The Intellectual Intuition of Hegel's Psychology

Daniel Schwartz

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ABSTRACT

I argue that Hegel appeals to the idea of an “intellectual intuition” in his Encyclopedia Psychology and that this appeal has important ramifications for the received view of Hegel’s mature philosophy. Hegel did not, in my view, break with Schelling over intellectual intuition in as decisive a way as has been claimed. Establishing this greater continuity between Hegel and Schelling will, I hope, bolster a minority opinion in the literature and highlight a critical yet underappreciated aspect of Hegel’s philosophical method. To wit, Hegel was a consummate reviser and, as his dealings with intellectual intuition demonstrate, revamped rather than rejected certain of his predecessors’ doctrines.

INDEX WORDS: Intellectual intuition, Hegel, Schelling, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Theoretical intelligence
THE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION OF HEGEL’S PSYCHOLOGY

by

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THE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION OF HEGEL’S PSYCHOLOGY

by

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DEDICATION

To my parents, Mark and Ellen Schwartz, who never, even for a second, asked me “what I was going to do with that.”
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There are few orthodoxies in the world of Hegel studies. That Hegel came to reject “intellectual intuition” (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) as a faculty of knowledge—is not quite an orthodoxy, but it is a popular view among Hegel scholars. Kenneth Westphal is one such scholar, a prominent one, who has defended this view in several spirited articles of late.¹ Can Westphal’s view of Hegel, and that of so many of his colleagues, be resisted? It will come as no surprise (especially to those familiar with tired academic foreshadowing) that I think we can and should resist this view of Hegel. More surprising is the fact that Westphal himself provides a clue as to how such resistance might be mounted.

Westphal writes that if Hegel were truly attached to intellectual intuition, he would use “intuition as a cognitive medium” so that we can “know positively what role this alleged medium plays in Hegel’s epistemology” (2007, 113). Intellectual intuition, the idea of a mind that can produce the intuitions it thinks, was a hot topic in Hegel’s day, not least because Hegel loudly (and trenchantly) criticized it as a model for how humans could acquire knowledge. Hence Westphal’s opposition to the idea that intellectual intuition played a role in Hegel’s mature philosophy. Yet in the same essay that Westphal insists on Hegel’s rejection of intellectual intuition, the essay quoted above, Westphal nevertheless specifies where such an intuition would have to be found, if indeed it could be found, in Hegel’s mature thought. Hegel’s account of “theoretical intelligence” (*theoretischer Geist [Intelligenz]*), sections §§440-468 of his *Philosophy of Mind*—this is where Westphal tells us we must search even while he is convinced we search in vain (114).² And why?

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² Numbers preceded by “§” without further bibliographic information refer to sections of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Mind: A Revised Version of the Wallace and Miller Translation*. Edited by M. J. Inwood. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). I cite Hegel’s Remarks (*Anmerkungen*) by “A” and his Additions (*Zusätze*) by “Z.” My
Why can't we find intellectual intuition, a mind that creates its intuitions, in these otherwise auspicious passages of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Mind*?

Because, as Westphal argues, “any intuition” in these passages “incorporates and modifies sensations in ways that make possible representations, which in turn make possible both names and classifications, all of which together makes possible . . . conceptualization proper” (ibid.). We’re looking for a mind that generates the intuitions it requires for “thinking,” for “conceptualization proper.” Yet here we have a mind that incorporates the intuitions it requires for “thinking.” Here, intuitions are given to the mind; the mind does not give itself intuitions. For the mind of these sections, then, there can be no intuitions without sensations, no representations without intuitions, no names without representations, and no thinking without names. There is no coincidence, then, between thinking an object and intuiting one because here the mind must intuit to think. Thus, Hegel does not appeal to intellectual intuition in his *Philosophy of Mind*. Such, at least, is Westphal’s conclusion.

Yet it is significant, as I have noted, that while Westphal insists on the absence of intellectual intuition from Hegel’s mature philosophy, he nevertheless specifies where we would have to find this faculty. It is as if Westphal cites these passages of the *Philosophy of Mind* to anticipate the objection they might be adduced to support. But how compelling is Westphal’s prebuttal? Is he right to prescind intellectual intuition from these passages due to theoretical intelligence’s alleged dependence upon intuition?

Certainly, Westphal is right that intuition precedes representation in the mind’s development. Westphal is also right that the mind must have the capacity for intuition to develop the capacity for representation. But there is a way in which it is as important for the mind to

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citation method for all other primary sources can be found in the “Primary Sources” section of the bibliography located at the end of this paper.
dispense with intuition as it is to have had intuition in the first place. Consider the lifecycle of a plant, a frequent metaphor for Hegel. Before bearing fruit, a plant develops a pistil. After fertilization, the pistil grows into the fruit of the plant. The fruit contains the seed of a new plant and the bridge to a new lifecycle. Thus, the pistil is necessary for the plant to reach maturity. Just as necessary, however, is the pistil’s “negation” by the fruit it becomes. A plant must develop a pistil to mature. But it must also dispense with its pistil to reach maturity, to bear fruit. The same is true of intuition in Hegel’s account of intelligence.

Theoretical intelligence must develop a capacity for intuition to develop representation and thinking in turn. But at the same time, intelligence must dispense with intuition even though intuition is presupposed by the thinking that supplants it. In the stage at which theoretical intelligence can represent intuitions—the stage which Westphal identifies in order to exclude—in this stage the mind progressively severs its representations from their connection to and reliance on intuition. Indeed, this severance, whereby the mind detaches its contents from intuition, this is how the mind ultimately attains its freedom in thinking. The mind’s dependence on intuition, is then, like the pistil of the flower, crucially cast off in the process of its maturation. The mind eliminates intuitions it regards as other than itself so that is may be wholly at one with itself, wholly self-determined. How, in representation, does the mind emancipate itself from intuition and thereby dispense with what Westphal thinks it must presuppose? By creating what it presupposes, by producing the intuitions required for thought, in other words, by intellectual intuition.

Note well, that the intellectually intuitive mind Hegel describes here is not identical to the intellectual intuition he so famously renounced. Hegel employs some of the same concepts and strategies he developed decades earlier while experimenting with the idea of “an intellectual intuition of nature” (intellectuelle Anschauung der Natur). But, the intellectual intuition of the
Philosophy of Mind is a revised version, even a radically revised version, of the intellectual intuition Hegel worked on earlier in his career. That, at least, is the thesis of this paper.

Let me immediately dispatch two separate but related objections. I dispatch them here to help clarify what I wish to argue and why. The first objection is that mine and Westphal’s views of theoretical intelligence are only trivially different. I say theoretical intelligence must dispense with given intuitions so that the mind can give intuitions to itself in thought. Westphal says theoretical intelligence must derive its ability to think from intuitions the mind preserves. Ultimately, this difference could be said to boil down to emphasis. I see representations as intuitions produced by the mind—but crucially—severed from their connection to intuition. Westphal sees representations as intuitions modified by the mind but—just as crucially—retaining their connection to intuition. I focus on the created rather than derived character of representations, whereas Westphal focuses on their derived rather than created character.

The second objection is that mine and Westphal’s views of intellectual intuition are only trivially different. I say that the intellectual intuition of Hegel’s theoretical intelligence is a radical revision of his earlier work on the same subject. Westphal says that Hegel abandoned his earlier focus on intellectual intuition and that this intuition is, therefore, absent from Hegel’s mature thought in general and Hegel’s discussion of theoretical intelligence in particular. Here again, one might suspect that the difference between “a radical revision of intellectual intuition” and “an absence of intellectual intuition” is more a difference of emphasis than of substance.

Let me say by way of clarification that the point of contention in each objection—the relationship between representation and intuition in the first objection and the difference between the revision or excision of intellectual intuition in the second—that both points misrepresent what I wish to claim. I am not merely pointing out a loose analogy, one arguably more semantic than
philosophical, between an intellectual intuition of nature and a mind that thinks in the intuitions it creates. Indeed, the analogy runs deeper than this, as deep as some of the epistemic strategies both forms of intellectual intuition pursue in their quest for knowledge. To wit, both the intellectual intuition of Hegel’s earlier work and the intellectual intuition of his *Philosophy of Mind* come to know their object in the following way.

