Rerecording Romantic Rhetoric: An Inquiry Into Myths, Traps, and Implications

Sarah K. Bramblett
Georgia State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/english_diss

Recommended Citation
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/english_diss/242

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of English at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in English Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
RECOLLECTING ROMANTIC RHETORIC: AN INQUIRY INTO MYTHS, TRAPS, AND IMPLICATIONS

by

SARAH BRAMBLETT

Under the Direction of Lynée Gaillet, PhD

ABSTRACT

In the history of rhetoric and composition, the subject of romantic rhetoric has been valued and discussed for its contributions to theory. At the same time that it has been positively viewed, romanticism has been characterized as antirhetorical and representative of the beginning of the devaluation of rhetoric. In this dissertation, I trace the narrative of research about romantic rhetoric. I highlight the myths and traps that lead to the implication that romantic rhetoric is unrecognized as an organizing tradition within our field. In discussing myths such as the idea that romanticism, as an era, is radically opposed to the enlightenment and traps like romanticism is antirhetorical, I set a schema for understanding the valuing of under-represented categories within rhetoric’s history. I also show, through analysis of secondary sources, the value and
exigency of romantic rhetoric for today’s students. Recollection of research about romantic rhetoric, as a sub-field, emphasizes the hopeful possibilities that emerge when a definition of rhetoric is complicated.

INDEX WORDS: Romantic rhetoric, Composition pedagogy, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century, Enlightenment rhetoric, Historiography
RECOLLECTING ROMANTIC RHETORIC: AN INQUIRY INTO MYTHS, TRAPS, AND IMPLICATIONS

by

SARAH BRAMBLETT

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2020
RECOLLECTING ROMANTIC RHETORIC: AN INQUIRY INTO MYTHS, TRAPS, AND IMPLICATIONS

by

SARAH BRAMBLETT

Committee Chair: Lynée Gaillet

Committee: Michael Harker
Elizabeth Lopez

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Services
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
December 2020
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my family. My parents, Mark and Amy Geil, thank you for inspiring my love of learning from the start. My sisters, Hannah and Rebekah, thank you for partnering in my imagination’s development. My husband, Lane, thank you for filling my life with beautiful love, and thank you for your unwavering belief in me. And my unborn baby girl—thank you for filling me with hope for the future.

To my students—thank you for making this profession a dream and this research meaningful.

To my professors—thank you for teaching me more than you know.

And to the Author of imagination and logos. As Edmund Burke wrote, “The more accurately we search into the human mind, the stronger traces we every where find of his wisdom who made it… the use of the passions… cannot be barren of praise to him, nor unproductive to ourselves of that noble and uncommon union of science and admiration, which a contemplation of the works of infinite wisdom alone can afford to a rational mind” (52).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge, with extreme gratitude, my dissertation director, Lynée Gaillet. Dr. Gaillet, thank you for leading with wisdom and grace; your exemplar kindness and mentorship have made graduate school a joy. I would also like to acknowledge my committee members—thank you for making time to give feedback even during the demanding requirements of a pandemic. Dr. Michael Harker, thank you for asking excellent questions and inspiring deeper inquiry. Dr. Elizabeth Lopez, thank you for matching theory with practicality and for teaching me how to teach.

I’m also grateful to Dr. Ashley Holmes for her encouragement and for her help with IRB approval, to Dr. George Pullman for introducing me to Greek rhetoric and the long history of rhetoric, to Dr. Baotong Gu for believing in me and helping me learn about grant writing, and to Dr. Mary Hocks for connecting me with other scholars. Dr. Malinda Snow, Dr. Beth Gylys, and Dr. Paul Schmidt also provided inspiration and ideas in regard to the subject of romantic rhetoric. Dr. Angela O’Neal first sparked a love of the eighteenth and nineteenth century and Dr. Marcia Bost graciously met with me to discuss my foundational ideas for the first few chapters.

I’d also like to acknowledge the scholars who took time to talk with me about romantic rhetoric: Drs. Peter Elbow, Hephzibah Roskelley and Kate Ronald, Sherrie Gradin, Katie Homar, John Willinsky, Hannah Rule, and Craig Smith. The conversations were a treat.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... V

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... IX

1 AN EXTENDED INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1

1.1 Setting the Stage: Romanticism’s Relevancy to Rhetoric .................................................. 2

1.2 Purpose, Methods, and Methodology ................................................................................. 11

1.3 Definition of the *Narrative* of Romantic Rhetoric Research ........................................ 18

1.4 Definition of Romantic Rhetoric ....................................................................................... 26

1.5 Definition of Myth, Trap, and Implication ......................................................................... 35

1.6 Chapter Introduction ........................................................................................................ 40

2 THE FOUNDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 43

2.1 From Ivor to Isaiah ............................................................................................................ 46

2.2 Synthesis of Emerging Myths and Traps ......................................................................... 61

2.3 The Rise of Categories and Complaints ........................................................................... 65

2.4 Synthesis of Myths and Traps ......................................................................................... 71

3 THE FORMATIONS ................................................................................................................. 75

3.1 Berthoff and Lauer ............................................................................................................ 77

3.2 Paradigm Problems .......................................................................................................... 82

3.3 Underappreciated Connections between Rhetoric and Romanticism .......................... 89

3.4 James Berlin ..................................................................................................................... 94
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Current-Traditional Rhetoric and New Literacy</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Synthesis of Myths, Traps, and Implications</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>THE FAULT LINES</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Responses to Too Narrow a View of Romanticism</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Ross Winterowd</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Synthesis of Myths, Traps, and Implications</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Loops: 2001-2017</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>More Introductions and Invitations</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Synthesis of Myths, Traps, and Implications</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MYTHS, TRAPS, IMPLICATIONS, AND HOPE</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Definition Myths, Traps, and Implications</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Author Myths, Traps, and Implications</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Category Myths, Traps, and Implications</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Trap: Romanticism is Antirhetorical and a Return to Definitions</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Future Studies</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>A Course in Romantic Rhetoric</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>Happily Ever After</td>
<td>..........................................................</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WORKS CITED .......................................................... 172

APPENDICES .......................................................... 184
Appendix A: Syllabus ......................................................................................................................... 184

Appendix A.1: Alternative Reading Plans......................................................................................... 191
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Author Citation Connectivity Chart, 1934-2019................................................................. 16
Figure 1.2: Timeline of Key Works in the Narrative of Romantic Rhetoric Research .................. 20
Figure 1.3: Title Word Cloud.................................................................................................................. 27
Figure 2.1: Author Citation Connectivity Chart, 1934-1969................................................................. 74
Figure 3.1: Author Citation Connectivity Chart, 1972-1989................................................................. 111
Figure 4.1: 1990s Author Citations Connectivity Graph................................................................. 129
Figure 4.2: 2000s Author Connectivity Chart.................................................................................. 144
Figure 4.3: 2010s Author Connectivity Chart.................................................................................. 145
Figure 0.1: The Oxbow (1836) – Thomas Cole.................................................................................. 184
1 AN EXTENDED INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time, as a graduate student in a history class focused on eighteenth and nineteenth century rhetoric, I read an introduction to Giambattista Vico’s work. The class engaged in a robust discussion on the enlightenment principles that prompted Vico’s response. My peers and I were excited by the theories about imagination and expression contributed by Vico. I was enthralled, but I had the feeling that I had heard something similar before. The idea of responses to sweeping movements of scientific reason reminded me of my undergraduate “Intro to British Literature” class where romanticism was explained by its response to enlightenment principles. Romanticism seemed to include theories similar to Vico’s contributions to rhetorical history. After class, I nervously posed the question: “so what’s the deal with romantic rhetoric?” Over the semester, the answer unfolded before me as if I was watching a classic movie. The answer to the question revealed plot twists, dramatic dialogues, unrecognized heroes, and scholars likened to villains or heroes. An ending is still being written. The answer to the question is a story worth telling.

In this dissertation, I tell a story about rhetorical research conducted from 1934 to 2019. I argue that this research shows that romanticism is relevant to rhetorical theory. Yet, there are moments throughout 1934 to 2019 where scholars contend that romanticism is antirhetorical. Within publications that reveal the divide in perceptions of romantic rhetoric, complex binaries that define rhetoric and composition shape the evaluation of romantic rhetoric. The binaries include perceived separation between imagination vs. invention, enlightenment vs. romanticism, and problem-solving vs. polarities. By telling the story of research that grapples with, argues against, or establishes a foundation for romantic rhetoric, I question the implications of these binaries.
This first chapter, serving as an extended introduction to the dissertation, is essential in establishing a foundational definition of romantic rhetoric and the myths, traps, and implications that exist within the narrative. In this chapter, I briefly demonstrate the prevailing claims that romanticism is antirhetorical. By previewing the arguments made for and against romanticism’s relevancy to rhetoric, I foreshadow arguments about the ways in which enlightenment thinkers formulated ideas of imagination attributed, largely, to romantic authors. I question the dismissal of romanticism’s contributions to rhetoric from histories of rhetoric and composition. In this chapter, I outline my methodology, methods, and rationale for recollection and visualization, and I offer foundational definitions of the ambiguous term romantic rhetoric, of the narrative of romantic rhetoric, and of my use of myths, traps, and implications within the narrative.

1.1 Setting the Stage: Romanticism’s Relevancy to Rhetoric

The fifty years before and after the year 1800 were characterized by academic fervor. Philosophers and poets vulnerably and boldly returned to classical works and set forth a theory of language that responded to developments of the time. These well-read scholars developed theories within community, and they generally wrote extensively. They were steeped in an academic tradition that was changing, so they changed it as they responded to it and to each other. This age was marked by quick transitions, the manifestation of psychology, the response to technology’s rapid and rabid influence, and a desire to understand and add to the beauty of persuasion. The years surrounding and between 1750-1850 are often characterized as belonging to “enlightenment” and “romantic” thought in literature and in historiographies of writing studies.

Scholars within rhetoric and composition have long considered romanticism as distinct from enlightenment thought. Oftentimes, this logic has been carried out to the extreme, to the
conclusion that romanticism has no place within rhetorical studies. A prime example of this dismissal is made by Bizzell and Herzberg in *the Rhetorical Tradition* (2001) as they introduce the rhetoric that marks the nineteenth century.

The central themes of Romanticism are, as noted previously, fundamentally antirhetorical. Rhetoric was allied with literature and literary criticism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because of the reigning didactic conception of literature… The key terms are solitude, spontaneity, expression of feeling, and imagination—all quite opposed to the rhetorician’s concern for society, planned discourse, communication, and moving the will through reason and passion. (995)

Roskelly and Ronald point out this statement in 1998, looking at the 1990 edition of Bizzell and Herzberg’s anthology, but the claim remains largely unchanged from the 1990 to 2001 editions of *the Rhetorical Tradition*.

The *Norton Anthology of English Literature* introduces the romantic period with a bold statement about the gothic mode (part of the romantic age, depending on the definition): “the mode had originated in novels of the mid-eighteenth century… in radical opposition to the Enlightenment ideals of order, decorum, and rational control” (“The Romantic Period: Topics”). The emphasis on *radical opposition* suggests that the response of romantic ideals rejected premises of the enlightenment.

James Berlin said “It is a commonplace of contemporary discussions of rhetoric to regard the romantic frame of mind as staunchly anti-rhetorical” (Berlin *Writing Instruction* 42). Ross Winterowd claimed that romanticism is responsible for the devaluation of rhetoric and composition (62). Richard Young is cited as one who defames romanticism based on the creation of the current-traditional paradigm (Waldo 31). Veeder states, “There has been little room for the
British Romantics in the study of rhetoric because it is generally agreed that they did not concern themselves with it, but their influence upon academic culture and upon the relationship between literature and rhetoric is a central concern for contemporary studies of rhetoric, composition, and literature” (“Romantic Rhetoric” 300).

While enlightenment rhetoric has been well-represented in composition’s narrative, as evidenced by the inclusion of authors in The Rhetorical Tradition and the context of the quotes listed above, romanticism has been largely misaligned within the historical evolution of rhetoric and composition, dismissed in major textbooks as antirhetorical, or misrepresented because it is misunderstood. But the story is more complicated than simple erasure; many scholars have, as Veeder alludes to, investigated the romantic theories as they relate to and advance the understanding of rhetoric.

From the early day of English departmental research, romanticism has been a subject of study. With different motives and methods, authors such as Kenneth Burke, M. H. Abrams, I. A. Richards, W. J. Bate, and Isaiah Berlin wrote about romanticism and rhetoric via primary analysis of romantic authors. They were interested in the ways in which romanticism contributed to the long history of literature and writing.

Several of the more recent landmark studies and influential scholars within rhetoric and composition have also demonstrated interest in romanticism. Some of the scholars (Kinneavy, Rohman and Wleccke, Berlin) invoke romanticism to set categories for an emerging field; their purpose is to understand methodology and pedagogy within rhetoric and composition. Other scholars like Crowley, Berthoff, and Lauer engage in conversations about invention, imagination, and problem-solving and within these discussions, themes related to the role of romanticism’s legacy within rhetoric and composition emerge. Gordon Rohman and Albert
Wlecke, Richard Young, Peter Elbow, James Berlin, Sharon Crowley, Janice Lauer, and James L. Kinneavy (among many others) were not necessarily using Coleridge, Wordsworth, Hazlitt, etc. to explicitly argue for application of “romantic” ideas or attention placed on the romantic authors. Rather, several rhetoric and composition scholars in the 1970s and 1980s make extemporaneous points about the state of field and use romanticism’s rhetorical qualities as a category or as an auxiliary support in a variety of different degrees and purposes, positive and negative (these positives and negatives are detailed in Chapter Three).

Whereas these scholars wrote implicitly about romanticism’s relevancy to rhetoric, many respected rhetoric publications focus explicitly on “romantic rhetoric,” arguing that romanticism is important to rhetoric. Books by Sherrie Gradin, Hephzibah Roskelly and Kate Ronald, Ross Winterowd, Bialostosky and Needham, and Byron Hawk and essays by Rex Veeder, Kristi Yager, Kathleen O’Brien, Hannah J. Rule, and Katie Homar offer direct suggestions and implications for contemporary rhetoric and composition based on questions asked about writing in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, particularly writing that has since been labeled “romantic.”

In this dissertation, I tell the story of the research that has contributed to a decades long conversation about “romantic rhetoric.” The story allows for a better understanding and ability to ask and answer the deceptively complex question: why does the label “antirhetorical” still linger on the term “romanticism”? This question relates to an equally influential question: why, given romanticism’s relevancy to rhetoric, is romantic rhetoric not considered a respected category of rhetoric’s history (like enlightenment rhetoric)?

“Romantic rhetoric,” as a sub-field, is not fully realized within contemporary or even historic rhetoric and composition, despite the studies reviewed above and in more detail
throughout this dissertation. The term “romantic rhetoric” exists in literary publications that are devoted to romanticism, but because of evidentiary bias and disciplinary conventions, treatment of romantic rhetoric in these circles reinstates the conditions that diminish the term’s significance in the first place (see discussion on Paul de Man’s *The Rhetoric of Romanticism* in Chapter Three, for example). Within rhetoric and composition, “romantic rhetoric,” is referred to anecdotally (especially in the case of many scholars writing about romantic rhetoric in the 1980s), as a topic within debates about great divides (imagination vs. invention, current-traditional rhetoric vs. expressionism), and as a perpetually introduced concept worthy of consideration (Agnew, Homar, Smith). Despite the presence of romantic rhetoric within journal and book publications in rhetoric and composition, references are incomplete, cursory, or attenuated due to, among other reasons, difficulty in defining “romanticism” and “rhetoric,” views that consider and teach romanticism as “radically opposed” to enlightenment-era perceptions of language, and ideology that champions categorical hierarchies.

As a result, the term “romantic rhetoric,” does not function like accepted sub-fields (classical, epistemic, or material rhetoric, for example). The restricted historical and ideological lens placed on “romantic rhetoric” prevents it from ascending to the place of an organizing tradition in our field. I posit that several complex myths and traps present within the narrative of romantic rhetoric lead to an incomplete treatment of “romantic rhetoric.” Scholarship supporting romantic rhetoric that sits on the fringes (and sometimes even at the forefront) of rhetoric and composition is undervalued because romantic rhetoric, as a sub-field, is not present. This is problematic because it limits students.

Romantic rhetoric, and the scholarship about romantic rhetoric, offers valuable contemporary lessons. Throughout this dissertation, I examine cultural moments to better
contextualize and understand the writings about romanticism’s relevancy to rhetoric. These cultural references range in severity. For example, Isaiah Berlin’s 1965 lecture about romanticism reveals fears of Hitler (40, 141). Other references to pop-culture are equally suggestive of the context surrounding discussions about romanticism’s relevancy; in the 1990s, two major works about romanticism and rhetoric reference *Dead Poet’s Society* (Gradin 18 and Roskelly and Ronald 123). My final two chapters deal more specifically with contemporary rhetoric, but at the onset of this project, I offer my own contextualization to show what is at stake—especially in the lessons that could be particularly helpful to today’s students of both first-year composition and of graduate studies of rhetoric and composition.

I write this dissertation in 2020, socially distant as the world responds to the global health crisis of COVID-19. In a time when a scientific virus can be politicized, we see a world hungry for persuasion that balances romantic and enlightenment rhetoric. Understanding romantic rhetoric can help students better articulate arguments that achieve, or at least begin to analyze, that balance.

Similarly and apart from a pandemic, university students are facing unprecedented mental health challenges (Locke 3, Degges-White and Borzumato-Gainey 1, Sommers and Saltz 125). Looking to the 19th century gives us another tool to help students as they grapple with disclosing internal struggles for public audiences. Studies about romantic rhetoric give unique insight about audience and the balance between writing for internal and external purposes (O’Brien 85-86, Gradin 91). I write this foundational narrative of romantic rhetoric research because I believe that these valuable studies can help students understand the longevity of rhetoric and composition’s struggling with questions about process, vulnerable disclosure, and publication.
Lessons on romanticism and rhetoric can offer historic understanding for combating mental health challenges that rely on the connections between writing and emotions.

Beyond the lingering lessons taught by romantic rhetoric research that relate to general balance of internal and external audiences and of logos and pathos, analysis of romantic rhetoric can also offer students metaphors for grappling with very specific arguments. As Craig R. Smith shows, the romantic authors teach us about the rhetoric of responding to climatic crisis. In a time of similar ecological fears as were sparked by the industrial revolution, we look to this past response and return to similar metaphors that help us teach effective persuasive writing. These metaphors extend well into ecological pedagogical studies and material rhetorics, again showing the historic precedent for movements that are currently popular within rhetoric and composition.

Perhaps most importantly, in examining divides that limit romantic rhetoric’s respect, we learn that polarization and demonization of the different yields dangerous conclusions. The divides that have split science and humanities, literary studies from rhetoric and composition, and imagination from invention are linked to the myth that the romanticism is antirhetorical. Debunking the myth helps us articulate a language of unity. Without a tradition that readily recognizes romanticism’s relevancy to rhetoric, students miss out.

These lessons are not as readily apparent or historically rich without or apart from romantic rhetoric. Part of the difficulty in answering the two main questions (why is romanticism considered antirhetorical and why, despite research that shows romanticism is rhetorical, is romantic rhetoric not considered a respected category of rhetoric’s history?) is that the answer begs for categorization. As I demonstrate in the following chapters, categorization complicates rhetoric’s history. Because of the myths about categorical confusion (categories are mutually exclusive) that often lead to traps that suggest hierarchical dominance of one category over
another, I am hesitant to champion romantic rhetoric as a category, especially as categorical divisions of history become increasingly retrograde.

In *A Counter-History of Composition: Toward Methodologies of Complexity*, Hawk tells the counter-history of vitalism. The term “counter-history” does not apply as effectively to romantic rhetoric because romanticism represents one definable slice within the larger pie of rhetoric’s history whereas a counter-history, such as vitalism, represents a swirl of filling that touches each slice. While I carefully contextualize the history of scholarship about romantic rhetoric, calling romantic rhetoric a counter-history would misrepresent the research and era.

If romantic rhetoric is not necessarily a category or counter-history, then what is it? This initial confusion in determining how to call, consider, characterize, and classify romantic rhetoric feeds the myths and traps that further lead to a diminished view of romantic rhetoric. I preview this confusion to show the necessity for a recollection of romantic rhetoric as just that, romantic rhetoric—a valuable, recognized sub-field within rhetoric and composition, not at the expense of other sub-fields (like enlightenment rhetoric) but as part of a rich chronology that influences our understanding today. Throughout this dissertation, I refer to romantic rhetoric as romantic rhetoric, imagining a positive view of both rhetoric and romanticism. In a sense, I dress romantic rhetoric for the dream job, not the job it currently has. That is, by consistently referring to romantic rhetoric throughout this dissertation as if it is a part of rhetoric and composition’s history, I invite and initiate language that accepts romantic rhetoric as a sub-field. I argue that the research about romantic rhetoric has much to teach us about the myths and traps that limit our understanding. This leads to my claim that romantic rhetoric offers unique and valuable lessons that are particularly relevant today. I offer this foundation that examines the ebbs and flows of romantic rhetoric’s treatment within rhetoric and composition because, generally, highlighting
the myths and traps is transferrable, relevant to larger conversations, and necessary in demonstrating the value of romantic rhetoric as a sub-field.

In order to re-collect romantic rhetoric, I analyze scholarship about romantic rhetoric as it has been defined, perceived, marginalized, and defended by scholars between 1934 and 2019. This analysis of scholarship about romantic rhetoric raises questions about the myths, traps, and implications of a misunderstood romantic rhetoric. As such, this dissertation will

1. Explore the reasons romanticism is considered antirhetorical.
2. Expand the definition of romantic rhetoric (acknowledging the complexity of categorization and labels that make defining challenging).
3. Examine historical boundaries, especially along the lines of perpetuated myths and traps.
4. Establish a foundation for future studies in romantic rhetoric.

I establish a foundation by telling the chronological narrative of research about romantic rhetoric. Future studies cannot exact change without the common lexicon and understanding of myths and traps that limit romantic rhetoric as an inferior or unrecognized sub-field. With the popularity of critical imagination, the repetition of ideas from the 1980s published in recent scholarship about romantic rhetoric (Hannah J. Rule, Katie Homar), the cultural similarities between today’s intersections of technology, psychology, and writing and historic turns toward romanticism, and an overall increased appreciation for the nineteenth century amidst persisting absence of romantic rhetorical resources, this inquiry into categorical traps and myths is well-poised to suggest rhetorical possibility.
1.2 Purpose, Methods, and Methodology

With attention to method, a legacy of the enlightenment rhetoric, and the imagination celebrated through romanticism, this dissertation asks and answers questions that lead to a reconsideration of the narrative of romantic rhetoric research. By examining the many examples of research conducted over many decades, I uncover myths, traps, and implications about romantic rhetoric, historical analysis, and rhetoric and composition studies at large.

To tell the narrative of romantic rhetoric, I rely on a combination of Hawk’s methodology towards complexity and feminist rhetorical methodologies. Important connections exist between feminism and romanticism. Sherrie Gradin claims that romanticism is devalued because of its association with traditionally feminine characteristics: “Perhaps one of the reasons expressivist and romantic theories are so easily placed in the position of the ‘other’ is that they are perceived to contain many aspects of what our culture has identified as feminine: a focus on the personal, the emotive, and expression for the self” (13). Roskelly and Ronald also point out the feminist connections, citing Donna Dickerson’s “romantic feminism” to say that romantic ideals offer hope for women in valuing difference and change (67). The connections between romanticism and feminism, while based in part on problematic sweeping generalizations, lend the theoretical lens of feminist research to my inquiry as I seek to understand more deeply the exaggerations, justifications, and complaints against romanticism as a component of the rhetorical history canon. Strides in feminist research make this connection feasible and relevant.

In the foundational Feminist Rhetorical Practices, Jacqueline Jones Royster and Gesa E. Kirsch outline a process of rhetorical assaying that includes four terms of engagement; the strategies are comprised of critical imagination, strategic contemplation, social circulation, and globalization (19). Central to answering the question about the motivations of those who have
written about romantic rhetoric is the feminist rhetorical practice of critical imagination. Not only does critical imagination offer an ability to appropriately analyze a variety of scholars, it is also a practice that has roots in romantic rhetoric. Though Royster and Kirsch do not reference the romantic roots of their research strategy, the imagination so theorized and treasured by romantic authors blends well with the critical analysis and ability to turn inner thoughts outward, also celebrated by romantics. Royster, with similar tone and argument as Coleridge, defines imagination in *Traces of a Stream*:

> Imagination functions as a critical skill in questioning a viewpoint, an experience, an event, and so on, and in remaking interpretive frameworks based on questioning… the necessity is to acknowledge the limits of knowledge and to be particularly careful about ‘claims’ to truth, by clarifying the contexts and conditions of our interpretations and by making sure that we do not overreach the bounds of either reason or possibility (in Royster and Kirsch 19)

“Reason” and “possibility” are words often employed to draw a line between the enlightenment and romanticism, and thus, assign rhetorical value to enlightenment reason and logic and against romantic possibility and emphasis on feeling. Much of the conflict in secondary sources about romantic rhetoric stems from claims of truth. By questioning contexts and conditions, searching for audiences, and understanding the scope of a thinker’s writing, I apply the principle of critical imagination to carefully remake an interpretive framework that better understands the intersections between complicatedly diverse categories of thought.

Particularly useful in Royster and Kirsch’s list of questions that enable critical imagination are the inquiries: What were the frameworks used to question? Where are broader thoughts needed? What is illuminating/relevant about the context? (20). I ask these questions in
analysis of the scholars who have studied romantic rhetoric, directly and indirectly, since the 1930s. This framework of questions initiates conversation about myths, traps, and implications while emphasizing situational context rather than inviting direct critiques against researchers.

Within answering the questions about the context and motivation, critical imagination employs Geertz’s strategy of tacking in and tacking out as a “dialectical and dialogical analytical tool” to “enhance our capacity to account more substantially and respectfully” (Royster and Kirsch 72, 75). For this research on romantic rhetoric, I analyze those who have written about romantic rhetoric with a critical imagination that both exists because of the steps that were, in many ways, initiated by the critical elements of enlightenment rhetoric, the imaginative values of both enlightenment and romantic rhetoric, and the work in bringing romantic rhetoric from the fringes of the field by various scholars. Now with the term “critical imagination” so widely accepted, I am able to analyze these secondary sources, understanding the complexity as I tack in and tack out of cultural assumptions, stances of the field, political drives, and motivations. Critical imagination also helps focus my research on these scholars (most of whom have expansive theories stretching beyond their contributions to romantic rhetoric) by anchoring my research on their involvement with and characterization of romantic rhetoric.

Royster and Kirsch acknowledge that critical imagination is a starting point. To better apply the data gathered through critical imagination, I use the process of re-collecting described by Letizia Guglielmo in the introduction to Remembering Women Differently. Guglielmo explains, “as a feminist rhetorical act, re-collecting creates opportunities to expand the process of recovering women’s work by also looking for opportunities to disrupt or destabilize established memories created by prior acts of recollection and public remembrance” (3-4). My analysis of secondary sources on romantic rhetoric sets the foundation to then disrupt and destabilize these
prior memories by acknowledging places in which traps have been set and myths have been mistaken for fact in the narrative of romantic rhetoric.

Maintaining the feminist strategies for inquiry, I also employ Byron Hawk’s methodology of complexity to anchor my discussion of implications, traps, and myths in writing affirmatively about categorical cohesion and complication. Hawk’s first step within his methodology includes acknowledging that writing history responds rhetorically (260). As I detail the different theories in the story of romantic rhetoric research, I point out ways in which scholars are responding rhetorically to their context; this, along with the later steps, again coincides well with the feminist methodologies of re-collection and critical imagination. The second step outlined by Hawk includes examining key terms as they change in meaning when applied to different periods and categories (262). As I look at the narrative of romantic rhetoric research, the terms “imagination” and “invention” shift in meaning and importance. These key terms, within my broader analysis of the shifting meaning of romantic rhetoric, allow me to discuss the key myths, traps, and implications.

Analyzing terms as they shift in meaning leads to finding similarities and differences in discourses that develops new groupings based on practices (Hawk 265). Even a chronological approach, for the sake of organization, begs for chapters and breaks that create new groupings. By grouping years together, and associating those years with implications, I follow in this step of Hawk’s complexity.

The final two steps in Hawk’s counter history include seeing names and dates as key points in understanding interconnected relations and “writing affirmatively by using categories to open up possibilities rather than exclude them” (268, 270). The chronological narrative approach (discussed further in the definition of “narrative of romantic rhetoric”) has reinforced my
intentionality in detailing the contexts of dates and the background of scholars to show a robust timeline of research that, as much as possible, allows for positive connections and affirmative claims to emerge.

Visuals also help enlighten the imagination, especially in seeing interconnected relations and in seeing the dates as crucial to the context of the narrative. In discussing the definition of the narrative of romantic rhetoric, I include a timeline designed using Excel and AutoCAD; the years of publication each represent one line on each bar graph (see Figure 1.2). This timeline serves as a key point of reference as I provide cultural context and apply critical imagination that questions said context.

In each chapter, I include webs that show author connectivity. These are broken down by decade, and thus, are best analyzed alongside the timeline. The connectivity webs show that some authors in the narrative of romantic rhetoric research are cited with greater frequency than other authors. The webs also demonstrate the complexity of the narrative and raise the visual question of why, despite so many connections and chained citations, romantic rhetoric remains underappreciated. I identified the major works that further the narrative of romantic rhetoric research, the works also listed on the timeline, and that cite and are cited by at least one other author that meets the first two qualifications. Referencing the index, bibliography, notes, and text of each article, book, and dissertation, I listed the names of the authors who are discussed and emphasized within a text in substantial ways. To make each of the citation connectivity webs, I grouped “citing authors” in the decade group that corresponds to their first publication (as listed on the timeline) and individually listed each author that the citing author cited. Each citing author was placed in respective decade tabs. If an author had publications in two different decades (like Berthoff), the author only appears on a graph as a “citing author” in the earlier decade. I used the
“Network X” code in Python to create the visual webs (Hagberg, Schult, and Swart). As an example, and a justification for the need for this dissertation, Figure 1.1 includes the connectivity web of all major authors. The lines overlap to such degrees that conclusions cannot satisfyingly be drawn. Throughout the chapters of this dissertation, the webs representing each decade are interpretable, but this web of authors across the decades shows that there are connections worth exploring in greater detail within the narrative of romantic rhetoric research.

To note, more authors are cited throughout this dissertation than those listed on the timeline, and especially on the connectivity webs. The authors included in the visuals are the ones that, I argue, most advance, contribute to, or demystify, the myths, traps, and implications of a misunderstood romantic rhetoric. Figure 1.1, the connectivity web, justifies the need for a dissertation that untangles the web.

One risk in a study that focuses on romantic rhetoric is related to the many fields romantic rhetoric touches, including literature studies, philosophy, history, and rhetoric and

Figure 1.1: Author Citation Connectivity Chart, 1934-2019
composition. The limits, then, of this study include setting a boundary that looks for cohesion in the way these principles have been applied within the field. In aligning with Hawk’s goal to write affirmatively using categories to create possibilities, this limit also differentiates me from decades of research emphasizing claim making that have resulted in deep, abiding, yet often necessary binaries between romanticism and enlightenment rhetoric, expressivism and current-traditional and rhetorical pedagogy, etc. The claims so focused on hero/villain approaches to rhetorical research lead to a categorization that does present certain benefits, but my aim is to complicate the categories while writing affirmatively about cohesion. I seek answers to these questions about romantic rhetoric and the myths and traps because answering them, ever aware and understanding of my motives, allows me to see better the implications of pairing rhetorics against one another.

In his introduction to Octalog I, Murphy says that “the writer of history is a grapher of the *polis*” (“Octalog”). In this project, I must understand my role in graphing the politics of the field. In the same Octalog, Connors speaks to the debating nature of the field, “Composition historians live by necessity in a polemical universe of discourse… we are forced to make judgments and take sides in everything we write… How, in other words, has the culture created rhetoric, and how has rhetoric then recreated the culture?” (“Octalog”). Much of the discussion of romantic rhetoric is culturally situated. But rhetoric and composition’s historical research and methodological advances welcome affirmative writing rather than taking sides, as Connors discussed. Critical imagination constructs a “rhetoric of hope” that enables and is enabled by an understanding of multiple layers and dimensions (Royster and Kirsch 74).

The rhetoric of hope inherent in my discussion of romantic rhetoric is emphasized by a series of interviews I conducted in September of 2020. Having received IRB exemption, I used a
semi-structured interview format to talk with Peter Elbow, Hephzibah Roskelly and Kate Ronald, Sherrie Gradin, Katie Homar, John Willinsky, Hannah Rule, Craig Smith, Lois Agnew, and Ben McCorkle. The interviews with scholars featured throughout the narrative echoed the thoughts present throughout the decades of research that suggest romantic rhetoric is worth of deeper consideration.

Before unraveling layers, unveiling the story, and examining the rhetoric of hope present in the narrative, an understanding of definitions is necessary. The purpose of this dissertation, in many ways, centers on a desire to understand these complex terms as they are made manifest in the field over years of rhetorical study. A lack of a common language and understanding of romantic rhetoric creates gaps in research and knowledge. These initial definitions, while foundational in setting up the language used in this dissertation and in establishing a preliminary common lexicon, are necessarily open to elucidation as the narrative of romantic rhetoric unfolds. Thus, I will return to the definition of romantic rhetoric in the final chapter.

