Summer 8-2024

Essays on Sector Switching

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ABSTRACT

ESSAYS ON SECTOR SWITCHING

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AUGUST, 2024

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The public sector has been facing a looming human capital with persistent challenges in recruitment and retention, highlighting the need to compete for talent against private sector employers. Sector switching is the process of changing from a private to a public job or *vice versa*, tracking the dynamic processes of attracting private workers and retaining public workers from leaving for private jobs. As few studies have examined sector switching, this dissertation aims to examine the causes and consequences of sector switching through a comprehensive approach, focusing on two general questions: 1. What factors impact the probability of sector switching? 2. What is the effect of sector switching on workers' pay?

This dissertation begins with the development of a framework for sector switching, discussing the necessary steps of changing jobs and moving to the other sectors in the process of switching sectors. Chapter II examines the impacts of demographic factors on the probability of sector switching, including gender, race, veteran, disability, sexual orientation, and marital and parental status. As sector switching impacts the public sector workforce, this chapter also contributes to representative bureaucracy studies by examining the representation of underrepresented groups in the public sector. The results show that gender and race, as well as

veteran, disability, sexual orientation, and marital and parental status affect whether workers switch to the other sector.

Chapter III explores the impacts of sector switching on workers' pay, appearing to be the first to examine the question in the context of the U.S. As sector switching tracks workers between the public and private sectors, this chapter also contributes to public-private sector wage differential studies by examining wage changes of workers accounting for unobserved skills. The results show that workers typically have wage gains from switching between the public and private sectors, but public workers have lower wage gains from switching to the private sector than from within-sector mobility. This dissertation ends by identifying several research gaps in examining sector switching, calling for future research to focus more on this underdeveloped area.

ESSAYS ON SECTOR SWITCHING

BY

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A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
of
Georgia State University

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
2024

ACCEPTANCE

This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the candidate's Dissertation Committee. It has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies of Georgia State University.

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Dedication

To my mother, thank you for your unconditional love and unwavering support.

Acknowledgements

The completion of this dissertation would have been impossible without the invaluable support from professors, friends, and families. First, I'd like to thank my dissertation committee. I am deeply grateful to my advisor, Dr. Gregory Lewis, for serving as my dissertation committee chair and for his unwavering support throughout my Ph.D. program. Dr. Lewis began mentoring me when I knew nothing about research, and his immense patience in reading my drafts and providing detailed feedback has been instrumental in my progress. I also express my profound appreciation to my other advisor. Dr. Cathy Liu, for her continuous encouragement and invaluable feedback, not only on my dissertation but throughout my academic career. I am equally thankful to Dr. Christine Roch for her insightful comments, which have guided my future research projects. I extend my gratitude to Dr. Jason Coupet for reading my dissertation and offering valuable feedback. The guidance provided by each of these mentors, in their respective areas of expertise, has been indispensable to the completion of this dissertation.

I am profoundly grateful to a remarkable group of professors who have played a pivotal role in my academic journey. I extend my sincere appreciation to Dr. Can Chen, Dr. James Cox, Dr. Glenn Harrison, Dr. Daniel Kreisman, and Dr. Todd Swarthout for their consistent guidance and support. I'm also truly grateful to the staff at the Andrew Young School for their support, especially Elsa Gebremedhin, Abena Otudor, and Ana Moseley. Their support has been invaluable in helping me navigate through various challenges and successfully complete this dissertation.

Apart from the formal mentoring from professors, I have also been informally guided by many friends. It has been such a privilege to have two best friends throughout the Ph.D. program, Luisa Nazareno and Justina Jose, with whom I have spent countless hours brainstorming,

discussing, and sharing. I will cherish our friendship forever. I would also like to express my gratitude to my other peers, who have always been available and helpful, including Youngwan Song, Esther Han, Olga Churkina, Lauren Forbes, Matteo Zullo, Ximena Pizarro, Eun Joo Kwon, Jennifer Kang, Rory Renzy, and Meghna Paul. I am also fortunate to have many Chinese friends in the department, who provided me with invaluable support when I first arrived in Atlanta, including Tracy Shicun Cui, Qiaozhen Liu, and Bo Li, and who provided encouragement and act as listeners, including Meng Ye, Laiyang Ke, and Scarlette Shi.

Lastly, I express my heartfelt appreciation to my parents, Ling Zhong, and Zhongran Huang, for their unconditional love. I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to my family, as this long journey would never have come to an end without their unwavering support.

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Chapter I: Introduction

Sector switching is the process of changing from a private to a public job or *vice versa* (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009; Su & Bozeman, 2009), requiring workers to decide both to change jobs and to move to another sector. Though scholars have paid significant attention to job mobility (Gottfries & Teulings, 2023; Hur & Abner, 2023; Peltokorpi & Allen, 2024) and sector choice (Cordes & Vogel, 2023; Holt, 2018; Vogel & Satzger, 2024), few studies have examined the process of sector switching (for recent exceptions see AbouAssi, Johnson, & Holt, 2021; Frederiksen & Hansen, 2017; Piatak, 2017).

The under-examination of sector switching is surprising for several reasons. First, studies have shown an increasing trend of sector switching worldwide. In Russia, Klepikova (2016) finds that the annual share of private workers switching to the public sector increased from 9% to 13% between 2004 and 2013. In Denmark, Frederiksen and Hansen (2017) show that the probability of moving from private jobs to public jobs and *vice versa* has increased by 70% and 90% between 1980 and 2006. In the U.S., Piatak (2017) finds that a larger share of federal, state, and local government workers were sector switchers in 2008 than in 2004.

Second, the public sector has been facing a looming human capital crisis for a long time (Jakobsen, Løkke, & Keppeler, 2023; Light, 2000), with persistent challenges in recruitment and retention (Hur & Abner, 2023; Leider et al., 2023; Linos, 2018). Only a small percentage of new hires are entrants into the labor market, and most are people who either already have jobs with other employers or are between jobs (Hahn, Hyatt, & Janicki, 2021; Stijepic, 2021), highlighting the need for the public sector to compete for talent against private sector employers in recruitment and retention. Competing for talent requires the public sector to attract private

workers and prevent public workers from leaving for private jobs, whereas sector switching encompasses dynamic processes of moving between sectors.

Third, with the introduction of the New Public Management (NPM) reforms in the public sector, public workers have become increasingly rewarded with performance-based incentives (Heinrich, 2002; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010; Van der Hoek, Groeneveld, & Kuipers, 2018). It is challenging for the public sector to set competitive pay (Berman, Bowman, West, & Van Wart, 2021). Inadequate public sector pay typically fails to attract and retain qualified workers (Lasseter & Daman, 2024), motivate workers (Corduneanu, Dudau, & Kominis, 2023) and improve organizational performance (Fenizia, 2022), and excessive pay often elevates governmental expenditure (Anzia & Moe, 2015), leads to budget shortfalls (Reilly & Reed, 2011) and imposes burdens on taxpayers (Laffer, Winegarden, & Childs, 2011). In this regard, tracking wage changes in sector switching provides insights into how to set competitive public pay systems.

Understanding the factors that drive sector switching, as well as its consequences, is crucial for developing strategies to bolster the public sector workforce and improve its organizational performance. This dissertation aims to examine the causes and consequences of sector switching through a comprehensive approach, focusing on two general questions: 1. What factors impact the probability of sector switching? 2. What is the effect of sector switching on workers' pay?

Using data from the 1996-2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), this dissertation answers these two questions in Chapters II and III. Chapter II examines the impacts of demographic factors on the probability of sector switching, including gender, race, veteran, disability, sexual orientation, and marital and parental status. As sector switching impacts the

public sector workforce, this chapter also contributes to representative bureaucracy studies by examining the representation of underrepresented groups in the public sector. This chapter conducted the logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE) to examine the impacts of demographic factors on the probability of sector switching. Results show that gender and race, as well as veteran, disability, sexual orientation, and marital and parental status all affect whether workers switch to the other sector.

Chapter III explores the impacts of sector switching on workers' pay. This study appears to be the first to examine the question in the context of the U.S. As sector switching tracks workers between the public and private sectors, this chapter also contributes to public-private sector wage differential studies by examining wage changes of workers accounting for unobserved skills. This chapter conducted the two-way fixed effects (TWFE) regression to examine the impacts of sector switching on workers' pay. Results show that workers typically have wage gains from switching between the public and private sectors, but public workers have lower wage gains from switching to the private sector than from within-sector mobility.

To sum up, this dissertation offers a comprehensive examination of sector switching from two different angles. Beyond this, it highlights the need for scholars to prioritize this underdeveloped area. There is significant potential for further research to deepen understanding and address the complexities of sector switching, thereby contributing to more effective recruitment and retention strategies and pay systems in the public sector.

Chapter II: The Impacts of Demographic Factors on the Probability of Sector Switching

2.1 Introduction

Sector switching, changing from a private to a public job or *vice versa* (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009; Su & Bozeman, 2009), is a crucial process for understanding public-private sector differences (Hansen, 2014), sector convergence (Frederiksen & Hansen, 2017), and even recruitment and retention. Public administration scholars have long warned that the public sector faces a looming human capital crisis (Jakobsen et al., 2023; Light, 2000). With a declining interest in government employment among public affairs graduate students (Bright & Graham, 2015; Chetkovich, 2003; Rose, 2013) and millennials (Feintzeig, 2014; Ng, Gossett, & Winter, 2016), an increasing number of public workers have chosen to leave the public sector since the Great Recession (Hur & Hawley, 2020), especially among millennials (Ertas, 2015), encouraging the public sector to delve into how to recruit and retain workers.

The public sector faces challenges in recruitment and retention (Hur & Abner, 2023; Leider et al., 2023; Linos, 2018), either failing to compete for talents against the private sector (Fowler & Birdsall, 2020; Kim, 2008) or losing employees to the private sector (Asseburg & Homberg, 2020; Lavigna & Hays, 2004). Though public administration scholars have paid significant attention to public recruitment and retention (see Hur & Abner, 2023; Sievert, Vogel, & Feeney, 2022 for recent examples), they primarily focus on workers' sector preferences (Lewis & Frank, 2002), attraction (Asseburg & Homberg, 2020; Cordes & Vogel, 2023), or choice (Blank, 1985; Dong, 2017; Holt, 2018) in recruitment or public workers' turnover (Bright, 2021; Cho & Lewis, 2012) in retention. As workers may prefer the government but still hold private jobs (Lewis & Frank, 2002), and state and local government workers can leave and choose federal jobs (McPhie, Rose, & Sapin, 2008), solely examining workers' sector

preferences or choice and public workers' turnover may not adequately address the complexities of competing for workers against the private sector. Sector switching encompasses dynamic processes of moving between sectors, providing insights into strategies to attract workers from the private sector and retain workers in the public sector.

Sector switching affects whether the government's workforce is representative of society (Kingsley, 1944; Kranz, 1976; Krislov, 1974; Mosher, 2016), which can enhance organizational performance (Choi & Ko, 2024; Opstrup & Villadsen, 2015; Pitts, 2005) and change the attitudes and behaviors of represented clients (Ding, Lu, & Riccucci, 2021; Gade & Wilkins, 2012; Meier & Nicholson-Crotty, 2006). The government has devoted persistent efforts to ensure the representation of minority groups, including women and racial and ethnical minorities (Bishu & Kennedy, 2020), disabled and veteran workers (Lewis & Pathak, 2023), and probably LGBT workers (Davidovitz & Shwartz-Ziv, 2024; Lewis & Pitts, 2011). The representation of minority groups is often insufficient, however, especially at higher levels (Johnston, Alberti, & Kravariti, 2023; Kim & Lewis, 2018), and underdeveloped for specific groups (see Bishu & Kennedy, 2020 for disabled and LGBT workers), including mothers and fathers. Although the advancement of their representation requires the government to recruit and retain minority groups (Donohue, 2021; Lee & Cayer, 1987; Menifield, Estorcien, Ndongo, Quispe, & McDonald III, 2024; Sabharwal & Geva-May, 2013), recent studies find that the public sector sometimes fails to recruit and retain them (Carver-Thomas & Darling-Hammond, 2019; Linos, 2018).

Previous studies on sector switching have primarily examined its patterns without distinguishing among directions of switching (Piatak, 2017) or trends over time (Frederiksen & Hansen, 2017), focused on millennials (AbouAssi et al., 2021; Johnson & Ng, 2016), or relied on

surveys to recall workers' past job history (Hansen, 2014; Su & Bozeman, 2009). Few studies pay attention to the impacts of demographic factors on sector switching.

Using data from the 1996-2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), this study examines the impacts of demographic factors on sector switching. The relevance of this study is fourfold. First, the public sector faces a looming human capital crisis (Jakobsen et al., 2023; Light, 2000) and challenges in recruitment and retention (Hur & Abner, 2023; Leider et al., 2023; Linos, 2018), failing to attract talents from the private sector (Fowler & Birdsall, 2020) and retain its workers in the public sector (Asseburg & Homberg, 2020). As workers' sector choice or turnover alone may not adequately address the complexities of competing for workers against the private sector, sector switching tracks the process of moving between sectors, involving workers' turnover and sector choice.

Second, representative bureaucracy studies call for public servants to share society's demographics (Mosher, 2016), through recruiting and retaining underrepresented groups, to improve organizational performance and effectively serve underrepresented groups in the population (Choi & Ko, 2024; Ding et al., 2021). Recruiting them requires tracking the transitions of leaving for public employment while retaining them requires understanding why they stay with current jobs or moving to another public agency, where sector switching offers a robust framework for examining these processes comprehensively.

Third, studies often use turnover intentions to examine public workers' turnover (Moynihan & Landuyt, 2008), leading to bias as turnover intentions do not always align with actual behaviors (Cohen, Blake, & Goodman, 2016). Workers may have turnover intentions but not quit their jobs, and previous research showed conflicting results between using turnover intentions and behaviors (Jung, 2010). As workers become more likely to change jobs after the

pandemic than before (Banerjee, 2022), scholars need to provide more robust insights into workers' turnover. This study fills the gap and examines workers' actual turnover behaviors.

Fourth, previous studies rely on various approaches to show which group of workers wants to work for the government, including asking sector preference questions (Tschirhart, Reed, Freeman, & Anker, 2008) and identifying workers' sector choice at the point of interview (Mastekaasa, 2020). Workers may say they prefer to work for the government but still hold private jobs, and using two approaches sometimes produces inconsistent results (Lewis & Frank, 2002). This study could help understand sector choice and preferences from another perspective.

This study first develops the theoretical background for the impacts of demographic factors on sector switching. After describing the SIPP data, it tests hypotheses using logistic regressions and finds that women, blacks and other races, and veterans were more likely to switch to the public sector, but Latinos, Asians, and wives and mothers were less likely than their counterparts to switch. This study also finds that blacks, veterans, and husbands were more likely to switch to the private sector, but disabled workers and wives were less likely than their counterparts to do so switch. Finally, this study discusses potential implications for recruitment and retention.

2.2 Literature Review

As sector switching requires workers to decide both to change jobs and to move to another sector, job mobility and sector choice are two necessary steps to switch sectors. Few studies pay extra attention to both job mobility and sector choice in sector switching, however, encouraging scholars to focus on them to gain a deeper understanding of sector switching. As underrepresented workers' differences in sector switching could result from differences in both

job mobility and sector choice, this literature review considers gender, race/ethnicity, disability, veteran, sexual orientation, and marriage and parenthood differences in both.

2.2.1 Job Mobility

Gender, race/ethnicity, disability and veteran status, sexual orientation, and marriage and parenthood impact the probability of changing jobs in both the public sector (Ali, Bishu, & Alkadry, 2018; Cho & Lewis, 2012; Chordiya, 2022; Kopp, 2015; Sabharwal, Levine, D'Agostino, & Nguyen, 2019) and the private sector (Baldwin & Schumacher, 2002; Barrera & Carter, 2017; Booth & Francesconi, 2000; Gibney, 2019; Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000), but their impacts may differ between the private and public sectors.

2.2.1.1 Private Workers. The traditional hypothesis is that women have higher turnover rates than men. Women tend to have weaker labor market attachments and more workforce interruptions (Cortés & Pan, 2023; Mincer & Polachek, 1974) because of their stronger linkages to family, making them more likely to quit their jobs for childbearing and childrearing. Women have lower labor force participation rates (Blau & Kahn, 2017; Goldin, 1977, 1986, 2023; Krueger, 2017) and are more likely to leave the labor force than men (Blau & Kahn, 1981; Cotton & Tuttle, 1986).

Recent studies typically find that women are less likely than men to voluntarily change jobs (Cao & Hu, 2007; Kristensen & Westergård-Nielsen, 2004; Royalty, 1998). Women care less about monetary rewards and competition (Beutel & Marini, 1995; Lyons, Duxbury, & Higgins, 2005) and are more risk-averse than men (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Eckel & Grossman, 2003, 2008; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998). As more risk-averse workers are less likely to change jobs (Argaw, Maier, & Skriabikova, 2017; van Huizen & Alessie, 2019), women are less likely to seek or accept outside offers. Women also have higher levels of job satisfaction than

men (Hodson, 1989; Keaveny & Inderrieden, 2000; Okpara, Squillace, & Erondu, 2005; Oshagbemi, 2000), indicating that women are less likely to change jobs (Ali, 2008; Cotton & Tuttle, 1986).

Minorities have higher turnover rates than whites, largely because they are more likely to become unemployed than whites (Hachen, 1990; Shin, 2007; Zax, 1989). Minorities have complicated voluntary turnover patterns compared to whites, however. Park and Sandefur (2003) and Javdani (2020) find that blacks, Latinos, Asians, and whites had a similar likelihood of voluntary job changes (also see Blau & Kahn, 1981). Booth, Francesconi, and Garcia-Serrano (1999) find that minorities were less likely to quit their first jobs than whites.

Racial/ethnic minorities usually care more about extrinsic values, including pay and benefits, than whites (Brenner, Blazini, & Greenhaus, 1988; Ng & Sears, 2010), however, and they are more likely to seek better outside offers than whites. Discrimination against minorities also encourages them to change jobs voluntarily more often than whites. Workplace discrimination typically leads minorities to have more negative experiences (McCord, Joseph, Dhanani, & Beus, 2018; Pettigrew & Martin, 1987), lower probabilities of promotions (Landau, 1995; Paulin & Mellor, 1996; Pergamit & Veum, 1999), and lower levels of job satisfaction than whites (Magee & Umamaheswar, 2011; Miller & Travers, 2005; Triana, Jayasinghe, & Pieper, 2015; Wang & Jing, 2018). As a result, minorities are more likely to change jobs than whites. Donohue (1988) finds that blacks had higher quit rates than their white counterparts. Minority is a broad concept, however, and blacks, Latinos, and Asians may differ in turnover rates. Leonard and Levine (2006), for instance, find that blacks had higher, but Latinos and Asians had lower turnover intentions than whites.

