Governments Response to Drug Cartel's Violence: The Case of Colombia and Mexico

Ilenia E. Quintero
Governments Response to Drug Cartel’s Violence: The Case of Colombia and Mexico

by

Ilenia Quintero

Under the Direction of Louis-Alexandre Berg, PhD

A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2021
ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on how governments respond to cartel violence in Colombia and Mexico with either cooperation or retaliation. I tested three explanations in Medellin from 1984 to 1993 and Culiacan from 2000 to 2011. While the theory suggests that state repression causes cartel violence or, the other way around, based on the empirical analysis, I find that the theories that focus only on cartel violence are insufficient because there is an interrelationship between international assistance, type of cartel violence, and the type of cartel territorial control with how governments respond to cartel violence. Therefore, I conclude that the type of cartel violence and the type of cartel territorial control have the most potent effect on how governments respond to cartel violence than international assistance.

INDEX WORDS: Cartel Violence, Governments, International Assistance, Cooperation, Retaliation, Cartel Territorial Control, State Weakness
Governments Response to Drug Cartel’s Violence: The Case of Colombia and Mexico

by

Ilenia Quintero

Committee Chair: Louis-Alexandre Berg

Committee: Jennifer McCoy
Ryan Edward Carlin

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Services
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
August 2021
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my parents and fiancé for always supporting me with love and affections and their dedicated partnership for success in my life.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge everyone who played a role in my academic accomplishments. First of all, my parents, who provided me love and support. Without my parents, I could never have reached this level of success. Secondly, my committee members, each whom has provided advice and guidance throughout the research process. Thank you all for your unwavering support.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................. V

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... VII

LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... VIII

1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Literature Review ............................................................................................................... 3

1.2 Explanations to Government Response ........................................................................... 6

2 METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................... 9

2.1 Most Similar System: Case Selection ............................................................................... 10

2.1.1 Operationalizations ..................................................................................................... 12

3 CASE STUDIES ..................................................................................................................... 15

3.1 Medellin’s Government Response to Cartel Violence ....................................................... 15

3.2 Culiacan’s Government Response to Cartel Violence ....................................................... 25

4 DISCUSSION AND RESULTS: MEDELLIN AND CULIACAN ........................................ 31

5 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 42

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 44
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Possible Explanations of Government Response................................................................. 7

Table 2 Case Timeframes and Explanations of Government Responses ........................................... 10
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 U.S. Anti-narcotics assistance to the Colombian government from 1984 to 1993 ........ 15

Figure 2 Extraditions from 1984 to 1993................................................................. 16

Figure 3 U.S. Anti-Narcotic Assistance to the Mexican government from 2000 to 2007 and
Merida Initiative funding estimate FY2008 to FY 2011 ........................................... 25

Figure 4 Extraditions from 2000 to 2011.................................................................... 25
1 INTRODUCTION

With the rise of violent cartels in Latin America and North America, drug cartel violence has been constant since the 1980s. Violence in the countries residing the most powerful cartels increased by reaching 27,213 homicides in 2011 in Mexico and 28,441 homicides in 1993 in Colombia. For instance, in 1984, the Medellin Cartel had an assassin shot and kill Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in Bogota, Colombia (Perera 2015). The following year, Pablo Escobar had financed an attack with armed guerrillas at the Palace of Justice in Bogota, Colombia, that resulted in the death of over 100 people, including governmental officials. In 1989, a presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento, was shot and killed on stage in Soacha, Bogota. Then, later that year, the Avianca airplane was destroyed by an explosive device killing 113 people. The destruction of that plane was an attempt to kill Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, a political candidate.

In 1991, the Medellin homicide rate reached its top-level of 381 deaths per 100,000 habitants, making it the most violent city in the world under Pablo Escobar's cartel (Durán-Martínez 2015). Initially, the Colombian government retaliated against the Medellin Cartel but then it later complied by paralyzing the extradition laws. However, that was not enough for the Medellin cartel, and violence continued to emerge in Colombia. After the assassination of a presidential candidate, the United States provided support to the Colombian government to eradicate the Medellin Cartel with the Andean Initiative.

Similarly, the Mexican government was hit with constant violence from the most powerful cartels. Between 2006 and 2012, narco-executions killed 2,894 police forces and 262 public officials (Rosen and Zepeda 2016). In November 2010, Mexican drug cartels executed the former governor of Colima, Silverio Cavazos Ceballos. Earlier that year, Mexican Cartels
murdered a PRI candidate for the government of Tamaulipas, Rodolfo Garcia Cantu. Drug cartels also managed to kill Jose Francisco Blake Mora, a Minister of the Interior, which was the federal government's second-highest position (Lerner 2011). Violent attacks against the Mexican government did not stop there, it still happens until this day. An estimated 150,000 deaths have occurred since 2007, and more will continue to pile up unless this violence is eradicated. Mexico's transition to democracy in the early 2000s gave fuel to the burning fire of violence. Mexican cartels felt obligated to use violence as the preferred method to influence the Mexican government to comply with their demands until Calderon's presidency officially declared war on drugs leading to a bilateral agreement between Mexico and the United States to combat narcotics through the Merida Initiative.

This paper focuses on how governments respond to cartel violence in Colombia and Mexico with either cooperation or retaliation. I have tested the following explanations in Medellin and Culiacan. Firstly, when there is cartel monopoly control, governments are most likely to respond with cooperation. Secondly, when cartels use direct coercive violence against the state, governments are most likely to respond with retaliation against cartels. Lastly, when there is sufficient international assistance governments respond with retaliation against cartels because of adequate counternarcotic funds and resources in law enforcement. While the theory suggests that state repression causes cartel violence or, the other way around, based on the empirical analysis, I find that the theories that focus only on cartel violence are insufficient because there is an interrelationship between international assistance, type of cartel violence, and the type of cartel territorial control with how governments respond to cartel violence. Therefore, I conclude that the type of cartel violence and the type of cartel territorial control have the most potent effect on how governments respond to cartel violence than international assistance.
I have structured this paper into five sections. In the first section of the paper, I will discuss state response and cartel violence literature. In the second section, I will discuss the possible explanations of government response to cartel violence. The third section introduces the methodology that I will conduct in my research to explore the interaction between international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel violence with governments' response to cartel violence by either cooperating or retaliating. In the fourth part of my paper, I will examine the interaction between international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel violence with governments' response to cartel violence in Medellin and Culiacan. The last section of the paper will discuss the results of the interaction between international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel violence with the outcome of government response. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main findings.

1.1 Literature Review

Why do drug cartels use violence against governments? To answer this question, we must look into the literature on drug cartel violence and state response. For instance, Lessing argued that turfs wars versus cartel cooperation caused whether the cartel used violent lobbying or violent corruption against Mexico and Colombia's governments (Lessing 2015). Additionally, he compared organized criminal groups to insurgencies, guerrillas, or terrorist groups. Turfs wars among cartels is an approach of contest like insurgencies, guerrillas, or terrorist groups that want to remove or replace the governments. Moreover, Lessing explains that drug cartels use the constraint approach, i.e., coercive force against governments unlike the conquest approach used by insurgencies, guerrillas, or terrorist groups to remove or replace the government.
Similarly, Duran-Martinez argues that the state security apparatus's cohesion and competition among cartels determine drug cartels' incentives to employ violence. Violence is visible and frequent when traffickers are competing with each other, and the government is fragmented. By contrast, violence is less visible and frequent when the cartel market is monopolized, and the state security apparatus is cohesive (Durán-Martínez 2015). Likewise, Rios argues when there is violence and competition among cartels, local elected officials are more likely to get attacked (Rios 2012).

