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John S. Duffield

Georgia State University, duffield@gsu.edu

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John S. Duffield
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602-1615
(706) 542-1880
duffield@uga.edu

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Introduction

Since the end of the cold war, the security of the Asia-Pacific region has been the subject of considerable scholarly attention. One reason for this interest is the area's heightened strategic significance, which is itself due in no small part to the rapid economic growth that many of the countries in the region enjoyed in the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, the post-cold war international politics of the Asia-Pacific have been relatively dynamic and unsettled, especially in comparison with Europe. The breakup of the Soviet Union and subsequent turmoil in Russia, the rise of China, the strategic retrenchment of the United States, uncertainty about Japan, and other developments all have raised questions about the future trajectory of security relations in the region.

Of particular interest to a number of scholars has been the evolving constellation of international security institutions in the Asia-Pacific. One can discern two especially notable sets of recent developments. On the one hand, many long-standing mutual security arrangements have undergone significant changes, ranging from dissolution to revitalization. On the other hand, the last decade has seen efforts to fashion all new international security structures, most importantly the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), that, many hope, will be able to address the novel security challenges presented by the post-cold war era.

Despite this recent flurry of activity, however, one cannot help but be struck by the relatively limited nature of the formal institutional security architecture to be found in the Asia-Pacific region throughout the postwar era, at least in comparison, once again, with the Euro-Atlantic. Although both areas have been crisscrossed by large numbers of security ties, those of the Euro-Atlantic have generally been characterized by greater multilateralism, elaboration, and
formalization than have those of the Asia-Pacific. Such differences have been emblematic, moreover, of both externally-oriented collective defense ties and inclusive collective security arrangements at the regional level. In short, the Asia-Pacific has yet to host anything comparable to the highly-developed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), respectively.¹

The striking nature of these differences is only intensified when one considers that, at least from a global perspective, the two regions have possessed many common features since World War II. In both cases, the postwar era began with the defeat of a regional power that had aspired to hegemony, leaving a profound power vacuum. Subsequent years witnessed an increasingly intense struggle for influence and control by the two emergent superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, a competition that culminated in the formation of numerous formal alliances between them and local partners. Within its own spheres of influence, the United States exhibited, at least initially, a pronounced preference for multilateral security arrangements. And both regions have been characterized in more recent decades, but especially since 1990, by a growing degree of multipolarity as the cold war competition has abated and the power of the United States and the Soviet Union has declined in comparison with that of important regional actors.

How, then, is one to explain the contrasting nature of the security institutionalization that has occurred in the two regions? The answer to this question is of potentially great policy relevance. Prominent analysts have argued that the absence in the Asia-Pacific of a dense network of security institutions like that of Europe is one condition that makes the former area more ‘ripe for rivalry’ after the cold war.² Thus a better understanding of the determinants of regional security institutions should help to illuminate the prospects -- and perhaps even to
suggest concrete strategies -- for creating and strengthening those of the Asia-Pacific as part of a
more comprehensive program for promoting peace and stability in the region.³

At the same time, a comparative analysis of the formal security arrangements of the Asia-
Pacific regions promises to make a contribution to the more general theoretical literature on
international security institutions.⁴ Although a substantial number of works on the sources of
alliances already exists, scholars have yet to ask why such institutions are formalized and
elaborated to varying degrees and why they assume bilateral versus multilateral forms (when
more than two potential partners are available).⁵ Likewise, no systematic attempts have been
made to understand variations in regional collective security institutions.⁶

The use of an explicitly comparative approach should help to illuminate the causes of
such differences. Nevertheless, the purpose of this paper is not theory testing per se. Rather, the
goal is simply to identify factors that would seem to account for the variation in regional security
institutionalization that has been observed. To this end, the paper borrows freely from several
well-established theoretical perspectives in the international relations literature. The first of
these, neorealism, seeks to explain variations in international outcomes primarily in terms of the
structure of the international system, which is typically defined as the distribution of material
capabilities among states. Neorealist analyses may differ depending on whether the focus is on
global structures or those at the regional level. But for all neorealists, the intrinsic nature of
states as well as the international institutions they may create are relatively unimportant.⁷

In contrast, two other important theoretical perspectives stress precisely those factors that
neorealism deemphasizes. State-level or ‘second-image’ theories seek to explain international
outcomes primarily in terms of state characteristics. Over the years, such theories have
proliferated, and there is no consensus on precisely which state characteristics -- political system,
level of development, national identity, political culture, ideology, etc. -- are most consequential.
But second-image theorists would agree that such factors are determinative of whether or not state preferences and strategies are compatible and, just as importantly, whether or not states perceive them as being so. Finally, institutional theories seek to highlight the role that international institutions play in shaping international outcomes. The problem for the present analysis is that variations in institutionalization are precisely the outcomes we are seeking to explain. Nevertheless, institutional theory can be useful by sensitizing us to the possibility of path dependence as a result of sunk costs and altered incentive structures.

In fact, this analysis finds that all three of these theoretical perspectives help to account for the differences in security institutionalization observed between the Asia-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic areas. But some appear to be more helpful than others. In particular, differences in regional structural factors, especially the relative capabilities and geographical dispersion of the states in each area, appear to have been leading determinants of this cross-regional variation. Such factors, which are emphasized by fine-grained versions of neorealism, tended to promote the creation of multilateral alliances and stronger institutional forms in the Euro-Atlantic while favoring bilateralism and less elaborate and formalized institutions in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the early postwar years. Until relatively recently, moreover, the effects of these regional structural differences appear to have been significantly reinforced by differences in the patterns of state characteristics, especially those concerning historical animosities and levels of development, to be found in the two regions. In addition, the nature of the institutions established (or not, as the case may be) at one point in time has restricted the range of institutional possibilities at later junctures. Arguably, the constraining effect of the regional structural factors that inhibited the creation of strong multilateral security institutions in the Asia-Pacific has attenuated with the passage of time, but the state-level obstacles remain significant.
The following section surveys the empirical record of security institutions in the Asia-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, highlighting the most important differences. A second section discusses the inadequacy of a global structural perspective for explaining these differences. The third section explores the role of regional structural factors in producing the contrasting institutional outcomes. A fourth section explicates the reinforcing effects of state characteristics and the role of institutional path-dependence. In a conclusion, I draw upon the preceding analysis to consider the future prospects for security institutionalization in the Asia-Pacific.