Though disabled workers are more likely to have involuntary turnover than workers without disabilities (Mitra & Kruse, 2016), they are also more likely to change jobs voluntarily (Baldwin & Schumacher, 2002; Fogg, Harrington, & McMahon, 2010). Disabled workers may face workplace discrimination (Beatty, Baldridge, Boehm, Kulkarni, & Colella, 2019; Crudden & McBroom, 1999) and low pay satisfaction (Hirst, Thornton, Dearey, & Campbell, 2004; Sundar et al., 2018), leading to negative attitudes toward jobs (Jones, 2016; Schur, Kruse, Blasi, & Blanck, 2009) and lower job satisfaction (Schur et al., 2017). As a result, disabled workers are more likely than others to change jobs. Baldwin and Schumacher (2002), for example, find that disabled workers were more likely than workers without disabilities to have voluntary turnover. Schur et al. (2017) find that workers with disabilities are more likely to have turnover intentions than workers without disabilities.

Veterans are more likely than nonveterans to voluntarily change jobs when they first leave the military (Barrera & Carter, 2017; Maury, Stone, & Roseman, 2014) because they typically struggle with integrating into the workplace in transitioning from the military to the civilian world (Black & Papile, 2010; Hunter‐Johnson et al., 2020). Veterans are also more likely than nonveterans to change jobs in future careers (Harrod, Miller, Henry, & Zivin, 2017). They often have mental health issues, workplace stereotypes, and stigma (Morin, 2011; Stern, 2017) and face role uncertainty (McAllister, Mackey, Hackney, & Perrewé, 2015) and workplace discrimination (Gonzalez & Simpson, 2021; Shepherd, Kay, & Gray, 2019), such as perceived as stereotyped and less able to experience emotion. Negative experiences and role uncertainty lower veterans' job satisfaction (Ahsan, Abdullah, Fie, & Alam, 2009; Cantarelli, Belardinelli, & Belle, 2016; Landsbergis, 1988; Lyons, 1971; Orgambídez & Almeida, 2020), leading to higher turnover rates than nonveterans. Maury et al. (2014), for instance, report that nearly half of

newly hired veterans left their first civilian employment within one year. Barrera and Carter (2017) also find that veterans left their first jobs faster than nonveterans and reported more jobs on their resumes.

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) workers are more likely than their counterparts to change jobs voluntarily because they experience discrimination and harassment at work, including negative performance evaluations, verbal and sexual harassment, and unequal pay (Badgett, 2009; Badgett, Lau, Sears, & Ho, 2007; Herek, 2009). Herek (2009), for instance, finds that 15% of LGBT workers believed they had been denied a promotion due to their sexual orientation, compared to only 5% for heterosexual workers. Perceived workplace discrimination lowers LGBT workers' job satisfaction, encouraging them to leave their jobs (Caillier, 2013; Memon, Salleh, & Baharom, 2017; Ragins & Cornwell, 2001; Velez & Moradi, 2012). Gibney (2019), for example, find that LGBT scientists have higher turnover intentions than others because of discrimination. Sears, Mallory, Flores, and Conron (2021) also find that more than one-third of LGBT workers have left jobs because of unfair treatment.

Marriage and parenthood also impact workers' turnover, but their impacts may differ by sex because of the sexual division of labor (Becker, 1973, 1991). Married men and fathers have traditionally acted as the income earners in the household (Shelton & John, 1996), devoting more effort to paid labor and working longer hours to be the "good providers" (Kaufman & Uhlenberg, 2000; Pollmann-Schult, 2011). The family role makes married men and fathers more risk-averse than single and childless men (Bernasek & Shwiff, 2001; Chaulk, Johnson, & Bulcroft, 2003; Görlitz & Tamm, 2020; Sunden & Surette, 1998), suggesting that they are less likely to change jobs than single men. More recently, husbands and wives have similar responsibilities inside and outside the home (Gerson & Gerson, 2010; Wilkie, 1993). Fathers typically reduce their work

hours and become more involved in nurturing and rearing their children (Chesley, 2011; Goodman, 2005; Kaufman & Uhlenberg, 2000), discouraging fathers from changing jobs. Ahituv and Lerman (2011), for example, find that married men were less likely to change jobs than single men. Booth and Francesconi (2000) also find that fathers were less likely to change jobs voluntarily than childless men.

Married women and mothers spend more time on work inside the home than men and single women (Demo & Acock, 1993; Huber & Spitze, 1983). They are more likely to change jobs because they quit the labor market more often than men and single women (Goldin, 1977, 1986; Seitz, 2009). Married women are less likely than men and single women to change jobs voluntarily. Though they worked more time than their previous cohorts (Percheski, 2008) because of married men's greater involvement in the household than before (see Goodman, 2005), married women still spend more time in the household than single women (Jones, Manuelli, & McGrattan, 2015), suggesting less investment in work. Instead, married women prefer work-life balance more and are less likely to change jobs voluntarily. Married women and mothers are also more risk-averse than single women (Chaulk et al., 2003; Sunden & Surette, 1998). Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2004), for instance, find that married women were less likely to have turnover intentions than single women. Looze (2017) also find that married women and mothers were less likely to change jobs voluntarily than single and childless women.

Women, married workers, and workers with children are less likely, but minorities, disabled workers, veterans, and LGBTs are more likely than their counterparts to change jobs. Stronger protections for underrepresented groups in the public sector probably discourage them from voluntary turnover.

2.2.1.2 Public Workers. Though Lewis and Park (1989) find no gender differences in turnover rates, more recent studies show that women are less likely than men to change jobs in the public sector (Cho & Perry, 2012; Ertas, 2015). Women are more likely than men to express concern and responsibility for the well-being of others and seek meaningful jobs (Beutel & Marini, 1995; Lyons et al., 2005) and have higher levels of public service motivation (PSM) (Bright, 2005; Riccucci, 2018), making the government an ideal workplace for them to serve the society. Public jobs are also more secure than private jobs (Clark & Postel-Vinay, 2009; Farber, 2010), discouraging more risk-averse women from leaving voluntarily.

Along with racial/ethnic minorities, women are typically better paid in the public than in the private sector (Asher & Popkin, 1984; Jacobsen, 1992; Moore & Raisian, 1991). Though gender and racial pay gaps are persistent in both the private (Blau & Kahn, 2000, 2007; Darity & Mason, 1998) and the public sectors (Lewis, 1988, 1998; Lewis, Pathak, & Galloway, 2018; Mandel & Semyonov, 2021), these pay disparities are typically smaller in the public sector. Stronger formal protections against discrimination and smaller race and gender pay gaps in the public than in the private sector (Lewis, Boyd, & Pathak, 2018; Lewis, Pathak, et al., 2018; Mandel & Semyonov, 2014) discourage women and minorities from leaving.

Racial/ethnic minorities may be less likely than whites to change jobs in the public sector (Borman & Dowling, 2008; Cho & Lewis, 2012) but typically have mixed turnover patterns relative to whites in the public sector. They sometimes have similar quit rates to whites (Bertelli, 2007; Caillier, 2011; Kellough & Osuna, 1995) and are usually more likely (Ali et al., 2018; Choi, 2009) than whites to change jobs, however, partly because they still perceive discrimination in the public sector (Bradbury, Battaglio, & Crum, 2010), leading to lower probabilities of promotions (Baldwin, 1996; Hofhuis, Van der Zee, & Otten, 2014) and lower

levels of job satisfaction than whites (Choi, 2009). Minorities also care more about extrinsic values than whites (Brenner et al., 1988; Ng & Sears, 2010) and are probably more likely to change jobs to seek career advancements. Low levels of job satisfaction also encourage them to change jobs (Ali, 2008; Price, 2001).

Moynihan and Landuyt (2008), for instance, find that women were less likely than men, but minorities were more likely than whites to have turnover intentions in the Texas state government. Cho and Lewis (2012) find that most groups of women, including Black and Latino women, were less likely than white men to leave the federal service. Ertas (2015) finds that women were less likely than men, but minorities were more likely than whites to have turnover intentions in the federal service. Ali et al. (2018) find that blacks were more likely to want to change jobs than all other races, including whites.

Disabled workers also face workplace discrimination in the public sector. They have lower grades and promotion rates (Lewis & Allee, 1992) and encounter more harassment than workers without disabilities (Bruyere, 2000; Robert & Harlan, 2006). As a result, disabled workers are more likely to have turnover intentions and behaviors than workers without disabilities in the public sector. Bradley, Green, and Mangan (2012) find that workers with disabilities were more likely to have permanent quits and temporary quits than workers without disabilities. Chordiya (2022) also find that workers with disabilities are more likely to have turnover intentions than workers without disabilities in the federal service.

Veterans have lower levels of job satisfaction than nonveterans in the public sector (Tao & Campbell, 2020; Vanderschuere & Birdsall, 2019), indicating that veterans are more likely to have turnover intentions or behaviors (Moynihan & Pandey, 2008). Kopp (2015), for example, finds that veterans were more likely than nonveterans to leave their jobs in the federal service.

Vanderschuere (2015) also find that veterans were more likely than nonveterans to express an intention to leave their current agency.

LGBT workers also experience discrimination and harassment in the public sector (Cech & Rothwell, 2020; Sears, Hunter, & Mallory, 2009). As a result, LGBT workers are less satisfied with their workplace treatment than heterosexual workers (Lewis & Emidy, 2022; Lewis & Pitts, 2017), indicating that they are more likely to have turnover intentions or behaviors (Ragins & Cornwell, 2001; Velez & Moradi, 2012). Lewis and Pitts (2017) find that LGBT federal workers were 10% more likely to express turnover intentions of leaving specific agencies. Sabharwal et al. (2019) also find that LGBT workers had higher turnover intentions than heterosexual workers in the federal service.

Married workers and workers with children may be less likely than single and childless workers to leave public jobs. The public sector often has stronger job protections, leading the private sector in the adoption of family-friendly policies, including paternity leave, on-site childcare, telework, and flexible schedules (Durst, 1999; Facer & Wadsworth, 2008; Lee & Hong, 2011; Lewis, Pizarro-Bore, & Emidy, 2023). Married workers may have higher levels of job satisfaction and lower levels of work-life conflicts in the public than in the private sector (Feeney & Stritch, 2019), discouraging them from turnover intentions and behaviors (Kim & Wiggins, 2011; Lockwood, 2003). Ali et al. (2018) find that married women were less likely than single women to change jobs in the public sector.

Married workers and workers with children may be more likely than single and childless workers to leave public jobs, however, partly because they need to feed the family but the public sector typically fails to provide competitive wages compared to the private sector (Borjas, 2002; Schmitt, 2010). Workers with children typically invest more in improving themselves than

childless workers, suggesting that they are more experienced and skilled. Skilled workers typically experience wage penalties in the public sector (Jacobsen, 1992; Schmitt, 2010), and men also experience wage penalties compared to women. Since voluntary job changes often result in wage gains (Schmelzer, 2012; Topel & Ward, 1992), married workers may be more likely than single ones to change jobs.

2.2.2 Sector Choice

When workers change jobs, they also decide whether to stay within the same sector or move to another sector, and sector choice is also necessary for switching sectors. Underrepresented groups are more likely than their counterparts to work for the government (Blank, 1985; Lewis & Frank, 2002; Lewis & Pathak, 2023). Legislation, executive orders, and scholars all called for public organizations to become model employers in creating inclusive organizations with all groups of workers (Clark, Ochs, & Frazier, 2013; Selden & Selden, 2001), resulting in a higher representation of underrepresented groups in government workforce (Choi, 2011; Lewis, 2012; Llorens, Wenger, & Kellough, 2008; Riccucci, 2009).

Women and racial/ethnic minorities received fewer callbacks from employers than men and whites in the labor market, partly because of discrimination (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; González, Cortina, & Rodríguez, 2019; Hangartner, Kopp, & Siegenthaler, 2021; Neumark, Bank, & Van Nort, 1996; Quillian, Pager, Hexel, & Midtbøen, 2017). Stronger formal protections against discrimination in the public sector, including fairer hiring processes (Carlsson & Rooth, 2007; Jankowski, Prokop, & Tepe, 2020) and higher salaries for women and minorities (Jacobsen, 1992) and smaller gender and race gaps in the public than in the private sector (Lewis, Boyd, et al., 2018), encourage them to prefer public jobs relative to private jobs.

Women are also more likely than men to seek prosocial jobs (Beutel & Marini, 1995; Lyons et al., 2005) and have higher levels of PSM (Bright, 2005; Riccucci, 2018) and risk aversion (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Eckel & Grossman, 2008). As workers with higher levels of PSM and risk aversion have a higher likelihood of choosing government jobs (Dong, 2017; Perry & Wise, 1990; Pfeifer, 2011), women are more likely than men to work for the government.

Blank (1985) finds that women and nonwhites were more likely than their counterparts to choose public jobs. Lewis and Frank (2002) find that women and minorities were more likely than men and whites to work for the government. Mandel and Semyonov (2021) find that women and blacks were more likely than men and whites to work in the public sector. Lewis and Oh (2018) and Lewis and Han (2024) find Latinos and Asians were more likely than whites to work for the federal service. Lewis, Boyd, and Pathak (2022) also find white women, blacks, Latinos, and Asians were more likely than white men to work for state governments.

Disabled workers are also more likely to work for the government (Lewis & Pathak, 2023; Ng & Sears, 2015), partly because they prefer employment with higher levels of job security and flexibility (Schur et al., 2017) and enjoy better workplace accommodation in the public sector (Anand & Sevak, 2017; Hill, Maestas, & Mullen, 2016; Jansen, van Ooijen, Koning, Boot, & Brouwer, 2021). The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) also prohibited discrimination in hiring, promotion, and other employment outcomes against workers with disabilities and mandated employers to provide reasonable accommodation to disabled workers. Ng and Sears (2015) find that college students with disabilities in Canada were more likely than others to work in the public sector. Lewis and Pathak (2023) also find that employees with disabilities are more likely to hold federal jobs than those without disabilities.

Veterans have a complicated pattern of preferring public jobs. Several factors discourage veterans from holding public jobs. First, public jobs typically require skilled workers and hire better-educated and more experienced workers (Bender & Heywood, 2010; Lewis & Oh, 2009), but veterans are less likely to hold at least bachelor's degrees than nonveterans (Lewis, 2012). Second, veterans are mostly white men (Lewis, 2012), indicating a lower likelihood of holding public jobs. Veterans are often more likely to work for the government than nonveterans (Blank, 1985; Kopp, 2015; Lewis, 2012; Lewis & Frank, 2002; Lewis & Pathak, 2014; Winters, 2018), however, because the federal government has preferred to recruit veterans at least since World War I (United States Civil Service Commission, 1955). The Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 established a formal system for increasing federal employment of honorably discharged veterans, and President Barack Obama issued an executive order in 2009 to focus efforts on veterans' employment, contributing to faster promotion rates for veterans than nonveterans. Stritch, Jensen, Swindell, Allgood, and Fullerton (2023) find that veteran candidates receive better assessments than similar candidates with private sector experience in local governments.

Lewis (2012), for example, find that veterans are at least three times as likely to hold federal jobs and 10% more likely to hold state and local government jobs than nonveterans. Lewis and Pathak (2014) also show that veterans are more likely to work for state and local governments than nonveterans. Winters (2018) also demonstrates that veterans are more likely than nonveterans to work for the federal service.

LGBT workers are less likely than heterosexual workers to work for the government (Lewis & Pitts, 2011) because they experience higher levels of discrimination and harassment and weaker protections in the public than in the private sector (Pizer, Sears, Mallory, & Hunter, 2011). 72% of Fortune 500 companies included sexual orientation in their non-discrimination

policies in 1999 (Sears, Mallory, & Hunter, 2011), and the percentage increased to 87% in 2009 and 91% in 2013 (Sears & Mallory, 2015). Only 9 states prohibited discrimination in 1999 (Lewis & Pitts, 2011), however, and the number only increased to 20 in 2011. Insufficient protections for LGBT workers in the public sector discourage them from stating their sexual orientation in the federal service (Lewis & Pitts, 2017) and contribute to their lower levels of job satisfaction than others in the federal service (Lewis & Emidy, 2022; Lewis & Pitts, 2017), indicating that LGBTs are less likely to work for the government than their counterparts. Lewis and Pitts (2011) find that LGBT workers were less likely than others to work for the government, especially in states without protection laws. They also find that women with female partners were more likely than women with male partners to work for the government, especially in states with protection laws, however, indicating that LGBT workers may be more likely to work for the government with sufficient protections. In Canada, LGBT workers are substantially more likely than others to prefer government jobs (Lewis & Ng, 2013; Ng & Sears, 2015).

Married workers and workers with children are more likely than single and childless ones to work for the public sector, partly because the government typically has stronger job protections and more family-friendly policies to provide mothers and fathers with more flexible schedules to take care of children (Durst, 1999; Facer & Wadsworth, 2008; Feeney & Stritch, 2019; Lee & Hong, 2011; Lewis et al., 2023). Family-friendly policies also help married workers and mothers focus more on work, have more on-the-job training, and support their careers (Lu, Wang, & Han, 2017; Mason & Goulden, 2002; Mastracci, 2013). Married workers are also more risk-averse than single workers and childless workers women (Chaulk et al., 2003; Sunden & Surette, 1998), encouraging them to choose public jobs (Anandari & Nuryakin, 2019; Buurman, Delfgaauw, Dur, & Van den Bossche, 2012; Pfeifer, 2011). Mandel and Semyonov (2021) find

that married workers are more likely to work for the government. Lewis and Huang (2022) also find that marriage increased white women's and men's likelihood of working for federal service and that mothers were more likely to work for the federal service.

2.2.3 Sector Switching

Though the impacts of gender, race/ethnicity, disability and veteran status, sexual orientation, and marriage and parenthood on job mobility and sector choice have gained significant attention, very few studies discussed their effects on sector switching, with most not identifying any impacts of race and gender and no study even examining the impacts of disability and veterans status and sexual orientation. Su and Bozeman (2009), for example, find no gender and race differences in the likelihood of switching to the public sector. The results are surprising, with numerous studies showing that women and minorities are more likely than men and whites to work for the government. Piatak (2017) finds that gender had no effect on the probability of switching sectors, and race almost had no effect, though she does not distinguish among directions of switching. It also finds that marriage and parenthood negatively impacted the probability of switching sectors.

Previous studies often relied on measures of workers' sector preferences or turnover intentions, which may not accurately reflect actual behaviors. Using sector preferences might lead to bias, as underrepresented workers could express their preferences for the government without working for it. Lewis and Frank (2002) find that women were more likely than men to work for the government but did not show a higher preference for public jobs. Racial/ethnic minorities expressed a stronger preference for government work than their actual likelihood of obtaining such employment, while veterans had a stronger likelihood of holding public jobs than their preferences. Dalton, Johnson, and Daily (1999) find that turnover intentions only accounted

for 9% to 25% of actual turnover. Cohen et al. (2016) posit that turnover intention and actual turnover are distinct concepts at the organizational level. Inconsistencies between behaviors and intentions probably produce unreliable results. Cho and Lewis (2012) find that minorities were less likely than whites to quit the federal service but were as likely as whites to intend to quit.

