his allying with Soviet Russia did influence his thoughts.237

Many Chinese intellectuals were also favorably inclined toward Communist Russia. The success of the Russian Revolution led some of them to believe that the only future for China was to fight against imperialism. In their eyes, Russia was the first country that voluntarily relinquished its privileged position in China, and it thus marked a new departure from Western imperialism. The May Thirtieth Movement (wu-sa yundong) of 1925 started from labor strikes and student protests and later developed into a major movement against foreign powers and Chinese warlords. “Down with Imperialism” and “Down with Militarism” became two popular slogans of the day. Again, Chinese students took the lead in their protests against the “unequal treaties” signed between China and foreign powers since the First Opium War (1839-1842) and Christian missionary schools established as a result of the unequal treaties. Many of them flocked to Guangzhou to join the revolutionary army; some slipped to Moscow for political training at Sun Yat-sen University.238 “Learning from Russia is the only solution,” was the most influential slogan of the day, as Mao Zedong has put it:

> It was through the Russians that the Chinese found Marxism. Before the October Revolution, the Chinese were not only ignorant of Lenin and Stalin, they did not even know of Marx and Engels. The salvos of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism. The October Revolution helped progressives in China, as throughout the world, to adopt


the proletarian world outlook as the instrument for studying a nation’s destiny and considering anew their own problems. Follow the path of the Russians - that was their conclusion. In 1919, the May 4th Movement took place in China. In 1921, the Communist Party of China was founded. Sun Yat-sen, in the depths of despair, came across the October Revolution and the Communist Party of China. He welcomed the October Revolution, welcomed Russian help to the Chinese and welcomed cooperation of the Communist Party of China.239

3.1.1.4 Second United Front

Zhongguo kanri minzu tongyi zhanxian, or the Second United Front, was a political ideology that arose partly as an inevitable response to Japanese aggression against China (1937-1945) and partly as a coincidence with the world-wide democratic coalition against Fascism.240

In China, the purge of the communists in 1927 did not prevent the rapid growth of Marxism. Radical movements such as the rallies for “proletarian literature” and the “new social sciences” were the trends of the time, and they led student organizations to grow into powerful political instruments. During the 1930s, Chinese students constantly demanded an immediate cessation of the civil war in order to be united to fight against Japanese aggression. They burst out in demonstration in Beijing on December 9th, 1935, calling a national anti-Japanese united front to struggle for the survival of the Chinese nation. Notably, many student volunteers from CSCM and YM/YWCAs joined student protests and demonstrations across the nation.241


240 Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, 103-10. The first “united front” was led by Sun Yat-sen in 1923. With prompting from Russia, Sun arranged an alliance between China’s Nationalist and Communist parties to fight the remaining colonial powers and work towards reunification. The great legacy of this move was the cementing of Sun’s role as the father of modern China in the eyes of both the Nationalists and the Communists. Sun Yat-sen still plays an important role in the creation myth of today’s Chinese Communist Party.

The patriotic student protests brought an ideological unity in Chinese literary circles. The formation of the China Writer’s Association in June 1936, which officially declared ideological unity in Chinese literature, was a sign of this. There was also an overwhelming force of public pressure for an all-China united front from the sectors of Salvationists, the GMD fractions, the media press, and political groups supported by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the United Front could not have become a political reality without the cooperation of GMD and CCP, the two major political parties in China. “The United Front had its main objective in resisting the Japanese invasion. It involved, first of all, the cessation of civil war between GMD and CCP, and secondly, the co-operation of all political parties in a common fight against Japan.”

The student demonstration broadened into a national salvation movement, and this development finally triggered the 1936 Xi’an Incident, which led to the national unity between the ruling Nationalist party and the Communist rebels for the common goal of resisting Japanese military aggression. This Anti-Japanese United Front was the only basis for China to survive as a nation. As Jiang has pointed out:

Resistance, unity, and democracy were all interlocked with each other. There could be no resistance without unity, and no unity without democracy. Ever since the war of resistance was started in 1937, the fundamental political issue in China is no longer the prolongation of the “political tutelage” of the Guomindang or the spread of communism but the working out of a democratic basis for the different parties to govern together towards China’s reconstruction.


243 Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement*, 138-39. The Xi’an Incident was a political crisis that took place in Xi’an, Republic of China, in 1936. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Republic of China, was detained by his subordinates, Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, in order to force the ruling GMD to change its policies regarding the Empire of Japan and the CCP. After the incident, Chiang aligned with the Communists against the Japanese. The statement “Chiang Kai-shek on Kuomintang-Communist Unity” was issued on September 12, 1937, followed the next day by the announcement of the CCP’s statement. See Lawrence K. Rosinger, *China’s Wartime Policies: 1937-1944* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), 96-97; Mao, “Guo-Gong Hezuo Chengli hou de Puqie Renwu,” 38-41.
3.1.2 Major Debates on Culture and Religion

During the period from 1927 to 1937, some of China’s best brains debated heatedly on cultural identity and religion. The molding of their ideological minds therefore was an interplay of three major currents of thought: liberalism, nationalism, and communism.

3.1.2.1 On Cultural Identity

In his article “Zhongguo wenhua zhi chulu” (The future of Chinese culture), Chen Xujing (1903-1967) argued for a “wholesale of westernization.” To him and other May Fourth radicals and liberals, “culture, as an integrated entity, could not be divided; therefore when Chinese take in Western science it is necessary to bring in other related elements, including its shortcomings.” Chen declared, “Judged as cultural development, modern Western culture is indeed more advanced than ours, such as in conceptualization, art, science, politics, education, religion, philosophy, literature, even in daily life, like food, shelter, transportation, so the only way forward for Chinese culture would be to become utterly westernized.”

Yet, many conservatives found it difficult to indiscriminately reject China’s cultural heritage and uncritically accept all things Western. The nationalist sentiments were especially strong when China was drifting toward another war with Japan. Ten Chinese professors in 1935 issued a statement calling for a rebuilding of the Chinese indigenous culture. They declared that Chinese culture had once enjoyed an important position in the world but was now losing its ground and its special character. They opined that China should not just revive the ancient culture for

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“history does not repeat itself,” nor should China blindly follow Britain and America or the Soviet Union or Italy and Germany. The uniqueness of time and space must be taken into consideration. In other words, the shaping of the Chinese indigenous culture should be based on the needs of the present-day China. Hence, the proper course for China was to reject only what was useless in its own historical heritage and to absorb only what was helpful from other countries.\(^{245}\)

Hu Shi, one of the most influential leaders of NCM, sharply criticized this declaration. In his responding article (1935), Hu Shi described the so-called indigenous culture meant to maintain local identity as nothing new but in fact just an old mask for Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909)’s dictum, “Chinese learning as the fundamental structure and Western learning for practical use.”\(^{246}\) The basic trouble with China to Hu Shi was this unwillingness to give up its past and its failure to make a happy adjustment with the Western culture. He maintained that ten college professors had failed to understand the nature of cultural change. “Culture itself is conservative, and people who have an inertia will take care of the indigenous elements. What a forward-looking intellectual should do is to accept humbly the scientific and industrial world civilization and not bolster the innate conservatism of the ordinary people.”\(^{247}\) Hu Shi suggested a selective adaptation of Western

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\(^{247}\) Kiang, *Chinese Student Movement*, 140; Hu Shi, “Chongfen Shijiehua yu Quanpan Xihua” (1935) [Full Globalization and Wholesale Westernization]. In *Hu Shi Lunxue Jinzhu*, Diyiji, Juan si [Hu
modernity meant to identify and engage with Chinese culture through a scientific process. But his term of “full westernization” or “full globalization” instead of “wholesale Westernization” later became Chen Xujing’s view of complete Westernization in 1935.\(^{248}\)

In contrast, Sun Yat-sen was not in favor of a wholesale repudiation of the past. Sun identified himself with the traditions of Chinese history and culture and believed that nations existed and were identifiable by such factors as common blood, language, religion, and customs. In his *Minzuzhuyi liu jiang* (Six Lectures on Nationalism), Sun recognized the historical legacy of Chinese culture, but to keep up with world progress, he also drew heavily on political theories of the West as he believed a transformation of thought was necessary to his course of revolution.\(^{249}\)

In his words, nationalism was a powerful idea that could weld a people together and throw off a foreign yoke; at the same time, it was a national pride and awareness of national identity. Sun sought to revive this national spirit, which he believed the Chinese had once had but lost in a premature cosmopolitanism. He wanted to arouse in the Chinese a pride in their ancient virtues and achievements. “It was this pride in this indigenous culture,” Sun believed, that “would enable China to learn from the West’s scientific and technological achievements without losing China’s ethnic identity.” As such, Sun deemed that “China should not blindly imitate the West but should work out a democratic system of government suited to her own traditions and needs…” If we want

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to learn from Europe we should learn what we ourselves lack - science - but not political philosophy.”

The Chinese Communists, too, were against Hu Shi’s idea of Westernization. They asserted that China’s problem was not one of adapting to Western culture but that China, being a ‘semi-feudal and semi-colonial’ country, must struggle for national independence and social justice. To them, the so-called spiritual culture was only a superstructure of the productive relationship of human society. Moreover, the kind of Western culture which Hu Shi took for granted had already shown its inherent contradictions through the repeated conflicts among the imperialist powers and the periodic economic depressions within the capitalist countries. The acceptance of Westernization should not be so wholesale as to include the results of a declining capitalistic system. The Communists believed in science and democracy but maintained that it was important to understand the concrete social and economic basis for them. As such, Mao Zedong urged his party members to study not only the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin but also those of Chinese cultural heritage because “the China of today has emerged from the China of yesterday. There is therefore much to learn from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen.”

To nourish a new democratic culture with national character, China needed to assimilate a good deal of foreign progressive culture, not enough of which was done in the past. “We should assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the present-day socialist and new-democratic cultures but also from the earlier


\[251\] Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement*, 141.

cultures of other nations, for example, from the culture of the various capitalist countries in the Age of Enlightenment. However, we should not gulp any of this foreign material down uncritically.”

Mao hence criticized Hu Shi:

To advocate “wholesale westernization” is wrong. China has suffered a great deal from the mechanical absorption of foreign material. Similarly, in applying Marxism to China, Chinese communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form if it is to be useful, and in no circumstances can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula…Chinese culture should have its own form, its own national identity. National in form and newly democratic in content--such is our new culture today.

“It is remarkable to study Hu Shi, Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong on their debates on Chinese cultural identity,” as Jiang indicated, “Hu Shi tended to reject totally the old Chinese culture, whereas Sun Yat-sen and Mao Tse-tung maintained that wholesale Westernization would be injurious to China.” In Hu Shi’s mind, the scientific and industrial civilization of the West was becoming the civilization of the world and all China needed to do was to repent her past mistakes and adopt the world civilization with humility. He felt that there was little to be proud in things like “opium, bound-feet, and the eight-legged essay” in the Chinese civilization. Obviously, Hu Shi represented those who favor a whole-hearted transformation of China on the model of the Western democracies. Dr. Sun Yat-sen wanted to adopt the old Chinese philosophy to modern thought with the sole purpose of making China nationally free, politically democratic and economically prosperous, while Mao Zedong appropriated the Marxist-Leninist doctrine to support a democratic revolution but to work ultimately for the realization of a socialistic and communistic system.

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255 Hu Shi, “Cantong de huiyi yu fansi” [Tragic memory and repentance], in *Hu Shi Lunxue Jinzhu*, Diyiji, Juan si [Hu Shi and his recent studies 1: 4] (Beijing: Waiwen Chubanshe, 2013), 471-78.

256 Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement*, 139.
3.1.2.2 On Religion: Christianity

Through the Republican Era, Christian missions (both Catholic and Protestant churches) were still an ongoing phenomenon with which Chinese intellectuals were most closely acquainted through Christian higher educational institutions. By the 1930s, there were 14 Protestant and three Catholic universities, but not until the late 1920s were all of these independent from the public educational system of China (consisting of three national universities at that time). This special position became a major target of the Anti-Christian Movement, which was closely connected to the “recovery of sovereignty over education.” The movement attracted intellectuals and officials from different political backgrounds, CCP and GMD being most prominent. Their critiques on religion, especially Christianity, intensified discourse among Chinese students who aligned with different thoughts and approaches. “Both Renaissance liberals and the Chinese communists are fundamentally opposed to religion, whereas the opinions of the Guomindang are divided and the present government attitude is one of neutrality.”

257 Before 1949, setting up educational organizations was the main means of expanding the influence and training modern personnel for Protestant Christian churches, which were different from Catholic ones in that the former attached great importance to higher education and got great achievements in addition to their efforts in primary and secondary education. From the early 20th century to the late 1920s, various Christian missionary groups set up altogether 14 mission universities in China. It had a tremendous influence on the higher education of China because at that time there were only three state-run universities, namely Peking University, Shanxi University, and Peiyang University. In addition, mission universities had set examples in educational patterns. See Jessie G. Lutz, China and Christian Colleges, 1850-1950 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1971); Peter Tze Ming Ng, Changing Paradigms of Christian Higher Education in China, 1888-1950 (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 2002); Wang Zongxin, Zhongguo Jiaohui Xuexiao Zongheng: Qimeng yu Zaojiu [The development of Christian Schools in China]. (Ontario, Canada: Christian Communication Inc. of Canada, 2000); Zhang Kaiyuan, Shehui Zhuanxing yu Jiaohui Daxue [Social Transformation and Christian Colleges], sponsored by The Henry Luce Foundation. (Wuhan: Hubei Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1998).


259 Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, 142.
Once almost a converted Christian, Hu Shi was influential in his criticisms on religion. In his 1919 article “Buxiu: Wo de zongjiao” (Immortality: my religion), Hu declared himself an atheist who did not believe the concept of God with its own will and power. Likewise, he did not believe in the immortality of the human soul either. Religion to him was determined by the dichotomy of superstition (mixin) versus rationalism (lixing zhuyi) and naturalism (ziran zhuyi). To him, superstition and its religious transcendental aspects and ritual practice were in the domain of religion.²⁶⁰ Hu called for an intellectual “agnosticism,” elaborated by Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), “If anybody should believe in God, his demand should be ‘Give me your evidence!’ All beliefs must be supported by scientific evidence or demonstrable knowledge.” In line with his pragmatism, Hu saw no need to believe in a mysterious God or spirit because “there may be good people among those who believe in immortality of the spirits, but not all those who believe in the destructibility of the spirit are bad men.”²⁶¹

Hu’s opinions on Christianity were rather more eclectic. On the one hand, he named Jesus one of “the immortality of worth” figures with the lasting influence of great personality, and recognized the historical contribution of the missionaries to modern China. On the other hand, he regarded Christianity as a “foreign” religion and inconsistent with China’s national spirit. The only way to indigenize Christianity in China and to make it a positive force of modernization was to concentrate on its “moral teaching.” By doing so, Christian missionaries must discard superstition


and theology; otherwise, their moral teachings would be washed away in the end. In his mind, “the future of Christianity in China was a question which should be considered apart from the question of the past services rendered to China by the Christian missionaries.” Hu further wrote:

The part played by the missionaries in the modernization of China will long be remembered by the Chinese, even though no Christian church may be left there. They were the pioneers of the new China. They helped the Chinese to fight for the suppression of opium which the pirate-traders brought to us. They agitated against foot binding, which eight centuries of esoteric philosophizing in native China failed to recognize as an inhuman institution. And they brought to us the first rudiments of European science. The early Jesuits gave us the pre-Newtonian astronomy, and the later Protestant missionaries introduced modern hospitals and schools. They taught us to know that there was a new world and a new civilization behind the pirate-traders and gunboats.

Many of the Protestant missionaries worked hard to awaken China and bring about a modern nation. China is now awakened and determined to modernize herself. There is not the slightest doubt that a new and modern China is emerging out of chaos. But this new China does not seem to promise much bright future to the propagation of the Christian faith. On the contrary, Christianity is facing opposition everywhere. The dream of a “Christian occupation of China” seems to be fast vanishing - probably forever. And the explanation is not far to seek.

Chinese Communists opposed religion from both philosophical and social standpoints. Philosophically, they regarded religion as an ideology incompatible to the communist atheism; socially, they viewed religion as the “opiate of the people.” Christianity, in particular, had served to maintain capitalist social order. The Anti-Christian Movement in the 1920s was indeed under the influence of atheist Communism. Students who attacked Christianity were from the standpoint of all-sufficiency of modern science and also from Marxist doctrinaire angle, as they believed:

(1) Gods are born of fear. The laboring class in their state of extreme poverty, instability and despair, found their burden too much for them, and, driven by the thirst for life and dread of death, they created out of their imagination an omnipotent and extra-mundane


deity to be their protector – too much disgusted by their suffering in this life to look for a savior in the realistic world.

(2) The ruling class has used religion as their tool to prevent class conflict. They would blind the laborers to the understanding of the law of class consciousness and class struggle; they would tell them to be patient, peaceful, and to look for reward for their toil in this world rather than in the world to come. The Christians, supported by crumbs from the table of the bourgeoisie, have not only ignored the sufferings of the common people but have actually encouraged the bourgeoisie to redouble their efforts to exploit the oppressed class.264

During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), CCP considerably modified their policies toward Christian institutions. They even made an effort to permit religious freedom in the so-called liberation areas, that is, territory directly under their control, but in their statement made by Mao Zedong, “The possibility exists of a united front against imperialism, feudalism and superstition between the scientific thought of the Chinese proletariat and those Chinese bourgeois materialists and natural scientists who are progressive, but in no case is there a possibility of a united front with any reactionary idealism.” Hence, in the field of political action Communists may form an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front with some idealists and even religious people, but they could never approve of their idealism or religious doctrines.265

The party of GMD that officially supported the principle of separation of the state and religion had a divided view about Christianity.266 Sun Yat-sen, for example, was a baptized

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266 Other than Sun Yat-sen, his son Sun Fo, his close friend Huang Xing, and his protégé Chiang Kai-shek (with his own inner circle including his wife Soong Mei-ling, brother-in-law Kong Xiangxi, and avowed-brother General Feng Yuxiang) were Protestants, but many others like Wang Jingwei, Zhu Zhixin, Wu Zhihui, and Dai Jitao were anti-Christian activists. Dai was also well known for his support of Buddhism, while General Bai Congxi was the leader of Islam in Republican China. See Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement*, 143.
Protestant Christian, but his Christianity has been a subject of some controversy; it has been argued that Sun was not really a Christian but portrayed himself as such for political reasons. The evidence to support this claim was that Sun was not a churchgoer, nor did he often celebrate Christian holidays. Nevertheless, Sun told an audience in San Francisco, shortly before the Revolution in 1911: “Our greatest hope is to make the Bible and Christian education, as we have known it, the means of conveying to our countrymen what blessings may be in the way of just laws.”

Jiang himself in 1923 also heard Sun Yat-sen talk in person about Christianity and the YM/YWCAs in particular, commenting that:

Dr. Sun praised YMCA program of character-building to save China but reminded us that the conflict between science and religion arose from the different understandings of the origin of man. In his point of view, Christianity should be more liberal in interpretation of the Scriptures. The theory of evolution indicates that man is originally evolved from animal; the building of character therefore should aim further on man’s evolution from humanity to divinity. Chinese Christians in particular should not avoid politics just as Christians in the West who had fought for their own countries during the time of war even though they all believed in the same God and Christ. To him, religion is seeking the future welfare of the soul, and politics is seeking the present welfare of the body. Sun therefore referred to his San Min Zhu Yi as a sort of bible by which the salvation of China could be obtained.

Being a political revolutionary, not a church-trained theologian, Jiang saw Sun as a missionary for secular ends with an earthly gospel. His impact was greater than that of the


268 It was at Guangzhou YMCA-China National Convention that Jiang Wenhan and more than 300 delegates listened to Sun Yat-sen’s speech on “Guomin yao yi Renge Jiuguo” (Saving China through Character Building). Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, 144; Jiang, “Guanyu Zhongguo Jidujiao Qingnianhui Lishi,” 188-89.
missionaries in China, and that was why in every open anti-Christian outburst, Sun’s personal affiliation with Christianity served as a kind of restraining influence.\footnote{Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement*, 143. Audrey Wells suggests Sun’s Christianity was originally and continuously of the Taiping Revolution variety; it also incorporated the anti-clergy attitude of the Boxer Rebellion, although Sun did not attack the Christian ecclesiastical organization of which he was dismissive. Sun’s Christianity also embraced Darwin’s theory of evolution and accommodated many conflicting Chinese values. See Wells, *The Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen*, 109.}

### 3.1.3 To Ride in the “New Thought Tide”

The debates on culture and religion reflected the new intellectual and social trends in modern China. It also brought enormous pressure on Chinese Christianity. Emerged as a part of CSM, the Chinese SCM was facing the challenges of anti-Christian sentiment associated with anti-imperialism. Leaders of Chinese SCM like Jiang Wenhan were forced to rethink Christianity and its relation to Chinese culture and society. They acknowledged the significance of the “new trend of thought” (xin sichao) and wished to make their own contribution to the cultural reconstruction of China. Their responses in general followed the development of Chinese SCM with aims at two major issues confronting Christianity: relevancy and social responsibility.\footnote{Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement*, 129.}

#### 3.1.3.1 Relevancy

In the 1930s, one important tendency of Protestant scholars was to define the relevance of Christianity in Chinese culture and society. Two reasons indicated why Christianity did not exercise any considerable influence on Chinese thought. The first was “the inability of the Church to hold and educate its best talents until they become equal in intellectual strength and standing with the most powerful intellectuals outside the Church.” The Christian missions had put so much emphasis on statistics of converts that they overlooked the need for making an intellectual interpretation of Christian faith to educated Chinese. Some of the fundamentalist
groups even regarded the pursuit of knowledge as being secular. In fact, there was hardly any justification for saying that the Chinese people were so practically minded that they were not interested in theology. The second reason was the paucity of high-grade Christian literature. The Association Press of YM/YWCAs was almost the only agency which aimed to serve the educated youth. Although many Western classics were translated into Chinese, no Christian newspaper existed in China before the War of Resistance against Japan. Christian literature in China had very limited circulation.²⁷¹

One issue recognized by Jiang and other Chinese leaders was that the anti-Christian movement actually revealed the vital importance of the Gospel that had been preached in the past. Although the attacks advanced by the anti-religionists were mostly anti-intellectual and unorganized, Christians realized an urgent need to reinterpret Christian faith among Chinese youth, as Zhao Zichen put it:

The new culture movement stimulates him (students) with a new philosophy of life, making him feel that many things that were considered eternal laws and verities are but things of the past and the man can both create these significant things and also destroy them at a stroke of the hand. There are, indeed, some whose reason tells them not to believe in such doctrines as “The Virgin Birth,” “The Resurrection of the Body,” “Apostolic Succession,” and the like, and who therefore determine not to believe in them even though this means they must go to hell and endure eternal torture in lakes of unquenchable fire.²⁷²


To make Christian faith relevant to the Chinese youth, the Chinese SCM called for a "Christian rationalism" seeking a common ground between Christianity and modern science, which meant to repudiate the traditions and outworn creeds of Christianity through promoting a general belief of "the truth," because "the truth is one, and that if it is true in science it must also be true in religion." The objects attacked by anti-religious groups were really some superstitious behaviors, not spiritual faith. The task for Chinese SCM therefore was to work out a rationale of Christian faith. Jiang explained:

Superstition is a barrier to civilization, but faith is the key to truth and the richness of the spiritual world. To be devoid of faith is to lose hope and to lose the fighting spirit. What we want to attack is superstition, not rational faith. Reason helps us to see, but power exposed through emotion is necessary for the fulfilment of our vision. The one needs the other.

The Chinese Christians are united in demanding that the Christian religion be truly expressed. The church transplanted from the West seems to us to be entirely buried under a mess of forms, traditions and customs. We want to brush aside all these things in order to make manifest the essence of Christianity, so that we may accept that we can, discard what we should discard, improve what can be bettered, and create what we need. We are united in demanding a true Christianity that is not covered up by things that do not properly belong therein.

However, in seeking to reinterpret Christian faith in the context of China, the resistance from the fundamentalist and revivalist groups could not be ignored. The fundamentalists in China, like those in Western countries, were opposed to any reconciliation of religion with modern scientific knowledge. Their biblical literalism was the basis of their Christian faith; the revivalists were also conservative in their theological position but unique in their emotional style of preaching, which led to a great deal of religious confusion. For instance, some groups like the

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273 Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, 129.

Little Flock, the Bethel Band, and the Oxford Group Movement offered religion on the strength of passion and emotional release, “something that was cheaper and easier than a faith soundly built up upon a foundation in knowledge related to the culture of the people and the advanced thought of the day.” In fact, to think lightly of the need of scientific knowledge in spiritual teaching was doing the Christian cause in China a great harm.275

3.1.3.2 Social Responsibility

Corresponding to the relevancy issue of Christianity was the affirmation of the social responsibility of Chinese SCM. The missionary work in China started as a movement of relevance to save the souls of heathen Chinese. John R. Mott and Sherwood Eddy, for instance, were two of the frequent visitors to China. They attracted thousands of students to their evangelical meetings with a frank message about the world’s “manifold temptations, evils and sins” and then pointed to Christ as the “secret power” and “the way, the truth and the life.” Their Christian moralism was effective in making a huge appeal centered on Christian right at a time when Confucian moralism was breaking down.276 The students had never been very clearly theistic and were frequently bewildered about a personal God. Jesus Christ, however, was a concrete figure, and the students were easily attracted to him by his love and sacrifice. Even during the turbulent period of the anti-Christian movement, there was comparatively little attack on the lofty character of Jesus. The students were also keenly concerned about the problems of


this world, as there was an insistent demand to “identify religion with life.” As Jiang described the situation:

Chinese students will respond readily to the challenge of Christ. They would seldom respond to the appeal of the pleasure and beauty of another world, which is more an attraction for older people who feel that they are getting near to their celestial home. Nor do they take seriously the message of hellfire as given by many of our evangelists in the revival meetings, though it does get hold of some of the immature youth. They mostly respond to the higher and nobler appeal, the appeal of Jesus Himself; “Deny thyself, take up the cross and follow me.”

Yet Christian theism had not taken much root in China. Although Western thinkers like Thomas Huxley, Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, Kropotkin, Trotsky, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, and many others had influence in China, Christian theology had little influence over the Chinese mind. Instead, China’s nationalistic scholars were able to spread among Chinese youth a skeptical attitude towards all conceptions of God. Coping with such a skepticism there must have contributed to a new strategy to adopt traditional Chinese ethos in Christianity – a “new wine in an old wine bottle” in which Christian teaching was “really at heart and in spirit” with Confucius, a Chinese symbol. As such, Jesus became the new Confucius. Those who followed him did so not because of his religion but because of his character. Jesus hence became the symbol of Christian cause in China and not only was viewed as an ethical character but also a social revolutionary. Jiang and other Chinese SCM leaders believed that the ultimate purpose of Christianity was social reconstruction, for the “Kingdom of God” was the central teaching of Jesus. He was more keenly aware of the challenge of Communism and echoed with Wu Yaozong

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that in the past “the Church has been interested only in philanthropic work and social service but failed to realize its responsibility toward the political and social system.”

The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) raised a big challenge to the Christian students on the issue of pacifism. Many students opposed an economic boycott for fear that it would bring wholesale starvation to the Japanese people. Jiang nevertheless condemned the continued aggression of the Japanese and stated: “We love peace, but we love justice more. We are against any action that will lead to unnecessary sacrifice, but we are not afraid to shed our blood for the sake of truth and justice. We pledge ourselves to backup to the utmost the nationwide movement of resistance which has arisen throughout the country.”

Facing the national crisis, Jiang brought Chinese SCM under the influence of the United Front as he saw a strong sense of patriotism and social responsibility among Christian students to support the formation of a political united front for China’s national salvation. From a practical point of view, he emphasized the same objective between Christianity and communism in the task of social reconstruction because they both repudiated the “status quo” and worked for the establishment of an ideal social order. Communism challenged the capitalist system from the economic standpoint based on the inner contradictions of the capitalist system, while Christianity

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criticized capitalism from the religious standpoint by charging the exploitation of labor as unjust and inhumane. Jiang quoted from Wu Yaozong:

The most fundamental difference is that the Christians believe in the absolute worth of personality, the infinite possibility of each individual, and the correspondence of means and ends, whereas the communists have no such scruples if it works for the good of the collective man.

The difference between Christianity and communism is the difference between the Sermon on the Mount and the Communist Manifesto. Yet, the Christian belief of God is not in conflict with the Marxist belief in dialectic materialism, just as Christianity has no real conflict with the theory of evolution. Philosophically speaking, the Marxists have only a “horizontal” understanding of reality, while the Christians offer a “vertical” interpretation of the eternal God. Horizontally, everything was changing, but vertically everything changes only according to the unchangeable “moral order.”

3.1.4 Conclusion: Chinese Student Movement

In his groundbreaking book, Jiang Wenhan summarized his methodological approach to the subject of Chinese student movements from a cultural perspective. By doing so he examined the ideological motivations behind student movements and how Chinese society and culture had an active role in shaping those ideologies. He called his methodology “a study of modern Chinese thought with the students as the axis.” Jiang illustrated the main ideological motivations behind student movements in four preeminent phases: Chinese Renaissance, Revolt against Religion, Nationalist Revolution, and United Front. He then classified the interplay of pre-1949 student movements into three categories – liberalism, nationalism, and communism – and concluded that

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282 Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement, 133; Wu, Shehui Fuyin, 105-07, 118, 123, 127; Wu Yaozong, Meiyou ren Kanjianguo Shangdi [No man has seen God] (Shanghai: Qingnian Xiehui Shuju, 1943), 27-41.
the legacy of pre-1949 student protest movements was a political, social, and cultural movement composed of Chinese autonomy and enlightenment.\textsuperscript{283}

There are several points to be highlighted. The first point is a “Chinese Renaissance” in CSM. This unique character arose as an intellectual awakening of the students and manifested in two important aspects: the bold criticism of the old Chinese culture and an almost wholesale importation of Western ideas. These two aspects made the spirit of CSM very different from the Reform Movement of the nineteenth century. Clearly, the goal of CSM was the modern Western culture guided by science and democracy. “Science was taken in its positivistic sense against superstition and metaphysics, while democracy was understood against the liberal-bourgeois background.” Under such strong influence from the West, the CSM leaders broke loose from tradition and authority with this new spirit of liberation of individual emancipation. Thus, the historical CSM before 1949 was a concrete expression of the new sense of responsibility in public affairs, and as a result, the patriotism of CSM and its intellectual awakening was spread to the common people. “The rapid growth of CSM publications and social organizations was a clear indication of how the new spirit of freedom and self-expression could conquer the established habit of indifference and blind acceptance of traditions which have been so detrimental to mental and material progress in China.”\textsuperscript{284}

The second point is a result of the Chinese Renaissance. Clearly, Confucianism lost its prestige among the younger generation, while the widespread acceptance of the validity of Western science caused students to set aside all historical religions as sheer superstition. CSM regarded

\textsuperscript{283} Kiang, preface to \textit{The Chinese Student Movement}, x-xi.

Christianity as a greater menace than other historical religions because its aggressive evangelism threatened to engulf large numbers of the Chinese people. The basic arguments of CSM were in accord with the spirit of the Chinese Renaissance that Christianity was superstition and as such was incompatible with modern science. But when their attention was focused on the mission schools, Christianity was accused as a forerunner of Western imperialism and an instrument of capitalist exploitation. The nationalistic and communist ideologies had joined their forces in this opposition against Christianity.\(^{285}\)

The third point is the vital importance of CSM, in particular its outlook on cultural patterns and religious belief, since its students represented the future of China. As such, the historical study on CSM by Jiang was focused on the interplay of the currents of thoughts at the time, namely Liberalism, Nationalism, and Communism. In terms of representative leaders, Jiang listed three as they were: Hu Shi, Sun Yat-sen, and Mao Zedong. Hu Shi represented those who favored a whole-hearted transformation of China based on the model of Western democracies. Sun Yat-sen wanted to adopt the old Chinese philosophy to modern thought with the sole purpose of making China a nation free of foreign aggressions that was politically democratic and economically prosperous. Mao Zedong proclaimed that Marxism-Leninism was the foundation for a democratic revolution, but his ultimate goal was to establish a communist system in China. On the debates of Chinese culture and religion, Hu Shi tended to totally reject old Chinese culture, whereas Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong maintained that wholesale Westernization would be harmful to China.\(^{286}\)

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Truly, the molding of the minds of the Chinese students depended on the interplay of the new thought tide in China in the aftermath of the May Fourth Movement. One thing was clear to Jiang, as he noted, “the educated class was destined to shoulder the responsibility of developing a cultural pattern true to the Chinese genius and realistic faith satisfactory to the eternal yearnings of man.” It was therefore a false contention that China could be modernized by merely adopting science, democracy, or socialism from other countries for these were only the products and not the creators of the Western and foreign societies. Jiang further explained, “This does not mean that China should not appropriate the best things in other countries, but it does mean that whatever we have appropriated from other countries should be integrated with the racial genius and historical conditions of the Chinese people.”

The attack on religious superstition by CSM seemed to have taken away the need for a religious faith. The more forward-thinking students would say that they have no objection to faith but that they are opposed to religious faith. In other words, the only faith accepted by these students is a faith based on reason. “But faith and reason cannot be the same thing,” argued Jiang, and he further proposed that no human reason can fathom the many dimensions of life. A realistic faith required an understanding of the ambiguous nature of man and an implicit trust in the moral coherence of the universe. Hence, “Christianity has a great future in China if it can provide an intellectualistic exposition of this kind of faith adequate to meet the minds of the Chinese students.”

In Jiang’s story of CSM and its ideological confrontation with Chinese culture and religion, Chinese students are portrayed as a special group with a collective identity. Students were

287 Ibid.

described as young, forward-looking, more outspoken, and adventurous in the struggle for political freedom and social justice because they had little personal interest at stake. Their demonstrations constituted a powerful influence on Chinese society at a time when there were few outlets to voice public opinion. In addition, students represented a precious intellectual group in early twentieth-century China because only a small proportion of the population had the opportunity to study in the colleges and schools. CSM was a well-organized force in China for reflecting mass sentiments. Of course, it had detractors. Some criticized it as distracting and insisted that the primary objective of the students was to study and to prepare themselves for future service to the nation, while the others frequently charged CSM of being engineered by political groups behind the scene. But Jiang Wenhan made it clear that “students are indeed patriotic Chinese. In their experience, the demonstrations have proved to be the most effective means of making the issues known and of turning the events by forcing the authorities to change their policy. There are undoubtedly some abuses in the movement, but no political group can artificially create such influence as to prompt a nationwide CSM.”

Although not the originators of these ideas, students in China were the group that turned ideas into actions. As Jiang has pointed out, “they are the voice of the people and they are, in a real sense, the intermediators between ideas and events.” Jiang concluded that Chinese students were a major player in recent Chinese history:

In so far as the Chinese students played a very large part in the national life of China, all the important currents of thought bear an intimate relation to the Chinese Student Movement. Also, the significance of the various historic student movements only emerges from an understanding of their ideological background. As such, it is no exaggeration to say that an understanding of the Chinese Student Movement is essential to an understanding of modern China in the first half of twentieth-century. Hence, to understand

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289 Ibid, 146; Jiang, “Zhongguo Jidujiao xuesheng yundong de lishi fazhan,” 152.
the Student Movement is to understand much of the mind of China. To fail to understand the Student Movement is to fail to enter the soul of modern China.\textsuperscript{290}

*The Ideological Background of the Chinese Student Movement* made Jiang Wenhan a well-known figure in academia. Kenneth Scott Latourette wrote a “Foreword” for Jiang, in which he holds the author in high regard:

Mr. Kiang has performed a service of first class importance in giving us a comprehensive review of the Student Movement. He has traced it from the beginning to the present. In doing so, he has utilized a great mass of the pertinent sources. He has found these chiefly in Chinese – in periodicals, books, and other printed material. He has also placed the Movement in its context in the great stream of China’s history over the last half century. Never before has the entire story been put together in such full and well-proportioned fashion. Mr. Kiang is a Christian and is concerned for the bearing of the Student Movement upon the course of Christianity in China. For this reason his pages will be of peculiar value to those who are interested in the future of that faith in China. However, he writes with objectivity and other than those whose primary commitment is Christianity will find his chapters fascinating.\textsuperscript{291}

In his review of the book, John King Fairbank praised Jiang as the first Chinese historian who analyzed the development of student movements in China as part of the main currents of China’s modern intellectual history:

This thin volume is really a great deal more than its title implies, for it traces the main currents of China's modern intellectual history more succinctly and clearly than any other work now available. In fact Kiang, in the process of summarizing the ideological experience of his modern generation in China, has produced one of the most useful works published on that country in recent years. He treats the problem of Christianity in China as one facet in the whole complex of problems precipitated in the course of China’s adjustment to the Western impact, and his treatment is throughout objective, cogent, and based on a survey of the leading Chinese writers, too many of whom are unknown to Western students of China.