A. Both create the intuitions they seek to know.

B. Both abstract from the subjective contingencies of their created intuitions.

C. Both ultimately realize the unity that underlies their created intuitions and themselves.

To return to the two objections above, my argument does not turn on whether an intuition has been created or derived, or on whether enough of intellectual intuition persists for Hegel’s radically revised version to go by the same name. Rather, I try to show that what may at first seem like a rough parallel, between the intellectual intuition of Hegel’s youth and the theoretical intelligence of his maturity, deepens into a genuine philosophical debt when we consider Hegel’s consistent fealty to the three themes outlined above. For theoretical intelligence does indeed, as we shall see, develop into something that a) creates the intuitions it thinks, b) abstracts from these same created intuitions, and c) ultimately realizes the unity between these created intuitions and itself.

Apart from putting the brakes on an accelerating trend in Hegel scholarship, what is significant about Hegel’s mature debt to the doctrine of intellectual intuition? First, and most obviously, Hegel’s debt to this doctrine revises our current view of his debt to Friedrich Schelling, a champion of intellectual intuition who was, at different points in Hegel’s career, a dear friend, an esteemed colleague, and a bitter rival. Scholars commonly attribute the rift that divided Hegel and Schelling to Hegel’s rejection of intellectual intuition. So, evidence of a mature (if
significantly revised) appeal to this doctrine on Hegel’s part would alter how we understand the decisiveness, at least philosophically speaking, of their breach.

Second, and more important, Hegel’s debt to intellectual intuition hits home an often intoned but seldom internalized insight into Hegel’s philosophical method. To wit, Hegel was a consummate reviser and, as his dealings with intellectual intuition demonstrate, revamped rather than rejected certain of his predecessors’ doctrines. Appreciating Hegel as a philosopher of revision is critical to understanding his relationship to his philosophical past, and the philosophical past more generally. Consider the preface to the _Phenomenology of Spirit_, where, once again, the fructifying plant is front and center.

’T]he very attempt to define how a philosophical work is supposed to be connected with other efforts to deal with the same subject-matter drags in an extraneous concern, and what is really important for the cognition of the truth is obscured. The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements. The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole. But he who rejects a
philosophical system [i.e. the new philosopher] does not usually comprehend what he is doing in this way; and he who grasps the contradiction between them [i.e. the historian of philosophy] does not, as a general rule, know how to free it from its one-sidedness, or maintain it in its freedom by recognizing the reciprocally necessary moments that take shape as a conflict and seeming incompatibility. (1-2)

*The Phenomenology of Spirit* was the first major publication of Hegel’s philosophical maturity, the book that launched his independence from Schelling, Hegel’s closest mentor at the time. It was also the book that first put Hegel and Schelling at loggerheads. Hegel criticized Schelling’s ideas about intellectual intuition in withering (and eminently quotable) terms. And yet, despite the *Phenomenology*’s role in the drama of Hegel and Schelling’s divergence, the preface to the *Phenomenology* presents philosophy as a realm of reconciliation. Here, Hegel recasts the contradictions between diverse philosophies as so many opportunities for comity, as means to a unified system of knowledge, a science, that Hegel dedicates his career to devising.

If we put to the *Phenomenology* the question, “Does Hegel accept or reject Schelling’s account of intellectual intuition?” we can readily find the reply above. The *Phenomenology* rejects the question of acceptance or rejection because it is predicated on a misunderstanding of how philosophy progresses. Neither Hegel nor (genuine) philosophy advances by acceptance or rejection. Instead, both are engaged in a more nuanced, dialectical process of revision.

Bearing Hegel’s commitment to revision in mind, one sees that much of the literature on his reception of intellectual intuition seriously misconstrues his philosophical practice. Hegel does not draw or discard philosophical doctrines like so many cards in a deck. He renovates extant philosophical façades, usually Greek ones, doing them up in the modern style. In fact, the metaphor of renovation is Hegel’s. “To build a new city in a devastated land has its difficulties, even if there
is no lack of material at hand; but even greater are the obstacles, of a different kind, when the task is to give a new layout to an ancient and solidly constructed city, with established rights of ownership and domicile; one must also decide, among other things, not to make use of much otherwise valued stock” (2015, 507). Here, in the Science of Logic, the project is not so much one of creation as it is one of renovation.

Aside from what it says about his philosophical method, Hegel’s commitment to revision also says something about Hegel’s philosophical temperament. Few people would accuse Hegel of modesty. And no wonder. Hegel can be final in his philosophical judgments, bold in his systematic ambitions, and downright audacious in his breadth. But at the same time, Hegel never claimed to accomplish anything so extravagant alone. And despite what people assume, he also never claimed to have personally brought philosophy to an end, even if he asserted that the end of philosophy was in sight. “The last philosophy thus contains” as Hegel is careful to note, “the previous ones, includes all the stages, and is the product and result of all the ones that preceded it . . . [O]ne must rise above . . . one’s own vanity, the notion that one has thought something special” (TW 20:461). To conclude, Schelling’s doctrine of intellectual intuition is a bit like one of the stages in Hegel’s “last philosophy.” Its legacy, as I will argue, lives on even if, in the full flowering of Hegel’s thought, that legacy looks different than its progenitor.
2 BACKGROUND

2.1 When in Jena Do as Schelling Does

Schelling was just twenty-three when he became a professor at the University of Jena. Then, in 1801, two years after his appointment, Schelling published “On the True Concept of the Philosophy of Nature.” Here, Schelling describes an intellectual intuition of nature as a way to acquire knowledge of reality. After positing ourselves as subjects, and in so doing, identifying ourselves as the objects of such positing, Schelling bids us abstract from ourselves entirely. For, in abstracting from our ourselves as knowing subjects, we can reach the true basis of reality, namely, the unified ground on which both supervene. The challenge of Schelling’s intellectual intuition lies in this abstraction from our intellectual activity. Such abstraction, an activity Schelling sometimes describes as “depotentiating,” requires that we reach beneath our conscious activity to nature in its unconscious productivity.

The I must take the subject-object only from its own intuition (I make it non-conscious), but not from mine. The task is: to make the subject-object in this way objective, and to generate it from itself to the point where it coincides as one with nature (as product). The point where it becomes nature is also that where the unlimitable in it raises itself to the I and where the opposition between I and nature, which is made in common consciousness, completely disappears, so that nature = I and I = nature. (95-6)

In abstracting from itself the I also abstracts from its object, since subject and object are correlatives of one another.\(^3\) Thus, the depotentiation Schelling envisions is not so much a suppression of the subject, but of subject as opposed to object, subject as negatively related to

\(^3\) Schelling explains this correlation between subject and object rather crisply in his 1795 essay “Of the I as Principle of Philosophy.” “I call subject that which is determinable only by contrast with but also in relation to a previously posited object. Object is that which is determinable only in contrast with but also in relation to a subject” (1980, 75).
object. The I does not transcend the subject so much as the disjunction implied by subjectivity. Once the I neutralizes this disjunction in intellectual intuition, it can apprehend the unified ground of itself and its object, that ground which the diremption of subject and object presupposes, namely, nature. What is more, in engaging with nature as its ground, the I realizes its unity with nature; for the I is incarnated within it.

Hegel also published in 1801, his first major publication, *The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy* (a.k.a. the *Differenzschrift*). The *Differenzschrift* was devoted, among other things, to the man who had procured Hegel his first university job, Schelling, who was eight years Hegel’s junior. Schelling got Hegel a modest gig as a lecturer at Jena and, from 1801-1803, the two collaborated closely, often publishing jointly in a journal they founded together.

