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On Nietzsche, Homer, and Dissimulation

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ON NIETZSCHE, HOMER, AND DISSIMULATION

by

JOEL A. VAN FOSSEN

Under the Direction of Jessica Berry, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I focus on two undervalued aspects of Nietzsche’s admiration of the ancient Greeks: the healthy psychology of the Greeks, and the origins of this health in Homeric poetry. I argue that Homer was a cultural physician for the ancient Greeks and is responsible for creating a new, healthy set of values through his epic poetry. In turn, these Homeric values brought Greece into its “tragic age”—a time during which Greek culture was “the highest authority for what we may term cultural health” (PTAG 1). Moreover, Homer’s success as a cultural physician comes from his ability to lie poetically lie. So, I also give an account of how Nietzsche thinks this kind of lying is psychologically possible through what I call Nietzschean dissimulation.

INDEX WORDS: Friedrich Nietzsche, German philosophy, Homer, Truth
ON NIETZSCHE, HOMER, AND DISSIMULATION

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JOEL A. VAN FOSSEN

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1 INTRODUCTION

In his inaugural address at the University of Basel, Nietzsche lectured on the “Homeric question,” which is “the question of the personality of Homer” (HCP 151). This question was central to debates in nineteenth century German philology.¹ As James Porter argues, Nietzsche’s early philological career focused on “the formation of Homer as a locus of cultural value: indeed, [these works] are an inquiry into the value of this value” (Porter 2004, 7). For Nietzsche, however, the Homeric question reveals less about the personality of Homer and more about “the weight of the personalities of the philologists!” (ibid.) On Nietzsche’s view, the popular caricature of ancient Greece as a civilized culture of rational discourse and the birthplace of impartial inquiry did not faithfully represent how Homeric texts described ancient Greek culture. In these texts, the Greeks waged constant brutal warfare, worshipped vengeful gods, and loved art in virtue of its beauty, not its truth. As a young Classical philologist, Nietzsche recognized what his colleagues and contemporaries missed in “the gulf between the ideal antiquity […] and the real antiquity” (HCP 150). According to Nietzsche, philology properly done poses a threat to the idealized image of the Greeks—an image that many of his contemporaries held. Indeed, by discovering the “real image of antiquity,” we can see that the Greeks “have a trait of cruelty, of tiger-like pleasure in destruction [tigerartiger Vernichtungslust]” (HC 174). And for Nietzsche, they take pleasure in this instinctual cruelty—a quality that is praiseworthy and healthy.

In this thesis, I focus on two undervalued aspects of Nietzsche’s admiration of the ancient Greeks: the healthy psychology of the Greeks, and the origins of this health in Homeric poetry. I

¹ The question focused mostly on whether Homer was an individual or a tradition of poets. Heinrich Schliemann’s archaeological discoveries in the early nineteenth century, according to James Porter, revitalized the idea that Homer was “not a phantom but a material reality” (Porter 2004, 16). On the other side of the debate was Richard Claverhouse Jebb. Porter describes Jebb’s reaction to Schliemann: “what Schliemann unearthed was both excitingly and frighteningly strange, and Jebb would have none of it. He disputed Schliemann’s methods and challenged his findings” (ibid.). The debate between Schliemann and Jebb surrounding the Homeric question continued to be important for philologists throughout the nineteenth century.
argue that Homer was a cultural physician for the ancient Greeks and is responsible for creating a new, healthy set of values through his epic poetry. In turn, these Homeric values brought Greece into its “tragic age”—a time during which Greek culture, according to Nietzsche, was “the highest authority for what we may term cultural health” (PTAG 1). I make my argument in two main sections. In the first section, I explain what it means on Nietzsche’s view to be a “cultural physician,” and how Homer was the first successful physician after the failure of previous attempts to unify ancient Greek culture under a set of values, namely by the Orphic cults and Hesiod. Homer’s success comes from his ability to lie poetically about the events that led up to the fall of Troy and the unification of the ancient Greek world. In the second section, I give an account of how Nietzsche thinks it is psychologically possible for a person to lie to herself through, what I call, Nietzschean dissimulation.
2 A HEALTHY HOMERIC PSYCHOLOGY

When Nietzsche praises the Greeks, he does not have in mind a static, monolithic culture. He understood that ancient Greece underwent transformative cultural shifts over the course of hundreds of years. Nietzsche is most interested in the Greeks of what he calls the “tragic age,” which spans from Homer to what he sees as the degeneration of Greek culture with Socrates and Plato. The specific dates are less important for Nietzsche than that the healthy era of Greece fell between two periods of illness. Before the tragic age, Greece was in a “pre-Homeric abyss” (HC 179)—a time in which “Orpheus, Musaeus and their cults reveal what were the conclusions to which a continual exposure to a world of combat and cruelty led—to a nausea at existence, to the view of existence as a punishment” (HC 175). The period in Greece before Homer is an “abyss” because at that time, Nietzsche describes, the cities located around the Greek peninsula were engulfed in a “bloody jealousy of one town for another, one party for another” (GSt 167). Moreover, a “murderous greed of those petty wars, the tiger-like triumph over the corpse of the slain enemy, in short, the continual renewal of those Trojan battle-scenes” (ibid.) became the continuous state of the Greeks. And, as Nietzsche argues, “without a state, in the natural bellum omnium contra omnes, society is completely unable to grow roots in any significant measure and beyond the family sphere” (GSt 170). According to Nietzsche, as a result of the political instability in the Greek peninsula and the surrounding Mediterranean, the Greeks produced mythologies symptomatic of a pessimistic and war-torn culture, which, to use Hobbes’ phrase, rendered human life as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1651, 78).²

Because the Greeks emerged from this abyss to convalescence, Nietzsche describes the Greeks’ health in the tragic age as an “achievement.” He argues, “The celebrated clarity,

² Nietzsche’s description of “the natural bellum omnium contra omnes [a war of all against all]” is a direct reference to Hobbes from whom Nietzsche borrows the phrase.
transparency, simplicity and orderliness of the Greeks, [...] can easily mislead us into believing that all this was simply handed to the Greeks” (HH II: 219). Moreover, what is distinct about the tragic age is the dominance of Homeric values. For it is Homer who “liberated Greece from Asiatic pomp, vagueness and obscurity and [...] attained to architectural clarity on a large scale and a small” (ibid.). Nietzsche asks, “where do we look if we stride backwards into the pre-Homeric world, without Homer's guiding and protecting hand? Only into night and horror, into the products of a fantasy used to ghastly things” (ibid.). Thus, out of the pre-Homeric abyss, Homer was the cultural physician who brought Greece into an age of health.

Homer’s role as cultural physician here is crucial. Nietzsche discusses cultures as being either healthy or decadent. We should not take terms like “cultural health” or “decadence” to be merely metaphorical for Nietzsche. When he discusses the “health” or “decay” of a culture, he is referring to the psychological and physiological state of the individuals in that culture. In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche gives an account of what a culture is and what the task of a cultural physician is in relation to it:

The various cultures are various spiritual climates each of which is especially harmful or healthful to this or that organism. History as a whole, as knowledge of the various cultures, is pharmacology but not the science of medicine itself. The physician is still needed who will avail himself of this pharmacology to send each person to the climate favorable precisely to him—for a period of time or forever. (HH II: 188)

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3 See also WC 375; HH II: 220.
4 When Nietzsche mentions the pre-Homeric “Asiatic pomp,” he is referring to Orphism, which is thought to have originated in Asia minor. See, for example, Ovid IV.1, and also Early Notebooks 7[123]; HC 175-6; HH II: 219.
5 Jessica Berry gives an account of this Homeric “liberation” on Nietzsche's view. She argues, “Freedom, in this non-metaphysically loaded sense of a mere absence of constraint or even of never having known such constraint, is in Homer’s case a freedom from superstition, from the crushing weight of moral convention, and from the systems of morality that tyrannize modern individuals” (Berry 2013, 90). This notion of freedom is consistent with Nietzsche’s fatalism because, as Donovan Miyasaki argues, “Nietzsche’s normative ideal of a higher, more valuable human type consists of the only kind of agency he believes to be possible: the mere feeling of freedom—the qualitative feeling alone, without deeper substance” (Miyasaki 2016, 256).
Before a physician can prescribe a cure, she must first understand the physiology of her subject. She must understand how a patient’s illness disrupts this physiology, and what “climate” is necessary for convalescence. To understand properly the health the Greeks achieved through Homer, we must first understand Nietzsche’s view of the psycho-physiology of the Greeks prior to Homer; the Orphic illness; the failure of others, namely Hesiod, to cure the Greeks; and how Homer succeeded as a cultural physician. Crucially, Nietzsche argues that we may gain insight about the nature of different cultures in different periods of history from a careful analysis of their language and the texts they wrote. Nietzsche calls this form of analysis philology. He describes philology as the ability “to read facts without falsifying them through interpretations, without letting the desire to understand make you lose caution, patience, subtlety. Philology as ephexis in interpretation” (A 52). Nietzsche’s analysis of the Orphic texts, Hesiod, and Homer is an attempt to understand how Homer came to be the dominant locus of value in Greek culture without letting modern values pollute that understanding. Moreover, the Homeric poems are full of poetic accounts of bloody battles, lying characters, and petty gods. Nietzsche wants to understand why these events and characters became the Greek ideal and what their success as cultural ideals tells about the psychology and physiology of the creatures who adopted them.