…The greatest service which this book performs is to make it plain that China’s modern intellectual leaders have been slaves neither of Right nor of Left but independent and usually courageous thinkers intent on the transformation of Chinese culture and Chinese life. As the American public painfully becomes aware that democracy can develop

\textsuperscript{290} Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement*, 139.

\textsuperscript{291} Latourette, foreword to *The Chinese Student Movement*, x.
in China only in a Chinese form, there must be a great deal more study of the field which Kiang Wen-han has so ably surveyed.292

Jiang Wenhan and his pioneer work has inspired generations of American historians in the postwar era to be interested in the subject of student movements in China. Scholars like Vera Schwarcz, John Israel, Chow Tse-tsung, Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Jessie G. Lutz, Charles Keller, Clifton J. Phillips, Brian Hall, Clarence H. Hamilton, and Dwight W. Edwards in their respective works have made substantial contributions to the knowledge of Chinese student movements.

Vera Schwarcz published her book, *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919* (1986), with a particular focus on the cultural aspect of the May Fourth Movement and its impact on Chinese society. Like Jiang, Schwarcz called the “idol-smashing” iconoclasm of the May Fourth Movement “the Chinese enlightenment” and regarded the moment as “the first of a series of incomplete efforts to uproot feudalism while pursuing the cause of nationalist revolution.” To Schwarcz, the “May Fourth thought” had a profound impact on Chinese students as the movement made them an active agent to quest for China’s reform and modernization. Yet different from the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment, according to Schwarcz, was the fact that the May Fourth Movement did not move the country substantially toward modernity and had little impact on grassroots Chinese society.293

In his book *Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937* (1966), John Israel examined the evolution of three student movements during 1927-37. Through the analyses of a broad cultural, social and political background in the Republican Era, Israel demonstrated how the Communists succeeded in turning students’ anti-Japanese sentiments into modern Chinese nationalism. Israel

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argues that the main purpose of the 1927-37 student movements was to fight against imperialistic aggression and by doing so students unified the country with a strong sense of modern nationalism and thus defending China as an independent modern nation-state free of foreign domination.294

In Chow Tse-tsung (Zhou Cezong)’s monumental study of the May Fourth Movement (1960), he argued that a series of China’s social, political, and ideological events in the early twentieth century caused the student demonstration.295 Jeffery Wasserstrom later interpreted the student activism in twentieth-century China as an act of political theater, a performance that included “the use of oratory, song, gestures, and other forms of symbolic actions.” In his book Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China (1991), Wasserstrom examines student movements from 1912 to 1947. The book goes in detail about the impact of student activism on the people and government of modern China but does not explain clearly the cause or origin of the student movements in question.296

Charles A. Keller and Jessie G. Lutz approached the subject from a religious perspective. By including SCM in the same category (or context) of CSM, they measured the Christian students and their nationalistic activism through a non-governmental network of institutional and personal associations, such as YM/YWCA affiliates. The authors believed that to understand the story of SCM and YMCA was essential for understanding the influences of Christianity on nation building

294 Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937, 1-10.
in twentieth-century China. They concluded that religion has been an important component of the larger historical and social development in modern China.\textsuperscript{297}

### 3.2 Christianity in China

Historically, Christianity has made several forays into China, first with Persian Nestorian monks in the seventh century and followed by Catholic Franciscans in the thirteenth century and Jesuits in the sixteenth century. Each attempt failed and was unable to establish a lasting presence in Chinese soil. However, on its fourth attempt, Christianity survived under an atheist Communist regime and has become a significant part of Chinese culture.\textsuperscript{298}

How then, did Christianity encounter China? How did missionaries justify their theories on the subject of church and state? And why must the Three-Self Principles be the only way to help “Christianity in China” become “Chinese Christianity?” Jiang argued, “The key issue for the spread of the Christianity in China is whether or not the alien religion is capable of implanting itself on East Asian soil. As the receivers of Western Christianity, as long as the churches established by foreign missionaries were politically, economically and also evangelically dependent on the churches of the West, they would never be able to take root in Asian soil.”\textsuperscript{299}


\textsuperscript{298} On February 17-28, 1982, Jiang Wenhan conducted lecture seminars in Tokyo, Japan, sponsored by Comparative Culture Research Institute (CCRI) of the International Christian University (ICU) and Tokyo Woman’s Christian University (TWCU). His unpublished lecture notes were obtained from a 15-hour seminar audio tape in English made by and archived in ICU CCRI and TWCU. The notes were themed on “Chinese Revolution and Christianity” with three main topics: (1) History of Christianity in China; (2) Christianity after 1949 Revolution, and (3) Reconciliation with God and Reconciliation with Men.

3.2.1 Christianity in China, Pre-1800

3.2.1.1 Nestorians from the Church of the East, 635-845 CE

Christianity entered China long before the modern era. In 635 CE, the Nestorian monk Alopen from Persia made the first known attempt to bring Christianity to China. Named jing-jiao in Chinese and patronized by the emperors of the Tang dynasty, Alopen and other Nestorians built a monastery, translated the Bible into Chinese, and baptized Chinese Christians. They were active in China for 210 years and then simply disappeared. These Nestorians were effectively forgotten until the Ming Dynasty. In 1625, an eighth-century stone tablet was found in the city of Xi’an that shed some light on how Nestorians operated in the Tang dynasty and the events leading to their disappearance. When a massive internal rebellion nearly toppled the Tang dynasty in the 750s, Confucians and other cultural conservatives began to decry foreign influence, and a xenophobic religious sentiment emerged. In 845, an imperial edict limited all foreign religions. Nestorianism subsequently disappeared from China.\(^{300}\) As Jiang Wenhan explained, “Tang Christianity had aligned itself too closely with the Tang state. The Nestorians’ faith was a marginal religion that never achieved a prominent role in Tang society. When it fell out of imperial favor, it vanished. Tang Christianity was not indigenous; it did not endure.”\(^{301}\)

3.2.1.2 Nestorians and Franciscans, 1262-1368

A significant Christian presence did not reappear until the 13\(^{\text{th}}\) century, when Mongols conquered China and founded the Yuan Dynasty. Nestorians from Persia made the second attempt.


\(^{301}\) Jiang, Zhongguo gudai Jidujiao, 37.
They plied the trade routes between the Mediterranean world and China and brought their faith to the Karaits, a Turko-Mongolian tribe. Within a century, most of the 200,000-member clan had become Christian. They formed alliances with other Mongol tribes, including the sub-clan of Genghis Khan (1162-1227). From Rome, the popes also sent Franciscan priests John de Plano Carpini (1185-1252) and John of Montecorvino (1247-1328) in an effort to establish ties with Nestorian Christians and to form an alliance with the Mongol empire. These Christians were called Yelikewen, which referred to the people who believed in the Christian God. The Mongol rulers protected Christianity in Yuan China. Their court at Helin (Karakoram) was open to Christian missionaries because the mother of Kublai Khan was a Nestorian. In just about a century, the Yuan Christians were active mainly among the Mongol nobles and tribe leaders. By 1305 two Catholic churches were built in Beijing with more than thirty-thousand people baptized. Both Nestorian and Catholic Christianity existed until the collapse of the Yuan dynasty in 1368. Christianity vanished again from China for a time.\textsuperscript{302} As in the Tang dynasty, Yuan Christianity left few enduring marks in China. No indigenous church remained. “Christianity’s third foray into China would not come for two hundred more years, but this time Christianity began to take root, becoming an enduring part of the Chinese religious landscape.”\textsuperscript{303}

\textbf{3.2.1.3 Catholic Jesuits, 1583-1706}

In 1534, as the Roman Catholic Church struggled to respond to Martin Luther in Germany, Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556) in Paris formed the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) with three primary goals: education, missions, and stopping the spread of Protestantism. Led by Francis Xavier (1506-


\footnotesize\textsuperscript{303} Jiang, \textit{Zhongguo Gudai Jidujiao}, 126; Jiang Wenhan, \textit{Ming-Qing Jian zai Hua de Tianzhujiao Yesuhuishi} [Catholic Jesuits during Ming-Qing period China] (Shanghai: Zhishi Chubanshe, 1987), 1.
1552), a founding member, a new wave of Jesuit missionaries made the third attempt to come to China. Xavier sailed to the East Indies and pioneered the Jesuit mission to Japan in 1549, but he died three years later on Shangchuan Island. He never entered the China of his dreams. While the Jesuit mission flourished in Japan, they could not even enter the Middle Kingdom.

All this changed in 1582. The Italian Jesuit priest Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) arrived at the Portuguese settlement of Macau, China, and would become the most famous Western missionary in Chinese history. Possessed of a brilliant mind, Ricci carried out the Jesuits’ policies – accommodation of Chinese culture and evangelization from the top of society down – to perfection. Ricci shaved his head and beard and donned the robes of a Chinese intellectual. He used impressive intellect to win favor of the elite, dazzling the literati at dinner parties with his memory skills. He would examine a list of 500 Chinese characters once and then repeat the list in reverse order or recite volumes of Chinese classics after scanning them once. Ricci set his eyes on the imperial court and made it to Beijing in 1602, the first for a Western missionary in Ming China. He presented European clocks, a steel-string fiddle, and a world map to the emperor Wan Li. The Jesuit community in Beijing translated Western works of astronomy, geography, and mathematics into Chinese. Life in the capital city gave Ricci access to the highest of Chinese officials from whom he converted “three pillars” of the church: Xu Guangqi (1562-1633), Li Zhizao (1565-1630), and Yang Tinyun (1562-1627). Ricci attempted to promote mutual


understanding between China and the West, and he was somewhat successful.\footnote{Jiang, \textit{Ming Qing jian zai hua de Tianzhujiao Yesuhuishi}, 10-20; Gu, \textit{Chuanjiaoshi yu jindai Zhongguo}, 1-17; Latourette, \textit{A History of Christian Missions in China}, 91-101; Bays, \textit{A New History of Christianity in China}, 21-24; Whyte, \textit{Unfinished Encounter}, 40-48; Wang, \textit{Zhongguo Jidujiao shigang}, 73-82; Yi, \textit{Zhongguo Jidujiao Shilue}, 49-52.} In the 1630s, however, the Jesuits’ dominance ended. When the Manchu overthrew the Ming rulers in 1644, the political change had negative effects on the Catholic mission, but the church later grew under the open-minded and inquisitive Kangxi Emperor in the 1680s and 90s, spurred by Kangxi’s 1692 edict of tolerance for missions and Christianity. By the end of the seventeenth century, Christianity in Japan and China had switched places: an eradication campaign had destroyed Christianity in Japan, but there were over 250,000 Catholics in China.\footnote{The Jesuits’ mission in Japan ended in 1639 when the Tokugawa regime issued the final Sakoku Edict prohibiting all traffic with Catholic lands. John Howe, “Japanese Christians and Americans,” \textit{Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization} edited by Marius B. Jansen (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 337; Jiang, \textit{Ming Qing jian zai Hua de Tianzhujiao Yesuhuishi}, 54-56; Wang, \textit{Zhongguo Jidujiao shigang}, 131-34.}

However, there was inevitably a clash of cultures. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Rite Controversy emerged as a dispute among Roman Catholic missionaries over the religiosity of Confucianism and Chinese rituals. The debate centered over whether Chinese ritual practices of honoring family ancestors and other formal Confucian and Chinese imperial rites qualified as religious rites and were thus incompatible with Christian beliefs. Ricci and his fellow Jesuits argued that these Chinese rites were secular rituals compatible with Christianity, within certain limits, and should thus be tolerated. The later-arrived Dominicans and Franciscans, however, disagreed and reported the issue to Rome. At the end of the dispute, many Dominicans and Franciscans changed their positions to agree with the Jesuits’ opinion, but Rome disagreed.\footnote{Jiang, \textit{Ming Qing jian zai hua de Tianzhujiao Yesuhuishi}, 62-64; Gu, \textit{Chuanjiaoshi yu jindai Zhongguo}, 12-13; Bays, \textit{A New History of Christianity in China}, 28-29; Latourette, \textit{A History of Christian Missions in China}, 131-41; Wang, \textit{Zhongguo Jidujiao shigang}, 135-48; Yi, \textit{Zhongguo Jidujiao Shilue}, 102-18.}
In response, the emperor Kangxi of the Qing dynasty issued an edict to end the controversy in 1706: “All missionaries would be examined and only those who agreed with ‘the policies of Matteo Ricci’ would be able to remain in China. Everyone else would be deported.” Soon the Roman popes also banned the rites and forbade the debate. Relations broke down. “After the Rites Controversy, Christianity was seen in China as a heterodox ideology and banned. In 1724 Kangxi’s son, the Yongzheng emperor, rescinded the 1692 edict for the toleration of Christianity. Yongzheng outlawed Christianity, labeling it an ‘evil cult’ that subverted Chinese culture.”

3.2.2 Protestant Missionaries in China, 1807-1949

The arrival of Protestant missionary Robert Morrison (1782-1834) to China in 1807 marked the fourth attempt to disseminate Christianity in China. This is usually referred as the “modern missionary movement.” It lasted for one and a half centuries until the Communist takeover. Jiang considered this perhaps the most important period in the history of Christianity in China, noting, “By preaching the Bible, the missionaries reached all levels of Chinese society despite many difficulties. In China’s relations with the West during the nineteenth century, Protestant missionaries are the most important actors.”

3.2.2.1 Early Missionary Work, 1807-1842

Since Christianity and its propagation were illegal in China and Westerners were permitted to reside only in Canton (Guangzhou) and Macau until the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing, Morrison and

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309 Jiang, Ming Qing jian zai hua de Tianzhujiao Yesu huishi, 67; Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China, 144; Bays, A New History of Christianity in China, 30; Wang, Zhongguo Jidujiao shigang, 141; Yi, Zhongguo Jidujiao Shilue, 114-18.


other missionaries operated on China’s fringes, where they occupied themselves with traditional fundamentalist work and used the intellectual approach to study Chinese, translate the Bible, and publish religious tracts. In the process they composed grammars and dictionaries to aid their successors and began to work out a Christian terminology. They itinerated in the Hong Kong-Canton region and Southeast Asia, preaching and distributing Christian publications. They also lived in a symbolic relationship with Western merchants. For example, Morrison, while commissioned by the London Missionary Society (LMS), at the same time served as an interpreter for British East Indian Company. For the first twenty-five years Morrison and his colleagues baptized only ten Chinese, including Liang Fa (1789-1855), the first Chinese Protestant minister. From 1807 to 1839 a total of just fifty missionaries were assigned to China, and only a few stayed for any length of time. But after 1839 the number of Western missionaries in China increased drastically. As a consequence of the Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860), the unequal treaties pried China open to the West, allowing and protecting missionary propagation with the opening of treaty ports, toleration of Christian evangelism, and extraterritoriality. Morrison, German missionary Karl Gutzlaff, and American missionary Peter Parker became famous for their active role as translators on the treaties. In part because of this, “Christian missions functioned within a political context, and in the mind of most Chinese were associated with Western imperialism and opium.”

312 After the First Opium War (1839-1842), the Qing dynasty was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanjing with Britain in 1842, the first of what the Chinese later called the unequal treaties and which granted an indemnity and extraterritoriality to foreigners, including missionaries in China; opened five treaty ports to foreign merchants; and ceded Hong Kong Island to the British Empire. See Spence, The Search for Modern China, 143-64.

313 Jiang, “Lecture 1;” Gu, Chuanjiaoshi yu jindai Zhongguo, 22-27, 47-68; Gu, Cong Malixun dao Situleideng, 1-19; Yi, Zhongguo Jidujiao Shilue, 136-45; Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China, 209-32, 244-81; Bays, A New History of Christianity in China, 42-52; Whyte, Unfinished Encounter, 95-103; Wang, Zhongguo Jidujiao shigang, 149-68; Yao and Luo, Zhongguo Jidujiao Jianshi, 1-24; Lutz,
3.2.2.2 Anti-Christian Agitation, 1860-1900

Obviously, to win the hearts and minds of the Chinese to Christ was the missionaries’ fundamental goal in China. Nevertheless, the whole missionary enterprise in the country did not grow smoothly as they had expected even after the unequal treaties. In the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, Christianity, as an integral part of Western culture, met with a strong resistance from traditional Chinese culture. Such confrontation first came from the Chinese gentry-scholar-official class. They were afraid that someday the Christian faith would take lead over Chinese culture in China and reduce the influence of their class. Consequently, they argued that Christian symbolism, terminology, and several of its customs were diametrically opposite from many aspects of Chinese traditional culture. For ordinary Chinese people, Christianity was inevitably associated with China’s defeat in two Opium Wars and the rise and fall of the Taiping Rebellion (Taiping Tianguo, 1814-1864), all disastrous to the country.314 Jiao-an (mission cases) reflecting the conflicts between foreign missionaries and Chinese locals were frequent. To settle the cases always meant humiliation to China.315 Many Chinese were convinced that the missionary movement was a serious threat to Chinese sovereignty and cultural hegemony, not to mention a real “religious problem.” They termed Christianity a “yang jiao” (foreign religion) and its

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missionaries “yang guizi” (foreign devils). The growing xenophobia eventually led to the Boxer Uprising (Yihetuan Yundong, 1899-1900), in which Chinese rebels attacked missionaries and churches. Before the revolt was quelled in August of 1900 by the joint troops of eight nations, it had killed more than 250 Westerners and thousands of Chinese Christians. Jiang concluded, “The Boxer Uprising was a major Chinese opposition to Christianity led by the gentry and government officials, and supported by the general public. The spears of the peasant insurgents were directed against the imperial powers who had made use of religion to invade China.”

3.2.2.3 Early Indigenization Movement

As the culmination of nineteenth-century anti-foreign and anti-Christian agitation, the Boxer Uprising drove home the point to Chinese Christians that, in the popular mind, their profession of the foreign faith and their membership in churches dominated by Westerners had turned them into disciples of the “foreign devils” and collaborators in the Western assault on the Chinese tradition. In the decades that followed, a major task of Chinese Christian leadership was to shake off the foreignness of Christianity in the Chinese popular perception and to take control of the churches. In short, they had to indigenize Christianity for the needs of the country and its people. In the case of denominational mission churches, a much-publicized move was the devolution of ecclesiastical control on native leaders and the founding of interdenominational


Chinese organizations. The transfer began at the Centenary Missionary Conference of 1907 and accelerated in the 1920s amidst an explosion of mass anti-imperialist and Christian indigenization campaigns.\textsuperscript{319}

A landmark of the indigenization movement was the Protestant Fourth National Christian Conference held in Shanghai in May 1922. In sharp contrast to three previous national conferences of 1877, 1890, and 1907, Chinese delegates outnumbered the foreign ones for the first time. Moreover, they made the theme of the Conference “the Chinese Church” with a stronger tone for both church unity and indigeneity. The Conference legitimized the creation of NCC to coordinate the activities of different denominations nationwide. The unified Church of Christ in China (CCC) then formed in 1927. It called for the two-fold task of the Chinese Christian movement: to promote an independent, unified, and non-denominational base for Christianity in China under the banner of “Three Self” Principles – self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation. For the first time a Chinese Christian leader Cheng Jingyi was elected general secretary.\textsuperscript{320}

For Chinese Protestant leaders, to throw off the “foreign color” and achieve “indigenous color” (bense) became their urgent need, even as the anti-Christian movement was first erupting in 1922. Many of them sought to discard western mission board control and explored theological integration with traditional Chinese culture, including Yu Rizhang, Zhao Zichen, Wu Leichuan, Wang Zhixin, Wu Yaozong, and others. Most were characterized by liberal theology, commitment to social reform, deep Chinese patriotism, and acquaintance with Westering learning and mores.


\textsuperscript{320} Jiang, “Lecture 2;” Duan, Fenjin de Licheng, 209-38; cf. The Chinese Church, as revealed in the National Christian Conference, held in Shanghai, May 2 to Thursday, May 11, 1922 (Shanghai: The Oriental Press, 1922), 74-5.
Some representative ideas that emerged from their discussions were: (1) Fuse the Christian belief into the ideology of Confucianism; (2) optimize traditional Confucian ideology using Christian doctrines in order to elevate the integrity of citizens of China with the morality of Jesus Christ; (3) form a new “oriental religion” by blending the essence of Christianity with the essence of Confucianism, and (4) contextually root the Christian belief into Chinese society in order to improve social condition.321

Before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, a number of indigenous churches were established including the Church of Christ, the True Jesus Church, Jesus Family and Little Flock. Many prominent leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, were Christians at least nominally. Despite such indigenization, by the time of the Communist takeover in 1949, in a land of 550 million souls, the total 700,000 Protestant Christians was just about one-half of one percent of the population. Christianity was still seen as an alien religion in the country.322

3.2.3 Christianity in Communist China, 1949-1966

Facing the new Communist state, the destiny of Chinese Christianity could be described by Shakespeare’s famous line: “To be or not to be?” The choice of Three-Self Church leaders was “to be,” which was not quite understood by many “orthodox” Christians. Since its conception, the Three-Self Church had received harsh criticism from the Western Christian world as well as from leaders of many independent Chinese churches. For instance: Wang Mingdao (1900–1991), the

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founder of Christian Churches in Christ (Jidutu huitang), denounced Wu Yaozong, Jiang Wenhan, and other founders of TSPM as “unbelievers” and refused to take part in the TSPM. He then published a series of articles with provocative titles such as “To Be Obedient to Man or to God?”, “The Truth or the Toxin?”, and “For the Sake of Our Belief!” to criticize those “unbelievers.”

Wang Mingdao’s action deeply provoked the Chinese government; he was arrested in 1955 and spent 22 years in a labor camp near Shanghai. This would have been the destiny of many Three-Self Church leaders if they had chosen differently. As Jiang relayed: “There is a handful of studies on the history of Christianity after 1949 conducted by oversea scholars that accentuate the opposition against the Three-Self Patriotic Movement. But what is not to be discussed is what lies ahead of Chinese Christianity if the Three-Self Church had not been formed after 1949.”

3.2.3.1 Christianity as a “Religious Problem”

The turbulent history in first half of the twentieth century once again changed the fate of Protestant missionaries and Chinese Christians. After the Communist takeover, the new regime quickly took actions to uproot the Christian influence in China under the banner of patriotism. All 130 foreign missionary institutions and organizations, including YM/YWCA, and Christian schools and universities were shut down. Missionary funds were frozen. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1951, all foreign missionaries were expelled. By the end of 1951, not a single

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323 Wang Mingdao, Wushi nian lai [My Past Fifty Years] (Hong Kong: Chenxing Shuwu, 1967), appendices 1–50; Whyte, Unfinished Encounter, 243-44; Wickeri, Seeking the Common Ground, 164-70.

Protestant missionary remained in mainland China, marking the end of 150 years of Protestant missionary work. Left behind were 700,000 Chinese Protestants facing an uncertain future.325

Maoism or Mao Zedong Thought (as it is known in China) was the dominant, state-enforced ideology and, of course, was atheist. As such, the Communists condemned religion as “the opiate of the people.” Christianity in particular was seen as something brought to China under the protection of Western gunships, and foreign missionaries, as its propagators, were representatives of imperialist powers. These views were not new, but the activities of missionaries in modern Chinese history were considered not so much a religious or social problem as they were an international political problem, that is, “cultural imperialism.” As such, Chinese Christians were viewed as “semi-foreign.” As one popular saying in China before the 1949 Liberation goes, “One more Christian means one less Chinese.” Christianity, although relatively small in number of followers in comparison with Buddhism and Islam and never a major political power in China, represented a potential danger to the new government and a threat to social stability and political unity.326

3.2.3.2 State Relations with Christianity

However, while CCP was suspicious of religion in general, it did not seek to systematically eliminate religion as long as the religious organizations were willing to under the direction of the


Chinese state. As a matter of fact, Premier Zhou Enlai stated explicitly that CCP allowed domestic churches to function after 1949 as long as they would not collaborate with Western imperialism and were loyal to the motherland. The 1949 Common Program ratified by the first CPPCC also gave legal basis to the United Front, which included religious organizations. Most importantly, Article 88 of the 1954 Chinese Constitution declared to Christians that “citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.”

In the same year, CCP recognized five official religions in China: Buddhism, Daoism, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam. The justifications for these religions to be “official” were based on their characteristics: (1) long-term nature (changqixing), (2) mass nature (qunzhongxing), (3) ethnic nature (minzuxing), (4) international nature (guojixing), and (5) complex nature (fuzaxing).

To institutionalize the state’s relations with religions, CCP put all religious institutions under the jurisdiction of state and party bodies through the United Front. The establishment of RAB both implicitly and explicitly banned religions outside of the five approved ones. It also officially set the state at the head of the Church, Mosque, Temple, and every other religious body in China.

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330 The RAB, an official state organ later renamed the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA, zongjiaoju), was established in 1951 underneath the United Front Work Department (UFWD,
church off from its foreign ties. Moreover, at a time when the new China was trying to consolidate its social and political system, there was a demand not only that Christian churches and their institutions refrain from political deviation and resistance but also that they participate in all phases of socialist construction and various patriotic movements of the motherland. When these regulations were applied to Christian organizations, which automatically meant unconditional support of the Communist Party, they became intertwined.\textsuperscript{331} Because of this, the ideological concept of “patriotism” specifically became vitally important to Chinese Christians after 1949. More than the love of an old civilization or a simple nationalism, “patriotism” meant love and loyalty to a new China under the leadership of CCP.\textsuperscript{332}

\textbf{3.2.3.3 In Common Program, Christians and Chinese United!}

Obviously, to remove the historical stigma and continue the course of indigenization of Christianity in communist China, the first and foremost important task for Chinese Christianity was to seek reconciliation and coalition with CCP and through the United Front to be joined with Chinese people in political consensus during the nation’s socialist reconstruction. Chinese Christians were actually greatly encouraged by the state policy on religious freedom officially guaranteed by the 1949 Common Program with the common goal of people in China, Christians


or not, to stand on the democratic united front to resist the invasion of imperialism and strive for world peace.\textsuperscript{333}

With the inception of the United Front of the Common Program, Chinese Protestantism after 1949 was able to continue its unfinished course of indigenization based on the Three-Self Principles with its participation in government campaigns against the United States and imperialist reactionaries as well as in government economic construction programs (e.g. land reforms, the Great Leap Forward). In July 1950, forty Protestant leaders declared a direction of endeavor for Chinese Christianity in the construction of a new China by calling Christian churches and organizations to support the Common Program and under the leadership of the new Communist government “to oppose imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism, and take part in the effort to build an independent, democratic, peaceable, unified, prosperous and powerful New China.” On this basis of patriotism, the Chinese churches acknowledged the problem of imperialism while working for the promotion of selfhood in the church bodies, meaning the immediate termination of overseas financial assistance and a profound emphasis on the nature of Christianity in both religious work and more general work in the communist state. The “three-self manifesto” became the banner of the campaign of TSRM, the largest Protestant indigenization movement in the history, to promote “love country, love church,” a political reconciliation with the Communist government and Chinese people.\textsuperscript{334}

\textsuperscript{333} In his “Lecture 3” notes, Jiang wrote, “Under Article 5 of the Common Program various individual rights were guaranteed, including the right of freedom of religious belief. This was the first formal statement of religious policy. And it makes clear the fact that religion was to be treated within the United Front. This is important as it indicates that in legitimate place within New China, the principle was to be re-confirmed in the 1954 Constitution under Article 88 which simply stated, ‘Citizens of the People’s Republic of China have freedom of religious belief.’” Also see Luo, Xin Zhongguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Gailan: 1949-1999, 1-2; Spence, The Search for Modern China, 515.

\textsuperscript{334} Jiang, “Lecture 2” and “Lecture 3;” Jiang, “Wu Yaozong,” 51-53; Wu, “Zhankai Jidujiao Gexin Yundong de Qizhi,” 50-52; Luo, Xin Zhongguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Gailan, 8-11; Duan, Fenjin de Licheng,
3.2.3.4 Christianity and Marxism-Leninism

Under the encouragement and urging of Wu Yaozong, in 1950 Jiang published *Jidujiao yu Ma-Lie Zhuyi (Christianity and Marxism-Leninism)* to lead fellow Christians to study Marxism-Leninism. In the volume, Jiang first discussed the reasons for Christians to study Marxism-Leninism by delineating some of the fears and misunderstandings among Chinese Christians towards Marxism-Leninism. He then focused on the Marxist-Leninist approach on Christianity, not to display how these two inherently contradictory world traditions pitted against with each other but to build a modus of mutual understanding and respect through discourse and comparison. Through the lens of Marxism-Leninism, Jiang introduced the thoughts and theories of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels that were adopted and later developed by Vladimir Lenin, which led to the first successful communist revolution in Russia in November 1917 and formed the ideological foundation for the world communist movement centering on the Soviet Union. In the twentieth-century China, Marxism-Leninism was sinicized as Mao Zedong Thought. After 1949, Marxist-Leninist principles became the ideological and philosophical foundation of communist China. Jiang then reminded his fellow Christians of the vital importance of Marxism-Leninism because after 1949 “it is inevitable for Chinese people of that time, Christian or not, to be influenced by Marxism-Leninism, the official ideological and political doctrine of CCP. In the near future, China will proceed from new democracy onto socialism and communism. As such, the crucial but difficult mission of Chinese Christianity was to find a way to escape the nest of Western ideologies and establish its own religious principles.” Jiang then urged Chinese Christians to get acquainted

with Marxism-Leninism in depth before they began carrying out this historical mission.\textsuperscript{335} He acknowledged that “according to Marxism-Leninism, when classes are destroyed, religion will be destroyed with it.”\textsuperscript{336} In searching for the foundation of coexistence between Christianity and Marxism-Leninism, he chose to believe that under the banner of a United Front, atheists and believers could work together to construct a new democratic China since freedom of religion was ensured in the Common Program. Thus he said, “Our Christians need not to worry too much of the future. The most important thing right now is our action, which needs to display our spirit of love and service.”\textsuperscript{337}

In his book, Jiang delved deep in his comparative case study between the Eastern Orthodox Church under the Soviet Union and the Chinese Church in the new Communist state. He then stated that historically the Chinese Church had not existed as long as the Eastern Orthodox Church had in Russian history. Chinese churches before 1949 mostly depended on foreign donations for financial support, while the Eastern Orthodox Church had lasted long enough to have a deep root in Russian culture and society in order to be independent. Hence, in order for Christianity in China to be indigenized, the churches in China must disconnect with Western imperialism and unite under the banner of Three-Self. Jiang’s perspective on Marxism-Leninism clearly reflected the mindset of the Christian community in China at the time: to accept government leadership in the Three-Self program in order to have political legitimacy in the communist party-state system.\textsuperscript{338}

\textsuperscript{335} Jiang, \textit{Jidujiao yu Ma-Lie Zhuyi}, 1-7.


\textsuperscript{337} Jiang, \textit{Jidujiao yu Ma-Lie Zhuyi}, 22-25.

\textsuperscript{338} Ibid, 63-64. Notably, the book became Jiang’s most popular one published in Chinese. It reprinted five times until the CCP ordered a stop. In Jiang, “Lecture 2.”
3.2.3.5 Protestant Church Unification

As the charter document of TSPM, the “Three-Self Manifesto” in 1950 provided symbolic and structural discourse for Protestant indigenization in China and therefore allowed the movement to create the basis for Protestant church unification, whereby social cohesion and ecumenical harmony were achieved by theological differences being dissolved into the greater unity provided by loyalty to the People’s Republic. For instance, in Shanghai before 1949, there were more than two hundred churches of all sizes and denominations. After 1954, the TSPM reorganized them by reducing the number of churches and dividing them geographically. Shanghai was divided into ten districts with each district having one or two big churches. In this way, the local Three-Self churches could let out closed church buildings for rent, which helped them gain financial independence.\(^{339}\)

The major force attributed to such unity was the state policy of severing foreign links, which was accelerated by the Korea War (1950-1953). In his 1950 conversations with Wu Yaozong and other Protestant leaders, Zhou Enlai stated clearly that the Chinese state “will no longer invite foreign missionaries to China because, consciously or not, they may easily become tools of imperialism… It will not hurt Christianity if there are no foreign missionaries.”\(^{340}\) Six months after the Korean War broke out, the CCP issued “Regulations Governing All Organizations Subsidized with Foreign Funds” followed by an even more stringent set of regulations published

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in July of 1951. Protestant leaders including Jiang Wenhan reacted to the call from CCP with a public statement in January 1951 to announce their thoroughgoing support. Later in their Beijing Conference for “Handling of Christian Organizations Receiving Subsidies from the United States of America,” when summoned by CCP, Protestant church leaders again supported an immediate action to break all foreign links while condemning American imperialism. The Conference also set a Preparatory Committee to promote church unification under patriotic banner of Three-Self. Wu Yaozong was elected as chairman.

Notably, such a top-down unity precluded monopolization of absolute truth by any single church because the different theological viewpoints and spiritual experiences of various denominations were respected. By 1954 all Three-Self churches became non-denominational with joint church services.

3.2.4 Conclusion: Burdened Past but Bright Future, Post-1978

In his research notes Jiang wrote, “From 1949 to 1966, for seventeen years we were within the United Front to qiutong cunyi. Under the banner of TSPM, we survived numerous political campaigns. But the ten years of Cultural Revolution destroyed the United Front, the TSPM, and the Church in China. Chinese Christians with religious persons of all other faiths suffered a decade of attacks and persecution. But all this has been changed after 1978” (Table 1).

342 Ibid, 24-29; Liu, Hongqi xia de Shizijia, 128-30.
344 Jiang, “Lecture 2.”
Table 1 Protestant Population of China, 1949-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Protestants</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>483,870,000</td>
<td>936,000</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>1,000,175,288</td>
<td>3,386,611</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data adapted from Philip L. Wickeri, Seeking the Common Ground: Protestant Christianity, the Three-Self Movement, and China’s United Front (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publisher, 2011), 188.

Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open-door policies in the 1980s were effective. In addition to stimulating an economic growth, the policies also lifted many of the Mao-era bans, including many restrictions on religious practices. Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution proclaimed the new stand of CCP toward religion. It maintained freedom of religious belief and also constitutional protection on “normal religious activities.” The same year CPPCC also issued a document titled “The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on Religious Issues in Our Country’s Socialist Period.” This document, commonly referred to as Document 19, offers a rather straightforward – by CCP standards – expression of regret for the past treatment of religious persons and organizations, which has never happened in any other countries in the world. In the document, the party recognized the complexity and longevity associated with religion and the crucial role of religion in individual and societal development. Additionally, it clearly stated that freedom of religious belief must be protected for all citizens.

As one of the first-generation Protestant TSPM leaders, Jiang Wenhan witnessed and, to some extent, participated in the entire process of modern indigenization of Christianity in China. “Through the practice of Three-Self and patriotism, Chinese Christianity has changed its image


among the people. It has also presented one unique model for selfhood and independence among Third World Churches. It has certainly alerted the attention of historians, Church leaders and Christians in general worldwide to a degree to rethink of mission in its theory and practice.”

Jiang also firmly believed that “through a sure-footed approach to its work, the Chinese church should strive to realize a great unity among Christians founded on Three-Self patriotism, which will effectively defend against any infiltration by overseas groups who seek to exploit Christianity in order to infiltrate China.”

To Jiang Wenhan and his fellow Christians, the tremendous growth in Christian activity after 1978 was a testament to the changing ideas and positions taken by CCP in regards to religion. At the present time, Christianity still keeps its momentum in China. In comparison to the Mao era, the Chinese government has continued a relatively mild policy towards Christianity. This is not to say that China has religious freedom similar to that in the West. Indeed there is still long way to go, if a Western-type of religious freedom is even the direction that China chooses to go. However, the overall situation in China suggests that it is slowly moving toward a more open society for religious freedom. Christianity has a burdened past in China, yet it has not only survived but also has become the fastest growing religion in contemporary China. Nowadays, Christianity is a significant part of Chinese culture. Combined from all denominations, this vibrant Chinese Church has become the most diverse religious institution in the world. Chinese Christianity is following

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Three-Self principles to harmonize with the Chinese political and cultural climate. It is of vital importance that in an atheist state, Christianity recognizes that its ultimate challenge is not about survival or religious freedom but a meaningful and realistic evangelization to encourage more believers to make contributions to the country’s harmonious social progress, cultural prosperity, and economic development.\textsuperscript{350}

PART TWO: TAKEDA (CHO) KIYOKO (1917-2018)

4 A JAPANESE CHRISTIAN

Takeda Kiyoko, also well known as Cho Kiyoko sensei (Professor Cho) for generations of her students, was a Japanese Christian leader who founded Asian Cultural Studies at ICU in Tokyo and served as president of WCC for the Asia-Pacific. Her dedication to restoring postwar human relations and understanding among Asian people, both local and international, was highly recognized. Yet as a role model of Japanese women in the twentieth century, Takeda gave unique contributions to a number of important fields, in particular, the history of ideas in modern Japan and how traditional Japanese culture encountered Christianity in the twentieth century, that have been largely overlooked. Part Two recounts Takeda’s life career and her role as a prominent Christian humanist in postwar Japan and analyzes her contributions to the broad issues regarding the indigenization of Christianity in Japan and the significance of the Japanese imperial system centralized on tennō (the “heavenly emperor”).