However, state repression scholars focus on how the state's response affects criminal group’s violence. Bailey and Taylor focus on governments' attempts to control or repress criminal groups triggers how criminal groups employ different tools and instruments in three categories: evasion, corruption, and confrontation against the government (Bailey and Taylor 2009). Their argument consists of confrontational signals used as a calculation by criminal groups. It is most likely used when organized crime segments believe the costs of tolerating government actions are higher than the risks of drawing attention to themselves. Calderon et al. analyze whether the captures or assassination of kingpins and lieutenants have increased drug-related violence and whether the violence overflows spatially. The evidence suggests that the capture or killings of drug cartels leaders have worsening effects on drug trafficking organizations related to violence and homicides that affect the general population. However, lieutenants' captures or killings seem only to make things worse with violence in "strategic places" or municipalities located in the transportation network. Most importantly, most of the drug trafficking-related violence effects are during the first six months after the drug kingpin's removal (Calderon et al., 2015).
Another contribution to state repression literature is Philips's theoretical framework that suggests a distinction between political and criminal groups and uses it to explain how leadership removal affects criminal violence. Philips argues that groups differ in terms of incentives they offer recruits or members and the "market" they function in. For example, criminal groups depend on "material" incentives, and leaders coordinate those incentives. Therefore, leadership decapitation can disturb the illicit business in the short-term. However, long-term, as long as there is a demand in the market for criminal groups' services, any weak organization will be replaced. Violence will continue despite leadership removal and can increase due to it (Phillips 2015).

Lastly, the cartel structure literature contributes to the correlation between cartel structure and the policymaking process. Desmond-Arias examines how criminal organizations influence the policymaking process. He argues that three dynamic principles emerge based on the structure of the crime and the relationships these groups have with state officials. Then, this relationship shapes the experience of policymaking in locales where these criminal organization function. When armed actors have a strong relationship with the state officials, they are more influential in the policy process. On the other hand, if there is a competition between these criminal organizations and the state, then the criminal organizations can manipulate the policy process by semi-clandestine contacts with civic groups. However, when there is unorganized and little connection with criminal groups have little direct influence on policy process, but the criminal group’s presence and violent activities can create friction that increases the costs of enforcing a policy (Desmond-Arias, 2018). The cartel structure literature relates to the literatures of state repression and inter-cartel conflict by providing explanations of how cartel violence can emerge and increase.
The contributions above have helped expand the literature on cartel violence and state response. For instance, inter-cartel scholars argue that the type, frequency, and visibility of violence depends on conflicts between cartels. On the other hand, state repression scholars argue that state oppression against cartels can trigger drug cartel violence when the cost of tolerating government actions are low and there is leadership removal. Contrarily, the cartel structure scholars argue that criminal organizations can influence policymaking by the relationship criminal organizations have with state officials. Therefore, if there is less connection between criminal organizations and state officials, it can create violent activities from the criminal organization which increases the cost of enforcing policy. Unfortunately, the literature is insufficient because it’s missing the cycle interaction between possible explanations that cause governments to response to cartel violence. I would like to contribute to the literature of cartel violence and state response by focusing on the explanations of government response to cartel violence.

1.2 Explanations to Government Response

How do governments respond to drug cartel violence? The government, employing social contract, should protect its citizens no matter the cost, but that is not the case in Colombia and Mexico. Unfortunately, these governments are challenged by the violence caused by drug cartels. Additionally, they have weak state institutions that make it difficult to combat cartel violence. I explore three explanations that elucidate governments response to drug cartel violence. These explanations build upon the literature of cartel violence and state response because the literature I stated above examines the causation of cartel violence.
As you can see in Table 1, cartel monopoly control in a given territory has many advantages for the government to cooperate with them. For instance, the majority of the people in these territories are loyal to the cartels making it hard for police officials to find cartels’ hotspots, or municipal security forces that are under cartels’ control can serve as informants or enforcers of the cartels (Trejo and Ley, 2021). However, when there is cartel competitive control with multiple cartels in a territory, cartels will protect their territory by all means necessary against competitors or law enforcements. Consequently, cartels begin to carry out acts of violence against their competitors or government officials. Rival cartels can use these acts of violence to collaborate with law enforcement to tackle down the violent cartel. Then, the government uses this opportunity to retaliate against the violent cartel. Therefore, I argue that cartel monopolization influences governments to respond with cooperation, and they respond with retaliation when there are multiple cartels in a given territory.

Secondly, cartels use violence as a strategic purpose against governments when states interfere with their business and when governmental officials do not accept materialistic incentives to implement with their policy demands. Therefore, cartels’ employment of violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>International Assistance</th>
<th>Type of Cartel Territorial Control</th>
<th>Type of Cartel Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Cartel Monopoly Control</td>
<td>Cartel-Civilian Violence and Inter-Cartel Violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Possible Explanations of Government Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Retaliation</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Cartel Competitive Control</th>
<th>Cartel-State Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


against the local populace, the security forces and government are used to intimidate anyone
contemplating resistance to drug trafficking (Knowles, 2008). Government’s response depends
on the type of violence used by cartels that causes retaliation. In other words, if cartels use
coercive force against government officials, governments are most likely to retaliate against
cartels. This government response is because the state’s primary objective with respect to public
security is to maintain public order or to maintain the impression of it; therefore, when it is
challenged by cartels it must respond with full force. Nevertheless, I argue that when cartels use
violence against the state, governments are most likely to retaliate against cartels.

Lastly, when international assistance is low or insufficient in a weak state, the state’s law
enforcement faces significant challenges in making the federal police more efficient, effective,
and accountable with the lack of funding, resources, inadequate training, and corruption (Reames
2003). These challenges make it difficult for law enforcement to retaliate effectively against
highly trained cartels and have all the resources for combat against the police. Nevertheless,
when there is high or sufficient international assistance provided for these governments, they are
given funds to retaliate against drug cartels. These assistance programs include monetary funds
for a counternarcotic measure such as military assistance, the training and equipping counter-
narcotics battalions, technology, intelligence training, and institutional reform. Once these
governments apply these counternarcotic measurements, retaliation is the best approach against
drug cartels. On that account, I argue that international assistance might have a significant effect
on the outcome of government response. Also, I would like to acknowledge that there is a
possibility for inter-relationship among my independent variables that I will address in my case
studies. From the explanations above, I have stipulated the following hypotheses:
*H1:* When there is cartel monopoly control governments are most likely to respond with cooperation.

*H2:* When cartels use direct coercive violence against the state governments are most likely to retaliate against cartels.

*H3:* When there is sufficient international assistance governments respond with retaliation against cartels because of adequate counternarcotic funds and resources in law enforcement.

## 2 METHODOLOGY

In this section of the paper, I introduce the methodology that I used to explore the interaction between type of cartel territorial control, the type of cartel violence, and international assistance with governments response to cartel violence. I intend to test these explanations by using Medellin and Culiacan as the unit of analysis. I conducted a case study using the most similar research design and qualitative comparative analysis using my independent variables, i.e., international assistance, type of cartel territorial control and the type of cartel violence and dependent variables, i.e., cooperation or retaliation.
2.1 Most Similar System: Case Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>International assistance</th>
<th>Cartel Territorial Control</th>
<th>Cartel Violence</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Retaliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medellin</td>
<td>1984-1989</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medellin</td>
<td>1989-1993</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culiacan</td>
<td>2000-2007</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culiacan</td>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2 Case Timeframes and Explanations of Government Responses*

I will conduct a longitudinal study in Medellin and Culiacan with two different timeframes in each city. Therefore, many of the confounding variables that might explain the outcomes of my dependent variable stay the same, except for my main variables of interests which are international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel violence. Medellin and Culiacan both have geographical location that gives advantage to the proximity to cultivation labs and distribution routes. Lastly, the proximity to its number one
consumer the United States. These variables do not affect the outcome of my dependent variable because they remain constant across the cases, allowing me to examine the effects of variation in my independent variables, international assistance, type of cartel territorial control and type of cartel violence.

