Imagining a Twenty-First Century Strategy

Marcia Bost

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation argues that a diversity of epistemology within the field of rhetoric and composition can encourage Imagining as a strategy to negotiate the conundrums and binaries of the post-everything era, especially in negotiating the social presence of online learning. I trace Imagination from Enlightenment Pedagogy, which privileged the individual, unteachable genius, to the conflation of invention and Imagination and the disappearance of both in current-traditional, modern, and postmodern pedagogy. Underlying this disappearance seems to be a distrust of Imagination, as exemplified by Kenneth Burke. I suggest that strategy of Imagining, rather than the faculty of Imagination, is needed—a move that is congruent with the active agency suggested by Marilyn Cooper. I also suggest that the theoretical basis for Imagining as a bridge can be found in the “Thirdness” of Charles Sanders Pierce. Following Coleridge, I suggest
that four means of knowing serve as foundations for Imagining: the group, the text, knowledgeable others, and the spirit. These four means can give the field of rhetoric and composition a diversity of epistemologies, and these terms provide the means to more fully describe our complex, partial, and recursive ways of knowing in the twenty-first century. These ways of knowing are especially necessary in online learning where teachers and students may only “see” each other through their words.

INDEX WORDS: Diversity of epistemologies, Coleridge, Kenneth Burke, Ann E. Berthoff, Posthuman, online learning.
IMAINGING A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY STRATEGY

by

MARCIA INZER BOST

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IMAGINING A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY STRATEGY

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my family: my late parents, Charles Inzer and Julia Layman Inzer, who taught me the value of never giving up and my husband and children who bore with me in the making of “doctor mom.”
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Thank you to all my “knowledgeable others,” in particular my committee members: co-chairs Dr. Lynee Gaillet and Dr. Michael Harker and committee member Dr. George Pullman. Thank you to all my colleagues who endured my questions about knowing, in particular Dr. Brenda Ayers, Dr. Micheal Elam and Dr. Fabrice Pussin, and to Dr. Mark Hamilton, who served as a peer reader. Thank you also to those who encouraged me to seek my doctorate while I was at Kennesaw State University: Dr. Todd Harper, Dr. Laura Dabundo, Dr. Greg Meyes, and especially Dr. Bernadette Musetti who saw my potential before I did.
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INTRODUCTION

What comes next for the discipline of rhetoric/composition? That is the quandary facing the discipline of rhetoric and composition, according to Sidney Dobrin. The difficulty of envisioning a future is the source of all the “post” prefixes now littering scholarship, he argues: postmodern, post process, post human, and even post composition (which serves the title of his book—Postcomposition). He correctly points out that the discipline cannot continue to define its work by this negative prefix which essentially posits that it is “beyond” something without specifying where it is. However, I find that his erasure of the student and/or the writer is not helpful in an era when technology (especially in online learning at the present moment) already serves to remove or severely limit the writer through the disembodiment of information. Research on successful online teaching, discussed in more detail in chapter 1, suggests that a presence and an informed ethos need to be deliberately enacted by both teachers and students. Most interaction between students and teachers, at this point, takes place through the written word. The presence of the writer in his or her writing has to be imagined, contrary to Dobrin and others, like Katherine Hayles, whose theories destabilize the liberal, modernist ideas about “self.” Practice and theory have demoted the writer from the authorial genius of the Enlightenment to the fragmented scribbler of group thought in the post everything era, a trend that I will discuss further in chapter 1.

At the same time, other educators, such as Sir Kenneth Robinson, are looking at the pace of technological development and suggesting that no one can envision the skills students need more than five years into the future. This event horizon is particularly true in online learning, with its reliance on rapidly developing technology. In light of this pace, any answer to Dobrin’s
question has to be a generative strategy, not a static term, since a strategy can be repeated as needed to meet the new challenges we cannot yet see or even imagine.

Two theorists who have suggested answers to Dobrin’s question of what comes next are Byron Hawk in *A Counter-History of Composition: Toward Methodologies of Complexity* and Robert P. Yagelski in *Writing as a Way of Being: Writing Instruction, Nonduality and the Crisis of Sustainability*. Both propose different ways of looking at theory, creating in the process new ontologies and new ways of knowing that include imagining. Hawk argues for the expanding of the ideology of the field to include vitalism (a philosophy that fuses mind and body), while Yagelski, based on his phenomenological study of writing situations and writers writing, suggests the foundation of the Buddhist teachings of Eihei Dogen.

First, Hawk maps the philosophy of vitalism from the imagination of S.T. Coleridge through the ideology of James Berlin and the intuition of Henri Bergson to the machine-biological fusion of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Hawk draws on what he describes as Coleridge’s early “philosophical vitalism based on the concept of polarity” (141) while bracketing Coleridge’s later idealism as a philosophy “that cannot be read as vitalism” (note 5, p. 281). Hawk zeroes in on Coleridge’s methods, explicating the interpretations of E.C. White among others, to note a complexity that does not neatly fit into Berlin’s ideology of truth arising from social-epistemic contexts (109-112). Paramount among Coleridge’s methods is intuition, which in Bergson’s view, arises from “the process of living in the complex, evolving interplay of body, mind, and the world” (114). Thus, Bergson posits, according to Hawk, a mind-body connection that is a continuum and not a dichotomy. Hawk describes the networks suggested by Deleuze and Guattari as a complex vitalism wherein the machine and the body are not distinctive (158-163). Hawk also notes that Victor Vitanza bypasses the binary model of dialectics/
paralogy, suggesting that paralogy is continuous invention breaking out of dialogs (222). In his further discussion of Vitanza’s “sub/versive historiography,” Hawk notes categories can exclude, such as was done with Coleridge (I will discuss this exclusion further in chapter 1). Hawk suggests that the solution to the problem of exclusion is the production of “counter-categorizations that incorporate the initial category in order to both move beyond it and to address a present-day historical problem or practice” (272). He further argues that his categories present “no impenetrable/impassable lines…..” In his discussion of the impact of vitalism on rhetorical practice, Hawk writes that “students need to develop their own schemata to fit their particular topics and situations” (192). He also argues against using received methodology: “…design your own occasions, build your own constellations, and invent your own heuristics specifically for those contexts” (254). While the main thrust of his argument seems to be the opening of the field to other ideologies, specifically vitalism, he sprinkles his books with suggestions for openness that are tantamount to an invitation, including calls for other possible categorizations and multiple counter histories (260-262). I interpret these scattered observations about counter history as an engraved invitation to pen my own.

Yagelski also issues an invitation. “Imagine 1,000 writers writing,” he encourages us in his manifesto (137). He writes this imperative as the application of his unitary theory that the mind/body dichotomy does not really exist since both are temporary. “Imagine them writing— together—for themselves and for each other,” he continues. “And imagine when they are finished nothing happens to the 1,000 texts they produce…Now imagine that you are one of the 1,000 … Imagine…” While recounting his experience of working with the National Writing Project, he writes, “But I never imagined asking 1,000 people to write at the same time. More to the point, I had never imagined simply putting the text aside once the period of writing was over”
He is citing this phenomenological evidence to argue for focusing on the student who is writing rather than the text he or she writes. He places the responsibility for the lack of imagining on the persistent modern, Cartesian view (dominating the field as current/traditional pedagogy) that it is the text that matters. Instead, he urges us to imagine a pedagogy that is student-centered and which relies on a collaborative epistemology: “a pedagogy based on the idea of writing as a way of being is fundamentally social and inherently communal” (160).

Combining these invitations, in this dissertation I imagine new categories that describe our knowing in ways that more accurately reflect the complexity of the current technological moment and give us means to confront an event horizon of five years or less. I am suggesting a more diverse epistemology with terms based on Coleridge’s later theoretical work. As more completely explored in chapter 3 and 4, Coleridge suggested four means of knowing, in part as a theoretical foundation for his description of Imagination. Those four means were the Bible, the preacher, church tradition, and the Spirit. I suggest that those four loci of knowing could be re-conceptualized as the text, the knowledgeable other, the group, and the spirit, bringing epistemological diversity to the field of rhetoric/composition. I am, in part, employing the method described by Hawk as producing “counter-categorizations that incorporate the initial category in order to both move beyond it and to address a present-day historical problem or practice” (272). Further, as an experienced online instructor, I am particularly interested in the dynamic of the knowledgeable other (the instructor or other leader) in the creation of online spaces where Imagining is encouraged.

The dynamic that I am exploring is described in Shirley Brice Heath’s *Ways with Words*. In the Epilogue to this seminal work on literacy practices of different communities, Heath notes

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1 Because the term “ways” is often connected with the product of knowledge, I have chosen to use the “means” to emphasize the process of knowing. The term “means” also provides a connection to theories of making meaning, as will be explored in chapter 3.
that teachers taking her courses felt increasingly disempowered by bureaucratization and technology. Conversely, Heath’s presence as anthropologist and a college instructor had “a catalytic effect” on these teachers as they faced desegregation and other challenges of the 1970s. In response to Heath’s class assignment to write field notes, these teachers created their own texts which led to further discussions and “imaginative innovations” (356-358). Thus, three of the four means—the knowledgeable other (Heath herself), group collaboration, and texts—were at work among these teacher/students. In Heath’s analysis of the effect of religious practices on literacy and her use of a Biblical text (II Corinthians 10:12) to introduce the book (xiii), there may even be a subtle undercurrent of the spirit at work. While the context is different more than four decades later, we are also dealing with new situations that challenge all our pedagogical givens and are likely to continue to do so.

Just as there is a hint of this spiritual means in Brice’s description of imagining new ways of coping with changing student demographics, I see a hint of the spiritual in Yagelski. It comes in his grounding of his concept in the Buddhist teachings of Eihei Dogen. This knowledgeable other, as explicated by Yagelski, advocates the “basic interconnectedness of all beings” and a merging of the mind-body dichotomy to form a “nondualistic way of being in the world” (81-82). For Dogan, only the universe is permanent and there is “no transcendent self or individual soul that exists apart from the body” and recognition of this concept is the attainment of “Buddha-nature” (83). Yagelski suggests that Dogan’s description of this realization “might roughly translate as truth (or, to put it in more spiritual terms, enlightenment)” (83). Yagelski concedes that Dogan’s approach (summarized as studying self to experience the nonduality of self) has been “dismissed by Western scholars as so much spiritualism or mysticism” (84). He argues that Dogan’s stance towards language resonates with the neo-sophist and poststructuralist
view of language as unstable “and therefore unreliable as a vehicle for truth” (85). Truth comes from experience without linguistic expression, as Yagelski explains Dogan’s teaching; he writes that in this teaching, “language ceases to be an obstacle to truth because truth is extra-linguistic” (85). It is language and the way it is constructed that leads to dualities, such as expressed by Derrida in his concept of difference, which seems to undermine duality while still preserving it, Yagelski writes. He argues that nonduality is more than either a spiritual belief or a philosophical question, “rather a legitimate description of the physical world and a valid way to understand what it means to be human” (87). While he acknowledges that he does not know what truth is, Yagelski suggests that writing as a way of being could be based on the hope for peace and justice (99). I see his nibbling at the idea of truth, as well as his advocacy for peace and justice and sustainability of resources as a spiritual quest. Thus, the spiritual remains a search for truth as Yagelski seems to be advocating the same ontology as Hawk’s vitalism and mind-body continuum. Coleridge did not live in that particular a Buddhist discourse community of faith (as I will discuss in chapter 4) and neither do I. However, I do not limit this problematic and controversial fourth means of knowing—the spiritual—to my own or any other discourse community.

However, I am operating in a different sphere when I teach online since Yagelski and Brice both function in situations where teachers and students see each other and can converse in real time. Yagelski writes of 1,000 people writing in the same physical room and of several face-to-face conversations with students about their writing, as well as his experience writing in a coffee shop. Brice also writes of brick-and-mortar schools and physically observing parents and children and neighbors reading and telling stories as part of their literacy development. What happens when the teaching and learning are moved online, where texts and conversations are
asynchronous? What happens when the teacher and student are not even in the same time zone? Often, I reply to students within minutes (if we both happen to be online) and certainly within a few hours. However, last year, I had an online student who was in South Korea, having returned home after living sometime in the United States. Due to our conflicting time zones and work schedules, there was an average of 18 hours each between her question, my reply, and her response asking for more explanation or confirming her understanding. A conversation could take three to four days on one topic. It is in this troubled sphere, where conversation may be chronologically skewed (and our presence only imagined through our texts) that I began my search for ways to incorporate Imagining as a composition strategy, a search that resulted in this dissertation.

Like Hawk and Yagelski, I want to suggest a theory built from a non-materialist perspective. However, instead of the merger of body and machine in complex vitalism or nonduality based on Eastern mysticism, I suggest the use of Coleridge’s four means of knowing (text, group, knowledgeable other, and spirit) will allow us to trace the complex trajectories of imagining. I argue that the present theory is inadequate for present practice, specifically in online learning where the presence of the writer must be imagined from his/her writing. Therefore, a more diverse epistemology (Coleridge’s four means of knowing—text, group, knowledgeable other, and spirit) and a robust concept of Imagining are needed to meet current challenges as well as a future that Robinson suggests cannot be predicted beyond five years.

I have deliberately left the colon out of the title so that the term Imagining can be read in two ways: as a gerund to name a strategy that I suggest is vital to writing in the post-everything era, and as a participial verb suggesting the embodiment of imagining in writing this dissertation. Like Hawk and Yagaski, I am using the form CATTt, in which the letters stand for Contrast,
Analogy, Theory, Target and tale or pedagogical applications, although I have switched the Analogy and Theory chapters to enhance the flow of the narrative. In Chapter 1 “Imagination and Breaking Free,” I trace the historical disappearance of the concept of Imagination, except in isolated pockets—Ann E. Berthoff and a few in the field of education. Imagination was bracketed with genius by Enlightenment pedagogy, and then conflated with invention in the New Rhetoric. With the identity of “author” declared dead by Roland Barthes, post-modern writers find the act of writing difficult, if not impossible. I argue that this disappearance has left the field of rhetoric and composition less able to meet the challenges of the future, particularly in online learning where the participants must be imagined from their writing.

In Chapter 2 “The Illusive Looking Glass of Theory: Genius, Coleridge, and Burke,” I explore the reasons that Kenneth Burke, who serves as an exemplar of the field, may have distrusted Imagination. While he agrees with Berthoff and Cassirer on the definition of humans as symbol-using animals, Burke distrusts Imagination and places the term in the same box as Temptation. I will argue that he does so because of his reliance on the philosophy of Spinoza and not on his methods of dramatology and logology.

In Chapter 3 “‘A Glassy Essence’: Reflecting on the Search for an Active Imagination,” I try to define the term Imagination (a mental faculty), which becomes Imagining (an active gerund) that allows the writer to leap from a current understanding to a deeper or possibly new understanding. I start with the theories of Samuel Taylor Coleridge because he serves as a touchstone for others writing on Imagination, who are in turn quoted by secondary sources. That list includes Hawk, Berthoff, and Burke, as well as educators such as Maxine Greene and moral philosopher Mark Johnson. I argue that Imagination should be conceptualized as a mediating act, as a cogitative leap between being and knowing, as imagining.
In Chapter 4: “Through the Glass Darkly: Composing Agents for Imagining,” I examine the epistemological and ontological basis for Coleridge’s four means of knowing (text, group, knowledgeable other, and spirit), which in turn serve as the foundation for his theory of Imagination. It is this foundation that Hawk brackets as he uses only the texts by Coleridge that support his argument for vitalism. I suggest that Coleridge’s ontology, which allows for the operation of the spirit, supplies a necessary element that can serve as a “third” leaping between text and group, or knowledgeable other and text, or group and knowledgeable other or other permutations. There could in fact be several different binaries with either of the two other means of knowing acting as a bridging “third.” Even more complex interactions can be seen in the contrast of the four means from different eras—the knowledgeable others of the Enlightenment era and those of the post-modern era, for example. These dynamic possibilities are illustrated in the final chapter.

In chapter 5, “The Unseen Presence,” using as evidence comments from the survey of my colleagues with online teaching experience, I argue that the four means of knowing will enlarge the scope for imagining, as well as enriching the epistemology of the field. I suggest that conceptualizing the means of knowing as the text, the group, the knowledgeable other, and the spirit will allow for far more nuanced and recursive descriptions of knowing and enhance the possibility of Imagining. In answer to Dobrin’s question, I suggest that Imagining is a twenty-first century strategy that will allow us to see beyond the event horizon of five years and Imagining can best be fostered by the use of and reflection on Coleridge’s four means of knowing-- text, group, knowledgeable other, and spirit. To this end, I suggest what changes that we as knowledgeable others might need to make in a syllabus, where the acceptable texts, groups, knowledgeable others and spirit (or prohibition thereof) are typically prescribed by the
institution and instructor. I make moves towards writing an unsyllabus, an alternative to the normative document that encourages student participation in writing it. An openness to student connections, I suggest, is necessary to negotiate the conundrums of the post-everything age.
“All depends upon a breaking free, a leap, and then a question”

Maxine Greene, *Releasing the Imagination* (6)

CHAPTER 1: IMAGINATION AND BREAKING FREE

A wild-haired artist intensely working away in his attic, scribbling, painting, or composing—that’s a common (mis)conception of a genius using his imagination. A brief logology of the term *Imagination* demonstrates the linguistic connection of *genius* and *imagination*, as well as its connection to *imitation* or *phantoms*. *The Oxford Dictionary of the English Language* illustrates the way in which Imagination is often discounted as an imitation, a copy, a shadow of the real, or even a phantom. In its adjective form of *imagery*, the term means existing only in imagination or fancy, having no real existence (s.v. “Imagery”). Imagination can be productive, but is subdivided into fantastic thought, fancy, creativity and poetic genius (s.v. “Imagination”). The term is also closely linked to the word *invent* (to discover), a characteristic that led to its being labeled as a part of Invention in composition, where it lost currency (I will discuss this trend in detail later in this chapter). Imagination is also linked to *ingenuity*, which has as its root “gen,” and brings in the family of words that include *generate* and *genius*. However, these definitions simultaneously place a limit on Imagination through such terms as *native intelligence* and *extraordinary capacity* (s.v. “genius”). My quest for a more robust concept of Imagination, suitable for twenty-first century composition, begins at this nexus of complexity: *Imagination, image, invent, generate,* and *genius*. In order to break free as Greene describes, in this chapter I will first analyze the relationship of Imagination and genius and the categorization of Imagination as a part of Invention and the disappearance of both in twentieth century composition. As a foundation for my leap, I will look at writing of Ann E. Berthoff,
whom I think is a champion of Imagination. From there I will move to Imagination in the posthuman moment, including the necessity of imagination in online learning and the small but consistent drumbeat for Imagination in the field of Education. I will end with question: how can we write within, beyond, and through these contexts?

**Imagination as the Sphere of Genius**

The Romantic poets may be culpable for the enduring connection of genius and Imagination. Samuel Taylor Coleridge pays homage to the term *genius* in *Biographia Literaria*, using the term more than 100 times, although some of these are in the sense of beginnings (see, for example, 231, n. 63). He defends authorial genius against charges of irritability and madness (chapter II, 14-15). He also designates several authors as geniuses, notably Shakespeare and Alexander Pope (214, n. 9, 10) and his friends Robert Southey (see for example Chapter III, 24) and William Wordsworth (Chapter IV, 27). In addition, Coleridge claims for genius these characteristics: calmness of temper (chapter II), “profound sensibility” and quickness of association (216, n. 13), skill with satire (219, n. 19), and a maturing ability quickly growing out of youthful errors (Chapter IV 29). Even though most of those receiving the accolade of “genius” are established authors, Coleridge leaves room for someone who is uneducated to be a genius (Chapter IX, 48). He also distinguishes between talent and genius, advising the young writer to use his talents to pursue a vocation for economic support (a stable paycheck) and to use his genius to pursue his writing (Chapter XI, 73). Yet, his exploration of the term Imagination is not necessarily tied to in-born characteristics, but springs from varied sources, as I will suggest in chapters 3 and 4.
Coleridge is also linked both in time and philosophy with fellow Romantic poet Percy Bysshe Shelley, whose “A Defense of Poetry” (published 1840) creates a binary of imagination and reason. Shelley posits in Part I:

Reason is the enumeration of quantities already known; imagination is the perception of the value of those quantities, both separately and as a whole. Reason respects the differences, and imagination the similitudes of things. Reason is to imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the spirit, as the shadow to the substance (310).

Thus, he identifies Imagination as a quality higher than reason. Shelley goes on to famously declare that “poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world” (335). This linkage of imagination, genius, and privileged status became the defining description of Romanticism that is only recently being reexamined, in works such as Byron Hawk’s *The Counter-History of Composition*. However, its vaulted position in Romanticism left it vulnerable to attack and eventual subjugation, as the concept’s fate in the twentieth century will show.

Before the Romantic poets privileged genius, Enlightenment rhetoricians Hugh Blair, George Campbell and Richard Whately had based their teaching of writing on this connection. Building on classical rhetorical theory, they posited, among other tenets of oratory, that style include those characteristics of vividness and clarity provided by imagination and that in-born talents needed to be perfected by education. (Whately 13). Blair in his lecture on “Criticism—Genius—Pleasures of Taste—Sublimity in Objects” declares the following: “A masterly genius, it is true, will of himself, untaught, compose in such a manner as shall be agreeable to the most material rules of criticism, for as these rules are founded in nature, nature will often suggest them in practice” (47). Blair adds that instruction in rules cannot make up for the lack of genius, but
that instruction might be able to direct genius, which is necessarily imperfect, towards the avoidance of faults (48).

Blair also distinguishes between taste and genius, with the power of writing and speaking left to genius. He adds that genius will also include taste and may extend beyond taste in literature into fields such as mathematics (49). Blair also suggests that genius can profit from education by studying examples of previous genius (133). He posits that the essence of style is found in “good sense accompanied by a lively Imagination” (84). Blair connects imagination with genius in the ancients (59): all three of these Enlightenment rhetoricians recommended study of ancient rhetoricians such as Aristotle and Quintilian (12). Blair also links Imagination to other abilities in his list of the characteristics of the eloquent speaker: “a strong, lively, and warm imagination; quick sensibility of heart, joined with solid judgment, good sense, presence of mind” which are supported by education in style and composition, a graceful manner, and a pleasant voice (128). George Campbell also suggests that the necessary powers of an orator include Imagination, memory and passion as “handmaids” to reason, although Imagination can lead one astray (249-250). In the theory articulated by these Enlightenment rhetoricians, Imagination retains its tie to genius, or at least an in-born ability, capable of being directed by education.

In her analysis of current/traditional composition textbooks, Sharon Crowley suggests that Campbell is working with a model of the mind based on the faculty psychology of the Middle Ages and associationism as theorized by Hartley, Hume, Gerard, Kames, Priestly and Locke (17-19). She also notes that Campbell “placed much more importance on logical proofs than other kinds of appeals” and that theorists of that day “placed much more faith in the information given minds by the senses—that is, in empirical evidence—than classical
rhetoricians” (16). Imagination for Campbell, according to Crowley, takes a subsidiary role: it can be used “to move the passions or influence the will,” with such persuasion being one of the four ends of discourse (15). While Crowley remains focused on the rise and fall of current-traditional pedagogy as a whole, Janice Lauer in *Invention in Rhetoric and Composition* traces the term “invention” beginning with the same Enlightenment rhetoricians. She suggests that imagination, along with other faculties such as emotion, will, and judgment were part of understanding for Campbell, Alexander Gerard and Blair during the enlightenment (*Invention* 40-59). This idea of native ability as the basis of good writing also surfaces in the debate over the abolition of first year composition, particularly among those who advocated its abolishment.²

In the view of some advocating its abolishment, genius is required for writing, and imagination is assumed as an operative mental faculty.

**Imagination as the Stepchild of Invention**

While tracing the history of invention, Lauer connects Imagination as a subsidiary term, which shared the fate of invention. With a few exceptions, she posits that the idea of *invention* disappeared in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. (Lauer *Invention* 41-43). She notes the following exceptions: some American professors followed Campbell’s ideas of understanding, imagination, and memory (notably Joseph McKean). Another exception appears to have been John Genung, who wrote *Practical Elements of Rhetoric*. He suggests that “a native endowment of imagination” and aptitude are the means to good writing (Lauer *Invention* 61). Lauer envisions rhetoric as encompassing two extremes. Both McKean and Genung appear to be part of the one polar position described by Berlin and Robert Inkster as teaching “composition as

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² See, for example, David Russell’s discussion of romanticism and liberal culture and Thomas Loundsbury’s argument against first year composition.
an act of genius.” The other extreme was the current-traditional paradigm that emphasized stylistic correctness (Lauer *Invention* 64), a trend upon which Crowley expands.

Invention meets a similar fate in Crowley’s history of current-traditional pedagogy. Crowley describes the loss of invention as “gradual hardening of discursive arteries that characterized invention during what I call the mature period of current-traditional rhetoric—from about 1870 to about 1900.” (95) She suggests that the tradition became increasingly text-centered “as it lapsed into old age” (95). The loss of invention began with the focus of early current-traditional pedagogy that relied on associationism. Crowley writes:

> Invention was a mental process that began when writers made connections between ideas. In turn, ideas were generated either from experience or from reading. Adherence to this introspective procedure would provide writers with an accurate picture of the part of the world under investigation. This move, which confined invention to exploration of some aspect of writer’s accumulated experience of the world, marked a stark contrast to classical inventional theory, in which speakers and writers evaluated the worth of an argument not only in terms of its internal cogency and its suitability to a case, but with an eye toward its potential reception by an audience as well. (62)

In this pedagogy, the writer was expected to perform specific “mental gymnastics” with any deviation seen as coming from inability or carelessness on the part of the writer (68).

In Crowley’s account of current-traditional textbooks, some authors in the mid-century were concerned about invention. For example, Henry Noble Day in *Elements of Rhetoric*, suggest using the commonplaces of classical rhetoric in specific situations, such as the courtroom (74). She also sees Genung was also “an anomaly among late-century current-traditional authors in giving detailed attention to invention” (77). Crowley posits, “whether or not Genung was
familiar with the literature on method, his account in the *Working Principles of Rhetoric* of the two directions taken by invention certainly resembled Coleridge’s accounts of unity and progression” (81).

Crowley also points to the 1945 text *Essentials of English Composition* by A. Howry Espenshade (89) as one that included imagination as a source of subject matter. “Espenshade and his collaborators wrote that the ‘imagination is, or may become, a constant and unfailing source of good writing…’” but then set imaginative writing outside the composition classroom “Since imaginative writing demanded ‘penetration, insight, control’ the student writer who wished to cultivate his imaginative faculty ‘should found his imaginings upon the known’” (6; qtd in Crowley 89-90) As the current-traditional pedagogy stumbled into “old age,” Crowley notes, streamlining eliminated any appeals to the imagination found in Campbell and others (101).

However, most current-traditional textbook authors relied only on reason as a source for invention. A case in point, according to Crowley, is Alexander Bain, who “made its centrality to modern discourse theory explicit when he subsumed appeals to the imagination and the passions under this faculty. ” In the process he bracketed oratory and poetry, which rely on imagination, as irrational and unpredictable. Imagination was thus barred from composition classrooms. Crowley writes: “Its emphasis on reason also explains why writers in the textbook tradition were so firmly opposed to students exercising their imaginations. Unfortunately this position also led them oppose the exercise of originality or innovation” (157). Although the theory (that all good thinkers followed the same process that could be learned) was wonderfully democratic, Crowley writes, but “if writers’ minds took tacks that were innovative, unconventional, digressive, or difficult, they could be suspected of possessing inadequate or unnatural reasoning processes” (162)
Ironically, the bracketing of originality and innovation (I read these as synonyms of Imagination) began with what Crowley describes as the focusing of the inventional process “solely on the individual creative mind of a rhetor working in relative isolation….” in early current-traditional pedagogy (32). As the current-traditional theory matured, it became more text-centered, according to Crowley (81). The epistemology of Coleridge, as I will argue in chapters 3 and 4, will widen the focus of invention, in contradiction to this current-traditional narrowing.

The status of invention (and thus imagination) seems to have improved in the second part of the twentieth century. Heuristics, which emerged in the 1960s, were considered as one teachable means to engage memory and imagination and thus could be a means for invention (Lauer Invention 9). Flexible heuristics were provided by Richard Young, Alton Becker and Kenneth Pike in Rhetoric: Discovery and Change, including the “natural abilities of intuition, incubation, and the imagination” (Lauer Invention 128). However, with the formation of rhetoric and composition as a discipline, anything that seemed connected with Romanticism, including Coleridge and imagination, was rejected in favor of the heuristics of classical rhetoric, a rejection that Hawk considers erroneous (18).

The Berthoff-Lauder debate was a crucial turning point, according to Hawk (18). In my analysis, Berthoff makes other arguments (principally that language should not be considered a code, as will be discussed later); however, she does connect her foregrounding of creativity to the legacy of the Romantics (Response 415). Kelly Pender, in the annotated bibliography appended to Lauer’s history of invention, characterizes their debate as being about Berthoff’s not wanting to include psychology in the discipline, as well as differences on the concepts of problem-solving and invention and the split between humanities and science (Lauer, Invention,
170). This debate and its implications for imagination in the posthuman era will be considered in more detail below.

As classical rhetoric became privileged, Imagination become connected with expressivism. In his survey of the discipline in 1986, Lester Faigley connects creative imagination with Peter Elbow and the expressivists, who followed the Romantic principle “that ‘good’ writing does not follow rules but reflects the processes of the creative imagination” (655). There were two other Romantic principles, integrity and originality, which expressivists could not champion, Faigley writes, because integrity is difficult to judge and originality is linked to natural genius (654-655).

As a way of gaining disciplinary status for composition, Faigley suggests research into the social contexts of writing (663). Thus, in expressivism, Imagination remains a favored concept, but genius has disappeared, perhaps for good. In addition, Faigley’s call for research of social influences indicates a turn to the social-episteme.

After her mention of Faigley (104), the term imagination also disappears of Lauer’s history. Significantly perhaps, Imagination does not appear in the glossary as a separate term in Lauer’s history (being listed as one of the activities prompted by heuristics). In addition, Berthoff is not listed in Lauer’s annotated bibliography. Crowley points to a similar fate for invention as a whole:

Based on the concept of knowledge as a commodity, Invention was eventually rendered marginal in current-traditional pedagogy because of its assumption that knowledge could be found or reproduced, but it could never be generated by the composition of discourse or in reaction to a rhetorical situation. (163)

The idea of the genius is further rejected by Kenneth Bruffee in “Collaborative Learning and the ‘Conversation of Mankind.’ ” He points out the concept of the writer as “genius” is based
in Cartesian philosophy. One of three sites of authority, the Cartesian viewpoint locates the instructor’s authority in the mind of the genius or those who have studied his text closely, according to Bruffee. Instead, he suggests that teachers should operate as “certified representatives of the communities of knowledgeable peers that students aspire to join” (558). His seminal essay signaled the social turn with Lunsford and Ede now advocating that all knowledge is collaboration, as I discuss in later in this chapter. As this historical narrative shows, the term *genius* fell out of favor in the teaching of rhetoric and composition, Imagination become categorized as a part of Invention.

As Hawk points out, the discipline did indeed take a social turn with the ideological theories of James Berlin, which create a closed system (80). In Hawk’s analysis, Berlin’s “openness” about his ideology created a set of prescriptive expectations that actually closed off invention. Hawk suggests a bodily epistemology like vitalism to deal with the complexity of the twenty-first century (85). I will suggest a more diverse epistemology, and in chapter five, an unsyllabus as a means of overcoming such ideological closures. Within the literature track of English departments, something similar may have been happening to the notion of Imagination. I. A. Richards suggests that ability to read critically declined and writers of the Romantic period, who championed Imagination, became “effigies to be shot at because what they represent is no longer understood” (195-196). Until Hawk’s still unsanctioned re-vision, Imagination as a concept seemed to have been banished from the discussions except with the writings of Berthoff.

The only theoretical possibilities for imagination, hidden and subsumed by the social-episteme, remain in the work of Vatz, who privileged the rhetor as shaping discourse. Building on the rhetorical situation as described by Bitzer, Vatz points out that most events are chosen, communicated, and interpreted by others (228). It is only the actions of the rhetors “through their
linguistic depiction” that make these events remarkable or even meaningful to an audience (228).
Vatz argues, “Therefore, meaning is not discovered in situations, but created by rhetors” (228).
If the rhetor is shaping meaning, then student has an opportunity to shape his/her writing through leaps of imagination.