4.1 A Girl of Hyogo, 1917-1939

Takeda Kiyoko was born on June 20, 1917, to an affluent landlord family in the small village of Kounoike (city of Itami today) of Hyogo Prefecture in the Kansai region of Honshu Island. Living in a huge house of more than 600 tsubos, the family leased land to farmers. When Takeda was barely one year old, the pandemic Spanish influenza of 1918 took away her father

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351 Cho is her married surname. After marriage in 1953 she continued to use her maiden name Takeda Kiyoko in her works and Kiyoko Takeda Cho in her English publications. When I studied at ICU Graduate School during 1985 and 1987, Professor Cho was my academic advisor, legal guarantor, and spiritual mentor. For two years, I worked as her RA at the Comparative Culture Institute, which was founded in 1976.

352 Tsubo is a Japanese unit of areal measure, roughly 3.3 m² or 35.5 ft² and equivalent to the area of two tatami mats.
Takeda Takehira and a two-year old sister. She and two older brothers were therefore raised by their mother, Takeda Hiroko.\footnote{353 Takeda, Deai: hito, kuni, sono shiso, 9-10. The Spanish flu pandemic of 1918, the deadliest in history, infected an estimated 500 million people worldwide - about one-third of the planet’s population - and killed an estimated 20 million to 50 million victims, including some 675,000 Americans.}

4.1.1 Taishō Era, 1912-1926

Takeda was a child in the Taishō era, a period also known as the age of “Taishō Democracy” for its relatively progressive development between the boldly modernizing Meiji Era (1867-1912) and the militarization of the early Shōwa period (1926-1945).\footnote{354 Ibid, 7.}

4.1.1.1 Protestantism in Taishō Democracy

The Taishō period began in 1912 with the death of the Meiji Emperor and the beginning of Emperor Taishō’s reign. While short, it was nonetheless an important period in the history of Christianity in twentieth-century Japan. As the Taisho period began, Japan had become a constitutional monarchy with a democratically elected parliament. It had a modern military that had won two major wars overseas by defeating its gigantic neighbors China and Russia in 1895 and 1905, respectively. Japan was an active member of the international community. It participated in the League of Nations and had colonies of its own. This relatively liberal environment contributed to the steady growth of Christian churches. During the Taishō period, Christianity spread well among urban middle-class people. Christian influence quickly extended beyond those who were formally affiliated with churches and into intellectual circles and social programs such as women’s education, care for the sick and disadvantaged, and movements for social reform.\footnote{355 Helen J. Ballhatchet, “The Modern Missionary Movement in Japan: Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox,” in Handbook of Christianity in Japan, ed. Mark R. Mullins (Boston: Brill, 2003), 42-52; Dohi Akio, Nihon Purotesutanto Kirisutokyōshi [A history of Protestant Christianity in Japan]. (Tokyo: Shinkyō Shuppansha, 1980), 255-258.}
Japanese YM/YWCA also became active in both Christian and non-Christian institutions of higher education.\(^{356}\) Such growth was further facilitated by cooperative evangelistic efforts and interdenominational work. In 1922, the ecumenical movement in Japan came to a climax with the formation of NCC, an ecumenical organization that included most Protestant denominations, Christian schools and social institutions, YM/YWCA, and the Japanese chapter of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU).\(^{357}\)

Although its actual power over individual denominations was limited to moral persuasion, NCC played a crucial role in coordinating the cooperative activities of the Protestant movement; it also did much in supervising relief operations for Christian churches after the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake and, at the international level, presented reasoned Christian protests against the United States Congress’ 1924 Anti-Immigration Bill. Increasingly, NCC also assumed the duty of representing the Protestant movement in its dealings with the Japanese government. Furthermore, it was deeply involved in supporting evangelistic initiatives. The most important of them was the Kingdom of God movement that began in 1929.\(^{358}\) NCC strove to coordinate and unite Protestant efforts to meet new challenges at home and to allow Christian leaders to play a prominent role at

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international conferences and junkets, such as those at Edinburgh, Jerusalem, Madras, and Lambeth that periodically punctuated the global Christian calendar in the decades before 1930. Among Christian leaders, Kagawa Toyohiko (1888–1960) was arguably the best known Japanese in the world. Another, Nitobe Inazō (1862–1933), stood out as one of the most influential of pre-war Japanese interpreters of Japan to the West. Indeed, the Christian movement served as a major link between Taishō Japan and the outside world.

However, the rising of tennō-centered militarism, the internal strains in Japanese society exacerbated by the Great Depression, and the growing international crisis in East Asia all confronted Japanese Christianity. Furthermore, the growing anti-Japanese sentiments in China, especially the 1919 anti-Japanese demonstration led by Chinese students, fanned Japanese xenophobia and whetted the military’s appetite for external aggression and internal control at home. In the words of Japanese Christian leader Hamish Ion:

(They) failed in the end to act as a bridge over which modern, western democratic values could be transmitted into Japan. Likewise, the inability of Church leaders to see the relation between the religious question and the rise of militarism led to their failure to influence events be they in Japan, in North America or in Europe.

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361 Ion, “The Cross under an Imperial Sun,” 70.
4.1.1.2 Mission Schools and Education for Women

Christian mission schools for girls and women have played an important role in modern Japanese history and culture. Through early Meiji transformations, Western missionaries found Japan to be a particularly open environment for the establishment of Christian schools. Additionally, mission schools, along with other private institutions, filled the gaps in Japan’s fledgling national educational system during early Meiji. Female mission schools, in particular, significantly augmented the public education offered to girls, a role they would play until World War II. Before 1900, girls were fortunate to have access to any sort of public post-primary education, however limited in scope; as late as 1894, only eight kōtō jogakkō (female college) existed for young women. Therefore, Christian schools provided almost all of the higher education for Japanese girls and women before 1900.362

As the Taisho period began, ideas that had seemed radical to an earlier generation of Christians were becoming more mainstream. While a number of female mission schools had made industrial education a priority in the Meiji period, the idea of women working for wages and in a broader range of areas was discussed in a more open and positive way. In addition, women’s labor conditions, such as that of factory workers, had become a central concern of missionary educators in Japan.363 With increasing concerns over women’s lack of rights and opportunities, more missionaries began to openly criticize the dichotomy between the public educational tracks for

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362 Between 1870 and 1889, 34 major female mission schools were founded, including Ferris, Kobe Jo Gakuin (Kobe College where Takeda Kiyoko studied during 1937-1939), Aoyama Jo Gakuin, Joshi Gakuin, Kwassui Gakuin, and others. See Kohiyama Rui, Amerika fujin senkyōshi: rainichi no haikei to sono eikyō [As our God alone will lead us: The nineteenth-century American women’s mission enterprise and its encounter with Meiji Japan] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1992), 184-86; Karen Seat, “Mission Schools and Education for Women.” Handbook of Christianity in Japan, ed. Mark R. Mullins (Boston: Brill, 2003), 324.

363 The Japan Evangelist, (January 1913). It is an issue devoted entirely to women’s issues in Japan.
men and women in Japan. Building on such sentiments, one of the most successful Christian endeavors during the Taishō period was the founding of Tokyo Women’s Christian College (Tokyo Joshi Daigaku) in 1918, with Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933), one of the most prominent Christian leaders in early twentieth-century Japan, as first president.  

During the Taishō period, Japanese society started to embrace liberal ideals as never before. In the 1920s, “democracy” was a trendy concept among intellectuals and had influence on education. However, counterpoising forces were also at work in this period of liberalism. For example, in 1925, when the country adapted universal manhood suffrage, the government passed a new Peace Preservation law to curtail political protest. While private schools increasingly focused on independent, critical thinking, the government aggressively reappropriated the Meiji Era agenda of training men to “enrich the country and strengthen the army” (fukoku kyōhei) and the nationalistically motivated “good wife, wise mother” (ryōsai kenbo) agenda for women.

4.1.2 Mother: A Lifelong Role Model

As a Kansai girl from a traditional Japanese family, Takeda grew up in a strongly patriarchal atmosphere, but she was also under the moderating influence of her mother, who was a tough and independent woman. Takeda Hiroko, Takeda’s mother, assumed responsibility for the household after the death of her husband. She taught Takeda to be humble and to care for others,

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364 Takeda Kiyoko, “II: Nitobe Inazō no jinkaku kyouiku” [Nitobe Inazō’s Character Education], in Takeda, Dochaku to haikyō, 118-77.


and she also supported her daughter’s desire for further education. She was born into an affluent family that emphasized education and public philanthropy. She herself was well-educated, good at Japanese literature and music, and loved to read and write poems. She kept her passion on reading even after she was married. Takeda recalled, “Often after we slept, Mother hid herself in a small family toilet to read until after midnight.” Her favorite books included Kagawa Toyohiko’s *Across the Line of Death* (1920) and Arishma Takeo’s *A Declaration* (1922). She used to teach Takeda that “Farmers… bring the spirit of spring from the earth. To make them suffer more is our sin” (Figure 8).

Takeda’s mother was a Buddhist practicing the Soto school but was also interested in Jodo-Shinshu, as she believed Shinran’s teaching could helped her live fully and strongly, and became more tolerant and open-minded to the outside world. For years she was a local activist who dedicated herself to help the poor and needy, and she also served in a local women association at Kounoike to advocate for women’s rights in education and social welfare. Although widowed

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368 Takeda, *Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso*, 13. Figure 8. Takeda Kiyoko and her mother Takeda Hiroko. Courtesy of Takeda Kiyoko.

369 Cho, “Shisō shi ni manabu,” 11-12; The Soto School of Buddhism is the largest of three traditional sects of Zen in Japanese Buddhism and emphasize Shikantaza, a form of meditation without objects, anchors, or content. The Jodo Shinshu sect (True Pure Land school of Buddhism), founded by Shinran (1173-1263), is the most widely practiced branch of Buddhism in Japan.

at age 31 and never remarried, she was determined that her daughter Takeda should have a good family life, and insisted that a good marriage should be managed because it meant commitment, fights, tears and emotional turmoil. In her words, “to marry someone is to have faith in life.” As Takeda recalled later:

When I turned to 31 and started dating with Cho Yukio, my future husband, mother was excited yet without relief. She wanted to see me get married soon and kept telling me how to be good at cooking and be efficient in life after having a child. To her, cooking for a family should never become a burden because it is the easiest thing to learn. She liked to say, “Manage your time and multitask, like me, by reading while cooking at the same time!”

Takeda Hiroko was determined to train her daughter into an independent woman with a good education and well-disciplined character. At age 10, every day Takeda walked more than 30 minutes to the local elementary school by herself regardless of the wind, rain, or snow. During her high school years, she commuted by bus to the county of Hyogo for classes. She learned Japanese reading, math, history, and English grammar and music; in addition she took koto and shamisen classes and practiced tea ceremony and flower arrangement after school. She graduated as valedictorian and was highly recommended by her school teachers to go to either Tokyo or Kyoto for her college education, but Takeda Hiroko disagreed. She told her daughter to apply for Kobe College (Kobe Jogakuin), a women’s Christian school, with a major in English:

For your self-disciplining and self-strengthening, religion is absolutely necessary! *Kobe Jogakuin* is the first women’s college with university status in Kansai by American missionaries. The college will provide you Christian higher education with the best English

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372 *Koto* is a traditional Japanese string instrument with 13 strings similar to the Chinese guzheng (zither) or the Indian santoor, while *shamisen* is a three-stringed instrument similar to a lute or the Afghani rubab.
class to help you communicate with people from around the world. Most importantly, you will be close to home!\footnote{157}

Supported by her mother, Takeda left her home village in Hyogo prefecture in 1937 to study at Kobe College. It was a turning point in her life, both spiritually and in more tangible ways. She converted to Protestant Christianity on March 20, 1938, at the Kobe Hirano Church of the Nazarene Church denomination and later became a student leader of YWCA-Japan.\footnote{374}

### 4.1.3 Kobe College: A Dual Identity

Yamasaki Yoko points out that in early twentieth-century Japan education at the primary level was egalitarian and virtually universal, but at higher levels it was multi-tracked, highly selective, and elitist. College education was largely limited to the few imperial universities, where German influences were strong. Three of the imperial universities admitted women, and there were a number of women’s colleges, some quite prestigious, but women had relatively few opportunities to enter higher education. During this period, a number of universities were founded by Christian missionaries, who also took an active role in expanding educational opportunities for women, particularly at the secondary level. Kobe College was one of them.\footnote{375} Founded in 1873 by two American Board women missionaries and supported by the Woman’s Board of Missions of the Interior, Kobe College was the first Christian educational institution for women in Western Japan and the only missionary women’s college with the Meiji governmental accreditation of senmon

\footnote{373} Takeda, *Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso*, 14; Ii Ken, “Takeda Kiyoko sensei (J54) no shisō to Kobe Jogakuin no genten.” [The thought of Takeda Kiyoko (J54) and the origin of Kobe College] *Kobe College Bulletin* No. 186 (July 11, 2019), 1-2. Ii Ken is current president of Kobe College.


To young Takeda, Kobe College was unique in its culture. The college insignia of a three-leaf clover represented the tripartite development of “body, mind and spirit;” the school color was dark blue representing “peace and truth,” and the school motto “Love Thy God, Love Thy Neighbor” reflected the Christian spirit through “independent thinking and self-disciplining.” The college curriculum was designed to nurture “liberated women individuals with open minds, flexible thinking and sound judgment.”\footnote{Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 20-24; Cho, “Shisō shi ni manabu,” 4-5. In her class lectures, often Cho talked about her experiences at Kobe College and mentioned that her favorite color was dark blue, the school color of Kobe College. Also see Ii Ken, “Takeda Kiyoko sensei,” 1-2.}

More noticeable to Takeda was the adoption of the two names of Kobe College and Kobe Jogakuin after the 1894 campus expansion. This dual identity was found in both the English and Japanese catalogues that defined the purpose of Kobe College in order to obtain recognition from the Japanese government in 1909.

The English version stated: “Its purpose is, by means of a Christian education, to train girls and young women into a harmonious development of body, mind and spirit, and thus to equip them for lives of useful service to God and to their fellowmen.”

The Japanese version was: “The purpose of this institution is to impart an education essential to women and based on Christian morality, and thus to develop womanly character in accordance with the principles of the Imperial Rescript on Education.”\footnote{The English catalogue of Kobe College was translated by Charlotte Burgis DeForest. Ishii, American Women Missionaries at Kobe College, 147-48.}
Takeda embraced the liberal atmosphere at Kobe College, which contrasted markedly with the regimentation at her previous schools, and came to understand that discipline was not something to be imposed from above but to be cultivated from within. The curriculum, which encouraged independent thinking, broadened her mind, and she immersed herself in the library’s collection of western literature, particularly in political science and philosophy. She quickly became a liberal-minded individual with a new identity, a Japanese woman with an open-minded worldview, flexible thinking, and sound judgment in her Christian faith.\(^{379}\) Yet, this also manifested awareness of two seemingly divergent interests: Japanese traditions and Christianity. She noticed that each year students attended the campus celebration ceremony for the emperor’s birthday (tenchō setsu), which commenced and closed with Christian hymns and prayers.\(^{380}\) Elements of Japanese culture, including poems, songs including the singing of Kimigayo, the Japanese national anthem, and the recitation of the Imperial Rescript were put in the middle of the program after the Bible reading and prayers. Takeda was impressed by how the American missionaries created such a bicultural environment by incorporating the values and the norms of both cultures. Certainly to her, Kobe College was neither Japanese nor an entirely American institution. What value could she learn from this cultural blending? Bringing this question with her, Takeda encountered two unique individuals: American missionary Charlotte Burgis DeForest and Japanese Christian Kagawa Toyohiko.\(^{381}\)


\(^{380}\) Tenchō setsu was a national holiday held from 1869 to 1948 to celebrate Emperor’s birthday.

4.1.3.1 Charlotte B. DeForest

At Kobe College Takeda was mentored by Dr. Charlotte Burgis DeForest (1879-1973). DeForest was born and raised in Japan and baptized by Niijima Jo (1843-1890). As the daughter of a long-serving Congregational missionary, DeForest served as American missionary at Kobe College and became its fifth president from 1915 to 1940. During her years at Kobe College, DeForest interpreted acts of “independent thinking” as foreign to Japanese girls with traditional Japanese education in Confucianism and sought to instill in them the habit of rational, independent thought as an aspect of Christian thought, in the hope that Christianity would one day prevail in Japan. Though it never did, the “independent thinking” that became a hallmark of Kobe College graduates was reinforced by “the personal relationship between the American women missionaries and the Japanese girls.” In her classes, DeForest exemplified the idea of new “bicultural” women - “women of Japanese exterior who possessed cosmopolitan outlooks in the interior.”

She stressed that the college’s work on women’s education was significant because it was planting “the leaven” of Christian faith in the bosoms of the Kobe College girls, who would spread the way of thinking in their families, even if they were not professed Christians. In addition to emphasizing Christianity as the only religion, universal and superior to all other forms of religion, especially in

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382 Niijima Jo, also known as Joseph Hardy Neesima, was the founder of Dōshisha University and the pioneer Japanese Christian of the Meiji era.

383 Her parents were both missionaries and her father, John Hyde DeForest, was decorated by Emperor Meiji for his efforts to promote international friendship and for relief work during the 1906 famine. See American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, The One Hundred and First Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (Boston: Congregational House, 1911), 193-194.


385 Takeda, Deai, hito, kuni, sono shiso, 22-23; Ishii, American Women Missionaries at Kobe College, 199.
the betterment of women’s social status, she acknowledged the existence of Shintoism and Buddhism in Japan.\textsuperscript{386} During the 1930s and 1940s when tensions between the United States and Japan were increased over the war in Asia, Kobe College struggled to reconcile the rise of state Shintoism, Japanese ultra-nationalism, and American racism. DeForest and her Japanese converts developed different visions of egalitarian cosmopolitanism and remained faithful to their Christian faiths even as the states of Japan and the United States demanded more conformity to their wartime notions of patriotism. DeForest was challenged with the questions of shrine visits and racism against Japanese Americans, but she managed to shape a new hybrid identity as Christian and “supernational.” Takeda later identified this Japanese dual consciousness through the image of “humans in shells” - a clue to another cosmopolitan vision rooted in Christian faith appropriate to Japanese culture in reconciliation with the rest of Asia.\textsuperscript{387}

DeForest not only taught Takeda the basics of Western dining and other social etiquette at her home on campus; her sensibility as a Christian missionary may also have been an influence in Takeda’s conversion to Christianity in 1938 and subsequent involvement with the YWCA. In the late 1930s, DeForest oversaw Takeda’s selection to go on exchange to Olivet College in Michigan. She sent her prayers before the day of Takeda’s departure:

\textsuperscript{386} To her, Shintoism gave women a high place whereas Buddhism kept women in a position of subjugation and even degradation. Yet, the attitude of the intelligent Christian was to discriminate between the superstitious relics of animism in Shintoism and the noble element of hero-worship or reverence. In this view, the latter was compatible with Christian faith, whereas the former was not. See Ishii, \textit{American Women Missionaries at Kobe College}, 199-200.

\textsuperscript{387} Takeda, \textit{Deai, hito, kuni, sono shiso}, 64-66; Takeda Kiyoko, “Furi kaetrute omou koto: Nichibei sensō to sengo Nihon” [Recollections of War with the United States and Postwar Japan], in \textit{Remember December 8: The History of ICU’s University Hall and 70 Years of US-Japan Relations}, edited by ICU Press, 23 (December 10, 2011).
The LORD bless thee, and keep thee: The Lord make his face shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee: The Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace” (Numbers 6: 24-26). 388

4.1.3.2 Kagawa Toyohiko

Long before attending Kobe College, Takeda had already heard the name of Kagawa Toyohiko (1888-1960) from her mother, who was Kagawa’s fan. 389 When Kagawa came to speak at her college, Takeda and her friends “filled with high anticipation went to hear his speech, but were rather bewildered” because the speech “seemed to wander vaguely from biochemistry to something like religious philosophy without any organization, and we could not understand what the author actually intended to say. To this day I have a deep impression of our bewilderment.” This certainly was not merely the impression of students like Takeda, as she later wrote in her essay on Kagawa that “many laborers clad in grey work clothes who enthusiastically listened to Kagawa at his Labor School couldn’t understand him either.” 390 So who was Kagawa Toyohiko, and why he is considered a great man in Japan?

Kagawa Toyohiko was born in Kobe as the son of his rich father’s mistress. He lost both his parents at the age of four. He endured much suffering in his childhood, and the experience


389 Cho, “Shisō shi ni manabu,” 3; Takeda, Deai, hito, kuni, sono shiso, 10.

made him sympathetic to the poor. At the age of sixteen, he became a Protestant Christian. He then went on to study theology at Meiji Gakuin in Tokyo and Kobe Theological Seminary. On Christmas Eve of 1909, the twenty-one-year-old Kagawa moved into the Shinkawa slum to serve the physical and spiritual needs of some 7,500 people. At age twenty-six, Kagawa went to the United States to study at Princeton Theological Seminary. After returning home, he became involved in labor and peasant movements, organizing religious programs with the Jesus Band of Kobe as the base of his work. In 1921 Kagawa organized the Friends of Jesus. This Franciscan-like band of young people strove for spiritual discipline, compassion for the poor, and an evangelical life of witness.\footnote{Cho, “An essay on Kagawa Toyohiko,” 51-52; Takeda, “Kagawa Toyohiko no shakai shisō,” 244-48; Mark R. Mullins, “Christianity as a Transnational Social Movement: Kagawa Toyohiko and the Friends of Jesus.” \textit{Japanese Religions} 32 (1 &2): 78-81.} When Tokyo suffered a massive earthquake in 1923, he shifted the main emphasis of his work to that city. As a strong pacifist and community organizer, he started the National Anti-War League in 1928 and also organized the Federation of Labor. In the 1930s, he addressed rural problems, such as soil erosion, by persuading many of Japan’s farmers to plant fodder trees to conserve soil, supply food, and feed animals (the three “dimensions” of his system). He promoted economic cooperatives in Japan and peace and social reform programs before and after World War II.\footnote{Yasuo C. Furuya, “Postwar Protestant Missionary Work in Japan: A Retrospective Account and Theological Appraisal,” in \textit{Japan Christian Review} 64 (1998): 22; Ion, “The Cross under an Imperial Sun,” 75-76; Bo Tao, “The Peacemaking Efforts of a Reverse Missionary: Toyohiko Kagawa before Pearl Harbor,” in \textit{International Bulletin} 37: 3 (July 2013): 171-76.}

As the most prominent Japanese Protestant leader known for his wide range of activities and contributions to society during his time, Kagawa had a significant influence on many people both within and outside the church through his work as an evangelist, social worker, writer, and free labor union organizer. At the time, however, there were people who regarded him as a
dangerous social activist and rabble-rouser. Kagawa was a problem for the authorities at various stages of his career and was arrested a number of times because of his social and political activities and pacifist views. Although he was a controversial figure, by the end of his life, he was recognized for his various contributions to both the church and society. Many people regarded him as the “Saint Francis of Japan” for his identification with the poor and for his compassionate work in the slums. He became one of the few Japanese to have been nominated twice for the Nobel Peace Prize in Literature. Shortly after his death in 1960, he was also posthumously awarded the First Order of the Sacred Treasure. One year later, 103 doctors, professors, patients, workers, writers, teachers, and acquaintances issued a two-volume *Biography of Kagawa*. Each contributed an essay.  

“There are many other images of Kagawa that can be painted,” Takeda argued. He was indeed a social reformer who confronted poverty, a labor leader who sought social justice and humanitarianism, and a Christian evangelist who was devoted to the Social Gospel Movement in Japan. “His socialist theory and interpretation of human nature was certainly more optimistic and humanistic than the orthodox Christianity…The role he played in the Japanese Labor Movement during the Taisho Period is too important to be ignored or treated with indifference, as it has been the case in the past in Japan.”

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4.2 The War and the World, 1939-1942

In July 1939, Takeda left Japan to continue her education at Olivet College, a sister school of Kobe College in the United States. En route to the United States, Takeda travelled to Europe as part of YWCA-Japan delegation to the First World Conference of Christian Youth hosted by WSCF in Amsterdam. At the age of twenty-one, she, the youngest of the delegation, was director of campus student YWCA-Japan.395

4.2.1 Christianity in Early Shōwa Era, 1926-1945

The Shōwa Era (1926–1989), the 63-year reign of the Shōwa Emperor Hirohito (1901–1989), is divided into pre- and post-World War II periods. The pre-1945 Shōwa Era (1926–1945) concerns the Empire of Japan, while post-1945 Shōwa Era (1945–1989) is the State of Japan.396 Takeda described the early Shōwa years as “a stifling, tedious ‘dark valley’ of national isolation and intellectual stagnation, brought about by Japanese ultra-nationalism and militarism.” As she explains:

During the period from the 1930s to 1945, at home Japan suppressed the freedoms of thought and religious belief of its people through an ideology of “clarifying the essence of the national policy,” in which the emperor was held to be a living god. Abroad, Japan set its sights on “world rule of the divine race,” invading the various countries in Asia and bringing great hardship to the people of its neighboring nations in the process. 397

395 Takeda, Deai, hito, kuni, sono shiso, 25-26; Takeda, Watashitachi to sekai, iv, 4-8; Ii Ken, “Takeda Kiyoko sensei,” 2.


4.2.1.1 Religious Statism in Wartime Shōwa

Under the control of fascism, Shōwa Japan tried to solve internal problems by the expansion of the nation that resulted in a series of wars: the Manchurian Incident (1931), the Shanghai Incident (1932), the Sino-Japanese War (1937), and finally the Pacific War (1941-1945). Inside the country, the wartime government desperately advocated for the unbroken line of Japanese sovereignty through the emperor system (tennosei) and meanwhile reiterated the Public Security Preservation Laws to clearly define a boundary between private and public matters and thus demanded loyalty in all spheres of society in order to suppress political dissent. Subsequently, any ideological attack, such as a proposal for socialist reforms, was seen as an attack on the very existence of the empire. The meaning of the law was gradually stretched to academic spheres. In 1937 the Ministry of Education issued Kokutai no hongi (Cardinal principles of our national polity), with which it blanketed schools and the media. The conflict ushered in the final phase in the evolving religious policies of Shōwa Imperial Japan. The relations between the state and the established religions underwent major changes. Prodded by the military, the authorities widened their dragnet to smash several Christian groups, notably the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Holiness Church. The regime employed an increasingly statist form of corporatism to mobilize the support of religious bodies. Whereas the religions had previously worked with the state on a


399 In 1937 Yuasa Hachirō (1890–1981), the president of Dōshisha University, was forced to resign on the grounds that he had misread the Imperial Rescript on Education at a university event.

The government’s new policy toward religions sought to use clerics to collect donations for the war, console families of the dead, and proselytize on the Asian continent in the name of so-called Japanism. In 1939, the Diet enacted the long-stymied Religious Organizations Law, giving the state unprecedented powers to regulate religious bodies and associations. In the following year, religious organizations fell victim to this authoritarian rule. Labor unions, political parties, and most other autonomous organizations were put under the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Drawing on their new powers to license all religious groups, Ministry of Education officials compelled twenty Christian denominations to merge into a mere two organizations. Meanwhile, the wartime state asserted a monopoly over the definitions of orthodoxy and social order with a rigid interpretation of Japan’s “national polity” (kokutai). At the same time, government agencies pressured the established religions into eliminating alleged discrepancies between their teachings and the imperial myth.\footnote{Garon, “State and Religion in Imperial Japan, 1912-1945,” 300-301; Dohi, \textit{Nihon Purotesutanto Kirisutokyōshi}, 358-416; Sheldon M. Garon, “The Imperial Bureaucracy and Labor Policy in Postwar Japan,” \textit{Journal of Asian Studies}, Vol. 43 (May 1984), 441-44; Ion, “The Cross under an Imperial Sun,” 75-76.}

The subordination of all religions to the cult of the emperor became abundantly clear during the debates over the Religious Organizations Bill in 1939. Speaking before a Diet committee, Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichirō (1867-1952) codified the new definition of orthodoxy: “Let me emphasize that all religions must be one with the ideal of our national polity; they cannot be at odds with the spirit of our Imperial Way.”\footnote{House of Peers, special committee on the Religious Organizations Bill, February 8, 1939, cited by Sheldon M. Garon in ibid, 96.} In 1940, the statist Konoe Cabinet declared that
Shinto was the state religion. Under the revised Peace Preservation Law, government officials could and did destroy any religious groups for propagating beliefs that simply “denied” (or varied from) the national polity or that “blasphemed the dignity of the Grand Shrine of Ise or the Imperial House.”

Takeda claimed that before 1945 Shōwa Japan “was under the control of Japanese fascism, and Emperor Hirohito (the tenno) was regarded as a living deity and the core of the national policy and the focus of Japanese ultra-nationalism.”\(^{403}\) State Shintoism was established as a “National Religion,” which differed considerably from the previous forms of Shinto belief and practice. It was used, nevertheless, to unify and integrate the heterogeneous population and mobilize the people for nation building, modernization, and military expansion. As Mark R. Mullins noted:

> Given the legal measures and intense government pressures noted above, it is not surprising that most transplanted churches and Christian institutions gradually accommodated themselves to the nationalistic environment. After varying degrees of resistance to the claims of the state, the Roman Catholic Church and most Protestant denominations eventually instructed their members to participate in the rituals of civil religion. By the late 1930s most churches had also created some form of theological rhetoric to legitimize the Imperial Way, including support for Japanese military expansionism.\(^{404}\)

Sheldon M. Garon also pointed out, “With the ultra-nationalism of tenno-centered militarism, the overwhelming majority of religious bodies, including most Christian denominations, adjusted to the new doctrinal absolutism and thus avoided direct persecution. Nevertheless, one must recognize that their acquiescence marked a sharp break with the once formidable power of the established religions to protect their institutional and doctrinal autonomy.”\(^{405}\)

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\(^{403}\) Takeda, *The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor*, 2.


\(^{405}\) Garon “State and Religion in Imperial Japan, 1912-1945,” 301.
4.2.1.2 YWCA in Wartime Shōwa: Complicity and Conflict

Needless to say, religious statism in the pre-1945 Shōwa period had a profound impact on Japan’s YWCA, not only restricting its routine function as a non-profit non-government Christian youth organization, but also hindering its role as a part of the international women’s social movement. Founded in 1905 and affiliated to World YWCA, YWCA-Japan had been vocal for liberation of women and improvement of social welfare. When Japanese military invaded Manchuria in 1931, and again when the Japanese invasion broke into a full-scale war with China in 1937, YWCA in Japan agreed with World YWCA’s Christian internationalist and liberal feminist perspective that Japan should end its occupation of China immediately, yet under the wartime Shōwa religious statism, a patriarchal definition of nationalism was cultivated by the militarists who dominated the country throughout the 1930s and actually limited any opposition to their government’s imperialist policies. Japanese YWCA women felt that they had no real “power” in society to effectively challenge the male-led state. After Japan bombed Chinese civilians in Shanghai in January 1932, Japanese YWCA president Matsu Tsuji tried to explain YWCA’s position and its inability to make an effective protest to Sarah Lyon, the leader of YWCA of the USA Foreign Division:

…. Women in Japan have no vote or voice in the government, so it is difficult to have much real influence in its affairs. We have had continued discussion and study groups in order to understand the problem thoroughly and influence opinion toward the use of peaceful means for settlement of the difficulty. We wish that we might do more but under the present circumstances it does not seem possible.406

In Ruth F. Woodsmall’s impression of the Sino-Japanese Christian crisis, “The YWCA in Japan has not taken any very independent aggressive stand. The (Japanese) movement is not a central influence as in China but joins with other peace efforts. On the whole, however strongly

individuals may feel, it is difficult openly criticizing government policy.” In public, Japanese
women leaders with whom she talked “are inclined to justify Japan’s position;” privately, they
“are much troubled as are other Christian leaders, and feel powerless to know what to do.”

For the Chinese it is difficult as is always the case to distinguish between the
military policy and government action, and the Japanese people. The YWCA in China does
not feel that it can regard the YWCA in Japan as entirely unrelated to the Japanese national
policy.407

Karen Garner explains, “Because they felt powerless, Japanese YWCA women did not
transcend the gender roles that the patriarchal state defined for women in the 1930s or early 1940s.
In the 1930s and during the imperial war, Japanese women had no political rights.”408 The Shōwa
state, however, shifted attention by encouraging women’s participation in war-support activities
at the grass-roots level. In 1942, the Great Japan Women’s Organization (Dai-Nippon Fujinkai),
including YWCA-Japan, was formed to consolidate all nongovernmental women’s organizations
under state control. The government emphasized that women’s place was in the home and that
producing children was women’s patriotic duty, and yet women, by necessity and with government
social support, also made up the majority of the workforce in war production industries. During
this period, the government promoted a “mother-centered” family-state ideology, to which
Yoshiko Miyake explains, “the Shōwa mother was regarded as the mother of the nation in contrast
to the early twentieth century when the Meiji (era) mother was recognized as merely the mother
within the family.” This female-centered ideology, Yoshiko Miyake argues, “provides insights
[into] why feminists collaborated with war policies.” Although this must definitely not lead to the

407 Ruth F. Woodsmall spent a year in Japan and China (1931-1932) to interview Chinese and
Japanese Christians for the John D. Rockefeller-funded Layman’s Foreign Mission Inquiry. See Ruth
Woodsmall to Sarah Lyon, “Relations with International Organizations,” WYWCA Archives, Geneva,
Switzerland, Box 258.

408 Garner, “Global Feminism and Postwar Reconstruction,” 201.
conclusion that Japanese women shared these beliefs “willingly” as they contributed to the imperial war, they never produced “a systematic critique of the imperial system, which would have worked against collaboration.” Moreover, when the Japanese government “recognized women’s maternal contributions as comparable to soldiers’ contributions, YWCA women willingly demonstrated their capabilities.”

Neither did the Japanese Christian Church actively oppose the war, which would have provided Japanese YWCA women with a legitimate institutional base of support for antiwar protest. Just as the Japanese YWCA was cut off from the international women’s movement in 1940, so was the Japanese church cut off from the Western church after 1941. Imperial edict required Japanese Christians to serve the nation by supporting “national spiritual mobilization” campaigns and through mission activities in the occupied territories in Asia. In fact, some Japanese Christian leaders “came to see divine purpose behind Japanese actions in East Asia.” At that time, any antiwar activism would have been severely punished, such as imprisonment or even execution. As the result, YWCA-Japan and the entire Christian enterprise in Japan were in hard times. Takeda noted, “During the first 20 years of the Shōwa period, Japanese people were trapped

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by an inhumane ideology which deprived them of their freedom and human rights, and made them suffer.”  

4.2.2 The First World Conference of Christian Youth, 1939

From July 24 to August 2, 1939, Takeda attended the World Christian Youth Conference, the last prewar ecumenical meeting hosted by WSCF. Cosponsored by worldwide Christian organizations, 1,500 youth and students came from all continents to the city of Amsterdam for an ecumenical call of “Christus Victor.” The meeting became a seminal event to transmit Christian hope and commitment to witnessing of the faith for the generation of young people who were to be torn from one another by another world war, which broke out only a month after the conference.  

On her way to the Amsterdam conference, Takeda exposed herself for the first time to the harsh reality of international relations and outsiders’ perceptions of Shōwa Japan as an imperial aggressor in Asia. After departing from Japan, the delegation’s first stop was Shanghai, where they were shown around a city devastated by Japanese aerial bombardment. Chinese Christians in Shanghai gave the delegates a tour of the so-called “city of death,” which impressed upon Takeda the horror wrought by the Japanese invasion. This lesson in the brutality of the Japanese military was reinforced by witnessing the suffering and misery caused by European colonialism at their stops in French Indochina, British Hong Kong, Singapore, and Ceylon. In Shanghai and the later ports of call, Takeda and her delegation faced sharp questions about Japan’s foreign policy. What

411 Takeda, “The Dual Image of the Emperor.”

Takeda would later describe as the “unspeakable darkness, poverty, and sadness” of Asia would remain deeply impressed upon her consciousness.\textsuperscript{413}

At the conference, Takeda personally experienced the effect of Japan’s invasion of China when her friendly gestures were rebuffed by Gong Fusheng (nicknamed “K-san” by Takeda), the woman leader of Chinese SCM, who declared, “Even if we were to become friends here, the problems between us would not be resolved. If you really want to become friends with me, you must first return to Japan and work to have Japanese troops withdrawn from China.”\textsuperscript{414} While Takeda was initially surprised at this admonition, further reflection led her to understand that it was an expression of resentment towards Japan’s invasion to China. The journey to Amsterdam developed Takeda’s insight into the deep enmity felt towards Japan in Asia and the suffering and devastation caused by imperialism; it also prompted her enduring interest in Asia, and encountering its people, countries, and thoughts later became part of her life’s work. It was at the conference that she first met with Karl Paul Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), the American theologian and ethicist who gave a keynote address on the topic of “The Christian Youth in the Conflicting World.”\textsuperscript{415} He would have a profound effect on Takeda.

