12-2024

A Friendlier White Genocide Myth: How Framing Influences Support for Bigoted Immigration Policy

Allison Betus
Georgia State University

A Friendlier White Genocide Myth: How Framing Influences Support for Bigoted Immigration Policy

by

Allison Betus

Under the Direction of Anthony Lemieux, PhD

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2024

ABSTRACT

The White Genocide Myth (WGM) is one of the most popular conspiracy theories among White supremacists and other antisemites, yet narratives derived from it are regularly featured in mainstream immigration discourse in the United States. To safely attract followers and advance political agendas, White supremacists often reframe their beliefs into more neutral and media-friendly language. I designed a 3X2X2 conjoint experiment to explore whether changing the target (Mexico, Iraq, or England), the tone (ambiguous or explicitly negative), and the source (White nationalist or patriot) of an anti-immigrant argument derived from WGM would significantly influence agreement and perceptions of factual accuracy. Perceptions of WGM's factual accuracy increased when participants reported higher homophily (perceived similarity to another) to the source, and the source self-identified as a patriot. Participants were more likely to agree with WGM if they viewed the argument as factual and viewed it in the patriot condition, an ambiguous condition, an Iraq condition, or a Mexico condition. Agreement was also positively related to both explicit and implicit prejudice against immigrants, with explicit prejudice being the stronger correlate and predictor. A closer look at the source's impact on agreement and perceptions of factuality revealed that the patriot condition elicited higher ratings on both from only White participants. Participants of color found WGM equally unpersuasive and lacking factuality, regardless of source condition. Moving forward, activists, scholars, policymakers, and counterterrorism efforts should be aware of these biases and the opportunities they provide for extremists to influence mainstream politics.

INDEX WORDS: Framing, White supremacy, Immigration, Persuasion, Political messaging, Bias

A Friendlier White Genocide Myth: How Framing Influences Support for Bigoted Immigration Policy

by

Allison Betus

Committee Chair: Anthony Lemieux

Committee: Carol Winkler

Erin Kearns

Cynthia Hoffner

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Services

College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

December 2024

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the many friends who supported and encouraged me during my PhD journey. Special thanks to John, Emily, and Rebecca for all their support and encouragement throughout the years. I would like to thank Lindsea for doing her best to warn me of the stress that accompanies a PhD. While I ultimately ignored her best advice (i.e. don't do it) the rest helped me endure the process. I would also like to thank my fellow students at GSU for keeping me going, laughing with me, and helping me deal with life's curveballs, especially Aaron Dicker, Nagham el-Karhili, Ayse Lokmanoglu, Kelli Olstein, and Becky Wilson. Rory also warrants special mention for his extensive support and encouragement over the years. Many thanks also to Cass and Kelsey for allowing me to decompress with them, showing me new and interesting ways of viewing the social world, and getting me away from my computer. This was the most difficult thing I've ever done and I would not have survived it without you all.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I extend endless gratitude to the IT staff at GSU. They always managed to help me out with a straight face. I would also like to thank former grad director Tawanna Tookes and current graduate director Brittany Galuskin for helping me navigate deadlines and paperwork throughout my graduate career. I am very grateful for the guidance of my PI, Dr. Anthony Lemieux, whom has mentored me since I was a directionless undergrad and helped me find a place in serious scholarship. Dr. Erin Kearns has provided me with invaluable advice over the years and has been an excellent co-author. Her work has influenced mine for the better, as has her pragmatic attitude and I am very happy to know her. Dr. Amanda Rodgers always provided whip smart insight into the many flaws of counterterrorism policy, unparalleled expertise on Islam and geopolitics in the MENA region. She has expanded my understanding of the world and I am extremely grateful to her. Dr. Carol Winkler in particular whom, in addition to providing excellent feedback and professional advice, really helped me out when my appendix decided to part ways with me during ASC.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANOVA – Analysis of variance

BAc CI – Bias-corrected and accelerated confidence interval

NATIS - Negative Attitudes towards Immigration Scale

NSDAP - Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

ROAR – Restore Our Alienated Rights

SCT – Social cognitive theory

SIT – Social identity theory

SR2S - Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale

WGM – White Genocide Myth

1 INTRODUCTION

A great deal of anti-immigration rhetoric in mainstream US political discourse focuses on issues which have no apparent relation to race or religion, such as threats to election integrity, national security, culture, and meritocracy. Many people would assume that the colorblindness of the topics should lead to colorblindness in discourse and policy outcomes. Surely policies meant to keep out criminals, terrorists, cheaters, failures, and freeloaders should affect some people from every country and every group. Even if these measures affect people from certain groups or places more, it is likely because undesirables from those places and groups find the US especially attractive. If undesirables from certain groups and places are especially interested in infiltrating the US, then surely subjecting people who happen to be from those places and groups to additional scrutiny is a regrettable yet necessary method of protecting the US, its culture, and its elections. Surely anyone who opposes measures designed to keep dangerous people out of the US is either stupid, colluding with foreign criminals, or naive. I strongly doubt that this was your first exposure to that series of statements or that you have never met anyone who uncritically accepted all of them.

It is quite easy to justify profiling with colorblindness while also implying that opposition is unhinged or malicious so long as the audience is willing to believe some underlying assumptions and take a few things for granted. If the audience assumes colorblindness in enforcement as well as policy language, the methods for screening out threats are effective, the information about the threats is true, the people proposing the solutions are trustworthy, and the audience itself is confident that it understands the relevant events, groups, and people, then trusting colorblind policy to lead to unbiased outcomes is perfectly logical. None of these

assumptions need to be true for someone to believe that they are true. People can certainly be firmly confident in incorrect conclusions or insecure about correct conclusions.

A great deal of xenophobic information in mainstream political discourse is confidently incorrect and either goes unchallenged or is positioned as a valid counterpoint to correct information. Immigrants are posed as a major threat to election integrity. A report on interference in federal elections held in 2022 found evidence of activity by Russian and possibly Chinese hackers, but nothing regarding immigrants, Latinos, or Muslims (Department of Homeland Security, 2023). Rather than uncovering evidence of vast voter fraud among immigrants, The Heritage Foundation's database of election fraud cases in the US has identified several dozen cases of election fraud by or on behalf of non-citizens since 2002 (The Heritage Foundation, 2024). Immigrants are purported to be especially criminal and coddled by law enforcement. The Biden Administration echoes language about the need to secure the border and has increased border patrol activity (White House, 2024). Sanctuary cities are stereotyped as hotbeds of immigrant violence and corruption, despite having crime rates comparable to or slightly lower than non-sanctuary cities (Martínez et al., 2018; O'Brien et al., 2019).

Think of the anti-immigration rhetoric you have seen in mainstream discourse and compare it to that of 1940 Nazi pseudo-documentary '*Der ewige Jude*[1] (The Eternal Jew).' Commissioned by Joseph Goebbels and directed by Fritz Hippler, the film warns the viewer of a Jewish conspiracy bent on destroying Germany, White people, and Christianity (Hippler, 1940). The film argues that this Jewish conspiracy is flooding Germany with non-White immigrants as a method of promoting degeneracy and weakening the White race until it can no longer resist Jewish control. Jewish people are depicted as greedy, tribal, dishonest, unwilling to adapt to local culture, uncivilized, and violent, as are the non-white immigrants allegedly under their control.

[1] German title capitalization

The film accuses Jewish conspirators of intentionally spreading war, poverty, and degeneracy in the name of personal gain and revenge for past antisemitism. This is contrasted against hard-working, honest, generous, trusting Germans whose fundamental goodness renders them vulnerable to foreign invaders. The ghettos of Nazi Germany are depicted as government-funded paradises for people who grow rich by pretending to be oppressed. Antisemitic violence is framed as self-defense. The film only acknowledges the historical oppression of Jewish people to argue that it proves they cause trouble wherever they go. The film ultimately leads to the conclusion that Jewish people must be removed from Germany and prevented from immigrating there to protect German citizens and return to a mythical idyllic past.

If you replaced "Jewish" with "deep state" and "Germany" with "America" the narrative would strongly resemble modern far-right rhetoric on immigration. A great deal of anti-immigrant rhetoric throughout history has drawn from the narrative promoted by *Der ewige Jude* but this narrative did not originate with the film. Anti-Catholic bigots of the 19th century, the Nazis, and contemporary Islamophobes all alleged that these immigrants flooding in from overseas were loyal to a religious figure overseas, secretly worshipped Satan, did not respect women, and were plotting to insinuate their religious laws into the government (Goldwag, 2012). Catholic refugees of the Potato Famine, Jewish people fleeing the Holocaust, and modern Muslim refugees were accused of bringing their hardships on themselves and expecting others to solve their problems (Goldwag, 2012; Marcks & Pawelz, 2020). Vietnamese refugees fleeing the Vietnam War (Belew, 2018), Chinese immigrants in 1800's (Goldwag, 2012), modern Latinos (Gonzalez, 2019), and Syrian refugees (Yigit & Tatch, 2017) are just some other examples of groups vilified by this rhetoric.

The victims of this style of vilification are desperate and spread across centuries. The only thing they all have in common is that they were the target of xenophobic hate campaigns motivated and justified by White Genocide Myth (WGM), also referred to as Great Replacement Theory. WGM defines Whiteness according to whatever is needed to maintain supremacist power structures, which makes it quite versatile (Goldwag, 2012). In regards to immigration specifically, WGM alleges that non-White immigration and multiculturalism in Canada, the United States, Australia, and Europe is a plot to end Whiteness by destroying the culture (Goldwag, 2012). According to WGM, surges of non-White immigrants are encouraged to infiltrate the US and have enough children to alter the electorate and manipulate demographics (Marcks & Pawelz, 2020; Simi & Futrell, 2010). This would allegedly allow immigrants to manipulate government policies to pressure Americans into abandoning their values and culture (Marcks & Pawelz, 2020). These alleged invaders are also portrayed as major sources of disease, terrorism, crime, corruption, and exploitation in their host countries (Marcks & Pawelz, 2020; Moses, 2019). Women and children are portrayed as certain casualties of immigrant violence should White men fail to protect them (Goldwag, 2012; Marcks & Pawelz, 2020; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Violence and crime that immigrants themselves are fleeing is treated as proof that they cause trouble (Belew, 2018; Goldwag, 2012; Marcks & Pawelz, 2020). This all combines into a worldview where anti-immigrant violence is heroic self-defense and xenophobia is common sense (Goldwag, 2012; Marcks & Pawelz, 2020; Simi & Futrell, 2010). The conspiracy allegedly enjoys the support of self-hating White people, the greedy, degenerates, well-meaning idiots, and the media (Belew, 2018; Goldwag, 2012; Marcks & Pawelz, 2020; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Believers consider media apathetic, fake, or under direct Jewish control if it does not reflect a WGM worldview (Marcks & Pawelz, 2020).

While most people are not familiar with WGM, it is widely accepted among White supremacists. WGM has motivated and justified an incalculable amount of White supremacist bigotry, terrorism, and violence (Davey & Ebner, 2019; Goldwag, 2021; Marcks & Pawelz, 2020). Some examples of White supremacist mass killers motivated by WGM include Robert Bowers, Anders Breivik, Patrick Crusius, Payton Gendron, and Bryant Tarrant, with the latter even naming his manifesto "The Great Replacement" (Amarasingam et al., 2022; Davey & Ebner, 2019; Marcks & Pawelz, 2020; Moses, 2019; Tarrant, 2019). The murders of those influenced by the theory were carried out in Germany, the United States, New Zealand, and Norway and they targeted victims for being Muslim, Jewish, Black, immigrants, and children of alleged conspirators, respectively. White supremacists typically acknowledge that most people will reject WGM in its' raw form, often complaining that people are too ignorant or brainwashed to accept it (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Tarrant, 2019). Rather than trying to convince people that WGM is real, believers are selective about which aspects of the myth they reference and usually avoid making direct references to minorities (Belew, 2018; Simi & Futrell, 2010). This tactic is popular because it allows them to focus on issues that many people care about – such as immigration, crime, economic stability, and cultural anxiety – while subtly framing them through the lens of WGM (Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Obfuscating and repackaging White supremacist ideology as concern with a social or economic problem is historically a successful tactic for maintaining White supremacist power structures in the face of popular opposition (Belew, 2018; Inwood, 2015; Lassiter, 2006; Levitas, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009). Hardcore White supremacists simply do not have the numbers and voting power to openly influence the political landscape as they did before the Civil Rights Movement (Belew, 2018; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Many people think of White

supremacy as explicit discrimination and violence, but these tactics are generally discouraged because they cause reputational harm and drive away support (Futrell & Simi, 2017; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Even the makers of *Der ewige Jude* took great pains to justify antisemitic oppression as necessary and logical acts of self-defense instead of directly telling viewers to engage in street violence. People who repeat WGM narratives in mainstream forums typically eschew calls for violence in favor of expressing concerns about personal safety, national security, merit, and culture (Futrell & Simi, 2017; Kelly, 2017; Moses, 2019). This practice helps White supremacist activists to covertly influence politics – protecting themselves from backlash and coaxing support from people outside the ideology (Dovidio et al., 2016; Zeskind, 2009). Immigration is a popular vehicle for covert White supremacist propaganda because immigration is functionally racialized but demographics are often abstracted away in the rhetoric (Belew, 2018; Gonzalez, 2019; Silber-Mohamed & Farris, 2019).

Works such as *Der ewige Jude* and its major inspiration *The Protocols of The Elders of Zion* communicate bald-faced WGM to the audience because they were designed for populations which accepted antisemitic myths and White superiority as simple reality. If the audience already believes in the basic stereotypes underpinning WGM and there is no real risk of meaningful backlash, then there is little need to massage the rhetoric. Consider the United States in 2024 and how it differs from the political landscape in which WGM was conceived. To name just a few: most adults have the right to vote, most people living in the US are immigrants or are descended from them, citizenship is not restricted by race, it is much easier to form friendships and bonds across groups, easier to make contact across groups, information can be shared and fact-checked in real time, and challenging bigotry is a better way to gain social status than enforcing it in most social spaces. If someone attempted to teach either of the above-mentioned works as serious

warnings against a real threat, they would be rightly mocked and discredited by most people. The average American is not concerned that a Jewish conspiracy might erase White people via flooding the country with non-White immigrants. They are much more likely to be concerned with fairness, comfort, and self-preservation. In that environment, it makes much more sense to focus on different aspects of WGM. People who believe in WGM want to combat the alleged genocide by stopping the flow of degenerates. They do not need to convince people that the entire conspiracy theory is true to convince them that non-White immigrants are a threat. Rather than blaming a Jewish conspiracy, the focus is often on the people who would be considered their collaborators and degenerates (e.g. Democrats, liberals, coastal elites). The vices of non-White immigrants are not explicitly attributed to internal rot inherent to their race, but they are presented as traits you can and should expect to find among them. Instead of entire races and religions being portrayed as villains, people coming from specific countries which happen to have dominant majorities of Muslims or POC are presented as the problem. Convincing a layperson that elites are letting criminals from Mexico and the Middle East cross the border for some political benefit at the expense of US citizens is a more palatable form of WGM for modern audiences.

Yet distancing WGM rhetoric from the core ideology also cannot explain all the leeway and consideration given to it. Consider the variety of groups targeted by WGM rhetoric. They are or were members of groups marginalized in the US. It is notable that the rhetoric applied to people from Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America has not been applied to Russian-Americans or Russian immigrants, despite Russia's hostility to the US and efforts to interfere in American politics. International terrorist activity from far-right groups like The Base and Atomwaffen have not resulted in mass immigration holds on people coming from England or

Canada. Frankly, many Americans seem more willing to generalize negative traits to immigrants who are not White Europeans.

At time of writing, the 2024 presidential election looms and xenophobic rhetoric is a major part of many Conservative political campaigns. During Donald Trump's acceptance speech for nomination as the Republican candidate for president at the 2024 Republican National Convention, he described a "massive invasion at our southern border that has spread misery, crime, poverty, disease, and destruction to communities all across our land (Gleason & Barber, 2024)." Attendees carried signs reading "Mass Deportation Now" as they listened to speakers accuse immigrants of poisoning the blood of the US (Pitzer, 2024). They were warned of immigrants bringing disease and crime (Pitzer, 2024). Trump himself compared immigrants to vermin and the Southern border to an open wound (Pitzer, 2024). This messaging is nothing new. Since his campaign for the 2016 election, Trump has spent years depicting Latinos as outsiders, rapists, criminals, thieves, cheaters, election interferers, and terrorists (Gonzalez, 2019; Kulig et al., 2020; Trump, 2015, 2016a, 2016b). Among White people, support for the January 6th insurrection was linked to both anti-immigrant sentiment and belief in WGM (Barreto et al., 2023). People who have attacked refugee shelters and pro-immigrant politicians have justified their actions with arguments derived from WGM (Marcks & Pawelz, 2020). WGM is openly affecting the political landscape of the US at time of writing.

This rhetoric will not be abandoned as long as it is useful, and clearly it is, so when is it most useful? Who is most receptive to WGM rhetoric? Are White supremacists correct that their messaging is more appealing when they simply take a softer tone and identify as something less odious? If the right social cues do not make WGM more appealing, then continue here Is WGM more persuasive when it is used against certain groups? The arguments are often presented as

racially neutral by focusing on behavior rather than naming specific demographics, so they should be considered equally valid when the audience has different demographics in mind. By examining participants' responses to WGM rhetoric which strongly implies, but does not directly assert, that Muslim, Latino, or White immigrants are harmful to the United States, I seek to answer these questions. To properly interrogate this problem, I turned to literature on communication, political science, and psychology to better understand how and why people are receptive to WGM rhetoric in immigration discourse.

1.1 Xenophobia in News and National Security

Among the US public, terrorism is an especially salient threat in immigration policy (Avdan & Webb, 2019). Looking at how US news media talks about immigration and foreigners, it is unsurprising that a layperson might become receptive to WGM rhetoric. Media generally reports on immigration in threatening ways which comport with popular stereotypes about immigrants (Nacos et al., 2007). The tone of this coverage, as well as the volume of it predictive of attitudes towards immigrants, perceptions that individual immigrants are here illegally, and the perception that immigration is an important problem in the US (Dunaway et al. 2010; Dunaway et al. 2011).

States with large immigrant populations have been depicted as warzones overrun by criminal immigrants (Gonzalez, 2019; O'Brien et al., 2019; Trump, 2016a, 2016b). US media tends to depict Latin immigrants as undocumented, tribal, criminal, primitive, uneducated, unskilled, lazy, threatening, economically destructive, and unwilling to integrate into American society (Abrajano & Singh, 2009; Berg, 2002; Chavez, 2001; Farris & Silber Mohamed, 2018; Mastro & Behm-Morawitz, 2005; Pérez, 2016; Schultz & Zelezny, 2003; Suro, 2008). US media coverage of Muslims tends to focus on criminality, terrorism, misogyny, and otherness (Shaheen,

2003) sometimes even assuming that terrorists are Muslim if they are a person of color (Powell, 2018). Islam is portrayed as a violent religion and "the West vs Islam" is a common theme in media depictions of the war on terror (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017; Ibrahim, 2010; Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007). Muslims committed 12.5% of terror attacks in the US between 2006 and 2015, but received 44% of the overall print media coverage on the subject within that timeframe, and the bulk of it was generated by the 4% of perpetrators who were foreign-born (Kearns, et al., 2019b). Most terror attacks get very little media attention and some get none whatsoever, making the disproportionate focus on focus on foreigners and Muslims even starker (Chermak, 2003; Kearns et al., 2019; Powell, 2018). An examination of the actual language within terrorism coverage revealed that 77% of the articles which referenced terrorism or terrorists were written about attacks by Muslims (Betus et al., 2019). Violence by Muslims is often depicted as terrorism, whereas far-right extremists are often depicted as regular criminals with no organizational ties (Gade et al., 2018; Johnson, 2012; Levitas, 2004 Mitnik, et al. 2018; Powell, 2018; Zeskind, 2009). With this lack of context, media coverage of White supremacist violence often portrays it as unpredictable and driven by individual grievance or mental illness (Belew, 2018; Powell, 2018). Because immigrants and Muslims receive no such privilege, organizational ties (e.g.: MS-13, ISIS) may be freely documented or suggested. These narratives construct a reality where WGM-derived rhetoric can seem plausible.

Here I will provide an example of a media narrative which I think derived much of its legitimacy from resembling a media narrative about foreign terrorists. On June 6th, 2019, FOX published an article on a recent interview with a captured ISIS foreign fighter from Canada. The interviewee, located in a Syrian prison, described an alleged plot to sneak ISIS through the Southern border with fake passports, whereupon they would secure powerful bank jobs and

commit financial sabotage against the US (McKay, 2019). Both the original piece by an interviewer and the FOX article contains the following:

> "Yet this account of a Canadian ISIS cadre recently interviewed under SDF authority in Rojava, Syria, is not published here as a warning bulletin for an imminent attack against our country, nor is it a fear-mongering attempt to suggest that a wave of ISIS terrorists are waiting to cross our southern border, but a reminder to diligently consider leads and sources that confirm terrorists' intentions to exploit one of the weakest links in our national security: our borders." (McKay, 2019; Speckhard, 2019)

Yet, this story does not stand up well to scrutiny and the interviewer noted that they had never encountered a similar plot before in hundreds of interviews with captured fighters (Speckhard, 2019). According to the interviewee, the story could not be corroborated because everyone who was involved was dead and he did not know any of their names. While he admitting to voluntarily joined ISIS, he accused the group of imprisoning and torturing him after he refused to cause financial duress to the US (Speckhard, 2019). A non-citizen capable of securing a powerful banking position in the US with no prior job offer while maintaining membership in a globally-recognized terrorist organization would presumably have the connections and skills to use a safer and more convenient method of entry than showing their faces to US Border Patrol with fake documents in hand. The original article by one of the interviewers ends in the following:

> "EDITOR'S NOTE: The alleged plot described by the ISIS suspect is a claim by this single individual only, and has not been corroborated by intelligence sources; some of these sources have noted to HSToday details in the account that are unlikely to be true from a logistical and tactical perspective. While Abu Henricki's case in regard to his admission of aiding a terrorist group has yet to be adjudicated, it is important to note that it is not uncommon for terror suspects hoping for leniency to craft stories claiming that they had a reduced role in the group or were instrumental in preventing an attack. We recommend that readers keep this in mind while weighing the veracity of this admitted ISIS fighter's claims." (Speckhard, 2019)

It seems extremely unlikely that a similar narrative about a White supremacist plot would be given the same weight and credibility by experts and the media, especially considering that federal agencies received and ignored several tips about the January 6th insurrection, which was also plotted publicly (Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2023). While the alleged plot was highly suspect, the narrative fit into existing stereotypes and fears about terrorism, border security, Islam, and foreigners.

Just as media coverage disproportionately focuses on foreign terror threats, national security policy regarding entry into the US also tends to focus on Muslims and Latinos. In 2017, US began detaining everyone who crossed the US-Mexico border without permission, including asylum seekers and children (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2022). This escalated to a policy of separating children from their parents, which was typically followed by minimal or no effort to reunite them (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2022). This policy was adopted to discourage future migrants from attempting to enter the US (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2022). The victims of this policy were predominantly Latino, likely because no similar policy was enacted on the US-Canada border. US citizens of Latino descent were not spared suspicion. In 2019, a Louisiana citizen was detained for four days due to local sheriff's policy of automatically putting immigration holds on people with Latino surnames (Schwartzmann, 2019). In 2017, the Trump Administration entered a legal battle to ban citizens of several predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States, ostensibly to prevent terror attacks (Department of Homeland Security, 2017). Yet, most terror attacks in the US have been motivated by far-right ideology, most perpetrators are White, and overwhelming majority have been US citizens (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2023; Kearns et al., 2019).

The FBI has repeatedly warned that far-right extremists, not foreign Islamists, are a massive threat to national security and actively infiltrate law enforcement and the military (FBI Counterterrorism Division, 2006; 2015; Levitas, 2004; Johnson, 2012; Zeskind, 2009). In 2023, Islamists committed none of the seven terror attacks in the US, whereas far-right extremists committed five (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2024). Between 2008 and 2017, far-right attacks were responsible for 71 percent of extremist-related deaths (Anti-Defamation League, 2018). An attempted coup at the United States Capitol on January 6th, 2021 was carried out by domestic far-right extremists, not Muslim or Latino immigrants. Yet there has been no similar call to stop international travel and immigration from Canada, England, or Russia, despite groups like The Base and Atomwaffen collaborating internationally to harm the US.

While media does not effectively tell us what to think, it does make certain issues, events, people, and messages more salient by granting them more attention, thereby influencing what we think about (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Cacciatore et al., 2016). Media can vicariously teach us how different groups behave and how we should behave in response to them, especially if we lack first- or second-hand experience with them (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Media can create images of reality that feel more real than reality itself and can even vicariously traumatize people by exposing them to harmful events (Awan et al., 2011; Davis & Macdonald, 2004; Schuster et al., 2001). By reflecting certain worldviews consistently, it reinforces the dominant paradigm and encourages compliance (Castells, 2007). Mainstream media rarely presents viewpoints or furthers interests that do not benefit the established system (Castells, 2007). In essence, people use media to create images of their worldview and encourage audiences to discuss issues within the framework of that worldview. By doing so while drawing attention away from other interpretations, it creates the illusion that their interpretation of events is “just how it is.” If media

depictions present groups in ways that fit into a White supremacist conspiracy framework, there is no need spell out the bigotry overtly. It will convey and teach the worldview through repetition and consistency. People may also underestimate the threat of domestic white supremacist terrorists, since they are relatively less salient in the media (Kearns et al., 2019).