Such leaps can also be found in the work of individual teachers such as Edward White. An example of the rhetor in action, Edward M. White identifies himself as a writer, which he explains in his chapter in *Living Rhetoric and Composition*, is the reason, he valorizes, the rhetor: “We shape events, control reality, define feelings by putting them on the page. Writers make reality and so are more in charge of what goes on than are other people” (171). By taking this stance as he teaches, writes textbooks and scholarly articles, and interrogates writing assessment, White is enacting Vatz’s theory of the rhetor. Vatz writes, “No situation can have a nature independent of the perception of its interpreter or independent of the rhetoric with which he chooses to characterize it” (226). Imagination is clearly an activity of the mind as the rhetor sees and chooses terms to describe his/her vision, this positioning of the rhetor leaves room for the operation of imagination, as an emphasis on the social does not.

**The Champion of Imagination**

While Vatz offers a window through which to leap, Ann E. Berthoff, throughout a long career of writing that champions Imagination, provides an open door and an “assisted invitation” to use her term from *Forming/ Thinking/ Writing* (14). Berthoff graduated with a Masters of Art from Radcliffe College in 1948, well before the discipline of English offered degrees in Rhetoric and Composition. Her education, as well as her use of Coleridge, may account for her insistence that pedagogy and theory cannot be separated (“Chaos” 647) and her continued use of literary texts in theorizing (*Reclaiming*). Her career spans nearly 40 years, and she retired as professor
emeritus at the University of Massachusetts at Boston (“Biographical”). One of the founders of the discipline of rhetoric/composition, she championed process learning that looked at how writers actually wrote, according to her profile on CompPile. She is credited with being “one of first to assert that composing is not an ancillary act of the thought process but that it is part of the natural process of perception and conception.” She is also recognized as standing alone as a theorist who places “forming” next to thinking and writing as the primary activities of writing (“Contributions”). She wrote seven books and numerous articles—some of which will be discussed in this chapter.

In considering her relation to the discipline, Berthoff rejected a review that placed her work within New Rhetoric, expressivism, or process writing. She describes her textbook, *Forming/Thinking/Writing*, as leaving out the ordinary assignments “or any other of the banalities of the so-called rhetorical tradition.” She points out that it also does not include ‘prewriting’ or ‘rewriting.’” Instead her book provides opportunities to perform composition beginning with “looking and looking again” (“Response to Gephardt” 95). She points out that her methods are based on Coleridge and Richards: “revision is not a stage of composition but a dimension. Watching a sheepdog at work can teach you more about the dialectical character of composing than reading dreary reports by psycholinguists who have just discovered recursion.” (“Response to Gephardt” 95). In offering students “assisted invitations,” Berthoff is setting up a context for students to enact imagination within the composition classroom.

My analysis will focus on three aspects of her work and the possible effect that her theory could have on imagination in the present moment. First, she anticipated the posthumanist trend that converted language to code and resulted in, to use Hayles’ phrase, information losing its body. Second, Berthoff posits a theory of imagination that is based on making meaning from
Third, Berthoff assumes an agency for the writer that fits well with Marilyn Cooper’s theory of the emergent and enacted agency.

**The Seminal Debate—Pushing Back Against Decoding**

The Berthoff/ Lauer debate in *College Composition and Communication* that was one of the turning points of the discipline (according to Hawk) began in 1972, with the publication of the bibliography from Janice Lauer’s dissertation. I find that this moment was also a formative time in the development of posthumanism. The first wave of cybernetics was ending, and a book was published by Mary Catherine Bateson, daughter of one of the participants of the Macy Conferences that birthed the first wave of cybernetics (Hayles 76). This first wave, beginning after the Second World War, theorizes the construction of information as a flow that did not depend on materiality but is communicated through a binary code (Hayles 50-52). Berthoff saw the beginning of something similar to the cybernetic disconnect in the psychological studies that Lauer foregrounds. Calling it harmful, Berthoff rejects a theory of learning that changes language to a signal code, meaning to information, form to medium, and interpretation to “decoding.” (“The Problem” 238) She argues against the concept that students are just “well-programmed encoders” (“The Problem” 240). She also considers Lauer to have “a narrow understanding of heuristics [which] precludes from consideration any approaches but those sanctified by the technologists of learning” (“The Problem” 237) and which does not consider the political agendas of those psychologists. In these arguments, she is challenging communication theory that led to the posthuman concepts of information.

In her response, Lauer characterizes Berthoff’s comments as “misdirected and unsupported” (“Response” 208) and based on fear (“Response” 210). In an attempt at reconciliation, Lauer adds the word “creativity” to her concept: “Problem solving as creativity
uses not sets of rules but heuristic procedures, systematic but flexible guides to effective
guessing” (“Response” 209). She does not comment on Berthoff’s concerns about the slippage of
language into code.

In her response to Lauer, Berthoff posits that adding “creativity” to “problem-solving” does
not solve the problem; the problem continues to be “those who reduce and limit the operation of
imagination in this way” to obtain meaningful data (“Response” 414). She points again to her
distinction between “information processing” and the uses of English (“Response” 414). She
raises questions about creativity and suggests that theorists look at the notebooks and journals of
artists and thinkers, the kind of inquiry that is “the principal legacy of the Romantic Movement”
(“Response” 415). She thus foregrounds imagination as theorized by Coleridge as a bulwark
against the encoding trend that became posthumanism. In his counter-history, Hawk similarly
uses the imagination theory of Coleridge to posit vitalism as a new paradigm to explain
complexity in the posthuman moment (120).

In her original article arguing against problem solving as the paradigm for writing, Berthoff
is concerned that a list of “problem-solvers” will not include Levi-Strauss or Paulo Freire (“The
Problem of Problem Solving,” 241). Following Freire, she notes that naming the world is the task
of students, which in turn is based on learning to see and hear and listen. She writes that “no
‘learning experience,’ no matter what the ‘learning environment,’ can liberate if the act of
naming does not become the act of knowing. ‘Know your knowledge’ was Coleridge’s advice to
the young. It is still a revolutionary precept”(241). In her response to Lauer, Berthoff adds that
“Creativity is not an area [for psychologists to study]; it is the heart of the matter, and the matter
is using the mind to create images and models by means of language.” (“Response” 415). In her
most extensive statement of a theory of imagination, Berthoff posits that it is more useful for
English teachers to think in terms of “interpreting [rather] than encoding and decoding and of intention, context, tone, point of view rather than input and output.” She finds “dialectic less treacherous than feedback” (“Theory” 648-649). Thus, she is anticipating and challenging the posthuman conception of information as a feedback loop, as well as language as a code.

**The Move towards Theory—Embracing Chaos**

Second, Berthoff posits a theory of imagination that makes use of chaos as a method. Chaos represents a problem to early conceptions of self-organizing systems (see Hayles on homeostasis and entropy, 102). Berthoff, on the other hand, embraces chaos, maintaining that language itself will lead the students to create order from the initial confusion they create or encounter when writing (“Chaos” 648). In fact these ambiguities are “the hinges of thought,” she writes, quoting I.A. Richards’ phrase (“Chaos” 649). In *Reclaiming the Imagination*, she brings together more than thirty excerpts of both theoretical and fictional literature to illustrate how the structure of language can lead the writer to use his or her imagination to construct order. The chapter titles and subtitles, which she supplies as editor, include the following (presumably in the order in which the student will encounter them): the process of imagination (perception—the intelligent eyes, body and soul, abstraction); language and the making of meaning (units, words, and logic of metaphor); interpretation and the act of knowing (mediation, method, perspective and content); artists at work (Coleridge, Paul Klee, Gerard Manley Hopkins, and others). As Berthoff points out, the student can judiciously mix these excerpts, perhaps Jane Addams with Vygotsky, in a variety of permutations. Enlarging “the Romantic program of liberating the imagination,” she seeks to reclaim that concept “as the name for the active mind, the mind in action making meaning” (Preface, *Reclaiming*). Berthoff explains her method further in “Learning the Uses of Chaos.” Insisting that theory and practice must always be linked, Berthoff suggests that
structuring a classroom to contain the chaos of ideas will lead students to greater invention through the driving force of language.

In an explanation towards a theory of imagination (“From Problem-solving to a Theory of Imagination”), Berthoff continues to question “problem solving,” pointing out that the concept “offers no guarantee that a critical assessment will be undertaken of either the problem or the solution” and in fact the term can hide contexts of the problem (“Theory” 636-637). She explicitly rejects the quantification methods and communication (information) theory that support this model (“Theory” 638). As support for her challenge, she explains a theory of language based on the work of I.A. Richards, Edward Sapir, Ernst Cassirer, Charles Sanders Pierce, and Suzanne K. Langer. (In chapter three, I will examine the philosophy and seminology that undergird her theory from *The Mysterious Barricades: Language and its Limits*). Berthoff argues against the posthuman concept of the human based on the science of cybernetics. She writes:

> Man is neither an encoding-decoding machine nor a super pigeon but in Ernst Cassirer’s phrase, the *animal symbolicum*: Man is that one creature whose world of behavior is built by language and who makes sense of ‘reality’ by a process of linguistic invention and discrimination. We need to recognize language [using Richard’s phrase] as “the supreme organ of the mind’s self-ordering growth” (“Theory” 638).

Berthoff here is recognizing some of the same concepts (self-making) as posited by cybernetic researchers (see Hayles 136). Instead of locating this ability in the mechanical, the information net, or the environment, she is claiming this characteristic for humans.

Berthoff also questions assumptions of the Dartmouth Conference, which played a role in the emergence of the discipline (see for example, Robert Parker’s “From Sputnik to Dartmouth:
Trends in the Teaching of Composition”). She particularly opposes the idea that language is a signal code and the General Semantics’ ideas that language should be “a map of the territory of reality” and their distrust of imagination (“Theory” 640). Berthoff is concerned that composition may be taught like a skill such as typing, losing its critical edge, and she rejects the rationale of usefulness to justify the teaching of composition. If that is the case, “then the chief models should be the grocery list and the Letter to the Editor” she suggests (“Theory” 644). In this article as in others, Berthoff opposes the polarity of creativity and intellectual work, which leads to the devaluation and irrelevance of both and illogically creates dichotomies such as “organization of feelings/ organization of knowledge” (“Theory” 645). The missing element in these dualities is “the understanding of language as an instrument of knowing—our means of knowing our experience, knowing our feelings, knowing our knowledge” (“Theory” 646). She argues:

Without a sound philosophy of knowledge (or an intuitive grasp of the actual functioning of the mind); without an understanding of the way language builds the human world; without a philosophical understanding of the form-creating and form-discovering powers of the imagination, it will be very difficult to decide what is needed or to imagine what is possible. (“Theory” 646)

Her theory emphasizes both the active nature of imagination and an underlying view of language that makes meaning and knowledge.

Berthoff does not quite articulate a theory of imagination in this article, instead pointing to rhetoric as containing the tools to form such a theory. She also suggests that teachers study other arts to learn “the relation of perception to conception, the relationship of the primary imagination by which we construe the forms of experience to those symbolic means—kinetic,
linguistic, visual, tonal—by which they are articulated.” Part of the teacher’s job is to teach students “to look and to see all over again” and “to listen and to hear.” She also suggests that English courses teach the composing process and rhetorical concepts drawing on the students’ knowledge of design and form (“Theory” 647-648). This pedagogical stance also emphasizes action and synthesis of various disciplines.

The rhetorical approach advocated by Berthoff emphasizes the mediating function and the symbolic nature of language which can lead to an understanding that language is “an instrument of knowing.” Her approach will also allow the inclusion of literature “as a form of knowledge” (“Theory” 649). This approach helps teachers, Berthoff writes, “to conceive of those uniquely human operations of mind by which the forms of knowing create and discover the substance of knowledge.” Only then can a theory of imagination be stated: “the imagination which creates poiesis and the imagination which is ‘the prime agent of all human perception’” (“Theory” 649). This approach combines composition and literature for a human answer to the complexity of the posthuman moment. Her theory emphasizes both the active nature of imagination and an underlying view of language that makes meaning and knowledge. For me, this theory provides a valuable gap between the determinism of socially constructed meaning and information as a coded feedback loop; this gap will be the space where I as writer can enact Agency and a space where I can encourage my online students to exercise their Imagination. I propose to elaborate on her insights to construct an epistemology, ontology, and practice of Imagination.

Possible Theoretical Support—Enacting Agency

Third, the terms that Berthoff uses to describe Imagination fit well with the emergent and enacted agency of Cooper. Berthoff’s working concepts for a theory of imagination are “naming, identifying, differentiating, generalizing, defining, interpreting, evaluating” (“Theory” 648).
These active participles comprise a more organic approach than the models of engineering which conceive of language as a signal system, she argues (“Theory” 649). She gives a similar list of participles in Reclaiming: “forming, thinking, knowing, abstracting, meaning, making, acting, creating, learning, interpreting” [all of which are contained in the term Imagination] (“Preface” np). In using these participles as the elements of imagination, Berthoff emphasizes the active nature of language, which is enacted by a rhetor. It is precisely this sort of embodied action which Hayles found missing in the second wave of cybernetics (148). Thus, Berthoff’s theory may provide an answer to Hayles’ question of what kind of posthumans we can be.

All of Berthoff’s active verbs fit well with Cooper’s emergent and enacted agency. Cooper tosses out the liberal notion of the “subject” as too damaged a concept to provide agency (423). Hayles has already declared the liberal concept (“self” in her phrasing) imperiled (85) and then absent entirely (192-193). Cooper notes that modern philosophers have deconstructed and then killed off that subject (424). Instead, in the posthuman moment, she theorizes a concept of agency that does not rely on mastery, determination or fragmentation. These agents are “unique, embodied, autonomous individuals in that they are self-organizing, but by virtue of that fact, they, as well as the surround with which they interact, are always changing” (425). It is in the doing that agency exists, she theorizes, creating a space in which a posthuman might be able to write. Berthoff’s theory of imagination incorporates just this type of doing, which is capable of forming order from the complexity of the present posthuman moment. In addition, Berthoff includes a diversity of texts from Coleridge to Susan Langor on the nature of language. This diversity of sources creates the chaos that Berthoff claims is the seedbed of imagining. The nature of language itself leads students in this scenario to form patterns and perhaps come to a new understanding. A diversity of sources, some brought in by the students, will be a hallmark
of the unsyllabus that I suggest in chapter 5. In my opinion, Berthoff’s approach may provide an answer to the question of what kind of posthumans we can be (Hayles 246). We can be Actors who are constantly forming and re-forming our ideas through imagination.

**Imagination in the Posthuman Moment**

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, dissatisfaction with foundational theory seems to nag the discipline of rhetoric/composition, due perhaps to a sense that theory has lagged behind the explosion of digital writing and online teaching/learning. As I noted in the earlier, Hawk makes his argument for vitalism as a more productive philosophical lens in the context of historical distance from the bracketing of Coleridge and his definition of Imagination as “romantic” (49). Hawk is not the only writer to question the foundations of the field. Raul Sánchez in *The Function of Theory in Composition Studies* also questions the ideology of James Berlin. Sánchez also proposes a new way of looking at composition by placing the act of writing in the center, rather than representations of ideology, culture, or rhetoric. Calling for such a radical recasting of the current theories of writing as representation of *something else*, Sánchez argues that writing should be considered as the producer of theories, ideologies, cultures, and even the “writing subject.” Using Derrida’s deconstruction of binary pairs (one of which is always privileged over the other), Sánchez wants to reverse the privilege to WRITING/ideology, WRITING/culture, and WRITING/“writing subject,” with all these *something else* being “understood as the effects of writing” (97). Sánchez presents several paradoxes, which he admits at the end he cannot solve (100). He decries ontology (5) but makes an allusion to an explicitly ontological question (what’s holding the world up?) in the last chapter (99). When Sánchez alludes to the turtle that holds up the universe, he is hinting at the connection between ontology and epistemology. James W. Sire in *Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept* suggests that
one’s epistemology depends one’s conception of what is really real. My quest for a more robust concept of Imainging, based on the question of how one knows, will necessarily lead through the minefields of both ontology and epistemology, as I will illustrate in chapter 4.

Similarly, Jeff Rice in *The Rhetoric of Cool* presents an alternative view of writing, one which he posits will be more compatible with, and appropriate for, composing with digital technologies. Rice argues that the composition field missed the emerging computer technology in 1963 and instead turned to the ancient past—classical rhetoric as articulated by Edward Corbett and others. In addition to proposing an alternative rhetoric, he also claims to be “inventing” this rhetoric although most of these moves already exist and have even been brought together in some creative fields. Rice uses as evidence practices from television, movies, posters, record covers, music, and Yoruban visuality (48). These practices are “cool” as exemplified in the terms *chora*, *appropriation*, *juxtaposition*, *commutation*, *nonlinearity*, and *imagery* and drawn from communication venues outside of composition (television, movies, advertising). He seems to privilege the creative, right-brain process of “showing” (9) by the cut-up, the collage, indeterminate meaning, ambiguity, and recursive meaning. He argues against any left-brain analysis and writing a narrative (114), but is constructing one for the reader. His exploration may provide strategies for bringing the process of imagining into the online classroom.

The place of first year composition courses has been a part of that narrative of retreat and return that Hawk describes, and this debate serves as focus for change in Sidney Dobrin’s *Postcomposition*. He posits not the death of the field of composition, but its “passing” on to something else. [Ironically, the term “passing” is a polite Southern euphemism for dying.] He writes that his book “is an attempt to figure what comes next, what comes after composition studies.” He agrees with Judith Halberstram and Ira Livingston, who suggest that the ubiquitous
“post” prefixed to all sorts of terms show the “regrettable failure to imagine what’s next” (qtd. in Dobrin 2-3). He suggests ending the focus of composition on the subject (students), and indeed ending the whole enterprise of composition (including the first year sequence) in favor a focus on the act of writing (3). He aims to emphasize the differences between writing and composition, suggesting that writing is the larger term while composition is a limited pedagogical theory with an emphasis on the student instead of writing (2-4). His erasure of the student, when carried over to online learning, is simply a continuation of the post human trend of disembodied information. Hayles describes this disembodiment as she traces the intermingling human and technology of this present moment and suggests that we all are always already post human. After describing the history of this evolutionary progression through three waves, three genres, and three stories in the twentieth century, she opposes such post human visions as uploading one’s brain patterns to computer software, advocating instead a view of information as embodied in humans. In my opposition to the erasing of students from writing, I will suggest other dimensions of humans beyond the mind and body as sources of epistemology.

**The Problem of Presence in Online Learning**

Online learning is one site where the teacher and the students can find themselves erased by technology and in need of imagination to bridge the gap. Developing a visible presence in distance learning has emerged as one of the themes of research about online spaces. In their metasynthesis of nine qualitative studies of online teaching attitudes, Jennie De Gagne and Kelly Waters recommend that instructors remain highly active while creating an environment for students to take charge of their own learning. Based on their research, this interaction or presence contributes to “a meaningful and rich experience” for the students, which is even more necessary to successful online teaching than knowledge acquisition (586). Teresa Capra also
points to research that has found a “social presence” makes student learning easier (290). In his story of dynamics of the online classroom, William Cordon emphasizes that course design should make room for the presence of both student and instructor. In addition, Raven Wallace, in her review of more than 100 research studies, notes that “a knowledgeable other” who guides students is necessary for learning, not just a presentation of information (242). She adds that a student also learns better by being a part of a community of learners, guided by the teacher, who help each other understand the concepts, (242). She also reports that research has found that interaction with the instructor and other students contributed significantly with student satisfaction and learning (249). Reporting on a 2001 study by K. Swan, Wallace notes that three factors were necessary for a successful online course: “A clear and consistent course structure, an instructor who interacts frequently and constructively with students, and a valued and dynamic discussion (249). Other researchers found that 60 percent of student satisfaction was attributed to social presence (Wallace 251). Consequently, the constructing of a presence online is vital for both the instructor and the students.

The “presence” being called for in online spaces has traditionally been theorized as ethos and identity. In analyzing rhetoric, Aristotle describes ethos as the need of the rhetor to “construct a view of himself as a certain kind of person,” one who seems to identify with the audiences’ preconceived notions (2.1. 1377); in this enterprise, the rhetor must understand the general characteristics the audience (Kennedy’s introduction, 148). In his interpretation of Aristotle’s remarks in Rhetoric 1356A, Jim Corder suggests that Aristotle strongly implies that “ethical argument is central to human discourse” (Selected Essays 66). Corder adds that “… it might be said that almost the most authoritative of proofs is that supplied by character” (62).
Ethos thus includes both the rhetor’s perceived character and the audience’s beliefs, which intersect in argument.

The dual character of ethos is also described in Cicero’s *On the Ideal Orator*. His concept of “ethos” (2.182-184) … is concerned with (an image of) the whole of the speaker’s character, and with making the audience feel goodwill toward him” (“Introduction” James M. May and Jakob Wisse, 35). The online presence infers that both aspects of *ethos* are at work and aid both teachers and students in imagining each other. This presence could be established by the words and other design choices (such as posting a photo) made by the instructor and the students. (See for example, Laura Davis in *Teachers as Avatars: English Studies in the Digital Age.*) However, in the context of erased subjectivity (as theorized by Dobrin, Hayles, and others), presence through an ethos or identity can only be enacted if some concept of authorship, however problematic, is retained. As noted above, that possibility exists in rhetorical theory in the privileging of the rhetor by Vatz and the active agent by Cooper.

**The Possibility of Imagining as the Response**

I am suggesting that the concept of Imagining may provide a generative term for the understanding of presence, especially in online spaces which rely so heavily on words. It may also provide a process for inventing new strategies to cope with the rapid pace of change, which is highlighted by Sir Kenneth Robinson in his speech to the Education Commission of the States. Robinson argues that the reality of technological innovation leads to a future cannot be visualized more than five years ahead. In response, he champions the arts, which teach “self-confidence, creativity, innovation, flexibility, social skills and a sense of well-being” (6). Robinson contrasts this process to the factory model of education which virtually eliminates creative thinking. The Partnership for 21st Century Skills also calls for innovation as part of
education in the new century. The response of the discipline to these calls for innovation, I am suggesting, should be a reexamination of the concept of Imagination and the strategy of Imagining, especially as configured in online learning. We can be humans (post or not) with an imagination that leaps beyond whatever technology we hold in our hands at the present moment. Robinson proposes the term “divergent thinking”; he explains it is not a synonym of creativity, “but it is a good example of it. It’s the capacity to think non-logically: to think analogically and associatively” (4). Robinson in Out of Our Minds suggests that creativity can be achieved by collaboration within a group with diverse expertise and backgrounds.

Unfortunately, within the discipline, such diversity is short-circuited by the epistemological roots, established by Bruffee and others, which posited one way to knowledge: the meanings negotiated and confirmed by the group. In “Collaborative Learning and the ‘Conversation of Mankind,’ ” he suggests that creativity is group based (556); further, he limits the possible epistemology by declaring that “knowledge must be a social artifact” based on the presumption that there is no absolute referent (554-5). In addition, Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede posit that all writing “is inevitably grounded in social exchange,” even if writers are only choosing which sources to use, a concept that I will return to in chapter 5 (200). Coleridge, on the other hand, suggests four sites for knowledge to be made, acquired, discovered, or imagined: church traditions, the Bible, the inspired preacher, and the interior work of the Holy Spirit (Barbeau 3). I am suggesting that these sites can be generalized as the group, the text, the informed leader/teacher, and the spirit. At this point, I am classifying Imagining as a strategy arising from Coleridge’s ontological description of the sites for seeking knowledge which include the processes of making, accessing, and learning. I am not suggesting that the field necessarily believe in a Spirit, but that the epistemology of those who do believe should be
respected and be made a part of the research paradigms for groups that do, providing epistemological diversity. Without such a diversity of epistemology, I argue, the nature of the discipline will continue to be “post” and imagining what comes next will be more difficult.

In addition, Imagination of a robust type and with a diverse epistemology, as Coleridge suggests, may be required to see the presence of others in their writing. Mark Johnson in Moral Imagination suggests that Imagination is necessary for a human to perceive and identify with others. While his observations are geared towards supporting his argument that Imagination is necessary to morality, he bases his propositions on recent empirical evidence that supports a wider role for Imagination in reasoning in general. He writes, “Humans are fundamentally imaginative creatures whose understanding of experience is built up with imaginative materials of cognition. Contrary to the received view, such metaphors and other imaginative structures are what make criticism possible in the first place…” (3). In reexamining Imagination and searching for a strategy of Imagining, I suggest a more diverse epistemology, one that allows for imagining in the sense of both Johnson and Coleridge. If Robinson is correct about the horizon of our vision being five years, then we need a process for continuing to invent the solutions that we need. The sort of generative imagining that I am suggesting needs a new epistemological diversity that will enable a more nuanced understanding of how knowledge is generated.

**Imagination in the Education Field**

Since my goal is understanding the teacher’s role in opening the online class to imagination, I turn now to the field of education, where there has been a small, but consistent counter drumbeat for Imagination. The tale begins with Mary Warnock, a philosopher of education from England in the 1970s, who serves as a source for several, more recent educators (Greene, 140, 184; Egan, *Teaching Outside the Box*, 6-7; 11, 23-27; McKernan 22). Warnock
suggests that the goal of education must be to strengthen imagination (112). While she uses the term “faculty,” her concept is more active: “Imagination, though it may start from the observation of things, will not rest there, but will ‘modify’ them, will see how they might be different” (“Towards a Definition of Quality in Education” 113). Berthoff also connects imagination with seeing (Reclaiming the Imagination 4) and suggests that “a theory of imagination would remind us to provide occasions for lots of perception, for lots of looking at things, for observation” (The Making of Meaning 36). Berthoff assumes that the role of the knowledgeable other is to provide the opportunity for imagining. Warnock also suggests that the knowledgeable other has an important role to fill: “The imagination is better served in the long run by the vistas afforded by the work of other people better equipped than oneself to discover truth” (114). The ultimate goal for Warnock is students who can leave their teachers behind and go on with whatever has interested them. She suggests more specialization earlier so that the student can study “a thing deeply and for its own sake” (a concept she credits to Coleridge) (118). She connects Imagination with the freedom to think. (121). In her book Imagination, Warnock reiterates her belief that Imagination should be the chief goal of education (9). After tracing its descriptions through philosophy and poetry, she posits, “Imagination is our means of interpreting the world, and it is also our means of forming images in the mind,” with both of these processes intertwined (194). Warnock suggests that looking, listening, and reading can stimulate the Imagination as much as making of objects (207). The implications for education are in the selection of stimuli for Imagination, and this selection, I suggest, is the job of the knowledgeable other.

Warnock’s philosophy of Imagination as central to education has not been widely accepted in curriculum development, argues James McKernan. He considers this lack of
acceptance as a result of market-driven curriculum based on specific skill sets, which he rejects (23). In addition, he suggests that curriculum planning should begin with process inquiry (36). His process inquiry asked about the values held by teachers in the USA, Costa Rica, Palestine and the Republic of Ireland (177). He “argues for curriculum to be grounded in procedural values rather than arguing for curriculum specified in behavioral targets” (180). As a result of his research he suggests, “The religious factor is an independent variable that cannot be ignored in the value research enterprise . . . It is noteworthy that the American students—almost entirely Protestants and church members—ranked the religious values Forgiving and Salvation higher than all other respondents, who were Catholics, in the main . . .” (186). He adds that his “data show American undergraduates and graduate students to hold the highest priority of all six value perspectives for the religious ideology” (187). His research is suggests that I may also be able to find Coleridge’s fourth means of knowledge—the spirit.

While the role of the knowledgeable other is demonstrated by Berthoff in the textbooks that she compiled, Maxine Greene models the synthesis of observation and thought that Warnock suggested, writing in a series of essays described as “a narrative in the making” (Greene 1). A professor of philosophy and education at Columbia University, Greene combines her research interests of educational theory and social change, particularly the use of the arts and multiculturalism with her exploration of Imagination. Greene provides additional description of this concept’s position and effects in education. She argues that the opportunities for understanding of the Other, choice, and social change are lost if imagination is not given its proper place as one of the cognitive capacities of humans. She states:

“One of the reasons I have come to concentrate on imagination as a means through which we can assemble a coherent world is that imagination is what, above all,
makes empathy possible. It is what enables us to cross the empty spaces between ourselves and those we teachers have called “other” over the years. If those others are willing to give us clues, we can look in some manner through strangers’ eyes and hear through their ears. That is because, of all our cognitive capacities, imagination is the one that permits us to give credence to alternative realities. It allows us to break with the taken for granted, to set aside familiar distinctions and definitions” (3).

In the ethical sense, then, Greene anticipates the conclusions of Johnson that Imagination is necessary to understand others. Also like Coleridge, she points out that Imagination allows us to “make order of chaos and open experience to the mysterious and the strange—that moves us to go in quest, to journey where we have never been before” (23). Drawing on a diversity of knowledgeable others (John Dewey, Wallace Stevens, Harriet Arendt, and Emily Dickinson), Greene suggests that Imagination is necessary for the student to learn by becoming different. She adds a generous description of empowerment through Imagination: “A space of freedom opens before the person moved to choose in the light of possibility; she or he feels what it signifies to be an initiator and an agent, existing among others but with the power to choose for herself or himself” (22). Thus, Imagination opens up the possibility for change by attributing freedom and significance to the Agent.

The arts, including literature, “provide new perspectives on the lived world” (4). In fact, for Greene, the arts allow students to conceive different circumstances and decide that their own circumstances need to be changed; thus imagination leads to the possibility of reform (5-6). She states: “All depends upon a breaking free, a leap, and then a question. I would like to claim that this is how learning happens and that the educative task is to create situations in which the young are moved to begin to ask, in all tones of voice there are, ‘Why?’ “ (6). In positioning
Imagination as a cognitive ability available to all students, Greene completely disconnects it from the Romantic pigeonhole of some rhetoric/composition theory and connects it with social sites of knowledge.

In a similar manner, Kieran Egan, professor of education at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, has written a great deal about Imagination in education and argues that imagination is pervasive in education, especially in such areas as memory, emotion, objective knowledge and social virtues (Teaching 19). He suggests that Imagination brings “flexibility, energy and vividness” to all educational endeavors and gives rise to the allegory of education as an imaginative journey (Teaching 20). He suggests a framework to plan lessons for learning the younger grades focused on learning, for the middle grades focused on the key of literacy, and for high school and college focused on theoretical thinking, as he explains in An Imaginative Approach to Teaching.

He also suggests that all cultures acknowledge imagination, however it may be labeled, as “a capacity that allows us to call up mental images, think about things that are not present, or consider things that do not exist” (3). With the long-term emphasis on accountability in education, Imagination has suffered, according to Egan in Teaching and Learning Outside the Box. He argues that educational achievement can be increased by focusing on students’ imaginations. (4). Acknowledging the philosophy of Hume and Kant in the late Enlightenment, Egan also quotes from Coleridge, suggesting “The modern sense of the imagination as a productive, generative capacity comes very largely from the Romantics” (7). However, he thinks the Romantics “over sold” the idea and set it in opposition to rationality. Egan conceives of imagination as a cognitive ability that “lies at a kind of crux where perception, memory, idea generation, emotion, metaphor, and no doubt other labeled features of our lives intersect and
interact” (8). Thus, Egan sees imagination playing a role in these educational processes: “in resisting conventional, stereotypical thinking; in its relationship with memory and memorizing; in the development of social virtues such as tolerance; in its support of the idea of, and pursuit of, ‘objective’ knowledge; and in its connection with our emotional development” (10).

Egan thinks imagination should be pervasive in education, which is difficult only if it is thought of as thing, a faculty of mind. He writes:

If we see it, instead, as a particular kind of flexibility, energy, and vividness that can imbue all mental functions, as a kind of mood of mind, then its role in the topics I have mentioned becomes easier to understand. To be imaginative, then, is not to have a particular function highly developed, but to have a heightened capacity in all mental functions. It is not in particular, something distinct from reason, but rather is what gives reason flexibility, energy, and vividness. It makes all mental life more meaningful; it makes life more abundant. Dewey (1966) expressed this sense of the pervasiveness of imagination thus: “Imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human activity as is muscular movement” (“Democracy and Education,” p. 237; qtd in Egan 20).