1.3 Definition of the Narrative of Romantic Rhetoric Research

My phrase the narrative of romantic rhetoric research allows me to capture the overall story while remembering my purpose. The research I look at includes authors who cite romanticism directly and those who do not, but the overall narrative of the research becomes a central tenant and argument of this dissertation. When I refer to the narrative of romantic rhetoric research, I summarize my method and rationale to recollect and critically reimagine research that relates to romanticism and rhetoric from 1934 to 2019. The components of the definition are found in the justification of the individual terms. In this section, I focus on the definition of “narrative” and discuss the benefits of telling the narrative through a chronological approach (the definition of “romantic rhetoric” is offered in greater detail in the next section).
Varieties of approaches are viable when presenting information about the scholarship that focuses on romantic rhetoric. Several existing studies on romantic rhetoric (Dietz, O’Brien, Veeder) include brief literature reviews that offer exemplar understandings of the field’s interest in romantic rhetoric, but the details are necessarily cursory and oftentimes, theorists are cited in clusters that miss key works (see the author connectivity webs throughout this dissertation and represented, in summary, in Figure 1.1). In this dissertation, I seek to understand the field’s interest in romantic rhetoric on both a broader level than those literature reviews, overviewing casual mentions and explicit defenses, and a more nuanced level, with precision and attention to detail in order to better understand the categorical confusion and cohesion, the myths and the implications.

Initially, as I encountered sources, I began to create groups. These scholars are *against* romantic rhetoric. These scholars *defend* romantic rhetoric. As I approached this inquiry into categorization and myths about romantic rhetoric, I was reminded of my own tendencies towards categorization. I note that the grouping is helpful, especially in establishing a base understanding. I am grateful for the enlightenment legacies to my education that teach me to see patterns and create categories like those for or against romantic rhetoric. But I am also a student of the romantic and enlightenment valuing of imagination, emotion, and narrative. Rather than presenting categories of scholarship about romanticism (those against romantic rhetoric, those defending romantic rhetoric, those in the middle ground tangentially talking about romantic rhetoric), I situate the narrative of research onto a timeline (see Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2: Timeline of Key Works in the Narrative of Romantic Rhetoric Research
This timeline provides a visual representation of the research that I refer to as I, throughout this entire dissertation, tell the narrative of romantic rhetoric research. Though not all wrote in favor of romantic rhetoric (Bizzell and Herzberg are included on the timeline), and while some do not explicitly add to the research about romantic rhetoric (Sharon Crowley, for example), together, these writings tell a story about the ways in which romanticism’s contributions to rhetorical theory have been both misunderstood and valued within rhetoric and composition. The green lines on the timeline represent the number of publications each year; 1980, for example, saw several publications that, in some way, further the narrative of romantic rhetoric research.

The limits of a chronological approach necessitate that, while I try to dive deeply into the theories related to romantic rhetoric, I do not offer in-depth arguments about each thinker’s total repertoire of scholarship. For example, Ann Berthoff and James Berlin each offer complex theories on romantic rhetoric, but they are also well-known for their other theories and contributions to rhetoric. Many authors in this narrative contribute theories to rhetoric and composition that are unrelated to romantic rhetoric, and largely, many are known better for those theories. But this is the story of romantic rhetoric research, so I summarize the well-known theories and direct the story back to the contributions to romantic rhetoric’s narrative. When examined within the narrative of romantic rhetoric, I limit my discussion on these highly influential thinkers in order to understand their complexity but also, to keep progressing in the narrative of romantic rhetoric.

Another complication of the chronological narrative approach is the complexity of the thinkers. Like the rhetors and poets that many of the authors within the narrative examined from
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the authors cited in this chronologically told narrative read, write, and think within contexts that necessitate shifts and evolutions of thinking. Year to year, some authors like James Berlin shift in their opinion toward the value of romantic rhetoric. Other times, the shifts seem to happen within the same article or chapter (Ross Winterowd provides an interesting case study on consistency of opinion). Telling the broad story of romantic rhetoric helps my argument avoid the trap of overcomplicating the complex shifts in thinkers’ thoughts because narratives allow and encourage dynamic growth of “characters”. Furthermore, the broader scope and goals of this dissertation help to mitigate the limit and celebrate complexity.

The final limit of the chronological approach to a narrative deals with the timeline itself. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, several writers publish many works that impact romantic rhetoric’s timeline. For the most part, I have chosen to present each author when they published their work that most advances or relates to romantic rhetoric. For example, Rex Veeder published articles in 1993, 1995, and 1997 but I choose to talk about his articles (many of which are similar in theme and in contribution to the narrative) in the section detailing works published in 1993 because his research is similar in style to the other research of these early 1990 works. By clustering authors around one date, I intentionally shine the spotlight back on the overall narrative and focus on emphasizing the number of authors interested in romantic rhetoric. The detailed timeline (Figure 1.2) offsets this limit. My chronological approach is itself very much an argument, and the limits are far outweighed by the benefits.

The chronological approach is useful for a variety of reasons. One, it consistently draws us back to the methodology of critical imagination that is so central to this research. Tacking in and out of the researcher’s background by nodding towards the cultural contexts of composition
at the times of publication enables a different and valuable understanding of arguments for and against romantic rhetoric.

Two, this chronological overview highlights areas in which interest in romantic rhetoric spiked and waned—initing questions about categorical implications and myths. When looking at the decades of research from distance, the perspective illuminates consequences of the ebbs and flows in a way that categorizing the thinkers does not. A robust timeline of events also nods to Hawk’s methodology towards complexity. As Young states, “when seen through the historian’s eyes, revolutions are more likely to appear as stages in the growth of a discipline” (409). A complex understanding of growth is helpful in understanding implications of categorical confusion and cohesion.

Third, and most personally important, this chronological approach reminds me that this is a narrative with real figures and scholarship that made and makes a difference, and so I arrive to my definition of the narrative of romantic rhetoric research.

We are drawn to stories for a myriad of reasons, and one reason is fittingly and, dare I say, romantically, reminiscent of the legacies of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Many specific details in this dissertation emphasize the reasons imagination, expression of feeling, the idea of sublimity, and the cultivation of taste in writing are persuasive to an internal and external audience. While I save most of those details for the chapters that follow, I do point to Michael Jackson’s *the Politics of Storytelling: Variations on a Theme by Hannah Arendt* for an initial rationale and definition for my use of the word “narrative.” Jackson writes, “Our lives are storied. Were it not for stories, our lives would be unimaginable. Stories make it possible for us to overcome our separateness, to find common ground and common cause… A story enables us to fuse the world within and the world without” (240). Similarly, Lekkie Hopkins discusses the
importance of narrative: “narrative, through engaging our senses as well as our rational intellect, can provide the context within which our imaginations can fly to the space of the other, to glimpse the world that the other inhabits” (137). While this dissertation does not focus (directly) on racial tension or cultural divides and traumatic suffering that spur Hopkins’s defense of narrative, the narrative still, very romantically and rhetorically, breaks down categorical divisions and opens the imagination to the (an) “other” side of historic rhetoric analysis.

When I focus on telling the narrative of romantic rhetoric within the narrative of rhetoric and composition, I work towards my goal, borrowed from Hawk, of talking affirmatively about categories. When I fit the robust books and articles into my predetermined categories, I am both tempted and required by my own heuristics to highlight the weakness in the arguments of those that disparage romantic rhetoric. When I tell the story of romantic rhetoric, I am able to view the research as part of the dynamic narrative that is loaded with periods of growth, of discovery, of maturing thinking, and of opportunity. Initially, I sought to examine the disrupted history of romantic rhetoric. Now, I seek to tell the narrative of romantic rhetoric, because, as Roskelly and Ronald say,

The history of composition and rhetoric has often been couched in the language of evolutionary replacement, battle for survival and extinction. Whether these historians despise the past or admire it, they organize historical movements into discrete unites, one unit inevitably replacing the other… these canonical treatments of the history of rhetoric neatly categorize past periods as artifacts and characterize past rhetoricians as successful mutations—adapted to changing environments—or as fossils (Roskelly and Ronald 103). Practically, a chronological narrative approach is challenging in that it requires contextual knowledge of the history of rhetoric and composition. Several excellent histories inform my own
timeline, and each of these histories are robust arguments within themselves. I draw specifically on Thomas P. Miller’s *The Evolution of College English*, Lisa Ede’s *Situating Composition*, James Murphy’s *The Rhetorical Tradition*, and Ross Winterowd’s *The English Department* as well as articles, the Octalogs, and *the Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies* to create the context that enables conversation about romantic rhetoric research. Theories about historiography have been well detailed in Ballif’s collection *Theorizing Histories of Rhetoric*. While aware of the theories and cautions for working historically, telling the narrative of romantic rhetoric is more my focus rather than theorizing a different approach to the history of rhetoric (Ballif 2-3).

Telling the story of romantic rhetoric is like revisiting a familiar story and telling a side character’s narrative (the Star Wars franchise’s movie about Han Solo’s early years, for example). As James J. Murphy said, “Since we don’t know our own history, we don’t know whether we are making new discoveries or merely remaking old mistakes” (3). Telling romantic rhetoric’s story helps illuminate ways in which discoveries have been repeated. By collecting this research in one timeline, I hope to present a resource for future discoveries. Though much of the recent work on romantic rhetoric alludes to the contested past of romantic rhetoric with a few paragraphs dedicated to the authors and their works, by delving deeper, tacking in and out using critical imagination, I hope to create a fuller picture that can lead to more research based on a contextualized story. By telling the story of romantic rhetoric, I hope to make new discoveries.

Ede’s goal is similar to my own:

I want to emphasize that I recognize that the story I narrate here is most assuredly not the story of composition but a story, one that highlights certain events, persons, and experiences while placing others in shadow… it will not lead to some broad revolution in
theory and practice in the field. Rather, it will at best lead to the asking of further questions (45).

I am not offering a new history of rhetoric and composition, but I am using existing history to tell the fascinating narrative of romantic rhetoric, and this story has direct implications for students. I arrive at further questions by telling a story within a story of composition, which in turn reveals the myths that have been perpetuated, traps that have been opened, and implications that continually influence rhetoric and composition in ways that do lead to reconsideration of historical boundaries.

1.4 Definition of Romantic Rhetoric

In a dissertation that purposes to tell the narrative of romantic rhetoric research, a definition of romantic rhetoric seems necessary. But, as this dissertation demonstrates, a definition of romantic rhetoric is complex. Looking at the timeline (Figure 1.2) reveals a variety of titles that include either the term “romantic(ism),” “rhetoric,” or “romantic rhetoric.” Figure 1.3 represents a simple Word Cloud (developed on wordclouds.com) to show the repetition of these words within the titles:
Given the titles explicitly about romantic rhetoric (Veeder’s “Romantic Rhetoric and the Rhetorical Tradition,” Berlin’s chapter “Emerson and Romantic Rhetoric,” Ramsey’s “Rhetoric and Romanticism,” and so on), it would be understandable to expect a definition of “romantic rhetoric” within some or many of the works. But the definitions of romantic rhetoric are vague and, thus, unreliable for extrapolation. One of the most referenced “definitions” of romantic rhetoric is offered by Berlin:

In this chapter, I would like to demonstrate Emerson’s effort to create a romantic rhetoric that, despite its emphasis on the individual, is social and democratic, combining the comprehensiveness of Aristotelian rhetoric with a post-Kantian epistemology. At the
same time, it is a system designed to be counteractive to the eighteenth-century rhetoric of its day” (*Writing Instruction* 42).

Gradin and Hawk both reference Berlin in their analysis of romantic rhetoric, without necessarily expanding on or offering their own definition of romantic rhetoric (Gradin 2-3, Hawk 60-62).

Veeder, in “Romantic Rhetoric and the Rhetorical Tradition” cites the distrust rhetoricians feel about British Romantics and examines De Quincey’s definition of British rhetoric to discuss pulpit rhetoric and appeals to aesthetics (300). Veeder concludes, “In order to meet the criteria of the Romantic rhetorician, the composer must seek to create a tone and atmosphere that encourages the audiences to recognize a moral or ethical purpose to discourse, to encourage speculative thinking, to emphasize identification with the largest group possible, and to suggest things for the audience to do while reading or listening” (316). Like Berlin, Veeder hints at a definition without explicitly stating what “romantic rhetoric” is. If I continue listing “definitions” of romantic rhetoric as offered by scholars from 1934-2019, I would get ahead of myself (see the remainder of the dissertation for this discussion). Instead, I give my own definition based on the composite parts: romantic and rhetoric.

To better unite the definitions of “romanticism” and “rhetoric” and establish a foundational understanding, I define romantic rhetoric as an available means of persuasion that stems from the eighteenth and nineteenth century considerations of imagination, nature, emotions, and the sublime within the context of philosophies of education, writing, and influence that, while featuring independent inspiration, is not divorced from an awareness of audience and community development. Though inadvertently ignored or intentionally left out of major anthologies, many scholars within rhetoric and composition have studied and made claims using romantic rhetoric. As such, “romantic rhetoric research” refers to the scholarship that contributes
to the narrative and answers questions about the implications of a misunderstood romantic
rhetoric.

This stipulative definition of romantic rhetoric is difficult to form because both
“romanticism” and “rhetoric” are challenging to fit into one definition, but even the difficulty in
forming a definition suggests the rhetorical possibilities. The definition of rhetoric is not the
focus of this dissertation, but I do devote a few pages to the definition because it becomes
relevant for the following chapters, and, in defining “rhetoric” from its Greek roots, early
glimpses of the tension that divides enlightenment rhetoric from romantic rhetoric show the
complex roots of the divisions.

Perhaps coined by Plato, the Greek word *rhetorike* was originally distrusted as the art of
the public speaker (Pullman). Verbal skill was important, but it was also highly suspicious.
Isocrates introduced a different way to teach this eloquence, and then Aristotle changed the
conversation on the purpose and definition of rhetoric. In his extensive discussion on the subject,
Aristotle defined rhetoric as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of
persuasion” (37). Rhetoric is the ability to be an observer and understand specific circumstances
in which persuasion is a possibility. According to Aristotle, rhetoric is not persuasion; it is an
ability to see the available means of persuasion. Rhetoric is a descriptive activity, and Aristotle
argues that rhetoric is the combination of analytical knowledge and the understanding of
characters used to offer people with incomplete information enough knowledge to complete an
action (41). Because rhetoric centers on a group of people, the audience of rhetoric is critical
(73).

Aristotle’s overall definition of rhetoric influences centuries of definitions (to an extent
impossible to fully capture in this brief overview), including my own definition of romantic
rhetoric. Contained in his extended definition of rhetoric, Aristotle alludes to the debate between science and art that would, in later centuries, determine different valuations of rhetoric and romanticism. According to Aristotle, rhetoric occurs where the scientific means for making decisions are absent (39). Rhetoric is the most powerful form of decision making when the group is undecided, when little scientific evidence is available, and when the audience has incomplete or undiscoverable knowledge. If a truth exists, rhetoric becomes a different discipline; it becomes a science. Rhetoric cannot be a science because it is based on probabilities (Aristotle and Kennedy 42). According to the definition offered by Aristotle, rhetoric makes that which is probable conveyable and convincing. Later conversations on imagination, invention, and the role of rhetoric and composition that contribute to traps resulting in a devaluation and misunderstanding of romantic rhetoric (see Chapters Two and Three) date back to Aristotle and to other classic thinkers.

Cicero defines rhetoric as “eloquence to persuade their fellows of the truth of what they had discovered by reason… But the art of eloquence is something greater, and collected from more sciences and studies than people imagine. [It is the incredible magnitude and difficulty of the art which makes good orators scarce]” (Cicero, 7-10, and Pullman). Cicero goes on to say that eloquence requires knowledge of many things so the words spoken are not ridiculously empty. Words must be carefully built with understanding of the emotions of man—a theme well celebrated in romanticism. In Cicero’s definition, the art of rhetoric requires grace, wit, learning, quickness and brevity in reply and attack, decorum, and urbanity. In addition, rhetoric also demands specific knowledge and expert memory. Immanuel Kant, an enlightenment philosopher, also defines rhetoric as an art, and in doing so, he sets up a critical distinction:
Rhetoric, so far as this is taken to mean the art of persuasion, i.e., the art of deluding by means of a fair semblance, and not merely excellence of speech (eloquence and style), is a dialectic, which borrows from poetry only so much as is necessary to win over men's minds to the side of the speaker before they have weighed the matter, and to rob their verdict of its freedom. . . . Force and elegance of speech (which together constitute rhetoric) belong to fine art; but oratory, being the art of playing for one's own purpose upon the weaknesses of men (let this purpose be ever so good in intention or even in fact) merits no respect whatever” (53).

Kant distinguishes rhetoric from the easy manipulation of people. Rhetoric is not solely about the goal of the speaker. Rather, the eloquence has a purpose and accomplished rhetoric allows the audience to maintain control of their own thoughts and decisions. The “art” of eloquence and rhetoric lead to perceived divides between the time period of romanticism and the enlightenment.

George Campbell’s definition of rhetoric as “the grand art of communication, not of ideas only, but of sentiments, passions, dispositions and purposes…. That art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end,” in a way, delineates possibilities by giving the art a subject (Campbell lxxiii in Bormann). The argument must have a possible end in sight, but it can be filled with the strokes of passion and purpose that returns the definition to the concept of art. Perhaps this is best summarized by Wayne C. Booth’s very simple definition that rhetoric is: “the whole art of discovering and sharing warrantable assertions” (11). Without specifically calling rhetoric an art, Margaret Muller’s definition of rhetoric discusses the purpose of rhetoric and in doing so, alludes to the purpose of any art—the stirring of emotion. She states, “rhetoric enables the celebration of everyday reality, facilitates communication, and articulates and regulates the expression of ambition and the whole political process. There is also of course an emotional
function” (Muller in Jeffreys 155). The emotional functions of rhetoric continue to be relevant to a definition of romantic rhetoric.

My stipulative definition of rhetoric, for this dissertation, considers rhetoric as the art and science of seeing and generating ideas that bridge understanding; focusing on real possibilities that can influence people, rhetoric is powerful persuasion. Rhetoric, as evidenced in its most effective applications over the centuries, has the beauty and attention to craft that the discipline of art prizes. At the same time, it carries a significant purpose and important rules and efficiency that are more often associated with science and study than with art. When tagged with the descriptor “romantic,” rhetoric emphasizes the artistic distinctions or persuasion that eloquently and imaginatively appeal to internal and external audiences of composers.

To understand the definition of “romantic rhetoric,” a description of romanticism is also necessary. Like “rhetoric,” “romanticism” is a category, field of study, and term that has eluded and confounded scholars for centuries. In an address delivered at the fortieth Annual Meeting of the Modern Language Association, 1923, Arthur O. Lovejoy opened by referencing an attempt made in 1824 to define romanticism, saying, “the singular potency which the subject has from the first possessed to excite controversy and breed divisions has in no degree diminished with the lapse of years” (229). The same is true a century later; the complexity has not diminished over the years. The concept of romanticism sparking categorical confusion, and thus, breeding divisions and controversy, is central to the tenants of the definition of romantic rhetoric.

With copious examples of different definitions of romanticism and what it has been said to precipitated, Lovejoy says, “The word ‘romantic’ has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing. It has ceased to perform the function of a verbal sign” (232). Even in 1923, Lovejoy was tasked with defending romanticism against observations made by Messrs.
Lasserre, Seillere, Babbitt and More, and others that “Romanticism is the chief cause of the spiritual evils from which the nineteenth century and our own have suffered” (233).

Lovejoy recommended a thorough study of the origins of the word romanticism and a move toward use of the word “romanticisms” when discussing the subjects on the grounds that each type of Romanticism was highly complex and did not logically fit together (235-236). Later scholars have relied on these definitions. Byron Hawk analyzes Lovejoy’s references to romanticisms including Germany’s romanticism in the 1790s, England’s in the 1740s, France’s romanticism (which is different in 1801 than it is from 1810 to 1820), and America’s later romanticism to agree with Lovejoy that each romanticism values something different (Hawk 33). Walter Ong summarizes “Arthur O. Lovejoy’s celebrated prowess in distinguishing varieties of romanticism was probably due to the ferment of romanticism still active in all of us as much as it was due to the diversified richness of the original romantic movement itself” (Ong 265).

Lovejoy extends his critique: “the categories which it has become customary to use in distinguishing and classifying ‘movements’ in literature or philosophy and in describing the nature of the significant transitions which have taken place in taste and in opinion, are far too rough, crude, undiscriminating—and none of them so hopelessly so as the category ‘Romantic’” (253). From the early days, definition of the word “romanticism” was difficult, complex, and revealed broader categorical myths and traps in the fields that studied romanticism.

In searching for a definition of romanticism in 1965, Isaiah Berlin comes to a similar conclusion as Lovejoy as he summarizes Heine, Ruskin, Taine, Schlegel, Brunetier, and others stating, “if we consider these quotations from men who after all deserve to be read, who are in other respects profound and brilliant writers on many subjects, it is clear that there is some difficulty in discovering the common element in all these generalisations” (15-16).
Other early scholars do make a more direct attempt at a definition. While in *The Mirror and the Lamp* M. H. Abrams claims “the romantic ‘movement’ in England is largely a convenient fiction of the historian” (100), in *Natural Supernaturalism*, Abrams summarizes Shelley’s conception of romanticism based on the common important themes: “a comprehensive intellectual tendency which manifested itself in philosophy as well as in poetry… casually related to the drastic political and social changes of the age” (11). To continue in summarizing each scholar’s definition of romanticism would be to, again, write the entire dissertation in this one section, but the story that will be told echoes much of the same confusion and complexity as represented by Lovejoy’s, Berlin’s, and Abrams’s definitions.

For now, I return to my definition of romantic rhetoric that synthesizes a historic context of the definitions of rhetoric and romanticism to argue that romantic rhetoric is a phrase that serviceably captures the broad understanding of rhetoric, an art and science of persuasion, and romanticism, the legacy of the eighteenth and nineteenth century valuation eloquence, emotion, and imagination. I devote large sections of this dissertation to exploration of the trap that romanticism is antirhetorical. The definitions detailed in this section set a foundation for showing the logic in uniting the terms romantic and rhetoric under one phrase, and thus, one definition because the common threads of persuasion, available means, art, audience, and emotion unite the two. Given this extended definition, I use the term romantic rhetoric to capture various nuances and to group together a wide range of research that furthers a narrative about romanticism’s relevancy to rhetoric. Though parts of this dissertation will touch on concepts of romanticized rhetoric, the utility of rhetoric as restricted by the literary period of romanticism, and the rhetoric of romanticism, I do not dwell on these because each of these topics deserve dissertations of their own. But for those studies to emerge, first an analysis of the confusion surrounding the vague
term “romantic rhetoric” must be laid as a foundation. I offer this foundation an argument for the validity of romantic rhetoric as a sub-field within rhetoric and composition.

1.5 Definition of Myth, Trap, and Implication

By analyzing romantic rhetoric via a chronological narrative approach, I highlight the ways in which myths enter and drive the story. Even the word “myth” connects to the romantic elements of a mythical narrative that reveals the main characters falling into traps and actions leading to implications. These storied words of “myth” and “trap” are often misused, like the word romantic, so I look to the definition of the “literacy myth” to justify and form a definition that will be useful in outlining several of my main arguments.

Within literacy studies, the word “myth” has been helpful in understanding the concept of literacy and those who attach to it a “be all, end all” characteristic. In a reflection on his work The Literacy Myth thirty years after its publication, Harvey J. Graff defines the literacy myth as the perpetuated belief that the acquisition of literacy results in and is a precursor to economic development, democratic ideals, increased intelligence, and upward social mobility. Graff reflects upon the resistance and support of literacy myths acknowledging that new literacy myths continue to emerge; history’s lessons are necessary in that they prompt new reconsiderations (638). For Graff, “the understanding of myth” is a mode of communication that reveals the relationship between the past, present, and future (637). Graff is careful to point out how examining the literacy myth invites a historical analysis that reveals interrelationships: “For the literacy myth, history and myth inseparably intertwine. Myth itself becomes a mode of interpretation—explaining or narrating—and a means to communicate that understanding…” (638).
Beyond revealing the connection and need for a contextualized history, what makes this language about myths helpful to this dissertation is the delicate balance between myths as an expression of falsehood and truth. As Graff notes,

Like all myths, the literacy myth is not so much a falsehood but an expression of the ideology of those who sanction it and are invested in its outcomes. For this reason, the literacy myth is powerful, resistant to revision, and longstanding. Contradicting popular notions, myth is not synonymous with the fictive or the false. By both definition and means of cultural work, myths can *not* be wholly false. For a myth to gain acceptance, it must be grounded in at least some aspects of the perceived reality and can not explicitly contradict all ways of thinking or expectations” (638)

The myths I examine in this dissertation have roots in well-expressed, well-researched discoveries and statements. Tagging these statements with the word “myth” allows for a more nuanced approach to the implications of long-held, popular theories and beliefs. “Myth” language also offers a different lens for examining the scholarship that tries to debunk myths, though none of the scholars label the claims they defend against as myths. Instead, many of the scholars presented in the narrative of romantic rhetoric research offer a passionate attack against claims different from their own.

This defense of binaries evident in the romantic rhetoric narrative, again, shows the overlap between literacy myths and romantic rhetoric myths and how the language surrounding myth fits well within the narrative approach. Graff argues,

Since mythos is grounded in narrative, and since narratives are fundamentally expressions of values, literacy has been contrasted in its mythic form with a series of opposing values that have resulted in reductive dichotomies… and other binaries that
caricature major social changes… Such hierarchies reinforce the presumed benefits of literacy and thus contribute to the power of myth (639).

In Graff’s work, more important than circumstances is the underlying statement on power and agency and a call to reject binaries and understand, reinterpret, and be transparent about literacy and literacy myths. Graff states that “the past and the present are inseparable” (643). This claim that the past and present share an intertwined trajectory that can actually be leveraged to dismantle binaries is crucial to my inquiry of the narrative of romantic rhetoric research.

To further demonstrate the utility of the word “myth” and the connections between myths within the narrative of romantic rhetoric and the literacy myth, I will point out a myth about romantic rhetoric that I have already discussed even in this first chapter. One myth that continues to impact the narrative of romantic rhetoric is that, because “romanticism” has lost its value as a signifier, it has lost its overall value in rhetorical history. As has already been discussed, romantic rhetoric myths start with confusions over the word “romanticism” and the efforts that have been made to discount and defend it. As such, romantic rhetoric has been defined in various ways and has, in many ways, not been defined at all.

One implication of this myth is that romantic rhetoric is absent in the larger narrative of rhetoric and composition as an organizing sub-field or tradition within the field (this is one of several myths that lead to the same implication). Graff’s solution is similar to my own, “only by grounding definitions of literacy in specific, contextualized, and historical particulars can we avoid conferring on literacy the status of myth” (639). By telling the narrative of romantic rhetoric research, I provide context and reveal the myths that are believed. Rather than
disproving them or exploding the myths (because “romanticism” is a challenging word to define; myths are never fully false), I, like Graff does with the literacy myth, hope to understand and to reinterpret the myths to illuminate implications (652). I call attention to the complexity of the myths and language to allow for more nuanced understanding.

As I examine the research that outlines reasons for the field’s dismissal of romantic rhetoric, viewing these reasons as myths is helpful. Myth language allows me to debunk the areas of the research that are not fully based on evidence now available while also acknowledging important foundations. The value of the language surrounding myths allows me to complicate the discussion by showing ways in which falsehood and fact intermingle in complex scholarship that, occasionally, asks a period of rhetorical history to do and be too much, in a similar way that literacy is often asked to be too much, and is thus misunderstood.

The danger of using the word myth is that it is difficult to understand, and possibly, overused. In this way, “myth” is a perfect term for this research because romanticism and myth fall into this similar category of words that are 1. misunderstood, 2. defamed for their romantic and literature connections, and 3. overused without being fully understood. That a word would be overused without being understood is one of the themes I reveal throughout this dissertation, a theme that is also a trap leading to arguments that perpetuate misunderstanding.

Not all of the situations and writings fit nicely into the language and metaphor of a myth. Also helpful in understanding is the word “trap.” Whereas myths are not synonymous with falsehood, traps represent common ways of thinking that are more closely related to inconsistency and incorrect interpretation. For example, the myth I used as the example above is that because romanticism is difficult to define, it has lost its overall value in rhetorical history. This myth
relates to the precision of language and though there is truth to the statement, the myth limits rather than opens up new avenues for discovery. A similar, yet very different approach to the precision of language already introduced in this narrative is the claim made by Bizzell and Herzberg that romanticism is antirhetorical (995). Rather than consider that claim a myth, I choose to instead see it as a trap that Bizzell and Herzberg fall into and then further legitimize for the field. This trap “romanticism is antirhetorical” is, in turn, set in part by the perpetuation of the myth that the word romanticism is an insufficient signifier (this trap is complex and I will discuss it at length in the following chapters). The teaching of myths as facts often set traps, and these traps often lead to broader implications that often end at the same point: romantic rhetoric is not a recognized sub-field and this limits students. Using the language and labels “myth” and “trap” allow me to differentiate situations within the narrative of romantic rhetoric. This understanding, like the use of questions that drive critical imagination, invites critiques of situations rather than of scholars, important in affirmatively assessing categorical division and cohesion.

Some of these myths and traps lead directly to broader implications for the field. Other times, the research itself leads to implications and bypasses one of the myths or traps I have highlighted. Examining implications, at large, helps me avoid misusing my terms “myth” or “trap” by forcing situations within the narrative of romantic rhetoric research to fit into the category of “myth” or “trap.”

To summarize my schema, “myth” allow me to identify complex beliefs and values about romantic rhetoric, as they have been told and repeated throughout decades of study. My use of the word “trap” is both dependent and independent of “myth.” Oftentimes, a myth directly leads to a trap that perpetuates a misunderstanding. But throughout the narrative, traps arise from
different motivations unrelated to myths. Traps are oftentimes more detrimental to romantic rhetoric’s recognition. I use the term “implications” to discuss effects of the myths and traps. As I do with my definition of romantic rhetoric, after telling the narrative of romantic rhetoric, I will detail the overview of the implications, myths, and traps. In the process of describing the fallacies and caricatures associated with romantic rhetoric as myths and traps, I detail a new method for interpreting misconceptions and recollections of rhetoric and composition’s history. My focus remains on romantic rhetoric, as a sort of case study, but within my attention to a particular era, I posit this schema of myth and trap language as useful in a repertoire of tools for historic analysis.

1.6 Chapter Introduction

Following this foundation for the story, I initiate the narrative in Chapter Two by examining the writing about romantic rhetoric, and other relevant scholarship, from 1934 to 1971. Following the strategy of tacking in and tacking out inherent to critical imagination, in Chapter Two, I trace the narrative of perceptions about romantic rhetoric within the field. Beginning with the foundational authors (Kenneth Burke, M. H. Abrams, I. A. Richards, Isaiah Berlin, for example), I examine the contexts and the motivations in order to establish the narrative. This sets the stage for an analysis of those who implicitly added to the narrative of romantic rhetoric (Kinneavy, Perelman). Within this discussion, I highlight the myth that paradigms of romanticism and enlightenment are separate, and in responding to the enlightenment, romanticism is radically opposed to the (rhetorically rich) enlightenment. Early writings in the narrative of romantic rhetoric research reveal the emergence of categories and, thus, the emergence and foundation for myths that paradigms are separate in writing studies and English departments.
Chapter Three covers the years between 1972 and 1989. This intense period of research shows how the myths detailed in Chapter Two impact and are perpetuated in the research. With a review of authors such as Berthoff, Young, Elbow, D’Angelo, Fulkerson, Engell, Ramsey, Berlin, and several others and a detailing of their writings on romantic rhetoric, in Chapter Three I seek an answer to the question “why is romantic rhetoric unrecognized as a valid sub-field?” The myths/traps/implications exposed and discussed in Chapter Three are twofold. In the 1970s and 1980s, research complicates the traps that romanticism is antirhetorical and that imagination is divorced from invention.

Chapter Four focuses on the “golden era” of romantic rhetoric research. Because the most full-length books championing romantic rhetoric published in the 1990s, in Chapter Four, I highlight the ten years before the turn of the millennium. Many of the writings in this era grapple with the argument that romanticism is relevant to rhetoric through analysis of the rhetoric of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Emerson. In Chapter Four, I discuss the complexity of the myth that focuses on the efforts that were reached to defend romantic rhetoric, and I question why these efforts were necessary based on the story that has emerged to this point. With a few exceptions, as detailed in the chapter, much of the work in the past twenty years (2000-2020) has recycled the same myths that have been circulating since the 1930s. Authors fall into the same traps that authors have been falling into since the 1960s. By discussing more contemporary and recent scholarship, I show one of the main implications of the myths and seek, yet again, to answer and complicate the question: why do myths persist despite years of scholarship that seek to debunk them?

Finally, Chapter Five continues in the thoughts presented in Chapter Four. By reviewing all of the major myths, traps, and implications, I suggest that a new understanding of paradigms,
specifically related to romantic rhetoric allows for complex categorization, that romanticism is rhetorical, that rhetoric has romantic qualities worthy of continued consideration, and that imagination and invention coexist in writing studies more often than is recognized. I synthesize the myths, traps, and implications presented throughout the dissertation. Specifically related to romantic rhetoric, this leads to broader implications for the field, and these implications, along with implications of perpetuating myths, are addressed in the final chapter. In Chapter Five, I also present a summary of key points discussed in interviews with key scholars in the narrative. The synthesis of conversations points to the need for a remembered, recollected romantic rhetoric. Thus, the conclusion of my dissertation ends on a hopeful note, inviting readers to take up the work of historic recovery and locate themselves research in the rich chronological narrative.
2 THE FOUNDATIONS

Early mentions of romanticism that inform writing tradition and later studies of romantic rhetoric appear in forwards, biographies, and literary analyses of romantic authors. Books such as I. A. Richard’s *Coleridge on Imagination* and M. H. Abrams *The Mirror and the Lamp* are cited often by the scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s, so this is where my narrative on romantic rhetoric research begins. Though many of these books do not explicitly define romantic rhetoric, they lay the foundations for the narrative, they offer insight into imagination and the relevancy of imagination and invention to English studies, and they establish a tradition that sees the rhetorical excellence offered through romanticism. In these early years of the narrative, myths and traps emerge related to definitions of romanticism, the paradigm shift from the enlightenment to romanticism, and the rhetorical value of romanticism to writing studies as it develops as a field. In this chapter, I argue that the foundations of the myths and traps that continue to limit perceptions of romantic rhetoric emerge based on a misunderstanding of romanticism within rhetoric and the development of departments and categorical hierarchization.