The effects of media reporting go far beyond simply presenting information. Media helps to spread ideology and reinforce a consensus of reality by organizing events and information into narratives (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Castells, 2007; Gitlin, 1980; Ruigrok & Van Atteveldt, 2007). The messages interpreted from media lead people to construct mental models of reality, especially when the audience has little real-life experience to draw upon (McCombs, 2005; Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007). Consuming terrorism-related media increases fear of terrorism, which itself is linked to increased support for curtailing civil liberties, especially those of Muslims (Nellis & Savage, 2012). News portrayals of Muslims as terrorists increases perceptions that they are aggressive, support for military action in Muslim countries, and support for Islamophobic policies (Saleem et al., 2017). US citizens and media tend to link terrorism to Muslims while conflating Muslims with Arabs, racializing the religion and tying it to terrorism (Alsultany, 2012; Gottschalk, 2008; Park et al., 2007; Saleem & Anderson, 2013). People are more likely to label an attack as terrorism when the perpetrator is Muslim (D'Orazio & Salehyan, 2018; Huff & Kertzer, 2018; West & Lloyd, 2017). A 2017 poll found that roughly half of Americans felt that Islam was not part of mainstream society and, on average, felt less warmth towards Muslims than most other major religious groups (Pew Research Center, 2017). In 2016 half of Americans reported that that at least some Muslims are anti-American, with 11% responding that most or all are, and 14% believed that Islam promotes violence (Pew Research Center, 2016). Even limited exposure to stereotypical media depictions of Latinos is associated

with negatively judging them and favoring policies that disproportionately harm them (D. Mastro et al., 2007; D. E. Mastro, 2003; D. E. Mastro & Kopacz, 2006). Consumption of television news is predictive of supporting restrictive immigration measures, especially among viewers of FOX news (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012). When news media on immigration included images of Mexicans, Americans viewed immigration less favorably than the same story with images of Europeans (Brader et al., 2008).

Polling indicates that fear of terrorism is widespread in the United States. According to Gallup, when asked to rate different threats to the United States, international terrorism was rated critical by 71% of respondents and important by 23% whereas domestic terrorism was rated as critical by 68% and important by 28% (Gallup Inc, 2024). As of 2023, 36% of respondents reported personally worrying about future terror attacks a great deal whereas only 11% reported not worrying about it at all (Gallup Inc, 2024). In 2021, only 33% of Americans reported feeling not at all worried that they or someone they know will be the victim of a terrorist attack (Gallup Inc, 2024). Compare this with the Cato Institute's examination of terrorist violence in the US spanning 1975 to 2017:

> "Including those murdered in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the chance of a person perishing in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil committed by a foreigner over the 43-year period studied here is 1 in 3.8 million per year. The hazard posed by foreigners who entered on different visa categories varies considerably. For instance, the chance of an American being murdered in a terrorist attack by a refugee is about 1 in 3.86 billion per year, while the annual chance of being murdered in an attack committed by an illegal immigrant is zero. By contrast, the chance of being murdered by a tourist on a B visa, the most common tourist visa, is about 1 in 4.1 million per year. Compared to foreign-born terrorists, the chance of being murdered by a native-born terrorist is about 1 in 28 million per year." (Nowrasteh, 2019)

Keep in mind, of the 3,518 deaths attributed to terrorism in the US from 1975 to 2017, 3,037 were from the September 11th attack (Nowrasteh, 2019). Most terror attacks in the US

have either no casualties or the perpetrator as the sole casualty (Kearns et al., 2019). In spite of this rarity, in 2021 37% of Americans reported avoided large events and 36% would not travel overseas out of fear of terror attacks (Gallup Inc, 2024).

People seem to mainly be concerned with populations stereotypically associated with otherness and terrorism. Support for anti-Muslim policies and hawkish foreign policies increases with self-reported levels of fear and worry about terrorism (Gadarian, 2010; Haner et al., 2019). In a sampling of public opinion regarding various refugee crises, US public preferred helping Albanian refugees over Cubans, Syrians, and the Indochinese refugees.**Error! Bookmark not defined.** People are also more likely to tolerate extremely harsh punitive measures (e.g. torture, indefinite detention, denial of legal counsel) against Muslim and minority terror suspects than far-right terror suspects (Piazza, 2015).

Media consumption of terrorism-related news is positively correlated with perceptions that an individual, or someone they are close to, will be the victim of a terror attack (Nellis & Savage, 2012). Images of foreign Latino criminals and Muslim terrorists have been drilled into the popular consciousness by over-coverage of terrorism and violence which reflect those stereotypes. This has resulted in many people adopting these images as realistic and accurate depictions of a threat they might encounter. By linking terrorism with foreign minority members and framing home-grown far-right violence as normal crime, the media replicates arguments made in WGM without explicitly endorsing them. This creates a space where bad actors can openly support policy to oppress minorities while claiming that they simply oppose terrorism, not immigrants from specific racial or religious demographics. Given the inherently high stakes of preventing terrorism, couching bigoted ideology language in neutral language and national security concerns can distract from the impact of biased policies. This is to say nothing of people

simply not caring about potential bias if it means safety. It seems logical to expect that people will be more willing to entertain the idea of Muslims or Latinos as terrorist threats than White people.

I present media alongside national policy because the justaposition highlights the ways they influence one another and because media has tremendous influence over how we perceive the world. People often perceive themselves as unbiased, but our perceptions are influenced by the arrangement and presentation of relevant information (Pronin et al., 2002). By focusing on specific information, the audience is encouraged to think of the object while considering that information. For example, the lenses through which US news media is typically filtered is that of White Christians, so the designations of crime and terrorism are considered through the lens of information especially relevant to White Christians (Powell, 2018). This encourages the audience to think of terrorism as it perceived by White Christians. Consider that, while people who are Muslim, Middle Eastern, and Latino face scrutiny and suspicion due to national security concerns, Christians have been favored for refugee status to the US consistently since 2002 (Krogstad, 2019). The data provides no reason to believe that Christian refugees are superior to any other, but it could make perfect sense to someone whose understanding of terrorism reflects that of the media narratives outlined earlier. To a layperson, solutions based on solid intelligence and data might seem equally as ineffective and disconnected from reality as existing solutions seem to many experts.

Even if a person avoids xenophobic media narratives, their presence in national news coverage influences the national conversation. In the field of Communication, the media's power to focus the public's attention on its interpretations of events is called agenda setting. Concepts which are salient in media messaging become salient in the mind of the public, ergo agenda

setting both directs the audience's attention and indicates how they should think about the topic (Cacciatore et al., 2016; Van Atteveldt et al., 2006). This influences the public's interests which influences their policy interests (Dearing & Rodgers, 1996). Two mechanisms behind media's persuasive power are its ability to focus the public's attention and its credibility as a source of information.

1.2 Framing

In the field of Communication, the process of arranging information to create meaning is called "framing." Agenda setting highlights the salience of objects whereas framing highlights aspects of the object (Chyi & McCombs, 2004). Even within the discipline, there is no universally accepted definition of framing, though there is a high degree of similarity between most of them. All mainstream definitions of framing in Communication Studies rely on the premise that the form of information influences the meaning people take from it. Framing can be described as the process of drawing attention to certain aspects of an event, person, or object to highlight something about it (McCombs, 2005). Frames can also be defined as constructs which assign meaning to events, social structures, and cultural artifacts, which are used to organize, encourage participation in, and rationalize the actions of social movements (Snow et al., 1986). In this paradigm, frames construct reality and our expectations about what happens when we take certain actions. Yet others posit that framing is the process by which people develop, revise, or reorient their concept of an issue, which ultimately forms their attitude about that issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007). According to this interpretation of framing, attitudes are created by accumulating evaluative beliefs about an object and looking at this information while accounting for personally relevant considerations. Changes of opinion due to framing are called framing effects (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Personal salience increases the strength of a frame's effects,

as does distress (Druckman & McDermott, 2008; McCombs, 2005). Gadarian (2010) posited that people concerned about terrorism may be especially susceptible to persuasive messages about foreign policy due to distress and personal salience strengthening framing effects.

There are many types of frames. Symbolic frames construct and reinforce group identities, making them important to building and maintaining social movements (Adams & Roscigno, 2005). These teach us what different group memberships mean, how they act, and what we can expect from them. In drawing specific attention to what it means to be part of a group, symbolic frames also teach us what it means to be outside of that group. White nationalists in particular often strive to be thought of as patriots because it encourages people to interpret their actions as motivated by patriotism (Belew, 2018; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009). Because patriots are venerated and White supremacists are denigrated, implying that one could be the other is deeply offensive to many Americans even when that assessment has some merit. This can easily lead people to mistake anti-racism for anti-patriotism, making it difficult to effectively attack patriot-themed hate groups (Johnson, 2012). Compare this to media depictions of Muslims and Latinos. Many media depictions employ symbolic frames indicating that terrorism and international crime are the domains of both groups. Using Muslim as synonymous with terrorist and Latino as synonymous with immigrant criminals are far less controversial practices than associating patriotism with White supremacy. Symbolic frames have drawn these lines.

Equivalency frames present the same information through different lenses to draw attention to losses or benefits (Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007). For example, instead of calling for rights to be taken away from other groups, many White supremacists reframe their bigotry as advocacy for White people (Belew, 2018; Johnson, 2012; Levitas, 2004; Zeskind, 2009).

Emphasis frames draw attention to specific aspects of the framed object to signal something about the object itself (Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007). For example, a study found that 85% of participants supported a hate group's right to hold a political rally when an argument for it began with "Given the importance of free speech…," compared to 45% support when it began with "Given the risk of violence… (Sniderman & Theriault 2004)."

Associative frames create links between the subject and other objects or concepts for the purpose of drawing attention to perceived similarities between them (van Atteveldt et al., 2006). Some White supremacist groups use names which do not explicitly reference Whiteness (e.g. Alt-Right, Groyper Army, Rise Against Movement) or reference other identities (e.g., Christian Identity, American freedom Party, Patriot Front). Many White supremacist groups and individuals self-identify as patriots in order to deflect attention away from their ideology by centering people's attention on their military service (Belew, 2018; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009). This not only pushes White supremacist ideology out of focus, racist extremism among veterans may be excused by people who are offended by the notion that a veteran could be a racist extremist (Belew, 2018; Goldwag, 2012; Johnson, 2012; Levitas, 2004; Zeskind, 2009).

Frames can be applied to the medium, messenger, text, audience, and cultural context of a message; altering any of these factors can change perceptions of the message (Ruigrok & Atteveldt, 2007). Consider how you would respond to receiving a cake from a loved one on your birthday with 'Happy Birthday' written on it in frosting. Now consider how your response would change if we apply different frames to the specified locations: Happy birthday is written on divorce papers instead of a cake (medium), the cake is given by a total stranger (messenger), the cake says "You're Moving Out" instead of "Happy Birthday" (text), your loved one gave your

birthday cake to the dog (audience), or your birthday was six months ago (context). It is unlikely that any of those examples would produce the same audience response as the original example. They indicate different things about the receiver, the person delivering the message, and the state of the relationship between the two. Frames are only meaningful in the context of other information and can reveal a great deal about a culture's values because they rely upon shared understandings of reality (Castells, 2007; Jensen, 2021). The previous examples of frames altering meaning relied upon you, the reader, understanding the concepts of a birthday, gift-giving, marriage, divorce, social norms, and passive-aggression, to name just a few.

Frames can be used to assign roles to others and create narratives which provide explanations and remedies for grievances (Adams & Roscigno, 2005; Tarrow, 1998). Because we tend to make decisions based on the information that is most salient, framing both sets and changes the standards by which we judge things (McCombs, 2003; Zaller, 1992). Framing alters the audience's understanding of a problem, which alters the perception of what the solution should be and the actions people will take in response (Cacciatore et al., 2016; Svihla & Reeve, 2016). Negative political information is easier to remember than positive political information (Perloff, 2002). If people are exposed to enough frames depicting Muslim and Latino immigrants as terrorist threats they may come to see terrorism as the domain of these groups. For example, sometimes laymen to refer to White supremacist and far-right extremist groups as Y'all Qaeda or Vanilla ISIS. The intended effect seems to be to shame these people by comparing them to Islamist groups and the messaging activates frames of Muslim terrorists in situations where they have no involvement, thus taking focus away from the ideology and motivations of the actual attackers. It also implies that violent extremists who are not Islamists are aberrations or perhaps mischaracterized.

News media consistently use frames in its rhetorical and stylistic choices to alter how the audience will interpret a topic (Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007). People will usually oppose or support a given policy based on whatever considerations are on the top of their mind at the time (Zaller, 1992).

The process of fringe White supremacy becoming mainstreamed can be understood as a series of frame changes in pursuit of legitimacy. As information moves from the core, the people sharing the information and receiving the information change, and they reframe the information according to need, context, and purpose. Frames can be specially tailored to catch the attention of people who have specific beliefs or information. If a message would cause backlash, frames can be used as a distraction or disguise (Albertson, 2015). Unframed information becomes less accessible as other information is framed, so frames can be strategically applied to push certain things out of salience (Entman, 1993; McCombs, 2003), such as the earlier example of affecting symbols of patriotism to distract from bigotry. Multivocal appeals are also quite useful for manipulating audiences. Colloquially known as a "dog whistle," a multivocal appeal is a message with a superficial meaning and an additional meaning which is only detectable by people with special knowledge. Multivocal appeals are common and can be harmless, such as an inside joke between friends. Politicians often use them in messaging on meaningful issues to create a connection between them and groups savvy to their real meaning (Perloff, 2002). They subtly signal group membership and allow people to express controversial opinions without risking backlash, while also courting naïve support from people who only understand the superficial message (Albertson, 2015). Naive support even carries the additional benefit of providing defensible deniability for those with specialized knowledge. They can simply pretend

that the naive interpretation is the correct one and adopt the arguments generated by naïve supporters if their motives are called into question.

Frames are not passively received by the audience though. People frame the frames based on their own knowledge, beliefs, and experiences (Jensen, 2021). A contemporary historian or media scholar would understand the information in DEJ much differently than an anti-Semite in 1940, for example. To be effective, frames must reflect greater social values while also appealing to beliefs and experiences that the audience already has (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996; Morris, 2000; Tarrow, 1998). Reframing a message for different audiences is critical to convincing people that a message is worth their consideration because the different groups have different knowledge, considerations, and priorities (Giles et al., 2010).

Yet media frames both create and reenforce mainstream culture through repetition and depicting narratives which uphold the status quo (Castells, 2007). If there are established frames for indicating certain kinds of crime and criminals, the absence of those frames can itself indicate that the subject does not fit the criteria to be considered through them. Earlier we explored how the media depicts migrant crime and terrorism and, in doing so, associates it with Muslims, Latinos, and immigrants while treating similar crime by White citizens as personal, apolitical, and unrelated to group membership. This is accomplished by applying different frames to different perpetrators and events.

If frames reflect our understanding of how something works, we may interpret it as simply reflecting reality, especially with frame repetition and no real-world experience. The effects of this get stronger the more aligned they are with existing knowledge and beliefs. This makes pushback against those frames absurd because it seems that critics are criticizing reality for not matching what should be. People may come to see biased framing as reality and reality as

biased framing. Given the effects of framing it seems likely that people will be more receptive to narratives which match frames they are already familiar with. Information is never independent of context.

1.3 Source Credibility

White supremacist website *The Daily Stormer* advises authors to adopt certain tactics, such a quoting mainstream media outlets whenever possible, to "co-opt" the legitimacy of mainstream media and discourage users from viewing it as fake news (Anglin, 2017). In essence, author Andrew Anglin expected that mimicking mainstream media would lend some degree of its' credibility to *The Daily Stormer.* Anglin was not the first White supremacist propagandist to appropriate credibility from more credible sources, but his leaked style guide does provide a rare honest account of this practice. There is utility to crafting an image of credibility. The frames found in a message's source influence the meaning of the frames in the message itself. The audience's knowledge, beliefs, and experience influence their interpretation of the source just as they do the text. Just as there is no universally persuasive message, there is no universally trusted source. Even a well-crafted and accurate message can seem absurd if it comes from an uncredible source. Voters typically prefer a skilled persuader over an unskilled persuader, even if the unskilled persuader is correct (Perloff et al., 2002).

In this dissertation, we rely on the definition of source credibility as a source's perceived trustworthiness and desire to provide accurate information (Hu & Sundar, 2010; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; McCroskey & Richmond, 1996). Higher source credibility typically enhances frame credibility, which tends to decrease the amount of scrutiny people will apply to information before accepting it (Benford & Snow, 2000). Source credibility can influence the likelihood of people taking action in response to information, one example being that people are

more likely to act on health information from a medical website than a personal blog (Hu & Sundar, 2010). Source credibility influences the level of confidence and doubt a person experiences when considering a persuasive message (Briñol et al., 2004). Messaging from high credibility sources also produce more attitude change than that of low credibility sources (Hovland & Weiss, 1951). Familiarity with a topic seems to decrease persuasive effectiveness of source credibility but it does have an overall positive relationship with persuasiveness (Hu & Sundar, 2010; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Tormala & Clarkson, 2007). In essence, people want to believe information from sources that they view as credible, credibility reduces scrutiny, and credibility influences the potency of framing effects.

The credibility of one source can influence that of another. A moderately credible source will be perceived more favorably if it is preceded by a message on a different topic from a source with low credibility (Tormala & Clarkson, 2007). High credibility is also not always a boon to persuasiveness. If audience members have positive thoughts in response to an argument from a high credibility source, it typically translates into more positive attitudes towards the source, but negative thoughts tend to accompany audiences viewing the source less favorably (Tormala et al., 2006). Tormala et al. (2006) posited that arguments perceived as strong generated more positive thoughts whereas arguments perceived as weaker lead to more negative thoughts.

The tone of a persuasive message can influence source credibility. When presented with a message about hotel rule compliance, participants reported the most positive attitude towards positive frames provided by a credible source, compared to negative frames and noncredible sources (Kim & Kim, 2014). This was a relatively minor and non-threatening message, however, and studies on more serious messaging have found other results. For example, a study of college students' intentions to get tested for STIs showed that negative frames from a credible source

were the most effective (Mccullock & Perrault, 2020). Adding a salient group identity also alters how we perceive the credibility and persuasiveness of a source. University students rated students from the same university as more credible than students from a different school, for example (Clark & Maass, 1988). Students attending the same school as the participant were also more capable of getting students to adopt a different attitude (Clark & Maass, 1988).

Perceived expertise and homophily (personal social similarity to the audience member) are highly important factors in making judgments about source credibility (McCroskey & Richmond, 1996). While experts are generally considered more credible than laypersons, people may deem a source with high homophily and low expertise as more trustworthy than the inverse (Burrows et al., 2000). People find politicians more likeable if pictures of them are altered to reflect the facial features of the viewer, especially if the viewer is a weak partisan or unfamiliar with the politician, indicating that homophily can act as a substitute for knowledge when evaluating others (Bailenson et al., 2008). People may also prefer to have information conveyed to them by people with high levels of homophily via a combination of personal anecdotes and expert information (Bernhardt & Felter, 2004). For example, Donald Trump has frequently fabricated statistics about immigration, crime, and terrorism and explained the lack of proof as corrupt media refusing to report the truth (Belew, 2018; Goldwag, 2012; Gonzalez, 2019; Trump, 2015, 2016b; Zeskind, 2009). His supporters responded by labelling contradictory information as “fake news” showing a strong preference for homophily over expertise, or even conflating the two.

Sharing information and socializing are major functions of White supremacist gatherings, forums, and media (Belew, 2018; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Wong et al., 2015). Given White supremacist reliance on myths, misinterpretations, and falsehoods, this indicates a desire for

homophily over formal expertise. White supremacists also put effort into increasing their own homophily with mainstream America. Even White supremacists who believe that most people secretly agree with them typically expect to be rejected if their beliefs are discovered (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Wong et al., 2015). Knowing that the average person would outright reject messaging from an identifiable White supremacist, many try to fit in with mainstream society; eschewing traditional symbols of hate, adopting a clean-cut aesthetic, and pursuing traditional, high-status careers (Belew, 2018; Futrell & Simi, 2017; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009).

Because the source of information can alter how we interpret that information, people who want to mainstream fringe narratives may try to increase how credible they seem to the audience. While we should not take public-facing White supremacist rhetoric at face value, it does make sense to examine whether a popular and anecdotally successful tactic for gaining legitimacy does make statistically significant differences in how audiences perceive racist messaging. The literature does indicate that homophily impacts message reception, which indicates that WGM might be received more favorably if presented by a source which reminds us of ourselves. Given that we like to think of ourselves as unbiased, perhaps this perceived lack of bias is projected onto high homophily sources. Alternatively, a source which is perceived as biased may be perceived as having low homophily. In the context of understanding how WGM is mainstreamed in mainstream anti-immigration rhetoric, high homophily could make WGM messaging more persuasive by further reducing the audience's willingness to critically examine it. If I am unbiased and I think a person like me is unbiased, it logically follows that they must have unbiased reasons for their beliefs, ergo I do not need to examine their beliefs for bias because they are like me and I am unbiased.

2 WHITE SUPREMACIST POLITICAL MESSAGING

In the previous chapter, we examined how WGM narratives are disseminated through mainstream media and informing current discourse on immigration policy. That chapter focuses on features and conveyance of the messaging itself, but we cannot ignore the role of the audience itself in accepting and normalizing this messaging. Acceptance of a narrative indicates that, on some level, the audience was open to accepting it. In this chapter, we will look at features of the audience which may make people more receptive to WGM narratives and examine some examples of White supremacists successfully mainstreaming their ideology.

2.1 Group Identity and Intergroup Perceptions

Earlier I said that the US media typically presents news through a perspective of White Christians, but what does that mean? I've discussed source credibility, homophily, and persuasion but not the social dynamics which underpin them. These all have their respective impacts but why do they have them? I believe that literature on group perceptions and social learning can help explain these effects.

Kathleen Belew (2018) described the social structure which facilitates this transformation as a series of concentric circles: A small core of activists pursues a lifestyle centered on extremist ideology and production of content related to that lifestyle. A larger group of people support the cause, and may attend events, but are not fully immersed in the lifestyle. A yet larger group has some beliefs in common with the core group and consumes their information, but does not produce any itself. Ideology, customs, and trends travel out from the core, eventually becoming altered and watered down as they pass between these groups (Belew, 2018). The messaging eventually becomes removed enough from the core meaning to potentially appeal to people who would otherwise reject it (Belew, 2018). This allows White supremacists to find apparent

common ground with people outside of the ideology without requiring them to disclose the roots of their beliefs and opinions (Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Group identity is an inescapable part of WGM. It defines several degenerate groups, their motivations, and their roles in the conspiracy. It also defines the protagonists, the traits which set them apart from the degenerates, and their role in stopping the conspiracy. WGM provides an easy blueprint for understanding the world: the bad people belong to degenerate groups and good people belong to the superior group. If someone seems to be part of the superior group but does not share its values, they are degenerate. If a member of a degenerate seems to have similar values and beliefs to the superior group, they are simply hiding their true degenerate nature. The protagonists of WGM are not only White; they observe the proper rituals, symbols, and norms.

Many people have a similarly narrow view of who can be considered a White supremacist. The average person can be expected to recognize at least some symbols and tropes associated with racist skinheads, the Ku Klux Klan, and Nazis. The innumerable games, movies, books, plays, shows, and songs depicting White supremacists often rely on the audience understanding them already. White supremacy is so strongly associated with the Nazis that many Americans casually describe all White supremacists with that term. Ignorance of other White supremacist symbols, ideology, and culture may leave people vulnerable to White supremacist messaging if it falls outside of their understanding of that rhetoric. Many modern hate symbols resemble sports scores, expressions of machismo, or edgy humor, leading naive people to sometimes use them innocuously (Miller-Idriss, 2019). By using non-traditional symbols of White supremacy and designing those symbols to appeal to people who cannot see the deeper meaning, racists can signal their ideology to each other while minimizing unwanted attention

from anti-racists (Miller-Idriss, 2019; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009). They can simply pretend that they are one of the people who simply liked the look.

Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) posits that humans learn, model, and employ behaviors based what is rewarded and punished in our environment, social groups, and media (Bandura & Walters, 1963; Bandura, 2002). Our self-concept is derived from group membership, which motivates us to maintain a positive group image (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Oakes, 2011). We have a vested interest in belonging to groups that reflect well on us and for those groups to flourish. People tend to associate with groups that they view positively (Buckler, et al., 2009**).** People may also enhance their self-image and self-esteem by making unfavorable comparisons between other groups and their in-groups (Buckler, et al., 2009; Mastro, 2003).

In practical terms, this often manifests as trusting people more or less based on perceived group membership. People are more accepting of messages coming from in-groups members than from out-group members (Weisel & Zultan, 2016). People also tend to anticipate worse behavior from out-group members and treat them with less warmth and forgiveness (Linville et al., 1989). When bad behavior is observed, people are more likely to blame external factors when it is from an in-group whereas the same behavior from an out-group is more likely to be attributed to internal factors (Ross, 1977).

A society's dominant groups enjoy disproportionate power and protections while subordinate groups are disproportionately stigmatized and blamed for problems like disease, crime, and unemployment (Pratto et al., 2006). Dominant groups also have far more influence over how subordinate groups are portrayed in media and may use that to legitimize group myths, which become part of shared social ideologies (Pratto et al., 2006). From this we get culturally

accepted stereotypes and narratives about how groups act, as narrated by the dominant group. They may not be accurate, but they can be used to justify the status quo.

A person may like an out-group member while hating the group, especially if they consider them atypical of their group (Bodenhausen et al., 1995). The desire to be egalitarian does not perfectly prevent acts of discrimination, especially if they are subtle or unintentional (Dovidio et al., 2016). We feel the pain of out-group members less and harsh consequences against them are less likely to bother us (Skitka et al., 2004). This effect gets stronger the greater the perceived psychological distance (Skitka et al., 2004). This lack of care for the outgroup can manifest as indifferent and callous foreign policy, especially regarding immigrants and refugees (Avdan & Webb, 2019). When fear of terrorism is justification for harsh immigration policy, it is perceived as more acceptable against psychologically distant groups, whereas psychologically close immigrant groups are treated more kindlyr and seen as less threatening (Avdan & Webb, 2019). For example, people who supported torturing detainees in Guantanamo Bay, most of whom had been arrested for being in the wrong place at the wrong time, compared their suffering to college students enduring a fraternity hazing and fretted over the torturers' need for emotional release (Sontag, 2004).

It is important to remember that White supremacist movements are social as well as ideological, providing a place where members can form bonds with each other (Belew, 2018; Miller-Idriss, 2019; Simi & Futrell, 2010). White supremacists offer a group identity, if not a lifestyle, to potential recruits and sympathizers. White supremacists who were not introduced to the ideology from family often learn about it from peer groups (Schafer et al., 2014; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Propaganda designed for enemies of White supremacists is different to that designed for their allies and supporters. Groups which seek the destruction of society and their

enemies also often claim to be places of growth and comradery for allies. Even calls for violence often include familiar and fraternal language, implying that participation equals acceptance and inclusion (Marcks & Pawelz, 2020). Some White separatist explicitly evoke brotherhood in their loyalty oaths as well as their name, such as The Silent Brotherhood (Belew, 2018). White supremacists do not typically approach potential supporters with hatred and form bonds afterward. They form bonds with people through hobbies and shared experiences before introducing the ideology (Belew, 2018; Levitas, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Practically speaking, they build homophily before attempting recruitment. For that to happen, the target must be open to viewing themselves as like the recruiter.