\textsuperscript{413} Takeda, \textit{Deai, hito, kuni, sono shiso}, 29; Takeda, \textit{Watashitachi to sekai}, iv-v, 2; Cho, “Shisō shi ni manabu,” 4-5; Takeda, “Furi kaetrute omou koto,” 18.

\textsuperscript{414} Takeda, \textit{Watashitachi to sekai}, 8; Takeda, \textit{Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso}, 30. Takeda encountered the speaker from the China YWCA, whom she identifies simply as “K-san,” again at the Union Theological College in New York, where the two became close friends. This Chinese student is identified as Gong Fusheng in an NHK ETV special series on the Cold War era (ETV tokushu shirizu “Ampo to sono jidai”), first broadcast on 1 August 2010.

The Amsterdam conference was the last major international ecumenical event before the war broke out in Europe. The tension of impending conflict pervaded every session, with delegates bidding each other farewell “until we meet in the trenches.”416 Following the conference, the Japanese delegation travelled through Europe to London, where they witnessed preparations for war and where Takeda was delayed for over a month awaiting for a visa to the United States.

4.2.3 Studying in the United States, 1939-1942

Studying at Olivet College brought Takeda the opportunity to meet Niebuhr for a second time. There, she was interested in the philosophy of religion and Christian ethics and was introduced to Niebuhr’s thoughts on the relation of Christianity to problems of social ethics and politics through the lecturer Reverend M. Holmes Hartshorne, a graduate of Union Theological Seminary. When she graduated from Olivet in 1941, Takeda entered Columbia University and the Union Theological Seminary Graduate School. The move to New York was actually facilitated by Hartshorne, who had been a favorite student of Niebuhr. On his recommendation, Niebuhr agreed to take Takeda as one of his students, and thus she was able to continue her studies of Christian thought. Niebuhr and his wife took particular care of Takeda, offering to act as her guarantors so that she could continue her studies after the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan. Later she recalled:

Professor Niebuhr was gracious in guiding me with special care and invited me to meetings he organized in his home for his students. He was known then as the most gifted professor of theology so that his lectures on Christian ethics held in one of the large classrooms were always full, not only with students from the seminary, but also with many clergymen and scholars from other universities.417

416 Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 30; Takeda, Watashitachi to sekai, hito o shiri kuni o shiru, 16.

Between September 1941 and June 1942 Takeda studied Christian ethics, religious philosophy, and intellectual history at Union Theological Seminary in New York City under the tutelage of Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, another influential theologian. To Takeda, this was a formative time that filled her with intellectually and personally challenging experiences. When she encountered Niebuhr at the Amsterdam conference, the professor of social ethics was staunchly advocating American intervention on the European front and trenchantly denouncing the irresponsibility of the pacifist camp. A deeply religious thinker, Niebuhr was essentially a pacifist, but he was also a realistic thinker and argued that Americans should feel moral responsibility for Nazi Germany’s assault on the Jews; while going to war was immoral, not doing so would be even worse. Niebuhr was committed to the resolution of social issues through political action. He had confronted injustices as a young pastor in Detroit, and he now spoke out on international relations. Niebuhr was widely known for his profound insights on human nature, society and history, which he articulated in several popular books and essays in popular periodicals. Takeda, who had only recently begun to contemplate the implications of Christianity for conceptualizations of human nature and the challenges of living fully in the world, found his writings particularly intriguing. His engaging lectures, delivered in a powerful speaking voice, made him a very popular teacher at the “very lively and liberal theological school.”

The outbreak of the Pacific War and the subsequent repatriation of Japanese temporary residents in America cut short her graduate study. It was with profound regret that Takeda left

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419 The Pacific War, also called the Asia-Pacific War, was the theater of World War II that was fought in the Pacific and Asia. It began on 7/8 December 1941, when the Japanese invaded Thailand and
New York in June 1942, despite Niebuhr’s encouragement to remain and friendly support from other university faculty and staff and fellow graduate students. She felt uncomfortable with the prospect of being an enemy alien and was determined to experience Japan’s inevitable defeat with the Japanese people. She attributed her decision to return to Japan as an acknowledgement of her identity as Japanese, not an expression of patriotism.420

4.3 Student Director of YWCA-Japan, 1942-1953

Soon after her return to Japan on August 20, 1942, at the age of twenty-five, Takeda was appointed national director of Japan YWCA’s Student Division, a position she served until 1953. Her main responsibility was to rebuild SCM on university campuses. Under the direction of Hikaru Shizue, the general secretary of YWCA of Japan who dedicated all her life to the Christian social reform movement in modern Japan, Takeda became the major leader of the Japanese SCM.421 Her role in promoting the twentieth-century “liberal Christian” and “liberal women,” however, was seriously challenged by the wartime Shōwa government. Under the religious statism dominated by fascism and totalitarianism, she and her Japanese SCM struggled to survive, especially as the revised Public Security Preservation Law of 1941 empowered the state to destroy any religious


420 In early 1942, Takeda received notice from the Japanese Government instructing her to return to Japan on the first exchange ship. Takeda was one of those students deported to Japan on a Swedish vessel on personnel exchange treaty. She left New York in June of 1942 and arrived in Yokohama Port, Japan, two months later via an International Red Cross exchange ship that was repatriating Japanese temporary residents from the United States. Yuasa Hachiro went to see her off on June 18, 1942. Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 55-56; Takeda, “Furi kaetrute omou koto,” 20; Cho, Hachiro Yuasa, 59.

group for preaching beliefs that simply varied from emperor worship. Some Christian teachers and students were arrested and died in prison. Takeda had a similar experience. Her frequent contact with Chinese and other international Christian students aroused the suspicion of the authorities and directly led to her detention in July 1943 by the Special Higher Police, militarist Japan’s equivalent of the Gestapo.422

Nevertheless, Takeda was a strong and fearless leader to her students. She was nicknamed the “Urashima Tarō” of YWCA, meaning that she struck them as a person completely changed after being abroad.423 In 1943 she provided encouragement and moral support to mobilized female students who were far from their native villages, working alongside them and sharing the harsh conditions in the factories. Before military officers in charge of a factory where she was employed, Takeda tried to lay out facts about how Japanese high school and college student volunteers at the facility were malnourished. She backed her argument with a chart showing their weight.424 While pretending to obey the military officials and national propaganda that Japan would win the War, Takeda was relieved to learn that those students disbelieved the propaganda or whispered among themselves the signs of defeat.425 The factory experience involved neither unbearable labor nor

422 Her “crime” was to ignore the government wartime policy of helping people from “enemy” countries such as China. See Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 59-64. Takeda, “Furi kaetrute omou koto,” 22-23. See also Ebisawa and Oouchi, Nihon Kirisutokyōshi, 588-590; Barbara N. Ramusak and Sharon L. Sievers, Women in Asia: Restoring Women to History (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), 223-25.

423 Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 59-61. Urashima Tarō is the protagonist of a Japanese fairy tale.


425 Takeda Kiyoko, “Kaigara-gata no ningenzō.” Sengo-shi shōgen purojekuto: Nihonjin wa nani o mezashite kita no ka?” [“Shell type human figure.” Postwar history testimony project: What did the
hardship as she was accustomed to sparse conditions. Nor was it wasted on the young scholar, as she later reflected on the behavior of the mobilized students in these exceptional circumstances in a scholarly article on human types and modes of interaction.426

4.3.1 Postwar Reconstruction

With the end of the Pacific War and the start of the American Occupation of Japan in 1945, and with this the abolition of Shintoism as the national religion and the prohibition of Emperor Worship, missionaries resumed their activities. The postwar constitution guaranteed freedom of religion and separation of church and state.

4.3.1.1 “Christian Boom” in Postwar Japan

Christianity in Japan did not have an easy revitalization in the postwar era. However, substantial cooperation between missionaries and church leaders fostered the recovery of the Japanese church. Works of “love among the ruins” were carried out by all missionaries, old and new, including the so-called “J-3’s” (Japan-3-year term missionaries).427 At the same time, their combined relief work encouraged many non-Christian Japanese to see Christianity in a positive light as a pacifist, liberal influence in the nation. In 1948, Japan SRC was formed by YM/YWCA, and the Catholic student movements. With the cooperation of WSCF and local groups of interested individuals, local SRC offices were set up by student volunteers to distribute clothing, food, vitamins, and books; a portable X-ray machine was made available to the colleges, and a rest home


for incipient tuberculosis patients was built. Later, SRC also sent books, supplies, and microscopes to students in other Asiatic countries.\textsuperscript{428} Chairing the Student YWCA National Committee, Takeda was deeply involved in SRC project and simultaneously brought a new mission to postwar Japanese SCM through a nation-wide program of reeducation. By traveling around the country she met with social workers, religious leaders, and educators to emphasize true democratic precepts.\textsuperscript{429} In participating in the postwar “Christian Boom,” Takeda contributed herself to the process of national democratization and called it truly a kind of “liberation.”\textsuperscript{430}

The result of the postwar “Christian Boom” was significant. By 1948, the Protestant Christians had established 156 new churches. In 1951, there were 15,765 baptisms in 1,480 churches. In 1953, a year after the end of the occupation period, church membership figures reached 193,606, about a ten percent increase from the prewar number. The most significant results had been centered among the Japanese youth. By a 1953 survey, 32 percent of the young converts to Christianity were students. 25 percent came from the urban population, but only one percent was from the rural areas (Figure 9). \textsuperscript{431}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{membership.png}
\caption{Membership in the YWCA-Japan, 1927-1960}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{429} Ibid, 15; Cho, \textit{Hachiro Yuasa}, 40.

\textsuperscript{430} Takeda, \textit{Higher Education for Tomorrow}, 12.

4.3.2 Reconnecting with the World

Under the guarantee of freedom of thought and belief provided by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Takeda sought to resume her involvement in international ecumenical organizations. In 1945, she reconnected with Jiang Wenhan and Chinese SCM to resume joint Sino-Japan SCM activities for WSCF’s “Week of Prayer and World Fellowship.” In 1948, she attended WSCF’s first Asia Leadership Training Conference in Kandy, Sri Lanka, and reconnected herself with Christian leaders from various Asian countries including India, China, the Philippines, and Burma. It was also a rare opportunity to interact with Jiang Wenhan and other Chinese Christian leaders, and their friendships deepened in Kandy. Takeda and Jiang exchanged their thoughts about research on the cultural and ideological encounters of Christianity in modern Asia.

With the end of the Occupation of Japan (1945-1952), travel bans were lifted, removing another barrier to participating in major international events. Takeda freely interacted with Asian Christian students at the Third World Conference of Christian Youth, which was held in December 1952 in Kottayam, India. While in India in January and February 1949, Takeda lectured at Madras Christian University and Allahabad Agricultural University. Through contact with the Indian YWCA and the wife of the Indian Finance Minister, she learned of the plight of post-partition refugees and received an invitation to have lunch with Prime Minister Nehru at his New Delhi

432 Right after Japan’s defeat in 1945, Jiang Wenhan invited Takeda and Japanese SCM to join with the Chinese SCM for WSCF Week of Prayer and World Fellowship activities. In his letter Jiang wrote, “Even in the midst of the war’s devastation, we kept our promise and observed a day of prayers for Japanese and Chinese students. Let’s continue to work together.” Takeda and Jiang recalled their postwar collaboration when they met again in 1982 at ICU. See Takeda, Watashitachi to sekai, 23; Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 136-37; Jiang, “Lecture 2.”

433 Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 94-95.
residence. Takeda recalled that Nehru asked incisive questions about the political situation in Japan, particularly about women in parliament and the communist movement.\textsuperscript{434} Her reflections on this meeting were widely publicized in Japan. Nehru’s views on issues such as Pan-Asian fellowship and Asian solidarity became known in the Japanese intellectual community (Figure 10).\textsuperscript{435}

For Takeda, participation in Christian Student Federation meetings and traveling in Asia in the late 1940s and early 1950s marked the beginning of her active engagement in the international ecumenical movement. She had face-to-face contact with a broad range of individuals, including leaders of newly independent Asian countries and civilian victims of Japanese imperialism. Having long been interested in communism in Asia, and in China specifically, Takeda made her first visit to communist China thanks to her connection with a Chinese Christian friend, and it led to a month-long visit to the People’s Republic in May-June 1956. During her busy schedule, she met with Jiang Wenhan, Ding Guangxun, Talitha A. Gerlach

\textsuperscript{434} Takeda Kiyoko formed an immediate bond with Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi, who was the same age as her and then living with her father. Takeda had another opportunity to meet with Nehru and Gandhi on their visit to Japan in October 1957. In their discussion on this occasion, Nehru expressed his admiration of Japanese “self-discipline” that he perceived was behind the nation’s post-war recovery. The conversation, which was broadcast live on national television, also covered topics such as the roots of individualism and collectivism in India and Japan. Takeda Kiyoko, “Kirisutokyō to Nihon bunka” [Christianity and Japanese culture], in Takeda Kivoko Chosaku Nenpu, ed. ICU Sotsugyōsei Takeda Kivoko Chosaku Nenpu kankōkai [ICU graduates on Bibliography of Takeda Kiyoko] (Tokyo: ICU Press, 1990), 11-48.

\textsuperscript{435} Takeda, \textit{Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso}, 97-100; Takeda, \textit{Watashitachi to sekai}, 96-122. Figure 10. Takeda Kiyoko and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at New Delhi, 1957. Takeda, \textit{Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso}, 100.
(Geng Lishu in Chinese, 1896-1995), and other national leaders of Chinese YM/YWCA to hear their stories about TSPM. She toured newly formed daycare centers at the countryside; attended church services in Shanghai, Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Hankou; and was invited to meet with the students from Peking University. In Shanghai, she met with Xu Guangping (1898–1968), one of the most prominent figures in Chinese women’s organizations and head of the Chinese People’s Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. She later published an article on her conversations with Xu on contemporary Chinese society in the October 1956 issue of Sekai.

Takeda admitted that her experiences in Asia and personal contacts in the Asian Christian community were pivotal to her pacifist views. The sight of war-torn Western Europe that she witnessed en route to London after attending WSCF meetings in Berlin and Geneva in 1951, and the new experiences in Manila on her way back home during that journey further impressed Takeda of the evils of imperialism and the importance of peace. Her vested interest in developing links among East Asian Christians was not limited to relations with Japan’s former colonies, such as Korea and Philippine. On these occasions, as Vanessa Ward has pointed out:

Common Christian faith was key to overcoming suspicion of her nationality...Her interest in other people and places, and her facility for forming genuine relationships came to the fore. Here, and in many other writings, her reflection on her own experiences enabled her to draw out the broader significance of relations between individuals for relationships between nations.

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436 Talitha A. Gerlach was an American YWCA worker who spent most of her life as a social worker in Shanghai, China, where she died. She received various awards from the Shanghai and Chinese government.

437 Xu’s husband, the prominent writer Lu Xun (1881–1936), once studied at the Sendai Medical Academy (1904-1906). See Takeda, Watashitachi to sekai, 24-32; Takeda, Deai: hito, kuni, sono shiso, 136-38.

4.3.3 Ideas across Cultures

The SCAP guarantee of freedom of thought and belief certainly gave courage and opportunity to Takeda. She was conscious of the impotence of Japanese intellectuals’ opposition to military fanaticism in the prewar years and concerned with the problems of the duty and function of Japanese intellectual in society. She had a sense of urgency to introduce intellectual developments from outside of Japan, in order to get away from the feeling of national isolation that has always afflicted all but the most cosmopolitan of Japanese intellectuals. In early 1946, she became one of six core figures of the Institute of Science of Thought Research (ISTR, Shisō no Kagaku Kenkyūkai), and a co-founder of the Institute’s journal Science of Thought (Shisō no kagaku).439 Together with a diverse group of intellectual specialists Takeda committed herself to outlining the relevance of American thought - discussion of which had been taboo in early Shōwa Japan - to Japanese readers through critical analyses. Her first contribution to the Institute’s journal was a commentary on Reinhold Niebuhr’s The Myth of World Government in March 1946. For the next issue, she tackled The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, one of the most influential books in her life by Niebuhr.440 As she said,

When I returned to Japan I wanted to study the mutual impact of Christianity and Japanese culture. I didn’t want to just rehash Western ideas. I wanted to study Japan…. I had studied under Niebuhr but I knew that I mustn’t be a mere spokesman. Rather I felt

439 There were six founding members. The other five were Harvard-trained economist Shigeto Tsuru; the Tsurumi siblings Kazuko and Shunsuke, philosophy students at Columbia and Harvard, respectively; historian Maruyama Masao; and physicist Taketani Mitsuo. Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 76-77.

440 Her commentary appeared five months after the essay was published in the journal Nation. Niebuhr’s famous observation that “man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary” appeared in the foreword of her translation. Also see Takeda, “Rainhorudo Nībā – Saitan hyakunen,” 170-71.
strongly that I wanted to take what I had learned from Niebuhr and Tillich and find my own particular research within the intellectual environment in which I found myself.\footnote{441} Takeda fast became the foremost interpreter of Niebuhr’s thought in Japan.\footnote{442} Her translation of The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness was widely read in intellectual circles, and prompted invitations to participate in group discussions (zadankai) on the work and requests for further commentary on Niebuhr’s thought. Takeda also promoted Niebuhr to Japanese readers through other translations. Her 1953 monograph-length study of Niebuhr’s views on humanity, society, and history highlighted Niebuhr’s particular contributions to Christian social ethics.\footnote{443} She was not, however, simply a mouthpiece for Niebuhr’s ideas. Her analysis of his critique of American pacifism in the December 1950 issue of the journal World weighed his views on American foreign policy against the Quakers’ peace project and highlighted the virtues of the latter.\footnote{444} Also, while Niebuhr doubted that, in the context of Cold War tensions, there existed a neutral position that could guarantee Japan’s security, Takeda demurred; as a member of The Peace Problems Discussion Group (Heiwa Mondai Danwakai), she firmly believed that Japan’s independence would depend on the signing a comprehensive peace treaty.\footnote{445}

\footnote{441} Takeda, “Nībā no shisō - ningen to rekishi e no dōsatsu” [Person and history: Niebuhr and his thought], in Sengo demokurashī no genryū, 169-74, cited by Kawamoto Takashi, “Takeda Kiyoko to Rainhōrudo Nībā.” Shisō no kagaku (December 1995): 28-35.

\footnote{442} Takeda was not the first Japanese translator of his writing, however. Japanese scholar Kurihara Motoi translated Niebuhr’s Does Civilization Need Religion? (1927) as Kindai bunmei to Kirisutokyo [Modern civilization and Christianity] published by Idea Shobo in 1928.

\footnote{443} Takeda Kiyoko, Ningen, shakai, rekishi: Nībā no hito to shisō [Person, society, history: Niebuhr and his thought] (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1953).

\footnote{444} Takeda, Nībā no hito to shisō, 170.

\footnote{445} Kawamoto Takashi, “Takeda Kiyoko to Rainhōrudo Nībā.” Shisō no kagaku (December 1995), 28-35.
Working with her fellow research members at ISTR, Takeda shared a common approach for interdisciplinary dialogue and collaborative research on “thought” and its manifestations in society. She aimed to counter the tendency to excessive academic specialization by promoting a broad comprehensive outlook on human problems as a whole. Her approach was manifest in the particular attention given to the thought of “common people,” which she considered to be as valid a subject of research as that of philosophers. She distinguished herself from other intellectuals with her receptiveness towards methodological pluralism and her diversity of outlook and ideology. Her projects reflect what later emerged as one of her main areas of scholarly interest: thought formation, through survey and participation to observe the activities and attitudes of ordinary people.\footnote{Cho, “Shisō shi ni manabu,” 7-10; R.P. Dore, “The Tokyo Institute for the Science of Thought,” in \textit{Far Eastern Quarterly} 13:1 (November 1953): 23-36.}

The first major group project Takeda participated in was “the philosophy of the common man” (hitobito no tetsugaku), aimed at exploring thought, not as a reified abstract set of ideas, but as manifested in the everyday consciousness, thinking (shisō) and behavior (kōdō) of ordinary individuals, and as expressed in popular novels, arts and entertainment.\footnote{The project was referred to as “hitobito no tetsugaku” [The People’s Philosophy]. Of the ten articles Takeda contributed to the journal between 1946 and 1960, three articles were related to this project. The project continued in \textit{Chuo kōron}’s “Nihon no chikasui” [Japan’s Groundwater] column between April 1956 - October 1959, which Takeda co-authored with Sekine Hiroshi and Tsurumi Shunsuke, and then in \textit{Shisō no kagaku} (January 1960 - September 1964).} The elaboration in research also reflected her interest in the lives and values of individuals as they negotiated their way in society and her steadfast commitment to revitalizing the human element in Japanese society.\footnote{Takeda describes her personal response to the project as follows: “I learned the importance of not being tied to or restricted by the work of particular researchers written on the basis of particular perspectives, theories or ideologies, but rather of gaining direct insight into the values, ways of thinking and lifestyles of ordinary people through such raw material as anecdotes.” See Takeda, “Seikatsu to shisō,” in \textit{Shisō no kagaku}, 4-20.}
The year of 1953 was very special to Takeda. In March she married Cho Yukio (1924-2007), a Japanese economist and faculty of Tokyo Imperial University (University of Tokyo), \(^{449}\) and in April, she resigned from her position with YWCA-Japan to take up an academic post at the newly founded ICU to pursue scholarship on modern Japanese intellectual history. \(^{450}\)

4.4 International Christian University, 1953-1988

International Christian University (ICU, Kokusai Kirisutokyō Daigaku) is the leading liberal art college in Japan with approximately 2,800 students and 152 full-time faculty members as of 2015. Situated in a parkland-like campus on the outskirts of Tokyo, ICU had always been very special to Takeda. \(^{451}\)

Invited by ICU’s founding president Yuasa Hachirō (1949-1961), \(^{452}\) Takeda first joined ICU as a part-time instructor and was soon promoted to full-time status. She became assistant professor in 1955 and full professor in 1961, the same year that she was awarded a doctorate by the University of Tokyo for her dissertation on “Christianity and Human Formation in Modern

\(^{449}\) Cho Yukio was a Protestant pacifist deeply influenced by Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930), the founder of the Japanese Non-Church Movement (Mukyōkai). He later became president of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (1985-1989). In 1999 he received the Second Order of the Sacred Treasure for his distinguished research achievements in economic history and financial theory in modern Japan. Takeda, *Deai: hito, koku, sono shisō*, 82-93.


Japan.” In 1983, she was promoted to graduate school professor. During her thirty-five years at ICU, Takeda was deeply involved in the administration of the University, serving a range of positions such as Dean of the College of Liberal Arts (1967) and Dean of the Graduate School (1970). She was also active internationally, holding positions such as the president of the World Council of Churches for the Asia-Pacific (1971), councilor of the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia (UBCHEA, 1974), and president of Sōkeirei Japan Fund (SJF, 1984). Furthermore, as director of ICU Institute of Asian Cultural Studies (IACS, 1971), she planned numerous research projects on the modernization of Japan and Christianity or, more broadly, on the modernization of Asia and Christianity, and she published a great number of invaluable scholarly works while providing supervision to other researchers (Figure 11).

In her book *Higher Education for Tomorrow: International Christian University* published in 2003, Takeda recounted the postwar history of ICU to commemorate its 50th anniversary. Through a chronological narrative, she pinpointed the reasons why ICU was founded at the time and how ICU people envisioned its future. Situating the ICU story in the broad context of intellectual history, Takeda discussed intellectual, social and educational challenges in postwar

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**Figure 11** Takeda Kiyoko at ICU graduate student seminar, 1986.

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Japan through the lens of Japan-US relationship as well as within the international situation, thus going beyond the development of one university.

4.4.1 ICU - Postwar Christian Project

ICU was founded in 1953, but its planning started in 1949 during the chaotic years in Japan following World War II. It was hoped by Takeda that as a postwar Christian project, this new university would play a dynamic role in making Japan a peace-loving and democratic nation. In 1949, fifty-nine Japanese and American educators and church-affiliated people met in Gotemba, Japan, to formally inaugurate the university, approve its constitution, and elect its first officers. Its founding philosophy was supranational and derived from deep reflection on the war. People from different nations and cultures were to come to the Mitaka campus to live, study, and work together as an international community. ICU received funding from both Christian and non-Christian citizens, mainly in Japan but also in the US and Canada. Those making donations in Japan did so in the hope of helping to create a new Japan, while those in the US and Canadian Protestant churches did so to honor and commemorate the many lives lost on both sides of the war and also in the hope of reconciliation and the recovery and democratization of Japan.455

4.4.1.1 The Ideological Groundwork

Takeda has accurately described postwar Japan as a nation that “emerged from the Second World War as a defeated nation, its country reduced to ashes and its people left on the verge of total exhaustion as a result of militaristic rule based on an ideology of ultra-nationalism.” Against such a background, “International Christian University was founded as a new university with a new vision, based on educational principles and a view of humanity firmly grounded in a humanistic universalism.”456 Postwar Japan was on the way to democratization. The actions taken toward this state included Emperor Hirohito’s “declaration of humanity” in January 1946 and the new Constitution of Japan, promulgated in November 1946 and gone into effect in May 1947, which had provisions that defined the emperor as the symbol of the nation and renounced Japan’s right to wage war. In November 29, 1946, the Committee for Educational Reform decided to enact the Fundamental Law of Education. As Takeda commented, while “all of these seemly radical democratizing reforms were in a certain sense forced upon Japan by the Occupation Forces, at the same time these new policies were greeted enthusiastically by large numbers of Japanese people, because the postwar democratization was truly a kind of ‘liberation’.”457 In her mind, “If the Meiji Restoration can be called the first opening of Japan to the outside world, the aftermath of the defeat was a period of great reforms in the realm of political and social systems and values worthy of being regarded as Japan’s second opening.” During this historical trajectory, ICU was established

456 Takeda, Higher Education for Tomorrow, 12.

in an age “when the policies of the nation and thoughts of people were rapidly turning away from the values of the prewar and wartime years of the early Shōwa period, and toward a great respect for peace and democracy.” She has sharply noted the challenges that ICU was facing:

This was the formation of a university that remain steadfast in its principles and ideas about education and image of the kind of people it sought to create, as well as in its desire to raise those who would devote themselves to the peaceful advancement of human society, all the while bearing in mind the problems of conflicts and coexistence among multiple systems of cultural values.\footnote{458}

\subsection*{4.4.1.2 A Shared Vision}

The founding of ICU was a dream for postwar Japanese Christians and an ecumenical product of a shared vision of Christians from both sides of the Pacific. Yuasa Hachirō claimed that the university was “the realization of the shared vision of Japanese and American Christian leaders.” \footnote{459} Kennett Scott Latourette described the university as a dream of Japanese and Americans in a nation shattered by overwhelming disaster: “It was an attempt, in a world torn by hatreds and in a nation which has been at once the exponent and the victim of a rabid, overweening nationalism, to create an institution of learning in which both conquered and conqueror could join in helping the conquered so to build on the ruins that a different Japan could emerge.”\footnote{460} Takeda described ICU as being “envisioned as an institution to nurture new human resources for the democratization of Japan and world peace and as a symbol of reconciliation, and to nurture

\footnote{458} Takeda, \textit{Higher Education for Tomorrow}, 17.


individually who can open doorways to coexistence among people from varied cultural dimensions, and with diverse ways of thinking and living."

Guided by this shared vision were the pledges of extensive transnational collaboration across the Pacific Ocean. The project was supported by prominent Japanese educators, cabinet members, and even the Emperor. Hisato Ichimada (1893-1984), the Governor of the Bank of Japan who was a Buddhist, headed the fundraising campaign that obtained enough to purchase a large piece of land for building the university campus. General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), the SCAP, served as the Honorary Chair of the US-ICU fundraising campaigns. Many North American Christian leaders responded with deep commitment and generous contributions as well. The movement of ICU in Japan became the largest interdenominational undertaking in the history of ecumenical Protestantism for the establishment and support of a single educational institution anywhere in the world. As declared in its 1949 statement of purpose and mission: “ICU is a University for Tomorrow.” Taketa explained it well:

International Christian University seeks to create an academic community of freedom and reverence based on the spirit of Christianity and takes as its purpose the nurturing of leaders with a keen sense of international culture and of being members of society.

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461 Takeda, Higher Education for Tomorrow, 17; Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 124.

462 General MacArthur recognized the importance of ICU Project as “one of the most important things that the United States and Canada can do to create Christian leaders to have influence not only in Japan but on the whole Orient as time goes on.” This statement is one of several prepared for release under MacArthur’s name to be used in fundraising campaign literature for ICU. See letter from Laurence E. Bunker to Mr. Russell Durgin, dated June 23, 1949, in the MacArthur Memorial Archives. Copy in ICU University archives.

463 Preeminent among them was Ralph E. Diffendorfer, founding president of Japan-ICU Foundation and secretary of the Methodist Board of Missions, who had been the first chairman of the Associated Boards for Christian. Kenneth Scott Latourette, the Sterling Professor (Emeritus) of Missions and Oriental History at Yale University Divinity School, succeeded Diffendorfer as president in 1951 when Diffendorfer became ICU’s executive vice-president. A key link between the Japanese and American planners was August Karl Reischauer, the father of Edwin O. Reischauer, who was the prominent Harvard scholar of Japan Studies and former ambassador to Japan (1961-1966).
This University is established through international cooperation and, as shown by its name, emphasizes the spirit of Christianity, international good-will and democracy. 464

4.4.1.3 The Identity Conflict

However, the very fact that ICU was launched amidst the Allied Occupation’s program of democratic reforms for defeated Japan caused many Japanese to harbor suspicions. Its Christian background and its goal to become a university different from the traditional Japanese university mold further caused some uneasiness. Takeda recalled that once she was questioned by some Japanese Christian leaders, “Why would you want to have anything to do with such a colonial university?” 465

Clearly, there was an identity crisis in the early years of the university: the existence of multiple ICUs. From the very beginning, because ICU’s founders were convinced that Japan’s prewar education system was partly responsible for the country’s drift into militarism and world war, they worked to set up an American-style small liberal arts college in Japan. They looked to Christian liberal arts universities as a model schools, such as Haverford, Amherst, and Williams. According to Yuasa, the new university should be academically rigorous, international, interracial, intercultural, and coeducational. “As the ‘University for Tomorrow,’ ICU would be a place for the creation of peaceful Japanese who the world can trust, respect and love. It is our wish to teach Japanese who will see all humanity as their friends and the world as their home.” 466


However, the reality of setting up ICU, and the reality of carrying out basic reforms in university education during the immediate postwar years, was more complex and contested. Steele M. William points out, “Educational reform in post-1945 Japan, and perhaps especially reform at the university level, had to deal with economic and political realities.” ICU and other Christian universities at that time were “postwar universities” - either seeking to return to simpler times and restore old foundations or, as in the case of ICU, looking forward to the new world of peace and justice. But at the same time, they were also “cold war universities.” Japan was occupied between 1945 and 1952; any educational reform depended on the support of General Headquarters (GHQ), which is what most Japanese called the office of SCAP headed by General Douglas MacArthur.

MacArthur in fact became one of the strongest supporters of the new Christian university that became ICU. During the occupation, he supported Christianity, reasoning that it would serve as the spiritual underpinning for Japan’s democratic reforms. Although MacArthur and Yuasa both were devout Christians and concerned about the future of Japan, their worldviews differed significantly, especially after the outbreak of the Cold War in 1948 and the Communist takeover of China in 1949, followed by the outbreak of Korean War in 1950. These events were the cause of what is often called the “reverse course” in American occupation policy. Instead of democratization and demilitarization, rebuilding Japan’s industry took priority. Moral rearmament was also necessary, and in this context the establishment of ICU gained new urgency - not simply for its promise to spread Christian values in the new Japan but more strategically as a means to

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counter the “siren call of communism.” As such, both within Japan and in the United States, ICU emerged as an anti-communist project.\footnote{Takeda, Higher Education for Tomorrow, 29-35; Steele, “The Cold War and the Founding of ICU,” 23-30.}

As Takeda pointed out, “ICU is both a postwar university and a cold war university.” Many Japanese universities were similarly caught between the conflicting ideologies that caused the cold war. In the ICU case, MacArthur’s hopes to combine Christian evangelism with American democracy was not entirely successful. Moreover, debates within ICU were more nuanced than simple support or rejection of the American goals in Japan.

\subsection*{4.4.2 Yuasa Hachiro and ICU}

The hero of the ICU story is Yuasa Hachirō, a Christian educator and an international pacifist. Yuasa was the first president of ICU. He was born and raised in a first-generation Christian family in Japan. His parents and their families adopted the dramatic cultural and political changes brought by the arrival of the American “Black Ships” in 1853 and the Meiji Restoration of 1868. As devoted Christians, “they would no doubt have planned in one’s personality a deep respect for a strict, Puritanical self-control, as well as for freedom and independence, a pioneering spirit to face adversity without crumbling, and a devotional way of living to serve both God and humankind.”\footnote{Cho, Hachiro Yuasa, 3-51; Takeda, Higher Education for Tomorrow, 41-46.} After graduating from the middle school affiliated with Dōshisha University, Yuasa became a Protestant Christian in March 1908. He spent sixteen years of work and study in the United States and obtained a Ph.D. in entomology from the University of Illinois in 1922. Yuasa returned to Japan in 1924 and taught at Kyoto Imperial University before becoming the president of Dōshisha University in 1935. With the rising of militarism in the Japanese government at the time, Yuasa quickly ran into trouble. He was forced to resign in 1937 after refusing to
eliminate Christian language in the university’s mission statement. Anonymous posters labeled him a traitor, and he received death threats in the mail. He had been in exile in the United States before he returned to Japan in 1946 to resume his position as the president of Dōshisha University.\(^{471}\)

The long experience of work and study in the United States, enriched by his family heritage, foreshadowed Yuasa’s identity as rooted in two different cultures. He became a liberal leader in education and women’s rights in early Shōwa Japan by carrying on an ecumenical vision. Meanwhile, he was deeply committed to the *mingei* (indigenous folk craft) movement led by Yanagi Sōetsu (1889-1961, also known as Yanagi Muneyoshi). He founded the Kyoto Mingei Club in 1933 and held four exhibitions before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.\(^{472}\) During 1942-1946 he stayed in the United States as one of Japan’s top scholars and educators. Although exiled, still he declared himself a Japanese Christian who decided to protest against the war from overseas. He worked as consultant for a New York Interdenomination Committee to help U.S. Japanese and openly claimed, “I am 100% Japanese, but a Christian Japanese ... I wish to be a symbol of the Church Universal.”\(^{473}\)


\(^{472}\) Yanagi Sōetsu was a Japanese art critic, philosopher, and founder of the *mingei* (folk craft) movement in Japan in the late 1920s and 1930s. His desire to share an appreciation of these folk crafts with the Japanese public grew from an admiration for the Korean craft tradition, and it became his mission to foster opportunities for the public to rediscover Japanese and other Asian traditional craft firsthand. In 1936, the Japanese Folk Crafts Museum (*Nihon Mingeikan*) was established. In 1984, Yanagi was posthumously awarded the *Bogwan* Order of Cultural Merit, the first to be awarded to a non-Korean. Takeda, *Higher Education for Tomorrow*, 129-36.

With his return to Japan in October 1946, Yuasa brought a fresh perspective and began to reexamine the roots of Japanese thinking and the “minds of the Japanese people.” As the first president of ICU (1953-1961), “he was a guiding light in laying the structure and academic foundation of the university, and he subsequently served as chairman of the Board of Trustees until his death in 1981.” Takeda wrote,

One of the most important elements in his life was to opening up the way to world peace after World War II and to harmonious relations among the races of the world. Throughout his presidency at ICU, Yuasa dedicated this goal by bringing as many professors and students as possible around the work to live and study on the ICU campus. Meanwhile, he insisted on creating the ICU culture of respect for differences by demanding that every new student, upon entering ICU, pledge his/her support for the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For him, the mission of ICU rested entirely on respect for the human rights of every person in society and on the dedication of both faculty and students to that ideal.

At the end of her book about Yuasa Hachirō, Takeda quoted a short poem, “My Creed,” penned by Yuasa that revealed his vision for ICU as the “University for Tomorrow” that would join Christianity with enduring values in Japanese culture and offer a merciful balm to the challenging times:

To live is to love  
To love is to understand  
To understand is to forgive  
To forgive is to be forgiven

474 Takeda first met Yuasa Hachirō at a national YWCA conference in 1938 the latter, as the keynote speaker, had already impressed his audience with his ecumenism and humanism. The attack at Pearl Harbor made them meet again in the United States. When Takeda was deported to Japan in June 1942, Yuasa came to see her off with encouragement. Four years later, Takeda received a gift from Yuasa who also returned to Japan, a copy of Reinhold Niebuhr’s The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, the most comprehensive statement of Niebuhr’s political philosophy. Yuasa wanted Takeda to translate the book as soon as possible, because “it must have something to contribute to the process of democracy in new Japan” as its subtitle was A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defense. Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 73-75; Ward, “Journey in Thought,” 82.