Table 2 illustrates possible explanations to government response in Medellin and Culiacan; these explanations can explain if the government responds with cooperation or retaliation. For example, Medellin did not have sufficient international assistance in the late 1980s; however, by the early 1990s, the Andean Strategy Plan was implemented in Colombia with sufficient funds to combat drug cartels. Not to mention, the Medellin cartel had significant control of its territory until the early 1990s. The type of cartel violence in the mid-1980s up to the 1990s was mostly cartel-state violence in Medellin.

In the same fashion, Culiacan did not receive sufficient international assistance before 2007 until the Merida Initiative was implemented. Culiacan’s type of cartel territorial control changed in the early 2000s but then remained under the Sinaloa Cartels’ control. However, Culiacan’s type of cartel violence was mostly cartel-civilian violence and inter-cartel violence before 2007, but then it changed to cartel-state violence. The timeframes that I will observe are 1984-1989 and 1990-1993 in Medellin and 2000-2007 and 2008-2011 in Culiacan. These timeframes will help me process trace how my independent variables affect the dependent variables. The scope conditions are given that there is state weakness the above explanations can be generalize to other cases. Additionally, the hypotheses that I stated above can explore the possibility of alternative explanations and whether there is a relationship between the above variables that explain governments response. However, I must mention that there is a possibility of reverse causation between my variables throughout my case studies.
2.1.1 Operationalizations

I collected qualitative and quantitative data to measure my independent variables, i.e., international assistance, the type of cartel control and the type of cartel violence to examine how each independent variable interacts with my dependent variables’ outcomes: cooperation or retaliation. I have defined and provided measurements of each variable below.

International Assistance

I define international assistance when assistance is provided from a foreign state in forms of military assistance, training and equipping counternarcotic battalions, technology and intelligence training and counternarcotic and economic monetary funds from the used towards military assistantship, training and equipping counternarcotic units, technology, and intelligence training by the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Economic Support Fund (ESF). I used INCLE, IMET, FMF, and ESF because they are the funding account names provided by USAID that funded counternarcotic initiatives. I measured international assistance given each year to the Colombian or Mexican government using U.S. Government Documents, USAID, and other sources with international assistance reports. High level of international assistance will be measured as greater than 82 million dollars used towards military assistantship, training and equipping counternarcotic units, technology, and intelligence training. On the other hand, medium level of international assistance is measured between 24 to 82
million dollars whereas low level of international assistance will be measure as less than 24 million dollars used towards military assistantship, training and equipping counternarcotic units, technology, and intelligence training.

*Type of Cartel Territorial Control*

I distinguish between two types of cartel territorial control: cartel monopoly control and cartel competitive control. Cartel monopoly control is when cartels have monopoly over a given territory by controlling sales of drugs, transit of drugs, aspects of the population and is able to protect its territory by all means necessary when threatened by a competitor or law enforcement officials. On the other hand, cartel competitive control is when there are two or more cartels or independent operators have control of a given territory. To measure the type of cartel territorial control, I used secondary sources such as newspaper reports coding for disputes within cartels.

*Type of Cartel Violence*

I distinguish between three types of cartel violence: cartel-civilian violence, cartel-state violence, and inter-cartel violence. Cartel-civilian violence is when cartels use coercive force against civilians in forms of extortion, kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings. In contrast, cartel-state violence is when cartels use coercive force against security forces and governments in forms of firefights, raids, assassinations, and bombings. On the other hand, inter-cartel violence is when cartels have disputes with other cartels in the forms of shootings,
assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings. I used the above indicators to locate that information in newspapers reports and violence related studies.

*Government Response: Cooperation and Retaliation*

I define cooperation when the municipal, state or federal government comply with cartels by protecting, facilitating, staying on standby when there is cartel-related violence, or not extraditing important leaders of the cartels when arrested. I measured cooperation using the above indicators by looking when cartel-related violence occurs in the forms of assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings occur; when the authorities fail to take any action to stop it and when cartel leaders are arrested but are not extradited. By contrast, I define retaliation as a mechanism of state repression against cartels in the forms of police/military operations such as raids/seizures, extraditions, or confrontations between police/military and cartels. Retaliation and cooperation were located with newspaper reports and articles. Cooperation was placed at one extreme of the spectrum and retaliation at the other extreme to trace the variation of each of the independent variables.
3 CASE STUDIES

3.1 Medellin’s Government Response to Cartel Violence

In this section, I will examine Medellin’s government response depending on the level of international assistance, cartel monopoly control, and type of cartel violence. The Colombian government began to receive U.S. antinarcotic assistance in 1973 when both states signed a bilateral agreement; since then, the U.S. had provided funds to the Colombia government in forms of aircraft, vehicles, communication, and investigative supplies and equipment to Colombian narcotics control and law enforcements (GAO, 1988). However, I will focus on the timeframe from 1984 to 1993 to see how my independent variables, type of cartel territorial control, international assistance, and the type of cartel violence, affect the Colombian government response to cartel violence with either cooperation or retaliation against cartels. The graphs below show U.S. funding assistance and extraditions from 1984 to 1993.

Figure 1 U.S. Anti-narcotics assistance to the Colombian government from 1984 to 1993
Source: U.S. Foreign Aid Greenbook
In April of 1984, the Medellin cartel assassinated the Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, who was also known to openly criticized cartels and talked about his enforcement against drug trafficking (El Colombiano). After this attack from the Medellin Cartel, the Colombian government did not take it well. President Betancur retaliated against the cartel by enforcing extradition treaties that he initially did not want to implement in Colombia. During this year, the Medellin cartel had cartel monopoly control and the level of international assistance was low; that being the case, I argue that the cartel-state violence explanation is the best to explain the Colombian government response during this year. The Colombian government responded with retaliation towards the cartel because the cartel used direct coercive violence against the state. The violence used was against the Minister of Justice of Colombia, an important leader responsible for the law and justice for the national executive ministry of the government of Colombia. Therefore, the Colombian government's response against the Medellin...
cartel can be explained by the Colombian government responding with force to maintain order or at least the impression of it.

The following year, Bogota’s Superior Court Judge Tulio Manuel Castro Gil, who had indicted Escobar for the murder of Lara Bonilla is assassinated as he climbs into a taxi. Throughout 1985 judicial harassment and intimidation becomes commonplace in Colombia. Consequently, in November of 1985, the Medellin Cartel financed the M-19 guerilla to ambush the Supreme Court of Colombia resulting with the death of 100 people, including police officers and 12 judges of the Supreme Court of Colombia (Atta and Anderson, 1988). After the ambush in the Supreme Court, the Colombian government continued to retaliate with the extradition treaties of drug traffickers. As you can see in Figure 2, the Colombian government allowed for five Colombian citizens to be extradited to the United States. In this point in time, the level of international assistance was low, and the Medellin cartel continued to have monopolization over its territory. Henceforth, I argue that cartel-state violence continued to influence the Colombian government to respond with retaliation in the form of extraditions because the Medellin cartel carried out multiple assassinations of Supreme Court Judges and other important government officials. As I stated, when cartels used coercive violence against the state, governments respond with retaliation.

In December of 1986, Guillermo Cano Isaza, the editor-in-chief of El Espectador, was assassinated on his way home from work (Forero, 2020). He was known to write about tough penalties against drug traffickers. In late August 1986, a few weeks after President Barco took office, a trial judge, apparently bribed or threatened by traffickers, unexpectedly cooperated with the release of cartel member Jorge Luis Ochoa. Ochoa had recently been extradited from Spain to Colombia, and the United States wanted him extradited. The Colombian government
cooperated with releasing and not extraditing Jorge Luis Ochoa, one of the key founding members of the Medellin Cartel. In 1986, the Colombian government received 11.59 million dollars which is a low amount of international assistance. Additionally, the Medellin cartel continued to have monopoly control of Medellin. Violence in Medellin reached 115 homicides per 100,000 with cartel-civilian violence. Therefore, I argue that each of my independent variables can explain the Colombian government's response with cooperation during the above incidents. Meanwhile, I also consider that the change of Presidents from Bentacur to Barco did not impact the Colombian government's response since President Barco did not take any action against drug cartels once he took office. Therefore, international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel violence affected the Colombian government's response during this year.