The Empirical Record

Since World War II, both the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific have hosted large numbers of security institutions. Most prominent among these have been strong -- by historical standards -- alliances linking the United States to regional actors, but there have also been some modest regional collective security arrangements. What distinguishes the regions is not so much the sheer number of security institutions as it is the greater elaboration and formalization of those ties and the more multilateral nature of alliances in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Alliance Formation During the Early Cold War Years, 1945-1955

These differences emerged by the early 1950s. By that time, the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area had formed a highly institutionalized 12-member alliance, NATO, which included both an elaborate political apparatus for consultation, policy coordination, and joint decision-making and an integrated military planning and command structure. Grounded in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, NATO also built on the pre-existing Western Union, which six West European states had established the previous year. In the early 1950s, moreover, five of the original continental members of NATO in combination with the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) elaborated plans for a supranational European Defense Community (EDC), which, however, never came to fruition.\(^9\)

In contrast, the security institutions of the Asia-Pacific region in the early postwar years consisted primarily of a series of bilateral agreements concluded by the United States and individual countries: the Philippines (August 1951), Japan (September 1951), South Korea (October 1953), and Nationalist China (December 1954). The only -- and still modest -- departure from this initial pattern was the trilateral security treaty signed by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS) in September 1951. It was not until 1954 that a multilateral arrangement bearing any resemblance to NATO was born with the signing of the Manila Pact that led to the creation of the eight-member Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) the following year.\(^10\)

Especially in comparison with NATO, moreover, most of these U.S.-sponsored arrangements were only weakly institutionalized. As a general rule, they involved less binding security guarantees, few if any common policy making structures, little joint military planning, and minimal or no integrated command bodies and military infrastructure.\(^11\) In addition, they failed to include some important non-communist regional actors, such as Indonesia, Burma, and India, all of which had been mooted as potential members of SEATO, and, after its independence in 1957, Malaya.\(^12\) It is also noteworthy that, in contrast to the Western Union and NATO, none of these alliances was established until after the outbreak of the Korean War and that no comparable formal security arrangements of any kind – bilateral or multilateral – were concluded among the many U.S. allies in the region.

**The Emergence of Regional Collective Security Institutions**
A second distinct phase of regional security institution-building took place in the late 1960s and 1970s. In the Euro-Atlantic area, the principal development during this period was the establishment of the bloc-transcending Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1973 and the signing two years later of the Helsinki Final Act, which included a set of principles concerning the behavior of participating states and several confidence-building measures (CBMs). Although the CSCE was better characterized as a process than as an organization, through the 1980s it nevertheless served as the pan-European forum for the negotiation of arms control agreements and additional CBMs.

In the Asia-Pacific region, in contrast, there was no comparable movement, however modest, toward the establishment of an all-inclusive regional collective security system. What little activity of this nature that did take place occurred at the sub-regional level, with the founding of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Yet even ASEAN could be characterized as a security institution in only the most limited terms. Indeed, only in 1992 did its leaders explicitly agree for the first time that security cooperation was a worthy goal and begin to address security issues directly. In addition, ASEAN contained only very general behavioral prescriptions, such as non-interference in the internal affairs of other members and renunciation of the threat or use of force; few formal mechanisms, which have seen little or no use; and no military component. Instead, ASEAN consisted primarily of regular dialogues and consultation, leading on occasion to consensual ad hoc agreements that placed few constraints on its members. SEATO, for its part, rather than grow, began to lose members and was finally disbanded in 1977, although the Manila Pact on which it was based remained in force.

**The Post-Cold War Period, 1990-present**
It was not until the 1990s that either region witnessed a degree of security institution-building that was in any way comparable to that of the early postwar years. In the Euro-Atlantic area, this activity has assumed a wide variety of regional and sub-regional forms. The CSCE has been transformed from a process into a formal organization consisting of several permanent bodies, and it has acquired a growing number of security-related mechanisms as well as a new name (OSCE). NATO has been streamlined and has developed new appendages -- the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Partnership for Peace (PFP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council -- that have joined it and its members with erstwhile adversaries and European neutrals. The members of the European Union (EU) have sought to fashion a new European security and defense identity (ESDI) based on a revitalized WEU and the EU's own new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).\(^\text{19}\) And the countries of the region have forged several important pan-European agreements concerning arms control and CBMs.

Although not insignificant, the level of post-cold war institution building in the Asia-Pacific region has not been nearly as great. Here, the most important development has been the initiation, in July 1994, of the ASEAN Regional Forum.\(^\text{20}\) By bringing together virtually all the states in the area, including the major powers, the ARF represents the potential kernel of a regional collective security system. So far, however, it remains only minimally institutionalized, possessing few formal structures or procedures. Instead, it continues to emphasize dialogue, consultation, and informal consensus in lieu of decisive action, with the most noteworthy achievements taking the form of modest CBMs. As a result, it has not yet helped to resolve any actual conflicts or yielded any concrete institutional measures that might significantly enhance the security of its participants.\(^\text{21}\)
In addition, the end of the cold war has been followed by considerable activity in the area of bilateral security relationships. The closure of the last U.S. bases in the Philippines in 1992 was offset by the conclusion of modest military support arrangements between the United States and Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei.22 In December 1995, Australia and Indonesia signed a very general agreement on security cooperation, although this was subsequently suspended.23 The United States and Japan have taken steps, most notably the issuance of a revised set of defense cooperation guidelines, to reaffirm and strengthen their long-standing security ties.24 And even Vietnam has moved toward establishing military ties with the United States.25 None of these bilateral developments, however, has notably altered the overall security architecture of the region. Even the U.S.-Japan alliance, which is the strongest of these bilateral arrangements, remains far less elaborated than NATO.

In sum, both the Asia-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic areas have hosted large numbers of security institutions since shortly after World War II, and both have seen a renewal of institution-building activity in the post-cold war era. Nevertheless, the security institutions of the two regions have been characterized by important differences concerning the degree of formalization, elaborateness, and multilateralism. How might we best make sense of these regional patterns of security institutionalization, in terms of both their similarities and their differences?

**The Inadequacy of a Global Structural Perspective**

A common starting point for the analysis of security affairs is neorealist theory. Neorealist explanations typically emphasize the basic structure of the international system, as defined primarily by the number and relative capabilities of major powers. In fact, a global structural perspective does help to explain the rapid proliferation of security institutions in both
the Asia-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic during the decade after World War II as well as the emergence of proto-collective security institutions in later years. It is much less able, however, to account for the important differences across the two regions that are identified above.