475 Cho, Hachiro Yuasa, xii-xiii.

476 Ibid, 113, 153. Takeda’s bibliography on Hachiro Yuasa was published in both Japanese and English. Her Japanese version Yuasa Hachiro to Niju Seiki [Yuasa Hachiro and the Twentieth-century] was
Philip West describes the Yuasa story as “a saga of wrestling within the unresolved questions of Japan’s role in World War II, the impact of the American occupation, Japan’s role in the Asian Cold War, and the new realities of Post-Cold War Asia. Yuasa’s vision holds steady, even as the meanings of International, Christian, and University adapt to an ever-changing world.” West also went on to commend that Takeda as the biographer of Yuasa “shared the Yuasa vision and, as a longtime professor at ICU and leading intellectual figure in postwar Japan, brings to her writing profound insight into the challenges that ICU had faced in its efforts to remain true to its founding vision.”

4.4.3 International Intellectual Exchange

Inspired by Yuasa Hachirō and his vision for ICU, Takeda became instrumental in the formation of the Committee on Asian Cultural Studies in 1958, which was the forerunner to the Institute of Asian Cultural Studies (IACS), and served as its first woman director in 1971-1983. In her description, IACS was an academic and cultural mediator to promote broad exchange relationships between Japanese and Asian intellectuals. The institute’s early research aimed at Christianity and Asian Culture with a focus on the affinity and conflict between traditional Asian and rival Christian concepts of man, history, and society. In 1960, three research projects were published as the first proceedings in Asian Cultural Studies 2. Among them, two were conducted first published by The Journal of Social Science (49-52), during 2002 and 2004, and later by Kyobunkwan in 2005.


478 Takeda was personally asked by Yuasa Hachiro to be the director of IACS. Takeda, Higher Education for Tomorrow, 176.

479 For the research projects “Christianity and Asian Culture,” Takeda was in charge of Japan, while Yamamoto Sumiko was in charge of China. They later published a summation as Chōgoku Kirisutokyōshi kenkyō [Studies in the History of Christianity in China] through Tokyo University Press in 1972.
by Takeda: “Methodology of the History of Thought in Asia” and “Studies on Modernization of Japan by Western Scholars.” Under her leadership, IACS was active in scholarly exchanges with foreign countries. In particular, American historians contributed to several of IACS’ first projects. The institute closely worked with UBCHEA to sponsor open lectures by inviting scholars from various Asian countries. It also benefited from generous grants from the Harvard-Yenching Institute; its director, Edwin O. Reischauer and his Japanese wife, Haru Matsukata, frequently visited ICU.

Another forum through which Takeda actively promoted Japan’s international engagement in cultural affairs was the Japanese Committee of Japan-US Intellectual Interchange (Nichibei chiteki kōryū i’inkai), a program designated to the purpose of building a “broad base of mutual understanding and respect between two countries through in-depth dialogue among creative minds to improve the process of postwar democracy.” Japan-US Intellectual Interchange was...

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481 Other contributors include Marius B. Jansen, American historian from Princeton University; Robert N. Bellah, scholar of Social Relations of Harvard University; Ronald Dore, British sociologist from London School of Economics and Political Sciences; Robert J. Lifton, American psychiatrist from Yale University; and Maurice E. Troyer, American psychiatrist of ICU.

482 In 1982 Takeda invited Jiang Wenhan for two weeks of open lectures on “Chinese Revolution and Christianity” at IACS, sponsored by both Harvard-Yenching Institute and UBCHEA.

launched in early 1952 with Takagi Yasaka (1889-1984) as chair, Matsumoto Shigeharu and Gordon Bowles as permanent co-secretaries, and Takeda and other seven Japanese scholars as regular committee members. Notably, she was one of only two Japanese women members of the Japanese Committee, having been invited to join when the chair of Japan YWCA, Tsuji Matsuko, agreed to join “only if Miss Takeda did.”484 Underpinning her involvement was the desire to promote constructive dialogue of intellectual exchange between people of the two countries for the advancement of world peace and democracy. It also enabled her to advance her own agenda: public acknowledgement of the contributions to Japanese society of individual Japanese women. When the Committee sought to sponsor a visit to the United States by a prominent Japanese figure, she convinced her colleagues that the suffragist, Diet member, and President of the Women’s League of Voters Ichikawa Fusae should be sent as “a representative of Japanese women and a pioneer of their liberation.”485

Sponsoring Ichikawa’s visit to the United States was a very practical way in which Takeda engaged in the promotion of democracy in postwar Japan through intellectual exchange and mutual understanding between America and Japan. In 1953, she accompanied Anna Eleanor Roosevelt (1884-1962), former first lady of the United States and one of the first American Intellectual Exchange Fellows, on her visit to Tokyo and Osaka (Figure 12).486 Originally the Interchange

484 The other seven members were Koizumi Shinzō, president of Keio University; Maeda Tamon, the Minister of Education; Kameyama Naoto, professor of the University of Tokyo; Matsukata Saburō, president of the Boy Scouts of Japan; Haneda Tōru, professor of Kyoto University; Nagayo Yoshirō, famous novelist; and Tsuji Matsuko, chair of Japan YWCA. Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 149; Ward, “Journey in Thought,” 83.


486 Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 152-53. Anna Eleanor Roosevelt was the First Lady of the United States (1933-1945). In her entry to her “My Day” column for September 15, 1954, E. Roosevelt related that Takeda Cho was “one of the secretaries in the group helping the exchange visitors” during her 1953 visit to Japan. While in Tokyo, Roosevelt addressed the ICU convocation on the topic of the
Program was envisioned to function for a year or two immediately after the signing of the peace treaty to facilitate Japan’s transition from an occupied nation to an American ally, but it extended into the 1960s and beyond. Reinhold Niebuhr was on the first list of American scholars hosted by the Japanese Committee. Paul Tillich, Takeda’s other former teacher at Union Theological College and later a Professor of Theology at Harvard Divinity School, spent eight weeks in Japan in 1960; his dialogue with leading Buddhists in Kyoto was reported as an exemplary outcome of the Program and “a triumph for communication and the exchange of ideas, precisely the purpose of the Intellectual Exchange Program.”

Takeda’s involvement with Japan-US Intellectual Interchange brought her entry into close networks and lineages of Japanese Christians who had experience of living in the United States and close associations with internationally-minded Americans dating from the prewar era and committed to transpacific friendship. In 1965 and 1966, Takeda herself also conducted research at Princeton University and Harvard University as an Intellectual Interchange Fellow. In addition, Takeda continued her particular interest with Asia with a primary concern on China and Chinese Christianity. Sponsored by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, UBCHEA, and other organizations, in 1971 she hosted a Japan-Korea joint comparative studies conference entitled “Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Freedom.” See Japan ICU Foundation, “Mission and History,” accessed July 18, 2019. https://www.jicuf.org/mission-history/. In July 1954 Takeda Cho went to United States to attend the second WCC conference at Evanston. During that time, she was invited by E. Roosevelt to stay overnight at her New York residence.

487 Figure 12. Takeda Kiyoko and Mrs. Anna E. Roosevelt in New York, 1954.

“The Modernization of Asia and the Problem of Humanity” in Seoul; the “China and Japan Seen Historically” open lectures in 1972, the international symposium “Religion and Socio-Cultural Transformation in Asia” in 1977, and “Chinese Revolution and Christianity” in 1982.\textsuperscript{489} Her leadership in ICU’s research program on Asian cultural studies and her work to promote educational exchanges between ICU and Asian countries led her to serve on UBCHEA in 1974 and become its honorary director after 1979.\textsuperscript{490}

4.4.4 President of World Council of Churches

Throughout her many scholarly pursuits, Takeda always strived to deepen her engagement with global ecumenical Christianity. In her role as student director of YWCA-Japan, she was linked with World YWCA in the Asian region, and her network also grew with her involvement with Japan WCTU and the League of Women Voters of Japan. Her ecumenical engagement aimed at gender relations and women’s education, rights and social status, with a particular concern on women being able to achieve their full potential in life. Her role with WSCF during 1950s and 1960s led to involvement with WCC. She became an adviser to WCC’s assemblies in Evanston (1954), New Delhi (1961), and Uppsala (1968); served on the WCC Joint Commission on Ecumenical Affairs (1964-1965); and participated in the Humanum Studies (1969-1975). She also attended the Church and Society Conference at Geneva in 1966 and was a member of WCC’s Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (1968-1975). Following two decades of

\textsuperscript{489} Takeda, \textit{Higher Education for Tomorrow}, 180.

dedicated service, she was elected by the central committee as the President for the Asia-Pacific during 1971 and 1975. She was the first Japanese Christian and the second Asian woman to serve in that position (Figure 13). 491

When Takeda was appointed, she was already well known in the Asian ecumenical movement and WCC assemblies for her distinguished career in education and leading role in Japanese SCM and YWCA-Japan to be a voice on gender relations and women’s education, rights, and social status. 492 Her appointment, recommended by Willem Visser’t Hooft, was significant. It represented the growing importance of women within the Christian ecumenical movement, which paralleled the secular modern feminist movement for women’s liberation and status and sought to “expand [women’s] roles in ministry, seminary education and decision making, participation and power.” 493

In fact, as soon as the Uppsala assembly was over, pressure for increased women’s representation and participation in the structures of the WCC began to mount. A first sign of this came at the 1969

491 Figure 13. Takeda Kiyoko at WCC Conference, Switzerland, 1971. Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 121. Following the death of WCC president Daniel Thambirajah Niles (1908-1970) in 1970, Takeda Cho was recommended by Willem Visser’t Hooft, the first WCC general secretary (1948-1966), to the central committee as a replacement in the presidium. Pauline Webb, the first woman vice-moderator, also suggested to general secretary Eugene Carson Blake to fill the vacancy with Takeda, and phoned the Kyodan (United Church of Christ in Japan) authorities to gain their consent to her nomination. Webb recalled that they were “not very keen” but gave their assent. Takeda proceeded without any opposition in the central committee and served until the fifth assembly in Nairobi in 1975. See “Personal Communication,” Pauline Webb to Janet Crawford, (1971), in Janet Estridge Crawford, “Rocking the Boat: Women’s Participation in the World Council of Churches 1948-1991,” PhD diss., (Victoria University of Wellington, 1995), 212.


meeting of the central committee, where the Division on Ecumenical Action report recommended that “serious attention be given to appointing more women to senior posts on the WCC staff.”

The Council responded positively and determined to take new directions and new emphases to encourage women’s participation through internal reconstruction. Philip Potter supported Takeda’s appointment:

I agree entirely that we’ve got to give attention to this and I hope to do so. Of course, in our committee structures we are very much influenced by what happens in the churches themselves, and if the churches do not have women in the centre of their life, it is very difficult to get them into the structures of the World Council.

Takeda became the voice of WCC women who were deeply committed to the outreach activities in the service of women’s advancement and world peace. During the Utrecht central committee meeting in August 1972, she met with sixteen women including delegates and staff in a separate group to assert the identity and strategy of Christian women in WCC. One of her requests to the Council was “to take steps to remedy the imbalance between the percentage of women in the total composition of the Assembly and the percentage actively participating in the life of the churches.” The executive committee responded at the January 1973 Bangkok conference with a recommendation to the Central Committee that “60% of the places at the last

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496 Takeda, Deai: hito, koku, sono shiso, 122; Crawford, “Rocking the Boat,” 212.

497 Crawford, “Rocking the Boat,” 239-41; 289-94.

assembly to be filled by the Central Committee should go to women.”⁴⁹⁹ At the Nairobi Assembly in 1975, Takeda again was the voice for women. In her plenary themed on “Women in a Changing World,” she revealed women’s legacy in the ecumenical movement and called for the women of WCC to break out of their provincialism and to think globally.⁵⁰⁰

In 1997, in recognition of her long-standing achievements in the Christian world, Takeda was awarded the Christian Merit Award from the Christian Association of Japan.⁵⁰¹

### 4.5 From Japan to Asia, Pre-2018

One phrase often used to describe Takeda, both within and outside her religious circle, is that she was a scholar of being an “unofficial diplomat.” This is because she consistently worked for improving mutual understanding not only between the people of Japan and its Asian neighbors but between diverse churches and communities across Asia and the Pacific region. Her unofficial diplomacy began on her 1949 trip to India and continued after her retirement from ICU in 1988. She continually shared her overseas experiences with people in Japan. She published many articles in major newspapers, academic journals, women’s magazines, and Christian periodicals, reporting social and political conditions in various Asian countries. In Vanessa Ward’s point of view, “This was important information on places and issues that received little attention in the mass media. Through these accounts, Takeda contributed to widening the knowledge of Japan’s neighbors

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⁵⁰¹ Saika Nobuyuki, “Nihonjin hatsu no WCC kaichō de Kokusai Kirisutokyō Daigaku meiyo kyōju no Takeda Kiyoko shi, shouten” [The first Japanese WCC President, ICU Emeritus Professor Takeda Kiyoko passed away], in Kurisuchan Puresu [Christian Press], April, 20, 2018.
among ordinary Japanese, providing the basis for improved understanding and for better relations.”

4.5.1 In the Philippines

In September 1974, Takeda revisited the Philippines only to see a country very different from the one she had seen two decades earlier. Takeda was the WCC’s representative in a delegation of the Christian Conference of Asia, which at the time was lobbying for the release of prisoners of conscience, among them two Manila-based staff members. The delegation eventually set a meeting with President Ferdinand Marcos. According to Ron O’Grady, who led the delegation, it was Takeda who “succeeded in disarming the Filipino President in the middle of his expression of hostility towards Japanese by making a confession of guilt and asked for the President’s forgiveness for the suffering that had been caused.” The discussion ended on a reasonably cordial note. “Marcos gave us a signed copy of his latest book and we all went home. Soon after, [X] was released and [Y] was allowed to leave but not to return.”

In this trip to the Philippines, Takeda’s genuine expression of remorse had a very practical immediate result: the release of Christian Conference of Asia staff. Ward notes, “Her representation of herself as Japanese gave legitimacy to her apology, but rather than an assertion of national identity, it should be seen as a tactical guise, and an expression of her Christian humility.” In the Philippines, Takeda was recognized as a legitimate actor because of her identity as both a Christian and Japanese. In one instance, her Christianity inspired confidence while her national identity was the object of the local people’s resentment and their motivation to engage with her; in the other instance, her representation of a global Christian ecumenical organization


provided the opportunity to intercede on behalf of other Christians, while her national identity constituted a useful tool for achieving the intended outcome. Ward adds:

While Takeda identified as both a Christian and a Japanese, her commitment to humanity stemming from her faith always took precedence over her concern with national identity. Her apology on this occasion was not intended to be on behalf of the Japanese state, but an expression of her humanist interest in better relations between Asian peoples. 504

4.5.2 In China

Takeda’s unofficial diplomacy to China took two forms. One was to reconnect with Christian circles and networks after China’s reopening in 1978; the other was her support for the charitable SJF, for which she served as director and vice-president between 1984 and 2000. 505

4.5.2.1 Meeting Chinese Christian Leaders

After her 1950s trip to China, Takeda was unable to contact the Chinese Church, YM/YWCA until after 1978 when China’s reform and opening-up policy opened the doors for her to interact, dialogue, and cooperate once more with her fellow Christians in China. She was quick to seize the opportunity to engage the Chinese church leaders in academic and social projects. In November 1980, Takeda made her trip to China again, representing the Japan Foundation (kokusai kōryū kikin) to work with the Beijing Japanese Language Education Center on its teaching handbook on modern Japan intellectual history. 506 During her one-month trip, she went to Shanghai and Nanjing to meet with her two lifelong friends, Jiang Wenhan and Ding Guangxun, then the leaders of CCC and TSPM, respectively. In Shanghai, she was invited by Jiang to attend


506 The Japan Foundation was established in 1972 by an Act of the National Diet as a special legal entity to undertake international dissemination of Japanese culture and became an Independent Administrative Institution under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2003 under the “Independent Administrative Institution Japan Foundation Law.”
five church reopening services, where she was impressed for “the seats were soon filled out, but people still walked in even after the service had started. Some had to stand in the back; many were outside on the street. When the church choir started to sing, I saw people in the audience smiling with tears on their faces.” Takeda was sympathetic to the dreadful experiences that many Chinese Christians, including Jiang and his family, had endured during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), but she was encouraged to see the resurgence of churches and Christian activities in China. She invited Jiang to visit ICU to introduce his ongoing research project at SASS, a multivolume monograph on the history of Christianity in China that was the first research project on the topic conducted by a Chinese Christian after 1949. 507

In Nanjing, Taketa was briefed by Ding Guangxun for the upcoming reopening of Nanjing Union Theological Seminary, where Ding had served as the principal since 1952. She was encouraged by the news that a Chinese church was going to create a charity foundation as a faith-based non-governmental organization in order to provide a channel for Chinese Christians to engage and hence integrate more fully with non-Christians and non-believers in Chinese society. She commended Chinese Christians for their contribution to China’s social development. In her words, “There must be respect for their work today and their present determination to continue the Three-Self principles of the Chinese church as a Chinese-run entity with Chinese leaders.” When the Amity Foundation was created in 1985, Takeda was among the first group of donors. 508


4.5.2.2 Leading Sōkeirei Nihon Kikinkai (SJF)

On September 29, 1972, Japan normalized her diplomatic relations with China. This landmark in Sino-Japanese relations was followed by the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978, the Japan-China Joint Declaration of 1998, and the Japan-China Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Benefited Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” issued in 2008. Takeda described the normalization in 1972 as a historical event “long-anticipated by the Japanese people,” and her thoughts turned to the important question of cooperation between Japan and China as well as the United States and the Soviet Union for “peace in the Pacific.” The normalization of Sino-Japanese relations was, in her mind, the first step towards shared responsibility for ensuring this peace. She further opined that “cooperation and mutual restraint of these powers in their joint search for the best way forward for the independent cultural, political and economic development of weaker Asian countries was fundamental to securing ‘peace in the Pacific’.” To her, it was essential that in pursuit of good relations with China and other Asian countries, Japan must first face its history of aggression against these countries and admit its war responsibility. Similarly, it was the Japanese people’s duty towards humanity to strive for “peace in the Pacific” after the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations.509

In response to a request from the China Soong Ching Ling Foundation (SCLF) to continue the charitable work of Mms. Soong Ching Ling (1893-1981), SJF was established in September of 1984. Takeda served as its director and vice-president until 2000, when the organization was

dissolved. Her reputation and connections in the Japanese elite circles helped the organization with fundraising, not only in the private sector but also from government resources. She was able to see senior government leaders to discuss funding issues, sometimes on an unscheduled visit. She also led to several high-profile individuals serving on the SJF’s board of directors, which in turn attracted more sponsorships and further facilitated its work. During Takeda’s tenure as director of the board, SJF received close to 500 million yen in official funds for its projects. These funds, along with donations from the private sector and the general public, were channeled into the provision of scientific technologies and the modernization of infant educational and maternal health facilities in China. A particular focus was on enhancing the facilities initiated by Soong Ching Ling, such as a children’s science park in Beijing. In addition, SJF focused on support for education in remote barren areas. In particular, it helped build primary education in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, such as raising various types of funding for classroom materials, female student scholarship, female teacher training program, and an eliminating-illiteracy program for adult women.


511 Utsunomiya Tokuma (1906-2000), a Liberal Democratic Diet member who supported the strengthening of Sino-Japanese relations, and led official delegations to China before normalization, served as President of the SCLJF from its establishment until his death and donated office facilities.

512 Takeda Kiyoko, ed., Chūgoku no kirihiraku michi - Nihon yori miru [The Way of China - View from Japan] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1992), i-vi. Also, for a discussion of the constructive role of Japanese non-governmental organizations, including the Asian Network for History Education, in maintaining relations at the sub-state level, see Utpal Vyas, “Japan’s International NGOs: a small but growing presence in Japan-China relations,” in Japan Forum 22: 3-4 (December 2010): 467-90.
In fact, SJF’s focus on practical assistance at the grassroots level ensured that the organization did not become mired in the political complications or ideological rifts that attended the formal Sino-Japanese relationship, and Takeda’s apolitical stance facilitated broad cross-party support for the organization. SJF also endeavored to deepen its members’ understanding of contemporary Chinese society. In the wake of the 1989 “Tiananmen Incident,” Takeda promoted understanding of the underlying causes of the incident through discussion of the nature of democracy in China by bringing together scholars and China experts for regular study sessions with SJF members, mainly in theoretical discussions that focused on the following: (1) democracy and freedom of thought, (2) China’s “nepotism,” (3) China’s co-existing public economy and market economy, and (4) Asian democratization and Westernization.\(^{513}\)

In addition, regular tours to China to observe firsthand the progress of SJF sponsored projects were organized to provide its members the opportunity for direct contact and candid exchange with ordinary Chinese people. Such initiatives, according to Ward, “illustrate one of the foundational principles of the SJF: that mutual understanding based on knowledge and experience, and its practical expression lead to improved relations between peoples and contribute to world peace.” In addition, “They also demonstrate Takeda’s understanding of peacebuilding - that it was the result of not only the will and initiative of officials and government leaders but also grassroots sentiment that depended social and economic justice - and her willingness to engage at both levels.”\(^{514}\)

Takeda’s contribution to education and social work in China was recognized by the Chinese government. In December 1994, she was honored with the 7th Soong Ching Ling Camphor Tree Award for her

\(^{513}\) Takeda, Chūgoku no kirihiraku michi: Nihon yori miru, v-x.

“outstanding contributions to improving maternity care and children's education and health in China” (Figure 14). Through China SCLF, she was invited to attend the 50th anniversary commemoration ceremony of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Since 2009 she served as a member and honorary member of the four councils of China SCLF until her death in 2018.

4.6 “Lifelong Homework”

Takeda Kiyoko died on April 12, 2018, at the age of 100. She was known to describe her own accomplishments with the modest phrase “lifelong homework.” Yet given her long lifespan across two centuries and many major events in world history, it is indeed quite a remarkable “homework” that she accomplished. Takeda’s life from a small rural village in western Japan to the global city of Tokyo and from a modest college girl to a prominent professor of an internationally-recognized university is a remarkable tale. As a scholar, Takeda was a prolific writer with numerous published works that have had great impact on the studies of modern Japanese intellectual history and cultural studies. But her contributions went beyond academia. Takeda was at the forefront of the Japanese intellectual community’s engagement with the outside world and particularly with the Christian communities in Asia. As a Christian activist, her broad international network allowed her to play what might be called an unofficial diplomacy in postwar Japan-Asia relations. Her contributions were noteworthy not only because they were achieved in a male-dominated social milieu but also because they reached out to the broader intellectual

515 The Soong Ching Ling Camphor Award was created in 1985 and is awarded every two years to recognize those who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of women and children at home and abroad. Figure 14. The 7th China Soong Ching Ling Camphor Tree Award, Beijing, 1994, China Welfare Institute, http://www.cwi.org.cn/zh/sqlzsjs/content.aspx?id=7512.

community beyond the boundary of Japan. Her social critique reflected a commitment to a Christian-humanist worldview. In the end, such a worldview is an outstanding product of the integration between Japanese tradition and Christian values that Takeda wonderfully personified.
5 BEYOND THE BOUNDARY

In addition to her international recognition as a Christian leader and a distinguished academic, Takeda Kiyoko has impacted postwar Japanese intellectual life. She is a preeminent historian of Japanese intellectual history. In the West she was best known by her work on the post-war emperor system, in particular her book in English, The Dual Image of the Japanese Emperor. Most of her works are published in Japanese and not widely known in the English-speaking world. Yet they are critically important for our understanding of postwar Japanese intellectual life in the field of Christianity in Japan.\(^{517}\)

In this chapter I examine Takeda’s exploration of Christianity in modern Japanese intellectual history, in particular the Japanese encounters with Christianity, especially Protestantism, in both Meiji and Taishō periods (1868-1926). I focus on her two major publications, Dochaku to Haikyō: Dentōteki etosu to Purotesutanto (Indigenization and Apostasy: Traditional Ethos and Protestantism), 1964; and Tennōkan no sōkoku: 1945-nen zengo (The Dual Image of the Emperor: Before and After 1945), 1978. My goal is to reveal her attempt to reconcile the tenets of Christianity with Japanese indigenous culture, her constructive analysis on two conflicting images of the emperor system, and the basic character of the nation based on her subsequent attempts for a more just and moral society.

5.1 Christian Indigenization in Japan

Japan has a relatively long history of Christian evangelization dating back more than 460 years to the arrival of Francis Xavier (1506-1552) as a Jesuit missionary in Kagoshima in 1549.

The faith was suppressed by the Tokugawa shogunate and went underground from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries. Over the last century and a half, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Anglican, and Orthodox priests and lay people, many of them scholars and educators of high intellectual caliber, have devoted great energy to missionary work in Japan. Meanwhile, the Japanese church was one of the earliest in Asia to develop indigenous leadership and ministry. Despite all these efforts, Japan has relatively few Christians today. According to the Center for the Study of Global Christianity, Japan’s Christian population is below three million, or about 2% of the nation’s total population of 128 million.\(^{518}\)

This remarkably low figure, all the more striking if compared with the burgeoning of Christianity in China and Korea, has prompted missiological reflection on the relationship between the Christian faith and Japanese culture. The conventional wisdom takes it as a unique problem of religion facing Japanese culture. However, Takeda Kiyoko disagreed. In her view, the nature of Japanese culture is a mixed and interwoven one with the potential to accept the Christian faith in its own way, that is, through Christian indigenization.\(^{519}\)

### 5.1.1 The Concept of Indigenization

What does Christian indigenization mean in the context of Japan? Much research has been devoted to this topic, using expressions such as “acceptance,” “reception,” or “perception” to describe the process. A more frequently used word is *dochaku*, which literally means “to take root

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Takeda describes the process of *dochaku* as an eternal dialogue between Christianity, an integral part of Western culture with its unique pattern of thought, and Japan, an Asian country has its own distinctive culture. Such a historical process does not mean that Christianity is merely adopted or remodeled to be suitable for the culture of Japan, its way of thinking, and its patterns of life. Nor does it mean that Christianity underwent a fundamental change in its essence in order to be more suitable for Japanese soil into which it was transplanted. Rather than suggest that Christianity was “Japanized,” Takeda believed that Christianity, a prophetic religion, in fact took deep root when it was first sown in Japanese soil centuries ago, so to speak. It then lost itself deep in that soil, in which it leavened, and over time it stirred up essential elements within that soil from which new societal and cultural values formed and thereby allowed Christianity and Japanese indigenous culture to pass through confrontations. There then burst out of the very soil a new living phenomenon – Japanese Christianity – from which was generated new culture and new ways of life. This historical process is described in the Biblical parables relating to “a grain of wheat,” “salt of the earth,” and “leaven.”

### 5.1.2 Indigenization in the Context of Modern Japan

To Takeda, the details of the process in which Christianity was “indigenized” in modern Japan were extremely difficult to describe. From the time Protestantism was introduced in 1859, it had to struggle to be accepted and indigenized. There were numerous ups and downs in the spread of the religion, and it frequently had confrontational encounters with Japanese culture.

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520 Indigenization in Japanese terms may be expressed as *tekiō* (adaptation), *juyō* (reception), *bunkanai kaika* (inculturation), and *bunmyakuka* (contextualization). See Takeda, *Dochaku to haikyō*, 4.

Meiji Japan, for example, was an era of civilization and enlightenment. Japanese culture underwent great change because of the impact of Western culture. Meiji Japan also witnessed a fast growth of Christianity, Protestant churches in particular, that sailed ahead under the impetus of winds favoring all kinds of Westernization, especially after the removal of the long-established ban against Christianity in 1873. Indigenous Christian movements developed and aimed at synthesizing Christian concepts with Japanese traditional beliefs. Although remaining a minority, Meiji Christian intellectuals were dedicated to the course of indigenization, and a ridgeline can be found that shows how they contributed to the interpretation of the essence of Christianity in Japan. However, for the Japanese state and society, the reception of Western culture was primarily meant to welcome modern science and techniques and, politically, to establish a constitutional monarchy. Seeking the “wisdom throughout the world” did not include Christianity. This attitude, reflected in popular slogans such as “Japanese spirit and Western techniques” and “Eastern ethics and Western science,” was generated by Japan’s long history of prejudice against, fear of, and contempt for the “heretical Christian sect” and by the Meiji government’s fear that the introduction of Christianity would facilitate the introduction of republicanism. Such a fear was clearly recorded in the Kyōbushō Nisshi (Diary of the Ministry of Education).

In spite of such an unfavorable atmosphere in Japan, Meiji Christianity made remarkable strides between 1968 and 1889. By 1889 there were 274 Protestant church buildings in Japan with 28,997 converted Japanese Christians. There were a number of distinctive patterns of thought in

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522 In 1873 the Meiji government removed the ban against Christianity, largely because of the force from the West. The American government had openly pressed the Iwakura Tomomi delegation (1871-72) that it would not be possible to revise and adjust the unequal treaty between Japan and the United States until the ban against Christianity was removed. See Takeda, Dochaku to haikyō, 5-6; Cho, “The Christian Encounter with the Traditional Ethos of Japan,” 112.

which Christianity was received, accepted, and naturalized. These patterns of thought, representing a “Japanese way” of approach, require investigation because they reflect much more than just the ways in which a foreign religion was received in Japan; they involve the very essence of Christianity adopted into a non-Christian society.  

Scholarly research has been focused on the “Japanese way” of indigenizing Christianity. Questions about the acceptance of Christianity in Japan were discussed in the 1960s following the publication of a book by Helmut Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture* (1951). Niebuhr developed several paradigms to illustrate different ways of interpreting Christ in culture: (1) Christ against culture, (2) Christ of culture, (3) Christ above culture, (4) Christ in paradox with culture, and (5) Christ the transformer of culture. Several scholars have taken up the issue of Christianity and culture to re-evaluate the indigenization of Christianity in Japan. Dohi Akio (1927-2008), using the term *Juyō* of reception, looked at the historical process of how Protestantism was received in modern Japan. Takenaka Masao (1925-2006), a Japanese theologian who sought “to be a Japanese Christian in a Japanese cultural context,” attempted to define an ideal type of inculturation for Christianity in Japan. Like Dohi Akio, Takeda Kiyoko emphasized the way of *Juyō* in the historical process of Protestantism in modern Japan. More specifically, she interprets

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the relationship of Christianity and indigenous culture in Japan by using the word *dochaku* to describe various attempts at harmonizing Christianity with Japanese culture.528

### 5.1.3 Five Patterns of Indigenization

In her most influential book, *Dochaku to Haikyō: Dentōteki etosu to Purotesutanto* (1967), Takeda classified five unique patterns of the Christian indigenization in Japan:

1. **Compromise type** - Christianity is absorbed by Japanese culture, and it loses its original function, identity and uniqueness;
2. **Isolating type** - Christianity places too much emphasis on its uniqueness, and it becomes isolated from Japanese culture;
3. **Confronting type** - Christianity confronts Japanese culture and remains isolated;
4. **Grafting type** - Christianity is implanted in Japanese culture as a supplement, and
5. **Apostatizing type** - Christianity is abandoned after some time.529

Echoing Niebuhr, Takeda argued that Christianity originated in the Near East, took root in various countries in West, and became an integral part of Western culture. It then came to Meiji Japan as a Western religion, took root in the spiritual soil of Japan, and again became indigenized or naturalized. The indigenization of Christianity in Japan is a cultural transformation between Christian ethos and Japanese culture. These five unique patterns represent “eternal dialogues” in the course of modern Japanese history, and they are, indeed, “an inquiry into indigenous cultural energies in Japan.”530

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5.1.3.1 The Compromising Approach

People classified as the “compromise” type tried to overcome the anti-Christian sentiment by recognizing the *Meiji Kenpō* (Meiji Constitution, 1889) and *Kyōiku ni Kansuru Chokugo* (Imperial Rescript of Education, 1890) in public and accepting a traditional and old mythology of emperor worship that worked as a backbone of modern Japan imperialism. They cited ancient Japanese gods from *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki* as manifestations of the God of Christianity, adopted a syncretic attitude to bring Christianity more closely in line with the traditional ethos of Japan, and advocated forms of Christianity that would be syncretized with Confucianism, Buddhism, or Shintoism.\footnote{Takeda, *Dochaku to Haikyō*, 4-8; Cho, “The Christian Encounter with the Traditional Ethos of Japan,” 112-15. The Meiji Constitution empowers the imperial state on the basis of absolutism and the authority vested in the emperor. The Imperial Rescript of Education declares the educational policy in Japan in order to create subjects who are loyal to the emperor. The *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki* of Japan are the two oldest official written documents that chronicle the history of Japan, covering the period from its mythical origins to 697 CE. The Nihon Shoki, written in Chinese, reflects the influence of Chinese civilization on Japan.} In overseas missionary activities in Korea, for example, Honda Yōitsu (1849-1912) acted as an agent of the Japanese government to convert Koreans into Japanese subjects loyal to the emperor.\footnote{Takeda, *Dochaku to Haikyō*, 7; Mullins, *Christianity Made in Japan*, 19-20; Garon, “State and Religion in Imperial Japan, 1912-1945,” 301; Anderson, *Christianity and Imperialism in Modern Japan*, 65-66.}

In fact, the compromising approach formed a mainstream branch of Protestantism in Meiji Japan. They upheld the idea that Christianity could be adopted to the requirements of national policy and that such adoption could be accomplished without contravening the traditional Japanese ethical principles of loyalty and filial piety. To be a good Japanese subject was not contradictory to being a good Christian. They sincerely believed that to lessen Japanese public antagonism over the state interference of their religion would lead Christianity eventually to be indigenized in the
hearts and lives of their people. With this “both-and” position, the compromising approach attempted to harmonize Jesus and Japan. People of this approach therefore gave in to authority voluntarily:

Christianity then becomes much less of a religious solution to the spiritual problems of the people, and becomes much more of a religion absorbed by the traditional Japanese way of doing things. The process of compromise changes the very essence of Christianity.\(^{533}\)

5.1.3.2 The Isolation Approach

This was a typical attitude of Meiji Christians who tried to keep their religious belief pure. People in this approach emphasized the absolute authority of Christ, tended to deny their cultural background, and exclusively devoted themselves to their faith. Because of their fear of compromise, or to become altered or “contaminated,” they adhered rigidly to Western Christian lifestyle to the extent that other Japanese disparaged them as having a “buttery” scent. These people confined their lives to worshipping and to their churches, and therefore their rejection of Japan’s SCM between 1930 and 1932 was expected. When some youth volunteers were arrested for participating in socialist demonstration, the isolationists chose not to help, reasoning that “their interest was mainly directed to their transcendental theological studies.”\(^{534}\)

Clearly in this approach, as Takeda quoted from Niebuhr, the conflict between Christianity and traditional ethos was conspicuous in its “either-or” position, which interprets the world in an antagonistic fashion: “Whatever does not belong to the commonwealth of Christ is under the rule

\(^{533}\) Takeda, *Dochaku to Haikyō*, 8-9; Cho, “The Christian Encounter with the Traditional Ethos of Japan,” 114-15. Notably, this compromise type also appears in the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) in China, which was established in 1950. The Chinese TSPM attempted to indigenize Christianity in China through Three-Self Principles: self-government, self-support and self-propagation. Instead, it joined in a political United Front that promoted a nationalist patriotism. See my Part One: Jiang Wenhan and Chinese Christianity.

\(^{534}\) Takeda, *Dochaku to haikyō*, 8; Cho, “The Christian Encounter with the Traditional Ethos of Japan,” 115-16.
of evil.” It is noticeable that this isolationist approach indeed enabled some Japanese Christians to keep their religious beliefs “pure.” However, when isolation was pursued just for the sake of isolation, evangelism ceased, and Christianity became an inert faith, a mere theological skeleton apathetic to the various political, economic and social problems of the world. More importantly,

The purpose of Christian gospel is to judge and save mankind; but when it is isolated from reality, it becomes a mere abstraction. When isolated, the truth of the gospel may appear to remain pure in the church and in the hearts of its believers, but what actually happens is that the gospel is removed from reality and is denied the opportunity to exert a real impact on the distortions of society. In this respect, the “isolation” approach and the “compromise” approach overlapped. Clearly, both approaches retarded the indigenization of Christianity in Japan.

5.1.3.3 The Confrontation Approach

In contrast to followers of the first two types, people in this type of approach often provoked public confrontation. They attacked old Japanese ethos and social norms, believing that Japanese culture was incompatible with Christian truth. For instance, Uchimura Kanzō, a vital indigenous Christian leader and the founder of “Mukyōkai,” a non-church indigenous Christian group, claimed in public that after becoming a Christian, he had found himself emancipated from worship to the gods of all the shrines he happened to pass. Neesima Jō, a famous Japanese missionary and the founder of Dōshisha University, wrote to his father after his baptism, “Japanese gods and Buddhas are made of wood, copper, iron, stone or paper. It is obvious that there is no

535 Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, 50.