However, in June 1987, the Colombian Supreme Court, intimidated by all the violence and threats the Medellin Cartel expose the Colombian government, ruled the extradition treaty unconstitutional despite President Barco’s signature. Then, in November of 1987, Jorge Luis Ochoa was captured. Twenty-four hours after his capture, gang thugs arrive at the house of Juan Gomez Martinez, an editor of Medellin’s newspaper El Colombiano. They provide Gomez with a communique from “The Extraditables,” which threatens the Colombian government with executions of Colombian political leaders if Ochoa is extradited (PBS). Later that year, Ochoa was release under doubtful legal matters. As a result, the Colombian government cooperated with the cartel by releasing Ochoa and ruling out the extradition treaties. The Colombian government had received a low amount of international assistance of 12.92 million dollars.

Moreover, the Medellin cartel continued to have monopoly control over its territory. As a result, I argue that governments cooperated to cartel violence because of cartel monopoly control
and a low level of international assistance. The Medellin Cartel continued to show monopoly control of its territory by founding “The Extradibles” and controlling an aspect of the population by threatening to conduct coercive violence against the state by killing political leaders. In conjunction, the Colombian government did not have enough funds to overcome the corruption of the release of Ochoa’s doubtful legal matters.

In January of 1988, the murder of Colombian Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos was claimed by the Extraditables (PBS). Hoyos was investigating wrongdoings in the government and judiciary. He also had recently begun to investigate Jorge Luis Ochoa Vasquez's release. President Barco promised not "give in" to blackmail or intimidation by traffickers in a national speech. He invoked the state of siege powers and announced a package of emergency measures, the Statute for the Defense of Democracy. Specifically, he announced that he would increase the National Police force of 70,000 men by 5,000 and appoint 5,000 new judges and assistants. Barco also pledged to renew extradition efforts and ordered the military to join the police in a new offensive. In a month, the army destroyed two large cocaine processing complexes and dozens of smaller ones but did not recapture Jorge Ochoa (Bagley, 1988). Although international assistance was low and the Medellin cartel had monopoly control, the Colombian government responded with retaliation instead of cooperation. Under those circumstances, I argue that the Colombian government responded with retaliation against the Medellin cartel because cartel-state violence was used against the Colombian government by assassinating Colombia's General Attorney Hoyos. As a result, the Colombian government retaliates to maintain public order disturbed by the Medellin cartel.

In 1989, the Medellin Cartel carried out several manifestations of violence against the government. Firstly, the Medellin Cartel killed Governor Antonio Roldan Bentacur on his way to
a speech. Then, they killed Judge Maria Elena, who refused to take brides throughout her career. Later that year, they killed the presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan when he appeared to demonstrate his campaign. They later exploded a bomb on a commercial airplane to murder his replacement, killing all those aboard. The assassination of the presidential candidate of the New Liberalism party Luis Carlos Galán on August 18, 1989, and the "declaration of war" on August 24 by the Extraditables against the Colombian government gave a sense of urgency to the US mobilization. On August 25, President Bush invoked Section 506 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and ordered 65 million dollars in military supplies to the Colombian Armed Forces and police (Guaqueta, 2005). President Bush seized the opportunity to launch the United States National Drug Control Strategy. He presented the Andean Strategy in his televised address on September 6, 1989. In addition, the Colombian government ordered to destroy all airplane landings strips that were not registered with the government.

Additionally, the identities of Supreme Court judges that handle narcotic cases were kept secret. By the end of that year, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez, one of the drug lords of the Medellin cartel, was killed by the Colombian police in a raid on his ranch in Tolu. As you can see in Figure 2, President Barco used his executive orders to bring extraditions into effect. As a result, the Colombian government extradited 15 Colombians to the United States. During this time, the Colombian government was not affected by the Medellin cartel monopoly control since it responded with retaliation. On the ground of this, I argue that the Colombian government retaliated against the cartel because the Medellin cartel used direct coercive violence against a presidential candidate and other government officials. On top of that, the United States gave a sufficient amount of international assistance since Barco promised to fight against cartel violence.
In April 1990, Pablo Escobar offered 4,200 dollars for each dead CNP police officer; thus, local killers responded by murdering 42 city police officers in May (De la Torre, 2008). On April 11, 1990, eight members of the Elite Corps died after the explosion of 100 kilos of explosives under the Pandequeso bridge. Unfortunately, eight civilians also lost their lives (El Colombiano). Meanwhile, the Andean Initiative was being implemented in Colombia. The Colombian government was provided economic, military assistance, and law enforcement assistance through INCLE, FMF, IMET, and MAP by receiving 111.07 million dollars. In the first five months of 1990, thirty-eight metric tons of cocaine were seized—surpassing the total for all of 1989. The cost of the offensive is estimated at 1 billion dollars (Committee on Government Operations, 1990). After such violent events from the Medellin cartel, the Colombian government responded with retaliation because the Medellin cartel was using coercive violence against the state by offering 4,200 dollars for each dead CNP police officer, causing the death of 42. Additionally, the international assistance from the United States helped the Colombian government respond with retaliation by extraditing three Colombians to the United States.

However, when President Gaviria took office in late 1990, one of the Ochoa brothers surrendered when the Colombian government under Gaviria promised not to extradite him to the United States, where he was wanted for drug charges. Later that year, Ochoa's younger brother Fabio, also another cartel leader, surrendered. As you can see above in the extradition Figure, seven Colombians were extradited to the United States earlier that year. However, drug leaders like the Ochoa brothers were not extradited after President Gaviria took office. The following year, the new constitution declared an anonymous vote to ban extraditing criminals to the United States. As a result, Escobar, the Medellin Cartel drug lord, surrendered himself to the Colombian authorities with the condition that his imprisonment would be "lenient" and that he would not be
extradited under President Gaviria's Sometimiendo policy which demanded confession of crimes and for criminals to surrender.

Meanwhile, the homicide rate was the highest point in Medellin, with 381 homicides per 100,000 in 1991, including in the past thirteen months, about 350 policemen have been kill by hired sicarios (Farah, 1991). The Colombian government agreed to Escobar's surrender allowing him to live in La Catedral, which was known to be a luxurious mansion. I argue that the Colombian government cooperated by not extraditing these critical members of the Medellin cartel because President Gaviria's goal when he came into office was to reduce cartel violence. To that end, Gaviria's administration was more lenient with drug cartels and cooperated to stop cartel-civil violence and for the key members to surrender. As a result, the Medellin key members agreed to their surrender but under their conditions. At the same time, the Medellin cartel continued to have monopoly control over its territory, which I argue that it also contributed to the Colombian government cooperating with the Medellin cartel with its lenient prosecution laws.