The time between 1934, when I. A. Richards wrote *Coleridge on Imagination* and 1965, when Isaiah Berlin gave lectures on “the Roots of Romanticism,” was a turbulent era of change. In 1934, Adolf Hitler, a month after the “Night of the Long Knives” became *Der Führer* of Germany (“WWII”). Worldwide tensions escalated; on September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland and World War II was initiated in Europe. The United States entered the war on December 8, 1941. World War II officially ended on September 2, 1945, some 85 million casualties later (though reports vary widely). After the war, boundaries and borders were redrawn and historic locations across Europe, where possible, began to be rebuilt. In 1948, Levittown, New York, became the first mass-produced suburb (Alan). The Korean War lasted
from 1950 to 1953 (Alan). The Cold War sparked fear; the time period was one marked by war. Because of this, it was a time of technological development that, beyond contributing to the war efforts, made life easier. Walt Disney opened Disneyland in 1955 with words that called listeners to cultivate imagination and emotions of joy (“Happy”).

During this time, education necessarily responded to cultural changes. In the 1950s, United States college enrollment increased by 49% (Snyder 66). During the 1960s, enrollment rose by 120% (NCES 66). Several of the changes in society led to the increase in college enrollment. For example, the surges in high school degrees conferred in the 1920s meant more students were eligible for college, the 1940s brought federal funding for veterans, and in the 1960s, the “baby boom” generation entered college (Snyder 67). The history of rhetoric and composition, and the narrative of romantic rhetoric research, fits into this broader history.

Edward P. J. Corbett describes the teaching of rhetoric in the 1930s by first noting the 1914 “divorce” between the teachers of speech (who formed the Speech Communication Association) and the National Council of Teachers of English (141). This separation is marked in other influential histories, including Murphy’s *The Rhetorical Tradition and Modern Writing*. Kinneavy articulates the rise of departmentalization as giving rise to “the melodramatic walkout of the speech and elocution members of the English departments” (Kinneavy 23 in Murphy’s *Rhetorical Tradition*). Kinneavy claims that this divide led English departments to focus more on the bellestric elements of writing and less on context and rhetoric (24).

In his mention of the “divorce,” Corbett focuses on two scholars and rhetoric at Cornell. The first graduate course in rhetoric was taught at Cornell in 1920, and it was the only Ivy-league school that had a significant graduate program in English in the twentieth century (Corbett 148). Corbett cites Hoyt Hudson’s articles that define the Cornell School of rhetoric and suggest a
course outline for graduate studies in rhetoric, differentiating literary studies, public speaking, dramatics, and pronunciation from rhetoric discourse: “the most important subject with which we have to do” (Howes, Historical Studies 15 as cited by Corbett 146). Even these early distinctions foreshadow later categorical confusion and cohesion that make romantic rhetoric’s narrative so compelling. According to Corbett’s discussion of Hudson’s article “Rhetoric and Poetry,” Hudson “conceded that sometimes rhetoric and poetics are intermixed” while still being distinct disciplines. Hudson, a poet and teacher of literature, delineated “poetry is for the sake of expression; the impression on others is incidental, Rhetoric is for the sake of impression; the expression is secondary—an indispensable means” (Howes, Historical Studies 371 as cited by Corbett 146). Though this definition is interesting to the topic at large, this departmental divide at Cornell was primarily between speech and communication rather than rhetoric and poetry. Furthermore, the articles and books of interest to the narrative of romantic rhetoric pick up in the next few decades following this foreshadow of divide. That said, Cornell was an outlier in its teaching of rhetoric during this time and the separation of rhetoric and poetics was, sadly, well-developed, hinting at the binaries that continuously impact the reception of romantic rhetoric.

English departments in the 1930s-1960s, hinging on the influence of the 1914 walkout and the lack of focus on rhetoric, were heavily influenced by literature. In The English Department: A Personal and Institutional History, Winterowd calls 1938 a turning point for literature based on the publication of the World’s Body by John Crowe Ransome, Literature as Exploration by Louise Rosenblatt, and Understanding Poetry by Cleanth Brooks and Robert Peen Warren (184, 198). Literary education, Winterowd claims, was dichotomized… This is a dichotomy from which English departments as custodians of literature have never recovered, a schism between professionals and other readers that
has created the image, on the one hand, of a priestly class that knows secrets about poetry that can be revealed only to those who are specially trained, and, on the other hand, of an effete, elitist clique that has nothing of value to say in the social world of economics, politics, religions—nothing to say, that is, in the agora, the quotidian (201-202).

In this literary culture, interest in romantic authors inspired influential books by authors who have become familiar in English departments and rhetoric and composition’s history like I. A. Richards and Kenneth Burke. As I analyze Richard’s, Burke’s and others’ approaches to Coleridge, I demonstrate the apparent foundations of the valuing system of romantic rhetoric. The reasonings of these early scholars point to myths and traps that, I argue, emerge repetitively later in the narrative. Taken with the other ruminations on romanticism, these analyzes of Coleridge and other literary criticisms build the arguments of Engell, James Berlin, Berthoff, Gradin, Roskelly and Ronald, and Hawk as they describe romanticism and/or rhetoric. As I analyze the ways in which these myths emerge, I also highlight the ways in which the foundational authors avoid falling into some of the traps that later limit romantic rhetoric. In this overview, I argue that there are moments in the narrative, especially before dichotomies divided English departments to such a severe degree, that we can now look back on for suggestions about how and why romantic rhetoric should and can be considered a valuable sub-field.

2.1 From Ivor to Isaiah

In 1934, I. A. Richards wrote Coleridge on Imagination (it would go on to have a second edition published in 1950 and be reprinted in 1955). Interested in poetry, philosophy, Basic English (as in, a language made up of only 850 words), and analytic reading, Ivor Armstrong Richards became known for his part in the development of New Criticism (Augustyn). Loaded with his own historical moment, Richards offers helpful arguments that become foundational in
analyzing criticism and Coleridge. Richards acknowledges the opinions on Coleridge in 1934 (showing the actual interest in romanticism was already well developed):

I should first indicate my approach to Coleridge—for there are many. I do not mean by this merely that he was a poet, a philosopher, a preacher, and a political theorist, as well as a critic. Nor do I mean that we may approve or disapprove, that we may consider him a genius and a pathological specimen; a methodologist and a muddler; a God-intoxicated man and a drug addict; a semasiologist and a victim of verbalism…. He has been treated sufficiently often as a human contradiction and as a biographers’ puzzle. He has been pitied and patronized, condemned and defended enough (xi).

Richards focuses on Coleridge as a psychologist who was aware and curious about his own thought processes, and Richards credits Coleridge for his uncommon talent for systematic thinking (2). Warning that critics must be careful in examining the influences of Coleridge since Coleridge’s own mind was the primary influence, Richards shows his valuing of Coleridge’s contributions (4). Like in later compilations and critiques of Coleridge, (specifically, John Spencer Hill’s 1971 compilation *Coleridge on Imagination*) Richards investigates the division between associationism and imagination, especially as Coleridge’s theories differ from and yet are guided by Hartley, Locke, and Hume (16). Relying on examples from Longinus and discussion on Plato, Richards draws a distinction between imagination and imitation with examples, summarizing Coleridge’s doctrine on imagination in four points (24, 29). After chapters dedicated to the influence of nature (144) and the definition of *genius* (62), Richards reviews his approach:

---

**Myth:**
Because “romanticism” has been over-studied, it has lost its overall value in rhetorical history.
I have tried to further this development [of a theory of poetry] by presenting Coleridge’s Theory of Imagination for more detailed consideration than it has hitherto received, and by adding suggestions towards extensions of his method of analysis. These must perhaps await fuller exposition before they become effective. But, with the history of opinions on Coleridge before us, it seemed but just that an account of his work should be attempted before new derivations from it again obscure our debt (233).

Later critics determine that Richards achieved his goal. M. H. Abrams says I. A. Richards “takes the crucial import of the distinction between fancy and imagination more seriously than any critic since Coleridge himself” (Abrams Mirror 182). In Richards on Rhetoric, edited by Ann Berthoff in 1991, Berthoff notes the applicability of Richards in teaching, showing that the literary starting point offered by Richards is rhetorical: “he wrote very little about composition, per se, but in everything he wrote, there are important implications with respect to how we think about teaching writing and the ways we go about it” (xi). The narrative of romantic rhetoric reveals that Richards’s outlining of the Theory of Imagination did indeed lead to fuller exposition.

In Coleridge on Imagination, Richards identifies traps and myths that will be important to the narrative, but Richards does not let these limits diminish or weaken his argument. He recognizes the trap that Coleridge has been over-classified and romanticism has been over-studied, and he successfully avoids the trap by relying on primary study and contextualization of Coleridge. Richards draws distinction between imagination and imitation, and thus explains something that in subsequent years becomes a point of contention. Thus far in the narrative, the
myths and traps are foreshadowed, but Richards manages to avoid the major myths and traps that later lead to implications resulting in a diminished view of romantic rhetoric.

One of my central arguments is that a missing tradition recognizing romanticism’s relevancy to rhetoric limits our students. Richards’s analysis of Coleridge proves my point. Both for first-year students and rhetoric and composition graduate students, learning to examine over-studied, over-argued subjects and rely on primary study and contextualization are critical skills for writing and thinking. I argue that Richards’s dealing with Coleridge is exemplar both as a rhetorical analysis and for its contributions to theories on imagination and invention. But without a general awareness of romantic rhetoric, these lessons offered by Richards—and by Burke—require more detailed mining since Coleridge is not considered, at large, a rhetor.

In 1939, Kenneth Burke, the largely self-educated thinker known for his contributions to rhetorical criticism, a definition of rhetoric, and application of rhetoric in the classroom, wrote about Coleridge with the startling opening: “Each time I note the signs of the elite boom for Kierkegaard and Kafka, I am disgruntled. It should be Coleridge” (Clark). In “Why Coleridge?” Kenneth Burke focuses on the years 1797-1798 as pivotal “watershed” years for Coleridge as an important figure in idealism. As an introduction to biographies on Coleridge by E. K. Chambers and Lawrence Hanson, Kenneth Burke’s selling points on Coleridge are meant to intrigue and invite people to think of Coleridge as more than the poet associated with high school English lessons.

Burke remarks upon the relevancy of Coleridge to his current political moment, linking Coleridge’s England’s responses to the French Revolution with Burke’s world’s responses to the Russian revolution and Fascist reaction: “It is this constant eagerness to consider local situations with reference to universal situations that gives even his [Coleridge’s] most transient concerns
their lastingness. And though you may very often disagree with his vote on a given issue, you must repeatedly salute his precision in singling out the issues to vote on.” Burke’s portrait of Coleridge emphasizes the rhetorical attributes of the poet as they relate to audience, situation/context, kairos, and ethos. Burke, who Fogarty claimed exemplified “new rhetoric”, valued the rhetorical contributions of Coleridge (Hawk 14-15). Rex Veeder says, “Burke is direct in his estimate of Coleridge’s worth to someone interested in writing” (21). Marcia Bost examines how Coleridge is one of the major figures Burke uses to support his own ideas (48). Pointing out the class Burke taught on Coleridge, Bost claims that Burke described Coleridge as an “idealist, one of the greatest critics of world literature, a great dialectician, and a literary idealist… Coleridge seems to morph into whatever Burke needs him to be at the moment” (48).

Bost traces Burke’s relationship with imagination in more detail than the affordances of this narrative offer, and Bost concludes: “Following the Romantic Movement’s setting Imagination in opposition to logic, Burke suggests that any modern use of passions, emotions, actions, mood, and personality is likely to be presented as an image” (56). Bost is able to reach this conclusion because a narrative of romantic rhetoric that establishes the cohesive categories and exposes the myth that romanticism viewed imagination in opposition to logic had not been written—highlighting another reason as to why this narrative is important, without romantic rhetoric as a respected sub-field within the history of rhetoric, the myth that romanticism sets imagination in opposition to logic lingers.

Bost’s argument that Coleridge was to Burke whatever Burke needed exposes an important trap: the romantic authors, Coleridge especially, were so prolific that their work has been interpreted by scholars without
full understanding and context. This same myth is evident in I. A. Richards’s quote above that references Coleridge as a human contradiction. Burke’s ideas are complex, and to avoid falling into a similar trap of using Burke only to the suitability of my claims, I will limit my analysis of Burke to this broad point: Kenneth Burke saw rhetorical value in study of romantic principles. This becomes important when later research suggests that romanticism has no place within rhetorical anthologies; the absence of Coleridge from the Rhetorical Tradition (Bizzell and Herzberg) leads to confusion in encountering Burke’s opinions and uses of Coleridge and distance from primary sources grows. Simply adding Coleridge to one anthology, while it would help establish legitimacy of one romantic rhetoric scholar, would not be enough. To show that romanticism is not antirhetorical, a tradition that recognizes romantic rhetoric is necessary.

But, again, one of the most persistent traps I trace throughout this dissertation is the claim that romanticism is antirhetorical. One possible cause for the existence of this trap is the common myth, as evidenced in Bost’s claim above and in a pendulum view of history, is that romanticism is distant and separate in its response to the enlightenment. This myth is foundational to the devaluing of romanticism because seeing romanticism as detached from the rhetorically rich enlightenment era leads to the thought that romanticism, therefore, must be rhetorically deprived.

Berthoff applies the pendulum metaphor to composition studies, warning that “pendulum-swinging… is likely to lead to vertigo, if not brain rot, and that, in any case, it is a distraction” (“Rhetoric as Hermeneutic,” 280). While Berthoff talks about the pendulum between positivist and mystical poles of dyadic semiotics, Roskelly and Ronald refer to Berthoff’s reference to
pendulum swinging to understand the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: “So modernism is taught as inevitably replacing the ‘romantic period,’ which displaced the Enlightenment brought on by the Industrial Revolution and growing democracy” (Roskelly and Ronald 119). In this reference, Roskelly and Ronald highlight a common understanding of the romantic period: it represents a pole opposite on the pendulum to enlightenment rhetoric.

Rather than be limited by the metaphor of a pendulum, Hawk refers to broad and taught reactions of rhetoric through the “metanarrative of rhetoric’s retreat and return” history (41). Enlightenment retreats as romantic ideas return. Others refer to the responsiveness of rhetoric in terms of paradigms. Young cites Thomas Kuhn in defining paradigm as a “system of widely shared values, beliefs, and methods that determines the nature and conduct of the discipline. A paradigm determines, among other things, what is included in the discipline and what is excluded from it” (Young 397). As paradigms shift, the new ideas are valued and often reject, even radically oppose, ideas of the old paradigm—or so the teachings go. Whether viewed as a pendulum swing, a retreat and return, or a paradigm shift, the myth that romanticism is different from the enlightenment, and thus, of lesser value to rhetoric, impacts nearly every decade of research in this narrative. Yet early on in the narrative of romantic rhetoric, this myth is well debunked by Walter Jackson Bate.

In 1946, the year the first meeting of the United Nations was held, Harvard University Press published W. J. Bate’s From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eighteenth-Century England. Bate won the Pulitzer Prize for his biographies on Samuel Johnson (which James Engell showed his gratitude for in the Creative Imagination (58)) and John Keats, but From Classic to Romantic summarizes much of his early works (Krupnick). As the published version of Bate’s Lowell Lectures from 1945, the purpose of From Classic to Romantic was to
outline the evolution of ideas that Bate claims to be a most crucial transition between the eighteenth and nineteenth century (vii). Tracing and defining concepts like associations, faculty, taste, reason, nature, and imagination, Bate takes on “one of the most majestic themes of all cultural history—the change in the controlling ideas of art, literature, and philosophy, from the conceptions of Renaissance humanism to those of nineteenth-century subjective empiricism” (Humphreys 509). Bate shows how important the centuries are, how the methods of the centuries changed throughout time, and how the arbitrary headings of “classicism” and “romanticism” have gained continued use and defy replacement (vi). He focuses on thinkers including Locke, Hume, Johnson, Reynolds, Edmund Burke, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Hazlitt, Gerard, Keats, and several other philosophers and poets to say,

As the eighteenth century progressed, the inevitable mechanistic and emotional reactions to neo-classic rationalism, as well as to what remained of classical and Renaissance humanism, received effective and consistent support from British empirical psychology. The closing years of the century were accordingly characterized by a general conviction decidedly different from that which it had inherited: a conviction that the essential nature of man was not reason… but that it consisted, in effect, either of a conglomeration of instincts, habits, and feelings…” (160).

Here, the power of the myth metaphor shines. There is evidence for the legitimacy of part of the pendulum myth, and Bate points out the ways in which the convictions of romantic and classic/enlightenment theories represent different and shifting values. He also, importantly, acknowledges the inheritance of ideas, pointing out, for example, the ironic commonplace of history that the source of romantic emphasis on feeling was the mechanistic psychology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Bate 129). In highlighting the ironic commonplaces of
history, Bate essentially acknowledges what I am labeling the pendulum myth: “Critics who rather too arbitrarily oppose the classic and the romantic as diametrical opposites often take pause to caution us not to judge the various ramifications of classicism by what they degenerated into” (168). Not only does Bate highlight the dangers and irony of arbitrarily pinning classicism against romanticism, he also shows how the two time periods are related with a warning not to form quick generalizations that judge an age by the one preceding it (166).

In a 1947 review of *From Classic to Romantic*, A. R. Humphreys admires Bate’s thorough and detailed approach while also noting the shortcomings (in a direct manner): “In substance, then, Mr Bate has made a notable contribution to the study of ideas. Unfortunately, the excellence of its scholarship is to quite an extent discounted by the dreary abstraction of its style… mere unrelieved exposition, if logical and clear, would still be an acceptable medium for an important thesis” (Humphreys 510). Years later, the material feels, as Humphreys articulated, hard to digest. While extraordinarily admirable and one of the most adept books at highlighting potential myths and traps and avoiding them via in-depth historic analysis, the key themes in *From Classic to Romantic* are challenging to identify. Nevertheless, the thorough approach to a historical awareness and linking of the rhetorical qualities of romanticism qualify *From Classic to Romantic* as a key publication in the narrative of romantic rhetoric because Bate presents an alternative option to viewing the enlightenment as radically opposed to romanticism, especially in terms of rhetoric. With enlightenment rhetoric a well-accepted sub-field, I argue that Bate’s book is an excellent resource for establishing romantic rhetoric as a valuable sub-field because Bate’s association of the time periods shows the continual development of rhetorical ideas, from classicism to romanticism.
A much longer book than Berlin’s *Roots of Romanticism* or Bate’s *From Classic to Romantic*, Abrams focuses on detailing criticism, and he surveys literary criticism’s history through an examination of romantic authors. Under the direction of I. A. Richards, in 1953, M. H. Abrams wrote the landmark book *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition* (viii). In the year the discovery of DNA was announced and Elizabeth II was crowned Queen of the United Kingdom, Abrams made foundational claims about theories of poetry developed in the first forty years of the nineteenth century. Abrams draws on the “original and enduring critics of the time” (vii). In doing so, Abrams examines varieties of romantic theory that are helpful in defining romanticism and its characteristics. While an undeniably important book for literary criticism and later categories within rhetoric and composition, Abrams’s approach to romanticism is also rhetorical. With the presentation of quotes like,

> In any period, the theory of mind and the theory of art tend to be integrally related and to turn upon similar analogues, explicit or submerged. To put the matter schematically: for the representative eighteenth-century critic, the perceiving mind was a reflector of the external world; the inventive process consistent in a reassembly of ‘ideas’ which were literally images, or replicas of sensations; and the resulting art work was itself comparable to a mirror presenting a selected and ordered image of life (*Mirror* 69),

Abrams writes in a similar style to the authors he studied, the authors that fill the rhetorical cannon of history like Locke, Vico, and Blair. Abrams posits theories on how people think about imagination and invention and he backs his findings with elaborate detail and examples from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, making his approach important in the narrative of romantic rhetoric for the theories presented, the thoroughness of the authors studied, and the renown in English studies at large.
James Engell (1981) recognizes the lasting value of Abrams: “the most comprehensive discussion of organic theories… is still M. H. Abrams” (381). James Berlin uses M. H. Abrams’s distinctions to explain Blair’s concept of poetry (28). M. H. Abrams becomes particularly important in a conversation about categorization. Roskelly and Ronald suggest that James Kinneavy’s *Theory of Discourse* draws on the categories M. H. Abrams’s offers in this 1953 work (33). In defining the maps that separate romanticism and vitalism, Hawk explains how James Berlin’s term expressivism is developed, in part, as a response to Richard Fulkerson’s essay “Four Philosophies of Composition” which takes categories from *The Mirror and the Lamp*’s categories in literary criticism (Hawk 54). Gradin also credits M. H. Abrams’s definition of “expressive” found in *The Mirror and the Lamp* (2). Terms that have become commonplace in rhetoric and composition have roots in Abrams’s reflection on romanticism.

Though *The Mirror and the Lamp* is most relevant to this narrative, Abrams continued to write about and define romanticism. In his 1971 publication, *Natural Supernaturalism*, Abrams looks at the Biblical roots in much of the romantic theories. With excellent cultural context, Abrams describes the impact of revolutions (particularly the French Revolution) on romantic thought. Like Richards, Abrams is valuable to romantic rhetoric, and rhetoric and composition at large, on several levels. The rhetorical valuing of romanticism in *The Mirror and the Lamp* and the themes in Abrams’s later works are excellent examples of a scholar using primary evidence to support rhetorical claims. Abrams highlights attributes of romanticism, like the links to revolutions, that could directly yield research that supports today’s students. Within the narrative
of romantic rhetoric research, the continued interpretations of M. H. Abrams reveal the dangers of a tradition that cites scholars without full understanding of the sub-field of romantic rhetoric.

Though Abrams did not necessarily perpetuate, debunk, or initially set myths or traps about romantic rhetoric, his relevance later in the narrative does highlight myths and traps centered on categorical hierarchies. The categories that Abrams initiates become points of contention and defense in later rhetorical studies, but we do not have to wait until the 1970s and 1980s to see theorists responding defensively to claims made against romanticism (and rhetoric). With the dramatic opening sentence, “For approximately half a century in France, and for a slightly shorter time in Great Britain and America, Romanticism has been the target of the critics’ onslaught,” Henri Peyre goes on to suggest that though romanticism was abused, it “fared rather well” (29). In an article written in 1954 in *Yale French Studies: Romanticism Revisited* and republished in 1999, Peyre examines various versions of romanticism from around the world and shows how they were treated by history and anti-Romantic reactions (30). Like I. A. Richards, Peyre is overwhelmed with the layers that distance his contemporary scholarship from the primary sources: “These poets are immensely great, especially for those who, like the quinquagenarian author of these lines, first discovered them before thesis upon thesis, textual analysis piled up upon over-subtle deciphering of their enigmas had converted them into pillars of academic criticism, overgrown with adhesive learned gloss” (32). Peyre discusses the rise of rhetoric and the danger of French eloquence, but his piece is largely a contribution to the opinions on French poetry more than it is an academic thesis on romantic rhetoric itself. Still, many key theorists were disgruntled with the general treatment of romanticism in the 1950s and 1960s.
In 1964, Earl Wasserman declared, “we owe the word ‘Romanticism’ a good deal of extra pay; we have made it do such a lot of overtime work by meaning so many things” (17). Though complaints against the broadness of the signifier “romanticism” were common (see Chapter One about Lovejoy’s opinion about the term’s lacking of precision), Wasserman is among the first voices to suggest that categorically, “romanticism” is problematic based on the interests of the poets who are often labeled “romantic.” Specifically, Wasserman points out that Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, and Shelly “share many features, but a catalogue of these would merely melt the four poets into an anonymous confection… it would destroy our essential reason for reading them” (17). While noting that their cultural moments overlapped, and their interests in imagination gives them some connecting points, Wasserman argues that what the four poets “chose to confront more centrally and to a degree unprecedented in English literature is a nagging problem in their literary culture: How do subject and object meet in a meaningful relations? By what means do we have a significant awareness of the world?” Wasserman highlights the rhetorical qualities in the difficult-to-define romanticism (22). O’Brien refers to Wasserman’s understanding and labeling of Keats’s poetry as “epistemology of empath” to show that Wasserman “dispels the notion that the imagination is contrary to reason for the Romantics” (O’Brien 87). The idea that imagination and reason are opposed continues to impact the reception of romantic rhetoric for decades.
Also published in 1964, an article that would set the course for much research in rhetoric and composition contributed indirectly to the narrative of romantic rhetoric research. Gordon Rohman and Albert Wlecke posed the question, “Why do students write poorly?” (216). In their government-sponsored report, Rohman and Wlecke draw on M. H. Abrams’s plant analogy to demonstrate a paradigm for writing as a process of growth (222). In summarizing Rohman and Wlecke’s argument that thinking is different from writing yet also a necessary precursor to writing, Faigley notes that Young credits Rohman and Wlecke in helping overturn the current-traditional paradigm. But Faigley also highlights a limit of Young’s approach: “What Young neglects to mention is that Rohman and Wlecke revived certain Romantic notions about compositing and were instigators of a ‘neo-Romantic’ view of process” (Faigley “Competing Theories” 654). Categories emerged with a force, in many ways instigated by Rohman and Wlecke’s study and by the cultural context surrounding composition studies; these categories such as current-traditional rhetoric become a focus in the next section of the romantic rhetoric narrative, the section detailing studies that emerge after the Dartmouth conference. Wlecke went on to publish *Wordsworth and the Sublime* in 1973, demonstrating interest in imagination and the sublime, but in rhetoric and composition, Wlecke is better-known for his collaboration with Rohman that starts to distinguish pedagogical options and literary studies from rhetoric and composition. The question “Why do students write poorly?” is a precursor to the traps and myths that I will highlight in discussion of Berthoff and Lauer and a problem/solution approach to teaching writing.

As a final overview within this early section of the foundation era of the narrative of romantic rhetoric, the theories and claims presented by Isaiah Berlin’s *The Roots of Romanticism* (lectures in 1965, and repeated in 1967, 1975, and 1989 (when Berlin was eighty-years-old) and
edited by Henry Hardy and published in 1999 and again in 2013) show a shift in the narrative. Like the other authors overviewed in this section, Berlin is thorough and well-read. Like the others, Berlin views romanticism as more than a literary movement and as a period worthy of rhetorical note: “the interest of romanticism is not simply historical. A great many phenomena of the present day—nationalism, existentialism, admiration for great men, admiration for impersonal institutions, democracy, totalitarianism—are profoundly affected by the rise of romanticism, which enters them all” (Berlin xi). Also similar to others, Berlin analyzes several definitions of romanticism (18); in A Counter-History of Composition, Hawk cites and references these definitions offered by Isaiah Berlin (33). Berlin also defines Enlightenment and includes analysis of well-respected rhetorical thinkers (many of whom are included in the Rhetorical Tradition); Vico, Blake, Locke, Newton, Herder, Kant, and others are analyzed (21). In these respects, Berlin is similar to the other authors presented thus far in the narrative, but Berlin is also more definite in his claims, foreshadowing the next series of writings on romanticism.

With claims like, “the importance of romanticism is that it is the largest recent movement to transform the lives and the thoughts of the Western World” (1), “the cage of which he [Blake] speaks is the Enlightenment, and that is the cage in which he and persons like him appeared to suffocate all their lives in the second half of the eighteenth century” (50), and “the great achievement of romanticism, that which I took as my starting-point, was that, unlike most other great movements in human history, it succeeded in transforming certain of our values to a very profound degree. That is what made existentialism possible” (139), Isaiah Berlin draws lines in the sand. As Bate was monotone, mired in details and supporting evidence, and somewhat unclear in his presentation of claims, Berlin was, in many respects, the opposite: passionate and overwhelming in his stances. Berlin exposes a trap that suggests that romanticism is superior
than the enlightenment options for rhetoric. This is slightly different from the trap that
romanticism is antirhetorical, but based on the same myth that views the time periods as opposed
to each other. Characterized by Berlin’s cage description of the Enlightenment, the staunch
defense of romanticism that perpetuates the claim that romanticism deserves exclusive credit (at
the expense of other time periods) is just as limiting as the claim that romanticism is
antirhetorical.

Isaiah Berlin was very clearly a product of his time. These original lectures reveal a fear
of the re-creation of Hitler in other thinkers (40, 141). Berlin’s *Roots of Romanticism* is a turning
point. Though it is foundational and later, well cited, in the same manner as Bate, Abrams,
Richards, and Burke, Berlin begins to draw lines; the claims lead to categorization. This, along
with the theories that become categories—set up, in part, by Abrams and by Rohman and
Wlecke and given fodder for defense by arguments like those offered by Wasserman and
Peyre—complicate the quest to find cohesion between categories.

2.2 Synthesis of Emerging Myths and Traps

How does the field move from these early moments of valuing romanticism to the later
dismissal of romanticism as antirhetorical? I pause the narrative to note the implications of the
myths and traps discussed, and in doing so, I further justify the rhetorical importance of romantic
rhetoric.

Two myths that emerge from the early studies suggest that romanticism had, by the
1930s, been over-studied and had lost its value as a signifier. Romanticism was already clouded
by “too much” theory and study, and as evidenced in the context and narrative above, this gives
rise to the myth that romanticism has lost its value as a signifier and thus, its place in romantic
rhetoric. The same myth discussed in the introduction (Lovejoy’s quote that romanticism “has
ceased to perform the function of a verbal sign” (232)) becomes more entrenched in the thirty years after Lovejoy first complained.

As I will continue to show through the narrative, “romanticism” remains difficult to define. This does not keep scholars from studying it or finding rhetorical value in it, as is already exemplified by the number of those who have grappled with the definition. As Bate said, “romanticism” as a category, defies replacement (vi). Still, this myth persists in the timeline; for example, in the 1990s, Gradin and Roskelly and Ronald try to rename/rebrand romantic rhetoric based on a general lack of understanding of the definition of romanticism. Noting the foundations of the myth that romanticism defies a place in romantic tradition because of its vague definition early in the narrative allows me to establish a discussion about the enduring complication of definition. Without a common lexicon and understanding, romantic rhetoric does not ascend to the respected position of a sub-field. And without being recognized as a sub-field, romantic rhetoric remains difficult to define—a vicious cycle that limits students from accessing all the rhetorical opportunities present in both the primary romantic rhetoric sources and in the analysis of secondary sources about romantic rhetoric that I have and will continue to highlight given their importance to the narrative of research.

The “definition myth” is very similar to the annoyances displayed in the 1930s-1965 that romanticism had been over-studied. Tracing this myth through the narrative is also fascinating because one of the defining romantic rhetoric myths of 2000-2020 is that romantic rhetoric has not been studied enough. Since both the over-studied myth and the difficult-to-define myth continue to appear in the story, further analysis of the implications of these myths will, in part, wait until more of the story unfolds. However, as this early overview highlights, romanticism did
not lose its overall value in rhetorical history because it was difficult to define or because too many other scholars had muddied the waters. The number of scholars drawn to continued study and definition of romanticism and romantic rhetoric displays the invitational possibility present in the complex and heavily-researched subject.

Emerging from the myths related to the definition and over-study of romanticism, two traps develop based on romantic figures themselves. Because romantic rhetors were so detailed, prolific, and interested in many theories, they are interpreted in a variety of ways, often in ways that are useful to the scholar who is doing the interpreting. Because the romantic poets themselves were so distinctive from each other, Wasserman argues that they cannot all be classified into the same category of sweeping understanding. Avoiding the traps while determining the lasting relevancy and legitimacy of the traps takes careful understanding of the categories and definition of romanticism; the myths and traps are connected. If contextualization and understanding is needed, then, arguably, one would need to read all the works on romanticism to arrive at a fair definition of romantic rhetoric. Well, reading all those works would be nearly impossible, given the sheer quantity of research (Lovejoy’s, Richards’s, and Peyre’s complaint) that already existed in 1934 and that has continued to add to the complexity. Were one to read the works and fully contextualize, one would likely arrive at the same conclusion as Wasserman that the romantic authors cannot fairly be grouped together. Herein lies the complexity of categorizing. Categories, broad like “romanticism” and more specific like the different types of writing pedagogies, are necessary in initiating and inviting research. Categories help researchers avoid making biased citations by giving a common reference point, and categories condense articles and well-known research into manageable amounts. But at the same
time, categories invite pendulum teachings of history and the myth that values and eras within history are mutually exclusive.

The complexity of categorization, evident in the “solution” to avoiding traps that leads to the misuse of historic scholars for biased claims and convenient categories, reveals myths and traps that will be discussed throughout the remainder of this dissertation, especially the myth that in responding to the enlightenment, romanticism is “radically opposed” to the (rhetorically rich) enlightenment (pendulum myth) and the trap that romanticism is antirhetorical (and even the emerging myth, that imagination and invention are mutually exclusive, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three). While the writers I have featured in this section describing 1934-1965 are not as immediately connected to establishing or debunking these myths and traps as the scholars that follow in the narrative, noting the origins of these discussions reveals hope and relevancy.

At this point in the narrative, romanticism was already distrusted and scholars approached it from a defensive stance, but scholars still studied and defended romanticism and romantic rhetoric (though they did not call it by this name) for the qualities it contributed to writing studies and to composition. Still, confusion persists, and in the next segment of history, categories are used to manage the confusion. Unfortunately, rather than debunk myths or create common agreement, the creation of categories agitates a myth that more broadly affects the narrative of romantic rhetoric. The creation of categories, mixed in with the catalytic question “why do students write poorly” creates traps that emerge more clearly in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
2.3 The Rise of Categories and Complaints

Boundary lines were drawn after World War II; throughout the time when the children of the WWII veterans graduated high school and went to college, barriers were championed. In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court called for racial desegregation of schools, and the need for the Civil Rights Movement attests to the dangerous reality and the lengths people went to in order to maintain racial boundaries.

