Extending Tomas Kulka's Aesthetic Dualism: Value, Not Meaning, in the Case of Absolute Music

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EXTENDING TOMAS KULKA’S AESTHETIC DUALISM: VALUE, NOT MEANING, IN THE CASE OF ABSOLUTE MUSIC

by

TYSON BITTRICH

Under the direction of Dr. Jessica N. Berry

ABSTRACT

Within the past few decades the topic of musical meaning in the case of absolute music has received increasingly greater attention in the philosophical communities. One discussion is a debate between Constantijn Koopman and Stephen Davies, on the one side, and Peter Kivy, on the other. In this paper, I argue that many of the features of the musical encounter captured in terms of meaning by Koopman & Davies’ position are better addressed in terms of value. On Kivy’s suggestions, I contend we avoid use of the term ‘meaning’. To wit, I extend a conceptual framework for aesthetic value, advocated elsewhere by Thomas Kulka, to make the case that absolute music has the kinds of value that explain our tendency to ascribe ‘meaning’ to it, and that absolute music is valuable in multiple philosophically relevant ways, even if not meaningful in any.

INDEX WORDS: Musical Meaning, Absolute Music, Stephen Davies, Peter Kivy, Tomas Kulka, Aesthetic Dualism, Aesthetic Value.
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VALUE, NOT MEANING, IN THE CASE OF ABSOLUTE MUSIC

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Presented in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts in Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2012
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January 2013
I’d like to thank my committee members Steve Jacobson and Andrea Scarantino, as well as the ever patient and encouraging Jessica Berry. The process was both moving and meaningful.
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When Schindler asked Beethoven to explain the “meaning” of Beethoven’s Sonata in d minor, Opus 31 no. 2 … Beethoven cryptically suggested that Schindler read Shakespeare’s *Tempest*.¹

Within the past few decades, the academic philosophical communities most concerned with aesthetics and philosophy of art have paid the topic of *musical meaning* increasing attention. The reasons for this may not be apparent. Speaking generally about music, it seems apparent that music moves listeners, that music is ubiquitous across culture and generation, and that the reason for music’s ubiquity is due, in large part, to music’s ability to move listeners. These assertions are seldom contested, yet how we as philosophers unpack the claim that “music moves listeners” is quite contentious. One might think music’s ability to move listeners can be explained by its capacity to carry meaning. But major questions about musical meaning remain open to consideration: whether musical works “mean,” how musical works “mean,” and then, of course, what musical works “mean.”

Consider the case of Ludwig von Beethoven and the piano sonata popularly referred to as “The Tempest Sonata.” The scare quotes around “meaning” in the epigraph above, from the *Harvard Dictionary of Music*, suggest some confusion, worry, or vagueness about what it would even mean for a traditionally non-representational artform, chamber music in the early nineteenth century, to have a meaning.² Shakespeare’s *Tempest* is *about* something— for starters, exile, loyalty, political dealings, love, and forgiveness. Sonata in d minor, Opus 31 no. 2 doesn’t seem to be *about* anything. Perhaps the entry is evidence that Beethoven simply failed to

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² An artwork or art-kind is said to be ‘representational’ either when it depicts some entity as having certain characteristics, or when some individual, entity, or event can be seen-in, heard-in, or otherwise observed-in the work itself. In pictorial art, a Jackson Pollock work is non-representational, whereas a Caspar David Friedrich work is paradigmatically representational.
understand what sort of answer was expected of him by Schindler, who was Beethoven’s caretaker-secretary in his last years, and Beethoven’s eventual biographer. Or perhaps Beethoven offered his suggestion in a wholly facetious manner.

To be fair, we have good reason to doubt that the piano sonata affectionately referred to as “The Tempest Sonata” was composed with the explicit intention that it be literally about whatever Shakespeare’s Tempest is about. Contemporary musicologists have since challenged the credibility of Schindler’s testimony to the alleged conversation. The previously cited dictionary entry finishes by relaying that Shakespeare’s play is only “associated with” the Sonata in d minor, Opus 31, no. 2 for pianoforte. Is association enough to ground meaning?

Without a theory of musical meaning already at hand, it is difficult make heads or tails of this example, and I have not yet stated how I take the term ‘musical meaning’. I’ve done this, in part, to show how compelling and yet confounding ‘musical meaning’ can be for music without lyrics or program—often called ‘absolute music’. I submit that it is more difficult to account for meaning in the case of absolute music than in the case of music with lyrics or program. The difference between theories of these two types of musical meaning has everything to do their respective relation to semantic or linguistic theories in general. I contend that any good theory of musical meaning for absolute music should be divorced from semantic or linguistic theories and that any good theory of meaning for music with lyrics or program should closely cohere with them. In this essay, I will be considering only the case of absolute music.

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4 Hereafter, absolute music’ is understood to be music without lyrics or program. Neither Sondheim & Bernstein’s West Side Story nor Ottorino Respighi’s Pines of Rome are ‘absolute music’. But J.S.Bach’s Partita No. 3 in E major for solo violin (BWV 1006) is exemplarily ‘absolute music.’
In the philosophical literature, discussions of musical meaning are mired in confusion, and the concepts employed to clear up the confusion vary widely. Some philosophers, as already stated, appeal to extant semantic or linguistic theories to explain musical meaning. Others reach for a theory of emotional expression; others offer arousal theories. There are those who attack the problem by relating it to the philosophy of mind, the issue of intentionality, or the problems of artifactual kinds. Still others consider musical meaning to be a task properly taken up by interpreters in any number of other fields—critics, musicologists, historians, sociologists—who help discover and reveal to the public at large certain interpretations appropriate for the artwork.5

One discussion of musical meaning in the literature is a debate between Constantijn Koopman and Stephen Davies, on the one side, and Peter Kivy, on the other. In their coauthored article, “Musical Meaning in a Broader Perspective,” Koopman & Davies (2001) construe ‘meaning’ broadly and without relying on or appealing to linguistic or semiological frameworks. Before exploring their broad account of musical meaning, Koopman & Davies take issue with the suggestion that absolute music cannot mean or that absolute music has no meaning. They single out Peter Kivy as someone who holds this position. Koopman & Davies state that the supposition whereby music has no meaning is “inescapable only if one restricts the notion of meaning to the linguistic model” (2001: 261). They contend that ordinary language allows for a more generous use of ‘meaning’ and go on to provide a four-fold account of musical meaning for the case of absolute music. In doing so, Koopman & Davies wish to show that views like Kivy’s are too reliant on linguistic accounts for meaning, and, consequently, miss out on important types of meaning for absolute music.

5 For linguistic theories within Philosophy of Music, see Meyer (1956) and Cooke (1959). For a neo-Wittgensteinian approach to experience, meaning, and music, see Bar-Elli (2006). For a discussion of expression theories, see Davies (2003: 134-51); for an arousal theory, see Matravers (1991). For intentional and artifactual kinds, see Thomasson and Levinson (2007).
Peter Kivy provides a rebuttal in his 2007 essay, “Another Go at the Meaning of Music: Koopman, Davies, and the Meanings of <<Meaning>>”  
Kivy’s issue isn’t that we couldn’t accord a broader meaning to absolute music, but that in the broader construal given by Koopman & Davies, “there isn’t anything that lacks ‘meaning’.” If Kivy’s position is woefully restrictive, the broader perspective is woefully unrestrictive. If we construe meaning the way Koopman & Davies do, Kivy contends there’s nothing remarkable, philosophically or otherwise, about music’s having meaning because everything has (or could have) meaning” (2007: 286). Kivy is open to considering features of the musical encounter that linguistic notions of meaning cannot capture, like the ones Koopman & Davies have located. He is adamant only that we refrain from using the word, ‘meaning’, when considering them. As it turns out, Kivy agrees with much that Koopman & Davies have to say about the musical encounter; he just objects to discussing it in terms of ‘meaning’:

Words have magnetism; they are magical. They wield a peculiar and subtle power over us. And the word <<meaning>> is one of the most magnetic, magical, and powerful of all. So unless we continually repeat to ourselves the mantra, <<This is not semantic meaning, this does not license us to talk with the interpreters, this does not bestow philosophical or moral or narrative significance upon music>>, we are liable to forget how little we gain when we grant <<meaning>> to music if the meaning is anything but the semantic variety. (2007: 297)

For myself, I am sympathetic to Kivy’s position and recommend caution in the use of the term ‘meaning’ when addressing the features of the musical encounter tracked in Koopman & Davies’ account. I suggest, with Kivy, that the topic of musical meaning so broadly construed becomes too heterogeneous, ambiguous, and unhelpful. It seems to me that the tensions within the philosophy of music literature at large turn on ambiguities and equivocations (often

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6 In G. Fløistad (ed.). 2007. Contemporary Philosophy, Volume 9: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art (Dordrecht: Springer), 285-301. Kivy employs pointed brackets (<<...>>) throughout to signal mention as opposed to use; I retain his punctuation here.
inadvertent ones) between various meanings of ‘meaning’. Some, if not most, of the disagreement and confusion surrounding musical meaning in the case of absolute music can be resolved simply by tracking these ambiguities and equivocations, and cleaning up the terminology whenever possible. Koopman & Davies’ broader concept of meaning fosters such ambiguities and equivocations. Taking Kivy’s recommendation to give up the word ‘meaning’ altogether, I argue that many of the features of the musical encounter captured by Koopman & Davies’ position are better addressed in terms of value. I wish to offer a conceptual framework for aesthetic value, advocated elsewhere (in the literature on the problem of forgeries) by Thomas Kulka (2005). By extending Kulka’s framework for solving the problem of the value of forgeries—his “Aesthetic Dualism”—to absolute music, I hope to make the case that absolute music has the kinds of value that explain our tendency to ascribe ‘meaning’ to it, and that absolute music is valuable in multiple philosophically (and sociologically, and psychologically) relevant ways, even if not meaningful in any.