This paper examines how gender, race/ethnicity, disability and veteran status, sexual orientation, and marriage and parenthood impact job mobility, sector choice, and finally sector switching. As women, married workers, and workers with children are less likely than their counterparts to change jobs in the public sector and more likely to work for the government, they should be less likely than others to switch to the private sector. Women, married workers, and workers with children are also less likely than their counterparts to change jobs in the private sector. Their lower probability of changing jobs but higher likelihood of working for the government contributes to their complicated patterns of switching to the public sector.

As racial/ethnic minorities, disabled workers, and veterans are more likely than their counterparts to change jobs in the private sector and more likely to work for the government, they should be more likely to switch to the public sector. Minorities, disabled workers, and veterans are also more likely than their counterparts to change jobs in the public sector. Their higher probability of changing jobs in the public sector but higher likelihood of working for the government suggests that they should be more likely to switch from one public agency to another, complicating their patterns of switching to the private sector.

As LGBTs are more likely than heterosexual workers to change jobs in the public sector and less likely to work for the government, they should be more likely to switch to the private sector. LGBTs are also more likely than others to change jobs in the private sector. Their higher probability of changing jobs in the private sector but the lower probability of working for the

government suggests that they should be more likely to change jobs within the private sector, complicating their patterns of switching to the public sector. This study has the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Women, married workers, and workers with children are less likely, but racial/ethnic minorities, disabled workers, veterans, and LGBTs are more likely than their counterparts to change jobs.

Hypothesis 2: Women, racial/ethnic minorities, disabled workers, veterans, married workers, and workers with children are more likely, but LGBTs are less likely than their counterparts to choose public jobs if changing jobs.

Hypothesis 3: Racial/ethnic minorities, disabled workers, and veterans are more likely than their counterparts to switch to the public sector, but it is not clear for women, LGBTs, married workers, and workers with children.

Hypothesis 4: Women, married workers, and workers with children are less likely, but LGBTs are more likely than their counterparts to switch to the private sector, but it is not clear for racial/ethnic minorities, disabled workers, and veterans.

The impacts of sexual orientation, marriage, and parenthood may be more complicated than other factors, however, because their impacts on job mobility and sector choice are underexamined and may differ by gender (Ali et al., 2018; Gorman, 1999; Lewis & Pitts, 2011). Gay male workers are less likely than heterosexual male workers, but lesbian female workers are more likely than heterosexual female workers to work for the government (Lewis & Pitts, 2011), indicating that lesbian workers may be more likely to switch to the public sector. Married men may be more likely than single men (Gorman, 1999), indicating that they should be more likely to switch to the public sector. Married women may be less likely than single women to change

jobs (Ali et al., 2018), however, suggesting that they should be less likely to switch to the private sector. This study has the following additional hypotheses for married and LGBT workers:

Hypothesis 1A: Husbands and fathers are more likely, but wives and mothers are less likely than their counterparts to change jobs.

Hypothesis 2A: Gay male workers are less likely than heterosexual male workers, but lesbian female workers are more likely than heterosexual female workers to work for the government.

Hypothesis 3A: Lesbian female workers and husbands and fathers are more likely than their counterparts to switch to the public sector, but it is not clear for gay male workers and wives and mothers.

Hypothesis 4A: Wives and mothers are less likely than single and childless women to switch to the private sector, but it is not clear for husbands and fathers.

2.3 Data and Methodology

2.3.1 Data

This study uses panel data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally representative panel survey providing information on employment dynamics, collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. The SIPP collects monthly data from individuals for periods ranging from 2.5 to 4 years in each panel, including 14,000 to 52,000 households. This study uses data from 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels,[1] collectively covering from March 1996 to December 2013 with gaps. Respondents reported employer IDs and sector of employment (federal, state, local government, or private sector), allowing tracking job mobility or sector switching behaviors.

[1] The SIPP also has two latest panels, starting in 2014 and 2018. However, the SIPP changed the structure of collecting data in the following two panels, interviewing respondents annually instead of every four months.

The SIPP adopts a rotation group design, with each respondent randomly selected into one of four rotation groups. Every fourth month, the SIPP interviews respondents from one rotation group about their previous four months and calls each interview a wave. This study follows Grogger (2004) by using data on the last month of interviews and classifies respondents whose employer ID changed between waves as experienced job mobility and those whose sector also changed as sector switchers.

This study focuses on public and private workers aged 18 to 65.[2] Since unemployed and employed workers typically have different job search behaviors and outcomes (Faberman, Mueller, Şahin, & Topa, 2022), this study focuses on voluntary turnover[3] and defines it as employer-to-employer transitions with respondents changing employer IDs between two consecutive waves or within four months. Identifying transitions requires the study to observe at least two waves, indicating that no transitions happened in the first wave. The study drops all observations in the first wave and excludes those with missing values.[4]

This study runs separate analyses based on respondents' sector of employment in each wave. Respondents can stay with their jobs, change jobs within the same sector, or switch sectors in the following waves, as shown in Figure 1.[5] Once deciding to switch sectors, respondents stay in the sample in the transitioning month but leave the sample afterward. If moving back to the previous sector later, respondents reappear in the sample after the transitioning month.[6] The

[2] This study drops around 370,000 observations working in other sectors or serving in the military or owning any businesses.

[3] This study drops almost 600,000 unemployed observations.

[4] This study drops almost 180,000 observations in the first wave in each panel.

[5] Since this study only focuses on private and public workers, respondents either becoming unemployed or switching to the nonprofit sector do not show up in the sample.

[6] Respondents have already changed jobs and will not change jobs in the transitioning month, and including these observations will underestimate the probability of changing jobs.

samples have around 960,000 observations from more than 160,000 private workers and 220,000 observations from more than 37,000 public workers.

Figure 1. Decision Tree of Public or Private Workers



This study has three dependent variables. The first is job/employer mobility, coded as 1 for those who changed employer IDs and 0 otherwise. The second is the job movers' ending sector, coded as 1 for those moving to another sector and 0 otherwise. This study follows Holt (2018) and combines the federal, state, and local government into the public sector and treats observations moving between the public and private sectors as moving to another sector. In examining the job movers' ending sector, this study only focuses on job movers and their transitioning periods. The third is sector switching, coded as 1 for those switching sectors and 0 otherwise. For any observations with sector switching coded as 1, both their job mobility and the ending sector should be coded as 1.

The key independent variables are gender, race/ethnicity, disability and veteran status, sexual orientation, and marriage and parenthood. For gender, this study uses female, coded as 1 for women and 0 for men. For race/ethnicity, it divides workers into five groups: whites, blacks, Latinos, Asians, and other races; it creates four dummy variables, code 1 for the four groups and 0 otherwise, with whites as the reference group. For disability status, this study uses disability, coded as 1 for disabled workers and 0 for those who are not. For veteran status, it also uses veteran, coded as 1 for veterans and 0 for those who are not. The same respondent's gender, race/ethnicity, disability, and veteran status sometimes appear to change from one wave to the next in the SIPP, however, and it is generally safe to assume the most recent data are correct (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001, p. 286). This study adopts the approach and corrects inconsistent values.[7]

The SIPP did not identify respondents' sexual orientation directly, however, and this study classified the householders and their same-sex spouses and unmarried partner as members of either gay or lesbian couples as 1 and 0 for those who are not. The nature of panel data also allows for coding previous and later observations of these respondents as homosexual. Though marital and parenthood status are dummy variables, this study divides workers into four categories, single with children, married without children, and married with children, with single without children as the reference group. The SIPP only provides information on the total number of children in the household, however, without specifying each respondent's parenthood status. This study assigned respondents' parenthood status based on the relationship among respondents

[7] This study finds less than 3,000 observations with inconsistent values across waves, accounting for less than 1% of the total.

within the household. This study also includes other variables, including age, education, union status, occupation, and current and previous earnings.[8]

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics in Examining the Probability of Sector Switching

	Private Sector			Public Sector		
Variable	Min	Max	Average	Min	Max	Average
Dependent Variables						
Job Mobility	0	1	0.127	0	1	0.080
Job Movers' ending sectors	0	1	0.059	0	1	0.401
Sector Switching	0	1	0.007	0	1	0.032
Controlled Variables						
Female	0	1	0.444	0	1	0.576
Black	0	1	0.105	0	1	0.140
Latino	0	1	0.148	0	1	0.093
Asian	0	1	0.040	0	1	0.030
Other Race	0	1	0.017	0	1	0.023
Disability Status	0	1	0.051	0	1	0.055
Veteran Status	0	1	0.078	0	1	0.109
Sexual Orientation	0	1	0.005	0	1	0.006
Single with Children	0	1	0.116	0	1	0.099
Married without Children	0	1	0.173	0	1	0.217
Married with Children	0	1	0.367	0	1	0.412
Union Status	0	1	0.088	0	1	0.368
Education Years	1	20	13.5	1	20	14.9
Age	18	65	38.6	18	65	43.3
Current Earnings	0	53,633.4	1,547.0	0	3,2671.2	1,702.0
Previous Earnings	-6313.6	51,399.2	1,550.9	0	3,2671.2	1,704.3
		N=955,986			N=219,812	

Note: 1. For Job Movers' ending sectors, each sub-sample only focuses on job movers instead of all observations.

13% of private workers changed jobs within four months, and 6% of job movers and .7% (13%*6%) of all private workers switched to the public sector (Table 1). Only 8% of public

[8] Table A1 in Appendix A shows detailed information about variables.

workers changed jobs, and 40% of job movers and 3% (8%*40%) of all public workers switched to the private sector. The public sector has a larger share of female, black, other race, disabled and veteran workers, LGBT workers, wives and husbands, and mothers and fathers but a smaller share of Latino and Asian workers than the private sector.

2.3.2 Methodology

The logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE) is a method for analyzing duration data, which could produce equivalent results to the Cox proportional hazards (PH) model (see Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Suresh, Severn, & Ghosh, 2022 for details).[9] This study adopts logistic regression with RSE to examine how demographic factors impact the probability of changing jobs, moving to the other sector, and switching sectors. This study also runs subgroup analyses separately for women and men to examine the impacts of sexual orientation and marriage and parenthood. This study includes the control variables shown in Table 1. Age, age-squared, years of education, and current and previous earnings are interval-level variables. Union membership is a dummy variable. It uses 21 dummy variables for occupation categories.[10] It also controls state-fixed and month-fixed effects and converts the logit coefficients to average partial effects using the Stata *margins* command (Williams, 2012).

[9] This study does not use the Cox PH model because some respondents have multiple transitions in the sample (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 714). The proportional hazard assumption is also difficult to meet in the case of sector switching, with tests showing that the assumption is violated in this study (StataCorp, 2017).

[10] The SIPP used the 1990 Census Occupation Code List in 1996 and 2001 panels but used the 2002 Census Occupation Code List in 2004 and 2008 panels. To address the issue, this study follows what Scopp (2003) and Beckhusen (2020) have done to apply conversion rates to the 1990 Census Occupation Code List to make it consistent with the 2002 Census Occupation Code List and aggregates all occupation codes into 22 categories.

2.4 Results

2.4.1 Descriptive Analysis

In the private sector, 12.7% of male and female workers changed jobs within a typical four-month period (Column (1) in Section (a) of Table 2). Of these job movers, 7.5% of women but only 4.6% of men took jobs in government (Column (2)). Since women and men were equally likely to change jobs, but female movers were more likely than male movers to take government jobs, women were more likely than men to switch to the public sector overall (1.0% of female but only .6% of male workers switched to the public sector; Column (3)).

12.2% of whites changed jobs (Column (1) in Section (b) of Table 2), compared to 14.5%, 13.6%, 12.1%, and 15.6% for blacks, Latinos, Asians, and other races. Of these job movers, 5.9% of whites moved to public jobs (Column (2)). Higher percentages of blacks and other races (8.0% and 7.8%) but lower percentages of Latinos and Asians (4.2% and 4.8%) moved to public jobs. Taken together, 0.7% of whites switched to the public sector, and higher percentages of blacks and other races (1.2%), consistent with Hypothesis 3, but lower percentages of Latinos and Asians (0.6%) switched, contrary to Hypothesis 3.

12.7% of workers without disabilities and 12.4% of disabled workers changed jobs (Column (1) in Section (c) of Table 2). Of these job movers, 5.9% of workers without disabilities, but 6.5% of disabled workers moved to public jobs (Column (2)). 0.7% of workers without any disabilities switched to the public sector (Column (3)), and a higher percentage of disabled workers (0.8%) switched, consistent with Hypothesis 3.

12.8% of nonveterans and 10.6% of veterans changed jobs (Column (1) in Section (d) of Table 2). 5.8% of nonveteran movers and 6.9% of veteran movers took government jobs

(Column (2)). Taken together, 0.8% of nonveterans but only 0.7% of veterans switched to the public sector (Column (3)), contrary to Hypothesis 3.

Table 2. Summary Statistics by Groups of Private Workers

Group of Workers	(1) Job Mobility	(2) Sector Choice	(3) Sector Switching
(a) by Gender			
Male	12.7	4.6	0.6
Female	12.7	7.5	1.0
(b) by Race/Ethnicity			
White	12.2	5.9	0.7
Black	14.5	8.0	1.2
Latino	13.6	4.2	0.6
Asian	12.1	4.8	0.6
Other Race	15.6	7.8	1.2
(c) by Disability			
Workers without Disability	12.7	5.9	0.7
Workers with Disability	12.4	6.5	0.8
(d) by Veteran Status			
Nonveterans	12.8	5.8	0.8
Veterans	10.6	6.9	0.7
(e) by Sexual Orientation			
Heterosexual	12.7	5.9	0.7
Homosexual	14.0	6.6	0.9
(f) by Marriage and Parenthood			
Single without Children	15.9	5.9	0.9
Single with Children	14.9	5.4	0.8
Married without Children	9.7	6.8	0.7
Married with Children	10.3	5.8	0.6
	N=955,986	N=119,347	N=955,986

Note: 1. Column (1) and (3) include all observations in each sub-sample, tracking respondents for several months. 2. Column (2) only includes job movers, tracking respondents sector choice in job mobility. 3. All statistics are mean values of percentages of changing jobs, moving to the other sector, and switching sectors by group of workers.

12.7% of heterosexual and 14.0% of LGBT workers changed jobs (Column (1) in Section (e) of Table 2). 5.9% of heterosexual movers and 6.6% of LGBT movers took government jobs (Column (2)). 0.7% of heterosexual and 0.9% of LGBT workers switched to the public sector (Column (3)).

15.9% of childless single workers changed jobs (Column (1) in Section (f) of Table 2), compared to 14.9%, 9.7%, and 10.3% for single workers with children, married workers without children, and married workers with children. Of these movers, 5.9% of childless single took government jobs (Column (2)). Higher percentages of married without children and married with children (6.8% and 5.8%), but a lower percentage of single movers with children (5.4%) moved to public jobs. 0.9% of single workers without children switched to the public sector, and lower percentages of single workers with children, married workers without children, and married workers with children (0.8%, 0.7%, and 0.6%) switched.

In the public sector, 8.3% of male and 7.8% of female workers changed jobs (Column (1) in Section (a) of Table 3). Of these job movers, 43.2% of men but only 37.8% of women took private jobs (Column (2)). As women were less likely than men and female movers were less likely than male movers to take private jobs, women were less likely than men to switch to the private sector overall (3.6% of male but 2.9% of female workers switched; Column (3)), consistent with Hypothesis 4.

7.5% of whites changed jobs (Column (1) in Section (b) of Table 3), compared to 9.2%, 9.3%, 8.7%, and 10.5% for blacks, Latinos, Asians, and other races. Of these job movers, 40.5% of whites chose private jobs (Column (2)). Higher percentages of Latinos and Asians (41.0% and 42.6%) but lower percentages of blacks and other races (38.8% and 35.5%) moved to private

jobs. 3.0% of whites switched to the private sector (Column (3), and higher percentages of blacks, Latinos, Asians, and other races (3.6%, 3.8%, 3.7%, and 3.7%) switched.

Table 3. Summary Statistics by Groups of Public Workers

Group of Workers	(1) Job Mobility	(2) Sector Choice	(3) Sector Switching
(a) by Gender			
Male	8.3	43.2	3.6
Female	7.8	37.8	2.9
(b) by Race/Ethnicity			
White	7.5	40.5	3.0
Black	9.2	38.7	3.6
Latino	9.3	41.0	3.8
Asian	8.7	42.6	3.7
Other Race	10.5	35.5	3.7
(c) by Disability			
Workers without Disability	8.1	40.1	3.2
Workers with Disability	7.2	40.9	3.0
(d) by Veteran Status			
Nonveterans	7.9	39.9	3.2
Veterans	8.5	42.1	3.6
(e) by Sexual Orientation			
Heterosexual	8.0	40.2	3.2
Homosexual	7.3	38.9	2.8
(f) by Marriage and Parenthood			
Single without Children	9.9	48.4	4.8
Single with Children	9.1	40.4	3.7
Married without Children	6.8	33.3	2.3
Married with Children	7.1	35.9	2.6
	N=219,821	N=17,246	N=219,821

Note: 1. Column (1) and (3) include all observations in each sub-sample, tracking respondents for several months. 2. Column (2) only includes job movers, tracking respondents sector choice in job mobility. 3. All statistics are mean values of percentages of changing jobs, moving to the other sector, and switching sectors by group of workers.

8.1% of workers without disabilities and 7.2% of disabled workers changed jobs (Column (1) in Section (c) of Table 3). Of these job movers, 40.1% of workers without disabilities, but 41.0% of disabled workers moved to private jobs (Column (2)). 3.2% of workers without any disabilities and 3.0% of disabled workers switched to the public sector (Column (3)).

7.9% of nonveterans changed jobs (Column (1) in Section (d) of Table 3), compared to 8.5% for veterans. 39.9% of nonveteran movers, but 42.1% of veteran movers changed to private jobs (Column (2)). As veterans were more likely than nonveterans to change jobs and veteran movers were more likely than nonveteran movers to change to private jobs, veterans were more likely than nonveterans to switch to the private sector overall (3.2% of nonveterans but 3.6% of veterans switched; Column (3)).

8.0% of heterosexual and 7.3% of LGBT workers changed jobs (Column (1) in Section (e) of Table 3). 40.2% of heterosexual movers, but only 38.9% of LGBT movers took private jobs (Column (2)). 3.2% of heterosexual workers switched to the private sector (Column (3)), and a lower percentage of LGBT workers (2.8%) switched, contrary to Hypothesis 4.

9.9% of childless single workers changed jobs (Column (1) in Section (f) of Table 3), compared to 9.1%, 6.8%, and 7.1% for single workers with children, married workers without children, and married workers with children. Of these movers, 48.4% of childless single took government jobs (Column (2)). Lower percentages of single with children, married without children, and married with children (40.4%, 33.3%, and 35.9%) moved to private jobs. 4.8% of single workers without children switched to the private sector (Column 3), and a higher percentage of single workers with children (3.7%), contrary to Hypothesis 4, but lower percentages of married workers without and with children (2.3% and 2.6%) switched, consistent with Hypothesis 4.