The 1914 division between communication and composition was represented by a melodramatic walkout; the Dartmouth Conference in 1966 serves as the next well-known dividing point. Many consider the collaborations at the conference the birthplace of modern composition studies (Thomas Miller 20). Questions at that conference, such as Kitzhaber’s “What is English?” sparked research that was well-funded through national grants and programs (Thomas Miller 20).

The “literacy crisis” captured attention; Lester Faigley notes that though there were “skirmishes” between literature and composition departments in English, administration looked favorably on the development of writing programs (Faigley *Fragments* 67). Students who had not before received opportunities to develop their education were enrolling in schools, “writing from a different perspective but drawing upon their own rhetoric of crisis, scholars in composition were positioned—if only they could articulate ‘a body of relatively abstract knowledge’—to argue for the legitimacy of its enterprise” (Ede 66). Those who earned degrees in literature but taught in composition staked professional and disciplinary claims (Ede 59). In this era when opportunities developed, rhetoric and composition depended on categories to establish legitimacy and meet practical needs. In this climate, explicit interest in romantic rhetoric decreased in popularity. As Roskelley and Ronald write,
In all these attempts to define composition the specter of romanticism has always hovered, sometimes portrayed as a seductive yet dangerous presence to be beaten back, subdued, or overcome, sometimes described as a ‘garret’ that writers wish they could retreat to, and sometimes cast as an infantile stage to be passed through and dismissed once writers achieve a mature, rigorous rhetorical sense of context and purpose (35).

The narrative of romantic rhetoric in this time is largely marked by the categories into which it was fit. This era of romantic rhetoric research begins with well-funded research forming rhetoric and composition as a distinct discipline and transitions to arguments defending or denying romanticism’s role in the emerging field. Through the transition, traps are established that lead to problematic interpretations of romantic rhetoric later in this time period and that persist today.

In 1969, Chaim Perelman wrote, “The Social Context of Argumentation.” Emphasizing the diversity of modern audiences, Perelman critiques assumptions about universal human nature. In “The Social Contexts of Argumentation,” Perelman defines modern (formal) logic as that which is devoted to the study of demonstration and is based on true premises. He states that effective argumentation requires a common language and communication so that minds can meet. In discussing truth, Perelman argues that into the Middle Ages, rhetoric became less of a form of argumentation and more of a literary method. Pertinent to this narrative of romantic rhetoric research, Perelman states,

Rhetoric became the study of stylistic methods and such it was to remain until the Romantic movement which subordinated the techniques themselves to the poet’s inspiration. Positivism, as it developed during the second half of the nineteenth century,
marked the lowest point of rhetoric, which was removed from the syllabus of the French state schools in 1885 (255).

The brief history Perelman gives sets romanticism as a villain of rhetoric. While not directly about categories, Perelman separates historic periods and characterizes the role of eras with clearer consequences than the early scholars in the narrative of romantic rhetoric research (1934-1965). Perelman restates the common myth that emerges from pendulum and paradigm views of history. While separating time periods to better understand the significance of developments can be valuable, potential myths emerge when the categorization leads to hierarchies and value statements that discount overlap. This happens in Perelman’s case, and in the many similar instances wherein romantic rhetoric is devalued. The myth that romanticism “subordinates” the rhetorical practices determined by the classical thinkers and initiates a low-point in rhetoric’s history quickly becomes a trap that leads to the judgement of romanticism as antirhetorical. Categorical traps emerge with potency.

The often-referred to 1971 *Theory of Discourse* by James Kinneavy set up more categories within composition. Fulkerson says that the “very impressive work” proposes four types of writing that grow from the four communicative acts: reference discourse, expressive discourse, persuasive discourse, and literary discourse, “each to be judged on its own terms” (434). In addition to noting Kinneavy’s use of Abrams’s categories, Roskelly and Ronald acknowledge the role of *A Theory of Discourse*, saying that the opposition of romantic and rhetorical stances dominates conversation from 1971 to 1995 when they write *Reason to Believe*: “Ever since James Kinneavy’s 1971 *A Theory of Discourse*, there has been, in theory if not in
practice, an unwavering line drawn between ‘expressive discourse’ and discourse that
‘persuades’ or ‘refers/informs’” (33). Roskelly and Ronald are also careful to point out that
Kinneavy did not write the categories to be mutually exclusive (33). Kinneavy emphasized that
goals of different discourses and categories often overlap. Roskelly and Ronald note that
Kinneavy posited that the categories “do not constitute a hierarchy… But almost from the
publication of this landmark book, composition has read these aims as hierarchical; at the very
least, they have been analyzed as polar opposites” (33). And so, unintentionally, a trap is set that
perpetually limits recognition of romantic rhetoric: categories are mutually exclusive, and thus,
some categories are better than others. Romantic rhetoric, if it is
discussed at all, is framed by categorical hierarchization often
declaring it “lesser,” and this further limits romantic rhetoric from
assuming a role as a sub-field.

Waldo gives us an example of that polarizing use of Kinneavy’s work and more directly
speaks to the role A Theory of Discourse plays in the narrative of romantic rhetoric research:
“Rhetorical theorists, on the other hand, have not always reviewed the Romantic Spirit with so
kind a pen. In A Theory of Discourse, for example, James Kinneavy makes the curious comment
that he felt ‘expressionistic theory… to be an unfortunate error of nineteenth century
Romanticism’” (Waldo 64). Waldo’s interpretation does put Kinneavy in a similar camp as
Perelman, a camp in which the authors blame the demise of rhetoric on romanticism.

Examining the oft-quoted “unfortunate error” statement in context illuminates
Kinneavy’s motives. Kinneavy writes about expressive discourse:

Some theories had already established expression as one of the aims of discourse, and
there was that era of post-Dewey progressive education in America in which ‘self-
expression’ had been the dominant aim in composition assignments in the elementary and secondary schools. *A fortiori*, the author felt the expressionist theory of literature to be an unfortunate historical error of nineteenth-century Romanticism. But several reasons barred me from considering expression as a specific aim of discourse (373).

Kinneavy goes on to explain his reasons so that other students may examine their own thoughts. His reasons deal with categorical confusion. His first reason is that the extremes of progressive education led many to reject validity in the movement. His second reason, “there was a violent reaction to Romantic expressionism,” speaks to the political context and the emotional reactions in which categories, especially related to romantic rhetoric, bring out. Kinneavy’s third reason was that there was little theory about a distinct expressive discourse (373). Kinneavy looks at Casserer’s historical antecedents to emotional roots of language (Vico, Rousseau, and Herder are mentioned) to briefly demonstrate expression has been “the concern of several important schools of thought” but that a more thorough investigation needs to be made (373). Kinneavy champions expressive discourse as an important use of language psychologically and civically, “a democracy which ignores expression has forgotten its own roots” (374). In this regard, and in the careful and foundational analysis of expressive language that follows, Kinneavy himself cannot be categorized as a villain in the narrative of romantic research. Rather he, like so many who initially lay out categories, offers questions and calls for further analysis. However, his “unfortunate error” statement (along with statements like Perelman’s) set the stage for future justifications that romanticism is not worthy of a place within rhetorical studies.
In study of the “villains” in the romantic rhetoric narrative, an interesting myth emerges: researchers against romanticism (and expressivism) establish a tradition in which romantic rhetoric can be dismissed. This myth is based in truth: Perelman and Kinneavy’s quotes, especially when separated from their contexts, do not shed romantic rhetoric in a positive light. However, Perelman and Kinneavy were like so many scholars theorizing in the context of departmental questions and a need for categorization. They are tagged as being against romantic rhetoric, but their intention, largely, was not to discount an entire era of writing history. I argue that the myth is established based on shortcut approaches similar to the trap of using the detailed, prolific romantic rhetors of the eighteenth and nineteenth century to prove a point convenient to the researcher. This myth reveals deeper questions: why is it convenient for later scholars to use Kinneavy and Perelman to dismiss romantic rhetoric or to quickly defend romantic rhetoric against villains like these? How is the tradition that dismisses romantic rhetoric set? To arrive at an answer, more of the story must be told.

However, before more of that story is told directly, research published in 1971 contributes to the narrative; Walter Ong wrote *Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology*. He opens the book with an extended discussion on rhetoric that would seem to dismiss the myth related to pendulum and paradigm views of history that rhetoric disappears in romanticism:

> With the advent of the age which from one point of view we call the technological age and from the other point of view the romantic age, rhetoric was not wiped out or supplanted, but rather disrupted, displaced, and rearranged. It became a bad word—as did...
many of the formerly good words associated with it, such as art, artificial, commonplace, and so on (8).

While Ong does not seem to be against romanticism in this excerpt, his later statements sound like Kinneavey’s and Perelman’s in setting up distinctive categories: “Romanticism, as we have suggested, marks the end of rhetorical culture” (14). Apart from Chapter Eleven, the book itself is more about Ramism than it is about romantic rhetoric or technology (19). Briefly, about the subjects that form the title of the book, Ong suggests that romanticism and technology mirror each other in that they are products of and responses to dominance over nature and the retrieving of knowledge (264). Lois Agnew describes Ong’s observation as it relates to De Quincey: “Romanticism can be seen as critiquing the very mechanization upon which originality depends; the Romantic rejection of the commonplace reflects a desire to replace the collective knowledge of oral traditions with a yearning for the original and unknown promised by print” (141). Within this narrative of romantic rhetoric research, Ong represents a slight spin on ideas—the connection between technology, rhetoric, and romanticism still represents untapped potential research—but, overall, Ong’s book provides another example of a researcher examining the discontinuity between romanticism and rhetoric while also largely, focusing on elements other than romanticism.

2.4 Synthesis of Myths and Traps

In the brief years between 1966 and 1971, the myths and traps that are hinted at before 1966 materialize in more direct language and with more direct implications. The pendulum myth continues to bear significance. With general support given to viewing the enlightenment as a distinctly different time period from romanticism, phrases with language like Perelman’s “subordinates,” Kinneavy’s “unfortunate error,” and Ong’s “end of rhetorical culture” become
associated with romanticism. Romanticism gains a negative reputation as it is perpetually separated from rhetoric, but this separation is not always well-grounded. Bate’s argument demonstrates that there romanticism is rhetorically founded in classicism/enlightenment rhetoric. Isaiah Berlin shows how romanticism offers lessons to the rhetorical canon, impacting writing studies. And even Perelman, Kinneavy, and Ong, who first lend phrases that, when repeated, create the trap that romanticism is antirhetorical, in context, try to make sense of a complex field and not blatantly discount romantic rhetoric. Of course, to make this claim, I am simplifying complex researchers and theories for my own benefits in much the same way romantic authors are often used for the convenience of the interpreter. To mitigate the dangers of this fallacy, I write with the awareness of the trap, in hope of writing affirmatively about categorical confusion and cohesion, and in following the example of Richards and Bate in returning to “primary” sources for evidence (my primary sources being secondary sources about romanticism and rhetoric, examined in new light).

I use the evidence to argue that categorical implications of the pendulum myth are seen as Kinneavy links romanticism to expressivism. In the advent of categorizing pedagogies, the myths and traps become even more complicated. Between the years when Kinneavy initiates categories and Fulkerson’s categories stir debate, distance from direct valuing of romantic rhetoric grows. The debates shift, but the same core myths—romanticism shifts away from rhetorical enlightenment thought and that categories are mutually exclusive—lead to the same core trap that romanticism is antirhetorical. The foundations presented in this chapter provide the context for the myths and traps. Demonstrating that these traps have been successfully circumnavigated via careful historical study and contextualization (I. A. Richards, M. H. Abrams) grounds the
conversation about myths in a rhetoric of hope. The solutions are present in the richly layered history of analysis.

At the same time, the solutions are not simple and romantic rhetoric is, as is well demonstrated by the number of scholars discussed in the narrative thus far, a complicated and contested unrecognized sub-field. As demonstrated in Figure 2.1, the Author Citation Connectivity Chart representing 1934-1969, even the early and foundational authors who were writing about similar subjects did not cite their contemporaries in a way that offers a full picture of the vibrancy of the research supporting romantic rhetoric. Bate, and his work that shows the enlightenment foundations for romanticism and thus rhetorical connection, is only cited by Abrams in this time period (to note, chronology matters, perhaps more than any of the other connectivity charts, in interpreting Figure 2.1, especially given the span of years between publications and lack of widespread availability of the publications). As I further demonstrate in the next chapter as I discuss the scholars in the later 1970s and 1980s who publish arguments, romantic rhetoric discussions invite questions about writing, emotion, persuasion, and feeling. In the next two decades of the narrative, the traps and myths, and as such, the debates and the scholarly jabs, feel more personal. The stakes rise, and the drama thickens.
Figure 2.1: Author Citation Connectivity Chart, 1934-1969
3 THE FORMATIONS

The Watergate Scandal, the development of the computer (and then Microsoft and Apple), the Vietnam war, the formation of the European Union, and space exploration—among countless other developments and changes—are snapshots that display the growth and the context of the world during the 1970s and 1980s. Categorization and the aftermath of categorization marked the years, in the world at large and within English departments.

University experience in the 1970s shifted. With less federal funding, fewer people earned degrees, and tenure-track jobs were cut in half. Thomas Miller described the implications of fewer opportunities: “As becomes evident at such critical junctures, the history of our profession turns out to be part of the broader history of professionalism, in large part because English has traditionally played a fundamental role in credentialing professionals” (21). Professionalism became a focus that Ede points out carried on to the next decade, saying that since the mid 1980’s, authors have attempted “to narrate if not the then a story of composition” (17). Ede references John Trimbur’s observation that many of these narratives share an inevitable outcome of the plot: professionalization and discipline formation (17). Ede and Trimbur’s developed theories discuss the problematic consequences of discipline formation (including subjugation of counterknowledges) in more detail than my synthesis of romantic rhetoric research allows for or needs. However, the dangers of discipline formation are subtly present within the narrative. The move to professionalize in the 1970s and 1980s gives important context for the myths, traps, and implications that I identify as emerging and continuing—for fallacies that limit an appreciation for romanticism’s rhetorical contributions.

The myths and traps that were hinted at in the 1960s become more realized in the 1970s and 1980s, and implications of the myths become clear. Yet just as rhetoric and composition was
a field on the rise in these decades, the myths, traps, and implications that limit romantic rhetoric remain foundational. As groups and categories are more explicitly formed, romantic rhetoric is discussed from a wide array of perspectives. Through this dissertation, I use the term “romantic rhetoric” as if it exists as a respected sub-field within rhetoric and composition, noting throughout that the myths, traps, and implications limit this existence. However, in this era in particular—the 1970s and 1980s, “romantic rhetoric,” as a term and as a possible sub-field, is employed. Why does the term not linger beyond the 1980s?

In this chapter, I answer the question as I highlight the exchange between Berthoff and Lauer, explicit arguments made by Engell, Ramsey, James Berlin, and Waldo, and questions about current-traditional rhetoric and romanticism’s intersections with New Literacy. In focusing on this section of the chronological narrative of romantic rhetoric research, my analysis reveals the complications that emerge from an unestablished tradition for recognizing romanticism’s contributions to rhetoric, mainly that categorizing rhetors in the 1970s-1980s is problematic, then and for contemporary research today, and that an understanding of imagination’s role in rhetoric is misunderstood, in part, because an understanding of romantic rhetoric is missing. These implications are directly relevant for contemporary rhetoric and composition students who untangle histories of imagination, as they learn about New Literacy Studies, and as they study the historic categories of composition. Though I continue to refer to “romantic rhetoric” as if it were a well-established sub-field in hopes that the language becomes more commonplace and the value of recognition is more clearly evident, the lack-of acceptance of “romantic rhetoric” is largely set by the studies that deal explicitly and implicitly with romantic rhetoric from 1972 to 1989.
3.1 Berthoff and Lauer

With unique research focus, Ann Berthoff is an outlier in the narrative of romantic rhetoric research. Though Berthoff goes on to write about theories of imagination in rhetoric that directly reference romanticism, her early writings in the 1970s implicitly relate to the romantic rhetoric narrative. In 1972, Ann Berthoff wrote a keenly aware article in College English questioning the decisions that came out of the 1966 Dartmouth Conference. Though, in this article, Berthoff does not mention the word “romantic,” romantic thinkers (in detail), or the time period of romanticism (or enlightenment thought, for that matter; her 1972 article is not a historical analysis), she does make an argument that is central to understanding the context of the early 1970s as it relates to romantic rhetoric’s narrative. Berthoff argues that the question “What is English?” leads to a problem-solving approach to a subject that, instead, needs “a theory of imagination and we will find it implicit in the principles of rhetoric which inform our teaching of language and literature, reading and writing. Rhetoric is a formulation of the laws of the imagination, that operation of mind by which experience becomes meaningful” (647). Drawing on I.A. Richard’s 1955 Speculative Instruments, Berthoff sets a flag in the ground on the side of imagination (Berthoff 641). Though in the 1972 article “the Problem of Problem Solving,” Berthoff does not mention romantic rhetoric, Berthoff’s other writings and the responses that the article conjures do bring romanticism directly into the conversation.

Janice Lauer, in May 1972, responded to Berthoff’s “The Problem of Problem Solving” in a strongly-worded College Composition and Communication editorial-like opinion. Lauer contends that Berthoff limits problem-solving to too narrow an area of educational psychology-problem-solving learning (208). Lauer claims “Berthoff laments the psychologists’ polarizing of the creative and the intellectual, but she indulges in a few polarities herself which are as
unsubstantiated as is her own accusation… dichotomizing, especially unsubstantiated polarization, rarely leads to understanding the complexity of human experience” (209). Lauer claims that Berthoff misunderstood Bruner “from a sense of threat which is widespread—the fear of many humanists that they and their values will be gobbled up by the ‘scientists’” (209). Statements such as these make this debate a great example of the categorical confusion that stems from the larger categorical defenses of “humanities” vs. “sciences.” The debate between Lauer and Berthoff offers a glimpse into the implications of categorical defenses of “enlightenment” vs. “romantic” rhetoric stemming from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Lauer’s answer is an argument for pluralism (210).

Berthoff responds to Lauer in “Counterstatement” (December 1972), where “romanticism” more directly enters the conversation: “This kind of inquiry is not the special province of ‘experts’ in the field of psychology: it is the principal legacy of the Romantic Movement. English teachers have access to knowledge concerning the form-creating powers of ‘the prime agent of all human perception,’ as well as the form-creating powers of the Secondary Imagination, whenever we remember where to look” (415). Perhaps this statement traditionally earns Berthoff the label of “sympathetic to romanticism” in the narrative, as Hawk summarizes the importance of the debates:

The question of romanticism’s relationship to the discipline goes at least as far back as the early debates between Janice Lauer and Ann Berthoff regarding the nature of inventive thinking and how it should be theorized and taught in rhetoric and composition. Berthoff becomes coded as a ‘romantic who denies the ‘teachability’ of invention by leaving it up to chance, to the imaginations of geniuses…” (Hawk 2).
The exchange between Berthoff and Lauer enables me to discuss several myths, traps, and implications in the narrative, and the first relates to this coding and categorizing of Ann Berthoff. Hawk discusses the ways in which Berthoff is coded as a romantic, but she is also often described with other sets of labeling adjectives; very few scholars know how to categorize Berthoff, a theme detailed well in Paige Davis Arrington’s dissertation “Ann Berthoff from the Margins: An Infusion of All-at-once-ness for Contemporary Writing Pedagogy.” Arrington, with exemplar archival research, demonstrates the ways in which Berthoff has been marginalized and misconstrued (3).

Berthoff’s attitudes toward teaching later earn her the complicated categorization of a “New Rhetoric” scholar (by Berlin, but Berlin’s thoughts on Berthoff shift, see Arrington 54). In the 1990s, Gradin rebrands romanticism’s contributions to rhetoric through her invented category “social-expressivism,” and, according to the letter Arrington reproduces, Berthoff felt that social-expressivism fits her perspectives:

Thanks so much for your letter of April 11. I appreciate your support and am glad that you find ‘social-expressivism’ a fair characterization of the perspectives I take up in Romancing Rhetorics. I was particularly leery of trying to place you in any of the theoretical categories we tend to throw around so blithely.

“Letter from Gradin to Berthoff, 12 May 1997” (Arrington 56).

In this letter, Gradin captures well one of the traps that persists in the narrative of romantic rhetoric research: theoretical categories can limit.
In examining statements by Perelman and Kinneavy, I highlighted the myth that researchers against romanticism establish a tradition that dismisses the rhetorical qualities of romanticism. I complicated this myth by analyzing the term “against” as it is applied to the categorization of such thinkers. We can understand Berthoff’s support of the rhetorical qualities of romanticism using the same myth language, but reversed: researchers (like Berthoff) for romanticism establish a tradition that… what? Justifies romantic rhetoric’s place in the field? As demonstrated in Chapter One and in my rationale for writing this dissertation, romanticism’s rhetorical qualities are not well appreciated and romantic rhetoric, largely, does not exist as an organizing tradition in the same way other time periods of rhetorical history do. So then, the reverse of this “against romanticism” myth is not applicable because researchers who support romanticism do not establish a tradition that respects romantic rhetoric. In Berthoff’s case, she was not trying to garner support for romantic rhetoric; instead, she relied on research that happened to fit broadly within the theories of romanticism. From the complicated reversals of the “against romanticism” myth, I identify a cyclical implication: researchers who champion some romantic qualities of rhetoric are liable to be miscategorized, and even more dangerously—dismissed, because the field does not have a longstanding recognition for the rhetorical contributions of romantic authors, poets, and rhetors. Berthoff’s writings after 1972 continually emphasize that romantic thinkers offer contributions to rhetoric.

Reclaiming imagination becomes a theme in Berthoff’s writings. In, “The Intelligent Eye and the Thinking Hand,” published in 1980 (in The Writer’s Mind, the same book that includes
Ramsey’s “Rhetoric and Romanticism,” see description later in this chapter), Berthoff posits that developing the imagination is a forming power of the mind (196). Ramsey suggests that her thinking “provides our most direct link to a Coleridgean perspective” (7). Also in 1980, Berthoff’s “Learning the Uses of Chaos” was first published. Drawing on Vygotsky, Freire, Kenneth Burke, and I.A. Richards, Berthoff’s argument about the power of naming and language resounds similar to arguments made by romantic authors (650). In 2017, Gretchen L. Dietz suggests that Berthoff “repurposes Coleridge’s language to make relevant observations about the relationship between writing and the imagination, and between theory and practice” (54). So Berthoff, throughout her writings, uses and builds upon the theories of romanticism to show how relevant the ideas are to composition studies throughout a time period in which it was not popular to associate rhetorical research with romanticism.

Putting Berthoff on my timeline of the story of romantic rhetoric makes me liable to also misconstrue Ann Berthoff (or any of these scholars, thinkers, or beloved professors). Arrington speculates that the field’s embrace of “pluralism” in the 1980s and 1990s contributes to the marginalization of Berthoff “symbolic of the larger ‘cost’ stemming from a fear of declaring common beliefs and values” (3). In this narrative of romantic rhetoric, I hope to find commonality between generations of writers who thought about romanticism, either briefly or extensively. I tease the threads of “pluralism” until the knot unravels and something substantial about categorical confusion is revealed.

Which brings me back to the 1972 exchange between Berthoff and Lauer and the conversation about pluralism and the complexity of analysis of the narrative of romantic rhetoric research; I cannot easily deem Lauer “against” romantic rhetoric because she was “against” Berthoff in the exchange. Lauer’s
argument for pluralism is actually in line with the arguments I make for cohesion of categories rather than dichotomization, making her statements also extraordinarily helpful in highlighting and complicating the myths that, in the end, answer (and raise) questions about what to do with romantic rhetoric. I have already identified the dangers of the trap that categories represent hierarchies. When Lauer discusses pluralism, she makes a similar argument that, later in the narrative of romantic and enlightenment rhetoric, gets buried in the more glamorous sides of debate.

Seeing Berthoff and Lauer as representing different polarities is as dangerous seeing the enlightenment and romanticism as *radically* opposed poles on a pendulum, even though Berthoff admits that her article was “rather polemical” (“Counterstatement” 416). As an example of this danger, the exchange between Berthoff and Lauer also highlights again the emerging myth that imagination (again, Berthoff consistently argues about the benefits of imagination to rhetoric) and invention are mutually exclusive in their role in writing studies. Since the exchange between Berthoff and Lauer is more directly about psychology’s role in rhetoric and the heuristic of problem-solving, and since neither imagination nor invention are the direct solution to the “problem,” at this point in the narrative, I tag the myth with the descriptor “emerging.”

Responses to Berthoff’s later works and later analysis of current-traditional rhetoric bring the myth more fully into the narrative (see my synthesis at the end of this chapter).

### 3.2 Paradigm Problems

While Berthoff and Lauer’s exchange shows the complications of implicitly associating with romanticism, Richard E. Young exemplifies the complications in an even more profound way. In 1973, the year after Lauer and Berthoff’s exchange, Cooper and Odell published
Research in Composing: Points of Departure. In this collection, Richard E. Young wrote “Paradigms and Problems: Needed Research in Rhetorical Invention” (Young 397). Young writes a call for research, noting the crisis of the discipline to respond to unstable paradigms (404). Young references Coleridge and seems to speak positively of the work of Gordon Rohman that was inspired by Thoreau, but he is often quoted as one who argues strongly against romanticism’s role in rhetoric.

Examining similar myths as those that I have previously discussed about “villains” in the story, it is possible that Young has also been misread; perhaps he, like many of the others—Kinneavy, Perelman, and even Lauer—argues against the misuses of romantic in rhetoric based on the claim that many rhetoric scholars do not have a clear conception or framework for using romanticism because there is not a clear enough definition of the disciplines of rhetoric and composition and of romantic rhetoric.

Nevertheless, Young’s theories are foundations for discussions, especially conversations about current-traditional rhetoric. Russell, Hawk, and Gradin quote Young’s statement: “though we lack the historical studies that permit generalizing with confidence, the position [of the new romantics] seems not so much an innovation in the discipline as a reaffirmation of the vitalist philosophies of an old romanticism enriched by modern psychology” (28). Gradin examines how Young discusses expressivism and reaffirms vitalist philosophies of old romanticism (46). Hawk pulls from the quote as he establishes an understanding of how rhetoric has viewed romanticism and points out the “slippery categorical distinctions” (28).
Young is often interpreted as one who does not affirm romanticism’s role in rhetoric. Hawk describes Young as “connecting science and romanticism/vitalism in opposition to rhetoric as art or techne” (23). Russell acknowledges the connection between assumptions about the nature of the writing process, expressivism, and the “very qualities that Romantics prize. But these are also qualities, Young points out, that lie outside the domain of rhetorical principles (133)” (143). Mark Waldo suggests “Richard Young more pointedly asserts that Romanticism is responsible for composition’s current-traditional paradigm” (31). Waldo draws on Young’s description of romanticism as stressing the natural abilities of the mind and the uniqueness of creativity that lead to a decrease in the need for teaching the composing process.

Richard Young is, thus, another difficult to classify contributor to the narrative of romantic rhetoric. Is Young as against romantic rhetoric as other scholars make him out to be? The answer is not incredibly clear, but then again, this is one of my driving arguments that I make through this detailing of the narrative: the categorization and understanding of these complex thinkers—even the ones who seem to be against romantic rhetoric—can feed the trap that leads to the dismissal of romantic rhetoric despite the extensive research suggesting that it belongs to the discipline’s history and current understandings. Because romantic rhetoric has not existed as a respected sub-field, thinkers continue to be misunderstood and poorly categorized.

As often as Young is quoted in later romantic rhetoric research, Peter Elbow’s name is mentioned with greater frequency (see Figure 3.1: Web of Connectivity, later in this
Peter Elbow’s role in the narrative of romantic rhetoric research is interesting. Though so often cited, he was not explicitly a romantic rhetoric champion or scholar. Though he wrote books that many tend to link to romantic theories (see Chapter Four), Elbow’s purpose was not to historically connect romanticism to writing studies. But because later scholars do find the connections between his work and romanticism, I include a summary of (a small selection of) his scholarship in this narrative to best set the foundation for the decades of research in romantic rhetoric that follow.

Peter Elbow’s *Writing Without Teachers* (published in 1973, the same year as Young’s “Paradigms and Problems”) emphasizes student-centered pedagogy that focuses on the individual. Freewriting and building confidence are central to Elbow’s arguments that (other researchers have declared) feed expressivism. In a discussion on the three categories of voice (writing without voice, writing with voice, and writing with real voice), Elbow concentrates on the power of real voice. Elbow encourages writers to balance feelings and experiences (333). While Elbow defends himself as recently as 2015 as not being an expressivist, many in the field continue to associate Elbow with Macrorie, Britton, Murray, and other expressivist scholars (Roeder and Gatto 27). In many ways, the different scholars associated with expressivism offer decidedly different approaches and rationale than Elbow. The variety of theories presented by the scholars who have been, by history, largely sorted into the same pedagogical school centered loosely, and often not intentionally, around some of the same views of the romantic poets and rhetors. But it is Elbow who most often gets associated with romanticism, though the term does not appear in his well-known work *Writing Without Teachers*. 

**Myth:** Categories are mutually exclusive.
Many of Elbow’s writings are interesting and would add fascinating footnotes to this narrative on romantic rhetoric; however, those writings would better tell the (also interesting) narrative of expressivism. Worth mentioning, though, is Elbow’s “Closing My Eyes as I Speak: an Argument for Ignoring Audience.” In this 1987 *College English* article, Elbow does mention the word “romanticism”: “To celebrate writer-based prose is to risk the charge of romanticism: just warbling one’s woodnotes wild. But my position also contains the austere classic view that we must nevertheless revise with conscious awareness of audience” (Closing 55). O’Brien acknowledges this quote as a demonstration of Elbow recognizing “the stereotypical dichotomy of romantic/classic which views Romanticism as anti-social and Classism as social” (O’Brien 85-86). Defining a degree to which Elbow was directly impacted by romantic rhetoric is difficult. When I asked Peter Elbow about the degree to which he was influenced by principles of romanticism, he said he did not consciously apply romantic theory in his thoughts or writing but that he was trained in literature and he had studied Wordsworth (personal interview). Because of the interpretations of his works, Elbow continued to affect the narrative of romantic rhetoric because of writings like O’Brien’s that make explicit the implicit connections.

As another side note within the narrative, in 1975 Hal Rivers Weidner’s dissertation “Three Models of Rhetoric: Traditional, Mechanical and Vital” was written. This dissertation is often discussed by the major theorists. Berlin, in 1980 cites Weidner as creating an “invidious hierarchy” that exalts poetry and demeans rhetoric (“Rhetoric” 62). Hawk and Vitanza also discuss Young’s interpretation of Weidner’s dissertation in the ways it cavalierly dismisses romanticism (Hawk 2).
Elbow and Weidner’s early 1970s scholarship highlights again the complexity of categorization, but from a different perspective of categories. In Chapter Two, I established these myths and traps in the context of “enlightenment” and “romantic” as categories. The research emerging in the early 1970s, and from the subsequent categorization of Berthoff and Elbow, shows the myth and trap also apply to the created categories within writing studies. Weidner’s dissertation shows how these categories promote hierarchies.

As the decade progresses, the categories become more distinct. In 1975, Frank D’Angelo wrote *A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric* offering a discussion of romantic dimensions of rhetorical theory. According to Hawk, in this book, D’Angelo coined the term “new romanticism” (18). D’Angelo writes that new romanticism approaches to writing focus on creative expression and personal writing and that, in doing so, they offer a balance to rational, systematic approaches to writing. By emphasizing imagination, feeling over intellect, discovery over preconceived notions, new romanticism “holds that not all of our mental processes are rational” (D’Angelo *Conceptual* 159).

D’Angelo’s 1984 *College Composition and Communication* article is also relevant. In “Nineteenth-Century Forms/Modes of Discourse: A Critical Inquiry,” D’Angelo focuses on underlying assumptions of composition textbooks, suggesting that the nineteenth-century forms/modes of discourse be “discarded as the basis of serious composition teaching” (“Nineteenth” 32). On their own, these opinions of D’Angelo seem innocuous in the timeline of romantic rhetoric research. But these theories, like the theories of the other categorizers in the 1970s, become used. As Hawk says,
D’Angelo’s characterization may seem innocent enough. But unfortunately the binary that is created between problem solving or heuristics, on the one hand, and new romantics, on the other, becomes drastically polarized into those who see invention—and by extension writing—as teachable via heuristics, and those who have no method at all and leave invention up to subjective genius and feeling, seeing it as unsusceptible to being taught. The result is that Berthoff, and anyone associated with other versions of romanticism, is relegated to this reductive notion of new romanticism (18).

As such, the myths and traps that I have highlighted as emerging (invention and imagination are mutually exclusive; categories represent hierarchies) are set for later defense of categories in the 1980s and 1990s. But in the 1970s, categories were still being defined.

In 1979, Richard Fulkerson wrote “Four Philosophies of Composition.” In the introduction to the article in The Norton Book of Composition Studies, Fulkerson discusses the origin for this influential article: “I was trying to make personal sense of a bewildering field” (430). As I discussed when introducing M. H. Abrams to the narrative of romantic rhetoric, The Mirror and the Lamp influenced Fulkerson to think about Abrams’s four theories and their relevance to composition (430). Like Berthoff warned against in “The Problem of Problem Solving,” Fulkerson is operating under a problem—solution mindset. The problem he discusses is inconsistency in theory, understanding, and teaching. Of his four categories—expressive, mimetic, rhetorical, and formalist—the category “expressive” is unsurprisingly most relevant to the narrative of romantic rhetoric research. Though Fulkerson does not, in this article, link his expressive category to romanticism, Fulkerson’s category of “expressive” along with the other 1970s rhetoricians who offered “expressive” as a category set the stage for the golden era of romantic rhetoric research as many defend expressivism using romanticism. Defending any one
of the categories, however, is not Fulkerson’s goal with “Four Philosophies of Composition.” Like Young, Fulkerson offers a paradigm that he hopes will reduce mindlessness and promote consistency in the field (435).