From a global perspective, the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific areas shared a number of important structural features during the early postwar years. In each case, a would-be regional hegemon lay in ruins, defeated and occupied. Although both Germany and Japan continued to represent potential threats, should their war-making potentials ever be revived without adequate controls, the dominant powers then vying for influence in each region were the United States and the Soviet Union, a situation that reflected the highly bipolar nature of the new global power structure. Increasingly, moreover, and perhaps quite naturally in view of this bipolar structure, relations between the two superpowers were marked by tension and hostility. As a result, the United States became ever more inclined to seek the rapid political and economic rehabilitation of the defeated regional powers, or at least those parts of their former territories lying within its sphere of influence. From the U.S. perspective, it was imperative to deny the Soviet Union control over the industrial and military resources of Germany and Japan.26 And ideally, their energies could be enlisted in the emerging global competition for influence between Soviet communism and the West.

These common factors go far toward explaining the emergence of formal U.S. security ties to states in both regions. American efforts to hasten the restoration of sovereignty, the economic recovery, and the rearmament of the defeated powers raised acute security concerns among their regional neighbors, which had so recently been the victims of German and Japanese aggression. Consequently, the United States found it expedient to offer formal security guarantees to Western-oriented states in both areas in order to obtain their acquiescence in its
lenient policies toward Germany and Japan.\textsuperscript{27} Otherwise, the erection of strong regional bulwarks against Soviet influence would have been much more problematic.\textsuperscript{28}

Although a global structural perspective yields important insights, it does not begin to provide a fully satisfactory account of the security institutionalization that has occurred in the Asia-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Several of the leading motives for the creation and maintenance of security institutions do not fit easily with such an analytical framework. Above all, there is the rather awkward fact that many of the initial postwar security arrangements were directed at least as much against Germany and Japan as they were against the Soviet Union, notwithstanding the severely weakened positions of the defeated powers.

In addition, the structural similarities cannot explain the important variations identified above in the nature of security institutionalization across the two regions. The difference in the degree of multilateralism is even more puzzling when one considers U.S. preferences. Although these are often portrayed as fundamentally different in the two regions, they were in fact quite similar. The Truman administration was not enthusiastic about incurring formal security obligations in either area, but its natural inclination and initial predisposition, once the need to extend security guarantees became clear, was to seek multilateral solutions. In the Euro-Atlantic area, U.S. officials never gave any serious consideration to purely bilateral arrangements. In the Asia-Pacific as well, the original U.S. conception was of a multilateral Pacific Pact that would include the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly Indonesia.\textsuperscript{29} Yet this proposal was never realized. And the primarily bilateral nature of the institutional outcome in the Asia-Pacific would seem to be rendered yet more problematic by the fact that, given the differences in timing, an attractive multilateral model already existed in the form of NATO.\textsuperscript{30}
A global structural perspective is no more satisfactory for explaining subsequent institutional developments in the two regions. Clearly, the emergence of the CSCE was facilitated by the considerable improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations that began in the 1960s, just as the end of the cold war set the stage for the further institutionalization of the CSCE and the first steps toward the possible erection of a collective security system in the Asia-Pacific that have occurred in the 1990s. In Northeast Asia in particular, recent concerns among American allies that the United States might reduce its security role in the region has done much to prompt interest in multilateral alternatives. Yet the decline and, later, the disappearance of cold war antagonisms cannot account for the important differences that mark the two regions -- above all the fact that inclusive collective security arrangements appeared much earlier and have attained much higher levels of institutionalization in the Euro-Atlantic area -- or for the precise character of the institutional outcomes, given the wide range of possibilities.

The Importance of Regional Structural Factors

The limitations of a global structural perspective suggests the need, at least as a first step, for a more fine-grained neorealist analysis that is sensitive to regional characteristics. Such an approach directs our attention to sub-systemic structural conditions, such as the number, relative capabilities, and location of regional actors, that can serve as important additional incentives for and impediments to security institutionalization. For example, one important factor that a focus limited to the power and policies of the United States and Soviet Union fails to capture is the leading role that lingering concerns about potential German and Japanese power played well after the end of World War II in shaping regional security cooperation. After all, it was those countries, not the Soviet Union, that had just waged unsuccessful campaigns of aggression against many of their neighbors. Consequently, it was natural for surrounding countries to
continue to fear and to seek assurances against them, even though they had been eclipsed in terms of actual capabilities by the new superpowers. Indeed, Asia-Pacific states initially demanded U.S. security assurances almost exclusively out of concerns about a possible resurgence of Japanese power once the United States began to press for a liberal peace treaty.33 Likewise, France, in seeking alliance ties with the United States, was motivated at least as much by the anxieties triggered by Western moves to create a separate German state out of the western zones of occupation.34 Several years would have to pass before the Soviet Union and its satellites would replace them in the eyes of many as the principal regional threat. Only the last early cold war security institutions to be erected in the Asia-Pacific can be viewed principally as attempts to block the expansion of communist influence.35

The employment of a regional structural perspective is even more useful for highlighting dissimilarities across the two areas under consideration that can serve as the basis for a more satisfactory explanation. At least two differences in the geostrategic circumstances of the U.S. spheres of influence in the Asia-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic help to account for the disparate institutional outcomes, especially during the early postwar years.36 The first is differences in the relative sizes of the extant regional actors. The construction of security institutions in Western Europe benefited from the presence of two major -- if no longer great -- powers, Britain and France, which were willing and able to take the initiative and play leading roles in this process. In the Asia-Pacific, in contrast, no countries of comparable rank existed.37 As a result, although even a country as large as France frequently evinced fears of German domination, Japan’s potential regional partners had even more reason to be concerned and thus to eschew security ties with the former hegemon for fear of being dominated.38

At least as important, however, are the geographic characteristics that have set the two regions apart. For example, one finds considerable differences in the proximity of regional states
to one another. In the Euro-Atlantic area, many countries shared a common border with or lay only a short distance from the former enemy. As a result, it was not difficult to imagine that a serious military threat could quickly materialize if and when the shackles of the occupation were removed. In the Asia-Pacific, in contrast, most regional actors were located far enough from Japan that they had somewhat less (although still good) reason to be concerned. Japan would have to acquire a substantial power projection capability before it could once again threaten them, and it would be relatively easy to interpose the U.S. navy. Consequently, they had less incentive to erect strong institutional security structures -- beyond bilateral ties with the United States -- as a hedge against a possible revival of Japanese militarism. This situation may also help to explain the lack of institution building prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.