2.4.2 Regression Analysis

In the private sector, women were 0.7 percentage points less likely than men to change jobs (Model 1, Table 4), supporting Hypothesis 1. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, female movers were 0.8 percentage points more likely than male movers to work for the government (Model 2). Taken together, women were 0.1 percentage points more likely than men to switch to the public sector (Model 3).

Table 4. Average Partial Effects on the Probability in the Private Sector

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Variables	Job Mobility	Sector Choice	Sector Switching
Female	-0.7***	0.8***	0.1*
Black	1.1***	0.9***	0.2***
Latino	-0.8***	-0.2	-0.1*
Asian	0.1	-1.6***	-0.2***
Other Race	1.0**	2.5***	0.3**
Disability	0.5*	0.2	0.1
Veteran	1.1***	1.0***	0.2***
Sexual Orientation	1.2	-0.7	-0.0
Single with Children	0.5**	-0.5*	-0.1*
Marry without Children	-1.4***	-0.0	-0.1**
Marry with Children	-1.5***	0.1	-0.1***
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	955,986	119,347	955,986

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. Model 1 and Model 3 include all observations in the private sector sub-sample. 3. Model 2 includes only observations of respondents when changing jobs. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Blacks and other races were 1.1 and 1.0 percentage points more likely than whites to change jobs in the private sector (Model 1, Table 4), but Latinos were 0.8 percentage points less likely to change jobs. However, the turnover probability of Asians did not differ statistically

significantly from whites. The complicated impacts of race only support Hypothesis 1 for blacks and other races. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, black and other race movers were also 0.9 and 2.5 percentage points more likely than white movers to take public jobs (Model 2). Asian movers were 1.6 percentage points less likely to work for the government, however, contrary to Hypothesis 2. Taken together, blacks and other races were 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points more likely (Model 3), but Latinos and Asians were 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points less likely than whites to switch. These results only support Hypothesis 3 for blacks and other races.

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, disabled workers were 0.5 percentage points more likely than others to change jobs (Model 1, Table 4). Of job movers, workers with and without disabilities had similar likelihoods of moving to public jobs (Model 2), contrary to Hypothesis 2. Disabled workers also had a similar likelihood of switching to the public sector with workers without disabilities (Model 3), failing to support Hypothesis 3.

Table 5. Average Partial Effects on the Probability in the Private Sector for Men

Variables	Model 1 Job Mobility	Model 2 Sector Choice	Model 3 Sector Switching
Sexual Orientation	0.6	-2.2	-0.4
Single with Children	0.2	-0.6	-0.1
Marry without Children	-1.0***	0.1	-0.0
Marry with Children	-0.9***	0.2	-0.0
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	517,531	64,623	517,531

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. Model 1 and Model 3 include all observations in the private sector sub-sample. 3. Model 2 includes only observations of respondents when changing jobs. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Veterans were 1.1 percentage points more likely than nonveterans to change jobs (Model 1, Table 4), supporting Hypothesis 1. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, veteran movers were 1.0 percentage points more likely than nonveteran movers to work for the government (Model 2). Veterans were 0.2 percentage points more likely than nonveterans to switch to the public sector (Model 3), consistent with Hypothesis 3.

Table 6. Average Partial Effects on the Probability in the Private Sector for Women

Variables	Model 1 Job Mobility	Model 2 Sector Choice	Model 3 Sector Switching
Sexual Orientation	1.7	0.5	0.2
Single with Children	0.3	-0.6†	-0.1*
Marry without Children	-1.9***	-0.1	-0.2***
Marry with Children	-2.5***	0.1	-0.2***
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	438,455	54,724	438,455

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. Model 1 and Model 3 include all observations in the private sector sub-sample. 3. Model 2 includes only observations of respondents when changing jobs. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Contrary to Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3, sexual orientation does not have any significant impacts on job mobility, sector choice, and sector switching in the private sector (Table 4), partly because gay and lesbian workers have different turnover rates. Dividing by gender, gay male workers still had similar turnover rates with heterosexual male workers (Model 1, Table 5), failing to support Hypothesis 1 again. Lesbian female workers were 1.7 percentage points more likely than heterosexual female workers to change jobs (Model 1, Table 6), but the impact was

only close to statistically significant,[11] inconsistent with Hypothesis 1. Gay male movers were 2.2 percentage points less likely than male movers with female partners to take public jobs (Model 2, Table 5), and gay male workers were 0.4 percentage points less likely than heterosexual male workers to switch to the public sector (Model 3). The impacts were also only close to statistically significant,[12] however, contrary to Hypothesis 2A. On the other hand, lesbian and heterosexual female movers had similar likelihoods of taking public jobs (Model 2 Table 6), contrary to Hypothesis 2A. Lesbian female workers still had a similar likelihood of switching to the public sector with heterosexual female workers (Model 3), contrary to Hypothesis 3A.

Table 7. Average Partial Effects on the Probability in the Private Sector including Interaction Terms

Variables	Model 1 Job Mobility	Model 2 Sector Choice	Model 3 Sector Switching
Female	-0.8***	0.8***	0.1*
Sexual Orientation	0.5	-2.8	-0.5
Sexual Orientation*Female	1.4	3.1	0.7*
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	955,986	119,347	955,986

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. Model 1 and Model 3 include all observations in the private sector sub-sample. 3. Model 2 includes only observations of respondents when changing jobs. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

[11] The t-statistic is 1.61.
[12] The t-statistics are -1.53 and -1.50.

This study further runs regressions with an interaction term between sexual orientation and female (Table 7). Though lesbian female workers may be more likely than gay male workers to change jobs and less likely to work for the government, they had a similar likelihood of changing jobs (Model 1), and the probability of taking public jobs between them did not differ significantly (Model 2). Lesbian female workers should be more likely than gay male workers to switch to the public sector: gay male workers were 0.5 percentage points less likely than heterosexual male workers to switch to the public sector (Model 3), [13] and lesbian female workers were 0.8 (0.7+0.1) percentage points more likely than gay male workers to switch to the public sector.

Single workers with children were 0.5 percentage points more likely to change jobs, contrary to Hypothesis 1, but married workers without and with children were 1.4 and 1.5 percentage points less likely than childless single workers to do so (Model 1, Table 4), consistent with Hypothesis 1. Of job movers, only single workers with children were 0.5 percentage points less likely to work for the government (Model 2), failing to support Hypothesis 2. Taken together, they were all 0.1 percentage points less likely than childless single workers to switch to the public sector (Model 3).

As turnover rates may differ between husbands and fathers and wives and mothers, this study further runs subgroup analyses by gender. Husbands without and with children were still 1.0 and 0.9 percentage points less likely than childless single men to change jobs (Model 1, Table 5), contrary to Hypothesis 1A. They had similar probabilities of switching to the public sector with childless single men (Model 3, Table 5), failing to support Hypothesis 3A.

[13] It is almost statistically significant with t-stat at -1.59.

Wives without and with children were 1.9 and 2.5 percentage points less likely than childless single women to change jobs (Model 1, Table 6), consistent with Hypothesis 1A, but single mothers had similar turnover rates, contrary to Hypothesis 1A. Of these movers, single mothers were 0.6 percentage points less likely than childless single women to take public jobs (Model 2), and wives had a similar likelihood of taking public jobs, contrary to Hypothesis 2. Single mothers and wives were 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points less likely than childless single women to switch to the public sector (Model 3).

Table 8. Average Partial Effects on the Probability in the Public Sector

Variables	Model 1 Job Mobility	Model 2 Sector Choice	Model 3 Sector Switching
Female	0.0	-1.9*	-0.2
Black	1.7***	-0.6	0.3*
Latino	0.8*	-0.7	0.1
Asian	0.1	4.0⸸	-0.1
Other Race	1.2*	-4.5*	0.0
Disability	-0.6	-1.2	-0.4⸸
Veteran	2.2***	3.4**	1.2***
Sexual Orientation	-0.3	0.2	0.3
Single with Children	0.7*	-1.4	0.2
Marry without Children	0.0	-2.8*	-0.2
Marry with Children	0.1	-1.0	0.0
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	219,821	17,246	219,821

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. Model 1 and Model 3 include all observations in the public sector sub-sample. 3. Model 2 includes only observations of respondents when changing jobs. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

In the public sector, women and men had a similar turnover rate (Model 1, Table 8), failing to support Hypothesis 1. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, female movers were 1.9

percentage points less likely than male movers to choose private jobs (Model 2). Women and men had a similar likelihood of switching to the private sector (Model 3), however, contrary to Hypothesis 4.

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, blacks, Latinos, and other races were 1.7, 0.8, and 1.2 percentage points more likely than whites to change jobs (Model 1, Table 8). The turnover probability of Asians did not differ statistically significantly from whites, contrary to Hypothesis 1. Of these movers, blacks and Latinos had a similar likelihood of choosing private jobs with white movers (Model 2), failing to support Hypothesis 2. Asians were also 4.0 percentage points more likely than white movers to choose private jobs. Other race movers were 4.5 percentage points less likely than whites to choose private jobs, however, supporting Hypothesis 2. Only blacks were 0.4 percentage points more likely than whites to switch to the private sector (Model 3), and most minorities and whites had a similar likelihood of switching to the private sector.

Table 9. Average Partial Effects on the Probability in the Public Sector for Men

Variables	Model 1 Job Mobility	Model 2 Sector Choice	Model 3 Sector Switching
Sexual Orientation	1.4	-5.6	0.4
Single with Children	0.0	-0.1	-0.1
Marry without Children	0.4	0.9	0.4$^{\downarrow}$
Marry with Children	0.6$^{\downarrow}$	2.6$^{\downarrow}$	0.6**
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	90,515	7,402	90,515

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. Model 1 and Model 3 include all observations in the private sector sub-sample. 3. Model 2 includes only observations of respondents when changing jobs. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ↓p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Disabled workers had a similar likelihood of changing jobs with workers without disabilities (Model 1, Table 8), contrary to Hypothesis 1. Of these job movers, disabled workers and workers without disabilities had a similar likelihood of choosing private jobs (Model 2), inconsistent with Hypothesis 2. Disabled workers were 0.4 percentage points less likely than workers without disabilities (Model 3).

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, veterans were 2.2 percentage points more likely than nonveterans to change jobs (Model 1, Table 8). Veteran movers were 3.4 percentage points more likely than nonveteran movers to choose private jobs (Model 2), however, contrary to Hypothesis 2. Veterans were also 1.2 percentage points more likely than nonveterans to switch to the private sector (Model 3).

Table 10. Average Partial Effects on the Probability in the Public Sector for Women

Variables	Model 1 Job Mobility	Model 2 Sector Choice	Model 3 Sector Switching
Sexual Orientation	-1.2	1.0	0.1
Single with Children	0.7*	-2.9⸸	0.1
Marry without Children	-0.1	-5.8***	-0.5**
Marry with Children	-0.3	-4.0**	-0.4*
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	129,306	9,844	129,306

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. Model 1 and Model 3 include all observations in the private sector sub-sample. 3. Model 2 includes only observations of respondents when changing jobs. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Contrary to Hypothesis 1, 2, and 4, sexual orientation does not have any impact on job mobility, sector choice, and sector switching in the public sector (Table 8). Dividing by gender,

the turnover probability of gay and lesbian workers did not differ statistically significantly from their LGBT counterparts (Model 1, Table 9&10). Gay movers might be less likely, and lesbian movers might be more likely than their counterparts to work for the government, but the impacts were also statistically insignificant (Model 2, Table 9&10), contrary to Hypothesis 2A. Gay and lesbian workers also have a similar likelihood of switching to the private sector with their counterparts (Model 3, Table 9&10). This study further runs the regression by including an interaction term between sexual orientation and female (Table 11) but does not find any impact.

Table 11. Average Partial Effects on the Probability in the Public Sector including Interaction Terms

Variables	Model 1 Job Mobility	Model 2 Sector Choice	Model 3 Sector Switching
Female	0.0	-2.0*	-0.2
Sexual Orientation	1.1	-5.1	0.3
Sexual Orientation*Female	-2.2	8.6	0.1
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	219,821	17,246	219,821

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. Model 1 and Model 3 include all observations in the private sector sub-sample. 3. Model 2 includes only observations of respondents when changing jobs. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Though married workers have a similar likelihood of changing jobs with childless single workers (Model 1, Table 8), single workers with children were 0.7 percentage points more likely to change jobs, contrary to Hypothesis 1. Of job movers, married workers without children were 2.8 percentage points less likely than childless single workers to take private jobs (Model 2),

supporting Hypothesis 2. Marriage and parenthood did not impact the probability of switching to the private sector, however (Model 3), contrary to Hypothesis 4.

Single fathers and childless husbands had similar turnover rates with childless single men (Model 1, Table 9), contrary to Hypothesis 1A. Husbands with children were 0.6 percentage points more likely than childless single men to change jobs, however, consistent with Hypothesis 1A. Of these movers, single fathers and childless husbands still had a similar likelihood of moving to private jobs with childless single men, failing to support Hypothesis 2. Husbands with children were 2.6 percentage points more likely to move to private jobs, contrary to Hypothesis 2. Taken together, husbands without and with children were 0.4 and 0.6 percentage points more likely than childless single men to switch to the private sector (Model 3).

Single mothers were 0.7 percentage points more likely than childless single women to change jobs (Model 1, Table 10), and wives without and with children had similar turnover rates with childless single women, contrary to Hypothesis 1A. Single mothers and wives without and with children were 2.9, 5.7, and 4.0 percentage points less likely than childless single women to take private jobs (Model 2), consistent with Hypothesis 2. Taken together, wives without and with children were also 0.5 and 0.4 percentage points less likely than childless single women to switch to the private sector (Model 3), consistent with Hypothesis 4A.

2.5 Conclusions and Implications

The government is seeking to become a model employer and trying to recruit underrepresented groups from the private sector and retain them in the public sector (Donohue, 2021; Lee & Cayer, 1987; Menifield et al., 2024; Sabharwal & Geva-May, 2013). This study indicates that the public sector is successfully recruiting women, racial/ethnic minorities, and veterans from the private sector. The fact that Latinos and Asians are less likely than whites to

switch to the public sector is surprising because Latinos and Asians, especially Latino and Asian women, are usually more likely than whites to work for state and local governments (Lewis et al., 2022; Lewis & Pathak, 2014) or the federal service (Lewis & Han, 2024; Lewis & Oh, 2018). One potential explanation is that Latinos and Asians are more likely than other races to be immigrants in the U.S., preventing them from obtaining public, especially federal, employment (Lewis, Liu, & Edwards, 2014). The SIPP panels identified respondents' citizenships in the 2004 and 2008 panels, making it possible to examine Latinos' and Asians' likelihood of sector switching compared to whites with further controlling citizenship. Though workers with citizenships are more likely than their counterparts to switch to the public sector (Model 3, Table A3), the robustness check does not change the patterns of Latinos and Asians in switching (Model 3, Table A2&A3). Another potential explanation for Latinos is that they are less likely than whites to change jobs than whites, discouraging them from switching to the public sector. Asians and whites have a similar likelihood of changing jobs, however, and they are less likely to move to public jobs, casting doubts on previous studies' findings showing that Asians are more likely than whites to work for the government. Overall, the government needs to put more effort in recruiting Latinos and Asians from the private sector.

Compared to the private sector, the government has done a better job in retaining underrepresented groups (12.7% versus 8.0%, see Table 1), consistent with Wang, Yang, and Wang (2012) and Agarwal and Sajid (2017) find that private workers have higher turnover rates than public workers. The government has also successfully retained underrepresented groups: women and most racial and ethnical minorities have a similar likelihood of switching to the private sector with their counterparts, and disabled workers are less likely than nondisabled workers to switch, supporting that disabled workers are more likely to work for the government

(Lewis & Pathak, 2023). Blacks and veterans are more likely than their counterparts to switch to the private sector, however, inconsistent with Cho and Lewis (2012) and Winters (2018). Despite this, wives are less likely than single childless women to switch to the private sector, suggesting the impacts of family-friendly and work-life balance policies in the public sector (Feeney & Stritch, 2019). Husbands are more likely than single childless men to switch to the private sector, however, indicating that the public sector typically provides workers with a more compressed wage structure (Borjas, 2002) and men often experience public sector wage penalties (Schmitt, 2010). As a result, husbands as the primary income earner in the household often need to seek outside offers. Although most previous studies found that women were less likely than men to have turnover intentions in the public sector (Ertas, 2015; Moynihan & Landuyt, 2008), women and men had a similar likelihood of changing jobs (Model 1, Table 8), consistent with Lewis and Park (1989). Previous studies also found that minorities were less likely to have turnover intentions in leaving the government (Pitts, Marvel, & Fernandez, 2011). This study finds that blacks were more likely to switch to the private sector and that Asian job movers were more likely than their white counterparts to move to private jobs, however, casting doubts on studies using turnover intentions to examine public workers' turnover behaviors.

Previous studies adopted different approaches in examining who wants to work for the government, including asking about workers' sector preferences, attractions, and choice (Asseburg, Hattke, Hensel, Homberg, & Vogel, 2020; Clerkin & Coggburn, 2012; Holt, 2018) and identifying their class of work (Mandel & Semyonov, 2021), showing that underrepresented workers are more likely than their counterparts to work for the government. This study finds inconsistent results from the perspective of sector switching. Women are more likely than men to switch to the public sector, but they have a similar likelihood of switching to the private sector.

Latinos and Asians are less likely, and other races are more likely than whites to switch to the public sector, but they also have similar probabilities of switching to the private sector. Disabled workers have a similar likelihood of switching to the public sector with workers without disabilities but are less likely to switch to the private sector. Veterans are both more likely than nonveterans to switch to the public or private sector. These inconsistencies may suggest that scholars should consider workers' job mobility patterns in examining their sector choice.

This study still has several noteworthy limitations. First, it treats employer-to-employer transitions as voluntary turnover, but some of these transitions are probably involuntary turnover (Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, & Robin, 2006). As minority groups are typically more likely than majority groups to change jobs involuntarily, this approach may overestimate the probability of changing jobs among minority groups, such as women and racial/ethnical minorities. This study does not exclusively focus on full-time workers because the initial months of new jobs sometimes do not require working at least 35 hours. This study's approach may lead to bias, but the robustness check focusing solely on full-time workers finds similar results. The study also does not include the industry in the regressions, primarily due to concerns that more than 80% of public workers were in three categories.[14] Controlling for both industry and occupation produces similar results in most signs of coefficients. [15] Finally, collecting panel data allows respondents to change information from one wave to the next (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001, p. 286). Inconsistent observations comprise less than 1% of the total, and excluding respondents with inconsistent gender or race information across waves produces similar results.