Egan further suggests that the Romantic allegory of life as a heroic journey could be a metaphor for education. The implications of focusing on imagining is the privileging of shared narrative which allows students to “imaginatively feel” and begin to respect others (15). For Egan, narrative serves as an organizing principle for developing curriculum (See for example curriculum design worksheets for k-12 at The Imaginative Education Research Group.) While Egan keeps the Romantic connection, he sets Imagination in a cultural context and conceptualizes it as an activity—imagining, rather than Imagination as a mental faculty. He is like Cooper in suggesting that the emphasis should be on the doing.
Egan also takes aim at the codification of language as information so prevalent in the post-everything culture: “Human learning is something quite different from storing information—and bearing this in mind is not at all difficult. The difficult part, I think, is in taking seriously its implications. And this is where taking imagination seriously begins to play havoc with some of the familiar established elements of the current educational scene” (13). Egan, in my opinion, is correct in his conception that learning is more than amassing information.

Taking the concept a step further, Keiichi Takaya in “Imagination in the Context of Modern Educational Thought” argues that to be educated, one must be imaginative in order to see what possibilities may lie beyond the information (28-29). He also points to the general sense in educational circles that education is a lifelong process of growth and that being educated requires a moral understanding which in turn relies on imaginativeness (29). However, he rejects the theory of Imagination as a faculty and suggests that Imagination is now conceived as a part of rationality. Takaya discounts the ideas of Friedrich W. Froebel, who thought like Coleridge that “imagination and creativity was a symbol of divine nature embedded in the human nature that would develop itself (as a seed grows into a flower as long as a proper environment is there) rather than something to be developed by such artificial means as instruction” (38). Takaya points out that Egan bases his definition on White (1990): “An imaginative person is one with the ability to think of lots of possibilities, usually with some richness of detail (The Language of Imagination, p. 185; qtd. In Takaya note p.40). Consequently, the concept is back in a vaulted position similar to that prescribed by the Romantics as Takaya sets Imagining at the center of learning. However, Takaya abandons any Romantic baggage that the concept might have through two centuries of hard knocks.
While Greene, Egan and Takaya focus on education in k-12, Noreen B. Garman and Maria Piantanida bring Imagining into graduate level studies. In *The Authority to Imagine: the Struggle towards Representation in Dissertation Writing*, which they edited, essayists share their writing journeys. In her description of the interpretive dissertation, Garman quotes Greene on imagination taking the writer to places she has never been and adds: “

Going those places in the dissertation process, however, requires a special kind of power—the author’s power to initiate, institute, and establish not only from the authority of the academic discourse and the granting institution, but also form within one’s self. Granting one’s self permission to create is often more difficult than seeking assurance from faculty. Assuming authorial right means no longer ‘eavesdropping’ on other scholars’ discourses and relying on their ideas and concepts, but rather beginning to enter into those discourses by claiming authorship (12).

These theorists demonstrate the imaginative process that I need to go through in preparation for leaping: consulting texts, groups, knowledgeable others and the spirit, then reflection in a complex recursive process.

In examining the writing process of these graduate students, which they describe in their essays, I find traces of Coleridge’s four means of knowing. Even though (and perhaps because) she is dedicated to collaboration (viii), Garman herself serves as the knowledgeable other when she sets up the group, through which more than 60 students have received encouragement in writing their dissertations (xxvi). The texts, described by Garman as social texts, are created by the students themselves. Thus, I see three of Coleridge’s four means—group, text, knowledgeable other. Imagination is essential to the process; Garman writes that all the essays “present self-reflective analyses of each author’s struggles within her chosen genre to gain ‘the
authority to imagine’ herself creating a rigorous and provocative text” (x). Garman also suggests that the title of the book “serves not just as a goal for both authors and readers of this collection but also as a representation of how subjects—here, these particular authors—spring from the discourses that incite them”(xii). Like Berthoff, Garman and Piantanida connect theory and practice (xvii) and suggest that there are “inextricable connections among form, meaning, and ways of knowing” (xx). As the knowledgeable other, Garman provides the theoretical background for these interpretivists, noting that the texts are the representations of the actions and research of the writers, in which layers of meaning are built, rather than reduced from data (3-5). Imagination is variously described as a conceptual leap, a found metaphor, an exciting harmony, and a dance (9-12).

All the writers in this collection may be considered emerging knowledgeable others. For example Lynn Altman Richards in “Pictures in my Mind: Viewing Images of Dissertation Authorities through Process Drama and Narrative Inquiry,” describes texts by authorities as her first sources. She has two knowledgeable others (her advisor and her father—Garman is not described). The group serves as a place where she can test her thinking. (20-21) Richards suggests that a quote from Greene serves as an inspiration: “To learn and to teach one must have an awareness of leaving something behind while reaching toward something new, and this kind of awareness must be linked to imagination (Greene, 20; qtd. in Richards 32). Thus, Richards in her process incorporates three of Coleridge’s means of knowing, as well as relying on Imagination.

While Greene, Egan, Takaya, Garman and Piantanida have opened a large playing field for the author to imagine in the discipline of education, the term author remains problematic in rhetoric and composition. How can one claim authorship when the author has been declared dead
by Roland Barthes? How can one read the despairing cry of Jim W. Corder in *Life and Death in West Texas* and still write, knowing that one may become as fragmented as he seems to be at the end of his life? In the introduction of that book, James S. Baumlin and Eric Knickerbocker note that writing, which is based on one’s experiences (like the reflective dissertations Garman’s mentees), is complicated by “contemporary theory’s questioning of the very notion of individuality and identity.” In fact, Corder writes as if he expects to disappear along with the towns and farms of his childhood (16-17). Corder describes his status in the chapter “The Scrapbook that Holds the Truth at the End of the World”:

If I stand against the classroom wall, I tend to disappear. I am mostly sort of beige and grey, as are many institutional walls, and I’m likely to fade into the background of the moment. Perhaps I can argue myself into obsolescence and with a little help, on into oblivion” (150).

Online teachers and students are already faded into the background of the technology through the extensive use of writing, with few interactions beyond the posts of a photo and discussion boards, and emails. How, then, can we write and find each other in our texts? Like these teachers completing their dissertations, I will seek my answer in and through Imagination as written in theory and practiced in writing. First, I will explore the fate of Imagination in the writings of Kenneth Burke. While he agrees with Berthoff and Cassirer on the definition of humans as symbol-using animals, Burke comes to a different conclusion about the place of Imagination, based—I will argue—on his attachment to the philosophy of Spinoza and not on his methods of dramatology and logology.
"Since you know you cannot see yourself
So well as by reflection, I, your glass,
Will modestly discover to yourself
That of yourself which yet you know not of."

William Shakespeare (Julius Caesar, act 1, sc. 2, l. 67-70.)

CHAPTER 2: BURKE AND THE ILLUSIVE LOOKING GLASS OF THEORY

We cannot see ourselves without a mirror/glass as Cassius reminds Brutus in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. Cassius’ image is part of his campaign to persuade Brutus to murder Caesar, something that Brutus is not inclined to do at first. This scene serves to remind us that mirrors may reflect an illusive image, particularly if the person holding it has an agenda as Cassius does. In the same way, theory can serve as a mirror to show us ourselves as we teach, but it may also serve as a terministic screen, to use Burke’s term (Gusfield 11-12). The writings of Kenneth Burke serve as a case study of the vicissitudes of Imagination as a looking glass.

The popular image of the genius at work may be such a murky looking glass. Burke, with influential books spanning five decades, exemplifies the progression from imaginative genius (described in detail in chapter 1) to an imagination so disruptive that it is paired with temptation and must be controlled by reason. In what seems to be an illustration of writing one’s way towards an idea (aka Donald Murray), Burke uses Coleridge’s ideas as a touchstone and Imagination as a term to think with and through. I will argue later in this chapter that it is at the point of the dramatistic pentad that Burke illustrates his distrust of imagination, with the full fruition of that distrust coming in his logology of the first three chapters of Genesis. First, I will examine Burke’s connections to and interpretations of Coleridge. Then I will trace Burke’s emerging use of the term Imagination, traverse the collective wisdom on which he bases his understanding of Imagination, and explore his search for a transcendent term.
Examining Burke on Coleridge

While Coleridge acknowledges genius, he does not reduce Imagination to the artist in the garret. As examined in detail in the next chapter, Coleridge de-synonymizes the term into fancy and secondary and primary imaginations. While assuming that some have a native-born ability, he sets the writer at the nexus of heaven and earth negotiating meaning through four different means, as I will discuss in chapter 4. Burke suggests that Coleridge bases his view of poetry as a “dim analogue of Creation” based on “the modicum of novelty in the act” of Imagination. (Grammar of Motives 68)

In a 1939 article, Kenneth Burke argues that Coleridge is more complex than the philosopher Kierkegaard and surrealist writer Kafka and blames Coleridge’s neglect on the early compulsory reading of his poetry in high school. Burke suggests that “The Ancient Mariner,” containing watershed moment in a watershed poem, in a watershed year” (1797-98) provides many critical points of engagement particularly in Coleridge’s struggle with drug addiction. Burke further argues that Coleridge’s ideas were fruitful: “Out of idealism, both Marxism and Nazism are descended—and Coleridge is as thorough an exponent of idealism as Hegel or Schelling, plus the fact that he could write great idealistic verse, as the German metaphysicians could not . . ‘. ’” Coleridge’s place in the lineage of literature and the similar context of French and Russian revolutions provide further reasons for considering Coleridge, according to Burke. He further commends Coleridge for connecting the local issues with universal concepts, noting that his favorite maxim was “extremes meet; and that he “knew how to pursue its intricacies to the ends of the universe.” Here Burke provides the grounds for his later reliance on Coleridge when considering Imagination in the context of the Pentad.
Indeed, Coleridge serves as one of several perennial sources of “collective” wisdom for Burke, who uses both Coleridge’s literary works and his philosophical works to illustrate/support his own ideas. Jane Blankenship posits in “‘Magic’ and ‘Mystery’ in the Works of Kenneth Burke” that Coleridge was Burke’s “sometime partner in dialogue, especially on the topics of cosmic mystery…” (144). Burke also taught a course on Coleridge at the University of Chicago (The Philosophy of Literary Form 369n). While noting Coleridge’s materialist leanings (Grammar of Motives 14, 368-371), Burke describes Coleridge as the following:

- an idealist (The Philosophy of Literary Form 3);
- one of the greatest critics of world literature (The Philosophy of Literary Form 63);
- a great dialectician (Grammar of Motives 34);
- and finally, a literary idealist (Rhetoric of Motives 24).

The label of “idealist” is consistent with Burke’s designation for philosophies that feature the Agent (Grammar of Motives 128). Coleridge seems to morph into whatever Burke needs him to be at the moment. For instance, Burke tries to build on Coleridge’s divisions of Imagination for his own division of the term Idea (Rhetoric of Motives 132-135).

**Tracing Burke’s Journey**

While Imagination is not among the pivotal terms in his early works, as outlined by Blankenship, Murphy, and Rosenwasser, Burke begins a journey in those early works that will lead him to write about this term in his later books, particularly Rhetoric of Motives and Rhetoric of Religion. In his first book of criticism, Counter-Statement, Burke often writes around the edges of the concept, as when he acknowledges the role of imagination in his own process of conceptualizing (215). At this early stage of his developing theory, Imagination has not come to the fore but seems to underlie his thoughts on the process of the artist creating whether in texts or
art. He writes: “…The self-expression of the artist, qua artist, is not distinguished by the uttering of emotion, but by the evocation of emotion” (Counter-Statement 53). Burke later notes that Aristotle and Longinus credit the Imagination with this evocation of this emotion (Rhetoric of Motives 78-79). When Burke writes of the symbol as both the magic and the message in Counter-Statement, he is edging towards the concept of Imagination. For example, he summarizes the artistic process in this way: “We have the original emotion, which is channelized into a symbol. This symbol becomes a generative force, a relationship to be repeated in varying details, and thus makes for one aspect of technical form” (61). He also suggests that the technical form, such as a poem, can be a generative principle and suggests that the technical appeal of a symbol is its ability to be continually repurposed as society changes (57-60). In expanding on the work of the symbol, Burke states that a symbol can illuminate problems that are tangential to the pattern of life on which it is based (157). These connections, in my view, allow for the symbol to generate Imagining. The closest Burke comes to the specific term Imagination in Counter-Statement is the connection of imagery with sensations (n198). The concept is also often connected with generation of ideas (see my logology of the word Imagination based on the Oxford English Dictionary in chapter 1). In this book Burke seems to be locating Imagination in the symbol and suggesting that it can be accessed through the choice of symbols which correspond to the writer’s emotions. This connection of Imagination to the emotions will be strengthened in Burke’s later works. In exploring the way that writers produce literature, Burke has not yet written about the specific concept of Imagination to think with and through.

In Permanence and Change (published in 1935), Burke, as he explains in the prologue, is writing a “treatise on communication” (xlviii). In delving into symbolism and language, he uses the common trope of genius (again with connections to Imagination) as a way of bridging the
ancient rift of science and philosophy. He writes that “the devices of poetry are close to the spontaneous genius of man” that will help establish a philosophy that is based on science and pragmatism, not revelation (66). Burke comes closest to writing about Imagination in this book when he discourses about planned incongruity, which has the use of metaphor as its central method. Burke writes, “Metaphor has always had about it precisely this revealing of hitherto unsuspected connectives which we may note in the progressions of a drama. It appeals by exemplifying relationships between objects which our customary rational vocabulary has ignored” (90). Here Burke seems to be operating on the notion that Reason is opposed to Imagination. He also declares that metaphor is the key to understanding poetic action (264). The idea of “analogical extension” of older paradigms to new contexts is another close approach when Burke dubs the person making such an extension “an inventor” (105). The vividness of imagery may have been in the background when he explores the work of signs. A system of signs is dead, he writes, “unless concrete imagination infuses life into them,” and “all action is poetic” (215). Burke also seems to suggest that all action, which has a purpose, in contrast to mere motion, is based on Imagination rather than reason. [Later in *The Grammar of Motives*, Burke distinguishes between action (an act of the will) and motion (a moving of the forces of nature) 66] Even though Burke is beginning to use the word Imagination, he has not yet interrogated the term. He is in a sense writing to find out what he thinks, and Imagination and its possibilities of transcending the present, material state has not yet come to his attention.

In *Attitudes Towards History*, published in 1937, Burks analyzes history in terms of communication changes. He drops this nugget about the imaginative process into his analysis of Marx: poets should be able to see the future [a characteristic that has been labeled as a part of Imagination by Aristotle, according to Burke (*Grammar of Motives* 78n)]. Burke asks the
following rhetorical question: “Should not the synthetic future already make itself felt incipiently in the minds of poets confronting the antitheses of the present?” (95). In other words, poets should be able to imagine the future based on contradictions of the present. Arguing the importance of the negative to language, Burke emphasizes a negative aspect of imagination found in cycles of historical development: the “Bureaucratization of the Imaginative” in which the government, language, and social networks largely see only one possibility. In the cycle of social movements, this bureaucratization is never complete with the result of increasing polarization and the emergence of a new orthodoxy. In the process of change, Burke points out that “perspective by incongruity” is parallel to methodology of invention (a term under which Imagination is often subsumed, as described in chapter 1). This perspective would take terms from one context and use them in another and change the meaning of symbols (225-229). In his dictionary of terms, Burke includes thirteen pages on Imagery, but does not discuss the concept of Imagination that may be necessary to see and construct the most vital imagery. Burke points first to his earlier suggestion in Counter-Statement that a poet’s imagery could be analyzed by looking at the words he used as well as the key or pivotal metaphor (274-275). Two years later in Philosophy of Literary Form, Burke seems more interested in discovering forms, inventing here the images of the Burkean parlor (110) and the drama as the hub from which all else radiates (103-106), rather than in concepts that underlie these forms. Coleridge is frequently mentioned, but not Imagination. Burke is, however, ready to tackle the concept in his next book, especially as he discusses the implications of the pentadic term Agent.

Traversing Burke’s Collective Wisdom

In A Grammar of Motives, Burke introduces his Pentad—the Scene, Act, Agent, Purpose and Agency, which I will discuss in more detail later in this chapter. As for Imagination in this
book, Burke sometimes uses the term as a synonym for thought or the mind as in “stimulating the imagination to think…” (123; see also 117 and 120). However, in this book Burke begins to investigate the word as a concept and to consider collective wisdom about Imagination, discussing in detail the philosophy of Hobbs (133), Kant (223), and Spinoza (143-144). He also tosses in a descriptive account by Wallace Stephens of Imagination and the poet’s writing process (224). Stevens, according to Burke, describes that process with a series of idealistic words (personality, sensitiveness, sensation) that can be summarized in the word “imagination.” Stevens, in short, suggests “the union of a labyrinthine imagination (the ‘unconscious’) with the rationality of a poetic medium developed by deliberate conscious sophistication” (224). While Stevens sees an overlap of Imagination with poetic knowledge of form, the others referenced by Burke connect Imagination to the senses in one way or another and warn against it, a position that Burke will ultimately take in The Rhetoric of Religion. In The Grammar of Motives, Burke attempts to transcend Imagination, noting (perhaps with envy) that the Surrealists may possibly be fulfilling the ideal of transcending imagery with images (429).

According to Burke, Hobbs (who also serves as major source in The Rhetoric of Religion) thought of imagination as “decaying sense” because imagination or fancy represents memory and not action or perception itself (Grammar of Motives 133). While motion begins in the imagination, it is “‘but the relics’ of motion, ‘remaining after sense’; it is the kind of motion that, being weaker than the motions of sense, he [Hobbs] has called ‘decaying sense,’ “ as Burke explains (134). (For a graphic representation of the various relationships of Imagination to other faculties, see Appendix A). Thus in this book, Imagination remains tethered to the senses. Burke is not a successful in finding the transcendence this book and tries again in The Rhetoric of Motives.
Seeking a Transcendent Imagination

In *The Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke discusses Imagination as part of traditional rhetoric and suggests that it begins in the senses. In his dialectic with “collective wisdom,” Burke seems to be searching for that transcendence in general, locating it variously in the following:

- “the motivated scene” in the poetry of Matthew Arnold (8),
- terms that contain ambiguous motives (10),
- the nature of symbol use (232, 286),
- a new dimension of insight displayed by Shylock in the Merchant of Venice (193, 313),
- the search for a “god term” (276) and a title of titles [a term later explicated in *The Rhetoric of Religion* (277)],
- and in identification (326).

Burke uses the word “transformation” almost as a synonym of Imagination, including with this link: “The range of images that can be used for concretizing the process of transformation is limited only by the imagination and ingenuity of poets” (12). In surveying collective wisdom, Burke suggests that a new terminology is needed that treats imagination and logic as consistent in some variables and different in others (88). He notes a traditional view of imagination as “reordering the senses” to create something new and even mystical (78-79). Transitioning to poetic images, which symbolize things that never existed (83), Burke then connects Imagination to Identification because poetry contains both private and public connotations (84). Since Imagination depends heavily on images, Burke’s thoughts wander to imagery, which he describes as the conveyance of “an invisible, intangible idea in terms of visible, tangible things” (86). In searching for a term to transcend and contain both ideas and imagery, Burke again consults “collective” wisdom and constructs the following correlation:
imagination stands in the same relation to poetry as ideology does to rhetoric (86-88). By this, I understand that he is suggesting that imagination generates ideas for poetry as ideology generates rhetoric. At least, he concedes a limited role for Imagination, but it is not the cognitive or ethical role I envision.

In addition to illustrating this problematic nature of the concept of Imagination, Burke’s survey of this collective wisdom also serves as a guide through several centuries of philosophy. Illustrating the breadth of his search, Burke surveys a wider assortment of philosophers in this book, beginning with Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and ending with Bentham (1748-1832). Burke quotes from Aristotle’s Psychology where he seems to espouse a wide conception of Imagination: “To the mind, images serve as if they were contents of perception. If it judges them to be good, it pursues them. If it judges them to be bad, it avoids them. That is why the mind never thinks without an image” (80). However, on further analysis, Burke points out Aristotle connects Imagination with sensation, being slightly above it on the scale of mental functions and possibly a midpoint between sensation and intellect, at least in Ethics. Aristotle used this term as one of as three effective devices of speech, along with antithesis and metaphor (78). In Burke’s analysis, the appeals of pathos and ethos as articulated by Aristotle probably involved imagination (81). Aristotle, as well as Cicero, pointed out the close relationship between poetry and rhetoric, in Burke’s description (87). Aristotle also wrote in terms of energeia, or “actualization” that “suggest purposive movement,” which is necessary to be considered a motive, one of Burke’s themes. In Aristotle’s book on religion and politics, Burke suggests, Imagination is “a medium of prophetic vision for communicating the revelations of religion. Here is the kind of imagination which could later be secularized in romantic theories of artistic
vision” according to Burke (78n). Here Burke begins constructing the theoretical basis for his connection of Imagination and idealistic philosophies.

Burke also analyzes the contribution of Longinus, who attributes dramatic images in speech to imagination (phantasia): the term had “come to be used of passages where inspired by enthusiasm and passion, [wherein] you seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes of the audience” (qtd. by Burke 79). His examples show great exaggeration, but Longinus suggests Imagination in rhetoric should be used to “convince the audience of the ‘reality and truth’ ” of claims, where Imagination can actually “master” the audience (79).

Longinus provides an early example of philosophy which connects imagination with genius and imitation (a connection that I explored in the previous chapter).

Burke also turns to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. This philosopher was the second best known of Renaissance philosophers and was considered “remarkable original—indeed idiosyncratic” (Copenhaver np). Burke points out that Pico, building on Aristotle’s suggestion that “images serve as if they were the contents of perception,” argues that “the mind never thinks without an image.” The chief use of imagination for Pico was the education of children to the “tortures of hell and the delights of Paradise” (80). According to Burke, Pico found imagination ”dangerous” in its dependence on the senses, even to those who reason and understand, a connection that Burke will develop in The Rhetoric of Religion.

Frances Bacon brings Imagination into Rhetoric, according to Burke. Bacon wrote, “The duty and office of Rhetoric is to apply Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the Will” (from The Advancement of Learning, in Rhetoric of Motives, qtd. by Burke 80). Bacon also posited that Rhetoric serves Imagination, as logic serves understanding; thus, Imagination can reinforce religion, opinion, and apprehension. Burke makes this critical assessment of Bacon:
“Like Augustine, he here considers rhetorical inducement to action from the standpoint of sermonizing, and he judges imagination as a means to persuasion to this end” (80-81). In this ordering of the mental faculties, Imagination is a tool that can serve other motivations and loses its generative properties.

According to Burke, George Santayana merged the Latin stress on drama with German transcendental idealism, particularly in the area of the spirit, since “the only possible way for spirit to create is to imagine” (Realms of Being p. 575; qtd. by Burke 82,). Santayana seems to equate imagination with knowledge, rather than fantasy, allowing it to transcend the mere senses (82). Here is an opposing view to Aristotle, Pico and Bacon which opens a wider field of activity for Imagination. Santayana, as analyzed by Burke, allows for the generative properties of Imagination in a way that resonates with Coleridge’s perspective (which I will explore in chapter 4).

Following the Romantic Movement’s setting Imagination in opposition to logic, Burke suggests that any modern use of passions, emotions, actions, mood and personality is likely to be presented as an image. He posits that the use of images “explicitly or implicitly involve ‘imagination’” and these ‘lyric’ motives are often opposed to ‘dramatic’ motives, but may include an overlap and even a sliding into the scientific observation to include “all shades of sentiment and refinements of taste and judgment” (81). Here Burke is speculating that the use of image and Imagination might be a process/term that might transcend dualities such as science/philosophy or lyric/drama.

Burke also suggests that William Hazlitt looks at imagination from an ethical viewpoint proposing the necessity of Imagination in making good decisions. Hazlitt attributes to Imagination “the motives by which I am impelled to the pursuit of my own good and those by
which I am impelled to pursue the good of others” (from *Essays on the Principles of Human Action* qtd. by Burke *Rhetoric of Motives* 83). Hazlitt attributes to Imagination the ability to naturally control blind impulses, thus disconnecting it from the control of Reason, unlike Pico and Bacon. Hazlitt also connected ideas to Imagination by his term “ideas of the imagination” (84). Thus, Hazlitt, at least as reported by Burke, seems to emphasize the generative aspects of Imagination in a way that resonates with the “Moral Imagination” of Johnson (discussed in chapter 1).

Burke suggests that Kant puts Ideas in the category with Reason as both principles and dialectical; thus Reason and Ideas contrast with the senses, which led to experiences, sensibilities and understandings (83). Imagination in Kant is restricted to remembering or anticipating images received from the senses, according to Burke. Thus, Burke sees Kant’s philosophy of Imagination as similar to that of Aristotle and Pico and does not explore Kant’s influence on Coleridge (see Engel for that discussion).

As his last philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, in Burke’s view, points out the dangers of the rhetorical use of images and Imagination. Besides warning that we should look for the images behind the ideas (88), Bentham warned against the euphemistic use of the pleasing images, which tickled the Imagination but hid the problems of any whole concept being discussed (91). In discussing Bentham’s ideas of order, Burke also notes that “there is a basic terminology of perception grounded on sensation, memory, and ‘imagination’ (in the general, psychological, non-poetic meaning of the word)” (184). Thus, Bentham is another philosopher who appears to equate Imagination with the senses.

As I understand his arguments, Burke draws on the collective wisdom of Pico, Kant and Bentham, who all place Imagination in the same category as the senses. Aristotle places
Imagination midway between the senses and the intellect, and Longinus connects it with creating vivid impressions in rhetoric. Bacon differentiates between Reason and Imagination and places both of them under the control of the Will. Only Hazlitt suggests that Imagination might lead to ethical decisions, in a manner that prefigures Johnson’s stance. In modern usages, according to Burke, images lead to Imagination and Imagination is contained within the concept of Knowledge. Much later Burke again connects Imagination with transcendence through the ironic principle as a way to overcome “local motivation” (313). In *The Rhetoric of Motives*, he never quite arrives at the terminology that suggests that Imagination might be a key to cognition and ethics.

In *The Rhetoric of Religion*, Burke illustrates a principle he earlier articulated in *The Rhetoric of Motives*: “whereas the philosophic expressions were later translations of the earlier narrative ones, we may look upon narrative expressions as translations of philosophic ones” (14). In this later book, Burke is looking at the narratives of Augustine and Genesis and converting those stories to a series of words and graphing the relation of those terms, a process that he calls logology. He defends his use of these texts by noting, “It is necessary to consider all the symbolic dimensions involved in the motives of the symbol-using animal [his description of Man (1, 40)]. In addition, these texts are intended to show why any secular theory of language that ignores the hints provided by theology is bound to be inadequate, whether or not theology is ‘true’” (14n). In the use of logology, Burke notes that he is questioning the positivity of the pentad. He writes that the terms of the pentad should be questions: “They are really but a set of blanks to be filled out” (26n). In looking at religion, Burke is still seeking motives: “since the theological use of language is thorough, the close study of theology and its forms will provide us with good insight into the nature of language itself as a motive” (vi). He defines “logology” as
“words about words” in parallel to theology as “words about God” (1). While Burke broadly describes his study as being an attempt to bring the concepts of religion into this secular study of language (5), the only “religion” that he studies is Christianity. The application of logology to other world religions such as Buddhism or Islam apparently was beyond his scope, and it is certainly beyond the scope of this dissertation. The methods of logology, as he illustrates in chapter one and chapter three, include looking at the origin of words and then graphing their connections. He suggests that religious words add a new dimension to nature (8) and that that dimension should not be eliminated from language study (10). In this aspect, I agree that the dimension of spirit should not be eliminated from the study of language and even the teaching of writing. As I will argue in chapter 4, spirit is one of the means of knowing. I am perhaps defining spirit even more broadly than Burke’s term religion.

In writing words about words, Burke suggests six analogies, although in my view, illustrations might be a better term. Burke gives the following summation of the dimensions of religion that he applies to language use:

(1) The likeness between words about words and words about The Word [principally from the biblical book of John].

(2) Words are to non-verbal [nature] as Spirit is to Matter.

(3) Language theory, in coming to a head in a theory of the negative, corresponds to “negative theology” [as illustrated in words for God such as ineffable].

(4) Linguistic entitlement leads to a search for the title of titles, which is technically a “god-term.”
(5) “Time” is to “eternity” as the particulars in the unfolding of a sentence are to the sentence’s unitary meaning.

(6) The relation between the name and the thing named is like the relations of the persons in the Trinity. (33-34; see also 38 for an even shorter list by titles)

In explicating the sixth analogy, Burke discusses thesis-antithesis-synthesis of Hegel and suggests that Coleridge complicates the triadic system by adding prosthesis and mesothesis. He does not comment further on Coleridge’s pentad, but reproduces it in a note. I will discuss the implications of Coleridge’s pentad for knowing in chapter 4. In my understanding, Burke is using “perspective by incongruity” to apply theological terms to language use. He is not particularly concerned with determining the “truth” value of any of his analogies (10, 12, 40, 188). I sense an implication that logology can replace theology. He suggests that “the relation between theology and logology should not be conceived simply as proceeding in one direction.”

(36). He also suggests that “fortunately,” it is not the duty of logology to solve theological riddles but to only consider connections between terms (193). He even uses the term logology in the way that some writers might use the name of God: “At this point (praise Logology!) we most decidedly need not enter the fray on Hobbesian terms [the terms of Popery, the Anti-Christ, and doctrine] (199). While this last comment might be irony, the use of logology in the manner similar to a god-term might indicate Burke’s privileging his method over any doctrinal study.

The “grounding” of logology can itself be explicated through Burke’s pentad, in essence turning his mere terms of the logological translation of the theological narrative back into a narrative, which I shall now attempt to do. He suggests that the concept of personality, even a supernatural personality, arises from “ingredients distributed among three empirical orders (words about nature, words about the socio-political, and words about words)” (Rhetoric of
Religion 36). The term *genius* here is but an analogical extension backwards from the supernatural to the natural, he argues (36). In his further explanation of how words constructed The Word [the supernatural] (37-38), Burke writes of “analogies folding back on themselves,” storms raging, and family symbolism. But what Agent, I ask, makes the analogies, names the storms, establishes families, and uses symbols? Through his logology and his explanation here, Burke, in my view, is erasing the Agent, which empirically is impossible. Someone, probably Burke in this instance, must be applying those terms and writing those words about words. The very “grounding” of logology in “empirical terms” is the establishment of a Scene, and as I will argue below, the Scene is always privileged by Burke.

I will now look closely at Burke’s study of the first three chapters of Genesis because I find there the term Imagination. Burke translates the narrative of these chapters into a word study and in the process connects Imagination to temptation. Without looking overmuch at the Scene or the rest of his Pentad, he identifies the dominant pair of words as Obedience and its opposite, Disobedience. This analysis leads to a chart of terms that correspond or fall into one or the other of the categories (See chart *The Rhetoric of Motives* 184). Here Burke uses the term “covenant” from Hobbs to use for the motive in this section and the term “fall” from Coleridge. Burke also relies on the Scofield Reference Bible (first published by the Oxford University Press in 1909 with extensive notes and chain references by Rev. C. I. Scofield) for his summaries of the successive covenants (175-177). Burke next calls on the “collective wisdom” of Rashi’s Commentary on the Pentateuch. Shlomo Yitzhaki [Salomon Isaacides, known by the acronym Rashi] was a medieval French rabbi considered the “father of all commentaries on the Talmud. Burke looks at the principles of sacrifice that cluster about the motive of Covenant, focusing on the Law and the logology of Genesis as dealing with first principles (179-180), but he views
Creation and Eden as a necessary condition “what nature must be like if it is to be a perfect fit with the conditions of human socio-political order” (180). In other words, Burke is reasoning backward from a materialist perspective, much like Hobbs, and suggesting that the Law came first in philosophy. Burke posits that Creation and a universal God were then written into the narrative as coming first temporally in order to justify the Jews taking the Promised Land on the orders of that God (179). In other words, Burke seems to be claiming that a band of nomads invented the narrative of creation and its author to “naturalize” its “occupation” of a particular land.