Geographic proximity also made it more natural and easier for West European states to work together. Proximity meant a greater degree of security interdependence; an external threat to one country often represented a threat to others. In addition, considerable gains were to be had through cooperation, since the security of one country could often be enhanced by strengthening the defenses of its contiguous neighbors.

In the Asia-Pacific, by contrast, greater distances meant that threats to one country did not necessarily translate into common security concerns requiring joint solutions. As a result, less was to be gained through multilateralism, and the obstacles to collective military preparations were greater. The assumption of defense obligations to other countries in the region was unlikely to enhance a state's security and might well, in the event of actual hostilities, have the effect of tying down scarce defense resources that would be needed elsewhere.39

Finally, the nature of the respective institutional security arrangements was importantly shaped by the geographical circumstances of the regional power center. In Europe, the industrial resources of western Germany were located hard on the dividing line between the two emerging
blocs. Consequently, the task of deterring and defending against possible attacks on German territory, especially once the outbreak of the Korean War convinced Western leaders that Soviet military restraint could no longer be assumed, was a highly demanding one. It required the active participation of all of western Germany’s neighbors as well as that of the Federal Republic itself. This requirement in turn necessitated the establishment of elaborate political and military structures to determine and coordinate the myriad activities of the allies and to ensure that German armed forces, once formed, would be under tight allied supervision and control.40

In the Asia-Pacific, by contrast, the vital center of regional power, Japan, although actually closer to the territory of the Soviet Union than was Germany, lay off the Eurasian mainland. As a result, the United States, by virtue of its substantial naval and air capabilities, could defend Japanese territory almost single-handedly. There was no compelling need to involve other countries, and since relatively few Japanese resources, in addition to U.S. basing rights, were required, there was little need for elaborate bilateral structures either. By the same token, because of their distance from the Soviet threat and the availability of U.S. naval protection, other island states in the region had little to gain from military ties with Japan. It was simply a less important potential security partner than was the Federal Republic in Europe.

A further consequence of the relatively low level of security interdependence in the Asia-Pacific resulting from the geography of the region was that the United States initially had little interest in making security commitments to non-communist territories that bordered directly on or that lay just overland from the Soviet Union and its Chinese ally, e.g., South Korea, Hong Kong, Indochina, Thailand, and Burma. Not only were these areas of relatively little strategic importance, but they seemed highly vulnerable to attack. As special envoy and soon to be Secretary of State John Foster Dulles noted in early 1952, ‘the United States should not assume formal commitments which overstrain its present capabilities and give rise to military
expectations we could not fulfill, particularly in terms of land forces’. Consequently, the Pacific Pact proposal proffered by the United States was limited to offshore island states.

The initial U.S. inclination to exclude mainland territories from its formal security sphere in the Asia-Pacific had yet another important consequence. From London's perspective, not only would it leave the British colonies of Hong Kong and Malaya unprotected, but it would suggest that Britain was renouncing its responsibilities in the region. Thus the British voiced strong objections to the U.S. proposal. Primarily as a result of this opposition, the multilateral Pacific Plan quickly dissolved into bilateral arrangements with Japan and the Philippines and the trilateral ANZUS treaty.

In more recent years, the arguably higher level of security interdependence bred by greater geographical proximity in Europe as a whole has fostered the development of stronger collective security institutions there than in the Asia-Pacific. One might also expect the growth of Chinese power to have had a stultifying impact in this regard, but it has thus far had, in fact, the opposite effect. An important motive for the formation of the ARF was the desire to constrain China by engaging it in a constructive manner. Nevertheless, although China has not (yet) posed enough of a threat to provoke strong balancing behavior by its neighbors, the creation and strengthening of many bilateral security arrangements in the region as well as the ARF itself represent attempts to respond to the rise of Chinese by ensuring continued U.S. engagement.

**Reinforcing State-Level and Institutional Factors**

Differences in regional structural factors appear to account to a considerable extent for postwar differences in security institutionalization in the Asia-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic areas, especially during the early cold war years. Nevertheless, two other sets of factors seem to have importantly reinforced and sometimes supplemented the effects of local geostrategic
circumstances. These are the characteristics of the states in the region and their perceptions of one another, and the path-determining effects of pre-existing international institutions.  

**State Characteristics**

In contrast to neorealist theory and other systemic or ‘third image’ approaches, a number of theoretical attempts to explain international relations have emphasized the characteristics of the units, in this case nation-states. Notwithstanding its structural ‘neorealist’ turn of the past two decades, even realist theory has traditionally placed considerable weight on the nature of states and their perceptions of one another. And over the years, an almost bewildering array of other unit-level theories, concerning everything from class and social structure to political institutions to ideology and culture, have been developed and advanced. Despite their significant differences, these approaches are united in agreement on the importance of the intrinsic behavioral and perceptual dispositions of states, whatever their origins. In particular, such factors can greatly shape the possibilities for security cooperation.

Among other things, this state-level perspective directs our attention to differences in the character of Germany and Japan and in regional perceptions of them, differences which have had important institutional consequences. Although there was little love lost between Germany and her western neighbors after World War II, the especially brutal nature of Japan's wartime behavior (and, before that, its colonial practices) erected unusually high obstacles to postwar cooperation with potential regional partners, obstacles that in fact have still not been overcome. These differing legacies of the conflict were subsequently reinforced by the types of policies pursued by the defeated powers. Once established in 1949, the FRG aggressively pursued reconciliation with its neighbors, championing novel schemes for European integration that might even involve the sacrifice of important aspects of state sovereignty. Japan, in contrast, had
minimal dealings with nearby countries, focusing instead on its bilateral relationship with the United States.\textsuperscript{47}

Consequently, fears of Japanese intentions and anti-Japanese sentiment more generally remained strong long after the war. Shortly after the failure of the American Pacific Pact proposal, Dulles, who had been the chief U.S. negotiator, wrote that many prospective members of any Asian alliance ‘have memories of Japanese aggression which are so vivid that they are reluctant to create a Mutual Security Pact which will include Japan’.\textsuperscript{48} In 1954, when the members of the Western Union and NATO were willing to add Germany to their ranks, Australia and New Zealand opposed the inclusion of Japan in the relatively inconsequential SEATO on the grounds that to do so would be provocative in areas where the physical or psychological scars of the war remained unhealed.\textsuperscript{49} And South Korea and Japan, both close U.S. allies with several nearby common enemies, did not even normalize their political relations until 1965 because of historical animosities.\textsuperscript{50}