[14] This study used an aggregated form of the code with the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) into 20 categories. The three categories are Educational Services, Health Care and Social Assistance, and Public Administration.

[15] In the model, this study controls gender, race, disability and veteran status, sexual orientation, marriage and parenthood, age, age-squared, education years, previous and current earnings, union membership, occupation, industry, state and time fixed effects.

Despite these limitations, this study has important implications for recruitment and retention in the public sector. First, this study finds that the government fails to attract Latinos and Asians from the private sector, indicating that the government workforce probably could not reflect their representation of society (see Lewis & Oh, 2018; Llorens, 2008) and Latinos and Asians could not fully engage in incorporating their interests into decision-making (Sowa & Selden, 2003). The government should put more effort into attracting Latinos and Asians from the private sector. Though the government has done a better job in retaining workers than the private sector, it should also prioritize efforts to retain specific underrepresented groups, such as blacks and veterans, in the public sector. The inconsistencies also indicate that turnover intention is not a good proxy to examine public workers' actual turnover, encouraging future scholars to use longitudinal data. Finally, this study answers the question of who wants to work for the government from the perspective of sector switching, indicating that workers' job mobility may play a role in workers' sector choice.

Chapter III: The Impacts of Sector Switching on Workers' Pay

3.1 Introduction

Sector switching, changing from a private sector to a public sector job or *vice versa* (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009; Su & Bozeman, 2009), is a crucial process for understanding public-private sector differences (Hansen, 2014), recruitment and retention, and pay systems. In examining public sector recruitment and retention (Asseburg & Homberg, 2020; Hur & Abner, 2023; Jakobsen et al., 2023) and pay systems (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2010; Knies, Borst, Leisink, & Farndale, 2022; Lee, 2020; Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 2010), public administration scholars typically find that pay is one of the most significant factors in attracting and retaining workers (Crewson, 1997; Kellough & Nigro, 2002; Lasseter & Daman, 2024; Leider et al., 2023) and that setting competitive pay motivates them to put forth effort and improves organizational performance (Gagné et al., 2022; Lapuente & Van de Walle, 2020; Lee, 2020). Facing challenges in attracting and retaining workers (Asseburg & Homberg, 2020; Hur & Abner, 2023; Linos, 2018), understanding how to motivate public workers (Anderfuhren-Biget, Varone, Giauque, & Ritz, 2010; Molines, Mifsud, El Akremi, & Perrier, 2022), and improving organizational performance (Anwar & Abdullah, 2021; Kim, 2010), the public sector needs to dig deeper into sector switchers' wage changes to set competitive pay.

As few studies have examined workers' wage changes in moving into or out of the public sector (for exceptions see Rattsø & Stokke, 2019), scholars primarily focus on public-private sector wage differentials (Bender, 1998; Gindling, Hasnain, Newhouse, & Shi, 2020; Sherk, 2010) but find complicated results about the competitiveness of public sector pay (Langbein & Roberts, 2023; Lewis, Pathak, et al., 2018). State and local governments often pay workers less than the private sector (Schmitt, 2010), facing challenges in recruitment and retention (Beck,

Boulton, Lemmings, & Clayton, 2012; Linos, 2018). The federal government typically pays workers more than the private sector (Sherk, 2010), attracting workers to apply for federal jobs (Krueger, 1988b), but still faces challenges in attracting and retaining skilled workers (Goldenkoff, 2015; Libicki, Senty, & Pollak, 2014) because of its relatively compressed wage structure (Borjas, 2002), a dilemma for public organizations worldwide (Kim, 2008).

Inadequate public sector pay leads to failures in attracting and retaining qualified workers (Kellough & Nigro, 2002; Lasseter & Daman, 2024) and motivating workers (Corduneanu et al., 2023; Voorberg, Jilke, Tummers, & Bekkers, 2018) and improving organizational performance (Fenizia, 2022; Rasul & Rogger, 2018). Though efficiency wage theory posits that employers need to pay workers enough to incentivize them to be productive and retain them (Akerlof, 1982, 1984; Taylor & Taylor, 2011), excessive public sector pay contributes to elevated governmental expenditure (Anzia & Moe, 2015), leading to budget shortfalls (Reilly & Reed, 2011; Reilly, Schoener, & Bolin, 2007) and imposing burdens on taxpayers (Laffer et al., 2011; Sherk, 2010). The public sector pay systems are essential in recruiting and retaining workers (Lasseter & Daman, 2024; Leider et al., 2023), motivating workers' efforts (Taylor & Taylor, 2011; van Triest, 2024), and improving organizational performance (Durant, Kramer, Perry, Mesch, & Paarlberg, 2006; Fernandez & Madumo, 2024).

Furthermore, the public sector needs to set competitive pay for different groups of workers. Scholars typically find that the public sector provides larger pay premiums for low-skilled than high-skilled workers (Depalo, Giordano, & Papapetrou, 2015; Gindling et al., 2020; Melly, 2005; Taylor & Taylor, 2011) and for women and racial/ethnical minorities than men and whites (Bender, 1998, 2003; Bonaccolto-Töpfer, Castagnetti, & Prümer, 2022; Hospido & Moral-Benito, 2016; Schmitt, 2010). Most studies often examine public sector wage premiums

without taking into account the impacts of unobserved skills and job mobility, however, and the public sector may attract and retain the most qualified low-skilled workers and women and racial/ethnical minorities (Bargain & Melly, 2008; Siminski, 2013), encouraging scholars to examine sector switchers' wage changes.

Using data from the 1996-2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), this study examines the impacts of sector switching on workers' wages. The relevance of this study is threefold. First, the public sector typically has challenges attracting and retaining talent (Kim, 2008), motivating workers (Corduneanu et al., 2023), and improving organizational performance (Fenizia, 2022) because of its pay competitiveness (Fernandez & Madumo, 2024; Lasseter & Daman, 2024; Taylor & Taylor, 2011). By examining the impacts of sector switching on workers' wages, this study sheds light on the extent of wage changes in moving into or out of the public sector, offering insights into whether public organizations provide competitive pay.

Second, previous studies on public-private sector wage differentials typically fail to account for self-selection and unobserved heterogeneity (Gindling et al., 2020; Giordano et al., 2015; Lausev, 2014). It is not a random event for workers to work for the government, however, and more recent studies use panel data to deal with the selection problem in France (Bargain, Etienne, & Melly, 2018) and Spain (Hospido & Moral-Benito, 2016). As few studies have examined public-private sector wage differentials with panel data in the context of the U.S (for exceptions see Makridis, 2021, but it only focuses on science and engineering graduates), this study fills the gap and uses panel data to account for unobserved skills in the U.S.

Third, more recent studies examine public-private wage differentials with panel data (Bargain et al., 2018; Hospido & Moral-Benito, 2016; Makridis, 2021) but typically fail to consider the impacts of job mobility. These studies compare wages of sector switchers before

versus after (Makridis, 2021) or public leavers and stayers (Rattsø & Stokke, 2019), ignoring that workers changing jobs typically lead to wage changes. This study offers a robust framework for examining wage changes in job mobility and sector switching to compensate for this gap.

This study first develops the theoretical background of the impacts of sector switching on workers' wages. After describing data, this study tests hypotheses using the two-way fixed effects regression and finds that workers have wage gains from switching to the public or private sector, but public workers have lower wage gains from switching to the private sector than from within-sector mobility. Finally, this study discusses potential implications.

3.2 Literature Review

As sector switching requires workers to decide both to change jobs and to move to another sector, understanding the impacts of job mobility and public-private sector wage differentials are two necessary steps to know the impacts of sector switching on workers' wages. The first part of this section reviews the literature examining the impacts of job mobility.

3.2.1 Job Mobility

Voluntary job mobility typically raises workers' wages (Altonji & Williams, 1992; Bartel & Borjas, 1981; Light, 2005; Schmelzer, 2012; Topel & Ward, 1992), but involuntary job mobility often lowers it (Couch & Placzek, 2010; Jacobson, LaLonde, & Sullivan, 1993; Lachowska, Mas, & Woodbury, 2020; Pérez & Sanz, 2005). Economists introduce theories and models to explain why workers experience wage gains and losses in job mobility. Human capital theory, for example, posits that workers invest in human capital to improve their productivity and seek better wage offers in the labor market (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1974). Voluntary job changes often happen after workers improve their productivity and seek better outside offers, resulting in wage gains. Firms only retain workers whose marginal revenue exceeds the marginal cost

(McAfee, 2005), however, and workers failing to do so will experience involuntary job changes, leading firms to assume them with low productivity, known as market signaling (Spence, 1978), and offer low wages (Gibbons & Katz, 1991).

Job search theory assumes that workers only have imperfect information about jobs (Lippman & McCall, 1976), and workers choose any acceptable wages if they are unemployed but only accept jobs with higher wages if they are employed (Burdett & Mortensen, 1998). Voluntary job changes typically result in wage gains, but involuntary ones often lead to wage losses.

Blumen, Kogan, and McCarthy (1955) introduce the mover-stayer model to predict workers' job mobility (also see Goodman, 1961; Spilerman, 1972), assuming that high-productivity workers are more likely to stay, but low-productivity workers undergo persistent involuntary turnover, suggesting that involuntary job mobility leads to wage losses.

The raiding model assumes that firms go after high-productivity rather than low-productivity workers (Lazear, 2012). High-productivity workers rarely suffer unemployment and are more likely to change jobs voluntarily with positive wage changes.

Although job search models typically focus on workers, employers also play a significant role in job mobility. Two relevant models introduce the role of employers and assume that a worker's productivity is different when working for different employers because the job match quality is different across jobs (Jovanovic, 1979a; Mortensen, 1978). The labor market does not have "good" workers and employers, but only "good" matches with wage rates reflect the quality of job matches (Le Barbanchon, 2016; Mincer & Jovanovic, 1981). These two models have disparities in their assumptions of the arrival of information about job match quality, however.

Borrowing from Nelson (1970), labor economists called them either "search good" (Jovanovic, 1979a; Mortensen, 1978) or "experience good" models (Johnson, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979b).

The "search good" model assumes that workers have perfect information about the job match quality upon receiving outside offers (Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979a). Workers will know wage offers before job mobility and only accept offers with better job match quality, leading to wage gains.

The "experience good" model assumes that workers only know job match quality after "experiencing" assignments in organizations (Jovanovic, 1979b; Mortensen, 1978). Though workers expect wage gains before changing jobs, they may have smaller wage gains than expected after "experiencing" assignments if the job match quality is low, leading to a less promising wage trajectory. As a result, workers will still seek outside offers and voluntarily change jobs again without knowing the job match quality of these offers, but their low job match quality in the previous jobs suggests a high likelihood of experiencing wage gains in the following voluntary job changes.

Voluntary turnover results in higher wages (Card, Cardoso, & Kline, 2016; Card, Heining, & Kline, 2013; Hyslop & Maré, 2009; Jinkins & Morin, 2018). Bartel and Borjas (1981) find that voluntary turnover produced positive wage changes. Altonji and Williams (1992) find that voluntary quits increased wage growth. Light (2005) finds that men experienced higher wage growth from voluntary job moves than from staying with current jobs. Schmelzer (2012) finds that voluntary job-to-job mobility brought permanent income rewards in Germany.

With most previous theories predicting that voluntary job changes result in wage gains, the "experience good" model also suggests that workers sometimes experience smaller wage gains than expected in voluntary job changes (Jovanovic, 1979b; Mortensen, 1978), where two

categories of wage changes, short- and long-term wage changes, explain why. Mincer (1986) defines short-term wage changes as the differences between the starting wage on the new job and the job before and long-term wage changes as the differences in wages between these two jobs. The "experience good" model indicates that workers may experience short-term wage gains but long-term wage losses in voluntary job changes.

Voluntary job changes may also lead to short-term wage losses but can result in long-term wage gains. Private workers' wages depend on their own and their firms' productivity (Abowd, Kramarz, & Margolis, 1999; Bagger & Lentz, 2019; Postel‐Vinay & Robin, 2002a, 2002b). Workers sometimes start their careers in low-productivity firms that can't afford to provide workers with high pay and leave for high-productivity firms with immediate wage losses in exchange for future higher wage growth (Postel‐Vinay & Robin, 2002a, 2002b). Connolly and Gottschalk (2008) find that more than 44% of job-to-job transitions resulted in short-term wage losses, but 36% and 19% of these transitions for females and males eventually resulted in long-term wage gains.

Short-term wage losses in voluntary job changes can also lead to long-term wage losses if the moves are into lower-ranked jobs (Tjaden & Wellschmied, 2014), involve occupational mobility (Kambourov & Manovskii, 2009a, 2009b), and occur for other nonpecuniary reasons (Jung & Kuhn, 2019). Workers sometimes accept jobs that pay less than current jobs to avoid unemployment (Jolivet et al., 2006). Workers also sometimes change both jobs and occupations (Moscarini & Thomsson, 2007) without being qualified in new occupations, leading to short- and long-term wage losses. Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) find that job mobility that involved changing occupations led to an 18% drop in weekly earnings, on average. Workers also change jobs to have more flexible schedules or prioritize other nonpecuniary factors (Card, 1991;

Heckman & MaCurdy, 1980; Mincer, 1962), leading to wage losses. Jung and Kuhn (2019) find that 24% of wage-loss job-to-job transitions were due to nonpecuniary factors, including flexible schedules.

Furthermore, job mobility may affect wage gains differently by groups, e.g., women and men and racial/ethnical minorities and whites. Women and racial/ethnical minorities typically have smaller wage gains than men and whites (Alon & Tienda, 2005; Bowlus, 1997; Loprest, 1992; Oettinger, 1996). Women and minorities are more likely than their counterparts to leave and reenter the labor market (Royalty, 1998; Taniguchi & Rosenfeld, 2002), and minorities, especially blacks, are more likely to experience involuntary turnover (Park & Sandefur, 2003). Reentry into the job market and involuntary job mobility lead to smaller wage gains than voluntary job mobility (Lachowska et al., 2020; Munasinghe, Reif, & Henriques, 2008) and even wage losses (Couch & Placzek, 2010; Jacobson et al., 1993; Lachowska et al., 2020), and distinguishing among types of mobility contributes to explaining disparities in workers' returns. Keith and McWilliams (1995, 1997) for example, find no gender differences in wage growth once controlling for different types of mobility. Javdani (2020) also finds that visible minority employees had similar returns to quits as their white peers.

Scholars still find disparities in wage gains from voluntary job mobility between either men and women (Fuller, 2008; Pearlman, 2018) or whites and minorities (Alon & Tienda, 2005; Oettinger, 1996), however, and women and minorities still have smaller wage gains than their counterparts from voluntary job mobility (Albanesi & Olivetti, 2009; Fuller, 2008; Pearlman, 2018; Pinkston, 2006). Women typically play a more pivotal role in the household than men (Becker, 1973, 1991; Bertrand, Goldin, & Katz, 2010), leading them to invest more in the home and less outside than men (Demo & Acock, 1993; Huber & Spitze, 1983; Paull, 2008; Royalty,

1996) and care more about flexible schedules rather than wage offers in job mobility (Filer, 1985). Though more risk-averse women may only take jobs with significant higher pay (Argaw et al., 2017), they are also less likely than men to bargain with their future employers for wage gains (Roussille, 2021) and more likely to accept jobs earlier (Cortés, Pan, Pilossoph, Reuben, & Zafar, 2023), leading to smaller wage gains. Women also have less desire to compete for high-ranking positions in job mobility (Gneezy, Niederle, & Rustichini, 2003; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007), leading to gender differences in promotion rates (Blau & DeVaro, 2007).

The classical assimilation model assumes that the minority assimilates into society by adopting the majority's cultural patterns and beliefs and developing affiliations and connections with the majority groups (Gordon, 1964), and these processes are necessary for upward mobility. While many minorities are immigrants and need to assimilate into society, it takes them time to become acculturated and connected, suggesting that they may have smaller wage gains than whites in job mobility (see Hall & Farkas, 2008 for example of education).

Discrimination against women and minorities also explains why they have smaller wage gains in job mobility. The employer learning model assumes that employers cannot observe applicants' productivity in changing jobs (Altonji & Pierret, 2001; Farber & Gibbons, 1996). Employers need to learn from subsequent observations of workers' output, which fails to help employers determine workers' starting wages. Employers may treat race and gender as market signals of workers' productivity (Spence, 1978), however, and provide women and minorities with lower starting wages than men and whites. With stronger familial linkages (Shelton & John, 1996) and weaker labor market attachments (Mincer & Polachek, 1974), women face discrimination in the labor market by regarding as less productive than men. Minorities also face discrimination in the labor market. They receive fewer callbacks for interviews (Bertrand &

Mullainathan, 2004) and inferior job offers (List, 2004) than whites. Employers also believe minority workers are less productive than whites (Pinkston, 2006), have low evaluations of them (Kirshenman & Neckerman, 2019), and have prejudice against them (Charles & Guryan, 2008). For certain minority groups who are immigrants, such as Asians and Hispanics, employers even believe that they cannot speak English fluently, constraining their communication skills.

Del Bono and Vuri (2011), for example, find that women have lower wage gains than men in job mobility. Pearlman (2018) also finds that women without college education receive lower wage gains from voluntary inter-firm mobility than similarly educated men. Pinkston (2006) finds that minorities had lower starting wages than whites in job mobility.

3.2.2 Public-Private Sector Wage Differentials

Public and private workers often have wage disparities (Biggs & Richwine, 2014; Borjas, 2002; Krueger, 1988b; Schmitt, 2010). State and local government workers often receive lower pay than private workers (Schmitt, 2010), but private workers sometimes apply for federal service to seek higher pay (Krueger, 1988b). Public administration scholars and economists also hold different opinions on public-private wage differentials (Miller, 1996).

Public administration scholars believe public workers typically have lower wages than private workers (Biggs & Richwine, 2014; Keefe, 2012; Langbein & Lewis, 1998; Llorens, 2008). Public organizations rely on salary surveys of comparable positions in the private sector to determine "prevailing rates" for public workers, which are at least close to private sector rates (Fogel & Lewin, 1974; Llorens, 2008). Inappropriate determination of "prevailing rates" may underpay public workers (see Llorens, 2008 for the case of Kansas), however, because policy-makers sometimes could not determine the appropriate labor market for comparisons and public

jobs are sometimes systematically different from private jobs (Disney, 2007), such as police and intelligence services.

Political pressures may also keep public pay below market levels since it almost entirely relies on tax revenue (Nigro, Nigro, & Kellough, 2012). As states typically project budget deficits in fiscal years (Oliff, Mai, & Palacios, 2012), state governments propose remedies such as public-employee pay freezes and cuts and constitutional amendments to limit pay increases (Keefe, 2012), indicating that public workers are underpaid. Langbein and Lewis (1998), for example, find that electrical engineers in public service earned about 12% less than private workers. Llorens (2008) also finds that male state employees earned less than private workers. Biggs and Richwine (2014) find that state workers were underpaid relative to private workers.