2.1 The Simple and Logical Greeks

The Greeks acquired their health, but Nietzsche maintains that certain psycho-physiological traits were characteristic of the Greeks throughout their history. For example, Nietzsche argues, “The Greeks are indescribably logical [logisch] and simple [schlicht] in all their thought; at least in their long good age they never wearied of this” (GS 82). To understand
what Nietzsche means by “simple [schlicht]”⁶ thought, we may contrast it to the psychological complexities of the priestly type. On Nietzsche’s view, the priestly types complicated the otherwise simple relations among evaluative concepts for aristocratic cultures, like the Greeks. While the Greeks instinctively equated nobility and goodness (GM I: 7), the priestly types complicated this relation by judging that “the miserable alone are good” (ibid.). The former equation is “coarse, crude, superficial, narrow, straightforward, and above all unsymbolic” (i.e., simple), while the latter is “its inversion” (GM I: 6). The simplicity of Greek thought is instinctual—the instinctual evaluation that “nobility is good” does not require calculation and does not lend itself to reflection. The “inversion” of these concepts, however, requires reflective reasoning, and through it “man first became an interesting animal, [...] only here did the human soul acquire depth in a higher sense and become evil” (ibid.).

One way in which the Greeks were simpler than moderns—one way in which they hadn’t yet acquired “depth”—is that the Greeks saw value in cruelty. Nietzsche describes the experience of cruelty: “To see somebody suffer is nice, to make somebody suffer even nicer—that is a hard proposition, but an ancient, powerful, human-all-too-human proposition” (GM II: 6). “Cruelty,” Nietzsche argues, “is one of the oldest festive joys of mankind” (D 18). Moreover, Nietzsche argues that the Greeks “have a trait of cruelty, of tiger-like pleasure in destruction [Vernichtungslust]” (HC 174, emphasis added). The impulse to cruelty is a facet of human psychology in general, and the Greeks took joy in this cruelty. The value equation that “cruelty is good” is not arrived at by reflection; it is a simple, instinctual reaction to the fact that the Greeks experienced cruelty as pleasurable.

In addition to their simple thinking, Nietzsche describes the Greeks as “logical in all their

⁶ ‘Schlicht’ means ‘simple’ in the sense that something is ‘uncluttered’, ‘unpretentious’, or ‘plain’.
thought” (GS 82). He argues, “What was the point of the Greeks? […] All the presuppositions for a scholarly culture, all the scientific methods were already there, […] the factual sense, the last and most valuable of all the senses had schools and traditions that were already centuries old!” (A 59) In his early lectures on the pre-Platonic philosophers, Nietzsche describes this “factual sense” more explicitly. He argues,

The Greeks regarded Thales of Miletus as the first philosopher. In itself it is arbitrary to say that so-and-so is the first and that before him there were no philosophers, for a type does not [come to] exist all at once. Such a stipulation follows from a definition of “the philosopher.” This [riddle of defining philosopher] is what we seek to solve. Thales posits a principle from which he makes deductions; he is foremost a systematizer. It might be argued that, on the contrary, we already find the same quality in many of the older cosmogonies. We need only to think of the cosmological notions in the Iliad, then the Theogony, then the Orphic theogonies. (PPP 2)

In this passage, Nietzsche presents several historical examples of how the Greeks had a drive to understand the world systematically. The Greeks, whether philosophers or poets, seek to uncover facts; they want to create explanatory systems to help them understand the world in terms of certain truths. Later in his lectures Nietzsche argues, “The power to systematize—very strong in the Greeks’ ranking and genesis of their gods—presents us with a drive never coming to rest” (PPP 3). If we look at Thales’ case more closely, we can see that the Greek desire to systematize. Nietzsche argues,

I do not mean, of course, that Thales’ thought in some attenuated or restricted sense contains a sort of poetic truth. One might imagine there could be some sort of value in it for an artist, […] the whole typology, in fact, of sculpture—might well find the proposition, “all is water,” a true one. On the contrary, the thought of Thales—even after realization that it is unprovable—has its value precisely in the fact that it was meant non-mythically and non-allegorically. (PTAG 3)

Thales wanted to create a system to explain the world in terms of a truth that he considered verifiable. This drive to systematize is what makes the Greeks’ thought “logical.” And as Nietzsche mentions, this drive is an instinct older than Thales (PPP 2).

It is important to note that the simplicity of thought and the factual sense Nietzsche
ascribes to the Greeks are not by themselves sufficient for health. As Jessica Berry argues, “the ‘will to a system’ Nietzsche denounces is the hypertrophied desire for understanding that, qua pathological, is the cause of so many philosophical ‘symptoms’” (Berry, forthcoming), which is well-supported by much of what Nietzsche maintains regarding “systematizers” (TI ‘Arrows’ 26; D 318). Moreover, according to Berry, the will to systematize is motivated by an unchecked will to truth. She argues, “What is crucial is that the will to truth that informs all genuinely scientific endeavors not become insatiable, not become attached to the value of truth as unconditional. ‘Everything unconditional,’ Nietzsche says, ‘belongs to pathology’ (BGE 154)” (Berry, forthcoming). So, the power to systematize is an expression of a particularly powerful—dominant or even unconditional—will to truth. The systematizing instinct of the Greeks is, if left untreated, pathological. In the next section, I show how this pathology plagued the Greeks before the tragic age.

2.2 The Orphic Illness

The unification of Greece as a healthy culture would need to come from a system of values that allowed the Greeks to flourish given their “simple” and “logical” thought. Any cultural physician that would attempt to create a healthy set of values for the Greeks would need to consider these impulses as fundamental to her patient’s healthy psycho-physiology. In other words, a cultural physician cannot ignore the psycho-physiological facts; this way of thinking must be regarded as a healthy process of the organism, not a disruption of a healthy process. Nietzsche presents three poetic attempts to establish a system of values for the Greeks: the Orphics, Hesiod, and Homer (PPP 2).
As I will show in this section, Nietzsche’s view of the Orphics’ attempt at systemization was an attempt to establish two primary values: (i) that what is related to the soul is good, and (ii) that what is related to the body is bad. The systemization of these values, according to Nietzsche, was an illness for the Greeks, though a short-lived one. Nietzsche argues, “If we stride backwards into the pre-Homeric world, without Homer’s guiding hand to protect us,” we delve, “only into night and horror [...] where earthly existence is reflected in these repellingly dreadful legends” (HC 175). Orphism emerged from this “pre-Homeric abyss,” and is historically, according to Nietzsche, the first attempt at a systematic theogony. He outlines four different versions of Orphic Theogony. In the first version, the creator-gods are Night, Heaven, Chaos, and Ocean (PPP 3). The pre-Homeric “abyss” refers to the age in which the mystery cults, including Orphism, were widespread religions in Greece. Although the precise origin and establishment of these cults is unknown, there is a general Orphic doctrine, as reported by both Plato and Pindar. In Plato’s Cratylus, for example, Socrates discusses several possibilities for the etymology of the term ‘body’ (σῶμα). First, Socrates speculates that ‘body’ (σῶμα) is derived from ‘grave’ (σημα). He then speculates that “those around Orpheus” (οἱ ἄμφι ὘ρφέα) are most likely responsible for inventing the term ‘body’. Socrates then explains, “[the Orphics] were under the impression that the soul is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe (σώζω), as the name body (σῶμα) implies” (Cratylus 400c). The accuracy of Socrates’ etymology, which is speculative, is not important; however, the description of the Orphics’ view of the body is. It is important because

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7 The dispute about whether Orphism is earlier than Homer is controversial because there is no mention of Orphism in the Iliad or Odyssey. However, in “Homer’s Contest,” Nietzsche clearly argues that Orphism is pre-Homeric. Biebuyck, Praet, and Vanden Poel give a reason for Nietzsche’s position: “Homer’s silence on the topic had, in Nietzsche’s view, nothing to do with the sequence of historical events, but with a deliberate strategy founded on manifest lack of agreement between Orphic thought and the spirit of Homeric poetry” (Biebuyck et al., 2004, 166).
this view of the body is “a misunderstanding of the body” (GS P 2) and symptomatic of a life-denying philosophy.