US political power and representation is dominated by Christians and European Americans. European Americans should feel the least psychological distance between immigrants who are also European Christians. In that case, it would also make sense for them to view them as less threatening and more deserving of support than non-White and non-Christian immigrants. If a person who seems like us implies something potentially bigoted, we should be more likely to attribute this to accuracy than undesirable bigotry. Empathizing with a person's concerns regarding terrorist threats should also increase as psychological distance from them decreases and psychological distance from the immigrant group increases. This, however, does not necessarily translate into explicit dislike of the distant group or perceiving the self as biased. It is very unlikely that all of the people who feel that Christians and White people should be prioritized over other refugees would openly describe the former groups as fundamentally superior. Respondents may have answered that way out of a desire to protect in-group members from harm. They may not even consider it discriminatory and there could be any number of explicit motivations for their answers.

White supremacists take advantage of stereotypes to both cloak their ideology and drum up support for their arguments. Bias can take many forms and it often lives in the blind spots of cognition. If an implicit White supremacist narrative presents mainstream stereotypes as simple facts, unconscious bias may make us more likely to take their words at face value. This dissertation has primarily concerned narratives and deception but, at the end of the day, part of agreeing with White supremacists is accepting their myths as fact in at least some contexts and capacities.

2.2 Stereotyping and Bias

WGM does not appeal to people at random. If a person's worldview and beliefs are already bigoted, then narratives which reflect those beliefs will likely be convincing to them. For example, one study found that perceptions that Hispanic people live up to the "bad hombre" stereotype were consistently related to White nationalism and resentment against Hispanic people (Kulig et al., 2020). No matter the quality of the narrative or communicator, there are always people who see behind the façade, including some who choose to maintain it while feigning ignorance.

There are three main components to bias against a group: stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Both academic and colloquial definitions for these terms vary widely. For example, some people believe that they cannot be biased if they do not feel anger or hate towards a group whereas others believe bias only meaningfully exists at the institutional level and a hundred shade of grey between and outside of those two views. Here we will be relying on definitions established in behavioral science. Stereotyping is assuming that a person has certain traits based on their real or perceived group membership. Stereotypes may be positive, negative, or neutral (Czopp et al., 2015). Prejudice is an affective response (usually negative) towards real

or perceived members of a group prior to, or in absence of, experience with them (Katz, 1991). Discrimination is showing differential treatment based on real or perceived group identity (Katz, 1991). All these processes can occur subconsciously ("implicit bias") and may even be directed against a group to which a person belongs to themselves ("internalized bias") (David & Derthick, 2013; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Just as with terrorism, framing, and source credibility, there is no one definition of racism. As Ben-Cheih et al (2021) note however, there is a consensus across the literature that it manifests through discrimination towards a group and is based on a belief in social group hierarchy or unconscious prejudices

Hatred is simply not necessary to commit bigotry or internalize harmful ideas. Think again to the traits that the media and WGM associates with minority immigrants and the legitimacy the media grants those associations. Legitimized myths about a group can be enough to generate bias, even in the absence of personal endorsement or hatred (Pratto, et al., 2006). The myths themselves can act as a bridge between hardcore White supremacy and average people (Belew, 2018). If a Nazi wants to ban minority immigrants to stop a Jewish conspiracy and an average person wants to do the same to prevent terror attacks, the end result is that they are united in common purpose to advance the agenda of the former. Suppose someone had turned their car into a bomb and needed help getting it to the site of attack. If they can convince the friend to help them without revealing their intent or the bomb, that friend would be unwittingly but materially assisting the in impending harm. Even a murderer motivated by explicitly hateful myths may have no particular hatred for their victims. Christchurch terrorist Brant Tarrant, who murdered 51 people, explained in his manifesto that he felt no ill will towards Muslims but needed to stop White genocide (Moses, 2019; Tarrant, 2019). Dylann Roof commented that he almost called off his massacre in Charleston after his victims were kind to him but alleged that

he had to do it because he believed that White people were being wiped out. If these myths can motivate people to kill without needing to hate their victims, surely, they can motivate people to take less extreme discriminatory actions. Presenting biases as facts without being explicitly pejorative can be an excellent way to make the biases seem similarly normal, especially if both parties are expressing discontent about the same thing (Goldwag, 2012; Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Explicit hatred only represent (Adams & Roscigno, 2005) some of the forms that bias can take and, in absence of them, people may not recognize it when they encounter it. This is especially problematic when people are explicitly egalitarian but implicitly biased against a group. When people regard themselves as egalitarian, feel sympathy for the plight of a marginalized group, and express support for equality, but still show negative attitudes against them, it is called "aversive prejudice" (Dovidio et al., 2016). These negative feelings are unwanted, can be subconscious, and are often rooted in anxiety and fear rather than hatred (Dovidio et al., 2016; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Pearson et al., 2009). People who are aversively prejudiced will often react to accusations of bias defensively because being confronted with potentially biased behavior causes psychological dissonance (Dovidio et al., 2016). Consequently, aversively biased people will often avoid the pain of acknowledging this hypocrisy, thereby ensuring that they will not work on overcoming or examining that bias. This is buoyed by research indicating that peoples' confidence in their own objectivity and lack of bias are positively related to committing subtle discrimination (Dovidio et al., 2016).

Subtle discrimination tends to manifest when a situation is ambiguous enough (i.e., when behavioral norms and expectations are uncertain) that it can be attributed to factors unrelated to group membership (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; D. E. Mastro et al., 2008). For example, one study had White college students pick between recommending a

Black or White candidate for a prestigious position at their university. When one candidate was clearly qualified over the other, they made fair decisions. When it was unclear which candidate was more qualified, students tended to recommend the White candidate (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). In clearly defined situations, the aversively biased may even show favoritism towards the out-group over the in-group (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). Southern strategy-style discrimination is designed to misrepresent the intent of institutionally powerful bigots and obfuscate the cause and scope of the outcomes. The disconnect between the apparent narrative and reality creates ambiguity in addition to misdirecting attention.

Aversive prejudice therefore hides itself from casual observers and generates its own camouflage. Situational ambiguity provides a defensible explanation for out-group bias, whereas positive behavior towards out-group members in clear-cut situations bolsters an egalitarian self-perception. An aversively Islamophobic person may have Muslim friends and support religious tolerance, but also support travel bans on majority Muslim countries if situational ambiguity is high enough (e.g. not all of the people affected are Muslim, so it is technically not a Muslim ban, ergo supporting it is not Islamophobic and saying a support a "Muslim ban" is inaccurate). Given the existential threat of terrorism, the greater than zero crime rate among immigrants, and the potential consequences of inadequate border security, the question of how to effectively prevent international terror attacks can provide ample situational ambiguity for bias to be comfortably expressed.

Another relevant form of bias is symbolic bias. Symbolic bias, like aversive prejudice, is an indirect form of bias which can easily be expressed in contemporary discussion regarding immigration. It has four basic components: beliefs that 1) discrimination against a group is a thing of the past, 2) a group's failure to thrive is due to an unwillingness to work, rather than

systemic barriers, 3) the group is making excessive demands and 4) the group is receiving more than they have earned or deserve (Henry & Sears, 2002). Unlike explicit bias, symbolic bias asserts that groups are not biologically inferior, but that the people in the group lack the values to achieve success comparable to society's dominant groups (Buckler, et al., 2009). Themes of symbolic racism are also often echoed in autobiographical accounts of how people came to embrace white supremacy (Schafer et al., 2014). If self-avowed white supremacists independently describe symbolic racism as a major catalyst for their ideology, then arguments rooted in it must be capable of persuading people who are not already white supremacists. Because of its indirect nature and superficial focus on individual merit (i.e. the earlier highlighted cornerstones of how racist political policy continued to endure in US politics) symbolic bias can be an effective tool for promoting white supremacy.

Symbolic racism often manifests in political behavior and is a better predictor of political attitudes and behavior than political affiliation or explicit racism (Sears & Henry, 2005). Among European Americans, symbolic racism increases support for both openly racially targeted policies and policies which subtly, but disproportionately, affect racial minorities (Sears & Henry, 2005). Among European Americans, it symbolic racism decreases support for African American political candidates and increases support for ethnocentric European American candidates (Tesler & Sears, 2010). Because it resembles bias against individual traits rather than groups, the explicitly biased, implicitly biased, aversively biased, and genuinely naive can all come to support the same political policies without necessarily sharing the same motivations for their support or having the same understanding of policy implications. Symbolic bias is more associated with conservatives whereas aversive bias is more associated with liberals (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Nail et al., 2003; Pearson et al., 2009).

In summation, white supremacist causes have learned that altering their language, identities, and symbols will make people more likely to agree with them and more likely to support their political aims, so long as they can credibly deny bigoted intent. Policies and rhetoric that denigrates groups that white supremacists do not like can be found in media depictions of terrorist threats and non-white immigrants, often training audiences to associate minority groups with crime and terrorism. People are more likely to listen to and trust people towards whom they feel less psychological distance, while being less concerned with groups that they view as more psychologically distant. People are also motivated to maintain positive in-group images and thus show increased understanding and favoritism to in-group members. Bias against minority groups is more likely to be expressed when there is sufficient situational ambiguity. Taken together, altering the identity of the communicator and the immigrants being discussed should alter participants' perceived psychological distance from both, which should alter audience responses to and perceptions of biased rhetoric. Responses should also be influenced by personal worldviews, prejudices, and identities.

2.3 White Supremacy in Mainstream Discourse

Now that we have discussed framing, group dynamics, and bias, let us examine the history of White supremacists using these tools to successfully repackage their image in the US. White supremacist groups promote narratives which portray them as victims (Moses, 2019). While it is unclear how much of their success is due to convincing optics versus audience sympathies with the core ideology, history provides many examples of White supremacy shaping mainstream discourse before and after it was politically dangerous. The substance never changed much, only the framing. White supremacy has been a been crucial component of state power in the US since the country's founding (Belew, 2018; Du Bois, 1935). White supremacy was

openly accepted in political speech and institutionally supported until political and social changes in the 1960's and 1970's gradually made it a liability (Zeskind, 2009). Prior to the Civil Rights act of 1963, many racist organizations viewed themselves as upholding the law included active and former law enforcement and military personnel (Belew, 2018; Katz, 1986). There was also massive support for White supremacy in popular media and science. In the massively popular 1915 film "Birth of a Nation" the KKK of the antebellum South were lionized as defenders of White womanhood against bestial, sex-crazed, Black men and conniving Northern carpetbaggers. In the words of President Woodrow Wilson: "It's like writing history with lightning. My only regret is that it is all so terribly true." During the first two eras of the KKK (the Reconstruction Era South and 1915-1944, respectively), the Klan's activities were so accepted by mainstream White society that lynching was a social event among respectable society (Eckstrand, 2018). Even being an openly pro-Nazi American during World War 2 was accepted until the US entered the conflict, to say nothing of the fact that US eugenics programs inspired the Final Solution (Zeskind, 2009; Levitas, 2002). White supremacy was also buoyed by junk science and the education system. Many pseudoscientific publications interpreted arbitrary and unreliable data in ways that justified the status quo under the guise of reason and objectivity (Menand, 2001). One example is deciding that cranium circumference is a reliable indicator of intelligence and recategorizing human skulls into different racial groups until the group of "White" skulls have the highest circumference[2] (Menand, 2001). In an environment so heavily dominated by the idea that White people are inherently superior, the framing around White supremacy could be blunt and apparent (Zeskind, 2009).

[2] In this example, prior to designation by the researcher, the race of the deceased was also unknown or unconfirmed more often than not.

Racial myths, including those reflected in the WGM, were on full display in popular media and often drove the plot. “Birth of a Nation” depicts White disenfranchisement, election tampering to benefit minorities, unqualified minorities being handed jobs, minorities refusing to assimilate to White standards of behavior, people of mixed race as degenerate and harmful to women, and a government conspiracy to punish White people. After the assassination of President Lincoln, punitive legislation meant to punish the South wass enacted and enforced by a government conspiracy. Claims included that black people stuff ballot boxes while preventing White people from voting, White women are driven to suicide to avoid the sexual advances of Black men, fraudulently elected Black politicians drink liquor on the job and act highly unprofessional, and the government enacts increasingly oppressive laws until the KKK is forced at act in self-defense, which ultimately results in armed KKK reinforcing the status quo of the antebellum South with voter intimidation. The KKK and their actions are depicted as heroic, a tragic necessity of the government trying to impose an unnatural order out of greed and vindictiveness.

Following the gains of the Civil Rights movement, pressure to suppress White supremacy increased, but the attitudes and infrastructure that had maintained White hegemony remained. By the late 60’s openly racist speech was a political liability and old methods of control (e.g. lynch mobs, Klan rallies) had lost a great deal of their mainstream legitimacy (Belew, 2018; Inwood, 2015; Zeskind, 2009). Existing class and race hierarchies had also been eroding since World War 2, and tensions were rising between working class White people and racial minorities (Inwood, 2015; Lassiter, 2006). Image and discourse management became critical to maintaining both hegemony and the appearance of neutrality and equality under the law (Dovidio, 2001; Dovidio et al., 2016; Futrell & Simi, 2017; Inwood, 2015; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Historically, White

hegemony in the US was protected by deriving social and economic benefits from racial subordination and disparity (Clarke & Thomas 2006; Inwood, 2015; Leong 2013; Mumm, 2017). The practice relied on and built consensus that the marginalized group was an acceptable target and encouraged discourse that demonizes victims for failing to thrive (Lipsitz 1998; Mumm, 2017). In essence, when the status quo is threatened, the dominant group will shift how it secures the benefits of group exploitation rather than move away from it. Slavery, a major source of agrarian labor, had been abolished in 1863 and the nearly as exploitative practice of sharecropping disappeared during the 1940's. This was replaced with a system where non-White workers had to be paid but had no guarantee of being paid the same as White workers. In 1964 racially discriminatory pay was outlawed with the Civil Rights Act. When Black Americans began to attain more legal protections and social mobility, the status quo was indeed threatened and many poor White Americans resented the progress and new economic competition (Zeskind, 2009). No matter how poor or disreputable a White person was, they could always look down on non-Whites (Zeskind, 2009). White supremacists characterized government intervention on behalf of racial minorities as betrayal by a system they had previously protected and supported (Belew; 2018, Zeskind, 2009).

As White supremacist activists and politicians looked for ways to reassert White dominance without getting into social or legal trouble, this rich vein of racist anger was exploited. In the 1960's, political strategist Kevin Philips predicted that conservative politicians would flourish by appealing to racist resentment among disaffected working-class White people (Brunn et al., 2011). They simply needed a new method for tapping into that resentment. When a group cannot use brute force to influence people, it may use framing to gain non-coercive power (Roselle et al., 2014). To this end, post-Civil Rights era racist political messaging pivoted away

from racial myths to logics of personal merit and accomplishment, effectively repackaging existing racial stereotypes and burying them in obfuscating language (Inwood, 2015).

> Dubbed "the Southern Strategy," this technique quickly proved to be extraordinarily successful at winning mainstream support for racist policy and is still popular to this day (Inwood, 2015; Johnson, 2012; Lassiter, 2006; Levitas, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2015; Zeskind, 2009). In essence, the Southern Strategy takes a bigoted narrative, focuses on traits associated with a stereotype instead of naming the demographic, and uses it to justify policy that disproportionately harms minorities. Lee Atwater, strategist for Ronald Reagan, described it in the following quote (author's edits). "In other words, you start out, you start out in 1954 by saying 'n****r, n****r, n****r,' [but] by 1968 you can't say n****r, that hurts you, backfires, so you say stuff like 'forced bussing,' 'states' rights,' and all that stuff. At this point, you're getting so abstract now, you're talking about cutting taxes, by this time you're talking about all these economic things, and the by-product of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites…" (Inwood, 2015)

The Southern Strategy effectively describes a framing strategy. Reframing the results of bigotry as personal failings and enacting racist policy through theoretically racially-neutral laws allowed bigots to claim that the outcomes of institutional oppression were the fault of victims while also ignoring institutional advantages heaped on beneficiaries (Inwood, 2015). The ambiguity and confusion caused by Southern Strategy-style rhetoric also allows outsiders to uphold White supremacy without having to endorse it or even consciously recognize it (Belew, 2018; Schafer et al., 2014; Simi & Futrell, 2010). People simply have to take the narrative at face value. The Southern Strategy was used to spin increased equality as losses of personal liberty and proof that White Americans are uniquely barred from self-advocating, playing directly into racist resentment against equality (Belew, 2018; Zeskind, 2009).

By indirectly tying race to broad economic concerns, conservatives were able to re-assert political power by rebranding White supremacy as class struggle (Inwood, 2015). Multivocal appeals were useful to this process. To many, the working class simply refers to anyone with a working-class job, but politically the term was specifically associated with conservative Irish,

Polish, and Italian working-class communities (Inwood, 2015). By associating the working class with Conservative Whites and progressivism with minorities and degenerates, progressivism could be rhetorically be positioned as oppositional to the working class, feeding Americans' sense that progressive policy harmed their financial security, opportunities, and status (Inwood, 2015; Zeskind, 2009; Levitas, 2002).

The Farm Crisis of the 1980's provides an example of White supremacist activists exploiting real grievances and framing it as something else to the public. The Farm Crisis was a time of tremendous hardship for American farmers, especially those who were minorities or owned small farms. Farmland had become the target of speculators, and the cost of land was soaring (Levitas, 2004; Shimoni-Stoil, 2022). Interest rates and the cost of oil increased, exports were decreasing, production was at record highs, and the amount of credit available to farmers had shrunk (Levitas, 2004). Many farmers had debt from land and equipment purchased on credit during more lucrative times, which only increased in severity as the crisis wore on. Farmers were forced to sell off assets to prevent foreclosure, but this only delayed the problem. Suicides skyrocketed as people lost farms that had been family-owned for generations. The complexity of the situation also meant that there was no clear solution or villain to blame. Many farmers came to believe that the government was allowing bankers to exploit them and some became suspicious of what help was available (Levitas, 2004; Shimoni-Stoil, 2022). White supremacist conspiracy theories found fertile ground in this bleak environment.

Anti-federalism and resentments against the financial system provided both opportunities and cover. The "Banker" label had been a multivocal appeal meaning "Jewish" long before the crisis and it was especially well-adapted for a situation like the Farm Crisis. Farmers were at the mercy of banks regardless of ideology. Consequently, the rhetoric of anti-racist farmers and

racist farmers was quite similar while carrying very different meanings. To be clear, White supremacists who assisted minorities during this time kept their motives and Klan memberships a secret. Because WGM positions Black people as the pawns of Jewish people, helping a Black person to harm those higher up in the conspiracy is ultimately in service of White supremacy. The practice of using temporary alliances with individual POC to further racist ends was even depicted in *The Turner Diaries*.[3] To an outside observer or a credulous local whom had only ever seen the public-facing propaganda, actions like this would make accusations of racism absurd.

There are farmers of every color and culture but many White supremacists revere agriculture as the embodiment of traditional White masculinity and self-sufficiency (Goldwag, 2012; Levitas, 2004). Consequently, White supremacists had a preexisting presence in US farm culture and knew how that political landscape operated. White supremacist groups privately met and plotted against minority farmers, their supporters, and non-White land ownership while publicly opposing egalitarianism from a cultural position (Goldwag, 2012; Levitas, 2004). This could be accomplished by simply basing objections to egalitarianism in arguments about losing tradition or honoring previous generations of farmers (Levitas, 2004). The corollary, that these groups also want to institutionally discourage non-White farm ownership, could be left unsaid or denied (Goldwag, 2012; Levitas, 2004). The occasional token gesture towards a Black farmer further helped with optics (Levitas, 2004).

White supremacists rebranded their group image as they did their policy. By the 80's many White supremacist leaders were encouraging followers to go to college, get a high status job, and persuade people to support policies that encourage White dominance in non-obvious ways (Futrell & Simi, 2017; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Groups that successfully frame themselves as

[3] A White supremacist insurrection rewards POC who assist them in running a Whites-only territory only to depose or execute them along with all the rest when they are no longer needed.

defenders of tradition, masculinity, motherhood, and community safety are still considered a valuable force for radicalizing outsiders and drumming up public support for policies rooted in white supremacist ideology (Kelly, 2017; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009). This façade would be very hard to sell if coming from someone covered in racist symbols, so it benefits White supremacist causes to appear normal (Goldwag, 2012; Levitas, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009). Many groups adopted relatively vague names to reduce out-group suspicions of racism, with varying degrees of success (Futrell & Simi, 2017; Goldwag, 2012; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009).

Prior to the Fair Housing Act, for example, White property owners could simply refuse to rent or sell housing to POC. After the act was passed, the people who would have previously refused to offer housing to people based on race instead insisted that people lived in the conditions they earned, ergo integration meant that minorities were taking housing that they did not deserve (Lassiter, 2006). Under this logic, ensuring fair and equitable housing to all was secondary to addressing White concerns about property values, fairness, and crime rates. In the 1970's this approach was also employed against desegregation bussing. Despite being rooted in anti-Black racism, anti-bussing political messaging often focused on concerns about crime rates in schools instead of being explicitly racist (Zeskind, 2009). One of the most notorious pro-segregation groups of the time, Restore Our Alienated Rights (ROAR) led by Louise Day Hicks, argued that bussing would take away parents' right to determine where their children attended school and the quality of those schools (Nutter, 2010). Hicks, a conservative and feminine mother from a working-class background, couched support for racial segregation in language about protecting womanhood and motherhood (Nutter, 2010). The unspoken implication was that Black students were a threat to both and a corrupting influence on the schools they attended,

calling back to older racist stereotypes and arguments against school desegregation. ROAR and similar organizations were functionally lobbying to block African-Americans from accessing equal educational opportunities, but the focus on individual freedoms left little opening for that discussion. This allowed people to support functionally racially segregated school systems while claiming to have no racial bias (Zeskind, 2009). If anything, segregation was portrayed as protecting families, neighborhoods, and schools (Zeskind, 2009).

During World War 2, the racist policy to place all Japanese-Americans in internment camps was openly supported with stereotypes about Asians being dishonest and sneaky. Racist propaganda from both World Wars depicted non-Americans and non-Whites as subhuman and many Americans were the targets of violence and crime. Racial othering was encouraged by state propaganda and legislation. Comparatively, refugees of the Vietnam War faced terrorism and violence from White power groups. Refugees from Vietnam were largely allies of the US whom had assisted in the war, yet domestic White supremacists slandered them as Viet Kong and organized campaigns of terror against them (Belew, 2018). Participants included members of the KKK, Vietnam veterans, anti-communist activists and local law enforcement, making it very difficult for victims to seek justice, even though their attacks were often framed as self-defense against communists (Belew, 2018). This effectively spun White supremacists as protective patriots, even as they attacked US allies and destroyed their property (Belew, 2018). Many Americans were anti-communist and viewed violence as an acceptable response to communism (Belew, 2018; Zeskind, 2009). Consequently, White supremacist violence against “communists” went largely unpunished and people were generally unwilling to question accounts of events from Vietnam veterans and local law enforcement (Belew, 2018; Zeskind, 2009). Images of communism had become enmeshed with images of invaders from Southeast Asia and Latin

America, but many White people were also assaulted, harassed, and killed for being "communists (Belew, 2018)." Realistically, anyone who annoyed or opposed enough White supremacists risked being branded a communist. The FBI itself adopted a policy of investigating incidents of far-right and White supremacist violence in isolation and discouraged attempts to find ties to a broader movement, allowing various White supremacist groups to terrorize victims with little federal intervention (Belew, 2018). This combination of White victims, dog whistles, powerful perpetrators, and political scapegoating made it dangerous and difficult to oppose White supremacist organizing.

The reframing of white supremacy is not fully a matter of changing rhetoric, it is also influenced by the beliefs and experiences of the people hearing these narratives. A person may believe several White supremacist myths without thinking of themselves, or even the myths, as a racist. They may view racist beliefs as "common sense" or justify them with non-racist reasons or simply ignore challenging evidence. When possible, they may point to minority members who have joined or benefitted from racist groups to dismiss deeper analysis of their beliefs. The uniformed Nazi, the tattooed racist skinhead, and the hooded Klansman are all real images of White supremacists but they are not the full spectrum of White supremacist presentation. Belief in White supremacy has unified White people across gender, class, education, religion, political factions, and geography and so a wide variety of fashions, symbols, and subcultures have formed (Belew, 2018; Johnson, 2012; Levitas, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009). When people rely on a narrow range of old stereotypes about White supremacists to identify and understand them, it leaves massive, exploitable, blind spots in their cognition. The concepts of group membership and how we treat different group members are related to nearly everything discussed in this dissertation. We must acknowledge that our responses to rhetoric about groups

are going to be influenced by our attitudes, beliefs, and relationships with them. When we are invited to view a group a certain way, preexisting knowledge of the group and what membership means is going to influence how much we trust that interpretation. If people respond to the rhetoric the same regardless of group it is applied to, that would indicate that respondents are not bringing racial or religious stereotypes into their judgements. If their answers vary by group, then these stereotypes are likely playing a role in participant interpretations.

The Alt-right prefers to style itself as disruptive intellectuals standing against both the left and establishment conservatives, dismissing accusations of racism as stupidity and virtue signaling (Eckstrand, 2018; Greene, 2019). They claim to want to halt immigration not out of hate but concern for the preservation of White culture and belief that different racial groups can never truly integrate. Identifying as alt-right provides more deniability of racial or religious bias than the label "white nationalist" though both ideologies are based on believing in White superiority (Althouse & Anderson, 2018; Eckstrand, 2018; Kelly, 2017). Maintaining White cultural dominance is central to the alt-right and many members of that movement have ties with other White supremacist ideologies (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017). The alt-right's language is typically couched in discourse relating to culture and traditional ideas of masculinity (Kelly, 2017). Even so, the alt-right is philosophically and tactically like the Ku Klux Klan; differing mainly in the alt-right's hesitancy to admit to racial bias and tendency to prefer internet harassment over real life intimidation (Catsam, 2018; Eckstrand, 2018). The movement also lacks a unified political ideology and frequently communicates via memes, adding an obscuring layer of irony and humor to their rhetoric (Althouse & Anderson, 2018; Kelly, 2017; Greene, 2019). This allows them to deflect accusations of racism by claiming that it was all just a joke (Kelly, 2017; Greene, 2019).