After Escobar's surrender, homicide rates went down fifteen percent; however, it all changed when Escobar brought two of his lieutenants, Fernando Galeano and Gerardo Moncada, to La Catedral for questioning. He suspected they were stealing from him; then, he killed them. After this event, Gavira ordered Escobar to be transferred to a more secure prison. As a result, Escobar escaped from La Catedral, Escobar's escaped humiliated the Colombian government. Unfortunately, the violence reemerged in Medellin. The Medellin cartel continued to kill police forces and launched bombs. For instance, a police officer was on his way home from work and was shot to death (UPI, 1992). The day before, five police officers were shot dead by young men recruited by the Medellin cartel. In December of 1992, a bomb was blasted near the Antansaio
Girardot sports stadium, killing fourteen people, including ten police officers among the dead (Reuters, 1992). The Medellin cartel also began to avenge military cartel boss Brances Munoz who died in a shootout with security forces. After Escobar escaped and there was continuous violence, under U.S. and Colombian police chiefs’ pressure, Gavira committed full force retaliation against the Medellin cartel. The Bloque de Busqueda among the DEA agency dedicated their intelligence to finding Escobar that eventually helped to find and killed Escobar in a shootout in December 1993. The Colombian government did have help with Escobar’s removal from the Cali cartel and Los PEPES. I argue that the Colombian government’s retaliation response was caused by Escobar using violence while he was in La Cathedral because Escobar knew he was losing control of the Medellin cartel’s monopoly control. Eventually, Los PEPES (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) ambushed the Medellin cartel with the help of the Cali cartel and collaborated with the Colombian authorities against the Medellin cartel, making it to a more competitive control. After Escobar’s escape, he continued to use cartel-state violence by killing police officers and kidnapping government officials to negotiate with the Colombian government. However, the Colombian government ignored Escobar's request and continued to retaliate. Additionally, the international assistance given to the Colombian law enforcement by the creation of the Bloque de Busqueda and the assistance given by the DEA gave the Colombian government a better fighting chance against the Medellin cartel resulting in the death of Pablo Escobar.

The Colombian government shifted from retaliation to cooperation or vice versa from 1984 to 1993 when there was cartel violence. From 1984 to 1985, the Colombian government retaliated against the Medellin cartel since cartels used cartel-state violence against important government officials. Unfortunately, this retaliation from the Colombian government leads to
more violence from the Medellin cartel. However, from 1986 to 1987, the Colombian government cooperated with the cartel by releasing and not extraditing Ochoa, and the Supreme Court declaring the extradition treaty unconstitutional. International assistance during these years was low, and the Medellin cartel had monopoly control over the sales of drugs, transit of drugs, and controlled aspect of the population with corruption. I argue that the most influential variables are international assistance for not having sufficient funds to overcome the corruption caused by the Medellin cartel's monopoly control that bribes government officials.

Despite all, from 1988 to 1989, the Colombian government retaliated against the Medellin cartel because of several assassinations of government officials, making cartel-state violence and international assistance the important variables during this period by shifting the government response from cooperation to retaliation; meanwhile, cartel monopoly control stayed the same. From 1990 to 1992, the Colombian government response shifted from retaliation to cooperation. The Medellin cartel continued to enforce cartel violence even after President Gaviria took office. However, Gaviria decided to cooperate with the Medellin cartel with lenient prosecution laws against the cartel members if confessed and surrendered. I argue that Gaviria's administration impacted the Colombian government's response to cartel violence, and the shift from cartel monopoly control to a competitive control began when Escobar got "arrested" in 1991. However, after Escobar escaped, the Colombian government decided not to tolerate the Medellin cartel's coercive violence against the state and ignored Escobar's attempts to negotiate. Instead, Gaviria's government committed itself to total retaliation against the Medellin cartel with the help of international assistance from the United States, which resulted with the Medellin cartel losing monopoly control to a more competitive control that led to the death of Escobar in late 1993.
3.2 Culiacan’s Government Response to Cartel Violence

![Graph showing U.S. Anti-Narcotic Assistance (USD millions) from FY 2000 to FY 2011.](image)

*Figure 3 U.S. Anti-Narcotic Assistance to the Mexican government from 2000 to 2007 and Merida Initiative funding estimate FY2008 to FY 2011
Source: U.S. Foreign Aid Greenbook; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) budget office, U.S. Department of State*

![Graph showing Extraditions to the U.S. from 2000 to 2011.](image)

*Figure 4 Extraditions from 2000 to 2011
Source: U.S. Department of Justice*
In this section of the paper, I analyze Culiacan with the timeframes of 2000 to 2011. I want to see if there is a possible explanation of the Mexican government’s response to cartel violence by looking at international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel violence. As you can see in Figure 3, the Mexican government received 23.360 million dollars from the United States to support antinarcotic control in 2000. Then, the following year, the Mexican government received 49.685 million dollars, but it received the highest amount of U.S anti-narcotic assistance in 2006 with 166.825 million dollars (USAID).

Since 2000, the funds were used for equipment and training for the Mexican army, mainly to help the Mexican Navy intercept planes and vessels suspected of transporting illicit drugs. However, defense officials said that U.S. efforts to intercept suspected Mexican-flagged vessels are hampered by the lack of a maritime cooperation agreement and, also, that coordination with the Mexican Army, which manually eradicates drug crops (GAO, 2007). Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) funded the maintenance of the aircraft and sensors and training for sensor operators and image analysts. Part of NAS funding was also used to provide logistical support to contractors, including spare parts.

In the early 2000s, Culiacan did not experience significant cartel-related violence but mostly turf wars between cartels. However, "El Chapo" Guzman escaped from prison in 2001 with the helped of bribed guards. He was able to take monopoly control of his territory from Carrillo Fuentes and Arellano Felix in the mid-2000s (Mira and Curtis, 2003). I argue that the Mexican government cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by facilitating El Chapo escaping from prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison; additionally, by not taking any action after his escape. During this period, the Mexican government received insufficient international assistance from the United States, leading to inadequate law enforcement performance against
the Sinaloa cartel. Moreover, the monopolization of the Sinaloa cartel over Culiacan and its surroundings controlled the local police making them loyal to the cartel by facilitating "El Chapo" Guzman's escape and his recapture with bribes. During this time, the type of violence was inter-cartel violence because there were disputes between factions of the Sinaloa cartel. As a result, these disputes among cartels did not get the Mexican government's attention to stop it by any means.

Visible violence during this cartel war was uncommon, and the Sinaloa cartel was careful to keep their confrontations under the radar (Duran-Martinez, 2018). In 2002, Ramon Arellano Felix was killed by the Sinaloa Cartel's gunmen and Sinaloa state police (Jordan and Sullivan, 2002). In another shoot-out between sicarios and Rodolfo Arellano Felix's bodyguards in 2004, one of Rodolfo's bodyguards was injured. The bodyguard turned out to be the ministerial police of State (PME) Pedro Perez Lopez. During his recovery, the governor of Sinaloa gave him paid leave and praised him as an "effective commander." (Al Cimino, 2013). During this period, cooperation between municipal and federal police with cartels was common. I argue that cooperation from the municipal and federal police can be explained by the Sinaloa cartel offering better-paid protection since their salary is meager when there is not enough international assistance given to the Mexican government. Furthermore, it provides significant proof that the Sinaloa cartel began to monopolize its territory; meanwhile, inter-cartel violence occurred, and the state did not take any action to terminate it.

Despite that drug-related violence was not a big concern for the Mexican authorities before 2006, the Mexican authorities under Fox’s administration still began to crack down on drug trafficking because of massive cooperation from lower parts of the Mexican government with cartels. The crackdown began with arresting important members of the drug cartels and
extraditions to the United States. As you can see in Figure 4, extraditions increased from 2000 to 2006. However, in September of 2001, Arturo Guzman Loera, brother of “El Chapo” Guzman, was arrested but later was killed in 2004 by another prisoner named Jose Ramirez Villanueva (Vanguardia). Then, in 2005, Miguel Angel Guzman Loera was detained by special forces of the Mexican Army in Culiacan, Sinaloa (Rosen and Zepeda, 2016). Although the Mexican government was extraditing drug traffickers to the United States, the Mexican government cooperated by not extraditing these important leaders once they were captured. The Mexican government continued not to receive a sufficient amount of international assistance. Furthermore, the Sinaloa cartel had a monopoly over its territory, making it easier to protect important leaders.