Furthermore, in the *Meno*, Plato reports the primary importance of the soul, according to Orphic doctrine, and the function the soul plays in determining punishment in the afterlife. Plato describes these central tenets of Orphism in the following way:

As Pindar too says it, and many others of the divine among our poets. What they say is this; [...] They say that the human soul is immortal; at times it comes to an end, which they call dying; at times it is reborn, but never destroyed, and one must therefore live one’s life as piously as possible:

*Persephone will return to the sun above in the ninth year*
*The soul of those from whom*
*She will exact punishment for old miseries.* (Meno 81b)

The Orphic cults were based on the myth that humans are the descendants of the Titans, who were responsible for killing Dionysus. As bearers of the Titans’ burden, humans are subject to punishment in the afterlife depending on how virtuous they were on earth. Crucially for Nietzsche, Orphism is a religion based on one’s personal responsibility for one’s own actions, which then determine eternal punishment or reward. It is an ascetic religion in which one denies the body to promise a better condition for the soul after death. Therefore, on Nietzsche’s view, Orphism led “to nausea at existence, to the view of existence as a punishment to be discharged by serving out one’s time, to the belief that existence and indebtedness were identical” (HC 175). The Orphic doctrine also led to certain constraints on how one ought to act in order to secure a preferable after-life; for instance, “keeping wholly to inanimate food” (Laws 782c). In the *Gorgias*, Socrates endorses this Orphic view of the body by quoting Euripides: “For I tell you I should not wonder if Euripides’ words were true, when he says: ‘Who knows if to live is to be dead, And to be dead, to live?’ and we really, it may be, are dead; in fact I once heard sages [the
Orphics] say that we are now dead, and the body is our tomb” (*Gorgias* 492e-493a).

Orphism was a product of the Greeks’ instinct to systematize. That is, it was an attempt to provide a totalizing explanatory system about the gods, cosmos, and humans’ relation to these. According to Nietzsche, “precisely these [Orphic] conclusions are not specifically Hellenic” (*HC* 175). Such conclusions led to the failure of an Orphic *reformation* in Greece—“all [Orphism] managed to found were sects” (*GS* 149). The Orphic imperatives of how one ought to live (e.g., that one must be a vegetarian to avoid eternal punishment) are non-Hellenic in the sense that such demands are different from established cultural norms in pre-Homeric ancient Greece.

More importantly, Orphism was an attempt to suppress the Greeks’ “tiger-like love of destruction [Vernichtungslust].”

On Nietzsche’s view of physiology, ignoring or resisting one’s instinct does not destroy that instinct. Instead, Nietzsche argues, “All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn themselves inwards” (*GM* II: 16). For example, the priestly type’s denial of “the instinct for freedom” in the *Genealogy* does not lead to the destruction of that instinct—it redirects it inwards. Nietzsche argues, “The *instinct for freedom*, forcibly made latent [...] Driven back, suppressed, imprisoned within, and finally discharging itself only on itself: this, only this, is *bad conscience* in its beginnings” (*GM* II: 17). However, unlike the slave revolt from the first section of the *Genealogy*, in which the priestly types “undoubtedly succeeded” (*GM* I: 9), the Orphic demands were *physiologically impossible* for the Greeks to sustain. Nietzsche argues,

To demand of strength that it *not* express itself as strength, that it *not* be a desire to overwhelm, a desire to cast down, a desire to become lord, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs, is just as nonsensical as to demand of weakness that is express itself as strength. (*GM* I: 13)

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8 See also Plato’s *Phaedo* 80c-84b.

9 To call this demand psychologically impossible might seem implausible. However, I should note that the demand was (i) impossible to sustain, and (ii) Nietzsche does not recognize enough of a distinction between the psychological and the physiological to make what is psychologically unsustainable physiologically possible.
Orphism nonsensically demanded that the Greeks not be who they were and not take pleasure in destruction. So, on the one hand, Orphism’s attempts to provide a totalizing theogony and cosmology satisfied the Greek instinct to systematize. On the other hand, the Orphic reformation failed because it made a physiologically impossible demand. Nietzsche argues, “That several attempts to found new Greek religions have failed testifies to the higher culture of the Greeks even in rather early times” (GS 149). However, the Greeks’ strong lust for destruction is not sufficient for bringing about a healthy culture. As Brian Leiter notes, on Nietzsche’s view, “human beings are by nature cruel and aggressive, but giving free rein to those natural impulses would obviously be incompatible with communal life” (Leiter 2015, 178). So, for the Greeks to be a culture, which requires communal living, any system of values or cultural institutions would need to provide either an outlet for Vernichtungslust or sufficient power to redirect it internally. Orphism provided neither of these.

### 2.3 Hesiod’s Failure

In the wake of Orphism’s failed reformation, there came two more attempts to establish a unifying mythology: Hesiod and Homer. What distinguishes Hesiod and Homer from the Orphics is what Nietzsche calls in “Homer’s Contest” the “Greek genius.” As opposed to the Orphics who, as Nietzsche argues, “thought that a life rooted in such an impulse [to combat and victory] was not worth living” (HC 176), the Greeks continued to view existing impulses as unavoidable. For example, Hesiod views envy as an unavoidable affect; it is not something that can be ignored. Hesiod writes, “There are two Eris-headed goddesses on earth” (Works and Days 11), and,
One should praise the one Eris as much as blame the other, if one has any sense; because the two goddesses have quite separate dispositions. One promotes wicked war and feuding, the cruel thing! No mortal likes her, but the yoke of necessity forces man to honor the heavy burden of this Eris according to the decrees of the Immortals. Black Night gave birth to the older of the two; but Zeus, who reigned on high, placed the other on the roots of the earth and amongst men as a much better one. She drives even the unskilled man to work [...] This Eris is good for men. (Works and Days, 12-26)

This passage, which Nietzsche quotes in full in “Homer’s Contest,” shows that Hesiod observed that envy is unavoidable—we are instinctively envious creatures. Importantly, Hesiod does not indicate that humans are agents who deserve praise or blame. Instead, we should assign praise and blame to Eris. In both its good and wicked forms, Eris drives humans to act. On the one hand, “no mortal man likes” the bad Eris, but “the yoke of necessity” forces humans to act in accordance with it. That is, “according to the decrees of the Immortals.” And on the other hand, humans may experience envy “as the effect of a benevolent deity” (HC 177). On Hesiod’s view, humans are passive subjects whom Eris drives to act in certain ways; they lack agency. Hesiod’s view of Eris is in opposition to the Orphics, who viewed humans as agents responsible for their actions and deserving of punishment in the afterlife. In later work, Nietzsche criticizes “the psychology of the will,” in which “people were considered ‘free’ so that they could be judged and punished—so that they could be guilty” (TI ‘Errors’ 7). The Orphics attribute agency to people, and therefore, responsibility, desert, and punishment. The genius of Hesiod, Nietzsche argues, is that he “acknowledges the existing impulse, terrible as it was, and regarded it as justified” (HC 176). Hesiod still believes that praise and blame are justified, but responsibility does not come from a human’s choosing to act from envy; rather, we should praise or blame Eris for human envy.

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Nietzsche does not distinguish between Eris and envy here. In another passage about Hesiod, Nietzsche argues, “Hesiod counted [envy] among the effects of the good, beneficent Eris” (D 38). My explanation for this is that “envy” is the relevant affect in both cases. The Greeks thought this came from Eris; Nietzsche thinks it comes from the drives.
Hesiod recognized that envy is good for humans in one form. In its good form, envy “drives even the unskilled man to work” (Works and Days, 25). However, this observation alone does not provide a way out of “the pre-Homeric abyss” (HC 179). For example, Hesiod recognized the unavoidability of Eris, but he considered it in one of its forms to be wicked. Nietzsche argues,

The envious man is conscious of every respect in which the man he envies exceeds the common measure and desires to push him down to it—or to raise himself up to the height of the other: out of which there arise two different modes of action which Hesiod designated as the evil and the good Eris. (HH II: 29)

Envy in its good form motivates an individual to become more excellent: “to raise oneself up to the height of the other.” In a discussion about Hesiod’s view of envy, Nietzsche argues “there was nothing offensive [for Hesiod] in attributing to the gods something of envy: which is comprehensible under a condition of things the soul of which was contest” (D 38). The good Eris is a motive to become better compared to someone else. However, even though it can motivate us to become great, it also has the power to lead to a world of wickedness. Eris, in one of her forms, is a motivating force that “no mortal likes” (HC 176). In its wicked form, envy motivates a person to push his opponent “down to the common measure.” Christa Davis Acampora describes the motivational difference between these two kinds of envy:

One can defeat an opponent in at least two ways: either by summoning a superlative performance from oneself, thereby winning by surpassing one’s opposition, or by diminishing the capacities of one’s opponent, thereby undercutting his excellence and overcoming by diminishing one’s opposition. (Acampora 2013, 19)

Good envy is a quality of the healthy individual who is focused on her own excellence; bad envy results from a hatefulfulness towards another—it is a resentful affect. For Hesiod, this hatefulfulness makes envy “wicked.” Consequently, Hesiod’s view is a deeply pessimistic one: first, we are constituted in such a way that we lack agency, and second, certain affects (e.g., bad envy) are wicked, resentful, and unhealthy.
Unlike the Orphics, Hesiod understood that the Greeks’ *Vernichtungslust* could not be ignored or extirpated. However, Hesiod failed as a cultural physician because he saw this instinct as an *incurable* sickness. For Hesiod, certain facts of our existence entail a view of the world that is pessimistic, and he lacked the ability to view these impulses in a non-pessimistic way. In Hesiod’s mythology, humans are a degenerate form of earlier, better races. There were five ages for Hesiod: the Golden Age, Silver Age, Bronze Age, Heroic Age, and Iron Age. In each subsequent age, humans degenerate and become more miserable. By the Iron Age, the period right after the Trojan War, Hesiod says, “For now is the race of iron; and they will never cease from toil and misery by day or night, in constant distress, and the gods will give them harsh troubles. Nevertheless, they shall have good mixed with ill. Yet Zeus will destroy this race of men also” (*Works and Days* 172-5). So, according to Hesiod, earlier, better humans “lived remote from ills, without harsh toil and the grievous sicknesses that are deadly to men” (*Works and Days* 94-5), but humans now need to toil and work until Zeus decides to destroy them. For Hesiod, humans are powerless compared to the gods. Human misery or joy is decided by the gods, whether Zeus or Eris, and finally, the advice that Hesiod provides is that we should try to give the gods “no cause for offense” (*Works and Days* 827).

In Hesiod’s eyes, the bad Eris is an evil affect that cannot be cured. His pessimistic worldview poses the same challenge that Schopenhauer presents for Nietzsche. Brian Leiter summarizes this challenge well:

Nietzsche’s concern is why we who confront seriously the terrible truths about the human situation—even before the ones constituted by pain and suffering befall us—should keep on living, when we know full well that life promises systematic suffering, immorality, and illusion? Why not accept Schopenhauer’s apparent verdict, and give up on life altogether? (Leiter, forthcoming)
Hesiod, like Schopenhauer, was committed to reporting about the world truthfully, but at the expense of health—he saw humanity and himself as necessarily doomed to wicked impulses. But he never justified why we should (or could) keep on living despite such pessimistic conclusions.

According to Nietzsche, Homer and Hesiod “depicted the same age” (D 189), an age of bellum omnium contra omnes. Hesiod is honest about his description of the world—he saw a world full of wicked impulses and created a mythology that explained this wickedness. However, “Honesty,” Nietzsche argues, “would lead to nausea and suicide. But now our honesty has a counterforce that helps us avoid such consequences: art, as the good will to appearance” (GS 107). The Greeks did not achieve their health through Hesiod. What was required for health—and is required for the health of an individual or a culture—was a psychological shift in how one could see the world. That is, a change in the affects and values one has about reality, even in its most brutal and harshest forms.

2.4 Homer the Cultural Physician

Hesiod could not imagine a world that was worth living in and in which the impulses of war and cruelty are necessary. Homer, on the other hand, accomplished the task of glorifying even these war-like impulses. Homer’s mythology depicted the same events as Hesiod, but he rendered them with a positive valence. In Greece after Homer, Nietzsche argues that “its colors through an artistic deception, seem lighter, gentler and warmer, its people, in this warm, multi-colored light, seem better and more likeable” (HC 175). Nietzsche often describes different affective states as different ways in which the world is “colored.”11 The artist, including the poet, influences the perspectives through which one experiences the world. There are a few ways to

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11 See HH II: 148; HH II: 116; D 26, 255, 426, 561; GS 7, 139, 152, 301.
interpret this claim about how our affective states “color” the world. On the one hand, Maudemarie Clark argues that Nietzsche uses “color” as a “metaphor for value” (Clark 1998, 68). Paul Katsafanas, however, argues, “Nietzsche will speak of affects and drives as ‘coloring’, ‘gilding’, ‘lighting’, and ‘staining’ the world. These terms suggest that affects and drives highlight or even alter aspects of an experience” (Katsafanas 2013a, 167). Although Katsafanas’ suggestion that the poet actually “recolors” the world is strong, it is more accurate to what Nietzsche argues. If the poet can cause a change in one’s psychology, then the poet also has the power to change our experience, including experiential content, like color. In his discussion of the dangers of Romanticism, Nietzsche describes one of the benefits of poetry as “spreading a Homeric light and splendor over all things” (GS 370). Crucially, Nietzsche does not think that the poet can do this through an act of deliberative willing. For Nietzsche, a person doesn’t choose her values and affects. A poet like Homer sees the world in glorified way, and this kind of psychology is common among artists.

What is unique about an artist, as opposed to any other person, is that the artist translates their affective states into art. In an aphorism titled “Towards a psychology of the artist,” Nietzsche argues, “One physiological precondition is indispensable for there to be art or any sort of aesthetic action or vision: intoxication” (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 8). For Nietzsche, intoxication is a characteristically strong feeling. Nietzsche argues, “the essential thing about intoxication is the feeling of fullness and increasing strength” (ibid.). Moreover, intoxication is an affect that is strong enough to cause an action by overpowering competing psychological forces. We can use “the most ancient and original form of intoxication”—sexual excitement—as an example. Sexual excitement becomes intoxicating when the desire for sex becomes strong enough to overcome

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12 See also Clark and Dudrick 2007, 203.
any other competing drives. An animal may be hungry, but sexual excitement can overcome even this impulse. Furthermore, intoxication is not merely a supremely strong affect that causes an action. “This feeling,” Nietzsche argues, “makes us release ourselves onto things, we force them to accept us, we violate them,—this process is called idealizing” (ibid.). “Idealizing,” then, happens across the animal kingdom. This action of forcing oneself onto an object is characteristic of the artist—the artist creates art in her own image. She forces her medium to become what she desires. We can imagine, for example, that the characters in Michelangelo’s sculptures are not true to nature but are instead the idealized forms of his own imagination.

Nietzsche argues, “[The born painter] never works ‘from nature’—he leaves it to his instinct, his camera obscura” (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 7). So, intoxication is a strong affect that causes one to act and idealize. For such an artist, “everything he sees, everything he wants, he sees swollen, driven, robust, overloaded with strength” (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 8). Although Homer and Hesiod “depicted the same age” Homer depicted this age of human heroes and victory in which humans overflow with strength and guile, according to his “camera obscura.” Hesiod, on other hand, has “the opposite condition, a specific anti-artistry of the instinct,—a way of being that impoverishes all things, dilutes them, makes them waste away” (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 9).

Nietzsche argues, “The greatest fact in the cultivation of Greece remains that Homer became pan-Hellenic so early. All the spiritual and human freedom the Greeks attained to goes back to this fact” (HH II: 262). However, Homer did not intend to change Greek culture. He was not a poetic political reformer—that would surely be an odd claim for Nietzsche to make. Instead, Homer provoked this reaction among the Greeks because his skill surpassed anyone else at that time; he became a figure of envy. Nietzsche argues, “The Greek is envious and does not experience this characteristic as a blemish, but as the effect of a benevolent deity” (HC 177).
Homer became a standard to compete against, he became revered, and the reverence for Homer invoked envy in other Greeks. Nietzsche describes an “attack” on Homer by other poets, who strove to do what Homer did but to do it better, i.e., to write poetry like Homer, but to write it more beautifully. He argues, “We do not understand the strength of this attack on the national hero of poetry unless we construe the root of the attack to be the immense desire to take the place of the fallen poet and inherit his fame” (*ibid.*). The “tiger-like” *Vernichtungslust* of the Greeks compelled them not only to emulate Homer, but to best him.13 “The Greek artists,” according to Nietzsche, “poetized in order to conquer; their whole art cannot be thought of apart from contest” (*HH I*: 170). Unlike Hesiod, Homer did not consider this impulse wicked, and unlike the Orphics, Homer did not view the body as a “prison” for the soul. Instead, Homer provided the Greeks with an inspiration to express their instincts externally. Homer rendered himself and his heroes enviable. For the Greeks, when one experiences something great, he does not stand in awe of it, but wants to gain power over it: “the greater and more eminent a Greek man is, the brighter the flame of ambition to erupt from him” (*HC* 175).