"Patriot" White supremacist groups often lionize veterans and seek them as members, even though the overwhelming majority of veterans have and want nothing to do with these groups (Belew, 2018). Similar to describing racist policies as "common sense" this is by design, as criticism of white supremacists who label themselves as patriots can be easily redirected and misconstrued as criticism of non-racist patriots and the concept of patriotism itself (Johnson, 2012; Levitas, 2004; Zeskind, 2009). Given the strong association between patriotism and the military, speaking out against specific white supremacist patriot groups, even when care is taken to clarify exactly who is being targeted for criticism and why, is extremely politically dangerous and can result in tremendous backlash (Johnson, 2012).

Stereotypes create illusory links between groups and behaviors, making them an important part of Southern Strategy-style rhetoric. If a person equates Muslim with "terrorist" and Latino with "illegal," referencing illegals and terrorists should be sufficient to bring those groups into a person's awareness and vice versa. This leads us to ask: how do we acquire stereotypes and how do they manifest in our thinking and judgments?

3 STUDY

The past two chapters have outlined factors which I believe are critical to explaining how White supremacists can promote WGM in mainstream immigration discourse: framing, source credibility, group identity, and bias. I posit that these factors all work in tandem to produce a sort of cognitive slight of hand. If the language is not quite hateful, if the source does not openly signal a bigoted ideology, and if the rhetoric appeals to beliefs and stereotypes already held by the audience, it seems to me that people should be more likely to agree with arguments derived from WGM and less likely to be suspicious of the person making the argument.

5.1 Hypotheses

As I have previously established, perceptions of homophily influence perceptions of a source's credibility (Burrows et al., 2000; McCroskey & Richmond, 1996). Source credibility can be understood as a source's desire and capability to provide accurate information (Hu & Sundar, 2010; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; McCroskey & Richmond, 1996). Source credibility influences audience responses to messaging and can enhance the effects of framing (Benford & Snow, 2000; Hu & Sundar, 2010; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Tormala & Clarkson, 2007). People are also more trusting of people like ourselves and more likely to make excuses for their negative choices and behaviors (Ross, 1977; Weisel & Zultan, 2016). If we believe messages from in-group members more readily than those from out-group members, anti-immigrant messaging should seem more accurate if the reader feels high homophily with the speaker. Since we our motivated to see ourselves as accurate and unbiased, I posit that people will tend to perceive a source as more credible the higher homophily they feel with it. Considering this, also I predict that messaging derived from WGM will seem more plausible if it comes from people who remind us of ourselves. Taken together, I expect that a speaker who is more relatable will be

perceived as more credible, and participant agreement will be reflected in perceptions of source credibility. If correct, they will demonstrate a vulnerability to WGM messaging that may be independent of personal beliefs and knowledge. I tested this with two hypotheses.

H1a: Homophily will be positively correlated with source credibility.

H1b: Source credibility will be positively correlated with agreement.

By their admission, the purpose of White supremacists softening their language and image is to drum up political support and to ease potential recruits into the ideology (Inwood, 2015; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009). White supremacists acknowledge that openly identifying as a racist will result in rejection and discreditation, leading those who seek mainstream acceptance to identify with groups that are not necessarily strictly white, much less white supremacist (Futrell & Simi, 2017; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009). White supremacists also expect explicit expressions of bigotry to repel mainstream society (Miller-Idriss, 2019; Simi & Futrell, 2010). To counter this, many racist groups and ideologies encourage members to focus their messaging on mainstream topics and values which can apply to members of any race or religion, such as self-defense, independence, fairness, parental rights, masculinity, common sense, and merit (Inwood, 2015; Miller-Idriss, 2019; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Zeskind, 2009).

If a person claims a White supremacist identity, people can be expected to infer several other beliefs and traits from that. If they claim an apparently neutral identity, this preemptive judgement likely will not happen. If it is not obvious that a person is a White supremacist, good faith assumptions may prevent people from noticing or interrogating problematic messaging

(Miller-Idriss, 2019). In light of the success of these methods, such as the Southern Strategy framing anti-blackness as states' rights, the alt-right posturing as cynical intellectuals, and Proud Boys identifying as a pro-Western and pro-man drinking club, I predict that:

H2a: A covert White supremacist will be perceived as more credible than an overt White supremacist.

H2b: Participants will agree with a covert White supremacist more than an overt White supremacist.

H2c: Participants will agree with an ambiguous tone more than an explicitly negative tone.

Symbolic bias tends to be expressed via political opinions and aversive prejudice tends to be expressed in ambiguous situations (Dovidio et al., 2016; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Pearson et al., 2009; Sears & Henry, 2005). People who support mainstreamed White supremacist rhetoric often claim that their positions are driven by neutral concerns rather than bigotry. If that concern really is unrelated to demographics, support should be similar if the rhetoric is applied to different groups. However, because these "neutral" concerns are often paired with racialized policy and justified with logics of White supremacy, I predict that:

H3a: Participants' agreement with WGM rhetoric will be influenced by the identity of potential immigrants.

H3b: The correlation between agreement with WGM rhetoric and symbolic anti-immigrant bias will stronger than the correlation between agreement and explicit anti-immigrant bias.

H3c: Participants who score high on implicit bias and low on explicit bias will be most likely to agree with WGM rhetoric when it is presented by a covert White supremacist.

5.2 First Pilot Study

I determined that a conjoint design a would be a natural fit. The strength of a conjoint design lies in the fact that, when analyzing the effects of a specific independent variable, other independent variables can be used as controls. This allows researchers to easily see the effects of a factor overall and between several different conditions while controlling for other factors' influence. My plan was to design vignettes with different tones and add in additional information about the target and source later. Creating different combinations of tone, target, and source would create my conditions.

The first pilot (Appendix A.1) was designed to identify appropriate White supremacist identities, locations which were strongly associated with the required demographics, and determine whether two vignettes were evoking different reactions from participants. The rhetoric this study seeks to mimic often avoids explicit bigotry, so the materials would need to imply certain things without explicitly stating them. I needed to determine which countries would indirectly signal Latino, Muslim, and White identity. When people know where a person is from, they will fill in unknown details about that individual based on what they know about the demographics of that country or region (Avdan & Webb, 2019). If the rhetoric was directed at a country instead of a demographic, it provides plausible deniability of bigotry because even

highly homogenous countries have some diversity and all countries engaged in objectional practices. I also needed a pair of White supremacist identities which signal that identity but not to the same degree. Third, I needed to ensure that the vignettes had significantly different tones, one explicitly negative and the other ambiguous.

3.2.1 Participants

A total of 620 participants were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Participation in this pilot, and all future pilots, was restricted to people from the US who also currently reside in the US. This was to help minimize personal investment in immigration policy among participants and ensure a degree of familiarity with recent immigration discourse in the US. After filtering out participants who did not finish, did not meet the inclusion criteria, reported being under 18 or earned a reCAPTCHA score lower than 0.7, 542 participants remained.[4] Of these 542 remaining participants, 25 (4.6%) were 18 -24, 204 (37.6%) were 25 – 34, 171 (31.5%) were 35 – 44, 73 (13.5%) were 45 – 54, 56 (10.3%) 55 – 64, 12 (2.2%) were 65 – 74, 1 person was (0.2%) was between 75 – 84, and none were 85 or older.

3.2.2 Materials

The initial pilot survey (Appendix A) had a simple 1X1X2 design. Participants were asked to identify and rate terms which could denote White supremacy, rate the likelihood of a citizen of a specific country belonging to a certain demographic, and respond to one of two vignettes. Answers were scored on a five-point Likert scale with a neutral midpoint (5 = extremely likely, 1 = extremely unlikely). The locations for Muslims were the Middle East, Iraq, and Syria. The locations for White people were Europe, England, and Armenia. The locations for

[4] A reCAPTCHA score is a value ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 which indicates the likelihood that a respondent was a bot. While the standard is 0.5, I increased it to 0.7 due to the immediate monetary rewards likely motivating scammers to use more sophisticated bots.

Latinos were South America, Mexico, and Venezuela. The purpose of this was to determine which countries would be most likely to activate beliefs and attitudes about the demographic without explicitly referencing them, thus providing a layer of ambiguity and room for participants to justify away any feelings of bias.

Participants were asked to read one of two vignettes and share their honest opinion about the tone of the text on a five-point Likert scale with a neutral midpoint (5 = extremely positive, 1 = extremely negative). Both vignettes draw from WGM and ultimately make the same argument. The US should stop accepting immigrants due to bad actors. Terrorism, violence, and drugs are given as specific concerns. The vignette ends in an expression of disapproval for how immigrants impact local culture, impact the electorate, and drain resources from citizens. The negative vignette is slightly longer because it includes hostile language patterned off xenophobic language found in mainstream media. While both tacitly accept WGM, the negative vignette specifically identifies immigrants as willing cheats and malefactors whereas the neutral vignette places less emphasis on immigrants as people and more on concern with the threats. The negative vignette is as followsI have several reasons why I think the US should stop accepting immigrants. People are surging over here and some of them do not have the US' best interest at heart. We have to be wary of terror threats that immigrants bring along with them. And then there's all the violence and drugs that their friends bring in. Beyond that, people from other cultures bring their own values here and I can barely even recognize my neighborhood anymore. They won't learn our culture. I don't like it and I miss how it was before they came over here. I worry about how they'll vote too. Who's to say they won't try to implement their laws over here? Finally, we just can't support everyone and their deadbeat families.The ambiguous vignette is as follows:

> I have several reasons why I think the US should stop accepting immigrants. People are coming over here and some of them do not have the US' best interest at heart. We have to be wary of terror threats. And then there's all the violence and drugs. Beyond that, people from other cultures bring their own values here. They don't learn our culture. I don't like it. I worry about how they'll vote too. Finally, we just can't support everyone.

Both vignettes apply similar emphasis framing by drawing the audience's attention to potential threats posed by immigrants, thus drawing attention away from the humanity of immigrants and the benefits they bring to their host countries. The negative vignette also makes greater use of symbolic frames, which construct and reinforce group identity. Immigrants are deadbeats and friends with criminals in this explcit condition, while the ambiguous vignette mentions that drugs and crime are problems to consider and laments that "we just can't support everyone." My intent was for the negative vignette to read as coming from someone who dislikes immigrants as people and for the ambiguous vignette to seem more concerned with larger issues than with the character of immigrants themselves. Both are quite xenophobic but I had hoped that the ambiguous condition would be interpreted as less so. The vignette was accompanied by a five-point Likert-style scale item asking participants to rate the tone of the text (5 = extremely positive, 1 = extremely negative).

To help me select appropriate identities, I compiled a list of identities, mostly those used by the far-right, with the accompanying instruction for the participant to check off each term they recognized. I also programmed an associated block of questions which displayed the recognized identities and asked participants to rate how likely it is it that a person self-applying that term is a white supremacist (5 = extremely likely, 1 = extremely unlikely). The only demographic measures I collected were age and whether the participant was born in and currently living in the US. All survey materials were made with Qualtrics.

3.2.3 Procedure

The survey was distributed on Amazon's Mechanical Turk on January 25th, 2021. All 542 participants were born in the US and resided there at the time of the survey. After consenting to participate in the survey, participants answered the blocks of questions on demographics, associations between groups and locations, identities, and the vignettes in a randomized order. Participants were randomly selected into one of the two tone conditions. After these blocks were completed, participants filled out the block of questions regarding identities they had reported recognizing. Participants were compensated fifty cents for their time.

3.2.4 Results

Of the 542 participants who met all inclusion criteria, the number respondents who reported recognizing each identity were, in descending order, 316 (58.3%) for White nationalist, 306 (56.5%) for patriot, 291 (53.7%) for extreme right, 282 (52%) for neo-Nazi, 272 (50.2%) for antifa, 265 (48.9%) for Christian identity, 261 (48.2%) for alt-right, 259 (47.8%) for skinhead, 235 (43.4%) for militia leader, 226 (41.7%) for White feminist, 225 (41.5%) for White separatist, 174 (32.1%) for sovereign citizen, 122 (22.5%) for neo-confederate, 118 (21.8%) for red pilled, 99 (18.3%) for racial realist, 93 (17.2%) for kluxer, 87 (16.1%) for neo-paganism, 84 (15.5%) for ecofascist, 79 (14.6%) for trans-exclusionary radical feminist (TERF), 75 (13.8%) for alt-lite, 69 (12.7%) for dissident right, 63 (11.6%) for accelerationist, 62 (11.4%) for paleoconservative, 59 (10.9%) for identitarian, and 37 (6.8%) for klangus priesthood. Conveniently, the two most recognized identities were both real and represented both overt and covert White supremacist identities. A paired samples t-test, i.e., a parametric test designed to detect differences in means between variables taken from the subject, revealed that participants perceived that a White nationalist (M = 4.33, SD = 1.086) and a patriot (M = 3.35, SD = 1.32) had significantly

different likelihoods of being a White supremacist ($t(231) = 12.085$, $p < .001$). In essence, a White nationalist was rated as likely to be a White supremacist whereas the patriot was rated neither likely nor unlikely to be one. A full list of the identities and their respective likelihoods of being White supremacist can be found in Table 1.

Table 1 Likelihood of being a White supremacist

Label	*M*	*SD*
White Nationalist	4.33	1.09
Neo-Nazi	4.33	1.12
Skinhead	4.32	1.12
Kluxer	4.28	1.06
White Separatist	4.1	1.19
Neo-Confederate	3.99	1.2
Extreme Right	3.83	1.3
Klangus Priesthood	3.81	1.05
Alt-Right	3.71	1.31
Identitarian	3.61	1.11
Racial Realist	3.49	1.24
Red Pilled	3.47	1.24
Militia Leader	3.46	1.17
Christian Identity	3.4	1.29
Dissident Right	3.39	1.22
Accelerationist	3.37	1.21
Patriot	3.35	1.32
Alt-Lite	3.32	1.35
Sovereign Citizen	3.26	1.2
White Feminist	3.22	1.32
Paleoconservative	3.16	1.38
Neo-Paganism	3.03	1.27
Ecofascist	2.81	1.33
TERF	2.73	1.2
Antifa	2.57	1.48

The distribution of scores is also notably different between responses to the patriot and White nationalist identities. Of the 316 participants who reported recognizing the term, 197 said

they were extremely likely to be a white supremacist and another 68 rated them as somewhat likely. Compare this to the patriot, who was rated as extremely likely by 67 of 306 participants and somewhat likely by 90. More than half of participants rated the patriot unlikely or neither likely nor unlikely to be a White supremacist whereas more than half of participants rated the White nationalist as extremely likely. Table 2 contains information on the raw score distributions. I therefore decided to use White nationalist as the overt identity and the patriot as the covert identity.

Table 2. White supremacist identity score distribution

Label	Extremely likely	Somewhat likely	Neither likely nor unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Extremely unlikely
White Nationalist	197	68	22	15	14
Neo-Nazi	186	44	25	14	13
Skinhead	166	48	22	9	14
Kluxer	56	18	9	9	1
White Separatist	117	53	31	9	15
Neo-Confederate	56	33	16	10	7
Extreme Right	115	90	36	21	29
Klangus Priesthood	11	14	6	6	0
Alt-Right	92	79	39	24	27
Identitarian	13	23	13	7	3
Racial Realist	27	24	26	15	7
Red Pilled	25	41	30	8	14
Militia Leader	50	72	67	28	18
Christian Identity	60	83	58	32	32
Dissident Right	14	22	15	13	5
Accelerationist	13	16	21	7	6
Patriot	67	90	77	26	46
Alt-Lite	17	21	17	9	11
Sovereign Citizen	29	48	55	24	18
White Feminist	44	64	47	40	31
Paleoconservative	12	17	13	9	11
Neo-Paganism	12	22	23	17	13
Ecofascist	11	16	21	18	18

TERF	7	14	22	23	13
Antifa	40	45	43	47	97

Based on the relatively low recognition rates for all terms, it seems possible that the question (“Please select all terms you recognize") was misinterpreted by participants and they may have instead selected groups which they see as a problem or threat. If that is the case though and participants did interpret the question as “who do you see as a threat?” the finding is still valid.

As for associations between demographics and area of origin, found in Table 3, participants overall assigned a high degree of likelihood to all locations. The highest average associations were Mexico for Latinos (*M* = 4.23, *SD* = .946), Iraq for Muslims (*M* = 4.14, *SD* = .965), and England for White people (*M* = 4.23, *SD* = .815).

Table 3. Demographic likelihood by location

Group	Location	*M*	*SD*
Latino	Mexico	4.23	0.95
	South America	4.05	1.05
	Venezuela	4.19	0.98
Muslim	Iraq	4.14	0.97
	Middle East	4.03	0.94
	Syria	4.08	0.91
White	Armenia	3.78	1.00
	England	4.23	0.82
	Europe	4.17	0.83

Because each of the participants were only shown one vignette condition, their responses to it were analyzed with an independent samples t-test, which is a parametric test designed to detect whether there is a significant difference between the means of two independent populations. Participants’ did not respond significantly differently ($t(540) = -.105$, $p = ns$) to the ambiguous (*M* = 2.617, *SD* = 1.5) and the negative vignette conditions (*M* = 2.631, *SD* = 1.563).

5.3 Second Pilot Study

I drafted another pilot study to test whether a new set of vignettes would be perceived appropriately. Again, one was designed to be negative whereas the other was designed to be more ambiguous. I decided to keep the core arguments the same and focused on trying to evoke different tones, tone being central to H2c.

3.3.1 Participants

I recruited 630 participants from MTurk. Participants whom had taken the previous pilot were categorically excluded. After screening out people who did not finish, were not citizens, failed to identify the group discussed in the vignette, or received a reCAPTCHA score lower than 0.7, 390 participants remained. Of these 390 remaining participants, 19 (4.9%) were 18 -24, 176 (45.1%) were 25 – 34, 106 (27.2%) were 35 – 44, 47 (12.1%) were 45 – 54, 29 (7.4%) 55 – 64, 11 (2.8%) were 65 – 74, 2 (0.5%) were between 75 – 84, and none were 85 or older.

3.3.2 Materials

In the second pilot study (Appendix B), I made another attempt to create vignettes which would be perceived as negative and ambiguous, respectively, which would allow me to test H2c. Both vignettes argue that immigration should be shut down because it brings terrorism, drugs, crime, election tampering and freeloaders who will not assimilate to US culture. To help differentiate them, I decided to make the negative vignette focused on immigrants as a threatening out-group, whereas the ambiguous vignette focuses on Americans as a positive in-group, deserving of protection and high standards. The negative vignette reads:

> Honestly, I support shutting down immigration. We need to focus on fixing our broken borders and stopping the drugs and violence surging into our communities. Any of the people coming here could even be potential terrorist sympathizers too. I also wish folks who've crossed the border would act like they live here. I don't understand why they should get the right to vote when they don't understand what

> citizens here want. The tax burden is also an issue. We don't have infinite money to support everyone who wants a handout.

The ambiguous vignette reads.:

> Honestly, I support shutting down immigration. We need to focus on attracting only the cream of the crop and preventing drugs and violence from coming into our communities. Some of the people coming here could even be potential terrorist sympathizers too. I also wish folks who've crossed the border would try to see our perspective on a lot of things. I don't understand why they should get the right to vote when so many people who were born here can't. The tax burden is also an issue. We don't have infinite money to support everyone who wants to come here.

These vignettes are followed by three five-point Likert scale items meant to measure participants' perceptions of the speaker: whether they seem to feel positive or negative about the group they were discussing (5 = extremely positive, 1 = extremely negative), how heavily they relied on facts to construct their opinion, and how heavily they relied on stereotypes to construct their opinion (responses to both items ranged from a 5 = great deal to 1 = none at all). The items regarding reliance of facts and stereotypes were my initial attempt to develop a measure of source credibility. Participants were also asked for their age, whether they were a U.S. citizen, and an attention task which required them to identify whether the vignette they had read was about immigrants, pregnant women, or unemployed people. All survey materials were made with Qualtrics.

3.3.3 Procedure

The survey was distributed on Amazon's Mechanical Turk on April 6th, 2021. After consenting to the study, participants were randomly sorted into either the negative or ambiguous vignette condition. Of the participants who finished the survey, correctly identified the target of the vignette, and reported being U.S. citizens, 207 completed the ambiguous condition and 183

completed the negative condition. Participants were compensated five cents for successful completion of the survey.

3.3.4 Results

Once again, an independent samples t-test showed that the ambiguous (M = 2.546, SD = 1.547) and negative (M = 2.399, SD = 1.452) conditions did not evoke significantly different reactions from participants ($t(388) = .963$, $p = .079$). Regarding perceived reliance on stereotypes, another independent samples t-test showed that the ambiguous (M = 3.918, SD = 1.131) and negative (M = 3.667, SD = 1.109) conditions did not evoke significantly different reactions from participants ($t(385) = 2.199$, $p = .84$). Another independent samples t-test looking at difference in perceptions of reliance on facts showed that the ambiguous (M = 2.932, SD = 1.385) and negative (M = 2.811, SD = 1.319) conditions did not evoke significantly different reactions from participants ($t(385) = .878.$, $p = .441$).

5.4 Third Pilot Study

Still in need of appropriate vignettes, I drafted a third pilot. This time I decided to increase the number of vignette conditions and increase the complexity of the messaging.

3.4.1 Participants

I recruited 865 participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Participants whom had taken either of the previous pilots were categorically excluded. Screening out people who did not finish, were not citizens, failed to identify the group discussed in the vignette, or received a reCAPTCHA score lower than 0.7, left me with 611 participants. Of these remaining participants, 38 (6.2%) were 18 -24, 259 (42.4%) were 25 – 34, 165 (27%) were 35 – 44, 76 (12.4%) were 45 – 54, 48 (7.9%) 55 – 64, 24 (3.9%) were 65 – 74, 1 person was (0.2%) was between 75 – 84, and none were 85 or older.

3.4.2 Materials

For the third pilot (Appendix C), I drafted four vignettes with a 2X2 design: the vignettes were either symbolically biased or explicitly hostile and focused on either praising an in-group (US citizens) or denigrating an out-group (immigrants). Participants were asked to rate how the speaker felt about the group they were discussing (5 = extremely positive, 1 = extremely negative) and the degree to which the speaker had based their argument on facts and stereotypes, respectively (5 = a great deal to 1 = none at all). The out-group focused and overtly hostile vignette is as follows:

> I think we need to shut down immigration entirely to fix our illegal immigrant problem. We now have to worry about our borders because of terrorists. If outsiders want to be here then they should stop whining about discrimination and follow the rules. We don't need more criminals and drug dealers here and we definitely don't need them voting. If those folks want to thrive in the US, they can try some hard work instead of whatever it is they do back home. I don't like parasites. I am not happy about my tax dollars supporting cheaters and their families.

The in-group focused and overtly hostile vignette is as follows:

> I think we need to shut down immigration entirely to fix our illegal immigrant problem. The rules are in place to protect us from terrorists. If that's discrimination, what do you call Americans living in fear for the benefit of cheaters? We deserve to be protected from drug dealers, criminals, and election fraud. Americans are a cut above the rest and we need to protect them instead of stooping to match the rest of the world. I don't seeing people leech off hardworking Americans. I'd much rather spend my taxes on folks who are actually making an effort to fit in.

The out-group focused and symbolically biased vignette is as follows:

> I support shutting down immigration entirely until we can get illegal immigration under control. We have to maintain high standards at our borders to keep out terror threats. I hear people talking about how we're discriminating by doing that but it's 2021. We're all equal under the law now. Besides that, drugs and crime

> are flooding into our communities. I worry about how it will affect elections. Folks need to work hard if they want to thrive in America, not just show up asking for a hand out. It's not fair that people who didn't follow the rules can make demands. Why should my taxes go to supporting line jumping?
>
> The in-group focused and symbolically biased vignette is as follows:
>
> I support shutting down immigration entirely until we can get illegal immigration under control. We have to maintain high standards at our borders to protect ourselves from terrorists. I know that, historically, we've made some mistakes with how we treat people but it's 2021. We're all equal in the eyes of US law. Besides that, we have to everything we can to prevent drugs and crime from harming our communities and elections. American values are a cut above the rest and we need to protect them even if some people say it's wrong. We thrive because we work hard. Do that and you'll never need a handout. People who only take what they earn should be the only folks making demands. We've got to take care of the folks who are already here legally first.

I suspected that the largest differences would appear between the symbolically biased vignette focused on protecting US citizens and the overtly hostile vignette focused on denigrating immigrants. To ensure that participants had read the vignette, they were asked to recall whether it had been about immigrants, pregnant women, or unemployed people. To ensure that they fit the inclusion criteria, as they had affirmed in the act of signing the consent form, participants were asked whether they were born in and currently living in the US. Participants' ages were also collected. All survey materials were made with Qualtrics.

3.4.3 Procedure

The survey was distributed on Amazon's Mechanical Turk on September 21st, 2021. After giving consent to participate, which included affirming that the participant was a US citizen who resided in the US at the time of taking the study, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four vignette conditions. Participants were compensated five cents for their time.

3.4.4 Results

A one-way ANOVA revealed that the conditions did significantly impact the perceived tone ($F(3, 607) = 5.835$, $p < .001$). Tukey's post hoc test revealed that participants in the in-group focused and symbolically biased condition ($M = 3.05$, $SD = 1.522$) perceived the tone as significantly more positive than participants in both the out-group focused and hostile condition ($M = 2.41$, $SD = 1.562$, $p = .001$) and the in-group focused hostile condition ($M = 2.44$, $SD = 1.55$, $p = .002$). All other pairwise comparisons were not significant (see Table 4). Based on these findings, I selected the out-group focused and hostile vignette as my negative condition and the in-group focused and symbolically biased vignette as my ambiguous condition.