The project I have in mind is not only motivated by Kivy’s advice to avoid ‘meaning’ talk, but also by Tomas Kulka’s invitation to extend his aesthetic theory, “Aesthetic Dualism,” to forms of art beyond the visual. My project respects the need for a theoretical parsimony within philosophy of music, philosophy of art, and aesthetics. Given the choice between extending a helpful value theory from its source genre (painting) to others (music for starters), on the one hand, and trying to save a term (here, ‘meaning’) from it’s “death of thousand qualifications”, on the other, ceteris paribus the former is preferred.

To put my position another way, absolute music moves listeners; absolute music makes sense. But absolute music does not have ‘meaning.’ That absolute music moves listeners and

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7 Kulka states: “I have illustrated the distinction between aesthetic and artistic value through examples of visual art; it should be clear, however, that [the distinction] applies to all the artistic disciplines.” (2005: 69)
makes sense is not reason enough to speak of its having ‘meaning.’ Listeners (both moved by a work of absolute music and to whom the work makes sense) speak of absolute music’s ‘meaning.’ Yet, when asked to elaborate on the ‘meaning’ of the work, they most often discuss the significance the piece takes in their life (or a group’s lives), or the value placed on tracking the coherent dynamic progress of the work.

Koopman & Davies themselves, when defining their stipulated types of ‘meaning,’ use terms such as ‘significance’, ‘importance,’ and ‘utility’ and my suggestion is that the sense of ‘meaning’ Koopman & Davies are really after is either ‘significance’, ‘importance,’ or ‘function’. Instead of wielding a strained, equivocatory sense of ‘meaning,’ I contend we address the many aspects of the encounter with absolute music within the extant prevailing value theories. Rather than rely on equivocations around ‘meaning’ and ‘value,’ I propose we talk directly about value.

Additionally, though there are listeners who will speak of absolute music’s ‘meaning,’ I assert that we philosophers understand such utterances as kind of short-hand for certain types of value or significance conferred on the work. I suggest with Peter Kivy that continued use of this short hand within the philosophical literature can be misleading and conceptually sloppy and that we should jettison it use, regardless of its continued use in common parlance.

I will, therefore, proceed by (2) laying out Koopman & Davies’ position, (3) presenting Peter Kivy’s critique of it, (4) rehearsing Thomas Kulka’s “Aesthetic Dualism,” and (5) extending that theory to account more readily for the salient features of the musical encounter with absolute music that Koopman & Davies have construed in terms of ‘meaning’. Finally, (6) I’ll return to the alleged Shakespearean inspiration for Beethoven’s Sonata in d minor, Opus 31 no. 2 to see how the position fares.
2. Koopman & Davies’ Position

Koopman & Davies’ debate with Kivy turns on the inclusion of the term ‘meaning’ in discussions of the powerful reactions listeners have to absolute music. The authors identify Kivy early on as an opponent of the conclusion that music has meaning:

One might conclude that, at root, music has no meaning. Peter Kivy argues this way: Because music has no semantic content musical meaning does not exist “as a reality of listening.” His conclusion is inescapable only if one restricts the notion of meaning to the linguistic model. Ordinary language allows for a more generous use of ‘meaning’, however. Most people agree that (good) music makes sense and can be said to have meaning. (2001: 261)

Koopman & Davies’ reply includes a brief argument for this claim, that music has meaning because music makes sense, followed by a lengthy descriptive project of the ways in which music ‘means’, to which they devote most of their energy. All three authors—Koopman, Davies, and Kivy—are against the use of ‘meaning’ in a strict linguistic sense. It is worth noting the extent to which Kivy agrees with many of the features of Koopman & Davies’ descriptive account. Their disagreement has to do with presenting these features as types of meaning as opposed to something else (say, value).

To paraphrase, Koopman & Davies contend that in the case of absolute music:

(1) A musical work has no meaning, in the strict linguistic sense of ‘meaning’.
(2) Yet most people agree that (good) music makes sense and can be said to have meaning.
Therefore,
(3) These works clearly have meaning in other, non-linguistic ways.

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8 This appeal to common linguistic practice suggests one of two things: either most people think they are getting at the same thing when they say “music makes sense” and “music has meaning,” or else they think that music’s making sense is the reason for its having (non-linguistic) meaning. It’s not clear which the authors intend, but I suspect the latter. I find Peter Kivy’s review and criticism of this argument persuasive, and I’ll scrutinize this argument further in what follows.

9 Koopman & Davies want to avoid ‘strict linguistic meaning’, whereas Kivy looks to avoid addressing the aspect of the musical encounter within the realm of ‘semantic content.’ Elsewhere, Stephen Davies claims “I do not believe that music is a symbol system that conveys a semantic, or quasi-semantic, content” (1994, ix). Conservatively, I take the current discussion to be disqualifying semantic theories of meaning. The general claim seems to be then that, despite the apparent quasi-syntactic features absolute music might display, music has no semantic content.
This is more or less Koopman & Davies’ argument for musical meaning in an extra-linguistic sense. As we shall see, Peter Kivy takes issue with this argument and refutes the position by discrediting the second premise. Again, Kivy grants that music makes sense in the ways enumerated by the coauthors, but resists the conclusion that it has “meaning.” In short, Kivy grants (1), but is suspicious of (2), and he is open to exploring (3), but without the use of the term ‘meaning’. Let us first turn to Koopman & Davies’ account in detail.

Koopman & Davies contend that once the sense of the term ‘meaning’ is broadened beyond a strict linguistic sense, there are four distinct ways in which absolute music has ‘meaning’. In Part I of their article, Koopman & Davies explore two types of formal musical meaning. In Part II, they advance a two types of musical meaning they take to be rooted in the subjective significance music has in human life. Koopman & Davies’ four types of meaning are: “Formal Significance,” “Experiential Formal Meaning,” “Meaning-for-the-Subject,” and “Meaning-for-Us.”

2. a. Formal Significance\textsuperscript{11} consists in the “coherence of the structural elements of the musical work; to understand the musical work in this first way is understand how it is put together” (2001: 261). Koopman & Davies have in mind here a relationship, ruled by coherence, among various parts of a musical work. The work makes sense insofar as its various elements implicate what is to follow or what has preceded them: “We hear earlier events as having consequences for the proper order and treatment of later ones, although it is usually the case that, at any given

\textsuperscript{10} Peter Kivy helpfully glosses formal meaning as ‘meaning of…’ (i.e., the meaning of the work in question) and meaning rooted in subjective significance as ‘meaning to…’ (i.e., the meaning of the work in question to this listener or those listeners) (2007: 289).

\textsuperscript{11} Koopman & Davies in fact begin with “Explanations of Formal Meaning,” whereas Kivy refers to the first type as “Formal Significance,” using a term from a very similar concept advanced by Davies (1994). The choice for one over the other is arbitrary; they are interchangeable.
moment, more than one continuation is apt” (2001: 262). Coherence is not a linguistic notion as, say, reference, denotation or designation are. Elements within a work relate differently to each other than standard linguistic elements in several ways. Firstly, coherence is based on a reflexive relation: “In a linguistic context, reference involves nonreflexive relationships between the meaning-bearer and what it stands for; by contrast, the relationship between musical entities is reflexive” (2001: 263). The first appearance of a theme, motif, or progression implies its reappearance, and the reappearance implies the antecedent appearance.

Secondly, a musical entity refers only to other musical entities, whereas most linguistic entity refer to, denote or otherwise pick out non-words. “Musical entities are not vehicles for reference beyond themselves, but parts of the very thing communicated. We treat words as transparent to their meaning, ignoring [the words’] intrinsic features, but we attend to the formal properties of the musical events for their own sake” (2001: 263). This seems fairly straightforward. Non-word objects populate the reference class for any given word, but musical entities implicate ontologically similar entities: the other musical entities in the same work.

Third, language requires from the literate an act of abstract conjunction of a word with a non-word; absolute music requires from one who hears with understanding an act of perception:

Whereas meaning-bearer and meaning are related in language through an act of abstract conjunction by which the former comes to stand for the latter; relationships between parts of a musical work are established simply by their being concretely perceived as belonging together within the same perceptual field. (2001: 263)

We can explain the coherence of entities within the musical works as a “belonging together” in an auditory field (i.e., the work), just as we might explain coherence in other types of perception, say visual patterns. For example, “we do not usually take one part of the wallpaper to refer to

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12 A possible worry is that music, in some cases even absolute music, does refer, mimic, or express ontologically different things. See Peter Kivy’s eighth and ninth chapters of Music Alone as well as Zemach (2002) p. 169.
another, despite their implied iteration…. Similarly, we should not assimilate relations among a work’s musical elements to linguistic reference” (2001: 263).13

Finally, Formal Significance, unlike Experiential Formal Meaning (to which I shall turn next), is explicitly a discussed affair:

We explain musical works as displaying an internal rationality. Musical works cohere in specific ways that can be explained because … their progressions are ruled by implication. Explanation here is in terms of coherence…. The coherence of the parts of the [work] at all levels enables us to explain the function of the various parts in the whole. (2001: 263)

From a capacity to hear with understanding and explain how a work is put together and therefore how it makes sense, Koopman & Davies argue that what the listener hears with understanding and also what the listener explains is meaning:

Because we can explain what happens at a given point in the music by reference to what occurs on either side of it, it is not inappropriate to talk of “the meaning” of the music and of its temporal progress. In the context of formal meaning, the question “What is the meaning of event \( x \) in piece \( y \)?” should not be taken as a request to specify some referent \( z \) that could be identified as the meaning of \( x \), [rather] it is [typically] a request to elucidate the way \( x \) coheres with the rest of piece \( y \). (2001: 263-64, my emphasis)

It is important to notice here the guarded locution, “not inappropriate” in Koopman & Davies’ assertion of the crucial inference from sense-making to meaning. Peter Kivy does well to critique this move, as we shall see.