After President Calderon took office, he declared war on drugs. Just ten days after taking office, President Calderón deployed 6,784 soldiers, 1,054 Marines, 1,420 federal police officers, and 50 detectives in Michoacán (Grayson, 2010). President Calderón declared “a war on drugs” that continued during his administration and spread from Michoacán to at least seven other states and regions: Chihuahua, the Isthmus region (southern border of Mexico), Guerrero, Baja California, Sinaloa, Nuevo León-Tamaulipas, and the Golden Triangle (parts of Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Durango). As a result, violence began to emerge at different levels in other states and cities have not experienced before; however, that was not the case for Culiacan. Culiacan reached its highest rate of 18.48 per 100,000 homicides in 2001, but it remained lower than 18.48 per 1000,000 homicides between 2000 to 2007 (SNSP).

After a year of Felipe Calderon being in office, the Merida Initiative was signed between Felipe Calderon and George W. Bush in December of 2007. The initiative led to an increase in U.S. financial support to Mexico in resources to combat drug trafficking. It included resources to
help train police officers, improvements in the security institutions that combat narcotics, and renovate the judiciary system in Mexico (Rosen and Zepeda, 2016). However, the Merida Initiative would not start until 2008. The U.S. provided 1.6 billion dollars to all the programs and activities under the Merida Initiative. I argue that the United States provided support to the Mexican government when Calderon took office since he declared war on drugs. The United States saw the opportunity to collaborate with the Mexican authorities.

Calderon’s crackdown causes kingpins like “El Chapo” and Ismael to lose billions of dollars and to make them fight over their plaza payments. As a result, Joaquin Guzman and Ismael Zambada fought in Culiacan, Sinaloa, against their longtime friend and ally “the Beard” Beltran Leyva. The turf war in Culiacan began in 2008, with cartel-related violence skyrocketing with 1,084 homicides. At the time of the turf war, El Chapo Guzman had an alliance with federal officials to take over all of Mexico’s trafficking supported by federal troops. Not to mention, El Chapo is known to have helped with the arrest of his enemies, for example, the brother of Alfredo Beltran Leyva, who was arrested in January of 2008 in Culiacan. The Mexican government’s “Operation Clean House,” i.e., an operation to find corruption among government officials, helped discover several federal police officials cooperating with the Sinaloa Cartel. President Felipe Calderon acknowledged that corruption among federal police and soldiers was a significant problem in Mexico, along with drug trafficking (Associated Press, 2008). The Mexican government retaliated against Levy’s (ABL cartel) faction; however, the Mexican government, with the help of international assistance, discovered that federal officials were cooperating with the Sinaloa cartel.

As shown in Figure 3, under the Merida Initiative, the Mexican government received 400 million dollars from the ESF, FMF, and INCLE in 2008. President Calderon, with the resources
provided by the U.S. anti-narcotic assistance, conducted several operations against cartels. On April 30th, 2008, a battle emerged in an upper-class neighborhood in Culiacan between state police and sicarios. Soon after the battle, two members of the state judicial police were declared dead. As a response, the Mexican federal government implemented the joint military-police Operation Culiacan-Navolato in response to these violent incidents in Culiacan. This operation mobilized 2,723 armed personnel, including soldiers, federal police, marines, and the attorney’s general police (Duran-Martinez, 2015). By the end of May, this mobilization caused a major violent event in Culiacan between the federal police and sicarios. The federal police were preparing to search a house when the shooting broke out, in which a suspected hitman was killed and two were arrested (Expansion, 2008). I classify this action as retaliation by the Mexican government because they sent out the military to Culiacan once these violent events arose. The Mexican government had received a sufficient amount of international assistance from the United States, and there was cartel-state violence while these violent events took place. Additionally, I must also consider that the change in administration from Fox to Calderon impacted the Mexican government's response with retaliation. Therefore, Calderon's repression against drug cartels affected cartel violence throughout Mexico, making this an ongoing cycle.

In 2009, the Mexican government received 460 million dollars from the FMF, ESF, and INCLE. The following year, Mexico received 639 million dollars which was the highest amount received from the U.S. However, in 2011, it began to decrease, with the Mexican government receiving 143 million dollars from FMF, ESF, and the INCLE. In 2009, the son of Ismael Zambada, Vicente Zambada Niebla is captured by the Mexican Military, then he was extradited to the United States in 2010 (El Universal, 2009). Then, in December of 2009, Marcos Arturo Beltran-Leyva, who was the leader of ABL, was killed in a Government of Mexico operation
intended to capture him; he was known to be one of the most violent members of the organization (U.S. Department of State). A year later, Carlos Beltran Leyva, Arturo’s brother was arrested in Culiacan by the Federal Police (El Universal, 2010). When the violence peaked in 2009 with 1059 and 2010 with 1815, the least disturbed organization appeared to be the Sinaloa Cartel, whose foremost leaders Guzmán and Zambada remained large and still in charge. The apparent triumph of the Sinaloa’s gave rise to speculation that this organization was better protected than its rivals by corrupting government authorities (Burnett, Menaloza and Benincasa 2010). I argue that the Sinaloa cartel had disputes within its faction, forcing important cartel members to create their own organizations and declare war on the Sinaloa cartel, resulting in the Sinaloa cartel losing cartel monopoly control from 2000 to 2004 and after Calderon took office in 2008. However, after enough international assistance given by the United States, the Mexican government retaliated by extraditing 107 drug traffickers, assassinating, and capturing significant ABL cartel and Sinaloa cartel leaders. Additionally, cartel-state violence used by the cartel was against the Mexican government’s military, making the Mexican government retaliate even more against the cartels. Nevertheless, the Sinaloa cartel under Guzman and Zambada continued to have monopoly control once the critical leaders of the ABL cartel were removed even though the Mexican government retaliated more intensely towards the cartel than during Calderon’s presidency than Fox’s.

4 DISCUSSION AND RESULTS: MEDELLIN AND CULIACAN

In this section of the paper, I will discuss the results of the case study of Medellin and Culiacan. I examine each of the three possible explanations of government response in Medellin
and Culiacan. I will explore the possibilities of international assistance, type of cartel territorial control, and type of cartel violence to have an interactive and cyclical nature with either cooperation or retaliation. At the end of this section, I will compare Medellin and Culiacan by applying the above variables and pointing out their interactions.

_Type of Cartel Territorial Control and Government Response_

In this part of the paper, I will apply hypothesis 1 to my cases: Medellin and Culiacan. My first hypothesis states that when there is cartel monopoly control, governments respond with cooperation. I will trace the interaction between the type of cartel territorial control and governments' response to cartel violence with either cooperation or retaliation.

To begin with, the Medellin cartel had significant monopoly control from the late 1970s until the early 1990s. In the timeframes that I observed from 1984 to 1991, the Medellin cartel held monopolization until Escobar's arrest in 1991. In 1984, the Medellin cartel assassinated the Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla; thus, the Colombian government retaliated against the Medellin cartel by implementing extradition treaties with the United States even though the Medellin cartel had monopoly control. The following year, the Medellin cartel continued to carry out acts of violence, such as the assassination of a Superior Court Judge. The Colombian responded with retaliation by extraditing five Colombians to the United States; meanwhile, the Medellin continued to have monopoly control. In 1988, the Medellin cartel via the Extradibles assassinated Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos. Subsequently, the Colombian government responded with retaliation by destroying two large cocaine processing complexes and a dozen smaller ones. In 1989, the Medellin Cartel carried out several manifestations of violence against
the Colombian government by assassinating Governor Antonio Roldan Bentacur, Judge Maria Elena, presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan, then later exploded a bomb on a commercial airplane to murder his replacement, killing all those aboard. The Colombian government responded with massive retaliation by destroying all airplane landings that were not registered with the government and brought extraditions into effect; going on, the Medellin cartel still had monopoly control. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not accurate when the Medellin cartel monopoly control from 1984 to 1985 and 1988 to 1989.