Table 4 One-way ANOVA of Condition X Tone

(I) Condition	(J) Condition	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
OutEx	InEx	-.026	0.171	.999	-.47	0.44
	OutSym	-.263	0.173	.427	-.71	0.20
	InSym	-.633*	0.172	.001	-1.07	-0.18
InEx	OutEx	.026	0.171	.999	-.41	0.47
	OutSym	-.237	0.173	.519	-.68	0.21
	InSym	-.607*	0.172	.002	-1.05	-0.16
OutSym	OutEx	.263	0.173	.427	-.18	0.72
	InEx	.237	0.173	.519	-.21	0.70
	InSym	-.370	0.174	.144	-.82	0.09
InSym	OutEx	.633*	0.172	.001	.19	1.09
	InEx	.607*	0.172	.002	.17	1.07
	OutSym	.370	0.174	.144	-.08	0.83
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.						

A one-way ANOVA revealed that perceptions of reliance on facts did significantly differ between conditions ($F(3, 607) = 3.552$, $p = .14$) but Tukey's post hoc test did not show any

significant differences between groups (see Table 5). The significant ANOVA and insignificant post hoc test indicate that there are significant differences between two or more groups but I cannot confidently state which groups have the differences

Table 5 Effect of Condition on Perception of Reliance on Facts Post Hoc Tests

(I) Condition	(J) Condition	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
OutEx	InEx	-0.026	0.151	0.998	-0.415	0.364
	OutSym	-0.351	0.153	0.100	-0.745	0.043
	InSym	-0.375	0.152	0.065	-0.766	0.015
InEx	OutEx	0.026	0.151	0.998	-0.364	0.415
	OutSym	-0.326	0.153	0.145	-0.720	0.068
	InSym	-0.350	0.152	0.098	-0.740	0.041
OutSym	OutEx	0.351	0.153	0.100	-0.043	0.745
	InEx	0.326	0.153	0.145	-0.068	0.720
	InSym	-0.024	0.153	0.999	-0.419	0.371
InSym	OutEx	0.375	0.152	0.065	-0.015	0.766
	InEx	0.350	0.152	0.098	-0.041	0.740
	OutSym	0.024	0.153	0.999	-0.371	0.419
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.						

A one-way ANOVA of revealed that differences were not significant between groups ($F(3, 604) = 1.32$, $p = .267$). Tukey's post hoc test also did not detect any significant difference between groups (see Table 6).

Table 6 Effect of Condition on Perception of Reliance on Stereotypes Post hoc Tests

(I) Condition	(J) Condition	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
OutEx	InEx	-0.040	0.130	0.990	-0.375	0.295
	OutSym	0.201	0.132	0.424	-0.139	0.540
	InSym	0.092	0.130	0.897	-0.245	0.428
InEx	OutEx	0.040	0.130	0.990	-0.295	0.375
	OutSym	0.241	0.131	0.260	-0.098	0.579
	InSym	0.131	0.130	0.744	-0.204	0.466
OutSym	OutEx	-0.201	0.132	0.424	-0.540	0.139

	InEx	-0.241	0.131	0.260	-0.579	0.098
	InSym	-0.109	0.132	0.841	-0.449	0.230
InSym	OutEx	-0.092	0.130	0.897	-0.428	0.245
	InEx	-0.131	0.130	0.744	-0.466	0.204
	OutSym	0.109	0.132	0.841	-0.230	0.449
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.						

These pilot vignettes did not include a speaker or immigrant identity, so they can also act as a baseline against which I can compare the results of the main study. At this point, I was satisfied with the results of the pilot and so decided to move onto my dissertation experiment.

5.5 Final Study

3.5.1 Participants

Dynata recruited 1646 participants. Their responses were included if they finished the survey, achieved a reCAPTCHA score of 0.7 or higher, affirmed that they were a US citizen, and affirmed that they were not an immigrant. Of the 1137 participants who met those criteria, 535 (47.1%) were men, 597 (52.5%) were women, 2 (0.2%) were other, and 3 (0.3%) preferred not to say. As for their racial makeup 570 (50.1%) identified as White, 223 (19.6%) as Black, 114 (10%) as mixed race, 99 (8.7%) as Asian, 61 (5.4%) as Latino, 28 (2.5%) as Indigenous American, 8 (0.7%) as Pacific Islander, 2 (0.2%) as Arab, 12 (1.1%) as unsure, and 20 (1.8%) preferred not to say. When asked if they were raised by immigrants, 901 (79.2%) were not,119 (10.5%) were raised by at least one immigrant but not exclusively, and 117 (10.3%) were raised exclusively by immigrants. Politically, 450 (39.6%) were Democrats, 229 (20.1%) were Republicans, 287 (25.2%) were Independents, 120 (10.6%) claimed no affiliation, 22 (1.9%) were other, and 29 (2.6%) preferred not to say.

3.5.2 Materials

This study uses a 3X2X2 experimental design, making a total of twelve distinct vignettes (see Table 7). The tone conditions incorporated group focus; the negative tone focusing on the flaws of immigrants whereas the ambiguous tone focused on the potential harm done to citizens. Both conveyed the message that immigrants were bad for America but the latter obfuscated this by focusing on potential harm to citizens. The ambiguous vignette was meant to mimic the implicitly biased rhetoric used to mainstream White supremacy whereas the negative vignette was designed to more resemble explicit White supremacy. The vignette depicted a speaker voicing opposition to immigration into the United States by making arguments rooted in the WGM. Participants were asked to judge whether the speaker liked immigrants, if they agreed with the vignette, rate whether the person delivering the rhetoric was like themselves, and whether they agreed that the source was relying on facts. The speaker's identity was referenced at the end to activate participants' stereotypes about the immigrant group independent of and before stereotypes about the speaker's group identity. Source credibility only influences confidence when it follows a persuasive message (Briñol et al., 2002). When it come before a message, other mechanisms influence its persuasive power, such as bias or preemptively deciding how much scrutiny to apply (Briñol et al., 2002). The tactic being examined was designed to distract from that identity so participants should be thinking about their opinions regarding the immigrant group before discovering the identity of the speaker. Each condition began with the speaker referencing immigrants from Mexico, Iraq or England and ends by self-identifying as a white nationalist or a patriot.

Table 7 Experimental Design

Immigrants	Tone	Speaker Identity

Muslim (Iraq)	Ambiguous: Focused on behavior and promoting in-group	Covert (Patriot)
Latino (Mexico)		
	Negative: Focused on people and denigrating out-group	Overt (White Nationalist)
White (England)		

I included some control variables to help account for the way WGM rhetoric taps into genuine fears about real disease, terrorism, and crime. Discussion about immigration in mainstream discourse often focuses on illegal immigration, which can activate people's negative feelings around law-breaking and cheating. To control for this, participants indicated how much illegal immigration concerns them (5 = a great deal, 1 = not at all). This study was also run in a post-COVID-19 world and some portion of participants would doubtlessly be traumatized or materially impacted by the disease. Negative experiences with COVID-19 could potentially make some people potentially more susceptible to agreeing with the vignette without endorsing the sentiments used to support the claim that the US should shut down immigration. To control the impact of fear of COVID-19, participants indicated their agreement (5 = definitely yes, 1 = definitely no) with the statement "immigrants are disproportionately responsible for the spread of COVID-19." As Chapter 1 revealed, terrorism is often depicted as an outside threat. Some participants may have internalized media depictions of terrorism with necessarily consciously endorsing the stereotypes and biases which underpin them. To control for participants' fear of terrorism, they finished the following statement (5 = extremely, 1 = not): "I am _____ worried about terrorist attacks happening the in the US."

Surely some readers will have realized that people who endorse WGM without irony and fearful people who lack a political agenda would likely answer all of these control variables similarly, although for different reasons. They therefore should significantly differ on measures of bias against immigrants. The Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SR2S) was adapted to measure attitudes about immigrants instead of African Americans (one item that references chattel slavery was removed for not being applicable) and included as a measure of symbolic bias (Henry & Sears, 2002). To measure explicit bias against immigrants, the Negative Attitudes towards Immigration Scale (NATIS) was included (Varela et al., 2013). The adapted SR2S and NATIS scales can be found in Appendix D.2. Including measures of explicit and implicit bias is permissible within the same model because, while not totally unrelated to one another, they do measure distinct constructs (Buckler, 2009). Unlike measures of explicit bias, implicit bias measures are not sensitive to the respondent's age, education level, gender, or political affiliation (Greenwald & Krieger, 2006). Symbolic prejudice also seems to affect different racial groups equally (Buckler, et al., 2009), making the SRS a valid measure of bias in a racially diverse sample. Nearly every item was scored on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Extremely negative/not at all, 5 = extremely positive/absolutely). All survey materials were made with Qualtrics.

3.5.3 Procedure

The survey was distributed by Dynata on November 5th, 2021. Participants were randomly sorted into one of the vignette conditions, which varied by target (Muslims, Latinx, or White Europeans) and/or source (a White nationalist or a patriot), and tone (negative or ambiguous). All blocks of questions were presented in randomized order, as were the items within those blocks.

4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

4.1 Main Findings

H1a: Homophily will be positively correlated with source credibility.

I used partial correlations instead of Pearson correlations to explore this data because the former can factor in covariates whereas the latter cannot. A partial correlation controlling for concern about illegal immigration, immigrants' perceived blame for COVID, and concern about terrorism revealed a strong positive correlation between homophily and perceptions that the speaker was relying on facts ($r = .686$, $p < .001$). A 95% BCa CI [.64, .73] indicates that there is an effect for this partial correlation. Therefore, I accept hypothesis H1a. When I ran a Pearson correlation (i.e. the same test without control variables) the positive relationship between homophily and perception of relying on facts became stronger ($r = .822$, $p < .001$) and a 95% BCa CI [.8, .85] showed an effect for the test, indicating that the control variables tempered results.

A deeper look is required here. Correlations are descriptive statistics and are therefore not appropriate for making predictions. I used simple linear regression to determine if homophily affected perceptions of reliance on facts. The fitted model showed that reliance on facts equals .648 + (.825*homophily), which was significant ($R^2 = .676$, $F(1, 1288) = 2692.62$, $p < .001$). This indicates that perceptions of homophily predictably influenced perceptions of factual accuracy, accounting for 67.6% of the variance in scores of reliance on facts.

I also ran a multiple linear regression analysis to check if the addition of the control variables influenced the relationship between perceptions of homophily and factual accuracy. The model was significant ($R^2 = .698$, $F(4, 1285) = 743.63$, $p < .001$) and all variables were

significant. The predicted score of factual accuracy is: .208 + (.687*homophily) + (.11*concern about illegal immigration) + (.087*blame for COVID) + (.056*concern for terrorism).

Taken together, we can see that homophily accounts for the majority of variance on perceptions of reliance on facts and that the controls, while significant, are much weaker predictors. This could mean that the concerns about COVID, illegal immigration, and terrorism are intentionally overemphasized by people who are receptive to WGM rhetoric. It could also mean that these concerns are used for self-deception, like the sort we would expect from the implicitly biased. It likely points to people's general desire to see themselves as accurate and unbiased. If a person who reminded us that we seemed to have ideas based in nonsense, it would reflect poorly on us and challenge a positive self-image. While the effect was expected, the strength of the relationship was much stronger than I had anticipated

H1b: Source credibility will be positively correlated with agreement.

A Pearson correlation showed a strong positive correlation between agreement and source credibility ($r = .85$, $p < .001$). Another partial correlation accounting for all controls revealed that perceptions of source credibility showed a strong positive correlation with agreement ($r = .74$, $p < .001$) which fell within a 95% BCa CI [.707, .778], indicating an effect for the test.

Simple linear regression showed the model fit was significant ($R^2 = .726$, $F(1, 1288) = 3414.92$, $p < .001$). This indicates that perceptions of source credibility accounted for 72.6 % of the variance in participants' agreement scores. The predicted score of agreement equaled .372 + (.883*source credibility). Multiple linear regressions including all control variables showed the model was significant ($R^2 = .741$, $F(4, 1285) = 919.05$, $p < .001$). Agreement as the dependent variable was not significant ($\beta = .057$, $p = .325$), indicating that it does not significantly differ

from zero when the other variables are set to zero. Considering that agreement must come from somewhere, this is not a bothersome result. Concern about terrorism was also not significant (β = .021, p = .384). To improve parsimony, I removed fear of terrorism from the model and reran the analysis. The model remained significant (R^2 = .741, F(3, 1286) = 1225.07, p < .001). Agreement was still not significant within the model (β = .09, p = .069), but the remaining variables were. Because agreement was not significant within the model, predicted agreement equaled 0 + (.103*concern about illegal immigration) + (.096*blame for COVID) + (.778* source credibility).

Source credibility exercised a much stronger influence over participant agreement than concerns of illegal immigration and blame for COVID. I was surprised that fear of terrorism did not significantly predict agreement but we will set this aside until the Additional Analyses section of this chapter. For now, let us focus on the relationships between agreement, source credibility, and homophily. My findings indicate that perceptions of source credibility increase as homophily increases and that agreement increases as perceived source credibility increases. This indicates that relatability ultimately contributes more to agreement with WGM rhetoric than the concerns raised by it. This supports earlier-cited work on group dynamics indicating that people are more receptive and less critical of people we perceive as like ourselves. I had hoped that the serious nature of the control concerns and the salience of the immigration in modern politics would have been more influential, but the data simply did not support that hope. The finding also casts doubt on claims made by everyday people who support immigration policy grounded in WGM. If that support really were an unfortunate byproduct of valid concerns, why was the impact of those concerns so weak relative to homophily?

H2a: A covert White supremacist will be perceived as more credible than an overt White supremacist.This question was explored with an independent samples t-test. Speaker identity did have a significant relationship with perceptions of source credibility ($t(1288) = -2.218$, $p = .027$) for participants overall. Source credibly was lower in the White nationalist condition ($M = 2.54$, $SD = 1.41$) than the patriot condition ($M = 2.72$, $SD = 1.49$).

Given the powerful relationship between source credibility and agreement, it was a bit troubling that the gap in credibility was not wider. I found myself wondering if this was, in part, an outcome of so many far-right extremists being allowed access to major media platforms. The result of extremist groups like The Oath Keepers, Proud Boys, and Three Percenters being treated not as violent, lawless, extremists but as bastions of traditional Conservative America with unaddressed, valid, concerns.

H2b: Participants will agree with a covert White supremacist more than an overt White supremacist.

Agreement was significantly different between speakers ($t(1288) = -2.583$, $p = .01$). Participants overall agreed with the White Nationalist significantly less ($M = 2.59$, $SD = 1.46$) than the patriot speaker ($M = 2.81$, $SD = 1.54$).

H2c: Participants will show higher agreement with an ambiguous tone than a negative tone.

Participant agreement was significantly different between tone conditions ($t(1288) = -3.131$, $p = .002$). Agreement was lower in the negative condition ($M = 2.57$, $SD = 1.51$) than in the ambiguous condition ($M = 2.83$, $SD = 1.5$). This finding affirms the belief that potential supporters of White supremacist policy are more receptive to less hostile rhetoric, as well as research indicating that ambiguity and in-group protectiveness can facilitate discrimination.

Let us consider these three hypotheses together as well as in relation to the two which came before. Agreement increases as perceptions of source credibility increase and source credibility increases as perceptions of homophily increase. Identity influenced source credibility. People agree with WGM rhetoric from a patriot a more than from a White nationalist and when the tone is ambiguous rather than negative.

H3a: The location referenced will influence participants' agreement with the argument.A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed that there was a significant difference between groups ($F(2,1134) = 6.389$, $p = .002$) . A Tukey post hoc test showed that participant agreement was significantly lower when the location was England ($M = 2.41$, $SD = 1.42$) compared to Iraq ($M = 2.78$, $SD = 1.48$, $p = .003$), and Mexico ($M = 2.73$, $SD = 1.54$, $p = .01$) conditions. There was no significant difference in agreement between the vignettes referencing Iraq and Mexico ($p = .943$).

Table 8 Post hoc test of Relationship between participant agreement and target

(I) ImmGroup	(J) ImmGroup	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Iraq	Mexico	.035	.107	.943	-.215	.285
	England	.351*	.107	.003	.099	.602
Mexico	Iraq	-.035	.107	.943	-.285	.215
	England	.316*	.108	.01	.061	.57
England	Iraq	-.351*	.107	.003	-.602	-.099
	Mexico	-.316*	.108	.01	-.57	-.061

H3b: The correlation between agreement and symbolic anti-immigrant bias will stronger than the correlation between agreement and explicit anti-immigrant bias.

Pearson correlation showed that participants total score on the NATIS had a strong significant correlation with agreement (r = .663, p < .001) which fell within the 95% BCa CI [.624, .701]. A partial correlation revealed that, when controlling for fear of terrorism, blame assigned to immigrants for COVID, and concern about illegal immigration, this relationship was about half as strong but still significant (r = .345, p < .001) and within the 95% BCa CI [.277, .41]. A Pearson correlation between agreement and scores on the SRS showed a moderate positive relationship (r = .535, p < .001) and fell within the 95% BCa CI [.496, .573]. A partial correlation factoring in all controls, as with the analysis looking at the NATIS, reduced the strength of the correlation but still showed a significant relationship between SRS score and agreement (r = .227, p < .001) which still fell within the 95% BCa CI [.173, .284]. We must therefore accept the null hypothesis that symbolic bias did not have a stronger relationship with agreement than explicit bias.

Given the noticeable effect of the control variables, I decided to employ linear regression as I had done when testing hypotheses H1a and H1b. Simple regression on the relationship between NATIS scores and agreement showed that the model fit was significant (R^2 = .44, F(1, 1288) = 1011.98, p < .001), indicating that NATIS scores accounted for 44 % of the variance in agreement. Because agreement was itself not significant (β = .026, p = .768) the predicted score of agreement equals 0 + (.08*NATIS). Multiple linear regression including all control variables showed the model was significant (R^2 = .489, F(4, 1285) = 307.837, p < .001), as were all variables within the model. Predicted agreement score equaled -.263 + (.049*NATIS score) + (.195*concern about illegal immigration) + (.176*blame for COVID) + (.083*concern for terrorism).

Simple regression on the relationship between SRS scores and agreement showed that the model fit was significant (R^2 = .287, F(1, 1288) = 517.453, p < .001), indicating that SRS scores accounted for 28.7% of the variance in agreement. Based on this test, the predicted score of agreement equaled -.597 + (.156*SRS). Multiple linear regression including all control variables showed the model was significant (R^2 = .45, F(4, 1285) = 263.171, p < .001), as were all variables within the model. Predicted agreement score equaled -.645 + (.065*SRS score) + (.219*concern about illegal immigration) + (.336*blame for COVID) + (.135*concern for terrorism).

H3c: Participants who score high on implicit bias and low on explicit bias will show higher agreement with the covert White supremacist than other participants.

Participants with above median scores on the SRS2S and below median scores on the NATIS were labelled aversively biased. A total of 158 (13.9%) participants fit these criteria. Status as aversively biased did not significantly influence agreement with the speaker (F(1) = 3.078, p = .08). Among participants who were labeled aversive, concerns about COVID were the only covariate that was significant. Removing non-significant covariates from the model to improve parsimony did not produce significant results. We must accept the null hypothesis that the aversively prejudiced, as they are conceived in this study, do not show higher agreement with the patriot than other participants.

4.2 Additional Analyses

Particularly galling was the discovery that participants' perceptions of source credibility were unrelated to whether the source was a patriot or White nationalist but we must consider that White supremacist messaging is designed by, and mainly for, consumption by White people. I decided to rerun the analyses after dividing participants into those whom had exclusively self-

identified as White and those who identified as POC or mixed race. Among White people, speaker identity did significantly impact the model ($F(1) = 5.263$, $p = .022$). White participants perceived the White Nationalist ($M = 2.622$) as significantly less credible than a patriot ($M = 2.822$) ($MDiff = -.201$, $p = .022$). Among POC, speaker identity was independent of perceptions of credibility ($F(1) = .001$ $p = .97$). Taking a similar second look at the relationship between agreement and the source White participants showed a slightly stronger effect than participants overall ($F(1) = 6.474$, $p = .018$). White Nationalist had a mean agreement of 2.705 while the patriot had a mean of 2.911 ($MDIFF = -.206$, $p = .018$). Among POC, speaker identity was independent of participant agreement ($F(1) = .374$, $p = .541$).

When analyzed by race, correlations between NATIS scores and agreement were similar between groups. Doing the same with agreement and SRS scores showed that White people actually had a very slightly lesser correlation between agreement and score ($r = .186$, $p < .001$) than POC did ($r = .264$, $p < .001$).

In Pilot 3, perceptions that the speaker was relying on facts for their argument had a strong positive correlation with perceptions of how the speaker felt about the group ($r = .714$, $p < .001$) which fell within the parameters of a 95% BCa CI [.663, .762].

Earlier I noted that fear of terrorism was not a significant predictor of participant agreement, but that was for the entire sample. Stereotypes about terrorism are not evenly applied to the three demographics, ergo it seems likely that this may not be true when looking at agreement by immigrant group.

5 CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Discussion

Changing the tone and target of WGM rhetoric influenced participants' responses to it. An ambiguous vignette elicited more agreement than a negative vignette, though the effect was small. Agreement did not significantly differ between participants in the Muslim and Latino conditions or the White and Latino conditions, whereas participants in the White condition showed less agreement than those in the Muslim condition. The lack of significance when comparing the White and Latino immigrants could be the result of social factors. Latinos greatly outnumber Muslims in the US (18.9% of the population vs 1.1%). This translates into more opportunities for shared contact, co-employment, friendships, relationships, and education with Latinos. Just over half of US Latinos are Catholic as well, which means that they share religious traditions with some majority members. This creates opportunities to signal shared values and beliefs, potentially increasing homophily. Due to the increased opportunities for real-world contact, this could be reducing reliance on stereotypes and media depictions when participants were primed to think of Mexican immigrants. As for the non-significant difference between the Muslim and Latino conditions, perhaps people who are biased against one are just as likely to be biased against the other. Both Latino and Muslim immigrants are often depicted as foreign and threatening and their harmful stereotypes share some overlap.

While there was a significant difference between responses in the White nationalist and patriot conditions, it was small. Scores indicated that participants showed slight disagreement in both conditions, a bit more so in the White nationalist condition. This may indicate that participants are skeptical of self-identified patriots, especially considering the rise of patriot-branded extremist groups in public discourse and news media. For example, data was collected

after the January 6th insurrection at the US capitol, which was followed a surge of media coverage of this manifestation of extremism. Here we should consider Belew's (2019) point that some people simply misinterpret White nationalism as patriots who happen to be White. Then again, a person who does so should also consider her other point: some people see White supremacy and patriotism as one and the same. This relationship between speaker identity and agreement with their argument was for participants overall. It is important to keep in mind that White supremacist myths are primarily made for White audiences though.

Interestingly, and counter to the hypothesis, scores of explicit bias against immigrants had a stronger positive correlation with agreement than symbolic bias. I anticipated that the ambiguity provided in the vignette would seem more persuasive to the implicitly biased because implicit bias often manifests in ambiguous situations. Many people who identify with White supremacist ideology complain about being rejected by others and express relief at finding a space where they can speak their minds without consequences. The opportunity to express their real attitude, with a greatly diminished risk of it being linked back to them may have encouraged some of the more explicitly biased participants to agree without reservation. On the other hand, people who are implicitly biased may be uncomfortable with self-reporting agreement because it could contradict their self-concept. A person's own implicit bias can be unknown to them or a source of shame. In the latter case, a participant may judge themselves for agreeing with the White nationalist while an explicitly biased person likely would not feel much shame in either condition.

When participants were separated in White and POC, however, a different effect emerged. The effect of speaker's identity doubled on White participants and was statistically insignificant among POC. The language used in the vignette is weaponized against many groups

and especially US POC. Since similar rhetoric has caused a great deal of institutional harm and this harm tends to fall on disadvantaged groups, it makes sense that changing a group identifier was not enough to effect persuasiveness.

Speaker identity did not significantly impact their perceived reliance on facts. Again, this could be due to participants misinterpreting "What nationalist" but it could also be because aversion to White supremacy is less powerful than bias against immigrants. Also, and again contrary to the hypothesis, status as aversively biased (i.e., low explicit bias score, high implicit bias score) did not significantly impact agreement with a self-identified patriot. In fact, participants rated as aversively prejudiced were less likely to agree with the patriot speaker than other participants.

The perception that the speaker was relying on facts was also more strongly positively correlated with agreement. Perceived similarity between participant and speaker was strongly positively correlated with perceptions that the speaker was basing their opinion on facts. This indicates that high homophily does make WGM-derived rhetoric seem more legitimate. Tone had a weaker relationship to agreement than perception that the speaker was using facts, which was itself related to perceived homophily. This lends credence to the idea that White supremacist rhetoric is more effective when it comes from a more relatable source. To break down what seems to be happening, we need to keep the following in mind the findings that 1) a White supremacist is viewed as more fact-focused when they seem like us 2) people work to maintain positive self-image 3) people want to belong to high status groups 4) most people have negative views of White supremacists, and 5) what people perceive as White supremacist depends on their understanding of the construct.

5.2 Limitations and Future Directions

The data tells many interesting stories about how people respond to WGM-derived rhetoric, but so many conditions and hypotheses across four surveys also provides us many potential opportunities to change or improve the design. While this study does control for attitudes about illegal immigration, COVID, and terrorism, it does not factor in where participants get their information on these topics or the strength of their convictions. A nihilistic person, for example, could blame immigrants for COVID and terrorism but also feel that everyone shares equal blame, or even be wholly apathetic towards the problem. It is possible that some participants may have hated the source, disagreed with every point they made, and believe that immigrants from the specified country are being unfairly maligned, but still agree with it on the logic that it would be worth it to prevent or lower the risk of something else. A person terrified of COVID, for example, might be reluctantly willing to adopt an immigration shutdown if they genuinely believe it would improve their odds of survival. An isolationist or dedicated misanthrope might oppose immigration to the US from any part of the world regardless of geopolitical events and demographics. Some participants might have agreed with the vignette based on the perception that it would offend others, possibly in anticipation of annoying someone with their choice. An optional opportunity for participants to explain their responses could have potentially added more context to the data.

Also, while the language of the vignette had varying degrees of ambiguity, the proposed solution was both harsh and unambiguous. Participants were asked whether they agree with the speaker but not which specific parts of the narrative they agreed with. Participants were also presented with different versions of an argument for the same proposal. If participants had

instead been shown vignettes that proposed different kinds of discriminatory solutions, a difference might have emerged.