In contrast, economists find that comparable workers typically have higher wages in the public sector than in the private sector (Bender, 1998; Bewerunge & Rosen, 2013; Borjas, 2002; Chatterji, Mumford, & Smith, 2011; Giordano et al., 2011; Krueger, 1988a, 1988b; Smith, 1976). Elected officials want to attract votes from public workers, and they may adjust pay policies to provide public workers with high pay (Bennett & Orzechowski, 1983; Blais, Blake, & Dion, 1991). Bennett and Orzechowski (1983), for example, suggest that public workers voted for the correct politicians to avoid potential income losses.

Scholars use several approaches to examine public-private wage differentials (Reilly, 2013), explaining why several scholars have complicated results in public-private sector wage differentials. Scholars either compare median or gross pay levels by ignoring individual characteristics (Slater & Welenc, 2012), adding values to public jobs attributed to job security (Biggs & Richwine, 2011), or taking account of benefits (Bewerunge & Rosen, 2013). Public workers are usually more experienced and educated than private workers (Greenfield, 2007),

however, comparing median or gross pay levels will overestimate public workers' pay. Public employment is also more secure than private employment (Farber, 2010) and provides better benefits (Gittleman & Pierce, 2012), and taking into account job security and benefits will also overestimate their pay. Smith (1976), for example, finds that federal workers received better pay than private workers. Krueger (1988b) also finds that workers experienced higher earnings increases in moving from the private to the public sector than the opposite move. Bender (1998) reviews several relevant studies and finds that public sector wage premiums existed in the federal government. Giordano et al. (2011) also find a conditional pay differential in favor of the public sector in ten European countries (also see Christofides & Michael, 2013).

The concept of public workers is broad, including federal, state, and local government workers. Federal workers are typically better paid than private workers (Biggs & Richwine, 2011; Choi & Garen, 2021; Krueger, 1988a, 1988b; Moore & Raisian, 1991; Sherk, 2010). Krueger (1988b) finds that federal workers had received better pay than private workers. Biggs and Richwine (2011) find that the federal workers received 14% more pay than private workers. State and local government workers usually have lower wages than private workers (Lewis, Pathak, et al., 2018; Munnell, Aubry, Hurwitz, & Quinby, 2011; Poterba & Rueben, 1994; Schmitt, 2010). Schmitt (2010) and Munnell et al. (2011) find that state and local workers earned 4% and 9% lower than private workers, respectively.

Public-private sector wage differentials also vary at different points of the wage distribution. Private workers have higher wages at the top of the wage distribution, indicating that high-skilled workers are better paid in the private than the public sector. Borjas (2002) finds that high-skilled workers preferred to join the private sector for higher wages. Public workers, on the other hand, have higher wages at the bottom of the wage distribution, suggesting that low-

skilled workers have higher pay in the public than in the private sector. Mueller (1998) finds that low-skilled workers experienced higher wages in the public sector than in the private sector.

Fogel and Lewin (1974), for instance, find that the government typically paid low- and middle-skilled workers more than private workers but paid high-skilled workers less. Poterba and Rueben (1994) also find that low-skilled workers enjoyed public sector wage premiums, but high-skilled workers had public sector wage penalties in state and local government (also see Schmitt, 2010). Public workers have a significant public sector wage premium at the bottom of the wage distribution but a small wage premium or even a wage penalty at the top across countries (Cai & Liu, 2011; Depalo et al., 2015; Gindling et al., 2020; Hospido & Moral-Benito, 2016; Melly, 2005; Taylor & Taylor, 2011). The public sector attracts and retains the most qualified low-skilled workers (Bargain & Melly, 2008; Siminski, 2013) but fails to do so for high-skilled workers (Katz & Krueger, 1991; Lucifora & Meurs, 2006).

Depalo et al. (2015) find that public workers enjoyed wage premiums at the lower part of the wage distribution in European countries, but premiums decreased and became penalties at the upper part in some countries. Melly (2005) finds that public-private sector wage differentials were positive at the low end of the wage distribution but became negative at the top end in Germany. Cai and Liu (2011) find that public sector wage premiums for males decreased monotonically with the wage distribution and became negative at the top half in Australia.

Scholars usually examine public-private sector wage differentials without considering the impacts of unobserved characteristics. More recent studies examine public sector wage premiums by using quantile regression with fixed effects to remove the impacts of unobserved skills (Bargain et al., 2018; Bargain & Melly, 2008; Canay, 2011; Hospido & Moral-Benito, 2016). Bargain et al. (2018) find that public workers had wage premiums at the bottom of the

wage distribution but wage penalties at the top. Hospido and Moral-Benito (2016) find that public sector wage premiums became smaller with fixed effect model than with pooled regressions across the wage distribution (see Bargain et al., 2018; Bargain & Melly, 2008), however, indicating the needs of controlling unobserved skills.

The public sector wage premiums also differ by gender and race. Women and minorities typically have larger public sector wage premiums than men and whites (Asher & Popkin, 1984; Bender, 1998, 2003; Jacobsen, 1992; Mueller, 1998; Schmitt, 2010). Jacobsen (1992), for instance, finds that women and minorities enjoyed larger public sector wage premiums than whites. Mueller (1998) also finds that Canadian female workers had larger public sector premiums than male workers. Though state and local government workers usually experience public sector wage penalties (Munnell et al., 2011), Schmitt (2010) finds that women had smaller penalties than men. Lewis, Pathak, et al. (2018) find that blacks and Latinos earned more, but whites and Asians earned less in the state government than in the private sector and that blacks, Latinos, and Asians earned more, but whites earned less in the local government than in the private sector. They also find that all groups of workers earned more in the local government than in the private sector after 2008.

3.2.3 Sector Switching

Though the impacts of job mobility and public-private sector wage differentials have received significant attention, this study only finds limited examination of the impacts of sector switching, either briefly (Frederiksen & Hansen, 2017; Shahen, Kotani, Kakinaka, & Managi, 2020) or without identifying themselves as fitting into this topic (Hospido & Moral-Benito, 2016; Knight & Wei, 2014; Makridis, 2021; Rattsø & Stokke, 2019). One potential explanation is that scholars rarely examined the impacts of job mobility on public workers' wages (see Biasi

& Sarsons, 2022 for exceptions).[16] Instead, they typically find that job mobility among public workers means moving to the private sector (Klepikova, 2016) and use the impacts of sector switching as those of job mobility (Knight & Wei, 2014) or public-private sector wage differentials (Hospido & Moral-Benito, 2016; Makridis, 2021; Rattsø & Stokke, 2019), ignoring either the impacts of job mobility or sector pay gaps.

Focusing on different countries, these studies present complicated results. For instance, in Australia and the US,[17] workers who switched from the private to public sector had wage increases, but those who moved in the opposite direction had wage decreases (Knight & Wei, 2014; Makridis, 2021). In Egypt, workers also experienced wage decreases in switching to the private sector but no wage changes in switching to the public sector (Shahen et al., 2020). Several studies also present contradictory evidence, however. In Denmark, workers had wage gains in switching to the private sector but wage losses in moving to the public sector (Frederiksen & Hansen, 2017). In Norway, public leavers have wage gains in switching to the private sector (Rattsø & Stokke, 2019).

Women and minorities earn less than men and whites in both the general economy (Black, Haviland, Sanders, & Taylor, 2006; Blau & Kahn, 2007, 2017; Charles & Guryan, 2008; Darity & Mason, 1998; Goldin, 2006, 2014; Goldin, Kerr, Olivetti, & Barth, 2017; Mandel & Semyonov, 2016; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993) and in the public sector (Bishu & Alkadry, 2017; Idson & Price, 1992; Lewis, 1988, 1998; Lewis, Boyd, et al., 2018). The public sector often has smaller gender and racial pay gaps than the private sector (Lewis, Boyd, et al., 2018; Lewis, Pathak, et al., 2018; Llorens, 2008; Mandel & Semyonov, 2014), however, suggesting that

[16] Biasi and Sarsons (2022) briefly examine the impacts of job mobility among public teachers in Wisconsin and find that public teachers have wage gains.

[17] Makridis (2021) only focuses on a series of surveys of science and engineering graduates in the US.

women and minorities may have larger wage gains than men and whites in switching to the public sector but lower wage gains in switching to the private sector.

Though scholars have not examined how sector switching impacts workers' wage differently for women and men and minorities and whites, several studies present relevant results using panel data in examining gender differences in public sector wage premiums. Hospido and Moral-Benito (2016), for example, find that women had larger wage gains than men in working for the Spanish government. Mahuteau, Mavromaras, Richardson, and Zhu (2017) and Bonaccolto-Töpfer et al. (2022) also find that women had higher wage premiums than men in the public sector in Australia and Germany. However, Rattsø and Stokke (2019) find little difference between gender from switching to the private sector in Norway.

This paper first examines the impacts of within-sector mobility on workers' wages. Workers should have wage gains after voluntary within-sector mobility in both the public and private sectors. As women and minorities typically have lower wage gain after within-sector mobility in the private sector (Pearlman, 2018; Pinkston, 2006) but greater public sector wage premiums than men and whites (Lewis, Pathak, et al., 2018; Schmitt, 2010), they should have smaller wage gains after within-sector job mobility in the private sector but larger wage gains in the public sector. This study has the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Workers have wage gains after voluntary within-sector mobility, and women and minorities have smaller wage gains than men and whites in the private sector but larger wage gains in the public sector.

Furthermore, federal workers typically have higher wages (Sherk, 2010), and state and local government workers usually have lower wages than private workers (Schmitt, 2010). Workers should have larger wage gains after switching to the federal government, but smaller

wage gains after switching to the state and local government than after within-sector mobility. Taken together, workers should have wage gains after switching to the public sector and the local, state, and federal government. As women and minorities typically have larger wage premiums than men and whites, they should have larger wage gains after switching to the public sector. Since public workers typically have significant wage premiums at the bottom but small and even no wage premiums at the top of the wage distribution (Depalo et al., 2015), workers should also have larger wage gains after switching to the public sector at the bottom than the top of the wage distribution. This study has the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2A: Workers have larger wage gains after switching to the federal government, but smaller wage gains after switching to the state and local government than after within-sector mobility.

Hypothesis 3A: Workers have wage gains after switching to the public sector (federal, state, and local government), and women and minorities have larger wage gains than men and whites.

Hypothesis 4A: Workers at the bottom have larger wage gains after switching to the public sector (federal, state, and local government) than the top of the wage distribution.

The public-private wage differentials also imply that workers should have smaller wage gains after switching from the federal government to the private sector, but larger wage gains after switching from the state and local than after within-sector mobility in the public sector. Taken together, workers should also have wage gains after switching from the state and local government, but it is unclear whether workers have wage gains after switching from the federal government to the private sector. As women and minorities typically have larger wage premiums than men and whites, they should have smaller wage gains after switching to the private sector.

Workers should also have larger wage gains after switching to the private sector at the top than the bottom of the wage distribution. This study has the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2B: Workers have larger wage gains after switching from the state or local government to the private sector, but smaller wage gains after switching from the federal government than after within-sector mobility.

Hypothesis 3B: Workers have wage gains after switching to the private sector (from state and local but not federal government), and women and minorities have smaller wage gains than men and whites.

Hypothesis 4B: Workers at the top have larger wage gains after switching from the public (federal, state, and local government) to the private sector than the bottom of the wage distribution.

3.3 Data and Methodology

3.3.1 Data

This study uses panel data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally representative panel survey providing information on the dynamics of employment, collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. The SIPP collected data from individuals monthly for 2.5 to 4 years in each panel, including 14,000 to 52,000 households and providing information on respondents' race, sex, employer IDs, class of work, and earnings.

This study uses data from the 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels, collectively covering the period March 1996 to November 2013 with gaps. Respondents reported their employer IDs and whether they worked in the federal, state, local government, or private sector, allowing the Census Bureau to determine whether respondents changed employers or switched sectors. Since

the SIPP provides monthly data on the respondents' class of work, employer IDs, and earnings, this study tracks monthly observations of each respondent ranging from 2.5 to 4 years.

The SIPP adopts a rotation group design, with each respondent randomly selected into any of four rotation groups consisting of about a quarter of the entire panel. Every fourth month, the SIPP interviews respondents from one rotation group about their previous four months and calls each interview a wave. This study follows Grogger (2004) with using data on the last month of interviews and identifies respondents whose employer ID changed between waves as experiencing job mobility and those whose sector also changed as sector switchers.

This study focuses on public and private employees aged 18 to 65.[18] Since unemployed and employed workers typically have different job search behaviors and outcomes (Faberman et al., 2022), this study focuses on voluntary turnover[19] and defines it as employer-to-employer transitions with respondents changing employer IDs between two consecutive waves or within a four-month period. This study runs separate analyses based on whether respondents entered the survey as private or public workers. It categorizes respondents as staying with their original employer through the period, changing jobs within the same sector, or switching sectors.[20] Respondents may change jobs more than once in the survey, however, and cumulative mobility impacts workers' wages (Keith & McWilliams, 1995; Yankow, 2022). To address this, this study tracks respondents until they change jobs for the second time during the survey.

[18] This study drops around 370,000 observations working in other sectors and serving in the military.

[19] This study drops almost 600,000 observations when workers were unemployed.

[20] Since this study only focuses on private or public workers, respondents either becoming unemployed or switching to the nonprofit sector do not show up in the sample.

Table 12. Summary of Samples

Private Sector	All Observations	Stayers	Within-Sector Movers	Sector Switchers
Observations	689,054	429,010	246,167	13,877
Respondents	132,077	83,978	45,384	2,715

Public Sector	All Observations	Stayers	Within-Sector Movers	Sector Switchers
Observations	171,864	122,963	35,712	13,189
Respondents	28,129	20,084	5,371	2,674

Note: 1. All Observations include Stayers, Within-Sector Movers, and Sector Switchers. 2. Stayers are who stay with their original employers in the whole survey. 3. Within-Sector Movers are who change jobs but do not switch sectors. 4. Sector Switchers are who change jobs and switch sectors. 5. Respondents are individuals interviewed in the sample, and each respondent has several observations but can only change jobs once. Respondents will leave the sample if they change jobs more than once.

The study has one dependent variable, the natural logarithm of workers' hourly wage in the current month. The SIPP only provides workers' monthly earnings, however, including workers' earnings derived from all jobs worked during the month, including wage and salary income, bonus payments, commissions, overtime payments, tips, other income from self-employed businesses, self-employed business profits, and accounting for time spent away from a job without pay.[21] This study excludes workers owning any businesses, holding more than one job, and reporting earnings less than $1.[22] It also converts monthly earnings into constant dollars based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) in December 2013[23] and calculate hourly wage with weeks and hours worked in the current month.[24] This study drops outliers, trimming the bottom and top 1%, including extremely low (less than $1 per hour) and high wages (more than $1,000 per hour). The samples have approximately 700,000 observations

[21] For detailed information, see https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp/about/sipp-content-information/components-of-total-income.html.

[22] This study drops more than 200,000 observations.

[23] Retrieved from https://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables/historical-cpi-u-201710.pdf.

[24] This study drops more than 70,000 observations with missing values in weeks worked in the current month and usual hours worked per week.

from more than 130,000 respondents first interviewed as private workers and 170,000 observations from almost 30,000 respondents first interviewed as public workers. This study also divides respondents into three groups of workers: stayers, within-sector movers, and sector switchers, as shown in Table 12.

The study has two key independent variables. The first one is within-sector mobility, coded as 1 for those who changed employer IDs but not sectors and 0 otherwise. The second one is sector switching, coded as 1 for those who have switched sectors and 0 otherwise. In switching sectors, this study divides the public sector into levels of government because federal workers have higher wages but state and local government workers have lower wages than private workers (Krueger, 1988b; Schmitt, 2010).

The study also has other independent variables, including gender, race, age, education, tenure,[25] disability status, veteran status, marital and parenthood status,[26] sexual orientation,[27] union status, part-time status,[28] weeks worked per month, and usual hours worked per week, occupation, and industry.[29] This study includes both occupation and industry because both occupation and industry specific human capital are key determinants of wages (Sullivan, 2010). The same respondent's gender, race/ethnicity, and disability and veteran status sometimes appear to change from one wave to the next in the SIPP, however, and it is generally safe to assume the

[25] The 1996-2008 SIPP only provides information on the start date of current employment without specifying its tenure. This study calculated respondents' tenure by months based on the start date, interview month, and changes in employer IDs.

[26] The 1996-2008 SIPP only provides information on the total number of children in the household, however, without specifying each respondent's parenthood status. This study assigned respondents' parenthood status based on the relationship among respondents within the household.

[27] The 1996-2008 SIPP did not identify respondents' sexual orientation directly, this study classified the householders and their same-sex spouses and unmarried partners as members of either gay or lesbian couples. The nature of panel data also allows for coding previous and later observations as these respondents as homosexual.

[28] This study constructs a dummy variable by identifying observations without usually working at least 35 hours in the reference month as part-time workers, but the same worker may work more than 35 hours in the following reference month.

[29] Table B1 in Appendix B shows detailed information about all variables.

most recent data are correct (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001, p. 286). This study adopts the approach and corrects inconsistent values.[30]

Table 13. Descriptive Statistics in Examining the Impacts of Sector Switching

	Private Sector			Public Sector		
Variable	Min	Max	Average	Min	Max	Average
Dependent Variables						
Hourly Wage	2.8	113.2	21.7	3.3	78.1	24.3
Controlled Variables						
Within-Sector Mobility	0	1	0.191	0	1	0.109
Sector Switching	0	1	0.011	0	1	0.039
Female	0	1	0.431	0	1	0.573
Black	0	1	0.097	0	1	0.138
Latino	0	1	0.140	0	1	0.090
Asian	0	1	0.040	0	1	0.030
Other Race	0	1	0.015	0	1	0.020
Disability Status	0	1	0.047	0	1	0.051
Veteran Status	0	1	0.085	0	1	0.112
Sexual Orientation	0	1	0.005	0	1	0.006
Single with Children	0	1	0.106	0	1	0.095
Married without Children	0	1	0.195	0	1	0.231
Married with Children	0	1	0.394	0	1	0.425
Union Status	0	1	0.104	0	1	0.402
Part-Time Workers	0	1	0.116	0	1	0.096
Education Years	1	20	13.5	1	20	14.9
Age	18	65	40.1	18	65	44.4
Tenure	0	618	88.2	0	566	129.5
Weeks Worked	1	5	4.3	1	5	4.3
Usual Hours Worked	1	99	40.7	1	99	40.1
	N=689,054			N=171,864		

Table 13 shows that hourly wages of workers starting in the private sector distribute more spread than workers starting in the public sector, and the average wage is smaller in the private

[30] This study finds less than 3,000 observations with inconsistent values across waves, accounting for less than 1% of the total.

than the public sector, consistent with what scholars typically find. It also shows that private workers are more likely to change employers than public workers but less likely to switch sectors.