Homer’s role as a poet is crucial to understanding why he had such an influence on the ancient world: according to Nietzsche, in the ancient world poetry is an efficient means to gain influence.

In those ancient times that called poetry into being, one really did aim at utility, and a very great utility at that; back then, when one let rhythm penetrate speech—that rhythmic force that reorganizes all the atoms of a sentence, bids one to select one’s words and gives thoughts a new color and makes them darker, stranger, more distant: a superstitious utility, of course! (*GS* 84)

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13 The motivating force of envy that Homer invoked had an effect not only on the world of poetry but on the craftsmen and institutions of Greece as well. The meaningful struggle to best one’s rival is commonly referred to as *agon*. A discussion of the various ways *agon* affected the ancient Greek culture and its institutions is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion on these topics, see Siemens 2002, Acampora 2013, and Higgins 2015.
In ancient times, poetry provided an opportunity to impress upon others one’s own experience. Nietzsche argues that, “By means of rhythm one thus tried to compel them and to exercise a power over them: one cast poetry around them like a magical snare” (ibid.). The poet seeks to make his idealization have meaning not just for himself but also for others. Homer presented the world in a way that was desirable. To incite envy as Homer did, a poet must be good at presenting the world in a desirable way, but to gain influence, he must have some idea of the reality of the individuals (i.e., of their psychology and culture) whom she is trying to influence. Analogously, for the physician to cure her patient, she must have a proper understanding of her patient’s physiology.

Homer excelled in his capacity as cultural physician. He recognized the reality of necessary impulses and created a desirable image of the world based on these impulses. Nietzsche argues, “Three-quarters of Homer is convention [...] he wants to conquer immediately [...] the first condition is that he shall also be understood immediately” (HH II: 122). To be understood immediately, Homer rendered the world in such a way that the Greeks’ Vernichtungslust could not be ignored—he did not make the same mistake as the Orphics. And not only did he refuse to deny these instincts, he made them characteristics of the most enviable persons, namely Odysseus and Achilles. He immediately excited the Greeks because he knew what would excite them. On the one hand, Odysseus used his cleverness and adaptability to best his opponents: the Harpies, the Cyclops Polyphemus, and Circe. On the other, Achilles dominated his opponents with an uncompromising rage. In depicting his heroes in these ways, Homer established a system of values around which Greece in the tragic age flourished.

14 See also HH II: 221; D 544.
Homer has a healthy psychology; his poetry is mere fantasy, but it is, as Nietzsche says, art “in which the will to deception has good conscience on its side” (GM III: 25). In The Gay Science, Nietzsche describes this kind of art:

Honesty would lead to nausea and suicide. But now there is a counterforce against our honesty that helps us to avoid such consequences: art as the good will to appearance. We do not always keep our eyes from rounding off something and, as it were, finishing the poem; and then it is no longer eternal imperfection that we carry across the river of becoming—then we have the sense of carrying a goddess, and feel proud and childlike as we perform this service. As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us, and art furnishes us with eyes and hands and above all the good conscience to be able to turn ourselves into such a phenomenon. (GS 107)

Homer’s glorified depiction of pre-Homeric Greece was necessary for the Greeks to escape the nausea-inducing pessimism of other mythological accounts. Crucially, Homer’s poetry does not alter the fact that the events of the Trojan were brutal and bloody. It is, however, an idealized presentation of these events for the sake of overcoming unhealthy pessimism.

In the Genealogy, Nietzsche argues that suffering is a terrible truth about human existence. On Nietzsche’s view, like Hesiod’s, we are bound to suffer: “[man] was for the most part a diseased animal” (GM III: 28). However, Nietzsche continues, “the suffering itself was not his problem, rather that the answer was missing to the scream of his question: ‘To what end suffering?’” (ibid.) Hesiod’s failure as a physician was not that he noticed suffering, but that he failed to realize that it is the meaninglessness of suffering that makes it terrible. Homer, on the other hand, provided the Greeks with a meaning for their suffering. Instead of condemning the war-like instincts of the Greeks, Homer created the type of gods who became witnesses to this war and gave it a meaningful context. Nietzsche argues,

It is certain in any case that the Greeks still knew of no more pleasant offering with which to garnish the happiness of their gods than the joys of cruelty. With what sort of eyes do you think Homer had his gods look down on the fates of humans? What was the ultimate meaning of the Trojan wars and similar tragic horrors? There can be no doubt at all: they were meant as festival games for the gods. (GM II: 7)
Homer provided a new way of viewing the Greeks’ bloody and brutal history. As a poet, he glorified the exploits of Odysseus and Achilles for the sake of making them a spectacle. His primary concern was not with “getting the facts right”—his primary concern was making a world that was interesting for the gods, and as Nietzsche argues, these events were probably also “festival games for the poets” (ibid.). Homer wanted to make the world a worthy spectacle for himself—his drive to dissimulation was a reaction to preserve his own health. In this way, “Homer is so much at home among the gods” (HH I:125).

As an artist, Homer left it “to his instincts, his camera obscura, to sift through and express the ‘matter at hand’, ‘nature’, and object of ‘experience’…” (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 7) Homer’s primary concern was not to depict the events exactly as they happened, but to depict his idealized vision. Therefore, Nietzsche quotes Homer: “For as Homer says, ‘Bards tell many a lie’” (GS 84). However, as Nietzsche argues, “In the end, it comes down to the purpose the lie is supposed to serve” (A 56). Homer lied to make the world a worthy spectacle:

The facility and frivolity of the Homeric fantasy was necessary for soothing the immoderately passionate disposition and over-subtle intellect of the Greeks and temporarily banishing them. When their intellect speaks, how cruel and bitter life appears! They do not deceive themselves, but they deliberately and playfully embellish life with lies. (HH I: 154)

However, on Nietzsche’s view, lying does not always serve such healthy ends. Nietzsche argues, “Plato contra Homer: that is the complete, the genuine antagonism—there the ‘otherworldly one’ with the best of wills, the great slanderer of life; here its involuntary deifier” (GM III: 25). On Nietzsche’s view, Plato’s world is saturated in moral lies. Homer’s lies, on the other hand, serve only to empower his heroes—Achilles is neither morally good nor evil. He is, however, clever, beautiful, and an exceptional liar.
What prevents Homer from becoming an ‘otherworldly one’, like Plato, was that he was not merely a poet; he was also an astute observer of human behavior and motivation. His poetry is grounded in what Brian Leiter calls “Classical Realism.” As Leiter explains, “Realism in this sense refers to a certain hard-headed, unromantic, uncompromising attitude, which manifests itself in a brutal honesty and candor in the assessment of human motives and the portrayal of human affairs” (Leiter 2015, 38). Importantly, Classical Realism is not grounded in the unconditional will to truth. It is a desire for knowledge in the sense that knowledge can give us “a feeling of power” (TI ‘Errors’ 5). Nietzsche describes the realism in Greece as, “that strong, stern, hard matter-of-factness instinctive to older Hellenes” and “courage in the face of reality” (TI ‘Ancients’ 2). The drive to truth manifested itself in Greek psychology as this Classical Realism. Nietzsche admires the Classical Realism of the Greeks in the tragic age, and for Nietzsche, Thucydides is a paragon example of Classical Realism. He argues,

What is it I love in Thucydides, why do I honor him more highly than Plato? He takes the most comprehensive and impartial delight in all that is typical in men and events and believes that to each type there pertains a quantum of good sense: this he seeks to discover. […] Thus is him, the portrayer of man, that culture of the most impartial knowledge of the world finds its last glorious flower: that culture which had in Sophocles its poet, in Pericles its statesman, in Hippocrates its physician, in Democritus its natural philosopher, which deserves to be baptized with the name of its teachers, the Sophists. (D 168)

Nietzsche argues that Thucydides is part of “that culture of the most impartial knowledge of the world.” This “impartial knowledge” is not “objectivity” in the sense that objectivity is “disinterested contemplation” (GM III: 12), which Nietzsche criticizes. Thucydides’ impartial knowledge cannot be disinterested contemplation because Nietzsche praises Thucydides, saying, “there are fewer thinkers with so many ulterior motives” (TI ‘Ancients’ 2). Nietzsche highlights some of these “ulterior motives”: Thucydides’ “unconditional will not to be fooled and to see reason in reality,—not in ‘reason’, and even less in ‘morality’” (ibid.). This unconditional will
not to be fooled is not an unconditional will to truth. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche argues that the unconditional will to truth is not that “I do not want to let myself be deceived [*Ich will mich nicht täuschen lassen*],” it is that “I will not deceive, not even myself [*Ich will nicht täuschen, auch mich selbst nicht*]” (*GS* 344). We should not confuse these two. “Note,” Nietzsche warns us, “that the reasons for the former lie in a completely different area from those for the latter” (*ibid.*). For Nietzsche, the desire not to let oneself be deceived [*Ich will mich nicht täuschen lassen*] does not necessarily presuppose that self-deception is *in itself* bad. A person may want not to let themselves be deceived because knowledge is beneficial to them and not because knowledge is unconditionally valuable. For example, the more a person knows about an organism’s psychology and physiology, the more power she has over that organism. Therefore, Nietzsche argues, “Thucydides has *self*-control, and consequently he has control over things as well” (*TI* ‘Ancients’ 2).