In the *Differenzschrift*, Hegel emphasizes the unified structure of nature, just as Schelling does in “On the True Concept.” For Hegel, though, if we are to preserve the integrity of this structure, we must do so with respect to both nature and the I and not, like Fichte and Schelling, privilege the one over the other. So, we must, like Fichte, conceive of the I as subject-object, and like Schelling, conceive of nature as subject-object. However, while it is necessary on the one hand, to separate out the composite structure of both the I and nature, it is also necessary on the other hand, to bring together both nature and the I as moments of a more fundamental unity, a unity one can abstract to in intellectual intuition. This more immanently differentiated but no less unified intuition of reality Hegel dubs “transcendental intuition” (*transzendentale Anschauung*).

In order to grasp transcendental intuition in its purity, philosophical reflection must abstract from this subjective aspect so that transcendental intuition, as the foundation of philosophy, may be neither subjective nor objective for it, neither self-consciousness as opposed to
matter, nor matter as opposed to self-consciousness, but pure transcendental intuition, absolute identity, that is neither subjective nor objective. . . Opposition as it pertains to speculative reflection is no longer an object and a subject, but a subjective transcendental intuition and an objective transcendental intuition. The former the Ego, the latter is nature, and both are the highest appearances of absolute, self-intuiting Reason.

Hegel is not more specific in the Differenzschrift about how to accomplish this abstraction in transcendental intuition. And given his later embrace of dialectics, one might suspect Hegel abandoned such an intuition altogether. Not so, as we shall see.

2.2 Hegel’s Psychology in the Philosophy of Mind

In the Psychology section of his Philosophy of Mind, Hegel gives an account of cognition that explains how humans develop the capacity for “thought” (Denken). What follows is an overview of this account. Then, in section three, I point out elements in Hegel’s account that, in my view, rely on Schelling’s theory of intellectual intuition.

Reason, for Hegel, involves the mind’s ability to lay hold of objects independent of itself. A mind that reasons can make true claims about what is. Humans can reason because the objects humans reason about are rationally constituted in the way the human mind is. In the Psychology, the developing mind exerts progressively more control over its objects and in so doing understands, and ultimately demonstrates, the above truth: that the objects of reality are intelligible to the mind because reality is identical to the mind—reality is rational.

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4 For a more extensive overview of Hegel’s Psychology see Lucia Ziglioli’s helpful account in Ziglioli, “World of Representation and Thought: Hegel on Subjective Knowing,” 2016.
5 See, for example, how Hegel puts this point in the Encyclopedia Logic. “To say that there is understanding, or reason, in the world is exactly what is contained in the expression ‘objective thought’” (1991, §24 A).
Besides accounting for how the mind can have knowledge, this compatibility between the mind and its objects also accounts for how the mind can be self-determining. Reasoning is a way for the mind to determine itself, to liberate itself from confronting something other. If the mind is only free when it is self-determined, then the mind may not be determined by an object, a thing that it regards as other. Thus, at the culmination of the mind’s reasoning, in thinking, the mind’s realized compatibility with its object is at the same time the mind’s liberation from its object’s otherness. It is then important to remember that Hegel invokes both knowledge and freedom in his Psychology because both are at stake.

Hegel begins his account of a mind gaining control over itself and its objects, by explaining how “intelligence” (*Intelligenz*) emerges from and incorporates two earlier forms of mind, that of “soul” (*Seele*) and “consciousness” (*Bewußtsein*) (§440). As the culmination of these forms, mind relates to objects both as determinations of itself (soul) and as determinations of something other than itself (consciousness). In comprehending both these relations, the mind realizes its constitutive role in its experience of objects and thereby emerges as intelligence. That the mind distinguishes between itself and its objects, and must do so to experience objects as such, indicates for intelligence the broader freedom it exercises in its activity.

After characterizing intelligence accordingly, Hegel proceeds to describe the stages intelligence progresses through en route to thinking. The first stage, “intuition” (*Anschauung*), shows intelligence that certain of its perceptions refer to objects outside itself. In intuition, intelligence direct its “attention” (*Aufmerksamkeit*) to objects in time and space and thereby differentiates these objects from its subjectivity (§448). Because intelligence must attend to objects to intuit them, intelligence regards its intuition of objects as entirely self-wrought. Yet in intuiting objects, the mind finds objects to be self-standing, and therefore determinative of intuitions
intelligence formerly considered self-determined. The objects of intuition must, therefore, be further incorporated into the mind for intelligence to determine its intuitions genuinely. In other words, intelligence must “inwardize” its intuitions.

Thus, the next step in intelligence’s increasing determination of itself and its intuitions involves the inwardization of intuition through “representation” (*Vorstellung*). Intelligence initially encounters representations in its “recollection” (*Erinnerung*) of past intuitions. When intelligence comes across an intuition it has had before, it refers this intuition to a past representation of it stored in the mind (§454). This type of mental representation, what Hegel calls an “image” (*Bild*), helps intelligence inwardize its intuitions by importing mental copies of them into the “space and time” of the mind (§452). When intelligence then encounters an intuition it recollects, it can regard this intuition as its own, as one it already possesses in its store of images (§454).

Also important for the greater control intelligence exerts over itself, and its intuitions is the recollected image’s abstraction from the intuitable manifold it represents. The image retains a portion of the perceptual content experienced in intuition, not the full range of content originally intuited (§452). The abstract image is, in this way, isolated from the immediate context that gave rise to it. It is now separable from the full range of contingencies (time, place, etc.) that produced the intuition it represents. Yet despite the image’s contextual independence from intuition, the type of intuition that initially produced the image is still necessary for intelligence to recollect the image. Intelligence cannot summon images at will. This changes in the first phase of “imagination” (*Einbildungskraft*), where intelligence can recall images of intuitions without those intuitions present. Here, in “reproductive imagination,” intelligence extends its mastery of intuition in being able to represent instances of intuition without requiring such instances to do so (§457).
In “associative imagination,” (Associirende) intelligence organizes its images under more universal images of its design (§456). So, intelligence might group the images of two conifers by identifying what they have in common and making this commonality the universal under which it subsumes both. This organization of images under universal images eventually yields still more universal images—more universal in their further abstraction from the wider range of particulars they comprehend (§455). The universal image of a conifer eliminates the varying determinations of all individual conifers, while the universal image of a tree eliminates the even more varying determinations of all individual trees. Now that intelligence incorporates both particular images (such-and-such conifer) and the general categories under which it organizes these images (conifers simpliciter), intelligence possesses intuitions in both their universal and particular moments.

This unity of universal and particular in intelligence signals the emergence of the “creative imagination” (Phantasie), the third and final phase of imagination’s development. Here, intelligence encounters an image as known (i.e., categorized under a universal), and as existent (i.e., instantiated in a particular image). Both knowledge of the image and the image itself are now within intelligence. Creative imagination is, in this unity of the two, self-contained or self-identical; it need not go beyond itself for its cognitions (§457). Yet because intelligence is self-contained in this manner, it has no way to confirm the veridicality of its images. Intelligence must, therefore, instantiate its ideas externally so that other subjects may verify them. Intelligence accomplishes this by creating “signs” (Zeichen) (§457).

Signs are physical things intelligence produces to refer to its internal images. And once again, the sign-making capacity of intelligence allows the mind greater control over its intuition of objects. This control is evident in the mind’s ability to make its internal images manifest to external intuition (§457 A). Also significant, is the way the mind produces such manifestations. In
linking a specific intuition to a specific mental image, intelligence severs the links this intuition naturally has to other mental images. In using an asterisk to signify a footnote, I disregard everything the asterisk’s intuitable form connotes: a star for instance. What is more, because the intuitable form of the sign (*) does not resemble the signified representation (the footnote), because the signifier is arbitrary, intelligence has free range in choosing what intuition it will use to signify the representation it has in mind (§458 A). Intelligence can equally use the word “conifer” or “Nadelbaum” to refer to its image of certain trees.

But, for the sign intelligence uses to be used and verified by other minds, intelligence must sustain the link it establishes between sign and image. It must remember that the word “conifer” means conifer so that is can use the word repeatedly and consistently, and so that it can recognize when other minds do the same. Thus, the signs intelligence initially established externally it now retains in “memory” (Gedächtnis), memory in its first phase of development, namely, “retentive memory.”