Nor have intra-regional obstacles to security cooperation been limited to lingering attitudes of enmity toward defeated would-be hegemons, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Another important unit-level factor, especially in the early postwar years, has been the legacy of imperialism, especially distrust, and in some cases outright hostility, on the part of former colonies toward the former imperial powers. As Dulles observed in the language of the time, ‘Many Orientals fear that Westerners are incapable of coöperating with them on a basis of political, economic, and social equality’.\textsuperscript{51} As a result, newly independent states were often hesitant or unwilling to enter into the security arrangements proffered by the United States, especially where doing so meant compromising their neutrality.\textsuperscript{52} In particular, Indonesia, Burma, and India had no interest in joining SEATO.\textsuperscript{53} Indeed, Indonesia under Sukarno pursued a foreign policy based on confrontation against all forms (both real and imagined) of colonialism
and imperialism, opposing in particular the U.S. and British military presence in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore.\(^{54}\)

More generally, the fact that the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area have been characterized by a high degree of political, economic, and cultural homogeneity has arguably contributed to a natural cohesiveness and mutual identification that facilitated the emergence of multilateral security arrangements independently of any favorable geographical circumstances.\(^{55}\) In the Asia-Pacific region, by contrast, security cooperation has often been impeded by significant differences in the level of political and economic development, not to mention the possibility of racist attitudes. Thus, in the early 1950s, Australia and New Zealand were reluctant to assume defense obligations to the Philippines, which they viewed as politically unstable and, in any case, unable to make much of a contribution to their common security.\(^{56}\) As Dulles noted in his post-mortem on the Pacific Pact negotiations, ‘some countries are as yet unable or unwilling to qualify for definitive security arrangements under the “Vandenberg formula” of “continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid”’.\(^{57}\)

Occasionally, other dyadic tensions and conflicts rooted in state characteristics have interfered with institution building or precluded greater multilateralism. For example, in the early 1950s, Australia viewed Indonesia as a major threat, given the risk that communists might come to power in Jakarta and revisionist Indonesian claims to western New Guinea, and thus opposed its inclusion in U.S. proposals for multilateral security arrangements.\(^{58}\) By the same token, Indonesia's decision to jettison its policy of Confrontation with Malaysia and adopt a more conciliatory attitude in the mid-1960s following Sukarno’s replacement by Suharto was a necessary condition for the establishment of ASEAN.\(^{59}\)

Curiously, these unit-level differences could on occasion serve as a fillip to multilateralism. One consideration that influenced the initial U.S. design for a Pacific Pact was
the desire to have Asiatic representation in the form of the Philippines and possibly Indonesia. Later, the imperative to avoid the taint of imperialism was an important U.S. motive for resisting the expansion of ANZUS to include Britain, notwithstanding entreaties from London, and for creating SEATO. A primary purpose of Indonesia’s support for ASEAN was to alter its neighbors’ negative perceptions of its intentions. Likewise, an important Japanese motive for promoting multilateral security cooperation in the region after the cold war has been to reassure others.

**Institutional Path-Dependence**

Consideration of institutional factors themselves as possible explanatory variables can further enrich our understanding of the patterns of security institutionalization considered in this paper. The principal conceptual contribution of an institutional perspective in this context is that of path dependence. The choice of institutional arrangements at one point in time can have an important bearing on institutional (and other) possibilities and outcomes at subsequent junctures. Although this perspective would thus seem to be most useful for explaining later rather than earlier developments in a temporal sequence, it also helps to justify the considerable attention paid so far to the initial phase of security institutionalization in the two regions.

In fact, the search for institutional determinants of the postwar security outcomes in the Asia-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic must go back at least to the institutional legacies of World War II, especially the occupation regimes imposed on Germany and Japan. Differences in those regimes contributed to the different regional configurations of power and interest that in turn influenced the timing and nature of the initial postwar regional security institutions.

In Japan, the United States effectively enjoyed total control over the administration of the occupation. It was dependent on other countries primarily to legitimize its policies, especially when it sought to reach a peace agreement with Tokyo at the beginning of the 1950s. In
Germany, in contrast, power was divided, both de jure and de facto, among the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France.

This power-sharing arrangement had several important consequences. First, it hastened the unfolding of the cold war in the European theater. Conflicting objectives with regard to Germany contributed to a rapid breakdown of four-power cooperation and early decisions by the three western powers to proceed jointly with the political and economic rehabilitation of their zones of occupation. These moves helped in turn to put the issue of U.S. security guarantees to the countries of Western Europe on the agenda as early as 1948, some two years sooner than occurred in the Asia-Pacific.

Second, the multilateral nature of the occupation regime meant that, even after attempts to find a common solution with the Soviet Union to the German problem had ceased, the United States could not easily pursue its objectives in the western part of Germany unilaterally. Rather, it still needed to obtain the cooperation of Britain and France. Thus these two European powers enjoyed greater leverage over U.S. policy than did any Asia-Pacific state. This leverage helped Britain and France to extract American security guarantees at an earlier date than was possible in the Asia-Pacific.

Finally, the presence of British and French as well as U.S. military forces in western Germany meant that the territory of the FRG was covered by NATO security guarantees. As a result of this situation, France in particular was spared the need to agree to early German membership in the alliance. In contrast, a comparable Asia-Pacific security arrangement involving Japan could have been truly multilateral only if Japan had been included as a formal party from the outset. This, of course, was a requirement that all potential members of the proposed Pacific Pact other than the United States found highly objectionable.
Once the first postwar security institutions began to form in Europe, further institutional consequences followed. The multilateral Western Union offered a logical and compelling model for NATO, which can be understood primarily as an expansion of the former to include the United States and Canada. In fact, given the prior existence of the Western Union, it would probably have been difficult for the United States to insist on organizing its security ties to Europe on a purely bilateral basis, even if it had wanted to. In contrast, no such regional institutional template existed in the Asia-Pacific prior to the U.S. decision to offer security guarantees to countries in the area.

The early experience with NATO had a different set of consequences for the shape of the security institutions that were to emerge in the Asia-Pacific. Most importantly, objections to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that arose in the Senate during the ratification process led Truman administration negotiators, especially Dulles, to press for the inclusion of more open-ended, and thus less controversial, language in the guarantee clauses of the treaties concluded with allies in the Asia-Pacific. In addition, prior military commitments in Europe made in the context of NATO caused the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to object strongly to the assumption of any comparable obligations in the Asia-Pacific, especially while large numbers of forces were tied down in Korea. And later, it has been suggested, pre-existing alliance arrangements were at least partly responsible for the lack of effort to develop true collective security or collective defense schemes in Southeast Asia.