In 1986, the Medellin cartel assassinated Guillermo Cano (the editor-in-chief of El Espectador); instead of the Colombian government retaliating against the Medellin cartel, it cooperated to cartel violence by releasing and not extraditing Jorge Luis Ochoa, one of the key founding members of the Medellin Cartel when the Medellin cartel held cartel monopoly control. The following year of 1987, the Colombian government cooperated again by ruling the extradition treaty unconstitutional despite President Barco's signature and releasing Ochoa after his recapture in November that year; meanwhile, the Medellin held cartel monopoly control. In 1990, Pablo Escobar offered incentives for local killers to murder police officers resulting in the death of 42 police officers in one month. However, later that year, when Gaviria took office, he cooperated with the Ochoa brothers by negotiating their surrender without extraditions. The Medellin cartel continued to have monopoly control while these negotiations occurred. From 1991 to 1993, the Medellin cartel began to lose monopoly control after Escobar "surrendered" to La Cathedral, which inclined the Colombian government to retaliate against the Medellin cartel once it began to have a more competitive control by collaborating with the DEA and unifying the Bloque de Busqueda that located intelligence to find Escobar. Hence, hypothesis 1 did sustain
accuracy when the Medellin cartel monopoly controlled from 1986 to 1987 and 1990 to 1991 and began to lose monopoly control to a more competitive control from 1992 to 1993.

On the other hand, the Sinaloa cartel did not have monopoly control before the mid-2000s. In the early 2000s, Culiacan did not experience significant cartel-related violence but mostly turf wars between cartels. However, the Mexican government cooperated by facilitating El Chapo escaping from prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison; additionally, it did not take any action against the cartel after his escape. Additionally, during turf wars between Arellano Felix and the Sinaloa cartel, the Sinaloa state, and ministerial police cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by protecting them against the Arellano Felix organization. On this account, hypothesis 1 was inaccurate when Culiacan had competitive cartel control from 2000 to 2004.

In the mid-2000s, “El Chapo” Guzman was able to take monopoly control from Carrillo Fuentes and Arellano Felix organizations. By the same token, after the capture of Miguel Angel Guzman Loera, an influential Sinaloa cartel leader in Culiacan, the Mexican government cooperated by not extraditing this important leader once he was captured. In 2008, the Sinaloa cartel began to lose monopoly control to a more competitive control when Calderon's crackdown caused "El Chapo" and Ismael to lose billions of dollars and to make them fight over their plaza payments. As a result, Joaquin Guzman and Ismael Zambada fought in Culiacan, Sinaloa, against their longtime friend and ally "the Beard" Beltran Leyva. The turf war in Culiacan began in 2008, with cartel-related violence skyrocketing with 1,084 homicides. The Mexican government's "Operation Clean House," i.e., an operation to find corruption among government officials, helped discover several federal police officials cooperating with the Sinaloa Cartel. The Mexican government retaliated against Levy's (ABL cartel) faction by mobilizing armed personnel, including soldiers, federal police, marines, and the attorney's general police (Duran-
Martinez, 2015). By the end of May, this mobilization caused a major violent event in Culiacan between the federal police and sicarios. The federal police were preparing to search a house when the shooting broke out, in which a suspected hitman was also killed, with two more were arrested. After the defeat of the ABL cartel in 2009, the Sinaloa cartel held monopoly control once again; thus, the Mexican government cooperated to cartel violence by failing to take any action to stop it. Nevertheless, hypothesis 1 was accurate when the Sinaloa cartel held monopoly control from 2005 to 2007 and 2009 to 2011, and when there was competitive cartel control, hypothesis 1 was accurate in 2008. As a result, after looking at each case, my overall assessment of the accuracy on hypothesis 1 is that it was accurate in Medellin and Culiacan.

Type of Cartel Violence and Government Response

In this part of the paper, I will apply hypothesis 2 to my cases: Medellin and Culiacan. My second hypothesis states that when cartels use direct coercive violence against the state, governments are most likely to respond with retaliation against cartels. I will use the same approach as above by tracing the interaction between the type of cartel violence and government response with either cooperation or retaliation.

Violence in Medellin arose from the early 1980s to the early 1990s. After the assassination of Minister Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla by the Medellin cartel in 1984, the Colombian government responded with retaliation by enforcing extradition treaties. I argue that the cartel-state violence explanation clarifies the Colombian government's response during this year. The Colombian government responded with retaliation towards the cartel because the cartel used direct coercive violence against the state. The violence used was against the Minister of
Justice of Colombia, an important leader responsible for the law and justice for the national executive ministry of the government of Colombia. The following two years, the Medellin cartel continued to carry out cartel-state violence with the assassination of government officials and judges.

Consequently, the Colombian government continued to retaliate with the extradition treaties of drug traffickers. From 1988 to 1989, there were multiple assassinations of an important political leader, a governor, an attorney general, and a judge by the Medellin cartel; because of that, the Colombian government retaliated against the cartel because the Medellin cartel used direct coercive violence against a presidential candidate and other government officials. From 1992 to 1993, after Escobar escaped, the Medellin cartel carried out multiple forms of coercive violence against the Colombian government by killing police officers and kidnapping government officials to negotiate with the Colombian government. However, the Colombian government did not tolerate the Medellin cartel violence and decided to retaliate against the Medellin cartel with the United States' help using the DEA and the Busque de Busqueda. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was accurate when cartel-state violence, i.e., direct coercive violence against the state from 1984 to 1989 and 1992 to 1993.

In 1990, Pablo Escobar offered incentives for local killers to murder police officers resulting in the death of 42 police officers in one month. The Colombian government responded with cooperation when President Gavira introduced "lenient" prosecution laws against cartels. Therefore, the Colombian government cooperated by negotiating with the Ocha brothers when there was cartel-state violence. In 1991, the homicide rate was the highest point in Medellin, with 381 homicides per 100,000, including in the past thirteen months, about 350 policemen have been kill by hired sicarios. Although there was cartel-state violence, the Colombian government
cooperated by agreeing to Escobar's surrender and allowing him to live in La Catedral, which was known to be a luxurious mansion. On the ground of this, hypothesis 2 was inaccurate when there is cartel-civil violence and cartel-state violence from 1990 to 1991.

Violence in Culiacan was at low rates between 2000 to 2007; however, the homicide rates increased between 2008 to 2011. The Mexican government responded with cooperation when there was inter-cartel violence and cartel-civil violence. In the early 2000s, Culiacan did not experience significant cartel-related violence but mostly turf wars between cartels. However, "El Chapo" Guzman escaped from prison in 2001 with the helped of bribed guards. Therefore, the Mexican government cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by facilitating El Chapo escaping from prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison; additionally, not taking any action after his escape.

On the other hand, it responded with retaliation when there was cartel-state violence. For instance, On April 30th, 2008, a battle emerged in an upper-class neighborhood in Culiacan between state police and sicarios. Soon after the battle, two members of the state judicial police were declared dead. As a response, the Mexican federal government implemented the joint military-police Operation Culiacan-Navolato in response to several violent incidents in Culiacan. This operation mobilized armed personnel, including soldiers, federal police, marines, and the attorney's general police. By the end of May, this mobilization caused a major violent event in Culiacan between the federal police and sicarios. The federal police were preparing to search a house when the shooting broke out, in which a suspected hitman was also killed, with two more were arrested. Correspondingly, the Mexican government retaliated because they sent out the military to Culiacan once these violent events arose when there was cartel-state violence. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was accurate when there was inter-cartel violence and cartel-civil
violence between 2000 to 2011. Therefore, my overall assessment of the accuracy of hypothesis 2 after analyzing each case is that it was accurate in Culiacan and Medellin.