Then, in “reproductive memory,” the memorized signs now internal to mind are called “names” (Namen) (§462). Here, intelligence abstracts from the intuitable qualities of the singular name it inwardizes. So, in its inwardization of a name intelligence might leave out, for instance, certain sounds peculiar to particular utterances of the name in question. Yet at the same time, intelligence retains those sounds necessary for identifying that name in the future. Intelligence memorizes the name as universal and thereby retains the general form of the name by which particular instances of it can be identified (§461).

Once intelligence permanently links the name “conifer” to its image of one it no longer needs the image it has relied on so far. The name “conifer,” even without the image it refers to, is enough for intelligence to consider the type of tree in question. Intelligence, therefore, has
increased control over intuition in that it can dispense with intuition without also dispensing with its cognition of objects. In the name, intelligence deals with something that initially appeared to it in external intuition as an object, as a sign. Yet this object, the sign now represented in intelligence by a name, is one intelligence produced (§462).

In “mechanical memory,” (mechanisch) the third and final phase of memory’s development, the mind abstracts from intuition entirely, that is, from the intuitable contents still associated with names (§463). The mind does this because intuition, even as semiotically linked to names, is still subjectively conditioned. The circumstances (historical, cultural, physiological, etc.) I encounter conifers in condition my intuition of what a conifer is. Thus, in mechanical memory, the name “conifer” remains but what “conifer” signifies does not. In this way, the names of the mind are meaningless (§463). Collectively, however, these names are meaningful; they are the set of names memorized by intelligence and, as such, conform to the order intelligence imposes upon them. Intelligence’s memory is “mechanical” in that the order it arranges its names in is exogenous to the names themselves. Because they are individually meaningless, names have no internal connection to one another. Their only connection is the one intelligence confers upon them: they are all names of this intelligence (§463).

By being meaningful for intelligence but meaningless in themselves, the names of mechanical memory represent the final step in mind’s subjective development, the step in which mind becomes objective and can think. The names intelligence makes sense of are, in themselves, “senseless” (sinnlos), that is, utterly other than, and indifferent to, their intelligible order (§463). Thus, meaningless names are, in their otherness, objective for the meaning-making subjectivity that comprehends them. Names are the object of intelligence. In mechanical memory, the mind reconciles subject and object. For, subject (intelligence) and object (names) emerge as immanently
differentiated moments of a totality (mind). At the culmination of its development, then, intelligence exhibits consummate control over and liberation from the object it intuits by reconciling itself to its object’s otherness. The object is fully intelligible to the mind in being fit to be a component of it.
3 THE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION OF HEGEL’S PSYCHOLOGY

“As reason its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself i.e. to universalize it” (§457). Such is Hegel’s summary of the first half of his Psychology, where the intelligence assimilates the objects it intuits. Intelligence works on its intuitions to further inwardize what appears to it as external. However, at a crucial juncture, the intelligence is “directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. In other words, it aims at making itself be and be a fact . . . it is self-uttering, intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs” (ibid.). Intelligence’s central transition, then, is from appropriation to production. Intelligence “appropriate[s] the immediate datum” of intuition but then becomes “intuition-producing.”

In this section, I argue that the “intuition-producing” intelligence of the Psychology is indebted to Hegel and Schelling’s earlier account of intellectual intuition. The intuition-producing intelligence is, like intellectual intuition, also thematized in terms of production, abstraction, and correspondence. Indeed, we shall see that as intelligence develops it: A) moves closer to producing its intuitions, B) abstracts more from the subjective aspects of such intuitions, and C) progressively realizes the correspondence between itself and its intuitions. Thus, as I shall show, the intelligence’s development is predicated on these three crucial moments of Schelling’s intellectual intuition of nature.6

3.1 Reproductive Imagination

The “intuition-producing” portion of the Psychology, in which the mind spontaneously produces its representations, begins in Hegel’s discussion of imagination. In imagination,

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6 Note, however, that intelligence is most Schellingian in its most developed state. So, although I discuss the steps intelligence takes toward Schelling to trace the breadth of Schelling's influence over Hegel’s account, the most vivid and archetypal examples of Schelling's impact occur only at the end of Hegel’s account—and only at the end of my discussion in turn.
intelligence can represent a prior intuition that it no longer intuits. So, I may call to mind the image of a chocolate cake even after finishing the cake in front of me. Reproductive imagination is an improvement over recollection in that intelligence no longer requires an occurrent intuition of the image it wishes to represent. In imagination, intelligence can summon images spontaneously.

3.1.1 Production

What does imaginatio have to do with intellectual intuition? If we are looking for a mind that creates its intuitions intellectually, then reproductive imagination will hardly suffice. This type of imagination represents past intuitions to itself internally in the form of mental images. It does not instantiate physically the content it intuits. And yet, Hegel often describes the mental images of reproductive imagination in ways that emphasize their objective character. So often, in fact, that one begins to wonder whether Hegel is indeed the obscurantist many have accused him of being.

Consider, for instance, the transition from recollection to imagination in Hegel’s Psychology. In recollection, “an abstractly stored image needs, for its reality, a real intuition” (§454). When it has such an intuition—one that resembles the image it has stored—then intelligence is “aware of its initially only internal image as also an immediate image of intuition and as proved in intuition. The image, which in the pit of intelligence was only its property, is now, with the determination of externality, also in its possession” (ibid.). In other words, to recollect the image effected by a past intuition intelligence must encounter a subsequent intuition of the same kind. But, to imagine an object, intelligence need not intuit the object it represents. In reproductive imagination, “Intelligence is thus the power which can externalize its property and which no longer needs external intuition for the existence of the property in intelligence” (ibid.) Such is Hegel’s account of what imagination can do that recollection cannot. Imagination can
produce what recollection requires intuition to induce, namely, the mental representation of an object.

But notice Hegel’s repeated emphasis on the objectivity of this merely mental representation. Rather than say, “intelligence can represent an image to itself,” he says, “intelligence can externalize one.” Indeed, Hegel links the ability to “externalize” with “external intuition” to associate what intelligence imagines with what it intuits. So, in the transition from recollection to imagination, we go from an intelligence that relies on external intuition to “prove” its merely “internal images,” to an intelligence that “no longer needs external intuition” to “externalize” its images into “existence.”

Several of the Zusätze to reproductive imagination also emphasize the objectivity of intelligence’s representations. At first, when intelligence represents an intuition by recollecting it, intelligence diminishes “the clarity and freshness of the immediate individuality, the all round determinacy, of what is intuited; the intuition is obscured and blurred, when it becomes an image” (§452 Z) One way we distinguish between an intuition and an image is that an image is fainter than the intuition it represents. The cake you see before you is more vivid than the cake you recollect in your mind’s eye. But, by recollecting a mental image repeatedly, intelligence dilutes this distinction between image and intuition. For, “the image, by being frequently summoned up in this way, acquires such a great vitality and presence in me that I no longer need the external intuition in order to recollect it” (§454 Z). Intelligence gradually restores to the image some of the vividness that distinguished it from its intuition. So much so that, in imagination, intelligence can dispense with intuition. Of course, an intuition remains more vivid than even an imagined representation. But, in co-opting some of this vividness, intelligence nevertheless brings its images closer to the intuitions they represent.
Hegel’s consistent blurring of the boundaries between internal representation and external intuition is not the product of obscurantism on his part, nor is it an accident of his admittedly wooly style. It is an early indication Hegel gives us that he is working toward a mind modeled on the idea of intellectual intuition, a mind that can reconcile itself to its object by producing what is objective for it. Thus, Hegel notes the incipient objectivity of what are still subjective representations to flag the ultimate objectivity of what intelligence works on itself to produce. What may seem like the blurring of boundaries is then the building of a bridge, a bridge constructed by intelligence to span the gap intellectual intuition had been contrived to close, namely, the gap between subject and object. In sum, Hegel’s focus on the creative aspect of imagination, but also as we shall see on the creative aspect of Representation as a whole, is akin to the same focus in intellectual intuition. For the critical point in both cases is to see how a subject creates its object.