3.3.2 Methodology

The study follows Makridis (2021) and adopts the two-way fixed effects (TWFE) model with the following form:

$$\ln(y_{it}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \delta Treatment_{it} + X_{it}\beta + \phi(j_{it}, \theta) + \varepsilon_{it}$$

In the model, y_{it} represents workers' hourly wage; α_i represents individual fixed effects; γ_t represents month fixed effects; X_{it} represents individual control variables; $\phi(j_{it}, \theta)$ denotes a semi-parametric function of job-specific characteristics; and ε_{it} represents robust standard errors clustered at the individual level; The key independent variables, $Treatment_{it}$, are coded 1 in the period when the respondent changed jobs or sectors and in all subsequent periods. Thus, stayers are always coded 0 on the treatment variables and movers are coded 0 until they changed jobs or sectors. The coefficient of interest in all regressions is δ, showing the average treatment effect of job mobility or sector switching. Since these models contain individual fixed effects, many of the individual demographic characteristics (e.g., race and gender) drop out due to collinearity.

The study has two models: the first examines the impacts of within-sector mobility and sector switching, and the second divides the public sector by levels of government. The models also include control variables, with age, age-squared, tenure, tenure-squared, education years, weeks worked, and usual hours worked as interval-level variables and union and part-time status as dummy variables. Though marital and parenthood status are dummy variables, this study

divides workers into four categories accordingly, single with children, married without children, and married with children, with single without children as the reference group. This study uses 21 and 19 dummy variables for occupation and industry categories.[31] It also includes state-fixed effects. To examine the heterogeneous effects by gender and race, this study further runs subgroup analyses focusing on women, men, and each racial group separately.

As public workers typically experience public sector wage premiums at the bottom but penalties at the top of the wage distribution (Depalo et al., 2015; Melly, 2005), this study further follows Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) and Borgen (2016) to estimate unconditional quantile regression with fixed effects (UQR-FE) with clustered robust standard errors to examine the impacts of sector switching by quantiles of hourly wage.[32] The key element of the UQR-FE approach is the concept of the recentered influence function (RIF) in robust estimation, representing the impact of one individual observation on a distribution measure, including quantiles. As $\ln(y_{it})$ is workers' log hourly wage, the RIF, $RIF(\ln(y_{it}), q_\tau)$, for the τ-th quantile of $\ln(y_{it})$ is then $q_\tau + [(\tau - I(\ln(y_{it}) \leq q_\tau))/f_{\ln(y_{it})}(q_\tau))]$, where q_τ is the τ-th quantile of $\ln(y_{it})$, $I()$ an indicator function of identifying whether the value of $\ln(y_{it})$ is below q_τ and $f_{\ln(y_{it})}$ the density of the marginal distribution of $\ln(y_{it})$. The theoretical property of the expected values of $RIF(\ln(y_{it}), q_\tau)$ equals q_τ. As $RIF(\ln(y_{it}), q_\tau)$ is never observed, this study also follows Firpo et al. (2009) and replaces the unknow components by their sample estimators:

[31] The SIPP used the 1990 Census Occupation Code List in 1996 and 2001 panels but used the 2002 Census Occupation Code List in 2004 and 2008 panels. To address the issue, this study follows what Scopp (2003) and Beckhusen (2020) have done to apply conversion rates to the 1990 Census Occupation Code List to make it consistent with the 2002 Census Occupation Code List and aggregates all occupation codes into 22 categories. This study also addresses the same issue for Industry Code List and aggregated all industry codes into North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) categories.

[32] This study does not need to redefine the quantiles of log hourly wage and uses UQR instead of conditional quantile regression, which defines its quantiles conditional on the controlled variables.

$$\widehat{RIF}(\ln(y_{it}), \widehat{q_\tau}) = \widehat{q_\tau} + \frac{\tau - I(\ln(y_{it}) \leq \widehat{q_\tau})}{\widehat{f_{\ln(y_{it})}}(\widehat{q_\tau})}$$

where $\widehat{q_\tau}$ is estimated as $\arg\min_q \sum_{i=1}^{N}(\tau - I(\ln(y_{it}) \leq q))(\ln(y_{it}) - q)$. The nonparametric Rosenblatt kernel density estimator $\widehat{f_{\ln(y_{it})}}(\widehat{q_\tau})$ is $\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\frac{1}{h_{\ln(y_{it})}}K_{\ln(y_{it})}(\frac{\ln(y_{it})-\widehat{q_\tau}}{h_{\ln(y_{it})}})$, where $K_{\ln(y_{it})}$ is the Gaussian kernel and $h_{\ln(y_{it})}$ the scalar bandwidth for $\ln(y_{it})$. This study further models $\widehat{RIF}(\ln(y_{it}), \widehat{q_\tau})$ as a function of the same control variables as in the TWFE:

$$\widehat{RIF}(\ln(y_{it}), \widehat{q_\tau}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \delta_\tau Treatment_{it} + X_{it}\beta_\tau + \phi(j_{it}, \theta) + \varepsilon_{it\tau}$$

The quantile estimate of δ_τ represents the causal effects of sector switching on the unconditional τ-th quantile of $\ln(y_{it})$ with cluster-robust standard errors. This study also further divides the public sector by levels of government.

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Regression Analysis

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, private workers averaged a 5.9% wage increase if they changed jobs within the sector (Model 1, Table 14) and an 8.1% wage increase if they switched to the public sector, with specific increases of 7.3%, 6.1%, and 13.5% after switching to the local, state, and federal government (Model 2), respectively, consistent with Hypothesis 3A. These results also indicate that workers experience larger wage gains after switching to the federal government than after within-sector mobility, supporting Hypothesis 2A. However, they

had similar wage gains after switching to a state or local government as within-sector mobility, contrary to Hypothesis 2A.

Table 14. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Private Workers' Hourly Wages

DV = Log (Hourly Wage) Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Within-Sector Mobility	5.9***	5.9***
Sector Switching	8.1***	
To Local Government		7.3**
To State Government		6.1*
To Federal Government		13.5***
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Observations	689,054	689,054
R-squared	0.19	0.19
Number of Respondents	132,077	132,077

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the two-way fixed effect model with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 4. All other independent variables were also controlled.

This study further focuses on UQR-FE to examine disparities in the impacts of sector switching by quantiles of workers' wages. Workers had a 10.2% wage gain after switching to the public sector at the 10th quantile of the wage distribution (Model 1, Table 15). The percentage increased to 12.7% at the 30th quantile but kept decreasing to 4.7% and 4.9% until the 70th and 80th quantiles. At the 90th quantile, sector switching did not lead to any wage changes, however, suggesting that low-skilled workers have larger wage gains than high-skilled ones, consistent with Hypothesis 4A.

Table 15. The Impacts of Sector Switching on Private Workers' Hourly Wages by Quantile

DV = Log (Hourly Wage)	Model 1		Model 2	
	(1)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Quantile	Sector Switching	To Federal Govt	To State Govt	To Local Govt
Q10	10.2**	11.7	8.9	10.5*
Q20	12.1***	18.8***	9.4*	11.1**
Q30	12.7***	21.1***	10.3*	11.0**
Q40	10.2***	18.6***	7.8	8.3*
Q50	8.9***	18.2***	4.9	7.8*
Q60	5.0⸸	9.9⸸	3.5	3.9
Q70	4.7⸸	10.0⸸	2.4	4.0
Q80	4.9⸸	7.8	1.0	6.3⸸
Q90	3.1	9.5	-1.9	3.7
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the UCQ regression with fixed effects and clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 4. All other independent variables were also controlled. 5. Sample sizes and number of respondents are reported in Tabel 14.

Divided into levels of government, workers had an 18.8% wage increase after switching to the federal service at the 20th quantile (Column (1) in Model 2, Table 15), and the percentage increased to 21.1% at the 30th quantile and kept at more than 18.0% until the 50th quantile. After that, the percentages decreased to less than 10.0% at the 60th and 70th quantiles and lost their significance afterward. Workers experienced a 9.4% and 10.3% wage gain after switching to the state government at the 20th and 30th quantiles (Column (2) in Model 2), and the percentages kept decreasing and losing their significance afterward and becoming negative at the 90th quantile. Workers also had an around 11.0% wage increase after switching to the local government at the 10th, 20th, and 30th quantile (Column (3) in Model 2), but the percentages decreased to 8.3% and 7.8% at the 40th and 50th quantiles. The percentages once lost their significance at the 60th, 70th,

and 90th quantiles. These patterns suggest that sector switching to the private sector leads to larger wage gains at the bottom than the top of the wage distribution at all levels of government, consistent with Hypothesis 4A.

Table 16. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Public Workers' Hourly Wages

DV = Log (Hourly Wage) Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Within-Sector Mobility	10.2***	10.1***
Sector Switching	6.3***	
From Local Government		3.7
From State Government		13.0***
From Federal Government		1.5
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Observations	171,864	171,864
R-squared	0.23	0.23
Number of Respondents	28,129	28,129

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the two-way fixed effects model with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 4. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, public workers averaged a 10.2% wage increase if they changed jobs within the sector (Model 1, Table 16) and a 6.3% wage increase if they switched to the private sector, but they only have a 13.0% wage gain after switching from the state government (Model 2), only partly supporting Hypothesis 3B. Consistent with Hypothesis 2B, these results also indicate that workers experience smaller wage gains after switching from the federal government than within-sector mobility. However, public workers had smaller wage gains after switching from the local government than within-sector mobility and approximately

the same gain after switching from the state government as within-sector mobility, contrary to Hypothesis 2B.

Table 17. The Impacts of Sector Switching on Public Workers' Hourly Wages by Quantile

DV = Log (Hourly Wage)	Model 1	Model 2		
	(1)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Quantile	Sector Switching	From Federal Govt	From State Govt	From Local Govt
Q10	5.3	6.4	3.6	6.0
Q20	5.6	2.7	10.9*	3.0
Q30	5.0⸸	0.2	9.0*	4.4
Q40	4.0⸸	-2.4	10.1**	2.7
Q50	4.3*	-2.6	11.7***	2.3
Q60	6.3**	-1.5	15.6***	3.4
Q70	7.1***	0.3	15.4***	4.5⸸
Q80	8.6***	0.3	20.7***	4.1
Q90	8.2**	1.9	18.8***	3.6
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the UCQ regression with fixed effects and clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 4. All other independent variables were also controlled. 5. Sample sizes and number of respondents are reported in Tabel 16.

In the public sector, workers had a 5.0% wage gain after switching to the private sector at the 30th quantile of the wage distribution (Model 1, Table 17), but the percentage decreased to 4.0% and 4.3% at the 40th and 50th quantiles. Since then, the percentage kept increasing to 8.6% and 8.2% at the 80th and 90th quantiles, consistent with Hypothesis 4B.

Divided into levels of government, federal workers did not have any wage changes after switching to the private sector (Column (1) in Model 2, Table 17). State government workers had a 10.9% wage gain after switching to the private sector at the 20th quantile (Column (2) in Model

2). The percentage decreased to 9.0% at the 30th quantile but kept increasing to more than 15.0% after the 60th quantile. At the 80th and 90th quantiles, workers had a 20.7% and 18.8% wage gain. Local government workers only had a 4.5% wage gain at the 70th quantile after switching to the private sector (Column (3) in Model 2). These patterns show that federal workers have no wage changes, but state and local government workers had larger wage gains after switching to the private sector at the top than the bottom of the wage distribution. These results support Hypothesis 4B for state and local government workers but not for federal workers.

Table 18. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Private Workers' Hourly Wages by Gender

DV = Log (Hourly Wage)	Model 1		Model 2	
Variables	Female	Male	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Within-Sector Mobility	5.6***	6.0***	5.6***	6.0***
Sector Switching	8.7***	6.6*		
To Local Government			7.1*	6.8*
To State Government			7.9*	2.7
To Federal Government			16.2*	10.5*
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	307,112	381,942	307,112	381,942
R-squared	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Number of Respondents	59,602	72,475	59,602	72,475

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the two-way fixed effect model with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 4. All other independent variables were also controlled.

3.4.2 Heterogeneity by Gender and Race

Subgroup analyses further examine disparities in the impacts of sector switching by gender and race. Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 3A, women had smaller wage gains after

within-sector job mobility but larger wage gains after switching to the public sector. Women averaged a 5.6% wage increase if they changed jobs in the private sector (Column 1 of Model 1, Table 18) and an 8.7% wage gain if they switched to the public sector, compared to a 6.0% and 6.6% wage increase for men.

Table 19. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Private Workers' Hourly Wages including Interaction Terms with Gender

DV = Log (Hourly Wage) Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Within-Sector Mobility	6.0***	6.0***
Within-Sector Mobility*Female	-0.4	-0.4
Sector Switching	6.6*	
Sector Switching *Female	1.9	
To Local Government		6.8*
To Local Government*Female		0.3
To State Government		2.7
To State Government*Female		5.0
To Federal Government		10.5*
To Federal Government*Female		5.1
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Observations	689,054	689,054
R-squared	0.19	0.19
Number of Respondents	132,077	132,077

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the two-way fixed effect model with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. The models include interaction terms between female and all other variables, including state and time dummy variables. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Dividing by level of government does not change the pattern, and women had a 7.1%, 7.9%, and 16.2% wage gain (Model 2, Table 18), but men only had a 6.8%, 2.7%, and 10.5%

wage gain after switching to the local, state, and federal government. Using regression with interaction terms between gender and all other variables on the combined sample, however, indicates that gender differences in wage changes after each type of job mobility were not statistically significant, shown in Table 19.

Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 3B, women had an 11.0% wage increase if they changed jobs in the public sector (Column 1 of Model 1, Table 20) but no wage increase if they switched private sector, compared to an 8.8% and 8.3% wage increase for men.

Table 20. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Public Workers' Hourly Wages by Gender

DV = Log (Hourly Wage)	Model 1		Model 2	
Variables	Female	Male	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Within-Sector Mobility	11.0***	8.8***	10.9***	8.5***
Sector Switching	4.1	8.3**		
From Local Government			3.4	3.8
From State Government			6.6↓	20.7***
From Federal Government			1.3	1.6
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	100,441	71,423	100,441	71,423
R-squared	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.24
Number of Respondents	16,440	11,689	16,440	11,689

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the two-way fixed effect model with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ↓p<0.10. 4. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Dividing by level of government do not change the pattern, women had a 6.6% wage gain (Model 2, Table 20), but men had a 20.7% wage gain after switching from the state government.

Further analysis with interaction terms also shows that women had an 11.7% smaller wage gain than men after switching from the state government (Model 2, Table 21).

Table 21. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Public Workers' Hourly Wages including Interaction Terms with Gender

DV = Log (Hourly Wage) Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Within-Sector Mobility	8.8***	8.5***
Within-Sector Mobility*Female	2.0	2.2
Sector Switching	8.3**	
Sector Switching *Female	-3.8	
From Local Government		3.8
From Local Government*Female		-0.4
From State Government		20.7***
From State Government*Female		-11.7*
From Federal Government		1.6
From Federal Government*Female		-0.3
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Observations	171,864	171,864
R-squared	0.24	0.24
Number of Respondents	28,129	28,129

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the two-way fixed effect model with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. The models include interaction terms between female and all other variables, including state and time dummy variables. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Whites had a 6.3% wage increase if they changed jobs within the private sector (Column 1 of Model 1, Table 22), compared to 6.1%, 3.2%, 6.9%, and 8.3% of blacks, Latinos, Asians, and other races, suggesting that whites only have larger wage gains than several minority groups

in job mobility. Including interaction terms also shows that only Latinos had a 3.0% smaller wage gain than whites (Model 1, Table 23), partly supporting Hypothesis 1.

Table 22. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Private Workers' Hourly Wages by Race

DV = Log (Hourly Wage)			Model 1		
Variables	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Within-Sector Mobility	6.3***	6.1***	3.2**	6.9**	8.3*
Sector Switching	8.3***	10.5*	1.6	18.3*	-11.8
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	500,680	67,405	82,020	27,510	11,439
R-squared	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.21	0.26
Number of Respondents	93,637	14,059	16,736	5,188	2,457

DV = Log (Hourly Wage)			Model 2		
Variables	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Within-Sector Mobility	6.3***	6.0***	3.2**	6.9**	8.1*
Sector Switching					
To Local Government	7.9**	5.5	4.4	8.7	4.7
To State Government	7.1*	0.7	3.1	9.4	-5.8
To Federal Government	11.2**	38.0***	-13.2	41.7*	-23.1
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	500,680	67,405	82,020	27,510	11,439
R-squared	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.21	0.26
Number of Respondents	93,637	14,059	16,736	5,188	2,457

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the two-way fixed effect model with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 4. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Whites also had an 8.3% wage increase if they switched to the public sector (Column 1 of Model 1, Table 22), compared to 10.5% and 18.3% for blacks and Asians, indicating that whites have smaller wage gains than blacks and Asians after sector switching, partly supporting Hypothesis 3A. Latinos and other races did not have any wage change after switching sectors, however, contrary to Hypothesis 3A.

Table 23. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Private Workers' Hourly Wages including Interaction Terms with Race

DV = Log (Hourly Wage) Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Within-Sector Mobility	6.3***	6.3***
Within-Sector Mobility*Black	-0.2	-0.2
Within-Sector Mobility*Latino	-3.0*	-2.9*
Within-Sector Mobility*Asian	0.6	0.6
Within-Sector Mobility*Other	1.8	1.7
Sector Switching	8.3***	
Sector Switching*Black	2.1	
Sector Switching*Latino	-6.2	
Sector Switching*Asian	9.3	
Sector Switching*Other	-18.5	
To Local Government		7.9**
To Local Government*Black		-2.2
To Local Government*Latino		-3.3
To Local Government*Asian		0.8
To Local Government*Other		-2.9
To State Government		7.1*
To State Government*Black		-6.0
To State Government*Latino		-3.7
To State Government*Asian		2.2
To State Government*Other		-12.0
To Federal Government		11.2**
To Federal Government*Black		24.1**
To Federal Government*Latino		-22.0**
To Federal Government*Asian		27.5
To Federal Government*Other		-30.8

Table 23. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Private Workers' Hourly Wages including Interaction Terms with Race (continued)

DV = Log (Hourly Wage) Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Observations	689,054	689,054
R-squared	0.19	0.19
Number of Respondents	132,077	132,077

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the two-way fixed effect model with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. The models include interaction terms between each group of races and all other variables, including state and time dummy variables. 4. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, ⸸$p<0.10$. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Divided by level of government, whites had a 7.9% and 7.1% wage gain (Column 1 of Model 2, Table 22), but all other minorities did not have any wage change if they switched to the local or state government, contrary to Hypothesis 3A. Whites also had an 11.2% wage gain if they switched to the federal government (Column 1), compared to 38.0% and 41.7% for blacks and Asians, consistent with Hypothesis 3A. Adding interaction terms also shows that blacks had a 24.1% larger but Latino had a 22.0% smaller wage gain than whites after switching to the federal government (Model 2, Table 23), only partly support Hypothesis 3A.

