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The Public and the Private Good: Plato on the Happiness of the Citizens in the Republic

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Plato on the Happiness of the Citizens in the *Republic*

by

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Under the Direction of Allison Piñeros Glasscock, PhD

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ABSTRACT

In Book IV of the *Republic* Adeimantus raises a concern to Socrates that the guardians seem quite unhappy. If true, this charge threatens one of the central aims of the *Republic*: to show it is better for you to be just rather than unjust. Socrates offers a response, but ow to interpret this response is a matter of some debate. I argue that we ought to interpret his response as implying that Kallipolis' citizens will be happy, but that they will be happy as citizens whose private interests are mediated by the public interest of the city. This account, which I call the hylomorphic reading of the city, helps incorporate features of the most plausible positions in the literature and helps Socrates respond to Adeimantus' concern. The guardians—along with the other citizens—will be happy, and they will be happy because of the role they play in the city.

INDEX WORDS: Plato, The *Republic*, Happiness, Citizens, Political philosophy

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my friends here at GSU. In no particular order: Payden Alder, Victoria Isett, Bridget Berdit, Jack Romp, Raul Figueroa-Santamaria, Frankie H. Wotton IV, and Ongun Kılıç—it was a great privilege to work, talk, and live with you for the last few years. Seeing each of you develop as writers and philosophers has been one of the most rewarding experiences of my life. Without you, I would not have made it this far. So, I will take what each of you has taught me with me wherever I go from here. Thanks, y'all. To my family: I could not have even attempted any of this without you.

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1 INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of Book IV of the *Republic* Socrates says that he is not attempting to make "any one group [in Kallipolis] outstandingly happy" (420b-c), but is rather aiming to make "the whole city happy" (420c).[1] Despite the simple appearance of this aim, there is much debate about what Plato means when he has Socrates speak of making the whole city happy.[2] Some interpreters—holists—argue that the Kallipolis is a kind of super-organism or other distinct entity whose happiness stands over and above the happiness of its individual citizens.[3] Reductionists,[4] in contrast, hold that when Socrates speaks of the happiness of the whole city he only means the happiness of each of its individual citizens. Others attempt to combine features of both positions, arguing that the city is a distinct entity but that its happiness necessarily implies the happiness of its citizens.[5]

There is good reason that interpreters are so interested in what Socrates has in mind here. Just before Socrates tells us that he is attempting to make the whole city happy, Adeimantus raises a concern: the guardians, who at this point in the discussion rule the city and are the best of its people, don't seem to be benefiting very much from their position. The guardians are deprived of land, wealth, and "all the things that are thought to belong to people who are blessedly happy"

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[1] All quotations from the *Republic* are taken from the Grube translation. See Plato. *Republic*. Edited and translated by G. Grube. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing, 1992. Socrates also mentions that he thinks it likely that the guardians will be happy just as they are, but that this happiness will be of a kind particular to them (420b). This point will be addressed further in §4, but it is worth noting now that Socrates is optimistic about the happiness of *at least* the guardian class who, as Adeimantus' objection points out, seem the least furnished with ordinary means of happiness.

[2] I will be assuming throughout this paper that what Socrates says Plato believes. This stance is not without its shortcomings, but as a hermeneutic tool it makes things less intractable than they otherwise would be.

[3] See Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies,* vol. 1 (London, England: Routledge, 1947); George Grote, *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*, vol. 3 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[4] Sometimes called "Individualists" in the literature.

[5] See, Donald Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual in Plato's Republic," *Ancient Philosophy* 21, no. 1 (2001): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil20012116. See also, R. W. Hall, "Justice and the Individual in the 'Republic.'" *Phronesis* 4, no. 2 (1959): 149–58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181657.

(419a). They seem to "derive no good from [the city]" (419a). Adeimantus thus asks that a response be provided to someone who claims that Socrates is not "making these men very happy" (419a). It is in response to this charge that Socrates claims that he is attempting to make the whole city happy.

Adeimantus is posing a weighty objection: one of Socrates' main goals in the *Republic* is to show that being just is better for one's prospect of happiness than being unjust.[6] If the best and most just people in the best and most just city aren't happy, and if they really don't receive any sort of good from their position within it, then Socrates' central project in the *Republic* risks failure. Since the stakes of Socrates' response are so high, it is important to get a clear picture of what exactly his response amounts to. If the holists are right in their interpretation of Socrates' response, it is not clear that Socrates is successfully answering Adeimantus' objection at all. If the city's happiness as a whole is what really matters, then it might very well turn out to be the case that the happiness of the guardians, along with all of the other citizens' happiness, is of little or no importance. In fact, if certain holistic interpretations of Socrates' response are right, it might very well be the case that the city as a whole is happy but many or most if its citizens are not. If these interpreters are right, then it seems as though Socrates' response would fail to alleviate Adeimantus' concern. On the other hand, if the reductionists are right in their interpretation, then Socrates is responding to Adeimantus in a relatively straightforward way: most or all of the citizens will be happy. Thus, interpretations of Socrates' response provided by the holists and reductionists are radically different, seemingly incompatible, and vary in their assessment of the success or failure of the response to the challenged posed. The aim of this

[6] See, e.g., Gregory Vlastos, "The Argument in the Republic That 'Justice Pays,'" *The Journal of Philosophy* 65, no. 21 (1968): 665, https://doi.org/10.2307/2024542, 665. See also, Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 149. In the *Republic* see, e.g., 352a-354a for one of Socrates initial attempts to show that living justly is more suited to make a person happy than living unjustly.

paper, then, is to critically interpret Socrates' remarks on the happy city with the debate in the literature in mind. What exactly does Socrates mean when he says his aim is to make the whole city happy?

The work will proceed as follows: in section two, I lay out the interpretive debate between holists and reductionists in more detail. I will argue that each of the established positions fails to account for crucial aspects of Socrates' view, and that we are thus in need of a new and different interpretation. In section three I begin to argue for a basis for this new interpretation: the hylomorphic reading of the city. I claim that Plato views the city and its citizens as a hylomorphic unity of form and matter such that each cannot be made sense of without the other.[7] I thus agree with the holists insofar as I argue that the city cannot be understood only as the aggregate of the individuals living within it.[8] In section four I apply this hylomorphic reading of the city to the issue of its happiness and argue that when Socrates makes claims about the happiness of the city, he means the happiness of all of its individual citizens *as* citizens—as individuals whose interests and characteristics are fundamentally mediated by the structural features of the city—and not the happiness of some distinct entity called "Kallipolis." I agree with the reductionists' conclusion about the happiness of the city, then, because I think the happiness of the city means the happiness of all of its citizens. My position is thus neither entirely holistic nor entirely reductionistic, but takes on the features of both of these positions that are textually grounded and allows for Socrates to satisfactorily answer Adeimantus' challenge. Finally, using a passage that is central to the debate between holists and reductionists, I return to some accounts in the debate to show the shortcomings of each.