3.1.2 Abstraction

In reproductive imagination, intelligence can produce an image abstracted from many of the empirical circumstances in which intelligence originally intuited it. When I imagine a chocolate cake, it need not have all the properties of the chocolate cakes I have intuited previously. Instead, the chocolate cake I imagine may have only some of the properties common to some of my prior intuitions of chocolate cake. I can, for instance, picture a chocolate cake with brown frosting but without the sprinkles decorating my chocolate cake of most recent memory, the one I had for dessert. Thus, though various empirical circumstances condition particular intuitions, intelligence may abstract from these circumstances and thereby imagine a universal representation. The imaginary cake with the brown frosting is universal—both in resembling all chocolate cakes and in not resembling, exactly, any one chocolate cake in particular. Also more universal are the circumstances in which intelligence can imagine. Intelligence need not, as in recollection, intuit a
cake to imagine one. Thus, through abstraction, intelligence liberates its mental activity (its imagining) and its mental representations (its imaginings) from some of the empirical conditions to which it is bound in intuition.

What does this abstraction have to do with intellectual intuition? Intelligence’s capacity for abstraction contributes to its development of objective thinking. To think objectively intelligence must abstract from the empirical contingencies of its intuitions. It must apprehend objects as they are essentially and not as it happens to intuit them. The same is true of intellectual intuition. As we saw in “On the True Concept,” Schelling urges us to abstract from everything subjective so that we can focus on what is neither subjective nor objective, namely, nature—nature before it is mediated through an experiencing subject. Abstracting to nature means not only abstracting from the I’s subjective structure but also from its contingent perception of the object. The I must abstract from all the ways it happens to perceive its object in virtue of the empirical I that it is. In both intellectual intuition and Hegel’s Psychology, then, the subject abstracts from the empirically contingent features of its subjective experience. For only in thus abstracting can the subject focus on what is essential to the object it seeks to know.

3.2 Associative Imagination

The next stage of intelligence’s development is associative imagination. Here, intelligence associates a set of images by grouping them under a universal image, one that exhibits a property (or properties) shared by the set. So, I associate several different cakes, cakes with chocolate in their ingredients, by subsuming them under a more general representation of chocolate cake. What

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7 “But though the intellect (Verstand) has in itself the defect just indicated, it is nevertheless a necessary moment of rational thinking. Its activity consists, in general, in abstraction. Now if it separates off the contingent from the essential it is entirely within its rights and appears as what in truth it ought to be. Therefore, someone who pursues an essential purpose is called a man of intellect” (§467 Z).
is more, I select the universal representation into which I sort my particular representations. From a plurality of potential principles, I generate the one by which I will determine whether certain cakes qualify as instances of the same genus. Association is then an advance over reproductive imagination in allowing intelligence to organize the images it represents.

3.2.1 Production

What does associative imagination have to do with intellectual intuition? Associative imagination organizes the mental images intelligence represents; it does not intellectually produce what intelligence intuits. Yet there is still a marked discrepancy between the subjectivity of intelligence’s mental images and their developmental role in objective thinking. Indeed, Hegel alerts us to these images’ developmental role by highlighting their objective character.

The representation is the middle term in the syllogism of the ascent of intelligence, the link between the two meanings of relation-to-self, namely being and universality, which in consciousness are determined as object and subject. Intelligence supplements what is found with the meaning of universality, and supplements what is its own, the inner, with the meaning of being, but a being posited by itself.

The abstraction that occurs in the representing activity by which universal representations are produced etc. (§455 A)

This passage highlights the objective character of intelligence’s associations in two ways. First, intelligence “finds” the representations it categorizes—just as it “finds itself determined” by the objects it intuits (§446). To find something is to distinguish what one finds from oneself. So, in both intuition and imagination, the fact that intelligence finds something underlines the independent existence, the objectivity, of the thing found. The above passage also stresses the objective character of associative imagination in describing how intelligence brings its general
categories into “being” (a quality Hegel attributes to the object of consciousness) by populating these categories with the particular representations they comprehend. Thus, although it is true that intelligence produces associations which are merely subjective, it is also true that these associations possess object-like independence in both their particular and universal moments.

Why does Hegel again emphasize the objectivity of intelligence’s imaginings and, in so doing, erode the distinction between representation and intuition? Because this erosion is a step toward the mind’s reconciliation of representation and intuition at the end of the Psychology. Ultimately, intelligence produces the intuitions it thinks and thereby extends to intuition the control it exercises over representation. Thus, here too is an evident parallel to intellectual intuition, to a mind that produces the objects it intuits. For in objectifying representations the mind moves closer to representing objects.

3.2.2 Abstraction

We already saw that associative imagination exercises more control over abstraction in its ability to represent whatever it wishes as the universal image by which it will associate particular images. So, I can represent a large cake to myself and thereby associate cakes as much by their bulk as by their chocolate ingredients. Whereas before intelligence was bound to associate objects with the time and place in which it intuited them, now intelligence can associate images in whatever way it wishes. Part of intelligence’s increasing control over abstraction has to do with what intelligence abstracts from, that is, content intelligence has already internalized. Both the particular images intelligence abstracts from and the universal images intelligence abstracts to are internal to the mind.

In abstracting from its images, therefore, intelligence also abstracts from itself. At the same time, however, the images intelligence abstracts from are internalized from external intuition.
Thus, in associative imagination intelligence abstracts from both the empirical content of the objects it intuits and from the mental content of the images it represents. Like the mind of intellectual intuition that abstracts reciprocally from both itself and its object, the intelligence abstracts from both its subjective and objective moments, from its images and its intuitions.

In Schelling, the mind abstracts reciprocally (as we saw) from subject and object because each is correlative of the. And here too, the intelligence’s reciprocal abstraction also indicates a correlation between intelligence and its object. At each stage of the Psychology, intelligence and its object assume different forms in virtue of how each relates to the other. First, intelligence intuits intuitions, then, it imagines representations, then, it remembers names, and finally, it thinks thoughts. Thus, in associative imagination, intelligence’s reciprocal abstraction from image and intuition acknowledges what the broader structure of Hegel’s Psychology announces—namely, the metaphysical correlation between subject and object. In both Schelling and Hegel, then, the abstraction that helps unify subject and object in thought also reflects this metaphysical correlation between the two.

3.3 Creative Imagination

In creative imagination, intelligence produces representations it uses to refer to mental images. So, instead of picturing a lion I can picture a bushy mane, or the word “lion,” to refer to my image of a lion. Creative imagination thus gives me more flexibility in choosing how to summon the images I wish to consider. To symbolize something in creative imagination, I need only one intuitable aspect of the symbol to relate to the image the symbol represents. I can use a mane to symbolize a lion because I associate a mane with lions I have intuited. To signify something in creative imagination, no intuitable aspect of the sign need relate to the image the sign
represents. No intuitable aspect of the word "lion" need be related to lions I have intuited. Creative imagination is then an advance over associative imagination in that intelligence relies less on specific intuitions to summon the images it wishes to represent.

3.3.1 Production

What does creative imagination have to do with intellectual intuition? Creative imagination produces representations that refer to images derived from intuition. Even the created sign, then, refers to an image still ultimately conditioned by the subjective intuitions of a particular intelligence. What the word “lion” means to me may (given my particular psychological and historical circumstances) still be different from what it means to you, even if in most cases we agree that the objects we call lions are the same. Thus, the imagination creates something that is not genuinely objective in the way the object of intellectual intuition is. Yet by calling our attention to the objective qualities of signs and symbols, Hegel nevertheless invokes intellectual intuition as the sort of mind into which intelligence develops.

In fantasy, intelligence has been perfected to self-intuition within itself inasmuch as its content, derived from its own self, has pictorial existence. This structure of its self-intuiting is subjective; the moment of what is is still lacking. But in the structure's unity of the inner content and the material, intelligence has likewise implicitly returned to identical self-relation as immediacy. As reason, intelligence starts by appropriating what is immediately found within itself (§445, c.f. §455 A), i.e. by determining it as a universal; correspondingly its activity as reason (§438) is, from the present point on, to determine as a being what within it has been perfected to concrete self-intuition, i.e. to make itself into being, into the thing. When active in this determination, it is self-externalising, intuition-producing: (yy) sign-making fantasy. (§457)
The intelligence’s transition from appropriating intuitions to producing intuitions is one of the key transitions of the Psychology. And the more this transition proceeds, the more the mind appears to move from an intellect that intuits to an intellectual intuition.