It is also possible that the observed result is partially due to the testing materials. Recall that the NATIS was designed to test bias against Latino immigrants whereas the SRS was designed to detect symbolic racism against Black Americans. While implicit and explicit bias can be directed at any group and there is certainly overlap in how it is expressed towards different groups, the attitudes and beliefs surrounding individual groups are distinct and influenced by history and culture. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems possible that different effects would have occurred if there had been bespoke versions of the modified SRS and NATIS for each group reflecting respective stereotypes.

Participants also may have, in absence of visual information about the speaker, made up their own mental image of the speaker. While I did ask participants a few questions about the speaker, I did not examine their perception of that person more deeply. While homophily was measured, I did not include more in-depth measures of why participants felt that way. While there is a limit to what you can measure about human perception, and there are limitless variables underpinning both our perceptions and willingness to share them, participants were asked to give their opinion on immigrants much more extensively. This means the data allows us to explore attitudes towards different groups of immigrants with more nuance. For example, the study asks participants to rate how much they blame immigrants for various serious problems, but does not measure similar negative attitudes towards people who share the speaker's politics. A source's similarity to self, while an important part of how we interpret information, is not the only kind of similarity people consider. It seems reasonable that some of the variance in responses could have been caused not by homophily, but by perceiving the speaker as like people

in their life or media diet. Making a few extra survey questions that would have allowed easy comparison between participants' attitudes towards both could have yielded richer information on how attitudes towards groups influences message reception. For example, a person who agrees with a bigoted message and rates it factually accurate, but also blames people with those politics for COVID outbreaks, might feel differently than someone who rejects the message but does not see the politics as a threat. A more intricate look at how people perceive the speaker and others with similar politics could reveal more information on which aspects of them influence message reception and to whom.

Future work that seeks to build on this dissertation should consider the many moving parts that could be altered. Incorporating audio and visual aspects to the messaging to mimic television news would be a fascinating corollary study, as would using real speech. Body language, props, clothing, symbols, and vocal pitch can all convey a great deal of meaning. Researchers could also try a series of studies that examine individual aspects of WGM in more detail or look at the effects of other kinds of framing on reception to WGM. WGM narratives can be used to justify a wide variety of bigotry and this study only focused on a kind of manifestation of xenophobia. Identifying and demonizing degenerate elements among the "true" citizens, sowing distrust of experts, undermining policies that expand civil rights, and discouraging people from pursuing higher education are just a few examples of uses for WGM narratives. Examining how Americans respond to WGM arguments applied to fellow citizens would be a fascinating point of comparison, especially since WGM has explicit themes of subterfuge and betrayal which have, historically, been used to justify restricting the behavior of dominant majority members to prevent "degeneracy."

The way the vignette was structured, with participants discovering the speaker's identity after viewing their opinion, precluded checking for the effects of counterbalancing. Altering the order of the demographic prime and the speaker identity may yield different findings and could provide a better picture of how these factors influence audience responses. I anticipated that priming participants with the speaker identity before the demographics would result in a floor effect for the overt identity but the mixed results regarding participants' perceptions of the speaker indicates that this should not be taken for granted. Counterbalancing was also not pursued because it would have doubled the number of conditions. Holding the structure constant made conditions easier to compare. Altering the point at which participants are aware of the speaker's identity would likely alter their interpretation of the message, which could have allowed a deeper look at how people respond to WGM.

If future researchers would like to explore the effects of the identity/message counterbalancing, a series of smaller studies that focus on one other variable (e.g. just immigrant identity, just tone) seems like a decent starting point. Another avenue worth exploring could be incorporating a real event or person into the narrative and looking at how people respond when that information is made salient. This does carry the extra complexities of controlling for individual knowledge and experience with those events or people but WGM narratives, and political narratives in general, make use of them to amplify emotional resonance. This project also did not explore the role of anti-Blackness in attitudes towards immigrants or terrorism. Anti-Blackness is prevalent in the logics and history of counterterrorism, but is also underexamined in the literature (Meier, 2022). While xenophobia applies to both Muslim and Latinx immigrants, anti-Blackness may have an oversized impact on attitudes about Muslim immigrants. This is not to say that xenophobia against Muslims and Latinos is the same, only to note that these groups

have different racial stereotypes attached to them which were not fully explored in the current study.

It should also be noted that experiments are sensitive to the context in which they are conducted. I anticipated participants having some degree of exposure to xenophobic rhetoric, I did not anticipate the former president, the same earlier mentioned for his embrace of the xenophobic rhetoric which inspired this dissertation, would attempt a coup just weeks before launching the first pilot survey. I was too shocked and numbed by the event and immediate aftermath to consider how this might impact responses to the pilot. I do not judge myself for overlooking this but I do acknowledge that the chaos, rumors, media circus, disinformation campaigns, and fear may have altered the salience of some identities and perceptions of them. I do still stand by the initial choices of White nationalist and patriot but I encourage researchers to be more proactive in evaluating the potential effects of current events on participants.

5.3 Final Conclusions

Policies regarding immigration and international threats should be based, not on ancient conspiracy theories with a modern aesthetic, but on fact-based realities. Whether the person pitching an oppressive idea reminds us of ourselves should not be a deciding factor when we determine who is allowed to come to the US and who is sent to a detainment center. Race and religion should not be sufficient to condemn people as potential terror threats. Yet they are.

WGM narratives will likely not disappear anytime soon. Refugees coming from South America and the Caribbean have increased over the early 2020's due to poverty, violence, hate, gangs, political upheaval, and repression (The Soufan Center, 2023). In conjunction with current political unrest, election cycles, economic hardship, and any number of disasters, tragedies, and threats, there are plenty of opportunities for people to insert WGM rhetoric into discussions

about refugees and immigrants. Ironically, a lack of legal pathways for these people has increased the demand for human traffickers, which both generates money for organized crime and provides terrorists with additional opportunities to illegally enter the US (The Soufan Center, 2023).

Despite social taboos against White supremacy and humans' natural desire to accurately understand the world, attitudes derived from WGM have a strong foothold in immigration discourse and news media. WGM describes immigrants as surging, violent, altering the electorate, terroristic, and lazy, and so do many people who host serious news shows with massive audiences. When rhetoric based in White supremacy is broadcast from major news outlets, it encourages the audience to interpret informationthrough that lens. Data reliably and consistently shows that far-right extremism committed by domestic actors is the greatest terror threat in the United States, yet the news media favors foreigners and Jihadists in terms of coverage. Research has repeatedly shown that Americans' perception of who commits terrorism is much closer to media depictions than the facts. A fringe message derived from WGM can be misrepresented to a non-expert audience with various levels of emotional engagement in the topic at hand. Misrepresenting a narrative in a way that provokes feelings of group identity and threat is a potent combination for distracting people from the real outcomes of policy. This is not just a problem of malicious actors, but also of audiences who are not equipped to recognize this kind of manipulation. In media studies, it can be easy to forget that many people only occasionally glance at the news in passing and do not pay attention to the internal politics and financial incentives that dictate how the networks function. If the goal is to inject a fringe idea into mainstream discourse the argument does not necessarily have to be good or sound; it just has to get to a reputable stage and resonate with people. Most people are not scientists or fact-

checkers and the particulars of an argument are going to matter less than what is already relevant or emotionally resonant with a given audience member.

White supremacy relies on violence for control and the shape of that violence changes along with laws, culture, and politics. While street violence is still employed, such as that committed by Proud Boys and Oath Keepers, using it can now harm the perpetrators as well as the victims. In the heyday of the Klan, robes and institutional connections made it very unlikely that individual members would suffer consequences for their violence. A great deal of White Americans also approved of what the Klan was doing and were not inclined to use their political or social power to discourage them. Institutional oppression of marginalized groups was similarly unlikely to cause serious backlash to politicians which meant that legal forms of control could be explicitly bigoted. As negative legal and social consequences became an escalating risk to White hegemony, White supremacists focused on finding ways to abstract the causes and effects of violence. Now that information transfer is instant and more political and social power has transitioned to women, POC, non-Christians, and queer individuals, street violence is a much more costly form of social control. Halting immigration from specific countries while labeling them as inherent sources of terrorism and crime is an act of violence. It denies opportunity and refuge to people whose only crime was living in the wrong place while also associating them with hated behavior and groups. When we consider violence, we need to also consider how our feelings about that violence change when it challenges or reinforces the status quo (Meier, 2020). When Muslims and Latinos are the victim, the status quo is reinforced. The same violence against White people is a challenge to the status quo.

People who remind us of ourselves likely belong, or at least seem to belong, to at least one shared group. When an apparent group member does something bad, we are more likely to

make excuses for them than to attribute it to the group member. Compound this with our desire to maintain a positive self-image, and there is substantial motivation to maintain a positive image of group members who remind us of ourselves. Most people are also motivated to be accurate and hold correct beliefs. Alternatively, individuals share the desire to distance the self from denigrated groups. A person who is like us and exhibits admirable behavior is affirming. The same person acting in ways that are incompatible with our ideal self may shock and embarrass, possibly even lead a person to distance themselves from the group. If a person is sharing a message that resonates with you and you discover that they belong to a despised group, you may respond by rationalizing away the cognitive dissonance. The speaker may have been being ironic or had recently gone through something traumatic. Perhaps they are just misunderstood or intentionally provocative. Ambiguity provides us space to justify things and find exceptions. In cases where the vileness of the message sender cannot be denied, it is possible to agree with a terrible person on certain things without you perceiving that is tainting you. Very few people would seriously judge vegetarians for Hitler's association with the practice, for example. Attempts to unmask the underlying bigotry may be rejected out of a desire to distance the self from a despised social group.

Dissecting the rhetorical tricks of bad actors is a necessary process for developing strategies to unmask the disingenuous and mitigate extremists' attempts to push their ideology onto the unsuspecting and vulnerable. If the difference between supporting or not supporting bigoted policy comes down to framing at least some of the time, those frames need to be understood. When those frames are used to advance White supremacist conspiracies, the resulting narratives should be exposed as clearly and loudly as possible. The effects of homophily, immigrant identity, and bias were not individually very large, but a large effect is not

necessarily required to get biased policy signed into law. Political rhetoric rooted in White supremacy does not have to convince people of the deeper ideology to secure enough support for votes. Given the famously narrow margins by which politicians are elected and laws are passed, the numerous small effects could tip enough naïve or ambivalent voters into enacting White supremacist policy without even knowing it. Policies that fixate on marginalized populations as terror threats have hurt innocent people while allowing White supremacist extremists and their ideologies to enjoy comparatively less suspicion and interference.

Framing and rhetoric are deeply important to White supremacists because they cannot rely on facts or genuine popular consensus to maintain power. The thinking and logics which underpin WGM rely on primitive bigoted understandings of group dynamics and geopolitics. If WGM were a strong platform by itself, it would not need to be whitewashed and sold piecemeal to voters. Viewers who watched *der Ewiege Jude* were exposed to WGM in its raw form because it fit into the culture, politics, the education system, and popular science of Nazi Germany. The wickedness of Jews and their alleged quest to globally parasitize and punish the White race was considered common knowledge. The tropes and stereotypes could be blatantly presented as fact because they fit into pre-existing understandings of Jewish people and the groups which they allegedly control. While there is no shortage of media promoting the view that immigrants are inherently threatening to the USA, the pre-existing social attitudes and structure for WGM to openly occupy a position in mainstream immigration rhetoric simply are not present. This difficulty is compounded by the bad reputation that White supremacists have earned. There was once a time when Klan regalia did not discredit a person's political opinions. Rather than accepting that this time has passed, many White supremacist activists have spent decades

learning how to gain superficial credibility and tweak their messaging to resonate with peoples' values.

Yet rhetoric alone is not enough to transform White supremacist extremism into mainstream political discourse. Audiences interpret rhetoric through the lens of their beliefs and biases. Our experiences and beliefs also influence how we respond to frames. In fact, there are times when an audience will recognize the real reasoning behind the rhetoric, see through the window dressing, and participate in upholding the façade. Remember, framed information pushes unframed information out of the narrative. As we covered earlier, fear of terrorism is often given as an apparent defense of policies that disproportionately hurt Muslim and Latinx communities. A person on, for example, the Alt-right would likely anticipate and welcome harm to these communities, but would know that the optics of saying so are detrimental to their social standing. If that person embraced the anti-terrorism argument and enthusiastically proselytized about it without engaging with the racialized elements of the issue, a casual observer will likely think of the issue through that lens. If a person does not have a good understanding of the biases and stereotypes that plague counterterrorism, discussion of those racialized elements is likely to be dismissed as secondary to the "real" issue of preventing terrorism. This allows white supremacists to gain support from people who accept the superficial messaging but not necessarily the conspiracies that underpin it. There is no need to convince that crowd of racial myths or introduce them to radical racist philosophers. Whether acceptance of WGM-based logics is rooted in explicit bigotry, misunderstanding, ignorance, concern for a separate problem, or a desire to protect the status quo, it is still acceptance of WGM.

Our tendencies to like people who remind us of ourselves and rationalize away undesirable attitudes discourages people from exploring potentially upsetting beliefs and leaves

people vulnerable to messaging that provides alternate explanations. Discomfort at culture shock can be reframed as resistance against forced multiculturalism or the new world order. Support for institutional xenophobia can be reframed as concern for others, protecting culture, and preventing terrorism. White supremacist propagandists exploit language and group perceptions to create technicalities and ambiguity which, in turn, give people space to miss or rationalize away bigotry. This helps destructive, anti-social ideologies, such as white supremacy, survive in mainstream society. The people who genuinely believe in it cannot hope to influence mainstream culture without the aid of people who do not. There would be no need to use the Southern Strategy or multivocal appeals to advance their interests if this were not the case. By identifying when people are more vulnerable to WGM, we give people the tools to critically examine their own feelings on said messaging and to identify inconsistent beliefs. By empowering people with knowledge of how White supremacists repackage their ideas, we empower them with the ability to identify and deal with modern fascism. Earlier I discussed the potential effects of January 6th on the first pilot but really all four surveys were likely affected by it in some capacity. Perhaps the timing was not a limitation. Perhaps I simply started collecting data immediately after we entered a new landscape of political discourse. Maybe responses were influenced by heightened motions and media coverage but it is possible that those attitudes were already there, just as strong but a bit better hidden.

REFERENCES

Abrajano, M., & Singh, S. (2009). Examining the Link between Issue Attitudes and News Source: The Case of Latinos and Immigration Reform. *Political Behavior*, *31*(1), 1–30. JSTOR.

Adams, J., & Roscigno, V. J. (2005). White Supremacists, Oppositional Culture and the World Wide Web. *Social Forces*, *84*(2), 759–778. https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2006.0001

Ahmed, S., & Matthes, J. (2017). Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A meta-analysis. *International Communication Gazette*, *79*(3), 219–244. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048516656305

Albertson, B. L. (2015). Dog-Whistle Politics: Multivocal Communication and Religious Appeals. *Political Behavior*, *37*(1), 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-013-9265-x

Alsultany, E. (2012). *Arabs and Muslims in the Media*. NYU Press; JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfv0k

Althouse, M. T., & Anderson, F. D. (2018). The Southern Baptist Convention's Resolution on the Alternative Right: Making Progress on the Upward / Downward Way. *Journal of Communication & Religion*, *41*(1), 46–60.

Amarasingam, A., Argentino, M.-A., & Macklin, G. (2022). The Buffalo Attack: The Cumulative Momentum of Far-Right Terror. *CTCSentinel*, *15*(7), 27.

Anglin, A. (2017). *The Daily Stormer's Style Guide*. The Daily Stormer.

Anti-Defamation League. (2018). *Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2017*. Anti-Defamation league. https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/adl-murder-and-extremism-report-2017.pdf

Apfelbaum, E. P., Sommers, S. R., & Norton, M. I. (2008). Seeing race and seeming racist? Evaluating strategic colorblindness in social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *95*(4), 918–932. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0011990

Avdan, N., & Webb, C. (2019). Not in My Back Yard: Public Perceptions and Terrorism. *Political Research Quarterly*, *72*(1), 90–103. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918776118

Awan, A. N., Hoskins, A., & O'Loughlin, B. (2011). Radicalisation and media: Connectivity and terrorism in the new media ecology. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, *4*(3), 473–476. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2011.634705

Bailenson, J. N., Iyengar, S., Yee, N., & Collins, N. A. (2008). Facial Similarity between Voters and Candidates Causes Influence. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *72*(5), 935–961. JSTOR Journals. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfn064

Bandura, A. (2001). Social Cognitive Theory of Mass Communication. *Media Psychology*, *3*, 35.

Bandura, A., & Walters, R. H. (1963). *Social learning and personality development.* New York.

Barreto, M. A., Alegre, C., Bailey, J. I., Davis, A., Ferrer, J., Nguy, J., Palmisano, C., & Robertson, C. (2023). Black Lives Matter and the Racialized Support for the January 6th Insurrection. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *708*(1), 64–82. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162241228395

Belew, K. (2018). *Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America*. Harvard University Press.

Ben-Cheikh, I., Beneduce, R., Guzder, J., Jadhav, S., Kassam, A., Lashley, M., Mansouri, M., Moro, M. R., & Tran, D. Q. (2021). Historical Scientific Racism and Psychiatric Publications: A Necessary International Anti-racist Code of Ethics. *The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry*, *66*(10), 863–872. https://doi.org/10.1177/07067437211020613

Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology, 26,* 611–639. JSTOR.

Bennett, L., & Iyengar, S. (2008). A New Era of Minimal Effects? The Changing Foundations of Political Communication. *Journal of Communication*, *58*, 707–731. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.00410.x

Berg, C. R. (2002). *Latino Images in Film*. University of Texas Press; JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.7560/709065

Bernhardt, J., & Felter, E. (2004). Online Pediatric Information Seeking Among Mothers of Young Children: Results From a Qualitative Study Using Focus Groups. *Journal of Medical Internet Research, 6,* e7. https://doi.org/10.2196/jmir.6.1.e7

Betus, A., Kearns, E., & Lemieux, A. (2019). "Terrorism" or "Mental Illness"?: Factors that Impact How Media Label Terrorist Attacks. *SSRN*, 39.

Bodenhausen, G. V., Schwarz, N., Bless, H., & Wänke, M. (1995). Effects of Atypical Exemplars on Racial Beliefs: Enlightened Racism or Generalized Appraisals. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *31*(1), 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1995.1003

Brader, T., Valentino, N. A., & Suhay, E. (2008). What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat. *American Journal of Political Science*, *52*(4), 959–978. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00353.x

Brewer, M. B. (1999). The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate? *Journal of Social Issues*, *55*(3), 429–444. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00126

Briñol, P., Petty, R., & Tormala, Z. (2004). Self-Validation of Cognitive Responses to Advertisements. *Journal of Consumer Research*, *30*, 559–573. https://doi.org/10.1086/380289

Briñol, P., Tormala, Z., & Petty, R. (2002). Source credibility as a determinant of self-validation effects in persuasion. *Poster Presented at the 13th General Meeting of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, San Sebastián, Spain*.

Brunn, S., Webster, G., & Archer, J. (2011). The Bible Belt in a Changing South: Shrinking, Relocating, and Multiple Buckles. *Southeastern Geographer*, *51*, 513–549. https://doi.org/10.1353/sgo.2011.0040

Buckler, K., Wilson, S., & Salinas, P. R. (2009). Public Support for Punishment and Progressive Criminal Justice Policy Preferences: The Role of Symbolic Racism and Negative Racial Stereotype. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, *34*(3–4), 238–252. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-008-9056-9

Burrows, R., Nettleton, S., Pleace, N., Loader, B., & Muncer, S. (2000). Virtual Community Care? Social Policy and the Emergence of Computer Mediated Social Support. *Information, Communication&Society*, 95–121. https://doi.org/10.1080/136911800359446

Cacciatore, M. A., Scheufele, D. A., & Iyengar, S. (2016). The End of Framing as we Know it … and the Future of Media Effects. *Mass Communication and Society*, *19*(1), 7–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2015.1068811

Castells, M. (2007). Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society. *Journal of Communications - JCM*, *1*.

Catsam, D. C. (2018). If You're (Concerned About) White You're Alt-Right: Racialized Conservative Responses to Black Panther. *Journal of Pan African Studies*, *9*, 53.

Chavez, L. R. (Leo R. (2001). *Covering immigration: Popular images and the politics of the nation / Leo R. Chavez.* University of California Press.

Chavez, L. R. (Leo R. (2008). *The Latino threat: Constructing immigrants, citizens, and the nation*. Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, [2008] ©2008. https://search.library.wisc.edu/catalog/9910079672902121

Chermak, S. (2003). Marketing fear: Representing terrorism after September 11. *Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media*, *1*(1), 5–22.

Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing Theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *10*(1), 103–126. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054

Chyi, H. I., & McCombs, M. (2004). Media Salience and the Process of Framing: Coverage of the Columbine School Shootings. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *81*(1), 22–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/107769900408100103

Clark III, R. D., & Maass, A. (1988). The role of social categorization and perceived source credibility in minority influence. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *18*(5), 381–394. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420180502

Clarke, K. M., & Thomas, D. A. (2006). *Globalization and race: Transformations in the cultural production of blackness*. Duke University Press.

Cohen, B. C. (1956). The Press and Foreign Policy in the United States. *Journal of International Affairs*, *10*(2), 128–137. JSTOR.

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. (2023). *Planned in plain sight: A review of the intelligence failures in advance of January 6, 2021: HSGAC majority staff' report.* Department of Homeland Security. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23861777-hsgac-majority-report_jan-6-intel

Counterterrosim Policy Directive and Policy Guide. (2015). Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division.

https://ia802908.us.archive.org/32/items/CounterterrorismPolicyDirectiveAndPolicyGuide/Counterterrorism%20Policy%20Directive%20and%20Policy%20Guide_text.pdf

Czopp, A. M., Kay, A. C., & Cheryan, S. (2015). Positive Stereotypes Are Pervasive and Powerful. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10*(4), 451–463. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691615588091

Davey, J., & Ebner, J. (2019). The 'Great Replacement': The violent consequences of mainstreamed extremism. *Institute for Strategic Dialogue,* 36.

David, E. J. R., & Derthick, A. O. (2013). What Is Internalized Oppression, and So What? In E. J. R. David (Ed.), *Internalized Oppression* (1st ed.). Springer Publishing Company. https://doi.org/10.1891/9780826199263.0001

Davis, C. G., & Macdonald, S. L. (2004). Threat appraisals, distress and the development of positive life changes after September 11th in a Canadian sample. *Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 33*(2), 68–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/16506070410025832

Dearing, J. W., & Rogers, E. M. (1996). *Agenda-Setting*. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452243283

Department of Homeland Security. (2017, January 27). *DHS Implementation of Executive Order #13769 "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States."* https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2018-01/OIG-18-37-Jan18.pdf

Department of Homeland Security. (2023). *Joint Report of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security on Foreign Interference Targeting Election Infrastructure or Political Organization, Campaign, or Candidate Infrastructure Related to the 2022 US Federal Elections*. https://www.dhs.gov/publication/key-findings-and-recommendations-foreign-interference-related-2022-us-federal-elections

D'Orazio, V., & Salehyan, I. (2018). Who is a Terrorist? Ethnicity, Group Affiliation, and Understandings of Political Violence. *International Interactions*, *44*(6), 1017–1039. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2018.1500911

Dovidio, J. F. (2001). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The third wave. *Journal of Social Issues*, *57*(4), 829–849.

Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2000). Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999. *Psychological Science*, *11*(4), 315–319. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00262

Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., & Pearson, A. R. (2016). Aversive Racism and Contemporary Bias. In C. G. Sibley & F. K. Barlow (Eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of the Psychology of Prejudice* (pp. 267–294). Cambridge University Press; Cambridge Core. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316161579.012

Druckman, J. N., & McDermott, R. (2008). Emotion and the Framing of Risky Choice. *Political Behavior*, *30*(3), 297–321.

Du Bois, W. E. B., & Mack, H. J. (2017). *Black Reconstruction in America: Toward a history of the part which black folk played in the attempt to reconstruct democracy in America, 1860-1880*. Routledge.

Dunaway, J., Abrajano, M. A., & Branton, R. P. (2007). *Agenda Setting, Public Opinion, and the Issue of Immigration Reform*.

Dunaway, J., Goidel, R. K., Kirzinger, A., & Wilkinson, B. C. (2011). Rebuilding or Intruding? Media Coverage and Public Opinion on Latino Immigration in Post-Katrina Louisiana. *Social Science Quarterly*, *92*(4), 917–937. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2011.00797.x

Eckstrand, N. (2018). The Ugliness of Trolls: Comparing the Methodologies of the Alt-Right and the Ku Klux Klan. *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, *3*. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6026

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, *43*(4), 51–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x

Farris, E. M., & Silber Mohamed, H. (2018). Picturing immigration: How the media criminalizes immigrants. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, *6*(4), 814–824. https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2018.1484375

Futrell, R., & Simi, P. (2017). The [Un]Surprising Alt-Right. *Contexts*, *16*, 76–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504217714269

Gadarian, S. K. (2010). The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes. *The Journal of Politics*, *72*(2), 469–483. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990910

Gade, E. K., Card, D., Dreier, S. K., & Smith, N. A. (2018). *What Counts as Terrorism? An Examination of Terrorist Designations among U. S. Mass Shootings*.

Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2000). *The aversive form of racism.*

Gallup Inc. (2024). *Terrorism*. Gallup.Com. https://news.gallup.com/poll/4909/Terrorism-United-States.aspx

Gil de Zúñiga, H., Correa, T., & Valenzuela, S. (2012). Selective Exposure to Cable News and Immigration in the U.S.: The Relationship Between FOX News, CNN, and Attitudes Toward Mexican Immigrants. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, *56*(4), 597–615. https://doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2012.732138

Giles, H., Reid, S. A., & Harwood, J. (2010). *The dynamics of intergroup communication* (Vol. 8). Peter Lang.

Gitlin, T. (1980). *The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making & unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley : University of California Press, [1980] ©1980. https://search.library.wisc.edu/catalog/999469439402121

Gleason, S., & Barber, R. (2024, July 19). *Read Donald Trump's full RNC speech transcript* [News]. USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/07/19/donald-trumps-full-rnc-speech-transcript/74464790007/

Goldwag, A. (2012). *The New Hate: A History of Fear and Loathing on the Populist Right*. VIntage.

Gonzalez, E. (2019). *Stereotypical Depictions of Latino Criminality: U.S. Latinos in the Media during the MAGA Campaign*. 17.