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[7] With reference to the city, "form" is not meant in the Platonic sense in this paper.

[8] My view is thus largely in agreement with Donald Morrison's account of the city, though different in ways that will be addressed later. See Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," 6-7.

2 HOLISTS, REDUCTIONISTS, AND THE IN-BETWEENERS

As already noted, the debate surrounding Plato's views about the happiness of the city can be split into two competing interpretive camps: holists and reductionists. While there are many details on which they disagree, the critical split between them comes from their answers to the following question: does the happiness of Kallipolis just mean the happiness of its individual citizens? Holists answer no, while reductionists answer yes. Holists argue that Socrates thinks of the happiness of the city as something distinct from the happiness of its citizens, at least in principle. In contrast, reductionists hold that the happiness of the city just means the happiness of its individual citizens. Implicit in the literature is also another divide: the nature of the city itself. Most holists think that Socrates' Kallipolis is a kind of whole that stands over and above its citizens, dominating them and overriding their interests and autonomy. Most reductionists insist, implicitly or otherwise, that the city is not a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.[9] While this simple outline can help orient us initially, it will be useful to turn to the finer points on which the two sides disagree to get a more detailed picture of the debate. Thus, the aim of this section is to examine what I take to be the accounts most representative of each position from across the debate, and to show why each of these positions are unsatisfactory.

In *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Karl Popper ascribes to Plato an organic theory of the state.[10] For Popper, Plato's Kallipolis is "a kind of super-organism" that is not only ontologically distinct from the individuals who populate it but is also, as a unified body politic, valued more than them.[11] Popper and other holists have good reason to think Plato and Socrates might have really been endorsing such a theory. Socrates directly analogizes the city to

[9] They still hold that the city is a whole, just not one that goes beyond its constituent parts.
[10] Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies,* 67.
[11] As he says, "the city…is greater than the individual" and that "the individual is lower than the state and an imperfect copy of it." See Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 67-68.

individual organisms. For example, he asks Glaucon "[w]hat about the city is most like a single person" and answers that, just as when a single person hurts his finger "the entire organism" is aware of its finger as its own and pained by it, so too will the city "say that the affected part is its own and will share in pleasure or pain as a whole" when a citizen experiences good or bad fortune (462c-d). Holists, then, generally agree with two connected but distinct propositions about the city: (1) the city is a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts and (2) the happiness of the city *does not* equate to the happiness of its citizens, at least in principle if not in practice.[12] It is the holists' endorsement of these propositions that leaves open the possibility that Plato could conceivably think that many or most of the citizens could be unhappy while still calling the city happy.

There are good reasons to doubt that the holistic reading is entirely correct, however. Concerning (2), insofar as the holists think Socrates is simply unconcerned about the happiness of the citizenry, there is an immediate and obvious objection available: the issue of their happiness would not have arisen if Socrates were not concerned with the happiness of Kallipolis' citizens. Plato is clearly and intentionally bringing the reader's attention to the issue of the citizens' happiness by having Socrates say that he is not making "any one group [in Kallipolis] outstandingly happy" (420b-c). Even if we read Socrates' statements here through a holistic lens, it would be odd to claim that Socrates is not at all concerned with the happiness of the citizens of Kallipolis. Of course, the holist might reply that Plato is drawing our attention not to the happiness of all of Kallipolis' citizens but to the happiness of the city interpreted as a whole distinct from them. However, this reply leads to a second reason to doubt holistic readings: even

[12] I add this qualification because some holists understand that Plato *believes* his citizens will be happy. But holists tend to think that this happiness is only an accident of the citizens being a part of the city, and not an essential feature of it. Holists think, in other words, that Plato believes the citizens will be happy, but that had it turned out otherwise Plato would have kept the city the same and simply bitten the bullet on this point.

supposing the holists are right in asserting that Plato endorses (1), this endorsement does not entail (2). While Socrates does deploy organic metaphors when describing the city, his deployment of this language does not go as far as Popper thinks in showing that Socrates endorses (2). It is one thing to claim that (1) leaves open the possibility that (2) is true, but another to claim that (2) must follow from endorsing (1). For the holists to show Socrates endorses (2), they would need to establish something stronger than the fact that Socrates agrees with (1). They could argue that he thinks that it is possible for the city to be happy even while many or most of its citizens are quite unhappy directly, rather than taking this view to be an implication of (2). If they could show both that Socrates endorses (1) and that most of the population could be unhappy but the city still be said to be happy, then we would have good reason to think he also endorses (2). While some interpreters do argue for this position, it carries with it its own problems, as will be shown below.

Indeed, the reductionists' complaint against the holists is most frequently that they are overly reliant on Plato's use of organic terms when describing the city to justify their position. They doubt that he really endorses (1). In "Social Justice and Happiness in the Republic: Plato's Two Principles," Kamtekar offers one of the most developed and convincing reductionist accounts in the debate.[13] Kamtekar holds that

> Plato does not regard the city as an organic entity over and above its citizens, or its happiness as distinct from the happiness of its citizens. Rather, the happiness of the city consists in the happiness of its citizens, with the further constraint that this happiness be brought about by the city's institutions.[14]

[13] Though I will focus on her account here, other supporters of a reductionist account similar to Kamtekar's include C.D.C. Reeve and Gregory Vlastos. See C. Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic* (Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing, 2009); Gregory Vlastos, "The Theory of Social Justice in the Polis in Plato's Republic," in *Interpretations of Plato* (Brill, 1977), 1–40."

[14] See Kamtekar, "Social Justice and Happiness in the Republic," 204. For an account that has interesting and meaningful disagreements with other sections of Kamtekar's paper, as well as with Vlastos' various dealings with happiness in the *Republic*, see Anna Grecco, "'Having one's own"' and Distributive Justice in Plato's 'Republic'.'" *History of Political Thought* 32, no. 2 (2011): 185–214. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26225709.