Then Burke switches to Order (which has an opposite term, Disorder), instead of Covenant (which appears to be wholly positive), and begins analysis of the dramatistic cycle of terms with “act,” which he identifies with the one negative order given by God not to eat of the fruit (180-181). Burke posits that the terms for the socio-political order become fused with the terms for natural order (181-182). He further suggests that without language, specifically the negatives of language, there would be no disobedience (187). With a nod towards dramatology, he notes that “‘persons’ by definition ‘act’” and “implicit in the idea of an act is the idea of free will” (187). Although the pentadic terms hover in the background, he remains committed to his logological project: “we are now concerned solely with the implications of terms” (188). Yet, he does not explicitly turn away from dramatism, describing the Scene as the “motivational locus of the act.” However, he reduces the agent’s act to the act’s attitude (perhaps complicating his pentad with a sixth term) so that he can focus on the “implications of terms” (188). He speculates that the term Will is the “place” [Burke’s scenic word with scare quotes] for “the choice between different possibilities of attitude-act development” (188). So, Scene is still very much the prime mover even within Burke’s logological explication of terms.
It is in exploring the influences on the Will that Burke comes to the term Imagination. Imagination influences the Will on the Disorder side, he argues, when it is grounded in the senses and leads to temptation and a fall; when Reason and Faith control Imagination, it can lead to Order, with Faith possibly transcending Reason which deals with Natural Law (188-189). Ironically, he is echoing Pico here in his connection of Imagination and Temptation. In a “grammatical” description [Burke’s term and scare quotes], he acknowledges that an Act implies an Agent who is capable of acting (192, see also 176). However, as a matter of terms, he suggests that personality as a characteristic of the Agent arises from the Agent’s use of symbol-systems and “the creative verbal fiat” [a term earlier attached to the first verse of Genesis, 180]. Burke posits that, in grammatical terms, the story of Genesis suggests we symbol-users arise “from a scene that is the act of a super-person” which leads to the “ultimate theological riddle” of predestination versus free-will, which his logology deliberately sidesteps (193).

However, Burke primarily concentrates on logology and elaborates on his Order/Disorder pair (193-194), but can’t resist mentioning the theological problem of evil and the existence of Satan (194-195). He thinks there might be two kinds of Temptation (or yielding to temptation): first, not quite being perfect but with good intentions and second, making a Covenant with the Devil (195). Burke notes that James Joyce in his Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man illustrates both kinds. Imagination in this instance is identified with the artist’s “deliberate choice of a ‘proud’ aesthetic calling” (196) and hence leads to Disorder. Burke also notes here that Imagination can be used by God convey warnings to the victim who is about to sign a contract with Satan. This description is again the traditional connection between Imagination and the senses and temptation.
After *The Rhetoric of Motives* and *The Rhetoric of Religion*, Burke also connected the senses and Imagination to temptation in an entry he wrote in 1968 for the *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* on “dramatism” (reprinted in *On Symbols and Society*, 279-281). He states: “Imagination falls on the side of disorder insofar as it encourages interests inimical to the given order, though it is serviceable to order if used as a deterrent by picturing the risks of disorder—or, in other words, if it is kept ‘under the control of reason’ “ (279). This passage confirms the connection of Imagination and senses under Reason. Thus, his search for a transcendent Imagination, which might bridge Reason and sense, remains unfulfilled in his own writing, the cause for which I will now discuss.

**Speculating on a Transcendent Imagination**

I will now examine the first three chapters of Genesis from another perspective to illustrate that the methods of dramatism and logology do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Imagination must be bracketed with temptation. In my perspective [and using dramatistic terms], Burke has remained too attached to the primacy of Scene over Agent and Agency, which limits his circumference to materialism (a connection that he points out in *The Grammar of Motives* 128). Furthermore, I think that he has not carried Scene far enough in his analysis of the first three chapters of Genesis (nor, I concede, was this his intention). If Burke had first identified the Scene beyond the Scene of Eden, perhaps beyond the time/space continuum, then he might have seen a larger drama. Burke explicitly rejects this Scenic possibility in *The Grammar of Motives*, writing that the Creation was the positing of time (64). I find that his ground for doing so was in his privileging of the Scene generally, which in turn led to his distrust of Imagination, as I will discuss below.
However, the Scene/Agents before Eden are hinted at in the narrative of the Bible\(^3\) (whether or not one accepts the truth claims of that story) and vividly imagined by Milton in the first book of *Paradise Lost*\(^4\). In these narratives, Satan, who may be identified as Counter-agent to God’s Agent, challenges God for control of the kingdom/universe. In both Milton and the Bible, he is defeated, thrown out of heaven to temporarily roam the earth, and is looking for ways to get revenge. God then creates the world and, along with it, the time/space continuum. Adam and Eve are also created “in the image of God” and walk with Him in the Garden of Eden in the cool of the evening (Gen. 3); this action can be interpreted as a “relationship.” Satan enters the scene of Eden as one of the most beautiful and subtle of creatures, the snake. Adam and Eve, being made both in the image of God and of the “substance” of earth, are pulled in both directions of this cosmic conflict and choose to follow Satan’s advice to raise their own status. Adam and Eve in this instance become pawns and almost *agents-minus*, a term Burke uses to characterize Darwin’s organisms in *Grammar of Motives* (157). With his emphasis on Order and Covenant, Burke characterizes this act as disobedience (*The Rhetoric of Religion* 175). In the realm of “relationship,” this act is seen as “betrayal.” If one uses the dichotomy of relationship/nonrelationship, then “friend/enemy” is another pair of words that also characterizes this act. Even the “covenant” motive, which Burke appropriates from Scofield, can be seen as the changing stages of relationship, until in the final covenant Jesus can call his disciples “friends” (John 15: 12-14). Using these words, one could construct a different chart from Burke’s “Cycle of Terms Implicit in the Idea of Order” (184).

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\(^3\) See specifically, Isaiah 14: 13 (where Satan vows his self-glorification), Rev. 12: 3-4 (where Satan, symbolized as a red dragon, draws a third of the angels into his army), and the Scofield note to Rev. 20: 10 (which summarizes the references to Satan beginning with Gen. 3:1).

\(^4\) Burke tries to imagine a conversation between God and Satan as an epilogue to this book.
From the perspective of drama, the Purpose is hinted at in the metaphor of the snake bruising the heel of the Seed, a purpose that was fulfilled when Jesus died on the cross. A new charting of the logology of the first three chapters of Genesis could also yield a new position for Imagination, one that is not boxed with temptation and the senses under the Curse, but that creates a bridge between friend and enemy, good and evil. (See Appendix B). In the chapter 4, I will argue for the possibility of Imagination being such a bridge (building on the concept of “Thirdness” of Charles Pierce).

**Privileging of Scene and the Distrust of Imagining**

Burke’s cannot see Imagination as a transcending term, in spite of his knowledge of Coleridge, in spite of his search through major Western philosophers (some of whom saw it that way), and in spite of his method of logology (which could have been different). I argue that this inability lies in his privileging of the Scene in the dramatistic pentad, even when translating the narrative into a logology. This distrust is ironic considering that Coleridge himself suggests a pentad on based on a more diverse epistemology, as I will discuss in the next chapter. Perhaps this distrust occurs when Burke used “perspective by incongruity” to lift Coleridge’s pentad out of his epistemology. As I will show here, Burke limited himself to the ideology of materialism by concentrating on the Scene as the first among equals in his pentad. The connection of Scene to materialism is one that Burke himself makes (*The Grammar of Motives* 128).

In the *Grammar of Motives*, Kenneth Burke introduces the full explanation of his dramatism as a generating principle for discovering and discussing motives, illustrating and anticipating the ways that “dialectical and metaphysical issues necessarily figure in the subject of motivation” (xxiii). The writer may select any one of the five terms—Agent, Act, Agency, Scene or Purpose—to emphasize, since they overlap and connect like the fingers on a hand (xxii).
Acknowledging that the overlap can lead to ambiguity, he suggests, “What we want is not terms that avoid ambiguity, but terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise” (italics in the original, xviii). In discussing the terms and their applications to literature, philosophy, and life, he discusses first the Scene-Act ratio and the Scene-Agent ratio before detouring through the philosophical discussion of substance, and then to the Scene generally. This placement of Scene before the other four terms could suggest that Scene is the first among equals, and this position is confirmed by Burke’s statements that the Scene contains both the Act and the Agents (3) and “agents require placement in scenes” (50). In spite of his acknowledgement of ambiguity, he states quite adamantly: “both act and agent require scenes that ‘contain’ them” (15), although rhetorically one term can be emphasized as distinct from the others (16). “The ratios may often be interpreted as principles of selectivity rather than as thoroughly causal relationships” (18), Burke suggests. In other words, these could be terms to think with, rather than causes and effects.

In spite of this apparent flexibility of selection and changing ratios, Burke sees Creation as a problem, even an embarrassment (61) when viewed through the looking glass of his pentad. Burke writes that Creation is a representative anecdote—“not as a temporal event, but as a logical prototype of act” (64). Burke notes that William James found it impossible to imagine a way (another term for “scene”) for creation. The grounding of Creation in an Agent without a Scene violates Burke’s pentad; he writes: “The concept of God as an agent doesn’t quite satisfy the dramatistic necessities, for an agent, like an act, must be placed in some scene (70). As a result, Burke himself seems to be having James’ trouble imagining when he asks “what are we to do with a god who is himself the ground of everything? When he acts, in what scene does he
act?” (71). Such a God who imagines the Scene is part of the ontology of Coleridge’s Imagination, as I will discuss in the next two chapters.

Moving on to the other terms of the pentad, Burke attributes Imagination and other such expressions describing personality to the Agent. Describing uses and differences between the pentadic terms, Burke writes, “Under ‘agent’ one could place any personal properties that are assigned a motivational value, such as ‘ideas,’ ‘the will,’ ‘fear,’ ‘malice,’ ‘intuition,’ ‘the creative imagination.’” (The Grammar of Motives xx). In spite of his valorization of Coleridge, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, Burke found that his notion of Imagination was unclear. In discussing the scope and reduction of the term Act, Burke notes that an act can have a bit of novelty, which might have “that justified Coleridge’s view of poetry as a ‘dim analogue of Creation.’ However, for Burke that formula was obscured by the idealist stress upon agent, as locus of the ‘shaping spirit of Imagination’ by which we give forth that which we receive, since ‘in our life alone does Nature live,’’ he writes (68). In discussing the Agent in General, Burke notes that idealism, as defined in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, is said to hold the following: “Apart from the activity of the self or subject in sensory reaction, memory and association, imagination, judgment and inference, there can be no world of objects.” (171) Imagination thus is a characteristic of the Agent and idealism is the philosophy that emphasizes the Agent (128).

Burke’s privileging of the Scene appears to be based on the collective wisdom of another philosopher with whom he may have had a dialectic relationship even stronger than the one with Coleridge. That philosopher is Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), whom Burke describes as bridging medieval and modern philosophy (Grammar of Motives 68).

Spinoza’s influence started early. The young Burke in the 1920s focused on turning American literature back to Spinoza and Goethe (Selzer 132). Burke acknowledged his reliance
Spinoza for philosophy (Selzer 41). In an interview with William Cahill in 1989, Burke remembered that he was “wild about Spinoza, Bergson” in his youth (np). In that interview, Burke also made this comment about his early reading habits:

Remy de Gourmont [1858-1915], *Latin Mystique* [1892], that was the book I needed. De Gourmont had no belief at all in theology, in religion, but he loved the beauty of the thing, you see, the beauty of the language, and, my God, that *Latin Mystique* of his is a wonderful book, in that respect. You'll find in some of my early stories my use of some of the material that I got in him. And then also he put me on to some of the early Christian poets. The language was always the belief; it was always the language. When they started to modernize the Church, that's the last chance I ever had. I could only get a thrill out of the rituals of the Church." (np)

The concern about language, as well as the philosophy of Spinoza seems to have had a profound effect on his thinking, more in my opinion than the philosophy of Coleridge.

Consequently, Spinoza, along with Hobbs and Darwin, serve as collective wisdom for Burke’s explication of the Scene in *The Grammar of Motives*. While discoursing on Scene, Burke posits, “Spinoza, like most philosophers prior to romanticism placed imagination, and its partner, memory, much closer to sheer brute sensation than to insight or vision” (143). Burke quotes from Spinoza’s *On the Improvement of the Understanding* to illustrate the point that words are a part of the imagination and the memory. Therefore, in the words of Spinoza,

There is no doubt that words may, equally with the imagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we keep strictly on our guard. Moreover, words are formed according to popular fancy and intelligence, and are, therefore, signs of things as existing in the imagination, not as existing in the understanding (144).
It is this connection of imagination and error that Burke returns to in his placing of Imagination and temptation in the column of Disobedience in *The Rhetoric of Religion*.

Spinoza, as quoted by Burke, goes on to suggest that the understanding holds such concepts as “infinite” which cannot be visualized in the imagination (144). In describing the alignment of terms in Spinoza, Burke compiles a list that places the *intellect*, as well as its parts *will, opinion, and imagination*, under the passive column (148). Burke is still describing the circumference of Scene within his discussion of philosophical schools. He points out that “Spinoza distinguished three kinds of knowledge. The first is that of opinion, or imagination, and is inadequate. The second kind is Reason—but higher than Reason stands Intuition, which ‘proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things’ (Book II, Prop. XL, Note II).” Intuition is the perfection of Reason, which is thoroughly scenic according to Burke (150-151). According to Burke, Intuition for Spinoza leads to the “crowning motive, the intellectual love of God.”

However, Spinoza’s God is equated with Nature, and, as Burke previously illustrates, Spinoza’s view is pantheistic, and thus his philosophy as a whole is scenic even when leaning a bit towards the Agent. Burke writes, “human nature is treated simply as a special case of nature in general, hence a function of scene” (152). This is one of several examples of Burke positing that the philosophy of Spinoza is scenic. For example, Spinoza’s view of the Agent as retaining some immortality after death is designated by Burke as scenic (149). A key point for Burke may be this analysis of Spinoza: “But Spinoza, in equating God and nature, gave us a concept of nature that could have no scene beyond it. For nature was everything—and beyond everything, considered as a totality, there could be nothing to serve as its context” (*The Grammar of Motives* 25).
Thus, Imagination, especially as Coleridge envisions it, becomes very problematic within Burke’s Pentad. While discussing the pentadic term Purpose, Burke also turns to Spinoza, who formulated all determination as negation. “Accordingly, the applying of negative terms to God does not indicate that God Himself is negative, but only that the human imagination is unable to transcend the limitations of the senses” (295). Burke himself, with his reliance on Spinoza, seems unable to imagine something he cannot see, an Agent without a Scene; thus he cannot accept Coleridge’s epistemology nor Coleridge’s definition of imagination. Timothy Crusius writes in *Kenneth Burke and The Conversation after Philosophy* that he remained a skeptic, never accepting any metaphysical or epistemological theory (32). Crusius notes that Burke quotes Spinoza in an early work, *The Philosophy of Literary Form* and never seemed to get beyond his gloss on Spinoza’s idea of the “adequate idea” that can reside only “in an infinite, omniscient mind” (PLF 7, qtd. In Crusius 32). Yet, as I have argued, it is precisely this sort of mind that Burke cannot imagine because he privileges the Scene, leading to his distrust of Imagination in the same manner as his early mentor Spinoza.

By grounding his theory in the dramatistic pentad and his epistemology in materialism, Burke illustrates a profound distrust of imagination and a turn to materialism. He is not alone, of course, in his turn towards materialism and its flowering in “the social turn.” James Berlin, as analyzed by Byron Hawk, leads the field of rhetoric/composition into a “forgetting” of a wider epistemology (84). Bruffee, as mentioned in chapter 1, also champions collaboration, as do Lunsford and Ede.

This privileging of the Scene as necessarily containing the rest of Burke’s Pentad is problematic for online learning, since the scene is not visible, as in a traditional brick and mortar classrooms where teachers and students face each other. Indeed, with the current state of online
learning, the participants may be visible to each other only through the texts that they create. We often have to imagine each other. In Burkeian terms, the online student must be an Agent who imagines both the Scene and other Agents through the texts that are posted. It is to a more diverse epistemology that allows for a robust Imagining of the Other through texts that I turn in the chapter 4. In chapter 3, I will reflect on the search for a definition of an active Imagination that would allow teachers and students the theoretical agency to imagine.
CHAPTER 3: “A GLASSY ESSENCE”: REFLECTING ON THE SEARCH FOR AN ACTIVE IMAGINATION

What is Imagination? That question calls for a definition, but as I begin to research how others have answered that question, I discover that I am looking in a tri-fold mirror where the sources are endlessly reflected one inside the other. The sheer magnitude of looking at even contemporary sources is staggering. More than 200 major, current works on Imagination are listed in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, attesting to the depth and breadth of Imagination studies in these fields of psychology and philosophy. Tamar Gendler, who wrote the entry, begins her overview of Imagination with an almost obligatory quote from P.F. Strawson’s “Imagination and Perception,” where he compares the complex of terms ‘image’, ‘imagine’, ‘imagination’ to a family, but suggests that listing the relationships would be too difficult. Gendler subdivides the research fields into the following: imagination and other mental states, including belief; norms and violations of imagination; imagination’s roles including moral understanding and counterfactual reasoning; puzzles and problems, including imaginative resistance and fictional emotions; and empirical work on imagination, including its use among the autistic and delusional.
In an attempt to avoid bewildering myself and my readers, I will narrow my search for a definition primarily to Coleridge and his interpreters and primarily to the disciplines of English (both composition and literary studies) and Education, as discussed in chapter 1. I have chosen Coleridge because he is quoted in nearly every source on Imagination, from Margaret Greene in education, to Ann E. Berthoff in English, to Kenneth Burke, whose writings spanned several fields, to Mark Johnson in psychology of ethics. In fact Burke suggests “Our modern views of the imagination come to us via the idealist Coleridge from the Idealist Kant” (Grammar of Motives 223). Coleridge is central to any examination of Imagination: as philosopher James Engell points out, Coleridge synthesized two centuries of philosophical thought about the term, and as I extend that notion later in this chapter, Coleridge is a starting point for many current examinations of the term (See Appendix C for a graphic representation of these lines of influence). First, I will examine Coleridge’s discussion of imagination, including his theoretical positioning of the Agent. Then I will look at various interpretations of his definition of Imagination, including Burke, Richards, and Warnock.

**Coleridge on Imagination**

Coleridge’s description of Imagination is often a touchstone for musings about Imagination, as I have discussed regarding Mark Johnson, Berthoff, Greene, and others (chapter 1) and Kenneth Burke (chapter 2). In a way, this dissertation will follow these scholars’ lead; however, I will be looking particularly for perspectives that relate to the Act of Imagining and the Actor as a rhetor, to borrow Burke’s Pentad terms. I will suggest that the Actor through the

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5 Coleridge writes about “bewildering” himself with philosophy (both through study and speculation) in Biographia Literaria, chapters I, VI, and XII. I consider it an apt term.

6 When reading Coleridge and Burke, I am struck by their similar use of capitalization. Coleridge sometimes capitalizes “Actor” as Burke does.
Act of Imagining creates the Scene, in contrast to Burke’s insistence that the Scene must contain the other pentadic terms (discussed in chapter 2). I differ from these scholars in suggesting in chapter 4 that Imagining is best encouraged by following Coleridge’s ontology and epistemology, particularly the four means of knowing (the group, the text, knowledgeable others, and the spirit—as I have reconfigured them)

I.A. Richards suggests that, by writing about Imagination, Coleridge was responding to the rhetorical situation of his day: “He lived at a time when a deep and general change was occurring in man’s conceptions of himself and of his world, and he spent his powers upon the elaboration of a speculative apparatus that would be a kind of microscope with which to study this change and others” (2). Richards also notes the previous growth of literary criticism by Alexander Pope to which Coleridge was responding (194). In addition, Alexander Turnbull, in his preface to Biographia Epistolaris, suggests that Coleridge turned to philosophy because of his intellectual growth. In Turnbull’s assessment, Coleridge “was, constitutionally, the most comprehensive mind of a new age, and just because he was its greatest thinker he was perplexed and attracted by the majority of the problems which arose around him, and which he himself helped to raise. " (Part I, “The Permanent”) While Wordsworth’s influence on Coleridge is well known, Turnbull suggests that Tom Poole, with whom he debated philosophy, had more influence and that Coleridge began to think more on the concept of the permanent: “He was henceforth no longer the Poet of Romanticism, whose significance he had exhausted, but the philosopher of the Permanent, which presented itself as a splendid possibility in all departments of human knowledge and activity.” Both Richards and Turnbull note that Coleridge’s speculations on the nature of Imagination remain fragmentary.
Coleridge states his least fragmentary description of Imagination in chapter XIII, 
*Biographia Literaria.* At the beginning of this work, he heralds his purpose with a lengthy quote from Goethe which ends with the following sentence: “He wishes to spare the young those circuitous paths, on which he himself had lost his way.” This intellectual autobiography traces Coleridge’s life from his schooling in the classics, his reading German philosophers, his publishing attempts and his moving to the Lake District with Wordsworth, as well as his side trip into Universalism and back to Christianity. The immediate rhetorical situation (to use Bitzer’s concept) to which Coleridge is responding is the slander of critics who do not understand his philosophy and his disagreement with Wordsworth on some of the principles of poetry. Ultimately, as he points out, he is building “a solid foundation, on which to permanently ground my opinions, in the component faculties of the human mind itself, and their comparative dignity and importance…” (I, 10)7. It is in building this philosophical foundation for writing and evaluating poetry that he describes and analyzes the notion of Imagination. Richards suggests that Coleridge is going even further in his reflections: “from notions of our notions we can go on to an INNER SENSE of the act of notioning, of the acts of choosing among our notions and framing them, comparing them, and so on” (chapter X in *Biographia Literaria*, referenced in Richards 44-45). In essence, Coleridge is writing his own metaphysics to support his creative writing and going even beyond that.

In chapter I, Coleridge begins building his argument by creating an ethos of a learned man through a narrative of his education. Both the quote from Goethe and the recounting of his studies are rhetorical moves that follow the format set by Descartes in part one of *The Discourse on Method*, where he expresses the hope that his intellectual journey will prove useful to others

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7 The page numbers cited for *Biographia Literaria* are based on my printing out, with narrow margins, the Project Gutenberg text. I am also adding the chapters for clarity. Unless otherwise noted, the citations are from *Biographia Literaria.*
(6). However, Coleridge will go on to suggest several theses for engaging Imagination that will turn Descartes’ conclusions on their head, as I discuss later in this chapter.

As noted in the previous chapter, Coleridge takes for granted a range of human intellectual capabilities with “genius” at the apex (II, 12) and claims this distinction for his friends Southey (III, 21) and Wordsworth (IV, 23). These connections of imagination, genius, privilege, and even the spiritual may have predisposed modern theorists of rhetoric and composition to reject Romanticism when the discipline was being formed (Hawk 18). In building up to his fullest description of Imagination in *Biographia Literaria*, Coleridge distinguishes between Fancy and Imagination with this evaluation: “Milton had a highly imaginative, Cowley a very fanciful, mind.” (IV, 25) Coleridge suggests that to understand the truth, one needs to make distinctions between words that are synonyms, especially if those words (like the Greek *phantasia* and Latin *imago*) are borrowed from other languages. His term for the distinguishing is “desynonymize” (IV, 24-25), and he suggests in an endnote that one of the pair of synonyms should become the general term and the other should have a more technical application (177, n. 22). Richards suggests that Coleridge uses Fancy as the more general term, and Imagination as the limited term that includes a deeper connection between the parts of an analogy, but that Coleridge is not consistent in this usage (75-77). In his inconsistency, I think that Coleridge is demonstrating his process of imagining, which as Berthoff points out, often leads to chaos, which the writer must clarify. In Coleridge’s case, he seems to leave the clarification to the reader, or perhaps, like “Kubla Khan,” life interrupted his thoughts.

In building his metaphysics in *Biographia Literaria* (however inconsistent), Coleridge draws on his previous reading of multiple philosophers from Aristotle to Hume, providing in essence the literature review familiar to any rhetoric/ composition theorist. He further divides
them according to their stand on the Will and whether they lean towards Idealism or Materialism (V, 26-28). He interprets Aristotle’s general law of association as follows: “Ideas by having been together acquire a power of recalling each other; or every partial representation awakes the total representation of which it had been a part” with vividness making the most impression on the memory. Coleridge also suggests five agents or causes for the association: time, space, interdependence or necessary connection such as cause or effect, likeness, and/or contrast (V, 28). While initially intrigued with the Hartley’s law of association, Coleridge rejects it as being too mechanical, resulting in division between “the despotism of outward impressions, and that of senseless and passive memory” (VI, 30). Coleridge observed that the Hartleian theory would reduce the writer to a mere onlooker while every other force “co-operates to produce the minutest stroke of every letter” (VII, 32). Hartley’s reduction of the writer is similar to the later challenges of Bathes and Foucault to the notion of the Author. (See Andrea Lunsford on “Collaboration and Collaborative Writing: the View From Here.”) Instead, he theorizes that the will and all thoughts are “distinct powers, the function of which it is to control, determine, and modify the phantasmal chaos of association” (VII, 32). The implications for writing are immense. If the writer is so controlled by outward, mechanical associations, then the writer will benefit even less from education than the genius who already has within him/her all that is needed to compose. In his rejection of mechanical associationism, Coleridge is preparing the way for his theory of the writer as an Agent who can create through Imagination. The lengthy philosophical argument that follows (incomplete though it is), is undertaken by Coleridge, in my view, as a foundation for positioning the writer as an Agent.

Instead of these mechanical inscriptions, Coleridge describes the act of thinking like the act of leaping—both active and passive with another faculty to connect the two. He writes, “In
philosophical language, we must denominate this intermediate faculty in all its degrees and determinations, the IMAGINATION” (VII, 34). Coleridge suggests that the central problem of dualism as introduced by Descartes is the connection between being and knowing (VIII, 33). Coleridge solves this problem by suggesting that the two forces are “contranatural,” occurring together in such a manner that it is difficult to disengage them (IX, 37): “We learn all things indeed by occasion of experience; but the very facts so learned force us inward on the antecedents, that must be presupposed in order to render experience itself possible.” Coleridge suggests a new term: esemplastic from Greek words meaning “to shape into one” (X, 41). After a lengthy aside on the merits of being one’s own publisher and further biographical details in chapters X and XI, he discusses whether or not to fully explain the rational foundation for his theory of Imagination in chapter XII. He speculates that there is a philosophical imagination and that there are some without “a philosophical organ” whose degree of consciousness may not be as developed as that of others (XII, 65). He further speculates that the objective (nature) and the subjective (self or intelligence) must exist together but that the subjective includes the idea of the objective while the reverse is not true. (XII, 66-67). He states ten theses, effectively turning Descartes’ maxim “Cognito ergo sum” on its head. These principles indicate that Coleridge is seeking a truth that is correlative to being, that is either original or mediate, and that is self-grounded. There will be only one ultimate principle which cannot be a thing. Coleridge writes, “This principle, and so characterized manifests itself in the SUM or I AM: which I shall hereafter indiscriminately express by the words spirit, self, and self-consciousness.” This principle will be an Act resulting from the union of object and subject (which is originally spirit) beginning with the maxim of “I Know Myself in order to end with the absolute I AM.” He adds, “The principle of our knowing is sought within the sphere of our knowing” and this knowing and being are not
cause and effect, but “co-inherent and identical” (XII, 68-70). In particular, Coleridge notes that he objects to Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum” because it is tautological and does not acknowledge the grounds in which we have our being (187, note 53). Thus, Coleridge is using his principle of desynonymization to arrive at a unity. This diversity within unity in the means of our knowing will ultimately allow for the operation of Imagining in the writing process. By the term Imagining, I mean the active process described by both Cooper and Berthoff of forming, thinking, writing and also of making the cognitive leap of making new connections (or at least connections new to the writer)/

Continuing his argument, Coleridge also suggests that Wordsworth has not distinguished between Fancy and Imagination (XIII, 73). The following are the mental powers as distinguished by Coleridge:

- Imitative (voluntary and automatic)
- Imagination (the shaping and modifying power)
- Fancy (the aggregative and associative power)
- The understanding (regulative, substantiating, and realizing power)
- Speculative reason (scientific theorizing) which produces unity, necessity, and universality
- Will (practical reason)

According to Coleridge, these powers are aided by the faculty of choice and the sensation of volition (XIII, 73).

Coleridge acknowledges that his philosophy is difficult to understand and difficult conceptually. He even includes feedback from one friend who wrote that Coleridge’s words made him feel as if he had been standing on his head (XIII, 75). Coleridge also here promised to write a book on “CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY” [all capitals in the original] as well as “treatises on the Logos or communicative intellect in Man and Deity.” Here Coleridge seems to
be begging indulgence for an incomplete philosophical grounding. He realizes that he will need to continue working on that framework and leaps to the description/definition of Imagination.

Having established his credibility though his literary biography, provided some framework for a philosophy of imagination, promised more, and begged indulgence for his abstruse subject, Coleridge makes his somewhat fragmentary statement on Imagination. Here is the famous quote:

The Imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary Imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate: or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.

FANCY, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites. The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and space; while it is blended with, and modified by that empirical phaenomenon of the will, which we express by the word Choice. But equally with the ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association (XIII, 76).

Coleridge thus makes three distinctions in this description. The third, Fancy, is the easiest to see: it is our commonplace use of metaphors and clichés, the mechanical connecting of two
concepts that are somewhat alike on one point. Imagination, however, is two-fold; depending on one’s ontological grounding, the primary Imagination may be either a higher use by Actors (Burke, *Rhetoric of Motives*, 79; Richards, 180) or the primary act of God in creating the world (J. Robert Barth, 20 and Jeffrey W. Barbeau, 155). In either case, I suggest that Imagination is the mediation that transforms the subject/object relationship by providing new insights and complex connections not previously understood or made.

The italics and the small caps are in the original and, in my opinion, are critical for understanding Coleridge’s perspective of Imagination as found in the Agent. The use of small caps is a traditional way of indicating English words that translate the Hebrew words for God. (“Preface” Bible New International Version, 34). The term “I AM” is the first name of God given to Moses (Exodus 3:14), and its use by Jesus to refer to himself almost resulted in his being stoned for blasphemy (John 8:58.) In light of his educational training as an Anglican cleric, Coleridge may be understood as focusing on the Agent, both God and human, through the Agency of Imagination. Coleridge suggests that the human imagination is only a dim reflection of the Divine Imagination that envisioned the world before it existed. In making this claim, Coleridge directly contradicted Burke’s materialist view that the Scene must exist first. Coleridge is, however, well within the description of an Idealist that Burke suggests (see chapter 2 for a complete discussion). In my view, God as the first creator is an important part of Coleridge’s epistemology, which I will discuss in more detail in chapter 4.

Coleridge’s purpose may also have been to provide both a distinction and a unity: He later writes: “Great injury has resulted from the supposed incompatibility of one talent with another, judgment with imagination and taste, good sense with strong feeling, &c. If it be false, as assuredly it is, the opinion has deprived us of a test which every man might apply.” (*Anima*
Thus, in Coleridge’s metaphysics, Reason and Imagination are not opposing faculties, as they are in many of the philosophers surveyed by Burke in his search for a transcendental Imagination (to which I have devoted a large portion of chapter 2).

Coleridge promises a more complete argument in a work explaining “Logosophia” or “dynamic philosophy” (XII, 68). This work was never completed although he worked on it until his death. Richards quotes this journal entry from Coleridge:

‘The metaphysical disquisition at the end of the first volume of *Biographia Literaria* is unformed and immature; it contains fragments of truth but is not fully thought out. It is wonderful to myself to think how infinitely more profound my views now are and yet how much clearer they are withal. The circle is completing; the idea is coming round to, and to be, the reality” *Table Talk* June 28, 18343; one month before his death (qtd in Richards 66 note 1).

In spite of its contingency and fragmentation (or perhaps because of those characteristics), Coleridge’s definition of Imagination and its distinction from Fancy remains a beginning point for theories of Imagination. Thus, Coleridge models the process of imagining as an active rhetor, who expresses his thoughts even though they remain contingent and fragmentary. In chapter 4, I will discuss this contingency and fragmentation in light of Anne Berthoff’s interpretation of Charles Peirce’s concept of “thirdness.” I will now turn to the interpretations of Coleridge’s concept, beginning with Burke.