Notice first Hegel’s emphasis on “self-intuition.” Like the I of Schelling which, as we saw, intuits itself in the act of its self-positing, the intelligence of the Psychology also intuits itself in the act of positing itself. Granted that intelligence does not, like Schelling’s I, intuit itself in a reflexive act of self-consciousness. Intelligence does not say “I am” and, in so doing, render itself an object for itself. But, intelligence does create content, i.e., images, it identifies with itself. “For the content of intelligence is intelligence itself, and so is the determination that it gives to this content” (§457 A). In creative imagination, intelligence occupies itself with content that originates in itself—content that is of itself, by itself, and for itself. If the latter sounds suspiciously like the Gettysburg Address, it is because both address the same momentous issue, namely, self-determination.

As I mentioned earlier, self-determination is also at stake in the Psychology. (In fact, self-determination is at stake in intellectual intuition as well, fundamentally so for Fichte but also for Schelling.) Besides explaining how intelligence comes to know its object, Hegel also explains how intelligence emancipates itself from objects that determine it. How can I keep my mind from being acted on, imposed on, by objects I intuit? Part of Hegel’s solution in the Psychology involves making the objects I intuit mine, first by appropriating them, then by creating them, but ultimately, by reconciling myself to them. At the culmination of its development, the intelligence reconciles subject and object by disclosing their unity. Here, in creative imagination, we approach reconciliation by seeing how objective the intelligence can make the images it creates. For in making its contents objective the mind can realize its unity with objects.
Related to intelligence’s increasing ability to create what it intuits is Hegel’s point about the physical intuitability of what intelligence creates. Intelligence is embodied and can use its body to express signs. So, intelligence can, for instance, produce utterances to signify its images (§459). Here, Hegel invokes language, describing it as “the product of intelligence for manifesting its representations in an external element” (§459 A). In passing, Hegel specifically addresses written language, “which enlists the help of an externally practical activity” and which “proceeds to the field of immediate spatial intuition, in which it takes and produces signs (§454)” (ibid.). As before, Hegel merges internal representations and external intuitions, blurring those boundaries Schelling thought intellectual intuition transgressed.

Although the Psychology first presents representations as internalized intuitions, here Hegel inverts this presentation (quite willfully) in describing linguistic representations manifested “in an external element.” Here, a physical thing intelligence produces, a vocal sound, a semiotic mark, is (in keeping with his inversion) “the subjective element which gives itself objectivity in the image” (§457 Z). In linguistic signs, the physical object intelligence intuits is subjective while the internal image intelligence represents is objective. Hegel reverses his presentation here because the sign can only refer to what it is a sign of if intelligence mentally connects the sign to its referent, namely, its image. The sign’s only connection to objectivity is, in other words, the image (of the object) intelligence associates with it. Nevertheless, Hegel’s description of a subject fabricating physical things and mentally conferring objectivity upon them—this too parallels salient themes in Schelling’s account of intellectual intuition.
3.3.2 Abstraction

One may object, Westphal in particular, that I overstate the intelligence's ability to create what it intuits. After all, anything the intelligence represents intelligence must ultimately derive from intuition. What this objection overlooks, however, is Hegel's explicit and principled insistence on the intelligence's negation of intuition over the course of the Psychology. In an important sense, intelligence must then reconstitute rather than re-present the intuitions it gradually eliminates. Hegel is especially adamant on this point in an introductory section of his Psychology where he singles out Condillac’s empiricist psychology for criticism.

In particular the governing principle is that the sensory is taken, no doubt rightly, as primary, as the initial foundation, but that from this starting-point the subsequent determinations appear as emerging only in an affirmative manner and the negative aspect of mind’s activity, by which this material is spiritualized and sublated in its sensoriness, is misconceived and overlooked. In this approach, the sensory is not merely what is empirically primary, but continues to serve as the genuinely substantial foundation.

(§442 A)

I have spoken already about how the intelligence’s negation of intuition mitigates Westphal’s attempt to prescind intellectual intuition from Hegel’s Psychology. Here, however, I want to connect the theme of negation to the theme of abstraction I have been tracing throughout. In reproductive and associative imagination, we can readily see that intelligence negates intuitions by abstracting to increasingly universal images of them. I negate the intuitable contents of a particular chocolate cake by abstracting to the image of a chocolate cake in general.

In creative imagination, however, the connection between negation and abstraction is less apparent. Clarifying this connection is critical, however, to claiming (as I have) that Hegel’s
Psychology draws on Schelling’s intellectual intuition—Schelling’s account of intellectual abstraction in particular. How then does creative imagination abstract from intuition? In the first phase of creative imagination, the symbol, intelligence may (as we saw) abstract from all but one of its image’s intuitable properties. Then, intelligence can make its image’s remaining property the basis of that same image’s resemblance to its symbol. So, I can use the color red to symbolize embarrassment because of the flush that often accompanies our feeling embarrassed. How does abstraction stand with respect to the sign, the second phase of creative imagination? In the sign, I may abstract from all the intuitable properties of my image, except, the property of intuitability itself. I can then use an intuition that, sheer intuitability aside, bears no resemblance to the image it signifies. Thus, in creative imagination too abstraction helps emancipate the mind from intuition, much as it helps the mind transcend subjectivity in Schelling’s intellectual intuition of nature.

3.4 Mechanical Memory

3.4.1 Production

The Psychology’s treatment of memory and mechanical memory, in particular, contains some of Hegel’s clearest statements on the connection between his ideas and Schelling’s. In memory, the mind of Hegel’s Psychology “has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition—the immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an object which is the product of intelligence itself—such a without-book as remains locked up in the within-book of intelligence, and is, within intelligence, only its outward and existing side” (§462).

Hegel characterizes the object (Dasein) the intelligence is “dealing with” as “the product of intelligence itself,” echoing both Kantian and Schellingian conceptions of intellectual intuition.8

8 Admittedly, “Dasein” is not a word Hegel typically uses to mean object. In the Science of Logic, “Dasein” represents the third stage in Hegel’s Doctrine of Being. At this stage, Being and Nothing sublate each other in the whole they
Moreover, this object intelligence produces is produced without being “derived from intuition.” This sort of object is what Hegel calls a name. A name encapsulates the content of a thought but is “free,” as Jere Surber puts it, “of any sensual, imagistic, or representational component” (257). Take Hegel’s lion example. In thinking about a lion “we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its image even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representation. We think in names” (§462 A).

With the name, the mind may discard the images initially essential to its cognition. Hegel has several ways of describing this progressive excision of imagistic material, a process which culminates in mechanical memory and the intelligence’s loss of all meaningful content. In §463, the mind engages in “the supreme self-divestment of intelligence,” and in the Zusatz to §462, words are described as “something bereft of mind.” The names the mind entertains are so empty of what it has entertained previously—images, representations, what was until now the currency of thought—that names confront the mind as something other than, or external to, thought. This emptied alterity existing within the mind is what Hegel ultimately honors with the term “objectivity” (Objektivität). The name is an object for the subject because the subject regards the name as other than it. However, the name is also something generated by the mind and immanent to it. In the passage describing reproductive memory, Hegel alludes to the peculiarity of this situation in which the “without-book . . . remains locked up in the within-book of intelligence.” Later, Hegel writes:

In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and with the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as giving an existence to the content

mutually condition; Being and Nothing develop into Becoming, or "Dasein." Thus, M.J. Petry’s (1977) translation, “determinate being,” may be more accurate than W. Wallace’s (Hegel 1971, 203) gloss. See Jere O’Neill Surber (2011, 243-61). See also Michael Inwood (2003) on “determinate being.”
in intelligence, is the externality of intelligence to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e., of an intuition of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which intelligence reduces itself on its own ground. (§462)

The mind must, to think anything, express its thoughts in some existent form distinguishable from itself. The name is the “existence” with which the mind furnishes its thoughts. But the name is also, as Hegel stresses, “the self-externalization to which intelligence reduces itself on its own ground.” One might think Hegel is simply restating his first point from a different vantage, that the mind distinguishes itself from the name it thinks about by being as “external” to the name as the name is to it. But Hegel already alluded to the distinction mind makes between itself and the thought it expresses, its name. Before the colon in the above passage, there is the phrase: “the externality of intelligence to itself.” So, what does Hegel add with “self-externalization”?