One can point to additional examples of institutional path dependence in the wake of the cold war. In both the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions, most of the institution building that has taken place since 1990 has centered on international institutions erected during previous decades. Few, if any, of the new security institutions have been created entirely from scratch. Consequently, one might legitimately wonder whether the OSCE, the NACC and the PFP, the
CFSP, and the ARF might ever have emerged but for the prior existence of the CSCE, NATO, the EC, and ASEAN, respectively. Indeed, in the absence of ASEAN, something even as modest as the ARF might have been difficult to set up, given the continuing level of mistrust among the major powers in Northeast Asia.70

Moreover, the new institutions have strongly reflected the strengths and limitations of their predecessors. To continue with the example of the ARF, its extremely low level of formalization and elaboration is not surprising given the nature of ASEAN. In contrast, the architects of the new European security architecture have benefited in general from the prior existence of a much stronger and more diversified institutional basis on which to build. Of course, the degree to which the potential of pre-existing institutional infrastructures is actually exploited will depend on a range of other factors, not least of which are the interests of their participants and the degree of amity and enmity that prevails among them, as suggested by the case of the ARF. Nevertheless, one can say that such institutional legacies will be especially determinative when the structure of the international system offers few clear imperatives, as has been the case since the end of the cold war.

**Conclusion**

This analysis has found that, using familiar theoretical approaches to the study of international relations, one can offer a highly satisfactory account of postwar patterns of security institutionalization in the Asia-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Commonplace analytical perspectives help to explain both the similarities and the differences in the institutional outcomes that have characterized the two regions. At the most general level, a global structural perspective helps to account for the rapid proliferation of security institutions in both regions during the decade after World War II and, to a lesser extent, the institution building that has taken place
since 1990. It cannot explain, however, the much greater degrees of multilateralism and of and institutional formalization and elaborateness to be found in the Euro-Atlantic area throughout the postwar era.

In order to understand these differences, it is necessary to consider structural factors of a primarily regional nature, such as the relative sizes and the geographical dispersion of relevant regional state actors. In particular, the absence of potential regional counterweights to Japan, the relatively great distances between Japan and other U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific, and Japan’s greater defensibility in comparison with West Germany resulted in fewer opportunities and incentives for security cooperation than existed in the Euro-Atlantic area during the early postwar years. These unfavorable structural circumstances were reinforced by state characteristics, such as enduring enmity toward Japan, mistrust of the former colonial powers, and disparate levels of development, that erected additional obstacles to the construction of strong multilateral security institutions in the region. Finally, we have seen how the presence (or absence) of regional institutions at one point in time has importantly shaped the possibilities for further institutional development at later junctures.

Missing, perhaps conspicuously so, from this analysis has been a search for internal motives for the formation of regional security institutions. Important recent studies of the sources of alliances have shown that weak regimes sometimes seek security ties with other states in order to shore up their positions vis-à-vis domestic opponents. In fact, considerations of this nature have not been entirely absent from the calculations of postwar national leaders in the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific areas. For example, an important initial purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty was to raise confidence and boost morale in the countries of Western Europe. And SEATO was set up as much to counter the danger of internal subversion in the countries of Southeast Asia as it was to deter more traditional external forms of aggression. In later years,
Indonesia at least viewed ASEAN largely as a means to address internal threats by preventing external interference in its domestic affairs.  

Overall, however, domestic security concerns appear to have done relatively little, in comparison with the other factors identified in this paper, to promote or hinder the formation of security institutions in both regions. In Western Europe, apprehensions about the durability of the democratic orientation of several countries immediately after World War II were short-lived. And although domestic instability in some of the post-colonial Asia-Pacific states due to a lack of strong central political institutions or the presence of serious internal challenges sometimes served to obstruct the establishment of alliance ties by diminishing the appetite of potential partners for greater security cooperation, this does not seem to have been the dominant determinant.

**The Future of Security Institutions in the Asia-Pacific**

On the basis of the preceding analysis, one might derive several conclusions about the prospects for further security institutionalization in the Asia-Pacific. In important respects, the obstacles to multilateralism and the development of more elaborate and formalized institutions have been reduced. Other significant impediments remain, however, and some new ones have emerged. Thus the further development of regional security institutions, especially those of an inclusive nature, is possible, but progress is not likely to come as easily as it has in Europe.

Turning first to conclusions that follow from the global structural perspective, the end of the East-West ideological conflict that marked the cold war should, on balance, facilitate the formation of inclusive regional collective security institutions, as has already begun to occur with the formation of the ARF. At the same time, however, it renders problematic the preservation of existing alliances -- primarily those involving the United States -- predicated on the Soviet threat
and precludes the creation of strong new ones, absent the emergence of compelling new security rationales.

A second structural development of a global nature, the steady erosion, if not the definitive end, of U.S. hegemony in its former spheres of influence, has ambiguous implications. In some respects, it complicates the task of institution building and maintenance. In theory, the existence of an effective hegemon can compensate to a considerable extent for the absence of common interests and even the presence of significant conflicts among other regional actors. During the decades since World War II, and especially in recent years, however, both the relative power of the United States and the size of its military presence in the Far East has declined, reducing its previously unrivaled potential for inducing or coercing security cooperation.

Nevertheless, as suggested above, one should not exaggerate the ability -- or at least the willingness -- of the United States to impose multilateral institutions where they are not wanted. Its most ambitious proposal, the ill-fated Pacific Pact, was blocked by the opposition of much smaller regional actors. Paradoxically, moreover, the risk of U.S. disengagement and the desire to prevent it has served as a leading motive for the creation of new security ties in the Asia-Pacific. Thus perhaps the most that can be said is that American policy preferences will play an important role in shaping institutional outcomes in the region, notwithstanding the relative decline of U.S. power.

To the extent that global structural conditions have become yet less determinative of regional security arrangements, local structural circumstances should be even more so in the future. And from this perspective, the conditions for institutionalization are perhaps more auspicious than at any time since World War II. First, and paralleling the relative decline of U.S. power, the Asia-Pacific has seen since the 1940s the steady emergence of a number of important regional actors with the potential, in principle, to play leadership roles, thanks to a combination
of successful postwar economic recovery and development. These include Japan, Canada, South Korea, Australia, the ASEAN group, and, if one brings in former adversaries, China. Indeed, Australia, Canada, and ASEAN have been the sources of the most important multilateral institutional initiatives since the late 1980s.