Gottschalk, P. (2008). *Islamophobia: Making Muslims the enemy*. Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. *Psychological Review*, *102*(1), 4–27. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.102.1.4

Greenwald, A. G., & Krieger, L. H. (2006). Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations. *California Law Review*, *94*(4), 945. https://doi.org/10.2307/20439056

Greenwald, A. G., & Pettigrew, T. F. (2014). With malice toward none and charity for some: Ingroup favoritism enables discrimination. *American Psychologist*, *69*(7), 669–684. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0036056

Haner, M., Sloan, M. M., Cullen, F. T., Kulig, T. C., & Lero Jonson, C. (2019). Public Concern about Terrorism: Fear, Worry, and Support for Anti-Muslim Policies. *Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World*, *5*, 237802311985682. https://doi.org/10.1177/2378023119856825

Henry, P. J., & Sears, D. O. (2002). The symbolic racism 2000 scale. *Political Psychology*, *23*(2), 253–283. https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00281

Hippler, F. (Director). (1940). *Der Ewige Jude* [Propaganda; Documentary]. Terra Film. https://archive.org/details/DerEwigeJude1940

Hovland, C. I., & Weiss, W. (1951). The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness*. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *15*(4), 635–650. https://doi.org/10.1086/266350

Hu, Y., & Sundar, S. (2010). Effects of Online Health Sources on Credibility and Behavioral Intentions. *Communication Research*, *37*(1), 105–132. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650209351512

Huff, C., & Kertzer, J. D. (2018). How the Public Defines Terrorism. *American Journal of Political Science*, *62*(1), 55–71. JSTOR.

Ibrahim, D. (2010). The Framing of Islam On Network News Following the September 11Th Attacks. *International Communication Gazette*, *72*(1), 111–125. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048509350342

Institute for Economics & Peace. (2023, March). *Global Terrorism Index 2023: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTI-2023-web-170423.pdf

Institute for Economics & Peace. (2024, February). *Global Terrorism Index 2024: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GTI-2024-web-290224.pdf

Inwood, J. (2015). Neoliberal racism: The 'Southern Strategy' and the expanding geographies of white supremacy. *Social & Cultural Geography*, *16*(4), 407–423. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2014.994670

Jensen, K. B. (2021). Media effects: Quantitative traditions. In K. B. Jensen (Ed.), *A Handbook of Media and Communication Research* (3rd ed., pp. 156–176). Routledge.

Johnson, D. (2012). *Right wing resurgence: How a domestic terrorist threat is being ignored*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Katz, I. (1991). Gordon Allport's "The Nature of Prejudice." *Political Psychology*, *12*(1), 125–157. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/3791349

Katz, W. L. (1986). *The invisible empire: The Ku Klux Klan impact on history / by William Loren Katz*. Open Hand Pub.

Kearns, E. M., Betus, A. E., & Lemieux, A. F. (2019). Why Do Some Terrorist Attacks Receive More Media Attention Than Others? *Justice Quarterly*, *36*(6), 985–1022. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2018.1524507

Kearns, E. M., Betus, A. E., & Lemieux, A. F. (2021). When Data Do Not Matter: Exploring Public Perceptions of Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *44*(4), 285–309. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1543145

Kelly, A. (2017). The alt-right: Reactionary rehabilitation for white masculinity: US alt-right extremism is a logical consequence of mainstream neo-conservatism. *Soundings (13626620)*, *66*, 68–78. https://doi.org/10.3898/136266217821733688

Kelman, H. C., & Hovland, C. I. (1953). "Reinstatement" of the communicator in delayed measurement of opinion change. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *48*, 327–335. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0061861

Kim, D.-Y. (2014). The Effects of Message Framing and Source Credibility on Green Messages in Hotels. *Cornell Hospitality Quarterly*, *55*, 64–75. https://doi.org/10.1177/1938965513503400

Krogstad, J. M. (2019, October 7). Key facts about refugees to the U.S. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2019/10/07/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/

Kulig, T. C., Graham, A., Cullen, F. T., Piquero, A. R., & Haner, M. (2020). "Bad hombres" at the Southern US border? White nationalism and the perceived dangerousness of immigrants. *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 0004865820969760. https://doi.org/10.1177/0004865820969760

Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. *Psychological Bulletin*, *108*(3), 480.

Lassiter, M. D. (2006). *The Silent Majority: Suburban politics in the Sunbelt South* (STU-Student edition). Princeton University Press; JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt4cgcv8

Leong, N. (2012). Racial capitalism. *Harv. L. Rev.*, *126*, 2151.

Levitas, D. (2004). *The terrorist next door: The militia movement and the radical right*. Macmillan.

Linville, P. W., Fischer, G. W., & Salovey, P. (1989). Perceived distributions of the characteristics of in-group and out-group members: Empirical evidence and a computer

simulation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *57*(2), 165–188. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.57.2.165

Lipsitz, G. (2018). *The possessive investment in whiteness: How white people profit from identity politics* (Twentieth anniversary edition.). Temple University Press.

Marcks, H., & Pawelz, J. (2020). From Myths of Victimhood to Fantasies of Violence: How Far-Right Narratives of Imperilment Work. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1788544

Martínez, D. E., Martínez-Schuldt, R. D., & Cantor, G. (2018, January 1). *Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on "Sanctuary Cities" and Crime*. Sociology Compass. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12547

Mastro, D., Behm-Morawitz, E., & Ortiz, M. (2007). The Cultivation of Social Perceptions of Latinos: A Mental Models Approach. *Media Psychology*, *9*(2), 347–365. https://doi.org/10.1080/15213260701286106

Mastro, D. E. (2003). A social identity approach to understanding the impact of television messages. *Communication Monographs*, *70*(2), 98–113. https://doi.org/10.1080/0363775032000133764

Mastro, D. E., & Behm-Morawitz, E. (2005). Latino Representation on Primetime Television. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *82*(1), 110–130. https://doi.org/10.1177/107769900508200108

Mastro, D. E., Behm-Morawitz, E., & Kopacz, M. A. (2008). Exposure to Television Portrayals of Latinos: The Implications of Aversive Racism and Social Identity Theory. *Human Communication Research*, 32.

Mastro, D. E., & Kopacz, M. A. (2006). Media Representations of Race, Prototypicality, and Policy Reasoning: An Application of Self-Categorization Theory. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, *50*(2), 305–322. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15506878jobem5002_8

McCombs, M. (2002). The agenda-setting role of the mass media in the shaping of public opinion. *Mass Media Economics 2002 Conference, London School of Economics: Http://Sticerd. Lse. Ac. Uk/Dps/Extra/McCombs. Pdf*.

McCombs, M. (2005). A Look at Agenda-setting: Past, present and future. *Journalism Studies*, *6*(4), 543–557. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700500250438

McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *36*(2), 176–187. https://doi.org/10.1086/267990

McCroskey, J. C., & Richmond, V. P. (1996). *Fundamentals of human communication: An interpersonal perspective*. Waveland PressInc.

Mccullock, S. P., & Perrault, E. K. (2020). Exploring the Effects of Source Credibility and Message Framing on STI Screening Intentions: An Application of Prospect and Protection Motivation Theory. *Journal of Health Communication*, *25*(1), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1080/10810730.2019.1692262

McKay, H. (2019, June 6). *ISIS plotted to send westerners to US through Mexico border: Report* [Text.Article]. Fox News. https://www.foxnews.com/world/isis-plot-westerners-mexico-border

Meier, A. A. (2020). The Idea of Terror: Institutional Reproduction in Government Responses to Political Violence. *International Studies Quarterly*, *64*(3), 499–509. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa034

Meier, A. A. (2022). Terror as justice, justice as terror: Counterterrorism and anti-Black racism in the United States. *Critical Studies on Terrorism, 15*(1), 83–101. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2022.2031132

Menand, L. (2001). Morton, Agassiz, and the Origins of Scientific Racism in the United States. *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education*, *34*, 110–113. https://doi.org/10.2307/3134139

Meyer, D. S., & Staggenborg, S. (1996). Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity. *American Journal of Sociology, 101*(6), 1628–1660. JSTOR.

Miller-Idriss, C. (2019). *The Extreme Gone Mainstream: Commercialization and Far Right Youth Culture in Germany*. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691196152.001.0001

Mitnik, Z., Freilich, J., & Chermak, S. (2018). Post-9/11 Coverage of Terrorism in the New York Times. *Justice Quarterly*, *37*, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2018.1488985

Morris, A. D. (2000). Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals. *Contemporary Sociology*, *29*, 445–454.

Moses, A. D. (2019). "White Genocide" and the Ethics of Public Analysis. *Journal of Genocide Research*, *21*(2), 201–213. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2019.1599493

Mumm, J. (2017). The racial fix. *Focaal*, *2017*(79), 102–118. https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2017.790109

Nacos, B. L., Bloch-Elkon, Y., & Shapiro, R. Y. (2007). Post-9/11 Terrorism Threats, News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United States. *New York*, *1*, 22.

Nail, P. R., Harton, H. C., & Decker, B. P. (2003). Political orientation and modern versus aversive racism: Tests of Dovidio and Gaertner's (1998) integrated model. *Journal of*

Personality and Social Psychology, *84*(4), 754–770. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.4.754

Nellis, A. M., & Savage, J. (2012). Does Watching the News Affect Fear of Terrorism? The Importance of Media Exposure on Terrorism Fear. *Crime & Delinquency*, *58*(5), 748–768. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128712452961

Nowrasteh, A. (2019). *Terrorists by Immigration Status and Nationality: A Risk Analysis, 1975–2017* (866; Policy Analysis). The CATO Institute. https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terrorists-immigration-status-nationality-risk-analysis-1975-2017

Nutter, K. B. (2010). Boston, Busing, and the Bicentennial of 1976. *Historical Journal of Massachusetts*, 24.

O'Brien, B. G., Collingwood, L., & El-Khatib, S. O. (2019). The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration. *Urban Affairs Review*, *55*(1), 3–40. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087417704974

Park, J., Felix, K., & Lee, G. (2007). Implicit attitudes toward Arab-Muslims and the moderating effects of social information. *Basic & Applied Social Psychology*, *29*(1), 35–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/01973530701330942

Pearson, A. R., Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2009). The Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *3*(3), 314–338. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00183.x

Pérez, E. O. (2016). *Unspoken Politics: Implicit Attitudes and Political Thinking*. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge Core. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460078

Perloff, R. M., Dillard, J., & Pfau, M. (2002). Political Campaign Persuasion and Its Discontents. *The Persuasion Handbook*, 605–632.

Pew Research Center. (2016, February 3). Republicans Prefer Blunt Talk About Islamic Extremism, Democrats Favor Caution. *Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project*. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2016/02/03/republicans-prefer-blunt-talk-about-islamic-extremism-democrats-favor-caution/

Pew Research Center. (2017, July 26). How the U.S. general public views Muslims and Islam. *Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project*. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/07/26/how-the-u-s-general-public-views-muslims-and-islam/

Piazza, J. A. (2015). Terrorist Suspect Religious Identity and Public Support for Harsh Interrogation and Detention Practices. *Political Psychology*, *36*(6), 667–690. JSTOR.

Pitzer, A. (2024, July 23). *Trump's Massive Deportation Plan Echoes Concentration Camp History* [News]. Scientific American. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trumps-massive-deportation-plan-echoes-concentration-camp-history/

Pornpitakpan, C. (2004). The Persuasiveness of Source Credibility: A Critical Review of Five Decades' Evidence. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *34*(2), 243–281. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02547.x

Powell, K. (2018). Framing Islam/Creating Fear: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism from 2011–2016. *Religions*, *9*(9), 257. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9090257

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., & Levin, S. (2006). Social dominance theory and the dynamics of intergroup relations: Taking stock and looking forward. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *17*(1), 271–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280601055772

Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., & Ross, L. (2002). The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self versus others. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *28*, 369–381. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202286008

Roselle, L., Miskimmon, A., & O'Loughlin, B. (2014). Strategic narrative: A new means to understand soft power. *Media, War & Conflict*, *7*(1), 70–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635213516696

Ross, L. D. (1977). The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process1. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, *10*, 173–220.

Ruigrok, N., & Van Atteveldt, W. (2007). Global Angling with a Local Angle: How U.S., British, and Dutch Newspapers Frame Global and Local Terrorist Attacks. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, *12*(1), 68–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/1081180X06297436

Saleem, M., & Anderson, C. (2013). Arabs as Terrorists: Effects of Stereotypes Within Violent Contexts on Attitudes, Perceptions, and Affect. In *Psychology of Violence* (Vol. 3). https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030038

Saleem, M., Prot, S., Anderson, C. A., & Lemieux, A. F. (2017). Exposure to Muslims in Media and Support for Public Policies Harming Muslims. *Communication Research*, *44*(6), 841–869. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650215619214

Schafer, J. A., Mullins, C. W., & Box, S. (2014). Awakenings: The Emergence of White Supremacist Ideologies. *Deviant Behavior*, *35*(3), 173–196. https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2013.834755

Schultz, P., & Zelezny, L. C. (2003). Reframing Environmental Messages to be Congruent with American Values. *Human Ecology Review*, *10*, 126–136.

Schuster, M. A., Stein, B. D., Jaycox, L. H., Collins, R. L., Marshall, G. N., Elliott, M. N., Zhou, A. J., Kanouse, D. E., Morrison, J. L., & Berry, S. H. (2001). A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks. *New England Journal of Medicine*, *345*(20), 1507–1512. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJM200111153452024

Schwartzmann, K. (2019, August 22). *A Louisiana Parish Jailed a U.S. Citizen for Being Latinx. We're Suing.* American Civil Liberties Union. https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/race-and-criminal-justice/louisiana-parish-jailed-us-citizen-being-latinx-were

Sears, D., & Henry, P. (2005). Over Thirty Years Later: A Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism. In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 37, pp. 95–150). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(05)37002-X

Shaheen, J. G. (2003). Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *588*(1), 171–193. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716203588001011

Shimoni-Stoil, R. (2022). The Curious Case of Oscar Lorick: Race, Markets, and Militancy during the Farm Crisis. *Agricultural History*, *96*(4), 487–511. https://doi.org/10.1215/00021482-10009770

Silber-Mohamed, H., & Farris, E. M. (2019). 'Bad *hombres* '? An examination of identities in U.S. media coverage of immigration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1574221

Simi, P., & Futrell, R. (2010). *American Swastika Inside the White Power Movement's Hidden Spaces of Hate*.

Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Mullen, E. (2004). Political Tolerance and Coming to Psychological Closure Following the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks: An

Integrative Approach. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *30*(6), 743–756. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204263968

Sniderman, P. M., & Theriault, S. M. (2004). Studies in Public Opinion. In W. E. Saris & P. M. Sniderman (Eds.), *Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and Change* (pp. 133–165). Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691188386-007

Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. *American Sociological Review*, *51*(4), 464–481. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095581

Sontag, S. (2004). Regarding The Torture Of Others. *The New York Times*, 25–42.

Southern Poverty Law Center. (2017). *Alt-Right*. Southern Poverty Law Center. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/alt-right

Southern Poverty Law Center. (2022, March 23). *Family separation – a timeline*. Southern Poverty Law Center. https://www.splcenter.org/news/2022/03/23/family-separation-timeline

Speckhard, A. (2019, June 3). *PERSPECTIVE: ISIS Attack Plot Claim Underscores Border Vulnerability*. Homeland Security Today. https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/terrorism-study/perspective-isis-fighter-claims-attack-plot-via-mexico-underscoring-border-vulnerability/

Suro, R. (2008). *A Report on the Media and the Immigration Debate*. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/0925_immigration_dionne.pdf

Svihla, V., & Reeve, R. (2016). Facilitating Problem Framing in Project-Based Learning. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Problem-Based Learning*, *10*(2). https://doi.org/10.7771/1541-5015.1603

Tajfel, H. (1981). Human Groups and Social Categories. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *21*(3), 189–201. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.1982.tb00540.x

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In J. T. Jost & J. Sidanius (Eds.), *Political Psychology* (0 ed., pp. 276–293). Psychology Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203505984-16

Tarrant, B. (2019). *The Great Replacement*.

Tarrow, S. (1998). *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press; Cambridge Core. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813245

Tesler, M., & Sears, D. (2010). *Obama's Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America*. University of Chicago Press.

The Heritage Foundation. (2024). *Election Fraud Cases* [Dataset]. https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud/search?combine=&state=All&year=&case_type=All&fraud_type=All

The Soufan Center. (2023). *The Security Implications of Historic Levels of Migration at the U.S. Southwest Border*. The Soufan Center. https://mailchi.mp/thesoufancenter/the-security-implications-of-historic-levels-of-migration-at-the-us-southwest-border?e=6ce040d530

Tormala, Z. L., Briñol, P., & Petty, R. E. (2006). When credibility attacks: The reverse impact of source credibility on persuasion. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *42*(5), 684–691. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.10.005

Tormala, Z. L., & Clarkson, J. J. (2007). Assimilation and Contrast in Persuasion: The Effects of Source Credibility in Multiple Message Situations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *33*(4), 559–571. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206296955

Trump, D. (2015). *Remarks Announcing Candidacy for President in New York City | The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-announcing-candidacy-for-president-new-york-city

Trump, D. (2016a). *Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio | The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-accepting-the-presidential-nomination-the-republican-national-convention-cleveland

Trump, D. (2016b). *Remarks on Immigration at the Phoenix Convention Center in Phoenix, Arizona | The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-immigration-the-phoenix-convention-center-phoenix-arizona

Turner, J., & Oakes, P. (2011). The significance of the social identity concept for social psychology with reference to individualism, interactionism and social influence. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 25*, 237–252. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.1986.tb00732.x

Van Atteveldt, W., Ruigrok, N., & Kleinnijenhuis, J. (2006). Associative framing: A unified method for measuring media frames and the media agenda. *International Communication Association (ICA).*

Varela, J., Jr, E., Clark, J., Cramer, R., & Crosby, J. (2013). Development and preliminary validation of the Negative Attitude Toward Immigrants Scale. *Journal of Latina/o Psychology, 1*, 155. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033707

Viveca S. Greene. (2019). *"Deplorable" Satire: Alt-Right Memes, White Genocide Tweets, and Redpilling Normies*. *1*, 31.

Weisel, O., & Zultan, R. (2016). Social Motives in Intergroup Conflict: Group Identity and Perceived Target of Threat. *European Economic Review*, *90*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.01.004

West, K., & Lloyd, J. (2017). The Role of Labeling and Bias in the Portrayals of Acts of "Terrorism": Media Representations of Muslims vs. Non-Muslims. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, *37*, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1345103

White House. (2024). *President Biden Announces New Actions to Secure the Border*. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/04/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-new-actions-to-secure-the-border/

White Supremacist Infiltration of Law Enforcement. (2006). https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Jan-6-Clearinghouse-FBI-Intelligence-Assessment-White-Supremacist-Infiltration-of-Law-Enforcement-Oct-17-2006-UNREDACTED.pdf

Wong, M. A., Frank, R., & Allsup, R. (2015). The supremacy of online white supremacists – an analysis of online discussions by white supremacists. *Information & Communications Technology Law*, *24*(1), 41–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600834.2015.1011845

Wood, S. D., Jakubek, J. T., & Kelly, K. (2015). You've got to fight to be white: The rural foundation of the new militia for race control. *Contemporary Justice Review*, *18*(2), 215. https://doi.org/10.1080/10282580.2015.1025633

Yigit, I. H., & Tatch, A. (2017). Syrian Refugees and Americans: Perceptions, Attitudes and Insights. *American Journal of Qualitative Research*, *1*(1), 13–31. https://doi.org/10.29333/ajqr/5789

Zaller, J. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge University Press.

Zeskind, L. (2009). *Blood and Politics: The History of the White Nationalist Movement from the Margins to the Mainstream*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: First Pilot

Appendix A.1: Informed Consent

Title: Perceptions of Groups and Group Identifiers

Principal Investigator: Dr. Anthony Lemieux

Student Principal Investigator: Allison Betus

Introduction and Key Information You are invited to take part in a research study. It is up to you to decide if you would like to take part in the study. The purpose of this study is to understand the extent to which adult US citizens associate demographics and group terms. Your role in the study will last 5 to 10 minutes. You will be asked to do the following: Simply fill out the survey as honestly as possible. Participating in this study will not expose you to any more risks than you would experience in a typical day. This study is not designed to benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about how Americans perceive groups.

Purpose The purpose of the study is to understand how Americans perceive groups. You are invited to take part in this research study because you are an adult citizen of the United States of America. A total of about 600 people will be invited to take part in this study.

Procedures If you decide to take part, you will fill out a brief, multiple choice survey. There are no wrong answers. Study participation should take no more than 10 minutes.

Future Research Researchers will remove information that may identify you and may use your data for future research. If we do this, we will not ask for any additional consent from you.

Risks In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. No injury is expected from this study, but if you believe you have been harmed, contact the

research team as soon as possible. Georgia State University and the research team have not set aside funds to compensate for any injury.

Benefits This study is not designed to benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about the extent to which adult US citizens associate demographics and group terms.

Compensation You will receive fifty cents ($0.50) for participating in this study following completion of the survey.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may refuse to participate or stop participating at any time. This will not cause you to lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Confidentiality We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. The following people and entities will have access to the information you provide: Dr. Anthony Lemieux, Allison Betus, the GSU Institutional Review Board, and the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP). No identifying information is being collected. The information you provide will be stored on a password protected external hard drive and password protected cloud storage which only the researchers may access. When we present or publish the results of this study, we will not use your name or other information that may identify you. Please be aware that data sent over the Internet may not be secure.

Contact Information Contact Allison Betus at abetus1@student.gsu.edu if you have questions, concerns, or complaints about the study. The IRB at Georgia State University reviews all research that involves human participants. You can contact the IRB if you would like to speak to someone who is not involved directly with the study. You can contact the IRB for questions,

concerns, problems, information, input, or questions about your rights as a research participant. Contact the IRB at 404-413-3500 or irb@gsu.edu.

Consent If you are willing and qualified to volunteer for this research, please indicate so below. Please note that this survey will be best displayed on a laptop or desktop computer. Some features may be less compatible for use on a mobile device.

- ○ I consent, am from the US, and currently live there.
- ○ I do not consent, am not from the US, or currently do not live there

Appendix A.2 Survey

Please select all terms that you recognize.

White Nationalist

Kluxer

Racial Realist

Identitarian

Alt-Right

Alt-Lite

Sovereign Citizen

White Separatist

Patriot

Skinhead

Neo-Confederate

Neo-Nazi

Accelerationist

Dissident Right

Paleoconservative

Red Pilled

Christian Identity

Neo-Paganism

Extreme Right

Ecofascist

Antifa

Trans Exclusionary Radical Feminist (TERF)

White Feminist

Militia Leader

Klangus Priesthood

Sometimes people describe themselves with terms that can have many meanings. In your opinion, how likely is it that a person identifying with the following terms is a white supremacist?

	Extremely likely	Somewhat likely	Neither likely nor unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Extremely unlikely
White Nationalist	○	○	○	○	○
Kluxer	○	○	○	○	○
Racial Realist	○	○	○	○	○
Identitarian	○	○	○	○	○
Alt-Right	○	○	○	○	○
Alt-Lite	○	○	○	○	○
Sovereign Citizen	○	○	○	○	○
White Separatist	○	○	○	○	○
Patriot	○	○	○	○	○
Skinhead	○	○	○	○	○
Neo-Confederate	○	○	○	○	○
Neo-Nazi	○	○	○	○	○
Accelerationist	○	○	○	○	○
Dissident Right	○	○	○	○	○
Paleoconservative	○	○	○	○	○
Red Pilled	○	○	○	○	○
Christian Identity	○	○	○	○	○
Neo-Paganism	○	○	○	○	○
Extreme Right	○	○	○	○	○
Ecofascist	○	○	○	○	○
Antifa	○	○	○	○	○
Paleoconservative	○	○	○	○	○
Trans Exclusionary Radical Feminist (TERF)	○	○	○	○	○
White Feminist	○	○	○	○	○
Militia Leader	○	○	○	○	○
Klangus Priesthood	○	○	○	○	○

How likely is it that someone from the Middle East is Muslim?

Extremely likely

Somewhat likely

Neither likely nor unlikely

Somewhat unlikely

Extremely unlikely

How likely is it that someone from Europe is White?

Extremely likely

Somewhat likely

Neither likely nor unlikely

Somewhat unlikely

Extremely unlikely

How likely is it that someone from England is White?

Extremely likely

Somewhat likely

Neither likely nor unlikely

Somewhat unlikely

Extremely unlikely

How likely is it that someone from South America is Latinx?

- ○ Extremely likely
- ○ Somewhat likely
- ○ Neither likely nor unlikely
- ○ Somewhat unlikely
- ○ Extremely unlikely

How likely is it that someone from Armenia is White?

- ○ Extremely likely
- ○ Somewhat likely
- ○ Neither likely nor unlikely
- ○ Somewhat unlikely
- ○ Extremely unlikely

How likely is it that someone from Mexico is Latinx?

- ○ Extremely likely
- ○ Somewhat likely
- ○ Neither likely nor unlikely
- ○ Somewhat unlikely
- ○ Extremely unlikely

How likely is it that someone from Venezuela is Latinx?

- ○ Extremely likely
- ○ Somewhat likely
- ○ Neither likely nor unlikely
- ○ Somewhat unlikely
- ○ Extremely unlikely

How likely is it that someone from Syria is Muslim?

- ○ Extremely likely
- ○ Somewhat likely
- ○ Neither likely nor unlikely
- ○ Somewhat unlikely
- ○ Extremely unlikely

How likely is it that someone from Iraq is Muslim?

- ○ Extremely likely
- ○ Somewhat likely
- ○ Neither likely nor unlikely
- ○ Somewhat unlikely
- ○ Extremely unlikely

Please read the vignette and tell us your honest opinion in the question that follows.

Negative Condition:

I have several reasons why I think the US should stop accepting immigrants. People are surging

over here and some of them do not have the US' best interest at heart. We have to be wary of terror threats that immigrants bring along with them. And then there's all the violence and drugs that their friends bring in. Beyond that, people from other cultures bring their own values here and I can barely even recognize my neighborhood anymore. They won't learn our culture. I don't like it and I miss how it was before they came over here. I worry about how they'll vote too. Who's to say they won't try to implement their laws over here? Finally, we just can't support everyone and their deadbeat families.

Would you say the text is positive, negative, or neutral?

- ○ Extremely positive
- ○ Somewhat positive
- ○ Neutral
- ○ Somewhat negative
- ○ Extremely negative

Please read the vignette and tell us your honest opinion in the question that follows.