2.b. Koopman & Davies take our ability to explain music’s making sense in terms of coherence as justification for their speaking of meaning, but the second stipulated type of meaning is more phenomenological, immediate, and is not reliant on a discursive activity:

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13 Notice that Formal Significance need not rely on a familiarity with the theoretical concepts available to those with academic training in music analysis (though such a familiarity cannot hurt). Coherence here can be discussed without score literacy and can be done using non-technical language, such as theme, tension and release, development, iteration, rising and falling, and so on.
To understand the music as meaningful, it is not necessary that we can explain the progression of the music. Meaning can be understood immediately in the musical encounter. Music presents itself as a continuous process in which, at every moment, what we hear follows in a compelling way from what came before. (2001: 264)

Experiential Formal Meaning is what is perceived, in the perceptual activity of one who hears with understanding, or it is the “coherent dynamic content the listener discovers by focusing on the music’s formal progress” (2001: 264).

Koopman & Davies are suggesting a type of meaning that is dependent on the response of a listener but that is a property of the work and not of the listener. The suggestion that meaning is a listener-dependent property of the musical work may give rise to some theoretical concerns. A similar problem has been addressed elsewhere, in discussions of “secondary” properties, such as color. An object’s greenness is dependent on subject’s perceiving green, but the greenness is commonly (though not always) attributed to the object and not the perceiver. A musical score is a blueprint for coherent experience, and, though the dynamic coherent content that is Experiential Formal Meaning is realized in the listener’s reaction, the meaning is supposed to be found in the work. Just as our distinguishing greenness from, say, blueness may be said to depend on a “certain agreement in the relevant judgments of suitably qualified perceivers” (2001: 265), so too can the distinguishing of various musical entities in a work of absolute music be said to depend on certain agreement among suitably qualified listeners. Koopman & Davies provide an account of what is meant by “suitably qualified listeners” in the case of music. Appropriate sensory apparatus for color differentiation is required for the capacity to respond to certain light waves as being green. The same can be said for hearing clusters of acoustical events as a cadence or a melody or counter melody within certain musical stylistic conventions (2001: 266).
Yet, whereas in the case of color perception, the ability or inability of an individual to distinguish blueness from greenness may be explained by a story about a deficiency in the relevant perceptual apparatus, in the domain of music perception, the explanation of one’s being a suitably qualified perceiver will have to do with training or familiarity with a music style or culture, and not physiology. A necessary condition of being a “suitably qualified listener” is exposure to the applicable musical stylistic conventions. For example, those of us who have been exposed to predominantly Western tonal music may not be suitably qualified to hear with understanding the Gamelan music of Indonesia or the non-centric, atonal works of Alban Berg. We would be suitably qualified, however, in the case of Bach, Brahms, the Beatles or Dave Brubeck. Moreover, deeper levels of understanding are made possible with greater exposure to the musical traditions and stylistic conventions from which and in which the works originate.14

In addition to “Experiential Formal Meaning” ’s being non-discursive and response-dependent, Koopman & Davies claim that “Experiential Formal Meaning” is ineffable, to some extent. Each musical work presents a complex whole of dynamic qualities wherein entities are presented, repeated, alternated, contrasted and transformed, such that each work offers a unique Gestalt. When a listener hears a work with understanding in this second way, the meaning she grasps is ineffable in that it is “finer-grained, subtler, and more complex than linguistic concepts and propositional structures are” (2001: 265).15

14 “Whereas our capacity to perceive colors is innate, our ability to grasp a work’s experiential meaning results from a largely unconscious learning process in which we become acquainted with the conventions of the musical tradition to which [the work] belongs. Only those who have internalized the conventions of the work’s style, genre, traditions are able to respond with understanding to it” (2001: 265). Davies explores this issue further in his article, “Musical Understanding and Musical Kinds” in Themes in the Philosophy of Music (2003).
15 For an interesting connection to the discussion of non-conceptual representational content, see Luntley (2003)
2.e. Koopman & Davies’ “Meaning-for-the-Subject” and “Meaning-for-Us” can be understood roughly as the “meaning of the work to” some subject rather than simply “meaning of the work” as just outlined. Koopman & Davies assert that “Meaning-for-the-Subject” is largely subjective:

Meaning-for-the-Subject... has to do with the place [a musical work] takes in the individual’s life or consciousness, with the specific way she or he experiences it, and with how this relates to her or his perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and desires.... Moreover, there are dimensions—historical, psychological, social, political, ideological, etc.—that allow for [reactions to a musical work] of a more personal kind. (2001: 268-69)

The biggest shift here is one of attribution: “Meaning-for-the-Subject” is attributed to the subject, not to the piece of music. Like the previous two types of alleged meaning, Meaning-for-the-Subject can be and often is governed by the dynamic progressions to which the listener is responding. If there is a “blueprint for coherent understanding” in this third way, the blueprint extends from the listener to the work; that is, the relationship is reversed from the case of the first two types of alleged meaning. In response to the work and operating within highly contingent and varied listening contexts, each individual ascribes idiosyncratic meanings to the work (2001: 269).

This view has many important conceptual implications. Most important are the verification conditions of the claim to meaning. Gone is the need for considerable interpersonal agreement in the relevant judgments of suitably qualified perceivers that was required for Experiential Formal Meaning. When discussing the idiosyncratic meaning of a work with another listener, one generally doesn’t expect the other listener to share it. The best example of an idiosyncratic dimension of musical meaning, according to the authors, is one that is rooted in the association of music with particular events in a person’s life (2001: 269). That the Sibelius Violin Concerto in d minor “means” personal struggle, redemption and triumph to one listener
but “means” the death of a loved one to another listener is perfectly consistent. One cannot be said to have “gotten it wrong” when hearing the work with understanding in this third way. Association is, according to the authors, enough to ground this highly personal type of meaning.

This is not to say that listeners’ behavior at large doesn’t sometimes exhibit a shared “Meaning-for-the-Subject.” The significance a work can take in an individual’s life or in the lives of members of a group can be both idiosyncratic and shared, for example, when music contributes to the identity of a group:

Teenagers are an exemplary case. They categorize their peers in ways that identify and value a specific way of life in which music is crucial. Members of the group love and hate the same types of music, go to the same concerts, buy the same [albums], talk in the same way about music, wear T-Shirts of the same bands, and so on. As the case shows, the meaning music has for the subject is constituted both by meanings that are private and by those that are shared with others. Instead of being objective properties of the music, both kinds are to be attributed to the subject. (2001: 269)

“Meaning-for-the-Subject” here is accompanied by an expectation that others (suitably qualified listeners) will find a similar meaning in the work, which isn’t the case above with the Sibelius Violin Concerto example. Nonetheless, Meaning-for-the-Subject is, in both examples, to be attributed to the subject(s) and not the work itself. So there is a type of meaning that according to Koopman & Davies captures the significance a work takes in the place in our lives. (This is not to be confused with the last of the four ways in which they say music makes sense and has meaning, namely, “Music-for-Us.”)

So ‘Meaning-for-the-Subject’ is really a two-fold concept. There is the significance a work takes in my life and the significance a work takes in our lives. Hereafter, I’ll refer to these two concepts “Meaning-for-the-Subject” in its idiosyncratic sense and “Meaning-for-the-Subject” in its group sense, respectively.
2.d. With Meaning-for-Us, their fourth and final type of meaning, Koopman & Davies seek to account for the apparent ubiquity of music. They posit that most people appreciate engaging in musical activities of some sort and consider their doing so to contribute significantly to their lives (2001: 269). They take it that Meaning-for-the-Subject just rehearsed is too indeterminate to explain the ubiquity of music. They take it be no mere coincidence that music happens to be playing during rites of passage, courtship, war, and other important social events (2001: 270).

Koopman & Davies’ account here is a social, functional and evolutionary tale of sorts: “We are a social species. Our relationships are of deep evolutionary importance to us. We must be able to understand others so that we can live cooperatively with them, which we must do if we are to flourish and reproduce” (2001: 270).

The authors locate four or five beneficial reasons we engage in music as a species. Engagement in musical activities is socially vital. To understand others, we need to be able to detect coherence of pattern, we need to be able to predict future behavior, and we need to develop an empathic response to otherness. Koopman & Davies contend that listening to music provides an outlet—one at lower stakes than human interaction itself—for the development of all three of these capacities. The fourth benefit, temporary self-forgetfulness, builds on the empathic response; and engaging in music promotes of social cohesion. Together these reasons constitute the evolutionary “meaning” of music for humans in general, or its “Meaning-for-Us.”

“Meaning-for-Us” is supposed to explain “how and why music has meaning for humankind” (2001: 270). The explanation is interesting but not integral to our project. The social benefits provided by musical activities in general are of great interest to other fields like sociology, behavioral psychology, evolutionary biologists and arguably philosophy as well. The project I have in mind in this paper, however, is the alleged meaning of specific works, and not
the meaning, value, or use of engaging in musical activities whatsoever. I will set aside this fourth type of “meaning,” on the grounds that it answers a different question than the one we’re after—one about our interaction with music activity in general, and not with individual works.