From Berthoff and Lauer’s exchange to the complications of categorizing leading scholars like Elbow, Young, and Berthoff given Weidner’s, D’Angelo, and Fulkerson’s categories, the 1970s capture important implications of the myths and traps. Through this narrative of romantic rhetoric research, I question why the rhetorical theories produced under the label of romanticism are not more widely accepted. The research I have highlighted that emerges in the 1970s is less directly about romantic rhetoric explicitly, but it creates complications that hint at an answer to the question. The complexity of categories within writing studies, and the following obsession with classifying thinkers within categories (Berthoff, New Rhetoric; Elbow, Expressivist, etc.) creates a red herring (to borrow language from Lauer, 210). In an effort to accomplish the needed work of establishing and making sense of a field, the actual qualities and theories offered by romantic authors gets lost, and an established tradition that includes romanticism’s contributions does not make it into the canons and rhetorical history books (Bizzell and Herzberg). These oft-quoted works from the 1970s further the distance between rhetoric and romanticism.

3.3 Underappreciated Connections between Rhetoric and Romanticism

The story could end here if the categorical distractions made research into romanticism and rhetoric too complicated for future scholars to enter the conversation. Even if the categorical defensives of romanticism’s contributions to rhetoric (via discussion of expressivism’s contributions to rhetoric, for example) represented all the research that followed the 1970s, the
narrative would be simple. But the story is one of plot twists and unexpected fascinations with romanticism and rhetoric. Though most explicit research connecting romanticism and rhetoric would come about in the 1990s as a defense of the philosophies and paradigms set in the 1970s, in the early 1980s, two works stand out as early and valuable connections; Jon R. Ramsey’s chapter about rhetoric and romanticism and James Engell’s book connecting the enlightenment to romanticism are underappreciated gems.

Engell’s book *The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism* is worth noting within the narrative of romantic rhetoric because, in part, so much of what Engell says could have eliminated contention surrounding romantic rhetoric had Engell’s work been more widely appreciated within rhetoric and composition. In *The Creative Imagination*, James Engell traces the concept of imagination as it developed from the Enlightenment to Romanticism. Engell claims that imagination was the most crucial development of the eighteenth century (ix). Referencing Hobbes, Burke, Addison, Locke, Gerard, Shaftesbury, Leibniz, Hume, Johnson, Goethe, Kant, Hazlitt, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and an impressive host of others (primarily German and English romantic and Enlightenment thinkers), Engell demonstrates that understanding of the imagination grew simultaneously in criticism, literature, philosophy, psychology, science, and religion (3). Engell, influenced by M. H. Abrams, Isaiah Berlin, Arthur Lovejoy, and I.A. Richards (among others) and with the support of W. J. Bate, provides a thorough commentary that, in many ways, answers the subtle call posed in Bate’s *From Classic to Romantic* (1946). Engell’s comprehensive overview offers several definitions of imagination, discusses the complexity of terms like sublimity, beauty, and taste, and ultimately shows how
associationism and other crucial enlightenment ideals gave birth to Romanticism, the “militant but brilliant child of the Enlightenment” (Engell 320).

Engell sets a generative foundation by defining the difference between fancy and imagination, the concept of genius, and the faith in which so many authors put in imagination. While Engell’s coverage is remarkable, his focus feels more like that of an intellectual explorer who is less concerned with making an explicit claim and more engrossed by discovering various thoughts on imagination in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Engell is not interested in the rhetorical links to imagination. Rhetoric, in this impressive overview of imagination, is mentioned briefly and as an apologetic aside, despite the fact that so many of the categorically tagged rhetoricians are prominently discussed within Engell’s work (190).

Despite the lack of direct mention of “rhetoric,” Engell’s attention to audience and invention make the Creative Imagination worth reconsidering as part of the narrative of romantic rhetoric. The future traps that discount romanticism within rhetoric and composition center on a misunderstanding of romanticism that leads to the declaration that the romanticism is antirhetorical and therefore not worth consideration. The trap that romanticism is antirhetorical is based, for the most part, on an incomplete understanding of romanticism. Engell understood romanticism well, and he explains the enlightenment connections to romanticism in painstaking detail, but the same trap effects the reception to his writing within rhetoric and composition;
Engell is not well-cited within later rhetorical research, particularly rhetorical research about romanticism (see later connectivity webs, Figures 3.1, 4.1, and 4.2).

For Engell, the trap that romanticism is antirhetorical is relevant because Engell, whether for sake of scope of the lengthy book or based on a larger misunderstanding, does not credit the enlightenment theories from which imagination developed from as rhetorical. Though most of Engell’s book points out the rhetorical qualities of the imagination, Engell’s lack of naming the theories as rhetorical harkens back to the same trap that allows readers to label romanticism as antirhetorical, in this instance based on an incomplete understanding not of romanticism but of rhetoric. The result for both roots of this trap is similar; romantic rhetoric’s narrative is not fully told, so misunderstanding is perpetuated and romantic rhetoric does not gain acceptance as an organizing tradition or subfield.

Whereas Engell offers the narrative a unique connection between romanticism and the enlightenment, Jon R. Ramsey foreshadows similar research as that which emerges in the narrative in the 1990s. In 1983, Ramsey wrote “Rhetoric and Romanticism” as part of The Writer’s Mind, a book compiled in response to the “literacy crisis” and mindful of the connection between writing and cognition (ix, xi). Ramsey argues that Wordsworth’s statement of intention to discover “in what manner language and the human mind act and re-act on each other” demonstrates that romantics “regarded the reformation of language, moreover, as central to the social and psychological revolution they hoped to foster” (3). By examining Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s collaboration on Lyrical Ballads and the “Preface,” the poets “were intent upon
defamiliarizing the formulas of perception, thought, and expression which preserved the status quo of ignorance and injustice” (4).

Ramsey moves from evidence that Coleridge and Wordsworth believed in the power of language to a demonstration of how “Romantic literature holds implications especially for prewriting and invention, rewriting and recursiveness, and the stubbornly nonverbal components of our experience,” citing, for example, the archival description of Keats’s, Shelley’s, Wordsworth’s, and Coleridge’s descriptions of the beginning parts of creative processes (9).

Another underappreciated contribution, Ramsey’s chapter offers an example of valuable research diminished by catchier conversations on categories and contention, illuminating another potential reason why romantic rhetoric goes so long unrecognized: in the early 1980s, this connection between Wordsworth and Coleridge to rhetoric is not as imminently quotable, debatable, or defendable as conversations about polarization and process.

Ramsey’s 1983 “Rhetoric and Romanticism” is not to be confused with Paul de Man’s 1983 The Rhetoric of Romanticism (published posthumously in 1984, the introductory note was written in 1983). A reprinting of his essays dating from his dissertation in 1956, de Man acknowledges that while there is apparent coherence within each essay, the essays do not articulate a general statement about romanticism; de Man leaves the historical definition to others, acknowledging that while the study of romanticism was being pursued by other scholars, it was not an easy task. Paul de Man’s essays demonstrate depth of inquiry into several romantic authors, and this shows, as the title suggests, rhetorical analysis and theory development within romantic rhetoric (viii).

These works in the early 1980s, I argue, show continual interest in romanticism and rhetoric. Because a tradition of romantic rhetoric was not well-established, in part because of the
contention over categories in the late 1960s and 1970s, potential connections were not fully realized. Where in rhetoric and composition’s archives is the article that details romantic contributions to rhetoric based on Engell’s detailed description of the enlightenment foundations for imagination? Since this article/book is missing from the narrative, the myth persists that the enlightenment and romanticism are opposed poles. The narrative shifts in a new direction of twists as James Berlin writes about romanticism and rhetoric.

3.4 James Berlin

In regards to being defendable, debatable, and thus, widely quoted, Paul de Man and James Berlin stand in contrast to Jon R. Ramsey and James Engell. James Berlin was a complex thinker and well-known and well-read figure in the field. Berlin’s writings about romanticism both propel and limit further research and support for the validity of romanticism within research. Ede reflects on Berlin’s implications to the field: “When Jim Berlin published his taxonomy… I embraced his categorizing of recent work in composition because it met my own need to impose order on what in fact was a dizzying array of scholarly and pedagogical projects. Only later did I see the limitations as well as the benefits of his taxonomy” (Ede 78). Berlin’s categories and opinions on romantic rhetoric present unique complications to the narrative.

In telling the overall story, I focus on Berlin’s *Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges* because, in it, Berlin most explicitly discusses the value of a broad consideration of romanticism. Given its publication in 1984, *Writing Instruction* and a summary of Berlin fit this point in the chronological narrative. However, I also briefly discuss Berlin’s 1980 article about Coleridge, his 1987 book *Rhetoric and Reality: Writing Instruction in American Colleges, 1900-1985*, and secondary sources describing Berlin’s movement away from direct support of the connection between romanticism and rhetoric.
In 1980, five years after earning his PhD and while teaching at Wichita State University, James Berlin’s “The Rhetoric of Romanticism: The Case for Coleridge” sets the stage for some of Berlin’s statements in his 1984 book. In the article, Berlin begins by citing the infamous Young quote (and Weidner dissertation) that link vitalism and romanticism as enemies of rhetoric. Berlin offers a reformulation of Coleridge’s understanding of polarity and rhetoric to demonstrate that rhetoric and poetics are not mutually exclusive categories: “the upshot of which is the exaltation of poetry and the denigration of rhetoric” (62). With careful understanding of the historical context of Coleridge, Berlin offers a model for reading Coleridge rhetorically. In doing so, James Berlin seems to support the idea that romantic authors such as Coleridge retained rhetorical value for composition. These thoughts developed into Berlin’s book.

In 1984, James Berlin’s *Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges* was published. The tracing of thinkers throughout the nineteenth-century is grounded in primary sources (both oft-cited and little known primary sources) and Berlin consistently demonstrates the importance of the historical analysis to (then) contemporary pedagogy and scholarship. As the first publication in the Studies in Writing and Rhetoric series, the purpose in Berlin’s investigation is grounded in the rhetorical outlooks of 1984. *Writing Instruction*’s value is thus twofold; it lends understanding and draws attention to the nineteenth century and analysis of *Writing Instruction* offers insight into composition theory and perceptions of romantic rhetoric in the 1980s.

Berlin opens his book with a discussion on the changes in rhetoric. He gives reasons for the changes: the way the rhetoric defines “reality, writer or speaker, audience, and language” is based on cultural surroundings (1). In his introduction, Berlin argues that there are three distinct rhetorical systems at work in the nineteenth century: “The first is classical in origin, deriving
from Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. The second is psychological-epistemological rhetoric (Douglas Ehninger’s term), which I will refer to as eighteenth-century rhetoric. The third is romantic rhetoric, growing out of the transcendental movement and in most ways uniquely American in its development” (3-4). Berlin explains romantic rhetoric by its role (and the lack thereof) within composition courses:

Romantic rhetoric did not find its way into composition courses until late in the century, despite the fact that it grew out of the work of such important figures as Emerson, Thoreau, and others involved in the transcendental movement. Their impact, furthermore, for all of their strength in other areas, was almost completely ignored in college textbooks until late in the century. Yet romantic rhetoric was a significant force that must be considered (9).

This statement, made early on, that recognizes the lack of romantic rhetoric’s acceptance, drives much of the book. Though Berlin does not explicitly define romantic rhetoric (one of the ongoing complications to this dissertation), he describes (his estimation of) romantic rhetoric’s characteristics.

Berlin argues that romantic rhetoric is different from other types of rhetoric in the way it analyzes audience because romantic rhetoric emphasizes the composing process and the act of writing and speaking (9). Within his general overview of romantic rhetoric, Berlin explains the incorporation of science, reality, the faculties, the spiritual, and the differences and similarities between the Aristotelians to show that the romantic rhetoric synthesizes all parts of human nature (10). In concluding the introduction, Berlin offers his positionality: he attempts to give each
rhetoric fair treatment, but he does admit to a bias against eighteenth century-rhetoric and a “predilection for romantic rhetoric” (12).

In the introduction to “Emerson and Romantic Rhetoric,” Berlin hints at the same questions driving my research: “Any consideration of romantic rhetoric today necessarily encounters difficulties” (42). Berlin estimates that the opinion that romantic rhetoric is antirhetorical is based on the individuality of romanticism whereas rhetoric is viewed as a social construction. To challenge this viewpoint, Berlin analyzes Ralph Waldo Emerson’s rhetoric. Berlin suggests a foundational connection between Blair and Emerson to then argue that “Emerson’s rhetoric is preeminently concerned with the role of discourse in the public domain, centering on the place of communication in modern democracy” (43). This discussion depends on an analysis of truth and truth’s relevance to the overall definition of rhetoric. Berlin also discusses the connections (and the secondary sources analyzing the connections) between Emerson’s views and Plato’s, especially as they relate to Nature and language.

This all paints Berlin as a staunch supporter of romantic rhetoric, and by his own declarations, in many ways, he is in 1984. But some questions exist even in his 1984 book that hint at the later challenges of understanding and classifying Berlin. Linking expressionists to the Platonic rhetorical theory and practice allows Berlin to further support nineteenth-century and Emersonian rhetoric (89). Berlin goes on to contrast this to “new rhetoric,” noting that “epistemic rhetoric” would also be a good name for new rhetoric, and stating that

This category includes a wide diversity of thought emanating from a wide variety of sources. I find the clearest pedagogical manifestation of this rhetoric in the composition textbooks of Peter Elbow, Anne Berthoff, and Richard Young, Alton
Becker, and Kenneth Pike. I realize that the differences among these three textbooks are considerable. The single feature that brings them together, however, is that they regard rhetoric as epistemic, as a means of arriving at a truth, and they place language at the center of this truth-seeking, truth-creating enterprise. In this, they are the rhetorical descendants of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Fred Newton Scott… Emerson and Scott were intellectual forebears, putting forth theories of rhetoric that are strikingly similar to contemporary developments (90).

Linking together three categorically distinct and important individuals within the romantic rhetoric narrative under a category that is neither expressionistic nor romantic demonstrates the challenge in classifying and understanding any of these thinkers. Nevertheless, Berlin shows how all three of his contemporary views—the classical, the expressionist, and the new rhetoric—“Represent extensions of the best the nineteenth century has to offer” (91). He gives important justification for the continued study of the nineteenth century.

If Berlin continued in these thoughts after this 1984 publication, then this dissertation would be redundant. There would not be a need to tell the story of romantic rhetoric because, I hypothesize, textbooks would take up Berlin’s approach and be far more open to analysis of romanticism as rhetorical. Berlin answered many of the questions about the enlightenment’s influence on romanticism. The connections between eras of thought and context were clear. But Berlin’s theories and perspective shifted, making Berlin difficult to classify and his early support of romantic rhetoric difficult to understand.
In 1987, Berlin’s *Rhetoric and Reality: Writing Instruction in American Colleges, 1900-1985* offered the field what Donald Stewart called an extension of Berlin’s *Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges*. In the 1987 book, Berlin still focuses on categories, this time identifying three epistemological categories—objective, subjective, and transactional (ix). In the subjective theories, truth is located within the individual, and Berlin notes that this builds from Platonic idealism modified by Emerson and Thoreau and encouraged by psychology (11). In the overview of the book, Berlin responds to Robert Connors’s critique of *Writing Instruction*. Connors’s review found *Writing Instruction* failed to be impersonal and objective. Berlin counters that history is always written from a point-of-view and that it often helps when historians are aware of the interpretive strategies with which they form their stances (17). Berlin does say, “I should add, however, that I cannot claim to be a disciple of any one of the three” (18). Still, others have exposed and theorized on Berlin’s preferences.

Berlin is a major figure in Hawk’s *A Counter-History of Composition*. Hawk posits that Berlin’s “reading of Emerson in *Writing Instruction* allows Berlin to make more detailed historical distinctions between expressivism and romanticism in *Rhetoric and Reality*” (66).

Many of these distinctions focus on the types of romanticism and expressivism including patrician romanticism, aesthetic expressionism, and Brahminical romanticism (Hawk 74). The other historical distinction that Hawk claims Berlin slips into is a common challenge and critique in interpreting nineteenth century scholarship: what should scholars do about the aristocratic uses of eloquence and elitist traditions that complicate understanding of rhetorical relevancy? Hawk answers this question about Berlin:
Berlin’s maps change because the historical period he is examining changes, and teachers in the discipline tacitly accept his categories—no matter how generalized—because they do, in part, correspond to practices being advocated and practiced in the discipline at particular times… Berlin’s maps become reified as they are generally accepted by the discipline. And the same thing happens to Berlin himself. Though his earlier maps trace diverse historical practices… they lead him to a preferred position and definitive determinations… (76)

Hawk says that once Berlin lands in these preferred positions, he then works to pedagogically implement the position and closes the door to historical development (76). More directly, Hawk says, “Just as Young reduces vitalism for the sake of disciplinarily, Berlin forgets it for the sake of politics” (Hawk 84-85). As such, James Berlin becomes nearly impossible to classify in his undeniably important role in romantic rhetoric research’s narrative.

The confusion I encounter in understanding Berlin’s opinions on romanticism contributes to the argument driving this chapter; categories, of history and of pedagogy, are necessary and crucial in the development of rhetoric and composition. They launch inquiry; whether scholars point back to Kinneavy’s or Fulkerson’s or Berlin’s categories, the categories offer heuristics for research and methodology. But the confusion persists because, as Hawk alluded to, some of the history was distilled and the scholars (just

### Implication:

Romanticism is assumed to be antirhetorical and, as such, is not a popular field with which to be associated.

### Trap:

Because the rhetors were so detailed, prolific, and interested in a wide variety theories, they can be interpreted in ways that are convenient.

### Trap:

Because the rhetors were so distinct from each other, they cannot all be classified in the same category.
like the thinkers in the eighteenth and nineteenth century) themselves developed (84).

Rhetoric and composition scholars like Berlin were not static in their opinions on subjects of history. Dynamic thinking is reminiscent of the traps that create confusion in categorizing and understanding romantic authors (as described in Chapter Two). Layers of political associations, distinct writings (Berlin groups together Berthoff, Young, and Elbow in the same category), and theories that shift over time given further research and changes in purpose distance direct and primary source analysis of romanticism’s rhetorical contributions in the 1980s. The confusion in interpreting and, now, describing the work of Berlin (or Berthoff, or, for that matter, any of the thinkers) reveals the necessity of this narrative of romantic rhetoric research. The sheer confusion in placing and understanding romantic rhetoric research is one of the many reasons that romanticism’s rhetorical contributions are shafted in rhetorical theory and history.

It is important to note, in re-collating perspectives on romantic rhetoric from the 1980s that this period of writing studies history, like the period of romanticism, has been layered in many decades of distance and distilment. One of my main purposes for this narrative of romantic rhetoric is to demonstrate the categorical confusion within the story. Somehow, despite all this research that seems to debunk the myth that romanticism is antirhetorical and despite the integral role that romanticism played in the formation of theory and of rhetoric and composition, romantic rhetoric still either remains unknown or rests in a cloud of confusion. I delve into the details on the complex thoughts of the 1970s and 1980s to demonstrate the importance of a story that is misremembered within the larger story. Many figures and works described thus far in the chapter are well-known. I look at them again, not to write a counter-history or to posit that these landmark cases and studies are in some way deficient; instead, I look at the role of these studies in the narrative of romantic rhetoric because, like they do to so many sub-fields and stories
within rhetoric and composition, they influence the narrative and the categorical confusion of the next era of writing on romantic rhetoric, the work that emerges in the 1990s explicitly defending and writing about romantic rhetoric with more perceptivity and specific championing than the research that established the categories in the 1970s and 1980s could offer.

3.5 Current-Traditional Rhetoric and New Literacy

As an important aside to the narrative of romantic rhetoric, a note on current-traditional rhetoric is warranted because, in a similar manner as the rise of the category “expressivism” laid the foundations for declarations for or against romanticism’s rhetorical value, the category (and writings about) current-traditional rhetoric also stirred auxiliary conversations about romantic rhetoric (see Young’s writings). Thus, Sharon Crowley’s two 1985 publications: “The Evolution of Invention in Current-Traditional Rhetoric” (Rhetoric Review) and “Invention in Nineteenth-Century Rhetoric” (College Composition and Communication) are important in tracing invention, a canon that is often said to be absent in romantic rhetoric (see Berthoff and Lauer’s exchange for claims about imagination’s devaluing of invention).

By tracing the canon of invention in “the Evolution of Invention in Current-Traditional Rhetoric,” Crowley characterizes the first and second generation of current-traditional theory and determines that the first generation cites Campbell and Blair. Looking specifically at early nineteenth-century American schools, Crowley states that rhetoric was a blend between classical and eighteenth-century discourse. Crowley examines the ways in which Bain and Day discuss the limits and divisions made by the mind. Still focusing on invention, Crowley also looks at Fernald and Genung as they relate to prewriting in Expressive English (1918). Crowley’s conclusion is that invention is not always absent from current-traditional rhetoric and her hope is
that “a fuller understanding of the historical underpinnings of current-traditional rhetoric will help us to devise a more appropriate rhetoric with which to replace it” (344).

“Invention in Nineteenth-Century Rhetoric” is similar. Crowley examines nineteenth-century textbooks to show how rhetoric is split between style and invention (57). While Crowley does offer an impressive overview of the canons and textbooks from that time, notably absent from her analysis is the presence of nineteenth-century romantics and their theories on invention.

Granted, Crowley is looking primarily at textbooks, but this absence (even in the textbooks that form the basis for Crowley’s claims) is revealing and worth mentioning in the narrative of romantic rhetoric. This is another cause and effect of categorical confusion, and it reveals the relevancy of the myth that invention and imagination are mutually exclusive. This myth is not justified based on the lack of overlap between imagination and invention; as Engell demonstrates, imagination and invention have an intertwined history throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century (see the end of this chapter). Imagination and invention, in the narrative of romantic rhetoric, are viewed as distanced poles. This view stems from and feeds the ongoing lack of recognition of romanticism’s contribution to rhetoric.

Once again, the chronological narrative highlights the ironies present in the long trajectory of romantic rhetoric research. I hypothesize that Crowley’s works did not include the invention of imagination, in part, perhaps because the field was not receptive to the longstanding tradition of recognizing romantic rhetoric. But during the same years, authors like Waldo and Faigley tried to justify romantic rhetoric. Mark Waldo, in 1985 (a Rhetoric Review article), provides an analysis of Kinneavy and Richard Young’s stances against Romanticism (64) concluding that romantics “offer a great deal to the field… if only because their insights are the
foundation for so much of it…. it is unjustified here to claim that the poets led a revolt against neoclassical rhetorical convention, it is also unfair to hold them responsible for the dominance of a paradigm antithetical to much of their own theory” (78). By surveying Wordworth’s and Coleridge’s philosophy of rhetoric, Waldo focuses on psycho-rhetorical discourse. Waldo links Wordworth’s theories on redrafting to the “discovery model” for writing, connecting Donald Murray and Peter Elbow to romantic authors (75). Waldo’s approach is helpful and unique in its early defense of romanticism in a rhetorical way; that said, Waldo is very much centered on debate, as much a product of his context and time as the writers in the early 1970s discussing categorization within rhetoric and composition. Waldo attempts to draw romantic rhetoric into the spotlight, but the subject did not pair well with the debatable topics that gained attention. Whereas many authors in this era develop theories over several publications, after this singular publication Waldo drops out of the romantic rhetoric narrative.

In 1986, Lester Faigley wrote the influential “Competing Theories of Process: A Critique and a Proposal.” He connects expressivism and romanticism, and as Rule summarizes, Faigley “describes expressivism exclusively in romantic terms” (204). With particular attention to Peter Elbow, Faigley discusses integrity, spontaneity, originality, and the notion of natural genius. Faigley’s findings demonstrate yet another example of the research that links rhetoric and romanticism and makes the trap that considers romanticism as antirhetorical that much more unfounded (655).
In 1987, John Willinsky took a different approach to conversations about romanticism and its role in rhetoric and composition by connecting romanticism to New Literacy (“The Seldom-Spoken Roots of the Curriculum: Romanticism and the New Literacy”). Willinsky makes bold claims, suggesting that the revolution initiated by romantic poets (particularly Wordsworth and Coleridge) in response to the French Revolution parallels the revolution in language arts that was occurring in the late 1980s, the response to progressive education movements, or as Willinsky said, “the new paradigm in language education—the New Literacy as I am calling it” (268). Willinsky’s argument depends on the categorical separation of the enlightenment from romanticism, and though he is one of the rare scholars who cites Engell’s claim that romanticism is built on enlightenment ideas of imagination, Willinsky calls particular attention to the differences between the two schools of thought. This serves his argument that connects enlightenment thinking to behavioral psychology and romantic thinking to New Literacy: “Both Romanticism and the New Literacy have set about in a similar way to make a place for themselves by denouncing the old texts and declaring the unrealized potential of a commonplace language for their new works as poets and teachers” (282).

As Willinsky reaches the conclusion of the argument, he is careful to point out that Romanticism warns against the divisiveness of taxonomies (285), that his essay is an “initial experiment…in the analysis of curriculum and in the history of ideas,” (286), and that he necessarily summarized the complexity of romanticism in order to achieve his goal of surveying New Literacy with greater depth (286). Some of Willinsky’s points become problematic in later understandings of romanticism’s role in rhetoric: O’Brien acknowledges that Willinsky claims...
that “just as the Romantics cultivate the cult of individualism, New Literacy shifts the emphasis from the authority of the teacher to the student (275)” (O’Brien 80). Despite these later concerns, Willinsky offers a unique argument in this era of categorical splitting.

Willinsky makes pertinent points to this narrative: “The history of ideas portrays a field full of contention as it describes the points of affinity and challenges that have arisen before. But such a history also creates, as an epiphenomenon, a critical apparatus of its own” (287). The category/field of New Literacy opens a different direction of inquiry into categorical confusion, a direction that connects a response to David Russell’s writing about romantic rhetoric to Willinsky’s thoughts about New Literacy.

In 1988, in a *Rhetoric Review* article, “Romantics on Writing: Liberal Culture and the Abolition of Composition Courses,” David Russell discusses romantic theory as ammunition of the theorists who wished to abolish the first-year composition course (abolitionists, as Russell calls them). Through Russell’s discussion of the divide between rhetoric and literature departments within English Studies, this composition theory article describes romantic assumptions in rather negative terms.

Russell discusses the danger of exclusion in romantic rhetoric. The argument of abolitionists (specifically, Russell examines Oscar James Campbell and Thomas Lounsbury) is that men of genius figure out, naturally how to say what they need to say. Russell acknowledges the connection between assumptions about the nature of the writing process, expressivism, and the “very qualities that Romantics prize. But these are also qualities, Young points out, that lie outside the domain of rhetorical principles” (143). According to Roskelly and Ronald, “Russell attacks the romantics as elite, a product of
‘liberal culture’” in the same way in which James Berlin, later, finds sources of expressionist approaches in “liberal culture” (35). Unease about invention and elitism are, again, ways in which the nineteenth century and romantic rhetoric are confined and pigeonholed rather than opened up for rhetorical possibility.

To understand Russell’s role in the narrative of romantic rhetoric research, I highlight an article that does not argue for or against romantic rhetoric but does demonstrate a contextualized understanding of Russell and how categorical defense impacts the lens of reading; Michael Harker’s “The Legibility of Literacy in Composition’s Great Debate: Revisiting ‘Romantics on Writing’ and the History of Composition” offers a unique approach to a longstanding idea and debate. Harker’s article helps further explain Russell’s contributions to the narrative of romantic rhetoric while giving deeper insight into the two works that were analyzed in “Romantics on Writing”: Thomas Lounsbury’s “Compulsory Composition in Colleges” (1911) and Oscar James Campbell’s “The Failure of Freshman English” (1939).

While Russell argues that romanticism and liberal culture are driving forces behind compulsory composition, Harker posits that New Literacy Studies offers a theoretical lens with which to consider the two articles from the early 1900s, thus offering a different perspective in understanding the compulsory composition debate (22). In doing so, Harker illuminates another way in which categories and debates lead to narrative twists: “The tendency, Rose argues, is for composition instructors who subscribe to ‘great divide’ theories to draw generalizations from exceptional cases” (24). Beyond exposing another way in which romantic rhetoric is a victim of debates and great divide theories, analysis of Russell reveals another implication of the field’s general misappropriation of romantic rhetoric; Russell follows in patterns set by the field that
lead to ignoring components of romantic rhetoric as essential, but also to mischaracterizing the relationship of imagination to rhetoric and pedagogy.

Much of the anxiety raised by current-traditional rhetoric centers on the question of invention and “genius.” As has been demonstrated by the hints at the emerging myth, considering imagination and invention as mutually exclusive is a myth—a myth that has complicated rhetoric’s categories since the 1700s. Engell demonstrates the ways in which “the Enlightenment created the idea of the imagination” in a manner that is worth capturing in the narrative of romantic rhetoric (3). The following quotes from the Creative Imagination show the historic foundation for understanding genius, imagination, and invention set by an understanding of enlightenment and romantic rhetoric that employs the lens of cohesion:

- “In English thought the imagination becomes less diametrically opposed to reason and more the working partner of reason, the act of reasoning itself, a process so complex that it cannot be broken down into the logical or ‘rational’ steps of ‘method’” (20).
- “Yet on the whole, ‘imagination’ in the late seventeenth century was hemmed in by a snarl of critical terms. It was in part a question of vocabulary and semantics. ‘Wit,’ ‘judgement,’ ‘enthusiasm,’ ‘invention,’ poetics ‘fire’ or ‘ardor’—all these are mixed and compared with ‘imagination.’ In some instances these values and attributes are taken to be part of the imagination. In other cases imagination is identified as a constituent part of these qualities” (34).
- “By the 1720s and 1730s the imagination begins to acquire a distinctly positive character. It becomes the power not only to invent images but also to animate and excite, providing what Dryden called the ‘life touches’ and ‘secret graces’ of art” (41).
- Referencing Akenside, Gerard, and Tetens: “The imagination ‘blends’ and ‘divides’; the images and ideas, caught up and controlled by its power, ‘mingle,’ ‘join,’ and ‘converge.’ The imagination ‘enlarges,’ ‘extenuates,’ and ‘varies’ its materials until a single new and unified image or work of art is produced” (45).
- “The Enlightenment’s view of the imagination had one immense advantage that the later nineteenth century failed to recapture: it focused on the source of creative power, on what permits the unified operation of all faculties, and at its highest
pitch, on what constitutes genius and creativity… The study of genius also places the idea of imagination in a rarefied atmosphere—as Coleridge knew, who often ‘apologizes’ that genius is too uncommon to be commonly understood and that the imagination of genius alone should not be trusted as a guide to life or as a form of salvation. Coleridge also knew that it is exactly in the rare atmosphere of genius, in asking what genius is and what promotes it, that we discover the richest and most meaningful concept of imagination, a discovery made first by the Enlightenment” (79).

• “The role of the imagination widens as it participates in this new imitation, one that is geistig, even geistlich, receiving support from the critical philosophy, from the rampant interest in neo-Platonism, and from those, like Blake, Hamann, Lessing, and Coleridge, who revered the Bible as a holy poem ‘imitating’ the Word and the spirit of God” (109).
• “Tetens’ Dichtkraft is like Hume’s ‘imagination,’ a completing power. It follows the lead of suggestion, involves passion, and extends creatively what the outside world only implies. Imagination gives mental inferences concrete form and shape” (125).
• “When Blake says that the imagination creates reality, he is voicing the same kind of attitude found in Keats as well, who remarks that certain ethereal things gain their worth by the ‘ardour of mental pursuit’ we invest in them” (247).
• “Shelley’s idealistic faith in the imagination presents several paradoxes that weighed heavily on him and were perhaps a cause of the sense of burden that colors art of his life. First, if the imagination and inspirational and unwilled, the poet may become an automaton. But if the poet is really struggling to attain an ‘unwilled’ moment of inspiration, then the will does seem to be involved up to the time of that transient flash of insight when the veil falls away from his eyes” (263).

With more careful attention to the primary sources of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than the limits of this dissertation afford, these quotes show the longstanding, complicated relationship between imagination and invention, especially as established by romantic and enlightenment rhetors. The selection of quotes demonstrates the fact in the myth. Distinctions between enlightenment and romantic conceptions of imagination exist, but imagination and invention were consistently linked together throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These quotes also demonstrate the sometimes dangerous implications of
theories of imagination that emphasize “genius.” But more resoundingly, this selection of quotes (and Engell’s context within *the Creative Imagination*) makes a case for a more complex viewing of imagination and its association with invention. So again, I argue that if tradition of acknowledging the rhetorical aspects contributed by romantic thinkers existed, then perhaps Engell would have been more widely appreciated and more directly connected to rhetoric. If a greater appreciation for the cohesiveness of ideas presented by the enlightenment and romanticism existed, some of these later traps on the exclusivity of imagination and invention would not be as severe.

### 3.6 Synthesis of Myths, Traps, and Implications

I have highlighted the ways in which the myths funnel into traps and traps funnel into implications throughout the narrative of romantic rhetoric research in the 1970s and 1980s. From the exchange between Berthoff and Lauer to the confusion of romantic rhetoric’s role in current-traditional debates, the myth that imagination and invention are mutually exclusive represent ways in which, overall, space is not made readily available for extended study or support of romanticism’s contributions to rhetoric within the overall story of composition studies. This myth is debunked, in part, by Engell’s demonstration of the connections between imagination and invention in *the Creative Imagination*, but Engell’s lack of direct mentioning of rhetoric limit the widespread acceptance of the validity of imagination’s role in invention. In Figure 3.1, the Connectivity Graph representing the 1970s and 1980s, I visually capture the popularity and the reciprocity of citations that directly relate to the field of rhetoric and composition. The works about romanticism’s relevancy to rhetoric, romantic rhetoric even, are less cited than the works that engage in debate and categorization more directly.
Romanticism’s role within rhetoric also encounters challenges in the mis-categorization of authors like Engell, Berthoff, Young, and Berlin. In this era of professionalization and discipline formation, categories inspire research. But unfortunately for romantic rhetoric, the research that is inspired perpetuates the idea that romanticism is antirhetorical, and thus, dangerous to associate with. This spurs on a need for defense of romantic rhetoric that often comes in the form of rebranding of romantic rhetoric via books and articles in the 1990s. The problem with defense is that it necessitates a positionality that limits full historic analysis examining the complicated reasons why romantic rhetoric is underappreciated.