Leaving off her final constraint for a moment, Kamtekar is making two distinct claims here: (1') that the city and its citizens are ontologically identical, and (2') that the city's happiness is not distinct from the happiness of its citizens. These two claims form the core of her reductionist position. The further constraint she introduces is worth investigating, however.

Kamtekar, despite her reductionist position, still thinks the structure of the city plays a part in its citizens' happiness. To explain why she adds the constraint that the happiness of the citizens be brought about by the city, she gives an analogy of a family. She says that a family is not happy if *either* (a) any of its members are miserable or (b) all the members are happy but are all estranged from one another.[15] Her picture, then, is as follows: "It is not," she says, "that the family's happiness is constituted by any happiness over and above its members' happiness, however; the family's happiness is constituted only by its members' happiness."[16] Nevertheless, it would be strange to say a family was happy if they failed to resemble a family at all, even if each individual in the family were happy. Echoing Socrates' language that the *aim* of the structures he and his interlocutors are discussing is to make the whole city happy (420b), Kamtekar says that part of the family members' happiness "should have been an effect of their being a family."[17] To put it another way, if their being a part of the family played *no* role in their being a happy member of that family, then we might be hesitant to call it a happy family.

Just as we have reasons to think the holists' position gets the picture of the happiness of the city wrong, however, there are aspects of the reductionist position that seem untenable. Namely, we have reason to be skeptical of (1'), a reading of the city that understands Kallipolis ontologically as *nothing* but the individuals living within it. Holists are, as was noted, quick to

[15] Kamtekar, "Social Justice and Happiness in the Republic," 206.
[16] Kamtekar, "Social Justice and Happiness in the Republic," Ibid.
[17] Kamtekar, "Social Justice and Happiness in the Republic," Ibid.

point to the fact that Socrates utilizes various organic analogies when discussing the city. While this organic language may not imply everything the holists believe it does about the city's happiness, it nevertheless gives us good reason to think that Socrates views the city as a whole that is in some way distinct from the collection of parts that make it up. It would be a stretch to claim that Socrates' use of organic terminology when describing the city was thoughtless or not intended to signal in any way his broader views on the nature of the city. Reductionists like Kamtekar often interpret Socrates' use of organic descriptions of the city as failing to show what the holists claim these descriptions imply about the city. But more than simply employing organic metaphors, in passages like 462c-d cited above Socrates seems to be saying that the city is really *like* a body.[18] So, while there are reasons to at least strongly doubt (2), the holists in turn give us reason to doubt (1'). This exchange of criticisms has left some interpreters wanting to find a middle ground between the holists and reductionists.

One of these interpreters is Donald Morrison. He offers an interesting middle position between holists like Popper and reductionists like Kamtekar.[19] In "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual in Plato's *Republic*," Morrison concurs with the holistic understanding of the metaphysics of the city and with its happiness being non-identical to that of its members.[20] But he acknowledges that the reductionists' are capturing an intuition about Plato's position: Plato is concerned with the happiness of all the city's citizens.[21] In other words, he thinks that Plato wants the citizens to be happy, but that if it turns out that the city needs to be organized in such a way that they are not, then that organization still ought to be enacted and that

[18] Kamtekar's interpretation will be investigated in more detail in §4.
[19] For another interpreter who largely agrees with Morrison's conclusions, see R. W. Hall, "Justice and the Individual in the Republic," *Phronesis* 4, no. 2 (1959): 149–58, https://doi.org/10.1163/156852859x00164.
[20] Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," 23.
[21] Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," Ibid.

they needn't be happy. As he says, "the happiness of all the individual citizens is *neither* necessary *nor* sufficient for the happiness of the city."[22] He argues *both* that all of the citizens could be happy but the city might not be *and* that some (or even most) of the citizens of the city could be unhappy but the city could still be said to be happy.[23]

Morrison endorses the idea that the city, structured by its virtues, institutions, and classes is not reducible to its members.[24] In fact, he claims that there is an Aristotelian notion of matter and form implicitly present in the *Republic* "where the *citizens* are the matter and the *constitution* (politeia), or basic arrangement of offices, is the form."[25] But while Morrison begins with these holistic commitments, he also thinks that the "goal or purpose" of the city's structure "is to promote the greatest possible well-being of the individual citizens."[26] So, Morrison takes the happiness of the whole city to mean the "the goodness of [its] structure."[27] Morrison's view is productive step forward over exclusively reductionistic or holistic views because it attempts to reconcile Socrates' apparent concern for the happiness of the citizenry with his ontological view of the city. I focus on Morrison in some detail both here and below because the position I will defend below is closely related to his. As I will argue in later sections, however, Morrison's position that the majority of the city's population could be permanently unhappy but the city as a

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[22] Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," 18.
[23] For the first claim, see Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," 18; and for the second, see Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," 12. Additionally, see Morrison's footnoted proposition (1a') on the same page: "the happiness of the city is compatible with the enduring unhappiness of one of its major classes."
[24] Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," 6.
[25] Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," Ibid.
[26] Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual, 7. Alternatively, "it is plausible to say that the state is for the individual, that its most significant purpose is to help man with what is of the greatest importance to him." See Hall, "Justice and the Individual in the Republic," 158. For a view that disagrees with both Popper's conclusion about the political place of the citizen and Morrison's or Hall's position that the city is *for* its members, see Oppong Stephen Peprah, "Reinvestigating the Political Position of the Citizen," *Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia* 14, no. 4 (2020), p. 41.
[27] Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual, 7.

whole could somehow still be said to be happy is unjustified and does not follow from the ontology of the city that Morrison provides.

We have, then, a general picture of how Socrates' remarks on the happiness of the city are interpreted and an indication that none of the established positions are, on their own, satisfactory. With the aim of developing a new interpretation that can address the issues faced by the holists and reductionists, and with the aim of understanding Socrates' claims about the whole city's happiness, in the next section I offer an interpretation of what Socrates understands the city to be ontologically before returning to the issue of the happiness of the city in §4.

3 SOCREATES' CITY AND CITIZEN

Since we are concerned with understanding what Socrates means when he says he wants to make the whole city happy, a close examination into the metaphysics of the city is a productive place to start. I will first examine Kallipolis in broad terms by explicating its structure and organizing principles. Following this broad explication, I will return to Adeimantus' objection in order to motivate an investigation into some passages that bear directly on the nature of the citizen and city. Using these passages, I will argue that the holists are right to say that the city is, ontologically speaking, more than just the collection of its members. Second, I will argue, along with Morrison, that when we take a version of this ontology seriously, a conceptual interdependence emerges between the city and its citizens. I call this ontology the hylomorphic reading of the city. I will conclude in this section by arguing that, while Morrison is right to think the city is something like a hylomorphic unity, he does not follow out correctly the implications of such an ontology, instead drawing some faulty conclusions about what this ontology implies about the happiness of the citizens in Kallipolis.