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16 For one provocative argument, see Dutton (2003).
3. Peter Kivy’s Critique

In “Another Go at the Meaning of Music: Koopman, Davies, and the Meanings of \textit{Meaning}” (2007), Kivy’s response to Koopman & Davies is two-fold: he takes issue with their argument for the claim that music has meaning because it makes sense, but he agrees with their descriptive account of the four features of the encounter with absolute music—provided we omit any mention of the term ‘meaning’. This quibble over ‘meaning’ is an important one.

I would first like to discuss Kivy’s take on Koopman & Davies’ appeal to common parlance: they claim that music has meaning because “most people agree that (good) music makes sense and can be said to have meaning.” Kivy rejects this move, though he concedes that there is a compulsion (which he attempts to explain) among music theorists, philosophers of music, and others to talk about musical meaning (even in the most indeterminate sense of ‘meaning’). Thereafter, I will touch on Kivy’s coverage of the four types of alleged meaning.

Consider my earlier paraphrase of Koopman & Davies’ argument for musical meaning (page 8 above). In his own reconstruction of the argument, Kivy further parses the second premise that “most people agree that (good) music makes sense and can be said to have meaning.” He presents three claims, offered by Koopman & Davies, that together suggest that their descriptive project is warranted:

(KD1) Most people agree that good music makes sense.

(KD2) Most people agree that good music can be said to have meaning.

(KD3) There is some connection between most people’s claims that music makes sense and their claims that music can have meaning.
(KD1) seems quite reasonable. Regarding (KD2), it is patently true that, in common parlance, the utterance, “music has meaning,” is perfectly natural. But based on Kivy’s experience (and mine), when one is pressed to expand on this utterance, or to say what one thinks a piece of music means, one usually appeals to emotional states or shifts to explanations of idiosyncratic significance “to me” (see Section A.3. above). In the former case, where the music is happy, sad, triumphant, etc., Kivy has captured a conflation wherein “the pre-systematic ‘intuition’ that is being expressed by most people … is not that music has meaning, although these are the words frequently acquiesced in, but that music is expressive, which is quite another thing” (2007: 288). The supposed connection between music and the emotions is one the oldest and most persistent claims in the philosophy of music. Kivy offers this point, not because he thinks expression theory is a viable answer to the question how “music means,” but because the pre-systematic “intuition” resulting in the utterance that “music has meaning” is confused. People do not understand what is being asked of them or what the utterance would entail once we move beyond intuition into theory. The burden of proof, he says, remains on Koopman & Davies to offer further evidence and argument for (KD2).

A far as (KD3) goes, in their article, the authors offer the following defense:

Because we can explain what happens at a given point in the music by reference to what occurs on either side of it, it is not inappropriate to talk of “the meaning “of the music and of its temporal progress. In the context of formal meaning, the question “What is the meaning of event $x$ in piece $y$?” should not be taken as a request to specify some referent $z$ that could be identified as the meaning of $x$. Typically, it is a request to elucidate the way $x$ coheres with the rest of piece $y$. (2001: 263-64, my emphasis)

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17 Kivy states this a bit differently: “people often enunciate the words, ‘music has meaning’” (2007: 288). Philosophical concerns about the difference between “enunciation” and “utterance” have no direct bearing on our concerns here. I also am not using ‘natural to common parlance in a gricean sense here; though interestingly enough, Grice’s distinction may have some import on our current topic: see Grice (1991) and Pfister (2010).
Peter Kivy is quick to dispute this unconfident assertion that it is “not inappropriate” to talk of “the meaning” of the music. Why not say it is “appropriate,” or that it is “natural”? This way of expressing a proposition, by denying the negation, is the logically weakest way in English to suggest a connection between explanation of sense-making and meaning-having. It is a hedge, but an understandable one.

Koopman & Davies are suggesting that the question, “What is the meaning of event x in piece y?” is a natural linguistic expression for “most people” and that it should be taken as a request to elucidate how the musical event coheres with the rest of the piece. I contend, as does Kivy, that this question, even if natural, is not typically understood as conveying such a request. If by “most people” we mean people (who are not trained in music theory or analysis) who listen to Western classical absolute music, I claim that “meaning” is almost always seen by them as a property of the work as a whole or a property of larger sub-units of the work. To inquire about the meaning of one small musical event within a musical work seems to me totally unnatural, and not a part of common parlance. If Koopman & Davies have in mind another range of “most people,” say those trained in music theory and analysis, then the question, “What is the meaning of event x in piece y?” would constitute a request for function of the musical event within a given analysis of form, harmonic progression, or what have you. Even in the more selective domain of, say, a music theory classroom, the locution, “What is the meaning of event x in piece y?” would be quite unnatural. On either understanding of who “most people” are, I think we can couch this whole conversation more naturally in terms of coherence. In the above passage, Koopman & Davies interpret the unnatural locution, “What is the meaning of event x in piece y?” as a request to elucidate the coherence or function of event x in piece y. I argue, along with Kivy, there is no need to use the term ‘meaning’. If (KD3) is true, and there is some connection between most
people’s claims that music makes sense and their claims that music can have meaning, I strongly urge that the connection is not the kind Koopman & Davies intend. The authors claim that it is because music makes sense that music has meaning and that because most people say ‘this music makes sense’ that they are warranted in saying ‘this music has meaning’. On the contrary, I believe, with Kivy, that when most people say that ‘this music has meaning’, what they really intend is that ‘this music makes sense’:

<<Making sense>> is not co-extensive with <<having meaning>>, even in the broad sense of <<meaning>>. Witness the fact that it is perfectly idiomatic to say of a piece of machinery whose workings or purpose one doesn’t understand, <<It doesn’t make sense (to me)>>, whereas it is not idiomatic to say <<I don’t know what it means>>. In other words, <<making sense>> is a description made in numerous contexts that have nothing to do with meaning, either in its semantic or non-semantic uses. (2007: 294)

In Kivy’s critique of Koopman & Davies’ four distinct types of (apparent) meaning, I want to stress that Kivy advocates the omission of the term ‘meaning’, and we should take seriously Kivy’s suggestion that the reaction elicited in the musical encounter with absolute music can be discussed more clearly and faithfully to common parlance using other terms. Even if he denies that music has meaning, Kivy still accepts the authors’ suggestion that music makes sense, and nothing prevents our reading Koopman & Davies’ four-part description of the musical encounter solely in terms of music’s making sense. From this perspective, music makes sense to the subject (MS1) insofar as the subject grasps the coherence of the sum of a work’s formal parts, (MS2) in the context of the experience of following the dynamic progression of the work during the act of listening, and (MS3) with respect to the place the work takes in a listener’s life or listeners’ lives.18

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18 The fourth way in which music could be said to make sense to the listener would be (MS4) in terms of the opportunities for growth and social utility the act of listening to the work affords. However, I bracketed this fourth type at the end of Section A, p. 16.
In the section on Formal Significance, Koopman & Davies have it that explanations of how music make sense are to be given in terms of internal coherence (2001: 263). Peter Kivy takes this to be uncontroversial, but he questions the leap from explanations of coherence and function to “not inappropriate” talk of meaning. Kivy’s critique of (KD3) above is, in part, a critique of Koopman & Davies’ first type of alleged meaning, Formal Significance.

To bolster the criticism that a work’s making sense does not warrant its having meaning, Kivy introduces an argumentative analogy that compares our hearing a musical work with understanding to our viewing the workings of a clock with understanding:

The question is, normally, "<<What is the function of this chord in the piece?>> or "<<what’s the chord doing here?>>, or something of the kind. It is no more idiomatic to ask about the meaning of a chord in a musical composition than to ask what the meaning of the escapement mechanism is in a clock. One can ask the question that way and perhaps be understood. However, it is plainly false to suggest that it is the ordinary way of asking, or even a particularly enlightening way of asking it. (2007: 291)

While Kivy focuses on the unnaturalness of a asking about the meaning of a clock or an escapement mechanism therein, I think it’s also fruitful to consider the converse. It is natural in common parlance to discuss both escapement mechanisms and chords in terms of function and sense-making. A watchmaker, or perhaps even an amateur watch collector, knows what an escapement mechanism does and how it functions with the other parts in a watch. Once the various parts of a watch are in their rightful positions, the builder and the collector could remark that the mechanism “makes sense” in this position and not some other. That the collector can detect when the watch parts make sense in their rightful positions does not, however, warrant the watch collector’s asking after the “meaning” of the watch or the “meaning” of the mechanism. This seems to follow in the case of the chord and the musical work as heard by a “suitably qualified listener.”
Kivy further challenges the appropriateness of jumping from sense-making in terms of coherence and function to meaning within an analogy first offered by Koopman & Davies. The analogy involves the comparison of the development of a musical work to a human action. According to Koopman & Davies, we can explain why a musical work develops one way rather than another, and the reasons we might give sometimes resemble the reasons used to explain human action. “What does that hand gesture mean?” seems quite natural in common parlance. Yet, in these cases, Kivy contends, and I agree with him, that the inquiry into the meaning of the gesture will wind up back in function talk or a discussion of symbols and semantic content (which has already been rejected as a non-starter for absolute music by both Koopman & Davies and Kivy). We may well ask what is the purpose of the hand gesture or, what amounts to the same thing, ask, “What is she doing?” In this case, gestures communicate specific attitudes of the gesturer. A musical work (and its entities) does not have attitudes, beliefs, or desires, on Koopman & Davies’ own account. It cannot intend, believe, or desire to communicate any such thing. I also advance that appeal to the intentions, beliefs, or desires of the composer is a dubious move. The analogy to human actions, like gestures, is unhelpful. Moreover, Kivy urges that we not settle for terminology that is merely “not inappropriate” when we have terms, like ‘coherence’, that are appropriate and already a part of natural language.