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8 While *process* is an apt word, it may also be confused with writing process. Henceforth, I will mostly use the word *mediation*, which embodies the idea as *process* plus the sense of “thirdness.”
Burke on Imagination in Coleridge

In interpreting Coleridge’s description of Imagination (Rhetoric of Motives 79), Burke points out that he has divided the faculty into two different sorts: 1) Greek phantasia which is equated with “fancy” (mechanical slicing and blending of sensory images) and 2) Latin imaginato which means creative and super sensory. Then Imaginato is further divided into two types: ‘primary’ and ‘secondary.’ (Rhetoric of Motives 79). Coleridge’s method is to reason from the top down, he posits (The Rhetoric of Religion 41). Burke also suggests that the division of Imagination has its source in Coleridge’s drug use (The Philosophy of Literary Form 98). He does not, however, discuss Coleridge’s faith, which Barth and Barbeau have found necessary to understanding Coleridge. Burke’s survey of philosophers provides background on shifting conceptions of Imagination; in addition, his pentad provides the terminology for analyzing the mediation of Imagination. In Burke’s review of the philosophical descriptions of Imagination in The Grammar of Motives and The Rhetoric of Motives (as discussed in chapter 2), the term remains a static faculty of the mind—there is no dissolving, diffusing, dissipating or recreating as suggested by Coleridge. However, in his rejection of the Actor outside of a Scene—in other words, God—(Grammar of Motives 69ff), he does not provide any insights that will be useful in the digital world where Agents must operate without a visible Scene. ⁹

Richards on Coleridge

In his seminal book on Coleridge’s Imagination, I.A. Richards concedes that he is interpreting the theory of Coleridge (an Idealist) from a Materialist viewpoint,(19). Richards is not looking for a concept of Imagination, so much as he is searching for useful terms—

⁹ I’ve reflected at greater length on this conundrum in “Location: Writing in and for the Cloud.”
“speculative instruments”—for a psychological reading of poetry (2, 96). From his own ontological grounding, Richards sees Coleridge’s unquestionable Christianity as part of a myth (180-181). He writes that Coleridge’s inclusion of God as a ground for his metaphysics is a delusion, based on a quote from Coleridge himself: “When a man mistakes his thoughts for persons and things, he is mad. A madman is properly so defined: (Table Talk, July 25, 1832; qtd in Richards 172). Richards suggests that the idea of God (as a person) is one such mistake that is part of a greater myth (173). At the same time, Richards privileges science (and by implication, psychology) as a particular kind of mythology that actually is knowledge (174). In weighing the relative merits of idealism and materialism, Richards thinks that neither can be judged right or wrong because they are using different concepts and languages (70-71). Nevertheless, he considers Coleridge’s ideas as possible speculative instruments that may aid in the psychological exploration of introspection by creating a mechanical process. While Richards sees Coleridge’s metaphysics as superseded by advances in materialism/mechanical philosophy, he finds the poet’s psychology fruitful: “his conception of the mind as an active, self-forming, self-realizing system is plainly an immense improvement” (69). Richards thus is focusing on the active terms of Coleridge’s description: dissolving, diffusing, dissipating or recreating.

Richards also provides extensive examples of using Coleridge’s terms of Fancy and Imagination to interrogate poetry and drama. In addition, he draws from Coleridge doctrines that can be used to explore a poet’s introspection. He suggests two seminal doctrines, as follows:

1. “The mind of the poet at moments, penetrating ‘the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude’, gains an insight into reality, reads Nature as a symbol of something behind or within Nature not ordinarily perceived
2. The mind of the poet creates a Nature into which his own feelings, his aspirations and apprehensions, are projected” (145).

In this explanation, Richards is attempting to provide specifics for Coleridge’s unity of subject and object within the mind of the poet. While these insights and applications are useful for understanding Coleridge, they do not add to the definition of Imagination that I am seeking.

Imagining in Other Interpretations

In her philosophy of imagination, Warnock professes that she once believed that Coleridge had “the secret of the kind of understanding of imagination that I sought, and that it was contained both in his theory and practice” (Imagination 10). It seems to be the lack of clarity that led to her loss of “faith” (her term). While conceding that Coleridge drew many of his ideas from German philosophy, Warnock posits that “the theory of imagination to be found in his work contains features which, wherever they recur, seem to contribute to a true view of the imaginative function” based on both practice and theory. Coleridge, she suggests, is looking at his own process of imagining and his own inner self in order to formulate a theory of the universal Self (73).

I shall point out here that if Coleridge thought that he could find a universal Self by looking at his particular mind, then he is following in the footsteps of the Enlightenment rhetoricians who assumed such universality. Campbell thought of the audience as similar to the orator: “thinking beings endowed with understanding, imagination, memory, and passions, such as we are conscious of in ourselves, and learn from the experience of their effects to be in others” (Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric 94; qtd by Crowley 29). As Crowley argues, this universal aspect of the individual allowed the student to focus on his own thoughts for invention (32). In
discussing method, Crowley also points out that Coleridge “thought that the operations of the mind reflected those of nature and through it, divine law. The “creative IDEA” of the divine mind “not only appoints to each thing its position, but in that position, and in consequence of that positions, gives it its qualities, yea, it gives its very existence, as that particular thing” (from his essays in The Friend, 1818; qtd in Crowley 42). Since Biographia Literaria was originally published in 1817, Coleridge is further grounding his definition/description of Imagination in the divine mind, as I will discuss in more detail in chapter 4.

In spite of this universality within the self of each “thinking” individual, Warnock points out that the creation is credited to only to God in Coleridge’s description, while human imagination is positioned as a “repetition” of the divine activity. Warnock equates “the poetic faculty” with the secondary imagination and suggests that Coleridge is following Schelling’s transcendental idealism (91). She further argues that Coleridge does not maintain the distinction between the primary and the secondary in the rest of his writings and badly confuses the writings of Kant (94-95). She suggests that a clearer statement of Coleridge’s distinctions between the faculties of reason and understanding is found in Appendix B of The Statesman’s Manual. In my view, Coleridge also suggests the mediating function of imagining in this passage:

The completing power which unites clearness with depth [and] the plenitude of the sense with the comprehensibility of the understanding is the imagination, impregnated with which understanding itself becomes intuitive, and a living power. Reason without being sense, understanding or imagination, contains all three within itself as the mind contains thoughts, or the expression is in the face. (qtd. in Warnock 99)

I will further discuss this mediating function of imagination in chapter 4.
Rather than the confusion that Warnock finds, Engell suggests that Coleridge’s conception of Imagination is the climax of a more than a century of writing and thinking about the term (329). He also argues it is the philosophical concept and its various iterations lived out through poets and fiction writers that created the Romantic Movement, and not artists who created the term (ix). Dan Flory disagrees with Engell’s claim that creative imagination was exclusively a product of the eighteenth century and does not mention Coleridge, ending his historic review of Imagination with Kant. Instead, Flory suggests that thinkers look to classic stoical rhetoric for ideas on creative imagination which are more like modern, post-Enlightenment theories than those of Aristotle or Plato. If the Engell’s assessment is correct, then it is possible that Coleridge can serve as a beginning point for the theories of Imagination to branch out with corresponding implications for concepts of the Agent. See Appendix C for an illustration of Coleridge’s position.

Also in the field of philosophy, Mark Johnson, as I noted earlier, explores the importance of imagination to ethics, refuting the pigeon-holing of Imagination as a Romantic notion. While his observations are geared towards supporting his argument that Imagination is necessary to morality, he bases his propositions on empirical evidence that supports a wider role for Imagination in reasoning in general. He writes, “Humans are fundamentally imaginative creatures whose understanding of experience is built up with imaginative materials of cognition. Contrary to the received view, such metaphors and other imaginative structures are what make criticism possible in the first place…” (3). In his project of revising the traditional concept of ethics, he discards the common dichotomies between reason and imagination and other concepts such as reason and feeling (ix-xi). He grounds his reasoning in empirical cognitive studies that show the mental activity is based on bodily experiences and organized by imagination (1).
Johnson further suggests that imagination is commonly equated with unrestrained fancy and that he can show it is “neither subjective, unconstrained, nor irrational” (2-3).

In short, for Johnson, it is the Imagination and the metaphorical structures it constructs that allow alternate perspectives, prediction of possible outcomes, and new possibilities (4). Pointing to empirical research that shows the reason springs from imagination, Johnson writes: “And it turns out that this view of reason as imaginative is precisely what is required for beings like ourselves who encounter changing environments and situations and who must adapt to, act within, and transform those situations in a creative fashion” (31). This view of the primacy of Imagination carries it beyond the limits of moral understanding in to such philosophical categories as counterfactual reasoning and aesthetics. He identifies the following as empirically based concepts about human conceptualization: the theory of prototypes; frame semantics; metaphorical understanding, basic-level experience; and narrative (8-11). Johnson stops short of claiming that all thinking falls under the “god-term” of Imagination (61). With this emphasis on the usefulness of Imagination in reasoning, Johnson’s concept might fall under the Burke’s term of Agency, which is pragmatic in nature and focuses on the fact that “the ‘proof’ of the human act is in the doing” (*The Grammar of Motives* 282). In doing so, Johnson has given theoretical grounding for the concept of the Agent an active rhetor, particularly in constructing stories.

Some theorists in the field of rhetoric/composition have also seized Coleridge’s definition/description to further their own conjectures. This seems to be the case with Hawk who uses the Imagination theory of Coleridge to posit vitalism as a new paradigm to explain complexity in the posthuman moment. In response to digital challenges of twenty-first century and increasing disembodiment, Hawk used Coleridge’s concept of Imagination as a speculative instrument to open a gap in the ideology of the discipline and to argue for vitalism as a more productive
foundation for the discipline (120). In his re-visioning of the disciple, Hawk begins with Coleridge’s method, which he characterizes as the balanced operation of the mind, informed by education, to create’’ a dialectical relationship between part and whole, mind and world” (42). He traces the concept of Imagination through Bergson, Polanyi, and Deleuze to posit that “the body is the critical, epistemological link between situation and invention” (120). In the development of his argument, Hawk changes the term imagination to intuition, since this term seems to fit better with vitalism.

Other voices are being raised as well. Joshua Gunn in “Refiguring Fantasy: Imagination and Its Decline in U.S. Rhetorical Studies” calls for a new look at Imagination through the lens of sociology, psychoanalysis, and Althusserian Marxism. As a more recent materialistic take on Imagination, Gunn suggests “a reconsideration of the role of imagination and the imaginary in invention as a theoretical project that may reconcile or at least manage the tension between criticism that relies on a traditional, self-directed rhetorical agent and that which assumes a ‘decentered,’ posthumanist subject” (42). Following philosopher Kearney, Gunn briefly traces the history of imagination from Aristotle through the Renaissance to the Romantics and the postmodern paradigm, reducing Coleridge to a footnote on transcendental imagination. In the post everything era, Gunn posits that “the human imagination dissolves into the concept of ‘the imaginary,’ which is a complex concept informed by insights from sociology, psychoanalysis, and Althusserian Marxism (42). He suggests trying to form a paradigm that includes both social and psychological functions of Imagination so that both the masses and the individual are represented in rhetoric (55). In a limited sense, he is advocating bringing back the Agent but within an ideology that, I suggest, foregrounds the material Scene at the expense of this Agent.
He is also relying on a dichotomy of individual/society that is problematic, as I will argue in chapter 4.

In addition, Arthur Witherall argues that imagination is essentially dynamic: “If knowledge is like a tree with roots and branches, then imagination is like a bird which makes its nest in cognition, but whose true beauty lies in flight.” (271) He defines Imagination as “the notion of searching for possibilities, and in some cases trying to find possibilities that have not yet been discovered or realized, involves a dynamic notion of mental activity” (271) He further suggests that Imagination finds its natural home in storytelling: “Stories can provide us with conceptions, ideals, paradigms and unreal visions of ourselves. They may then become vehicles for self-understanding, for we can project our own lives into the new contexts they provide, and interpret the reality that we live in new ways…”(281). His analogy of flight for Imagining may prove helpful in forming my own definition of Imagining.

**Imagining as a Mediating Act**

As Sidney Dobrin makes clear in *Post-Composition*, a twenty-first century conception of Imagination needs to be a strategy, a practice, an activity, rather than just a concept. In other words, we need to be thinking about Imagining, rather than Imagination, a noun which implies a static faculty of the mind. Further, part of that Act of Imagining must be a leap, sometimes between concepts that are unlike, sometimes outside of the box of traditional dogma or collaborative thinking. Coleridge writes of the mental leap between being and knowing. He describes the act of thinking like the act of leaping—both active and passive. Coleridge writes that thinking is “not possible without an intermediate faculty which is at once both active and passive. In philosophical language, we must denominate this intermediate faculty in all its degrees and determinations, the IMAGINATION.” *(BL, VII, 34)*. Weatherall extends the analogy
of Imagining as a cognitive leap by suggesting that it involves a take-off and landing. This image of Imagining as a leap, probably into the unknown, is a metaphor that also emerges in Coleridge (Biographia Literaria VII, 42), Greene (6), and Garman and Piantanida (9). Coleridge suggests the leap as analogy for the way the mind works, particularly in Imagination. I am also using the leap as analogy, co-existing with the analogy of the mirror, perhaps similarly to the co-existence of the wave/particle conundrum of light.

Thus, Coleridge gives a more robust account of imagination, one that is not confined by the Scene, as in Burke, but empowers the Agent. In fact, it is connatural or consubstantial with reason and spirit, and thus can mediate between the senses and other cognitive faculties. Imagining, then, is the act of mediating between what is and what is not, between what is seen and what is unseen, between the A and X of language, particularly when this mediation results in thinking and knowing beyond one’s current perception. This definition falls with the parameters of “thirdness” as Berthoff interprets C.S. Peirce’s concept, a central concept in the next chapter.

Returning to the image of this researcher looking in a tri-fold mirror, I find that it is “I” who is also reflected multiple times. But also my “eye” is involved, and as Berthoff points out, the eye can only be seen in reflections of other eyes or of mirrors (Mysterious Barricade 69-71). In this imaginary vision, I am looking at my eye in reflections of my eye and at the reflections in those reflections. In the double sense of Shakespeare’s “glassy essence” (explained by Berthoff in a manner that provoked this reflection), I am seeing my seeing and notioning my notions. The image at the beginning of this chapter would have been distinguished as Fancy by Coleridge; it’s a convenient shorthand image to remember my bewilderment at multiple configurations of Imagination, with writers quoting other writers stretching back 2,500 years. By seeing in the
glass and *through* the glass as a speculative instrument, the image might now be distinguished as Imagination.
CHAPTER 4: THROUGH THE GLASS DARKLY—COMPOSING AGENTS FOR IMAGINING

As noted in chapter three, Coleridge left unfinished the philosophical basis for his theory of Imagination. In this chapter I explore these philosophical bases. First, I will look at Coleridge’s ideas, fragmentary as they are, as well as his ontology. Then, I will examine the postmodern challenges to his views. Next, I will look towards more supporting perspectives, principally those of philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce as explained by Ann E. Berthoff. First, a cautionary note is in order. Since we can know only partially, we need to cultivate an humbleness about our theories, as suggested by Paul in his discussion of spiritual gifts and love in I Corinthians: we see through the glass, darkly.

On the other hand, such incomplete seeing might be just the context that we need to come to a better understanding of Imagining in new century. In *The Mysterious Barricades: Language and its Limits (MB)*, Berthoff sees the partiality of knowledge as an opportunity, even a necessity, for interpretation and learning (50-53). In light of her argument [examined in more detail later in this chapter], I suggest that the very fragmentary nature of Coleridge’s theory of Imagination allows it to serve as a fulcrum, gathering two centuries of philosophy and allowing others over the next two centuries to form our own conceptions of making meaning. However, as
Berthoff notes in her description of Vygotsky’s dynamic system of meaning, one “can’t move from structure to process simply by converting nouns to participles” (53). I seem to have made just that simple grammatical change in the previous chapter (from Imagination to Imagining), so now I need to examine the underlying theories that will enable me to move beyond grammar to theory.

**Foundations of Coleridge’s Theory**

Although Coleridge’s exposition of his theory remained fragmentary, he did not conceive of his philosophical foundation as fragmentary. As noted in chapter one, he theorized that the objective (nature) and the subjective (self or intelligence) existed together in ways that were difficult to disengage (*Biographia Literaria* XII, 66-67). As Richards explains in *Richards on Rhetoric*, in advocating this “coalescence of subject and object,” Coleridge presupposed the existence of an INNER SENSE, which is developed through reflection and which is distributed unevenly across the populace [the capitals are Coleridge’s] (118-120; Coleridge *Biographia Literaria* I 172-173). Coleridge’s term is “realizing intuition,” which creates for Richards “a verbal machine” and leads to often inefficient and sometimes dangerous introspection. Richards distinguishes between this kind of introspection and Imagination: “Coleridge’s theory of knowing treats knowing as a kind of making, i.e., the bringing into being of what is known. By itself, it makes no discoveries except in the sense of discovering what it has made” (*Richards on Rhetoric* 120). Imagination, of course, goes beyond knowing what one knows. Richards further suggests that Coleridge is inconsistent in advocating knowing oneself (and one’s God) as the first principle of philosophy, due in part to challenges in his life. Nevertheless, Richards advocates that we understand that for Coleridge “the self that knows, its knowing, its knowledge and what it knows” are indivisible, especially in the moment of coming to that knowledge. Richards adds,
“We need to take them together to explore the act of knowing by means of the inner sense, and to divide off the sphere of what may be called pure psychology,” but once divided these concepts can only be brought together by the mediating act of interpretation (Richards on Rhetoric 122).

For Coleridge the simplest fact is a result of a mind that is perceiving, constructing and forming (124). Interpretation, as an act, is going to be central for both Richards and Berthoff, as they seek to explain leaping over the barricades that divide binaries. Imagining, as a process, is probably going to be a similar mediating act, in my view.

While Richards rejected Coleridge’s faith as delusional in Coleridge’s Imagination (172) (as we have seen in chapter three), others have found that understanding his faith is critical to understanding the man and his ideas. In addition to treating the terms Imagination and genius in a similar manner, Coleridge is following in the footsteps of the Enlightenment rhetoricians, George Campbell, Hugh Blair, and Richard Whately, who drew on their professions as Protestant preachers to give an ecclesiastical flavor to the discipline (Whatley et. al 17). For example, John Beer in Coleridge’s Writings claims that Coleridge’s religious ideas so saturate his writing that the later cannot be understood without first understanding the former (qtd in Barbeau 1-2). The problem of Coleridge’s drug addiction may have actually spurred Coleridge’s return to his childhood faith, according to Robert Wendling, who traces Coleridge’s spiritual development through his drug use and domestic problems to a philosophy grounded in Christianity. Wendling writes that Coleridge thought the role of Imagination was “to make vital and permanent truths revealed to us through Reason (the ‘inner light’ or ‘voice of God’ within us) incarnate in and expressible through images of sense” (23). Further, the perspective of these scholars suggests to me that Imagining can serve as a mediating Agency between Spirit and the natural senses, or in Coleridge’s terms, the subject and the object.
In addition to Christian faith, J. Robert Barth also points to Coleridge’s close reading of Kant and his appropriation of Kant’s terms for a Christian-based philosophy. He brings together Coleridge’s musings both from published works such as *Aids to Reflection*, marginal notes in books of theology Coleridge read, a manuscript called *Opus Maximum* (unpublished at his death), and even letters recorded by his nephew. Barth traces Coleridge’s path from orthodoxy as the son of a Church of England clergyman to the embrace of Unitarianism and back to Trinitarianism, based on Kantian philosophy (a journey given briefly by Coleridge in *Biographia Literar*ia). Barth analyzes the effect of Spinoza, Kant and Schelling on Coleridge’s thought; this reading formed a “dynamic philosophy,” which created a tension with his Christian faith. Barth argues that “much of Coleridge’s religious thought is an attempt to reconcile the dynamic philosophy and the Christian faith,” resulting in a balance (*Coleridge* 13). Barth also suggests that Coleridge’s reading of Kant, as early as 1801, may have influenced his distinction of fancy and imagination as related to the distinction between understanding and reason (*Coleridge* 23n). Barth notes Coleridge’s growth beyond Kant: “Coleridge on the other hand was interested not only in principles of morality [which remained only principles for Kant], but also in religious knowledge, and he was now, profoundly unlike Kant, to conceive of reason as at once cognitive and volitional” (*Coleridge* 25). Since this concept of reason bridges both knowledge and will, it may serve as a mediating idea.

In contrast to this philosophical reading of Coleridge, Jeffrey Barbeau concentrates on the biblical influence on Coleridge’s thought. Barbeau sets Coleridge’s writing within the theological debates of his day: higher criticism and “Bible only.” According to Barbeau, Coleridge was influenced by higher criticism theologians (principally Eichhorn) and included considerations of context (author’s intention, culture, etc.) in his interpretations of the Bible.
However, Coleridge went beyond simply questioning the text and included in his “Pentad of Operative Christianity” the following: the Bible, Christ as the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the Church, with all these strands synthesized in the preacher (Barbeau 6). [I will examine Coleridge’s pentad in more detail later in this chapter.] Moreover, Coleridge did not worship the Bible; instead, Barbeau asserts, “His commitment to the philosophical truth of Christianity frees him to question the Bible, even at the risk of unorthodoxy” (2). Specifically on Imagination, Barbeau writes, “For Coleridge, the Imagination is active in the world of reality rather than fantasy (205 n18). Barbeau thinks that Coleridge’s theory of imagination informed his interpretation of the Hebrew poetry of Psalms where he sees “an ‘energy’ and ‘force and distinctiveness’ of writing that exceeds the bounds of any literal hope” (69). Likewise, Coleridge suggests that Imagination “allows the prophets to communicate divine ideas” (155). Barbeau posits that Coleridge relied on the Wisdom of Solomon to theorize a higher Reason which includes the Sense, Understanding and Imagination (136). Thus, Barbeau seems to be arguing that higher reason is the mediating term. I am suggesting that Imagining, like reason in this case, would involve bringing together both the mind (cognitive) and the heart (volitional).

Moreover, faith such as Coleridge had may not be limited to certain discourse groups who formally embrace it. J. Robert Barth adds that our instinctive ordering of our experiences is based on faith, at least a faith in the possibility of order and knowledge, if not faith in God (“Implications” 23). Everyone, according to Barth, has primary Imagination and instinctively uses it to create order from sensory chaos. Coleridge’s concept of Imagination as being “connatural” with the mind of God is based on traditional theology. In addition, the artist uses secondary imagination to reshape or remix the world in a different form (“Implications” 23-24). Barth also writes that “Imagination, in Coleridge’s view, is a cognitive faculty of a high order”
which provides unity and balance to all mental activities and emotions ("Implications" 25-26). Barth rejects as “merely ‘mechanical’” the oppositions or juxtapositions of human and divine or self and God, advocating instead that the two realities “interpenetrate” one another (“Implications” 28). According to these perspectives, Coleridge connects Imagination to both divine and human reality. Again, Coleridge provides a terminology that shows the overlap of reason and senses, as well as the Agency of Imagination to empower the Agent to write. In my opinion, the Agency that supports Coleridge’s description of Imagination may be found in his Christian faith. Although these scholars do not use Peirce’s philosophical terms, there is a sense that binaries like human/divine or will/knowledge do not explain the whole situation.

**Pentad of Operative Christianity**

Coleridge does not set up binaries such as those above or even something like fancy/Imagination. Instead he sets forth what he entitles “THE PENTAD OF OPERATIVE CHRISTIANITY” [Coleridge’s capitals]. I quote the page in its entirety before explicating it.

*Prothesis*

Christ, the Word

*Thesis*  

*Mesothesis* or the  

*Antithesis*  

Indifference  

The Scriptures.  

the Holy Spirit.  

The Church.

*Synthesis*

The Preacher

[Exact words of Coleridge’s explanation with his italics]
The Scriptures, the Spirit, and the Church are co-ordinate; the indispensable conditions and the working causes of the perpetuity, and continued renascence and spiritual life of Christ still militant. The Eternal Word, Christ from everlasting, is the Prothesis, or identity;--the Scriptures and the Church are two poles, or the Thesis and Antithesis, and the Preacher in direct line under the Spirit but likewise the point of junction of the Written Word and the Church, is the Synthesis.

This is God’s hand in the World.  

Some of his terms—thesis, antithesis, synthesis—were part of German Romanticism (Engell 91). Coleridge adds the terms prothesis, which he identifies as identity, and mesothesis, which refers to a bridge or mediating term. Burke suggests that the mesothesis of this scheme is a synonym of religion (The Rhetoric of Religion 175). Although Coleridge may have borrowed some of his terms, he complicates the interaction between the polar opposites. Instead of a binary of any sort, Coleridge is suggesting something far more complex, diverse, and nuanced. He is postulating that knowledge operates in two directions, one vertical and one horizontal. Although his schemata on the page does not show the preacher mediating between the text and the church

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10 There is some problem with accurately citing this page. While the Google books version puts this page in Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, p. 36, the Project Gutenberg version of this same book does not. An early version is also found in Literary Remains, Notes on Irving’s Ben-Ezra, 1827. The footnote there says that this notation was made in the margins of The Coming of Messiah in Glory and Majesty by Juan Josafat Ben-Ezra. Burke also quotes this graph in The Rhetoric of Religion (31), but makes few comments on it.
or between the spirit and the church, this seems to be the position he is advocating in his comments.

In fact, in other texts Coleridge elaborates on the role of the preacher as a mediator of knowledge, noting that the word *preacher* is similar to teacher, discoursor, herald, ambassador, and messenger (Barbeau 203 n. 3). I suggest that the knowledgeable other or the teacher has a role similar to that of the preacher at the junction of the text and the group, interpreting each to the other, as well as encouraging the individual to interpret the text and to interpret her/himself through the text. This is just the sort of dynamic interaction that I will be looking for in my research. For those who have a Christian worldview, there is also a vertical axis with the knowledgeable other receiving his/her identity in Christ through the mediation of the Holy Spirit.

**The Philosophical Antitheses of Coleridge**

In the present post-everything atmosphere, there seems to be little theoretical support for Coleridge’s Pentad or his tetrad of knowledge making. Many of these theories stem from Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction, outlined in his seminal speech of 1966, wherein he characterizes every term as containing a reduction of its opposite which sets up a struggle for dominance. [Berthoff characterizes this duality as “dyadic gaps” and I will explore her counter arguments later in this chapter.] In his speech Derrida used concepts from linguistics to build on and critique the ideas of previous philosophers: Nietzsche (no being, no truth), Freud (critique of consciousness), Heidegger (the destruction of metaphysics) and Levi-Strauss (the nostalgic search for the Ideal in primitive societies). Derrida declared that there is no center for philosophy because “the center” transcends the center (according to Western philosophy) and so there cannot possibly be a center (519). He argues: “it would be possible to show that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated the constant of a presence—*eidos, arche,*
telos, energeria, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, or conscience, God, man\textsuperscript{11} and so forth” (518). His frequent questioning of “presence” in particular leads me to agree with Berthoff that the elimination of “presence” is the focus of his agenda (\textit{The Mysterious Barricades} 60). Later in the speech, Derrida is even more specific as to the element he wishes to eliminate from discourse: “The absence of the center here is the absence of the author” (527). Instead, he creates what Berthoff will later call a “clean machine”: the endless “freeplay” of language with little choice available. Derrida reduces the possibilities by declaring that there exist “two interpretations of interpretation”: one that dreams of a stable truth and one that affirms freeplay and progresses beyond presence (533). In reducing the possibilities to a binary, he also defines human beings as the ones who have always “dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end game” (533). This speech seems to be the beginning of the elimination of presence in writing, which could have destructive implications for online learning where, as Wallace has shown, presence is vitally necessary. I will explore both those implications and Berthoff’s counterargument later in this chapter.

To elaborate on the effects and subsequent refinements of Derrida’s duality would require a book with a very different focus than this one. To some extent, Byron Hawk has suggested some of the effects in his thorough analysis of the limitations of James Berlin’s ideology, although he links this constraint to the exclusion of Coleridge and his vitalist tendencies rather than to Derrida’s duality. In addition, Janice Lauder has documented the disappearance of invention, and its red-haired step child Imagination, from the field of rhetoric and composition. Kenneth Bruffee, in his establishment of collaboration as the only acceptable means of knowing, bracketed Coleridge’s ontology as “pre-Cartesian.” [and bracketing, as Berthoff points out, is

\textsuperscript{11} Several theorists use the problematic term “Man” to refer to all human beings. While I retain that term in quotes for accuracy, I will use the term \textit{human beings} otherwise.
simply a way of ignoring the agent (The Mysterious Barricades 33)]. Sanchez also pushes back against the duality that reduces writing to the weaker of pair, writing, in deference to Ideology (97), as I have previously discussed, although he does not suggest a means of flipping the dominance of the pair, or getting beyond duality.

As I pointed out at the end of chapter one, the effects of the erasure of presence on individual writers can be quite dramatic. Perhaps the best description of these effects on the individual (a problematic term in itself for postmoderns) comes from Jane Flax. In Thinking Fragments, she describes the problem of voice within the theories of psychoanalysts, feminists, and post modernists:

> How is it possible to write? What meanings can writing have when every proposition and theory seems questionable, one’s own identity is uncertain, and the status of the intellectual is conceived alternatively as hopelessly enmeshed in oppressive knowledge/ power relations or utterly irrelevant to the workings of the technical-rational bureaucratic state? (5)

The result appears to be a extensive writer’s block based on the lack of motivation. Flax is also quoted by Lisa Ede and Angela Lunsford in Writing Together (169); in using this quote, they seem to acknowledge this problem. They suggest that it is a result of the social turn in composition and rhetoric that questioned Western culture’s assumptions about authorship (187, 190). Flax, Ede, and Lunsford graphically illustrate the problem of relying on binaries in our theorization of writing, but it seems to me that they are constructing another binary: individual/ COLLABORATIVE CONTINUUMS. A mediating term is needed, in my opinion, rather than a new binary. As I suggested in chapter three, Imagining could be such a mediating term.
A demonstration of the effects of binary theories can be seen in the writing of Jim W. Corder who deconstructed himself as an author (a process described in detail by James S. Baumlin in “Towards a Corderian Theory of Rhetoric”). His later work, in Baumlin’s interpretation, “confronts the linguistic and epistemological skepticism of postmodernism, which serve to problematize (rather than lionize) the ‘heroic’ self-in-process” (25). Yet Corder can write near the end of his life in *Hunting Lieutenant Chadbourne*:

> Poststructuralist thought announces the death of the author: language writes us, rather than the other way around, and interpretation prevails rather than authorship. We have been, whether knowingly or not, whether directly or not, part of a twenty-five-hundred-year-old tradition that allowed and encouraged us to believe that *ethos* is in the text, that authors do exist, that they can be in their words and own them even in the act of giving them away (225).

He adds that now writers are “not even ghosts” but an interpretation of the reader (225). Yet, Corder maintains that he can hear the voice of the lieutenant, who died young on the Texas frontier and had a fort named for him: “Despite all, I came to think that ethos is in there somewhere. I came to think that he might yet be in his letters and that I might yet find him.” (226). As Baumlin points out, Corder had an earlier, “heroic” phase in which he championed the formation of ethos through writing and a later, “tragic” phase where he questioned every idea of the former. Based on Baumlin’s analysis, I see the creation of a binary, heroic/tragic, that leaves a gap—Baumlin calls it “the chasm of deconstruction” (46). Like Coleridge, Corder did not publish his last work, although it was sent out to a publisher, who rejected it. In an attempt to articulate this unfinished rhetorical theory, Baumlin includes a quote from Corder’s “Losing Out” as his last word. I quote here in part: “we can be mean, vengeful, and narrow, but we must
remember to say, too, that we are precious and dear and momentous…” (qtd in Baumlin 47).

Corder here still seems to me to be stuck in binary thinking. Baumlin suggests a possible bridge, and I will examine that suggestion after I have explored the concept of “thirdness,” which will serve as a “speculative instrument” to understand Corder’s story.