First, then, the broad strokes. There are some aspects of Kallipolis that are well-known and clearly described by Socrates. After agreeing to search for justice in the individual by trying to find it in a city first (368d-369a), we see Kallipolis formed in the dialogue because Socrates thinks that "people need many things" and it is in the interest of each person to gather together with others as "partners and helpers" to satisfy these needs better than they could alone (369b-c). The discussion of the mature structure of the city takes up a substantial portion of the *Republic*. This structure, of course, is the tripartite class system of the guardian rulers, auxiliary soldiers, and producer craftsmen. Socrates develops this structure because he does not think that we are all equally suited to every task; we are not all born alike with equal skills or dispositions to the same

kinds of work (370a-b). Some may be good at woodworking or farming, some at defending the city, and some at ruling it. Thus, with the preservation (463b)[28] and benefit of the city's members in mind, Socrates posits a principle of specialization (PS) that states that each citizen should do "one thing for which he is naturally suited, [do] it at the right time," and be "released from having to do any of the others" (370c).

This principle states that each citizen will: (1) perform one job, craft, or service that is suited to his nature, (2) perform this job, craft, or service at the right time, and (3) not be permitted to perform any other job, craft, or service to which their nature is not suited. The PS, then, acts as a method of dividing labor within the city. The importance of the PS for the project of the *Republic*, however, cannot be overstated. The PS not only serves as the ultimate foundation of the tripartite class system, but also grounds what Socrates describes as justice in the city (433b). Socrates says that "it turns out that this doing one's own work—provided that it comes to be in a certain way—is justice" (433b).

On a first reading of the *Republic*, one might think that the PS impacts the *private* lives of Kallipolis' citizens to a staggering extent. The guardians, after all, are deprived of most private property (416d), of choice of housing, and of access to any money (416e). They can't leave the city for private reasons (420a) and can't even know who their biological children are. But the reasons Socrates gives for imposing these austere conditions are related to the role the guardians play in the city: "if they acquire private land, houses, and currency themselves, they'll be household managers and farmers instead of guardians" (417a). The position occupied by the guardians, dictated by the PS, thus determines not only the public lives of these citizens but also

[28] The rulers and guardians are also called the preservers in Kallipolis. While Plato clearly describes them as better than the average citizen in many respects and with a more important function (465d), this does not mean that Plato thinks every other citizen thereby becomes a meaningless part of the city whose happiness need not be considered. See fn. 36 for more on this point.

plays an integral role in determining their private affairs, tastes, and privileges. It also impacts the guardians' private lives through their education: they are raised and educated to see the city in a certain way and to guard against all of the pitfalls of ruling that Socrates sees as most dire (413c-d; 416b). Further, one could extend this reading and think that it is not only the guardians' but all citizens' private lives that are determined by the PS. All of the citizens of Kallipolis receive *some* form of education that trains them for their occupation—this is demanded by the PS—but this education and occupation are not restricted only to the public domain.

At this point, the relevance of Adeimantus' challenge comes into view. One might interpret Adeimantus as raising the concern that even if the guardians are "happy" in some civic or public sense, they can't really be happy as private individuals given their meager state of living. If this concern is what he is expressing, then Adeimantus is raising some difficult questions about the boundaries of public and private life in Kallipolis. Even if the citizens *qua* citizens are happy, as Socrates implies the guardians are (465e-466b), a question could be still be raised: can an individual *qua* individual be unhappy in Kallipolis even if, *qua* citizen, they are happy? If we answer in the affirmative, then a farmer could be said to be civically happy in the sense that she fulfills her role according to the PS (370c) and in general acts as a good and just citizen. But we would then leave open the possibility that she could return each night to her home full of private misery and pain. She could be quite *unhappy* individually, even while acting as a good and happy citizen does. This sort of worry is the kind expressed by Popper and his depiction of the citizens as "cogs."[29] Thus far Socrates has not done much to alleviate this concern. It is clear at this point that the PS controls many aspects of the citizens' lives, but this

[29] E.g., Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies,* 94.

control might be just the problem. A citizen might be restricted to acting for the public good and never allowed to act for the sake of their private good.

While this reading and the concern it implies are not implausible, the PS and the structures of the city it entails serve not as means of restricting the private lives of citizens, but rather as necessary conditions for citizens to exist at all. In an example that helps elucidate Socrates' view of the relationship between the citizens in Kallipolis and the nature of the city itself, Socrates says that

> [T1] [w]e know how to clothe the farmers in purple robes, festoon them with gold jewelry, and tell them to work the land whenever they please. We know how to settle our potters on couches by the fire, feasting and passing the wine around, with their wheel beside them for whenever they want to make pots. And we can make all the others happy in the same way, so that the whole city is happy. Don't urge us to do this, however, for if we do, a farmer wouldn't be a farmer, nor a potter a potter, and none of the others would keep to the patterns of work that give rise to a city. (420d-421a)

Here, Socrates is making a claim that is crucial to understanding how he views Kallipolis' citizens. T1 is arguing that the occupation one practices, determined by the PS, *makes* citizens what they are. Notice that this claim is not as small a claim as it may seem. Socrates is not just saying the obvious—that to be a potter or farmer you must work as a potter or farmer: the purple-robed farmer still farms, just at their own discretion, the feasting potter still has their wheel, but only crafts when they wish to. Socrates is claiming something more: that what the citizens' occupations are in Kallipolis informs what they are permitted or not permitted to do in a general sense. If the potters had too strong a taste for wine, or the farmers for jewelry and fine clothes, they wouldn't perform their jobs well and so they would cease to do what they ought to be doing according to their natures.[30] In a sense, they would no longer be the people they ought to be. So,

[30] See 421d-422a. Wealth and poverty both make people less skilled in their crafts, and so these too are regulated by the PS for the producing class. Interestingly, a stark division between the wealthy and non-wealthy where only the rich have a say in ruling is characteristic of an oligarchy for Plato (550c-551e). Socrates and Adeimantus agree that

while it seems on a first pass that the PS determines the occupations, private privileges, and tastes of all of Kallipolis' citizens, it is doing something more fundamental than that. The PS and the structures of the city are changing individuals with merely private interests into citizens whose interests are always mediated by the city and its public interest. In this sense, what it means to be a citizen is that one has no merely private interests. If Plato conceives of citizens this way, then the merely private individual with private interests has been eliminated from the city.[31] Thus, the concern raised by the reading of Adeimantus's objection above is answered: it is not possible for a citizen to be publicly happy and privately miserable, because they have no merely private interests that could be denied or neglected such that they would be miserable in this way.