International Assistance and Government Response

In this part of the paper, I applied hypothesis 3 to my cases: Medellin and Culiacan. My third hypothesis states that when there is sufficient international assistance, governments respond with retaliation against cartels because of adequate counternarcotic funds and resources in law enforcement. I will apply hypothesis 3 to Medellin first and then Culiacan. I process traced the interaction between international assistance and government response with either cooperation or retaliation.

Medellin did not have sufficient international assistance in the late 1980s; however, by the early 1990s, the Andean Strategy Plan was implemented in Colombia to combat drug cartels. From 1984-85, the Medellin cartel had cartel violence against the state, such as assassinations of important government officials. Consequently, the Colombian government retaliated by enforcing extradition treaties with the United States; not to mention, the Colombian government received around 40 million dollars during these two years. From 1988-89, the Medellin Cartel carried out several manifestations of violence against the government. Firstly, the murder of Colombian Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos was claimed by the Extraditables. Afterward, the Medellin Cartel killed Governor Antonio Roldan Bentacur on his way to a speech. Then, they killed Judge Maria Elena, who refused to take bribes throughout her career. Later in 1989, they killed the presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan when he demonstrated his campaign. They later exploded a bomb on a commercial airplane to murder his replacement, killing all those
aboard. Henceforth, the Colombian government responded with retaliation by renewing extradition efforts and collaborating with the United States by implementing the Andean Strategy Plan and receiving over 70 million dollars within those two years. From 1992 to 1993, cartel violence reemerged by bombs being blasted, kidnappings of government officials, and police assassinations. Taking that into account, the Colombian government retaliated against the Medellin cartel with the international assistance given to the Colombian law enforcement by the creation of the Bloque de Busqueda, and the assistance given by the DEA gave the Colombian government a better fighting chance against the Medellin cartel resulting in the death of Pablo Escobar. Consequently, hypothesis 3 is accurate from 1984-85 with an overall medium level of international assistance and 1988-89 and 1992-93 with an overall high level of international assistance resulting in the Colombian government retaliating during those periods.

After the Medellin cartel assassinated Guillermo Cano Isaza, the editor-in-chief of El Espectador, the Colombian government cooperated by not taking any action against the cartel. Additionally, the following year, Jorge Luis Ochoa, one of the key founding members of the Medellin Cartel, had recently been extradited from Spain to Colombia, and the United States wanted him extradited. The Colombian government cooperated with releasing and not extraditing Jorge Luis Ochoa. From 1986 to 1987, the Colombian government received a low amount of international assistance. In 1990-91, the Medellin cartel provided monetary incentives to local killers resulting in the death of many police officers; additionally, after receiving a medium level of international assistance, the Colombian government should have retaliated against the cartel. However, the Colombian government cooperated when President Gaviria began implementing his "lenient" prosecution laws under the Sometimiendo policy, eventually leading for multiple vital leaders of the Medellin cartel to surrender without extraditing them to
the United States. Hypothesis 3 was not accurate from 1986-87 with a low level of international assistance and 1990-1991 with a medium level of international assistance resulting in the Colombian government to respond with cooperation instead of retaliation.

Culiacan did not receive sufficient international assistance before 2007 until the Merida Initiative was implemented. After a shooting broke out between the federal police and sicarios, two state judicial police were declared dead; thus, the Mexican federal government implemented the joint military-police Operation Culiacan-Navolato in response. Fortunately, the Mexican government had received a high level of international assistance from 2008 to 2009, which help with the mobilization of 2,723 armed personnel, including soldiers, federal police, marines, and the attorney's general police. This mobilization contributed to the capture and assassination of cartel members of the ABL cartel. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is accurate in 2008-11 with the Mexican government's overall high level of international assistance responding with retaliation during those periods.

In the early 2000s, the Mexican government cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by facilitating El Chapo escaping from prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison; additionally, by not taking any action after his escape. During this period, the Mexican government received a medium level of international assistance from the United States, but it still led to inadequate law enforcement performance against the Sinaloa cartel. Meanwhile, there was a turf war between "El Chapo" Guzman and the Carrillo Fuentes and Arellano Felix; the Sinaloa state police cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by providing them with protection against the other cartels. For that reason, hypothesis 3 was not sufficiently accurate from 2000-01 with an overall medium level of international assistance, causing the government to cooperate with cartels. However, from 2002-07, the Mexican government's level of international assistance was
high; thus, the Mexican government responded with cooperation when there was high international assistance instead of retaliating against the Sinaloa cartel. Henceforth, international assistance did not sufficiently explain Colombia's government response as it did for Culiacan. Therefore, after looking at each case, my overall assessment of hypothesis 3 is accurate in Culiacan but not for Medellin.

Medellin and Culiacan

In this part of the paper, I analyzed Medellin and Culiacan on my independent variables to differentiate the outcome of my dependent variables in both cities. Medellin and Culiacan's government response can be possibly explained by the type of cartel violence used by the cartel. For instance, Colombia's government responded with retaliation when the cartels used direct coercive violence against the state. Similarly, Mexico's government responded with cooperation when the cartels used coercive violence against civilians or retaliated when coercive violence was used against the state. Therefore, hypothesis 2 can be a possible explanation for both Medellin and Culiacan's government response. By contrast, hypothesis 3 has a more substantial effect on Culiacan than Medellin. Unfortunately, international assistance did not significantly impact Medellin, whereas hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 1 influenced how the government responded. Nevertheless, hypothesis 2 had a more substantial effect on Culiacan and Medellin than hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 3. However, I must acknowledge that there was an interactive and cycle relationship among these variables. For instance, in Mexico, when President Calderon took office in 2006, repression against cartels was his priority. As a result, cartel violence and
international assistance increased, which eventually led the Sinaloa cartel to lose monopoly control to a competitive control within cartels to more government retaliation.

Overall, the outcome of these two cities can help explain a possible explanation of why governments respond with either cooperation or retaliation depending on the type of cartel violence used by cartels and the type of cartel territorial control, or the level of international assistance. Initially, I argued that international assistance significantly affected the government's response; however, I was incorrect. Medellin and Culiacan can confirm the type of cartel violence, and the type of cartel territorial control has the most potent effect on how governments respond to cartel violence than international assistance as these variables interact with each other.

5 CONCLUSION

In brief, I hope the study conducted above can help contribute to the literature on drug cartel violence and state response by providing evidence of interactions among the type of cartel violence, the type of cartel territorial control, international assistance with government response to cartel violence. I found that the type of cartel violence impacted governments' response more than the type of cartel territorial control and international assistance; additionally, how the cycle of nature among these variables can explain how they interact with each other. For instance, when a new government emerges with repression against a cartel, it leads to more cartel violence to more government retaliation to cartels to lose monopoly control. Nevertheless, the case study of Medellin and Culiacan can help explore or generate a new theory by looking into the variation of different outcomes of government responses. Future research should contribute to the literature by looking into other cases, whether they have similar explanations as to the
Colombian and Mexican governments, to see if there's variation in cooperation or retaliation against drug cartels. Additionally, scholars can explore other possible explanations that affect government response, such as presidency transitions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Bruce, Bagley, M. (Fall, 1988) "Colombia and the War on Drugs" Foreign Affairs, Fall, 1988, Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 70-92


Calderón, Laura, Y. et al. 2019 "Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico" Justice in Mexico. 1-61


El Colombiano. #MedellinEsMas

El Universal. 2009 "Detienen al hijo de El Mayo Zambada"
El Universal. 2010 "La PF detiene en Culiacn a hermano del Jefe de Jefes"


Gillin, Joel. 2015. “Understanding the Causes of Colombia’s Conflict: Weak, Corrupt State Institutions.” Colombia Reports.


UPI, “Drug Gunman Kill 29th Policeman in Medellin” Nov. 12, 1992