Ambiguous Condition:

I have several reasons why I think the US should stop accepting immigrants. People are coming over here and some of them do not have the US' best interest at heart. We have to be wary of terror threats. And then there's all the violence and drugs. Beyond that, people from other

cultures bring their own values here. They don’t learn our culture. I don’t like it. I worry about how they’ll vote too. Finally, we just can’t support everyone.

Would you say the text is positive, negative, or neutral?

- ○ Extremely positive
- ○ Somewhat positive
- ○ Neutral
- ○ Somewhat negative
- ○ Extremely negative

How old are you?

- ○ Under 18
- ○ 18 - 24
- ○ 25 - 34
- ○ 35 - 44
- ○ 45 - 54
- ○ 55 - 64

- ○ 65 - 74
- ○ 75 - 84
- ○ 85 or older

Were you born and currently living in the US?

- ○ Yes, I was born in the US and live there
- ○ I was not born in the US and/or do not live there

Appendix B: Second Pilot

Appendix B.1: Informed Consent

Title: US Citizens' Perceptions of Groups

Principal Investigator: Dr. Anthony Lemieux

Student Principal Investigator: Allison Betus

Introduction and Key Information You are invited to take part in a research study. It is up to you to decide if you would like to take part in the study. The purpose of this study is to understand how US citizens perceive opinions about groups of people. Your role in the study will last 5 to 10 minutes. You will be asked to do the following: Simply fill out the survey as honestly as possible. Participating in this study will not expose you to any more risks than you would experience in a typical day. This study is not designed to benefit you. Overall, we hope to gain information about how Americans perceive groups.

Purpose The purpose of the study is to understand how US citizens perceive opinions about groups of people. You are invited to take part in this research study because you are an adult citizen of the United States of America. About 600 people will be invited to take part in this study.

Procedures If you decide to take part, you will read a short vignette and answer a few questions. There are no wrong answers. Study participation should take no more than 10 minutes.

Future Research Researchers will remove information that may identify you and may use your data for future research. If we do this, we will not ask for any additional consent from you.

Risks In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. No injury is expected from this study, but if you believe you have been harmed, contact the research

team as soon as possible. Georgia State University and the research team have not set aside funds to compensate for any injury.

Benefits This study is not designed to benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about the extent to which adult US citizens associate demographics and group terms.

Compensation You will receive five cents ($0.05) for participating in this study following completion of the survey.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may refuse to participate or stop participating at any time. This will not cause you to lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Confidentiality We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. The following people and entities will have access to the information you provide: Allison Betus, the GSU Institutional Review Board, and the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP). We will use a study number rather than your name on study records. The information you provide will be stored on a password protected external hard drive and password protected cloud storage. When we present or publish the results of this study, we will not use your name or other information that may identify you. Please be aware that data sent over the Internet may not be secure.

Contact Information Contact Allison Betus at abetus1@student.gsu.edu if you have questions about the study or your part in it. If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about the study, the IRB at Georgia State University reviews all research that involves human participants. You can contact the IRB if you would like to speak to someone who is not involved directly with the study. You can contact the IRB for questions, concerns, problems, information, input, or

questions about your rights as a research participant. Contact the IRB at 404-413-3500 or irb@gsu.edu.

Consent If you are willing and qualified to volunteer for this research, please indicate so below. Please note that this survey will be best displayed on a laptop or desktop computer. Some features may be less compatible for use on a mobile device.

- ○ I consent, am from the US, and currently live there.
- ○ I do not consent, am not from the US, or currently do not live there

Appendix B.2: Survey

Please read the vignette and tell us your honest opinion in the question that follows.

Ambiguous Condition:

Honestly, I support shutting down immigration. We need to focus on attracting only the cream of the crop and preventing drugs and violence from coming into our communities. Some of the people coming here could even be potential terrorist sympathizers too.

I also wish folks who've crossed the border would try to see our perspective on a lot of things. I don't understand why they should get the right to vote when so many people who were born here can't. The tax burden is also an issue. We don't have infinite money to support everyone who wants to come here.

How does this speaker seem to feel about the group they are discussing?

- ○ Extremely positive
- ○ Somewhat positive
- ○ Neither positive nor negative
- ○ Somewhat negative
- ○ Extremely negative

How much do you think the speaker relied on facts for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

How much do you think the speaker relied on stereotypes for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

Please read the vignette and tell us your honest opinion in the question that follows.

Negative Condition:

Honestly, I support shutting down immigration. We need to focus on fixing our broken borders and stopping the drugs and violence surging into our communities. Any of the people coming here could even be potential terrorist sympathizers too.

I also wish folks who've crossed the border would act like they live here. I don't understand why they should get the right to vote when they don't understand what citizens here want. The tax burden is also an issue. We don't have infinite money to support everyone who wants a handout.

How does this speaker seem to feel about the group they are discussing?

- ○ Extremely positive
- ○ Somewhat positive
- ○ Neither positive nor negative
- ○ Somewhat negative
- ○ Extremely negative

How much do you think the speaker relied on facts for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

How much do you think the speaker relied on stereotypes for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

Q23 How old are you?

- Under 18
- 18 - 24
- 25 - 34
- 35 - 44
- 45 - 54
- 55 - 64
- 65 - 74
- 75 - 84
- 85 or older

Were you born and currently living in the US?

- Yes, I was born in the US and live there
- I was not born in the US and/or do not live there

Q26 Which group of people did you read about?

- ○ Immigrants
- ○ Pregnant Women
- ○ Unemployed People

Appendix C: Third Pilot

Appendix C.1: Informed Consent

Title: US Citizens' Perceptions of Groups

Principal Investigator: Dr. Anthony Lemieux

Student Principal Investigator: Allison Betus

Introduction and Key Information You are invited to take part in a research study. It is up to you to decide if you would like to take part in the study. The purpose of this study is to understand how US citizens perceive opinions about groups of people. Your role in the study will last 5 to 10 minutes. You will be asked to do the following: Simply fill out the survey as honestly as possible. Participating in this study will not expose you to any more risks than you would experience in a typical day. This study is not designed to benefit you. Overall, we hope to gain information about how Americans perceive groups.

Purpose The purpose of the study is to understand how US citizens perceive opinions about groups of people. You are invited to take part in this research study because you are an adult citizen of the United States of America. About 600 people will be invited to take part in this study.

Procedures If you decide to take part, you will read a short vignette and answer a few questions. There are no wrong answers. Study participation should take no more than 10 minutes.

Future Research Researchers will remove information that may identify you and may use your data for future research. If we do this, we will not ask for any additional consent from you.

Risks In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. No injury is expected from this study, but if you believe you have been harmed, contact the research

team as soon as possible. Georgia State University and the research team have not set aside funds to compensate for any injury.

Benefits This study is not designed to benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about the extent to which adult US citizens associate demographics and group terms.

Compensation You will receive five cents ($0.05) for participating in this study following completion of the survey.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may refuse to participate or stop participating at any time. This will not cause you to lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Confidentiality We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. The following people and entities will have access to the information you provide: Allison Betus, the GSU Institutional Review Board, and the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP). We will use a study number rather than your name on study records. The information you provide will be stored on a password protected external hard drive and password protected cloud storage. When we present or publish the results of this study, we will not use your name or other information that may identify you. Please be aware that data sent over the Internet may not be secure.

Contact Information Contact Dr. Anthony Lemieux at alemieux@gsu.edu or Allison Betus at abetus1@student.gsu.edu if you have questions, concerns, or complaints about the study. The IRB at Georgia State University reviews all research that involves human participants. You can contact the IRB if you would like to speak to someone who is not involved directly with the study. You can contact the IRB for questions, concerns, problems, information, input, or

questions about your rights as a research participant. Contact the IRB at 404-413-3500 or irb@gsu.edu.

Consent If you are willing and qualified to volunteer for this research, please indicate so below. Please note that this survey will be best displayed on a laptop or desktop computer. Some features may be less compatible for use on a mobile device.

- ○ I consent, am from the US, and currently live there.
- ○ I do not consent, am not from the US, or currently do not live there

Appendix C.2: Survey

VigIntro Please read the vignette and answer the questions that follow.

Out/Ex I think we need to shut down immigration entirely to fix our illegal immigrant problem. We now have to worry about our borders because of terrorists. If outsiders want to be here then they should stop whining about discrimination and follow the rules. We don’t need more criminals and drug dealers here and we definitely don’t need them voting. If those folks want to thrive in the US, they can try some hard work instead of whatever it is they do back home. I don't like parasites. I am not happy about my tax dollars supporting cheaters and their families.

Out/Exfeel How does this speaker seem to feel about the group they are discussing?

- Extremely negative
- Somewhat negative
- Neither positive nor negative
- Somewhat positive
- Extremely positive

MOp How much do you think the speaker relied on facts for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

MS How much do you think the speaker relied on stereotypes for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

VigIntro2 Please read the vignette and tell us your honest opinion in the question that follows.

In/Ex I think we need to shut down immigration entirely to fix our illegal immigrant problem. The rules are in place to protect us from terrorists. If that's discrimination, what do you call Americans living in fear for the benefit of cheaters? We deserve to be protected from drug dealers, criminals, and election fraud. Americans are a cut above the rest and we need to protect

them instead of stooping to match the rest of the world. I don't seeing people leech off hardworking Americans. I'd much rather spend my taxes on folks who are actually making an effort to fit in.

InExFeel How does this speaker seem to feel about the group they are discussing?

- ○ Extremely positive
- ○ Somewhat positive
- ○ Neither positive nor negative
- ○ Somewhat negative
- ○ Extremely negative

InExO How much do you think the speaker relied on facts for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

InExS How much do you think the speaker relied on stereotypes for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

Q36 Please read the vignette and tell us your honest opinion in the question that follows.

Out/Sym I support shutting down immigration entirely until we can get illegal immigration under control. We have to maintain high standards at our borders to keep out terror threats. I hear people talking about how we're discriminating by doing that but it's 2021. We're all equal under the law now. Besides that, drugs and crime are flooding into our communities. I worry about how it will affect elections. Folks need to work hard if they want to thrive in America, not just show up asking for a hand out. It's not fair that people who didn't follow the rules can make demands. Why should my taxes go to supporting line jumping?

OurSFeel How does this speaker seem to feel about the group they are discussing?

- ○ Extremely positive
- ○ Somewhat positive
- ○ Neither positive nor negative
- ○ Somewhat negative
- ○ Extremely negative

OutSO How much do you think the speaker relied on facts for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

OutSS How much do you think the speaker relied on stereotypes for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

Q41 Please read the vignette and tell us your honest opinion in the question that follows.

In/Sym I support shutting down immigration entirely until we can get illegal immigration under control. We have to maintain high standards at our borders to protect ourselves from terrorists. I know that, historically, we've made some mistakes with how we treat people but it's 2021. We're all equal in the eyes of US law. Besides that, we have to everything we can to prevent drugs and crime from harming our communities and elections. American values are a cut above the rest and we need to protect them even if some people say it's wrong. We thrive because we work hard. Do that and you'll never need a handout. People who only take what they earn should be the only folks making demands. We've got to take care of the folks who are already here legally first.

InSymFeel How does this speaker seem to feel about the group they are discussing?

- ○ Extremely positive
- ○ Somewhat positive
- ○ Neither positive nor negative
- ○ Somewhat negative
- ○ Extremely negative

InSymO How much do you think the speaker relied on facts for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

InSymS How much do you think the speaker relied on stereotypes for their opinion?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

Q23 How old are you?

- Under 18
- 18 - 24
- 25 - 34
- 35 - 44
- 45 - 54
- 55 - 64
- 65 - 74
- 75 - 84
- 85 or older

Q24 Were you born and currently living in the US?

- Yes, I was born in the US and live there
- I was not born in the US and/or do not live there

Q26 Which group of people was discussed earlier in the study?

- ○ Immigrants
- ○ Pregnant Women
- ○ Unemployed People

Appendix D: Final Survey

Appendix D.1: Informed Consent

Title: US Citizens' Perceptions of Immigration to the US

Principal Investigator: Dr. Anthony Lemieux

Student Principal Investigator: Allison Betus

Introduction and Key Information

You are invited to take part in a research study. Participation is strictly voluntary. We are interested in understanding Americans' attitudes towards immigration. You will be asked to give your opinions and respond to a short passage. Please be assured that your responses will be kept completely confidential. Your role in the study will last 15 to 20 minutes.

Simply fill out the survey as honestly as possible. Participating in this study will not expose you to any more risks than you would experience in a typical day. Although this study is not designed to benefit you, we hope to gain information about how Americans perceive immigration.

Purpose

The purpose of the study is to understand how US citizens born in the US perceive immigration to the US. You are invited to take part in this research study because you are an adult and US citizen born in the US.

Procedures

If you decide to take part, you will read a short passage and take a survey. There are no wrong answers. Study participation should take no more than 30 minutes.

Future Research

The researchers will not collect information that may identify you. If we conduct further research on this data, we will not ask for any additional consent from you.

Risks

In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would experience in a normal day. No injury is expected from this study, but if you believe you have been harmed, contact the research team as soon as possible. Georgia State University and the research team have not set aside funds to compensate for any injury.

Benefits

This study is not designed to benefit you personally. We hope to gain information about how Americans perceive immigration.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal

Participation is voluntary. You have the right to refuse to participate or stop participating at any time. This will not cause you to lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Confidentiality

We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. We will not collect personally identifying information at any point, nor will it be requested. Please be aware that data sent over the Internet may not be secure.

Contact Information

Contact Dr. Anthony Lemieux at alemieux@gsu.edu or Allison Betus at abetus1@student.gsu.edu if you have questions, concerns, or complaints about the study.

The IRB at Georgia State University reviews all research that involves human participants. You can contact the IRB if you would like to speak to someone who is not involved directly with the study. You can contact the IRB for questions, concerns, problems, information, input, or questions about your rights as a research participant. Contact the IRB at 404-413-3500 or irb@gsu.edu.

Consent

If you are willing and qualified to volunteer for this research, please indicate so below.

- ○ I consent, begin the study
- ○ I do not consent, I do not wish to participate

AppendixD.2: Survey

Q112 We are interested in how you feel about immigrants to the US. Please select the answers that most closely reflect how you feel. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private

RNATIS1 Immigrants should be given the same rights as native citizens.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

NATIS2 Immigrants do not have valid reasons for leaving their native country.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

NATIS3 Immigrants in large groups are dangerous.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

NATIS4 Immigrants bring the problems of their native country to America.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

NATIS5 Immigrants are a burden on American tax payers.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

NATIS6 Allowing people to immigrate to the United States is a bad idea.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

NATIS7 Immigrants never want to return to their native/home country.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

NATIS8 Immigrants' culture(s) dilutes American culture.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

NATIS9 Immigrants are a threat to national security.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

NATIS10 Immigrants are not as smart as Americans.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

NATIS11 Immigrants get preferential treatment compared with citizens.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

NATIS12 There are too many immigrants in the United States.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q201 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

IraqWNEx I think we need to shut down immigration from places like Iraq entirely to fix our illegal immigrant problem. We now have to worry about our borders because of terrorists. If outsiders want to be here then they should stop whining about discrimination and follow the rules. We don’t need more criminals and drug dealers here and we definitely don’t need them voting. If those folks want to thrive in the US, they can try some hard work instead of whatever it is they do back home. I don't like parasites. I am not happy about my tax dollars supporting cheaters and their families and I will not apologize for being a White nationalist.

LikeMeIraqWNEx I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

AgreeIraqWNEx I agree with the statement I just read.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

FactsIraqWNEx I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeIraqWNEx I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

Q200 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

IraqWNIm I support shutting down immigration from places like Iraq entirely until we can get illegal immigration under control. We have to maintain high standards at our borders to protect ourselves from terrorists. I know that, historically, we've made some mistakes with how we treat people but it's 2021. We're all equal in the eyes of US law. Besides that, we have to everything we can to prevent drugs and crime from harming our communities and elections. American values are a cut above the rest and we need to protect them even if some people say it's wrong. We thrive because we work hard. Do that and you'll never need a handout. People who only take what they earn should be the only folks making demands. We've got to take care of the folks who are already here legally first and I will not apologize for being a White nationalist.

LikeMeIraqWNIm I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeIraqWNIm I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

AgreeIraqWNIm I agree with the statement I just read.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

FactsIraqWNIm I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

Q199 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

IraqPEx I think we need to shut down immigration from places like Iraq entirely to fix our illegal immigrant problem. We now have to worry about our borders because of terrorists. If outsiders want to be here then they should stop whining about discrimination and follow the rules. We don’t need more criminals and drug dealers here and we definitely don’t need them voting. If those folks want to thrive in the US, they can try some hard work instead of whatever it is they do back home. I don't like parasites. I am not happy about my tax dollars supporting cheaters and their families and I will not apologize for being a patriot.

FactsIraqPEx I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

AgreeIraqPEx I agree with the statement I just read.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeIraqPEx I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- A great deal
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

LikeMeIraqPEx I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- A great deal
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

Q198 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

IraqPIm I support shutting down immigration from places like Iraq entirely until we can get illegal immigration under control. We have to maintain high standards at our borders to protect ourselves from terrorists. I know that, historically, we've made some mistakes with how we treat people but it's 2021. We're all equal in the eyes of US law. Besides that, we have to everything we can to prevent drugs and crime from harming our communities and elections. American values are a cut above the rest and we need to protect them even if some people say it's wrong. We thrive because we work hard. Do that and you'll never need a handout. People who only take what they earn should be the only folks making demands. We've got to take care of the folks who are already here legally first and I will not apologize for being a patriot.

FactsIraqPIm I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

AgreeIraqPIm I agree with the statement I just read.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeIraqPIm I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeMeIraqPIm I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- A great deal
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

Q197 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

MexWNEx I think we need to shut down immigration from places like Mexico entirely to fix our illegal immigrant problem. We now have to worry about our borders because of terrorists. If outsiders want to be here then they should stop whining about discrimination and follow the rules. We don’t need more criminals and drug dealers here and we definitely don’t need them voting. If those folks want to thrive in the US, they can try some hard work instead of whatever it is they do back home. I don't like parasites. I am not happy about my tax dollars supporting cheaters and their families and I will not apologize for being a White nationalist.

FactsMexWNEx I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

AgreeMexWNEx I agree with the statement I just read.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeMexWNEx I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- A great deal
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

LikeMeMexWNEx I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- A great deal
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

Q196 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

MexWNIm I support shutting down immigration from places like Mexico entirely until we can get illegal immigration under control. We have to maintain high standards at our borders to protect ourselves from terrorists. I know that, historically, we've made some mistakes with how we treat people but it's 2021. We're all equal in the eyes of US law. Besides that, we have to everything we can to prevent drugs and crime from harming our communities and elections. American values are a cut above the rest and we need to protect them even if some people say it's wrong. We thrive because we work hard. Do that and you'll never need a handout. People who only take what they earn should be the only folks making demands. We've got to take care of the folks who are already here legally first and I will not apologize for being a White nationalist.

FactsMexWNIm I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

AgreeMexWNIm I agree with the statement I just read.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeMexWNIm I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeMeMexWNIm I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

Q195 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

MexPEx I think we need to shut down immigration from places like Mexico entirely to fix our illegal immigrant problem. We now have to worry about our borders because of terrorists. If outsiders want to be here then they should stop whining about discrimination and follow the rules. We don’t need more criminals and drug dealers here and we definitely don’t need them voting. If those folks want to thrive in the US, they can try some hard work instead of whatever it is they do back home. I don't like parasites. I am not happy about my tax dollars supporting cheaters and their families and I will not apologize for being a patriot.

FactsMexPEx I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

AgreeMexPEx I agree with the statement I just read.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeMexPEx I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- A great deal
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

LikeMeMexPEx I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- A great deal
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

Q194 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

MexPIm I support shutting down immigration from places like Mexico entirely until we can get illegal immigration under control. We have to maintain high standards at our borders to protect ourselves from terrorists. I know that, historically, we've made some mistakes with how we treat people but it's 2021. We're all equal in the eyes of US law. Besides that, we have to everything we can to prevent drugs and crime from harming our communities and elections. American values are a cut above the rest and we need to protect them even if some people say it's wrong. We thrive because we work hard. Do that and you'll never need a handout. People who only take what they earn should be the only folks making demands. We've got to take care of the folks who are already here legally first and I will not apologize for being a patriot.

FactsMexPIm I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

AgreeMexPIm I agree with the statement I just read.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeMexPIm I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeMeMexPIm I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- A great deal
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

Q193 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

EngWNEx I think we need to shut down immigration from places like England entirely to fix our illegal immigrant problem. We now have to worry about our borders because of terrorists. If outsiders want to be here then they should stop whining about discrimination and follow the rules. We don’t need more criminals and drug dealers here and we definitely don’t need them voting. If those folks want to thrive in the US, they can try some hard work instead of whatever it is they do back home. I don't like parasites. I am not happy about my tax dollars supporting cheaters and their families and I will not apologize for being a White nationalist

FactsEngWNEx I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

AgreeEngWNEx I agree with the statement I just read.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeEngWNEx I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeMeEngWNEx I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

Q192 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

EngWNIm I support shutting down immigration from places like England entirely until we can get illegal immigration under control. We have to maintain high standards at our borders to protect ourselves from terrorists. I know that, historically, we've made some mistakes with how we treat people but it's 2021. We're all equal in the eyes of US law. Besides that, we have to everything we can to prevent drugs and crime from harming our communities and elections. American values are a cut above the rest and we need to protect them even if some people say it's wrong. We thrive because we work hard. Do that and you'll never need a handout. People who only take what they earn should be the only folks making demands. We've got to take care of the folks who are already here legally first and I will not apologize for being a White nationalist.

FactsEngWNIm I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

AgreeEngWNIm I agree with the statement I just read.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeEngWNIm I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeMeEngWNIm I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- A great deal
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

Q191 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

EngPEx I think we need to shut down immigration from places like England entirely to fix our illegal immigrant problem. We now have to worry about our borders because of terrorists. If outsiders want to be here then they should stop whining about discrimination and follow the rules. We don’t need more criminals and drug dealers here and we definitely don’t need them voting. If those folks want to thrive in the US, they can try some hard work instead of whatever it is they do back home. I don't like parasites. I am not happy about my tax dollars supporting cheaters and their families and I will not apologize for being a patriot.

FactsEngPEx I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- Absolutely
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

AgreeEngPEx I agree with the statement I just read.

- Absolutely
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

LikeEngPEx I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- A great deal
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

LikeMeEngPEx I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- A great deal
- A lot
- Somewhat
- A little
- Not at all

Q190 Please read the passage below and answer the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private.

EngPIm I support shutting down immigration from places like England entirely until we can get illegal immigration under control. We have to maintain high standards at our borders to protect ourselves from terrorists. I know that, historically, we've made some mistakes with how we treat people but it's 2021. We're all equal in the eyes of US law. Besides that, we have to everything we can to prevent drugs and crime from harming our communities and elections. American values are a cut above the rest and we need to protect them even if some people say it's wrong. We thrive because we work hard. Do that and you'll never need a handout. People who only take what they earn should be the only folks making demands. We've got to take care of the folks who are already here legally first and I will not apologize for being a patriot.

FactsEngPIm I think the statement I just read was rooted in facts.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

AgreeEngPIm I agree with the statement I just read.

- ○ Absolutely
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeEngPIm I think the person who gave the interview likes immigrants _____.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

LikeMeEngPIm I think the person who gave the interview is _____ like me.

- ○ A great deal
- ○ A lot
- ○ Somewhat
- ○ A little
- ○ Not at all

Q125 We are interested in how you feel about immigrants to the US. Please select the answers that most closely reflect how you feel. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private

Q173 It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if immigrants would only try harder they could be just as well off as US citizens.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q174 Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Modern immigrants should do the same.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q175 Some say that immigrant leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven't pushed fast enough. What do you think?

- ○ They're trying to push much too fast
- ○ They're pushing at about the right speed
- ○ They're not pushing fast enough

Q176 How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think immigrants are responsible for creating?

- ○ All of it
- ○ Most of it
- ○ Some of it
- ○ None at all

Q177R How much discrimination against immigrants do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead?

- ○ A great deal
- ○ Some
- ○ A little
- ○ None at all

Q178R Generations of discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for immigrants to work their way out of the lower class.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q179R Over the past few years, immigrants have gotten less than they deserve.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q180 Over the past few years, immigrants have gotten more economically than they deserve.

- ○ Strongly agree
- ○ Somewhat agree
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree
- ○ Somewhat disagree
- ○ Strongly disagree

Q128 We are interested in how you feel about immigrants to the US. Please select the answers that most closely reflect how you feel. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions, which will be kept private

Illegal immigration concerns me _____.

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

Immigrants are disproportionately responsible for the spread of COVID 19.

- Definitely yes
- Probably yes
- Might or might not be
- Probably not
- Definitely not

I am _____ worried about terrorist attacks happening in the US.

- ○ Extremely
- ○ Very
- ○ Moderately
- ○ Slightly
- ○ Not

What is your gender?

- ○ Man
- ○ Woman
- ○ Other
- ○ Prefer not to say

How old are you?

- ○ Under 18
- ○ 18 - 24
- ○ 25 - 34
- ○ 35 - 44
- ○ 45 - 54
- ○ 55 - 64
- ○ 65 - 74
- ○ 75 - 84
- ○ 85 or older
- ○ Prefer not to say

What is your political affiliation?

- ○ Democrat
- ○ Republican
- ○ Independent

- ○ No affiliation
- ○ Other
- ○ Prefer not to say

What is your religious affiliation?

- ○ Christian
- ○ Muslim
- ○ Jewish
- ○ Other
- ○ No Affiliation
- ○ Prefer not to say

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- ○ Less than high school
- ○ High school graduate
- ○ Some college

- ○ 2 year degree
- ○ 4 year degree
- ○ Professional degree
- ○ Doctorate

What is your race? Please select all that apply.

- ○ White
- ○ Black / African American / Caribbean
- ○ Latino / Hispanic
- ○ Indigenous American
- ○ Asian
- ○ Arab / Middle Eastern
- ○ Pacific Islander
- ○ Unsure
- ○ Prefer not to say

Were any of the people who raised you immigrants?

- ○ Yes, all of them
- ○ Yes, but not all
- ○ No

Are you a US citizen?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

Are you an immigrant?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No