The answer lies in the “inwardization or recollection” the name undergoes. The name does not require inwardization in the way an outer intuition does, because the name is generated by and proper to the mind. It may seem strange to think that a word like “lion” is proper to the mind. Surely “lion” has an externally intuitable form, a standard combination of auditory features that distinguishes it from other sounds. Indeed, Hegel made much in sign-creation of the sign’s physical embodiment in the “vocal note.” So in what sense is the name already inward? In the transition from imagination to memory Hegel writes that “The reduction of” the name’s “outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory” (§460). In memory, the name is the word “lion” that we retain in our minds, not the auditory instantiation of the word, but the word as thought. One might object that, even in thought, we hear the word lion when we think of it. But we do not hear a word we recollect. Our inner monologue is silent.
By inwardization, Hegel means a name’s capacity to encapsulate a thought “apart from intuition and image.” When we know and understand the name “lion” we “recollect” what a lion is, without associating the name “lion” with intuitable data. In being known by us, the object is “in” us and thus “inwardized.” When the mind knows a thing solely through its name, “apart from image or intuition,” this amounts to a reduction of the mind “on its own ground.” For in eliminating the intuitable image, the mind is left only with something other than or “external” to it.

Here, the correspondence between intuition and subjectivity is again apparent. Before deploying names, the mind represented things in intuitable images, and to this extent, consisted of the intuitions it represented. Intuitions were definitive of the mind’s subjectivity, structurally essential to how it thought about and encountered objects. For the mind to now think differently, for it to think in names rather than intuitions, it must conceive of itself as other than what it has been, as external to itself. The mind is not the kind of subject it once was.9

The Hegelian account of memory just given bears clear parallels to Schellingian intellectual intuition. The Hegelian name is an object produced by the mind; the mind produces the object by abstracting from intuition; and the object, while distinct from the mind, is also immanent to it. We have in the name, what Hegel calls an “object” produced by the mind. The mind arrives at this object, the name, by abstracting from intuition, which Hegel regards as fundamental to the structure of subjectivity. Further, we have seen something the mind only sees at the conclusion of mechanical memory, that the “object,” despite being distinguished from the mind in its mindlessness, is at the same time immanent to the mind.

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9 The word “Entäusserung” that Wallace and Petry translate as “self-externality” can also mean “self-alienation,” suggesting the way intelligence has produced something alien to itself. The mind is a subject that is other than itself within itself, or, external to itself within itself.
In mechanical memory, the mind runs through a series of names without noticing what these names refer to. Hegel cites rote memorization as an example. A person can more readily memorize a composition if he “attaches no meaning to its words” (§463). In mechanical memory, the mind is so used to naming its representations, and to thinking of its representations in names, that it no longer discerns the meanings behind the names it thinks. The mental self-divestment observed in the mind’s use of names has now been taken a step further. The mind regards names as not only empty of imagistic form but of any meaningful content whatever. Hegel describes the names of mechanical memory as “meaningless words,” for instance, and later writes:

The faculty of conning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or which are separately meaningless . . . is so supremely marvellous, because it is the very essence of mind to have its wits about it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is like machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intuition been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made . . . it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus, one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. (§463 A)

The mind regards names as non-mental, as “found” by the mind rather than proper to it because names no longer encapsulate anything meaningful. The mind eliminated so much of what characteristically constituted itself, that what remains is regarded as other than itself. Language similar to Hegel’s earlier discussion of self-externalization resurfaces accordingly: “the mind is estranged in itself,” “make[s] itself external in itself.” Two points, however, are newly of note in this passage. First, Hegel describes the mind as embodying properties of its purportedly non-
mental contents, that is, its names. The mind of mechanical memory does not “have its wits about it.” It functions with blind automaticity. This talk suggests that the mind has made itself into an object of sorts. Hegel writes in the Anmerkung to §457 that the mind “makes itself be as a thing,” and later in the Zusatz to §462, the mind takes “on the nature of a thing and to such a degree that subjectivity, in its distinction from the thing, becomes quite empty, a mindless container of words, that is a mechanical memory.”

Thus, mechanical memory follows a trajectory similar to Schelling’s intellectual intuition of nature. For in Schelling too, the I constitutes both its self and its object (A). Likewise, in Schelling, the subject’s ability to render itself objective is key to attaining objective knowledge. As Schelling writes, “[T]o make the subject-object [as the object of intellectual intuition] objective and to bring it out of itself to the point where it wholly coincides with nature.” Note how similar Schelling’s process looks to Hegel’s where, in mechanical memory, the mind “makes itself be as a thing.” Note also that, as in Schelling, mechanical memory’s objectification of itself is important for its acquisition of objective knowledge. “[O]ne of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is,” as Hegel writes, “here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it.” This mention of “objectivity” in thought establishes the developmental narrative of the Psychology as also being about the acquisition of knowledge, knowledge similar to that gained in Schelling’s intellectual intuition.

At its culmination, mechanical memory transitions to what Hegel calls thinking. Thinking is Hegel’s term for the objective knowledge acquired at the end of Theoretical Mind, and importantly for our comparison to Schelling, this objective knowledge realizes the essential identity of subject and object (C). Hegel writes of this identity as follows:
If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent requires something else—to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivity and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thought, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed from the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existence. (§464)

It may seem curious for Hegel to speak of the intelligence as interpreting the names it thinks in if these names are meaningless. However, Hegel explains what interpretation he has in mind earlier when he writes in §463 that the intelligence, besides having names within it, is “at the same time the power over the different names—the link which, having nothing in itself, fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order.” The mind is not only the names it traffics in. It is also the organizing activity that holds these names together. On Houlgate’s reading, the mind becomes aware of itself as “the purely abstract, mechanical activity of connecting alone” (90). If before the mind equated itself with its representations, made “itself be as a thing,” now the mind equates itself with the unifying activity that renders these things its own.

But how does the intelligence come to realize it is not merely the thing organized but also the organizer? Intelligence recognizes itself as this organizing activity because it has stripped away its intuitable content. The intelligence, having at the culmination of its self-divestments abstracted completely from its representations, realizes the degree to which it is utterly abstract, “a merely abstract subjectivity” as Hegel calls it. This mental abstraction and the self-knowledge that results also reveals the essential identity of the intelligence and its objects (its names), an identity that results in objective knowledge. Here too, a point of contact with Schelling emerges in that the
mind’s abstraction from the subjectivity of its representations makes acquiring objective knowledge possible.

To return to our passage above, the “representing intellect,” again, interprets the “mere names” insofar as it holds them in an ordered sequence. But we now have the other “of the two dynamic factors of thought,” namely, an apperceptive subjectivity (§463 A). Hegel alludes to this when he writes above that “in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivity and the meaning.” The external objectivity of the intelligence is its names, and the meaning of the intelligence is the “stable order” it confers upon them. Thus, “[i]n this way” as Hegel writes “intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity.”

This unity of objectivity and meaning amounts to the realization of subject-object unity essential to objective thought. “[I]ntelligence is explicitly,” as Hegel makes clear “a plain identity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that what is, only is in so far as it is a thought (§§ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object” (§465). Here, at the opening of Hegel’s section on thinking, is another evocation of Schelling’s mind thinking that object. Moreover, the identity of the subjective and objective is something the intelligence realizes. Thus, I close my discussion of mechanical memory with the contention that, given the thematic and terminological parallels between mechanical memory and Schelling’s intellectual intuition of nature, we must conclude that Hegel wrote this section with Schelling in mind. In speaking of an intelligence that abstracts from itself and thereby realizes the knowledge it has of the objects it produces, Hegel also speaks of Schelling’s intellectual intuition.