Both Flax and Corder illuminate the negative results of duality, but do not suggest a remedy. Like Corder, I find myself seeking ground to stand on. For him it was the material and remembered location of the West Texas of his childhood, which had in fact largely disappeared. Given the immaterial nature of online learning and teaching, I am seeking a theory that allows my presence and the presence of my students within our words posted in cyberspace. Therefore, I argue that Imagining as a Thirdness could be a remedy, following Berthoff’s excellence exposition of Charles Sanders Peirce’s term.

**Thirdness as to Remedy to Dyadic Gaps**

I am suggesting that the philosophical notion of Thirdness, advocated by Peirce and explained by Berthoff, is a concept that can allow us to move beyond these dyadic struggles and gaps. In *The Mysterious Barricades*, Berthoff examines Richard’s theories of interpretation and Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, as well as theories of language, as “Triadic Remedies.” However, I will be concentrating on Peirce’s semiotics here. Peirce is known as the father of semiotics, and Berthoff defines the term thusly: “Semiotics’ as it appears in this book, fosters a view of language as a system whose formal completeness is the source of its heuristic power, as a symbolic form whose limits make possible the apprehension of the world and the making of meaning” (6). This view of language has positive implications for online learning, as I will discuss later in this chapter.
Berthoff first demonstrates the inadequacy of theories that rely on binaries of any sort. She bases her opposition to such theories (which she does not specifically name) on their reduction of knowledge to a series of dichotomies which eliminate the human from the process, thereby creating a “clean machine” without an operator and his/ her messy interpretations (The Mysterious Barricades 19-20). These theories, she suggests, solve problems, but in practice cannot account for all the observed phenomenon. In my understanding, Berthoff seems to be saying that all binaries are logical categories, which confuse language and/or reality. The advocates of binaries either claim that language makes reality or that language is merely a code, or even claim both at once, something along the order of “there is no reference and it is represented by a code” (17). Her corrective is to urge acknowledgement of “the centrality of interpretation.” (18). Berthoff notes that Richards distinguishes between the signal and the message: “A system of meanings is not reducible to the means by which it has been realized” (22). In other words, the medium in not the message, as Marshall McLuhan claimed, nor is the medium the messenger. However, Berthoff suggests that to get these clean binary machines to operate, theorists must sneak some sort of “ghost” back into the machine in the form of a competent reader or other fictional construct. In my opinion, this careful distinguishing between meanings of words is the answer to posthumanists who reduce the human mind to code and suggest that the ultimate survival will be uploading one’s mental circuits to a computer (See for example, Hayles 36).

In order to problematize all symbol usage, the makers of gangster theories, Berthoff points out, have seized the partiality of knowledge as expressed in the semiotics of philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Specifically, she suggests that Derrida misreads Pierce to erase the “presence” of the author by taking representation out of the process (The Mysterious Barricades
Instead, she advocates the interpretation of Richards and his student William Empson, for whom “ambiguity provided an invaluable speculative instrument for the study of the structure of complex words and texts” (37). Berthoff also suggests this partiality should lead us to keep our theories “tentative by continually hypothesizing by the method Peirce called abduction (or retroduction)” By this method we express our ideas so as to draw from them their implications and consequences (61). For instance, Berthoff’s gloss of Richards explaining the glassy essence of Shakespeare and Peirce, described later in this chapter, gives an example of this speculative instrument in practice, with the ambiguity of that phrase opening additional meanings rather than limiting them.

Pierce was a central touchstone for Berthoff, who closely followed Richards in his interpretation of this difficult philosopher. Pierce posited three general categories that are modes of being: Firstness (identified with quality or feeling as well as original experiences); Secondness (identified with an event or action and the lessons of hard knocks) and Thirdness (identified with an effect or conduct). Thirdness, which could actually occur before an event as a cause, was the most important, mediating between the Firstness and Secondness. As Berthoff explains, Thirdness is an Interpretant, “an idea we think with: it is the mediating idea which is held by the interpreter.” Further,

Thirdness is mediation, representation, transmission; it bridges. Most persistently, Pierce sees it as continuity. Mediation is necessarily a process, which explains the emphasis on semiosis, on making, finding, interpreting signs. We learn from experience—we take habits and break them, too—by seeing significances, thus learning and changing, growing: that ‘sense of learning’ is Thirdness (60).
Thirdness can vary by situation being variously in Pierce’s examples the law that mediates between freedom and compulsion, the thread of life that mediates between fate and indeterminacy, (59) and the spark that mediates between the gunpowder and the explosion (65). I am claiming that Imagining is a Thirdness that mediates between what is and what is yet to come or be conceived. In a sense, Thirdness becomes a conceptual leap. Because this concept of Thirdness includes the Interpreter who does the mediating, the presence of the writer can also be acknowledged. Berthoff calls this presence representation. Before I look at the implications of Thirdness for presence in writing, I will first look at the nature of (post)humans and language in the light of Thirdness.

*Nature of (Post) Humans through the Glass of Thirdness*

Peirce, in Berthoff’s interpretation, sees “Man as a Sign”, dependent on other “Man-signs” for context and representation. Pierce is drawing a triadic metaphor, an analogy, between human beings and signs. As Berthoff summarizes: “Man is a sign because insofar as he is more than animal, he is spirit and spirit is analogous to meaning: it reaches out; it recognizes itself in its representations” (62-63). In this analogy, all four of Coleridge’s knowledge-making means are implied, in my view. The group consists of other “Man-signs” with the necessity for collaboration. The spirit as a source of meaning is part of who and what a human being is. The text is implied in the sign. The knowledgeable other is less visible, but implied as the one who is writing, reaching out, and recognizing its/his/her representations.

Human beings are in this interpretation a Thirdness, as illustrated in Richard’s explication of “glassy essence” used by Peirce as a title of an essay. (explicated. by Berthoff *The Mysterious Barricades* 65-71). The phrase, as Berthoff points out, serves as the expression of “an important aspect of Thirdness.”(68) First reminding readers of the phrase’s occurrence in Shakespeare’s
Measure for Measure as Isabella is pleading for mercy, Berthoff notes that both Richard Rorty and the editors of the Riverside edition treat it as a stock trope. Here are the lines from Shakespeare:

But man, proud man,

Dress’d in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he’s most assur’d-
His glassy essence—like an angry ape
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
As makes the angels weep; who, with our spleens,
Would all themselves laugh mortal (II, ii, 117-123; qtd in The Mysterious Barricades 68)

Richards, however, suggests that Shakespeare brings ignorance and assurance together in a metaphor of a glass that is both a barrier and a lens for seeing. Thus, Richards converts what could be “an inert image, a mere decorative or ‘rhetorical’ flourish to a representation of a deeply felt idea” (MB 70). I would add that Richards in this explication has, in Coleridge’s terms, turned a Fancy into Imagination. Berthoff further suggests that we have to recognize our seeing before we can represent our thoughts through writing. Important to our understanding of Coleridge is her further gloss of the metaphor: “The reason we are assured of our glassy essence is that we are made in the image of our Creator. The seeming contradiction of assurance and ignorance is thus resolved: our mirroring serves as a lens” (italics in the original, The Mysterious Barricades 71). I would add, it is the concept of “made in the image of a Creator” that underlies Coleridge’s division of Imagination into the primary and secondary.

This conception of the human being stands in contrast to Arthur Burks’ interpretation of Peirce’s writings on this point, as Berthoff points out (The Mysterious Barricades 63). After
reading Burks’ “Man: Sign or Algorithm? A Rhetorical Analysis of Peirce’s Semiotics,” I find that I agree with Berthoff’s analysis that Burks has reduced Peirce’s analogy, which is rich with insights, to three rhetorical terms and then to a mathematical equation. Burks states that he will “strip the Emersonian-like rhetoric from Peirce’s writings … then advance my own formula” (281). Burks acknowledges that Peirce is “building a strong analogy between a man and a sign” (283) but sums up the analogy as follows: “each individual man, ‘proud man,’ is a sign processor interacting with other sign processors in an environment. Man is a sign in the sense of being the most advanced sign user of this general semiotic process” (283). This interpretation of Pierce, as Berthoff points out, reduces man to a series of binary codes (The Mysterious Barricades 63). Burks then follows with his formula: “Man is an adaptive algorithm evolving in an environment along with other such algorithms” (283). This well-expressed posthuman sentiment echoes through the culture as well: the television show Numb3rs features a Stanford mathematics professor/ genius who can explain and predict all human behavior based on complex algorithms. Burks’ description also resonates as well with Hayles’ account of How We All Became Posthuman. Burks further argues that Peirce’s “aphorism” is “a semiotic and evolutionary version of Aristotle’s characterization of man as the rational animal” (289). In so restating Peirce’s analogy without the notion of Man as a Thirdness, Burks, in my opinion, reveals more about his worldview than Peirce’s semiotics.

As Berthoff points out, the purpose of Pierce’s theory of meaning making is to explore the question: “What is Man to become?” (The Mysterious Barricades 65) Since Peirce was writing from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the early part of the twentieth century, his

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12 This use of texts as a springboard to argue one’s own ideas is one of the reasons that I suggest that we treat texts differently from collaborating with colleagues. We use texts; we collaborate with colleagues. I will be looking to see if that distinction is found in my research.

13 The show ran on CBS from 2005 to 2010 and can now be seen online or occasionally on cable, usually late at night. I confess to being a fan.
posing of this question may in my opinion indicate the beginning of restive dissatisfaction with technological developments. Certainly the question is a brother to the one posed by Hayles near the end of the twentieth century: “What kind of post humans will we be?” (246). Hayles does not answer her questions beyond suggesting that post humans should be embodied and not uploaded to computer hard drives. Pierce’s answer, I suggest, would be that a post human can and should be a Thirdness—one who interprets signs, while being a sign as well as being a sign user among other sign users.

_Nature of Language and Thought through the Glass of Thirdness_

One’s view of the nature of human beings necessarily impacts one’s view of language. Of his analogy of “Man as a Sign,” Peirce writes: “…there is no element whatever of man’s consciousness which has not something corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is obvious. It is that the word or sign which man uses is the man himself…the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign…” (qtd in Burks 282). In my opinion, this concept illustrates that writers can create a presence through words that represent themselves, in whatever medium.

While words are signs, they are not codes. Berthoff argues against the concept of language as a code, beginning with her 1970s debate with Janice Lauder. Berthoff saw the beginning of something similar to the cybernetic disconnect described by Hayles in the psychological studies that Lauer foregrounds. Calling it harmful, Berthoff rejects a theory of learning that changes language to a signal code, meaning to information, form to medium, and interpretation to “decoding.” (“The Problem” 238) She argues against the concept that students are just “well-programmed encoders” (“The Problem” 240). Later in _Mysterious Barricades_, she argues, based on the philosophy of Peirce, that “all knowledge is interpretation and that all
interpretation must itself be interpreted” (5). This concept leads her to make distinctions between the different senses of the word “code” as applied to language. In making this distinction, she is following Coleridge’s method of desynonymizing between meanings as a way of better understanding terms (181 n.58). In her argument against gangster theories, she notes that one must differentiate between the signal and the message. She posits that “a system of meanings is not reducible to the means by which it has been realized: the Morse Code and a code of etiquette (Richards again) are not the same kind of code” (The Mysterious Barricades 21-22).

This conflation of signal and message leads, Berthoff suggests, to ”the conception of the sign as a dyadic relationship” and ultimately to Whorf’s “linguistic relativity” which decrees that “we are prisoners of the language of whatever speech community we are born into and that each world-view is determined by the particular language of the group holding it” (The Mysterious Barricades 34-35). Berthoff argues against this view, suggesting instead that “the relationship of language and thought is mediated by meaning,” which cannot be narrowly defined in linguistic terms (37). Specifically, she suggests that readers use their experiences and existing schemas to interpret a text: “thus psycholinguistics misrepresents the reading process because it does not account for natural and necessary projection and anticipation which, when it is deliberately deployed as what Coleridge called ‘the forethoughtful query,’ is at the heart of practical criticism” (25). Thus, language becomes a Thirdness, through which we can represent our presence, in whatever media. According to this theory, Corder was correct in thinking that he could find Lieutenant Chadbourne in a packet of yellowing letters.

Implications of Thirdness in the Story of Corder

Baumlin, in his extension of Corder’s rhetoric, uses existentialism (30-31) and theology (36-37) as theoretical foundations. Evaluating those grounds is beyond the scope of this work, so
I will look at Corder’s story through the lens of Thirdness. But first, I must take a brief detour to examine the term *generative ethos*, since that (and not *presence*) is used by Corder and Baumlin. Generative ethos “describes not simply one’s self-image or character but, rather, a living mode of rhetorical invention, arrangement, and style” (Baumlin 35). As Baumlin describes the process, the term denotes a lifestyle that extends love to the audience and brings together both the openness of thought and the closure of language when a writer chooses and uses a word in a linear sentence. Thus, generative ethos is a Thirdness bridging openness and closure and based on a similar process that I am claiming for Imagining.

In addition, this sort ethos includes a sense of “grounding” somewhere. Corder’s “Report from the Provinces” stresses the importance of being grounded in a time and a place, even if that place now exists only in the mind and memory of the writer. Corder suggests that location is “your primary metaphor, it is the place you stand to sense and measure your experience” (*Selected Essays* 50). He explains, “When we speak, we stand somewhere, and our standing place makes both known and silent claims upon us. We make truth, if at all, out of what is incomplete, or partial” (94). A sense of place, the writer’s place, is a part of one’s identity.

Baumlin notes the connection of place, memory, and identity in Corder’s psychology, writing:

> It is within memory that our identities are recorded and sustained. Corderian memory mirrors the structures of narrative: expressive (indeed, constitutive) of identity, the stories we tell construct a “home-place for the self.” To have identity is to be “at home” in such a place, even when it is rendered as a memory, a “place in the mind” (11). The process that is described here is storytelling with the ground becoming the Scene and the writer/rhetor becoming the Actor in his own theory. Baumlin summarizes the process:
In effect, Corder the storyteller transforms Corderian theory into a story about
Corder the theorist who tries to live by his own theory and tests it and laments his personal failure and dies before he can tell the story to a satisfactory completion, in the end proving that “the message is not separable from the speaker.” (33).

This story is a promising demonstration for the writer who has been banished from his/her own text by the mechanizations of clean machines. Storytelling can be a Thirdness that connects the binaries of innocent and world-weary, of heroic and tragic tales, of possibilities and closure.

Corder also valorizes storytelling. In “Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love,” he suggests that “we are all narrators, historians, tale-tellers” and “each of us creates the narrative that he or she is” (Selected Essays 170). On words, Corder writes: “A speaker manifests his universe in his words; his words are his universe, and its shape is in the words whether or not he understands and controls, whether or not we listen and see” Corder also quotes from Paul van Buren who suggests that we create and own the world as we speak (93). To express the process in the Pentad of Kenneth Burk: the Agent creates her/his own Scene, made up of remembered fragments.

Corder’s concept of an ethos embedded within the text is important for online learning since most interaction is through texts at this moment in an online classroom. Technology may change this medium, of course, but Imagining could still be a strategy for getting to and flourishing in that future. In this context, presence through the representation of an ethos or identity can only be enacted if the teacher and students, who are asynchronous in time and space, are willing share their stories. Thus, “storytelling” becomes the Thirdness that connects the binaries of there and here, of then and now, of writer and reader. Storytelling seems to rely on
the writer’s imagining a world and telling them through his words while the reader receives and re-imagines that world.

**Implications of Coleridge’s Theory**

Although he draws on insights of various philosophers, Coleridge’s ontology is Christian, which is compatible with Peirce’s concept of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. As implied by his Christian foundation, Coleridge viewed human beings as tri-part: body, mind, and soul or spirit. (For the tri-part division of humans in Scripture, see Deuteronomy 6:5, Mark 10:27, Matthew 22:37, and Luke 10:27). As a Christian he would have seen each human being as a triad—body, mind, and spirit. In addition, he probably would have agreed that without the spirit, the mind and body are dead (James 2:26). To conceive of Coleridge’s world view as less than triadic would leave him stranded in the duelist cul-de-sac created by Descartes. In Peircian terms, the spirit would be the Thirdness, without which the body and mind are lifeless.

This ontology led to his Pentad of Operative Christianity where in the Spirit mediates between God and human beings and the preacher mediates between the text and church. In practice, he offers quartet of means for forming meaning, which I have repurposed as the text, the group, the knowledgeable other and the spirit. Coleridge expressed something of the complicated interactions that he envisioned in the notes published in six volumes in during the last two decades of the twentieth century (Barbeau “Abbreviations” xi, 203 n. 3). Coleridge wrote: ‘The Eternal Word thro’ and by the Spirit may fit the Individual to be a Teacher, a Discourser; but without supplying the place of the Church by miracles, or that place of the written word by miraculous inspiration, he cannot be a Herald, an Ambassador’ (qtd in Barbeau 203 n. 3).
Put into practice in rhetoric and composition, these four means of knowing might result in other mediating triads. Two examples come to mind. Shirley Brice Heath’s *Ways with Words*, having incorporated a process of imagination similar to Coleridge’s tetrad, can mediate between teachers who are thoroughly cognizant of the ways of the academy and those students who come from other discourse groups with other ways of handling texts. As a knowledgeable other, the teacher may also need to mediate between a difficult text after students have tried to explicate it during group work and are still confused. I’m thinking specifically of e.e. cummings’ “anyone lived in a pretty how town.” The poet’s refusal to use capital letters and his uninhibited use of pronouns, personal, indefinite, and interrogative instead of names or other nouns, are particularly confusing to students who have not experienced this before. The part of the knowledgeable other is to explain these techniques that are unlikely to be uncovered by group discussion.

The value of having a set of four means of knowing which mediate with each other is seen by examples of the imbalance of using a single means. The Roman Catholic Church before the Reformation had come to rely solely on church tradition, which led to practices incompatible with the Bible in, for example, the sale of indulgences. This custom was opposed by Martin Luther in his 95 theses; instead as the preacher, he advocated the teaching of the Word of God as a corrective (see particularly no. 53 and 54). In addition, Coleridge in proposing his tetrad of means and his pentad was reacting to the call in his day to rely solely on the Bible. He opposed the rejection of church tradition by the Puritans because it was based on “a belief in the perspicuity of the Bible and its capacity to provide clear doctrinal teaching without any interpretive aid” (Barbeau 115). Barbeau also points out one way that Coleridge corrected the imbalance:
In the prophets no less than the Gospels, Scripture is thereby ‘pregnant’ with meaning, but great care must be used to identify the true meaning of every text. Once again, Coleridge looks first to the immediate historical occasion of the text not to supplant a spiritual or philosophical sense, but to provide the historical foundation for the spiritual (65).

More modern events illustrate of the imbalance created by sole reliance on the preacher or spirit for meaning. Deborah Layton’s book, *Seductive Poison: A Jonestown Survivor’s Story of Life and Death in the People’s Temple*, illustrates how the elevation of a preacher to the sole source for knowledge can lead to tragedy. Without the mediating knowledge of the Bible, church tradition, and/or the spirit, 913 followers of the Rev. Jim Jones drank the poisonous Kool-aid November 18, 1978, at their supposed paradise in Guyana. Even the spirit—if unmediated by the text, the group, and/or the knowledgeable other—can lead to tragedy, as illustrated by the story of the Son of Sam murders in New York in 1976-1977. The convicted perpetrator, David Berkowitz, claimed in several rambling notes that a demon, speaking out of a dog’s mouth, told him to kill. Interestingly, he now claims to have become a born-again Christian through reading the Bible.14 These examples illustrate the need—not only in rhetoric and composition, but in the real world—for the corrective mediation of Coleridge’s four means of knowing.

**Implications of Thirdness for Imagining**

The problem with post-humanism is it contains no third—no concept that can mediate between the binary mind/ body. As envisioned by theorists, one or the other of the binary is dominant, due to the nature of binaries (Derrida, Sanchez). The result is that the mind has

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become free-floating information which has lost its body (Hayles) or it becomes primarily a matter of embodiment with thoughts becoming merely a matter of electronics firing across gaps between neurons. For example, Kristie S. Fleckenstein in *Embodied Literacies: Imageword and a Poetics of Teaching* seems to take this position by writing about “the overtly somatic nature” of literacy and interpretation (114). The concept of Thirdness widens the horizon to allow new possibilities and new interpretations of the post-human situation. These new possibilities might just be the remedy to overcome the writer’s block occasioned by Derrida’s binaries.

Berthoff posits that “concept of horizons is inherently triadic; the surveyors’ triangulation suggests as much“ (*The Mysterious Barricades* 98). I would add that the concept of Thirdness would allow us to change our horizons and get beyond the power dynamics of binary concepts. The Third, added to the First and Second, allows for an audit, for an accountability, that is missing from the real world examples described above. The concept also adds diversity without bracketing any Agent. It is the addition of, not the deletion of, Agents and Agency. It allows the field to respect discourse groups that may not be ideologically materialistic. Further, the concept widens the circle that Bruffee closed by declaring that one becomes part of the academy by agreeing with its “interests, values, language, and paradigms of perception and thought” (555). Since Bruffee brackets belief in any absolute referent as pre-Cartesian (557), my first impulse was to see myself as outside that circle of knowledgeable others—a place that must also be ascribed to Coleridge. Instinctively, I followed Corder’s method of rewriting the story, conceiving of the field of rhetoric and composition as three overlapping Venn diagrams which represented the cognitive, expressive, and the collaborative. Bruffee drew a circle to keep me out; I drew a circle to take him in, to paraphrase the epigram by Edwin Markham. This dissertation is a more reflective and scholarly attempt to do the same. Yet within Bruffee’s essay,
there is some reference to the work of the knowledgeable other: the teacher may be the one who has to set up the assignment so that collaborative work by students can proceed (553). That contribution is theoretically founded if we conceptualize the teacher as a Third aiding the interpretation of the text by the student(s). It is this unseen presence of the teacher that I will explore in the next chapter.

The theoretic foundation for online writing is equally problematic. Finding a “ground” is virtually impossible because concepts like “site” and “cyberspace” are metaphors that do not in fact refer to any material place. The writing which represents the writer as an Agent exists encoded in electrons somewhere and is brought to us through several interfaces that remain largely invisible. This question of representation is one that is problematized by gangster theories that are based on binaries bracketing the Agent, as Berthoff has shown extensively (MB 99 and others). It is the problem highlighted in Corder’s reflections on “Hunting Lieutenant Chadbourne.” The question of representation is at the heart of presence in online learning. I suggest that the semiotic theory of Thirdness can bridge the gap between teachers and students created by online learning. Putting Thirdness in a more Burkean vocabulary, Thirdness can be an Agency that allows the Agent to leap gaps in knowledge, medium, and even scene/no scene of internet learning.

**Returning to the Glass, Darkly**

When I hear the phrase “through the glass, darkly,” I remember a visit to a new church that met in a dance studio. The long wall of mirrors and dance bars was covered by a gauze-like curtain that blurred the images of the worshipers. Since the curtain panels were thin and light

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15 I am indebted to Valerie Robbins for my thinking about interfaces after hearing her presentation at the 2013 Computers and Writing Conference.
weight, movements of the worshipers and opening door sometimes blew them aside, revealing a clear reflection. Theory is like that. Sometimes it does reveal a clear image, but we must remember the breath of air that reveals may also double the curtain and obscure another reflection.
“Anyone who listens to the word but does not do what it says is like a man who looks at his face in a mirror and, after looking at himself, goes away and immediately forgets what he looks like.”

James 1:23-24 NIV

“Imagine…” Robert Yagelski

CHAPTER 5: THE UNSEEN PRESENCE (OR THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS)

Theory, such as I have explored in chapters 1-4, should never stand alone in the view of Berthoff. While the comparison of the mirror and the word, in the biblical quote above, refers to the law, I think that it applies as well to theory and practice. As stimulating as theoretical discussion can be, it is moot if it cannot give us a better understanding of our practice. So now I turn our gaze to our practice as reflected in the mirror of theory. If I were writing in Coleridge’s time, I might follow the early Enlightenment theory that the individuals shared similar mental processes and investigate only my own processes. However, that source of knowing has been thoroughly problematized by Crowley and others, and I must imagine ways to access all four means of knowing (the group, text, spirit, and knowledgeable others) to suggest Imagining as a twenty-first century strategy. I could at this point imagine a number of scenarios including querying the texts for more examples of the group, the text, the knowledgeable other and the spiritual at work, discovering ways that my colleagues define imagination, empowering student engagement through imagining, and debunking the distrust of imagining. However, I will concentrate on the role of the knowledgeable other in knowing and imagining because it is this
knowledgeable other who largely remains the unseen presence in online learning. That role includes reflecting on our ways of knowing and enacting our knowing in designing a different sort of course syllabus. In this chapter I will report on reflection by some of my colleagues who teach online at Christian colleges and imagine a syllabus that allows room for imagining.

As the last chapter of his book *Writing as a Way of Being*, Robert Yagelski commands, implores, and invites us to imagine the implications of the perspective for which he is arguing. I will follow his example and *imagine* the implications for online learning of the Coleridge’s four means of knowing (discussed in chapter 3) and of the portrait of the unseen presence (as revealed later in this chapter), against the background of a general distrust of imagining (chapters 1 and 2). As I have discussed theories of imagining, two analogies have emerged: imagining as a cognitive leap and imagining as looking in and through a mirror. In this chapter, I will combine the two analogies in a strategy I am calling leaping through the looking glass. Yes, the sound of shattering glass can possibly be heard. I use this analogy because I am all too aware that I am suggesting different epistemologies from the received wisdom of the field of rhetoric and composition.

In particular, my perspective is different from the icons of collaboration, Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede. In the 2011 collection of their writings, Ede and Lunsford add their latest insights on writing together in a new essay, “Collaboration and Collaborative Writing: The View from Here.” In this essay, Lunsford and Ede suggest that collaboration should be re-conceptualized as a multilayered continuum. They argue that “writing is collaborative ‘all the way down’” in spite of the discipline’s insistence on single authorship (193). To counteract the “deeply entrenched notions of authorship” in the academy and the notion by students that networked writing is not “real” (197), they suggest three continuums based on degree of
collaboration, the degree of love between the participants, and the degree of control (200-201). They further divide the continuum of control into hierarchical collaboration, where the goals and roles are strictly limited, and dialogic collaboration, which is less structured (201).

In my perspective, these descriptions are highly linear, with the writer more or less restricted to identifying her degrees of collaboration at a single point on one or more of these sliding rules. While the description of dialogic collaboration allows for some recursion, the overarching concept of *continuum* is still linear. Based on their descriptions of these continua (200-201), I have constructed the following diagrams.

![Figure 1 Continua of Collaboration](diagram.png)

These graphic representations suggest that the continua they propose function as a sliding rule that locates the work of collaboration at a single point in time, but does not give the theorist and writer terms with which to describe the recursiveness of writing, wherein a writer goes again and again to her experience, her sources, and her colleagues for additional and deeper insights. I have found such repetition necessary in writing this dissertation, as I will illustrate a little later in
this chapter. This recursiveness is also described extensively by Yagelski in his phenomenological study of the writing of his students and his own writing.

Further, the role of the knowledgeable other is hinted when Ede and Lunsford observe that while students are somewhat self-guided, they also need guidance from instructors. Based on a study by Andrea and Karen Lunsford, they suggest that more guidance in first year writing is needed in the form of instructor-created assignments that assist students in learning both collaboration and new media writing (199). This guidance is an example of the unseen presence of the knowledgeable other, emerging even here in the ultimate privileging of collaboration by those who have both practiced and championed it for more than three decades.

**The Arcs of Knowing**

In contrast to these sliding rules of collaboration, I am suggesting that Coleridge’s the four means of knowing (as I have reconfigured them, the group, the text, the knowledgeable other, and the spirit) will allow for a more nuanced description of knowing and will allow us to better describe the complexities of knowing in the twenty-first century. Instead of a sliding rule, the means of knowing that I am exploring are more like the arcs of juggled balls within the mind of an individual who gathers information from three or four means, tests and evaluates that information, and synthesizes it, perhaps in new and startling ways or just in ways that reconfigures his/her own intellectual constellation. The analogy of the arcs of juggled balls allows for the occasional dropped ball, as writers choose then reject and then perhaps pick up again a topic, focus, or a form. Such recursion is in my view an important step in writing that opens the process to the possibility of Imagining, a possibility I will explore later in this chapter. The use of these means of knowing as terms allow writers and thinkers to trace these non-linear arcs of knowing. I suggest that Imagining emerges from such non-linear processes. Each of these arcs of
knowing is a cogitative leap that I have previously described as Imagining (chapter 3). Ephemeral as a lazar beam, such a leap could be as potentially transformative, as the writer gains a better understanding of the meaning he aims to express.

While I would not lay the lack of imagining (the historic disappearance of which I traced in chapter 1) solely on the desks of instructors, I propose to examine here the links between the lack of imagining and the lack of epistemological diversity within the field. When Yagelski argues for focusing on the student who is writing rather than the text he or she writes, he places the responsibility for the lack of imagining on the persistent modern, Cartesian view (dominating the field as current/traditional pedagogy) that it is the text that matters. Instead, he urges us to imagine a pedagogy that is student-centered and which relies on a collaborative epistemology: “a pedagogy based on the idea of writing as a way of being is fundamentally social and inherently communal” (160). Thus, the group (one of Coleridge’s means of knowing) is the epistemological source in Yagelski’s conception of writing as a way of being.

While I would agree—based on Coleridge—that the text should not dominate, I disagree with a similar privileging of the collaborative over all other means. In fact, when I look at Yagelski’s description of writing in the classroom, I see a clear indication of all of Coleridge’s means and not just the group. Most importantly for my focus, it is “we” the writing instructors who must, in Yagelski’s view, change our purpose to meet the crisis of sustainability and embrace “the belief that the overriding purpose of formal education is to enable us to imagine a better future and create just and sustainable communities that contribute to our individual and collective well-being” (139). It is “we” the writing instructors who will “help students understand and harness the power of writing…[and] foster a different way of being in the world…” (140). He further suggests that his role in structuring assignments as drafts, not
finished products, enables students to see writing as a means of inquiry and not an end in itself (155). To me, this role is a clear example of the importance of the knowledgeable other in encouraging imagining. From my perspective, his descriptions of the power of freewriting (assigned and then not graded) illustrate the role of the teacher as the knowledgeable other who enables students to imagine in ways that are transformative (in this case, turning middle schoolers into happy writers) (140-144). It is the teacher, as the knowledgeable other, who writes the syllabus, writes or articulates the directions for free writing, allows the class time for this free writing, and then declines to grade it. It will be the teacher who will have to set up opportunities for imagining (as I will argue later in this chapter).

Whatever its ultimate use, the text also serves as a source of knowing, through the very act of writing. Yagelski writes, “As Murray often reminded his students, it is the writing itself that teaches us—if we allow it” (145). For Yagelski, then, the text, written by the student and moderated by the group, also serves as a way of knowing. As part of his suggestions for the future, he writes, “we might critically and honestly examine our own experiences to illuminate the role that texts play in our lives and the lives of other people we encounter” (165). This is not, as I understand it, a call to return to the early Enlightenment notion of the genius at work, but an examination of the phenomenology of writing, in particular the text as a means of knowing.

Following Yagelski’s phenomenological method, I will discuss my own experience of Coleridge’s four means of knowing. I noted in an early entry in my research journal that I was using all four means (the group, the text, the knowledgeable other, and the spirit) in writing this dissertation. Berthoff, Burke, Crowley, Hawk, and many others have served as my knowledgeable others. These secondary sources provided me with terms to think with and through, positions to push against, windows to leap through in imagining my way to a becoming
a knowledgeable other myself. I tested my research questions at a roundtable during the Graduate Research Network and received feedback from the group there. While I see my position within the field of rhetoric/composition as contingent and emerging, discussing my proposal with my committee was another source of knowing, blending two of the means—group and knowledgeable other. For me the spiritual was also another means of knowing. As Burke suggested, this dimension to words should not be bracketed. In addition to enlisting my discourse community of faith as support, spiritual texts have served as touchstones. Recently while vaguely listening to a sermon and mulling over my beginning quotation for this chapter, I thought of a verse that described the law as a mirror (quoted at the beginning of this chapter). I was making a note to look up the key words in my 1420-plus-page Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance when the preacher displayed these two verses in his PowerPoint. While I certainly do not claim divine inspiration, I do look to the spiritual as a means of knowing. Later in this chapter, the insights of my colleagues who are teaching online at Christian colleges will suggest ways of disambiguating the work of spirit in writing. My acknowledgements here should be seen as illustrations of the four means of knowing (the text, the group, the knowledgeable other, and the spirit) at work in my own writing. In addition, recursion occurred when my readers (my knowledgeable others), gently but firmly, suggested elaboration on several points. Thus, I reread and wrote in the margins and back pages of my textural sources, brainstormed and sharpened my points in discussions with colleagues, and asked for prayer, before I faced the computer again and revised.