Figure 3.1: Author Citation Connectivity Chart, 1972-1989
4 THE FAULT LINES

The first Octalog “the Politics of Historiography” (1988) initiated much of the research that was published in the 1990s. In this landmark conversation, Berlin contextualizes the dialogue, “As economic, social, and political conditions change, so do the rhetorics that inscribe the discourse rules that are a part of these conflicts. We read and write histories to understand better our differences from the past and this difference provides the point of illumination for the present” (“Octalog”). Most of the historians owned their social motivation, as Robert Connors summarizes “I write history to try to make my world a better place, to try to brighten the corner in which I live and work” (“Octalog”). The Octalog revealed potential and purpose in studying history, and the positive motivations extend to the narrative of romantic rhetoric research. But by the late 1980s, the field was full of contention and motivations for writing history were also mired in defense and offence.

Formations of categories were largely complete, and in their wake, scholars made arguments along fault lines. Hawk references Ronald and Roskelly’s argument in Farther Along: Transforming Dichotomies in Rhetoric and Composition (1990), “once these perspectives are named, they tend to evolve into positions that require defending or attacking” (3). Hawk claims that Farther Along initiates a decade of competing ideas, whether those ideas center around Berlinian exaltation of culture studies or overall questioning of “the divisions that had become reified ideological strongholds” (Hawk 88). Again, the narrative of romantic rhetoric research fits into the field’s overall pattern, and in the defending and attacking, traps, myths, and implications that I have described thus far become more fully realized.

The 1990s deserve special attention in this narrative of romantic rhetoric. In the years between 1995-1998, most of the full-length books written specifically on romanticism and its
rhetorical connections were published within rhetoric and composition. Several other articles published in the field’s leading journals championed romanticism. Many of the books and articles are defensive in nature. The authors argue adamantly for the “underdog” of romanticism. There is somewhat startling overlap between many of the works, even in the cultural references authors make; both Gradin and Roskelly and Ronald make more than a passing reference to *Dead Poet’s Society* (Gradin 18 and Roskelly and Ronald 123).

Historically, the decade began with the Cold War’s official end. Like in other decades, there was war, genocide, refugee crises, and conflicts. There were developments; the advent of World Wide Web (1991), the ability to send text messages between phones (1993), and the introduction of Google search engine’s to the Web (1998) all impacted research, communication, and daily life (Living History). In the 1990s, one third of doctoral institutions had graduate programs in rhetoric and composition (Thomas Miller 9). According to Baliff, “Although the reclamation of the ancient rhetorical tradition was of interest to scholars of rhetoric, composition, and communication during much of the latter half of the twentieth century, this interest transformed into a central preoccupation during the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, producing a plethora of publications on the history of rhetoric” (Baliff 1). While the work of setting up categories was largely complete, those categories earned defenses as they slid into and out of popularity.

There was less discussion that defined expressivism and more discussion that argued for the pedagogical validity of expressivism (Fishman and McCarthy, Veeder, Gradin, Roskelly and Ronald, etc.). The definitions morph into other discussions, and as scholars discuss literacy narratives, freewriting, brainstorming, and student’s rights to their own language, hints of the former conversations on romanticism and expressivism find their way into defenses. Still,
“expressivism” was in need of defense because it was increasingly becoming retrograde. In
1998, Roskelly and Ronald reflected on the decade in which they wrote:

In the last ten years, composition has looked to cognitive, linguistic, expressive, and
social theories of learning, meaning, and communication for solutions to the problem of
how to help students write better. Yet as each theory is embraced, it’s as quickly rejected,
and rejected so soundly that to call it up again risks the label of ‘old-fashioned’ or
retrograde (104).

Hawk says that most pedagogical discourse in the 1990s embraced critical pedagogies that
mirrored Berlin’s idea of social-epistemic rhetoric (207). The impact of rhetoric and composition
culture on the narrative of romantic rhetoric leads to further implications of categorical confusion
and justifies telling the ongoing story.

I have begun to give answers and highlight the myths and traps; the 1990s writings on
romanticism and rhetoric offer exemplar ways in which these traps and myths have already been
complicated, debunked, or avoided within the narrative. However, key myths still exist and
linger into the 2000s. As such, highlighting the ways in which these myths and traps are
discussed in the 1990s reveals the persistence of the myths. In this chapter, I argue that the
implications of a history of rhetoric and composition that fails to recognize the relevancy of
romanticism emerge with greater clarity, to the disadvantage of contemporary students.

4.1 Responses to Too Narrow a View of Romanticism

In 1992, Fishman and McCarthy’s article, “Is Expressivism Dead? Reconsidering its
Romantic Roots and Its Relation to Social Constructionism” adopts the ‘enlightenment is the
villain, romanticism is the hero’ mindset in an overview of eighteenth-century romantics.
Fishman and McCarthy highlight parallels between Elbow and Johan Gottfried Herder, initiating
research linking romantic rhetoric to expressivism (like Kristi Yager’s “Romantic Resonances in the Rhetoric of Peter Elbow's *Writing without Teachers*”). Fishman, the contributor who delves into defending expressivism in this article, was teaching “Intro to Philosophy,” and his introduction posits that the authors respond to the “charge that expressivism, following the romantics, is tied to the ideal of the isolated writer” (649). Fishman delineates the attacks against expressivism and counters that they operate under “too narrow a view of romanticism” and, to correct this misunderstanding, a wider understanding of eighteenth-century German writing (Herder in particular) is needed to see how romanticism and expressivism do not support individualism or self-absorption, rather, they emphasize ways to identify with one another and create social communion (649, 654). Fishman and McCarthy continue conversations about imagination and invention from a different perspective, and in doing so, they offer another example of research that marks romanticism as rhetorical.

Rex Veeder also used primary romantic sources to demonstrate the rhetorical qualities present in romantic works. In 1993, *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* published his article, “Coleridge’s Philosophy of Composition: An Overview of a Romantic Rhetorician.” Veeder validates the rhetoric of Coleridge for an audience who was fighting in departmental turf wars and, as a battle move, used Coleridge as “an easy target for those who would use him to demonstrate how ‘literary’ concerns should not be included in composition pedagogy” (20). O’Brien applauds Veeder’s approach and argument that Coleridge’s rhetorical trainings and writing qualify Coleridge as an important figure in composition (O’Brien 79).

As published in *Rhetoric, Cultural Studies, and Literacy: Selected Papers from the 1994 Conference of the Rhetoric Society of America*, Veeder’s “Expressive Rhetoric, a Genealogy of
Ideas, and a Case for the British Romantics” seeks to give a historical contexts for the influence of British Romantics to expressionist theory (99). Veeder offers five basic tenets for British Romantic rhetoric, claiming that the tenets are in harmony with expressive rhetoric (101).

Veeder’s 1997 article “Romantic Rhetoric and the Rhetorical Tradition” is broader in scope as he acknowledges the divide between rhetoricians and romantics of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, especially through contemporary lenses of rhetoricians and literary critics. Veeder establishes the context of distrust between rhetoricians and British romantics, even though “some substantial efforts have been made to include the ‘literary’ Romantics in our discussion of rhetoric” (Veeder 300). To make his argument that British romantic theory was political and rhetorical, Veeder examines Thomas De Quincey’s essay on rhetoric (1828) that states British rhetoric is exemplified best by poets and preachers (critiquing Sheridan). Veeder draws heavily on Coleridge, William Godwin, and, Keckermann to discuss the importance of pulpit rhetoric in connecting romantic theory and expressive activity to rhetoric. By discussing the rhetorical purpose of aesthetics, Veeder defines “taste” according to romantic rhetoric, showing how the romantic authors operate on deeper theoretical backings than is typically assumed: “romantic rhetoric is, therefore, a much more demanding form of rhetoric than is commonly acknowledged. One implication of Romantic rhetoric is that we need to think of it as a reflective practice rather than as merely expressive.” Veeder sets a generative foundation that begins to distance romanticism from expressivism (316).

Veeder wrote “Romantic Rhetoric and the Rhetorical Tradition” in 1997, in the midst of many publications that thrived because they linked expressivism with romanticism. Notable among romantic rhetoric studies that join the two, Sherrie Gradin’s book Romancing Rhetorics: Social Expressivist Perspectives on the Teaching of Writing offers one of the most
comprehensive discussions on romantic rhetoric. With an overview of the history of expressivism as it is connected to and founded in romanticism, Gradin discusses categorical confusion, imagination in the classroom, and the value of romantic rhetoric. In 1995, Gradin was on the defense of expressivism, because, as Zebroski claimed, the world was “against” it (vii). Gradin’s acknowledgements reveal that she had Peter Elbow’s continuous support through the process (xi). Romantic Rhetorics is closely related to Gradin’s doctoral dissertation defended in 1990 (“British Romanticism and Composition Theory: The Traditions and Value of Romantic Rhetoric”).

Arguing that “denigration of the expressivist theories of composition is often based on misconceptions of expressivist theory and practice as well as incomplete knowledge of the tradition from which they arise” leads Gradin to her thesis that while the social-expressivist rhetorics are already at play in the field, they need to be more fully practiced (xiv). Furthermore, Gradin suggests “Perhaps a social-expressivism has not previously been articulated because scholars in composition studies are inclined to make passing remarks about romanticism without much knowledge of what it entailed as a movement” (xv). Roskelly and Ronald applaud her attempt: “As Gradin points out, composition has not realized that romanticism itself constituted a rhetoric and always contained within it the impulses toward democratic action and social critique” (36).
Gradin opens her first chapter, “Whose Categories are these Anyway?” with M.H. Abrams’s definition of expressivism and the three rhetorical theories as presented by James Berlin. Gradin theorizes on Berlin’s change in perspective, essentially arguing that Berlin’s favor shifted along with the power struggle the field faced over expressivism (3). She claims that there has been a “long history of aversion to romanticism… Much of the aversion of romanticism, however, seems based on caricatures of the romantic poets, caricatures which have their roots in false images” (9). The image of caricatures is a helpful heuristic in understanding oversimplification of time periods and is useful when complicating the myth that the two thought periods, the enlightenment and romanticism, are radically opposed.

Gradin goes on to say that romantic things are synonymous with things that are frivolous and silly while non-romantic things are reasonable and sound (7). This becomes problematic when “Expressivist pedagogues, like their romantic forebears, value the emotive, the intuitive, and the imaginative… Expressivist rhetorics are, after all, a product of their historical and cultural time” (7). Gradin counters the accusation that romantic/expressivist thought is anti-intellectual (7). She explains the core fallacy in categorization,

Pointing to or even creating flaws in expressivist theories and pedagogies makes it easier for social-epistemic rhetorics to look superior in every way. Unfortunately, this tendency to create a straw-man sets up a problematic system of categorization so narrowly conceived that it ignores what romantic theory contributes to the discipline and even to social-epistemic theories themselves (11).
Gradin references Derrida in talking about the complications of categorization while admitting that she also is forced to categorize in her own conversations, noting that none of the scholars themselves “wishes to be pigeonholed, nor in reality can they so easily be constructed as one thing or the other” (14).

Gradin argues that both romanticism and expressivism evolved/reacted to worldviews that were mechanistic and rigid (17). Gradin looks to the educational philosophies of Rousseau, Andrew Bell, and Joseph Lancaster as they influenced Wordsworth and Coleridge (26). Intellectual ancestry is further explored as Gradin links Coleridge to Berthoff (38). Gradin connects expressivist contemporaries (in her categorization, Rohman, Berthoff, Murray, and Elbow) to romantics. Writing about the competition that fuels her students, Gradin alludes to Wordsworth and the competition in Cambridge students. Gradin returns to the idea that rhetoric is responsive and that romantic rhetoric rose in response to passive educational philosophies (mentioning as an aside that neo-classical rhetoric also was a reaction) (78-79). In the end of Chapter Four, Gradin most clearly explains her goal:

The theories and practices of these contemporary expressivists are a complex and valuable reincarnation of what is most worthwhile in the educational and poetic theories of the original romantics… my intent is to illuminate a tradition of romantic thought and to suggest that many theories on education and writing have been supplemented, in invaluable ways, by some important romantic tenants. To do so expands the boundaries repeatedly used to describe expressivism… in order to envision the ways in which expressivists and social-epistemic rhetoric are not merely estranged theories that share no common ground, we must provide the historical context for expressivism as I have been doing here (89-90).
Gradin counters the arguments that neo-romantic and expressivist rhetorics lack rigor, are antirhetorical in their understanding of audience, and are only about self-development. Gradin reads and rereads, “both romanticism and expressivism to adjust the field’s general understanding of romantic rhetoric in the face of disparaging attacks on expressivism. In doing so, a theory and practice for social-expressivism arises from both the romantic past and the expressivist present” (91). Examining the man-of-genius myth, Gradin invites further analysis of the education of the imagination and romanticism’s relation to feminism (chapters that, twenty-five years later, feel dated).

Gradin’s *Romancing Rhetorics* is an undoubtedly important milestone in the narrative of romantic rhetoric research because the book argues for historical contexts while demonstrating the connections between romanticism to rhetoric. Many of the myths that I have presented thus far are dispelled in Gradin’s argument and demonstration of the rhetorical contributions of romanticism. Writing within her context in 1995, Gradin understandably utilizes expressivism to discuss romanticism, and while her points are valuable, the precedent of equating theories of romantic rhetoric to expressivism is well-established by Gradin’s work, limiting later discussions of romanticism to necessarily include conversations about expressivism. Gradin’s later scholarship shifts to emphasize queer rhetoric—Gradin moves away from her early direct support of romantic rhetoric. So while some of her necessarily foundational discussions linking feminism and romanticism and her focus on expressivism’s connections to romanticism now feel dated given a wider acceptance of feminism, Gradin’s arguments about romantic rhetoric remain relevant because romantic rhetoric is still relevant—and would continue to be so, especially in the mid-1990s.

**Trap:** Romanticism = expressivism
Also published in 1995, the underappreciated book *Rhetorical Traditions and British Romantic Literature* emphasizes romanticism’s relevancy to rhetoric. Edited by Don Bialostosky and Lawrence Needham, this collection of essays describes the dismissal of romantic rhetoric. The introduction opens with a statement that captures well the theme of the narrative of romantic rhetoric research: “That rhetoric declined as Romanticism rose is the commonest of commonplaces, a story seemingly agreed to by all parties” (1). Referencing the typical contenders (Bizzell and Herzberg, M.H. Abrams) as well as new faces to this narrative (Bender and Wellberry, Wilbur Samuel Howell), Bialostosky and Needham demonstrate that the “commonplace story become[s] institutionalized in substantial anthologies designed for distinct courses that legitimate and reproduce separate fields of rhetoric and literary studies that shape the expectations of their professors” (1). As such, *Rhetorical Traditions and British Romantic Literature* is a collection of eight new and eight previously published (mostly in the 1980s) essays by various authors that attempts to investigate the relationship between romanticism and rhetoric in a new way to lead to a rapprochement between the literary and rhetorical branches of English studies… whose separation was founded upon and is sustained by the commonplace story of the end of rhetoric and the rise of literature in the Romantic period. We are not concerned, however, to tell another grand literary historical narrative to replace the old one and establish new departmental boundaries. We would rather loosen the hold of that story and open the field to interdisciplinary inquiries that were prematurely closed by its hegemony (5).
The essays in the collection counter assumptions that support the incompatibility of rhetoric and romanticism with historical analysis that supports revived study of the nineteenth century: “The belief that rhetoric and Romanticism are incompatible is based not only on the absence of formal rhetorics written by Romantic authors but also on the perceived decline in classical study by the early nineteenth century” (6). Out of the sixteen essays, the only author already familiar to this narrative on romantic rhetoric research is James Engell (a republication of Engell’s “The New Rhetoricians: Psychology, Semiotics, and Critical Theory”). The other essays, in-depth arguments about a variety of topics related to romantic rhetoric, further demonstrate how much research has been done to painstakingly open imaginations beyond commonplace ideas, or what I am calling myths and traps, about rhetoric and romanticism. The lack of citations of these essays within subsequent essays and books in the narrative of research show the persistence of departmental and methodological boundaries and commonly-held beliefs (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the connectivity webs, at the end of this chapter).

With a similar motive as Gradin’s goal, in 1996, Kristi Yager wrote “Romantic Resonances in the Rhetoric of Peter Elbow’s Writing without Teachers” to demonstrate the historical depth in Elbow’s assumptions. Like Gradin and Fishman, Yager is defensive: “I hope to refute charges against the intellectual credibility of Elbow’s work” (144). Drawing connections between the metaphors and claims of Elbow and the metaphors of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Keats allows Yager to predict that though Elbow does not “explicitly attribute these metaphors to his Romantic predecessors, he could not have been ignorant of them” (145). Yager’s article is another demonstration of the rhetorical relevancy of romanticism and another
example of scholarship linking expressivism to romantic rhetoric, further limiting and furthering the exigency of both subjects.

If Gradin’s book is the most detailed in proving the legitimacy of romantic rhetoric, Roskelly and Ronald’s *Reason to Believe: Romanticism, Pragmatism, and the Possibility of Teaching* represents the most rigorous attempt to name the applicability of romantic rhetoric. In their 1998 book, Roskelly and Ronald ask how the history of our thoughts about education connects to teachers:

For most of recent pedagogical history; teachers have not been able to name—and so claim—a philosophy that embraces both idealism and practicalism, individuality and social responsibility, inquiry and faith. To examine the history of romanticism and pragmatism—to put them together as romantic/pragmatic rhetoric—is to recover a history and philosophy that teachers can use to question their own practices and beliefs and to give them theoretical support for the beliefs they continue to hold (3).

Connecting romantic and pragmatic American philosophers, and thinking specifically about Berthoff, Roskelly and Ronald argue that there has been an “almost total dismissal and/or neglect of romantic influences on rhetorical theory and practice even though… what's best about philosophical romanticism is practically essential to any classroom teacher who wants to keep his or her teaching alive year after year” (1-2).
Roskelly and Ronald discuss labels and the myriad of people and researchers who get labeled romantic. Their solution to problematic and stereotypical labels is to create a new term: “to rescue both terms—romantic and pragmatic—from their traditional labels and limiting connotations, we will rename them together in order to look again at their histories and their current incarnations in theory and practice” (25). Their justification for the new term is based on the obscuring of romanticism from over-categorization and study (25). Where Gradin uses the term social-expressivism to “reclaim” romantic rhetorical qualities, Ronald and Roskelly rely on romantic/pragmatic rhetoric. These labels become important in a discussion of categorical confusion: “When teaching and theory organize philosophical history into categories, usually in categories of opposition, hierarchy, or linearity, readers can easily forget the philosophical position that guided the writing” (Roskelly and Ronald 62-63). Is creating new categories from old names the solution, or does this renaming contribute to a misunderstood narrative, further restricting romantic rhetoric from assuming the legacy of a tradition?

Roskelly and Ronald begin to tease out the categories by offering important history on the basis that “romanticism has not dominated and therefore debased rhetoric; moreover, romanticism has never been put into practice systematically in the writing classroom and has never been examined seriously in the history of rhetoric” (37) (though the many contributions to the narrative discussed in this chapter thus far, particularly Bate and Berlin, suggest that romanticism has been studied within the history of rhetoric). Roskelly and Ronald outline the seeds of romanticism in the settlements
of the American Puritans, focusing on the interconnections of pragmatic and romantic rhetoric in the American experience (39-53). Their conclusion is optimistic in suggesting that romantic pragmatists are “engaged in the process of becoming conscious of the connectedness of all human enterprises” (159). This connection requires imagination that leads to sustained, practical actions, showing that romantic (pragmatic) rhetoric is applicable and already valued by the field in the 1990s (Roskelly and Ronald 159). These calls to remember and apply romantic rhetoric to pedagogy are defining moments in the narrative of research.

4.2 Ross Winterowd

The 1990s offer four main full-length books about romantic rhetoric, which is why I call this the golden era of romantic rhetoric research. Gradin’s and Roskelly and Ronald’s books capture fairly similar arguments for the relevancy of romantic rhetoric. *Rhetorical Traditions and British Romantic Literature*, as a collection of essays, is unique in its perspective, but topically, retains similarities. The fourth book, Ross Winterowd’s *The English Department: A Personal and Institutional History* is very different in its approach to romantic rhetoric. Published in 1998 (the same year as *Reason to Believe*), Winterowd wrote an academic memoir of sorts, offering a bridge within divided English departments. Winterowd claims that “Both current-traditionalism and expressivism (vitalism, New Romanticism) resulted from the rationalistic rhetoric of the Enlightenment and Romanticism” (2). Winterowd offers a reinterpretation of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Emerson, Arnold, and I.A. Richards. His language is charged and loaded with personal institutional histories (“my greatest argument with Ann E. Berthoff and other New Romanticists regards the foundational notion that composition is the making of meaning” (9)). He critiques Gradin (14) and his purpose “to argue that Romantic attitudes and values persuade the teaching and study of English and that overt and covert Romantics control the institution”
(16) is rather convoluted. He cites and gives important perspective about Blair, I.A. Richards, Coleridge, Emerson, Shelley, taste, and fancy, when talking about the roots. His epilogue is important in belying his stance and his kairos in speaking to composition-rhetoric at large (203). His book is an outlier in the overall narrative since it both supports and denies romantic rhetoric. He critiques Berthoff and Gradin and his opaque purpose demonstrates the confusing conversations that swirl around the subject of romantic rhetoric (14, 16).

This confusing approach was not new for Winterowd. In 1992, Winterowd wrote “Where is English? In the Garden or the Agora?” which Roskelly and Ronald call a less well articulated and more stereotypical response to the varying definitions, historical and current, of romanticism and rhetoric in our professional conversation. Winterowd argues that composition, and English studies in general are in grave danger because they have followed the path of romanticism rather than of rhetoric… later in his 1994 *Teacher’s Introduction to Composition in the Rhetorical Tradition*, Winterowd not only takes at face value the stereotypical definition of romantic thought, but he uses that definition to demonize it (36).

O’Brien also explains attempts an explanation of Winterowd’s various statements about romantic rhetoric, saying he “in *Composition/Rhetoric: A Synthesis*, sees rhetoric as the unifying theory that can bring the two disciplines together… Ironically, though, Winterowd faults Romantics for creating the division between literary and composition studies” (78). Despite Winterowd’s, at times clearly antagonistic stance towards romantic rhetoric, there are still moments when he contributes...
positively to the narrative in *The English Department* (1998). He seeks to tell the story of how “current-traditionalism and expressivism (vitalism, New Romanticism) resulted from the rationalistic rhetoric of the Enlightenment and Romanticism” (3). He cites Engell and his historic overview is extensive (51). Yet he still comes to the circular conclusion that romanticism has yielded problematic confusion for rhetoric in English departmental history (91). Winterowd’s role in the narrative of romantic rhetoric is quite complex, demonstrating again that the confusion in the narrative bred in the 1960s-1980s grew and bore fruit of contempt and further misunderstanding. Perhaps this is why the same year, 1998, gives the narrative two opposing books about a similar subject: romantic rhetoric. These contrasts, I argue, contribute to romantic rhetoric’s lack of recognition as a sub-field, further limiting students. To understand romantic rhetoric as it is written about in the 1990s requires a deep understanding of expressivism, current-traditional pedagogy, and rhetoric and composition culture, including a knowledge of the networks of scholars’ personal opinions and biases. This nuanced knowledge requirement obstructs the valuable lessons of romantic rhetoric.

### 4.3 Synthesis of Myths, Traps, and Implications

Octalog II, “The (Continuing) Politics of Historiography” (1997) (re)introduced debates about technology, literacies, embodiment, and identity. Linda Ferreria-Buckley writes of her research on Victorian Britain and nineteenth century rhetoric to emphasize that during the time period between 1800-1920, rhetoric was alive and well and to point out that the research strategies needed to be better thought out and taught (95). Janice Lauer warns of a trap that seems to encapsulate the strides made in the 1990s:

> Every year as new doctoral students enter our graduate program, they bring along a collection of names of composition theorists, positioned often as heroes or villains,
collected from histories of the field they have read in previous courses. These names are pinned to categories, particular ideas or theories, seldom viewed as dynamics scholars, whose ideas change and develop. Their static map of the field positions all theorists’ work, no matter the decade, as a historical, contemporaneous and open to the same evaluation…. Missing from their maps are the many voices whose ideas have enriched our field over the years” (“Octalog II”).

Lauer calls for multiple voices, moving beyond labels or thinking that labels are complete analogies (like postmodern), and connecting historiographic principles to stories (99). In the narrative of romantic rhetoric research in the 1990s, the map became a bit static. The names were pinned to categories in defense of theories, expressivism and new-romanticism, that were going out of style. New names for romantic rhetoric tried to sweep in and make a difference. The result is a view of romantic rhetoric that appears defensive rather than comprehensive and rich, able to stay relevant in a new millennium.

As displayed in Figure 4.1, the 1990s represent a decade rich with citations. Veeder, Gradin, Winterowd, Roskelly and Ronald, and Bialostosky and Needham cite authors familiar to this narrative. Elbow is cited more often in the 1990s than Engell is, showing a romantic rhetoric more concerned with questions over the broad category of expressivism than with the enlightenment foundations for romantic rhetoric and imagination. This highlights the most important and pressing trap of the 1990s that limits the continued exigency of romantic rhetoric today: romantic rhetoric was limited by its connection with expressivism.
Though the research that defended expressivism based on the historic precedents found in romantic rhetoric added to the narrative and questioned the ways in which romanticism was undervalued, the connection ultimately linked two fading-from-popularity, dangerous-to-the-legitimacy of the field subcategories of rhetoric together. As I demonstrate through analysis of research conducted about romantic rhetoric from 2000-2019, that link is hard to sever. Recurring research deepens the connection between expressivism and romanticism. While this is a trap in the sense that other viable connections are missed because the research is focused on a specific sub-connection, the writing about expressivism and romantic rhetoric is valuable in that it continually develops the narrative, analyzes the legitimacy and pedagogical value of romantic rhetoric, and shows, again, that there is an element of rhetorical intrigue presented by the time period of romanticism worth reconsidering.

Figure 4.1: 1990s Author Citations Connectivity Graph
4.4 Loops: 2001-2017

In 2001, the second edition of the *Rhetorical Tradition* was published, claiming that romanticism was arhetorical:

The central themes of Romanticism are, as noted previously, fundamentally antirhetorical. Rhetoric was allied with literature and literary criticism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because of the reigning didactic conception of literature… The key terms are solitude, spontaneity, expression of feeling, and imagination--all quite opposed to the rhetorician’s concern for society, planned discourse, communication, and moving the will through reason and passion (Nineteenth-century rhetoric, Introduction, Bizzell and Herzberg *The Rhetorical Tradition* 995).

Whereas Roskelly and Ronald and Biolostosky and Needham call attention to the similar claim published in the 1990 edition, the 2001 statement that romanticism is arhetorical is not the subject of as direct remark in the following research. But more relevant are the ways in which the *Rhetorical Tradition* permeates into instruction as a widely adopted textbook.

The Third Edition of *The Rhetorical Tradition* hints at the textbook’s influence. Traditionally “minor” authors, Gorgias, Thomas Wilson, and Vico were included in the first edition, and now, are “viewed as luminaries of the tradition, alongside the major canonical thinkers, with a significant body of secondary works devoted to their thought” (Bizzell, Herzberg, and Reames iii). The Third Edition, published in 2020, employees broader overall categorizations when organizing history. Rhetoric’s history is divided into a four-part structure (Bizzell, Herzberg, and Reames iv). The “fundamentally antirhetorical” quote in the 2001 edition was edited, and while romanticism is not treated favorably, the introduction to the category “Modern Rhetoric” (and specifically, Nineteenth-Century Britain) is less severe:
Although many eighteenth-century works on rhetoric included treatments of poetry, a contrary notion was beginning to gather strength. In the Romantic view, poetry was not performance but soliloquy… For poetry, utterance is the end, not, as in rhetoric, the means to an end. This view reinforced the Romantic notion of the poet that had been defined by, among others, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who insisted that poetry is not rhetoric at all. (Bizzell, Herzberg, and Reames 845)

The distinction between poetry and Romanticism is an important improvement between the 2001 and 2020 editions. The distinction circumnavigates the trap that romanticism is antirhetorical. However, the reduction of Coleridge to only an insistence that poetry is separate from rhetoric limits appreciation for 1. Coleridge’s views on rhetoric, 2. The contributions of imagination to rhetorical tradition, and 3. The acceptance of romantic rhetoric as an established tradition in the same ways that other sub-genres are accepted.

Bizzell, Herzberg, and Reames acknowledge in their selected bibliography Agnew (2012) and Bialostosky (2012) for their works on the relationship between rhetoric, criticism, and romanticism (853), effectively acknowledging a connection but missing other crucial works on the relationship between rhetoric and romanticism that were published between 1990-2020. Part of their failure to acknowledge other valuable resources on the relationship is attributable to the implication of various traps and myths: romantic rhetoric is limited, between 2000-2020, to introductions. Veeder described Coleridge’s method of composition as one that “circles, spirals, and loops” (“Coleridge” 26). In the years following the golden era of romantic rhetoric publications, the narrative circles back, spirals away from the claims of the 1990s, and seems like a story on loop.
As Y2K fears faded, and the “Dot-Com” bubble burst, the world entered a new millennium. Terrorists attacked the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and a “war on terror” was declared. By 2001, half of Americans used the Internet and the iPod was the best-selling MP3 player. Facebook launched in 2004. Two months after the iPhone was released in 2007, one million phones were sold. In 2008, economic crisis hit in the United States.

Within English studies, job insecurity influenced the field. According to Thomas Miller’s survey of the MLA Job Information list, in 2008 to 2009, the number of jobs decreased by almost fifty percent (viii). Funding was cut from all departments of humanities and tenure-track job listings also dropped. Miller, in 2010, implored his audience to recognize the challenges and changes in American higher education (ix). By 2015, the academic job market remained bleak. Michael Bérubé, in an afterword to essays about graduate education edited by Leonard Cassuto, acknowledged the many challenges and calls for reform that had gone unanswered. Still, despite the title “Abandon all Hope” and the persisting, paradoxical problems facing academics and English departments, Bérubé highlighted areas in which influence and hope still exist. As I write in 2020, the impact of COVID-19 on economics and academia is yet to be fully realized or determined. One trick of history is noting the events future generations will deem worthy of broad timelines.

The studies of history that had sparked fascination in the 1980s and early 1990s were critiqued for who they excluded from the narrative. Octalог III, “the Politics of Historiography in 2010” showed that historiography remained vibrant and contested and that rhetoric and composition “still negotiate[s] multiple and contested understandings of what constitutes the history of rhetoric, how to study it, and rhetoric’s role in forming and promoting the common good” (“Octalог III”). As the introduction states, “we research and teach in political and
economic times that necessitate rethinking our ways of doing, writing, and teaching rhetorical history” (Gaillet 234). Questions about historic research and methodology were raised and answered. *The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies* (2009) offered compelling arguments advocating for further careful research in the history of rhetoric and composition. In the narrative of romantic rhetoric research, from 2010 to present day, publications quietly advance the story. Most of the publications go largely unnoticed and extend research of the 1990s while still making similar general arguments. The standout publication of this era in the story is Byron Hawk’s book *A Counter-History of Composition: Toward Methodologies of Complexity* (2007). Hawks’ attention to the complexity of the eighteenth and nineteenth century opens up discussions of intricacy that impact conversations of historic analysis.

In 2000, *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* published Kathleen O’Brien’s article “Romanticism and Rhetoric: A Question of Audience.” O’Brien looks at how Romantic literary theory answers questions about audience and the balance between private inspiration and social transformation. O’Brien connects the reactions of Coleridge and Keats to expressivist theories. While O’Brien certainly links expressivism (mostly, Elbow) to romanticism and, in this way sounds like the romantic rhetoric researchers from the 1990s (“In expressivism—the current composition movement that most closely resembles Romantic theory—I find the most balanced argument on audience” (O’Brien 80), her writing also moves beyond a defense of expressivism to a more thorough understanding of audience and larger implications within rhetoric. With practical pedagogical examples and in-depth understanding of the various romantic authors, O’Brien’s piece shows the value of studying romantic rhetoric.

Trap: Romanticism = expressivism
Lauer in *Invention in Rhetoric and Composition* (2004), mentions romantic writing in passing, as one of the long-standing debates on the merit of natural ability (linking it together with vitalist teaching) (45). She is not stirring up old debates; instead, she (barely) nods to the role romanticism played in history of rhetoric and composition.