Returning to the text, the end of T1 indicates that doing work in this specialized manner gives rise to or maintains the city. It is not only the case, then, that these "patterns of work" are shaping the lives of the citizens, but also that the citizens and the work they perform play a crucial role in making the city what it is. As obvious a claim as this may seem, it tells us about the nature of the city. Shortly after T1, Socrates asserts that "you're happily innocent if you think that anything other than the kind of city we are founding deserves to be called *a city*" (422e). By

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the oligarchic city is the first to allow the "greatest of all evils" for any city: the privatization of possessions, pleasures and pains (552a). This oligarchic city falls prey to this evil *because* "wealth and the wealthy are valued or honored more than virtue and good people are valued less" (550e).

[31] Popper and those who are concerned with the flattening of the individual in the city may be importing a worry that might be quite alien to Plato. A polis is a collection of people who have, for the sake of meeting their needs, agreed to live together as "partners and helpers" (369b-c). It is not just a place where people happen to live together, each of them pursuing their own individualized interests to the detriment of others. In other words, I think that Plato might not, in his overall scheme of thinking, take the individual perspective as especially privileged. While this lack of focus on the individual may seem unintuitive to modern readers, from a textual perspective there is no reason this should count against a reading like mine or Morrison's. As Rosseau notes in *On the Social Contract*, the meaning of the word "[city] is almost entirely lost on modern men. Most of them mistake a town for a city and a townsman for a citizen. They do not know that houses make a town but citizens make a city." See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Rousseau: The Basic Political Writings: Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Discourse on Political Economy, on the Social Contract, the State of War*, ed. Donald A. Cress, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing, 2012). Here, p. 165. Reeve also makes note of this in a footnote in the *Republic*. See Plato, *Republic*, 44n14.

itself, this statement might be thought to act only as a rhetorical tactic aimed at convincing the interlocutors or the readers that Kallipolis really is the best, most virtuous city. Socrates is, however, attempting to make a broader point: that there is something unique about the manner in which Kallipolis is structured—namely, the interdependence between its citizens and the structures of the city—that makes it special. We can see evidence of this interdependence in the following passage:

> [T2] S: Then isn't the first step towards agreement to ask ourselves what we say is the greatest good in designing the city—the good at which the legislator aims in making laws—and which is the greatest evil?
> G: Absolutely.
> S: Is there any greater evil we can mention for a city than that which tears it apart and makes it many instead of one? Or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?
> G: There isn't.
> S: And when, as far as possible, all the citizens rejoice and are pained by the same successes and failures, doesn't this sharing of pleasures and pains bind the city together?
> G: It most certainly does.
> S: But when some suffer greatly, while others rejoice greatly, at the same things happening to the city or its people, doesn't this privatization of pleasures and pains dissolve the city?
> G: Of course. (462a-c)

T2 shows us that Socrates is aiming at binding the citizens together and making them one instead of many. The "greatest good" that binds them together is a mutual sharing of pleasures and pains. I'll call this greatest good their *common affect*.

It should be noted that Socrates mentions this greatest good is produced in part directly from the sharing of wives and children among the guardians (464b). This foundation for the city's greatest good might initially seem to be disconnected from the PS and justice, and one could ask what the connection is between justice and the greatest good of the city. Indeed, one could claim that Socrates is saying that Kallipolis achieves the greatest good, not because it is just, but because of this sharing of spouses and children in common. However, the reason for the

sharing of spouses and children in common among the guardians is so that they do not corrupt themselves by privatizing things that should be held in common (464b). Like the other structural restrictions placed on citizens in Kallipolis, the reason the sharing of wives and children is a desirable goal at all is so that the guardians keep to the work that they are naturally suited to doing—so that they live in accord with the PS. The common affect of the citizens in Kallipolis is a direct result of the structural organization of the city, and this structure is just the city organizing its institutions in ways that promote its citizens' following of the PS. That is to say, Kallipolis achieves the greatest good for any city *because* it is just.

T2 tells us that the ontological status of the city is that of a *unity*, though of course what is being unified are its citizen-parts. Recall Kamtekar's analogy of a family; like a family, a city is made up of smaller, necessary parts without which it would no longer be what it is. Kamtekar's analogy can be pressed further, however. Also like a family, while it makes good sense to say that these individual parts are integral to the city's being, *they are not exhaustive determinates of the whole*. The organization and structure of the city's parts—its form—is also essential to understanding what it is. Thus we have the form of the city—the PS, the class structure it produces, and the kind of lives lived under these structures—and the matter of the city—its citizens—united into one: Kallipolis. I call this a *hylomorphic* reading of the city. This is a kind of hylomorphism because, as I argued above, the PS and the class structure of Kallipolis play a role in constituting the citizens in Kallipolis. So, not only does the city require citizens to be organized and stand in certain rigorously defined functional relationships to one another *in order* that the city qualify as a genuine city at all, but it also *shapes* who these citizens are in the first place. The city *makes* the individuals within it citizens—the form doesn't just organize the parts,

leaving them unchanged except with regard to their relations to one another, it fundamentally changes them into something they weren't before *because* of these relations.

This influence of the city on its citizens is done in specific ways through education, the noble lie (414d-415d), and the various restrictions put in place on the various classes, and in a more general way through the strict and city-wide adherence to the PS. Additionally, the phrasing of "before" might have unintended implications. I am not making a temporal claim that the city exists and then shapes individuals into citizens. The city requires citizens and does not exist before them temporally. But, likewise, the citizens cannot exist without the city. They would be mere individuals. So, I use the term hylomorphism to describe the relationship between the two. The city just is all of its individual inhabitants organized and arranged in a just manner, and its inhabitants are the city insofar as they stand in their justly arranged position according to the PS (i.e., insofar as they are citizens). In this way, I agree with the Aristotelian claim about the ontological priority of the city and Morrison's claim that this seems to be implicitly at work here in Plato.[32]

Before moving to the next section where I will discuss the happiness of the whole city in some detail, I would like to describe why my account, which closely resembles Morrison's, is a step forward. Thus far, I have argued that all of the citizens in Kallipolis share in a common affect, and that this affect is a result of the city's form. I claimed that the part this common affect—along with all of the other structural features of the city—play and the part the citizens in turn play in constituting the city, form a unity in which each side is dependent on the other. Granting this point for the moment, it can illuminate some differences between Morrison's

[32] See Aristotle, *Politics: A New Translation*. Translated by C. D. C. Reeve. Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing, 2017, 1253a20-28.; For Morrison's point, see fn. 20.

account and my own. I'll address one of these differences here, and the other in the following section.