If I were living in the Enlightenment period, I might now turn to the examination of the imagining of other writers as illustrated in their texts (as Coleridge does in Biographia Literaria). However, in keeping with my argument that a diversity of epistemology is needed, I
will turn to the comments of my colleagues whom I asked to describe their means of knowing using the four terms (the group, the text, the knowledgeable other, and the spirit). I deliberately did not define the term *spirit*, leaving that open to the individual interpretation. Some respondents found this lack of definition a problem, but it is precisely in the discerning of the source and meaning of the spirit that the text, the group, and the knowledgeable other play a part. For example, within the discourse community of faith, we are exhorted to test the spirits by comparing and contrasting the word of the spirit with the text and the interpretations of others (I John 4:1). As I suggested in chapter 4 under the implications of Coleridge’s theory, it is this lack of comparing the means of knowing to one another that can result in misunderstandings, which in turn lead to travesties like the Son of Sam murders.

When I queried some of my colleagues at Christian colleges who teach online, no one questioned the existence of the four means. All attributed their learning to some combination or all of the means. Their responses to my questions about the interaction of Coleridge’s four means of knowing illustrate the difficulty of separating these means. As one respondent remarked, “I’m not sure that there is a perceptible difference in learning: I gain knowledge, insight, and wisdom from all of these sources.”

Coleridge’s comment on separating subject and object seems to apply to the disentangling of the four means as well: “During the act of knowledge itself, the objective and subjective are so instantly united, that we cannot determine to which of the two the priority belongs. There is here no first, and no second; both are coinstantaneous and one. While I am attempting to explain this intimate coalition, I must suppose it dissolved.” (*Biographia Literaria* XII, 83).

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16 In reporting this survey of colleagues, I have identified only those who gave permission to do so, in accordance with my IRB documents.
This difficulty of disentangling terms and their use seemed to trouble the respondents as well when they answered the question “What differences do you see in your learning through knowledgeable others, texts, collaborative groups, and the spirit?” Eight out of twelve participants specifically mentioned the role of the knowledgeable other. While there is some overlap, seven noted the importance of texts, and seven mentioned the spirit, plus two more who merely pointed to the importance of all four. The collaborative group was mentioned positively by five, while two suggested this means was their least favorite and inconsistent in results. One respondent noted that she is “a scholar that learns a lot from reading literary criticism and research, but the truth or lack of truth that I discern while reading is revealed to me through the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit gives me ideas of what to write for publication.” Not surprisingly, she also wrote that the Holy Spirit was her most important source. Another participant also suggested a larger role for this means. As Michael Elam explained:

As a Christian scholar, I would not make the spirit a discreet category, but one that works in and through the other three. I find myself usually starting with knowledgeable others in order to get basic information, going to texts (secondary) for building on basic information, and synthesizing the information of knowledgeable others and texts into more complex wholes through collaborative groups. However, I’m not sure that the process needs to flow in this order always. The information I take from each can be brought to the other, and I think all is guided by the spirit.

Here we can see the tracing of the unseen arcs of knowing within the unseen presence of the knowledgeable other. Those arcs can go from additional knowledgeable others to texts to collaborative groups, undergirded by the spirit. I would also add that the arcs may take any
direction and may flash again and again. I would graph those arcs here, but only a digital, moving, and interactive schemata would be adequate.

A similar dynamic interaction of all four means is described by another respondent, as she reflects on the recursive ways that knowledgeable others, tests, and groups contribute to her knowing. While starting with texts, she writes, “through knowledgeable others and collaborative groups, I learn to see beyond my own world view (which relies heavily on my belief system/moral code) to understand how others interpret texts or what knowledge they have to share. Through wrestling with all of these, I learn best.” Another professor recounts a slightly different approach to these dynamic interconnections. He reflects,

I respond well to knowledgeable others. Beyond facts, they give perspective and aid in demonstrating the process of critical thinking. I appreciate text for the delivery of facts. I find collaborative groups an inconsistent way of learning. The involvement of the spirit helps in forming my own perspective to the learning experience.

As this colleague points out, all the four means (text, group, knowledgeable others, and spirit) may not be equally operative at all times. The means may form pairs or triplets in several directions: text/group, group/knowledgeable others/spirit, group/spirit/text, etc. The means of knowing can also operate through other means. The pairs or triplets that are formed may be either integrative or oppositional. For instance, the spirit can be discerned though the text, as Bible believers claim, or the knowledgeable other may impart his thoughts through the text. Equally, the group may negotiate an interpretation or re-interpretation of the spirit. The pairings and intersections of these means of knowing should serve speculative instruments (to use Richard’s term) to reflect on our knowing.
The most reflective and philosophical answer came from my colleague Fabrice Poussin. He suggests that learning is most effective when all are combined and the learner is completely engaged. Poussin posits that knowledgeable others “create the live communication element which allows for immediate interaction and feedback.” Reading the texts, he writes, give the learner a more leisurely way to explore ideas and “a consistent foundation.” While collaborative groups must be structured to avoid chaos, they provide “a multifaceted discussion, leading to the exploration of diverse perspectives.” Most important to Poussin is the Spirit, which he describes as “the ultimate inspiration for the learning process, its guiding force, and in the end, its ‘check and balance.’” While illustrating the difficulty of disentangling the means of knowing, these perspectives posit a dynamic interaction, which is consistent with Coleridge’s descriptions of the process as well as his ontology (which I discussed in chapter 3 and 4).

Asked to rank one means as the most important to their own learning, eight mentioned the knowledgeable other, while six suggested that texts were also important. Others acknowledged that all four were important and tried to describe the relationship. Considering this as “a very difficult question,” one professor wrote,

> Obviously, you need a text as a starting point in terms of organizing learning, but I think that knowledgeable others and collaborative groups aren’t completely mutually exclusive. You can have knowledgeable others in collaborative groups, and that’s what I’ve often found is extremely beneficial to students. The process of talking through material with peers and with the instructor as a guide has created a lot of interesting and beneficial learning moments in my classes.

Another described the process as a continuum or cycle, adding “No matter what method, I find myself going from one to another in order to build more cohesive knowledge.” Poussin
also suggests that one means should not be privileged over the others because the ideal combination is all four. While the spirit is essential, he posits, “the other three elements are also crucial to the process as they relate the Divine to the Human.” Considering that all respondents teach at Christian colleges, the idea of the spirit as present at all times may be underlying even those comments which did not specifically include this term, as responses to other questions indicate.

Asked about the interaction of the four means, nine respondents replied that they all work together, building and integrating knowledge. Essentially, the respondents expanded on their answers to the previous two questions. Alluding to the transformative possibilities, another respondent wrote:

I think the ways these methods interact is almost limitless provided those engaged in them are open to learning in the first place. By learning I do not mean the inevitable acquisition of knowledge, but the willingness to put oneself in a position to receive information and process it by searching for connections between different points and kinds of information.

Another wrote that “the great lecturers/professors and the great texts feed the spirit and give one a sense of purpose. The spirit/imagination is fed by the ‘greats.’ The same can be said of great artists and sculptors. They appeal to the spirit within us.” Although all these respondents described the interconnections of the four means in different ways, all confirm their existence and their importance to knowing. Moreover, all the terms add to our ability to explain the complexity, the recursiveness, and the integration of our knowing.
From Knowledgeable Others to Students

The use of these means of knowing (the group, the text, the knowledgeable other, and the spirit) also provide terms to describe interactions with students. Far from being merely a collaboration, these interactions can embody all the four means. As Brenda Ayers notes, she “keeps a tangible presence on the discussion board” by monitoring online posts and encouraging deeper thinking, and she answers about 300 emails a week. In addition to the assigned reading within course, she also posts announcements at least three times a week, ending “with a Scripture that I believe is relevant to the announcement or that will encourage the students to continue to strive for excellence.” She adds that she prays over messages that she has to send to students that “are not what students want to hear.” She also prays with students about personal problems, describing herself “as God’s ambassador.” Thus she is effectively using all four means of knowing (knowledgeable other, group, text, and spirit) in these interactions with students. Ayers is herself the knowledgeable other. Her work in setting the assignments, posting announcements, and responding to emails are examples of the use of text. Note that for her as a Christian, the Bible is the ultimate text and source of authority. She is also a part of the group by her intense participation in the discussion boards. As her description indicates, the Spirit permeates all that she does. I suggest that bringing these arcs of knowing to light helps make visible her presence as the knowledgeable other in her online classes.

From Knowing to Imagining

I also suggest that the complex interaction of the arcs of knowing opens space for imagining, a space that is not available if knowing moves along a linear sliding ruler. One respondent directly equated the spirit to Imagination. Since I deliberately did not define spirit in my question to him, he interpreted the term to mean his individual spirit, writing the following:
From grade school on, and especially at the undergraduate and graduate levels, the inspiration from “knowledgeable others” has probably been at the forefront… I would say my “spirit,” or as I prefer, “imagination” (I’m really an Emersonian at heart) has led me to many influential texts which have been a part of my intellectual and personal development. “ [ellipse and parentheses in the original]

This colleague did not explain what he mean by “Emersonian at heart,” or imagination. In fact, he seems to prefer knowledgeable others in face-to-face classrooms as a means of learning. His comments sent me scurrying off to review Emerson’s take on the means of knowing (the knowledgeable other, the text, the group and the other, as I have configured them). In contrast to this colleague, Emerson rejects most of those whom might be considered knowledgeable others. Emerson writes in “Divinity School Address” the following: “We mark with light in the memory the few interviews we have had, in the dreary years of routine and of sin, with souls that made our souls wiser…” (10). While he reveres Jesus Christ as a man who had vision (4-5), he looks for a new Teacher who will (among other things) “see the world to be the mirror of the soul” (12). He commands his audience of emerging preachers “to refuse the good models, even those which are sacred in the imagination of men, and dare to love God without mediator or veil” (10).

In this address, Emerson also rejects the one who relies on texts alone as a babbler and insists that the spirit is the only means by which one can learn (6-7). He further rejects the group as a means of knowing. He suggests that people following a popular leader “think society wiser than their soul, and know not that one soul, and their soul, is wiser than the whole world” (10). Emerson also rejects this means of knowing in “The American Scholar” (49). That leaves only the spirit or, in Emerson’s terms, the soul as a means of knowing. This soul receives it nourishment from three sources, according to Emerson in “The American Scholar”: nature,
books, and action, (18). Even these sources are but a circling back to the universal soul since Emerson sees nature as the symbol of spirit (Nature, chapter IV, “Language” 9)\(^{17}\) and nature as “the organ through which the universal spirit speaks to the individual, and strives to lead back the individual to it” (Chapter VII, “Spirit” 23). He is writing in terms of the Romantic mindset when he equates Truth and Beauty (Chapter VI, “Idealism” 20-21) like Shelley in “Ode to a Grecian Urn.” In the same way, Emerson is writing from the Enlightenment perception that the one individual, especially the genius, thinks in a same manner as all others (“The American Scholar” 19). While Imagination does figure briefly in Emerson’s writing, it remains a faculty within the individual. In Nature, Emerson defines Imagination as the “the use which Reason makes of the material world” (chapter VI, “Idealism” 19). In my understanding, Emerson links the spirit and imagination because all human actions (and the actions of nature as well) are results of the universal spirit. In discussing Coleridge’s robust description of Imagination in chapter three, I suggested that Imagining empowers the Agent, exists as consubstantial with reason and spirit, and thus can mediate between the senses and other cognitive faculties. While Emerson’s description of the spirit is similar, he is not writing of the term as Coleridge or I or the Bible would use it (as I discussed in chapter 4), but it is not my purpose to argue theology. My focus here is using Coleridge’s means of knowing (as I have reconfigured them—text, group, knowledgeable others, and spirit) to analyze Emerson’s theories of knowledge. This analysis enables us to see that he privileged the spirit, as he defined it, and explains why few in the post-everything era, which valorizes the group, would declare themselves to be Emersonian like my colleague. This privileging of the spirit and Emerson’s and Coleridge’s connection to it may additionally suggest how Imagining has been bracketed with spirit and disappeared from the narrative of the field. In order to bring back Imagining to the field, I suggest interrogating our

\(^{17}\) I am including the chapter since page numbers in Project Gutenberg documents can vary.
use of all of the four means of knowing (spirit, text, group, and knowledgeable other) to discover how Imagining happens.

**The Arcs of Imagining**

Others of my colleagues linked Imagination with creativity, as did the respondent who did not want Imagination messing with his truth-seeking curriculum. A professor who teaches exclusively online reported that he had his “students imagine they are the character in a story or novel and create Pinterest boards that would be applicable to those characters.” For this professor and others, creativity means adapting activities from face-to-face classrooms, such as drawing activities, connections between the Bible and pop-culture, and wiki-type research projects. Technology plays a part in several creative projects, including this report: “I know of one professor who utilizes “Second Life” to immerse students in the first century Roman world by assigning them a character in the virtual world that must interact the characters of other students and the professor along a guided script.”

Creativity, while not synonymous with Imagination, seems to be a key component of the definition of Imagination in the practice of these professors.

Others described Imagining in a way that showed they defined it in terms of seeing differently, synthesizing information, and even thinking critically. One respondent wrote that she thought Imagination operated in her online course to help students “to identify the gaps in literature and fill them or to assume a different point of view exercises critical thinking and really compels the student to look closely at the text.”

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18 I explored Second Life as a vehicle for online learning in “Snowcrash: Multiple and Erased Bodies in Cyberspace” and concluded that university participation in this platform is declining from a high point in 2008, due in part to the high cost of the necessary technology.
I sometimes ask students to rewrite an ending of a short story, or to rewrite the story from another character’s point of view. I often ask them to discuss on the Discussion Board what is missing in a story. For example, in Chopin’s “The Story of an Hour,” I ask them to imagine what Mrs. Mallard’s life was like that caused her to feel joy when she learned that her husband had died. Another project could be that the students suggest what Mr. Mallard’s reaction might be upon hearing about his wife’s reaction to his presumed death. With Conrad’s Heart of Darkness I might ask students to give the African version of Marlow’s journey into the Congo or imagine what Kurtz’s fiancé might be like.

Another professor cautions that courses should provide the right parameters before students work without them (I’m guessing that he equates Imagining with working without parameters). He adds that with this precaution, “imagining can help students create innovative syntheses of information.” One respondent suggests this role for Imagining: “Imagination allows students to think about topics differently, and the more a student can think about something from a different perspective, the greater their learning will be.” The connection between critical thinking and Imagining is also highlighted by the professor who wrote: “I feel that my course(s) are balanced between the various areas you identify. I think that imagining can be best developed by emphasizing higher levels of thinking and activity.” This description of Imagining in action resonates with the definition that I suggested in chapter 3: it is the act of mediating between what is and what is not, between what is seen and what is unseen, between the A and X of language, particularly when this mediation results in thinking and knowing beyond one’s current perception.
As asked to reflect on the kind of critical thinking that includes imagining, Elam replied: “It happens a lot. The student’s reaction is ‘I never thought of that before.’ My reaction is ‘very interesting—I never considered that before.’” While he could not think of a specific example, he said, “I do encounter it: in every class it happens. Students come up with an idea that I never considered. When that happens, I am interested in knowing more. I rely on their imagination to flesh out those ideas.” To encourage imagination, he asks students, “tell me more—look into that and tell me what you find.” When there are times that he does not know something, he encourages students to be imaginative. “Students feel safe to explore when they know that I don’t have an agenda. At times when my imagination fails, I encourage students to use theirs. On some points they may be suited more than I am [to explore the idea].” In this description, imagining is a critical process resulting in a cognitive leap, which corresponds with my definition of imagining.

However, imagining is not necessarily confined to student engagement, creativity, and learning. Poussin sees imagining as possible and even necessary throughout the whole process of teaching from creating tests, selecting and creating multi-media materials, and encouraging learners to explore all sorts of sources and even develop skills not normally associated with particular courses. He writes, “Imagining is an ideal area in this day and age for students to utilize their own learning skills and techniques, as they may choose to express themselves in a way that is less limited than would be in a normal classroom situation, and more appropriate to their learning process.” He adds, “Imagining gives free reign to the learner, to explore his own creativity, and so better connect the thing learned with his own needs and enthusiasms.” Thus, he sees imagining as a means of creating more freedom and more learning for students, much like Greene (whom I quoted in chapter one). None of these descriptions are of course mutually
exclusive. The concept of imagining that emerges from this brief survey suggests an interconnectedness that includes student engagement, creativity, critical thinking, and cognitive freedom, all of which begin with the knowledgeable other.

**Arcing from Imagining to Teaching**

How do we as knowledgeable others bring these insights about our knowing and imagining into the classroom (whether that is a digital or brick-and-mortar space)? The written record of enacted pedagogy attests to the difficulty of this leap from theory to practice. It seems to be an enterprise fraught with the danger of turning a liberating theory into a dogmatic pedagogue, as Richard E. Miller notes in suggesting his praxis of the sublime. Miller describes how pedagogies that are intended to be liberating become regimens that require attention to certain kinds of writing as appropriate resistance, while others are considered failures. He suggests that the need to assess educational activities turns even such concepts as “learning and reading as exploration” into a quest to discover the predetermined ideas that the teacher wants the student to find (“Praxis” 51-52). Miller uses the occasion of grading Educational Testing Service essays by a massive team to contemplate the effect that grades, especially the final course grade, have on pedagogy. He sees two problems with new systems of pedagogy: they devolve into “pedagogies of obedience” and must set themselves in a binary opposition to previous systems. Both are problems that I wish to avoid while suggesting the encouragement of Imagining.

First, Miller argues that the universal and inevitable existence of grades forces teachers (whatever their declared pedagogy) into what he calls a pedagogy of obedience. This system is based on nineteenth century methods which featured the master giving chucks of information to “learners” who were required to prove that they knew that information by passing tests and
“saying what was expected of them”. (43-48) He suggests that *Hard Times* by Charles Dickens offers a useful narrative for overcoming the enforced “obedience” to the test. In the story, as Miller recounts it, the circus girl who has a different way of knowing can imagine alternatives to the quantitative rules of the pedagogue. Miller writes, “The alternative to a pedagogy of obedience, Dickens suggests, lies in the use of the imagination or the fancy, a faculty whose nature is to elude both assessment and a strictly regimented system of instruction grounded in immediately verifiable data” (50). Thus, any new ideas about Imagining in the classroom will need to overcome what Miller describes as the institutional imperative “to regulate, organize, and evaluate the responses students produce” (51). To avoid this dead end, Miller suggests that conceding the possibilities of error in attempting great projects should be applied to reading and writing. Particularly important to encouraging Imagining will be a method of assessment that allows what Miller calls “generative errors.” Later in this chapter, I will explore Peter Elbow’s Contract for a B as one possible such method.

Another problem that Miller identifies in the proposing of any new pedagogy is that it must oppose itself to previous pedagogies and, in effect, “stack the deck” against those pedagogies. Miller analyzes the challenge in this way:

At times it seems that this problem is endemic to the topic of teaching, as evidenced by the alternatives that populate the landscape, where we find, for example Berthoff’s ‘pedagogy of knowing’ versus the ‘pedagogy of exhortation,’ Giroux’s “pedagogy of possibility” versus an implied alternative that I like to call “the pedagogy of despair,” and, of course, Freire’s “pedagogy of liberation” versus the discipline’s favorite whipping boy, “the banking concept of education.” (51)
To avoid this binary, Miller suggests that encouraging students to link texts and see reading and writing as interconnected acts of exploring even though this practice may result in writing that is confused and unruly. (57) The writing process, he argues, should be seen as recursive: ”it can also be a recursive system whereby the developing ideas in an unfolding text become increasingly complex, contingent, muddied, stalled and even abandoned” (57). This sort of exploration in practice means “providing students with the opportunity to read and write about something other than a single text in isolation and to focus, instead, on getting students to establish relationships between texts—juxtaposing terms and ideas, pursuing connections, exploring hunches, making a run for the sublime.” (58). In my view, Miller’s practice would encourage Imagining through connecting texts, but would pass over the role of the knowledgeable other, while missing altogether the contributions of the group and the spirit as means of knowing. I suggest, of course, that all four means should be included in the classroom, a practice that I shall unfold a little later in this chapter.

In discussing his interest in the generative power of error, Miller also gives us a glimpse of Berthoff’s last graduate seminar before she retired in the mid-eighties. He remembers:

I’ve never been in a pedagogical situation that was as unpredictable and as freewheeling as this one was. In striving to get the packed seminar to “reclaim the Imagination,” Ann threw everything she had at us—works from philosophy, cognitive science, biology, art history, literature, anthropology—to force us to gain access to our own interpretive powers…. Ann’s message throughout all of this was both straightforward and profound: what makes us human is our ability to reflect on our reflections, to be conscious of our own consciousness, to think about our own ways of thinking. (“Response” 166).
Here, again, the role of the knowledgeable other predominates through the choice of texts and classroom activities. Even though I consider Berthoff as one of the champions of Imagination, Imagining cannot be all about the choices of this most knowledgeable of others. Students are still faced in this scenario with finding the “correct” answer envisioned by Berthoff.

Considering the difficulties of any pedagogy’s devolvement into regimens (“pedagogies of obedience” in Miller’s term) and into binary oppositions, I am not suggesting a pedagogy of Imagination so much as a strategy of Imagining based on a diverse epistemology that embraces all four means of knowing (the text, the group, the spirit, and the knowledgeable other). It is, I suggest, a strategy not meant to supplant previous methods, but one that adds to the field in such a way as to leap between and over the binaries. I see Imagining as, in the terms of Pierce, a Thirdness (see chapter 3 for an extended discussion)—the spark that leaps between gun power and the explosion. Being a strategy, and not a pedagogy, Imagining can morphe as conditions and students change. Setting up such an environment for Imagining is the role of the knowledgeable other. Imagining is a strategy that will also necessitate our reexamining a number of our practices. Here I will concentrate on the changes that may need to be made in the writing of the syllabus in order to allow space for the arcs of imagination. The syllabus, as Sarah Golsby-Smith writes in “Singing from the Same Songsheet: The Flexible Thinker and the Curriculum in the 21st Century,” dominates the relationships between the student, the teacher and itself to shape learning (67). She describes the state-wide syllabus written for her state in Australia as a song sheet for all to sing from, decentering the text with an ideological emphasis (69). She further argues that following the syllabus resulted in the student receiving a body of knowledge, rather than engaging in the critical thinking that it was supposed to encourage. She writes, “Ironically, the syllabus turns out to be teacher-centric, defining our professional
identity” (68), adding, “It is the way the syllabus positions the student pedagogically that undercuts the emancipatory purposes of the syllabus” (72). In concurrence with Miller, She notes that her responses to student writing that is not within the parameters of the syllabus are guided by the rubric and the end-of-course exam. Such a syllabus, and its insistence on one ideological stance, does not promote either imagination or dialectic, she argues. Golsby-Smith does not have the luxury of rewriting her syllabus, as I will suggest here, but her explanation of the importance of the syllabus is one reason that I chose to focus on it as an opening into the encouragement of Imagining, particularly in online spaces.

**Imagining a Different Syllabus.** Imagine teachers, especially those teaching composition online, as practitioners of Imagining, reflecting on and encouraging the use of Imagining. I intend here to suggest the sort of course (or with some practical changes, a workshop) that would be necessary for these knowledgeable others to learn about and begin to practice reflection of their means of knowing (spirit, text, group, and knowledgeable others). In reviewing a syllabus that I wrote as part of my competency exam on online learning (see Appendix D), I discover that I have written myself into a corner of sorts—the necessity of writing an unsyllabus. By this I mean that my traditional syllabus is inadequate to create the experience of Imagining and to explore the four means of knowing as providing the arcs for such an experience. I will have to re-imagine the syllabus. I will discuss the necessary changes below; for a move towards a possible unsyllabus, see Appendix E).

As the situation now stands, teachers are expected and indeed contractually obligated to write a syllabus that clearly outlines the theme and texts of the course, which generally fall along the teacher’s ideology and interpretation of the content. This prescriptive style of teaching, stemming (as Miller argues) from the need to grade, seems to be the foundation of the typical
syllabus and is illustrated in its formation. In the traditional syllabus, I as the instructor, the knowledgeable other, and presumed expert receive the departmental template, with the institutional policies spelled out and/or referenced. Also included in that boilerplate are usually the prewritten course description and objectives, which are linked to departmental and institutional objectives, mission statements, and accreditation accountability measures. The prescriptive nature of the course is especially noticeable in the typical wording of the course objectives, which repeats this formula: “The student will….” (emphasis mine). Then I add the textbooks and reading, the written assignments, the discussion topics, lecture focus, and other details. In an online course, the entire session is typically set and already posted online when students receive web access and begin navigating through the course. As has been my experience, the teacher may also receive a premade online course with all the “lectures” already posted. For all words and theories spilled in contrary directions, the content of the text, and the teacher’s knowledge of it, remain the focus. Instead of the “sage on the stage,” meme of the online classroom in particular is the unseen presence pulling the strings behind the curtain to achieve course and institutional objectives.

In an online course, this prescriptive organization may be one cause of students who simply disappear, not posting assignments or responding to emails. While research has not directly made this connection, it has shown that student participation is a perennial challenge and is heavily dependent on social presence (Wallace 253). Even in a face-to-face graduate course, students can take the stance of least participation. Given group work on a list of proposed actions and attitudes, my group and I (all teachers working on a master’s) rolled our eyes, took a vote by a show of hands, and listed the majority decisions as the ones that we had “negotiated” and “clarified.” I don’t remember the list, only our minimal participation.
This lack of student buy-in is also a problem highlighted by Yagelski and his teacher/students. He recommends free writing with no grading. I am imagining an unsyllabus\(^{19}\) for a graduate class that will give these teacher/students room to reflect upon the complex, ever-changing relationships of their means of knowing, using the concept of Imagining. By the adding the prefix *un* to the term *syllabus*, I wish to set it apart from the normative document that prescribes everything within the course. In other words, the *unsyllabus* is an alternative to the syllabus. I realize that I am setting up a possible binary opposition (syllabus/UNSYLLABUS); consistent with my arguments throughout for “Thirdness,” I am depending on the imagining of the readers and students to transform this binary. While some of the components of the unsyllabus will legally have to remain the same as a traditional syllabus, these are the possible areas for alternatives: objectives, focus, texts, assignments, and assessment.

**Objective Shifts.** While students will need to understand the theory I have been examining in previous chapters, including the four means of knowing (knowledgeable other, spirit, text, and group) and the historical interpretations of imagining, the objectives of the course should foreground the students’ own reflections on their practice. An example of this sort of engagement is provided by the dissertation writers who share their struggles in *The Authority to Imagine*. As I noted in chapter 1, these writers combined a variety of means to examine their practices in the light of theory. Similarly, the students in this unsyllabus course will need to interrogate their own roles as knowledgeable others in designing syllabi, in effect making the unseen presence visible. In doing so, they may also discover ways to make their presence known to their composition students. In teaching this graduate course, the instructor needs to model this process as well. While the instructor would point to some of the texts she/he has chosen, students

\(^{19}\) I recently attended an unconference, The Technology and Humanities Camp, which illustrated the possibilities of letting the attendees participate in the organization of the conference.
should have the opportunity to construct their own canon of texts that they find thought-provoking, inspiring, and/or challenging. Since this canon construction is similar to the building the bibliography for this dissertation, students who build their own canon in this unsyllabus course may find that process a valuable precursor for writing their own dissertations. The ultimate goal, of course, will be these graduate students’ being able to imagine their own presence and the presence of their online composition students within their respective writings.

In light of this rationale/ description, I would propose the following objectives:

- Students may possibly be more knowledgeable of their own means of knowing (the group, text, spirit, and knowledgeable others) through reflection on their practices;
- Students may be more prepared to understand those of other discourse groups who access different sources for knowing;
- Students may have discovered connections between their ways of knowing and imagining different scenarios;
- Students may be able to apply some or all of their insights to their teaching practices;
- Students may be more aware of and able to articulate their roles as knowledgeable others;
- Students may have compiled a canon of their own that they may draw on for future writing and insights
- Students may be able to formulate their own objectives and designs for encouraging imagining.
In writing these objectives, I have deliberately dropped the prescriptive auxiliary verb *will* and substituted *may*, as a way of opening up space for possibilities not prescribed ahead of time by the (somewhat) knowledgeable other preparing this unsyllabus.

**Focal Shifts.** Instead of preselected weekly topics, the unsyllabus would be centered on questions. I would of course need to explain terms and procedures on the first session, but I anticipate organizing the course with the students, much like the un-conference was organized with proposals posted on the walls and then scheduled. Here are a few questions that come to mind as possible organizing foci (other knowledgeable others will no doubt have their own lists).

- What are your goals for this course?
- What are your primary texts?
- Who are your primary knowledgeable others?
- How can what you have learned from any of these means (or combination thereof) be a basis for online teaching?
- What questions would you like the group to discuss?
- What technical aspect would you like to master or learn more about?
- What online strategy would you like to explore?
- What are the challenges of online learning (generally and personally)?
- How can imagining be a “Thirdness” for finding ways to overcome the challenges?

These questions as the focal point of the week’s work are necessarily general in order to create an openness for students to bring their own knowledge to the class (an operation of the means of the group as well as possibly the spirit). Some of these questions seem necessary to illuminate the theories that will allow for reflection on all the means of knowing. Others have no
set answer and are proposed to encourage the student’s own reflection. Since I anticipate rewriting the schedule of activities after or during the first session, these general questions are only guidelines. As a knowledgeable other, I will have to be aware that I am predisposed to ask rhetorical questions that lead the student to the conclusion that I want according to my own perspective. I will have to strive to ask truly open-ended questions, the answer to which I may not know. This openness about one’s own limitations and perspective is also consistent with current trends in writing instruction that rely on contractual grading, as I will discuss in the section on assessment.

**Textual Shifts.** Instead of setting the complete reading list, which would limit the possibilities for knowing, this un-syllabus would ask students to bring in their own texts. Such a move would create more theoretical chaos, which is the seed bed of imagining, according to Berthoff. Further, these texts could be of whatever genre--fiction, theory, and even children’s books. Students would then investigate the connections and disconnections in the uses of imagination.

After creating chaos, (something she did very well according to Miller’s description) Berthoff suggests building a clear path to categorize ideas. She notes, “once we encourage the generation of chaos, however, we are morally as well as pedagogically bound to present very carefully the ways of emerging from it” (*The Making of Meaning* 75). She cautions against using these methods as a “recipe” without understanding how and why it works (*Making* 33-34). In her textbook *Forming/Thinking/Writing*, she begins with a dialectical notebook that keeps track of observations as “a way of auditing the making of meaning (Introduction, n.p.) She then illustrates the process of naming and defining as steps towards forming concepts, finding inferences and warrants, inventing analogies, and sorting ideas into categories. In one assisted
invitation (*Forming* 78-82), she presents a drawing that looks something like bare tree branches or the delta of a river and asks students to brainstorm terms to describe it, and then categorize them in terms of spatial, temporal, or cause /effect. She further suggests that the overall pattern of the interpretations of the drawing might be that of a triangle (delta) or a branching system. Through these steps she suggests that undergraduate composition students will naturally find their way out of chaos due to the linguistic drive to create order.