536 Takeda, Dochaku to haikyō, 8-9; Cho, “The Christian Encounter with the Traditional Ethos of Japan,” 116.

spirit residing in them.” Similarly, many newly baptized Japanese Christians threw various symbols of their old Buddhist or Shinto religions into the river and denounced Shinto shrines in public even when they were targeted and their families’ safety was threatened. While such direct confrontation with polytheistic beliefs declared “an emancipation from man-made idols and earthly authority,” it had also provoked a bitter controversy over the conflict between education and religion, particularly Christianity, in Meiji Japan.

The most famous case against Uchimura Kanzō caused a great public clamor in 1891. As a teacher at the First Higher School in Tokyo, Uchimura became almost a household name for traitor in Japan for his refusal to bow to the Imperial Rescript on Education. Led by Inoue Tetsujirō (1855-1944) and Katō Hiroyuki (1836-1916) from Tokyo University, a nationwide anti-Christian sentiment arose to denounce Christianity for its teachings being in conflict with Japanese ethical concepts of “loyalty” and “filial piety,” and Christians therefore were accused of being enemies of the Japanese state. The situation continued, almost unchanged, until the end of World War II. Nevertheless, Uchimura was defended by his Christian fellows, including Uemura

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540 The Imperial Rescript on Education (*Kyōiku ni Kansuru Chokugo*), or IRE for short, was signed by Meiji Emperor on October 30, 1890, to articulate government policy on the guiding principles of education for the Empire of Japan. The 315-character document was read aloud at all important school events, and students were required to study and memorize the text. Takeda Kiyoko, *Shunretsunaru Dōsatsu to Kan'yō: Uchimura Kanzō o megutsute* [Uncompromising vision and tolerance: On Uchimura Kanzō] (Tokyo: Kyobunkwan, 1995), 80-89; Takeda, *Deai: hito, kuni, sono shiso*, 175-76; John F. Howes, *Japan’s Modern Prophet: Uchimura Kanzō, 1861-1930* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 74.

Masahisa (1858-1925), Kashiwagi Gein (1860-1938), and many others. “They said that if they were pressured into worshipping the Emperor as a god, they would be forced to oppose the act, even if it means death.” Takeda further summarized their position:

Together they declared that a political monarch could not interfere with their Christian conscience. They opposed all systems that took precedence over the individual and refused to deify any personage at the top of the socio-political pyramid. They fought hard to defend their Christian faith, on the one hand, to confront traditional Japanese culture and, on the other, to constitute the central driving force behind Japanese Christians in Meiji Japan.542

5.1.3.4 The Grafting or Transforming Approach

In horticulture, a technique called grafting is used to join two plants together. Using this agricultural analogy, Takeda interpreted people in this group who grafted Christianity into standing Japanese tradition. The value structure is what she called “tree-grafting approach” or “transforming approach,” which is to select the most important thoughts and values from Japanese tradition with the potential of budding in a positive way and then to graft them with Christian truths in a positive way, thereby interpreting Christianity as a new way of life to be transplanted on the soil of Japan.

A prototype of this approach can be found in Uchimura Kanzō. As mentioned above, Uchimura pursued the “confrontation” approach to resist the Rescript, yet he did not reject the traditional way of thought. He was different from the people in the isolated type as well, for he was always conscious of his cultural background and of his true identity as Japanese. In Daihyōteki Nihonjin (Representative Japanese), he selected five persons from Japanese history to represent the indigenous trunk to which his Christian thought had been grafted: Saigō Takamori (1828-1877), a leading samurai and scholar of the Wang Yangming School who respected heaven and

542 Both Uemura Masahisa and Kashiwagi Gein were Japanese Protestant pastors, theologians, and critics of Meiji and Taishō periods. See Takeda, Uemura Masahisa, 64-86; Takeda, Shunretsunaru dōsatsu to kan’ yō, 69-99.
loved man; Uesugi Yōzan (1751-1822), an enlightened feudal lord who attempted social reform so that “all people may live by their labor”; Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856), a farmer-sage who argued that “the best work is not done by the man who works most, but by the man who works with the most noble motive”; Nakae Tōju (1608-1648), another master of Wang Yangming School and a village teacher who made a distinction between eternal truth (“the way” or logos) and man-made laws (nomos) and claimed that one can only rely on the former; and Nichiren (1222-1282), a Buddhist monk of great faith who challenged political authorities of his time to vindicate what he believed to be religious truths.543

From the writings of those five prominent Japanese individuals, Uchimura found potential elements of universal truth and values that would fit the particular cultural traditions of Japan. He then went further to clarify his use of the tree-grafting approach in the encounter between Christianity and Japanese cultural ethos, as he wrote in Nippon no Tenshoku (Japan’s heavenly mission):

When a Japanese believes in Christianity in a truly independent fashion, he is a Japanese Christian, and his Christianity is a Japanese Christianity. This is a very simple thing. A Japanese does not gain control of Christianity in its entirety. By becoming a Christian, he does not create a new Christianity. He is a single Japanese individual, and he is also individual Christian. For this reason, he is a Japanese Christian. A Japanese does not stop being a Japanese by becoming a Christian. If a Japanese were to become an American or an Englishman or turn into an indefinable, amorphous somebody or other, he would be neither a real Japanese nor a real Christian.544


5.1.3.5 The Apostasy Approach

People in this group abandoned their Christian faith completely in order to protest a “hypocrisy” of Christian churches during the process of indigenization. Arishima Takeo (1878-1923) was the most typical leader who pursued the “apostate approach.” In Meiji Japan when Christianity encountered Japanese culture, the former often became distorted in a number of ways. For example, Confucian ethics seeped into Christian thought, and certain traditional Japanese family values influenced the church-member relations. A hierarchical structure was formed in which the pastor acted as “the head of the family,” while the church members became the obedient and subordinate “members of the family.” Arishima Takeo fought against such distortion and expressed disapproval that Confucianism functioned in the guise of Christian morality and that the ideologies of the Japanese family-state and autocracy were played as dominant thought patterns to interpret the relationship between God and man. By calling these a “religious hypocrisy,” Arishima severed himself from Protestantism, instead began to seek for the true meaning of “selfhood” or “manhood,” and thereby laid the foundations for the development and appreciation of humanism in modern Japan. Arahata Kanson (1887-1981) was another “apostate” who originally was a pacifist and Christian socialist but became discouraged with and turned his back on the Christian churches after they had shifted position and had given positive support to the government’s efforts

545 Takeda, Dochaku to haikyō, 14; Cho, “The Christian Encounter with the Traditional Ethos of Japan,” 116-17. In her point of view, Arishima’s writing was sharply critical on Christianity and strongly influenced by emotionally intense, humanistic, and employed ideas from the Bible, Tolstoy, anarchic socialism, and his time and experiences in America and subsequent year in Europe, resulting in feelings of alienation from Japanese society. Also see Leith Morton, Divided Self: A Biography of Arishima Takeo (Canberra, Australian: Allen & Unwin, 1988), ix-x.

in the imperialistic wars. Although he became an apostate, Arahata lived his life as a spiritual or ascetic socialist, integrating the ethos he had received as Christian:

The “apostasy type” signifies a unique Japanese group of apostates who were sincere seekers after truth, but who were dissatisfied with both the “compromise approach” and the “isolating approach.” In addition, they could not detect the constructive side of “confrontation approach.” They thus lost their ways in the existing Christian communities of Japan. The “apostasy approach” was pursued by those people who sought after creative ways to live faithfully to Christ, even if it involved proclaiming themselves to be apostates.  

5.1.4 Nitobe Inazō vs. Uchimura Kanzō

In the history of Christianity in the Meiji period, a combination of “confrontation” and “tree-grafting” approaches was popular for most Japanese Christians to build up “eternal dialogues” between Christianity and Japanese culture, but only few finally accomplished their goals. Nitobe Inazō, a Japanese Christian scholar and diplomat, was one of those few. In her study of Nitobe, Takeda underlined the type of tree-grafting approach that was involved in Nitobe’s way of thinking, in his faith, and in the way that he reacted to traditional Japanese norms and to religions other than his own.

Nitobe Inazō certainly was one of the most influential Christian internationalists in Japan in his time. He had been famous in his multifaceted careers as an agricultural economist, educator, diplomat, and politician. Born in Morioka in the last years of the Tokugawa period, he studied at the Sapporo Agricultural School (Hokkaido University). There he met Uchimura Kanzō, and together they became Protestant Christians under the tutelage of Professor William Smith Clark (1826-1886). Nitobe was away from home for six years and four months and in this period received

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an extensive education in both agriculture and foreign languages from schools in Tokyo, Sapporo, the U.S.A., and Germany, where he completed a PhD in Agricultural Economics. Throughout this time, he expressed a desire to create a stronger bond between Japan and the West, dedicating his life to becoming “a bridge across the Pacific” by bringing Japanese culture to the West and western culture to Japan through his writing, lectures, and political work.548

Like Uchimura Kanzo, Niobe Inazō was one of the principal figures of Sapporo Independent Christian Church, or so-called the “Sapporo Band.549 They were actually close friends but sharply contrasted in personality and in the way each practiced his Christian faith. In personality, for instance, Uchimura was a prophetic man of fighting spirit who in 1901 founded the Mukyokai, an indigenous non-church sect group with a strong emphasis on negation of the passive importation of the Western churches. In contrast, Nitobe was a Quaker and became a member of the Monthly Meeting of Baltimore in 1886. Though also a sect-type, Nitobe was a peace-loving person who respected the inner light of human beings and was friendly to everybody as he truly believed that Christianity was an inner essence deeper than the surface of church structures and dogmas and “that God [was] in everyone.”550 In practice, Uchimura was a strong


549 In the early Meiji times, Protestant Christianity was spread to the country from three main centers: Yokohama, a port town south of Tokyo; Kumamoto in Kyushu; and Sapporo in Hokkaido. The Sapporo Band of Christians gathered under William S. Clerk. Both Uchimura Kanzo and Niobe Inazō were leaders in the Band.

550 Quakers are a historically Christian group formally named the Religious Society of Friends or Friends Church and all generally united by their belief in each person’s ability to experientially access an inward light, or “that of God in every one.” See Nitobe Inazō, “A Japanese View of Quakerism,” in Lectures on Japan: An Outline of the Development of the Japanese People and Their Culture, in Nitobe
man with vitality and force in his evangelization. He challenged people by confronting them with their own system of values. By contrast, Nitobe was almost maternal in his warmth and affection, being receptive and tolerant of all. As for followers, Uchimura had fewer disciples who came through careful selection and strict training. Many of them left him after a while because of his intolerance and often narrow-mindedness. Perhaps unsurprisingly, more people gravitated to Nitobe, who practiced religious tolerance by welcoming all types of people who came to him and never imposed his opinions on his followers. Instead, he promoted liberal and democratic ideas in Japan’s modern education, especially in women’s education. He pioneered mass education and wrote for *Jitsugyo no Nihon* (*Business Japan*) to influenced men and women of the working class at a time when university professors were not supposed to write for such “low class” magazines.\(^{551}\) As a result his liberal thoughts, based on Christian respect of manhood, influenced a wide range of the people, and his followers were highly diverse and came from every part of the land.\(^{552}\)

In practicing their Christian faith, both Uchimura and Nitobe were against the wider backdrop of Taisho society. Uchimura advocated his indigenous *Mukyokai* movement, “the church of Christians who have no church, or a camp for people without a home,” and declared himself both a Christian and a patriotic Japanese; that is, he embraced two “J’s:” Jesus and Japan. Facing heavy opposition, Uchimura stood firmly on his faith in redemption, resurrection, and the second coming of Christ. He championed against the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and publicly refused

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\(^{551}\) *Jitsugyo no Nihon* was the first business magazine in Japan and started in 1897. It covered articles about economy, finance, and current affairs. It also offered information about business for people with no formal education on the subject. The magazine supported Japan’s participation in World War II.

\(^{552}\) Takeda, *Dochaku to Haikyō*, 27-38; Takeda, *Shunretsunaru dōsatsu to Kan’yō*, 4-8; Cho, “The Christian Encounter with the Traditional Ethos of Japan,” 120-22.
to cooperate with the government in its policy of ideological unity. In Takeda’s words, he was indeed “the kind of man who came not to send peace, but a sword.” In contrast, Nitobe wanted to be an apostle to a non-Christian culture and considered his life’s work to be a bridge across the Pacific between different cultures and value concepts. He practiced Quakerism, a faith “calling the Inner Light,” which he also believed was in common with some religious mysticism of the East, for instance, Buddhism and Daoism. He was sympathetic to the Neo-Confucian Wang Yangming (1472-1529), finding parallels between Wang’s doctrine of the “luminous mind” and the New Testament. Shinto, too, in Nitobe’s mind became an emanation of the Japanese soul: “This religion thoroughly imbued Bushido with loyalty to the sovereign and love of country.”

To Takeda, Nitobe was a Quaker but also an orthodox in his belief of Christian redemption; he was neither narrow-minded nor intolerant in practicing his Christian faith. He was a true disciple of Jesus who detected the “good Samaritan” in others, including women. Takeda concluded:

Nitobe’s approach indicated the way he grasped the true meaning of the gospel, not only for Christians, but for the entire world. For him personally, the gospel represented a way of thinking about the “hidden Christ.” However, from another point of view, he actively practiced his faith in Christ, in the very midst of Japanese spiritual tradition, and worked to root that faith deep in the soil of Japan. It is probably because of the way in which he practiced his faith that he was able to be so tolerant and independent.

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554 Nitobe, Lectures on Japan, 367-68.

555 Nitobe Inazō, Bushido: the Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought, in Nitobe Inazō Zenshū 12 (Tokyo: Kyobunkwan, 1969), 174. In this book, Nitobe analyzed the moral codes of the Japanese medieval warrior class, i.e. samurai, associating them with the modern bourgeois values of Western Europe and the United States.

5.1.5 Japanese Indigenous Energy

In her five ways of Juyō for the historical process of Protestantism in modern Japan, Takeda pointed out that during the “eternal dialogue” between Christianity and Japanese culture, the idea and term of “indigenous energy” came from Japanese cultural heritage as the new potentiality for indigenization. 557

According to Takeda, “indigenous energy” was regarded as having three major sources: despair, women, and cultural heritage. The energy of despair came from those who, despite suffering and oppression and struggling in anguish, discover deep reservoirs of mental energy, which enable them to break through the walls that shut them up in hopeless despair. It is also a political energy resulting from the conscientization and organization of the oppressed as they mobilize to fight poverty, hunger, and want.558 The energy of women is certainly one of the indigenous forces, but in Japan women as one unique group or significant area with considerable potentialities had not yet been fully developed, recognized, and used.559 The cultural energy was embedded in traditional moral and religious ethos, philosophical ideas, and value concepts that give the traditional understanding of humanity and interpretation of the meaning of life. Such ethos can be found not only in sophisticated religious or philosophical ideas but also in folk tales, folk arts, poems, literature, or music that bear the significant characteristics and sentiment of the base culture. 560 According to Takeda, “the three sources of indigenous energy are just glimpses of some


areas where the resources for indigenization can be found. In fact, the Japanese indigenous energy can be found in extremely diverse thought-forms, traditions, cultures, attitudes, life situations and experiences. In their diversity these situations are full both of conflicts and of a promised potentiality of the ecumenical activity of Christianity.”

5.1.5.1 Japanese Cultural Energy

Among the three sources of Japanese indigenous energy, the most distinctive one is cultural energy, a source with two elements: universalistic and particularistic. The universalistic elements are some features in the traditional value concepts that are open to or seeking for the universalistic value implied in the Christian message, while particularistic elements make Japanese absolute and justified in exclusive self-glorifying. Such particularistic elements are apt to lead to various kinds of idolatry whereby one attributes an absolute (usually positive) value to one’s position, tradition, ideas, or ideologies. However, “the indigenous culture is a mixture and an interwoven totality of the hidden values, the immanent potentiality towards universalism and unique forms of particularism bearing the roots of the unclean spirit, the root of the mystery of evil, in the depth of its cultural soil. This is the concrete human reality in Japan.”

For instance, the Buddhist priest Shinran, a pioneer of the “Jodo” sect (Pure-land Sect), defined some positive elements from Buddhist thought in Japan: “Even a good man can be saved. Therefore, a bad man will be surely saved.” What he meant was that even a proud person who regards himself or herself as a good person can be saved. Therefore a humble person of repentance

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who knows that he or she is a bad person can be saved, by the grace of Buddha.\textsuperscript{563} Uemura Masahisa, one of the outstanding Protestant pioneers of Japan, also wrote about this type of Buddhist understanding of the sinfulness of man and his salvation as a partial grasp of the Christian concept of man and the blessing of the Gospel.\textsuperscript{564} Kagawa Toyohiko, the foremost leading Christian social reform, also spoke of this kind of indigenous religious consciousness as an indigenous wild olive branch to be grafted to the root.\textsuperscript{565}

Nevertheless, Japanese Christians also found family symbolisms that could correspond with the “father-image” and “mother-image” in Japanese tradition. A Confucian or a Shintoist thought pattern helped but at the same time also hindered true understanding of Christianity. Hence for Japanese Christians, their important mission to process Christianity in a Japanese context involved a search for indigenous cultural energy in order to gather “the wheat” and burn “the weeds” at harvest time. On the one hand, they needed to free the universal values of Christianity from western cultural particularism; on the other hand, they had to not fail to recognize those universal values expressed through Christianity. The ultimate goal was to find the true universal message of Christianity for Japan.\textsuperscript{566}

\textbf{5.1.6 “From Within” and “From Without” Scheme}

While exposing the process and methods of Christian indigenization in the modern Japan context, Takeda stressed that a careful examination of the qualitative transformation of Christianity


was necessary. Needless to say, indigenization was not simply identical to modernization. How then do indigenous cultural elements and various outside factors, including Christianity, interact internally and structurally to bring about a genuine transformation of Christianity in Japan?

Taking the modernization of Asia as an example, Takeda observed a transformation scheme of “from within” and “from without.” She believed that in some cases a modern transformation can be induced “from within” by an internal contradiction among elements of Asian indigenous culture. In other cases an impact “from without” in the form of foreign cultures, civilization, or thought stimulates and couples with potentialities and indigenous embryos for a change “from within.” This interaction of elements from within and from without thus causes a modern transformation. 567 In the twentieth century such transformation was brought by particularistic motives such as colonialism, imperialistic quest for markets, or ambitions of cultural domination as with Europeanization or a modernization evoked by Western influence. However, when the foreign impact contains a universalistic and humanitarian element such as Christianity, religious or secular humanism, democracy, or social justice and positive challenges, universalistic elements can be summoned from within the indigenous culture, and these indigenous embryos develop into a creative nuclei for the innovation of historical reality. The modernization in Asia is a genuine transformation. But it is impossible if the potentialities within Asian cultures and value concepts fail to evolve into the nucleus or bearer of a historical transformation. 568

As for the case of Japan, Takeda discovered that a similar transformation occurred when the indigenous cultural elements and impact of Christianity interacted internally and structurally to bring about Japanese Christianity. Through a historical trajectory of mutual confrontation


between Christianity and Japanese culture, both sides responded as mutual sounding boards to give birth to a new concept of Japanese Christianity. Hence this embryo of a cultural nucleus already existing within the Japanese indigenous energy becomes an indigenous driving force for historical change. Certainly, this is neither a simple Christianization, a transformation induced from without, nor an uncritical affirmation of Japanese culture. It was a genuine innovation and “transformation of culture.”

Takeda related her scheme of “from within” and “from without” to what Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt (1923-2010) called the “transformative capacities” or the “transformative potential” within Protestantism. This subconscious force provides the basis for individual motivation and the potential for transforming the social structure from within. Eisenstadt listed three factors that create a society’s transformative potential: (1) a strong combination of “this-worldliness” and transcendentalism, (2) the strong emphasis on individual activism and responsibility, and (3) a direct relationship of the individual to the sacred and to the sacred tradition. “These factors give rise to a new ethos centered on the individual, a positive approach to the creation of history, and active spirit that leads to the transformation of history.” From Eisenstadt, Takeda realized the birth of transformation as not only a tenacious individual, for which Calvinism is functioning as his “mental virus,” but also an autonomy that provides the driving force behind the restructuring using old materials in a new construction of the social, cultural, and political order. Such autonomy in cultural activities means to hold a creative power in order to develop a new symbol, that is, an

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old symbol entrusted with a new meaning that will lead, sustain, and legitimize the formation of a new social order. Takeda explained, “Through Eisentadt I would like to seek within the bosom of the traditional Japanese value consciousness and the Japanese community for the ‘transformative capacities or potential’ that could develop and function as an autonomous power. Because such power would serve to transform the human and social structure from within.”

5.1.7 “New Wine in Old Wineskins”

During the cultural transformation of Christianity in Japan, Takeda claimed that some old symbols like “the wheat” within the indigenous cultural energy, acting as a universalistic element, is often picked out and utilized to symbolize the radically new goal of transformation. The qualitative process of “from within” and “from without” is psychologically stabilized through the continuity of the symbol, while the anti-humanitarian and particularistic elements of the tradition are cut off and rejected in order to create new ideals. Notably, universalistic elements as new ideas or new ideals are interwoven with the old and are incorporated consciously or unconsciously. Since there is the continuity of an old symbol, an essential transformation of Christianity in Japan, like a “new wine in old wineskins” (to give the Biblical expression a positive connotation), can be carried through without a sense of loss of cultural identity.

Takeda took several examples to elaborate on this cultural transformation. Fukazawa Yukichi (1835-1901), one of the most prominent thinkers of modern Japan, claimed that his general definition for civilization includes two fundamental elements. One is to have modern science and the capacity of reasoning based on science. The other is the spirit of independence.

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573 Takeda, Dochaku to Haikyō, 40; Cho, “The Continuity of Old Symbols,” 89-90.
However, he utilized the motto *jitsugaku* or “empirical learning” as the way to transform Japan to a modern nation through science and education.\(^{574}\)

Uchimura Kanzō, the founder of the *Mukyōkai* “non-church” movement, brooded over what it meant to be both a Christian and a patriotic Japanese. He disputed the Japanese nationalistic “two J’s” concept, which saw “Jesus and Japan” as mutually antagonistic. Instead, Uchimura proclaimed: “My faith is not a circle with one center; it is an ellipse with two centers. My heart and mind resolve around the two committed names. And I know that one strengthens the other.” In his mind, when Japan and Jesus were both symbolized by a “J,” they rotated within the same oval, the result being that “J” neither was a “Jesus” introduced along with Western culture nor simply an exclusive traditional “Japan.” Rather, when Japan and Jesus met, the encounter led to a “new Japan.”\(^{575}\)

Nitobe Inazō in his work, *Jitsygyō no Nihon* (Japan’s practical learning), analyzes several key concepts in Japanese culture such as *shūyō* (self-cultivation), *haji* (shame), *yowatari no michi* (art of living), *rei* (benevolence), and *on* (obligation and filial piety). He sought to bring new interpretation to these commonly accepted values. For instance, the concept of *shūyō* in Confucian tradition means self-cultivation towards a calm, peaceful, and dependent state of mind submitted properly to the outer social order.\(^{576}\) Nitobe did not reject the value of self-cultivation but stressed the importance of individual independence and selfhood through cultivation, while true selfhood

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or self-independence in practice is to live by following the invisible king of God (Christianity), which he equated to the voice of conscience. The concept of haji is the consciousness of “shame culture” or “honor culture” that runs deep in traditional Japanese ethos. Instead of judging negatively the way in which Japanese felt about “shame” and “honor,” Nitobe defined Japanese “shame” as a sense of guilt from within to grain of righteousness, a very important element of human beings of any country and a special instinct of mankind, and replaced the concept of individual consciences with American “guilt culture” on law and punishment. He then compared it with “impurity,” a Shinto terminology, and argues that “although different from Christian concept of sin, Shinto’s impurity certainly involved the idea of sin and it might be transformed into Christian concept of sin, the inner consciousness of guilt.”

The concept of yowatari no michi is a popular Japanese concept referring to a kind of social skills up to moral principles. Nitobe injected the concept with the Christian ethos of “purity in the world.” Hence, the way to be in the world but not of it, or “world-rejecting asceticism” – a traditional Japanese passive virtue of “not seeing, not hearing, and not speaking” – was replaced with “inner-worldly asceticism” that espoused a positive and practical approach of “looking, listening, and speaking.” The Confucian concept of rei or benevolence (ren) was generally

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regarded as the essence of the human being. From Japanese Bushidō (the way of the warrior) Nitobe interpreted the word rei (benevolence) as ai (love), and the word “politeness” was substituted with “love” to follow. To him, a Japanese sociality formed in oneself to “be yourself,” which was solely based upon personality, not on social position or rank. “Whether it is the polite difference one pays to one’s superior, one’s equal, or one’s inferior, it must always be rendered in terms of the others’ person (personality).” The concept of “on” is five Confucian norms of obligation and filial piety in Japanese traditions: to heaven and earth, to one’s parents, to one’s ruler, to one’s own people, and to one’s teachers. Nitobe recognized the traditional value concept of obligation and filial piety as an essential way of learning to be human, yet by infusing the concept of “on” with a meaning of gratitude to the object of ordinary people, he indicated that the concept of obligation should cross space from the family metaphor to the community, the country, and the universe, which was completely different from the old Confucian concept of “on” practiced by Japanese for centuries.

Takeda found the continuity of old cultural symbolism in various Asian countries. The concept of Pantja Sila, proposed by Sukarno (1901-1970), the first president of Indonesia (1945-67), means the five principles of the state: (1) nationalism, (2) internationalism (humanity), (3)


democracy (*mufakat*), (4) social justice (wellbeing, economic democracy, or society without poverty), and (5) belief in God (One Supreme Being).\(^{585}\) Interestingly, in the process to formulate his nationalistic theory of *Pantja Sila*, Sukarno was influenced by Sun Yat-Sen of China, particularly Sun’s Three Principles of the People: Nationalism, Democracy, and People’s Livelihood. Likewise, he was also influenced by Mahatma Gandhi’s thought of Indian nationalism, humanism, and religious tolerance. However, Takeda indicated that Sukarno was not simply adopting ideas and programs from the outside. Out of the pluralistic indigenous cultural soil of Java and of the peoples of many islands and religious and ethnic groups, Sukarno carefully picked up a symbol bearing the mark of pluralism (*Pantja Dharma* or *Pantja Sila*) that gave his people a sense of certainty of self-identity. It also gave his people a vision to understand and reinterpreted the meaning of the life and the history of the nation. Taketa points out that ‘Sukarno put new universalistic value concepts and developed it into the new guiding principles of the people. Then the old wine-skin, with its image of continuance, is already transformed into a ‘new wine-skin with new wine’.’\(^{586}\)

The spread of the symbolic term *Pantja Sila* in postwar Asia brought Prime Minister Nehru of India and Premier Zhou Enlai of China together to issue a joint statement on *Pantja Sila* in 1954 to describe the five principles of peaceful coexistence: (1) mutual respect of sovereignty, (2) nonaggression (inviolability), (3) non-intervention in internal affairs, (4) equality and reciprocity, and (5) peaceful co-existence. These principles were supported by Burma, Indonesia, and other nations in Asia as well as African countries. The idea of having new symbol with old roots in

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traditional cultures was now tossed between them like a volleyball and, having found acceptance in the heart of the people through the years of the postwar period, developed into a new key word to renew and innovate value systems and social systems. Takeda concluded, “The case of Pantja Sila shows exactly how an old symbol, rooted in tradition, is preserved in continuity through which the spirit and social and international relations of that tradition have been radically transformed. Particularly, it shows symbolically one possible example to transform universalistic cultural elements through the involvement of Christianity in a surprisingly ‘Asian Way’.”587

5.1.8 Conclusion: Japanese Way of Indigenization

In her study of the indigenization of Christianity in Japan, Takeda emphasizes the way of Juyō in the historical process of Protestantism in modern Japan. From the perspective of the relationship between Christianity and Japanese indigenous culture, she centered on the Japanese word dochaku and then classified and described five patterns of indigenization, identified Japanese “indigenous energy” to represent new potentiality for indigenization, applied the “from within” and “from without” scheme to define the qualitative transformation of Christianity, and cleverly reversed the metaphor in the biblical parable of “new wine in old wine skins” to stress the continuity of Japanese cultural identity, which was carried throughout transformation of Christianity. From reexamination and reevaluation to rediscovery, Takeda generated “eternal dialogues” between Christianity and Japanese culture.

A few points can be underscored. First, the process of dochaku by Takeda is an “eternal dialogue” between Christianity and Japanese culture. Christianity, an integral part of Western culture, was received by Japan, an Asian country with its own distinctive culture. Through dochaku, Christianity took root in Japanese lives. The indigenization of Christianity in Japan was

587 Ibid.
a cultural transformation between Christian ethos and Japanese culture. The five classified patterns of *Juyō* generated “eternal dialogues” in the course of modern Japanese history that are, indeed, “an inquiry into indigenous cultural energies in Japan.”

Second, Takeda believed that Japanese indigenous culture in reality is a mixture and interwoven totality of the hidden blessing, the immanent potentiality towards universalism and unique forms of particularism bearing the roots of the unclean spirit, or the mystery of evil, in the depths of its cultural soil. Hence, Japanese Christians are called to go into a deeper inquiry and reexamination of the nature of their culture and indigenous energy in order to get a clearer discovery and understanding of the particularistic and universalistic elements. The intention of *dochaku* and *Juyō* is therefore to explore further into the depths of these diversified cultural and human resources, to dig out promised indigenous potentialities, and to discover an effective approach to renew and reconstruct traditional value systems that contain both potentialities of the “weeds” and the “wheat.”

Third, Takeda stressed the necessity of careful examination of the qualitative transformation of Christianity. Her scheme of “from within” and “from without” observes the transformation that occurred when the indigenous cultural elements and Christianity interacted internally and structurally to bring about Japanese Christianity. Mutual confrontation between Christianity and Japanese culture gave birth to a new concept of Japanese Christianity. Takeda then turned herself to the perspective of widening the application of the theme of “modernization.” Instead of relating to the spirit of capitalism and Puritanism, she paralleled Eisentadt’s ideas to deal with the “internal transformative capacities of Protestantism and their impact on the

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589 Ibid, 228.
transformation of the modern world.” The significance of Protestantism, she argued, lay “not in any direct effect it had on economic, political, or scientific activity, but in the contribution it made toward the restructuring of Asian society in general.” It was therefore essential for Japan to germinate those elements through a stimulation from either the outside (i.e. the capacities and potential of Protestantism) or the inside (i.e. a social contradiction). An outside stimulus does not necessitate a thorough destruction of Japan’s traditional religious and cultural values or the traditional community structure. Takeda explained, “We rather search for a way to create the ethos necessary to carry through an indigenization from within and the autonomy, methods, and tools that are needed to create a new Japanese Christianity. This search has been and still is being the mission for Japanese Christianity.”

To classify various historical attempts to transform Christianity in a Japanese context, Takeda defined a theoretical connection with Niebuhr. Although her analysis was not directly comparable to the scheme of Niebuhr on *Christ and Culture*, she largely applied his paradigmatic approach to Japanese culture. She did not use the term “culture” to classify Japanese approaches to Christianity, yet by clearly identifying Japan and its culture as a dynamic entity, she emphasized the individual’s reception in the process of indigenization. Her approach, while drawing on Niebuhr’s model, offers original perspectives for an understanding of cultural transformation. Her five patterns of approach to explore the relationship of Christianity and Japanese culture present several ways in which Christianity has tried to take root in Japanese culture and society, resulting in a wide range of understanding Christian identity. It is particularly worth noticing that Takeda

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added an apostatizing type - a temporary mode of indigenization where Christianity is renounced or abandoned after a period of time - which is common among Japanese Christians.592

5.2 The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor

In 2019, Naruhito, the 126th Japanese emperor officially proclaimed his enthronement in a ritual-bound, centuries-old ceremony (Sokui no Rei) attended by more than a hundred dignitaries from around the world. The head of state had begun his reign that May after his father, Akihito, became the first emperor to abdicate in over two centuries. Naruhito underwent an elaborate series of rituals at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo.593 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stood before Naruhito’s throne and read a speech. He then bowed deeply and yelled “Long live the emperor!” Naruhito - whose name means “a man who will acquire heavenly virtues” - became the latest emperor in an unbroken line that stretches back 14 centuries.594

The role of Japan’s emperor has changed significantly since Naruhito’s grandfather, Emperor Hirohito, sat on the throne. Once considered the living embodiment of gods, the emperor has become a largely symbolic figure. The most religious and in that sense “mysterious” of the emperor’s enthronement ceremonies, known collectively as the daijosai, are generating considerable controversy in Japan and internationally. Japanese Christians have prompted lawsuits to object to the government’s use of taxpayer money for the daijosai because “it smacks of the

592 Takeda, Dochaku to Haikyō, 7-8; Cho, “The Christian Encounter with the Traditional Ethos of Japan,” 140-41.


militaristic past and violates the constitutional separation of church and state since the government pays the 2.7 billion yen ($25 million) cost.”

Such controversy on the enthronement of the 126th Emperor Naruhito has certainly triggered international attention again on questions, first raised nearly 75 years ago, concerning the nature and extent of the emperor system centered on his grandfather, the 124th Emperor Hirohito, his participation in the decision-making process prior to 1945, and the role he played in the subsequent Pacific War.

5.2.1 The Emperor System

The nature of the prewar emperor system has been a fundamental question for scholars of Japan. Research has ranged from Carol Gluck’s groundbreaking work on the circulation of Meiji ideology at the local level to Takashi Fujitani’s study of the symbolic construction of the emperor through public pageantry and the circulation of imperial imagery to Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s thesis of popular “imperial consciousness” and “grassroots fascism” in the 1930s and 1940s to Sheldon Garon’s research on how social elements reciprocated, if not actively collaborated, with the state to manage certain social behaviors and practices. More recent scholarship has sought to understand the new modalities of power emerging in the mid-Meiji-period prison and police systems, including Umemori Naoyuki’s pioneering research on the “colonial mediations” during the formation of the modern penal system and Daniel Botsman’s study of the radical break that

595 Ibid.

occurred in punishment between the late Tokugawa and mid-Meiji periods.\(^{597}\) While these studies focus largely on how the emperor system was disseminated and reproduced at the level of society, other scholarship has explored developments at the state or constitutional level: Maruyama Masao’s early thesis that in prewar Japan all value was exteriorized into the emperor, allowing for the state to spread a “many-layered, though invisible, net over the Japanese people”; Fujita Shōzō’s analysis of the emperor system as a dialectic between the particular institutional forms of the imperial state and the principles with which it ruled society; and Walter Skya’s arguments that Shintō ideology was inscribed in the Meiji Constitution and continually reconceptualized in constitutional and political theory in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s.\(^{598}\)

Like Walter Skya, Takeda Kiyoko analyzed the double structure of the emperor system in which the Meiji oligarchs presented the emperor as simultaneously divine, mythical, absolute, and a constitutional monarch, which what she calls the enduring “dual image” of the emperor as the grounding problem that informed prewar constitutional theory. In her prize-winning book, *The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor*, Takeda further engages her research by tracing Western attitudes toward Emperor Hirohito during World War II and immediately afterward, when the


\(^{598}\) Maruyama Masao, “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-nationalism,” in his *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*, ed. Ivan Morris (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1963), 1-24; Fujita Shōzō, *Tennōsei kokka no shihai genri* [The rule of the emperor state] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shoto, 1966). Fujita began by arguing that the various and wide usage of the term *tennōsei* was not one of categorical ambiguity, but in fact represented the “complexity” of the emperor system itself. He distinguished three basic usages of the term: firstly, that the emperor existed as sovereign, and secondly, that *tennōsei* referred to the “regime” that became “the political structure of modern Japan” in which bureaucrats exercised authority in the name of the imperial sovereign independent of the Diet. Finally, Fujita noted “a kind of metaphorical usage” of the term *tennōsei* as a “particular social phenomenon” that signified the unique “forms” through which the *tennōsei* governed society. See Walter A. Skya, *Japan’s Holy War: The Ideology of Radical Shintō Ultranationalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009).
Allies were faced with the difficult decision of what to do with the Japanese emperor. By delving deeply into United States, British, Canadian, Australian, and Chinese sources, she examines behind the decisions to the debates taking place in government, academic and business circles in the Allied countries around the world: How did the Allies understand the emperor system? Why did their views change during the course of the Second World War? What role, if any, did they see for the emperor system in the Occupation, which set out to democratize Japan according to the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration?

5.2.2 Embracing Defeat: 1945

Perhaps the greatest challenge to the very existence of the emperor system came in the wake of Japan’s defeat in 1945 and the unprecedented occupation by foreign powers that ensued. When faced with the option of “unconditional surrender” held forth by the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, Japan’s imperial government understandably hesitated. The fundamental reason for their hesitation was the fate of the imperial institution if Japan surrendered on the terms offered by Potsdam. The debate lasted over two weeks. After two atomic bombings and a declaration of war by the Soviet Union, the emperor broke the deadlock among his leading officials and accepted the terms of Potsdam on August 14, 1945. At noon the following day, the emperor’s prerecorded message announcing the termination of hostilities was broadcast to the entire

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599 Her Japanese version Tennōkan no sōkoku: 1945-nen zengo [The Dual-image of the Emperor: Before and after 1945] was originally a serial in the World magazine, published by Iwanami Shoten in 1978, and won Takeda the Publishing Culture Award from Mainichi Shinbun. By 1988 the book had already been reprinted eight times and was listed among the most basic literature for studying the Japanese imperial system.