Whites had a 10.8% wage increase if they changed jobs within the public sector (Column 1 of Model 1, Table 24), compared to 7.2% and 12.7% of blacks and Latinos. Asians and other races did not have any wage gain after within-sector mobility, however, suggesting that whites have larger wage gains than several minorities, contrary to Hypothesis 1. Whites also had a 9.6% wage increase if they switched to the private sector (Model 1), compared to 23.2% for Asians. All other minorities did not have any wage change, however, indicating that whites have larger

wage gains than most minorities after switching to the private sector, supporting Hypothesis 3B. Including interaction terms also shows that Latinos had a 11.6% smaller wage gain than whites after switching to the private sector (Model 1, Table 25).

Table 24. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Public Workers' Hourly Wages by Race

DV = Log (Hourly Wage)			Model 1		
Variables	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Within-Sector Mobility	10.9***	7.2*	12.7**	7.3	4.8
Sector Switching	9.6***	0.2	-3.1	23.2*	-3.7
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	125,503	24,075	13,060	5,115	4,111
R-squared	0.24	0.22	0.24	0.32	0.36
Number of Respondents	20,161	4,174	2,181	865	748

DV = Log (Hourly Wage)			Model 2		
Variables	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Within-Sector Mobility	10.8***	7.2*	12.7**	7.9	5.7
Sector Switching					
From Local Government	7.1*	0.7	3.1	9.4	-5.8
From State Government	16.2***	-0.3	1.3	38.4*	63.2*
From Federal Government	4.8	-2.0	-1.5	2.8	-0.1
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	125,503	24,075	13,060	5,115	4,111
R-squared	0.24	0.22	0.24	0.32	0.36
Number of Respondents	20,161	4,174	2,181	865	748

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the two-way fixed effect model with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 4. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Divided by level of government, whites had a 7.1% wage gain (Column 1 of Model 2, Table 24), but all other minorities did not have any wage change if they switched from the local government. Whites also had a 16.2% wage gain after switching from the state government (Column 1), compared to 38.4% and 63.2% for Asians and other races, contrary to Hypothesis 3B. Blacks and Latinos did not have any wage change from switching from the state government, however, consistent with Hypothesis 3B. Adding interaction terms shows that Latinos and other races had a 12.2% and 33.0% smaller wage gain than whites after switching from the local government, and other races had a 40.5% larger wage gain after switching from the state government (Model 2, Table 25), only partly supporting Hypothesis 3B.

Table 25. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Private Workers' Hourly Wages including Interaction Terms with Race

DV = Log (Hourly Wage) Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Within-Sector Mobility	10.9***	10.8***
Within-Sector Mobility*Black	-3.4	-3.3
Within-Sector Mobility*Latino	1.7	1.7
Within-Sector Mobility*Asian	-3.3	-2.6
Within-Sector Mobility*Other	-5.6	-4.6
Sector Switching	9.6***	
Sector Switching*Black	-8.6	
Sector Switching*Latino	-11.6*	
Sector Switching*Asian	12.4	
Sector Switching*Other	-12.2	
From Local Government		7.2*
From Local Government*Black		-4.7
From Local Government*Latino		-12.2*
From Local Government*Asian		19.7
From Local Government*Other		-33.0*
From State Government		16.2***
From State Government*Black		-14.2*
From State Government*Latino		-12.9

Table 25. The Impacts of Within-Sector Mobility and Sector Switching on Private Workers' Hourly Wages including Interaction Terms with Race (continued)

DV = Log (Hourly Wage) Variables	Model 1	Model 2
From State Government*Asian		19.1
From State Government*Other		40.5⸸
From Federal Government		4.8
From Federal Government*Black		-6.5
From Federal Government*Latino		-6.0
From Federal Government*Asian		-1.9
From Federal Government*Other		-4.7
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes
Observations	171,864	171,864
R-squared	0.24	0.24
Number of Respondents	28,129	28,129

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the two-way fixed effect model with clustered robust standard errors (RSE). 2. All coefficients have been converted into percentages. 3. The models include interaction terms between each group of races and all other variables, including state and time dummy variables. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ⸸p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

3.5 Conclusions and Implications

Although scholars typically find that the government fails to recruit and retain workers because of its uncompetitive pay (Borjas, 2002; Lasseter & Daman, 2024), this study presents contradictory evidence in recruitment, showing that private workers have wage gains after switching to the public sector (Model 1, Table 14). Though these results may differ by level of government (Lewis, Pathak, et al., 2018; Sherk, 2010), private workers also have wage gains after switching to all levels of government (Model 2, Table 14). Compared to within-sector movers, sector switchers still have at least comparable wage gains after switching to state and local government and even larger gains to federal service. These results support that federal

workers have received better pay (Biggs & Richwine, 2011; Krueger, 1988b) but fail to support that state and local government workers have lower wages than private workers (Lewis, Pathak, et al., 2018; Schmitt, 2010). Scholars also find that the government typically attracts most qualified low-skilled workers (Bargain & Melly, 2008; Siminski, 2013) but faces challenges attracting high-skilled workers (Goldenkoff, 2015; Libicki et al., 2014) because of its relatively compressed wage structure (Borjas, 2002). As a result, low-skilled public workers often experience wage premiums but high-skilled ones typically have wage penalties (Depalo et al., 2015). This study presents supportive evidence, showing that private workers experience larger wage gains after switching to the public sector at the bottom than the top of the wage distribution (Table 15). However, private workers did not experience any wage penalties at the top of the wage distribution. This study shows that the public sector provides competitive pay to recruit private workers. As efficiency wage theory posits that employers need to pay workers high enough so that workers are incentivized to be productive (Akerlof, 1982, 1984; Taylor & Taylor, 2011), the public sector wage systems may aim to hold government officials accountable and ensure that they are working hard, explaining why public workers have higher work effort than private workers (Frank & Lewis, 2004; van Triest, 2024).

The results on retention are complicated. Public workers have wage gains both after switching to the private sector and within-sector mobility (Model 1, Table 16). Compared to within-sector movers, sector switchers have smaller wage gains, however, suggesting that the public sector provides competitive pay in attracting public workers from other agencies. Divided by level of government, only state government workers have wage gains from switching to the private sector (Model 2), consistent with Schmitt (2010) that state government workers have lower pay than private workers. These results also suggest that federal and local government

workers do not have wage gains after switching to the private sector, failing to support Biggs and Richwine (2011) that federal workers have higher pay than private workers and Schmitt (2010) that local government workers have lower pay.. Scholars also find that the government faces challenges in retaining high-skilled workers (Borjas, 2002; Kim, 2008), and this study also presents complex results. Public workers have wage gains at the top of the wage distribution in switching to the private sector (Model 1, Table 17), but it is mainly because state and local government workers have wage gains (Column (2) & (3) in Model 2). This study shows that the public sector provides competitive pay to retain federal and local government workers but not state government workers, consistent with the fact that federal and local government workers have higher pay than private workers (Krueger, 1988b; Lewis, Pathak, et al., 2018). It also finds that the public sector needs to put more effort into retaining high-skilled workers, consistent with Hur and Abner (2023).

This study further finds that women, blacks, and Asians have larger wage gains than men and whites after switching to the public sector (Table 18&22), especially to federal service, consistent with the fact that women and minorities had larger public sector wage premiums (Lewis, Pathak, et al., 2018; Schmitt, 2010) and gender and racial pay gaps are smaller in the public than the private sector (Lewis, Boyd, et al., 2018; Mandel & Semyonov, 2014). These studies also suggest that men and whites have larger wage gains than women and minorities after switching to the private sector (Table 20&24), especially from the state and local government.

This study still has several noteworthy limitations. First, this study treats employer-to-employer transitions as voluntary turnover, but some are involuntary turnover (Jolivet et al., 2006), underestimating the impacts of voluntary job mobility and sector switching. Also, this study only uses left-censored data, tracking respondents for a specific period. As it fails to track

respondents before the interview period, respondents may just change their jobs before first appearing in the survey, underestimating the impacts of job mobility or sector switching. Finally, collecting panel data allows respondents to change information from one wave to the next (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001, p. 286). Inconsistent observations comprise less than 1% of the total, indicating that it will not lead to biases.

Despite these limitations, this study has important implications for setting public pay. First, the government has already set competitive pay for attracting private workers and high-skilled ones, and higher pay in the public than the private sector also motivates public workers to put more effort. The public sector also provides competitive pay in retaining federal and local government workers, but it fails to retain state government workers and high-skilled workers. As the public sector provides competitive pay in recruiting high-skilled workers, the government may move slowly in pay raises compared to the private sector and sometimes even downgrade workers' pay scales (Heckman, 2024). Second, the public sector provides a more competitive pay for women and minorities than whites compared to the private sector, which may explain why women and minorities are more likely than men and whites to work for the government (Lewis & Frank, 2002) and less likely to leave (Cho & Lewis, 2012). Third, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity also provides insights into public-private sector wage differentials. Focusing on sector switchers in two directions, this study finds that the federal government typically pays workers more, but the state government usually pays workers less than the private sector. It also finds that the public sector typically pays low-skilled workers more but high-skilled workers less than the private sector.

Chapter IV: Conclusions

Over the last decade, an increasing trend of sector switching has happened worldwide (Frederiksen & Hansen, 2017; Klepikova, 2016; Piatak, 2017), encouraging scholars to put more emphasis on this topic. This dissertation has examined sector switching from two different angles, contributing to the literature on public sector recruitment and retention (Jakobsen et al., 2023; Lasseter & Daman, 2024), representative bureaucracy (Bishu & Kennedy, 2020; Johnston et al., 2023), and public pay systems (Bargain et al., 2018; Makridis, 2021; Rattsø & Stokke, 2019). Collectively, this dissertation sheds light on the causes and consequences of sector switching in the context of the U.S., thereby enhancing the understanding of the public sector workforce and public-private sector wage differentials.

More specifically, Chapter II discussed the impacts of demographic factors on the probability of switching between public and private sectors. The results indicated that the public sector is successfully recruiting women, blacks and other races, and veterans from the private sector, reinforcing the government's role as a model employer in recruiting underrepresented groups (Donohue, 2021; Menifield et al., 2024).. However, the public sector struggles to attract Latinos and Asians, indicating a need for more effort to enhance recruitment from these groups. The results are surprising because Latinos and Asians, especially Latino and Asian women, are usually more likely than whites to work for state and local governments (Lewis et al., 2022; Lewis & Pathak, 2014) or the federal service (Lewis & Han, 2024; Lewis & Oh, 2018).

The results in Chapter II also revealed that the public sector is successfully retaining public workers compared to the private sector, consistent with Wang et al. (2012) and Agarwal and Sajid (2017). In retaining underrepresented groups, disabled workers are less likely than non-disabled workers to switch to the private sector, supporting that disabled workers are more

likely to work for the government (Lewis & Pathak, 2023). Specific groups of public workers, including blacks and veterans, are more likely than their counterparts to switch to the private sector, however, highlighting the need for strategic retention initiatives. As several studies find that blacks and veterans are more likely than their counterparts to work for the government (Mandel & Semyonov, 2021; Winters, 2018), this study calls for further exploration of their sector choice when leaving public jobs.

Although most previous studies found that women were less likely than men to have turnover intentions (Ertas, 2015; Moynihan & Landuyt, 2008) and racial/ethnic minorities were less likely than whites to have turnover intentions in leaving the government (Pitts et al., 2011), this chapter presents counterevidence and found that women and men had a similar likelihood of turnover behaviors, consistent with Lewis and Park (1989), and most racial/ethnic minorities were more likely than whites to change jobs, consistent with Moynihan and Landuyt (2008). As a result, this chapter underscored that turnover intention is not a good proxy for actual turnover behaviors among public workers, advocating the use of longitudinal data to better understand job mobility. Finally, this chapter addressed the question of who wants to work for the government through the lens of sector switching, indicating that workers may choose not to work for the government because they did not want to change jobs.

Chapter III examined the impacts of sector switching on workers' pay. The results show that workers have wage gains after switching to the private sector, inconsistent with Borjas (2002) and Lasseter and Daman (2024) that the public sector typically fails to recruit workers because of its uncompetitive pay. Compared to within-sector movers, this chapter also finds that private workers have larger wage gains after switching to the federal government, supporting that federal workers often receive higher pay than private workers (Biggs & Richwine, 2011;

Krueger, 1988b). It also finds that private workers have similar wage gains after switching to the state and local government and within-sector mobility, failing to support that state and local government workers often receive lower pay than private workers (Lewis, Pathak, et al., 2018; Schmitt, 2010). Chapter III also finds that private workers experience larger wage gains after switching to the public sector at the bottom than the top of the wage distribution, consistent with that low-skilled public workers often have public sector wage premiums but high-skilled ones typically do not have and even have wage penalties (Depalo et al., 2015). The results also support that the government typically attracts most qualified low-skilled workers (Bargain & Melly, 2008; Siminski, 2013) but fails to support that the government faces challenges attracting high-skilled workers (Goldenkoff, 2015; Libicki et al., 2014).

Chapter III also finds that public workers have wage gains after switching to the private sector, and those wage gains were smaller than those after within-sector mobility, suggesting that the public sector may provide competitive pay in preventing workers from leaving for private jobs. The results also show that state government workers experience wage gains after switching to the public sector, consistent with Schmitt (2010) that state government workers have lower pay than private workers. Public workers also have wage gains at the top of the wage distribution from switching to the private sector, supporting that the government faces challenges in retaining high-skilled workers (Borjas, 2002; Kim, 2008).

Chapter III finds that women, blacks, and Asians have larger wage gains than men and whites after switching to the public sector and that men and whites have larger wage gains than women and minorities after switching to the private sector. The results support that the public sector provides more competitive pay for women and minorities than whites compared to the private sector, indicating that women and minorities typically have public sector wage premiums

(Jacobsen, 1992; Mueller, 1998). These results may also explain why women and minorities are more likely than men and whites to work for the government (Lewis & Frank, 2002; Mandel & Semyonov, 2021) and are less likely to leave (Borman & Dowling, 2008; Cho & Lewis, 2012), and why the public sector has smaller gender and racial pay gaps than the private sector (Lewis, Boyd, et al., 2018; Mandel & Semyonov, 2016).

While this dissertation examines the causes and consequences of sector switching in a comprehensive approach, it aims to serve as a stepping-stone for a new research agenda in this underdeveloped area. Chapter II primarily explores demographic factors on the probability of sector switching, calling for researchers to focus more on intrinsic factors that motivate workers to switch sectors, such as PSM, job embedment, and job fit. Chapter III primarily examines the impacts of sector switching on workers' pay, calling for research to focus more on the impact of sector switching on workers' promotion rates, job satisfaction, and organizational performance.

Appendix A. Chapter II Supplementary Materials

Table A 1. Operationalization of variables in Chapter II

Variable	Description	Operationalization
Dependent Variables		
Job Mobility	If workers change jobs.	Dummy, 1 for those who change jobs in the current month.
Job Movers' ending sectors	Job movers' sector choice.	Dummy, 1 for those who move to the other sector in the current month when changing jobs.
Sector Switching	If workers switch sectors.	Dummy, 1 for those who switch sectors in the current month.
Independent Variables		
Gender	Gender of workers	Dummy, 1 for female and 0 for male
Race	Race of workers	Dummy, divided into five groups. 1 for those who belong to White, Black, Latino, Asian, and Other Race.
Age	Age of workers, measured by year.	Numeric (18-65)
Education	Education years of workers.	Numeric (0-20)
Disability	Disability status of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as disability.
Veteran Status	Veteran status of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as veterans.
Marital Status	Marital status of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as married.
Parenthood Status	Parenthood status of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as fathers or mothers.
Sexual Orientation	Sexual orientation status of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as heterosexual.
Occupation	Occupation categories of workers.	Dummy, divided into 22 categories. 1 for those who belong to any groups.
Union	Union membership of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as union members.
Current Earnings	Earnings of workers in the current month.	Continuous, converted into constant dollars with Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), based on 1982-1984.
Previous Earnings	Earnings of workers four months ago	Continuous, converted into constant dollars with Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), based on 1982-1984.

Table A 2. Average Partial Effects on the Probability in the Private Sector

Variables	Model 1 Job Mobility	Model 2 Sector Choice	Model 3 Sector Switching
Black	1.1***	0.9*	0.2**
Latino	-0.9***	0.1	-0.1
Asian	0.4	-1.9***	-0.2***
Other Race	0.7↓	2.1**	0.2*
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	554,892	71,353	554,892

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE) with the 2004 and 2008 panels. 2. Model 1 and Model 3 include all observations in the public sector sub-sample. 3. Model 2 includes only observations of respondents when changing jobs. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ↓p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled.

Table A 3. Average Partial Effects on the Probability in the Private Sector Controlling

Citizenship Status

Variables	Model 1 Job Mobility	Model 2 Sector Choice	Model 3 Sector Switching
Black	1.1***	0.9**	0.2***
Latino	-0.8**	0.3	-0.0
Asian	0.6	-1.6***	-0.2**
Other Race	0.7↓	2.1**	0.2*
Citizenship	0.5↓	1.2*	0.3***
Controlled Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	554,892	71,353	554,892

Notes: 1. The table shows results from the logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors (RSE) with the 2004 and 2008 panels. 2. Model 1 and Model 3 include all observations in the public sector sub-sample. 3. Model 2 includes only observations of respondents when changing jobs. 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ↓p<0.10. 5. All other independent variables were also controlled. 6. These models also control citizenship status.

Appendix B. Chapter III Supplementary Materials

Table B 1. Operationalization of variables in Chapter III

Variable	Description	Operationalization
Dependent Variable		
Hourly Wage	Workers' hourly wage this month	Continuous, calculated with constant dollars with CPI-U based on Dec 2013 and weeks and hours worked in the current month.
Independent Variables		
Within-Sector Mobility	If workers have changed jobs within the sector.	Dummy, 1 for those who have changed jobs before within the sector.
Sector Switching	If workers have switched to the other sector.	Dummy, 1 for those who have switched sectors before.
Gender	Gender of workers	Dummy, 1 for female and 0 for male
Race	Race of workers	Dummy, divided into five groups. 1 for those who belong to White, Black, Latino, Asian, and Other Race.
Age	Age of workers, measured by year.	Numeric (18-65)
Tenure	Tenure of workers, measured by month.	Numeric (0-618)
Education	Education years of workers.	Numeric (0-20)
Weeks Worked	Weeks worked this month	Numeric (1-5)
Hours Worked	Usual hours worked per week	Numeric (1-99)
Disability	Disability status of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as disability.
Veteran Status	Veteran status of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as veterans.
Marital Status	Marital status of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as married.
Parenthood Status	Parenthood status of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as fathers or mothers.
Sexual Orientation	Sexual orientation status of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as heterosexual.
Occupation	Occupation categories of workers.	Dummy, divided into 22 categories. 1 for those who belong to any groups.
Industry	Industry categories of workers.	Dummy, divided into 20 categories. 1 for those who belong to any groups.
Union	Union status of workers.	Dummy, 1 for those who report themselves as union members.

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