The first difference between our accounts is that, while Morrison does give us an ontology of the city that explicitly uses this hylomorphic terminology, and though I broadly agree with analysis of holism as it relates to the city, he underemphasizes the conceptual interdependence of the sides of such a hylomorphic unity. He gives the example of a triangle that is supposed to be analogous to the city: "I would say that being a triangle is a structural property of the three lines, which is not identical with any properties of the lines, individually considered."[33] What makes it a triangle and not just the three lines, then, is a sort of emergent property that depends on the relationship in which the three lines stand to each other. The triangle, and likewise the city, isn't just an additive collection of all of its parts. It is those parts *and* their structure that make the whole what it is.

But, notice, that what must be granted by Morrison here is that the relationship the lines stand in to one another *change* what the lines are, at least in some minimal sense. They are not just three lines; they are sides of a triangle. Without the form structuring their relationships to one another, the lines would not be the sides of a triangle. The general point here is that this sort of unity of matter and form implies not only that matter be in some form or another, but that whatever form it takes in some way effects and changes the matter. So, it is not just that city is a unity of "citizens under a constitution," but that the citizens here are *made* citizens by their being a part of the city.[34] If the form of the city molds individuals into citizens, and does so in such a

[33] Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," 6.
[34] Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," ibid. I also want to emphasize that while there are of course individuals who live outside of any polis, for Plato these individuals stand in a relationship to one another that is defective. These relationships are what leads to "silly, adolescent ideas of happiness" that Plato derides (466b).

way that eliminates all of their merely private interests, it leads to problems for some of Morrison's later claims about the happiness of the whole city. I will address these problems in the next section to show the second difference between our accounts. In sum, the holists are right to say to say that *the city is more than just the sum of its parts*, if by parts we are only thinking of individuals with private interests who happen to live in the polis. The term "citizen" implies all of the structurally mediated features the city places in and around these individuals—the complex interrelations, defined interactions, privileges, and restrictions that make the citizens who they are. The city cannot be just a collection of individuals without these mediated features. In the next section I continue examining the text with an eye to understanding what Socrates means when he says he aims to make the whole city happy.

4 THE HAPPINESS OF THE WHOLE CITY

Thus far I have shown that Plato thinks that being a citizen means that one's private interests and lives are mediated by the PS and the structure of the city, and that as a result of these structures one will share in a common affect that extends to all citizens. These aspects of being a citizen are the result of them being a part of the city, of being changed from individuals with merely private interests into citizens who play integral roles in making the polis what it is. If this view is right about what their being a citizen implies—namely, that these changes are fundamental to them being who they are once in the city—then we can at last return to the question of what Socrates means when he says he is aiming to make the whole city happy. To answer this question, this section will proceed as follows. First, I will explicate the answer to this question that the hylomorphic view entails. Second, I will return to the accounts of Kamtekar and Morrison by explaining and criticizing their interpretations of one of the central passages on which the holist and reductionist debate hinges to show the advantages of my view.

To begin, then, what does the hylomorphic view of the city imply about its happiness? Once more think of the family. In some sense, it is true that there are times where one member of a family might sacrifice their own interests for the sake of the whole. I might choose to cancel plans with a friend so that I could attend my niece's dance recital. But in another sense, in choosing the activity that promotes the happiness of the family of which I am a part, I am actually preserving my own happiness *as a part* of that family. If I never went the recitals, or the birthday parties, or the dinners—if I never did any of the family like things with them—I would no longer be a part of the family, and thus could not share in any of their happiness as my own. Even what might be thought of as exclusively "my own" happiness here—following through with the plans with my friend—is mediated by my membership in my family. My interest in

pursuing plans with my friend is informed by me being a part of my family. In it being informed in this way it is no longer *just* mine. In the city, all interests are mediated by its structure in a similar fashion. On the hylomorphic view, then, the happiness of the whole city means that its members must be happy, but that they must be happy *as a part of the city*. Their being a part of the city is what lets them be happy as citizens. In order to explain the happiness of the citizens, we would, quite intuitively, need to appeal to something more than just these individuals—namely, the city and its structures. And, conversely, to explain the happiness of the city we would need to reference its citizens. This picture of things is why Socrates derides "a silly, adolescent idea of happiness" that takes hold of a citizen and "incites him to use his power to take everything in the city for himself" (466b-c)—because if they get more than what is their own, they may be "happy" in a certain sense, but not happy qua citizen of a city.[35] If I am estranged from my brother, I may be happy, but I cannot be happy *as a brother* insofar as being a brother describes a certain functional relationship—a relationship defined *by my membership in the family*—to another that is not being fulfilled. Where the city is concerned, the picture is even more extreme than that of a family.

As I attempted to show in the previous section, in the case of the city, whose structures mediate its members' lives even more than those of a family's, there is no way for any citizen to be happy in any sense other than being happy as a citizen. The city has modified all of the private features of their lives so that they are all, in some sense, public interests. Still, while the family analogy helps elucidate the intuitive plausibility of my position, returning to the text will be

[35] The idea of happiness here is relational. When Socrates claims that "there can be no happiness, either in public or in private, in any other city" than Kallipolis (473d-e), what I take him to mean is that there is no other city in which any of its citizens will be happy *because* they are not acting as citizens should. Thus the "silly" notion of happiness; just as an estranged brother may be happy, he is not happy as a brother, and while one may be happy who takes more than what is their own, it will not be the happiness of a citizen since to do so would undermine the very thing—the city—that makes them what they are.

helpful. Given my previous analysis of T1 and T2, if the citizenry is happy, then the city is correctly structured according to the PS, and vice versa.[36] The citizenry must be happy in principle because what it means to be a citizen-part is dependent upon the city being a distinct whole. A single citizen can't really have the sort of happiness described in T1 because then they wouldn't be happy as a citizen, but happy as something else entirely.[37] But, supposing we can call the whole city happy, they can and will be happy *as* a citizen because they will have a common affect. The reason for this happiness is that they will share in the pleasures and pains of the entire citizenry as described in T2. If I am hurt, my fellow citizens hurt too, and if they prosper, so do I. Further, if the entire citizenry shares its pleasures and pains mutually, then the city is correctly structured according to the PS.