Interest in the complexity of the eighteenth and nineteenth century grew and interest in defending expressivism and romanticism was less of a focal point. Still the articles and books teasing out the complexities of historiography lend to the overall narrative of romantic rhetoric. For example, in 2005, Ben McCorkle’s argument “Harbingers of the Printed Page: Nineteenth-Century Theories of Delivery as Remediation” shows that belletristic and elocutionary movements of eighteenth and nineteenth century rhetoric are not as opposed as historically assumed. McCorkle looks at the cultural mechanisms of remediation in the fast-growing medium of print to make the connection. By offering a different reading of traditions that affect contemporary rhetoric, McCorkle’s discussion on the cyclical effects that rhetoric and technology (and thought) have on one another is one of the most efficiently argued statements about the eighteenth and nineteenth century. McCorkle’s work opens up doors to argue that romanticism and enlightenment, as movements, are not as opposed as is often thought. However, McCorkle questions well-accepted categories of history within a well-established tradition of rhetoric—enlightenment rhetoric. As a result of the implications of the many traps and myths that I detail in this dissertation, works similar to McCorkle’s, but applied to questioning romantic rhetoric’s categories, are less possible because overall, romantic rhetoric is not an accepted or established tradition.
Bringing complexity to another level, Byron Hawk’s book *A Counter-History of Composition: Toward Methodologies of Complexity* (2007) offers an interesting spin to the narrative of romantic rhetoric research. Hawk’s examination of the disciplinary categorization of vitalism and contemporary rhetoric gives a unique perspective to the divide between different theoretical foundations of composition. Hawk shows how vitalism has been historically linked to expressivism and romanticism, and Hawk demonstrates that this connection has not always been the most helpful categorization (he warns well against the dangers of categorization while also recognizing the need for categories of thought). By discussing Berlin’s theories, Hawk establishes an understanding of how rhetoric has viewed romanticism. The subject of this book, vitalism, is Hawk’s link to a discussion of expressivism, psychology, romanticism, and the enlightenment: “These slippery categorical distinctions ultimately generate problems for the field of rhetoric and composition” (28). Hawk offers methodologies that are important to this dissertation, but his work is also worth noting for the ways it lends an initial complication of romantic rhetoric while still focusing, necessarily so for the sake of a *counter-history*, on vitalism.

More directly focused on romantic rhetoric, Lois Agnew’s 2012 book *Thomas De Quincey: British Rhetoric’s Romantic Turn* is relevant to the narrative of research for its definitions of rhetoric and romanticism. The book is part of the “Rhetoric in the Modern Era” series, designed to introduce students to topics within the rhetorical tradition (ii). By looking at romantic author Thomas De Quincey, Agnew argues that De Quincy’s version of rhetoric as a form of intellectual inquiry meets the changing demands of the nineteenth century (15). Agnew
opens her book with the acknowledgement that “most accounts of British rhetorical history end with the 1828 publication of Richard Whately’s *Elements of Rhetoric*” (1). The introduction to the first chapter makes an argument familiar to many arguments I make throughout this narrative of romantic rhetoric research. Agnew devotes pages to demonstrating that rhetorical scholars have ignored or dismissed a wealth of knowledge by failing to acknowledge romanticism and that a handful of scholars (Bialostosky, Needham, Veeder) have tried to justify romanticism’s rhetorical qualities (4).

Agnew examines others who have classified De Quincey as a rhetorician, and notes De Quincey’s exclusion from canonical histories: “Quincey’s ideas… provide a valuable infusion of energy to the discipline—and a reminder that rhetoric’s vitality comes from its capacity to respond to cultural change in ways that are endlessly varied and complex” (145). Agnew presents De Quincey as an example of a figure who resists disciplinary boundaries, in this way like Wordsworth and Gorgias. In a review of the book, Katie Homar states, “Her study, as it introduces rhetoricians to the Romantic era, encourages further exploration of the diverse, innovative ways in which nineteenth-century authors conceived of rhetorical theory and practice” (209). The key word “introduces” shows just how misunderstood romantic rhetoric is within the discipline. Agnew indeed offers a stellar introduction to Thomas De Quincey, but so many of the studies reviewed in this dissertation also introduce rhetoricians to the romantic era.

Without a tradition that recognizes romanticism’s contributions to rhetoric, how can the field move beyond introductions? How can the introductions evolve into in-depth research? And, importantly, what is the danger of introductory remarks like this (see Smith and Homar for

**Implication:** A tradition that recognizes romanticism’s contributions to rhetoric is missing; as such, introductions and invitations to research romantic rhetoric are necessary and (new) depth is limited.
repetitions of introductory remarks)? The nineteenth century continues to be misappropriated, though by 2012 several scholars had painstakingly pointed out the relevance of the nineteenth century (Horner, Gaillet, Johnson, Agnew, *The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies*). But the implication is cyclical, and without the narrative of romantic rhetoric research that showcases the many introductions to the relevancy of romanticism to rhetoric, more introductions flood the shallow banks.

In 2014, the narrative of romantic rhetoric loops again with the publication of the book *Critical Expressivism: Theory and Practice in the Composition Classroom*. Hannah J. Rule’s chapter, “Rereading Romanticism, rereading Expressivism: Revising “voice” through Wordsworth’s Prefaces” describes many of the main characters in this research saga: Fishman, Berlin, Gradin, and Elbow, claiming that “Over time, composition scholars have found both resonance and dissonance with romanticism” (201). Her analysis of Wordsworth supplements much of the other research on Wordsworth’s *Lyrical Ballads*. She also questions categories, complexity, and defends expressivism (as part of the larger book she contributes to): “pedagogies and rhetorics are deemed untenable because they are labeled romantic or expressivist, or romantic-expressivist. This essay works to complicate these alliances” (201).

Rule concludes that rereading romanticism offers another method of understanding voice and language in the expressivist condition. Her argument is reminiscent of earlier arguments as she explains that romanticism and expressivism emphasize physicality rather than inwardness (while still valuing first-person experience: “looking back to romanticism provides another, under-theorized way of considering language that can also disrupt the
expressivism/constructionism binary” (213). Rule’s quote demonstrates the ways in which binaries still, in 2014, form a central theme within romantic rhetoric research.

Several dissertations touch on romantic rhetoric within this period. Ruth Clayman, in 2014, examines Ulmer’s 1984 *Applied Grammatology* in an effort to show how contemporary students of Ulmer’s invention model bridge are situated within American Romanticism and Derridean deconstruction (1). Also in 2014, Marcia Bost wrote a dissertation that traces imagination from Enlightenment pedagogy and argues that a strategy rather than a faculty of Imagination is needed. Bost relies on Coleridge’s four means of knowing as her foundation for Imagination and as a way to describe the ways of knowing in the twenty-first century. Five years later, Paige Arrington’s 2019 dissertation offered a nuanced approach to Ann Berthoff, and as was discussed in Chapter Three, Arrington references the complexity of categorization of rhetoric and composition scholars associated with romantic rhetoric. All three of these dissertations discuss romanticism and rhetoric, and while each demonstrate exemplar research strategies, romantic rhetoric is not the main subject of the arguments.

Romantic rhetoric is the subject of focus in Gretchen Linnea Dietz’s 2016 dissertation (of which Kate Ronald was a reader). Dietz argues that poetics and rhetoric have been separated by accident. Inspired by the pragmatist tradition (Berthoff), Dietz reclaims the romantics (particularly the German romantics) for the purpose of reclaiming style within rhetoric and composition. As such, Dietz’s argument is explicitly for romanticism: “The field is shaped by romantic thinkers to a degree, but I assert that it can and should be even more so. Berthoff’s books draw upon romantic theories and break from traditional research methods and expectations. I seek to do the same” (4). Dietz gives attention to Coleridge, Berthoff, and Gradin (12). Though there is
an overlap in overarching ideas between her dissertation and my own, in the end, Dietz emphasizes style more directly than romantic rhetoric.

As the publication of Critical Expressivism demonstrated, romanticism remained yoked, in many respects, to discussions of expressivism within rhetorical research. As such, Eli Goldblatt’s CCC 2017 article, “Don’t Call it Expressivism: Legacies of a ‘Tacit Tradition’” is relevant to a discussion of romantic rhetoric. Goldblatt traces the ways in which “expression” is woven into scholarly traditions and pedagogy in a way that eloquently speaks to the cultural moment of 2017:

When we focus so much on professional and theoretical understandings of writing instruction—especially in the context of higher education budget cuts, larger class sizes, and more calls for standardized quantitative assessments—we can forget the importance of two impulses that compel writers: the desire to speak out of your most intimate experiences and to connect with communities in need. These desires seem quaint and inessential at a moment when politicians and parents clamor for the young to be as competitive as possible on the job market (442).

Goldblatt argues that recognizing expressivism’s method of understanding will strengthen the core of the discipline against daunting challenges in America at large and within the global literacy scene (442).

Goldblatt grapples with the same complexity of audience that has long existed in the complicated history of romantic rhetoric, calling it “the persistent underlying paradox of composition/rhetoric” (443). Writers compose alone but within spaces that are charged by publics (443). About categorization, Goldblatt recognizes the divisions that have been carried from the late 1980s through lore “as though they still have explanatory force” (444). Goldblatt
boldly states that the divisions and lingering value judgements “do us very little good today, particularly if they leave us with a hesitance to embrace fully the critical insights of past scholars and theorists” (Goldblatt 444). Apart from his references to others citing romanticism, Goldblatt’s article is not at all about romantic rhetoric. But in the same way his analysis shows that expressivism is woven into the core of contemporary rhetoric and composition, romantic rhetoric is woven into the foundations. Goldblatt’s argument demonstrates that a conversation about romantic rhetoric is relevant because the topics of conversation within the field that have long inspired dialogue about the tenants central to romantic rhetoric remain ongoing.

4.5 More Introductions and Invitations

Other articles and books also confirm the relevancy of a narrative of romantic rhetoric research. In 2018, Craig R. Smith’s book, *Romanticism, Rhetoric and the Search for the Sublime: A Neo-Romantic Theory for Our Time*, connects the Enlightenment, romanticism, rhetoric, and environmental movements (building on the ideas in his 2016 journal article “Constructing a Neo-Romantic Rhetorical Theory”). Craig R. Smith is an interesting figure in this romantic rhetoric narrative. In addition to university teaching, Smith served as a full-time speechwriter for President Gerald Ford and as a consulting writer to George H. W. Bush. Smith retired from his job as full Professor at California State University in 2015; Cambridge Scholars Publishing published this book on romanticism, rhetoric, and the sublime in 2018. This context is important; as Smith argues for the teaching of rhetoric, he admits that in an era of fake news and alternate facts, he has been witness to “the rise and the fall of the quality of public address” (x).

As might be expected, Smith’s book is more political than many of the other works in this narrative of research about romantic rhetoric; his aim is turned toward a crisis of preserving the environment: “Again, those who favor the use of reason and science, which we can trace to
the Enlightenment, are often correct in their assessments and criticisms, but they often fail to convince their audiences… to overcome this problem, a movement has grown out of studies of the Romantic Era that aims to provide a remedy – retrieving Romantic theory for use in our own time, particularly with regard to saving the environment” (xi).

While in the 2018 book, Smith focuses on the historic roots of romanticism, in his 2016 article, Smith more clearly articulates his concept of a Neo-romantic theory (Lepp 173). His Neo-Romantic theory is built on analysis of Thomas De Quincey and Hugh Blair and consists of an aesthetic lens that achieves “the sublime built on the Romantic themes of nature, nationalism, and narrative” (221). Very much a product of 2016’s context, Smith calls for Neo-Romantic theory based on emerging research about affect theory. Like Engell, Smith does not write from a background or to an audience in rhetoric and composition, a fact that is important as the two cite scholars unfamiliar to this narrative who arrive at similar solutions to those in rhetoric and composition. Unlike Engell, Smith discusses rhetoric explicitly. For example, Smith states, “Starting with Herbert Wichelns, rhetorical criticism focused on rhetoric’s instrumentality in order to distinguish rhetorical from literary criticism… thus, rhetorical criticism has mainly focused on the achievement of ends, often political, as opposed to the aesthetic achievement of the sublime” (221).

While I focus this dissertation and narrative of romantic rhetoric research from a background and to an audience of rhetoric and composition scholarship, I note that Engell and Smith arrive at similar conclusions and offer underappreciated contributions to the narrative. Smith references Kenneth Burke, Isaiah Berlin, Agnew, De Man, and Veeder: key figures in this narrative. His historic and rhetorical overview included in the article and book is impressive. Yet because romantic rhetoric is not a well-established organizing tradition within rhetoric and
composition, rhetorical works such as Smith’s find little cross-over and acceptance within the field.

Furthermore, Smith’s preface justifies the importance of *this* dissertation: “While many have examined the Romantic Era and its artists, few have examined its rhetorical theory, and none to my knowledge has called for Neo-Romantic theory strengthened by contemporary rhetorical theories that would support it. In fact, some who have analyzed the Romantic Era argued that it terminated rhetorical theory” (ix). Smith is not the first to suggest a gap in the research that, in fact, does not fully exist, as demonstrated by the fifty (give or take, and depending on classification) works about romantic rhetoric analyzed in this dissertation. Still, I cannot fault Smith for identifying the gap because, despite the large amount of research, categorical confusion, multiple perspectives, and complexity of stances make the romantic rhetoric research difficult to identify and define.

Smith, like many others in this narrative, focuses on Edmund Burke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and David Hume (their reactions to the Enlightenment), Percy Shelley (rhetorical discourse to protect the environment and change government), traces of Wordsworth and Coleridge, and Hugh Blair and Thomas de Quincey (relevancy of their theories in contemporary times). This leads to Smith’s thesis:

In addition to supporting the thesis that rhetoric was alive and well in the Romantic Era, this book, with its emphasis on rhetorical as opposed to literary theory, hopes to contribute to the Green Romantic Movement by creating a Neo-Romantic theory that
synthesizes Romantic rhetorical theory with more contemporary rhetorical theories that expand and make rhetoric more potent in our own time (x).

Smith is mindful of the ways his Neo-Romantic theory stirs civic engagement in the twenty-first century, arguing that three of the most prominent elements of Romanticism include nature (including beauty and the sublime), nationalism, and narrative (3, 5). Smith connects the Enlightenment to romanticism in order to identify the bridge figures and, ultimately, to offer a “better understanding of the development of the Romantic era” in order to add another means of persuasion to the current rhetorical arsenal (5).

Similarly, Homar examines Hazlitt to display the value Hazlitt offers to the rhetorical arsenal. In a *Rhetoric Review* article published in 2019, Katie Homar examines William Hazlitt’s “attention to the complex interplay of aesthetics and politics in his criticism” because it “deepens our understanding of ‘romantic’ rhetoric as reflexive and politically engaged” (119). Homar argues that Hazlitt’s “critical co-opting of classical practices” categorize him as a modern rhetor and critic “whose performances not only enrich our understanding of rhetoric’s early nineteenth century histories but also help us to reconceptualize the implications of ‘romantic’ rhetorical criticism and practice for today” (120). After impressive overview of the education system and Hazlitt’s context, Homar concludes that considering Hazlitt as “a rhetorical critic of an age in flux” deepens the ideas about ideological discourse and the complex interplay between “how individual rhetors’ choices are enabled or constrained by systemic, institutional forces; or the damaging or liberating consequences of rhetorical pedagogies and practices on a society” (130). Homar claims that examination of Hazlitt invites “deeper, further investigation of this
period’s impact on our contemporary rhetorical theories, criticism, and pedagogies” (130). And so, this long, looping narrative of romantic rhetoric research concludes with an invitation to better and more deeply examine the works of the nineteenth century.

4.6 Synthesis of Myths, Traps, and Implications

Even this dissertation is, in many ways, necessarily an introduction because, despite these many justifications for the validity of romantic rhetoric, there is no clear consensus on what romantic rhetoric is. A consistent citing of the “key figures” is absent, as is demonstrated by Figures 4.2 and 4.3.

Figure 4.2: 2000s Author Connectivity Chart
These webs show that many of these authors have been cited, but the citations are irregular. As demonstrated by the 2000s Connectivity Graph, Hawk exemplarily cites approximately twenty of the same main scholars I have analyzed in this dissertation, justifying a key legacy of romantic rhetoric scholarship (though, as summarized when discussing Hawk, his thesis in presenting a counter-history and justifying vitalism is different from my goal to show the relevancy of romanticism to rhetoric).

The 2010s Connectivity Graph includes the least number of circular references out of all the decades connectivity graphs except for the connectivity graph before 1970. The lack of connected citations in the 2010s is not for lack of availability of resources. On the contrary, the Internet made journal articles easier to access. The lack of connectivity in citations is also not attributable to the lack of overall interest or publication in sources about romantic rhetoric, as evidenced by the publications in *Rhetoric Review*, Southern Illinois University Press, and the *Western Journal of Communication*. Instead, I believe the overall infrequency in number of
citations is attributable to the longstanding myths, traps, and implications I have identified by telling of the narrative of romantic rhetoric research; the lack of connections further justifies this long introduction approach.

Were someone to re-collect their own narrative of romantic rhetoric research, they might include a different selection of citations, making their webs of author connectivity different. There were dissertations that I did not have access to (like Weidner’s dissertation and Jean Flanigan Johnson’s 1992 dissertation “The Romantic Legacy: Genius and Authorial Power in Modern Composition Theory” (cited in Winterowd the English Department 52). There are many other books about Coleridge and imagination that I chose not to include in my narrative (like the 2001 book edited by Christine Gallant, Coleridge’s Theory of Imagination Today) because I believe their focus was more centered on Coleridge rather than romantic rhetoric. I have set out to introduce and re-collect, and in doing so, inquire about myths, traps, and implications about romantic rhetoric. Even what I did not, or could not, include serves to further demonstrate the implication that without a tradition recognizing romanticism’s contributions to rhetoric, introductions remain necessary. As I argue in the next chapter, with this introduction made, doors to further research into romantic rhetoric (that do look intently at dissertations or at Coleridge’s/imagination’s role within romantic rhetoric, for example) are opened.

Implication: A tradition that recognizes romanticism’s contributions to rhetoric is missing; as such, introductions and invitations to research romantic rhetoric are necessary and (new) depth is limited.
5 MYTHS, TRAPS, IMPLICATIONS, AND HOPE

Through telling the narrative of romantic rhetoric research, I have revealed myths, traps, and implications that emerge repetitively between 1934 and 2019. The main trap, that romanticism is antirhetorical, summarizes many other myths and traps. The trap that romanticism is antirhetorical is, at the same time, perpetuated by the many other myths and traps. While I have discussed the myths and traps individually and in context of the timeline, in Chapter Five, I synthesize and draw connections between the years of research.

To summarize and re-introduce my terms, I have used the word “myth” to identify the complex intermingling of fact and falsehood within the narrative of romantic rhetoric. “Trap” language has allowed me to identify reasons why the field has missed opportunities related to romantic rhetoric. I discuss implications for the field in light of the myths and traps.

In this chapter, I show the utility of romantic rhetoric, especially in terms of how the myths and traps have been overcome. Fittingly for the conclusion of a dissertation about romantic rhetoric, the focus is on the subject of romantic rhetoric and the possibilities present if romantic rhetoric were considered an organizing tradition within rhetoric and composition. But as I have shown throughout this dissertation, the method of understanding romantic rhetoric research in terms of the myths and traps that have characterized the subject also holds great potential. As I alluded to in the first chapter “romantic rhetoric” is, in some ways, a case study in historic analysis. As such, in this conclusion, I also emphasize the exigency of the narrative approach that utilizes myth and trap language.

Myths and traps have been discussed within romantic rhetoric’s history, though not by this label. Gradin, for example, emphasizes caricatures (9). As I have demonstrated, several scholars discuss the limitations of the idea that romanticism is antirhetorical. Calling these
limitations and fallacies by the names myth and traps help create new understanding. As I referenced when introducing the term myth in Chapter One, the literacy myth has proven helpful in New Literacy Studies. While building on the same concepts that make literacy myth language helpful, the terms “myth” and “trap” allowed me to draw connections and make arguments.

“Myth” allowed me to talk about the complex beliefs and values associated with asking a subject, romantic rhetoric, to be or do too much. Myths helped me find the balance between truths and exaggerations. I used the term “trap” to capture inconsistencies and incorrect interpretations, like the trap that “romanticism is antirhetorical.” This “trap” language helped me focus on the data rather than the authors making the claims. And both myths and traps, independently and together, lead to implications about romantic rhetoric. This schema has potential in recollecting other misremembered and complicated eras within both the long history of rhetoric and the relatively short history of contemporary rhetoric and composition studies.

In the beginning of this chapter, I review the myths, traps, and implications in three different groupings: those related to definition, those related to the authors and researchers, and those related to categorical confusion. This sets up a discussion of next steps, answering the question of what is to be done with romantic rhetoric. I return to a definition of “romantic rhetoric,” as promised in Chapter One. I also list new possibilities for research and I suggest methods for and demonstrate the benefits of teaching and making the narrative of romantic rhetoric more widely appreciated within rhetoric and composition. The application of romantic rhetoric is supported by a summary of conversations with nine of the key figures that have contributed to romantic rhetoric’s recent research.
5.1 Definition Myths, Traps, and Implications

From the early stages of romantic rhetoric research (Lovejoy’s definition and I.A. Richard’s analysis) two myths have driven the story, and both myths result in romanticism losing value in overall rhetorical history. One myth arrives at the devaluation because “romanticism,” as a subject, has been subject to too much study and analysis. Similarly, the other myth suggests that the word “romanticism” has lost its value as a signifier. These myths are not specific to romantic rhetoric’s narrative. As I identified in Chapter One, the same myths apply to the term “rhetoric” at large and even to the word “myth.” These myths related to definition contribute to romanticism’s lost value within rhetorical history, primary romantic work’s exclusion from the canons of rhetorical history, and the need for a recollection of romantic rhetoric research.

Related to these definition myths is a specific trap about the time period of romanticism. In Chapter Three (when discussing current-traditional rhetoric), I identified the trap that associating romanticism with elitism and lack-of-invention allows for the dismissal of romanticism’s rhetorical contributions. I include this in a discussion of “definition” myths because the lack-of sound definitions helps romantic rhetoric remain misunderstood. A narrow view of the nineteenth century bleeds into confusion surrounding romantic rhetoric’s definition. When the category falls into the trap of being antirhetorical, and it is believed to be over-studied and over-used to the point that the word defies definition, then the time period’s rhetorical benefits are harder to highlight at large, especially in light of lingering, established perceptions of the nineteenth century.

The implication, then, cyclically feeds the myths and traps: romantic rhetoric remains difficult to define. This, of course, fuels other myths and traps not explicitly about definition (researcher traps, why would researchers want to entangle with an unpopular category;
categorical implications, because a definition is missing, the field is limited to introductions). This affects students directly in that a definable, important sub-field is not defined and is missing from our tradition.

The myths, traps, and implications related to the definition of romantic rhetoric beg questions related to my definitions of myths, traps, and implications. Who has benefitted from the myth that romantic rhetoric is undefinable? What ideologies about rhetoric, students, and education underline the myth of definition? These definition myths are related and linked to the nuances of the trap that romanticism values independent elitism, answering the question about ideologies underlying rhetoric. Rhetoric is celebrated as an audience centered, democratizing use of language. Rhetoric, as a field, has relied on defining itself apart from characteristics of romanticism. Given the implications of these connected myths and traps related to the murky definition of romantic rhetoric, I set a new trap in suggesting that rhetoric consider the potential of romanticism as a definable, subfield. Through setting this “trap,” I hope to capture new possibilities.

I am hopeful in the possibilities, and I believe they outweigh the negative consequence of complicating the overall definition of rhetoric, because throughout the narrative, I have identified the resiliency of scholarship. Several examples display persistence of study, despite the difficult-to-define nature of romantic rhetoric. Roskelly and Ronald show the relevancy of the term “romantic” (and pragmatic) for pedagogy (1-2). Lovejoy examines the various definitions of romanticism, despite his complaint that it has lost its value as a signifier, and as I demonstrate in the connectivity webs throughout this dissertation, Lovejoy’s research remains well cited throughout the decades of romantic rhetoric research (232). The number of publications (see the timeline and the webs) also are evidence of interest in romantic rhetoric.
While some of this persistence of research is attributable specifically to romantic rhetoric, other shifts that take the power away from these definition myths emerge from the contextual developments within rhetoric and composition. In The Present State of Scholarship in the History of Rhetoric (2010), Gaillet shows that interest and acceptance of rhetorical excellence of the nineteenth century was more commonplace even in the 1990s (153). Greater acceptance of the nineteenth century, as well as continued curiosity, show the resiliency of romantic rhetoric to exist despite definition myths that might otherwise write it out of the story. Still, I believe wider recognition of romantic rhetoric could only benefit students, draw greater attention to the excellent studies that have investigated romantic rhetoric, and expand rhetoric and composition’s historical canon by giving greater positive attention to the rhetorical contributions of the nineteenth century.

5.2 Author Myths, Traps, and Implications

Similar to the definition myths, traps, and implications, complications in the narrative exist based on those who study, research, and write. These “author” myth, traps, and implications occur on two levels within the narrative of romantic rhetoric; in the primary and secondary sources, confusion exists. The traps are two-fold. Because the romantic rhetors, and the later romantic rhetoric researchers, were so detailed, prolific, and interested in a wide variety theories, they can be interpreted in ways that are convenient. At the same time, because the romantic poets and later theorists were so distinct from each other, they cannot all be classified in the same category. These two traps are similar in nature to the myths about the definition. They represent two sides of the same coin, a coin that buys a misunderstanding of romantic rhetoric.

The author myth extends to those who are assumed to be against romantic rhetoric, and the myth is one of blame and villainization: researchers against romanticism establish a tradition
that dismisses romantic rhetoric. Again, this is not unique to the story of romantic rhetoric. As Gradin said, categorization and trends of departmentalization led several authors to be pigeonholed and characterized as a villain or a hero (14). In this line of reasoning, then, the myth is directly linked to the trap that authors are interpreted in ways that are convenient. The trap that blames authors who are “against” romantic rhetoric for the missing tradition is dangerous in that it fails to see context, it discounts research that supports romantic rhetoric, and it feeds sensationalized great-divide debates whereas, generally, there is cohesion rather than divide. For example, the three main pedagogies that I highlight in the narrative of romantic rhetoric research include Gradin’s social-expressivism, Roskelly and Ronald’s romantic-pragmatic teaching philosophy, and Roeder and Gatto’s critical-expressivism. These three pedagogies blend theories that seem to oppose one another, in much the same ways that authors who seemingly discount romantic rhetoric seem to oppose the subject. The connections between seemingly disparate pedagogical models represent the resiliency of romantic rhetoric, the value of a blend of approaches, and contextual assessment that debunks great-divide myths.

The implication of these myths and traps related to the researchers is, again, cyclical. A tradition that recognizes romanticism’s contributions to rhetoric is missing; as such, thinkers get mis-categorized. The reason for the missing tradition is more complex than the few authors who have been quoted repeatedly for their diminishments of romanticism’s rhetorical qualities; the synthesis of all of these myths and traps shows how a sub-field has been slighted. Future research is limited and misunderstood because new thinkers and writers, as they write about romantic rhetoric, are liable to be sorted by the same traps: used in a way that is convenient or not classified into an appropriate field of study because their writings are distinct and prolific. Cohesion and research that examines the full repertoire of a scholar, whatever century that
scholar wrote in, is limited and thus, a tradition that accepts and understands romantic rhetoric is also limited.

Again, these myths and traps are complex and not independent of other forces. Historically, the field (and academia at large) has benefitted from the myth that someone who disagrees with some claim is a villain to the research. We set up compelling arguments by discounting the research of others. Pressures to contribute new research necessitate arguments that there is something lacking about previous research. This connects the author traps to the author myths. In producing new research, categorical divisions encourage and make possible the sorting and convenient use of authors. Authors, historic and more contemporary, who write very clearly on a very specific subject are easier to agree and disagree with when contributing new research to the field. The trap then, relies on a belief in the myth that depends on easy “hero”/“villain” sorting of scholarship. As I have said throughout this dissertation, I am liable to fall into and perpetuate this deeply ingrained trap related to authors. I try to present a unique and new approach to rhetoric and composition’s view of the eighteenth and nineteenth century given an analysis of scholars in the twentieth and twenty-first century. I often benefit from the very myth I try to debunk. My characterization and categorization of authors might not always be perfectly in line with their original intentions. Lest I become cynical, research is a good and necessary thing. Romantic scholars felt a need to add to the conversation, to see and use language differently, and to create “new research,” and I argue that our repertoire of scholarship has benefitted from their stance. The synthesis of myths, traps, and implications related to authors—given the deep-set ideologies and need for scholarship—is directly related to myths and traps connected to categorical confusion.
5.3 Category Myths, Traps, and Implications

Most persistent throughout this dissertation have been myths, traps, and implications related to categorical confusion. Categorical confusion exists in the narrative when examining the difference between the enlightenment and romanticism, between imagination and invention, and between contemporary pedagogical schools of thought.

From Chapter One, the pendulum myth that in responding to the enlightenment, romanticism is “radically opposed” to the rhetorically rich enlightenment has provided complications for the narrative of romantic rhetoric research. Similarly, and lingering from the pendulum myth, is the myth that imagination and invention are mutually exclusive. This myth feeds pedagogical valuing. The association of romantic rhetoric with expressivism also represents a trap related to categories. This trap is related to the researcher myths. In the 1980s and 1990s, romanticism is so often connected with expressivism that the two fields, in many ways, become categorically merged. As such, highlighting romantic rhetoric’s exigency and usefulness for the field, beyond expressivism, takes extra work.

Unpacking these myths represent research possibilities. Another study explicitly examining one of these myths (or even part of the myth, for example, Vico’s similarities to Coleridge as part of unpacking the myth that the Enlightenment thinkers are different from Romanticism thinkers) would add to rhetoric and composition’s understanding of the nineteenth century. Because I examine these myths as they relate specifically to the narrative of romantic rhetoric, I am able to discuss the related, overall, myths and traps.

The myth that categories are mutually exclusive quickly gives rise to the trap that categories represent hierarchies. Defenses muddy the waters of romantic rhetoric research as authors defend romanticism as more valuable than the enlightenment (Isaiah Berlin), champion
imagination instead of or apart from invention (critiques against Berthoff), or link expressivism to romanticism in order to demonstrate historic roots and, thus, hold on to a fading pedagogical category (that never fully fades, as demonstrated by Rule and Goldblatt).

The implication of categorical confusions is that, again, a tradition that recognizes romanticism’s contributions to rhetoric is missing. As such, introductions and invitations to research romantic rhetoric are necessary and (new) depth is limited. Who benefits most from the myth that categories are mutually exclusive? Similar to the need for new research that creates author myths, categories allow for quick understanding, helpful association, and publication opportunities. The trap that categories represent hierarchies captures publications that fulfill categorical assumptions. Publications that contribute to an author’s (and publisher’s) helpful associations and allow for quick understanding for students new to a subject are desirable. This system of learning is, once again, not the villain. I partake in the ideologies of the system as I make this claim, hoping to be well-categorized and hoping for my research to be well-received. Though I think these underlying ideologies and traps about categorical exclusivity have often limited the field, through my application of critical imagination, I have displayed the rhetoric of hope present throughout the narrative; the narrative is full of examples of scholars researching despite the myths and traps. Over fifty articles and books have been published about romantic rhetoric, a murky category. While I hope my questions about hierarchies and exclusivity of categories captures new possibility for depth, I happily note that the publication and scholarly advancement ideologies limiting romantic rhetoric have also built the system which has produced these publications championing romantic rhetoric.
5.4 Trap: Romanticism is Antirhetorical and a Return to Definitions

The trap that romanticism is antirhetorical merits focused attention. Throughout the narrative of romantic rhetoric, this trap is repeated and defended against most often. Like many other myths and implications, this trap is cyclical in that it relates to several of the other traps (categorical defenses rely on the trap that romanticism is antirhetorical, introductions to new research about romantic rhetoric consistently mention the trap, and the definition of romantic rhetoric is further complicated and limited by the idea that romanticism is antirhetorical). Furthermore, this trap is built on a foundation of other traps and myths. The idea that researchers are against romantic rhetoric, the idea that the enlightenment is superior within rhetorical history, and the idea that imagination is of less rhetorical value all fuel the trap that romanticism is antirhetorical. The same ideologies that drive the author and categorical traps allow for a system that quickly writes romanticism off as antirhetorical. But as the majority of studies I have cited in this dissertation demonstrate, the rhetorical relevancy of romanticism is present, historically viable, and worthy of consideration because of the ways it continues to impact pedagogy.

The narrative of romantic rhetoric research, told from 1934 to 2019, does not offer a consistent definition of romantic rhetoric. Thus, having told the narrative, I return to the stipulative definition of romantic rhetoric that I offered in Chapter One and demonstrate how, having reviewed the research, the definition is subtly supported by almost a century of research. Romantic rhetoric captures the art and science of considering the available means of persuasion that particularly relies on the emotional and imaginative theories of composition lent by scholars from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Building upon enlightenment theories, romantic authors continue to develop theories that fit well with contemporary composition
pedagogy, as evidenced by studies of Coleridge, Emerson, Wordsworth, Hazlitt, De Quincey, and others conducted by Richards, Gradin, Winterowd, Agnew, Homar and others. The narrative of romantic rhetoric research shows how, contextually, myths and traps have yielded cyclical implications. These implications beg the question: what is to be done with romantic rhetoric? What does it look like for the field to make space for rhetoric that is, in some ways, romantic?

5.5 Future Studies

Having established the relevancy of romantic rhetoric, I lay the foundation for future studies. As I have already alluded to, specific and detailed analysis of the categorical dispute between the enlightenment and romantic rhetoric and imagination and invention is warranted and would add to the richness of research that shows the complexity of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, specifically within rhetoric and composition. Many of the studies reviewed in the narrative, like Crowley’s “Invention in Nineteenth-Century Rhetoric,” would benefit from renewed interest that considers imagination’s historic relevancy, and studies like Engell’s the Creative Imagination would benefit from review that considers rhetoric’s relevancy to romanticism.

Demonstrating the cohesion between the enlightenment and romanticism would also further the research that I have presented in this dissertation. For example, even an overview of the scholars that Bizzell and Herzberg (and Reames) include in the 2001 and 2020 editions of the Rhetorical Tradition shows the cohesion between the Enlightenment and Romanticism (page numbers from the 2001 edition). John Locke (as referenced by so many of the romantic authors and keynote scholars), believes that knowledge of the “real external world” can only be achieved if we “understand the processes by which we come to such knowledge” (814). Those processes include “relating our ideas to one another, forming mental associations and examining the mental
processes of which we are aware” (814). This forms a foundation for imagination. Like Locke, David Hume argued that genuine knowledge can only come from “sense impressions and our mental operations upon them” (828). For Hume, imagination is a tool of reconciliation and a sense maker of impressions and ideas; for Giambattista Vico, imagination is a faculty that can be constrained, is linked to common sense, and allows understanding of the fleeting relations that happen through metaphor (862).