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10 The names themselves are externally objective because, as above, they are meaningless, and in this respect alien to the essential functioning of the mind.
3.5 Addressing an Objection: Why Here? Why Now?

I am not alone in thinking intellectual intuition plays a role in Hegel’s mature philosophy. Indeed, various proponents of this view have pointed to various places in Hegel’s oeuvre where they believe something like Schelling’s intellectual intuition to be in evidence. Thus, the objection—that Hegel’s debt to intellectual intuition ought to be apparent in several of his mature works and not merely in one section of one mature work—can be avoided by relying on the existing literature.¹¹

The more specific objection, however, regarding what motivates Hegel’s appeal to intellectual intuition here in the Psychology—this cannot be avoided. For, if he had no reason for incorporating intellectual intuition at this stage of his system, then Hegel’s appeal to Schelling is arbitrary. Indeed, arbitrary enough to call the appeal itself into question. Better, in this case, to ignore the text’s apparent parallels to Schelling than to insist, absurdly, that Hegel appeals to Schelling at random.

But Hegel’s introduction of intellectual intuition at this juncture is not random. On the contrary, here Hegel confronts a distinctive set of philosophical problems very like the ones Schelling confronted before him. These problems, which Schelling called on intellectual intuition to solve, motivate Hegel’s appeal to his former master’s methods. In short, Hegel aligns with Schelling at this moment because both face off against a common problem.

¹¹ See, for instance, Franks (2005, 378-9). Franks cites 3:520 of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy (Hegel 1955, Translated by Haldane and Simson). Or, see Kreines (2007, 306-334). Kreines cites introductory sections of the Encyclopedia Logic (Hegel 1991, Translated by Geraets, Harris, and Suchting). Or, see McCumber (2014). McCumber cites the Psychology section of the Encyclopedia as I do. There, Hegel’s account of mechanical memory features what McCumber calls a “linguisticized intellectual intuition,” wherein “philosophical thought ‘externalizes’ itself into names” and thereby “creates its own objects, which like the sounds of words are intuitive in nature” (2014, 71). McCumber, however, is wrong to characterize this intellectual intuition as linguistic, since it is principally Schelling’s intellectual intuition of nature that Hegel has in mind.
As evidence of this common problem, consider how both philosophers describe the task before them. In his essay “On the True Concept of the Philosophy of Nature,” Schelling grapples with how we can have objective knowledge. Indeed, Schelling clarifies what he means by “objective,” in part to explain how such knowledge is attainable. The “objective” for Schelling refers to our knowledge of the structure of reality, where reality consists in a unity of the subjective and objective. Although we traditionally see objects as cut off from subjects and for this reason regard objectivity as an unlikely epistemic extravagance, for Schelling, the “objective” is the essential unity of subject and object when grasped by consciousness. Objectivity is a feat of “consciousness in which the subjective raises itself to the highest (theoretical) potency” (92). In other words, consciousness here reaches a level of development wherein it apprehends the essentially unified structure of reality. Hence Schelling’s concern with the status of mental activities like “sensation, intuition etc.” which, as he stipulates (more than once), are only practicable for this objective mind, this mind aware of reality as unified (92, 96).

Schelling’s description of objectivity as the pinnacle of conscious activity underlines the cognitive character of the problem he confronts which, in sum, is the mind’s alleged inability to grasp something unlike itself, i.e., nature. Hegel too grapples with the mind’s attempt to know (veridically) the world it inhabits. Hence Hegel’s parallel preoccupation with cognition and its relationship to truth.

The operation of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition, though not in the sense that intelligence cognises among other things but in addition also intuits, represents, recollects, imagines, etc. Such a position is . . . connected with the great question of recent times, whether genuine cognising, i.e. cognition of truth, is possible, with the implication that, if we see that it is not possible, we have to abandon this endeavor (§445 A).
Both Hegel and Schelling, then, depart from a similar starting point: the human mind and its uncertain endeavor to understand the world. Given this shared point of origin, it is hardly surprising that Hegel appeals—precisely at this moment—to Schelling’s past teachings, even if he does so more in the spirit of revision than regurgitation.

Beyond sharing a common problem, Hegel and Schelling also share an intuition about how this problem can be solved. Both emphasize the emergence of our mind from the world it seeks to understand and by implication point to the merely immanent difference between mind and world. For, in being only immanently different from us, the world is plausibly intelligible to us. Thus, Schelling and Hegel both suspect that the mind-world problem is solvable insofar as the mind itself is a part of the world it seeks to understand.

Schelling therefore emphasizes the mind’s origin in nature, a proposition which, when properly understood, will reveal nature to “no longer be a dead, merely extended whole, but rather a living whole which increasingly reveals the spirit incarnated in it and which, by means of the highest spiritualisation, will in the end return into itself and complete itself” (104-5). This “spirit” which Schelling describes as “incarnated” in nature develops into a mind that knows nature, a mind which, in this knowledge, is implicated in nature once more.

In his introductory sections to the *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel also stresses the mind’s emergence from nature and does so for systematic reasons. Hegel treats the subjects discussed in the *Encyclopedia* according to the logical order of their development. So, in the *Philosophy of Nature*, for instance, organics is treated after inorganics because organics emerges dialectically from inorganics. Organic life emerges from inorganic matter and not the other way around. By the same token, in the *Philosophy of Mind*, the mind develops out of nature. “[M]ind” as Hegel writes, “has nature as its presupposition” (§381).
Thus, the *Philosophy of Mind* is the first time in the *Encyclopedia* where Hegel deals with the individual minds of living organisms. Hegel is not here discussing the development of the logical idea or the emergence of nature out of the logical idea. He is rather discussing cognition as it comes about in self-conscious animals, that is, in humans. The Zusatz to §381 elaborates on this point, laying out the ground Hegel has covered to arrive at mind’s emergence. “Philosophy has to demonstrate the necessity of this concept [viz. mind], as of all its other concepts, which means that philosophy has to cognize it as the result of the development of the universal concept or the logical Idea. But in this development, the mind is preceded not only by the logical Idea but also by external nature.”

Thus, Schelling and Hegel again converge, not, this time, in the problem they share, but in the solution, they perceive to be implicit therein. For in Hegel, too, the mind that emerges from nature (as soul) returns to nature (as intelligence). First, the mind, as a product of nature, is viewed “in its immediate unity with nature” (381 Z). Then, later in its development, the mind is defined “in its opposition to nature” (ibid.). Finally, however, the mind resumes “its unity with nature” and thereby “returns to itself out of that [former] opposition” (ibid.). Like Schelling’s consciousness which “return[s] into itself and complete[s] itself,” the mind of the *Encyclopedia* reconciles itself to its natural origins through knowledge of these origins. Indeed, as in Schelling, the mind may come to know nature because it is part and parcel of it.

To conclude, Hegel likely appealed to intellectual intuition in the Psychology because he recognized an ally in Schelling, one whose methods were at once intimately familiar and singularly suited to the task at hand. The mind’s cognition of the world may appear to be too broad and ill-defined an issue to establish something like philosophical influence. However, as I have tried to
show, Schelling and Hegel had highly specific and strikingly similar ways of framing this issue, both with respect to what this issue was and how they might overcome it.
4 CONCLUSIONS

I have tried to establish a point of contact between Schelling and the mature Hegel. That Hegel broke with Schelling to establish his dialectical method of philosophy does not rule out the possibility that Hegel continued to draw on Schelling’s ideas and lexicon. Given the prominence of certain Schellingian themes in Hegel’s Psychology, it would be rash to infer that Hegel altogether abandoned the idea of an intellectual intuition of nature. Indeed, that the mind of Hegel’s Psychology produces something it regards as objective, that the mind is brought closer in its apprehension of objectivity by abstracting from itself, and finally, that the objective knowledge the mind apprehends reveals the identity of subject and object—these are among the tenets of Schelling’s account of intellectual intuition. And it is this account—of an intellectual intuition of nature—which loomed large in Hegel’s memory even after he had left Jena for Berlin.
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