The self-control comes from the fact that he could *allow* himself not to be deceived—this ability is a testament to Thucydides’ strength in the face of reality, which is sometimes terrible. As Nietzsche argues, “what divides natures like Thucydides from natures like Plato is *courage* in the face of reality: Plato is a coward in the face of reality—*consequently*, he escapes into the ideal” (*ibid.*). Thucydides’ courage, which is indicative of “natures like Thucydides” (i.e., the list of Greek figures from *D* 168), keeps him impartial in the face of reality—Thucydides does not need to create an ideal, like Plato. Thus, Thucydides has the courage to know about reality *and* this desire for knowledge is motivated not by an unconditional will to truth. Thucydides investigates impartially for the sake of not wanting to be fooled—to be fooled about reality would mean to have less control over reality.
Thucydides’ impartiality served as a means to become more powerful—to know more about nature, and thus have more power over it—but Nietzsche argues that Thucydides is “the great summation, the final manifestation of that strong, severe, harsh objectivity that lay in the instincts of the more ancient Hellenes” (TI ‘Ancients’ 2, emphasis added). Homer’s poetry embodies this Classical Realism—he never denies the Greeks’ Vernichtungslust, but he provides a scheme of values such that the Greeks could flourish in light of their instincts and history. Unlike the Orphics, who thought that the body was a prison for the soul, the heroes and gods of the Homeric poems are not above or more than their instincts. And unlike Hesiod’s account of psychology, Homer did not view human drives as wicked; Homer’s heroes embraced the ineradicable impulses, like envy or wrath. In a section titled “The Greek Ideal,” Nietzsche describes what the Greeks found valuable about Odysseus,

What did the Greeks admire about Odysseus? Above all, his capacity for lying, and for cunning and terrible retribution; his being equal to contingencies; when need be, appearing nobler than the noblest; the ability to be whatever he chose; heroic perseverance; having all means at his command; possession of intellect […] all this is the Greek ideal! (D 306)

The Greeks saw Odysseus as a hero because of capacities that he possessed, including an ability to lie. This Greek ideal, which we find in the heroes of Homer’s myths, includes skillful lying, a pursuit of knowledge, and employment of both for the sake of other drives, like “certain strong and powerful drives like the enterprising spirit, daring, vengeance, cunning, rapacity and the desire to dominate” (BGE 201). The drive to truth is employed by the Homeric drives, and has a new meaning under them. Thus, both the logical and the Greek instinctual Vernichtungslust are retained in Homer’s poems. What emerges out of the pessimistic pre-Homeric abyss is a healthy Greek ideal that venerates humans and glorifies them for the kinds of creatures they are.
3 TRUTH AND DISSIMULATION IN NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

At this point, it is important now to explain how Nietzsche thinks this kind of Homeric self-deception works. It cannot be the case that Nietzsche thinks Homer (or anybody) could lie about the world and believe those lies to be true. David Hume describes the absurdity of this idea well in his explanation of the difference between a fiction and a belief. He argues,

We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed. It follows, therefore, that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. (EHU 5.2)

Hume’s point is straightforward: There is a gap between fiction and belief. When we consciously tell a lie, we cannot believe that lie to be true. For example, we can forget that it was a lie. Imagine the odd sensation one has when he forgets whether a memory was a dream or something that really happened to him. In any case, for Nietzsche’s psychology of the artist to make sense, which is necessary for understanding how Homer is a cultural physician, he must be able to account for how a person can move from a fictional idea to the belief that this idea is non-fictional. In this section, I argue that Nietzsche can account for this by a concept that I call Nietzschean dissimulation.

As a psychologist, Nietzsche is interested in explaining our values, affects, and morals. His method is to discover their causes, rejecting that humans have any exceptional status within nature’s causal order. He aims to “translate humanity back into nature” (BGE 230). This method is in opposition to the “old-style psychology, the psychology of the will” (TI ‘Errors’ 7), which is not sufficient for explaining what, on Nietzsche’s view, we now understand about humans and nature, namely that all of nature, including humans, operates under the same kind of causal necessity. In the preface to The Gay Science, Nietzsche argues, “philosophy has been no more
than an interpretation of the body and a *misunderstanding of the body*” (*GS* P 2)—the psychology of the will is an example of such a misunderstanding (e.g., that we are somehow above or are more than our bodies). Nietzsche’s “new psychology” focuses on the fact that “one is necessary, one is a piece of fate” (*TI* ‘Errors’ 8). And, “with intrepid Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs of old metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping at him all too long, ‘you are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin!’” (*BGE* 230), Nietzsche locates our mental life in drives and wills that operate like desires, instincts, or powerful motivational impulses.

### 3.1 The Will to Truth

Nietzsche argues that we experience our affects and values only as the *effects* of our drives; the antecedent causes remain unknown (*TI* ‘Errors’ 5). That is, the way the drives affect our experience (e.g., what we value) indicates little—or possibly nothing at all—about their origins. So, when we reflect on where our affects and values come from, we are seeking

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15 See also *HH* I: 18, 39; *GS* 109, 115; *BGE* 18, 19, 21; *TI* ‘Errors’ 7.
16 In other places, Nietzsche calls this “siren song of old metaphysical bird catchers” the “metaphysical need.” See *HH* I: 26; *GS* 151, 347.
17 Some have argued that “Nietzsche ultimately treats drives not as attributes of agents (like desires) but as agents themselves” (Poellner 2005, 174). This view is the “Homunculi View.” One merit of this view is that it gives a clear explanation of Nietzsche’s frequent characterization of drives as having agent-like characteristics. For example, “suppose a drive finds itself at the point at which it desires gratification—or exercise of its strength, or discharge of its strength, or the saturation of an emptiness” (*D* 119). However, this view “would be rather incongruous for Nietzsche,” as Paul Katsafanas argues, “who so vociferously argues against the superfluous positing of subjects” (Katsafanas 2013b, 728). In addition, Nietzsche states that these agent-like descriptions “are all metaphors” (*D* 119). Others, like Katsafanas and Christopher Janaway, have argued that drives “are glossed as inclinations and aversions or fors and againsts” (Janaway 2007, 214). Katsafanas adds to this account, “A drive [for Nietzsche] is a disposition that induces an evaluative orientation. Drives manifest themselves by structuring the agent’s perceptions, affects, and reflective thought” (Katsafanas 2013b, 752). This second view is the “Dispositional View.” On the Dispositional View, drives are the affective and evaluative dispositions of individuals. The basic observation here is that our drives are the psychological dispositions we have for (or against) certain affects and values. It would be strange, as the proponents of the Dispositional View argue, to imagine that Nietzsche thinks drives just *are* homunculi. In this paper, I do not give an account of what drives are on Nietzsche’s view. Instead, I assume the Dispositional View is true. However, I discuss drives as having “agent-like properties” in the same sense that Nietzsche does in *Daybreak* 119, which I take to be useful but metaphorical.
some truth about their antecedent causes. This task is destined to be largely unsuccessful, however, because our experience is wholly a collection of *effects*. Still, we desire to know where our affects and values come from. For example, if one feels pain, he desires to locate the source of this pain, even if locating this source is merely an immediate and instinctual attempt to escape it. Nietzsche does not begrudge our attempts to discover what the sources of our experience are. As he argues, “To trace something back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and gives moreover a feeling of power” (*TI* ‘Errors’ 5). We desire knowledge because it is comforting and even empowering, and on Nietzsche’s account, this desire is the origin of the drive to truth. As Nietzsche argues, “Danger, disquiet, anxiety attend the unknown—the first instinct\(^\text{18}\) is to eliminate these distressing states” (*ibid*.). Consciously, a person may feel compelled to discover the truth, but he has this conscious desire because he is unconsciously driven away from distressing states. So, the drive to truth *is* a drive to eliminate distress, but this drive does not necessarily appear in experience as a drive to eliminate distress. To us, truth appears important.