One caveat is nevertheless in order. The regional distribution of power remains highly skewed in favor of Japan and, increasingly, China. Consequently, the smaller countries may well continue to fear the possible domination of regional security arrangements by those countries. In addition, the rise of China may continue to help to breath new life into the bilateral alliances forged by the United States in Northeast Asia during the cold war, and it could even overcome the traditional obstacles to closer Japan-Korea security cooperation.76

Second, the implications of the geography of the Asia-Pacific, which previously militated against multilateralism, may have been altered by advances in military technology. The protection previously afforded by the great distances between many regional actors and, in a number of cases, their offshore locations has been eroded by increases in power projection capabilities through such mechanisms as the proliferation of ballistic missiles and advances in naval technology. The resulting higher levels of security interdependence should, other things being equal, provide incentives for greater security cooperation.

These reasons for expecting further security institutionalization, especially of a collective nature, must be tempered, however, by a recognition of the enduring obstacles to institution building presented by the characteristics of the states in the region and their perceptions of one another. Rather than reinforcing the effects of regional geostrategic circumstances, as they did during the cold war, these unit-level factors may tend to work counter to the favorable structural trends identified above. In contrast to Europe, the Asia-Pacific remains fractured by tensions and conflicts stemming largely from state characteristics that can hinder the development of
collective security institutions even as they provide reasons for maintaining old alliances and creating new ones.\textsuperscript{77}

Chief among these are enduring historical animosities. To some extent, security cooperation may also continue to be hampered by the legacy of colonialism, especially the mistrust that it has generated on the part of former colonies toward former colonizers, a hindrance that is absent in the Euro-Atlantic area. Perhaps more importantly, Japan's otherwise substantial potential to exert political leadership in the region continues to be crippled by strongly-held memories in other countries of its actions as a colonial power and during World War II and its perceived failure, in marked contrast to Germany, to accept its responsibility and apologize for past misdeeds. It may still be many years, if not decades, before Japan can earn the confidence of potential regional security partners.\textsuperscript{78} For its part, Japan will find it difficult to assume security commitments involving military obligations to other countries, even where they are welcome, because of deeply-rooted anti-militarist sentiments.\textsuperscript{79}

More generally, the region's diverse state characteristics and practices raises fears and creates frictions that are not conducive to progress on international issues.\textsuperscript{80} The actual and potential political and economic instability of many states, such as Russia, China, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan, generates uncertainty about their future intentions and behavior. Beyond that, substantial differences in political and economic systems and levels of development may simply make it more difficult to find common ground on security issues.\textsuperscript{81} And some close observers have pointed to a deeply rooted Chinese preference for bilateralism and suspicion of multilateral institutions, which has served as a principal brake on the development of the ARF.\textsuperscript{82}

Not to be overlooked are the places, such as Korea, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Kurile Islands, where one can still find revisionist attitudes toward basic questions of political jurisdiction and territorial boundaries. Such fundamental conflicts can complicate even the mere
task of initiating and maintaining a dialogue on security issues, not to mention the actual creation of formal security ties. The trend toward democracy in several states, most notably South Korea, offers some grounds for optimism, since pairs of liberal democracies are less likely than other types of dyads to engage in military conflict. But this trend is not yet sufficiently widespread or far enough advanced to promise a fundamental change in overall regional security relations.

Finally, security institutionalization will continue to be constrained by the lack of a strong base of pre-existing regional institutions, especially institutions of a multilateral character, on which to build. To be sure, the presence of old institutions can sometimes stand in the way of creating new, more functional structures. For example, the initially cool American responses to proposals in the late 1980s and early 1990s for an Asian-Pacific cooperative security structure reflected concerns that such a body would undermine the U.S. alliances in the region. As suggested above, however, much of the recent activity in Europe has been facilitated by the presence of considerable institutional raw material with which to work. The other consequence of the absence of an elaborate and multilateral institutional infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific is that it may represent a lost opportunity for promoting reconciliation among past and present adversaries in the region. Although the historic improvement that has occurred in Germany's relations with its neighbors owes first and foremost to a conscious German strategy to effect such change, it was certainly facilitated by the presence of security institutions such as NATO that, although created for other purposes, could be used to burnish the country's image in the eyes of its partners.

Nevertheless, there is at least one institutional cause for optimism. Recent institutional developments in Europe, especially those of a pan-European nature, can serve as valuable sources of ideas for possible Asia-Pacific experiments. Indeed, some recent proposals have been explicitly modeled after aspects of the CSCE and OCSE. Although too close an association
with European structures can also taint an initiative in the eyes of some states in the region, their relatively successful track record may ultimately imbue derivative proposals for the Asia-Pacific with an appeal that can overcome parochial resistance.
Notes

1. This analysis emphasizes those parts of Asia that are contiguous with the Pacific Ocean, namely Northeast and Southeast Asia.


3. It should be noted that this paper does not attempt to undertake the equally important task of evaluating the effects and effectiveness of different types of regional security institutions.

Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1994), which examines both economic and security regimes.

5. One might justifiably question whether much of alliance theory actually considers alliances qua institutions rather than merely as alignments. For example, one particularly influential study, Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), defines alliance as any formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between sovereign states. This definition would not seem to preclude purely ad hoc, one-shot arrangements growing out of a transitory alignment of interests.

6. Two recent books employ a theoretically-informed, comparative approach to study regional security. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), focuses on security communities, which are ideational constructs, while David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), examines what are termed ‘regional orders’, which refer to modes of conflict management. Neither, however, is explicitly concerned with formal collective security organizations per se, although there are likely to be important links between the three phenomena.


8. The analysis will exclude the security institutions such as the Warsaw Treaty Organization that linked the Soviet Union to its respective regional allies.

9. In 1955, the FRG was admitted to both NATO and the WU, and the latter was renamed the Western European Union (WEU).

10. The signatories included the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan.

12. In 1957, Britain agreed to guarantee the security of Malaya (later Malaysia), its former colony, under the terms of the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA), with which Australia and New Zealand associated themselves in 1959.

13. Also of note is the 1971 Four-Power Agreement on Berlin, signed by the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France, which codified the status of the divided city.

14. As for alliance-like arrangements, the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement was replaced in 1971 by the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) linking Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. These new arrangements, however, were merely consultative in nature. See Muthia Alagappa, ‘Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanations’, in Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 611-76 at 634.