It is in this way that Kamtekar's family analogy again appears accurate: it can't be said that a family as a whole is happy if any of its members are absolutely miserable. What else could make a family happy *if not* the happiness of its members? Yet, the family must *be* a family, and the city must *be* a city, and for this to happen its members have to stand in certain defined relationships with one another—relationships that are defined precisely by the form or structure of the whole to whom its members belong.[38] So, there is no way that the two can come apart: if we say that the city is happy, we must mean that its citizens are happy, and if we say the citizens

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[36] See Peprah, "Reinvestigating the Political Position of the Citizen," 37-38. There, they argue that partnership among citizens is important to Plato and that "part of the reason is that the non-philosophic citizen is neither a Popperian cog, a slave to a master, nor a moral patient, but a partner, a significant constituent member of the society….I think it cannot be argued otherwise that all professions sanctioned in the expanded polis are to partner with each for the benefit of both the individual and the polis."

[37] I.e., happy as individuals who are not citizens living in a city.

[38] For an account that agrees with my conclusion about the identity of the happiness or good of the city and that of its citizens, see Jerome Neu, "Plato's Analogy of State and Individual: The Republic and the Organic Theory of the State." *Philosophy* (London, England) 46, no. 177 (1971): 238–54. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100018994. Neu agrees with this identity, however, for very different reasons than the ones given here. He disagrees with Popper (and, in a similar vein, Morrison) insofar as Popper thinks that the individual subordinate their own good to that of the state so that the whole might be preserved at the expense of the part. See Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 94-95; Neu "Plato's Analogy," 246.

are happy, then we must also say that the city is. With the implications of my view laid out, I'll explore and revisit one of the central passages on which the holist and reductionist debate hinges. This passage is dealt with extensively by both Kamtekar and Morrison, and I will lay out both of their interpretations of it in general terms while attempting to show the shortcomings of their positions.

As noted in the introduction, 419a-421c begins with Adeimantus' objection that the guardians don't seem to be very happy and continues with the following response by Socrates:

> [T3] Suppose, then, that someone came up to us while we were painting a statue and objected that, because we had painted the eyes (which are the most beautiful part) black rather than purple, we had not applied the most beautiful colors to the most beautiful parts of the statue. We'd think it reasonable to offer the following defense: 'You mustn't expect us to paint the eyes so beautifully that they no longer appear to be eyes at all, and the same with the other parts. Rather you must look to see whether by dealing with each part appropriately, we are making the whole statue beautiful.' Similarly, you mustn't force us to give our guardians the kind of happiness that would make them something other than guardians[39]. . . . [I]f the guardians of our laws and city are merely believed to be guardians but are not, you surely see that they'll destroy the city utterly, just as they alone have the opportunity to govern it well and make it happy. (420d–421a)

For Morrison, T3 shows that individuals' happiness may be sacrificed in order that the whole might remain intact. In this way, he holds a holistic reading of the passage. On this reading, the purple eye *would* be more beautiful—and the guardian happier—if it were purple, but this cannot happen lest the eye no longer resemble an eye, and the statue no longer function as a statue. In fact, he calls the beauty of the statue a "gestalt" property—one that is not reducible to the beauty of all the parts considered in isolation nor to their sum total beauty.[40] Happiness, via this analogy, is the same way: it is a "pattern of relationships among the parts," but a pattern that of necessity leaves open the possibility that the maximal happiness of any individual may be

[39] See T1, 420e-421a, for the section of text left out here.
[40] Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," 13-14.

sacrificed in order that the whole pattern be maintained.[41] More than that, however, Morrison thinks that the happiness of entire classes can be sacrificed indefinitely so that this pattern of relationships can be maintained. Kamtekar, on the other hand, takes T3 to show something quite different—that in fact each part of the statue *is* maximally beautiful, and each citizen *is* maximally happy, but they are beautiful and happy qua part and qua citizen.[42] Thus, she understands T3 as supporting the reductionist position that happiness of the city just means the happiness of all of its parts.

I largely agree with Kamtekar because her interpretation preserves both the importance of the institutions of the city and the happiness of the citizens without subordinating one to the other.[43] In fact, her description and emphasis on the importance of the citizens getting the sort of happiness appropriate to them remaining functioning parts in the city is exactly in line with my reading of the city. The parts of the statue are beautiful—as beautiful as they can be—but they achieve this beauty by not being considered in an abstract and individualized way. Rather, the parts of the statue are beautiful precisely by being considered as situated relative to the rest of the statue in a concrete way. Of course, Kamtekar would reject any explicit appeal to features of the city that are not reducible to its members. But, as was noted, Kamtekar adds a condition to her reductionist view of the happiness of the city: that the citizen's happiness be brought about by the city's institutions. Yet, if the city is nothing but the sum of its individual citizens, as Kamtekar holds—if it is not a whole greater than the sum of its parts—it seems that this

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[41] Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," Ibid.
[42] Kamtekar, "Social Justice and Happiness in the Republic," 207-208. For an argument against her interpretation, see Jonathan Culp, "Happy City, Happy Citizens? The Private Good and the Common Good in Plato's Republic," SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2125391, p. 9.
[43] It is important to not subordinate the one to the other without a further argument showing it ought to be subordinated thus. One of the reasons the holist position is unsatisfying on its own is that it does not seem immediately clear why we should think the happiness of the citizens is neglected just because the city is greater than them.

condition is rather empty. What, if not the citizens living together, could make up these institutions and thus bring about their own happiness? If these structures and institutions are constituted by anything other than the citizens, then Kamtekar must be appealing to some other feature of the city that does not reduce to the citizenry. If the structures are only constituted by the individuals that make up the city, then there is no reason to add the condition. In adding this condition Kamtekar is appealing to a view of the city that understands it as something more than the sum total of its parts.