It was a day that could never be forgotten. The announcement was very short, only lasting four minutes, and did not openly state that Japan had been defeated, merely that the war "did not turn in Japan’s favor, and trends of the world were not advantageous to [Japan]." Three days later, on August 17, Hirohito issued a second "Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors" in all war theaters of Asia and the Pacific, ordering them to cease fire and lay down their arms.

Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue….under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire’s existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity.

Japan had lost the war. The emperor’s broadcast put an end to the American air raids. But World War II did not really end for the Japanese until 1952, and the years of wars, defeat, and occupation left an indelible mark on those who lived through them. No matter how affluent Japan later became, these remained the touchstone years for thinking about national identity and personal values. People like Takeda Kiyoko, a Christian social scientist, embraced the defeat of 1945 and, for more than six decades, has consistently affirmed her commitment to "peace and democracy." This is the great mantra of postwar Japan. To understand Takeda’s thoughts on this requires discussion of perspectives on the emperor system at the time.


604 Senda Kako, Tenno to chokugo to Showa shi [The Emperor, Imperial Rescript, and the Showa Period] (Tokyo: Sekibunsha, 1983), 394; Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 530.

605 "Peace and democracy" are two goals for Takeda’s lifelong homework, as they are clearly reiterated so many times in many of her postwar writings, public speeches, and international conferences.
5.2.3 Emperor System as a Problem

Even before Japan’s defeat, Emperor Hirohito and Japan’s imperial system became a decision-making problem for American policymakers and for other Allied leaders. Nearly everyone who thought about the problem of bringing democracy to Japan felt that the emperor or the emperor system was of central importance. But different ways of understanding the emperor system gave rise to conflicting policies as to how the emperor should be treated after the war. Several options were available to the Allies as they approached their victory in the summer of 1945. One was to continue with the emperor system in Japan even if it was on the basis of an amended constitution; another was to eliminate it entirely; a third was to replace the emperor who had been on the throne since 1926 by the crown prince or some other figure.606

5.2.3.1 From the United States

Long before that judgement was rendered, the State Department had struggled with the problem posed by the President’s demand for “unconditional surrender.” Some Far Eastern experts, including China specialists, were opposed to any policy that might put the United States in the position of “doing business” with Hirohito. Owen Lattimore saw the emperor as integral to the expansion of Japan, whether the trigger was pulled sooner or later. Economically, he belonged with the liberals, because of his huge investments; militarily, he belonged with the militarists, as the ritualistic fount of military morale; and socially, he belonged with both liberals and militarists because he was the keystone of the arch of economic and social privilege under which the people passed on their way to “work, obey, fight.” Lattimore did not think that Japan would be able to achieve an English-style “democratic monarchy” in the postwar period. Only a revolution could

solve the problem of the imperial institution; it would be a terrible mistake, he said, to try to use Hirohito to accomplish Allied purposes.\textsuperscript{607} Lattimore’s view on imperialist and militarist Japan energized the pro-China faction in the State Department that harbored strong anti-Japanese feelings and sought to depose the emperor including Secretary of State James Francis Byrnes himself, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Chairman of the Far Eastern Committee Carter Vincent, and Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs Stanley Hornbeck.\textsuperscript{608}

Echoing Lattimore was Thomas Arthur Bisson’s writing in \textit{Pacific Affairs} in March 1944. Bisson also saw a close connection between Japan’s militarists and the throne. The leaders of the Japanese Army “have assiduously fostered the divine pretensions of the Emperor as a tool of domestic and foreign policy,” he asserted. Hence, “It is essential that the whole Imperial myth be discredited in the minds of the Japanese people and the possibility of its revival be forever removed. If the Japanese people turn against the Emperor and dethrone him, the act should be applauded and supported. If they do not, the act must be done for them as soon as their acquiescence can be reasonably taken for granted.”\textsuperscript{609}

The Bisson article immediately triggered a response from American scholars Miner Searles Bates and Kenneth Scott Latourette. The two declared that they belonged to those “who would not

\textsuperscript{607} Owen Lattimore was an influential scholar of China and Central Asia. During World War II, he was an advisor to both Chinese and American governments and contributed extensively to the public debate on American policy in Asia. Owen Lattimore, \textit{Solution in Asia} (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945), 47-49; Takeda, \textit{The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor}, 113-14.

\textsuperscript{608} Ibid, 9-10.

\textsuperscript{609} Thomas Arthur Bisson, “The Price of Peace for Japan,” \textit{Pacific Affairs}, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 1944), 18-19. Bisson admitted that his article had benefitted from the meeting he attended with the members of the National Councils of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He also cited from Wilfred Fleischer’s dispatch in \textit{New York Herald Tribune}, December 12, 1942, “the claim that the ruling Emperor is a good and harmless man is beside the point. It is the institution which carries the danger. The same may be said for the recent alleged ‘proof’ in State Department documents that Hirohito ordered the militarists to refrain from precipitating war with the United States.”
try from the outside to destroy the imperial house and institution.” They saw that the imperial system “is essentially passive, a true tool.” No leverage existed other than the imperial prestige, “which a new regime, struggling precariously for strength, could employ to win sufficiently broad support in Japan,” and “nothing could be contrived so likely to store up resentments against a new regime and everything related to it as the evident fact that it was born in the destruction by foreign power of the cherished symbol of Japanese continuity.” They doubted “the wisdom (and, in this case, the possibility) of the extirpation of Shinto by the act of the conqueror. The patterns of that faith are too deeply set in Japanese life and thought to be removed by any summary procedure.” They firmly believed that it would be better to use the emperor to help accomplish Allied aims than to stir resentment in Japan by destroying a cherished symbol.  

No person probably strove harder to retain the emperor than Joseph C. Grew (1880-1965), the former U.S. ambassador to Japan (1932-41) who served at the end of the war as under-secretary and also for a period as acting secretary of state (1944-45). Rejecting the notion that the emperor should be saddled with personal responsibility for the military expansion of the Japanese Empire, Grew argued that the imperial institution “might be the only political element in post-surrender Japan capable of exercising a stabilizing influence like the ‘queen bee in a hive’.” Removing it might commit the Allied forces to the huge burden of maintaining and controlling for an indefinite period a disintegrating nation of more than 70 million.  

In late May 1945, acting on Grew’s instruction, Eugene Dooman, a top Japanese specialist, had drafted a clarifying memorandum that defined recently deceased Franklin D. Roosevelt’s concept as requiring the surrender of all

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Japanese military forces but not the denial of Japan’s monarchical system. In Grew’s memorandum, a surrender policy had two fundamental desiderata: (1) to render Japan forever incapable of threatening world peace and (2) to establish order in Japan with the least possible delay and with the smallest possible number of foreign personnel. To achieve these purposes, Grew thought that “the emperor could be most useful” in ending the war, as he wrote:

The greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution of the Throne. If some indication can now be given the Japanese that they themselves, when once thoroughly defeated and rendered impotent to wage war in future, will be permitted to determine their own future political structure, they will be afforded a method of saving face without which surrender will be highly unlikely.612

Overcoming the opposition of Dean Acheson and his adviser, Archibald MacLeish, who both wanted to see the imperial system abolished, Grew carried the memorandum to the White House. The new president, Harry S. Truman (1884-1972), seemed to agree with Grew’s arguments but wanted him to clear the matter with the Army. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (1867-1950), long a critic of Japan, also seemed amenable to Grew’s proposal, but the effort collapsed when General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff, cited military reasons why “just now” was not the moment to issue the kind of statement Grew and Dooman had in mind.613 The matter was put off until the Potsdam Conference, but it was not settled even then. “Hirohito had powerful enemies in the American Government,” Stimson later declared, “who wanted to treat him as a war criminal.” In the end, Grew and Stimson’s suggestion went unheeded.614 Based upon Lattimore’s

612 Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor, 90; Grew, Turbulent Era, 1421-23.

613 Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor, 89-91.

614 The final part of Article 12 of the proposed Potsdam Declaration originally read: The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government… This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible the
interpretation of imperialist and militarist Japan, the so-called pro-China policies set a tune on (a) abolition of the emperor system, (b) a complete purge of the existing leaders, (c) basic reorganization of the economic system, and (d) total reform of the political and social systems. In fact, as a Gallup poll conducted in June 1945 showed, the position of the Byrnes group was supported by the majority of American and Chinese opinion. So when General MacArthur asked for a Japan expert in the fall of 1945, he was instead sent an expert on Chinese affairs.

5.2.3.2 From Great Britain

The British Government found itself in a delicate position but ultimately proclaimed that the indictment of Hirohito as a war criminal would be “a capital political error.” In an article contributed to The Times after the war had ended, a future British prime minister, James Callaghan (1912-2005), called for the abolition of Japan’s imperial institution, a position that prompted Robert Craigie (1883-1959), Grew’s British colleague in Tokyo prior to the war, to reply that utilization of the emperor might be the best means of purging the country of its dangerous ideology. General Hastings Ismay (1887-1965) joined the debate by saying that, if unconditional


615 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 544; Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor, 22.

616 Ibid, 13.

617 Ibid, 25.

surrender involved the dissolution of the imperial dynasty, “there would be no-one to order the cease-fire in outlying areas, and fighting might continue in various British and Dutch territories, and also in China for many months or even years. Thus from the military point of view, there was a good deal to be said for the retention in Japan of some central authority who would command obedience.” The diplomat George Bailey Sansom (1883-1965) echoed that the imperial institution should be preserved and that the continuance of rule by the present emperor would serve a strategic purpose for the Allied forces scattered around East Asia and the Pacific, especially in areas where Britain had been given the responsibility for taking Japan’s surrender.

The British appeared to be reluctant in taking lead on any action toward Japan. There was also an assumption that Britain being a monarchy had a special perspective on the Japanese monarchy in general and on Emperor Hirohito in particular. Britain had hosted Emperor Hirohito as crown prince in 1921. It had originally been scheduled that he would visit the United States after his British trip, but in the end this had been cancelled. In Britain he spent two weeks touring the country. The British officials who escorted him were selected to be as close to his own age as possible. Some of these officials survived in inner government circles in 1945. Moreover, the crown prince had been personally responsible for welcoming the Prince of Wales on his return visit to Japan in 1922. The emperor was therefore a figure known to the British, and they were vigilantly favorable to him in the 1930s.

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620 George B. Sansom, a Minister Plenipotentiary attached to the British Embassy, also claimed, “We must not let Japan be a long-standing burden to us: we must see to it that she recovers, economically and in other ways, under some kind of supervision.” See Katharine Sansom, *Sir George Sansom and Japan: A Memoir* (Tallahassee, Florida: Diplomatic Press Inc., 1972), 135-9; Takeda, *The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor*, 25-27.

621 Nish, “Foreword,” xi.
On August 10 of 1945 the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Declaration with some reservations. The Labor government in London resolved that it was “inexpedient to insist on terms of surrender involving the abdication of the Emperor of Japan if it seemed likely that this would have the result of delaying substantially the end of hostilities in the Far East.”\(^\text{622}\) Within a week of the Japanese surrender on September 2, the Labor government endorsed the following view:

We are quite willing to let the United States take the lead in controlling Japan and we are prepared to recognize that the execution of policy in Japan itself should be the sole responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers;

We have assented to the proposal that General MacArthur should “carry into effect the general surrender of Japanese armed forces;” and to the statement made to the Japanese that “from the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to SCAP.”\(^\text{623}\)

5.2.3.3 From Australia, Canada, and China

The idea that Hirohito and the imperial system should be kept was not shared by all the Allies.\(^\text{624}\) Australia, too, demanded that the emperor be tried as a war criminal. William Webb (1887-1972), the Australian who served as the president of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, vehemently criticized the American decision not to indict Hirohito.\(^\text{625}\) Australia’s prime minister, Joseph Benedict Chifley (1885-1951), addressed to his Dominions Office that the

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\(^{623}\) Butler and Pelly, *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, 37; Also Sansom, *A Memoir*, 141-42.

\(^{624}\) Takeda mentioned briefly that during the 1950s the Soviet Union consistently criticized SCAP MacArthur’s “soft” line and demanded that the emperor be prosecuted for his responsibility for the bacteriological warfare that Japan had waged on Russian and Chinese troops. The reason she did not detail the attitude of the Soviet Union on the treatment of the emperor system during the Occupation period was due to lack of documentary evidence available to her. Takeda, *The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor*, 146-47.

\(^{625}\) Ibid, 53, 65, 144-46.
“Emperor as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces [was to] be given no immunity for Japan’s acts of aggression and war crimes which in evidence before us are shown to have been of a barbarous character.”626 Canada played a limited role in the occupation of Japan, but it, too, held a slightly different opinion. Canadian politician Egerton Herbert Norman believed that the emperor had been used by the Meiji leaders as the justification to achieve their national goals. The imperial institution in the hands of the ruling bureaucracy had been fashioned into “a pious fraud maintained as a political device to control the unenlightened.” Therefore, he asserted, “Even a disarmed Japan, if it is left with the Emperor system, will continue to be an unsolved and dangerous problem for the rest of the world”627

China also argued that “The Mikado (emperor) must go.” Sun Ke (also Sun Fo, 1891-1973), head of the Nationalist Chinese Legislative Council wrote in the October 1944 issue of Foreign Affairs that “the Mikado must go because the imperial idea is the essence of Japanese aggression.” Militarism and the emperor institution were inextricably interwoven in Japan, after all. Sun argued, “The Mikado is either a puppet and is useless for the purposes of democracy; or he is powerful and should have disciplined his militarists. He cannot be both.”628 Sun was sharply critical of the aforementioned position of Joseph C. Grew, saying that Grew’s position “actually inclines towards a dangerous policy of ‘hands off the Mikado.’ All war criminals must be brought to trial and the evidence will show whether Hirohito should be among them.” A democratic Japan was imperative

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626 Nish, “Foreword,” xiv; Butler and Pelly, Documents on British Policy Overseas, 521.


to China, Asia, and world, but to him “this cannot be created until the Mikado has been removed.”

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), the leader of the Republic of China, referred to the “emperor system” as a form of “the way of the hegemon” (ba dao) based upon emperor worship. In other words, for him the “emperor system” was a type of totalitarianism. However, Chiang’s policy, which he expressed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) during the Cairo Conference in November 1943, was that the ultimate form of government in Japan “should be determined by the wishes of the Japanese people themselves after the war.” In his New Year radio address in 1944, Chiang reiterated his moderate and flexible opinion on the emperor system: “All the Japanese militarists must be wiped out and the Japanese political system must be purged of every vestige of aggressive elements. After the destruction of Japan’s military government and the way of the hegemon, as to what form of government Japan should adopt, that question can better be left to the awakened and repentant Japanese people to decide for themselves.”

Why did the Allies have such different views on the nature of the Japanese emperor system? “The answer lies,” Takeda argued, “not simply in the existence of different ways of looking at Japan and different ways of understanding its emperor system. Also involved is the contradictory nature of the modern Japanese emperor system itself.”

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629 Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor, 1, 8, 46, 72-73.


631 Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor, 14; Grew, Turbulent Era, 1419.

632 Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor, 1.
5.2.4 A System of Sōkoku (Dual Images)

Like roots of the Japanese military expansion in the 1930s, the “emperor system” problem should also be traced back to Meiji Japan. As Takeda has pointed out, “two conflicting interpretations of the emperor and the basic character of the nation” emerged during the Meiji period. The more Emperor-centered schools of constitutional thought considered the emperor to own and control the nation and declared that “the world under heaven (i.e. the Japanese nation) belongs to one person (tenka wa hitori no tenka),” whereas others with the popular rights movement maintained that the people should control the state and the emperor must obey the popular will as “the world under heaven belongs to the people’ (tenka wa tenka no tenka).”

5.2.4.1 Itō Hirōbumi as Charioteer

No doubt the emperor system was absolutely the pivotal point of the Meiji state, the center of its ideology and the fulcrum of state power. Its dual interpretation was invented by the Meiji oligarchs and particularly by Itō Hirōbumi (1841-1909), the first prime minister of Japan. In his design of the modern emperor system, Itō drew upon a Cartesian analogy in order to explain imperial sovereignty as outlined in the 1889 Constitution and the supposed unity it brought to the new Meiji state.

The sovereign power of reigning over and of governing the State is inherited by the Emperor from His Ancestors and by Him bequeathed to His posterity. All the different legislative as well as executive powers of State, by means of which He reigns over the country and governs the people, are united in this Most Exalted Personage, who thus holds in His hands, as it were, all the ramifying threads of the political life of the country, just as the brain, in the human body, is the primitive source of all mental activity manifested through the four limbs and the different parts of the body. For unity is just as necessary in the government of a State, as double-mindedness would be ruinous in an individual.

633 Ibid, 2.
634 Ward, Thought Crime, 7.
Ito, who drafted the 1889 Meiji Constitution, utilized the above metaphor to identify the emperor’s supposed duality. “One image was the mythological and absolutist emperor, who was a living god (akitsu kami), a divinity in the enduring lineage of the imperial family. The other view reflected a rational and democratic interpretation” of the emperor in line with the Charter Oath of 1868, promising a deliberative assembly and a government responsive to public option.635 Under his guidance, the young Emperor Meiji was presented to the common people as “an absolute, transcendent sovereign” who bestowed the Constitution on them, but to intellectuals and politicians he was introduced as “a monarch limited by the Constitution,” as written in the opening paragraph of the Meiji Constitution:

Having, by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the Throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give development to the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favored with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors, and hoping to maintain the prosperity of the State, in concert with Our people and with their support, We hereby promulgate, in pursuance of Our Imperial Rescript [of 1881], a fundamental law of the State, to exhibit the principles, by which We are guided in Our conduct, and to point out to what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform.636

Indeed, Itō was cleverly able to drive a chariot “drawn by two horses, each with completely different personalities.” But conflicts were embedded in the document, and troubles would arise in the future when political powers were handed down to less capable men.637

5.2.4.2 Emperor and Cultural Identity

The tennōsei publicized by the Meiji oligarchs was further developed in the 1940s by Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960) and the right-wing nationalists. To them Emperor Hirohito

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635 Takeda, “The Dual Image of the Emperor.”


637 Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor, 3.
represented not only the Japanese political system but also the symbol and core of Japan’s “cultural unity” and “cultural identity.” They called for “the soul of Japan” (*Yamato Damashii*) and promoted emperor-centered nationalism based on the mythological concept of the emperor as a manifest deity and upon the belief that the emperor, the land, and the people of Japan were a sacred and indivisible entity. To Takeda, Watsuji Tetsuro and his like-minded nationalists endeavored to reeducate the people to believe that the Emperor was the central entity of Japan, which was “the land of the gods, inhabited by a people uniquely superior in the world, who lived together, the whole nation as a single family, under the benevolent guidance of the divine emperor.”

Mishima Yukio (1925-1970), one of the most influential Japanese authors in the twentieth century, was an extremist right-wing nationalist who wrote about Japan’s imperial past, heroic ideals, samurai traditions, and the honor of dying for one’s country. He embraced the ideal of the emperor as a god and insisted that the nucleus of an integrated, organic Japanese culture that embraced the chrysanthemum and the sword was none other than “the emperor as culture.” Hence, the archaic term *miyabi* (usually translated as “elegance”), an aesthetic value derived from the beauty of the imperial household (i.e. so-called courtly elegance), defined the idea of “beauty” and as such served as the core of the unity of Japanese people. Furthermore, he said that when *miyabi* was negated or overruled by the political system, this idea could try to reinstate itself, if necessary,

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640 Mishima Yukio was Hiraoka Kimitake’s penname. He was considered for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1968. Takeda, *The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor*, 3.
even by employing terrorism. Mishima interpreted the assassinations of Japanese political leaders by militarists during the attempted coup of February 26, 1936, as an act of *miyabi*. Thus, even as a cultural force, the emperor was characterized by two contradictory, yet co-existing elements: “gentility” and “terrorism,” or in other terms “sacred” and “profane” or “peaceful spirit” (*nigimitama*) and “violent spirit” (*aramitama*).  

On the contrary, there were progressive thinkers who opposed the extra-nationalism. Historian Yoshino Sakuzo’s “Taisho Democracy” and his theory of politics of the people (*minponshugi*) and statesman Minobe Tatsukichi’s “Organ Theory of the Emperor” in which he describes the emperor as an “organ” of the state under the constitution could be seen as examples of political development along the lines of democracy within the *tei-nōsei*.  

Needless to say, the historical development of a hegemonic “emperor system” was profound. During the Second World War Japan was under the control of a military regime, and Emperor Hirohito was regarded as a living deity (*akitsu kami*), the core of the national polity, and the focus of Japanese ultra-nationalism. Reflecting by this dual-image concept was the development of government policy that harbored and accelerated a harmony of the two approaches, sometimes in tension, sometimes in balance, under the leadership of a capable “charioteer,” and in other areas caused disunity or disruption between the two, each viewpoint seeking, often violently, its own way according to its own logic. However, in Takeda’s arguments, “the dual-image of the Japanese emperor is not a unique historical phenomenon.” She further elaborated:

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If one looks into the central value system of other monarchical nations, both
developed and developing alike, one can find both positive elements which are capable of
promoting humanism and democratic values, and negative elements which deny humanism
and rationality and promote despotic rule. In the West, and in the various countries of Asia
and Africa, deeply rooted indigenous values had played a vital role in the development of
modern nation states. It is in this sense that the problem of the dual nature of the Japanese
emperor is not simply a problem peculiar to Japan.644

5.2.5 The Allied Occupation, 1945-1952

After Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, the Allied powers, led by the United States,
occupied Japan for nearly seven years - longer than the actual war between the U.S. and Japan -
until the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force on April 28, 1952. Immediately following
the surrender of Japan, U.S. President Harry Truman appointed General Douglas MacArthur as
the SCAP. In that capacity, MacArthur directed the General Headquarters in Tokyo and supervised
the occupation programs in Japan. Besides the primary aim of demobilization, one of the biggest
missions for MacArthur was to bring American democracy into a traditional, imperialistic country
whose people worshipped the Emperor as a living god. The Allied Occupation was a profound
period to Japan and Japanese people, as Takeda has indicated:

If the Meiji Restoration can be called the first opening of Japan to the outside world,
the aftermath of the defeat was a period of great reforms in the realm of political and social
systems and values worthy of being regarded as Japan’s second opening.645

5.2.5.1 Iron Will and Flexibility

The legal document titled “The United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan”
served as the fundamental guideline for the Allied Occupation. The policy aimed to achieve two
primary objectives: (1) to prevent Japan from being a menace to the United States and other
countries in the Pacific area and (2) to establish in Japan a government which would respect the

644 Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor, 4.

645 Ibid, 111; Takeda, Higher Education for Tomorrow, 12.
rights of other states and fulfill Japan’s international obligations. On the day of Japanese surrender, President Truman specifically declared the authority of MacArthur as a Supreme Commander, with the approval of Clement Attlee of the United Kingdom, Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union, and Chiang Kai-shek of China:

From the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and Japanese Government to rule the state will be subject to you and you will take such steps as you deem proper to effectuate the surrender terms. You will exercise supreme command over all land, sea and air forces which may be allocated for enforcement in Japan of the surrender terms by the Allied Powers concerned.

As such, General MacArthur was given the full authority over governing postwar Japan.

The Occupation policy was designated to disarm, demilitarize, and democratize Japan. At the same time, the policy was pragmatic and had the intention of using the emperor for furthering the agenda of the occupation. There was indeed certain degree of flexibility regarding the institution of the emperor.

5.2.5.2 Emperor System Reinvented

Shortly after the Occupation began, the Americans realized that not only would it be wise to maintain the imperial institution but that it also was in the best interests of the U.S. to leave Hirohito on the throne. After meeting the emperor on September 27, General MacArthur became convinced that Hirohito would be a greater supporter of democracy than any other Japanese leaders.

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he had met: “This bloodless occupation would have been impossible without the retention of the Emperor for surrender purposes and declaring the maintenance of the Emperor during disarmament resulted in untold saving of American lives, money and time.”650 Even the above-mentioned China faction at the State Department grudgingly admitted that for practical reasons it was better to keep the emperor. The idea of replacing him with his twelve-year-old son Akihito was dropped.651

Most Japanese, surprisingly, were relieved with the Allied policy of retaining the emperor while divesting him of his powers and divinity. An opinion poll conducted in December 1945 revealed that as high as 92% of the Japanese wished to keep the emperor, but the great majority of them wanted him excluded from politics. Except for the Communists, who advocated the abolition of the imperial institution and the prosecution of Hirohito as a war criminal, all the other political parties favored retaining the emperor in a symbolic capacity. Even the Socialist Party advocated a democratized imperial system and the emperor playing only a ceremonial role.652

In accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, on December 15, 1945, SCAP issued the “Shinto Directive” to ensure that Japanese people were free “from direct or indirect compulsion to believe or profess to believe in a religion or cult officially designated by the state.”653 Two weeks later, the imperial rescript that negated the divinity of the emperor was issued on New Year’s Day

650 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 295.

651 Ibid, 126-30.


653 The document was officially entitled “Memorandum of the General Headquarters about Abolition of Governmental Sponsoring, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of Shinto (Kokka Shinto and Jinja Shinto),” in Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor, 114-15.
1946. In it the emperor denied his supposed “divinity” and any idea of the “superiority” of the Japanese people:

The ties between me and my people have always been formed by mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends or myths. Nor are they predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese are superior to other races and destined to rule the world.\(^{654}\)

According to Emperor Hirohito’s personal wish the “Charter Oath,” attributed to his grandfather, the Emperor Meiji, was placed at the beginning of the rescript.\(^{655}\)

The Japanese press printed the entire text of Hirohito’s first-ever New Year’s rescript to the nation, formally titled “Rescript to Promote the National Destiny” but popularly known as the “Declaration of Humanity” (ningen sengen). It begins with the full quote of the Charter Oath of Five Articles issued in 1868 during the Meiji Restoration, in which the first clause states, “We shall determine all matters of state by public discussion, after assemblies have been convoked far and wide,” and the last clause claims, “We shall seek knowledge throughout the world and thus invigorate the foundations of this imperial nation.”\(^{656}\) General MacArthur promptly responded: “The emperor’s New Year’s statement pleases me very much. By it he undertakes a leading part in democratization of his people. He squarely takes his stand for the future along liberal lines. His action reflects the irresistible influence of a sound idea. A sound idea cannot be stopped.”\(^{657}\)

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\(^{655}\) Ibid.


\(^{657}\) *Chicago Daily Tribune*, January 1, 1946.
New York Times also reacted in its lead editorial, saying that by issuing the rescript, the emperor had become “one of the great reformers in Japanese history.”

“It was his first formal address to his subjects since August 15, the day of surrender,” reviewed Takeda. Revising his constitutional status drastically and becoming a human, Hirohito managed to satisfy many of his foreign critics that he no longer claimed divinity.” Following that announcement, he began touring the country. He visited almost every prefecture in order to boost morale and support the objectives of the occupation. Dressed in a Western suit, the Emperor walked toward and talked to his people for the first time in Japanese history. This dramatic change had a great impact not only on the Japanese but also on foreigners, proving that the status of the emperor had really changed.

To Takeda, the “Declaration of Humanity” symbolically expressed the problem of the conflict between two elements implied in the dual image of the emperor system. It was certainly in accord not only with SCAP policy but with popular sentiment. Whether the initiative behind the rescript came from Japanese or American sources was still debatable. It was clear, however, that SCAP and the Allies as well as the Kijūrō Shidehara cabinet and the imperial court, all intended to use the rescript to open a new phase in their campaigns to rehabilitate Hirohito’s image. More specifically, Takeda explained, “The intention of the emperor was to reaffirm the democratic ideas that had already been defined in the Charter Oath which promised a deliberative assembly and government in accordance with public opinion.” Hence, “this emperor system was reinvented to serve as a bridge between the new postwar era and the Meiji roots of democracy as postulated in


659 Takeda, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor, 115-16.
the Charter Oath. In this way the New Year’s Rescript provided a basis for a new democratic Japan.”

5.2.6 Conclusion: Beyond the Boundary

In her masterpiece work, The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor, Takeda Kiyoko depicts the active postwar debates on the Japanese monarch at the helm of the state. More specifically, she reveals the hidden debates on the tennōsei system. This includes how the ideology of the emperor was inscribed in the practical, institutional, and juridical operations among the postwar Allies and why this ideology informed and was reinvented through the postwar reconstruction during Allied Occupation.

Through her lens of the tennōsei system, we walk into a grand experiment of World War II and the Allied Occupation: how victorious Western democratic nations sought to impose a new value system upon a defeated Japan and how the American (or Allied) Occupation impacted Japan’s traditional ethos and political system. To the U.S.-led Allies, their ultimate goal was to democratize Japan, yet their policies were conflicted in a way favorable to Japan’s own national interests. Based on their common principle to establish a peacefully-inclined and responsible government in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, Occupation authorities were particularly sensitive to Japanese public opinion. On the other hand, this principle was often utilized by Japanese government leaders as a means to preserve the traditional emperor system, emphasizing that “more than 92 percent of Japanese people supported the emperor system.” In the end radical democratization by Allied Occupation was achieved by dissolving the political and economic systems that were the basis of the absolutist nature of the emperor system while at the same time retaining the humanized emperor as a symbol of the state. This was declared

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660 Ibid, 123.
by the SCAP in accordance with the general sentiment of the Japanese people at that time. Moreover, it represented a synthesis of two conflicting policies for democratizing Japan based upon two conflicting views of the emperor, namely that of the Japanese experts and the so-called pro-China group within the U.S. State Department.

Takeda has made two important points in her study. First, postwar democratization did not come spontaneously from the Japanese themselves but was brought by the “iron will” of the Occupation forces. Second, the Western-imposed transformation was a “liberation” to most of the Japanese people who had been oppressed by the militarists and ultra-nationalists. Obviously, the people in Japan responded positively and at times with zeal to the “democratization,” “demilitarization,” and “demystification” policies of the Occupation. It might be partly true that this positive response was simply the product of Japanese deference to authority; it could also be seen as proof that an undercurrent of democratic values already existed deep within the “value concept” of the Japanese people. A defeated Japan opened peacefully to the world. This openness for radical transformation certainly encouraged the undercurrent of democratic and humanistic values to come up to the surface gradually and cautiously and finally emerge as cofactors in the reconstruction of postwar Japan.

More specifically through her elaboration, we comprehend how the Allies grappled with the “dual image” of the emperor system in an attempt to locate a “key” to carry out the ultimate goal of the Occupation. This key emerged through an invisible dialogue between the Occupation forces and the Japanese people over the question of the democratization of Japanese society. We find this in the 1947 Constitution: a symbolic expression in a humanized emperor involving a radical change of social institutions as well as continuity of grass-roots humane and democratic values. In this drama, notably the Japanese people are the passive co-actors who brought Japan
one major step forward towards democratization. A problem, however, is that authoritarian and inhuman aspects of the other side of the “dual image” of the emperor still remain as part of the Japanese “mental structure” even today. In Takeda’s words, “An ugly materialism and arrogance seems to go hand-in-hand with Japanese economic and technological success. In the future the Japanese people can and must play a more positive and more central role in the further liberalization and humanization of their country.”

The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed by forty-nine nations on September 8, 1951, marked the end of the Occupation. On April 28, 1952, the Far Eastern Commission, the Allied Council on Japan, and the Occupational General Headquarters were abolished. Thus, at least officially, the drama of the confrontation of the Occupation forces upon the “dual image” of the emperor system came to an end. But the drama certainly does not truly end there. In fact, as we mentioned above, the nature of the emperor and the emperor system has been continuously and widely discussed, with the intention either of reviving prewar absolutism or of pushing the transformation towards democratization further. Such debate becomes lively, particularly around December 8 as the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, August 15 as the anniversary of Japan’s surrender, or whenever new Japanese or American documents relating to the Occupation period are made public.

At last, one thing becomes clear to us, which is that prior to the war and notably for strategic reasons most Japanese Christians had only praised the emperor and, for legal reasons, had avoided the term “kokutai,” translatable as something like “national essence.” It had been part of Our Kokutai and Christianity, a 1907 attack evoked by Inoue Tetsujirō and Katō Hiroyuki on

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Christianity (and Buddhism) as incompatible with being Japanese. After the war, Christian intellectuals borrowed the idea of an emperor system to encompass the modern state ideological apparatus, including its use of quasi-religious rituals, such as the one that had given Takeda a pause for thought.

Takeda Kiyoko was old enough to be educated at the time when Japan had war with Asian nations and, eventually, with the West. She built her career in the postwar period and witnessed Japan change from a defeated and occupied nation to an economic superpower. During these national transformations, Takeda studied the historical contexts concerning political democracy, the Yasukuni Shrine issue, the principal war memorial in Tokyo, and the emperor as an individual. In each case, the history of the emperor system was at the core of the image of Japanese democracy.

Takeda utilizes the metaphor of the emperor in order to analyze how during the prewar ideology of the emperor system was articulated in and transformed through institutional efforts into a living deity, the core of national polity, and the focus of ultra-nationalism. Takeda’s “dual image” of the emperor system derives from her effort to clarify what she believed to be the analytical ambiguities produced by terms such as “sovereignty” and the “state.” The issue for Takeda was that the various proponents of the emperor system, whether radical, conservative, or liberal, were all assuming that a single, “easily identifiable” locus of authority or power could be discerned in the wider field of political practice. She countered that her concept of the emperor’s “sōkoku” (conflicted dual image) took into consideration the complexity and diversity of the political field without having to rely on the assumption of a state essence in determining the field of political practice.

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By evaluating the dual image of the emperor system, Takeda goes beyond the boundary on how the sovereign emperor and the Japanese spirit (nihon seishin) were reproduced, transformed, and disseminated through the institutional practices of pre- and postwar Japan. It is rare to find a Japanese woman scholar who studied and published on a topic that was to many Japanese still a taboo subject, since Emperor Hirohito was still alive at the time. It was also remarkable that she delved deeply into United States, British, Canadian, Australian, and Chinese sources to piece together historical narratives that are profoundly significant to our knowledge about one of the world’s oldest imperial systems.
6 CONCLUSION

In this study of the twentieth-century Christian indigenization movement in East Asia, I have looked into historical issues through two intellectuals and social activists: Jiang Wenhan of China and Takeda Kiyoko of Japan. Their lives were significant not only for their leadership in Christian indigenization in China and Japan, respectively, but also for what we can learn from their life experiences about the role of Christianity in modern Asia.

To conclude, I will highlight four areas of findings from the study of Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko: (1) the “new face” of Christianity in Asia, (2) the Asian concept of indigenization, (3) the Asian way of indigenization, and (4) the search for Asian Christian identity.

6.1 Asian Christianity as a “New Face”

According to Daniel H. Bays, “Within the past several decades, Christianity has become mainly a non-Western religion; over 60 percent of its adherents now live outside the West. Next to Africa, the greatest growth of Christianity has been in Asia.” A recent statistical survey also indicates that Christianity has become one of the largest and fastest-growing religions in Asia. Christian percentages rose from 1.2% of the population (11.4 million Christians) in 1970 to 8.1% in 2010 (127.8 million), with projected growth rate 3.0% per year to increase to 10.5% of the region’s population (171.1 million) by 2020. Much of this growth has been in China - from 0.1% of the population in 1970 to 7.3% (106 million Christians) in 2010 (Table 2).


Table 2 Christianity in Asia, 1970-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th></th>
<th>2020</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>2,134,992,000</td>
<td>95,398,000</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4,565,622,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>964,073,000</td>
<td>11,449,000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1,622,681,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-central Asia</td>
<td>778,833,000</td>
<td>27,222,000</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2,009,512,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-eastern Asia</td>
<td>285,161,000</td>
<td>50,371,000</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>655,941,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>86,925,000</td>
<td>6,356,000</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>277,388,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Rate* = average annual Christian growth rate, percent per year 1970-2020


The survey clearly indicates that the expansion of Christianity in the global south and the distribution of indigenous churches in Asia consist of a wide range of phenomena. Christianity has globally become increasingly diverse, and the profile of a “typical Christian” is undergoing rapid change. Scholars including Phillip Jenkins, Lamin Sanneh, and Alister McGrath suggest that the trend in Asia-led twentieth-century Christianity was to undergo a rapid “southward” upheaval.665 A distinctive analytical framework has therefore been observed that a new face of “Asian Christianity” can be recognized by contrasting declining participation rates in Europe and North America with the explosive growth of the faith among Asians, specifically Chinese.666 Statistically speaking, a chance encounter with a Christian nowadays is likely to mean coming face-to-face with someone who is, more often than not, an Asian like Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko.