Koopman & Davies’ second aspect, “Experiential Formal Meaning” is, again, the “coherent dynamic content the listener discovers by focusing on the music’s formal progress.”

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20 One could consider the composer or performer to be the active agent A desiring to bring about some specific meaning M in absolute musical work W in a schema whereby ‘A desires to convey M, and A believes W to be a means for conveying M’. To this strategy I’d suggest, with Monroe Beardsley and William Wimsatt, that the intentions of the artist aren’t always available and are never desirable. That a composer intends (or believes and desires) W to mean M not only doesn’t entail that ‘W means M’ it also provides no evidential support for ‘W means M’ See Beardsley and Wimsatt (1946) or http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beardsley-aesthetics/ (Section 5).
Here, too, the authors appeal to some robust connection between coherence (making sense) and meaning: “[w]e take the experience of coherent musical structure as the basis for ascribing meaning to music” (2001: 266). Kivy does not deny that those who hear with understanding experience coherent musical structure. He denies the need to consider this experience a basis for ascribing “meaning.” Here, too, I agree with Kivy that the ascription of meaning is not warranted. The second type of meaning can and should be cashed out in terms of ‘coherence’.

With respect to “Meaning-for-the-Subject,” Kivy admits he is not philosophically interested in subjective kinds of meaning, though he does not deny they exist (2007: 289). Recall that Koopman & Davies discuss both an idiosyncratic and a group sense of “Meaning-for-the-Subject.” ‘Meaning’ is just one among a variety of words, including ‘importance’ and ‘significance’, that describe the features of the encounter the authors pick out with “Meaning-for-the-Subject” and “Meaning-for-Us:”

Some of the words are better suited, more appropriate for the job than the <<m>> word is. Yet that is the word they constantly use. The danger to the unwary is that they will be lulled into thinking that something has been accomplished here in the way of redeeming for absolute music that coveted sense of <<meaning>>, the semantic sense, at least broadly conceived. (2007: 298)

In explicating their third stipulated type of meaning, “Meaning-for-the-Subject”, Koopman & Daveis replace meaning with ‘significance.’ If “Meaning-for-the-Subject” is simply the significance a musical work takes in a person’s life or in a group of persons’ lives, why not stick with ‘significance’? In fact, I contend that Koopman & Davies’ third type of alleged meaning is better construed as a kind of value and that a value theory would capture this aspect of the musical encounter in more natural terms.

Before we continue, I would like to highlight one last point from Peter Kivy’s critique. Peter Kivy is sensitive to the motivation writers like Koopman & Davies have to rescue meaning
for music, even in looser senses of the term ‘meaning’. The ambition to find some sense of
meaning for absolute music—no matter how tenuous—is borne out the widespread attachment to
the term ‘meaning’ (2007: 295). According to Kivy, absolute music is the only domain in the arts
and letters that has no space for the “busiest and most prized occupation” in the humanities, the
occupation of “interpreter of meaning.” Arts and letters are to be the source of great culture,
entertainment and knowledge, and the job of the interpreter is to reveal new and enlightening
meanings, but the interpreter needs to rely on the notion of semantic content to do so (2007:
295). This is the interpretative task to which musicologists, music theorists, etc. aspire, so
Koopman & Davies are left grasping for senses of meaning that render talk of musical meaning
merely “not inappropriate.” Kivy views Koopman & Davies’ attempt to rescue meaning for
absolute music a hollow victory at best:

We [are not] so myopic or totally obsessed with semantic meaning that we don’t know
there are other senses of <<meaning>>, and that some of them may correctly be ascribed
to music. Rather, it is that we know the other senses of <<meaning>> won’t do the job.
They won’t give the musical seekers after meaning what they want: license to talk the
talk of interpreters of the literary and representational arts. They get the word, but nothing
more. (2007: 296)

Heeding Kivy’s critique of Koopman & Davies’ position, I contend we can provide a tidier
account of many of the features of the musical encounter they otherwise rightly capture. And I
contend these are better addressed in a discussion of value.

I see many lessons to take away from Peter Kivy’s critique. We have reason to deny the
insistence that because music makes sense we are warranted in speaking of music’s ‘meaning’.
Of Koopman & Davies’ original four types of alleged meaning, I will discuss the first two as
possible kinds of value. I contend that, with respect to the third aspect of the musical encounter,
only the group sense of “Meaning-for-the Subject” is relevant to our concerns. “Meaning-for-the
Subject” for a group is accompanied by the expectation that others will share some similar
experience of the work. This concept, “Meaning-for-the Subject” for a specific group, is of philosophical interest insofar as philosophy is concerned with norms, interests and values that are intersubjectively accessible, shared or even intersubjectively binding. The idiosyncratic sense of “Meaning-for-the-Subject” is, by contrast, not of philosophical interest to Kivy, or to me. Idiosyncratic interests and values are not shared, are often not accessible, and are, by definition, not intersubjectively binding.\textsuperscript{21} Insofar as (axiological) philosophy is chiefly concerned with the norms, interests and values that are intersubjectively accessible, shared, and intersubjectively binding,\textsuperscript{22} “Meaning-for-the-Subject” in its idiosyncratic sense is of only peripheral interest, and I will, therefore, bracket it.\textsuperscript{23}

To avoid confusion, let us stipulate the more specific term “Significance-for-Us” to designate only “Meaning-for-the Subject” in the group sense. “Significance-for-Us” will mean the significance a work takes in the lives of a specific group of suitably qualified listeners. Recall that I have also suggested bracketing the fourth type of significance, “Meaning-for-Us,” as

\textsuperscript{21} These types of statements are warranted because they are trivially true. For an account defending the importance of idiosyncratic reactions and values within the philosophy of music, see Higgins 1997.

\textsuperscript{22} The debates regarding relativism, cognitivism, realism, etc. are very important, but unwieldy. This particular meta-ethical or meta-aesthetical commitment is controversial, of course, but I do not have the time nor space to defend it here.

\textsuperscript{23} There are some who take great issue with this move, and I would suggest viewing idiosyncratic reactions to and beliefs regarding a piece of absolute music as we would other idiosyncratic beliefs. Consider the differences between the claims ‘tomorrow is Thursday’ and ‘S believes that tomorrow is Thursday’ where S is a unique individual, and not a group. The truth-maker and the general object of inquiry in the former and the latter are markedly different. Whereas the truth maker in the latter case are the beliefs of S, the beliefs of S are largely irrelevant to the truth of falsity of the former case. Generally speaking, Philosophy of Art trades seldomly in claims of the latter kind, idiosyncratic claims. We can rehearse this as easily with ‘God exists’ versus ‘S believes that God exists’ as well as with ‘Sonata phi means psi’ versus ‘S believes that Sonata phi means psi.’ Again, it isn’t merely that the epistemic conditions of the latter claim in each example respectively is less demanding, but rather that the latter claim, when true, is trivially true and tells us next to nothing about the domain in question (be it tomorrow’s being Thursday, the existence of God, or the alleged meaning of a Sonata). Simply put, my contention is that Philosophy of Music is interested first in the musical works, second, in shared beliefs about musical works, and then only peripherally in unshared, idiosyncratic beliefs of individuals about musical works. That S believes Sonata phi means psi, is a story about S, not about Sonata phi, nor shared beliefs about Sonata phi.
peripheral to our concerns; however fruitful it might be to sociologists, behavioral psychologists, and evolutionary biologists, it cannot shed light on the meaning of particular musical works.

In the next section, I will present Tomas Kulka’s “Aesthetic Dualism.” When we return to musical meaning, we will consider how this theory can clarify the components of Koopman & Davies’ descriptive project: “Formal Significance,” “Experiential Formal Meaning,” and what I have coined here “Significance-for-Us.”
4. Tomas Kulka’s “Aesthetic Dualism”

Though it may not be obvious, the problem of forgeries in pictorial art can help resolve the debate about alleged types of musical meaning in the case of absolute music. Though our problem is not the problem of the aesthetic value of forgeries, as we shall see below, Tomas Kulka’s paper “Forgeries and Art Evaluation: An Argument for Dualism in Aesthetics” (2005) is important to our current project for the solution it offers to the problem of forgeries—“Aesthetic Dualism.”

Tomas Kulka contends there are two noncontroversial beliefs about forgeries that are accepted by all but a few philosophers:

(F1) Originals are more valuable than forgeries.

(F2) A forgery that is visually indistinguishable from the original has the same aesthetic properties and therefore the same aesthetic value.

The question is whether (F1) and (F2) are compatible. Before Kulka (2005), the extant literature suggested they are not. For Kulka, the problem of forgeries epitomizes a problem he identifies with an entrenched doctrine found widely across philosophy of art and aesthetics literature: that the value of works of art consists in their aesthetic value alone. This doctrine, which Kulka rejects, he calls “Aesthetic Monism,” and his article seeks to provide evidence that it is false and that it should be rejected in favor of another doctrine, which he coins “Aesthetic Dualism.”

Before we get to the article’s import for the issue of musical meaning, let me summarize Kulka’s rejection of Aesthetic Monism and his resolution of the problem of pictorial forgeries.

How curators, critics, art historians and art dealers respond to a forgery can make or break their careers. Philosophers interested in aesthetics and art, too, need to have a convincing response to forgery:
A philosopher of art caught without an answer to [the question] why there is any aesthetic difference between a deceptive forgery and an original work… is at least as bad off as a curator of paintings taking a Van Meegeren for a Vermeer.  