Even Mary Astell’s use of the term “imagination,” and more broadly, in her understandings that later become linked with imagination, show that roots for romanticism emerge in the enlightenment (845). Thomas Sheridan’s emphasis on symbols and communicating with clarity are vehicles in which emotions can be expressed (887). George Campbell writes about sympathy: “so much more powerfully do the qualities of the heart attach us, than those of the head” (937). In discussing taste, Hugh Blair references nature and imagination (957, 967). Even in “Part V: Nineteenth-Century Rhetoric,” of the Rhetorical Tradition (2001 edition) Richard Whately and Alexander Bain are classified with the Enlightenment thinkers but, when read with a lens of romantic rhetoric, also reveal cohesion between enlightenment and romantic ideals. Further analysis of archives would only enhance the argument.

Furthermore, the addition of excerpts from William Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads, Ralph Waldo Emerson’s Essays (Intellect, Art), Samuel Johnson’s Rambler and Preface to Shakespeare, Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Logic and Biographia Literaria, and Percy Bysshe Shelley’s A Defense of Poetry to the rhetorical history canon would enhance our understanding of rhetoric and composition. This anthologizing of romantic rhetors would be helpful because, despite Engell’s work, so many of the subsequent articles and books about romantic rhetoric, in
order to prove a point, disconnect romanticism from enlightenment theories (see discussion on Willinsky). In doing so, there seems to be a general misunderstanding of romantic rhetoric; in this misunderstanding, implications reach wide across the field. In 1965, Isaiah Berlin declared, “therefore, we are children of both worlds” (141). Considering the implications of being children of a cohesive enlightenment and romantic rhetoric allows for better understanding and justification of the historical analysis. This, in turn, leads to a more balanced teaching of rhetorical history.

Both studies demonstrating the cohesion between enlightenment and romantic categories and romantic rhetoric as a whole enable research that can expand upon the fields related to rhetoric and composition at which this foundation glances. I briefly highlighted romantic rhetoric’s intersection with New Literacy Studies (studying, among others, Willinsky, Russell, and Harker and with my introductory mentions of the literacy myth). Further research might interrogate the overlap and question how a fuller understanding of romantic rhetoric enables new inquiry specifically related to New Literacy. What are the romantic roots for the literacy narrative? How was literacy viewed during the nineteenth century as romantic novels emerged and increased in widespread popularity? Given a foundation that shows the relevancy of romantic rhetoric, questions like these can be answered and the narrative of romantic rhetoric might see new depth. These studies also have the potential to help further the field of literacy studies and, again, directly help students.

Rhetorical feminist research represents another field that the narrative of romantic rhetoric touches. I have given a brief overview of the connections between romantic rhetoric and rhetorical feminism (referencing and building upon Gradin; Roskelly and Ronald). As I have grappled with “disrupted history” and “re-collecting” through analysis of romantic rhetoric, I
have offered a very baseline inquiry to the connections between feminist studies and romantic rhetoric. Gradin, in much more detail, theorizes that romantic rhetoric has been discounted because it emphasizes pursuits usually tagged as “feminist” (13). Future studies could counter or support the feminist reasonings behind romantic rhetoric’s disrupted history. With twenty-five years of excellent feminist studies scholarship that has emerged since Gradin’s thoughts connecting romantic rhetoric and feminism, and given this foundation showing the ongoing relevancy of romantic rhetoric, the time is ripe for renewed analysis. Examining the pedagogical application of feminist pedagogies, as compared to romantic or neo-romantic pedagogies, within composition has the potential to highlight historic roots of best teaching practices and, thus, further develop the rationale that leads to the best methods for contemporary teaching.

Other pedagogical inquiries are also relevant. Opportunities, disconnected and connected to expressivism, open possibilities to further investigate the narrative of romantic rhetoric’s intersections with teaching practices. As pedagogies shift and respond to cultural contexts, we stand at a unique moment when incoming instructors learn a variety of methodologies with which to apply teaching principles (rather than three or four pedagogies that originally sparked debates that eventually discounted/defended expressivism and romanticism) (Tate, Taggart, Shick, and Hessler). The field is more open to seeing the value in multiple theories of thought. Still, terms such as neo-expressivism and neo-romanticism impact pedagogy. The 2015 publication *Critical Expressivism: Theory and Practice in the Composition Classroom* displays the current landscape of composition and addresses the praxis of “new expressionism” (Roeder and Gatto). Broadly, and like Rule does in *Critical Expressivism*, further understandings of the distant and recent historical undercurrents of contemporary pedagogies is made richer with an established base understanding of romantic rhetoric.
Another pedagogical implication of a broader understanding of romantic rhetoric informs ecological pedagogies. Central to romanticism (and enlightenment rhetoric) was a fascination with and valuing of nature and a community dependence in which writers learned from and participated in the “research” of others. Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s collaboration gives insight into this, and these aspects applied together interact well with a conversation about writing with influences and contributing to conversations within complex systems. Smith’s book demonstrates the powerful ecological metaphors we glean from romantic rhetoric.

A more direct implication of an understanding of romantic rhetoric might suggest enlightened understanding of the mental health of college students. Emerging from a time period of significant psychological research/change in psychological perceptions subsequent with explosions of technological acceleration and growth that parallels, in many ways, the shift that occurred between the labels “enlightenment” and “romantic,” we can observe romantic rhetoric strategies for writing instruction with interest, avoiding presentism without ignoring historical moments that are similar to our own. Research about romantic rhetoric negotiates the complexity of audience. A pedagogy that builds on emerging theories from romantic rhetoric, with an awareness of emotion and vulnerability associated with writing, can potentially help students better navigate the blurring line between private and public audiences for healthy processing and disclosing of written words (Geil).

Teaching the misappropriation of romantic rhetoric recognizes that any subject or time period, reviewed in isolation, discounts the historic process. We must again provide historical contexts. The theories presented by and about romantic rhetoric speak to larger movements within rhetoric and composition. Analysis of these theories and analysis of the kairos and reception of the works explicitly about romantic rhetoric have the potential to enlighten the field.
While the anthologizing of romantic authors is an important first step in moving away from the trap that says romanticism is antirhetorical, engaging in discussions in a classroom setting is an excellent way to complicate the history of rhetoric while also teaching several other important lessons.

5.6 A Course in Romantic Rhetoric

This teaching of romantic rhetoric is central to understanding the significance of the myths, traps and implications. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, the most pressing implication of a missing sub-field of romantic rhetoric is that students miss opportunities. Given this implication, I argue that teaching a course about romantic rhetoric has the potential to give a more complete view of the historical arch of rhetoric in order to achieve greater awareness of current implications for the field. I have included a sample syllabus for this course in Appendix A, but within this section, I detail the possibilities and rationale for teaching a course that focuses on romantic rhetoric (ideally, a graduate level seminar, though I explain variations and give an altered schedule in Appendix A1).

As I wrote in the introduction, I first came to awareness of romantic rhetoric through study of Vico in an 18th and 19th Century rhetoric course (taught by Michael Harker) at Georgia State University. This course fit into a traditional history sequence developed by Lynée Gaillet, Elizabeth Lopez, and George Pullman. My analysis and interpretation of the narrative of research about romantic rhetoric is uniquely indebted to this course on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the curriculum design of the rhetoric and composition program at Georgia State. Gaillet, Lopez, and Pullman have intentionally made the history of rhetoric a priority. Rather than focusing only on classical history, important attention is applied to the broader scope of written rhetoric. The diverse representation of students at Georgia State, the emphasis on
practical pedagogy, the direct opportunities for applications in teaching experience, and the historic sequence have all shaped my positionality. I could not have made the claims I have made throughout this dissertation without this wide lensed background. The overview of the centuries prizes contextualization and inspires me to see the possibility I describe for a course on romantic rhetoric. I see this course as a potential extension of the wonderful sequence of history courses that already exists at Georgia State.

While a course on romantic rhetoric necessarily prioritizes primary sources, students in this course could also have the opportunity to read contemporary arguments that support, deny, and manipulate romantic rhetoric’s influence. Selected eighteenth and nineteenth century readings pair in teaching students methods of analysis and offer a robust picture of these centuries that have shaped current teaching and writing practices.

While specifically analyzing romantic rhetoric and the cohesion and uniqueness of the writings from the early 1800s, a course about romantic rhetoric is valuable in its ability to also teach students research skills, pedagogical applications, and lessons in academic writing. In terms of research methodology, a course on romantic rhetoric could be as interdisciplinary as the instructor desires. The course could teach history through lessons in feminist rhetorical research, archival research fundamentals, art history, or more direct historic analysis. For those interested in expanding the feminist research connections, Donna Dickerson’s *Women in the Nineteenth Century* could be offered to students as they develop projects. Archival research could be applied to the lesser-known works of romantic rhetoric, primary sources from the nineteenth century (Coleridge’s letters could be an excellent starting point; his marginalia and dating his works teach excellent archival lessons). In a discussion of aesthetics, a comparison of enlightenment and romantic artwork could enhance the overall understanding of rhetoric. Understanding these
research skills in the context of an argument—that romantic rhetoric is a valuable sub-field—make the lessons more easily applicable and transferrable.

A history course featuring romantic rhetoric could be fundamental in connecting classical rhetoric to contemporary rhetoric. Romantic rhetoric research and primary readings highlight the neo-classical, roman, and classical roots of rhetoric. The under-recognized category of romantic rhetoric forms a bridge between several different established sections of historical analysis within rhetoric and composition. Lessons in romantic rhetoric give a practical method for understanding the dangers of presentism while also offering a glimpse into how our current theories are grounded in historic movements that we can learn from and adapt. As such, a course on romantic rhetoric also connects well to composition theory. The analysis of authors who have written about romantic rhetoric necessarily includes an overview of current-traditional theories, expressivism, neo-romanticism, neo-expressivism, and ecological pedagogies.

A course featuring romantic rhetoric could also offer a lesson in academic writing. By pairing scholars from the 1980s-2010s to primary sources, students could have an opportunity to see how writing in the field has shifted as rhetoric and composition has settled as a field. For example, writing in the 1980s prioritizes claims and categories. Authors like Hawk, writing in 2007, emphasize writing affirmatively and using categories to open up possibilities rather than make narrow claims. Exploration of a variety of academic writings could help students understand how to posit their own claims and contribute to the conversation.

Based on the responsiveness of many of the writings, this course could also be helpful in teaching composition pedagogy. Many of the scholars writing around 1800 developed their theories based on the inadequacies they identified in the education system. As M. H. Abrams writes in *Natural Supernaturalism*, “The Romantic era was one of technical, political, and social
revolutions and counter-revolutions—of industrialization, urbanization, and … of competing ideologies” (292-293). Thus, reading theories now, at a similar moment in which educational theories respond to and discuss several systematic shifts that have occurred in the last fifty years of education, readings in romantic rhetoric can spark discussion about pedagogy and praxis. The education lessons are particularly profound when comparing (and finding the many similarities between) enlightenment and romanticism ideals for education. A semester dedicated to romantic rhetoric is relevant and helpful in teaching fundamental skills of inquiry, reason, imagination, and appreciation of beauty.

Students could choose to pursue specialized topics within the romantic rhetoric umbrella that would add timely contributions to the field including, but not limited to, Christianity and sermonic rhetoric through the eighteenth and nineteenth century; the refinement of philosophy over the course of a lifetime (age studies); the audience of the pulpit, bar, and senate; similar neo-classical roots of enlightenment and romantic thinkers; psychology’s influence on the history of rhetoric and composition; community influence/writing, collaboration, and mentorship; or the impact of revolutions on rhetoric.

If the budget or program requirements do not allow for a special topics course in romantic rhetoric, several of the principles and lessons could be taught in the context of an existing history course. For example, in a course about eighteenth and nineteenth century rhetoric, focus on the responsiveness of rhetoric might call attention to drastic claims and question such claims by spending about three class periods addressing the foundational overlap between Edmund Burke, Vico, Jardine, Coleridge, and Emerson and then reading excerpts of secondary arguments by James Berlin, Gradin, and Hawk. Reading Burke, Vico, and Jardine sets up the argument that the enlightenment is foundational for romantic movements. Reading
Coleridge and Emerson demonstrates that romantics are steeped in enlightenment thought. Furthermore, many rhetoric and composition theorists quote and reference Coleridge and Emerson, and theories in these primary works overlap with many ideas presented by other romantics. Berlin, Gradin, and Hawk posit theories using historic analysis. Emphasizing these eight authors would also make the scope of a graduate seminar more appropriate for an undergraduate level seminar.

Blair claims, “when we are employed, after a proper manner, in the study of composition, we are cultivating reason itself” (952). Berlin (1984) argues that “Romantic rhetoric places the composing process, the act of writing and speaking, at the center of knowing” (9). Romantic rhetoric, paired with enlightenment rhetoric, seeks rigor of reason and logic while allowing for individuality and imagination in expression, which encapsulates well all that I hope to do as I teach. As Berthoff states, “Our job is to design sequences of assignments which let our students discover what language can do [and] what they can do with language” (Berthoff, Learning the Uses of Chaos in Norton Book of Composition Studies 649). In a class that allows for the exploration of what eras of thought have done with language, I see great potential for creating a positive environment that is backed in rhetorical tradition and graced with creative imagination.

5.7 Interviews

Having detailed how romantic rhetoric might be directly taught, I now widen the lens once again. In September of 2020, I discussed elements of romantic rhetoric with some of the key scholars that I have written about in this narrative; Peter Elbow, Hephzibah Roskelley and Kate Ronald, Sherrie Gradin, Katie Homar, John Willinsky, Hannah Rule, and Craig Smith all graciously agreed to be interviewed. The scholars have successfully incorporated theory into their pedagogy, impacting our students and our field. My conversations with these scholars
touched on pedagogical application, definition, democratization, the interdisciplinary possibilities of romantic rhetoric, and a rhetoric of hope as we look forward.

Though I move from a discussion of pedagogy to a discussion of the broader implications for the field, the subjects necessarily and foundationally intersect. When I discussed the inspiration to study and write about romantic (and pragmatic) rhetoric with Roskelly and Ronald, they pointed out that the inspiration starts and ends in the classroom because, in part, a teacher can impact far more people in the classroom than in the process of theorization. Roskelly and Ronald said that it is in the classroom where theories come to life and where the theorist finds out if their theories are viable and transferable (personal interview). This application of theory and valuing of the classroom, of course, does not discount the need for theory (personal interview). Hannah Rule said that theories that are alive and well in our teaching are well-captured in a history of romantic rhetoric. Sherrie Gradin emphasized similar viewpoints in her seminar on Neo-Romantic rhetoric (taught several years ago), stating that romantic rhetoric does an excellent job of reminding us of what is always there and what can be there in our teaching— inspiration (personal interview). The application of theory to expose and encourage inspiration is, in my opinion, one of the best gifts that romantic rhetoric offers. Through this dissertation, I have discussed cyclical implications of a mis-remembered, mis-categorized, and missing romantic rhetoric. Talking with teachers reminded me that, based on their work and the compelling subject matter of romantic rhetoric, a positive cycle of implications has long been at work: a theory that has historic roots has been applied in classrooms continues to motivate inspiration for teaching which, in turn, draws scholars back to research and analysis of the theory.
Despite the importance of romantic rhetoric to education and the need for practical application of theory, the articulation of romantic rhetoric remains opaque. Throughout this dissertation, I have noted the challenge of definition. In my conversations, I asked each scholar about their definition of romantic rhetoric, noting the same challenges and myths that I have summarized throughout this dissertation. Peter Elbow agreed with the need for a definition, saying that we need to define any word that people use, but because the meaning of words are embedded in the way people use them, definition is often difficult. Elbow discussed the similar conundrum he has encountered throughout his years of effort in defining voice: when a term has multiple meanings, there are, of course, problems (personal interview). Others also discussed the inherent challenge in defining romantic rhetoric. Sherrie Gradin noted that the definition of romantic rhetoric has shifted over time (personal interview). I have acknowledged that shift through this chronological narrative. While several scholars discussed the difficulty and importance of definition, others offered hints at actual definitions that stemmed from their research.

Katie Homar succinctly defined romantic rhetoric as a comprehensive look at language (personal interview). Craig Smith defined romantic rhetoric based on its constituents. He included horror, the sublime, and politics of reform in those constituents (personal interview). Hannah Rule affirmed the method of romantic rhetoric, suggesting that romantic rhetoric gives us the ability to undermine controlling concepts. She said that there is power in naming the tradition so that we can make sense of the subject and track it (personal interview). While these definitions vary and corroborate the challenges I have identified throughout this dissertation, overall, the interviews echoed the need for a definition; Lois Agnew suggested that the power of a definition of romantic rhetoric is that it allows and invites us to move beyond the definition of
rhetoric in a beneficial way (personal interview). Without trapping myself and asking romantic rhetoric to be more than it can be, I believe this synthesis of definitions again shows the potential and need for the definitions I have offered and traced by telling the narrative of romantic rhetoric. I see value in the process of definition, both for the ways in which defining romantic rhetoric illuminate the quirks, characteristics, and trends in our field and in the way the definition relates to receptivity and utility of ideas.

One way that some scholars see the utility of romantic rhetoric is in democratization. Peter Elbow pointed to the romantics when discussing that writing is no longer an elite activity. Roskelly and Ronald discussed how writing empowers students. All three scholars, renowned in rhetoric and composition for their own works that have influenced the field’s view of teaching, pointed out how the romantic legacy of teaching empowers students with a blended reconciliation of individuality and the wider audience. The democratization connects romantic rhetoric to the writing classroom, but the conversations extend beyond rhetoric and composition. Similar valuing of the democratization potential of romantic rhetoric are alive in communication and broader education fields, as evidenced by my conversations with Craig Smith and John Willinsky.

A leader in education, curriculum theory, and public resources associated with scholarship, John Willinsky said that rhetoric is generally a way of drawing attention to what is seldom spoken, or more ironically, what has been spoken but not realized; romanticism gives this an extra layer (personal interview). Applying this to education, Willinsky discussed the importance of engagement with the teacher because if the instructor understands and grasps the meaning and relevancy of a subject, the students are much more likely to also engage (personal interview). Again, romantic rhetoric and inspiration are closely linked.
Craig Smith, speechwriter for President Ford and consultant to Robert Kennedy, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush and award winning scholar in political communication and rhetoric, discussed the interdisciplinary attractiveness of romantic rhetoric. From a communication standpoint, Smith highlighted the logic for valuing the enlightenment, thinking, “A lot of people, a lot of professors in general, embrace the enlightenment values. Things should be reasonable. Things should be argued for with evidence and that's all true, but that isn't enough. If you're an environmentalist like I am and you’re scared to death that we’re destroying the planet, and the rational argument does not get through to people, then you need to turn to the romantic arsenal to help you make your point” (personal interview). Smith also touched on forensic rhetoric and the ways that romantic rhetoric shows up in our history of law.

Within the field of rhetoric and composition, romantic rhetoric retains relevancy for several sub-disciplines. Ben McCorckle and I discussed the intersections between romantic rhetoric and technology; the parallels between the eighteenth and nineteenth century’s responses to technology and today’s responses teach us about method for analysis. McCorkle called for increased recovery of those historic works. Given digital teaching and video communication occurring with dramatically increased popularity during 2020, eighteenth and nineteenth century studies of eloquence and style take on increased importance (McCorkle, personal interview). Also aware of technological connections, Katie Homar applies knowledge about romantic rhetoric to the way she teaches English to speakers of multiple languages and through her work in STEM writing (personal interview).

Of course, the interdisciplinary nature of romantic rhetoric is also part of the reason such a concept of romantic rhetoric does not widely exist. Lois Agnew discussed the disciplinary barriers and boundaries that have led romantic rhetoric to not be taken seriously (personal
Despite the introductory nature, the conversations about the exigency of romantic rhetoric in 2020 circled back to a rhetoric of hope. Craig Smith said romantic rhetoric is useful in motivating people to believe and do the right thing, suggesting a need to make romantic rhetoric robust by relying on what scholars in various fields have already done, under different and less-synthesized names. He said romantic rhetoric dates back to Cicero, and that we need to teach romantic rhetoric if we are going to be as potent a field as we want to be (personal interview). Lois Agnew said that romantic rhetoric captures the use of language not only to open up possibilities, but also to engage the mind in ways that will spark creativity and imagination. Again, for Roskelly and Ronald, everything starts and ends with the classroom. Theirs is a good model. So I end with the composition classroom, echoing their thought that romanticism has always been at the heart of teaching composition. The belief in the individual and that the small and mundane can offer something monumental and important inspires excellent teaching.

In Chapter 4 (Section 5: More Introductions and Invitations), I pointed out a cyclical implication by stating that the long, looping narrative ends with Katie Homar’s 2019 invitation to better and more deeply examine the works of the nineteenth century. Initially, I lamented this final invitation as a sad outcome. It seemed as if all the valuable scholarship I had reviewed yielded very few conclusive statements; romantic rhetoric remained misremembered and the scholarship remained un-collected. In my conversations with scholars, we acknowledged the invitational nature and many of the scholars discussed the ways they have since moved to other subjects of research focus. Several researchers were surprised I had unearthed their articles. While this could lead to pessimism, instead, all of my conversations ended on a positive focus on
potential. Each video conference ended with smiles and excitement, and after I left each meeting, I felt like cheering. A subject I stumbled into, though it has been studied, confused, and shelved over the years, is still alive. Having witnessed the excitement of experts as they discussed romantic rhetoric, the invitational aspect inspires my hope. The thrill of potential, potential that is based in years of experience, legitimacy, and research, holds an open promise. In 2020, this sort of hope is a precious commodity.

5.8 Happily Ever After

A story that begins with “Once upon a time” should end with “happily ever after.” While this is, admittedly, not that variety of narratives, I do find it appropriate to conclude with a note of optimism. The narrative of romantic rhetoric research reveals a subject that has preserved in research despite claims and commonplace ideas that dismiss it. The narrative shows the persistence of hope; romantic rhetoric has provided a framework for researchers to question how they can best teach their students. And with the possibilities now opened, as I have detailed in this chapter, the opportunities found in studying an interesting part of rhetoric’s past—romanticism—show again the value in examining history to give hope for the future.

WORKS CITED


Bost, Marcia, "Imagining a Twenty-First Century Strategy." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2014. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/english_diss/128


https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=miami1485298868714406&disposition:inline


Elbow, Peter. Personal interview. 10 September 2020.


Gradin, Sherrie. Personal Interview. 9 September 2020.


Homar, Katie. Personal interview. 9 September 2020.


McCorkle, Ben. Personal interview. 17 September 2020.


Roskelly, Hephzibah, and Kate Ronald. Personal interview. 10 September 2020.


Rule, Hannah. Personal interview. 11 September 2020.


Smith, Craig. Personal interview. 7 September 2020.


“WORLD WAR II: KEY DATES.” *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/world-war-ii-key-dates.


APPENDICES

Appendix A: Syllabus

Figure 0.1: The Oxbow (1836) – Thomas Cole

Course Description
This course examines historical foundations including the theories, practices, and teaching of rhetoric from the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Particular emphasis will be placed on the rhetorical features of works by well-recognized romanticism authors.

Grade Breakdown
10% timeline
10% scholarly disposition
25% presentation
25% reading responses
30% seminar paper

Grades: Grades are based on the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superior</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
<th>Needs Improvement</th>
<th>Failing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 to 98</td>
<td>89 to 88</td>
<td>79 to 78 = C+</td>
<td>Below 60 = F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= A+</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade</td>
<td>Range</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>97 to 93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>87 to 83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>77 to 70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>69 to 60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A plus or minus can affect a program requirement. For instance, if your program requires that you earn a grade of at least C in a course, a grade of C- will not meet that requirement.

Course Policies and Procedures

Paper Guidelines

Papers should be typed, double-spaced, 12-point Times New Roman font, 1-inch margins, printed, and stapled or turned in via iCollege using a Microsoft Word Document. In the top left corner of the first page, include your name, the course name and number, the date, and the name of the assignment. Your essay should have a creative, purposeful title, which should be centered on the first page and reflect title case capitalization.

Community

We are part of a learning community dedicated to supporting a positive environment for all participants. We must treat one another with respect at all times. Professional courtesy and sensitivity are especially important relating to individuals and topics dealing with differences of race, culture, religion, politics, sexual orientation, gender, and nationalities. Disruptive behavior such as disrespecting a member of the class, eating, sleeping, text messaging, web browsing, holding personal conversations, or doing work for other classes does not support this community. If you are disturbing the class, I may ask you to leave for the day, forfeiting any in-class assignments we may complete after your departure. If disruptive behavior continues or a pattern of disruption occurs, additional steps may be taken, including permanent removal from the course. Keep in mind that our community does not end at the classroom door, but extends to our iCollege space, course emails, and all other out-of-class environments used for our course interactions.

“The ends of language in our discourse with others being chiefly these three: First, to make known one man’s thoughts or ideas to another; Secondly, to do it with as much ease and quickness as possible; and Thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things” - Locke *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* in Bizzell and Herzberg 825

“No man was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher. For poetry is the blossom and the fragrancy of all human knowledge, human thoughts, human passions, emotion, language” - Coleridge 1817

*Biographia Literaria*
Please see http://codeofconduct.gsu.edu/files/2016/09/Disruptive_Student_September9_2016.pdf for information regarding GSU’s Disruptive Student Behavior Policy.

**Community of Care and Mental Health Resources**

Being a student can be stressful; you often have a lot to manage between classes, personal life, family, and work. In addition, writing and composing are vulnerable acts. As part of our effort to form a supportive community in this class, we should strive to look out for one another. A kind word, an enthusiastic comment about a peer's writing, or simply offering to listen can go a long way toward this goal. If stresses emerge regarding your course work, please speak with me. I will strive to support each of you in your academic life.

“So in order to feel what another feels, the emotions which are in the mind of one man, must also be communicated to that of another, by sensible marks” Sheridan *A Course of Lectures on Elocution*, in Bizzell and Herzberg 883

As a student, you may experience a range of challenges that can interfere with learning, such as strained relationships, increased anxiety, substance use, feeling down, difficulty concentrating and/or lack of motivation. These mental health concerns or stressful events may impact your ability to attend class, concentrate, complete work, take an exam, or participate in daily activities. Problems with relationships, family worries, loss, housing or food insecurity, or a personal struggle or crisis can also contribute to decreased academic performance. In these cases, please consider taking advantage of the resources the university provides through the Dean of Students’ Office or the Counseling and Testing Center. You can reach Counseling at https://counselingcenter.gsu.edu/ and 404-413-1640 and the Dean of Students Student Advocacy team at 404-413-1515.
Email Communication: In addition to meeting with me during my office hours, you are welcome to email me with questions or concerns. Please allow a minimum of 24 hours for responses to emails and recognize that weekend emails will not receive immediate response. Plan ahead – last minute communications may be missed! Also, plan to check your GSU student email regularly for announcements regarding this class.

The Writing Studio: The Writing Studio is an excellent resource for college writers. Located on the 24th floor of 25 Park Place, the Writing Studio provides free one-on-one assistance with all aspects of the writing process. Check their website for information on hours and scheduling appointments: http://writingstudio.gsu.edu/. Drop-ins are welcome, but appointments are advised.

English Majors: The English Department at GSU requires an exit portfolio of all students graduating with a degree in English. Ideally, students should work on this every semester, selecting 1-2 papers from each course and revising them, with direction from faculty members. The portfolio includes revised work and a reflective essay about what you have learned. Each concentration (literature, creative writing, rhetoric/composition, and secondary education) within the major may have specific items to place in the portfolio, so be sure to check the booklet located in the front office of the English Department. Senior Portfolios due dates are published in the booklets or you may contact an advisor or Dr. Audrey Goodman, Director of Undergraduate Studies. See the front office for additional information.

Incompletes: Receiving an Incomplete: The notation of “I” may be given to a student who, for nonacademic reasons beyond his or her control, is unable to meet the full requirements of a course. In order to qualify for an “I”, a student must:
- Have completed most of the major assignments of the course (generally all but one); and
- Be earning a passing grade in the course (aside from the assignments not completed) in the judgment of the instructor.

When a student has a nonacademic reason for not completing one or more of the assignments for a course, including examinations, and wishes to receive an incomplete for the course, it is the responsibility of the student to inform the instructor in person or in writing of the reason. A grade of incomplete is awarded at the discretion of the instructor and is not the prerogative of the student. Conditions to be met for removing a grade of incomplete are established by the instructor.

“Thus I have finished the consideration which the speaker ought to have of his hearers as men in general; that is, as thinking beings endowed with understanding, imagination, memory, and passions, such as we are conscious of in ourselves, an learn from the experience of their effects to be in others. I have pointed out the arts to be employed by him in engaging all those faculties in his service, that what he advanceth may not only be understood, not only command attention, not only be remembered, but, which is the chief point of all, may interest the heart” Campbell
The Philosophy of Rhetoric in Bizzell and Herzberg 936

includes revised work and a reflective essay about what you have learned. Each concentration (literature, creative writing, rhetoric/composition, and secondary education) within the major may have specific items to place in the portfolio, so be sure to check the booklet located in the front office of the English Department. Senior Portfolios due dates are published in the booklets or you may contact an advisor or Dr. Audrey Goodman, Director of Undergraduate Studies. See the front office for additional information.
Accommodations for Students with Special Needs: Students who wish to request accommodation for a disability may do so by registering with the Office of Disability Services (Suite 230, New Student Center, ext. 3-9044). Students may only be accommodated upon issuance by the Office of Disability Services of a signed Accommodation Plan and are responsible for providing a copy of that plan to instructors of all classes in which accommodations are sought. Students who need accommodations are asked to arrange a meeting with their instructor during office hours or at another mutually convenient time during the first week of classes. Bring a copy of your Student Accommodation Form to the meeting.

Academic Honesty: All students are expected to follow the GSU code of academic conduct. Forms of academic misconduct such as plagiarism, cheating on exams, unauthorized collaboration, falsification of sources, and multiple submissions will not be tolerated. All cases of plagiarism will be reported to the College of Arts and Sciences for review. For further information on the university’s policies on academic misconduct, refer to http://deanofstudents.gsu.edu/files/2016/03/2014-2015-Section-II-Academic-Conduct-Student-Code-of-Conduct.pdf.

Course Evaluation: Your constructive assessment of this course plays an indispensable role in shaping education at Georgia State. Upon completing the course, please take time to fill out the online course evaluation.

“Therefore, the soul must be enticed by corporeal images and impelled to love; for once it loves, it is easily taught to believe; once it believes and loves, the fire of passion must be infused into it so as to break its inertia and force it to will. Unless the speaker can compass these three things, he has not achieved the effect of persuasion; he has been powerless to convince” Vico On the Study Methods of Our Time in Bizzell and Herzberg 873

Course Schedule

This schedule reflects a plan for the course, but deviations from this plan will likely become necessary as the semester progresses. Students are responsible for taking note of changes announced during class time or through email when they occur.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Primary Sources</th>
<th>Secondary Sources</th>
<th>Type of Reading Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><em>Introductions, no readings</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Introductions to Enlightenment Rhetoric and 19th Century Rhetoric in <em>The Rhetorical Tradition</em></td>
<td>Roskelly and Ronald <em>Reason to Believe: Romanticism, Pragmatism, and the Possibility of Teaching</em> 1998</td>
<td>Reflective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful</td>
<td>1759, excerpts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Composition: Toward Methodologies of Complexity</td>
<td>2007, “Afterword”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fishman and McCarthy, 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jardine, George. Outlines of Philosophical Education Illustrated by the Method of Teaching the Logic Class in the University of Glasgow 1825</td>
<td>Excerpts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Richards, I.A. Coleridge on Imagination. 1934, 1950. Selections from Coleridge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Selections from Emerson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads, 1800</td>
<td>Grdin, Sherrie, Romancing Rhetorics 1995 CHAPTER Excerpt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Reference; Vico, Giambattista, On the Study Methods of our Time 1709</td>
<td>Grdin, Sherrie, Romancing Rhetorics 1995 CHAPTER Excerpt Watch clip from Dead Poets Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Reference; Sheridan, Thomas, Lectures on Elocution, 1762</td>
<td>Roskelley and Ronald Reason to Believe : Romanticism, Pragmatism, and the Possibility of Teaching 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blake, William, 1793</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reference;</td>
<td>Russell, David,</td>
<td>Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keats, John, 1817</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Wordsworth, William Thoreau, Henry David</td>
<td>Rule in Roeder and Gatto, 2014</td>
<td>Reflective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A.1: Alternative Reading Plans

As part of an overview history class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Primary Sources</th>
<th>Secondary Sources</th>
<th>Type of Reading Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Undergraduate Schedule Option (less intense reading)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Reading Due</th>
<th>Type of Reading Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introductions, no readings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Introductions to Enlightenment Rhetoric and 19th Century Rhetoric in <em>the Rhetorical Tradition</em></td>
<td>Reflective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Roskelly and Ronald <em>Reason to Believe: Romanticism, Pragmatism, and the Possibility of Teaching</em> 1998 Excerpt</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Wordsworth, <em>Preface to Lyrical Ballads</em>, 1800</td>
<td>Reflective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Selections from Coleridge</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Richards, I.A. <em>Coleridge on Imagination</em>. 1934, 1950.</td>
<td>Reflective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Berlin, James, <em>Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges</em></td>
<td>Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Selections from Emerson</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Various romantic authors, tbd</td>
<td>Reflective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Rule in Roeder and Gatto, 2014</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Berhoff, Ann “Learning the Uses of Chaos”</td>
<td>Reflective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>