For graduate students in this unsyllabus class, I suggest a little less brush clearing, least we clear only those paths that are already well trodden (in contrast to Berthoff’s assignment process). The unsyllabus would ask students to organize ideas under several categories and in several media. As one possibility, I can imagine a student juxtaposing George Baker’s *The Chambered Nautilus* with Mark Johnson’s *Moral Imagination* and exploring how imagining informs and shapes one’s moral perception of others. Baker’s children’s book is a fantasy that features two children trapped in the innermost chamber of a nautilus shell. They discover that a simple joke causes the first chamber to open into the next, but that each subsequent opening needs a progressively deeper thought. Having exhausted their knowledge from silly stories to the Ten Commandments, they are trapped in the outer most chamber and the waves of the rising tide are beating against the shell. One of them wishes that the other might be saved, even if she is not. The shell opens. They are saved. I can imagine a teacher of middle schoolers using this story to promote imagining how others feel and wishing them well, enacting the moral imagining that Johnson suggests. Opening the textual requirements will allow such leaps of imagining beyond what the knowledgeable other might have predicted for the class.

**Assignment Shifts:** Berthoff recommends a dialectical notebook, basically a regular spiral or bound notebook with a line drawn down the middle. The text, quote, or observation is
written on the left side with the student’s thoughts on the right side. Students are required to write about each text that they read. In this unsyllabus class, this kind of notebook could serve as the first forming of thoughts about the means of knowing and the uses of imagining. I anticipate providing some quotes on Imagination and Imagining from the research here as well as asking students to bring their own quotes to the notebooks and discussions. Since the outcome of the class would be reflective teachers who better understand their means of knowing and who imagine how these means might work in online spaces, that reflection will be focus of the final composition, which students may compose in whatever media they choose. About midway in the course, I would ask students to propose a medium or software to use in presenting their final project, with the only requirements that these be legal, shareable and possibly replicable in an online class.

**Assessment Shifts.** Since the typical syllabus usually contains detailed information about the quantification of assessment, the un-syllabus will have to shift in that regard as well. Imagining is difficult, if not impossible to predict, much less quantify and access. A possible means of assessment which may work with the un-syllabus is a contract, as Peter Elbow and Jane Danielewicz suggest in “A Unilateral Grading Contract to Improve Learning and Teaching.” In this plan, Elbow and Danielewicz reduce the burden and anxiety of grading by not evaluating the quality of the writing, but awarding a B for turning in assignments on time and otherwise participating (2-3). In contrast to Ira Shor and others, Elbow’s approach is consciously “unpolitical and ‘uncritical’” in order to “create a classroom where both teachers and students get to give as much time and attention as possible to writing—not politics and culture” (4). Elbow and Danielewicz further suggest that their contract serves to resist institutional and cultural standards while freeing students to grow in their writing ability without
the worry of grades (5). They note that such a grading is available to “teachers and students of all ideological stripes” and allows them to “put more energy into figuring out which activities most reliably produce learning and less energy into figuring out a numerical grade for a piece of writing” (5). They further suggest that “with the grade not so much at stake, students are more open to radical changes and are more inventive in how they might approach an essay….“ (11). The contract, they claim, will give students the space for internal motivation for revising (13) and lends itself to experimentation (16). There seems to be enough flexibility in both practical and ideological terms to incorporate such a contract for assessment within the un-syllabus that aims to encourage imagining. Such a contract will take away the need to choose “safe” topics and approaches that will tell the teacher what she wants to read. It will also allow the possibility of “generative errors,” in Miller’s terms. By creating this safety zone for innovation, it should encourage students to stretch for innovation both in topics and form—at least that option will be open. I will additionally explain that I am looking for evidence of the student’s thinking about and grappling with the terms that we are exploring, in ways that Miller described: “juxtaposing terms and ideas, pursuing connections, exploring hunches, making a run for the sublime.” While some students may feel set adrift by the lack of a hard-core rubric for assessment, others may be encouraged to try something new, without the usual penalties for failing.

I am not imagining that such an unsyllabus will work perfectly. As in life and technology in general, there will be unanticipated challenges. I am imagining that working through these challenges will give us (teacher and student alike) a better sense of how the concepts will work in online spaces. Certainly, this unsyllabus will be more generative of student buy-in and creativity because concepts and connections will not be predigested for them.
Embracing all the Arcs of Knowing

With the contributions of my colleagues via a survey and a move towards an unsyllabus, I have suggested a few changes, opening the course to more student participation. In positing these changes, I have made a few assumptions: We can learn *something* (though certainly not everything) about a writer through his writing—by what he reveals and does not reveal. We can sense some “presence” of the writer in her texts. This possibility is theoretically undergirded by the concept of “Thirdness,” as I discussed in chapter four. I am also assuming the possibility of the spirit (as defined by the writer) as another means of knowing, a “Thirdness” that operates similarly to the group, the knowledgeable other, and the text.

First, I argue that the unseen presence of the knowledgeable other should make her means of knowing visible both to herself and her students for the purpose of the encouraging of the unseen strategy of Imagining. Bringing Imagining into the classroom begins with the knowledgeable other who reflects on his own processes of knowing and carries those connections into the classroom where students may make their own connections. These leaps of knowing are potentially transformative as students gain a better understanding of the meanings they aim to express. In this context of reflective knowing, I suggest that Imagining emerges from non-linear processes—the arcing of ideas from the group, the spirit, the text, and the knowledgeable other. This arcing of the four means in any sorts of combinations, as illustrated by the comments of my colleagues above, results in knowing that takes students beyond their current perceptions.

Imagining, as I have defined it, is the act of mediating between what is and what is not, between what is seen and what is unseen, between the A and X of language, particularly when this mediation results in thinking and knowing beyond one’s current perceptions. By making this
leap, Imagining empowers the Agent, exists as consubstantial with reason and spirit, and thus can mediate between the senses and other cognitive faculties. It is a Thirdness (in the terms of Charles Pierce) that enables transcending the oppositional and confrontational space of binaries which are such a dominant feature of conversations in this post-everything era. The four means (group, spirit, text, and knowledgeable other), I argue, enable us to trace all the arcs of knowing.

Second, I have suggested that a reconstruction of the syllabus is needed to allow room for students to construct and reflect on their own means of knowing as a way of enhancing the possibilities for Imagining. In order to enhance the possibility of Imagining (in the sense that I describe in this project), the epistemological diversity of the field of rhetoric and composition must be expanded—we need input from all possible sources and all possible means of knowing in order to negotiate our way through and beyond the ever-increasing pace and complexity of technological changes. For instance, MOOCs (massively open online courses with hundreds of thousands of students) are already here, and students are sometimes receiving their online learning modules through their mobile phones. Increasing technological changes will probably make face-to-face, synchronous interaction more available as well, Other technical changes cannot be predicted beyond five years, as Robertson suggests. In other words, doctoral candidates cannot take their syllabi and Xeroxed lesson plans and comfortably settle into a predictable tenure at a brick, vine-covered college. We face a prospect of achieving our degrees and finding that the technology we learned to use is already outmoded, with the possibility we will need to restructure our outcomes, assignments, and assessments.

Employing Coleridge’s four means of knowing would allow us to constantly monitor and reconfigure our knowing as technology changes. These means of knowing (as I have reconfigured them based on Coleridge’s quartet of spirit, church, text, and preacher) are spirit,
group, text, and knowledgeable other. As illustrated by my colleague’s responses above, these
four means provide new terms and narratives to discuss the recursive interactions that result in
knowing. These means of knowing go beyond the theories of discourse groups and process
writing, allowing us to make dynamic new connections. These new connections are especially
helpful for those of us in the discourse group of faith who (to use Jacqueline Royster’s
memorable title) feel that the first voice we hear is not our own. It is not my intention to replace
the discourse group as a means of knowing or to supplant collaboration as a method of
writing/teaching. Instead, I suggest enhancing our conversation about knowing and our practice
of knowing with the three additional means (text, knowledgeable other, and spirit).

As I noted above, I am arguing for incorporation of Imagining as a strategy, based on a
more diverse epistemology that embraces all of these means of knowing. As a strategy,
Imagining can change with the addition and/or subtraction and/or integration of texts and groups
and knowledgeable others and spirit. Imagining as a strategy can also adjust with changing
technical exigencies, rhetorical situations, or material realities that may lie beyond the
technology that we now use.

Much remains to be done to unpack the means of knowing and our use of them in
Imagining. I anticipate many conversations about the connections of these means of knowing,
including quantitative research. Principle among these conversations would be the question of
how imagination allows us to perceive the presence of others in the texts they write—their voice.
By interrogating the means of knowing, we might be able to disambiguate how Jim Corder
imagined the voice of Lieutenant Chadbourne in his faded letters. Imagining might be the arc of
knowing that allows me to identify with Corder describing himself as fading into the woodwork.
I suggest that the strategy of Imagining and the four means of knowing will be terms that will allow us to make visible these arcs of knowing in future scholarship.

When juggling balls—as with the arcs of knowing—a certain amount of unpredictability is built in. Unexpected actions of the wind, gravity, or watchers may affect the outcomes. A certain amount of unpredictability must be tolerated and expected in making use of all the four means of knowing (text, group, knowledgeable other, and spirit). Using these terms allows us to discuss knowing in ways that go beyond the conundrums of the post-everything age, beyond the process of writing, and even the post process of writing that pegs writing to a single epistemology. While the certainty of a single ideological viewpoint may be a loss, I argue that a diversity of epistemology will allow the field of rhetoric and composition to thrive in an uncertain future. The sage on the stage (so often problematized, but still so often enacted) must give way to the visible knowledgeable other who shares her means of knowing and encourages students to imagine the future. When we toss a ball, pitch an idea, or encourage a student’s imagining, we can’t predict and often can’t quantify the results. Certainty may not be possible in the post everything era. With a diversity of epistemology, Imagining is.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Ratio Chart for Imagination

From Burke’s Rhetoric of Motives

[The symbol  stands for “leads to,” as in “Imagination leads to prophetic vision.”]

Modern theories

Knowledge

Imagination

Aristotle: sensation ------- imagination ----------- intellect (78)

Imagination  prophetic vision

Poetry  Rhetoric (87)

Longinus: imagination = phantasia, used in Rhetoric to “master” the audience

“Ability to bring a vision vividly before the eyes of the audience” (79)

Mazzoni: Poetry  Rhetoric

Pico: thought = image

Senses  Imagination (danger)

Bacon: Rhetoric = Reason + Imagination  Will

Rhetoric / Imagination ~ Logic /Understanding

Religion, Opinion, Apprehension

Imagination

Santayana: Latin drama + German transcendental idealism  imagination  spirit creations

Modern uses: images  imagination
Lyric ≠ drama but also

Hazlitt: imagination ⇔ ethical decisions

Kant: ideas = reasons, principles, dialectics
   Senses ⇔ experiences, sensibilities and understandings
   Imagination = remembering/ anticipating

Bentham:

Bentham: Perception
   Sensation, memory, and ‘imagination’

From Grammar of Motives

Hobbs: Imagination = decaying sense (fancy and memory) (133)

Wallace Stevens: “idealistic cluster” for Imagination = personality, indirect egoism, nervous sensitiveness, morality of the right sensation, spirit out of its own self, temperament, mind describing itself (GM 224)

Spinoza: Sensations ⇔ Imagination ⇔ error and fancy (143-144)
From Vico’s New Science

Ancient poets (Homer, for example): senses = vigorous imagination; imagination ≠ reason (144)

Compounded memory = Imagination (94)

Additional ratios from Johnson’s Moral Imagination

For Kant pure knowledge ≠ empirical elements (67)

Reason ≠ empirical experience, empirical concepts, or imaginative mechanisms (68)

Reason = imagination = reason; [or at least] imagination = reason (31)
Appendix B: Alternative Chart for First Three Chapters of Genesis

Based on the ratio relationship/nonrelationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>God</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satan--out for himself</td>
<td>Good angels, servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate</td>
<td>Love&lt;sup&gt;20&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Life/ Resurrection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disobedient</td>
<td>Obedient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darkness</td>
<td>Light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td>Reward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction</td>
<td>Creative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devour</td>
<td>Rebirth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Friend</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Human Beings

Created in image of God

Prone to choose Satan

<sup>20</sup> For a full list of characteristics of a sinful nature and a spiritual nature, see Galatians 5:19-22.
Appendix C: Coleridge’s Place in the Philosophy of Imagination

Engell suggests that Coleridge is “a natural climactic point” in the study of Imagination (129). The following graph is my interpretation of the lines of inquiry that he points out and my extension of it, which is suggestive rather than exhaustive.
Appendix D: A Graduate-Level Course on Online Learning

Question: Design a graduate-level course for PhD students and advanced MA students who plan to teach online writing courses at the college level. How would this course prepare individuals to design and implement online instruction? Specifically what resources, assignments, and deliverables would be required? Develop a syllabus and course materials that includes justification for the course and learning outcomes.

Rationale:

Guidance for instructors who will be teaching online is needed, even if those instructors are experienced in brick and mortar classrooms. In her experimental study of online learning strategies, Jacqueline Carroll states that the most significant concept to take away is “that faculty preparation for the online environment is of utmost importance” (478). The lack of preparation is also identified as one of the problems of online teaching, along with increased workload and isolation (Capra). The need for professional development is an emerging trend according to DeGagne and Waters. They also call for more research in several areas including faculty development programs. That preparation should go beyond technology. Harrington, et al, suggest that “teachers need to be trained not only to use technology, but to use it in pedagogically sound ways” (5). If experienced faculty need preparation to make the shift from face-to-face (f2f) to online teaching, students serving as Graduate Teaching Assistants will certainly need the guidance of an academic course before they teach online. With enrollment in online classes up 358 percent since 2003 (Instructional Technology Council) and more than 90 percent of institutions offering online courses (Capra), online teaching will probably be one of
the areas where new graduates can find employment. An academic course and experience teaching online can prepare them to contribute from day one of their employment (Green and Reed), as well as will assisting them in the job market.

The following scholars have spoken directly to this issue graduate preparation and professionalization. Updating the 1999 survey, Stuart Brown, Theresa Enos, David Reamer and Jason Thompson give a snapshot of the profession of rhetoric and composition. They pose an important question: “Are our PhD programs preparing graduates for the kinds of careers that they obtain?” My answer would be “no, not unless preparation and experience in online teaching is included in the graduate program.” Brown, et al. note that the number of dissertations on technology and communication have increased 40 percent (second only to the general category of “other”). These dissertations indicate an interest in the technology, and perhaps online learning, by graduate students.

In her four-year longitudinal study, "Preparing the Next Generation of Faculty: Graduate School As Socialization To The Academic Career," Ann Austin identifies several areas where changes are happening (perhaps as great as those of the later nineteenth century when the modern university was established): approaches to teaching and learning, increasing diversity, new technologies, community expectations of the academy, faculty lifestyles, and the academic market. This course will address some of those changing approaches to teaching and learning, as well as new technologies and entry into the academic job market. Austin also identifies a request by graduate students that they have opportunities for regular and guided reflection” (112). Two assignments in this class, the digital literacy narrative and the personal online pedagogy, will afford that opportunity.
In their analysis of the expectations for graduate learning, Sosnoski and Brumester suggest that graduate student/faculty collaboration will be necessary in this century and challenge rhetoricians to rewrite the scripts by which they work and live and reimagine roles and boundaries. My course will include collaborative work as the instructor and the graduate students brainstorm and synthesize varying proposed standards for the design of online courses.

Based on an analysis of teaching assistant (TA) narratives in the program where she mentors them, Barb Duffelmeyer characterizes them as mirroring their first year composition (FYC) students’ need to enact “performance before competence” (296). In this situation of dissonance and learning, both groups tend to fall back on the transmission model of learning, with the use of computers only adding to the problem and the potential. Duffelmeyer questions whether more technical preparation would be effective. She differentiates between training and preparation, writing that failure to do so would result in computer use being separated from its pedagogical basis and further increase TA dissonance. She recommends active participation as practiced by one TA: “an on-going process of participatory activity, a purposeful and active route of exploring and figuring things out as circumstances demanded” (303). She adds that new TAs cannot know ahead of time what strategies are needed, but this knowledge “can be developed in the communities of practice” (304). She suggests beginning with the WPA statement of goals to help new TAs to develop a philosophy of teaching (305). [I have chosen to use the CCCC Position Statement.] She advocates allowing them to have the “freedom not to measure up to utopian claims” about computer use (306). Instead of front-loading all the preparation in the first week before the semester, her program has a gradual approach with the realization that “learning to teach is a process” (308). In my course, graduate students will form
a “community of practice” by sharing knowledge and writing their own personal pedagogy, while understanding that they will continue to learn with every class that they teach.

Like Duffelmeyer, Barton and Haydn make the argument that new TAs should not be overwhelmed with information. They suggest that, rather than insisting on competency in a broad range of technology, trainees should be provided with examples of the powerful use of technical mediums within their specific fields. In their survey of teacher trainees in the field of education, Barton and Haydn found that intensive training regarding many technological mediums simply overwhelmed them. Instead of complete coverage, the trainees surveyed suggested that specific practical guidance as needed in the context of teaching would be more helpful. In light of this research, my course will allow students to choose which technological medium they would like to research. Rather than insisting that each student become competent in all the technologies, the reports will be posted to the class wiki and available to the students as they find a need in their teaching.

Shelley Reid is also concerned that a preparation program that seeks to cover everything that a new teaching assistant needs to know will limit options for growth. She suggests instead emphasizing “discoveries that lead to long-term learning over immediate competencies” and the life-long habit of “thinking like a teacher” (16). She identifies pressures that make coverage in a pedagogy course seem necessary: prevalence (wide spread comfort with survey courses); introductory status; and certification (the necessity to provide competent teachers); as well as trends within composition/rhetoric to broadly include many new theories and media, and the trends with education for professionalization. She suggests the paradigm of “reflection in action” through either a problem-based strategy or a discovery-draft strategy to counter these pressures. She offers examples of assignments from the pedagogy courses that she has taught. She
acknowledges that one pressure for coverage comes from the TAs themselves, as they seek to understand how to teach. Most do not want to hear that the concept of uncertainty is “an enabling condition” (28). She suggests that new teachers need to form a teaching agenda as well as a research agenda. In addition to the reflection activities, my course will include an ongoing professionalization opportunity, with the students meeting once a month for encouragement and guidance. A discussion forum will be available on the wiki for more immediate feedback.

In addition, Hewett suggests that the instructor can also share her/his own writing as a model of the process (61). Larkin also suggests this sharing as a part of building a presence and modeling the process (50). In the interest of building this presence/community, I will share my own digital narrative.

Graduate students in this class also need to see the connection of online learning to the larger field of rhetoric and composition. As William Condon notes, the prominence of writing in most, if not all, online activities naturally leads to a concern for the rhetorical effects of audience, purpose, and context. He suggests the following to take advantage of these virtual characteristics: opportunities to write at various levels of formality, collaborative writing for their own purposes, academic conversations. The assignments and the interaction through the wiki will provide these opportunities.

As a result of their interviews with ten online instructors and two administrators at two North Carolina institutions, Orr, Williams, and Pennington argue that instructors must be involved with the design of the courses that they teach. Thus, my course has a strong emphasis on the standards for design that have been proposed. There does not seem to be a consensus for online course design standards, so the instructor and graduate students will attempt to synthesize one.
In their metasynthesis of nine qualitative studies of online teaching attitudes, Jennie DeGagne and Kelly Waters note that “the landscape of online teaching is still evolving as technology changes and becomes more omnipresent in education” (587) They also point to rapid development of new technologies as part of the reality of teaching online. Because of these rapid developments (and the need for ongoing preparation, as noted above), the instructor and graduate students will continue to meet once a month in person and more frequently in a discussion forum.

**Syllabus: EN 8900**

**Special Topics: Online Teaching and Learning**

*Cross listed with 4200 as a special topic*

**Prerequisites:** Composition pedagogy course and one semester teaching f2f

**Description of course:** A graduate level course for those preparing to teach online and open to both doctoral and masters level students. We will be discussing these questions throughout the semester: how do online classes differ from f2f ones? What theories and designs are best for online classes? What technology is best suited to these theories, designs, and differences? The topics will range from an introduction to online learning with Dykman and Davis’ Online Forum to the process/content we teach—literacy in its various forms. Topics will also include the digital literacy narrative, the Digital Archive of Literacy Narratives (DALN), and Linda Boynton’s own narrative of online teaching. We will also read articles on the theory and challenges of online learning from Selfe and Cooper and Peterson’s “Key Issues.” This is not just a theoretical class, and therefore, it will include specific strategies such as Lee-Ann Kastman Breuch’s virtual peer review, Beth Hewett’s writing conference, and Troy Hick’s workshops. We will have collaborative activities wherein the professor and graduate students are
co-learners: reports on specific technologies, synthesizing design standards, and the course wiki. Ongoing professionalization assignments include the personal digital literacy narrative and the personal online teaching pedagogy

**Learning Outcomes**

Upon successful completion of this course, students will

- Reflect on their own journey through/ with technology
- Be conversant with pedagogical theories related to online learning,
- Use and synthesize multiple design standards to choose strategies and design their own courses online,
- Collaborate with others to establish/ maintain a wiki that will serve as a continuing resource,
- Write a reflection on their own pedagogy,
- Continue professional development beyond the class.

**Texts**

Three books will need to be purchased:


PDFs of or links to the following scholarly articles will also be posted to the course’s web site.

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21 The wiki will be modeled after the ones used by Dr. George Pullman in his Foundations of Rhetoric and Rhetoric from Cicero to St. Augustine classes.


Institute for Higher Education Policy. "Quality On the Line: Benchmarks for Success in Internet-Based Distance Education" April 2000. 31 May 2001


http://www.ncte.org/cccc/resources/positions/digitalenvironments

**Assignments**

**Media Report**, ongoing: Students will choose one technology (Second Life, Skype and other video links, smart phones, tablets, podcasts, MP4, wiki, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) and report on its use in online courses. Students will sign up for the technology they wish to explore and a date to present their findings.

**Personal digital literacy narrative**, due week 5: Students will write a paper of at least one page, double spaced, reflecting on their connections with computers and other digital media. The instructor’s digital literacy narrative will be available as a model.

**Course Design Report**, due week 8: After our brainstorming and synthesis in class, choose one standard or blend of standards and outline a composition class, giving the rationale for the design.

**Annotation post**, due week 12: Read, cite and annotate a new/different article or book about online learning to the class wiki. Because these should all be different, students should post their intended source early. This will be an ongoing bibliography that you can access when you are continuing your professional development.

**Personal online teaching pedagogy**, due week 15: using the sources we have read or additional ones from the bibliography, students will write a reflection of at least three pages on the pedagogy that they will use in teaching online. A works cited page should be attached.
Schedule

Week 1—Introduction, overview of online teaching
Read: Dykman and Davis, “Online Education Forum” all three parts.

Week 2—Theory and Challenges
Read and discuss the following:

- Peterson, “Key Issues”;
- Hewett Chapter 4, “Theories for Writing Responses in Online Settings” and “Postscript: Toward a Theory of Conference-Based Instruction”;

Week 3—Online teaching narratives and the Digital Archives of Literacy Narratives (DALN)
Read and discuss: Linda Boynton, "When The Class Bell Stops Ringing: The Achievements And Challenges Of Teaching Online First-Year Composition."

Week 4—The literacy myth and multiliteracies.

- Read: Graff, H.J. “The Literacy Myth at Thirty.”;
- National Council of Teachers of English “Position Statement on Multimodal Literacies.”
- Dennis A. Lynch and Anne Frances Wysocki. “From First-Year Composition to Second-Year Multiliteracies: Integrating Instruction in Oral, Written and visual Communication at a Technological University.”

Week 5—Digital literacy.
Assignment due: Write personal digital literacy narrative
Read: Robin Goodfellow, "Literacy, Literacies and The Digital In Higher Education."
Week 6—Peer reviews online

Read: Breuch, Lee-Ann Kastman. *Virtual Peer Review: Teaching and Learning about Writing in Online Environments*.

Week 7—Standards for design

In class collaborative, brainstorm and write a meta-synthesis of the standards suggested by the following reading selections. (These readings will be divided, with different groups reporting on the standards in their particular readings.)

- Theresa Capra, “Online Education: Promise and Problems.”
- CCCC Position Statement on Teaching, Learning, and Assessing Writing in Digital Environments (Yancy, et al)
- Institute for Higher Education Policy, "Quality On the Line: Benchmarks for Success in Internet-Based Distance Education"
- Lester Faigley, “Beyond Imagination: The Internet and Global Digital Literacy.”
- Lawrence Tomei, *Designing Instruction for the Traditional, Adult, and Distance Learner: A New Engine for Technology –Based Teaching*. [an E-book]

Week 8—Research on successful online courses

Read Wallace, Raven M. “Online Learning in Higher Education: a Review of Research on Interactions among Teachers and Students.”

Assignment due: Choose one standard or blend of standards and outline a composition class, giving the rationale for the design.

Week 9—online workshops

Read Troy Hicks, *Digital Writing Workshop*. 
Week 10—Hands-on practice on a software delivery platform (Blackboard, WebCT, Learning House, as available through the university)

Week 11—Hands-on practice, continued

Read Baker, David L. “Designing and Orchestrating Online Discussions.”

Week 12—Emerging Scholarship

Assignment due—post an annotation to the class wiki of a new/different article or book about online learning.

Week 13—Online conferencing

Read: chapters 1-3 of Hewett, The Online Writing Conference

Week 14—Online conferencing continued—role playing

Read: chapters 5-8 of Hewett, The Online Writing Conference

Week 15—Continuing professionalization—list serves and discussion forums

Assignment due: personal online teaching pedagogy

Continuing Professionalization

Students will meet once a month during the first semester of teaching online to discuss problems, questions. A discussion forum connected with the course wiki will also be set up for ongoing discussion and timely feedback.
Appendix E: A Move toward an Unsyllabus

Syllabus: EN 8900

Special Topics: Encouraging Imagining Online

**Rationale:** A course about Imagining is essential due to the disappearance of Imagination, as the step-child of Invention, from conversations about rhetoric and composition theory (Crowley, Lauer, Hawk—discussed in chapter one). In addition, a deep-seated distrust of Imagination seems to underlie much theory, possibly beginning with Burke (discussed in chapter two). However, Imagination is necessary for ethical treatment of others (Johnson). I also suggest that Imagination is also necessary for confronting an event horizon of five years, beyond which we cannot forecast as problematized by Robinson. Research in online learning has shown that a social presence is necessary for optimal learning (Wallace). I suggest that reflections on imagining and practices that encourage imagining will enhance the creation of presence online.

**Prerequisites:** Composition pedagogy and at least one semester each teaching face-to-face and online classes.

**Description of course:** This course is an introduction to the theory and practice of Imagining. Special attention will be paid to students reflecting upon their own practices of knowing and on inventing ways to encourage imagining in online courses. (Here I leave out specific technical instructions about discussions and turning in assignments so that the course can be adapted for either online, hybrid, or face-to-face presentation.)
Learning Outcomes

In addition to institutional objectives of critical thinking, successful completion of this course should result in the following:

- Students may possibly be more knowledgeable of their own means of knowing (the group, text, spirit, and knowledgeable others) through reflection on their practices;
- Students may be more prepared to understand persons of other discourse groups who access different sources for knowing;
- Students may discover additional connections between their ways of knowing and their ability to imagine different scenarios;
- Students may be able to apply some or all of their insights to their teaching practices;
- Students may be more aware of and able to articulate their roles as knowledgeable others;
- Students may have compiled a canon of their own that they may draw on for future writing and insights;
- Students may be able to formulate their own objectives and designs for encouraging imagining.

Texts

The following are two texts that I have found helpful in talking/ writing/ learning about Imagination. One of my questions to you will be the following: what two texts (as in any written
material, possibly, but not necessarily a book) that you have found helpful either in articulating a theory of imagination or enacting imagination (yes, that choice could be fictional).


**Assignments**

**Dialectical notebook:** You will need to respond to at least six of the following quotations by agreeing, disagreeing, adding an example, suggesting a change that this idea might make in your teaching, or making some other connection. You will also need to add five quotes of that you have found about Imagination and respond to these quotes in a dialectical notebook. This notebook is a regular spiral or bound notebook with a line drawn down the middle. The text, quote, or observation is written on the left side with the student’s thoughts on the right side. You may create this notebook using Word documents or Adobe PDF software. Due dates and notebook checks to be determined.

- “Imagination is our means of interpreting the world, and it is also our means of forming images in the mind,” with both of these processes intertwined.” (Mary Warnock *Imagination* 194)

- “The imagination is better served in the long run by the vistas afforded by the work of other people better equipped than oneself to discover truth.” (Mary Warnock “Towards a Definition” 114).

- “One of the reasons I have come to concentrate on imagination as a means through which we can assemble a coherent world is that imagination is what, above all, makes
empathy possible. It is what enables us to cross the empty spaces between ourselves and those we teachers have called “other” over the years. If those others are willing to give us clues, we can look in some manner through strangers’ eyes and hear through their ears. That is because, of all our cognitive capacities, imagination is the one that permits us to give credence to alternative realities. It allows us to break with the taken for granted, to set aside familiar distinctions and definitions.” (Maxine Greene. Releasing the Imagination 3)

- “All depends upon a breaking free, a leap, and then a question.” (Maxine Greene, Releasing the Imagination 6)

- Reason is the enumeration of quantities already known; imagination is the perception of the value of those quantities, both separately and as a whole. Reason respects the differences, and imagination the similitudes of things. Reason is to imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the spirit, as the shadow to the substance.” (Percy Bysshe Shelley “A Defense of Poetry” 310)

- “To the mind, images serve as if they were contents of perception. If it judges them to be good, it pursues them. If it judges them to be bad, it avoids them. That is why the mind never thinks without an image.” (Aristotle, quoted by Kenneth Burke in The Rhetoric of Motives, 80)

- “The only possible way for spirit to create is to imagine.” (George Santayana, Realms of Being p. 575; qtd. by Burke in The Rhetoric of Motives, 82).

- “There is no doubt that words may, equally with the imagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we keep strictly on our guard. Moreover, words are formed according to popular fancy and intelligence, and are, therefore, signs of things
as existing in the imagination, not as existing in the understanding.” (Spinoza, qtd. by Burke in Grammar of Motives, 144.)

- “The Imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary Imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate: or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. FANCY, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites. The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and space; while it is blended with, and modified by that empirical phaenomenon of the will, which we express by the word Choice. But equally with the ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association.” (Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, XIII, 76).

- “Humans are fundamentally imaginative creatures whose understanding of experience is built up with imaginative materials of cognition. Contrary to the received view, such metaphors and other imaginative structures are what make criticism possible in the first place…” (Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination, 3)

- “Imagining is an ideal area in this day and age for students to utilize their own learning skills and techniques, as they may choose to express themselves in a way
that is less limited than would be in a normal classroom situation, and more appropriate to their learning process.” (Fabrice Poussin, interview)

**Reflection.** Using the means of knowing (spirit, text, group, and knowledgeable other), write about how you come to know. This one-page essay is to be amended at the end of the semester to add how your perspective has changed during the course. I am looking for your engagement with these terms and your interrogating your own learning processes.

**Annotated Canon of Imagination.** This is an annotated bibliography focusing on Imagination. You should have at least ten sources that you have surveyed. List by MLA conventions and add a paragraph that describes how and why each one contributes your knowledge of imagining and imagination. There is no restriction on genre. I would like for you to present these to the class.

**Imagining a Syllabus:** Based on what you have learned about imagining, design a syllabus that departs from the traditional prescriptive template.

**Assessment**

Assessment will be based on Peter Elbow’s Contract for a B, which awards a B for all work that is turned in by the due date, with a higher grade based on content. In your work, I will be looking for evidence of your thinking about your means of knowing, even if this includes approaches that you later abandon (including those reasons for abandonment) and your engagement with the ideas we are discussing. When you explain the reasons for your ideas, that helps me understand your thinking.

**Schedule**
**First session:** I will present my thinking and research about imagining, including my argument that this is a necessary strategy for the twenty-first century. The following questions are offered as suggestions for the focus of our classroom (or online) discussions. After the first week, we will modify the focus questions to reflect your ideas about encouraging imagining and your emerging authority as a scholar. We will also set the due dates for the assignments when we write the schedule.

- What are your goals for this course?
- What are your primary texts?
- Who are your primary knowledgeable others?
- How can what you have learned from any of these means (or combination thereof) be a basis for online teaching?
- What questions would you like the group to discuss?
- What technical aspect would you like to master or learn more about?
- What online strategy would you like to explore?
- What are the challenges of online learning (generally and personally)?
- How can imagining be a thirdness for finding ways to overcome the challenges?