A well-executed forgery often fetches mixed appraisals, as indicated by (F1) and (F2) above. Prima facie, one might react to the devious act of misrepresenting authorship in an understandably negative way. Often, however, the work in question is expertly composed and ought to elicit positive appraisal. Borrowing from Aline Saarinen, Tomas Kulka presents the problem of forgeries this way:

If a fake is so expert that even the most thorough and trustworthy examination of its authenticity is still open to doubt, is it or is it not as satisfactory a work of art as if it were unequivocally genuine?

Consider the case of the painting, *Supper at Emmaus*: In 1937, one of the most respected authorities on seventeenth-century art, the retired Professor Abraham Bredius, hailed the painting as the masterpiece of Johannes Vermeer: “In no other picture by the great master of Delft do we find such sentiment, such a profound understanding of the Bible story, a sentiment so nobly human expressed through the medium of highest art.” *Supper at Emmaus* was sold for an exorbitant price as a Vermeer, upon Bredius’ recommendation. The work, however, was not Vermeer’s; it was a fake by Han van Meegeren, completed in 1936.

Beyond the financial and legal disputes that followed, there are philosophical problems. What are we to make of Bredius’ assessment of the composition, the technique, the use of color, spatial perspective, use of shadow, etc.? The philosopher of art had better either give reason to

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27 Van Meegeren was arrested in 1945. He stood a lengthy trial, was found guilty, and was fined and given a prison sentence just two weeks before a heart attack took his life in December 1957.
maintain a positive appraisal of the *Supper at Emmaus* or, on the contrary, provide theoretical
grounds for changing our appraisal.

Facing a general lack of consensus within the philosophical literature regarding forgeries
(the van Meegeren case included), Tomas Kulka identifies three predominant positions in the
literature: formalism, reductionism, and historicism. As we shall see, these three disparate
theories share one thing in common; they are all committed to the doctrine of monism, that is,
they all presuppose that the value of an artwork consists in the work’s aesthetic value alone.

A formalist approach to the problem of pictorial forgeries regards only the observable (in
this case visually perceptible) features of the artwork as relevant to appraisals:

Only the visual features of the painted surface—the configuration of its lines and colors,
composition, spatial relations, texture, design, etc., are relevant for its appreciation. The
subject of our evaluation is the finished product, not the information pertaining to the
history of its production. Who, when, and where painted the picture…are irrelevant for
the assessment of its aesthetic qualities. (Kulka, 2005: 59)

In the case of the van Meegeren fake, or any fake, in which the formal properties so closely
resemble the original that no one could distinguish the original from the forgery, the formalist
must conclude that the forgery is as valuable as an original, and, moreover, that its authenticity is
irrelevant to the appraisal.

The result is that the formalist cannot accommodate the intuition that the forgery is
duplicitous, disingenuous, or misleading. While the formalist position champions the
intuitive and widespread practice of basing our appraisals on how paintings look, the position
ignores another widespread practice of basing our appraisals on the apparent values of originality
and authenticity. Historians, curators, and collectors also depend on the values of authenticity
and originality, despite their not being straightforwardly observed in the work. The formalist
theory fails to track this. The formalist position denies (F1) and upholds (F2) above.
One alternative to the formalist stance is what Kulka calls the reductionist position. A reductionist theory has it that there must be an aesthetic difference between forgery and original, which can be reduced to the small physical differences between them. Even the most accomplished forgeries will have some physical differences. No matter how small they may be, they impact our aesthetic appraisals. Kulka says Nelson Goodman defends a form of aesthetic reductionism whereby every physical difference between original and forgery implies an aesthetic difference and vice versa (2005: 60). Goodman contends that the fact that one cannot tell the pictures apart at a given time is not evidence against the reductionist. According to Goodman, the knowledge that one is a forgery and the other an original:

(R1) stands as evidence that there may be a physical difference that I can learn to perceive,

(R2) assigns my present looking a role as training for perceptual discrimination [between forgeries and originals], and

(R3) makes consequent demands that modify and differentiate present experience in looking at the two pictures (2005: 60).

Kulka takes issue with the reductionist position, and rightly so. He asks how a future possibility of discerning minute physical differences between a forgery and an original is supposed to inform a present appraisal of the same two works. While Goodman warns against denying the future possibility of our acquiring such a skill, it seems equally possible that we will not learn to discern the differences between paintings, even if we know the observable, minute physical differences do exist. (R1) and (R2), even if true, do not support the reductionist conclusion. (R3) seems to beg the question by assuming the very thing to be established—that authenticity should inform appraisal.

There are many things that can influence an experience of a painting, such as the knowledge of its authenticity or inauthenticity. The conditions of observation on the part of an
appraiser can also be influenced by sleep deprivation, the nursing of a hangover, knowledge of
the work’s market price, the fact that the picture was a given as a gift by a loved one, etc. Surely
not all factors influencing the experience and appraisal of a picture are factors on which a
normative theory ought to be based. An obstinate insistence on the part of the reductionist that
authenticity is relevant to aesthetic appraisal seems unsubstantiated (2005: 60-1). The reductionist
accepts (F1) above, but denies the possibility of (F2) on the grounds that every forgery is
visually distinguishable from its original given enough time and training to hone the skill of
detecting minute physical clues.

Finally, the historicist claims the aesthetic differences between a forgery and an original
are due to the differences in the respective histories of the objects’ being produced. The
historicist denies that the forgery and the original belong to the same class of objects or style of
artwork. Kulka outlines the historicist position, in this case Mark Sagoff’s, in this manner:

(H1) Many aesthetic quality predicates, e.g. as satisfactory as, are attributed in a two
place relation between the object in question and a class of objects,²⁸ and these predicates
imply the object in question belongs to the class to which it is related.

(H2) There is no class (other than an unwieldy and unhelpful class of all paintings) to
which both and original and possible forgery belong.

Hence,

(H3) There is no class in relation to which aesthetic quality predicates can be ascribed to
both the original and possible forgery.

²⁸ Sagoff takes aesthetic judgments and appraisals of original artworks to imply reference classes, usually consisting
in a class of other works in the same “category of artistic style within a certain genre” (61). For example, Sagoff
offers that to say a work is geometrical is to imply the work is geometrical relative to the historical category to
which the work belongs:

When we say that Giotto is geometrical, we point out a certain feature of his paintings in relation to the
class of early Renaissance Florentine paintings. When we describe Mondrian as geometrical we do so in
relation to a different implicit class. Both Giotto and Mondrian are correctly described as geometrical; they
are not, however, geometrical in the same sense. (Sagoff, 1983, 133)
According to the historicist position, an artwork’s aesthetic value, just like its aesthetic properties (like being geometrical), are assessed in relation to other works that belong in the same style. Sagoff’s conclusion entails that originals and forgeries cannot have the same aesthetic value, because they do not have the same aesthetic properties; they are members of different classes of objects. Forgeries, in virtue of the historical details of their production, do not belong in the same category as the original, and therefore cannot be “as satisfactory as” the original. Or at least this is the way the historicist reasons.

Tomas Kulka finds this result, that a painting and its copy cannot belong to the same artistic style or genre, a bit odd, and I agree. Kulka shows that the historicist commitments entail that belonging to an artistic style is a visually imperceptible feature:

(K1) Originals and convincing forgeries are visually indistinguishable.
(K2) Originals and convincing forgeries are not in the same artistic style.
So, (K3) Artistic style is something that is visually imperceptible.

(K1) is a working assumption and is part of the reason that the problem of forgeries is philosophically interesting. (K2) is a conclusion endorsed by Sagoff, and the result, (K3), seems absurd. The historicist rejects (F2) above and accepts (F1).

Kulka discusses the individual shortcomings of each of the three positions but also notices that they have one thing in common: all three subscribe to the doctrine of Aesthetic Monism. The monist’s assumption that good works of art have high aesthetic value while, broadly speaking, bad works have low aesthetic value appears self-evident (2005: 62), but the problem of forgeries seems a challenge to this, as do historically significant works like Pablo Picasso’s *Les Demoiselles d’Avignon*. As any art historian or appreciator knows, *Les Demoiselles*

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29 An aesthetic monist holds that the value of artworks consists in the works’ aesthetic value alone.
"d’Avignon “was to become the cornerstone of twentieth century art” and a masterpiece of modernism. However, in 1907, when it was painted, Picasso and those around him whose taste he most trusted assessed it as having low aesthetic value: “those friends who were allowed to see it have felt that in some way, [Picasso] had let them down.”³⁰ Picasso himself rolled the canvas up, stored it in a dusty corner of his studio, and it was not seen again for some twenty-five years. While the work made a poor first impression, it did impact the next generation of painters. *Les Demoiselles d’Avignon* exemplifies the basic principles of the emerging Cubist style, and the aesthetic successes of Braque, Gris, Léger, Delaunay, and of Picasso himself in his later work are adumbrated by the 1907 painting. The challenge for Aesthetic Monism is to explain how a work with low aesthetic value can garner the respect *Les Demoiselles d’Avignon* does to this day.

Aesthetic Monism appears to be unable to handle either Van Meegeren’s *Supper at Emmaus* or Picasso’s *Les Demoiselles d’Avignon*. With respect to the latter, Kulka questions whether the praise and criticism address the same features of the work. When the critics praise *Les Demoiselles d’Avignon*, they emphasize its originality and its importance in the history of art, its status as a turning point, the beginning of cubism, etc.. When they criticize it, the focus is on its shortcomings of composition, color, gesture, and stylistic congruity—its formal features. Kulka is quick to point out that these are different sources of value, and that they perhaps indicate different types of value.