On Nietzsche’s view, even though the drive to truth is an important facet of human psychology, there is a difference between “the question whether truth is necessary” and the conviction that “nothing is more necessary than truth; and in relation to it, everything has only secondary value” (*GS* 344). Like all drives, if it could, the drive to truth would dominate the others. If the drive to truth successfully dominates, it becomes “the unconditional will to truth” (*ibid*.). This unconditional will to truth still has its origin in eliminating fear of the unknown and understanding one’s experience *for the sake of* an organism’s health, but Nietzsche asks,

\(^{18}\) According to Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche seems to regard *Intinkt* [instinct] and *Trieb* [drive] as terminological variants; he will sometimes alternate between the two in the same sentence (see, for example, *GS* 1)” (Katsafanas 2013b, 727n). Throughout this paper I also regard these terms as interchangeable.
Is it really less harmful, dangerous, disastrous not to want to let oneself be deceived? What do you know in advance about the character of existence to be able to decide whether the greater advantage is on the side of the unconditionally distrustful or of the unconditionally trusting? But should both be necessary—a lot of trust as well as a lot of mistrust—then where might science get the unconditional belief or conviction on which it rests, that truth is more important than anything else, than every other conviction? Precisely this conviction could never have originated if truth and untruth had constantly made it clear they were both useful, as they are. (GS 344)

The unconditional will to truth, which is motivated by fear of the unknown, is likely to cause us harm because truth has a limited utility—truth can be useful or harmful depending on circumstances.

Truths can be harmful, on Nietzsche’s view, when “the truth is terrible” (EH IV:1). Brian Leiter explains what this means. Leiter argues, for example, that for Nietzsche “there are terrible existential truths about the human situation” (Leiter, forthcoming). These truths are Schopenhauerian; they are generally pessimistic truths about the insignificance of existence and the persistent insatiability of the will.19 Crucially, the terribleness of a truth depends on the affective response that one has to it. That is, the magnitude of the terribleness of a truth depends more on who knows it than what it is. As Leiter argues, “All the terrible truths are terrible if contemplated, if internalized, and taken seriously” (ibid.). Furthermore, he argues, what is really at stake for Nietzsche is that life should be experienced as worth living, not that a rational or cognitive warrant exists for continuing to live. The issue is our affective or emotional attachment to life, which the ‘terrible truths’, at least when taken seriously, threaten to undermine; the issue is not whether there are good reasons for continued life. (ibid.)

On Nietzsche’s view, good reasons (i.e., justifications with cognitive content) do not motivate us to keep living in light of terrible truths.

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19 In the first section of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer argues, “Only deeper investigation, more difficult abstraction, the separation of what is different, and the combination of what is identical can lead us to this truth. This truth, which must be very serious and grave is not terrible to everyone, is that a man also can say and must say: ‘The world is my will’” (WWR I.1).
One type of person whom these terrible truths would affect in an unhealthy way is the person with an unconditional will to truth. This type of person thinks that every truth is worth contemplating; they take them seriously because they believe that nothing is more necessary—and more important—than truth. On Nietzsche’s view, Schopenhauer himself was an example of this kind of individual. The *unconditional* drive to truth is ultimately why Schopenhauer could not satisfyingly address “the problem of the value of existence,” which is: “Does existence have any meaning at all?” (GS 357) Nietzsche argues,

The ungodliness of existence counted for [Schopenhauer] as something given, palpable, indisputable: he always lost his philosopher’s composure and became indignant when he saw anyone hesitate or beat around the bush on this point. This is the locus of his whole integrity; unconditional and honest atheism is simply the presupposition of his way of putting the problem [of the value of existence]. (GS 357)

Schopenhauer’s integrity is located in his intolerance for even the most attractive lies, and he became angry when others’ actions and words reflected a less uncompromising honesty. However, the way that Schopenhauer poses the problem of the value of existence demands some reason (i.e., a justification with cognitive content) for existence other than the false reasons offered by his contemporaries. That is, an affirmative answer to the question, “Does existence have any meaning at all?” must be justified. However, as Nietzsche argues, “One can see what it was that actually triumphed over the Christian god: Christian morality itself, the concept of truthfulness that was taken ever more rigorously […] Looking at nature as if it were proof of the goodness and care of a god; interpreting history in honour of some divine reason” (ibid., emphasis added). Even though Schopenhauer denied the idea of a Christian god, he still maintained a commitment to the unconditional value of truth. Therefore, Nietzsche argues that Schopenhauer’s pessimism is “his horrified look into a de-deified world that had become stupid, blind, crazed, and questionable, his honest horror…” (ibid.). Schopenhauer’s pessimism is rooted in the way he poses the problem of existence because this problem itself presupposes the
unconditional value of truth. So, for Schopenhauer, the drive to truth “represents just itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate master of all the other drives” (*BGE 6*), and “in relation to [truth], everything has only secondary value” (*GS 344*), even a person’s health.

3.2 Dissimulation

The alternative to the unconditional will to truth is the *conditioned* will to truth. The will to truth may be conditioned by self-deception, which plays a fundamental role in our psychology—so, we have something of an instinct to be deceived. Nietzsche argues that life is “aimed at semblance, i.e., error, deception, simulation, blinding, self-binding, and [that] life on the largest scale has actually always shown itself to be on the side of the most unscrupulous *polytropoi*” (*GS 344*). He also tells us:

Man [...] has an invincible tendency to let himself be deceived and is enchanted with happiness when the rhapsode tells him epic tales as if they were true, or when the actor in a play plays the king even more regally than he is in reality. The intellect, that master of dissimulation, is free and discharged from other slavish duties, so long as it can deceive without *harming*, and then it celebrates its Saturnalia. (*TL 2*)

I call this tendency to deceive *dissimulation*. This is the tendency we have to deceive ourselves, where such deceptions have a functional value for us. We do not necessarily value

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20 This is the word Homer uses to describes Odysseus in the first line of *The Odyssey*. The prefix ‘poly-’ means ‘many’, while the noun ‘tropos’ has several meanings. It can mean ‘custom’, ‘guise’, or ‘style’. Nietzsche’s interpretation of Homer’s use of the word comes from the many false personalities Odysseus dons in *The Odyssey*.

21 In this paper, I use the word ‘dissimulation’ as a technical term as opposed to ‘lie’ because a person may or may not be aware of their dissimulations. Harry Frankfurt’s distinction between a “liar” and a “bullshitter” is useful here. Frankfurt argues, “But the fact about himself that the liar hides is that he is attempting to lead us away from a correct apprehension of reality; we are not to know that he wants us to believe something he supposes to be false. The fact about himself that the bullshitter hides, on the other hand, is that the truth-values of his statements are of no central interest to him; what we are not to understand is that his intention is neither to report the truth nor conceal it” (*Frankfurt 1986, 13–14*). Lying is an intentional rejection of truth; therefore, lying presupposes that one *knows* the truth. The bullshitter may not know the truth because he doesn’t care about it, presumably because he has some other end to achieve. Similarly, a person can dissimulate without knowing that they are doing so. The crucial difference between Frankfurt’s “bullshitting” and my account of Nietzschean dissimulation is that bullshitting is a moral concept for Frankfurt, while dissimulation is the activity of a drive and necessary for experience at all. Dissimulation is not a moral issue for Nietzsche; it is a psychological mechanism necessary for an organism’s health. Moreover, the word ‘dissimulation’ is the appropriate technical term for etymological reasons. In Latin, the verb ‘*simulare*’ means ‘to look like’, ‘to pretend’, or to ‘imitate’, and the prefix ‘*dis-*’ means ‘completely’. The verb
deceptions in themselves; rather, we value deceptions for the sake of some other end (e.g., aesthetic pleasure). For example, when painting a portrait, an artist can deviate from the way her subject appears, manipulating details to make the painting more beautiful. For this artist, aesthetic pleasure is more important than a true representation—she prefers representing the world differently than it is because it feels pleasing to do so. But dissimulation is not restricted to self-reflective choices, like those of the artist in my example. It plays a more general role in Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology—experience itself presupposes dissimulation. In a section titled, “Life not an argument,” Nietzsche describes this kind of dissimulation,

We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are able to live—by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith [Glaubenartikel] no one could endure living! But that does not prove them. Life is not an argument; the conditions of life might include error [unter den Bedingungen des Lebens könnte der Irrthum sein]! (GS 121)

Crucially, Nietzsche argues that “the conditions of life might include error.” We must believe in these “articles of faith” (i.e., dissimulations) in order to perform basic physiological activities. Consider, for example, how Nietzsche describes our experience of “cause” and “effect”: “Cause and effect: there is probably never such a duality; in truth a continuum faces us, from which we isolate a few pieces, just as we always perceive a movement only as isolated points, i.e., do not really see, but infer” (GS 112, emphasis added). Nietzsche makes two important remarks about causation. First, we never see causation; we merely infer that one event follows another. This observation is similar to David Hume’s view of causation. Hume argues,

upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all of nature, any one instance of connection, which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. (EHU 7.2.1)

‘dissimulare’ sometimes has a similar meaning to ‘simulare’, as in ‘to feign that a thing is not that which it is’, ‘to disguise’, or ‘to hide’. But its second meaning is ‘to leave unnoticed’ or ‘to neglect’. So, the deception in ‘dissimulare’ is a self-deception—it is hiding something from oneself without the knowledge of doing so.