It is obvious that this new face of Christianity burgeons from the global process of cross-cultural transmission between the “universal” and “particular.” Irving Hexham and Karla Poewe explain that Christianity “is a tradition that travels the world and takes on local color. It has both a


666 Julius Bautista and Francis Khek Gee Lim, eds., *Christianity and the State in Asia: Complicity and Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 201.
global, or metacultural, and a local, or situationally distinct, cultural dimension. As global cultures, the aim of universalistic world religions has been to spread a religious metaculture that was perfectly capable of remaining identifiable while being absorbed by local cultures. While it is often quite difficult to distinguish or disentangle the “metaculture” (universal elements) from the local variations or indigenous forms, these plural cultural expressions can be designated as part of a larger world religion because one can identify “striking continuities over time and space.”

These continuities in the case of Christianity can be identified with some common features such as “continuity of thought about the significance of Jesus, continuity of a certain consciousness about history, continuity in the use of Scriptures, of bread and wine, of water.”

Also imperative is that there is no such thing as a “pure” form of Christianity or any other world religion. There are only particular cultural manifestations, such as Christianity of Asian characteristics or what we might call Asian Christianity. The integration of universal and particular aspects (or global and local forces) shaped the characteristics of twentieth-century Asian Christianity. Wu Ziming attributes this neologism to Christian globalization with this blending of global and local forces, specifically for the historical evolution in East Asia from a missionary-imposed Western Christianity, which was resisted by Asians as an alien religion, to the development of genuine Asian Christianity. Wendy James and Douglas Johnson accurately point out that this Asian Christian identity, as a confession of faith, does not bring with it or

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670 Ng, Chinese Christianity, 2.
produce cultural and social uniformity, but as a personal experience, it inevitably goes with a characteristic sense of particular place or time. The theme of personal religious identity cannot be separated from that vernacular context. In this sense, “every Christian is a native.”

Asian Christianity is one typical model of Christianity in the twentieth century. The expansion of Christianity in the global south and the rise of indigenous churches in Asia as the common ground are historical phenomena involving cross-racial, cross-cultural, and multi-lingual experiences. Indigenization of Christianity in China and Japan came face to face with not just diverse peoples and languages but also different systems of culture and ideology. It is truly a story about the global and the local: confrontation, adaptation, competition, coexistence, and mutual influence. Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko are two Asian Christians whose genuine encounters and responses to Christianity exemplified an intellectual path of their generation, and their unique roles in shaping the course of indigenization of Christianity in China and Japan are significant.

6.2 Asian Concept of Indigenization

The concept of indigenization is not new to twentieth-century Asian Christians. They read about it from the Bible as early as Paul’s ministry in the book of Acts. Gentile churches, while keeping a close relationship with the mother church in Judea, had difficulty adopting Jewish practices such as circumcision. Paul, as a missionary to the Gentiles, understood the need of the Gentiles to be themselves. He defended their cause and convinced the Jewish Christians not to impose their own customs and lifestyle on the Gentiles (Acts 15).672


Inspired by the biblical tradition, Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko claimed their concepts of indigenization in East Asia have closely intertwined with cultural transformation, social reform, and political nationalism. The process they identified has been developed through two historical venues: an ongoing and complex interplay between the global reach of Christianity and the ways in which it is articulated and interpreted in a particular locality in Asia. The key issue for the spread of Christianity in East Asia is whether or not the alien religion is able to implant itself on non-Christian soil. If local churches established by the foreign missionaries were politically, economically and also evangelically dependent on the churches in the West, they would never be able to take root in Asian nations.673

6.2.1 From the Socio-Political Perspective

Jiang Wenhan’s concept of Christian indigenization stems from a socio-political perspective in which indigenization in Chinese undergoes “bensehua,” which means a missiological and organizational transformation to throw off the “foreign color” and to give an “indigenous color” (bense). Chinese Christians searching for independence from western dominance is a trend deeply embedded in modern Chinese history.674

Christianity entered China long before the modern era. The Nestorians from the Church of the East first came to China in the seventh century, followed by Catholic Franciscans in the thirteenth century and Jesuits in the sixteenth century. Each time they failed to establish the religion as a long-lasting institution. Protestantism arrived in China in 1807, but for more than a century it still remained an alien religion to the Chinese people. After China’s defeat in two Opium Wars (1839-1842, 1856-1860), Western powers imposed on China a series of “unequal treaties,” by


which missionaries enjoyed extra-territorial protection and Chinese converts had special privileges over their countrymen. If any church members committed any crime and were arrested by the Chinese government, the missionaries would intervene and get them released without trial. This caused resentment of non-Christian Chinese against Christians.675

For a long time, Christianity in China has been called a yangjiao, or a “foreign religion.” It was seen as detrimental to China, as a popular Chinese saying before 1949 put it: “One more Christian means one less Chinese.” In the eyes of the Communist regime, Christianity, although with relatively fewer followers in comparison with Buddhism and Islam, represented a potential danger to the state and a threat to social stability.676 In the popular mind, Chinese Christians’ foreign faith and their association with Western-dominated churches were unmistakable evidence that these people were collaborators of “foreign devils” in assaulting Chinese tradition. Accordingly, they responded favorably to the call for indigenization – to shake off the foreignness of Christianity in order to take control of the churches and, in short, to indigenize Christianity for the needs of the country and its people.677

6.2.2 From a Cultural Perspective

Resonating with Jiang Wenhan, Takeda Kiyoko used two Japanese words to describe her concept of indigenization: dochaku (lit. “taking roots in soil”) and Juyō (lit. “reception”). Her

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676 Jiang, “Lecture 2;” Liu, Hongqi xia de Shizijia, 75-79.

concept is based on the historical encounters through “eternal dialogues” between Christianity and Japanese culture.678

Since Catholic Jesuits made their attempt to preach the Gospel to Japan in 1859, the history of Christianity in Japan has undergone significant changes. For centuries, the relation between Japan and Christianity has been an uneasy one. Compared with its Asian neighbors, Japan only has a very small portion of its population who are Christians. Yet it would be incorrect to overlook the profound impact of Christianity on Japan. Historically, Christianity has made a significant contribution to the cultural exchange between Japan and the West, although the Christian presence in Japan was often seen negatively. Japan’s Christian interlude in the Tokugawa period led to intolerance and persecution of Japanese Christians.679 The Meiji Restoration of 1868 marked the beginning of a series of pro-Western reforms in Japan, which resulted in winning two wars against China and Russia. But Japan’s success in modernization led to the rising of Japanese nationalism. Conservative intellectuals were developing a new ideology of imperial divinity and national superiority.

However, since Christians advocated spiritual autonomy and freedom of conscience, they were an important stimulant in Meiji intellectual life, with leading roles in political reform and social change. Notably, Meiji Christian leaders were predominantly former samurais. They were well educated and talented. Among them were two giants of modern intellectual and religious work: Uchimura Kanzō, founder of the “non-church” movement, and Nitobe Inazō, a Quaker educator and internationalist.680


679 Breen and Williams, Japan and Christianity: Impacts and Responses, 1-7.

Modern Japanese thought thus underwent great changes because of the impact of Western culture. A number of clearly defined patterns evolved in Japan for the reception of Western thought. For instance, Meiji Japan adopted Western intellectual and technological elements with concepts such as “Japanese Spirit and Western Techniques” and “Eastern Ethics and Western Science.” The welcome reception of Christianity in Japan was somewhat exceptional among Asian nations. The response to Christianity was an attempt made by Japanese intellectuals to understand the essence of Western culture. This discussion of relationships between Christianity and Japanese culture became an animated dialogue in postwar Japan, and Takeda was at the center of that interchange.681

6.3 Asian Ways of Indigenization

Since the nineteenth century, Christianity has undergone significant changes. The quest started when Christian missionaries set out to develop contextual theologies and forms of worship appropriate to different cultural contexts. By time of the Edinburgh Conference in 1910, the efforts had moved far beyond the earlier practice of establishing self-supporting local churches to new ways of conceiving and interpreting the Christian faith. These changes greatly influenced the spread of Christianity in modern East Asia and resulted in what missiologists now called “indigenous church principles.” In church planning, that would become the principles of self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation. Two earliest proponents of this school of thought Rufus Anderson and Henry Venn emphasized “native agency,” which means to, in addition to

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preaching the Gospel and educating or healing non-Christians, put native converts in charge of new churches as soon as possible.682

6.3.1 Chinese Way by Jiang Wenhan

Jiang Wenhan sought for indigenized Christianity in China and practiced his “Chinese Way” around the missiology of Three-Self principles, but this eventually acquired an entirely different goal of anti-imperialism. His mission was therefore to promote an independent, unified, and non-denominational base for Christianity in China under the banner of the “Three Self” Principles. His emphasis on the word “self” reveals the real challenge of indigenization in the Chinese context. Jiang believed that before the 1949 revolution, Protestant Christianity in China was governed by foreigners, supported by foreigners, and propagated through foreigners. Protestantism was indeed a “foreign religion” that alienated the Chinese people. The first and foremost task for the indigenization effort was to transform Protestantism from foreign government, foreign support, and foreign propagation into self-government, self-support, and self-propagation in order to finally get rid of that inglorious “foreign” mark and be recognized as Chinese Protestant Christianity once and for all. Jiang hence declared his role as a Christian revolutionary in China to organize and train his people into a revolutionary force. His hope was to make a prophetic voice to replace violence with peace, autocracy with democracy, and oppression with value and dignity for all people.683

In July 1950, Jiang and other thirty-nine Protestant leaders declared a strategical plan for Chinese Christianity in the construction of new China. They called Christian churches and


organizations in China to support the Common Program, and work under the new Communist government “to oppose imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism, and take part in the effort to build an independent, democratic, peaceable, unified, prosperous and powerful New China.” In their “three-self manifesto” Jiang and his Protestant churches acknowledged the problem of imperialism while working for the promotion of selfhood in church building. Overseas financial assistances were terminated. The Three-Self principles along with the “love country and love church” slogan became the banner of their campaign to indigenize Chinese churches.684

On the basis of patriotism, Jiang Wenhan trusted the Communist regime. He was encouraged by its United Front policy in seeking common ground while maintaining differences. From 1949 to 1966, Jiang and his churches survived numerous political campaigns. Then the Cultural Revolution started and, like virtually all Chinese intellectuals, Jiang suffered a great deal of hardship during the decade-long political chaos. Jiang survived Mao’s last revolution and in the post-Mao era resumed his positions in the church. At the Third NPCC in 1980, Jiang and other 174 leaders reaffirmed their faith in continuity of “love country and love church,” the Three-Self, and mutual respect between the church and the Party. He became the leader of new CCC to guide theological reconstruction of indigenized Chinese churches and reach out to the world Christian community.685

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In addition to his commitment to the state and his role of fostering the Three-Self Church, after 1978 Jiang turned to academia as the first Protestant Christian to conduct research on the history of Christianity in China. His five-year proposal for a multi-volume publication on the subject, sponsored by SASS and supported by Shanghai RAB and SPPCC, rejuvenated religious studies, a field that had been taboo since 1949. In his two published monographs of Christianity in ancient China and Catholic Jesuits during Ming-Qing period, Jiang portrays the history of Christianity in China as a remarkable tale of the encounters between two very different civilizations. He also delineates how a foreign religion was indigenized. Through the lens of history, Jiang justifies Christian indigenization in China: “We live in a sea of non-Christian Chinese, yet we have to bring the Gospel to this mass of non-Christian Chinese people. Therefore, we must reconcile ourselves and not make ourselves alienated from those in order to make our Gospel and our preaching effective.”

6.3.2 Japanese Way by Takeda Kiyoko

Takeda Kiyoko’s studies mainly focused on religious thought and Japanese intellectual history, and she provided a comparative typological framework to interpret cultural transformation in the context of modern Japan. In her well-known work Dochaku to Haikyō (Indigenization and Apostasy), Takeda introduced five unique patterns of indigenization in the history of Christianity in modern Japan: compromise, isolation, apostasy, confrontation, and grafting. Among them, the so-called “tree-grafting approach” or “transforming approach” was popular as most Meiji Christians selected the most important thoughts and values from Japanese tradition, grafted them with Christian truths in a positive way, and finally interpreted Christianity.

as a new way of life to be transplanted in the soil of Japan. This comparative typology, Takeda noted, drew on Niebuhr’s model but was originally based on Weber’s interpretative sociology of religion rather than on theological criteria. It served as a typological “bridge” to carry the dialogue from the familiar world of Western Christianity to the relatively unknown territory of indigenous Japanese Christianity and clarified the complex relationship between imported and indigenous culture.

Inside of her inquiry into Japanese cultural tradition, Takeda claimed the term of Japanese “indigenous energy” that shaped the dialogue as the new potentiality for indigenization. She then underscored three major sources of “indigenous energy” found in the Japanese context as energy of despair, energy of women, and energy of cultural heritage and declared all three in their diverse forms to have interacted as the force of the “Japanese way” to indigenization through both conflicts and promised potentiality. Among these three sources, Japanese “cultural energy” was the most distinctive, carrying two unique elements: universalistic and particularistic. Some old symbols, like the family symbolisms in Japanese religious tradition and Confucian and Shinto thought patterns, could both help and hinder the indigenization of Japanese Christianity. More specifically, Japanese cultural energy was rooted not only in the mystery of old and new idolatry but also emperor worship that functioned as the political core of absolutistic nationalism and imperialism until the end of the Second World War. As such, “Japanized” Christianity could not be completely free from Japanese culture. Takeda thus declared that her mission was to explore further into the sources of Japanese cultural energy. Takeda’s intellectual journey therefore included digging out

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688 Takeda, Dochaku to haikyō, 5; Cho, “The Christian Encounter with the Traditional Ethos of Japan,” 112; Takeda, Deai: hito, kuni, sono shiso, 171.
promised indigenous potentialities to discover an alternative to renewing and reconstructing traditional value systems that contained both potentialities of the “weeds” and the “wheat.” Meanwhile, she also tried to free the universal values of Christianity from Protestant cultural particularism while not failing to recognize those universal values as expressed through Christianity. The real goal for her search was “to find the genuine Christianity, the true universal message of Christianity for Japan.”

While exposing the process of the indigenization in a modern Japanese context, Takeda stressed her scheme of “from within” and “from without” to examine the qualitative transformation of Christianity. In her interpretation, the historical trajectory was brought by the mutual confrontation between Christianity and Japanese culture; both sides responding as mutual sounding boards to give birth to a new concept of Japanese Christianity. Hence this embryo of a cultural nucleus already existing within the Japanese indigenous energy became an indigenous driving force for historical change. Certainly, this was a genuine innovation of “transformation of culture.” Through her scheme of “from within” and “from without,” Takeda confirmed within the bosom of the traditional Japanese value consciousness and the Japanese community the capability for “transformative capacities or potential” that could develop and function as an autonomous power.

By discovering cultural transformation in the process of indigenization, Takeda related her approach to Eisentadt’s theory of the “transformative potential” that existed within Protestantism and argued that the birth of cultural transformation not only impacted each and every Japanese

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Christian individually but also created an autonomy as the driving force behind the social restructuring, meaning the use of old materials in a new construction of the social, cultural, and political order. Such an autonomy in cultural activities intended to hold a creative power in order to develop a new symbol in which an old symbol was entrusted with a new meaning to lead, sustain, and legitimize the formation of a new social order. During the process, some old symbolism, embodied with the so-called universalistic element of Japanese indigenous energy, was often picked out and utilized to express symbolically the radical transformation. Such continuity of an old symbol, as Takeda clarified, was for an essential transformation of Christianity in Japan, like a “new wine in old wineskins,” and should be carried through without a sense of loss of cultural identity.  

6.4 Negotiating Asian Identity

It is remarkable that Christianity could be disseminated in China and Japan as a preeminent Western religion. While Asian Christianity does not quite manifest the demographic growth seen with some foreboding in Africa and Latin America, Christians in China and Japan still exert large influence in the political, cultural, and social landscape of the region. Consequently, the life works of Jiang and Takeda, especially how they interacted with their given historical realities, cannot be told without the socioeconomic and political context, especially the latter.

6.4.1 Conflict and Complicity

Both Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko had to cope with issues related to the relationship between the political power and Christian community in their respective countries. They often played a delicate role in balancing the two.

691 Takeda, Dochaku to haikyō, 40; Cho, “The Continuity of Old Symbols,” 89-90.
6.4.1.1 Christianity in Communist China

In China after 1949, the political constraints on Christianity confronted Christian leaders with a serious problem. Jiang Wenhan responded promptly to bring his fine sense of political realities to bear on this question. In his most popular book *Jidujiao yu Ma-lie Zhuyi* (*Christianity and Marxism-Leninism*), Jiang Wenhan focused on ingenious application of the Marxist-Leninist approach toward Christianity. Instead of displaying how these two world traditions contradicted each other, he attempted to build a modus of mutual understanding and respect through discourse and comparison. He then stressed the vital importance of Marxism-Leninism to Chinese Christianity because after 1949, “It is inevitable for Chinese people of that time, Christian or not, to be influenced by Marxism-Leninism, the official ideological and political doctrine of CCP. In the near future, China will proceed from new democracy onto socialism and communism.” He thus promoted the study of Marxism, Leninism, and their sinicized version of Mao Zedong Thought. By presenting a comparative case study between the Eastern Orthodox Russian Church under the Soviet Union and the Chinese Church in the new Communist state, Jiang stated that there was a historical necessity for Christianity in China to be indigenized as a crucial but difficult mission for Chinese Christians to reconcile with the communist state, which meant to detach from Western imperialism and to be united within the communist United Front framework.692

Jiang claimed that his 1939 trip to Yan’an and meeting with Mao Zedong there made him a lifelong believer of the United Front. Jiang interpreted the concept as that of seeking common ground while accepting existing differences. To him, the common ground (*tong*) was simply that of patriotism, socialist reconstruction, or modernization, while the existing differences (*yi*) were the differences in ideology, religious beliefs, or world view. The spirit of the United Front was not

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simply uniformity of opinion but the establishment of a community of interest around a common political stance through a “democratic process.” Jiang himself quickly became a proponent for the United Front and, starting from 1962, served as a member of SPPCC, a CCP-designated platform in Shanghai for political consensus.

Jiang actively promoted socialist ideology and on top of that expressed his confidence in the united front policy and the principle of freedom of religion. In his mind, CCP as a political entity represented the best hope for China’s future. The so-called people’s democratic dictatorship would be an ideal hegemonic power structure joined by all democratic parties and the Chinese people. He thus sought to develop a functional working relationship between Communist state and Christianity. As he admitted, “It was through the wartime Y’s social service programs that I got to know the Chinese communists, and my sympathy to them was therefore found on the common ground with shared interest.” Jiang’s perspective on Chinese Communism actually reflected the mindset of the Christian community of his time; it sought to accept the government leadership in order to gain political legitimacy in the communist party-state system.

6.4.1.2 Christianity in Imperial Japan

In postwar Japan, the new constitution of 1947 guarantees not only that the “Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation” but also that “freedom of religion” is protected to all. No longer the spiritual axis of the nation and sole source of sovereignty, the

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693 In his “Lecture 2: Chinese Revolution and Christianity,” Jiang mentioned his interview with Philip Wickeri on December 11, 1982, in Shanghai and how he reiterated the concept of United Front. Also see Wickeri, Seeking the Common Ground, xxi.


695 Jiang, “Lecture 3.”

696 Jiang, Jidujiao yu Ma-lie Zhuyi, 63-64. In Jiang, “Lecture 2.”
Emperor has been redefined as the “symbol of the state and of the unity of the people.” Takeda felt strongly an urgency to bring a fresh perspective into Japanese socio-political contexts and began reexamining the root of Japanese thinking and the “minds of the Japanese people.” In her prize-winning book, *The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor*, she depicted the active postwar debates on the Japanese monarch at the helm of state and the dual-imaged emperor system to comprehend how the ideology of the emperor was inscribed in the practical, institutional, and juridical operations of the postwar Allies and why this modern imperial ideology informed and was reinvented through the postwar reconstruction during the Allied Occupation. She analyzed how the emperor system was reshaped and transformed through a “dual image” derived from the analytical ambiguities produced by terms such as “sovereignty” and the “state.” The issue for Takeda was that the various proponents of the emperor system, whether radical, conservative, or liberal, were all assuming that a single, easily identifiable locus of authority or power could be discerned in the wider field of political practice. She contended that her concept of a “dual image of the emperor system” took into consideration the complexity and diversity of the political field without having to rely on the assumption of a state essence determining the field of political practice.

Driven by her critical point of view on the dual image of the emperor system, Takeda elaborated on how the practical effect of the sovereign emperor and the radiant Japanese spirit were reproduced, transformed, and disseminated through the institutional practices of the pre- and postwar emperor system. As a kind of indigenous cultural presence that was both ostensibly transcendent of secular politics and simultaneously its sovereign origin, the august emperor was

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invoked in firstly the Diet deliberations over the use of *kokutai* (national polity or essence) as something under existential threat from foreign ideologies and then in the government desperately advocating the “unbroken line of emperor” system through reiteration of the Public Security Preservation Laws to suppress political dissent, and finally the postwar interrogations, court decisions, and SCAP rehabilitation programs that constituted the administrative application of the emperor system. The problem as Takeda saw it, however, was that authoritarian and inhumane aspects of the other side of the emperor’s “dual image” still remained as part of the Japanese “mental structure” even today.\textsuperscript{699}

Takeda urged Japanese people to play a more active role in the liberalization and humanization of their country. In her book *Dochaku to Haikyō* she challenged the question of the significance of Christians in the modern Japanese state. In her two narratives to place Christianity into the intellectual history of Japan, she first observed the conflict (*sōkoku*) that arose when Japan encountered with the West, as described in her five-part typology of Christian responses to the emperor system: falling into compromise due to a sense of traditionalism; allowing rendering unto Caesar to co-exist with rendering unto Christ, so to speak; facing persecution; looking to overcome gradually; and rejecting it absolutely. Then she examined the paths of indigenization by which a foreign faith was transformed in Japan, and through the process Christianity was adopted or naturalized in Japan comparatively within a typological framework of compromise, apostasy, isolation, confrontation, and tree-grafting. Underlying her emphasis on transformation was a culture-state bifurcation or in her terms an organic metaphor of the planting of a universal, Christian idea into “the soil of the traditional ethos of Japan.” In other words, the emperor system

and the state were replaced with a national ethos that at its worst can end up feeling ahistorical, amorphous, and absolute.\textsuperscript{700}

### 6.4.2 Negotiating Asian Identity

Catholic novelist Endō Shūsaku (1923-1996) once famously asked, “If a gardener were to uproot a Christian sapling from its Western soil in order to transplant it into Japan, would its branches still bear Christian fruit? If a tailor were to disassemble a Western suit in order to fashion a Japanese kimono, would it still be a suit?” Endō then declared, “This country (Japan) is a swamp. In time you will come to see that for yourself. This country is a more terrible swamp than you can imagine. Whenever you plant a sapling in this swamp the roots begin to rot, the leaves grow yellow and wither. And we have planted the sapling of Christianity in this swamp – so Christianity must change, not for better.”\textsuperscript{701}

Twentieth-century Asian Christians started to search for a new set of clothes, so to speak, to fit their bodies and thereby discovered an understanding of faith that is more meaningful for them. In China, Jiang Wenhan dedicated his approach from a social-political perspective. Deeply influenced by Wu Yaozong, Jiang adopted the Weberian theory to specify his role in the Chinese context and formulated his mission to transform Protestantism in China to be more in tune with China’s cultural particularity and more adaptable to the country’s political reality.\textsuperscript{702} To him, the identity of Chinese Christianity was revolutionary in essence and allowed Christians to participate in the social revolution and to cooperate with all progressive forces in the nation in order to impact the transformation towards a new society. The concrete task for him to undertake was to promote


\textsuperscript{702} Kiang, \textit{The Chinese Student Movement}, 133.
revolutionary ideas, to serve as an agent for revolution, and to organize and train people into a revolutionary force. Hence, his social gospel in China was relevant social responsibilities, meaning “a revolutionary Protestantism proclamation and a prophetic voice to resist violence, advocate peace; resist autocracy, advocate democracy; resist all means of oppressing people and advocate the value and dignity of humans.”703

Like many Chinese intellectuals of his generation, Jiang welcomed the possibilities for radical social reforms offered by the CCP, and like many he was prepared to work within the system for the benefit of both society and his faith. He sought to build up a Chinese Christianity that takes its context seriously. To him, compromise was not capitulation but the art of negotiating for the possible rather than holding out for what was usually the impossible. In the realm of Christian ideas, ethics, and social life, he thus contributed to a matrix of mutual supportive and interdependent relationships between Christians and Communists. His desire to work with communist state was reflected in his mindset that “Communists in China are not interested in Christianity, but they are interested in Chinese Christians. Therefore, if Christianity agreed to be a member of the united front, then freedom of religious belief was not only a principle, but also a practical need.”704 His role as a Protestant revolutionary also has been implied in his overall commitment of TSPM to seek the common ground and identify with the Chinese people. However, his working with the Chinese state does not mean the articulation of a Christian-Communist synthesis any more than there was a Confucian-Buddhist synthesis in traditional China. Nor should it suggest that he yielded his faith to political ideology. Quite oppositely, his reservation of


differences within the common ground has meant that ideological understanding of Chinese Protestants continues to create space for a distinctively Christian position within socialist China. Jiang professed, “I am not a Communist, nor do I believe Marxism. After all, I am a Chinese Christian and I care about my church and my country.”

In Japan, Takeda Kiyoko studied the issues from a comparative cultural perspective. Drawing on Niebuhr’s model of *Christ and Culture*, Takeda turned her comparative typological framework towards the widening application of Weberian theory of sociology of religion to emphasize the internal transformative capacities of Protestantism and its decisive impact on the transformation of the modern world. The essential task for her was to germinate those cultural elements through a stimulation from both the outside (capacities and potential of Protestantism) and the inside (a social contradiction). During such a process her two-fold role was to contribute to the further liberalization of postwar Japan and to provide an alternative ethos necessary to carry through the indigenization from within. Clearly in her mind, the concept of indigenization in Japanese Christianity meant an integration of indigenous and foreign cultures. There were changes “from within” brought by an internal contradiction of traditional culture and thought, and there were impacts “from without” meaning foreign cultures, civilization, or thought that stimulated and coupled with potentialities and indigenous embryos. This interaction of elements from within and from without brought about a new Japanese Christianity.

Takeda built her case in the postwar period. This was an eventful era that included numerous historical transitions: the American Occupation, the return of sovereignty in 1952, the economic recovery in the 1950s, the rise to economic superpower in the 1970s-80s, the death of

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the Showa Emperor in 1989, and the presence of Japanese troops in Iraq. Takeda studied these transformations with the complicated history of the emperor system as the core for her theory of “imagining democracy.”

Being a Japanese Christian, Takeda believed in the power of Japanese cultural energy. By calling it a dynamic indigenous entity, she emphasized an individual role of participation for the indigenization of Japanese Christianity. Her point was that in Japan and other non-Western societies the transformed Christian culture has the potential to act as a “catalyst for revolution generated from within - a power capable of changing the value consciousness of the people.” Japanese Christianity therefore could be a powerful force for positive social and political changes.

The indigenization of East Asian Christianity and the wider parallel process of globalization sharpened the awareness of Asian Christians to stand in a dynamic intersection of a multicultural and multi-religious society. The state dominance in religious affairs in China and Japan created two important bases for global Christianity: a non-denominational Three-Self church in China and multi-denominational churches in Japan. From this point of view, Christianity has finally integrated into twentieth-century East Asian cultures.

In helping to transform Christianity into an indigenized Asian religion, Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko, each in their own way, have made Christian faith more accessible to the common people and churches more acceptable in society. Their interactions with each other and their practices in the indigenization movement, with their Sino-Japanese Christian solidarity crossing a

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707 Takeda, Higher Education for Tomorrow, 11.

broad terrain from Shanghai to Tokyo, stand as one of the most significant achievements of Asian Christianity in the last century.

In the spring of 1982 at the Tokyo ICU campus, Jiang Wenhan and Takeda Kiyoko met again as two old friends to review the twentieth-century history of Christianity in East Asia. They recognized the significant expansion of Christianity in the global south and the rise of indigenization movements in China and Japan. They emphasized the importance of self-propagating in the non-western context to develop an Asian missiology in which Christianity is received and naturalized. They recalled Asian ways of approach, either via the Three-Self indigenous principles from communist China or the tree-grafting pattern of typology from postwar Japan. Their lifelong experiences with Christianity reflected more than their individual encounters with the religion and in fact the very essence of Christian culture adopted into a non-Christian society. Galvanized by the state religious policies of China and Japan, they acknowledged the political reality of their respective nations as the bedrock for forging their Christian identity. In so doing they have made themselves exemplified Asian Christians of dual identity. Their stories are indeed significant to both Asian Christian experiences and the broader Christian history in the twentieth century.
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Jiaowu zazhi 教务杂志
Jidujiao Congkan 基督教丛刊
Jidujiao xueshu 基督教学术
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Jinling shenxue zhi 金陵神学誌
Meiguo Yanjiu 美国研究
Shijie zongjiao wenhua 世界宗教文化
Shijie zongjiao yanjiu 世界宗教研究
Shijie zongjiao ziliao 世界宗教资料
Tian Feng 天风
Tong Gong 同工
Zongjiao 宗教
Zongjiao Wenti Tansuo 宗教问题探索
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Zhonguo xueyun 中国学运

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APPENDICES

Appendix A  Glossary

Appendix A.1 Chinese Names and Terms

Ai Siqi  艾思奇  guojixing  国际性
Alope 阿罗本

ba dao  霸道  Hongweibing  红卫兵
bense  本色  Hunan  湖南
bensehua  本色化  Hu Shi  胡适

Cai Yuanpei  蔡元培  Jiang Wenhan  江文汉
changqixing  长期性  Jiang Shipa  江诗葩
Changsha  长沙  Jiang Xi  江西
Chen Duxiu  陈独秀  Jiang Xiaowen  江肖文
Chen Xujing  陈序经  Jiao-an  教案
Cheng Jingyi  诚静怡  Jidujiao  基督教
Chengjisihan (Genghis Khan)  成吉思汗  Jidutu huitang  基督徒会堂
Chiang Kai-shek  蒋介石  jiefang  解放
jia-zhe  教 载

Dazibao  大字报  jin-da tuanqi  金大团契
Deng Xiaoping  邓小平  jing-jiao  景教
Ding Guangxun  丁光训  Kaifeng  开封
Dong Biwu  董必武  Kangda  抗大

fei-jidujiao yundong  非-基督教运动  Kangxi  康熙
fuzaxing  复杂性  Liang Fa  梁发
Fuzhou  福州  Liang Xiaochu  梁小初

Gong Fusheng  龚甫生  Li Dazhao  李大钊
Gu Changsheng  顾长声  Liling  醴陵
Guang Xuehui  广学会  lixing zhuyi  理性主义
Guangzhou  广州  Li Zhizao  李之藻

Liu Liangmo  刘良模
Liu Shaoqi  刘少奇
Luo Zhufeng  罗竹风
Lushan  庐山
Lu Xun  鲁迅

Macau  澳门
Mao Zedong  毛泽东
Ma-Lie Zhuyi  马列主义
Matteo Ricci  利玛窦
Minzu Zhuyi  民族主义

minzu  民族性
mixin  迷信
Mu En Tang  沐恩堂

Nanjing (Jinling)  南京
Nie Er  聂耳

Qingnianhui  青年会
qiutong cunyi  求同存异
qunzhongxing  群众性

ren  仁
renge jiuguo  人格救国

Renmin Ribao  人民日报

sanmin zhu yi  三民主义
sanzi xuanyan  三自宣言
Shan-Gan-Ning  陕甘宁
Shantou  汕头

shehui fuwu  社会服务
Shehui Fuyin  社会福音
shengchan yundong  生产运动
Shengmingshe  生命社
shouhui jiaoyu quan  收回教育权

shu  恕
sishu  私塾
Song Ziwen  宋子文
Soong Ching Ling  宋庆龄
Sun Fo  孙科
Sun Yat-sen  孙逸仙

Taiping Tianguo  太平天国
Wang Mingdao  王明道
Wang Zhengting  王正庭

Wu-sa Yundong  五卅运动
Wu-si Yundong  五四运动
Wu Yaozong  吴耀宗

Xi'an  西安
xiaohui zu  校会组
xin sichao  新思潮
xinwenhua yundong  新文化运动
xinyihui  信义会

Xu Guangqi  徐光启
Xu Guangping  许广平

Yao Xianhui  姚贤惠
Yan'an  延安
yang guizi  洋鬼子
yang jiao  洋教
Yang Tinyun  杨廷筠
Yelikewen  也里可温

Yihetuan Yundong  义和团运动
Yongzheng  雍正
Yu Qiaqing  虞洽卿
Yu Rizhang  余日章

Zhang Zhidong  张之洞
Zhuo Fusan  赵复三
### Appendix A.2 Japanese Names and Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese Name</th>
<th>Pinyin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ai (愛)</td>
<td>ài</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>akitsu kami (秋津神)</td>
<td>àkitṣu kamı</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ama Toshimaro (阿満利)</td>
<td>āmá tōshimāro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arahata Kanson (荒畑寒村)</td>
<td>aramitamá kanson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aramitama (荒魂)</td>
<td>aramitamá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arishima Takeo (有島武郎)</td>
<td>arishimā takēō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushi (武士)</td>
<td>būshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushidō (武士道)</td>
<td>būshidō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bunkanai kaika (文化内開化)</td>
<td>bunkanai kaika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bunmyakuka (文脈化)</td>
<td>bunmyakuka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chō Yukio (長幸男)</td>
<td>chō yūkio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>daijōsai (大嘗祭)</td>
<td>daitōsai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai-Nippon Fujinkai (大日本婦人会)</td>
<td>daitōn fujinkai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dochaku (土着)</td>
<td>dóchakuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dohi Akio (土肥昭夫)</td>
<td>dóhi akio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dōshisha (同志社)</td>
<td>dōshisha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endō Shūsaku (遠藤周作)</td>
<td>ēndō shūsaku</td>
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<td>Ise (伊勢)</td>
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</table>
Itō Hirōbumi 伊藤博文
Jōdo Shinshū 平等真宗
jogakkō 女学院
juyō 受容

Kagawa Toyohiko 賀川豊彦
Kansai 関西
Kanto 関東
Kashiwagi Gein 柏木義円
Katō Hiroyuki 加藤弘之
Kimigayo 君が代
Kobe Hirano Kyōkai 神戸平野教会
Kobe Jogakuin 神戸女学院
kōdō 香道
Kokusai Kirisutokyō Daigaku 国際基督教大学
kokusai kōryū kikin 国際交流基金
kokutai 国体
kokutai no hongi 国体の本義
Kojiki 古事記
Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿
koto 琴
Kyōbushō Nisshi 教部省日誌
Kyōiku Chokugo 教育勅語

Matsumoto Shigeharu 松本重治
Meiji Gakuin 明治学院
Meiji Kenpō 明治憲法
Mikado 帝
mingei 民芸
Minobe Tatsukichi 美濃部達吉
minponshugi 民本主義
Mishima Yukio 三島由紀夫

miyabi 雅
mukyōkai 無教会
mushukyo 無宗教

Nakae Tōju 中江藤樹
Nichibein chiteki kōryū i’inkai 日米知的交流委員会
Nichiren 日蓮
nihon setshin 日本精神
Nihon Shoki 日本書紀
nigimitama 和御魂
Niijima Jo 新島襄
ningen sengan 人間宣言
Ninomiya Sontoku 二宮尊徳
Nippon no Tenshoku 日本の天職
Nitobe Inazō 新渡戸稲造

on 恩

ryōsai kenbo 良妻賢母
rei 礼

Saigō Takamori 西郷隆盛
sakoku 鎖国
senmon gakko 専門学校
sensei 先生
shamisen 三味線
Shidehara Kijūrō 平原喜重郎
Shinto 神道
shūyō 修養
Sokui no Rei 即位の礼
sōkoku 相剋

Takagi Yasaka 髙木八尺
Takeda Hiroko 武田広子
Takeda Kiyoko 武田清子
Takenaka Masao 竹中正夫

てきお 適応
tenchou setsu 天長節
tenka wa hitori no tenka 天下わ一人の天下
tenka wa tenka no tenka 天下わ天下の天下

Tenno 天皇
Tennōsei 天皇制

Tokugawa Shogunate 徳川幕府
Tokyo Joshi Daigaku 東京女子大学

Tsuji Matsuko 辻本松子
Tsubos 坪

Uchimura Kanzō 内村鑑三
Uemura Masahisa 植村正久
Uesugi Yōzan 上杉治憲
Urashima Tarō 浦島太郎

Watsuji Tetsuro 和辻哲郎

Yamato Damashii 大和魂
Yanagi Sōetsu 柳宗悦
yowatari no michi 世渡りの道
Yuasa Hachirō 湯浅八郎

zadankai 座談会