To clarify the discussion, Kulka introduces the doctrine of “Aesthetic Dualism,” which holds that when we appraise a work of art, there are two types of value we appraise. The first type he calls aesthetic value, which includes visually perceptible aspects of a work such as

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³⁰ John Golfing as quoted by Kulka, p. 63
balance of composition, harmonious use of color, dynamic contrasts and others. This is the value championed by the monist. But Kulka posits a second type of value, “artistic value,” to capture:

(AV1) the art-world significance of the innovation exemplified by the work, and,
(AV2) the inherent potential of this innovation for the subsequent artistic/aesthetic developments. (2005: 65)

This definition, Kulka admits, is informal, but he offers it in lieu of grounding the second type of value in originality or novelty, which he contends would be insufficient. There are original artworks that lack artistic value. “In order to be of art world significance, the work would have to suggest solutions to topical artistic problems, to point to new directions for further aesthetic development, to new expressive possibilities, etc.” (2005: 65). Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon satisfies this requirement and is highly esteemed because of it.

Note that artistic value appraisal is done retrospectively, that it requires knowledge of the relevant art history, and that it cannot be assessed by the contemplation of a work by itself. Innovation is not an “immanent property” of a work, but a complex relation between the work in question and its properties with a class of antecedent works and their properties (2005: 65). To say a work suggests solutions to artistic problems or that a work points to new directions for development requires that we know which problems are under discussion and what art style or genre or epoch is to be developed. “The [appraisal] of artistic value is thus essentially historical” (2005: 65).

“Aesthetic Dualism,” which contends that we base our appraisals of artworks on aesthetic value and artistic value, is able to provide a convincing answer the problem of forgeries. The two common sense beliefs (F1) that originals are more valuable than forgeries and (F2) that a forgery that is visually indistinguishable form the original has the same aesthetic properties and therefore the same aesthetic value are indeed compatible and consistent. In the case of Supper at Emmaus,
the works notable aesthetic value does not compensate for its marginal artistic value, and the overall appraisal is relatively low. The mixed criticism of Picasso’s *Les Mademoiselles d’Avignon* is, in view of “Aesthetic Dualism,” quite consistent. Whereas the work’s aesthetic value was judged to be low by Picasso and his contemporaries, as it still is by some current art critics and philosophers of art, the work’s artistic value cannot be overstated. Thus *Les Mademoiselles d’Avigonon’s* overall value is relatively high.

Importantly, Tomas Kulka encourages the application of “Aesthetic Dualism” beyond the visual arts: “I have illustrated the distinction between aesthetic and artistic value through examples from the visual arts; it should be clear, however, that [the distinction] applies to all the artistic disciplines” (2005: 69). In the next section, I will apply the distinction to the domain of absolute music and return to the issue at hand, musical meaning.

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31 It should be noted that the techniques used by Van Meegeren (canvas selection, lead choice, paint mixing, baking, etc.) were quite novel relative to the world of forgery. His fifteen known forgeries have travelled as a special exhibit, most recently shown in Stockholm and The Hague in 2004.
5. “Aesthetic Dualism” in the case of Absolute Music

The salient features of the encounter with absolute music construed in terms of meaning by Koopman & Davies can be captured more readily and concisely within a theory of value, namely, Kulka’s Aesthetic Dualism. In providing a solution to the debate over meaning in the case of absolute music, we should seek terminology that is in line with common parlance, terminology that aids in clarifying previous ambiguities and equivocations, and terminology better integrated into the rest of contemporary knowledge (in this case, aesthetics and philosophy of music). I assert that ‘value’ terminology fairs better than ‘meaning’ terminology on all three of these counts.

In Section B above, the word ‘meaning’ has been shown to be less appropriate and less natural to common parlance than other locutions, such as ‘sense-making’, ‘significance’, ‘importance’, and ‘value’. I suppose one might deny Koopman & Davies’ inference that most people agree that (good) music makes sense and can be said to have meaning, and preserve the descriptive portion of their position by recasting it in terms of ‘sense-making’. The suggestion would then be that music makes sense to a listener:

(MS1) who grasps the coherence of the sum of a work’s formal parts,

(MS2) in the experience of following the dynamic progression of the work during the act of listening,

(MS3) in virtue of the place the work takes in her life.

Prima facie, music seems to make sense in the first two ways. Music makes sense when one grasps the coherent relationship among the sum of a work’s formal parts. And music makes sense phenomenologically, during the act of listening, if the one who hears with understanding traces the dynamic progression of the work in time.
I cannot, however, accept that (MS3) is natural to common parlance and avoids equivocation. Koopman & Davies define “Meaning-for-the-Subject” as “the place [a musical work] takes in the individual’s life or consciousness, with the specific way she or he experiences it, and with how this relates to her or his perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and desires” (2001: 268). The “place a work takes” is more naturally understood as significance, importance or value, rather than a meaning. Koopman & Davies seem to treat these all as inter-replaceable or synonymous. Yet as Kivy has shown, the term ‘meaning’ carries many limitations. In short, my suggestion is to embrace the authors’ use of terms like ‘significance’, ‘value’, and ‘importance’.

Let us now consider whether Koopman & Davies’ two main senses of ‘meaning’ can persuasively be understood in terms of value, more specifically, within the framework of Tomas Kulka’s “Aesthetic Dualism.” If I can present all three senses in which Koopman & Davies think music “means”—i.e., “Formal Significance”, “Experiential Formal Meaning”, and “Significance-for-Us”—in a way that is at least as (if not more) natural to common parlance as any iteration previously discussed, then I will have done my job. We could then address the salient features of the encounter with absolute music without bringing in what Kivy calls the dubious “m”-word, heeding his critique and fulfilling Kulka’s invitation to extend aesthetic dualism to music.

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32 There are numerous occurrences where the authors use meaning with significance, importance, or value. For example, “We relate to [music] as a determining factor in our lives. Musical works are objects of concern, or special care We treat them with intense affection, with reverence sometimes”(268). “…aesthetics is concerned with when and why music has significance”(269). “music is important to us”(270). “What was missing from [our] account was an explanation of why we would value the experience achieved by this mode of listening”(272).

33 It is for this reason that I stipulated the term ‘Significance-for-Us’ to denote the significant place a work takes in the lives of a group of suitably qualified listeners.
On Kulka’s view, pictorial works with high aesthetic value are the ones with balanced composition, harmonious use of color, and telling contrasts; they are dynamic and express tension (2005: 64). Kulka takes these features to be the “internal” properties of the painting; they are directly observed and do not depend on information pertaining to the history of the painting’s production. On what is the aesthetic value of musical works based? Tomas Kulka would suggest the “internal” properties of the musical work, and I urge that that is precisely what Koopman & Davies are describing in the first two features of the musical encounter. If and only if a musical work affords the listener both the opportunity to discuss the coherence relations among the work’s formal parts and the opportunity to experience the dynamic development of the work immediately in the act of listening, then the work is of some aesthetic value. The more compelling the coherence of the formal parts and the more dynamic the experience of the work’s development in time, the higher the aesthetic value we assign to the piece. Just as the visual features seen in the painting (like lines and configuration, color, composition, texture and balance) are the properties over which aesthetic value is appraised in pictorial art (2005: 59), so the auditory features heard in the musical encounter are the properties on the basis of which a musical work is appraised. In other words, what Koopman & Davies have painstakingly described in the first half of their paper constitutes the basis for aesthetic value appraisals.

Extending “Aesthetic Dualism” to absolute music requires that we consider how artistic value is appraised. On what basis do we assign musical works high (or low) artistic value? Recall Kulka’s definition for artistic value:

(AV1) The art-world significance of the innovation exemplified by the work, and,
(AV2) The inherent potential of this innovation for the subsequent artistic/aesthetic developments. (2005: 65)
Artistic value appraisal is a retrospective activity that requires knowledge of the relevant music history. Musical works are of high artistic value when they suggest solutions to topical artistic problems of their day, and when they to point to new directions for further aesthetic developments. Artistic value cannot be assessed by the contemplation of a work by itself (2005: 65). Though these are the words of Tomas Kulka, they could easily be the words of Stephen Davies.

In his *Themes in the Philosophy of Music* (2003), Stephen Davies argues that hearing a work with understanding requires a familiarity with the music history from which and after which the work is coming. This is part of being a suitably qualified listener. But also, Davies contends that the fact that a work belongs to a specific musical kind (say that a work is a Symphony as opposed to a String Quartet or a Brass Quintet) places particular stylistic constraints on it, poses particular problems, invites particular compositional tactics strategies, etc. Therefore, to be able to appraise a work, one must have some exposure to the historical context of both the work itself and the musical kind of which it is an instance. “The important question is not ‘How is it put together?’ but ‘Why is its being put together this way rather than that significant to its being a concerto as opposed to a symphony?’” (Davies 2003: 216).

Davies is also suggesting here that composers in certain epochs see one of their compositional tasks as posing solutions to the compositional problems and challenges of the day. A composer may look to address a problem arising from a concerto’s sonata allegro form. In doing so, the composer is also confronting how the sonata allegro form in concerti is treated prior in other types, in sonatas and symphonies. The details of the problem are not of particular importance. What is striking for our current purpose is the way Davies discusses the historical
and retrospective viewpoint from which we could ever deem Mozart’s late concertos exemplary works of the classical era and, *ergo*, of high artistic value:

[We] could not appreciate why this option was not available to Mozart without recognizing that he was heir to styles and conventions the composer might modify and enrich but that he was not free to reject out of hand. Until [we] consider the precedents against which Mozart works, [we] treat the structures of his work as created ex nihilo and do not understand where Mozart was working with musical givens. A grasp of the conventions with and against which Mozart worked is crucial if one is to *appreciate* [my emphasis] not only the *successes* but also some of the *failures*. (2003: 228-29)

The point stands also for our historical and retrospective viewpoint on musical kind or genre:

If the [string] quartet poses the composer problems—of form, instrumentation, or whatever—that differ from those raised by the symphony, then one cannot recognize the solutions for what they are unless one has some idea of the *problem and its significance*. (2003: 232, my emphasis)

Earlier, I described artistic value and its reliance on one’s retrospective viewpoint and knowledge of history this way: To say a work suggests solutions to artistic problems or that a work points to new directions for development, requires that we know which problems are under view and what art style, genre or epoch is to be developed. Davies’ view here is in line with the retrospective and historical character of Kulka’s artistic value.