15. The five original members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei joined on attaining independence in 1984.


17. See, for example, Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), Michael Leifer, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum,’ Adelphi Paper, No. 302


19. All of the WEU’s original military structures had been absorbed by NATO by the mid-1950s. In the 1990s, however, it added a planning cell, a situation center, and a range of military and politico-military committees and working groups. (See Western European Union, ‘WEU’s Structure’, available from http://www.weu.int/eng/info/structure.htm; accessed 1 Oct. 1998.) And at the end of the decade, the EU took its first steps toward the acquisition of an autonomous capability for military action, including the creation of a Military Staff.

20. As of 2001, the membership of the ARF consisted of the ten ASEAN states, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and 12 other countries: Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, and the United States. In addition, a representative of the EU participates.


26. As early as 1948, George Kennan had defined them, along with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, as the five most vital power centers in the world from the standpoint of U.S. national security. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 30ff.


29. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, and David McLean, ‘Anzus Origins: A Reassessment’, Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 24, No. 94 (April 1990), pp. 64-82 at 68. In fact, the first serious discussion within the Department of State concerning possible multilateral security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific contemplated the inclusion of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Canada as well (McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, 265-6). This history conflicts with Peter Katzenstein’s contention that ‘[a]fter 1945 the United States enshrined the principle of bilateralism in its dealing with Japan and other Asian states’ and Miles Kahler’s suggestion (1994, 20) that the United States resisted multilateral security schemes desired by its allies in Asia. See Katzenstein, ‘Regionalism’, p. 143, and Miles Kahler, ‘Institution-building in the Asia-Pacific,’ in Mack and Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation, pp. 16-39 at 20.

30. Also rather problematic from a global perspective is the fact the United States did not simply impose its policy preferences for a multilateral arrangement on the states within its sphere of influence, much as the Soviet Union did in Europe. To explain such variations in superpower behavior requires acknowledging the existence of important sources of state interests that are not merely derivative of the material structure of the international system, an analytical move that is certainly inconsistent with the tenets of neorealism.


34. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*.

35. See, for example, McIntyre, *Background to the Anzus Pact*, p. 381.

36. Joseph Grieco has successfully used a similar approach for explaining differences in the degree of regional economic institutionalization (Grieco, ‘Realism and Regionalism’, esp. pp. 336-40). Nevertheless, Grieco places primary emphasis on differences in German and Japanese preferences, which he in turn explains in terms of U.S. power.

37. In 1965, Japan’s gross domestic product was equal to those of Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia combined. In 1989, it was more than three times as large. Figures derived from Table 4 in Donald Crone, ‘Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy’, *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (July 1993), pp. 501-25 at 510.
38. For similar reasons, Western-oriented Asian countries were reluctant to establish economic ties with Japan in the 1950s. See Grieco, ‘Realism and Regionalism’, p. 339.

39. In fact, the principal military commitments of Australia and New Zealand in the early postwar years lay in the Middle East. See McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 304.


45. Similarly, Peter Katzenstein (‘Regionalism’) has identified differences in domestic structures, especially the character of state institutions, as an important determinant of differences in the forms of regionalism pursued in Asia and in Europe.

47. Of course, it is important to recognize the structural and institutional reasons for these different policies. For geographical and economic reasons, Germany was much more dependent upon the goodwill and cooperation of its regional neighbors. In contrast, Japan had to rely primarily on the United States for its economic redevelopment as well as its security. In addition, the FRG began its life deprived of many of the traditional perquisites of sovereignty, not least of which was the right to make its own foreign policy. Thus it still had to overcome the mistrust of its neighbors before it could be fully rehabilitated politically.


50. Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). Although Japan and South Korea have engaged in a number of practical forms of security cooperation since 1965, they have never concluded a formal alliance.


52. Dulles, ‘Security in the Pacific’, p. 183

53. Braibanti, ‘International Implications’, p. 37; Brands, ‘From ANZUS to SEATO’, p. 268; and McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 383. The inability of the United States to impose its multilateral preferences on the countries of the region sits uncomfortably with Katzenstein’s characterization (‘Regionalism’, p. 142) of the period as one of ‘extreme hegemony’.


60. McIntyre, *Background to the Anzus Pact*, pp. 332-5.


66. Iceland, Denmark, Portugal, and Norway were invited to be charter members primarily because of the strategic importance attached to their North Atlantic territories, including Greenland and the Azores, for ensuring the unimpeded flow of U.S. reinforcements to Europe in the event of a conflict. See Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), pp. 82-3.

67. This discussion of institutional path dependence is not meant to deny the importance of realist factors in precipitating the formation of the Western Union and in motivating the conclusion of some form of transatlantic security ties.

68. Dulles, ‘Security in the Pacific’, p. 180. More generally, one is struck by how often diplomats and negotiators borrowed language from existing treaties in order to facilitate the conclusion of new agreements.


70. Likewise, the primary reliance of the United States on bilateral security agreements during the cold war caused Bush administration officials to be suspicious of new multilateral arrangements, which they feared might undermine existing U.S. ties. See Leifer, ‘ASEAN Regional Forum’, p. 23. It is not clear, however, whether this initial skepticism had any lasting consequences.


75. In this connection, it is also worth mentioning the long-term trend of growing strains in U.S. economic relations with some of its Asian allies, which occasionally spill over into security relations.


In October 1998, the Japanese prime minister offered an unusually forthright apology to the Korean people (New York Times, 9. Oct. 1998). Whether that and possible future gestures of atonement will be sufficient to overcome enduring regional resentments and suspicions remains to be seen, however. Just the following month, the President of China sharply criticized Japan for its unwillingness to apologize for its acts of aggression against that country in the 1930s and 1940s (New York Times, 30 Nov. 1998). And Japan has continued to resist international demands that it compensate the victims of its use of germ warfare or make records of the atrocities public (New York Times, 4 March 1999).

80. Aaron Friedberg has cited the lack of a common culture and of a shared identity in the Asia-Pacific, in comparison with the Euro-Atlantic, in ‘Ripe for Rivalry’, p. 24. The impact of such differences on security institutionalization, however, is relatively difficult to trace.


83. See Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, pp. 223-9, for an application of this argument to Japan-Korea relations.

84. See also Friedberg, ‘Ripe for Rivalry’, p. 23, and Betts, ‘Wealth, Power, and Instability’, p. 73.


86. See, for example, Christian Tuschhoff, in Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions, pp. 140-61.