Returning to Morrison, there are also positive reasons to think his interpretation of T3 and the view of happiness he derives from it fall short. First, what picture of the happiness of the whole city are we left with when we endorse Morrison's view? On his view, Plato allows for the permanent unhappiness of *an entire class* of citizens so that the city may remain happy.[44] Morrison is wrong on this count. One reason is immediate and textual: if Plato thought that any of the city's classes could be permanently unhappy in order that the city might remain happy, it is not unreasonable to assume that he would have had Socrates say it. We need not assume Socrates holds such an extreme view if there is no evidence to support it. All Socrates explicitly says is that he is not trying to make any one class outstandingly happy (420b-c)—but this is a far cry from condemning any one class to the possibility of permanent and perpetual unhappiness. In fact, it seems plausible to interpret Socrates' responses to Adeimantus—that they can't be concerned only with the happiness of one class in the city—as entailing that Socrates has some picture of the city in mind that extends happiness to more than just the guardians.[45] After all, if he were not concerned with the happiness of anyone except the guardians, Socrates would have

[44] See fn. 23.
[45] As noted in §2, Kamtekar also takes this position. See Kamtekar, "Social Justice and Happiness in the Republic," 206.

only attempted to argue that the guardians would be happy and left it at that. But he does not respond to Adeimantus this way, and instead he explicitly denies the idea that, if the guardians were happy, their work constructing the city would be complete.

Beyond this textual concern, a second problem has now become apparent. It is not clear why he stops at saying one class could be permanently unhappy. It is conceivable on his view that, should it turn out that in constructing the city as it ought to be constructed virtually *no* individuals within it would be happy, then Socrates would have to bite the bullet. I call this interpretation of the city's happiness *the extreme view*. He would have to conclude that the city as a whole is happy because it is properly structured, its parts in the right places relative to each other, but that almost every single part is itself unhappy. While this extreme view seems much too harsh a view to attribute to Socrates, this may be a bullet one is willing to bite. But, even if the initial implausibility of this position does not make us question this view of happiness, it does let us see why the hylomorphic view can avoid this problem and why Morrison's view cannot.

It doesn't seem that, *prima facie,* Morrison's ontological picture of the city is in tension with his view of its happiness as a sort of good relation or proper pattern of relationships among its parts. Just because something is a part of something else does not entail that it be good for that thing just in virtue of it being a part. So, conceivably, being a citizen doesn't mean that one would be happy because they were a citizen, even if by being a citizen they played a part in making the whole city happy. On this sort of reading, when Socrates replies to Adeimantus by saying that his concern in is making the whole city happy, his adding that "as far as possible" the entire citizenry will be happy seems to leave space open between the happiness of the city as a whole and the happiness of its citizens (420b).

This reading is in tension with what I claimed before: that to say the whole city is happy is just to say that its citizens are happy. Despite both Morrison and I thinking of the city in much the same way, he did not reach my conclusion about its happiness because he underemphasized the idea that, when viewing the city as he did, its citizens are changed into something they weren't before in such a way that their happiness becomes fundamentally mediated by public interest. I think that this misstep is what leads to his harsh view of what Socrates might allow for regarding the happiness of the citizens in Kallipolis. A view like Morrison's that leaves space between the public and the private good seems is vulnerable to eventually attributing to Plato the extreme view. Insofar as the extreme view seems implausible to attribute to him, positions like mine and the reductionists are preferable.

Returning to the broad picture, the hylomorphic reading of the city incorporates the most textually-grounded and most intuitive aspects of both the reductionist and holist accounts. There are two primary features of the debate that my view captures that are usually framed as incompatible with one another. It allows for the holists' interpretation of the metaphysics of the city to stand mostly unchanged while at the same time accounting for the reductionists' position concerning the happiness of its citizens. Thus, the happiness of the city is not merely a gestalt property as Morrison claimed, nor is it a property over and above its citizen's happiness as holists claim. Rather, the happiness of the city functionally equates to the happiness of its citizens, but only insofar as they are citizens and not mere individuals.

5 CONCLUSION

Adeimantus's challenge was that Socrates was not building the city in such a way that the guardians would be happy. Underlying this challenge, I argued, is the worry that living as one ought to in a just city would lead to a fair bit of deprivation and unhappiness. If this worry proved true, Socrates' entire argument in the *Republic* would risk failure. Further, while this worry was only explicitly directed at the ruling class by Adeimantus, it does not seem unreasonable to understand it as implicitly extending to the entire citizenry. After all, if many or most of the citizens living in an ideally just city were unhappy, then Socrates would not be giving his interlocutors good reasons for why one ought to live justly if one was not lucky enough to be placed in the ruling class. Holists do not make Socrates response to Adeimantus' worry plausible. When Socrates says that he is concerned with spreading happiness through the whole city, the holists conclude that so long as the ruling class and the city as a whole are happy, the happiness of most if its citizens is of little or only incidental concern to Plato. Reductionists, on the other hand, would make his response plausible, at least with reference to the happiness of Kallipolis' citizens. But they face an abundance of textual evidence that makes their position on the metaphysical nature of the city problematic. Accounts like Morrison's try to offer a third option: take the holistic reading of the city seriously while trying to account for the happiness of the citizens.[46]

I have argued that Plato views Kallipolis as a sort of hylomorphic unity that is greater than the sum of its parts. I also argued, however, that he thinks the happiness of this unity just means the happiness of its parts. On the hylomorphic view when Socrates replies to Adeimantus

[46] One thing that should be noted about Morrison's account is that he does believe the city's happiness will tend towards the happiness or wellbeing of its citizens. See Morrison, "The Happiness of the City and the Happiness of the Individual," 7. But, as I argued, I think the space he very intentionally leaves open between the happiness of the city and that of its citizens is implausible on a number of different grounds.

by saying that he is aiming to make the whole city happy, what he is asserting is that if the city is set up according to the principles he proposes, the citizenry will be happy (420b). This satisfies the worry that prompts Adeimantus' initial challenge. The citizens in Kallipolis will be happy, and they will be happy because of their adherence to the principles that make the city just. So, even the most austere conditions faced by the guardians are no objection to the idea that they, and the rest of the citizens, will be happy. But they can only be happy to the extent that they are participating in the structure of the city—a structure that Plato does not reduce to the sum total of its citizenry. Only by recognizing both the fact that Plato does not want the happiness of the city to be anything but the happiness of its citizens while at the same time acknowledging the incredible emphasis he places on the city's structure can we reconcile the debate between the holists and the reductionists. I believe that this hylomorphic reading of the city in the *Republic* can offer an alternative to endorsing either an entirely holistic or reductionistic account of the city, while preserving what is both plausible and textually grounded in both: the metaphysics of the city for the holists, and the happiness of the city for the reductionists. In doing so, we can take a step in the direction of understanding Socrates' response to Adeimantus's challenge as a satisfactory one.

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