So far so good. I have shown how Kulka’s “Aesthetic Dualism” may be extended to absolute music, and I have redrawn the first two features of Koopman & Davies’ position in terms of Kulka’s notion of *aesthetic* value. Now I must make the case that “Significance-for-Us” is more faithfully understood as appraisal in terms of what Kulka calls *artistic* value.

To begin, Kivy’s distinction between “meaning of the work” and “meaning of the work *to*” may prove helpful in this case, by showing how we might view Kulkian artistic value as a particular kind of “Significance-for-Us.” Kivy introduced the distinction in order to differentiate, even if loosely, between Koopman & Davies’ first and second alleged types of meaning and their third and fourth. The distinction between “meaning *of* the work” and “meaning of the work *to*”
illuminates a conceptual similarity between ‘Significance-for-Us’ and appraisals of artistic value within “Aesthetic Dualism.” Kivy’s distinction applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the two types of value in Kulka’s essay, “Aesthetic Dualism”: we can speak of aesthetic value as the “value of the work,” and we can speak of artistic value as the “value of the work to us.” As Kulka might put it, “artistic value cannot be assessed just by the contemplation of a given work by itself…. We have to be equipped with the relevant art-historical knowledge” (2005: 65). We are contemplating in the former cases the given work by itself, and we are contemplating in the latter cases the work within a certain context. It is theoretically important that neither ‘Significance-for-Us’ nor Kulka’s artistic value are immanent properties of the work itself; both require a community of suitably qualified listeners. Within this community, there are expectations that certain pieces will take on a specific significance while others may not, and hence, we look to attribute significance or value to these pieces and not those.

The case of Mozart’s late concertos exemplifies this feature of Kulkian artistic value. The teenager example doesn’t exemplify this feature as vividly, but I think we have reason to believe that even in that case there are shared expectations that others within groups of suitably qualified listeners (here, teenagers who wear those shirts and like these albums) will ascribe a shared or similar significance to the work.

I am not suggesting that there is no room for disagreement among Mozart scholars as to whether or not some of his concertos suggest solutions to artistic problems or point to new directions for development within the sonata allegro form. Rather, I am saying that there is enough common historical knowledge and familiarity with the forms utilized by Mozart and his

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34 It may be more accurate to present this distinction as the “value appraised on the basis of the properties of the work” versus the “value of the work’s ability to point to subsequent developments appraised within an historical context replete with stylistic conventions, precedents, and problems.”

35 Koopman & Davies 2001 269; or, see above, p. 16.
predecessors and successors to make debate possible. There are terms and conditions of debate that could lead to reasoned conclusions and the possibility of agreement over which concertos do these things and which fail to do these things.

One might argue that “Significance-for-Us” can be understood as appraisal of artistic value, but that it is no more natural to common parlance to do so than to talk about the ‘meaning’ of a piece for groups. Consider the teenagers example given by Koopman & Davies in their article:

Teenagers are an exemplary case. They categorize their peers in ways that identify and value a specific way of life in which music is crucial. Members of the group love and hate the same types of music, go to the same concerts, buy the same [albums], talk in the same way about music, wear T-Shirts of the same bands, and so on. As the case shows, the meaning music has for the subject is constituted both by meanings that are private and by those that are shared with others. Instead of being objective properties of the music, both kinds are to be attributed to the subject. (2001: 269)

While the type of significance found by the concert-going, t-shirt-wearing, clique-forming teenagers in this example is vastly different in kind from the significance that Mozart’s late concertos take on in the context of the classical era and the context of the development of the sonata allegro form, I contend that the artistic value proffered by Kulka yields an accurate treatment of ‘Significance-for-Us’. In both cases, the place the work takes in the lives of those groups is not a so-called objective property of the music, but is attributed to the groups of subjects. It is a value for the groups of the work, not a value of the works simpliciter.

There is a possible criticism of my project that I’d like to anticipate. Whereas Kulka’s appraising artistic value is specifically an historical and retrospective affair, the third aspect of Koopman & Davies’ position (what I have coined “Significance-for-Us”) need not be interested in historical context or be retrospectively observant. To this I would respond that artistic value is
a type of “Significance-for-Us”, but that not all cases of “Significances-for-Us” are types of artistic value. This is to also say that not all cases of “Significance-for-Us” are compatible with artistic value appraisals, but all cases of artistic value appraisals are cases of “Significance-for-Us”. Again, to say a work suggests solutions to artistic problems or that a work points to new directions for development (and hence has artistic value), requires that we know which problems are under view and what art style, genre or epoch is to be developed. What Kulka is offering, in Koopman & Davies’ terms, would be a type of value we might regard as retrospective and historical “Significance-for-Us”. This would be a narrower type within the category I had originally coined. As the teenager example provides, there are values held by groups in the concept “Significance[s]-for-Us” that are less rigidly defined than the retrospective, historical artistic value as described by Tomas Kulka. I submit that within the philosophy of art, and specifically in the philosophy of music, the Mozart example above is more paradigmatic to the literature than is the teenager example.

With this retrospective and historical kind of ‘Significance-for-Us’, my project offers the many musical scholars, critics, theorists and analysts a framework for discussing musical value. Provided there is an adequate level of agreement among the suitably qualified listeners as to what constitutes the problems and the solutions in any historical epoch of music history, music is no worse off than pictorial or literary arts, or the dramatic arts, in appraising value relative to history. More importantly, they can engage music as interpreters of value without wielding the dubious “m” word. The term “meaning” will continue to find itself into common parlance but doesn't cleanly track anything of philosophical significance. My suggestion has been to eliminate the term in favor of value, at least in philosophical conversation. It unlikely that this
result will satisfy all parties in the philosophical debate over musical meaning. To repeat Peter Kivy’s word of caution in full:

Words have magnetism; they are magical. They wield a peculiar and subtle power over us. And the word "meaning" is one of the most magnetic, magical, and powerful of all. So unless we continually repeat to ourselves the mantra, "This is not semantic meaning, this does not license us to talk with the interpreters, this does not bestow philosophical or moral or narrative significance upon music," we are liable to forget how little we gain when we grant "meaning" to music if the meaning is anything but the semantic variety. Thomas Hobbes famously said "Words are wise men’s counters … but the money of fools." And no word has, in the philosophy of music, been more taken for coin than counter that seductive word "meaning." We would do better without it. (2007: 299)
6. **Conclusion: Beethoven’s Sonata in d minor, Opus 31 no. 2**

Assuming Schindler’s story were true and Beethoven had suggested to anyone who wanted to know the meaning of (what to this day is known as) the ‘Tempest Sonata’ that they read Shakespeare’s *Tempest*, what is our response? As should now be clear, we can dismiss the reading according to which Beethoven’s Sonata in d minor, Opus 31, No. 2 is literally means whatever Shakespeare’s *Tempest* means. It may be of value to know that Ludwig van Beethoven associated his Opus 31, No. 2, or (the writing process thereof) with the last known play of Shakespeare, but what kind? I contend that the case of the ‘Tempest Sonata’ is a case of idiosyncratic value, what Koopman & Davies would classify as “Meaning-for-the-Subject” in the idiosyncratic sense.

I contend also that, if the story were true, it is at most a biographical curiosity. While the anecdote caught the eye of music historians, it seems obvious now that this detail could lend nothing to a value appraisal of the Sonata in d minor, Opus 31, No. 2. This potential fact would be of greater interest to Beethoven biographers and music historians than to philosophers. It may be true that the Sonata in d minor, Opus 31, No. 2 meant something like what Shakespeare’s *Tempest* meant to *Beethoven*; but it would be trivially true in a philosophical context. Artists of all genres and aptitudes draw inspiration to create a given work from various sources and hold personal associations with those sources long after putting the finishing touches on the work. This is removed from artistic value in the Kulkian sense, and it is even more removed from any notion of meaning of the sort advanced as types of meaning by Koopman & Davies. Kivy again here:

Another way of putting it is this. When I write about what Billy Budd means, what moral or broadly philosophical points Melville is making, I am playing the part of interpreter. When I write about what Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony means to me, I am playing the part of autobiographer, when I write about what [Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony] means to someone else, I am playing the part of biographer, and when I write about what it means
to the French Romantics, I am playing the part of social and musical historian. There is a world of difference between the first occupation and the other three. And it is the first occupation that many musical scholars, critics, theorists and analysts desperately long for. Alas, Koopman & Davies can offer them no consolation whatsoever in that direction. (2007: 299)

There is at least one other corollary implied by the position I hold here. The name ‘Tempest Sonata’ is useful simply as a name. The label ‘Tempest Sonata’ is useful in common parlance as a kind of shorthand for the slightly cumbersome ‘Sonata in d minor, Opus 31, No. 2’. But by no means does the use of this common parlance short hand warrant the attribution of meaning to the Sonata in a philosophical parlance, because it has no meaning in any philosophical sense of the term.
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