22 See also BGE 1, 4, 230; GS 354; GM III: 12, 24.
Hume concludes that our concepts “cause” and “effect” do not correspond with any real entities. We infer that certain effects follow from certain causes as a matter of conditioning—“[one] now feels these events to be connected in his imagination” (EHU 7.2). Similarly, Nietzsche argues, “we reason, ‘this and that must precede for that to follow’—but we haven’t thereby understood anything” (GS 112). For both Hume and Nietzsche, “cause” and “effect” are concepts that are fundamental to the way we experience the world, but they do not correspond with any real entities. For Hume, the process of connecting two events happens in the “imagination.” For Nietzsche, it occurs in the unconscious process of dissimulation.

The second point Nietzsche makes about causation is that we form the concepts “cause” and “effect” by isolating a few pieces of our experience, while ignoring the whole “continuum” of experience. That is, when designating one event as a “cause” and another as an “effect,” we are isolating these events from an entire continuum of sense data. If I see my friend push a cup off the edge of a table, for example, my judgment that “his hand caused the cup to fall” simplifies a much more complex set of natural phenomena (e.g., other activity happening in my field of vision). The cause (his hand moving) and the effect (the cup falling) are both events that my mind isolates in an otherwise continuous stream of sense data. When we infer some effect from a cause, Nietzsche argues, “There is an infinite number of processes that elude us in this second of suddenness” (ibid.). To make sense of the “suddenness” of the “continuum” of experience, only so much of it may enter our consciousness. This unconscious process includes selecting and emphasizing the experiences that enter consciousness. Nietzsche describes this unconscious selective process as active forgetting. He describes active forgetting in the following way,
Forgetfulness is no mere *vis inertiae* as the superficial believe; rather, it is an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of suppression, and is responsible for the fact that whatever we experience, learn, or take into ourselves enters just as little into our consciousness during the condition of digestion [...] as does the entire thousand-fold process through which the nourishing of our body, so-called ‘incorporation’, runs its course. (*GM II*: 1)

For Nietzsche, what enters consciousness is the result of a “subterranean” world of “noise and struggle” (*ibid.*). It is only through selective forgetting that we can form concepts like “cause” and “effect.” Otherwise, Nietzsche argues, “An intellect that saw cause and effect as a continuum, not, as we do, as arbitrary division and dismemberment—that saw the stream of the event—would reject the concept of cause and effect and deny all determinedness” (*GS* 112). But insofar as forgetting is an active force that prevents much of the “continuum” of experience from entering consciousness, what does make it to the level of consciousness is a *dissimulated version* of this continuum. So, concepts like “cause” and “effect” are crucial for experience, but they are merely the distorted results of an unconscious active forgetfulness. And Nietzsche lists other concepts that come from this same process. He argues, “We are operating with things that do not exist—with lines, surfaces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces” (*ibid.*). We have the concept, for example, of an absolutely straight line, even though such a line might not exist in reality (or at least we have never experienced it). Peter Unger makes a similar distinction when he talks about “absolute” terms. He argues,

> The terms of knowledge, along with many other troublesome terms, belong to a class of terms that is quite pervasive in our language. I call these absolute terms. The term ‘flat’, in its central, literal meaning is an absolute term. [...] To say something is flat is no different from saying it is absolutely, or perfectly flat. (Unger 1971, 94)

Unger is skeptical about whether we ever *accurately* apply certain absolute terms like ‘flat’. He argues, “in the case of some of these [absolute] terms, fairly reasonable suppositions about the world make it somewhat doubtful that the terms properly apply” (Unger 1971, 101). And insofar
as ‘flat’ is an absolute term, we might be skeptical that it applies to any physical objects. When we look at a flat surface, even under close inspection, “the surface is not one such that it is logically impossible that there be a flatter one” (Unger 1971, 102). Therefore, such absolute terms are helpful to the way we talk about the world, but they are inaccurate descriptions. When Nietzsche argues, for example, that “lines” do not exist, we can take him to be saying that absolute lines do not exist. Absolute terms are distortive and inaccurate, and to talk about reality in absolute terms is a form of dissimulation. These dissimulations are, however, fundamental to our experience. It would be impossible, and undesirable, to live in a world without concepts like cause and effect. So, even our most basic experiences presuppose dissimulation.

Naturally, not all dissimulations contribute to an organism’s health. Nietzsche argues that a dissimulation can be healthy “so long as it can deceive without harming” (TL 2), but it can also be unhealthy. Take, for example, the concept of free will. Nietzsche argues that free will is “the shadiest trick theologians have up their sleeves for making humanity ‘responsible’ in their sense of the term, which is to say dependent on them” (TI ‘Errors’ 7). So, the belief in free will involves dissimulation, just as in the case of cause and effect. “The notion of will was essentially designed with punishment in mind, which is to say the desire to assign guilt” (ibid.). The error of free will has its origin in the desire to punish and make others responsible and guilty for their actions, and this error harms because it is an illusion that priestly types use to make humanity dependent on them” (ibid). Unlike concepts such as “cause” and “effect,” the concept of “free will” is not fundamental to any healthy experience—its possible that we would be better off without it.

Importantly, dissimulations oppose the drive to truth. When we dissimulate, we don’t look into whether our dissimulations correspond with reality. To return to our earlier example,
we experience the world as a series of causes and effects, even though “cause” and “effect” do not correspond with any real entities. However, the drive to truth causes us to want to know the truth behind dissimulations (TI ‘Errors’ 5). But if the drive to truth becomes too strong, if it succeeds in “represent[ing] just itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate master of all the other drives” (BGE 6), we begin to mistrust all of our dissimulations. So, on the one hand, dissimulation conditions the drive to truth; it is healthy to believe certain dissimulations, like “the healthy concepts of cause and effect” (A 49). These concepts are the target of the priestly type, who invents guilt and punishment “to destroy people’s sense of causation: they are assassination attempts on the concepts of cause and effect!” (ibid.) On the other hand, too many dissimulations or the wrong kind of dissimulations are for Nietzsche antithetical to health. For example, guilt and free will are dissimulations meant to harm.

If we now return to Homer, we can see how Nietzsche accounts for the fact that Homer can see reality through his “camera obscura” without consciously deciding to do so. If a poet sees the world with a positive valence, as Homer does, then he can’t evaluate the world in any other way. On Nietzsche’s view, Homer rendered the world as a beautiful and worthy spectacle because that is the way he saw it. Moreover, insofar as artistic creation may be an unconscious activity of selecting and emphasizing, the healthy artist, like Homer, does not necessarily know for what reason she creates art. Instead, this artwork is the fortuitous byproduct of an organism that is healthy, as Nietzsche says, “at bottom” (EH ‘Wise’ 2).
4 CONCLUSION

For Nietzsche, one’s philosophy is preconditioned by how healthy or sick one already is: “In some,” he argues, “it is their weaknesses that philosophize; in others, their riches and strengths” (GS P 2). So, at the physiological level—“at bottom” (EH ‘Wise’ 2)—and before one engages in philosophy, one needs to be healthy. For the possibility of healthy philosophy, a culture needs “a philosophical physician in the exceptional sense of the term—someone who has set himself the task of pursuing the problem of the total health of a people, time, race or of humanity” (GS P 2). The health of the Greeks is traceable back to Homer, who is the cause of “all the spiritual and human freedom the Greeks” (HH I: 262), and who pulled Greece out of the “pre-Homeric abyss” (HC 179). But this cause was not mysterious. Homer had a profound impact on the way the Greeks saw the world, according to Nietzsche. And the way we see the world is due to the how we are constituted psychologically and physiologically. Healthy individuals, like the Greeks of the tragic age, do not regard envy as justified because they have, through reflective reasoning, discovered some argument in its favor. How we determine our affects and values is not through discovering some truth about them; this determination is merely the effect of the creatures we are. “While 'we' believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive,” Nietzsche argues, “at bottom it is one drive which is complaining about another” (D 109).

The Greeks were healthy because they did not seek a justification for their instincts. It takes a culture like the Greeks “to stop bravely at the surface, the fold, the skin; to worship appearance, to believe in shapes, tones, words—in the whole Olympus of appearance!” (GS P 4) On Nietzsche’s view, the “Greek genius” is not only a recognition that certain affects are necessary, but it is a recognition that we are our drives and nothing else. The appearances we
have are the deepest part about us, and thus, “Those Greeks were superficial—out of profundity!”

(GS P 4)
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